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1	Sexual allocation by both stressed and unstressed hermaphrodites within the
2	same population
3	
4	M. Broom <sup>1</sup> , R.N. Hughes <sup>2</sup> , M.T. Burrows <sup>3</sup> and G.D. Ruxton <sup>4</sup>
5	
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	<ol> <li>Centre for Mathematical Science, City University London, Northampton Square, London EC1V 0HB, UK</li> <li>School of Biological Sciences, University of Wales, Bangor, Deiniol Road, Bangor, Gwynedd, LL57 2UW, UK</li> <li>Scottish Marine Institute Oban, Argyll, PA37 1QA, UK</li> <li>College of Medical, Veterinary and Life Sciences, University of Glasgow, Glasgow G12 8QQ, UK</li> </ol>
14	Abstract
15	Factors influencing allocation of resources to male and female offspring continue to
16	be of great interest to evolutionary biologists. A simultaneous hermaphrodite is
17	capable of functioning in both male and female mode at the same time, and such a
18	life-history strategy is adopted by most flowering plants and by many sessile aquatic
19	animals. In this paper, we focus on hermaphrodites that nourish post-zygotic stages,
20	e.g. flowering plants and internally fertilizing invertebrates, and consider how their
21	sex allocation should respond to an environmental stress that reduces prospects of
22	survival but does not affect all individuals equally, rather acting only on a subset of
23	the population. Whereas dissemination of pollen and sperm can begin at sexual
24	maturation, release of seeds and larvae is delayed by embryonic development. We
25	find that the evolutionarily stable strategy for allocation between male and female
26	functions will be critically dependent on the effect of stress on the trade-off between
27	the costs of male and female reproduction, i.e. of sperm and embryos. Thus, we
28	identify evaluation of this factor as an important challenge to empiricists interested in

29 the effects of stress on sex allocation. When only a small fraction of the population is

30	stressed, we predict that stressed individuals will allocate their resources entirely to
31	male function and unstressed individuals will increase their allocation to female
32	function. Conversely, when the fraction of stress-affected individuals is high, stressed
33	individuals should respond to this stressor by increasing investment in sperm and
34	unstressed individuals should invest solely in embryos. A further prediction of the
35	model is that we would not expect to find populations in the natural world where both
36	stressed and unstressed individuals are both hermaphrodite.

keywords: sex allocation, hermaphroditic, dioecious, simultaneous hermaphrodite,
stress, evolutionarily stable strategy

40

#### 41 **1. Introduction**

42 The factors influencing allocation of resources to male and female offspring continue 43 to be of great interest to evolutionary biologists [1]. Sex allocation will be influenced 44 by the breeding system of a particular species. Breeding systems can be categorised as 45 dioecious, in which individuals are either male or female for their entire lifetime or 46 hermaphroditic, in which the same individual can produce both male and female 47 gametes. Hermaphrodites can be either sequential or simultaneous. Sequential 48 hermaphrodites, or sex changers, function as one sex early in their life, and then 49 switch to the other. Simultaneous hermaphrodites are capable of both male and female 50 reproduction at the same time, representing a prevalent life-history strategy among 51 sessile organisms, notably flowering plants and modular colonial animals [2]. 52 Allocation is often strongly influenced by environmental conditions [1,3] and here we 53 consider how hermaphrodites cope with an environmental stress that acts only on a 54 subset of the population simultaneously.

55 It has been demonstrated in hermaphroditic plants and animals that environmental 56 stress promotes increased allocation to male rather than female function [4,5]. During 57 the time required to produce a seed or larva, a hermaphroditic plant or animal can 58 potentially release many pollen grains or sperm and so fitness through male function 59 can begin to accrue immediately after sexual maturation whereas fitness through 60 female function is delayed. Hence a plausible explanation for stress-induced 61 allocation to male function is that the stressed organism is less likely to die before 62 reproducing successfully as a male than as a female. Here we present a mathematical 63 model that allows the quantitative consequences of this differential survivorship to be 64 evaluated. Specifically, we assume that under many ecological circumstances, some 65 (but not all) of a population will be subject to stress. For a population of flowering 66 plants or sessile aquatic invertebrates, such patchy stresses might include localised 67 grazing, overgrowth by larger individuals, or localised damage by wind or water 68 currents [5]. We further assume that individuals can control their allocation to both 69 male and female function in response to environmental cues that signal whether or not 70 that individual will be subject to the stressor. Under these assumptions, we produce 71 predictions for evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) in terms of the division of 72 resources to male and female reproduction not just for stressed individuals but also for 73 unstressed individuals within the same population. Although generally ignored by 74 previous treatments, there is no reason to expect that the changed allocation by 75 stressed individuals will not induce a change in unstressed individuals within the same 76 inter-breeding population. We will particularly focus on quantifying how the 77 evolutionarily stable strategies of both stressed and unstressed individuals are affected 78 by the fraction of the population that is stressed.

79

#### 80 **2. Model definition**

81	The strategy of an individual is defined by the pair $\{m_n, m_s\}$ , this being the investment
82	in male sexual function (hereafter "sperm") by an individual experiencing either
83	normal ( <i>n</i> ) or stressed ( <i>s</i> ) conditions ( $m_n, m_s \in [0,1]$ ). An individual playing { $m_n, m_s$ }
84	will produce a fraction $m_n(m_s)$ of the sperm in the unstressed (stressed) condition that
85	it would produce if it chose to invest entirely in sperm: $m_n=1(m_s=1)$ . Thus we
86	explicitly assume that individuals have a flexible strategy for investment between
87	male and female functions, and change strategy according to whether they perceive
88	themselves as stressed or not.
89	
89 90	In order to capture the assumption that male and female functions compete for
	In order to capture the assumption that male and female functions compete for resources, we assume that female sexual function (hereafter termed "embryos") can
90	
90 91	resources, we assume that female sexual function (hereafter termed "embryos") can
90 91 92	resources, we assume that female sexual function (hereafter termed "embryos") can be found for either of these two cases from relations $f_n(m_n)$ and $f_s(m_s)$ . That is, once
90 91 92 93	resources, we assume that female sexual function (hereafter termed "embryos") can be found for either of these two cases from relations $f_n(m_n)$ and $f_s(m_s)$ . That is, once investment in sperm is specified, these functions can be used to calculate the

97 
$$f_n \bigoplus f_s \bigoplus 0$$
, and

98 
$$f_n \Phi = \frac{1}{b_n}, f_s \Phi = \frac{1}{b_s}$$

99 where the relative cost of embryos to sperm in unstressed (stressed) individuals is  $b_n$ 100 ( $b_s$ ).

101

102 These restrictions simply mean that if all resources are spent on sperm then there can103 be no investment in embryos, whereas if there is no investment in sperm, then all

104resources can be channelled into embryos. If total resource allocation to male function105yields volume 1 of sperm for each type of individual, total allocation to female106function gives sperm-volumes of  $1/b_n$  and  $1/b_s$  to unstressed and stressed individuals107respectively. We note that allowing total allocation to yield different volumes of108sperm in stressed and non-stressed individuals makes no difference to the results, as109only the relative costs of embryos to sperm are important.110We also assume that the derivatives of both functions are always negative.

111 Biologically this assumption means that increasing investment in sperm can only be

112 achieved at the cost of reduced production of embryos. An individual playing  $\{m_n, m_s\}$ 

113 will thus produce a fraction  $f_n(m_n)(f_s(m_s))$  of the embryos in the unstressed (stressed)

114 condition that it would produce if it chose to invest entirely in eggs:  $m_n=0(m_s=0)$ . We

use the general functions  $f_n(m_n)$  and  $f_s(m_s)$  to allow for different levels of cost to be

116 available for intermediate levels of resource allocation. If volume of embryos is just

117 proportional to resources allocated we get the simple linear resource functions

118 used later in this section

119 
$$f_n = \frac{1 - m_n}{b_n}, \ f_s = \frac{1 - m_s}{b_s}$$

so that if half of the resources are allocated to embryos and half to sperm, half the maximum volume of each are produced,  $f_n (0.5)=0.5/b_n$ , for unstressed individuals. It is possible to envisage situations where production is either more (or less) efficient when divided, so that if sufficient resource was allocated to produce half of the maximum sperm volume then more (or less) than half of the maximum volume of embryos would be produced i.e.  $f_n (0.5)>0.5/b_n (f_n (0.5)<0.5/b_n)$ , for unstressed individuals.

To find the ESSs, we consider a mutant individual that plays  $\{m_n, m_s\}$  in a population 128 of other individuals that play the resident strategy  $\{m_n^*, m_s^*\}$ . We assume that each 129 130 individual has (independent) probability s of being stressed. If an individual is 131 stressed, then there is a probability that the individual will die before resources 132 allocated to sperm can be released as functioning gametes. This is represented as a 133 probability  $p_m$  that resources allocated to male function lead to successful production of viable gametes. There is a similar probability for investment in female function  $p_{f}$ . 134 135 As discussed in the introduction, the overwhelming empirical evidence is for  $p_m$  to be 136 greater than  $p_f$ .

137

138 If we make the simple Fisherian assumption that both male and female gain functions 139 are linear (effectively that all females will have the same number of offspring on 140 average, and each male is equally likely to be the father of any given offspring), then 141 we can apply the classical fitness function for the sex-ratio game [5,6]. For a mutant 142 parent which has a fixed expected number of children irrespective of their sex and has 143 male children with probability m in a population where males are in proportion  $m^*$ 144 this fitness function is given by

145

146 
$$R(m; m^*) = \frac{m}{m^*} + \frac{1-m}{1-m^*}.$$

147

Here the unique evolutionarily stable solution is for the population to invest in both sexes in equal proportion  $m^*=0.5$ . We shall see that the situation is more complex in our case, as there are potentially different costs applied to two distinct types of individuals.

153 Using the above equation we can express the pay-off to the mutant as

154

155 
$$R(\mathbf{n}_n, m_s; m_n^*, m_s^*) = \frac{(-s)m_n + sm_s p_m}{(-s)m_n^* + sm_s^* p_m} + \frac{(-s)f_n(\mathbf{n}_n) + sf_s(\mathbf{n}_s)p_f}{(-s)f_n(\mathbf{n}_n)^* + sf_s(\mathbf{n}_s)p_f}.$$
(1)

156

157 We can simplify this expression by defining some composite constants. Specifically,158 we define

159

$$160 \qquad \alpha = \frac{sp_m}{1-s}$$

161 and

$$162 \qquad \beta = \frac{sp_f}{1-s}.$$

163

From our arguments above about the relative values of  $p_m$  and  $p_f$ , we would expect  $\alpha$ to be greater than  $\beta$  in the overwhelming majority of ecological circumstances. We will also simplify the notation for embryos, using simply  $f_n$  and  $f_s$  to denote  $f_n(m_n)$  and  $f_s(m_s)$ ; and  $f_n^*$  and  $f_s^*$  to denote  $f_n(m_n^*)$  and  $f_s(m_s^*)$ . We will also use ' to denote the derivative of these functions. So that  $f_s^{*'}$  is the derivative of  $f_s$  evaluated at  $m_s^*$ .

Using these notational simplifications, we can simplify our expression (1) for the pay-off to a mutant to the expression below:

172

173 
$$R (m_n, m_s; m_n^*, m_s^*) = \frac{m_n + \alpha m_s}{m_n^* + \alpha m_s^*} + \frac{f_n + \beta f_s}{f_n^* + \beta f_s^*}.$$
 (2)

175A strategy 
$$\{m_n^*, m_s^*\}$$
 is an ESS if and only if within a population where almost all176individuals play this strategy, and a small fraction  $\varepsilon$  play an alternative strategy177 $\{m_n, m_s\}$ , the payoff to an individual playing  $\{m_n, m_s\}$  would be less than the payoff to178an individual playing  $\{m_n^*, m_s^*\}$ , i.e.179 $R(\bullet_n^*, m_s^*; (1-\varepsilon)m_n^*+ \varepsilon m_s, (1-\varepsilon)m_s^*+ \varepsilon m_s) \ge R(\bullet_n, m_s; (1-\varepsilon)m_n^*+ \varepsilon m_s, (1-\varepsilon)m_s^*+ \varepsilon m_s) \right]$ 180 $R(\bullet_n^*, m_s^*; (1-\varepsilon)m_n^*+ \varepsilon m_s, (1-\varepsilon)m_s^*+ \varepsilon m_s) \ge R(\bullet_n, m_s; (1-\varepsilon)m_n^*+ \varepsilon m_s, (1-\varepsilon)m_s^*+ \varepsilon m_s) \right]$ 181It is clear that a necessary condition for this to hold for arbitrarily small  $\varepsilon$  is183 $R(\bullet_n^*, m_s^*; m_n^*, m_s^*) \ge R(\bullet_n, m_s; m_n^*, m_s^*)$  (3)184 $R(\bullet_n^*, m_s^*; m_n^*, m_s^*) \ge R(\bullet_n, m_s; m_n^*, m_s^*)$  (3)185invading group uses a larger (smaller) male investment, this increases (decreases) the189number of males in the population, which decreases (increases) the payoff to males190compared to females.191For general functions R it is not possible to give more specific conditions which are193equivalent to condition (3), but we can give some necessary conditions. For normal194individuals, if  $0 < m_n^* < 1$  we require (at  $\varepsilon = 0$ ) that

195 
$$\frac{\partial R}{\partial m_n} = 0$$

and either *R* is constant in a population of  $\{m_n^*, m_s^*\}$  individuals or

$$197 \qquad \frac{\partial^2 R}{\partial m_n^2} < 0$$

- 198 at  $m_n = m_n^*$ .
- 199 If  $m_n$ \*=1 we require

$$200 \qquad \frac{\partial R}{\partial m_n} > 0$$

- 201 at  $m_n = 1$ .
- 202 If  $m_n$ \*=0 we require

$$203 \qquad \frac{\partial R}{\partial m_n} < 0$$

- 204 at  $m_n=0$ .
- 205 These conditions ensure that a population cannot be invaded by individuals playing
- 206  $\{m_n, m_s^*\}$  where  $m_n$  is sufficiently close to  $m_n^*$ .
- 207 Similar conditions are required for  $m_s$ .
- 208 These necessary conditions are also sufficient for  $\{m_n^*, m_s^*\}$  to be an ESS whenever
- 209 at most one of  $0 < m_n < 1$ ,  $0 < m_s < 1$  holds, and there are no extra cases where R has
- 210 zero derivative, other than when the population strategy is  $\{m_n^*, m_s^*\}$ .
- 211
- Thus to find ESSs we must consider the signs of the derivatives of the function *R*, andwe obtain the following expressions:
- 214

215 
$$\frac{\partial R}{\partial m_n} \ge <0 \Leftrightarrow f_n^* + m_n^* f_n' + \beta f_s + \alpha m_s^* f_n' \ge <0$$
(4)

216 and

217 
$$\frac{\partial R}{\partial m_s} > = <0 \Leftrightarrow \alpha f_n^* + \beta m_n^* f_s' + \alpha \beta m_s^* f_s^{*'} + \alpha \beta f_s > = <0.$$
(5)

218

219 To find ESSs, we must substitute  $m_n = m_n^*$  and  $m_s = m_s^*$  into (4) and (5).

220 221 The expressions in (4) & (5) can also be derived by differentiating the simpler 222 function 223  $(n_n + \alpha m_s) f_n + \beta f_s].$ 224 (6)225 226 Thus we shall consider the derivatives of (6), which is equivalent to considering those of our original (but more complex) expression, since only the signs of those 227 228 derivatives are important. 229 230 To make further progress we must explicitly specify the trade-off between male and 231 female functions for both stressed and unstressed members of the interbreeding 232 population. As discussed above, we will assume the following simple linear resource 233 allocation functions: 234  $f_n = \frac{1 - m_n}{b_n}$ 235 236 and  $f_s = \frac{1 - m_s}{b_s}.$ 237 238 239 Thus, the values given to the two parameters  $b_n$  and  $b_s$  describe the relationship 240 between female and male functionality for the two cases (stressed and unstressed). A 241 value of one for either of these parameters suggests an equal cost of sperm and

242 embryos. A value higher than one implies a larger cost (in terms of investment

required to produce one gamete) to egg production than sperm production. The

- 244 overwhelming empirical evidence is that, per gamete, sperm are cheaper and quicker
- to produce than embryos. Thus we would expect  $b_n$  and  $b_s$  to both be greater than one.

247 Let us further define the following composite parameters:

248

$$249 \qquad b=\frac{b_n}{b_s},$$

250  $c_1 = \frac{1}{1+b\beta}$  and

251 
$$c_2 = 1 - c_1 = \frac{b\beta}{1 + b\beta}.$$

Thus *b* describes the effect of stress on the trade-off between sperm and embryos. If *b* is equal to one then stress has no effect on this trade-off. If *b* is greater than 1, then sperm is more expensive (relative to embryos) for stressed individuals compared to unstressed individuals. Conversely, if *b* is less than one then sperm is less expensive for stressed individuals. As we shall see, the separate values of  $b_n$  and  $b_s$ do not affect our results, although their ratio *b* does.

258

Let us return to considering expression (6), which (utilising our newly-introduced

260 composite parameters) is given by the following expression:

261

262 
$$\mathbf{\Phi}_{n} + \alpha n_{s} \mathbf{\Phi}_{n} + \beta f_{s} = \left(\frac{m_{n} + \alpha n_{s}}{b_{n} b_{s}}\right) \mathbf{\Phi}_{s} + \beta b_{n} - b_{s} m_{n} - \beta b_{n} m_{s}^{2}.$$
(7)

After re-arrangement and dropping simple constant multipliers, one can demonstratethat (7) varies as the simpler expression:

266 
$$S(\mathbf{n}_n, \mathbf{m}_s) = (\mathbf{n}_n + \alpha \mathbf{m}_s) (-c_1 \mathbf{m}_n - c_2 \mathbf{m}_s).$$
 (8)

268 The derivatives of *S* are easily obtained:

270 
$$\frac{\partial S}{\partial m_n} = 1 - 2c_1 m_n - \mathbf{\Phi} c_1 + c_2 \, \mathbf{\tilde{m}}_s \tag{9}$$

271 and

272 
$$\frac{\partial S}{\partial m_s} = \alpha \left( 1 - 2c_2 m_s - \left( c_1 + \frac{c_2}{\alpha} \right) m_n \right).$$
(10)

273

#### 274 **3. Possible ESS forms**

We need to consider nine different possibilities for the form of an ESS:  $m_n$  could be zero, or one, or a value between zero and one. That is, normal individuals could invest entirely in embryos, or entirely in sperm or in a combination of the two. The same is true for stressed individuals.

279

280 Two of the nine combinations, S(0,0) and S(1,1), can be immediately discounted,

since for them S = 0 which yields minimum reward. Thus neither  $\{0,0\}$  nor  $\{1,1\}$  can

ever be an ESS. This clearly makes sense, as it would never be beneficial for the

283 whole population of stressed and unstressed individuals to all invest only in embryos

or all invest only in sperm.

285

Let us now consider the case where both stressed and unstressed individuals adopt a

hermaphrodite strategy of investing in both embryos and sperm: i.e.  $0 < m_n, m_s < 1$ .

288

289 For this to occur, the following is a necessary condition:

291 
$$\frac{\partial S}{\partial m_n} = \frac{\partial S}{\partial m_s} = 0.$$

293 It is straightforward to show that this leads to the condition below:

294

295  $b\beta = \alpha$ .

296

- 297 This expression leads to our first general conclusion, only in very unlikely
- 298 circumstances, where parameter values are carefully tuned, could we get an ESS

where both stressed and unstressed individuals are hermaphrodite. In almost all

300 circumstances, we would expect one or both of them to specialise and invest all their

301 resources in either embryos or sperm. We will now consider the remaining six cases

302 where at least one party (the stressed or the unstressed individuals within the

303 population) specialises in only one sexual role.

304

305 Case 1) Unstressed individuals invest only in embryos, stressed individuals only 306 in sperm:  $\{m_n, m_s\} = \{0, 1\}$ .

307

308 For this to be an ESS necessary and sufficient conditions are that at  $\{0,1\}$  the

309 following to expressions are satisfied:

310

311 
$$\frac{\partial S}{\partial m_n} < 0, \quad \frac{\partial S}{\partial m_s} > 0.$$

312

313 From (9) and (10), this simplifies to the conditions

314	
315	$\alpha > 1, \beta b < 1.$
316	
317	Case 2) Unstressed individuals invest only in embryos, but stressed individuals
318	devide resources between both embryos and sperm: $\{m_n, m_s\} = \{0, 0 < m_s < 1\}$
319	
320	For this to be an ESS, necessary conditions are that at $\{0, m_s\}$ :
321	
322	$\frac{\partial S}{\partial m_n} < 0,  \frac{\partial S}{\partial m_s} = 0.$
323	
324	From (9) and (10), this simplifies to the conditions below:
325	
326	$\alpha > \beta b,  \beta b > 1$
327	
328	and give the equilibrium strategy for stressed individuals below:
329	
330	$m_s = \frac{1+\beta b}{2\beta b}.$
331	
332	For this to be an ESS we also need to verify stability against changes in the value of
333	$m_s$ . The derivative of S, and so R, is zero at $m_s = m_s^*$ . Since R is linear in $m_s$ , given the
334	population mixture, this means that $R$ is constant for all $m_s$ . As stated earlier in the

text following condition (3), this is enough to prevent invasion by an individual

336 playing an alternative value of  $m_s$ , and we thus have stability.

338	Case 3) Unstressed individuals invest only in sperm; stressed individuals only in
339	embryos: $\{m_n, m_s\} = \{1, 0\}.$
340	
341	For this to be an ESS, necessary and sufficient conditions are that at {1,0}
342	
343	$\frac{\partial S}{\partial m_n} > 0,  \frac{\partial S}{\partial m_s} < 0.$
344	
345	This simplifies to the conditions below:
346	
347	$\alpha < 1,  \beta b > 1.$
348	
349	Case 4) Unstressed individuals divide investment between both sperm and
350	embryos, whereas stressed individuals invest only in embryos: $\{m_n, m_s\} =$
350 351	embryos, whereas stressed individuals invest only in embryos: $\{m_n, m_s\} = \{0 < m_n < 1, 0\}.$
351 352	
351 352	$\{0 < m_n < 1, 0\}.$
<ul><li>351</li><li>352</li><li>353</li><li>354</li></ul>	$\{0 < m_n < 1, 0\}.$
<ul><li>351</li><li>352</li><li>353</li><li>354</li></ul>	{ $0 < m_n < 1,0$ }. For this to be an ESS, necessary conditions are that at { $m_n,0$ }
<ul> <li>351</li> <li>352</li> <li>353</li> <li>354</li> <li>355</li> </ul>	{ $0 < m_n < 1,0$ }. For this to be an ESS, necessary conditions are that at { $m_n,0$ }
<ul> <li>351</li> <li>352</li> <li>353</li> <li>354</li> <li>355</li> <li>356</li> </ul>	{ $0 < m_n < 1,0$ }. For this to be an ESS, necessary conditions are that at { $m_n,0$ } $\frac{\partial S}{\partial m_s} < 0,  \frac{\partial S}{\partial m_n} = 0.$
<ul> <li>351</li> <li>352</li> <li>353</li> <li>354</li> <li>355</li> <li>356</li> <li>357</li> <li>358</li> </ul>	{ $0 < m_n < 1,0$ }. For this to be an ESS, necessary conditions are that at { $m_n,0$ } $\frac{\partial S}{\partial m_s} < 0,  \frac{\partial S}{\partial m_n} = 0.$
<ul> <li>351</li> <li>352</li> <li>353</li> <li>354</li> <li>355</li> <li>356</li> <li>357</li> <li>358</li> </ul>	{ $0 < m_n < 1,0$ }. For this to be an ESS, necessary conditions are that at { $m_n,0$ } $\frac{\partial S}{\partial m_s} < 0,  \frac{\partial S}{\partial m_n} = 0.$ This simplifies to the conditions below:

363 
$$m_n = \frac{1+\beta b}{2}$$
.  
364  
365 This is shown to be an ESS in the same way as in Case 2.  
366  
367 **Case 5) Unstressed individuals divide investment between both sperm and**  
368 **embryos; stressed individuals invest only in sperm:**  $\{m_n, m_s\} = \{0 < m_n < 1, 1\}$ .  
369  
370 For this to be an ESS, necessary conditions are that at  $\{m_n, 1\}$   
371  
372  $\frac{\partial S}{\partial m_s} > 0$ ,  $\frac{\partial S}{\partial m_n} = 0$ .  
373  
374 This simplifies to the conditions below  
375  
376  $\alpha < 1$ ,  $\beta b < \alpha$ ,  
377  
378 and gives the equilibrium value of investment for unstressed individuals:  
379  
380  $m_n = \frac{1-\alpha c_1 - c_2}{2c_1} = \frac{1-\alpha}{2}$ .  
381  
382 This is shown to be an ESS in the same way as in Case 2.  
383

Case 6) Unstressed individuals invest only in sperm; stressed individuals divide investment between both embryos and sperm:  $\{m_n, m_s\} = \{1, 0 < m_s < 1\}$ . For this to be an ESS, necessary conditions are that at  $\{1, m_s\}$  $\frac{\partial S}{\partial m_n} > 0, \quad \frac{\partial S}{\partial m_n} = 0.$ This simplifies to the conditions that  $\alpha < \beta b, \alpha > 1,$ and also give the equilibrium value defining investment by stressed individuals:  $m_{s} = \frac{1 - c_{1} - \frac{c_{2}}{\alpha}}{2c_{2}} = \frac{\alpha - 1}{2\alpha}.$ 

399 This is again shown to be an ESS in the same way as in Case 2.

### **4. Discussion**

402 Combining all of these cases, it is easy to see that we always have a unique ESS.

403 For any combination of parameter values, we can find the ESS strategies for both

404 stressed and unstressed individuals. These are summarised in Figure 1.

406 When there are no stressed individuals, then  $s \rightarrow 0$ , and so  $\alpha \rightarrow 0$  and  $\beta \rightarrow 0$ , and thus 407 the ESS strategy is for individuals to divide their investment equally between embryos and sperm ( $m_n = 0.5$ ). This equal investment in embryos and sperm is a consequence 408 409 of us making the simple Fisherian assumption that both male and female gain 410 functions (change in fitness as a function of allocation) are linear. How allocation is 411 predicted to change as a small number of individuals become stressed depends on 412 parameter values. In particular it depends on whether  $b\beta > \alpha$ , which can be re-413 expressed as the condition:

$$414 \qquad \frac{b_n}{b_s} > \frac{p_m}{p_f} \,. \tag{11}$$

415

If condition (11) is satisfied, then stressed individuals should invest fully in embryos 416  $(m_s = 0)$  and unstressed individuals should increase their investment in sperm above 417 50% ( $m_n > 0.5$ ). As the fraction of the individuals that are stressed increases (but 418 419 remains relatively modest), the investment of unstressed individuals in sperm should 420 increase. If (11) is not satisfied, then stressed individuals should invest fully in sperm 421  $(m_s = 1)$  and unstressed individuals should increase their investment in embryos above 422 50% ( $m_n < 0.5$ ). As the fraction of the individuals that are stressed increases (but is 423 still relatively modest), investment of unstressed individuals in embryos should 424 increase.

425

426 We must now interpret condition (11) biologically. It is more likely to be satisfied if  $p_f$ 427  $> p_m$ , and we argue in the introduction that we expect this to be very unlikely. It is 428 also more likely to be satisfied if the trade-offs between embryos and sperm differ in 429 stressed and unstressed individuals such that embryos are more expensive (relative to

430 sperm) for unstressed individuals. Thus, another general conclusion that we draw 431 from investigation of our model is that the evolutionarily stable strategy for allocation 432 between male and female functions will be critically dependent on the effect of stress 433 on the trade-off between the costs of sperm and embryos (the parameter b in our 434 model). If b is equal to one then stress has no effect on this trade-off. If b is greater 435 than 1, then sperm are more expensive (relative to embryos) for stressed individuals 436 compared to unstressed individuals. Conversely, if b is less than one then sperm is 437 less expensive for stressed individuals. Thus, we identify evaluation of this factor as an important challenge to empiricists interested in the effect of stress on sex 438 439 allocation.

440

In the absence of any clear reason to think otherwise, if we assume that the relative physiological costs of embryos and sperm are unaffected by stress, then *b* will equal one and we would expect (11) not to be satisfied and so stressed individuals to allocate entirely to male function and unstressed individuals to increase their allocation to female function. However, this prediction holds only when the fraction of the population that is stressed is relatively small.

447

Within this region where only a small fraction of the population is stressed at any one time (the bottom left quadrant of Figure 1), the evolutionarily stable strategy for the unstressed individuals varies smoothly as parameter values are varied smoothly, whereas the ESS for stressed individuals undergoes dramatic change from complete specialisation in embryos on one side of the dividing line to complete specialisation in sperm on the other side. However, unless the dividing line given by expression (11) is

454 crossed, the specialist strategy of stressed individuals is insensitive to changes in455 parameter values.

456

We can also look at the situation where stressed individuals are very common in the population. This is the top right quadrant of Figure 1. In the extreme case where almost all individuals are stressed,  $s \rightarrow 1$ , then stressed individuals should divide their investment equally between embryos and sperm ( $m_s = 0.5$ ). A prediction of the model in this case is that the evolutionarily stable strategy played by individuals when everyone is stressed is the same as the strategy played by individuals when no-one is stressed.

464

As the number of stressed individuals declines from a high value, then again whether
or not expression (11) is satisfied is key to our predictions. If expression (11) is
satisfied then stressed individuals should invest less in sperm and unstressed

468 individuals should invest entirely in sperm. However, if expression (11) is not

469 satisfied, then in this case the model predicts that stressed individuals should increase

470 their investment in sperm and unstressed individuals should invest solely in embryos.


471

It is also possible to identify combinations of parameter values such that individuals of one type (either stressed or unstressed individuals) invest entirely in embryos and those of the other type invest entirely in sperm. For example, providing  $\alpha > 1$  and  $b\beta <$ 1 then unstressed individuals should invest entirely in embryos and stressed individuals entirely in sperm. If we make the same assumption as above that *b* is equal to one, then (because we expect that  $\alpha > \beta$ ), then the above prediction will hold for an intermediate range of *s* values. Thus when a moderate fraction of the population is

479 stressed, the model predicts a complete breakdown of hermaphroditism, with stressed

480 individuals producing only sperm and unstressed individuals only embryos.

481



504 stress does not strongly affect the relative physiological costs of sperm and embryos. 505 Empirical investigation of this assumption would be very valuable. Moreover, 506 although our model applies to plants and animals with at least some post-zygotic 507 investment of resources (excluding post-partum parental care, typically absent from 508 sessile organisms), even a slight difference in the production rate of sperm and eggs 509 would bring externally fertilizing invertebrates such as certain corals and hydroids [9] 510 within its remit. To our knowledge, empirical data on the relative speeds of sperm and 511 egg production by externally fertilizing invertebrates are lacking, but experimental 512 determination of these values would be invaluable in the present context.

513

514 We assume that individuals respond to their own state (whether they are stressed or 515 not) and that such response is influenced by the fraction of the population that is 516 stressed. It seems unlikely in many situations where this fraction varies unpredictably 517 on short-timescales that individuals will be able to track such variation and respond 518 appropriately through phenotypic plasticity. However, in many circumstances the 519 fraction affected will either remain (at least approximately) constant over longer 520 timescales, or vary predictably (for example seasonally, or in response to tidal cycles). 521 Hence, our model implicitly assumes such a situation and that selection has moulded 522 individuals to show responses to either being stressed or unstressed that are 523 appropriate to the fraction of stressed individuals experienced in the population as a 524 whole.

525

Two previously published ESS models capture some of the elements of the present
model. Freeman et al. [4] predict increasing male allocation by hermaphroditic plants

528 occupying patches of habitat where dryness physiologically restricts seed production.

529 The predicted bias toward pollen production depended on the proportion of the 530 population occupying dry patches. Dryness would be regarded as a form of stress in 531 our model. Day and Aarssen [8] predict greater male allocation in smaller individuals 532 within a population of hermaphroditic plants, where survivorship increases with size. 533 Smaller individuals are likely to die before the relatively prolonged process of seed 534 production can be completed, yet are still likely to produce a significant quantity of 535 pollen. If survivorship is also determined by site/patch quality independently of plant 536 size, individuals occupying poorer sites should increase male allocation. In the above 537 respects, therefore, Freeman et al. [4] and Day and Aarssen [8] make similar 538 predictions to each other, and predictions that are in accord with those discussed 539 above generated by our model. Our model contributes further to investigation of the 540 effects of environmental stress on sexual investment by explicitly considering 541 reciprocal dependence of optimal sex allocation in stressed and non-stressed 542 individuals as a function of survivorship and likelihood of being stressed. We very 543 much hope that the novel predictions generated in this regard are sufficiently clear and 544 general to encourage empirical testing. 545

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548

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581 Figure caption: Summary of model predictions. The strategy of an individual in 582 terms of its division of investment between male and female reproduction is defined 583 by the pair  $\{m_n, m_s, \}$ , this being the investment in male sexual function (called 584 "sperm" in the text) by an individual experiencing either normal (n) or stressed (s) conditions  $(m_n, m_s \in [0,1])$ . An individual playing  $\{m_n, m_s\}$  will produce a fraction 585 586  $m_n(m_s)$  of the sperm in the unstressed (stressed) condition that it would produce if it 587 chose to invest entirely in sperm:  $m_n=1(m_s=1)$ . It is assumed that all resources not 588 invested in male function are allocated to female function. Thus we explicitly assume 589 that individuals have a flexible strategy for investment between male and female 590 functions, and change strategy according to whether they perceive themselves as 591 stressed or not. The strategy is influenced by a combination of values given to each of 592 two parameter groups,  $\alpha$  and b $\beta$ . We assume that each individual has (independent) 593 probability s of being stressed. If an individual is stressed, then there is a probability 594 that the individual will die before resources allocated to sperm can be released as 595 functioning gametes. This is represented as a probability  $p_m$  that resources allocated to 596 male function lead to successful production of viable gametes. There is a similar 597 probability for investment in female function:  $p_f$ . As discussed in the introduction, the 598 overwhelming empirical evidence is for  $p_m$  to be greater than  $p_f$ .

$$599 \qquad \alpha = \frac{sp_m}{1-s}$$

600 and

$$601 \qquad \beta = \frac{sp_f}{1-s}$$

The parameter *b* describes the effect of stress on the trade-off between sperm and embryos. If *b* is equal to one then stress has no effect on this trade-off. If *b* is greater than 1, then sperm is more expensive (relative to embryos) for stressed individuals

- 605 compared to unstressed individuals. Conversely, if *b* is less than one then sperm is
- 606 less expensive for stressed individuals.