

Rosemary Elliot

From youth protection to individual responsibility: Addressing smoking among young people in post-war West Germany

Vom Jugendschutz zur Eigenverantwortung: Der Umgang mit dem Rauchen bei Jugendlichen in Westdeutschland in der Nachkriegszeit

Summary: This article draws on health education material produced on smoking in the 1950s and 1960s in West Germany to question the extent to which smoking and health disappeared from the agenda in the post war decades, following the experience of anti-smoking propaganda during the Third Reich. It suggests that continuities can be seen in anti-smoking literature and campaigns both before and after the Third Reich around the notion of youth protection. In the early 1960s, there was a more decisive break with the past with the foundation of the Ministry of Health and a growing determination to make health education a federal responsibility. There was an evident shift towards notions of individual responsibility and rational choice, informed by a growing body of international epidemiological evidence on smoking and health. There were also some attempts to engage with youth culture in the 1960s, rather than seeing youth culture as a threat to the social order, as had been the case in older youth protection arguments against smoking.

Key words: smoking – health education – public health policy – youth culture – West Germany – tobacco taxation

Zusammenfassung: Auf der Basis von Gesundheitsaufklärungsmaterial, das in Westdeutschland in den 1950er und 1960er Jahren zum Thema Rauchen veröffentlicht wurde, und vor dem Hintergrund der nationalsozialistischen Anti-Raucher-Kampagnen, stellt der Beitrag die Frage, in welchem Ausmaß das Thema Rauchen und Gesundheit nach 1945 tatsächlich von der Agenda verschwunden war. Der Aufsatz zeigt, dass es im Kontext des Jugendgesundheitsschutzes durchaus Kontinuitäten in der Anti-Raucher-Literatur und bei den Anti-Raucher-Kampagnen vor und nach dem „Dritten Reich“ gab. Erst in den frühen 1960er Jahren, mit der Gründung des Gesundheitsministeriums und dem zunehmenden Willen, Gesundheitserziehung zu einer Aufgabe des Bundes zu machen, ist ein Bruch mit der Vergangenheit erkennbar. Kennzeichnend für diesen gesundheitspolitischen Wandel waren die wachsende Menge internationaler epidemiologischer Daten, die einen Zusammenhang von Rauchen und Gesundheit zeigten, und – davon beeinflusst – mehr Verantwortung des Einzelnen. Gleichzeitig gab es Versuche, sich stärker mit der

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Jugendkultur der 1960er Jahre auseinanderzusetzen anstatt diese lediglich als Bedrohung der sozialen Ordnung zu sehen, wie es in der vormaligen Politik des Jugendgesundheits-schutzes der Fall gewesen war.

Schlüsselwörter: Rauchen – Gesundheitsaufklärung – Gesundheitspolitik – Jugendkultur – Westdeutschland – Tabaksteuer

Introduction

The years following 1945 saw significant changes in the social and cultural context of smoking in what became West Germany, most notably the Westernisation of smoking tastes during the occupation period. At the end of the Second World War, the German tobacco market all but collapsed, along with the currency, and what became West Germany was flooded with American and British cigarettes as Allied soldiers entered the country. The cigarettes became a substitute currency in the black market which flourished, and as something to smoke, for those who could afford them.¹ American cigarettes were the most sought after and popular: a carton of 200 had a street value of 1000 Reichsmark before the currency reform.² These cigarettes carried associations of democracy and glamour, which had already been established during the war, when US cigarettes were seen as a luxury good.³ American cigarettes were made of Virginian tobacco blended with darker tobaccos, making cigarettes lighter and easier to smoke and to inhale than the Oriental blends traditionally preferred by German smokers.⁴ In December 1948, as part of the Marshall Plan, German tobacco manufacturers took their first delivery of barrels of Virginian tobacco to ease tobacco shortages caused by political turmoil in Greece and the near collapse of German tobacco cultivation. German manufacturers began to produce their own “American blend“ cigarettes, mixing Virginian tobacco with available Oriental tobaccos to cater for this new taste.⁵ The post-war decades saw a growth in cigarette smo-

- 1 Merki, Christoph: Die Amerikanische Zigarette – Das Maß aller Dinge. In: Hengartner, Thomas; Merki, Christoph (eds.): Tabakfragen: Rauchen aus kulturwissenschaftlicher Sicht. Zürich 1996, 65-68.
- 2 Reemtsma: Tabago: ein Bilderbuch vom Tabak und den Freuden des Rauchens. Hamburg 1960, 117.
- 3 Miller, Douglas: Foreign trade and exchange controls in Germany. In: American economic review 33 (1943), 923-925.
- 4 Hercher, Richard: Tabak. In: Beckerath, Erwin von et al. (eds.): Handwörterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften. Stuttgart 1959, 278.
- 5 Doren, Gustaf Nils: Die Zigarettenanzeige im Laufe der Reemtsma Firmengeschichte. Hamburg 1977, 9.

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king in West Germany, which was – by the 1960s – accompanied by increasing amounts of advertising focusing on lifestyle attributes and images of success and affluence.⁶ Much of this increased consumption was of Virginian, rather than Oriental, cigarettes, as Germany caught up with the international trend towards a lighter type of tobacco.⁷

This post-war growth in cigarette consumption took place in a social and political climate which has generally been seen as liberal in relation to tobacco use, and contrasts both to the more prohibitive era of the 1930s and early 1940s in Germany, and to widespread anti-smoking policies across the globe at the turn of the millennium.⁸ Comparatively liberal post-war attitudes towards tobacco use have been explained by historians and epidemiologists with reference to the legacy of Third Reich anti-smoking propaganda, the experience of the occupation period where shortages led to a black market, and, in the 1980s and 1990s, the influence of the tobacco industry.⁹ For example, Frankenberg states that:

[t]obacco regulation in Germany underwent a dramatic change in “philosophy” after the Second World War. Whether a reaction to Nazi Germany’s rather prohibitive and racist propaganda or a product of the “Camel lifestyle” that was promoted during the immediate post-war years, a much more liberal approach prevailed during the following three decades.¹⁰

What Frankenberg characterises as “prohibitive and racist propaganda” was underpinned by a growing body of scientific research on smoking and health through the 1930s and early 1940s in West Germany, which appears to have stalled after the end of the war.¹¹ Proctor suggests that the post war years saw “a kind of backlash” against the tobacco research and anti-smoking policies which had been established in Germany in the 1930s, and that “popular memory of Nazi tobacco temperance may well have hampered the post-war German tobacco

6 Knop, Karin: Zwischen Afri-Cola-Rausch und dem Duft der großen weiten Welt: Werbung in den sechziger Jahren. In: Faulstich, Werner (ed.): Die Kultur der sechziger Jahre. München 2003, 241-272.

7 Merki (1996), 79.

8 Merki, Christoph: Die Nationalsozialistische Tabakpolitik. In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 46 (1998), 19-42; Pötschke-Langer, Martina: Recommendations of the World Health Organisation on tobacco control and German reality. In: Sucht 46 (2000), 434-438.

9 Frankenberg, Günther: Between paternalism and voluntarism: tobacco consumption and tobacco control in Germany. In: Feldman, Eric A.; Bayer, Ronald (eds.): Unfiltered: conflicts over tobacco policy and public health. Cambridge, Mass. 2004, 161-189; Hess, Henner: The other prohibition: the cigarette crisis in post-war Germany. In: Crime, law and social change 25 (1996), 43-62; Gilmore, Anna; Nolte, Ellen; McKee, Martin; Collin, Jeff: Continuing influence of tobacco industry in Germany. In: The Lancet 360 (2002), 1255.

10 Frankenberg (2004), 171.

11 Proctor, Robert N.: The Nazi war on tobacco: ideology, evidence, and public health consequences. In: Bulletin of the history of medicine 71 (1997), 435-488.

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movement”.¹² More recently, Bachinger *et al.* have shown the tensions within anti-smoking policy in the Third Reich, particularly after 1941,¹³ while Merki has argued that, by 1943, senior Nazi officials were describing anti-smoking policies as “redundant” – not because everyone had given up smoking, but because there was very little available and affordable tobacco for ordinary people to smoke anyway.¹⁴ Nonetheless, Merki also suggests that health, in relation to smoking, disappeared from the political agenda in the immediate post-war years.¹⁵ This uncertainty as to the significance of Third Reich anti-smoking propaganda for developments in the post-war years opens the question of continuity and change in attitudes towards tobacco smoking across the middle of the 20th century in Germany.

In the post-war period, research on smoking and health was taken up primarily by the Anglo-American scientific community, who began to gather epidemiological and biological data showing a causal connection between smoking and lung cancer, as well as other chronic conditions.¹⁶ The extent to which epidemiologists working in the late 1940s and early 1950s in Britain were aware of research on smoking and lung cancer carried out by epidemiologists working in Germany in the 1930s is uncertain.¹⁷ By the late 1950s, the Medical Research Council (hereafter MRC) in Britain was attempting to bring knowledge on smoking and health to greater awareness, with the Royal College of Physicians (hereafter RCP) producing a landmark report in 1962.¹⁸ Both the report of the MRC, published in 1957, and that of the RCP, were, as this paper will show, influential in bringing the topic of smoking and health back onto the political agenda in West Germany.

However, it is also possible to argue that the question of smoking and health never really disappeared in West Germany in the post-war years. This paper will suggest that concern about the health effects of smoking was intricately tied with issues of tobacco taxation and the recovery of the domestic tobacco market following the influx of Virginian cigarettes on to the black market post-1945 and the changing tastes of West German smokers. Debates about the health risks of

12 Proctor, Robert N.: *The Nazi war on cancer*. Princeton 1999, 226-227.

13 Bachinger Eleonore; McKee, Martin; Gilmore Anna: Tobacco policies in Nazi Germany: not as simple as it seems. In: *Public Health* 122 (2008), 497-505.

14 Merki (1998), 39.

15 Merki (1996), 81.

16 Berridge, Virginia: *Marketing health: smoking and the discourse of public health in Britain, 1945-2000*. Oxford 2007, 23-25.

17 Elliot, Rosemary: “Stunde Null”? A comparison of British and West German responses to the epidemiological case against smoking in the 1950s. In: *Rokkansenteret Report 2* (2007), 121-132.

18 Berridge (2007), 44-51.

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smoking, particularly for young people, surface within this context at a federal level. The government sought to balance fiscal necessity with public health, leaving the responsibility for health education of young people in the hands of the *Länder*, voluntary organisations and private bodies, as had been the case prior to the Nazi regime. It is possible to see continuities in the institutions and personnel promoting an anti-smoking message through the 1950s and, to a certain extent, in the message being promoted, although references to racial hygiene and military preparedness are absent in the post-war years, as one might expect.

Nonetheless, health education material produced in the 1950s also suggests that anti-smoking sentiment was influenced by the social and cultural context of that decade. In texts, speeches and discussion about youth smoking, fears about the effect of Americanisation and mass consumption sat alongside concerns about social dislocation and its effect on young people. There was a feeling that young people had not been complicit in creating the problematic social and economic circumstances which were thought to be causing increased smoking, and thus, should be protected from consequent harm. This material shows the adjustments and tensions within West German society as it struggled to come to terms with the legacy of the Third Reich, the Second World War and the occupation period.

The emphasis on young people was only one aspect of post-war health education on smoking, but it was the largest, the most emotive and the most enduring. Analysis of health education aimed at youth shows a shift in emphasis from youth protection arguments in the early 1950s towards an approach grounded in international epidemiological evidence on smoking and health and a focus on individual responsibility for health by the 1960s. This can be linked to the establishment of the Federal Ministry of Health (*Bundesministerium für Gesundheitswesen*) in 1961, as a result of which the issue of smoking and health came back onto the political agenda at a federal level. The reappearance of smoking as a political issue was largely motivated by the need to respond to concerns raised about smoking by Anglo-American epidemiological and biomedical research on smoking and health. These fears were most prominently publicised in the already-mentioned RCP report of 1962, but also in the 1964 U.S. Surgeon General's report on smoking and health.¹⁹ Again, the West German response focused on young people, but a crucial difference by this point was the explicit desire to in-

¹⁹ Smoking and health: Report of the Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service. U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1964.

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form health education aimed at young people through up-to-date expert scientific and pedagogical knowledge.

One further point to consider is what is meant by youth in relation to smoking. In large part, in the original literature, the young smoker was conceptualised as male, which reflects the gender balance of smoking in the first half of the 20th century and well into the second. However, women were targeted by cigarette advertising from the early 20th century,²⁰ and there were specific health fears related to female smoking, not least the impact of nicotine on women's reproductive health and on the developing foetus.²¹ These fears continued to be voiced in relation to female smoking, cigarette smoking in particular, in West Germany through the 1950s and 1960s, at a time when, in other countries such as Britain, concerns about smoking focused almost exclusively on men. This focus on men was a product of the fact that Anglo-American epidemiological evidence firstly focused on smoking and lung cancer, then heart problems, and looked predominantly at sample populations of men, with studies of maternal smoking and foetal health not emerging until the early 1960s.²² In Germany, the trajectory of research into smoking and reproductive and foetal health was different. From early 20th century concerns about the effects of smoking on women's reproductive systems through to research on smoking, health and fertility among women carried out in the early 1940s, health concerns about smoking among women of reproductive age assumed a much more central position.²³

The paper draws on archival material from the *Bundesarchiv* in Koblenz from 1941 through to 1970 to illuminate action on smoking and health at a ministerial level and also at the interface between the federal government and the *Länder*. This is important given that health education was primarily a matter for the *Länder* governments.²⁴ The paper also draws on documents from the *Deutsche Gesundheitsmuseum*, also located within the *Bundesarchiv*, Koblenz, which the Ministry of Health took over full financial support of in 1964, and which became the Federal Centre for Health Education (*Bundeszentrale für Gesundheitliche*

20 Kosta, Barbara: Cigarettes, Advertising and the Weimar Republic's modern woman. In: Finney, Gail (ed.): *Visual culture in twentieth century Germany: text as spectacle*. Bloomington, Indianapolis 2006, 134-153.

21 Enke, Martina C.: *Über die Bedeutung des Tabaks in der europäischen Medizin vom 16. bis ins 20. Jahrhundert*. Berlin 1998, 405-406.

22 Elliot, Rosemary: *Smoking among women, 1890-2000*. New York 2007, 146-147.

23 Enke (1998), 405-406; Zimmermann, Susanne; Egger, Matthias; Hossfeld, Uwe: Commentary: Pioneering research into smoking and health in Nazi Germany – the “Wissenschaftliches Institut zur Erforschung der Tabakgefahren” in Jena. In: *International journal of epidemiology* 30 (2001), 35–37.

24 Lindner, Ulrike: *Chronische Gesundheitsprobleme: das deutsche Gesundheitssystem vom Kaiserreich bis in die Bundesrepublik*. In: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 33/34 (2003), 21-28.

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Aufklärung) in 1967. Campaigns on smoking and health have been explored at a *Land* level in Hamburg (from 1941) and Baden-Württemberg (from 1915). These states were selected because of the presence of the tobacco industry in Hamburg and because Baden-Württemberg was instrumental in providing the finance for the second health education brochure discussed in this paper in the mid-1960s. The paper also draws on materials dating from 1919 from the library of the *Deutsche Hauptstelle für Suchtfragen* and on the papers of Phillip F. Reemtsma (1893-1959) from 1918 at the *Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung*. There is also reference to material from the archives of the *Deutsche Hygiene Museum*, Dresden for the post-war period.²⁵

Smoking and youth from Imperial Germany to 1945

Historians such as Proctor and Merki have amply shown that anti-smoking sentiments and medical research about the negative health effects of smoking was evident in Germany from the early 20th century onwards and came to fruition during the Third Reich.²⁶ Less discussed, however, is the extent to which young people, as both perceived victims of tobacco smoking and as the most legitimate target of anti-smoking propaganda, played a central role in arguments about tobacco policy from the early 20th century onwards. Youth protection provided a justification for certain anti-smoking measures from the First World War onwards, and a means for anti-smoking and abstinence organisations to bring the issue of smoking and health onto the Nazi agenda. It is within the context of youth protection that continuities after 1945 can be seen.

The main force against smoking in the early 20th century was the German Anti-Tobacco League (*Bund Deutscher Tabakgegner*) established in 1910,²⁷ which continued its existence after the Second World War. From its inception, the German Anti-Tobacco League sought legislative measures including prohibition of smoking among under-16s and restrictions on the sale of smoking goods to this group.²⁸ The League had international parallels in the Anglo-American context, where campaigns to protect young people from smoking date back to the late

25 I am extremely grateful for the help given to me by the archivists and librarians at these organisations.

26 Merki (1998); Proctor (1997).

27 *Kurze Geschichte des Bundes Deutscher Tabakgegner*. In: *Deutscher Tabakgegner* (January 1919), 4. There had been tobacco abstinence organisations prior to the founding of the German Anti-Tobacco League, thus the League was part of an established tradition.

28 Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart (hereafter Stuttgart) E151/52 Bü 15, Satzungen des Bundes Deutsche Tabakgegner, undated, filed with material from First World War.

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19th century and have been well-documented.²⁹ Such campaigns fitted into other social movements such as Temperance reform, the drive for “national efficiency” and broader concerns about the health of the population in the wake of industrialisation.³⁰ The movement against cigarette smoking in Germany was less well developed than that in the United States or Britain, arguably because cigarette smoking (which was seen as the prime problem) was itself less established in the population.³¹

The German Anti-Tobacco League was a small organisation: by 1919, their membership was only 458 annual subscribers.³² Nonetheless, they were successful in the First World War in petitioning the government for a prohibition on smoking among young people, citing not only damage to internal organs, but damage to the “next generation” (*heranwachsende Geschlecht*).³³ Their arguments showed a mixture of moral concerns, military ideals and nationalism, and were clearly aimed at young men.³⁴ Their proposal was supported by the Reich Ministry of the Interior (*Reichsministerium des Innern*) who wrote to the *Länder* about the issue, citing other worrying behaviours including visiting cinemas, pubs and cafes, smoking cigarettes, reading trash (*Schund*) literature, and hanging about at night. Such behaviours were believed to exemplify a lack of discipline among young people. This was, the Ministry believed, due to the lack of a paternal influence, as many fathers and teachers were being conscripted into the army.³⁵ These opinions reflected concerns that war-time conditions were undermining the social order, but also fears about youth and morality.³⁶ Action against smoking among young people was also supported by the military authorities, who saw such policies within the context of preparing young men for military service.³⁷

29 Tate, Cassandra: *Cigarette wars: The triumph of the little white slaver*. New York, Oxford 1999; Duis, Perry R.: *Cigarettes and sin: Lucy Page Gaston led a children’s crusade against the evils of the weed*. Chicago 1983, 142-145; Hilton, Matthew: “Tabs”, “fags” and the “boy labour problem” in late Victorian and Edwardian Britain. In: *Journal of social history* 28 (1995), 587-607.

30 Elliot (2007), 43-44.

31 Jacobs, Tino: *Rauch und Macht: das Unternehmen Reemtsma 1920-1960*. Göttingen 2008, 30.

32 *Deutscher Tabakgegner* 3 (May 1919).

33 Stuttgart M77/1 Bü 1111, Die Reichskanzlei an die Bundesregierungen, 12 June 1916.

34 *Was sollte die Jugend vom Tabak wissen?* Bund Deutscher Tabakgegner, 1919.

35 Stuttgart M77/1 Bü 1111, Bekanntmachung des Ministeriums des Innern, betreffend die Erziehung der Jugend während des Krieges, 24 November 1915.

36 Dickinson, Edward R.: *The politics of German child welfare from the Empire to the Federal Republic*. Cambridge, Mass., London 1996, 116.

37 Stuttgart M77/1 Bü 1111, Stellv. Generalkommando XIII Armeekorps an den Herrn Kriegsminister, 17 August 1916.

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Measures against smoking did not last beyond the end of the war, because of an inability to effectively police any prohibition during the war.³⁸ Nonetheless, prohibition of smoking among youth remained a recurring theme in interwar debates on the state of youth culture and concerns about the drift of young people into waywardness.³⁹ The German Anti-Tobacco League argued, for example, that the “brutalisation” of young people had not diminished since the end of the war, blaming the influence of cinema and the illegal import of American cigarettes, an argument which tapped into wider fears about the negative influence of mass culture.⁴⁰ Such concerns arose in the broader context of the *Schmutz und Schund* (trash and dirt) campaign, which enjoyed some success.⁴¹ Arguments about smoking were aimed at young men primarily, with female smokers seen to be a minority. Young women were addressed separately, with appeals to economy and thrift – reflecting the financial turbulence of the Weimar period. One interwar publication noted the heavy financial cost of smoking, to both family and population. Women and girls were urged not to imitate the “stronger sex” by taking up smoking, but to use their “natural influence in the family” to persuade husbands, sons and other male relatives and friends to give up their “enslavement” to nicotine.⁴²

In much of the writing of this period, as Proctor has shown, nicotine was seen as the problematic component of tobacco.⁴³ Nicotine was recognised as addictive, characterised as a “poison” and seen to damage heart and circulation, with children at particular risk.⁴⁴ This was often linked into arguments about the nature of heredity influential in the early 20th century, with smoking, like alcohol, constructed as damaging not only to reproduction at an individual level, but to the *Volk* as a whole. This conceptualisation extended arguments about the susceptibility of children to the whole population. The Baltic-German physiological chemist, Gustav von Bunge, wrote “one forgets that the youngest and most sensitive organism is the germ cell (*Keimzelle*). [...] Therefore, we need to question whether regular smoking among adults also damages the germ cell. Looking at

38 Stuttgart M77/1 Bü 1111, Königl. Württ. Ministerium des Innern an das K. Stellv. Generalkommando XIII (K.W.) Armeekorps, 30 November 1917.

39 Dickinson (1996), 149.

40 Die Jugend wacht auf! In: Deutscher Tabakgegner (November 1919), No. 6, 55.

41 Stieg, Margaret: The 1926 German law to protect youth against trash and dirt: moral protectionism in a democracy. In: Central European history 23 (1990), 22-56.

42 Stuttgart E151/52 Bü 15, “Aufruf an die deutschen Frauen und Mädchen”, Bund Deutscher Tabakgegner. This is undated, but archived with material from the early 1920s.

43 Proctor (1997), 448.

44 Petri, W.: Zur Beurteilung des Nicotiningehaltes der Tabake. In: Zeitschrift für Lebensmitteluntersuchung und Forschung 60 (1930), 123-142.

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chronic alcoholism would suggest that it [nicotine consumption] does.”⁴⁵ Calls to restrict smoking among young people found favour in legislative terms with the sale of goods containing nicotine to under 16s becoming an offense in 1927. In 1933, almost as soon as the National Socialist regime took over, the German Anti-Tobacco League (which had renamed itself the *Deutscher Bund zur Bekämpfung der Tabakgefahren*) petitioned for legislation to be extended to prohibit tobacco use among under-18s.⁴⁶ This was partially achieved in March 1940, with the passing of a law to forbid those under 18 smoking in public, although this was justified as a war-time measure, and replicated the situation in World War One.⁴⁷

While the German Anti-Tobacco League maintained its status as an independent organisation through the Third Reich, members of the League saw the rise of the National Socialist Party (NSDAP) as an opportunity to promote their cause. In 1931, the directorship of the League had been taken over by Fritz Lickint (1898-1960), a prominent tobacco researcher and one of Germany’s foremost critics of tobacco use.⁴⁸ Lickint was also concerned with the consequences of alcohol misuse, which shows the way both issues were interlinked.⁴⁹ Lickint substantially increased the size of the League’s journal and re-organised it. In an editorial in 1933, under a picture of Adolf Hitler, the editorial proclaimed:

The Führer of our new state lives free from tobacco. All opponents of tobacco will realise this with sincere pleasure. It is also the first time that a German Chancellor of the Reich is a non-smoker and can make decisions over the fate of our Volk uninfluenced by nicotine and other social drugs [*Genußgifte*]. With this, we can hope for the first time, that our voice will be heard in government, after years and decades in which it has been practically impossible to even get a cautionary article into the daily press [...].

No wonder we have not yet succeeded in making the population aware of such important requirements as a tobacco-free upbringing and education for children and young people.

Now finally the time has come for us to arrive on the scene! The first step should be a prohibition of smoking among young people.⁵⁰

The editorial referred to acceptance among the medical profession for restrictions and education on youth smoking on health grounds. Adults who smoked

45 Stuttgart, E151/52 Bü 15, Bunge, G. von: Die Tabakvergiftung. Bund Deutscher Tabakgegner, undated, archived with material from the 1920s.

46 Rundschreiben. In: Deutscher Tabakgegner (1933), No. 2/3, 18.

47 Polizeiverordnung zum Schutz der Jugend vom 9. März 1940, Reichsgesetzblatt I, 499. For further details, see Lewy, Jonathan: A sober Reich? Alcohol and tobacco use in Nazi Germany. In: Substance use and misuse 41 (2006), 1189-1190.

48 Deutscher Tabakgegner (1931), No. 6, 37-38; Haustein, Knut-Olaf: Fritz Lickint (1898-1960) – Ein Leben als Aufklärer über die Gefahren des Tabaks. In: Suchtmed 6 (2004), 249-255; Proctor (1999), 183-186.

49 Haustein (2004), 249.

50 Wir Tabakgegner und das neue Reich. In: Deutscher Tabakgegner (1933), No. 2/3, 18.

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were seen to be beyond redemption (“not many adults can be cured of their addiction”). Lickint justified the emphasis on youth as a means of ensuring young people achieved their highest physical and intellectual potential, and also with reference to “the need to create an undamaged, free, new Germany from the embryo upwards”. Lickint drew on contemporary understandings of hereditary biology to make his point, stressing that “[i]t must be our aim for the future to reproduce our German *Volk* not only in the context of a pure race but with reference to the hygiene of the germ cell (*Keimhygiene*)”.⁵¹

The language of hereditary biology augmented arguments about the need for abstinence from smoking apparent in previous decades. Youth smoking was also seen as a response to the social and economic climate of the early 1930s. Lickint, who was a member of the SPD at the time, cited the “distress” and unemployment facing a high number of young people as a result of economic conditions as a factor which contributed to youth smoking, a reference to the effects of the Great Depression on Germany in the early 1930s.⁵²

For the National Socialist party, in the mid-1930s, anti-smoking sentiments arguably came second to concerns about alcoholism. The 1933 Sterilisation Laws permitted alcoholics to be sterilised, a fate which did not befall smokers, despite expressed concerns about the hereditary effects of tobacco consumption. This was possibly because excessive smoking did not lead to the same outward appearance of insobriety and was more socially acceptable. In 1934, the umbrella organisation for anti-alcohol groups, the German Reich Agency against Alcoholism (*Deutsche Reichshauptstelle gegen den Alkoholismus*) gave up its independence to become part of the NSDAP health office, becoming the Reich Agency against the Misuse of Alcohol (*Reichsstelle gegen den Alkoholmißbrauch*). In 1939, it merged with the Reich Working Group for Combating Drugs (*Reichsarbeitsgemeinschaft für Rauschgiftbekämpfung*), which was a section within the Reich Ministry of the Interior, to create the Reich Agency against the Dangers of Alcohol and Tobacco (*Reichsstelle gegen die Alkohol- und Tabakgefahren*), under the leadership of the Reich Health Führer (*Reichsgesundheitsführer*), Leonardo Conti. The aim was to align the aims of state and party.⁵³ The German Anti-

51 Lickint, Fritz: Tabak und gesunde Jugenderziehung. In: Deutscher Tabakgegner (1933), No. 2, 21.

52 Rundschreiben. In: Deutscher Tabakgegner (1933), No. 2/3, 18.

53 Arbeitsbericht 1939/40, Reichsstelle gegen die Alkohol- und Tabakgefahren, Berlin-Dahlem 1940, 1; Stuttgart, E151/09 Bü 335. The “Deutsche Hauptstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren” gives a slightly different account of its history in 1951, stating that the German Reich Agency Against Alcoholism merged with the Reich Working Group for Combating Drugs in 1934: Die Deutsche Hauptstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren: Ziele, Aufgaben, Organisation. Hamm 1951. I have opted to go with the account given in the German Reich Agency Against Alcoholism’s

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Tobacco League worked closely with the Reich Agency against the Dangers of Alcohol and Tobacco although it maintained its independence.⁵⁴

Tobacco came to the fore as a concern for the National Socialists relatively late in the 1930s, despite the hopes of the German Anti-Tobacco League in 1933. The impetus came from medical evidence emerging in Germany in the late 1930s. Lickint published his book on smoking and health, *Tabak und Organismus*, in 1939, the same year as Franz Müller published one of the earliest epidemiological studies making the association between smoking and lung cancer.⁵⁵ This and other subsequent research allowed the Reich Agency against the Dangers of Alcohol and Tobacco to make the argument that tobacco, as alcohol, presented a threat to the medical and moral health of the *Volk*, the *Volk* being constructed in racial terms.⁵⁶ This developed nationalist and public health arguments already present in earlier decades, but fitted within a more prominently racial hygiene agenda, as Proctor and Merki have shown.⁵⁷

However, it is notable that the first annual report of the Reich Agency against the Dangers of Alcohol and Tobacco stated that the purpose of the organisation was to concentrate on youth, pointing out that it was up to adults whether to smoke moderately or abstain.⁵⁸ The Agency listed 12 aims, of which preventing young people from smoking was the first.⁵⁹ The focus on youth smoking remained generally accepted even when anti-smoking policy became contentious in the early 1940s. As the tobacco industry and the Reich Tobacco Office successfully argued that tobacco was essential to the war effort, the Reich Ministry of Propaganda sought to limit the extent and content of anti-smoking sentiment.⁶⁰ Correspondence within the Reich Ministry of Propaganda expressed the belief that the only possible way of addressing smoking was to address young people

report of 1940, as this was published very soon after the merger had taken place. The merge was also reported in the medical press.

- 54 Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 352-6/1249, News cutting from *Ärzteblatt für Norddeutschland*, issue 16, 6 August 1939.
- 55 Müller, Franz: *Tabakmissbrauch und Lungencarcinom*. In: *Zeitschrift für Krebsforschung* 49 (1939), 57-85. This is discussed in more detail in Proctor (1999), 195-196.
- 56 Bericht der II. Reichstagung "Volksgesundheit und Genußgifte", Reichsstelle gegen den Alkoholmißbrauch, Berlin-Dahlem 1939; Stuttgart, E151/09 Bü 335.
- 57 Merki (1998); Proctor (1997).
- 58 Arbeitsbericht 1939/40, Reichsstelle gegen die Alkohol- und Tabakgefahren, Berlin-Dahlem 1940, 2.
- 59 Bericht der II. Reichstagung "Volksgesundheit und Genußgifte", Reichsstelle gegen den Alkoholmißbrauch, Berlin-Dahlem 1939, 3; Stuttgart, E151/09 Bü 335.
- 60 Various papers at the Hamburger Institute für Sozialforschung, hereafter HIS (PFR 480/01 – 03) and BA NS 18/226, including HIS PFR 480 – 02 Abschrift, Walter Funk, Reichwirtschaftsminister an den Stellvertreter des Führers, 5 May 1941; BA NS 18/226 Vorlage, 12 May 1941. For a fuller discussion, see Bachinger, McKee and Gilmore (2008), 497-505.

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and prevent them from taking the habit up.⁶¹ Within a more restricted anti-smoking policy, campaigns addressed to young people were to be centrally agreed and carried out through the Reich Youth Leadership (*Reichsjugendführung*).⁶²

Literature on smoking addressing young people was produced for the Hitler Youth (*Hitlerjugend*) and by the Reich Health Office (*Reichsgesundheitsamt*). The emphasis on young men's health was constructed in militaristic terms, and heavily influenced by the ideology of the regime.⁶³ In contrast, publications from the Reich Health Office emphasise the physiological effects of smoking, highlighting the effect of nicotine on the heart and the circulation. Here too, young people were seen to be at particular risk as growing bodies were not thought to be able to tolerate nicotine. There were also ideological concerns: that smoking and drinking did not "fit" with young German men, because of the perceived effects on courage and capability. Young women were urged to consider the effect of smoking on their future marital fertility.⁶⁴ This fitted within the broader pronatalist agenda of the Nazi regime.

Looking at the decades prior to 1945, a number of themes emerge. Young bodies were seen to be at greater risk from nicotine, albeit in gendered terms. The smoker was seen as male, with women in the early decades of the 20th century being seen as the moral arbiter, and asked to exert influence over male family members and friends to give up smoking. Smoking among young men was seen to exemplify a lack of parental, particularly paternal, influence and to be a result of mass culture. There were also strong links between concerns about alcohol and tobacco use. Anxieties about smoking and young people were also used as a platform to address established adult smokers. These themes were to re-appear in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

A changing context: smoking and youth protection in post-war Germany

As outlined in the introduction, tobacco filled both a cultural and an economic position in the occupation period, as a symbol of Westernisation and as source of revenue. The Allied authorities raised tobacco taxes substantially in 1946 to contribute to the costs of the occupation.⁶⁵ This rise caused outrage amongst Ger-

61 BA NS 18/226, Braeckow at Ministry of Propaganda, to Goebbels, 24 May 1941.

62 BA NS 18/226, Ministry of Propaganda to Deutsche Bund zur Bekämpfung der Tabakgefahren, 27 June 1941.

63 "Du hast die Pflicht, gesund zu sein!" Gesundheitsaktion der Hitler-Jugend (Reichsjugendführung, undated). This was viewed at the Deutsche Hauptstelle für Suchtfragen.

64 Goebel, Ferdinand: Warum rauchst Du? Berlin-Dahlem 1941, 10. This was viewed at the Deutsche Hauptstelle für Suchtfragen.

65 BA B102/73559, Alliierte Kontrollbehörde, Kontrollrat Nr. 26, 'Tabaksteuer'.

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man tobacco producers, who believed this was a factor in the continuing black market and smuggling problem and as such, undermined the domestic tobacco industry.⁶⁶ Whilst this tax increase was partly rescinded in 1948, West German tobacco producers immediately began to lobby the new Bonn government in 1949 for a further reduction in tobacco taxes to allow them to make their products competitive and to protect their livelihood.⁶⁷

These debates provided a starting point for revived anti-smoking concern after the war. The German Agency against the Dangers of Addiction (*Deutsche Hauptstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren*, hereafter DHS), founded in 1947, opposed any reduction in tobacco taxes on health grounds, arguing that the increased tobacco consumption they believed would result from reduced tobacco taxes contradicted all the principles of population health and nutrition. At a time when the authorities were fighting to tackle tuberculosis, the DHS asked, why they were forgetting the “epidemics” caused by alcohol and tobacco use.⁶⁸ The DHS stood as the common voice of welfare and abstinence groups in West Germany after the war. It was established as the successor to the Reich Agency against the Dangers of Alcohol and Tobacco, which had ceased to exist at the end of the war. The DHS aimed to provide guidelines and information on matter such as alcoholism, smoking and other addictions as well sexually transmitted diseases. There were numerous member organisations of the DHS, including welfare organisations such as the *Caritas Verband*, *Innere Mission*, the *Arbeiterwohlfahrt* alongside abstinence organisations such as the *International Guttempler Organisation* and the *Deutscher Bund zur Bekämpfung der Tabakgefahren*.⁶⁹ The DHS aimed “to fight addictions with all the measures not available to its member organisations”. In practice this meant it provided an information digest of the situation relating to addictions in the first instance, called *Infodienst*, and by the early 1950s, a monthly newsletter (*Ruf ins Volk*), a scientific journal, and pamphlets dedicated to specific health issues. Regional branches (*Landesstellen*) were set up, often on meagre budgets from charitable organisations, to liaise with the authorities of the

66 BA B102/11001, Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Zigarrenherstellerverbände des Britischen und amerikanischen Besatzungsgebiets, Denkschrift, November 1949. Complaints initially came from cigar manufacturers, with the issue subsequently being picked up by cigarette manufacturers.

67 BA B102/73557, “Skizze” sent by Philip Reemtsma to Bundeswirtschaftsminister, 5 January 1950.

68 Infodienst der Deutschen Hauptstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren (hereafter Infodienst), July 1948, 2.

69 Die Deutsche Hauptstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren: Ziele, Aufgaben, Organisation. Hamm 1951, 3-4.

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Länder and welfare organisations at a more local level.⁷⁰ This reflected the fact that the responsibility for public health was dealt with at the level of the *Länder*.

In addition to criticising proposed reductions in tobacco taxation, the DHS also spoke out in 1948 against the increased import of tobacco, set up through the Marshall Plan, arguing that this would lead to substantial health damage among the German people. They argued that shipping space and dollars would be better used on nutritious foods.⁷¹ In addition to health damage, the DHS argued that increased tobacco consumption caused emotional and moral damage to the *Volk*, connecting increased smoking and drinking to higher levels of criminality, sexually transmitted diseases and family problems.⁷² It is not immediately clear what kind of family problems were meant here, but other articles focusing on the need for youth protection refer to “soft” or “weak” parenting, lax morals and the need to awaken a sense of responsibility among parents.⁷³

In 1949, the DHS began a youth protection campaign, in conjunction with the *Landesstellen*, addressing a wide range of issues including smoking.⁷⁴ Here, concerns about secondary poverty were also apparent, as the DHS provided statistics on the proportion of national and domestic income spent on alcohol and tobacco.⁷⁵ In short, the DHS believed that reducing tobacco consumption was beneficial for the “morality and health of the *Volk*”, particularly young people.⁷⁶ Similar arguments were made about alcohol. The DHS also criticised measures to allow women under 25 tobacco rations – a group which had not been allocated tobacco under the National Socialists. Here, the arguments related to the “delicate organism” of the young woman which would be particularly damaged by tobacco.⁷⁷ This concern about young women and the broader medical and moral concerns about the health of the population can be seen as a product of the way in which smoking had been seen through previous decades.

From 1950, the DHS lobbied politicians to try to prevent the proposed cuts in tobacco taxes, sending a letter to all members of the Bundestag in 1951 and again in 1952. Price was seen as one of the main barriers to increased youth smoking and the DHS argued that the health of the population, particularly that of young

70 Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 352-6/1251, Bericht über die Zusammenkunft einer zu gründenden Landesstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren, 12 April 1949; Infodienst, 1949, No. 3, 1-2.

71 Infodienst, July 1948, 1.

72 Infodienst, July 1948, 2.

73 Infodienst, April 1948, 1.

74 Infodienst 1949, No. 3, 1. Other issues included campaigning to stop the spread of sexually transmitted diseases, campaigns against “Schmutz und Schund” and promoting abstinence from alcohol.

75 See for example, Infodienst 1954/55, No. 2, 1.

76 Infodienst, July 1948, 1-3.

77 Infodienst, July 1948, 1.

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people, would be endangered if tobacco taxes were reduced.⁷⁸ The DHS also sought support from its branches and officials in the *Länder*, urging them to petition members of the Bundestag about the issue.⁷⁹ A number of public health professionals and youth workers also wrote to the federal authorities condemning the tobacco tax cuts.⁸⁰ The concern which united such groups was that reduced tobacco taxes would lead to increased tobacco consumption, a point which the tobacco industry also accepted, and indeed desired. In 1953, the DHS drew on tobacco industry figures to suggest that the proposed reduction in tobacco taxes would lead to a monthly increase in smoking of one thousand million cigarettes nationally.⁸¹ The fear was that this increased tobacco consumption would impact most strongly on the health of young people.⁸²

The arguments made by the DHS in its 1950s material contain a mixture of scientific evidence emerging from the United States and Great Britain and concerns arising from post-war cultural change. These sat alongside older youth protection and pronatalist arguments. The DHS accepted that smoking contributed to lung cancer, although in common with the Anglo-American scientific community, the DHS focused on the lung cancer risk to men, using stark diagrams to show the correlation between increased smoking and higher lung cancer mortality. This correlation was a result of the higher proportion of male smokers in previous decades and the fact that post-war epidemiological research focused on this group.⁸³ Epidemiological concerns were augmented by cultural change and the impact of occupation, which had resulted in the Americanisation of smoking tastes, as the population shifted from cigars to cigarettes, and from Oriental to Virginian cigarettes. This trend towards cigarette smoking was seen to be particularly damaging to health as cigarette smokers were more likely to inhale, and Virginian tobacco was seen as more addictive.⁸⁴ The link between smoking and

78 BA B102 73557, Deutsche Hauptstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren to Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 5 June 1951; Deutsche Hauptstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren to members of the Bundestag, 8 September 1952; BA B102/73558, Deutsche Hauptstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren to members of the Bundestag, March 1953.

79 Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 352-6/1248, circular letter, Deutsche Hauptstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren, 13 September 1952.

80 BA B102/73558, see for example, Ernst Gass to Bundeswirtschaftsminister Erhard, 30 August 1952.

81 Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 352-6/1248, open letter, Deutsche Hauptstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren, 31 March 1953.

82 BA B102/73558, Kein Steuergesetz zum Schaden der Volksgesundheit und der Jugend. In: Ruf ins Volk: Monatschrift für Volksgesundheit und Jugendschutz (September 1952), 4.

83 BA B102/73558, Rauchen fördert Lungenkrebs. In: Ruf ins Volk: Monatschrift für Volksgesundheit und Jugendschutz (September 1952), 2.

84 BA B102/73557, "Keine kurzfristige Steuerpolitik", enclosed in letter from Deutsche Hauptstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren to Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 5 June 1951.

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crime was also made: the director of a youth prison argued that cigarettes lured allegedly young people into crime, as they either stole cigarettes, or used the proceeds of theft to buy them.⁸⁵

These arguments were also cited in the parliamentary debates surrounding the bill on tobacco taxation in 1953.⁸⁶ The Finance Minister agreed to put forward money for the health education of young people on smoking, which would, in his view, offset the danger from reduced tobacco taxes. This funding was to be given to existing non-government health and welfare organisations, not state-led measures.⁸⁷ Thus, the new Bonn government acknowledged and responded to concerns about the potential for increased smoking caused by reducing taxation, but did so in such a way as to distance themselves from the propaganda and restrictions of the Nazi regime. As one supporter of the bill put it,

One can only treat emotional illnesses like drug addiction adequately by treating the soul, but never through police orders, tax law and with all the methods of a past dictatorship, which we want to know nothing about. Only education is successful here. Those who are concerned about drug addiction will concern themselves with it.⁸⁸

This was the only reference to National Socialist anti-smoking policy and it is clear that it was one element in a much wider debate as the government sought to balance the needs of the domestic tobacco industry and the desire for revenue with public health.

Through the 1950s, health education material was produced by non-government organisations, such as the DHS, albeit with some financial backing. These were the same organisations that had been active during previous decades, thus – in many ways – simply reverting to the situation that had existed prior to the Third Reich. These organisations were keen to move on from their past whilst acknowledging its effects. In a conference focusing on youth protection in 1953, organised by the DHS, the opening speaker noted the terrible years behind them, their generation's guilt for this and the burden which the coming generation had to carry, which was, he believed, expressed through increased drinking, smoking and emotional and spiritual turmoil. He argued that this could be made good by advice and practical measures to help the welfare of young people. He continued,

If one wants to promote preventive health measures, one has to work on promoting an alcohol and tobacco free upbringing. We all know the great emotional and spiritual distress on the part

85 Weber: Zigarette – Ursache krimineller Entgleisungen von Jugendlichen. In: Ruf ins Volk (September 1952), 2.

86 Deutscher Bundestag, 257. Sitzung, 25 March 1953; Deutscher Bundestag, 259. Sitzung, 15 April 1953.

87 Deutscher Bundestag, 257. Sitzung, 25 March 1953, Finance Minister Schaffer, 12480.

88 Deutscher Bundestag, 259. Sitzung, 15 April 1953, Hammer (FDP), 12580.

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of our young people; and we know our responsibility to maintain their bodily and spiritual strength, which they need particularly in today's struggle for existence.⁸⁹

Speakers constructed smoking and drinking as an emotional response to the trauma of war, but also to the experiences of occupation, displacement and broken homes. As the occupational physiologist Otto Graf put it, "They [young people] have experienced people dying around them, in cellars and on the streets, and they cannot cope with these experiences".⁹⁰ A year previously, the director of the DHS, Hans Siedel, had made a similar argument, stating that young men had been socialised into smoking and drinking through their experiences as soldiers; but in addition that defeat and the occupation had led to social upheaval and feelings of inferiority. Siedel attributed smoking and drinking to a need to forget experiences which people couldn't digest or cope with.⁹¹

More specifically, in 1953, child psychologist, Werner Villinger (1887-1961), argued that part of the distress felt by young people stemmed from the changed circumstances of the German family, as men had fallen in the war, or languished in prisoner of war camps. Villinger blamed overstretched mothers, who were running households and going out to work, leaving children to fend for themselves; and disharmony between parents when fathers returned. But he also blamed the Americanisation of German culture, referring to what he called the nihilism of modern life, secularisation and the technologisation of society, citing the spiritual poisons of the cinema, the radio and magazines and mass sport – the last of these for the advertising at these events.⁹²

Villinger had been a prominent Nazi child psychologist, who allegedly committed suicide in 1960 after his involvement as an "expert" supervising the T 4 "euthanasia" programme came to light.⁹³ His words indicate the continuity of perceptions of smoking, and indeed drinking, and anti-modernist views, within broader youth welfare debates. Smoking was seen as one of a constellation of wayward behaviours, and much of the language was reminiscent of earlier debates. In this conceptualisation, the problem of smoking could arguably be resolved by re-instating a traditional family norm. Copies of the proceedings of the

89 Opening speech by Stückrath. In: Schutz unser Jugend: 4. Kongreß für Alkohol- und Tabakfreie Jugenderziehung, 12-15 October 1953, proceedings published by the DHS. Bielefeld 1954, 8.

90 Graf, Otto: Die Alkohol- und Tabakfrage im Lichte neuester wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisse des Arztes. In: Schutz unser Jugend (1954), 22-31.

91 Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 352-6/1249, "Bericht über die 'Wissenschaftliche Konferenz zur Erforschung der Suchtgefahren'", 24 July 1952.

92 Villinger, Werner: Psychologische und soziale Situation der Jugend. In: Deutsche Hauptstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren. In: Schutz unser Jugend (1954), 12-21.

93 Peiffer, Jürgen: Phases in the post-war German reception of the "euthanasia" programme (1939-1945) involving the killing of the mentally disabled and its exploitation by neuroscientists. In: Journal of the history of the neurosciences 15 (2006), 218.

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1953 conference were distributed to youth organisations and schools, showing that these ideas had some official backing.⁹⁴

Thus, discourses on smoking after 1945 evolved in a new context but many of the voices were the same. One of the books often cited in the 1960s in writing on smoking was by Kurt Pohlisch (1893-1955) who occupied an ambiguous role in the Third Reich, but continued to work professionally and publish in post-war West Germany until his death. Appointed as Professor of Psychiatry and Neurology at the University of Bonn in 1934, one of Pohlisch's main research interests was the misuse of alcohol, morphine and sleeping drugs. He appears to have been involved in the formulation and execution of the T4 euthanasia programme through 1940 and 1941, although he later argued that his stance had been intended to limit its impact.⁹⁵ His 1954 publication, *Tabak*, developed his research interests in addiction. He considered the psychology of smoking among young people, seeing beginning smoking as a three stage process, starting with opportunistic curiosity, developing through peer-led initiation into the last stage of establishing smoking as an imitation of adulthood.⁹⁶ His approach to the psychology of youth smoking, whilst only part of his work, was to pre-figure later work on smoking in the late 1960s which also considered the psychological motivations of young people for smoking.⁹⁷ However, whilst Pohlisch's work was cited in the 1963 government publication *Zum Problem des Rauchens*, an interest in the psychology of smoking does not seem to have informed the government's approach at that point.⁹⁸ In addition, Pohlisch argued that the "atrocious social and emotional need of [the German] people" in the immediate post-war years led to young people taking up smoking at an earlier age and in greater numbers than in "well-ordered peace times".⁹⁹

Similarly, Fritz Lickint continued to publish on smoking and health until his death in 1960 writing for both the DHS and the *Deutsche Hygiene Museum*, by then located in East Germany.¹⁰⁰ Whilst Lickint appears to have embraced Hitler's

94 Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 352-6/1250, report on "Wochenendlehrgang", Hamburgische Landesstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren, 12 April 1954.

95 Forsbach, Ralf: Die medizinische Fakultät der Universität Bonn im "Dritten Reich". München 2006, 200-201, 629-640.

96 Pohlisch, Kurt: *Tabak: Betrachtungen über Genuß- und Rauschpharmaka*. Stuttgart 1954, 86-93.

97 BA B310/520, Jugendliche und Rauchen – a study carried out by the Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsforschung, February 1969.

98 Goetz, Hans J.: *Zum Problem des Rauchens. Eine zusammenfassende Darstellung*. Wiesbaden 1963. This was published by the Bundesministerium für Gesundheitswesen in conjunction with the Aufklärungsdienst für Jugendschutz.

99 Pohlisch (1954), 93-94.

100 For example, Lickint, Fritz: *Jugend und Tabak*. Hamm 1958.

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Chancellorship in 1933, as director of the German Anti-Tobacco League, and had been a key speaker at anti-smoking events in the late 1930s and early 1940s, the line between anti-smoking arguments and Nazi sympathies was less than clearly drawn. As Davey-Smith and Egger have argued, Lickint was denied a post at the Scientific Institute for the Research into the Hazards of Tobacco (wissenschaftliches Institut zur Erforschung der Tabakgefahren) in Jena because he had been a supporter of the Social Democratic Party.¹⁰¹ Lickint's interests and profile in anti-smoking research and writing both pre-date and outlive the Third Reich.

In the early 1950s, youth smoking was seen through the prism of the previous decades experiences of war, and subsequent social displacement. Tobacco use was addressed with alcohol use in the terminology of abstinence which had characterised earlier 20th century movements. In Hamburg, for example, pupils were encouraged to pledge to live an alcohol and tobacco free life in a so-called "Golden Book", which is the same terminology used by the German Anti-Tobacco League in the 1910s.¹⁰² But this was also grounded in awareness of the medical arguments against smoking – to take Hamburg again as an example, an exhibition in 1952 showed the connections between heavy tobacco use, cancer and heart disease. The specific risks to women were highlighted, with reference to miscarriage, situating the dangers of female smoking within a reproductive framework.¹⁰³

By the late 1950s, the emphasis in anti-smoking discussions shifted towards stressing the international scientific evidence against smoking, and towards demanding more restrictive measures on smoking in addition to health education. Such demands remained framed within the language of youth protection –reflecting the fact that the DHS saw the Youth Protection Law, enacted in 1951, as a means of pushing for restrictions on the sale and advertising of cigarettes.¹⁰⁴ In 1957, the national conference of the DHS stressed the need to protect the family, in particular children, from the dangers of alcohol and tobacco use. One suggested measure was a restriction on advertising for alcoholic beverages and tobacco.¹⁰⁵ In 1958, an expert conference on the dangers of smoking, attended by

101 Davey-Smith, George; Egger, Matthias: The first reports on smoking and lung cancer – why are they consistently ignored? In: Bulletin of the World Health Organisation 83 (2005), 799-800. The institute was founded in 1941, partly supported by Hitler's personal funds.

102 Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 352-6/1250, report on "Wochenendlehrgang", Hamburgische Landesstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren, 12 April 1954.

103 Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 352-6/1250, Von Suchtgefahren bedroht: Ausstellung warnt vor Alkohol und Tabakmißbrauch. In: Hamburger Echo, 22 July 1952.

104 Poiger, Uta: Jazz, rock and rebels: Cold war politics and American culture in a divided Germany. Berkeley 2000, 47.

105 Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 352-6/1250, Bundestagung der Deutschen Hauptstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren: Entschliessungen der Arbeitsgemeinschaften am 16 Oktober 1957.

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medical professionals, including Lickint and youth welfare workers, called for a reduction in tobacco advertising, the removal of cigarette vending machines, more non-smoking carriages in trains, and more funding for anti-smoking campaigns. Such demands were justified by reference to the growing international body of evidence against smoking, a body which was seen to include work carried out in Germany in earlier decades, but also with reference to research in the United States and Great Britain. Details of a congress on smoking and lung cancer in London were reported to the 1958 conference, which also suggests an awareness and regard for international developments.¹⁰⁶ Key here would have been the MRC report on smoking and health which was published in 1957 in London and led to some limited government action in Britain.¹⁰⁷ The 1958 conference on smoking held by the DHS shows a shift towards smoking being addressed as a single issue, divorced from concerns about alcohol consumption. This should not be over-stated, however, as the DHS remained primarily concerned with the problems of alcoholism, as its publications, such as *Infodienst*, and the annual reports of *Landesstellen* attest.¹⁰⁸

Calls for restrictions on tobacco advertising were a response not only to increased tobacco consumption, but to the greater visual presence of the cigarette in advertising and marketing terms. From the late 1950s onwards, both German tobacco manufacturers and (mainly U.S.) multinationals had established the American-blend cigarette as the tobacco form of choice. This was increasingly accompanied by sophisticated and widespread advertising, which played heavily on West Germany's place in the post-war international order. The first, and most well-known, advertising of this type was for the brand Peter Stuyvesant, which ran in 1957 with the slogan "the aroma of the big, wide world" (*Der Duft der großen, weiten Welt*), accompanied, for example, by images of air travel.¹⁰⁹ Other brands used similar captions: Gelten cigarette adverts had the slogan "Tempo, Life, Activity – that is Germany" (*Tempo, Leben, Aktivität – das ist Deutschland!*) through the early 1960s with images of quintessentially American pursuits such as ten-pin bowling, as well as international trade and travel.¹¹⁰ Thus, cigarette advertising sold a lifestyle which was connected to ideals of freedom and liberty. This was different from advertising of the early 1950s which

106 Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 352-6/1250, internal report, Fachkonferenz zur Erforschung der Tabakgefahre vom 23. bis 24. Oktober 1958 in Münster (Westf.).

107 Berridge (2007), 34.

108 Infodienst, various copies held in the library of the Deutsche Hauptstelle für Suchtfragen, as it is now known, Hamm, and annual reports of the Hamburgische Landesstelle, Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 352-6/1252.

109 Der Spiegel, 16 May 1962, back cover.

110 Der Spiegel, 27 June 1962, 2; Der Spiegel, 23 May 1962, 2; Der Spiegel, 6 June 1962, 2.

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tended to concentrate on the attributes of the tobacco used in particular blends, for example, the provenance, flavour and aroma.¹¹¹ Lifestyle advertising also accorded with the changing cultural and economic climate of West Germany, as levels of affluence rose from the late 1950s onwards – no longer were people, including young people, only spending their disposable income on alcohol and tobacco, but on other consumer goods.¹¹² Rather than being itself a luxury good, cigarettes fitted within a lifestyle, the idea of which was internationally oriented.

Beyond youth protection? A new direction in health education on smoking

The early 1960s saw the start of a more active federal government role in providing information on smoking, which was influenced by international developments, both in scientific terms and in relation to the cultural position of the cigarette, as outlined above. A key factor was the creation of a Federal Ministry of Health (*Bundesministerium für Gesundheitswesen*, hereafter BGM) in 1961, under Elisabeth Schwarzhaupt (1901-1986), and the re-organisation of the Deutsche Gesundheitsmuseum (DGM) in 1962 towards a more centrally organised, health education role. The DGM had been set up in 1949 as a registered society, with the intention of establishing a comparable institute to the Deutsche Hygiene Museum, which, after the war, was in the Soviet zone. The DGM was part-financed by the federal government with other financial support coming from the city of Cologne, where it was based and where a previously existing *Volkshygiene Museum* had been destroyed in the war, and the Land North Rhine-Westphalia.¹¹³ In 1952, the DGM was expanded to encompass the Central Institute for Health Education (*Zentralinstitut für Gesundheitserziehung*) to reflect a broadening remit.

As part of this wider remit, the DGM set up the Information Service for Youth Protection (*Aufklärungsdienst für Jugendschutz*) in 1954 in order to bring together health professionals from government bodies and teaching associations who had a shared interest in youth protection and care. The focus was on youth education, which the organisation believed would help equip young people to deal with the dangers facing “body and soul” and “to fight effectively against trash and dirt” (*Schmutz and Schund*). According to a history of the Information

111 For example, adverts for Finas, *Der Spiegel*, 16 March 1955, 35; Gold Flake, *Der Spiegel*, 16 March 1955, 5.

112 Stephens, Robert: Germans on drugs: the complications of modernisation in Hamburg. *Ann Arbor* 2007, 86-87.

113 BA B310/290, Entwurf eines weiteren Jahresberichts (1965) des Zentralinstituts für Gesundheitserziehung, 4.

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Service, the main organs for achieving these aims were two magazines aimed at children and young people – the first, *Gib Acht!*, aimed at 10-16 year olds and a later publication, *Mücke*, aimed at under 10s. These were distributed through schools, and *Gib Acht!* developed an annual competition aimed at increasing awareness of issues concerning health and welfare.¹¹⁴

The use of the term *Schmutz und Schund* echoes interwar campaigns to protect German youth from immoral and obscene literature, and other pastimes which were seen to threaten youth with a descent into waywardness and immorality.¹¹⁵ This terminology had also been used by the DHS in its earlier work.¹¹⁶ But by 1962, when the *Aufklärungsdienst* of the DGM proposed running their annual health competition on smoking, the influence of post-war international epidemiological and scientific findings on smoking and health was clear. This was partly because the recently established Health Ministry saw itself as a key player in developing health education in these terms. In September 1962, Schwarzhaupt wrote to the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs in the *Länder* that she had promised the Information Service for Youth Protection extra funds to cover their anti-smoking campaign. Her correspondence was prompted by the fact that responsibility for education lies with the *Länder*, through the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs. These ministers met in the *Kultusministerkonferenz* (hereafter KMK) to deal with matters of cross-federal significance, with the aim of ensuring comparability across the *Länder*. While the KMK established a commitment to teaching health care in schools in 1953, this appears to have lain dormant until 1961, when they reaffirmed their commitment to education about health.¹¹⁷ In her letter, Schwarzhaupt stated that this campaign would be run under the patronage of her ministry. She also stated that the questionnaire for the competition would be put together by experts, including both pedagogues and doctors, and that the final version would be forwarded to the Information Service for Youth Protection at the DGM, to be published in the November edition of *Gib Acht!*¹¹⁸ This was clearly a statement of intent for the Ministry to take a leading role in health education and to make it driven by expert medical and educational knowledge.

However, that Schwarzhaupt found co-operation with the DGM reflects the fact that the DGM itself was undergoing a change of leadership and focus. In

114 BA B310/302, Aufgaben und Ziele des Aufklärungsdienstes für Jugendschutz, July 1961.

115 Stieg (1990), 22-56.

116 Infodienst 1949, No. 3, 1.

117 BA B304/2039, "Zur Gesundheitserziehung in der Schule: Arbeitsmaterial für den Schulausschuss der Kultusministerkonferenz", 30 November 1965, 29.

118 BA B310/302, letter from Bundesminister für Gesundheitswesen to Kultusminister/Senatoren der Länder, 1 September 1962.

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1962, having lain empty for a year, the directorship of the DGM had been taken up by Wolfgang Fritsche, who wanted to shift the emphasis of the DGM from exhibitions to a comprehensive programme of health education through publications, seminars, conferences and public engagement.¹¹⁹ The city of Cologne and the Land North Rhine-Westphalia removed their financial support in 1962 and 1964 respectively, with the Federal Ministry of Health taking full control in 1964.¹²⁰ This suggests recognition that health education was increasingly becoming a federal matter; a point also emphasised by Schwarzhaupt's contact with the Ministers of Cultural Affairs and Education at a *Land* level.

An important factor in both the increased emphasis on scientific understandings of smoking and health and the desire to act at a federal level was the 1962 Royal College of Physicians's (RCP) report, *Smoking and Health*, which had been published in London in March of that year. This report was produced by a nine-strong medical committee and reviewed the evidence on smoking and health damage as well as the psychology of smoking.¹²¹ It was published to great media interest in Britain: with headlines focusing on the greater premature mortality of heavy smokers due to lung cancer. The widely circulated British newspaper, the *Daily Mail*, for example, reported that 33% of heavy smokers died before the age of 65.¹²² Following publication of the RCP report, Schwarzhaupt declared the need for a medical-scientific research committee to examine the extent to which lung cancer is caused by smoking. This committee was to be set up under the auspices of the Federal Health Office (*Bundesgesundheitsamt*), which was the body responsible for recognising and assessing health risks in West Germany.¹²³ Consequently, in April 1962, the Federal Health Office set up a committee to consider the RCP report, and to decide whether there were particular recommendations which could be made. After consideration of tobacco taxation and restrictions on advertising, particularly advertising that might appeal to young people, the committee suggested that any legislative measures must be supported by health education. Nonetheless, the Committee reported that the British experience showed that general health education campaigns were largely ineffective, and recommended that health education be targeted at those who neither smoked as yet, or did not smoke regularly – that is, young people. The aim of such cam-

119 BA B310/290, Entwurf eines weiteren Jahresberichts (1965) des Zentralinstituts für Gesundheitserziehung, 8. As yet I have no further biographical information on Fritsche.

120 BA B304/2039, Referat von Frau Bundesminister Schwarzhaupt gehalten bei der 105. Plenarsitzung der Kultusministerkonferenz, 17/18 December 1964, 5.

121 Royal College of Physicians of London: *Smoking and health*. London 1962.

122 *Daily Mail*, 8 March 1962, front page.

123 Elisabeth Schwarzhaupt, Deutscher Bundestag, 4. Wahlperiode, 22. Sitzung, 22 March 1962, 788.

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paings, as with restrictions on advertising, was to reduce the appeal of smoking to youngsters, or, the report pragmatically noted, if they could not be completely kept from smoking, to draw out the beginning of their smoking careers.¹²⁴ The committee also recommended that such campaigns should be scientifically grounded and credible, and that they should be based on advertising psychology. Nonetheless, the committee also cautioned that such campaigns could only succeed, given the wide disparity between the financial means available to the government and that spent on tobacco advertising, if all those responsible for health education and policy stood behind anti-smoking campaigns with their full authority.¹²⁵ The extent to which this happened, however, is questionable. The content of health education material only changed slowly across the decade. Further, whilst the schools competition was the first element of a more substantial government commitment to addressing the problem of youth smoking, the health education campaigns of the mid-1960s suffered from financial setbacks and bureaucratic haggling, which led to delays in publication of materials and lack of agreement over principle and purpose.

In conceptualising health education on smoking, the DGM also had one eye on the British experience. They were aware of the British “THINK” campaign, which ran with the text – “Before you smoke – THINK – cigarettes cause lung cancer”.¹²⁶ The British Ministry of Health at this point sought to emphasise and draw attention to the “basic facts” on smoking, and hoped to discourage smoking among young people.¹²⁷ Similarly, the West German schools’ competition was aimed at young people, but the brochure which grew out of this was aimed in particular at school leavers and a wider non-school audience targeted through health insurers.¹²⁸ The schools’ competition ran under the title “Who is right?” (*Wer hat recht?*), and focused on a range of scenarios designed to test pupils’ knowledge of the health risks of smoking. There was also a competition to design an anti-smoking poster. This competition was judged a success with 200 000 copies of the magazine and 800 000 copies of the questionnaire being sent

124 BA B310/302, Der Präsident des Bundesgesundheitsamtes to the Bundesminister für Gesundheitswesen, 12 September 1962, 4.

125 BA B310/302, Der Präsident des Bundesgesundheitsamtes to the Bundesminister für Gesundheitswesen, 12 September 1962, 7. Neither tobacco taxation nor advertising changed in the immediate aftermath of the Committee’s findings.

126 BA B310/302, News cutting about the “THINK” campaign, which notes that it was the first official British campaign against smoking.

127 National Archives, London, MH 151/18, Memo, 31 December 1962.

128 BA B310/12, Schulze-Rhonhof, Deutsches Gesundheitsmuseum, internal memo, 25 November 1964.

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out. 300 000 questionnaires were returned, and schools were given prizes of teaching materials, books and sports equipment.¹²⁹

The competition was quickly followed by a brochure produced by the DGM with the support of the BGM, entitled *Zum Problem des Rauchens* in 1963.¹³⁰ This booklet was developed out of the previous schools competition, and was again intended to be “scientifically grounded” for use in classrooms. The foreword, written by Schwarzhaupt, stressed that non-smoking was a matter of individual responsibility for health. Schwarzhaupt explained that non-smokers would find their principles affirmed in the words and pictures contained. Smokers, on the other hand, were asked to consider whether they could justify doing avoidable damage to their health. The justification was a personal one – the issue was individual responsibility, not duty towards the population as a whole, nor a question of wider social, cultural or political matters.¹³¹ This contrasted sharply with material produced in the Third Reich under the National Socialist party, where health was constructed as a duty for racial hygiene, but also military and nationalist, reasons. It also contrasted – to an extent – with material produced earlier in the twentieth century, which also made arguments about national duty, and that of the 1950s which saw smoking as a response to social and economic trauma, rather than a matter of choice, and as damaging to the population as an entity. The expectation at this point was that people would respond in a rational manner to the scientific knowledge presented on smoking and health risks.

The 1963 brochure *Zum Problem des Rauchens* sought to ground its message in Germany history. This was not recent German history, but images and verse from the 18th century dealing with smoking, including edicts banning smoking, and, on the very first page, a poem in praise of tobacco dating from 1720. This may have been to give discussions about smoking a longer history and tradition than the propaganda of the Third Reich. These historical snippets sat alongside the medical scientific discourse, and more moralistic statements about over-indulgence in tobacco.¹³² Interestingly, the booklet contained a diagram and texts discussing the effect of smoking on women’s reproductive function and upon nursing infants – both concerns which were almost entirely absent in British health education material at the time.¹³³ This was arguably a legacy of National Socialist views on smoking and female reproduction, which formed a key feature of Nazi anti-smoking propaganda. Although the brochure was criticised in the

129 BA B310/302, Report: Wettbewerb über das Rauchen: “Wer hat recht?”, Deutsches Gesundheitsmuseum, Köln 1964.

130 Goetz (1963).

131 Goetz (1963), 3.

132 Goetz (1963).

133 Elliot (2007), 145-147.

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press for its lack of attention to lung cancer and lack of graphic detail, it was judged a success by the BGM, and a second run of 1 million copies was printed.¹³⁴

The focus on schools here was explained by Schwarzhaupt in a letter to the chair of the KMK in March 1964, in which she again raised the issue of smoking. She specifically related the need to act on smoking to growing concern within West Germany following the “English and American reports”.¹³⁵ This was a reference to the already mentioned 1962 RCP report and to the 1964 U.S. Surgeon General’s report on smoking and health which provided a review of the risks of tobacco use, focusing mainly on cancerous, respiratory and cardiovascular diseases.¹³⁶ It would appear that Schwarzhaupt’s intervention was a direct result of the 1964 U.S. report which had been published in January of that year and received substantial coverage in the West German press.¹³⁷ Schwarzhaupt noted in her letter to the KMK that “there is daily much concern among the general public about how to limit cigarette smoking, particularly among young people”. She further explained that much was being done to educate young people on the dangers of smoking through existing voluntary organisations, but these groups continually came up against the fact that more could be done in schools. She referred to the image of many teachers smoking in schools and on study trips, which did more to influence children to smoke than to dissuade them from smoking, and to the fact that school pupils were allowed to smoke during breaks and in some cases, during exams.¹³⁸ The KMK invited Schwarzhaupt to address them in a plenary meeting at the end of that year. Here, she stressed the importance of health education in schools, arguing that – after the family – school was the most important site for this. She emphasised the necessity of teacher training on health education matters and appropriate teaching aids.¹³⁹ In her presentation, she focused on smoking, but also discussed the importance of sex education.

Whilst thanking her for her willingness to meet with them, the president of the KMK replied that instruction on health and related problems relied on the input of parents.¹⁴⁰ It is clear from a subsequent memo that the KMK felt that health education on smoking was already being addressed at a *Länder* level, with various measures in place across West Germany. Smoking in school, for

134 BA B310/12, memo, 25 November 1964.

135 BA 304/2039, Der Bundesminister für Gesundheitswesen to the Vorsitzenden der Ständigen Konferenz der Kultusminister der Länder, 26 March 1964.

136 Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service (1964).

137 Forschung: Rauchen. In: Der Spiegel, 22 January 1964, 60-71.

138 BA 304/2039, Der Bundesminister für Gesundheitswesen to the Vorsitzenden der Ständigen Konferenz der Kultusminister der Länder, 26 March 1964.

139 BA B304/2039, Referat von Frau Bundesminister Dr E. Schwarzhaupt, 105. Plenarsitzung der KMK, 17/18 December 1964.

140 BA 304/3125, minutes, 105. Plenarsitzung der KMK, 17/18 December 1964.

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example, was forbidden in Bavaria and Rhineland-Palatinate, although anecdotal evidence suggests that such prohibitions were either rescinded or ignored by the 1970s. Other states had passed resolutions on the need to educate young people on the dangers of nicotine – though it is notable that in some cases, namely Schleswig-Holstein, these resolutions dated from the interwar period. The material used in classes, according to the KMK in 1964, came largely from non-government organisations such as the DHS and religious organisations such as the Protestant Association for Youth Protection (*Evangelischer Arbeitskreis für Jugendschutz*) in Munich.¹⁴¹ This memo suggests that addressing smoking was somewhat patchy. It also prompts the question how supportive the KMK actually were of federal government initiatives.

Schwarzhaupt also attempted to bring the question of smoking and health to popular awareness among adults. However, this was more problematic, largely because of the influence of the tobacco industry and the volume of its advertising spend. In 1963, at the same time as *Zum Problem des Rauchens* was published, short TV adverts, or “spots”, were commissioned by the BGM.¹⁴² These spots, considered novel at the time, featured an athlete expounding the virtues of non-smoking, a pupil being told that smoking was detrimental to his learning and a woman being instructed on the importance of not smoking while pregnant, and were intended to address the general population. However, the screening of these advertisements ran into difficulties, as the television channel concerned did not want to screen them alongside cigarette advertising, as tobacco manufacturers were paying an average of 300 DM per second. The BGM was legally prevented from paying for advertising time, according to a report in *Stern*, which meant that a solution had to be found to show the spots in interludes between programmes normally filled with music.¹⁴³ Similar problems were faced by the *Hamburgische Landesstelle gegen die Suchtgefahren* which wanted to run an anti-smoking poster campaign. Two advertising distribution firms in Hamburg refused to accept the campaign because they feared losing the cigarette industry as their customer, and argued that they could not hang anti-smoking posters alongside advertising for smoking. In the end, a third company accepted the campaign, and the “tobacco industry” (presumably Reemtsma in Hamburg) requested a copy for their own archives.¹⁴⁴ Both these examples show the reluctance of the media to cause offence to the tobacco industry because of the amount of money spent on adver-

141 BA B304/2039, Zur Gesundheitserziehung in der Schule, 30 November 1965.

142 Staatssekretär Bargatzy, Deutscher Bundestag, 109. Sitzung, 24 January 1964, 5028-5029.

143 Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 352-6/1248, Glück bei den Mainzelmännchen. Die ungewöhnlichen Aufklärungsfilme der Ministerin Schwarzhaupt. In: *Der Stern*, 18 August 1964.

144 Staatsarchiv Hamburg, 352-6/1251, Das Plakat, das keine Freude macht. In: *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 4 February 1964.

tising, a reluctance which arguably shaped health education campaigns on the risks of smoking in the later 1960s.

The mid-1960s: towards a focus on advertising

Much of the subsequent work at a federal level on creating and distributing health education material on smoking was carried out through the *Deutsche Gesundheitsmuseum*, and looking at this shows some of the tensions which arose. By the mid-1960s, there was also a change in the political and financial climate which impacted on budgets for health education.¹⁴⁵ In March 1963, the DGM were approached by a film company, Brevis Film, who suggested turning *Zum Problem des Rauchens* into a short film about smoking.¹⁴⁶ Although staff from the DGM met with the film company in 1963, concerns about finances seem to have slowed the negotiations. The initial estimated cost had been 35 000 DM, the final cost was 80 000 DM.¹⁴⁷ The film was contracted in 1965, under the title “Death Gives a Party” (*Der Tod gibt eine Party*), and continued to be dogged with financial problems, as disagreements over content led to scenes being re-edited.¹⁴⁸ The protracted disagreement over funds suggests that the political desire to address the issue of smoking and health was not backed by adequate resources, a point explicable by the broader financial crisis facing West Germany at the time. The acrimony about the film’s final content also shows some disagreement between the DGM and Brevis Film about what the film was aiming to achieve, and tensions within the DGM itself.

On one hand, the film was designed to appeal to young people, by incorporating elements of the post-war cultural context, but on the other, it was quite traditional in its approach. The innovative aspect of the film was its clear desire to appeal to young people, rather than seeing youth culture as a threat to social stability, as much earlier health education material had done. The title *Der Tod gibt eine Party* appeared on the screen from a revolving record, and the opening scene was a party in a bar. This was thought to be a scene which young people would relate to, but which would also typically give rise to smoking.¹⁴⁹ This in-

145 Richardson, J. L.: West Germany since Adenauer: stresses and strains of the late 1960s. In: Australian journal of international affairs 24 (1970), No. 1, 51-60.

146 BA B310/19, Memo relating to a visit from Brevis Film, 19 March 1963.

147 BA B310/19, Film contract, 19 May 1965.

148 BA B310/19, Brevis Films to DGM, 25 August 1965.

149 BA B310/19, memo on Aufklärungsfilm zum Problem des Rauchens “Der Tod gibt eine Party”, Bundesministers für Gesundheitswesen, 6 August 1965. The film has been analysed in more detail by Uta Schwarz. “Der Schmutzfink” und “Großalarm bei Kundi”: Film und Gesundheitsaufklärung nach 1945. In: Roeßiger, Susanne; Merk, Heidrun (eds.): Haupt-

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tion indicates the beginnings of a new approach to health education, moving away from the traditional manner of imparting health education information. However, following discussions between DGM and Brevis Film after a final viewing of the film in August 1966, this opening scene was cut short, because Fritsche felt it was too long. This view was also held by a representative from television channel ZDF, who watched the film to comment on its suitability for television.¹⁵⁰

The rest of the film was quite traditional in its approach, but even then, there were some reservations about how far the film should go. The film sought to arouse fear in viewers; showing the party host offering guests cigarettes, before the camera zoomed in on the lid of his cigarette case to reveal words which filled the screen – Nicotine: poison. The scene then cut to a demonstration of the effects of nicotine on a laboratory mouse (which promptly died), and the rest of the film interspersed explanation of the negative health effects of smoking given in a classroom setting with images of when people might smoke. The message was simple and stark – cigarettes are poisonous and they will kill you. As the title suggests, the intent of the film was to scare young people away from smoking – a point which was emphasised by Schwarzhaupt's successor, Käte Strobel, in 1967 when she stated that the film was intended to have a shock effect.¹⁵¹ However, the film was less shocking than it might have been: a scene featuring a leg amputation was shortened, as most of the staff at the DGM and the television representative from ZDF thought showing prolonged sawing through the bone was too “cruel” and would alienate viewers.¹⁵²

The more contentious editing requests from the DGM related to the scientific content of the film, in other words, the medical facts about smoking which were imparted in the voiced-over text. One criticism at the viewing of the final film was that the scenes discussing smoking and cancer were not incisive enough; a criticism that Brevis Film refuted by pointing out that the script had been approved by the DGM and the BGM, as well as a whole range of medical experts. Brevis Film absolved themselves of any responsibility for these particular scenes, saying that experts had insisted “the risk of cancer from smoking should not be given such prominence as it had not yet been proven that this risk actually existed to such an extent”. Brevis argued that they had made these views known

sache gesund! Gesundheitsaufklärung zwischen Disziplinierung und Emanzipation. Marburg 1998, 154-168.

150 BA B310/19, Bericht über mein Gespräch mit Herrn Dr. Engler bei der Brevis-Film, Köln, 11 August 1966.

151 Strobel, Deutscher Bundestag, 125. Sitzung, 12 October 1967, 6316.

152 BA B310/19, Bericht über mein Gespräch mit Herrn Dr. Engler bei der Brevis-Film, Köln, 11 August 1966.

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to the DGM through Schulze-Rhonhof, the staff member charged with the supervision of the project. Schulze-Rhonhof had, according to Brevis, also discussed the question of cancer with specialists in the area.¹⁵³

Christel Schulze-Rhonhof was, according to records, the public relations officer for the DGM, and there is nothing in the documents to suggest which specialists she had been in touch with as regards this film. However, through the making of the previous brochure, *Zum Problem des Rauchens*, and a subsequent 1967 brochure *Was stimmt nun eigentlich? (What is actually true?)*, Schulze-Rhonhof was in extensive correspondence and contact with a range of medical professionals, educators and scientific researchers, including Dr Helmut Schievelbein, a cardiologist who had close relations with the tobacco industry and published on the pharmacology and toxicology of nicotine, who she met three days prior to the screening of the film. Schievelbein was recommended to Schulze-Rhonhof by the Cancer Research Institute in Heidelberg (*Krebsforschungsinstitut Heidelberg*), as a well-respected expert in the field.¹⁵⁴ Further, Fritsche refers to Schievelbein's approval of the film.¹⁵⁵ From the available documents, it is not clear who made the argument that the risks of lung cancer were not yet sufficiently proven to be included in the film.

Schulze-Rhonhof's range of correspondents shows the links between health education and the tobacco industry in the 1960s, and suggests relatively good relations, despite growing health concerns.¹⁵⁶ Schulze-Rhonhof also corresponded with the Scientific Research Office of the Association of the Cigarette Industry (*Wissenschaftliche Forschungsstelle of the Verband der Zigarettenindustrie*), meeting with staff there in December 1966, three months after the contentious viewing of *Der Tod gibt eine Party*. By this point, she was collecting information for *Was stimmt nun eigentlich?* This Scientific Research Office was primarily concerned with researching the carcinogenic substances in tobacco smoke. Schulze-Rhonhof's report from this meeting suggests that she saw the research

153 BA B310/19, Brevis Film to Fritsche, 25 August 1966.

154 BA B310/12, Schulze-Rhonhof, Christel: Bericht über meinen Besuch bei Herrn Doz. Dr. Schievelbein, 22 August 1966; <http://tobaccodocuments.org/pm/2501159889-9891.html> provides a selected list of Schievelbein's publications. Accessed 30 March 2010.

155 BA B310/19, Stellungnahme zu dem Schreiben von Dr. Engler, Brevis Film GmbH vom 25.8.1966, 30 August 1966.

156 In 1979, Schievelbein wrote of his deep unease at the "witch hunt" which the developing global anti-smoking campaign was in danger of becoming, although he was a non-smoker and against smoking himself. He believed that progress could only be made through scientific discussion in a medical context. For discussion of the relationship between the tobacco industry and West Germany government from the 1980s onwards, see Gilmore, Anna; McKee, Martin: Tobacco control policy: the European dimension. In: *Clinical medicine* 2 (2002), 335-342.

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arm of the tobacco industry as a useful partner who could provide information, although she is careful to assure colleagues of her impression that “we don’t need to fear any negative influence; rather, we can avoid any mistakes before publication”.¹⁵⁷ This statement may be read in light of the previous discussions about lung cancer in relation to *Der Tod gibt eine Party* and shows a relatively unproblematic conceptualisation of relations with the tobacco industry.

The film *Der Tod gibt eine Party* was lent out to schools and youth organisations across West Germany, and also shown in November 1966 on one of the main German TV channels as part of a health programme. Thus, whilst the film had been created with young people in mind, it also addressed a general TV audience. Its showing was followed by a five minute interview by Schwarzhaupt.¹⁵⁸ Once again, Schwarzhaupt’s presence demonstrated a clear government presence in relation to health education on smoking, but the haggling over the cost of the film was indicative of broader problems of finances which extended to subsequent projects, given the broader financial crisis. The brochure *Was stimmt nun eigentlich?*, mentioned above, was mooted in 1964, after it emerged that *Zum Problem des Rauchens* could not be re-worked to create a brochure suitable for children below the final school year, a decision partly influenced by comments the DGM received about the brochure.¹⁵⁹

Nonetheless, the re-working of the brochure was almost abandoned in 1966 when it appeared that the Central Institute for Health Education of the DGM was not given the money to take the project forward, a point which suggests that the additional ministerial funding, which had been available for the schools’ competition, was not on-going.¹⁶⁰ The project was picked up by publishers who agreed to take it forward at their own risk in October 1966, with some financial support from Baden-Württemberg which was keen to order several thousand copies of the brochure for use in their schools.¹⁶¹ However, problems arose when the BGM mistakenly advertised the brochure as free in October 1967, leaving a hole in the finances when the publishers received “a flood of orders”, and causing recriminations among DGM staff and the BGM about who had been responsible.¹⁶²

157 BA B310/12, Bericht über meinen Besuch bei der Wissenschaftlichen Forschungsstelle im Verband der Zigarettenindustrie, Hamburg, 6 December 1966.

158 BA B310/19, memo: Aufklärungsfilm über Gefahren des Rauchens im II. Fernsehen.

159 BA B310/12, undated comments on the brochure “Zum Problem des Rauchens”, for example, dismissed the brochure as “non-journalistic, [...] too historical, [...] confusing, [...] too boring, and school-masterly in style and with imagery, which would only delight a historian”.

160 BA B310/15, Besuchsbericht, 26-27 October 1966.

161 BA B310/15, draft statement for the Bundesminister für Gesundheitswesen from Bundeszentrale für Gesundheitliche Aufklärung, 15 November 1968.

162 BA B310/15, Bundesministerium für Gesundheitswesen to Bundeszentrale für Gesundheitliche Aufklärung, 25 September 1968.

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Although there was undoubtedly a good level of public interest in smoking and health, health education on this, as with other subjects, suffered from a restricted budget through the 1960s, a problem which was not resolved with the establishment of the DGM's 1967 successor, the Federal Office for Health Education (*Bundeszentrale für Gesundheitliche Aufklärung*, hereafter BZgA).¹⁶³

Financial problems aside, the process of creating *Was stimmt nun eigentlich?* indicates a change in focus from the dangers of smoking and health towards considering how tobacco was marketed. This may have been influenced by ongoing debates around cigarette advertising at the time, and the BGM's desire for restrictions on advertising, which resulted in a voluntary agreement with the tobacco industry to restrict marketing to young people.¹⁶⁴ When Schulze-Rhonhof went to the Scientific Research Office of the Association of the Cigarette Industry in 1966, she was looking for help to collect a wide range of material for the compilation of the brochure – namely, press cuttings on smoking for a photo-montage, literature on the smoking habits of young people, statistical material on tobacco consumption, and the amount of money spent on smoking and other consumer goods by young people, advertising slogans from previous years, and images from advertising, the latter intended for a photomontage. While the meeting concluded with a scientific discussion of the dangers of cigarette smoking, Schulze-Rhonhof believed this was too specialised to be included in the text of the brochure.¹⁶⁵ The brochure set glossy pictures, such as would be seen in advertising with seductive images of smokers at parties, in cars or outdoors, against the truth of the health risks of smoking, set out in the text. The aim was to make young people think about why they smoked and the disjuncture between portrayals of smoking in the media and the health risks of tobacco use, hence the title *Was stimmt nun eigentlich?* or *What is actually true?* This suggests the view that young people were motivated to smoke by cigarette advertising, an argument which agencies like the DHS had already begun to float in the late 1950s. This view was to gain increasing credence in the BZgA in the early 1970s, in the

163 BA B310/290, Projekt-Zusammenstellung, 27 October 1968.

164 Schwarzhaupt, Deutscher Bundestag, 196. Sitzung, 2 July 1965; see also correspondence in BA B102/278193 which indicated the problems surrounding implementing this agreement in terms of anti-trust laws, particularly Bundesministerium für Gesundheitswesen to Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, 14 February 1966.

165 BA B310/12, Bericht über meinen Besuch bei der Wissenschaftliche Forschungsstelle im Verband der Zigarettenindustrie, Hamburg, 6 December 1966.

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context of both health education and discussions about restrictions of tobacco advertising.¹⁶⁶

However, one of the main problems of the 1967 brochure, according to a study conducted in October 1968 for the BZgA, was that young people identified with the smokers in the pictures, making comments such as “that’s exactly the way it is”, and “it’s like that for me too”. The authors of the study concluded that

The fear of not being able to participate in common experiences, not being up-to date any longer, is at least as strong, if not stronger, than the fear of not being physically fit any more.¹⁶⁷

This sentence is telling: arguments about health and fitness which had been the mainstay of anti-smoking material previously were simply not relevant to the generation of young people growing up in the cultural context of the 1960s, if they had ever been. Smoking cigarettes could no longer be portrayed as wayward when around 70% of the adult male population (50% at age 18) and 30% of the adult female population smoked (24% at age 18).¹⁶⁸ The challenge facing the DGM’s 1967 successor, the BZgA, who commissioned the study which yielded these comments, was to move away from a didactic form of health education towards creating something which would be seen as relevant in the context of young people’s lives, and which would lead them to question the pro-smoking culture they were growing up in.

Conclusion

Thus, the 1960s can be seen as a transition period in the history of smoking policy in West Germany. Across the decade, there was a shift away from older youth protection arguments, which were grounded in the early 20th century history, towards a more liberal approach which placed emphasis on making young people, and indeed adults, aware of the scientific and epidemiological research on smoking and health. It was, Schwarzhaupt stressed in 1963, a matter of individual choice whether or not to smoke. Nonetheless, there was a clear recognition at ministerial level that smoking was harmful to health and that the government had a responsibility to inform its citizens of the health risks involved. This re-

166 Feser, H.: Drogen unserer Zeit. In: Höch, Uwe; Birk, Regina (eds.): Durch die weite Welt 48. Band – Ein Jahrbuch für junge Leute. Stuttgart 1974, 326-333, especially 332-333.

167 BA B310/520, Jugendliche und Rauchen: a study carried out by the Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsforschung, February 1969.

168 Foley, Barbara; Lee, Peter: Estimation of sex-specific smoking statistics by standardized age groups and time periods, <http://www.pnlee.co.uk/documents/refs/ISS2suppl1.pdf>, 96-103. Accessed 30 March 2010.

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cognition was shaped by international scientific developments, rather than national concerns – it is notable that both Schwarzhaupt's intervention with the Information Service for Youth Protection in 1962 and with the KMK in 1964 were motivated by the RCP and the US Surgeon General's reports respectively. Further, the liberal approach in West Germany paralleled that taken in Britain at the time. However, while there was a commitment to health education, the structures for delivering this at the level of the *Länder* remained largely unchanged and there appears to have been limited financial commitment beyond funding for the schools' competition.

On the surface, this liberal framework was in contrast to what had gone previously and here, the 1950s have to be seen on a continuum with previous decades. 1945 did not mark a break with the past in terms of anti-smoking sentiment, but rather what one commentator has called "old wine in new bottles".¹⁶⁹ Concern about medical and moral damage to the *Volk* in the 1950s can be seen as the evolution of social and moral anxieties around smoking which had existed for decades previously, and which pre-dated the Nazi period. It was the German Anti-Tobacco League which saw the coming of Hitler as an opportunity to further their aims, rather than (initially at least) the other way around, while leading figures in that organisation continued to be active after the Nazis had fallen. In very different cultural climates, smoking was seen as a part of a range of undesirable behaviours, and children were to be educated against it. During the National Socialist period, smoking was seen to undermine the fitness of young people, and damage the future of the race; by the 1950s, it was seen as a reaction to emotional trauma and as a result of Americanisation. But here too, concerns about the cinema, absent fathers, and a lack of authority echoed comments aired in World War One. The connecting thread was the idea that youth smoking represented, in different ways, a threat to the social and moral order. In the early 1950s, the West German government did not dismiss the threat, but rather chose to distance themselves from addressing it. This distance was both a response to the experience of "past dictatorships", but also a recognition of the importance of supporting the domestic tobacco industry in the face of international competition.

By the 1960s, older youth protection arguments sounded out-dated and lacking in appeal (if that is, they had ever had any relevance for young people themselves). This was no more painfully obvious than in the criticism of the 1963 brochure *Zum Problem des Rauchens*, which aimed to be scientifically grounded, but used a very traditional layout to impart the message and drew on

169 Bühringer, Gerhard; Watzl, Hans: Zur Geschichte und Neugestaltung der Zeitschrift SUCHT: Alter Wein in neuen Schläuchen? In: Sucht 49 (2003) 8-12.

