

UNIVERSITY OF THE WESTERN CAPE

FACULTY OF ECONOMIC AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCES

Social Movements and Planning Institutions
in Urban Transformation: Housing in
Metropolitan Harare, Zimbabwe (2000-2015)



UNIVERSITY *of the*
WESTERN CAPE

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Abstract

This thesis examines the interaction between social movements and planning institutions in the delivery of low-income housing in metropolitan Harare. Post-2000, the problem of housing in Zimbabwe has been characterised by the weak technical and financial capacity of local authorities and central government to deliver low-income housing and social movements challenging conventional housing delivery approaches and promoting alternatives. Between 2000 and 2015, the largest share of low-income housing was provided by housing movements. This study employs transformative theory (Friedmann, 2011) to explain how societies, especially marginalised people, organise alternative services pertinent to their lifestyles. The thesis draws on 95 key informant interviews, 14 focus group discussions (with 120 members of housing movements), and enumeration survey data (covering 6,636 households). It uses extensive material from document analysis (council resolutions, council committee reports, departmental annual reports, co-operative audits and reports, and government investigation reports). This study uses purposive sampling in which defined criteria were used to select housing movements. The study suggests that there has been urban transformation in metropolitan Harare. As argued in this thesis, urban transformation is evidenced by changes in the urban fabric (for instance, through new housing and infrastructure services for the predominantly poor population), reconfiguration of power (with the urban poor playing a vital role in urban development) and the adoption by planning institutions of grassroots-centred planning and housing delivery approaches. This transformation seems to be the result of four factors. First, the sudden increase in social movements involved in the ‘formal and informal’ delivery of low-income housing. Secondly, the drastic decline in the capacity of central and local governments to fulfil their housing delivery mandates. Thirdly, the changes to low-income housing delivery approaches in terms of both planning and housing policy and practice. Lastly, the Fast Track Land Reform Programme has had a wide impact on access to housing in peri-urban areas. The study concludes that urban transformation has primarily been the result of social movements placing pressure on planning authorities which has brought a new urban development order. Interactions between social movements and planning institutions have been characterised by struggles, contestation and alliances, which continue to profoundly shape urban planning and housing in Zimbabwe.

Keywords: Planning institutions, social movements, planning, housing, contestations, alliances, contradictions.

Cape Town

February 2017.

Declaration

I declare that *Social Movements and Planning Institutions in Urban Transformation: Housing in Metropolitan Harare, Zimbabwe (2000-2015)* is my own work, that it has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other university, and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged as complete references.

Davison Muchadenyika

February 21, 2017.

Signed.....



Special Dedication

I dedicate this study to the urban poor across the world who are entangled in housing struggles with elites and authorities.



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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AGMs	Annual General Meetings
BSAC	British South Africa Company
CBOs	Community Based Organisations
CHITREST	Chitungwiza Residents' Trust
CHRRRA	Chitungwiza Residents and Rate Payers Association
COH	City of Harare
CSHD	Corporate Services and Housing Department (City of Harare)
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
DA	District Administrator
DHCS	Department of Housing and Community Services (now CSHD)
DOS	Dialogue on Shelter
DPP	Department of Physical Planning, MLGPWNH.
DRUP	Department of Rural and Urban Planning
DUPS	Department of Urban Planning Services (City of Harare)
DZ	Dzivarasekwa
EHHCSLC	Education, Health, Housing, Community Services and Licensing Committee
ELB	Epworth Local Board
EMA	Environmental Management Agency
ERDA	Epworth Residents Development Association
EU	European Union
FEDUP	Federation of the Urban and Rural Poor
FGDs	Focus Group Discussions
FTLRP	Fast Track Land Reform Programme
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GN	General Notice
GIS	Geographic Information System
GoZ	Government of Zimbabwe
HSUFF	Harare Slum-upgrading Finance Facility
HSUP	Harare Slum-upgrading Programme
HSUS	Harare Slum-upgrading Strategy
IDAZIM	Institute for a Democratic Alternative for Zimbabwe
LEDRIZ	Labour and Economic Development Research Institute of Zimbabwe

MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MHNSA	Ministry of National Housing and Social Amenities (2009-13)
MLGPWNH	Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
MOSMECD	Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprises and Co-operative Development
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MYGEC	Ministry of Youth, Gender and Employment Creation
MP	Member of Parliament
NDPs	National Development Plans
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NHDP	National Housing Delivery Programme
OHDC	Odar Housing Development Consortium
OM/RO	Operation Murambatsvina / Restore Order
POS	Political Opportunity Structures
RDT	Relative Deprivation Theory
RMT	Resource Mobilisation Theory
RTI	Research Triangle International
SAHPF	South African Homeless People's Federation
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programmes
SDI	Slum (Shack) Dwellers International
SGM	Special General Meeting
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SMOs	Social Movement Organisations
UDCORP	Urban Development Corporation
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCHS	United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (now UN-Habitat)
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UN-Habitat	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UPF	Urban Poor Fund
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

USD	United States Dollar
WADCO	Ward Development Committee
Zanu-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
ZCTU	Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union
ZIHOPFE	Zimbabwe Homeless People Federation
ZimStat	Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency
ZINAHCO	Zimbabwe National Association of Housing Cooperatives
ZINWA	Zimbabwe National Water Authority
ZRP	Zimbabwe Republic Police
ZTA	Zimbabwe Tobacco Association
ZW\$	Zimbabwean Dollar



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
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Chapter One

Introduction: The Housing Challenge

1.1 Introduction

Starting from the understanding that urban areas are incubators of revolutionary ideas, ideals, and movements (Harvey, 2012), this thesis investigates the interaction of social movements and planning institutions in the delivery of low-income housing in metropolitan Harare. This interaction has led to urban transformation, which is defined in the thesis as a change in the urban fabric (for instance, through new housing and infrastructure services to the predominantly urban poor population), reconfiguration of power (with the urban poor playing a vital role in urban development) and the adoption by planning institutions of grassroots-centred planning and housing delivery approaches.¹

This study uses Tarrow's definition of social movements as "collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities" (2011: 9). In cities, social movements challenge planning processes and housing delivery approaches and offer alternative approaches that are pro-poor and inclusive. Social movements are important agents for social change and transformation in cities (Miraftab, 2009; Fainstein, 2010; Friedmann, 2011; Harvey, 2012). They receive technical and financial support from social movement organisations (SMOs).² SMOs can be defined as a "complex, or formal, organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or countermovement and attempts to implement those goals" (McCarthy and Zald 1977 cited in Porta & Diani, 2006: 141).³

¹ The study assesses urban transformation through looking at among other things the following: policy changes that have significantly altered the way planning is conducted and the resultant impact on low-income housing; the role of the urban poor in providing themselves with housing and related infrastructure, and the influence of the urban poor in shaping urban development processes. As such, issues of illegality in low-cost housing do not count as transformation.

² Specific SMOs referred to in this thesis are Dialogue on Shelter and the Zimbabwe National Association of Housing Co-operatives.

³ It is important to note that the term SMOs is "very ambiguous, as it has taken very different meanings among different authors" (Porta & Diani, 2006: 141).

The specific social movements referred to in the thesis are housing co-operatives and the Zimbabwe Homeless Peoples Federation.⁴ The common similarities of social movements are goal orientation through sustained actions, use of standard set of actions, and display of unity, numbers and commitment towards a common goal (Christiansen, 2011: 4-5). These similarities are also common in housing co-operatives, hence qualifying them to be social movements. Further, a social movement is “a group of people who endeavour to build a radically new social order” (Zirakzadeh, 2006: 4). The aim of housing co-operatives is to change planning and housing outcomes within cities. In other words, housing co-operatives advocate for a new order in terms of the conduct of planning and resultant housing delivery processes.

In this study, planning institutions refers to state agencies involved in urban planning and the organisational cultures, policies, regulations and laws that guide and inform the practice of urban planning. The main planning institutions discussed here are the City of Harare, Chitungwiza Municipality, Epworth Local Board and the local government ministry.⁵ Planning institutions perform two main functions namely the planning and governance of urban areas. Planning is defined as a “self-conscious collective effort to imagine or re-imagine a town, city, urban region or wider territory and to translate the result into priorities for area investment, conservation measures, new and upgraded areas of settlement, strategic infrastructure investments and principles of land-use regulation” (Healey, 2004: 46). The main planning functions are development planning, development control and planning enforcement. In Zimbabwe, development planning means “the planning of regions, districts and local areas with the object of conserving and improving the physical environment and in particular promoting health, safety, order, amenity, convenience and general welfare, as well as efficiency and economy....” (GoZ, 1996). It includes the production of master and local plans - both are statutory plans which guide the development and configuration of land uses in urban centres. Development control means the functions given to planning authorities to permit, monitor and

⁴ In this study, these social movements are referred to interchangeably as housing movements. I acknowledge that some housing co-operatives (especially those formed and led by powerful political elites) may not necessarily qualify as social movements. However, other co-operatives have most characteristics that qualify them as social movements.

⁵ The three (City of Harare, Chitungwiza Municipality, Epworth Local Board) constitute local governments (Local Authorities or Councils) in Zimbabwe. In terms of planning, there are what are called Local Planning Authorities (LPA) which according to the Regional Town and Country Planning Act (Part III) are municipalities and town councils mandated with master and local planning and subdivisions and consolidations. Harare and Chitungwiza are LPA while Epworth does not have local planning functions. Instead, planning functions in Epworth are conducted by a government-entity, the Department of Physical Planning. The definition of planning institutions proffered in this study is comprehensive as it includes planning agencies (local authorities), policies, planning regulations and laws.

regulate development on land uses. Planning enforcement deals with the powers given to local authorities to enforce regulations within cities. These regulations are to do with building, environment, business and social enterprises, transport and infrastructure. Planning enforcement uses instruments such as permits, licenses and orders. Permits are issued and enforced primarily on planning developments, while licenses are for business and social enterprises. Orders are mainly issued on limiting or halting developments and activities deemed legal or illegal by local authorities. The interaction between housing movements and planning institutions is often either conflictual or complementary. It is the nature of this interaction that this thesis seeks to understand.

As mentioned above, urbanisation seems to play a key role in the formation of revolutionary ideas. In this instance, the proportion of urban population in Zimbabwe has increased from 10.64% in 1950 to 38.25% in 2010, and it is expected to rise to 64.35% by 2050 (UN-Habitat, 2010). However, urbanisation is taking place in a context of weak financial and technical capacity by local authorities to provide housing in general and to low-income groups in particular (Muchadenyika, 2015a). In other words, urbanisation is occurring under depressed economic conditions. For a second decade running, Zimbabwe has been plagued by a socio-economic and political crisis (Barclay, 2010; Mbeki, 2009; Kanyenze et al., 2011; UNDP, 2008). Its effects have manifested in urban centres mainly in the drastic informalisation of settlements and economic activities. Most authors have described the crisis as one of governance (Sachikonye, 2002; Chikuhwa, 2004; Raftopoulos, 2006; Potts, 2006a; Bourne, 2011; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013). The effect of a governance crisis in a highly centralised state like Zimbabwe has been the weakening and the subsequent collapse of state institutions, with local authorities seemingly not spared.

The Government of Zimbabwe's capacity to steer national development is weak (UNDP, 2010). By extension, urban governments are finding it difficult to perform basic functions and provide urban services. A major urban crisis is under way in Zimbabwe, as evidenced by inadequate service delivery of water, sanitation, electricity, and housing, among other services (Muchadenyika & Williams, 2016; Muchadenyika, 2017). One of the key challenges of urbanisation is to make available affordable and habitable housing. Historically, in post-independence Zimbabwe, the government played a key role in providing low-cost housing to cope with rapid urbanisation (Wekwete, 1994; LEDRIZ, 2012). However, prior to 2000, Zimbabwe entered a period of prolonged socio-economic and political turmoil. Funding from international financial institutions (such as the World Bank) and bilateral support from the

United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and European Union (EU) in urban development and housing, in particular, could no longer be extended to Zimbabwe. The country became isolated for a number of reasons, among them an unserviced debt, human rights abuses, and property rights violations (Raftopoulos & Phimister, 2004; Phimister, 2005; OSISA, 2007; Raftopoulos, 2006; Home, 2007; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). Other scholars argue that the land reform programme was key in Zimbabwe's isolation by Western nations (Moyo & Yeros, 2007). However, as argued in this thesis, land reform played a key role in availing land for low-income housing in and around major urban centres, despite inherent contestations.

Starting at the turn of the millennium, three interrelated processes have characterised planning institutions and social movements in housing delivery in metropolitan Harare. The first process is the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP), aimed at taking and re-distributing white-owned commercial farms to black Zimbabweans (GoZ, 2001). The arguments for and against Zimbabwe's land reform programme have been dealt with extensively elsewhere (Stoneman, 2000; Moyo, 2001, 2011; Moyo & Yeros 2005; Alexander, 2006; Cousins, 2006; Hammar, 2008; Thomas, 2003; Scoones et al., 2010; Rutherford, 2012). This study does not in any way attempt to weigh in on that debate. In peri-urban areas, land reform provided more land for urban expansion and housing. People grouped together in housing co-operatives and settled in peri-urban areas both formally and informally, resulting in new and different forms of urban development.

The second process is the ascendancy of the opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), in governing urban centres, much to the consternation of the ruling party, the Zimbabwe National Union Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF). Political contestation between Zanu-PF and the MDC over the administration of urban areas weakened local authorities (Olowu, 2010; RTI & IDAZIM, 2010; Musekiwa, 2012; Muchadenyika, 2014a). By extension, urban development and housing, in particular, became politicised and deeply contested (McGregor, 2013; Muchadenyika, 2015b). Land allocation in urban areas became a political issue and involved clashes among various actors (housing co-operatives, local authorities, Zanu-PF, central government, and land developers). Housing movements took advantage of this political contestation to access urban land and build houses for themselves (Masuko, 2008). In this study, housing movements are referred to as social movements involved in low-income housing through challenging existing housing delivery arrangements and promoting alternative methods.

The third process is the drastic increase in social movements in the form of housing co-operatives and the formation of the Zimbabwe Homeless Peoples Federation (ZIHOPFE) (referred to here as “the Federation”), which persistently challenged housing delivery institutional arrangements.⁶ The upsurge in housing movements was partly in response to the economic crisis which had rendered the provision of affordable housing by local authorities untenable (GoZ, 2009a; Masimba-Nyama, 2012). By definition, a co-operative is “an organisation of underprivileged people who can pool their resources (human, financial and material) towards achievement of a common goal” (Chirisa & Munzwa, 2008: 16). The co-operative and Federation movement challenged and provided alternatives to the conventional housing delivery process (Masuko, 2008; Chitekwe-Biti, 2009). The conventional form of housing provision is through local authorities allocating housing land or actual housing units to individuals on the housing waiting list (Muchadenyika, 2015a).

Post-2000, housing co-operatives and the Federation became the largest provider of low-income housing. For example, between 2000 and 2012, the City of Harare allocated 12,554 housing stands to 254 housing co-operatives, with 2,301 housing units completed (Muchadenyika, 2015a: 4). In 2011, the City of Harare allocated 2,954 residential stands to 76 housing co-operatives and 16 individuals on the housing waiting list (in excess of 500,000 home-seekers) (COH DHCS, 2012). During the same year, the city trained and registered 243 housing co-operatives with a total membership of 15,311. As of 2014, the Federation had a membership of more than 55,000 households and had facilitated access to housing stands for 15,000 households in Zimbabwe’s 52 local authorities (Muchadenyika, 2015a: 4). Such developments make housing movements an important area of study in order to understand how housing movements interact with planning institutions.

This study focuses on metropolitan Harare, which is composed of Harare, Chitungwiza and Epworth, where about 47% of Zimbabwe’s urban population lives (ZimStat, 2013a). Such a concentration of people has produced enormous competition for housing. However, since 2000

⁶ The genealogy of the housing co-operative movement can be traced to the government’s Marxist ideology immediately after independence. The first housing co-operatives are Cotton Printers (workplace-based) and Kugarika Kushinga (community-based, formed in 1986 and registered in 1990). In terms of the growth of registered housing co-operatives, there were two in 1985, 47 in 1992 and 135 in 1999 (Chirisa & Munzwa, 2008). The Ministry of Small, Medium Enterprises and Co-operative Development indicate that, as of 2015, there were about 3,500 registered housing co-operatives in Zimbabwe. These statistics show that the co-operative movement increased drastically after 2000. ZIHOPFE was formed in 1999 as an urban poor movement to challenge existing housing delivery approaches and pioneer alternatives.

the three local authorities (Harare, Chitungwiza and Epworth) have not been able to provide any new housing schemes to urban residents. In addition, the governance and allocation of land for housing in metropolitan Harare have been deeply contested by political parties, social movements, local authorities and central government (Muchadenyika, 2015b). It is in this context that housing movements have risen to prominence.

The choice of metropolitan Harare as the focal area for this study is based on its being Zimbabwe's capital and housing the majority of the country's urban population. The city's population has been expanding against a constrained and dilapidated urban infrastructure. As such, the city has a housing backlog estimated to be over 500,000 units (COH DHCS, 2012), against a population of 1,485,231 (ZimStat, 2013a).⁷ Furthermore, Epworth provides a unique trajectory of urban development in the sense that it developed from a village of 500 families (Chatiza & Mlalazi, 2009) in 1892 to an urban centre with 167,462 people (ZimStat, 2013a), without the conventional form of urban planning. The settlement developed informally over time, with people allocating themselves land and building houses without reference to planning permissions and approvals. At present, Epworth is undergoing *in situ* upgrading, the first of its kind in Zimbabwe (Butcher, 1995; Chitekwe-Biti et al, 2012). The *in situ* upgrading is a partnership among residents, the Federation, Epworth Local Board and central government.

Chitungwiza is Harare's dormitory town, providing significant housing and accommodation to Harare's workforce (Drakakis-Smith, 1992; Rambanapasi, 1994). However, over the years, the housing shortage in Chitungwiza "is not only desperate, but has also reached the point where it has become pathetic, especially when one takes into account the fact that on average up to 30 people live in a single residential unit" (Ramsamy, 2006: 155). Much of the land in Chitungwiza is state-owned (Rambanapasi, 1994; MLGPWNH, 2013a), a feature constraining the ability of the municipality to control housing delivery.

Post-2000, housing co-operatives in Chitungwiza played an important role in facilitating housing delivery. As of 2013, Chitungwiza had 26 registered housing co-operatives (MLGPWNH, 2013a), which co-operatives use political opportunities to facilitate easy access

⁷ The housing backlog figure of 500,000 raises questions. For instance, using an average size household of 3,9 (according to 2012 census) means that 1,95 million people need houses, whereas Harare's urban population stands at 1,485,231. This analysis points to two things. First, the Housing Waiting List is not an accurate methodology of estimating housing demand. Second, the city requires a housing needs assessment to indicate accurately the housing demand in the city and plan based on credible evidence.

to land, though with much contestation. After an overview of what this study entails, the research problem, study aim and research questions are explained below.

1.2 Framing the Study

1.2.1 Research Problem

The transformative role of urban social movements and community action is fundamental in shaping and re-making cities (Harvey, 2001; 2012). Urban movements are not only active in the Global North; social movements in general and urban social movements in particular are also present in the Global South (Williams, 1989; Mitlin & Mogaladi, 2013; Miraftab, 2009; Holston, 2008; Pieterse, 2008). In Zimbabwe, the failure of state institutions to provide adequate urban services to citizens has triggered collective action and mobilisation towards alternative urban futures, in particular housing. Post-2000, the problem of housing in Zimbabwe has been characterised by the weak financial and technical capacity of local authorities and central government to deliver low-income housing and social movements challenging conventional housing delivery approaches and promoting alternatives. In particular, ordinary people through grassroots movements, pool resources and skills, acquire or invade land, build houses for members and install infrastructure (water, roads, and sanitation). These social movements emerged and assumed greater significance after the country entered a period of unprecedented socio-economic and political crisis, beginning around 2000 and continuing to this day.

Alongside unemployment, one of the most serious problems facing Zimbabwe in the post-independence era is the critical shortage of housing for the low-income urban poor (Ramsamy, 2006). The provision of urban services and housing, in particular, has been marked by contestation among citizens, political parties, civil society and grassroots organisations (McGregor, 2013; Muchadenyika, 2014a; 2015b). The state has often used its apparatus (police, army and intelligence) and planning instruments (planning law and regulations) to crush people's initiatives in solving the enormous housing challenge. A case in point is the infamous Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order (OM/RO), which demolished houses in Zimbabwe's urban centres. An estimated 700,000 people lost their homes and livelihoods and a further 2.4 million people were affected in one way or another (UN, 2005). Nonetheless, grassroots movements continued to challenge the power and authority of planning institutions and to pioneer new housing approaches. This is the central focus of this thesis.

Zimbabwe's housing backlog stands at 1.25 million units at least, although there is no comprehensive assessment to substantiate this figure (GoZ, 2009a, 2012). Harare's estimated housing backlog is in excess of 500,000 units for a population of 1,468,767 people. The planning system has been singled out as one of the major impediments to housing delivery. The Government of Zimbabwe has criticised town planning standards for being "very high, very elaborate, rigid and not amenable to physical and climatic conditions", and irresponsible to end users, with the Government castigating planners for planning for themselves (GoZ, 2009a). Moreover, the urban planning system is inherently technocratic, robustly bureaucratised, and manifestly modernist, and has not responded adequately to changes over time (Kamete, 2007).

Such a planning context has produced contestations, contradictions and alliances between planning institutions and social movements regarding the production and delivery of housing services. In the context of a socio-economic and political crisis, the post-2000 period saw significant changes to housing delivery. Triggered by the socio-political and economic crisis, and in some instances taking advantage of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme, social movements in cities rose to prominence, advocating for land access and speedy delivery of housing.⁸ These movements appeared in the form of housing co-operatives, community-based organisations, and non-governmental organisations that challenged conventional housing delivery approaches (Muchadenyika, 2015a).

As such, in Zimbabwe's cities, a new and particular form of urban development took effect as social movements reversed the procurement processes of formal housing (obtain title to land, install infrastructure, build houses and move onto land). In other words, there is a semblance of radical or insurgent planning which is advancing urban transformation through social movements changing the existing power relations being exercised by planning institutions, and reducing barriers to poor people's access to housing. How can this be explained? Based on Friedmann's transformative theory, this thesis suggests that the interaction between planning institutions and social movements in metropolitan Harare has transformed urban society. Such

⁸ The FTRLRP put into motion radical transformation in cities as ordinary people accessed housing land with formerly agricultural or ideas farms converted to built-up areas. The radical nature of the programme spilled into the resultant planning processes. In essence, the FTRLRP reversed conventional planning processes of lay out planning, surveying, servicing, house construction and occupation.

interaction is primarily analysed through two issues: planning and low-income housing delivery. Understanding such interaction is the core of this study.

1.2.2 Study Aim and Objectives

The aim of the research is to investigate the interaction between social movements and planning institutions in the delivery of low-income housing. The specific objectives are to:

1. Interrogate how social movements are contributing to low-income housing delivery.
2. Examine how planning institutions are aiding and/or constraining low-income housing delivery.
3. Underscore the alliances and/or contestations between planning institutions and social movements in housing delivery.
4. Critique the roles of social movements and planning institutions in urban transformation.

1.2.3 Research Questions

The study is guided by the following research question: How are social movements and planning institutions interacting in low-income housing delivery in Zimbabwe? This raises the following four questions:

1. How are social movements contributing to housing delivery?
2. How are planning institutions aiding and/or constraining housing delivery?
3. What are the alliances and contestations between planning institutions and social movements in housing delivery?
4. How have social movements and planning institutions contributed to urban transformation?

1.3 Research Assumptions

The thesis suggests that the interaction between social movements and planning institutions in housing delivery has transformed urban society in metropolitan Harare. Both the manner in which planning is conducted and the nature and conduct of social movements have affected the delivery of low-income housing. It is essential that governing authorities pay attention to issues such as contestation, contradictions and collaboration among actors in housing delivery. This research attempts to contribute to such understanding by focusing on social movements and planning institutions in housing delivery between 2000 and 2015 in metropolitan Harare.

1.4 Urbanisation, Planning and the Housing Challenge

There seems to be a link between urbanisation, planning and housing. Urbanisation normally refers to the “demographic process of shifting the balance of usually national population from ‘rural’ to ‘urban’ areas” (Jenkins, Smith & Wang, 2007: 9). The 2013 national census puts Zimbabwe’s urbanisation level as 33% despite UN-Habitat (2010) having estimated 38.25% in 2010. In spite of such statistical variation, more people are living in Zimbabwean cities than ever before, making it imperative to have inclusive approaches to urban planning and housing delivery.

One key method of managing urbanisation is planning (UN-Habitat, 2009). A comprehensive definition views urban planning as a “self-conscious collective effort to imagine or re-imagine a town, city, urban region or wider territory and to translate the result into priorities for area investment, conservation measures, new and upgraded areas of settlement, strategic infrastructure investments and principles of land-use regulation” (Healey, 2004: 46). Housing is often an outcome of planning. Conceptually, the term ‘housing’ means both the production of houses and the processes associated with housing provision (Jenkins, Smith & Wang, 2007). Planning and housing are functions carried out by planning institutions, and hence are principal issues under investigation in this thesis.

1.4.1 The Global Context

The processes of urbanisation and their attendant effects are among the prominent twenty-first century challenges confronting humanity globally. The current wave of urbanisation “presents daunting pressures and decisions for urban citizens and especially activists, leaders and managers as they figure out how to cope and flourish” (Pieterse, 2008: 16). Statistics indicate that more than half of the world’s population is now urban (UN-Habitat, 2012). At the same time, urbanisation is a positive force for socio-economic and political transformation in that it presents local and regional governments with a challenge to adopt policies that maximise the benefits of urbanisation (UN-Habitat, 2008). As the world becomes urbanised, the urbanisation of poverty is a profound challenge. The lived realities of urban poverty are evident in informal settlements characterised by overcrowding and no or limited access to such services as water, sanitation and transport.

At this point, it is important to note David Harvey’s assertion that urbanisation plays a crucial role in the absorption of capital surpluses while at the same time dispossessing urban masses

of any right to the city (Harvey, 2012). Piketty (2014) argues that the present capitalist system perpetuates inequality, which threatens social justice. In addition, Body-Gendrot (2000: 227) has argued that

[t]he market does not favour social cohesiveness but generates tensions: it reinforces economic polarisation and inequalities in cities, the recomposition of space unveils power conflicts among major actors, and hundreds of thousands of marginalised people and their children may use their ‘voice’ as a threat to express their claims.

In order to avoid the marginalisation of the urban poor, it is vital that urban social movements assert their voices in the planning and management of cities. Without such collective action and voice, cities become centres of the rich, with poor people driven to urban fringes characterised by squalid living conditions. The challenge is how to make the process of urbanisation inclusive, catering for the needs of both the rich and poor. Reforming urban planning systems is vital in addressing current and emerging urban challenges, especially climate change, rapid urbanisation, poverty, informality and safety (UN-Habitat, 2009: xxvii). Therefore, alternative forms of urban planning are important in managing urbanisation. Put simply, planning must have a human face: it must be pro-poor and inclusive in approach, especially in relation to the provision of housing and related services to the urban poor.

As suggested thus far, one of the foremost urbanisation challenges is the provision of adequate and affordable housing to urban residents, in particular the poor and marginalised. In many instances, poor people themselves act “as active agents in getting land for housing – either negotiating tenure for land they occupy or negotiating for new sites on which they can build” (Satterthwaite, 2009: 299). Housing struggles have not been without conflicts, with the state being challenged to devise inclusive planning and housing delivery approaches. Compared to the rest of the world; “housing deprivation is greatest in Africa, where 72% of the urban population are slum-dwellers, followed by Asia at 46% and Latin America at 32%” (Tibaijuka, 2009: 2). Slums are characterised by lack of access to safe drinking water, sanitation or secure tenure, and a lack of durable buildings and overcrowding (UNCHS, 2003). Table 1 quantifies the global scale of urbanisation and the need for housing.

Table 1: People Requiring Housing and Urban Services by 2030

Urban population (2003)	3,043,934,680
Estimated urban population (2030)	4,944,679,063
Additional urban population (2003-2030)	1,900,744,383
Population living in slums ⁹ (2001)	923,986,000
People requiring housing and urban services by 2030	2,824,730,283

Source: UN-Habitat, 2005: 5.

Table 1 shows that close to 3 billion people are in need of housing and urban services by 2030. This poses a challenge to urban practitioners, local and national governments and international development organisations to critically rethink housing provision in the context of rapid urbanisation globally and specifically in sub-Saharan Africa.

1.4.2 The Sub-Saharan African Context

Urbanisation is a major challenge confronting African nations south of the Sahara. Many towns and cities in this region are dealing with crises compounded by rapid population growth, particularly in peri-urban areas; lack of access to shelter, infrastructure and services by predominantly poor populations; weak local governments; and serious environmental issues (Watson, 2009a: 151). This is true for Zimbabwe, as cities are characterised by drastic increases in informal settlements and economic activities, erratic service delivery and neglected urban infrastructure. The *2010 State of African Cities Report* (UN-Habitat, 2010: ii) observes that “as the urbanisation of African poverty makes further progress, the prospects of a dignified and productive life continues to elude the poorest among Africans”. Rapid urbanisation in the developing world is seriously outstripping the capacities of cities to provide services to citizens adequately (Cohen, 2006). Under-provision of essential urban services by city governments is prevalent, prompting people to devise alternative service delivery methods themselves.

Urbanisation literature on contemporary African cities can be broadly categorised as either optimistic or pessimistic. Pessimistic studies depict African cities as gloomy, hopeless and chaotic (Gandy, 2005; Gberie, 2005; Kurtz, 1998; Lewis, 2005; Schwab, 2002). On the other hand, optimists present a more nuanced and complex understanding of African cities than the gloomy generalisations of ‘Afro-pessimists’ (Anderson, 2002; de Boeck & Plissart, 2004; Diouf, 1999; Simone, 2001; 2004). A more practical and humane approach, which this study adopts, is that African cities are ordinary cities (Robinson, 2006) and ‘works in progress’ driven

⁹ UN-Habitat’s computation regarding slums includes four components, namely improved water, improved sanitation, durable housing and sufficient living area.

by the imagination of ordinary people constrained by and adapting to prevailing conditions (Simone, 2004: 1-2).

Mike Davis in *Planet of Slums* paints a disturbing picture of African cities as “growing prodigiously despite ruined import substitution industries, shrunken public sectors and downwardly mobile middle classes”, observing that “the African situation, of course, is more extreme” (Davis, 2005: 16, 18). He notes that more than 75% of the urban population in Nigeria, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Sudan live in ‘slums’. Such figures have, however, been contested by Myers (2011), who questions the data sources, the figures’ authenticity, and lack of a functional definition of what constitutes a slum. In this regard, I draw from UN-Habitat’s recent urban slum population data for sub-Saharan Africa. In 2012, the average African urban population living in slum areas was 61.7% (UN-Habitat, 2013). Slums show the magnitude of the housing challenge in African cities. It has been argued that between 70 and 95% of new housing in most African cities is unauthorised (Hague, 1997: 142).

Urbanisation without development is what has contributed to the image of African cities as degrading, irrecoverable and hopeless places (Locatelli & Nugent, 2009: 2). The distressing features of African cities, as highlighted by many scholars, include “unregulated growth, limited opportunities for gainful employment in the formal economy, severe environmental degradation, lack of decent and affordable housing, failing and neglected infrastructure, absence of basic social services, pauperization, criminality, negligent city-management, and increasing inequalities” (Murray & Myers, 2006: 1). Accordingly, “the real challenge is not merely to describe the failure of cities in Africa to emulate Western models of urbanisation, but to seek a deeper comprehension of why these urban agglomerations have developed the way they have” (ibid: 3). This entails understanding how the cities developed over time as well as the current urban development needs of the African city.

Nonetheless, the UN-Habitat’s *2009 Global Report on Human Settlements: Planning Sustainable Cities* (UN-Habitat, 2009) pinpoints urban planning in solving the many challenges affecting African cities. These challenges include growing informality, climate change, infrastructure deterioration, inequality and economic decline, and are a result of anti-urban policies or the absence of urban policies in many African cities (Pieterse, 2010). This is mainly because planning in Africa “owes much to the colonial legacies that inform the shape and composition of African urban spaces and places” (Odendaal, 2012: 174). The colonial legacy of planning in Africa manifests itself in planning legislation, institutions, education, and in the

plans themselves. As such, Porter (2010: 154) argues for the decolonisation of planning, because “the domain of planning is one area of many where injustices against indigenous peoples remain”. The link between planning and the realities of colonial legacies on the ground provides the *raison d'être* for planning reforms in much of Africa.

Since the fall of colonialism in many parts of Africa, little emphasis has been placed on local conditions when adopting Western urban planning methods. Urban planning continues to perpetuate social and economic segregation (Jenkins, Smith & Wang, 2007; Njoh, 2007; Myers, 2011; UN-Habitat, 2009). Planning systems, particularly in the Global South, have changed very slowly and some hardly at all, with many approaches and systems reflecting planning ideas from the Global North simplistically transferred to southern contexts through complex processes of colonialism and globalisation (Watson, 2009b: 151). Yet, planning ideas must be “articulated within discourses that represent particular notions of space and place, and which carry certain rationalities and normative assumptions about social life in the sites of the materialisation of these ideas” (Tait & Jensen, 2007: 114).

Such arguments allow one to focus on the context specific planning models that respond to prevailing socio-economic, environmental and political conditions. Questioning conventional planning methods, Pieterse (2008: 6) argues for radical incrementalism, which he defines as “a disposition and sensibility that believes in deliberate actions of social transformation but through a multiplicity of processes and imaginations, none of which assumes or asserts a primary significance over other struggles”. However, the Zimbabwean case shows deep political struggles in which urban planning is entangled in the contested realm of socio-economic and political power relations. The notion of radical incrementalism in urban planning is thus a struggle that entails meddling in institutionalised practices and confronting state power.

In urban literature, there is an increasing acceptance of the growth of informal settlements and the informalisation of formal settlements in African cities (Harrison et al., 2008; Grant, 2009; Muchadenyika, 2015b). Such informalisation manifests itself in “unregistered social networks in the built environment, livelihood strategies, social reproduction, cultural organisation or political mobilisation” (Myers, 2011: 73). Informal settlements are an important part of urban Africa, as they show both the extent of the housing need and incremental steps to housing. Other scholars (for instance, Locatelli & Nugent, 2009: 7) view the “crisis of African cities as attributed to the informality, ‘illegality’ and anarchy of their economies”. Here, it is vital to

recognise that the growth of informal settlements is a result of the exclusionary structure of the planning, socio-economic and political system. Furthermore, decreasing state engagement in low-income housing in sub-Saharan Africa has “resulted in increasing informalisation of housing provision for the majority of urban dwellers, while the minority benefit from increased formal housing market activity” (Jenkins, Smith & Wang, 2007: 229). The above analysis shows that African cities are grappling with challenges of urbanisation and housing, with Zimbabwe being no exception.

1.4.3 The Zimbabwean Context

The proportion of the urban population in Zimbabwe’s was 20.4% in 1950, increased to 38.25% in 2010, and is expected to rise to 64.25% by 2050 (UN-Habitat, 2010). Urbanisation has led to many challenges, including urban poverty, inadequate housing and provision of services (water, energy and refuse collection) and environmental degradation (Munzwa & Jonga, 2010). Table 2 shows some urbanisation and housing statistics for Zimbabwe. The challenges of urbanisation have been exacerbated by the country’s sluggish economic growth. Potts (2006b) writes that the reality of urbanisation in Zimbabwe is one of ‘shattered dreams and hopes’. Moreover, most of the urban infrastructure (water, sanitation, transport, health, electricity) has collapsed (AfDB, 2011; UN-Habitat, 2010) and continues to be overstretched by the increasing urban population. Suffice it to say that urban life is susceptible to service rationing by local authorities as a way of managing the high service demand.

Table 2: Urbanisation and Housing Statistics for Zimbabwe

Urban population (000)	Level of urbanisation (%)	Level of urbanisation (%)		Proportion of urban population living in slum area (%)		Urban slum population at mid-year (000)	
		2010	2030	2000	2009	2000	2009
4,837	38.3	2010	2030	2000	2009	2000	2009
9,086	50.7	3.3	24.1	140	1,141		

Sources: UN-Habitat, 2011; 2012.

Most poor Zimbabweans lack access to decent and secure housing, with settlements typified by overcrowding and lack of basic infrastructure and sustainable services (GoZ, 2012). The situation is exacerbated by an urban population increasing at a rate of between 5-7% per annum (GoZ, 2009a). Problematizing the housing challenge, the Government of Zimbabwe’s second National Housing Convention (GoZ, 2009a: 16) posits that

[t]he official national estimate of the housing backlog is given as 1.25 million units. Using an average family size of 4, the national backlog translates to 5

million citizens or 41.7% of the 12 million people. In terms of urban housing the 542,630 backlog translates to about 2.17 million people or 46.2% of the 4.7 million urban residents. As such, 40-50% of the country's citizens live in settlements that are below thresholds of basic convenience and sustenance.

The enormous housing backlog has also resulted in inappropriately located housing, tenure insecurity and poor access to human settlement services (water, sanitation, energy), causing heavy dependence on environmental resources (Chatiza, Dhliwayo & Muchadenyika, 2011). Ramsamy (2006: 167) contends that "Zimbabwe's critical shortage of housing for the low-income urban poor ranks next to unemployment as the most serious problem confronting the country in the post-independence period". The housing challenge is pronounced, as there has not been considerable investment in low-income housing by either government or local authorities for close to two decades.

The major challenges and bottlenecks affecting pro-poor housing and social amenities in Zimbabwe relate to housing finance, town planning and infrastructure standards, legislation, plan preparation and approval, land and off-site infrastructure, and coordination and institutional framework (Mhashu, 2009). A study commissioned by the Government of Zimbabwe and UN-Habitat details the regulatory framework bottlenecks for low-cost housing. In particular, the study noted bottlenecks in spatial planning and land development legislation, housing development procedures, housing policy and allied legislation, land development and housing finance and urban settlement management (Chaeruka & Munzwa, 2009). In general, housing policy and planning law and practice are among major factors constraining housing delivery.

In Zimbabwe a number of actors are involved in planning and housing, including central government, local authorities, the private sector, building material suppliers, financial institutions, the construction sector and civil society organisations. The functions of these institutions are explained in Table 3. Over the years, the capacity of these actors in housing delivery has been weak. In particular, Zimbabwe's local authorities are under severe stress, with a sharp decline in structures, systems and overall performance (MLGPWNH, 2013b). Actors involved in housing and planning such as central government, local authorities and community-based groups are key data sources in this study.

Table 3: Housing and Planning Actors and Roles

Actor	Roles
Central Government (Local Government, Public Works & National Housing ministry)	Land allocation, land-use planning, land policy (tenure issues) and general regulation of standards (building materials, housing finance), provision of technical assistance to Councils and other stakeholders, housing policy formulation, implementation, monitoring and review.
Local Authorities	Land allocation (state land allocated to Councils), land use planning, on- and offsite servicing, technical backstopping of community groups.
Community-based groups	Savings mobilisation, social mobilisation of home-seekers and capacity building, actual house construction, laying of municipal infrastructure.
National & International Development Agencies	Technical support (for instance, through research and policy implementation), direct provision, capacity building and financial resource leveraging.
Department of Physical Planning	Administers urban state land. As such, it is the custodian of settlement development standards.
Private Sector (building societies, land developers & Pension Funds)	Land development and servicing, actual home construction (contractors and employing organisations), supporting employees' housing programmes, provision of housing finance.

Sources: GoZ, 2012; Chatiza & Mlalazi, 2009; Chaeruka & Munzwa, 2009.

1.5 The Housing Challenge in Metropolitan Harare

Metropolitan Harare, like other metropolitan regions across the African continent, found itself at a crossroads at the turn of the millennium in relation to social change, urban services delivery (particularly housing), contested urban politics, and the rise of social movements advocating for radical change. Metropolitan Harare is composed of three urban areas (Harare, Chitungwiza and Epworth) that have a combined population of 2,123,132 (ZimStat, 2013b), making it the most urbanised region in Zimbabwe.

Over the years, two categories of social movement challenging planning and housing delivery approaches emerged. These are the co-operative movement and the Federation movement. ZIHOPFE membership totals 53,200 households across Zimbabwe (Muchadenyika, 2015a). The year 2000 saw the emergence of new kind of housing co-operatives that went beyond housing provision struggles to include land reclamation and challenging housing provision institutional arrangements (Masuko, 2008). Other housing co-operatives took advantage of the politics associated with the land reform programme, as the Government of Zimbabwe acknowledged the “existence of fast track housing co-operatives and created conditions for Zanu-PF politicians to exploit the space that the co-operatives had created” (Masuko, 2008:

203). The struggle to access housing through social movements was complicated by political parties trying to capitalise on the crisis by influencing home-seekers' political affiliation.

Planning and housing in pre- and post-independence Zimbabwe have been driven and shaped by political and economic developments. Principally, segregation policies and laws of the colonial regime were aimed at racializing planning and housing in cities. In fact, there were 'black' and 'European' areas, with the former lagging behind in terms of service provision and housing delivery (Matumbike & Muchadenyika, 2012). Economic growth prompted increased demand for 'black' labour, which forced the colonial regime to find a way of housing the 'black' African population. For security and economic reasons, this led the colonial government to adopt a peripheral development policy that resulted in the development of dormitory or satellite towns for Africans in Chitungwiza and Epworth (Rambanapasi, 1994). These two urban areas were developed as African towns aimed at moving Africans away from the 'European' town, Harare.

After independence, Zimbabwe adopted a 'one city concept' aimed at de-racialising cities. This policy led to the development of housing in former 'European' areas. However, in time, the racial divide became socio-economic, with housing developments revealing income status in post-independence Zimbabwe (Wekwete, 1994). The socio-economic and political crisis beginning in 2000 has had a wide impact on housing as local and central governments' capacity to provide low-income housing has weakened. At the same time, ordinary people in social movements have significantly changed urban development and housing. The following sections (focusing on Harare, Chitungwiza and Epworth) describe in detail how these urban centres were shaped by political and economic developments.

1.5.1 Harare City

Harare is Zimbabwe's capital city and the seat of government. Administratively, the city is composed of 46 wards with 46 elected councillors running city affairs. The 2012 National Census estimated the population of urban Harare to be 1,485,231 (ZimStat, 2013a). The city's housing backlog stands in excess of 500,000 housing units (COH DHCS, 2012).

1.5.1.1 Siting and Early Development (1890-1946)

The Cecil John Rhodes-led British South Africa Company (BSAC) sited the present day Harare in September 1890 following the arrival of the Pioneer Column. The siting and early planning of the city mirrored colonialism and its motives. O'Connor has described Zimbabwe's towns

as European because their planning and design was determined by settler needs (O'Connor, 1986; Ramsamy, 2006). However, human settlement in Harare predates 1890 as chiefdoms such as Neharawa, Mbare, Gutsa and many others were occupying the area (Chikowore, 1995). This view is supported by Bill Freund, who argues that Harare was created on the completely effaced site of earlier settlements (Freund, 2007). A number of geo-spatial features favoured the site, including abundant water from Mukuvisi River, reliable rainfall, fertile farmland, and a hill to the west of the town that made the area defensible (Chikowore, 1995; Zinyama, 1995).

However, in 1891, the BSAC considered changing the site of the town to Norton, Mvurwi, Darwendale or Rusape, but the proposal was rejected mainly by property developers who had erected six brick buildings (Beach, 1999). During the same year, the Salisbury Sanitary Board was established (Makumbe, 1998), comprising three elected members and two appointed members (Matumbike & Muchadenyika, 2012). The primary purpose of the Board was to improve urban conditions and plan the town. At the same time, the first formal plan, composed of 2,548 stands based on a grid-iron pattern, was developed (Chikowore, 1995). The Board institutionalised segregation within the city through town planning and housing development. This resulted in the planning and designation of 'European areas' far apart from 'African townships'.

The first African township, Mbare, was the first major undertaking for the African population by the Salisbury Sanitary Board in 1897. African housing was a 'nuisance' in the city, hence it was to be either minimised or developed far away from 'European' settlements. At its worst, this resulted in the development of Chitungwiza, 30 km south of the Harare central business district (Chikowore, 1995). Within Harare, this resulted in the allocation of 20 hectares to the first African Township, Harari (now Mbare), 3 km south of the city centre (Zinyama, 1995). Table 4 summarises the major developments in planning and governance that shaped the growth of the city between 1890 and 1926.

Table 4: Major Planning and Governance Developments in Salisbury (1890 and 1935)

Year	Developments
February 1882	Telegraph line from South Africa reaches Harare.
May 1899	Railway line from Beira reaches Harare.
October 1902	Railway line from Botswana passing through Bulawayo reaches Harare.
August 1906	Native Urban Locations Ordinance provided the establishment and administration of separate black residential areas in the newly established towns.
May 1913	Opening of Cleveland Dam as the town's water supply.
1913-14	Diesel-generated electricity provides for domestic and street lighting.

1925	Morris Carter Commission recommends that “only those natives working for Europeans should live in urban locations and that native townships be established”.
1935	Town elevated to city status.

Sources: Adapted from Zinyama, 1995; Musekiwa, 1995.

Meanwhile, the shortage of African housing was becoming acute and, by 1935, an increase in squatters living just outside the city led the government to identify a second township for 2,500 people on the state-owned Highfield Farm, about 8 km south-west of the city centre (Brown, 2001: 321). With post-Second World War industrialisation and the increased need for African labour, the African housing challenge became paramount, as explained in the following section.

1.5.1.2 Colonial Planning and Housing Crisis (1946-1980)

Industrial development after the Second World War exposed colonial planning and housing policy. An immense need emerged to house the African population, requiring changes in colonial policy. First, Town Management Boards (later Town Councils) to administer suburban and outlying areas were established in Meyrick Park (1944), Highlands (1945), Water Falls (1948), Greendale (1950), Hatfield (1952), Mabelreign (1953) and Mount Pleasant (1954). These, however, were all ‘European’ areas.

On the other hand, townships for Africans were also developed. The living conditions in these townships were comparatively squalid. The townships were developed in line with the Town and Country Planning Act (No. 22 of 1946) in which “the location of black residential areas was done in a way as to provide maximum ‘noise’ buffer between the [...] Native housing area and the nearest European area” (Zinyama, 1995: 15). Meanwhile, the African population in the city increased from 32,000 in 1940 to 75,500 in 1951, and reached 215,810 in 1962. The Native (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act (No. 6 of 1946) required the Salisbury municipality to develop native locations and provide housing to urban Africans. Table 5 shows the subsequent development of African housing.

Table 5: Development of African Housing in Harare (1950-1979)

Area	First Occupied	Brief summary of the scheme
Mabvuku	1952	Developed on Donnybrook Farm bought by City Council in 1942; from the outset, it was mainly conventional housing for married people.
Mufakose	1959	Developed on Crowborough Farm bought by City Council in 1951; detached and semi-detached housing for married couples, catering for higher income groups than Mbare, Mabvuku or Highfield.
Rugare	Mid-1950s	Developed by the Railways for its black employees; detached and semi-detached conventional housing.

Dzivarasekwa	1961	Second government township for domestic workers employed in north-western white suburbs.
Marimba Park	1961	Small, low-density, high-income scheme; freehold title available from the outset; a government township.
Kambuzuma	1964	Middle income site-and-services and core housing scheme; freehold tenure available after purchase price was paid and approved extensions completed; a government township.
Tafara	1967	Developed by Greendale Town Management Board for domestic workers employed in the north-eastern suburbs.
Glen Norah	1971	Developed by government; some houses employer-tied for letting to their married employees; others handed over to the city council for letting.
Glen View	1979	Site-and-services scheme with a few conventional houses for renting, materials provided on loan by the City Council.

Source: Adapted from Zinyama, 1995: 23.

The rapidly increasing urban population in Harare brought low-income housing to the fore. In 1961, Harare's population was 310,360. It increased to 386,040 in 1969 (Chikowore, 1995) and again to 420,000 in 1974 (Auret, 1995). This was happening at a time of repressive migration laws aimed at keeping the African population in rural areas. Municipality of Salisbury records show that in 1975 the city's housing stock amounted to 42,138 units housing 278,400 people. This means that 141,600 people (28,320 families, with an average family size of five) in high-density suburbs were either lodging or squatting (Auret, 1995). Seven years prior to independence, 2,703 low-income housing units were constructed in the city (Rakodi, 1989). Inclusive planning and low-income housing would be a top priority for post-independence Harare, as discussed in next section.

1.5.1.3 Post-Independence Urban Expansion and Housing (1980-2015)

Since 1980, the government's policy has been aimed at addressing housing shortages through the provision of low-income housing (Brown, 2001). The City of Harare began housing projects aimed at delivering completed housing units to individuals and households on the housing waiting list. Between June 1980 and June 1989, the city allocated 15,070 houses or stands against a housing waiting list of 50,055 (Auret, 1995). This indicates a mismatch between housing supply and demand in the city. During the same period, the municipal housing stock amounted to 74,859, with 63,446 houses either totally owned or being purchased by the occupant, and 11,413 rented by the municipality (Auret, 1995: 25).

As such, Zinyama (1995) argues that the construction of low-cost housing in Harare has lagged behind housing demand in post-independence Zimbabwe. The rising costs of building materials and shortages of municipal funds explain such a development. Meanwhile, shortages of low-

income housing resulted in a surge of informal settlements. In mid-1987, the City of Harare reported that there were 9,870 illegal residential structures in Harare's high-density suburbs (COH, 1987).¹⁰

Between 1980 and 1990, with support from the World Bank and USAID, low-income housing settlements were developed in Warren Park (core housing scheme, first occupied 1981), Kuwadzana (site-and-service scheme, 1984), Hatcliffe (sites-and-services scheme, 1984) and Budiro (sites-and-services scheme, 1988) (Zinyama, 1995: 23). Further, USAID provided USD 50 million to the Government of Zimbabwe for the provision of 20,000 low-cost houses in Harare and nine other towns. Despite this, Rakodi (1989: 11) characterises the post-1980 government approach to housing as one in which "an already established black bourgeoisie appears set to protect its growing property interests ... insisting on high-quality construction for low-income residents effectively marginalising the poorest households". Thus, infrastructure standards continued to be too high, affecting housing access to marginalised communities. Moreover, the production of housing in Harare was constrained by access to land, overburdened physical infrastructure and utilities, and a weak construction sector (Rakodi & Mutwiza-Mangiza, 1990).

Post-1990, there was an urgent need to increase the scale and pace of housing delivery. Housing projects that started before 1990 continued. During 1991-92 in Budiro 3 and 4, a total of 2,372 stands were being serviced, developed and allocated, with another phase (Budiro 5) of 4,653 stands commencing (Auret, 1995: 29). At the same time, the development of 400 stands in Sunningdale began and 1,986 Kuwadzana 3 stands were serviced. The City of Harare also began infill development, that is to say, developing and selling stands within established settlements. These stands are normally from repossession or conversion of open spaces to residential areas. As public sector and city council-led housing could not meet demand, housing co-operatives flourished. This was a desperate means by people to house themselves (Auret, 1995). Nationally, housing co-operatives grew from two in August 1985 to 47 in 1992, surging to 135 by 1999 (Chirisa & Munzwa, 2008).

The Government of Zimbabwe's socialist-leaning policies had limited impact on the urban poor (Drakakis-Smith, 1992). While informal settlements grew in Harare (Mbare-Joburg lines), Epworth and Chitungwiza, government policy remained opposed to squatter settlements. The

¹⁰ These were mainly in Highfield (25%), Glen View (20%), Mbare (17%) and Dzivarasekwa (14%).

housing crisis manifested in “overcrowding of the existing housing stock and extensive illegal lodging” (Rakodi, 1992: 130). The World Bank and International Monetary Fund-supported Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) took a toll on the government and city’s capacity to provide housing. In the late 1990s, the City of Harare’s capacity to deliver housing began to shrink drastically. Despite this, through support from the World Bank, about 11,200 serviced stands were completed in Harare (World Bank, 2000). Generally, World Bank projects in Zimbabwe “led to some gradual, limited improvement in housing conditions and access to facilities for some of the urban poor” (Ramsamy, 2006: 152).

Post-2000, the scope of the housing crisis grew to unprecedented levels. The crisis was exacerbated by Operation Restore Order, which destroyed ‘unplanned and illegal’ houses in Zimbabwe’s towns and cities. Harare was the worst affected, with numerous settlements being razed. Nationally, the Operation left 700,000 people homeless and affected a further 2.4 million people (UN, 2005). Census estimates indicate that Harare’s population increased from 656,000 (1982) to 1,184,169 (1992), before surging to 1,485,231 in 2012.

At present, the estimated population growth rate is 5.8% per annum (COH DUPS, 2012). About 44% of Harare’s total population is under 20 years of age, and unemployment in the city is as high as 80% (this figure takes into consideration formal employment only) (UN-Habitat, 2010). Such a youth bulge puts a huge strain on urban services, infrastructure, and housing.

In 2011 the City of Harare reported that there were more than 500,000 home-seekers (COH DHCS, 2012). During that year, the city allocated 2,970 stands to 16 individuals on the housing waiting list and 41 housing co-operatives. This was a steady increase, given that the city had allocated 614 stands in 2010. The estimated housing stock for Greater Harare stands at 211,000 dwelling units (COH DHCS, 2012). Furthermore, the city has been promoting reclamation of wetlands to build residential areas (Sithole & Goredema, 2013) in response to the housing need. This has, however, been severely challenged by residents’ associations keen on environmental stewardship and preservation.

Official estimates indicate the emergence of about 3,000 housing co-operatives in Harare between 2000 and 2015. Through formal and informal means, more than 100,000 housing stands were provided through housing movements. About 35,000 houses have been completed on these stands and on the remaining stands there are either houses under construction or housing structures that have not been planned. During the same period, the City of Harare could not provide any completed housing units due to technical and financial challenges. As such,

the co-operative and Federation movement became two major housing delivery movements for low-income housing.

1.5.2 Chitungwiza Town

Chitungwiza is located about 25 km southeast of Harare. It is the third largest city in Zimbabwe, with an urban population of 356,840 (ZimStat, 2013a). The town is divided into 25 administrative wards with each represented by an elected councillor. The town has been facing serious governance challenges, with the government appointing five caretaker commissions and investigating teams. The majority of land within and outside Chitungwiza is state land – a feature affecting the ability of the local authority to plan and manage urban development, as argued in Chapter Seven.

1.5.2.1 Siting, Planning and Development (1951-1980)

The development of the town primarily for housing the African population working in Harare affects the town to this day. Its conceptualisation was similar to that of Soweto in Johannesburg, making Chitungwiza a product of segregationist planning philosophy (Ramabanapasi, 1994). The town developed from two small townships, namely St Mary's and Seke. St Mary's Township was developed by the Government of Rhodesia on a sites-and-services scheme to house airport employees (Zinyama, 1995). Table 6 summarises the major developments in Chitungwiza between 1951 and 1976.

Table 6: Historical Development of Chitungwiza (1951-1976).

Year	Major developments
1951	Proposal to develop an African Township within Seke Communal land put forward.
1954	2006 hectares set aside for Seke Township through a Rhodesian Government Notice 795 of 1954 (Seke was the first settlement in present-day Chitungwiza).
1962	Seke Township declared a Local Government Area.
1969	Census estimates St Mary's Township population at 14,970.
Early 1970s	Tribal Trust Land excised to become a new residential area (Zengeza).
1976	St Mary's/Zengeza designated a new township area by the Rhodesian Government Notice 609. Core housing scheme initiated. The New Seke town master plan prepared and adopted. Several housing schemes developed, through the initiative of the ministry of local government, as the de facto local authority.

Sources: Adapted from Rambanapasi, 1994; Zinyama, 1995.

At this stage it is important to highlight that the colonial satellite or urban dormitory policy was not peculiar to Harare. Ntabazinduma would serve Bulawayo, while Zimunya was intended to restrain and capture the migration of blacks into Mutare. Satellite towns seem to represent the most determined attempt to entrench segregation between European and African areas. The post-independence epoch would present numerous housing challenges to the town, as described in the next section.

1.5.2.2 Post-Independence Urban Expansion and Housing (1980-2015)

At the time of independence, there were 29,000 houses under municipal control (Ramsamy, 2006) and many transitional camps in Chitungwiza (Hoek-Smith, 1982). Squatter settlements increased, an indicator of looming housing shortages. However, the Government of Zimbabwe's policy was anti-squatter, arguing for adherence to minimum planning and housing standards. In 1982, this policy resulted in the demolition of Chirambahuyo, a large squatter settlement in Chitungwiza (Ramsamy, 2006; Auret, 1995; Rakodi & Mutwiza-Mangiza, 1991).

Ascertaining the extent of the house destruction, Patel and Adams (1981: 87) concluded that "clearance of the area would destroy what people have built up both physically and socially". Despite the government's strong support for resettling squatters in rural areas, survey results indicated that 700 out of the 3,000 Chirambahuyo residents wished to return to rural areas (Patel & Adams, 1981). The demolition was followed by the destruction of Mayambara, where some people from Chirambahuyo had settled; in 1983, Russelldene, located between Harare and Chitungwiza, was demolished (Rakodi & Mutwiza-Mangiza, 1990).

Chitungwiza's population grew from 15,000 in 1969 (Zinyama, 1995) to 172,556 in 1982 (Ramsamy, 2006). The rapid growth is partly explained by the intensification of the armed struggle in rural areas, which acted as a migration push-factor. Chitungwiza was granted town status between 1982 and 1983. However, no urban land was vested in the town council (Rambanapasi, 1994), a development that limits the role of the municipality in housing development in the town. Thus, much of the land in and around the town is owned by central government – stripping the local authority of an essential resource to steer urban expansion. Furthermore, the failure to decentralise industrial production to Chitungwiza in the early 1970s (Brown, 2001) had a strong bearing on the growth of the town. Post-independence Zimbabwe tried in vain to stimulate industrial growth and relocation to the town. However, what are visible are small enterprises and 'home' industries, which in most cases free-ride on council services.

At the end of the first decade of independence, it was evident that the town was in need of massive investment in low-income housing. About 30,000 households were on the housing waiting list for Chitungwiza by mid-1991, which illustrates the scale of the shortfall of supply against demand (Rakodi & Withers, 1995). In June 1994, Chitungwiza's waiting list stood at 40,486, an increase of 3,167 or 8% since June 1993, whereas there had been an increase of only 1.2% in housing stock (Auret, 1995: 40). Municipal records indicate that by June 1994, total housing stock stood at 30,562.¹¹ However, Drakakis-Smith (1992) points to the construction of 30,000 low-income houses in the town between 1980 and 1990, a development attributed to limited implementation capacity.

Quoting the *Sunday Mail* (Zimbabwe) of March 17, 1991, Ramsamy (2006:155) shows the extent of the housing shortage in the town:

The fact of the matter remains that Chitungwiza's housing shortage is not only desperate, but has also reached the point where it has become pathetic, especially when one takes into account the fact that on average up to 30 people live in a single residential unit. It is even sadder when one considers that the majority of Chitungwiza's residents are so-called lodgers who occupy dwellings of varying sizes at rent to die rates [*sic*] . . . In fact, the exorbitant rents that the majority of the people in Chitungwiza are paying, the anguish, and the frustration that has become so evident means that the time bomb cannot be far from exploding.

Post-2000, housing problems in Chitungwiza continued as the local authority could not deliver any housing scheme. Housing co-operatives increased, as they became a key institution in housing delivery. However, at present, there is much contestation between central government and housing co-operatives, given that the former is advocating for the demolition of at least 11,000 houses. Furthermore, there are widespread reports of corruption in the allocation of land by the town council (Mukonza, 2013), a development central government admitted in its Land Audit Report.

¹¹ Chitungwiza Town Council: Report Chief Executive Officer, 27 October 1994.

Key findings of the Government's Land Audit include extensive illegal allocation of housing stands by Zanu-PF-linked land barons, youths, housing co-operatives, council officials and councillors; uncoordinated incremental development (without any development plans); non-approval of housing co-operative plans; sub-standard buildings; flouting of town planning regulations and procedures; and high vulnerability to safety and health standards (MLGPWNH, 2013a: 5-6). The Audit shows contestation and contradictions among Chitungwiza Municipality, central government and housing co-operatives, which this study seeks to understand further. At the same time, there is rapid urban sprawl around Chitungwiza, as nearby traditional leaders are parcelling out and selling land to desperate home-seekers (Mandibaya, 2012).

1.5.3 Epworth

Epworth is an urban settlement located about 15 km southeast of Harare. It is predominantly an informal settlement, with seven administrative wards. Planning and administration of the settlement is carried out by Epworth Local Board (ELB), though with severe capacity constraints. From 1986 to 2008, the Board was run by government-appointed commissioners. In 2008, the first elected councillors took over the management of the Board. The 2012 National Census estimated the settlement to have a total population of 167,462 (ZimStat, 2013). In succeeding sections, I explain the major developments of the settlement from early siting to the present day.

1.5.3.1 Siting and Early Development (1892-1980)

The history of Epworth as a settlement is linked to a religious movement in the late nineteenth century. In 1892, the colonial administration of the BSAC granted the Methodist Church 1,064 hectares of land (Nyamvura & Brown, 1999), marking the siting of Epworth. The Methodist Church, then under Reverend Isaac Shimmer Westlea, was holding the land in trust on behalf of the indigenous people in the area. The Church as the settlement authority would shape the growth and development of Epworth over time.

To consolidate its position and expand the settlement, the Methodist Mission bought additional land in adjacent areas, namely Glenwood farm (981 hectares) in 1904 and Adelaide farm (1,563 hectares) in 1908. Writers differ on when this process of settlement began. Chatiza and Mlalazi (2009) describe settlement beginning in 1929, while Nyamvura and Brown (1999) point to the 1950s. However, in 1950, the Methodist Mission "granted tenancies at Epworth to 500 families, for plots of land between 2,000m² and 6,000m²" (Ibid: 107).

In the earliest stages, four villages developed, namely Makomo, Zinyengere, Chiremba and Chinamano. They became known as original villages as other villages developed in response to the continued influx of people. The settlement witnessed a large influx in the 1970s as people fled from war-ravaged rural areas (Nyamvura & Brown, 1999; Chirisa, 2011; Msindo, Gutsa & Choguya, 2013). The liberation struggle had reached its decisive phase and most rural areas were battle zones. Post-1970s, new immigrants settled in areas contiguous to the original four villages, and these became known as extensions (Chitekwe-Biti et al., 2012). Independence would usher in new changes to Epworth, as discussed in the next section.

1.5.3.2 Squatter Settlement Upgrading Programme (1980-2005)

At independence in 1980, the housing stock in Epworth was close to 3,000 units (Hoek-Smith, 1982). The relaxation and repeal of migration laws resulted in a further influx of people. Unable to contain this growth, the Methodist Church transferred the settlement to the Government of Zimbabwe (Chitekwe-Biti et al., 2012). In 1983, the government “grudgingly decided to upgrade the squatter settlement of Epworth, where some 28,000 people lived in substandard housing” (Ramsamy, 2006: 134-135). It was a crucial decision that has shaped the growth and development of the settlement to this day.

According to Butcher (1986), a USAID-assisted feasibility study was conducted, with the Government of Zimbabwe providing ZW\$ 2 million for the upgrading scheme, which included water reticulation, sewerage systems, road networks and bus routes. Government then introduced a development freeze that prohibited settlement and development outside the boundaries drawn by the feasibility study. The upgrading programme commenced in 1985, with all informal units built after 1983 destroyed (Ramsamy, 2006).

Through Statutory Instrument 75 of 1986, the Government proclaimed Epworth a local authority, with Epworth Local Board established in the same year. The purpose of the Board is to plan and govern the settlement and to promote the involvement of local residents in the administration of the area (Nyamvura & Brown, 1999). However, the Local Board was not elective; rather, it was run by commissioners appointed by the local government ministry. At the time, Epworth had about 5,000 residential stands which were regularised through *in situ* upgrading (Chirisa, 2011). By 1987, the population had grown to 35,000 (Msindo, Gutsa & Choguya, 2013).

By 1991, informal structures continued to sprout as ‘original’ settlers parcelled out land to new homeseekers. The government sought to assert control over such a trend and evicted nearly 1,000 families to Porta farm, 40 km outside Harare (Chitekwe-Biti et al., 2012). However, the government’s attempt to control settlement growth failed. Epworth accommodates primarily the urban poor, many of whom cannot afford to stay in Harare. From 1982 to 1992 Epworth’s population increased from 30,000 to 50,000 (Drakakis-Smith, 1992). By mid-1999, five co-operatives had been set up, with a total membership of 77.

The beginning of the FTLRP in 1999 resulted in sudden growth of a settlement called Ward 7 or ‘Magada’,¹² in which groups of people under political party umbrellas annexed and parcelled out land and settled on it. Epworth Local Board tried to evict these settlers, but the resistance was determined and politically supported. It is estimated that by 2010 about 6,500 families had settled in ‘Magada’ alone (Chitekwe-Biti et al., 2012). After 2005, another phase of *in situ* upgrading began with new actors (ZIHOPFE and Dialogue on Shelter), as explained in the next section.

1.5.3.3 Rapid Expansion and In Situ Upgrading (2005-2015)

Writing in 1995, Collen Butcher pointed out that “the decision by the government not to bulldoze the informal settlement at Epworth but to upgrade *in situ* has major policy ramifications for the future with respect to the development of planning methodologies in Zimbabwe and to increasing the housing stock” (Butcher, 1995: 70). Today, the regularisation and formalisation of Epworth remain a key planning challenge. Research indicates that the formalisation process is becoming somewhat attractive, encouraging the continued influx of people (DoS, 2009; Chirisa, 2011).

In 2007, the ZIHOPFE Epworth chapter initiated dialogue with Epworth Local Board, marking the beginning of a relationship that would reignite the settlement upgrading programme. By 2008, communities had begun electing ward councillors to administer the affairs of the Local Board. The councillors adopted a resolution to upgrade *in situ* in 2011. At present, the alliance of Dialogue on Shelter and ZIHOPFE, the Epworth Local Board, local community, and Department of Physical Planning is undertaking a settlement upgrading programme aimed at

¹² A Shona word meaning sitting willy-nilly or at one’s own will.

providing households with secured tenure rights. Table 7 provides a summary of the status of planning and housing in Epworth.

Table 7: Status of Planning and Housing in Epworth

Area	Year	History of settlement	Legal & planning status	Status of housing	Services
Makomo	Circa 1908	Methodist Church members were allocated land which formed the core of the settlement growth.	Legally and formally planned	Old houses have no approved plans; new houses do.	Water and sewerage infrastructure exists but not working for lack of pumping capacity and water, respectively.
Chizungu	Circa 1940s	Original settlers some of whom sold part of their land.	Re-planned in the 1980s, partial installation of infrastructure.	Some houses have approved plans, others do not.	Use of natural springs and pit latrines
Jacha	Circa 1978	Area used to be gardens of original settlers, descendants of whom demarcated and sold stands.	Settlement is unplanned but recognised by ELB. ELB provided stand numbers.	Houses have no approved plans.	Water infrastructure with no running water for lack of pumping capacity. Sewer infrastructure not working due lack of water.
Chiremba	Pre-1980	Settlers consider themselves 'originals' who settled in Epworth first.	Legal and officially recognised.	Houses were built before establishment of ELB. Houses have no approved plans.	Water and sewer infrastructure in place but not working. Use of deep wells and pit latrines.
Chinamano Extension	Just before 1980	Original residents sold land in their fields and grazing areas.	Settlement re-planned and upgraded in early 1980s by central government.	Old and dilapidated houses, mostly with no approved plans.	No water and sewerage infrastructure. Use of pit latrines and deep wells.
Overspill	In the 1980s	Settlement planned from the beginning.	Formal and planned settlement.	Some houses have approved plans, others do not.	Water infrastructure with no running water for lack of pumping capacity. Sewer infrastructure not working due to lack of water.
Magada/Overspill	In the early 1980s	Originals sold land that was part of their fields.	Formal and planned.	Houses have no approved plans.	Water and sewer infrastructure exists but not working for lack of pumping capacity and water respectively.

Zinyengere Extension/ Magada	Circa 1997	Original residents sold land in their fields and grazing areas.	Settlement not planned.	Houses have no building plans; structures range from shacks to houses.	Individual connections to piped water financed by Plan International. No sewer, use of pit Latrines.
Domboram wari	-	Originals sold land in their fields and grazing areas.	Legally recognised by ELB.	No approved building plan.	Water infrastructure exists but no running water. No sewer; use of pit latrines.

Adapted from Marongwe, Chatiza & Mukoto, 2012.

1.6 Structure of the Thesis

This thesis is divided into eight chapters. In order to guide and frame the study, the first chapter describes the research problem, research questions and study aim and objectives. The chapter explains in detail the study area (metropolitan Harare) by analysing historical and current planning and housing developments in the three urban centres. Chapter Two describes the study methodology, in particular research methods, sampling, field research process, data analysis and presentation, and ethical considerations.

Chapter Three provides a critique of the major theoretical and conceptual debates underpinning the discourse of planning, housing, and social movements. With regard to planning, I focus on three planning theories, namely communicative/collaborative planning theory (Forester, 1989; Healey, 1999; Innes, 1995), the Just City approach (Harvey, 2000; 2012; Fainstein, 1995; 2000a), and radical planning theory (Sandercock, 1998a; 2000). These theories are relevant in Global South cities as well as to the study of social movements and urban planning. In addition, the chapter presents a comprehensive analysis of past and present approaches in housing discourse. Furthermore, I explain theories of social movements, namely political-opportunity structure theory (Tarrow, 1998; della Porta, 2008; Gamson & Meyer, 1996; Zald, 1991); resource mobilisation theory (Jenkins, 1983; Fuchs, 2006; McCarthy & Zald, 1977); and identity-formation theory (Kelley, 1994; Escobar & Zirakzadeh, 2006; Alvarez, 1992; Kubik, 1994). The chapter concludes with transformative theory (Friedmann, 2011) as a framework for analysis to explain social transformation in cities.

Chapter Four details the context of planning, social movements and housing in Zimbabwe. Pre- and post-independence developments in planning, housing and social movements are periodised and analysed. Primarily, this section of the literature review is carried out because many development issues have roots in past policy pronouncements and government action.

The central argument of the chapter is that the inadequacies in housing policies and projects, in addition to the socio-economic and political crisis, necessitated the rise of housing movements in low-income housing delivery.

Chapter Five explains the rapid transformation in Harare primarily evident in urban development, particularly housing. The chapter argues that more than 100,000 new housing structures have been built, mainly by housing movements comprising the urban poor. About 35,000 houses have been completed. Such housing developments by social movements challenge the conventional norms of urban planning and housing. In Harare, it is argued that transformation has primarily been through the actions of social movements (through confrontation, negotiation and radical alternatives) and responses of the city (through dialogue, engagement, supportive policy frameworks and consensus building).

Chapter Six focuses on planning and low-income housing delivery in Chitungwiza. However, the trajectory of social movements, particularly their role in planning and low-income housing delivery in Chitungwiza, is quite different from experiences in Harare. Co-operatives in the town wield immense political power, partly because they are formed and led by local political elites. These co-operatives have been spearheading a parallel planning and housing delivery system. Putting aside the 'legal and illegal' debate, radical or insurgent planning has delivered about 22,000 housing units, while the Chitungwiza Municipality and government has not provided a single housing unit.

Chapter Seven analyses Epworth's transition from informal to formal urban settlement, doing so by focusing on continued pressure exerted by social movements. Particular emphasis is placed on the pursuit of social and spatial justice and on how planning authorities conceded to demands of informal settlers through a just approach to planning. The chapter focuses on Ward 7 of Epworth, an informal settlement with a population of about 39,552 people (ZimStat, 2013b). The formalisation process in Epworth aims to deliver about 21,957 tenured housing stands.

Chapter Eight brings together the study's major arguments and recommendations. It concludes that post-2000 metropolitan Harare is entangled in transformation characterised by a change in the urban fabric (for instance, through new housing and infrastructure services to the predominantly urban poor population), the reconfiguration of power (with the urban poor playing a vital role in urban development), and the adoption by planning institutions of grassroots urban planning approaches. The manifestation of such transformation differs

contextually and seems to be largely influenced by the nature and conduct of social movements and the responses of planning authorities.

In summary, the components of the thesis dialectically connect general and specific experiences in Zimbabwe historically and structurally. This introductory chapter has provided the rationale for the thesis. The next chapter explains how the research data were collected and analysed.



Chapter Two

Mapping Structures for Analysing Contestations, Tensions and Alliances: Methodological Considerations

This chapter explains salient methodological issues that guided the collection, analysis and interpretation of data in this study. The chapter begins by providing a brief summary of main issues in social movement research. Such an analysis provides the backbone to the research, as it is vital that the study methodology recognises, builds on and critiques earlier studies. Thereafter, I explain in detail the focus issues and data sources based on the four research questions. This is done primarily as a way of developing a research approach to answer the focus issues emanating from the research questions. The study mixes qualitative and quantitative research methods: in-depth interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs), life histories, ethnography and participatory observation, document analysis, archival search and enumeration survey. This mixed-methods approach is informed by data needs emanating from the research questions and an attempt to solidify the study through each method's strengths.

Furthermore, the chapter explains how the researcher preserves data integrity and handles field research. The data is interpreted by way of actor analysis, process analysis, comparative analysis, and software analysis. The actor analysis focuses on the actions of housing actors, namely social movements, social movements organisations (SMOs), and planning institutions. Housing delivery is a process, hence the process analysis primarily engages with the formation and growth of social movements, lobbying and accessing land, and improvements made on land (building actual houses). The comparative analysis focuses on housing co-operatives and ZIHOPFE; local authorities (Harare, Chitungwiza and Epworth); and categories of housing co-operatives (co-operatives affiliated to MLGPWNH and council affiliated). The study also uses ATLAS.tiV7 and STATA to assist data analysis. Research findings are presented for each local authority, with the chapter structure following headings derived from research questions. Sub-headings are based on the indicators developed for each research question (see Annex I for questions asked during field research).

2.1 Methodological Issues in Social Movement Research

Research in social movements seeks to understand processes that change societies and promote social justice. Social justice is a particular application of just principles to conflicts which arise out of the necessity for social co-operation in seeking individual advancement (Harvey, 2009:

97). In researching social movements, it is often the case that one becomes an activist researcher. An activist researcher can be defined as “someone who sees value in radical education and the public debate of ideas which challenges the norm” (Chatterton, 2008: 421). In this regard, activist researchers see themselves as part of social justice movements and collaborate through participatory methodologies (Otto & Terhorst, 2011: 200). In other words, the researcher becomes part of the broader social movement, an arrangement which can provide the researcher with deep and critical understanding of the subject under study. At the same time, research activism often draws attention from political elites and authorities, as it work which can be perceived as counter-hegemonic.

However, Higginbottom (2008: 158, 161) questions the objectivity and neutrality of activist researchers, in particular through the standpoint of the ‘victim’, the ‘marginalised’ or the social movement. At some point during field research, the notion that research participants are indeed ‘victim’ and ‘marginalised’ triggered emotions. Such emotions seem to point to two issues. First, the need for more rigorous analysis to verify whether indeed people are victims or whether there are other factors to the status quo. Second, the emotions can easily destruct one from looking at the holistic nature of issues under investigation. Based on my field research, the efficacy of a researcher-activist depends on two things. First, the researcher-activist should sufficiently isolate himself or herself from making emotion inspired conclusion rather than fact. Second, the researcher-activist should critically juxtapose evidence collected from both ‘victims’ and responsible authorities.

Despite this, the outcomes of activist research contribute to academics, social movements and society at large (Freire, 2006). Thus, Rancière (1999: 30) describes activist research as a political act in the sense that “it attempts to make visible, heard and understood what has no place in the dominant order”. However, navigating urban politics is like traversing a minefield, especially in Zimbabwe where some housing movements are loosely controlled by vigilante groups that use violence and intimidation against perceived dissenting groups (Kriger, 2012). In such instances, one needs to be careful about one’s research mission and choice of words. In brief, activist research is social action for change (Madison, 2005), as it challenges current and mainstream thinking in academia and beyond (Otto & Terhorst, 2011).

Social movement researchers often use participatory action research (PAR). In PAR, the researcher and participants “work together to examine a problematic situation or action to change it for the better” (Kindon, Pain & Kesby, 2007: 1). Thus, it is important that the

researcher develops rapport with people in social movements. However, such relationships can only be built over time, an important element in ethnographic research. In the conduct of this research, research methods are structured in a way that allows the researcher to understand how the urban poor problematize and respond to the shortage of housing. This is mainly because PAR in human geography is often used in an “effort to understand space and society through analyses that are critical and radical and are understood to be part of the praxis of social and political change aimed at challenging, dismantling, and transforming prevalent relations, systems, and structures” (Pain, Kindon & Kesby, 2007: 28).

At the same time, participatory research methodologies have been criticised for being ‘top down’ and extractive (Cornwall & Brock, 2005), with there being risks of marginalisation within participatory processes (Cooke & Kothari, 2001). Despite this, Pain and Kindon (2007) opine that paying attention to scale is an alternative and promising way of negotiating the potential and paradoxes of PAR. In geography and urban research, space is an important dimension for understanding urban life. Kindon, Pain and Kesby (2007) also point to space and place as important to participation as a political practice. In this regard, it is vital to categorise social movements by place and see how various sites are used as arenas for social change.

Kesby (2005) views space as vital when trying to effect change beyond the various sites and arenas of participatory intervention. One has to understand local community concerns, engagement processes with elites, and opponents and allies, in an attempt to address community needs. Furthermore, horizontal and vertical networks and engagements by local communities are important in understanding inter-community engagements and engagements with planning institutions. In this way, PAR allows one to understand the hierarchical scaling of events, things and processes, conceptually, practically, and politically (Kindon, Pain & Kesby, 2007: 3). In this regard, this study’s methodology prioritised understanding social networks and relations between social movements operating in different places and how social movements interface with the local-state. The research methodology is therefore based on PAR. This is primarily because social movements are collective-action entities in which collective action can be understood through PAR. The next section deals with focal issues and data sources that inform the study approach, research methods and interface between social movements and planning institutions.

2.2 Distilling Analytical Focus Issues and Data Sources

At this point, it is worth recapping and elaborating on the focus issues for each research question. The main purpose of this is to delineate the data sources of the issues under investigation and to derive suitable research methods and techniques for collecting data.

In order to understand the contribution of social movements to low-income housing delivery, the study focuses on four issues, namely social organisation, housing development, political opportunities and infrastructure. Social organisation is a vital aspect of social movements (Della Porta & Diani, 2006), and in that regard I focus on mobilisation strategies, social networks, organisational strategies, and solidarity systems. Housing development strategies and actual housing units delivered are principal investigation issues under housing. According to social movement theorists, social movements exploit political opportunities (Tarrow, 2011; Della Porta & Diani, 2006). The study primarily investigates how social movements made use of the FTLRP¹³, political opportunities such as the contestation between the MDC and Zanu-PF in cities, and the socio-economic crisis, which made it difficult for government and local authorities to provide low-income housing. Furthermore, I analyse women's roles and needs in social movements and the gender sensitivity of such movements.

On the subject of how planning institutions are aiding or constraining low-income housing delivery, the study focuses on policies, strategies and actions by planning institutions and their impact on low income housing. For example, incremental and parallel development policies were adopted by the Government of Zimbabwe as low-income housing strategies (GoZ, 2012), though they were in use in the three study areas well before the new policy proposition.

For the third research question (“What are the alliances and contestations between social movements and planning institutions in low-income housing delivery?”), the study focuses on the leadership and governance of social movements, mobilisation and management of financial resources¹⁴, land access and allocation and planning regulations and procedures. Understanding

¹³ The FTLRP created political opportunities in the sense that the programme unlocked the availability of land for housing in urban and peri-urban areas. The programme gave government new impetus to incorporate more land for urban development. The relaxation of planning procedures during the FTLRP created opportunities for social movements as government promoted speed delivery of land in cities. However, I am cognisant of the problems associated with FTLRP in relation to proper town planning and coordinated housing development in cities.

¹⁴ Governance of social movements and management of resources are widely contested matters with planning institutions having an interest as these two have an impact on the delivery capacities of social movements. Thus, governance and management of social movements are potential area for conflict and collaboration between planning institutions and social movements themselves.

the leadership and governance of social movements entails looking at prior activist experience, understanding of issues (collective action know-how), visionary-goal-centred arrangements, and the level of interference from government and local authorities. Financial resources are fundamental to the functioning of social movements (Fuchs, 2006; Zirakzadeh, 2006), and emphasis is thus placed on sources of funds, financial management, expenditure of funds and accounting procedures. In relation to land access and allocation, the study narrows its focus to the process of accessing land (to the movement), the politics of land access, and allocation and transfer of land to movement members. Lastly, I focus on the contested nature of planning regulations and procedures between planning institutions and social movements.

Finally, on the contribution of social movements to infrastructure, the study focuses on the investments made on water, sanitation and road infrastructure. This is motivated by the view that qualitative housing dimensions have largely been forgotten in Zimbabwe's housing delivery in favour of addressing quantitative housing shortages (Kamete, 2006). This research question requires quantitative data, and thus data were drawn from enumeration surveys and statistics from social movements and local authorities.

After explaining the research questions and focus issues, the study explains the data sources – where data were collected. Data were primarily collected from social movements, SMOs and planning institutions. The main planning institutions under study are the City of Harare, Chitungwiza Municipality and Epworth Local Board, in which cases the research focused on departments responsible for: housing and social services, planning, engineering and surveying. Furthermore, government ministries (local government and small and medium enterprises) are vital data sources, as they are responsible for housing and urban planning and for registration and training of housing co-operatives, respectively.

In the case of social movements, the study looks at ZIHOPFE (ordinary members and coordinators) and housing co-operatives (ordinary members and management and supervision committees). Two SMOs – Dialogue on Shelter and Zimbabwe National Association of Housing Co-operatives (ZINAHCO) – provide the study with insights on how these relate to social movements and planning institutions. Apart from these mainstream data sources, research institutes, political parties, professional bodies, and NGOs provide the study with research informants.

2.3 Sampling of Movements and Choice of Methodology

Sampling is a process of choosing a smaller and more manageable number of people to take part in research (Dawson, 2002). However, three of the four research questions require qualitative data. In this regard, qualitative researchers rarely draw a representative sample from a huge number of cases to intensively study the sampled cases, given that it is difficult to determine the sample size in advance when they have limited knowledge about the larger group or population from which the sample is taken (Neuman, 2007: 141). Furthermore, qualitative research concerns itself with a “small collection of cases, units, or activities that illuminates key features of social life” (Ibid.: 141). In other words, this study is not concerned with producing a representative sample. Instead, cases are selected for in-depth study since these are manageable, considering that the most of the data needs are qualitative.

The selection criteria for movements to be studied were purposive: two on council land, two on state land and one from ZIHOPFE per town. In all the three urban centres, I had planned to study 15 movements and envisaged selecting individual co-operatives for case study and deeper analysis. However, in the field it emerged that it would be more prudent to focus on housing consortiums which incorporate a large number of housing co-operatives. This is mainly because the majority of co-operatives in Harare are grouped into consortiums, according to the City of Harare housing policy. In this thesis, a consortium is defined, contextually, as a collective entity formed by a group of co-operatives to pool finances and install bulk infrastructure. In Harare, the study selected Hopley B Housing Consortium (Hopley), Current Housing Consortium (Budiro) and Saturday Retreat Housing Consortium (Saturday Retreat) and Odar Consortium (Odar). The first two consortiums were allocated council land by the City of Harare, while the latter are on state land where movements were allocated land by the local government ministry. In addition, I draw from other individual co-operatives and consortiums in the city.

This situation in Harare was unique, however: in the other urban centres, the nature and structure of housing movements are different. Pre-defined selection criteria turned out not to be applicable in Chitungwiza and Epworth. This is because all co-operatives in Chitungwiza are on state land, which meant that the study had to select the two largest co-operatives in the town for analysis. In Epworth, as indicated in Chapter Seven, co-operatives failed and were disbanded. As a result, the community revolves around a structure called the Ward Development Committee (WADCO), which is the nucleus of the movement advocating for

formal housing. As such, the analysis in Epworth centres on Ward 7, which is perhaps the largest informal settlement in Zimbabwe. The settlement is, however, undergoing a process of *in situ* upgrading largely driven by the community through WADCOs and ZIHOPFE. Thus, the thesis used different criteria in selecting movements based on the realities obtaining in each urban centre. The movements studied in this thesis are summarised in Table 8.

Different contextual realities on social movements in the three case study urban centres explain variations in themes when presenting and discussing findings. The three case studies constitute the largest metropolitan region in Zimbabwe, hence, the need to understand issues of planning, housing and social movements. These analytical issues (planning, housing and social movements) are vital in explaining the process of urban transformation. Further, metropolitan Harare consists of the largest number (about 3,000) of housing co-operatives in the country.¹⁵

Table 8: Movements under Study in this Thesis

Urban Centre	Area	Number of Movements	Total Membership
Harare	Budiriro	11	657
	Saturday Retreat	16	8,000
	Hopley	18	843
	Odar	59	8,000
	Dzivarasekwa Extension	1	480
Chitungwiza	Zengeza 4	1	5,000
	Unit L	1	8,000
Epworth	Ward 7 ¹⁶	1	6636
Total		108	37,616

Source: Collated from Various Sources.

The changing nature of housing movements had an impact on the data collection methods employed in this study. Due to the nature of the research area, the dynamics of the subject under study, and the possible politicisation of data, it was decided to engage with communities directly. Official data might not be representative of the reality, due to the fluidity of informal settlements. It was not financially and operationally feasible to conduct a survey of all the areas (Dzivarasekwa Extension, Saturday Retreat, Odar, Hopley, Budiriro in Harare and Ward 7 Epworth, Unit L and Zengeza 4 in Chitungwiza) to achieve a representative sample. For these reasons, it was decided to use secondary quantitative data and collect primary qualitative data. The findings also draw on secondary quantitative data available in a number of surveys

¹⁵ Co-operatives statistics as provided by MOSMECD.

¹⁶ This is a loosely defined movement as compared to the rest.

conducted by local authorities, ZIHOPFE and Dialogue on Shelter in the study areas. However, those statistics might not accurately reflect the situation on the ground due to the fluidity of informality in urban areas.

2.4 Study Approach and Research Methods

The differentiated and dynamic nature of social movements has often led to the use of multiple data sources and collection methods by prominent scholars in the field (Tarrow, 2004; della Porta & Keating, 2008b: 34). This is often called mixed-methods research (MMR) or triangulation in research methods discourse. Use of mixed-methods serves as “a process of verification that increases validity by incorporating several viewpoints and methods” (Yeamin & Rachman, 2012: 156).

This study uses mixed-methods research in that it combines qualitative and quantitative research. Primarily, this is because three of the four main research questions require qualitative data, with the remaining question answered through quantitative data. This methodological pluralism seems to dominate social movement studies (della Porta & Keating, 2008). This study investigates the housing problem in Zimbabwe, which is typified by contestation and collaboration between planning institutions and social movements (Muchadenyika, 2015a, b). However, such contestation and collaboration has not been studied in depth by means of comparative analysis between urban centres. At the same time, current studies (for instance, Chirisa & Munzwa, 2008; Masuko, 2008; McGregor, 2013; Chirisa & Muhomba, 2013; Chirisa, Gaza & Bandaiko, 2014) do not focus on how social movements interact with planning authorities in low-income housing delivery. This study is unique in that it analyses different types of social movements, examines the interaction between social movements and planning authorities, and compares three local authorities.

Data collection during field research focused on the interaction of social movements and planning institutions in low-income housing delivery. The main techniques used to collect data are ethnography and participant observation, in-depth interviews, FGDs, life histories, document analysis, archival research (see Annex I for field research tools) and enumeration surveys. Combining these methods in one study is vital for triangulation, increasing the validity of data and minimising bias, enhancing the strengths and weaknesses of each individual methods, allowing data analysis from different perspectives, and increasing the overall scope

of research (Mayoh & Onwuegbuzie, 2015: 91-92). The sections below explain the techniques used to collect data and provide the sampling procedure for each method.

2.4.1 Ethnography and Participant Observation

Ethnographic approaches are often viewed as the heart of qualitative methods in social sciences, and are described as a “naturalistic approach whose main data-gathering and analysing techniques consist of participant observation and open-ended interviewing” (Bray, 2008: 296). Participant observation is a research technique in which the researcher incorporates himself or herself in the group s/he is studying “to understand the contradictions, the stakes, and the social expectations that people being studied experience” (Balsiger & Lambelet, 2014: 146). My first interaction with housing social movements was in 2002, after being introduced to them by my brother, who is a member of Mbuya Nehanda housing co-operative in Harare. From that day on, I have participated in and observed more than 20 co-operative meetings, sometimes representing my brother or accompanying him. I have witnessed the co-operative grow from less than 100 to more than 5,000 members and building close to 2,000 houses for its members. (However, my brother is yet to be allocated a house by the co-operative, despite his making monthly contributions since 2000 to this day!)

Moreover, I have also observed other housing co-operatives, such as Ushehwokunze, from 2010 till the present. I have participated in and observed the operations of this co-operative as a proxy to my aunt, who is a member of the co-operative. (Fortunately, she has benefited by being allocated about 800m² of land.) In May 2010, the BSc IV Regional Planning course at the University of Zimbabwe invited two ZIHOPFE founder members, Davious Muvindi and Sekai Chiremba, to speak about urban poor housing. In brief, they described how the urban poor movement was initiated and grew in the country. This triggered my interest, and from 2010 I started observing some ZIHOPFE groups in Epworth and Harare (Hopley and Dzivarasekwa). In the process, I developed personal networks and relationships that gave me insight into the functioning of these movements.

In summary, participant observation in social movement studies allows one to collect “first-hand data, move the observation scale (from meso- and macro-level to actions and interactions of individuals) and experience the movement itself” (Balsiger & Lambelet, 2014: 145-46). During the field research, I continued to observe housing movements in Harare, Chitungwiza

and Epworth by attending meetings and gatherings (see Annex I for a participant observation list).¹⁷

2.4.2 In-Depth Interviews

In-depth interviews are face-to-face interviews using an interview guide. By definition, an interview guide consists of “a listing of areas to be covered in the interview along with, for each area, a list of topics or questions that together might suggest lines of inquiring” (Weiss, 1994: 48). In-depth interviews aim to draw ‘expert’ and ‘non-expert’ views on social movements and planning institutions in the delivery of low-income housing in metropolitan Harare. Why in-depth interviews, though? Blee and Taylor (2002: 95) observe that “through semi-structured interviewing, researchers can get insight into the individual and collective visions, imaginings, hopes, expectations, critique of the present, and projection of the future on which the possibility of collective action rests and through which social movements form, endure or disband”. These interviews were conducted with social movement members, SMOs, government and local authority officials, mayors and councillors and other key informants in Harare, Epworth and Chitungwiza. Such interviews “bring human agency to the centre of movement analysis” (Blee, 2013: 96).

In-depth interviews were carried out in four phases. The first phase was between December 2010 and February 2011, during which 10 housing movement members in Epworth and six members in Hopely (Harare) were interviewed.¹⁸ These interviews focused on how families accessed land, relations with the local authority, land tenure and housing status (improvements on land). The second phase was between June 1 and September 1, 2013, in which in-depth interviews focusing on allocation of land for housing, developments in low-income housing and council-led housing schemes were conducted. In particular, I carried out 20 in-depth interviews with key informants drawn from city heads of departments, social movement leaders, political parties, SMOs, and other non-state actors. These interviews were carried out as part of a larger field research for a Master’s programme.

The third phase took place between June and July 2014 and involved eight city of Harare senior officials and three Dialogue on Shelter officials.¹⁹ The focus of these interviews was on

¹⁷ I observed four meetings, two in Saturday Retreat and the remainder in Dzivarasekwa.

¹⁸ Interviews were part of a large research project entitled “Zimbabwe Urban Land Markets Scoping Study”.

¹⁹ As part of the Mid-Term Evaluation of the Harare Slum-upgrading Programme under contract from Dialogue on Shelter, ZIHOPFE and City of Harare.

understanding the interface between ZIHOPFE, Dialogue on Shelter and the City of Harare in the delivery of low-income housing and other services in Harare slums.

The fourth phase of in-depth interviews was conducted between 13 August 2015 and 13 February 2016. These interviews were held with 95 key informants from the three local authorities (Departments of Housing, Urban Planning, Engineering and Land Surveying), social movements (ZIHOPFE and housing co-operatives), SMOs (Dialogue on Shelter and ZINAHCO), research institutes, political parties, government ministries and other non-state actors (see Annex II for the list of people interviewed).

The selection of key informants relied on purposive sampling. This is because selected informants are experts or have a wealth of experience, and are key actors. These in-depth interviews “are in fact particularly useful for understanding the sense that actors give their actions” (della Porta, 2014a: 230). Thus, the interviews focused on understanding how planning institutions and social movements contribute to low-income housing, examining tensions, contestation and alliances between the two groups. The phased approach allows the subject matter to be interrogated over time and in different places.

2.4.3 Focus Group Discussions

By definition, focus groups are “discussions within a small group, moderated by a researcher, and oriented to obtain information on a specific topic” (Blee & Taylor, 2002: 107). In these discussions, the role of the researcher is to facilitate and moderate the flow of the discussion. In this study, FGDs are used as a means of understanding how social movements are contributing to housing delivery. These discussions were held mainly with movement members in their respective communities. Focus was placed on social organisation, finance mobilisation, house-building strategies, exploitation of political opportunities and the interface with planning institutions.

Between June and July 2015, I carried out five FGDs in Dzivarasekwa Extension (Harare) with 50 ZIHOPFE members. These discussions focused on how the social movement is interfacing with City of Harare and social organisation around the planning and delivery of services (housing, water, sanitation) (Muchadenyika, 2015a). During the field research, I conducted 14 FGDs, drawing on 120 participants and with an average of nine per FGD (see Annex III for a list of FGD participants). These discussions were held with ordinary movement members and movement leadership.

It is important to justify why FGDs are used in this study. Focus groups allow “researchers to observe the group actions that underlie the construction of collective identity, collective action frames, and the emotional dynamics involved in the creation of oppositional values” (Blee & Taylor, 2002: 109). In this study, FGDs help in understanding group and movement dynamics with regard to the nature of collective action. Focus groups are “an ideal strategy to explore social construction processes” (Johnston, 2002: 83), especially for collecting information about specific sub-groups of the population and on issues that are of interest to them (della Porta, 2014b: 291). This is why I noted above that FGDs were conducted with specific sub-groups (ordinary members, co-operative leadership and ZIHOPFE coordinators).

2.4.4 Life Histories

Life histories are “accounts given by an individual about his/her life” (della Porta, 2014c: 262). These become critical for analysing personal and individual experiences such as transformation or lack of it through social movements’ work. The study intends to understand the housing struggles at an individual level through profiling life histories. These histories concern (i) those that started the social movements, (ii) the leadership of social movements, and (iii) individual movement members whose lives have been transformed through access to housing. In this study, life histories are key to capturing the tensions between social movements and planning authorities as well as to grasping how access and non-access to housing affects the lives of the poor. I conducted six life histories as a way of understanding housing struggles at a household level.

How were participants for life histories selected? I used two techniques. The first is purposive: people who had been identified in previous research encounters and had showed a rich history of experience in social movements were selected. The second is through snowball sampling, in which interviewed people identify potential candidates for life-history interviewing. This selection is based on referees’ knowledge and understanding of fellow movement members. Snowballing “permits trust to be built from the interviewee to the next” and helps in finding interviewees and managing interviews (della Porta, 2014c: 272).

2.4.5 Document Analysis

The study makes extensive use of grey literature (published and unpublished). These documents were accessed from the City of Harare, Chitungwiza Municipality and Epworth Local Board, Government of Zimbabwe, ZINAHCO, Dialogue on Shelter and ZIHOPFE. The

material includes co-operative open and closed files (correspondence between co-operatives and local authorities), housing movement financial and annual reports, and government notices, directives and circulars (these documents are listed in Annex IV). Such documents help in examining the functioning of social movements and their interface with planning authorities.

2.4.6 Archival Research

Most of the information providing a historical perspective on urban planning and housing in Zimbabwe is found in archives. An archive is an institution storing records that fulfil three conditions: they were generated within the professional (not private) activities of a juridical or natural person; they are not necessary about current affairs; and they are of permanent value (Bosi & Reiter, 2014: 119). Thus, the study employs archival research focusing on pre-independence laws, regulations, policies and reports. These were accessed at the National Archives of Zimbabwe (the archival documents that were consulted are provided in Annex V).

2.4.7 Enumeration Survey

The study draws from enumeration survey results conducted by ZIHOPFE and Dialogue on Shelter in Harare (Dzivarasekwa) and Epworth (Ward 7). These surveys can be defined as community-based censuses that capture a settlement profile, such as settlement history, demographic information, housing and land tenure, infrastructure, and livelihoods and socio-economic data. Enumeration surveys are comprehensive as they capture planning and housing information in a settlement (the enumeration tool is provided in Annex VI). In Chapter Seven, the study draws from an enumeration survey which covered 6,636 households in Epworth (Ward 7).

2.5 Data Integrity and Handling Field Research

In this study, the field is defined as “the natural, non-laboratory setting or location where activities in which a researcher is interested [...] take place” (Schensul, Schensul & LeCompte, 1999: 70). In broad terms, field research is “research based on personal interaction with research subjects in their own setting” (Wood, 2007: 124). The field research for this study was conducted in three urban centres: Harare, Chitungwiza and Epworth. I took cognisance of the different socio-political constructions of these centres. Below is a summary of the field research process and insights.

- a) Field research clearance and ease of doing research

To be able to conduct field research, local authorities and government ministries require that researchers seek clearance first. This is primarily for one to have access to officials and official documents as well as to be able to access the general community. In addition, it is a requirement to submit a copy of the thesis to all institutions involved during field research. In terms of ease of doing research, and based on the five government institutions involved, on average it took 16 days for a study to be cleared, as shown in Table 9. However, in order to avoid delays caused by bureaucratic research processes, I employed a two-pronged approach. This involved lodging a request for research clearance papers and at the same time collecting data from organisations and people who did not require complex clearance processes. In some instances, I used this time to interview communities and social movement leaders.

Table 9: Research Approval and Ease of Doing Research

Institution	Promised Duration (days)	Approval time-frame (days)
City of Harare	3	7
Chitungwiza Municipality	7	17
Epworth Local Board	7	14
MLGPWNH	7	27
MOSMECD	3	1
Average		15.6

Source: Researcher's Experience, 2015-2016.

As indicated in Table 9, the local government ministry took the longest time to approve the research (27 days). In contrast, in the MOSMECD the ministry took the least time (one day) to grant clearance. In Chitungwiza, my research application papers were misplaced, which suggests the challenges the municipality faces in filing and record-keeping. Research clearance letters and inherent conditions attached are shown in Annex VII.

b) Record-keeping and research

Of the three urban centres, the City of Harare has an established Records Department with a supportive staff. I was stationed at the City of Harare's Department of Housing and Community Services (DHCS) in the Records Department for four weeks. Primarily, I was perusing open and closed files containing correspondence between co-operatives and City departments. These files contained information from 1984 to 2015. The perusal was tedious but rewarding in that I collected valuable data and information, which is cited mainly in Chapter Five. I found city files filled with evidence that variously confirms and refutes much of what is known about social movements and planning institutions. Most of the material I found in those files was non-subjective. The files contained Council resolutions, City policies (planning and housing)

and correspondence between the city, government ministries and agencies and social movements.

c) Declaration of secrecy and academic research

Despite the fact that interviews were secured with officials in the local government ministry, it was the case that some of the officials were unresponsive and unreceptive during interviews, often pointing to the Declaration of Secrecy public officials sign. The local government ministry compelled me to sign the Declaration of Secrecy as a condition for being granted research clearance (Annex VIII). I signed it with a heavy heart, as the nature of my research entails unravelling sensitive issues in housing. However, other senior officials in the local government ministry urged me to be candid. They were very open in sharing their views during interviews – a development that strengthened my resolve to continue my investigations.

I could not ascertain why researchers are compelled to sign the Declaration of Secrecy. In my previous academic studies, there was no such requirement. The Declaration states that it exists “[i]n order that all Public servants understand their responsibilities in respect of official secrecy”. It summarises key provisions governing civil servants from the Public Service Act (Chapter 271), Official Secrets Act (Chapter 97) and Prevention of Corruption Act (Chapter 70). However, the study, researcher and research participants are constitutionally protected, in particular through Sections 62 and 194. Section 62 gives citizens “the right of access to any information held by the State or by any institution or agency of government at every level, in so far as the information is required in the interests of public accountability” (GoZ, 2013). Furthermore, the Constitution provides that “transparency must be fostered by providing the public with timely, accessible and accurate information”, which it holds as one of the basic values and principles governing public administration (GoZ, 2013).

In a way, the Declaration of Secrecy requirements show how the state apparatus conceives of and conceals information; in particular, they reveal its attitude to academic research. In the case of public servants, it can be understood why they should sign such a commitment. However, to compel a researcher to sign a declaration of secrecy is to contradict a fundamental aspect of research, namely bringing new evidence to light. In some instance, officials who were interviewed indicated that they were speaking “off the record” on sensitive issues. Hence, rather than mention the names of interviewees in this study, I have referred to their official positions instead in order to honour their requests for anonymity.

d) Recording interviews and capturing field notes

Within a total of 95 in-depth interviews, about 30 individuals agreed to be recorded. The majority were sceptical about the recording of interviews, saying that some issues are considered highly sensitive. It was decided to treat opinions on all issues considered sensitive as “off the record” and such were captured only through field notes. I decided both to record, where it was agreed to, and to take field notes, since the procedure was useful for comparative purposes. At the end of every day, field notes were word-processed and English interviews in audio converted to MS Word using Dragon software. I would check that the information captured by both methods tallied up with each other, and would fill in any gaps. For interviews in Shona, I did the translations.

Respondents spoke in the language of their choice. This was to avoid failure to articulate certain issues due to language barriers. The use of local language in particular during FGD was usually accompanied by emotions and non-verbal cues. These cues were key in understanding tensions and contradictions in social movements.

e) Fear, violence and factionalism among participants

Housing movements on state land are riven by contestations among warring factions. The areas studied in Harare South resemble a battlefield where violence is the main tool used to settle differences and assert power. At Madzibaba Border Gezi Housing Co-operative (Saturday Retreat), in order to avoid talking to ‘renegade’ factions within the co-operatives, I was accompanied by a youth responsible for security in the co-operative. He assured me that he is well known for his bravery and there was no need for me to worry about safety. He took me to people from one faction in the co-operative, with whom I held discussions. However, the FGD was different from the previous ones as participants’ faces expressed fear. I tried to allay the fear by explaining my research project thoroughly and saying that it is an academic study. In order to avoid witnessing conflict between factions, I decided to conduct separate FDGs with respondents from the other faction.

With regards to factions in co-operatives on state land, intra-party politics within Zanu-PF are central to the disputes. In addition, senior politicians seem to be destabilising the co-operative movement in Saturday Retreat with a view to installing loyal leadership there. Urban spaces on state land are deeply contested, with violence a prominent tool in determining who controls such areas. In general, people are questioning the political party that allowed them access to

state land, as key politicians seem to be involved in non-transparent land deals at the expense of ordinary movement members. Due to violence in Unit L, Chitungwiza, I was advised not to interact with community members. Nonetheless, I observed violence between members of opposing factions. The violence was also directed at hired contractors who were grading roads and had to withdraw their equipment.

In Budiriro, the fear among the FGD participants was evident, with people suspecting that I was part of the state intelligence establishment.²⁰ People were afraid of violent reprisals from Zanu-PF youth for having expressed facts and opinions to researchers. In order to build a climate of trust, I had to spend a considerable amount of time speaking to would-be research participants about their daily lives, challenges and prospects. In politically sensitive areas, people were freer in discussing matters informally. There were two reasons for this. First, in some areas, people thought I was a state security agent sent to tap community views. Secondly, given that informal discussions took longer than formal ones, respondents could gradually gain confidence in my integrity and neutrality.

f) Organisation of movements versus information

ZIHOPFE is a movement which is more organised than the housing co-operatives studied in metropolitan Harare. This is mainly because ZIHOPFE has structured meetings for planning, feedback, and monitoring of movement activities, which are absent in housing co-operatives. It is these meetings that I observed and in which I conducted FGDs. Furthermore, it was evident that ordinary members of ZIHOPFE exhibited a deeper understanding of the process of housing delivery and of the operations and management of the movement. The situation was different as ordinary members of housing co-operatives showed little understanding of housing delivery processes, something which can be attributed to elitism in the management of co-operatives and consortiums in Zimbabwe.

Moreover, ZIHOPFE has a technical partner, Dialogue on Shelter, which helps in collecting, processing and storing movement data and information. Such a relationship is vital for reflecting on social-movement affairs. However, co-operatives seem to face enormous challenges in maintaining databases and accurate information.

²⁰ Especially the second FGD. I spent about five hours after the FGD in informal discussion, during which time a number of issues were raised.

g) Gender dimensions

Of a total of 120 participants in FDGs, 67 were women. Some of the FDGs were women-dominated, which is explained in two ways. First, ZIHOPFE is a movement that champions women's issues and hence it is natural for women to be dominant in these FDGs. Secondly, women-dominated FDGs were designed specifically to understand gender dynamics in movements and informal settlements. In this regard, one of the focus areas was to understand services, such as water and sanitation, which have a disproportionate impact on women.

2.6 Data Analysis, Interpretation and Presentation

The analysis, interpretation and presentation of data follow defined themes which are derived from the study's main research questions. These themes are social movements and low-income housing delivery; planning institutions and low-income housing delivery; collaboration and contestation of social movements and planning institutions. Each of these has sub-themes. In analysing the data, I perform an actor analysis, process analysis, and comparative analysis aided by software (Atlas.tiV7 and STATA), which are explained in further detail below.

2.6.1 Actor Analysis

Actor analysis is the analysis of actors involved in low-income housing delivery and their actions. The three main actors in Zimbabwe are social movements, SMOs and local authorities. Particular attention is given in the analysis of data over the study period (2000-15) to the question of how these actors view and engage with each other. The analysis provides insights into the tensions, contradictions and alliances amongst them. Actor analysis is vital in explaining how housing actors in metropolitan Harare have promoted or thwarted urban transformation in their individual and collective capacity. Urban transformation is often a conflict-generation process as it reconfigures the structure of the city as well as power relations. Diverse interests often lead to clashes of ideas, ideals, ideologies and approaches to urban transformation through housing.

2.6.2 Process Analysis

The second analysis concentrates on the process of forming social movements up to the time houses for movement members are built. The focus is on inter- and intra-movement relationships as well as relationships with local authorities. The first process relates to the formation, growth and sustenance of social movements and involves issues such as triggers,

social and resource mobilisation, leadership and governance. The second process is the analysis of how social movements lobby, negotiate, access or annex urban land. The final process is how social movements make improvements to urban land. This analysis is vital in explaining the process of housing delivery and urban transformation in cities (from the formation of social movements to built-up structures in the form of housing).

2.6.3 Comparative Analysis

The third analysis is comparative, and involves comparing and contrasting research findings against three defined criteria. A comparison is made between the two types of social movements, namely housing co-operatives and ZIHOPFE. This comparison is premised on exploring any organisation-specific features that are aiding or constraining the functioning of these movements. The second comparison focuses on three local authorities with a view to understanding any location-specific characteristics influencing low-income housing delivery. The third concerns different categories of co-operatives (council-affiliated and local government ministry-affiliated) as a way of understanding how such differences affect low-income housing delivery.

2.6.4 Software Analysis

The thesis uses Atlas.tiV7 and STATA to aid the analysis of qualitative and quantitative data. Atlas.ti assists in the analysis of voluminous qualitative data collected during field research through in-depth interviews, FGDs, life histories, and documents. I have performed qualitative data analysis extensively in numerous previous studies, which has aided me in handling the voluminous data in this study. Secondary data from the enumeration survey were analysed using STATA.

2.7 Political and Ethical Considerations

Social movement research often attracts political attention, which raises ethical and security concerns for both the researcher and participants. In Zimbabwe's urban areas, there are vigilante groups that operate largely through informal networks (Kriger, 2012) and often claim ownership and control of informal settlements and some housing co-operatives. As I have argued elsewhere, urban poor housing is deeply entangled with political struggles (Muchadenyika, 2015b), with militia controlling some urban land and housing schemes (McGregor, 2013). This means that the researcher has to find a way of navigating such politics. My previous studies in the informal settlements of Epworth pointed to the importance of

making courtesy visits to local political structures before entering the community. Thus, during field research, where political tensions were high, I introduced myself and the study to real or perceived local leaders. Primarily, this is because social movement researchers cannot ignore the political context in which social movements are entangled (Milan, 2014).

I sought written clearance from the local government ministry in order to proceed with field research. Thereafter, it is a requirement to be cleared at local authority level before undertaking the study in local authority areas. Thus, written clearance was sought from Epworth Local Board, City of Harare and Chitungwiza Municipality. Such a clearance is vital when booking and undertaking interviews with local authority officials as well as for accessing databases and documents of these local authorities.

Conducting FGDs, in-depth interviews, and life histories also raised ethical issues. Participants in FGDs conducted themselves in line with the conditions of the University of the Western Cape on research ethics (in particular that participants pledge not to divulge to a third party any information shared during the discussion). Informants for in-depth interviews and those selected for life histories are cited directly only after they have consented to this. Before collecting data from any informant or participant, I explained the study and gained their consent. In brief, I sought permission and approval from individuals and organisations that participated in the research.

2.8 Study Limitations and Conclusion

The main study limitations concern lack of access to some key information, such as co-operatives' databases (by government) and MOSMECD annual reports, and violence that restricted access in some movements (in particular, Unit L in Chitungwiza). However, such limitations are not significant enough to have an impact on the study.

In summary, this chapter has discussed the research methodology used to investigate the tensions, alliances and contradictions in low-income housing delivery in metropolitan Harare. Building on issues in social movement research, the chapter has explained the importance of participatory action research. I explained in detail the focus issues and data sources based on the four research questions. This was done primarily as a way of developing a study approach and research methods that answer the focus issues emanating from the research questions.

The study employs a mixed-methods research methodology, fusing qualitative and quantitative methods. Such a mix of research methods is informed by data needs emanating from research questions and an attempt to solidify the study through each method's strengths. The study uses seven research techniques, namely in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, life histories, ethnography and participatory observation, document analysis, archival search and enumeration surveys.

The next chapter elaborates on the conceptual and theoretical aspects introduced in Chapter One. Thereafter, Chapter Four focuses on general and specific experiences in Zimbabwe, providing the historical and contemporary context.



Chapter Three

Theoretical and Conceptual Framework: The Discourse on Planning, Housing and Social Movements

This chapter presents major theoretical debates underpinning the discourse of planning, social movements and housing. These debates are essential in drawing theoretically informed conclusions about social movements and planning institutions in Zimbabwe. I focus on planning theories that are relevant to the study of social movements and housing in cities of the Global South. Departing from the premise that the current planning and designing of Global South cities was (and still is) informed by colonial planning legacies and practices (Myers, 2003, 2011; Odendaal, 2012; Watson, 2009a), I build a case for radical planning which takes into consideration the housing needs of the urban poor. However, radical planning is brought about through contradictions, contestations and struggles among social movements, civil society and the state (Fainstein, 2010; Miraftab, 2009; Holston, 2008; Friedmann, 2011). Such struggles largely determine planning outcomes such as the delivery of low-income housing.

In tracing the debates on housing, emphasis is placed on the importance of self-help housing and community-driven approaches. In general, housing debates point to the importance of promoting low-cost housing as a solution to the housing crisis in Global South cities (Jenkins, Smith & Wang, 2007; UN-Habitat, 2003; Tibaijuka, 2009; Datta & Jones, 1999; Ramsamy, 2006). Housing debates are highly controversial in scholarly literature, and are often triggered by socio-economic and political tensions in the global economy through the influence of international financial institutions and international development agencies.

Social movements are presented as agents of social change and transformation within cities (Fainstein, 2010; Harvey, 2012; Miraftab, 2009; Friedmann, 2011). Social change is usually triggered by socio-economic and political tensions to which the poor and excluded masses respond by forming movements. This is no different in the urban domain (Harvey, 1973, 2012; Soja, 2010, 2011; Castells, 1977, 1983, 2009). Theories of social movements which provide a proximate explanation of housing movements in metropolitan Harare are discussed. Furthermore, I summarise the role of social movements in housing from across the world to illustrate housing struggles in other countries. The chapter concludes by presenting transformative theory (Friedmann, 2011) as the conceptual framework. This framework hinges on two elements: social movements (agents for social transformation) and radical planning (means for social transformation) (Miraftab, 2009; Fainstein, 2010b; Friedmann, 2011).

3.1 Planning Discourse

3.1.1 Planning Theories

While acknowledging that there are other planning theories – such as rational comprehensive (Faludi, 1973), incremental (Lindblom, 1959; Talen, 2005), transactive (Friedmann, 1973), new urbanism (Trudeau & Malloy, 2011; Fainstein, 2000a; Grant, 2006; Ellis, 2002; Talen, 2005) and advocacy (Davidoff, 1965) – this section presents theories (collaborative, Just City and radical planning) that are considered to be most relevant in sub-Saharan African cities. This is mainly because these theories explain how social movements can contribute to just and inclusive cities in Africa. Departing from theories that view planning as an “instrument of control”, planning theories presented in this section see planning as a vehicle for “innovation and action” (Friedmann, 2003: 8).

Before delving into the specific planning theories relevant to this study, I explain rational comprehensive, incremental advocacy, and transactive planning. Rational comprehensive planning theory is perhaps the first conceptualised planning theory. It is based on basically four steps namely goal-setting, identification of policy alternatives, evaluation of means against ends, and implementation of decisions (Hudson, Galloway & Kaufman, 1979).²¹ This process is iterative, not always sequential and relies on feedback loops. Rational comprehensive planning has been mainly criticised for “its insensitivity to existing institutional performances capabilities; its reductionist epistemology; its failure to appreciate the cognitive limits of decision-makers, who cannot ‘optimize’ but only ‘satisfice’ choices by successive approximations” (Hudson, Galloway & Kaufman, 1979: 389). Criticism of the rational comprehensive planning theory provided building blocks for the incremental planning theory. Incremental planning is mainly about what Charles Lindblom terms ‘the science of muddling through’ meaning that decision making is not linear and hence the necessity of gradualism and adjustments.

Advocacy planning entails planners engaging in the “political process as advocates of the interests of government and other groups” (Davidoff, 1965: 331). Put differently advocacy planning views planning as a political process which requires a planner to navigate politics through balancing and safeguarding various interests. Transactive planning focuses on taking

²¹ These steps differ by author as they can be more than four.

decisions through planner being at the coalface of action (lived realities and experiences of people), dealing with and accommodating conflict (Friedman, 2011). This theory of planning hinges on the uncertainty of the future which prompts grounding decisions from planning practice.

In the Zimbabwean context, these theories allow one to question and understand how social movements participate, mobilise and take action in struggles for inclusive planning and housing approaches. I link these planning theories to the subject of social movements, housing and planning in general, and in the specific context of this study.

3.1.1.1 Communicative/Collaborative Planning Theory

The fundamental argument of communicative or collaborative planning is that communication is the most important element of planning practice (Forester, 1989; Healey, 1999, 2003; Innes, 1995). In this case, “interaction with stakeholders and interest groups, communicating ideas, forming arguments, debating differences in understandings, and finally reaching consensus on the course of action replaces detached, expert-driven plan-making as the primary activity of planners” (Watson, 2005: 275). Here, planning ceases to be a top-down activity but a process of rigorous and intensive engagement, involving negotiations between actors such as government, social movements and civil society. In other words, collaborative planning means that planning institutions and social movements enter a process of negotiation in order to define planning outcomes like housing and water. The sharing of divergent views through dialogue and engagement leads to better planning positions (Watson, 2005).

However, in practice, communication can be distorted (Castells, 2009). Habermas (1990a, b) puts forward a set of criteria to avoid such distortion and to guide communication processes: if processes are inclusive, emphatic and open, and if existing power differences between participants can be neutralised, then the outcome of such a process can be considered valid.²² However, Habermas’s criteria have been widely critiqued by other scholars. For instance, communicative planning theory has been criticised for not providing adequate response to the unfair and destructive use of power in planning processes (Huxley & Yiftachel, 2000; McGuirk, 2001; Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2000). Power contradictions and contestations in planning processes are never neutral (Forester, 1989; Pløger, 2004; Hillier, 2002). An example

²² It should be noted that Habermas is not a planning theorist and that some planning theorists have used his ideas.

is a situation where planning institutions show hegemonic power when dealing with social movements, with the latter struggling to change power relations.

In Zimbabwe, due to the nature of politics, planning and planners are associated with the powerful and wealthy, marginalising the urban poor (Kamete, 2011). These factors notwithstanding, this study shows how SMOs, which employ planning specialists, are providing technical support to social movements. In the findings chapters, I explain how two SMOs, Dialogue on Shelter and ZINAHCO, are providing support to housing movements (ZIHOPFE and housing co-operatives, respectively).

3.1.1.2 Just City Approach

Proponents of the Just City theory, such as Susan Fainstein, David Harvey and Edward Soja, have advocated for a theory and practice of planning that addresses redistribution, equity and justice in what is widely known as the Just City approach. Harvey's pioneering book *Social Justice and the City* opens with the assumption that "principles of social justice had some relevance for the application of spatial and geographical principles to urban and regional planning" (Harvey, 1973: 9). The purpose of the Just City Approach in planning is to have a just city, which Sandercock (1997a) defines as socially inclusive, where difference is not merely tolerated but treated with recognition and respect. Briefly stated, the Just City approach conceives planning as an activity promoting redistribution and social change within societies. The principal target of the Just City approach, Fainstein (2000:468) argues, is the "leadership of urban social movements" and "insurgent groups" whose role is to push their interests, which often clash with government interests. Through continued work and pressure from social movements, "the system itself will change incrementally as a consequence of continued pressure for justice" (Fainstein, 2010: 6). In this study, priority is given to the leadership and governance of social movements, with a view to understanding how such leadership interacts with planning institutions as well as how it affects the functioning of social movements.

In order to effect institutional transformation, transformative social movements require leadership and power mobilisation. This is essential in the transition of ideas to social action, as Fainstein (2010: 33) argues:

An intervening stage of mobilisation is required between the formulation of ideas and social action, and the two are dialectically related. Ideas can give rise to social movements that in turn change consciousness, ultimately

resulting in the adoption of new public policy, but this is more than a matter of negotiation and consensus building among stakeholders.

Most recently, Harvey (2012: xii) attributes the power and significance of urban social movements to Brazil's adoption in 2001 of a constitution that guarantees the right to the city, and housing, in particular. He further argues that such a constitutional requirement promotes an active sense of "insurgent citizenship", which involves "ongoing struggles over who get[s] to shape the qualities of urban life" (Ibid.: xii).

During Zimbabwe's constitution-making process, social movements campaigned for the inclusion of housing rights. The Constitution of Zimbabwe contains provisions that advance the rights of the homeless, specifically sections 28 (shelter), 74 (freedom from arbitrary eviction) and 77 (right to food and water) (GoZ, 2013). In concluding the study, I proffer suggestions on low-income housing development strategies so as to ensure that housing rights are a lived reality for the urban poor.

Susan Fainstein's Just City approach has been critiqued by Vanessa Watson. Watson (2005: 279) argues that "the question this [Fainstein's argument] raises of course, is how do redistribution and equitable planning occur, and who is to judge claims, if government is not to be trusted and if progressive officials do not exist". She further argues that Fainstein's theory "downplays government in the planning process, and her arguments are addressed primarily to groups outside of the state, [so] it is not clear how it would happen other than through luck or accident" (Ibid.: 279). Watson's concerns remain valid though experiences in most African countries show the failure of bureaucratized and technocratic planning (Silva, 2012; Myers, 2003; Njoh, 2003). Non-government actors are mobilising against highly atrophied forms of citizen governance in the urban domain, and with tangible results – as this thesis demonstrates in the Zimbabwean case. Other scholars (for instance Jenkins & Burgess, 2000) support Fainstein's argument that spatial forms have different distributive implications and negative socio-economic effects of spatial exclusion in cities (Borja & Castells, 1997). Injustice in cities leads to urban violence, crime and socio-political unrest (Body-Gendrot, 2000; Myers, 2011).

3.1.1.3 Radical Planning Theory

Sandercock (1998a, b; 2000; 2004) has established herself as the leading theorist on what she terms the "radical planning model". Her work is grounded in the conception of civil society as autonomous sites of struggle and resistance and of social movements as primary agents of

change. Fundamentally, the ‘radical planning model’, rooted in advocacy planning, takes place most often outside formal state and economic structures (Sandercock, 1998a). The notion of radicalism is brought through struggles among social movements, civil society and the state in seeking spatial justice (Soja, 2011).

With reference to Global South cities, Mirafteb (2009: 32) argues for the “notion of insurgent planning as radical planning practices that respond to neoliberal specifics of dominance through inclusion – that is, inclusive governance”. She maintains that insurgent planning practices driven by grassroots insurgent citizenship is “counter-hegemonic, transgressive and imaginative” (Ibid.: 32). A case in point is how “the Brazil Landless Movement consolidated itself as a national movement, increasingly mobilised against neoliberal policies”, despite facing “opposition from landlords and government” (Karriem, 2009: 321).

Under radical planning, social movements struggle and push for inclusion of their needs in planning processes and outcomes, despite breaching state authority and laws. How could this be? Friedmann (2011: 61) posits that radical planning is “performed largely at the political base of social movements in local communities, involving relatively small numbers of participants but with a view beyond their local sphere of action to the larger structural changes that must be accomplished on a wider scale”. The consolidation of location-based social movement efforts brings about structural changes at the city-wide level. This study describes how such movements, seen in context, grew in scale to effect city-wide transformation.

Most theorists argue for radical planning in the context of modern democracies (Beard, 2003). In authoritarian regimes, citizen coalitions unleash radical planning for social transformation, with crises providing an opportunity for radical action, as Beard observes:

Radical planning first takes covert or subtle forms. After experiencing success (albeit modest), the tangible improvement of their organisational skills, and increased confidence, residents begin to get a sense of their own agency and become politically conscious. This is a crucial precursor to overt radical action. This process can be accelerated when an opportunity presents itself, as when an economic and/or political crisis occurs and/or a repressive state is weakened (2003: 30).

Beginning in 2000, Zimbabwe’s socio-economic and political crisis weakened the role of the state and its institutions in providing low-income housing (Muchadenyika, 2015a; Kanyenze

et al., 2011). This study explains how this crisis galvanised social movements through radical planning, providing alternative housing delivery methods in metropolitan Harare.

3.1.2 Planning Approaches in Global South Cities

The premise of this section is that the current planning and designing of Global South cities was (and still is) informed by colonial planning legacies and practices (Myers, 2003, 2011; Odendaal, 2012; Watson, 2009a). In fact, colonial planning produced colonial urban spaces which revolved around segregation and severe inequalities in terms of housing and urban services provision (Jenkins, Smith & Wang, 2007; Njoh, 2007). These planning approaches have not served the interests of urban Africans, which necessitate the need to change planning methods (Watson, 2009a; UN-Habitat, 2009). Before advancing the argument for radical planning, I first explain how colonialism shaped and continues to shape African cities.

3.1.2.1 Colonial Planning and African Cities

Colonialism's legacy of segregation of the urban landscape and high degrees of inequality in African cities is widely acknowledged (Home, 1997; Myers, 2003, 2011; Wright, 1991; Rakodi, 1986; Nast, 1994). Colonialism in its various forms shaped and continues to shape urban planning and housing in African cities (Njoh, 2007). Most cities in the Global South were established as centres of power and control by colonial regimes. After the Western European Industrial Revolution, planning became "a tool for attaining political and ideological goals of the state or ruling class" (UN-Habitat, 2009: 49). Planning methodologies, legislation and institutions were adopted and modelled from European countries (Wekwete, 1995; UN-Habitat, 2009; Watson, 2011). African cities were governed and controlled remotely by colonial administrations from capital cities in the Global North, thus "playing a critical role in the process of colonial political domination and in the extraction of profit by colonial business enterprise" (Harrel-Bond et al., 1978: 309).

In modern times, little emphasis has been placed on local urban planning conditions in sub-Saharan Africa when adopting urban planning methods (Watson, 2009a). Instead, urban planning continues to perpetuate social and economic segregation (UN-Habitat, 2009). Odendaal (2012: 174) argues that in Africa south of the Sahara, planning "owes much to the colonial legacies that inform the shape and composition of African urban spaces and places". In particular, planning legislation, institutions and education require major reforms so that planning addresses the realities of urban Africa and promotes the aspirations of Africans. At

present, planning is still used as a tool for social segregation and exclusion in many territories (UN-Habitat, 2009). This is mainly because planning tools in use, for instance, master planning, zoning, building regulations and restrictive planning laws, “were not developed with the needs of the poor in mind” (McGranahan, Mitlin & Satterthwaite, 2008: 77).

It is these technocratic and bureaucratic types of planning that often put social movements in conflict with planning authorities. The present planning and governance system does not favour marginalised communities; in fact, it criminalises livelihoods and informal housing for the urban poor (Potts, 2008). Yet, planning authorities themselves are struggling to provide decent housing, services and economic opportunities for all those who live in cities. Primarily, planning must deal with “material problems that demand urgent and clear solutions” (McEwan, 2003: 341), and “those material problems clearly include the gross inequalities, social and spatial, which African cities inherited from European colonialism, problems these cities [were] ostensibly created to militate against” (Myers, 2011: 49). I argue that there is an urgent need for reforming urban planning through the practice and promotion of radical planning.

3.1.2.2 The Case for Radical Planning

Miraftab (2009) argues that there is need for radical planning in the Global South. In particular, she argues for insurgent planning characterised by “grassroots insurgent citizenship for planning, and the de-colonisation of planning theory” (Ibid.: 32). Planning in African cities requires inclusive governance in which the purpose of planning is to “plan with people” and not “plan for people”. Most recently, Watson (2012) argues that there are “stubborn realities” (social and spatial exclusion, slums, violence, crime) in Global South cities which can be confronted by planners and planning theory. In this respect, planning must address the realities of African city contexts through promoting social and spatial inclusion.

Planning in Africa owes much to the colonial legacies that inform the shape and composition of African urban spaces and places (Odendaal, 2012: 174). This legacy is reflected in planning legislation, institutions, and education, and plans themselves. Porter (2010: 154) argues for the decolonisation of planning because “the domain of planning is one area of many where injustices against indigenous peoples remain”. If this argument is true, planning in Africa requires adaptation to prevailing circumstances and needs of the urban poor.

Since the fall of colonialism in Africa, little emphasis has been placed on local conditions when adopting urban planning methods (Watson, 2009a; UN-Habitat, 2009). Planning systems,

particularly in the Global South, have changed very slowly and in some countries hardly at all, with many approaches and systems reflecting planning ideas from the Global North simplistically transferred to southern contexts through complex processes of colonialism and globalisation (Watson, 2009a: 151). Yet, planning ideas must be “articulated within discourses that represent particular notions of space and place, and which carry certain rationalities and normative assumptions about social life in the sites of the materialisation of these ideas” (Tait & Jensen, 2007: 114). Planning must be context- and place-specific, responding to prevailing socio-economic, environmental and political conditions. Over the years, social movements have engaged in struggles to change planning and housing delivery approaches in Africa (Satterthwaite & Mitlin, 2013). This thesis explains how social movements are challenging prevailing planning approaches and advancing alternative housing methods. In the Zimbabwean context, pressure from housing movements has resulted in planning authorities adopting grassroots-centred approaches to housing delivery (an element of radical planning).

3.2 Housing Debates and Delivery Approaches

The term ‘housing’ refers to both the production of houses and the processes associated with housing provision (Jenkins, Smith & Wang, 2007). Since the Second World War, housing approaches have evolved in the Global North and made their way to the South. These approaches include social housing, self-help, enabling, urban management, alliance-building and slum-upgrading. However, it is vital to point out that the housing challenge “cannot be solved by any one method” (Harris & Giles, 2003: 167). In practice, it is important that different housing delivery approaches be used for different segments of the society, taking into consideration contextual conditions.

3.2.1 Social Housing Policy

Social housing can be defined as “housing that has been constructed from public funds and so rents are subsidised so that it can be provided at a price that is not principally determined by the profit motive, but is rather allocated according to some concept of need and where political decision making has an important influence in terms of the quantity, quality and terms of provision” (King, 2006: 31-32). Beginning in the 1930s, governments as a matter of policy embarked on the construction of social housing, which mainly took the form of slum regeneration (Tibaijuka, 2009). In principle, social housing was a response to the squalid urban conditions that had galvanised crime and delinquency as well as posed threats to human health.

In this regard, social housing has been targeted at low-income groups (King & Oxley, 2000). The rise of social housing was popularised through welfare states, in which the state plays a fundamental role in the production and delivery of public goods and services to citizens.

The United States, United Kingdom and German governments developed extensive municipal housing projects primarily to house the working and middle classes. Over time there has been a sharp decline in social housing in welfare states. For instance, in the UK, the Right-to Buy legislation privatised social housing stock on a large scale (Van Gent, 2010). This development led Jones and Marie (2006) to argue that it was the sell-out of the welfare state. The decline in social housing coincided with the rise in home-ownership. At the same time, the gradual residualisation of the social housing sector due to policy changes has left the poorest and most vulnerable in the worst housing (Bradly, 2011). This is mainly because social housing is a crucial element of housing provision and housing systems, if not quite “the saving grace in the welfare state” (Rhodes & Mullins, 2009). In modern times, social housing is diminishing due to increased marketisation and privatisation of social housing. In the Zimbabwean case, social housing has been constrained by government policies biased towards home-ownership (Chaeruka & Munzwa, 2009). However, self-help approaches remain a mainstay in Zimbabwe’s housing delivery.

3.2.2 Self-Build and Self-Help Housing Paradigm

The British architect John F.C. Turner is widely recognised as having pioneered the emergence and spread of what became known as ‘self-help’ housing. Turner’s ideas were widely publicised in a number of publications (Turner, 1963, 1965, 1967, 1968a, b; Turner, Turner & Crooke, 1963; Mangin & Turner, 1968, 1969; Turner & Fichter, 1972).

Here, I summarise Turner’s key ideas. Turner argued for reducing the government’s role to ensuring security of tenure for land and housing, applying lower official standards, and providing access to financial and appropriate technical support (Jenkins, Smith & Wang, 2007: 159). His ideas were premised on promoting home-ownership and self-help involvement through labour (self-build) and self-management in housing provision. The self-help approach persists because it is the best-available mechanism for low-income households to secure housing (Mukhija & Scott-Railton, 2013; UN-Habitat, 2003).

The self-help paradigm has four phases – sites-and-services, squatter upgrading (through incremental development), employment activities and community organisation – and a focus

on 'programmes' rather than 'projects' (Pugh, 1995). The self-help approach resulted in the implementation of sites-and-services (aided self-help) programmes by many international development agencies and governments. In Chapter Four, Section 4.2.3, I explain how international organisations promoted the self-help approach in Zimbabwe. Home (1997) refers to sites-and-services schemes as programmes and projects implemented by government agencies providing support (infrastructure and services) to low-income households in building their houses.

In time it emerged that the self-help housing approach had weaknesses. These include: substantial subsidies were required for the financing of housing projects (for example, through interest rates being lower than inflation); cost recovery proved difficult, with often more than 50 per cent defaults in loans; the private sector was never adequately involved; and there was "downward-raiding" of projects, that is, higher-income groups which were not adequately supplied by market mechanisms acquired the houses (Jenkins, Smith & Wang, 2007: 163).

In Botswana, the self-help housing programme's subsidies (serviced land, building materials and technical assistance) "often operated as below-market-rate mortgages and were widely condemned for largely being unsuccessful and unsustainable and failing to produce a significant number of housing units" (Tibaijuka, 2009: 143). A widely known critique of self-help housing was advanced by Burgess (1977, 1978, 1982, 1985, 1987, 1992), who essentially argued for the need to be comprehensive when dealing with housing supply and to incorporate the diverse vested interests of groups such as politicians, building firms, landowners, and financial institutions. Such a critique led to the development of a new approach called 'housing as a whole', or the enabling approach.

3.2.3 Enabling Approaches

The enabling approach has been dominated by the World Bank-led strategy of "developing the housing sector as a whole by enabling primarily formal private markets to work more efficiently" (Keivani & Werna, 2001: 191). Principally, this approach emphasised housing development by the private sector and communities as opposed to direct provision by the state. UN-Habitat's enabling approach focused on community participation, while the World Bank's strategy emphasised the role of markets in housing delivery. Enablement involves providing "legislative, institutional and financial frameworks for entrepreneurship of the private sector, communities and individuals, and hence in this period, the international agencies focused assistance on promoting the development of policies and programmes as opposed to projects"

(Jenkins, Smith & Wang, 2007: 169). The enabling approach calls for a fundamental shift in the role of government from provider to enabler, as outlined in the ‘Global Shelter Strategy to the Year 2000’ (UN-Habitat, 2001), as shown in Table 10.

Table 10: The Government’s Role in the Enabling Approach

Through enabling housing markets by:	Through enabling partnership:
Setting up the regulatory framework needed and reforming government institutions, focusing them on different goals and retooling them accordingly.	Involving all actors in the process; accepting the informal sector as a partner; government only enables serviced land supply, finance, or servicing informal areas and providing security of tenure.
Ensuring the availability of the components of housing supply, including land, infrastructure, labour, building materials suppliers, and service providers, through technical assistance, and training.	Enabling several mechanisms of housing finance and land towards poverty alleviation.

Source: Adapted from Hassan, 2011.

The enabling approach has been criticised for its overconcentration on private markets and exclusion of alternative modes of housing provision. For instance, Tandler (1997) argues that in order to guarantee the success of this approach, it is vital to promote policies such as decentralisation, deregulation, privatisation and demand-driven development. In this regard, Turner argued strongly for deregulation to enable the decentralisation of housing provision. Many scholars (such as Baken & Van der Linden, 1993; Jones, 1996; Jones & Ward, 1995; Durand-Lasserve, 1987) criticise the enabling approach for ignoring the need for expanding the role of informal land markets and developers. In the developing world, informal markets play a significant role in housing delivery. Furthermore, the informal housing sector requires specific policy support targeting co-operatives, and community-based initiatives and subsistent landlords (Meffert, 1992; Vakil, 1996; Rakodi, 1995a; Kumar, 1996).

3.2.4 Urban Management Approaches

The World Bank, UN-Habitat and United Nations Development Programme developed the urban management approach, a package that focused on local governments²³ rather than the state because of the former’s proximity and responsiveness to citizens and the electorate. However, this package is “very demanding, requiring well developed public administration, effective coordination among participants, and complex systems of cooperation” (Pugh, 1995:

²³ Through institutional development, capacity-building, infrastructure management, urban land management, urban poverty alleviation, municipal finance and administration, and urban environmental management.

70). Over time it appeared that most local governments in the developing world were weak and lacked the capacity to run the urban management programme (UMP) effectively.

In the 1990s, the UMP focused on five components, namely urban land management, infrastructure management, municipal finance and administration, urban environmental management, and urban poverty alleviation (UNCHS, 1996). Essentially, the programme aimed at increasing the capacity of local governments to manage the urban sector and respond to challenges. The success of this approach was underpinned by and strictly linked to the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). In practice, SAPs did not yield expected outcomes in many developing nations (Mosley et al., 1995; Easterly, 2000; Klasen, 2003), compromising the chance of the UMP being a success.

3.2.5 Alliance-Building and Slum-Upgrading

Alliance-building emphasises the role of civil society, community-based organisations (CBOs) and other community groups in providing urban services. The challenge of slums in the developing world is pronounced. However, in a bid to address the slum challenge, development thinking has advocated for slum-upgrading programmes (UNCHS, 2003). Slum-upgrading can be categorised into two kinds: state and community-driven. The former was prevalent in the 1960s and 1970s, with governments formulating National Development Plans (NDPs) with budgetary allocation for direct construction of housing by government for allocation either through rent or on an owner-occupier basis (Tibaijuka, 2009). The latter has primarily focused on non-state actors (alliances of CBOs) and people themselves upgrading slum settlements through incremental development.

There are various approaches to slum-upgrading (UNCHS, 2003). However, in general, the focus is on providing low-cost infrastructure services such as water, sanitation, and transport, tenure security, and building actual houses (Cities Alliance, 1999). There are many examples of such an approach around the world. For instance, the Favela Slum-upgrading program (FBP) is transforming *favelas* into formal neighbourhoods, in the process addressing Rio's housing challenges (Handzic, 2010). Minnery et al. (2013: 162) argue that the most useful slum-upgrading approach is one that "includes changes to urban governance so that community capital can be maintained and improved over the longer term". In other words, slum-upgrading must embrace inclusive municipal governance in which the relationship between municipal authorities and slum-dwellers is transformed to foster partnership, inclusivity and

responsiveness (Muchadenyika, 2015a). Thus, sustainable slum-upgrading should change the configuration of governance and institutional arrangements (Ibid; Minnery et al., 2013).

In situ upgrading implemented through community participation is widely considered as global best practice in efforts to significantly improve the lives of at least 100 million shack dwellers (Patel, 2013: 211). An important pillar of *in situ* upgrading is community participation, which, according to Chogull (1996), has two functions: it meets basic needs such as housing or infrastructure, and allows communities that tend to be marginalised to influence the decision-making and politics around housing development. *In situ* upgrading emphasises minimal resettlement and disturbance of communities. This arrangement largely does not disturb the social and economic fabric of a settlement, which is a key factor in maintaining people's livelihoods (Huchzermeyer, 2009).

3.2.6 Recent Perspectives on Housing

This section focuses on sustainable urban development, Habitat Agenda, and MDG 7 Target 11. Sustainable urban development prioritises “comprehensive and environmentally sustainable planning and management of cities” (Tibaijuka, 2009: 44). The definition of sustainable urban development has four aspects: ecological integrity, public participation, equity, and futurity (Symes, Deakin & Curwell, 2005). Urban development was supposed to take cognisance of environmental issues, include the public in planning and decision-making, promote the right to the city, and not jeopardise the urban needs of future generations. Most importantly, sustainable urban development has become a powerful framework for developing solutions that improve the quality of life on a local level and which can also be an important component of responding to global environmental issues (Heberle, 2008).

The Habitat Agenda, which was adopted by governments in Vancouver (Habitat I, 1976) and Istanbul in 1996 (Habitat II), reflects a consensual approach to shelter on the part of the international community, and focuses on shelter as a human right (Tebbal & Ray, 2001). The Agenda state that “access to land and security of tenure are strategic prerequisites for the provision of adequate shelter for all and the development of sustainable human settlements” (UNCHS, 2003: 108). The provision of housing was considered to be intrinsically determined by access to land and tenure security. The next UN Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat III) will take place in Quito, Ecuador in October 2016. The conference focuses on the “New Urban Agenda” to reinvigorate the global commitment to housing and sustainable urbanisation. According to Resolution 67/216 of the United Nations

General Assembly (UNGA), the objective of the conference is to “secure renewed political commitment for sustainable urban development, assess accomplishments to date, address poverty and identify and address new and emerging challenges”.²⁴

The Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 7 Target 11 focuses on making a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum-dwellers by 2020. While the goal involves improving slum conditions, it falls short of making housing a priority of MDGs. Other scholars have argued that the goal “lacks a well specified target” (Devarajan, Miller, & Swanson, 2002:11); with the word ‘slum’ being a contested and “dangerous” term (Gilbert, 2007). The MDGs did not provide an operational definition of a slum, which makes it difficult to measure, monitor and evaluate. Simply put, the goal fails to provide practical guidance (Groenewald, 2011). Despite such criticism, the United Nations reported that the MDG target has been met, even though the number of people living in slum conditions is increasing (UN, 2014).

3.3 Social Movements

The interest of many scholars in social movements arises from the belief that they are important agents for facilitating and promoting social change (Tarrow, 2011) Acknowledging that there are various definitions put forward by different scholars (Tarrow, 1998; Della Porta & Diani, 1999, 2006; Benford et al., 2000; Goodwin & Jasper, 2003), this thesis adopts Sydney Tarrow’s definition of social movements as “collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities” (2011: 9). This definition highlights the importance of defining common challenges, purposes and drawing engagement and confrontation strategies with ruling authorities. In this regard, the sustained engagement of social movements with other actors is key to advancing their cause. To expand the above definition, a social movement is therefore “a group of people who endeavour to build a radically new social order” (Zirakzadeh, 2006: 4).

Social movements operate on various scales – global, regional, national and local. However, these movements are often but not necessarily interconnected through space, time and focus.

²⁴ Implementation of the outcome of the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II) and strengthening of the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat). United Nations General Assembly Resolution 67/216, 20 March 2013.

In the Global South, there are social movements engaged in anti-neoliberalism (Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, among others)²⁵ (Motta & Nilsen, 2011); low-income housing (India, South Africa, Brazil, Uruguay, Zimbabwe) (Harvey, 2012; Pieterse, 2008; Miraftab, 2009; Nahoum, 2013; Holston, 2008; Carvalho & Mendes, 2011; Scheinsohn & Cabrera, 2009; Chitekwe-Biti, 2009; Muchadenyika, 2015a); access to public services such as water, sanitation, electricity and health care (MacDonald & Ruiters, 2012); and democratising the state (the “Arab Spring” in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia) (Waal, & Ibreck, 2013). Since these movements differ in focus and structure, it raises structural specific questions. In the Zimbabwean context, this study focuses on movements’ social organisation (for instance, mobilisation strategies, social networks, organisations strategies, and solidarity and value systems), mobilisation and management of financial resources, political opportunities and the role of leadership in visionary goal-centred engagements.

Due to the failure of most states in carrying out their basic functions, there has been greater policing and penalisation of poverty and the poor in cities of the Global South (Motta & Nilsen, 2011). Perhaps this explains why the majority of social movements in the Global South are concentrated in urban areas. On the other hand, in the Global North, social movements are engaged in environmentalism (Zirakzadeh, 2006), pro- and anti-Europeanisation (della Porta & Caiani, 2009), struggles for just cities and reclaiming the city for anti-capitalist struggles (Harvey, 2012), and pro- and anti-immigration (Koopmans et al., 2005). These movements have networks at global, regional and local levels.

This study concerns itself with social movements in the urban domain – urban social movements. Their origins lie in the history of urbanisation, particularly industrialisation. In Great Britain after the 1960s, the rapid growth of a property-less, wage-dependent and urbanising working class compelled urban citizens to develop direct connections with the national government (Tilly, 2004). During France’s industrialisation around the mid-nineteenth century, a relaxation of regime laws triggered demonstrations and protests by workers’ organisations and unions (Tilly, 2004). For instance, in Lyon during the post-First World War period, “demonstrations had become a normal form of urban political life” (Robert, 1996: 373) as urban residents sought to challenge regimes in power. In America, urban protests in the 1960s were more common in “unreformed” mayor-council cities than in council-manager

²⁵ Rejection of the extreme forms of dispossession, poverty and inequality that have resulted from the shift to neoliberalism in the region since the early 1980s.

reformed ones (Eisinger, 1973), an indication that urban governance reforms are necessary. In simple terms, cities are centres of political discontent due to the urbanisation of capital, which has accumulation by dispossession as its axis (Harvey, 2006).

The work of Manuel Castells in the late twentieth century pioneered the study of social movements at the local scale (urban level). Miller (2000: 18) argues that “scale issues are clearly inherent in the strategies of social movements”. This is mainly because grievances have a spatial dimension and attempts at redress must take into account location dynamics. In the urban domain, grievances bring about struggles and competing interests over territory, authority and rights (Sassen, 2006).

It is on the basis of this conception that section 3.3.2 below explains how urban social movements promote transformation in the field of housing. Governance and planning are the key leverage points for urban transformation (McCormick, et al., 2013). Since 2000, there have been elements of transformation in low-income housing delivery as a result of planning institutions’ responses to the economic crisis, crisis-mode politics, and the rise of social movements leading to the relaxation of planning regulations. Thus, between 2000 and 2015, Zimbabwe recorded the largest number of housing stands and units delivered by self-help groups predominantly composed of the urban poor. In the next section, I explain theories underpinning social movements before exploring urban transformation in the field of housing.

3.3.1 Theories of Social Movements

While there are other theories of social movements, such as Marxist/class relations (Tilly, 1978; Della Porta & Diani, 1999; Crossley, 2002; McAdam, 1999), framing-process theory (Benford & Snow, 2000; Gamson, 1992; Snow & Benford, 1992; Gamson & Meyer, 1996; Christiansen, 2011) and new social movements theory (Melucci, 1989; Johnston, Larana & Gusfield, 1994), this section prioritises theories that provide a proximate analysis of social movements in metropolitan Harare. These theories are: resource mobilisation theory, political opportunity structure theory, and identity formation theory.

3.3.1.1 Resource Mobilisation Theory

Resource mobilisation theory (RMT) argues that a social movement arises from the long-term changes in a group’s organisation, available resources, and opportunities for group action (Flynn, 2011). Principally, the rise and fall of social movements is determined by the ability of SMOs to mobilise resources (McCathy & Zald, 1977). Material and non-material resources are

an essential explanatory factor in the life cycle of a social movement.²⁶ It is therefore critical to analyse how a social movement generates, spends and accounts for its resources. This study focuses on mobilisation and management of finance by housing movements, primarily because housing is resource-intensive. This is done through analysis of financial and audit statements of these movements. Further to that, the study looks into non-material resources such as social networks, strategies, and solidarity mechanisms.

For a social movement to be resourceful, it requires strong leadership. In this regard, Zirakzadeh (2006: 9) posits that “a movement normally emerges only after a group or person with appropriate political experience, vision, and resources first organises that constituency”. This means that RMT underlines the role of leadership. As presented in Chapters Five to Seven, this study prioritises the leadership and governance of social movements, with a view to interrogating how leadership affects the functioning of housing movements.

However, RMT has been criticised for its narrow political and economic focus. Flynn (2011: 119) argues that the theory “focuses almost exclusively on centralised social movement organisations and ignores decentralised social movement communities”. Decentralised social movements often have a flat leadership structure, which contradicts the strong and often individual leadership postulated by resource mobilisation theorists. Decentralised social movements put more emphasis on community as opposed to individual leadership. ZIHOPFE uses a flat leadership structure rooted in the community as opposed to housing co-operatives, which have a hierarchical structure (Chairperson, Vice Chairperson, Treasurer, and Secretary).

This study compares and contrasts the effectiveness of decentralised and centralised social movements (ZIHOPFE and housing co-operatives, respectively) in their operations. Furthermore, the RMT does not explain individuals’ motivation to join and participate in social movements (Beuchler, 1993; Opp, 2009). The theory of political opportunity structure has edged out the resource mobilisation perspective, which was dominant in the 1970s.

3.3.1.2 Political Process Theory or Political Opportunity Structure Theory

Political process theory holds that “constitutions, national-level policy-making institutions and processes, and intra-elite struggles over power profoundly influence both people’s decisions to

²⁶ Material resources include money, organisations, manpower, technology, means of communication, and mass media, while non-material resources include legitimacy, loyalty, social relationships, networks, personal connections, public attention, authority, moral commitment, and solidarity (Fuchs, 2006).

join movements and the strategies and tactics a movement employs” (Zirakzadeh, 2006: 12). In this case, the environment provides a stimulating factor to social movements. Political opportunity structure (POS) theorists such as Tarrow (1998: 33) view this theory as proposing a “political environment that provides incentives for collective action by affecting people’s expectations for success or failure”. Here, the structure, nature and composition of the political environment are major explanatory factors for social movements. POS theorists assume the relationship between opportunity and collective action to be curvilinear (Tarrow, 1996: 54; Tilly, 1978: 136), which means that a one-unit increase in opportunity may have either a positive or negative effect on the social movement, depending on how the actor sees the political situation at that time of action (Shingetomi, 2009: 3).

In this theory, political opportunity structures are defined as changes in the political environment that influence the chances of success (Opp, 2009: 161). The foundation of the POS theory was laid by Eisinger (1973), whose seminal work focuses on the effects of the political environment which is the context (structure of opportunities) within which politics takes place. Researching social movements requires one to critically analyse the political environment, which includes political institutions, their configuration, balance of power and inclusivity. This is vital to understanding how social movements are affected by or affect the political environment. In this theory, opportunity structures are the central factor affecting the emergence and development of social movements (Crossley, 2002). As part of responding to research question 2 (“How are social movements contributing to housing delivery?”), the study puts into perspective how political opportunity structures (such as the Fast Track Land Reform Programme, favourable government policy and the contestation between Zanu-PF and MDC in urban areas) influenced the configuration of housing movements.

A key point of POS theory is that social movements can be analysed in terms of strategy, structures and success in different nation states (Tilly, 1984b). This explains differences in social movements across the globe. For instance, social movements in Europe, Africa and Latin America possess distinctive characteristics. However, the overemphasis on political opportunities by political process theorists tends to eclipse other crucial factors. On analysis, the political process model was “not really about the *process* of contention because most of its practitioners failed to specify the mechanisms that connects different elements in the model to

one another” (Tarrow, 2011: 28). At the same time, Tarrow argues, the political-process approach posed answers to questions that had dogged previous approaches.²⁷

3.3.1.3 Identity Formation Theory

Identity formation theory was developed and refined by scholars from various disciplines such as sociology (Melucci, 1988; Touraine, 1985), history (Kelley, 1991; Evans, 1979), political science (Ackelberg, 1991; Apter, 1987) and anthropology (Escobar & Alvarez, 1992; Kubik, 1994). These scholars share the belief that “culture” – “broadly understood as how we interpret social arrangements, how we see our places within those arrangements, and how we see our immediate opportunities, powers, and limitations – profoundly informs and shapes our political actions” (Zirakzadeh, 2006: 13). Identity formation theorists emphasise the potency of the human capacity to critically analyse events and ideas as manifest themselves in the social environment (Johnston & Klandermans, 1995; Larana, Johnston & Gusfield, 1994). By nature, humans consume ideas prevailing in the world but they also produce and consume new ideas that may transform society. Principally, human beings define and redefine social identities.

The process of fashioning identities results in what is called collective identity (Tarrow, 2011). A *collective identity* exists, by definition, if there is a group (individuals with at least one common goal) with common beliefs, with common normative convictions, connected by social relationships and emotional bonds (Opp, 2009: 210). In this study, this theory assists in explaining social mobilisation strategies, in which social movements define collective identity such as homelessness and how collective action is promoted. Collective identity is a process through which actors assess the costs and benefits of collective action through negotiation, interaction, and building social cohesion (Melucci, 1988). The purpose of collective identity is to challenge the status quo. This is mainly because “elites often try to legitimise inequalities of power and wealth by disseminating ideas about the advantages of the status quo, and about the dangers of alternatives” (Zirakzadeh, 2006: 14). In this regard, social movements become a vehicle for struggles between elites and non-elites, mainly to advance the interest of the latter.

²⁷ According to Tarrow (2011), these questions include: Why do contentious politics seem to develop only in particular periods of history? Why does it sometimes produce robust social movements and sometimes flicker out in sectarianism or repression? And why do movements take different forms in different political environments?

3.3.2 Urban Social Movements, Housing and Urban Transformation

Bentley (2002) argues that urban transformation entails “how cities can be transformed into better places”.²⁸ In particular, transformation involves systemic and / or social change within cities (Maa, 2002; Williams, 2000). The core argument here is to change the lived realities of life in cities through reconfiguring physical, socio-political and economic dimensions of the city (Hsing, 2010). Access to the materialities such as housing, water, and road infrastructure therefore become fundamental issues in transforming cities. Thus, transformation deals with issues of services access and marginalisation. As such, transformation in cities promotes inclusivity, creativity and innovation with the ultimate aim of changing people’s lives.

Based on reviewed literature (Maa, 2002; Hsing; 2010; Bentley, 2002, Williams, 2000; Thorns, 2002), the core elements of urban transformation are the following:

- Access to urban services to the previously marginalised,
- Policy changes to promote inclusive cities,
- Changes in spatial configurations,
- Changes in state-society power relations.

The subject of urban social movements and their role in urban transformation is attributed to the work of Manuel Castells. Castells (1977) argues that the problematic of urban social movements has as its axis the forms of articulation between ‘urban’ struggles and ‘political’ struggles characterised by contradictions and mobilisation towards advancing urban claims of particular groups. Urban social movements are defined as a system of practices whose “development tends objectively towards structural transformation of the urban system” (Castells, 1977: 263). Thus, the concept of urban social movements emphasises “the potential of urban struggles to express structural contradictions and assist in bringing about radical changes in the political power” when the struggles link up with political organisations (Pickvance, 2003). Politics or its absence is an important factor in how urban social movements function. In the Zimbabwean case, this study investigates how politics affects land access and the functioning, autonomy, leadership and governance of social movements.

²⁸ Other scholars define urban transformation as a demographic transition from rural to urban. However, this is not the primary focus of urban transformation in this study.

More recently, Harvey (2012: 129) has argued that urban social movements reshape cities in a different social image, oppose neo-liberal urban policies (such as neighbourhood destruction and evictions), involve class and anti-capitalist struggles in the urban domain, and are “primarily articulated in terms of rights, citizenship and the travails of social reproduction”. In Global South cities, the prevalence of urban social movements in struggles for low-income housing is pronounced in countries such as Brazil, India (Harvey, 2012; Karriem, 2009), South Africa (Mitlin & Mogaladi, 2013; Pieterse, 2008; Miraftab, 2009), Zimbabwe (Chitekwe-Biti, 2009; Muchadenyika 2015a; Masuko, 2008), Nepal (Tanaka, 2009), Uruguay (Nahoum, 2013), Philippines (Teodoro & Rayos Co, 2009), Kenya (Weru, 2004), and Tanzania (Ndezi, 2009).

Such movements are engaged in sustained struggles with central and local governments, and yet record significant success in providing housing for the urban poor. Most of the studies cited above have focused on the work and efforts of social movements, as if they exist in a vacuum. Therefore, the question that arises is how such housing movements interact with planning institutions in low-income housing delivery – which is the aim of this study.

At this stage, it is important to explain how urban social movements promote urban transformation through housing delivery. Focus will be placed on the importance of space, the urban poor, social justice, and the right to the city, urban politics, alliances and collective action. Space is an important ingredient. It determines the configuration of land use in cities, and there is often great competition for space in urban areas. For Lefebvre, space holds the promise of liberation from the tyranny of social repression, exploitation and self-imprisonment (Smith, 2003). Housing movements, for instance, act in concert through coalitions and networks to claim, inhabit and rely on urban space (Soja, 2010). That urban space might be vacant or owned by private players, government and city authorities, such that the urban poor ordinarily cannot access such land through formal channels. In these cases, Edward Soja speaks of spatial justice: “justice struggles that attend to concerns over how space is used and how decisions about the use and design of particular spaces are determined” (Nordquist, 2013: 16-17). Such struggles are associated with the fight for social justice and the right to the city; both concepts are entangled in urban politics. In Zimbabwe, urban space has often been the site of contestation between the urban poor and the state, a struggle which this thesis seeks to better understand.

Social justice is an institutional condition that enables participation and overcomes oppression and domination through self-development and self-determination (Young, 1990). In order to

promote socially just urban societies, planning needs to focus on patterns of distribution (Harvey, 2009) and social structures and institutional contexts that bring about inequalities in cities (Cardoso & Breda-Vazquez, 2007). Movement struggles for social justice in cities meddle in deeply contested political contradictions, dialogues and negotiations with diverse competing interests among social groups. In such cases, the state, through urban planning, regulates non-antagonistic contradictions and represses antagonistic contradictions in favour of the interests of dominant social classes (Castells, 1977). It is such domination and the heavy-handedness of urban planning that the urban poor through social movements confront in efforts to promote a just city.

The urban poor are those that are relegated “to the margins and crevices of social and physical space” of cities (Wacquant, 2008: 232) largely due to governance, planning and economic arrangements. High density and congestion, combined with failed land and housing policies, mean that finding housing that provides adequate shelter and physical safety is one of the greatest challenges confronting the urban poor (Fay, 2005). Informal housing and lack of basic infrastructure and social services are prominent features in urban poor settlements. However, national institutions, laws and policies often criminalise urban poverty as “urban disorders and public nuisances” (Wacquant, 2009: 1). Despite this, the urban poor have a right to the city, which is an important feature of an inclusive city.

The promotion of a rights-based approach to urban planning and development is based on the right-to-the-city concept. The Right to the City, as Lefebvre (2003) argues, is a demand in response to a withering crisis of everyday life in the city. Such a demand confronts the city with the need to create an alternative urban life which is less alienated, more meaningful and dialectical, open to encounters and the perpetual pursuit of unknowable novelty (Harvey, 2012). It is such pursuit of alternative urban futures that urban social movements grapple with, championing novel housing delivery approaches. The notion of the Right to the City brings to the fore collective action – the central premise of urban social movements.

Through collective action, urban social movements make and remake cities in a fundamental and radical way (Harvey, 2012). Those living in substandard housing or without housing often constitute the majority of the urban poor. Through social movements disadvantaged social groups “claim their rights and entitlements through non-violent social action focused on concrete issues that shape the quality of life of their constituencies” (Pieterse, 2008: 95). However, such collective action is channelled through struggles with the state and its apparatus,

in particular planning institutions that are bent on control rather than innovation for the benefit of disadvantaged groups. This is mainly because planning at national, regional or city-wide levels often supports the status quo, even in situations where fundamental changes are necessary (Goodman, 1972).

In summary, the mobilisation of the urban poor, viewed from a grassroots perspective, has become a core theme in urban anthropology (Jaffe, Klaufus, & Colombijn, 2012). In particular, the majority of marginalised people take into their own hands the challenges of housing, neighbourhood and urban development, establishing shelters and earning livelihoods outside formal decision structures and ‘professionalised planning’ (Miraftab, 2009: 42). The relevance of exploring the mobilisations of the urban poor as presented in this thesis stems from a need to understand better how coalitions of people can interact with authorities in providing housing.

Table 11 attempts to summarise the activities of urban social movements (co-operatives and homeless people’s federations) in planning and housing delivery in different parts of the world.²⁹

Table 11: Case Studies of Movements in Uruguay, Sweden, South Africa and India

Name	Operations and Achievements
Uruguay’s Mutual Aid Housing Co-operatives	Composed of two actors, namely the state (financing, supervising and controlling housing construction process) and individual beneficiaries (labour contribution and controlling the house construction process). Has built 14,000 homes for working-class families with almost 1,000 more under construction, and more than 6,000 families in more than 100 co-operatives waiting for loans to build their homes as part of this system, Mutual aid housing co-operatives have been adopted in 14 Latin American countries.
Housing Co-operatives in Sweden	Housing co-operatives emerged in Swedish cities in response to the First World War urban housing crisis. Between 1945 and 2000, the total share of co-operatively owned housing in Sweden rose from 4% to 18%.
Federation of the Urban and Rural Poor (FEDUP)	Formed in 1991 as the South African Homeless People’s Federation (SAHPF) by more than 1,500 autonomous local organisations of urban poor households that have developed savings and credit schemes. Technically supported by People’s Dialogue on Land and Shelter, By April 2000, SAHPF had 1,288 savings schemes, about 80,600 active savers and 5.2 million rand. SAHPF split in 2005 after allegations of wide-scale fraud, corruption, clientelism and graft, leading to the founding of the FEDUP.

²⁹ Homeless people’s federations, as “community organisations, have grown stronger, [and] several have developed a federating capacity with generally city-based organisations capable of providing support to individual residents associations” (Mitlin, 2001: 144).

National Slum-dwellers Federation of India	<p>FEDUP has delivered 12,000 housing units (average size being 56m²), incremental loans for a further 2,000 houses, infrastructure for 2,500 families, and land tenure for 12,000 families.</p> <p>Set up in 1974 to work towards preventing demolitions in slums and secure basic amenities.</p> <p>Improvements through Mumbai's railway system resulted in the resettlement of 60,000 people without coercion.</p> <p>Pavement dwellers given the opportunity to register on electoral roles; recognition of pavement dwellers by the Slum Rehabilitation Authority; formal access to electricity.</p> <p>Government of India changed its plans to redevelop Dharavi in Mumbai in response to pressure and protest by Dharavi residents and grassroots organisations.</p>
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Sources: Nahoum, 2013; Ruonnavara, 2005; Ganapati, 2010; Baumann, Bolnick, & Mitlin, 2004; Baumann & Bolnick, 2001; Podlashuc, 2011; Patel, d'Cruz & Burra, 2002; Harris, 2010; Patel & Arputhan, 2008.

The preceding analysis of specific in-country experiences elsewhere in the world points to struggles between social movements and planning institutions as avenues for facilitating social transformation. Transformative theory, as advanced by Friedmann (2011), provides an explanation of such social transformation and is used in this study as the conceptual framework to explain the Zimbabwean context.

3.4 Transformative Theory: Towards a Conceptual Framework

This study uses Friedmann's (2011) concept of transformative theory to explain the interaction of social movements and planning institutions in social transformation. Transformative theory views planning as focusing on "transformative development which changes in the parameters of the systems and structures that limit peoples' opportunities to flourish and pursue their search, individually and collectively" to enhance system changes (Friedmann, 2011: xiii). Transformative theory is always and necessarily contextual: it points to *action*, *considers strategy*, endeavours to reach a *critical understanding of the present and the near future* and is informed by *specific social values* (Friedmann, 2011: 67).³⁰ This theory is best suited because it allows the study to zero in on the *contextual realities of social movements*, analysing how the *actions, values and strategies* of such movements contribute to housing delivery.

³⁰ My emphasis.

Households, community-based groups and social movements fighting and advocating for defined common concerns are important actors under the framework.

Transformative theory explains structural transformation of familiar problems of people's livelihoods – water, sanitation, electricity, jobs, housing and self-provisioning (Friedmann, 2011). The theory is concerned with how societies, especially the marginalised and ordinary people, organise alternative services pertinent to their lifestyles. Miraftab (2009: 45) expresses this attitude as: “I assert the need for a new consciousness that liberates planning imaginations”. This is critical for social transformation as social movements imagine, re-imagine and coalesce towards alternative urban futures. The inadequate provisioning of services by the state and its institutions fosters social mobilisation and collective action. Badiou (2005) argues that ‘collective’ means universalising, that is, including all concerned. Transformative theory is underpinned by two important elements, namely social movements and radical planning, as explained in the following sections.

3.4.1 Social Movements as Agents of Social Transformation

Many cities throughout the Global South are experiencing insurgent citizenship movements defined as “an insurgency that begin with the struggle for rights to have a daily life in the city worthy of a citizen's dignity” (Holston, 2008: 313). Notions of the transformative power of social activism and social movements are balanced by the acknowledgement of the limited resources and political power of the very marginalised (Castells, 2003; Amin, 1993; Kothari, 2005; Thompson & Tapscott, 2010). Social movements aim at transforming the living and material conditions of ordinary people as well as state-society relations. In fact, social movements challenge state institutions, policies, regulations and systems. In other words, social movements “claim some kind of shaping power over the processes of urbanisation, over the ways in which our cities are made and remade, and to do so in a fundamental and radical way” (Harvey, 2012: 5). Put more succinctly, social movements work vigorously for the transformation of urban life.

Fainstein (2010) views social movements as vehicles for transformation towards a more just society. She argues that “urban movements do have transformative potential despite being limited to achieving change only at the level in which they are operating” (Fainstein, 2010: 18). Friedmann (2011) puts grassroots movements at the centre of radical practice – an important element of social transformation. He argues:

The theory of social transformation must never be allowed to harden into dogma and must remain open to even fundamental questioning and re-conceptualization. The organisational counterpart to this epistemological commitment is a structure of radical practice that consists of a large number of autonomous (or quasi-autonomous) centres of decision and action whose coordination remains loose and informal. Such a structure encourages a better fit with local environments, a great deal of local experimentation, a maximum of social mobilisation, a self-reliant practice, and a non-dogmatic view of the problem. It is the very opposite of planning by the state, with its single-track vision, its remoteness from people's everyday concerns, its tendency to gloss over differences in local conditions, and its hierarchical ladders (Friedmann, 2011: 66).

In this regard, social movements are engaged in transformative struggles with established institutions of planning and power. Planning driven by social movements is deemed context-specific, addressing community concerns and is often characterised by imaginations and innovative ideas. Combining social movements that mobilise action in different communities yields transformation at city-wide level. This is achieved through cross-linking, networking and building coalitions among these social movements. Adopting this view, this thesis selects housing movements in metropolitan Harare for comparison and analysis.

3.4.2 Radical Planning as Means for Social Transformation

Planning as social transformation justifies “the inclusion of community organisers, activists, and everyday citizens as ‘planners’ working either in collaboration with, opposition to, or completely beyond the purview of state-sanctioned, formal planning processes” (Beard, 2003: 15). The premise of social movements is social mobilisation for structural changes through radical planning. The practice of radical planning is dedicated to changing existing power relations, whether exercised by the state or global corporations (Friedmann, 2011: 61). The goal of radical planning is to work towards structural transformation of systemic inequalities (such as unequal relations and distribution of power, opportunity and resources) through empowerment (Jenkins, Smith & Wang, 2007: 317).

However, the state offers resistance to radical planning. State actions must be fought over in political struggle for the legitimate claims of the disempowered (Piven & Cloward, 1979; Peattie & Rein, 1983). These struggles are critical in the state's embracing of inclusive

governance in which the needs and priorities of social movements are considered. In essence, radical planning focuses on social transformation through community organisation and urban social movements (Jenkins, Smith & Wang, 2007: 317).

In urban areas, the housing crisis promotes a radical and transformative politics that “seeks over time to shift the underlying causal factors that reproduce urban injustice” (Pieterse, 2008: 112). Briefly stated, radical planning practices should be insurgent. Miraftab (2009: 41) posits that in order to “promote social transformation; insurgent planning has to disrupt the attempts of neoliberal governance to stabilise oppressive relationships through inclusion”. Insurgent planning involves radical planning practices that promote the inclusion of the marginalised in a mainstream planning agenda. Furthermore, grassroots movements demonstrate radical practices through pioneering alternative practices that counter conventional practices.

It is vital to understand the role of radical planners in transformative theory. Radical planners impart relevant knowledge and skills in collective housing struggles; they assist households in organising themselves as co-operatives; they help to channel appropriate information, such as impending legislative struggles, to the emerging political community; they help to network local housing struggles with related efforts elsewhere; they offer their grantsmanship skills to obtain outside funding; and they assist households in better organising their available time for tasks that need attention (Friedmann, 2011: 66). Radical planners can be found in both state planning institutions and SMOs. In this study, an attempt is made to identify and analyse elements of radical planning on the side of the state and social movements. The main purpose of radical planners is to think ‘outside the box’ with the aim of broadening people’s horizons.

3.4.3 Thematic Issues under Investigation

In order to simplify the arguments presented above, I present the thematic issues under investigation in a diagram (Figure 1). Basically, there are three main actors: the planning institutions, social movements and SMOs. By ‘planning institutions’, I refer to government planning agencies (such as the DPP) and local authorities. The interaction between the planning institutions and social movements is defined by practices, contradictions, contestations and alliances. This is the coalface of the struggle for urban transformation. Collective action is demonstrated through practices and alternatives, contestations, contradictions and alliances. However, SMOs provide technical assistance to housing movements mainly in the form of capacity development, information and knowledge-sharing and dissemination. At the same time, SMOs are engaged in sustained dialogue and engagement with planning institutions.

I suggest that the sustained interaction among the three actors (planning institutions, housing movements and SMOs) determines urban transformation. Practices are the demonstration of radical alternatives by housing movements. The goal of these practices is “to work for structural transformation of systematic inequalities and, in the process to empower those who have been systematically disempowered” (Sandercock, 1998a: 97–8). Such practices can also take place in the form of insurgent practices. Pieterse (2008: 112) sees insurgent practices as essentially “reflecting autonomous efforts on the part of urban citizens in various kinds of associational configurations to carve out a space for their interests and desires despite regulatory or symbolic prescriptions of the state”.






Figure 1: Thematic Issues under Investigation (Source: Author's Construct, 2015).

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has presented key debates and arguments concerning planning, housing and social movements. It has argued that in using planning as a vehicle of innovation and action, social movements are vital in promoting radical planning. In particular, radical planning aims at social transformation so that cities become just and inclusive. However, the practice of radical planning is not without struggle; thus, the continued contestation, contradictions and collaboration between social movements and planning institutions are vital. Such levels of interaction promote new ideas and practices that are fundamental in transforming cities. In addition, current planning approaches promote segregation and inequalities in African cities, which calls for grassroots-driven transformative forms of planning.

Housing delivery approaches have changed from direct state provision to promoting people-centred housing methods. The housing challenge is enormous, but community-driven approaches seem to be a promising alternative. Across the world (Uruguay, Sweden, South Africa and India), housing movements are transforming urban societies, in particular, through low-income housing. These movements are engaged in sustained interactions and contestation with planning authorities, recording significant gains in providing housing to the urban poor.

The chapter concluded by presenting transformative theory as a conceptual framework which is centred mainly on social movements and radical planning (Friedmann, 2011; Miraftab, 2009). The former are conceptualised as agents of social transformation, while the latter is viewed as a means for societal transformation. The sustained interaction among housing social movements, SMOs and planning institutions is essential for urban transformation. The struggles for social transformation take the form of contradictions, contestation and alliances between housing movements and planning institutions.

Before presenting the research findings, the next chapter explains the historical and current context of housing and planning in Zimbabwe. I do so by focusing on developments in housing and planning from colonial antecedents to the present. Throughout the chapter, special attention is given to developments in housing and planning that had an impact on the delivery of low-income housing.

Chapter Four

Planning, Housing and Social Movements in Zimbabwe: From Colonial Antecedents to the Present

Guided by the study's conceptual framework (transformative theory), which points to context, action, strategy and understanding of the present and future (Friedmann, 2011: 67), this chapter examines and critiques the historical and current context of planning, housing and social movements in Zimbabwe. I do so with three objectives: first, to determine how governing authorities use planning and housing as tools to transform people's lives over time; secondly, to explain ordinary people's reactions through social movements to bottlenecks in the planning and housing delivery system; and thirdly, to provide background on planning and housing and prepare the reader for the findings chapters (5-7). Primarily, this section of the literature review is carried out because many development issues have roots in past policy pronouncements and government action. The central argument of the chapter is that the inadequacies in housing policies and projects, in addition to the socio-economic and political crisis, necessitated the rise of housing movements in low-income housing delivery.

The available policy documents show that the Government of Zimbabwe's objectives differ from those of the colonial era. In particular, housing and urban planning have featured in the post-independent development agenda as vehicles of social transformation – at least in theory. However, in terms of actual housing units delivered, government action does not necessarily conform to policy statutes. In other words, policy changes do not necessarily translate into meaningful changes in people's lives. It is such instances that have spurred social movements to play an active role in the delivery of low-income housing in the post-200 era. The chapter begins by explaining how the colonial regime's segregation practices were entrenched through urban planning and housing.

4.1 Pre-Independence Planning and Housing

In both pre- and post-independence periods, the development problems facing urban areas in Zimbabwe have been fairly consistent and established. Briefly stated, the “development problem is the provision of shelter, employment, transport and social services to an ever expanding urban population” (Jordan, 1984: 75). The development of virtually all Zimbabwe's major towns is largely linked to colonialism (Muchadenyika, 2014b). Colonial values such as segregation and exploitation of resources were deeply entrenched in the planning and

management of cities. In pre-independence Zimbabwe, planning enforced racial segregation. Africans (black Zimbabweans) lived in settlements far away from European settlements, with a limited supply of urban services. In most cases, Africans lived in overcrowded suburbs. Despite Africans being seen as temporary residents in cities, the growth of the African urban population exposed the inadequacy of the colonial planning and housing policy.

4.1.1 Urban Planning Developments

Historically, urbanisation and urban planning in Zimbabwe was “fundamentally a product of colonial capitalism and was determined by a variety of factors which shaped the colonial economy” (Wekwete, 1994: 31). Colonialism was a vehicle for capitalist accumulation as Zimbabwe’s economy went through geographic, sectoral and financial restructuring, which entrenched severe inequalities (Bond, 1998). Mining and the exploration of natural resources played a key role in the development of towns in pre-independence Zimbabwe (Kamete, 2012).³¹ Patel (1988: 20) argues that “urban areas of Zimbabwe were considered the preserve of the white population”. Simply put, urban planning was a tool to entrench racial segregation and inequalities. Patel (1988:20) further argues that “settlers systematically introduced schemes of preferential land division, differential property rights, job protection, economic incentives ... that effectively precluded black competition”. Racial segregation in urban areas was enforced through a number of policies and legislation which are explained below, their primary purpose being to entrench segregation in cities.

In order to attract black labour to urban areas, the settler government introduced Hut Tax (1896) and Poll Tax (1908). The demand for such taxes prompted the black population to move to urban areas so as to be able to raise such taxes through working. However, “Africans were forced to maintain a dual existence” (Wekwete, 1995: 35), “with the rural home and the urban one being based on impermanence” (Munzwa & Jonga, 2010: 125). Nonetheless, the 1925 Report of the Land Commission noted that elite Africans “will feel it a grievance if they are not able to acquire sites for residential purposes apart from the Native working classes”. The Commission saw “it most advisable that an area should be set aside now by the Municipality on each of the township commonages as a residential suburb for the more well-to-do Native of

³¹ These towns are Kwekwe, Kadoma, Chegutu, Zvishavane, Redcliff, Hwange, Shurugwi, Mashava, Inyati, Trojan Mine, Penhalonga, Mhangura, Mutorashanga, Chakari, Alaska Mine, Arcturus, Renco, Patchway, How Mine and Brompton.

the future” (Southern Rhodesia, 1926: 35). This led to the designation of African areas for African middle-class housing under the Land Apportionment Act (1930).

In 1933, the Town and Country Planning Act was promulgated mainly to curb the uncontrolled expansion of urban areas (Sparrow, 1979). The Act required “municipalities of the major towns to prepare planning schemes for the areas under their jurisdiction” (Jordan, 1984: 63). The Department of Physical Planning was created as a custodian of planning standards and to assist municipalities in town planning. The 1933 Act was based on the British 1932 Town and Country Planning Act. Subsequently, the 1945 Town and Country Planning Act was enacted, which aimed at preparing “town planning schemes that focused on the subdivision of land and the control of development to ensure the maximum practicable degree of economy, convenience and beauty” (Davison, 2002: 187). Town planning law ensured that development in urban areas was systematic and guided by some standards.

The 1945 Act was subsequently replaced by the 1976 Act. The major provisions of the latter (amended in 1980) included: responsibility for preparing regional plans; granting powers to prepare and implement master and local plans to local authorities; powers to control development; powers for land acquisition; and administrative and legal powers to the Department of Physical Planning and the Administrative Court (Wekwete, 1995: 21). Primarily, the 1976 Act worked with related legislation dealing with local government, land, mining, water, roads and property rights. In summary, then, pre-independence urban planning was based on racial segregation, which was manifest in housing, as will be explained in the next section.

4.1.2 Housing Developments

The official policy during the colonial era was that blacks in towns were temporary citizens (Chenga, 1995) and therefore ‘African’ housing was peripheral. In Salisbury, the Native Urban Locations Ordinance of 1906 created locations (black housing areas) separate from white residential areas for both security and health reasons. Perhaps the variation in housing regulation (1906) and the Town and Country Planning Act (1933) can be explained by the reliance of the colonial government on urban housing as a key tool in advancing racial and

spatial segregation. To legally bind segregation, the Land Apportionment Act (No. 30 of 1930) divided the country into ‘African’ (black) and ‘European’ (white) areas.³²

Furthermore, the Native (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act (No. 6 of 1946) obliged local authorities to finance and administer urban black townships, a turning point in the provision of housing to ‘Africans’ (Patel, 1988).³³ In the 1940s and 1950s, hostels for bachelors and married couples were built as a response to the demand for a stable and permanent workforce (Raftopoulos & Yoshikuni, 1999). Later, the Land Tenure Act (No. 55 of 1969) compelled municipalities to establish African townships with the aim of providing adequate housing for urban blacks. Housing was characterised by spatial segregation of the races, in terms of place of residence, land ownership and work, and the adoption of the principle that services for Africans should be financed by the township residents themselves (Musekiwa, 1995).

On the other hand, the need to reduce housing standards became apparent (Kamete, 2001a). This was necessitated mainly by the ever-increasing housing shortages in urban areas, driven by rapid migration of ‘Africans’ from rural areas. Even with substantial state subsidy, the Rhodesian Government saw standards as costly and too ambitious (GSR, 1964). A decision was taken to lower standards so as to reduce building costs (GSR, 1962; 1963). The cost of providing housing to Africans was deemed to be too high, hence the colonial government tried to increase its capacity by reducing planning standards. This change in approach led to “ultra-low-cost houses constructed using standard cement-reinforced chicken wire-mesh” (Kamete, 2001b: 34). Reducing standards was a way of increasing affordability, a proposition that would also form a critical part of post-1980 housing policies.

During the 1970s, as the urban housing crisis continued to grow, “the main tenants of municipal houses were permitted to let rooms to sub-tenants” (Rakodi & Withers, 1995b: 187). During the same period, the decisive phase of the armed struggle pushed many people into cities, further straining the housing challenge.

However, in 1979, the “Rhodesian government announced that it was adopting a policy of home-ownership and tenants of local authorities were given the right to buy their dwellings at

³² The Act required Africans living in ‘European’ areas to move within seven years of its enactment (West, 2002).

³³ The legislation also sought to control the influx of Africans through employment and restrictive access to housing (Musemwa, 2012).

considerable discounts” (Rakodi & Withers, 1995a: 250). This was probably an attempt to embrace a new ‘African-centred’ housing policy as a reflection of a transitional coalition. The coalition was between Ian Smith and Abel Muzorewa, and saw the creation of ‘Zimbabwe-Rhodesia’ in 1978 (Bourne, 2011). The home-ownership policy would be a cornerstone housing policy in independent Zimbabwe, as will be explained in section 4.2.2 below. Home-ownership is the preferred policy within the Government of Zimbabwe’s socialist ideologies in urbanisation and, in particular, low-income housing (Teedon & Drakakis-Smith, 1986, NTFH, 1999; Ramsamy, 2006; GoZ, 2012).

4.2 Post-Independence Planning and Housing

The problems of the colonial epoch have intensified in contemporary urban Zimbabwe and these include the stabilisation and sustainable reproduction of an urban workforce, housing and health, transport, and representative local government structures (Raftopoulos & Yoshikuni 1999). Post-independence Zimbabwe adopted a number of policies to redress colonial planning disparities and housing shortages. The repeal of repressive migration laws led to a huge influx of people into urban areas. Housing became a top priority for the government, with government partnering with international development agencies to provide low-income housing.

Between 1980 and 2000, the Government of Zimbabwe played a significant role in the delivery of low-income housing (Brown, 2001) for reasons which will be explained later. However, post-2000, the country descended into a prolonged socio-economic and political crisis which led to a failure by the government and local authorities to continue providing low-income housing (UNDP, 2008). At the same time, housing movements rose to prominence as significant players in low-income housing (Muchadenyika, 2015a).

4.2.1 Urban Planning Developments

Through changes to planning legislation, independent Zimbabwe promoted a ‘one city’ concept as a way of deracialising urban settlements (Munzwa & Jonga, 2010). However, Wekwete (1994: 36) argues that “the physical fabric of the built environment has remained segregated, to date, and much more in terms of income and physical characteristics ... and the growth of settlements still remains a segregationist philosophy”. In other words, racial disparities in urban planning became income disparities, with settlements divided by income: for instance, high density (low-income), medium-density (middle-income) and low-density (high income).

At independence, the ruling party, Zanu-PF, “given its Maoist leanings, did not feature urban development as prominently as rural development in its transitional development plans” (Ramsamy, 2006: 130). This means that the planning of urban settlements was not sufficiently prioritised a development that partly explains the urban challenges of today.

Instead, the government prioritised rural development, in particular through the Growth Point Strategy (1980-1985), which designated and set up growth centres or points in almost every district (Conyers, 2001).³⁴ The growth centre theory is attributed to the pioneering work of Francois Perroux, a French political economist who argued that “public investment programmes will have maximum effects on regional growth if concentrated in a small number of favourable locations (growth centres) in regional development policy” (Sharma, 1984: 133).

The Government of Zimbabwe argued that the development of growth points “had to be done in so short a period that it had to be visible to the rural population as a matter of urgency” (GoZ, 1991). The liberation struggle was mainly fought in the rural areas, and thus the government prioritised measures to appease its war-time constituency. The growth centres were intended to redress some of the effects of the settlers’ colonial partitioning of the country into ‘European Areas’ and peripheral ‘Native Reserves’ (Gasper, 1988). The conception of growth points was intended to bring urban functions (such as industry, recreation and jobs) and services to rural areas and in the process reduce rural-urban migration.

However, the Growth Point Strategy suffered from a lack of finance, infrastructure investment, and attractive decentralisation incentives (Patel, 1988; Wekwete, 1988). Of the 55 designated growth points, only one (Gokwe) has graduated into town status. The sluggish growth of growth points is attributed to problems related to poor planning and lack of an economic base, finance and infrastructure provisions (Sibanda, 1985). The failure of growth points meant people moved to cities, putting further strain on the housing situation and causing informal settlements to sprout in urban centres.

In 1982, minimum planning standards were revised upwards (Kamete, 2001a),³⁵ since the new government saw such standards and ultra-low-cost houses as the enduring symbol of the

³⁴ However, the initial phase of growth points commenced before independence (1978) under the transitional government’s policy document called ‘Integrated Rural Development Plan’.

³⁵ The new minimum housing standards were set as: no plot should be smaller than 300m²; whenever possible, larger plots of 300, 400, 500 and 600m² should be incorporated into future projects; the minimum core house should consist of two bedrooms, a dining-room, a kitchen and a toilet/shower; the minimum floor space should be 50–60m²; and building permits should not be granted for dwellings built to lower standards (GoZ, 1982).

colonial era (Ramsamy, 2006). However, high costs and affordability continued to haunt the new government (Masundu-Nyamayaro, 1993). In order to promote the development of low-cost housing, the Government of Zimbabwe embarked on reducing planning standards. Through Circular No. 3 of 1992, it “revised minimum building standards relating to the planning, infrastructure, and superstructure for medium and low-cost housing” (Davison, 2002: 192). Minimum housing standards were set as follows:

1. An expandable and detached four-roomed core house,
2. Minimum plinth size of 50m²,
3. Minimum plot size of 300m²,
4. Walls constructed of either burnt bricks, cement blocks or stabilised earth bricks coated with cemwash, and
5. Roofs of corrugated iron and asbestos sheets (Chenga, 1995: 47).

The reduction of minimum housing standards was intended to promote affordability (Chikowore, 1993), as government pointed to “affordable housing designs and economical use of land” (MIPTC, 1992: 4). Despite such moves by the government, Kamete (2001a) argues that inflation and rising costs of living and building materials caused the escalation of housing costs. For instance, construction costs rose by 60% between 1985 and 1987 (Kamete, 2001a: 40). This neglect of housing for reasons seemingly linked to ‘unaffordability’ would serve to increase the tensions and contradictions in the provision of housing in subsequent years, and thus give rise to the formation of housing movements in urban areas.

The government revised the 1976 Regional, Town and Country Planning Act in 1996, which guides and controls the planning and development of towns with eight objectives, namely promoting health, safety, order, amenity, convenience, general welfare, and efficiency and economy (GoZ, 1996a). After 2000, as the urban housing crisis worsened, the government significantly reduced planning, infrastructure and house construction standards. Thus, Circular No. 2 of 1992 was replaced by Circular No. 70 of 2004, outlining new minimum standards (Tables 12, 13 and 14).

Table 12: Planning Standards (Circular 70 of 2004)

Category	New standards
Low-cost/High Density	Stand size of 70-200m ² , 70-89m ² for semi-detached buildings, 90-200m ² for detached buildings. Building lines: 3, 1 and 2 metres from front, side and rear respectively. Road hierarchy: 12, 10 and 8 metres.

Medium Cost/Medium Density	500-799m ² , no outbuildings. Building lines: 5, 2 and 3 from front, side and rear respectively. Road hierarchy: 15m and 12m.
High Cost/Low Density	800-2000 ² , on-site sewerage disposal. Building lines: 5, 3 and 3 from front, side and rear respectively. Road hierarchy: 15 and 12 metres.
Peri-urban Residential Plots	1-2 hectares
Open Spaces	Not exceeding 5% of planning area.

Source: Chimowa, 2012: 13.

Table 13: Infrastructure Standards (Circular 70 of 2004)

Category	New standards
Roads	High Density: To be gravelled and provided with dish drains. Medium and Low Density: All roads shall be surfaced.
Water supply	High Density: Reticulated supply. Medium and Low Density: To the specification of local planning authority.
Sewerage	High Density: Reticulated system. Medium Density: Reticulated system. Low density: Reticulated for 800–1200m ² , on-site system for stands above 1200m ² .

Source: Chimowa, 2012: 13.

Table 14: Housing Construction Standards (Circular 70 of 2004)

Category	New standards
High Density	Minimum room size 6m ² with minimum width of 2.1m. Walls to be of burnt bricks or cement blocks of a minimum thickness 115mm for external walls.
Medium and Low Density	As per house construction guidelines produced by each local authority.

Source: Chimowa, 2012: 13

Despite the reduction in standards, an Urban Landmark study commissioned in 2011 found that the minimum standards are insufficient to trigger massive investment in low-income housing (Marongwe, Mukoto, & Chatiza, 2012). Potts (2006a) argues that the refusal by the government to address its overly high building standards in a radical fashion accounts for the housing crisis in urban Zimbabwe. In the urban planning domain, planning laws, as part of the state apparatus, have been used as a repressive ‘machine’ that promotes the wishes of dominant classes (Althusser, 2014) at the expense of the urban poor (section 4.2.2.4). Furthermore, at present most statutory plans (master and local plans) are out of their planning period, posing development control challenges to local planning authorities. In comparative terms, government policy developments have been more pronounced in housing than urban planning, as discussed in the next section.

4.2.2 Housing Policy Developments

Zimbabwe’s housing policy features four primary issues, namely the promotion of home-ownership, the establishment of new minimum housing standards, aided self-help, and the enforcement of a strong anti-squatter stance (Ramsamy, 2006: 132). Soon after independence,

policy pronouncements in the housing sector were aimed at addressing colonial disparities. Primarily, repressive migration laws were repealed, with the development of housing seen as a permanent feature for urban migrants. Housing policies emphasised the role of the government in providing low-income housing and clearing the increasing housing backlog.

However, in successive policies, the government seemed to ignore the transformative potential of self-help initiatives in low-income housing. Such a policy thrust accounts partly for the massive current housing backlog of more than a million units. The government policy of destroying ‘informal housing’ in 1983 (Operation Clean Up), 1991 and 2005 (Operation Restore Order) contributed significantly to the current housing crisis. Such destruction is also contrary to the policy aim of significantly reducing the housing backlog.

4.2.2.1 Repeal of Pass Laws (1980) and Rent Control Regulations (1982)

In 1980 the Pass Laws which had restricted ‘Africans’ from migrating and staying in towns without proof of employment and residence were repealed. This marked the government’s first attempt at promoting the right to the city. A sudden influx of people into cities created immense housing challenges. It would seem that addressing them required a comprehensive approach of state-led, private sector and community approaches. However, two years into independence, the government adopted Rent Control Regulations (1982), which were meant to “regulate the rental market in ways that offer protection to both tenants and landlords” (Chatiza & Mlalazi, 2009: 18). However, Rakodi and Withers (1995b: 188) argue that, following the rent control legislation, “new flat construction halted and increasing numbers of flats were sold, either individually to tenants or in blocks to employers”. This marked the beginning of the decline in social housing in urban Zimbabwe.

The effectiveness of the rent control regulations on housing supply has been questioned. In particular, Rakodi and Withers (199b: 188) hold the view that the legislation deterred “new construction, restricting the supply of small, modestly priced dwellings”. Rent controls were part of the independent government’s larger socialist aspirations as it set about asserting control over various aspects of the economy.

There is a long-standing debate on the welfare and distribution effects of rent controls. Scholars in support of rent controls argue that it has distribution and welfare benefits (Arrnott & Igarashi, 2000; Ejarque & Kristenson, 2013). Meanwhile, opponents argue that they lead to misallocation of renters (Glaeser & Luttentr, 2003); reduce landlord incentives in maintaining

property, leading to low quality housing stock; limit the production of new housing stock (Ost, Joderberg & Wilhensson, 2014: 353); and distort prices in uncontrolled housing (Hubert, 1993).

At present, rent controls are a critical part of the political agenda in a number of countries (Micheli & Schmidt, 2014). However, rental housing is equally tension-ridden (between tenants and property owners), often deepening rather than ameliorating the housing crisis (through overcrowding and squatting by tenants, which overwhelms the capacity of services such as water and sanitation). In part, this has led to the emergence of social movements seeking an alternative to rental housing.

4.2.2.2 Home-Ownership Policy

In the 1960s, limited home-ownership schemes were introduced, mainly on long leases, in order to accommodate a growing black middle class (Rakodi & Mutwiza-Mangiza, 1990). This was because “the members of the urbanised African middle class demanded housing outside of the municipal townships to which all Africans, regardless of social standing, were consigned under the system of residential segregation” (West, 2002: 99). Before independence, about 90% of the housing stock in high-density areas was rented accommodation (Kanyenze et al., 2011), a development that would be altered significantly through the home-ownership policy. Home-ownership is housing allocated on ownership basis (GoZ, 2012). It allowed house occupiers to purchase council or government housing stock (Auret, 1995). Ownership is a tenure that bestows a variety of privileges, such as security, opportunities for investment in an appreciating asset, and a greater degree of control over one’s living space (Rakodi & Withers, 1995b: 200).

The home-ownership policy led to the selling out of about 9,000 public rental units to individuals between 1980 and 1984 (Zanu-PF, 1985). The then Minister of Local Government and Housing, Edison Zvobgo, expressed the government’s support for home-ownership as follows:

It is intended that all new housing developed in our Local Government Areas (formerly African Townships) will be available for home-ownership. Ownership, and more particularly pride of ownership, is the key to the improvement of the way of life of the majority of our people (Ramsamy, 2006: 132).

In 1981, about 25,318 dwellings had been sold through the home-ownership policy (Rakodi & Withers, 1995a: 255). Despite promoting the home-ownership policy, the government acknowledged that “housing demand will continue to rise and the public sector has limited resources of finance and manpower which it can provide to housing” (GoZ, 1987: 6). This prompted the government to seek international capital to finance low-cost housing, which resulted in programmes such as Urban I and II and the Zimbabwe Private Sector Housing Programme (discussed in section 4.2.3).

Rakodi and Withers (1995b: 200) note that, despite the home-ownership policy, “in practice the cost of ownership combined with limited supply means that private rental is likely to be the only tenure available to low-income households”. The promotion of home-ownership by the Government of Zimbabwe continues up to this day, as reflected in projects and programmes such as Urban I and II, Housing Upgrading Programme, National Housing Delivery Programme (2004-08). This may have been influenced by global increases in home-ownership rates in the post-Second World War era (Atterhög, & Song, 2009). In order to guide housing development, the government adopted the national housing policy in 2000. But it would appear that the 2000 National Housing Policy (NHP) did not adequately address the housing shortages, hence the deepening crisis and emergence of housing movements.

4.2.2.3 National Housing Policy 2000

In November 1997, the first National Housing Convention was convened in Vitoria Falls as a platform to share ideas and shape a new housing agenda. The Convention focused on the essence of a new housing policy. The National Housing Policy 2000 is the first housing policy document produced in the post-independence period. It was released in 1999 by the National Taskforce on Housing (NTFH) (Love, 2002). Its major emphasis was on the creation of partnerships among the general public, international and local NGOs, local authorities, government and the private sector as well as civil society and local communities. The government’s goal was stated as providing 1,000,000 houses in ten years (NTFH, 1999: 19).

However, this goal contradicts this study’s analytical framework, which advances people themselves as agents of transformation (Friedmann, 2011). Instead, the government’s role was supposed to be removing systemic and institutional constraints that limit self-help approaches to low-income housing delivery. In successive post-2000 budgets, “there has been no marked improvements in the allocation of adequate financial resources by the fiscus to housing development” (Makunde, Mubaiwa, & Donga, 2012: 14), severely undermining government

capacity. Furthermore, the socio-economic crisis crippled the government's capacity to fund its operations, resulting in a very significant decline in new housing stock.

The housing policy argued that making housing development people-centred is an approach which would likely achieve higher success rates (NTFH, 1999). A grassroots-centred approach to housing development would be the cornerstone of the self-help groups such as the co-operative and federation movement. At the same time, the policy acknowledged that planning legislation and complex bureaucratic procedures have become inappropriate and are hindering housing delivery (Chirisa & Munzwa, 2008).

In terms of tenure configuration, the NHP 2000 stipulated that for publicly funded housing schemes, 20% would be reserved for rental accommodation, with the remainder set aside for home-ownership. This demonstrates government's commitment to promoting home-ownership ahead of social and rental housing.³⁶ The implementation of the policy was dented by the infamous Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order which destroyed most self-help housing schemes. Such ruthless state action against the homeless exacerbated the housing crisis, deepening the struggle between housing movements and state agencies, as demonstrated below.

4.2.2.4 Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order

On 18 May 2005 the Government of Zimbabwe launched Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order (OM/RO), mainly "to deal with crime, squalor and lawlessness, and rebuild and organise urban settlements and small and medium enterprises in a way that would bring dignity, order and prosperity to the stakeholders and the nation at large" (GoZ, 2005: 2). The Operation was unprecedented and had far-reaching consequences for urban low-income housing. The prime targets of the Operation were informalised urban employment and 'illegal' low-income housing solutions across the urban hierarchy (Potts, 2006a: 274). The Operation demolished about 92,460 housing structures, including those that had been legalised by local authorities (Nhekairo, 2012). The United Nations Special Envoy concluded that the Operation left more than 700,000 people homeless and affected a further 2.4 million people (UN, 2005). The majority of the houses destroyed belonged to the urban poor who had coalesced through grassroots organisations to pool resources and build houses.

³⁶ 'Social housing' means housing provided and managed by local authorities and housing associations allocated to users principally on the basis of housing need rather than market conditions (Reeves, 2005: 2).

As I have argued elsewhere (Muchadenyika, 2015b), urban housing for the poor is entangled in larger national political struggles and dynamics. Bratton and Masunungure (2006: 21) posit that one of the aims of the Operation was “to stifle independent ... political activity in the country’s urban areas”. Furthermore, during the Operation, the violence was wanton, symbolic and punitive, signifying Zanu-PF’s determination to maintain power and social control in the face of a population that probably did not provide a majority vote for it, with areas who voted for the opposition MDC being the worst affected (Bracking, 2005). The Operation shows how politics can destroy self-help initiatives in housing delivery. It left an urban dilemma of the sort described by Mamdani (1996) as spatially and administratively disconnected local governance structures, which, reinforced by economic and social exclusion, leave large parts of the population within cities voiceless and without political leverage over their own destinies.

The Operation exposed the country’s planning system. It is widely acknowledged that Zimbabwe’s planning system is highly technocratic, bureaucratised and ‘out of sync’ with prevailing socio-economic realities (Potts, 2006a; GoZ, 2009; Kamete, 2006; 2007). During the Operation, there was evidence of the “unpopularity of planning and its association with the wealthy and powerful” (Kamete, 2011: 83), as high-income suburbs did not experience the same destruction as low-income areas. By contrast, the confrontation between the state and urban poor was fierce and concentrated more so in poor suburbs than high-income areas.

Zimbabwe has experienced radical political, economic and social transformation, yet the planning system seems to be in a stasis (Kamete, 2007), with the practice and profession of planning mired in deeply entrenched political struggles. Put differently, “OM/RO stands as another disturbing monument of the dark side of [Zimbabwe’s] planning” (Kamete, 2009: 918). The United Nations recommended the urgent need to “revise the outdated Regional, Town and Country Planning Act and other relevant Acts” and to align “these Acts with the social, economic and cultural realities facing the majority of the population namely the urban poor” (UN, 2005: 8). However, such a revision is yet to take effect.

4.2.2.5 National Housing Policy 2012

The second National Housing Convention, convened in 2009, pointed out that housing policies and laws “should be amended to make them pro-poor, empower civil society and allow stakeholder participation in human settlements” (GoZ, 2009: 12). The Convention “revealed the essence of promoting community-based organisations in pro-poor housing delivery” (Muchadenyika, 2015a: 5) and called for the revision of the national housing policy to capture

the new thrust in government thinking on housing. In particular, the National Housing Policy 2012 is premised on guaranteeing decent and affordable shelter (as in the Constitution of Zimbabwe), community and private sector initiatives, economic empowerment, promoting inclusive cities, enhancing sustainable housing initiatives and responding to the unique needs of rural and urban communities (GoZ, 2012: 5-7).

The policy recognised ZIHOPFE and Dialogue on Shelter for the first time as institutions involved in urban poor housing (Muchadenyika, 2015a). Since the preoccupation of this study is grassroots approaches to housing, I focus on what the policy says in this regard. In order to facilitate the integration of CBOs and promote pro-poor housing, the National Housing Policy uses seven strategies. These strategies are: promoting land allocation and security of tenure; targeted subsidies; a ‘no eviction without alternative’ policy framework; broadening access to credit facilities; the implementation of flexible policies (incremental and parallel development); proper regulation of the CBO sector; and national budgetary allocations for CBOs (GoZ, 2012: 16).

On analysis, the housing policy is an admission by the government that top-down approaches to housing delivery have not been beneficial to the country. Instead, the policy recasts government’s role as facilitating “other actors to effectively play respective roles in housing development by addressing specific needs through the formulation of enabling policies and strategies and the adoption of appropriate technology” (Mutsekwa, 2012: iv). The next section details how housing policies were implemented as projects in the post-1980 era.

4.2.3 Post-Independence Housing Delivery Projects

Housing projects in the post-independence era focused on top-down approaches in which the role of providing low-income housing was a state and local authority function. Such an approach treated people mainly as beneficiaries rather than active actors in the housing delivery process. As this section suggests, it contributed to immense housing shortages as the state and its institutions’ capacity fell drastically. Below, I explain post-independence housing projects.

4.2.3.1 Urban I & II

The 1982 Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP) prioritised the provision of serviced plots on an aided self-help basis (with financial and technical assistance) as part of the national housing policy (GoZ, 1982: 15). Thus, the government’s objective was stated as being to “ensure adequate housing and related services at affordable prices for all”. The World Bank,

in partnership with the Government of Zimbabwe, financed sites-and-services schemes in what became known as Urban I and II. The government set up the National Housing Fund (NHF), as a financing vehicle for urban low-cost housing, providing 30-year loans at an interest rate of 9.75% (Ramsamy, 2006). Funding for sites-and-services programmes was made available through the NHF. At the end of the TNDP in 1985, about 13,500 houses of the planned total of 115,000 had been completed (Ramsamy, 2006: 35). Patel (1984) attributes such slow progress to an unclear thought-out housing policy (Patel, 1984).

Nonetheless, 1985 would emerge as the turning-point for low-cost housing in Zimbabwe. The World Bank urban-sector mission argued for increasing home-ownership and utilising the private sector as a way of expanding market-oriented housing delivery (World Bank, 1985). Subsequently, the World Bank launched Urban I, the major objective of which was to “increase the supply of affordable housing and related services to large segments of the poorer population, and to improve the system of housing finance” in the four major cities of Harare, Bulawayo, Mutare, and Masvingo (World Bank 1991: 8). The project was funded by USD 112.5 million, and consisted of five components, namely site development and servicing, transport, institutional development, housing finance and front-end fees.³⁷ In total, the Urban I project delivered 22,373 serviced stands for housing development (Kamete, 2006b: 986).

In May 1989, the World Bank launched Urban II (at a total cost of USD 580 million), which aimed to “expand the role of private sector financial intermediation for housing from a pilot operation in four cities, to a nation-wide sector programme” (Ramsamy, 2006: 147).³⁸ At the end of Urban II, the World Bank reported that 30,000 low- and middle-income housing stands were made available to beneficiaries in 21 cities and towns (World Bank, 2000).

However, during these programmes, the insistence on high infrastructure and building standards by the government increased the cost of participating in sites-and-services schemes (Rakodi & Withers, 1995c). Unlike other countries where aided self-help predominantly focused on the urban poor through *in situ* upgrading and incremental construction (Sri Lanka) and complete housing units (South Africa) (Landman & Napier, 2010; Joshi & Khani, 2010), aided self-help in Zimbabwe mainly benefited middle-income earners. Ramsamy (2006) argues

³⁷ Financed (all figures in millions) as World Bank USD 43; Government of Zimbabwe USD 22.4; Building Societies USD 37.6; Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) USD 9.6.

³⁸ Financed (all figures in millions) as World Bank USD 80; West Germany USD 21; Swedish International Development Agency USD 3; Building societies (Zimbabwe) USD 242; Government (Zimbabwe) USD 234.

that World Bank programmes did not reach the poorest segments of the urban population due to down-raiding of projects by high-income groups and the failure to improve the lives of the urban poor in the deteriorating political and economic climate. Moreover, the NHF was fraught by ineffective cost recovery, leading to severe decapitalisation by 1996 (Kamete, 2000).

4.2.3.2 Zimbabwe Private Sector Housing Programme

The Zimbabwe Private Sector Housing Programme (ZPSHP) was supported by USAID and focused on “eliminating obstacles to sustainable production and delivery of low-cost housing in construction, building materials and construction equipment industries, land delivery system and the housing finance system” (GoZ, 1996b: 17).³⁹ The programme began in 1992 and was designed in the context of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme. The Government of Zimbabwe argues that the programme has wide policy impacts, because reducing housing standards (under the USAID project) increased affordability to purchase the houses by 70% and increased governments budgets to low-income stand development (through NHF) (GoZ, 1996b; Palmer Associates, 1995).

The ZPHSP channelled funds through building societies rather than government as the National Housing Fund had indications of abuse by senior government officials (Kamete, 1999). In terms of its success, the ZPSHP delivered 19,000 serviced plots, 7,500 core houses and 17,000 self-help housing construction loans (USAID, 2000). Kamete (2001b: 129) concludes that the USAID-supported private sector housing programme contributed much towards addressing the problems it diagnosed in the low-income housing sector, namely low production capacity, lack of access to mortgage finance and the resulting inability of low-income groups to own a home in urban areas. This is mainly because the programme recorded a 1,300% increase in low-income mortgages, an increase in about 300% in home-ownership, and a 96% reduction in low-cost construction prices (USAID, 2000).

4.2.3.3 Housing and Guarantee Fund

The Housing and Guarantee Fund (HGF) provided house purchase guarantee schemes in which the Government of Zimbabwe guaranteed repayment for a privately financed mortgage (Ramsamy, 2006). These schemes were meant mainly for civil servants (Rakodi, 1995b; Mutwiza-Mangiza, 1991). The HGF was established in accordance to the Housing and

³⁹ Total project financing (all figures in millions) amounted to USD 150, composed of USD 77.68 (USAID), USD 25 (Government of Zimbabwe) and USD 47.5 (Building Societies).

Building Act (Chapter 22: 07). The HGF was supported by two housing guarantee loans (amounting to USD 50 million) advanced by the USAID, primarily focusing on urban low-income housing beginning in September 1980 (Kamete, 2001b). The first phase commenced in 1982, resulting in the servicing of 11,780 low-cost housing plots and the building of 7,680 core houses and community facilities in Harare (Kuwadzana) and Chitungwiza (Palmer Associates, 1995). In addition, the scheme provided technical support and training to the Ministry of Public Construction and National Housing staff on self-help housing (GoZ, 1996b).

The second phase, which commenced in 1985, serviced 19,300 plots and built 7,500 core houses, together with community and commercial facilities in Harare (Kuwadzana II), Marondera (Nyamheni), Kadoma (Waverley), Chinhoyi (Chinhoyi Stream), Redcliff (Rutendo), Chiredzi (Tshovani), Chipinge (Gaza), Bindura (Chipadze) and Gwanda (Palmer Associates, 1995: 7). The housing guarantee scheme proved very successful between 1985 and 1995 (GoZ, 2005). The Government of Zimbabwe argues that the programme led to policy changes such as the acceptance of a self-help approach to housing, the lowering of housing standards and the establishment of mechanisms to provide low-income mortgage finances through private sector building societies (GoZ, 1996b).

4.2.3.4 Housing Upgrading Programme

The programme focused on upgrading old and dilapidated pre-independence social housing. Suburbs like Mbare (Harare), Rimuka (Kadoma), Mabutweni and Iminyela (Bulawayo), Mutapa (Gweru), Mahombekombe (Kariba) and Baghdad Squatter camp (Victoria Falls) were upgraded (GoZ, 2009; Chatiza & Mlalazi, 2009). The Government of Zimbabwe argues that the upgrading programme “enhanced the value of properties, stimulated activity in the construction industry and allied trades, while paving ways for the introduction of new technologies and designs” (Mugabe, 2009: vi). The programme removed original structures and constructed of 3-4 bedroomed houses and flats with toilets and bathing facilities (GoZ, 2005).

In the early 1980s, government adopted a squatter upgrading programme (Butcher, 1995), though in practice it was selective, in that certain squatter settlements (for instance, Chirambahuyo, Chitungwiza and various others in Harare) were destroyed (Auret, 1995; Ramsamy, 2006). The upgrading programme would have far-reaching policy implications in the development of Epworth through *in situ* upgrading. Beginning in 1985, the government, through the local government ministry, commenced the upgrading of water and sanitation

supply in Epworth after a cholera outbreak (Nyamvura & Brown, 1999), although the upgrading is yet to be completed (Chirisa, 2011). At present the upgrading programme is in a new phase that began in 2005. The new phase is spearheaded by collaboration between ZIHOPFE, Dialogue on Shelter, Epworth Local Board and the MLGPWNH. This programme forms one of the focus areas of this study, and as such Chapter Seven is dedicated to understanding how planning institutions and social movements are promoting transformation in Epworth.

4.2.3.5 LARP and Homelink Housing Development Scheme

The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) launched the Local Authorities Re-Orientation Programme (LARP) in February 2005. The broader goals of LARP were to improve transparency and accountability, procurement procedures, public relations, revenue collection and information management system in local authorities (RBZ, 2007). The programme was aimed at strengthening the contribution of local authorities in national economic development (MLGPWNH, 2013b), and focused on a number of issues. This study's focus falls on the programme's contribution to housing, as presented in Table 15.

Table 15: LARP Housing Projects

Urban Area	Project
Kadoma	Demolition and reconstruction of 153 Nissan houses in Rimuka Township.
Masvingo	Servicing of 361 stands in Runyararo High Density suburbs.
Victoria Falls	Servicing of 717 high density residential stands in Mkhosana Township (incomplete as of September 2007).
Umzingwane	Servicing of 150 low density stands at Lower Ncema Park (Esigodini Township).

Source: Adapted from RBZ, 2007: 20-24.

In May 2004, the Reserve Bank launched the Homelink Housing Development Scheme (HHDS), an initiative that lured Zimbabweans in the diaspora to build houses in Zimbabwe. The HHDS offered mortgages to non-resident Zimbabweans, repayable in foreign currency over five years (LEDRIZ, 2012). It allowed Zimbabweans living and working outside Zimbabwe to purchase housing stands and houses and build houses and make improvements on existing properties. As of March 2015, Homelink reported that it had constructed a total of 145 houses sold to clients through mortgage finance.⁴⁰ Furthermore, the scheme is in the

⁴⁰ Information about this scheme is clouded in secrecy, which limits critical analysis.

process of rolling out new housing development schemes in Harare (Tynwald and Marlborough), Bulawayo, Mutare and other cities.

This scheme has been criticised for neglecting the housing needs of resident Zimbabweans, and its effectiveness was often hampered by the attractive exchange rate at the parallel forex market (Kanyenze et al., 2011).⁴¹ In conclusion, despite the HDDS's operational challenges of corruption, substandard houses and political contestation, to which McGregor (2014: 172-181) alludes, the scheme provides a modest contribution to medium- and high-income housing in a crisis situation. While the central bank was implementing the HDDS, the Zimbabwe government was implementing the National Housing Delivery Programme (NHDP), as explained below.

4.2.3.6 National Housing Delivery Programme (2004-08)

The NHDP (2004-08) was aimed at eliminating a housing backlog of 1,250 million units in five years (250,000 units per year) by reforming the housing delivery system to allow more actors, acquire peri-urban land for housing purposes and creating an integrated institutional framework for housing delivery (GoZ, 2003).

This was a highly ambitious plan, considering the prevailing socio-economic and political conditions. The production capacity of government had drastically fallen from between 11,000 and 20,000 housing units per annum between 1985 and 2000 to 5,500 serviced plots in 2002 (Kanyenze et al., 2011: 360). Based on these figures, one can argue that the target of 250,000 housing units per year was unrealistic and unachievable. The government argues that 320,000 residential stands were acquired under the programme, with 92,000 of these subdivided and allocated to beneficiaries on a self-help basis (GoZ, 2009: 3). In brief, the NHDP (2004-08) could not deliver a single housing unit; instead, the government changed focus to providing housing stands only.

In the aftermath of the infamous OM/RO, the government launched Operation Garikai/Shelter for the People. The Operation aimed at “promoting large-scale delivery of low-cost housing, vending and marketing, as well as small and medium business sites” (GoZ, 2005: 15). The Operation relied on local authorities providing access roads, trunk infrastructure and basic services to allow displaced people to build homes in accordance to the Regional, Town and

⁴¹ In 2015, HHDS through its Tynwald project became open for buyers staying in Zimbabwe and abroad

Country Planning Act (LEDRIZ, 2012). This was an unrealistic assumption, as local authorities had no such capacity; in reality, they were struggling even to pay salaries and provide basic services such as refuse collection, water and sanitation. The Operation constructed 3,325 houses during the inception year, a figure far below the 93,000 houses destroyed during Operation Restore Order (UNDP, 2008).

Operation Garikai was hastily put together and turned out to be chaotic. To substantiate this assertion, Box 2 puts into perspective findings made about Operation Garikai Phase 1 and 2 by a government technical committee in Marondera town. In essence, Operation Garikai provided housing units and stands without infrastructure, and later handed the unfinished work to local authorities, with “councils contesting the forced handover, arguing it was equivalent to dumping a chaotic programme” (Muchadenyika, 2015a: 3).

Box 1: The Nature of Operation Garikai in Marondera-Elmswood Residential Development

1. 205 stands condemned because they were on rocky outcrops which could not be serviced by roads, water and sewers;
2. 99% of roadworks not done in Phase II;
3. 40% of low-density stands have no water access;
4. Phase II is still to be serviced by sewers;
5. 90% of Phase I and II does not have electricity;
6. 15 stands have allocation anomalies (i.e. allocated to someone but developed by another person, or designated for other facilities such as social or servitudes but developed for residential purposes).
 - i) 75% of high density stands in Phase II use Blair toilets;
 - ii) 30% of low density stands are occupied and under development (mainly due to their inaccessibility and the unavailability of water).

Source: MLGPWNH MEP, 2013

Despite such contestation, government participation in actual land servicing and house construction through the flagship Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle has remained a modest contribution to addressing housing shortages in Zimbabwe (Chatiza & Mlalazi, 2009). The Government of Zimbabwe argues that the first phase of Operation Garikai delivered a total of 4,205 core housing units, with 3,000 at various construction stages handed to beneficiaries on an aided self-help basis (GoZ, 2009: 3). Under the Inclusive Government, beginning in 2009, the delivery of housing can be described as a set of projects, as discussed in the next section.

4.2.3.7 Housing Projects (2009-13)

Housing projects between 2009 and 2013 were based mainly on the Medium Term Plan (MTP) and Short Term Economic Recovery Programme (STERP). A government blueprint, the MTP sought to “provide adequate, affordable and decent housing to the population” (GoZ, 2011: 72). Both STERP and MTP prioritised revising the NHP and availing more land to local authorities for housing (GoZ, 2011; 2009b). Under STERP, government priority was given to co-operatives and associations to acquire land for their members (GoZ, 2009b). The focus of government housing projects was on rehabilitation and maintenance of public buildings, assessment and completion of stalled housing projects, construction of low-income housing and social amenities and the construction of affordable houses for civil servants (GoZ, 2011). Through joint ventures with the private sector and local authorities, government housing projects aimed at assisting low-, medium- and high-income earners, are summarised in Table 16.

Table 16: National Housing Loan Development Facility Projects

Location	Project	Status
Kwekwe	Mbizo 22	700 high-density stands 81 stands for flats Roads, sewer and water reticulation services
Harare	Sunway City	224 low-density stands Provision of social infrastructure
Marondera	Lower Paradise Park	108 low-density stands Provision of water, roads and storm water reticulation
Mutare	Chikanga	201 high-density stands Roads, sewer and water reticulation services
Harare	Willowvale Flats	18 blocks of 16 units each

Source: MEPIP, 2012: 127-8.⁴²

The projects shown in Table 16 are against a government aim of clearing the 1.25 million housing backlog within five years (GoZ, 2011). Furthermore, the government had aimed to acquire 500 hectares of land for urban housing (Ibid.), but by 2012 “there was no disbursement for new acquisition of land” (MEPIP, 2012: 127). It must be pointed out that the delivery of housing during this period was scuttled by the political construction of the Inclusive Government composed of the opposition, the MDC, and Zanu-PF. This is mainly because of tensions and contestation between ministries responsible for land and local government (under Zanu-PF) and the ministry responsible for housing (under the MDC).

⁴² The table considers only housing projects deemed by the government as more than 95% complete.

4.3 Critique of Housing Policies and Projects

In the post-independence period, the provision of low-income housing focused on the government and local authorities. This approach ignored key housing actors such as self-help groups. The omission in policy and practice has led to the suffocation of the low-income housing sector in the post-2000 era when the financial and technical capacity of both government and local authorities has diminished. Furthermore, housing policies seem to be disjointed as they do not build from each other. Policy implementation is piecemeal, with little emphasis on monitoring and evaluation, a key element in policy implementation. Suffice it to say, housing policies did not necessarily produce real changes in people's lives.

The housing sector is one where the state's detrimental influence is pronounced. The demolition of houses during Operation Restore Order countered the very aims of government housing policies – increasing home-ownership and reducing the housing backlog. State intervention through planning laws and regulations and the use of security forces has been problematic in the housing sector. This is because the state's response to low-income housing initiatives through destruction and violence undermined the authority of the state, with state authorities not adhering to formal rules (planning and human rights law) and there being loss of confidence among citizens in the state and its institutions (Hyden, 2006). The government destroyed self-help initiatives in housing primarily for political reasons. Housing in Zimbabwe is entangled in deep political struggles as to who controls urban areas and the subsequent urban development process (Muchadenyika, 2015b).

Planning law seems to be a convenient tool to retard and even destabilise social movements advocating for speed delivery of low-income housing. Housing policies have singled out the need to embark on planning law reform as a way of removing bottlenecks in low-income housing delivery (GoZ, 2009a, 2012). However, there has been no progress towards reform, which suggests that existing law is benefiting certain elite sections of the society. This is despite the fact that “the gap between the intentions of planning law and the actual reality of urban life grew wider until it became difficult to see a connection between the two” (Watson, 2011: 204). The adoption of parallel and incremental development by the Government of Zimbabwe, however, is a modest step towards promoting grassroots initiatives in housing delivery.

Increasing urban informality, in particular, informal settlements is a common feature in post-independence Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, planning authorities in Zimbabwe “are still bent on

bidding good riddance to ways of life and modes of practice that do not fit into the official schema of the modern city” (Kamete, 2013: 27). By their nature, informal settlements sprout up largely due to bottlenecks in the formal housing delivery system, but governing authorities have been reluctant to deal with such bottlenecks. Grassroots attempts to upgrade Epworth *in situ* are under way, as will be discussed in Chapter Seven. At present, the Harare slum-upgrading programme is using incremental development as a strategy for formalising and upgrading informal settlements (as will be discussed in detail in Chapter Five).

Housing policies were implemented through a number of housing projects. Key areas for consideration include infrastructure and housing standards, the credibility of housing institutions, the promotion of self-help groups, and project targeting. Lowering infrastructure and housing standards promotes the delivery of urban low-income housing, as demonstrated by the USAID scheme. To date, this scheme is widely acknowledged as path-breaking in Zimbabwe’s quest to provide low-cost housing designs. Based on the housing projects implemented in the post-independence era, it would seem that sites-and-services schemes (providing services infrastructure) are transformational in the delivery of low-income housing. This is mainly because the provision of infrastructure such as water, sanitation and roads is often beyond the reach of self-help groups and the urban poor.

The credibility of institutions meant for housing development is critical. The non-transparency of the National Housing Fund caused international development capital meant for housing to be channelled through non-state actors. Such a shift reduced the role and influence of the government in urban housing and the overall urban development process. In addition, a selection of beneficiaries is important in housing projects to avoid down-raiding by high-income groups. At the same time, projects that succeeded in targeting the urban low-income group were transformational, because marginalised groups often accessed housing. Access to housing increased the disposable incomes of such households, partly due to saving on rentals.

Use of self-help groups such as housing co-operatives and community groups did not feature prominently in housing projects. Where it has been emphasised, as in STERP, MTP, NHP 2012 and NHDP (2014-18), there has not been ancillary traction to support self-help housing groups. For instance, the government has not created policies to provide serviced land to co-operatives, a major stumbling block to co-operative housing in Zimbabwe. In spite of this, the FTLRP seems to have provided readily available land in most peri-urban areas. Inherent weaknesses in housing policies and projects partly explain the rise of the co-operative and federation

movement as an alternative to low-income housing provision. The delivery of housing has been influenced largely by socio-economic and political developments, which are discussed in the next section.

4.4 Socio-Economic and Political Developments

Politics and the economy have a significant bearing on the delivery of housing, particularly for the urban poor (Gilbert & Ward, 1985; Ramsamy, 2006; Tibaijuka, 2009). Zimbabwe's social, economic and political dynamics have profound effects on the delivery of low-income housing. First, the economic and political crisis significantly reduced the capacity of government and local authorities to provide low-income housing (GoZ, 2011). This triggered the rise of social movements as significant actors in low-income housing using the self-help approach. Secondly, the FTLRP's planning and lack thereof provided an opportunity for social movements to annex peri-urban land and develop housing (Muchadenyika, 2015b). Thirdly, the contest for urban control between the MDC and Zanu-PF led to the politicisation of urban low-income housing. This reason is primarily that political parties seem to usurp the powers of local authorities by allocating land to housing movements aligned to them.

Post-2000, the Zanu-PF government demonstrated "authoritarianism marked by antipathy towards norms of liberal governance and disdain for human rights and democracy" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009: 1139). This is evidenced by the government's destruction of houses during Operation Restore Order. When the central government failed to provide services, it was the local authorities that delivered the basic services (Musekiwa, 2012), though to an inadequate degree. However, local authorities are failing to provide water, sanitation, health, education, transport and housing services to citizens. The magnitude of service-delivery collapse is typified by a cholera epidemic that claimed more than 4,000 lives (ICG, 2009), the highest fatality rate in Africa over a 15-year period (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013). Admittedly, the urban governance crisis (a result of political, administrative and economic challenges) in Zimbabwe led to service-delivery failure (Ranger, 2007). At the same time, housing production dropped drastically as government funding for housing fell and housing finance by international development agencies was withdrawn (LEDRIZ, 2012). Social movements (community-based organisations and housing co-operatives) became significant actors challenging the conventional way of housing provision (Muchadenyika, 2015a) and pioneering alternative delivery methods.

In June 2001, the Fast Track Land Reform Programme, aimed at taking and re-distributing white-owned commercial farms to black Zimbabweans, began in earnest (GoZ, 2001). The FTLRP has had widespread impacts on access to housing land by ordinary people, though social movements bypassed urban planning regulations (Muchadenyika, 2015b). This assertion does not deny the widespread negative impacts of the land reform on agriculture, the environment, economic growth, social amenities, displacement, and human rights, which have all been widely acknowledged (Dzingirai, Manzungu, & Nyamwanza, 2012; Hammar, 2008; Hammar, Raftopoulos, & Jensen, 2003; Kinsey, 2010; Mills, 2014; Fisher, 2010). The Government of Zimbabwe acknowledges that in urban settlements there are problems associated with the availability and delivery of land for low-cost and/or low-income housing (GoZ, 2009; 2012). An evident phenomenon has been the occupation of municipal, state and private land within and outside urban areas by people in need of housing mainly through housing co-operatives (Masuko, 2008). Such social movements are engaged in contestation with government and local authorities, as these planning institutions are keen on using evictions as a means of enforcing planning laws and regulations.

Urban politics is composed of “various overlapping and mutually implicated institutional sites of engagement and contestation” (Pieterse, 2008: 11). The control of urban areas from 2000 to the present has pitted Zanu-PF and the MDC against each other. This battle, however, has been sustained at the expense of service delivery (Muchadenyika, 2014a). Zimbabwe’s urban politics is profoundly contested, making housing provision tenuous and politically motivated (Muchadenyika, 2015b). The control of land in urban areas is an important factor in shaping urban development. In particular, Zanu-PF structures have made political loyalty a condition of access to land, especially amongst some housing co-operatives (McGregor, 2013). The government land audit of land management and allocation in Chitungwiza and Seke concluded that 15,604 housing stands were allocated illegally by land barons and youth aligned to Zanu-PF (MLGPWNH, 2013a). In addition, some of these housing co-operatives are linked to Zanu-PF and led by Zanu-PF parliamentarians and councillors.

Post-2000, the process of informalisation has profoundly reshaped Zimbabwe’s urban economies and has occurred alongside episodes of commandist state intervention (Potts, 2008a). Informalisation was set in motion during ESAP, with the government accommodating ‘informal urban activities’ through Statutory Instrument 216 of 1994. In essence, this Statutory Instrument authorised non-residential activities (such as medical resource institutions and centres; shops and offices; service industry; warehousing and general maintenance; storage and

special industrial use) in residential areas (GoZ, 1994). Many people took advantage of this regulation and developed low-cost housing which was destroyed during Operation Restore Order (Chaeruka & Munzwa, 2009). ESAP on its own changed citizen agency in urban areas since it led to urban disaffection, riots, strikes and protests against the government (Tsvangirai, 2011). Urban informalisation is evidenced by a sharp decline in formal employment and substantial increases in informal activities and informal housing.

Zimbabwe's economic crisis devastated the livelihoods of the urban population and created conditions of extreme poverty in towns (Potts, 2006b), with formal unemployment estimated officially at 90% (Hammar, McGregor & Landau, 2010: 271). Urban poverty in Zimbabwe is "associated with the development of increasingly informalised urban employment and 'illegal' low-income housing solutions across the urban hierarchy" (Potts, 2006b: 274). Jones (2010: 286) describes Zimbabwe's informal economy as "a progressive encroachment of economic styles and tactics formerly relegated to the urban social margins ... activities formerly associated with down-class urban youth and part-time female work have rapidly become the source of livelihood for much of the urban population". Such ubiquitous informality has accompanied the rise of informal housing settlements. This is so partly because most people in urban areas are finding it difficult to afford rental housing.

The state's response to urban informalisation has been heavy-handed. The government tried with little success to crush informal economic activities and housing through Operation Dzikisa Mitengo (Price Controls) and Operation Murambatsvina in 2005. These operations used the police and the army as tools to unleash violence and restore order in the urban economy and housing activities (Bracking, 2005; Potts, 2005; Muchadenyika, 2015a; Bratton & Masunungure, 2006).

What is unusual, however, about the processes of informalisation in post-2000 urban Zimbabwe is how informality intersects with historically strong bureaucracies geared towards urban control (Hammar, McGregor & Landau, 2010: 270). It has been widely acknowledged that Zimbabwe's urban planning and management system is highly bureaucratised and formalised (GoZ, 2009; Kamete, 2006a, 2007; Potts, 2006; Hammar, McGregor & Landau, 2010). Against this backdrop, social movements advocating for change in the urban planning system would either be in a lockdown or build alliances with planning institutions. High rates of urbanisation and unrealistic, complex planning procedures are key arguments on the side of social movements. However, as new post-colonial urban dynamics began to break old spatial

divisions, formal regulatory frameworks remained a key means of control (Hammar, McGregor & Landau, 2010), despite resistance from the co-operative and federation movement.

4.5 Co-operative and Federation Movement

The inadequacies of housing policies and projects, along with socio-economic and political developments, precipitated the rise of social movements in the field of low-income housing in the post-2000 era. The co-operative housing movement has become a critical player in housing and social amenities delivery in Zimbabwe and beyond (GoZ, 2009). Housing co-operatives in Zimbabwe emerged in the 1980s as part of the independent Zimbabwe's socialist-leaning policies. In order to promote co-operatives in both social and economic transformation, the government promulgated the Co-operative Societies Act (Chapter 24: 05) on 15 July 1990. Primarily, the Act provides for the "formation, registration, regulation, management, functioning and dissolution of co-operative societies in accordance with co-operative principles and in pursuance of government policy and self-reliance" (GoZ, 1990 as amended). Co-operative principles as stipulated in the Co-operative Societies Act are perpetual succession, democracy and equality, transparency, collective ownership and voluntarism.

In terms of the growth of registered housing co-operatives, there were two in 1985, 47 in 1992 and 135 in 1999 (Chirisa & Munzwa, 2008). However, post-2000, housing co-operatives increased drastically to become a prominent player in low-income housing delivery. At the same time housing co-operatives "went beyond the struggle for housing provision to include campaigns for land reclamation and challenges to the institutional arrangements that governed the provision of housing in urban areas" (Masuko, 2008: 181). This highlighted the potency of the urban land question (Toriro, 2005), as new social movements in the form of housing co-operatives emerged during the land reform programme (Masuko, 2008). As of 2015, there are about 3,500 registered housing co-operatives in Zimbabwe.⁴³ Estimate figures collated from the local government ministry show 9,903 housing units under construction by 342 housing co-operatives in six provinces.⁴⁴

An earlier study by Vakil (1994) concluded that strengthening the co-operative movement has positive impacts on women and their families and marginalised groups, which in turn

⁴³ Figure by MOSMECD.

⁴⁴ This figure does not include co-operative housing projects in provinces such as Harare and Bulawayo metropolitan and Matabeleland North and South.

contribute to grassroots development in Zimbabwe. At present, there are two apex bodies for housing co-operatives, namely ZINAHCO and the National Co-operative Federation. ZINAHCO was mooted in 1993 and registered in June 2001 under the Co-operatives Societies Act. The organisation's vision is to "assist members of the society to access houses, through pooling of resources and skills, to value members of the society and give them a voice in the determination of their own future and provide an appropriate structure for community development and community based management of resources" (Duru, 2012: 70). By 2009, the organisation had 30 member co-operatives with a total membership of 9,000 throughout Zimbabwe.

The Federation movement was triggered by the increase in homelessness and the drastic decline in low-income housing delivery by state institutions. ZIHOPFE was launched in December 1998 by the then MLGPWNH minister, John Nkomo, with a membership of 12,000 people across Zimbabwe (Masimba-Nyama, 2012). The Federation is a unique grassroots movement both in terms of processes, methods and values. Chief among its founding values are the belief in the 'poorest of the poor' (poor people as agents of transformation), daily savings, weekly meetings, the central role of women, and active community participation (Masimba-Nyama, 2012). The Federation has grown in strength at a time of immense political opportunity as old traditions and affiliations break down in urban areas (Chitekwe & Mitlin, 2001). The political and economic crisis has brought severe challenges to formal state institutions, providing opportunities for participatory forms of development and self-help approaches to housing.

As with similar organisations in other countries like South Africa, India and Zambia, ZIHOPFE receives technical support from local NGOs, in this case Dialogue on Shelter. Through ZIHOPFE and Dialogue on Shelter, "the urban poor have built a strong and vibrant alliance which is acting as a medium of participation in city governance" (Muchadenyika, 2015a: 1). At present, the Alliance continues to "present government with an alternative and practical way of dealing with land and housing question" (Chitekwe-Biti, 2009: 365). As of 2014, the Federation had a membership of more than 55,000 households and had facilitated access to housing stands to 15,000 households in Zimbabwe's 52 local authorities (Muchadenyika, 2015a: 4).

Community-based organisations mobilise low-income and vulnerable communities considered unviable recipients of mortgage finance, private sector housing and, at times, council-assisted schemes (GoZ, 2009). Such mobilisation strategies have transformed urban housing by

facilitating housing access to poor and vulnerable groups. In that regard, the 2012 NHP recognised CBOs and grassroots organisations (ZINAHCO, Dialogue on Shelter and ZIHOPFE) for the first time as key actors in housing delivery (GoZ, 2012). This thesis thus argues that the provision of low-income housing by the co-operative and federation movement has resulted in urban transformation.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter has presented the main planning and housing policy developments before and after independence. In both eras, housing and urban planning was and is driven largely by politics. The colonial regime used planning and housing as part of its spatial segregation philosophy and practice. This led to the development of ‘African’ townships far away from ‘European’ residential areas. Furthermore, Africans without proof of employment were not allowed in cities. Simply put, ‘African’ housing was not a priority for the colonial government, hence the overcrowding of most ‘African’ townships.

However, independence brought significant changes to housing and urban planning. In successive development plans, the independent government laid out its vision of promoting home-ownership and tackling the ever-increasing housing backlog. The period between 1980 and 2000 saw considerable investment by the government in collaboration with development partners in providing housing, particularly for the urban poor. Despite this, Potts (2006: 273) argues that, since independence, the state has “adhered to housing policies that have made it both difficult and expensive for low-income urban residents to comply with legal housing requirements”. It is likely that this policy thrust has put in motion widespread contestation and alliances between planning institutions and social movements in the post-2000 era.

As the country slipped into an unprecedented socio-economic and political crisis in the period after the year 2000, the financial and technical capacity of the government and its institutions to provide housing and planning services was dramatically reduced. As a result, the housing crisis in urban Zimbabwe manifested itself in backyard shacks and free-standing informal housing (Potts, 2006a). At the same time, social movements became significant actors in housing delivery.

The next three chapters focus on the interaction of social movements and planning institutions in low-income housing delivery in Harare (Chapter Five), Chitungwiza (Chapter Six) and Epworth (Chapter Seven). In presenting these findings, the study focuses on three themes:

social movements and low-income housing; planning institutions and low-income housing; and contestations and alliances.



Chapter Five

Harare: A City under Transformation?*

Harare has undergone rapid transformation in the post-2000 era. Such transformation has been evident primarily in urban development, in particular housing. More than 100,000 new housing structures have been built mainly by housing movements comprising the urban poor. Such housing developments by social movements challenge the conventional norm of urban planning and housing delivery. In this regard, the form and structure of Harare city has been significantly altered. Estimates indicate that there are about 3,000 housing co-operatives in Harare, which have grown to become significant actors in low-income housing.⁴⁵

This chapter critiques how radical planning, as advanced by social movements, has transformed Harare as a city. In Harare, unlike in Chitungwiza and Epworth, there are elements of a fusion of radical and collaborative planning (dialogue, engagement, and confrontation, consensus-building) in which the City of Harare partners with housing movements in housing delivery. Elements of radical planning in Harare include resistance to top-down approaches to housing delivery, championing alternative forms of housing and infrastructure provision, grassroots mobilisation towards speed access to housing, and concessions by the City of Harare in adopting radical planning approaches such as parallel and incremental development. The City adopted parallel development as a low-income housing policy that has been used by housing co-operatives primarily to reduce costs. In addition, the City partnered with Dialogue on Shelter and ZIHOPFE in a slum-upgrading programme that set a new course in how the city conceptualises and responds to slum-dwellers (Muchadenyika, 2015a). The use of incremental development in *in situ* upgrading has proven to be transformational.

Despite urban transformation being under way, there are several contestations within the existing planning and housing delivery system. The main actors in these contestations are housing movements, the City of Harare, the local government ministry, and political parties. The local government ministry elects to engage directly with housing movements through allocating state land – a development that leads to serious contestations as such movements

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⁴⁵ Interview with MOSMECD Co-operative Development Officer, Harare, 19 August, 2015.

become averse to the City's regulations. Movements registered with the City of Harare govern and perform better than those registered to the local government ministry. The latter are political instruments, and so their administration and operations are highly politicised. As such, their approach to housing bypasses planning regulations with catastrophic effects on urban infrastructure planning (Muchadenyika, 2015b).

This chapter responds to the following questions: How does urban transformation occur? What is the role of social movements and planning institutions in such transformation? What are the contestations and alliances associated with such transformation? In understanding urban transformation, urban analysts engage with the question of change in cities (Thorns, 2002). This chapter therefore presents and analyses such change in terms of planning and low-income housing. I do so by focusing mainly on housing movements in areas such as Saturday Retreat (Ushehwekunze), Hopley, Current, Odar and Dzivarasekwa. The chapter also draws on cases from other movements in the city. The chapter begins by underscoring the role of social movements in low-income housing delivery.

5.1 Social Movements and Low-Income Housing

5.1.1 Social Movements and Housing Development

The total membership of the five movements studied in Harare amounts to 17,980. The state of housing in such movements is, however, different, as shown in Table 17. The difference is explained by their leadership and governance, relations with planning authorities (City of Harare and the MLGPWNH), and their strategies. Movements that have performed well in terms of developments on land (in Budiro, Dzivarasekwa and Hopley) have in common sound corporate governance and apolitical, cordial working relations with the City of Harare (Section 5.3.2). In addition, two of the movements (in Budiro and Hopley) were allocated land by the City of Harare and hence are guided by council procedures and regulations. Movements in Saturday Retreat and Odar are on contested land, having been allocated such land directly by the local government ministry (Section 5.3.1). Such movements are highly political, being characterised by intra-party struggles over power and authority.

Table 17: State of Housing in the Movements under Study

Place	Name of movement	State of housing
Budiro	Current Housing Consortium (11 co-operatives)	657 members allocated stands. Water and sanitation installed. Roads constructed to sub-grade level. 442 houses completed.
	ZIHOPFE	480 former slum-dwellers allocated stands with security of tenure. More than 90% using transitional houses. Houses at various stages of construction. Water, sanitation and road infrastructure in place.
Hopley	Hopley B Housing Consortium (18 co-operatives)	843 members allocated housing stands. About 90% have built unplanned housing structures. Water, sewer and road infrastructure in place.
Odor	Odor Housing Consortium (59 co-operatives)	8,000 people allocated stands. About 7,000 have built houses that can be regularised.
Saturday Retreat	Saturday Retreat Housing Consortium (16 co-operatives)	8,000 members allocated stands. Current members around 15,000 due to unofficial land allocations. No planned structures in the settlement. No water and sanitation infrastructure. Road openings without gravel in most cases.

Source: Collated from Various Sources.

Between 2000 and 2015, the City of Harare allocated 16,862 unserviced stands to 261 co-operatives, as indicated in Table 18. However, it must be noted that the database is not constantly updated and, as such, the figures in Table 18 may not portray the reality on the ground.

Table 18: Status of Housing Co-operatives on Council Land (2000-15)

Number of co-operatives in database	Membership	Co-operatives allocated land	Number of stands allocated	Housing units completed	Stands under servicing
561	46,140	261	16,862	3,000	13,862

Source: Adapted from City of Harare database.⁴⁶

Despite a significant number of stands being allocated to housing co-operatives, the proportion of completed housing units remains low. Out of 16,862 allocated stands, about 3,000 houses have been completed. There are two main reasons for this. First, the dollarisation of 2009 intrinsically meant that co-operatives had to start from zero. Movement savings made during the record inflationary period of 2000-08, which at its peak reached in excess of 150,000% per

⁴⁶ This database does not capture co-operatives allocated land by government. Table 19 shows such information.

year (Coltart, 2008), were wiped off. Secondly, from 2000 to 2006, the City would not allow co-operatives to commence house construction before the full development of infrastructure (water, sanitation and roads). In the pre-2000 era, the responsibility of off-site infrastructure was borne by the City and government. However, “post-2000, both institutions had no such capacity and by default such responsibility was transferred to low-income self-help groups”.⁴⁷

As reflected in Table 18, the main challenge of co-operative housing is the provision of infrastructure. The majority of co-operatives in Harare have been struggling to install infrastructure for the past decade. Even without infrastructure, most stands have transitional houses, mainly unplanned brick and mortar structures. Table 19 provides a comparative analysis of the contributions of the main actors to low-income housing delivery in Harare.

Table 19: Actors and their Contribution to Housing (2000-15)

Actor	Stands under servicing and houses under construction	Completed units
Housing Co-operatives (on Council land)	13,862	3,000
Housing Co-operatives (on state land)	53,000	31,000
ZIHOPFE	480	243
Government	1,583 ⁴⁸	637
City of Harare	0	0
Total	68,925	34,310

Sources: City of Harare Database; Dialogue on Shelter Database; Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2006; Research Findings, 2015-16.

Table 19 indicates that the largest percentage of completed housing units was delivered by social movements. However, social movements remain constrained by the burden of infrastructure provision, explaining why the majority of housing stands have no access to infrastructure services. At this point, it is vital to understand how social movements utilised political opportunities.

5.1.2 Political Opportunities and Housing

As discussed in Chapter Three, political opportunities are defined as changes in the political environment that influence the chances of success (Opp, 2009: 161). Here, I discuss how three main political opportunities – namely the FTLRP, the politics of urban control and the

⁴⁷ Interview with COH Chief Planning, Research and Housing Officer, Harare, 31 August 2015.

⁴⁸ The majority of these Operation Garikai houses were handed to beneficiaries before completion.

favourable government policy – facilitated the work of social movements in low-income housing delivery. Table 20 shows that about 84,000 new housing stands were created by social movements taking advantage of the FTRLP. The emergence of militant housing movements reversed the conventional process of housing delivery (of plan, survey, service, allocate). As a liberation war veteran observes:

In Harare, we started land invasions in 2000 as spillovers of the Svosve revolution. Those of us in town entered into peri-urban farms and the majority of settlers here [Saturday Retreat] are from Glen View, Glen Norah, and Highfield, where they were lodging. In Saturday Retreat, the invasions were led by Comrade Chinotimba. We settled here whilst government was doing the acquisition process. Zanu-PF recommended that in peri-urban areas, we should start co-operatives. We therefore formed co-operatives as a platform to develop housing.⁴⁹

Movements formed during the FTLRP went beyond the struggle for housing provision to include campaigns for land reclamation in urban areas (Masuko, 2008: 181). Such movements annexed and allocated members housing stands on land belonging to corporations or white commercial farmers. This is, however, not to deny that most of such farms are marred with deep struggles, as discussed in section 5.3.1. The sudden rise in co-operatives overwhelmed the capacity of government and the City of Harare to regulate planning and housing, as noted below:

Post-2000, housing structures mushroomed even out of proportion. The mushrooming of co-operatives stretched the capacity of both government and the City of Harare, in terms of regulating planning and housing. What happened is that, on peri-urban land, urban dwellers rushed to invade for farming and not for co-operative housing. Government said that land is earmarked for Harare's urban expansion and therefore advised people that if they wanted to stay, they should form housing co-operatives – leading to the mushrooming of co-operatives after 2000.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Interview with war veteran and Mashingshingi Co-operative chairperson, Harare, 2 November 2015.

⁵⁰ Interview with MOSMECD co-operatives official, Harare, 20 August 2015.

Table 20: FTLRP and Housing Delivery

Farm/Project	Estimated Number of Stands Created
Caledonia	23,000
Hopley	5,000
Arlington	7,000
Stoneridge	5,000
Aspindale	2,000
Dzivarasekwa	8,000
Gleneagles	6,000
Saturday Retreat	8,000
Acorn	4,000
Bellapaise	10,000
Retreat	6,000
Total	84,000

Sources: Toriro, 2007; Research Findings, 2016.

The contest for urban control between the MDC and Zanu-PF resulted in two parallel housing delivery systems. One is spearheaded by the City of Harare and the other by the local government ministry.⁵¹ The former prioritises allocating land to co-operatives registered with it using council regulations and procedures. As such, most co-operatives registered with the city are less political and have sound corporate governance.⁵² There is, however, evidence to suggest that some movements allocated land by the city are MDC-linked, for instance, in Budiriro. On the other hand, the local government ministry allocates land to movements inclined towards Zanu-PF. For instance, the local government ministry allocated more than 80,000 stands to movements aligned to Zanu-PF (Table 20).

In both cases, movements utilise the politics around urban control to benefit themselves. However, the political contest between the MDC and Zanu-PF also derailed the success of movements as issues of corporate governance and delivery became secondary to politicking. For example, Zanu-PF-aligned co-operatives have been reluctant to follow sound corporate governance practices.⁵³ Such conduct has reduced the potential contribution of movements to organised housing and planning in Harare.

The decision by the City of Harare and the government to relax housing-related policies through incremental and parallel development is transformational (see sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.4). These strategies have largely been used by movements, in particular, ZIHOPFE and co-

⁵¹ In terms of outputs and outcomes, co-operatives registered with City of Harare have largely performed and delivered on co-operative objectives as compared to those aligned to the local government ministry.

⁵² Based on analysis of Audits reports, complaints from members and correspondences with COH.

⁵³ Report on Housing in Harare Metropolitan Province, 3 June 2013.

operatives, in housing delivery. Such policy strategies reduce the cost and burden on social movements that are shouldering government and the City of Harare obligations of servicing infrastructure.

5.1.3 Structure and Organisation of Movements

The organisation and structure of a movement are fundamental factors determining its success or failure (Davis et al., 2005). Here, the focus is on the structure and relationships between individuals and groups within movements. This is vital because social cohesion and organisation are important aspects of building and sustaining a movement. There are three constituent elements that promote social cohesion within movements: party politics, housing need and rituals.

Movements affiliated to the local government ministry use party politics and political structures as the rallying point. As such, most of their gatherings use Zanu-PF slogans and liberation songs as a way of instilling discipline and fostering movement cohesion. These slogans include *Pamberi neZanu-PF; Pasi neMDC; Pamberi neZanu; Pasi neGamatox; Pamberi navaMugabe; Pasi nematsotsi, pasi nenhubu; Pamberi nekushinga* (Forward with Zanu-PF; Down with MDC; Forward with Zanu-PF; Down with Gamatox [Zanu-PF faction]; Forward with Mugabe; Down with thieves; Forward with bravery!).⁵⁴ These movements combine party politics and movement issues, and, as such, one has to be comfortable with Zanu-PF in order to be at ease with movement business. In such cases, political identity and networks are vital aspects of organising co-operatives (Chirisa, Gaza & Bandaiko, 2014).

Conversely, movements that are not invested in party politics, such as Current, Hopley and ZIHOPFE, are motivated by housing need. These movements are sustained on the principle of housing being vital to a family household. As such, their meetings are punctuated by rituals that emphasise the essence of housing in urban life. ZIHOPFE's social cohesion is fostered through rituals such as *Halala Federation halala. Tata Mfelandawonye tata. Dzirikuvakwa dzimba dzirikuvakwa* [Houses are being built]. *Hatidi kugara mumatangwena hatidi* [We do not want to stay in shacks]. *Masimba, shinga murombo shinga* [Power, Be brave, the poor, be brave]. *Mari yedu yedzimba ngaiuye tizoiti zhu, zhu, zhu* [Our money for houses should come].⁵⁵ These rituals are recited by anyone before and after making a contribution during

⁵⁴ Observation, Ushehwekunze Meeting, Saturday Retreat, Harare, 1 November 2015.

⁵⁵ Observation, ZIHOPFE Planning Meeting, DZ Extension, Harare, 16 October 2015.

movement meetings. Furthermore, they are used as a tool to foster unity and promote discipline, even in cases of disagreements.

Housing co-operatives use a structure with an elected management committee comprising of chairperson, treasurer, secretary and their deputies and committee members. The management committee manages the affairs of the co-operative on a day-to-day basis and exercises powers necessary to achieve the objectives of the society.⁵⁶ There is a supervisory committee which provides oversight to the management committee. For instance, in Common Vision housing consortium, the supervisory committee found irregularities in the management committee and corrective action was taken.⁵⁷ ZIHOPFE's structure is composed of savings schemes, networks, regions, national committees and national coordinators. In both cases, power resides in movement members, though in reality, it is not necessarily true, especially in some co-operatives where leaders are sole control (section 5.3.2). In order to build finance and political power, co-operatives have merged into consortiums. This has been a vital strategy for organisation, as consortiums have become a collective entity for resource mobilisation and infrastructure development.

5.1.4 Social Movements and Infrastructure

Ordinarily, infrastructure development is a function of the City of Harare. However, “from the year 2001 onwards, the city council experienced cash flow problems and as a result, it could not provide serviced stands to the co-operatives”.⁵⁸ Infrastructure servicing became a *de facto* responsibility of housing movements as they were allocated unserviced land. In order to promote and facilitate the process of infrastructure development by co-operatives, the city resolved to delay the payment of the land's intrinsic value until after land had been serviced. The city argues that “charging the co-operatives the intrinsic land value upon allocation would affect the installation of on-site infrastructure”.⁵⁹ Table 21 presents the role of the studied movements in infrastructure development in Harare.

⁵⁶ Housing Co-operative Society Bye-Laws.

⁵⁷ Common Vision Housing Consortium SGM minutes, 20 February 2012.

⁵⁸ Town Clerk's Report to EHHCSLC, 16 September 2010.

⁵⁹ Director of DHCS memorandum to Town Clerk, 28 February 2012.

Table 21: Social Movements and Infrastructure

Movement	Infrastructure installed	Total Investment Cost (USD)	Year of land allocation
Current	18 km of sewer. 14 km of water. 7 km of roads at subgrade level. All 656 houses connected to water and sewer. All houses electrified.	1.7 million	2005
Hopley B	6.9 km of sewer. 6.8 km of water. 7.2 km of tarred road. All 843 housing stands connected to sewer and water. All housing structures electrified.	2.922 million	2006
ZIHOPFE	480 stands connected to sewer and water. 3 km of sewer. 4.2 km of water. 2.4 km of roads.	1.5 million	2006

Sources: Research Findings, 2015-16; Hopley B Housing Consortium Progress Report, 25 October 2013.

Most of the housing movements are located in the southern parts of Harare. These movements are settled on formerly commercial farms and are facing infrastructure challenges largely due to the unavailability of bulk infrastructure in such areas. For instance, as indicated in Table 21, Hopley B housing consortium has installed water and sanitation infrastructure though there is no bulk infrastructure to connect to. As such, the movement is building a 1,000 stands-capacity septic tank for waste disposal.⁶⁰ Farms on Local Development Plan No. 31 have no bulk infrastructure, and these include Hopley, Mokum, Amsterdam, Odar, Kaola Park, Kutsaga, Arlington, Draycott, Godavery, Hatfield estate, Stoneridge, Nyarungu, Derbyshore, Shortson, Eyeston, and Retreat.⁶¹

The major challenge to addressing infrastructure requirements is that development is taking place in isolated pockets all over the planning horizon.⁶² However, it should be noted that the City of Harare and the government have offloaded the burden of infrastructure servicing and

⁶⁰ Interview with Hopley B Consortium Chairperson, Harare, 29 October 2015.

⁶¹ Letter by acting COH Town Clerk to Permanent Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 July 2006.

⁶² Major infrastructure needed in the area includes a ground water reservoir (11.4ML) and 1.14ML elevated reservoir; booster water-pump station; 600mm-diameter water pipeline from Southerton to Hopley from the 1500mm-diameter line (7km); 20ml/day BNR plant at, 5ml/day sewage ponds at two sites; and an outfall sewer 450mm diameter to 900mm diameter.

development onto co-operatives. All major infrastructure projects in Harare, for instance, in Glaudina, Budiriro, Harare South and Crowborough, valued at USD 5 million each, are being funded and implemented by consortiums of housing co-operatives. The city has, however, made concessions in terms of which consortiums are exempted from paying developers' charges in respect of sewerage, since the responsibility of off-site infrastructure rests with the city.⁶³

There are cases of resistance to sharing bulk infrastructure developed by housing movements, as the case cited below indicates:

The Respondents (four individuals and Tynwald South Community) be and are hereby interdicted from interfering with, blocking or obstructing Fontainebleau housing consortium or its civil contractors civil team from laying a public sewerage line which pass through stands 1875 and 1997 Tynwald South Avenue.⁶⁴

Even in cases of such a judgment, struggles over sharing infrastructure intensified. In the above case, the movement reported that “to our surprise, the residents continue to breach this order by acts of vandalism and disrupting the work of our contractor [...]. The residents “provocatively backfilled our trench and the incident later degenerated into violence as our members retaliated”.⁶⁵ Such behaviour occurs when people play the role of local authorities, acting self-interestedly to the point of restricting access to shared city infrastructure.

5.1.5 Women in Social Movements

Women are disproportionately affected by housing challenges compared to men. This makes them an important group to focus on when understanding the contribution of social movements in low-income housing. As evidence in Harare suggests, women are not just beneficiaries of but active participants and change agents in housing movements. Within ZIHOPFE, a predominantly women's movement, women are leaders and active participants in infrastructure installation. They are advocates negotiating and lobbying for changes in planning and housing. They are learners working with modern geo-spatial techniques such as geographic information

⁶³ Acting Director DHCS letter to Rambai Makashinga Co-operative, 31 July 2006.

⁶⁴ High Court of Zimbabwe Case number HC8962/10.

⁶⁵ Fontainebleau Housing Consortium Progress Report, 10 November 2011.

systems (GIS). They are also community planners and activists carrying out processes such as enumeration, profiling and layout planning, which have informed town planning in Harare in a major way. In the Federation, women's roles were described as follows:

Most housing issues affect women and therefore our motto is *Zita remadzimai ngarikudzwe, rana baba zvishoma* [women should be respected more than men]. During building, women are bricklayers; in Harare, we have more than five women builders but nationally we have about 20 bricklayers. Everything from trenching to building, women are at the centre. They are also at the centre of savings, a key pillar of financing the movement. In the movement, a ratio of three women to one man is good for us so that male voices won't overshadow women's voices. For house plans, we sketched the plans, taking into consideration our aspirations before handing to professional planners.⁶⁶

In the co-operatives studied, women are leaders, ordinary members and movement financiers. Border Gezi, one of the largest co-operatives in Harare, is led by a woman. She has warded off attempts by men to take over leadership of the movement. Such struggles involve "the Member of Parliament (MP), who through violence, using party youths as proxies, wants to install a new executive as a reward to people who campaigned for him during elections".⁶⁷ Overall, the representation of women in co-operative governance is very low, about a maximum of two in ten elected positions. Women interviewed during FGDs indicated how they play a vital role in financing housing development. These are the observations of a woman in Budiriro:

Our role is to assist our husbands through our vending business. I often use money from vending to buy bricks. We have a revolving fund at the market composed of five women and we contribute USD 2 a day. I often put some money in a small container. My husband bought bricks but without door frames there would be no progress. For us to build a beautiful house like this, I bought five door frames as a surprise, each going for USD 25 from a month's savings, in addition to coal rubbles and sand. It requires seriousness.

⁶⁶ Interview with ZIHOPFE coordinator, Harare, 1 September 2015.

⁶⁷ Interview with Border Gezi Secretary, Harare, 13 November 2015.

If you want to build, you should limit on spending and have food for survival only. You are even budgeting money designated for food to building. From vending, in particular, retailing *frezeets* and *maheu* [energy drinks], I get a profit of USD 300 per month.⁶⁸

In other movements, for instance, in Budiriro and Hopely, women said that they are often sidelined in movement business as their husbands are considered to be more legitimate movement members. Two narrations below support this assertion:

When I bought the stand, they said we don't want a cross-border trader; they needed someone with a payslip. I bought the stand and surrendered to my husband because they said we want someone with a payslip. Even I am not allowed to attend meetings despite that we are legally married. Co-operative by-laws are really bad, as they are not inclusive.⁶⁹

Our husbands are the ones that attend co-operative meetings. They do not even update us on co-operative business. However, we are often told of monies we should pay, leaving [out] other important issues of interest to us, such as progress on projects.⁷⁰

5.2 Planning Institutions and Low-Income Housing

5.2.1 Parallel and Incremental Development

In reaction to the post-2000 housing delivery approach in which local authorities play a facilitatory role, the City of Harare adopted parallel development policy in July 2006.⁷¹ The City acceded to parallel development on housing by co-operatives on condition of: full

⁶⁸ Interview with member of Current consortium, Budiriro, 21 October 2015.

⁶⁹ FGD 7 Current Housing Consortium, Budiriro, 21 October 2015.

⁷⁰ FGD 1 Hopely Housing Consortium, 9 October 2015.

⁷¹ Parallel Development is a City of Harare initiative adopted after receiving representations from housing co-operatives and property developers. In particular, the City of Harare presents that "After receiving representations for issuance of partial certificate of compliance from the following (a) (i) Housing Co-operatives (ii) Hamamaoko, Warren Park (iii) Harare North, Hatcliffe (iv) Independence Housing, Mabvuku and (b) private developers (i) Sultana, Warren Park and (ii) Global Property Developers..." the City of Harare departments (Chamber Secretary, Health Services, DHCS, DUPs, Road Agency) convened for deliberation and agreed to adopt parallel development as a policy to remove some bottlenecks in the housing delivery process. The policy was also driven by the high costs of infrastructure servicing which co-operatives were shouldering instead of the City of Harare (City of Harare Director of Works' Report to the Environment Management Committee, 28 July 2006).

installation of water and sanitation; roads at subgrade level; the granting of a partial certificate of compliance allowing the building of a standard three-roomed core house; and no title transfer if roads are not completed within five years of completion of standard core house construction.⁷² The policy was an admission to a new approach to housing in which social movements are the main actors. As such, it can be argued that the City of Harare reduced some bottlenecks to promote the contribution of social movements to housing delivery.

The economic meltdown affected local authorities and compelled the city to devise strategies that can ameliorate people's housing challenges.⁷³ The government and City of Harare were not in a position to perform their functions and therefore realised the essence of grassroots participation in housing.⁷⁴ Thus, parallel development recognises that low-income housing is vulnerable to economic challenges.

However, the policy provides new opportunities and challenges to coherent urban development. The main advantages arising from the policy were the allowance given to co-operatives to start building houses before the completion of tarred roads. This is because the “policy apparently assumes an incremental reward approach where the first stage is to allow basic infrastructure provision, secondly allow core houses construction, thirdly suspend building of superstructures and encourage the co-operatives to attend to tarred road construction and finally allow them to proceed with the remaining superstructural development”.⁷⁵

In this regard, the local government ministry requested “your [City of Harare] assistance in approving the 656 individual residential plans for the beneficiaries [Current Housing Consortium] to allow works to progress on site in line with the Ministry's policy in support of parallel development”.⁷⁶ Having been satisfied with water, sewer and road servicing, the City issued a certificate of parallel development to Current Housing Consortium.⁷⁷ Beneficiaries presented the benefits of the policy as follows:

⁷² COH Director of Works Report to the Environmental Management Committee, 28 July 2006.

⁷³ Interview with COH Housing Manager, Harare, 27 August 2015.

⁷⁴ Interview with COH Chief Research and Development Planner, Harare, 8 September 2015.

⁷⁵ Director of DUPS Memorandum to Director of DHCS, 30 March 2010.

⁷⁶ Director of Housing MLGPWNH letter to Director of DUPS, 28 January 2008.

⁷⁷ Director DUPS letter to chairperson Current Housing Consortium, 6 March 2009.

Parallel development allowed us to move on-site after meeting city conditions. This helped in saving on rentals as we could stay in our constructed three-roomed house. At the same time, we also took care of our infrastructure and neighbourhood to ward off any invasions and vandalism.⁷⁸

Others, however, have expressed dismay at the policy, arguing that the three-room cap impedes development.⁷⁹ The city has not been consistent in implementing the policy.⁸⁰ For instance, in Current Housing Consortium, two co-operatives (Tamuka and Pioneer) were allowed to build three rooms, while others were restricted. On the other hand, the policy has been abused by beneficiaries as people move to the site and stop infrastructure servicing, with the preoccupation thus becoming house construction. In such instances, “people are manipulating the concept and to some extent fuelling informal settlements”.⁸¹

Five years after the infamous OM/RO that destroyed what the City of Harare and GoZ deemed illegal housing, the city, in partnership with slum-dwellers, embarked on an *in situ* slum-upgrading programme. The programme would change how the city views, interacts and values slum-dwellers (Muchadenyika, 2015a). Slum-upgrading uses incremental development in which infrastructure services (water and sanitation) are provided gradually over time (from communal to on-site). Houses are built incrementally, that is, from wooden shacks to planned brick and mortar structures. What led the City of Harare to adopt such a strategy?⁸² Economic challenges prompted the city to reconsider its policies, while exposure visits (to Gaborone and Windhoek) were a way of embracing change, and pilot-demonstration through the slum-upgrading project.⁸³ The City of Harare also provides technical support to movements, as discussed in the next section.

⁷⁸ FGD 6 Current Housing Consortium, Budiro, 20 October 2015.

⁷⁹ FGD 7 Current Housing Consortium, Budiro, 20 October 2015

⁸⁰ The City of Harare Parallel Development Policy, 28 July 2006.

⁸¹ Interview with MLGPWNH Chief Housing Officer, 18 September 2015.

⁸² Perhaps, Incremental Development was adopted as a strategy as it was specifically centred on the Harare Slum Upgrading Programme.

⁸³ Interviews with: COH Housing Manager, 27 August 2015; COH Principal Town Planner, 8 September 2015; NGO Director, 1 September, 2015.

5.2.2 Support to Housing Movements

Of the three urban centres studied, the City of Harare has a fairly established system of providing support to housing movements. Such support is oriented towards formation, education and training of co-operatives. The DHCS provides services like arbitration and dispute settlement, management and advisory services to co-operatives.⁸⁴ In particular, the department assists co-operatives through “pre-registration campaigns, education on co-operative formation and management, leadership selection, and registration recommendations”.⁸⁵ Table 22 shows support services provided to co-operatives by the city in 2010. In 2011, the department established, trained and registered 243 co-operatives with a total membership of 15,311 (COH DHCS, 2012).

Table 22: Services Offered to Co-Operatives by DHCS in 2010

Type	Number of Meetings
Pre-registration	60
Conflict resolution and settlements of disputes	48
General meetings for co-operatives attended by co-operative officers	215
Contact meetings with other departments, government and NGOs	17
Bi-monthly meetings with housing co-operatives	6

Source: DHCS Annual Report 2010: 18

In addition, the MOSMECD plays a vital role by providing training support to co-operatives in Harare. The ministry’s mandate on housing co-operatives includes monitoring and evaluation, training, registration and settlements of disputes. The ministry provides two types of training: pre-registration and post-registration. The former focuses on definitions (what is a co-operative?), general guidelines, by-laws, and appreciation of co-operatives, while the latter focuses on legal framework, practical issues, and good corporate governance.⁸⁶ However, co-operatives have also developed houses illegally, triggering demolitions and regularisation, as discussed in the next section.

⁸⁴ Proposed policy on housing co-operatives in Zimbabwe presented at the 4th Housing Directors Forum.

⁸⁵ Interview with COH Chief Planning, Research and Housing Officer, Harare, 31 August 2015.

⁸⁶ Interview with MOSMECD Co-operative Development Officer, Harare, 19 August 2015.

5.2.3 Handling ‘Illegal’ Housing Developments

The City of Harare and the government have primarily used demolitions and forced evictions as a response to informality (Potts, 2006a; Rogerson, 2016; Kamete, 2009; Fontein, 2009). One such anti-informality campaign was OM/RO of 2005, which destroyed the majority of houses built through the co-operative approach.⁸⁷ The city demolishes co-operative houses it considers illegal. For example, “Council expressed concern on the need for it to demolish all illegal structures or settlements. An example cited was Joshua Mqabuko Nkomo co-operative in Kambuzuma where the co-operative illegally occupied and constructed houses next to the water tanks, which was a time bomb”.⁸⁸ Subsequently, the city demolished 200 housing structures in Kambuzuma and High Glen.⁸⁹

Unlike in Chitungwiza and Epworth, where authorities have responded to illegal developments through regularisation and formalisation, the City of Harare prefers demolitions and evictions. Such preference, the city argues, is a way to avoid setting a precedent through regularisation. As such, council policy towards regularisation states that

[a]rising from consideration of report on allocation of unserviced land to housing co-operatives ... the Committee was of the view that Council shall not allocate land to housing co-operatives, organisations and individuals who would have occupied Council land without approval. The committee felt that this was to curb invasions by such groups in anticipation of regularisation by council. [The Committee] resolved to recommend that it be Council Policy that Council shall not allocate its land to any organisation, individual who would have invaded or occupied such land prior to approval by Council.⁹⁰

Co-operatives also illegally occupy council land and construct houses. For example, Tabudirira Housing Co-operative invaded the remainder of Gleneagles farm, Budiro. The City of Harare’s DUPS responded:

⁸⁷ Examples include Simon Muzenda co-operative, which has 529 members and had about 63 houses destroyed, and Tanganyika co-operative, where 435 members had their structures destroyed (from one room to 116 full houses).

⁸⁸ 1832th Ordinary Council Minutes, 6 March 2014.

⁸⁹ 200 houses demolished, *The Herald*, Harare, 11 December 2015.

⁹⁰ Finance and Development Committee Minutes, 19 February 2015.

Indeed my Town Planning officials conducted a routine site inspection in Budiro and discovered that you have illegally occupied council land and you are in the process of constructing illegal houses on this piece of land. The DHCS who have the sole prerogative of allocation stands or land have also confirmed that you have not been allocated the piece of land in question.⁹¹

In response to illegal land occupation and construction of houses, the city often invokes section 36 of RTCPA to demolish illegal structures and evict illegal occupiers. From a town-planning perspective, demolitions can mean four things:

1. failure of council's development control activities, which should stop house construction at primary stages;
2. where prohibition and enforcement orders have been served, this shows a citizenry not keen on obeying council planning procedures and regulations;
3. lack of knowledge on the part of the community on council planning and housing regulations and procedures; and
4. lack of interest in regularisation by the local authority.

In Zimbabwe's planning system, 'development control' means the mandate given to planning authorities to permit, monitor and regulate development on land use. The City of Harare admit to development control challenges, for instance, by stating that

[there are] illegal structures mushrooming in stands which belong to co-operatives [which are a] wastage of resources instead of using materials for the actual structure or core house. [The] economic hardship of 2008 made policing of co-operatives difficult. Council has been overtaken by many illegal developments, therefore [there is an] urgent need to equip development control officers so as to enforce council by-laws and control all illegal developments. Housing co-operative officers must be equipped to deal with [the] housing co-operative situation of illegal developments at High Glen housing co-operative [and the] same as at Current Housing consortium. Both [were] given parallel development certificates and beneficiaries have moved on site.⁹²

⁹¹ Director DUPS letter to Chairman Tabudirira Housing Co-operative, 26 April 2010.

⁹² Minutes of the stakeholders' meeting held at Budiro District Office, 22 July 2009.

In other instances, central government has intervened, supporting regularisation in favour of co-operatives aligned to Zanu-PF. For instance, the largest regularisation programme undertaken by the government was through the Urban Development Corporation (UDCORP) in Caledonia. Caledonia was invaded by people whose houses were destroyed during OM/RO in 2005. Through Statutory Instrument 119 of 2012, Caledonia Farm was incorporated into the Harare municipal boundary, though the city could not assume land allocation and planning functions due to politics associated with the farm. It should be noted that Caledonia provides a key constituency to the ruling party.

Caledonia has 100 co-operatives with about 23,000 members (MLGPWNH, 2015). UDCORP regularised 27,000 houses with about 90% of the structures being completed houses.⁹³ The re-planning process managed to save at least 98% of existing housing structures.⁹⁴ For a comparative perspective, the status of housing in Caledonia before regularisation is presented in Table 23. Discounting political interests, such regularisation underlines the new governmental thrust towards informal settlements. It also indicates to the power of government in determining planning outcomes.

Table 23: Planning and Housing Status in Caledonia before Regularisation

Description	Residential	Institutional	Commercial & Service Industry	Open Spaces	Buffer/Wetland	Total
Unapproved schemes	15,450	87	240	14	27	15,819
Approved schemes	6,960	42	14	16	8	7040
Total	22,410	129	254	30	35	22,859

Source: MLGPWNH, 2015.

5.2.4 Policy-Practice Interface

Based on planning and housing practice, the city made policy changes. For example, in order to guide slum-upgrading, the City of Harare adopted the Harare Slum-upgrading Strategy (HSUS), which is centred on the three pillars presented in Table 24.

Table 24: Aspects and Principles of Harare Slum-upgrading Strategy

Aspect	Principles
Planning	Establishing a slum-upgrading unit to focus on slum-upgrading. Creation of pooled funds for social housing managed by Council, civil society and government.

⁹³ Interview with UDCORP Planning Officer, Harare, 15 December 2015.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

	Sponsor research on new construction and methods.
	Revising Harare Combination Master Plan and local development plans.
	Acceleration of social housing densification policy.
	Provision of adequate land for social housing.
	Funding on- and off-site infrastructure development.
	Implementing some provisions of Ministerial Circular on Housing Standards.
Finance	Creation of an annual slum-upgrading revolving fund managed by Council and the community.
	Adopting a policy for corporate social responsibility in the form of social housing for all companies doing business with Council.
Infrastructure	Adopting a policy on procurement of infrastructural construction materials and equipment with CBOs and co-operatives accessing free gravel and hiring council equipment at concessionary rates.
	Developing community-based ownership of infrastructure which takes into account underprivileged areas.
	Council setting up a pool fund for the development of infrastructure for all CBOs, including co-operatives.

Source: Harare Slum-upgrading Strategy⁹⁵

I focus on two issues regarding the HSUS which have a direct impact on low-income housing. These are a slum-upgrading unit and slum-upgrading revolving fund. In Harare, a project-based approach to slum-upgrading poses implementation, coordination and sustainability challenges. A slum-upgrading unit can provide a sustainable and effective framework for institutionalising slum-upgrading policy and practice (Muchadenyika, 2015a). It can also be an agent for the replication and upscaling of slum-upgrading.

One of the fundamental challenges facing the urban poor is access to low-cost housing finance (Köhn & von Pischke, 2011). In line with the HSUS, the City, with its partners ZIHOPFE and Dialogue on Shelter, constituted a pro-poor housing finance facility called Harare Slum-upgrading Finance Facility (HSUFF) and made a contribution of USD 120,000.⁹⁶ The terms and conditions of HSUFF loans are presented in Table 25. Such loans target slum-dwellers and poor communities.⁹⁷ This contribution to low-income housing is presented in section 5.3.3.

⁹⁵ Adopted on the 1822nd Ordinary Council Meeting, 8 November 2012.

⁹⁶ Finance and Development Committee Minutes, 17 March 2014.

⁹⁷ The loan application fee is charged at USD 1 per member paid at application.

Table 25: HSUFF Terms and Conditions

Aspect	Description
Loan range	USD200-700 (home improvement, water and sanitation, land purchase). USD100-500 (income generation).
Repayment Period (Loan Term)	12 months (home improvement, Water and sanitation, land purchase). 6 months (income generation).
Savings / Own Contribution	In cash or materials (for all four purposes).
Interests rate	3% per month (for all loans).
Security	Group guarantee plus savings equivalent to each member's instalment at any given time; Pledge of valuable assets for bigger loans as agreed by loan group.
Eligibility Criteria	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Loans are given to solidarity loan groups of between 5 and 10 members. 2. Loan groups independently choose their members according to affordability and loan repayment capacity. 3. Group members are jointly and severally liable to the group loan. 4. Group members must be located within the HSUFF area. 5. Loan groups that are part of ZIHOPFE are expected to continue upholding the principles and rituals of the Federation. 6. For all the loan sizes, each borrower should have savings in cash or in kind. 7. Borrowers should be at least 21 years old with a regular income.

Source: HSUFF Handbook.

Infrastructure servicing is the most expensive stage in co-operative housing. For example, Current and Hopley consortiums spend USD 1.7 million and USD 2.922 million, respectively, for infrastructure. However, in order to facilitate collective financing and installation of bulk infrastructure, the City of Harare advanced what are called housing consortiums. Since consortiums are not a statutory entity like co-operatives, the city developed a policy to guide them. The guidelines spell out attributes for consideration by co-operators when electing people to key management committee positions within housing consortiums.⁹⁸ Consortiums are the main vehicle for infrastructure development in co-operative housing.

One of the challenges facing delivery of low-income housing has been complex and bureaucratic planning regulations and procedures (GoZ, 2009; 2012). In Zimbabwe, planning regulations that have a direct effect on social movements relate to building and construction standards and the plan preparation and approval process. The ZIHOPFE experience (Table 26) shows that it takes a minimum of two years for layout plans to be approved by a local authority. This period is too long, considering that processes such as approval of house plans and mobilisation of building materials also take time.

⁹⁸ DHCS Guidelines for Selection of Key Management Committee positions within a Housing Consortium.

Table 26: Layout Approval Time-Frames

Local authority	Year land allocated to ZIHOPFE	Year layout submitted for Council approval	Year layout approved by Council
Mutare	2000	2002	2004
Victoria Falls	1999	2001	2003
Harare (Dzivarasekwa)	2006	2007	2010
Chinhoyi	2006	2007	2009
Nyanga	2010	2010	2012

Source: City of Harare, Review of Planning Regulations and Plan Approval Processes, 2012.

However, the major weakness of the plan regulations and approval processes in Harare is the conclusion that: “administrative improvements are needed more than actual review of regulations”.⁹⁹ This, I argue, is for two reasons. First, administrative inefficiencies in local authorities started in the late 1990s and there has been no sign of improvement. This provides a credible reason to argue for reviewing actual regulations considering the prevailing housing delivery approach in which social movements are the main actors. Secondly, changes take time and can be done incrementally, for instance, though implementing pilot projects using reviewed planning regulations (Muchadenyika, 2015a). The ideal versus the actual housing delivery process is presented in Table 27, and indicates the need to review planning procedures. On average, the housing delivery process should take about 3years though in reality it’s taking more than 10years.¹⁰⁰




Table 27: Ideal versus Actual Housing Delivery Process

Stage	Ideal Time (months)	Actual Time (months)
Local Plan Preparation	9-12	12
Subdivision layout	4	24
Land Survey	3	3
Roads, Water, Sewer Designs	1	1
Installation of services	3	60
Mobilization of Resources, Inspections, and Construction	18	60
Total	39.5	160

Source: Toriro, 2007; Research Findings, 2015-16.

The adoption of a parallel development policy by the City of Harare took place after negotiations and remonstrations from housing movements.¹⁰¹ The above cases show how practice by social movements can lead to policy changes. The main strategies used by social

⁹⁹ COH Review of Planning Regulations and Plan Approval Processes, July 2012.

¹⁰⁰ Whilst, the longer the housing delivery process, the more affordable it becomes, the lengthy period is compromising the output (in particular the actual houses and infrastructure). However, this process can be shortened if local authorities perform their function of infrastructure provision.

¹⁰¹ Director of Works Report to the Environmental Management Committee, 28 July 2006.

movements to influence policy are negotiations and demonstrating alternative practices. At the same time, planning authorities also reflected on their strategies' relevance and flexibility in the obtaining environment. The post-2000 housing delivery approach is, however, marred by contestation, as discussed in the next section.

5.3 Contestations and Alliances

5.3.1 Land Access and Allocation

In the post-2000 era, two opposing land allocation systems emerged – one by the City of Harare and the other by the local government ministry. This led to serious contestation over planning, housing and governance in Harare.¹⁰² The City of Harare allocates council land to housing co-operatives registered with it, whereas the local government ministry allocates land to co-operatives aligned to Zanu-PF. Co-operatives allocated state land often criticise the City of Harare's by-laws, procedures and regulations, as testified to below:

We have found it difficult to work with co-operatives on state land. If you talk of good corporate governance they often say we were not allocated land by the city. They were forced by the government to come on the city roster, for instance, in Caledonia – the city was given all the chaos to deal with by government. These co-operatives also do not attend bi-monthly meetings. Rather, they are run by officials in the MOSMECD and MLGPWNH, presenting planning and regulation challenges to the city.¹⁰³

The City of Harare allocates land to co-operatives using criteria such as date of registration, attendance at bi-monthly meetings, organisation and management, financial feasibility, updated membership lists, and audited financial statements.¹⁰⁴ At the same time, the local government ministry allocated land to co-operatives (in Table 28) apparently on the basis of Zanu-PF loyalty.

Much of the chaos in the co-operative movement has taken place on peri-urban farms where the issue of acquisition has been widely contested. Contestations are among co-operatives, government and the private sector, as indicated in Table 28, and have curtailed development in

¹⁰² Interview with former Registrar of Co-operatives, Harare, 25 August 2015.

¹⁰³ Interview with COH Official, Harare, 31 August 2015.

¹⁰⁴ COH CSHD Housing Division Procedure Manual, 13.

co-operative housing. Politics plays a major role in land allocation. For instance, a Harare South MP interfered in how the local government ministry should allocate land by stating: “Please allocate this list (121) at Chizororo farm which was approved by physical planning department – they are members of Harare South. *Please help me so we don’t lose our people from [our] constituency*” (emphasis added).¹⁰⁵ Zanu-PF branches have also been allocated land. For example, in Hopley, seven branches were allocated 2,373 stands in 2001.¹⁰⁶ This may explain why Harare South is the only constituency the Zanu-PF has won in successive elections between 2000 and 2013 in Harare. In this regard, co-operatives are “a tool in which Zanu-PF has re-asserted its influence and hegemony” in Harare (Chirisa, Bandaiko & Mutsindikwa, 2015).

Some co-operatives leave housing lists to the Metropolitan Governor’s office as a way of speeding up land allocation. These include Simbanevhu (170 members), Cain Nkala (144 members). However, by law Governors have no role in land allocation. In Harare, Governors are key actors in recommending and allocating land to the Zanu-PF-affiliated co-operatives. Governors and District Administrators (DAs) are Zanu-PF ‘ears and eyes’ at provincial and local level (Muchadenyika, 2015b: 1226). A government investigative report raised concerns about the role of DAs in Harare by observing that

[t]he two DAs (Mabvuku-Tafara and Goromonzi) took it upon themselves to allocate land to co-operatives, in violation of the DA’s mandate ... The findings indicate abuse of office and mismanagement of government affairs by senior government officials [DAs]. The two DAs wrongfully allocated land to co-operatives. [The DA for Mabvuku-Tafara] not only wrote several letters to Plan Africa instructing them to subdivide land, he also instructed them to re-subdivide land on planned sites, for example, in phases 1 and 2, a function outside his mandate, and out of sync with sound town planning. (MLGPWNH, 2015: 27-28).

In addition, the local government ministry officials have also been under immense pressure to facilitate the allocation of land to Zanu-PF groups. An official in the ministry pleads:

¹⁰⁵ Memo of 2 July 2005 from deputy minister of Transport and Communication (Nyanhongo) addressed to Comrade Simango, MLGPWNH.

¹⁰⁶ Director DHCS letter to Town Clerk, 6 February 2002.

I am being accused of putting spanners [in the works] in assisting beneficiaries in Nyanhongo constituency affected by Murambatsvina. Comrade Nyanhongo [then MP Harare South] requested through Honourable Minister [of local government] for 2,000 stands to be allocated at Hopley ... I have left with Mr Chiyangwa [then deputy director City of Harare Department of Housing] the list of beneficiaries from Mr Nyanhongo *who is accusing us of destroying his constituency* [emphasis added].¹⁰⁷



¹⁰⁷ Director of Housing MLGPWNH handwritten letter to the Director of DHCS, 24 August 2005.

Table 28: Contestations and Development Status on State Land

Farm name	Location	Housing Co-operatives	Development status and Nature of contestation
Sub E of Arlington	Near Harare International Airport	Nyikavanhu and others	Settlers have settled on unapproved stands. Land is zoned for industrial and not residential purposes. All housing structures demolished in December 2015 and about 3,000 people resettled on Stoneridge farm.
Caledonia	Near Mabvuku- Tafara	More than 100 co-operatives and housing trusts	Phases 1-3 have approved layout plans. Phases 40-20 layouts approved and 27,000 houses regularised by UDCORP.
Eyercourt	Harare South	Pungwe Chimurenga	Approved layout plan. There is contest with developer, Amalish, which is causing double allocations.
Retreat	Along Seke Road	Apex Board and co-operatives	Wrangle between co-operatives and Supersands. Co-operatives occupying commonage stands allocated to civil servants by MLGPWNH.
Eyerstone	Along Chitungwiza Road	Mvurachena and others	Occupation of wetlands and land within CAAZ restrictions. Illegal pegging of stands. No approved layout plan.
Stoneridge	Harare South	Moven Mahachi, Hondo Yeminda, Simon Muzenda and others	Invasion of 2,400 stands planned by MLGPWNH for relocation of Arlington settlers. Invasion of institutional stands including wetlands and unplanned areas.
Stoneridge Gillingham Estate Stand 48	Harare South Dzivarasekwa Extension Along Highglen, Marimba	Stoneridge Residents Association Nehanda Joshua Mqabuko Nkomo, Dzapasi, Wadzanai and Mydek	No servicing on site. Stands sold to beneficiaries by Amalish. Leadership wrangles and invasion of commonage stands. Have built and allocated about 1,500 houses. Multiple allocations, intra-co-operative squabbles and encroachment on unplanned areas. Farm not yet acquired and wrangle with Rautenbach, the landowner. Demolitions by the City of Harare in December 2015 halted by the local government minister after promising to compensate the landowner with 180 hectares of state land elsewhere.
Arcon	Near Crowhill	Sally Mugabe and others	Double allocations, occupation of government commonage stands and disregard of government leases. Leadership wrangles in co-operatives.
Marydown	Near Hatcliffe Extension	Mama Mafuyana	Commonage stands not submitted in full and not serviced, including commercial and institutional stands.
Hatcliffe North	Along Domboshava Road near Hatcliffe Extension	Earnest Kadungure, Divine Homes Developers, Alpha Land Developers (Gapare), Pilgrims Rest Properties (Chikwinya), Zvandasara and others	Multiple and double allocations, encroachment on wet lands and unplanned areas. Co-operatives allocating Government commonage stands.
Saturday Retreat	Harare South	Madzibaba Border Gezi	Leadership wrangles and invasion of commonage stands by factions. Serviced by gravel roads, wells and septic tanks.

Source: Research Findings, 2015-16.

The majority of housing movements invaded private land within Harare as part of the FTLRP. Perhaps, sensing the sheer determination and militancy of such movements, the Government of Zimbabwe later issued letters of offer ostensibly officially allocating land. However, most processes of land acquisition by the government came after movements had settled in farms. Thus, the government legitimised the land invasions using section 8(1) of the Land Acquisition Act [*Chapter 20:10*], as reflected in Table 29. Such invasions indicate the radical nature of housing movements in Harare and how the government acceded to such movements.

Table 29: Land Invasions, Housing Movements and Acquisition

Farm	Year of occupation	General Notice (GN) & Year of gazetting	Size (hectares)	Deed of Transfer	Original Owners
Saturday Retreat	2005	GN 161 of 2005	1189,5869	4035/1986	Crest Breeders International (Pvt) Ltd
Odar	2006	GN 161 of 2005	605,8092	5816/85	Zimbabwe Tobacco Association
Gillingham Estate A	2001	GN 475 of 2011	424,4014	5398/98	Quality Flowers (Private) Limited
Caledonia	2005	GN 161 of 2005	3060 morgen	1012/56	Valerie Pape Laing
Retreat	2000	GN 593 of 2011	1234,578	1723/76	Retreat Farm (Private) Limited
Eyerston of Arlington Estate	2001	GN 593 of 2011	1086,9361	1011/86	George Kileff and Sons (Private) Limited
Hatfield Estate	2001	GN 593 of 2011	140,380 5	4039/92	Bellapaise Estate (Private) Limited
Nyarungu Estate	2002	2010	193,4056	4149/80	Jetmaster Properties (Private) Limited
Subdivision A of Stoneridge	2001	2010	586,8960	5021/07	Pinnacle Holdings (Private) Limited

Sources: Various Government Gazettes; Research Findings, 2015-16.

There are three layers of contestation over land access and allocation in Harare. The first, between the City of Harare and the government, is centred on who should be allocated land in urban areas. The City of Harare has its preferred allocation criteria, while central government has a different set of conditions. This has led to some areas left without a planning authority, as indicated by the following statement:

The City of Harare must assume its administrative mandate whilst the urban state land office must assume its land management role in Caledonia. The co-

operative leaders have taken full advantage of the absence of an authority managing the settlement and moved in to create illegal local governments. Although Caledonia is incorporated into Harare Municipal boundaries, the city has not taken full control of the area leaving local leaders to fill the vacuum, much to the disadvantage of local residents (MLGPWNH, 2015: 29).

In order to curtail the contestation, the government has insisted that the City of Harare assert authority and control. In Caledonia, the government argued that it has no resources to undertake the project and emphasised that Caledonia was handed over to the City of Harare for development.¹⁰⁸ The government takes advantage of land allocation, which gives the ruling party political capital and allegiance. When it comes to planning and servicing, the government often professes incapacity and brings in the City of Harare to address development challenges. However, it would seem the City has been reluctant to take over, presumably because central government wants to dump its chaotic programmes (Muchadenyika, 2015a).

The second layer of contestation is between the government and Zanu-PF-aligned co-operatives. These struggles centre on compensation of previous farm owners, how planning and development should take place and who the legitimate owner of land is in occupied areas. The Constitution of Zimbabwe, in particular section 72, provides for compensation of acquired urban land. Section 16 and 20 of the Land Acquisition Act provides for full compensation of urban land to the previous landowner by the acquiring authority. However, for Odar farm, the Government of Zimbabwe argues that co-operators should compensate the original land owners, stating:

It is hereby recorded that the Government is under legal obligation to compensate the former landowner, namely Tobacco Association of Zimbabwe for the land and improvements on the said land and that such costs shall be borne by the developer or beneficiaries allocated the stands whichever is applicable. Once the level of compensation payable by the

¹⁰⁸ Director of Housing MNHSA letter to COH Town Clerk, 16 June 2009.

government has been accessed, the consortium shall pay an equivalent amount to the Ministry of Local Government for onwards transmission to Zimbabwe Tobacco Association (ZTA). In other words, compensation to ZTA shall be paid by the consortium or its beneficiaries.¹⁰⁹

In 2014, the government reversed the acquisition of Odar and vested ownership in Sensene Investments, stating that the “company will receive compensation directly from the occupants and pass ownership accordingly”.¹¹⁰ It is not clear how the title for Odar farm changed from ZTA to Sensene Investments, which is owned by a former Zanu-PF parliamentarian. Such government indecisiveness raises questions about transparency and the role of politicians in land deals. For instance, movements contended that

[w]e don't know how Sensene came in. High-level corruption is the main problem in housing co-operatives and the rich are exploiting the poor. We have been to higher offices and it would appear the local government ministry – high-ranking officials to the office of permanent secretary – are reversing what they themselves have gazetted. In our case, the farm was gazetted in 2010, confirmed by the administrative court, though contested. The Supreme Court ruling of 2013 ended the saga. The issue started with local government ministry's permanent secretary delisting the farm and declaring the land is no longer state land. The ministry said the land now belongs to Phillip Chiyangwa under Sensene. Many co-operatives are affected by this, for instance those in Ushewekunze and Stoneridge, where high-ranking government officials are colluding with the rich to fleece the poor. They use threats for no reasons. Chiyangwa came and demanded that

¹⁰⁹ Section 2(a) and (b) of MOA entered into by and between the Government of Zimbabwe (represented by MLGPWNH) and Odar Housing Consortium, 13 January 2006.

¹¹⁰ Acting Secretary for MLGPWNH to Chairman Pinnacle Property Holdings, 19 December 2014.

people pay him compensation, which is not approved by a legitimate process.¹¹¹

In Saturday Retreat Farm, the government stated that “the Consortium will meet the cost of compensating the original owner to finalise the acquisition process, so that the beneficiaries can eventually obtain title to the stands”.¹¹² The Deed of Settlement in the Administrative Court of Zimbabwe puts the compensation value at USD 26.240 million at the rate of USD 4 per square metre.¹¹³ Subsequently, the government offered 407 hectares of land and compelled the occupants to pay compensation directly to the landowner.¹¹⁴

However, housing movements at the farm are contesting the decision that they pay the former landowner, Crest Breeders, directly. As a liberation war veteran and co-operative leader explains:

Who is supposed to compensate? Our courts are being used by people and ministers who are corrupt. Ministry of lands is not involved in the selling of land in Saturday Retreat. It is Ministry of Local Government which is selling the country. I am the chairperson for Mashingishingi Co-operative and I refused to budge to the Crest Breeders issue. They send an eviction notice to me saying I should remove all my things within seven days. However, I was not there at the time of serving the eviction notice. They threw my belongings to the road, targeting me only because they saw a threat. Government was supposed to intervene [though it did not]. We, however, do not know where Crest got its power from. The court threw out the case and they took one week hiding my papers so that I cannot appeal. The judgement was handwritten on a piece of paper without typing after interference of other people. The ministry involved has interests. My house has been destroyed

¹¹¹ Interview with Southlea Park Homeowners Association member, Harare, 7 January 2016.

¹¹² Secretary MLGPWNH letter to Ushewekunze and selected co-operatives in Southern Area, 31 May 2005.

¹¹³ Deed of Settlement in the Administrative Court of Zimbabwe Case No. LA 6/14.

¹¹⁴ MOA between The Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe (represented by MLGPWNH) and Crest Breeders International (Private) Limited, 18 December 2014.

without a court order. The MP said everyone who does not want to pay to Crest Breeders will be evicted. Most of my belongings were stolen while I was on the road. I am staying on a house without a roof, and I put plastic papers for me to stay with my 17 wives and 45 children.¹¹⁵

The third layer of contestation is between the City of Harare and co-operatives, where the latter challenges the process of land allocation by the MDC-led council. Below, I cite accounts from Zanu-PF-linked co-operatives that demonstrate the contested nature of land allocation:

The Department of Housing took long to respond positively by way of providing the offer letter, so we decided to occupy the said land. We felt the land would be taken from us by co-operatives from the opposition MDC, since residential stands of all the land bank in Budiriro was [*sic*] being offered to co-operatives from the MDC-dominated Council. [Our co-operatives are] desperately and urgently in need of the offer letter because temporal [*sic*] housing structures were established in January 2013 to block MDC co-operatives who had more advantages [*sic*] of getting their papers fast-tracked by the MDC-dominated councillors.¹¹⁶

The degree of unfairness in the allocation of land in Budiriro is an open secret. Goshen Housing Consortium has 21 co-operatives, 18 co-operatives are MDC-linked co-operatives and three are from the ruling party. Ngungunyana has 10 MDC-linked co-operatives and the ruling party has one. Save Housing co-operative has all the papers and they were given without problem. Is it fair to have all the land for stands in Budiriro being occupied by MDC-linked co-operatives? All the sites we identified were allocated to MDC-linked co-operatives and Muzariri housing co-operative got no offer

¹¹⁵ Interview with liberation war veteran and Chairperson, Mashingshingi co-operative, Harare, 2 November 2015. See also “17 Wives, 45 Children living in the open” *The Sunday Mail*, Harare, 8 November 2015.

¹¹⁶ Letters by Bhora Magedhi and Mushwakura co-operatives to COH Town Clerk, 18 November 2013.

letter. This was pure favouritism to MDC campaign strategies for harmonised elections of 2013.¹¹⁷

Indeed, it is true that councillors play a key role in land allocation to movements. During the 2008-13 council, about nine councillors recommended 28 co-operatives to be allocated land.¹¹⁸ However, all the recommendation letters bore the statement that “I have no obligation to the proposal [of land allocation] provided all council procedures and regulations are followed”. It can be argued that councillors are keen for co-operatives to follow council procedures and by-laws. There was a council resolution that empowered co-operatives to consult the councillor first and seek a recommendation before making an application for land to the city.¹¹⁹ Such a resolution was problematic, and the council conceded that “issues of land identification and written recommendations from councillors had to stop forthwith as these interfered with allocation criteria”.¹²⁰

5.3.2 Leadership and Governance of Social Movements

Broadly speaking, the leadership and governance of social movements is terrain which is widely contested by members, leaders, the City of Harare and the government. Such contestation revolves around strategy, interference, and corporate governance, in particular, transparency and accountability, and terms of office. Leadership changes are contested. Where leadership has changed, there have been struggles between previous and new leadership.¹²¹ In brokering consensus, City officials have been criticised for siding with certain factions.¹²²

Co-operatives have a hierarchical structure composed of a management and supervisory committee ostensibly for checks and balances. However, in all 104 co-operatives studied there

¹¹⁷ Letter by Chairman Muzariri Housing Co-operative to COH Town Clerk, 14 November 2013.

¹¹⁸ For instance, Councillor Charumbira wrote on 16 May 2012 that “following my discussion with co-operative [Rambai Makashinga] leadership, could you please bring the item to the EHHCSLC for regularisation”. Subsequently, the Town Clerk’s Report to the EHHCSLC recommended the sale of 74 unserviced stands to Rambai Makashinga Co-operative in Budiro on 21 May 2012.

¹¹⁹ Town Clerk’s Report to the EHHCSLC, 14 January 2014; EHHCSLS Committee Minutes, 10 March 2014.

¹²⁰ EHHCSLC Minutes, 10 March 2014.

¹²¹ Petition signed by Pungwe Chimurenga Co-operative to the Registrar of Co-operatives, 17 April 2011.

¹²² Common Vision Housing Consortium Committee Chairperson Letter to Director DHCS, 12 March 2012.

is little evidence to suggest that supervisory committees perform supervisory functions over management committees. One such case is the supervisory committee of Common Vision consortium, which found financial irregularities by the management committee.¹²³ Most co-operative leaders have to some extent ‘captured’ movements, since it is even difficult to change leadership. In addition, there is a tendency in which chairpersons of co-operatives are not only powerful but wealthier than other co-operators. In Hopley, it was established that co-operative leaders were renting their personal vehicles to co-operatives – something that poses the risk of conflict of interest.

There are, however, distinctive qualities associated with successful co-operatives. These include a traceable record of leadership experience, apolitical processes, holding of regular meetings and AGMs, annual audits and compliance with the City of Harare’s regulations and procedures. These features were evident in Hopley B and Current Housing Consortiums – movements which have largely been successful. Successful co-operatives have resisted politics, while those that are considered unsuccessful have mixed co-operative business with politics.¹²⁴ Co-operatives allocated state land are poorly governed, as evidenced by the following:

1. About 99% of co-operatives on state land are not holding AGMs, and as a result elections are not held, meaning that most committees have been in existence since 2004.
2. There is allocation of excess land to co-operatives by the urban state land office, resulting in abuse of rights of co-operative management as they sell the excess stands.
3. There is no political and administrative dichotomy within the co-operatives, which is evidenced by intimidation of co-operators through threats of repossession of stands.
4. There is insecurity and uncertainty by the members allocated land by the Urban State Land as to the perpetuity of their co-operatives versus government policy.¹²⁵

Contestations about state land were presented as being historical, as narrated below:

¹²³ Minutes of Common Vision Housing Consortium, 25 February 2012.

¹²⁴ Interview with COH Chief Planning, Research and Housing Officer, Harare, 31 August 2015.

¹²⁵ Report on Housing in Harare Metropolitan Province, 3 June 2013.

People on state land did not form co-operatives out of choice but were forced to form co-operatives in order to stay on the land. However, it is in such areas where there are numerous problems as people spearheading land-grabbing are war veterans. When they formed housing co-operatives, war veterans were on the management as well. They would often argue that co-operative by-laws and policies came after they have settled on the land. Other co-operatives are managed as para-military areas with boom gates, for instance Hatcliffe.¹²⁶

Ushehwekunze's leadership challenges culminated in the MOSMECD appointing an administrator in 2006 to run co-operative affairs. Co-operative members responded by using Zanu-PF allegiance as a façade for bad governance through stating that:

Our housing co-operatives are different from other co-operatives and they were initiated by Harare Province War Veterans right from the beginning *for Political Agenda to strengthen our Zanu-PF Party Base*. How the ministry managed to appoint an administrator who is in the apex [body] stands to be political annihilation. The Honourable Minister, corruption is within some of the ranks and files in your Ministry's departments [emphasis added].¹²⁷

ZIHOPFE uses a flat leadership structure where members have powers to determine the strategies and direction of the movement. Nonetheless, there are indications of 'founder member syndrome'. Naturally, such a syndrome tends to alienate other movement members. In addition, the movement has not managed to develop a new generation of leaders. As such, it has relied on leadership that has been in existence for the past 15 years. Thus, the Federation is "a movement led by people who own land and houses leading the landless".¹²⁸ Such leaders went from being homeless to homeowners, yet represent the interests of the homeless. ZIHOPFE members observed that "such leadership no longer has the vibrancy and tenacity it used to have when [they themselves were] homeless".¹²⁹

¹²⁶ Interview with MoSMECD official, Harare, 20 August 2015.

¹²⁷ Letter by Ushehwekunze Co-operative Society to MYGEC, 4 November 2006.

¹²⁸ Interview with NGO Director, Harare, 1 September 2015.

¹²⁹ FGD 4 and 5, Dzivarasekwa Extension, Harare, 16 October 2015.

5.3.3 Mobilisation and Management of Financial Resources

Resource mobilisation theorists argue that financial resources are vital to the functioning of a movement (Flynn, 2011c; McCathy & Zald, 1977). Social movements have been able to contribute significantly to housing delivery due to comparative financial advantages. These movements mobilise financial resources from members on a monthly basis. Contributions per month range from USD 20 to USD 75, as shown in Table 30.

Table 30: Resource Mobilisation by Co-operatives

Movement	Members	Monthly subscription	Total contribution	Average amount per member
Current	657	USD 20	USD 1.7 million	2.587,52
Hopley B	843	USD 75	USD 2.922 million	3.466,20

Source: Research Findings, 2015-16.¹³⁰

In contrast, ZIHOPFE functions through daily savings and the Gungano Urban Poor Fund (UPF), as shown in Table 31. Daily savings serve to create readily accessible financial resources, build social cohesion and amplify the voice of the urban poor, share member experiences and demonstrate people's commitment to address their plight (Masimba-Nyama, 2012). The UPF provides loans for land purchase, housing construction, income generation and infrastructure projects (Chitekwe-Biti, 2009; Masimba-Nyama, 2012). Resources from daily and UPF savings have financed major activities such as contributions to HSUFF, office construction, land purchases and income-generation projects.¹³¹

Table 31: ZIHOPFE Daily and Gungano Savings (2010-2015)

Year	Total Registered Membership	Total Active Membership	Cumulative Gungano Savings (USD)	Total Daily Savings (USD)	Number Of Savings Groups
2009-2010	14,970	2,644	44.384	117.383	120
2011	48,210	2,644	142.753	178.943	586
2012	52,326	14,857	44.882	198.443	642
2013	53,287	19,008	324.079	598.048	658
2014	53,553	19,008	39.366	66.963	682
2015	8,307	8,307	60.110	76.925	336

Source: Dialogue on Shelter, 2016.

¹³⁰ Data for the other movements was not readily available.

¹³¹ Dialogue on Shelter Statistics. Actual expenditure includes HSUFF (USD 30,000), office construction (USD 30,000), land purchases (USD 44,527) and income generation projects (USD 45,927).

Housing finance is a common challenge in low-income housing (Tibaijuka, 2009). However, the City of Harare, in alliance with ZIHOPFE and Dialogue on Shelter, initiated a slum-upgrading finance facility. The “financial facility is a revolving fund for slum-upgrading and pro-poor housing development where donor agencies would contribute financially to the fund”.¹³² The initial contributions were USD 120,000 (City of Harare), USD 30,000 (ZIHOPFE) and USD 50,000 (Dialogue on Shelter). Access to the fund by the urban poor is presented in Table 32.

Table 32: HSUFF and Housing Loan Financing (as of March 2016)

Indicator	Home Improvement	Income Generation	Totals
Total amount disbursed	USD 176,900	USD 126,000	USD 305,900
Total loans issued	91	102	193
Total outstanding amount in loans	-	-	USD 114,769
Number of outstanding loans	-	-	99
Repayment rate	92%	96%	94% (Average)
Total number of loan groups	-	-	124

Source: Dialogue on Shelter, 2016.

Facts and rumours about corruption and incompetence are common in housing movements (Kamete, 2001c). For instance, the City of Harare Audit team found out that “all the 42 co-operatives in Hopley have no problems except Tariro housing co-operative which has 2 groups of management committees, one led by Mr. Tsopo which is recognised by the MOSMECD and the other led by Mr. Madembo. The latter is under investigation after being reported to ZRP for fraud involving USD 470,000.”¹³³ Furthermore, the Audit reports that “Mr Madembo illegally entered into agreement with Africa Homes Development Trust to sell 150 residential stands at USD 7,500 per stand giving a potential of USD 1.125 million”.¹³⁴ In Caledonia, the financial prejudice suffered by residents amounts to USD 57.5 million, while the potential financial prejudice can rise to USD 97 million (MLGPWNH, 2015). In Hopley, the movement

¹³² Finance and Development Committee Minutes, 17 March 2014.

¹³³ Findings of Audit report by Audit Manager, 6 July 2015; Audit Committee Minutes, 14 July 2015.

¹³⁴ Audit Committee Minutes, 14 July 2015.

split due to allegations of “unaudited financial accounts, operating without a bank account, flouting of tender procedures and non-transparency in the procurement of materials”.¹³⁵

Audits have not been judiciously done, though these are an indicator of how well co-operative resources are being managed. For example, no audits have been conducted for 10 years on 59 co-operatives at Odar farm.¹³⁶ For Ushehwekunze, an audit revealed financial irregularities. As the Registrar of Co-operatives observes:

Following the findings and observations of the enquiry and audit inspection conducted on the books and financial records of Ushehwekunze, the Registrar has reason to believe that the funds of the society are being misapplied and is convinced that the affairs of the society are being run in a manner that is detrimental to the interests of the members as a whole as evidenced by the members’ response at the Special General Meeting of 01 and 08 October 2006.¹³⁷

On the other hand, the Federation experienced fraud partly due to weak systems¹³⁸ and ‘founder member capture’, as presented below:

Gungano lost about USD 50,000. It is also the reason why people said, let’s decentralise, because one person was withdrawing money, allocating to beneficiaries and doing the accounting as well. This was done by two people who were very powerful in the movement and were signatories.¹³⁹

In reaction, the movement embarked on a process of reform, decentralising UPF savings to regions. Findings from pilots conducted in Masvingo, Kariba, Bulawayo and Gwanda indicated that the community-managed savings are beneficial because member access to the fund is easier and quicker.¹⁴⁰ In 2015, during the restructuring exercise, the constitution was put in

¹³⁵ Petition by 21 co-operative representatives in the Consortium signed on 5 June 2010 to Ward 46 Councillor.

¹³⁶ Southlea Park residents’ letter to ZRP (copied to MLGPWNH, President’s Office, COH, ZESA, MOSMECD), 9 January 2015.

¹³⁷ Registrar of Co-operatives’ letter to Ushehwekunze Housing Co-operative Society, 24 October 2006.

¹³⁸ This happened around 2011-12 and was discovered in late 2013.

¹³⁹ Interview with NGO Projects Officer, Harare, 21 January 2016.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

place with an aim of effecting leadership changes. However, implementation of reforms seems to be attracting resistance from founder members.

The MOSMECD and the City of Harare play an essential role in financial management of co-operatives through monitoring of audits and conducting training on financial management, among other things. The MOSMECD’s internal audit report of 2014 “revealed that during the year 76 out of about 6,500 co-operatives had their audited financial statements submitted to the ministry and also held AGMs”.¹⁴¹ However, the ministry official disputed the figures for two reasons. First, the figures may represent Harare only and, secondly, the ministry does not supervise co-operatives since co-operatives are independent and autonomous, which means they can choose not to comply. There is no mechanism to allow the ministry to reprimand non-compliant co-operatives, a situation that can promote rogue elements within the co-operative movement.

5.3.4 Slum-Upgrading Alliance

Slum-upgrading in Harare was made possible through an alliance of the City of Harare, ZIHOPFE and Dialogue on Shelter. The programme provided 480 tenured housing stands and expansive infrastructure services such as water, sewerage, and roads (Muchadenyika, 2015b: 1232). In undertaking *in situ* upgrading in Dzivarasekwa, roles and responsibilities among the alliance were shared, as shown in Table 33.

Table 33: Slum-Upgrading Actors and Roles

Lead actor/s	Roles
Government	Land allocation.
City of Harare	Approving plans, infrastructure development, developing and implementing a Slum-upgrading Strategy, providing land tenure permits, reviewing of planning regulations and approval processes, co-managing the programme, mobilising additional finance for replicating slum-upgrading.
Dialogue on Shelter	House Modelling, managing community savings and credits, slum-upgrading Finance Facility Study, documentation and dissemination of slum-upgrading, profiling and enumeration, co-managing the programme, mobilising additional finance for replicating slum-upgrading.
ZIHOPFE	Community mobilisation and organisation, participation in infrastructure provision, documentation and dissemination of slum-upgrading, profiling and enumeration,

¹⁴¹ Interview with MOSMECD Co-operative Development Officer, Harare, 19 August 2015.

Source: Muchadenyika, 2015a: 6.

The alliance was triggered primarily by four factors. First, the influence of international development capital provided by the Gates Foundation for slum-upgrading in five African cities meant that Harare would receive a grant of USD 5 million. The grant was instrumental in bringing the city back into mainstream housing delivery. As such, the grant would capacitate the city with modern geo-spatial planning and construction equipment. Secondly, the exchange visits facilitated by Dialogue on Shelter and the Federation enlightened city and government officials on the efficacy of slum-upgrading in other countries such as India, South Africa and Kenya. Thirdly, the enduring change that the city embraced by working with non-government actors and community groups became vital (Muchadenyika, 2015a). Such change was triggered by inclusive leadership within the city which prioritised engaging with slum-dwellers. Finally, the Harare alliance underwent a consensus-building process that facilitated shared understanding of slum characteristics and action points.

How did slum-upgrading help transform the city? It provided the city with a re-learning exercise that changed conceptions and perceptions about inclusive planning, housing and governance.¹⁴² The results of the slum-upgrading include the set-up of a pro-poor housing finance facility, allocation of stands to Gunhill slum-dwellers by the City of Harare, adoption and implementation of a slum-upgrading strategy which is assisting in city-wide slum-upgrading, and transformation of 480 poor households through secure tenure and infrastructure services. Elsewhere, the impact includes the adoption and implementation of *in situ* upgrading in Epworth (Chapter Seven), and adoption of slum-upgrading in other urban centres such as Bulawayo, Kadoma, Masvingo and Kariba.


5.4 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the role of social movements and planning institutions in urban transformation in Harare and their inherent contestations and alliances. The incapacity of the

¹⁴² Interview with COH DHCS Deputy Director, 25 June 2014.

government and the City of Harare in providing low-income housing prompted the rise of housing movements. Taking advantage of the FTLRP, housing movements went beyond housing delivery to invade and parcel out urban and peri-urban farms. The government acceded to such militancy and invasions by housing movements and began a process of land acquisition. However, such land is widely contested, curtailing development of housing and infrastructure. In comparative terms, housing movements on council land seem to be successful due to factors such as being apolitical, adherence to city procedures and regulations, and sound corporate governance.

Through formal and informal means, between 2000 and 2015 more than 100,000 housing stands were made available in Harare. On such stands, about 35,000 houses have been completed. However, areas occupied by housing movements are distant from available city bulk infrastructure. This makes it more expensive to make connections to existing infrastructure. At the same time, the City of Harare has offloaded its responsibility of infrastructure development to housing co-operatives. On average, co-operatives invest about USD 2 million on sewer, water and road infrastructure before laying a single brick on the actual houses. The role of social movements has largely been facilitated by the City of Harare, which has undergone a process of introspection and incremental change evident in the adoption of responsive and inclusive policies.



Chapter Six

Chitungwiza: A Fractured City

The trajectory of social movements and in particular, their role in planning and low-income housing delivery, in Chitungwiza is quite different from experiences in Harare. The town has 26 registered housing co-operatives, which wield immense political power, partly because they are formed and led by local political elites. These co-operatives have been at the forefront of a parallel planning and housing delivery system in the town. The institutional failure of the local authority resulted, partly, in housing co-operatives playing a *de facto* role of the municipality. The challenges of the city have resulted in the government appointing caretaker commissions to run urban affairs. In this regard, between 2008 and 2013 there were five investigation and intervention teams. However, such government intervention has not helped significantly in resolving the municipality's governance, planning and housing challenges.

Scholars have described fractured cities as characterised by “a basic duality of rich and poor, formal and informal, organised and disintegrated, ruled and unruled, separated and linked at the same time” (Koonings & Kruijt, 2007: 1); such cities are also marked by social disorder, economic decline and social conflict (Jacobs, 1992). As this chapter argues, Chitungwiza is a fractured town due to a contested planning and housing delivery system emanating from municipal failure. Chitungwiza Municipality is fraught with weak regulatory systems to facilitate the delivery of council functions such as planning, housing, and finance. Without these systems, the municipality is often abused by residents, officials, government and politicians. When municipal systems collapse, the practice and conduct of planning and, in particular, housing delivery become contested and haphazard – signs of a fractured city. Social movements have assumed the functions of the municipality in relation to planning and low-income housing delivery. The result has been a chaotic, complex and contested planning and housing delivery system whose outputs have been deemed illegal by government and the municipality.

This chapter examines how radical planning (Miraftab, 2009; Beard, 2003; Friedman, 2011; Sandercock, 2004) used by social movements has transformed housing delivery in Chitungwiza. This model of planning has its own challenges, which the chapter highlights.

Despite this, the Government of Zimbabwe and Chitungwiza Municipality have acceded to the new form of urban planning by regularising products of radical planning – ‘illegal houses’.

Chitungwiza Municipality does not own land; instead, it administers state land on behalf of the government (MLGPWNH, 2013a). On this land, the processes of planning and housing are supposed to be conducted by central government and the municipality, as shown in Table 34.

Table 34: Ideal Processes of Planning and Housing in Chitungwiza

Institution	Roles
Local government ministry	Pegging of stand boundaries by DPP (can be done by local authority if it has a town planner). Land surveying (at the cost of the local authority). Issuing of survey instructions. Issuing of title deeds. Cancellation of stand diagrams, title deeds and general plans. Management of existing leases. Management of Government’s 10% commonage. Excision and setting aside of communal land.
Chitungwiza Municipality	Allocation and sale of urban state land. Retention of revenue accrued from sale and lease of urban state land. Preparation of local plans. Infrastructure development and service provision. Preparation and signing of lease agreements. Processing of cessions.

Source: Adapted from the manual for the management of urban land.

However, the ideal situation presented in Table 34 contrasts with the prevailing reality. As I have argued elsewhere (Muchadenyika, 2015b), whoever has control of urban land controls urban development and housing. Land in the town is controlled by local political elites and party structures. Thus, the local authority is supposed to administer and manage a town where it has no power and control over the land. This arrangement is, however, historical, because at the formation of Chitungwiza town in 1978, the Rhodesian Government did not vest land ownership in the municipality (Rambanapasi, 1994). The post-independence government did not address this anomaly, hence perpetuating the challenges facing the town. This background has shaped the emergence and growth of housing movements in the town, as explained in the next section.

6.1 Social Movements and Low-Income Housing

6.1.1 Housing Development and the Role of Parallel Systems

The housing challenge in Chitungwiza is pronounced (Ramsamy, 2006; Schlyter, 2006). It has been argued that “on average 30 people live in a single residential unit” (Ramsamy, 2006: 155), an indication of extensive multi-habitation as a coping strategy for the housing challenge in the town (Schlyter, 2006). Multi-habitation “involves people who do not define themselves as one household but who share living space that is not clearly designed or divided for multi-family purposes” (Schlyter, 2006: 255). The town’s housing stock currently stands at 65,000 units, composed of three main areas, namely Seke (35,000), Zengeza (20,000) and St Mary’s (10,000).¹⁴³ However, in the post-2000 era, there has been no significant addition to the housing stock by the municipality. Housing co-operatives tried to fill the void by using methods not conventional in Zimbabwe’s planning regime. As shown in Table 35, by assuming municipal functions, co-operatives allocated land on which about 22,000 houses have been developed.

Table 35: Houses Delivered through Co-Operatives

Number of Co-operatives	Estimated number of stands allocated and houses constructed	Approximate number of people who benefited (using household size of 3,9)
26	22,000	85,800

Sources: UDCORP and Chitungwiza Municipality statistics.

Housing co-operatives and other movements acting as mini-local authorities affected the functioning of the municipality. Most functions, such as land allocation, planning and approval of buildings, were performed by individuals and groups.¹⁴⁴ The two largest housing co-operatives under study (Zanorembe and United We Stand) became *de facto* local authorities.¹⁴⁵ Co-operatives unilaterally allocated land, processed agreement of sales, approved layout and building plans, as narrated by two interviewees:

I went to council looking for land and the municipal officials said the municipality did not have any land. They advised me to visit United We

¹⁴³ The Chitungwiza-Seke Communal Lands Combination Concept Plan 2014-2016.

¹⁴⁴ FGD 8, Zengeza 4, Chitungwiza, 29 October 2015.

¹⁴⁵ Estimated membership stands at 5,000 for United We Stand and 8,000 for Zanorembe.

Stand because it had the land. We have been staying here from 2013, though we are not recognised by the municipality. What we want is somewhere to stay and whether it is legal or illegal, we do not ask that. During land purchases, land prices differed depending on middlemen [people who were brokering land sales], though I bought directly from the co-operative at USD 2,500 in 2011 and agreement of sale was signed. I latter paid to the co-operative USD 250 for surveying and pegging.

I went to council and the housing department referred me to United We Stand offices as Chitungwiza Municipality knew that the co-operative had land. In fact, United We Stand Co-operative's runners were council per se. Agreement of sale was signed and the co-operative land surveyor allocated me the land. The former Housing director had her own stands and unfortunately they were already taken.¹⁴⁶

Co-operatives developed a parallel system to that of Chitungwiza Municipality, for instance by having their own building inspectors, surveyors and planners who would service co-operators at a fee.¹⁴⁷ Statistics by UDCORP indicate that about 22,000 houses were built illegally. The parallel municipal system attracted trust from co-operators and homeseekers as residents in the town began appreciating and recognising such groups more than the local authority. There are three reasons for this. First, such groups provided residents with services (planning and housing) with some greater degree of ease and flexibility than the local authority. Secondly, most people leading these groups wielded considerable political power. Most of the "housing co-operatives acquired state land illegally through working in cahoots with former councillors" (MLGPWNH, 2013a: 10). Hence, residents trusted co-operative leaders based on their previous association with Chitungwiza Municipality and their political standing in society. Thirdly, residents seeking land from Chitungwiza Municipality were directed to such groups by senior council officials. In the process, residents were made to believe these groups were legitimate and recognised by the council.

¹⁴⁶ FGD 8, Zengeza 4, Chitungwiza, 29 October 2015.

¹⁴⁷ Interview with Town Planner, DPP, Harare, 14 January 2016.

The fact that co-operatives built about 22,000 houses without following municipal procedures shows that aspects of radical planning have emerged in the town. In radical planning, social movements are primary agents of change and often act outside formal state and economic structures (Sandercock, 1998a). The radicalism in Chitungwiza is apparent in the manner in which movements allocate land, and approve layout and building plans, functions that conventionally reside with planning authorities. Here, radical planning in Chitungwiza has confronted and challenged the whole foundation of bureaucratised and formal planning. In this regard, post-2000 housing has been made possible by social movements working largely in opposition to “state-sanctioned, formal planning processes” (Beard, 2003: 15). Planning authorities have also acceded to such a radical form of planning by opting for regularisation (section 6.2.3). The fact that the majority of houses were built through radical planning can be interpreted to mean the efficacy of social movements-led planning. It also dispels the notion that social movements are laden with illegality in cities.

From 2000 to 2015, Chitungwiza Municipality could not deliver any single completed housing unit. However, in 2007, the municipality allocated 10,000 stands of about 300m² in Nyatsime. Due to administrative inefficiencies within the municipality, people resorted to the parallel system, as borne out in the following account by a home-seeker:

We bought housing stands from alternative means [co-operatives] because there was no proper issuance of land from Council. We became victims because we had seen that the formal process of acquiring land from the municipality lack[s] order and transparency. For example, in 2007 I bought a high-density stand from Chitungwiza Municipality in Nyatsime for ZW\$1,500. Nyatsime had 10,000 stands but the municipality sold 15,000 stands. I bought 300m² but due to overselling, stands were reduced to 180m². In 2009, I was told to make an additional top-up payment of USD 900 after dollarisation. Up to this day, the municipality failed to facilitate that I move on-site, due to serious chaos and invasions in Nyatsime. Thus, council is the

one failing us and breeding this chaos. We then decided to try the alternative ways and here we are, staying in our house!¹⁴⁸

This account shows that when formal processes fail to deliver, people opt for alternatives. Land purchasers waited for about five years before being allowed to settle on-site. Through movements, other land purchasers invaded Nyatsime and the area became contested, with the municipality losing control of planning and housing activities. Beneficiaries formed Nyatsime Beneficiaries Housing Trust in a bid to compel the municipality to officially allocate beneficiaries their housing stands. This did not yield results, and a more militant and vigilante grouping called Nyatsime Housing Development Association emerged. The group invaded Nyatsime, allowing beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries to settle there. The Association became a *de facto* local authority, declaring the area a no-go area for Chitungwiza Municipality and government officials.¹⁴⁹ It allocated land to co-operatives and began charging for site plans (USD 20), identification of pegs (USD 40), bridge construction (USD 30), administration (USD 20) and building plans (USD 100) (MLGPWNH, 2013a: 11). It is evident that here social movements took advantage of political opportunities, as discussed in the next section.

6.1.2 Political Opportunities and Housing Development

According to political opportunity structure theory; “intra-elite struggles over power profoundly influence people’s decisions to join movements and the strategies and tactics a movement employs” (Zirakzadeh, 2006: 12). The contest for power between the opposition and ruling party in Chitungwiza fuelled how social movements there operated. The politics of urban control pitted the MDC-run Chitungwiza Municipality against the ruling party controlling land. As such, housing co-operatives, in particular, leaders and members, used Zanu-PF allegiance to access land through informal channels and build houses. Moreover, during election cycles, land is often used as a political tool, a development that Chitungwiza Residents and Rate Payers Association (CHRRA) has challenged, as averred in the following statement:

¹⁴⁸ Interview with supposed Nyatsime beneficiary, Chitungwiza, 29 October 2015.

¹⁴⁹ Government and Chitungwiza Municipality officials have been restricted entry by the vigilante group.

During elections, rules, regulations and laws are relaxed, with Zanu-PF officials giving land illegally. In 2008, most outgoing Zanu-PF councillors gave people land illegally. For example, [the] Ward 13 outgoing councillor had been allocated land adjacent to municipality head office for a stadium but later changed to residential. The councillor in question demarcated about 4,000 stands selling at USD 4,000 each. CHRRA and Chitungwiza Municipality protested, though we lost the court case to stop development at that place.¹⁵⁰

Tensions over urban control are evidenced by the fact that all co-operatives in Chitungwiza engaged in ‘illegal’ planning and housing are fronted by Zanu-PF leaders and members. In this case, land allocation is driven by narrow party interest, especially those of party leaders and their networks (Pieterse, 2014). Thus, it would seem that political muscle is key in co-operative housing and access to land. For instance, the leader of United We Stand is a senior official in Zanu-PF and was once a deputy mayor of Chitungwiza. Co-operatives in Chitungwiza are politically driven and the majority of them are affiliated to Zanu-PF.¹⁵¹ Zanoremba housing co-operative was formed and led by a Zanu-PF parliamentarian. Moreover, Zanu-PF youths have been at the forefront of invading land and selling it to people (MLGPWNH, 2013a). In turn, political structures and leaders defend such housing movements and their operations to the hilt. Ordinary members seeking housing made use of such political opportunities regardless of political affiliation to access land in the town.

The preceding discussion indicates that clientelism and patronage networks have taken root in Chitungwiza. The two are at the core of ‘illegal’ planning and housing underway in the city. Patron-client networks involving local government officials and local economic elites often lead to frustration and alienation of residents (Paik & Baum, 2014). In turn, residents often develop mechanisms outside formal state structures to access services pertinent to their lifestyles.

¹⁵⁰ Interview with CHRRA Secretary, Chitungwiza, 29 October 2015.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*

Due to the balance of power in this political environment, the municipality and opposition-led council would have little power over land allocation, planning and housing development. In such an environment, those wielding power, such as local political elites and co-operative leaders, became critical actors in planning and housing delivery. Such power is exercised in the form of networks spanning officials in party structures, government and state security agents. Such “networks and power-plays may have distinct and important influences on planning outcomes” (Hillier, 2002: 277). The planning outcomes include some houses which do not conform to planning regulations and standards.

It is important to note that power in Chitungwiza is exercised by actors and institutions outside the formal planning system. Social movements, through utilising such opportunities, delivered about 22,000 houses. However, politics also negatively affected the social movements. For instance, some houses were demolished by Chitungwiza Municipality. Using political power, “leaders threatened beneficiaries who raised transparency issues with evictions”.¹⁵² In addition, the use of politics in co-operative movements worked to the detriment of transparency and accountability, resulting in substandard or unfinished work on, for instance, infrastructure. Infrastructure, in turn, has an impact on accessibility, safety and the health of co-operators.

6.1.3 Social Movements and Infrastructure

This section analyses the contributions of social movements to water, sanitation and road infrastructure. Infrastructure exists largely to move water, power, people, materials and waste from one place to another (Simone, 2014). In the settlements planned by social movements, there are no reticulated water and sanitation facilities. Rather, they are served by wells and septic tanks. About 80% of the people interviewed indicated they had shallow wells on their properties.¹⁵³ Some of the stands were too small to have a well and septic tank in close proximity, posing the risk of cross-infiltration, especially in waterlogged areas.

However, there are cases of illegal sewerage connections, for instance, by United We Stand co-operative. It was indicated that the connections were done by Chitungwiza Municipality officials working in an unofficial capacity. The argument presented was that such officials

¹⁵² Interview with Planner, Harare, 19 October 2015.

¹⁵³ FGD 8, Zengeza 4, Chitungwiza, 29 October 2015.

knew Chitungwiza Municipality design standards and hence their work would stand the test in the event of regularisation. Movement efforts towards infrastructure were recounted by members as follows:

We pooled about USD 300 each and Chitungwiza Municipality employees installed the sewer system through informal arrangements. Approximately 60 houses have been connected to [a] sewer through an out-of-council arrangement. We engaged municipality workers – because they know standards. For water, we should get house numbers first before connecting water. But, at hand, we are using shallow wells. Municipal workers refused to connect water because of the stiff penalties associated with illegal water connections. We also made contributions for roads, and that was done spontaneously. We used the pooled resources instantly to avoid chances of mismanagement.¹⁵⁴

Unlike in Harare, where infrastructure installation is a responsibility carried out by co-operatives, in Chitungwiza it is an individual responsibility. This, however, makes infrastructure servicing difficult without a collective entity to pool and channel resources. Chitungwiza has no water source for itself and so it relies on water from Harare. Chitungwiza requires 45 mega litres of water per day, whereas the City of Harare supplies between 15 and 30 mega litres per day. In this instance, about 40% of the population gets a reliable water supply, leaving the rest to rely on intermittent water supplies once every fortnight.¹⁵⁵ From 2000 to 2015, housing developments have been increasing without investment in water and sewer capacity.

The housing settlements studied do not have surfaced roads; rather, they are accessible through road openings. During the rainy seasons, the tendency is to park vehicles some distance away and access houses on foot. These roads are causing severe environmental damage because they are not surfaced; they are susceptible to massive erosion in wet conditions. Unlike in Harare, where there is a standing policy (parallel development) to guide the construction of roads,

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁵ Chitungwiza-Town-Seke Communal Lands Combination Concept Plan (2014-2016).

Chitungwiza does not have one. This has made road construction a process which is not standardised and supervised. This not only poses challenges of accessibility but leaves such settlements vulnerable to flooding, since there are no storm drains to protect roads and channel storm water. In fact, there are only road openings.

The preoccupation of movements and their members in Chitungwiza seems to be with housing. As such, the issue of liveable settlements where infrastructure complements housing is considered secondary. However, infrastructure exerts a force in “the way it attracts people, draws them in, coalesces and expends their capacities” (Simone, 2015: 375). Without infrastructure, a new form of urbanity takes over, characterised by sharing water sources (depending on relations established); concentration of home industries along water courses such as rivers; use of septic tanks (even below stipulated 2000m² stands); and communal work in diverting water from road openings (during rainy seasons). Some of these features are typical of rural areas. However, this is now prevalent in most urban centres of Zimbabwe. Struggles to improve infrastructure are becoming a rallying point for community cohesion and collective action.

From the foregoing, the central question that arises is the impact that planning and housing driven by social movements has on town planning principles. This question is addressed in the next section.

6.1.4 Social Movements and Town Planning Principles

What happens when social movements carry out planning functions? I will focus on the salient features of settlements planned by social movements without the involvement of planning authorities. I will conduct this assessment against town planning objectives, namely promoting health, safety, order, amenity, aesthetics, convenience and general welfare, efficiency and economy in development (GoZ, 1996). Settlements planned by social movements seem orderly as most stands and houses are surveyed and in sequence. Spaces for roads are clear and building lines were observed on either side of housing stands. Safety was compromised, however, as was evident from houses built on 33-kilovolt (KV) power line servitudes, in wetlands, streams and riverbanks and on road servitudes. Such houses and settlements are vulnerable to flooding and disturbances of power, sewer lines and water mains.

‘Aesthetics’ is defined as the conservation and design of environmental beauty in cities (Porteous, 1996). In settlements where movements planned and built, emphasis was placed more on the built than the natural environment. Houses were built on wetlands, and open spaces were turned into built-up or other kinds of areas. This kind of planning is not sensitive to climate change, posing risks in the event of climate change-related disasters. ‘Convenience’ can be defined as how human and vehicular traffic navigates and accesses a settlement. As movements could only manage road openings, the roads are not gravelled and surfaced. During the rainy season, roads are unnavigable due to waterlogging and mud. People who live in such settlements walk some distance as vehicles cannot easily access such areas.

The impacts of housing co-operatives on spatial planning are widespread. These compromise town planning objectives and certain provisions of the Regional, Town and Country Planning Act as shown in Box 2. In particular, there was no collaboration with the municipality, with layout and house plans not approved. People were using political muscle to build in wetlands and on servitudes, which compromises safety.¹⁵⁶ Zanu-PF structures and members are at the centre of flouting town planning regulations. To protect such anomalies, party youths often conduct vigils at the municipality head office, ostensibly to frighten officials. In turn “the town clerk turns a blind eye to such illegal activities to safeguard his job, as some of these elements [party structures and officials] have influence over who runs council affairs”.¹⁵⁷ However, other co-operatives, such as United We Stand, “recruited building inspectors from Chitungwiza Municipality who would approve construction stages”.¹⁵⁸

Box 2: Impacts of Co-operative Activities on Spatial Planning

1. Uncoordinated incremental development as a result of the absence of a framework to guide developments in the form of a local development plan or master plans.
2. Housing Co-operatives’ layout plans were not approved by the municipality, though the same local authority allocated stand numbers for the same unapproved layout plans, for instance Zanorembe and United We Stand Housing Co-operative.

¹⁵⁶ Interview with Councillor, Chitungwiza, 9 November 2015.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁸ Interview with Town Planner, DPP, Harare, 14 January 2016.

3. Violation of provisions of the Regional Town and Country Planning Act (29:12) of layout plans through subdivision of most institutional stands and open spaces reserved for recreational uses into residential stands.
4. Institutional stands for three schools and a stadium have been illegally subdivided into residential stands without cancellation of the parent property lease.
5. Minimum stand sizes for school (institutional) stands are not meeting standards as a result of unprocedural subdivision and change of reservations.
6. Flouting of planning procedures by implementing infill layout plans designed by the council; land barons were not following layout approval procedures, such as consultations with relevant stakeholders, e.g. ZESA, EMA, ZINWA, the Ministry of Transport and Ministry of Local Government.
7. Stand allocations are being made before approval of layout plans.
8. Layout plans are being prepared on unsuitable base maps.
9. The flawed council lease agreements do not contain development conditions, and as a result beneficiaries do not have the development guides.
10. There are sub-standard buildings due to non-inspection by the council.
11. Safety and health hazards exist due to violation of public utility servitudes for sewerage, electricity and roads.

Source: MLGPWNH, 2013a: 5-6.

Having explained the contributions of social movements to planning and housing delivery, the focus will now shift to the role and reactions of planning institutions.

6.2 Planning Institutions and Low-Income Housing

6.2.1 Institutional Capacity to govern

Institutional capacity is considered important in the manner in which municipalities discharge their functions and deliver services (Peltenberg, de Witt & Davidson, 2000; Nientied & Racoviceanu, 2000; Chakunda & Chakaipa, 2015). Planning and housing developments in Chitungwiza Municipality reflect municipal failure. When the municipality collapsed, no defined systems would be functional, leaving the municipality vulnerable to abuse by officials,

politicians and residents. As such, the confusion and contestation in the town is a creation of officials, politicians, government and residents. While much literature focuses on state failure (Rotberg, 2003, 2004; Rice & Patrick, 2008; Carment, 2003; Cliffe & Luckham, 1999; Doornbos, 2002; Milliken & Krause, 2002); Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013; Giorgetti, 2010; Kriejen, 2004) it is crucial to understand precisely how municipalities fail. This section argues that Chitungwiza is a municipality that has failed. Two questions emerge from this assertion: What causes municipal failure? What are the characteristics of such failure?

To begin with the first question, Chitungwiza Municipality failed due to weak municipal systems, weak governance and administration, the unethical conduct of appointed and elected officials, and lack of ownership and control over land. Municipal systems governing land and housing delivery, planning, and information technology are vital to the discharge of municipal functions. However, in the absence of such systems to guide local authorities, the situation becomes haphazard. In Chitungwiza Municipality, the collapse of municipal systems resulted in widespread use of informal and parallel systems. These informal systems thrived and led to endemic corruption, which destroys the rubric of municipalities – that is, systems for delivering municipal services.

The efficient governance and administration of a local authority is fundamental to its success or failure (Myers, 2011). In the context of Chitungwiza, for decades the administration in charge of the municipality has been shaky and weak. This is evidenced by two government-appointed commissions to resuscitate municipal operations. Such commissions, however, have perpetuated the challenges facing the municipality, with Commissioners not having been appointed on merit. A member of the Commission observes:

Are Commissioners competent on what they are supposed to do? Who should comprise the Commission? Sometimes, these people are without the requisite qualifications. In our Commission, only two out of six were qualified; the rest did not have necessary qualifications. They were just saying, ‘We have been send by the Minister’, and were also relatives of the local government minister. Such people, however, made a lot of mistakes, which further compounded challenges facing the municipality. Commissioners were abusing powers in the Commission – it [power] should be applied in terms

of the law. Where does a Commission report to – Minister or full council?

There was a challenge of reporting and governance framework. Council was paying the Commission but the Commission was reporting to the Minister.¹⁵⁹

Senior municipal officials have been embroiled in corrupt practices, as evidenced by a former town clerk convicted for fraud and corruption. In handing down the judgement, the magistrate decried that the “accused [town clerk] should not have been under the impression of running Chitungwiza Town Council like he ran his tobacco farm”.¹⁶⁰ In 2012, the housing director unprocedurally allocated stands to United We Stand co-operative without full council resolution (MLGPWNH, 2013a: 7). These are all indications of poor corporate governance within the municipality.

The governance of urban centres by mayors and councillors requires leadership that is “visible, outward looking, open and less partisan” (Greasley & Stoker, 2008: 722). However, elected officials in Chitungwiza are embroiled in questionable governance practices. For instance, Chitungwiza Mayor Israel Marange was arrested and convicted of corruption involving land deals in 2009. In 2010, the MDC fired all 24 of its Chitungwiza councillors, “citing corruption, misdeeds, and defiance to party directives” (Muchadenyika, 2015b: 1224). In addition, the United We Stand co-operative leader (a councillor and former deputy mayor) “is privy to the entire goings-on in council as he possesses vital and confidential municipal records and documents in the manner of internal memos, minutes and resolutions” (MLGPWNH, 2013a: 7). Thus, the leader of United We Stand co-operative “has too much political influence and knows council systems which he often abuses”.¹⁶¹

Councillors, particularly in view of their inexperience and vulnerability to appointed officials, also contributed to municipal failure. The violence associated with politics in post-2000 Zimbabwe has attracted brave and not usually competent people to stand for council elections (RTI & IDAZIM, 2010). Most councillors are merely party activists with limited or no prior

¹⁵⁹ Interview with Former Commissioner, Harare, 19 January 2016.

¹⁶⁰ Daily News, Harare, 7 September 2013.

¹⁶¹ Interview with Chitungwiza councillor, Chitungwiza, 9 November 2015.

experience in public governance (Muchadenyika & Williams, 2016). Such councillors are vulnerable to abuse by council officials, as a Chitungwiza councillor observes:

As councillors, public officials know that when we came into council, most of us were unemployed; hence, we are easily manipulated even with small things like 20 litres of fuel. In such cases, when public officials want to push their agenda, they often remind you that at one point they gave you as councillor 20 litres of fuel outside normal procedures. This on its own means councillors are subject to manipulation and in many instances pushing agendas of officials which are often corrupt. As you know, most of us councillors, we are not educated and we have heavily relied on public officials. However, these public officials serve at the mercy of the ruling party and they are Zanu-PF-aligned, which has made them to mislead us when adopting resolutions. Our party [MDC] has not been able to provide us with technical advisers, in particular, in the field of urban planning and law. We have adopted so many resolutions that we thought would transform the municipality. However, with time, reflection and consultation, we realised that those decisions were non-transformational. Instead, they were avenues for public officials to make money. In other words, we often realise that we had been misled into entering into agreements which in some cases could not have been entered into if correct information was presented to us.¹⁶²

Officials have tended to use and abuse municipal positions as a way to sustain their livelihoods. The municipality has been struggling to pay salaries while it expects workers to perform duties. This situation has resulted in officials adopting the survival strategy of abusing council systems by approving housing plans and construction stages as well as illegally connecting water and sewers to illegal settlements.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*

Chitungwiza Municipality does not own land, yet it is mandated with planning and governance over such land. The tendency has been that individuals and housing co-operatives with political clout override the municipality. As a result, such individuals and co-operatives have established parallel municipal systems performing functions vested in the municipality by law. Land provides revenue to local authorities. However, in Chitungwiza, home-seekers would pay about USD 200 to the municipality for alleged regularisation of illegal activities, whereas land barons and co-operatives pocket between USD 3,500 and USD 5,000.¹⁶³ This serves to incapacitate the municipality financially and strengthen the financial capacity of parallel municipal systems.

In Chitungwiza, characteristics of municipal failure include widespread environmental degradation, housing developments that compromise on human safety and convenience, and the abuse of municipal systems. Regarding environmental degradation, the most affected areas are wetlands and stream banks, which have been converted into built-up places. Other housing developments have been halted at foundation level due to waterlogging. As such, people interviewed indicated that building resumes in dry seasons when water levels drop.¹⁶⁴ Planning is a practice “in which people shape and govern spaces and [which] takes into account social, economic, and environmental issues” (Van Assche et al., 2012). However, in the absence of planning, much of the space in Chitungwiza has been built-up without attention to environmental perseverance and integrity. Housing developments have been built in ecologically fragile lands, under 33KV power lines and on institutional stands – evidence of a lack of planning arising from municipal failure. In brief, co-operative housing here has ignored human safety and convenience.

The abuse of municipal systems is another feature of municipal failure. In Chitungwiza, houses developed illegally through co-operatives were incorporated into council systems through the use of council officials. Illegal housing delivery processes penetrated and took root in the

¹⁶³ Interview with Town Planner, DPP, Harare, 14 January 2016.

¹⁶⁴ FGD 8, Zengeza 4, Chitungwiza, 29 October 2015.

formal system of the municipality. This has had the effect of legitimising the parallel housing delivery process, as the Land Audit Report notes:

There was connivance between council officials in the Department of Housing and land barons particularly United We Stand Co-operative. Letters from the co-operative were directly going to the Department without passing through registry and were being actioned without any written instructions from the Town Clerk. There was also deliberate smuggling of stand numbers allocated by the co-operative in the system by backdating some letters received from the co-operative so that they can appear to have been allocated in 2010, yet the stand numbers in the range contained in the letters were only officially allocated by the Planning Department in 2012. The Housing Department, however, proceeded to unprocedurally open files and process lease agreements (MLGPWNH, 2013a: 7).

6.2.2 Municipal Capacity and Planning failure

The exercise and conduct of planning depends largely on the capacity of the local authority. As such, municipal failure manifests itself in planning failure mainly because planning is a governance function. Hence, the failure of governance in Chitungwiza has spilled into chaotic urban planning, which has produced widely contested housing struggles. On the basis of the way in which town planning is conducted formally and informally in Chitungwiza, and in considering the associated planning outcomes, I argue that there is indeed planning failure in this town and that it is the result of four interrelated processes.

First, the absence of formally agreed and laid-down procedures for land allocation fuelled informal processes. Unlike the case in Harare, where such procedures exist, Chitungwiza Municipality lacks them, leading to a chaotic land allocation process. In particular, council officials and politicians take advantage of the situation, allocating vast tracks of land in a non-transparent and haphazard way (MLGPWNH, 2013a). When land is allocated through illegal channels, it means that land development processes such as planning, surveying and building are conducted outside formal planning processes. Put differently, the planning and regulatory

function vested in Chitungwiza Municipality has been performed under the cover of housing co-operatives by politically connected individuals.

Secondly, the role and conduct of professional planners are fundamental in how cities are planned and governed. Planners advise municipalities and shape the form and structure of urban centres through planning proposals. However, as I argue here, the evidence in Chitungwiza suggests that professional planners are contributing to planning failure in the town. Planners working for the municipality “would mislead council [and] engage in illicit deals such as planning and selling housing stands in undesignated areas such as wetlands”.¹⁶⁵ This is a case in which planners jettison planning ethics in favour of personal enrichment.

However, the above contrasts to what obtains in literature where state power often uses planners to achieve its objectives, in the process compromising planning ethics (Flyvbjerg, 1998; Yiftachel, 1994, 1998). Here, the planner is self-serving. For instance, CHRRA alleged that “the town planner has destroyed Chitungwiza and we are not worried to tell him this”.¹⁶⁶ It was also said that a town planner had fled to South Africa after illegally planning and selling stands in the town. The municipality outsourced planning to a consultancy, which, too, misled the municipality.¹⁶⁷ In addition, for a considerable time planning functions were carried out by DPP Mashonaland East – a development that affected the conduct of planning as the department had no physical presence in the town.¹⁶⁸

Thirdly, the failure of the municipality in availing land for housing triggered a parallel housing delivery process. It is the responsibility of local authorities to plan and allocate land for housing to prospective homeowners. However, it seems Chitungwiza Municipality failed to perform this role. This is evident in Nyatsime, where the local authority tried and failed to allocate land

¹⁶⁵ Interview with Town Planner, DPP, Harare, 14 January 2016.

¹⁶⁶ Interview with CHRRA Secretary, Chitungwiza, 29 October 2015.

¹⁶⁷ For instance: “A serious miscarriage of duty was done by Mabika Town Planners who were engaged by Chitungwiza Municipality as consultancy planners in 2005 and the consultants deliberately misrepresented the position of Duri River in such a manner that stands in the range 24012 to 24107 on Surveyor General Plan Number DG3793 appeared to be within Chitungwiza Municipality’s area of dominion, yet the same are in Chitsvatsva Village (Seke Communal Lands) in terms of Statutory Instrument 15E of 2003” (MLGPWNH, 2013a).

¹⁶⁸ Interview with Town Planner, DPP, Harare, 14 January 2016.

for housing (section 6.1.1 and 6.3.1). People who had failed to access land through normal procedures looked for alternative means of doing so.

Finally, the illegal process of land allocation resulted in ‘illegal’ planning processes. Thus, subsequent processes in new housing settlements used ‘illegal’ processes. Surveying was conducted by contracted individuals coordinated by co-operative leaders. Individual stand allocation was done by co-operative leaders – a function that traditionally rests in the hands of the local authority’s housing department. In addition, house construction was not approved and inspected. In essence, those houses that were inspected were done so by private inspectors, the majority of whom were council employees working without council approval and authority. In the areas under study, co-operative leaders advised people to build without inspections and pay the fine after completion.¹⁶⁹

6.2.3 Regularisation of ‘Illegal’ Housing Developments

Regularisation is the process of formalising unplanned or informal settlements and/or houses (Fernandes, 2011; Kombe, 2000; Gazdas & Mallar, 2011). It takes various forms, such as secure tenure (titling), upgrading of infrastructure services and community support structures, and registration and recognition of houses by authorities. Regularisation as discussed here pertains to registration and recognition of houses built in Chitungwiza Municipality through a parallel municipal system (as explained in section 6.1).

In 2011, compelled by the magnitude of what it deemed illegal planning and housing development, Chitungwiza Municipality began a process to regularise illegal developments. Subsequently, the municipality adopted a resolution that “[a]ll subdivisions or developments done by United We Stand Co-operative be regularised and the Director of Urban Planning Services submits reports to the Committee (Public Works, Town Lands and Environmental Management) for noting”.¹⁷⁰ However, the co-operative could not cooperate with the municipality by submitting its layout plans. The government’s 2012 investigation team recommended regularisation, reporting that “[t]he layout (prepared by United We Stand Co-

¹⁶⁹ FGD 8, Zengeza 4, Chitungwiza, 29 October 2015.

¹⁷⁰ Minutes of Chitungwiza Municipality 386th Ordinary Council meeting.

operative on church stand 21325 Unit A) should be formalised under section 40(3) of the Regional, Town and Country Planning Act”. This shows a new approach by both government and the local authority, which had predominantly used demolitions as a preferred alternative. Nevertheless, the government’s Land Audit Report finds that regularisation “led to a meteoric rise in illegal settlements in both councils [Chitungwiza and Manyame] as more settlers bought land in anticipation of regularisation” (MLGPWNH, 2013a: 19).

According to Zimbabwe’s town and country planning regime, regularisation is undertaken for existing uses, buildings or operations which in their erection did not follow planning procedures. Using this caveat, Chitungwiza embarked on a regularisation process targeting about 11,000 houses.¹⁷¹ The regularisation programme is spearheaded by a government entity, UDCORP, which has taken over most of the planning functions in Chitungwiza. This decision has been challenged, however, with one councillor arguing that “it is a techno-political intervention of bringing UDCORP to extort planning powers of the local authority”.¹⁷²

The question that arises pertains to the processes involved in regularisation and the associated challenges. I address this question based on findings from Chitungwiza. Carrying out an audit of settlements is the initial process of regularisation: a land audit determines which settlements can be regularised. During this process, the guiding principles are the town planning objectives of order, convenience, environmental preservation, and safety. Housing developments which at a minimum meet the town planning objectives are selected for regularisation. However, this is a subjective process relying on officials’ judgment on what and what not to regularise.

After an audit, the second process is to enter houses selected for regularisation into municipal systems such as housing, finance, information technology and planning. This includes providing house numbers for such houses for easy recognition in municipal records. For each regularised house, an account and file is opened at the municipality. The files contain all the correspondence and information pertaining to each property. In Chitungwiza, the regularisation process attracted a fine of USD 1,500 paid to the municipality. This, it can be argued, is an attempt to promote adherence to municipal regulations and procedures instead of

¹⁷¹ Figure provided by Chitungwiza Municipality.

¹⁷² Interview with Chitungwiza Councillor, Chitungwiza, 11 November 2015.

regularisation. Individuals whose houses had been regularised begin to meet such obligations to the council as paying rates and levies.

The third step entails demolitions and relocations. Demolitions are effected on houses that cannot be regularised, and the occupants are relocated. However, in Chitungwiza, this stage was widely contested, given that individuals and coalitions of civil society organisations (CSOs) resisted the demolitions. Out of an estimated 11,000 houses, “only 90 houses were demolished, with houses selected in a random manner”.¹⁷³ The demolitions were carried out at night and used to instil fear.¹⁷⁴ Relocations require available land elsewhere for resettlement, along with political will and government support for it to be an effective measure. However, relocations seem to have failed in Chitungwiza due to the politics associated with land. As one town planner observed:

Part of [the] recommendations of the Land Audit was that where it was not possible to regularise, people were supposed to be relocated. About 8,260 households were earmarked for relocation, but that did not happen. During election cycles, before and after the elections, the issue of illegal land allocation comes up. Before elections, politicians would be campaigning using land and they will be ‘untouchable’. During election time, such areas are no-go areas for council. After elections, land is given to agents and supporters out of gratitude. This has contributed to Chitungwiza becoming a catastrophe, as we see today. Such politicisation of land has made relocation impossible.¹⁷⁵

Regularisation is supposed to create responsive and inclusive cities. However, in Chitungwiza the process was constrained by numerous difficulties related to institutional discord, politicisation and non-transparency, as a planning officer described:

After the Land Audit Report, UDCORP issued stop development orders on all identified sites. However, orders were not obeyed for various reasons. The

¹⁷³ Interview with CHITREST Programmes Director, Harare, 26 October 2015.

¹⁷⁴ Interview with Planning Officer, Harare, 15 December 2015.

¹⁷⁵ Interview with Town Planner, DPP, Harare, 24 January 2016.

Land Audit Report implicates Zanu-PF members – that’s why it is difficult to control and stop development. Even the suspension of [the] United We Stand leader took six months after the release of the Audit Report. The number of Zanu-PF councillors increased in 2013 elections in Chitungwiza due to the fact that the party was allocating land to its supporters. We identified areas for re-planning and re-planned five areas; some were affected and we tried to save what is in place. Penalty fees of USD 1,500 were charged and paid to the UDCORP account, as the public had no confidence in Chitungwiza Municipality. UDCORP would transfer funds to [the] Chitungwiza Municipality account. People were responding to UDCORP more than the municipality; however, the municipality accused UDCORP of misappropriating funds. In response, the municipality opened an estate account and we referred people to pay the money to that account, but it vanished and nothing progressed after that.¹⁷⁶

Regularisation in Chitungwiza Municipality follows a commandist approach in which the government directs the process. Such an approach has met with resistance from Chitungwiza Municipality, residents and civil society. The process missed opportunities to enable residents to understand why houses have to be regularised. By following a participatory process, this, I argue, could have fostered planning literacy among the general public. In addition, regularisation did not involve the municipality and build its capacity, which is a further reason why the municipality is reluctant to support the process.

6.2.4 Support to Housing Co-operatives

In the absence of support from Chitungwiza Municipality’s housing department, some co-operatives received technical and financial support from CBOs. ZINAHCO, in particular, assisted co-operatives in Chitungwiza through financial loans and loan management and construction training workshops. The loan management workshops equipped co-operatives

¹⁷⁶ Interview with Planning Officer, Harare, 15 December 2015.

with skills to enable them to repay accessed construction loans. In its Chitungwiza district union, ZINAHCO had a membership of 4,311 in 2010, of which 1,670 houses (with 1,000 stands at ground-clearing stage) had been completed.¹⁷⁷ Here, I focus on assistance provided to two co-operatives in Chitungwiza, namely Mushawedu and New Life Success.

Mushawedu housing co-operative comprises of people living with disabilities. Due to stigmatisation, they usually face immense discrimination when trying to secure rental accommodation. A member of Mushawedu co-operative described how the loan from ZINAHCO assisted them:

In 2011 we applied for a USD 5,000 loan and ZINAHCO offered to us equal opportunity to access finance from the revolving loan fund. We procured 600 bags of cement, built a warehouse and started moulding bricks. About 200 bags remained, and with that we built ten slabs for our members. A sample core house was built comprising two rooms, a toilet and bathroom.¹⁷⁸

Such loans are vital in financing grassroots housing initiatives in an environment in which access to housing finance is limited and expensive. The housing microfinance market had collapsed due to the ongoing political and economic challenges facing the country, leaving the urban poor vulnerable.

New Life Success housing co-operative was formed and registered in 2007 by people living with HIV/AIDS. Apart from dealing with housing finance, ZINAHCO has also taken an inclusive and gendered approach by supporting people living with HIV/AIDS. Due to stigmatisation, living at someone's house while suffering from HIV/AIDS can lead to serious relational challenges. This is especially when one's status is known to other tenants or the property owner. Stigmatisation of people living with HIV/AIDS is prevalent in Chitungwiza

¹⁷⁷ ZINAHCO 2011 Annual Report to SIDA.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

and Epworth (Glenberg et al., 2008). ZINAHCO uses a holistic approach, in the process addressing housing and other societal challenges such as HIV/AIDS.

A member of New Life Success co-operative attributes her personal strength to having attended and learnt from ZINAHCO workshops, such as its National Women Seminar, HIV/AIDS and gender workshops. She said that “these workshops have contributed to the resilience I possess today [in the face of] life struggles and situations”.¹⁷⁹

Having explained the role of social movements and planning institutions in planning and housing delivery in Chitungwiza, the study now seeks to explain the contradictions and contestation inherent in the prevailing planning and housing delivery system. The next section focuses on the land delivery process, intra-party struggles, the leadership and governance of movements, and financial mismanagement and abuse. These, it is argued, are all indicators of a deeply fractured city.

6.3 Contestations and Contradictions

6.3.1 Land Delivery Process and Land Institutional Arrangements

Land production, land delivery and governance and tenure frameworks are critical underpinnings of urban development (Simone, 2014). Zimbabwe’s disputed land reform programme unsettled the country’s land delivery process in urban areas when the chaos at rural farms spilled over into urban and peri-urban areas. The situation was worsened by government ministries and agencies which used informal procedures when allocating peri-urban farms for housing development. For example, the allocation of land to Zanoremba and United We Stand co-operatives was explained as follows:

Zanoremba claims to have been allocated land by the Provincial Governor. However, this is questionable because at law, Governors cannot allocate land in a municipal area. Maybe it was a recommendation. He [the co-operative leader] now assumes it [land] belongs to him – according to his version. There is no proof that he bought land from Chitungwiza Municipality, not

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

even a receipt. He only has a letter from [the] Governor. It's like [a] Headmaster of Prince Edward [School A] offering a child a position at Queen Elizabeth [School B]. For United We Stand, I have failed to find any documentation supporting allocation of land. The leader would identify and sell land and pocket the money. However, people come to the municipality asking for regularisation. Furthermore, he was informally allocated some land by some council officials.¹⁸⁰

The purported allocation letter from Harare Metropolitan Governor to Zanoremba co-operative is not referenced or signed (MLGPWNH, 2013a). It can be argued that the challenges in most peri-urban housing settlements are partly a creation of the central government. The latter, specifically by means of the local government ministry, would hand over such settlements to local authorities, who were expected to address widespread chaos. This finding is true of settlements such as Caledonia, Odar Farm, Ushehwekunze and Hatcliffe in Harare and Nyatsime in Chitungwiza. The local government ministry, in particular the urban state land office, also unprocedurally processed a Deed of Grant to a powerful individual in Chitungwiza (MLGPWNH, 2013a).¹⁸¹

The majority of land in Chitungwiza was allocated by co-operative leaders. This means that more than 20,000 stands were allocated without the involvement of the municipality and government as the landowner. In Nyatsime, where the municipality tried to allocate land, the situation became chaotic as a result of invasions borne of frustration and politicking. The contestation over land allocation was explained as follows:

When council tried to solve the chaos in Nyatsime, it faced stiff resistance. There was a court interdict which compelled council to stop interfering with what is happening in Nyatsime. However, people keep on settling in the area. If the municipality wants to intervene to bring sanity, settlers destroy council

¹⁸⁰ Interview with Former Chitungwiza Chamber Secretary, Harare, 23 November 2015.

¹⁸¹ One hundred and forty-three hectares for an institutional stand in Zengeza 4, which was subdivided to 592 residential stands.

vehicles. Even the Deputy Sheriff's car was stoned. There are private individuals from political parties who are now in control of Nyatsime. More than 9,000 stands have been invaded without council approval. The local government minister was chased away when he visited the area. Those without council papers started throwing stones.¹⁸²

Nyatsime shows the uncoordinated nature of land management within the Government of Zimbabwe. In 2005, the local government ministry allocated Chitungwiza Municipality two farms for housing development, namely Bremar and Longlands. This came after the "local government ministry was allocated the two farms by *word of mouth* from the lands ministry, though the land was occupied by peri-urban farmers already" (emphasis added).¹⁸³ The municipality planned and sold 10,000 stands in Nyatsime. However, the same land had been allocated to peri-urban farmers by the Lands and Resettlement ministry (MLGPWNH, 2013a). As such, peri-urban farmers sued the municipality and won the case as they possessed offer letters issued by the government.

Issues of land incorporation in municipal boundaries are also contentious and chaotic. For example, in 2013 Chitungwiza council resolved that "Chitungwiza Municipality boundary should be adjusted to incorporate developments around unit 'O' area including the illegal developments of United We Stand Housing Co-operative".¹⁸⁴ However, extending municipal boundaries is a function vested in the president of the country.

The ownership of land in urban areas is vital in determining who has power and authority to control development, plan and deliver housing. Two arguments explain the present chaotic land delivery process in Chitungwiza. First, Chitungwiza Municipality is reluctant to control the land delivery process, arguing that land belongs to the state and that the municipality is keeping custody of it on behalf of the central government. In this regard, the municipality argues for land ownership to enable it to control planning and housing delivery effectively. Secondly,

¹⁸² Interview with Councillor, Chitungwiza, 9 November 2015.

¹⁸³ Interview with Chitungwiza former Chamber Secretary, Harare, 23 November 2015.

¹⁸⁴ Minutes of Chitungwiza Municipality 401st Council meeting.

stringent regulations do not apply to state land as they do to council land, given that the administration of state land is highly political inasmuch as the ruling Zanu-PF has often used state land in urban areas as a tool to influence voting patterns (McGregor, 2013; Muchadenyika, 2015b). Conversely, critics within government argue that vesting land ownership in a collapsed municipality would exacerbate the chaotic land delivery process.¹⁸⁵

6.3.2 Intra-Party Struggles and Contestation

The largest housing co-operatives in Chitungwiza are fraught with intra-party struggles. Whoever controls such co-operatives has the greater political power, as entails some degree of influence over the political lives of co-operators. Leadership wrangles in Zanoremba housing co-operative pit a councillor and MP against each other, both of whom are Zanu-PF politicians. Contestations about co-operative leadership also concern access to co-operative resources.

Such tensions and contestations have led to the creation of militias to protect opposing faction figures.¹⁸⁶ The militias are comprised of Zanu-PF youth and Zimbabwe National Army members, among others.¹⁸⁷ Militias are at the centre of the factional fighting that is derailing co-operative business. For instance, I observed opposing militias stoning hired equipment for rehabilitating gravel roads, in the process shattering and damaging windows. In addition, such militias play a central role in threatening and disrupting the building of houses of co-operative members loyal to the rival faction. Thus, both factions are claiming control of the co-operative and subsequently asking members for subscription fees.

A Zanu-PF councillor at the centre of battling for the control of Zanoremba co-operative with a local Zanu-PF MP provides the following insights:

There is a court case where I am accused of embezzling USD 300,000 whilst they know that MP Chigumba was responsible for collecting subscriptions. I was only elected in 2014 and now everyone pays to the bank. We now have a layout plan but it is yet to be approved. ZRP is not doing their work as they

¹⁸⁵ Interviews with Town Planner, DPP and Official, Urban state land Office, 14 January 2016.

¹⁸⁶ I saw three vehicles escorting the rival faction of Zanoremba housing co-operative.

¹⁸⁷ Interview with Councillor, Chitungwiza, 17 November 2015.

are not arresting Chigumba but terrorising me. The Land Audit report implicates Chigumba, but they are arresting an innocent person. They are giving Chigumba more time to continue doing land baron business. ZRP is betraying us as Chitungwiza Municipality – if it performs its mandate, things could be easy for the municipality. If we want to solve the issue, we normally get into the wrong hands. ZRP looks at who are you and not the issue at hand. At Chitungwiza Municipality we are trying our best to bring sanity and order in the town. Security agents should help us as a whole because Zimbabwe is getting slowly into Somalia, into a situation of warlords. Those doing unlawful things, such as selling land and protecting ill-gotten wealth through their mafia, are scot-free. If government fails to curtail this, some areas could end up being no-go areas because of warlords. If one is operating outside the law – such should cease to operate. Even Chigumba was given a court order not to interfere with co-operative business, but he is still interfering. He has even recruited soldiers – Major Makara and youths such as Steve Chimu, Leo Kamu (not real names) who are walking around with axes. But ZRP is aware but doing nothing. Those people should be silenced. This precedent will spread the whole country. Even in council chambers, there is fist-fighting with people who are not councillors who want to contribute to discussions.¹⁸⁸

At government level, such contestation is also known and tense, as the Land Audit Report confirms that Zanu-PF members are at the centre of the disorganised land and housing delivery process in Chitungwiza. In spite of this, the local government minister was unable to take action due to political contestation within Zanu-PF: those at the centre of the chaos in Chitungwiza are backed by senior politicians within the party. Notwithstanding the Audit findings, the government has shown no interest in taking any action in recourse. This can be taken to mean that the government is complicit in the shambles at Chitungwiza. Thanks to political conflict, government investigations are of little value. For instance, the government appointed a

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

resuscitation team, land audit team and investigation team, all of which were perceived as ‘toothless’.¹⁸⁹ Moreover, the failure of such efforts tends simply to strengthen the power of parallel municipal systems.

Why is there a lack of political will to address the Chitungwiza crisis? Three explanations are possible. First, politicians spurring ‘illegal’ planning and housing activities in Chitungwiza are part of a huge network of patron-client relationships, relationships that anchor people in a clear framework of reciprocal obligations (Simone, 2014) in which land and money are traded for political support. The network includes senior politicians as well as local authority and government officials who all benefit from the chaos in the town. Secondly, the politics of urban control involves Zanu-PF trying to portray municipal failure in Chitungwiza as a result of the municipality being MDC-dominated. Such a political context means that central government does not always have an incentive to help the municipality improve its performance (Resnick, 2014). Thirdly, the Chitungwiza Municipality has collapsed, meaning that addressing the planning and housing crisis requires measures to rebuild the municipality’s capacity, particularly its corporate governance systems. This capacity-building process, which calls for major investment in human capital and municipal systems, seems to be one that neither central government nor the municipality is keen on undertaking.

6.3.3 Leadership and Governance of Housing Co-operatives

The way co-operatives are led and governed in Chitungwiza stands in sharp contrast to what obtains in Harare. Co-operative audits, holding regular meetings and AGMs, supervision by City of Harare’s DHCS, and active participation by co-operators in co-operative business are practices which are present in Harare but absent in Chitungwiza. As I argue below, housing co-operatives in these two cities are similar only in name but are otherwise distinct in practice.

In two co-operatives studied in Chitungwiza, other members did not know that they are in fact a co-operative. Rather, people thought these were private developers. In this case, members could not ask anything pertaining to corporate governance. Thus, there were no elections and audits, and the management and governance of such co-operatives became a preserve of the

¹⁸⁹ Interview with Town Planner, DPP, Harare, 14 January 2016.

founders. In the case of Zanoremba housing co-operative, the founder and leader conflated the co-operative with a private company. The argument was that in a private company, the proprietors do whatever they deem necessary to protect their interests. In order to suppress accountability, leaders of these co-operatives recruited non-professionals to perform administrative duties, “a strategy to reduce incidences of questioning”.¹⁹⁰ Such an administrative set-up led to widespread maladministration and financial mismanagement (section 6.3.4). However, “when beneficiaries realised that they were in a co-operative, a faction emerged agitating for adherence to principles of cooperativism”.¹⁹¹

Co-operatives in Chitungwiza are led by Zanu-PF-linked individuals. Such individuals have political power which they use primarily for three things:

1. Gaining easy access to land through invasions and informal party channels.
2. Building a political base by selling land to Zanu-PF cadres and using the threat of evictions for beneficiaries to support Zanu-PF in elections.
3. Building protective networks with senior politicians so that ‘illegal’ housing structures are not challenged and questioned.

A government investigation concluded that land barons are politically connected (MLGPWNH, 2013a), which explains why there is cowering and hesitancy to bring stability to the town.¹⁹² After five investigation and intervention teams, people realised all these processes were of little significance, thereby giving more power to land barons.¹⁹³

The leadership of Zanoremba housing co-operative has been contested in the High Court of Zimbabwe. Such contestation presents recognition challenges to the municipality. This is mainly because after working with leadership for some time, the other faction claims legitimacy, supporting this with a new court ruling. This has stalled engagement between Chitungwiza Municipality and the co-operative, as the former has had to bear with leadership

¹⁹⁰ Interview with Town Planner, DPP, Harare, 14 January 2016.

¹⁹¹ Interview with Former Chitungwiza Chamber Secretary, Harare, 23 November 2015.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*

¹⁹³ Interview with Town Planner, DPP, Harare, 16 January 2016.

contestations from time to time.¹⁹⁴ Leadership of co-operatives provides access to political and financial resources, and hence it is contested.

6.3.4 Financial Mismanagement and Abuse

According to section 35 of the Co-operative Societies Act (Chap. 24: 05), the financial records of co-operatives should be audited annually. Furthermore, subscriptions by members are supposed to contribute towards paying land-intrinsic value and infrastructure servicing. In Chitungwiza, however, co-operatives had no audited accounts, were not supervised by the responsible ministry, and employed non-professionals.¹⁹⁵ During FGDs, members said that once they have paid subscriptions, they do not know where the money goes. A common observation heard from members was ‘I have land in town and everything else therefore becomes of less significance’.¹⁹⁶ This partly indicates the degree of desperation by individuals who acquired land in Chitungwiza through co-operatives.

Housing co-operatives enriched leaders at the expense of Chitungwiza Municipality. Unlike in Harare, where co-operatives pay land-intrinsic value of USD 4/m² as part of allocation conditions, in Chitungwiza, the monies from land sales were misappropriated by individuals. According to the government Land Audit Report, the central government and Chitungwiza Municipality lost about USD 20.423 million through illegal land sales. Such monies were pocketed by co-operative leaders, in particular, Zanoremba, United We Stand, Heritage, Face East, Yemurai Disabled, Ruvimbo and Zanu-PF youths (MLGPWNH, 2013a).

The amount thus received by individuals (USD 20.423 million) could have provided water, sewer and road infrastructure to about 8,169 stands, at an average of USD 4,000 per stand. This indicates that the co-operative movement could pool significant resources which, if properly managed, can provide infrastructure services. In general, based on such financial capacity, one can argue that the co-operative model works in low-income housing delivery.

¹⁹⁴ Interview with Former Chitungwiza Chamber Secretary, Harare, 23 November 2015.

¹⁹⁵ Interview with Town Planner, DPP, Harare, 16 January 2016.

¹⁹⁶ As commonly raised by participants during FGDs.

Financial mismanagement in Chitungwiza went unchecked due to three factors. Unlike in Harare, where audited accounts and evidence of sound corporate governance are selection criteria for land allocation, in Chitungwiza there are no formal processes for allocating land to co-operatives. In reality, co-operatives obtain land through 'illegal' and informal means. This arrangement poses challenges to municipalities' ability to supervise governance and financial management in co-operatives effectively. In Harare, the MOSMECD plays its supporting role by supervising AGMs and audit compliance for co-operatives. However, in Chitungwiza the MOSMECD did not play such roles in the 26 registered co-operatives. Lastly, the fact that people bought stands not knowing these were part of a co-operative disempowered them from demanding accountability and transparency in financial management.

6.4 Conclusion

The manner in which planning is conducted and housing delivered in Chitungwiza is marred by widespread contestation and confusion. This chapter argued that the town of Chitungwiza is fractured as a result of the actions of social movements and the incapacity of Chitungwiza Municipality. In the post-2000 era, social movements spearheaded a parallel planning and housing delivery system that impaired the municipality's ability to perform its functions. As such, the majority of houses delivered via social movements are deemed illegal by the Chitungwiza Municipality and government. This has necessitated a government-directed and -led regularisation programme targeting about 11,000 completed housing units.

Political factors have informed and driven a parallel planning and housing delivery system. This has presented serious challenges to environmental conservation, human safety and convenience, all of which are town planning objectives: the tendency has been to regard housing purely and simply as an end in itself. The parallel planning and housing system flourished thanks to what has been characterised here as municipal failure. While the latter is a complex subject that requires further analytical inquiry, the chapter has focused on the causes and effects of municipal failure. The main four causes have to do with weak municipal systems, weak governance and administration, unethical conduct by appointed and elected officials, and lack of ownership and control over land. Manifestations of such failure include uncoordinated

housing developments, abuse of municipal systems, widespread environmental degradation, and planning failure.

Despite these failures in official planning, at grassroots level there are elements of radical planning in Chitungwiza, ones driven by social movements. Such a form of planning has significantly altered the form and structure of the town. In part, such planning is credited with contributing to the largest number of housing units in the town post-2000. Putting aside the ‘legal and illegal’ debate, radical or insurgent planning delivered about 22,000 housing units, whereas Chitungwiza Municipality and the government could not provide a single housing unit. The municipality and government have decided to regularise at least half of the houses built through a parallel planning and housing delivery system. This regularisation process translated into the *de facto* presence of the state in planning and housing (through a government entity taking over planning functions from the municipality). However, the take-over led to contestation and resistance from the municipality, stalling the regularisation process.

Radical or insurgent planning holds encouraging potential, particularly in situations where state and municipal capacity is constrained. Whilst social movements have been the main agents of such radical planning, there has been a lack of technical expertise from qualified and trained ‘radical planners’ who could advise these social movements. Such non-collaboration with insurgent planners, partly led to the contribution of social movements to housing lacking credibility to the government, and municipality.

Chapter Seven

Epworth: The Informal-Formal Transition

Chapter One argues that Epworth developed informally over time. In 1986, the Government of Zimbabwe proclaimed an urban local authority in the form of a Local Board to plan and govern Epworth. Thus, Epworth Local Board (ELB) came into being. The government set out two objectives for ELB, namely to regularise existing and future development in the area and to improve living conditions of Epworth residents (Epworth Local Board, 1986). In pursuit of this, the government embarked on an *in situ* upgrading programme. Six thousand stands were upgraded (Chirisa & Muhomba, 2013: 951), marking the start of formalised planning in Epworth. Since then, there has not been a significant addition to the housing stock by ELB, apart from 1,200 stands in Overspill planned and serviced in 1990. The 2012 census estimates that about 167,462 people reside in Epworth, which means that the majority live informally (as there are 7,200 formal stands). About 30% of Epworth is considered planned and formal (DOS et al., 2014), making the interaction between social movements and planning institutions distinctively different to that in Harare and Chitungwiza.

This chapter analyses Epworth's transition from informal to formal urban settlement. It does so by focusing on ongoing struggles and continued pressure from social movements in pursuit of recognition and how planning authorities conceded to such demands through formalisation. Epworth's distinctive growth-path poses questions to the existing body of planning and housing literature. These include: How does an area change from rural to urban without formal planning? What is the role of social movements in transforming informal settlements? How does informal planning feed into formal planning during the formalisation of settlements? What are the tensions that characterise planning and housing in informal settlements? This chapter addresses these and related issues. It focuses primarily on Ward 7 of Epworth, which is an informal settlement with a population of about 39,552 people (ZimStat, 2013b). I begin by analysing the role of social movements in transforming the informal settlement.

7.1 Social Movements and Low-Income Housing

7.1.1 Informal Housing and Political Opportunities

In the post-independence era, Epworth is the only informal settlement that has been tolerated by the Government of Zimbabwe (Manjengwa, Mutema & Tirivanhu, 2016). This is contrary to the government's ruthless attitude towards informal settlements, marked by demolitions and evictions (Fontein, 2009; Potts, 2006a, 2008b; Kamete, 2007, 2009). As shown in Table 36, of the 22,024 housing stands and structures in Epworth, about 13,058 are informal. These informal housing stands are in the process of being regularised and formalised using *in situ* upgrading. Of the 32 urban centres, Epworth hosts perhaps the largest informal settlement in Zimbabwe. Informality in Epworth is characterised by high levels of poverty and informal economic activities and settlements. A 2011 survey found that the incidence of household poverty in Epworth was 82%, which is similar to that of rural districts (Manjengwa, Feresu & Chimhowu, 2012). In Ward 7, formal employment is mainly in menial jobs such as security guards (45%), general hands (7%), drivers (11%), housemaids (6%) and shopkeepers (8%) (Enumeration Survey, 2010).

Table 36: Epworth Property Stock

Area	Housing Stands				Other Stands			Total
	High Density	Medium Density	Low Density	Mixed Density	Commercial	Industrial	Institutional	
Formal (Wards 1-6)	3,447	2,465	1,814	1,260	212	31	72	9,301
Informal (Ward 7)	8,391	-	-	-	-	-	1	8,372
Informal (Wards 1 and 6)	4,667	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,667
Total	16,485	2465	1,814	1,260	212	31	73	22,340

Source: Calculated from ELB property database, 2015.

One fundamental factor in explaining growth in informal housing in Ward 7 is migration. The urban economy of Harare has been declining since the late 1980s (Sachikonye, 1996; Kamete, 2006c), resulting in, among other things, retrenchments and a drop in formal employment. The migration of people from Harare to Epworth was determined by structural economic conditions (Potts, 2010). This is borne out by 47.7% of Ward 7 residents indicating Harare as their area of origin, as shown in Table 37. At the same time, about 35,4% of households in Ward 7 indicated rural areas as the area of origin. This can be interpreted to mean that the ward provides an entry point to cities due to its cheap living conditions.

Table 37: Areas of Origin for Households

Area of origin	No. of households	Percentage (%)
Harare	3,162	47.7
Epworth	1,124	16.9
Rural Areas	2,350	35.4
Total	6,636	100

Source: Enumeration Survey, 2010.

Informal settlements provide affordable accommodation. Survey results show that about 75.6% of people cited affordable accommodation as the major pull factor to Epworth (Enumeration Survey, 2010). Their reasons for migrating to Epworth are reflected in Table 38. In a way, Epworth provides a fall-back to people who face accommodation challenges in nearby urban centres. Others reasons such as employment and marriage are, however, outside the scope of this study.

Table 38: Reasons for Migrating to Epworth

Reason	No. of Households	Percentage (%)
Affordable accommodation	5,018	75.6
Employment	1,139	17.2
Marriage	362	5.4
Evictions	117	1.8
Total	6,636	100

Source: Enumeration Survey, 2010.

Epworth, and Ward 7 in particular, witnessed a rapid influx of new settlers in 2000 during the FTLRP (Enumeration Survey, 2010). However, settling informally is deemed illegal in Zimbabwe's town planning regime. Despite this, informal housing in Epworth shows a different trajectory, as no massive evictions were undertaken. Settlers devised a strategy to diffuse the threat of evictions and demolitions: through political allegiance to the ruling party, Zanu-PF. Community members testified to this:

For us to stay here, it's all because of politics. Politics is our foundation so that we won't be evicted. People argued about how we can secure our stay here and the resolution was, let's be part of Zanu-PF. The party helped us for free, defending that this area belongs to us. There was, however, an issue that informal settlers are not genuine Zanu-PF supporters. However, even on

elections, Zanu-PF won in this ward. What started first is settling and [we] later thought of using Zanu-PF to stand for us and our challenges.¹⁹⁷

In return, Zanu-PF protected the settlers, arguing that they constituted a core party base in Harare province, which had predominantly been an MDC stronghold since its formation in 1999 (Kriger, 2012). Party structures, the local MP and the president would defend the informal settlement, as a WADCO member narrates:

We were staying without paying any levies to ELB. In *The Herald* we saw bulldozers drawn, indicating that there were going to be demolitions in Epworth. We formed a squatter committee and met at *majecha* to strategise. For us to build momentum, we asked ourselves how many war vets, ex-detainees, presidential guards and ex-soldiers we have. We realised the essence of making Zanu-PF aware that we are party supporters so that we won't be evicted. In order to make sure that our houses won't be demolished again, we wrote a letter in 1998 to the president. The letter was handed to him at Harare International airport. We told the president that, in Epworth, we have presidential guards, ex-detainees, war vets and supporters of the party and we do not want our houses to be demolished. The party realised that Epworth has its supporters. This is what affirmed our settling here. In a way, the fact that Epworth supports Zanu-PF has protected people settling in the area.¹⁹⁸

Zanu-PF played a fundamental role in preserving Epworth as an informal settlement and halting evictions. This is in sharp contrast to massive evictions and demolitions in Harare, with most people who were affected being perceived as opposition MDC supporters (Bracking, 2005; Morreira, 2010). As such, it can be argued that politics became a key factor in defending informal housing in Epworth. However, Zanu-PF did not undertake any meaningful

¹⁹⁷ FGD 10, Mabvazuva School, Epworth, 10 December 2015.

¹⁹⁸ Interview with Ward 7 WADCO Committee Member – Lands, Epworth, 12 December 2015.

programme to address ubiquitous informality in Epworth. Rather, “the party seemed to be more worried about loyalty and allegiance of settlers at the expense of formalising the settlement”.¹⁹⁹ In fact, “Zanu-PF threatens to deny settlers residential stands unless they participate in Zanu-PF activities” (Kriger, 2012: 21).

The change in the governance regime to elected councillors presented a political opportunity – as before, appointed commissioners were not representing the interests of informal settlers.²⁰⁰ In this regard, the new governance structure undertook regularisation and formalisation. In summary, there are three political opportunities exploited by informal settlers in Epworth. These are the politics of urban control, which saw Zanu-PF protecting informal settlers; the rise of the MDC in controlling Epworth; and changes to the governance of ELB, which ushered in the first elected councillors. These factors provided incentives for collective action in defence of informality.

7.1.2 Failure of the Co-operative Model

Unlike in Harare, where co-operatives significantly contributed to housing delivery, co-operatives failed in Epworth. What could explain this? First, in Epworth, co-operatives emerged at the behest of politicians, and thus members were not convinced of the importance of such movements. This led to a tendency of leaders to abuse co-operatives for personal and political gain.²⁰¹ Secondly, governance challenges within co-operatives prompted people to withdraw their monies and disband.²⁰² The third reason concerns the absence of technical support and of a clear framework guiding co-operative operations from the ELB. As argued in Chapter Five, the conduct of leadership is a key success factor in co-operative housing. In Harare and Chitungwiza, co-operatives failing to deliver on their objectives are associated with corrupt and poor corporate governance. In Epworth, leadership contributed to the failure of co-operatives. As former members recounted,

¹⁹⁹ FGD 11, Mabvazuva School, Epworth, 10 December 2015.

²⁰⁰ Interview with Ward 7 Councillor, Epworth, 12 December 2015.

²⁰¹ FGD 10, Mabvazuva School, Epworth, 10 December 10, 2015.

²⁰² Interview with WADCO Committee Member – Lands, Epworth, 12 December 2015.

[i]t was under the Member of Parliament that the co-operative idea was conceived. The impetus was that for people not to be evicted, we should form co-operatives. We were paying subscriptions incrementally over time and the head office was at Batanai School. However, co-operatives were fraught with corruption and people withdrew their monies while others failed. People who were leading these co-operatives started progressing in their lives. Other leaders bought commuter omnibuses. Even our MP was not transparent in co-operative affairs and she latter “dumped” the area to represent elsewhere.²⁰³

The failure of co-operatives prompted the community to devise new strategies to advocate for secure tenure and housing. This strategic refocusing enabled informal settlers and their movements to realise their goal of secure housing. One such strategy was the WADCOs, as a Ward 7 councillor observes:

We had co-operatives but they brought no meaningful change in the settlement. Therefore, we dumped them and looked for a route of engaging council and private developers. We took a new thrust consisting of WADCOs, Councillors and ELB and as we are talking, people are being allocated stands. Everything is now done through ELB which is managing the ongoing formalisation project. We had more than 10 co-operatives in Epworth and we dumped them in 2006. These were initiated by the MP though they were riddled with maladministration. There was rampant corruption in co-operatives.²⁰⁴

It can be argued that co-operatives work in formal settlements where the preoccupation is with purchasing and developing land. In informal settlements, it would seem that the model of co-operatives does not work because major issues in such settlements, such as building consensus

²⁰³ FGD 10, Mabvazuva School, Epworth, 10 December 2015.

²⁰⁴ Interview with Ward 7 Councillor, Epworth, 12 December 2015.

on upgrading and pre-upgrading processes (profiling, enumeration, and mapping), are outside the purview of co-operatives.²⁰⁵ When Epworth residents realised the inefficiencies associated with co-operatives, they disbanded them. The other possible reason why co-operatives failed in Epworth is that they have a limited membership, whereas the enormity of work in informal settlements requires the participation of every settler. WADCOs would be central in grassroots-driven *in situ* upgrading.

7.1.3 Grassroots-Driven *In Situ* Upgrading

The transformation of Ward 7 from a rural to an urban setting was characterised by struggles centred on control of land, building of structures, and recognition of the settlement by the council. For decades ELB argued that the area is a squatter settlement (Chirisa & Muhomba, 2013). Without recognition, the community developed its own institutions to carry out functions such as development planning. One such institution is the WADCO, which would spearhead the development of the Ward and act as the interface between residents and the ELB. When the Ward was finally recognised, “ELB would realise that the Ward contributes a significant percentage to the Council budget”.²⁰⁶

What happens when people themselves initiate development in urban areas? A grassroots-driven process came into being because ELB and the government have no capacity to provide such essential services. The Epworth case shows the potency of grassroots-based *in situ* upgrading financing model. What does this mean? Informal settlers are financing the upgrading process through individual contributions in a special-purpose fund created and managed by ELB.²⁰⁷ Upgrading finances are centralised and managed by the Local Board. This is made possible by the community’s realisation that that ELB and government were unable to finance upgrading, its decision that the ELB should manage the upgrading fund, and its recognition that transformation requires community financial investments.

²⁰⁵ These are outside co-operative objects in Housing Co-operative Society Bye-Laws.

²⁰⁶ Interview with Ward 7 WADCO Chairperson, Epworth, 12 December 2015.

²⁰⁷ ELB Meeting Minutes, 29 March 2012.

ZIHOPFE committed USD 50,000 to initiate the formalisation process that assisted in the development of Ward 7's layout plan.²⁰⁸ However, "ELB argued that it could not take the process further as it was financially constrained".²⁰⁹ At that stage, communities took control of financing the formalisation process. Surveying fees were pegged at USD 200; WADCO negotiated this to USD 170, an amount which would be paid in instalments.²¹⁰ However, Zanu-PF leaders intervened and maintained that survey fees were still expensive and pegged at USD 110.²¹¹ To incentivise people to pay, ELB devised a strategy to start allocating stands formally.²¹² The local authority used formalisation as an opportunity to facilitate debt-clearing by residents, and accordingly the council adopted a resolution to compel residents to clear debts before paying survey and registration (regularisation) fees.²¹³ In Epworth, the regularisation fee is USD 100, which is lower than Chitungwiza's USD 1,500. To promote joint ownership of the project and transparency, "all monies are paid to [the] Ward development Fund at ELB, with the local authority receipting and accounting at no charge".²¹⁴

The participation of ordinary residents in *in situ* upgrading activities has significantly increased planning literacy within the community. In particular, "participation in planning processes helped people in appreciating urban planning and reducing resistance to *in situ* upgrading challenges such as relocations if one is on the road or institutional sites such as schools and clinics".²¹⁵ Participatory planning had a tendency to ward off community resistance. However, the ability of such a model to finance water, sanitation and roads infrastructure cannot be ascertained at this stage. Suffice it to say that financing infrastructure installation is the most expensive part of informal upgrading. In hindsight, it can be proposed that this is the stage where infrastructure can be co-produced incrementally with the government, ELB and communities.

²⁰⁸ Epworth Slum-upgrading Concept Paper, 15 December 2015.

²⁰⁹ Interview with Ward 7 WADCO Chairperson, Epworth, 8 December 2015.

²¹⁰ FGD 10, Mabvazuva School, Epworth, 10 December 2015.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*

²¹² Interview with Ward 7 Councillor, Epworth, 12 December 2015.

²¹³ ELB Meeting Minutes, 26 June 2014.

²¹⁴ Interview with Ward 7 WADCO Chairperson, Epworth, 8 December 2015.

²¹⁵ FGD 13, Ward 6 Epworth, 16 December 2015.

7.1.4 Informality and Infrastructure

Water and sanitation characteristics of the 6,636 households in Ward 7 are shown in Table 39. About 78.4% of the households use deep wells as the source of water. Ward 7 is served by one borehole, which is overstretched as people in other areas such as Overspill access water from it too. It also explains why only 1.4% indicated that they use borehole as the source of water. This has forced the community to rely on shallow wells, on average three for every ten houses²¹⁶ or eight people per well (Enumeration Survey, 2010). However, participants in all the four FGDs held in Epworth argued that during the rainy season, water flows in shallow wells despite continued drinking of such water. Women commented on the “psychological, physical and emotional stress associated with struggles on available water points”.²¹⁷ There is violence associated with accessing water at overcrowded boreholes. For instance, it was reported that such violence “often occurred due to struggles to reduce time spent on boreholes”.²¹⁸ The majority who fetch water are women and children, and so they are disproportionately affected by water challenges in informal settlements.

For sanitation, about 98.7% of households use pit-based toilets as shown in Table 39. The average person per pit-based toilet is six (Enumeration Survey, 2010). These toilets are built as temporary structures, and their spatial distribution from water points (shallow wells) poses risk of cross-filtration during rainy seasons.²¹⁹ Most disused pits for Blair toilets are often not fully reclaimed, creating a breeding ground for diseases and snakes. The Federation has introduced Ecosan Skyloo toilets, though at a slow pace due to the contested nature of development in the Ward.

Table 39: Water and Sanitation Characteristics

Water			Sanitation		
Water Source	No. of Households	Percentage (%)	Type of Toilet	No. of Households	Percentage (%)
Shallow well	1,341	20.2	Pit-based (pit latrine & bucket)	6,547	98.7
Deep Well	5,201	78.4	Bush	64	0.96
Borehole	94	1.4	Ecosan	25	0.04

²¹⁶ Based on estimates of FGD participants.

²¹⁷ As advanced by women participants during FGDs.

²¹⁸ FGD 11, Mabvazuva School, Epworth, 12 December 2015.

²¹⁹ FGD 12, Mabvazuva School, Epworth, 12 December 2015.

Total	6,636	100	6,636	100
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Source: Enumeration Survey, 2010.

Road infrastructure is important for facilitating mobility and linking residents with social and economic services. However, Ward 7 in particular has no surfaced roads, and is serviced by road openings which are not even gravelled. For instance, 81.2% indicated that they use small paths to access their houses, while 18.7% use gravel roads (Enumeration Survey, 2010).

7.2 Planning Institutions and Low-Income Housing

7.2.1 *In situ* Upgrading and Formalisation²²⁰

In situ upgrading requires community participation as well as minimum resettlement and disturbance of a settlement's social and economic fabric (Huchzermeyer, 2009; Patel, 2013). Formalisation entails official registration and issuance of titles to individuals or families now holding housing or other land-based assets in an allegedly tenuous and insecure condition (Bromley, 2008). Zimbabwe's town planning regime has a provision for regularisation of buildings, uses or operations which in their erection did not follow planning procedures (GoZ, 1996). However, there is no framework to guide *in situ* upgrading and formalisation. The Epworth case became path-breaking and stood to contribute to both planning law and policy. The *in situ* upgrading explained in this chapter is in sharp contrast to the top-down government-directed programme of the 1980s (Kamete, 2013).

Why *in situ* upgrading? First, relocation of about 40,000 people was not practically feasible, given the resistance from informal settlers. As such, *in situ* upgrading "brought a new dimension, a realisation that we [ELB] cannot move people from point A to B and back again."²²¹ Secondly, lessons learned with regard to HSUP were instrumental in assisting the upgrading process. The third factor was the opportunities provided by the NHP 2012, which adopted incremental development as a low-income housing strategy. In Epworth, *in situ* upgrading uses incremental development where services are provided gradually (from communal to on-site services). Fourthly, about 69.3% of households indicated that *in situ*

²²⁰ It is important to note that the *in situ* upgrading process is still in the infancy stage. Primarily, the process has covered title registration, community planning and surveying with issues of service provision still outstanding.

²²¹ Interview with ELB Engineer, Epworth, 5 December 2015.

upgrading is the preferred upgrading model, as shown in Table 40. A fifth factor was the influence of ZIHOPFE and Dialogue on Shelter, which both use *in situ* upgrading as a model to formalise informal settlements. Lastly, politics influenced the decision to adopt informal upgrading, given that the first elected councillors began to influence policy by adopting *in situ* upgrading. This is in contrast to the Commissioners era, in which “the ELB was persistently arguing that ‘squatters’ have to go”.²²²

Table 40: Informal Settlers and Preferred Upgrading Model

Preferred Upgrading Model	No. of Households	Percentage (%)
In-situ	4,597	69.3
Relocations within Epworth	1,042	15.7
Relocations elsewhere in Epworth	758	11.4
Relocation out of Epworth	239	3.6
Total	6,636	100

Source: Enumeration Survey, 2010.

The decision to adopt *in situ* upgrading demonstrates the flexibility of planning institutions. In other words, it can be argued that Zimbabwe’s highly technocratic planning showed its other side – the human face. In such a case, planning contributes to a just city by promoting social justice, inclusivity, and recognition of informal settlers. Communities presented evidence of how upgrading came about, after scepticism and resistance from town planners:

Epworth Local Board realised that it is very important to regularise so that people stay formally. Why now? There were contestations with town planners arguing that *in situ* upgrading will not work if conducted when people are occupying the land. Therefore, planners argued that people should be evicted first to pave the way for town planning processes. However, at present, planners have realised it is possible to upgrade *in situ*.²²³

At this stage, a question arises about which processes entail *in situ* upgrading and formalisation. These processes include enumeration, mapping, layout planning, surveying and land allocation, as explained in Table 41.

²²² Interview with ELB Housing Officer, Epworth, 13 January 2016.

²²³ Interview with Ward 7 WADCO members, 5 January 2016.

Table 41: In situ Upgrading and Formalisation Processes

Process	Explanation
Profiling	Capture of basic settlement data and context such as land use, housing, service provision, economic activities and social and political environment.
Enumeration	Community conducts censuses that collect data describing living conditions in informal settlements (see Annex VI for enumeration tool). Communities develop a development plan which forms the basis of the upgrading process.
GIS Mapping	Satellite and digital imaging is used to provide a link between social and spatial data. The process minimises disruption and displacement by taking cognisance of existing developments.
Layout planning	Communities develop sketch maps showing spatial distribution of land uses. Professional planners further combine community sketch maps into a consolidated layout plan.
Surveying	Demarcation of stand boundaries and lodging of general survey map with Surveyor General's Office.
Land allocation	Allocation of housing stands officially by the Local Board.

Source: DOS, ZIHOPFE & SDI, 2012; Research Findings, 2015.

In total, the formalisation process targets 21,957 stands, and about 21,957 households will have secure tenure.²²⁴ It has been argued that formalisation of land rights is a way of reducing poverty (Sjaastad & Cousins, 2008) and increasing people's propensity to invest and ability to secure finance (Johnson et al., 2002; Smith, 2004; de Soto, 2000). On the other hand, scholars like Payne, Durrand-Lasserve and Rakodi (2009), Bromley (2008) and Toulmin (2008) argue that in urban areas formalisation may result in unintended negative impacts, such as strengthening the capacity of landlords to exploit poor tenants, along with problems surrounding taxation and exclusion from property markets that may adversely affect the urban poor. However, the study could not assess the potential effects of land rights formalisation, as the formalising is still unfolding.

At the time the field work for this study was concluded, about 3,200 stands had been formally allocated. A process triggered by community initiatives in Ward 7 was scaled up to all seven wards, a development which highlights the potential of grassroots initiatives. The upscaling of formalisation in Epworth thus contradicts Fainstein's (2010) view that the transformative potential of urban movements is limited to achieving change at the level in which they are operating. As this study demonstrates, the transformative potential of urban movements can be

²²⁴ Distributed as 4,000 (ward 1), 1,300 (ward 2), 800 (Ward 3), 4,000 (ward 4), 1,200 (ward 5), 3,857 (ward 6) and 6,800 (ward 7). Interview with ELB Housing Officer, Epworth, 13 January 2016.

realised across a city through learning, exchanges and expansion of movements themselves. In Epworth, what started at ward level grew into a city-wide movement that is transforming the urban centre.

What has been the role of councillors in Epworth's formalisation process? The next section addresses this question.

7.2.2 Councillors and Formalisation of Settlements

Councillors became key in the formalisation process through adopting resolutions to formalise and representing the interests of informal settlers. In Ward 7, the councillor “was negative at the beginning, though she later turned to be a change champion after understanding formalisation”.²²⁵ In comparison to male councillors, the female councillor, it seems, provided leadership in line with the letter and spirit of formalisation (Chitekwe-Biti et al., 2012). By contrast, male councillors seem to be concerned about power struggles and controlling the formalisation process.²²⁶

The councillor in question was not only the sole female but also Zanu-PF's sole representative. Such an arrangement became strategic as social movements and SMOs could not be seen as working in MDC areas and propping up the opposition party. In 2012, councillors adopted a resolution to regularise Ward 6 and Ward 3.²²⁷ The area earmarked for regularisation in Ward 3 was previously left out of planning boundaries and settlers were earmarked for relocation.²²⁸ However, councillors chose *in situ* upgrading ahead of relocation. In this regard, councillors became key agents of promoting socially inclusive urban centres.

Councillors acted as a means of channelling information between ELB and communities. For instance, during the formal allocation of regularised stands in Wards 6 and 7, it was noted that “[c]ouncillors were advised to notify residents earlier before the date of allocation to avoid

²²⁵ Interview with NGO Director, Harare, 1 September 2015.

²²⁶ For example, in the 2013-18 council, some male councillors even stopped the formalisation process, ostensibly for personal gain.

²²⁷ ELB Meeting Minutes, 29 March 2012.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*

delays when officials [ELB] went on the ground. All councillors were to attend the allocation exercises in support of each other”.²²⁹ The political clout of councillors as representatives of people facilitated the work of ELB officials in informal settlements. In a way, this reduced the violence and resistance often associated with informal settlements. Epworth is embroiled in political and criminal violence (Kriger, 2012; Chirisa & Muhomba, 2013); however, councillors with political party structures (in particular, the security arm) were instrumental in quelling violence during the upgrading process.²³⁰

In terms of funding, councillors argued that “residents, as owners of the project” had to fund *in situ* upgrading.²³¹ This was a clear indication that ELB had no financial capacity, and hence it advocated for a grassroots-driven process. Unlike the case in many informal settlements, where authorities and politicians promise to do everything for informal settlers, the decision by the ELB to clearly state its financial incapacity was transformational. It can be deduced that an honest assessment of institutional capacity is vital in slum-upgrading. The ability of municipal leaders to understand and accept municipal constraints on formalisation provides room for potential funders. In Epworth, communities and ZIHOPFE are the major financiers of slum-upgrading.

7.2.3 Managing Informal Upgrading

As discussed in section 7.3.3, there are various layers of contestation in Epworth. Informal upgrading generates new political dynamics as different actors struggle to assert power and authority over the process. The first resolution towards formalisation and its initial processes were set in motion by an MDC-led council. Such a decision in some way made the party a champion of inclusive municipal governance, much to the consternation of Zanu-PF, which was concerned about the political impact of a successful informal upgrading process led by an opposition party. In the absence of Zanu-PF councillors, the District Administrator influenced the process and protected Zanu-PF interests. Community members observed:

²²⁹ ELB Meeting Minutes, 15 September 2015.

²³⁰ FGD 13, Ward 6 Epworth, 16 December 2015.

²³¹ ELB Meeting Minutes, 26 June 2014.

Borrowing from Ward 7, as Ward 6, we initiated the process to develop the Ward through formalisation. As such, the MDC councillor went to the District Administrator's office to discuss and initiate development in the area. However, the District Administrator instructed the councillor to come with Zanu-PF members to validate his proposals. In this regard, Zanu-PF members were asked to confirm what the MDC councillor had said and they indeed confirmed the resolve by the community to formalise.²³²

In this case, the DA's office remains an important tool for Zanu-PF to control land and housing in Epworth. However, post-2013, Zanu-PF gained control of Epworth and used its political clout to influence the pricing of outsourced services through negotiations and directives.²³³

As the struggle to control the formalisation process raged on, "ZIHOPFE and Dialogue on Shelter were stopped [by the councillor] while conducting profiling and enumeration in Ward 4".²³⁴ The councillor, however, favoured a consultant-driven process, which arguably opens an avenue towards control and possible personal benefit. Party officials in Epworth wield much power, and communities have little room to question decisions by political leaders. However, ELB's housing department argued that "Federation processes are not time conscious, as it needs everyone to be involved and does not usually tally with our [ELB] speed".²³⁵

Informal upgrading is a multifaceted process that, among other things, gives rise to struggles for political capital. This is evident in the contest for power and control between the Ward 7 councillor (2008-13) and WADCO chairperson, with the latter displacing the former as councillor in the 2013 election. Processes such as informal upgrading transform communities, and communities in turn have a tendency to ingratiate themselves to people leading such

²³² FGD 13, Epworth, 16 December 2015.

²³³ Examples include: "survey fees reduced from USD 200 per stand to USD 120 per stand for Wards 1 and 5 as per their [surveying firm] negotiations with Zanu-PF Harare province members". Survey fees reduced "from USD 170 per stand to USD 110 per stand for Ward 7 as per directive from Zanu-PF Harare Province members" (ELB Meeting Minutes, 05 May 2015).

²³⁴ Interview with DOS Projects Coordinator, 28 August 2015.

²³⁵ Interview with ELB Housing Officer, Epworth, 13 January 2016.

processes.²³⁶ Informal upgrading involves demarcation of space, which often generates conflict that the Local Board would find itself meddling in and trying to resolve.²³⁷ In handling such conflict, an understanding of collective gains and the pros and cons of upgrading proved to be crucial. The participatory nature of the upgrading processes helped in resolving contestations over space.

However, Epworth as an informal settlement was captured by political elites who stalled the formalisation process. In particular, in Wards 4 and 5, councillors halted enumeration exercises largely because they wanted control over the process. This shows how councillors can stall upgrading for personal gain.²³⁸ In such cases, ELB could do nothing without the support of councillors. However, managing *in situ* upgrading depends on the local authority's institutional capacity to plan and govern. This is discussed in the next section.

7.2.4 Institutional Capacity to Plan and Govern

Urban areas by their nature require considerable capacity in planning and governance by the respective local authorities (Nientied & Racoviceanu, 2000). 'Planning' in this context is defined as a conscious activity which shapes the spatial distribution of land uses and urban functions. Here, 'governance' is defined as the ability of a local authority to make, adopt and implement policies, administer its area of jurisdiction and enforce local laws (by-laws) (Mushamba, 2010).

ELB has weak capacity to perform planning and governance functions, yet it has been argued that capacity-building is required for local authorities before rolling out informal upgrading programmes (Huchzermeyer, 2009). In an assessment of 77 slum-upgrading projects implemented between 1969 and 2014, about 20 of them prioritised institutional strengthening and capacity-building (Olthuis et al., 2015). This shows the importance of institutional capacity in managing processes and outputs of slum-upgrading. Weak capacity can be explained by developments in planning and governance over time in Epworth. In Zimbabwe's hierarchy of urban settlements, a Local Board ranks lowest in terms of planning powers and sometimes size.

²³⁶ FGD 11, Ward 7 Epworth, Mabvazuva School, 10 December 2015.

²³⁷ FGD 13, Ward 6 WADCO members, Epworth, 16 December 2015.

²³⁸ Interview with Dialogue on Shelter Official, 12 January 2016.

It does not have planning powers, such as master and local planning and undertaking subdivisions and consolidations (GoZ, 1996). These planning functions are instead performed by a government entity, the DPP. However, in the case of Epworth, there have been no significant attempts by the DPP to plan the urban area. During *in situ* upgrading, the DPP took two years to approve a layout plan for Ward 7.²³⁹

By centralising planning functions and deliberately not transferring land to local authorities, the local government ministry acts as a *de facto* local authority. Such actions were questioned by an ELB official:

In Harare, the local government ministry has direct control on certain areas such as Whitecliff and Caledonia. Here in Epworth, we are supposed to plan and govern without controlling land delivery. This is distorting everything, as the ultimate product is compromised. Planners and engineers are coming last, instead of first, to give a service in such settlements. Processes of town planning have been reversed. State land is being allocated and managed by the local government ministry.²⁴⁰

Government officials argue that local authority capacity is vital in land management. As such, “if government thinks that such capacity exists, land is transferred and a Deed of Grant is given to a local authority”.²⁴¹ However, I argue that local authorities, regardless of their size, should be vested with full planning powers. Centralisation of planning at the DPP has brought efficiency and operational challenges to urban areas. For instance, the process of approving layout plans is bureaucratic, tenuous and time-consuming (GoZ, 2009a), and in most instances is overtaken by developments on the ground. In this context, it becomes prudent to streamline the roles and functions of DPP and build up the planning capacity of local authorities.

Inclusive municipal governance entails protecting the interests of the weak and poor (Muchadenyika, 2015a). As this chapter argues, the governance of Epworth has been deeply contentious due to informality and governance arrangements. From 1986 to 2008, governance

²³⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁰ Interview with ELB Official, Epworth, 05 January 2016.


²⁴¹ Interview with Town Planning Officer, DPP, Harare, 19 January 2016.

in Epworth was top-down and imposed by central government, creating an acrimonious relationship with residents who resisted and challenged such authority. It can be argued that such an arrangement over the years increased residents' resentment of the Local Board, which residents saw as serving the interests of the minority and government. As a counter-strategy, they constituted WADCOs, which performed governance functions and also worked in parallel with the ELB.

7.3 Contestations and Alliances

7.3.1 Struggles for Democratic Representation and Governance

In Zimbabwe, local government elections were introduced in 1993 in rural district councils and 1995 in urban councils (Muchadenyika & Williams, 2016). However, since the government took over control of Epworth in 1983, it has been appointing commissioners to run the affairs of the settlement. Epworth residents have been locked in a struggle to realise their voting rights, as a WADCO member recounted:



From 1986 to 2008, there were Commissioners and not councillors, a development that led us to start the fight for democratic representation in Epworth. There were people who regarded themselves as landowners and for one to get land, one was supposed to be a bona fide child of 'originals'. The Commissioners were sons and daughters of 'originals', and were representing interests of landowners. On the other hand, Chiremba Residents Association was dominating the Board over anything that could be done, vehemently protecting the interest of 'originals'. Commissioners were deciding on land matters and doing the allocation through selling the land, arguing that the land is theirs. In fact, they were presenting themselves as 'originals'. The fight started early in 1993-94, when ELB had planned and serviced Overspill and people who were supposed to occupy those stands were bona fide sons and daughters of Epworth 'originals'. However, intended beneficiaries failed to pay and the stands ended up being sold to outsiders. That's when the struggle really began.

In 2002, we tried to push for an election but it failed. Commissioners and Residents Associations resisted arguing that aspiring councillors were ‘squatters’. In that regard, two aspiring councillors (Kadimba and Mbayimbayi) were disqualified by Chiremba Residents Association, arguing that they can’t be governed by migrants. However, our argument has always been that councillors are for the sake of development and we therefore kept on fighting up to 2008, when government finally conceded to our demands. All WADCOs wrote a letter to government demanding councillors, and it was then that a team was sent for Wards delimitation. Even today there are even some ‘originals’ who do not want to pay levies to Council, arguing that the land belongs to them and that they built houses on their own.²⁴²

Commissioners were, however, serving the interests of ‘originals’ and the community fought fierce battles to elect councillors to run the affairs of the settlement. I argue that the decision to use government-appointed Commissioners contributed to the furtherance of informality in the urban centre. There are a number of reasons for this. First, Commissioners were reluctant to address planning and housing challenges in informal areas. For instance, in Ward 7, Commissioners argued that informal settlers should be evicted from “originals” fields and grazing areas.²⁴³ Furthermore, Commissioners were seeing “informal settlers as second-class citizens and therefore not deserving to choose councillors”.²⁴⁴ Secondly, the interface between ELB and residents was limited as the medium of representation (councillors) was not yet available. In this regard, the ELB regarded the existence of ‘squatters’ as a ‘nuisance’.²⁴⁵ At the same time, informal settlers over the years developed their own structures as Ward 7 became self-governing and drove its own development.

The struggle for representation was eventually won in 2008, when all seven wards elected councillors for the first time in history. Since the beginning of council representation, relations between residents and ELB have changed significantly.²⁴⁶ In planning and development

²⁴² Interview with Ward 7 WADCO member, Epworth, 12 December 2015.

²⁴³ FGD 10, Epworth, 10 December 2015.

²⁴⁴ Interview with Ward 7 WADCO members, Epworth, 5 January 2016.

²⁴⁵ Interview with ELB Official, Epworth, 5 January 2016.

²⁴⁶ Interview with Ward 7 WADCO Vice Chairperson, 12 December 2015.

functions, despite their being spearheaded by Ward 7 residents, there is collaboration with the ELB. Councillors are vital in planning, development and governance at the local level (Hansen, 2002). Councillors and WADCOs are acting as epicentres of planning, housing formalisation and general development in Epworth.

Despite this, WADCOs seem to wield more power than the ELB, for a number of reasons. These chiefly include the financial capacity of residents, historical reasons (these started when the Ward was not recognised by the ELB) and the political muscle of WADCOs (Zanu-PF-formed and -based). As such, the local authority has difficulties in implementing programmes without buy-in from WADCOs. In other words, it can be argued that ELB as a planning institution has been ‘captured’ by WADCOs. The role of WADCOs in land struggles and allocation was explained as follows:

Land was being misused and sold at will, and we decided to have a secretary for lands in WADCOs. We campaigned vigorously to remove MDC councillors as war vets, ex-detainees and war collaborators. We were not allowed in ELB because they knew that we had power. At present, nothing can be done on land without my knowledge and authority. ELB has no power to allocate land without our [WADCO] recommendation. We fought the liberation struggle for land and our land should not be misused. Everyone who wants land for schools, playing grounds should come to the Secretary for lands first before approaching ELB.²⁴⁷

There is coproduction of both planning and infrastructure services in Chitungwiza. Coproduction is “the involvement of citizens, clients, consumers, volunteers and/or community organisations in producing public services as well as consuming or otherwise benefiting from them” (Alford, 1998: 128). This essentially means that the planning and management of services requires the active participation of both public agencies and service users (Bovaird, 2007). Whilst, other scholars (for instance Needham, 2007; Brandsen & Pestoff, 2006) have

²⁴⁷ Interview with Ward 7 Committee Member – Lands, Epworth, 12 December 2015. I observed the Apostolic Faith Mission in Zimbabwe Church, which wanted a church stand, negotiating and getting instructions from the WADCO members at ELB offices.

primarily argued that coproduction improves the delivery of services, In Chitungwiza, it has led to the capture of the municipality by social movements.

The available literature focuses on state capture (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013; Mills, 2014; Gros, 1996; Kaufmann, 2010; Mueller, Vatter & Arnold, 2016; Jensen, 2002; Carment, 2003; Call, 2008). However, the role of informal groups in influencing the functioning of ELB provides this study with an opportunity to contribute to knowledge in what I call ‘municipal capture’. Municipal capture is a situation in which a local authority’s mandated functions are influenced and controlled by individuals or groups largely through informal means. Such groups or individuals take advantage of weak municipal systems, or misuse their perceived or real political and economic power to this effect.

7.3.2 Struggles for Recognition and Relationship-Building

The stance ELB took towards Ward 7 informal settlers was that they are ‘squatters’ and should therefore be evicted. In pursuing the eviction motive, ELB and the government issued eviction notices via helicopters. In addition, ELB secured an eviction order from the High Court of Zimbabwe in 2001 to evict about 6,000 informal settlers (Chirisa & Muhomba, 2013). At the same time, the violence and resistance associated with the FTLRP constrained evictions, as the Housing directorate argued:

For us [Epworth Local Board], the initial plan has always been that people should be evicted as they are classified as ‘squatters’. We had a Court Order for evictions which was due for implementation. We were waiting for other state actors like Zimbabwe Republic Police to implement the eviction order. However, when we reached the time to act, *hondo yeminda* [FTLRP] started. So evicting people where you want to put houses became difficult to justify.²⁴⁸

As a counter-position, informal settlers developed strategies to promote their being recognised as residents and not squatters. Such strategies include use of political opportunities, financial

²⁴⁸ Interview with ELB Housing Officer, 13 January 2016.

capacity and protests and demonstrations. Politics and violence were used to weather eviction threats. As the WADCO committee member responsible for land commented:

Eviction threats normally came towards the rainy season because one would be left with one alternative of going to the rural areas. However, people said, Let's base with Zanu-PF to diffuse evictions, and evictions also stopped. Our affiliation to Zanu-PF helped us critically. The issue of 'originals' bred social exclusion which stalled development. Most often, we used *jambanja* [violence] for our grievances to be heard. Where we are now – it was a tedious, long process of contestation and collaboration. We did this on our own accord as residents struggling for recognition by ELB.²⁴⁹

The use of protests, demonstrations and residents' financial capacity was equally important in changing the perception of the local authority. In December 2001, "there was the first demonstration organised by residents in their struggle for recognition by the Board".²⁵⁰ The demonstration was in reaction to continued issuance of eviction orders. Informal settlers also used their financial capacity in paying rates to the local authority and in the process arguing for their recognition. For instance, a WADCO Chairperson said:

We were prepared to pay money to council. We were given lodgers' cards and we refused them because it meant one is still lodging. In 2001, we were finally given cards given to landowners. We started encouraging each other to pay rates, and the most support which capacitated ELB came from Ward 7. By that time the council had only one tractor, one truck and two typewriters and it had bill arrears of ZW\$ 1.3 billion to ZINWA. The Local Board started boosting buying tractors and computers, among other things. We did that to defeat the system so that we won't be evicted in this area. If we could not do this, we could have been evicted, as helicopters were dropping eviction

²⁴⁹ Interview with WADCO Committee Member – Lands, Epworth, 12 December 2015.

²⁵⁰ Interview with Ward 7 WADCO Committee Member, Epworth, 12 December 2015.

papers in the area once every 10 days. At the same time, ELB was arguing that it cannot recognise anyone staying beyond Adelaide farm.²⁵¹

The decision by communities to constitute WADCOS was fundamental as they (WADCOS) became a key mechanism to fight for interests of informal settlers. During field research, there was opportunity to observe the working relations between WADCOS and ELB on issues of planning and housing. For instance, all the WADCOS from the seven wards were camped at the ELB's housing department assisting ward members with the formalisation process and verifying documents. In fact, one needed a referral from WADCOS to be served by the housing department. Furthermore, during the official allocation of housing stands, ELB officials partnered with WADCO members, in particular those responsible for security.

How did Epworth manage to weather the storm of OM/RO? In 2005, during OM/RO, residents were threatened with evictions, though they were not affected by the Operation.²⁵² A combination of factors explains this. First, "Zanu-PF structures and politicians urged government not to destabilise Epworth as it forms the party base in Harare".²⁵³ Secondly, if the Operation had succeeded it could have destroyed more than three-quarters of all housing structures in Epworth. Thirdly, the timing of demolitions in Epworth coincided with the government's announcement halting the Operation after engagement with the UN Special Envoy.²⁵⁴ The Board had aimed to demolish 17,000 homesteads and issued seven-day eviction notices jointly with the Zimbabwe Republic Police (Chirisa & Muhomba, 2013: 958). However, about 500 families destroyed their housing structures (Ibid.), with the rest gearing up for a showdown with the demolition authorities.

7.3.3 Levels of Contestation

There are four levels of contestation in Epworth. The first is between ELB and 'originals', where the latter accuse the former of being lenient and accommodative to 'squatters'.

²⁵¹ Interview with Ward 7 WADCO Chairperson, Epworth, 12 December 2015.

²⁵² *Ibid.*

²⁵³ FGD 11, Ward 7 Epworth, 10 December 2015.

²⁵⁴ Interview with ELB Engineer, Epworth, 5 January 2016.

Furthermore, ‘originals’ argue for “compensation for the development that took place in their grazing fields”.²⁵⁵ In addition, ‘originals’ have difficulties in “recognising the ELB since the Board came after they had settled and [been] self-governing for more than half a century”.²⁵⁶ Such challenges often occur when an area changes from rural (communal land) to urban. However, over the years the ‘originals’ managed to safeguard their interests through Commissioners while marginalising ‘squatters’. This arrangement would cease after the first local government elections in Epworth in 2008.

The second level of contestation is between ‘originals’ and ‘squatters’. The former argue against regularisation of informal settlements, while the latter champion formalisation.²⁵⁷ The tensions between these two groups are complex, historical and marred by discrimination, as WADCO members explained:

In the beginning, they [originals] didn’t even want to see us. Even today, they are being forced by law to accept the new reality. They were dragging by all means to forestall development in informal areas. We were not allowed access to maternity and education facilities as ‘squatters’. We had to access such services outside Epworth up until 2000. Their argument was that informal settlers should move out. If you have a funeral, even [in] their cemeteries they refused to bury ‘squatters’. Even now, they are saying cemeteries are full, and many people now go to Zinyengere. It is painful and heart-breaking in one country to be labelled as ‘squatters’, ‘foreigner’, or *muuyi* (late-comer). However, most ‘originals’ are immigrants from other countries, such as Zambia and Malawi, and are forbidding Zimbabweans to stay here. Our parents feared the white man and therefore prioritised rural homes. Foreigners, now ‘originals’ had no option but to look for accommodation in urban areas. They are living comfortably, these

²⁵⁵ Interview with ERDA official, Epworth, 12 December 2015.

²⁵⁶ Interview with Chiremba Resident, Epworth, 4 January 2016.

²⁵⁷ Interview with Ward 6 WADCO Chairperson, Epworth, 16 December 2015.

‘originals’, with the right to property ownership in Zimbabwe. But for us, they are resisting our formalisation. At the height of the tension, people were writing on boundary walls, saying, ‘Go back to Lilongwe!’ It was then that the president intervened and argued for an inclusive settlement where formal and informal settlers live in harmony.²⁵⁸

The third level of contestation concerns inter-party struggles. In 2008, the MDC won and took control of ELB. From 1986 to 2008, the local government ministry, and by extension Zanu-PF, was running affairs in Epworth through the appointment of Commissioners. New strategies thus emerged to undermine and permeate the MDC-controlled council.²⁵⁹ Two in particular proved useful, namely WADCOs and party militia. WADCOs became a strong and forceful structure influencing development in seven wards of Epworth. Party militia were often responsible for terrorising known MDC officials and supporters and disrupting MDC-led initiatives in Epworth (Kriger, 2012). Inter-party contestations spilled over into land invasions as parties sought control over territory. In a way, political parties became *de facto* land allocation authorities. A Ward 7 WADCO Vice Chairperson observed:

Council could not deliver services such as allocating land, and people realised the need to use political parties to occupy land. Land was there, but Epworth Local Board failed and that’s why people are all over here in Epworth. Secondly, political parties, for instance MDC, thought it was behind in terms of allocating land to its supporters, and they occupied land in places such as Pentagon. Since there were MDC councillors and only one from Zanu-PF, MDC used political power to annex some places. For example, they invaded Pentagon though it was reserved for industry but is now allocated to not less than 200 people. This situation triggered Zanu-PF people to invade other areas, saying MDC is grabbing land. For instance, in Ward 7 we had kept open spaces for schools, recreational facilities, and some

²⁵⁸ Interview with Ward 7 WADCO members, Epworth, 5 January 2016.

²⁵⁹ FGD 13, Ward 6 WADCO members, Epworth, 16 December 2015.

were taken by our members [Zanu-PF] because we feared that they can be taken by MDC supporters again. On the other hand, Ward 7 was a liberated zone and it was a no-go area for MDC – that is why some places for schools are still there.²⁶⁰

The MDC took a landmark decision to upgrade Epworth *in situ* and regularise informal housing in the urban centre. This decision, as this chapter argues, would have long-lasting and significant impacts on planning and housing development in Epworth: the council resolution should go down in history as transformational. Decisions like these are vital in addressing the challenges of informal housing in African cities where the urban poor cannot afford housing access through the formal housing process.

7.3.4 Informal Land Markets and Land Access

The majority of land in Epworth was accessed through informal land markets. Land sales were mutual between sellers and buyers though not supported by any documents.²⁶¹ Survey results show that 73.3% of total households (6,636) indicated that they bought their stands from ‘originals’, with the remainder having accessed it through self-allocation or claims of Local Board allocation (Enumeration Survey, 2010). In this instance, sellers usually subdivided their stands or disposed of grazing pastures and fields. In part, frustration with Harare’s housing delivery process fuelled the informal land market in Epworth, as revealed in Box 3.

Box 3: Land Sales as Narrated through Life History

I arrived in Harare in 1975. I made five applications for a house at the City of Harare so that I have a place to stay in town. On all my applications, I could not even be invited for interviews for stands allocation. I kept struggling with rented accommodation and at one point; I was renting one room with five children. I have worked for three companies since 1975. I looked for alternatives and heard that there is a place where people were being given stands by ‘originals’ in Epworth.

²⁶⁰ Interview with Ward 7 WADCO Vice Chairperson, Epworth, 12 December 2015.

²⁶¹ FGD 10, Mabvazuva School, Epworth, 10 December 2015


This was happening in 1994 and these were called temporary structures. Settling on this land was done privately, and grapevine was a key method of alerting would-be prospective homeowners. I came here at the end of 1994 and realised what was happening in Epworth. I came with a view to look for a place to rent, so I investigated what was happening. At the beginning of 1995, I bought a stand that had been sold to six people and therefore was defrauded.

I reported the matter to the Zimbabwe Republic Police and they advised me to negotiate for a settlement. I came to Ms Chirimba and she was allocating land to people with her team, which included Mupamombe, Douglass and others. I bought the stand for ZW\$750 at the end of 1995. Others had built shacks. Of the ZW\$750, I paid ZW\$15. They walked into the area collecting outstanding monies, and they collected a further ZW\$25 only before I completed the house.

At the beginning of 1996, they came with pressure and we wrestled and I paid another ZW\$300. After I paid that money, eviction orders came from ELB in 1996. The first eviction order came and we ignored; second orders came, and we ignored, and third as usual. In 1997, ZRP came saying all people who were sold stands should come and register such transactions. However, all our receipts were not recorded because sellers were fraudulent and violent, so we could not voice ourselves through asking receipts. We left our few receipts with the Criminal Investigation Department, and we could not ask their availability and offices, as they said, 'We will call you to court'.

The court date arrived and we were called to room 4 or 6, Rotten Row court. We saw all the land sellers in court. Court proceedings ended and we were told to go and stay, but there was no clarity on the status of the settlement.

Source: Life history of Ward 7 Resident, Mabvazuva Secondary School, Epworth, 10 December 2015.



Enumeration Survey results indicate land ownership as 51% landlords, 43.7% tenants and 5.3% relatives (Enumeration Survey, 2010). Most people who were at the forefront of selling land in the urban centre were also active in politics. As such, politics protected informal land deals and was used as a tool to 'legitimise' land sales.²⁶² The process of accessing land was protracted and contested, as asserted by one FGD participant:

There was someone called Ms Chirinda. She had a field here and she was selling the stands. She would tell you where your stand starts and ends, and I would put four stones as demarcation. I came in 1994, after rumours that there was available land for housing in Epworth. Many people were selling

²⁶² Interview with ELB Official, 4 January, 2016.

stands here. So it was a matter of urgency because of high demand and the need to facilitate quick payment. Settling here was protracted and laden with contradictions. There were multiple claims of stands – others saying I am already building, others claiming ownership of such stand, others saying I have planted my sweet potatoes there. However, with money, one could easily bribe land sellers to be declared sole and ‘legitimate’ owner. There was no formal agreement: it was too late for that, and the focus was on ‘I have won’.²⁶³

At this point, it is important to ascertain under what conditions informal land markets thrive. First, both the Local Board and government had no formal processes of land acquisition in Epworth. In this case, there existed a vacuum which confronted by an impending need by people to acquire urban land. As such, an alternative informal urban land market developed over time which facilitated access to urban land for 14,824 new land owners. Secondly, an obscure land tenure system in which the Methodist Church, ‘originals’ and government claim ownership of land breeds confusion. Under such circumstances, informal land markets thrived and became a key mechanism for land sales. Such a blurred land tenure system is “compounded by the belief among Epworth residents that state land is not for sale”.²⁶⁴

Thirdly, land in Epworth is not vested and owned by the local authority; rather, the majority of land is state land. This arrangement affects the role of the ELB in governing, planning and housing development as administration of state land has more to do with politics than urban planning (Muchadenyika, 2015b). Political party structures are more powerful in land allocation than the Local Board. Residents argued that the ELB has no power over allocation of land in the urban area since it is state land.²⁶⁵ Fourthly, political opportunities availed by the FTLRP opened avenues for urban residents to claim land for housing through unconventional means.²⁶⁶ In Epworth, Ward 7 in particular, the FTLRP was associated with the arrival of new settlers who annexed land and settled (DOS, 2009). Lastly, formal urban land markets do not

²⁶³ FGD 12, Mabvazuva School, Epworth, 10 December 2015.

²⁶⁴ FGD 11, Mabvazuva School, Epworth, 10 December 2015.

²⁶⁵ FGD 10, Mabvazuva School, Epworth, 10 December 2015.

²⁶⁶ Interview with Ward 7 WADCO Chairperson, Epworth, 8 December 2015.

always make provisions for land access to the urban poor (Satterthwaite, 2009), but informal land markets do.

7.3.5 *In Situ* Upgrading Alliance

In situ upgrading requires alliances with various actors – state and non-state (Muchadenyika, 2015a; Tomlinson, 2015). This is mainly because of the need to capitalise on different actor competencies. As such, *in situ* upgrading in Epworth was made possible through an alliance among Dialogue on Shelter, ZIHOPFE, community and the ELB. The alliance was formalised through a Memorandum of Understanding which provided the parameters according which slum-upgrading would be undertaken. The alliance was built on “recognising the importance of adequate and secure housing in the improvement of the lives of the urban poor [with partners] committing themselves to enter into negotiations for an equal, constructive and collaborative partnership that seeks to address the challenges of the urban poor who struggle with issues of poverty, homelessness, inadequate shelter, lack of secure tenure, lack of safe water and sanitation, ill health and overcrowding in the Epworth Local Board area”²⁶⁷

The alliance focuses on the development of grassroots and city-level capacity to implement a comprehensive and sustainable process of people-driven tenure security, adequate infrastructure, decent and affordable housing, and *in situ* upgrading.²⁶⁸ Such a focus understood the fundamental role of grassroots in formalising settlements. As argued elsewhere in this chapter, communities contribute through finances, labour and general cooperation during *in situ* upgrading processes. On the other hand, focus was placed on developing the capacity of the local authority to enable it to manage outputs from the upgrading process. *In situ* upgrading in Epworth has five main actors, namely ZIHOPFE, WADCOs, ELB, MLGPWNH, and Dialogue on Shelter. Table 42 shows *in situ* upgrading actors and roles.

Table 42: *In situ* Upgrading Actors and Roles

Actor/s	Roles
ELB	Securing tenure to regularised settlers. Providing technical expertise in house and infrastructure designs.

²⁶⁷ MOU made and entered into by and between Epworth Local Board, Dialogue on Shelter for the Homeless in Zimbabwe Trust and ZHOPFE, 2.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.* 3.

	Providing water and sanitation and road infrastructure.
	Creating and managing a special purpose fund for slum-upgrading.
WADCOs,	Mobilising and providing labour and finances.
ZIHOPFE &	Mobilising community participation.
DOS	Documentation and dissemination of slum-upgrading activities.
	Conducting settlement wide profiling and enumeration.
	Proposing and developing new innovations on housing and infrastructure development.
MLGPWNH	Approving layout plans.
	Technical advice on town planning processes.

Source: MOU entered between ELB, DOS and ZIHOPFE.

There were, however, tensions and struggles within the alliance. In beginning upgrading, Dialogue on Shelter and ZIHOPFE had technical expertise and experience which became vital to the functioning of the alliance. However, after learning the procedure, WADCOs and ELB side-lined ZIHOPFE and Dialogue on Shelter, and were doing it alone.²⁶⁹ This can be explained by the need by the local authority and WADCOs to retain full control of the process.

What made the alliance work? It was through a combination of experience brought in by ZIHOPFE in slum-upgrading, the resolve of informal settlers to seize the opportunity, and a decision by ELB to formalise.²⁷⁰ When people live informally for decades, their conception of informality often changes. As such, informal settlers began to understand and look for alternative ways of formalising the settlement. In this regard, when housing co-operatives failed, settlers developed new structures, such as WADCOs, and advocated for councillors - both which became vital in *in situ* upgrading.²⁷¹

7.3.6 Informal Planning and Introducing Planning Principles

Informal planning outcomes in Epworth include mixed-density, footpaths instead of roads, informal houses and structures, and an absence of basic and social services. A settlement of 39,552, it has no primary and secondary school and health facilities, which means that residents have to travel to other areas such as Mabvuku, Ruwa and Hatfield to access such services, adding to their costs.²⁷² Absence of social service facilities creates extra costs for people to access basic services like health and education. Housing structures are haphazard, unplanned

²⁶⁹ Interview with NGO Official, Harare, 12 January 2016.

²⁷⁰ Interview with Ward 7 WADCO Chairperson, Epworth, 12 December 2015.

²⁷¹ Interview with Ward 7 WADCO member, Epworth, 12 December 2015.

²⁷² Interview with Ward 7 WADCO members, Epworth, 5 January 2016.

and made of poor building materials (Fig 2 and 3). Housing structures are composed of unplanned brick and mortar (94.5%), pole and dagga (3.7%), and temporary shacks (1.7%) (Enumeration Survey, 2010). There are, however, 166 low density planned and serviced stands developed by a private developer, Shelter Zimbabwe.

Put differently, the building technology is poor and reminiscent of rural homesteads. However, it can be argued that such building technology is an incremental step towards building formal housing structures. Access is a major challenge in informally planned areas, as people often maximise built space at the expense of road access and passage.²⁷³ Roads are often narrow and meant for pedestrian use rather than vehicular traffic. Existing roads themselves are like footpaths in rural areas that have developed not through construction processes but pedestrian use over time.



²⁷³ FGD 12, Mabvazuva School, Epworth, 10 December 2015.




Figure 2: Condition of Buildings, Epworth Ward 7 (Source: Dialogue on Shelter, 2012).




Figure 3: Orientation of Buildings, Epworth Ward 7 (Source: Dialogue on Shelter, 2012).

Informal settlements sprout through informal planning without reference to planning principles and regulations. However, during formalisation the introduction of planning principles and regulations was a fundamental step. How can one introduce them without facing resistance? This is done through “participation of communities in planning processes, which increases planning literacy on the part of residents”.²⁷⁴ The imaginations of communities graphically in sketch maps (Fig. 4) made people understand the trade-offs associated with planning. They began to realise the “importance of planning principles and regulations in the transformation of the settlement”.²⁷⁵

A second method was a deliberate process of allowing obtaining conditions to inform and determine planning principles and regulations, and not vice versa.²⁷⁶ This entailed changing

²⁷⁴ FGD 13, Epworth, 16 December 2015.

²⁷⁵ FGD 12, Epworth, 10 December 2015.

²⁷⁶ Interview with NGO Official, 27 August 2015.

and reducing planning standards to accommodate prevailing settlement conditions. The approval process for the layout plan was contentious and protracted, as the plan created a road network which is not in conformity with existing standards.²⁷⁷ However, negotiations with central government on standards led to compromises and ultimate approval of the layout plan (Fig. 5).




Figure 4: Layout Plan Produced from Community Participation (Source: Dialogue on Shelter, 2012).

²⁷⁷ Interview with ELB Engineer, Epworth, 5 January 2016.




Figure 5: Approved Layout Plan, Ward 7 Epworth (Source: Dialogue on Shelter, 2012).

In summary, the formalisation process challenged and changed the planning culture in Zimbabwe. The inclusive planning approaches evident in informal upgrading contribute to inclusive municipal governance. Introducing planning regulations and principles during informal upgrading is a process that generates conflict. However, FGD participants argued for the power of planning as key in introducing regulations, stating that:

[t]own planning has strict regulations. However, one woman wanted to strip in protest when she realised that her house was on a road, according to the layout plan. What this process means is that we are going for town status with a town planning system. Inevitably, some of the things we want should be set aside. For town planning to take place, government should actually not be lenient with us. Rather, the power of planning should take place. If too much

leniency is shown, new 'squatting' may sprout and thus government should be shrewd in the town planning process.²⁷⁸

7.5 Conclusion

The chapter set out to explain how social movements in informal settlements can impact on urban planning and housing. In particular, I have presented a grassroots-based perspective on the transformation of informal settlements. As the local authority and government are constrained to financially support the process of *in situ* upgrading, communities and grassroots movements are at the forefront of driving the formalisation process. Through structures such as WADCOs, communities assumed more power over planning and housing in Epworth. Traditionally and in law, such functions reside with planning authorities. The scenario has repercussions for the existing body of knowledge. The findings from Epworth allow one to illustrate what the chapter has termed 'municipal capture'. Municipal capture is a condition which happens when communities spearhead, finance and assume more power in the planning process than the planning authority. While the phenomenon of municipal capture is new, as noted in this research, what is common in state theory is called state capture.

How does an area change from rural to urban? Epworth provides a classic example of such a transition. However, the transformation from predominantly rural to urban has occurred without adherence to conventional planning strategies such as master and local planning. How then did the area develop? It developed in reverse to the planning norm, with people settling first and planning processes following later. Such reversals took place in full view of the Government of Zimbabwe and ELB. More than 90% of the total planning area in Epworth was developed through *in situ* upgrading despite the absence of an upgrading framework. Such a framework can, however, contribute to existing planning laws.

For urban transformation to take place, democratic representation and governance of urban areas are fundamental. As this chapter has explained, it is such representation that makes definitive decisions that aid the transformation of human settlements. The challenge of informality in African cities is common yet overwhelming. However, I argue that grassroots-

²⁷⁸ FGD 12, Epworth, 10 December 2015.

driven processes of formalisation offer rays of hope. Such an approach not only creates a new planned settlement but improves community cohesion and planning literacy. Thus, transforming urban settlements is not only about changing the structure of urban areas; it is also about changing institutional relations of power within and across a range of planning policy domains, thereby establishing new forms of planning that involve learning by doing.



Chapter Eight

Conclusion and Implications for Housing and Planning Policy and Practice

The state and all its institutions and agencies of government at every level must take reasonable legislative and other measures within the limits of the resources available to them to enable every person access to adequate shelter.

Section 28 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.

No person may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances.

Section 78 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.

The task of this thesis has been to tell the story of ordinary people, those in the crevices and at the margins of urban centres who are often labelled an 'urban nuisance'. Through social movements the urban poor are important agents for social change and transformation in cities (Harvey, 2012; Fainstein, 2010; Miraftab, 2009; Friedmann, 2011). Social change is usually triggered by socio-economic and political tensions to which the poor and excluded masses respond by forming movements, and in this respect the urban domain is no different (Harvey, 1973, 2012; Soja, 2010, 2011; Castells, 1977, 1983, 2009). Indeed, in the Zimbabwean case the economic crisis, and political tensions at both central and local government level triggered the sudden rise in housing movements in the post-2000 era. Ordinary people in metropolitan Harare responded to local authorities and government incapacity by forming movements that would challenge conventional housing delivery methods and champion alternative means.

In the introductory chapter, the aim of this thesis was stated as an investigation of the interaction between planning institutions and social movements in the delivery of low-income housing. The interaction between social movements and planning institutions is characterised by contestations, struggles and alliances which continue to profoundly shape urban planning and housing in metropolitan Harare. As explained in this study, such struggles have been both internal (within movements) and external (inter-movements and between movements and planning authorities). Post-2000, metropolitan Harare has been undergone a change in its urban

fabric (for instance, through provision of new housing and infrastructure services to the predominantly urban poor population), reconfiguration of power (with the urban poor playing a vital role in urban development) and the adoption by planning institutions of grassroots-centred urban planning approaches. The manifestation of such transformation differs contextually and seems to be largely influenced by the nature and conduct of social movements and the responses of planning authorities.

8.1 Critique of Urban Transformation

Urban transformation in Zimbabwe has been achieved primarily through ongoing struggles and continued pressure from social movements in pursuit of social and spatial justice. Through strategies such as negotiation, confrontation, and defiance, housing movements have compelled local authorities and the Government of Zimbabwe to concede to new forms of planning, for example, by regularisation and formalisation of housing developed by social movements. In metropolitan Harare, a new form of urban development took effect as social movements reversed the procurement process of formal housing. In other words, there is a semblance of radical planning in how community organisations and social movements are changing existing power relations exercised by the planning institutions and working towards reducing structural barriers to affordable housing by the urban poor. Evidence of urban transformation includes:

- Occupation and development of land in cities by housing movements without necessarily adhering to planning laws, procedures and regulations.
- Regularisation and formalisation of settlements occupied and developed through housing movements by central government and local authorities.
- Undertaking of *in situ* upgrading in Harare and Epworth, providing security of tenure to the urban poor.
- New housing and infrastructural developments driven by social movements.
- Policy changes (adoption of incremental and parallel development) to facilitate a grassroots-centred approach to housing delivery.

- New forms of urbanity which do not fit in with the official schema of modernity, such as unplanned housing structures, extensive use of septic tanks (on stands less than 1,200m²), Ecosan toilets, and road openings or gravel roads.
- Informal planning studios shaping planning in Harare and Epworth (acting as grassroots forms of urban planning) (Muchadenyika, 2015a).
- Acknowledgment for the first time of urban poor housing institutions (Dialogue on Shelter, ZIHOPFE and ZINAHCO) in the housing policy.
- The revision of planning, infrastructure and housing construction standards with a view to balance affordability and socio-economic factors (Chimowa, 2012).

The transformation above has resulted in four things. First, there is evidence to suggest that ordinary people (who can be qualified as the urban poor) have accessed housing and related services. Second, there is an increase in self-organisation in cities around issues of service provision (housing, water and sanitation and transport). Such self-organisation is, however, affecting local political dynamics as people consider their future outside mainstream political party structures. Third, the transformation has led to housing access by the middle-class which class has been eliminated by the ongoing economic challenges. Fourth, as argued in this thesis, local political elites have accumulated housing land under the guise of ‘leading’ transformation processes.

In addition, transformation has been curtailed by two things. These two relate to the negligent engagement of national politics and the failure by government to provide subsidised infrastructure. In a way, as argued in this thesis, infrastructure constitute the single largest cost in the provision of low-income housing. With government and local authorities providing infrastructure, the pace of transformation could have been better. Other than policy changes, national politics has not sufficiently placed planning and low-income housing in the mainstream government agenda. This development leaves many bottlenecks in planning and housing.

The nature of the contestation, alliances and contradictions between social movements and planning institutions is influenced by a number of factors, chief among them being politics and

governance systems. Significant differences in politics and governance arrangements in Harare, Chitungwiza and Epworth explain variations in the nature and form of social movements in these urban centres, which makes it difficult to generalise about them. Social movements in each urban centre were and continue to be shaped by existing socio-economic and political realities. This is because urban formations, the organisation of urban space and the behaviour and aspirations of city dwellers partly depend on power relations (Parker, 2004).

As such, the nature and conduct of social movements would seem to determine the conduct of planning and housing delivery processes. For instance, in Harare, there are two main categories of co-operatives: those allocated land by the City of Harare and the other allocated by the local government ministry. The former have mostly followed planning and housing regulations, while the latter have largely reversed the housing delivery process through militancy and unconventional means. Between 2000 and 2015, through formal and informal means more than 100,000 housing stands were provided in Harare. On such housing stands, about 35,000 houses have been completed, with the remaining stands composed of houses under construction or unplanned housing structures.

However, at the same time, the City of Harare could not provide a single completed low-income housing unit. An attempt was made by the Government of Zimbabwe through OG/HK, though the programme could only deliver 637 completed housing units in Harare.²⁷⁹ ZIHOPFE, in partnership with the City of Harare, pioneered a slum-upgrading programme in Harare that has changed the way the city conceptualises housing and interacts with or views slum-dwellers. The impacts of slum-upgrading have been the transformation of 480 poor households through secure tenure and infrastructure services, the set-up of a pro-poor housing finance facility, allocation of stands to Gunhill slum-dwellers by the City of Harare, and adoption and implementation of a strategy which is assisting in city-wide slum-upgrading. Elsewhere, the impact includes the adoption and implementation of *in situ* upgrading in Epworth, as well as the adoption and commencement of slum-upgrading in other urban centres such as Bulawayo, Kadoma, Masvingo, and Kariba.

²⁷⁹ On request for current statistics about OG/HK in Harare, officials in the MLGPWNH indicated that “you cannot get that information”. Hence, I had to rely on Parliamentary reports on the programme.

In Chitungwiza, housing co-operatives have been spearheading a parallel and radical planning and housing delivery system in the town. The institutional failure of the local authority resulted partly in housing co-operatives and politicians playing the de facto role of the municipality. The result has been a chaotic, complex and contested planning and housing delivery system whose outputs have been deemed illegal by both government and the municipality. Despite this, the Government of Zimbabwe and Chitungwiza Municipality have conceded to the new form of urban planning by regularising products of radical planning – ‘illegal houses’.

Radical planning in Chitungwiza has threatened, transgressed and shaken the whole foundation of bureaucratised and formal planning. In part, such planning is credited with contributing to the largest number of housing units in the town post-2000. Putting aside the ‘legal and illegal’ debate, radical planning delivered about 22,000 housing units, whereas Chitungwiza Municipality and the Government of Zimbabwe could not provide a single one. The municipality and government have decided, to regularise at least half of the houses built through a parallel planning and housing delivery system.

In Epworth, housing co-operatives failed and the community formed Ward Development Committees as the nucleus of the housing movement. Epworth shows a grassroots-centred perspective in transforming informal settlements. However, the transformation from a predominantly rural to urban setting has been effected without adhering to conventional planning strategies such as master and local plans (statutory plans in Zimbabwe).

The transition has been achieved through the formalisation process, largely driven by informal settlers. The resolution to formalise Epworth was adopted by first elected councillors in 2011, indicating the importance of democratic representation in urban transformation. ZIHOPFE, using experiences gained during the HSUP, was instrumental in lobbying and advocating for formalisation in Epworth. The formalisation process aims to provide about 21,957 households with secure tenure – an important feature in urban transformation.

Such grassroots-oriented planning programmes have transformed informal settlements elsewhere in Africa (Mitlin & Mogaladi, 2013; Huchzermeyer, 2009; Muller & Mitlin, 2007). Indeed, grassroots-driven processes of formalisation offer rays of hope. Such an approach not only creates a new planned settlement but builds community cohesion and improves planning

literacy among communities. Thus, transforming urban settlements is not only about changing the form and structure of urban areas, but about changing institutional relations of power within and across a range of planning policy domains, thus establishing new forms of planning, such as, learning by doing.

Urban transformation is a result of insurgent or radical or transformative planning. Based on the findings presented in this study, I make the following theoretical contributions. First, for radical planning to take place in cities, it is not only through struggles by social movements and civil society. Rather, I argue that the responsiveness (through policies and practices) of formal state structures is fundamental in facilitating radical planning outcomes. Thus, there is need to critically study the role of formal state structures in radical planning.

Second, SMOs are vital in facilitating and championing insurgent planning. Experiences in Metropolitan Harare indicates that social movements working in alliance in SMOs produced better insurgent planning outcomes as compared to movements working in isolation. Planning is a highly technical field, hence, insurgent planners become essential in providing technical advice to social movements. ZIHOPFE which receives technical support from Dialogue on Shelter has produced better planning outcomes as compared to some co-operatives working without technical support from SMOs. In light of this, the central role of insurgent planners is an essential explanatory component in insurgent planning theory.

Third, transformative planning takes place through the convergence of ordinary peoples' struggles and responsiveness of formal state structures. In understanding transformative planning, it is essential to place emphasis on tensions, strategies of convergence, alliances and transformative outcomes. In this regard, planning that transform societies is a result of continuous struggles for change and constant reflection on the part of formal state structures.

8.2 Social Movements and Low-Income Housing

Departing from the understanding that urban areas are incubators of revolutionary ideas, ideals, and movements (Harvey, 2012), the study employed transformative theory with two important elements that help explain social transformation, namely social movements and radical planning (Friedmann, 2011; MirafTAB, 2009). In engaging with the subject of planning and

housing in metropolitan Harare, social movements have been conceived and analysed as agents of social transformation, with radical planning as a means for societal transformation. However, the notion of radical planning is realised through contradictions, contestations and struggles among social movements, civil society and the state. Such struggles determine planning outcomes such as the delivery of low-income housing.

The trajectory of housing movements in Zimbabwe is largely influenced by the socio-economic and political construction of the state. Politics and economics have profoundly shaped the emergence and growth of social movements in the urban domain. Through contestation and alliances with planning authorities, social movements have played an essential role in the transformation of urban society. Such transformation has occurred in three ways. First, land invasions by housing movements in urban areas (Ward 7 in Epworth, Hopley, Hatcliffe, Dzivarasekwa Extension, and Saturday Retreat in Harare) as part of the FTLRP challenged and reversed the housing delivery process. These invasions allowed ordinary people access to urban land which under conventional planning and housing procedures could not have been accessed in this way. In such areas, there is a semblance of insurgent planning in which people allocate themselves land and informal planning processes take effect.

Secondly, the massive contribution of social movements in the development of off-site and on-site infrastructure in metropolitan Harare has shifted actor roles in the urban domain. Housing movements performed the roles of the local authorities and central government, relegating these planning authorities to perform functions of land allocation, planning approvals and development control. It became largely the responsibility and function of social movements to finance the planning, installation and management of urban infrastructure. Local authorities would take over the management and maintenance of such infrastructure after completion of housing projects and handover by social movements.

Thirdly, the conventional planning system acceded to changes and challenges brought about by the active involvement of social movements in housing delivery through the adoption of parallel and incremental development as key pillars of urban planning and housing. These two strategies transformed the form and structure of cities. At the same time, both approaches are proving to be viable low-income housing delivery strategies in an environment where the capacity of both central and local government is severely constrained. However, post-2000,

settlements look haphazard – a characteristic not conceivable in pre-2000 urban Zimbabwe. This can be attributed to lack of monitoring and a shared understanding between planning institutions and social movements of what incremental and parallel development means in practice. On the other hand, such disorder can be interpreted as incremental steps to planning and housing delivery as conceived and driven by ordinary people. For conceptual clarity, incremental housing has three phases, namely access to land, construction of a basic housing nucleus and incremental improvement of the houses (Green & Rojas, 2008).

Through collective action, urban social movements make and remake cities in a fundamental and radical way (Harvey, 2012). Through social movements, urban centres in metropolitan Harare have undergone changes such as new housing developments, the majority of which do not have the requisite infrastructure, despite occupation. In some instances, the boundaries of Harare as a city have been extended by social movements, with government proclaiming boundary extensions to accommodate settlements occupied by housing movements. In other words, the conception of urbanity in metropolitan Harare has changed with new forms of urbanity such as gravel roads, unplanned houses, septic tanks, and boreholes becoming defining features.

This thesis has argued that urban transformation would seem to originate from four contextual features. The first feature is the sudden increase in social movements involved in the ‘formal and informal’ delivery of low-income housing. I should underscore that the legality or illegality of such settlements is not of primary importance in this study. What is vital is the manner in which the urban poor who predominantly have been beneficiaries turned into active participants in housing delivery. Others arguing from an elitist perspective, some of whom I interviewed during field research, often denigrated these social movements as the main reason for the prevalence of ‘slums’ in urban Zimbabwe. However, collectively, social movements delivered 143,927 stands with 57,000 completed housing units from 2000 to 2015 in metropolitan Harare. During the same period, the Government of Zimbabwe and the three local authorities delivered 637 low-income housing units. Comparatively, it is social movements who are at the forefront of low-income housing delivery in Zimbabwe, making them an important factor in housing and urban planning.

A second key feature is the drastic decline in the capacity of central and local governments in undertaking their mandates. In line with Zimbabwe's town planning regime, it is the responsibility of government and local authorities to install and maintain infrastructure and deliver housing, primarily to the urban poor. This, as the study shows, was no longer tenable. The common and often cited reason is economic challenges. Whilst this is partly true, this study shows other key reasons such as changes in power relations, with social movements attaining more 'planning power' than planning institutions who primarily were the 'untouchables' in the pre-2000 era. Such power is reflected by social movements invading council and state land without formal procedures of land allocation.

There have also been changes in power relations between central government and local authorities. The function of land allocation for housing is traditionally and in law vested in local authorities. However, due to the contestations and political construction of both central government and local authorities, the former through the local government ministry usurped local authority powers of land allocation. In other words, the local government ministry became a *de facto* local authority in settlements like Caledonia, Odar Farm, Hopley, Saturday Retreat Farm, and Hatcliffe (Muchadenyika, 2015b). The local government ministry did not only allocate land to social movements but went as far as collecting rates and levies from such settlements.

A third trend in housing policy and practices concerns the changes to the low-income housing delivery approach. Prior to 2000, government and local authorities provided completed housing units and serviced stands through aided self-help. However, as argued in this study, the post-2000 approach, driven by internal and external factors, has resulted in co-operative housing rising to prominence. These approaches, like in Latin America and Asia, were centred on incremental development, which has been a major focal point in housing international discourse in the post-millennial period (Cities Alliance, 2011; Mukhija, 2014; Green & Rojas, 2008).

Lastly, as argued in my Introduction and reinforced by my findings elsewhere (Muchadenyika, 2015b), the FTLRP has had widespread impact on access to housing in peri-urban areas. It seems that the wave of housing movements in urban areas would be difficult to reverse. In fact, settlements like Caledonia, Hopley and Saturday Retreat in Harare and Ward 7 in Epworth are

signs of a revolution. It would be prudent to rationalise the state of housing and social movements in such areas, though this can be a struggle in itself. It becomes a struggle because some movement members in the abovementioned settlements still perceive central government as having a responsibility to provide housing services. At the same time, “urban councils are contesting the forced handover [of settlements developed through OG/KH] arguing that is equivalent to dumping a chaotic programme” (Muchadenyika, 2015a: 3). Furthermore, the leadership of the majority of movements in those settlements is highly political and not keen on good corporate governance.²⁸⁰

The FTLRP remains a path-breaking programme for low-income housing delivery in urban centres. However, in this study, I have argued that the Government of Zimbabwe has not meaningfully used the programme to change people’s lives and transform urban society through low-income housing. Instead, government and local authorities have largely abandoned the burden of housing and infrastructure to social movements. As such, restructuring social movements in metropolitan Harare through coherent infrastructural development to facilitate low-income housing would be a lasting legacy for the Government of Zimbabwe. The point I am making here is that a government-supported programme in providing infrastructure, and security of tenure in all peri-urban areas would turn out to be the largest housing delivery programme ever recorded in the history of the country. This would mean depoliticising land and housing and enabling social movements to realise their goals with structured support from government and local authorities.

Emanating from the above, shouldering the role of government and local authorities (of infrastructure development) is a major constraint to low-income housing delivery. The result has been the uncoordinated nature of infrastructure development in most post-2000 settlements. It would seem that initiatives by social movements in infrastructure development largely focus on immediate needs and do not incorporate future and adjacent urban infrastructure needs. Infrastructure has thus been developed not as an essential asset of the urban settlement, but as a requirement to meet approval guidelines set by local authorities. However, it can be argued that the role of coordinating urban infrastructure is the function of local authorities and

²⁸⁰ Report on Housing in Harare Metropolitan Province, 3 June 2013.

government. The uncoordinated and poor development of infrastructure in metropolitan Harare is largely due to the complacency of local authorities and government.

When government and local authorities could not play their role, social movements opted for alternatives, which brought about a new kind of urbanity. Most settlements being developed by social movements are served by wells, Blair toilets, pit latrines, Skyloos and subgrade gravel roads. One would think that it resembles the 'villagisation' of cities in progress, where cities are being ruralised. From a technocratic or bureaucratic planning perspective, one is tempted to argue for the demolition of such settlements to allow proper planning. However, based on OM/RO, such an argument is not only simplistic but wrong. OM/RO tried to derail a new wave of low-income housing, without success and without offering viable and sustainable alternatives. A more humane and proper explanation of the state of infrastructure in low-income settlements studied is therefore that such features explain grassroots forms of planning and development in cities. Thus, I argue that what is happening in metropolitan Harare is grassroots-driven transformation, as social movements are building infrastructure incrementally. The movements studied in Hopley and Budiro took about five years to install water, road, and sewer infrastructure, which is an indication of housing movements' capacity.

Fainstein (2010) argues that the transformative potential of urban movements is limited to achieving change at the level in which they are operating. Contrary to Fainstein's views, this study demonstrates that the transformative potential of urban movements can be realised city-wide through learning, exchange visits and expansion of movements themselves. For instance, in Epworth, what started at ward level transformed into a city-wide movement which is transforming the urban centre. Slum-upgrading which started in a ZIHOPFE area in Harare has seen the movement influencing five other urban centres through its city-based affiliates starting the process of slum-upgrading. In summary, rather than opposing grassroots-driven movements, there are, theoretically, several ways in which institutional planners and by extension, central government, could harness these innovative bottom-up social forms of planning. These include formally acknowledging the role of such movements and incorporating grassroots forms of planning in planning traditions, regulations and statutes. The second entails entering into strategic alliances with such movements through planning authorities providing social service facilities. The third aspect entails changing or devolving bureaucratic planning

responsibilities and procedures that have a bearing on grassroots movements. These include plan approval processes, and planning, infrastructure, and house construction standards.

8.3 Planning Institutions and Low-Income Housing

In the three urban centres studied, the majority of housing movements have built houses through parallel structures that are contrary to municipal procedures. The thesis has argued that this is evidence of radical planning in the metropolis which is largely driven by social movements. Radical planning views social movements as primary agents of change and it often takes place outside formal state and economic structures (Sandercock, 1999a). The radicalism in metropolitan Harare is shown in the manner in which movements invade and allocate land, approve layout and building plans, which are functions that predominantly reside with planning authorities. Put differently, social movements have shaken the foundation of bureaucratised and formal planning. The conduct of planning and delivery of housing by social movements is in opposition to “state-sanctioned, formal planning processes” (Beard, 2003: 15). Planning authorities have conceded to such a radical form of planning through policy changes, regularisation and formalisation. Such concessions signify that through continued work and pressure from social movements “the system itself will change incrementally as a consequence of continued pressure for justice” (Fainstein, 2010: 6).

Professional planning in Zimbabwe has undergone transformation. The country has been in a crisis mode for close to two decades, as has the profession and practice of urban planning. To maintain relevance in an environment in constant flux, planning has had to change. Planning changes were evident in policies, cultures, regulations and procedures. The conception of planning as a preserve of trained professionals has been challenged. In Harare and Epworth, ZIHOPFE has been actively involved in participatory planning and development through informal planning studios. Such participation has allowed communities to contribute their imaginations with regards to the form and structure of the settlement they want (Muchadenyika, 2015a: 7). Planning professionals working for the City of Harare, Epworth Local Board and Chitungwiza Municipality pointed out that the past two decades have been a period of relearning as conventional planning methods were not only challenged but became irrelevant.

In metropolitan Harare, institutionalised planning has been confronted with people planning for themselves. There are elements of insurgent planning in which movements are not only transgressing planning procedures, but performing planning functions such as layout planning, surveying, pegging, land allocation and approving construction stages. When a system is confronted by external exigencies, it will change over time (Muchadenyika, 2015b). Thus, the Government of Zimbabwe adopted incremental and parallel development, which in principle are constituent elements of radical planning, as these two strategies use social movements as the centrepiece of housing and urban development. Zimbabwe's planning system has been shaken by drastic changes in economic, social and political conditions. The usually bureaucratised and technocratic system of urban planning has loosened, allowing informalised approaches to planning.

Municipal capacity is fundamental in the delivery of planning and housing services, and particularly for urban transformation. However, as indicated in this study, Chitungwiza and Epworth show indications of, respectively, what I have termed municipal failure and municipal capture. While much of the literature focuses on state failure (Rotberg, 2004; Rice & Patrick, 2008; Carment, 2003; Doornbos, 2002; Milliken & Krause, 2002; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013), it is imperative to understand how municipalities fail. Municipal failure is a phenomenon characterised by uncoordinated housing developments, compromises to human safety and convenience, planning failure and widespread environmental degradation. In attempting to understand municipal failure, I have focused on its causes and manifestations. Municipal failure is caused by weak municipal systems, weak governance and administration, unethical conduct of appointed and elected officials and lack of ownership and control over land. As a result, the municipality becomes vulnerable to abuse by residents, officials, government and politicians. However, when municipal systems collapse, the practice and conduct of planning and, in particular, housing delivery become tenuous, contested and haphazard.

Municipal failure manifests in planning failure as planning is a governance function. Planning failure is a condition characterised by chaotic planning and development of areas leading to deeply contested housing struggles. Five interrelated processes can lead to planning failure. First, the absence of formally agreed and laid-down procedures for land allocation fuels the use

of informal procedures. Second, the unethical conduct of professional planners alters the form and structure of urban centres. Third, the failure of a municipality to avail land for housing triggers a parallel housing delivery process. Fourth, the illegal process of land allocation results in illegal planning processes. Lastly, when planning fails, planning by social movements becomes an individualistic project that does not prioritise creating a settlement that functions.

While available literature primarily focuses on state capture (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013; Mills, 2014; Gros, 1996; Mueller, Vatter & Arnold, 2016; Jensen, 2002; Call, 2008), this study has discussed what I call ‘municipal capture’. Municipal capture is a condition when a local authority’s mandated functions are largely influenced, controlled and to some extent carried out by individuals or groups through informal means. Such groups or individuals take advantage of weak municipal systems through using perceived or real political and economic power.

While it is evident that central government and local authorities have largely abandoned their mandate of infrastructure development in urban areas to social movements, this arrangement has also brought about new regulatory dynamics. First, urban infrastructure development and expansion is now a function of housing movements, who are prioritising their immediate infrastructure needs. Thus, there has been no meaningful long-term planning and development of urban infrastructure in urban centres. However, the African Development Bank, through the Zimbabwe Multi-donor Trust Fund, is supporting water and sanitation infrastructure rehabilitation in Harare and Chitungwiza (Muchadenyika, 2016). In that regard, urban infrastructure is and will remain a major hindrance to urban expansion in Zimbabwe. In addition, there have been contestations over sharing and connecting of urban infrastructure. In other words, it would seem that housing movements do not conceive urban infrastructure as an ‘urban common good’.

Second, the development of infrastructure has been affected by confused ownership of urban land. For instance, the City of Harare sited a 1,000-stands-capacity septic tank to service 843 stands in Hopley B (Southlands Park) on private land. The housing movement committed substantial resources (USD 0.2 million) to the project until the private landowner declared a land dispute. The movement subsequently lost its investment as it seems that the City of Harare does not know the ownership status of land within its boundaries. In Chadcombe, Msasa, the

City of Harare sold land to a housing consortium and co-operative – land which belonged to a private owner. In addition, the city surveyed and pegged such land for a fee, with the Consortium investing nearly a million dollars in infrastructure servicing only for the City to realise that it is private land when the owner objected after three years of on-site developments. It is unfair for the urban poor to bear the costs of a ‘professional error or negligence’ without receiving any compensation from the City.

A third trend is the emergence and acceptance of alternatives to conventional urban infrastructure. These include the extensive use of septic tanks instead of reticulated sewer, boreholes instead of reticulated water, and gravel roads instead of tarred roads in Hopley, Saturday Retreat, Odar, and Caledonia, among others. These practices are facilitating inclusive service delivery and planning in cities, despite such practices not yet being included in planning law. Rather, such practices have been adopted in policies related to planning and housing, a vital step in rationalising the country’s high planning standards which have been maintained at the expense of inclusive urban growth (GoZ, 2009a).

Policy changes and flexibility on the part of planning institutions has been equally transformational. Community-driven approaches could not escape Zimbabwe as the National Housing Policy 2000 and 2012 emphasised the role of co-operatives and CBOs in low-income housing delivery. To acknowledge a new approach to housing delivery, government and local authorities redefined – at least in practice – their role in housing delivery to be land allocation and development control. In the post-2000 era, one of the major impacts on low-income housing in Harare, in particular, and Zimbabwe, in general, was made through the HSUP, a partnership of ZIHOPFE, Dialogue on Shelter and the City of Harare. In other words, housing projects are an important vehicle of changing planning traditions. This is shown by the City of Harare’s acceptance of reviewing planning regulations and procedures, adopting incremental development in both access to service infrastructure and the construction of housing units and funding the establishment of a pro-poor housing finance facility.

Borrowing from the work of local authorities and, in particular, the City of Harare, ZIHOPFE, and housing co-operatives, government adopted parallel and incremental development as low-income housing strategies in the 2012 National Housing Policy. In this regard, I argue that social movements do influence policy, not necessarily through lobbying and advocacy but

through action and demonstration of alternatives. The above indicates the importance of policy to deliberately support the work of housing movements.

Miraftab (2009: 32) argues that there is need for radical planning in the Global South, in particular, insurgent planning characterised by “grassroots insurgent citizenship for planning, and the de-colonisation of planning theory”. Based on the findings of this study, I argue that insurgent planning constitutes radical planning practices which promote inclusion of the marginalised in a mainstream planning agenda. For instance, the radical nature of practices by social movements in metropolitan Harare brought the subject of low-income housing to the fore in central and local governments’ planning and housing agenda, though largely in a reactionary way. Furthermore, grassroots movements demonstrate radical practices through pioneering alternative practices that counter conventional practices. Over time, such practices have been accepted as part of planning traditions.

8.4 Alliances and Contestations

In this study, I have argued that low-income self-help groups are a viable and prudent approach to low-income housing delivery, especially in situations where central and local government are severely constrained to perform their housing development functions. It would seem that these groups are not only contributing to housing delivery but also to building the social fabric of communities. These communities assist each other in both happy and difficult times, for instance burials, weddings and prolonged sickness. However, such unity is proving to be a vital aspect of the resilience of the urban poor and social cohesion in societies which otherwise could be divided by issues such as politics, HIV status and income vulnerability. Solidarity mechanisms for both co-operatives and the Federation are an important community asset when engaging with elites and planning institutions. Furthermore, outside housing, the Federation model focuses on health, income generation projects, and burial societies, among others, which are all aimed at building the resilience of individual households and communities. The situation is different in co-operatives, where the main rallying points are housing and political structures.

Social movements operate on a collective agency basis and the level of unity manifest in low-income self-help groups in metropolitan Harare is contributing to the sustenance of movement activities and pursuit of movement objectives. This is, however, not to deny that differences

and contradictions do exist. In both urban centres studied, tensions within movements are often triggered by corporate governance issues where leaders want to abuse their positions for personal gain. However, these movements have shown some degree of resilience as cases of financial mismanagement did not tear the movements apart, except in Hopley, where a splintering into two movements took place in 2011. Rather, the movements put in place additional safeguards for movement funds such as audits, petitions and changing leadership. Unlike in South Africa, where the SAHPF split in 2007 due to allegations of embezzlement and fraud by movement leaders (Podlashuc, 2011), the ZIHOPFE remained united after experiencing fraud by some of its founder members. This shows that the movement is resilient and mature enough to respond to internal shocks without abandoning its mission.

This study indicates that housing is profoundly a political process. Politicians are invariably present, even if they are absent from the *de facto* housing process – that is, they are present even in their absence. For instance, grassroots movements are to a great extent directly or indirectly removing the ‘burden’ from such ‘political leaders’, who often claim, quite falsely, credit for such housing movements. Unlike the ZIHOPFE, which considers itself apolitical, housing co-operatives have been able to secure land for housing largely by taking advantage of political opportunities. Co-operatives have built alliances with politicians where it suits and benefits them. On the other hand, they have ignored political bickering when party politics has a negative impact on their functioning. This I argue is a strength of the co-operative movement. The Federation has not been able to take advantage of political opportunities that have existed since 2000. This partly explains why in major cities like Harare, the Federation was not allocated land for a decade (2004-2014). However, in 2015 the City of Harare allocated 121 unserviced stands to Gunhill slum-dwellers in Mabvuku as the spillovers of the HSUP.²⁸¹

Dealing with land is always political; hence, social movements are entangled in political struggles in accessing land. As such, the Federation ought to understand how and why housing co-operatives, even with USD 1,900 are getting land from cities. Even co-operatives as young as three years have been allocated land when for a decade the Federation has not been allocated any land in Harare. Such a reality requires the Federation to change its model of operation,

²⁸¹ EHHCSLC Minutes, 17 February 2015.

failure of which might lead to the movement losing relevance in the long term. This would occur because the goal of Federation members is access to housing and as such members might not see any point in belonging to a movement that is not realising their dreams. However, opportunities do exist for the Federation to strategically re-orientate itself as a primarily anti- eviction movement, defending the rights of slum-dwellers rather than pre-occupying itself with championing low-income housing for its members.

The delivery of low-income housing in metropolitan Harare resembles a struggle. It is a struggle waged by the urban poor on many fronts: political, economic, internal and external. Social movements are entangled in deeper political contestations in which housing is politicised. MDC-linked co-operatives have largely benefited from land nearer bulk infrastructure (for example, co-operatives allocated land in Budiro show political linkages). In such cases, MDC councillors have, however, insisted that party-linked co-operatives follow council procedures and regulations, a development that is assisting in coherent housing development on council land. At the same time, Zanu-PF-linked co-operatives have invaded council and private land in struggles to control the allocation of urban land. However, Zanu-PF-linked co-operatives are more prominent on state land such as peri-urban Harare and in Chitungwiza. In Zanu-PF-linked movements, there is serious abuse of leadership positions for personal gain. A case in point is USD 20,423 million pocketed by Zanu-PF-aligned co-operative leaders instead of Chitungwiza Municipality and government (MLGPWNH, 2013a). In such movements, if one asks about corporate governance issues one is deemed both a 'renegade' and 'sell-out', warranting persecution and eviction. Members of such movements have suffered, are suffering and will continue suffering from abuse of their rights, resources and freedoms by Zanu-PF-linked 'leaders'. In other words, the Zanu-PF government has failed to rationalise settlements on state land, making the party complicit in a chaotic and contested urban development underway in Zimbabwe.

In urban planning theory, urban space is often conceived as physical space which determines whether such space can be developed or not. However, as this study suggests, it is not just about physical space but socio-political space which determines whether space is developable or non-developable. For development to take place in urban areas, geospatial characteristics are not the only consideration. In Metropolitan Harare, social and political dynamics are key

to determining if an area can be developed. In Harare South and Chitungwiza, there are areas which could be viewed as non-developable on the basis of ecological fragility, but politics has made them developable and habitable. In such cases, individuals with social and political power determine the nature and pace of development in a particular area. I suggest that it would be prudent to have a theory that explains how socio-political dynamics explain the development of physical space.

The economic challenges facing Zimbabwe in the post-2000 era are evident in the informalisation of settlements and economic activities. In fact, the life of most urban residents is difficult and challenging, with people opting to live in substandard and unplanned structures as a coping mechanism. However, despite the economic challenges, urban social movements have been pooling resources for housing delivery with some degree of success. Nonetheless, it is the internal struggles in movements which are proving to be a hindrance. To be precise, the majority of social movements are constrained by weak and corrupt leadership and governance – to the detriment of the urban poor.

In Zimbabwe, people who allocate vast tracks of land illegally are usually called land barons. Land barons are a network of individuals engaged in illegal land allocation using seemingly mafia tactics such as intimidation, abductions and violence. Such a network is prevalent in Harare and Chitungwiza. These land barons often thrive on selling and allocating state land, using the name of Zanu-PF for convenience and legitimacy. There is no evidence to suggest that the party sanctions such activities, but its failure to curb such illegal activities make it complicit.

The network of land barons comprises officials from departments such as Housing and Community Services and urban planning from the City of Harare and Chitungwiza Municipality, Zanu-PF senior politicians and youth, councillors and former councillors, government officials (MOSMECD and local government), state security agents and officials in the judiciary system. The network has information on:

- vacant pieces of land in cities;
- pending council resolutions to allocate land to certain co-operatives or individuals;

- peri-urban farms earmarked or in the process of gazetting and acquisition; and,
- land disputes within and around cities.

According to this study, such information is vital in the network's activities. For instance, if they realise that some co-operatives are about to be allocated land, the network uses politics to instigate illegal invasions by some co-operatives. This strategy facilitates chaos and confusion and causes illegal land sales to thrive. The network seems to have a monopoly of violence as it easily unleashes party youth to harass those who stand in the way. Its control of state security agencies is equally useful in executing illegal activities. For instance, the ZRP would often ignore requests for investigation of illegal land deals in both Harare and Chitungwiza. State security agents are normally used to intimidate and silence people or organisations which try to stand in the way of the network. Apart from enjoying expensive lifestyles, those in the network have strong connections and could easily manipulate state and government institutions. In addition, even the local government ministry's handling of state land is questionable and diabolic, with transparency secondary to appeasing political elites (see Annex IX and X).

8.5 Strategies for Low-Income Housing Development

Based on this study, the strategies for low-income housing development for Zimbabwe are discussed under the following headings:

a) Land Access and Allocation

The delivery of land is a vital aspect of low-income housing delivery. However, this research has found that the majority of housing movements allocated state land are facing enormous operational challenges. These challenges include relations with local authorities, abuse of funds by leadership, unclear tenure, and lack of noticeable development. Such challenges are evident in Caledonia, Hopley, Odar, and Saturday Retreat. Such co-operatives are aligned more to the local government ministry than the City of Harare, however, making it difficult for the city to control planning and housing development in such co-operatives. As compared to council-affiliated housing co-operatives allocated council land, co-operatives on state land are not only problematic but also have not recorded meaningful development on land despite settling for

more than a decade. Furthermore, in terms of corporate governance, co-operatives on council land are more accountable to movement members as compared to co-operatives on state land. The latter often victimise movement members who question transparency and accountability.

In Chitungwiza, urban land is state land, an arrangement constraining the local authority to determine or at least influence the allocation of land to co-operatives. As such, land allocation and access have been performed by individuals linked to Zanu-PF and Zanu-PF party structures. The net result has been the development of 22,000 houses through a parallel housing delivery system. In other words, Chitungwiza Municipality has played a very minimal role in housing developments in the town for the past decade. The situation of Chitungwiza is the creation of the Government of Zimbabwe, which has been reluctant to transfer state land to council land. It would seem that the government and Zanu-PF want to influence and control land allocation in the town at the expense of the municipality. In other words, the deeply contested nature of low-income housing in Chitungwiza is explained by land institutional arrangements in the town.

It can be argued that such centralisation (of land allocation) is one of the challenges affecting central-local government relations which have constrained the functioning of local authorities for decades. In the post-independence era, central government has taken over functions such as water and sanitation, education, vehicle licensing, and electricity from local authorities (Musemwa, 2010, 2014; Muchadenyika, 2015b; Muchadenyika & Williams, forthcoming). Such recentralisation is not peculiar to Zimbabwe but has been witnessed in many African countries, contributing to the continent's urban crisis (Smit & Pieterse, 2014). In fact, Zimbabwe's third largest urban centre is supposed to plan and deliver housing in an environment in which the municipality does not own a single hectare of land.²⁸² In metropolitan Harare, developments on state land are characterised by chaos, contestations, contradictions and no provision of infrastructure services.

However, based on the arguments this study has presented on chaotic and contested planning and housing on state land, I suggest that transferring state land to municipal land is an important

²⁸² The Municipality head office is even at a primary school site, using school buildings as offices.

step in curtailing challenges facing urban local authorities. In this regard, the role of central government should be limited to gazetting peri-urban farms and transferring state land to council land. The responsibility of allocating land to social movements should be primarily that of local authorities. This is mainly to allow local authorities to be in control of both land allocation and its planning and development. Moreover, local authorities have somehow defined credible criteria (such as audited financial statements, AGMs, updated membership lists, attendance at council bimonthly meetings) for allocating land to social movements. In particular, the criteria for allocation used by the City of Harare partly explain the positive and progressive contribution by housing co-operatives to housing delivery in the city.

b) Policy Integration, Consistency and Reform

Planning law seems to be a convenient tool to retard and even destabilise social movements advocating for speed delivery of low-income housing. Housing policies have singled out the need to embark on planning law reform as a way of removing bottlenecks in low-income housing delivery (GoZ, 2009a, 2012). However, there has been no progress towards reform, which could mean that existing law is benefiting some elite sections of the society. This is despite the fact that “the gap between the intentions of planning law and the actual reality of urban life grew wider until it became difficult to see a connection between the two” (Watson, 2011: 204). The adoption of incremental development by the Government of Zimbabwe, however, marks a modest step towards promoting grassroots initiatives in housing delivery. However, planning authorities in Zimbabwe “are still bent on bidding good riddance to ways of life and modes of practice that do not fit into the official schema of the modern city” (Kamete, 2013: 27). As such, informal settlements sprout largely due to bottlenecks in the formal housing delivery system. Nonetheless, governing authorities have been reluctant to deal with such bottlenecks in the planning and housing delivery system.

At present, housing development is not conceived as part of the overall spatial urban development framework. Such a conception, however, is leading to numerous challenges of coherent urban development. Perhaps the most visible part of such challenges are uncoordinated infrastructure development and human settlements developed with ‘housing as an end in itself’. Put differently, there is no link between urban development and housing. This could be the result of an absent national and metropolitan urban development framework,

which is vital in steering urban growth through coordinated actions on land, housing and infrastructure in urban centres (Turok, 2015).

The three local authorities that this study focused on do not have a defined housing policy despite the existence of the National Housing Policy. The City of Harare in its council and committee reports often refer to ‘council housing policy’, but there is no consolidated document which outlines the policy. However, there are numerous outlined council resolutions which are deemed as the council’s policy, dealing with parallel development, guidelines for selecting consortium leadership, demolitions, and land allocation to co-operatives, among other issues. Such lack of policy consolidation and clarity has resulted in confusion between councillors and appointed officials on who has the responsibility for land allocation and the procedures for such. Without a defined housing policy to guide local authorities and their officials, the tendency has been to use informal means, which often breeds confusion. Furthermore, there are indications of non-synchronisation of housing policy between central and local governments. A case in point is that the City of Harare adopted parallel development in 2006, with national government adopting the policy as a housing strategy in 2012.

At the national level, the provision of low-income housing primarily focused on the government and local authorities in the post-independence period. This approach ignored key housing actors such as self-help groups. Such omission in policy and practice has led to the suffocation of the low-income housing sector in the post-2000 era when the financial capacity of both government and local authorities has lessened. Furthermore, housing policies seem to be disjointed as they do not build from each other. Policy implementation is piecemeal, with little emphasis on policy evaluation, a key element in policy implementation. Suffice to say, housing policies did not necessarily transform into real changes in people’s lives.

c) Regularisation and Formalisation of Informal Settlements

Regularisation of 22,000 houses in Caledonia (Harare) and Chitungwiza (targeting 11,000 houses) shows a new trajectory of responses to informality by both government and local authorities. For conceptual and practical purposes, what are the steps involved in regularisation? Carrying out an audit of settlements is the initial process that determines settlements and housing structures which can be regularised. During this process, the guiding

principles are the town planning objectives of order, convenience, environmental preservation, and safety. After audit, the second process is to enter houses selected for regularisation into municipal systems such as housing, finance, information technology and planning. This includes providing house numbers to regularised houses for easy identification in municipal records. The third step entails demolitions and relocations. Demolitions are effected on houses which cannot be regularised and their occupants relocated. Regularisation is supposed to create responsive and inclusive cities. However, regularisation should not be viewed and conducted in a commandist approach in which government directs the process. Such an approach often attracts resistance from local authorities, residents and civil society, as in Chitungwiza.

In situ upgrading is a prudent strategy to formalise informal settlements, particularly in situations where central and local governments are constrained. In such a case, what communities require from planning authorities is political will towards upgrading. The financing aspect can be shouldered by communities. What do we learn from such a financing model? When people contribute financially, there is a tendency to own the upgrading process. In this case, the role of government institutions is streamlined to policy making, managing and regulating the upgrading process and approving planning processes. The process of communities taking charge of their own development creates community-centred structures and promotes social cohesion. Community structures are fundamental in steering grassroots-driven development. In Epworth, through planning development activities, pooling resources, the community has united for a shared vision of transforming informal settlements. This is in contrast to top-down interventions in slum-upgrading which often meet resistance and non-acceptance by beneficiaries (Kamete, 2013; Huchzermeyer, 2009). Social movements in Epworth, NGOs, ELB and central government have partnered in an *in situ* upgrading programme which aims to deliver 21,957 tenured stands to informal settlers. However, the upgrading programme has faced challenges such as reluctance by the DPP in accepting informal upgrading and local political elites stalling upgrading processes.

d) Infrastructure Development

One of the pre-eminent challenges in housing struggles by the urban poor through movements is the provision of infrastructure services. The delivery of low-income housing is tenable in a situation where government and local authorities perform their duties – provision of

infrastructure. However, the over-emphasis on land in peri-urban areas has negated a focus on infrastructure, which is a key aspect of housing development. As this study demonstrates, the two key components of low-income housing are the delivery of land and infrastructure. The former has been readily available, and this has led to numerous low-income settlements developing without basic services such as reticulated water, sanitation and roads. This has created a new and differentiated form of urban settlements in Zimbabwe.

It is acknowledged that the existing urban infrastructure is overstretched (AfDB, 2011), making it prudent to have alternative methods of addressing the infrastructure deficit, especially in new housing settlements. This, I suggest, entails leveraging on both public and private sector initiatives. Lessons can be drawn from the City of Harare-Central African Building Society project in which the city sold 5,000 stands at USD 0.5 per square metre based on the proposition that the private developer would develop off-site infrastructure services that also benefit nearby housing projects and the potential to affect the pricing of the completed housing units. This is an innovation that requires scaling-up in other areas. However, eligibility for the CABS-City of Harare partnership “required a CABS bank account and a defined income bracket, making it difficult for ultra-low-income households to benefit” (Muchadenyika, 2015b: 1232).

The invasion of land by social movements in peri-urban Harare is a revolution which is difficult to reverse. However, the City of Harare ought to include such settlements in the overall urban development plan. Settlements like Odar, Hopley and Saturday Retreat might require regularisation and *in situ* upgrading as the starting point to deliver planning and infrastructure services. Conventional approaches of servicing and resettling people involves the challenges of relocations. The total population in these settlements stands at about 113,599, which is considered rural for census purposes (ZimStat, 2013b). This is despite that such areas fall under the City of Harare’s boundaries.

At present, social movements are overburdened through providing and maintaining infrastructure and building housing units. This task is difficult for the urban poor to accomplish. This explains why most social movements have been struggling for nearly two decades to finish housing projects. The installation and management of infrastructure by social movements alone, a function traditionally performed by government and local authorities, has led to mistrust between social movements and planning authorities. It is unfair for local authorities to

benefit from infrastructure investment by social movements. Local authorities are only taking over the management and maintenance of infrastructure only after the completion of a housing scheme.

The burden of infrastructure on social movements manifests in sub-standard infrastructure as the priority of social movements is approval as opposed to quality, durability and resilience. As such, infrastructure easily dilapidates, reducing the value of these settlements and also exposing such settlements to risks. This is exacerbated by the fact that some of these settlements have been built in ecologically fragile areas. It would seem that the majority of infrastructures are vulnerable to hazards such as floods. Thus, as a way to build urban resilience and reduce the burden on social movements and promote fairness, I argue for co-production and co-management of urban infrastructure. Co-production can be defined as “a strategy used by citizens and the state to extend access to basic services with relatively little consideration given to its wider political ramifications” (Mitlin, 2008: 339).

Co-producing infrastructure among movements, local authorities, and government frees significant social movement resources which can be channelled to acquiring land and building actual houses. If it were not for the allocation requirement for social movements to install infrastructure, the sector could have contributed in a major way to low-income housing delivery. This is because the money contributed to infrastructure is enough to build and complete a habitable house. Second, co-producing and co-managing helps local authorities not only in approving but managing and monitoring processes of installing infrastructure. As such, co-production assists in curbing vandalism and contestations of sharing infrastructure as social movements are claiming exclusive ownership of such infrastructure.

e) Housing beyond Brick and Mortar Structures

Perhaps due to the continued pursuit by the government of home-ownership policy, the emphasis in policy and practice has been on owning a house in urban areas. Such a policy thrust led to widespread development of housing units even with sub-standard materials. What have suffered have been ancillary services that make a human settlement liveable and sustainable. In most settlements studied, there is no significant investment in education and health care, let alone commercial and industrial facilities, leaving settlers to rely on services offered in other

settlements. This does not only provide an additional cost but it results in non-access to such services. The space for such services largely exists, though in some instances, it has been occupied by informal settlers. Conventionally, such facilities are a preserve of local authorities; however, with their inactivity in the provision of housing, the development of ancillary services has largely been neglected.

Housing development should be integrated with other sectors of the economy such as industry. However, in metropolitan Harare, housing has been developed as an end in itself. This has led to houses developed for people with nowhere to work. As such, despite the challenge of accommodation being solved, other needs of livelihoods and survival are left unattended. In this regard, some residents are unable to even pay levies and rates required by local authorities. The absence of industrial development in areas such as Epworth and Chitungwiza has led to rapid informal economic activities as livelihood means. However, such informal activities largely free-ride on council services.

f) Institutional and Governance Framework of Housing Co-operatives

Existing government oversight in housing co-operatives is fragmented, with the two government ministries involved straddling jurisdictional boundaries and leaving gaps. The MOSMECD mainly prioritises corporate governance in housing co-operatives, a development which is negating oversight of housing co-operatives in actual housing delivery. At the same time, the local government ministry concerns itself with land allocation, after which it seems to withdraw its services. Based on the challenges partly caused by fragmentation of responsible ministries, this study suggests that housing co-operatives should fall under the ministry responsible for housing to allow the ministry to be responsible for both governance of housing co-operatives and the housing delivery process.

Perhaps leadership and governance is the single-most important factor in collective housing. The distinguishing features of successful housing movements are leadership experience, corporate governance practices (with layers of checks and balances), and apolitical and active membership. However, the obtaining reality of leadership and governance of housing movements is not promising. The majority of such leadership has captured movements, ostensibly for personal gain. This is exacerbated by the fact that leadership changes have mostly

been rare. On the other hand, there is no binding framework on limit of leadership terms. In particular, there is no code of ethics from local authorities and government to govern the conduct of movement leaders.

g) Multi-Pronged Approach to Housing Delivery

Since independence in 1980, the Government of Zimbabwe has argued for and promoted home-ownership in successive housing policies and programmes. While such a policy can be laudable considering independent Zimbabwe's socialist inclined approach to development, the policy has resulted in suffocating other forms of housing. The decision by the Government in the 1980s and 1990s to sell off municipal-owned social housing to individuals affected the revenue base of local authorities in the post-2000 era. During the period under study (2000-15), there has been no investment in social housing in metropolitan Harare by the three responsible local authorities. Based on such developments, I argue that housing should be looked at from a broad perspective and that a policy thrust favouring home-ownership alone is bound to lead to a housing crisis. Social housing allows densification which reduces infrastructure costs. Densification maximises on land, which is becoming scarce in metropolitan Harare considering the tensions and contradictions associated with peri-urban farms.

h) Housing and Planning Research and Training

Most people working in the housing field, particularly in local authorities and the ministry responsible for housing, have no formal training in housing. This background has prompted officers to be bureaucratic and resistant to change largely because 'their only footing' is council and government policies, regulations and procedures. Officials have largely resisted alternative approaches in housing delivery, a development forestalling innovation and new ideas. However, the Harare Slum-upgrading Programme provided an opportunity for relearning, despite resistance from professionals. People working in the housing sector have backgrounds in business and other social sciences which are not grounded in housing issues, trends and approaches.

As such, the professional and academic training of public officials is vital in housing policy and practice. That said, it would seem that housing as an academic discipline has not fully evolved in Zimbabwe. The closest discipline in the country teaching housing issues is urban

planning. However, the Department of Rural and Urban Planning at the University of Zimbabwe's offers no stand-alone housing courses. Even the planning profession is not regulated, a development that has resulted in widespread contentious ethical issues in planning practice. In order to have control over planning procedures and regulations, which have an impact on housing delivery; it is vital to regulate the planning profession just like engineers and surveyors. Furthermore, universities ought to consider offering housing degrees at undergraduate and graduate levels.

i) Housing Information Management System

The process of housing in Zimbabwe is marred by confusion and lack of reliable data which can be used to inform housing policy and practice. The availability and delivery of land is a key factor in housing delivery. However, in metropolitan Harare, the land registration and management system is fraught with uncertainty. This has resulted in low-income self-help groups losing investment after land disputes from landowners, despite the City of Harare and central government's allocation of such land to housing movements. Furthermore, land acquisition and transfers, particularly in Harare South, are shrouded in mystery. For example, in 2014, the government reversed the acquisition of Odar and vested ownership to Sensene Investments and stated that the "company will receive compensation directly from the occupants and pass ownership accordingly" (see annex IX for full details).²⁸³ However, it is not clear how the ownership of Odar farm changed from the Zimbabwe Tobacco Association to the Government of Zimbabwe and finally to Sensene Investments (a company owned by a former Zanu-PF parliamentarian). Such government indecisiveness raises questions about transparency and the role of politicians who are seemingly colluding with former landowners. Lack of such clarity has often resulted in the urban poor being the prime victims of shady land deals from land barons with political connections and protection. Such developments build a case for the need of a housing information management system. The system should, among other things, include available land banks, land earmarked for housing, approved layout plans, stands allocated, housing units under development, and completed housing units.

²⁸³ Acting Secretary for MLGPWNH to Chairman Pinnacle Property Holdings, 19 December 2014.



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Appendices

Annex I: Field Research Tools

Tool A: In-depth Interviews: Local Authorities (Depts. of Housing, Planning, & Engineering)

1. What do you understand by incremental and parallel development?
2. How relevant are the two in the current urban practice in the context of prevailing socio-economic circumstances?
3. How is your local authority implementing incremental and parallel development?
4. In what way is the strategy promoting low-income housing?
5. What is the role of your local authority in the formation, education and training of social movements (housing co-operatives and ZIHOPFE)?
6. How do you engage with social movements?
7. How are your relations with social movements?
8. How are lessons from practice being incorporated into housing policy?
9. Explain the process of allocating land to social movements? (Probe politics of the process).
10. What are the existing planning regulations and procedures that your local authority use?
11. What are the impacts of such regulations and procedures to low-income housing delivery? (Probe any contested procedures).

Tool B: In-depth Interviews: Mayors, Councillors & Political Parties

1. What is your view on government's decision to adopt incremental and parallel development?
2. What is your opinion on the state of low-income housing in metropolitan Harare (Harare, Chitungwiza and Epworth)?
3. Comment on the role of housing co-operatives and ZIHOPFE in housing delivery?
4. What is your party's position on housing co-operatives?
5. What is your view on the process of allocating land to urban poor groups? (Probe personal experiences).
6. How can authorities enforce planning regulations in housing co-operatives?
7. Describe how social movements mobilise and manage their finances?
8. In your opinion what are the policy gaps within the low-income housing sector?

Tool C: FGDs: Social Movements (Co-operatives & ZIHOPFE – Ordinary Members)

1. How do you mobilise your members?
2. Does your movement have any organisational strategy?
3. Describe solidarity systems and social networks you use?
4. How many housing units have been built by your movement to date?
5. What political opportunities have you exploited in accessing land? (Probe FTLRP, Contestation between MDC & Zanu-PF and socio-economic crisis).
6. Explain the role of women in your movement (Probe gender sensitivity of the movement).
7. How do you mobilise and manage your funds? (Probe issues of financial abuse).
8. Describe the process of accessing land for the movement? (Probe experiences & challenges).
9. How is land allocated to individual movement members?
10. What is your opinion on planning regulations and procedures you are supposed to follow?
11. Are there any specific strategies within the social movement aimed at policy influence?
12. How has participation in collective housing processes transformed you as an individual?

Tool D: In-depth Interviews: Social Movement Leaders

1. Tell me about your leadership experience.
2. What is your understanding of collective action issues?
3. How does your movement plan its activities?
4. What is your experience in community mobilisation?
5. Describe your relations with central and local government? (Probe interference, collaboration etc.).
6. What are the sources of funds for your movement?
7. How are movement finances managed? (Probe auditing, financial systems, abuse etc.) (See & make copies of audit reports, bank statements).
8. Do you think your movement has had impact on housing/planning practice or policy? If so, in what ways?
9. What is your comment on central and local government support to social movements?

Tool E: In-depth Interviews: SMOs (Dialogue on Shelter & ZINAHCO)

1. What is your understanding of incremental and parallel development?
2. How are the two strategies affecting the delivery of low-income housing?
3. Describe the support you provide to social movements.
4. What is your comment on the process of land access and allocation by social movements?
5. How are the current planning regulations and procedures affecting low-income housing?
6. What are the relations between social movements and local authorities?
7. What is your opinion on the current planning standards in relation to low-income housing?
8. What is the role of politics in low-income housing?
9. What are the key lessons you have learned from collective housing processes?
10. Do you think your organisation has had an impact on housing/planning practice or policy? If so, in what ways?
11. What is your comment on central and local government support to social movements?

Tool F: In-depth Interviews: Ministry of Local Government, Public Works & National Housing

1. What is your understanding of incremental and parallel development?
2. Why did the Government of Zimbabwe adopt the two as housing development strategies?
3. What are the key issues emerging from the implementation of the two strategies?
4. What is the current government position on low-income self-groups (co-operatives and ZIHOPFE)?
5. What is the role of the ministry in the allocation of land to social movements?
6. How does the ministry support social movements?
7. Tell me about the status of planning standards in low-income housing areas.
8. What is your assessment of planning regulations and procedures vs social movements?
9. What has been the contribution of social movements in complementing government efforts in reducing the housing backlog?
10. What is your view on the leadership and governance of social movements?
11. Any kind of government support that you can imagine targeted at social movements in order to strengthen their delivery capacities?

Tool G: In-depth Interviews: Ministry of Small & Medium Enterprises & Co-operative Development

1. What is the role of the ministry in co-operative development in Zimbabwe?
2. How many housing co-operatives are registered with the ministry in Harare, Chitungwiza and Epworth? (Get the national figures & distribution by provinces as well).
3. Explain the ministry's role in the formation, education and training of housing co-operatives.
4. What have been the main challenges emerging out of the ministry's engagements and work with housing co-operatives?
5. What are the lessons learned from housing co-operative experiences?
6. What is your opinion on the current legislation in relation to registration and operations of housing co-operatives?

Tool H: In-depth Interviews: Research Institutes & other Interest Organisations

1. What explains the sharp increase in low-income housing self-help groups in the post-2000 era?
2. Why has the Government of Zimbabwe adopted incremental and parallel development as housing development strategies?
3. What are the impacts of such a strategy on urban development?
4. What is your comment on the process of land access and allocation by low-income self-help groups?
5. What is your comment on the leadership and governance of social movements?
6. What is the contribution of social movements to water, sanitation and road infrastructure?
7. How have interventions by social movements led to knowledge-building on low-cost housing in terms of alternatives that have been presented?

Tool I: Life History Guide (Ordinary members & leaders of movements)

1. Briefly tell me your biographical details.
2. Why did you join this movement?
3. How did your social movement start?
4. What is your role in this movement?
5. Take me through the journey from the formation of this movement to this day.
6. How has your participation in this movement changed your life?

Tool J: Participation Observation List

1. State of infrastructure (water, sanitation and roads).
2. State of housing structures (completed, uncompleted, planned or unplanned).
3. Nature of settlements (order, convenience, health, safety, environmental preservation).
4. Movement cohesion mechanism (rituals, slogans).
5. Conduct of movement meetings and gatherings (issues discussed, participation by movement members, attendance).
6. Nature of visible contestations and contradictions.
7. Nature of alliances and collaborations.

Annex II: List of In-depth Interviewees

No	Name	Designation and Organization
1	Julius Chiwawa	Co-operative Development Officer, MOSMECD
2	Oscar Nyamukova	Co-operative Development Officer, MOSMECD
3	K Chikura	Chief Co-operative Officer Monitoring & Evaluation, MOSMECD
4	Elton Manjeya	Operations Director, Realty Property Developers
5	Christopher W.E. Matumbike	Former Permanent Secretary, Ministry of National Affairs
6	Walter Sakarombe	Researcher, Development Governance Institute
7	Mike Mavhenyengwa	Former Registrar of Co-operatives, Ministry of National Affairs
8	Patience Mudimu	Projects Director, Dialogue on Shelter
9	Bridget Mandizha	Housing Manager, DHCS, City of Harare
10	William Tafirei	Senior Administration Manger, DHCS, City of Harare
11	George Masimba Nyama	Projects Coordinator, Dialogue on Shelter
12	Nyasha Gumbo	Chief Planning, Research and Housing Officer, DHCS, City of Harare
13	Beth Chitekwe-Biti	Director, Dialogue on Shelter
14	Shadrack Tondori	Coordinator / Founder Member, ZIHOPFE
15	Sekai Chiremba	Coordinator, ZIHOPFE
16	Wadzanai Vhutuza	Principal Town Planner, DUPS, City of Harare
17	Austin Kasiyamhuru	Chief Research & Development Planner, DUPS, City of Harare
18	S. Moyo	Director Estates Management, MLGPWNH
19	Joel Chaeruka	Former Chairperson DRUP, University of Zimbabwe
20	Buhle Dube	Lecturer, DRUP, University of Zimbabwe
21	Pardon Gotora	Chief Housing Officer, MLGPWNH
22	Nathan Nkomo	Director, Research, MLGNHPW
23	Innocent Chirisa	Senior Lecturer, DRUP, University of Zimbabwe
24	Nyasha Mutsindikwa	Lecturer, DRUP, University of Zimbabwe
25	George Mukodzi	District Administration Offer, DHCS, City of Harare
26	Clement Mandizvidza	Committee Member / Project Officer, Hopely B Consortium
27	Manatsa Chinhengo	Chairperson, Hopely B Consortium
28	Monalisa Tabariko	Secretary, Madzibaba Border Gezi Co-operative
29	Vulindlela Mukozho	Administrative Assistant, Madzibaba Border Gezi Co-operative
30	Shupai Hlerema	Secretary, Steering Committee, Ushehwekunze Housing Co-operative
31	Fungai Nyarota	Chairperson, Steering Committee, Ushehwekunze Housing Co-operative
32	Tarisai Dandajena	ZIHOPFE member, DZ Extension
32	Mallon Mapika	Planner / Chitungwiza resident
33	L. Hlatshawayo	Chairperson, Current Housing Consortium
34	Isaac Nyikayapera	Planner, MLGPWNH
35	Mr Z	Former Building Inspector, Chitungwiza Municipality
36	Marvellous Khumalo	Programmes Director, Chitungwiza Residents Trust (CHITREST)
37	Alice Utahwarova	Advocacy & Information Officer, CHITREST
38	Arnold Mubango	Intern, CHITREST
39	Felix Chihoro	Secretary, Chitungwiza Residents and Ratepayers Association
40	Kudzai Chatiza	Researcher, Development Governance Institute
41	Struggle Dzapasi	Chairperson, Gukuraivhu Housing Co-operative

42	Goodwill Mushangwe	Deputy Mayor, Chitungwiza Municipality
43	Tendai Simon	Councillor, Chairperson Public Works and Planning Committee, Chitungwiza Municipality
44	Richard Chamutsa	Councillor, Chairperson Education, Housing & Community Services Committee, Chitungwiza Municipality
45	Kallisto Masango	Councillor Ward 18, Chitungwiza Municipality
46	Tichaona Muchakwa	Councillor Ward 1, Chitungwiza Municipality
47	Darlington Musonza	Councillor Ward 12, Chitungwiza Municipality
48	Rosemary Maridza	Planning Technician, Chitungwiza Municipality
49	Mr. Sakanda	Assistant Planning Technician, Chitungwiza Municipality
50	Priscilla Vengesai	Former Chamber Secretary, Chitungwiza Municipality
51	Last Muzamindo	WADCO Chairperson, Ward 7 Epworth
52	Milton Manomano	WADCO Vice Chairperson, Ward 7, Epworth
53	Aleck G. Makangira	WADCO Committee Member
54	Mr Mataranyika	WADCO Committee Member – Secretary for Lands
54	Elson Mungate	Chairperson, Epworth Residents Development Association
55	Vengesai Muchoni	Councillor, Ward 7, Epworth
56	Shingai Kawadza	Planning Officer, Urban Development Corporation
57	N. Mudada	Chairperson WADCO Ward 7, Zanu-PF District Chairperson
57	Robert Chapotera	Epworth Chiremba Resident
58	Joseph O. Zvareva	Engineer, Epworth Local Board
59	Donald Muchena	Founding Board Member, Epworth Local Board
60	Martha Chayamiti	WADCO Member, Epworth Ward 7
61	Mathew James	Ward 7 resident
62	G. Chidofira	WADCO Member, Epworth Ward 7
63	David M Matumbike	Director, Local Governance Community Capacity Building Trust
64	Cliff Kaseke	Southlea Park Homeowners Association
65	Musakura Kunasa	Southlea Park Homeowners Association
66	Nathan Nyambuya	Southlea Park Homeowners Association
67	David Simbanegavi	Southlea Park Homeowners Association
68	Jeofrey Makonyere	Planner, MLGPWNH
69	Absolom Masendeke	Director, Civic Forum on Housing
70	Rejoice Ngwenya	Political Analyst
71	James Chiyangwa	Director, DHCS, City of Harare
72	John Choto	Housing Officer, MLGPWNH
73	Emmanuel Siraha	Projects Officer, Shelter Zimbabwe
74	Charles Mangongera	Former Policy Chief, MDC
75	Andrew Mlalazi	Senior Planning Consultant
76	Dale Dore	MDC Councillor, City of Harare (2002-03)
78	Percy Toriro	Planning Consultant, UDCORP
79	Davious Muvindi	Founder member, ZIHOPFE
80	Takudzwa Jera	Surveyor, Dialogue on Shelter
81	Dennis Muranduri	Housing Officer, Epworth Local Board
82	Ronald Chimowa	Acting Deputy Director, DPP
83	E. Nyamadzawo	Urban State land Office, MLGPWNH
84	Nyasha Matimaire	Principal Town Planning Officer, DPP
85	Cosmas Murepa	Planner, DPP

86	Last Madzivanyika	Former Chamber Secretary, Chitungwiza Municipality, Mbetsa Resuscitation Team
87	Patson Paradza	Planner, MLGPWNH
88	Tendai Muchada	Senior Programs Officer, CHRA
89	Judith Musasa	Former Town Planner, DPP
90	Brenda Hove	Projects Officer, Dialogue on Shelter
91	Blessing Kwambana	Planner, MLGPWNH
92	Stan Mazango	Party Official, MDC
93	Jonathan Kagoro	Coordinator, MLGPWNH/UNDP
94	Molin Chakamba	Projects Officer, Dialogue on Shelter
95	Eddie Cross	Member of Parliament and Secretary for Local Government, MDC



Annex III: List of FGD Participants

No.	Name	Co-operative / Savings Groups	Gender
FGD 1. Hopley B Housing Consortium			
1	Evans Kashaya	Sendekera	Male
2	Tawanda Chitanda	Cheziya	Male
3	Tambudzayi Sibanda	Cheziya	Female
4	Florence Munyaradzi	Vimbiso	Female
5	Sukholuhle Sihwede	Cheziya	Female
6	Sharon Mapanzure	Vimbiso	Female
7	Anyway Kadiramwando	Mufakose Teachers	Female
8	Talent Muvimi	Cheziya	Female
9	Otilia Karaga	Sendekera	Female
10	Betty Kalinde	Mabasa	Female
FGD 2. Hopley B Housing Consortium			
11	Mrs. Hamadziripi	Global Plastics	Female
12	Mr. Chikono	Global Plastics	Male
13	Mr. Kapikinyu	Zviratidzo	Male
14	I Mahofa	Chirambahuyo	Male
15	Mrs. Makohliso	Takunda	Female
16	C. Dube	Chirambahuyo	Male
17	P. Mashiri	Zviratidzo	Female
18	Mrs. Chikara	Zviratidzo	Female
19	L. Hatuugari	Zviratidzo	Female
FGD 3. Saturday Retreat Housing Consortium			
20	Molin Nyamayevhu Machipa	Madzibaba Border Gezi	Female
21	Richard Patiripakaipa	Madzibaba Border Gezi	Male
22	Ozwell Musonza	Madzibaba Border Gezi	Male
23	Kudakwashe Mafish	Madzibaba Border Gezi	Male
24	Ngoni Matsvai	Madzibaba Border Gezi	Male
25	Edmore Chimhandire	Madzibaba Border Gezi	Male
26	Rabiya Ngongondo	Madzibaba Border Gezi	Female
FGD 4: ZIHOPFE DZ Extension			
27	L. Mavhima	Nokutenda	Female
28	Sliden Makona	Canaan	Male
29	A. Gomo	Tayambuka	Male
30	I. Tafirenyika	Tinotenda	Female
31	Gladys Mubviro	Mushamukuru	Female
32	T. Chapfika	Faith	Female
32	Portia Mhlanga	Progress	Female
33	Gladys Tagarisa	Tawananyasha	Female
34	E. Alufeyo	Believe	Female
35	P. Tafirenyika	Tafara	Female
36	N. Masimo	Nokutenda	Female
37	F. Goto	Canaan	Female
FGD 5: ZIHOPFE DZ Extension			
38	T. Kariza	Nokutenda	Female
39	C. Tom	Canaan	Female

40	G. Banda	Believe	Female
41	K. Chibaya	Tawananyasha	Female
42	M. Nyagomo	Tinotenda	Female
43	Matha Mack	Mushamukuru	Female
44	T. Makuvire	Faith	Female
45	Murenza	Progress	Female
46	B. Muvindi	Tayambuka	Female
47	F. Mpofu	Nokutenda	Female
48	Chinhondo	Tafara	Female
49	P. Makava	Faith	Female
FGD 6. Current Housing Consortium Budiro 5 Extension			
50	Panganai Zenda	Tregers	Male
51	Luke Nzama	Five Stars	Male
52	Noah Nkoma	Emerald Hill	Male
53	Kidius Munemo	Five Stars	Male
54	Joel Mawire	Winefields	Male
55	Chrispen Mutukwa	Towerlight/ VC Consortium	male
FGD 7. Current Housing Consortium Budiro 5 Extension			
56	Mrs Matengu	Tapiwanashe	Female
57	Annah Chasakala	Tamuka	Female
58	Mr. X	Five Stars	Male
59	Faith Munorwei-Nyaruwe	Tregers	Female
60	Mrs. Mhaka	Tregers	Female
61	Mr. Mhungu	Five Stars	Male
62	Mr. Chivaviro	Wadzanai / Gleaneagles	Male
63	L. Watungwa	Rufaro Marketing	Male
64	Mrs. Siwela	Vimbainesu	Female
FGD 8. Zengeza 4, Mabamba Area, Chitungwiza			
65	Mrs Murambiwa	-	Female
66	Mrs Shava	-	Female
67	Mr Mutandwa	-	Male
68	Mrs Nyenye	-	Female
69	Mr Jongwe	-	Male
70	Mr. X	-	Male
71	Mrs. Jongwe	-	Female
FGD 9. Saturday Retreat Housing Consortium			
72	Cde Kaseke	Geneva	Male
73	Mr. Kumirai	ZIMTA	Male
74	Cde Manyoni	Tasimuka	Male
75	Mr. Milos	Mashingishingi	Male
76	Cde Karikoga	Ushehwekunze	Male
77	Cde Tichakunda	Cain Nkala	Female
78	Cde Zvichanaka	Hebert	Male
79	Cde Gomoguru	Takunda	Male
80	Cde Masango	Highfield Cannan	Male
81	Cde Makwikwi	Mujibha Chimbwido	Female
82	Cde Tinosvika Chete	TUZ	Female
FGD 10: Ward 7 Epworth Residents			

83	Tabeth Mahere	Ward 7	Female
84	Precious Musiniwa	Ward 7	Female
85	Esilina Chandaona	Ward 7	Female
86	Petronella Manyara	Ward 7	Female
87	Sekai Masiyiwa	Ward 7	Female
88	Colector Masvikeni	Ward 7	Female
89	Faresi Chogavana	Ward 7	Female
90	Maidei Mukungu	Ward 7	Female
FGD 11. Ward 7 Epworth Residents			
91	Edinah Mbudah	Ward 7	Female
92	Modester Paswavairi	Ward 7	Female
93	Abigail Mazivanhanga	Ward 7	Female
94	Maidei Nyamhiwa	Ward 7	Female
95	Gladys Mativenga	Ward 7	Female
96	Mrs. Zisuvi	WADCO Secretary for Health	Female
97	Last Muzamindo	Ward 7, Tongogara District	Male
98	Moses Kaingo	Ward 7, Zvido Zvevanhu	Male
FGD 12. Ward 7 Epworth Residents			
99	Peter Chadida	Ward 7, Reikai Tangwena	Male
100	Clason Maushe	Ward 7, Reikai Tangwena	Male
101	Conrad Simbi	Ward 7, Tongogara District	Male
102	Ranganai Muziva	Ward 7, Tadzikamidzi District	Male
103	Ganai Jasmoni	Ward 7, Tadzikamidzi District	Male
104	Timothy Masendo	Ward 7, Zvido Zvevanhu district	Male
105	Joe Mapondera	Ward 7, Tongogara District	Male
106	Fanny Musarareyi	Ward 7, Simon Muzenda District	Male
107	Milton Manomano	Ward 7, Simon Muzenda District	Male
FGD 13. Ward 6 WADCO members Epworth			
108	Future Jena	WADCO Member, Ward 6	Female
109	Magret Matere	WADCO Member, Ward 6	Female
110	Estheri Alphonco	WADCO Member, Ward 6	Female
111	Margret Marimbo	WADCO Member, Ward 6	Female
112	Edson Banga	WADCO Member, Ward 6	Male
113	Simbarashe Chikuni	WADCO Member, Ward 6	Male
114	Garikayi Nyaguwa	WADCO Member, Ward 6	Male
FGD 14. Odar Housing Consortium, Harare South			
115	Cde Tichatonga	Southlea Park	Male
116	Cde Tafanana	Southlea Park	Male
117	Cliff Kaseke	Southlea Park Homeowners Association	Male
118	Musakura Kunasa	Southlea Park Homeowners Association	Male
119	Nathan Nyambuya	Southlea Park Homeowners Association	Male
120	David Simbanegavi	Southlea Park Homeowners Association	Male

Annex IV: List of Documents, Reports and Letters Reviewed and Analysed

1. Acting Secretary for MLGPWNH letter to Chairman Pinnacle Property Holdings, 19 December 2014.
2. Audit Report on Issues of Land Management and Allocation Chitungwiza Town and Seke District 04 – 22 November 2013.
3. Chitungwiza Municipality 386th Ordinary Council meeting minutes.
4. Chitungwiza Municipality 401st Ordinary Council meeting minutes.
5. Chitungwiza Town Council: Report Chief Executive Officer, 27 October 1994.
6. Chitungwiza Town-Seke Communal Lands Combination Concept Plan (2014-16).
7. COH 1822nd Ordinary Council Meeting Minutes, 8 November 2012.
8. COH 1832th Ordinary Council Minutes, 6 March 2014.
9. COH Acting Director DHCS letter to Rambai Makashinga Co-operative, 31 July 2006.
10. COH Audit Committee Minutes, 14 July 2015.
11. COH Audit Report by Audit Manager, 6 July 2015.
12. COH CSHD Housing Division Procedure Manual.
13. COH DHCS Guidelines for Selection of Key Management Committee positions within a Housing Consortium.
14. COH DHCS letter to Town Clerk, 6 February 2002.
15. COH Director DUPS letter to Chairman Tabudirira Housing Co-operative, 26 April 2010.
16. COH Director DUPS letter to Chairperson Current Housing Consortium, 6 March 2009.
17. COH Director of DHCS memorandum to Town Clerk, 28 February 2012.
18. COH Director of DUPS memorandum to Director of DHCS, 30 March 2010.
19. Director of Housing MLGPWNH hand written letter to the Director of DHCS, 24 August 2005.
20. COH EHHCSLC Minutes, 10 March 2014.
21. COH EHHCSLC Minutes, 17 February 2015.
22. COH EHHCSLS Committee Minutes, 10 March 2014.
23. COH Finance and Development Committee Minutes, 17 March 2014.
24. COH Town Clerk's Report to the EHHCSLC, 16 September 2010.
25. COH Town Clerk's Report to the EHHCSLC, 14 January 2014.
26. COH Town Clerk's Report to the EHHCSLC, 21 May 2012.
27. COH Director of Works Report to the Environmental Management Committee, 28 July 2006.
28. COH Review of Planning Regulations and Plan Approval Processes, July 2012.
29. Common Vision Housing Consortium Chairperson letter to Director DHCS, 12 March 2012.
30. Common Vision Housing Consortium SGM minutes, 20 Feb 2012.
31. Deed of Settlement in the Administrative Court of Zimbabwe Case No. LA 6/14.
32. Director of Housing MLGPWNH letter to Director of DUPS, 28 January 2008.
33. Director of Housing MNHSA letter to COH Town Clerk, 16 June 2009.
34. Epworth Local Board Brief to Sweden Delegation.
35. Epworth Local Board Clients Charter.
36. Epworth Local Board Strategic Plan.
37. Epworth Ward 7 Development Plan.
38. Epworth Ward 7 Enumeration Report.
39. Finance and Development Committee Minutes, 19 February 2015.
40. Fontainebleau Housing Consortium Progress Report, 10 November 2011.
41. High Court of Zimbabwe Case number HC8962/10.
42. Housing Co-operative Society By-Laws.
43. Letter by acting COH Town Clerk to Permanent Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 July 2006.
44. Letter by Chairman Muzariri Housing Co-operative to COH Town Clerk, 14 November 2013.

45. Letter by Dialogue on Shelter for the Homeless in Zimbabwe Trust to COH DCSH, 29 June 2015.
46. Letter by Ushehwekunze Co-operative Society to Minister of Youth, Gender and Employment Creation, 4 November 2006.
47. Letters by Bhora Muggedhi and Mushawakura co-operatives to COH Town Clerk 18 November 2013.
48. Memo of 2 July 2005 from deputy minister of Transport and Communication (Nyanhongo) addressed to Comrade Simango, MLGPWNH.
49. MLGPWNH Manual for the Management of urban land.
50. Minutes of Common Vision Housing Consortium, 25 Feb 2012.
51. Minutes of the stakeholders meeting held at Budiro District Office, 22 July 2009.
52. MOA between The Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe (represented by MLGPWNH) and Crest Breeders International (Private) Limited, 18 December 2014.
53. MOA entered into by and between the Government of Zimbabwe (represented by MLGPWNH) and Odar Housing Consortium, 13 January 2006.
54. MOU made and entered into by and between Epworth Local Board, Dialogue on Shelter for the Homeless in Zimbabwe Trust and ZHOPFE.
55. Petition signed by 21 co-operative representatives in the Consortium signed on 5th June 2010 to Ward 46 Councillor.
56. Petition signed by 89 members of Pungwe Chimurenga Co-operative to the Registrar of Co-operatives, 17 April 2011.
57. Proposed policy on housing co-operatives in Zimbabwe, annex to paper presented on the 4th Housing Directors Forum.
58. Registrar of Co-operatives letter to Ushehwekunze Housing Co-operative Society, 24 October 2006.
59. Report on Housing in Harare Metropolitan Province, 3 June 2013.
60. Report on the Findings of the Inter-Ministerial Team investigating issues at Caledonia Farm, March 2015.
61. Letter by MLGPWNH Secretary to Ushehwekunze and selected co-operatives in Southern Area, 31 May 2005.
62. Southlea Park residents letter to ZRP (copied to MLGPWNH, President's Office, COH, ZESA, MOSMECD), 9 January 2015.
63. Zanoremba Report, October 2015.
64. ZINAHCO 2011 Annual Report to SIDA.

Annex V: List of Archival Documents Reviewed

1. Land Apportionment Act (No. 30 of 1930).
2. Land Tenure Act (No. 55 of 1969).
3. Native (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act (No. 6 of 1946).
4. Native Urban Locations Ordinance of 1906.
5. Regional, Town and Country Planning Act of 1976.
6. Town and Country Planning Act (No. 22 of 1946).
7. Town and Country Planning Act of 1933.
8. Town and Country Planning Act of 1945.

Annex VI: Enumeration Survey Tool

	Nhamba yemba (House Number)	
	Zita raEnumerator (Name of Enumerator)	
Personal and household details		
1	Ndiani ari kupindura mibvunzo (Who is the respondent)	a) Household head b) Spouse of household head c) Child of Household head d) Relative of household head
2	Zita rearikupindura mibvunzo (Name of Respondent)	
3	Nhamba dzechitupa (ID number of Respondent)	
4	Murume/mukadzi (Sex)	a) Male b) Female
5	Zera reari kupindura mibvunzo (Age)	
6	Zvemichato (Marital Status)	a) Single b) Married c) Widowed d) Separated/Divorced
7	Ndimi ani pastand pano (Land Ownership)	a) Landlord b) Lodger c) Relative d) Other, specify
	Makanyoresa here kukanzuru muchitsvaga imba/stand (housing waiting list)	a) Yes b) No
8	Pane mhuri ngani pano (Number of households)	
9	Muri vangani mumhuri menyu (Number of people in your Household)	a) Number of men..... b) Number of women.....
10	Mune mazera api mumhuri menyu (Age categories in the household)	a) (0-5yrs)..... b) (6-18yrs)..... c) (19-65yrs)..... d) (65yrs and above).....
11	Hutungamiri hwemumhuri (Household headship)	a) Male-headed b) Female-headed
	Chimiro chehutungamiri hwemhuri (Nature of household headship)	a) Economically active head b) Child-headed c) Elderly-headed
Settlement and structure details		
16	Chimiro chenharaunda (Status of settlement and Plot)	a) Formal (Originals) b) Informal (Gada)
12	Makabvepi (Where did you come from)	a) In Epworth in other wards b) In Harare c) Rural areas d) Other, specify
13	Makauya riini muno muWard 7 (When did you come here in Ward 7)	
	Makauya riini muno muEpworth (When did you come here in Epworth)	
14	Nei makauya muno muEpworth (Why did you come here in Epworth)	a) Affordable accommodation b) Employment opportunities c) Marriage d) Evictions E) Other, specify
15	Makapiwa kana kutengeserwa stand nani (Who allocated/sold you this plot)	a) Bought from originals b) Self allocation c) Local board d) Other, specify

17	Stand yakakura zvakadii (Size of plot)	a) Length..... b) Width.....
18	Imba yakakura zvakadii (Size of structure)	a) Length..... b) Width.....
19	Imba ine makamuri mangani (Number of rooms)	
20	Imba yakavakwa nei (Type of Structure)	a) Plastic shack b) Tin shack c) Timber shack d) Pole and Dagga e) Brick and Mortar f) Other, specify
21	Kana iri yezvidhinha yakapuranwa here (If Brick and mortar is it planned)	a) Yes b) No
22	Kana yakapuranwa yakaapuruvhwa neLocal Board here (Is it approved by LocalBoard)	a) Yes b) No
23	Stand yakasevhiswa here (Is the Plot serviced)	a) Yes b) No
24	Stand ine mvura here (Does the plot have Water)	a) Yes b) No
25	Mvura inobva pai (What is the water source)	a) Shallow well b) Deep well c) Borehole d) Tap e) Other, specify
26	Panowanikwa mvura pari pakushanda (Is the water source active)	a) Yes b) No
27	Munoshandisa chimbuzi chakaita sei (What type of toilet do you use)	a) Pit Latrine b) Bucket system c) Bush system d) Ecosan toilet e) Other specify
28	Chimbuzi ichi chiri kushanda here (Is the toilet functioning)	a) Yes b) No
29	Munoshandisei pakubika nekuona (What is the source of energy)	a) Fire wood b) Paraffin c) Solar d) Sawdust e) Electricity f) Other, specify
30	Munoshandisa mugwagwa yakaita sei (What type of road do you have)	a) Small paths b) Gravel c) Tarred roads
31	Mugwagwa uyu unoshandisika here (Are the road usable)	a) Yes b) No
Upgrading and regularisation details		
32	Mune masevhisi amungade munzvimbo yenyu here (Are there any basic services required in the settlement)	a) Yes b) No
33	Pamasevhisi aya angatange kuitwa munzvimbo menyu ndeapi (How would you prioritise the services required)	a)..... b)..... c)..... d).....
34	Ndeipi nzira yekusevhisa yamungakwanise (What services arrangement would you afford)	a) Incremental b) Once-Off
35	Mune mabasa ekuvandudza nzvimbo ari kuitwa here. (Is there any upgrading work being done in the settlement)	a) Yes b) No
36	Ndiani ari kuita mabasa aya (Who is undertaking the Upgrading work)	a) Community b) Local Board c) NGOs d) Government e) Other, specify
37	Munofunga mungaiteiwo kubatsira mukuitwa kwemabasa aya (How do you think you could participate in the upgrading activities)	a) Financial contributions b) Unskilled Labour contribution c) Professional contribution d) Other, specify

38	Munofunga kuti kanzuru ingaitai panyaya yekusimudzira kana kuvandudza nzvimbo yenyu (What do you think could be the role of Local Authority)	a) Provide Land b) Financial Contribution c) Equipment d) Professional Assistance e) Other, specify
39	Maringe nemabasa ekusimudzira kana kuvandudza nzvimbo zvingaitwe nemutoo upi (In the event of Upgrading would you prefer)	a) (vandudzo mugere pano) In situ Upgrading b) Relocation in Ward 7 c) Relocation in Epworth d) Relocation out of Epworth e) Other, specify
40	Munokwanisa kutenga stand yakakura zvakadzi (Which plot size would you afford)	a) 150sqm(\$600) b) 200sqm (\$800) c) 300sqm(\$1200) d) 500sqm(\$2000)
Socio-economic details		
41	Munoshanda here (Are you employed)	a) Yes b) No
42	Ibasa repakambani here kana remaoko (If employed)	a) Formal b) Informal
43	Munoita basa rei (What is your profession)	
44	Kana riri remaoko nderei (If informal identify)	a) Vending b) Sand abstraction c) Tree cutting d) Carpentry e) Other, specify
45	Munowana marii pamwedzi (How much do you earn/month)	
46	Munoshandisa marii pamwedzi (How much do you spend/month)	a) Rentals..... b) Local Board Rates..... c) Food..... d) Transport..... e) Health..... f) School Fees..... g) Other, specify.....
47	Munoshandisa chii kuenda kubasa (Type of transport you use to go to work/town)	a) Bus b) Bicycle c) Foot d) Other, specify
48	Munokwanisa kusevha marii yestand pamwedzi (How much would you afford towards stand/services/house per month)	
49	Mune zvikoro mu-ward muno here (Do you have schools in this ward)	a) Yes b) No
50	Mune makiriniki mu-ward muno here (Do you have clinics in this ward)	a) Yes b) No
51	Ndeapi matambudziko ezvehutano ari munzvimbo menyu (What are the major health issues in your community)	a) HIV/AIDS b) Cholera c) Diarrhoea d) Tuberculosis e) Malaria f) Other, specify
52	Ndiani ari kubata dambudziko iri (Who is tackling these health issues)	a) Family Unit b) Community c) Local Board d) Government e) NGOs f) Other, specify
53	Muri nhengo yeZimbabwe Homeless Peoples' Federation here (Do you belong to the Zimbabwe Homeless People's Federation)	a) Yes b) No
54	Makamboita dambudziko rinokonzerwa nemamiriro ekunze here (Have you experienced any natural disasters)	a) Yes b) No
55	Kana riripo, nderipi (If yes, which natural disasters)	a) Floods b) Droughts c) Strong Winds
56	Makapedzisira kusangana naro iri riini (When was the last time you experienced the natural disaster)	

57	Makakanganiswa nazvo here uye pane zvakaparadzwa here (Were you affected by the natural disaster and was property destroyed)	a) Yes b) No
58	Zvakakanganisa pamunowana mvura here (Did the disaster affect the water source)	a) Yes b) No
59	Chii chakaitwa kuedza kupedza dambudziko iri (What was done to reduce the impact of the natural disaster by)	a) You..... b) Community..... c) Local Board..... d) Gvt..... e) NGOs.....

Checked by..... Cross checked by..... Date.....



Annex VII: Research Clearance Letters



CITY OF HARARE

HUMAN CAPITAL AND PUBLIC SAFETY DEPARTMENT
ROWAN MARTIN BUILDING, HARARE, ZIMBABWE
POST OFFICE BOX 1680
TELEPHONE 752979 / 753000

EMAIL: hrd@hararecity.co.zw
ADDRESS ALL CORRESPONDENCE TO THE HUMAN CAPITAL AND PUBLIC SAFETY DIRECTOR

18 August 2015

University of Western Cape
Private Bag x17
Bellville 7535
Cape Town
South Africa

Davison Muchadenyika

RE: AUTHORITY TO CARRY OUT RESEARCH FOR DAVISON MUCHADEYIKA

This letter serves as authority for Davison Muchadenyika on his research on the topic:
**“SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND PLANNING INSTITUTIONS IN URBAN
TRANSFORMATION: HOUSING IN METROPOLITAN HARARE, ZIMBABWE”.**

This is in partial fulfilment of his PhD in Development Studies with University of Western Cape.

The City of Harare has no financial obligation and neither shall it render any further assistance in the conduct of the research. The researcher is however requested to avail a copy of the research to the undersigned so that residents of Harare can benefit out of it. The research should not be used for any other purpose other than for the study purpose specified.

Yours faithfully

DR. C. CHINGOMBE
HUMAN CAPITAL AND PUBLIC SAFETY DIRECTOR
LM/mm

“HARARE TO ACHIEVE A WORLD CLASS CITY STATUS BY 2025”

VISION: HARARE TO ACHIEVE A WORLD CLASS CITY STATUS BY 2025

**MINISTRY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, PUBLIC WORKS AND
NATIONAL HOUSING**

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791470
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
ZIMBABWE

The Office of The Secretary
P. Bag 7755
Causeway
HARARE

Ref: ADM/23/8

11 September 2015

Mr Davison Muchadenyika
University of Western Cape
P Bag X17
Bellville 7535
South Africa



**REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO CARRY OUT A RESEARCH: MR
MUCHADENYIKA DAVISION: STUDENT: UNIVERSITY OF THE WESTERN CAPE**

The above subject refers.

I am pleased to inform you that the Head of Ministry has granted your request to carry out a research in the following organisations:

- a) Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing: Head Office.
- b) City of Harare
- c) Chitungwiza Municipality
- d) Epworth Local Board

Please note that you are to sign an Official Secrecy Act before you commence your research. Information gathered is confidential and should not be divulged to any unauthorised members of the public.

The Ministry will be grateful to receive a copy of the end product.

M. Yanganani

For: Secretary for Local Government, Public Works and National Housing.

Correspondence should be addressed to the Secretary

Telephone No's 731003/6
252529 253925
253492 250714

Fax No 731879
Email info@smecd.gov.zw
Website www.smecd.gov.zw



Reference:

Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprises Development
& Cooperative Development
Linquenda House
No. 58/60 Nelson Mandela Avenue
Private Bag 7740
Causeway
Harare
Zimbabwe

Ref: SMED/17/8

17th August 2015

Mr Davison Muchadenyika
Institute for Social Development
University of the Western Cape

Dear Mr Muchadenyika



REF: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION FOR ACADEMIC PURPOSES:
UNIVERSITY OF THE WESTERN CAPE: STUDENT NO. 3210422

Reference is made to your letter received on 17th August 2015 in which you requested for information for academic use in a research project.

We hereby confirm that the Ministry accepted your request and that you be given access to the required information.

You are hereby directed to approach the Acting Director Cooperative Development on the 6th Floor and 7th Floor, respectively, Linquenda House.

They can also be reached on the following contact details:
Mr Chirume Cell 0773482846 and Mr K Chikura Cell 0778029383, 1st Floor Chiedza House
email: kchikura@smecd.gov.zw

By copy of this letter, the Divisions have been advised accordingly.

G Bvute
for: **Secretary Small and Medium Enterprise and Cooperative Development**
cc Acting Director, Cooperative Development

CHITUNGWIZA MUNICIPALITY



All Correspondence to be addressed to the Town Clerk

If Calling, Please
Ask for...M.MUKONYORA

P. O. Box 70, ZENGEZA
Chitungwiza.

10 November 2015

Davison Chadenyika
INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
Cape Town
SOUTH AFRICA

PHONES: 23001/4; 23000/9;
23022/3;
FAX: 070-23337

Dear Sir,

PERMISSION CARRY OUT A RESEARCH PROJECT

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 19 October 2015, on the above captioned subject.

Please be advised that, the Council will be making the necessary provisions to assist you with information you require for your project. Furthermore, be advised that the Council is also interested in the findings of your research. You are therefore advised to submit your findings/project results to the Head Human Resources.

For more information you are advised to approach the undersigned.

Yours faithfully

M. MUKONYORA (Mrs.)
HEAD HUMAN RESOURCES
CC: Town Clerk



SIGNATURE.....

DATE.....

Mrs. M. Mukonyora *10/11/2015*

EPWORTH LOCAL BOARD

1038 Chiremba Road
P. O. BOX EP180
EPWORTH



Telephone: 263 4 2936393-6
: 263 4 577445/9
Email : elb@africaonline.co.zw

ALL CORRESPONDENCE SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY

ELB REF:

05 January 2015

YOUR REF:

Mr Davison Muchadenyika
University of Western Cape
P.Bag X17
Bellville 7535
Republic of South Africa





Dear sir,

AUTHORITY TO CARRY OUT A RESEARCH AT EPWORTH LOCAL BOARD

Please be advised that this council has granted you authority to carry out a research as requested.

Thank you,




Dr. W. Mhanda (PhD)
Board Treasurer
EPWORTH LOCAL BOARD

Annex VIII: Declaration of Secrecy



DECLARATION OF SECRECY

In order that all Public servants understand their responsibilities in respect of official secrecy, the relevant extracts from those Acts which relate to official secrecy are tabled below.

a) Public Service Act - Chapter 271

First Schedule - acts of misconduct.

An officer shall be guilty of misconduct if:-

"11 Except in the discharge of his official duties or with the consent of the appropriate Minister and in accordance with such directions, if any, as the appropriate Minister may from time to time give him -

- a) he discloses information acquired in the course of such duties; or
- b) he uses for any purpose information gained by or conveyed to him through his employment in the Service, notwithstanding that he does not disclose such information; or
- c) he directly or indirectly, whether anonymously or otherwise, makes any communication to the public in connection with any matter concerning the Service or any officer or department thereof, which is prejudicial to the Service;

Provided that the provisions of the sub-paragraph shall not apply in respect of a communication made with the authority or by an association recognised in terms of Section forty".

b) Official Secrets Act (Chapter 97)

This Act prohibits the wrongful disclosure of any official information and provides inter alia that any person in the employment of the state who -

- i) communicates information of a secret or confidential nature to any person other than a person whom he is authorised to communicate it or a person to whom it is in the interests of the state his duty to communicate it;
- ii) uses information of a secret or confidential nature in his possession in any other manner prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State;
- iii) fails to take reasonable care of, or so conducts himself as to endanger the safety of any information of a secret or confidential nature;
- iv) retains for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interest of the State any official document which he has no right to retain or which it is contrary to his duty to retain, or fails to comply with any directions lawfully given him with regard to the return or disposal of such document;


- v) allows any other person to have possession of any official document issued for his use alone, or communicates any secret official code word or pass word so issued, or, without lawful authority or excuse, has in his possession any official document or secret official code word or pass word issued for the used of some person other than himself, or on obtaining possession of any official documents, by finding or otherwise neglects or fails to restore it to the person or authority by whom or for whose use it was issued;

shall be guilty of an offence.

c) Prevention of Corruption Act (Chapter 70)

Section 3 of this Act reads:

- a) If any agent corruptly accepts or obtains, or agrees to accept, or attempts to obtain, for any




Annex IX: Summary of Events: Odar Farm

Date and Year	Event
15 August 1985	Harare South Agricultural Trust Company Pvt Ltd sold Odar Farm (605,8092hectres) to the Zimbabwe Tobacco Company for ZW\$120,000.
13 January 2006	MOA between GoZ represented by MLGPWNH and Odar Housing Development Consortium (OHDC) signed. In the MOA, government accepts the land allocation to OHDC; beneficiaries to pay compensation of the land to MLGPWNH for onward transmission to ZTA; development conditions were to be conducted to the satisfaction of the local authority; government gave occupation and possession of Odar Farm to OHDC; and government undertook to issue title deeds in favour of beneficiaries upon completion of infrastructure works and not to reallocate the land to other parties.
16 June 2006	Government through General Note 161 of 2005 points out that: in terms of the Land Acquisition Act section 8 (1) (iii), “The President has acquired compulsorily the land described in the Schedule for urban expansion”. The description of land in the Schedule included 14 farms including Odar Farm owned by Zimbabwe Tobacco Association.
9 November 2006	DPP approves the layout plan for Odar Farm (Plan No. HOPU-15).
5 January 2007	City of Harare approves road and storm water design drawings for Odar Farm.
21 August 2008	MLGPWNH confirms the allocation of Odar Farm to Odar Farm Housing Development Consortium for low- to medium-income housing as part of NHDP (2004-08).
10 December 2008	Minutes of the ZTA resolution (attended and signed by three people) give Philip Chiyangwa “authority to act on behalf of the association [ZTA]”.
14 October 2009	High Court of Zimbabwe grants a Provisional Order barring ZTA from transferring Odar Farm to Sensene Investments until a preliminary notice to acquire the farm by the State has been rescinded or nullified by a Court of law. The Order validated the Agreement between OHDC and the State.
29 November 2010	Administrative Court of Zimbabwe confirmed the acquisition of Odar farm for urban development purposes.
3 March 2011	Ministry of Land and Resettlement confirmed that “Remainder of Odar Farm was confirmed in the Administrative Court of Zimbabwe. It therefore means that the property is now state land which falls under City of Harare Municipal authority”.
17 June 2013	Supreme Court of Zimbabwe dismissed an appeal by ZTA against an Order by the Administrative Court confirming the acquisition of the Remainder of Odar Farm.
19 December 2014	Government through MLGPWNH resolves to return Odar Farm to Sensene Investments (subsidiary of Pinnacle holdings) owned by Philip Chiyangwa, a Zanu-PF politician and former MP. Sensene would receive compensation directly from the occupants and pass ownership. Government also returned Nyarungu Estate to Jetmaster Properties owned by Philip Chiyangwa.
5 February 2015	MOA between MLGPWNH and ZTA (represented by Philip Chiyangwa) signed. Parties agreed that the compulsory acquisition of Odar Farm “ <i>be and is hereby not confirmed and shall be rescinded</i> ”; Sensene Investments will develop the area (infrastructure servicing); occupants will compensate Sensene directly; Sensene to provide title directly to paid-up beneficiaries.
6 February 2015	MLGPWNH reverses the acquisition of Odar Farm, Nyarungu Estate and Stoneridge to companies owned by Philip Chiyangwa and inform the Attorney General’s Office. The reason for reversal is cited as “the spirit of indigenisation and black empowerment”.

3 July 2015	MLGPWNH instructs the Civil Division to transfer Odar Farm and Nyarungu Estate from Government of Zimbabwe to Sensene Investments and Jetmaster Properties respectively (both owned by Philip Chiyangwa).
7 July 2015	Deed of Transfer for Odar Farm stamped “Endorsement in terms of Section 10 (3) of the Land Acquisition Act (Chapter 20.10). The ownership of the within mentioned land has vested in the President of Zimbabwe in terms of Section 8 of the above mentioned Act”. This means that title was transferred to the Government of Zimbabwe.
8 July 2015	Deed of Transfer for Odar Farm stamped “Transferred this 8 th day of July 2015 to Sensene Investments”. <i>This means that in less than 48hours the ownership of the farm had transferred from ZTA to Government of Zimbabwe to Sensene Investments!</i>
8 July 2015	8,000 beneficiaries of Odar farm request ZRP to investigate the Permanent Secretary and Principal Director in the MLGPWNH.
5 September 2015	Compensation agreement signed by Sensene Investments and OHDC agreeing that the property is compensated <i>voetstoots</i> , Consortium to bear transfer costs and pay full compensation of USD42.196.644. <i>However, this agreement is widely contested by occupants in Odar Farm and is at the centre of tensions on Odar farm.</i>

Sources: MOA between GoZ (represented by MLGPWNH and Odar Housing Development Consortium); Provisional Order in The High Court of Zimbabwe Case No. HC4756/09; Administrative Court of Zimbabwe Case No. LA0065/10; Supreme Court of Zimbabwe Judgement No. SC25/2013; MOA between MLGPWNH and ZTA; MOA of Compensation between Sensene Investments and Odar Housing Development Consortium; Deed of Transfer; Government Gazette, General Notice 161 of 2005; Various Ministry letters.



Annex X: Summary of Events: Saturday Retreat Farm

Date and Year	Event
1986	Individual Properties Pvt Ltd sell 4 pieces of land measuring 1,189.5869 hectares in Saturday Retreat to Crest Breeders International for ZW\$300,000.
1996	The President through Statutory Instrument 41 of 1996 alters the boundaries of Harare City Council to incorporate 35 farms, including Saturday Retreat Farm
20 February 2004	Ushewokunze Housing co-operative registered (Reg. No. 3341) under Section 7 of the Co-operative Societies Act (Chapter 24:05). MLGPWNH allocates the co-operative 4,100 stands on Plan No. 202/58 as part of the NHDP.
17 April 2004	In his founding affidavit in the Administrative Court, Minister of Lands and Resettlement presents that government wants to acquire 33,000 hectares of land for urban expansion and that “government is in a position to compensate Respondent [Crest Breeders]”.
13 May 2005	MLGPWNH outlines conditions for the development of Saturday Retreat Farm by Ushewokunze and other co-operatives. These conditions include: engagement of town planners and surveyors; engineering drawings (water, sewer and water) to be approved by City of Harare; civil works to be approved by City of Harare; house construction to commence after sewer and water reticulation in place; consortium to compensate original landowner.
16 June 2006	Government through General Note 161 of 2005 points out that: in terms of the Land Acquisition Act section 8 (1) (iii), “The president has acquired compulsorily the land described in the Schedule for urban expansion”. The description of land in the Schedule included 14 farms with four of them owned by Crest Breeders in Saturday Retreat Farm.
17 November 2012	Solomon Mujuru Housing Trust (represented by Shadreck Mashayamombe, MP for Harare South - 2013-18) enter into MOA with Teachers Union of Zimbabwe for the sale of 300 undeveloped stands in Saturday Retreat Farm at USD 4,500 per stand.
18 December 2014	MOA between the Government of Zimbabwe represented by MLGPWNH and Crest Breeders International signed. The Agreement gave Crest Breeders unoccupied 407 hectares of land as part of compensation; recommends Crest Breeders as preferred developer of the occupied land; appoints Crest Breeders as developer of the unoccupied land; in the event of developing the occupied land, Crest Breeders to recover development costs directly from Occupants; Crest Breeders to charge USD4/m ² as part of compensation <i>in line with agreement between Occupants and Crest Breeders (however, this agreement is the source of immense contestation in the farm as it was signed without the consent of co-operative members and leaders)</i> . Parties acknowledged that “ordinarily, upon compulsory acquisition, title is transferred to Government. However, Crest Breeders will be allowed to retain title in order for them to be able to raise capital and to also transfer title directly to any Occupant who would have paid off for his or her stand”.
13 January 2015	<i>Order</i> in the Administrative Court of Zimbabwe in a case between Minister of Lands and Rural Resettlement and Crest Breeders International ordered that: Confirmed the compulsory acquisition of Remainder Extent of Saturday Retreat Estate; affirmed the full compensation for compulsory acquisition of urban land; compensation to be set out in MOU between GoZ and Crest Breeders; Crest Breeders appointed sole and exclusive developer of the property defined in the Deed of Settlement measuring 401 hectares (This was after an <i>Order by Consent</i> issued with the same orders). A <i>Deed of Settlement</i> had the

	same undertakings as in the Order in addition to: stating the compensation value of occupied land to USD 26,240 million at a rate of USD4 / m ² .
6 July 2015	CFI Holdings (which owns Crest Breeders) issues an Eviction Notice on Stand 3409 to Struggle Dzapasi (Chairperson Mashingishingi Housing Co-operative). The 48 hour notice compels the occupant to vacate the property or face legal proceedings.
6 August 2015	Order in the Magistrate Court for the Province of Mashonaland ordered that: "Struggle Dzapasi and all those claiming through him be and are hereby interdicted from entering into, occupying or carrying out digging, laying or construction work or otherwise altering the property called Stand 3409 Saturday Retreat, Harare".

Sources: MOA between GoZ and Crest Breeders; Oder, Order by Consent and Deed of Settlement in the Administrative Court of Zimbabwe Case No. LA6/14; Various MLGPWNH letters; Deed of Transfer; Order in the Magistrate Court for the Province of Mashonaland, Held at Harare, Case No. MC 21613/15; Government Gazette, General Notice 161 of 2005.

