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Paolo Scotton

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The dissertation of Paolo Scotton is approved

PROGRAM COORDINATOR: Prof. Giovanni Orsina, *Luiss Guido Carli University* and *IMT Institute for Advanced Studies Lucca*

SUPERVISOR: Prof. Antonio Masala, *IMT Institute for Advanced Studies Lucca*

The dissertation of Paolo Scotton has been reviewed by:

PROF. LORENZO INFANTINO, *Luiss Guido Carli, Rome*

PROF. EVE FOURMONT-GIUSTINIANI, *Aix Marseille University*

PROF. ANTONIO RIVERA, *Universidad Complutense, Madrid*

IMT School for Advanced Studies

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Vita

- 2016 March-June Visiting PhD Researcher at *Fundación Universitaria Ortega y Gasset-Gregorio Marañón*, Madrid (3 months), under the supervision of professor Javier Zamora Bonilla.
- 2015 26-27 May Organizer of the international conference: *Tracing the path of tolerance. History and critique of a political concept*. University of Padova, Department of Political and Juridical Sciences and Scuola Galileiana di Studi Superiori. Padova.
- 2014-2015 October- May Visiting PhD Student – Erasmus+ Traineeship, at *Universidad Complutense*, Madrid, Department of History of Philosophy (9 months) under the supervision of professor José Luis Villacañas.
- 2014 November **Diploma in Humanities at Scuola Galileiana** (*Galileian School of Higher Education*) (100/ 100 cum laude), University of Padova.
- 2014 21-25 July Oslo University Summer School in Social Science: *Deliberative Democracy: Theory and Practice*.

- 2014 7-11 July Universidad Complutense Summer School, Curso de Verano. Title: *Ortega y Gasset: Liberalismo, Socialismo, Nacionalismo, Autonomismo y Federalismo (En el centenario de la generación de 1914).*
- 2014 29-30 April Organizer of the conference: *Filosofia e responsabilità intellettuale. Per una rilettura dell'opera di José Ortega y Gasset (Meditaciones del Quijote 1914-2014).* University of Padova, Department of Languages and Literature and Scuola Galileiana di Studi Superiori. Padova.
- 2013 November-Present **PhD Student at IMT Institute for Advanced Studies Lucca, Italy. Full Scholarship.** PhD Programme in Political History.
- 2013 September-Present Responsible for the cultural activities of the *Alumni's Association of the Galileian School of Higher Education.*
- 2013 July **Master Degree in Philosophical Studies** at the *Università degli Studi di Padova.* (110/ 110 cum laude).
- 2012 February-May Erasmus Student, LLP Scholarship, at the *University of St Andrews.*

- 2011 November Visiting Student at the University of Chicago
- 2011 July **Bachelor Degree in Philosophy,**
Università degli Studi di Padova.
(110/ 110 cum laude).

Publications

a) Books

- Scotton, P. (2016), *Origine ed epilogo dell'intellettuale. Persona, educazione e politica in Ortega y Gasset*, Aracne, Roma.

b) Edited Books

- Scotton P. and Zucchi E. (2016), *Tracing the Path of Tolerance*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle.
- Scotton P. and Scattola M. (2014), *Prima e dopo il Leviatano*, Cleup, Padova.

c) Articles in Peer Reviewed Journals

- Scotton, P. (2016), *Una enseñanza paradigmática. El magisterio de Ortega en la obra de Lorenzo Luzuriaga*, in «Revista de Estudios Orteguianos», 32.
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- Scotton, P. (2013), *La formazione della pubblica opinione. Gramsci e Ortega a confronto*, in «Lo Sguardo, Rivista di Filosofia», 13, III: 267-283.

d) Book Chapters:

- Scotton, P. (2016) *Ectopic collectivities. Education and the problem of tolerance in the contemporary philosophical debate*, in P. Scotton and E. Zucchi, (eds.) *Tracing the path of tolerance*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle, pp. 148-163.
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e) Books' reviews

- Review: Ana Martínez Rus, *La persecución del libro. Hogueras, infiernos y buenas lecturas (1936-1951)*, Ediciones Trea, Gijón, 2014, in «Spagna Contemporanea», 47, 2015.
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Conferences

- 2-3 June 2016: III Jornadas sobre Democracia y Participación 'Ernesto Laclau, Universidad de Sevilla. Paper: *Nuevos espacios deliberativos: el papel de la Universidad en la participación democrática*
- 9-13 May 2016: LIII Congreso Filosofía Joven, Salamanca, Universidad de Salamanca. Paper: *El poder de la cultura, la cultura del poder. El compromiso intelectual y educativo de Ortega en relación a las mutaciones políticas y cambios culturales en el mundo universitario.*
- 10-12 March 2016: XXI Congreso Valenciá de Filosofía, Universitat Jaume I de Castelló de la Plana, Valencia, Paper: *Filosofar a la altura, y a la basura, de los tiempos. Ortega y Gasset y la cuestión universitaria .*
- 2-5 November 2015: International Conference organized by Universidad Complutense de Madrid, VII Congreso Internacional de Jóvenes Investigadores en Filosofía - *Los límites de lo humano.* Paper: *Humanismo, educación e identidad global. Análisis de la reforma pedagógica y política de Edgar Morin.*
- 8-9 June 2015: International Conference organised by Universidad de Minho (Braga, Portugal) “VI Meetings on Ethics and Political Philosophy”. Paper: *Two different grounds for democratic practices? The problem of legitimacy in a cosmopolitan world.*
- 18 May 2015: Seminar presentation, Universidad Complutense de Madrid within the “Seminario

Introducción a Ortega y Gasset”. Working paper entitled: *Teoría y práctica de la educación en Ortega y Gasset*.

- 24 April 2015: Seminar presentation, University of Padova within the “Seminari di Cinema e Letteratura” Working paper *Pater in fabula. Il padre tra cinema e letteratura negli anni Duemila in Italia e Spagna*.
- 15-18 April 2015: International Conference, University of Palermo: *Building Consensus. Rethoric between democracy and conflict*. Paper: *Consenso e forme di razionalità. La socievolezza della ragione vitale in Ortega y Gasse*.
- 11-12 December 2014: International Conference, University of Padova and S.G.S.S.: *Allegoria e teatro tra Cinque e Settecento: da principio compositivo a strumento esegetico*. Paper: *La tragedia del libero arbitrio di Francesco Negri*.
- 29-30 April 2014 International Conference, University of Padova and S.G.S.S. *Filosofia e responsabilità intellettuale. Per una rilettura dell'opera di José Ortega y Gasset (Meditaciones del Quijote 1914-2014)*. Paper: *Ortega e la dimensione politica dell'educazione*.
- 12-13 September 2013 Annual Conference by the Association *Filosofia d'Alta Quota*, Paper *El verdadero ser de la vida. Creatività e necessità dell'esistenza: relazioni tra la Bestimmung di Fichte e il destino di Ortega*.
- 9-11 May 2013 International Conference, University of Padova, University of Verona and S.G.S.S on Scipione Maffei. Paper: *La poetica della Merope nella Drammaturgia amburghese di Lessing*.

Abstract

This thesis analyses the concept and practice of philosophy within the Spanish academia during the first half of the XX century, in relation to different political and institutional regimes. In particular, the research focuses on the academic career of the most prominent intellectual of that time, José Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955), who dominated the Spanish philosophical scene for almost fifty years. Through the analysis and study of his intellectual biography and of his theory of education, this research sheds light on the instrumental political and social function that the academic teaching of humanities did play in the case of the Spanish contemporary history. The thesis investigates the mutual relations between the philosophy of Ortega and the one purported by the Spanish academia, thought as a social and political institution, considering the period comprised since his first appointment as a professor at the University of Madrid, in 1910, until his death in 1955. In particular, contrary to the majority of the studies on the author, the thesis pays particular attention to the second part of his life marked, since 1936, by a long exile, a brief return in Spain after the end of World War II, and the creation, in 1948, of the Institute of Humanities, an experimental educative project he developed during Franco's regime.

The kernel of this investigation is constituted by an often dismissed feature of Ortega's philosophy: i.e. the centrality of the theory and practice of education during the whole course of his life. Significantly, he always developed his theorisations within a particular context: the Spanish academia and, in particular, the University of Madrid. This institution constantly underwent relevant changes during the first half of the XX century due to paradigmatic mutations in the political regimes leading the country. In particular, the period analysed in this thesis includes the study of four different historical paradigms: the period which followed the end of the Restoration, the one ruled by the II Republic, the beginning of Franco's regime and, finally, its changes in relation to the post-war international context. This variability affected the way in which Ortega conceived the function of philosophers and intellectuals in society. His philosophy, which can be defined as a constant intellectual protrepsis, changed in relation to the political and academic circumstances under which he lived. In fact, he conceived the

role of the intellectual as strictly intertwined with a social and political mission, that went beyond the limited borders of the academia, even if it always arose from this institution.

Based on a study of Ortega's teachings in their historical context, conducted through a careful reconstruction of the academic debates that characterised the Spanish University – rendered possible by the analysis of a wide range of primary sources, both from personal and public archives, as well as of newspapers, cultural reviews, books and school texts – this research contributes to shed light on the functioning of the academic debate and its role within society, in particular in relation to the creation and diffusion of humanistic disciplines. The research offers an analysis of a very compelling case study that permits to comprehend how academic debates evolve under different political regimes, and the extent to which philosophy is always forged and, at the same time, contribute to modify the institution within which it develops. In conclusion, the work offers an innovative reading of the philosophy and intellectual activity of Ortega y Gasset, contributing to clarify one of the most controversial periods of his life which, until now, had not been analysed in-depth.

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACe	<i>Acción Católica Española</i>
ACNdP	<i>A asociación Católica Nacional de Propagandistas</i>
AGA	<i>Archivo General de la Administración (Alcalá de Henares)</i>
AHC	<i>Archivo Historico de las Cortes (Madrid)</i>
AHUC	<i>Archivo Histórico Universidad Complutense (Madrid)</i>
AMAE	<i>Archivo Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores (Madrid)</i>
AOG	<i>Archivo Ortega y Gasset (Madrid)</i>
ASR	<i>A asociación a Servicio de la República</i>
BNE	<i>Biblioteca Nacional Española (Madrid)</i>
BOCE	<i>Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Españolas</i>
BOE	<i>Boletín Oficial del Estado</i>
CEDA	<i>Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas</i>
CEU	<i>Centro de Estudios Universitarios</i>
CNE	<i>Consejo Nacional de Educación</i>
CNR	<i>Centro Nazionale delle Ricerche</i>
CSIC	<i>Consejo Superior de Investigación Científica</i>
FE	<i>Falange Española</i>
FETyJONS	<i>Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista</i>
FF	<i>Ford Foundation</i>

FN	<i>Frente Nacional</i>
FOG	<i>Fundación José Ortega y Gasset</i>
FP	<i>Frente Popular</i>
FUE	<i>Fundación Universitaria Escolar</i>
GM	<i>Gaceta de Madrid</i>
IEP	<i>Instituto de Estudios Políticos</i>
IH	<i>Instituto de Humanidades</i>
ILE	<i>Institución Libre de Enseñanza</i>
JAE	<i>Junta para la Ampliación de Estudios</i>
LEP	<i>Liga de Educación Política</i>
LOU	<i>Ley de Ordenación Universitaria</i>
MEN	<i>Ministero de Educación Nacional</i>
OC	<i>José Ortega y Gasset, Obras Completas</i>
PRR	<i>Partido Republicano Radical</i>
PSOE	<i>Partido Socialista Obrero Español</i>
RE	<i>Residencia de Estudiantes</i>
REN	<i>Revista de Educación Nacional</i>
REP	<i>Revista de Estudios Políticos</i>
RS	<i>Residencia de Señoritas</i>
SEU	<i>Sindicato Estudiantil Español</i>
UC	<i>Universidad Central de Madrid</i>
UFEH	<i>Unión Federal de Estudiantes Hispanos</i>

UN *United Nations*

UNESCO *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization*

INTRODUCTION

1. Topic and research questions

José Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955) is considered as one of the most prominent intellectuals in the Spanish speaking context. For almost a century he oriented the Spanish academic debate determining its scientific and political agenda, its philosophical and literary tastes, both during and after his life. In spite of being unanimously shared this affirmation has not been translated so far in a comprehensive study of his works that – starting from an analysis of his philosophy and in particular of his theory of education – would define the form that his academic teaching acquired in relation both to his theoretical insights and to the political and social circumstances under which he lived. Put it differently, despite the increasing number of works that during the last two decades have demonstrated the pivotal role played by his theory of education in relation to his overall philosophical account, the question of the mutual relationships between his theorisations and the surrounding university context has been naïvely studied so far.

Indeed, on every single aspect of human knowledge – Ortega wrote – so much has been written that the entire life of a man would not be sufficient to read all about it, let alone the possibility of acquiring a decent grasp and forming an autonomous idea on it. Ironically enough, this is not the case as far as his pedagogical thought, and above all his concrete professorship, are concerned. There are in particular two reasons that contribute to render this topic an intriguing case study which has to be scrupulously analysed not only since it is insufficiently considered by Ortega's scholars, but also insofar as it can produce a better knowledge of the processes of cultural production on a general point of view. Both of them reveal, through Ortega's case, the existence of a fascinating dynamics that affects all intellectual experiences but

whose importance, at least within the branch of philosophical studies, is usually underestimated.

The first is related to the mutual influence between the philosophy purported by an author and the factual circumstances, the social and political *milieu* within which he develops his theoretical activity. This first consideration not only means that philosophical ideas cannot be thought as abstract entities which spring up as staggering intuitions independently from the concrete circumstances under which they develop. Indeed, it also implies a further consequence, i.e. the impossibility of conceiving the academic activity as a neutral and objective practice which is carried out in a sort of “Hyperuranion”, with neither an interest in influencing the concrete policies and politics of a society nor a tendency to be oriented by a more or less explicit hegemonic culture which often imposed itself on the very academic discourse. At the same time, this implies that the philosophical activity can never be conceived as an activity carried on by a single individual, but rather always by a group which can be identified and studied through the analysis of its linguistic utterances: i.e. through the creation and establishment over time of different communities of discourse.

The second aspect that Ortega’s case contribute to elucidate directly springs from this consideration, and can be encapsulated in a short sentence: all academics possess a *social status* and exercise a *political power*. It is not a matter of being a leading or a third-rate intellectual, this is indeed a condition which can belong both to professional as well as to amateur thinkers. The question is subtler and is related to the fact that the academic practice always has a twofold nature: on the one hand it is a vocational and open-minded activity, on the other it consists in a social obligation and in the consequent transmission of an imposed set of knowledge from a generation to another.

In the case of the teaching of humanities, which directly deals with social and political problems, this is blatantly evident. The history of Spanish Academia during the XX century represents a fascinating instance of this tendency of politicising education and, in particular, the University. For this reason, and given the fact that José Ortega y Gasset is a philosopher whose life underwent radical changes both in relation to the social status he possessed and the political power he exercised, his case constitutes a perfect archetype for studying this complex dynamics.

With the term “politicisation” this thesis does not refer merely to the everyday political struggle concerning single and limited decisions, inside and outside the academia. On the contrary, the term refers to the political and ideological debates that constitute the background orienting and guiding the concrete policies that take place inside and outside the University. In the Spanish case the University represented the pillar of a society that remained substantially conditioned by a vertical mode of knowledge construction and transmission. Thus, by understating the role played by University within this production of hegemonic power it will be possible to comprehend a large and important part of the Spanish cultural and political history which so far still remains largely unexplored.

The basic conviction enlivening this thesis is that only by considering Ortega’s professorship as both a vocation and a deliberate choice it would be possible to comprehend to what extent his intellectual activity represented a constitutive trait both of his personal existence and of that of his nation. He had been a teacher and a leading intellectual for more than forty years, since he established himself as a professor of Metaphysics at the *Universidad Central* of Madrid in 1910 until his death in 1955. During this very long period his philosophy changed in relation to the constitutive discontinuity characterising the Spanish political circumstances and – both as a consequence and as an effect – the university scenario. In other words, during this period the shifting sands of culture determined very radical changes both at the institutional, political and social level. All these mutations influenced and were concurrently influenced by Ortega, determining slight and big shifts both in the matter and form of his teaching and intellectual practices. The very term “intellectual” acquired different meanings over time. In this changing context, explaining the persistence of Ortega’s legacy in the Spanish academia evidently constitutes an intriguing research question, an open problem which has not been sufficiently considered by his scholars.

2. *Scope and aims*

The thesis offers an innovative contribution to the study of the works and teachings of Ortega y Gasset in respect to two basic aspects: a chronological and a methodological one. In relation to the first, in

contrast to the majority of the studies conducted on the author, the thesis does focus in particular on the last years of Ortega's life: from the the beginning of the civil war – followed by his return to Spain after the exile in Europe and South America – until his death. The common dismissal of this period of Ortega's life is due both to the immediate rejection of his political neutrality by his disciples and by some opposed biased trends within the Spanish historiography concerning the period of Franco's regime. At the same time, it will be impossible to comprehend the evolution of his thought without taking into consideration its origins. For this reason, the thesis does also substantially deal with the initial period of his intellectual activity.

This innovative chronological perspective aims to attract the attention of a far more general public than the one represented by the scholars of Ortega for at least two important reasons. Firstly, because the study of the ways in which Ortega's educative theory and practice was elaborated and developed during Franco's regime can contribute to enrich the overall comprehension of the troublesome relations among political institutions and intellectuals during a very controversial period for the history of Spain. A period responsible for the evolution – or rather the regression – of the philosophical practice in the country for a very long period of time. Secondly, because Ortega's pedagogical concerns and the ways in which they were developed, specifically during the dictatorship, gave birth to a comprehensive theory of education which interestingly overlapped, and at the same time countered, most of the concurrent debates about the role played by Humanities in enhancing the effective involvement of citizens in social democratic practices.

Thus, the research aims at analyzing and studying in its historical context the pedagogical and political projects developed by the Spanish philosopher in Madrid during the whole course of his life and, in particular, during the most troublesome period of his intellectual experience. To this second aspect they will be devoted three of the four main sections which compose the entire thesis, spanning from the beginning of his exile until the realisation of the project he developed in Madrid between 1948 and 1950, i.e. the *Institute of Humanities*. By considering the theories and practices of education put forward by the philosopher during this period the research intends to comprehend if and to what extent his theorizations have contributed to build and orientate the concrete Spanish political debate for almost fifty years.

Therefore, by taking into account both the cultural projects realized by Ortega and the several books he published on the role of intellectuals in society, it could be possible to question the way in which political theories and intellectual experiences develop and change in relation to social and political transformations.

These general scope and aims of the present research are also complemented by a more specific outlook in relation, in particular, to the second period of Ortega's life. In fact, thanks to a study in context of Ortega's teaching activity and via an analysis of his political theorisations during this epoch, the research intends to shed light on four significant aspects usually dismissed by his scholars. The first is a clarification of the extent to which Ortega's last educational projects could or could not be considered as in constant confrontation with the academic and therefore political questions which marked the first phase of Franco's dictatorship, from 1939 to 1951 (about, for instance, legitimacy, sociability, European integration, etc.).

Connected to this first aspect is the second innovative aim of the research in relation to the last period of Ortega's activity. In fact, through the analysis of the books he published during these years and in which he reflected on the role of education and the function of intellectual in politics, it will be possible to put into question the historical myth according to which the period among 1936 and 1948 would have constituted a period of silence and political isolation for the Spanish philosopher. In fact, after having reached a relevant influential position within the Spanish political scenario during the Second Republic (1931-1936), not only as a philosopher but also as a deputy in the parliament, Ortega y Gasset abandoned his country,. The first years of Franco's dictatorship were marked in particular by a vivid interest within the new political and intellectual elites for replacing the old liberal culture with new values and ideologies. This process called for a direct involvement in political issues of all the higher educational institutions and, consequently, of the university. In such a context, the academia became the key element for constructing a new ideology among restricted intellectual minorities – contributing to shape the political discourse of the regime – and for propagating these emerging values among the rest of the population. Due both to the significant prestige reached by Ortega during his long career and to the systematic theory of education and cultural transmission he had developed during his intellectual activity, he constituted a reference point within this new

political scenario. The research would thus contribute to comprehend to what extent his influence was ostracized, instrumentally utilised or authentically appreciated by the regime and, concurrently, by some niche minorities within it by those political groups which are usually deemed to have represented the little shelters where the liberal Spanish culture latently survived.

In relation to this it is possible to identify a third aspect of innovativeness as far as the investigation on the last Ortega is concerned. In fact, this research aims at shedding light on the intriguing question of the critical presence and influence of Ortega y Gasset during the first years of the Francoist regime via a twofold investigation: a) the study of the cultural discourse built by minority sectors of the Falangist movement which identified in the philosopher a reference point for their purposes and aims; and b) the analysis of the activities brought about by Ortega in Spain and abroad during this period. On this aspect, a special attention will be devoted to the very scarcely studied case of the *Institute of Humanities*, a cultural project he built up in Madrid with the help of some of his disciples between 1948 and 1950. This investigation will also permit to take into account the following ramifications of his ambitious educational project outside the Spanish borders. In this way it will be possible to understand if and to what extent the *Institute* constituted an attempt of introducing an experiment of liberty and freedom of expression within an intellectually closed and censorious dictatorship.

Lastly, this research does also have a fourth and more ambitious purpose which permits to pose a substantive research question which goes beyond the limits of the Spanish case. Indeed, through the case of the pedagogical commitment of Ortega y Gasset, a philosopher who was unceasingly and actively engaged in intellectual and political projects throughout substantially different political regimes, this research aims at understanding and questioning the role of higher education and cultural institutions in the construction, maintenance or critique of political leadership and social consensus. In fact, these cultural institutions possess a strong pedagogical character and substantially contribute to the edification of those political theories which give form to the political sphere and shape the general public debate. Consequently, this research intends to put into question the relations among the development of political theory and philosophical discourses with the historical and political contexts in which and for

which they were conceived and propagated. This aspect of the thesis is directly linked with the extremely vivid debate that in the last decade has characterised the Spanish self-perception of the social role of historians and intellectuals. In fact, as the debate between Santos Juliá and Sebaastian Faber has revealed [Santos Juliá, 2009; Faber, 2007, 2012, 2014] the responsibility and irresponsibility of the intellectual in relation to the social and political circumstances under which he lived constitutes an unsolved question in relation to the construction of the Spanish historical memory and in relation to the role we are commonly used to attribute to the intellectuals and the academicians as active players within the political context [Cox, 2015].

3. *Methodology*

This research pertains to the domain of intellectual history. It constitutes a study in context of the intellectual debates which developed among cultural élites in relation to the thought of Ortega y Gasset. Rather than an intellectual biography the research constitutes an attempt to develop a meta-analysis of Ortega's thought and pedagogical activity. It aims at doing so by studying a single aspect of his vast philosophical theory and practice that exhibits the most evident connection within the political sphere: the socialization and politicization of people through education. An aim which culminated in the significant case of the *Institute of Humanities*.

Therefore, from a methodological point of view, the research joins two qualitative methodologies: a) an archival research and study of historical sources, in order to reconstruct the political context surrounding this question b) a philosophical critique of Ortega y Gasset's theory of education both in relation to this historical context and concerning its relevance as a general political theory.

In fact, by analysing the intellectual activity of Ortega y Gasset not only from a theoretical point of view but also from the point of view of intellectual history and sociology of philosophy¹ it would be possible to

¹ This term has been coined by Collins [1998] in his compelling book on the sociological evolution of philosophy. In particular, he used this expression for indicating the construction, within the philosophical practice, of social groups struggling for the cultural hegemony. He coined the term to indicate the way in

comprehend to what extent his theoretical perspective cannot be separated from the concrete context in which it developed.

Interestingly enough, some of the guiding principles of the method adopted in this research are obtained by following some suggestions regarding the technique of the historic practice provided by the very Ortega and which have proven to be extremely akin to what has been later labelled with the term “intellectual history”². One of the fundamental convictions that informs this discipline is that all philosophical and political ideas do possess a concrete life in relation to the social world in which they developed, an intellectual life in mutual relation with the social, intellectual and political circumstance [Rorty, Schneewind, Skinner, 1984]. Put it different, the intellectual history could be defined as the historical study of the past thoughts [Skinner 2001]. This means that to comprehend the philosophy of a given author it has always to be taken into account the context in which he developed it, insofar as all philosophical ideas are the expression of a system of thought and living which informs a given historical epoch. Whereas we are accustomed to attribute the ontological status of “a different historical epoch” to very far periods of time in relation to our

which the intellectual discourse, and in particular the philosophical one, develops according to determined social patterns. The inescapable “situatedness” of all philosophical practices that Collins has contributed to disclose, and its relation to the evolution of philosophy through generational processes of transmission, constitute the main problem faced by this thesis in reference to the Spanish academia during the XX century. At the same time, starting from this general framework, this thesis dissociates from Collins’ book insofar as it aims to put the situatedness of Ortega’s philosophy in relation to the evolution of his thought and in that of the intellectual context in which it was received.

² The field of intellectual history, which developed at least since 1960s and, later, with the so-called linguistic turn, includes a very vast number of scholars who have developed their theories in different directions and in relation to different branch of humanities: in relation to the history of ideas, cultural history, history of concept, discourse theory, social history, political theory, sociology.... In spite of the great variety of approaches, often antithetical among one another, it still seems possible to find a lowest common denominator of all these different theories, in particular in the study in their peculiar contexts of intellectual theories and ideas. Ideas which are thought as fundamental elements contributing to give an explanatory sense the social and political practices of a given epoch and society, being at the same time influenced by them [Whatmore, 2015; Collini, 2016].

present, it is possible to argue that all historical interpretations need to start by considering the object of their investigations as a constitutive *alter* in relation to the present. This is what this thesis intends to do in the case of Ortega y Gasset, studying how his theory of education and his theory of the intellectual influence in society depended on the concrete circumstances in which he lived and also on a given historical and social epoch – that is the Spanish and European society of the first half of the XX century – which has to be thought as radically different to our own, even if it can be said to constitute a part of our own historical background.

The methodological suggestions which can be deduced from the theory of history developed by Ortega y Gasset precisely relate to the constitutive difference which characterises the human life in different epoch. In particular, some interesting insights on how to write history can be found in the *Prólogo a Historia de la Filosofía de Émile Bréhier*, written by Ortega in 1942. In this text he affirms the necessity of always considering the ideas purported by a philosopher together with the concrete material situations in which he lived, given the fact that the proper meaning of any philosophical idea is intrinsically linked to the moment in which and for which it has been thought³.

This implies that all philosophical ideas – and this is evidently the case of the educative theory proposed by Ortega y Gasset – always spring up from a concrete situation, a set of material and historical circumstances and, at the same time, play a performative role in that very context. Very often the context which constitutes the basis of the meditations of a philosopher is only implicitly present in his works, being for him an obvious and therefore imperceptible precondition. For this reason, the obligation of the historian is that of bringing it to light

³ As Ortega put it: «La vida es siempre concreta y lo es la circunstancia. De aquí que solo si hemos reconstruido previamente la concreta situación y logramos averiguar el papel que en función de ella representa, entenderemos de verdad la idea» [OC, VI: 148]. All Ortega's texts, unless stated otherwise, will be quoted in their original language without providing a translation. The reference will always be, if not stated differently, to the last complete edition of his works (*Obras Completas*) published by Taurus and the *Fundación Ortega y Gasset* between 2004 and 2010. The Roman numerals will indicate the volume, the Arabic ones the number of the pages within that volume. It has to be noted that the first six volumes gather the works that Ortega published during his life, whereas the last four volumes – VII to X – those which have been published posthumously.

again. To do this in the case of Ortega it is necessary to always take into account at the same time his philosophy and the institutional and social context in which, or in relation to which, he developed his theories, that is to say, the academic world, considered both at a local and a global level.

The purpose of this method is that of reconstructing the unceasing dialogue between the philosophical theory and practice of Ortega and the Spanish society, in different periods of his life. In fact, the philosophical activity, as Ortega put it, cannot be separated from its social and political dimension, both insofar as it is practiced within an institutional framework and because all intellectual activity always aims to play a vital role in the building of the public opinion⁴. As a consequence, in the course of this research a particular emphasis will be put on the institutional and political turning points of the Spanish society that determined a different relation of the philosopher with his circumstances. In this way it will be possible to reconstruct the “undulating history of the prestige and disrepute of the philosopher” [OC, VI: 153] in the paradigmatic case of Ortega y Gasset, which can be said to epitomise the Spanish intellectual life of the XX century and, to a certain extent, the one of the European society.

This methodological approach, which takes into consideration at the same time the theoretical contributions of the philosopher, the time in which he lived and the concrete educative practices he developed over time – defining them as linguistic acts in a broad sense – appears to be extremely useful in particular in the case of Ortega y Gasset to counter a common tendency within the literature concerning the last period of his life: that is the division between partisans and detractors of his behaviour in relation to the Franco’s regime. A clear instance of this opposed tendency is offered by the debate among the scholars of the philosopher which followed the publication of Gregorio Morán’s book *El maestro en el exilio* [1998]. In this text the author identified in the period of Ortega’s exile a lack of intellectual responsibility during the civil war and, moreover, in relation to the oppressive Spanish political regime with which, Morán implicitly argues, Ortega would have to a certain extent directly collaborated. A complete different interpretation on this period of Ortega’s life was offered for instance by the book of

⁴ «La filosofía es también función de la vida colectiva, es un hecho social, una institución. Y todo esto pertenece también a la realidad “filosofía”» [OC, VI: 151].

José Luis Abellán. *Ortega y los orígenes de la democracia*. In his book Abellán affirms that during all his exile and, in particular, thanks to his decision to return to Madrid to contribute to the amelioration of the intellectual scenario, Ortega would have helped setting the ground for the future democratic development of Spain, «creyendo que su prestigio intelectual puede ayudar a esa caída del franquismo con su sola presencia, aunque esta de momento sea discreta» [Abellán, 2000: 147].

Both of these perspectives commit the same mistake, i.e. they take for granted the fact that in the new political scenario the only possible way to exercise an intellectual role would have been that of being in favour or in contrast not of an idea, but rather of a political party. On the contrary, by considering the role that Ortega attributed to the philosophical activity as a meta-political meditation, it would be possible to trace a completely different history of his intellectual presence during the last period of his life.

In fact, since its instauration, the Franco's regime completely changed the way in which the intellectual, the academia and all the cultural world were conceived. In particular in relation to the role assigned to the humanities in the definition of its ideology. These, in fact, were conceived as having a fundamental legitimating function for the purposes of the political regime. The University was conceived as a part of the political sphere. However, this relation among the control of the cultural power and the exercise of the political one cannot be limited exclusively to periods of dictatorial or oppressive culture. As a matter of fact, the academia, as all the other cultural institutions, always represents a crucial social factor in determining the creation and transmission of a particular political view. This, in general terms, could be defined as the hegemonic tendency of cultural institutions in relation to different political contexts. The existence of a constant struggle for the conquest of the hegemony appears as a basic structure of the academic discourse in particular in all those cases in which opposite visions collide in relation to a same relevant question. Accordingly, to comprehend the relevance of Ortega y Gasset both before, during and after the instauration of Franco's dictatorship it would be necessary to focus on the positions he assumed in relation to the most debated questions within the intellectual world during different periods of his life and, concurrently, to the consequent reactions of the academic world to the contributions of the philosopher. By studying this peculiar dynamic which characterises the intellectual

production it would be possible to offer a new and compelling perspective on a still opened and debated question.

For reaching this goal, and specifically in relation to its historical character, the research is carried about mainly through the textual analysis of primary sources and archival documents, taking into account the different actors involved in the academic debates. Moreover, concerning the intellectual discourses developed within the regime, this historical reconstruction has been conducted in particular through a) the study of the debates both on the formal and material reform of University; b) the analysis of the legislation on University and cultural institutes to which these debates finally gave birth; c) the study of primary sources (books and discourses) of very important and significant political figures of that period concerning the role and scope of higher education. Moreover, the research has also compared the theory of education developed by Ortega with the one concretely purported and realized through the legislative process carried about by the regime – considering it in relation with the ideological debates over the role of culture and university which extensively marked the intellectual and political debate among élites during the first phase the Francoist regime. In addition, as far as Ortega y Gasset is concerned, the aims and concrete realizations of his theory of education has been analyzed and discussed through the help of the archival materials gathered in his personal *Archive* and which collect a large number both of administrative documents and of personal letters which significantly contribute to identify and trace the links that rendered possible the realization of his numerous educational projects during the decade of the forties.

4. Sources

The interrelations among the theorisations of Ortega y Gasset and the concrete social circumstances under which he lived are studied through different sources in relation to the different epochs. One of the most important sources which has been employed for this purpose are the books, writings and conferences that Ortega gave on the theme of the social function of the intellectuals and the role of university and education within society – both before Franco's regime and during its construction and maintenance. These have been put in relation to some of the most representative and outstanding voices' of different groups

of interest and lobbying within different social and political regimes concerning these same topics. For doing this, apart from the historical stats and archival sources, a useful tool for the definition of the academic climate in different historical and political regimes is offered by the different Spanish scientific reviews published in the domain of humanities. In relation to the first part of Ortega's presence within the Spanish scenario, for instance, the *Revista de Educación*, *Revista de Occidente*, the *Boletín de la ILE* and other reviews have been extensively used for comprehending the social context and the reception of his theory. A very useful source for reconstructing the period of the so-called *Edad de Plata* of the Spanish academia is offered by the online *Archivo de la Edad de Plata* (www.edaddeplata.org) and the *Archivo de la JAE* (arhivojae.edaddeplata.org). In addition, in relation to the institutional context, they have also been taken into account the laws published in the *BOE*, the *Diario de Sesiones del Congreso* and the activity of the *Cortes*, to which Ortega participated for a short period of time at the beginning of the thirties.

Then, in relation to the second part of Ortega's life, a particular attention has been devoted to the structure and the ideology purported by the reformed University during the thirties and the forties. The University, as already pointed out, cannot be conceived merely as a neutral entity but also as a political and social institution. In order to do so, along with the legislative documents about the reform of the University, they have been analyzed also the courses, the subjects, the topics and the way in which they were discussed in particular within the *Universidad Central de Madrid*, the one in which Ortega taught and in which he founded the so-called *Escuela de Madrid*. In addition, to reconstruct the institutional radical changes that occurred within society and the university system, a great importance has been given to the inaugural discourses of the academic years pronounced in different universities of the country in the first decade of the regime, in particular from 1939 to 1943. Moreover, a significant variety of journals belonging to the different souls of the regime and directly concerned with the problem of developing and spreading a cultural ideological hegemony during the period 1940-1951 have been analyzed for reconstructing the different social groups which struggled for the cultural hegemony. In particular, the reviews considered are *Arbor*, *Revista de Filosofía*, *Escorial*, *Insula*, *Revista Nacional de Educación*, *Revista de Estudios Políticos* and *Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos*.

The main archives consulted for the purposes of the research are: *Archivo Fundación José Ortega y Gasset*, Madrid; *Archivo General de la Administración*, Alcalá de Henares; *Archivo Histórico de las Cortes*, Madrid; *Archivo Histórico de la Universidad Complutense*, Madrid; *Hemeroteca Histórica*, Madrid; *Archivo Lorenzo Luzuriaga*, Madrid; and the documents collected at the *Fondo Antiguo* of the *Biblioteca Nacional*, Madrid, related to primary sources published during the period, in particular for the period comprised between 1938 and 1956.

5. *Status quaestionis*

The research brings together some very important and ample scientific literatures by considering at the same time a) the studies on the reforms of university and higher education which took place during the first half of the XX century in Spain, b) the literature on the intellectual community of discourse which rendered them possible, in particular during the first foundational phase of Franco's regime and c) the vast literature concerning the philosophical, educational and political activities realised by José Ortega y Gasset.

Regarding the first aspect of this research, there has been in the last decade a growing interest in the reforms of higher education both before and during the dictatorship of Francisco Franco. In particular, it is very important to point out the very useful research activity brought about within the Programme "History of Universities" of the Figuerola Institute of Social Science History – a part of the Carlos III University of Madrid – devoted to improve the overall knowledge on the Spanish high-learning and academic institutions. Within this program several books on the topic have been published in the last fifteen years, both collecting archival documents and proposing general interpretations on the institutional changes within the domain of higher education. Among them indispensable for the purposes of this research are: Carolina Rodríguez López [2002]; Faustino Oncina Coves [2008]; Germán Perales Birlanga [2009]; Pablo Campos Calvo-Sotelo [2011]; Manuel Cachón Cadenas [2012]; González Calleja and Álvaro Ribagorda [2013]; Otero Carvajal [2014]. Other interesting studies have been conducted in other Spanish institutions [Lopez Bausela 2011; Esteban Recio 2014]. These studies all agree on the assumption that Franco's regime marked a radical paradigmatic change within Spanish

society and educative system. Moreover, they all agree on the fact that this change was conducted both within and through the help of the academic institutions.

As a consequence, in the last years it has been stressed by several scholars the importance of the ideological strategy purported by the regime through the help of academic institutions. The leading role which in this context the humanities and the social sciences were deemed to play has been often underlined. Very useful texts have been written, for instance, by Mainer Baqué [2009], in relation to the figure of the pedagogue; Basco Gil and Fernando Mancebo [2010], in relation to the teaching of history; Peiró Martín [2013] on the role of the historian; Moreno Pestaña [2013] in relation to the study and practice of philosophy during the first phase of the dictatorship. The book of Moreno Pestaña is particularly relevant for the purposes of this research because, for the very first time within the Orteguian studies, it presents a study in context of his philosophy in relation to the political changes of that historical period (until the '60s). In particular, he devotes his study to the development of one important aspect of Ortega y Gasset philosophy, i.e. his theory of generation. This recent attempt constitutes an interesting path which this research tries to follow, even if partially distancing from it.

A very useful tool for reconstructing the questions at stake and defining the borders of the political and cultural élites which struggled among one another for the control of the academic power is constituted by the journals and reviews devoted to humanities and social sciences published during that period. Indeed, these journals have been proved to have played a crucial role in the spreading of new political and cultural ideologies during the first phase of the regime. About this topic, some books have been recently published, in particular in relation to the history and development of those journals and groups of interest which directly pertain to this research. Among them: Mora García [2006]; Prades Plaza [2007]; Díaz Hernández [2008]; Fernand [2008]; Sesma Landris [2009, 2014]; Fernández Martínez [2010]; Eduardo Iáñez [2011].

As far as the literature on José Ortega y Gasset is concerned, his intellectual biography has already been written at least, in particular, by two eminent scholars: Zamora Bonilla [2002] and Jordi Gracia [2014]; and the thought and life of the Spanish philosopher have already been analytically studied from different perspectives. For the purposes of the

research, which connect his philosophy with his political and pedagogical activities and theorisations, significant are the works of Aguilar [1998]; Cacho Viu [2000]; Graham [2001]; Lavedan [2005]; de Haro Honrubia [2008]; Llano Alonso [2010]; Cerezo Galán [2011]; Atencia [2015] and, in relation to the first part of Ortega's life, Cabrero Blasco [2016].

For the purposes of this research the most important aspects to be considered are those related to the pedagogical scope of his writings and activities. As pointed out by Angé Casado [2001], the problem of education has attracted to a very little degree the scholars' attention. Considering in particular the last years of Ortega's intellectual engagement it has to be noticed that the first comprehensive insight into the activity of the *Institute* is constituted by the biographical memory of the philosopher Julian Marías [1983], co-founder of the institute, who dedicated a chapter of his famous *Ortega. Las trayectorias* to this intellectual experience. This text represents an important source in order to understand the guidelines of the project from a direct and engaged witness of the facts. However, the reconstruction done in this book is very partisan and constitutes more a hagiography than a rigorous analysis of the relevance of this experiment. Moreover, the extent of the whole project was not linked to the vaster pedagogical theorisation of Ortega y Gasset.

On the contrary, concerning the scientific literature, the relevance which the theory of education played in the entire philosophy and political activity of Ortega y Gasset during whole his life has been pointed out for the first time by Tabernero del Río [1993]; and, successively, some articles and books followed this study by analyzing some peculiar aspects of Ortega's theory of education, largely focusing on the first part of his life. Among them, in particular, Vicente and González [2002]; Rovira Reich [2002]; Almeida Amoedo [2002]; Cambi et al. [2007]; Castello Melia [2009]; Monfort Prades [2011]; García Nuño [2014]. Due to this partial and limited view, the vast majority of the studies on the theory of education of Ortega y Gasset has left apart the last period of his life, stressing quite exclusively the relevance of his teaching for the following generation of Spanish intellectuals and in particular in relation to the University of Madrid, but without entering into the details of Ortega's personal experience. Among them: Castillo Castillo [2001]; Reñón [2003]; Padilla [2007]; San Martín and Moratalla [2010].

Only quite recently, following the controversy after the publication of the book of Moran [1998], some scholars have focused specifically on the last period of Ortega y Gasset's life, but very often with an apologetic aim and without taking into consideration his theory of education. Among them: Neira [2000]; Bolado [2005, 2009, 2011]; Monfort Prades [2011]. An exception to this apologetic tendency is represented by Giustiniani [2008] who in her doctoral research and in succeeding works [Giustiniani, 2009, 2014] studied the philosophy of Ortega in relation to the historical context during the first phase of Franco's regime. However, she considered exclusively the period from 1936 to 1946, leaving apart all the projects carried out by Ortega after his return in Spain and, consequently, not taking into account the *Institute of Humanities*. Recently, Campomar [2016] has contributed to shed new light on the period of Ortega's Argentinean exile, thanks to a rigorous study in context of the intellectual relationships he maintained in the course of his stay in that country. However, the specific point of view adopted by the author does not permit to answer to the questions posed by the current research.

Given this *status quaestionis*, this research aims to constitute an original contribution within the scope both of the literature on Ortega and of that concerning the cultural and academic structure and functioning of the Spanish educative system.

6. Structure

The thesis is divided in four main sections, each of which is composed of two or three chapters, following the chronological criterion. The other criterion used for structuring the whole thesis is determined by the methodology adopted which imposes to constantly consider within each section both the political and the philosophical sides. In other words, of always bringing together the thought of Ortega y Gasset with its historical context and concrete realizations. For this reason, each section takes into consideration Ortega y Gasset's political and pedagogical thought and activities in mutual relation with the changing Spanish political circumstances. The four sections are:

1) *Birth and apogee of a spiritual guide.*

This first section offers an introduction on the intellectual activity and pedagogical theory of José Ortega y Gasset by mainly analyzing his writings in the period of his intellectual formation and apogee, from 1908 to 1935. In particular, this section studies the political relevance and the social implication of his pedagogical and political theory. The purpose of this section is that of trying to define to what extent Ortega's reflection on the role of higher education in building a conscious citizenship constituted a constant preoccupation of his teaching and publicist activities, and to understand how it was related to the concrete social and cultural circumstances in which he lived. The aim of this part is that of comprehending what were the basic political strands which marked the evolution of Ortega's thinking in the first years of his life, and to link them with the concrete educative and political initiatives he realised in the course of this period. Moreover, it also aims to comprehend to what extent the presence of Ortega within the Spanish academia, and in particular the University of Madrid, can be labelled as a significant one and for what reasons, and what were the main characteristics of his teaching. In addition, this first part of the thesis does take into account also the institutional and political changes which occurred during this period, characterised by the instauration of different political and cultural regimes. In this context, they will be analysed the relations that the Madrilenian philosopher maintained with these different regimes, and the way in which the variations in the circumstances produced relevant changes in the ways in which he perceived his philosophical role within society. This investigation will permit to consider the relation between political and academic life both regarding the institution to which Ortega belonged and in relation to the way in which he conceived his intellectual role in a society that, also through the help of the educative system, was experiencing a process of slow modernisation characterised by periodic accelerations and decelerations.

This section will be developed by taking into consideration three important hermeneutical tools which will be also used in the following sections of the thesis: 1) the importance of the diachronic development of Ortega's theory of education in relation to the historical facts and its relevance within Spanish society; 2) the relation of his meditations with his political activities; 3) the possibility of proposing and systematizing a theory of intellectual influence and cultural transmission within society starting from the pedagogy developed by Ortega during this

period. This last aspect is of great relevance as far as the philosophical character of this thesis is concerned. Indeed, the determination of a theory of cultural transmission, starting by taking into account Ortega's viewpoint, would permit to question its own validity through the historical research, and therefore it would render possible a meta-analysis of his educational practices.

2) *The separation from the University.*

The second part of the thesis is devoted to the study of the period comprised between the beginning of the Spanish civil war, in 1936, and the full establishment of a new political and cultural system which can be thought to have reached its provisional conclusion with the material reconstruction of the University of Madrid in 1943. In comparison to the majority of the investigations on Ortega y Gasset, this thesis largely focuses on the last period of his life and intellectual experience, being this the most controversial and complicated one. That is to say, a very compelling case study to comprehend what to be an intellectual in times of crisis really means. For understanding the nature of this critical period – that is a period of cultural transition, as Ortega defined it in the abovementioned prologue to the book of Bréhier – this section reconstructs the political and cultural scenario during the first years of the evolution of the regime. This was marked in particular by a new definition of the idea of culture and by the need of constructing new political values. The University, and in particular the Central University of Madrid, was the main battlefield in which this change took place, both materially and spiritually speaking. Thus, on the one hand, this section of the thesis will analyze the birth and construction of the rhetorical discourse on the mission and aim of University which spread within the élites of the New State and, on the other, the way in which Ortega observed these changes from his exile. His attitude during this period has frequently been defined by the very philosopher as a period of absolute silence and, by his detractors, as a period of active collaboration with the regime. The study of his writings, public speeches and conferences he gave during this period in relation to the changes that were occurring in Spain – in particular in relation to the way in which the political power acquired the absolute control of the educative system and of all intellectual activities – will permit to comprehend to what extent these common interpretations can be considered as legitimate or not. For this purpose they will be taken into

consideration the legislative changes underwent by the educative system in general and the University in particular. Moreover, a special emphasis will be put on forms of dissension within an apparently homogeneous culture, with the aim of comprehending if and to what extent Ortega did take advantage from these initial contrapositions between different components of the regime's establishment.

Contrary to the limited literature on this topic, the purpose of this section does not principally lie in a presentation of his political conduct. It neither consists in expressing a judgment over his political ambiguity both during and after the civil war. On the contrary, its aim is that of critically inquiring into the way in which Ortega conceived his intellectual role within a cultural and political regime which was extremely different from the one in which he was educated and which he consistently contributed to forge.

3) *Hegemonic Vs Marginal. Ortega's exile in dialogue*

The third section of the thesis deepens into the period of the exile of the philosopher – which lasted until the summer 1945 – and also takes into account the effective reform in the University teachings of humanistic disciplines in Spain during the first half of the forties. In particular, the section does take into consideration the construction of a new paradigm of national history, and therefore of national memory. It does so both from a theoretical point of view, through a presentation of the philosophy of history developed during the first year of political control of the Spanish University, and by taking into account the interpretations of a specific historical theme: i.e. the imperial past of Spain, in its relations to the Roman Empire. Moreover, it also investigates the way in which the role of the intellectual did substantially changed in the very perception of the people responsible for academic posts. For doing this it will be conduct an analysis of a paradigmatic case within the rhetoric of the regime, that is the way in which the persona of Juan Luis Vives had been actualised by the academic world with the purpose of defining the basic traits of the new organic intellectual. All these rhetorical and linguistic utterances which took place within the Spanish academia will be compared to the works of Ortega y Gasset during the same period, in order to comprehend if and to what extent a dialogue between the two positions was possible, or at least, had been attempted by the philosopher; and if and to what extent this attempt did obtain relevant results in the cultural debate

within the Spanish borders. This analysis will be conducted by the help of primary sources such as relevant articles published in the following journals and reviews: *Arbor*, *Revista Nacional de Educación*, *Revista de Filosofía* (UCM), *Revista de la Universidad de Madrid*, and *Revista de Estudios Políticos*. Moreover, it will be conducted by considering the creation of new journals (such as *Escorial*, *Leonardo*, *Insula*) and, concerning Ortega's viewpoint, considering some important document collected within his personal Archive, such as notes and letters. In the case of the second part of Ortega's Lusitanian exile, this section of the thesis does also take into account the mutations in the national and international scenario, to understand if and to what extent they contribute to the return of the philosopher in Spain in 1945. In fact, since 1944, Franco's dictatorship seemed to live a profound crisis which could have ended up with its replacement in favour of the Bourbon monarchy but that, ultimately, gave birth to the new "democratic appearance" represented by the publication of the *Fuero de los Españoles* and the *Ley de sucesion*. In this context, it will be crucial to understand how the positioning of different components of the dictatorship could have play a role of mediators for favouring the return of the philosopher and if and to what extent this corresponded to a political purpose within the regime or, on the contrary, constituted an attempt to subvert it.

4) *The struggle for the cultural supremacy. Ortega back in Spain*

The fourth part of the thesis deals with the last period of Ortega's life, since his coming back in Spain after almost ten years of exile. This sections aims to define the conditions of possibility that rendered possible his return in a context apparently homogeneously in contrast with him. For this reason, a particular attention will be paid to the position of the cultural propaganda of the regime in relation to Ortega and to the eventual points of fracture within the cultural establishment of the regime which could have favoured, or seen with sympathy, the return of the philosopher. For this purpose they will be analysed the new positioning towards the philosopher starting from 1945, in particular through the creations of new reviews and the beginning of Ortega's intervention in Spain. So, in this section it will be analyzed the philosophy of education and the teaching activity of Ortega y Gasset in Spain, in particular through the case of the Institute of Humanities, so as to study the fourth and final mutation of this theorization in relation

to historical and political changes: from the context of the Generation of '14, to the II Republic to the instauration of the regime of Francisco Franco, by ending with the post-war international context. A vast part of this last section is intended to study the creation of the Institute of Humanities in Madrid, the last educative initiative he tried to realise in his country between 1948 and 1950. This part of the thesis intends to focus in particular on a) the reasons which sustained the creation of the *Institute*, b) the significance of the concept of “humanities” developed by the philosopher, c) the relations which rendered possible the realization of the *Institute* and d) the motivations which brought to its end. The personal Archive of the philosopher has been really useful for this purposes, being preserved there a) the letters of Ortega with the other members of the project; b) the administrative documents of the *Institute*; c) the articles published on the *Institute* during this period in several journals and newspapers; d) the letters received by Ortega by friends and public figures which observed from different point of views the development of the activities of the Institute. Moreover, the thesis will also take into account the eventual connection of Ortega’s educative theory and practice from the international point of view, studying if and to what extent his theorisations were connected to a the share international movement that, also through a conspicuous political and economic intervention, was trying to promote an educative reform intended as a political instrument for building a global citizenship and a climate of peace. As a consequence, this section will present a study of the relevant function of the intellectual and the philosopher within this new political scenario and within a new political ideology which still grounds our concept of education in democratic society. Lastly, this section does also aims to understand what is the legacy Ortega left to the Spanish philosophical debate after his death.

PART I

BIRTH AND APOGEE OF A SPIRITUAL GUIDE

The first part of this work aims at clarifying to what extent the professorship of Ortega y Gasset, since its very beginning, had always been extremely tied to a profound political engagement. In particular, by focusing on the period comprised between the beginning of the XX century and the onset of the Spanish civil war, they will be exposed the motivations, the circumstances, the methods and the aims which marked his intellectual upheaval. This period, which finally culminated in the hegemonic role played by Ortega as the main cultural reference of the Spanish II Republic. However, in spite of these significant variations, this first period represents a quite homogeneous epoch in which the philosopher had the opportunity to express his opinion freely and frequently, enjoying time by time the positive effects of an increasing prestige and a growing reputation.

The present section of the thesis is divided in two chapters according to a chronological criterion: they analyse respectively the first and the second decade of his intellectual activity. The two chapters present a similar structure which focuses on six main questions, each of those is articulated in one or more paragraphs. In particular they aim at investigating how 1) during the first part of Ortega's life and intellectual activity, he considered that his duty as a young intellectual should have been that of promoting an educational reform aimed at ameliorating the material and spiritual conditions of his compatriots. The terms in which he conceived this educational reform changed over time also, but the kernel of the question never disappeared during all this period. Furthermore, 2) this constant preoccupation produced an unceasing

meditation of the philosopher concerning the way in which he realised his philosophical activity. Put it differently, he constantly put into question his social status and at the same time the social status and political aim of the institution to which he belonged. This will be demonstrated by taking into account specifically the numerous occasions in which he spoke to a public audience, that is to say not to his students and colleagues within the University but to a larger public. However, the aim of the present thesis is that of always considering the ideas of Ortega in relation to the factual circumstance which rendered them possible. For this reason, both of the chapters 3) investigate the relationship between Ortega's aspiration of reforming his nation via an educational activity and the social and cultural background from which his main ideas arose during this period. These background conditions represent the implicit structure of Ortega's life of which he was not responsible for but that substantially influenced his thought contributing to determine its scope, goal and evolution. The fourth question considered in this section constitutes the pivotal problem of the entire thesis, that is 4) the way in which these background conditions, together with Ortega's personal contribution to the educative problem in Spain and the concurrent political circumstances in which it was posed – sometimes favourable sometimes adverse – reverberated within the university system. This question evidently produces a subsequent problem concerning 5) the extent to which this debate within the University both depended on political facts and ideologies and contributed to determine new cultural policies during different political regimes. In a sort of vicious circle which always starts at the same point in which it ends this first section also aims to 6) clarify the way in which the theory of education purported by Ortega unceasingly changed both in its contents and methods implying a constant redefinition of his political function and social status.

This section, given the vastness of the topic, will highlight exclusively some momentous events within the biography and production of the Madrilenian philosopher. The aim of this section is that of offering an introductory overview which would subsequently permit to comprehend both the biographical and conceptual premises underlying his following intellectual activities, which otherwise would not be totally intelligible.

Chapter 1.

The birth of a professor sui generis

The life of Ortega y Gasset is constitutively linked to that of the Spanish academia. This relation started since he was very young, during his studies at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Madrid, and later during his frequent travels in Germany, to deepen his philosophical knowledge. The cultural and social climate that he met both in his country and abroad contributed to shape his tastes and interests, to orient his philosophical investigations as well as his educative practices. Indeed, his choice to become a public intellectual and an academician seems to have brought to Ortega's mind both as a logical consequence of the background precondition characterising his circumstances and by a personal vocation he autonomously forged. Shedding light on this first period of Ortega's life is therefore indispensable to comprehend the fundamental guidelines which characterised the following evolution of his thinking and professorship. In particular, this chapter focuses on Ortega's *Bildung* and his following teaching activity, dealing with the period comprised between 1906 and 1920.

To comprehend to what extent the personal and social circumstances influenced his career, the chapter starts by (§1) analysing the familiar and academic inputs he received, both in Spain and in Germany, which oriented his decisions and interests. These (§2) will be later take directly into consideration by tracing the basic traits of his first public appearances which seem to be marked in particular by the aim of ameliorating the conditions of Spain through a pedagogical reform inserted in the vaster European social movement. This particular framework will permit to study (§3) the fragile but substantive relation between the socialism and the liberalism of the philosopher. In fact, whereas the first of the components of this relation will disappear from the political lexicon of Ortega, the second would constitute a constant reference of his intellectual and political activity. The term, however, would have acquired different meanings during different epochs of his thought. This analysis will thus permit to comprehend what were the main characteristics of Ortega's liberalism during his youth. The

importance of linking the evolution of Ortega's philosophy to the concrete circumstances under which he lived will be proved in particular (§4) by comparing his pedagogical interest with the disastrous material conditions of the Spanish educative system. Thus, the preoccupation of Ortega will be proved to be intrinsically linked to the political and social settings. This will determine the necessity to answer to a question that the scholars have somehow indirectly posed when considering the works and life of the Spanish philosopher, i.e. (§5) if he can be considered either an academician or a politician, or to what extent these aspects of his persona represented two sides of the same coin. This problem will be discussed in particular by analysing (§6) the first theoretical book he published, the famous *Meditations on Quixote*, and by linking it with the political and educative preoccupations he manifested during the same years. After this, the chapter will directly take into considerations (§7) the situation of the University of Madrid in the first two decades of the XX century, to understand if and to what extent the development of Ortega's philosophy was linked to the concrete academic circumstances of his *Alma Mater*. This analysis does constitute a fundamental aspect of the thesis, insofar as it permits to comprehend the evolution of the thought of Ortega in relation to the institutional framework within which he developed it. In fact, as a consequence of this analysis, the last paragraph of this chapter will be devoted (§8) to the definition of the basic strands of his teaching activity and educative theory that followed the publication of his famous book, determining the beginning of his intellectual apogee.

1.1 The academic fascination

Education constituted a constant passion of José Ortega y Gasset from his very youth, at least since he was a student at the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Madrid [Taberero del Rfo, 1993]. His very biography is indeed that of a predestined cultural leader. Thanks to the personal relationships of his family, his life in Madrid had soon be characterised by a regular attendance to the most educated social milieu of the Spanish capital [Zamora Bonilla, 2002]. The consistent social capital he inherited from his family gave him the opportunity to gain very early some notoriety within the Madrilenian bourgeoisie, in particular thanks to his journalistic activity for the family's newspaper *El Imparcial* [Blanco Alonso, 2005]. Indeed, Ortega born in a well-read family, with a long and outstanding liberal tradition. A lot of his

relatives hold important role as active members of the national politics. His maternal grandfather for instance, Eduardo Gasset y Artime, had been a deputy and a minister, and also his father, José Ortega y Murilla, had been an indolent deputy of the *Cortes* for twenty years, from 1898 to 1918 [Valero Lumbreras, 2013: 11-16]. One of his uncle, Rafael Gasset, obtained very prestigious political roles, culminating in his activity as Minister of agriculture and industry in 1900. So, he was part of a long tradition of moderate and liberal politicians revitalised by his brother, Eduardo, who would be a liberal deputy from 1910 to 1923.

The political career should therefore appear to Ortega as the natural path to follow in a country characterised by a reduced social mobility and a quite restricted oligarchy which governed the country [Moral Roncal, 2003; Fradera and Millan, 2000: 75]. However, without discarding the possibility of intervening in politics, Ortega y Gasset chose another path, preferring to follow his personal vocation towards the study of philosophy rather than devoting himself to the political struggle and living the life the fate appeared to have prepared to him. So, he took the first occasion which was offered to him, that is a scholarship funded by the *Junta para la Ampliación de Estudios* and went to Germany to ameliorate his philosophical knowledge¹. He was attracted by the desire of enhancing his understanding of the German philosophy and of deepening his interests towards the rigorous study of the discipline. In Marburg he discovered an academic reality that surprised and shocked him in comparison to the one he was accustomed to in Spain. So, from then on, Germany represented to him a model to imitate, a cultural ideal that he and his Country should have to pursue. Significantly, in 1906, at the age of 23, Ortega expressed the certainty of having a proper mission to accomplish, a personal life project. This consisted in offering his personal contribution to the enhancement of the social conditions of the Spanish society in a different manner in comparison to the one which his family had traditionally pursued: not by talking in political meetings and assemblies, but through his educative activity within the University [García Nuño, 2014].

This attitude is clearly expressed in an interesting series of articles he anonymously wrote for *El Imparcial*, signed with the initials X.Z. The series is significantly entitled *La Universidad española y la Universidad Alemana*. The comparative study of the Spanish and German University

¹ On the importance of the numerous Ortega's stays in Germany during his youth, all fundamental for the development of a strong interest towards the political pedagogy, see in particular J. Zamora Bonilla [2005: pp. 83-90].

conducted by Ortega in these articles took into consideration both the material and the intellectual characteristics of the two systems, that is to say the economic and the scientific aspects. In these writings a young and impertinent student criticises the Spanish educative system, in particular the University, depicted as an obsolete structure ready to collapse. In order to ameliorate the situation, according to him, it would have been necessary an overall reform that, starting from the University, would later propagate to politics and society as a whole. This is due to the fact, according to Ortega, the University and, generally speaking, the school, should not be secluded to society, but should rather be a living part of it. Indeed, he conceived the formal education as the most powerful and effective cultural channel thanks to which it would have been possible to create the necessary condition to enhance the development of the public opinion. In particular, because the school represented to him the necessary institution that could have guarantee the acquisition of democratic habits, such as the desire and ability to debate and participate in a deliberative process. This, according to him, should have been one of the main goals of the schooling system. Therefore education at its highest levels – i.e. during University – was conceived as a momentous part of this democratic empowerment rendered possible by the development of a critical thinking, since University represented both the place in which the future political leaders were formed and the institution responsible for the wide dissemination of culture. For this reason he thought that: «Para volver a España nada menos que en una Grecia, no es ciertamente la Universidad el único instrumento, pero sí el más importante» [OC, I:69].

The University, according to Ortega, had primarily a political function and the professor should not devote himself exclusively to scientific research, but should firstly teach to his students to investigate in an autonomous way, so that to develop a critical thinking [OC, I:74, 81]. He was really fascinated by the thought expressed by the Berlin professor Paulsen who practiced this form of engaged professorship. Ortega wanted to play a vital role in his country and the journalistic activity seemed to him far more fascinating than the parliamentary politics. But even more attractive was to him the possibility of becoming an academician, conceiving the University not only as the temple of knowledge but also and foremost as the bridgehead for spreading a liberal frame of mind within a cultural elite. Indeed, he conceived education as the means through which it would have been possible to foster the personal and collective freedom, laying the foundation of social progress.

This process, to him, was rendered necessary in order to ameliorate the conditions of a country that was dramatically underdeveloped in comparison to most of the other European States. Ortega considered that the most apt instrument to adopt was that of education, in particular of a political pedagogy strongly influenced by the neokantian movement and in particular by the *Sozialpädagogie* theorised Paul Natorp, one of his professors in Marburg [Orringer, 1979: 75-106]. Not only the form, but also the contents of the German education he received during his stays in Marburg and Berlin captured the attention of this young philosophy student. In a brief article he published in *El Imparcial* in 1908 he wrote that he would have devoted himself in the following years to renew the general perception and the common meaning attributed to the word “culture”, following the example of the most advanced nations, such as Germany. As he put it: «este es el tema entorno al cual quisiera urdir algunas variaciones útiles [...] para fomentar lo que es en mí una idea fija, una manía opresora: la reforma del concepto que se tiene vulgarmente de la cultura» [OC, I:135]. Thus Ortega’s academic fascination did not represent a personal ambition, but rather the profound desire of modernise the Spanish politics through an indirect but, according to him, more powerful and effective way, that is the reform of the educative system:

La política significa una acción sobre la voluntad indeterminada del pueblo, no sobre sus músculos, una educación, no una imposición. No es dar leyes, es dar ideales y por ideales no se entiende nada vago y doncellil, sino cualquier posible mejora espiritual o material de la sociedad, desde la libertad de cultos hasta la revisión del arancel, donde acaso esta parezca más ideal que aquella como más remota y difícil.

1.2 Europe as a myth

By this time Ortega is still on the way to become a leading intellectual figure. At this point in his life, after obtaining his doctorate in 1904, he had started to teach at the *Instituto Magisterio de Madrid* [since 1908] and had written a large amount of articles in two liberal newspapers, one of those he contributed to fund. He is twenty seven when, in 1910, he is invited to a conference in Bilbao speaking of *La pedagogía social como programa politico*. This occasion represented the opportunity to systematise the major theses purported in his precedent articles. At the same time, it offered him the opportunity to call for a

collaboration among intellectuals and a growing middle class to realise this political program. The slogan that summarises this conference is that of the Europeanization of Spain [Graham, 2001: 395]. To Ortega, the political problem affecting the country was first and foremost a problem related to its lack of culture. Accordingly, the only way to solve it would have been that of importing and transmitting the scientific and social progress already made abroad.

Even if apparently Ortega simply repeated the arguments he already presented in other situations, this conference represented a first significant watershed in his intellectual career. His pessimistic analysis of the Spanish cultural situation and the call for a political regeneration which could have been rendered possible only by imitating Europe caused some violent intellectual reactions – among the most notorious the one of Miguel de Unamuno [Ochoa de Michelena, 2007] – which also gave to Ortega some fame and fortune. The significance of this conference is due at least to two reasons. The first is that in this occasion Ortega offered a more precise account of the meaning of the two basic terms of his intellectual basic preoccupations so far: education and social pedagogy. The second is given by the fact that thanks to this conference he attracted a growing number of followers, especially among the younger generations which started to identify in Ortega a spokesperson who could represent their own interests towards the public opinion and within the University.

As far as the first aspect is concerned, Ortega conceived education as the concrete process through which what should be can become real. Indeed, the formal education always hides a normative aim which should be set according to the interests and needs of the society. The goal of education is that of materialising the ideal project of a better society that the social pedagogy – conceived as a scientific discipline rather than as a concrete practice – had previously set. Education is therefore conceived by Ortega as the necessary instrument for implementing the standards set by the social pedagogy. This goal cannot be realised exclusively within the University system, but should integrate a more capillary organisation of formal schooling. As he wrote in his personal diary in 1909: ««Las Universidades deben ser sólo para ciencia y para crear sabios. Lo cual quiere decir que es preciso crear otro tipo de instituciones docentes para hacer hombres [de 8 a 20 años]»» [OC, VII:170]. In this period he thought that it was the duty of the State to create the necessary cultural infrastructures which could have rendered possible the development of the country [Sánchez Ron, 1999].

The political program presented by Ortega was basically rooted in a communitarian conception of the civil society, whose members as single individuals should have to collaborate so to construct a better society. At the same time, he did not think that this could have been the product of a spontaneous order, but rather the result of an educational process. The fascination for the German culture, together with the reading of Costa's book *Reconstitución y europeización de España*, produced in Ortega a sort of idealisation of Europe which operated as a sort of mantra in his first intellectual interventions. As he said in this conference: «Regeneración es el deseo; europeización es el medio de satisfacerlo. Verdaderamente se vio desde el principio que España era el problema y Europa la solución» [OC, II:102]. This conference produced a wave of emotional involvement among a rising generation of young intellectuals which, after the colonial disaster of 1898, was trying to individuate a new unifying myth for rehabilitating their nation [Lorente, 1994]. The end of the colonial power marked also the end of the period of the so-called *Restauración*, an epoch spanning from 1874 to 1898. During this period a very limited oligarchy, basically ruled by Antonio Cánovas del Castillo and Práxedes Mateo Sagasta, dominated over the political decision of the Country. These two men represented the two main parties [the liberal and the conservative] that – with a continuous turnover made somehow explicit through the *Pacto del Pardo* endorsed by the king Alfonso XII [Tortella, 1993] – unceasingly led the Country.

In this scenario, the political elections were not open and, on the contrary, were largely manipulated both by the census suffrage and by the influence of the very powerful local elites which determined the vote in the rural electoral colleges, a phenomenon known as *caciquismo* [Cabrera and Del Rey, 2011]. This system rendered possible a relative stability during all this period even if the political life of Spain was frequently opened to the whims of the army and its violent *pronunciamientos* that, during this period, were the expression of a wish to modernise the country through the radical change of its institutions [Varela Ortega, 2013]. Moreover, a very large part of the population, deprived of its political power, was basically indifferent or hostile to the political system. The everyday politics was reduced mainly to a struggle among elites and the highest classes, represented by the political institutions of the Church, the King, the Army and the two main political parties [Carr, 1982]. This period was also characterised by the presence of strongly extractive political and economic institutions which contributed to determine a very low level of economic growth. According to the young generation impersonated by Ortega, the politics

of the *Restauración* had ultimately failed, and a new form of politics was needed. As far as education is concerned, the first important decree on education of the second half of the century, which organised the education system into three different levels according to the *ley Moyano* (1857), was not implemented and education, especially for the elementary level, remained substantially decentralised and opened to the different decisions of single regions and families [Nuñez, 2005]. This was the reason why Ortega called for a new institutional effort within the educative system and for a process of growing decentralization.

After this conference, during the very 1910, Ortega launched a new editorial adventure: a review significantly called *Europa*. This was a quite unsuccessful meteor within the Spanish cultural scenario, but constitutes a clear proof of the basic direction which his political program took during this period and which would have been mirrored in his most famous book: *Meditations on Quixote* [Villacañas, 2004: 117].

1.3 A liberal with a socialist outlook

Starting from these premises and due to his constant confrontation with the German system, politics and education started to represent to Ortega two synonymic expressions [Haro Honrubia, 2015]. Indeed, he was persuaded that the only plausible political system was the one represented by a liberal-democracy enhanced by an educative process. Therefore, as Elorza [2002], rightly wrote, his pedagogical commitment implied a constant effort towards the effective democratisation of his country². For this reason he enrolled in the Spanish Fabian Society, created in 1907 following the British model [Abellán, 2005: 60]. He thus endorsed a liberal pedagogical ideal which focused on the development of the individuals – and in particular of those who were better equipped with intellectual and material resources – in order to gradually gain a general improvement of the social conditions through this elitist

² A. Elorza, *La razón y la sombra. Una lectura política de Ortega y Gasset*, Barcellona, Anagrama, 2002 [1984], p. 43: to Ortega: «[R]esulta imprescindible, para alcanzar la práctica transformadora, pasar antes por la movilización de ese cuerpo mostrenco que comprende la mayoría de la población. De ahí que necesariamente democracia signifique pedagogía. [...] Es el problema en que se debate Ortega en sus diez primeros años, de optar por una labor pedagógica, siempre fundamental para él pero sin incidencia concreta sobre un país en crisis de régimen».

influence³. For this reason, in spite of having already taken the decision of devoting himself to the study and teaching of philosophy, he also continued to frequently write for the family newspapers so to directly communicate to a larger audience. In addition, together with his brother Eduardo, he decided to create a new liberal review: *El faro*.

Interestingly enough, all the articles published in this review during the first months since its creation focused on the importance of building a new cultural politics within what he considered as an underdeveloped country. As Ortega wrote in a letter to one of the Spanish leading figure of that time, Miguel de Unamuno, the aim of this publication was that of offering «un ensayo de pedagogía política – y política en mi vocabulario ya sabe que es liberalismo y revolución, cultura contra materia» [Robles, 1987: 73]. Whereas it is surely possible to affirm that before being a professor Ortega was a witty journalist, at the same time it is true that his constant worry also during this first period of his formation was represented by the problem of education. The political education of the population not only represented a political problem, but also a matter of intellectual meditation since: «es toda idea política una idea científica» [OC, I:140]. So, also when speaking to a general audience with strong political aims Ortega did not renounce to what apparently seemed a certain pedantry typical of the intellectual. This, according to him, represented the only correct methodology to adopt in order to foster a liberal mentality: use a mass media, such as a newspaper, as an instrument for making people think.

So, what does “liberalism” mean in Ortega’s vocabulary? He offers a clear definition of this term in an article written in 1910 entitled *La reforma liberal*. Liberalism, to him, defines the aspiration of the individuals and the civil society to acquire new domains of political influence contrasting the oppressive power exercised by an old and threadbare political system such as the one represented at that time by the Spanish conservative party. Liberalism means to substitute the rigid system of bureaucratic laws with a more flexible attitude, both in economics and politics. This, with the aim of freeing the positive energies of civil society in order to ameliorate the lives of both individuals and the community. According to Ortega, liberalism is:

³ As Pedro Cerezo Galan wrote, in this period the posture of the philosopher was headed towards «una conjunción entre liberalismo y socialismo, que pudiera corregir a uno y a otro, en una nueva forma de integración». See *Ortega y la regeneración del liberalismo: Tres navegaciones y un naufragio*, in *Meditaciones sobre Ortega y Gasset*, F.H. Llanos Alonso y A. Castro Sáenz (eds.), Madrid, Tébar, 2005, p. 629.

«aquel pensamiento político que antepone la realización del ideal moral a cuanto exija la utilidad de una porción humana, sea esta una casta, una clase o una nación» [OC, I:143]. He did not share a classic concept of liberalism such as the one purported, for instance, by Mill according to which the true liberty would be that: «of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it» And, as a consequence: «Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily or mental or spiritual» [Mill, 2000: 62]. According to Ortega, the single individual cannot be conceived as the measure of good and rightness, since he conceived liberalism always as an instrument for the social development of a community. He does not believe in the spontaneous order – which during that period the conservative leader Antonio Maura was perverting in a nationalistic sense. He conceived liberalism as a moral ideal, a normative principle to follow and for this reason he thought that: «No es posible hoy otro liberalismo que el liberalismo socialista» [OC, I:145]⁴. For this reason he also expressed his favour towards the Spanish socialist party and its most outstanding representative: Pablo Iglesias [Fox, 1988: 343-346].

Within this framework, education was conceived by Ortega not as a propagandistic instrument, but rather as a means through which it would have been possible to construct a better society, more equal and open. This could have been obtained through a spiritual, moral and economic improvement of the social conditions, passing through the development of single individuals. All these enhancements could have been realised only by fostering the freedom of every single person, therefore promoting firstly the development of their intellectual abilities since: «lo que ha hecho al hombre hombre es la ciencia» [1920, OC, I: 168]. The liberalism proposed by Ortega constituted a moral principle and, for this reason, he thought that a State that did not explicitly

⁴ On this crucial aspect of Ortega's thought see in particular the very useful essay by Luciano Pellicani, 1983:107. As he put it: «Appare quindi evidente che il liberalismo orteghiano – checchè sia stato scritto al riguardo – è cosa ben distinta dal liberalismo "sitile XIX secolo". La sua continua polemica contro lo stalinismo non è assimilabile a quella dei Mises e degli Hayek, quanto meno nel senso che non sfocia nella difesa a oltranza del mercato autoregolato. Tutto, il contrario. Nello stesso momento in cui Ortega sottolinea i pericoli inerenti alla illimitata dilatazione della giurisdizione potestativa dello Stato, egli sottolinea il dovere morale dei poteri pubblici di intervenire nel meccanismo economico al fine di azzerare i privilegi di classe e di procurare a *tutti* i cittadini i mezzi materiali e culturali indispensabili per la fruizione delle libertà».

recognise, as its most basic duty, the promotion of the public wisdom would have been an immoral State [OC, I: 169]. In conclusion, during his youth Ortega conceived liberalism as inseparable from an idea of justice, and education was considered as the basic anthropological instrument [Botanch Callén, 2015] that could have rendered possible the construction of a better society. But, why at the beginning of the XX century did Spain need to be rescued by a philosopher and a group of intellectuals with progressive tendencies? To comprehend this point it is necessary to briefly recall the socio-political and cultural conditions characterising the country during that period.

1.4 *The material conditions*

The socio-political and cultural milieu in which Ortega was absorbed was marked by a vivid debate within the *regenerationist* group concerning the construction of a new educative policy, which could have put into practice the principles of the Krausist philosophy⁵. These had been implemented by Giner de los Ríos and the *Institución Libre de Enseñanza* [Orden Jiménez, 1998; 2011]. This institution, as stated by Cacho Viu [2000: 156-157], constituted at the same time: 1) a pedagogical laboratory, 2) a potential political bureau made by students and scholars who were able to influence the government intervening on social issues, 3) a place in which both young students and old intellectuals could debate and get in touch in an informal way and, 4) as the basic core of the Spanish liberalism. Ortega was fascinated by this institution, which represented the most advanced research institute which was extremely active during those years.

The basic problem that the *ILE* was facing during this period was that of the development of a liberal education, the same problem that Ortega prioritised at the beginning of his academic career [Capellán and Orden Jiménez, 2007]. This was due to the disheartening material conditions of the country which can be recalled through the help of some historical data. As far as the educative situation was concerned, in

⁵ Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (1781-1831) was a German Romantic philosopher. During the XIX century Giner de los Ríos imported in Spain his philosophy which influenced the Spanish liberalism and determined the creation of the ILE in 1876 [Stoetzer, 1998]. This philosophy, a blend of Hegel and mystical meditation which combined philosophy and religion [Rodríguez Carro, 2014; García Mateo, 1992], was mainly based on the ideas of social and individual progress

1875, when the ILE was created, the illiteracy rate was equal to 75% of the adult population. At the time in which Ortega started his academic career it was still higher than 60% [Samaniego Boneu, 1977: 141]. If we take into consideration the people aged between 10 and 60, in 1920, the rate was still equal to the 42,5%, extremely higher in comparison to the rest of Europe [Taberero del Rio, 1993: 19]. In general terms, during the period from 1875 to 1915 the vast majority of the population was unable to read and write, and so unable to engage effectively in a political debate [Nuñez, 2005: 164].




Fig. 1: Level of education during the *Restauración*⁶




Fig. 2: Evolution of the illiteracy mean.

⁶ The graphs presented here are elaborated from the data collected in Nuñez, 2005: 207-244.

Not only the population was living in a deplorable condition, but also considering the formal educative system the situation was really disappointing. During primary school, the ratio students/ teacher was equal to 75:1, and people who could go to university in the period 1917-1935, that is the period in which Ortega exercised a sort of cultural hegemony within the humanistic faculties, was merely comprised between one and two parts of thousand [Samaniego Boneu, 1977: 354]. Finally, taking into consideration what nowadays is considered as the period of compulsory education, only 2% of the population did formally go to school [Nuñez, 2005: 233].

The secondary and university education was an extremely elitist reality, apparently scarcely integrated with the popular culture of its time. From a legislative point of view, during the first two decades of the XX century the different governments in power had not been able to promote a substantial reform of the educative system. The lack of a unified project was partially compensated by some very specific actions taken in particular by some reformist institutions, above all the *Junta para la Ampliación de Estudios* and the ILE. The JAE was created in 1907 and some years later, in 1909, a decree established that compulsory education should encompass all the people aged from 6 to 12. In 1910 it was created the *Residencia de Estudiantes* and in 1915 the *Residencia de Señoritas*, followed in 1916 by the *Instituto Escuela*⁷. All these institutions contributed to set into the political agenda the educative reforms that, during those very years, Ortega was strenuously defending [Puelles Benitez, 1989]. The rate of literacy starting to significantly increased after the end of the I World War in conjunct with all these institutional changes and the relative economic growth enjoyed by the Country until the mid-thirty, when it was abruptly interrupted by the civil war (see Fig. 2).

Given these material conditions it is evident that Ortega, in proposing a profound educative and political reform, was looking at the poorness of the factual situation, of which he was informed by the statistical reports of his friend and disciple Lorenzo Luzuriaga [Scotton, 2016]. When, during the LEP Conference in 1914, he called for the collaboration of an entire generation of young students, it cannot be dismissed the fact that more than half of the Spanish population of that time was younger than him [Samaniego Boneu, 1977: 141]. Spain was

⁷ The *Instituto Escuela* was the first educative institution in Spain that prepared the student to enter the University. Later on, as we will see in the final part of this thesis, it was the means through which Ortega restarted to occupy an influential cultural position after his exile.

indeed experiencing a generational crash, a crash that more than ideological was grounded on a very concrete and material struggle. Thus when talking of a new and an old politics, found an extremely receptive audience ready to listen to him. The civil society of which he was talking was composed by all those dynamics and energetic young persons who attended his speeches, whereas the State was represented by an old-fashion and aged intellectual gerontocracy. To look outside the Spanish boarder, as Ortega did, was therefore a factual and vital necessity.

1.5 A philosopher or a politician?

In 1910 Ortega obtained the chair of Metaphysic at the University of Madrid. He thus realised his desire to become an official intellectual, to obtain a relevant social status within the Spanish society of the XX century. He did not renounce to look for the collaboration of the society at large, writing in numerous newspapers, launching new reviews and speaking in political meetings. He was indeed a public figure. His political program presented in 1910 founded in the following years a growing interest also within national politics. Thus, on March 23 1914, he was invited as the representative of the *Liga de Educación Política Española* to pronounce a public speech at the *Teatro de la Comedia* of Madrid. This political association, launched in 1913, proclaimed itself neutral in relation to the party system even if it was really akin to the *Partido Reformista* [Elorza, 2002: 72-74]. Ortega, on that occasion, clearly mixed his philosophical and political role, in a conference significantly entitled *Vieja y Nueva Política*. The pedagogical and political concerns he already manifested in his previous writings⁸ now acquired a new concreteness. Indeed, on this occasion he formally was the spokesman of a political association.

In this conference he claimed for a direct intervention of the University and the schooling system in politics, since he thought that the political reform of the country should have been put into practice by starting from an educative process. As he had previously declared in a conference at the *Escuela de Magisterio* in 1913, he felt that the “time of the master” had come. In other words, it had come the right moment for

⁸ «El texto de tal disertación contiene casi todo lo que su autor había ya dicho sobre España, en diferentes ocasiones y en diversos artículos. No hay pues, rectificación, sino exposición sistematizada de conjunto». Cfr. S. M. Tabernero del Río [1993: 57].

implementing a popular education in order to obtain a political regeneration. In the Madrilenian meeting of March 1914 he directly assigned for the first time this regenerative role specifically to the institution to which he belonged, that is the university. The new politics mentioned by Ortega was actually a curious synthesis of pragmatism and idealism, in the sense that he conceived politics as an intellectual activity. Every political decision should have been taken considering the needs of the population at large, thinking deeply to the consequence of every choice taking into consideration the existence of a common good. Against the *caciquismo*— that could be defined as a political practice of lobbying lacking a political culture [González Hernández, 1999; Villacañas, 2014] – Ortega assigned to the University, conceived as a laboratory of intellectual thinking, a leading role in determining the ends that political leaders should have to realise and put into practice.

Not only the politicians, but also the philosophers and intellectuals of the generation of '98, according to Ortega: «aplaudían la mediocridad porque no tuvieron la experiencia de lo profundo» [OC, I: 772], largely causing disruptive consequences for the general political and historical condition of the country [Storm, 1999]. Ortega moved a very radical critique to the old politics, the *España caduca* [OC, I: 762], as he called it, which was conceived as responsible for the national underdevelopment. However, he did not call for a complete destruction of the past intellectual and political experiences, but rather for their modernisation⁹. There were, for instance, some intellectuals figure of the previous generation that he considered as fruitful examples to follow even for that new generation that, after his speech, would have started to leader the country, the famous *Generación del '14*, a movement that, significantly, sprang from the University [Costa Delgado, 2015]. In other words, it is not possible during this period to separate the professorship of Ortega y Gasset from his political interventions: culture and politics were conceived as synonyms both in theory and in practice.

⁹ He indeed speaks of a «nueva declaración y voluntad de pensamientos que, más o menos claros, se encuentran ya viviendo en las conciencias de nuestros ciudadanos». J. Ortega y Gasset, *Vieja y Nueva Política*, in *Obras Completas, tomo I*, p. 710.

1.6 Philosophy as political education: the *Meditations on Quixote*

Interestingly enough, the accusations he purported during the political meeting in 1914 did not differ from the ones he presented in what is unanimously considered as his first philosophical book: the *Meditations on Quixote*, published in 1914. In this book he directly quoted vast parts of his recent speech, accusing the entire intellectual class, that constituted the pillar of the University, to have produced intellectuals «educados por una edad rencorosa, que había laminado el universo y hecho de él una superficie, una pura apariencia» [OC, I: 802]. In the *Meditations* politics and philosophy are even more strictly intertwined. His interpretation of Cervantes' book aims at offering a new perspective on a very popular text, deeply rooted in the collective identity of Spain. By insisting on his critique against Unamuno [Cerezo Galán, 2007], who individuated in Don Quixote the essence of a tragic character lacerated by the conflict between faith and reason [Savignano, 2013], Ortega identifies in him a dynamic hero, who not only acted in a new and positive way, but who was also able to transmit and teach this proactive attitude to a larger population [Haro Honrubia, 2006]. Don Quixote was used as a representative of the new national hero. During his youth Ortega conceived his role as a philosopher and the intellectual as strictly related to a political function, and he was persuaded of having pedagogical mission to accomplish.

Accordingly, also the *Meditations* can be understood as a philosophical attempt to build a new Spain in strong opposition to the old-style politics Ortega wanted to replace. When he speaks about the Quixote, he is indeed talking about the political situation he was living. He thought that the only way in which the philosophical practice could have been useful would have been as a meditation on the present enriched by a theoretical and historical perspective. Thus it is possible to notice an evident proximity of his academic interests to the concrete political goals of his generation. So, when he mentions the adventurous character of Don Quixote he defines it as a real and true tendency to ameliorate the material conditions. Therefore, not simply as the «vapor de un cerebro» [OC, I: 811], that is the mist of a confused brain such as that of a mad. On the contrary, Don Quixote epitomised a positive attitude, maybe utopian but not completely unrealistic, to change the circumstances that impeded the free evolution of one's own personality and, consequently, of society.

Ortega tried to do it by acting as an innovative intellectual from his academic chair. Interpreting the desire of a whole generation, he tried to import in Spain the most recent philosophical debates that were animating the European intellectual scenario. He was one of those young students who, at the beginning of the XX century, had had the possibility to spend a formative period abroad thanks to the fellowship given by the *ILE* and the *JAE*. Indeed, the social pedagogy that Ortega imported and adapted to the Spanish context was strongly influenced by the thought of Paul Natorp, and the very ideas he purported found within the Spanish academia a very fertile background for germinating. This is proved, for instance, by the fact that the very book of Natorp had been translated into Spanish by a young professor: Manuel García Morente, who in the *ILE*'s Bulletin, when presenting the book, wrote that the University of Madrid should have dealt with the creation of culture in order to profoundly reform and ameliorate the conditions of the country [Morente, 1914]. Significantly, Ortega calls his meditations on Quijote “experiments for rescuing his circumstances”. An expression that meant an attempt to elevate the academic and political debates and design a fruitful political project¹⁰.

However, by the end of 1914 the European War was approaching and that political atmosphere which could have rendered possible a revival of the liberals values was deteriorating. The *LEP*, created just few month before, interrupted its activities. This situation encouraged Ortega to think about new political projects with the aim of continuing to exercise his influence within the political and cultural scenario. This is why he founded, in January 1915, a new cultural review called *España*. This publication was rendered possible thanks to the economic help of Nicolás María de Urgoiti, a Basque entrepreneur who, from then on, represented a constant reference point for financing all Ortega's projects. The goal of *España* was the same of the *LEP* and the *PRE* and among the participants to this project it is possible to find several people who already signed the *Manifiesto* of the league. Among them Ramiro de Maeztu, Pérez de Ayala, Azaña, the very secretary of the *PRE*, Luis de Zulueta and one of the most acclaimed intellectuals of that period: Eugenio d'Ors [Zamora Bonilla, 2002: 152-153]. In spite of the great expectations of Ortega the project was soon abandoned and the last

¹⁰ «[Ortega] delinea un'idea di filosofia come scienza universale coniugata con il riconoscimento della sua costitutiva valenza pratica in questa capacità di comprensione- *salvación* del presente ed elaborazione di un progetto politico-culturale che disegni, altresì, il compito proprio dell'intellettuale nei confronti della realtà» [Cantillo, 2012: 33-34].

articles he published for this review date back to the beginning of 1916. The dismissal of this cultural initiative was probably due, as Antonio Elorza has demonstrated [2002: 84-88], to the very limited audience it had been able to reach and the subsequent economic difficulties that rendered impossible its survival.

During the period comprised between 1910 and 1916 professor Ortega y Gasset was not only engaged in a constant political activity, but was also closely tied to outstanding politicians. Most of these politicians shared with him a common preoccupation, that is to say that they felt the need to modernise the country according to a liberal framework, with the aim of increasing social justice and promoting egalitarianism as two basic conditions for rendering possible an open and competitive society. The idea grounding this movement was that of posing the bases for developing a new intellectual elite¹¹. The role of this elite would not have been that of perpetuating an oligarchic form of exercising power, but rather to implement a real democratisation of Spain. Not in the sense of a general levelling of culture [Haro Honrubia, 2008: 66], but as an ascending process of the population towards the highest level of knowledge. This could have been rendered possible by the institutionalisation of a popular education and the dissemination of knowledge within the university and via the existent mass media, i.e. newspapers and cultural reviews. Surely, Ortega obtained very scarce results in terms of mass engagement¹², but he did play an agglutinative role within the progressive political culture of his country, dialoguing

¹¹ Cerezo Galán [2011: 16-31], significantly defines this period of Ortega's production as an attempt to establish an enlighten cultural attitude among those who had to act in politics: «La generación de 1914 interviene en la vida pública, creando opinión, en cuanto intelectual, reduplicativamente, es decir, en función de un saber profesional y una disciplina metódica, que le confiere autoridad y prestigio.[...] La proyección de esta actitud metódico/ reflexiva en política tenía que ser decisiva y definitiva». *Ibidem*, p. 23.

¹² Vicente Cacho Viu, for example, is extremely critical in relation to the concrete effects of the political pedagogy theorised by Ortega: «el cambio desencadenado entre las minorías cultas no tuvo su debido correlato en una acción educadora masiva, hecha imposible por la impermeabilidad del mundo oficial y aun de amplios sectores sedicentemente tradicionales; monopolizador aquel, el Estado, de una enseñanza universitaria y, con el tiempo, de cuotas crecientemente importantes de la elemental obligatoria, y fuertemente implantados éstos, con pedagogías ya andadas a retirar, en los estudios secundarios». [Cacho Viu, 2000: 58].

with some political figures such as Francisco Giner de los Ríos¹³ and Pablo Iglesias [Cabrero Blasco, 2012].

To the activity of the LEP, participated several of the most outstanding figures of that time such as Ramiro de Maeztu, Antonio Machado, Manuel Azaña, Pablo Azcárate, Américo Castro, Manuel García Morente, Lorenzo Luzuriaga, Salvador Madariama and Ramón Pérez de Ayala. Ortega represented the reference point of an entire generation which was trying to radically change and revolutionise the previous political regime, a modern Don Quixote¹⁴.

1.7 The University of Madrid at the beginning of the XX century.

After the dissolution of the LEP and the failure of *España* Ortega decided to devote himself exclusively to the personal meditation and the academic life, conceived for the first time in his personal existence as a profession secluded from a direct intervention in politics. This new aptitude of the philosopher is reflected in a new sort of publication, quite intimate, which he began in 1916: *El Espectador*. From then on Ortega renounced to the active political intervention, but without abdicating to the critical role that he assigned to the intellectual in relation to the political life. He abandoned the political arena to join a new form of critical spectatorship, aiming to «raise a stronghold against politics», offering a pure theoretical account on political issues¹⁵.

¹³ Giner de los Ríos saw «en Ortega al líder de la generación de jóvenes intelectuales que toman con vigor las riendas de la cultura española y que, por encima de la generación que les precede, conectan con la moral de la ciencia que Giner defendía desde los comienzos de la Restauración». Aymerich Soler, 2002: 173.

¹⁴ See on this point the very precise work by Menéndez Alzamora, *La generación del 14 y José Ortega y Gasset*, in M. Menéndez Alzamora and Robles Egea (eds.), *Pensamiento político en la España contemporánea*, Trotta, Madrid, 2013. On this generation see as well the interesting article by Costa Delgado, *Capital cultural, carrera profesional y trayectoria política en la crisis de la Restauración*, in «Sociología Histórica», 2, 2013, pp. 153-180.

¹⁵ As Westler and Craiutu [2015: 594] correctly put it: «In Ortega's view, the task of *El Espectador* was to carve out a space for independent reflection in an age of impassioned politics and to provide respite to those weary of ideologically driven discourses and who sought to preserve their intellectual independence. As such, *El Espectador* was supposed to represent a rejection of "bad" politics,

In the meanwhile he was teaching at the University of Madrid, an institution characterised by a very elitist and old-fashioned structure, but with reformist tendencies. Indeed, the JAE was acquiring a predominant role also within this University, and at that time represented the most prestigious cultural institution of the country. The JAE represented the engine of the Spanish socio-political modernisation and for this reason, in spite of declaring its political neutrality, it had to face the resistances of conservatives and catholic sectors both within and outside the University. Nevertheless, after having overcome a first political impasse that could have determined the death of the JAE at its very beginning¹⁶, it later gained a growing influence within the University as a cultural reference point [Otero Carvajal and López Sánchez, 2012: 129].

Ortega's relation with the ILE and, subsequently, with the JAE, was extremely close. He shared the same interests in renewing the cultural and political scenario through a pedagogical activity and he was particularly fascinated by its founder: Francisco Giner de los Ríos [Sánchez de Andres, 2010: 49-93]. Ortega was not the only one to share this vision. Indeed, the fellowship program carried on by the JAE had produced in very few years a fervent climate of international dynamism. During the first years of its life, the program gave to more than 300 university students and young researchers the possibility to spend a period abroad, an impressive number considering the scarcity of the student population. Moreover, the majority of these students during their studies in a foreign university had the opportunity to acquire an in-depth knowledge on educative and pedagogical issues, on the didactic methodology and the university reforms that had been recently carried out in other country. In fact, 140 of the total fellowships given between 1907 and 1914 had been allocated to research conducted on pedagogical themes [Marín Eced 1987: 261-278]. An extraordinary effort which resulted in a large number of publications explicitly

i.e. ideological politics, and it constituted a model for a more effective intellectual engagement with the political world».

¹⁶ The most violent attack against the JAE came from the very minister Rodríguez San Pedro who on December 27, 1907, declared at the Congress of deputy his deepest worry for the consequences that this institution could have produced in terms of undesired modernisation: «Si por un cosmopolitismo exagerado no pueden debilitarse y quebrantarse los fundamentos morales en que toda la Nación debe descansar». *Diario de Sesiones del Congreso*, legislature 1907, vol. 436, n. 127, p. 4003.

devoted to these problems. Among the most prolific researchers and writers who had been formed via a JAE's fellowship it is possible to find authors such as: Lorenzo Luzuriaga, Rodolfo Llopis Ferrándiz, Fernando García Medina, Antonio Gil Muñiz, Concepción Sáinz-Amor García, Félix Martí Alpera, Antonio Juan Onieva Santamaría, Pedro Rosselló Blanch e Fernando Sáinz Ruiz.

Thus the ample general consensus of Ortega's proposal was mainly especially due to the fact that the audience to whom he was speaking had received his very intellectual inputs and shared a common vision. The tight bond between the JAE and the University was legally recognised by a Royal Decree (11-4-1913) which established that its secretary would have to be a university professor. Significantly, one of the most vigorous supporters of the JAE in the parliament was Eduardo Ortega y Gasset, the brother of the philosopher. In the course of a discussion on the possibility to limit the scope of the JAE he maintained the necessity of preserving the autonomy of the institution, affirming that the vision it endorsed was not a form of radicalism, but just a moderate reformism which could have enriched the liberal tradition of the country without any subversive tendency¹⁷.

This discussion in the parliament revealed the existence of a more or less hidden struggle that was taking place inside the University during that period. The growing power exercised by the ILE and the Krausist influences did encounter the opposition of the catholic members of the faculty of Philosophy of the University of Madrid, exacerbating an opposition rooted in a recent past. In particular, whereas the department of Metaphysics was traditionally more inclined towards a laic and progressive philosophical and political outlook, since the teaching of the former Republic president Nicolás Salmerón Alonso [Alcaraz, 1991]; on the contrary the department of the History of Philosophy constituted, since the professorship of Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo, an outpost of the traditionalism and anti-Krausism. In spite of being originally created by the founder of the Krausist movement in Spain, i.e. Sanz del Río [Orden Jiménez, 2000] this department constituted, since the time of Menéndez Pelayo, the epicentre of the resistance against the modernisation of the University. Menéndez Pelayo's idiosyncrasy towards Krausism traced back to his youth as a student of professor Salmerón, who he considered as a despotic and incompetent teacher. For instance, he wrote to his friend a letter, dated 1874, in which he condemned the temper of the professor with this final

¹⁷ See the interesting text collected in *Diario de Sesiones del Congreso*, legislature 1914, vol. 501, n. 110: 3366, 3397-3398.

remark: «Esto te dará muestra de lo que son los Krausistas, de cuyas manos quiera Dios que te veas siempre libre»¹⁸.

When Ortega did obtain the chair of Metaphysics he had to defend also the interests of the institution that he indirectly represented, that is the ILE and the Republican tradition. In the meanwhile, after the death of Menéndez Pelayo, the chair of History of Philosophy had been assigned to Adolfo Bonilla y San Martín who, since 1910, started to edit the complete works of his master. The struggle among the two souls of the Faculty of Philosophy constituted a recurrent character of the Spanish University until the civil war which ended up in the hegemony of the most traditionalist side. A continuous contraposition between laicism (Ortega), and Catholicism (Menéndez Pelayo-Bonilla-Zubiri) [Cañas López, 2005]. A latent struggle that did not vanish neither during the '30s, when a philosopher somehow akin to the philosophy of Ortega, that is Xavier Zubiri, was put in-charge of the Department of History of Philosophy.

José Ortega y Gasset was then acquiring a growing influential role within the intellectual sphere and also within the public opinion. After his Madrilénian conference and the publication of the *Meditations* he became, as Jordi Gracia [2014: 84] has written, something similar to a media star of the time. He represented an emblematic figure of what later would have been named the *Edad de Plata* of Spanish culture, an intellectual constellation in which Ortega represented a planet able to attract several satellites, as illustrated by a marvellous painting of Giménez Caballero in 1928 (see Annex 1).

This image also constitutes a wonderful testimony of the counterpart of this modernising group that, during the *Edad de Plata* and also in the following years, characterised the conservative tendency of the Spanish cultural system: a contraposition among diametrical opposite intellectual and political groups that existed not only inside the Faculty of Philosophy but also in other faculties and, more generally speaking, in the whole cultural debate. This contraposition would later cause disruptive consequences in the political history of the country. On the one hand the galaxy of Ortega, who had a very relevant role during the '20s. This group gravitated towards the liberal newspaper *El Sol*, lunched by Ortega and Urgoiti in 1917 [Desvois, 2010]. On the other side, the group which composed the editorial staff of *ABC*, a conservative newspaper which during the next decades would replace the hegemonic role played by Ortega and his followers. Ortega's

¹⁸ Marcelino Menéndez Pelayo, *Epistolario*, Fundación Universitaria Española, Madrid 1982-1991, I: 104.

collaboration with *El Sol* was extremely fertile. He chose this particular means to go beyond the limited academic circle. During fifteen years (1917-31) he published in *El Sol* 426 articles. For this reason, when abandoning this editorial project, in 1931, he affirmed that in those articles one could have found his whole philosophy in pills¹⁹ [OC, IV: 625].

So, by the end of the second decade of the XX century, the wish of reforming and modernising the country founded, in the University of Madrid, the support of a young generation of students and researchers really willing to change it. This desire was concretised also from a legislative point of view through the project of University autonomy proposed by the minister of education César Silió in 1919. The aims that moved the minister was very similar to the one purported by Ortega, as revealed by a precedent essay written by Silió in 1914. Indeed, he thought that the University represented an old-fashioned institution that should have been reformed in order to ameliorate the conditions of the society as a whole:

Pensamos –separándonos de la opinión de muchos a quienes asusta la idea de conceder un régimen de libertad a las actuales universidades, entecas y viciadas en su función – que en el radicalismo de la reforma podrá hallarse el remedio.[...]Hay que proceder de manera que resulten invertidos los estímulos: que haya de preferirse a la Universidad preparatoria de exámenes rutinarios y fáciles, la Universidad elaboradora de ciencia y formadora de hombres [Silió, 1914: 103].

Silió's project aimed to reform an institution considered as unable to propagate to the rest of a population a culture that could have been perceived as useful. Before starting to implement the University system, not only in the biggest cities of the country but also in smaller towns, it would have been necessary to reform and modernise this institution by promoting a reform from within [Puyol Montero, 2011: 24-29]. This thought was totally shared by the very Ortega, has proven by an article he wrote in 1915 for *España*, in which he contrasted the idea of opening a new university in Murcia²⁰.

¹⁹ For a detailed study of the journalistic activity of Ortega y Gasset during this period see the very interesting article of Blanco Alonso, 2010, in particular pp. 85-100.

²⁰ «Llevar a Murcia una Universidad era como enviarles un cuerpo muerto, de que en su lugar debía creares una institución más moderna y eficaz» [OC, I:855].

The catastrophic conditions of the university had been denounced also by some professors of the University of Madrid, significantly by one of Ortega's friend and a member of the LEP: Manuel García Morente. A year before the presentation of Silió's project he wrote a long essay for the Bulletin of the ILE in which he highlighted the existence of a constitutive problem inside that institution: «El problema interno de la Universidad no puede resolverse sino por la Universidad misma» [García Morente, 1996 [1918]: I, 2: 86]. When the minister announced the reform project he praised the decision. He was persuaded, as his friend Ortega was, that all the political and social problems of the country sprang from the deficits of the University system. Commenting the project of the minister he wrote: «La decadencia de la Universidad española es atribuible a muchas causas ciertamente; pero una de ellas, y de no escasa importancia, es el alejamiento de la sociedad, en que la Universidad ha ido malviviendo» [García Morente 1996 [1919]: I, 2: 146].

By separating this institution from the State's bureaucracy, according to Morente, it would have been possible to near the civil society. The independence of the University from politics, its autonomy and the possibility of developing an open and free scientific research could have produce a growing interest among the intellectuals in the quality of the infrastructures in which they teach and of the methodology of their teachings. Improving the interests for the real effects that they research could bring about in society. Morente did not ponder exclusively a formal reform, but tried to define also the basic guidelines of a new methodology and contents of teaching. He underlined the need of a critical education aimed at forming democratic habits and also at enhancing the research at its most advanced level²¹. In fact, he thought that an education purely attentive to the real conditions of the job market would have been a perversion of the authentic goal of the university system²². He also set some concrete goals to be realised in terms of modernisation of the university structure: the enhancing of the library facilities, of seminars and laboratories, the active collaboration

²¹ «La función universitaria, en consecuencia, no será solamente la docente de enseñar sino, sobre todo, la productiva, la investigadora, la inventora» [García Morente, 1996 [1919], I, 2: 150].

²² «Una Universidad puede responder a cuatro tipos o ideales distintos: el docente, el educativo, el científico y el profesional. Los tres primeros se determinan esencialmente en función del concepto que se tenga del sentido y valor de la ciencia. El cuarto es una perversión del ideal universitario, cuasa por el abuso del poder central del Estado» [*Ibidem*: 149].

between research groups of experienced scholars and young students with the aim of limiting the formal lectures. Generally speaking, a growing participation of the students to the life of the University and a selection of the teachers according to a competitive criterion. The Spanish university were about to follow the examples of other European countries engaged in an overall reform of this institution, in particular following the French model [Baratas Díaz, 1995], enhancing the higher education autonomy and the creation of independent research centres.

To summarise, it seems correct to affirm that the JAE had brought about, in a very short period of time, enormous results. It realised an extensive lobbying activity within the University and, in particular, via the *Centro de Estudios Históricos*, which generated a positive climate that permitted to put into practice a radical change. Among the members of the *Centro*, a research institute of advanced studies, there were outstanding intellectual figures such as Menéndez Pidal, Americo Castro, Manuel Bartolomé Cossío, Julian Besteiro, Manuel Garcia Morente and José Ortega y Gasset.

However, in March 1922, the scenario significantly changed: the minister's activity was stopped by a new wave of resistance which sprang from the same University of Madrid, from its conservative and catholic wing. The excuse was offered by the controversy on the celebration of the Day of the Student. This day was traditionally celebrated by the catholic student association on March 7th, anniversary of Saint Thomas Aquinas. The minister decided to renew this tradition, without considering the fact that the Dean of the University of Madrid, Carracido, had already set a different date: February 4th. This dichotomy produced a clash of catholic against nonreligious associations. The first were supported by the political forces: not only the minister but also the King decided to take part in the celebration taking place in March. This event opened the way to an overt conflict between traditionalists and reformists, both inside and outside the University. A conflict that reached politics, determining the end of Silió's project and his replacement during the following summer with a traditionalist minister: Montejo y Rica.

1.8 The guidelines of Ortega's professorship

The philosophy of Ortega during this period developed according to some main basic guidelines: the interest for Cohen's Neo-Kantianism and Husserl's phenomenology and the study of the value theory developed by Max Scheler [Savignano, 1996: 5-20]. Starting from all

these influences he developed his theory of perspectivism, a philosophical account that assigned to single individuals a creative and productive function in relation to the reality surrounding them [Graham, 1994; Defez i Martín, 2003]. All these different influences constituted the object of his teachings and constituted also part of a theory of education he sporadically sketched during his lectures and writings. As already pointed out, the theme of education played a fundamental role in his most famous essays and conference, such as the *Meditations on Quixote* and *Vieja y Nueva Política*, but also in other writings such as *El Quijote en la Escuela* (1920). In all these texts Ortega repudiated an utilitarian form of education which was largely accepted at that time and represented, in Spain, by Antonio Zozaya²³.

His criticisms towards an utilitarian concept of education were directed against the tendency of prioritising the preservation of the status quo over the possibility of tracing new scenarios. He presented his arguments in particular in an article entitled *Los "Nuevos" Estados Unidos* in which, by following the theses of the German pedagogue Georg Kerschensteiner, he describe his education as opposed to the process of adaptation in utilitarian terms, talking about a *pedagogía deportiva* in contrast to a *pedagogía utilitaria*. Influenced by the new biological discoveries, and in particular by the theories of Hans Driesch (1867-1941) and Jakob Von Uexküll (1864-1944)²⁴, Ortega considered the evolution of human life not as a mere form of adaptation to reality, but rather as a creation and moulding of a new state of affairs [Rogers, 1994]. Therefore, he considered pedagogy as a discipline aimed at stimulating human creativity without thinking exclusively to its pragmatic utility. That is to say, not considering as the ultimate goal of education that of promoting only the ability of solving pragmatic problems for achieving predetermined targets. For this reason he gave particularly importance to a humanistic culture which could enhance the creative potentiality of each person, as demonstrated in particular by the poetic thinking and the use of metaphors as a personal language having a universal validity²⁵.

²³ In 1920 Zozaya published an article, entitled *Aprendamos a vivir*, whose thesis were in radical opposition to the ones purported by Ortega. See *La Libertad*, 12-III-1920.

²⁴ Regarding this biologist Ortega declared in 1922: «[D]ebo aclarar que sobre mí ha ejercido, desde 1913, gran influencia estas meditaciones biológicas. Esta influencia no ha sido meramente científica, sino cordial» [OC, VI: 308].

²⁵ Salas Ortúeta, 2009: 141: "El lenguaje, la perspectiva individual y el contexto social dentro del cual un individuo se produce preexisten a la invención de una

He conceived education as the main way through which all persons could have reached a complete fulfilment of their own humanity through a liberal process of emancipation and self-improvement²⁶. Accordingly, he thought that, as a professor, he had the duty to foster the ethics of research among his students and to contribute to the enhancement of culture, which in this period, for him, represented a sort of ethical and socio-pedagogical norm [Parente, 2013: 13]. Not just an abstract idea, but a principle of moral conduct²⁷ [Pellicani, 1971].

For these reasons, all the social institutions that were responsible for the education of the young generations – such as the Church, the State, the School and the private institutes of education – should have contributed to ameliorate the lives of each and every citizen so as to offer to everyone the same opportunity to live a satisfactory life²⁸. Thus, in this period, Ortega's philosophical account was strictly bound to his pedagogical concern. For instance, the very distinction between a rigid and bureaucratic State and a fervent civil society is also reflected in his theory of education, with the distinction between an external and imposed culture as opposed to a personal and interiorised education. This second type of education differs from the first insofar as it always put into question the external reality, fostering a proactive attitude towards the research and the significance of culture for one's own life [Ferrari Nieto, 2009]. This is due to the fact that, according to Ortega, knowing is different from comprehending [Scotton, 2014], and this is true in particular as far as the political sphere is concerned [OC, I:770].

Starting from these premises Ortega assigned to education a very precise political goal. Indeed, given that culture is not merely conceived

metáfora y a la vez este decir es efectivo e incluso puede adquirir vigencia de acuerdo con unas condiciones o reglas». On the importance of metaphor as an expression of the personality and as a form of vital reason valid at the interpersonal level see in particular Gutiérrez Pozo, 2000a and 2000b. A more recent perspective is offered also by Scotton, 2014.

²⁶ To Ortega the sportive attitude of human intelligence would ultimately render possible the enanchement of «Los ímpetus originarios de la psique, como son el coraje y la curiosidad, el amor y el odio, la agilidad intelectual, el afán de gozar y triunfar, la confianza en sí y en el mundo, la imaginación, la memoria» [OC, II: 405]

²⁷ «La cultura – la vertiente ideal de las cosas – pretende establecerse como un mundo aparte y suficiente, adonde podamos trasladar nuestras entrañas. Esto es una ilusión y sólo irada como ilusión, sólo puesta como un espejismo sobre la tierra, está la cultura puesta en su lugar» [OC, I: 812].

²⁸ «Los organismos por la cultura creados – ciencia o moral, Estado o Iglesia – no tienen otro fin que el aumento y potenciación de la vida» [OC, II:225].

as an external set of knowledge but also as an internal and personalised comprehension of the world which contributes to forge the moral and intellectual habit of each individual, this means that each person possesses a proactive attitude to change the external reality according to his perception of the normative character of social rules. When Ortega affirms that «la voluntad es un objeto paradójico que empieza en la realidad y acaba en lo ideal» [OC, I: 818], this means that every cultural production and political reality cannot be conceived without taking into account the individual who brought it about, and that every significant social change cannot but be the result of an educational process and the realisation of a vital need. The function of education is therefore that of exhibiting the relation between the individual and the community in a way that can render the second of these terms intelligible to the first²⁹. And this is rendered possible in particular by the process of rendering comprehensible the culture of a nation, that is the *raison d'être* of the community. For this reason, he wrote:

La cultura nos proporciona objetos ya purificados, que alguna vez fueron vida espontánea e inmediata, y hoy, gracias a la labor reflexiva, parecen libres del espacio y del tiempo [...] Lo que hoy recibimos ya ornado con sublimes aureolas, tuvo a su tiempo que estrecharse y encogerse para pasar por el corazón de un hombre [OC, I: 755].

Ortega exhibits an Aristotelian account of human being, considered as a social animal [Haro Honrubia, 2015: 498]. But to be a social being every and each individual must comprehend the reality which surrounds him and have to retrace the reasons which have produced that society rather than another. In other words, for being a member of a community each person must comprehend and share with the other members of the same group a common background, and this contributes to define a collective identity which constitutes the basis of the social consensus:

Apenas herida la retina por la saeta forastera, acude allí nuestra íntima, personal energía, y detiene la irrupción. La impresión es filiada, sometida a civilidad, pensada – y de este modo entra a cooperar en el edificio de nuestra personalidad. [OC, I: 781]

²⁹ It is true as Haro Honrubia wrote, that during his youth and before 1914: «Para Ortega el valor del individuo se manifiesta y justifica en lo social o colectivo» [2015: 495], but at the same time the society has to justify his existence by calling for the participation and collaboration of the individuals who compose the community.

This is evidently opposed to a defence of the *status quo*. In fact, the rejection of the acquired culture is always possible and sometimes desirable. Thanks to the better comprehension offered by the educative process this rejection would not ultimately end up in an anarchical rash, but rather in a reasonable political proposal rising from the will of the single individualities. From a political point of view, Ortega's pedagogy cannot be classified neither as conservative nor as revolutionary. On the contrary, it constitutes a project of participative politics, characterised by a previous revitalisation and rationalisation of the public debate through an educative process since, as he put it: «una cultura impresionista está condenada a no ser una cultura progresiva» [OC, I: 785].

A democratic system that did not prioritise a critical education among its citizens would consequently be, according to Ortega, a *de facto* non-democratic government. Civilisation is therefore conceived by the Spanish philosopher as a process of development of individual freedom in order to contribute to the social progress [Serafín-Tabernero, 2009]. Indeed, it is in the single person that Ortega identifies the cornerstone of the relation between the individual and the community, and this is reflected in his pedagogy that assigns a pivotal role to the valorisation of one's own vitality. Within this general philosophical and pedagogical outlook and the context described in the precedent paragraphs, Ortega y Gasset exercised his professorship at the University of Madrid arousing the interest of the students and stimulating a regeneration of the University from within. The significant effects of his teaching on the political and cultural Spanish scenario will be analysed in detail in the next chapter.

Chapter 2.

Fortunes and failures. The golden age of an impertinent intellectual

The period comprised between 1920 and 1935 represents the apogee of Ortega's intellectual and political experience, in all its facets and different roles. During this period he was firstly a respected political advisor and, successively, the founder and leader of a liberal party. The centre of his interests and preoccupations was still represented by the educative problem that during these years started to be quite exclusively declined in the terms of the need of a comprehensive university reform. In a period in which both at a national and at an international level the political scenario was experiencing a continuous institutional turmoil, the pedagogical proposal of the Spanish philosopher acquired a more and more relevant political scope and goal. This was partially due to the constitutive strands of his educative theorisation, always conceived as a form of enhancing the political awareness and consequent participation of citizens to public life. However, the social political contingencies did determine a new formulation of the main problems that had always represented the kernel of Ortega's political and pedagogical vision. In this context, he had to directly face a new and compelling problem: the education not only of the uneducated person, but also and foremost of the impolite one, of the person who rejects all form of education but who violently demands his right to intervene in the public sphere.

This chapter investigates (§1) Ortega's definition of the proper role of the intellectual and liberal philosopher as part of a restricted elite that, far from being separated to the rest of the society, had to accomplish to its political responsibility for the enhancing and amelioration of democracy. It is exactly to promote this cultural and social development that the philosopher created what would have been one of his most effective and important projects: the *Revista de Occidente* (§2). Through this editorial project he was able to reach a far more ample public than the one that populated the University, obtaining a social power and a public recognition that rendered him a reference point not only within

the academia but also and foremost within the whole Spanish liberal bourgeoisie. At the same time, he continued exercising a leading role also within the Faculty of philosophy at the University of Madrid (§3), where he started to focus more frequently on pedagogical issues, with the aim of proposing a reform of the intellectual both inside the university and in the social sphere. The changing political conditions and, in particular, (§4) the onset of the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera determined the first of a series of critical moments within the life of Ortega y Gasset both as a liberal thinker and as a public figure. However, whereas many Spanish and international intellectuals were increasingly moving towards fascists or at least authoritative political perspective Ortega, on the contrary, always maintained during the period of the dictatorship a liberal outlook, persuaded that the only plausible solution to every political question should have been offered by a critical analysis of reality, and never by a violent intervention. In the meanwhile, (§5) the University of Madrid was acquiring a more and more massive dimension that mirrored both the growing extension of the middle class of the country and its growing politicisation that was causing disruptive consequences in the institutional stability of the nation. Ortega did consider as indispensable such a reflection on these new phenomena. His ideas would have been translated into an overall philosophical account immediately after the end of Primo de Rivera's dictatorship, mainly through the publication of two main books: (§6), *The revolt of the masses* and *The mission of the University*. These texts focused on the same problem – the dangerous relationship between democracy and the mass society – by two complementing perspective: from the point of view of the political ruler and from the point of view of the intellectual leader. The two perspective ultimately merged in the very experience of Ortega who in 1931 founded with some other liberal intellectuals the *Agrupación a Servicio de la República* (§7). This new form of philosophical intervention in the political sphere represented the peak of Ortega's long meditation on the role of the intellectual in society and an experience that marked also the successive political and cultural life of the nation in the following years. Significantly enough, one of the institution which benefitted the most from this intellectual intervention in the realm of politics would have been (§8) the University, and in particular the one of Madrid and its humanistic faculties that lived an extremely exciting chapter of its life that would have been dramatically put into question during the following years.

2.1. Ortega behind the scenes of politics

Ortega's disaffection towards an active political participation and the following focus on the academic activity did not produce a lack of interest in political issues in the period comprised between 1915 and 1922. On the contrary, he played a peculiar role of political advisor concerning all the major topics at stake within the public debate. This is evidently reflected in the articles he published for three main newspapers and reviews: *El Imparcial*, *El Sol* and *España*.

In the liberal newspaper *El Imparcial* he published in 1917 a series of articles significantly entitled *Hacia una mejor política*, [Towards a better politics]. Through this slogan he called for a substantial change in the way in which the political themes were discussed within the public debate, both in the Parliament and in the ampler domain of the civil society. Indeed, he was persuaded that only by sharing a better understanding of the political issues at stake and favouring a well-informed public opinion, it would have been possible to construct a better society. For overcoming the politics of the *Restauración* he considered as indispensable firstly to educate citizens in order to build a public opinion: «Los ministros españoles tienen de la vida social una idea propia, a la vez, de un Faraón y de un cacique de aldea. Creen que la vida social se hace en sus despachos. No se enteran de que la vida social es convivencia» [OC, III:25].

For this reason, Ortega assigns to the intellectuals a pivotal role in the process of building the public opinion. He thought that only by nearing citizens to the parliamentary discussions and stimulating a conscious debate within the civil society on these themes, the goal of constructing a solid public opinion could have been realised. Moreover, he was persuaded that this process should have been put into practice by a new generation of young intellectuals – professors, teachers and so on – who, guided by the common purpose of modernising the country, had to reform an old and obsolete political system. The most significant instances of this tendency in the works of Ortega are respectively an article and a long essay he published in *España* and *El Sol*: *Imperativo de intelectualidad* (1922) and *España Invertebrada* (1922). This second text in particular enjoyed an incredible fortune not only in Spain but also abroad, significantly contributing to determine the most various and often antithetical interpretations of the political and social thought of Ortega during his whole life³⁰.

³⁰ Ortega, in the prologue to the second edition of this essay expressed his worries for this multiplicity of interpretations that often subverted the sense of

During the '20s the philosopher unceasingly called for a twofold reform of the Spanish culture, that is to say both a change in the general philosophical outlook provided by the University and a reform of the relationship among intellectuals, politicians and civil society [Savignano, 1983: 25]. In particular, he conceived that professors, writers and scientists should all contribute to the reform of the political discourse by forming an enlighten elite able to set the bases of the social consensus towards a new form of conceiving politics: «construir una minoría selecta capaz de influir hondamente en los destinos étnicos y dar un comienzo de nueva organización a este pueblo nuestro que se deshace y atomiza día por día» [OC, III: 383]. The pessimism which followed the failure of the LEP in 1914 just vanished in 1922 with the publication of the *Imperativo de Intelectualidad*, a text in which Ortega declares that the Spanish intellectuals had finally the opportunity to accomplish to their political mission, that was «la hora de la gran tarea» [*Ibidem*]. After the end of the I World War he conceived the possibility of putting into practice a form of engaged professorship, abandoning the party system, could have renewed the reformist tendency indicated by the generation of the '14. By appealing to a specific class, that was that of the intellectuals and university teachers, he envisaged the chance of constructing an aristocratic elite willing to ameliorate the general condition of the whole civil society [OC: III: 385].

In order to do this he thought it was indispensable that intellectuals traced the basic guidelines of a political project aimed to instil in the public opinion the wish of taking part into a common national destiny for realising a new and better society. This is the main topic of his *España Invertebrada* that begins by taking into consideration the issue of the separatist movements of the Northern regions. These movements had recently produced violent manifestation against the State government, as in the famous case of the strike in Barcelona in 1919 whose main causes can be traced back to a lack of confidence in an old-fashioned political system [Bengoechea, 1998; Pradas Baena, 2003]. Thus, in order to unify the country, it was necessary to move towards the realisation of a unanimously shared political vision. Indeed, he conceived a nation, like Renan, as an everyday plebiscite, that is to say as a continuous and enthusiastic collaboration of citizens to a common and unified political project. For realising this quite utopian goal it was

his political view. OC, III: 423: «Si yo hubiese podido prever para él tan envidiable fortuna, ni lo habría publicado. [...] Al encontrarse ahora este ensayo con los lectores que no estaban previstos, temo que padezca su contenido algunas malas interpretaciones».

necessary to count on a solid *intelligentsia*, able to transmit this project to the public opinion³¹.

The basic aim of this intellectual influence was that of mitigating the dramatic and violent effects of a direct intervention of the masses in the political life, as recently proved by the Catalan turmoil and by the bolshevist revolution. All these very different outbreaks of political violence, to Ortega, shared a basic trait, i.e. a brutal aggressiveness that was due to a lack of thinking and planning. A lack both of a real comprehension of the social norms and of a set of political reforms. For these reasons he called for the need of improving a reflexive attitude concerning political issues both among politicians and the civil society. He thought that the masses, that were increasingly conquering larger political influence within the European society, lacked the essential ability to take part into a serious political debate due to educational shortages. In fact, he believed that only education should have provided the basic abilities for understating and taking part in a really participative democratic process. It was necessary to enhance a process of alphabetisation and mass education, not of indoctrination but of critical thinking. In fact, *he thought that all revolutionary movements were first and foremost blatant manifestations of cultural problems rather than political ones. The lack of trust in the leading classes of the country had to be counter by an educative process.* In fact:

Este fenómeno mortal de insubordinación espiritual de las masas contra toda minoría eminente se manifiesta con tanta mayor exquisitez cuanto más nos alejamos de la zona política. Así el público de los espectáculos y conciertos se cree superior a todo dramaturgo, compositor o crítico, y se complace en cocear a unos y otros. Por muy escasa discreción y sabiduría que goce el crítico, siempre ocurrirá que posee más ambas calidades que la mayoría del público. Sería lo natural que ese público sintiese la evidente superioridad del crítico y, reservandose toda la independencia definitiva que parece justa, hubiese en él la tendencia de dejarse influir por las estimaciones del entendido. Pero nuestro público parte de un estado de espíritu inverso a éste: la sospecha de que alguien pretenda entender de algo un poco más que él, le pone fuera de sí. [OC, III: 481-482].

The minority recalled by Ortega in *España Invertebrada* (1922) is not formed by a nobility or by an aristocracy of money. On the contrary, he purports the necessity of constructing a *minoría selecta* in virtue of the

³¹ On the relation between this intellectual elite and the general population see in particular Haro Honrubia, 2008.

individual's merits. A ruling class able to be an example of virtue, competence, knowledge and that does not impose its power but rather is able to conquest and attract the masses. The concepts presented by Ortega in this text have frequently been interpreted as the expression of a political thought on the border between an authoritative democracy and a form of conservatism [Achiri, 2012]. However, the aristocracy of spirit described in his writings reveals a completely different aim³². Indeed, he repeatedly speaks about the construction of a “new-man” during this period, using a well-imposed rhetorical expression of those times³³. However, when talking about this new man he never refers to a new political leader, but rather to the need of forming a new type of citizen. Therefore, his form of aristocratism cannot be separated from the concurrent attempt to promote a cultural reform of the country so to avoid the degeneration of democracy into a pernicious anarchism.

The mass is thought by Ortega as a potentially positive political resource but only insofar as it rationally participates in the public debate. For this purpose, education is needed in order to train citizens to become free and active members of a social community. For this reason, as he put it: «es la política quien debe adaptarse a la pedagogía, la cual conquistará sus fines propio y sublimes» [OC, III: 517]. The construction of a ruling class constituted only the first but indispensable phase of Ortega's political proposal, since its very construction was thought as the basic instrument through which it would have been possible to forge a new form of enlightened citizenship. In fact:

En la clase intelectual reside vagamente - ¡muy vagamente, es cierto! – la única posibilidad de constituir una minoría selecta capaz de influir hondamente en los destinos étnicos y dar un comienzo de nueva organización a este pueblo nuestro que se deshace y atomiza día por día [OC, III: 383].

This is the reason that brought Ortega to present himself, during this period, as a political advisor both in the newspaper *El Sol*, in a series of

³² The aristocratism of Ortega is undeniable. As he will write in the *La rebelión de las masas*: «Yo no he dicho nunca que la sociedad deba ser aristocrática, sino mucho más que eso. He dicho y sigo creyendo cada día con más enérgica convicción, que la sociedad humana es aristocrática siempre, quiera o no, por su esencia misma». On this controversial aspect of Ortega's thought see in particular Majfud 2006.

³³ Indeed, the rhetoric of “newness” which spread in Europe during that period substantially affected the thought of Ortega during the ‘20s, as proven by Lasaga, 2013.

articles entitled *Ideas Políticas* (1922) and, in particular, offering his advice to the very King, as proved by a famous meeting organised by the marchioness Villavieja, attended by several intellectuals³⁴. In *Ideas Políticas* he defines the role of the intellectual not only as a mere spectator of the political debate, but rather as a person able to determining its flux, offering a critical view that should be constantly take into consideration. Indeed, in one of these articles he significantly wrote that: «El intelectual un poco consciente de sus destinos, en lugar de pedir al político un acta, debe pedirle que le lea con mediana atención» [OC, III: 391].

2.2 *Revista de Occidente. The birth of Ortega's myth*

The growing impact of the liberal movement on the formal educative system also produced a relevant influence on the political spheres, which, at that time, was still ruled by a restricted elite. Indeed, the liberal coalition [*Conjunción Liberal*] won the general election of April 29th 1923. Such coalition constituted a very fragmented group unable to leader the country towards the path of modernisation proposed during the electoral campaign. The real political participation of the public opinion was still very limited [A. Yanini, 1993; Dardé Morales, 2015]. In this context, Ortega started to take into consideration the possibility of founding a new cultural review in order to exercise his intellectual role both within the academia, the liberal ruling class and an emerging public opinion. Thus the purposes expressed in *España invertebrada* were translated in a new cultural project: the *Revista de Occidente*. The first volume was published during the summer 1923, just two months after having shared the idea with Fernando Vela, its editorial secretary³⁵. The desire which brought Ortega to realise this project was that of presenting an up-to-date vision of the European philosophical and literary debate in order to offer to the general audience a critical instrument to understand the present age. As he put it in 1923:

Muchas gentes comienzan a sentir la penosa impresión de ver su existencia invadida por el caos. Y, sin embargo, un poco de claridad, otro poco de orden y suficiente jerarquía en la información les revelaría pronto el plano de la nueva arquitectura en que la vida occidental se está reconstruyendo.

³⁴ A chronicle of the meeting can be found in *El Sol*, 3-VI-1922.

³⁵ For a brief but very precise story of this review from its very foundation until the present see in particular Márquez Padorno, 2005: 101-110.

La *Revista de Occidente* quisiera ponerse al servicio de ese estado de espíritu característico de nuestra época [OC, III: 529].

This fortunate editorial project constituted a reference point in the Spanish cultural scenario until the beginning of the civil war, in 1936. It brought in the country the most relevant European debates of the time both in the field of humanities and natural sciences, looking in particular to the German intellectual scenario [Lemke Duque, 2014], without dismissing the contribution of France, England and Italy. Indeed, the majority of the Spanish population still continued to be largely illiterate and did not have access to these texts. However, while Ortega was fighting for his modernising ideas through an educational reform, a new well-read and wealthier bourgeoisie was starting to take form. This constituted the audience of the *Revista* that circulated in approximately 3000 copies, included those that were intended to the Latin American public [Sánchez Camara, 2001]. The price of each copy was equal to 3.5 pesetas, in an epoch in which the annual salary of the primary teachers, for instance, was comprised between 2500 and 3000 pesetas [López Martín, 1986]. The success of the review is proven by the fact that it rapidly passed from publishing three times a year to be a monthly publication. Its fame also crossed the Spanish borders and had an important echo also in France and, in particular, in England through the interest of the journal *The Dial* [Garbisu, 2015].

Philosophy, literature, science, aesthetics, biology... all these topics were treated in the review which represented, as Márquez Podorno correctly put it, the ideal complement for compensating the excessive specialisation which characterised the university education [2015: 105]. This editorial project reveals what was Ortega's concept of his own mission as a university teacher and as an intellectual engaged in politics, and of the political nature of his pedagogy during this period. Indeed, from the '20s, Ortega thought that a comprehensive education was indispensable to promote the formation of a cultured ruling class and bourgeoisie aimed to comprehend and consequently rule the social processes. In fact, this review was addressed both to the students and the professionals, the liberal bourgeois who, after having received an higher and university education, desired to stay informed of the main scientific progress³⁶. In this way *the Revista constituted the realisation of Ortega's pedagogical aims during almost fifteen years, spreading his ideal of a modernisation of the country through an educational reform*. Through it

³⁶ For a profile of the readers of the review see in particular López Campillo, 1972.

Ortega succeeded in one of his most ambitious goal: awaken a large and popular interest towards philosophical questions, with the aim of shaping a well-informed citizenship. For this reason, together with the *Revista* he also promoted a book collection publishing the European classics texts of philosophy, sociology and psychology. This was rendered possible by the collaboration with the editor *Espasa Calpe* and in particular by the creation of the *Biblioteca de Siglo XX*, during the period 1921-1923 [López Cobo, 2013].

If we analyse the contents of the *Revista* it will soon emerge that pedagogy constitutes one of its main and most recurrent topics. In particular, the view adopted by the review was that of a comparative study of the educational reforms which had been put into practice in other countries. Moreover, according to the philosophical principles of Ortega, the review tried also to assume a perspectivistic approach: that is inquiring a same topic from different perspectives in order to illuminate the constitutive plurality of realities and opinions. An instance of this tendency is offered by the article by Luis de Zulueta, entitled *¿Cómo formar la personalidad humana?* [Zulueta, 1923]. Here he presents the debate on the role of education in the shaping of citizens that took place in French between the minister of Poincaré government, León Bérard – supporter of a classic education – and Albert Thierry, a socialist trade unionist and advocate of a professional education. The conflict of opinion is described as a vibrant chronicle, aimed not at answering to the questions formulated by the author in a dogmatic way, but rather at offering the possibility of acquiring a better understanding of the topic at stake to develop a critical thinking on it.

These projects developed by Ortega were not cathedrals in the desert. On the contrary, they perfectly fit in the cultural background of the period. Indeed, the thesis purported by Ortega were evidently due to the ILE's influence and, at the same time, constituted an original contribution to its main ideas, having an ample echo on the multiple institutions related to it. Moreover, during those years, the Madrilenian philosopher enjoyed an incredible success. He represented a trendy icon for a new generation of students proceeding from an emergent upper-middle class: the so-called *señorito satisfecho* [Moreno Pestaña, 2011: 126]. This was reflected in particular in one of the most prolific cultural institution of the time: the *Residencia de Estudiantes* founded by JAE in 1910³⁷. Indeed, one of the students of the *Residencia*, Rafael Méndez, in

³⁷ For comprehending the importance of this institution, and the related *Residencia de Señorita*, within the Spanish cultural scenario of the so-called *Edad*

remembering that period of his formation and the atmosphere within the institution, spoke about: «muchachos vestidos con sobria elegancia, amables, racionalistas, que leían a Ortega y Gasset» [Méndez, 1987: 20]. Some of these fascinated followers of the philosopher also actively participated into the *Revista de Occidente* that, in its first 15 years, counted on the collaboration of more than 300 authors, half of whom were Spanish³⁸.

However, it would be erroneous to consider the *Revista de Occidente* as the only liberal review which during that time operated towards a renewal of the Spanish educative system. Indeed, it cannot be dismissed the very important role played during this period by the *Revista de Pedagogía*, created in 1922 by one of Ortega's disciples and friends: Lorenzo Luzuriaga Medina. This publication significantly contributed to ameliorate the debate on the reform of the education [Nicolich, 1983 and 1992]. It did it in particular by facing the question of the importance of humanities in all the level of the formal schooling, from the primary school to the university [Casado Marcos de León, 2011]. The purpose of this review was: «reflejar el movimiento pedagógico contemporáneo y, en la medida de sus fuerzas, contribuir a su desarrollo»³⁹. Also this review contributed to the fame and popularity of Ortega's philosophy, and in particular of his pedagogy. Indeed, the very Luis de Zulueta, wrote in 1922 an article – that inaugurates this new review – entirely dedicated to Ortega's theory of education, in which he underlined that thanks to the lessons of the Madrilenian philosopher, the most up-to-date pedagogical notions had been recently imported in Spain [Zulueta, 1922: 5]. Within the same review also Ortega's friend and colleague Manuela García Morente affirmed that the works of the philosopher, in particular the essays included in *El Espectador*, contained a very interesting pedagogical thought, a quite comprehensive theory of

de Plata see in particular Ribagorda, 2009 – in particular pp. 173-257; and Ribagorda 2011.

³⁸ Among the most active collaborators, a part from the very Ortega, is important to underline the presence of some of the most influential intellectuals who continued to have a determinant role in the Spanish cultural policy of the country. They constituted also in the following decades the core of Ortega's intellectual circle, and developed their intellectual career also independently from their master in the following years. They are in particular Fernando Vela, who published 55 articles, Antonio Marichalar (54), Gómez de la Serna (33), García Morente (20), García Gómez (17), José Antonio Maravall (16), Gregorio Marañón, Xavier Zubiri, Ledesma Ramos, Julián Marías, Pérez de Ayala, José Sacristan.

³⁹ *Revista de Pedagogía*, 1, Enero 1922.

education. He appreciated in particular the fact that his contribution to pedagogy was strictly related to a vaster philosophical debate, aimed at promoting the development of the humanity of every and each single individual [García Morente, 1922a; 1922b]. The basic ground of Ortega's pedagogy was constituted, to Morente, by his theory of vital reason. A theory that advocated for the full development of one's own personality through a practical inquiry into the intimate motivations of his actions and decisions.

To summarise, during the '20s Ortega developed an overall theory of education which overcame his previous theorisations that had quite exclusively concerned the need of bringing about an effective political education and socialisation of the masses. Indeed, he started focusing also on the anthropological premises of his educative thinking. Moreover, *all his theses found a very favourable ground in which they flourished during this period, also thanks to a capillary propagation of his ideas through all the possible media of the time: newspapers, cultural reviews, journals, schools, university and, moreover, politics.* He represented without any doubt a popular intellectual icon during that decade. His influence spread through all the discipline and his figure acquired a symbolic status which rendered him a catalyst for a cultural renovation that involved the whole Spanish cultural and political elite.

2.3 Ortega's university teaching (1921-1922)

Both of the articles respectively written by Zulueta and García Morente in 1922 for the recently founded *Revista de Pedagogía* underlined the innovativeness of Ortega's university lessons and their importance in relation to the development of a comprehensive theory of education. For this reason – after having analysed Ortega's pedagogy as exposed in the articles he wrote for a larger audience and their warm reception within the academic scenario – let's now consider to what extent his university lessons directly dealt with pedagogical issues and how he perceived his role as a philosopher within the academia. For these purposes it is important to consider the course he realised during the academic year 1921-1922, whose main themes later appeared in a book published in 1923 and entitled *El tema del nuestro tiempo*⁴⁰.

⁴⁰ For realising these analyses they have been taken into consideration both the notes used by Ortega for developing his classes and the book which sprang from them. The notes have been recently published in his complete works *Lecciones del Curso Universitario 1921-1922*, in *OC*, VII, pp. 767-797

In the first chapter of this book Ortega offers a clear instance of the way in which he interpreted his role as a university teacher. His aim was that of contributing to the formation of a new generation of students and intellectuals willing to contribute not only to the development of the academic scientific production but also, and foremost, to create and influence the public opinion. He wanted to build within the faculty of philosophy a «minoría de corazones de vanguardia» characterised by a «filosofía beligerante, que aspira a destruir el pasado mediante su radical superación» [OC, III: 562]. The real philosopher and intellectual was conceived as a person of great talent and scrupulous methodology who would have converted him in a «individualidad egregia que consiste, precisamente, en una actuación omnímoda sobre la masa» [OC, III: 563]. Indeed, Ortega thought that the political history of a country proceeded with a discontinuous rhythm given by the alternation between phases of creation, establishment and crisis of intellectual generations. Each of these generations was conceived as responsible for the creation of an overall system of ideas, social, political and educative institutions that responded to the needs of the population within a limited period of time by creating an hegemonic cultural perspective. Within this general theoretical framework Ortega reproached the absence of such generation at the time of speaking and for this reason he conceived his university lessons as having a precise aim. His teaching: «aspira [...] tal vez sin lograrlo, a cumplir con toda pulcritud el imperativo histórico de nuestra generación» [OC, III: 567], which consisted in a paradigmatic change of the Spanish intellectual and institutional scenario.

He considered his professorship as a political tribune, and he defined a very ambitious plane, that of: «buscar una rigurosa y amplia orientación en los rumbos de la historia» [*Ibidem*]. This would have been realised through a philosophical investigation of the new tendencies of the mass society, a meditation on the structure of the public life with the aim of constructing an elitist ruling class able of comprehending, explicating and regulating it:

La política es gravitación de unas masas sobre otras. Ahora bien; para que una modificación de los senos históricos llegue a la masa, tiene que haber influido en la minoría selecta. Pero los miembros de ésta son de dos clases: el hombre de acción y el hombre de contemplación. No es dudoso que las nuevas tendencias, todavía germinante y débiles, serán percibidas primero por los temperamentos contemplativos que por los activos. La urgencia del momento impide al hombre de acción sentir las vagas brisas iniciales que, por el pronto, no pueden henchir su práctico velamen. [...] La materia

delicadísima de la ciencia es sensible a las menores trepidaciones de la vitalidad, y puede servir para registrar ahora con tenues signos lo que andando los años se verá proyectado gigantescamente sobre el escenario de la vida pública [OC, III: 570-571].

Starting from these premises he argues in favour of a “reform of the intellect”. Thus, the epistemological inquiry he develops in the first part of this course is very strictly bound to his political call for a reform of culture and therefore of the teaching methodology. His critiques towards a dogmatic and abstract teaching and his defence of a more personalised instruction were directed towards a precise target: the building of a new form of intellectuality able to speak to an ample audience and to have a relevant political influence through his soft intellectual power. This constant Ortega’s worry is reflected in his very theory of knowledge in which, talking about the formation of cultural paradigms, he argues that:

No basta, por ejemplo, que una idea científica o política parezca por razones geométicas verdadera para que debemos sustentarla. Es preciso que, además, suscite en nosotros una fe plenaria y sin reserva alguna. Cuando esto no ocurre, nuestro deber es distanciarnos de aquélla y modificarla cuanto sea necesario para que ajuste rigurosamente con nuestra orgánica exigencia [OC, III: 585-586].

As a result, his philosophical account implies at least two important consequences concerning the role he assigned to the intellectuals in society. Firstly, since every scientific idea is fundamentally linked to the most urgent questions concerning the concrete biological, political and intellectual life of individuals, this implies that the philosophical activity should always consist in an analysis of the present that pays attention to these concrete aspects. Secondly, given the significance of an ample and diffuse acceptance of the cultural paradigm brought about by this activity, Ortega supports the idea of the intellectual engaged in politics and able to communicate his ideas to the mass. This is not considered by the philosopher as an homogenous group, but rather as a discrete sum of potentially reasonable individuals. The intellectual has the duty to talk to this conjunct of individuals trying to rationally persuade them of the correctness and utility of the system of ideas purported by him and his generation.

For this reason his pedagogy is grounded on the principle of the personalisation of teaching, given the importance he assigned to the individual comprehension as the main pillar of the educative process:

«la verdad integral sólo se obtiene articulando lo que el prójimo ve con lo que yo veo; y así sucesivamente» [OC, III: 616]. This thesis constituted the core of his pedagogy as expressed in his university lessons during that period. In this way he connected the general culture purported by a generation to the individual dimension of a liberal education: «El “sentido teórico” de un juicio es, pues, algo objetivo a que se llega por medio del acto de juzgar, que es una actividad del sujeto» [OC, VII: 792]. This constitutes the kernel of the *cultural liberalism* purported by Ortega’s theory of education which ends up by promoting the political participation of every and each individual⁴¹.

So, his university teaching shared the same basic traits of his popular writings. He did not think to the academia as the place for building a neutral and objective science, at least as far as humanities were concerned. On the contrary, he conceived it as a social institution which should have been responsible of a political and historical change within the Spanish culture and society. This radical change had to be realised through a rational reform rendered possible by the educative process, not through a revolution. This is what he underlined also in a short text he added to *El tema de nuestro tiempo, El ocaso de las revoluciones* (1923). Ortega condemned both the irrational and violent forms of political revolution and those characterised by an excessively utopian and rationalistic vision. Indeed, given his cultural liberalism, he conceived every effective political movement as a concrete manifestation of an idea, of an original and creative thinking. As he put it:

Todo el mundo estará de acuerdo en reconocer que las revoluciones no son en esencia otra cosa que radicalismo político. Pero tal vez no todo el mundo advierte el verdadero sentido de esta fórmula. [...] No se es *radical en política* porque se sea radical *en política*, sino porque antes se es radical en el pensamiento [OC, III: 626].

The basic difference from an utopian revolution and an effective reform plane would lie on the different degree of concreteness in relation to the vital needs of the citizens involved in it. He thought that the decade of the ‘20s would have been unable to produce an authentic

⁴¹ As written by Valero Lumberas, 2013: 52-53: «Esta dualidad y el énfasis de herencia claramente institucionista, en la dimensión pedagógica de la política de construcción de un hombre interior, de una personalidad moralmente sólida que se proyectase al exterior en una tarea común, sería un rayo permanente del liberalismo cultural orteguiano, sin cuya consideración se corre el riesgo de mal interpretar la dimensión política de la obra del filósofo».

revolution since he was sure that the failure of the utopian revolution of the past century would have produced a transitional epoch characterised by a revitalisation of traditionalism and conservatism. During such a period the political consensus would have been based on an unquestioned faith in the social norms rather than on a rational comprehension of these same social norms⁴². This was, according to Ortega, what was happening in Spain during that period in which the old-regime still remained in power:

El caso de España es bien claro: se han dado y se dan extremadamente en nuestro país todos los otros factores que se suelen considerar decisivos para que la revolución explote. Sin embargo, no ha habido propiamente espíritu revolucionario. Nuestra inteligencia étnica ha sido siempre una función atrofiada que no ha tenido un normal desarrollo [OC, III: 636].

However he conceived these periods as transitional and as essentially anti-intellectualist epochs. Indeed, *the intellectual should always aim at enhancing in the population a rational and not superstitious comprehension of reality*. This was due to the fact that: «El filósofo, el intelectual, anda siempre entre los bastidores revolucionarios. Sea dicho en su honor. Es él el profesional de la razón pura y cumple con su deber hallándose en la brecha antitradicionalista» [OC, III: 637]. Thus, Ortega also in his university lessons supported the idea of the intellectual as engaged in the political debate, not as a mere politician, but rather as an anti-conformist and critical spectator. *His duty was mainly avoiding that the masses were manipulated by charismatic leaders*. For this reason, when shortly after, in 1923, Spain experienced the authoritative and dictatorial leadership of Primo de Rivera, Ortega did manifest a sense of frustration and pessimism towards the possibility of putting into practice his intellectual reform.

The dictatorship of Primo de Rivera represented just the first of a series of cases in which, during his long intellectual life, Ortega had to face a relevant change in the political regime. A change largely opposed to his own political and philosophical perspective and, at the same time, in contrast to the political ideas prevalently endorsed by the University.

⁴² Ortega developed such political view influenced by the case of the Roman Empire as presented by the German historian Theodor Mommsen who, according to him, demonstrated that: «Las épocas post-revolucionarias, tras una hora muy fugaz de aparente esplendor, son tiempo de decadencia» [OC, III: 639]. Mommsen constituted a constant reference of Ortega's political thought, in particular as far as his reflection on the idea of "nation" is concerned. See in particular Aguilar Gavilán, 1998 and Bagur Taltavull 2013.

The analysis of his posture during this and other occasions will surely permit to comprehend to what extent his theorisations were reflected in his political behaviour and, concurrently, how the changing political circumstances determined a radical reformulation of some of his main ideas.

2.4 Ortega during the dictatorship (1923-1929)

The *Alzamiento* of Primo de Rivera on 13th September 1923 had a significant impact on the Spanish cultural atmosphere. A wave of catholic traditionalism invaded the University. The new minister of education, Eduardo Callejo, fought against the influence of the JAE within the educative system, trying to introduce a different pedagogical ideal: that of the *Colegios mayores* [Ribagorda, 2013: 116-121]. However, in spite of this radical change in the pedagogical trend, Ortega maintained his influential role both within and outside the university. This was mainly due to the fact that the elitist ideas he purported in some of his more famous writings [e. g. *España Invertebrada* and, partially, *El tema del nuestro tiempo*] did find a very good reception within right wings and conservative circles [Cerezo González Cuevas, 2009: 82-84]⁴³. Moreover, Ortega did not take position against the General and, in relation to the new political regime, often showed a quite ambiguous public posture.

A clear example of the conservative interpretation of Ortega's thought is offered by the fortune of one of his article he wrote in 1920 in which he sustained the thesis according to which, in order to end with the communist wave of strikes in 1920, it would have been necessary the direct intervention of an authoritative power [OC, III: 313-314]. This precedent episode was later uncritically interpreted as an endorsement

⁴³ This conservative interpretation of Ortega's thought is still endorsed by some of the main scholars of his thought. The very González Cueva, for instance, affirmed that since 1914 Ortega moved towards a conservative perspective which culminated in his endorsement of Primo de Rivera's dictatorship. See in particular Cerezo González Cuevas, 2006: 272-273: «El pronunciamiento militar del 13 de septiembre de 1923 acaudillado por el general Miguel Primo de Rivera fue favorablemente recibido por el filósofo, que tres años antes, como ya sabemos, había pedido una dictadura militar».

Sometimes, the instrumental interpretation of Ortega's thought which circulated in the conservative groups of the time had been ingenuously confused with the very idea purported by the philosopher. This is the case of the short essay written by Truelsen Floría, 2008.

to the regime of Miguel Primo de Rivera. This was also due to the instrumental use of Ortega made by the very dictator during his first manifestation as the new leader of the country in Barcelona in 1923, where he directly quoted the philosopher's words [Fonck, 1996: 126-127].

Moreover, another relevant factor which contributed to Ortega's fortune during the first part of the dictatorship was the misuse made of his political theses by some university students. These young students were active in political organisations, in particular the *Asociación Católica Nacional de Propagandistas*, founded in 1908 [Montero, 1993]. This is the case, for instance, of José María Pemán and José Pemartín Sanjuan, two students of the University of Cadiz who would later be two reference points of the following regime of Francisco Franco. The ideology of Primo de Rivera's movement was extremely fragile and badly defined. It represented an eclectic political thought in which coexisted extremely different authors such as Balmes, Ganivet, Vázquez de Mella, Ortega, Scheler, Bergson or Schmitt [Castro Sánchez, 2013]. Many of the concepts elaborated by Ortega were used for the purpose of legitimating the new regime and a violent political behaviour. In particular the thesis of the selected minority developed by the philosopher in his *España invertebrada* played a significant role in labelling him as a conservative and reactionary thinker.

However, if we take into consideration the opinions Ortega personally expressed few days after the *Alzamiento* of Primo de Rivera, we discover a completely different reality. The philosopher wrote an article to be published by *El Sol* in October 1923, *Política de estos días*. The article did not appear in the press due to a radical change in the editorial politics of the liberal newspaper that was trying to counter the conservative attacks of the *ABC* by nearing to the dictatorship. Indeed, *El Sol* were facing relevant economic problems and these critics, together with the austerity of the *Papelera Española*, were causing the newspaper's bankrupt. Ortega's article remained unpublished both because of the military and editorial censorship of the very newspaper in which he had to publish [Fonck, 2010: 12-16]. In this writing⁴⁴ Ortega defends his right to intervene as a free and independent intellectual within the public debate by criticising the military dictatorship of Primo de Rivera. He separated himself from the tendency of this new political front of using his very words as a sort of slogan, depriving them of their authentic meaning and of any philosophical substance. In particular, he

⁴⁴ The text of Ortega's article has been published in the recent edition of his complete works. See OC, VII: 803-806.

argues that his thesis, that was being abusively used, had been previously thought in a completely different context and for pursuing opposite ends. In fact:

Con otros hombres de ciencia y de letras que pertenecen a mi generación, he combatido ásperamente a los viejos políticos y a la vieja política durante más de quince años. Me importa recordar que la expresión “vieja política” se ha levantado hasta la popularidad que hoy goza de una mísera conferencia mía dada en 1914. Conste, pues, que me he badito contra el eclipsado régimen más que casi todos los españoles que ahora resumen su patriotismo [OC, VII: 805].

By underlining his patriotism Ortega is not supporting the new nationalist regime. On the contrary, he says this exclusively to counter the incorrect exploitation of his thesis by this new ideology:

Por mi parte, no estoy dispuesto a aceptar esa línea mágica que arbitrariamente se quiere trazar con ánimo de imponer a todo prójimo una localización forzosa. La perversidad del antiguo régimen no abona en modo alguno cualquier otro con que se le quiera sustituir. [...] Y las ideas, tópicos, sentimientos que dominan la vida española en estas semanas no me parecen los más adecuados para que se forje una nueva nación saludable [*Ibidem*].

Thus, Ortega neither endorsed nor directly opposed the new political regime that, he though, could potentially help the country to ameliorate in comparison to the recent past, but only if the new establishment had previously realised a «profunda rectificación de ideas y de actos» [OC, VII: 806]. A rectification that, to Ortega, could be carried about only through the advising role of the intellectuals. Therefore, the Madrilenian philosopher did not renounce to the possibility of playing an influential role also within this new political movement in which many of his students had taken part. During the first years of Rivera’s dictatorship (1923-1926), Ortega published several articles both in *El Sol* and in the very review of the movement: *La Nación*. Through these articles he continued to influence the public debate. Moreover, he reflected more critically on the importance of the intellectuals and education in determining the consensus towards one political regime rather than another.

Indeed, in *Sobre la vieja política* (November 1923), Ortega reproached the populist aptitude of the regime. In fact: «lo más pernicioso que puede hacerse es halagar sus [of the mass] torcidos instintos, dándole a entender que es ella virtuosa y que sus males proceden de individuos determinados, y, al fin y al cabo, sobresalientes» [OC, III: 553]. Ortega

insisted in affirming the need of changing and reforming the Spanish politics, but he thought that in order to do this *it would have been necessary to forge a new bourgeoisie, an upper-middle class able to rationally participate in politics*. Even in this new scenario he did not renounce to present his main theses in favour of a cultural reform of the nation that had to precede the consequent political one: «La curación de España es faena mucho más grave, mucho más honda de lo que suele pensarse. Tiene que atacar estratos del cuerpo nacional mucho más profundos que la “política”, la cual no representa sino la periferia y cutis de la sociedad» [OC, III: 554]. The indirect advices he gives to Rivera’s establishment can therefore be summarised in two main points: a) favouring the presence of intellectuals within the political cabinet; b) having the courage of taking unpopular decisions for benefiting the country in the middle-long term. Thus, *the partial support of Ortega to regime constituted at the same time a veiled critique*.

One instance frequently quoted as a proof of Ortega’s endorsement to the regime of Primo de Rivera is the series of articles entitled *Ideas Políticas* (1924). In particular, the philosopher is often reproached for being a supporter of a conservative and authoritative form of government during the ‘20s when he wrote that: «El paso por la dictadura creo yo que será una admirable experiencia pedagógica para las sociedades actuales» [OC, III: 681]. However, Ortega is extremely ironical in mentioning such pedagogical utility which rather than a support of the dictatorship turns out to be a ferocious critique of it: «al cabo de ella, aprenderán las masas – que no se convencen con razones, sino por los efectos sufridos en su propia carne – que ciertas libertades no son, a la altura de estos tiempos, cuestiones políticas sobre que quepa, en principio, discusión» [*Ibidem*]. Thus, also during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera Ortega did not renounce to promote a liberal political reform within a democratic framework. At the same time, this very democracy was considered by Ortega as indispensable to transform and ameliorate the society by enhancing the rationality of its members, of a mass he wanted to convert in an enlighten minority [Peris Suay, 2014]. The authoritarianism which was spreading in the whole Europe should have represented, to Ortega, only a transient moment of its political history whose positive function would have been that of rehabilitating the liberal Parliamentary system as an instrument for promoting a public and rational debate⁴⁵. All the articles of the series

⁴⁵ J. Ortega y Gasset, *El parlamento: cómo dignificar su función*, in OC, III, p. 685-686: «La dignidad del Parlamento exige que se le dispense de intervenir directa ni indirectamente en las menudencias de la existencia diaria. [...] El nuevo

Ideas Políticas analyse the importance of reforming the parliamentary institution, but only after having put into practice a concrete educational reform: «¡Educación, cultura! Ahí está todo. Ésa es la reforma sustancial» [OC, III: 693].

Thus, the struggle against illiteracy and ignorance envisaged, according to Ortega, the construction of a new form of humanistic education. During these years the philosopher engaged in what was a very relevant debate within the Spanish intellectuals at that time, i.e. the nature of the normative ideal of a new humanism. This debate started from the publication of a book by Ramiro de Maeztu, a friend of Ortega during his youth⁴⁶, who, in *La crisis del humanismo* (1919) argued in favour of the restoration of a traditionalist thinking, eradicated in the past and with a catholic outlook. In this text, against Ortega's proposal for a liberal intellectual reform, Maeztu supported the establishment of a «clasicismo cristiano» [Maeztu, 2001: 89] in order to ameliorate the conditions of the country⁴⁷. In fact, he thought that only the medieval and Christian tradition could have resolved the Spanish cultural crisis. Ortega did take place in this debate, supporting Maeztu's thesis of the necessity of a reform of humanism and humanistic culture as a way to reform the society, but conceiving it in an opposite direction. Indeed, he thought that Maeztu's thesis:

con ser de gran interés, no ha conseguido convencer a muchos que, como yo, sólo desearíamos llegar a convencernos de que el latín y el griego enseñan, mejor que otro aprendizaje, a movilizar el pensamiento. En cambio, debe insistir con denuedo en la formación de esa Liga contra la Incultura. El día en que esa Liga existiese y gozase de plenitud, España estaría salvada. Porque la reforma sustantiva de nuestra nación tiene que ser de nuestra sociedad y no de nuestra política [OC, III: 694].

To the same problem the two intellectuals offered totally different solutions, in spite of the syncretism that the political rhetoric of a young

Parlamento debe funcionar con poca frecuencia y gran solemnidad, debe decidir sobre pocas y elevadas cuestiones, debe mantenerse a una patética distancia de lo menudo y cotidiano».

⁴⁶ Ortega in 1914 dedicated his famous *Meditaciones del Quijote* to his friend Ramiro de Maeztu.

⁴⁷ As José Luis Villacañas wrote in relation to this book: «Con este libro ya se cierra el camino de modernización social-liberal que, en paralelo con Ortega, Maeztu había emprendido en 1901. A partir de este libro las soluciones de Maeztu hallaron sus veneros en las últimas teorías antimodernas a su disposición» [Villacañas, 2000: 166].

group of right-wing students were realising during that period. The same misleading interpretation affected also the idea of “nation” as conceived by Ortega. In particular, his thesis about the necessity of overcoming the party system in favour of the construction of a unique political project able to look at the interest of the nation as a whole and not at the interest of some lobbies was now intended as an endorsement to the nationalistic party of Primo de Rivera. In fact, by imitating the example of Mussolini, who created the fascist only party in 1922, the following year the Spanish general had founded an analogous party.

In conclusion, the analysis of Ortega’s writings and lessons during the dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera – in which some scholars have sometimes identified an open endorsement to the regime – has reveals that his political thinking and intellectual posture maintained a strong continuity with his precedent meditations, supporting very similar theses to the ones that brought him to the creation of the LEP in 1914. His support to the General is limited to an initial period and his optimism towards the possibility of a change in the country purported by a new political movement was very scant. He always was extremely cautious and sceptical due to the illiberal character of the regime. In particular during its subsequent stabilisation that started from December 1925. Ortega did not support neither right nor left fronts during this period and, as Beatrice Fonck has rightly put it: «La benevolencia de Ortega respecto al nuevo régimen es aparente y en cierta forma demoledora» [Fonck, 2010: 17]. Against the political radicalisation of two opposite fronts which began during the ‘20s, Ortega argued in favour of an independent intellectual posture since: «“Derechas” e “izquierdas”, las dos Iglesias, me excomulgan, cada cual desde su mano» [OC, III: 802]⁴⁸. He thought that the popular irrational and uncritical support to one of these fronts constituted a serious danger for the development of a liberal democracy. The regime manifested, according to Ortega, a complete lack of cultural and historical substance, and for this reason he progressively rejected it: «La dictadura desnuda y a la intemperie, sin atmósfera de pensamiento, toma fácilmente el aspecto de un simple suceso que no llega a ser un momento histórico. [...] Sólo las ideas pueden darle estabilidad» [OC, IV: 32]. Consequently, he advocates for himself a critical and intellectual role aimed at explaining the reasons of the upheaval of such radical movements in order to counter them.

⁴⁸ Ortega strongly criticised also the left during this period. For a presentation of his main arguments see in particular García Queipo de Llano, 1998: 246-249.

2.5 *The University of Madrid during the dictatorship*

Due to the radicalisation of the political debate, since the end of 1925 Ortega started to separate more firmly the political and the academic spheres. This attitude was a consequence of the growing intrusion of the press censorship and, secondly, of the factual rejection of the philosopher's advice by the establishment. His last attempt to conquest a significant role in shaping the ideology of the regime is probably constituted by some articles he published on the conservative leader Antonio Maura. Through these texts he partially praised some of the policies carried about by the recently died conservative leader⁴⁹. His strategy is plain and he would repeat it also in the future, during the dictatorship of Francisco Franco. Put it shortly, *he decided to indirectly talk about current political situations by referring to past political actors or public figures who were appreciated and esteemed by the regime in charge. This strategy was aimed at achieving two main results: a) escaping from a rigid censorship and b) taking part into an existing debate, gaining public attention without speaking of apparently too sensitive topics.* Indeed, in spite of being considered by the movement's press as a «pontífice laico»⁵⁰, during this time he enjoyed extremely limited spaces of intellectual freedom.

From 1926 he consequently decided to devote himself to more neutral topics, such as aesthetic, literature, etc. These changing political circumstances moved him to elaborate a philosophical justification of the separation between the political and the intellectual spheres. This theorisation is rigorously expressed in particular in a long essay entitled *Mirabeau o el Político* (1927). His critique of the intellectual poorness of the regime brought him to radically distinguish between two ontologically different forms of living: «los ocupados y los preocupados; políticos e intelectuales» [OC, IV: 210]. The intellectual, Ortega argues, is often expelled from the political scenario, but this does not mean that a critical aptitude should not be adopted by the very politicians. In fact: «en el progreso de los tiempos la sociedad se complica y los políticos necesitan ser cada vez más intelectuales» [OC, IV: 222]. He criticised the popular misconception of the successful politician conceived exclusively as a charismatic and authoritative man of deeds. Such authoritarianism, without the ability to convince the masses by rationally defending his

⁴⁹ As Zamora Bonilla wrote, in these texts Ortega aim was that of: «obligar al ciudadano a participar en la vida pública entregando al mayor número de ciudadanos la toma de decisiones sobre los problemas que les afectaban» [Zamora Bonilla, 2002: 252].

⁵⁰ *La Nación*, 22-VII-1926.

legitimacy, would constitute a very fragile form of government⁵¹. The rational support of the public opinion, realised also through the help of the intellectuals, was according to Ortega an indispensable condition for the establishment and maintenance over time of a political regime.

This statement could sound like a prophecy considering the evolution of Primo de Rivera's dictatorship and the effects that the lack of intellectual participation to his project produced. Indeed, since 1926, the Spanish academia, and in particular the University of Madrid, started to manifest its dissent towards the political leader. Just some months before, the very brother of Ortega, Eduardo, wrote from his French exile a very influencing book in which he directly countered the dictator⁵². The regime responded through a repressive and violent public attack against those persons identified by the conservative press as "false intellectuals", opposed to the "true intellectuals" which supported the politics of Primo de Rivera⁵³. Among the authentic intellectuals there were authors such as Eugenio d'Ors, Ramiro de Maeztu, Ramón y Cajal, etc.

These were very prestigious figures of the Spanish cultural scenario, but their influence did not spread effectively throughout the entire University system. Indeed, the importance of conquering this institution and imposing a conservative pedagogical model – that of the catholic traditionalism – was absolutely clear to the regime. However, in particular in the case of Madrid, this aim had to face the resistances of an institution which had been recently shaped according to liberal and reformist principles. In fact, the University of Madrid represented a bastion of liberalism and democratic thinking during this period, and also a place of exacerbated political radicalisation and violence between generations, both vertically and horizontally speaking⁵⁴. The catholic

⁵¹ «El que haya perseguido con alguna curiosidad los últimos siglos de Roma, habrá notado este trágico hecho: el gran político no parece. En vez de reconocer la forzosidad de unir la fuerza con la inteligencia, se hacen ensayos de exclusivismo, acentuando al extremo la dote de fuerza y se busvan puros hombres de acción» [OC, IV: 222].

⁵² Eduardo Ortega y Gasset, *La verdad sobre la dictadura*, Paris, Juan Dura, 1925.

⁵³ See *ABC*, 24-IV-1926.

⁵⁴ Ribagorda, 2013: 27: «La oposición a la Dictadura de Primo de Rivera constituyó la divisoria entre el ciclo "antiguo" y el "moderno" de la protesta en las aulas, que adoptó contornos políticos francamente revolucionarios aunque con importantes implicaciones reformistas en las esferas económica, religiosa, moral, cultural, sexual o educativa. [...] La deriva perversa de la agitación escolar hacia la violencia politizada fue el ultimo acto de un ciclo de protesta

front crashed with a liberal and modernising thinking that had been forged at least during the previously twenty years by the ILE and other relevant educative institutions (JAE, RE, RS). This is rendered evident by considering the overall composition of the university teachers in Madrid. In 1925, 75% of them, for instance, had a direct link to JAE [Otero Carvajal, 2013: 44-50].

The dictator tried to take part in the reform of the university system. He also tried to present himself as an intellectual and, after having donated a large amount of money to the University of Salamanca, in July 1926 he had also been proclaimed *Doctor ad honorem*. During the dictatorship the university started to be more open to the masses, attracting a growing number of students. The university population almost duplicated in the period comprised between 1923 and 1929, passing from 29.000 to 45.000 students⁵⁵. When Ortega started his teaching activity in 1908, the overall university population amounted to 15.000 students⁵⁶. This quantitative change – which did not depend on the national institutional and political change – determined the need of constructing new infrastructures for accommodating the students. In Madrid the project of a new campus started to be implemented during that period by the king Alfonso XIII in 1927 [Niño, 2013]. Moreover, the minister of education Eduardo Callejo promoted, in 1926, a growing autonomy of the university, that ended up favouring the construction of religious research centres and colleges.

The idea of the conservative and Catholic dictatorship, as presented for instance by Pemartín in 1928 in his book entitled *Los valores históricos de la dictadura española*, had to appear an aberration to the liberal intellectual class. Indeed, the laicism, liberalism and Europeanism which Ortega and his colleagues had spread within the university represented the antibodies against the capillary diffusion of authoritarianism in Spain during the '20s. The political ideology of the right and conservative movement was grounded on three main pillars: a) a political and economic corporatism; b) the construction of a restricted elite with the aim of manipulating the masses; c) the defence of the legitimacy of an extremely powerful executive power [Castro Sánchez, 2014: 60]. All these points were radically opposed by the

estudiantil que había comenzado a mediados de los años veinte y que se clausuró dramáticamente en el baño de sangre de la guerra civil.

⁵⁵ *Datos y cifras de la enseñanza en España*, in «Revista Sindical de Estadística», 114, 1966, pp. 36-38.

⁵⁶ Acuña de, J., Vargas de, P. [1927], pp. 136-142.

political and cultural reform suggested by Ortega and generally purported within the University.

For this reason, the Madrilenian philosopher can be collocated among the group of the “false intellectuals”, using the distinction adopted by the new political establishment. This is proven by a letter sent to Ortega by the director of the *Ateneo de Madrid* in 1927⁵⁷, Gregorio Marañón, who praised Ortega’s book on Mirabeau (1927) of which, he says: «He hablado con mucha gente. Ha hecho un gran efecto»⁵⁸. So, since at least 1926 within the intellectual class and in particular within the University of Madrid, emerged a fervent opposition towards the regime of Primo de Rivera. An opposition that partially contributed to the progressive lack of popular appeal of his political proposal⁵⁹.

The majority of the intellectual community did not support anything of the educative policy of the regime. The following events that took place in 1928-1929 revealed that the support of this community would have been indispensable in order to guarantee the survival of the regime. Indeed, it was within the University, opposing to the Callejo’s law, that in the summer 1928 the students started to manifest against the regime. The protest exacerbated between the end of February and the beginning of March 1929 with the strike in the Faculty of Law. The conflicts were so harsh to impose to close the university of Madrid for almost two years, from 16th March 1929 until the end of October 1930. The violence spread in the very centre of the Spanish capital, causing surprise, fear and grudge in the population.

During all this period Ortega continued to be a reference point within the University, both among his colleagues and the students. And, among these, both for those who belonged to the Catholic front and to those who belonged to the opposition. This is proven by a letter sent to Ortega by a group of students affiliated to the *Confederación de Estudiantes Católicos de España* who at the end of 1929, during the

⁵⁷ The *Ateneo* had indeed already manifested its hostility towards the regime in the spring 1926, affirming that: «el pensamiento no puede vivir sin la libertad». See *Note of the Junta del Ateneo de Madrid*, in Queipo de Llano, 1998: 275.

⁵⁸ Letter by Gregorio Marañón to Ortega y Gasset, in Archivo Fundación José Ortega y Gasset-Gregorio Marañón, Madrid, C-30/ 12.

⁵⁹ It is important to point out that a first opposition to the regime within the academia already emerged in 1924 when Miguel de Unamuno was suspended from his chair of Greek at the University of Salamanca. However this constituted just a sporadic case, a single episode which did not determine a consistent and organised opposition to the regime. See in particular González Xalleja, 2005: 290-298.

dramatic events which were taking place in the university, asked him to indicate: «su manera de pensar sobre la intervención de los estudiantes en la vida y gobierno de la Universidad»⁶⁰. Ortega was constantly evoked by both of the fronts. However, in all his public interventions of this period he continued to observe a more or less rigid political neutrality, without abandoning his major preoccupation: the cultural reorganization of the country through an educative reform that had to start from the University.

2.6 *The reform of the University*

Following the *cierre* of the University in 1929 Ortega resigned from his role as a professor, showing his non-acceptance of the regime⁶¹. Even if independently from the formal schooling system he continued to teach, passing from the university class to the theatres and cinemas of Madrid. The lessons he gave in the cinema Rex and the theatre Infanta Isabel in 1929 – *Qué es filosofía* – represented the chance he always sought to get in touch with an ampler public⁶². Ortega's fame reached his climax during this period and in particular after the publication in 1930 of the complete book of his famous *Rebelión de las Masas*, his most popular and internationally renowned book.

When, the 9th October 1930, the University re-opened Ortega's popularity was at its best. Some students belonging to the FUE invited him to give a conference on the most urgent topic at stake: the future of the University after the end of the dictatorship. The dramatic events of the precedent years evidently called for a meditation on the social role of this institution, its scope and aims. Ortega accepted the invitation. Not only he gave this conference, but he also published his reflections on *El Sol* and, soon after, a collection of these articles in the form of a

⁶⁰ Letter to Ortega by the students of *Confederación de Estudiantes católicos de España*, 6-XII-1929, in AOG, Madrid, C-102/ 26.

⁶¹ On 18th March 1929 Ortega wrote a letter to the minister of education to resign from his charge: «Excelentísimo Señor, tengo el honor de elevar a Usted mi dimisión del cargo de catedrático de Metafísica de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la Universidad de Madrid, que he desempeñado durante diez y ocho años sin gloria, pero con decoro». In *Archivo General de la Administración, Alcalá de Henares*, 31. 5708.2, in particular 13817 “*Expediente personal del Catedrático José Ortega y Gasset*”.

⁶² Indeed, as written by Zamora Bonilla, 2004: «Era la primera vez en la historia de la España contemporánea que la filosofía salía de las aulas y cautivaba a un gran número de oyentes no profesionales».

book entitled *Misión de la Universidad*. This threefold circulation of his theses makes patent the will of the philosopher to propose his reflection to the public opinion through all the possible channels offered to him [Blanco Alonso, 2005: 101-145]. He conceived his role as similar to that of a philosopher of the Enlightenment: contributing to forging a critical public opinion. Indeed, such a critical public opinion, according to Ortega, was completely absent in the Europe of the 1930s. To be established it needed to be spread thanks to a process of civilisation among the population. This would constitute a long time process which would have involved both a cultural and a political education of the masses in order to reassure the validity of social institutions by exhibiting the historical reasons that brought to their meaningful creation and maintenance over time [Sánchez Cámara, 2003]⁶³.

The *Mission of the University* constitutes without any doubt not only a philosophical and pedagogical, but also a political text. This is evidently proven by the introductory discourse he addressed to his students⁶⁴. He presents himself as a spiritual guide and as a heir of the tradition of the pedagogical renewal started by ILE and the other related institutions⁶⁵.

This remark did not constitute a nostalgic souvenir of the past, of the beginning of his teaching career. On the contrary, he argued that the theories of the ILE would finally have had the possibility to be put into practice in the new University that was going to be created. In fact, the ideas spread by that institution in the past, given the slow rhythm of history, were finally founding a favourable ground to flourish in the current situation. Ortega affirms that the present conditions had finally favoured the creation of an unanimous group of people, of intellectuals, who were expressing a common goal since they were sharing a common background. They all wanted to reform this institution, according to the basic principles expressed by the ILE:

⁶³ A similar concept of the public opinion has been presented for instance by Searle, 2010: 103: As Searle puts it: «the institutions and the institutional facts within the institution require continued recognition or acceptance because they exist only as long as they are so recognized and accepted»

⁶⁴ This text has been recently published in the last complete edition of his works, see in particular *Temple para la reforma*, in OC, IV.

⁶⁵ «Miren ustedes: ahora vendrán a hacer los veinticinco años que escribí mis primeros artículos sobre reforma del Estado español en general y de la Universidad en particular. Aquellos artículos que me valieron la amistad de don Francisco Giner de los Ríos» [OC, IV: 1034-1035].

Sin duda la hora es feliz; llegan ustedes en la madrugada de una fecha ilustre: un pueblo durmiente durante siglos comienza a estremecerse con esos menudos temblores torpes que anuncian en un cuerpo el despertar y que va a ponerse en pie [OC, IV: 1036].

The group indicated by Ortega is more likely to be that composed of some Madrilenian professors, writers and intellectuals who, on 23th March 1930 went to Barcelona for an homage to the Catalan intellectuals. That trip forecasted the following creation of a delegation of the Spanish *intelligentsia* wanted to reform the country. Among them, apart from the very Ortega y Gasset, the Madrilenian group was composed of Gregorio Marañón, Pérez de Ayala, Jiménez de Asúa, Pedro Salinas, Menéndez Pidal, Luis de Zulueta, Lorenzo Luzuriaga, Sánchez Albornoz, Araquistán, García Lorca and others [Márquez Padorno, 2003: 47-54]. That recent experience constituted a vivid memory in the mind of Ortega when speaking to his students of an existing path towards a radical reform of the University for which he called for a collaboration of students and teachers.

He criticised the students' drift towards violence and the extreme politicisation of the University of Madrid, and interpreted them as symptoms of the spreading of populism within the academia. In this context populism appeared to him as a synonym of briskness and slovenliness, of a lack of patience and reflexion. In particular, he uses the expression *chabacanería* which, according to him, would constitute the radical evil of the Spanish society, representing the concrete manifestation of the public ignorance he had always tried to counter. This condition, says Ortega, had rendered impossible a real investigation and intellectual activity within the University. For this reason, he affirms that: «Desde hace años he tenido que buscar un sitio fuera del edificio universitario porque los gritos habituales de los señores estudiantes, estacionados en los pasillos, hacen imposible entenderse dentro de las aulas» [OC, IV: 1039].

The reform of the University is therefore considered as a priority in order to interrupt the continuous degeneration of this institution. For this purpose he considers as indispensable to reverse the process of depersonalisation that was taking place both within and outside the academia, with the aim of reforming the political situation of the whole country: «Para actuar sobre una masa hay que dejar de serlo, hay que ser fuerza viva, hay que ser grupo en forma» [OC, IV: 1040]. As in the case of the *Rebelión de las Masas*, also the educative reform proposed by Ortega deals with the social category of the mass-man, the *hombre masa*. With this term he indicates a mediocre person whose cognitive abilities, character and desires are the expression of an uneducated person who,

in his everyday life, simply conforms to the rest of the population without thinking autonomously [OC, V: 252]. To counter this situation, whose pernicious effects, according to the philosopher, recently came into being in the widespread use of violence as a political instrument both in Spain and in the rest of Europe, he considered as indispensable to foster a mass education. The University, conceived by Ortega as the right place to foster a careful investigation, should therefore be open to a larger audience⁶⁶. But before doing this, it was necessary to change its functioning, which has proved to cause more harms than benefits.

Indeed, the University should become a «principio promotor de la historia europea» [OC, IV: 568] by promoting a struggle against populism. This would have been rendered possible only through the construction of a comprehensive understanding of the reality and a following transmission of a systematic culture – conceived as a “system of vital ideas possessed by each historical epoch” [OC, IV: 568]. Therefore, to build the bases of a social rational consensus among the population it was necessary, according to Ortega, to transmit a cultural background that had to be generally shared by the whole population. *Since the mass man and the low social class had been conquering an increasing relevance within the political life, he suggested to open the University to a vaster audience.*

Given the low level of the students – i.e. of the mass man – it would have been necessary to introduce a basic pedagogical principle: the principle of economy in education. The University should have to guarantee a basic understanding of the main problems at stake, so to offer to everyone the minimum background indispensable for taking an active and meaningful part into the cultural debate. For this reason, the teaching should have been focused exclusively on general notions that every and each one could understand and from which everyone could have significantly benefitted both from a material and intellectual point of view. Thus, Ortega says:

Hay que partir del estudiante medio y considerar como núcleo de la institución universitaria, como su tornos o figura primaria, *exclusivamente* aquel cuerpo de enseñanzas que se le pueden en absoluto rigor exigir, o lo

⁶⁶ As Márquez Padorno rightly wrote [2001: 196]: «La Misión de la Universidad supuso así no sólo un estupendo análisis teórico, sino también el comienzo de la reforma propuesta en su páginas a través de su propio autor, indiscutible representante de la Universidad española, que acerca desde las mismas líneas de su ensayo y en sus escritos inmediatamente posteriores, el sereno análisis universitario al quehacer cotidiano».

que es igual, aquellas enseñanzas que un buen estudiante medio puede de verdad aprender [OC, IV: 549].

This consideration implies two further consequences: a) the necessity of building a unified study plan whose aim was that of offering a general understanding of all the basic questions of the current cultural debate. Indeed, he conceived this basic curriculum as composed of the following subjects: physics, biology, history, sociology and philosophy. Moreover, Ortega's account implies b) a very severe critique to a university oriented exclusively to fostering the research without paying attention to the fundamental role played by the didactic. For promoting the cultural development of citizens it was far more important to transmit notions and foster a critical attitude rather than concentrate exclusively on a self-referential research. The complexity of the contemporary cultural setting called for synthetic visions and not for hyper-specialised research:

Nunca tal vez el hombre medio ha estado tan por debajo de su propio tiempo, de lo que éste demanda. Por lo mismo, nunca han abundado tanto las existencias falsificadas, fraudulentas. Casi nadie está en su quicio, hincado en su auténtico destino. El hombre al uso vive de subterfugios con que se miente a sí mismo, fingiéndose en torno un mundo muy simple y arbitrario, a pesar de que la conciencia vital le hace constar a gritos que su verdadero mundo, el que corresponde a su plena actualidad, es enormemente complejo, preciso y exigente [OC, IV: 559].

With this reform proposal Ortega did not intend to eliminate the investigation from the university. He simply thought that this should not have been a priority of all the students and teachers being limited only to some of the best qualified students and researchers. For these reasons, Ortega also criticises the common attitude of his colleagues within the academia who only focus on their micro research without taking into account the problems which the current society in which they live was facing. In spite of the knowledge they possess on specific fields, they are just as barbarian as their students and the mass man in respect both to their own existences and to the social life. Ortega's proposals of a university reform took into consideration: a) a methodological reform (principle of economy); b) a recruiting reform (favouring the didactic and explanatory ability of the teachers); c) an infrastructure reform (promoting the modernisation of the institution). All these reforms were aimed at achieving a unique goal: rendering the University a really influential social institution, since: «La vida pública

necesita urgentemente la intervención en ella de la Universidad como tal» [OC, IV: 567]. Ortega's dream was that of a University that would have been able to contribute to the formation of the public opinion in a more effective and capillary way than the other mass media. Politics and education are conceived as complementary by the Spanish philosopher. A basic conviction that would have also oriented his political intervention after the publication of this reform proposal.

2.7 *A professor in politics*

Politics and university are conceived by Ortega as the two sides of a same coin. The first constitutes the place in which the public opinion exercises his right and duty to freely deliberate. But the public opinion is not merely created through polls or elections. These, Ortega thinks, are only the final outputs of a long and on-going process of discussion and mutual understanding that takes place in the everyday life⁶⁷. In fact, the public opinion that forms a mature liberal democracy cannot just be an expression of unthinking wills and instinctual reactions. On the contrary, it has to be a rational and critical view on social reality in order to ameliorate it [Peris Suay, 2009]. The public opinion that should characterise the life of a liberal democracy cannot permit the proliferation of an hyper-democracy in which all opinions, even the dumbest, count equally [Ariso, 2013]. For this reason, creating a public opinion is the main duty of the educative system and, in particular, of the University. This does not imply any form of propagandist teaching, since the plurality of points of view is always considered by Ortega as the basic condition for the flourishing of society and individuals. He just advocates for a critical education whose main goal would have been that of constructing a reflexive public opinion. This general theorisation did produce direct consequences on Ortega's public life.

⁶⁷ As Habermas 2006: 413 put it: «The presumption of reasonable outcomes rests in turn on the assumption that institutionalized discourses mobilize relevant topics and claims, promote the critical evaluation of contributions, and lead to rationally motivated yes or no reactions. Deliberation is a demanding form of communication, though it grows out of inconspicuous daily routines of asking for and giving reasons. In the course of everyday practices, actors are always already exposed to a space of reasons. They cannot but mutually raise validity claims for their utterances and claim that what they say should be assumed – and, if necessary, could be proved – to be true or right or sincere, and at any rate rational».

With the end of Primo de Rivera's dictatorship new political forces appeared on the horizon and new political projects were planned. The possibility of establishing a republican government acquired a progressively larger number of supporters. Among them, a group of intellectuals led by Ortega y Gasset. On 10th February 1931 the manifesto of this new political association was published in *El Sol*. That was the birth of the *Agrupación al Servicio de la República*. Significantly, before its publishing, the Manifesto already circulated within the University of Madrid [Márquez Padorno, 2003: 67-71]. The main Ortega's collaborators on this new political project were Gregorio Marañón and Pérez de Ayala. In this text Ortega justifies his participation in the active politics of his time, saying that the urgency of the political situation rendered indispensable «para todos salir de su profesión y ponerse sin reservas al servicio de la necesidad pública» [OC, IV: 660]. The Manifesto obtained the support of many liberal and socialist intellectuals soon after its publication. *Ortega definitely broke the barrier between politics and intellectual activity, being persuaded that this would have been necessary to realise the political reform he always envisaged and to construct: «una República que despierte en todos los españoles, a un tiempo, dinamismo y disciplina llamándolos a la soberana empresa de resucitar la historia de España [...] exigiendo mucho de cada ciudadano»* [OC, IV: 661].

The ASR did not obtain a unanimous acceptance among the intellectuals, especially among the conservative group. Eugenio d'Ors, for instance, immediately after the publication of the Manifesto wrote for *El Debate* an article in which he reproached those “espíritus ingenuos” who had decided to circulate this text among the University, and denouncing its lack of concreteness⁶⁸. Interestingly enough, among those who supported d'Ors statement there were many of those intellectuals who would later play a leading role in the University of Madrid from the decade of the '40s, such as Juan Zaragüeta, who also invited d'Ors to write an anti-manifesto [Márquez Padorno, 2003: 80]. The cultural and political platform created by Ortega participated in the general election on 12th April which marked the beginning of the republican government [Pecharromán, 2002: 40-45]. In the following election for the *Cortes Constituyentes* that took place in the summer 1931, Ortega was one of the 13 candidates of the ASR who obtained the right to sit in the constituent parliament. He was voted both in the province of León and Jaén, where he obtained respectively 58.000 and 80.000 votes [Márquez Padorno, 2003: 165]. The others member of the ASR to

⁶⁸ See Eugenio D'Ors, *El Debate*, Madrid, 1-II-1931.

be elected were all intellectuals and members of the upper civil society. Among them layers such as the secretary Justino de Azcárate, Juan Díaz del Moral, José Fernando González Uña, Manuel Rico Avello and Publio Suárez Uriarte. Doctors such as Gregorio Marañón and Vicente Irazo Enguita; engineers such as Juan José Santacruz and Bernardo Giner de los Ríos; and university teachers such as Alfonso García Valdecasas, José Pareja Yébenes or a writer as Ramón Pérez de Ayala.

The undisputed leader was without any doubt José Ortega y Gasset who thus began his new adventure in the parliament. In his new condition as a politician he tried to put his ideas in practice. So, he did not renounce to the political pedagogy he always tried to realise as a professor. Significantly, during the first discourse he pronounced during his political campaign he basically presented some of the theses he elucidate in his *Misión de la Universidad*. In León, the 26th June 1931, from the stage of a theatre he affirmed:

Dicen que a las masas no se les puede hablar de asuntos precisos y difíciles porque no los entienden. [...] Pero yo os digo lo siguiente: la idea más difícil del mundo cuando ha sido pensada por un hombre con plena claridad puede ser expuesta de manera que la entienda el entendimiento más humilde y el alma menos culta. Pero eso sí, la condición es que el que habla lo haya pensado antes de verdad y ponga luego un poco de amor y de entusiasmo para transmitirla al prójimo menos ilustrado. Porque la política democrática es algo que se hace con el pueblo, más por lo mismo, toda verdadera política democrática es, a la vez, educación y enseñanza del pueblo [OC, VIII: 489-490].

All the brief political activities of Ortega in the parliament – he only participated in the works of the ASR for approximately one year – were characterised by the defence of liberal democratic principles. He did not think that democracy represented a value *per se*, but only insofar as it could be useful «para el objetivo central de su filosofía política: la educación del pueblo en los valores de la cultura» [Lumbreras, 2013: 68]. He participated in the commission of the reform of the state, and also in the constitutional and the educative ones. All his parliamentary interventions were aimed at elevating the public debate by offering a more theoretic perspective on the issues at stake. His goal was that of effectively give his contribution to the definition of the new politics of the nascent Republic. In order to gain the support of his colleagues and the public opinion he coined enthusiastic expressions which would later have a great fortune among the right and conservative parties in the following years: that of the *national party* and that of the *New State*.

The new Republican Constitution was approved at the beginning of December 1931. Soon after its establishment, Ortega partially criticised it. He conceived the possibility of creating a new republican party separating himself from the ASR and proposing a “rectificación” of the Republic towards the construction of a National republican party for promoting educative, institutional and administrative reforms (of the parliament, of the regional autonomy and of the national economic plan). His positions were strongly criticised by the left that accused the philosopher of endorsing conservative positions within a parliament largely formed by left-minded people [del Villar, 2003]. He started to lose his influence within the *Cortes* and he soon resigned from his role within the ASR.

Significantly, before definitely abandoning his active participation in the parliamentary politics, the last relevant campaign he sustained was that concerning the reform of the University, in particular in his discourse concerning the autonomous statute of the University of Barcelona. This topic unified his two main preoccupations: the educative policy and the national unity. Ortega disapproved the opportunity of conceding to the University of Barcelona the formal recognition of his bilingualism in which he foresaw the risk of a progressive interruption of the activity of the State University in Barcelona. He lost also this last battle, and therefore he decided to leave apart his political activity and return to be just an intellectual and a philosopher, as he expressed in 1932 in his *Prólogo a una edición de sus obras* [Salas, 2007: 156]. However, this experience was not a total failure. In fact, during his presence within the republican government, the University of Madrid, supported by the new political regime, brought about a series of substantial reforms that finally produced the long expected change for which the philosopher had repeatedly called.

2.8 *The University of Madrid during the II Republic*

Ortega’s essay on the role and destiny of the University, as previously seen, brought from a precise context and operated within an institution that was undergoing profound and radical changes. He represented just the spokesperson of a larger and prevailing group which shared the same vision. From this group it started the most effective opposition to the regime of Primo de Rivera, whose collapse opened up new scenarios. Soon after the political election in April 1931, one of the first political reforms was that of the new minister of

education Marcelino Domingo, in May 1931⁶⁹. His project established the reorganisation of the faculties of Philosophy and Literatures of the two main universities of the country: Madrid and Barcelona. Moreover, in the case of Madrid, the University was almost ready to inaugurate its new infrastructure in the campus of the *Ciudad Universitaria*. The decree was, according to the very minister a «ensayo de futuras reformas de la Universidad» that consisted in giving to these universities a «régimen de excepción»⁷⁰ that rendered possible to try new teaching methodologies and approaches aimed at modernising this institution. In particular, the decree recognised more flexibility concerning the learning plans, giving to the students a larger freedom in deciding their curricula and in deciding to what extent to attend the classes. It reduced the numbers of exams to take. In summary, it conceded to students an ample freedom. In particular, article 8 of the decree established that:

El Ministro reconoce a los alumnos el derecho a formar los planes de examen de Licenciatura o de Certificado, previa la aprobación por la Facultad del que aquéllos hayan formado. Tomando como base cualquiera de los tipos señalados en este Decreto, el alumno podrá introducir en él los cambios que estima oportunos, con tal de que el número de materias, el de las pruebas y la relativa dificultad del conjunto sean apreciados por la Facultad como equivalentes a los del certificado cuya modificación se proponga⁷¹.

The grounding principle of this reform can be found not only in the works of Ortega but also in the propagation of his ideas that was rendered possible by one of his greatest friends and admirer: the dean of the Faculty of Philosophy Manuel García Morente. In 1932 he presented the reform of the faculty underlining the importance to offer to a quantitatively growing student population a new and more responsive university system [García Morente, 1996, I, 2: 342]. As Ortega had done, in order to counter the depersonalisation of the education in a mass society he pointed out the necessity of prioritising the students over the teachers, considering each alumnus as a person who the university would have the duty to ameliorate. For this reason, he underlined the necessity of starting from improving the material conditions in which the education took place, favouring the creation of an atmosphere of joy, comfort and collaboration:

⁶⁹ *Gaceta de Madrid*, n. 125, 5 Mayo 1931, p. 539.

⁷⁰ GM, n. 259, 16 Septiembre 1931, pp. 1847-1850, in particular p. 1847.

⁷¹ *Ibidem*, p. 1849.

Ha de poderse crear un ambiente material de convivencia, en donde las vidas pacíficas de quienes cultivan los estudios de Letras y de Ciencias, discurran fácilmente, sin tropiezos ni contrariedades, abastecidas de cuanto material necesitan: edificios cómodos y confortables, bibliotecas abundantes y modernas, laboratorios bien provistos y los emolumentos mínimos para poder dedicar integralmente la existencia a la vocación estudiosa.[...]Por lo pronto la Facultad nuestra tendrá en el breve plazo de algunos meses un edificio nuevo, moderno, amplio, cómodo. En él se reunirán todos los libros que andan hoy dispersos en las distintas bibliotecas pertenecientes a la Facultad. En él habrá aulas, seminarios, despachos, sala de lectura y de estancia; habrá incluso gymnasio, comedor y cocina, que estudiantes – y profesores – podrán utilizar a mínimo coste. [...] Y aún abrigo la esperanza de que todos los domingos y días festivos pueda salir de Madrid en automóvil propio, sin gasto alguno, una caravana de estudiantes con algún profesor, a solazarse en excursión de arte y naturaleza por las comarcas próximas a la capital [García Morente, 1996, I, 2: 352].

Echoing the very words of Ortega y Gasset, Morente affirms that the first duty of the University would have been that of communicating to a larger audience and shaping the public opinion. To reach this goal it was of crucial importance to favour the discussion among this institution and the civil society. For this reason Morente assigned to the University five main duties: a) transmitting from a generation to another the culture at its highest level; b) promoting the practical application of this knowledge and c) favouring the performance of further research; d) helping the students to ameliorate their living conditions as human beings; and e) communicate with the rest of the population and contribute to the public debate⁷².

Thus, the words of Ortega were finally being concretely implementing in the University, also from a legislative point of view. The reform promoted by Marcelino Domingo was undoubtedly a great success that had a very good reception both within the academia and the politics, two poles that also during the first biennium of the Republican regime were very strictly intertwined. The experiment

⁷² «Primero; ha de transmitir a las nuevas generaciones el caudal de la cultura lograda. Segundo: ha de adiestrarlas en el manejo de los métodos probados, inciendo a los estudiantes en la aplicación de las técnicas más valiosas de investigación. Tercero: ha de aspirar – al menos – a aportar ella misma algún nuevo fruto de fecunda producción científica. Cuarto: ha de acoger y tutelar la vida toda del estudiante, ofreciéndole en su seno la mayor cantidad posible de facilidades para su existencia, subsistencia y elevación. Y quinto: ha de mantener vivo el interés social, el contacto con el público general y la masa de la nación española» [García Morente, 1996, I, 2: 345].

passed to be part of an overall *Ley de Bases de la Reforma Universitaria* promoted by the new minister of education Fernando de los Ríos in March 1933⁷³. Fernando de los Ríos was a social democratic politician who, during his youth, had studied in the ILE, founded by his uncle Francisco Giner de los Ríos. In spite of the positive atmosphere that surrounded the law [Jiménez-Landi, 1996: 270-275], there would not have been the opportunity of discussing it in the parliament due to the concurrency of the new political election in November 1933. This determined the defeat of the republican and socialist front. However, the educative reform during the first biennium of the Republican regime represented one of the most important aspects of the modernisation of the country, which permitted to reach and overcome the standards of many other European nations.

In fact, the educative reform did not concern exclusively the formal university system, but was also implemented towards the creation of new educative centres, in particular the popular universities. These represented a project that the very García Morente significantly promoted during those years [Moreno Martínez and Sebastián Vicente, 2010]. By the beginning of December 1931 some university students also fostered a project aimed at enhancing higher education within the adults and the workers. Thus, the conclusions reached by the national congress of the *Unión Federal de Estudiantes Hispánicos* affirmed that: «La misión educadora de la Universidad no acaba en el estudiante: debe difundirse al pueblo y es preciso que el mismo estudiante comprenda esta necesidad y extienda la cultura que de ella recibió» [See Pérez Galán, 1977: 137]. This political and social engagement of the students during the first biennium of the II Republic extensively increased – as a consequence of the precedent radicalisation during the regime of Primo de Rivera – and the FUE acquired a more and more influential role in many of the issues related to the educative reform. The main goal purported by this group of students was that of opening the University to the working class, basically in order to realise an effective transmission of the culture, as previously theorised by Ortega. The creation of the summer university of Santander in 1932 – promoted by the minister Fernando de los Ríos – is another instance of this diffuse tendency [Blanco Alonso and Ramón Carriazo, 2006]. Ortega participated in this project, supporting it since its very creation and, in the summer 1933, giving some lessons. The spirit of Ortega's educative reform was then put into practice during the Republican period,

⁷³ In *ABC*, 23 March 1933, *Edición de la mañana*, p.33.

rendering possible his ambitious project of spreading the influence of the University across the whole society.

The main institutional supporter of this reform was the University of Madrid that represented the centre of the political and cultural power. It is in this period that a new generation of intellectuals and scientists, sharing a common political and philosophical vision started to flourish, i.e. the famous *Escuela de Madrid* that orbited around the figure of Ortega y Gasset [Padilla, 2007]. During these years and until the beginning of the civil war the *Escuela* reached its apogee⁷⁴, before propagating outside the Spanish borders during the following decades. The group of teachers and students belonging to it would later play a decisive role within the Spanish and Latin American scenario, contributing to spread the ideas of their symbolic master in different countries and academic disciplines [Orden Jiménez, 2008: 218]. Among them, a first generation of orteguianos composed by José Gaos, Julián Marías, María Zambrano, Lorenzo Luzuriaga, and a second and indirect generation composed by Rodríguez Huéscar, Manuel Granell, Antonio Maravall and José Luis Aranguren.

⁷⁴ However, it is important to underline that the *Escuela* was concretely conceived as such only posthumously, that is after the end of Ortega's influential role during the 30s. Its invention represents a sort of historiographic myth created during the Francoism in order to claim for a different cultural perspective by using the reference to a common master – Ortega – in order to counter the political and cultural hegemony of the regime. Indeed, the school represented more a memory of a recent past than a concrete reality. In fact, it is true that the school was: «reflejo y expresión de una realidad tan de bulto e ineludible como es el discipulado orteguiano. [...] El núcleo de los que pueden llamarse más propiamente sus discípulos filosóficos se sitúa en la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la Universidad de Madrid, desde donde irradia poderosamente». See *La Escuela de Ortega*, in «Revista de Estudios Ortegaianos», 2003, 6: 201. But at the same time, starting from the civil war: «La verdadera diferencia se encuentra en dos puntos: [...] entre redes orteguianas y redes no orteguianas que acceden a la enseñanza previa laminación de aquella» [Moreno Pestaña, 2013: 78-79]. In fact, among the members of the *Escuela* often are philosophers and intellectuals who constituted the kernel of the new political and intellectual regime, strongly opposed to Ortega, during the first years of Franco's regime, such as Pedro Laín Entralgo or Juan Zaragüeta. (See Guy, 1985: 299). However, also within the most faithful friends of Ortega, such as Antonio Maravall or Julián Marías, the use of the master sometimes produced radical misinterpretations of his thought in order to render it more compatible with the new political regime. For instance, Maravall ridiculously affirmed that: «precisamente por ser un filósofo español, Ortega ha tenido que representar tanto para los católicos españoles» [Maravall, 1959: 19].

The University of Madrid represented during the beginning of the 30s a successful experiment of modernisation and collaboration between teachers and students, as demonstrated by the Mediterranean cruise which took place during more than a month in the summer 1933. The main promoter of this travel was the very Manuel García Morente. This constituted an experience of intellectual life in common that contributed to create personal relations of friendships between a whole intellectual elite that largely approved and followed the principle of the ILE which rendered possible this voyage by financing it [Gracia Alonso, 2006].

During this period, after his dismissal as a politician in 1932, Ortega started to focus exclusively on his academic and philosophical activities. He expressed the desire to offer a systematisation of his theories and announced the beginning of a “second navigation” oriented towards a more theoretical and less political or journalistic perspective [OC, V: 99]. From 1932 to 1936 he shaped some of the most relevant philosophical concepts of his entire life, but in spite of his desire he was unable to translate them into a systematic philosophical production. Moreover, his anthropological, philosophical and historical reflections still continued to be related to his political and pedagogical interest, with the unceasing aim of comprehending and defining his role as an intellectual and philosopher within the society, as a spiritual guide of a whole generation. During a discourse he pronounced at the University of Granada in 1932, *Reforma de la inteligencia*, he called for the independence of the intellectual activity from the political one. But this attitude did not constitute a synonym of indifference. On the contrary, the role he advocated for himself was that of: «forjar las nuevas normas que pudieran en la hora de declinar las antiguas elevarse sobre el horizonte» [OC, V: 209]. In other words, he never abandoned his desire of moulding the political debate and the public opinion, as a free and independent intellectual.

PART II

THE SEPARATION FROM THE UNIVERSITY

The civil war represented a breakpoint in relation to Ortega's life, to the history of the university to which he belonged and, most of all, in relation to the Spanish political history. Very few studies so far have extensively taken into consideration this last period of Ortega's philosophical production and intellectual life. Moreover, the majority of them has exclusively considered the evolution of his biography without taking into consideration the ways in which it related to the evolution of the Spanish and international cultural scenario. A relevant exception in this sense is constituted by the book of Gregorio Morán, *El Maestro en el Erial* [1998] whose great merit was that of offering a general overview on the political posture of Ortega during the last fifteen years of his life and in relation to Franco's regime. This pioneering work, however, was characterised by a very limited perspective that basically aimed to inquire into his relationships with the regime from a purely political point of view. Moreover, the ambiguous posture of Ortega has been quickly labelled as pro-francoist without taking into account the reasons and the methods that characterised Ortega's intervention as an intellectual in the public and cultural debate of that period. Indeed, during his long exile that started in 1936 and ended in 1945, bringing Ortega firstly to France and later to Argentina and Portugal. During this period the philosopher continued to take part into the Spanish intellectual life, but it did it in a very different way compared to the past.

Contrary to the limited literature on this topic, the purpose of this section does not principally lie in a presentation of his political conduct. It neither consists in expressing a judgment over Ortega's political ambiguity both during and after the civil war. On the contrary, its aim is that of critically inquiring into the ways in which Ortega conceived his intellectual role within a cultural and political regime that was extremely different from the one in which he was educated and, at the same, which he had consistently contributed to forge. This section will contribute to prove that, more than during his early life, in this period the philosophy, the ideas and the intellectual practices of Ortega strongly depended on the concrete political and social circumstances under which he lived. Moreover, it will be demonstrated that the Spanish case represents a particular and significant instance of a broader question concerning the formation and recognition of scientific knowledge as produced and transmitted within the academia. Political paradigms and hegemonies change over time and their mutations impose radical changes in the intellectual register, in the same way in which different cultures impose the use of different languages.

As for the case of languages, this imposition constitutes a force that bends a whole society and every single individual to adopt a certain style rather than another, even when one is trying to emancipate herself from this imposition. Indeed, it is impossible to engage in a dialogue without accepting its basic rules, even if the aim of the conversation is that of changing these very norms. The only possible alternative to this condition would be either a total isolation, represented by a sort of intellectual monologue – and, ultimately, the recognition of one's inanity – or a complete muteness, an aptitude that not only accept to recognise this uselessness, but that also chooses to prefer this condition rather than to accept the rules of the game. These two different positions, in spite of the self-proclaimed silence that Ortega affirmed to have observed during his exile, did not correspond to the aptitude of the philosopher during this period of his life. In fact, he chose not to abdicate from his intellectual role. This decision implied the logical impossibility to completely leave apart the cultural debates that were taking place in Spain during that period, and the necessity of looking for possible collaborations in order to play an active role in this changing scenario.

These considerations do not excuse Ortega from his controversial political responsibilities that could be pointed out during specific

periods of his life, such as his disputable aptitude towards the FN during the civil war and his criticisms to the republican forces. However, taking into account exclusively these aspects of his life and political thought would merely produce a sort of anecdotic narration: either a desecration or an hagiography. On the contrary, the perspective adopted in this section is that of studying through the case of Ortega, the mutual relation that always exists respectively between a) a philosopher and his time; b) the thinking he purports and the common language shared by the cultural scenario in which he acts; c) the power exercised within the academia and the political power; d) the meditation on one's own intellectual role and the concrete historical and social conditions that favour or impede it.

Indeed, the case of Ortega is extremely interesting insofar as he had to exercise his intellectual function during a series of different political regimes, always with the aim not of serving their interests but rather with the aim of offering a critical point of view on his circumstances. He did not pass through a process of political camouflage, as some of his colleagues did, nor he escaped from the reality. The analysis offered in these pages will exhibit the reasons why it is not correct to refer to this period of Ortega's thought as conservative or reactionary. And this will be proven by considering in particular the meaning he attributed and the function he assigned to the intellectual, the philosopher and the educative process in relation to society, paying particular attention to the definition of these terms within the academic system.

Chapter 3.

The breakdown of the civil war

The civil war represents a tragic phase of the Spanish history and an alarming instance of the political radicalisation that characterised the whole European continent during the '30s. During the conflict, the violent fights between leftist and conservative movements, which marked the period comprised between 1936 and 1939, produced a diffuse climate of violence and barbarism. The university, that had always been strictly intertwined with politics, was now one of the major battlefields of this harsh and long conflict. In fact, since the very outbreak of the civil war, this institution played an active part in it, being a symbolic as well as a concrete object of dispute between the two opposite political fronts. In particular, the University of Madrid and its recently built campus became a battleground of this conflict. For those intellectuals who remained in Spain – and also for those who preferred to escape abroad – it was impossible to maintain a neutral position between the *Frente Popular* and the *Frente Nacional*. A growing political radicalisation impeded it. This was particularly evident within the University, one of the most active institutions in promoting, during the republican age, the enhancement of a liberal and democratic way of thinking.

This chapter analyses Ortega's attitude before the civil war and during the period of growing politicisation of the University (§1) and also the reception of the main ideas of the philosopher within the right movements that initially identified Ortega with a conservative thinker (§2). The physical and spiritual destruction of the University of Madrid and the Faculty of philosophy during the conflict (§3) obliged several intellectuals to emigrate. During his French exile Ortega did not renounce to be part of an intellectual debate (§4). In his philosophical writings during this period he sent implicit messages to the Spanish cultural establishment, defending the need of a dialogue between the opposite fronts and denouncing the extreme politicisation of the intellectual scenario (§5). In brief, he manifested a conciliatory aptitude.

Being persuaded of the probable victory of the FN he defended it in a series of articles he arranged with some members of the Franco's entourage that were addressed to an international audience (§6). However, he never shared the ideology of the regime. For this reason and due to his philosophical and educational framework, also in his most propagandistic articles he never renounced to directly criticise the political views, the demagoguery and populism, of the new fascist movements.

3.1 *A critical spectator*

As already seen in the previous section, the University of Madrid during the II Republic constituted a temple for the flourishing of liberal principles within intellectuals and the civil society. In other words, this educational institution conceived itself as a political entity. For this reason, when at the end of 1932 a new electoral campaign took place, one of the most outstanding enemies of the right wing movements created around the CEDA, whose leader was Gil Robles, was represented exactly by the University of Madrid. Indeed, this was conceived as a symbol of the republican regime. Curiously enough, these criticisms rarely involved the thought of Ortega y Gasset who was generally perceived – also thanks to his critical posture towards the Republic since the end of 1931 – as a possible ideologue of the conservative movement. In particular, his elitism and his defence of the value of the minority over the masses, his idea of the nation and his valorisation of the vitality of human existence constituted some of the main traits that fascinated the young intellectuals and politicians who were trying to construct an eclectic right-minded ideology¹. An ideology that wanted to counter the hegemonic thinking of the Republic. One of the most famous supporters of Ortega's thought within these political movement was Ramiro Ledesma who, in 1931, founded the *Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalistas* [González Cueva, 2006].

¹ As Julía, 1996: 53: «No era la CEDA una formación estrictamente fascista, ya que rebosaba catolicismo e incluso clericalismo para serlo, pero en su simbología y en su lenguaje, así como en los uniformes y en los lenguajes de sus juventudes, hacía todo lo posible por parecerlo».

In fact, in spite of his atheism and liberalism, which rendered him indigestible to the catholic and conservative forces, Ortega was considered as the author of one main text: *España invertibrada* (1922) in which he underlined the importance of building a strong and authoritative State. His philosophy was interpreted as a reactionary proposal aimed at building a new and anti-democratic form of government. These readings of his thought obliged the philosopher to intervene in the public debate in order to counter these arguments. He did it in a long article published by *El Sol* in 1933 entitled *Viva la República*. The election on 12th November 1932 had determined the victory of CEDA and the following questionings of the parliamentary democracy as an effective form of political governance. Within this context, Ortega wrote this article in order to affirm that his violent attacks to the II Republic did not imply any systemic critique to this form of government as such. On the contrary, it wanted to constitute a stimulus for ameliorating the functioning of a young and fragile institutional system, such as the Spanish democratic regime. For this reason he affirms that: «La única posibilidad de que España se salve históricamente, se rehaga y triunfe es la República» [OC, V: 283].

Ortega's partial endorsement to the right movements was therefore exclusively based on the wish to construct a mature form of bipartite democracy alternating left and right within a stable political system. In fact, he thought that the republican power manifested the realisation of a more general and historical tendency that could not have been dismissed. Thus, the victory of a dictatorial, monarchical and reactionary right constituted to him a falsification of this tendency, and ultimately an undesired political scenario:

¿Es que en serio pueden presentarse ante los españoles, como gente que saben lo que hay que hacer con España, los grupos supervivientes de la Dictadura que la han tenido siete años en sus manos sin dejar rastro de fecundidad y menos después de muerto el único de esos hombre que poseía alma cálida y buen sentido, que era el propio general Primo de Rivera? Y con más vehemente evidencia hay que decir lo propio de los monárquicos [OC, V: 285].

In particular Ortega criticised the demagogical attitude of these new political movements whose tactics represent a complete distortion of the basic grounds of his intellectual engagement in politics. In fact, they reveal a tendency «envilecedora de las masas como aquélla contra la

cual protestaba yo en mi discurso de León» [OC, V: 285]. *Demagogy and populism, to Ortega, are the main obstacles for the development of an authentic democratic system, since they render thoroughly impossible the enhancement of political education and, therefore, the construction of a critical public opinion within the civil society.* This absence of a clear and precise thought is reflected in the overall political program of these forces, in fact they: «se han dirigido al país sin claridad en lo más esencial, hasta el punto de ocasionar el hecho sin ejemplar de haberse producido incuestionablemente un triunfo y que a estas horas no se sepa a quién corresponde» [OC, V: 291]. Thus, the criticisms of Ortega towards the right movements are primarily concerned with the lack of seriousness and clearness in their political proposals. This was also the major cause of the consequent lack of pedagogical interest which is what Ortega considered as the most important trait of any positive political movement but that was scarcely possess both by right and left.

So, back in 1932-1933, the Madrilenian philosopher already pointed out the need for the new movements, that were acquiring a prominent role within the political scene, to construct a solid cultural identity abandoning a politics made of slogans and violence against false enemies, such as the communism or the masonry. In order to obtain this it would have been necessary to respect the republican institutional framework assumed by Spain in 1931. *However, the words of Ortega went unheard: not only the right movements constructed their own identity in direct opposition against the Republic and per via negationis, but they also opted for a complete destruction of the previous institutional system.* The use of reason as a political means would be dismissed, leaving room to the systemic use of violence, ending up in the burst of the civil war in 1936.

3.2 *An involuntary ideologue*

However, Ortega's precise critiques to the right movements did not impede the instrumental use made by these political forces, in particular within the rising Falangist movement. Even when he was criticised by the members of FE, this critiques always reflected a very particular dynamic of "usificación" [Medin, 2014: 253-258], that is to say an instrumental use of his theses. In fact, his political thought was either praised as a partial justification of authoritarianism, violence and elitism, or reproached as a socialist and liberal thinking. But in both

cases he represented the main reference of a vivid public debate². The case of Antonio Primo de Rivera, son of Miguel Primo de Rivera and leader of the FE, constitutes a clear instance of this dynamics [Simancas Tejedor, 2000]. In 1934 he affirmed that in Ortega «están las raíces intelectuales de nuestra doctrina, en especial de este postulado que yo estimo fundamental, de la “unidad de destino”». He admitted not to know personally Ortega and that the writings he had read were exclusively the famous *España invertebrada* and *Rebelión de las Masas*. He also admitted of having constructed his positive judgment mainly on the opinion of his father. However, he could not but reproach his liberal attitude that he considers as his biggest mistake [Bravo Martínez, 1939: 52-53]. His *Homenaje y reproche a Don José Ortega y Gasset* (1935) perfectly reveals the very eclectic and instrumental use of Ortega made by the FE since his very birth³. In this text José Antonio reproaches to Ortega his lack of political courage, accusing him of being at the halfway between a politician and an intellectual. He thought he should have abandoned his critical view and actively participate in politics joining his movement and putting into practice his project of rendering Spain a vertebrate nation.

However, there was an abysmal distance between the attitudes, scopes and methods of Ortega in comparison to those of the movement promoted by Primo de Rivera. The philosopher unceasingly continued to mark this difference and his retirement from public life in 1932 to devote himself to the study and systematisation of his thought evidently proves it. Within the university he continued to defend the role of the *ILE* and the importance of education in order to counter the growing populism of the country. In this period he started to define the main traits of his theory of history (that he called “historical reason”. See Lasaga Medina, 2005). His pedagogical interest continued to be very strictly related to his philosophical thought. Indeed, he conceived

² However, as Sánchez Cámara, 2005: 191, rightly wrote: «Toda pretensión de interpretar el pensamiento político de Ortega en un sentido «pre» o «parafascista» fracasa necesariamente y constituye una burda tergiversación, nacida acaso de una mala interpretación de su elitismo o aristocratismo, de su teoría de la minoría selecta».

³ As correctly written by Canales Patricio, 1961: 14: «José Antonio se vale de Ortega como Dalí puede valerse, a veces, de algún motivo o de alguna figura ya resuelta anteriormente, que al quedar incorporada a su composición adquiere un sentido diferente u otra intención bien manifiesta».

education as a process of revitalisation of the past in order to comprehend the basic principles governing a society. Only through this process of internalisation of the past it would have been possible to develop a sense of political participation as a meaningful and living activity that every citizen should have realised to live authentically.

He defended these theses during several of his lessons and public conferences, in particular when addressing to his students and their very role within the university and the society. He did it by tracing a sharp difference between two types of teaching: one that conceives students as passive receptors of useless notions and another that aims at transmitting a sense of a practical and useful knowledge.

[E]l hacer que la pedagogía regula y que llamamos estudiar, es en sí mismo algo umanamente falso [...]. Se introduce en la mente humana un cuerpo extraño, un repertorio de ideas muertas, inasimilables o, lo que es lo mismo, inerte. [...] La solución [...] no consiste en decretar que no se estudie sino en reformar profundamente ese hacer humano que es el estudiar y, consecuentemente, el ser del estudiante. Para esto es preciso volver del revés la enseñanza y decir: enseñar no es primaria y fundamentalmente sino enseñar la necesidad de una ciencia, y *no enseñar* la ciencia cuya necesidad sea imposible hacer sentir al estudiante» [OC, V: 273-275].

The educative problem constituted a crucial preoccupation of Ortega also during the period in which he unwillingly became a discussed ideologue for the emergent right political movements. He chose to devote himself to the investigation and teaching, obtaining in that very period the most prestigious awards for his intellectual activity. In fact, in the occasion of the 25th anniversary as a professor at the University of Madrid in 1935, he received a public homage from his colleagues and students⁴. They celebrated his eminent professorship in a series of articles written by García Morente, Fernando Vela, María Zambrano, Gregorio Marañón, Xavier Zubiri, Luis Santullano and Blas Cabrera. In November 1934, the city of Madrid gave him the *Medalla the Oro de Madrid*, as a public award to the «pensador mas grande de España»⁵.

In the University he continued to be a reference point for his students and also in the broader intellectual community he enjoyed a

⁴ See *Cuadernos de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, sezione Facultad*, 2, 1935-1936.

⁵ In Abellán, 2005: 115.

successful public recognition as a liberal democratic philosopher. He obtained also an international recognition, being invited by the Faculty of Philosophy of the Sorbonne University to teach a module in 1935-1936⁶. Moreover, his pedagogical attitude rendered him prone to communicate also to a larger audience. Thus, the American newspapers *Cosmopolitan*, in 1935, invited the philosopher to «avail yourself of this opportunity to speak directly to millions of our citizens», on the occasion of an international symposium to be held in New York among other intellectual and political figures⁷. All these recognitions bear witness to his philosophical writings and also to his role as a public intellectual that was able to be an agglutinative political element both inside and outside the university.

This had been rendered possible by the context of the University of Madrid, the pillar of the cultural and political Spanish power [González Calleja, 2013]. It is not surprising, consequently, that also in the following years this University will have constituted the centre of the political debate, and every radical change in the social and political situation of the country would have passed through it. The new political regime identified in the ILE and the Republican model of the University its greatest enemy that had to be annihilated in order to construct a new cultural paradigm. This caused Ortega's departure from Madrid and the Spanish formal schooling system. A separation that – as it will be proved in the next chapters – would not imply the dismissal of his intellectual role, but rather a radical reconsideration of its nature.

3.3 *The University of Madrid as a battlefield*

The Spanish civil war, that ended in 1939 with the victory of the *Frente Nacional*, determined a new deal for the national education and in particular for the UC. The liberal and socialist principles of the II Republic were replaced by new pedagogical proposals. The majority of them shared a common origin, i.e. the valorisation of the catholic tradition that during the '20s and '30s had been partially marginalised

⁶ Letter by J. De Cardenas to Ortega, 13-XI-1935, in AOG, C-119/ 10.

⁷ Letter by P. Harry Burton to Ortega, 11-X-1935, in AOG, C-119/ 12. Ortega refused this opportunity due to the concurrence of other activities. See in particular the letter by Ortega to Burto, 15-X-1935, CD-B/ 97.

by the “regenerationist” movements. The Church had been substantially reluctant to accept the changes promoted by the republicans and, since the famous burst of the convents which took place on May 11, 1931, it became suspicious with any manifestation of liberal thinking [Nuñez de Prado, 2014]. *Indeed, the struggle against the two fronts during the civil war basically reproduced the opposition between two different ideologies and institutions that could be epitomised in the ILE and the Church. A conflict that had marked the Spanish political scenario for more than ten years before the Alzamiento of General Franco on July 18th, 1936⁸.*

From an ideological point of view, the traditionalism of the Catholic front merged with other cultural and political movements of the time, and in particular with the Italian fascism and, to a very relevant extent, with the German Nazism [Saz Campos, 2004; Paxton, 2005; Nuñez Seixas, 2015]. And this in spite of the very limited impact of the *Fe de las JONS* in the 1936 election, with only a 0,7% of votes. In fact, the totalitarian experience that already marked the Italian and German cases was a stimulating example for the military dictatorship. A new form of authoritarian government that would have concretely gained the political power even if lacking a comprehensive and unified ideological account and a normative view⁹ [Preston, 1995]. *In this extremely complex and varied scenario the very UC constituted the main battlefield among opposite fronts, both during and immediately after the civil war.*

In particular, starting from the summer 1936, the University became the main battlefield of the conflict. As Calvo Sotelo has written [2004:

⁸ On the role of the Church during the civil war and the reasons that supported its direct intervention in the conflict see in particular Álvarez Bolado, 1995.

⁹ Indeed, this plurality of political perspectives and interests constituted, in spite of its counterintuitiveness, a positive trait of the military regime at least at an initial stage. In fact, as wrote by F. Gallego Margalef, 2014: 19: «La debilidad organizativa del fascismo español, que en realidad se comparte en un grado mayor de lo que acostumbra pensarse con fascismos de masas en visperas de su rápido crecimiento al iniciarse la década de los treinta, no fue un obstáculo para que llegara a imponer su capacidad de integración social, su enérgico activismo y su habilidad de síntesis de distintas tradicionales ideológicas en la construcción de un gran proyecto contrarrevolucionario que homogeneizó con sus propuestas doctrinales y con su mística militarizada». On these aspects and on the relevance of the fascist ideology within the Franco's regime see in particular F. Gallego Margalef, 2012.

116]: «el campus pasó de ser un espacio iluminado por el idealismo educativo, intelectual y arquitectónico a convertirse de la noche al día en un sombrío y sangriento territorio de lucha». However, as already seen in the previous chapters, it would be an ingenuity to define this change as abrupt and completely unexpected. In fact, the Spanish University had always constituted, during the course of the whole century, the place in which different political and ideological fronts violently crashed, causing disruptive consequences which would later propagate to the rest of the society. The division between conservative and leftist movements had characterised the life of the University since the very beginning of the XX century, and the University of Madrid had contributed in the recent republican past to the creation of a great democratic expectation. The failure of this new political outlook, together with the frustration of the Great Depression and the enhancement of the political radicalisations, produced the premises for the outbreak of the political revolution [Payne, 2004: 112]. What is more significant in the case of the civil war is that the recently built campus of the UC, due to its strategic position in the immediate suburbs in the north-west of Madrid, played a decisive role for the control of the whole city [Reverte, 2004].

The battle of the *Ciudad Universitaria* took place starting from November 1936 when the troops of the FN had to stop their march towards the centre of Madrid in the nearby of *Casa del Campo*, due to the resistance of the opposite front, and soon after, November, 6 1936, they started their attack over the city passing through the *Ciudad Universitaria* and *Plaza de España*. Thus, the University was not only ideologically but also from a military point of view divided in two opposite fronts and the Faculty of Philosophy represented one of the most violent centres of this conflict since its very beginning, both from a symbolic and a very material point of view [González Cárceles, 2008]. The very faculties became the trenches of the battle (see Annex 2). Immediately after the military coup of Franco, on August 29 1936 the dean of the Faculty, Manuel García Morente was substituted by Julián Besterio and the very Faculty was totally destroyed in the following months [Nuñez Díaz-Balart, 2008] The photographs of the ruins bear witness of the extreme violence of this struggle that would later be instrumentally used by the Francoist regime to blame the republican front for the destruction of the faculty and to praise the new

government for the great efforts done in order to restore it (Annexes 3 and 4).

Evidently, given the circumstances, it was impossible to maintain a decent academic life during the conflict. However, some of the basic administrative activities of the University still continued to be offered, but both the classes and the exams were suspended. The UC largely moved, during the civil war, to Valencia, where it continued to operate as an institution of the Republic until 1939 [Rodríguez López, 2013]. In the meanwhile, in particular since 1938 as a consequence of the progressive success of the FN, the University located in Madrid started to assume a completely different outlook. New professors, with a catholic and traditionalist ideology started to replace the old ones, while politics was reinforcing its control over this institution.

3.4 *Looking for a dialogue*

Ortega arrived in Paris in September 1936, escaping from what he perceived as an extremely dangerous condition for his personal safety [Zamora Bonilla, 2002: 415]. He was not alone in France. Not only because several members of his family decided to follow him abroad, but also insofar as a lot of the most representative republican intellectuals and politicians who were close to him preferred the French exile to the life in Madrid. Among them, in particular, Pio Baroja, García Morente, Xavier Zubiri, Felipe Blas Cabrera, Carmen de Yebes and Gregorio Marañón. Paris was also a refuge for some intellectuals who sympathised with the FN and with whom Ortega got consistently in touch during his exile. Among them Antonio Marichalar, and María de Maeztu, the sister of Ramiro de Maeztu. In particular, Marichalar would have constituted the *trait d'union* between Ortega and the FN, giving him the opportunity to get in touch with the cultural counsellor of the new National Defence Council who he met in Burgos in 1936, i.e. the journalist and writer Eugenio Montes. Montes invited Ortega to take part in the propaganda in favour of the FN¹⁰.

¹⁰ As Marichalar wrote to Ortega that: «en Burgos esperan que usted haga alguna manifestación de simpatía al movimiento, si es que, en verdad, la siente, y que la haga antes de la toma de Madrid. [...] Lo que se esperaba es que por medio de artículos y declaraciones, Europa supiera cual era el modo de pensar de los que no estaban con el gobierno rojo y no manifestaban su opinión, no

Indeed, during the first months of the civil war, Ortega assumed a very clear position in favour of the right military and political movement. More than an endorsement to a fascist ideology the decision of the philosopher was mainly motivated by two basic reasons. First of all by the personal rejection of the republican extremisms that had characterised this movement during the previous months. This was due in particular to the birth, at the end of 1935, of the *Fronte Popular*, and the creation of a left coalition that included also the communists in the government [Pecharromán, 2002: 229-231]. He recognised that the causes of the civil war did not totally rest on the responsibility of the *FN*, whose very birth and growth was rather the result of an increasing conflict within the left and a response to the phenomenon of radicalisation of the republican government.

Ortega considered himself as an eminent victim of this political radicalisation that had obliged him, against his will, to take a political position against Franco immediately after the *Alzamiento*, depriving the philosopher of the opportunity to maintain his constitutive neutrality which characterised the attitude of a critical spectator¹¹. The second motivation underneath this decision was more intimate. In fact both of his son, José and Miguel, were fighting with the *FN* in the civil war, persuaded that, among the two movements, the nationalist one could have represented a better political perspective¹². The political posture of

obstante, disponiendo de los elementos. En suma, servir a una causa, si no se sirve a la otra». Letter by Marichalar to Ortega, 12-XI-1936, in AOG, C-67/ 11.

¹¹ In a letter to Vittoria Ocampo Ortega wrote that he had been obliged to sign a manifesto against Franco by some «jóvenes escritores comunistas que volvieron con nuevas amenazas. Entonces dije que sólo firmaría tres líneas en que no se fuese contra nadie y que hubiese podido firmar un año antes. Así salió aquello – redactado por no sé quien – y que contrastaba tanto con el manifiesto adjunto de los “escritores antifascistas” que subrayaba su carácter forzado y de despego». Evidently, when Ortega wrote this letter in Argentina inviting Ocampo to share its contents in the intellectual society of Buenos Aires he was strategically adopting a posture that could have favoured his inclusion within it. Letter by Ortega to Ocampo, 24-X-1936, in AOG, CD-O/ 31.

¹² M. Ortega, 1983:134: «Durante nuestros paseos, en casa, en todo momento, hablé mucho con mi padre sobre España. Estábamos convencidos que la vida futura de nuestro país sería más posible del lado nacional que del lado republicano. Mi intención era no quedarme al margen. Cuando le dije a mi padre que tenía el propósito de ir al frente le pareció natural».

Ortega was soon known by his most close circles of friends and collaborators, but only partially supported.

This is clear, for instance, by taking into account the letter that in June 1937 Javier Zubiri wrote to Ortega reporting the invitation of Salvador Madariaga – the leader of the opposition to the FN from Paris – in order to ask him to sign a manifest supporting a peaceful resolution of the Spanish conflict. He presented this petition very soothingly since he knew that: «no entrara en sus planes mezclarse en tales empresas»¹³. Indeed, Ortega did not sign this manifesto. Just some months after receiving this letter he was strongly persuaded that the FN would soon have won the war. For this reason he thought that the next political interlocutor with whom he would have to deal would have been the General Francisco Franco, and he started to get prepared for this eventuality¹⁴.

For this reason, in 1937-1938 Ortega published some texts with a veiled propagandistic aim for the British and French press, after having discussed them with a member of Franco's establishment: Luis Calvo. The collaboration to the cause of the FN was realised in particular through two essays – a prologue and an epilogue – that Ortega wrote by taking as a starting point his most famous and appreciated political works within the conservative ideology: *España Invertebrada* and the *Rebelión de las Masas*. In addition, in 1937, Ortega wrote another political essay he published in the conservative journal *The nineteenth century and after* entitled *On pacifism*. In summary, during the years of the civil war it is possible to notice a permissive and conciliatory attitude in Ortega towards the FN and its leader Francisco Franco. He was strongly persuaded that this movement would have finally won the war and for this reason he tried to appear as a possible cultural

¹³ Letter by Zubiri to Ortega, 15-VI-37, in AOG, C-53/ 7.

¹⁴ As Ortega wrote to Carmen de Yebes during the summer 1937: «Veo que en la España blanca hay cada vez más orden si bien a costa de ir recayendo todo bajo el poder de las fuerzas más habituales. En lo internacional es de notar la lenta pero continua gravitación de Inglaterra hacia el Gobierno de Salamanca. Lo que no se ve aun es proximidad de solución». Letter by Ortega to Yebes, 25-VII-1937, in AOG, CD-Y/ 18. Some days later he would add that «parece que se va aclarando el horizonte de nuestro gran drama español. Si no interviene algun elemento hoy invisible no me estrañaría nada quel el proceso se acelerarse vertiginosamente». Ortega to Yebes, 3-VIII-1937, in AOG, CD-Y/ 19.

reference point also for the future establishment by defending the image of Franco and the movement in the foreign press. Nevertheless, neither he repudiated his previous republican experience, presenting himself as an ideologue of the FN, nor he changed his political and philosophical views towards a sort of conservative, authoritative or fascist thinking. *Indeed, Ortega continued to maintain strong relationships with several of the republican entourage in exile¹⁵ and, as it will be proved, he always conceived his intellectual role as a critical and impertinent activity.*

In other words, Ortega, during this period, abstained from any sort of political radicalism, even if he was contended by both the movements at the same time. This does not mean that he observed a totally neutral position, being on the contrary significantly oriented towards the defence of the FN. He was convinced and hoped that Franco's troops would have soon won the war. The personal motivations that brought him to take this decision were not related to an ideological endorsement to the basic ideas of the rising political regime that, after the civil war, would start to exhibit his authoritative, populist and illiberal character. *The aim of Ortega was simply that of trying to open the way to a political dialogue, also during a period in which it appeared to be blatantly impossible.* He was persuaded that this was both his personal and his public duty as an intellectual.

3.5 *The language of the dialogue: Ortega on translation*

The first philosophical essay written by Ortega y Gasset during his exile clearly reveals this dialogic tendency implicit in his political writings. Indeed, in *Miseria y esplendor de la traducción* (1937) he adopts

¹⁵ One of the most significant example of this is the relation between Ortega and Lorenzo Luzuriaga, who always tried to mediate with other Spanish intellectuals in order to construct an alternative both to the republican and the nationalist front for the post-war period. In 1937 Lorenzo Luzuriaga suggests for example to Ortega the idea of creating a third party as a way to limit the tremendous growth of the political radicalisation among two Spains. Cfr. Letter by Luzuriaga to Ortega (15/ 7/ 1937, in AOG, C65/ 27C). He also manifests an opposite view in comparison to that of Ortega in relation to *En cuanto al Pacifismo*. In particular he thought that the civil war was not exclusively an issue of domestic politics, as Ortega wrote, but rather an international affair that implied a foreign military and economic intervention. See the letter by Luzuriaga to Ortega, 1-10-1937, in AOG, C65/ 27H.

an attitude that will characterised the majority of his texts written during the exile, consisting in talking about the political and cultural scenario of his country in an indirect but very effective way. The veiled references to the historical context have often been neglected by the scholars, but in the case of this thesis they are vitally important to understand the strategy adopted by Ortega to continue being an influential intellectual within an hostile setting and to express his own political opinions while apparently talking about completely different topics. As Martín has recently underlined [2014: 148], this text reveals the posture of Ortega during the civil war: «questa posizione scomoda a entrambe le parti contrapposte nella guerra di Spagna [...] un parlare non diretto e immediato che richiede la pazienza – e la volontà – dell’ascolto».

In this text Ortega offers to the reader a sort of Socratic dialogue in which he compares opposite theses concerning the nature of the translation from a language to another. Both the structure and the topic of this essay are cautiously chosen by the philosopher. They reveal the very intention of the philosopher to favour a dialogue among different positions, different languages that only by being translated could have permitted a fruitful conversation among the different cultures purported by those speakers. Martín [2014] underlines in particular two relevant aspects of this essay in relation to Ortega’s perception of his intellectual role during a troubled historical period: a) the defence of a neutral and silent aptitude as an effective way to express and communicate his thinking¹⁶; b) the distinction between a good and a bad utopianism. Concerning the first of these aspects, Ortega’s thesis according to which silence constitutes a way to express one’s opinion would have been, in an indirect way, a justification of his own silent attitude. As far as the utopianism is concerned, the distinction between these two types would reveal, according to Martín, a critique to the republican utopianism, whose rationalism would have caused the

¹⁶ On this performative and political function of silence see Ferguson 2002: 8: «Silence can serve as resistance to any institution that requires verbal participation (as do virtually all). On a macroscopic political scale, states often require such participation and subsequently employ a variety of means to compel it. The state-sponsored requirement to take an oath is a particularly overt form of obligatory speech. Loyalty oaths, public recantations of heresy, self incrimination, enforced pledges of allegiance, and require judicial affirmations all oblige certain well-circumscribed speech acts».

explosion of the conflict. The recent thesis of Martín deserves to be taken into close consideration insofar as it can offer an instance of a very interesting methodology that permits to read most of Ortega's writings during the exile in this comparative and historical way. At the same time, it can be consistently enriched by taking into account not only Ortega's point of view, enlarging the perspective to the cultural and political debates that during the same period were taking place within the Spanish academia.

In fact, the term "utopia" represented during that period a keyword also within the cultural debate that was taking place within the right movements which were trying to define their normative outlook. The utopia of replacing the republic with a new political order appeared more and more realistic, and this implied the necessity of concretise this utopian thinking. This is the case, for instance, of the famous book of José Pemartin, entitled *¿Qué es "lo Nuevo"?* (1937), that tried to define the basic traits of a new and positive utopia. Ortega not only reproached the republican utopianism but also warned the new movement of the risks linked to an excessively idealist outlook: «La característica esencial del buen utopista al oponerse radicalmente a la naturaleza es contar con ella y no hacerse ilusiones. El buen utopista se compromete consigo mismo a ser primero un inexorable realista» [OC, V: 713]. Moreover, there are at least two very important parts of this essay which have to be cautiously analysed insofar as they disclose the way in which Ortega conceived his intellectual activity during the period of the civil war. In particular, a) the brief excursus on the role of the philosopher and b) the long meditation, which constitutes the skeleton of the whole essay, concerning the anachronism of the activity of translating and educating.

The first of these aspects is briefly and accidentally presented by the Spanish philosopher as a non important aspect of the major problem, but it is evident the relevance of this section if compared with the growing impact of populism within the European and Spanish political scenario. In particular, he assigns to the intellectual the function of criticising the opinion of the masses and of those who take advantage of their instinctual traits to obtain consensus and power. In fact:

¿No parece más verosímil que el intelectual existe para llevar la contraria a la opinión pública, a la *doxa*, descubriendo, sosteniendo frente al lugar común la opinión verdadera, la *paradoxa*? Pudiera acontecer que la misión del intelectual fuese esencialmente impopular [OC, V: 714].

The importance of the *paradoxa* as an intellectual device can be better comprehended by taking into account Ortega's writing on the public opinion he wrote in 1937, to reproach the New Yorker editorial company Norton&Company for the bad translation of his *Invertebrated Spain*, which offered the image of the philosopher as a supporter of the republican front. The public opinion criticised by Ortega was the one that the international press was contributing to create and that would be responsible, according to the philosopher, of the wrong opinion according to which: «la actual lucha española procedería de la simple rebelión de unos militares ayudados por unos moros y por dos naciones autoritarias [Italy and Germany]» [OC, IX: 223]. He criticises the lack of correct information characterising the international public opinion concerning the Spanish civil war, in particular the English and American one. Without taking part for the FN, he refuses to be defined as a supporter of the republican front.

In particular he argues in favour of the necessity of a better understanding of the reasons of the two opposite parts before defending one or another cause. In fact, as he affirmed in his writing on translation, it is not the same thing to use a similar term in Spanish or German. This veiled statement can surely be interpreted as a way to say that, according to him, the words *Führer* and *Caudillo* indicated two completely different realities depending on the different national backgrounds to which they applied. The lack of a serious understanding of these cultural differences would have determined the creation of a misinformed public opinion. The only possible remedy for this could have been offered by an intellectual activity that, starting from the facts and not from abstract postulates, would try to comprehend and interpret the reality [1937, OC, V: 720]. Even when talking of the scientific method, and in this case of physics, Ortega, during this period, is referring to political questions. He indeed reproaches Einstein's aprioristic pacifist outlook, accusing him for being too ingenious when analysing political questions.

The second interesting trait of Ortega's essays written in 1937 is that which concerns the anachronism of translation in relation to the problem of education. The philosopher introduces the topic with the question: «¿qué hay de vivo y qué hay de muerto en nuestra lengua?» [OC, V: 418]. In this way, he poses the questions of the importance of the language spoken in a given time in relation to the community that

speaks it. Accordingly, he assigns to language the fundamental role of constructing the cultural identity of a nation. His opinion is fully in contrast with the one purported by the traditionalism of Ramiro de Maeztu or Eugenio d'Ors. The latter, in particular, wrote in 1937 in a book entitled *La tradición* – a sort of ideological guide for the falangist movement – in which he affirmed that the tradition of a nation constitutes the immortal and vital trait of its own identity. On the contrary, Ortega affirmed that the historical consciousness of the past is important only insofar as it aims at reforming and overcoming the history of a nation, not at glorifying it. This would have been the aim of a humanistic education: knowing the past in order to project a different future, not just a copy of a decadent history: «No hay más remedio que educar su óptica para la verdad humana, para el auténtico “humanismo”, haciéndole ver bien de cerca el error que fueron los otros y, sobre todo, el error que fueron los mejores». Ortega's conclusion is a direct attack to the classicism of d'Ors, insofar as he thinks that the classics: «nos interesan, nos importan [...] como errores, no como maestros» [OC, V: 722].

To summarise, Ortega's essay on translation reveals some basic traits of his posture during the civil war in relation to the political and cultural changes that were taking place in his country and within the international scenario. Firstly, this text manifests a frequent tendency of the philosopher to talk about the current political situation in an indirect and veiled way, camouflaging his opinion under a philosophical appearance. Secondly, it exhibits a partial support towards the FN in particular by defending it from the attacks of the international scientific and political community. He did it even if he never shared the basic ideological premises of the movement. In fact, as far as the *pars construens* of the FN is concerned, he always expressed his scepticism about the totalitarian character of the normative utopia proposed by the intellectuals and politicians who belonged to it¹⁷. Lastly, this text offers an instance of the way in which Ortega conceived his intellectual role during this period; that is to say as an attempt to favour the dialogue between two opposite points of view with the aim of reconciling them through a mutual understanding of their reasons.

¹⁷ In fact, in his personal notes he probably wrote in the summer 1938 in taking into account the political ideas of Franco he affirms that: «Declaraciones totalitarias, de exclusivismo católico de Franco. Imposibilidad mía de aceptarlas». Notes of Ortega, in AOG, NT-26/ 6/ 1/ f.10.

However, this strategy would finally end up in a complete failure and the dialogue would rather resemble to a melancholy monologue.

3.6 A sui generis collaboration with the FN

Ortega also arranged with Luis Calvo, a member of Franco's entourage, the composition of some short essays supporting the cause of the FN. His essay on pacifism and his political prologues to the Rebellion of the masses responded to this specific purpose. *These articles are often considered by the scholars as the main proofs of the collaboration and endorsement of Ortega to the new political movement*¹⁸. *However, by analysing the theses presented by the philosopher in these texts it is evident that his main preoccupation was not that of taking part into the political debate, but rather of guaranteeing a place for the intellectual activity to prosper also within a demagogical and violent political scenario. This statement can be asserted, for instance, by considering his Prólogo para franceses (1937).*

From a political perspective, his critiques to what he calls an "old liberalism" did not imply a thoroughly defence of a sort of fascist corporatism or a communitarian conception of the state. On the contrary, he continues to affirm the priority of individual freedom over the State as the most effective way to reach the enhancement of the society conceived as a whole. His defence of the regime is extremely weak and he is far from enthusiastic about the general radicalisation of the political situation, both concerning the left and the right. As he put it: «ser de la izquierda es, como ser de la derecha, una de las infinitas maneras que el hombre puede elegir para ser un imbécil» [OC, IX: 364]. To avoid this exasperated politicisation he underlines the importance of the intellectual duty of maintaining a rigid neutrality in respect to the everyday political struggle. The intellectual should avoid the

¹⁸ See for instance Gregorio Morán, 1998: 61-62: «Es curioso y significativo que las tres aportaciones de Ortega al conflicto abierto por la guerra civil española estén referidas directamente a *La rebelión de las masas*. Sin entrar en otros detalles confirma el carácter de obra cumbre del periodo conservador de nuestro pensador y cuyo referente político no ha sido suficientemente reseñado. Suena mal el tono beligerante y reaccionario de estos añadidos con el acento más equilibrado del resto del libro, escrito ocho años antes».

“politicismo integral” that is typical of the politicians and the masses. The civil war manifests, according to him, the factual difficulty of realising a concrete social education of the masses, as he had always thought during his long academic career. He expresses his worry concerning the «*pouvoir spirituel*, insuficientemente ejercido por mandarines literarios y por una Universidad que se ha quedado por completo excéntrica a la efectiva vida de las naciones» [OC, IX: 368-369].

This text has often been understood as the transition of Ortega to a conservative thinking insofar as here he would have adopted a conservative outlook similar to the one purported by the so-called French doctrinaires. However, also in its most theoretical aspects, this text reveals a very different perspective. In fact, the main reference of this article is the French conservative liberal thinker François Guizot [Craiu, 2003: 5] and in particular his *Histoire de la civilisation en Europe* [Graham, 2001: 470]. In this text, written in 1828, Guizot theorised the construction of a new political regime that would have to be established in French after the end of the monarchical experience, the succeeding revolution and the Napoleonic authoritarianism. The analogy of Ortega with the *Restauración*, the republic, the civil war and Franco’s authoritarianism is evident, and he shares with the French thinker the idea of the necessity of establishing a mix form of government: a constitutional monarchy which could have permitted the prospering of a liberal society merging some authoritarian traits [OC, V: 387-389]¹⁹. In Guizot Ortega would find a reference point for developing most of his sociology, purported in particular in some important books such as *Ideas y Creencias* and *El hombre y la Gente*. As the French thinker, Ortega attributed to the definition of the term “civilisation” a pivotal role in determining the equilibrium between the individuals and the society. In fact, the mutual relation among the two terms and the priority given to the individual over society imply that the process of civilisation cannot be conceived as an imposition but rather as a progressive creation flowing from the individual wills. As Guizot put it: «Los grandes desarrollos del hombre interior han recaído en provecho de la sociedad, y que los grandes progresos del estado social han redundado en bien de la humanidad» [Guizot, 1847: 19]. The

¹⁹ On the borderline conception of a new form of liberalism with some authoritarian characteristics, as conceived by Ortega starting from this prologue, see in particular Villacañas, 2011.

single individual is always conceived by Ortega as the starting point of every political theory and, following the theses of Guizot and Royer-Collard, he attacks all forms of authoritarianism. In fact, such political outlook would end up by depriving the individuals of their freedom to enjoy a fruitful life²⁰.

Ortega never abandoned two fundamental traits of his thinking and intellectual activity also when engaging into an attempt of defending the Spanish Falangist movement. *In particular, he never renounced neither to a minimum form of liberalism nor to the persuasion that the real politics should always aim at avoiding a demagogic and populist derive, favouring the dialogue and the reasoning, avoiding the use of violence and fallacious forms of thinking.* At the same time, he countered the nationalistic outlook, underlying on the contrary the importance of constructing a united Europe in which different nations could positively coexist: «La unidad de Europa no es una fantasía, sino que es la realidad misma, y la fantasía es precisamente lo otro: la creencia de que Francia, Alemania, Italia o España son realidades sustantivas e independientes» [OC, IV: 355-356]. In spite of his accuses to the British internationalism, that he considered as responsible for the intervention of foreign military forces in the course of the Spanish civil war, Ortega never defended the legitimacy of authoritarian nationalisms. On the contrary, he thought that he would have been possible to integrate the interests of different nations into a unified and peaceful political project. The totalitarian degenerations of the European politics, in particular in Italy and Germany, appeared to Ortega as the most dangerous trait of the new political situation of the '30s²¹. In this context, the intellectual influence on the construction of the public opinion was conceived by the philosopher as the only possible means that could have permitted to avoid this totalitarian risk [OC, IV: 515].

²⁰ As Guizot put it: «Las sociedades humanas nacen, viven y mueren sobre la tierra, donde queda consumado su destino...pero, no contienen enteramente al hombre» [Guizot, 1847: 23].

²¹ For this reason he considered as indispensable a diplomatic resolution of the political tensions among Germany and Great Britain, for avoiding the dangers of the different nationalisms. He wrote in his notes: «necesidad que había alguien – libre de racismo – quedase en posibilidad de entenderse con Inglaterra y abocar a posibles peligros provenientes de Italia y Alemana». Cfr. AOG, NT-26/ 6/ 1/ f.12.

His article *On pacifism* (1937) represents the most discussed of his texts of the period. In this occasion he points out the necessity of passing through a totalitarian experience in order to save the old liberalism and renew it²². He coined for this purpose the expression “new liberalism” which, as he declared in one of his notes, constituted a way to support the falangist movement in a very veiled way²³. He did not share the ideology of this political force, but he thought it could have produced a positive change within the political history of the country, representing a phase to go through before overcoming it. With the final aim of constructing a new form of liberalism. His disillusion in the political proposal of the Franco’s regime are clearly stated by the very Ortega in several of his personal notes he wrote in 1938-1939²⁴. When, in 1939, the war finally ended with the victory of the FN he wrote to his friend Gregorio Marañón – whose son, as the sons of Ortega, did take part in the war with the nationalist front – a letter in which he reveals his satisfaction and hope for a positive change within the country²⁵. An expectation that would soon be deceived.

In fact, just some months after sending this letter in which he manifested his partial support to the new regime, thinking he could have taken part to it from an intellectual points of view, he faced a completely different reality. The dean of the Faculty of Philosophy of Madrid, Julián Besteiro, was processed and condemned to death by the regime even if he maintained an irreproachable posture – according to

²² El totalitarismo salvará al liberalismo, destiñendo sobre él, depurándolo, y gracias a ello veremos pronto a un nuevo liberalismo *templar* lo regímenes autoritarios [OC, V. 516].

²³ «Mi proposito de hacer afirmación de “nuevo liberalismo” para desde ella defender el movimiento. Vacío que se me ha hecho fuera». AOG, NT-26/ 6/ 1/ f.10.

²⁴ As he wrote, for instance: «Una adhesión mía no era una adhesión al heroísmo bélico de la vanguardia, sino a las estupideces y atrocidades de la rataguardia». Or: «el Prólogo para franceses lo he escrito para en todos sentidos tomar altura y mostrar que mi franquismo no modificaba mi liberalismo. Porque la lucha en España hace que yo no pueda ir a fondo contra el totalitarismo so pena de parecer dar la razón a los rojos cuyo totalitarismo repugno todavía más», in AOG, NT-26/ 6/ 1/ f.18 e NT-26/ 6/ 1/ f.7.

²⁵ «Hemos pasado alguna nerviosidad con la última coletada del atún comunista pero a través de las confusas noticias hemos sabido representarnos lo que luego ha resultado la verdad. Ahora esperamos el buen comienzo del auténtico fin». See letter by Ortega to Marañón, 13-III-1939, in AOG, CD-M/ 36.

Ortega – towards the FN during the civil war²⁶. From then on the Spanish philosopher would be increasingly suspicious towards the new political regime of which he perceived the illiberal character. The possibility of exercising a proper intellectual influence within such violent and dictatorial political framework appeared extremely difficult to be realised. After the killing of Besteiro, Ortega decided not to return back to Spain and continued his exile. After having been in Paris for some months he moved to Buenos Aires. He thought that «El intelectual serio tiene – por lo mismo que no “hace política” – que procurar vivir donde que de un *minimum* de libertad»²⁷. He sought to maintain a basic condition of freedom for rendering possible the intellectual activity which was absolutely not guaranteed in his own country.

He perceived as more and more difficult the possibility of exercising his critical function within a propagandistic cultural scenario in which all the mass media, and also the formal schooling system, from its lowest level up to the University, were imposing a dogmatic form of education. In addition, also his reception within the right-movements was radically changing in comparison to the recent past. In fact, during the years that preceded the civil war he was both reproached and praised. Now, on the contrary, the condemnation of the intellectuals of the II Republic started to affect all the public figures who had collaborated to that political experience, independently from their particular positions. This is proved, for instance, by the book written in 1938 by Serrano Suñer, the leader of the *Tribunal de Responsabilidades*, responsible for judging the conduct of the intellectuals who wanted to return in Spain after the civil war²⁸. *Ortega never joined the Francoist movement neither participated actively in it*²⁹. This, in this initial period,

²⁶ «¡Con qué dignidad y sentido del deber ha estado Besteiro hasta el último momento! Supongo que lo comprenderá así Franco y que no correría ningún riesgo pero convenía asegurar que esto es así y hacer lo humanamente posible para que no perturbasen a este hombre que ha hecho tanto por los madileños victimarios, que está enfermo y viejo». Lettera di Ortega a Marañon, 30-III-1939, in AOG, CD-M/ 38.

²⁷ In AOG, NT-26/ 6/ 1/ f.16.

²⁸ Serrano Suñer, R. [1938] *Los intelectuales y la tragedia española*, Editorial Española S.A, San Sebastián.

²⁹ As he wrote in his personal notes: «Yo puedo adherir a un movimiento como se adhiere uno a un movimiento, andando –andando con el. Pero no puedo

impeded to him to be included in the new political and cultural establishment. Nevertheless, his very peculiar form of collaboration with the FN during the civil war would later give him the opportunity, in particular starting from the '40s, to intervene again in the public debate, even if from a very marginal and precarious position.

adherir a un movimiento que es una cosa vaga, movil, poniendo una firma escrita en un preciso papel». In AOG, NT-26/ 6/ 1/ f.9.

Chapter 4.

The cultural revolution. The construction of an authoritative university

This chapter aims at analysing the intellectual debate that took place in Spain during the foundational period of Franco's dictatorship, in particular from 1939 to 1943, in relation to the reform of higher education and the university system. During this period the academia represented both a product and a cause of the radical recent political change. For this reason, a thorough comprehension of what was going on within it is compulsory also to understand Ortega's activity. The debate within the Spanish academia was characterised by a deadlocked attempt to construct and consolidate a common ideology that could have been shared by all the very different components of the new political regime.

After taking into consideration (§1) the material changes that occurred since the civil war within the academia and in particular the *Universidad Central* of Madrid, where a dramatic process of purge took place, they will be analysed (§2) the basic decisions and reforms purported by the first minister of Franco's regime Sainz Rodríguez. Indeed, he set the bases for (§3) the following debate over the nature and goal of the new University. An harsh debate that marked the cultural Spanish scenario until the end of the II World War.

This debate produced two significant novelties within the academic world: (§4) the creation of a new form of intellectual, i.e. the organic intellectual; and (§5) the emergence of a new community of discourse. This community of discourse and its political role will be analysed in particular by taking into consideration the rhetoric that characterised the academic life during these years. In fact, in spite of its apparent triviality, rhetoric constitutes a crucial political aspect that can permit to

clearly define the basic tenets of the new magmatic ideology. In fact, as Van Dijk [2008: 30], put it: «The exercise and maintenance of social power presupposes an ideological framework. This framework, which consists of socially shared, interest-related fundamental cognitions of a group and its members, is mainly acquired, confirmed, or changed through communication and discourse».

The reconstruction of this debate will also permit to comprehend that (§6) the political homologation of this community of discourse to a fix set of principles took place through to a subtle differentiation among different communities [Ferrary, 1993: 200]. The creation of at least two main groups of interest revealed a radical difference in the way of conceiving the overall educative reform also within the regime. In particular, (§7) the university reform that would finally be approved in 1943 ratified the supremacy of the catholic front over the falangist one which, however, did not completely lose its battle. A fact that opened the way to future dissents within the regime. In this context, the instrumental use of Ortega – (§8) who, in particular due to his *Misión de la Universidad*, continued to constitute a reference point during the whole debate – would have played a very important role in coagulating different intellectual and political perspectives also during the following years.

4.1 *New State, new education*

Unas de las tareas que apremiaba a nuestra juventud combatiente era la de llevar el espíritu de nuestra Cruzada al plano de la Universidad. Era preciso afrontar el problema doble: de una parte la Universidad española no podía ser neutra en el orden de las ideas. Tenía que definirse ideológicamente y confesar que estaba dentro o fuera de la concepción cristiana del mundo y de la vida. Por otro lado, la Universidad no era tampoco un ente intemporal que pudiese estar situado al margen del movimiento político que aspiraba a cambiar de raíz la vida y la estructura de la Patria. Había, pues, que definir el estilo de la Universidad en función de dos postulados trascendentes: lo religioso y lo político³⁰.

³⁰ Editorial in «Revista de Educación Nacional», n.30, Junio 1943, pp. 4-5.

With these words, written in June 1943 in a short and anonymous article, the director of the *Revista de Educación Nacional* and of Franco's propaganda, Pedro Rocamora, summarised the long and harsh debate that since 1938 was taking place in the Spanish intellectual community concerning the reform of the University. In the summer 1943 the *Comisión de Educación* of the *Cortes* would finally approve a law which regulated the University system. A law that would then mark the cultural history of the country for almost the whole life of the regime, until 1970 [Fernández Soria, 1998]. These words constitute an impressive testimony of a constitutive tendency of the educative and university system that the creation of a new totalitarian state of the General Franco contributed to exacerbate. In fact, the University always evolves in relation to the institutional, political and social regimes in which it prospers. It serves different purposes depending on the needs of a society in a given time. This is evident in the case of the Spanish educative system during the whole XX century whose academia has long been an expression of a political ideology [Galán, 2009 and Puelles Benítez, 2010].

Rocamora's statement also reveals that both from an internal and an external point of view the academic institution reproduces social and political states of affair. Indeed, the university is characterised by a substantial dichotomy between, on the one hand, the creation of an objective and neutral knowledge and, on the other, the accumulation of personal or associative powers – social status and prestige – which are exercised both within and outside the university [Bourdieu, 1971; 1975]. This constitutive dichotomy causes the creation of more or less open communities of discourse whose processes of formation and consolidation correspond to the precarious equilibrium of these two opposite forces. What Angermüller [2013] has defined with the name of “discursive capital”. This tendency had clearly characterised the life of the University of Madrid during the II Republic, where the delicate balance of power between academic and political institutions had determined the cultural hegemony, or at least dominance, of a liberal and democratic professorship. With the upheaval of the new political regime the academic and political spheres would fatally start to place themselves side by side, almost coinciding. In this way they ended up by threatening their reciprocal autonomy.

In fact, whereas the University cannot be neutral in respect to its ideas – as Rocamora wrote – the education it purports is explicitly

conceived as an instrument of political control and domination. In other words, the University would become a sort of extractive institution whose main aim would be that of guaranteeing the bases of the social consensus³¹, that is to say the transmission and acceptance of a certain conception of the world. In fact, State legitimacy is always a double correlation of imposed and accepted practices of power, not only of the ability of a State to coercively impose its norms [Searle, 1994; 2010]. The changes in the educational system and its institutions not only represent the final product of a political and institutional decision, but constitute also a source of further changes in the very institutional framework of a society, contributing to render it more inclusive or, as in the case of the Spanish academia during the Franco's regime – as witnessed by the words of Rocamora – more extractive.

As a matter of fact, the ruling class of the regime and, in particular the new members of the academia, tried to redefine, since the very birth of the New State, its ideological outlook. The Spanish academia constitutes an instance, within the history of the fascist movements in which not only, as in the case of Italy, an intellectual class decided to follow the political trend in a submitted way [Croce, 1933], but rather energetically tried to lead this change, defining its very guidelines. During this process, through an intellectual debate, they were determined and transmitted the political lines of a new ideology. Thus they took place harsh struggles for the political and cultural hegemony of a political sector over another. This was mainly due to the magmatic and chaotic scenario that characterised the birth and the first apogee of the right Spanish movements that won the civil war. In fact, despite the retrospective interpretation of Rocamora, according to whom the ideology of the regime had always been formed by both a religious and a political character equally distributed in the sensibility of all the members of the intellectual community, the debate which took place within the university, concerning the very nature of the ideology which the New State would have to purport, clearly reveals that this ideology evolved over time through a series of violent struggles within the

³¹ Acemoglu and Robinson famously divided political institutions in two categories: extractive and inclusive [Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012, in particular Ch. 3]. The first ones are those which distribute power just among few people, a narrow elite, without the participation of a large civil society and, even in those cases in which they do so, they still suffer for a lack of political centralization that renders inefficient any political and economic decision.

academia³². Such violent debate was particularly significant during the Franco's regime, when a new cultural group emerged imposing its hegemony within the new political and academic scenario. For this reason, it is extremely important to reconstruct it in order to comprehend the social order that resulted from it during the following two decades. In fact, as Bourdieu wrote:

In the symbolic struggle over the production of common sense, or, more precisely, for the monopoly of legitimate naming, that is to say, official – i.e., explicit and public – imposition of the legitimate vision of the social world, agents engage the symbolic capital they have acquired in previous struggles, in particular, all the power they possess over the instituted taxonomies, inscribed in minds or in objectivity, such as qualifications [Bourdieu, 1985: 732].

The analysis of the community of discourse that gave birth to this debate on the future of the academic institution represents a fruitful way to comprehend the way in which the university, its rhetoric and the idea it purports, were both guided and contributed to guide the political changes. Interestingly enough, it is possible to note that the new intellectual class of the regime started to flourish before the victory of the FN in the summer 1939. In fact, it existed both before and during the II Republic through some key-figures such as the rector of the UC during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, Pio Zabala y Lera, who would lead the most important university of the country from 1939 to 1952. He had always been a violent critic of the *JAÉ*, opposing to the liberal educative model the ideal of a catholic education [Niño, 2013: 67-103]. Other leading figures were, for instance, Antonio Ballesteros Beretta, Eduardo Ibarra, Francisco de Paula Amat, Eloy Bullón or the future minister of education Pedro Sáinz Rodríguez. During the first half of the '30s, within the Spanish University they had always coexisted a traditionalist and catholic aim with a liberal a progressive

³² The structure of the Francoist ideology and its construction within the University has been recently studied by several Spanish scholars. In particular, the instrumental function of the University as a political means, whose main aim was that of creating not only a social consensus but also a common and shared political view within the leading class, has been studied by Carreras Ares J. and Ruiz Carnicer M.A., 1991; Sotés Elizalde, M. A., 2004; and Otero Carvajal, L.E., 2014. All these research have proved that this process evolved over time, passing through very heterogeneous phases.

one. They had always fought one against the other, causing disruptive consequences for the life of this institution [González Calleja, 2009].

This contraposition was not only the expression of an ideological incompatibility, but also the result of the crisis and failure of an organization that was starting to expand and was becoming a mass-institution. A lot of new students, who belonged to a raising bourgeoisie, matriculated with the purpose of relevantly ameliorating their social and economic statuses. However, their expectation were frequently betrayed. *The radicalisation and politicisation of the students' movements, both the fascist and the communist ones, were therefore the result of this educative and social failure of the university.*

The University became the place in which a young generation started to engage in a violent form of political participation. The civil war was a result of this tendency and a dramatic period for the life of the UC. Most of the republican establishment of the University, soon after the beginning of the war, moved to Valencia. Thus, the cornerstone of the Spanish culture, i.e. the University of Madrid, started to acquire a new outlook increasingly more akin to the right movements and the Falangist forces. The new State University opened his activities in 1938 with the participation of some professors such as Pío Zabala, Inocencio Jiménez y Vicente, Ciriaco Pérez Bustamante, Emilio Jimeno Gil and Juan José López Ibor.

In this scenario the educative problem started to acquire a growing importance for the new political regime that saw in the academia a possible instrument for constructing a Spanish conservative ideology. In fact, with the victory, for the troops of Franco and the chaotic amalgam of political forces that sustained the *Caudillo* during the war, it started to be considered as indispensable to define their own political identity in a unified way. However, they lacked of homogeneity within the victorious front. This was due to the fact that the glue that had linked together the various right political movements into a unique ensemble during the civil war was merely constituted by an *a priori* opposition to the republican tradition³³. Whereas the II Republic was

³³ As Ferran Gallego Margalef, 2014: 20 has correctly written: «La fascistización no es el crecimiento de un partido con ideología y proyecto político acabados, constituidos en el momento de su creación.[...] Es el proceso por el que la contrarrevolución española, y europea, va sintetizando posiciones doctrinales y agrupando proyectos políticos, estableciendo un campo de influencias y correcciones mutuas, canalizando la fluidez de sus intercambios ideológicos,

characterised by a well-defined cultural politics, the FN lacked such well established ideological thinking. For instance, the very manifesto of the Falange, the *Consígnas Nacional Socialistas*, just defined the Falange as a revolutionary movement without assigning to it any positive value. In other words, this revolutionary tendency was not translated into a practical political program, and it always remained a «revolución pendiente» [Molinero and Ysás, 2008: 18]. The reference to the Catholic tradition, at least within the Falange, played indeed a secondary and instrumental role in comparison to the desire of annihilate the republican power. The very *Acción Católica Española*, born from the ACNDP, during that period found its most relevant agglutinant factor in a rancorous opposition to the republican experience, rather than in a autonomous cultural and political proposal [Cabellero de la Torre and Robles Rodríguez, 2015]. As María Zambrano clearly wrote: «Nosotros los españoles teníamos nuestra historia en suspenso, nuestras tradiciones eran puro problema, hasta tal punto que los tradicionalistas tenían que inventarlas, lo cual no significa que no las tuviésemos, sino que estaban allí donde no se nombraban». [Zambrano 1998: 98].

Thus, once the enemy had been annihilated, it became urgent to supply the new political state of affairs which lacked a proper political doctrine with a new overall ideological account. An account that could have guaranteed the instauration of a new ruling class able to lead the Nuevo Estado. This term only indicated an empty signifier, a *flatus vocis* with no exact meaning. The university of Madrid was not only one of the main battlefields of the civil war, but also the symbol of a political regeneration³⁴ and, at the same time, the concrete place in which a profound debate over the normative ideal of the new State did take place, involving all the different spirits that composed the big

asentando sus compromisos estratégicos, en una permanente tensión entre la defensa de sus identidades parciales y la convicción de pertenencia a un mismo espacio cuya homogeneización es objetivo compartido». Thus it is possible to affirm that in the case of francoism there is not a political essence which pre-existed to the factual existence it acquired and changed unceasingly over time.

³⁴ As the minister of education Ibáñez Martín wrote some years later: «Lo más modernos edificios – alarde de fina y severa arquitectura -, sufren grandes mutilaciones y la vida de los soldados de España entre las ruinas de la Ciudad Universitaria adquiere caracteres de drámatico heroísmo, afirmando en ellos la inquebrantable decisión de vencer». Ibáñez Martín, 1949: 66.

Francoist family. The aim of this debate was that of tracing the basic guidelines of the Spanish fascism and, at the same time, of legitimating the radical political changes that had occurred *de facto* without being previously theorised *de jure*³⁵.

4.2 Sáinz Rodríguez's counter-reformation

Since the establishment of the first minister of education of the New State, Pedro Sáinz Rodríguez, the new political regime showed its determination to radically change the pedagogical policies that characterised the previous republican government [Alted Vigil, 1984]. The intellectuals of the previous generation were conceived as the main cause for the degeneration of the Spanish political and cultural life, as clearly stated by Enrique Suñer [1938], a professor of the University of Madrid who would later be put in charge of the *Tribunal de Responsabilidad política* during Franco's dictatorship. With the new minister of education Sáinz Rodríguez – who stayed in power from January 30, 1938 to April 27, 1939 – the new regime brought about a counter-revolution³⁶ within the Spanish educational system. Indeed, one of the most dramatic decision taken by the new government of the FN concerning educational matters was that of purging from the academia – often violently – the majority of the university professors who had been appointed during the republican period. In addition, Sáinz Rodríguez started to construct a new ministerial organization that imposed an oppressive control over the educational system as a whole, focusing in particular on the creation of a national-catholic

³⁵ Gallego Margalef, 2014: 591: «La teorización de un Estado nacional, totalitario, católico y revolucionario se encontraba con el camino preparado por una guerra que hacía que tales reflexiones fueran más el resultado de la conquista del poder en el proceso bélico que de una tarea de propaganda y convencimiento lanzado desde las cátedras en las que se formulaban los nuevos principios».

³⁶ This expression has been recently coined by López Bausela [2011: 24], who has defined this reform as: «una reforma educativa impuesta por la fuerza, al amparo de un poder incontestable de carácter dictatorial, cuyo objetivo principal fue operar una transformación radical en la mentalidad de la juventud española por medio de una contrarrevolución pedagógica que erradica para siempre la opción republicana de la vida política en nuestro país».

identity through a propagandistic education in the high-school [Claret, 2006: 44-45].

The minister had previously being a member of the ACNdP and, even before the civil war, he contributed to lay the foundations of the new pedagogical reform in a book entitled *La tradición nacional y el Estado futuro*. In this text he argued that the only way to build a new political power in Spain able to remain into power over time would have to pass through a valorisation of the catholic tradition of the country, through the creation of a common faith shared by everyone. For this reason, when appointed as minister, he was persuaded that his role should have to correspond to an inquisitorial function aimed at: «Una creación de la conciencia nacional, un tribunal popularísimo, instrumento con que la fe colectiva del pueblo trata de liberarse consciente y voluntariamente de todo contagio que pudiese traer como consecuencia una división de la unidad de la conciencia nacional» [Sáinz Rodríguez, 1935: 40].

During his first public discourse as a minister he pointed out the main characteristics of this new form of education. An education that he did not consider as a prerogative of the State but also of the Church, defending a peculiar form of totalitarianism in comparison, for instance, to the German or Italian cases. As far as education was concerned, this Catholic tradition would have been translated into a form of propagandist culture that:

Es un deber del Estado, no porqué piense que el Estado debe ser el monopolizador de la enseñanza. [...] Si el Estado español tiene todo el sentido de las nuevas modalidades de los que llamamos estados totalitarios en el mundo, sabrá conjugar con una doctrina original propia, ese concepto de la autoridad estatal, con las normas de la tradición católica, imprescindible componente de la civilización de nuestro pueblo [Sáinz Rodríguez, 1938: 40].

The nominee of Sáinz Rodríguez had been strongly supported by the very influential cardinal of Toledo Gomá y Tomás. In other words Sáinz was substantially the mouthpiece of the most radical sector of the Spanish Catholicism³⁷. This is rendered evident by comparing the

³⁷ As Montero, 1993: 93-94 affirmed: «El 30 de Enero de 1938, durante la estancia de Herrera en España, se había producido el nombramiento del primer gabinete de la España nacional. La junta Técnica y las Comisiones dieron paso a

theses purported by the minister with the ones defended, for instance, by the most representative members of the Jesuit group such as Enrique Herrera Oria, the brother of founder of the ACNdP, Ángel Herrera Oria³⁸. Enrique Herrera devoted himself to the educational problem since the beginning of the twenties, when writing for the catholic journal *Atenas*. During the '30s he intensified his propagandistic activity through articles and essays in particular for the catholic reviews *Razón y Fe* and *El Debate*. In all his writings it is possible to perceive both a very harsh opposition to the previous republican cultural outlook – accused of being a revolutionary, liberal and Masonic form of hegemonic thought³⁹ – and a strong desire to propagate a religious culture by taking advantage of a growing political influence within the new right movements.

The aim was that of substituting a liberal cultural framework with a traditionalist one, based on the catholic values purported in the Papal bull *Divini Illius Magistri*, that insisted in the necessity of bringing about renewed pedagogical and propagandistic activities by the European religious and political institutions. The ultimate goal of the Bull was that of promoting the participation of the religious believers in politics and, ultimately, of assigning to the catholic Church a new monopolistic control over education⁴⁰. Enrique Herrera Oria engaged in a constant

los diversos ministerios: el Régimen comenzaba a discurrir por caminos de consolidación. Lo que se pretendía recrear era algo similar al Estado español del Siglo de Oro: una autoridad central fuerte, apoyada en la religión católica como elemento de cohesión social. Si los propagandistas habían saludado con entusiasmo este proyecto cuando era tan sólo una idea más o menos vaga, ahora que empezaba a convertirse en realidad no le iban a regatear su apoyo ni sus ofrecimientos de colaboración».

³⁸ On the importance of Ángel Herrera Oria and his influence within the catholic and political world see in particular Cantavella and Serrano, 2006.

³⁹ «Con la subida de Azaña, Fernando de los Rios, Marcelino Domingo y Domingo Barnés, se puede decir que también la masonería se había enmadrado en las alturas del Poder y en el Ministerio de Instrucción Pública. También en España, desde el 14 de abril del año 1931, estábamos en plena guerra escolar» [Herrera Oria, 1934: 319].

⁴⁰ Pius XI, 1929: §7: «It is therefore as important to make no mistake in education, as it is to make no mistake in the pursuit of the last end, with which the whole work of education is intimately and necessarily connected. In fact, since education consists essentially in preparing man for what he must be and for what he must do here below, in order to attain the sublime end for which he

defence of the Catholic values, advocating for the influence of the Church in politics and, in particular in education.

The arguments in favour of the hegemonic control of culture by the State were consequently based on catholic premises also in the general outlook of the minister Sáinz Rodríguez. The high school and the University were perceived as the most important institutions responsible for the education of the masses and also of the ruling class. To mend a cultural scenario in which the Catholic influence was perceived as extremely limited, Herrera Oria proposed the construction of a new educational system⁴¹. In order to put it into practice he was persuaded of the necessity of looking for a collaboration between the Church and the political representatives. As he wrote in the preface of one of his books:

Dios quiera que este libro sirva para iluminar a los ministros de Instrucción Pública, a nuestros legisladores, en cuyas manos está el derrocar la orientación mal llamada nacional de la escuela, que, con su laicismo masónico, no es en los momentos actuales ni religiosa ni española, ya que no es tampoco prolongación de la familia española que venera el Crucifijo y demanda para sus hijos las grandes enseñanzas del mejor código de religión y moral: el Catecismo de la doctrina cristiana expulsado de nuestras escuelas, contra el derecho natural y las leyes de los pueblos más cultos [Herrera Oria, 1934: 8-9].

According to Herrera Oria, the reform of the Spanish education and, as a consequence, of the whole society, should have passed through an initial reform of the *bachillerato*, that is to say the connecting

was created, it is clear that there can be no true education which is not wholly directed to man's last end, and that in the present order of Providence».

⁴¹ «Esa masa universitaria carece de ideas religiosas sólidas, de las que se derivan el respeto a la autoridad y el amor racional a la patria. Preguntamos: ¿Hay en los centros superiores un número suficiente de intelectuales católicos que tengan ideas claras y precisas en las cuestiones fundamentales del dogma y moral católicos, que conozcan las bases sobre que se asienta la filosofía católica? [...] No hay un fuerte núcleo de intelectuales católicos en el sentido que hemos explicado antes porque no hay Universidades católicas, y no hay universidades católicas, si no de derecho, al menos de hecho, porque no hay intelectuales católicos en número suficiente que deberían formarse en las Universidades católicas». [Herrera Oria, 1934: 146].

link between higher education and university. This reform represented the pedagogical priority of the *Opus Dei*, a catholic association recently founded in 1930 by Josemaría Escrivá de Balanguer. The main reason for this interest lay on the fact that the student population in the period of secondary education had extraordinarily incremented in few years, passing from 64.000 students in 1928 to 125.000 in 1934 [Nuñez, 2005: 214]. In this context, the possibility of acculturating a new generation of citizens and an entire ruling class (in 1934 only the 3% of the potential students' population received a secondary education) by transmitting a system of knowledge and beliefs radically in contrast to the one purported during the republican period was considered as a great opportunity and a vital priority for the Catholic forces. In particular from a political point of view. Significantly, the reform of the *bachillerato* would have been – together with the spring of the debate concerning the reform of the University – the most relevant contribution of the minister of education Sáinz Rodríguez to the reform of the pedagogical system during the first life of Franco's regime.

4.3 *The New University: a debated future*

During the spring 1939, Sáinz Rodríguez was substituted by another member of the ACNdP, José Ibáñez Martín. Without any doubt, this catholic association had a very relevant role in the construction of the new university during the first years of Franco's regime [Cavallaro, 2012: 41]. Once into power, the regime wanted to build a completely new institutional framework. This change significantly affected the educative system. Following the example of the Italian fascism, the *Ministerio de Educación Nacional* was now created. The regime was making a tremendous leap into the construction of a new ideological outlook and, for this purpose, it called for the collaboration of the University, conceived as a means both for the propaganda and for the production of culture. This is evident by taking into consideration the *Proyecto de Ley de Reforma Universitaria*, published by the end of April 1939⁴² [López Bausela, 2011]. The reform constituted an urgency for the

⁴² In this text the University was defined as: «El más alto organismo de la cultura educativa nacional [...] llamada a constituirse en el más autorizado elemento orientador de los ideales fundamentales hispanicos en lo que a la Enseñanza y la Cultura se refiere». See BOE n. 117, 27 Aprile 1939, p. 2266.

new political government, since in 1939 the twelve Spanish public universities opened after almost three years of interruption. *The Caudillo had always underlined the importance of the university in the construction of a national identity and a compact ruling class: now it was the time to pass from theory to practice, and build what, together with the army and the public law, was considered as the third pillar of the new Francoist society*⁴³.

In this context, the University represented the centre of the political debate. This was due to the fact that its very nature and normative ideal should have to realise the best representation of the regime's ideology. At the same time, however, the unity of the political forces that had sustained Franco during the civil war was extremely fragile. This fragmentation and the existence of radically different views regarding the nature of the new political power produced a fierce contraposition. In particular between the catholic and the falangist wings. The only point shared by the two fronts was the strong desire to annihilate and overcome the recent republican past, as proved by the spectacular *Auto da Fé* taking place on April 30, 1939 at the UC. On that occasion all the "Masonic", "communist", "anti-Spanish" and "laic" books were burnt, as in an inquisitorial process [Martínez Rus, 2014: 15-40]. This common aim was also manifested by the consistent substitution of professors within the University. In fact, considering the University of Madrid, 155 out of 278 professors who composed it in 1944 had been appointed just starting from 1939 onwards [Alted Vigil, 1991: 117].

On the contrary, as far as the new educational course was concerned, it is possible to notice the existence of very different positions. In fact, the destruction of what was conceived as a form of "*pseudocultura*" was not replaced by a comprehensive ideology. Indeed, the exclusive reference to the religious trait could have constituted a barrier rather than a bridge in the process of consolidation of the unity among the different political aims [Martín Puerta, 2013: 17]. In particular, within the FET y JONS, a large number of people was looking with growing sympathy at the successes of the other European

⁴³ Franco, *Discurso de unificación, Salamanca 19 Abril 1937*, in *Palabras del Caudillo*, Editora Nacional, Madrid, 1943. In this occasion Franco also traced some basic guidelines for the new University which should have been: «Universidad clásica, que continuadora de su gloriosa tradición, con su espíritu su doctrina y su moral, vuelva a ser luz y faro de los pueblos hispanos». *Ibidem*, p. 16.

fascisms, not only at Italy and Germany, but also at the *Estado Novo* of professor Salazar, who represented the symbol of the cultural legitimacy of the fascist ideology. The discussion that took place since 1939 was both the expression of the will of constructing a new political ideology and the manifestation of a struggle for power within the francoist family⁴⁴. Thus, more than the image of a political unity, the university during the first years of the regime constituted a very fragmented social institution that, paradoxically, was deemed responsible for the construction of this new political identity.

The two basic texts that set the ground for further discussions were the books of José Pemartín⁴⁵ and José Pérez Ibor⁴⁶. The first, in his *¿Qué es lo nuevo?*, engaged in an attempt to conciliate a fascist patriotism with a religious outlook, in particular assigning this role to a new discipline to be included in the university curriculum: the History of Spain. In fact, this should have been: «la *segunda religión* de los Españoles, sin miedo alguno a idolatrías, puesto que por designio altísimo de Dios, en nuestra España la religión de la Patria se identifica con la religión de la Religión» [Pemartín, 1937: 162]. Pemartín looked at the rhetoric of Mussolini – who defined the fascism as the soul of the

⁴⁴ Sotes Elizalde, 2004: 32: «En esas fechas, el S.E.U. y Falange se mostraban claramente cercanos a los regímenes nacional-socialista alemán y fascista italiano. Por otro lado, observando los contenidos de la revista, puede constatarse la unión entre los objetivos políticos y las actividades profesionales. Había un interés por la mejora estructural de la Universidad, pero también un afán por imponer la presencia de los principios falangistas en su funcionamiento y en su actividad».

⁴⁵ José Pemartín y Sanjuán was in charge of the *Servicio Nacional de Enseñanza Superior y Media*. He was a monarchic falangist who collaborated also with the catholic review *Acción Española*. Thanks to his predisposition to dialogue with the two aims of the regime he was one of the promoters of the creation of FET y de la JONS. In his very influential book entitled *¿Qué es lo nuevo?* he dedicated an entire chapter to define the educational outlook of the regime, calling for a “intensive fascism”, i.e. a form of syncretism between religion and patriotism. See in particular Sánchez Castro, 2013.

⁴⁶ José Ibor was a young doctor and alfonsoist monarchist when, in 1938, he was nominated for the commission concerning the discussion of the project of university reform. He later took part in the CSIC and created the scientific review *Norma. Revista de Exaltación universitaria*. His book, *Discurso a los Universitario* [1938], represented a very influential pamphlet that oriented the debate.

soul of the Italians⁴⁷ – to construct his definition of the Spanish fascism. According to Pemartín, religion should have supported the fascist ideology of the new State and this, at the same time, should include in its united doctrine the basic principles of Catholicism. However, he was persuaded that no educative freedom could have been conceded to private institutions and the whole national educational system should have been governed by a totalitarian State. So, whereas the catholic principles were included in the new ideology, on the contrary the political influence of the Church was extremely limited⁴⁸.

On the other hand, López Ibor's book constituted a very influential text insofar as it was the first attempt, made by the rising francoist ruling class, of overcoming the mere opposition to the republican university and defining the basic guidelines of a new academic system. Starting from this book, a vast literature of normative academic discourse would have flourished within the Spanish university, as it will be proved in the following pages. López Ibor rejected both the idea of a mediaeval university (based on dogmatic and catholic premises) and the rationalistic one purported during the Republic. He called for a new model of academia, that he calls "imperial" [López Ibor, 1938: 67]. He proposed an ambitious project based on the reform of the concept of humanism. As he put it, the Spanish fascism should have had to reach an extraordinary goal in the European scenario: «lanzar al mundo un tercer humanismo, que no sea como el del Renacimiento un estudio de las humanidades, ni una mezcla impura de paganismo y cristianismo, sino un cultivo de los más puros valores humanos, tanto inmanentes como trascendentes: un humanismo auténticamente español, totalitario» [López Ibor, 1938: 68]. Thus, the University was conceived as one of the most important political institutions for the new political regime, since it should have been responsible for the creation of a new ideology.

The proposal of Ibor constituted a turning point in the relation between political power and academia. For the first time since the birth of the falangist movement the intellectuals were not perceived as a

⁴⁷ Mussolini, *La dottrina del fascismo*, Sansoni, Firenze, 1936.

⁴⁸ «Un Estado totalitario de fundamento Fascista, tiene que exigir necesariamente a sus Médicos, Físicos y Matemáticos, a más de la Cultura específica de su especialidad, la orientación Cultural general de la Nación-Estado: Religiosa y Patriótica. Lo que se exige en el Extranjero hay que exigirlo en España». Pemartín, 1937: 184.

weed that had to be extirpated, but rather as a useful resource. This produced another significant consequence within the academia: the politicisation that had characterised the Spanish university at least since the decade of the '20s was now converted in a form of direct political control over this institution. This caused a genetic mutation in the way in which the intellectuals and the professors conceived their roles. The intellectual activity conceived as a critical and reflexive attitude, a conception always supported by Ortega, was now replaced by a direct political intervention with a sole and unquestionable aim: serving the national cause. As Ibor put it: «En la Nueva Edad no se dará el tipo del intelectual como espectador, de aquel que no participa de los hechos, tratando de imponerles un cauce, cualquiera que sea el riesgo que corra» [Ibor, 1938: 141]. These were the premises that, since Autumn 1939, characterised the process that brought about the creation of a new university and, consequently, of a new form of intellectual that for the first time appeared in the history of the Spanish culture.

4.4 The organic intellectual: the case of Martín Martínez

The new intellectual that suddenly appeared in the public scenario during the first years of Franco's regime was a twofold figure. On the one hand he conceives himself as a spiritual and ideological guide, on the other he had to struggle for becoming an official voice of a regime that needed him only insofar as he could be useful for its purposes. His independence from the political power was substantially null. The intellectual became a bureaucrat who had to be extremely cautious in order to reach his ambitious goals of acquiring a better social status and exercise his political influence, due to the oppressive control imposed by the regime. During the inauguration of the UC in 1939 the very minister of education Ibáñez Martín clearly defined the role that these public officials should have to play within the new political regime. In fact:

Empeño del nuevo Estado es precisamente fomentar la investigación española colocándola en la primera línea de las preocupaciones y los problemas nacionales. Pero es deber suyo velar por la unidad de la ciencia, coordinarla con las necesidades del país, hacer que redunden las actividades científicas en servicio de la nación e impedir, a la par, que

pueden en ningún caso ser instrumento perverso contra los sagrados principios de la Patria [Ibáñez Martín, 1939: 34].

The desire that moved the minister and the Franco's entourage during this period was that of identifying university with politics, following the example of what was happening in Italy after the publication of the *Carta della Scuola* in that very year. As declared in the XIX point of this document: «L'Università ha per fine di promuovere in un ordine di alta responsabilità politica e morale il progresso della scienza e di fornire la cultura scientifica necessaria per l'esercizio degli uffici e delle professioni»⁴⁹. The University was therefore conceived as the most powerful instrument that could have provided legitimacy to the New State. At the same time, it was considered as indispensable for indicating a normative ideal to follow for the future. Thus, the reopening of the university, in 1939, gave the opportunity to many of the members of the new establishment to propose their programmatic view about the role of the academia within society and politics. The common aim was that of defining the nature of the new academia within a totalitarian regime, whose basic ideology was represented by a cult of the catholic tradition and a more or less dogmatic form of fascism [Iañez, 2011: 33].

One of the most significant instances of this debate that took place at that time in Madrid, in particular at the *Centro de Estudios Universitarios* – the university recently founded by the ACNdP – was that of Isidoro Martín Martínez. Martínez, a young law assistant professor, not only was a member of the most influential catholic association of the time, but he also boasted an admirable fascist pedigree. In fact, he had studied in Bologna, obtaining in the homeland of fascism his doctorate in law. When he pronounced his discourse in Madrid, at the end of October 1939, among his audience there was also the minister of education. His text reveals the desire of a young researcher to be part of an intellectual community that was clearly recognisable. In the first pages of his discourse he quotes all the most relevant figure of the time who were engaging in the definition of the

⁴⁹ In the case of the Italian fascism, as Pasqualini, 2013: 5 wrote: «Il punto di partenza nella ristrutturazione della scuola nel suo complesso è l'intenzione di trasformare un'istituzione in organo politico di regime, come si evince da gran parte delle dichiarazioni». On the relation between the Italian and the Spanish reform of education see in particular Vittoria, 1991 and Puelles Benítez, 2002.

essence of the new academia: Pemartín, López Ibor, Herrera Oria and the very minister of education, whose discourse, that took place in the UC, just a week before is extensively cited by Martínez. The structure of his text clearly reveals the existence of a community of discourse to which he wanted to belong. All the reference points, the noble fathers or rather the pantheon of the regime was extensively named and praised in the course of his discourse⁵⁰. So, the academia, and in particular the humanities, were explicitly becoming what some scholars think they always are: relations of power [Kusch, 2000], and Martínez not only accept, but defended the thesis according to which in a totalitarian State there is no place for intellectual independence: «nada, pues, de libertad de cátedra» [Martín, 1940: 46].

Martínez was persuaded that the University had to play a pivotal role in the resurgence of the nation. In order to do it, they should have been revitalised the imperial and Catholic traditions of the Spanish most antique universities: Alcalá, Toledo, and in particular Salamanca⁵¹. After having praised the past and the present of the Spanish culture he also traced the basic guidelines for the ideological future of the New State and its University. He supported the idea of a university built on Catholic values, and purported a religious education. The first goal of the University and, in general, of the higher education, should basically consist in transmitting, according to Martín, moral and social values. In fact:

La primera misión que tiene, pues, que cumplir la Universidad española es la de asentar la unidad de la cultura, forjar un pensamiento diáfananamente católico y hondamente español. [...]No basta ilustrar la inteligencia; es necesario también fortalecer y acostumbrar la voluntad. Al joven universitario hay que adiestrarlo en el ejercicio de las virtudes religiosas y sociales [Martín Martínez, 1940: 43, 55].

This educative mission, conceived as a socialisation of a young generation according to the principles of Catholicism, was not only limited to the knowledge transmitted to the students, but also to the

⁵⁰ He quoted the thinkers of the Ancient Rome: Seneca, Quintilian, Martial, then the authors of the School of Salamanca, the Catholic Monarchs, Vives, Balmes, Donoso Cortés, ...

⁵¹ «La Universidad puede y debe representar un solidísimo punto de apoyo para el resurgimiento de España» [Martín Martínez, 1940: 15].

concrete practices which should have been adopted within the academia⁵², since: «una misa oída en común, un catedrático comulgando junto a sus alumnos da, sin duda [...] una lección mucho más eficaz que cuando logra la resolución feliz de un problema científico complicado» [Martín, 1940: 64-65]. However, the attempt made by Martínez in his discourse did not only consist in the exaltation of the Catholic value but also, and more interesting, in the conjunction of these values with the tradition of the Falange. Using the words of Primo de Rivera or Franco to sustain the necessity, for instance, of constructing the *Colegios Mayores*. *The rhetoric used by the new academic elites of the regime was therefore radically different from the Italian or German one* [Francesconi, 2009] *and this was mainly due to the very different role assign to religion in the educative process.*

4.5 A new literary genre defining a community of discourse

*The text of Isidoro Martínez represents a significant instance of a new literary genre that was flourishing during that period: the programmatic discourse. A genre that was rapidly passing from politics to academia due to the increasing osmosis between these two spheres of the Spanish cultural and social life. This genre was particularly, but not exclusively, adopted during public ceremonies such as opening academic speeches, conferences' plenary sessions or acceptance speeches. Each of these discourses presents a same basic structure: after an initial welcome speech and a lavish *captatio benevolentiae* of the audience, the speaker must mention his university colleagues who are no longer in charge. Then, before developing the theme on which he should possess a mastery competence, he has to present the reasons why he chose a particular topic, motivating it on the basis of the national interest. In the conclusions, he has to greet the students wishing them to flourish within an institution that had to be conceived as a functionary part of the Spanish totalitarian State. In addition, the whole speech should*

⁵² Martín, 1940: 58: «No basta que nuestras Universidades lleven a cabo sus enseñanzas con una escrupolosa adhesión a la verdad del dogma católico. Para que todas nuestras Universidades sean católicas como quiere el Caudillo, no bastaría con la enseñanza de la Religión, sino que resulta imprescindible la práctica de la Religión».

always be characterised by the constant reference to the main authors of the Falangist pantheon that some intellectuals were contributing to define. Eugenio d'Ors, for instance, planned since 1939 the creation of a *Biblioteca del falangista consciente* which should have exactly defined the hegemonic ideology of the regime by publishing the books of all the authors considered as akin to the mentality of the new political regime [Eugenio d'Ors, 1939]. In his book he offered a series of rhetoric *topoi* and *auctoritates* which would have to constitute the basis for most of these speeches.

Therefore, the rigid structure of these speeches marked the birth of a literary genre that defined the new ruling class. Indeed, this was a very powerful and expressive genre since its rigidity permits to notice, through the very slight variations that each speaker did, the existence of different families and groups within a same community of discourse⁵³. The existence of this community – which flourished within the academia and contributed to define the new ruling class of the country – is testified also by the existence of a unique topic of discussion chosen by all the different members of the community in 1939: the renewal of the university in accordance to totalitarian principles. Not only in Madrid, but also in Murcia, Oviedo, Salamanca or Seville the community of discourse was propagating its dogmatic vision of culture and university.

⁵³ I adopt this term by referring to the works of Scattola. He used this expression to define the creation of different argumentative schemes which emerged in the early modern period among political thinkers in different European countries. As he put it [Scattola, 2014: 90-91]: «Possiamo chiamare questi raggruppamenti come “comunità di discorso” in senso proprio perché effettivamente essi sono caratterizzati dalla presenza di una pratica comune di ragionamento, da uno stile unitario di argomentazione o di discussione. La presenza di questo legame comune attraverso il discorso può essere rilevata in tre modi. In primo luogo i membri di ciascuna di queste comunità sono, diremmo oggi, figure omogenee, ossia appartengono allo stesso ceto o al medesimo segmento cetuale. In secondo luogo essi si riconoscono reciprocamente come interlocutori del medesimo discorso, mentre escludono gli estranei dalla loro cerchia, e ciò in modi sia espliciti sia impliciti. Per questo motivo le “comunità di discorso politico” possono essere facilmente considerate anche come “comunità di citazione”. In terzo luogo ciascuno di questi gruppi utilizza un ben definito codice linguistico o letterario, caratterizzato da una rigorosa combinazione di forme e di contenuti».

In Murcia, for instance, Santiago Montero Díaz – who the following year obtained a position at the prestigious UC teaching history of ancient philosophy [Parra Garrigues, 1956: 306-311] – pronounced his discourse significantly entitled *Misión de la Universidad*. His affinity with this rising community of discourse is proved by the references and quotes he adopts in his text, by the unceasing attempt to rigidly define the members of the *ingroup* and *outgroup* of the Francoist family, which represented the leading ideology⁵⁴. Using in a very instrumental way the words of Ortega y Gasset he affirmed that the duty of the new University should have been that of constructing a selected minority able to annihilate the precedent liberal tradition and to pose the basis for a new totalitarian regime. In fact his aim was that of building: «esa minoría humana, rectora y decidente, capaz de proyectar sobre el Estado y el pueblo los resultados de una creatividad constante, enérgica, sin posibles interrupciones ni desmayos» [Montero Díaz, 1940: 9].

The same discussion over the nature and normative end of the new University was taking place as well in Oviedo. In this case is Teodoro González García, professor of public law, who had to defend the totalitarian project of educational reform and, at the same time, had to give his contribution to the debate. After manifesting his satisfaction for the birth of a new cultural outlook within the university, which was replacing the “Marxist cultural revolution”, he started to define what, according to him, was a new «ordenación jerárquica y unitaria de las cosas» that, obeying to the Catholic dogmas, was taking place within the academia [González García, 1939: 5]. The authorities mentioned by the professor were mostly the same quoted by Eugenio d’Ors: among them Donoso Cortés, Vives, Balmes or Vazquez de Mella. The mission of the university, according to him, would have consisted in creating a fervent laboratory of political doctrines with the main goal of constructing the premises for the development of a Spanish way to fascism. For this reason, he harshly condemned all the forms of political eclecticism and exalted the traditionalist virtues of the new State. In this way it could have been possible to effectively counter the «concepción demo-liberal-socialista del Estado» by favouring the creation of a totalitarian communitarianism [González García, 1939: 33]. In the

⁵⁴ This is the distinctive trait – as Van Dijk, 2003 has demonstrated – of the creation of sectarian ideologies through the discursive practice and within the social reality.

course of his discourse he clearly breaks the barrier between academia and politics manifesting that the two spheres had ultimately collapsed into one. In particular he affirmed that the only way to realise this new cultural ideal would have been that of creating a unified national party, replacing the theory of the separation of powers with the creation of a strong executive power and a legitimate State of exception based on the exaltation of a badly defined traditionalism. As he put it:

La innovación revolucionaria alcanza el reconocimiento de la consagración política: en la vida de un pueblo, cualquier rodeo inesperado, se ve impulsado por el brío de los grandes acontecimientos históricos, se perfila y expansión, después, con una vocación rectilínea; y en vez de representar una excepción, se hace presente magnífico de un impreciso y tumultuoso pasado. [...] En el fondo de todas las revoluciones transcendentales late un anhelo imperioso de necesidad y legitimidad ¡Vano intento el de sujetar entonces su fuerza con cortapisas legales, con textos constitucionales “escritos”! [González García, 1939: 34].

Starting from these premises, González theorised the need of a cultural counter-reform against the Marxist heresy which would justify all the possible violent and repressive measure that the new regime could have adopted in the name of the tradition. Not only the University was serving the purposes of the new State by indicating original normative ideals, but also by legitimating, from a theoretical point of view, all its oppressive and aggressive practices.

One of the most significant example of this tendency his offered by the inaugural speech of the professor of criminal law at the University of Salamanca Isaias Sánchez Tejerina. In his discourse he offered a scientific justification [«estrictamente juridico-penal», Sánchez Tejerina, 1940: 24] of the *Alzamiento* of the FN in 1936. In fact, he affirmed that the FN just reacted to the ferocious attacks of the republicans and, for this reason, the decision to rebel against the violence of the leftist forces represented a case of exercise of the national right of self-defence. The military coup was thus conceived as the expression of a legitimate right that could not be put into question. As a consequence, the very legitimacy of Franco's regime could not be discussed any further. *Thus, de facto, the main mission of the University was that of legitimating the new political power, and no academic activity could have been carried out without taking into account the interests of the nations as established by Franco and his ministers.*

At the same time, the scientific community was serving the interest of the State also by creating the premises for the cultural and economic development of the country. This instrumental function was praised by the community of discourse, for instance by Manuel Lora Tamayo, professor of chemistry at the university of Seville, in his inaugural speech in 1939⁵⁵. His leading role in the scientific research produced within the Francoist family was publicly recognised at least from the publication, during the civil war, of his book *Ideas sobre una ordenación nacional de la investigación científico-técnica*. The main preoccupation of Lora Tamayo was that of setting the bases for the creation of the national research centre of the New State, following the example of the Italian *Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche*, founded in 1923, and enormously implemented during the second half of the '30s⁵⁶. With this discourse he wanted to support the creation of the CSIC by defending a debated thesis in that period, i.e. the leading role that this institute should have played within the academic system.

This new literary genre was therefore both a means for constructing a community identity within the recently created academia and a way through which it was somehow possible to propose original views on the future of this very community accepting its basic, and very rigid, rules. In fact all these speeches had a double function: on the one hand they realised their propagandistic purpose by depicting to the external audience – thanks to the construction of a well defined pantheon – the image of an extremely unified institution. On the other hand, they served as a vehicle for promoting an internal, even if extremely reduced, debate within this very community. The range of political and cultural dissent was extremely limited, but it is somehow visible through the slight variations that appeared in these very discourses, in particular when they were addressed not to the general public but to a more selected audience. Indeed, together with all these commonalities, the discourses addressed to a university audience also manifested some points of disagreement as far as the normative project of the new culture was concerned. They were the expression of a community in fieri whose structures and aims were still debated.

⁵⁵ Manuel Lora Tamayo, as Santiago Montero Díaz, would soon after pass to the more prestigious UC, where in 1944 he became vice-rector of the University. At the beginning of the 60s, he would also be nominated minister of education.

⁵⁶ On the nature and activities of the CNR during this period see in particular Di Giovanni, 2005; and Maiocchi, 2008.

It is possible to summarise the main points of disagreement in three main open questions: a) If the religious education was a priority for the State, how should it be provided by non-governmental associations such as Catholic one? This problem was extremely relevant insofar as the educative role of the Church could have been drastically impoverished if adopting a more fascist and less traditionalist point of view. b) The idea that the university should have to socialise the masses and to forge the new ruling class also opened up another relevant question: what kind of professional figures should the university forge in accordance to this new institutional framework? c) Lastly, the University was also conceived as a centre for scientific research but, with the creation of the CSIC, what would have been the destiny of the single universities if they had to be subjugated by a centralised institution? Would the autonomy of the single centres be drastically diminished?

These questions animated a very harsh debate, and not only a rhetorical one. In fact the solutions to these questions implied further consequences both from a political and cultural point of view. Indeed they would have determined the hegemony of one group within the fragmented Francoist family over the other. *As a matter of fact, depending on the responses provided to these questions, the new State would have adopted a more military, corporative or religious framework.* This was a discussion that found within the academia the perfect ground for prospering. In fact, the community of discourse that gave birth to this dialogue was aware – thanks to the recent example provided by the totalitarian regimes established in other European countries – of the importance of implementing, through a cultural and legislative activity, the theoretic premises of an authoritative power. They knew that, thanks to these decisions, «se forma no solo un Nuevo Estado, sino un orden nuevo; se va hacia un nuevo tipo de hombre» [Beneyto Pérez, 1939: 15]. They understood that the definition of the nature of the new political regime constituted the basic premise for tracing the identity of the new intellectual figure. The subordinate role of the intellectual in respect to the political sphere was already accepted by this community of discourse that tried to compensate this loss of independence and power by changing its very essence, trying to be part of the new ruling political class.

4.6 *The struggle for the hegemony within the academia*

Professorship and power, became synonymic expressions and what could have appeared as a pure rhetoric wish started to be concretely put into practice creating the ideology and structure of Franco's regime. However, the disagreements that characterised the debate within this academic community of discourse did not vanished but rather increased while the process of institutionalisation of the educative system was being implemented.

On the one hand, the creation of the CSIC in 1939 and the adoption of Lull's *Arbor Scientiae* symbolised the leading role play by religion in the establishment of the national university (see Annex 5). The Catholic associations, and in particular the ACNdP, were constantly pressing the minister Ibáñez Martín with the aim of gaining a leading role in the educative system. The very influential bishop Pla y Deniel explicitly recognised the importance of the minister's activities in his inaugural discourse for the University of Salamanca in 1940. On that occasion, he greeted Ibáñez Martín for having served the cause of the Church «proclamando de nuevo la raíz religiosa de las primeras fuentes de nuestra cultura» and so contributing to «converger en la Iglesia española el origen de nuestro florecimiento científico y de la expansión del pensamiento hispánico en el mundo» [Pla y Deniel, 1940: 10]. However, the dominant role assigned to the Church in the educative process was perceived by many members of the establishment as a substantial degeneration of the principles of the Falange, of the original national-syndicalism that supported Franco from the very beginning of his political action.

Indeed, the educative program set by the FET y JONS during the civil war envisaged a totally different cultural reform, according to which the State should not have played a subaltern role in comparison to the Church. In fact: «La iglesia y el Estado concordarán sus facultades respectivas, sin que se admita intromisión o actividad alguna que menoscabe la dignidad del Estado o la integridad nacional»⁵⁷. The leading role that the Church advocated for himself in the creation of the new ruling class was in conflict with the prerogative of the national party that, in 1939, had created the *Instituto de Estudios Políticos*, with the aim of forging the new political and cultural elite of

⁵⁷ *Fundamentos del Nuevo Estado*, Vicesecretaría de Educación Popular, Madrid 1941, § XXV.

the country [Sesma Landrín, 2013]. Starting from these premises, at the beginning of the '40s it took place a violent struggle over the nature of the new educative model in which the most orthodox members of the Falange started to counter the representatives of the religious associations [Alares López, 2011: 619].

A young researcher can be identified as the spokesperson of the Falangist front: Pedro Laín Entralgo, a catholic intellectual who participated to the definition of the principles of the national-syndicalism [Argaya Roca, 2003, Martín Puerta, 2013: 211]. In his book, *Los valores morales del nacionalsindicalismo*, published in the spring 1941, immediately before the first governmental crisis of the Franco's dictatorship of May 1941, Laín Entralgo tried to conciliate the two souls of the regime presenting himself as a «falangista y católico» [Laín Entralgo, 1941: 9]. However, he did not renounced to violently criticise the political decisions of the minister of education who had relegated the Falange to a subaltern role, betraying the party. In a context of apparent unity, his words could sound as extremely heterodox when affirming, for instance, that the State and the Church should be two independent entities, as affirmed by Dante in his *De Monarchia*, since the governor should depend on God but not on the Pope. Laín affirmed that there were some «deberes morales históricos, nacionalmente calificados, que se les revelen en algún modo independientes de las obligaciones estrictamente religiosas» [Laín Entralgo, 1941: 25]. His criticisms towards the autonomy of the Church and the existence of a “Christian democracy” represented by that time one of the most vivid synthesis of the falangist cultural ideal [Piñas Mesa, 2007: 54].

The educative role of the catholic association was radically put into question by this outstanding member of the Falangist movement who affirmed that the formation of the new generation within a totalitarian regime cannot but being a priority of the State, without any intromission of the Church. He thought that the duty of providing the moral development of the university students should not pertain to these associations, but rather to the university unions, the SEU. Significantly enough, the very national representative of the SEU, José Miguel Guitarte, claimed for this leading role in the control of the education during the inauguration speech at the University of Valladolid on November, 4th 1940, when, talking in the presence of the *Caudillo*, he affirmed that the SEU, and not the Church, constituted «la línea continuada de la más pura política falangista». For this reason the

University should have adopted a fascist educative model: moral, patriotic, physical and military education in order to create a military camaraderie, not an apostolic one⁵⁸.

On that occasion, in Valladolid, also the minister of education Ibáñez Martín pronounced a discourse resoundingly entitled *Hacia un nuevo orden universitario*. In his speech he adopted a slightly different rhetoric from the one he used in other occasions. He knew he was speaking to a Falangist audience, and for this reason he preferred not to appear excessively akin to the position of the religious members of the establishment. Consequently, he defended the Christian principles of the Spanish science [Ibáñez Martín, 1940: 6] but, at the same time, he clearly distinguished the roles of the State and the Church assigning to the former the duty to socialise the masses and forge the new ruling class. He sustained the necessity of putting the University question at the top of the political agenda. The reform he presented during that occasion, while the project was still discussed by the parliamentary commission, was very similar to the one presented by the representative of SEU: an elitist, patriotic, hierarchical, military and traditionalist university⁵⁹. He therefore exhibited a great political opportunism, and during a phase in which the reform was still debated by the members of the new cultural and political elite, he preferred to continuously adapt his speeches to the changing audiences rather than assuming a fix and unmovable position.

⁵⁸ As referred in the chronicle of the *Revista de Educación Nacional*, this military and fascist unit represented, to the delegate of education of the FET y JONS, the end that the falangist education should pursue: «Falange comprende que en la conquista y selección de los profesores y Maestros reside una de las bases esenciales de la Revolución Nacional, cuya entraña es de tipo espiritual principalísimamente. Sin el profesorado organizado con disciplina de milicia, no puede penetrar a fondo la Falange en todas las Escuelas, Institutos y Universidades, y lograrse en ellos la unificación espiritual, que es programa espiritual del régimen». See *Revista Nacional de Educación* [1941], 2: 92.

⁵⁹ «En el primer plano de las preocupaciones de un Estado que quiere rehacerse de una catástrofe nacional ha de estar la revolución de los espíritus, porque sin ella los males del desorden y la anarquía vuelven a fermentar, y aun fermentan más fácilmente si sólo trata de curárselos con remedios materiales. Esa revolución de los espíritus sólo se alcanza en el campo de la educación y de la cultura. Por eso, repito, el Nuevo Estado español no puede arrebatear el máximo de los medios necesarios a la reconstrucción y renovación de la Universidad» Ibáñez Martín, 1940: 17.

The balance of power significantly change since the political crisis of the spring 1941 when the Falangist group started to acquire a more relevant role in the process of nation building due to the victories of the Axis. As a consequence, the Falange called for a rapid fascistisation of the country [Preston, 2006: 380-395] and education represented the most relevant matter at stake. The very *Revista de Educación Nacional*, which represented the official voice of the minister, started to give space to fascist positions such as that purported by the rector of the University of Santiago Ruiz del Castillo. According to him, for instance, the education had to be guaranteed exclusively by the State, intended as a totalitarian form of government⁶⁰. The review *El Escorial*, recently founded by Laín Entralgo and other falangist members, affirmed the supremacy of the State over the Church during the very 1941 in his Editorial. The religious education was conceived as included in the general education purported by the fascist movement, taking into consideration the fact that: «No conviene olvidar – muchos parecen ignorarlo, otros quieren que no se sepa – que la Falange fué desde su origen un movimiento universitario, que de la Universidad salieron sus mejores hombre y que entre los estudiantes se reclutaron sus mejores milicias»⁶¹.

The appeasement of the minister towards the Falangist group – during a period in which the fascist ideology appeared to dominate in the political and cultural scenario thanks to its military success – is testified by an article he wrote for the *REN*, expressing his admiration for the cultural reform brought about in Germany⁶². Moreover, from the legislative point of view, between the end of 1940 and the beginning of 1941 they were approved some basic laws that drastically reformed the educative system towards a fascist direction: the *Ley de Bases* of SEU⁶³

⁶⁰ «El Estado total, síntesis de Derecho y de Cultura, integración de la vida social, a la cual conduce en la dirección unitaria que señala el destino de un pueblo en marcha, ha de dar a la Cultura un rango decisivo en la ordenación de los valores y de las fuerzas nacionales» Ruiz del Castillo, 1941: 28.

⁶¹ *La Universidad*, in «Escorial», Cuaderno 9, 1941: 7.

⁶² Ibáñez Martín, 1941, 6: 7: «Nunca en la Historia de la Humanidad alcanzaron las armas de un pueblo la gloria difícil que, en estos dos años de lucha, Alemania ha sabido lograr. Pero, como en toda suprema coyuntura histórica, vuestro país supo también forjar, como instrumento indispensable para el triunfo, la estrecha alianza de las armas y de la cultura».

⁶³ BOE, 342, 7-XII-1940, pp.8388-8392.

and the creation of the university army (*Milicias Universitarias*)⁶⁴ ruled by the *Delegación Nacional de Educación* of the FETyJONS.

At the same time, following the example of other European totalitarianisms, it was created the *Consejo Nacional de Educación* [Otero Carvajal, 2014: 69-130]. The ideology propagated by this centre was extremely akin to the one purported by the other fascisms, as proved by the book of one of the counsellors of the CNE [Iniesta Corredor [1941]], in which he compared all the different educative reform recently realised in Italy, Portugal, Germany, Hungary and Japan. *The fascistisation was supported by the minister of education. However*, the reasons underneath this change in the policies of Ibáñez Martín were mainly opportunistic rather than reviling of a personal conviction. This turning point in the educative policies ultimately produced a relevant exacerbation of the opposition between catholic and falangist forces, in particular due to the leading role that the ACE, the ACNdP and the Opus Dei wanted to play within the cultural scenario of the New Spain.

In fact, the preponderance of the Falangist front in the struggle for the cultural hegemony during the first half of 1941 was soon questioned by the Catholic associations [Sotés Elizalde, 2004: 135-152]. Ibáñez Martín tried to mitigate the Catholic discontent by creating the CSIC⁶⁵. The organisation of this research institute responded, according to the very minister, to a basic political reason: balancing the relations of power between catholic and falangist forces permitting to the former to operate in order to Christianise the country [Ibáñez Martín, 1941b]. In this extremely conflictive scenario, by the end of 1941, it started the discussion of the Anteproyecto for the reform of the university [Italicus, 1941: 27-32].

From now on the political context significantly changed and a new balance of power started to emerge. The military self-confidence of the Axis began to creak, and Spain faced a new problem: foreseeing the chance of a defeat of the Axis. Spain had to manifest its neutrality not only from a military but also from an ideological point of view. Moreover, the government crisis had ended up in a reaffirmation of the predominant role played by the catholic front. By following the rhetoric production on the Anteproyecto, it is possible to notice a progressive

⁶⁴ BOE, 64, 5-III-1941, pp.1547-1549.

⁶⁵ The very minister defined it as a place in which: «Comulgaron nuestros sabios y rezaron nuestros investigadores, porque vana es la ciencia que no aspira a Dios» See *Crónica*, [1941], in «Revista de Educación Nacional» 1: 95.

shift in the lexicon adopted by the establishment. The problem of the “university reform” started to be translated into a problem of “educative reform” where the word “education” was always conceived in terms of moral and religious education.

The shift appears evident by analysing the articles published in the REN between the end of 1941 and the beginning of 1942. The falangist positions defended by Gerardo Gavilanes, representative of FETyJONS, were mitigated by the articles of Luis Araujo-Costa on the importance of a catholic education within the University or by the ones of the member of ACNdP Pedro Rocamora on the predominance of the Church over the State in all the questions related to education. As he put it: «Se ha reconocido [...] a la Iglesia la suprema jerarquía que le corresponde en orden a la educación» [Rocamora, 1942: 7]. So, by the end of 1942, the academic community of discourse was evidently orienting its normative project towards the creation of a confessional state. This occurred while the the Axis was gradually weakening and the Falange suffered a substantial extradition from the government after the removal of the ministry of foreign affairs Serrano Suñer [Montero, 1993 and Gallego Margalef, 2014].

4.7 National-Catholicism, the University reform

The long debate concerning the future of the University, which began since the nominee of Ibáñez Martín in 1939, was finally coming to an end almost five years later. The different positions, and in particular the confrontation within the falangist and the confessional fronts, had been expressed through a series of public speeches and books that defined the borders of the community of discourse. The apparent unity of the regime appear extremely fragile to any external observer. At the same time, this discussion characterised also the institutional debate where the opposite views were even more radically expressed. As soon as the *Cortes* were opened, after having been suspended since 1936, on July, 1 1943, the National Educative Commission promptly began to discuss the University reform project⁶⁶. The commission was chaired by Leopoldo Eijo, bishop of Alcalá and

⁶⁶ See Archivo Histórico de las Cortes, *Comisión de Educación Nacional*, 01-VII-1943.

Luis Ortiz Muñoz, a friend of Ángel Herrera Oria, the founder of the ACNdP [Gutierrez García, 2008: 23-24]. Among the members of this commission there were the falangists Laín Entralgo and Antonio Tovar, the rector of the UC, Pio Zábala y Lera and the philosopher Juan Francisco Yela Utrilla, who in 1942 had published the book *Catolicismo y Falange*.

The most debated points basically concerned the nature of the moral education to be guaranteed within the university, the possibility of giving to the catholic private institutes of education the same rights of the national universities and, ultimately, the introduction of religion as a basic module of all the university courses, directly controlled by the Church. The discussion was extremely animated and, finally, no overall consensus was reached. The Commission preferred to avoid the risk of a dramatic collapse of the academic community of discourse by leaving in his final draft an evident ambiguity concerning the possibility of assigning to the religious institutes the same right of the national ones. Tovar and Laín clearly countered this possibility, and a conciliation between the two aims of the regime was rendered possible only thanks to the intervention of Torres Lopez, professor of law at the UC.

His proposal reflected the precariousness of the agreement among the different forces of the regime, affirming that the final decision will be taken in an undefined future, when the relation among the State and the Church would have been more clearly determined⁶⁷. The long debate had not been concluded yet, but the Church seemed to have acquired a growing influence in all the matters related to education, even if most of its battles were effectively countered by the member of the Falange [Morente, 2015: 204-207]. The final text constituted a very fragile balance among the two main aims of the regime. Indeed, it recognised the ideological but not institutional supremacy of the Church over the State, maintaining the very ambiguity that had characterised the discussion within the commission:

⁶⁷ «En su día, si hay alguna ambigüedad u oscuridad, como decía el Sr. Tovar, se podrá esclarecer mediante acuerdos entre ambas supremas Potestades y por eso no debe existir recelo alguno en aceptar una fórmula tan clara: declaración de aceptación de los derechos, sin decir cuáles, que luego en su momento se determinará el valor profesional de los títulos entre ambas supremas Potestades, cada una en su respectiva esfera». In AHC, *Comisión de Educación Nacional*, 01-VII-1943, pp. 10/ 5-6.

Esta excelsa misión de formar íntegramente a la juventud está inspirada en unos principios fundamentales, sin los que sería vana la docencia, peligrosas la investigación y la profesionalidad e infructuosa la educación. Unas y otras funciones han de servir ante todo a un mismo principio unitario y vivificante: el espíritu católico. Decir que una Universidad es católica es afirmar que vive sometida a la vigilancia de la Iglesia, la eterna maestra de la verdad, y que, por tanto, está lejos, no sólo de heterodoxia dogmática, sino de extravíos en el orden moral. En España sin perjuicio de reconocer a la Iglesia sus derechos docentes en materia de enseñanza universitaria, y de prever un mutuo acuerdo futuro de las dos Potestades, en el que se concierte el modo de poner en práctica esos derechos, lo verdaderamente importante hasta desde un punto de vista político es cristianizar la enseñanza del Estado, arrancar de la docencia y de la creación científica la neutralidad ideológica y desterrar el laicismo, para formar una nueva juventud poseída de aquel principio agustiniano de que la mucha ciencia nos acerca al Ser Supremo⁶⁸.

The Church was conquering a growing power and its influence was spreading in all the aspects of the social, political and cultural life of the country. This ideological Catholicism did not imply the removal from the most important charges of the new State of some of the most influent members of the Falange, but the internal and external circumstances were moving the regime towards a gradual dismissal of its fascist ideology. The publication of the *Ley de Reforma Universitaria* on July 29, 1943 represented the culmination of a long lasting debate among the two opposite fronts of the Franco's regime. After almost five years they had not reached the promised synthesis they had been expected to realise [Ibáñez Martín, 1943: 9], and only the external circumstances would have prompt them towards a common direction. Curiously enough, while the propaganda of the regime on the reform of the university was reaching its climax due to the inauguration of the new Central University of Madrid, the very academic community which should have represented this unity was evidently beginning to crumble. Also for this reason the university legislation started to be extremely linked with an oppressive control of all the teaching activities [Souto Galván, 2008: 91-92].

A testimony of this fragmentation is offered by the very minister of education Ibáñez Martín. During a discourse he pronounced at the CSIC at the end of 1943 for the first time his critiques to the false

⁶⁸ BOCE 1943, 16: 169.

intellectuals were directed not exclusively against the liberal thinkers but also against those within the regime who stayed in the grey area between a legitimate and an illegitimate ideology. As he put it:

España está preparando su influencia decisiva en el pensamiento humano. [...] No caben posiciones centrales, ni líneas medias, entre España y anti-España. Ofrecemos y pedimos sinceridad. Entre la España que cree y la España que blasfema, no admitimos la zona intermedia, dulzona y traidorzuela, petulante y vacía, de unos entes aislados, que no creen y parece que no blasfeman, pero son escépticos rotundos y blasfemos perfumados [Ibáñez Martín, 1947: 132].

The new Spain was now represented by a cultural intellectual elite that clearly supported and shared an orthodox catholic ideology, as proved by the journey of the members of the CNE to Rome on February 21, 1943 in which they were received by the pope Pius XII⁶⁹. The official ideological shift was testified by the very Caudillo by the end of 1943 when inaugurating the UC. In his discourse he clearly defines the new hierarchies of the cultural policies, in fact:

el Estado se ha sentido, hoy más que nunca, colaborador de la Iglesia en al restauración del orden cristiano y se ha propuesto, a la vez, apoyar su existencia presente y futura en la unidad espiritual de los españoles, lograda en el campo de la educación [Franco, 1943: 5].

Soon after, the ACe would start to put into practice its «conquista de la Universidad», i.e. to systematically act so as to gain the complete hegemony within the University education, with the aim of forming the

⁶⁹ Once back from that journey the vice-president of the CNE, Garcia Siñeriz, read a letter written by the pope and, as Ibáñez Martín [1947: 134] wrote: «Al poner reverentes sobre nuestra cabeza y sobre nuestro corazón la bondadosa carta de nuestro Santo Padre, y al recibir su confortante Bendición Apostólica, que extendía a todos los colaboradores del Consejo, vimos en sus palabras y aceptamos como compromiso de honor y como deber de nuestros trabajos, de nuestra labor y de nuestra misión, lograr que las buenas doctrinas vayan penetrando cada día con más intensidad, a la vez que con la máxima convicción, en todas las mentes y conciencias, para aspirar a esa renovación interior que como meta e ideal, hasta como conveniencia y necesidad en el orden público, nos senala el Vicario de Cristo»

new ruling class of the country⁷⁰. The penetration of the Catholic associations within the University would have also been guaranteed through a series of laws and decrees, collected in the LOU, which filled the emptiness concerning the role of the Church in the university, willingly left by the *Ley de Reforma Universitaria*⁷¹. Clear instances of this tendency are the decree for the defence of religion as a university subject (1944)⁷², the recognition of the CEU as part of the UC (1945)⁷³ or the foundation of the Universidad Internacional Menéndez y Pelayo, ruled by the CSIC (1945)⁷⁴. Moreover, since 1944, the Criminal Code included an article that condemned all form of dissent to the Catholic religion [Fernández-Pacheco, 2008: 225].

Later, since 1944, the catholic associations started to receive a different and more permissive treatment, as proved by the fact that the journal of the ACE, *Ecclesia*, was excluded from the control of the censorship [Sevillano, 2003: 81]. From then on, the academic and cultural community of discourse of the regime and, consequently, its propagation within the Spanish society, started to be oriented towards a consolidation of a Catholic and religious education, not only in relation to the contents but also to the institutional framework. It is possible to affirm that since 1939 this community of discourse had undergone a slight change that can be observed in its very rhetoric.

⁷⁰ As declared at the end of the meeting of the Association in december 1943 [Acción Católica Española, 1943: 2]: «La Iglesia nos pide, por boca de su Jefe Supremo, el Vicario de Jesucristo, que penetremos y ejerzamos una saludable influencia en la vida universitaria. ¿Parecerá quizá empresa sobre manera difícil? Lo es, en efecto, y como tal nos la presenta el Papa [...] Pongamos en la Universidad, como lo hace el Papa, la más firme esperanza de un mañana mejor, y en nuestro trabajo apostólico, no sólo la ilusión de un futuro espléndido, sino también la de un presente cargado de frutos, por el bien que experimentarán las almas de nuestros compañeros y de nuestros discipulos y por el que recibirá la Acción Católica, a la que el apostolado universitario habrá de dar dirigentes capaces y bien formados».

⁷¹ Nicolas Marín, 1991:345: «Hasta la *Ley de Ordenación Universitaria* y los decretos de ordenación de las Facultades, la Universidad experimentó una etapa de reorganización docente, presidida por un férreo control político encaminado a la consecución de un proyecto de “re cristianización de la cultura española”, objetivo primario de Ibáñez Martín».

⁷² BOE 39, 8-II-1944, pp.1106-1107.

⁷³ BOE 208, 27-VII-1945, p.668.

⁷⁴ BOE 325, 21-XI-1945, pp.3089-3090.

This mutation, even if significant, did not correspond to a sort of genetic mutation since the Catholic traditionalism had always been part of the regime's DNA. However, what was before just a part of the Francoist ideology began, since 1943, to be the very essence of what had been called an "Hispanic-theocracy". That phenomenon can clearly contribute to prove that the reactionary movement that composed the big Franco's family during those very years were not the product of a fix and determined ideology, but rather of a mass of lobbyist and personal interests [Villacañas, 2004b].

Thus, the university, responsible for the creation and propagation of this ideology, was completely abandoning its initial fascist outlook and favouring the diffusion of a Catholic dogmatism. So, the resulting exclusion of a relevant portion of Franco's establishment, of some relevant political figures and intellectuals that contributed to the victory of the general, determined the emergence of a partial dissent within the regime. The struggle for the cultural hegemony and the exercise of power latently marked the whole decade of the 40s and ultimately reached its climax in 1956 in the occasion of a students' manifestation. This dissent was not aimed at opening the way to a form of liberal falangism – as it has been sometimes written by the scholars. The existence of a "liberal Falange" constitutes a sort of historiographic *topos* that had been correctly countered, for instance, by Santo Juliá. Has he proved, the members of movement that formed a slight opposition to the regime during the last years of Franco's dictatorship, had contributed to create their own foundational myth, going back to the decade of the 40s. However, during those years their opposition to the regime was mainly motivated on the basis of their imposed exclusion from the top of the regime's hierarchy⁷⁵.

This phenomenon clearly produced the creation of new communities of discourse within the Spanish academia. In fact, the constant and subtle struggle for the control of the national ideology

⁷⁵ Juliá, 2004: 127: «Esta invención del sintagma "Falange liberal" y esta mirada a *Escorial* como paradigma de revista liberal no es de hoy; ni siquiera es de esos productos que se suelen atribuir ahora a la transición. [...] Falange liberal es más antiguo; se origina en el último tramo de la dictadura y sus creadores fueron distinguidos filósofos políticos no siempre, aunque sí en algunos casos, procedentes de la filas de Falange, ni del Movimiento». For this reason in the 70s they «reinterpretaban aquel momento como un momento liberal y se tuvieron a sí mismos como liberales». *Ibidem*: 140.

produced the creation and consolidation of different families within the regime that expressed themselves through different journals and reviews. This contraposition also constituted the ground for the instrumental use of Ortega during Franco's dictatorship by some members of the establishment who had been relegated to a secondary role within the regime, in particular after the end of the WWII. In fact, Ortega had already been a contended and criticised reference during the whole period in which the university reform had been discussed and debated. His voluntary exile did not mark the end of his influence within the Spanish academia. On the contrary, as it will be proved in the next subchapter, most of the dissimilar positions expressed during the debate revolved around his *Misión de la Universidad*.

4.8 *The stone guest*

During the period 1938-1943, in spite of its slight differences, the community of discourse which characterised the cultural establishment of the regime shared at least a common enemy: i.e. the laic and liberal educative model of the II Republic. The ILE and the JAE were held as the ultimate responsables for the violence of the civil war and, in general, for all the evils of the Spanish politics⁷⁶. The thesis purported by the regime can be summarised in the slogan: «A la revolución roja, el socialismo le ha dado las masas, la *Institución Libre de Enseñanza* le ha dado los jefes» [AA.VV, 1940: 5]. In this context, the role played by the liberal and republican thinker Ortega y Gasset could not be completely dismissed, even by those areas of the CEDA and the Falange that had been trying to assimilate his thinking within the new ideology. For this reason, in several of the discourses analysed in the previous pages, *the figure of Ortega is depicted as that of an enemy of the nation whose philosophy had to be strenuously countered and ultimately dismissed*. The Jesuit Enrique Herrera Oria, for instance, in his history of Spanish education, identified the whole philosophy of Ortega with the ILE, a pedagogic

⁷⁶ The ILE was conceived as: «el origen de todos los daños posteriores, y por lo tanto, el error padre de los demás errores». In AA.VV. *Una poderosa fuerza secreta. La Institución Libre de Enseñanza*, Editorial Española, San Sebastian, 1940:12.

institution he considered as Masonic and communist. Not only Ortega was considered an heterodox for his anti-traditionalist philosophy of history – as it will be proved in the next chapter – but also and foremost for his anti-catholic intellectual roots. Herrera Oria’s criticisms towards the Madrilenian thinker reached the paroxysm of accusing him for being the moral responsible for the blowout of the civil war. This was due to the fact that his philosophy was considered as a form of atheism and, therefore, as a moral aberration:

Este fue en realidad el gravísimo error de Ortega y Gasset, repetidamente inculcado a los estudiantes de la F.U.E., en su célebres conferencias, tan elegantes de forma como endebles en el fondo histórico y, sobre todo, en el conocimiento de los archivos universitarios españoles. No comprendió que las Residencias organizadas por la Institución Libre, a través de la Junta de Ampliación, eran una copia sin espíritu de los Colegios mayores y menores. De ahí sus amargos frutos, como la Gran Cruzada española lo ha demostrado sin que por eso queramos decir que todos los que en ellas se educaron hayan desembocado en el mar de la revolución soviética [Herrera Oria, 1941: 195-196].

Each author or theory that had been directly or indirectly linked to the ILE was treated with suspicion. This institution was considered as the main responsible for the marginalisation of the catholic world from the higher education and the university system, having constituted the most radical experiment of modernisation in Spain, countering the traditionalist *status quo* [Otero Carvajal, 2010]. The position of Ortega was rendered extremely complicated and debated also because of the crucial role he had played as a professor and public figure in the UC, during the *cierre* of the University in 1929. Moreover, in the following years, he had been the epitome of the modernizing educational normative ideal. The critical thinking he tried to promote within the university was completely unsuitable for the new regime and the separation of the dictatorship’s community of discourse from his position was a logical precaution. This decision was reflected also in the editorial policies. In fact, as the professor Américo Castro, recently emigrated to the US, wrote to his friend Federico de Onís:

Espasa [the editor that had always published Ortega’s book] renuncia a sacar a la calle ediciones listas... de los siguientes autores: Marañón, Ortega [...]. En suma, han trazado una raya divisoria, y en la España de ellos no queda sino literatura gesuítica o cosa parecida. Esos hombres, algunos de

los cuales han dado sus hijos a la causa de Franco [it was the case of both Ortega and Marañón], son mirados como enemigos⁷⁷.

So interestingly enough, the majority of the works concerning the nature and role of the university within the new State always referred, in a polemical way, to the books of Ortega and, in particular, to his *Misión de la Universidad*. The new cultural ideal purported by the regime was often constructed *per via negationis* just by looking at the theses expressed by the philosopher almost ten years before, rather than by proposing a new and positive normative project [Neria, 2000]. For clarifying the meaning of this sentence, and to comprehend the positioning of the different members of the cultural establishment of the regime towards Ortega, it is useful to refer to some of the previously mentioned texts.

The very important discourse to the university students pronounced by Lopez Ibor, for instance, clearly reflected this tendency to develop each text concerning the reform of the university system through a direct confrontation with Ortega's book. López Ibor recognised in the introduction of his discourse that the *Misión de la Universidad* represented the most grandiose attempt ever made by a philosopher to deal with the problem⁷⁸. However it was factually unable to reform the institution since, according to Ibor, Ortega totally dismissed the importance of reforming the concept of humanity via the necessary reference to the Spanish Catholic traditionalism. In particular, López Ibor moved four main criticisms to Ortega.

The first concerned his laicism and his lack of religiosity. In fact, the ratio-vitalism of the Madrilenian philosopher was interpreted as a defence of a renaissance form of humanism, basically characterised by its immanentism, laicism and negation of any form of transcendence⁷⁹.

⁷⁷ Personal letter of Américo Castro to Federico de Onís, quoted by Naranjo, Luque and Puig-Samper 2002: 313.

⁷⁸ He defined it as «el intento más solemne, que se hizo en los últimos años de atacar por su base nuestro problema universitario». [López Ibor, 1938: 18].

⁷⁹ López Ibor, 1938: 43: «Este concepto de la cultura basada en la vida, nos aproxima a la posición del hombre del Renacimiento, sobre todo en sus primeras fases. [...] Pero este concepto de la cultura es, en definitiva, relativista, temporal y efímero. Parece querer ignorar que en la idea de la cultura hay un momento intemporal, derivado de una idea de norma no contingente»

The second pertains to the political proposal of Ortega that should have been promoted by education, and in particular the *Facultad de Cultura* proposed by the philosopher. The organisation of the courses in five main disciplines, which all the university students should have followed is, to Ibor, an utopian and also dangerous educative model. In fact it was both impossible that each student acquired a so ample quantity of notions concerning too many disciplines and, moreover, this would have not permitted to obtain an adequate specialised scholarship. The risk that Ibor individuated in this model was that of forging well-read professionals who lacked an authentic morality, a sort of Lutheran ethics and not a proper Catholic – or rather Spanish – one [López Ibor, 1938: 53].

The third criticism was also more virulent and marked a line within the Francoist community of discourse concerning the scope of the educative role of the University and the culture that the regime had to promote and spread. In fact, he did not share with Ortega the idea according to which culture would have been thought as a variable system of beliefs concerning the totality of one's living experience that each person has to critically interiorise and discuss in order to develop his own personality. On the contrary, culture was conceived by Ibor as an immutable reality which is imposed from above and according to whose eternal principles each one has to adequate and conform his life without discussing them. As he put it: «Cultura no es, pues, el sistema de ideas desde el cual se vive, sino por el cual se vive. O mejor, se vive y se existe» [López Ibor, 1938: 55]. The educative model which had to promote this form of moralistic culture, which stuck to religious and patriotic principles, should be a sort of permanent study within the University of the nature of the Spanish humanism. In fact: «En la Nueva Universidad no han de figurar las facultades yuxtapuestas como en un mosaico. Deben cesar los compartimentos; no en la organización, sí en el espíritu. Cada una no debe estudiar una realidad distinta, sino todas la misma realidad desde un punto de vista distinto» [López Ibor, 1938: 54].

The fourth and last of Ibor's criticism to Ortega aimed at defending the idea of scientific research that the regime was trying to implement through the project of the CSIC. A project to which he would later have participated. The Spanish philosopher, according to Ibor, only focused on the didactic and pedagogical aim of the University, forgetting its importance as a research centre and interested, on the contrary, in

importing a foreign culture (the German one in particular) in Spain. This would represent a trait of Ortega's thinking he inherited from the ILE that promoted the myth of Europe over the Spanish tradition. The new State, on the contrary, should have focused on the technical and scientific research to reach its economic and cultural autarchy⁸⁰.

Another instance that testifies that the normative ideal of the regime was initially grounded on an overall critic of Ortega's book is offered by the discourse of Isidoro Martín Martínez. As Ibor, he recognised the importance of Ortega's outlook that, however, was ultimately incomplete being «truncado en su vuelo» [Martín Martínez, 1940: 37]. In particular, he shared Ortega's principle of economy in education (§2.6) but he reproached his lack of a moral framework of education and the absence of religion from the curriculum. The criticisms presented by Martín Martínez were therefore really similar to the ones purported by Ibor and can ultimately be summarised in his enunciation of the mission that the university should have accomplish: «La primera misión que tiene, pues, que cumplir la Universidad española es la de asentar la unidad de la cultura, forjar un pensamiento diáfano y católico y hondamente español: la medida de lo universal servido según nuestras modalidades particulares» [Martín Martínez, 1940: 43].

To summarise, the characterisation of Ortega appeared, since the very beginning of the debate within the regime concerning the future of the University, as an undesired but unavoidable reference point. His liberalism and laicism could not fit into the new Catholic educative model that the new establishment wanted to encourage. Significantly enough, this preoccupation was not limited to the religious members of the regime. On the contrary, the aversion towards Ortega traced the line also between a majority and a minority of the falangist members of the cultural establishment. This aversion could be epitomised, for instance, by Pedro Laín Entralgo who at the beginning of the '40s – when his political ambitions had not been yet slowed down – directly criticised Ortega for his lack of religiosity⁸¹. Indeed, even if Laín

⁸⁰ López Ibor, 1938: 103: «La posición de Ortega viene a ser, como no podía menos, la de creer que el problema español se resuelve simplemente con europeizar a España. No investiguemos, contentémonos con transcribir, viene a ser el lema de la europeización. [...] Sólo una autarquía de la inteligencia nos permitirá una autarquía económica».

⁸¹ Laín Entralgo, *Educación del Impetu*, in «Revista Nacional de Educación», 4, 1941.

thought that education should be a prerogative of the State and not of the Church in order to forge the new falangist ruling class, he did not diminish the importance of educating according to religious principles.

The removal of this component from Ortega's ethics, according to Laín, constituted the main problem of a philosopher that, for this reason, should have been substantially banned from the Spanish nationalist ideology. The concept of belief (*creencia*) that Ortega significantly developed during those very years referring to the process of creating and transmitting culture, is conceived by Laín in a totally different way. Not as an inner system of thoughts that each one has to comprehend for living accordingly, but rather as an imposed set of norms concerning the faithful respect of the State, law and homeland. These should be conceived as the main axes of the nationalistic education since, contrary to the concept purported by Ortega: «El sentido primario de nuestra vida no es el deportivo-festival, sino el religioso-militar» [Laín, 1941b: 16]. According to Laín, a proper education can be reached exclusively through a process of indoctrination characterised by the respect for the tradition of an authoritative State. This should have ultimately be the end of the university: forging the future generation in accordance with this rigid set of principles and beliefs.

On the other side, a minority of the falangist family perceived that the lesson of Ortega could still have played a fundamental role in defining the basic trait of a pedagogical model. Using some of his basic tenets, in addition, could also have been of great utility for the regime. An example of this conception is offered for instance by Lora Tamayo who, in his discourse, constantly praised the Madrilenian philosopher for his educative thinking. He also reproached some members of the new academic community of discourse for their exaggerated attacks against Ortega, and he tried to ennoble his figure⁸². However, the interpretation of the philosopher offered by Lora Tamayo it is not aimed to restore the authentic importance and implications of his thinking, but rather of using it in an instrumental way. In fact he affirms that the *Misión de la Universidad* would offer a full justification

⁸² Lora Tamayo, 1939: 44: «A agudizar el tema entre nosotros, ha contribuido Ortega y Gasset con su concepto de la misión de la Universidad. Y acaso lo que en torno a sus ideas se ha debatido tenga mucho de lo que él mismo llama “volcán de lugares comunes, que es todo hombre cuando habla de una cosa sin haber pensado antes en ella”».

for the nationalistic education purported by the regime. Since, as he says quoting Ortega's book:

La Universidad no puede vivir al margen de la vida de la nación. "Tiene que estar abierta a la plena actualidad, más aun, tiene que estar en medio de ella, sumergida en ella". Nunca más alta la Universidad que cuando vibra al unísono de las grandes inquietudes nacionales [Lora Tamayo, 19439: 45].

Thus the model of university traced by Ortega could have served, according to this falangist professor, as an eminent justification for the predominance of the nationalist component of the regime over the catholic one. This interpretation did not truly take into consideration Ortega's thought. As already pointed out, in his *Misión* the philosopher underlined the necessity of building a university able to influence the life of the society not as mere instrument of the political power, but rather as its spiritual guide. He criticised the interferences both of the State and of the Church in the control of the education that, according to him, should have had a vital role in the construction of a critical public opinion. The proper aim of the university should have been that of forming citizens able to avoid political partisanships and reject uncritical arguments⁸³.

Thus during the first and defining years of the regime's life, Ortega represented either a enemy to be annihilated or a source that could have been instrumentally used for supporting the idea of a patriotic and totalitarian educative model. Ortega had actually been expelled by the new cultural scenario being a symbol of an undesired past⁸⁴. The present was dominated, in particular from 1943, by a preponderant, but not exclusive, Catholic ideology. Curiously enough, it would have been exactly the way of approaching and criticising the works of the Madrilenian philosopher what would later have traced the line among

⁸³ OC, IV: 562: «Para ello tiene la Universidad que intervenir en la actualidad como tal Universidad, tratando los grandes temas del día desde su punto de vista propio – cultural, profesional o científico. De este modo no será una institución sólo para estudiantes, un recinto *ad usum delphinis*, sino que, metida en medio de la vida, de sus urgencias, de sus pasiones, ha de imponerse como un “poder espiritual” superior frente a la Prensa, representando la serenidad frente al frenesí, la seria agudeza frente a la frivolidad y la franca estupidez».

⁸⁴ However, at least from a formal point of view, Ortega legally was included in the list of the professors of the UC until his death in 1955. See Gracia, 2014: 566.

different lobbies and families within the regime. During the beginning of the 40s, the ample and widespread criticisms to his lack of religiosity clearly revealed that the Catholic component of the regime had conquered a substantial control on educative policies.

The enormous change within the UC is also testified by the election of Juan Zaragüeta as the substitute of Ortega y Gasset in the chair of Metaphysics. The pedagogy purported by this priest was radically different from the one presented by Ortega. This affirmation can be proven by analysing Zaragüeta's book *Pedagogía Fundamental* [1943] in which he offered an overall presentation of the educative model that the new State should have to promote. The university traced by the priest differed from the one conceived by Ortega at least in respect to three main aspects: a) the prominence of religion over philosophy as the peak of a humanistic education; b) the methodology to be adopted; c) the role of the intellectual both within the university and in the society. So, it is evident that religion was gaining within the university, both from a formal and practical point of view, a leading role in the education of a new generation⁸⁵. From a methodological point of view, the professor should have completely dismissed the Krausist principles, presenting to his students a closed and rigid set of knowledge that could not be discussed. No space was left to the development of a critical thinking and: «La instrucción habrá de superar considerablemente a la educación, o sea la heteroformación a la autoformación» [Zaragüeta, 1943: 213]. Moreover, men and women should receive a different education from the primary school to the university. Lastly, the role of the intellectual within the society should correspond to a propagation of the Catholic principles, «una vocación de apostolado» [Zaragüeta, 1943: 499], both within the university and in relation to the public debate.

Starting from these premises Zaragüeta's conclusions concerning the future of the university were extremely clear in their radicalism: this institution should have to guarantee the construction of a national culture ruled by a theological outlook. The total dismissal of Ortega is therefore evident by taking into consideration the very form that the

⁸⁵ Zaragüeta, 1943: 179: «La estimación de los bienes humanos culmina en la moral, cuyo es propio apreciar el Bien absoluto y apetecerlo también absoluta y obligatoriamente. Por eso, la formación pedagógica de la estimativa habrá de coronarse con la ética o disciplina de los bienes superiores, y hasta con la Religión que nos relaciona con el Bien supremo por excelencia, Dios».

University was acquiring during the first years of the regime. However, for tracing the basic tenets of the new ideology of the regime it was also indispensable to establish the contents of the rigid set of knowledge that Zaragüeta thought it would have been necessary to transmit. During this same period (1939-1945) the cultural establishment of the regime started to produce an overwhelming amount of discourses and debates concerning the basic aspect of this new positive culture. Curiously enough, despite his expulsion from the official culture, Ortega did try to enter into this debate while in exile, with the aim of continuing to influence the public and cultural debate presenting his critical voice. As detailed in the next chapter, in spite of the enormous difficulties he faced during this period, *Ortega did not renounce to his intellectual role, conceived as a form of critical reflection on the present, with the aim of contributing to change the current social situation. The will of offering his radical insights on the most relevant topics of the new cultural establishment contributed to significantly change most of his philosophical agenda.* In fact, he started to suit it to the debates that were taking place in Spain.

PART III

ORTEGA'S EXILE IN DIALOGUE

After having described the historical context and the intellectual debate that gave birth to the new university, defining its normative ends from a macroscopic point of view, in this chapter they will be analysed the concrete changes that the humanities undertook during the first years of Franco's dictatorship. Both from a formal point of view – via the significant legislative changes – and from a material one – through the purge of an entire academic community – the University became one of the pillars of the regime's propaganda, defining its basic theoretical guidelines. This can be proved in particular by analysing the definition of a new ideal of humanistic education which the reform of the formal university system realised in order to serve the purposes of the political power. In this context, the University, and in particular the faculties of humanity, started to be conceived both as laboratories of political ideas and as institutions devoted to the diffusion of this new culture.

The University of Madrid became the most representative place in which the new ideology was being built. During these years, the new academia rigorously defined a precise orthodoxy that discriminated between legitimate and prohibited points of view. The construction of the new intellectual was complemented by the definition of a new set of knowledge whose contents should have to respond to the needs of the political power. Consequently, humanities underwent a complete redefinition of their topics and methodologies, as it will be proved in this section by analysing the changes that took place in the teaching of 1) history, 2) philosophy and 3) political sciences. Put it differently, the creation of the organic intellectual was mirrored by the creation of a new hegemonic culture.

History was one academic discipline that acquired a leading role in setting the bases for building this instrumental ideology. This process determined the construction of a mythical past, the valorisation of the mediaeval tradition, ancient languages and Catholic traditions. Moreover, not only the contents but also the form of teaching history radically changed. In fact, the description of historical events was complemented by their meta-historical narration, with a teleological, and often theological, explanation. As a consequence, also philosophy of history and metaphysics became the kernel of the humanistic education by providing the best instruments for legitimating the current regime in the light of the national past and its consequent destiny. Lastly, the synthesis between these disciplines and the purposes of the political power was assigned to two new academic subjects: sociology and political science.

This part of the thesis analyses three different debates extremely interrelated among one another aimed to define the basic traits of the new culture purported by the recently reformed university. In particular, they will be taken into consideration respectively the way in which the past was conceived – through the case of the Roman and Spanish Empires – the significance of this past in relation to the general political interpretation of the present – through the philosophy of history – and, finally, the definition of the new philosophical scholasticism within the regime – via an analysis of the discourse which focused on the figure of Juan Luis Vives. The whole analysis will be conducted by always taking into consideration at the same time the discourse which was being developed within the regime, and the one autonomously proposed by Ortega. Through this comparison it will be possible to comprehend if, and to what extent, the thought of the Madrilenian philosopher evolved in relation to the institutional, political and cultural changes of the circumstances in which he lived and to the different audiences he addressed during this troublesome period of his intellectual experience: from the Argentinean exile to Portuguese one.

Chapter 5.

Building identity. Humanities in the first years of Franco's regime

This chapter will focus on what was taught within the Spanish academia in the first years of Franco's regime, taking into account the construction of the national history as a political means for building a collective identity. To do this it will be analysed in particular the creation of a new foundational myth which linked the birth of the Iberian nation with the Roman Empire. Moreover, it will also be taken into account the posture of Ortega in relation to this debate that took place in particular during the period of his Argentinean exile, from 1940 to 1942. In his texts, contrary to the diffuse opinion among his scholars, it is possible to notice his will to enter into this political and cultural discussion which were occurring in Spain and of which he was sufficiently informed. In fact, he did not want to renounce to his influential role within the intellectual life of his country, even if the new academia was far from interested in listening to the teaching of this vestige of the Republican past. Through this analysis it will be possible to compare the most significant strands of the academic production of the regime with the concurrent theorisations of Ortega, so to comprehend what was the concrete role that the Madrilenian philosopher still played within this renewed cultural scenario. In fact, before speaking of Ortega's collaboration, opposition or indifference in relation to the Franco's regime – as often done by the scholars of the philosopher – it is necessary to begin by authentically comparing the two poles of the discourse, in order to avoid slapdash and predetermined judgments.

Thus the first part of this chapter analyses (§1) both the qualitative and quantitative renewal of the Spanish academia, in particular in the case of the teaching of humanities, before focusing on the significant case of (§2) the narration of the imperial past of the nation that the university was purporting with evident propagandistic aims. The

intention to propagate this myth within the civil society, and not only among the university students, is testified by (§3) the popularization of this recently created myth through mass media, and in particular the newspaper and the radio, demonstrating the desire of indoctrinating the population in accordance with the new ideals that the academic and political worlds were developing. However, this apparently homogeneous ideology was in reality extremely fragile as proved by (§4) the alternative visions of the Roman Empire purported by different souls of the regime, such as the scientific and cultural review *Escorial*, whose editorial line radically differed from the one of the orthodox propaganda. The case of the notion of “empire” was indeed just one instance of a broader historiography tendency which consisted in (§5) constructing a new philosophy of history aimed at justifying and legitimating the new political power. The analysis of this teleological theory of history would later be compared with (§6) the one that Ortega developed during those same years, in constant confrontation with the rhetoric of the regime. Together with his completely different interpretation of (§7) the imperial past of Spain, the interest towards the theory of history in the case of the Madrilenian philosopher manifested the attention he paid towards the cultural discourse which was taking place in Spain at, at the same time, the evident changes in his philosophical agenda produced by that particular scenario. Changes that, however, would never determine an abdication from the main principles he always defended. Lastly, in order to comprehend the relevance of Ortega’s theorisations on the Spanish context, the chapter will take into account (§8) the way in which his theories were received among the Spanish intellectuals, both those who were more akin to the philosopher and of those who always manifested a radical rejection of what he still symbolised.

5. *I Novum Organum*

No cabe más que un solo camino: el de llegar a la conciencia del hombre español y grabar indeleblemente en su espíritu y en su corazón, la idea de su tremenda responsabilidad ante el juicio inapelable de la Historia. Que si cada hombre es portador de un grado de valores espirituales y eternos [...] si es preciso llegar a esta transformación del pensamiento colectivo del pueblo, el espíritu de cada individuo será la primera zona de acción de esta nobilísima empresa renovadora [Ibáñez Martín, 1942: 15-16].

In spite of the significant differences that characterised the various communities of discourse which coexisted within the regime, the construction of the new academia implied a unified attempt of tracing the contents of the culture of the New State. This process was realised through the definition of a new intellectual pantheon, of a specific and inescapable set of cultural references. Once the educative system of the recent past had been completely disqualified, it was now necessary to replace it with a new one.

The construction of this pantheon did not respond to scientific and academic reasons, but rather to the political ends and propagandistic aims of the regime¹. Indeed, the academic production of the first years of the regime (1939-1943) focused in particular on the definition of its new reference points within the national history. In fact, all the pedagogical efforts of Franco's regime during this period, at all level of the educative system, were oriented towards the establishment of a normative political ideal, conceived as indispensable for guaranteeing the social consensus². In particular, the University was deemed responsible for the construction of the nationalistic guidelines of the new culture, i.e. the very concept of law, homeland and faith that would later be propagated to the rest of society and to the youngest generations [Torres, 1941: 17].

Indeed, the teaching of humanities was now organised according to a unifying principle which put at the top of the educative process the study of theology. The CSIC was the main promoter of this reform that adapted the image of Lull's tree of Sciences to the new scientific theocracy promoted by the regime³. In this process of definition and

¹ As Gallego Margalef [2014: 789] has correctly written: «En la gran rectificación cultural del Nuevo Estado, la reafirmación de estos motivos no era un asunto de interés académico y ni siquiera de justificación elaborada por las elites, sino de necesidad de completar el proceso de nacionalización de las masas».

² For An overview of the role of education in primary and secondary school see in particular Capellán de Miguel, [2006].

³ «En las conyunturas más decisivas de su Historia concentró la Hispanidad sus energía espirituales para crear una cultura universal. Esta ha de ser también la ambición más noble de la Espana del actual momento, que, frente a la pobreza y paralización pasadas, siente la voluntad de renovar su gloriosa tradición científica. Tal empeño ha de cimentarse, ante todo, en la restauración de la clásica y cristiana unidad de las ciencias, destruidas en el siglo XVIII. Para ello hay que subsanar el divorcio entre las ciencias especulativas y experimentales y promover en el árbol total de la ciencia su armonioso incremento y su

establishment of a new ideology, humanities played a vital role, being considered as the kernel of the educative proposal. They had a predominant role in relation to the construction of the new scientific disciplines, at least until the end of WWII, when the situation radically changed and the need of an urgent economic development imposed to the regime the valorisation of technical and industrial sciences [Sanz Menéndez, 1996]⁴. This was due to the fact that, during the first period of consolidation of the new establishment, the main worry was that of defining – through the help of professors, clergies, intellectuals and politicians – the new national culture. In this context, history and, generally speaking, the humanities did play a vital part. This is evident by considering that almost all the publications of the CSIC during its first year were devoted to literature history, philosophy, theology and law, with no presence of relevant scientific topics⁵.

Indeed, within the University they will be created authentic historiographic myths, and history became the most adequate means for legitimating the political power via a manipulated interpretation of the past. The course of history would have to justify the present condition of Spain and, consequently, to orient its future. This implied, in particular, the vindication of the importance of some figures, such the Catholic Monarchs of the Imperial Spain, in the definition of the national identity, and the concurrent condemnation of the whole period comprised between the French revolution and the II Spanish Republic, interpreted as the most vivid expression of the continuity of the pernicious effects of the communist germs within national history [Abós Santabàrbara, 2003].

The importance of history in the new academic and political system is also testified by the preminent role that, within the UC, acquired the historian Pio Zabala y Lera, who would be elected as the rector of the University. By the end of the civil war, the department of history of the

evolució homogènea, evitant el monstruós desenvolupament de algunes de les seves branques, amb anquilosament d'altres». In *Estructura y Normas del Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas*, Madrid, 1943: 7.

⁴ This trend is proven also by the financial aids provided by the government in 148 when the institute of philosophy of the CSIC received a total of 298.000 pesetas, the one of theology 280.000, while the institute of technology almost a tenfold amount. See Ibáñez Martín, 1949: 23.

⁵ See *Española aportación del Consejo Superior de Investigación Científica a la Fiesta del libro*, in «Revista Nacional de Educación», n. 5, 1941: 68-73.

UC was composed only by four people, all of whom had proved their dedication to the national cause during the war [Pasamar Azurúa, 1991; Parra Garrigues, 1956]⁶.

For guaranteeing the normal functioning of the University after the purges which affected in particular the department of history, after the war many professors were transferred from peripheral universities to the centre of the Spanish academia. Consequently, as demonstrated by the emblematic case of the professor of contemporary history Ciriaco Pérez Bustamente – who had joined the FN in Valladolid during the civil war –, *the selection of the new teaching staff was basically motivated by political reasons, looking at the devotion demonstrated to the regime in the recent conflict* [Pallol Trigueros, 2014]. However, the transfer of some professors from a university to another was not sufficient to cover the huge amount of vacancies within the departments of history [Peiró Martín, 2013: 37-67]. For this reason, in particular in some peripheral universities, a new generation of young teachers, who had recently obtained their PhDs, could aspire to gain a post within the academia, once proved of not having been involved in Republican experiences and having demonstrated their loyalty towards the regime. For instance, the new selected professor of Primitive History at the UC, Julio Martínez Santa-Olalla, obtained his post in 1939 without participating to any competitive exam, once his tutor, professor Obermaier, decided not to return in Spain after the victory of the FN. Significantly, one of Santa-Olalla major merits was that of having vehemently condemned the Republican University in which he had been educated⁷. *This renewal of the academic staff responded to the need of the regime of controlling the knowledge produced within the university, so to avoid undesired interpretation of the national history*⁸. *In 1941, almost 60% of the overall professors of history of the new Spanish academia had obtained their role after the civil war.*

⁶ They were: Antonio Ballesteros, professor of Spanish and Latin American history; Antonio García y Bellido, Archeology; José Ferrandis, Numismatics; Zabala, professor of History.

⁷ Martínez Santa-Olalla, *La Universidad y el separatismo*, in «Libertad, Diario Nacional-Sindicalista», 10-XI-38.

⁸ Peiró Martín, 2013: 54: «En este sentido, más ilustrativo que una posible nómina de anécdotas son los 40 nuevos catedráticos que, entre 1940 y 1950, accedieron a las cátedras de Historia existentes en las doce facultades de Filosofía y Letras repartidas por la geografía española».

The link between history and politics was not only a professional, but also a personal one. The criteria of the selection procedures during these years directly implied also a specific structure and content of the teaching courses. In fact, no neutral narration was accepted, nor in relation to the contemporary history neither to the ancient one.

5.2 The Spanish empire: the creation of a myth

The renewal of the staff and the general framework in which history was taught were complemented also by a radical change in the topics at stake. In particular, two historical themes became trending topics within the academic discussion: 1) the concept of “civilisation” and 2) the nature of the Spanish Empire. In relation to the second of these aspects, it has to be pointed out that the concept of the Empire constituted the normative ideal of the “new man” not only in the Spanish case, but also both in the Italian Fascism – the Roman empire – and the German nazism – the Holy Roman Empire. The comparison among the different conceptions embedded in the notion of empire was aimed to offer, as far as the Spanish rhetoric is concerned, an individual national identity grounded on a noble past, and, consequently, an appearance of legitimacy to the Franco’s regime. The Roman Empire constituted an antecedent in respect to the Spanish one, but it could not have been considered as the best representation of the national identity. Similarly, the Spanish notion of Empire should also differ from the German one, whose roots had been found by the German rhetoric in the ancient Greece, and not in Rome [Gallego Margalef, 2014: 151].

In the Spanish case, this concept was debated both by the Catholic and the Falangist groups participating to the definition of the new ideology [Tusell, 1990: 23-24]. In fact, the notion of “empire” also implied a definition of a new form of humanism insofar as it should have guaranteed the construction of a common imperial past shared by all the forces of the Axis. As Alfonso de Ascanio wrote in his influential book on the Spanish Empire:

El fascismo imperialista italiano y el imperialismo racial hitleriano que late dondequiera que palpita la raza germánica, son manifestaciones de un

nuevo humanismo, fenómenos filosóficos-sociales que representan el prólogo de una nueva época histórica que se alza sobre las ruinas de la Edad Contemporánea, caduca, fracasada, moribunda. [...] El humanismo abstracto de esta edad contemporánea, absurda y destructora, es la escisión definitiva del hombre con la gracia; y por eso la tendencia humana se ha orientado en dos direcciones, que son el individualismo a ultranza, perturbador, tóxico y negativo, y el socialismo extremo, violento, atropellador y virulento. Ambos significan lo mismo: dos formas de atomización del hombre espiritual; o sea, la descomposición violenta de la personalidad y la violación de los principios que rigen la sociedad [Ascanio, 1939: 6-7].

It was clear to the mind of the new cultural establishment that for building a centralised and authoritative power it would have been necessary to instil in the mind of all the population a powerful myth that would have to act as a source of legitimacy for the purposes of the regime. As Antonio Tovar [1941: 11] wrote:

Un Imperio se construye a fuerza de conciencia y a fuerza de voluntad. Procuramos que llegue a todo el pueblo español, hasta sus últimas capas, hasta sus últimos rincones, esta vibración imperial de conocimiento del pasado español, de la incorporación de este pasado a la conciencia nacional, para que el pueblo sepa lo que quiere.

The topic was so crucial in the definition of the essence of the national culture and the teaching of humanities that, as in the case of the form that the University should have acquired, several voices emerged from within the political regime, offering different interpretations of the nature of the Spanish Empire; according to the divergent political and ideological interests at stake. The importance of this aspect of the Spanish history within the educative system had been already pointed out by the first minister of the Franco's regime, Pedro Saínz Rodríguez, who, in 1938, had established the creation of a new subject in the secondary education, called *History of the Spanish Empire*⁹.

⁹ See *Ley de la Jefatura del Estado español de 20 septiembre de 1938 Sobre reforma de la Enseñanza Media*, BOE 23-IX-1938, n. 85:1386: «Complemento natural de las humanidades clásicas han de ser las humanidades españolas. Es nuestra lengua el sistema nervioso de nuestro Imperio espiritual y herencia real y tangible de nuestro Imperio político-histórico. Como dijo Nebrija en ocasión memorable, fue siempre la lengua compañera inseparable del Imperio. Sólo un profundo estudio de nuestro idioma sobre sus textos clásicos y el aprendizaje de su

The introduction of this new subject within the formal schooling system aimed to instil in the high school students the perception of the existence of a glorious national past which had to be emulated and whose main features lay in its bureaucratic centralism, in its authoritarian trait and religious outlook. In fact, the Empire magnified by the national propaganda, i.e. the Catholic Empire of the XVI century, represented the full expression of the Spanish DNA, its international and universal scope regulated in accordance to a religious framework. This extremely ideological content was transmitted in the high school manuals designed by the educative authorities with the purpose of doing an instrumental use of history. A significant instance of this tendency is the high school manual written by the jesuit Feliciano Cereceda in which the author traces a strong continuity between the Roman and the Spanish empires, with the explicit purpose of linking together their current political destinies [Cereceda, 41: 9]. However, the focus of this book, as well as of the majority of the concurrent texts written by religious members of the cultural establishment, substantially lay on the valorisation of the Catholic empire as a way to legitimate the cultural and political role of the Church in the struggle for the hegemony. In this way, they vindicated the fundamental role played by the Church in the definition of the national identity. A similar strategy was adopted, for instance, by Alfonso de Ascanio in his very popular book on the imperial character of Spain:

Lo que nos interesa y nos enorgullece es el descubrir que la Nueva España Nacional que estamos forjando con sacrificio y dolor en su triple perfil orgánico, autoritario y jerárquico, tiene su legítima e inconfundible solera en aquel Imperio nuestro de Carlo V y Felipe II que creó la Hispanidad hace cinco siglos, forjando la Raza en un cálido aliento precursor del nuevo humanismo llamado a caracterizar la nueva edad histórica que alborea [Ascanio, 1939: 41].

The reference to the imperial past, and in particular to the moment in which the history of Spain acquired a more definite Christian spirit, constituted a normative example in relation both to the individual traits

empleo y de sus bellezas, puede darnos la seguridad de que el presente renacer de nuestro sentido nacional y patriótico, labrado a golpes de dolor y adversidad, no sea una exaltación pasajera, sino algo permanente y sustantivo en el espíritu de las generaciones venideras».

that each citizen should possess and to the actual political attitude of Spain in relation to a new eventual imperialism. Indeed, the rhetoric of the regime aimed at forging its citizens in accordance to the ideal of a “Christian knight”. The expression had been coined by the Catholic intellectual Ramiro de Maeztu, and was frequently used also within the academia. This is the case of the inaugural discourse pronounced by one of the most distinguished members of the Republican University, converted to Christianity after the civil war: Manuel García Morente [1942: 82], who would have later served the Francoist cause¹⁰.

In relation to the collective traits of the Spanish identity, that the reference to the imperial past was aimed to transmit, it is possible to identify in particular three important strands in relation to the definition of a) the foreign politics – with the notion of *Hispanidad*; b) the national politics and the cultural hegemony of the Catholic members of the regime¹¹; c) the definition of a new form of humanism¹².

¹⁰ On Morente’s religious and political conversion see in particular López 2010, according to whom, p. 314: «La obra del último Morente, 1936-1942, es una justificación de la contienda, la legitimación del bando franquista, y la delimitación de los rasgos por los que habría de discurrir el nacionalcatholicismo vencedor».

¹¹ Ascanio, 1939: 43: «Hemos tratado de probar: 1) Que existe por el ancho mundo un vasto imperio espiritual hispánico viejo de cuatro siglos; 2) que la raza que lo puebla tiene la misma sangre, igual cuna y tradición, idéntica religión y la misma habla, o lo que es lo mismo que los intereses morales de todos esos pueblos hispánicos son idénticos; 3) que por el mundo entero hay un despertar político y filosófico-social racista que orienta las sociedades humanas hacia las grandes confederaciones espirituales de igual raza e idioma; 4) que existe una política, una cultura y una influencia hispánica que jamás han cesado de latir, a las que España se debe en cuerpo y alma». The racism of Ascanio was somehow mitigated by some members of the Falange, as for instance, by Antonio Tovar who in 1940 wrote: «Cada región española tiene una mezcla de razas, diversas en proporción y elementos. Por eso la unidad de España no va a ser ya nunca una unidad racista, ni tampoco de lengua o de cultura, sino una unidad de destino, lograda a fuerza de romanidad y viva sólo en los momentos en que España tiene conciencia de su destino universal».

¹² *Ibidem*: 163: «El Nuevo Humanismo es de esencia espiritual y sobre él se ha basado la nueva concepción de la sociedad y del Estado: jerarquía, autoridad, trabajo y tradición: del pasado ha seleccionado las glorias, las virtudes, la fe, la poesía, los recios moldes de la continuidad cultural e histórica, el cultivo y desarrollo progresivo del patrimonio moral».

5.3 The propagation of the myth: the radio

Interestingly enough, the myth of the Spanish Empire constructed within the University was then transmitted to the rest of the population through a capillar system of national propaganda. A leading role in this process of dissemination was played by the national radio. Indeed, this mass-medium, largely used for popular and frivolous entertainment, also included some programs of political and cultural education, managed by the members of the academic and religious establishment. In fact, according to the official statistics of the regime [Ibáñez Martín, 1949: 710-724], almost 70% of the total broadcasting was dedicated to music, 15% to the news. In addition, another 15% was dedicated to the education of the audience, according to the principles of the regime. The areas of knowledge included were in particular religion, humanities, science, literature and theatre. In all these programs there was a relevant presence of academics and clergies who contributed to the diffusion of the national propaganda in pills [Guardia, 2006]. Indeed, as the minister of Education wrote, the National Radio represented the “most advanced voice of Christianity”.

Thus, together with the creation of a repressive and violent control of the means of communication the regime, since its very beginning, also created an efficient system of propaganda. The contents of the culture spread through this propagandistic instrument were largely created within the University and later transmitted to the rest of the population [Sevillano, 2003]. The person in charge of this system, whose bases had been set back in 1937, was Serrano Suñer, responsible for the *Delegación del Estado para la Prensa y la Propaganda*¹³. Since the end of the civil war, Serrano implemented a very efficient and totalitarian control of all the mass media which culminated, in 1942, in the creation of the *Servicio Español de Auscultación de la Opinión Pública*. This institution was responsible for constantly testing the results of the propagandistic system in the building of the opinion of the Spanish citizens. Significantly, at the centre of the national propaganda it is possible to find in particular the notions of Empire and that of *Hispanidad* [Belmonte, 2006: 43].

In this context, the radio represented the main voice of the official propaganda, and, consequently, an analysis of the notion of *Hispanidad*

¹³ For the legislative process see BOE, 27-III-37; BOE, 3-VI-37; BOE 25-X-37; BOE 12-XII-37; BOE 17-IX-37

promoted through this medium would reveal the proper aims of the regime in relation to this concept. The first discourse on this topic is that of the Jesuit Vagas Zúñiga, who gave a long discourse in 1941 on the nature of the Spanish Empire, connecting it with the Roman past and vindicating its religious character as the main trait of the *Hispanidad*. His discourse was aimed at guaranteeing a legitimate ground for the foreign policy of the regime. In fact, in the name of the Catholic past, Spain was trying to construct an Iberian unity with other nations, such as Portugal, and a strict collaboration overseas with the Argentinian government [Berbeito Díez, 1989]. *Through the notion of Hispanidad, the national propaganda wanted to instil in its citizens the conviction that it existed a natural and traditional tendency, governed by the will of God, to unify these countries within a unique empire* [Zúñiga, 1941: 23].

The importance of the University and the new intellectuals to construct and propagate these myths is also proved by the fact that several of the university professors, as members of the *Consejo de Hispanidad*, were invited to give brief lectures on the radio. Both the rector of the UC, Zabala y Lera, and the professor who replaced Ortega in the chair of Metaphysics, Juan Zaragüeta, gave their lectures on the concept of *Hispanidad*. According to the first, this concept represented the universalistic tendency of Christianity, that is: «el necesario principio de unidad superior que junte interiormente los entendimientos y los corazones» [Zabala y Lera, 1940: 7]. The valorisation of the Catholic past was complemented by a strong condemnation of modernity. In fact:

Iniciado en los primeros años del siglo XVIII y proseguido a lo largo del siglo XIX, cuanto el historiador aprecia es roptura de tradición, censurable propensión a admirar lo extranjero, menosprecio de lo propio, olvido de cuanto habíamos sido cuando fuímos lo más, deshispánización, en suma, que nos llevó a la mengua de trocar nuestro encumbrado puesto de caballeros del ideal por el harto más modesto de simples pajes de lanza de señores autoritarios y despáticos, que llegaron a dominarnos [Ibidem, 5].

Similarly, Zaragüeta identified the *Hispanidad* with the national duty of unifying the culture of all the Spanish-speaking countries under the leadership of Spain and of its Catholic ideology: «en aquel vigoroso movimiento netamente español de revitalización del pensamiento escolástico al alborear de la Edad Moderna» [Zaragüeta, 1940: 9]. The

glorious past that had to be revitalised was that of the second Scholastic, the works of Francisco Suarez, Domingo Soto and Francisco de Vitoria.

5.4 Which Empire? *Revista de Estudios Políticos*

In spite of the apparent ideological homogeneity that the regime wanted to transmit to its citizens through all these propagandistic media, the nature of the Spanish Empire, and therefore the normative purposes of the New State, were constantly debated within the cultural establishment, often producing divergent interpretations. Indeed, the *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, review of the FE, among 1941 and 1943 tried to offer a different reading of the national past and of this particularly important notion for the national culture. There were in particular two points of dissension between this review and the official orthodoxy: 1) the relevance of the theocratic component of the Spanish Empire; 2) the legacy of the Roman Empire. In fact, generally speaking, the Roman Empire played, according to the REP, a far more relevant role than the Catholic one in relation to the definition of the Spanish identity. Moreover, the Empire was interpreted as a degeneration of the monarchic power, in which the separation of power between the religious and secular spheres was much more clearly established.

The controversy started in 1941 when Francisco Javier Conde published a translation of Carl Schmitt over the nature of the imperial power [Schmitt, 1941]. Given the different perspective adopted by the German propaganda, the role of the Church and the Catholic tradition in the definition of the notion of Empire was extremely limited. Moreover, in the case of Schmitt, the concept did play a vital role in the international politics, but not in the same form of the concept of *Hispanidad*. In fact, the notion of “imperialism” was conceived as a form of foreign policies which responded to the crisis of legitimacy that the modern notion of the State was undergoing. The traditional appeal to the national unity, in the name of some basic cultural or natural traits (language, race), which on the contrary constituted the kernel of the Spanish propaganda, was considered as inadequate for the new political international movements. These, in fact, should have built their legitimacy not on an old tradition but on the new voluntarism of

the people, not on an external imposition but on an internal will¹⁴. As a consequence, the Empire that the forces of the Axis had to build in opposition to the one purported by the Allies should have principally count, for building its legitimacy, on the notion of people rather than of the single dictatorship in power.

This perspective significantly lessened the importance of the Church in the building of the new imperialist identity. This constituted a very heterodox position in relation to the official propaganda, and for this reason it had to be countered. Thus, some months later, in the same review, the young professor of History of Law at the University of Valencia, Alfonso García Galló, presented a more orthodox perspective. Indeed, according to García Galló, the grandeur of the Roman Empire had been reached thanks to the contribution of two Spanish emperors: Trajan and Hadrian. They would have contributed to instil in the Roman Empire a trait typical of Spanish character: the millennial tradition of the creation of an absolute and unconditional power:

España sostiene por tradición antíquísima, la idea universal, con tal fuerza y firmeza, que se busca entre los españoles – Trajano y Adriano – a los dos emperadores que han de fortalecer el Imperio y fundarlo sobre bases nuevas. Esta concepción del poder real que encontramos en la Península y que se exterioriza en la práctica es recogida como doctrina filosófica y ofrecida al mundo romano». [García Galló, 1941: 687, 690].

The form of government purported by these emperors, according to García Galló, was constituted by a sort of paternal communitarianism in which the whole power was concentrated in the hand of a single person who did not have to give reasons for his actions. In this context: «El individuo se debe por entero a él [the emperor] y ha de sacrificar sus gustos con tal de que el emperador viva» [García Galló, 1941. 697].

¹⁴ Schmitt, 1941: 99: «En un Derecho internacional nuevo el concepto ordenador es nuestro concepto de Imperio, que toma por punto de partida en el orden del espacio un ámbito nacional muy extenso sustentado por un pueblo. Vemos en él la entraña de una nueva manera de pensar el Derecho internacional que arranca del concepto del pueblo y deja subsistir íntegramente los elementos ordenadores contenidos en el concepto del Estado, a la vez que hace honor a la noción actual del espacio y a la disposición, de las fuerzas políticas; que mide con medida "planetaria", es decir, con la medida espacial de la tierra, sin aniquilar a los pueblos y a los Estados y sin poner proa hacia un derecho mundial de cuño universalista e imperialista».

He coined a new expression that would have been extremely popular in the definition of the relationship between the citizens and Franco during the first years of the dictatorship. He defined this form of total confidence in the paternalistic decision of the leader as the expression of an ancestral trait of the Spanish character, what he called: “*devotio iberica*”. This concept would later serve to construct a propagandistic set of theories aimed at legitimizing the authoritative power of Franco and the conjunction of spiritual and secular power he promoted during his whole dictatorship. Clearly enough, the teaching of history would have obeyed to very precise political purposes, and the exaltation of the Roman Empire would have had an evident instrumental function aimed to reinforce the politics of the regime. In fact, the concept of “*devotio iberica*” applied to the essence of the Spanish people, perfectly traduced the intentions of the *Caudillo*, who in his discourses on the role of the education in building the new generations of citizens always revealed his paternalistic temper:

La juventud tiene que educarse, y lo mismo que la madre tiene el derecho a la educación de sus hijos y a formarles en unos principios espirituales y morales, la Patria, que es madre común, lo tiene para formar a sus juventudes en el culto al deber y en el servicio a Dios y a la Patria [Franco, 1947: 143].

However, the editorial position of the *REP* largely differed from Galló’s general account. Indeed, according to the director García Valdecasas – a right-minded orteguian who in 1932 found the *Frente Español* and later participated into the FN [Cerezo González Cuevas, 2006: 278-280] – the new State should not have been the expression of a paternalistic and discretionary power. On the contrary, it should be based on an established institutional order. Valdecasas, more than the role of the single dictatorship, praised in the Roman empire the bureaucratic apparatus that should have been emulated by the new political regime [García Valdecasas, 1942: 7]. Thus, the Empire, as in the case of Schmitt’s analysis, was not conceived as the best realisation of the theological power, but rather as the most efficient response to the crisis of legitimacy of the modern liberal state of the XVIII and XIX centuries, i.e. the creation of a totalitarian State¹⁵. This was conceived as

¹⁵ García-Valdecasas, 1942: 10: «La Sociedad entra en .lucha permanente contra el Estado para fijar los límites dentro de los cuales la acción del Estado debe

the historical duty that, according to Valdecasas, the new Spanish Empire should have to realise, marginalising the Church. The problem that the regime would have faced was that of avoiding the risk of a too oppressive bureaucratisation that, as in the case of the Roman Empire, would have produced its own collapse. Significantly enough, this period of decadence corresponded to the reign of Constantine, the first emperor to claim conversion to Christianity. The study in-depth of the Roman Empire, to Valdecasas, was extremely useful in order to have a model to which to compare the present, by underlying the pros and cons, so as to avoid them. The imperial past was therefore considered as a legacy of the past which did not have to be excessively idealised, but rather critically studied:

¿Es idéntica la situación presente a la del Imperio romano? Creemos que no, pero que tiene con ella temerosas analogías. Hay, sin embargo, factores distintos. Hay, sobre todo, la experiencia histórica de lo que a aquel gran organismo le sucedió. No está dicho que aquello fuera una fatalidad inexorable. En todo caso no tiene por qué repetirse siempre que los hombres prueben la capacidad suficiente para sacar las enseñanzas de aquel pasado y vencer peligros semejantes a aquellos [Ibidem: 22].

The leading role played by the University in the making of the political principles of the new State was vindicated through the example of the Roman Empire, for instance by the professor of law at the University of Seville, Federico de Castro y Bravo. According to him, the ruling roman class was sustained by some fundamental features, such as a strong military discipline and an effective political propaganda. These were exactly the prerogatives of the academia in relation to his formal aspect – the *university army* created by FET y JONS. But these necessary conditions were ultimately supported by the creation of a precise rule of law, by a bureaucratic system established by the jurists. As Castro y Bravo wrote:

Roma tuvo desde muy pronto una clase de hombres para servir al Derecho. Tres fueron las funciones más consideradas, las que significaban más alto servicio y llevaban a los más altos honores: la ciencia del Derecho, la

encerrarse y, por tanto, el campo de libre acción que le debe dejar a ella. Este movimiento social tiende en su primera etapa a minimizar el Estado. El pensamiento liberal opera con las contraposiciones constantes: Estado y sociedad, gobierno y pueblo, etc., como expresión de esa pugna permanente».

elocuencia [política] y la milicia. La jurisprudencia es, a diferencia de Grecia, uno de los pilares de la vida romana; a ella debe una de sus fuerzas más eficaces, su ciencia organizadora. La superioridad de Roma sobre Grecia no está en sus legisladores, sus filósofos, sus artistas, sus oradores ni siquiera en sus generales; estaba en la disciplina militar y civil y en el modo de hacer cumplir las disposiciones jurídicas [Castro y Bravo, 1942: 194].

To summarise, the editorial line of the *REP* consisted in the valorisation of the Empire as a form of totalitarian government rather than a dictatorial one. The positions among members of a same community, that is the academy, significantly diverged in relation to a crucial normative aspect of Franco's regime. So, at least until the crisis of the spring 1943 which, as seen in chapter 4, determined a significant move towards the predominance of the Catholic component of the regime, the *REP* gave voice to those academics who were more akin to the forces of the Axis, as proved by the case of the different narration of the imperial Spanish history. Their aim was that of promoting a fascistization of the paternalistic and religious regime of Francisco Franco. This attempt definitely failed in 1943, when the affinity with Italy or Germany constituted a political risk, which was reflected in the growing standardization of the different interpretations on the imperial and mediaeval past of the Spanish Catholic origins¹⁶.

5.5 *Politia magistra historiae.*

Independently from the different interests at stake, all the members of the academic community shared the conviction according to which the control of the national history would have determined the control of the national politics. This was not only the case of the ancient history but also, and foremost, that of the contemporary one. In fact, even if the *Alzamiento* evidently constituted a breaking point in the Spanish history, the university and the research institutes established by the regime – such as the CSIC – tried to propose a radically different interpretation of the recent events, tracing a path of continuity with the tradition. This can be proved by considering the evolution of the

¹⁶ As Payne, 1996: 32 correctly wrote: «Los primeros síntomas del cambio notable en el equilibrio internacional de poder entre 1942 y 1943, debidos a la creciente fuerza de los Aliados, comenzaron a modificar en seguida ciertos matices políticos del régimen español».

university teachings. For instance, since 1942, the University of Madrid established the creation of a new course mandatory for all the students of Humanities: *Historia Universal*. Professor Ciriaco Bustamante was in charge of the course. Significantly, in the mandatory book of the course, that is the monumental *História de la civilización española* (1944), Bustamante depicted an extremely ideological interpretation of the recent Spanish history.

The history of the last two centuries was seen as a struggle between two opposite forces: the imperial tradition and the revolutionary one. The second, recently represented by the Republican government and its leader, Manuel Azaña, represented the «prototipo del intelectual frío, resentido y amargado, incapaz de comprender nuestra gloria militar y la grandeza de nuestro Imperio» [Pérez Bustamante, 1944: 359]. The first and victorious one, on the contrary, was represented by the national movement, that had vitalised the glorious national imperial tradition. According to Bustamante, this would have been impossible without the help of some political thinkers who, in a period dominated by the liberal hegemony, had continued to defend the values of the imperial tradition. These were, in particular, Marqués de Lozoya, deputy for the CEDA in 1936, and, before him, Menéndez y Pelayo. Significantly enough, the very few doctoral thesis discussed in this period in the UC concerning topics of contemporary history all dealt with these figures and their connection with the imperial past¹⁷.

Significantly enough, it is possible to affirm that during this period the way in which History was narrated was substantially regulated by political reasons¹⁸. As written by Beneyto Pérez [1942: 15], professor of History of Law at the University of Salamanca and, at the same time, one of the most outstanding figures of the falangist movement:

Filósofos, políticos y juristas se orientan hacia la historia de lo político como determinado por una doble corriente: la de rehuir los problemas concretos

¹⁷ This very limited pantheon of Spanish historians discussed in these theses included, in particular, Balmes, Menéndez y Pelayo, Pradera, Vázquez de Mella, Donoso Cortés, Aparisi y Guijarro, Maeztu. Cfr. *Sumarios y extractos de las tesis doctorales leídas desde 1939 a 1944 en la sección de Historia*, Universidad Complutense, Madrid, 1954-1955.

¹⁸ As correctly underlined by Iáñez [2011: 131] in tracing the history of the review *Escorial*: «La cultura se convierte en el Nuevo Estado en un elemento de acción política».

de la disciplina que profesan, y la de buscar en la historia – con superada versión – la lección para el presente.

The past events were systematically distorted by the new organic intellectuals of the regime with the aim of constructing and spreading a determined interpretation of the national destiny among the young students [Valls Montés, 1983]. Moreover, the historical paths were included into a teleological explanation aimed at proving the legitimacy of the regime. One significant instance of this tendency is constituted by the thesis realised in 1944 by Rafael Gamba, a student of Juan Zaragüeta at the UC, entirely dedicated to the philosophy of history¹⁹. A vast synthesis of the thesis would later be published in the official review of the CSIC, *Arbor*, being part of the theoretical framework which sustained the overall philosophical account of history in accordance with the national-catholicism of the regime [Prades Plaza, 2007]. In his article, Gamba vindicates the importance of the concept of “tradition”, conceived as the spiritual essence of a nation²⁰. He affirmed that each nation would have to be ruled by a spiritual immanent force which would have determined the course of its history according to an established and immutable path. The human interventions would be ultimately unable to determine the history of a country, whose destiny was considered as determined by this metaphysical principle. In other words, the role of human beings in the course of history would only be that of correctly interpreting the direction of these historic forces which governed all events. Significantly enough, there would have been exclusively one correct way of interpreting the historical events, since all were regulated by a unique principle. Consequently, the only legitimate historical narration would be the one which, *per se*, had proved to be able to give reason for an history explained in teleological terms, i.e. Christianity. As Gamba put it:

¹⁹ Gamba Ciudad, R. *La interpretación materialista de la historia [una investigación social-histórica a la luz de la filosofía actual]*, in *Sumarios y extractos de las Tesis doctorales leídas desde 1940 a 1950 en las secciones de Filosofía y Pedagogía*, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Madrid, Madrid, pp. 61-66

²⁰ Gamba Ciudad, 1945: 558: «La tradición es, simplemente, el reconocimiento de que la realidad histórica de las naciones, de las culturas o civilizaciones, es de índole espiritual, y que, por tanto, su devenir está íntimamente ligado al tiempo, o más bien, es tiempo en sí mismo».

Tradición concreta, por antonomasia, significa para nosotros aquella en que nuestra civilización ha creído y se ha hecho fecunda, aquella cuyo contenido espiritual cristiano la ha conducido, por un camino de perfección, hacia fines e ideales eternos [Gambra Ciudad, 1945: 572].

According to Gambra, after the falsehood of the Republican period, finally the truth was starting to clearly appear at the horizon, and the duty of the historians would ultimately consist in making this clear. So, as proved by the thesis of Gambra, *almost ten years after the separation of Ortega from the University of Madrid, the philosophy purported within this institution had completely changed and no place was left to his theory of history. A new generation of young students was being forged by a completely different cultural establishment whose theoretical framework radically differed from the one that Ortega had tried to transmit during the course of his long teaching career.* In this new political and cultural context, what posture did the philosopher maintain during his long exile? And how the history of philosophy he significantly developed in this period interacted with the new Spanish academic scenario?

5.6 Ortega's theory of history during the exile

There is a large consensus among the Orteguian scholars about the fact that, since the beginning of the '30s, the Madrilenian philosopher put at the centre of his intellectual agenda the problem of the historical character of human being and, consequently, the historical character of the philosophical practice²¹. An instance of this tendency is consituted by the course he gave at the UC in 1933 on Galileo Galilei, a course which will be significantly published in Spain in 1942 with the title *Esquema de las crisis*. However, not only in this famous text but also in a lot of other writings of the same period, he developed a compelling discourse on the nature of historiography. Before analysing his writings it is important to distinguish between the theory of history proposed by Ortega and the current meaning of the word historiography.

²¹ Zamora [2013: 91], for instance, writes that: «La razón histórica se convierte desde los años treinta del siglo pasado en un tema constante de la llamada por el propio José Ortega y Gasset su “segunda navegación”». The progressive interest of the philosopher for history and sociology is underlined by all his critics. See for instance Morón Arroyo, 2011; Savignano, 1984; Oses, 1989; Cerezo Galán, 2011.

In fact, the philosopher conceived his activity as an anthropological enquiry aimed at comprehending the theoretic conditions of possibility of the diachronic development of the interpersonal and social relations, and not of the phenomenological occurrences of the historical events. Put it differently, Ortega's interest for history was not focused on establishing what actually happened in a precise historical circumstance. On the contrary, he aimed at comprehending how significant historical events can determine paradigmatic changes in the concrete lives of the people who experienced them. And, consequently, how historians interpret these paradigmatic events in relation to their own times. In fact, according to Ortega, history cannot be comprehended without taking into account the existential experience of every single person, who is always defined in relation to the historical time in which she lives and acts. The interest for the study of history, in Ortega, constitutes a philosophical practice which consists in explaining the reasons why a particular event would later produce a specific set of historiographical interpretations. His analysis constitutes a sort of meta-history of the reasons underneath the historical narrations²². The meta-historical character of Ortega's historiography is particularly interesting if we compare it with his own personal experience during those years, to understand how his meditations of history were related to the one hegemonically purported by the Spanish academia.

In fact, it is in 1940 when Ortega affirmed to have almost finished a «gran mamotreto filosófico» [OC, V: 657] on history which he called *The dawn of historical reason*. Indeed, this is only one of the many unfinished projects of the Madrilenian philosopher. A sketch of what this long manuscript should have been is offered by the series of academic lessons he gave in Buenos Aires during the autumn 1940, entitled *Razón histórica*, largely indebted to the philosophy of Dilthey [Lévêque, 2008] In the very introduction of his course he underlines the fact that all his

²² As Pérez Carrasco [2014: 322] correctly wrote: «Ortega non è mai stato uno storico della filosofia, quanto piuttosto un filosofo speculativo, che ha rivolto il proprio pensiero verso la realtà storica fino ad affermare la natura storica del pensiero stesso, ma che non ha mai fatto concrete ricerche storiche. Ed è forse per questo che oggetto della riflessione orteghiana non è tanto la realtà storica in se stessa, quanto i concetti che si utilizzano per dare conto di quella realtà. Ortega non si preoccupa tanto della ricostruzione concreta del pensiero altrui, quanto delle condizioni di possibilità della ricostruzione di quel pensiero; vale a dire, egli si occupa più di teoria storiografica che di storia delle idee»

discussions on the nature of history constitute a chance for reflecting on some specific terms of the current political debate, on the slogans that characterised the ideological debate of the period. They were all attempts of defining the meanings of the words forged during the long course of history, whose inadequate use, made by political leaders and intellectuals, had rendered them theoretically insignificant but politically powerful. As Ortega said to his Argentinian audience presenting the course:

Pues... ¿de qué se va a tratar? De eso – de eso mismo de que se trata en todas partes fuera de aquí, ahí, en calles y plazas, en hogares y casinos, en clubs, bares y tabernas, en las reuniones públicas y en las reuniones secretas de los gobiernos, en la soledad del hombre sobrecogido y en la exaltación de la muchedumbre conglomerada, en tierra, mar y aire, debajo de la superficie del mar y por encima del aire, en la estratosfera – de eso, de eso se trata. Pero se va a tratar como corresponde a este sitio. En este sitio, que es una cátedra de lo que se llama “filosofía” no se habla de las cosas sino de lo esencial de las cosas. Bien que inodora, es ésta la cátedra de las esencias. Y frente a todos esos innumerables horrores y dolores, y fervores que pasan ahora, aquí se va a hablar de lo que en medio de ellos y bajo ellos es lo que esencialmente pasa [OC, IX: 477].

It could seem senseless that, given these premises, the first three of a total of five lessons were dedicated to a problem apparently related exclusively to the philosophy of knowledge. In particular, the replacement of the notion of the Cartesian *cogito* with a new grounding principle of human rationality. However, it is exactly by replacing it with the notion of “vital reason” – through the replacement of the universal intellect with the individual reason who acts according to its needs and wishes – that Ortega rigorously set the grounds of his reflection on the nature and ends of history. In fact, given this premise, it is possible to comprehend that the shipwreck suffered by human beings in a world that had lost a definite meaning, determine the attempt of rebuilding a meaningful sense to the world in which one lives. This implies the will of reasoning about the rules which regulate the life of every and each person and of the historical and vital meaning of a society [Tejada, 2003]. The human being is considered as an active agent in the course of history since she constantly has to give a sense to her own existence. In fact, her life is not given to her once and for all, but she always has to shape it over time. For this reason, history does

not only relates to the past, but also to the future both of a single individual and of the collectivity.

Each individual constructs his own history which, at the same time, is the product of the collective history he inherits but, that does not constitute an end in itself. The first consequence of this perspective is a clear rejection of any telological or – as in the case of Gamba – theological principle grounding the development of history²³. In fact, the meta-historical principle indicated by the Madrilenian philosopher does not constitute a religious premise, but rather the vitalistic ground that *ab origine* sustains the life of every human being²⁴. Far from establishing a sort of transcendental principle, Ortega argues in favour of the “circumstantiality” as the main trait of human existence, and therefore of the personal and collective history. A problem that he perceived since his very youth, but that he radically reframed during this period [Tejada, 2012].

Indeed, if the constitutive trait of human being is his historical dimension, both in the sense that he is forged and contribute to shape his own history, so, in different times, humanity has assumed different substantially forms which impede to determine a fix and immutable nature or even a fix path of evolution. This basic thesis constitutes an antithetical philosophical account in comparison to the one that was serving as the paradigm of the francoist ideology: i.e. the traditionalism of Eugenio d’Ors. In fact, d’Ors identified in some fix structures, that he called *eoni*, the recurrent historical clusters that compose the history of humanities. A system of traditions that would constantly appear, again and again, in the course of human history. Significantly enough, after the end of the civil war, this constituted the hegemonic paradigm in the interpretation of history, a paradigm that d’Ors propagated within his

²³ As Savignano [1996: 100] argues: «La ragione storica rappresenta, pertanto, l’unico strumento ermeneutico adatto a narrare ciò che all’uomo è accaduto e a rendere ragione di quanto ha fatto in una determinata congiuntura vitale senza sconfinare in atteggiamenti teologizzanti, unilateralmente ottimistici o pessimistici, o addirittura in velleitarismi utopici».

²⁴ Bertinotto, 2003: 123: «La filosofía transcendental es, entonces, al mismo tiempo, “razón vital” y “razón histórica”; razón vital porqué, comprendiendo la conciencia [la natural, como la filosófica] como construcción construida, como *gebildetes Bild*, muestra genéticamente operante en ella lo que llama absoluto [o vida]; razón histórica porqué muestra que las ideas – incluidas la idea de su propio principio – no son sino el producto del mismo proceso con el cual se construyen, a nivel fenomenológico (y a lo largo del tiempo), las “cosas”».

cultural circle gathered in the so-called *Casa de la Sabiduria*, composed by eminent historians and intellectuals of the regime such as Pedro Laín Entralgo and José López Íbor [Martínez Carrasco, 2013].

According to Ortega, history does not constitute a path to be followed, but just a fruitful example to be looked at for understanding the reason underneath the present. This implies that all the current habits, words and so on, are obviously a product of the past and, to be rendered comprehensible, it is necessary to explain the historical reasons that contributed to their creation. Otherwise, the current world in which one lives would result as intrinsically meaningless. This is the topic of another course Ortega had given in 1940 at the *Sociedad de Amigos del Arte* of Buenos Aires some months before, and which would constitute the basis of another very important course: *Man and People*.

In fact, during this course Ortega dealt with the analysis of what he called civilisation, that is to say the collective product of the individual historical reason over time. These lessons start with a basic premise according to which: «una enorme porción de nuestra vida se compone de cosas que hacemos, no por gusto, ni inspiración, ni cuenta propia, sino simplemente porque las hace la gente y, como el Estado, la gente ahora nos fuerza a acciones humanas que provienen de ella, y no de nosotros» [OC, IX: 303]. The apparent contradiction among an explanation of the human behaviour as based on individual needs and the mechanic living in society does reveal a constitutive problem of Ortega's meditation on the relationship between individuals and their history. A problem he will later developed in the course he gave in Madrid in 1949 on the same topic.

To Ortega, society, in its everyday life, would not be the expression of a *Volksgeist*, as Schmitt had put it. The single individuals are not aware of the reasons why they act. They are just unconscious spectators of an already written script²⁵. Given this condition, Ortega's proposal is that of calling for the importance of the intellectual in the society as the person responsible for the creation of an historical awareness that would aim at building the public opinion. As Ortega put it:

²⁵ «Pero, repito, que eso del *alma colectiva*, de la *conciencia social*, es arbitrario misticismo. No hay tal *alma colectiva*, si por *alma* se entiende – y aquí no puede entenderse otra cosa – sino *algo* que es capaz de ser sujeto y responsable de sus actos, *algo* que hace lo que hace porque tiene para él claro sentido. ¡Ah! Entonces será lo característico de la *gente*, de la *sociedad*, de la *colectividad*, precisamente ¿Qué son *desmaldas*?» [OC, IX: 304].

Urge un poder espiritual nuevo, que no tiene por qué ser estatal. Pero un poder espiritual es necesario. ¡No faltaba más! El hombre, si quiere serlo, no puede abandonarse a decir cualquiera cosa que le pasa por la cabeza, por el alma – que es como el cuerpo: un mecanismo y nada más. Hay una ética del decir – que es urgente enunciar y propagar –, como hay una ética de todo hacer humano [OC, IX: 312].

It is evident, from this quote, Ortega's critique to the propagandistic ideology and to the totalitarian outlook that the organic intellectuals of the regime were purporting. Not only he criticises his academic colleagues, but he also proposes a different way of exercising the intellectual activities and, in particular, he proposed a different way for being an historian. According to him, history cannot be studied with the aim of finding instrumental similarities with the present, but rather to understand the basic differences that exist between different epochs and different context. In this way it could have been possible to comprehend the dynamic nature of human beings. The study and teaching of history does have to be useful, but not for propagandistic purposes. As he thought it was proved by the recent history, the institutional, social and therefore cultural changes are so evident that all analogy with the past would be totally unfeasible. In fact: «Si comparamos el estado de creencias en que el hombre europeo se halla hoy con el reinante hace no más de treinta años, nos encontramos con que ha variado profundamente, por haberse alterado la convicción fundamental» [OC, VI: 49].

Thus, the considerable changes in the very set of beliefs and habits of the modern society would reveal the way in which historic paradigms do change over time. Significantly enough, it would be by reasoning on the political and cultural conditions of the '30s and 40's that Ortega coined the term "creencias" [beliefs] for indicating the set of shared opinions and habits grounding the perception of the social and intellectual reality possess by all and each citizen [OC, V: 665]. To the questions of the way in which these sets of beliefs do change over time Ortega will devote his book *Esquema de las crisis y otros ensayos* (1942). In this book the philosopher individuates the driving forces of the paradigmatic changes in the intellectual generations and in the dynamic of intergenerational transmission of knowledge. In particular, according to Ortega, all historical periods would be characterised by a struggle between three different generations with the aim of exercising

an hegemonic cultural and social control. In particular, all historical periods would be characterised by a struggle between an hegemonic generation which has fought to replace the precedent one and which, at the same time, is being questioned by a new and growing generation. Significantly enough, the older generations would contribute to the formation of the new ones which, concurrently, define themselves in opposition to the formers. In this way, always interconnected, but necessarily opposing systems of values, would endlessly struggle against one another for conquering the hegemony²⁶. This struggle is not exclusively among generations. Indeed, it can also be infra-generational in the cases in which, within a same period of times, different perceptions of reality coexisted. To explain this phenomenon Ortega traced a distinction between the relation of *coetaneidad* (sharing the same system of values within a same generation) and the one of *contemporaneidad* (belonging to the same generation of time, having different values) [Aróstegui, 2004: 109-142]. Evidently enough, *the generational and infra-generational struggles* were not a sort of metaphysical invention of a philosopher living in an Hyperurania. On the contrary, they represent the translation in philosophical terms of the concrete problem suffered by Ortega, an eminent representer of a recently failed generation.

The possible struggle between these forces could have produced the complete evaporation of a system of beliefs and, consequently, a structural crisis of a whole society. In fact «El hombre, desde que nace, va absorbiendo las convicciones de su tiempo, es decir, va encontrándose en el mundo vigente» [OC, VI: 391], but he unceasingly changes over time, since: «Ese mundo vigente [...] hacia el cual y en función del cual vivimos, en vista del cual decidimos nuestras más

²⁶ The concept of generation and its relation to the beliefs does constitute the *trait d'union* between the historical and sociological meditations of Ortega during the '40s. As Moreno Pestaña wrote, [2011: 119]: «El concepto de generación permite, al menos, tres tipos de usos. Por un lado, ayuda al historiador o al sociólogo a analizar las condiciones espacio-temporales que permiten una cierta forma de ser. Por otro lado, en su uso político, propone o detiene la sucesión en los centros de poder, vinculándola a la puerilidad, la madurez o la senectud de ciertos grupos humanos. En fin, la referencia a la generación propia y su confrontación con las ajenas permite ordenar los repertorios de creencias y ajustar los proyectos a ciclos temporales más o menos previsibles».

simples acciones, es el elemento variable de la vida humana» [OC, VI: 398]. However, these paradigmatic changes in the course of history do not occur abruptly. On the contrary, they are the result of a long process of sedimentation of a new system of thought able to orient the future generations²⁷.

The slow motion of the historical forces and the following social acquisition of new habits and beliefs would explain the radical difference between the laws externally imposed in a discretionary way by changing governments – strong uses – and the ones which are internalised and sedimented through the historical process – weak uses. The latter would ultimately constitute, according to the Madrilenian philosopher, the ground of the public opinion, while the former would quickly disappear each time a new political power replaced another²⁸. The example provided by Ortega to explain this difference is extremely significant, since he individuates in the Roman salute the external imposition of an habits which is destined to quickly disappear not being grounded on any historical or cultural dimension.

So, the meditation on history conducted by Ortega is both in its extent and in its context much vaster and evidently subversive in comparison to the one purported by the Franco's regime. In fact, by analysing the Spanish historiography of his time and the political scenario in which he lived, Ortega proposed a critical reflection on the current status quo through an historical and comparative methodology. Moreover, by establishing the starting point of his historical meditation not in an external or universal principle but in the concrete life of single individual, he explicitly rejects any form of collectivism and he does so in the name of the valorisation of a liberal and individual construction of the social world.

Moreover, the analysis of the Madrilenian philosopher does not concern exclusively the Spanish case. This is just the point of departure he adopts for trying to comprehend the reasons for the development of different totalitarianisms in the European continent. Thanks to this

²⁷ «La sociedad es tardígrada, perezosa, se arrastra despacio y avanza por la historia con lento paso de vaca, que a veces nos desespera por su morosidad». [OC, IX: 341].

²⁸ «Quién triunfa, quién triunfa a la larga, en la historia, los usos débiles y difusos o los usos fuertes y rígidos? Pensando – como he dicho – que todos los usos tardan en nacer y tardan en morir, no es verosímil que acabe nunca por triunfar definitivamente un intento de cambio súbito» [OC, IX: 344].

particular perspective, he did develop a far more compelling theorisation on history in comparison to the ideological one purported by the regime [Salas Ortueta, 2015: 92]. The analysis of the crisis of the European science, that Ortega had pointed out in his *Mission of University*, is now complemented by the study of the political and social crisis that emerged as a consequence of the former. In particular, he develops a theory of the history of philosophy and culture as a sequence of paradigmatic cultural and social crises.

This interpretation of the historical development of humanity is firstly sketched in a very interesting text, that is the prologue he wrote to the History of Philosophy of Émile Bréhier, composed in the winter 1941-1942. This is the last text of his Argentinian exile, and an attempt to develop an hermeneutics of the recent times. In his prologue Ortega offers a synthesis of his theory of history intended as a discipline responsible for the comprehension of the historical forces of a given time: 1) the individuation of radically different cultural paradigms²⁹; 2) the comprehension of the reasons underneath the paradigmatic changes, that is the individuations of the nature and reasons of different sets of beliefs: «la tarea del historiador es descubrir, aun en los tiempos más atroces, los motivos satisfactorios que para subsistir tuvieron los contemporáneos» [OC, VI: 136]. So, neither a self-indulgent erudition nor an instrumental use of history is what Ortega theorised. On the contrary, he vindicates the importance of the epistemic function play by this discipline in the comprehension of the social reality and also of the intellectual experience.

In fact, by understanding the reasons for the historical evolution of humanity, it would have been possible to connect the lives of the single individuals with the ones of the community, not only on the synchronic but also on the diachronic level. If the life of every person is characterised by the relation to his factual circumstances, the same can be said in the case of the collective life. The consequences of this theoretical shift in the study of the history of philosophy are very relevant. In fact, according to Ortega, no authentic philosophical idea could actually emerge in a given time independently from the historical and social contexts – i.e. the specific paradigm and set of habits and beliefs – that characterise the life of each individual thinker. This

²⁹ «La historia, en cuanto disciplina intelectual, es el esfuerzo metódico para hacer de todo otro ser humano un *alter ego*, donde ambos término – el *ego* y el *alter* – han de tomarse en plena eficacia» [OC, VI: 142].

consideration evidently counters any form of metaphysical narration of history, and renders unfeasible the explanation of its development as the manifestation of a *philosophia perennis*, as purported by the official philosophers of the new Spanish academia. In fact, according to Ortega: «No hay, pues, “ideas eternas”. Toda idea está adscrita irremediamente a la situación o circunstancia frente a la cual representa su activo papel y ejerce su función» [OC, IV: 151]. The observation of the social and political material conditions in which he was living offered to Ortega the empirical stimulus to develop a new theoretical framework, aimed to describe the general patterns of the historical evolution of societies, rejecting any form of teleologism.

Moreover, his philosophical meditations was not only based on a social analysis, but did also have some very relevant consequences on the socio-political sphere. In fact, the starting point of Ortega's argument is the conviction according to which what determines the social habits and rules of a society is always a determined set of beliefs shared by its members. In other words, a common and hegemonic philosophical point of view. This would be transmitted over time through an educative process always opened to slow but substantial changes. As a consequence, philosophy does always have a public function, producing two contradictory aims: on the one hand philosophy can be practiced 1) in the interest of the State by organic intellectuals; 2) in the interest of the civil society by independent thinkers. Significantly enough, such problem is posed by Ortega for the first time during these years.

The creation of a new type of intellectual, exemplarily represented in the Spanish academia, had imposed a new philosophical question: i.e. the dialectic between dogmatism and autonomous thinking. As a matter of fact, Ortega's philosophy do change in relation to the social and political circumstances under which he lives. He did not escape from the intrinsic circumstantiality of philosophy that he himself had clearly and recently theorised. This circumstances suggested to Ortega the difference between an authentic and a false way of philosophising. The first would be the one which assumes the historical and transient character of the social institutions and beliefs, and it's able to criticise them when needed in order to propose a new and more adequate comprehension of reality. On the contrary, the second would be characterised by the unquestioned faith in the validity of the *status quo*, by a conservative thinking unalbe to comprehend that no social

construction constitutes an eternal reality, «no es definitivo, sino tan histórico y corruptible como cualquiera de sus hechos hermanos en el pasado» [OC, VI: 171]. The tradition, that is to say the history of philosophy and culture, is not the source of a universal concept of reality, but rather an instance of the evolution of the humanity which has to be comprehended and studied without idealising it:

El tiempo de hoy reclama los tiempos anteriores, y *por eso* una filosofía es la verdadera, no cuando es definitiva – cosa inimaginable – sino cuando lleva en sí, como visceras, las pretéritas y descubre en éstas el “progreso hacia ella misma”. La filosofía es así historia de la filosofía y viceversa [OC, VI: 171].

To summarise, in contrast with the dogmatic philosophy purported by the Spanish academia, Ortega proposed a critical study of the past, which was aimed at questioning the tradition and assuming the factual crisis of beliefs suffered by the Spanish contemporary society.

5. 7 *Ortega on the Roman Empire*

The very close relation between the evolution of Ortega's meditation during the '40s and the cultural and political Spanish context is also testified by the particular attention he started to pay in this period to the question of the nature Roman Empire. A topic to which he devoted a whole book, *Del Imperio Romano* (1941). This theme offered to him the possibility to reflect on the nature of the social power by focusing on a topic extensively treated within the Spanish academia, but of doing it for a totally different perspective, rejecting the intellectual autarchy of the regime and studying this question in relation to the European history³⁰. Also the bibliography he adopts for the studying of this topic radically differs from the one used by the regime. In particular, he largely refers to the works of Rostovtzeff – a russian historian who in 1926 wrote an economic history of the Roman

³⁰ «La historia del Imperio romano es ya le primer estrato de la historia de Europa» [OC, VI: 85].

Empire – and to the classical works of Mommsen on the Roman history, together with a lot of other relevant sources³¹.

Thus, the study of the Roman Empire offered to him the possibility of putting in practice the very historiography he had sketched in his more theoretical writings, with all the sociological and political consequences of the historiographical activity. He did not render the Roman Empire a sort of myth, neither the most pure manifestation of the exercise of a totalitarian or dictatorial power. Paradoxically, the Roman Empire did not even constitute the kernel of his book. Indeed, he traces a clear analogy with his own personal experience. As in the case of Cicero's *De re publica*, also the book of Ortega had been composed «en plena guerra civil» [OC, VI: 87], in the moment in which the social reality was undergoing a paradigmatic cultural and social change. Thus, the main issue presented in this work would not be the Roman Empire, but rather the crisis of the precedent republican regime.

In fact, the Roman Empire would have arisen, according to Ortega, in a moment in which the roman society had lost its faith in the fundamental set of beliefs that grounded the social life during the Republic. In particular, two basic traits that had been regulating the social life during that historical period had lost their strength. The roman society had lost 1) its *harmony* (concordia) and 2) its *liberty* (libertad). The whole meditation of the philosopher is constructed on the study of these two basic concepts. For this reason, the book constitutes a concrete study of a moment of crisis of a society, a moment in which the shared beliefs lost their force and validity. The concept of Empire, idealised by the regime's propaganda, was strongly criticised by the Madrilenian philosopher as the expression of the failure of the State:

El Imperio es el Estado informe, sin límites, sin instituciones. Es la comprensión o imperación muda y sin más. Las instituciones son fórmulas de ornamento, construcción de escatola sobre aquello que es lo único real³².

³¹ In particular, as underlined by Pino Campos, 2001: 286: «Entre los grandes especialistas en la cultura, historia, literatura, filosofía y lengua griegas y latinas cuyas obras leyó podemos citar a Otto Seeck, Thomas Mommsen, Grote, Bopp, M. Bréal, K. Bühler, J. Burckhardt, B. Delbrück, A. Ernout, A. Meillet, Vendryes, Glotz, Howaldt, Hrozny, A. Reyes, Schliemann, A. Schulten, Ed. Meyer, W. Jaeger, Kreschmer, B. Snell, Solmsen, Toynbee, U. Wilamowitz».

³² Note *Roma*, in AOG, NT-11/ 2/ 1/ f9

He provocatively enters in the Spanish intellectual debate on the nature of the Roman Empire by radically changing the general standpoint of the analysis. This case study would reveal, according to him, that no social reality can be produced without the support of a basic condition of harmony among the members of the society. In other words, without a widespread social consensus. This cannot be imposed in a violent way. On the contrary, it has to be built and transmitted through an intellectual activity. An imposed political propaganda cannot produce any positive result in relation to the construction of this social consensus, since it would not take into consideration the vital needs that ground the construction of the very set of beliefs shared by a society. As he put it, the national propaganda was only «el gas del apasionamiento, que proporciona a las almas una ilusión aerostática» [OC, VI: 93]. Thus, in a period in which the public consensus was undergoing a profound and substantive crisis, as in the case of the Roman Empire and also in the the one of the undefined New Spanish State that emerged after the end of the civil war, the society would live in a period of political and cultural confusion, experiencing a pervasive lack of sense, with disruptive political consequences:

Para huir del vacío íntimo y para sentirse apoyado, corre a alistarse bajo cualquiera bandera que pasa por la calle. Con frecuencia es el más frívolo y superficial amor propio quien decide el partido que se toma. Porque, partida la sociedad, no quedan en Ella más que partidos. En estas épocas se pregunta a tolo del mundo si “se de los unos o de los otros”, lo contrario de lo que pasa en las épocas creyentes [OC, VI: 94]

This words also reveal the attitude of the Madrilenian philosopher towards those who, since the very beginning of the civil war, had always tried to call for his alignment in favour or against a specific party (Gracia, 2014: 567). In fact, he rejected the idea that all public figures, and in particular the intellectual, should directly intervene in politics. On the contrary, they should play an indirect but constitutive role in the building of the construction of the basic political ground which would later permit the expression of a regulate and not disruptive dissension³³. Some scholars have pointed out the possibility

³³ In this point the theory of Ortega could be said to purport a defense of the nation as the basic principle of unity of a society. As Llano Alonso [2010: 146] wrote: En el intervalo de tiempo que media entre el estallido de la Guerra civil

of noticing in this valorisation made by the Spanish philosopher of the social harmony a shift towards conservative positions that previously he would have rejected³⁴.

However, *his critique to the construction of the public opinion via political propagandistic means, as in the case of the Spanish academia, reveals the presence of a very important distinction between the position of the Madrilenian philosopher and the ones of the cultural establishment*. And also between his political view and a sort of Conservatism. This can be demonstrated in particular by considering the social role he assigned to the intellectual. The intellectual, according to him, should not educate the population in accordance to the interest of a particular party or in order to maintain the *status quo*. On the contrary, he should always try to build and transmit a knowledge that would be able to answer to the basic needs of the individuals who compose the society.

Thus, by inverting the relation between individuals and community Ortega affirms that the intellectual does neither have to purport the realisation of a political ideal nor fighting for its maintenance, but should rather contribute to the continuing redefinition of the normative ideal of the society in accordance to the historical and vital reason³⁵. In any case, it is certainly true that during this period Ortega did maintain

española y el final de la II Guerra Mundial, forzarán la relectura y posterior reformulación de lo que algunos han denominado – a mi modo de ver de manera impropia – como “nacionología orteguiana”». However, as Aguilar [1998: 138-139] has correctly pointed out: «Pese a las tensiones conceptuales que se advierten al estudiar en Ortega el significado de la nacionalidad, pese a sus derivaciones, acaso no medidas lo suficiente, entre relativistas, organicistas y eventualmente de tinte corporativo, su oposición al nacionalismo[...] no parece que pueda ser puesta de entredicho»

³⁴ Díaz Álvarez, 2013: 268-269: «El “tercer liberalismo de Ortega habría que situarlo, en su enunciación más clara, en la posguerra española, aun cuando se arrastra ya probablemente desde su ruptura con la República y el inicio de la Guerra Civil. Respira decepción y conservadurismo y tiene como trasfondo una visión negativa, a veces claramente hobbesiana, de la naturaleza humana. El ensayo más representativo de esta última etapa quizá sea *Del Imperio Romano* (1940)».

³⁵ Scotton, 2013: 279: «La funzione egemonica dell'intellettuale si traduce, nel lessico orteghiano, nella capacità di costruire ed edificare *ex novo* i presupposti necessari perché si possa esercitare il comando (*mando*), il quale non è concepito dal filosofo spagnolo come mero esercizio del potere, ma si traduce piuttosto nell'effettiva “presión e influjo difusos sobre el cuerpo social”».

an ambiguous position in his writings, with the aim of having the possibility to enter into the cultural debate that was taking place in Spain. For this reason, not only he chose to talk about a very sensitive political theme, but he also winked to the regime in elaborating the new normative ideal of which he was talking about. In fact, in his book on the Roman Empire he coined a new expression, that of “totalitarian liberalism”, which constituted an attempt to operate a synthesis between the new intellectual and political fashion and the core of his personal vision of politics. In other words, he tried to propose his normative plans for the future of his own nation during a transitional period, persuaded that in order to maintain the liberal core of his political and philosophical doctrine it would have been necessary to adapt it to the new forms of government which dominated the European scenario [Villacañas, 2011: 747]. In this way it would have been possible to avoid the main risks of the new international scenario: populism and authoritarianism.

Ortega rejects a classical liberal view according to which the social order would be the result of a spontaneous regulation. Indeed, to him, the human being is essentially anti-social and, for this reason, to live in a society, he has to be forced to respect some norms. As he put it: «el derecho presupone la desesperanza ante lo humano» [OC, VI: 107]. So, a social pressure of the society over the individual – that is the totalitarian character of liberalism – would always be part of the correct relation between individuals and collectivity. The nature of this totalitarianism would consequently depend on the different degree of pressure exercised by the State: «No es, la presión misma que el Estado representa, sino la forma de esa presión, quien decide si nos sentimos libres o no» [OC, VI: 116]. To Ortega, in some historical epochs the political institutions directly flow from the needs of the individuals who live in a given society, determining a total correspondance between the vital interests of the citizens and those of the State. Sometimes, on the contrary, the latter are coercively imposed to the individuals and do oppose, to a relevant extent, to their personal wills. In such circumstances, it would be impossible to conceive any sort of spontaneous order, since the social reality would just be imposed but neither comprehended nor produced by the citizens. The State would therefore be perceived by the individuals not as a “natural skin”, but rather as an orthopedic support, that is to say, an unnatural and painful imposition [OC, VI: 126].

When this is the case, that is when a collectivity has lost its faith in a set of beliefs considered as natural realities, than it is possible to degenerate in a totalitarian regime or, as in the case of the Roman Empire, in an intermediate and transitional condition among liberalism and totalitarianism. This was exactly what, according to Ortega, was happening in Spain.

The transitional solution proposed by Ortega for the case of the New Spanish State is that of building a new politics which radically differed from the totalitarian propaganda of the far-right. In order to do this, it would have been necessary, firstly, to restore the role that the intellectual had lost in the society and, secondly, to avoid to impose to the population a new set of rules without having previously comprehended what was actually needed by the population. Once again Ortega individuates in the intellectuals and in particular in the university system the institution responsible for accomplishing this duty. As Ortega put it:

Enfermedades corporales fueron incurables hasta un buen día en que una técnica ad hoc, nada complicada, permitió dominarlas. ¿Es absolutamente impensable una técnica de la sociedad, una higiene, una medicina, una cirugía de lo colectivo? Pero estas cosas son posibles, serán de cierto, y por lo pronto, conocimiento y no lo contrario: política [OC, VI: 120].

He significantly identified in the Roman Empire an analogous term of comparison which was considered as responsible for mediating between the interests of the individuals and those of the State: that was the plebeian tribune. His analogy is aimed to restore the role of the parliament in the normal function of the political debate and, in particular, in defending the freedom of speech and the “libertad de Prensa” [OC, VI: 132]. In fact, it is essentially in the intellectual freedom and in the freedom of teaching that he individuates the possibility of constructing a sort of synthesis between liberalism and totalitarianism, creating a new form of political power.

In conclusion, during his Argentinian exile Ortega did not observe, as often said, a total silence concerning the political and cultural Spanish agenda. Indeed, on the one hand he tried to present a different and autonomous point of view and, on the other, he tried to do it in a not too controversial way, so to have the possibility of requiring an influential role within the new establishment. Moreover, he moved towards the nationalist circles, by meeting with some members of the

political entourage of the new Argentinian president Ramón Castillo, such as the abovementioned César Pico [Giustiniani, 2007b: 7]. Thus, he did not refuse those interpretations of his thought that could have been useful for the purposes of the regime. His book on the Roman Empire, was indeed published in Spain in 1941 and was perfectly apt to enter into the political and academic debate on the normative ideal that the New State should had to follow. At the same time, the references to the need of a parliamentary monarchy and the vindication of the importance of the freedom of speech as two basic institutional and cultural prerequisite of the new political regime, demonstrates the intention of the philosopher to indicate his normative proposal to the cultural establishment, and in particular to those that still looked with interest at his ideas.

5.8 *Saepe etiam in proeliis fauni auditis. The reception of Ortega in Spain*

Indeed, the books published by Ortega in 1941, in particular *Historia como sistema* and *Del Imperio Romano* did not pass unnoticed in Spain. In particular, within the falangist reviews, which more directly were trying to struggle for the political and cultural hegemony. In particular, this is evident in the case of *El Escorial*, a review founded in 1940 and directed by Pedro Laín Entralgo³⁶. Ortega's books, in fact, would have

³⁶ The manifest of the review is an emblematic instance of the fascist ideology which characterised this publication. The aim of building a restricted minority of intellectual able to exercise an hegemonic control of culture was clearly stated by Pedro Laín Entralgo in the manifest: «Primero: congregar en esta residencia a los pensadores, investigadores, poetas y eruditos de España: a los hombres que trabajan para el espíritu. Segundo: ponerlos – más ampliamente que pudieran hacerlo en publicaciones específicas, académicas y universitarias – en comunicación con su propio pueblo y con los pueblo anchísimos de la España universal y del mundo que queren reparar en nosotros. Tercero: ser un arma más en el propósito unificador y potenciador de la Revolución y empujar en la parte que nos sea dado a la obra cultural española hacia una intención única, larga y trascendente, por el camino de su enraizamiento, de su extensión y de su andadura cohonestada, corporativa y fiel. Y, por último, traer al ámbito nacional – porque en una sola cultura universal creemos – los aires del mund tan escasamente respirados por los pulmones españoles, y respirados sobre todo a través de filtros tan aprovechados, parciales y poco escrupulosos». See

been reviewed respectively by the very Laín Entralgo and by Carlos Alonso del Real, who had recently received his PhD in classic philology. Alonso del Real is particularly famous for having denounced during the civil war to the national police his friend, and disciple of Ortega, Julián Marías. Both Laín and del Real recognised the relevance of Ortega's books in relation to the political context in which they appeared, underlying their relevance for the cultural debate which was taking place in Spain on that topic. As Laín put it: «Se debe destacar la oportunidad española al tema» [Laín, 1941c: 305]. While the national history was being converted in a matter of political propaganda, the importance of comprehending the correct way of interpreting it and refusing «actitudes pseudohistóricas» was the main aim of Laín. However, Laín is far from praising the attitude of the philosopher and his theory of history. In fact, by considering his anthropological foundation of history and the circumstantial character he assigned to the human beings, Laín perceived a great risk for the ideology

Manifiesto Editorial, in «Escorial», 1, 1940, p. 10. There is a very influent scholarship interpretation of this review as an experiment of liberalism in the dictatorial context, largely indebted to the mythical narration done by the very Laín Entralgo, 1987: 287: «Mientras tanto, desde el Ministerio de Educación Nacional y a través del naciente Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas se acometía la empresa de reconstrucción intelectual de España [...] con un criterio directamente opuesto al nuestro: continuó implacable tal “depuración” y deliberada y sistemáticamente se prescindió de los mejores, si estos parecían ser mínimamente sospechosos de liberalismo o republicanismismo, o si por debajo de su nivel había candidatos a un tiempo derechista y ambiciosos». This interpretation has been efficiently countered by Iáñez, 2011, according to whom, [19-20]: «*Escorial* era una “revista de cultura y letras” ascrita a la Prensa del Movimiento, en tanto que apartado ideológico del partido único, Falange Española y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista. Segunda, que los representantes del grupo de *Escorial*, sus cabezas visibles y también las menos visibles, como se irá viendo, pertenecían en distintos grados y con responsabilidades diversas a la estructura de Prensa y Propaganda de Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista (FE-JONS) y del Estado. Tercera, que, en correspondencia con las dos cuestiones anteriormente expuestas, los escorialistas desempeñaron una función orgánica en el seno del Nuevo Estado, en concreto en algunos de los resortes de poder cuyos intentos de control desataron los más encarnizados enfrentamientos entre los diversos sectores del bloque hegemónicos del franquismo. Su historia política es, por tanto, la historia de la lucha por el control [...] de los aparatos ideológicos de la cultura del Nuevo Estado».

purported by the regime. Namely, the replacement of the perennial character of the Christian teleology with an unpredictable order of historical events [Laín, 1941c: 311].

The concept of history presented by Ortega was therefore generally rejected by the members of the new cultural establishment. An exceptional case of a very positive reception of it is offered by the article written in the same review by Antonio Maravall [1942]. In fact, in the books of Ortega he individuated a very useful resource for building a new national ideology. In general, however, *the lack of a metaphysical outlook in the works of the Madrilenian philosopher was conceived as a demonstration of the impossibility of conciliating it with the national-catholic ideology.*

Particularly relevant for the purposes of annihilating any possible use of Ortega's philosophy would be the articles written between 1941 and 1943 by Joaquín Iriarte in the Jesuit review *Razón y Fé*, aimed to completely delegitimize any reference to Ortega [Bolado Ochoa, 2011; Cerezo González Cuevas, 2009: 105-110]. Reviewing the prologue to Bréhier, for instance, Iriarte labelled the history of philosophy proposed by Ortega as anti-catholic [Iriarte, 1943: 108]. His historiography would finally end up in a dangerous relativism, incompatible with a Christian dogmatism. According to the clergyman, the theory of Ortega could have also corrupted the new generations of students, and for this reason should have been very strongly countered to impede its spreading among the university students, since:

Los ánimos juveniles que lo oigan, pues es considerable el ascendente que en ellos ejerce el pensador [...] se van a imaginar que, mientras sigan creyentes, fieles a la fe de los padres, no han de quedar consagrados como filósofos. Y querrán comprar la aspirada aureola a precio de una apostasía, que será triste por lo que deja y triste por lo que da [Iriarte, 1943: 117].

As far as the notion of Empire is considered, as already said, Alonso del Real wrote a review for *El Escorial*. Del Real had been recently appointed to the chair of Primitive History at the UC³⁷. He understood the subversive character of the book written by Ortega³⁸, and also the

³⁷ AA.VV. *Diccionario Biográfico Español Contemporáneo*, Círculo de Amigos de la Historia, Madrid, 1970, I: 9.

³⁸ Alonso del Real, 1941: 314: «Es seguro que si hubiese anunciado una serie de artículos, pongo por caso, “Sobre las instituciones políticas de la República Romana”, habría asustado a gran parte de los posibles lectores»

opportunistic reasons that had brought him to select that particular topic: «es evidente la alta tensión de interés que en el hombre de hoy excita este nombre de múltiples resonancias: *Impero Romano*» [Alonso del Real, 1941: 315]. In his review, Alonso not only manifested his approval towards the critique of the concept of liberalism purported by the philosopher, but he also tried to go a step further, interpreting Ortega's text in the light of the need of the young generations of readers who was looking for a cultural guidance. In other words, Ortega was perceived as a possible reference for this young generation of intellectuals who were trying to establish the bases of the orthodoxy of the regime. However, as far as the normative proposal advanced by Ortega at the end of his book was concerned – that is the necessary institutional change that could have been produced to realise the so-called totalitarian liberalism – Alonso del Real radically differed. In fact: «el problema concreto si bien importante, no es de tal urgencia vital como para lanzar ese esperado ¡por fin!» [Alonso del Real, 1941: 317]. So, even in one of the few reviews that, during the first years of the Franco's regime, was paying attention to the works of Ortega, it is possible to notice a strong critique towards the political consequences of this theoretical framework.

In conclusion, from this analysis it is possible to deduce that not only the self-proclaimed silence of Ortega did not really exist, but also, and foremost, that the new Spanish cultural establishment did not remain silent in respect to what Ortega was writing during those years. The questions which characterised the cultural agenda of the regime also constituted the kernel of Ortega's meditations. He explicitly proved to want to intervene in the new cultural scenario of his country, even from abroad. From this reason, all of his writings always took into consideration the possible audience which could have read them, knowing that his intervention could have been heard only if it had previously adopted the basic context and structure that characterised the new hegemonic intellectual dialogue. In spite of the differences, one thing can be said to associate Ortega to the new Spanish ruling class. That is the constant preoccupation towards the construction and transmission of culture to the future generations, the education of the nation and its citizens, and the awareness of the crucial role played by the University in all the processes of cultural production and communication. However, the purposes of the different actors radically differed.

In fact, in spite of the similarities in the general approach to the same question, the differences do prevail. The analogy could be maintained only at an extremely superficial level. Indeed, both the political and theoretical proposals are evidently incompatible. To extremely summarise: on the one hand the defense of the need of enhancing a critical education and, on the other, the proposal of a dogmatic and orthodox pedagogy. For this reason, the dialogue that, as proven, Ortega was trying to realise at least with the youngest generations within the Franco's establishment could better resemble a melancholy monologue, destined to the political and cultural marginalisation. Indeed, during the first years of the life of the regime, the struggle for the political hegemony within the University and through the cultural reviews did not produce radically divergent opinions. On the contrary, the different perspectives depicted in it always fell within a very limited range. And Ortega could not have played any concrete role in it.

Chapter 6.

What does to be a Humanist mean?

On Juan Luis Vives

In the previous chapter they have been analysed the main traits of the humanistic education propagated within the University of the Franco's regime through the case of the teaching of history and, in particular, the history of the Spanish Empire within the University of Madrid and the CSIC. This analysis has contributed to explain the evolution of three basic humanistic disciplines that gained a significant relevance during that period: 1) national history, 2) philosophy of history and 3) sociology. All together, and through the guidance of theology, these disciplines constituted the totality of the humanistic knowledge organised under the Lullian tree. This chapter will focus on the final product of this new educative model.

In fact, this new set of knowledge was implemented by a new practice of the teaching activity. The concept of what a professor should be radically changed in relation to the mutations in the ways in which the humanities were conceived. This process of definition of a new humanistic ideal will be studied in this chapter by taking into consideration a significant philosophical debate that took place in the Spanish academia at the beginning of the '40s. It is the case of the series of studies dedicated among 1940 and 1942 to the figures of Juan Luis Vives, a member of the new academic pantheon. Indeed, the department of philosophy of the CSIC, which according to the minister Ibáñez Martín was the most important of all, was dedicated to him.

The case of Vives also epitomises the way in which the academic debate developed during this period. It was a debate characterised by a series of very slight differences on single shared topics always treated in a similar way. The academic debate resembled to a political one and, often, under the veil of small differences it was possible to find the seeds of incompatible discrepancies.

In order to reconstruct this debate this chapter will offer (§1) a preliminary definition of the limit of this discussion, by taking into account the antithetical interpretations of the legacy of Vives offered respectively by Puidgollers and Tomás y Samper, who can be said to represent the in-group and out-group of the debate. Then by considering the legitimate position presented within the new cultural establishment, it will be underlined (§2) the importance of Vives in the definition of a new form of humanism and a new professorship which constituted the representation of the orthodoxy of the regime. This largely homogeneous panorama will be compared with the attempts made by Ortega to play a part in it by proposing a different interpretation of the author. An attempt made both (§4) in an indirect way, through the mediation of his friend Gregorio Marañón, and in (§5) a direct way, as proved by the conferences and articles he wrote on Juan Luis Vives, in particular during his Argentinean exile. However, as it will be proved in the last part of this chapter, (§6) the theses sustained by Ortega were substantially incompatible with the new cultural climate and, also due to his continuous attempts of enhancing the debate within the regime, he suffered of a twofold isolation: from his homeland and from the exiled republican intellectuals.

6.1 Juan Luis Vives. A national(ist) icon?

The new University of the regime was grounded on some symbolic references that were gaining an extremely important role in the definition of the hegemonic culture. Among them, the faculty of philosophy had individuated in particular a figure that could have represented the image of the new intellectual of the regime: Juan Luis Vives. Thus in 1940, the fourth centenary of his death, gave to the philosophical community of discourse the possibility of unanimously focusing its hegemonic rhetoric on this particular author. This produced a dialogue in which, as in other cases, different positions struggled one against the other for representing the leading correct interpretation of what a philosopher should have ultimately been. In this way, within a shared norm which defined the in-group and the out-group of the community of discourse, a variety of proposals emerged.

In particular, the basic grounds of the diatribe were set by a book published that very year by Mariano Puigdollers. Since 1938 he had been an outstanding member of the ACNdP, head of the commission *Cultura y Enseñanza* of the New State, professor of law at the University of Valencia and, since 1941, at the University of Madrid. Moreover, since the creation of the CSIC in 1940, Puigdollers had been appointed as a member of the department entitled to Ramon Llull, responsible for the organisation of all the humanistic departments of the research institute³⁹. In other words, he was one of the best representatives of the ideology that the new regime wanted to purport, an authority in the cultural scenario.

In his text Vives becomes the symbol of the social, cultural and political authentic essence of Spain, in fact: «Luis Vives es nombre que llena toda una época, la más sugerente de todas las de la Historia Universal y especialmente de la de España, ya que entonces se labra con afanes de grandeza la *Hispanidad*» [Puigdollers, 1940: 9]. Not only he would represent the history of Spain at its best, but would also constitute the best representative of the essence of the normative ideal that the new theocratic State was realising in the present, since in him it would be possible to identify: «lo que es médula y esencia la más pura de la Hispanidad, lo que en tecnicismo escolástico llamaríamos “forma substancial del ser español”, y es la *catolicidad*» [Ibidem: 10]. Moreover, he would also represent the fundamental traits of the authentic intellectual and teacher, since in his works and in his life he had been able to combine a theoretical meditation with an irreproachable moral behaviour, been «un arquetipo, un ejemplar digno de proponerse a la juventud de todos los tiempos, y ciertamente de los actuales» [Ivi: 12]. He represented both the norm of the perfect intellectual and of the perfect citizen, combining the two main characters that all Spanish individual should possess to be part of the national community: being a good falangist and a good Catholic. This would be possible since his life manifested a moral conduct aimed *ad parandam vitam* and also *ad parandam virtutem*, so combining secular and spiritual lives in a single existence. His Christian philosophy would have produced a philosophy of history extremely akin to the one purported by the regime, whose teleology was strictly related to a theological interpretation of the Spanish destiny.

³⁹ See AGA, 32/ 14064, exp. 708573; AGUCM, P0655, 24; Archivo del *Centro de Estudios Universitarios* AGCEU, 2208.


According to Puigdollers, in Luis Vives it would have been possible to identify an excellent pedagogical theory that could have enlivened the Franco's University system since he combined a rigorous investigation and teaching with the desire of shaping the personality of the young generations according to his Catholic moral principles [Ibidem: 16]. In fact, to Puigdollers, Vives did not accept the Erasmus' heresy, embracing a different concept of the intellectual and humanist as a loyal member of the Roman Catholic Church, in fact a «deseo de un solo redil y un solo pastor gravitaba incesante en el corazón de nuestro humanista», against the “huracán de la herejía” which was spreading during that period all around Europe [Ibidem: 19].

To put it briefly, the Valencian humanist constituted to Puigdollers the perfect epitome of the ideal intellectual and citizen that his association, the ACNdP, was trying to convert in the hegemonic ideal of the new State. In his text, it is possible to notice a continuous translation of Vives' teachings to the contemporary political scene. Thus, his refusal of the protestant heresies represented the rejection of the educative and social policies realised in Spain by the Republican government and, on the other hand, the individuation in the figure of a single leader which combined secular and spiritual power, i. e. the *Caudillo – redil y pastor* – the expression of the authentic nature of the Spanish humanism. The actualisation of the early modern humanist is explicitly proposed by Puigdollers in particular in relation to his educative proposal as delineated in the treaty *De Discipulis* (1531). In this book according to Puigdollers, it would have been possible to find «los gérmenes de los modernos Consejos Superiores de Educación y de Cultura» [Ibidem, 218], of the recently born CSIC and its department of philosophy. By adapting the words of Vives to the concrete cultural and political scenario in which he lived – according to Puigdollers Vives would have been a «partidario de un *Estado fuerte*» [Ibidem: 214] – the member of the CSIC traced the normative characters that the new University should have followed to restore the early modern grandeur of the Spanish humanism. In particular, this should have to realise a new encyclopedic knowledge oriented by Christian values and a total subjugation to the authorities of the State and the Church, being theology the basis of the new culture and politics that the regime

should have purported⁴⁰. In its general traits, this interpretation purported by Puigdollers constituted the norm which would have later defined the in-group of the community of discourse which contributed to the development of the discussion on Vives and, consequently, of the normative ideal that the new State should have realised following this example.

A completely different perspective, that could be said to represent the out-group of this debate, is the one presented during the same year by the pedagogue Rodolfo Tomás y Samper, an exiled republican intellectual, educated in the same liberal university of Ortega y Gasset and, during the '20s, one of the most outstanding representatives of the movement *Escuela Nueva* in Spain [Carpintero, 2014]. In 1924 he founded the *Instituto Samper*, and during the civil war he lost his chair. Once returned in Spain in 1940, he founded the *Unión de Intelectuales Libres* in Madrid, with the attempt to propagate his liberal pedagogical ideas. His attempt constituted an evident failure and soon after the publication of his book on Vives he was imprisoned for three years, until 1943 [Moratinos, 1988]. So, as Puigdollers can be considered as one of the best representatives of the new national-catholic pedagogical ideology, the same can be said of Tomás y Samper in relation to the old republican one.

⁴⁰ As some years later, in the official review of the CSIC, *Arbor*, the Catholic intellectual Raimundo Paniker would have synthesise [Paniker, 1944: 21], this should have been the general organisation of the new national culture, sustained by the transmission, first of a moral teaching:



His book on Vives is a very short pamphlet thought to be used by the primary teachers in their classes when preparing their lessons for celebrating the centenary of the death of the Spanish humanist [Tomás y Samper, 1940]. The aim of this book is that of offering to the teachers an alternative reading of Vives which could have opposed the hegemonic one so efficiently propagated by the regime. An attempt of intellectual resistance to the political power and an exercise of freedom of speech. In fact, the legacy of Vives to pedagogy, according to Tomás y Samper, cannot be individuated in any patriotic and political aim. His pedagogical innovation, indeed, should have been found in the methodologies he adopted, for instance in the mnemonic techniques he elaborated. In addition, his importance would lay on the central role he gave to students as the pillars of the educative process, leaving the teachers in a secondary ground. The ethics of his teaching and his life, vehemently praised by Puigdollers, would not possess any religious traits according to Tomás and, moreover, could not be conceived as a defense of the Catholic orthodoxy. In addition, his pedagogy was strictly linked to the elaboration of a new European culture of which Spain was a part, and not the centre, during the early modern period.

Thus, the only possible continuity of Vives in relation to the Spanish present could have been individuated in the affinity between his pedagogical ideas and the ones represented by the *Escuela Nueva*, which constituted the bases of the Spanish liberal educative proposal during the '20s and the '30s. In fact:

Vives representa algo más que el entronque del mundo medioeval con el mundo moderno y su labor cultural: inaugura un nuevo período. [...] Es que comprendió el valor del método experimental en la ciencia, de donde resultó su defensa del principio de intuición en la enseñanza [Tomás y Samper, 1940: 23-24].

The attempt of Tomás y Samper is that of using Vives to rehabilitate the educative tradition of the ILE, of his pedagogical methods and political outlook, and of doing this through the reference to an intellectual figure largely present in the rhetorical debate of his time. His position was evidently marginalised by the regime, condemned to the silence. In fact, for the normative ideal of the New State, the intellectual and the education he purported, Tomás y Samper was sentenced to jail in 1940. The new political and cultural climate did not permit any sort of direct and decisive opposition to the hegemonic

thought, in particular in the name of republican and liberal values. And the control of the education was perceived as indispensable for exercising an effective political power.

6.2 *The patriotic philosopher*

Thus, Vives became the symbol of the authentic and orthodox philosopher of the new State. This is evidently clear by analysing the long series of books and scientific articles that the Spanish academia produced between 1940 and 1942. Among them it is possible to identify four basic complementary ways of praising his legacy: 1) as a political thinker; 2) as a pedagogue; 3) as a Catholic model; 3) as a nationalist.

The first aspect was promoted for instance by the Franciscan Juan Bautista Gomis, founder of the review *Verdad y Vida*. In his book [Gomis, 1941], starting from the premises of Puigdollers, he underlines the importance of Vives in relation to the definition of the concept of *Hispanidad*⁴¹. In particular, what according to Gomis deserved to be particularly mentioned was the importance of the early modern humanist in defining the character of the new political normativeness. As he put it:

Felicísimo, en efecto, será el Pueblo español, si aprovecha la coyuntura presente y providencial, para seguir los cauces abiertos por Luis Vives en el campo de la ciencia política, que conducen las aguas sociales al mar de la felicidad; felicísimo, si se deja moldear en el troquel ideológico de su hijo preclaro [Ibidem: 20].

The first instance of Vives' importance in relation to the definition of the national ideology would be provided by his anti-communist and anti-socialist outlook. In fact, with a clear and ridiculous anachronism, Gomis affirms that the communists were «conocidos y flagelados en su libro *De communione Rerum*» [Ibidem: 21]. For this reason, the duty of the new State in relation to this eminent figure of its great past would have consisted in continuing the struggle against the communist

⁴¹ In the works of Vives, in fact: «están reconcentradas todas las esencias generosas de la Hispanidad, que cada español debe asimilarse, entranandose las y, sobre todo, debe aduenarse de ellas, fecundandose el Estado, la Nación y la Patria» [Gomis, 1941: 2].

intellectuals of the republican period. Consequently, the valorisation of the Catholic nature of Vives' teachings was aimed at building a new political force: «El destino de la España Nueva debe ser instituir y ejectuar el testamento ideológico de Luis Vives que devolvería a Espana el Principado del Mundo que tuvo en otros siglos» [Ibidem: 26].

A similar valorisation of the political legacy of the Renaissance intellectual is provided by the professor of law of the University of Valencia, Salamanca and Madrid, Wenceslao Gonzalez Oliveros, an outstanding member of the FE [Miguel-Motta, 2012: 473-475], who also led the national courts that established the intellectual purges within the university, obtaining prestigious awards such as the *Gran Cruz de Alfonso X*⁴². Significantly enough, his book on Vives, firstly written in 1937 and then re-edited in 1940, should have been just a translation and scientific comment of Vives' *De Communiore Rerum*. However, not only the translation does occupy exclusively one tenth of the total manuscript, but it is also characterised by an extremely partisan discussion of his work. The reading of Vives is almost grotesque in its ideological use. As the very subtitle stated, the book of Vives would have constituted the first anti-communist monograph written by a Spanish thinker [González Oliveros, 1937: 3], «en cuya vasta y genial producción se halla contenido – en germen, flor o fruto – todo lo que la Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las J.O.N.S. ansía y algo más» [Ibidem: 8].

The anticommunism of Vives could be legitimately deduced, according to Oliveros, by his opposition to More's *Utopia*, interpreted as the source of the communist thought. The early modern opposition of a Spanish thinker to the heresy of communism was consequently conceived as the prove of a sort of predestination of the Spanish intellectuals, who would had been elected as the guardians of the political Catholic orthodoxy against any form of communist and laical thinking. As Oliveros wrote, Vives would represent the: «¡Vocación singular de nuestra Patria, siempre en la vanguardia histórica de las letras y las armas para detener – en los umbrales mismos de la tierra y el espíritu cristiano occidental – el temeroso ataque de la Bestia!» [Ibidem: 10]. Moreover, Vives would have been the representer of a new form of humanism in opposition to a degenerated *hominismo*. The latter would represent the political and cultural ideology purported by

⁴² See AGA 21/ 20356.

the communists, which consisted in abandoning all transcendent visions of human destiny, eliminating any reference to the spiritual nature of human beings⁴³.

A complementary interpretation of the teachings of Vives was the one traced by the Franciscan Rafael Alventosa Garcia. In his book on the nature of the New Francoist University [1940] it is possible to identify the valorisation of the pedagogical relevance of the humanist thinker. In particular, he adopts the educative model of Vives to argue in favour of the need of transmitting a Christian education to the future generations, what he called *sabiduría crisitiana*. Moreover, he thinks that this should have been done through a paternalistic educative methodology. In fact, the professor should have been conceived, according to Alventosa, as an indispensable guide and censor able to individuate and eliminate from the cultural scenario in which a young student is educated, all those theories which could have been in contrast with the established orthodoxy. He thus justifies the practice of censorship since:

Para el joven, en edad universitaria, difícil tarea sería la labor de juzgar con acierto lo bueno y lo malo de cada libro, y así que Vives para ellos ofrece una más segura norma, la del maestro. Desea que le preceda en el camino persona instruída e íntegra en quien se confie como en caudillo que lo aleje de los peligros, ya sin darle noticia de ellos, ya diciendo claramente, a quienes así convenga, cuál es el mal que se halla oculto, permitiendo a cada cual sólo aquello que le sea ventajoso, teniendo bien conocida la capacidad de cada uno de los que van bajo su dirección [Alventosa, 1940: 47].

A more secular perspective in relation to the educative process, which put the religious character of Vives on the background of the political discourse, is offered by some articles published in the review *Escorial*, in particular by the professor of law of the University of

⁴³ Ibidem, 178: «Porqué el comunismo soviético es inconciliable con el humanismo; pero, en cambio, puede compadecerse bien con el hominismo. Ese hominismo en virtud del cual ciertos católicos marxistoides hubieran preferido que el Caudillo Franco, en vez de alzarse en nombre del Espíritu contra la Bestia marxista, se hubiera conformado con buscar un arreglito con ella, una vez aguantado su primer desfogue, con el fin de evitar las molestias y daños de una larga y dura y gloriosa guerra de Independencia y Salvación de España y del Orbe civilizado».

Granada, José Corts Grau, a personal friend of Laín Entralgo⁴⁴. In his article he argues in favour of the importance of Vives' pedagogy in relation to the new University of the regime. In fact, he praises the rigorous ethics of Vives both as a scholar, a professor and a student. This, more than his religiosity which however does still constitute the basic ground of Grau's reflection, would be the most relevant basis of the theorisation of Vives, and would constitute a guidance for the national future:

El conocimiento oriéntase de suyo a una finalidad: ayudar al hombre a ver más claramente sus fines y, por consiguiente, a ser mejor y más feliz. De aquí el nervio ético de la filosofía vivista, que trasciende a toda su concepción del Derecho, de la organización social, de la política y de las relaciones internacionales [Corts Grau, 1940: 60].

At the same time, Vives is used by Grau for defining the new political paradigm of the regime: that is its authoritarianism conceived as its fundamental ground, rejecting any form of authentic liberalism. In fact, according to Grau: «La verdadera y suma libertad es someterse a la autoridad legítima y acudir presto y de grado al llamamiento de las leyes y de los gobernantes» [Ibidem: 65]. In brief, according to Grau and the editorial line of the *Escorial*, Vives represented the epitome of the intellectual, the teacher and, also the student, characterised by an extraordinary ability to focus on relevant problems and of doing it with an extremely rigorous moral discipline. The same discipline which characterised his total obedience to the political power, ultimately an authentic nationalist.

Among the falangist intellectuals, in fact, it is possible to notice a more evident propensity to praise the nationalist legacy of the intellectual activity of Juan Luis Vives. This is, for instance, the case of the Professor of law of the University of Salamanca, Juan Beneyto Pérez. According to him, Vives was the symbol of the patriotic intellectual entirely devoted to the defense of his nation⁴⁵. As a consequence, he adopts this intellectual attitude in his interpretation

⁴⁴ Indeed, after the his initial purge from the University, it will be Laín, head of the national propaganda during that period, to testify in favour of the loyalty of Corts Grau to the regime. See AGA 21/ 20503; Archivo Central de Educación (ACE -Alcalá de Henares), 93968-048; ACE 92640-41.

⁴⁵ [Beneyto Pérez, 1941: 9]: «El intelectual que se ensambla en el destino de su Patria».

and actualisation of Vives' legacy, in particular in relation to the international politics of the regime. In fact, the example of the Valencian intellectual is used by Beneyto to underline the important role the philosopher, as counselor of the politicians, had to play in favouring a condition of peace in Europe in a period characterised by continuous conflicts. In particular, he describes the European context in which different nations were fighting against one another while Charles V was observing a neutral position in defense of peace. In this way, Beneyto proposes a clear analogy with the case of Spain under the government of Franco and the neutrality observed by the country. As he wrote: «Carlos es Caudillo de la paz cristiana [...] y pide en la forma más emocionada y de más eterno sentido la conciliación de Europa frente al Asia, la unidad de los cristianos contra los infieles» [Beneyto, 1941: 14].

The defense of the Catholic character of Spain in the name of Vives was therefore instrumentally adopted to defend the international politics of the regime. The same strategy was also used by the very Caudillo, who defended his authoritative policies as a religious mission aimed to guarantee a condition of peace inside the Spanish borders and to fight communism at the international level [Olivie, 2006]. Vives, for Beneyto, would represent the source of legitimation of the international politics of the regime.

Thus, since 1940, Vives had been instrumentally used by the cultural establishment of the regime with the purpose of tracing the basic traits of the new patriotic intellectual who acted in the interests of the nation. Moreover, through his example, they would have been also set the cultural guidelines of the humanistic education purported by the New State. Vives was constantly used to speak about university and pedagogy, and he was also an object of study within the university, in particular in the faculties of philosophy and law. The importance of Vives in forging this new culture was given by the encyclopedic nature of his general teaching, that comprehended all the humanistic disciplines, as underlined by the dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Murcia, Battle Vázquez, in his monographic course on the Valencian humanist [Battle Vázquez, 1942:11-14]. A universal thinker thanks to the vastity of his knowledge, and an authentic Spanish and Catholic intellectual for the scope and purpose of his investigations and teachings. As example for the New State and the new intellectual community.

6.3 *The faint criticisms of Gregorio Marañón*

This majoritarian interpretation of the legacy of Juan Luis Vives within the academic and intellectual world implied the concept according to which the intellectual should always serve the interests of his nation, being a patriotic citizen who would never oppose to the political and cultural status quo of his country. A moderate criticism to this widespread view of the intellectual as subjugated to the political power is presented by one of Ortega's friend, the doctor Gregorio Marañón, who in 1942 gave his contribution to the intellectual debate over Vives. Marañón, after a brief exile during the civil war, in 1942 had returned in Spain, where he continued to publish books, articles and exercise his profession. In spite of his liberal past, he was substantially tolerated by the regime thanks to his public endorsement to the national front he did in winter 1937, in the middle of the civil war [Lopez Vega, 2008].

Interestingly enough, Marañón ironically used Vives as a sort of masque to talk about his personal condition and that of his friend Ortega. In fact, in Vives he identifies the person who lives in a condition of exile, experiencing the existential difficulties related to the possibilities of coming back to his homeland and the worries of not being able to play an influential role in his own country. In fact, the fundamental premise of Marañón's essay can be individuated in the very definition of the intellectual he offers. In fact, to Marañón, being an intellectual implies being an influential person within the cultural debate of a country: «un intelectual es una parte de la conciencia de su Patria durante los años de su vida mortal» [Marañón, 1942: 119]. Now, the problem evidently emerges when an intellectual voluntarily decides to abandon his homeland – as in the case of Vives – not being totally in accordance or in strong opposition with the culture purported in it. According to Marañón, here it lies an evident problem, namely that of combining the largely praised patriotism of Vives with his decision to leave his country and exercise his intellectual influence within a larger context, i.e. the European one.

Marañón's approach to the study of the legacy of Juan Luis Vives was therefore evidently in contradiction with the apologetic literature of the academic world, since the patriotic duty of the intellectual, according to him, should not consist in a *a priori* defense of his country, but rather in the «crítica de la patria» [Ibidem, 121]. In fact, such honest

critique is considered by Marañón as «la consideración imparcial o apasionada de la vida de su país, y en ella caben tanto los juicios favorables como los adversos. Ahora bien, esta crítica es más que otra cosa un deber auténtico del intelectual» [Ibidem, 122]. The authentic intellectual does not have to be subjugated to the contingent political power since his historical mission does not have to respond to partisan interests⁴⁶.

In his text Marañón affirms that the intellectual should not merely be the propagator of the beliefs and norms imposed by the society. On the contrary, he should react against these norms, and in particular against those he does not consider as adequate, being an independent and free thinker. Accordingly, Marañón does not share the idea purported by the regime according to which every criticism would correspond to an anti-Spanish attitude and should therefore be strongly countered as heterodox and dangerous. This, in fact, was the case of the regime's propaganda against the so-called generation of 1898 [Abellán, 1996: 519-524]. On the contrary, to Marañón, an honest critique should always be considered as a sign of respect towards the object criticised, and in the case of the political critique of the intellectual, it should have been regarded as a valid suggestion made in the interests of the nation. In fact, this intellectual activity could serve to better comprehend the problems that a nation was experiencing, facing and trying to solve them. The critical education, and the promotion of it done by the intellectual, would be the most effective instrument for promoting the amelioration of the society, not by adopting an acritical attitude towards the political situation. Significantly enough, the description of the role of the intellectual as exercised by Vives evidently resembled to the one that also Ortega was proposing during the same years. The analogy between Vives and Ortega also related to the concrete biographical conditions of the two authors.

In fact, describing the exile of Vives Marañón wrote that: «Vives suspiraba pensando en España. En una carta a Vergara, su amigo, que algún tiempo después la Inquisición había que procesar, le decía que todos los defectos de los españoles se remediarían a fuerza de leer» [Marañón, 1942: 132-133]. Both the reference to the utility of education as a means of political and social development and the reference to Vives' letter to Vergara and his Spanish nostalgia constituted veiled

⁴⁶ Marañón, 1942: 124: «Su misión está por encima de las consideraciones más sagradas, como son las que impone la Santa pasión nacional».

references to Ortega's case. In fact, just some months earlier, at the beginning of 1942, Ortega had written to Marañón to inform him that he was thinking about the possibility of returning in Europe, in Portugal, after a long Argentinian exile. Ortega motivated his decision on the basis of his nostalgia for his friends and for the life in Spain. As Ortega wrote to Marañón:

Desde la entrada de la guerra de este continente pierdo, al menos en unos meses, todo sentido mi vida aquí, la adquiere en cambio buscar contacto con los míos y, en general, con ese continente que, a pesar de todo, sigue siendo el único que posee algun contenido⁴⁷.

In Marañón's interpretation, Vives constitutes the epitome of the intellectual duty of not obeying to the imposed norms of the society, but rather of criticising them and defend the importance of a critical education for the social development of the nation. So, the Renaissance intellectual mirrors the biographical experience of the very Marañón and Ortega, manifesting his preoccupation towards the reception that could have attended Ortega once returned in Madrid. In fact, an hostile cultural establishment would have to decide if and to what extent to reintegrate both Marañón and Ortega in the new intellectual climate in which very few, if any, liberty of speech was conceded⁴⁸.

6.4 An active spectator: Ortega in Argentina

Dedico todo 1940 a dar la batalla a la vida intelectual insubordinada y hostil a España desde aquí⁴⁹.

Far from his homeland, politically and culturally marginalised, Ortega, since 1939, was living in Argentina. There he did not interrupt his intellectual activity and, even if he was not in charge of any official post, he continued publishing articles, giving conferences, seminars

⁴⁷ Letter by Ortega to Marañón, Buenos Aires, 13-01-1942. In AOG, CD-M/ 42.

⁴⁸ As Ferrary [1993: 150]: has written, under Franco's regime «al intelectual se le iba a permitir desarrollar una actividad creadora, siempre que no llevase al fomento de actitudes críticas que entrasen en conflicto con los principios oficiales del régimen. Paralelamente, se le negaba toda posibilidad de influjo social al margen de los cauces oficiales de control de la opinión existente».

⁴⁹ In AOG, PB-297/ 27.

and lessons. He also participated to a radio show. At the same time, he was frequently invited also in other Latin American country. From the Venezuelan minister of Education he also received a formal offer of a chair at the national University⁵⁰. At the beginning of his stay the information he received about the Spanish cultural and political situation were extremely fragmented. What, on the contrary, he clearly perceived, was the great suspicion that the international community manifested towards Spanish neutrality during the war. A suspicion he attributed to far-left political positions. Thus, in a letter to his friend Azcárate, Ortega, in spite of the scarce information he possessed, did demonstrate to understand the difficulties that the new State was experiencing to establish a precise ideology and, therefore, to consolidate his political power:

De España no sabemos aquí nada [...] Todas mis noticias se reducen a lo que me ha dicho hace poco José Fernando en una única carta que me ha escrito en estos meses [...] en estos últimos seis meses, es decir desde que comienza la vida-después-de-la-guerra se expresan [mis amigos] con infinitamente más cautela. [...] Pasa, después de todo, lo que tiene que pasar, a saber, que pasará bastante en estabilizarse suficientemente la vida, en reconstruirse la unidad efectiva del mando, el poder normal del Estado.

The confusion and instability experienced by the Spanish politics implied evident consequences in relation to the cultural production of which Ortega was aware. In this state of confusion he thought it would have been possible to elaborate new political and philosophical doctrines which could have provided the basic guidelines of the future State. Similarly to his precedent intellectual and biographical experience, he was persuaded that he could have played the role of the intellectual advisor to the political power, and so he did not discard the possibility of being part of the new intellectual establishment of the Franco's State. In this context he was particularly sensitive in relation to the intellectual niche of freedom that the regime could have guaranteed to its thinkers. In fact, as he wrote to Azcárate, he was looking with interest at the project of publishing a new cultural review that appeared to be formed by some of his friends⁵¹. Since the spring 1940, Ortega

⁵⁰ Letter by Azcárate to Ortega, Caracas, 15-III-1940, in AOG, C-55/ bis-6c.

⁵¹ «Se va a publicar una revista de tono elevado de que será director Sánchez Mazas, subdirector Marichalar y secretario Maravall». Letter by Ortega to

started to receive more and more information about the cultural situation of his country, in particular thanks to the intermediation of Fernando Vela. He, for instance, informs Ortega that: «algunos escritores, entre ellos García Gomez y Gerardo Diego, han constituido una Academia llamada “Musa, musae” y proyectan una revista que se titulará “Los españoles” que dirigirá Sánchez Mazas»⁵².

Not only he frequently started to receive up to date information about the Spanish cultural scenario, but he was also involved, or at least invited to take part, in the development of one of this cultural project. In fact, in November 1940 Antonio Maravall wrote to Orega a very enthusiastic letter invited him to write and publish with urgency a sociological treaty which could later have been used to orient the construction of the new State. Such book, that Ortea had already announced some years before but finally did not realise, could have set, according to Maravall, the editorial bases for the review – i.e. *Escorial* – to which he was collaborating and, hopefully, for the ideology of the regime that the review aimed to forge⁵³. The interest of Ortega towards the new Spanish cultural scenario was therefore, at least at a minimum extent, mutual.

Ortega's interest towards his nation was motivated by the hope and desire by taking part again to it as a possible intellectual and to continue to guide the political debate from within. This invited him to partially change the topics of his philosophical meditations, orienting them towards the new intellectual trends, without renouncing to express his critical points of view. Significantly, in the light of the recent changes in the political scenario, in September 1940 he wrote to Azcárate that the topics of which he wanted to talk about were in particular: «sociedad, uso, costumbre, opinión pública, vigencia colectiva, derecho, Estado, Nación»⁵⁴. To put it briefly, Ortega clearly perceived the new direction that the Spanish culture was assuming after the end of the civil war and the victory of the National Front, and even if he was demonstrating his scepticism about the new political regime, he did not discard the possibility of taking part in it through an intellectual activity.

Azcárate, Buenos Aires, 20-III-1940, in AOG, CD-A/ 67. This was the project of the *Escorial*.

⁵² Letter by Vela to Ortega, Tanger, 4-IV-1940. In AOG, C-50/ 14

⁵³ Letter by Maravall to Ortega, Madrid, 12-XI-1940, in AOG, C-67/ 9.

⁵⁴ Letter by Ortega to Azcárate, Buenos Aires, 29-IX-1940. In AOG, CD-A/ 69.

He manifests this intention not only in his private letters, but also in his public writings, even if in a more indirect way. This is the case of the *Prólogo a un diccionario enciclopédico abreviado* he wrote by the end of 1939 in Argentina, who should act as an introduction to a new editorial project he was realising through the editorial Espasa Calpe [OC, V: 631-639]. In this text he critically referred to the French encyclopedists defining them as false intellectuals since their main preoccupation lay on the propagation of culture rather than on its creation, of rendering it popular rather than profound. The critique of Ortega is directed against the type of the organic intellectual of the regime and its superficial attitude which converts everything in mere propaganda. However, at the same time, his critique does follow the general trend within the new academia of criticising the Enlightenment period – in the case of the regime ideology because of its individualist scepticism. This formal and not substantial wink to the widespread ideology was therefore done in order to move a more direct and violent attack against it. Namely, to criticise the dogmatic ideology of the regime and the progressive replacement of the intellectual freedom for a politically imposed thinking. In fact, against the frenetic rhythm of the political struggle he vindicates the importance for the intellectual to reflect with calm and ease:

El pensamiento creador tiene su *tempo*, que no es posible acelerar. Pero la propaganda, la pedagogía, la “ilustración”, son faenas mecánicas que invitan a ser realizadas lo más pronto posible. De aquí la prisa de Diderot, el aire de *Fa presto* que toma su labor y la de sus colaboradores – un poco fullera, como todo lo apresurado. Además, ¿porqué no decirlo aquí de paso? Como la transformación del hombre y la sociedad prevista por los “filósofos” traía consigo el predominio del intelectual, estos intelectuales tenían prisa por llegar al poder. Este apetido de mando de los intelectuales dieciochescos ha sido el gran pecado y la gran deserción en la historia de la intelectualidad [OC, V: 636].

Ortega does manifest his strong criticism against the increasing identification of the intellectual with the politician, an identification he had always openly criticised. For this reason, he decided to maintain his political neutrality, at least from a public point of view. His only interest was that of having the opportunity to exercise an intellectual influence among the élite and the civil society. Thus, instead of focusing on political questions, with the help of his sons Miguel and José, he was trying to organise the re-opening of the publication of the

Revista de Occidente in Madrid. His public neutrality and, at the same time, his proximity to Spain, was proved also by his decision to move to the formally neutral Argentina [Rapoport, 1988].

However, the relevant presence of Spanish exiles in Argentina was contributing to reproduce in another different context, the same contrapositions between Republicans and Nationalists which had poisoned the Spanish scenario [Spektorowski, 2003; Goldar, 1996], even if the endorsement and support to the Axis was evidently inferior in comparison to the Spanish case. In fact, in September 1940 Franco had met Hitler to discuss the eventual entry of Spain in the War, a possibility that ultimately failed due to the excessive conditions imposed by the Führer for the Spanish participation to the conflict [Carotenuto, 2005]. Ortega, significantly enough, did always maintained a very ambiguous political position, nearing to the right-far Argentinean movement, and criticising the exiled republican intellectuals [Campomar, 2016].

In any case, at the very least, the geographical distance of Argentina from the European context permitted to the philosopher to enjoy that minimum degree of tranquillity and ease that he considered indispensable for practicing all intellectual activities. In fact, since the summer 1940, with the successes of the Axis, on the international point of view, and the removal of Sanchez Masas from governmental charges – considered by Ortega a man that, even if at a minimum level «representaba la defensa de lo intelectual»⁵⁵ – he perceived the substantial impossibility to play an active role in the Spanish scenario.

6.5 *Vives, or el matarife*

The debate over Juan Luis Vives that took place in Spain in occasion of the fourt centenary from his death, gave to Ortega the possibility of entering in the intellectual debate of his country. In fact, the Spanish Cultural Institute of Buenos Aires invited him to give a conference on the topic on November 12, 1940⁵⁶. In spite of talking to an audience composed by distinguished members of the Spanish political establishment, Ortega offered an interpretation of Vives radically in

⁵⁵ Letter by Ortega to Luzuriaga, in AOG, 25-VIII-1940.

⁵⁶ *La Institución Cultural Española celebra a Vives y a Saavedra Fajardo*, in *La Nación*, 13-XI-1940, in AOG, PB-232/ 29.

contrast to the one which was being spread by the official culture. In fact, even if also for the Madrilenian philosopher Vives constituted an exemplary figure which permits to comprehend the role and end of the intellectual activity within society, he considered his legacy important for very different reasons. Indeed his relevance was due, to Ortega, not to the traditional values he would have impersonated, but rather to the critical way in which he faced the most relevant problems of his time. The analysis of his conference in Buenos Aires permits to point out three main argumentative directions that Ortega followed to orient his critique towards the official culture purported by the regime: 1) anthropological; 2) historical; 3) educative.

In fact, Vives is considered by Ortega as an exemplary figure first of all insofar as he always tried to give a sense – secular and not religious – to the existential drama that characterises the life of every human being. In fact, he had to face, along his whole life, the difficulties related to the need of conforming his personal vocation to the adverse social circumstances. In this way he would have demonstrate to what extent: «La vida consiste en un combate fiero – por muy pacífico de gestos que a veces parezca – entre ese yo que es un perfil de aspiraciones y de anhelos, de proyectos, y el mundo, sobre todo el mundo social en derredor» [OC, IX: 445-446].

In virtue of this existential character of his intellectual experience, he would perfectly represent the condition of all human beings, whose biographies are substantially forged by the historical and cultural circumstances in which they live, in particular in epochs of crisis. To Ortega, Vives lived in one of those critical periods in which traditional values are put into questions and it is necessary to build a new set of beliefs and habits for orienting the life of the single individuals and the society. In this trait of Vives' experience Ortega individuates the most significant aspect of his modernity. In fact:

Por fortuna o por desgracia hablo delante de hombres que, como yo, han asistido a un cambio tan súbito y tan radical de la figura en que la vida colectiva, el sistema de los usos intelectuales, morales, económicos, políticos y estéticos consiste, que no será necesario encarecerles hasta qué punto la historia es eso: cambio [OC, IX: 447].

With these words Ortega does not refer in particular to the political changes of the Franco's regime, but rather to the so-called scientific crisis, later propagated to the domain of the cultural values, that

affected the whole European continent during the first decades of the XX century. However, there are several aspects of this conference that directly link Ortega's discourse with the concurrent intellectual debate that was taking place in Spain.

Indeed, the times in which Vives had to live were characterised both by a cultural and a political change. For this reason, his Catholicism, that the Francoist establishment was unceasingly praising, was in fact a doubtful credence which was radically different from the mediaeval Catholicism that the regime was depicting as the source of his cultural and historical legitimacy. As Ortega ironically put it, criticising the disappointing level of the Spanish academic cultural debate: «En el café o en el diario – scrive Ortega – se presumirá haber dicho algo estricto cuando se ha dicho de alguien que es cristiano, pero en verdad, no se ha hecho más que usar una palabra equívoca que significa innumerables cosas» [OC, IX: 453]. Ortega questions the nature of Vives' faith, and also affirms that the very essence of a religion is not fixed and determined once and for all, being on the contrary always shaped by the political and cultural changes produced in a given time. No concept possesses a timeless nature, and at the same time no social practice has a life independently from its historical moment.

As far as the religion of Vives was concerned, the heterodoxy of Ortega's position is also testified by his affirmation according to which the Valencian humanist was a follower of Erasmus, a synonym, in the educative teaching of the Franco's cultural hegemony, of a non-aligned intellectual and free thinker who interprets the religious dogma in an heterogeneous and wrong way [Castillejo Cambra, 2014: 556-557]. This cultural reference did have a clear political consequence. In fact, the dogma of the new regime was individuated in the words of the *Caudillo* and the religious institutions. The possibility of accepting different interpretations of his wishes – similarly to the way in which Erasmus offered a different interpretation of the Bible – would have determined a loss of the authentic meaning of the words of the general and of the teaching of the Spanish Church.

Moreover, to Ortega, not only the theoretical beliefs but also the religion practiced by Vives, his *devotio moderna*, would testify the different sensibility characterising the Spanish humanist in relation to the previous mediaeval paradigm. In fact, whereas the former assigned positive values to the human life exclusively insofar as it was orienting towards a spiritual end, the Renaissance sensibility, in which

Vives lived, completely overturned this hierarchy. This overturn would later be converted in a doctrine aimed to conquer the political power through a *militia Christi* – a clear allusion to the Jesuit hegemony in the new Spanish State through the Opus Dei. On the contrary, the Valencian humanist, whose sensibility was antithetical to the one later purported by the Jesuits, offered a completely different perspective. A valorisation of the *cultura animi*, that is to say the refusal of a political struggle and the withdrawal into the study of humanities aimed to cultivate his spirit not for a life afterlife, but rather for his current mundane existence [OC, IX: 460-465].

As a consequence, also as far as the educative project of Vives is concerned, he would not have shared the pedagogical framework of the Jesuits. His ideal of education included the need of studying «*sine querella*» [OC, IX: 467], distancing himself from the frenetic political diatribes. The loss of a social and cultural consensus and the contrasting opinions should not impose to the intellectuals and the students a partisan attitude. On the contrary, as Vives proved, the mission of the intellectual should always be that of reflecting with ease and tranquillity on the new historical circumstances in which he lives to try to offer an overall interpretation of them and, consequently, proposing possible solutions to the scientific and social crisis of values. In the case of the Renaissance thinker: «Una nueva e intacta tarea ve antes sí: ciencia vigorosa y empírica, técnicas sociales – política, educación, organización del pauperismo –; en suma, un estudio positivo de lo humano – individual y colectivo –, una antropología» [OC, IX: 470]. A mission that, needless to say, had a lot in common with the one that the very Ortega was trying to realise during those years.

After this conference Ortega continued to use Vives for talking about the role of the intellectual more than in the Renaissance past, in his current times. He did so in a series of articles he published for the Argentinean newspaper *La Nación*. In these texts he radicalised the link between intellectual theories and cultural and historical circumstances in which he lived, also underlining the relevance of the political scenario in changing the topics at the centre of the agenda of every authentic intellectual. This, in fact, should face them without actively taking part in the struggle for the political hegemony. In fact, in the political sphere, in the realm of ideology, according to Ortega, the words of the philosopher are rendered meaningless and constantly banalised. So, in particular in period of political struggle and

intellectual crisis, the real philosopher should refrain from a direct intervention in the political arena. During such periods his duty would consist in trying to rebuild the basic set of beliefs that ground the social coexistence. For doing this, he should reject any dogmatic statement and systematically exercise a sceptical investigation. Thus Ortega neatly distinguishes between the role of the intellectual and that of the propagandist. The latter would represent just the trivialization of the authentic intellectual practice, of the effort for the clarity in the diagnoses and possible solutions to the social problems⁵⁷.

This lack of an authentic intellectual outlook, according to Ortega, did not only characterised the Spanish scenario, but was also a trait that marked the new international self-consciousness of the philosophical practice. Indeed, he also accused of political partisanship the British intellectuals who judged over the Spanish situation. His critique was indeed twofold: on the one hand he criticised the new culture that was spreading inside the new Spanish regime, and on the other he defended the national interests in relation to the international scenario. Clearly enough, he did so with the aim of having the possibility of influencing the cultural debate of his country, criticising it from within.

His critique to the organic intellectual was extremely precise and violent. Indeed he assigned to the real intellectual and to the teacher a role incompatible with the purposes of the pedagogical reform of the regime. The intellectual, to Ortega, was characterised by a sceptical attitude that unceasingly put all social norms and the status quo into question, doing this in a violent way which resembled the activity of a butcher. As Marañón wrote about Vives, Ortega was therefore criticising the new cultural hegemony of his country for possibly ameliorating and not for destroying it. As Ortega put it:

El mundo con que el Intelectual se encuentra le parece estar ahí precisamente para ponerlo en cuestión. [...] A primera vista parece que es un destructor y se le ve siempre con visceras de cosas entre las manos, como un matarife. Pero es todo lo contrario. El Intelectual no puede, aunque quiera, ser egoísta respecto a las cosas. *Se hace cuestión de ellas*. Y esto es el síntoma máximo del amor [OC, V: 628].

⁵⁷ «La mayor parte de los intelectuales que andan por ahí no lo son, claro está, sino que viven *haciendo de* intelectuales, a veces correctamente, sirviendo con honradez y no escasa utilidad el oficio a que socialmente se ha comprometido, el “cargó” que ocupan». [OC, V: 623].

6.6 Ortega's isolation

The ideal of the authentic intellectual presented by Ortega was evidently incompatible with the Spanish cultural establishment that had excluded or marginalised relevant intellectual figures for much less than this [Claret, 2006b]. As in the case of his books on history and the Roman Empire, Ortega's texts on Vives and the role of the intellectual received a similar, or worst, treatment. In fact, also the revista *Escorial*, which in general had proved to be receptive to his ideas [Ferrary, 1993: 140-146], in this occasion did not express any attention to Ortega's definition of a peculiarly patriotic intellectual. The only case in which his concept of the intellectual is mentioned is by referring to his *Meditaciones del Quijote* and, moreover, by trivialising his proposal and presenting the ideal of the intellectual as a saver of his own nation.

This is the case, for instance, of the discourse pronounced by the professor of History of Law at the University of Zaragoza, Minguijón y Adrián, at the *Real Academia de Ciencias Morales y Políticas* in Madrid. This text was so popular in relation to the way in which the intellectual of the new regime was conceived that it was considered as a cononic text to be read by all the University student in the humanistic faculties [Artigas, 1943] According to Minguijón, the intellectual should have saved his country by favouring the resurgence of the Christian tradition and by giving to it a new metaphysical order [Minguijón Adrian, 1941]. The new regime was conceiving the intellectual as an instrument of propaganda, and the university education as the place in which his teaching had to construct a dogmatic and acritical vision of reality. Indeed, the reform of the University, in 1943, had established in the curriculum of all the humanistic faculties the creation of a three-years course of political education, in which the students should have learnt the basic political and cultural dogmas of the regime which could not have been critically discussed⁵⁸. The social reality should

⁵⁸ *Ley de 29 Julio 1943 sobre ordenación de la Universidad Española*: «La Ley, en todos sus preceptos y artículos, exige el fiel servicio de la Universidad a los ideales de la Falange, inspiradores del Estado, y vibra al compás del imperativo y del estilo de las generaciones heroicas que supieron morir por una Patria mejor. Este fervor encarna en instituciones de profesores y alumno, al par que en cursos de formación política y de exaltación de los valores hispánicos, con el fin de mantener siempre vivo y tenso en el alma de la Universidad el aliento de la auténtica España». On the structure of this course see in particular

have been explained according to metaphysical principles and should have excluded any sort of critical reflection.

This was clearly incompatible with the idea purported by Ortega according to which the intellectual should have to critically reflect on the most common linguistic and social realities so that to reform the common and uncritical opinions that the society imposed to the individuals⁵⁹. In fact, according to Ortega:

Los decires del hombre, señores, van hoy a la deriva, y tras ellos va a la deriva todo su destino [...]. Urge un poder espiritual nuevo, que no tiene por que ser estatal. Pero un poder espiritual es necesario [OC, IX: 312].

In contrast to the widespread opinion represented by Minguijón, Ortega affirmed the necessity of considering social phenomena as totally human facts, without any trascendental feature, since they are the product of a totally human activity. As a consequence, being the result of a human activity that does not ground on metaphysical premises, the social reality and the social norms do possess the same ontological status. Thus, the intellectual would not be the interpreter of a divine order, but rather of a totally human one. In spite of his veiled criticism against the cultural paradigm imposed by the regime, the lack of a direct attack to the new political power established in Spain, his prudent attitude, caused to Ortega the condemnation of some of his old disciples and students who had been exiled in Argentina or in other Latin American country. In fact, the exiled intellectual did not recognise in Ortega an interpreter of the new duty of intransigent opposition the exiled should have accomplished in this new cultural and political scenario. For instance, one of the most loyal friend and disciple of Ortega, the philosopher María Zambrano, during the years of the civil war directly attacked his master's attitude towards the regime, accusing him of being a conformist bourgeois prone to be subjugated by the regime [Zambrano, 1998: 130-133]. As a matter of fact, Ortega also vindicates, during the exile, his intellectual duty of

AA.VV, 1944, *Guía de la Universidad de Madrid*, Universidad de Madrid, Madrid: 515-517.

⁵⁹ «Partí de afirmar que buena parte de las angustias históricas actuales procede de la falta de claridad sobre problemas que solo la sociología puede aclarar, y que esta falta de claridad, en la conciencia del hombre medio, se origina, a su vez, en el estado deplorable de la teoría sociológica». In AOG, PB-21/ 10487.

neutrality in relation to political questions⁶⁰. A prudent attitude which determined his progressive isolation from both the intellectual fronts: the one of the new Spanish establishment and that of the old republican friends, represented by the intellectual of the exile. This caused in Ortega a sense of complete isolation and impotence. He felt as: «cayendo en los espacios interplanetarios sin saber a que agarrarme»⁶¹.

The political neutrality always manifested by the philosopher was conceived by him as the necessary safety distance that the intellectual should have observed in order to maintain a critical attitude towards the established power. A theory that, as already said, he had explained for the first time back in 1927, in his book on Mirabeau. This does not mean, as on the contrary he always affirmed, that during his exile he had remained silent without indirectly but frequently expressing his own – broadly speaking – political ideas. It just reveals that he preferred not to be part of a political struggle, avoiding any sort of direct censorship that should have definitely impeded him to play a role in the cultural debate of his country, hoping of reforming it from within. *For this reason, he often practiced a sort of self-censorship*⁶², *not only during his exile in Argentina but also, and foremost, during his stay in Portugal*. In the case of the Argentinean exile, it is possible to find in his personal correspondence a lot of instances of Ortega's acceptance of all the possible suggestions made by the official propaganda to "sweeten" his writings. And also of his practice of self-censorship, as in the case of the letters he sent to his editor in Buenos Aires, Espasa Calpe, and its director, Manuel Olarra.

For instance, concerning his book entitled *Ideas y Creencias*, he accepted all the suggestions made by the official censorship, exhibiting

⁶⁰ «Reitero de la manera más expresa que cuanto diga sobre esos hechos actuales no significa mi opinión política sobre ellos sino sólo mi opinión sociológica y filosófica. Si yo hubiera podido exponer íntegramente mi pensamiento social – cosa en que no se podía ni soñar por la escasez de tiempo – hubieran ustedes podido colegir cuál era mi opinión política; pero de otro modo, y yendo las cosas como han ido, nadie puede pretender descubrir mi opinión política en ninguna de las nociones particulares que he ido exponiendo». In AOG, PB-21/ 10487.

⁶¹ Letter by Ortega to Carmen Yebes, 14-XI-1941, in AOG, CD-Y/ 32.

⁶² As Rockwell correctly wrote in respect to the relation between Ortega and the censorship [Rockwell, 1994: 294]: «La susceptibilidad de Ortega ante las censuras argentinas a su autoproclamado papel crítico en el exilio, sugiere que percibía un paralelismo entre Argentina y España».

a totally collaborative attitude. As he wrote to Olarra: «Me hago muy bien cargo –scrive il filosofo – de la árdua faena que es el ejercicio de una discreta Censura y todos debemos coadyuvar a su posible perfección»⁶³. However, in particular due to economic difficulties and personal disagreements, finally the relation between Ortega and Espasa Calpe came to an end⁶⁴. He also chose not to publish during his life a lot of texts he had written, such as the text of the conferences on Vives, in order not to appear as a subversive thinker that the regime had to condemn. For this reason, the most direct manifestations of opposition of Ortega to the regime can be found in few words pronounced during some conferences or lessons which were not conceived for a big audience, but rather for restricted circles. All his editorial projects, such as the new Argentinean project of his *Revista de Occidente* and thenew collection of book, *Biblioteca Conocimiento del Hombre*, finally failed⁶⁵ [Campomar, 2010]. The same also happened to another editorial project that Ortega was trying to realise during that period, the *Enciclopedia Autodidáctica*⁶⁶. The constant intellectual failures and the growing isolation he was experiencing determined the final decision of the philosopher to nearing to Spain by moving to Portugal in February 1942. There he continued to observe with interest and in a critical way the Spanish intellectual debate, offering his alternative position on the role of the intellectual and education in society.

⁶³ Letter by Ortega to Manuel Olarra, 27-VIII-1941, in AOG, PB-292/ 21-3.

⁶⁴ Letter by Ortega to Olarra, 27-VII-1941, in AOG, PB- 292/ 4: «La increíble conducta de Espasa-Calpe conmigo después de una colaboración de veintitres años que quedará en la historia de España y la conducta personal de usted en nuestro trato de estos últimos meses, han sido y son tan poco claras y sinceras que me obligan a colocarme en una actitud de inquietud extremay extrema desconfianza».

⁶⁵ This publication, according to the desire of the philosopher, should have constituted an attempt to orient the Spanish cultural scenario by proposing a series of reviews, translations and comments, bibliographical references and so on on key works of the political and philosophical thought. As he wrote to Olarra, the *Biblioteca* would have produced «una automática restauración de la dirección española en la vida intelectual». Letter by Ortega to Olarra, in AOG, PB-292/ 27-i.

⁶⁶ Letter by Federico Castillejo to Ortega, 13-V-1940, Buenos Aires, in AOG, PB-291/ 9.

Chapter 7.

Nearing Spain: the Lusitanian exile

In 1942 Ortega came back to Europe. What should be a provisional stay near the borders of Spain, in Portugal, finally turned out to be his home for more than 3 years, from the spring 1942 to the summer 1945. Also in the following years the philosopher would officially reside in Lisbon, symbolically marking his distance from the Franco's regime. This period of his life has always been considered, in continuity with the first years of his exile, as a period of substantial absence and silence in relation to the cultural debate that was taking place in his own country. However, both his public activities – such as conferences and writings – and the personal relationships he maintained with outstanding figures of the Spanish cultural entourage, do reveal that Ortega continued to develop his philosophical theory and his educative practice in tight connection to what was happening in Spain. Moreover, he can also be said to have actively contributed to purport a significant transformation in the political and cultural atmosphere of Spain in a period in which the international scenario was drastically changing. For all these reasons, his Lusitanian exile can be labelled as an experimental period of his life, indispensable for preparing his return in Spain.

This affirmation will be proved firstly (§1) by analysing the reasons that determined Ortega's choice of returning in Europe and stay in Portugal. For this purpose, they would be taken into considerations the geopolitical characteristics that rendered this country a suitable place for nearing – not only geographically speaking – Spain, and develop fruitful relations with other Spanish intellectuals. After that they will be analysed (§2) two significant writings of the philosopher published in Spain during this period, both of which revealed the strategy used by Ortega to express his veiled criticisms towards the regime without being accused of directly opposing to it. This will be proven in particular by considering (§3) his posture in relation to the Spanish academic system during those years. As it will be proved, he did not renounce to the main pillars of his educative theory and, in a period in

which a sceptical attitude did not find any place inside the Spanish academia, he vindicated the need for the real intellectuals to intervene in the political debate in a different way. His main theses and criticisms towards the regime will be illustrated in particular (§4) by taking into consideration the course he gave at the Lisbon University in 1944, which was complemented by (§5) a series of cultural initiatives that he tried to realise in order to put into practice his theoretical meditations. While the WWII was approaching to an end, (§6) the international political scenario did significantly change and all these transformations directly spilt into the Spanish political and cultural life. Ortega partially benefitted from these mutations but at the same time (§7) the regime saw him as a possible instrument for acquiring a new international and democratic allure. The Madrilenian philosopher, in the meanwhile, (§8) was continuing to reinforce his political and cultural contacts, scrupulously preparing his return so to have the possibility of playing again a significant role within the Spanish academia.

7. 1 Ortega in Lisbon

When Ortega moved to Lisbon during the spring of 1942, Antonio Salazar's dictatorship had already been in charge since more than fifteen years, since the coup d'état of May 28th 1926. Under such circumstances the cultural situation of the Country, according to several scholars, resembled to a gloomy wasteland [João Medina, 2004]. Indeed, there were very few, if any, cultural activities and the political scenario was characterised by an intense radicalisation between "Salazarians" and Marxists. On the contrary, from an international point of view, the formal neutrality of Portugal – even if somehow sympathetic with Franco's regime [Rodríguez Garoz, 2005] – appeared to be much more credible to the international community in comparison to the Spanish case. This was due in particular to the critical positions endorsed by Portugal since the very beginning of the II World War [Kaczorowski, 2015]. Without any doubt, this was one of the main reasons which brought Ortega to decide to move to Portugal, along with the possibility of nearing to his homeland. In this way he hoped to finally have the chance to take part into the Spanish cultural debate, without abandoning his intellectual independence. According to the majority of his biographers, such period of his life was generally

characterised by ease and tranquillity, that is, by those two basic conditions which, according to him, would have rendered possible an intensification of his philosophical activity [Herrero, 1991].

However, in spite of the very important differences in relation to their international positions, Salazar's regime had a lot in common with Franco's dictatorship. Eve Giustiniani [2008: 733-735], for instance, pointed out five basic features shared by the two Mediterranean establishments: 1) an authoritarian character, 2) a military support to the political power, 3) the mobilisation of an ample variety of political and social forces, 4) a steady process of fascist institutionalisation and lastly, 5) a reactionary ideology.

Since the end of the civil war Lisbon had also welcomed a considerable number of Spanish intellectuals and political figures with whom Ortega would have the chance to get in touch during his three-years exile in the Lusitanian country. Among them José Torán, Antonio Marichalar, the Count of Yebes, the eventual monarchy heir Juan de Bourbon, the Spanish ambassador Nicolás Franco and Eugenio Montes, the director of the Spanish Institute in Lisbon and previously a student of Ortega, who supervised his doctoral thesis. The cultural and social *milieu* which surrounded the philosopher during his Lusitanian exile was enriched as well by the frequent visits of his sons and friends such as Julián Marías, Antonio Maravall and Luis Díez del Corral. Thus during this period, Ortega received an increasing amount of news about his homeland and started to converse again, and more intensely than during his Argentinean exile, with important politicians and intellectuals. He had strict relationships with those who were more akin to the regime and with those who were trying to construct an opposing power by restoring the monarchy. For instance, in his late book about the reign of Juan de Bourbon, the first ministry of education of Franco's regime, Pedro Sáinz Rodríguez, affirmed that Ortega and the future king developed a strong friendship during their common exile in Portugal. This friendship increased over time, both before and after the famous Manifesto of Lausanne, written by Juan de Borbon in 1945, with which the prince called for an institutional change in the Country after the end of WWII [Sáinz Rodríguez, 1981]⁶⁷.

Despite these influent friendships Ortega did not perceive himself as a politician and did not want to actively participate neither in the

⁶⁷ Sáinz Rodríguez, 1981: 95

Portuguese nor in the Spanish political debate. On the contrary, he was far more interested in playing an influential role into the cultural atmosphere of his Country, and partially in Portugal; even if he was well-aware of the practical impossibility of doing it [Ferreira Patrício, 2014]. As he wrote to his friend Gregorio Marañón in May 1944, he had to face the most tragic experience that could occur to an intellectual: that of lacking the freedom of writing and, moreover, of lacking a proper publicity:

Me desanima entrever que las cosas en que verdaderamente trabajo estos años van a tardar mucho en poderse publicar en España. Y no porqué sean tremendas – siempre he detestado la tremebundez – sino porque se refieren precisamente a los temas hoy más perseguidos: lo que es el destino humano y lo que son las entrañas de la sociedad⁶⁸.

For this reason, he devoted himself to study rather than writing or teaching, even if he did not abdicate completely to his intellectual function and always maintained a proactive attitude. Indeed, he was persuaded that the proper mission he had to accomplish as a philosopher was exactly that of comprehending the critical situation that not only Spain, but in general the whole Europe, was facing, and of trying to define problems and possible solutions. This, according to Ortega, did not imply exclusively a political reform – which, in any case, was surely rendered necessary by the end of the global conflict. On the contrary, the most urgent problem to face was related to the need of a cultural change in relation to the habits, the mentalities, the common lives of the average men (as he wrote in the book *La caza solitaria*).

Given the limitation of freedom of speech he was suffering during this period, and in order to express his point of view without touching the most sensible nerves of the cultural orthodoxy of the regime, Ortega significantly decided to adopt a new communicative strategy: he moved towards apparently more neutral themes, expressing through the veil of the futility his critical points of view.

⁶⁸ Letter by Ortega to Marañón, 5-V-1944, CD-M/ 44, in AOG.

7.2 *The Lusitanian writings*

The strategy adopted by Ortega is patently evident by considering the very few works he published during his Lusitanian exile. In fact, apart from a new edition of some of his articles written during the late twenties, he only published two new original works, both in 1943: the *Prólogo a Veinte años de caza mayor del Conde de Yebes*, and the *Prólogo a Aventuras del capitán Alonso de Contreras*. The two prologues both focus on apparently frivolous topics, but it would be a mistake not to notice the blatant strategy adopted by Ortega to enter into the Spanish cultural debate through these writings. The first of them represents an essay on hunting. The second, on the other side, constitutes a reflection on the life of a soldier and a functionary of an absolutist State. The two topics were both of enormous interest for the Spanish public opinion. In fact, according to a survey conducted by the national Institute of Public Opinion during that year, the most interesting topics in the opinion of the newspapers' readers were precisely the war and hunting, followed by sports news, articles and chronicles about bullfights⁶⁹. Evidently, Ortega manifested the intention to continue to be a reference point for the Spanish public opinion, not only at its highest level, i.e. within the university system where he was impeded to do this, but also and foremost among the general audience. Through these writings he tried to spread his thought in pills, *offering an heterodox perspective on very common and popular themes*.

For instance, the writing on hunting was a brief introduction to his anthropology, and in particular to the notion of "vocational hobby". This term is defined by Ortega as the quest and practice of a suitable divertimento, considered as the most characteristic trait of human beings. In other words, each person, according to Ortega, had to find her own fulfilment in the practice of a freely chosen activity, not imposed by any external law. Hunting is considered in his writing as the best expression of this human tendency and as a desire of escaping from the external world, from the daily routine, and concentrating into an apparently unnecessary occupation. This anthropological consideration brings Ortega to take an indirect move towards the political sphere. In fact, given this premise, human beings are considered as irreducible entirely to their political, social or cultural

⁶⁹ *Cómo leen los españoles su prensa en Gaceta de la Prensa Española*, Madrid, 17, 1943, p. 300

dimension. As it can be deduced from his writing, this general outlook implies a strong critique of the idea of an absolutist State in which the individual lives would only count insofar as they could be useful to pursue the ends of the State.

This is not the only interesting aspect which emerges from the reading of this prologue. In fact, Ortega's analysis of the behaviour of the hunter represents the counterpart of what, according to him, the philosophical aptitude should ultimately be: a predisposition of unceasingly reconsidering each problem without giving anything for granted. This represents, to him, the most important trait of the intellectual, and it is exactly in force of this argument that he moves a critique to the cultural hegemonic habit of Franco's establishment, i.e. the unquestioned cult of the tradition:

En efecto, solo piensa de verdad quien ante un problema, en vez de mirar sólo por derecho, hacia lo que el hábito, la tradición, el tópico y la inercia mental harían presumir, se mantiene alerta, pronto a aceptar que la solución brinque del punto menos previsible en la gran rotundidad del horizonte. Como el cazador en el fuera absoluto que es el campo, el filósofo es el hombre alerta en el absoluto dentro de las ideas, que son también una selva indómita y peligrosa [OC, VI: 333].

A similar veiled critique to the basic features of the Franco's cultural scenario can be noticed also in his prologue to the life of Alonso de Contreras. The topic chosen by the philosopher in this writing is the biography of a professional soldier. The romantic life of this adventurer represents to Ortega nothing more than the expression of the common living of a functionary of XVII century Spain. Antonio de Contreras is basically deprived of an authentic vocation, being continuously engaged in endless adventures without following his own will, but rather obeying to the strict impositions which flow from his social role. He simply served the State Reason without questioning it, committing the worst crimes with a reckless disregard to their consequences. Contrary to this behaviour, that is the action for the sake of the action, which is the main trait of Contreras' life, Ortega affirms the necessity of acting always for the sake of a personal end, looking for the realisation of one's own vocation. The philosopher offers his very heterodox point of view by changing the usual perspective: from the predominance of the State on the individuals to the intrinsic value of human independence and freedom.

This is likely to be considered as a very scarce critique of a totalitarian or absolutist regime, but this seems to be what Ortega thought he could communicate to his readers in Spain at the moment of his Lusitanian exile. Indeed, his worries about the effects of these writings on his reputation were proved by the fact that he preferred to public his prologue on Contreras anonymously. In this new peculiar way, through a careful selection of the topics and a delicate prose, he tried not to lose the grasp with his Spanish audience.

7.3 A critical spectator of the new University

In addition, it is possible to find in other writings and conferences of this period in Portugal, that neither were published in Spain nor during his life, some of the most interesting features of the evolution of Ortega's thought during these years. In particular, one of the main problems which he continued to analyse during this period was the problem concerning the function of the intellectual and education in society. This is a crucial question, insofar as it is exactly by considering it that it will also be possible to clarify what type of society Ortega was supporting during this period. The first instance of this tendency is given by the invitation of Julián Marías to write a short introduction to his book entitled *History of Philosophy* (1942). Indeed, this offered to Ortega the pretext for reflecting on the very role of the intellectual and the philosopher in society.

Julián Marías had been one of Ortega's student during the beginning of the '30s, and in his letters to his professor he frequently recalls that period of lost happiness. He considered himself as one of the few real disciples of the philosopher, who had been the symbol of a free and open-minded university⁷⁰. This aspect, according to Marías, represented the most valuable product of the republican cultural tradition epitomised by Ortega. It was a tradition that he thought it could have been possible to restore: «la de la Facultad nuestra; creo que ha sido algo real y valioso y que a pesar de las aparencias no está

⁷⁰ «Porqué – perdóneme la franqueza a que me siento autorizado por este largo diálogo silencioso de seis años – creo que soy una de las pocas personas en quienes usted ha dejado una huella más profunda y tal vez auténtica». Letter by Marías to Ortega, 22-VI-1942, in AOG, C-31/ 3.

muerta, por lo menos, la siento viva en mí»⁷¹. Ortega never recognized in Mariás, at least during his Lusitanian exile, a real disciple and he always was extremely critical about all his attempts to speak on his own behalf.

Ortega was indeed particularly sceptical about the possibility of having a relevant role in the new Spanish intellectual scenario, and for this reason he considered utopian Mariás' belief of an eventual rebirth of the previous university atmosphere. However, he accepted to write an introduction to his book, which time by time grew – as Ortega wrote to Mariás – till the extension of a big book of 400 pages. In this text he formalised some of the main reflections on philosophy of history. The final manuscript, currently preserved at the Ortega's archive, is awfully shorter than what Ortega declared. At the same time, it is extremely useful in order to comprehend what, according to him, the proper activity of the philosopher should have been.

In these pages it is possible to notice a direct critique to the dogmatism of the new Madrilénian Faculty of Philosophy, where the critical thinking had been substituted by a very rigid orthodoxy. Ortega knew he was the constant target of some of the most aggressive attacks of the new establishment, in particular by some of the catholic members of the regime. One of the leading figures of this catholic group was without any doubt the Jesuit Joaquín Iriarte who vividly attacked the main ideas of Ortega, without even critically assessing his thought due to the fact that, according to him, it was absolutely null [Iriarte, 1941: 102]. He did this in a series of articles published in *Razón y Fe* in 1941 and then collected in a book in the following year⁷².

The theses purported in that book had a relevant influence within the catholic propaganda against Ortega during the '40s, becoming widely accepted among the advocates of the culture of the New Spain⁷³ which began to identify in the philosopher an opponent of the nation⁷⁴. According to Iriarte, Ortega was the symbol of the philosopher

⁷¹ Letters of Mariás to Ortega, 22-VI-1942, in AOG, C-31/ 3.

⁷² Iriarte [1942].

⁷³ See, for instance, Bolado Ochoa, 2011.

⁷⁴ «Frente a Ortega y Gasset no caben actitudes mezquinas. Lo que representa es demasiado para oponerle, como algunos ingenuamente pretendieron, la conjuración del silencio, o para restrear contradicciones en la suprema consecuencia de su pensamiento». J. Bofil, in «Cristianidad», 53, 1946, p. 225.

«incredulo»⁷⁵, without any sort of faith or belief, and he consequently represented the worst example of the sceptical aptitude in philosophy.

The response of Ortega to these critics lies precisely on the *Epilogue of Philosophy* which significantly begins with an attack to the dogmatism and a defence of scepticism as an intellectual habit since:

El que presume poder instalarse en una doctrina antigua – y me refiero, claro está, solo a quien se da cuenta de lo que hace – sufre una ilusión óptica [...] Si no podemos alejarnos de las filosofías preteritas no tenemos más remedio que intentar edificarnos otra [OC, IX: 584].

For this reason it is necessary, according to Ortega, to develop a critical thinking and to question all the dogmas in order to construct a more solid philosophy. Therefore, scepticism is considered as the constant exercise of thought that each authentic philosopher should always practice. Ortega, in tracing the history of philosophy, attributes the word “scepticism” a specific meaning: i.e. the correct philosophical practice that the authentic investigator does realise. Starting from this premise he develops a strong critique to the professionalization of philosophy which would have reduced this critical activity to a functionary role. Contrary to any sort of scholasticism within the academia, the notion of philosophy that he purports in this writing is therefore that of a vocational practice which should never be completely institutionalised and never become a mere profession. Had it happened, the intellectual would have lost his ability to positively contribute to the development of new ideas, to critically question the established power. This would produce the reduction of philosophy to an activity of mere repetition of imposed dogmas lacking a true meaning for the single individual as well as for the whole society.

The most evident instance of this phenomenon of bureaucratisation, according to the philosopher, would be given by language, which could be at the same time the most powerful and generalised social use as well as the most significant expression of one’s own ideas, feelings and individuality. In fact: «la lengua es precisamente lo que el individuo no crea sino que halla establecido en su contorno social. [...] Hablar es, por lo pronto, usar una vez más ese uso significativo, *decir lo que ya se sabe*, lo que todo el mundo sabe, el consabido». But, at the

⁷⁵ J. Iriarte, *La novísima visión de la filosofía en Ortega y Gasset*, in *Razón y Fe*, 127, 1943, p. 117.

same time: «Sólo uno mismo tiene a la vista la “nueva cosa” y, al elegir un vocablo para nombrarla, sólo uno entiende éste. Asistimos, pues, a una función del lenguaje que es lo contrario de la lengua o hablar de la gente o decir lo consabido» [OC, IX:616].

So, Ortega clearly distinguishes among a social and a personal use of the language⁷⁶. This distinction, considering the context in which Ortega elaborated it, also implies a very neat duality between two ways of being a professor: as a mere functionary or as a proper thinker. His critique to the scholasticism directly reflects his preoccupation towards the growing relevance of a dogmatic form of philosophising within the new Spanish academia. It is also worthy to remember the fact that, during this very period, Ortega was developing a more vivid interest for etymology. Indeed he considered it as the most powerful means to critically reflect on language as a social use⁷⁷. To summarise, it is possible to affirm that the attention devoted to this problem emerges as a sort of side effect of Ortega’s confrontation with the new intellectual regime of Franco’s university. Indeed, the Epilogue of Philosophy constitutes a dialogue between Ortega and his main critics in Spain, a dialogue in which he defends his own positions and calls for a restoration of an authentic intellectuality in his Country. The one that the propaganda of the regime was contributing to annihilate.

7.4 Teaching again: a paradigmatic course

Between the end of November and the beginning of December 1944 Ortega gave some lectures at the University of Lisbon which formed the course entitled *La razón histórica*. This would have represented another very significant instance of the intellectual posture of the philosopher during his Lusitanian exile. This series of lessons had been rendered possible thanks to the mediation of Vitorino Nemesio and Oliveira Guimarães, the director of the Lisbon Faculty of Literature and Philosophy. Nemesio informed Ortega that, given the political sensitivity of the topic, he had previously asked for an opinion concerning the viability of inviting him to speak about this matter

⁷⁶ F. J. Martín Cabrero, 1998.

⁷⁷ The importance of the notion of “social use” will be analysed in the next chapter. For an introduction see in particular Ferreiro Lavedán, 2005.

directly to the office of the Minister of National Education. Everything would have been supervised by the *Policía de Vigilancia y Defensa del Estado*⁷⁸.

Ortega knew that his words would have been heard not only in Lisbon, but also in Madrid. As a matter of fact, the very Spanish Minister of Education, Ibáñez Martín, was constantly informed of Ortega's lectures. Indeed, the 30th November 1944 he received a letter from the Spanish ambassador in Lisbon concerning the first of Ortega's lesson, which was very scrupulously detailed both in its contexts and in its reception⁷⁹.

Given the personal sympathy of the director of the Spanish Institute in Lisbon, Eugenio Montes, towards Ortega, the report would clearly be favourable to the philosopher. The lessons of Ortega were of public domain in Spain, thanks to a series of articles which appeared in the main newspapers of the time, such as *ABC*, *Nueva España* and, *Informaciones*⁸⁰. In fact, in spite of his apparent futility, the topic chosen by Ortega was of great relevance within the new academic scenario in which the narration of the past had become a matter of political control. Moreover, the constant attacks against the historical aptitude of Ortega constituted one of the main concerns of his critics within the Faculty of Philosophy of Madrid, where he was constantly reproached for lacking an ontological and metaphysical point of view in the study of history⁸¹, as already seen in chapter 5.

There are at least four main features of Ortega's academic course on historical reason that give an hint of the relevance of this text in relation to the political context and of his subversive posture in regard to the Spanish cultural scenario. Indeed, in this essay it is possible to find: a) a critique to the current political situation; b) a direct attack to the university community; c) an analysis of the reasons for the crisis of the

⁷⁸ Letters by Vitorino Nemesio to Ortega, 18-IX-1943, in AOG, C/ 68-9b.

⁷⁹ In AGA, 31. 5708.2, in particular n. 13817 *Expediente personal del Catedrático José Ortega y Gasset*: «Para su debida información y conocimiento, adjunto paso a manos de V.I. copia de un informe y anejos que se citan, del Agregado cultural de España en Lisboa»

⁸⁰ Cfr. AOG, respectively PB-232/ 53, PB-232/ 54, PB-232/ 55.

⁸¹ This is proven in particular by the polemic between the two ways of conceiving the history of philosophy purported in this period respectively by Ortega and Javier Zubiri. Cfr. Moreno Pestaña, 2013, in particular pp. 102-110.

intellectual; d) a set of basic guidelines for promoting a new upheaval of the intellectual in society.

Regarding the first of these aspects, Ortega shows to be aware of the fact of being speaking to a far more larger audience than the one that was attending to his lessons in Lisbon. For this reason he takes the chance to directly communicate to his eventual audience in Spain and, broadly speaking, within the international scenario. This is proved by the fact that during the third of his six conferences he pauses his discourse about the role of the intellectual in society to read in minute details – something quite unusual to him – a text in which he reproaches the international lack of recognition of the right of neutrality. As usual, he speaks in a quite ambiguous way. However, the main points of his arguments can be summarised as follows: 1) the international community should safeguard the existence of the basic political and economic right of neutrality among the nations; 2) the neutrality of Spain during the II World War should be internationally recognised; 3) the States should respect this right in relation to the activities of their citizens, not intervening in their personal affairs⁸².

Whether the first two considerations constitute an overt defence of Spain in relation to the international scenario, the last constitutes a reproach to his country as well as to Britain, given by the fact that Ortega disapproved the intrusive control of the postal service, which had affected him personally, at least from 1939, as revealed to him by his friend Fernando Vela⁸³. Ortega's statements clearly reveal an attempt made by the philosopher to legitimate his own country in the post-war scenario from an international point of view, while remaining critical as far as the internal cultural and economic policies were concerned.

⁸² «La supresión del derecho a la neutralidad que empieza por la anulación de la libertad de comercio en el neutral y sigue por la intervención en los servicios postales y la violación del secreto de la correspondencia y termina con la adscripción forzosa a alguno de los países beligerantes es síntoma claro de haberse por completo obnubilado en el mundo la conciencia del derecho. Porque al suprimirse ese derecho particular – la neutralidad con todos sus atributos – no se le sustituye por otro y en su hecho aparece sólo el arbitrio poderoso». OC, IX: 671.

⁸³ Cfr. Letters by Vela to Ortega, Tanger 30-IX-1939: «Su carta vino censurada por "l'autorité militaire", según decía una etiqueta. No sé por que razón, una carta escrita en Argentina para un español de Tanger puede ser abierta». In AOG, C-50/ 13.

Indeed, his critique to the lack of neutrality from an economic perspective represents also a critique to the autarchic and monopolistic market developed during the first phase of Franco's regime⁸⁴. A policy that the very Caudillo, some months later in June 1945, would have partially stigmatised within a new political scenario in which the totalitarian powers had already collapsed⁸⁵. Indeed, as Richards [1998: 95] put it: «autarky was a freely chosen option selected by primarily for ideological reasons». So, even if in this occasion Ortega partially defends the foreign policy of the regime, nevertheless he does not renounce to his liberal standpoint both about politics and economics. According to him, the duty of the State should have always been that of not intervening within the private and economic sphere of its citizens, to which a minimum level of freedom should always be guaranteed independently of the government in power⁸⁶.

When he pronounced this words in Lisbon, during November 1944, the war was just coming to its end: the Normandy landings of June 1944, the Russian offensive in the Balkan region and the Allies campaign in Italy had started to determine a progressive reduction of the Axis' power. In this context the recognition of Spanish neutrality during the war was clearly crucial for the purposes of the regime and, in general, beneficial to the country. Ortega does not remain silent during this period. On the contrary, he was trying to obtain some recognition in his country in which, as already seen, he still wanted to be part of an intellectual and cultural community. For this reason, he publicly endorsed the foreign policy of the regime.

⁸⁴ On the nature of the Spanish economic autarky during the decade of the forties see in particular M. Richards, 2006: 93-99.

⁸⁵ «Ni nuestras tradiciones, ni nuestro carácter individualista e independiente, ni el sentido católico de la vida que en España predomina, son compatibles con las fórmulas que sacrifican al hombre y la iniciativa privada a la absorción de un Estado monstruoso y omnipotente». *Discourse of Franco to the Nacional RADIO*, in G. di Febo and S. Juliá, 2005: 55.

⁸⁶ As Ignacio Sánchez Cámara rightly put it, according to Ortega: «La libertad no es un valor más juntos a otros, que debe disputar con ellos la supremacía, sino la condición de la posibilidad de toda elección de valor. La consecuencia de esto es la necesidad de limitar el poder del Estado, de trazar los límites de su acción. Por eso al liberal no le importa tanto quién manda, el titular de la soberanía, sino, mande quien mande, cuánto manda, hasta dónde alcanza el ámbito del poder». Cfr. I. Sánchez Cámara, 2007: 60.

However, this constituted only one of the most relevant features of Ortega's course in relation to the political and cultural context of the period. Indeed, whereas he manifests his acquaintance towards the Spanish foreign policy, at the same time he reproaches its cultural internal policy. He directly attacks the university system by pointing out that the intellectual had passed from being a guide for his nation, to simply being one of its functionary. This fact determined a complete loose of the authentic role of the professors who renounced to be masters for the future generations, thinking exclusively to the realisation of their personal, social and economical ambitions. Regarding to this point Ortega's critique is twofold: on the one hand he criticises the submissive role of the University in respect to the political power and, on the other, he criticises the impoverished academic discourse about the most urgent philosophical and social questions. According to him, the University should have played a more important role in society, both by orienting the decision makers and by ameliorating the conditions of the masses: «La Universidad no es un colegio – no es ni siquiera solo para los estudiantes. Toda la nación debe vivir, más o menos, la vida universitaria y lo sensible es que a ella tengan dificultad para asistir los obreros con mente alerta» [OC, IX:655]. Contrary to the francoist University, conceived as a place for propagating a dogmatic education to a restricted – both qualitative and numerically speaking – élite, Ortega proposed a completely different normative aim for this institution. So, also in this period he did not renounce to his democratic ideal of University which he purported in his Mission of University more than fifteen years before. Moreover, he considers that the academicians who were working within this new University were not up to their role, as demonstrated by the fact that: «los que hablan a toda hora de lo colectivo no revelan tener noción alguna clara sobre lo que esa palabra significa ni sobre los problemas que ella incluye y arrastra» [OC, IX:651].

Ortega moves a critique both to the cultural Spanish scenario and, more generally speaking, to the growing distancing of the intellectual from the society. This separation was due, according to the philosopher, to the crisis of the intellectual which started from the beginning of the XX century and which produced a complete dismissal of his importance within the general audience as well as within the political elites. Both the citizens and the governors had renounced to the suggestions of the intellectual, till the point of considering

absolutely superfluous his very existence. As Ortega put it, this situation had determined the will of completely eliminating the intellectual from the human life, conceived both from a personal and a political point of view⁸⁷: «Los intelectuales han pasado de serlo todo a no ser nada» [OC, IX:631]. It is possible to notice in this moan a neat resentment towards his melancholy condition. His role within Spain, especially in comparison to the '30s, had been significantly limited, the University appeared to be no longer interested in his works and everything that came up from his philosophical framework was strongly criticised as an heterodox and dangerous point of view. However, he did not renounce to play a role in this context and in this text he explicitly sets the main traits of what could have represented his own intellectual activity in the country.

This constitutes the fourth and last of the features mentioned at the beginning of this paragraph: the definition of the function of intellectual in society. According to Ortega, the intellectual should always freely express his opinions and always be an example for the whole community. For this reason, contrary to the current state of affairs and the condition of the University which was dominated by a dogmatic nationalism, he thought that the philosopher should have opted for exercising his role not as a profession within the University but as a vocational activity. Furthermore, the intellectual had the duty of not obeying to the political power and neither to the public opinion. The intellectual, as Ortega put it, is by his own nature, unpopular, and his mission is that of amending public opinion in order to free the citizens from their mistakes⁸⁸.

This general description provided by Ortega does imply some relevant consequences in relation to the concrete possibility of the intellectual to be effective in society. In particular, if the philosopher lacks both the political and the popular support his efficacy would clearly be extremely reduced. In other words, if the intellectual were not helped neither by an institutional nor by a civil support, how could he really intervene in a significant way within society? The answer to this question is quite naïvely provided by Ortega, but it clearly reveals his own purposes: according to him the philosopher has to consider

⁸⁷ «Lo que ahora se intenta es suprimir radicalmente la colaboración del intelectual en la vida humana» [OC, IX: 632].

⁸⁸ «Su misión es corregir la opinión pública y traer a los hombres de sus errores» [OC, IX: 650].

himself as a outsider and the only instrument he possesses to effectively produce a change within society is his own speech.

He would have to strenuously oppose and criticise the institutional regime if it was needed and, at the same time, he would have to seduce the general audience in order to gain its respect not by saying what people want him to say, but rather by convincing them of his own point of view: «He aquí, esbozado en su fondo y en su forma, para qué están ahí los intelectuales, qué es lo que han venido a hacer sobre la tierra: oponerse y seducir» [OC, IX: 652]. Opposing and persuading. This, according to Ortega, is what the intellectual had to do during those years, and this is what he himself would have tried to do. He affirmed and put into practice his theory, considering that when the philosophical activity is radically put into question and deteriorated, as in the case of the Franco's University, the only thing that he could meaningfully do would be reacting against this state of affairs since: «Cuando la situación sufre un cambio radical [...] la filosofía no tiene más remedio que ser una reacción también radical» [OC, IX: 663].

Put it differently, he thought that the only philosophical solutions to the current political problem should have been that of enhancing the research of rational solutions also during irrational times, given the fact that men always are exposed to the risk of descending to a condition of brutality: «La razón o racionalidad es un imperativo inexorable del hombre, una llamada o grito que resuena en su más profunda y auténtica intimidad haciéndole llegar el mandato: tienes que ser racional» [OC, IX: 700].

7.5 *Cultural activities*

In spite of the theoretic defence of the intellectual isolation purported by Ortega, the Madrilenian philosopher was aware of the necessity of finding a minimum of consensus and social recognition in order to play a critical role within society in an effective way. *For this reason, he maintained frequent relations with a lot of the members of the cultural and political establishment of his country, and in particular with those who were starting to seriously put into question, quite more often for personal rather than for ideological reasons, the absolute rigidity of the regime.* A proof of the strong will of the philosopher to take part into the cultural debate is the long series of cultural activities that Ortega carried out soon after returning in Europe. During his exile in Portugal

he tried to establish a plan of intervention through the publication of cultural reviews, in particular thanks to a new editor project he was trying to build up: *Azar*. For this purpose he contacted several of his disciple who had remained in Madrid during this period to realise this project, such as Julián Marías, Fernando Vela (who was in Tangier), and Rodríguez Huéscar, but obtaining limited support. Through his son, José Ortega Spottorno, he also tried to persuade the censorship of the Francoist establishment to permit this publication. This is revealed by a letter of his son to Santiago Montero Díaz who acted as a mediator between Ortega and the director of the Propaganda, Gabriel Arias Salgado⁸⁹. Moreover, in a personal note he sent to Manuel Halcón, responsible of the *Consejo de Hispanidad*, he underlined that through this review he wanted to continue to act as a liberal intellectual, and that he was absolutely sure of the fact that: «*lo único y lo más que al presente se puede intentar para conseguir un comienzo de nueva influencia era operar sobre el flanco con una labor nada ruidosa y soliviantadora, pero que sostuviese y, tal vez, impusiese por la superioridad y duración de sus esfuerzos*».

Indeed he thought it would have been possible to obtain a new intellectual relevance only through a very precise critique to specific aspects of the regime: «No puede pensarse hoy por hoy en otra clase de eventual influencia que la que provenga del orden intelectual y aun esta solo podría obtener alguna probabilidad de buen éxito si se incoa en muy determinado y reducido modo»⁹⁰. He was persuaded that the only possibility to skew in the society of that time would have been that of realising a prominent intellectual activity. For doing this he should have to counter both the public opinion and the established power, offering an independent and critical point of view in a time of political radicalisation. This aptitude was clearly expressed in all of his works published and written during his Lusitanian exile.

During all this period he tried to identify possible allies to realise his projects, without discarding the possibility of finding a concrete support and some spaces of freedom for his intellectual activity inside the very regime. However, albeit the initial support of Halcón and the director of the *Instituto Español del Libro*, José Pemartín, the project will be blocked by the negative opinion of the Jordana-Sousa, Foreign

⁸⁹ Letter by José Ortega Spottorno to Santiago Montero Díaz, 15-VII.1942, in AOG, C-124/ 7.

⁹⁰ Cfr. AOG, PB-432/ 2

ministry of Franco's regime among 1942 and 1944⁹¹. So, the editorial project of *Azar* did not obtain the support of the regime, neither economically nor ideologically, and Ortega faced several difficulty in publishing only one book at the end of 1943 – *Homo Ludens*. However, Ortega's desire to return to be a leading voice able to guide the Spanish public opinion had not disappeared.

In March 1945, thanks to the mediation with the regime of his son José Ortega Spottorno, the *Revista de Occidente* scheduled the publishing of the Complete Works of the philosopher. But also this new project was realised with extreme difficulty and not without the oppressive control of the regime, and a far completed edition of his works was started to be published only almost two years later, in 1946-47⁹². The first edition of the first volume was limited to 4000 copies⁹³. In the following years, after a long pause in 1947, due to health problems, [Ortega Spottorno, 2002: 480] he intensified his public interventions and founded new intellectual projects. Among them, the most interesting would be that of the Institute of Humanities he founded in Madrid in 1948.

7.6 *The new international scenario*

The possibility to intervene in the cultural debate was also offered to the philosopher by the external conditions imposed to the national politics by the end of the war. In particular, the changes in the global political situation, which had recently been determined by the end of the second World War, opened the way to the possibility of new and unexpected scenarios within the Spanish cultural politics.

The end of the war and the defeat of the Axis in the following year determined significant changes both from an international and a national point of view. Indeed, the Yalta conference, which took place in February 1945, set the basis of a new international balance of power. Franco's regime, considered as directly linked to the fascist ideology,

⁹¹ *Proyecto de D. Ortega y Gasset de establecer una Editorial hispano-portuguesa*, in AMAE, R-2461/ 77.

⁹² For a detailed reconstruction of the history of this publication see in particular José Ramón Carriazo Ruiz, *Historia de un texto. Las Obras completas de José Ortega y Gasset*, in «Revista de Estudios Orteguianos», 18, 2009, pp. 9-48, in particular pp. 19-25.

⁹³ Cfr. AOG, *Carpeta Lolita*, PB-444.

was indirectly condemned in that occasion by the three main political powers in the final declaration of the conference which states that:

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the people of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three Governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems⁹⁴.

Thus, in this new international state of affairs, Franco's regime would have represented just a temporary form of government which should have shortly been replaced by a democratic one. Not surprisingly, all the different Spanish political forces which had been continuing to organise themselves abroad saw in this statement the possibility of restoring either a republican or a monarchical power in the country. Both the republican government exiled in Paris and the Prince, Juan de Borbón, who was at that moment in Portugal, thought that, thanks to the international contribution, Franco's regime was finally coming to an end.

In particular, the possible heir to the Spanish throne, a month after this declaration, the 19 March 1945, published in Lausanne his *Manifesto* against the regime, calling for the restoration of the monarchy in Spain. In this text he speaks directly to the Spanish population, but at the same time he dialogues with those foreign political leaders who preferred not to intervene in Spain because of the risk of determining a second and more dramatic civil war. For this reason, Juan de Borbón underlined both the antidemocratic character of Franco's regime and the extremism of the Republic, and identified with the monarchy the only political power which could have been able to guarantee the peace within a democratic institutional framework⁹⁵. The total incompatibility

⁹⁴ *Yalta Conference Agreement, Declaration of a Liberated Europe*, February 11, 1945, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, National Archives. See in <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116176>.

⁹⁵ «Corre España el riesgo de verse arrastrada a una nueva lucha fratricida y de encontrarse totalmente aislada del mundo. El Régimen actual, por muchos que sean sus esfuerzos para adaptarse a la nueva situación, provoca este doble

of the Monarchy with Franco's regime had been previously declared by the very Prince during an epistolary interchange with the dictator in 1943-1944. In fact, immediately after the fall of Mussolini in the summer of 1943, Juan de Borbón had written to Franco to formally asking him to renounce to his power⁹⁶. In 1945, the heir to the throne clearly changed his strategy and decided to leave apart the personal suasion of the dictator preferring to publicly call for the collaboration of the population and the international forces.

The *Manifiesto* had a good echo outside the Spanish border, but obtained very few results. Apart from the demission of the Duque of Alba as the Spanish ambassador in Great Britain, it neither produced evident reactions against Franco's regime, nor determined the step back of the dictatorship that the international community expected. The common wish of removing Franco from his power was indeed expressed at the end of the San Francisco Conference the 26th June 1945 and then in the conclusion of the Potsdam Conference of the following month in which the regime was explicitly condemned for its antidemocratic trait [Sola Ayape, 2015]. This decision would have been reiterated also by the Assembly of the United Nations the 9th February 1946 which determined that no international recognition and support could have been conceded «to States whose regimes have been installed with the help of armed forces of countries which have fought against the United Nations so long as these regimes are in power»⁹⁷.

Following the creation of the UN, another international organization appeared in the same year: the UNESCO. The UNESCO was funded in London the 16th November 1945 at the end of a long plenary meeting of

peligro; y una nueva República, por moderada que fuera en sus comienzos e intenciones, no tardaría en desplazarse hacia uno de los extremos, reforzando así al otro, para terminar en una nueva guerra civil. Sólo la monarquía tradicional puede ser instrumento de paz y de concordia para reconciliar a los españoles; sólo ella puede obtener respeto en el exterior, mediante un efectivo estado de derecho, y realizar una armoniosa síntesis del orden y la libertad en que se basa la concepción cristiana del Estado». *Manifiesto of Lausanne*, in Sainz Rodríguez, 1981: 324.

⁹⁶ Letter by Juan Borbón to Francisco Franco, 3-VIII-1943, in Sainz Rodríguez, 1981: 358.

⁹⁷ UN Twenty six plenary meeting, Resolution 32, *Relations of the members of the United Nations with Spain*.

the *Conference of Allied Ministers of Education*⁹⁸. This organisation began its activity in 1942, in the middle of the war, thanks to the interest of the British minister of Education Richard Austen Butler⁹⁹. The UNESCO was created with a neat political target, that was to promote a new culture of peace which could have been able to contrast the propagandistic education of the Axis, offering an attractive model from an economic, spiritual and cultural point of view for the post-war period¹⁰⁰. This aim is clearly stated in its very Constitution. The article 1.1 in particular declares that:

The purpose of the Organization is to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the world, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion, by the Charter of the United Nations¹⁰¹.

The primary interest of the UNESCO was that of supporting via, an educational program, the end of the UN, favouring a global alphabetisation aimed at setting the bases of the culture of peace¹⁰². Spain was initially excluded to this organisation, as well as from the UN and the European recovery Program of the following years.

⁹⁸ Cfr. *Conference for the Establishment of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization*, London, 1945.

⁹⁹ For an historical introduction to UNESCO see in particular F. Martinez Valderrama, *Historia de la Unesco*, Unesco, Paris, 1991; A. Yoder, *The Evolution of the United Nations System*, Taylor and Francis, Washington DC, 1993; Antonio Monclús e Carmen Sabán, *La escuela global: La educación y la comunicación a lo largo de la historia de la UNESCO*, Fondo de cultura económico, Madrid, 1997. Very useful are also the recent books of Carlo Felice Casula, *UNESCO 1945-2005. Un'utopia necessaria. Scienza, educazione e cultura nel secolo mondo*, Città Aperta, Enna, 2005; and that of J. P. Singh, *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO]. Creating norms for a complex world*, Routledge, New York, 2011.

¹⁰⁰ As it was written in a 1944 document of the CAME: «It is essential that in the new Europe Allied Scientific Culture and outlook shall replace the German». Cited in J. P. Singh, *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO]*, op. cit., p. 14.

¹⁰¹ See UNESCO, *Basic Text*, UNESCO, Paris, 2004.

¹⁰² On the political role of UNESCO see in particular A. Iriye, 2002.

To contrast this very dangerous attack, Franco opted for a formal restyling of the government, changing several ministers and approving a new general law which could have given an appearance of democracy to his regime: the *Fuero de los Españoles*, officially approved by the *Cortes* the 17th July 1945. In this text, some of the basic human and civil rights of the modern liberal democracy were officially recognized, but exclusively from a very formal point of view. Indeed, all the articles concerning freedom of speech, reunion, postal secret, and freedom of movement were explicitly subjected to possible changes, as stated in article 35 of the *Fuero*¹⁰³. In this way, the very legislation of the country was indeed a formalisation and perpetuation of a *de facto* State of exception which characterised the despotic power of Franco. The new image presented to the international community after WWII was far from being considered democratic. The apparent drastic change had finally ended up in a simple make-up of the regime [Tusell, 1984], which implied also some changes in relation to the members of the government, with the inclusion of some ministers which belonged to Catholic association. In this context the Church represented the only source of legitimacy to the regime within the international scenario [Casanova, 2005]. For this reason, Franco nominated Martín Artajo, which came from the *Asociación Católica*, as the new Foreign minister of his post-war government. In this way the dictator started to move towards a formal rejection of the fascist principles, leaving apart, at least formally, the ideology of the Falange.

7.7 Ortega as a political resource

The new apparently democratic outlook of the regime did not persuade the majority of the members of its own establishment. In particular, many of them thought that the new “democracia organica” proposed by Franco – a term used for describing his paternalistic and authoritarian form of government¹⁰⁴ – was substantially unacceptable both according to the ideology of the Falange and for the international

¹⁰³ «La vigencia de los artículos doce, trece, catorce, quince, dieciséis y dieciocho podrá ser temporalmente suspendida por el Gobierno total o parcialmente mediante Decreto-Ley, que taxativamente determine el alcance y duración de la medida». Cfr. B.O.E, n. 199, 18 VII 1945, pp. 358-360

¹⁰⁴ For a discussion of this term see in particular F. Sevillano, 2002.

community. Franco used this term for the first time during an interview he realised for the *United Press* the 7th November 1944, while partially opening to the possibility of a popular referendum on the opportunity to establish a form of monarchical power¹⁰⁵. According to him, Spain represented a very peculiar form of democracy, the one which consists in: «la ejecución del Evangelio, que nosotros fielmente perseguimos»¹⁰⁶. Not all the members of the establishment shared the same view purported by the General, who was persuaded that his government could have remained into power despite the international pressure. The most patent manifestation of this internal dissension is given by the letter sent to Franco by his former Foreign minister Serrano Suñer on 3rd September 1945. Suñer had been one of the most relevant supporters of fascism during the previous decades, and his opinion was highly respected by the most devoted members of the Falange [Garriga, 1986]. In his letter he presented to the dictator the possibility of an eventual operation of the Allies within the Spanish borders, inviting Franco to abandon his political role:

No se puede ahora inventar una Falange democrática y aliadófila sin faltar a aquel respeto. [...] Ayer fuimos nosotros los posibles salvadores. Dejemos que hoy lo sean quienes pueden serlo. Adopte el Estado una nueva fisionomía, pero de verdad y sin pueriles malabarismos¹⁰⁷.

In the same letter, Suñer suggested to Franco to leave the power to new political figures which could have likely been approved by the international community, such as Gregorio Marañón, Cambó or the very Ortega y Gasset [Serrano Suñer, 1977]. In a following interview, during the 80s, Suñer revealed that after that letter he met Franco, who showed his scepticism about the possibility for the philosopher of being a good minister for the new government¹⁰⁸. This did not mean neither

¹⁰⁵ See *Franco ha dicho... recopilacion de las mas importantes declaracioens del Caudillo desde la iniciacion del alzamiento nacional hasta el 31 de diciembre de 1946. Las ediciones sucesivas se publicaran con apendices que complementen la cualidad de este libro*, Editorial Carlos Jaime, Madrid, 1947,p. 306.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 69.

¹⁰⁷ Letter by Serrano Suñer to Franco, 3-IX-1945, in *El franquismo año a año. Lo que se contaba y ocultaba durante la dictadura, 1945*. Madrid, Biblioteca El Mundo, 2006, p. 16.

¹⁰⁸ «Me dijo: “Verdaderamente la situación es grave, pero hay que resistir”. Yo le manifesté: “Hay que estar en la realidad, pero precisamente por lo peligroso

that Ortega wanted to participate in any government nor that he was directly informed of this possibility. On the contrary, it simply reveals the fact that the international and internal conditions in which Spain was lying during those years insinuated to some outsiders of the Franco's establishment the need of a radical change towards a real democratic government. In this sense, Ortega y Gasset was perceived as a possible resource.

This was evidently stated by the right-wing newspaper *Arriba* in the occasion of the return of the philosopher in Spain during the summer 1945¹⁰⁹. According to the author of this article: «El reencuentro del hueso y la sangre con el paisaje y alma de la Patria sera más gozoso todavía cuando vida e Historia sean una sola. España está aquí y es, justamente, lo que es. Y, porque lo es, Ortega vuelve a ella»¹¹⁰. *This words reveal the instrumental use the regime intended to do of Ortega, whose mere presence in Spain could have been perceived as a blatant demonstration of his support to the status quo.* However, as it has been proven, it is more likely to be the case that Ortega envisaged the possibility of supporting a restoration of the Monarchy rather than the persistence of Franco into power [Giustiniani, 2008: 926-930]. The political situation seemed to be headed towards this new institutional change. Anyway, the dictator did not step back from his power, in spite of the growing international pressing against his regime. He succeeded in surviving to this international situation in particular by underling the anticommunist

del momento, aunque sea sólo por instinto de conservación, yo no sería quien te aconsejara que de pronto dieras un salto en el vacío y dijeras: ahí queda eso. Pero una cosa es no dar el salto en el vacío, no entregarse sin más, y otra desconocer la realidad cierta de que no se puede seguir así, de que así esto va a acabar mal”. Entonces comentamos algunos puntos de mi carta. Le hablé de los hombres nuevos que yo proponía como gobernantes: “Sí, hombres cuyo nombre tiene eco y resonancia en el mundo, porque hoy en día, Marañón, Ortega y Cambó son personas internacionalmente conocidas, a la inversa de estos ilustres seudofalangistas o tecnócratas, que no conoce nadie”. Fue entonces cuando él, que era muy dado a la anécdota, me pregunta: “¿Tú crees que Ortega valdría para ministro?”. Y añadía: “Yo creo que sería un mal ministro”. Y yo le dije: “Es un hombre eminente de quien puede esperarse una gran obra, y si resultara que lo administrativo y burocrático le aburrieran, ya le pondríamos un buen subsecretario”. In Saña, 1981: 282-285.

¹⁰⁹ See *Se habla de... Ortega y Gasset*, in *Arriba*, 12-VIII-1945.

¹¹⁰ *Ibidem*.

and catholic character of Spain in a period in which the cold war appeared as the new conundrum of international politics.

When Ortega decided to return back to his homeland he could not predict the direction of the national politics in the following months, but he was certainly aware that in order to have a minimum space of intellectual freedom he had to accept to have close relationships with those members of the establishment who were contributing to the political make-up of the regime. His son, for instance, [Ortega Spottorno, 1983: 176] remembered that during that period his father had the possibility to meet in at least two different occasions three very important members of the regime: Fernando María Castiella, José Félix Lequerica and José María de Areilza, respectively the director of the *Instituto de Estudios Políticos*, the former foreign minister and a loyal Falangist.

All of them shared a significant expertise concerning foreign policies issues. These meetings demonstrate that Ortega was conceived by the regime as a very useful instrument in order to gain international respect and credibility during a period of dramatic isolation. It is also plausible that Ortega knew he could be helpful in this respect, agreeing not to directly opposing the regime in a way that could have damaged its foreign policy. This is what he actually did, as it has been previously demonstrated by analysing his writings and speeches. He probably did so in order to have the possibility of playing again an intellectual influence in the country, exercising a soft power he was sure – as it will be proved in the next pages – it could have produced important results.

7.8 *Preparing the intellectual return*

In the meantime, this international situation was producing some adjustments in the Spanish cultural world. In spite of conserving a very rigid censorship and a very strong repressive apparatus, the same establishment of the regime revealed some little signs of moderate appeasement. These tiny signs appeared more evident within the arts and the painting [Gracia, 2006], whether, as far as the philosophical production is concerned, they showed up in particular via the permission conceded to the *Revista de Occidente* to edit again its books. This represented a sort of appeasement between the regime and Ortega's family which was epitomised by the publication, in 1945, of a

collection of essays written by García Morente during his whole life¹¹¹. That is to say, both before and after his conversion to Catholicism and his endorsement to the regime. Four of the nine essays published in this occasion directly concerned the philosophy of Ortega y Gasset and the majority of them dealt specifically with his theory of education. *Moreover, Morente was presented in the prologue, written by Manuel Granell, as one of the last direct disciples of Ortega, having the «idoneidad para la comprensión y exposición de los logros metafísicos de Ortega»*¹¹². A quite obscure sentence which evidently affirms that Morente's interpretation of Ortega's thought could have been considered as the most suitable reading for the philosophical scholasticism and catholic dogmatism endorsed by the new University of the regime. Evidently, the return of Ortega in Spain had to be scrupulously prepared in order to obtain the desired effect.

This partial breach in the cultural atmosphere of the regime and the prudent preparation of Ortega's return are also proved by the creation of some new cultural reviews such as *Cuadernos de Adán* and *La Estafeta Literaria*, both funded between 1944 and 1945. In particular, the first of these two reviews gave quite an ample space to Ortega y Gasset, publishing one of his previous essays in the first volume (*Ni vitalismo ni racionalismo*, wrote in 1924), and an essay by the famous writer José Augusto Azorín dedicated to the philosopher in his second volume published in 1945, entitled *Ortega o el orador*. In this text he describes the great expectation caused by a conference of the Madrilenian philosopher and his impressive ability to capture the audience: «El tiempo no existe para el auditorio cuando habla Ortega. Presos en la sutil red de sus razonamientos y de sus imágenes, el tiempo pasa sin que nosotros, los que escuchamos, lo advirtamos. Y cuando al cabo de hora y media llega al final, ¿es que realmente estamos en el final?»¹¹³. Ortega's oratory ability is significantly compared to that of a very authoritative politician of the past: Maura. Every person reading this article cannot but hope to have the possibility to directly admire this great public speaker during his life. This article clearly produces a great expectation after Ortega's return in Spain in relation to his public and teaching activity. An expectation which would have produced an enormous interest in all his following appearances also in the new

¹¹¹ Manuel García Morente, *Ensayos*, Madrid, Revista de Occidente, 1945.

¹¹² *Ibidem*, p. 14.

¹¹³ See Azorín, *Ortega o el orador*, in *Cuadernos de Adán*, Madrid, 1945, p. 27.

generation of students that so far had not had the opportunity to listen to him.

During his Lusitanian exile, Ortega had never ceased to cultivate strong cultural relations with some intellectuals with strong connection with Franco's regime. His letters reveal several of these frequentations which have been also underlined by José Ortega y Spottorno, the son of the philosopher, in his biography. In particular, he mentions among the most influent proponents of Ortega's return in Spain Luis Díez del Corral and Antonio Maravall [Ortega Spottorno, 2002: 395]. These two figures have a lot in common. Both the authors took part in the project and realisation of the *Escorial* and both privileged a political and, broadly speaking, sociological rather than philosophical perspective. Both conceived political theory as an instrument of legitimacy of a political regime, and both joined the FET y JONS since its very birth [Santos, 2002; Fresán Cuenca, 2003]. When they were organizing his return Spain they were both engaged in a project of theoretical legitimacy of Franco's government after the end of WWII. In fact, the end of the war caused the logical interruption of a state of exception and the need of posing the bases of a legitimate form of political power.

To do so, Antonio Maravall wrote *Los fundamentos del derecho y del Estado* (1947) in which, starting from the concept of life as presented by Ortega in his writings, he constructed a social theory concerning the way in which the social relations are constructed and maintained over time. Starting from the concept of the human life as an ongoing project to be realised, he argues in favour of a communitarian account in which the freedom of the individuals is constrained and reduced to the common desire of a community to reach a unified goal. For this reason, the State would represent a "community of destiny" which includes the desires and ambitions of the single individuals¹¹⁴. His interpretation of the thought of Ortega constituted a justification of a communitarian regime in the sense of an authoritarian power very similar to the "democracia orgánica" presented by Franco in those very years.

Similarly, Díez del Corral's book on the liberal doctrinarism [1945] constitutes a study of the premises of conservatism within a liberal framework, that is to say an attempt to conciliate the freedom of the

¹¹⁴ «Las formas de comunidad, por un lado, comprometen decisivamente el destino de los individuos que en ellas se integran. Por eso, en una dimensión fundamental de la vida, sólo puede pertenecerse a una comunidad – religiosa, política, familiar, etc. [Maravall, 1947: 211].

individual with the imposition of the State or the community. He himself traced the offspring of his interests in the doctrinarian liberals in the words of Ortega and his *Prólogo a los franceses* (1937). When he published his book, in 1945, immediately after he sent a copy to the philosopher as a tribute to his influent mastery¹¹⁵.

Albeit the oppressive mainstream condemnation of Ortega – due to his lack of religiosity, metaphysical interest and systematic thought¹¹⁶ – some of the members of the establishment, and especially those who had partially been left apart from the new national-catholic hegemony, started to instrumentally adopt Ortega and other intellectuals of the past two decades to claim for a leading role within the francoist family. At the same time, due to the changing political circumstances, the rescuing of Ortega's thought – or rather of his personal figure – was conceived as useful for the survival of the regime. Within the international community Ortega enjoyed a representative role, and his return constituted the possibility of ennoble the Spanish government.

At the same time, he was also exalted by those intellectuals who were completely excluded by the regime orthodoxy but wanted to play an active role in it. The most famous case of this group is that of Julián Marías. This Ortega's disciple wrote in 1945 a short article defending the general philosophical account of his master against those who: «suelen reprochar a Ortega que no ha dado forma más rigurosamente científica a sus ideas filosóficas»¹¹⁷. This double and opposite tendency in the reception and narration of Ortega's philosophy during the decade of the 40's significantly marked the different reactions to his return in Madrid after his long exile. This was also due to the fact that the philosopher did not want to play a secondary role within the cultural debates of his country, and strongly desired to gain back his leading intellectual role.

¹¹⁵ Letter by Diéz del Corral to Ortega, 23-VIII-1945, in AOG, C-59/ 13.

¹¹⁶ Using the words of one of his critics, Roig Gironella, in Ortega: «Encontramos un escepticismo elegante: duda, vaciedad. Filosofía solo por filosofar, como se fuma para pasar el rato; pero o para encontrar la verdad (entendiendo la verdadera verdad, la que aun siendo limitada y proporcionada a la pequeña capacidad humana, con todo dice algo que “es”, y que como afirmación “absoluta” se opone al “error”). Roig Gironella, 1946: 110.

¹¹⁷ See J. Marías, *Algunas precisiones sobre la filosofía de Ortega y Gasset*, in «Leonardo. Revista de las ideas y formas», 3, 1945, pp. 437-449.

So, even when the chances to intervene within the public sphere as a free and independent intellectual were consistently limited by the circumstances, Ortega did not renounce to play what he thought is his philosophical duty. Moreover, the information he received from his friends in 1945 seemed to him to suggest that the regime was changing its autocratic and totalitarian outlook, in particular as far as the freedom of speech and publication was concerned [Gracia, 2014: 577]. Thus, he obeyed to his imperative of authenticity and decided to return in Spain and continue his intellectual activity in order to invite both the Spanish cultural elites and the public opinion to critically reflect on the current political situation. The end of WWII constituted to him a relief. He thought that after more than ten years in which his role had been strongly diminished by the circumstances, it could have been possible to restore a proper dialogue with his audience. A dialogue which he conceived as viable both inside and outside the University.

PART IV

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CULTURAL HEGEMONY.

The theory of the generations of Ortega was the expression of his most profound understanding of the relations of power exercised among different groups competing for the cultural, political and social leadership of the new Spain. He assigned to his theorisation a great explanatory power in regard to the regulation of the social life. This also reveals the importance he assigned to the need, for all the intellectuals, of being part of a specific and vital generation in order to have an influential role within society. For this reason, both before, during and after his return in Spain, Ortega always looked not only for an audience, but also and foremost for possible collaborations who could have concretely helped him to reaffirm his intellectual status within the Spanish society. In particular, he sought to find consensus among the youngest generations which, even if included within the regime, had been manifesting discomfort in relation to an excessively oppressive and dogmatic cultural control. This operation of persuasion, in particular after the end of the war and the beginning of a new political phase, both from a national and an international point of view, appeared to be a concrete possibility for the return of the philosopher. Indeed, he intensified his dialogues with exiled monarchists as well as with young intellectuals included in the new cultural establishment but did not entirely embrace its ideology. To converse effectively with them Ortega partially accepted to adapt his language to the idiom spoken within the new academia, choosing the themes by looking to the cultural debates that were spreading in the country and also by

adopting a basic common language. At the same time, however, he tried to modify it when possible, to transform it in order to put in it the seeds of his dissension, as he did in the case of his definition of liberalism. The political question still remained open and, as it will be proved in the course of this chapter, Ortega tried to offer his contribution to one of the most debated topics within the regime: i.e. the legitimacy of an exceptional power, not really grounded in the respect of the rule of law, as it was the case of Franco's dictatorship. During the period of his return in Spain, and until his death, Ortega fought for conquering a relevant influential role in the Spanish cultural scene. A struggle that finally turned out to be a total failure, but that reveals the desire of the philosopher of never abandoning his country. In fact, he wanted to push it into the new European cultural debate that started after the end of the war with the purpose of including Spain within the new continental scenario. And, in continuity to all his precedent meditations, he was persuaded that in order to this, before realising a political change, it would have been necessary to produce a cultural conversion.

This section takes into consideration the period comprised between Ortega's return in Spain, in 1945, and his death in 1955. In addition, it also analyses the legacy of his philosophical and pedagogical theory in the Spanish academia during the following years. After a first and quite disappointing return, the second coming of Ortega in 1948 constituted a very remarkable attempt of taking part into the Spanish cultural scenario through the creation of the Institute of Humanities. For this reason, a central part of this section is devoted to the analysis of the political scenario in which this project was realised, of the relations that rendered it possible, of its aims and, finally, of the reactions to it of the political regime, the young generations that started to compose it and the general population that, directly or not, had the chance to participate in it. In this way, and also by taking into consideration the following developments of Ortega's theory and practice of education in relation to the national and international contexts, this section contributes to shed light on a period of his life usually underestimated, both by his biographers and by the scholars of his philosophical ideas. A period that, as it will be proved, has to be scrupulously taken into account for comprehending the evolution of the philosophical and academic debate in Spain at least until its transition to democracy.

Chapter 8.

A provisional return

The end of the war represented another watershed both for the life of Spain and for the personal existence of Ortega y Gasset. The University, and the very notion of philosophy and humanity purported within it, underwent another significant change that subverted the hierarchy within the regime. Thus, the apparent homogeneity of the cultural Spanish scenario revealed its extremely fragmentation and conflictive character. The academia represented once again the battleground of this new political struggle in which, for the first time, emerged a group of intellectuals and politicians which defined itself as proper disciples of Ortega. They operated in a context in which, starting from 1944, Franco's dictatorship started to live a profound crisis which could have ended with its replacement in favour of the Bourbon monarchy. This was not the case of a regime that lastly assumed a new democratic appearance represented by the publication of the *Fuero de los Españoles* and the *Ley de sucesion* (1945). The return of Ortega in Spain after more than ten years of exile, represented a significant symbolic gesture and an attempt to contribute to the modernisation, at least at a superficial level, of the regime.

This chapter investigates to what extent the return of Ortega in Spain met the needs of the regime, contributing to its regeneration, and to what extent this had been intentionally or unintentionally done by the philosopher. Indeed, during these years, Ortega enhanced his struggle for recovering a direct contact with the Spanish academia and public opinion, revealing the wish to re-establish a cultural normality within a broken country. After examining the reasons that led Ortega to return back in Spain through an analysis of his writings and letters (§1), the position of the official journal of the regime's academia towards Ortega will be analysed, in particular by taking into consideration the articles published in the two most influential scientific journal on the humanities and political sciences: *Arbor* and *Revista de Estudios Políticos* (§2). These positions will later be contrasted (§3) with the one presented by new journals and reviews founded during this period of the Spanish

history and which were far more akin to the Orteguian perspective, having among their members some direct disciples of the philosopher. These reviews are in particular *Ínsula* and *Leonardo*. The first public appearance of Ortega after this exile (§4) undoubtedly represented a braking point for the philosopher: his dreams and desires collided with the dramatic reality of a country in which each form of cultural expression was still rigidly controlled and censored. This, on the one hand, caused a new voluntary exit of the philosopher from the country and, on the other, determined his increasing interest for the new problems that the post-war global society had to face in terms of humanistic education and intellectual responsibility (§5). In the meanwhile, the Spanish academia was developing a new form of sectarian communication, overcoming the previous nationalist ideology with an exclusively religious one, giving birth to a sort of third-Scholasticism (§6). The total rejection of Ortega and of this form of philosophising and educating a new generation of students (§7) did constitute one of the main reasons that stimulated the philosopher not to abandon completely Spain to its own destiny, trying to continue exercising his cultural influence, unceasingly looking for an active collaboration with, at least, the few members of the academia who he still had in great esteem (§8).

8.1 Ortega back in Spain

Ortega came back in Spain in August 1945 after more than nine years of exile. No sensationalism accompanied his return that had been keenly understated by the regime. The very Ortega preferred to preserve a sort of anonymity during his first return in the country, conceiving it as a sort of experiment primarily aimed to get in touch with his family and friends rather than to intervene directly in the public debate (Ortega Spottorno, 2002: 397-398). For this reason he did not enter in Madrid until the autumn of 1945, after having spent the whole summer in the Basque Country. In any case, the press did report the news at the very beginning of August¹.

¹ Here it is a non-exhaustive list of newspapers that reported this news: *El Alcazar*, 8-VIII-1945; *Pueblo*, 8-VIII-1945; *Unidad*, 8-VIII-1945; *Jornada*, 8-VIII-1945; *La Voz*, 8-VIII-1945; *Información*, 9-VIII-1945; *Arriba*, 9-VIII-1945; *Ya*, 9-VIII-1945; *ABC*, 9-VIII- 1945; *Redención*, 11-VIII-1945. In AOG.

On August 12, 1945, the newspaper *Arriba* published a longer article on Ortega's return in which the philosopher was significantly depicted as the initiator of the regime's ideology. His decision to come back in the country was interpreted as an endorsement to the new political establishment². He received a warm welcome by this newspaper, a reception which concealed a secret agenda: inviting Ortega to serve the national cause during a period in which Spain was increasingly isolated from the international scenario. This plan was covertly disclosed by the newspaper which affirmed that: «No podía faltar nuestra bienvenida en este momento del regreso a la lar. Pero menos aún podía faltar la expresión de nuestro deseo más férvido: el que D. José Ortega y Gasset sepa todo cuanto hay implícito en esta bienvenida»³.

Ortega was therefore supposed to play a significant role in defence of Franco's establishment from an international perspective. Far more questioned was his right to contribute to forge the Spanish public opinion according to those educational principles that could have been in contrast with the dogmatic pedagogy offered by the regime. The words of the priest Sánchez Villaseñor clearly revealed the preoccupation, from a Catholic point of view, towards the possible dangers that the philosophy of Ortega y Gasset could have caused within a young generation of students. In fact, his philosophy would constitute the expression of a "pseudo-humanism" which would not be apt to build the consciousness of the post-war humanism. In fact: «A la actitud antropocéntrica deberá oponer la concepción católica del mundo y de la vida. Al racionalismo y existencialismo, incapaces de integrar jerárquicamente el intelecto y la vitalidad, la grandiosa síntesis de la filosofía perenne» (Sánchez Villaseñor, 1943: 335).

Nevertheless, Ortega did not share this view. Manuel Aznar, in one of his letters he wrote to the Madrilenian philosopher after its return in Spain, gives us an hint of what was the goal that Ortega pursued by coming back to his country. He wanted to favour and lead an intellectual dialogue among the different souls of the regime, with the

² See, *Se habla de Ortega y Gasset*, in *Arriba*, 12-VIII-1945: «Ortega ha podido hacer comenzar una etapa que en la historia de España arranca quizás de él mismo y termina con nosotros, los que hemos ganado el fresco laurel de la juventud por intentar una revolución para los demás». [...] «España está aquí y es, justamente, lo que es. Y, porqué es lo que es, Ortega vuelve a ella». In AOG.

³ In *Maricel*, 24-VIII-1945. In AOG, PB-232/ 82.

aim of constructing a new cultural minority able to promote a transformation in the social, political and intellectual scenario⁴. Indeed, some months after his return in Madrid, from autumn 1945, Ortega did start to get in contact with the intellectual circles of the capital, in particular thanks to the mediation of his son José who reopened the activity of the *Revista de Occidente* and his frequent meetings (Gracia, 2014: 578).

By the beginning of 1946 he had already managed to realise a great amount of works and activities both in Spain and abroad. He starts to collaborate with several Spanish reviews such as *Leonardo*, the *Revista de Psicología General y Aplicada* and planned the possibility of writing a prologue to a book of Erasmus for the review *Zodiaco*. Not only he restarted to act as an intellectual entirely devoted to publish both within scientific reviews and popular journals, but he also did it having a clear concept of his role in a Spain, a country that he perceived at a radical turning point of its political history. As he wrote to the director of the *Revista de Psicología*, José Germain, in March 1946 he was persuaded that a form of active and honest collaboration with the government would have been nonsensical insofar as «el Gobierno, claro está, no lo merece y además está moribundo»⁵. For this reason he deliberated to collaborate with a review officially based outside the Spanish boarder, in Tangier, where Fernando Vela was collaborating with a journal, *España*, that had the great chance of escaping from the control of the still rigid Spanish censorship. During this period Ortega perceived the possibility of using this stratagem to begin to influence with greater independence in Spain. For this purpose, he planned a very scrupulous plan of intervention that he shared with his friends and collaborators⁶.

Ortega's project to establish a continuous collaboration with *España* would not have been put in practice and he only published an article

⁴ «No hago sino pensar en todo su plan de restablecimiento del diálogo entre intelectuales, y en sus proyectos de dirigir un tremendo llamamiento a las minorías. Letter by M. Aznar to Ortega, 29-VIII-1945, in AOG, C-55bis/ 8k.

⁵ Letter from Ortega to Germán, 2-IV-1946, in AOG, CD-G/ 56.

⁶ «Es preciso que organizemos con un perfecto mecanismo de funcionamiento rapidísimo, el envío constante de libros. Esta necesidad se convierte en extrema al meterme a hacer esto artículos de periódico que acaso sepa voy a hacer y que serán, por ahora, tres al mes». Letter by Ortega to Castilla, 18-III-1946, in C-50/ 18.

significantly entitled *Llevo doce años de silencio*. In this short article – that should have introduced a series of essays that would had to be published during the whole year (1946) – Ortega declared that after so many years of silence and limited speech he could finally return to speak, or rather to “say” and declare (*decir*) the truth⁷. He also claimed for the necessity of fitting his discourse to the new historical, political and social circumstances, due to the fact that no philosophical idea can be though independently from the context in which it is produced⁸. The basic tenets of his new intellectual intervention within the Spanish cultural scenario had been clearly posed by the beginning of 1946. He possessed fresh arguments, the attention of some mass media and was starting to individuate a possible audience among which he could have spread his ideas. The basic conditions for starting his intellectual activity appeared to be finally realised, and the main problem he faced – i.e. an adverse political regime – seemed to be opened to a rapid and substantial transition (Portero, 1989, 27-55).

8.2 *The political background: Arbor and Revista de Estudios Políticos*

With the end of the WWII the cultural discourse within the Spanish borders slightly changed. Undoubtedly, the freedom of speech and the likelihood of producing a significant cultural innovation still remained unfulfilled ambitions shared by a very limited intellectual minority. A minority to which Ortega belonged. At the same time, some evidences of a new negotiation of the general outlook of the regime can be noticed. In particular, two different aspects deserve to be briefly sketched. On one hand, within the academia, and in particular in the faculty of philosophy of the UC, it is possible to observe a significant move towards an intensification of the Catholic character of the Spanish culture. This move was aimed to preserve the

⁷ «Decir no es, pues, verbalizar sino *de-clarar* la verdad, hablar en forma. En el auténtico decir no se expresa una necesidad, una emoción o un capricho privados, sino formalmente una doctrina. Ahora bien, esto es lo que no ha podido hacerse *en ninguna parte del mundo* durante estos diez años» (OC, IX: 705).

⁸ «No es uno, se me ocurre, quien debe ser consecuente con sus ideas, sino sus ideas quienes deben ser consecuentes con la realidad» *Ibidem*.

cultural status quo by abandoning any sort of reference to a fascist ideology and replacing it with a dogmatic scholasticism (Abellán, 2005: 159).

On the other hand, the necessity of modifying some of the basic tenets of the regime's ideology, rendering them more akin to the new international scenario, appeared to many as a viable possibility for reforming the dictatorship from within, with the ultimate goal of replacing it with the monarchy (Gallego Margaleff, 2014: 789). A third posture was the one represented by the radical opposition to the regime that was expanding outside the Spanish borders and in particular in France by the international socialism (Payne, 1996: 43-50; Ortuño Anaya, 2002: 19-21).

Ortega's return was evidently connected with the second of these attitudes towards the regime. He wanted to change it from within, but he was persuaded that to do this he would have to count on a new intellectual community that supported his efforts. Indeed, several scientific journals and reviews was starting to be created in the period that followed the end of the war. The cultural scene was still quite static, but at the same time isolated groups started to appear in the public scenario through new intellectual projects, such as oases in the desert (Díaz Hernández, 2007: 218). Some of them reflected the dominant ideology of the regime, as the review of the CSIC, *Arbor*. Other, such as the *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, directed from 1943 by Fernando Castiella, constituted an attempt to re-establish a continuity with some Spanish liberal authors. Others, such as *La Estafeta literaria*, tried to import in Spain the new trends of literature, both by giving to some young authors the possibility to present their works and by reviewing foreign books (González Ariza, 2010). Lastly, some of these reviews, such as *Ínsula* or *Leonardo*, apart from providing fresh news on the European culture, also tried to revitalise the thought of Ortega y Gasset. In this way they aimed at being the indispensable background that could have sustained the new intellectual action of the philosopher. This statement can be proved by analysing some of the articles published in these reviews between 1944 and 1946.

The treatment that *Arbor* reserved to Ortega was generally extremely critical. The theological humanism largely purported by the review was undoubtedly incompatible with the thought of the philosopher. An article by Jiménez Duque at the end of 1944, *Humanismo y mística*, clearly testified it. In this text, the author traces a

history of humanism from the late antiquity to the present day and depicts Ortega as one of the contemporary philosopher who – revitalising the anthropocentrism of the early modern period in the XX century – had contributed to the deterioration of the concept of truth due to the relativism of his “raciovitalismo”⁹. No culture outside religion. This could be the lemma of the this article¹⁰ and, in general of the review, which reflected the posture of the regime. In other words, no political power could have been exercised without the support of the Church and *Arbor*, a review basically guided by the Opus Dei, constituted the manifest of this ideological view. During the same year, in fact, the friar Lopez Órtiz, the founder of the review, dedicated a whole article to the papal bull *Divino Afflante Spiritu* that he interpreted as the manifestation of the possibility of using the sacred tests as methodological and authoritative tools to be applied in the scientific research and in particular to the study of history¹¹.

From October 1946, the review started to slightly change its outlook since the entrance of Calvo Serer in the editorial board. Calvo Serer was a monarchic professor who, since his encounter with Juan de Borbón in 1945, collaborated to the restoration of the monarchy in Spain (Díaz Hernández: 2008, 48-53). From a philosophical perspective he strongly disagreed with the concept of culture defended by Ortega and always sustained the necessity of posing the bases of a catholic philosophy which could have served the national cause (*Ibidem*: 73). *Arbor* reflected the spirit of this new member of the editorial board. Indeed, it started

⁹ «Todo se derrumba. Y la realidad del yo viviente, que se siente y se impone como sea, se agarra desesperada a lo que puede por tratar de explicarse. Pragmatismo a lo James, fenomenología a lo Husserl, intuicionismo inmanentista a lo Bergson, vitalismo a lo Ortega y Gasset, existencialismo a lo Heidegger...». Jiménez Díaz, 1944: 51.

¹⁰ «¿Qué es el humanismo? El estudio del hombre completo el estudio de su ideal. Para que se construya una pedagogía correspondiente. [...] El concepto del humanismo es así de hecho, necesariamente, un concepto relativo. Pero exige una solución objetiva, absoluta, en la que puedan convenir todos los espíritus serenos y humildes. Una mirada a la verdad cristiana nos pondrá la calma en el sosiego ardiente» (*Ibidem*: 53).

¹¹ «Ahora la encíclica *Divino Afflante Spiritu* nos sorprende gratísimamente por la plena seguridad con que sanciona la utilización en la ciencia sagrada del instrumental científico y los resultados de esa hermana menor en la gran familia de las ciencias que es la historia». (Lopez Órtiz, 1944: 412).

to dedicate a section to the international scenario reporting the main intellectual news, in particular in relation to the humanities.

The main themes treated by the journal slightly changed from the scientific topics (as in the line of the CSIC) to the role of the humanistic education in the new society of the second post-war. In this context the propagandistic and pedagogical preoccupations acquired a great importance for the review. Significantly, the professor of aesthetics at the UC and director of the review, Sánchez de Muniaín, dedicated a whole article to describe the basic traits that the effective propagator of culture should have to possess¹². At the same time, the review was starting to deal with problems such as the creation of the European Union¹³ or the responsibility of scientists in the age of the atomic bomb. However, the official ideology represented by this journal was still embedded in an orthodox defence of a form of national-Catholicism, and in particular the one purported by the Dominican priest Santiago Ramírez¹⁴, who would be one the greatest antagonist of Ortega soon after his return in Spain and long after his death. Indeed, Ramírez was chosen to substitute Ortega at the Chair of Metaphysics, but he renounced to this possibility permitting to Zaragüeta to do it¹⁵. According to Ramírez, the philosophy presented by Ortega could have corrupted the youngest generations and, consequently, should have been banned by the regime¹⁶.

Another review exercised a great influence in the cultural scenario of that time: the *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, the review of the *Instituto de Estudios Políticos* that in 1945, with the presidency of Castiella, was living a new phase of its long history. The REP, basically a product of the Faculty of Political Science and Economics of the UC (Muñoz Soro and Sesma Landrin, 2014), served as the main instrument for defining and legitimating the institutional order of the regime. The aim of the review was basically that of offering to the dictator a justification of the political regime and, at the same time, advising him on the best

¹² Sánchez de Muniaín, 1946.

¹³ Azaola, 1946.

¹⁴ Palacios, 1946.

¹⁵ In fact: «La opción del Estado franquista por Santiago Ramírez consolidaba una posición teórica tanto como un modelo social de filósofo». Pestaña, 2013: 82.

¹⁶ «La filosofía se convierte así en apoteosis de la cuquería: es ésta misma elevada al cubo, es decir, una cuquería refinada». Ramírez, 1958: 303.

decisions to take in a changing international contest. If ruling a country was firstly a pedagogical and educative function, as written by the professor of public law at the University of Oviedo Fernández-Miranda¹⁷, then the very Caudillo – or the eventual future monarch – should have been supplied with a comprehensive political doctrine. And this was exactly the aim of the review.

Providing a theoretical insight on political questions basically meant to define the normative goals of the regime, as explained in a dense philosophical article written by the professor of Logic at the UC Eulogio Palacios (1945). In his article he rejects the ratio-vitalism of Ortega, but not disqualifying it with the same *ad personam* arguments provided by his colleagues of *Arbor*, but rather motivating his position with philosophical reasons¹⁸. In this text he also presents the basic tenets of his conception of politics as a form of prudence. With this expression he did not mean that the regime should have prudently confide in God to survive in a turbulent political scenario, as wrongly written, for instance, by Gregorio Morán¹⁹.

On the contrary, Palacios' opposition between art and prudence serves as a tool to support the institutionalisation of a sort of state of exception based on theological and moral principles. This was conceived as the correct way to govern the country, unceasingly adapting the laws to its changing needs and the external circumstances²⁰. Consequently, the theorisation of Palacios focused on a

¹⁷ «La labor del Príncipe, del conductor o de la minoría dirigente es, pues, un dirigir y encaminar las actividades humanas que integran el organismo de la comunidad política, en su doble faceta de actividades creadoras y funcionales, hacia la meta de la perfección social y personal de la vida humana. Labor altamente política y esencialmente *educativa y pedagógica*». Fernández-Miranda, 1944: 587.

¹⁸ «La razón práctica nos permite saber hacer y ejecutar, pero es siempre a partir de un fin que es trascendente a ella. Si, en mi concepción, la razón práctica no es autónoma, tampoco lo será la razón vital e histórica, identificable con ella. Esto es un indicio a la diferencia básica que separa mi concepción de la de Ortega». Eulogio Palacios, 1945: 59.

¹⁹ «El objetivo no es otro que dar soporte metafísico a algo tan vulgar como la necesidad de la España de Franco de confiar “prudentemente” en que Dios les va a echar una mano si son perseverante». Gregorio Morán, 1998: 132.

²⁰ «Ante el tema de la política se plantea a veces la cuestión de si es un arte. Yo creo que debería plantearse de un modo más completo: si es arte o si es prudencia. Es indudable que, sea cual fuera la respuesta, deberá basarse sobre

more radical question: how to guarantee the legitimacy and maintenance into power of a State that rejects the rule of law but does not yearn to base its power uniquely on the army? This question was vitally important for the community of discourse that composed the IEP and the REP, since it characterised the concrete existence of a political power that always rejected a constitutional framework (Giménez Martínez, 2015). For this reason, the general outlook of Palacios did find an extremely positive reception within this intellectual circle, as proved by the notes of Azorín, Corts Grau and others (Morán, 1998: 133).

Such concerns over the necessity of offering a new political ideology that rejected fascism and embraced an apparently softer form of authoritarianism were overtly recognised by Antonio Maravall. In a long essay, largely indebted to the book of Diez del Corral on the nature of the doctrinarian liberalism, he theorised a normative goal of the regime which could have been adequate for the rapidly changing times²¹. In this way he proposed a justification for the legitimacy of the regime conceiving it as a form of *moral liberal democracy*. With this complicated and quite paradoxical term he defined a form of government that, by guaranteeing exclusively an extremely limited form of participation to the population (sporadic plebiscites²²) and founding its own legitimacy in transcendent and immutable values (moral character²³), would have aim to foster the liberty of the citizens

la distinción susodicha: la de tener o no reglas fijas. Si la política posee procedimientos invariables, es un arte; si, por el contrario, sus normas son flexibles y ocurrentes, pertenecen a la prudencia». (Eulogio Palacios, 1945: 65).

²¹ Maravall, 1945: 7: «En la situación de hoy una cosa es evidente: que hay que replantear el problema catolicismo-libertad, no porque se trate de una adaptación a los tiempos, cosa que en muy precisos límites sería lícito a la prudencia cristiana, sino porque los momentos de la Historia cambian de faz constantemente, y enfocados con una idea que no cambia dan, sin embargo, panoramas distintos».

²² *Ibidem*: 28: «Se mantiene un mínimo de participación popular en las funciones públicas – que ya hemos visto que no repele a un recto entendimiento del gobierno, y añadamos que está en la evolución natural del Movimiento español, declarada, desde el principio y comenzada a aplicar».

²³ *Ibidem*: 44: «Hemos de afirmar hoy la existencia perenne de un orden de bienes y de fines objetivos, válidos por encima y aun contra la voluntad humana, que cuando se aparta de ellos yerra. [...] La voluntad individual es infalible para el logro de los intereses sociales y políticos más altos».

conceived not as an end in itself, but rather just as a means for promoting a flourishing life which would have ultimately be established by a paternalistic power.

During this period, the same view was supported and shared by all the most representative members of the review, such as Corts Grau, who in his articles presented a very controversial thesis according to which the Right and the Law would always pre-exist to the concrete establishment of a State²⁴. Interestingly enough, the criticisms towards the liberal rhetoric were conducted in this case by using the words of the very Ortega who was now conceived as a valid philosophical source to combine a democratic with an authoritarian framework: this would correspond to the idea of a Christian community that the REP was proposing as a new legitimating tool for the regime amidst the growing influence of the USSR in the international scenario (Sesma Landrín, 2004).

To summarise, REP shared with Arbor a common ideology based on the vindication of the importance of Catholicism as a source of legitimacy and a viable cultural ideology. However the two reviews radically differed in two basic aspects: the indispensability of Franco's survival in the post-war scenario – which was discarded by the REP – and the way of approaching the thought of Ortega. This was much more critical in the case of Arbor, whereas, on the contrary, the REP tried to adopt it to the new political circumstances.

8.3 *Ínsula*: an *orteguian niche*.

Since its birth, in October 1945, *Ínsula* represented a significant novelty in the Spanish cultural scenario. It was indeed the first journal of the new State that had not been created directly by the political regime but rather sprang autonomously by a group of intellectual who basically shared a common admiration towards Ortega y Gasset, in particular Enrique Canito and José Luis Cano (Mora García, 2006). The aim of the review was not that of countering the regime, neither from a political nor from a cultural perspective. On the contrary, the aim was

²⁴ Corts Grau, 1946: 12: «El Derecho es anterior en sus fundamentos a toda organización estatal, y su universalidad prevalece sobre las singularidades estatales»

just that of revitalising the cultural scenario. For this reason, together with the texts of some of the most prominent intellectuals akin to the regime, the review devoted a great attention to some of the exiled writers who had played a significant political or cultural role during the II Republic (Tusell, 2004: 667). The review not only was totally independent from the regime, but was also looked askance by the political establishment (Ferrary, 1993: 270). However, from an international perspective, the regime benefited from this publication that appeared to concretise the pacifist words pronounced by the Caudillo since 1945 towards the exiled intellectuals (Larraz, 2009: 23).

Indeed, the review constituted a great innovation in the Spanish cultural scenario. In a period in which a very limited set of fix authors, chiefly Spanish, constituted the intellectual globe, *Ínsula* proposed to its readers, for the first time after the victory of the National Movement, the works and theses of philosophers and intellectuals such as Gide, Nietzsche, Valery, Pio Baroja, María Zambrano, Unamuno, etc. The review had a relevant success. Its cost grew time by time passing from the 1.5 pesetas of the first number published in 1946, to 3 pesetas in 1948 and finally to 5 in 1953. *Ínsula* was directly linked to the activity of the editor *Revista de Occidente*, and since its first number it advertised both the new edition of Ortega's *España Invertebrada*, and it forecasted the publication of his complete works. Marías – one of the greatest contributors to this review, having published during its all life 62 articles – affirmed that *Ínsula* enjoyed a peculiar freedom since its very birth, probably given by the fact that its main interest was not related to the political but rather to the cultural sphere (Marías, 1983).

However, interestingly enough, the first appearance of the name of Ortega in this review is not due to the contribution of one of his direct disciples or friend. His first evocation is made by the director of the United State Information Library in Madrid from 1945 to 1947, Lesley Frost Ballantine – daughter of the famous poet Robert Frost. Ortega is significantly mentioned in relation to his pedagogy. In fact, reporting the recent monographic edition of the *Saturday review of Literature*, Frost presents the *status quaestionis* of the educative debate in America and in particular the educative reform for the post-war period recently proposed by the *Educational Policies Association of New York*. In this context, she underlined the fact the Ortega was internationally

considered as an extraordinary example of an intellectual whose thought perfectly embeds liberalism into a pedagogical proposal²⁵.

This international openness is revealed also by a long article published by the director of the British Institute in Madrid, Walter Starkie, concerning the state of the Hispanic studies in UK. Starkie, in fact, was also one of the main correspondents of Ortega y Gasset since the beginning of the '30s, collaborating to the publication of his works and articles in Great Britain. The role that the Madrilenian philosopher could have played within the post-war scenario in Spain constituted for the British government a topic of great interest. This is testified also by an interview that took place between Ortega and British journalist Tom Burns in September 1945. The interview was later transmitted to the British ambassador in Madrid, Victor Mallet, who manifested his fascination and admiration for the philosopher²⁶. He reported²⁷ the plans of Ortega to intervene within the Spanish public life as well as his doubts concerning the effective possibility to play an influent role in the cultural scenario. The final impression of the British government about the philosopher was extremely positive, even if all his concrete projects and vision about the future of politics in Spain appeared as extremely utopian²⁸.

²⁵ Frost, 1946: 4: «Afortunadamente desde hace poco una educación liberal se va asociando a la cultura en el sentido en que usa esta palabra Ortega y Gasset en su Misión de la Universidad, donde dice que esta es “el sistema de las ideas vitales de que vive una época».

²⁶ *Spanish affair, conversation between Presse Attache and Señor Ortega y Gasset*, in AOG, «He is one of the few outstanding Spaniards with a truly European outlook and is generally accepted as representative of liberal culture at its finest».

²⁷ «It had become more or less dangerous for a man to say what he thought: he ran a risk which varied from that of ostracism to that of the firing-squad or the concentration camp, according to the political climate in which he happened to be living. [...] One day he hoped to find a really neutral territory and launch once again his *Revista de Occidente* which he would try and make into a sort of forum for detached thinking from all countries – as long as he was not suspected of political intent. He said he thought of Tangier as the most suitable place». *Ibidem*.

²⁸ «This is an interesting despatch, but I cannot wax an enthusiastic about it as does Mr. Sloan. Señor Ortega y Gasset is a philosopher, and in his conversation with Mr. Burns he has said a lot of true things fairly clearly and incisively. But a lot of what he says is pure unpractical philosophy. [...] If Señor Ortega y Gasset

Not only Ortega constituted a reference point for the international community, but also for some members of the Spanish cultural scenario that lived in the country even if they had a very marginal role within the Francoist establishment. In the fifth number of the review, a long article was also dedicated to the close friend of Ortega, Gregorio Marañón. Moreover, *Ínsula* would later contribute – since the end of 1946 – to diffuse and publicise all the intellectual activities that Ortega carried out in Spain, and also abroad. Both his books and his conferences were extensively reviewed in the journal and his philosophy was always strenuously defended by intellectual figure who would have later taken part in the Institute of Humanities, such as Mariás, Garagorri or Bleiberg. The review did constitute a vitalising element within the study of the humanities in an extremely static and oppressive cultural situation. The relative freedom of speech and independency enjoyed by this publication²⁹ would soon cause the strong opposition of the most traditionalist and established members of the regime and, as it will be proved, the bone of contention would always be represented by Ortega y Gasset and his concept of university and humanistic education.

8.4 *The Ateneo's conference*

In May 1946 Ortega finally gave his first public speech in Madrid after his long exile. As proved by the harsh debate that surrounded his return – both within the scientific journals and the popular newspapers – he was still playing a very powerful symbolic role within the national culture. The invitation to give a lesson in Madrid came from the

were likely to play an active part in Spain in the future, his views might be of some value, but his criticisms seem to me to be purely destructive, and he seems cast for the role of a philosopher-cynic living in retirement». *Ibidem*.

²⁹ This freedom was indeed extremely limited and pertained exclusively to matters that did not relate directly to political questions. As written by Ferrary, 1993: 200: «El panorama cultural de los primeros años de la posguerra indicaba, pues, que era posible llevar a cabo una actividad intelectual creativa y voluntaria, previa aceptación de (al menos de hecho) una serie de condicionamientos externos, dentro de los cuales, el más claro lo constituía la existencia de una única crítica intelectual oficial verdaderamente decisiva y, consecuentemente, la existencia de un sistema impositivo de censura».

director of the national propaganda and recently elected president of the Madrilenian *Ateneo*, Pedro Rocamora, ideologically akin to the ACNdP. The *Ateneo*, originally founded in 1835, was a private cultural institution, based in the centre of Madrid, devoted to the propagation of science and literature among vast sectors of the population. The institute had a very distinguished liberal and laic tradition (Abellán, 2006). For instance, in 1936, a peculiar election took place in order to decide among the members of the *Ateneo* if God existed or not. Significantly enough, the result of the election ratified the inexistence of any divinity. The fame of this institute, during its long existence, had spread also outside the national borders. *For this reason, the reopening of its activities in the spring 1946 aimed at representing to the international community the new open-minded outlook of the Spanish political regime after the end of the war* (Sánchez García, 2005: 872).

Ortega's conference was one of the first events that took place in the *Ateneo* after the end of the war and was extraordinary publicised by Franco's propaganda, evidently with a clear instrumental purpose (Giustiniani, 2007: 62). The conference was surrounded by a great expectation and an enormous crowd attended to the event in the *Calle del Prado* [see Annex 6] as reported, for instance, by the journalist José Montero Alonso who wrote that «La masa empuja, pugna por entrar en tropel, amenaza con romper la Resistencia de los empleados»³⁰. Among the audience there were also some of the most distinguished members of the political, intellectual and academic establishment³¹. Ortega was escorted by Pedro Rocamora and one of the leading intellectuals of the ACNdP, José María Pemán [see Annex 7]. *Everything had been scrupulously prepared so to offer to the public a clear representation of an eminent intellectual converted to the new political ideology, and willing to defend the values of the national-Catholicism*. Significantly enough, when in 1949 the minister of Education Ibáñez Martín would recall the activities of the *Ateneo* since 1946, he used the verb “*desfilar*” – i.e. to

³⁰ José Montero Alonso, *Don José Ortega y Gasset, tras casi un cuarto de siglo, vuelve a la tribuna del Ateneo*, in «Madrid», 6-V-1946. In AOG, PB-238/ 118.

³¹ In particular those political figures who belonged to the first generation of falangists such as Serrano Suñer, Sánchez Mazas, Fernando Castiella, intellectuals such as Gregorio Marañón, Emilio García Gómez, Eugenio d'Ors, Azorín, Julián Pemartín, and members of the university community, such as the new professor of Metaphysics at the UC Juan Zaragüeta. In AOG, PB-238/ 118.

parade – to indicate these public events in which distinguished figures of the past took part in conferences or lectures³².

Ortega's intention was surely not that of being part of a mere show, as proven by the introduction to his conference that he pronounced on that occasion. Indeed, he conceived his intervention as an attempt to reacquire his leading role as an intellectual and a philosopher by speaking in a context apparently more informal than the one of the university. For this reason, he dedicated the whole preamble of his lecture on theatre to the importance of recreating the conditions for regaining a fruitful dialogue with a new generation of students. He underlined the necessity of continuing the educative mission he was forced to interrupt almost fifteen years before. His emotional discourse beckoned the importance of reconstructing the cultural atmosphere that preceded the instauration of the new educative system, without nostalgically calling for an anachronistic return to the past. Indeed, the whole discourse reveals the desire to set the premises for the development of a next intellectual intervention, aimed to propose a new normative political, social and educative ideal. As he put it: «Continuar no es quedarse en el pasado, ni siquiera enquistarse en el presente sino movilizarse, ir más allá, innovar pero renunciando al brinco y al salto y a partir de la nada» (OC, IX: 880).

Moreover, the reference to the precedent brilliant epoch of the Spanish culture of the *Edad de Plata* constituted also for Ortega a pretext for presenting himself as a viable bridge between two completely different eras of the national history. For this reason, he vouched for the Spanish future in a very complicated and problematic international scenario. He affirmed that, from an historical – not political – point of view, Spain had passed relatively unharmed through the WWII and, consequently, enjoyed a better status in relation to the majority of the

³² Ibáñez Martín, 1949: 758-759: «Es hoy día el Ateneo de Madrid el primer centro de difusión intelectual española, de carácter no oficial. Nunca como ahora podría aplicarse con más razón esa especial, significativa y, al mismo tiempo, popular denominación con que suele conocerse tanto en nuestra Patria como en el extranjero: la de Docta Casa. Nunca como en los últimos años ha coronado con tanto éxito sus esfuerzos, ni ha reunido tal cantidad de estudiosos, como a partir del momento en que aceptó su presidencia el director general de Propaganda. [...] Por la tribuna del Ateneo, estos años, han desfilado Ortega y Gasset, don Ramón Menéndez Pidal, el doctor don Gregorio Marañón, por sólo citar a tres maestros de nuestra cultura».

other European nations. Spain, according to Ortega, enjoyed a «casi indecente salud» (OC, IX: 881). This affirmation would later be interpreted by the propaganda as an overt endorsement to the regime (Giustiniani 2007: 75-78). However, the explicit desire expressed by Ortega was – rather than promoting and publicising the regime – that of offering his positive contribution for the development and following instauration of a new institutional framework. He said this with extreme clarity:

Es menester que estemos alerta y que todos, noten ustedes la generalidad del vocablo, noten ustedes el vocablo generalísimo, *todos* tengamos la alegría y la voluntad y la justicia, tanto legal como social, de crear una nueva figura de España apta para internarse saludable en las contingencias del más azaroso porvenir. Para ello es menester que *todos* nos apretemos un poco las cabezas, agucemos el sentido para inventar nuevas formas de vida donde el pasado desemboque en el futuro, que afrontemos los enormes, novísimos, inauditos problemas que el hombre tiene hoy ante sí [...] (OC, IX: 881).

So, not only Ortega vindicated the continuity of his intellectual activity in relation to the University he had so extensively contributed to build during the republican period. On the same time, he supported the necessity of guaranteeing the edification of a legislative framework which had to overcome the emergency government that had characterised the first life of the regime. He called for the participation of all the political forces to the design of a new institutional outlook which could have been easily integrated within the European and global context. Interestingly enough, he paused his discourse on the word “generalísimo”, overtly addressing to the General Franco. A new rule of law should have replace the State of exception implemented in Spain since the end of the civil war. The definition of this new rule should have been the new mission that the intellectuals, leaving apart partisan interests and propagandistic roles, should have to accomplish for helping the democratic development of the nation.

Even if Ortega was aware of the fact that his conference dealt with an apparently superfluous topic, he considers his talk in the *Ateneo* mainly as a way to interact again with a community of students and intellectuals who, in the previous decade, had either ignored or strongly criticised him. For this reason, he presented the conference as an introduction to the development of future lectures and conferences

in Madrid. He said so by talking to the students who gathered in the *Ateneo*, revealing that his main interest still remained the education of the young generation: «Sobre lo que es política [...] tenemos que hablar, jóvenes, ¡y mucho!». He also announced the topic of his next lectures, i.e. politics. In spite of the indeterminacy of both the content and the date of these future meetings, Ortega presented them as a concrete possibility. As he put it: «No ahora – tiempo adelante – no sé bien cuándo – un día entre los días. Pero hemos de hablar, jóvenes, larga y enérgicamente» (OC, IX: 882).

However, the reception of the conference was quite disappointing for the philosopher, mainly for two reasons. The first was due to the incredible manipulation of his words made by the Francoist propaganda. For instance, the newspaper *Informaciones*³³, underlined that Ortega's preamble was just an overt endorsement to the clement regime that permitted his return. So did the majority of the newspapers, such as *La Vanguardia Española*, according to which Ortega had finally be recovered for the national cause³⁴. The second reason for Ortega's disappointment was due to the scarce attention paid to his real message, not only by the establishment but also by the young students. Apart from some letters of his friends he did not receive many congratulations or expressions of interest after his conference. On the contrary, he receives various violent letters of people who felt to have been betrayed by his attitude towards the regime³⁵. Ortega understood

³³ «Su insobornable fondo de patriotismo auténtico se expandió al contacto renovado con el público. [...] La conferencia terminó ahí, en los primeros párrafos, intencionados y rotundos, que lo decían todo, sin necesidad de reiterar tozudamente las posiciones [...] Bienvenido el filósofo a su solar y a su pueblo. Diez años después de la sacudida sísmica, la convivencia nacional que permite todo régimen auténticamente fuerte, abre sus puertas al diálogo, a la disertación y a la libertad auténtica del espíritu». *Ortega, en el Ateneo*, in «*Informaciones*», 6-V-1946. In AOG, PB-232/ 117.

³⁴ «Recobrado íntegramente para la perdurable grandeza del pensamiento español». *De la conferencia de Ortega y Gasset. Signos de la unidad Nacional*, in «*La Vanguardia Española*», 7-V-1946.

³⁵ «Atendiendo a su invocación a vernos las caras, ruegole desiste de cultivar la polítiac, y sobre todo de marcarnos camino y meta. Hablo en nombre de los padres que perdieron a sus hijos y hasta de quienes en nuestra modestia no nos equivocamos cuando el ilustre Ortega y Gasset con otras personalidades nos llevó a todos los fracasos y todas las amarguras. En el mundo hay más que su filosofía, maestro». Letter by Federico García Sanchiz to Ortega, 6-V-1946, in

he had been used by the regime and when, in October 1946, he was invited again by the *Ateneo*, he rejected the invitation saying that: «Tal y como siguen las cosas en nuestro país y especialmente como se sigue ejerciendo la censura [...] no es sino contraproducente. La eficacia de la palabra hablada o escrita vive de toda una serie de condiciones en el entorno social donde se ejercitan. Cuando esas condiciones faltan el proyecto mejor intencionado no hace sino causar daño»³⁶. From then on Ortega decided to live mainly in Lisbon and renounced to any other direct intervention in his country until the end of 1948 when he founded in Madrid, together with Julián Marías, the Institute of Humanities.

8.5 *A renewed philosophical outlook*

The great disillusion that followed the conference that took place on May 1946 in Madrid produced a double reaction. On the one hand Ortega experienced a period of depression and apathy that forced him to abandon all the projects related to his intervention in Spain (Gracia, 2014: 588). On the other, he did not cease to look at the international scenario as both a source of inspiration and a possible receptor of his philosophical thought. However, in both cases the production of essays and conferences that he conceived as indispensable to reacquire his social role and a cultural status would have been drastically interrupted until, at least, the beginning of April 1947, when he prepared his text for a new conference in San Sebastián on the occasion

AOG, C-62/ 19b. «Deje a tipos tan graciosos como los Eugenio D'Ors, los Montes, los Laín Entralgo, los Lizarrague el papel de filósofos al servicio de quienes les pagan. Ud. Don José, es de otra raza.[...] Se desilusionará Ud. ¡y muy pronto!, herido en su conciencia, advertirá que no valía la pena haber salido de Portugal» Letter by Eleuterio Guzmán Expósito to Ortega, 14-V-1946 in AOG, C-126/ 30; Letter by Antonio Salvat Navarro to Ortega, 18-V-1946; *Carta Amarga de un "Rojo" a don José Ortega y Gasset* to Ortega, 7-V-1946: «Observe Ud. lo que es la vida intelectual española. Lea la basura que se publica en diarios y revistas. Enterese hasta donde llega Falange y la Iglesia en la censura de libros, a qué bajo nivel ha descendido la enseñanza, la "depuración" de profesores y maestros, la intervención y privilegios del SEU, infórmese por los librereros de cómo los lectures se refugian más que nunca en las traducciones». In AOG, C-126/ 5.

³⁶ Letter by Ortega to Eugenio Mediano Flores, 29-X-1946.

of a philosophical meeting organised by the *Real Sociedad de Amigos del País Vasco*³⁷.

Since the end of the war Ortega had started to investigate the new tendencies of the philosophy of his time, focusing in particular on the philosophy of culture as purported in the UK and the United States. The new geopolitical scenario called for a reform of education and politics, that could no longer be based on the German tradition and, consequently, had to find a new universal paradigm according to which to promote the development and fulfilment of individuals and societies (Tiana Ferrer, 2011). For this reason, whereas this new period of Ortega's meditation was often disappointing as far as Spain was concerned, on the contrary it corresponded to a period of extreme ferment and enthusiasm in relation to the international context.

As proven by the several press articles and books that Ortega collected during that period³⁸, the two main philosophical and social problems that attracted the philosopher's attention from the end of 1946 were a) the role of education, and in particular of the schooling system and the university, in promoting a new ideal of humanity and b) the need of consolidating a culture of peace through a radical change of the geopolitical situation, in particular by constructing a new confederation of State in Europe. Indeed, Ortega showed to be particularly interest in the opinion of the political leaders whose nations had won the war and were consequently responsible of the new global order. He regularly read the speeches and articles of Churchill and Roosevelt in which these themes always constituted the kernel of the political discourse. Moreover, another interesting proof of Ortega's attention towards the role that the intellectual should had to play within this new international scenario is constituted by a long report conserved in his Archive, written by the Dean of the University of Chicago, Robert Hutchins, entitled "Science and Wisdom" concerning the moral duty of the intellectuals in relation to the problem of the atomic bomb.

³⁷ As Ortega wrote to Marías: «He tenido durante ese tiempo que escribirrear el discurso para San Sebastian [...] Al día siguiente de enviarla, en cambio, comencé a sentirme en plena normalidad, como hacia diez meses no me sentía. Esto no quiere decir que esté completamente confiado pero me parece indudable que las cosas de mis salud han pasado ya a otro clima». Letter by Ortega to Marías, 11-IV-1947, in AOG, CD-M/ 56.

³⁸ See AOG, Recortes de Prensa.

Not only Ortega was extremely curious and receptive in relation to the radical changes that were occurring in philosophy and society, but he was also considered as a very relevant figure by the intellectual international community. For instance, the construction of a new European identity represented the topic of the first *Rencontre internationale de Genève* in 1946. The *rencontres* constituted an international forum that gathered scientific and cultural European leaders in the Swiss capital to discuss the most relevant topics at stake. The participant of the first meeting were Julien Benda, Georges Bernanos, Karl Jaspers, Stephen Spender, Jean Guéhenno, Francesco Flora, Denis de Rougemont, Jean De Salis and Georg Lukacs. Ortega received an invitation for participating in those meetings both in 1946 and in September 1947, when the topic concerned the status of the moral and scientific European progress³⁹. He finally declined these first invitations due to his precarious health⁴⁰, and in the second occasion he was substituted by Eugenio D'Ors.

Ortega enjoyed a great consideration abroad, in particular due to the novelty represented by his theory of education. In fact, its main pillars could have largely fit the proposals of democratisation and popularisation of culture promoted during that period by the UNESCO, as pointed out in Latin America by his friend and disciple Lorenzo Luzuriaga (Scotton, 2016). However, by that time Ortega still perceived he had to accomplish his intellectual mission within the Spanish boarder and, as soon as his health ameliorated, he started to project new form of interventions within his country, obeying to the imperative of continuity he had vindicated during his conference in the Madrilenian *Ateneo*.

8.6 *The Scholasticism of the Madrilenian philosophy*

However, while Ortega was dealing with the more urgent problems connected to the necessary reform of education in a post-war scenario, the pedagogic and philosophical reality in Spain was still grounded on traditionalist roots. For instance, the research promoted by the CSIC,

³⁹ See Invitation by *Rencontres Internationales de Genève* to Ortega y Gasset, in AOG, C-128/ 37a.

⁴⁰ Telegram by Ortega to *Rencontres Internationales de Genève*, 17-VIII-1946, in AOG, C-14/ 23.

which by the time was actually a fiefdom of the Opus Dei (Bolado Ochoa, 2011), within the humanities focused exclusively on the importance of the Catholic and Scholastic philosophy as the most effective and valid form of thinking. This philosophical paradigm implied both a very strict and rigid election of the topics at stake and an extremely fixed form of argumentation. As a consequence, *in the faculty of philosophy, the very way of writing had remarkably changed and the essayists, creators of a new and experimental way of thinking, had been replaced by the commentators of a rigidly defined philosophical canon mainly based on mediaeval and Christian authors.* A very significant instance of this tendency is offered by the Dominican priest Santiago Ramírez who, between 1942 and 1947 published a very influential trilogy, in latin, on Aquinas' *Summa Theologiae* (Ramírez, 1947). As Eulogio Palacios wrote in a review of Ramírez's books, this theological comment to Aquinas represented the most profound and solid contribution that the Spanish philosophy could have produced to the discussion on the new educational and political order, since: «La técnica necesita hoy encuadrarse en la moral teológica. Y España, que nunca ha sido el país de la técnica, sino de la teología, es hoy, más que nunca, necesaria para la moralización del orbe» (Palacios, 1946: 451). The same Scholastic model had been introduced by the very CSIC within the University as a pedagogical method, in particular thanks to the publication of Pacios López's *Filosofía de la educación* (1947). The entire work constituted an attempt to adapt Thomism and its terminology to the new Spanish educational context. The pedagogical activity was consequently studied in terms of efficient, formal and final causes within a rigid theological framework.

Not only did this way of reasoning impose itself in the humanistic research within the CSIC, but also at the Universidad Central of Madrid, and in particular in the case of the Faculty of Philosophy. In 1946, the professor of Metaphysics Juan Zaragüeta (1946) wrote a modern introduction to Scholastic. In this book he presented a comprehensive history of philosophy from the ancient Greeks until the French existentialism, doing this by adopting the Thomism terminology. This represented the new common language spoken by the very closed academic community responsible for the study and promotion of humanities in Spain immediately after WWII. In spite of the apparent anachronism, this intellectual community did try to find its place, and consequently, the place of the Spanish Catholic ideology,

within the international context by diffusing its philosophical perspective also outside the Spanish borders.

A clear instance of this attitude is given by a very relevant cultural circumstance: the international philosophical conference that took place in Rome in November 1946, and to which participated some of the most prominent European intellectual figures of that time, such as Jaspers, Benda, Marcel, Aron, Abbagnano, Pareyson, Banfi, Troilo, Della Volpe, Del Noce and many others (Garin, 1963: 209-211).

The Spanish academia participated to the conference with all the most prominent members of the philosophical community: Juan Zaragüeta, Santiago Ramírez, Corts Grau, Calvo Serer, González Álvarez, Eugenio D'Ors and Millán Puelles⁴¹. The three topics at stake in the course of this meeting were a) the historical materialism of Marxism, b) the nature of existentialism; c) the grounding principles of science. Interestingly enough, the Spanish delegation participated in a substantial way exclusively to the third panel and, within this, only by posing questions related to the use of language, and in particular concerning the definition of a philosophical terminology, conceived in scholastic terms.

Indeed, both Marxism and existentialism were not really discussed respectively by Calvo Serer and Corts Grau. In fact, in their conferences the two Spanish intellectuals merely criticised *a priori* these theories in virtue of a theological conception of reality. The Spanish group appeared unable to significantly contribute to a debate that was probably extremely distant from its real preoccupations and interests, focusing exclusively on the relevance of a Catholic philosophy within the new global scenario. The mission of the Spanish delegation was that of proposing not only a philosophical but also a comprehensive vision of the scientific reality of the country since, as written by the Ibáñez Martín (1947b, 18): «La genialidad teológica española, que floreció para servir a la catolicidad de la fe, ha de ocupar también en este supremo instante la primera jerarquía del renacimiento científico. Nuestra ciencia actual – en conexión con la que en los pasados siglos nos definió como nación y como Imperio – quiere ser, ante todo, católica».

The evident cohesion of the Spanish members revealed the existence of a common ideology based on very strict metaphysical premises, on some undisputable principles that grounded a debate that, in

⁴¹ For a detailed chronicle of the conference see in particular Millán Puelles, 1946.

comparison to their European colleagues, seemed to be excessively focused on an anachronistic system of ideas. Whereas the world was moving towards a new form of scientific and evolutionary humanism, promoted by the recently founded UNESCO and its director Julian Huxley, Spain was continuing its campaign against atheism and any form of non-religious thought⁴². Thus, in September 1946, while in San Sebastián Ortega was reading his conference on Velázquez – a sort of autobiographical vindication of intellectual freedom and independence (Gracia, 2014: 594-597) – nearby, at the international catholic conference, Juan Zaragüeta was pronouncing his lecture on the construction of a Christian community of philosophers aimed at propagating worldwide the importance of Thomism and Scholasticism (Zaragüeta, 1947).

Only by looking to marginalised members of the establishment it is possible to appreciate some very slight signs of openness towards the Orteguian perspective. Indeed, in 1947, Julián Marías published with the editor *Revista de Occidente* a long introduction to the history of philosophy (Marías, 1947), a book that would have an enormous fortune within the Spanish academia in the following years. This introduction constituted an explicit attempt to divulgate the main ideas of his master, Ortega y Gasset, in particular in relation to the historical, circumstantial and vital reason, using them to interpret the history of Western thought. In spite of being a very marginal figure within the Spanish academia – his doctoral thesis had been rejected by Zubiri in 1942 – Marías and his book obtained a notable success. This is proven also by a long review of the text published by Juan Zaragüeta during the same year. In his review the professor of Metaphysics underlined the value of this book, an evidence of the greatness of the Spanish philosophy «aún para quien discrepe más o menos de sus orientaciones doctrinales» (Zaragüeta, 1947b: 319). With subtle argumentations Zaragüeta concluded his review criticising Marías' book, in particular

⁴² As Luis Sierra (1947) wrote in an article published in *Arbor*, the UNESCO did represent a problem and a relevant danger for a traditionalist and Catholic doctrine, since, according to Huxley: «La vision del mundo creado por Dios la sustituye por la de un mundo en eterna evolución de la sustancia viva, que ignoramos qué sea, y para el cual es preciso encontrar una nueva forma social y cultura; en un mundo en que los filósofos y los hombres de ciencia sustituyen a los sacerdotes como mediadores y el instrumento es la educación, especialmente la educación de masa».

its orteguian allure, adopting the instruments of scholasticism. The overall positive evaluation of the book is thus functional to underline the existence of great discrepancies between the official philosophy purported by the University and the one proposed by Ortega and his recognised disciples. Such discrepancies could have ultimately been eliminated by depurating those subversive arguments through a bathing in Thomism.

8.7 Ortega's anti-scholasticism

However, such attempts of instrumentally reading Ortega's ideas in a scholastic framework were strongly rejected by him. Indeed, on the occasion of an invitation by the director of the Madrilenian newspaper library, Eulogio Varela, to give a talk in Madrid on Leibniz, Ortega started to compose – during 1947 – a long essay he never finished, entitled *La idea de principio en Leibniz*. The book, the first attempt made by the philosopher to write a proper philosophical treaty according to the fashion of that time, was published only posthumously, in 1958, and constituted a direct attack to the way in which the philosophical inquiry was conducted in Madrid (Conderana Cerillo, 2013). Julián Marías, who soon received a first draft of Ortega's manuscript from the very author, recognised this overt critique to the Spanish academia, and also suggested some variations to his master in order to sweeten some of his most radical expressions⁴³. However, this work of Ortega does not only appear drastic and subversive in the adoption of some insolent epithets he used to indicate the members of the Spanish academia, in particular those who were more akin to a religious thinking. Indeed, the text also represents a radical critique of a way of conceiving

⁴³ «Por supuesto, su interpretación de la Escolástica me parece aguda y justícisma. Dice usted todo lo bueno que hay que decir de ella, con toda holgura y generosidad, pero todo eso dentro de su radical limitación, si no se advierte la cual son funestas sus propias excelencias. No sé cómo caerá; será malentendida, suscitará enojo; pero no importa; es verdad y está justificada, y basta. Tal vez fuera bueno, por eso mismo, omitir alguna expresión que, aunque procede de buen humor de usted, se entenderá y se exhibirá como prueba inequívoca de saña, odio, etc.; así “frailazo” y alguna más. Creo que es concederles un tanto de ventaja, sin beneficio sustancial». Letter by Marías to Ortega, 7-VIII-1947, in AOG, C-31/ 19.

philosophy as a dogmatic defence of some categorical principles either concerning metaphysics, ethics, politics or education.

In particular, he traced a distinction between dogmatic principles and grounding principles. Whereas the first are undisputable and considered true in every and each situation, on the contrary the second do not possess this absolute validity, and they are conceived as principles only insofar as their premises can bring about relevant consequences (OC, IX: 936). The constructivism that emerges from Ortega's book (Ovejero Bernal, 2003) is an evident attack to the excessive orthodoxy and dogmatism of the Spanish philosophy of that time which, adopting a scholastic and Catholic framework, did consider principles as true realities and not just as means for further investigations. In fact, according to the philosopher, scholasticism would suffer of a «esterilidad constitutiva» (OC, IX: 1025) that rendered it a useless philosophy. On the contrary, the methodical doubt introduced by Descartes should, to Ortega, always be incentivised by the philosophers and was indeed the main instrument used by very Aristotle, the father of the scholastic tradition⁴⁴.

Without entering in the details of this extremely compelling philosophical piece it is important, for the purposes of this work, to shed light on some of the most intriguing notes made by Ortega in regard to the scope and end of the philosophical activity *per se* and in relation to the frequent criticism he received from a vast part of the Spanish academia. In particular, apart from the critiques to the scholastic tradition, it is possible to put forwards some strands of this book which give a perfect clue of Ortega's posture towards both the Spanish and the global philosophy of that time: a) his defence of imagination and fantasy as inner traits of the philosophical reasoning; b) his vindication of the unpopularity and counter-intuitiveness of philosophy; c) the strongly related sociological distinction between ideas and beliefs.

a) In this book Ortega proposes a completely different account of what philosophy should properly be in comparison to the Spanish scenario. In fact, according to him, it should neither be a form of commentary of authoritative texts nor the expression of a rigorous

⁴⁴ «Aristóteles, como hombre de ciencia que era ante todo, fue un pensador radicalmente naturista y profano. Que un hombre así se haya convertido en el filósofo oficial del catolicismo es uno de los hechos más extraños, más confusos de la historia universal». In OC, IX: 1022.

logical thinking, but rather a form of imagination (OC, IX:1017). The thesis purported by Ortega basically constituted a defence of his peculiar way of writing that he knew was strongly criticised in Spain as excessively poetical and not rigorously philosophical⁴⁵. This *ad hominem* argument against his philosophical account is interestingly countered by Ortega who argues that poetry and philosophy do have something in common: they can be said to represent a true and scientific vision of the world, without pretending to be the truth. At the same time, this account which arises from “local” problem does have relevant philosophical consequences that would characterise all the last years of Ortega’s meditation in relation to the role of humanities in the post-war period. In fact, this self-proclaimed limitation – which poetry contributes to disclose as an inner character of any human enquiry and way of thinking such as in the case of philosophy – permits to consider all the disciplines encompassed within the humanities as partial, relative and debatable forms of knowledge. This confers to them a hint of uncertainty that, however, does not end in a tragedy: on the contrary, this partiality permits to consider all culture and its products – i.e. civilisation – as a tentative way of assigning a proper meaning to the lives of human beings, knowing that this activity would never be tragic, but rather will resemble to a playful preoccupation unceasingly open to its own endless reconstruction. In particular, the analysis of the concept of metaphor conducted by Ortega, reveals that philosophy shares with poetry a same tendency to create new ideas thanks to an operation of transposition of meaning which opens up new perspectives on reality. Therefore, the same *poietic skill* possessed by the

⁴⁵ «Pensar que durante mas de treinta años – se dice pronto – he tenido día por día que soportar *en silencio, nunca interrumpido*, que muchos pseudo-intelectuales de mi país descalificaban mi pensamiento, porque «no escribía más que metáforas» – decían ellos. Esto les hacía triunfalmente sentenciar y proclamar que mis escritos no eran filosofía. ¡Y claro que afortunadamente no lo eran! si filosofía es algo que ellos son capaces de segregar. Ciertamente que yo extremaba la ocultación de la musculatura dialéctica definitoria de mi pensamiento, como la naturaleza cuida de cubrir fibra, nervio y tendón con la literatura ectodérmica de la piel donde se esmeró en poner el *stratum lucidum*. Parece mentira que ante mis escritos – cuya importancia, aparte de esta cuestión, reconozco que es escasa – nadie haya hecho la generosa observación que es, además, irrefutable, de que en ellos no se trata de algo que se da como filosofía y resulta ser literatura, sino por el contrario, de algo que se da como literatura y resulta que es filosofía». in OC, IX: 1136.

poet is required to the philosopher who would have to invent his own style. Consequently, philosophy and poetry can be thought as two declinations of a same method and aim of enquiry which only differ due to the fact that the description purported by philosophy is usually, but only contingently, considered to be more akin to truth than the other.

b) The critique of Ortega to the scholasticism is also significantly conducted by criticising some aspects of Aristotle's philosophy. He did so in particular in the second part of the book in which it is possible to notice a clear shift from an epistemological to a sociological account. In particular, he considers Aristotle's defence of *endoxa*, that is of the common opinion which grounds the truth of the principles, as an anti-philosophical attitude: «La filosofía aristotélica [...] es la filosofía del sentido común, el cual, conste, no es inteligencia, sino asunción ciega por suggestion colectiva» (OC, IX: 1097). Indeed, every proper philosophical activity, according to Ortega, arises from a situation in which there are not fixed principles and shared beliefs, a situation of radical crisis that impels one to counter what is generally assumed by the population but that has lost its legitimacy. Contrary to Aristotle, «hombre del pueblo» (OC, IX: 1058), who defends the public opinion, he affirms that the mission of the philosopher and the intellectual should be that of being an «enemigo del pueblo» (OC, IX: 1056), who counters the false presuppositions and beliefs with the aim of ameliorating the society in which he lives. Scholasticism, on the contrary, is characterised by a political conservatism typical of a receptive philosophy which renders impossible to directly face the problems that a society is actually suffering, since: «El problema de entender la solución preexistente y dada imposibilita de raíz el sentir y ver los problemas auténticos, originarios, de que la solución lo es o pretende serlo[...] La deficiencia más grave de la filosofía escolástica es su incapacidad para plantearse los problemas filosóficos, que son siempre los últimos y extremos» (OC, IX: 1067, 1073). *Ortega's critique of Aristotle is consequently also a critique towards demagogy, traditionalism and conservatism, all aspects which were ideologically mirrored in a philosophia perennis that both epistemologically and politically speaking represented, according to Ortega, the most evident ignominy of the new Spanish academia.*

c) Moreover, this lack of authenticity and critical thinking that is expressed in the philosophy of the regime implies, according to Ortega, a very relevant problem in the social sphere. In fact, by accepting the

truth of an apparent reality and assuming in a dogmatic way the validity of certain principles, Scholasticism and its consequent pedagogical attitude would imply the acceptance of a rigid set of norms without discussing them. This would therefore cause an uncritical acceptance of any sort of imposed rules. Put it differently, such doctrine would ultimately dismiss any critical thinking by replacing an idea with a mere belief, unconsciously confusing the former with the latter. In fact, as Ortega writes: «El hombre, en cuanto viviendo los usos colectivos, es un autómatas dirigido por la sugestión social[...] y la filosofía aristotélico-escolástica [...] resulta ser una filosofía de catalépticos, esclavos psíquicos del “lugar común”» (OC, IX: 1099)⁴⁶. Ortega compares this attitude with a blind faith, accusing it to be in contrast with any form of authentic rational inquiry⁴⁷. In fact, a real philosophy could only start with a radical doubt, and this critical attitude was what, according to Ortega, should have been transmitted to the youngest generations, to the university students and the general public opinion (OC, IX: 1115). Not only the real intellectual is the person who puts everything in question, as Ortega put it, but this activity is so indispensable for the life of every single individual since «tendrían todos el deber inexcusable de ser intelectuales» (OC, IX: 1108). His accusation towards the Madrilenian philosophical circle is for the first time explicit in this text. It lies precisely on the progressive numbness of the critical attitude that, since the beginning of the civil war and in particular during the forties, had caused disruptive consequences on the intellectual climate of the capital:

La vida intelectual ha descendido téticamente de nivel en todas partes pero, en países donde nunca fue normal y saludable, la degeneración de los caletres es superlativa y el nivel anda ya por debajo del mar como en el largo Asfaltites. Madrid ha perdido el poco de alerta en la idea que logró

⁴⁶ To define this tendency of Scholasticism to rely on the common sense he provocatively uses the term “communism” or “communist sense”, an expression that should have clearly bothered the sensibility of the religious and academic audience to which he addressed.

⁴⁷ «Cuando los escolásticos al decir que ellos tienen la superioridad sobre toda la filosofía moderna [...] lo dicen con la soberbia y la petulancia cerrirrel, “aldeanas”, tan típicas del ambiente confinado en que se vive dentro de los conventos, siente uno sincera pena, no por creerse poseedor, a su vez, de una verdad superior aquella [...] sino por presenciar lo que es lisa llanamente una crasa ignorancia de que tengan o no razón con su sentencia». (OC, IX: 1107).

despertarse en él: ha vuelto a ser del todo el eterno aldeón manchego que siempre en el fondo fue y le ha salido a la cara su infuso e indeleble Madrideo. Madrid ha sido entregado, como se entrega una buena oveja a las alimañas, a los “intelectuales” provincianos y a los aficionados (OC, IX: 1147).

Ortega, in virtue of this critical attitude embedded in every true philosophical practice, denounces his repugnance towards any form of partisanship in the intellectual activity. The analysis he presents in this text on the role of beliefs in constructing the social reality and intellectual life would constitute the kernel of his last philosophical theorisation aimed to underline the relation between the objective construction of culture and the subjective and personal life of the individuals (Larrea, 2003). Starting from these premises, Ortega also reveals to be perfectly aware of the instrumental use that of his figure had been recently done in Madrid: «el filósofo nunca fue de un partido y todos quisieron adjudicárselo después» (*Ibidem*).

To summarise, Ortega’s book on Leibniz is a clear instance of his posture towards the cultural situation of his country and, at the same time, concerning the necessity of a general reform of the humanities in the post-war period. Both of these preoccupations constituted the kernel of his public intervention in the following years. Even if Ortega did not publish this long essay during his life he did not renounce to express his opinions in other occasions soon after having written these words. Indeed, through the activities of the Institute of Humanities he founded by the end of 1948, he radically opposed to the philosophy purported in his country, promoting different social analyses and claiming for a more critical pedagogy.

8.8 *Towards a dialogue: seeds for new projects*

Ortega’s conference on theatre – in spite of the delusion it caused both in the survivors of the II Republic and in the young falangists who aimed at gaining a more influential social power within the regime⁴⁸ –

⁴⁸ As Laín Entralgo (1989: 363) wrote in his autobiography recalling that conference: «Doble error cometió Ortega ante su propia exigencia: presentarse ante los españoles en un Ateneo regido por Ibáñez Martín, lo cual por fuerza había de debilitar la atención hacia él en las mejores almas de la juventud

did contribute to mobilise new energies within the Spanish culture. Not only some of Ortega's disciples, mainly through the review *Ínsula*, begun to promote a new image of his figure, but also outside his more intimate circle a more conciliatory position started to emerge. In the first case, thanks to the unceasing efforts of Julián Marías to establish a fruitful conversation with the philosopher, by the beginning of 1946 Ortega accepted to actively collaborate with his disciple in the development of new editorial and public interventions⁴⁹. Ortega's will was indeed that of continuing and ameliorating some of the projects, such as the *Biblioteca de Cien libros*, that he had carried about during his exile in Portugal. In particular he planned to publish a new collection, called *Estudios de Humanidades*, for the editor *Revista de Occidente*, with the aim of offering recent views on the topic that most interested him during that time with the collaboration of other Spanish intellectuals he felt more akin with⁵⁰.

During one of these frequent conversations with Julián Marías and Ortega's son, José, emerged a new and compelling idea for planning a new intervention of the philosopher in Madrid. Since the beginning of the forties, Julián Marías and his wife – Dolores Franco –, José Ortega and his sister Soledad, together with other young Spanish teachers, had founded the *Aula Nueva*. This was a private academy preparing students in their last year of *bachillerato* to their final exam (Ortega y Spottorno, 2002: 398). By the end of 1946 the *Aula Nueva* was going to disappear, mainly due to economic problems, and the very Marías, in one of his letters manifested his doubt regarding the future of this institution: «No sé si lo mejor sería suprimirla, o hacer alguna profunda

española de entonces, y hablar acerca del teatro. En una España depauperada, estremecida por el todavía inmediato recuerdo de la guerra civil, tensa de un modo o de otro ante la situación que le planteaba el tan reciente término de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, el teatro no podía ser, ni para Ortega ni para los españoles de 1946, “el tema de nuestro tiempo”. Un grave y exigente programa de vida cultural –un programa acorde con las palabras antes transcritas – debería haber sido en mi opinion el contenido de su conferencia».

⁴⁹ «Mis deseo sería trabajar solo o casi exclusivaemnte en relación con usted, para la *Revista* [de Occidente] o en otras tareas que usted proyecta: el *Diccionario de Labor*, el que José planteaba, los *Estudios de Humanidades*, si al fin llegan a ser». Letter by Marías to Ortega, 29-VIII-1946, in AOG, C-31/ 15.

⁵⁰ In his letter to Marías Ortega mentioned in particular Zubiri, Gaya, Fernando Sains, Mindán, Valdecasas and Diez del Corral. Cfr. Letter by Ortega to Marías, 11-IV-1947, in AOG, CD-M/ 56.

alteración»⁵¹. The wish to maintain alive this project by renovating it would later end up in the creation of the *Instituto de Humanidades* that was established within the complex of the *Aula Nueva*. The project would have been realised more than a year later, in the autumn 1948. During the period not only the group guided by Marías and Ortega's sons prepared the material conditions for rendering it possible, but it also set the ground for creating the great expectation and widespread acceptance of Ortega's new return in the capital.

At the beginning of 1948, *Ínsula* published an issue entirely dedicated to the philosophy of Ortega y Gasset with the contributions of the very members who were collaborating for the creation of the Institute. Among them Marías, Lafuente Ferrari, Dolores Franco and Paulino Garagorri. The attempt to introduce the philosopher in the cultural scenario is evident in the article written by Marías, who affirms the importance of studying Ortega for the great incitement he produces in his readers, for the quality of his prose and for the validity of his theoretical framework⁵². The homage of the review to the master did clearly constitute an attempt to prepare the path for his immediate entrance in Madrid and for promoting the activities he would have soon realised in the Institute of Humanities.

During the same year, another review was founded: *Cuadernos Hispánicos*. The review presented a far more conciliatory aim in comparison to all the rest of the official publications of the regime with the recent republican past and with the previous generation of intellectual to which Ortega belonged: the generation of the '14. As the director of the review, Pedro Laín Entralgo, wrote in his first editorial, the review: «ha nacido para servir al diálogo». In the first publication the name of Ortega appears exclusively in one but very significant

⁵¹ Letter by Marías to Ortega, 29-VIII-1946, in AOG, C-31/ 15.

⁵² «Ortega tiene tres cualidades que lo hacen especialmente apto para experimentar la contextura espiritual de los hombres que entran en contacto con su obra: en primer lugar, su incomparable poder de incitación y sugestión que procede tanto de su riqueza interior como de la absoluta generosidad con que ha usado de ella; en segundo término, sus dotes literarias, capaces de llegar a los españoles en aquel punto en que su sensibilidad es tal vez más viva; por último, el valor de pura teoría – en forma más estricta, es decir, filosófica – que tiene sus escritos, unida a la claridad máxima, de suerte que la comprensión de Ortega es buen instrumento para medir la capacidad para el pensamiento teórico y en especial para la filosofía». Marías, 1948: 1.

article written by the Argentinean philosopher César Pico on the mission of Spain in the post-war period. In this case, Ortega is presented as a «genial filósofo, gloria de Europa y de las Españas». The whole essay constitutes an analysis of Ortega's distinction between ideas and beliefs and its consequences in relation to religion and the political situation of Spain. Interestingly, the thought of Ortega is used to counter what are defined as two forms of excessive rationalism, i.e. the nationalism of the regime during the war period and the international cosmopolitanism of Marxism. The proposal of Pico, who adopts Ortega to prove it, consist in a sort of syncretism among different positions, with the aim of replacing the nationalist ideology of the regime with an internationally acceptable one. A ideology that was ultimately based on the defence of Catholicism⁵³.

So, in spite of the still largely homogenous ideology of the Spanish academia during the end of the forties, the perception of the role that Ortega could have played within the new political scenario significantly changed. In many reviews, his name was no longer perceived as a taboo and was not aprioristically criticised by the whole spectrum of the regime's establishment. More than an enemy tout court, he was perceived by many as a possible source that could have positively influence the cultural and political life of the nation. Whether this would have implied a complete acceptance of his philosophical framework (Marías) or an instrumental use of it (Laín), it would still be disputed. In any case, this new trend within the Spanish intellectual life, largely due to international circumstances, constituted the basic conditions that rendered possible the realisation of the most ambitious project of Ortega since the creation of the *Agrupación a Servicio de la República*: the creation of the *Instituto de Humanidades*.

⁵³ «La fidelidad al carácter nacional, a la idiosincrasia modelada a través de las vicisitudes históricas; la justa jactancia en las propias virtudes contrastadas por la propia y gloriosa perduración a través de los infinitos embates del tiempo, debe compaginarse con una postura abierta, con una mentalidad porosa a las ajenas cualidades. En otros términos, la custodia y salvaguardia del propio ser debe estar dispuesta a aceptar aquellas perfecciones extrañas que aseguren la futura síntesis ecuménicas. [...] Por eso España, eterna misionera apostólica puede levantar enhiesto y señero, con el de la Fe divina asociada a los valores humanos fundamentales». Cfr. César Pico, 1948: 50, 61.

Chapter 9.

The Institute of Humanities

As already seen in the previous chapters, since the civil war Ortega had been systematically marginalised by the formal University system and frequently criticised by a large part of the cultural establishment of the political regime. His second coming in Madrid in 1948 constituted his most audacious attempt to continue exercising his intellectual influence in Spain, assuming the fact of being an outsider in relation to the official educative policies purported by the Spanish government. This implied the need of inventing different and new means to transmit his philosophical and pedagogical theories, without counting on any official support. So, between 1948 and 1950, Ortega realised, with the help of some of his friends and disciples, the Institute of Humanities as an alternative educative institution involved in the teaching to university students and adults. The institute counted exclusively on the vocational participation of the civil society and the desire of a restrict group of intellectuals of delving into significant social and scientific problems independently from the oppressive orthodoxy of Franco's University. This project undoubtedly represented one the most effective realisation of the theoretical principles about the practice of philosophy and the importance of education in the building of the civil society that Ortega had been developing at least since his *Mission of the University*. His classes and seminars were not a mere repetition of his previous teachings. On the contrary, they constituted an interesting enrichment of his sociological and historical meditations in the light of the new international scenario. In spite of the lack of critical studies focused on this last Orteguian educative project, the Institute did constitute a significant attempt of introducing an experiment of freedom of expression within an intellectually closed and censorious dictatorship. An experiment which collapsed in Spain, but which was very strictly entangled with the attempt of constructing a global education of peace after the second World War, akin to the project purported by several international institutions. Through the case of the IH this chapter aims at understanding and questioning the role of this

cultural institutions in the challenging of the political leadership and social consensus in Franco's Spain.

The IH will be studied first of all by taking into account (§1) the cultural and political conditions which rendered this project possible. The social circumstances surrounding the Institute were indeed so pervasive in the development of the project that (§2) it became the new battlefield of the struggle for the cultural hegemony between two opposite fronts of the establishment in a period of international crisis and isolation for the regime. The diatribe between Pedro Laín Entralgo and Calvo Serer is a clear instance of this harsh contraposition. However, (§3) the interests of Ortega in realising this project were not exclusively limited to the local Spanish context. On the contrary, he conceived the Institute as a pedagogical experiment that wanted to constitute a possible path for the upheaval of humanities in the post-war scenario. In particular, Ortega proposed a reform of these disciplines based on two main pillars, discussed respectively in the first and the second course of the IH: (§4) the relevance of history as a way to comprehend the individual and collective nature of human beings; and (§5) the consequences of this study for sociology. Then, (§6) they will be taken into account the strong connections of this project with the new international worries towards the definition of a new humanistic education, before considering (§7) the concrete effects produced within the Spanish cultural debate by this brief but significant educative experiment within a dictatorial government. Lastly, (§8) they will be presented the reasons underneath the end of this project, also by countering the current and more popular explanations presented so far by Ortega's scholars.

9.1 The birth of an ambitious project

During 1948, in his frequent journeys and stays in Madrid, Ortega consolidated his relationships with the Spanish academic and political establishment (Gracia, 2014: 615). His public endorsement to one or another political movement continued to be contended by different and opposing fronts. In fact, in spite of their differences, all these movements shared the common idea according to which, independently from the real opinion of the philosopher, his figure *per se* would have surely benefited their cause. Thus, Ortega was considered,

at the same time, as the most suitable representative of the Spanish culture⁵⁴ and as a plausible defender of the Monarchical cause by the proponents of a necessary alternative to Franco's regime⁵⁵. However, whereas Ortega's attempt of playing an active role within the Spanish politics had evidently failed in 1946, when pronouncing his conference at the *Ateneo* of Madrid, the intention to continue inspiring new generations of young students and leading the intellectual debate still represented his main preoccupation.

The regime had understood that Ortega would not have been easily assimilated to its ideology and would not totally serve its cause, at least as the internal politics was concerned. At the same time, his presence in Spain had proven to guarantee a relief from the point of view of the international perception of the country in relation to the cultural atmosphere and the freedom of expression. For these reasons, when Ortega decided to create in Madrid an Institute of Humanities through the help and logistical support mainly of his son José Ortega y Spottorno and Julián Marías – after the failure of publishing the collection of the *Estudios de Humanidades* (Zamora Bonilla, 2002: 418) –, his activity was neither supported by the Spanish establishment nor completely ostracised. This attitude was reflected in the treatment reserved by the national newspapers in presenting, in the autumn 1948, the activities that would have been carried out by the Institute. As Marías (1983) wrote, the censorship of the propaganda obliged all the newspapers to dedicate exclusively very few and descriptive lines to this new intellectual project brought about by Ortega. However, the intimate circle that surrounded this activity could count on the sympathy of some members of the establishment that had a very influential role in the propagation of culture. Among them Laín

⁵⁴ An instance of this tendency is offered by the occasion of the arrival in Madrid of the French philosopher Gabriel Marcel, when Ortega was invited by the director of the Hispanic Institute in Madrid, Joaquín Ruiz Giménez, to a conference and banquet organised by the CSIC for representing his own country among the most eminent Spanish intellectuals. Letter by Ruiz Giménez to Ortega, in AOG, C-71/ 42a.

⁵⁵ As demonstrated, for instance, by the letter sent to Ortega by the antifrancoist Luisa María Narváez y Macías, duchess of Valencia: «La finalidad de este trabajo y su divulgación no es otra que la de llevar al convencimiento de quien corresponde la necesidad de pasar a la Restauración de la Monarquía por vía pacífica y terminar con este período excepcional de totalitarismo para bien de España». Letter by Magallanes to Ortega, in AOG, C-130/ 31.

Entralgo, Dioniso Ridruejo, Antonio Tovar (González Cuevas, 2009: 111). The very Laín, in his memories, admitted that he did not take part in the activities of the Institute, but that he always looked at it with empathy, hoping that it could partially open an inner debate within the intellectual community over the new course that the Spanish politics could have adopted in order to remain alive in a context of international turmoil (Laín Entralgo, 1989: 364).

Moreover, some other intellectuals, teachers, professors or influential political or public figures surrounded Ortega during those years, among them: Fernando Vela, Pepe Tuleda, José Ruiz Castillo, Emilio García Gómez, José Vergara, Antonio Huescar, Luiz Diez del Corral, Alfonso García Valdecasas, José Maravall, Antonio Díaz Cañabate, Domingo Ortega, Julio Camba, José Germain and Fernando Chueca (Abellán, 2005: 150). In particular, José Germain, an old professor of the Republican university, represented for Ortega a very fruitful reference point. Indeed, the doctor Germain – who collaborated with Ortega also to the project *Azar* and enjoyed a great intimacy with a lot of the members of the Falange (Gracia, 2014: 582-583) – since 1946 was the director of the *Revista de Psicología General y Aplicada* and not only repeatedly invited the philosopher to contribute to the review, but he also promoted the diffusion in it of the *Manifiesto of the Institute of Humanities*. Moreover, in spite of what Marías recalled in his memories, some longer articles did appear in the national press between October and November 1948 presenting the new project of the philosopher that would have been inaugurated by the beginning of December. In particular, a long article was published in ABC – directed by Ortega’s friend Luis Calvo – and, in several other newspapers, it was reproduced also a quite long note written by Enrique Casamayor⁵⁶. So, in spite of the very stringent censorship imposed by the regime and the lack of any form of direct and explicit support by the establishment, the Institute was finally realised and promoted between the summer and the early autumn 1948.

The absence of ideological support implied also a lack of economic aid to this new ambitious project. For this reason, this private initiative had necessarily to count on the matriculation fees of its students and participants. However the material conditions of the general population and the middle class would not permit a vast participation

⁵⁶ In AOG, *Recortes de Prensa*.

to these meetings as wished by the proponents of the Institute. In fact, during the period comprised between 1945 and 1950 the consumers market in Spain had not significantly improved in comparison to the war period, and while in 1935, before the civil war, the private consumption was equal to 12000 pesetas per person, in 1948 it did not reach 10000 (Maluquer de Motes, 2005: 1253). In this context, the call for an ample participation to such cultural project, whose matriculation fees corresponded to 1300 pesetas, was clearly utopian. For this reason the Institute not only decided to award some funding to persons in need or with a particular merit, but the funders also decided to include a series of free talks and public speeches so to expand the audience of these colloquia. *This decision responded to a special desire manifested by the very Ortega, that is the wish to attract to these meetings and lessons those who were more likely to be excluded from the possibility of acquiring a decent education, and this was a problem that, according to Ortega, was shared at the same time by the university students – educated by a contemptible propaganda – and by the low-class.* Thus Casamayor, in advertising the Institute, specifies that the lessons have been thought «facilitándose la asistencia a universitarios y obreros interesados en seguir lo estudios».

In any case, the reception to this new orteguian project within the civil society was largely positive and often quite enthusiastic. The 24-pages manifesto of the Institute of Humanities, after having passed the control of the censorship⁵⁷, was rendered public on November, 6 1948 in *Ínsula* and in the *Revista de Psicología General y Aplicada*. Moreover, it was also rendered public and sold in a lot of bookshops in Madrid and other Spanish cities, with a circulation of 1000 copies. After the publication of the prospectus of the Institute the organisers, Marías and Ortega, received a lot of letters and manifestations of interest from all over Spain. They were sent not only by the members of the upper society (ambassadors⁵⁸, professors⁵⁹, politicians and ministers⁶⁰ or

⁵⁷ *Instancia en solicitud de autorización para imprimir la obra “Prospecto del Instituto de Humanidades”*, in AGA, Exp. 5376-48 Sig 21/ 08499. According to the censor (Batanero), the manifesto: “no contiene nada censurable. Se limita a exponer la razón del título y contenido a desarrollar en la actividad del centro de cultura e investigación que crean, programa, matrícula etc.”

⁵⁸ Letter by Ruiz Morales (secretary of the Foreign minister) to Ortega, 6-XI-1948, in AOG, PB-366/ 2-1.

⁵⁹ Letter by Lopez Ibor to Ortega, 30-XI- 1948, in AOG, PB-366/ 52.

university students⁶¹) but also by the general population that had longed for the return of Ortega⁶². The numerous requests for not paying the tuition fees due to economic problems or to obtain substantive discounts could not have been totally attended by the organisers. However, it is possible to notice a special attention towards the conditions of the university students, the group of people that without any doubt constituted the centre of Ortega's attention and, for this reason, did receive a conspicuous support for attending the courses. Indeed, the institute assigned five full scholarships and a discount of the 50% to all the university students⁶³. There was a great expectation around the positive effects that the Institute could have brought about in the Spanish cultural atmosphere. At the same time, there were also some scepticisms over the concrete possibility that Ortega and his collaborators could have really contributed to enhancing the humanities within an obscurantist society that systematically manipulated any forms of intellectual freedom⁶⁴. Undoubtedly, the creation of the Institute did coincide with a moment in which the political confrontation among the different souls of the regime had reached his climax and the international scenario seemed to lead to an imminent institutional reform.

9.2 *In the political arena, beyond Ortega's intentions*

The political and ideological instability that characterised the country, by the end of 1948, can surely be epitomised by the dispute that took place among two outstanding members of the establishment: the director of *Escorial* and *Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos*, Laín Entralgo, and the director of *Arbor*, the review of CSIC, Calvo Serer. In October

⁶⁰ Letter by Matons Colomer (secretary of the Instituto Nacional del Libro Español) to Ortega, 10-XI-1948, in AOG, PB-366/ 4.

⁶¹ Letter by SEU to Ortega, 10-XII-1948, in AOG, PB-366/ 81.

⁶² «Mi fé no me defrauda, maestro. En esta espera estoy y de ella recibiremos la nueva aurora. Repito mi adhesión, fervorosa, como será la de muchos obreros españoles que le admiran, con la esperanza de un porvenir mejor». Letter by Ramón Busto Toyo to Ortega y Gasset. 3-XII-1948. In AOG, PB/ 366-63

⁶³ Letter by Instituto de Humanidades to Luis Teigell (Jefe SEU Madrid), 2-XII-1948, in AOG, PB/ 366-57.

⁶⁴ Anonymous to Ortega, 10-XII-1948, in AOG, PB-366/ 78.

1948 Laín collected a series of conferences and articles he had realised during the summer of that very year and published a book significantly entitled *España como problema*. The problem indicated by Laín concerned the very essence of the country. As he put it, it was an historical problem between “to be” or “not to be”, that is a problem regarding the normative existence of Spain (Laín Entralgo, 1948: 12). The problem of Spain is identified by Laín with the everlasting dichotomy between traditionalism and modernity, the first characterised by a respect towards religion and the values of Catholicism and the second by the cult of laicism and the desire of Europeanizing the country (*Ibidem*: 27-28).

The very strong opposition between these two fronts, according to Laín, could have been overcome only through a sort of syncretism between them, with the aim of constructing a third way that could have promoted the development of the nation avoiding the reiteration of this conflicting tendency. This third perspective, according to Laín, was epitomised by the attitude of Menéndez Pelayo⁶⁵ and, succeedingly, by the generation of '98, in particular by Miguel de Unamuno, characterised by the wish of effectively reforming the country but without imposing to it an external Europeanization⁶⁶. This, in fact, represented a new trend in the Spanish culture developed during the following years, in particular since the beginning of the fellowship programs abroad of many young university students, among them the very Ortega y Gasset, considered by Laín as «el más representativo de los hombre que integran el grupo» (*Ibidem*: 83).

Interestingly enough, Ortega is taken by Laín as the example of a positive way of conceiving the role of the intellectual in society, that is as an analyst of reality and a proponent of a political and social reform that was considered as indispensable for the benefit of the nation. Moreover, the revalorisation of the generation of the Madrilenian

⁶⁵ «La esperanza de don Marcelino consistía en la posibilidad de hacer en España algo verdaderamente “sustantivo y humano”, apoyando la acción creadora en tres supuestos: la capacidad inexhausta del hombre español (o, como entonces se decía, la energía de la raza”), la realidad de nuestra historia, entendida sin mixtificaciones progresistas o reaccionarias, y la situación histórica del espíritu humano en el último cuarto del siglo XIX». Laín Entralgo, 1948: 35.

⁶⁶ «Todos sueñan con una nueva época de la historia de España, en la cual ésta sería a la vez fiel a si misma y a la altura de nuestro tiempo» (*Ibidem*: 61).

philosopher made by the falangist doctor included very different intellectuals and political figures, some of them akin to the regime (as Herrera Oria or Eugenio D'Ors) and some of them incompatible with it, such as the republicans Pérez de Ayala or Azaña. The pedagogical appeal of the philosopher is interpreted by Laín as the instrument that permitted him to pass from the utopia of the previous generation to the real construction of a new Spain. The political scope and aim of education is therefore considered as a valid resource in order to forge the nation, and Ortega's proposal is not totally dismissed in this text as heterodox, but rather as an example that deserved to be imitated: «La minoría entusiasta y eficaz; he ahí el primer objetivo de la operación transformadora de Ortega. El periódico, la revista, el libro, la conferencia y la "privada plástica" serán los instrumentos inmediatos de este germinal equipo salvador» (*Ibidem*: 102).

Thus, in this book, Laín proposes an analysis and an appreciation of Ortega's thesis, with the aim of partially overcoming them as far as the construction of a new minority was concerned. In other words, he uses Ortega as a theorist of the importance of building an hegemonic thought and a leading minority able to rule the country, and propose himself and his circle as the most suitable entourage – nephews of the generation of '98 – which would have been responsible for the new national reform in a period of political uncertainty. The duties of this new cultural and political elite would have been those of resolving the problem of the dichotomy between traditionalism and modernisation by actualising the values of the *falange* within a new European and international scenario, underlining the Catholic strand of the European history and, consequently, the adequacy of Spain to this canon (*Ibidem*: 161).

The book of Laín was far from being offensive or heterodox in relation to the hegemonic thought that inspired the politics of the regime after the second world war. However, it was ferociously and immediately countered by the representative of another intellectual and political circle represented by the review *Arbor*: Calvo Serer. He acted as the spokesman of Pérez Embid, member of the ACNdP, director of *Arbor* and founder of the editorial Rialp. In 1949 Calvo Serer polemically published a book entitled *España sin problema*. According to Calvo Serer, Laín's interpretation constituted a too eclectic reading of national history. In fact: «Mientras para los españoles sea un problema su conciencia nacional, estarán agarrotados, lánguidos, afanándose

inútilmente en atormentarse» (Calvo Serer, 1949: 10). In addition, Laín had committed another great mistake according to him, that is bringing back to the public debate and cultural scenario many of those intellectuals that the regime had repeatedly tried to annihilate since its very foundation. In fact, Laín, in his book seemed to have left apart the contribution by the members of the catholic family of the regime, in particular Herrera Oria and the ACE, to the construction of the national identity (Gallego Margalef, 2014: 872). Thus, as Larraz has rightly pointed out (2009: 79), even if this discussion did not put into question the overall ideology of the regime, it disputed the very nature of its tradition and history, therefore, of its future normative aim. In fact, in 1947, Calvo Serer had published a Manifesto for a new generation of intellectuals, whose purposes and traditions radically differed to the ones later presented by Laín in his book, in particular in relation to the interpretation of Ortega's legacy (Díaz Hernández, 2008: 122). Whereas, according to Laín, this would have to correspond to a form of conservative syncretism, to Calvo Serer it was luckily to be better represented by a rigid Catholic orthodoxy. Moreover, the theory of Laín seemed to open the way to a new duality within the community of discourse which composed the regime and to the consequent struggle for the cultural hegemony (Ferrary: 1993: 298-303). This struggle was evidently confined to the domain of culture (Gallego Margaleff, 2014: 920), but, since 1951 it assumed the traits of a political dispute, in particular through the new academic policies implemented by the new minister of education Ruiz Giménez⁶⁷.

In this context, the Institute of Humanities, founded by Ortega in Madrid, represented a dangerous occasion that could have contributed to promote the vision of Laín and his entourage, to the detriment of the group represented by Calvo Serer. This fact constituted a great preoccupation of the director of Arbor, Pérez Embid, who by the end of 1948 was repeatedly writing to Calvo Serer to solicit the publication of his book due to the growing influence that Ortega was acquiring, in particular within the new generation of students:

⁶⁷ As written by Martín Puerta, 2013: 272: «Lo que era hasta 1951 una polémica religioso-cultural, pasó desde ese año a adquirir un rango político, pues el nuevo ministro de educación nacional, Joaquín Ruiz-Giménez, nombró rectores de las universidades de Madrid y Salamanca a dos distinguidos aperturistas culturales: los falangistas Pedro Laín Entralgo y Antonio Tovar».

Mientras tanto Ortega, Marías, García Gómez, Sambricio y otros han abierto en “Aula Nueva” una especie de Facultad libre de Filosofía con una serie de clases y cursillos monográficos sobre los cuales se han volcado todos los estudiantes de la Facultad, y todos los Licenciados jóvenes que andan por ahí como alma en pena⁶⁸.

From then on, all the activities of the group orbiting around *Arbor* were characterised by a forceful anti-orteguianism with the clear aim of contending to the Madrilenian philosopher his role of master for the new university generation (Díaz Hernández, 2008: 177). The control over the educative system was indeed also the priority of Laín Entralgo, as revealed in his *Político Universitario* (1949). In this short pamphlet he points out the necessity for the University to play a more vital role within social life, both from a qualitative and quantitative point of view. According to Laín, the mission of the university should have basically been that of leading the civil society, building the public opinion. For reaching these targets he considered as indispensable to act as a compact group with a precise goal, and to do it quickly and efficiently: «Es necesario – he wrote – que la penetración de la Universidad en nuestra vida social sea más amplia y vivaz» (Laín Entralgo, 1949: 13). By frequently quoting the texts of Ortega, and in particular his *Misión de la Universidad*, Laín presented an overall concept of what the university should have been, taking into consideration the role of the teachers, students, society and State. He offers a very clear vision of what, according to him, this institution should be. A clearness and precision that contributed to exhibit to the opposing fronts the risk of being outclassed. For all these reasons, the Institute of Humanity acquired a great significance within the Spanish cultural scenario, even beyond its proper intentions and goals. Ortega was again unwillingly converted in a pretext by the components of a fragmented regime for building a new cultural hegemony.

⁶⁸ Letter by Pérez Embid to Calvo Serer, 12-XI-1948, in Díaz Hernández, 2008: 171.

9.3 Why the Institute? From the local to the global

When Ortega conceived and realised the *Institute of Humanities* he was looking for a direct cultural intervention in his country. Indeed, his main aim was that of returning to teach in Spain and to continue his activity as an independent scholar. For this reason, he refused any sort of public endorsement to his project, and chose not to give his lessons in the University, accepting the difficult task of building a new educative institute with a complete different scope and purpose in respect to the official academia. For the same reason, he also decided to refuse the financial help that the Rockefeller foundation had offered him, so counting exclusively on the matriculation fees of the Institute's student⁶⁹.

The problematic status of the philosophy and the humanities in the post-war period was indeed a crucial preoccupation of many intellectuals at a global scale. The very Ortega was asked by the American scholar Clara Urquhart to collaborate by writing an article for a book she was preparing on the role of the intellectual in a broken world characterised by a lack of critical and individual thinking⁷⁰. Even if Ortega, at the end, did not take part in this book – to which collaborated intellectuals such as Günter Anders, Erich Fromm, Bertrand Russell, Salvatore Quasimodo and Albert Schweitzer – this problem would constitute the kernel of all the lessons he gave at the Institute of Humanities. Moreover, the very structure of the Institute and its organisation represented a clear response to the growing insignificance of the teaching and learning of humanities in a depersonalised society.

This can be comprehended first of all by taking into consideration the prospectus of the Institute of Humanities that Ortega and Marías published at the beginning of November 1948, for presenting their future cultural project. Indeed, the theoretical preamble of the text is constituted by a long meditation concerning the meaning of the word “humanities” in the European cultural and academic tradition. In

⁶⁹ In a letter to Jaime Benítez Ortega, in October 1951, wrote that: «La Rockefeller Foundation quiso, hace dos años y medio, financiar un instituto en Madrid. Yo rehusé ese apoyo porque no sabía cual sería la actitud del Gobierno Español ante la labor del instituto, sobre todo si el instituto tenía dinero», in AOG, CD-13/ 31.

⁷⁰ Letter by Clara Urquhart to Ortega, 12-III-1948, in AOG, N-24/ 38.

particular, Ortega rejects both the French definition of humanities as moral or political sciences – due to the vagueness of the second term⁷¹ and the limitation of the first⁷² – and the German tradition that conceives humanities in terms of *Geisteswissenschaften*, that is in terms of spiritual sciences, a term that had recently acquired very different and contrasting connotations during the recent conflict. The implicit problem underneath the partial refutation of the German tradition was mainly motivated by a general perception after WWII of the idealistic philosophy as a dangerous intellectual posture. As John Dewey wrote, it was possible to perceive in it the existence of «underlying strains of continuity connecting the creed of Hitler with the classic philosophic tradition of Germany» (Dewey, 1942: 69). Contrary to these leading traditions, Ortega offers a new and original definition of humanities. For doing this he adopted the Roman sense of the word and replaced the plurality that connotes it in the form “humanities” – that is a cluster of disciplines – with a unified notion of Humanity. With this very basic shift he underlines the relevance of the term in relation to the concrete life of every single individual and the community, moving the perspective from the disciplines taught within the academia to the concrete persons involved in the comprehension and actualisation of culture (Almeida Amoedo, 2001: 116). Ortega defines the humanities as the totality of the human facts and, therefore, he thinks that to speak of humanities means to speak both of the facts that pertain to the human beings and of the study of these facts conducted by the scholars in the field of humanities (OC, VI: 538). In a society ruled by fanaticism and extremism, by a depersonalised existence and the predominance of a sort of philosophical pessimism represented by existentialism, Ortega tries to construct in Madrid an oasis for the practicing of philosophy. This project could have seemed utopian, but it evidently sprang from the intimate desire of the philosopher to accomplish to the intellectual mission he taught he could not have discarded.

The terminological premise that opens the prospectus reveals at least two important and apparently opposed features of the project carried about by Ortega y Gasset: a) the global scope of his theoretical analysis, not limited to the Spanish scenario but opened to a constant confrontation with different philosophical traditions and disciplinary

⁷¹ «Entre las cosas humanas es la sociedad la menos patente» in OC, VI: 535.

⁷² «Lo humano no es solo costumbre. Hay, junto a ella, lo desacostumbrado, lo insólito, lo único», in OC, VI: 536.

perspectives; b) the intention to delve into the concrete living conditions of the post-war society, and of doing this specifically in Spain. These two purposes are both implicitly presented in the invitation to the Spanish public that Ortega includes in the following pages of this manifesto. At the same time, it is also possible to see them mirrored in the practical organisation of the whole activity of the Institute.

Regarding the first aspect, Ortega, in line with his precedent meditations (Monfort Prades, 2010), pointed out the necessity of defining humanity as an interdisciplinary reality which, under its unifying philosophical concept would include different approaches such as that provided by linguistic, philology, ethnology, historiography – as Ortega called it, historiology – and economy. The philosopher presents the institute as a collaborative project rendered possible by the activities of different scholars and, hopefully, students, aimed at analysing relevant problems for contributing to shed light on a complex and fragmented reality. As Graham (2001: 426) correctly put it, the prospectus is indeed an “essay on interdisciplinary” both in principles and in the subsequent practice of the institute. Moreover, the global scope of the project is also manifested by the overwhelming amount of foreign intellectuals that Ortega invited to take part in the activities of the institute. Among them Gabriel Marcel, Heinz Heimsoeth, Wilhelm Röpke, Arnold Toynbee, Pierre Jobit, Ernst Fritz and many others⁷³.

The second of the abovementioned features is rendered evident by the recurrent references made by Ortega to the Spanish cultural scenario. Not only for his continuous criticisms towards the scholastic tradition, but also, and foremost, for the direct invitation he did to the Spanish public of collaborating in his project. In the dumb (OC, VI: 541) cultural atmosphere of the country Ortega was aware of the political prudence that he had to observe to avoid any sort of repression to his Institute. For this reason, from the one hand he vindicated the aristocratic character of such intellectual project – which, according to him, did not aim neither to proselytise the Spanish society to a new creed nor to influence the national life – but on the other hand he overtly hoped for the possibility of a widespread interest within the civil society towards his new experiment:

⁷³ See administrative notes of the Institute of Humanities, in AOG, PB-368/ 12-15; PB-368/ 12-16; PB-368/ 12-17.

No desdeñamos al público, lo que sería una actitud estúpida. Lo que hacemos es no contar con él, porque, queramos o no, ya lo hemos dicho, la mayor parte de nuestras labores excluye su participación, y además porque no se le puede pedir ni constancia ni dedicación. Lo que haremos, si esa anormal abundancia de oyentes afluyese a algún curso, sería trasladar éste a un local de ocasión, suficientemente amplio, fuera de nuestro domicilio en *Aula Nueva* (OC, VI: 543).

This extraordinary affluence what was ultimately occurred, at least in the case of the courses taught by Ortega that had to be moved to the conference hall of the *Unión Mercantil*, for giving to the approximately 650 people who wanted to assist to his lessons the opportunity to do it [See Annex 8]. Not only his personal figure but also the general project of the Institute of humanities was able to reach the interest of a great audience and this permitted the full development of all the foreseen activities during its first year.

In particular, the activities of the institute during the course 1948-1949 were divided in four courses, two research seminars and four colloquia, characterised by an inverse proportion of openness and participation, being the colloquia limited to a restricted number of participants and implying a matriculation fee of 100 pesetas per colloquium. The courses were organised in a lesson per week and could run for 1 to 3 months, during this first year, from December to March. The themes for the courses were: Universal history (Ortega y Gasset), Arabism and classical philology (Emilio García Gómez), The historical method of the generations (Marías) and The culture of Mohenjo-Daro (Benito Gaya). The two research seminars focused respectively on the works of Goya (Ortega y Gasset and Valentín de Sambricio) and on the empirical application of the historical method of generation (Marías). Lastly, the four colloquia dealt with themes of economy (the social structure of price), philology and linguistic (modism) and philosophy (the clouds of Aristophanes)⁷⁴. Moreover, the activities of the Institute of Humanities were supplemented by the publication of a Bulletin which provided short information regarding its program and invited the audience to take part in an active debate over the Institute. In the first of these short publications Ortega

⁷⁴ The entire prospectus of the institute, with the list of the courses and participants had been consulted in AOG, PB-386/ 5.

explained the reasons for the tripartite organisation of the activities of the Institute, and in particular the importance of the colloquia as a experimental form of teaching and learning. These forms of dialogue among scholars and a restricted audience of experts were mainly conceived as an attempt to realise a complete knowledge on specific themes through an interdisciplinary method. This was indeed the only viable means that could have countered, according to Ortega and his collaborators, the constitutive inadequacy of the modern man of science, characterised by an extreme specialisation and consequent impossibility of reaching a comprehensive and meaningful knowledge on an ample and substantial problem of the human existence. By joining different perspectives and partial knowledge it could have been possible to reach an overall and more complete view on this questions, since: «Si se quiere que las disciplinas de Humanidades vuelvan a cobrar su auténtico vigor es preciso intentar la reintegración de la ciencia en su unidad organica, procurando compensar por todos los medios posibles su dispersión especialista que es, por otra parte, ineludible» (OC, IX: 1179).

In summary, the Instituto de Humanidades constituted Ortega's response to some of the main problems concerning the role of the intellectual, the academia and philosophy in the contemporary society. A question that he faced during the course of whole his life in the different periods of his long intellectual career. By 1948 Ortega dealt with new radical problems both concerning the cultural situation of his country – substantially deprived of a real freedom of speech and of a democratic participation, but at the same time living in a period of possible transition from an institutional regime to another – and the global situation in which the intellectuals were trying to regain a function after the drama of the WWII. Given the predominance of the masses in the political and social life, the intellectuals, according to Ortega, had suffered a consequent loss of prestige, and their vocational activity was merely becoming a profession among others. In spite of this and of the crisis within the scientific domain, Ortega did not think that any intellectual intervention would have been inadequate or useless. On the contrary, he affirmed the necessity of posing once again significant and ample questions that could have offered to the intellectuals the chance to get in touch with a general public and face the most relevant problems of the society through a contemplative perspective. As a consequence, it is possible to affirm that the Institute

of Humanity was clearly the realisation of Ortega's most powerful vocation.

9. 4 *The first lessons: on "historiology"*

The first course taught by Ortega in the Institute of Humanities dealt with the book *A study of History*, by Arnold Toynbee⁷⁵. In spite of Ortega's promise of analysing and criticising in depth the book of the British scholar, this ultimately served to Ortega as a pretext to talk about some of the main topics he had treated during at least the whole decade of the '40s. These can be basically summarised in two main strands: a) the concern for the development of an overall theory of history which would have connected the personal existence of the individuals with the social life of the community and b) the strictly related socio-political problem of the way in which the social consensus is built and, in particular, the problem of legitimacy. Many of the considerations that the Madrilenian philosopher included in this text derived from precedent courses and lectures he gave during his long period of exile. In particular, he offers a synthesis of the theses he presented in his conferences on the Historical Reason and his book on the Roman Empire. However, the confrontation with the recent publication of the British intellectual gave him the possibility to delve into some historiography and sociological problems he had not considered so far and which reveal a new preoccupation of the philosopher towards the theoretical and historical premises of the new social order that both globally and locally speaking was being implemented by that time.

The local interest of his meditations is constantly and steadily denied by Ortega, evidently for practical reasons, being all his lessons

⁷⁵ The analysis of Ortega's conference is made through the text recently edited in his *Obras Completas* (OC, IX: 1187-1408). This text largely differed from some previous editions. This new version of the conferences and posthumous book has been realised by joining Ortega's manuscript – used as the main source for reconstructing it – and the transcript made by some of his disciples in the institute – mainly Fernando Vela and Paulino Garragorri. The prevalent use of the manuscript instead of the exclusive use of the transcription – that is always integrated in the text - appears to be a more exhaustive and rigorous editorial criterion for offering an accurate version of this course.

registered and accurately scrutinised by the censorship (Marías, 2008). *For this reason, and for avoiding the regime's repression, when explicitly talking about politically sensitive problems, Ortega always pretends to move from the national to the international level, or from the contemporary to the ancient world, with the aim of avoiding any possibility of actualisation of his words.* Indeed, since the first lesson he poses the classical question of the best form of government and of its proper end, before analysing in detail the case of the Roman Empire for the following lessons⁷⁶.

The ambiguity of his references reached its acme in the central part of the course. In fact, by the end of the fifth lesson, Ortega introduced the theme of illegitimacy when talking about the dictators in the Ancient Rome, affirming that the exceptional power they had was not strictly speaking neither legitimate nor illegitimate, in the sense that it was exercised without any reference to a right of law and also without a clear endorsement from the population⁷⁷. Immediately after stating this provocative and ambiguous thesis about the illegitimate role of the “Jefe de Estado”, Ortega pointed out that he was not referring to the Spanish scenario. He denied that his words could have been interpreted as veiled allusions to Spain since: «No solo no lo son sino que no pueden serlo. Porque a ese que llamo desazonador, pavoroso ámbito de la ilegitimidad constitutivo no puede en ningún caso llegar un pueblo solo. El terrible fenómeno es demasiado profundo para que pueda producirse sólo en una colectividad» (OC, IX: 1275-1276). However, during the following lessons, he insisted in using the Roman Empire as a paradigmatic case for understating the essence of all political governments, and to affirm that only the constitutional monarchy would – historically speaking – constitute a legitimate form of government (OC, IX: 1288). Whereas on the one hand it is extremely difficult to establish the extent to which Ortega was concretely trying to promote a political and institutional change – even if he explicitly presents his sociological theory of state legitimacy as of great interest

⁷⁶ Significantly enough, the problem of the mixed constitution would represent the theme of Luis Díez del Corral's seminar during the second year of the institute (Marías, 1998).

⁷⁷ «No es que no se quisiese reconocer una legitimidad: es que no la había – la preexistente se había evaporado. Nadie tenía una idea clara y en que creyese firmemente sobre quién debía legítimamente mandar. Alguien tenía que ser pero nadie poseía en las mentes de lo ciudadano títulos legítimos para ello» (OC, IX: 1275).

for one outstanding recent opponent of Franco such as Serrano Suñer, (OC, IX: 1336) –, on the other hand it is patent from the very evolution of Ortega's course that the ambiguity of some of his affirmations was inspected with extreme suspicion and mistrust by part of the regime. Thus, from the seventh lesson, not only Ortega affirms that he would firmly stick to the text he had prepared to avoid further miscomprehensions, but he also vindicates the independency of his political theory from the current Spanish scenario, accusing his critics of being excessively focused on the national case, being unable to look at the larger picture: «La causa de todo esto, señores, es el triste aldeanismo en que ha recaído buena parte de la vida intelectual española. Con él ha reaparecido todo su conocido repertorio: la explosión de las envidias, la pueril eyección de insolencias y la vana agitación» (OC, IX: 1300).

Indeed, that the scope of Ortega's meditation was vaster than what many Spanish critics affirmed was proved both by the relevance of the themes treated by him and by the particular perspective adopted by the philosopher to analyse them. In fact, the general framework within which Ortega developed his argumentations was the constant confrontation with the recent internationalism. This new trend, according to the philosopher, was in fact setting the agenda of the intellectual and political debate during the post-war period, constituting the theoretical ground that legitimated the creation of supranational entities responsible for the regulation of the different national interests. Thus, his course also represents an analysis of a new political condition that, according to Ortega, too quickly had established the death of the national States and the birth of a new global order⁷⁸. The unification of the whole world population under the name of a unique civilisation was, according to the philosopher, an utopian and unrealistic political idea. This was not due to some immutable characteristics of the nations and to their "eternity", but

⁷⁸ El modo simplicista, atropellado y tosco con que de salida embiste al autor contra la idea de nacionalidad, la prisa incontinente que parece sentir en declararse no sólo anti-nacionalista sino anti-nacionista – así, porqué sí, sin sugerir para ello el menor fundamento – nos revela que no se trata de una idea, de una averiguación teórica sino de un odio personalísimo que fermenta y cuaja en los sótanos privados del alma de mister Toynbee y que mal controlado no da espera a que llegue mejor oportunidad, sino que dispara inmediatamente su intempestiva emisión. (OC, IX: 1221).

rather to the fact of constituting the collective history and therefore the actual system of convictions that regulates the life of every individual. Accordingly, the nation would represent the basis of social consensus acting, at the same time, as an individual and as a collective consciousness (Aguilar, 1998: 117-120). The globalisation, to Ortega, did not straightforwardly imply the homogenisation and sharing of this system of beliefs, since the material change of the conditions of living had to be combined with the common faith in a shared past able to sustain the future co-existence of a community of individual beings. As a consequence, the problem posed by Ortega in this course does have a global facet insofar as it offers a response to an urgent problem: i.e. the way in which this new social consensus could have been built once accepted the fact that, as proved by the war, it had evidently vanished.

To render intelligible the proposal of Ortega it is necessary to focus on two main aspects of his course: his “*historiology*” and his theory of social consensus. According to the Madrilenian philosopher, all relations of power are grounded on historical premises (Lavedán Ferreiro, 2012) and for this reason, to understand the everyday social life, it is necessary to delve into the history of that particular society. Ortega distinguishes between history as erudition (historiography) and history as human self-comprehension (historiology). Once this distinction is made it is evident that it is the latter what he tried to promote throughout the Institute of Humanities. In fact, according to Ortega, this: «Es un instituto de historia, mas por historia entiendo el estudio de la realidad humana desde el más remoto pasado hasta los hombres hoy vivientes, inclusive» (OC, IX: 1253). He conceives history as a meaningful narration of the past that manifests itself through a linguistic sedimentation. For this reason, not only in his course – through a recurrent use of etymology⁷⁹ – but also in all the activities of the Institute, he underlines the importance of linguistic and philology for shedding light on the past and, consequently, for understanding the present (Cruz, 2014). History is a social reality that is transmitted through another social instrument: i.e. language. Therefore language, far from being the expression of an inner consciousness, is a public reality that is available to all and which has a shared and common

⁷⁹ As W. Rickenbacker (1992: 31) correctly wrote: «Ortega’s recurring disquisitions on etymology serve two purposes: to underscore the historicity of language, and to forge a new metaphorical view of life». This last purpose, as it will be proved, has evident political consequences.

meaning that forges the social world. Moreover, due to the multidimensional essence of history and the impossibility of confining it in the past, it is intrinsically linked with the construction of social consensus, thought as a dynamic force. As Ortega put it:

La razón histórica, que no consiste en inducir ni en deducir sino lisamente en narrar, es la única capaz de entender las realidades humanas porque la contextura de éstas es histórica, es historicidad. [...] De lo dicho se desprende que toda realidad humana, por su historicidad, consiste en venir de algo pasado e ir hacia algo futuro. Por tanto, que es una realidad sustantivamente móvil. (OC, IX: 1266).

For this reason, the legitimacy of any form of government cannot be grounded on a social contract of a system of abstract rules set once and for all, but on a stratified set of historically developed practices that needs to be recast every single day by the individuals and which had to be grounded on a common wish shared by the citizens, a wish which could become an active principle of cooperation within society. The consensus, according to Ortega, does not manifest itself in the mere agreement of the members of a society on specific themes, but rather on the expression of a shared *Weltanschauung* produced during the history and consciously – or unconsciously – endorsed by all individuals. In the same years in which Ortega was developing his theory, also another philosopher, Wittgenstein, was delving into the epistemological analysis of common sense. Similarly, even if from a different perspective, also Wittgenstein pointed out the importance of the historical tradition as the basic ground of this vision of the world. Indeed, for the German thinker: «I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false» (Wittgenstein, 1969-1975: §94)⁸⁰. According to Ortega, this shared belief is what ultimately grounds and renders possible all social relations, the right, the norms and the political institutions. For this reason, he separated himself from

⁸⁰ The complex relation between Ortega and Wittgenstein on common sense as the basis of the public opinion (Peris Suay, 2009), has been interestingly discussed in particular by Ariso (2013), who points out that: «Si bien Ortega y Wittgenstein ha contribuido sobremanera al desarrollo de lo que Mulligan denominó “certeza primitiva”, hay profundas diferencias que subyacen a sus respectivas versiones de la susodicha “certeza primitiva”».

Kelsen, who assigned to the right a rational foundation, affirming that the legitimacy of the political power is grounded «en cierta situación total de la vida humana colectiva. De aquí que al quebrarse la creencia común se resquebraje la legitimidad» (*OC*, IX: 1321). Consequently, according to Ortega, the right is neither grounded on a fix set of rules and principles nor on a violent imposition of norms. On the contrary, it is based on a progressive and changing set of habits and social conviction that the citizens, through their active participation to the historical flux, are ultimately responsible of unceasingly reforming. This process of building consensus represented, according to the philosopher, the crucial problem that the Western civilisation was facing during that period, and to this question he would devote in particular the second of the courses he gave at the Institute of Humanities, entitled *Man and People*.

9.5 Individual and society in a state of exception

In November 1949 Ortega started his second course in the Institute of humanities. The great affluence of the audience rendered necessary to change the location of the conference: neither the *Aula Nueva* nor the Hall of the *Unión Mercantil* could host the event. For this reason the lessons took place in the *Barceló* cinema, that could have given space to approximately a thousand people. For this new course Ortega had planned twelve lessons about the relationship between individuals and society. According to the program – that he ultimately did not follow in its entirety –, it would have to present his ideas as it follows: 1- The human being, *human life*; 2- The human being, *we*; 3- The people; 4- The greeting; 5- The speech of the people, *the language*; 6- The social gathering; 7-The State; 8- The right; 9- The society and its form; 10- Nation, ultra-nation and inter-nation; 11- Animal and human societies; 12- Humanity⁸¹.

The topic represented one of the main preoccupation of Ortega at least since the second half of the '30s, since his conference in Rotterdam in 1936. However, far from being an exhaustive and final presentation of his sociological reflections, the course he presented at the Institute was an *in fieri* project that he continued to ameliorate and partially

⁸¹ In AOG, PB 366-12/ 6, 7.

change also in the following years and during different conferences he gave, in particular in Germany, during the '50s. Indeed, during his lectures at the Institute he completed approximately only the first half of the themes he had prospected in his previous project. Moreover, the final and ampler version of the book he was preparing during 1954-55, and that should have been composed by 15 or 18 chapters⁸², would not be completed. By those years he was planning not to publish the book in Spain, due to the censorship, but rather in America, Netherlands and Germany. In any case, this theme represented a central problem for Ortega during almost twenty years, that is for the whole course of the period that followed his exile until his death. As a consequence, it is possible to conclude that the more profound sense of the Institute can be grasped by referring in particular to this course.

That the sociological interest of the philosopher arose with particular emphasis during the years of the civil war and the global conflict is proved by the very first lesson of this course. In fact, for preparing it, he used the previous conference he gave in Buenos Aires in 1940, entitled *Ensimismamiento y Alteración*⁸³. The confusion and disorientation he perceived both in the public opinion and among the intellectuals on the social phenomena that were occurring during those years was still considered by the philosopher as a question of tremendous urgency in the national and international post-war scenario, due to the widespread «ineptitud sociológica» (OC, X: 142), both of the masses and of the intellectuals.

Interestingly enough, in this course Ortega connects in a extremely precise way his anthropology with his social theory, devoting the first half of it to the study of the personal and interpersonal life, and the second to the structure of the society. The human relations, according

⁸² Letter by Ortega to Lunt, 28-I-1955, in AOG, PB-315; letter by Ortega to Klipper, 15-VII-1954, in AOG, CD-K/ 30.

⁸³ Contrary to the previous Orteguian course in the institute of Humanities, the editors of his complete works (OC, X: 139-326) have chosen to adopt extensively and quite exclusively the manuscripts that the philosopher had prepared during the course of the years or specifically for the conference. In doing so they had frequently cancelled all possible references to the concrete cultural, political and social circumstances under which the course did actually take place in Madrid among November 1949 and December 1950. For this reason the analysis of this text will be enriched by taking into consideration other archival sources and texts written by the philosopher and which had not yet been published.

to the philosopher, largely differ from the social ones which are not bound to the same rules, i.e. do not share the same epistemic and ontological status. Particularly, according to Ortega, whereas all personal and interpersonal relations are grounded on a rational basis, on the contrary the social norms – uses – are characterised by their irrationality, or rather by being imposed behaviours that, customarily, each and every one adopts in her social and public life, without thinking about the reasons grounding her actions⁸⁴. The move from the individual actions to the social ones would consequently imply a progressive reduction of authentic involvement of the person who accomplishes those actions. As Ortega put it: «la *colectividad* es, sí, algo humano; pero es lo humano sin el hombre, lo humano sin espíritu, lo humano sin alma, lo humano deshumanizado» (OC, X: 257). This is due to the fact that all social actions lack the two main characteristic of the real human actions: i.e. the comprehension of the reasons beneath that act and the free will and desire to accomplish it (OC, X: 266).

The basic distinction traced by Ortega between human and social actions brings about a further consequence in relation to the way in which he conceives the problem of the creation and legitimacy of the political power. In fact, given the irrationality and mechanical character of the social existence, more than on a compact and rational system of rules set in a particular moment by a definite group of people, the social relations are more effectively regulated by costumes, habits, uses and commonly accepted rules of thumb. These are also called by Ortega beliefs, opposed to the ideas. The role played by beliefs and values in defining the legitimacy of social actions and facts had often been stressed by him. Indeed, to this theme he devoted an important essay, *Ideas y Creencias*, firstly published in 1936. In this book he underlined the very strict link between beliefs and social uses or, to put it in other words, between an epistemological point of view and a political one. Social uses, norms and institutions, according to Ortega, put pressure on the subject by directly or indirectly imposing him a certain way of behaviour. This common way of behaviour implies some

⁸⁴ As Ferreiro Lavedán, (2005: 180) put it: «La irracionalidad del uso no significa que éste carezca por completo de sentido, sino, eso sí, que funciona con independencia de él. De forma que el que yo entienda la norma jurídica, las instrucciones de funcionamiento de mi televisión o el por qué del vaso, no es algo necesario, pues bien puedo limitarme a usarlos; y, de hecho, es lo que normalmente hago».

positive consequences: for instance, it permits to foresee the behaviours of the other social agents and, in addition, it renders possible the development of the society according to a coherent and unified project.

A social norm, to Ortega, is in fact valid and active within society when it is concretely used. As a consequence, he speaks of social norms as *vigencias*, since they imposed themselves in the concrete world and are effectively present within society, constituting the basic norms of social relations. This implies that the legitimacy of a society is not grounded on something as a social contract, but rather on the validity of this system of *vigencias*. As Ortega put it:

El fenómeno sociológico fundamental que es la vigencia y que se da no sólo en la opinión sino en todo uso, que es, por tanto, el carácter más sustantivo del hecho social y de la sociedad como conjunto de hechos sociales, la vigencia, no consiste en la adhesión individual, tanto o cuanto numerosa (OC, X: 319).

The power of the State is consequently grounded on the consensus which depends on the a-rational acceptance of a set of beliefs. The production of such set of beliefs is not conceived in the same way of a system of rules and does not obey to the same procedures that regulate the creation of the Right. To explain this point Ortega traces another distinction between strong and weak uses. Whereas the State and the Right belong to the former, the public opinion – i.e. the compact system of beliefs that grounds the social norms – pertains to the latter. This does not mean that the forces of the weak uses is inferior to that of the strong ones. What is really weak or strong is the eventual sanction that can be imposed to the person who does not respect such use. In fact, in the case of the strong uses, such as the right, the sanction is more rigid and stronger, since the infringement of the law would determine the repressive intervention of the State. On the contrary, the sanction which is implied by the contravention of a weak use does not express itself neither through a coercive repression by the State nor by the imposition of a precise sanction (OC, X: 293). Therefore, according to Ortega, State and society have to be thought as two different entities. Whereas the first is exclusively the expression of a fix set of positive rules established by a government on a given time, the second would be the result of a long process of crystallisation of ideas which have been considered useful for the purposes of the social life. Interestingly enough, it is in the latter that Ortega identifies the place in which the

public opinion is forged and, consequently, the basis of political legitimacy.

The counterintuitive thought of Ortega is elucidated by the philosopher in particular through two examples: the greetings and the language. Both these social uses are considered as instances of the way in which, in an a-rational and mechanical way, people act in their social relations during their everyday life. The language spoken within a country, for instance, clearly epitomises the effectiveness of a social norm which permits to communicate among one another within a common set of mind, even if those who adopt this norm possess a more or less critical knowledge of the language and even if different subjects do have very different speaking abilities. This fact would also imply that being all social norms the result of a process of consolidation of the uses which are considered to be valid and therefore accepted within a society, the fact that they are respected *per se* would manifest the existence of a common public opinion, which is responsible for the legitimacy of political power or, to say it differently, which renders possible the existence of a stable form of social coexistence. The problem for the legitimacy of a political power clearly emerges not only when strong and weak uses evidently diverge, but also and foremost in all those cases in which no shared system of beliefs is present within a society and, as a consequence, there is not public opinion. Notably, the relation within weak and strong uses – i.e. the right, national and international – and the lack of the basic grounds of legitimacy that characterised the European societies since the '30s, should have been the topics of the last lessons of the course that, at the end, Ortega did not pronounce.

It is possible to find several instances of the probable development of his lectures in some following conferences he gave during the fifties, such as *Cómo muere una creencia*, *Un capítulo sobre el Estado* or *Individuo y organización*. In all these texts, in fact, Ortega underlines the distinction between State and society, that is between rationally and abruptly imposed norms and irrational and customary uses, repeating and expanding some of the main theses included in *Man and People*. However, the circumstances in which he pronounced these conferences clearly differed from the occasion of the course in the Institute of Humanities that was inserted in a different historical and political context.

The lack of a transcription of the course does not permit to analyse with precision the direct references of the philosopher to the political and social context and to say with certainty what was his aim and intention. However, it is likely to be the case that the course offered to him the opportunity to covertly formulate both his criticisms and his proposals concerning the way in which the Spanish State was being regulated. Indeed, the regime, by that period, represented a sort of State of exception. It lacked an authentic and definite regulation but at the same time the control of the police and the bureaucracy was a direct representation of what Ortega called an hyper-extension of the State. In fact, as the historian Julio Aróstegui (1996) underlined, Franco's regime constituted in those years an anti-juridical system whose very existence implied relevant problems concerning both its institutional framework and its legitimacy⁸⁵. Given these premises, it seems correct to affirm that Ortega discourse had three main goals, the first descriptive and the other two normative. In fact, on the one hand he studied how the social coexistence could be possible when lacking a positive jurisdiction – which undoubtedly was the case of the very recent Spanish history. On the other, he tried a) to set the limit for the intervention of the State in the social life, being an orthopaedic but not totalitarian instrument; and b) to offer his contribution towards the theorisation and practice of the influence of the intellectuals and ruling class in the formation of the civil society independently from the State.

Both of these purposes it is possible to find evidences in the various notes – preserved in his personal archive – used by Ortega to prepare his conferences at the Institute of Humanities which, in their majority, dealt with the abovementioned questions. In particular, the normative claims of the philosopher in relation to the need of limiting the intervention of the State and of guaranteeing at least a basic intellectual freedom of speech are set out in a note he prepared for *Man and People*, on the relation between individuals and community, entitled *Contra el colectivismo y el totalitarismo*. In this brief note he affirms that: «Toda realidad social es uso. Pero el uso tuvo antes que ser invención del

⁸⁵ As Sánchez Recio (1999: 37) has correctly written: «La dictadura franquista se mantuvo hasta 1947 en la más completa indefinición respecto a la forma de Estado; el régimen era simplemente dictadura o, de manera más precisa, puro estado de excepción, y para la pretendida legitimación interior y el reconocimiento internacional era necesario, aunque fuera sólo como referencia, especificar la forma política del Estado que se estaba configurando».

individuo y cultivo de un un grupo. Si se implide la actuación de estos la sociedad morirá cuando muera el gobierno»⁸⁶. Ortega's vindication of the weight of the intellectuals in the construction of the public opinion was based on the very idea purported by the philosopher of the distinguished role play by education and, in particular, by humanities, in the life of the single individuals and the society. The aim of IH was indeed that of realising a new form of collaboration not only among the intellectual class but also between this and the general public opinion. This intervention was based on a precise educative and socialising project that Ortega was promoting through the Institute.

9.6 Reforming humanities and forging intellectuals

In fact, the design of the activities that took place at the IH had been very scrupulously planned by Ortega, Marías and their collaborators. This institution should have transmitted to the students, just by throwing a glance to its very structure, the kernel of Ortega's view about the need of reinforcing a relation of reciprocity and mutual understanding among the intellectuals and the civil society. Moreover, as emphasised in the prospectus, the Institute advocated for the need of revitalising the study of the humanities to use them as a means for comprehending the society, considering them a prerequisite for changing the material conditions under which one lives. This fundamental intention of the philosopher was mirrored in all his lessons, and in particular in his new consideration of the role of the intellectual in the light of his historical and sociological theories. Indeed, the two courses that Ortega taught at the IH were very tightly intertwined. As a matter of fact, the historical essence of human beings constituted the premise for comprehending the social dimension of the individuals' personality and, at the same time, this consciousness should have propelled one to question the very foundations of the society in which she lived. This thorny affirmation can be elucidated by taking into consideration in particular one aspect that both courses analyse from different perspective, i.e. the nature of language. This feature of Ortega's meditation would later be connected to his central

⁸⁶ In AOG, 16-2-6/ 25.

argument in defence of the revitalisation of the study of a peculiar form of the humanities as a cultural and political necessity⁸⁷.

The language serves to Ortega as an excellent example for illustrating what a social use properly is. In fact, it possesses a double nature: on the one hand it is an imposed set of grammatical, phonetic, syntactic and pragmatic rules and therefore is perceived as totally external to the individual; but on the other hand the language is also the most effective means that each person has to express herself, and consequently is perceived as a private property. However, according to Ortega, language is not created, but rather learnt by the individuals and is the product of a long-lasting historical process of changes and adjustments. The colloquia on the modisms that took place in the IH – i.e. on the slang and figures of speech – wanted to investigate exactly the reasons that had determined the meaning of an expression that, *per se*, would not be intelligible without taking into account its social use⁸⁸. This apparent inexplicability implies the activation of rational process that would aim at clarifying the way in which, in the course of history, a particular expression has acquired a specific meaning through its use. This “narration” represents the only way through which a social use, that is imposed to the individuals and unconsciously used by them, would acquire a meaningful sense for their concrete existences (Lévêque, 2008)⁸⁹.

This is the point of departure of the long meditation on the nature of language that Ortega developed in *Man and People*. He reaffirms the possibility of rationally motivating a social use by comprehending its history, and in doing so he adopts the example of etymology as the key for understanding the most widespread social use, i.e. the language

⁸⁷ «El Instituto de Humanidades, si logra consolidar su existencia, se propone una reforma profunda de las ciencias que estudian lo humano, y esta reforma, que empieza por serlo de su mismo contenido científico, continua por ser una reforma en el modo de vivir de la ciencia, en el modo de existir del cuerpo social» (OC, IX: 1296).

⁸⁸ As D’Olhaberriague Ruiz (2009: 59) put it: «En las expresiones idiomáticas parece reconocer una suerte de racionalidad lingüística singular, anárquica y enmascarada, propicia como pocas para ser desentrañada y esclarecida por la razón narrativa y sólo por ella».

⁸⁹ For this reason Ortega affirmed that the main aim of the IH would have been that of constituting an hermeneutical experiment consisting in «determinar a qué todo suficiente hay que referir una palabra para que su sentido pierda el equívoco» (OC, IX: 1209).

(OC, X: 275-276). At the same time he goes further in using the example of the language in order to delve into the sociological problem that he was investigating and that brought him to analyse the essential requisites that a legitimate social power should possess. In particular, Ortega assumed that the language is both an imposed norm and a reality that can change over time through the intervention of the speakers.

In this text he purported in particular two theses which are extremely important in relation to his sociological theory. The first is the one according to which a language of a given society can substantially change over time if some of its members sweep themselves away from the rest of the population. This would bring them to develop a specific and different idiom which would served as a means for the construction of their own identity. The second is that also within a single group the language does actually evolves over time. This evolution would be regulated by a precise dynamic according to which a group of very proficient speakers would be able to influence the use of the language by dominating its rule and attributing a proper meaning to new words that would later enter into the common language of the lower classes (OC, X: 297-298).

By applying these theses concerning the creation and transmission of a language to Ortega's sociological theory it is possible to affirm that ,in the second course of the IH, the philosopher: 1) assigns to individuals and groups a more active role in the foundation of the society; 2) places the responsibility of this change in an intellectual activity: forging new ideas. This implies that the social uses are not considered as irrational *per se*. They had been rationally created before passing through a long process in which they lost their proper rational meaning for the majority of the population, gaining at the same time force and validity (*vigencia*). The framework set by Ortega in this book deals with a question that he felt as extremely urgent, that is: how it would be possible to construct a new set of uses and beliefs when the old had lost their validity?. In other words, this was the problem of building the identity of a nation conceived as a cohesive group of people sharing a common set of social norms and beliefs (Visone, 2013). The solution Ortega offered to this question lies in the new concept of the role he assigned to the intellectual in society through the reformation of humanities.

Indeed, the intellectual and philosophical activity is always conceived by him not only as a theoretical insight into the social world, but also as a way of changing it. The philosopher strongly refuses to conceive culture as something separated to the concrete life of human beings⁹⁰, as an academic practice which merely dealt with erudite questions. In the case of a state of political exception and cultural crisis such as that which characterised the Spanish reality and – to a certain extent – the international scenario, Ortega assigned to the intellectual the task of constructing the new set of beliefs and uses that would render possible the social life when this had disappeared (OC, IX: 1325). The study of humanities, to Ortega, is therefore indispensable both to comprehend the society in which one lives⁹¹ and reform it. For this purpose, the philosopher often called for an active collaboration of the participants to the IH in the development of the institute's activities, and in particular of the young students who attended his lessons. He conceived the role of the intellectual as a mediator between the rational life of the individuals and the apparently imposed norms of the society. This pedagogical aim responded to the perceived crisis of value of the post-war society and, at the same time, of the importance of cultivating a critical thinking as the main effective means through form of populism and totalitarianism (Simeoni, 2013). Ortega's meditations on these crucial aspects became more and more frequent during the '50s, not only in Spain within the IH, which interrupted its activities in the summer 1950, but abroad, in particular through a long series of relevant conferences and publications. Before analysing the theoretical developments of Ortega's thought it is essential to understand what were the reasons underneath the end of the IH and what its contribution to the Spanish cultural life.

⁹⁰ «Toda mi obra, desde sus primeros balbucesos, ha sido una lucha contra esta actitud, que hace muchos años llamé BEATERIA DE LA CULTURA, porque en ella se nos presentaba la cultura, el pensamiento, como algo que se justifica a sí mismo, es decir, que no necesitaba justificación, sino que es valioso por su propia esencia, cualesquiera sean su concreta ocupación y su contenido» (OC, X: 152).

⁹¹ «Si al practicar un uso, advertimos que no entedemos, en absoluto o apenas, el sentido del acto que ese uso nos obliga a ejecutar, nos encontramos con un problema nuevo [...] Como el acto, por sí, no revela su sentido, no tenemos más remedio que explicar su existencia, hacernos inteligible por qué lo hay, porqué está ahí, en suma, explicarlo y esto es teorizar» (OC, X: 289-290).

9.7 *The reactions to the Institute: a balance*

The reception of the IH by the Spanish civil society, and in particular by the middle-upper class, can be defined as generally positive, both in quantitative and qualitative terms. As far as the first of these aspects is concerned, it has to be pointed out that each lesson of the second course given by Ortega had been followed by approximately 1300 people. Evidently, his teachings did not reach only the university population but also the general public. This can be argued by taking into account the fact that the students matriculated in the Faculty of letters and philosophy of the UC by that time were less than 600 (Sánchez Montes, 1949). Moreover, by considering the costs of matriculation and the vocational character of these lessons – only 1 out of 8 students matriculated in the University would have terminate her studies – it is plausible to affirm that only a limited part of them would have taken part in these lessons. Indeed, as in the case of the conference in the *Ateneo* of Madrid, Ortega's lessons were public events that gathered the high society. Whereas this opened the way to harsh criticisms against the cultural level of his lessons in comparison to the difficult and serious lectures that were taking place in the same period within the University⁹², Ortega always vindicated with pride the fact of dealing with an heterogeneous audience which represented the general composition of the civil society.

The vast interest that surrounded the IH was also complemented by a general positive attitude of the civil society at all its level. The several letters received by Ortega and Marías reveal the great expectation as well as the supportive stance of the public towards the IH. Thanks to the ample résumés that were published in some cultural reviews and newspapers, such as *Ínsula* and *ABC*, Ortega's teachings were followed with fascination in many parts of Spain by an heterogeneous public which overcame the limits of the formal schooling system. Thus, for instance, a group of young students and self-taught people from Barcelona wrote to express its gratitude to Ortega for renewing the

⁹² Torrente Ballesteros, 1950, XI: «La música de Zubiri es difícil y sus cursos no se ven favorecidos, como los de Ortega, por los sombreros femeninos más lindos de Madrid: yo me atrevo a lamentarlo, pero comprendo y hasta disculpo, la ausencia de nuestras elegantes».

interest towards the Humanities⁹³. A similar admiration was manifested by a group of prisoners incarcerated in San Miguel de los Reyes, Valencia, which defined itself as: «un grupo de presos de diversas regiones de España que escuchamos un poco y reflexionamos cuanto el aletear de nuestro espíritu nos permite»⁹⁴ [See Annex 9].

The fame of the Institute did propagate also outside the Spanish borders: it received many expressions of interest from the UK. In particular, due to the topic of his first course, Ortega had been invited to publish his lessons on Toynbee by the same editor of the book of the British historian⁹⁵. The international appeal of the IH, due in particular to the innovativeness of his methodology and style, was emblematically manifested in a short article written by an American spectator of these courses, Edit Helman, according to whom:

The fervent and assiduous support of the Institute reveals the need that many thinking individuals of all ages and classes feel for help in confronting the world they find themselves in. In Spain, to be sure, other special factors explain in part the extraordinary success of the Institute: it is an oasis in the desert and people have long been thirsty; it is the only meeting place of people who have in common at least a preoccupation with cultural problems and who linger after lectures to discuss the questions that have been raised; and last, but most important, probably, everyone is attracted by the personality, prestige, and the magic word of Ortega⁹⁶.

The reception of the IH in the Spanish journals was hardly ever enthusiastic. An example of an extremely negative reception is that of *Arbor*, the official journal of the CSIC, that willingly ignored the IH until the end of the first year of its activity, to avoid advertising this institution. When the journal broke its silence on the IH in April 1949 it did so by vehemently criticising Ortega, deemed responsible for propagating a laic and anti-Catholic thought via «un ensayismo aparentemente inocuo»⁹⁷. *Arbor* was basically repeating the criticism of one of the main censors of Ortega's book: Joaquín Iriarte, who in 1949 devoted himself to an unceasing demolition of Ortega through a series of articles published in *Razón y Fe*. His critiques were directed in

⁹³ Letter to Ortega, 10-III-1949, in AOG, PB-367/ 31-1.

⁹⁴ Letter to Ortega, 1950, in AOG, PB-367/ 78.

⁹⁵ Letter by Starkie to Ortega, 19-II-1949, in AOG, PB-367/ 24-2.

⁹⁶ Helman, 1951: 47-48.

⁹⁷ Pinillo, 1949: 606.

particular against the historicism, the laicism and internationalism of the philosopher. As Iriarte wrote, judging the IH: «He aquí las líneas fundamentales de una filosofía que es la disolución de toda fórmula religiosa, moral y filosófica, y que sin objetividad, sin ejes fijo ni lastre, vuela vagarosa por los campos de la historia»⁹⁸.

A more neutral reception of Ortega's philosophy and his IH was the one of the *Revista de Filosofía* of the UC. The editorial line of the review was that of avoiding any sort of extremism both in advertising and in condemning the Institute. So, in April 1949, the review published a very syntethic summary of the purposes of the IH and Ortega's conferences, without any critical examination of the pros and cons of its contribution to the Spanish culture⁹⁹. Moreover, it did not present exclusively the view of Ortega's opponents, but also of his friends and disciples, reviewing with complacency Marías's book on the idea of "living-reason" in Ortega y Gasset (Láscaris Comneno, 1949). The very review of Iriarte's essays in 1950 reveals this tendency of objectivity and neutrality affirming that: «La revisión del "problema" Ortega sería imposible, mientras no se abandonara la crítica fácil, fustigante y malintencionada o la admiración incondicional, entusiasta y exaltada» and directly reproaching Iriarte for committing the first of these mistakes (Perdomo García, 1950: 532).

Lastly, an example of unconditional support to Ortega and the IH is that of the review *Ínsula* which had been responsible for advertising the creation of this institution since the end of October 1948 and decided, in accordance with Ortega and under the supervision of Marías, to periodically publish a chronical of its activities. Many collaborators of the IH were at the same time contributors of the review: among them Julián Marías, Paulino Garagorri and German Bleiberg. Bleiberg was the person responsible for writing the long chronicles about the IH that reached so many people within and outside the Spanish borders. He did so always using enthusiastic expressions of admiration towards Ortega and his «inagotable riqueza de pensamiento que siempre fluye de la palabra escrita o hablada» (Bleiberg, 1949: 2). Thus, since Ortega's creation of the IH and until his death, *Ínsula's* guiding principle would be that of propagating and defending the activities that the philosopher was carrying about both in Spain and abroad.

⁹⁸ Iriarte, 1949c: 423.

⁹⁹ *Revista de Filosofía*, Crónica, Abril 1949, pp. 354-356.

By the beginning of the second year, the IH had already obtained a great popularity and resonance within the civil society and, with different nuances, among the intellectual world. As a consequence, its creator had gained more confidence about the relevance and impact of his project in the Spanish cultural atmosphere, as Ortega put it in an interview he was being giving to ABC before the beginning of the course *Man and People*: «Quería ver con rigor de laboratorio cuál ea la reacción de mis compatriotas, y ella fue tan clara, entusiasta y diré que torrencial, que me infundió ánimo para proseguir y responder, como creo que debo, a esa amabilidad que tanto agradezco»¹⁰⁰. Ortega was gradually acquiring more importance and relevance within the Spanish debate that, as demonstrated by the different perception of the main cultural reviews of the period, was extremely polarised. These contrasts would contribute to the instability of the IH, that by the end of the spring 1950, interrupted its activities. An interruption which would have marked the end of Ortega's intervention in Spain.

9.8 *The end of the Institute*

Julián Marías, during the course of his long life, had frequently recalled the activities of the IH and provided the reasons for its final closing. He individuated in particular four main causes: 1) the economic difficulties of the IH; 2) the lack of political support; 3) the insufficient attendance and participation of the youngest generations to its activities; 4) the international appeal of Ortega's philosophy and his consequent frequent travels abroad (Marías, 1983). Whereas some of these reasons appear to be grounded on the historical facts, others do not stick adequately to reality. For instance, the first of these, i.e. the financial hardship of the IH, is unlikely to be real. In fact, the total income of the matriculation fees during the second year of the activity of the IH amounted to 247805 pesetas, while the total expenses – salaries, advertising and infrastructures – amounted to 158741. The net income of the IH was almost 90000 pesetas¹⁰¹. The positive trend in the

¹⁰⁰ ABC, *Segundo año del "Instituto de Humanidades" de Ortega y Gasset*, Madrid, 22-XI-1949.

¹⁰¹ In AOG, PB-368/ 18-22.

matriculation, from the first to the second year, when Ortega – the major source of income for the Institute – had almost doubled his audience, should have surely reassured about the possibility of consolidating the existence and expanding the activities of this recent cultural institution¹⁰².

Concerning the participation of the youngest generations, without any doubt they showed a great interest in particular in the courses of Ortega, but he did not perceive it as sufficient both from a quantitative and qualitative point of view. Indeed, Ortega received several letters by students who manifested their appreciation for his teaching soon after the beginning of the courses¹⁰³. However, the type of involvement of the students that Ortega was seeking to obtain through the IH should have been qualitative different. As he wrote to Julián Marías:

Lo que quieren que haga es que dé conferencias o lecciones y que ellos estén sentados escuchándome. Y nada más. Cuando yo le decía que no se puede estar empezando siempre por mi parte y que si los demás – por ejemplo, aunque solo como ejemplo, los jóvenes – no hacían algo por su parte, no era posible que se lograra nada. [...] No habían respondido los jóvenes en la forma y medida necesarias para que representasen una fuerza activamente fértil¹⁰⁴.

Ortega was in particular impressed by the lack of active participation he perceived among the youngest students, in the sense that he had hoped for their help for contributing to change the cultural and social situation of his country. He undoubtedly hoped it would have been possible to gather a group of people, a new generation, able

¹⁰² It is more likely to be the case that Marías confounded his personal financial conditions during that period in which he had not fix incomes with the conditions of the Institute. Indeed, the IH would have represented to him a very important source of income. As he wrote to Ortega: «De no proponer algunos planes relacionados con el Instituto – y ya sé hasta qué punto dependen de cosas delicadas independientes de su voluntad y de la mía – tendré que optar entre aceptar alguna labor de las que no haría sin algunas reservas o buscar algún quehacer más ajeno a mis trabajos habituales. Veremos lo que traen estos dos meses. En ellos tendré que ir maniobrando». Letter by Marías to Ortega, 5-VIII-50, in AOG, C-31/ 26.

¹⁰³ An example is the emotive letters written by some young university student to the philosopher by the end of March 1949. In AOG, PB-367/ 32;

¹⁰⁴ Letter by Ortega to Marías, 26-VI-1952, in AOG, CD-M/ 58.

to positive influence in the civil society, and the academic system, as it had always been the case of the teaching activity he had realised during his long career.

Then, in relation to Ortega's supposed international engagement it has to be pointed out that by the end of 1950 and the first half of 1951 Ortega did not travel more than during the period in which the Institute was in activity. In the long pauses during 1949, for instance, Ortega had been to Germany and, for the first time in his life, also in the United States, in Colorado, at the recently founded Aspen Institute. Indeed, the more vivacious period of travelling of the Madrilenian philosopher started no earlier than the summer 1951, that is more than a year after the interruption of the activities of the IH. He went to UK, Germany, France, Switzerland giving an incredible number of conferences, but by that date the project of the Institute had already been abandoned. By that time also Julián Marías, who would have to organise the IH in all its practical aspects, was planning to move abroad, in particular in Massachusetts, at the Wellesley college that had invited him as visiting professor for a semester¹⁰⁵.

The more plausible reason underneath the interruption of the IH's activities has to be found in the lack of political support. This does not merely mean that there were not the conditions that would have rendered possible the creation of an intellectual group of people which could have propagated the ideas of the institute. More than this, what to Ortega was the real cause of the impossibility of following with his project was the growing suspicion of the regime towards the Institute and, generally speaking, towards any form of intellectual freedom which manifested even the slightest sign of heterodoxy. This was attributed by the philosopher to a substantial change in the international politics of the regime. As Ortega wrote to Marías:

Sin que yo haya conseguido averiguar la causa, motivo o pretexto de ello, el gobierno se ha puesto más áspero, no sólo con nosotros, sino con todo el mundo y coincidiendo con esto aunque tal vez independientemente de esta actitud del gobierno, se ha hiperextesiado la censura eclesiástica en forma como hac mucho tiempo no observábamos. Repito, ninguna causa, motivo, pretexto internos de nuestro país justifica esto. Pero el hecho es incuestionable¹⁰⁶.

¹⁰⁵ Letter by Marías to Ortega, in AOG, 18-IV-1951, C-31/ 32.

¹⁰⁶ Letter by Ortega to Marías, in AOG, 23-II-1952, CD-M/ 57.

Indeed, in November 1950 the UN had revoked the resolution against the Spanish regime. The anti-communist outlook maintained by Spain had proved to be effective in determining the conditions that rendered possible the end of the international isolation of the country. At that time, the U.S. voted for the entrance of Spain in the international community since Franco's government could have helped in the fight against communism (Jarque Iñiguez, 1994; Güell, 2009). The cold war was, during that period, reaching its acme and a conflict between the two blocks did not sound as a totally improbable chance. Spain started to be considered as a resources and not as an obstacle for the defence of the Western values. The integration process of the nation within the international system was extremely fast: in less the three years it was admitted to all the major international institutions and, in 1955, it took part to the UN (Fernández García, Pereira Castañares, 1995: 134-137). Whereas it could seem that this change, together with the replacement of the Minister of Education Ibáñez Martín with a self-proclaimed admirer of Ortega – Ruiz Giménez – should have favoured the presence of the philosopher in Spain¹⁰⁷, this did not happen. From an internal perspective, this was mainly due to the resistance of the very Franco and the Opus Dei to a real modernisation of the country. In other words, the more religious sectors of the regime saw with clarity that the international recognition could have given the possibility of providing to the theocratic-hispanism represented by the Caudillo a full legitimate status. By that time the struggle between two very different concepts of modernity was being gained by the Catholic front, as proved by the agreement with the Roman Church signed in 1953 (Sanz, 2003). This would determine an even more rigid control of all the cultural and intellectual activities within the Spanish borders, as denounced by Ortega in his letter. An article published in *Arbor*, by Calvo Serer, by the end of 1951, clearly reveals that the opposition to

¹⁰⁷ As Molinero and Ysás (2008: 20) have written: «El programa de Joaquín Ruiz-Giménez tenía como objetivo revitalizar la vida universitaria, y el sistema educativo en su conjunto para lograr un mayor desarrollo de la sociedad española. Para ello, en el primer caso, la renovación exigía forzosamente dar cabida en la vida española a determinadas figuras intelectuales marginadas. [...] Joaquín Ruiz-Giménez, como los intelectuales falangistas, defendía que el Nuevo Estado debía ser “verdaderamente nacional” pero al mismo tiempo moderno, lo que se podría traducir por integrador de ideas y de personas».

Ortega and his disciples had reached its acme¹⁰⁸. In this context, as Ortega had perfectly perceived, the end of the international Spanish isolation would have guarantee to the orthodoxy of the regime the possibility to substantially repudiate any form of independent and critical thinking.

These were the main reasons that forced Ortega to abandon his project of the IH. However, his educative and philosophical proposal was perceived as extremely compelling outside the Spanish borders. The new fame he acquired during this period as a symbol of intellectual freedom gave him the opportunity to divulgate his humanistic reform in a transnational context and to continue to act as a reference point in his own homeland for some marginalised intellectuals, that in the following years would have contributed to the government of the so-called “technocrats” (Tusell, 2007).

¹⁰⁸ Calvo Serer, 1951, 321-322: «Son esos enemigos los que dirigen la cultura española y orientan el sentido de nuestra vida intelectual por cauces extranjerizantes. Y hasta la restauración intelectual comenzada en 1931, sus discípulos, amigos y continuadores [of Ménédez Pelayo] no consiguieron romper esa atmósfera antinacional. [...] La idea rutinaria de lo español ha sido influida, a lo largo de los últimos cuarenta años, entre otros, por los siguientes escritores: Azorín y Ramiro de Maeztu, Ortega y Gasset, Gabriel Alomar, Luis Araquistain, Manuel Azaña, Salvador de Madariaga, Luis de Zulueta y Fernando de los Ríos. Esta es la corriente ideológica que cuaja en la “República de los profesores” de 1931».

Chapter 10.

The end of hope? IH in continuity

The theory of education and the cultural activity developed by Ortega during his second coming in Spain did not find a good acceptance within the regime. At the same time, as already seen in the previous chapter, this activity was strictly in dialogue with the ambitious project of building a new global peace through education that international institutions purported after the end of the WWII.

In this section it will be analyzed the continuity of the philosophy of education of Ortega y Gasset in and outside Spain, so as to study the fourth and final mutation of this theorization in relation to historical and political changes: from the period of formation of a young student at the University of Madrid, to the context of the Second republic, later during the period of the Francoist regime and, finally, ending with the post-war international context.

Ortega's frequent travels abroad that took place during the fifties, most of them in the occasion of conferences and courses – in Germany, Switzerland, England, Portugal, Italy, Argentina and USA – gave him the possibility to continue to express his ideas and, at the same time, to try to influence the opinions of other intellectuals and political actors.

This was due in particular to (§1) the relevance that his ideas had in relation to the international context and their concrete contributions in giving birth to new educational practices. Indeed, as it will be proved in the following pages, the educative proposals realised by Ortega did find a very responsive ground in particular in the US, through the mediation of Robert Hutchins, professor of the University of Chicago and founder of the *Aspen Institute* in Colorado. In spite of the possibility recently opened to the philosopher at the global level, Ortega focused his attention in particular on the European context. As it will be demonstrated (§2) his theory of education constituted the premise for the consequent meditations on the role of the intellectual in the

construction of a super-national identity, a prerequisite for the building of a European unified society. As a matter of fact, (§3) the relevance of the reform of humanities he was purporting through the IH was perceived as so compelling by the very Ortega that he also tried to export the format abroad, in Munich. At the same time, he presented his ideas in many different occasions, such as the *Rencontres de Genève*, in which different positions on education and on the role of humanities were discussed by philosophers such as Marleau-Ponty and others. As a consequence, this section will present a study of the relevant function of the intellectual and the philosopher within this new political scenario and within a new political ideology which still grounds our concept of education in democratic society. However, the reception he received abroad was not comparable with the one he received at home. In fact, (§4) the scarce appeal of his theory in Spain is proved both by the failure of his candidacy at the literature Nobel prize in 1951 and, moreover, by the muffled celebration of his official retirement from the University in 1953. All these events contribute to explain (§5) his thought would have been so controversially interpreted after his death: condemned by the members of the academic establishment and idealised by a young generation of students which called for a renovation of the educative system within a stagnant cultural scenario. A contraposition which, after the end of Franco's regime, permitted a new instrumental use of the philosopher as the father of a liberal and democratic revolution.

10.1 The international appeal

The IH aroused a significant global interest in a context in which the processes of internationalisation in education were marking the post-war period. Indeed, Ortega's proposal coincided with two complementary international phenomena which contributed to render his project very attractive outside the Spanish borders. The first was the creation of UNESCO on November 16th 1946, which determined a growing attention towards the definition of the basic guidelines of a global education for peace promoted by Western countries (Singh, 2011). The second, strictly related to the previous one, was the radicalisation of the Cold War and the consequent desire of the US to

establish its cultural and political superiority at a global scale. The Machiavellian pragmatism of the American internationalisation during those years (Mazower, 2012) was indeed supported by a very effective cultural strategy. As Alfred Reisch (2013) has proved, America tried to win the Cold War also through a cultural policy, by the help of books – at the beginning addressed to intellectuals and then to students – as the most effective tools to spread ideas and values among people living in communist countries. The very UNESCO, since its creation, more than by neutral philanthropic aims was moved by the political wish to build a culture of peace able to counter the German model, rendering it more attractive also from the economic and spiritual point of view. As stated by the *Conference of Allied Ministers of Education* – the ancestor of the UNESCO -: «It is essential that in the new Europe Allied Scientific Culture and outlook shall replace the German»¹⁰⁹. Significantly enough, when Ortega y Gasset realised the IH in Madrid, the main preoccupations of the American observers ,after the refusal of the philosopher to accept the financial help of the Rockefeller Foundation, focused in particular on the prominent role of the German cultural tradition in the activities of the Institute. The NY Herald Tribune¹¹⁰ expressed in 1950 its concerns for this trait of the IH, affirming that: «There is a constant interchange of professors and audients with Heidelberg, Freiburg, Tübingen and other universities». The article ended by opening a debate over the possibility of financing this project for pursuing the American cultural interests asking to their readers: «Are we playing our part to influence Spanish cultural and economic development?».

Moreover, in 1948, the UNESCO published a *Solemn Appeal Against the Idea that Wars are Inevitable*, a document that invited all the cultural promoters such as teachers, scientists, artists, writers and journalists, to spread the values of peace and democracy, in order to counter the «pernicious idea that war is inevitable»¹¹¹. The organisation, supported by other Foundations and institutions, not only was a brain trust of scientific knowledge, but was also actively engaged in the promotion of specific educative policies in the different cases with the aim of propagating its very ideology (Casual, 2005: 42).

¹⁰⁹ Quoted in J. P. Singh (2011: 14).

¹¹⁰ Article reported in a letter by Clark to Ortega, 25-III-1950, in AOG, PB-367/ 81-1.

¹¹¹ *The UNESCO Courier*; Document UNESCO 2C/ res X.3, 1948.

Among the most relevant cultural institutions which were acting in support of the American interests there was the general-purpose Ford Foundation which was acting more on the global than on the local level (Arndt, 2005). In particular, since 1949, when *The Gaither Commission* submitted its recommendations to the Foundation's Board of Trustees, the Foundation started to implement its activities with the specific aim of promoting the development of peace, democracy, economics, education and behavioural sciences. After the conference in Aspen on Goethe, Ortega continued to act as a reference point within the European culture for Robert Hutchins, who, in 1950, became associate director of the Ford Foundation, during the same period in which the Aspen Institute was founded. During the winter 1949-1950 the correspondence between Ortega and Hutchins, concerning the theoretical premises and the practical goals of this educative institution, was quite intense. Robert Maynard Hutchins was a professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago. Since the '30s he had been focusing in particular on the importance of liberal education as a means for the development of a peaceful and wealthy society. In particular, he proposed a reform of the American educative system partially indebted to Ortega's proposal as presented in the *Misión de la Universidad* and rejected the pragmatism of John Dewey (Hutchins, 1936; Martin, 1991). When theorising the necessity of a global liberal education for the post-war scenario he adopted a thomist outlook, joining it with a general reading of the Ortega's vital-reason (Hutchins, 1943). Ortega referred to Robert Hutchins, who had invited him in Colorado, as «el gran innovador de la enseñanza universitaria en los Estados Unidos» (OC, X:15). Indeed, he thought he had found a very valuable ally in his campaign in defence of a renewal of humanistic education. As a matter of fact, the collaboration with Hutchins and his entourage in the University of Chicago, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Ford Foundation, would later be extremely fruitful when, some months later, the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies was finally created, and Ortega was adopted as one of its intellectual references for the development of its pedagogical proposal. As Walter Paepcke wrote to Ortega «I derived great pleasure from reading your *Mission of the University*. It is excellent in every way. Oddly enough, your ideas, those

of Chancellor Hutchins, and those of Dr. Sigerist, head of the Medical Department at John Hopkins, are in astounding agreement»¹¹².

In fact, Hutchins invited Ortega in Aspen where he was creating a new institute of humanistic culture [See Annex 11]. His purpose was that of offering undergraduate courses, adult education and philosophical seminars¹¹³. Ortega was asked by Hutchins to give his advice on the structure of this new school, given his expertise proven in the *Mission of the University* and, more recently, through the great success of the IH. This response offered him the possibility of briefly sketching the most basic strands of his pedagogical theory in relation to the changing international context.

Ortega's argument is based on a fundamental premise: a humanistic education is needed in the post-war age. His defence of Humanities in the American scenario is primarily motivated by the growing relevance acquired by the natural science in the high-school and university education. A supremacy which mirrored the statement of proposal of the very director of the UNESCO, Julian Huxley (1946), who sustained the ideal of a sort of evolutionary humanism oriented towards the scientific progress and the technical development of the society. As Ortega put it: «there is in America an extremely unbalanced state as regards education in favour of the naturalistic (not humanistic), physical, biological and technical education»¹¹⁴. This condition called for a new input to the humanistic studies and, at the same time, for a reform of humanities not only in the US but also in Europe. In fact, this reform had been pointed out by the philosopher as the main reason for the creation of the IH in Madrid.

Apart from this basic premise, Ortega's suggestions to Hutchins concerned different aspects of this humanistic education, in particular: 1) its scope, 2) its methodology and 3) its end. Concerning the last of these aspects, the ultimate goal of the Aspen Institute, according to Ortega, would have been that of fostering the creation of a new

¹¹² Indeed, the influence of Ortega on this oversee project was extremely relevant as proved by the fact that the very name of the Institute had been suggested by Ortega who perceived that the term "University", precedently used by Hutchins, represented an anachronistic and vague definition that would not have revealed the great ambition of the project. See Letter by Paepcke to Ortega, in AOG, C-135/ 60.

¹¹³ Letter by Paepcke to Ortega, 5-X-1949, In AOG, C-5979.

¹¹⁴ Letter by Ortega to Paepcke, in AOG, PB-370/ 1, pp.3-4.

intellectual and social elite able to influence, as Ortega put it, «all walks of American life»¹¹⁵.

This goal could have been reached, according to the philosopher, only through the adoption of a new methodology of teaching based on the cohabitation of teachers and students in a same institution which should have rejected all form of excessive comfort and promote what Ortega called “elegance”, naming it as a vital virtue. With this word he indicated the ability to live and act in society in an appropriate way, being able to fruitfully take part in intellectual conversations¹¹⁶. In Ortega’s description of the positive climate of mutual interchange of ideas that should have characterised the life in within the Aspen Institute, it is evidently possible to note a nostalgic memory of the atmosphere he had experienced firstly as a young student in Germany and later as a professor and influential public figure in Spain. In fact, in his letter Ortega explicitly longed for the return of the intellectual in the public sphere, conceived as a model for an entire generation of students and bourgeois willing to actively participate to the social life of their country by taking into account the exemplary figure of their master¹¹⁷.

In order to realise this utopian restoration of the intellectual and, in particular, of the philosopher at the centre of the social life, it would have been necessary to promote a form of education primarily different in scope. In fact, Ortega, in this occasion, recalls the *Mission of the University* and vindicates the importance of an education able to reach a meaningful synthesis of the different scientific subjects and to transmit to the students relevant knowledge which could be useful to comprehend the society in which they live. Ortega’s educative proposal can be summarised in the Latin motto *non multa, sed multum*, according to which an authentic comprehension of culture is acquired when a limited amount of information is completely interiorised by the

¹¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 13.

¹¹⁶ «Elegance must penetrate, inform the individual entire life, from the gesture and the way of walking, through the way of using language, of keeping on a conversation, of speaking in public, to the most intimate side of moral and intellectual actions». *Ibidem*, p. 9.

¹¹⁷ «This happened in Europe fifty years ago: in many places – for instance, at the “fashion days”, at theatres and at the great scientific and literary ceremonies – young people had the opportunity of seeing, merely seeing such exemplary figure: and that acted upon them without realising it, with the character of models to be imitated». *Ibidem*, p. 12.

student. As Ortega put it, the guideline of the Institute «would be to teach how to read, that is, to really absorb an important book; therefore applying also to reading the principles of concentration or condensation and synthesis. The idea is to attempt an education and culture which are pure nerve, deprived of adipose, tissues and lymphatic exuberance»¹¹⁸.

Evidently, education represented to Ortega the kernel of any social reform, not only in Spain but also at the global scale. He was persuaded that no effective policies could have been put into practice without counting on the comprehension of the citizens who should have to realise them and, on the same time, that all political proposals should have been based on an intellectual analysis of the problems at stake. First of all, of the role of the human being in a changing social context.

Ortega continued to maintain frequent relations with the Ford Foundation, in particular via Walter Paepcke and Robert Hutchins, also during the '50s. He continued to give his advice concerning education and to collaborate with this Institution that, in particular starting from 1953, would have played a leading role in the development of educative initiatives in Europe and also in Spain. In particular, the intervention of the Ford Foundation in this country was aimed at building a new intellectual and social elite – like the one that Ortega thought the Aspen Institute should have built in the US – which should have been leading the country after the end of Franco's dictatorship¹¹⁹. This would be realised in particular during the decade of the '60s, through the establishment in Madrid, with the financial support of the Foundation, of the *Seminario de Humanidades*, significantly directed by Julián Marías. This series of lectures and conferences emulated the ones

¹¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 5

¹¹⁹ As written by Santisteban Fernández (2009: 162): «El verdadero objetivo de los programas desarrollados por la Ford en España fue tener acceso a un grupo influyente de intelectuales, empresarios, financieros y técnicos de la administración con los que establecer una comunidad de intereses y que, a su vez, pudieran influir en la adopción de decisiones y cambios políticos en un tiempo en el que la desaparición del dictador se presumía cercana. De este modo se podría evitar una transición contraria a los intereses geopolíticos norteamericanos, evitando la inestabilidad social o evoluciones contrarias al atlantismo».

given by Ortega in the IH, largely counting on the same people who had rendered possible the development of the previous project¹²⁰.

10. 2 The cultural unification of Europe

The IH contributed to give to Ortega y Gasset a renewed notoriety, in particular outside the Spanish borders. Since the beginning of the activities of the Institute and, during the following years, Ortega would have repeatedly been invited to give lectures and conferences all over Europe and the Americas. In one of these conferences, in particular one on the figure of Goethe, Ortega took the occasion, as usual, for not directly speaking of what should have in theory been the subject of his discourse, i.e. the German intellectual, but rather for instrumentally taking the chance of expressing his main philosophical theses on the most urgent topics of his meditations. These American conferences, as well as those he gave in Germany, permit to trace with clarity the evolution of his thinking in this period. In fact, his preoccupation towards the end and methods of education, and in particular of philosophy, as an instrument of personalisation and socialisation of the individuals in these texts is directly linked to the necessity of building, with optimism a new cultural paradigm after the war: «El naufragio se convierte en nadador. La situación negativa se convierte en positiva. Toda civilización ha nacido o ha renacido como un movimiento natatorio de salvación» (OC, X:10). In particular, Ortega affirms for the first time the necessity to restore the European identity and construct a new form of super-national coexistence between the citizens of different countries (Beneyto, 2005). And to do so, in line with his precedent philosophical and pedagogical writings, he underlines the need of reforming the culture of the continent, in particular through the adoption of his historiological and humanistic method.

In all the occasions in which, during 1949, Ortega was invited to talk about Goethe - he did so in particular in US, Germany and Spain - he depicted him as a symbol of the European identity and as a source of inspiration for the destiny of the cultural and political health of the whole European society. Significantly, he attributes this potentiality to an eminent intellectual who, during his whole life, according to Ortega,

¹²⁰ On the organisation and activities of this seminar see *Ibidem*, p. 174-180.

had epitomised the most intimate struggle of the human condition with what he called the “difficulty of being” (OC, X:29)– both in its anthropological and social dimension. Put it differently, the struggle between being and having to be, between an ideal and its concrete realisation. By assigning this normative function to an intellectual, the philosopher partially reaffirms the importance of this social authority in ruling the society in an age of crises. However, at the same time, he goes a step further when underlining the necessity of transforming this culture into a possession of the masses so to render each citizen part of an intellectual community. In fact, according to the philosopher, no social improvement could have been made in a mass-society without having previously converted the mass-man into an educated and responsible human being. In this way, the philosophy and the philosopher acquired a new role and presence within the society, having philosophical ideas – the vitamins of a society – to be converted in popular beliefs, credences and habits.

This compelling thesis was enounced by Ortega in a particularly significant occasion, such as during a discourse he gave to the students in 1949 at the Freie Universität in Berlin, the capital of the recent global disaster of the traditional concept of humanity. The city that, for many, represented the end of the Western culture, for Ortega could have represented the re-birth of a new civilisation. In this occasion he provocatively affirms that democracy was neither an absolute value nor an unproblematic form of government. *Indeed, a democracy to be positive and valuable has to rest on the aware participation of citizens to public life.* As Ortega put it, «la democracia si no es contenida por otras fuerzas ajenas a ella, lleva al absolutismo mayoritario» (OC, VI: 569). These forces which are deemed responsible for sustaining the democratic life can be summarised in the intellectual aspiration for living a meaningful life. This is the mission that Ortega assigns to education, that is to propagate among the general public the perception of the importance of cultivating a humanistic education aimed to enhancing the basic rational requirements among citizens, in relation to their knowledge and political awareness. If this precondition were not satisfied, then it would be impossible to think about any sort of aware and conscious public opinion. The public sphere would on the contrary be characterised by superficiality and “recentism”. As Ortega put it: «no vale hablar de ideas u opiniones donde no se admite una instancia

que las regula, una serie de normas a que en la discusión cabe apelar. Estas normas son los principios de la cultura» (OC, IV: 417).

The conference at the Freie Universität offered him the opportunity to apply his theories to the European scenario by the time in which the project of a unification of Europe was starting to be concretely established. In fact, months before Ortega's conference in Berlin, significantly entitled *De Europa meditatio quaedam*, it had been founded in May 1949 the Council of Europe. The creation of a European community fascinated Ortega and, at the same time, weighed on the philosopher as a new intellectual responsibility that had to be seriously faced. The kernel of his conference is offered by his meditation on the nature of society, the distinction between Nation and State, based in particular on the role that each individual is deemed to play in each of this institutional framework. In fact, being each nation – as each human being – characterised by a contradictory complementarity between tradition and novelty, irrationality and rationality¹²¹, it would be impossible to conceive a social community without attributing to it a certain dose of rationality. Of what Ortega called vital reason¹²². As Ortega put it, a nation is a combination of three elements: man, tradition and chance (OC, X: 106).

Ortega's conference on the essence of the nation in relation to the problem of the creation of the European community focuses in particular on the process of building a nation. In fact, in a moment in which, as Ortega wrote, Europe was dissociated (OC, X: 126) – both from the point of view of the single States and of that of the mutual relation between these with their citizens – it was crucial to understand how this new social community could have been efficaciously built. The entire argumentation of the philosopher lies on a basic premise that defines the society as a combination of social uses in force. These

¹²¹ «El hombre, como persona o como colectividad, es siempre una ecuación entre su ser inercial – receptivo, tradicional, y su ser ágil – emprendedor, afrontador de problema» (OC, X: 102)

¹²² As Villacañas (2005: 183) wrote: «En la medida en que las naciones son varias, acreditan su carisma mediante la emulación, la competencia y el esfuerzo. En todo caso, en este momento de su formación, son realidades también sistemáticas y auto-referenciales. Componen tradiciones y viven desde sí mismas, con los ojos puestos en las demás, en una competencia vital continua. Vemos así que el problema de la nación es complementario del problema de la razón vital».

uses can have either a traditional or a rational ground, but they all must have in common a widespread acceptance and forcefulness among the whole social community. This implies that each person would engage with the society in different ways, according to her scale of rational participation to it. In fact, as Ortega writes: «La socialidad se da siempre estratificada» (OC, X: 110).

In a moment in which this sociability has been put into question or, as in the case of the European Union, has to be built, he deems necessary the intervention of culture as a means of socialisation. The history of nation building, according to Ortega, reveals the crucial role that the intellectual has always played in the formation of the public opinion – i.e. the grounding principle of the social uses – and the pernicious consequences, in terms of nationalisms, violences and democratic deterioration, that the replacement of the intellectual by the demagogue had repeatedly caused¹²³. In order to counter this possibility, Ortega underlines the necessity of a political elite that in each nation, and at a continental level, should be responsible for avoiding this process of deterioration. At the same time, however, he does not limit the scope of his meditation to the role of these elites within the life of the community, but he also takes into account the active participation of each one of its members in this “project of future coexistence” that a nation ultimately is, a *vis proiectiva* (Llano Alonso, 2010). As a consequence, Europe, should have been realised as a confederation of national States that rejected any form of nationalism. For doing this, the depersonalisation both of the ruling classes and the single citizens should have been countered by the valorisation of the culture of each nations and the whole continent (Sánchez Cámara, 2006: 270). A culture that had to be continuously revitalised through a critical thinking, for restoring «el credo intelectual y moral de Europa» (OC, X: 125).

Ortega’s conference in Berlin represented an epic event for the students of the German university. As the newspapers reported,

¹²³ «Lo que sí aconteció al llegar la democracia, por tanto, en los comienzos del siglo XIX, es que con ella comenzaron los pueblos de Occidente a caer en el deletéreo poder de los demagogos – sean de izquierda o de derecha – y como la única táctica de estos irresponsable personajes es extremarlo todo para poder alcoholizar a las masas, la conciencia de Nacionalidad, que llevaba ya dos siglos de tranquila, pacífica vida, se convirtió en programa político» (OC, X: 114).

thousands of people attended to Ortega's speech, the University was literary assaulted by students and common people who wanted to listen to the words of the philosopher. The *Bildungshung* of the Berliners exploded in this mass-manifestation of enthusiasm and interest¹²⁴ towards the works of a foreign intellectual, compared by the press to the greatest of the world: Jaspers, Huizinga, Croce and Heidegger. The incredible reception received in Germany – more among the general public than the academic thinkers (Jung-Lindemann, 2006) – and the international appeal of his theories provided to Ortega the stimulus to continue to develop his activities abroad, also due to the far more aloof reaction of the Spanish academia.

10.3 Exporting the IH: an utopian project

More than a resource for implementig a political change in Spain, Ortega saw in the Ford Foundation a very powerful ally which could have contributed to the global promotion of his humanistic reform. Indeed, the conditions for realising this reform in Spain were really scarce, in particular since the end of Franco's international isolation and the restored hegemony of the Catholic intellectuals. For these reasons, Ortega started to concretly conceive the possibility of realising his IH abroad. The idea of exporting the IH came to Ortega's mind in 1951, during a long and fruitful stay in Germany. After having shared his idea with very few distinguished intellectuals, such as Martin Heidegger and Heisenberg, in October 1951 he wrote to a student of Hutchins, and Director of the University of Puerto Rico, Jaime Benitez, to look for financial support – in particular, he asked for a contribution of 30.000 dollars – for realising an IH in Munich starting from January 1952. Benitez was a fervent Orteguian who had had the opportunity to meet the philosopher in his first stay in Aspen [See Annex 10]. He frequently wrote on the pedagogical theory of the Spanish philosopher and invited him and Marías in Puerto Rico several times in the period comprised between 1949 and 1955. Ortega presented the project of this Institute as a «obra en cierto modo única hasta ahora en el mundo y

¹²⁴ «Als es der Menge gelang, unter Demolierung enier Türfüllung in den Saal einzudringen brach spontaner Beifall aus». *Die Neue Zeitung*, 8-IX-1940. Cited in Carriazo Ruiz, 2014: 59. In his long article the author provides a very detailed and precise description of Ortega's trip.

que, sin buscarlo ni pretenderlo, coincide tanto con la línea general de la política estadounidense»¹²⁵. Benítez wrote to Hutchins, who took into consideration the possibility of realising this cultural initiative. However, as Ortega wrote to Marías some months later, the project was not finally concretised due to the difficulties of realising such an ambitious initiative in the very short period of time established by him¹²⁶.

Ortega's aspired, through this new institute, to gather in the German town some of the most distinguished international scholars with the aim of opening a public debate on what he conceived as a systemic ordeal of the Western civilisation. He had presented his diagnosis of the cultural European crisis in the course of the recent *Rencontres internationales de Genève* that had taken place in the Swiss capital. The lack of historical awareness in the general public opinion and the lack of certainty at the top level of scientific knowledge were the two main factors that, according to the philosopher, contributed to the condition of insecurity – both from an individual and collective point of view – of the Western civilisation¹²⁷. To restore it, according to Ortega, it would have been necessary to propose at a larger scale the project of IH he launched in Madrid three years before. In fact, despite the extremely negative diagnosis offered by Ortega in regard to the cultural situation of Europe, in the course of the *Rencontres* he clearly defended an optimistic outlook towards the possibility of recovering from this condition, in particular through a new intellectual and pedagogic intervention.

In the course of the colloquium that followed his conference he was supported in his diagnosis by the French philosopher Merleau-Ponty who, at the same time, radically differed from the prognosis of the

¹²⁵ Letter by Ortega to Paepcke, 1-X-1950, in AOG, CD-120/ 31.

¹²⁶ «Hubo un momento que pensé que podía hacerse aquí, financiado por la Ford Foundation, el Instituto de Humanidades. Heidegger quería venir a trabajar en él y así porción de gentes de archiprimer orden. He dado algunos pasos en este sentido para ver si en principio podría contarse con la antedicha financiación. Sin que las cosas estén claras, no parece que haya mal ambiente pero de todas suertes sería cosa de solución un poco distante». Letter by Ortega to Marías, 23-II-1952, in AOG, CD-M/ 57.

¹²⁷ «Las cosas que parecían más estables, y que eran para el hombre como una terra ferma en la que sus pies podían posarse, se hacen de golpe incertas o se revelan como errores, utopías o piadosos deseos [...] La civilización occidental ha muerto, con una muerte bella y honrosa» (OC, VI: 791, 792).

Spanish philosopher. In fact, according to Ortega, for ameliorating the current situation it would have been necessary to avoid any sort of existential tendency and focus with optimism on finding a cultural solution to the problem of the destiny of human being in the post-war society: «Toda mi conferencia no es más que una invitación a un trabajo entusiasta, en razón de las enormes posibilidades que hay» (OC, VI: 1122). With this statement Ortega defended the importance of education, and in particular of humanistic education, in promoting a positive social and cultural change. This was not a generic defense of the positive values of humanities *per se* since, as already pointed out, it rested on a general reform of the curricula, the methodologies and the final goals of this teaching. The vague idea that the study of philosophy, or even and more generally the humanities *per se*, would fashion better people and better society was rejected by the Spanish philosopher exactly for the same reasons that he proposed a new form of humanistic education: because of the historical failure of the traditional education that had produced the critical situation he was diagnosing. These failures, however, would not have proved the inadequacy of education as a whole, but rather only in relation to a particular model. For this reason, Ortega proposed an interdisciplinary approach to education which considered each individual as an *integrum* and which suggested the existence of a minimal threshold in the learning process.

The criticisms of the Spanish philosopher against the standardization of humanities, conceived as an instrument of social development *per se*, are explicitly presented in the conference he gave in London in 1953 concerning the future of philosophical education. He had been invited to give this conference, organised by the Ford Foundation, by the Board of the *Fund for the Advancement of Education*. In that occasion, Ortega remarked the need of starting all discussions on the future of humanities by taking into account the great “philosophical diversity” of the XX century. This did not only depend on the contraposition of two main political fronts – i.e. communism vs liberalism – but rested on the more substantial disagreement about the interpretation of the human condition in the contemporary age. For this reason, as Ortega wrote:

La dificultad extrema de la actual “philosophical diversity” para elaborar una sólida filosofía de la educación que oriente un importante “advancement of the education”, no parece que pueda, de manera fértil y

firme, ser tratada si no se hace antes un estudio a fondo de la situación humana en nuestro tiempo (OC, X: 391).

Thus, the anthropological turn proposed by Ortega in regard to the educative problem concerns at the same time the life of the common citizens and that of the intellectual. The second of these figures is studied in particular in the several conferences he gave in 1949-1951 on Goethe. In fact, to Ortega, the German thinker epitomises the intellectual anxiety for living an authentic life through a constant personal amelioration rendered possible by the help of culture. Goethe represents the importance of building one's own life, abandoning a «concepción ornamental de la cultura» (VI 554) and replacing it with the desire of realising a fruitful life through study, after having accepted that this would imply a withdrawal into one self. By focusing on the anthropological drama that, according to the Spanish philosopher, life always is, he set the bases for a new philosophical education that was thought as an antidote against existentialism¹²⁸. Goethe is used as an example of the new mission that the European culture had to accomplish to resolve its inner crisis. As Ortega wrote:

Aquí tienen ustedes la gran tarea goethiana en que, a mi juicio, comienza a entrar Europa: la construcción de una civilización que parta expresa y formalmente de las negatividades humanas, de sus inexorable limitaciones y en ellas se apoye para existir con plenitud (VI 564).

This social mission of culture cannot but rest on a pedagogy aimed to the humanisation of the very culture purported in a given time, since: «La auténtica y completa realidad de una idea aparece sólo cuando está funcionando, cuando ejecuta la acción que ella, en verdad, es, cuando cumple su misión en la existencia de un hombre» (X 22).

¹²⁸ «Algunos grupos de escritores europeos, menos numerosos que ruidosos, pretenden hoy retrotrear al hombre a la nada y dejarlo en ella instalado. Mucho habría que hablar sobre este brote de inspiración nihilista que se llama a sí propio “existencialismo”. No es esta ocasión oportuna para entrar en ello. Únicamente diré esto: no es la manera de combatir y superar ese nihilismo (que algunos – no yo – califican de pesimismo), apartar utópica e ingenuamente la mirada de las limitaciones y negatividades humanas. A mi juicio, hay que proceder inversamente» (OC, VI: 560-561). On the conflictive relation between Ortega and the existentialists see in particular Vela (1961) and Abbagnano (1987: 170-175).

As a consequence, education is thought as indispensable for the society as a whole and, at the same time, for the individual citizens insofar as their comprehension of the social world has to be sustained by the comprehension of the civilisation under which they live in order to give sense to their lives¹²⁹. For this reason it would be necessary to construct a new form of humanistic education, since:

Éste es uno de los fenómenos más característicos de nuestro tiempo. Las gentes – insisto en que me refiero al continente – no sienten entusiasmo o, por lo menos, satisfactoria confianza en el régimen bajo el cual viven, pero, al mismo tiempo, no vislumbran en el horizonte ningún otro sistema de instituciones que les sea una luminosa promesa (X 452).

As it is possible to argue from these considerations, Ortega's pedagogical proposal during these years was basically aimed to set the grounds for the practice of a liberal democracy at the global scale that refused the risk of a hyper-democracy¹³⁰, of what has been defined as the democracy of the public (Manin, 2010). The relation he established between individuals and society, and his reflection on the importance of education in promoting a responsible form of democracy, ultimately do converge in his attention towards rhetoric as a political tools. Indeed, the Spanish philosopher frequently underlined – and he did so in his Swiss conference – the importance of rhetoric as the main cultural feature of the Greek civilisation, conceived as the homeland of democracy. By doing so – and by affirming the necessity of reforming the ideas of rationality, calling for the creation of an historical and vital reason – Ortega tried to enlarge the notion of rationality by including also rhetoric in it, and giving the proper importance to a-rational or

¹²⁹ «La clave del proceso consiste entonces en la educación de la opinión pública [...]. La educación racio-vitalista de la minoría selecta se convierte entonces en Ortega en educación para la ciudadanía, una invitación a asumir la responsabilidad colectiva que es capaz de superar el individualismo de intereses y de criterios personales». Á. Peris Suay, 2009.

¹³⁰ For this reason, and for all the previous discussion on Ortega's theory of education in comparison to the Francoist one, it seems absolutely wrong, as Subirats (1990: 55) does, to affirm that Ortega's philosophy «es una filosofía moralmente sujeta a un principio de autoridad y de obediencia que no se aparta en absoluto de los modelos educacionales de la España tradicionalista».

irrational arguments in the political debate¹³¹. In fact, he was aware of the fact that language and rhetoric did play a vital role in the political sphere, but that they were usually badly controlled both by the general population and by the ruling class. For this reason, the reform of the humanities should start by the restoration of language as the basic way to comprehend the past of a civilisation and project its future.

During the last years of his philosophical activity Ortega abandoned the interest towards Spain that had always characterised his career, preferring to focus on what he perceived as the new mission of the authentic intellectual: the building of a new European society and culture which would overcome the national contrapositions that had ended up in the second world war. In any case, in spite of his physical and somehow intellectual distance from Spain, Ortega did not completely disappear from the cultural scenario of his homeland.

10.4 The regime's ostracism

There are at least three significant instances which can reveal how Ortega still constituted a reference point within the Spanish intellectual debate, both in positive and negative terms. The first of these instances is represented by the initiative of some university professors of the UC of Madrid who, in 1951, decided to write a petition in favour of Ortega's candidacy to the nobel prize for literature. Among the signers of this document, whose stimulus came from the *Real Academia Española*, there were the dean of the Faculty of Letters and Philosophy, Sánchez Cantón, and other professors, in particular devoted to the study and teaching of Spanish literature¹³². This initiative had been possible thanks to the fact that, as the very Franco gloomily recognised,

¹³¹ This point of view is significantly in line with the more recent theorists of deliberative democracy. For instance, Chambers (2009) particularly emphasises the importance of passions and rhetoric in the deliberative process, on this point see also Garsten, 2011. On the notion of rhetoric, conceived in Aristotelian terms, as a constituent part of the deliberative process and at the same time as a cultivable ability see Francisco Arenas Dolz, 2013. Extremely interesting on this point is also the recent book by Nussbaum 2011.

¹³² For a complete list of the signers see: *A la academia sueca. Comité del premio Nobel de literatura*, in AOG, PB-403/ 4-1 (See Annex 8).

the regime did not have a direct and effective control over the *Real Academia*, contrary to the all the others cultural institutions of the country (Rodríguez Nuñez, 2014). The proposal, however, did not encounter the support of the Spanish cultural and political authority, and the initiative, that had already been proposed in 1950 (Zamora Bonilla, 2002: 624), finally collapsed and did not produce any result (Morán, 1998: 272-273). The premature failure of this attempt was mainly due to the opposition of the Catholic sectors of the regime towards the philosophy and the very figure of Ortega, who was considered as a non-aligned intellectual. Indeed, the propaganda against the Madrilenian philosopher had reached its climax soon after the beginning of the IH (for the reasons explained in §9.3). Ortega represented a very divisive figure as proved by the intense debate that took place over the significance of his theories between detractors and supporters of the philosopher.

The main protagonists of this debate were on the one hand the jesuits Joaquín Iriarte, José Sánchez Villaseñor and Juan Ruiz Gironella and, on the other hand Ortega's disciple Julián Marías. The first group identified in the continuous attempt made by Ortega to influence the Spanish culture a significant danger for the basic Catholic principles at the basis of the national ideology. Joaquín Iriarte undoubtedly was the person who spent more efforts to disqualify this activity of Ortega, for instance in his book, published in 1949, entitled *La ruta mental de Ortega. Crítica de su filosofía*. The main aim of the book was significantly that of destroying the philosopher rather than critically assessing his works, also with the purpose of disqualifying the international appeal he had been obtaining during that period. Along this same line moved also an important member of CSIC and representative of the *Opus Dei*, Juan Sáiz Barberá, who, in 1950, published *Ortega y Gasset ante la crítica. El idealismo en El Espectador de Ortega y Gasset*. During that period, Julian Marías seemed to be the only defender of his master in Spain, but his book *Ortega y tres antípodas*, published in the same year of Barberá's attack, was a unique and marginalised attempt to rescue the philosopher from such strong and ideologically minded criticisms. *The defence of Marías, who tried to conciliate Ortega's thinking with a form of Catholicism, contributed to partially distort the thought of his master and, moreover, to determine the birth of a sort of new Orteguian scholasticism*. In fact, according to Marías, it could be possible to demonstrate «La fecundidad concreta de la filosofía orteguiana para comprender y

vivificar aspectos esenciales de la antropología cristiana, incluso en lo que tiene de más estrictamente religioso» (Marías, 1950: 182). In spite of its partiality, this new way of approaching the works of the Madrilenian philosopher undoubtedly permitted to open a dialogue – even if extremely limited and adulterated – over the significance of his philosophical proposal.

This process of creation of a sort of scholasticism within some sectors of the Spanish academia, willing to include Ortega in the national and catholic canon, can be rendered patent by analysing the situation that emerged during the immediately following years during the '50s. In this moment a new attitude towards Ortega started to spread among the intellectual elite of the country. The interpretation of his philosophy began to be not as monolithic as before, and within the established scholars two different factions emerged: those belonging to the *Opus Dei*, strongly in contrast with the philosopher, and some other more or less falangist intellectuals who, being Orteguian catholic, started to defend the thesis of a possible compatibility between Ortega's ideas and religion, finding significant traces of a presence of spirituality and religiosity in his philosophy¹³³. A good instance of this new tendency is offered by the celebration for the 70th birthday of Ortega y Gasset which took place in 1953 at the University of Madrid, marking his formal retirement.

The date significantly coincided with the promulgation of the decree by the Minister of Education Ruiz-Giménez¹³⁴ which opened up to the scholars of the '36 the possibility of entering into the Academic system, if they had not been engaged in the previous republican government and did not oppose to Franco's regime. Tiny signs of

¹³³ Among them, in particular, Laín and Aranguren. On the long diatribe started during the 50s and prolonged at least until the 70s, about the real or false religiosity of Ortega. See for instance Maravall, 1959.

¹³⁴ Interestingly enough, Ruiz Giménez claimed to be as well sort of disciple of Ortega, to whom he recognised, even before being appointed Minister, an influencing role over his own ideas and ways of thinking. See his letter to the Secretary of the Institute of Humanidades in 1948 and then his interview with José Ortega Spottorno, the son of Ortega y Gasset, in 1951, after being appointed minister: «Yo creo – y aunque muchos, como tu sabes, me lo critiquen no me importa – que es un deber para la Nación que tu padre habló en la Universidad. Que habló a las nuevas generaciones que no le han oído. Tu padre es una fuerza que nos ha influido a todos, por distantes que en algunos puntos puedan muchos estar de él». In AOG, PB-374 42.

revitalisation within the educative system which ended up by opening the way to a new generation of young historians who, in the decade 1950-1960 significantly marked a turning point in historiography during the dictatorship¹³⁵.

In that occasion Ortega's son, José, Julián Marías and Paulino Garagarri organised a course on the philosopher entitled "The state of the question" which took place in Madrid between March and May 1953. The group of professors and intellectuals who gave their lessons on these circumstances affirmed, in the prospectus of the course, their dependence on the thought of Ortega y Gasset for developing an authentic philosophical meditation:

Entre esas ideas nuevas y esos métodos aún no puestos en juego, una porción eminente procede de nuestro maestro común Ortega, que el próximo mes de mayo cumplirá, Deo volente, setenta años. A pesar de esta cifra, nosotros lo vemos como una promesa, como un pensador "de la segunda mitad del siglo XX". Queremos utilizarlo ávida y generosamente; si es posible, ir más allá de él: para un filósofo, ningún homenaje mejor que demostrar – andando: con él y por caminos que ha señalado y tal vez no recorrdio – su fecundidad¹³⁶.

Ortega's reaction to this initiative was largely positive, in particular due to the unexpected support he received from some members of the official academic and political system. However, this series of seminars and lessons was observed with suspicion by the more intransigent and orthodox sectors of the regime, as in the case of the review *Arbor*. In 1953 Vicente Marrero Suárez published a note upon the celebration carried out in Madrid in which he continued to purport the theses of Iriarte and the Jesuit group in order to discredit the works of the philosopher¹³⁷. His criticisms against Ortega were so harsh and violent that his note not only caused the reaction of the Orteguian disciples

¹³⁵ See Peiró Martín, 2013: 68-74.

¹³⁶ *El estado de la cuestión. Problemas y posibilidades en la segunda mitad de nuestro siglo*, in AOG, C-31/ 53, p.7.

¹³⁷ Ortega's teaching was seen as «el esfuerzo encaminado a descristianizar España más inteligente, más sistemático y brillante que se ha visto en nuestra patria desde la aparición de la Institución Libre de Enseñanza». Vicente Marrero rhetorically asked: «¿Es tan trascendental la obra de Ortega para que nos ayude con sus métodos y sus pasos a afrontar un programa tan gigantesco?». Marrero Suárez, 1953: 109, 110.

who officially protested with a letter directed to the Minister of Education, but also of other intellectuals. Indeed, the motivation and tone of that letter represented the birth of the abovementioned orteguian scholasticism. In fact, as Marías wrote to his master, all those who had taken part to the seminars reproached the idea that Ortega could have been labelled as anti-Catholic, a statement which was conceived as «una falsedad intolerable», in particular considering that «los discípulos de usted como en abrumadora mayoría católicos a fondo»¹³⁸. In other words, to render the philosophy of Ortega apt to be included into the outmoded Spanish cultural debate, the strategy adopted by his disciples was rendering it more attractive for the cultural establishment rather than for the younger generations. Thus, the real teaching of the philosopher, completely neglected during the previous decade, now started to be replaced by a propagandist outlook, reducing his theory to a limited set of basic stereotypical mottos¹³⁹.

10.5 A continuing controversy: Ortega after Ortega

After this enormous depuration, a debate started over the possibility of including Ortega within the canon of the accepted writers and intellectual figures of Spain; a debate which, in 1955, when Ortega died, seemed to involve also the new Minister of education Ruiz-Giménez. The 20th of October 1955, two days after the death of Ortega, he

¹³⁸ Letter by Marías to Ortega, 19-V-1953, in AOG, C-31/ 59. The signers of this letter to the director of the CSIS, Ibáñez, were: Laín Entralgo, Ridruejo, Valdecasas, Díez del Corral, Lafuente, Aranguren, Cruz, Lissarrague, García Gómez and Marías.

¹³⁹ As Cruz Hernández, (1953: 292) wrote in an article reporting the conversation he had with some young friends on the Spanish philosopher: «Inmediatamente mis amigos centraron la conversación sobre Ortega, en un tono cada vez menos consolador. Al poco rato, uno de ellos me increpaba por leer aún a tal “farsante”. Inmediatamente el otro saltó indignado y dijo que el “farsante” sería él. Y para evitar que la dialéctica acabase en un match de boxeo, puse fin a la discusión marchándonos a la calle. Entre el fresco de la noche y el ruido del *paseo*, me enteré de algo colosal: mis dos belicos amigos apenas conocían de don José Ortega y Gasset otra cosa que un par de artículos de periódico, que cuidadosamente habían recordado. Creo que los españoles nos parecemos un tanto a estos dos amigos míos, y gestamos la pólvora en salvatasca antes de saber quién es el enemigo».

published in *El Sol* and *El Magisterio Español* the necrology of the philosopher, calling for a «tregua respetosa». However, *de facto*, in that occasion Ruiz-Giménez made at least three very important hermeneutical moves which seem to have significant political consequences: a) he sustained the thesis of the personal political and religious errors of Ortega y Gasset; b) he underlined the dependence of his overall thinking on National and Christian premises, making him a prophet and therefore an unwilling defender of the National-Catholicism of Franco¹⁴⁰; c) lastly, he traced a continuity from Ortega's teachings up to the catholic scholars and academicians appointed during the regime¹⁴¹.

Thus, it is possible to notice an explicit attempt, made by the established culture, to include Ortega y Gasset among the most *castizos* authors¹⁴² of Spain, using him as a source of political legitimacy for the regime. But this position, hold by Ruiz-Giménez, was neither common nor popular among nationalist intellectuals. Indeed, in the immediate months after Ortega's death a violent campaign against him spread in Spain through newspapers and magazines: articles and books appeared, some of them patently opposed to the philosopher¹⁴³, others on the contrary less ideologically influenced, but still unable to produce a critical and reasoned balance of the activity of Ortega y Gasset.

On the contrary, an authentic interest towards the works of the philosopher was manifested by some students, in particular by the organisers of the *Congreso Universitario de Escritores Jovenes* in 1955. An entire generation of young students denounced the absence imposed by the regime of this very important intellectual from the official educative system. In the occasion of the commemoration of his death at the UC a student of philosophy affirmed that Ortega had been, for his generation: «una figura un tanto fantasmal. Nunca supimos donde

¹⁴⁰ It is evident here the divergence with the position of an Orteguian disciple as Marías, according to whom in the works of Ortega this theme «brilla por su ausencia». Cfr. Marías, 1959-1982, IV: 254.

¹⁴¹ See the article of Joaquín Ruíz-Giménez, *¡Descanse en Paz!*, in «El Magisterio Español», 20/ 10/ 1955, p. 803. In AOG, PB-243/ 243.

¹⁴² Álvarez Cobelas, 2004: 70-73.

¹⁴³ See, for instance, the vast series of articles published in *Razón y Fe* between 1955 and 1956 by Joaquín Iriarte.

estaba, y cuando lo sabíamos podía estar ya en otro sitio»¹⁴⁴. The students started to manifest their dissension against the cultural politics of the regime that had impeded a fruitful conversation with a very symbolic figure, who represented a largely unknown and for this reason epic past of the Spanish academia. As Abellán (1979) recalled in a short article, the funeral of Ortega gave to the students the opportunity to denounce the need of reforming the university system. For this purpose, they identified in Ortega a viable example of a path that had to be followed in order to reverse the trend of cultural stagnation and oppression they had been experiencing during the last 15 years. The words of these students are extremely significant:

Somos discípulos sin maestro. Entre Ortega y Gasset y nosotros hay un espacio vacío o mal ocupado. Notamos cada día que falta algo, que nos falta alguien. Nadie nos dice qué es estudiar, cómo debemos estudiar, para qué estudiamos. Nadie nos dice para qué vale la Universidad. Y estamos seguros ya de que vale para muy poco, y de que es necesario cambiarla mucho. Pero nadie nos dice cómo, nadie defiende que nosotros somos la base de la Universidad (Abellán, 1979: 59).

Interestingly, Ortega's death also constituted the stimulus for the first patent opposition to Franco's regime, that significantly started within the University. The so-called generation '56, was made of young Spanish students and intellectuals, manifested its disappointment in February 1956, by identifying in the person of Ortega y Gasset the master they could not have had and that, according to them, might have contributed to oppose liberal and democratic values to the strong dictatorship imposed by the *Generalísimo*¹⁴⁵. On February 10th, 1956, the government proclaimed the State of the Exception in order to violently subdue the revolt that from the university had rapidly moved to the street of Madrid. The fact that such revolt began within the University and by referring to Ortega y Gasset is far from anecdotal or casual. On the contrary, it was evidently motivated by the attitude that the

¹⁴⁴ *Acto en memoria del catedrático Don José Ortega y Gasset*, in «Revista de la Universidad de Madrid», 16 (4): 578.

¹⁴⁵ See, for example, the very interesting book written by the historian, and direct witness of the events José Luis Abellán, *Ortega y Gasset y los orígenes de la transición democrática*, Madrid, Espasa Calpe, 2000; see also the book of Pablo Lizcano, *La generación del 56. La Universidad contra Franco*, Madrid, Leer Documento, 2006.

Spanish philosopher had always adopted in relation to the social role of education, and in particular of the University. This, as proved in the course of this thesis, had always represented a political battlefield of opposite fronts, a place in which different ideologies were built and frequently crashed one against the other. After these episodes within the University, they will be created the *Asociación Socialista Universitaria* in 1956, the *Unión Democrática de Estudiantes*, in 1957, then the *Nueva Izquierda Universitaria*, and lastly the *Frente de Liberación Popular*. More than expressions of a democratic or liberal tendency, the birth of all these movements proves how the relations between University and politics, in the Spanish case, represented and would have continued to represent the very essence of this institution.

The protests of the students were not only violently repressed, but also countered by the academic – and political – establishment. This is the case of the monographic edition of *Revista de Filosofía*, published at the beginning of 1957. In spite of the wish to present a critical, respectful evaluation and an authentic discussion of the activities and writings of Ortega, the uncertain knowledge of his own writings and speeches, due to the silences and prejudices spread during the previous 15-20 years, caused very poor and partial assessments of his works.

From the end of the '50s the strong anti-Orteguian campaign within Spanish culture did not come to an end, despite the fact that some tenuous signs of changes and divisions within the regime relevantly continued also in the immediate years after his death. A notable contribution to this campaign was made in particular by the publishing of the book of the Dominican Santiago Ramírez, in 1958, entitled *La filosofía de Ortega y Gasset* in which the main theses of the Jesuits and the official national catholic regime were reinforced and systematised, thus offering a sort of official guidebook to the main criticisms against the philosopher. As far as the philosophical research is concerned – but a similar point could be raised in regard to the study of History – during the '50s and the '60, the main pillars of the Spanish academia still remained the diffusion and defence of the Aristotelian and in particular the scholastic tradition which, during all those years, represented the official philosophical orthodoxy, also thanks to its religious connotations. The book of Ramírez, as Bolado Ochoa writes (2011: 161): «es una aproximación inquisitorial a la filosofía de Ortega y Gasset, que busca calificarla desde el punto de vista de la pureza de la fe, según la teología y filosofía aristotélico-escolástica». In the following years

Ortega was largely treated according to two different points of view: either being subjected to devastating criticisms to his general philosophical account, as far as it was seen as incompatible with the structure of the New Spanish society and its religious system of value, or being simply neglected and left apart from the number of those who could have been considered as notable national intellectuals.

An exception to the first of these ways of dealing with his thought is offered by the book by José Luis Aranguren, *La ética de Ortega* (1966), which tried to counter the very thesis of Ramírez by exhibiting the possibility of a peaceful coexistence between Ortega's philosophy and Christian principles. A similar attempt had been previously made also by the historian José Antonio Maravall who, in 1959, published *Ortega en nuestra situación*. Another very remarkable exception to the second of the ways in which the Madrilenian philosopher was generally treated was that purported by his disciples, among them Julian Marías and Francisco Romero, which contributed to form part of what has been defined as the *Escuela de Madrid*. They tended to present a very different picture of the influence and importance of Ortega within the Spanish culture: for instance, Francisco Romero published in 1960 a book entitled *Ortega y Gasset y el problema de la jefatura espiritual* where he argued that Ortega played in Spain a fundamental role in determining its spiritual heritage. He defined him as a *jefe espiritual*, defining this figure as «una función social, no una tarea que pueda ser cumplida en la soledad» (Romero, 1960). But this, as the very important book of Marías published in the same year, constituted a very marginal attempt to integrate their master within Spanish culture. The beginning of the '60s, however, marked a new change in the way of dealing with Ortega, in particular thanks to a new generational turnover not within academia, but within other channels of cultural diffusion that the regime found increasingly difficult to control¹⁴⁶. The years between 1955 and 1960 were then characterised by a vast increasing of the number and quality of editors and by a more vital intellectual scenario¹⁴⁷, by a strong *antifranquismo* which however, from 1965¹⁴⁸ onward, was powerfully contrasted and repressed by the *Tribunal de Orden Público*. During the two decades comprised between his death and the one of

¹⁴⁶ See Peiró Martín, 2013: 79-80.

¹⁴⁷ Abdón Mateos, 2008.

¹⁴⁸ Ginard Féron, 2008: 202-204. In 1965, in particular, some left oriented scholars were expelled by academia or imprisoned due to their political ideas.

Francisco Franco, Ortega still continued to be debated by philosophers and historians.

This variegated panorama offered the possibility of a relevant innovation both in historical and philosophical trends. In regard to this second aspect, the significant importance of foreign philosophies such as structuralism and Marxism, opened a new radical phase of liberal and heterodox intellectual activity in which the works of Ortega could have been reintegrated not in the name of their pureness and traditionalism, but in the name of their appeal to modernity¹⁴⁹. The new *Revista de Occidente*, directed by Paulino Garagarri from 1963 to 1975, became the main vehicle of the renewed liberal approach to philosophy and, therefore, to Ortega's heritage. Anyway, among the liberal intellectual circles, Ortega was surely respected and seen as an important source, but at the same time his texts were only very partially known, due to their limited circulation. This partial knowledge characterised this first new rediscovery of Ortega's legacy, marked by a tendency to dismiss his own writings, in unwilling accordance with the popular Jesuits' theses. This fact, at the same time, implied a wish of overcoming his own philosophy during the first part of the '80s, even if that was still not well understood. As Rodríguez Huéscar critically wrote during those years in regard to the recent trends of his fellows scholars: «Para ser de verdad *heterodoxo*, lo primero que hace falta es ser *doxo*, es decir, haber digerido y asimilado la doctrina de la que se disiente»¹⁵⁰.

To briefly summarise, *from 1965 up to the end of Franco's dictatorship, Ortega surely did not represent one of the main reference points of Spanish culture, being on the contrary largely condemned by the official propaganda. Nevertheless, among his direct or indirect disciples he continued to be vividly defended through an unceasing editorial effort.* This strenuous defence was obviously marked by a non-critical assessment of the works of the master and by a large dismissal of his own texts. It was in particular from the middle of the '70s that the very group of Orteguian scholars called for a *cambio de marcha* characterised by a critical view on the author in the light of the most recent international development of philosophical trends. But, despite the incredible efforts of this small

¹⁴⁹ This new trend significantly opposed the previous tradition of all the '50s when «el lenguaje liberal acerca de la organización política del Estado había sido triturado por la retórica fascista y nacionalcatólica». *Ibidem*, p. 226.

¹⁵⁰ Rodríguez Huéscar, in *El País*, 16 November 1985, p. 28.

group of independent scholars, such as those previously mentioned or other such as José Luis Abellán, until the democratic transition the works of Ortega did not find the historical conditions to become part of the Spanish intellectual tradition. Only in this completely renewed political scenario Ortega and the so-called “liberal tradition”, which in reality had to be invented by the a recycled self-proclaimed democratic elite, benefited of a new deal in the evolution of the Spanish academia.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The novelty in relation to the Orteguian studies

The main aim of this research has been that of studying the relations between the philosophy developed by José Ortega y Gasset and the teaching and public activities he realised, considering them within the historical, social and political contexts in which he lived, and throughout the course of his whole life. In doing this, the research has been conducted by joining a theoretical analysis of his theorisations with a constant historical reconstruction of the material conditions which rendered them possible and largely contributed to influence them.

An instance of the mutual influence between the broader realm of philosophical ideas and the concrete situations in which they arise has been proven to be given, in the case of Ortega's philosophy, by the development of two central topics of his reflection such as the notion of liberalism he elaborated in different epochs of his life, and the mutable role he attributed to the intellectual as a social actor. Indeed, the vast scope of the research in relation to its chronological aspect has implied the need of studying the evolution of Ortega's thought in completely different contexts. This is mainly due to the frequent changes that the Spanish academic and political life underwent during this long period.

It has been proved that, in spite of these changes, Ortega did never completely disappear from the Spanish intellectual debate, even when he was significantly marginalised or criticised by the orthodox establishment of the Franco's regime. For this reason, the centrality of the author in relation to the Spanish intellectual world, both during and after his life, has permitted to investigate through his figure the evolution of the Spanish academia during more than fifty years, comprehending its inner functioning and its changing relations with the political power. Indeed, without any reasonable doubt, the research

has proved that it would be impossible to comprehend the evolution of the Spanish philosophy and academic teaching during the first half of the twentieth century without considering the role Ortega played in it, in the same way in which, however, it would be completely impossible to acquire a decent understanding of the authentic meaning of the philosophy of the latter without considering the context in which and for which he forged his ideas. This has been proven both in relation to the initial period of his intellectual career and, quite surprisingly, regarding the last period of his life, usually conceived as a moment of substantial separation of the philosopher from the Spanish cultural debate.

The research has contributed to define the evolution of the concept of the intellectual in relation to Ortega's life at two complementary levels: a microscopic and a macroscopic one. Concerning the first, it has been pointed out how the concrete theorisations of the philosopher were directly interrelated with the mutations within the Spanish academia, since his youth until his death. This particular context constituted the basis of his meditations along the whole course of his life not only consciously influencing the aims of his research, but also and more profoundly, by unconsciously determining its very scope. The evolution of the concept of liberalism in the course of his life, from a social to an authoritarian one, is a clear instance of this very forceful relation between the evolution of his philosophical ideas and the context in which they sprang.

Moreover, to a macroscopic level of the analysis, the thesis has demonstrated that the case of Ortega y Gasset possesses a paradigmatic value as far as the analysis of the evolution of the role of the intellectual in the XX century is concerned. In fact he lived in an epoch of transition in relation to the social function of the philosopher which permits to individuate at least three evolutionary phases of the relation between intellectual and society not only in the case of the Spanish history but, broadly speaking, in relation to the evolution of the European society.

In the first part of his life, until the beginning of the thirties, he enjoyed a very influential social status as a free thinker, a condition which would have soon been countered by the birth of the organic intellectual which constituted the main characteristic of the new cultural establishment of Franco's regime, in analogy with the common trend of the European history during the course of the upheaval of the

totalitarian movements. At the same time, in particular from the '30s, he perceived, in line with the works of Julien Benda, the progressive decline of the social prestige of the intellectual, due to the scientific and cultural crisis to which, during the last part of his life, he tried to respond by proposing a reform of the concept and practice of the humanities as a way to counter this tendency which directly affects our current situation.

Moreover, this investigation has permitted to counter two historiographical myths, one concerning the posture Ortega y Gasset maintained during the '40s, and the other related to the reception he received from some minority groups within the Franco's establishment. Concerning the first aspect, it is possible to affirm that the self-proclaimed silence Ortega is deemed to have observed during his exile does not constitute an historic reality. In fact, even if he did not explicitly comment the political decisions of the regime in all his writings of the period, it is possible to find several critical references to the Spanish cultural scenario. Moreover, he can be said to have developed all his philosophical ideas, concerning for instance his meditations on the nature of history or his sociological reflection, in strict relation to the academic debates that were taking place in Spain during the same period. His philosophy did undergo profound changes, at least in the election of the topics and in the ways in which he treated them. Thus, all his writings can be considered performative acts, always very critical, in the context of the changed university and political context of the Spanish academia.

Moreover, in relation to the reception he received in Spain, the thesis has contributed to demonstrate that the so-called liberal falangism, in the measure in which it was related to Ortega y Gasset, is another historiographic myth. In fact, more than to a sort of liberalism – a word which appeared to have no concrete meaning during this period – the interest towards the philosophy of Ortega y Gasset among the supposed members of this intellectual and political movement was exclusively instrumental and aimed to conquer the cultural hegemony of the regime against other groups of interest and power. This also permits to counter the idea of the existence of a proper *Escuela de Madrid*, which would have survived to Ortega's death during the '60s and the '70s. Indeed, the only real instance of such a school, as proved in the first part of the thesis, seems to can legitimately be traced back to

the beginning of the thirties, to the intellectual apogee of Ortega y Gasset and the formative period of the majority of the members of that supposed school.

If something as an Orteguian school can be individuated during the life of the regime the only possibility of identifying it is by the reference to a peculiar form of scholasticism that significantly tried to adapt Ortega to the needs of the new rhetoric of the regime. Substantially betraying the scope and aim of Ortega's philosophical and pedagogical account. In fact, as the analysis of the realisation of the Institute of Humanities in comparison to the concurrent Spanish academic scenario has contributed to prove, the meditation of Ortega on the role of the humanities and the intellectuals in society did constitute an alternative educative project in relation to the one purported by the regime. A proposal that did not find the sufficient support within the cultural establishment, not only among the most traditionalist groups, but also within the ones which are usually supposed to have been more akin to the philosopher.

Moreover, the entire investigation has contributed to prove how Ortega always linked his frequent educative theorisations with their concrete practices, and that these always had a twofold political dimension. In other words, he always conceived the practicing of the intellectual role as the activity of an entire group interested in influencing the social life by proposing and imposing its normative view over other minorities and over the general population through an educative –never propagandistic – process. This implied the need of joining the academic activity with a publicist and editorial one, with the aim of acquiring a relevant role within the cultural as well as within the public debate.

2. A description of the main findings

In relation to the single sections which compose the research it has to be noted that each of them contributes to substantially ameliorate the comprehension of Ortega's professorship in relation to its historical and social context. In particular, the first part of the thesis has proved that the philosophy purported by Ortega during the first years of his university teaching was very strictly related to the educative and social

reforms he was trying to realise in the Spanish society. At the same time, this peculiar character of his philosophical experience was due both to the influences he received during his stay in Germany, as often pointed out by the scholarly literature, but also, and probably to a larger extent, to the social and political climate surrounding the University of Madrid during his formative years. In other words, Ortega can be conceived as a member of a very large intellectual community, a generation that was imposing itself against the traditionalism of some sectors of the Spanish culture. The thesis has proved that without taking into account the constitutive struggle between tradition and modernisation which took place inside the University of Madrid since the beginning of the XX century, and lasted until the establishment of the Franco's regime, it would be impossible to comprehend the historical forces which grounded the philosophical meditation of Ortega y Gasset.

This modernising movement, represented by some educative institutions such as the *Institución Libre de Enseñanza*, initially determined the directions of Ortega's intellectual activity and, during the following years, it would have largely benefitted from the theoretical and practical contribution of the philosopher. In fact, during his apogee as a professor and a public figure, between the '20s and the '30s, Ortega fully assumed his intellectual responsibility and this brought him to directly intervene in the political arena. He did so through a series of editorial projects, via his teaching and political activity. All of these were informed by the principles he was used to teach within the University. In fact, he did not consider the academia as a place for building a neutral and objective science, at least as far as the humanities were concerned. On the contrary, he conceived it as a social institution which should have been responsible for a political and historical change within the Spanish culture and society. This radical change had to be realised through a rational reform rendered possible by the educative process, which promoted the political participation of every and each individual for the enhance of the individual freedom. Indeed, the analysis of his proposal for reforming the University that he presented during these years has been proven to be substantially linked to the political struggles he fought during the same period, constituting an antidote to the growing depersonalization of the mass society and a way to promote a liberal culture.

The second part of the thesis has contributed to show the way in which the philosophy of Ortega y Gasset significantly changed both its scope and its aims during his French exile which followed the beginning of the Spanish civil war. In fact, in order to maintain his political and intellectual influence in a period in which the autonomy of the intellectual was radically put into question, he was indirectly forced by the circumstance to adapt his philosophical discourse to the language spoken within the new academic scenario. This section has proven that these changes did not radically modified the perception he had of the role of the intellectual as a sort of critical spectator of the society and the political power, never abdicating from his intellectual independence. On the same time, he tried to be a reference point within the Spanish intellectual debate by observing a conciliatory attitude towards the political regime, aiming to regain his influential role in his homeland.

His book on translation has been proved to represent the theoretical framework of the new strategic language that Ortega was adopting to converse with the regime: a language made of allusions and veiled critiques. This analysis has contributed to prove that the myth of his silence during the period of his exile does not correspond to the historical reality. This constituted part of a strategy he adopted which, from a pragmatic point of view, has been proven to end up in a complete failure. In fact, the substantive changes underwent by the Spanish academia and educative system did not allow him to take part in the new cultural scenario, and when he received some attention by the new establishment, the instrumental use done by some members of the right movements did not correspond to the political and educative ideas presented by Ortega both before and during his exile. He was overtly criticised and misinterpreted, due to the fact that the historical and institutional forces which ruled the Spanish academia were significantly changing. This has permitted to prove that also within a substantially hostile cultural atmosphere, Ortega tried to maintain his independence and freedom of speech. Even if he did not overtly criticise the regime, he tried to contribute to enhance the intellectual dialogue within it. Something he perceived as a possible stimulus for the political and social change.

This project was condemned to its marginalisation. In fact, as it has been proven in particular in the third part of the thesis, the debate over

the normative function of the new university in the first period of Franco's regime gave birth to a completely new type of intellectual who was radically incompatible with the liberal outlook proposed by Ortega: the organic intellectual. The humanities, and in particular history, history of philosophy and sociology, acquired a growing relevance in the construction of this new cultural paradigm. In spite of the struggles within the University among different political and ideological elites competing for the cultural hegemony, very soon the Spanish academia acquired an homogeneous outlook which impeded any form of authentic dissension during the first half of the '40s. A more open, if limited, debate emerged in particular by the end of the second World War, due to the international accusations against the authoritarian trait of Franco's regime. As proven in particular by the cases of the debates over the nature of the Roman Empire, conducted in *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, and in relation to the one which took form concerning the intellectual figure of Juan Luis Vives, not only Ortega tried to dialogue with the Spanish academia, trying to propose his normative ideal through the theorisation of a "new liberalism", but he was also somehow corresponded by some of its members. Thus, his isolation was at least partially mitigated by the instrumental use made by some minorities within the regime which were trying to introduce some elements of modernisation within it, a timid reform which, however, never aimed to subvert the political power. Ortega took advantage of this scenario to reinforce his contacts and at the same time was used as a political resource by these minority groups. All these circumstances, soon after the end of the war, would have rendered possible his return in Spain.

Lastly, the fourth section of the thesis has demonstrated that the first return in Spain of Ortega in 1945, more than constituting a real problem, turned out to be a resource for the regime which, in propagandistic terms benefitted from his presence in a time of international isolation. On the contrary, given the changed international scenario characterised by the exacerbation of the cold war and the beginning of the process of international recognition of the Franco's regime, the second coming of the philosopher in Madrid and the creation of the Institute of Humanities in 1948 was looked askance by the establishment. In fact, the creation of the Institute did coincide with a moment in which the political confrontation among the different

souls of the regime had reached his climax and the international scenario seemed to lead to an imminent institutional reform, as proven by the concurrent debate between Calvo Serer and Laín Entralgo.

Thus, Ortega was again unwillingly converted in a pretext by the components of a fragmented regime for building a new cultural hegemony. However, he refused to limit the scope of his cultural initiative exclusively to the Spanish scenario. Indeed, the Institute represented the most ambitious project ever realised by Ortega in relation to the progressive loss of relevance of the intellectual in the European society. In this new international scenario and thanks to the creation of new international institutions and foundations devoted to the promotion of the humanities, Ortega individuated useful collaborators which could have helped him to give back to the intellectual his prestigious role in the construction of the public opinion. Consequently, he also tried to export the format of the Institute of Humanities abroad, even if he did not realise his ambitious projects. The significant attempt to answer to the crisis of the intellectual and the humanistic education determined also the fact that, during the last years of his life, Ortega chose to focus his meditations on the problem of the European Union, the most urgent question that the post-war society was facing and in relation to which the intellectual could have had the possibility of reassuming a guiding role.

During the last period of his life, the new problems he was facing and the substantial stagnation and hostility which marked the Spanish intellectual scenario obliged him to abandon any concrete plan of actively contributing to the academic debate in his country. Indeed, a strong contraposition between defenders and detractors of the philosopher contributed to the creation of two opposing scholasticisms within the Spanish academia. A contraposition which, until the end of the '70s, constituted the major legacy of Ortega's philosophy in Spain.

3. An analysis of the main findings

The chronological aspect of this thesis, and consequently its division in four main blocks following the life of Ortega y Gasset, does not constitute the only structural criterion which can be followed to reconstruct the results obtained through this investigation. In fact, it is

possible, and probably more interesting, to notice that the whole research has been scrupulously conducted according to four main coordinates which have constituted the trestle of each and all of these sections: a) the theory of education of Ortega y Gasset; b) his life in relation to the evolution of the Spanish academia; c) the relation between academia and society; d) the role of the humanistic education in the definition of political ideas. In analysing the main findings of this research, it can be useful to look in particular at least to two different aspects of this complex structure. In particular: I) the theory of education developed by Ortega y Gasset during the course of his life; II) His role within the Spanish academia and the evolution of the Spanish academic institution during the first half of the XX century, in relation to the social, political and historical forces. By analysing these complementary aspects it is possible for each of them to deduce at least four interesting conclusions that this research has contributed to demonstrate.

I. Concerning the theory of education of Ortega y Gasset this thesis has proved that

a) in contrast to the majority of the studies on the author, that relegate his pedagogical concern to a secondary place or consider it as a preoccupation exclusively present during his youth, Ortega developed a constant meditation on the role of education in society during the whole course of his life and intellectual experience. In addition, this pedagogical meditation has been proved to have unceasingly enlivened his overall philosophical account which cannot be adequately understood without linking his theorisations with his concrete teaching activities.

b) this educative concern was principally aimed, during his youth, to forge a better Spanish society, both from a spiritual and material point of view, and, in the following years, to contribute to the building of a European citizenship. The humanistic education has always been conceived by the Spanish philosopher as the more effective instrument that should have been used to counter the depersonalisation of the masses and, consequently, to ameliorate the concrete lives of the citizens of a community and of the civil society considered as a whole.

c) the philosophy developed by Ortega y Gasset, that, at least since the beginning of the '20s, can be said to consist in a philosophical

anthropology, was intrinsically linked to his political meditations and precisely because of his pedagogical concern. In fact, he conceived education as a way through which all persons could have reached a complete fulfilment of their own humanity, through a liberal process of emancipation and self-improvement. In order to realise this, he always tried to translate his intellectual engagement in political projects, always trying to realise them through the help of colleagues and politicians he perceived as members of his own generation.

d) Ortega's theory of education could constitute a compelling reference point in relation to the role of the University in our current democratic society. In fact, in recent decades, it has been made an evident and important detour in political theory and social sciences towards the study of forms of empowered democracies. Since the pioneering works of Carole Pateman [1970; 2012] on the importance of fostering participation for contributing to a genuine democratisation of our societies, these theories have acquired an outstanding importance. In this context, as James Fishkin put it: «democracy is more meaningful if citizens are better informed and more attentive to the issues they are voting on» [Fishkin 2002: 225]. However, several deliberative democrats often forget what the famous pedagogue John Dewey clearly and powerfully wrote almost a century ago in his famous book entitled *Democracy and Education* [Dewey, 2004, 3]: «beings who are born not only unaware of, but quite indifferent to, the aims and habits of the social group have to be rendered cognizant of them and actively interested. Education, and education alone, spans the gap». In other words, citizens are required to be able to understand the problems at stake, to have adequate information about the society in which they live in order to act according to democratic and rational principles and not according to authoritative and instinctual ones. For this reason, in order to understand a fact or a theory in its complexity it is necessary to possess some indispensable means, namely a system of knowledge and values –at least at a minimum threshold. This threshold should be regulated in accordance to what José Ortega y Gasset labelled as the “principle of economy”. In fact, if this precondition were not satisfied, then it would be impossible to think about any sort of aware and conscious public opinion. The public sphere would on the contrary be characterised by superficiality and “recentism”. As Ortega put it: «no vale hablar de ideas u opiniones donde no se admite una instancia que

las regula, una serie de normas a que en la discusión cabe apelar. Estas normas son los principios de la cultura» [OC, IV: 417]. Thus, Ortega's theory of education and the role he assigned to the University in the process of building a mature public opinion constitutes a still open invitation to question the current role of the University within society.

II. As far as the roles of Ortega within the academia and of the academia in relation to the Spanish society are concerned, the research has proved that:

a) The University of Madrid represented, both during Ortega's youth and in the following years, the social background for his philosophical activity which oriented both the scope and aims of his meditations during all his life. The particular context in which he lived since the beginning of the century was crucial in determining his concept of the role of the intellectual in politics and also in rendering possible all the political and educative projects he developed during his life. The school of Madrid, which reached its acme at the beginning of the thirties, constituted the realisation of an ideal of educative reform that he continued to long with nostalgia during his exile.

b) At the same time this project of reform did never find a total consensus within the cultural elite of the country. Thus, the Spanish academia has always been substantially divided between modernizers and traditionalists since the very beginning of the XX century. As a consequence, the institutional change represented by the instauration of the Franco's regime implied the vindication of a new predominant role by those very traditionalist groups that had been previously marginalised during the short period of hegemonic governance of the liberal government. In other words, Ortega not only exercised a political power during his academic career and had a very prestigious social status during his period as a professor, but he also acquired a very significant symbolic status in the struggle within the academia that marked the social, cultural and political history of Spain since the democratic transition in the seventies. For this reason, his relation with the political debate within his country did not end with his exile, since his philosophical and educative preoccupation was always intrinsically linked with that particular background. Also during the last and more troublesome period of his life he did not renounce to play his notable intellectual role in society, and even if he did not criticise directly the

regime, the Institute of Humanities he realised can surely be defined as his non-abdication to the duty of *Parrhesia* of the authentic philosopher and intellectual [Foucault, 1985].

c) The academia can be said to have been one of the main political battlefield of the Spanish history during the whole period studied in this research. It was conceived as the main pillar in the affirmation of the political power since it was considered as the main institutional contributor to the formation of the national ruling class. By adopting the terms of Acemoglu and Robinson [2012], it is possible to provocatively affirm that it represented an extractive cultural institution insofar as more than promoting a concrete development of the nation, it contributed to its political radicalisation and limited development in comparison to the rest of Europe. In fact, both the limited elite which composed the academic world and the generalised extraction of cultural resources done by the University from the rest of society without any attention to the state of affairs they produced among other people and in the long-run are clearly instances of its paradoxical extractive character. This is also proved by the unceasing climate of violence that characterised the life of the Spanish academia during the whole decade of the thirties and that not only continued but also grew during the following two decades, in a climate of political control and oppression. In fact, during the period of Franco's dictatorship, the separation between a limited and oligarchic ruling class and the vast part of the citizens grew enormously.

d) This also implied that during all the different political regimes the intellectuals, in the Spanish case, also played a very relevant role in the construction of the main ideological bases of those very regimes and in their propagation through cultural review. For this reason, it is possible to provocatively affirm that all the different regimes which characterised the Spanish history during the XX century had their organic intellectuals. Moreover, it is also possible to notice the existence of a perennial struggle between at least two hegemonic projects that always competed one against the other: the liberal versus the traditionalist one, the falangist versus the national-catholic, and so on. In addition, it has been proven that the relation with the international context was always marked by a substantial subordination of Spain to the rest of the continent, and that this aspect contributed to determine the provisional victories and defeats of the opposing fronts. Thus, the

whole research has contributed to demonstrate that the very concept of humanistic education, at least in the Spanish case, has always been intrinsically linked to the different political regimes that promoted a particular idea of culture with a very clear hegemonic purpose.

4. Final remarks

This study of the philosophy and teachings of Ortega y Gasset in their historical and social contexts has shown that the ideas cannot be conceived as independent entities without any relation to the concrete circumstances in which they spring. Moreover, they have always to be considered as a product of a precise epoch. This does not simply mean that the contexts contribute to shape the texts or are indispensable to comprehend them.

Far more than this, the present research has proved that the context – in this case the University of Madrid and its social and political characteristics – constitutes the necessary condition which renders possible the very existence of a text, of a theory. This statement does not imply any sort of historical determinism. On the contrary, the context has been proven to be a basic structure which orients the development of philosophical ideas which can be elaborated in a largely unpredictable way, but always within a given range. Put it differently, the context constitutes the language whereas the ideas the speeches elaborated starting from that language.

The present thesis has taken into account both the common language that characterised the University of Madrid – via an in-depth analysis of its communities of discourse in different times – and of the individual and relevant speeches. In particular, but not exclusively, the ones of Ortega y Gasset. This twofold analysis has revealed that the banality of the evil, contrary to what Nancy seems to purport in the case of Heidegger [2016], did not entirely affected the intellectual activity of Ortega y Gasset.

Indeed, his lucid focus on the role of the intellectual in society, also during the years of his exile and of the regime of Francisco Franco in Spain, represented the strategy he adopted to take part in the Spanish cultural debate. He chose to criticise without destroying the basis of the new political power, with the purpose of orienting its normative ideal and reforming it from inside, as it has been proven by analysing his

courses on history and sociology at the Institute of Humanities. If this attitude towards the political power has to be praised or blamed is something that probably depends solely on the peculiar sensibility of each interpreter.

On the contrary, what this thesis has surely revealed is that in the course of his whole life Ortega never betrayed the two main pillars of his philosophical and educative outlook. Probably, more than labelling this general framework with the classical term “liberalism”, it could be more appropriate to coin a different and more neutral expression by adapting a term used in the field of biology: i.e. “capabilitism”. In other words, Ortega never renounced to two basic convictions according to which 1) the starting point and the end of all philosophical and political project are the single individuals and 2) the duty of a philosophy, and consequently of an intellectual, would be that of promoting a constant amelioration of the potentialities and capabilities that each one possesses. Put it differently, the intellectual should be the promoter of a constant qualitative progress of a society through the enhancement of the individual fulfilment. If these conditions were realised, the intellectual would ultimately be dispensable, since every individual would have converted himself in an intellectual.

On the one hand, in our current Western societies it is likely to be the case that, as Ortega predicted, the intellectual has irredeemably lost both the social status and the political power he was used to exercise. However, the basic social mission he has to accomplish still appears as essential in order to guarantee that the freedom of a liberal democracy would not end up in the anarchy of an hyper-democracy. Who and how should be responsible for playing this role and what would be the role of the University still represents an open and urgent question for our current society.

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Reviews

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Escorial

Estafeta literaria

Ínsula

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



Fig. 3: GL, 15.07.1927

caballero, *Carteles*, Madrid, Espasa Calpe, 1927.




La Ciudad Universitaria de Madrid fue durante la Cruzada de Liberación española claramente la posición del ejército nacional, que en su avanzada, libró reñidísimas batallas por la posesión de las ruinas del Hospital Clínico, la Casa de Velázquez y la Escuela de Arquitectura. Véase la famosa pasarela en las inmediaciones de la Casa de Campo. Por allí las fuerzas nacionales tuvieron exclusiva comunicación durante veintiocho meses.


Annex 2. The University of Madrid and the two fronts during the civil war. In Ibáñez Martín, *Diez años al servicio de la cultura española*, 1949.



Annex 3: The destruction of the faculty of Philosophy of the Universidad Central. In *La ciudad universitaria. Esquema del trabajo realizado por el Ministerio de educación nacional sobre las ruinas heroicas*, Madrid, Octubre 1942



Annex 4: The arch dedicated to Franco which, according to the initial project for the reconstruction of the UC, should have been collocated at the main entrance of the campus. In *La ciudad universitaria. Esquema del trabajo realizado por el MEN sobre las ruinas heroicas*, Madrid, 1942



Annex 5: The Lullian arbor of knowledge and the structure of the CSIC, in AA.VV. *Estructura y Normas del Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas*, Madrid, 1943.



Annex 6: The crowd outside the *Ateneo* of Madrid for Ortega's conference in 1946.



Annex 7: Ortega y Gasset escorted by Pedro Rocamora during his conference in the Ateneo



Annex 8: Ortega's lessons in the Institute of Humanities

Valencia, [redacted] de 1950


PB-367178

A los señores directores del Instituto de Humanidades
muy hrs. nuestros

Gracias a la atenta delicadeza de un amigo de la calle, llegó hasta nosotros el programa en el que se anuncian los interesantes cursos de "Canta Nueva" que han iniciado ya en Madrid. Es difícil expresarles la sensacional atracción que ha producido en nuestra ciudad el desarrollo de tan importantes aspectos y el dolor que sentimos al no poder asistir directamente a los cursos, para apreciar del verbo calido de sus autoridades expositores, la explicación de materias tan importantes en el campo de la cultura universal y esencialmente para enlazar nuestra decadente corriente espiritual ibérica.

Pero las circunstancias que, como tan magnificamente ha expuesto D. José, determinan nuestras actitudes y posibilidades, nos tienen en esta penial de San Miguel de los Reyes y no podremos por mucho tiempo asistir a esas hermosas lecciones, a juicio nuestro, proa para el levantamiento español, hemos pensado dirigirnos a Vds. para manifestarles nuestro entusiasmo por la magnitud de su obra y para preguntarles con la mayor devoción afectuosa, si habría manera de adquirir algún resumen de esos cursos, especialmente del de D. José Ortega y Gasset, D. Alfonso García Valdecasas, D. Luis Valde del Corral y D. Julián Marías.

Somos un grupo de presos de diversas regiones de España que estudiamos un poco y reflexionamos cuanto al abatear de nuestro espíritu no permite que nos congregáramos en recibirles el más sincero homenaje. Debido al prolongado aislamiento no podemos seguir el desarrollo científico humano del mundo ni de la nación ya que no recibimos periódicos ni revistas; por ello tal vez sea extraño nuestra petición, por que bien pudiera ser que tengan Vds. esbozadas las lecciones del año anterior y



Annex 10: Ortega y Gasset and Jaime Benítez

Annex 11:

Ortega during his
conference in Aspen

