

Thesis
2557

UNIVERSITY OF STIRLING

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Thesis entitled:

TELEVISION, NATIONAL IDENTITY AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE
- A comparative study of Scottish and Catalan discussion programmes -

Submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

September 1994

*Oh, que cansat estic de la meva
covarda, bruta, tan salvatge terra
i com m'agradaria d'allunyar-me'n
nord enllà,...*

*Però no he de seguir mai el meu somni,
i em quedaré aquí fins a la mort.*

Salvador Espriu (1913-1985)

A la meva família, per vetllar l'esquitx.

To Mark, the Bremen musicians and el Llampec,
for their patience.

Acknowledgments

This study would have never been possible without the co-operation and support of a great many people both in the Catalan and the Scottish television industries. To the teams of both *Scottish Women* and *La Vida en un Xip*, I owe special gratitude for the time spent and the information given. I hope that if this study helps to improve the understanding of the national identity question in Scotland and Catalonia and also increase the democracy of our mass media, all those to which I have troubled may feel compensated.

I would particularly like to thank the British Council and Caixa d'Estalvis i Pensions de Barcelona for the funding of this thesis and their human support during my two years in Scotland.

This study owes its inspiration to Joaquim M. Puyal i Ortiga, whose ideas and efforts encouraged me to explore television as a democratic medium to which everyone should have access. However, this thesis would have never been finished without the patience, guidance and encouragement of my principal supervisor, Philip Schlesinger, who always believed in it. Special thanks to my second supervisor Mike Cormack for his criticisms and support. I would also like to thank Xavier Altarriba, Alastair Hetherington, Josep Gifreu, Salvador Giner, Manuel Parés i Maicas and Sebastià Serrano for their advice and encouragement. And thanks to Mark Grindle, Graham Haylor, Ana Roque and Kay Weaver, for trying to make sense of my English expression.

In Catalonia, my family, my godmother and Xavier Bosch gave me all their attention and support. I know for sure that without their comfort this project would have been abandoned long ago. No thesis would see the light without some rest: to the Scottish hills, the herons, the squirrels and to Mark, for having taught me how to love them. And to Colin and Caroline, for having offered me their refuge.

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Abstract

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This project examines questions of national identity and democracy in television through the analysis of the production processes of audience discussion programmes. The study of television debates, as public spaces through which members of particular communities discuss topics of common concern, shed some light on two different questions. On the one hand, this project explores whether the (re)construction of national and cultural identity intervenes in the process of programme-making within stateless nations. On the other hand, audience discussion programmes are examined to assess whether they can function as democratic spheres of social representation in the media.

These two strands of research are developed through ethnographic insights into two television debates: *Scottish Women* - produced by the commercial company Scottish Television (STV), and *La Vida en un Xip* - transmitted through the Catalan public television channel TV3 and produced by the production company DCo. S.A. A comparative study of these two programmes and their respective broadcasting contexts is provided. Also, the distinctive political status of Scotland and Catalonia within their respective states - Britain and Spain - and the European and international contexts, is examined in relation to the media.

The current debates concerning nationalism, the nation and national identity are discussed on the basis of culture as the essential element of the nation-building process. This study explores the process of cultural identity formation in Scotland and Catalonia and the role

of their respective media structures as potential actors in the (re)construction of collective identities. Thus, the analysis of television production is regarded as a key instrument with which to assess how this medium intervenes in such processes.

Audience discussion programmes are examined as television formats with the potential for providing a democratic public sphere in the media. An expansion of the concept of the public sphere, its transformation and its role in contemporary societies is, therefore, essential to develop this argument. Also, the relation between television debates and the community is explored through a survey carried out amongst participants of *Scottish Women* and *La Vida en un Xip*.

This work provides media studies with some keys to evaluate the role of television debates in the delicate political make-up of two nations without a state, Scotland and Catalonia. Questions of national and cultural identity are crucial to the policy-making of their respective broadcasting industries. Yet, such questions are difficult to distinguish and define in their programming. The comparative analysis of the two case studies reveals that every person involved in television making reflects to a certain extent his/her own perceptions of the country, and therefore, television debates mirror the ambiguities that may lie behind them.

This study provides some clues to reformulate the concept of the 'public sphere' on the basis of a 'dissection' of television production procedures. The findings also reveal the economic, political and social criteria that develop audience discussion programmes into spheres of entertainment rather than rational communicative environments in which a public sphere could function. The concepts of national identity and the public sphere are framed in the context of contemporary societies, in which post-modern values are eroding the role and interest of the individual in the political process.

Contents

TELEVISION, NATIONAL IDENTITY AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE

- A comparative study of Scottish and Catalan discussion programmes -

Acknowledgments	iii
Abstract	iv
Contents	vii
List of Tables and Graphics	xi
Chapter 1. National Identity, Media and the Public Sphere	1
1.1 Introduction	1
1.2 National Identity and Nationalism	6
1.3 Cultural Identity and the Media in Stateless Nations	12
1.3.1 Levels of identity and 'cultural damage'	13
1.3.2 Cultural identity, mirror and mirage	15
1.3.3 Cultural discourse: the cases of Scotland and Catalonia	21
1.3.4 Cultural identity and the media	28
1.4 Public Sphere, Media and Audience Participation	32
1.4.1 Public sphere and 'communicative space'	33
1.4.2 Public sphere and broadcasting	39
1.4.3 Audience participation and public space	41
1.4.4 Audience discussion programmes	48
1.5 Conclusions	55
Notes	57
Chapter 2. Television in Scotland and Catalonia	60
An overview of their respective broadcasting contexts	
2.1 Introduction	60
2.2 Broadcast television in the United Kingdom	62
2.2.1 British audience and programming policies	68
2.2.2 The Scottish mass media	70
2.2.2.1 Broadcasting in Scotland	70
2.2.2.2 Structure of television in Scotland	71
2.2.2.3 The Scottish industry 'goes south'	75
2.2.2.4 Parochialism vs. distinctiveness	76

2.3 Broadcast television in Spain	81
2.3.1 Some key historical facts	82
2.3.2 Spanish television and its regulation	83
2.3.3 The media system in Catalonia	88
2.3.3.1 Television in Catalonia	88
2.3.3.2 Competition, audience and programming policies	91
2.4 Small broadcasters on the European audio-visual scene	94
2.5 Conclusions	99
Notes	102
Chapter 3. Unfolding the project: an account of the methods	105
3.1 Introduction	105
3.2 Ethnography and Comparison	107
3.2.1 The researcher as an insider	108
3.2.2 Ethnography	109
3.2.3 Comparison	112
3.3 Research process	115
3.3.1 Research phases in Scotland	115
3.3.2 Research phases in Catalonia	116
3.4 Research methods	118
3.5 Limits of the project	122
Notes	125
Chapter 4. <i>Scottish Women</i> (1987-1993)	126
A television debate with a troubled title	
4.1 Introduction	126
4.2 From Current Affairs to Light Entertainment	127
4.2.1 Watching <i>Scottish Women</i>	128
4.2.2 History and evolution	129
4.2.3 STV, Skyline, STV	132
4.3 Setting up a series	136
4.3.1 A women's approach	137
4.3.2 Choosing topics	139
4.3.3 The 109 issues of <i>Scottish Women</i>	141
4.3.4 Editorial focus	144
4.3.5 Production process	148
4.3.5.1 Skyline: a database and a seating plan	148
4.3.5.2 'Opening the participation a wee bit'	151
4.3.6 At the studio	153
4.3.6.1 Pre-recording tasks	153
4.3.6.2 Recording: the word and the camera	155
4.3.6.3 In the gallery	157
4.3.6.4 In the scenery	158
4.3.7 Editing	161

4.4 Impact and prospects	162
4.5 A Scottish perspective on <i>Scottish Women</i>	165
4.5.1 Scottishness? Some responses from media professionals	166
4.5.2 <i>Scottish Women</i> and STV's policies	169
4.5.3 Participants and nationalism	170
4.5.4 Topics and identity	172
4.5.5 'A great sense of solidarity'	173
Notes	177
Chapter 5. <i>La Vida en un Xip</i> (1989-1992)	178
Social debates through fiction and reality	
5.1 Introduction	178
5.2 A product of a craft audiovisual industry	179
5.2.1 Social debates through fiction and reality	180
5.2.2 Evolution of the show	183
5.2.3 <i>El Xip</i> , a programme for TV3	185
5.2.3.1 TV3 programming policies and <i>El Xip</i>	186
5.2.3.2 DCo. S.A., the programme-makers	188
5.2.3.3 <i>El Xip</i> , the deal	190
5.3 Making the show: 'la cuineta'	192
5.3.1 Purposes and 'Common sense'	192
5.3.2 <i>La Granja</i> and the link gag	193
5.3.3 Choosing topics	194
5.3.3.1 The 143 issues of <i>La Vida en un Xip</i>	195
5.3.3.2 Editorial decision-making	198
5.3.4 Coordination	208
5.3.5 Last arrangements	209
5.3.6 Live	210
5.4 Response and impact	211
5.5 <i>El Xip</i> , Catalan identity and the 'internal debates'	217
5.5.1 The internal debates	218
5.5.2 'The Catalans think...'	219
5.5.3 The criteria of the programme-makers	221
Notes	226
Chapter 6. Dual Identity and Audience Motivation	229
A survey amongst Scottish and Catalan participants	
6.1 The procedures of the survey	229
6.2 The background of the respondents	231
6.3 A vague and dual national identity	234
6.4 The links between a television forum and the nation	237
6.5 Graphics	241
Notes	255

Chapter 7. Conclusions	
Television debates: cultural goods of a missing public sphere?	256
7.1 Scotland and Catalonia, two media cultures under strain	257
7.2 Television debates and a missing public sphere	264
References	271
Appendix 1	i.1
List of interviewees	i.2
Copy of the questionnaire <i>Scottish Women</i>	i.4
Copy of the questionnaire <i>La Vida en un Xip</i>	i.5
Appendix 2. <i>Scottish Women</i>	ii.1
The 109 issues of <i>Scottish Women</i>	ii.2
Briefing notes	ii.6
Questions	ii.13
Viewing figures	ii.14
Appendix 3. <i>La Vida en un Xip</i>	iii.1
The 143 issues of <i>La Vida en un Xip</i>	iii.2
Viewing figures	iii.4
Selection of press cuttings	iii.14

List of Tables and Graphics

◆ Fig. 4.1 The 109 transmissions of <i>Scottish Women</i> (1987-1993)	142
◆ Fig. 5.1 The 143 transmissions of <i>La Vida en un Xip</i> (1989-1992)	196
◆ Fig. 5.2 Experts' backgrounds. <i>La Vida en un Xip</i> (1989-1992)	204
◆ Fig. 5.3 63 thematic press reviews. <i>La Vida en un Xip</i> (October 1991 - June 1992)	215
◆ Fig. 5.4 'National Identity & Culture'. <i>La Vida en un Xip</i> (opinion polls, 1989-1992)	220
◆ Fig. 6.1 How old are the participants? (table of age in percentages)	231
◆ Fig. 6.2 Where do they live? (table of address in percentages)	232
◆ Fig. 6.3 What do they do for living? (table of occupation in percentages)	233
◆ Fig. 6.4 The dual nationality of the Scots and the Catalans (results of question 1 in percentages)	234
◆ Fig. 6.5 A dual feeling of national identity (results of question 2 in percentages)	235
◆ Fig. 6.6 Audience motivation (results of question 3; percentages of 1+2 answers of each statement)	238
◆ Graphics	
◆ Age groups (bar charts)	
Fig. 6.7 SW1+SW2	241
Fig. 6.8 XIP1+XIP2	242
◆ Address (pie charts)	
Fig. 6.9 SW1+SW2	243
Fig. 6.10 XIP1+XIP2	244
◆ Fig. 6.11 Occupation (pie charts): SW1+SW2 and XIP1+XIP2	245
◆ Fig. 6.12 The dual identity of the Scots (pie chart)	246
◆ Fig. 6.13 The dual identity of the Catalans (pie chart)	247
◆ Fig. 6.14 The dual feeling of national identity (pie charts of each option of question 2)	248

CHAPTER 1

National Identity, Media and the Public Sphere

1.1 Introduction

Personal roots are possibly a strong motivation to get oneself involved in a research project whose findings can help to understand better the rationality and irrationality of one's beliefs and actions. Being born into a community - such as the Catalan - whose people experience in varying degrees a sense of dual identity¹, aroused my curiosity to find out what the issue of 'national identity' and its related terms (*i.e.*, 'nation', 'nationalism', 'cultural identity') were about. This research project aims to explore those notions in the context of television and to analyse whether television production is influenced by the (re)construction of 'cultural identity' in two nations without a state: Scotland and Catalonia.

The ongoing change in 'complex societies' encouraged the researcher to focus on programmes whose aim is the participation of the audience in debating contemporary issues. At a time when individuals are redefining their relationship with 'civil society' and the 'public sphere', it seemed particularly relevant to analyse television products which are conceived as spaces of communication for the people of a community. Two audience discussion programmes will be examined: *Scottish Women* and *La Vida en un Xip*; the former produced by the commercial company Scottish Television and the latter by TV3, the first channel of the Catalan public broadcasting corporation. The analysis of these programmes reveals that television is fertile ground to explore the issues described above.

National Identity and Nationalism

Scotland and Catalonia are two nations which lost their sovereignty in the early eighteenth century. From then on, both countries started redefining their political status within their respective plurinational states, Britain and Spain. Despite the efforts of nationalism in both countries, their state political institutions do not recognise their status as nations without a state. However, neither Scotland nor Catalonia have given up their fight for the integrity of their national identities. Therefore, both are exemplary cases to explore the issues presented here in the context of a changing Europe, in which collective identities need to fit in to an ongoing process of transnationalisation.

Anderson's definition of the 'nation' as an imagined political community will be the starting point, since it focuses on the psychological dimension of the collective identity formation. The nation, whether or not legitimised by, in Giddens's words, the state as a 'power container' (quoted in Tomlinson, 1991: 84), is deeply rooted in the identity of individuals, who, in the belief that the nation exists, feel bound together.

Nationalism is approached here as an ideology which should be conceptually distinguished from the idea of the 'nation' or 'national identity'. Nationalism, thus, should be understood as a psychological phenomenon which carries with it institutional and political weight: nationalist movements can modify the developments of a 'national identity' both inside and outside given territorial boundaries, and often direct the will of a community to (re)construct its 'national identity'. The latter, though, is at the heart of the matter since nationalist projects are planned in the belief that 'a' 'national identity' exists.

The concept of 'national identity', defined by Schlesinger 'as a particular kind of collective identity' (1991a: 173), will be explored here in relation to television and the expression of national cultures through this mass medium.

In Western Europe today, both the integrity of 'national identities' (and their cultures) and state sovereignty seem to be affected by the ongoing process of building 'Europeanness'. With regard to this, Schlesinger remarks that the construction of a united Europe by cultural means is a political discourse rather than a feasible reality.² National and minority cultures do not give up their individuality. At the end of the twentieth century, citizens of regions, ethnic minorities and nations within the state boundaries fight to (re)build their identities, a phenomenon which has been identified by Garnham as a 'politics of recognition' (1992). In relation to the issues mentioned above, the theories of Anderson, Deutsch, Gellner, Schlesinger and others will be discussed.

Cultural identity

The concept of 'cultural identity' is crucial to the (re)building of a nation. Tomlinson defines 'cultural identities' as 'representations (in the sense that imagination is a representative faculty) of belonging' to the nation (1991: 81). It will be argued here that, in the context of stateless nations, 'cultural identity' becomes an instrument used by intellectuals and politicians to strengthen national identity and the political consciousness of the members of the community. Thus, the mass media, as playgrounds where these actors intervene and cultural representations are expressed, warrant a careful analysis.

Scotland and Catalonia are fertile ground to explore these issues. Both countries, although respectively part of Britain and Spain, have distinctive socio-political and cultural structures that contribute to construct their (national, local) *identities*. Whilst both countries try to redefine their 'national' status within their respective states, they experience processes of cultural assimilation and absorption by wider cultural and socio-political bodies. Bauman (1990: 155) suggests that such processes, inevitably, carry losses and gains for their respective identities; the mass media, it will be argued here, is a cultural battlefield where such a contention takes place.

This chapter will also focus on the role of the élites in recovering and/or 'inventing' the collective memories of the nations, that is, in the (re)construction of their cultural identities. It will be argued here, though, that the current 'complex society' gradually weakens the power of the intellectuals to define cultural discourse. This argument will be explored in both the *Scottish Women* and *La Vida en un Xip* case studies.

The linguistic issue is another essential theme of the 'cultural identity' question, particularly in stateless nations. If 'cultural identity' is understood as a diverse set of representations, *imaginings*, of the nation, sharing a 'cultural identity' requires a vehicle of communication amongst the members of the community, that is, a common language. Language guarantees the integrity of this 'cultural identity' and of the national consciousness, although, as Schlesinger points out, 'cultural identity' should not be seen as necessarily equivalent to 'national identity' (1991a: 145). Two different angles of the minority language question will be presented here in relation to the Scottish and Catalan cases.

Mass Media

Given the concepts presented above, the mass media - public or private - are to be taken into account at different levels of analysis: (i) media institutions reflect the distribution of power and are actors in the political process, (ii) mass media are producers of 'cultural (symbolic) goods', but (iii) their products are also 'economic goods', and by this dual nature, (iv) mass media programmes show remarkable evidence of the contradictions between polity, culture and their relationship to the marketplace (Garnham, 1986: 47).

This study focuses on television production to examine how professionals and media organisations deal with the contradictions mentioned above. Also, it is intended to demonstrate that professionals and institutions in Scotland and Catalonia internalise differently the question of national and cultural identity. The next chapter will focus on

media organisations in both countries. Here, specific attention will be paid to the Scottish and Catalan mass media as vehicles of expression of their respective cultural identities.

Public sphere and television

Finally, the discussion will move on to the role of 'civil society' in contemporary societies. Mass media, and television to a great extent, are sensitively linked to public policies, but are also part of a 'civil society', which, according to Melucci (1990) and Bauman (1990), is changing the terms of everyday life at a time of post-modern values.³

The concept of the 'public sphere' seems useful to place the role of mass media in the transformation of 'civil society'. The public sphere, understood in Habermassian terms, is a neutral space for democratic public discussion of matters of general interest in which all individuals have free access to participate.

To explore the transformation of the public sphere through the media, this study looks at a television genre of the nineties, 'reality television', whose main drive is to break up the division between the public and private realms, which, according to Bauman (1990), is a sign of post-modern times. Here, the analysis focuses on the format of 'audience discussion programmes'. Television debates, it is argued, function as platforms where 'the citizen is appealed to as a private individual rather than as a member of a public, within a privatised domestic sphere, rather than within that of public life' (Garnham, 1986: 48). Television production, it is believed, is the key to understanding how individuals and groups are selected to portray those 'matters of general interest' and through which particular discourses are mediated to the rest of the community.

In this study national and cultural identity, and the public sphere converge on the ground of media production, whose complex processes, it is believed, shape the representation of collective identities. Questions of national and cultural identity show differences when they are placed at the distinct levels in which a 'public sphere' may operate - supra-

national, state and sub-state political entities. It will be argued here that the 'public sphere' has a greater possibility to come into being in sub-state communities (such as the Catalan and the Scottish) than in those of states and supra-national entities. Because of the scale of the sub-national cases examined here, audience discussion programmes show some evidence of this.

The following pages attempt to draw a picture that binds together all these theoretical concepts. From the comparison of Scottish and Catalan programmes, the researcher aims to offer a better understanding of the formation of collective identity and the role that television can or should play in this process.

1.2 National Identity and Nationalism

Nationalist and ethnic movements are at the heart of contemporary politics all over the world. In the early nineties, when these lines are written, the ethno-religious war in former Yugoslavia between Serbs, Croats and Muslims is a tragic reminder of the dangers of radical ethnocentrism. Nationalism, 'national identity' and the clash between ethnic groups are not new phenomena of modern times. However, in 'complex societies', Melucci argues, 'as the range of possibilities becomes too wide compared to the actual opportunities for action and experience, the question of boundaries becomes the fundamental problem of individual and collective life. This problem of choice, uncertainty and risk in the hyper-technological scenario of complex society reminds everybody of the human experience of limits. And of freedom' (1990: 117).

Imagining the nation, understanding the nationalist cause

There is a conceptual confusion that surrounds the debate on 'nationalism', 'nation' and 'national identity'. It is argued here that the ground that binds together these three concepts is the existence of a culture shared by the whole community. Culture should be understood as a 'way of life' (Eliot, 1948: 41), as 'the distinctive style of conduct of a given community' (Gellner, 1983: 92). Several authors consider culture as 'the' condition for the nation to exist, for the people of the nation to feel identified with, and for nationalism to succeed.

As mentioned in the introduction, nationalism needs to be understood as a complex political and psychological phenomenon which works on the basis of an existing 'national identity'. At the same time, 'national identity' presupposes the belief amongst a given community that a 'nation' exists. This assumption, it is argued, implies that neither 'national identity', nor the 'nation' are stable givens, but, as Schlesinger rightly remarks, concepts in continuous construction (1991a). Before discussing the implications of culture in collective identity formation, the concepts of 'national identity' and 'nation' need to be defined.

Following Schlesinger, 'national identity' is 'a particular kind of collective identity' which is 'constructed in action' by means of 'dual processes of inclusion and exclusion'; such processes activate the recovery or reinvention of collective memories within a given time and limited space (1991a: 152-175). The process of constructing a 'national identity' works towards the definition of symbolic and non-symbolic boundaries, and perhaps, the political boundaries of a new state (Mira, 1984: 166; Rigol, 1982: 221).⁴ Given this notion, nationalism is one of the main actors in the process of national identity formation; both concepts, though, work on the premise that a nation exists.

Anderson's notion of 'nation' is particularly useful to understand the subjective dimension of these issues: 'the nation is an imagined political community - and imagined

both as inherently limited and sovereign' (Anderson, 1983: 6). A 'nation' can not be dissected into a list of ingredients for the perfect recipe, because it is an inward perception of each member of the community:

It is imagined as a *community*, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.

(Anderson, 1983: 7; the author's emphasis)⁵

The concepts of 'communion' and 'fraternity' suggest a sense of global communication amongst the people of the nation through common representations. Anderson remarks that 'nationalism has to be understood by aligning it...(with) the large cultural systems that preceded it' (1983: 12). Nationalism is intimately linked to culture, so much so that some authors do not conceive a nation without it (Gellner, 1983: 50; 54-5). Anderson's understanding of culture relies upon the primordialness of language, both as a factor of belonging to the community and as an 'experience of simultaneity'. To Anderson, language is both exclusive and inclusive: learning the language is the *passport* to the community (1983: 134). Schlesinger regrets that this theory does not develop the implications of mass communication for the nation-building process (1991a: 164).

National consciousness and class

The role of class structure and economic inequalities must not be disregarded in the process of 'imagining the community'. If print-languages were crucial to 'national consciousness', those who controlled communication and publishing technologies would be in a privileged position to shape it. In *Nations and Nationalism* (1983), Gellner pins this theme down. He places the role of social communication closer to the process of 'inventing' 'national identity' than Anderson's theory; to Gellner, mass media are permanent evidence of a communal experience (1983: 127).

Gellner argues that literacy, education and a centralised state machinery imposed a dominant high culture in industrialised capitalist societies as part of the nationalist project of nation-building. According to Anderson (1983) and Gellner (1983: Ch. 3 and 4), 'national consciousness' became feasible with the appearance of print-technologies. However, Gellner's perception of the state as the 'protector of a culture' and 'maintainer of the inescapably homogeneous standardising educational system' (1983: 110) does not seem to fulfil an explanation for nationalism where no such a state structure exists.⁶

Frequently, in nations without a state, 'alternative' cultural and political structures are built around the dominant class, which gradually becomes a class-nation, that is, the class that holds the power to represent the nation. Then, such class-nations, constituted into nationalist collectives, use the construction of 'national identity' as part of their class project. In Catalonia, the nationalist parties developed side by side with the rise of the Catalan bourgeoisie, the leading force of the political claims in Catalonia:

In national(ist) movements - not only in the Catalan, but all - it is normal that the flag is passed on, depending upon which social sector is leading, or taking advantage of it, using it. (...) Despite what it is said, the national question is one of the most permanent collective actions.

(Pujol, 1976: 184)⁷

For Gellner 'nationalism' is articulated by the discourse of the dominant class and ultimately responsible for the existence of 'nations'. Such a notion, although crucial to most processes of national identity formation, rules out other factors that, undoubtedly, also intervene in the process of building 'national identity'.

Nationhood and collective memory

Smith (1991) puts the accent upon the concept of 'ethnie', which embraces a sense of loyalty and nationhood among the members of the community. To Smith, 'ethnie' constitutes a sufficient condition for the existence of a nation. Ethnie is understood as a 'community of common descent', as the ground where all the constituent elements of the

nation bind together (ancestral past, family, historical memory, homeland). Given those elements, nationalism comes into being to strengthen nationhood. To Smith, nationalism is an “ideological movement” whose purpose is 'to maintain autonomy, unity and identity for a social group which is deemed to constitute a nation' (1991: 51).⁸

The stress on the ethnic origins of nations contrasts with Kellas' conception of a modern 'social nationalism'. 'Social nationalism', as a non-exclusive alternative to 'ethnic nationalism', is an ideology that aims to integrate everyone living and working in a given territory (1991: 51-71).⁹ In fact, it is believed, this ideology tries to ease the underlying conflict between natives and non-natives, the ones who belong to the nation and the ones who do not. Therefore, another point arises: the integration of the non-native into the community, who, to Bauman, can not be regarded as outsiders. He calls them *strangers*: those who are 'physically near, while remaining spiritually remote' (1990: 150). This process of integration, emphasised by Kellas' conception of a 'social nationalism', aims to build up the consciousness that a 'national identity' will bind them all together.

However, the integration of non-natives into the predominant national culture carries gains and losses for both sides. As Eliot rightly points out, it is as absurd to think of a self-contained national culture, as to think of an uncontaminated local culture (1948: 62). The contact with outer elements will bring into the representation of the nation alternative images, symbols and perceptions, that can either clash, integrate or be absorbed by the host culture. Another element, thus, comes in play: the (re)construction of the collective memory of the nation. Giddens' theory of nationalism focuses on this point.

To Giddens, nationalism relies upon 'the formation of (a) national public sphere based upon print, which also allows the invention of history in some form or another' (1985: 212, quoted in Schlesinger, 1991a: 167). The formation of a national 'public sphere' is particularly significant to the arguments of this thesis, as is discussed later. It is argued here that nationalist projects use features of 'cultural identity' as vehicles of reaffirmation

of their cause. Pujol's mention of the flag is a clear example of this. This appropriation or use of the community's *imaginations* can involve the invention or falsification of social habits and collective memories, either through state institutions (see Cannadine, 1983 on British Royal rituals) or through social and cultural lobbying agencies of 'civil society' (Trevor-Roper, 1983 on Scotland; Morgan, 1983 on Wales, and Hobsbawm, 1983 on European mass traditions).

Communication and community

Central to the construction of 'national identity' seems to be the need for communion, a common experience of communication, either through the use of print-languages or other forms of social interaction. The inability to communicate creates immediate separation. The ability to communicate creates (potential) spaces of communion. Karl Deutsch's theory supports this argument:

The essential aspect of the unity of a people... is the complementarity or relative efficiency of communication among individuals - something that is in some ways similar to mutual rapport, but on a larger scale. (...) The community which permits a common history to be experienced as common, is a community of complementary habits and facilities of communication. (...) The individuals who have these complementary habits, vocabularies, and facilities are what we may call a people.

(Deutsch, 1953: 162; 70-71)

Deutsch's theory relates the wider explanation of nationalism to the Catalan question, in particular through the emphasis on the competence to communicate offered by several Catalan authors (Serrano, 1980; Esteva, 1982; Puigjaner, 1984, 1988). The cohabitation of two languages is, not surprisingly, central to the intellectuals' concerns in Catalonia since the Catalan language is the cement of its 'national identity', but threatened by the powerful influence of Spanish culture.

In the above discussion it was argued that nation and national identity are in a continuous process of redefinition. Nationalism, understood as the political consciousness of

belonging to the nation, but fundamentally, as Giddens puts it, as a cultural and psychological phenomenon (1981 in Schlesinger, 1991a: 167), uses culture to legitimise its actions particularly where no political structure lies behind it. Stateless nations are a case in point. Culture is, undoubtedly, at the heart of the matter, since it provides the members of the community with the essential experiences of communion (language, history, traditions), that is, their cultural identity. The next section focuses on the process of cultural identity formation in relation to the mass media in stateless nations.

1.3 Cultural Identity and the Media in Stateless Nations

'In terms of nationality, a person is either Canadian or not, but culturally one may be Canadian in varying degrees.'

(Desaulniers, 1987: 151 in Collins, 1990a: 254-5)

'Internally, adopting St Andrew, a foreigner, as the national saint avoided internal conflicts... and had become 'a symbol that would unite two peoples separated by language and culture' (the Picts and the Scots in the eighth century).'

(David McCrone, 1992: 19)

'L'anar i tornar de gent estranya en el nostre territori ens ha tomat incongruents i paradoxals. Som fruit de diversos llevats i, per tant, som cultural i biològicament mestissos.'

(Jaume Vicens Vives, 1954: 25 in Flaquer i Giner, 1991: 22)¹⁰

Culture is about communication. However, culture can also act as a definer of boundaries between those who share it and those who do not. Culture, as Gellner puts it, can be a factor of 'entropy-resistance' when there is a failure to communicate the 'national culture' of the state to the inhabitants (1983: 64-73) and, thus, it can lead to processes of bad cultural integration. Moreno argues that Scotland and Catalonia are illustrative examples of the latter, since both Britain and Spain failed to impose a homogeneous national culture upon the nations within their respective boundaries (1986: 161-5).

'Cultural identity', understood as representations of the 'imagined community', as particular ways through which individuals experience identification, is a complex notion. How do we identify the features of 'cultural identity' of a given nation? Is there a way to protect them from processes of globalisation? Furthermore, are mass media - especially television - producers of 'cultural identity', or 'gravediggers' of local and national 'images' to achieve 'iconic and linguistic homogenisation' (de Moragas, 1991)?

1.3.1 Levels of identity and 'cultural damage'

It would seem that one of the key elements of 'national identity' is the capacity of a community to establish networks of social interaction. Levels of communication define levels of identification, and in contemporary Western Europe, levels of identification seem to overlap. As Robins and Morley remark (1992: 23), the project of building a European (cultural) identity needs to take into account that along with transnational expansion, communication networks exist at local, regional and national levels conferring different identities. Those dimensions are politically dependent on each other, and therefore, 'cultural identities' are determined by their parallel evolution. With regard to the process of Europeanness, Hobsbawm points out that such a process unsettles and disorients individuals, who tend to react strongly against mass migration, increasing cultural xenophobia and nationalism (1992: 15). The path towards a unified culture in Europe, thus, is unlikely to be smooth.

Cultural Imperialism and Globalisation

There seems to be neither a coherent cultural policy that can maintain a given 'national identity' in isolation, nor a cultural imperialism strong enough to threaten the existence of 'cultural identities'. There is a process of bargaining whereby on the one hand, 'cultural identities' redefine their symbolic territorial domains and on the other hand, transnationalisation expands global forms of communication.

Tomlinson argues that nowadays cultural imperialism is diluted into globalisation. He goes on to say that globalisation is even more damaging than predominant cultures, because it is not as visible and gradually becomes universal. In the media, globalisation is reflected in the homogenisation of cultural products, which expands common styles of communication and consumerism, consequently lessening the distinctiveness between cultures. Adapting foreign formats is a way to maintain the audience's loyalty to home production, while at the same time, these formats spread common cultural patterns among audiences from different countries. *Scottish Women* and *La Vida en un Xip* are two examples of foreign formulae adapted to home consumption. This argument is expanded in the last section of this chapter.

Some argue that the risk of 'cultural damage' by imperialist cultures, particularly the American, may be neutralised by state and national communication policies (Gifreu, 1986: 472). However, the transnationalisation of audio-visual trade and production, and the imperatives of the market neutralise the contraceptive effects of national cultural strategies. Negrine and Papathanassopoulos notice that the high costs of home products will gradually force a reduction in their percentage in broadcasting schedules in favour of imported programmes, cheaper and devised for global consumption (1991: 27-9).

How do minority cultures assimilate foreign cultural products? Schlesinger remarks that the process of inclusion and exclusion amongst unequal cultures - unequal in political and economic terms - makes them into 'fields of force' (1991a: 146). Canada is one amongst a great many countries where these fields of force show the confrontation between 'national cultures' and cultural imperialism. Collins' work on Canadian broadcasting reveals a paradoxical reality whereby the conscious effort of institutions and people to support the Canadian national identity is not in harmony with the behaviour of cultural consumption. The audience's favourable response to exogenous products increases dependency upon foreign markets, mainly the American (1990a; 1990b).

Several works endorse the argument that cultural and linguistic barriers are efficient, albeit not sufficient, bulwarks against cultural imperialism and that linguistic loyalty, at least in the short-term, benefits indigenous cultural products (Prince 1979: 41 in Bevan, 1984: 115, Biltereyst, 1992; Collins, 1990b: 210-14):

Production and consolidation of national culture necessarily means discrimination in favour of endogenous and against exogenous elements. Production for the international market-place requires rather a mediation between endogenous and exogenous elements.

(Collins, 1990b: 221)

The next chapter will discuss the implications of such a 'mediation' in stateless nations and how the latter's broadcasting policies struggle to balance cultural and economic criteria. The previous pages set up the European context of cultural consumption in the nineties and highlighted the problems of national cultures in the context of cultural imperialism and globalisation. However, what constitutes a cultural identity and who is entitled to shape it?

1.3.2 Cultural identity, mirror and mirage

Cultural identity is constituted, on the one hand, by an objective account of habits, traditions, beliefs and values, by ways of living and thinking, and somehow, a particular way of being in the world. On the other hand, there is a subjective perception of belonging by which each person feels linked to his/her own history.

(Parés i Maicas, 1988a: 8)¹¹

'Cultural identity' is a melting pot which, by its heterogeneous nature, is vulnerable to changes through the continuous process of its construction. 'Cultural identity', as mentioned earlier, is a particular way of imagining the community and such 'imaginings' constitute the culture (Tomlinson, 1991: 81). Language, symbols, literature, social habits, religion, traditions are ways of representing the community.

Is 'cultural identity' the force that produces the features of a given 'national identity'? Indeed, 'cultural identity' carries the real expressions of most national (emotional) claims. 'Cultural identity' is an essential concept to understand 'national identity' since cultural manifestations give a lining to the symbolic and non-symbolic boundaries on which the nation settles. By looking at the process of the formation of these cultural manifestations, we may be able to describe the role of the different 'cultural engineers', that is, institutions, collective movements and intellectuals.

Inventing traditions

Most cultural identities embrace a set of 'images' that distinguish one group from another. Mattelart warns us about the danger of using 'cultural identity' as 'a screen to reality' by confusing culture with the past, labeling or converting culture in a 'picturesque folklore' (1984: 17-18). Nonetheless, folklore, and by extension social habits and traditions, are 'a symbolic drive of independent cultural identities' (Esteva, 1982: 131).

Hobsbawm argues that 'invented tradition is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically imply continuity with the past' (1983: 1). There is evidence that where there was a lack of cultural representations, state institutions and/or social groups 'invented' or 'reconstructed' them by digging up legitimising pieces of history and past folklore.¹² Those reconstructions of cultural history need to be cautiously regarded as a component of (re)building 'cultural identities'; since they are frequently developed by members of a certain social group, such reconstructions may reflect a deformed image of the cultural identity, a mirage, according to a few people's interests:

The construction of a discourse, in which the cultural 'other' (and even 'enemy') lies beyond national boundaries may lend a spurious legitimacy to whatever cultural forces can assert themselves as representative of 'the nation' or whichever culture manages to speak as the national culture.

(Tomlinson, 1991: 73)

Intellectuals and the interpretation of culture

The role of intellectuals in interpreting the means of a particular culture, as privileged mediators between 'civil society' and institutions, is another element to be considered in the (re)construction of cultural identities. Intellectuals are those who deal with ideas, symbols and arguments; those who, not being necessarily linked to any political affiliation, create public opinion. At this point, Gella's distinction between intellectuals and *intelligentsia* is useful for understanding how nationalist forces can decisively orientate the content of 'national identity' by mobilising intellectual action as a social group:

The intelligentsia stratum develops in a given nation when the educated members of the establishment are unable to face and solve the nation's growing problems. In response, the intelligentsia appears as a new element of the social structure, as a stratum placed between the 'power establishment' on the one hand, and all other classes on the other.

(Gella, 1976: 25)

The selection of collective memories, the interpretation of history and the legitimacy of cultural habits are significant areas of cultural identities in whose building processes intellectuals had and still have a decisive role (Schlesinger, 1993; Smith, 1991: 91-98; de Swaan, 1991; Parés i Maicas, 1992; Flaquer and Giner, 1991).¹³ As far as mass media are concerned, Bevan's account of the birth of the Welsh channel S4C shows that the mobilisation of the *élite* became crucial to the protection of its cultural minority through broadcasting (1984). Likewise, the lobbying campaign for the development of Gaelic broadcasting in Scotland demonstrated its efficacy by getting a financial annual package of £9.5 million from the conservative government in 1989 (Cormack, 1993: 112-15).

Can we assume then that intellectuals and collective movements are crucial to 'cultural identity'? Certainly so in the past; but today, the ongoing processes of depoliticisation of society and privatisation of cultural consumption lead to a different path. Philip Elliott

argues that these changes erode the Habermassian 'public sphere', conceived as a neutral space for democratic discussion. 'The intellectuals', he argues, 'are about to be robbed of those public forums in which they could engage in their 'culture of critical discourse' (1986: 105-106).

The two case studies presented here show that mass media may in some contexts expect from intellectuals a different role from that of interpreting reality in high cultural terms; the intellectual discourse does not always suit mass media messages. Intellectuals are pushed to abandon the sphere of 'high' culture in order to integrate in the realm of 'low' mass culture. This argument will be stated with regard to audience discussion programmes in the last section of this chapter.

If globalisation and cultural homogenisation are weakening the distinction between the way people live in America and the way they do in Europe; if traditions, folklore and social habits can be part of a conscious forgery; if intellectuals are progressively losing their place in the processes of production and interpretation of culture; if religion is also becoming a ground of transnational alliances;¹⁴ what is left of the integrity of 'cultural identities'?

Keeping a grip on language

The language is no longer taken for granted, but increasingly becomes a symbol, a cherished national and historical treasure, sometimes the only common denominator of state's citizenry and itself constitutive of a sense of national unity from which the state takes its legitimacy.

(de Swaan, 1991: 320)

If sharing a nation means sharing a culture (Gellner, 1983: 43), then speaking the same language is a common and objective experience of the existence of that culture. Language is at once a factor of social cohesion and of social distance, particularly when there are two or more linguistic domains in a given territory, one stronger than the other

(Esteva, 1982: 102). At this point, Scotland and Catalonia show different approaches to the issue of linguistic minorities.

In Scotland, the majority of the people speak English as their mother tongue. However, there are two minority languages, Scots - a language with Anglo-Saxon roots - and Scots Gaelic, whose communities of speakers struggle for survival. The latter, a bilingual and geographically dispersed community, constitutes 1.4% of the Scottish population (Cormack, 1994b: 4). Gaelic, albeit more protected by its own community than the Scots language, is incapable of presenting a fully-fledged media culture (Cormack, 1993: 114, 1994b). As the next chapter will show, the boost to the Gaelic language in Scotland - particularly through broadcasting - owes more to the political class, media institutions and pressure groups than to Scottish civil society.

Findahl's work on Swedish broadcasting (1989) and Collins' analysis of the incongruence between culture and polity in Canada (1990a) suggest that language and culture are in fact only short-term obstacles to the expansion of information markets. When, as is the case, information markets are mainly developed in English, the issue of minority languages in Scotland has a sword hanging over its head. The Scottish cultural production and consumption habits are based upon the Anglo-Saxon world and Scotland is inevitably pushed to swim with this tide.

By contrast to the Scottish case, the cultural identity of the Catalans relies crucially upon the strength of their mother tongue. The Catalans, freed from Franco's genocidal policies, brought their language out of the private into the public domain. In the mid-seventies, with the arrival of democracy, the public sphere of the Catalan language was recovered (education system, publishing companies, Parliament, Government, political parties, mass media, finances and commerce). Since then, the project of 'normalisation' of the Catalan language has never stopped.¹⁵ Nowadays, 70% of the population speaks and uses Catalan on a daily basis and 90% understands it. The creation of a cultural

industry in Catalan then raised the problem of how this industry would cope with the globalising process and how it would survive without the sovereignty of a Catalan state. The next chapter focuses on this theme.

Another problem, which was referred to in the previous section, is the integration of non-natives, that is, Spanish immigrants, to the culture of the nation. Flaquer and Giner (1991) point out that there is a battle between Catalan and Spanish cultural bodies to define the cultural discourse, that is, to define their respective symbolic boundaries. Broadly speaking, the integration of immigrants in Catalonia was and is still a nest of political, social and cultural conflicts.¹⁶ Esteva argues that this situation is evolving slowly from 'biculturalism' (whereby two different quite isolated cultures - and peoples, Catalan natives and immigrants - cohabit) to a process of assimilation of immigrants by Catalan 'monoculturalism' (1982: 111). At this point, Catalan political and media institutions play a deliberate role in constructing a cultural industry that, it is hoped, will stand on its feet within the international marketplace.

The comparative perspective of the linguistic issue in Scotland and Catalonia proves that language is a cohesive but not an essential factor for the construction of national and cultural identity. To different degrees, language constitutes part of the distinctive Scottish and Catalan 'cultural identities'. Whereas in Catalonia language is crucial to the articulation of cultural representation and forms the leitmotiv of its cultural debate, in Scotland the varying degrees of development and use of the Gaelic, Scots and English languages do not disturb the process of building cultural identity by other means.

Amongst the different 'actors' intervening to build 'cultural identity', the ones described above arise in the analysis of the media in stateless nations. To frame the specific cultural background of each case study, a brief overview of the Scottish and Catalan cultural discourses is presented below.

1.3.3 Cultural discourse: the cases of Scotland and Catalonia

In nations without a state, the lack of political sovereignty pushes political arguments into the cultural domain, where, arguably, the legitimacy of the nation lies. Cultural discourses, as argued earlier, are directed by those in a position to communicate with the whole community (institutions, politicians, intellectuals, lobbies). Thus, language, religion, folklore, traditions and social habits are often channels of political manoeuvre. It is also in the cultural field that states may tend to make concessions to nations inside their boundaries.

However, the cultural discourse of stateless nations can be misleading, since, to counterbalance the homogenising effect of state cultures, they need to analyse, describe and publicise their cultures constantly, often building up a deceptive perception of singularity. Another point to consider is that, although language is central to the construction of 'cultural identity' as 'the most powerful instrument of...conservation and life of the nation' (Prat de la Riba, 1906 (1978): 58), one should not mistake language for culture. The focus needs to be on a wider frame: that of 'national identity'.

The Scottish and Catalan cultures have very distinctive histories that set up their cultural discourses differently; some key considerations can explain such distinctions. First, both countries fought British and Spanish cultural imperialism in different historical contexts. However, as a result of the British and Spanish attempts to impose cultural homogenisation, both Scots and Catalans have a sense of dual national identity and different levels of integration within their respective state structures. Second, the lack of a common language of the Scots distinct from English undermined the potential for a separate cultural industry, whereas the Catalans established parallel structures in Catalan to those in Spanish. Finally, nationalism was and is rather less consistent in Scotland than in Catalonia. It is argued below that in stateless nations, the existence of a coherent nationalist force orchestrates the efforts of putting together the cultural identity of their people.

Stateless nations, histories of defeat

Both Scotland and Catalonia, nations with thrones of their own in the past, lost their sovereignty in the early eighteenth century. Then their respective cultures were repressed by the imperialist power of Britain and Spain.

The use of the Catalan language in legal procedures was forbidden and it was recommended to eliminate it from the schools. All universities...were suppressed.... In Barcelona, a fortress that towered over the town was built. (...) Several military leaders and Catalan patriots were killed... and for a long time, a horrid terrorism ruled Catalonia.

(Soldevila: 1974)¹⁷

At the same time in history, Scotland experienced a similar repression. Its lifestyle and some of its institutions were abolished by the English. From then on, Scotland moved smoothly towards its democratic integration within the British state. The lack of violent friction between Scotland and its state, produced a rather volatile and incoherent nationalist movement, which was and is still at a political disadvantage, due to the British electoral system, which favours majority parties. By contrast, in Catalonia, the authoritarian cultural genocide pushed its people to claim their democratic rights, and at the same time their individuality as a nation.

Another explanation for this different evolution is the role of their respective intellectuals over the centuries in articulating the cultural discourse. According to Nairn, the emigration of the Scottish intellectuals and the *élites* South of the border to join the success of the British industrial revolution ruled out the chance for a class-nation to come into being in Scotland (McCrone, 1989: 163; Nairn, 1977: 154-5). Thus, the deficit of a nationalistic project banished any chance of consciousness of a 'national culture' (Nairn, 1977; 1989).¹⁸

By contrast, Catalan 'cultural identity' became a 'national culture' because an *intelligentsia* made it happen over the centuries.¹⁹ Catalonia was and is one of the

economic 'engines' of Spain. Whilst part of the Catalan *élites* adopted the Spanish culture because it was the culture of those in power, an influential Catalan *intelligentsia*, attracted to the economic wealth of the nation, was devoted to the Catalan cause. Then, when politics allowed it, their nationalist claims were coherent and determined.²⁰

The Church

In both countries, religion played a crucial role in preserving their respective national identities. The Church of Scotland maintains its distinctiveness from the Church of England. Moreover, the confrontation between Catholics - of Irish heritage - and Protestants - the religious background of most Unionist supporters (McCrone, 1992: 144) - is a key issue in the political battle. Lynch argues that nowadays religion does not seem to be as an acute problem as it was in the past (1991: 438). Nevertheless, the religious rivalry still manifests itself through Scottish popular culture. It is worth noticing the friction between Glaswegian football supporters of Celtic - Catholics - and Rangers - Protestants.²¹

In Catalonia, the Catholic church, like other aspects of the Catalan culture, became a battleground through which the state and the national forces tested their potential at times of cultural repression. On the one hand, the clergy was in hands of the Spanish Catholic Church upon which Franco relied to control the whole education system. Today the effects of Spanish orthodox Catholicism on the social and private spheres are still noticeable as will be shown in the empirical findings below.

On the other hand, though, the clergy from religious orders such as the Benedictines became a counterbalance to Spanish assimilation. The religious orders maintained their autonomy within the monasteries. There, the Catalan 'cultural identity' survived when no other institutions could act. Catalan nationalism grew alongside religious institutions, which explains the strong drive of Christian democracy in Catalan nationalist parties (cf. Ireland and Poland).

Scotland, a case of historic cultural discourses

The Scottish and Catalan cultural discourses differ because, as explained above, their historical evolution and their current political status are rather different. The coherence of a nationalist project in Catalonia expressed a unitary 'cultural identity', which fought against assimilation by Spanish culture before and after the arrival of democracy. By contrast, Scotland, albeit politically and institutionally dependent on London, was entitled to keep some of its cultural institutions over the centuries (its Church, its education and legal systems). As there was no strong nationalist project that pushed the Scottish nation to articulate its cultural identity, the traditional lifestyles and cultural manifestations from Highland and Lowland Scotland maintained their distinctive characters. This evolution, which some argue results in a schizophrenic cultural discourse (Nairn, 1977: 157; McCrone, 1992: 174-7), rules out the existence of a 'national culture'. However, that is not to say that there is no sense of 'national identity' in Scotland, but that its articulation is twice as complex as, for instance, in Catalonia, due to the absence of a coherent 'national culture' that might safeguard and construct the institutional structure for such an identity.

In terms of cultural discourses, Scottish culture presents indeed a rather fragmented landscape. For a start, there is an intellectual debate about who owned the set of symbols through which Scotland is portrayed, that is, the image of the Scots with tartans, kilts and bagpipes (Trevor-Roper, 1983). Alongside this rather 'picturesque folklore' of Scotland, the Gaelic community, a minority culture within Scotland, is making tangible efforts to protect its literary and oral tradition. Besides, the Scottish culture in English also produced a remarkable literary movement in the nineteenth century inspired by the bucolic grounds of rural life: 'kailyardism' (Nairn, 1977: 158, McCrone, 1992: 177-180; Harvie, 1994: 98-101; Daiches, 1993: 169-70):

MacArthur argues that the discourses of Tartanry and Kailyard are both frozen and regressive in that they provide a reservoir of Scottish 'characters', 'attitudes' and 'views' which can be drawn upon to give the 'flavour of Scotland': a petrified culture with a misty, mythic, and above all, static past.

(Griffiths, 1993: 14-15).

This conception of the Scottish lifestyle is to some extent mirrored by today's television culture. Significant examples are Scottish Television's (STV) drama productions *Doctor Finlay* and *Take the High Road*. By contrast to this rural perception of Scotland, the industrial development brought a cultural counter-offensive, 'Clydesidism', which claimed to be 'constructed from "real" images of working-class life, from the discourse of class, and from naturalism' (McCrone, 1989: 168).

All these historical cultural discourses are at the same time influenced by a powerful neighbour, England, whose overwhelming presence, according to McArthur, locks the Scots into a sense of cultural inferiority (1981, in McCrone, 1992: 186). In Scotland, the Anglo-Saxon culture was and is still politically supported by Unionism, whose interest and self-confidence relies upon their integration into the UK state. However, the Scots react to some extent against the English hierarchy and status consciousness by 'imagining' their community as egalitarian. This sense of egalitarianism, McCrone argues, defines 'Scottishness' in social and ideological terms (1992: 115-120). Indeed, this perception finds some endorsement among the findings of this work.

Overall, though, the British economic and political project withdrew the possibility of providing Scottish cultural identity with a powerful and unified *intelligentsia* and a 'national culture'.²² Today, to this outsider, Scotland appears culturally fragmented due to the multiple mechanisms of dependence enforced by British institutions over the country. The next chapter will demonstrate this argument with regard to the television industry.

Catalonia, two languages, two cultures?

In Catalonia, the problem is not the lack of a 'national culture', but the cohabitation of two languages, which, to some extent, define two coexisting national cultures, one in Spanish and one in Catalan.

Catalonia started its cultural dependence on the Spanish influence when the Catalan dynasty ended in the early fifteenth century and the Spanish throne started taking over the Catalan native culture. However, the pride of the Catalan nation which had been a major player in the Mediterranean during the Middle Ages, kept its aspirations alive. In their analysis of the Catalan cultural debate, Flaquer and Giner (1991) point out that there is a literature of reflection on the nature of the Catalans which explains why they have such a strong consciousness as a people. Following Vicens i Vives, they suggest that the attachment of the Catalans to the land and the family generated a sense of continuity which kept the consciousness of their national unity (1954: 40 in Flaquer and Giner, 1991: 22-3). An overview of the Scottish renaissance and its literature would show that clans, land and the need for defining the Scottish character are also strong drives of the Scottish collective identity. Such reflections can be found in the many socio-cultural studies on the Scottish culture.²³

Another significant characteristic of the Catalan character is its desire for consensus - *Pactisme*. This political and juridical conception of socio-political relations ruled Catalan affairs from the ninth to the eighteenth centuries. Today, *el Pactisme* is still the autonomous government's attitude towards Spain, which partially explains the current political contentment with the autonomous status of the nation.²⁴

This desire of consensus is also manifested in the cultural domain. As mentioned above, Catalan society offers two cultural playgrounds: one in Catalan and one in Spanish. Both languages are expressed in the everyday life of the Catalans; both are taught in schools and universities; the mass media are also linguistically divided. A political attitude of conciliation from both central and autonomous institutions tries to guarantee peaceful cohabitation for these two cultures. However, the question of defining 'culture' in a bilingual society remains unresolved.

A cultural conflict in Catalonia arises in relation to which language is used to express culture rather than what cultural manifestations may say about the country. Therefore, it is not surprising that Catalan ideologists regard language as 'the' cohesive element of their identity (Mira, 1984: 153-186; Badia i Margarit, 1985: 257-275; Rigol, 1982: 110-114). This also explains why mass media, both at local and nationwide levels, have always been privately and publicly supported.²⁵ Catalan press and broadcasting were and are active reminders of Catalan identity. Local and national media (press, radio and television) define territorial networks of social interaction amongst the inhabitants.

The issue is whether to consider mass media in Spanish operating in Catalonia as part of its 'national culture'. This ongoing debate questions the authenticity of some cultural activities within the national territorial domain. It is argued here that 'imaginings' of Catalan lifestyle can be expressed both in Catalan and Spanish. However, Catalan literature is exclusively constituted by written Catalan.²⁶

Flaquer and Giner argue that such a debate about 'a' Catalan 'national culture' has been discussed since *La Renaixença* (1991: 2).²⁷ The dynamic of this debate was induced by intellectual reaction, particularly active against Francoism. According to them, Catalan discourse is strongly politicised by the autonomous institutions through which Catalonia holds full control over cultural matters.

Flaquer and Giner also hold that, apart from the unresolved problem of the cultural integration of non-native Catalans, there is a gap between high culture - of the Catalan élite, popular culture (folklore, social habits, cultural events) and the mass culture that penetrates through media products, music and cinema. Apparently, they argue, there is no interaction between these sub-cultures. This pessimistic view diverges from the findings of this work. It is argued here that, although there is a long way to go, mass media in Catalan are filling up this gap by integrating the Catalan popular culture into mass media messages.

In contrast to Scotland, the Catalan cultural discourse is based on linguistic boundaries. However, the ethnocentric conception of language, as the only authentic definer of cultural boundaries, no longer seems valid. As we will see, the role of the mass media in also reflecting 'cultural identity' is a case in point.

1.3.4 Cultural identity and the media

In our mass media society, telecommunications and new technologies are transforming the way in which we consume culture. There is an increasing tendency towards the privatisation of mass cultural consumption and a decline in public service principles.²⁸

Nevertheless, traditional mass media products are still considered cultural goods: symbolic material that reflect lifestyles of particular peoples, consequently contributing to the construction of 'cultural identity'. In relation to this, Schlesinger remarks that such a contribution should not be taken for granted, but examined in specific contexts (1991a: 138). This study aims to provide this argument with some empirical support.

Media products are undeniably creators of an 'imagined' world and capable of mirroring certain lifestyles (Calhoun, 1991: 106-14; Biltereyst, 1992). With regard to this, fiction has a crucial role in building 'cultural identity': 'fiction seeps quietly and continuously into reality, creating that remarkable confidence of community in anonymity which is the hallmark of modern nations' (Anderson, 1983: 36). The next chapter discusses Catalan and Scottish broadcasting's attitudes towards this question; the *La Vida en un Xip* case study suggests that popular fiction is indeed a priority of home-production for cultural minorities.

The findings below demonstrate that both media institutions and products do contribute to the building of 'cultural identity'. The cases considered in this study - audience

discussion programmes - suggest that the more access the media give to the people, the more visible becomes the expression of their cultural identity, and, thus, the need for media professionals to take such questions into account, that is, to consider how the 'comradeship' conceives its immediate environment.

The need for representation

In 'complex societies', individuals experience a need for self-assertion that modifies their approach to 'civil society' and political institutions.

Civil society can be defined as a sphere of individual rights and voluntary association, which works as a politically peaceful assembly of individuals and groups, whose respective private affairs, objectives and interests are guaranteed by a public institution named "state".

(Giner, 1985: 73)

Giner goes on to argue that any mature civil society presents five essential dimensions, whose evolution gradually weaken civil society itself. These five dimensions are: individualism, privacy, the market, pluralism and class (1985: 73-79). As far as individualism is concerned, Melucci argues that the need for self-reassertion of the people can not be fulfilled by the identity of a group or culture, but by an 'inner capacity to "change form", to redefine itself repeatedly in the present, to reverse decisions and alliances' (1990: 109-10). Melucci goes on to argue that individuals need spheres of representation to express their individuality in relation to the rest of the community; corporate representation and collective movements are essential, but not enough.

In this context, Tomlinson remarks that today cultural identities are replaced by 'a commodified modern life', where the realm of the public is 'largely and for most people, the realm of habitual routine practices' and where cultural identities are 'more likely to arise in the "marginal" realms of meaning of the "private" sphere of family and sexual relationships, or the essentially representational sphere of "mass ritual" ' (1991: 87). However, 'cultural identities' are a safety net since they constitute familiar points of

reference for the members' community to look outside themselves. As Tomlinson nicely puts it, there is

a need for viable communities of cultural judgement: for communities on a scale to which individuals can relate and which can provide satisfying accounts of how and why we live as we live.

(1991: 178; the researcher's emphasis)

The emergence of local broadcasting is a way to fulfil this need, since local media establish close contact with the needs of their audience. In this context, Tomlinson argues that media are '*potentially* the source of strong national identification' among the members of the community (1991: 88; the author's emphasis). Speaking the same language is a way of experiencing communion. Singing the national anthem is another, as well as voting in the local or national or European elections. The transmission of such cultural events activates the dynamics of identification.

State-nation and nation without a state

At this point, the distinction between the state-nation and the nation without a state is crucial. In the state-nation, national and cultural identity are taken for granted. The state apparatus enables public institutions to portray signs of identification through the education system, nationwide media and cultural events, such as national festivities and official ceremonies.

In nations without a state, the portrayal of identity is another matter. Outside the nation, its signs of identity are perceived as parochial, local. Parochialism is a complex concept because its perception shifts according to the point of reference of both insiders and outsiders. The issue of parochialism becomes relevant to media production studies since signs of (local) identity can be seen as parochial. Therefore, broadcasters may try to avoid them regarding them as discordant with the values of cosmopolitan culture.

Communication policies provide media cultures with institutional frames. Such communication policies are established at international, state and national levels. Schlesinger remarks that wide cultural spaces, such as the project of a European audio-visual one, have problems of viability because of economic and political constraints (1993, 1994). At the level of stateless nations, however, communication policies are much more feasible. As noted earlier, though, cultural issues are frequently politicised to satisfy nationalist aspirations that are not otherwise to be achieved by political means.

In this frame of mind, it is argued, the British government agreed to finance the development of Gaelic broadcasting, whereas Scottish programming in English lacks financial support to survive within the UK competitive market.²⁹ The case of the Gaelic Television Fund confirms once more the lack of a coherent policy embracing all Scottish cultural matters.

In Catalonia, some intellectuals recommend the adoption of an integrative public communication policy to be applied over the whole Catalan speaking area, that is, the historic territorial domain of *els Països Catalans* (Gifreu, 1983; 1991). Catalan media institutions maintain an active role within their territory - two nationwide television channels and several radio stations. However, the Catalan government refuses to apply interventionist cultural policies that could be seen as xenophobic or even imperialistic towards other coexisting cultural realities (Gifreu, 1983; Gifreu and Corominas (eds) 1991).

The role of mass media in rebuilding 'cultural identities' is often ambivalent and contradictory. In stateless nations, such an ambiguity is expressed even more intensely.³⁰ On the one hand, as producers of economic goods, mass media are determined by the marketplace and state regulations. The next chapter will show this in relation to the Scottish and Catalan television industries. On the other hand, as producers of symbolic goods, mass media are domains where culture and political economy relate

to the 'cultural identity' of a given nation. Entertainment and formats are adapted to home production; fiction is dubbed; journalistic styles are copied. Native media cultures face outside cultural influence by devising home-products that can match the foreign audio-visual fashion. This work focuses on the Scottish and Catalan producers as key actors in this contest.

1.4 The Public Sphere, Media and Audience Participation

'At any point in time and space
some citizens will normally choose to remain silent
and only certain other individuals and groups
will choose to communicate with others.'

(Keane, 1991: 165)

The two previous sections reviewed questions of 'national identity' and the formation of culture in relation to the media of stateless nations. The complex interaction of three levels of identity - national, state and international - was discussed. It was also remarked that nationalism activates the dimensions of cultural identification and uses culture as an instrument in its cause. In this context, we underlined the role of intellectuals in redefining the cultural discourse of nations, but also the progressive decline of their role in public forums.

It was argued that cultural identities are seriously threatened by cultural imperialism, and more recently, by globalisation. Culture is an 'arena of struggle', in which media institutions are main actors. Media, as producers of cultural goods, show the contradictions between the economic imperatives of the international marketplace and the socio-political and cultural criteria applied to media products as symbolic goods. All these processes are framed within a 'post-modern' society, in which the boundaries between the public and the private realms are gradually being reshaped. In this society,

the role of the individual within public life increases due to the networks of social interaction and their own need to intervene in the public domain (Melucci, 1990).

This last section focuses on television as a field of representation of individuals and groups in the 'public sphere'. The concept of the 'public sphere' will be reviewed with regard to democratic broadcasting. It is argued here that the 'public sphere' offers a useful framework to understand public 'communicative spaces' in television. Also, the 'public sphere' can be conceived as operating in relation to supra-national, state and sub-state communities all of which face the contradictions that such a socio-political crossroads involves (Schlesinger, 1994).³¹ This discussion will be followed by an examination of audience discussion programmes as formats that provide the basis for a 'public sphere' in the media, which, in the current broadcasting environment, inevitably involves rethinking the concept of the 'public sphere'.

1.4.1 Public sphere and 'communicative space'

It is assumed here that a 'public sphere' exists as a space through which 'civil society' discusses its own means and ends.³² It is within this space that political processes and globalisation intervene. Media, particularly television, witness the interaction between power structures and 'civil society' in public debates.

The concept of the 'public sphere' and the media

The transformation of the bourgeois 'public sphere' has been comprehensively examined by Habermas (1989). The 'public sphere' was conceived as a neutral space where individuals could freely mediate between the state and the new industrial 'civil society'. However, this sphere was restricted to those with free access: the bourgeoisie. Within this space, the dynamics of a democratic rational communication was expected to develop the political means of a public forum capable of opposing the power structure. That 'public sphere', Habermas argues, has disappeared:

The downfall of the public sphere, demonstrated by its changing political functions, had its source in the structural transformation of the relationship between the public and the private realm in general.

(Habermas, 1989: 142-3)³³

As main features of the structural transformation of the 'public sphere', Habermas describes: (i) the permeation between private and public spheres, (ii) the polarisation of the social and the intimate spheres (deprivatisation of the private sphere itself, reduced to the family); and (iii) the depoliticisation of the 'public sphere' by the shift from a culture of discussion to a culture of mass consumption.

In the bourgeois 'public sphere', the press intervened to activate democratic controversy among individuals. However, the role of the media changed with the emergence of mass media society. To Habermas, the transformation of the 'public sphere' took place during the transition from the literary journalism of private individuals to the rise of mass media, which attended to the private rather than public interests (1979: 200):

The world fashioned by the mass media is a public sphere in appearance only. By the same token the integrity of the private sphere which they promise to their consumers is also an illusion.

(Habermas, 1989: 171)

Furthermore,

The public sphere becomes *the sphere for the publicising of private biographies*, so that the accidental fate of the so-called man in the street or that of systematically managed stars attain publicity, while publicly relevant developments and decisions are garbed in private dress and through personalisation distorted to the point of unrecognizability.

(Habermas, 1989: 171-2; the researcher's emphasis)

The approach of public service broadcasting to 'civil society' certainly differs from that of the press. It ought to be remembered that competition and a popular mass culture are the main 'characters' of the current broadcasting scene. Nonetheless, the struggle of public

service to survive beside competitive broadcasting does not rule out completely the role of television as a potential arena of a 'public sphere', where:

by 'public sphere' we mean first of all a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is guaranteed to all citizens. A *portion of the public sphere* comes into being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a public body.

(Habermas, 1979: 198; the researcher's emphasis)

If we believe that television can be part of this sphere, audience participation can be seen as a mechanism that enables such a communicative situation to happen. Programmes of public debate and audience participation embody the potential for, in Habermas' terms, 'communicative rationality'. However, such a potential is often constrained by the contradictions of media products themselves, both as sources of profit and as public goods. The findings of this work demonstrate that decision-making in the production process modifies the terms of unrestricted access and the rational discourse of participants.

A feasible 'public sphere'

The existence of a pure 'public sphere' where all individuals are in a position to discuss democratically and horizontally matters of general interest, is merely an utopia. First, as Garnham (1986) remarks, the individualistic terms of the Habermassian public sphere are not valid. There is a political process to be taken into account - institutions, parties, pressure groups, political campaigns. Second, social movements organise their actions corporately and defend their own collective interests rather than civil society's (Melucci, 1990: 56).

Elliott also points out that the role of individuals has shifted from one of citizens attached to political structures, to one of consumers of privatised cultural goods (1986: 106). Our 'public sphere' is a depoliticised one, where matters of general interest are those which concern material welfare and individual comfort. Furthermore, the state, which at one

time operated detached from 'civil society', gradually penetrates the latter by socialising some of its functions through non-state organisations (Keane, 1991: 107). All these factors interact and continuously shift the limits of the 'public sphere'.

Nonetheless, it is argued here that a 'public sphere', where 'civil society' discusses the fulfilment of collective and individual needs, exists. This 'public sphere' is neither neutral, nor politically bound, but a space where social actors confront and maybe solve their conflicts. In this connection, Melucci's view of a public sphere independent from political institutions and state structure (1990: 171-4) is unfeasible. If mass media institutions are creators of those Habermasian 'portions of public sphere' through television programmes, both the dynamics of these 'portions' and their production processes warrant a careful analysis. Television production shows that economic and political criteria interfere in setting up those products, and thus, intervene in the public sphere. Television is a window through which to explore how polity, economic imperatives and the principles of public good strike a balance.

'Communicative space'

The term 'communicative space' is much used by Latin authors in a similar sense to that of the 'public sphere' (cf. Mattelart *et al.*, 1984; de Moragas, 1991; Gifreu i Corominas (eds) 1991; Gifreu, 1991). However, the former refers to culture and identity rather than to the political dynamics of democratic 'civil society'.

The concept of 'communicative space' displays the cultural and symbolic dimensions of human interaction. However, it contradicts the political potential of the 'public sphere' defined by Habermas (1989), Garnham (1986) and Cohen (1985). Arguably, these different approaches reflect distinctive political cultures. Great Britain experienced the rise of a 'public sphere' in the political realm early in the eighteenth century (Habermas, 1989: 56). British society relies upon the stability of its political system; as Elliott puts it, 'law and order' (1986: 110). By contrast, in other European countries, such as Spain or

Italy, historic political struggles and a volatile climate in their current affairs limit people's confidence in the polity, and they therefore project this confidence onto the potential of 'civil society'.

Taking this into account, we understand the significance that Melucci imputes to collective action and social movements, detached from power structures, and their need for 'spaces of representation'. In 'complex societies', the deprivatisation of the private realm and the discussion of everyday life in the public realm question the meanings of individual existence within society:

Nowadays the social attribution of identity invades all areas traditionally protected by the barrier of 'private space'. Consumption, sexuality and affective relations are all fields of 'public' intervention; they are subject to a growing pressure from socially imposed behaviour models.

(Melucci, 1990: 123)

As will be argued later, this transformation shows clearly through the agenda of audience discussion programmes. Individuals need spaces to redefine their own identities, either through their involvement in collective action or through their individual participation in public life.

Motivation to participate plays a significant role in the dynamics of collective action. Melucci points out that individuals only decide to act when they are in control and know that some response will come out of their efforts (1990: 48). Where do the conflict and consensus of collective action take place? Melucci argues that 'conflicts develop in those areas of the system which are crucial for the production of information and symbolic resources, and which are subject at the same time to the greatest pressure to conform' (1990: 55). As noted earlier, the cultural domain is possibly the most significant battlefield of such conflicts.³⁴

'Communicative space' is then conceptualised as a field of cultural interaction and establishment of communication networks. For instance, Gifreu proposes the creation of a 'communicative space' to embody the territorial domain of a certain language, where a coherent cultural interaction would be feasible (1986; 1991; Gifreu and Corominas (eds) 1991). A similar conception lies behind the proposal of a 'Latin audio-visual space' (Mattelart *et al.*, 1984 in Schlesinger, 1991a: 144-148). This perception is also evident in Serrano's definition of culture as a 'communicative space' (1980: 115).³⁵ However, such works fail to develop the implications of this space within the socio-political structure. Still, both concepts, 'public sphere' and 'communicative space', assume that a rational human interaction is feasible. This point is pursued below.

Public Opinion, Communicative Rationality and Language

'Public opinion' is formed in the 'public sphere' through different institutions, the mass media amongst them. Following Habermas, the formation of public opinion requires the capacity to reason and understand, which emphasises the significance of language:

... human interaction, the field of meanings and values, presupposes language and exists in language. He (Habermas) goes on to argue that we can therefore discover within the structure of speech itself the essential grounding propositions of all human interaction and thus of all social organization.

(Garnham, 1986: 42)

Human interaction fulfils the principles of the 'public sphere' only if rational communicative action involves truthfulness, debate and agreement between the parts, comprehensibility, and sincerity. Rationality and universality are, according to Garnham, the strengths of Habermas' theory of human interaction. However, the former points out that Habermas does not place 'the social role and power of expertise and expert knowledge, nor, and it is crucial,...the role of social interests associated with knowledge broking' (Garnham, 1986: 44). Thus, he argues:

... it becomes difficult to handle the problem of the role of those who in fact manage the conduct of the information-gathering and debate which is the Public Sphere's *raison d'être*, namely, in particular, journalists and politicians themselves.

(1986: 44-5)

Media institutions are a case in point. Broadcasting services, mostly regulated by nation-states, are vitally linked to public institutions and political processes. At the same time, as producers of cultural goods, mass media are capable of 'inventing' programmes where the Habermasian 'communicative rationality', albeit restricted by political processes, could come into being.

The question is if such a 'communicative rationality' is still feasible in view of today's media scene. The rhythm and mechanisms of media production reduce the potential for this 'communicative rationality' to happen. However, the new tendencies of media production open up an unexplored path for the public to contribute to the building of a certain 'public sphere'. We might consider the latter, using Fraser's terminology (1990: in Livingstone and Lunt, 1994), as based in the 'oppositional public sphere' in which individuals and social identities could express their discourses, maybe chaotic and distant from political processes, in a common non-institutionalised space:

Television has a role to play in constructing a space rather than providing one, in negotiating an interactional style, and in bringing together diverse publics rather than displaying a common, unified public.

(Livingstone and Lunt, 1994: 32)

1.4.2 Public sphere and broadcasting

Media institutions, particularly in public broadcasting service, can devise public spaces to extend social interaction to the general public. Several authors examine the concept of the 'public sphere' in relation to broadcasting.

Taking into consideration Habermas' theory, Curran proposes a model for a democratic media system in which the core sector would be a public broadcasting service that could guarantee a 'public sphere' in the media. He argues that media provide 'an arena of public debate' and reconstitute 'private citizens as a public body in the form of "public opinion"' (1991a: 83). For Curran, the democratic functions of the media should aim: (i) to enable individuals to reinterpret their social experience and question the assumptions of the dominant culture, (ii) to act as an agency of representation, and (iii) to assist the realisation of the common objectives of society through agreement or compromise between conflicting interests (1991a: 104). The next chapter will argue that such functions of the media are being jeopardised by the pressure of internationalisation and the crisis of the public service philosophy.

Elliott insists that to explore the 'public sphere' in the media, the first focus of analysis should be the organisation of their institutions. Public service broadcasting is no longer financially viable. A competitive audio-visual market has buried the goals of the 'public good' traditionally pursued by public service when ideological criteria carried more weight than economic viability. At that time, the intellectuals had articulated the concept of the 'public good'. However, as argued earlier, intellectuals have lost their prominent voice in public forums. Their decline mirrors the decline of the public service itself. As a result of a loss of public broadcasting principles and with private interests ruling most media institutions, the 'public sphere' becomes vulnerable (Elliott, 1986: 113).

Looking at professionals and products, Garnham argues that journalists and politicians, main actors of this field, also do not fulfil the functions of a 'public sphere' in the media:

In particular the public service model has failed to come to terms with the proper and necessary social function of both journalists and politicians. In relation to both groups, there is a failure sufficiently to distinguish between two communicative functions within the Public Sphere, on the one hand the collection and dissemination of information, and on the other the provision of a forum for debate.

(Garnham, 1986: 49)

He carries on to argue that public service broadcasting is needed to guarantee the existence of public debate capable of opposing the networks of transnational corporations that guard the free flow of private interests across the countries (1986: 52). At this point, Keane also argues that the existence of a public service would protect the public interest and freedom of communication (1991: 126, 149). Both Garnham and Keane foresee the survival of the 'public sphere' not only through national public service broadcasting, but also through an international space, where a 'universal civil society' would discuss democratically the problems of globalisation.

1.4.3 Audience participation and public space

The previous pages envisage a pessimistic prospect for a democratic media system subordinated to powerful corporations and private interests. Scannell's angle allows a more positive reading of the potential of the 'public sphere' in the media. He focuses on broadcast programmes rather than on the structure of media institutions. Scannell argues that the arrival of commercial television forced the public service to broaden its perception of public interest and search for new ways of appealing to public concerns (1989: 326-7).

In this context, Scannell remarks upon the role of public media products in creating space for discussion: 'broadcasting came to fulfil - never without difficulty, always under pressure - its role as an independent public sphere, as a forum for open public discussion of matters of general concern' (1989: 327). At this point, Scannell reviews some of the television formats that integrated for the first time ordinary participants into the discourse of broadcasting - game shows and talk shows.³⁶ Audience participation strengthens the role of broadcasting in merging the public and private spheres: 'broadcasting discovered the pleasures of ordinariness creating entertainment out of nothing more than ordinary people talking about themselves' (1989: 324).

Some television formats drag the private realm into the light of the camera. Audience discussion programmes are a case in point. Such programmes hold public debates among members of the public around issues of common concern.³⁷ Individuals show no resistance to publicise questions that had traditionally remained within the private sphere. Taking into account the transfer of private affairs to public life, nowadays the agenda of public discussions covers mainly the fields of affective and sexual relationships, religious and ethical convictions, social habits and commodities.

Broadcasting discourse approaches those concerns by appealing to the common sense understandings of both participants and home audiences.³⁸ Participants of television programmes are mostly gathered from inactive social groups (housewives, the unemployed, students, the retired), whose interests differ from those integrated into the labour market. Therefore, to relieve participants from the strain of their (sometimes undesired) passive lives, issues tend to be focused on the cheerful rather than the tough side of life. The tone of the discussion is informal and relaxed. The storytelling of ordinary people prevails over information and conflicting matters.

The world, in broadcasting, appears as ordinary, mundane, accessible, knowable, familiar, recognizable, intelligible, shareable and communicable for whole populations. (...) The universe of discourse inscribed in the totality of output is not merely a content, but a set of relationships, a communicative ethos, that registers the quality and manner of social intercourse between institutions and audiences, and, beyond that, the expressive idioms of public and private life.

(Scannell, 1989: 334-5)

Melucci, with his insight into 'complex societies', reminds us that such portrayal of a 'common' everyday life is frequently imposed by models of social integration and the pressure of the media themselves to publicise certain conflicts and patterns of "normality" (1990: 131). As this work will show, that is certainly so in audience discussion programmes.

Matters of general concern are restricted to the range of issues that a depoliticised 'public sphere' can handle. Spaces that could be forums for discussion among citizens become cultural discussions among consumers of certain lifestyles. Debates are held around social habits, commodities, topical controversies and sexual issues. Certainly, public service broadcasting legitimised the presence of ordinary citizens to discuss controversial issues, as Keane remarks (1991: 118), but mainly questions that would not damage or put power structures on the spot. The need to reach mass audiences supported this choice: profound discussions, like it or not, appeal to minority audiences.

Nonetheless, the dynamics of audience participation formats set up democratic practices of human interaction among different groups - experts, people, institutions. Such formats constitute public spaces for people from different backgrounds to discuss each other's views.

Access and voice remain priorities but the underlying model of argumentation (negotiation versus critical discussion) and the underlying functions of the dialogue (compromise versus consensus) are changed, and the significance of social identities and social relations is no longer marginalized. Access and participation programmes should, according to this view, be evaluated in terms of how well they express a diversity of public voices and challenge established power to recognise the complexities of everyday life.

(Livingstone and Lunt, 1994: 35)

Livingstone and Lunt discuss the concept of the 'public sphere' in relation to audience participation and television debates. They agree with Curran (1991a, 1991b), Garnham (1986) and Keane (1991) that the Habermassian 'public sphere' is no longer valid in post-modern societies and needs to be reconceived. The 'public sphere', they argue, should be understood not as a space for a rational debate through which citizens reached consensus, but rather as a space for participative discussion which allows social groups and individuals to engage with their various positions. This new approach is what Fraser calls the 'oppositional public sphere' (1990 in Livingstone and Lunt, 1994: 8-35). This argument will be pursued later.

Is there a space for entertainment in the 'public sphere'?

There is a point that may be lacking in the current discussion on the 'public sphere'. Most arguments try to frame it within the political process and social representation. Dealing with the 'public sphere' in relation to broadcasting, one should not forget that audio-visual products are determined by broadcasting strategies that prioritise entertainment above all. The question is how entertainment fits in the rationalistic concept of a neutral space for social representation.

It has been argued here that the Habermassian 'public sphere' is unfeasible as originally devised. However, individuals still seek to participate in the public domain. How democratic broadcasting articulates such a participation may be the key for a further development of the concept of the 'public sphere'. Entertainment is an essential element to take into consideration as the new dynamics of television production suggest.

Audience discussion programmes, as the empirical data will demonstrate, are produced under the imperatives of a competitive audio-visual market. Such imperatives primarily intend to achieve high audience figures to guarantee advertising income and, consequently, long-lasting shows. Audience figures depend on the capacity of television producers to compete with fiction and game-shows, currently at the top of the ratings. Debate programmes consequently endeavour to include some entertainment in their formulae.

Entertainment involves prioritising particular ways of setting up the discourse on television: (i) the choice of topics is made according to an agenda based on the private rather than public affairs, (ii) issues are dramatised, exemplified and/or explained as stories, (iii) expert knowledge is popularised, (iv) participants are asked to explain their experiences and peculiarities rather than their thoughts, and (v) technical and academic argots are overtaken by colloquial manners of speaking. The main consequence of these

production practices is the lightening of the political content, albeit not necessarily, the absence of it.

Entertainment thus moves the concept of the 'public sphere' from the grounds of the political process and social representation to the grounds of social pleasure. Curran argues that under a 'radical democratic' perspective, entertainment is devised as a means for individuals to commune with themselves rather than merely a means for gratification (1991b: 27-38). This perception underlines the link between experiencing communion and entertainment, and thus, places the role of the latter in the process of building collective identities. To consider entertainment as inherent in the dynamics of the 'public sphere' is not to say that it loses its potential for discussing civil society's matters, but that the terms and mechanisms through which such matters are discussed are eased. Individuals feel the need to participate in the realm of the public and their private lives break into it.

Social entertainment was always within the domain of the public, but individuals were merely spectators. Audience discussion programmes and many other television formats suggest that today individuals have chosen to become major actors in their own amusement. At this point, the key issue is to strike the balance between entertainment and the 'public principles' observed by public service broadcasting. Such a balance is unlikely to be achieved in private television channels.

By contrast, provided that entertainment becomes a constitutive element of any form of audience participation, public service broadcasting should guarantee that information, education, objectivity and the many other principles to which public broadcasting is devoted, are not ignored. However, entertainment is not exclusively a 'content' element of television programmes, that is, those pictures and performances that provide amusement and laughter. The means of entertainment are also particular ways of making television which establish new dynamics of discursive interaction. Thus, a reshaped

concept of the 'public sphere', no matter what we call it, should take entertainment on board and its mechanisms should be examined in depth.

The 'public sphere', television debates and stateless nations

As argued above, the concept of the 'public sphere' faces a metamorphosis mirrored by the media in many different ways. It is believed that there is a potential for a common space in which individuals fulfil their needs for social representation in the depoliticised realm of the public. However, by taking into consideration the new approach of individuals to the public domain and the increasing influence of broadcasting imperatives in shaping such an approach, we should not disregard the impact that the 'public sphere' also has on the political process of the community. The examination of how the 'public sphere' may operate through the media in stateless nations will conclude this introduction.

Audience discussion programmes constitute a useful field to explore issues of social representation in small communities. Such debates are often presented as forums for social discussion, which frequently become the only platforms of expression for ordinary people. In small countries such as Catalonia and Scotland, where national and cultural identities are permanently questioned, there is, it is believed, a strong need for those platforms, which are devised as tools to counterbalance their underdeveloped democratic structures. It is argued here that in the context of national states, audience discussion programmes may be also perceived as representative of the community itself, but their wider respective political structures already provide (adequate) forums for discussion that release such television shows from any political significance. The political context chosen, thus, is essential.

As the empirical findings of this work show, the imperatives of the media business and the international marketplace establish new rules in programme-making, which should not be forgotten in this analysis. The 'public sphere' is pushed to compromise its

essential components as a neutral space for social discussion with the complex dynamics of television production. The terms of such a compromise shift according to the socio-political context considered. The possibility of a 'public sphere' is more likely to be functioning in the media of small communities than in those of larger communities, particularly in supra-national contexts such as Europe (Schlesinger, 1994):

In a national context it is possible to maintain a closer relation between participation and representation. At least in principle, it is possible for everybody to have access to the public sphere, including the media, and to represent themselves. This is inevitably an illusion in a European public sphere. The representation of such a sphere will be managed by professionals, journalists, politicians, opinion-makers etc. The number of different interests claiming the right to be represented will multiply at the European level, thus making a consensus even more difficult to establish.

(Stig Hjarvard, 1993: 89-90).

Hjarvard goes on to argue that the European public sphere is unlikely to come into being, since there has been an unequal development of the political and administrative structure, and public knowledge. By contrast, Tomlinson's argument of the need for 'viable communities of cultural judgement' (1991) seems to fit nicely in the context of small nations. Cultural minorities are threatened by globalisation and transnational interests, and thus need to be protected by outlining the boundaries of their identities.

The two audience discussion programmes analysed in this work offer some evidence of this: their discussions are frequently around issues that concern the community rather than the individual. As the next section will show, the scenario and set-up of these programmes work as reminders of the political forums, frequently poor or non-existent in their surrounding socio-political structures. The presenter becomes the referee of the discussion of individual and collective identity. These platforms for social interaction are located in broadcasting structures of sub-state political entities, determined by their complex cultural and political make-ups and exposed to the constraints of low media budgets in competition with state-run shows. These 'alienating' elements only strengthen

the determination of programme-makers to come near the community and appeal to its sense of identity in order to hook its loyalty. The Scottish and Catalan audience discussion programmes analysed in this study endorse this argument. The establishment of the rules and dynamics of such television debates is another matter that needs comprehensive examination.

1.4.4 Audience discussion programmes

Traditionally, producers appeal to mass home audiences through the performance of a minority - journalists, members of the star system or members of the élites. This minority has access to publicise their ideas to millions of people. When the public started having access to radio and television, people were generally invited to laugh or to be laughed at, and to participate passively in the glamorous scenario of stars and presenters. However, radio and later television integrated the active intervention of home participants through the telephone, which was the first step onto the path to audience participation.

On television, first, quiz-shows and later, talk shows and current affairs formats demonstrated that the portrayal and participation of ordinary people in radio and television was welcomed by home audiences.³⁹ Producers realised that members of the public on the screen generated an empathy with home viewers. Television makers understood that such programmes could satisfy the need of individuals to identify themselves in the realm of the public. Nowadays, the portrayal of otherwise anonymous lives on television is a recurrent feature.

Audience discussion programmes are framed in terms of these assumptions. They set up public debates about matters of general interest to which the audience has access. In those shows, individuals are entitled to use television to tell their stories and express their opinions, and consequently, they become the 'authors' of the television product.

However, media producers - still coming from the minority of professionals - decide the proceedings through which the participants are transferred from anonymity to public life. Public discussion programmes are not spaces of unrestricted communication. Economic and political criteria intervene in the decision-making, and, ultimately, producers are in control. A brief presentation of this format will help to figure out its limits.

'Reality television' vs. audience discussion programmes

In the nineties, we are witnessing the success of the genre of so-called 'reality television'. Programmes in this genre reveal the fortunes or rather the misfortunes of normally anonymous people. 'Reality television' programmes look for locations wherein emotional situations can be captured by the camera (courts, people's homes, in the search for a missing person). The main drive is not to recreate, but to show the drama of everyday life.

The format of audience discussion programmes is a relative of this genre. Both formats involve the portrayal of privacy under the public eye; however, the approach differs. In 'reality television', the camera invades private life. The drive of these shows is to capture emotional content, to portray human behaviour in its most intimate dimension. 'Reality television' reports human beings as objects, rather than subjects. They can not control the image that television gives of them, because they are caught *in situ*. Participants are offered no chance to refer to their attitudes in a rational way. As far as television producers are concerned, the difference between participants in 'reality television' and the actors in a 'soap opera' is that the former lack professional training.

Audience discussion forums are inspired, in principle, by a public-spirited intention of promoting public discussion among the community. In contrast to 'reality television', television forums invite the private domain into the public sphere. Individuals are requested to participate in discussions which concern them all. Such debates offer to the

participants a fairly neutral context in which to share opinions and contrast experiences with other members of the community. They are entitled to reason and discuss, and hence, they are, generally speaking, subjects of their own portrayal.

Livingstone and Lunt (1992) regard 'audience discussion programmes' as major sources of social representation. This is only partially true, since social representation is certainly limited by the production processes. Before explaining what are these limits, the format warrants a brief description.

Structure of audience discussion programmes

If the reader is familiar with American shows like *Donahue* and *The Oprah Winfrey Show*, the BBC programmes *Question Time* and *Kilroy* or ITV's *The Time, The Place*, the structure of such a format may be easily pictured.⁴⁰

First, television makers design a space that can physically hold a public forum. The size of the audience generally fluctuates between fifty and a hundred participants. The crowd in the studio emulates 'civil society', partially represented by anonymous people and members of the élites - experts, members of institutions, intellectuals. Studio sets tend to place experts in a more prominent location than the rest of the participants. The distribution of space constrains their roles and the dynamics of the discourse. The image of such programmes mimics to a certain extent the democratic setting of parliaments and courts.

Generally speaking, everyone willing to is able to contribute to such debates. However, a careful selection takes place amongst those who apply. Producers decide whether or not the candidates suit the intentions and tone of the programme. Participants of audience discussion programmes cover three distinctive roles: (i) a group of experts are invited to conceptualise the grounds of the issue. They tend to evaluate personal experiences and comments by the studio audience by means of 'normality' and 'common sense'; (ii) a

range of witnesses, storytellers of everyday life, legitimise the value of ordinary experience; finally, using Livingstone and Lunt's terminology, (iii) there are the 'lay participants', the crowd, invited to express personal opinions and experiences. Some formats do not include witnesses and others do not provide a conceptual discussion amongst experts, but the studio audience and a charismatic presenter are the two essential elements to them all.

The presenter orchestrates the discussion among the three different groups, distributes space and time among the participants, controls the agenda and occasionally intervenes as a mediator between the studio audience and the experts. Some of these shows also provide a quantitative approach to the matter through opinion polls. Others try to complete the circle of participation by integrating the home audience through telephone lines and letters.

These shows exist both in private and commercial television since they embody the potential for being a public service or just an entertaining show. In the present study, *Scottish Women* was created by Scottish Television, the commercial company with the franchise for the Scottish central region, and *La Vida en un Xip* was produced by an independent production company for Catalan public service broadcasting.

Most debate programmes create the impression that the discussion being held might continue after the end of the programme. This sense of continuity contributes in part to the idea of such forums as a portion of a real public sphere. To reinforce this objective, public debates discuss matters which are meant to interest everyone. But, who defines what those interests are?

Producers painting reality

It is during the decision-making process of these shows that political and economic criteria clash with the public spirit of the programme. Some issues are not debated

because they lack a spark or entertainment. Others are politically too risky. Producers, occasionally influenced by pressure groups and institutions, make the editorial decisions and decide the agenda to be discussed. When the public is informed about the issues in order to contribute, most editorial decisions have been made. Participants are offered the chance to be heard, but according to arrangements that lie out of their hands.

The process of selecting participants reveal, contrary to Livingstone and Lunt's perception (1992: 14-15), that social representation is constrained by means of success and spectacle. Participants, particularly witnesses, must guarantee either entertainment, suspense or drama. Researchers hunt peculiar types and leaders of local communities. The storytelling of ordinary experience is also carefully set up to attract the sympathy of home audiences. At this point, Livingstone and Lunt are right to acknowledge that these programmes highlight 'the ordinary anecdotal account of everyday life over the expert, scientific and abstract account, by validating the "normal"' (1992: 20). Such programmes cover the anecdotal rather than the conflictual aspects of issues. Dissemination of information, in spite of being a responsible principle of public service, does not serve the purposes of a peak-time show. Witty storytellers and passionate fights do.⁴¹

Normality, abnormality and common sense are the coordinates that shape the discourses of the different performers. In such programmes, to define 'normality' means to discern 'what society thinks' or 'what the majority does'. Such normality is defined by television producers, and represented in the studio by the 'lay participants'.

In a manner of speaking, witnesses personify situations of 'abnormality'. They tend to be extraordinary types, people who have experienced a common problem in an unusual way. Finally, the experts are selected to reflect 'common sense'. They explain those models of behaviour which the majority of the audience have internalised during the process of social integration. Thus, they are to some extent the representatives of the

socialising process. Beside this interpretive role, television producers often invite members of the star system to attract the audience. Popular figures and stars frequently hold poignant or outrageous attitudes towards the issue; they legitimise, thus, the 'abnormal' by means of their fame.

Members of public institutions are invited when an official account is required. This would be the case for controversial topics such as unemployment, taxes or the national health service. Then alternative experts are invited to represent social movements and collective interests and counterbalance the official views of public institutions.

The above overview of some production strategies does not say that producers apply conspiratorial tactics whereby power structures and media professionals set up the programme hand in glove. Still, it needs to be remarked that such programmes are controlled by a minority. The professional practices of this minority, even in public service broadcasting, are currently ruled by means of competitiveness and entertainment.

In audience discussion programmes, debates and report on social conflicts need to be compatible with amusement and spectacle. In this frame of mind, producers take decisions according to what they intuitively see concerns 'civil society'. They establish the social representation of their television forums by outlining 'characters' and conflicts that, they believe, exist. Then, reality is not mirrored, but painted, imagined.

The presenter, a hero of the community

Apart from producers, presenters are often completely involved in the setting up of such programmes. They need to be aware of every detail to manage the discussion in the arena. The success of the show frequently depends upon the presenter's charisma and ability to conduct the discourse without jeopardising his/her neutrality. Because of their crucial role, presenters of television debates usually become popular figures, members of the star system.

Studio and home audiences tend to have confidence in the presenter, as he/she tries to reach understanding and conciliate the different voices of the forum. The presenter, by mediating on behalf of the studio audience with the experts, can often be seen as a hero (Livingstone and Lunt, 1992: 24-5), the voice of equanimity and balance. During the programme, his/her position is perceived as closer to 'lay participants' and 'witnesses' than to the élites. This impression is also reinforced by the presenter's walkabout. However, this relation of sympathy is just a mirage on the screen. Presenter and experts normally have had prior contact behind the camera. Once more, that is not to say that discourses are arranged beforehand, but, that the potential for manipulation lies behind the format.

Audience discussion programmes are frequently perceived as 'the' forum of a particular territory, where the presenter is regarded as 'the' spokesperson of the community. The capacity of such television debates to represent 'civil society' is overestimated as well as the general interest of the issues discussed. Such a deformed impression can cloud over the democratic values of the format itself. Here, an inquiry into the attitude of Scottish and Catalan participants towards such programmes will support this point. The respondents attached to television forums a strong representative role in relation to their communities. Arguably, the lack of political power of stateless nations in wider forums reinforces the need of their inhabitants for public spaces of representation in the media.

In audience discussion programmes, producers feed the agendas from the culture of mass consumption. Such shows aim to entertain rather than set up an arena for democratic discussion. Participants are selected by means of spectacle rather than authenticity. Popularity completes the picture by emphasising an image of such forums as 'mirrors of the community'. This format, as it is, does not enable a 'portion of a public sphere' to come into being.

However, audience discussion programmes have a great potential for social representation. It is argued here that, in order to develop this potential, networks of constant feedback from the different actors within 'civil society', media and power structures need be established to intervene in the editorial decision-making and production process to strike the right balance in terms of content, social representation and public interest. Maybe then a 'public sphere' might come into being in television.

1.5 Conclusions

This chapter has aimed to present the themes interlocked in the frame of the research presented here. Taking into account the question of 'national identity' discussed in the first section, Scotland and Catalonia should be regarded as in a continuous process of redefinition of their respective status and identities within the national state and wider European contexts. The second section has attempted to underline the different actors of the cultural playground in relation to the media. There, the historic processes that make for the evolution of the Scottish and Catalan cultures as different were displayed. In order to understand the research presented below, such distinctions should be considered as the underlying background to programme-makers' practices in both stateless nations.

Finally, it was argued here that in contemporary societies, the individual expects not only to be represented, but to represent him/herself in the public sphere. The change of approach to public life is manifested in the transformation of the 'public sphere'. A public sphere would be more visible if social interaction became less mediated by political and bureaucratic means. It was also proposed that the concept of the 'public sphere' in relation to television needs to assimilate the consequences of the current broadcasting

tendencies. The media are relevant playgrounds where economic and socio-political criteria converge in the production of cultural goods.

This study presents a case for reinforcing the 'public sphere' in the media and exploring the mechanisms through which audience discussion programmes might allow this to happen. Consequently, this investigation focuses on Scotland and Catalonia as democratic stateless nations in which the issues discussed above are a case in point.

Notes

- 1 This work illustrates this point through the results of a survey amongst Scottish and Catalan participants: see Ch. 6. The data presented are supported by Moreno's work (1986: 156-7).
- 2 For a further perspective on the disjunctures of globalisation in the European context, see Held (1989). For a view on Europe in relation to Britain, see Jacques (1989). Also, a more comprehensive discussion on the artificiality of the European cultural project is developed by Schlesinger (1991a: ch. 7; 1991b; 1994).
- 3 Melucci explores the formation of collective action in the context of post-modern society and the new role of individuals within the state (1990). In relation to the latter, Hall and Held remark the changes between the concepts of citizen and citizenship. 'Citizenship', they argue, 'combines the public and the social with the individual aspects of political life' (1989: 177).
To Bauman (1990), post-modernity manifests itself by (i) a tendency to denationalisation of the state, privatisation of nationality or separation of both, (ii) placing the culture in the private domain, and (iii) a possible decrease of antagonism due to ethnic difference. To this researcher, the latter is highly disputable.
In relation to the change in 'complex societies', Melucci remarks that 'within the new conflicts, the function of socialisation and "submerged" participation is fulfilled by new networks rooted in everyday life, which open new channels for grouping and selecting élites... Cultural innovation and institutional modernisation are redefined' (1990: 41).
- 4 For the analysis of the constitution of collective identities and their role in 'complex societies', see Melucci (1990).
- 5 The article by Neal Ascherson on the recent history of the small state of Abkhazia is a significant reflection of contemporary politics on this issue ('Hopes in a small nation which dares to ask the dangerous questions', *Independent on Sunday*, 17-7-94).
- 6 A criticism of Gellner's argument is his standpoint of a centralised modern society (1983: 88-97). Gellner analyses nationalism from within the perspective of the state-nation, that is, from a position of 'imposition', rather than 'defence'. This view narrows the understanding of collective identities in nations without state. In the latter, the first step is precisely, to break through the state agencies by means of using the social, political and cultural organisations of civil society. Gellner qualifies such manoeuvres as 'entropy-resistant'.
- 7 Jordi Pujol has led the ruling nationalist party in the Catalan government since 1981. Pujol has been the President of the *Generalitat de Catalunya* since 1978 and he is likely to stay in power. The 'national(ist) question' stands for *el fet nacional*. *Fet* means 'fact'. It is significant that the spine of the Catalan nationalist project -incarnated by Jordi Pujol's ideology and his political coalition, *Convergència i Unió*- relies upon the concept of 'construction'. Slogans such as *fer país* (work for the country), *construir Catalunya* (construct Catalonia) are illustrative examples of it. The researcher's translation.
- 8 Unlike Gellner, Smith describes nationalist manifestations and also the existence of nations before industrial societies (1991: 43-70).
- 9 In Kellas' attempt to draw an integrated theory of nationalism and ethnicity, the author insists that instinctive human behaviour, in-group/out-group hostility and language division are the three essential explanations for the 'emotional appeal' and 'the virulence of ethnocentrism' (1991: 162).
- 10 The coming and going of foreigners in our territory, made us incongruent and paradoxical. We are the result of different seeds and therefore, we are culturally and biologically mongrels'. The researcher's translation.
- 11 The researcher's translation.
- 12 Among other relevant essays, of particular notice is Trevor-Roper's where he reveals that the origin of the Scottish kilt, the tartan Clan and the Ossian mythical poems in Gaelic were forgeries and falsification by a few enthusiastic Scottish intellectuals of the late nineteenth century (1983). In Catalonia, a comprehensive account of the Catalan traditions, folklore and habits entitled *Costumari Català* was gathered by Joan Amades in 1950.
- 13 Also, see the essays edited by Gella (1976) where the relation of the intellectuals and the *intelligentsia* to the historic processes of their nations is examined particularly in Eastern European countries. Further theoretical reflections on the role of the intellectuals and the mass media are discussed in *Els Intel.lectuals i els Mitjans de Comunicació* by AA.VV (1992).
- 14 For the development of this argument, see Schlesinger (1992: 17-18) where he stresses the current confrontation between Muslim countries and Christendom.
- 15 The term 'normalisation' is widely used in Catalan politics. 'Normalisation' is the project to return the Catalan language its status of full use. This term is further explained in the next chapter as part of the communication strategies of the Catalan mass media.

16 Franco's regime promoted mass migration from poor 'low' social backgrounds of deprived rural areas to Catalonia and the Basque Country, the most industrialised zones of Spain, where the industrial modernisation was in progress. Apart from economic reasons, the aim of this policy was to neutralise these historic nations by bringing in 'human (cultural) input' from the Spanish culture.

17 On Catalan history, see Soldevila (1963). In relation to the quote just cited, it is worth noticing that Barcelona was since the thirteenth century the centre of the country. 'If Catalonia was the centre of the Catalan domains, Barcelona was the centre of Catalonia. It was its spirit and its guidance, *el Cap i Casal*.' (Soldevila, 1974: 107). The researcher's translation. The structure of the Catalan culture is historically based, on the one hand, on rural lifestyle and on the other hand, on the urban life of the capital, which was the site of most Catalan institutions since the Middle Ages.

18 In the 1970s, the cultural discourse embraced economic and political dimensions. The revival of the Scottish National Party (SNP) reflected the collapse of the indigenous industry and strengthened its perspectives along with the economic plus of North Sea oil. However, the Unionist ideology in Scotland - conservative alliance with Britain - did not let nationalism take off. For an illuminating discussion on the socio-economic structure of Scotland over the century, see McCrone (1992) and Nairn (1976).

19 For further development of the role of the intellectuals in the Catalan cultural identity formation, see Soldevila in relation to medieval times (1974) and Flaquer and Giner on today (1991).

20 Jordi Pujol's books (1976; 1979) are a good insight into the nationalist project in Catalonia when nationalist parties were still struggling for power.

21 In relation to the role of sport and national identity, Scotland and Catalonia present similar features. The Scottish national teams represent the national pride of the Scots through encounters against the English and other nations. In Catalonia, the role of Barcelona F.C. is crucial to the reaffirmation of the Catalan identity. Blain, Boyle and O'Donnell (1993: 170-82) analyse the media discourse in relation to sporting events and interestingly, they look at the national rivalry between on the one hand, Scotland and Britain, and on the other, Catalonia and Spain during the Barcelona'92 Olympic Games' press coverage. For an insight into the Catalan identity and football, see Puyal and Serrano (1991: 53-74).

22 See Harvie for an in-depth analysis of the role of the Scottish intellectuals (1994: 79-111).

23 The relevance of 'clans' to the Scottish identity is underlined by works such as James Logan's *The Clans of the Scottish Highlands* (Logan, 1845). Daiches argues that in Scotland 'modern clan societies which lay more stress on surnames than their ancestors did, try to keep alive some of the pride and friendship of a kin-based society, and help to unite those of Highland descent throughout the world' (1993: 51-2). Comprehensive literature exists inspired by Scottish rural life (McCrone, 1989: 171-2, 1992; McCreadie, 1991: 39-46).

It is worthy of note the following quote by Ivor Brown from his foreword to an edition of Lewis Grassie Gibbon's *Sunset Song*, a masterpiece of Scottish literature of the 1930s: 'There the Scottish peasants appear in all their roughness and coarseness as well as their humour and their honour, just as the land itself appears in all its grudging and grinding dominion over labouring flesh as well as in the shimmering beauty of the Mearns upon a summer's day and the foison of earth well dunged and well cropped by Scottish skill and endurance' (1973: xi).

Dodgshon's work (1981) on the significance of rural life in Scotland throughout the centuries may expand on this issue. An interesting study about how folklore represents the character of its people was written by J. Clark Murray (1874: 168-197).

24 For further development of the significance of the Catalan character in relation to their national identity, see Vicens i Vives in Flaquer i Giner (1991). Also, Ferrater Mora, J. *Les formes de la vida catalana*, Barcelona: Selecta, 1944 (1972), and in Flaquer i Giner (1991: 28-47). For an up-to-date understanding of *el Pactisme*, see Rigol (1982: 187-216).

25 Of particular notice are the analysis of the press by Parés (1984) and Casasús (1987).

26 Serrano notices that any symbolic message - verbal or not - is to some extent ideological, both in its production and consumption processes (1979: 162). The interpretation of the ideological motifs of a specific cultural good is subjective, but identifiable, in spite of the linguistic code being used. That is why in Catalonia the interpretation of signs and symbols is often matter of public controversy.

27 *La Renaixença* was a Catalan cultural movement of the XIXth. century which fought for the recovery of Catalan identity through literature, music and journalism.

28 The development of these arguments are pursued in the next chapter.

29 Information released by Simon Forrest from STV revealed that the company is being forced to abandon home-produced projects because they are financially untenable without being networked across Britain (10-3-93, seminar presentation at Stirling University on future prospects of television in Scotland).

30 Cultural identity in relation to the media is extensively explored by Parés i Maicas (1988a, 1988b, 1992, in AA.VV, 1992).

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- 31 In his article 'Europe's Contradictory Communicative Space' (1994), Schlesinger examines the problems of a European communicative space and the complex process of building a European 'public sphere' in today's broadcasting scene. On this question, his viewpoints are also pessimistic.
- 32 See previous section for Salvador Giner's definition of 'civil society'.
- 33 For a comprehensive discussion of Habermas' views on the political changes of the public sphere, see 1989, Ch. 6.
- 34 Melucci sees the public spheres as spaces of representation where social actors have (but maybe are given) the chance to communicate and express themselves. However, this chance is frequently constrained by political and economic means. With regard to this, Melucci's distinction between on the one hand, individuals, collective movements and society as producers of cultural and symbolic codes, and on the other hand, political and economic power (1990: 56), is critically reviewed by Bartholomew and Mayer (1992).
- 35 The researcher's translation.
- 36 For an analysis of the significance of quiz-shows in modern times, see Cazeneuve (1977). He argues that the success of game-shows relies upon their capacity to provide home audiences with ways of escapism. As we will see, in audience discussion programmes, the choice of issues somewhat reflects this intention. This is confirmed by Fiske, whose study on quiz-shows and female audiences and participants also points towards this assumption (1990).
- 37 In the appendices of both case studies, the lists of topics debated by *La Vida en un Xip* and *Scottish Women* are included. A quick view of their thematic classification reveals that the main focuses are social management and availability of resources - health, security, money and taxes, leisure industry - and issues concerning private life - sex, relationships, family.
- 38 The concept of 'common sense' is discussed in relation to the *La Vida en un Xip* case study, since this was the core behind the editorial strategy of the show.
- 39 For the response of the British audience to quiz-shows, see Gunter (1986: 21). Further analysis on this genre is in Potter (1990) and Lambret (1980).
- 40 For a detailed research on these shows, see Livingstone and Lunt (1994).
- 41 For a perspective on this issue, see Helen Fielding's article 'Can TV ruin your life?' (*Independent on Sunday*, 17-7-94). Her professional viewpoint confirms the researcher's position.

CHAPTER 2

Television in Scotland and Catalonia

An overview of their respective broadcasting contexts

2.1 Introduction

The previous pages presented the political and cultural structures of Scotland and Catalonia and discussed the role of mass media in (re)constructing cultural identity in both contexts. The two case studies in this thesis, *Scottish Women* and *La Vida en un Xip*, were framed within the concepts of audience participation and democracy in television. These two audience discussion programmes were determined and, to some extent, shaped by the media institutions of their respective states, since both Scottish and Catalan audio-visual industries are, as we will shortly see, ultimately dependent on the structures of the media at the state level.

Moreno (1986) and Brand (1985) compared both stateless nations in relation to their similar aspirations of political autonomy. Both authors credit Scottish and Catalan popular cultures with an important role in maintaining their distinctiveness from the state cultures. As argued earlier, an independent media structure helps to reaffirm and keep alive such distinctiveness.

Up until now, neither a cultural, nor a political comparative approach to their respective media has been attempted to identify if any patterns of these 'popular cultures' show through television and influence production processes. This project was designed to provide cultural and media studies with some findings in this field. Subsequent chapters will analyse the debates *Scottish Women* (STV, 1987-1993) and *La Vida en un Xip* (TV3, 1989-1992) with regard to these questions.

The connections between Scotland and Catalonia emerge at different levels: (i) their macro-political context in a changing Western Europe, (ii) development of certain degrees of political autonomy and nationalistic claims, (iii) distinctive cultures, and, most of all (iv) particular broadcasting structures. This comparative approach carries some methodological difficulties to which the next chapter pays attention. However, the analysis of these dimensions presents differences and similarities which warrant analysis.

This chapter describes the Scottish and Catalan broadcasting institutions and establishes the contexts in which programme-makers work. *Scottish Women* was broadcast by the Glasgow-based independent company Scottish Television (STV) and *La Vida en un Xip* by TV3 - the first public channel of the Catalan public broadcasting service, *Corporació Catalana de Ràdio i Televisió* (CCRTV).

Both broadcasters operate within two wider frameworks: the British and Spanish systems, and the European Community regulations.¹ A systematic approach to both the Scottish and the Catalan mass media scenes is needed to understand the links between their televisions and the power structure of their respective states. A brief summary of the recent history and the current regulation of the British and the Spanish broadcasting systems is therefore provided.

This work also shows the relationship between broadcasters and independent companies in both contexts. The Edinburgh-based Skyline Productions produced three series of *Scottish Women* and the Catalan *Disseny i Comunicadors per als Mass Media* (DCo. S.A.) designed and produced *La Vida en un Xip*. The following pages illustrate the aforementioned audience discussion programmes within their respective national, state and European contexts.

Two initial considerations

Two significant remarks must be made with concern to the literature review of this chapter. Firstly, the Scottish and Catalan accounts of their respective media structures show an unbalanced situation. Whereas the account of the Catalan mass media presents a systematic up-to-date approach by both public institutions and private research publications, the Scottish broadcasting scene needs to be extracted from studies of the British system.²

The second remark concerns media studies in Western Europe. There are several recent comparative works that try to define a common background to all European countries in terms of regulation, business, funding, control structures and programming policies.³ These comparative lines of research show a wish to put together an overview of 'a' European broadcasting structure both to face competition from foreign corporations, and, also to build a sense of European broadcasting space, within the general development of 'Europeanness' now occurring. In the last part of this chapter, these questions are reviewed in relation to small broadcasters in Europe.

2.2 Broadcast television in the United Kingdom

The history of the British broadcasting system is one of balance and control between public and commercial institutions.⁴ However, as argued below, the developments at the end of the twentieth century seem to forecast the break-up of this balance and the start of a more competitive popular era in British broadcasting.

The British broadcasting debate in the nineties

The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), established by Royal Charter in 1927, spread a pattern of public service in Europe and all over its old colonies. Today, the

Corporation has five national networks and 39 local radio stations, two TV channels, 23,000 employees and a World Broadcasting Service.

Nowadays, the future of the BBC depends upon the new approach to its programming policies according to the changing scenario of British broadcasting. Along with the future of its public service principles, another of the BBC's concerns is its funding. The 'licence fee' - every British household with a TV receiver pays an annual tax to fund the public service - seems no longer sufficient to sustain the BBC finances. However, both the British government and the BBC support the continuity of this system as the main funding source of the organisation.⁵ Neither advertising, nor sponsorship are considered appropriate methods of contributing to its monetary requirements as they could compromise the BBC's independence.

In the early fifties a strong commercial sector started developing side by side with the BBC. The 1990 Broadcasting Act established a fully competitive independent television (ITV) system commencing in January 1993. The fifteen enfranchised ITV companies will broadcast in their respective areas for a minimum period of ten years and will compete for advertising revenues and commissioning for the ITV network. The new Independent Television Commission (ITC), which replaced the former Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA), was established to issue franchises to those who wished to broadcast on the ITV network, and then regulate them.

The expansion of satellite channels could be seen as a threat to the ITV business since satellite is not subject to the same quotas for regional programming and imports. Some revision of the 1990 Broadcasting Act is being considered to modify the ITV ownership rules.⁶ Also, the BBC needs to rethink its role as the 'cornerstone' of the British broadcasting service, so called by the Peacock Committee. Some key historical events need to be taken heed of to understand why these changes are likely to occur.

Public vs. commercial television, an efficient match

BBC television was a monopoly from its experimental transmission in 1936 until 1955, when the commercial Independent Television (ITV) was launched and the duopoly between the two was created. In these early fifties, the ITV system had little in common with today's Western commercial television. Despite being privately owned, the ITV system had and still has many public service requirements which are legally established and carefully controlled, as is argued later. The Independent Television Act of 1954 strictly legislated in matters concerning sex and decency, and established a quota of 14% of imports - which the BBC also respected. Both channels maintained a fine equilibrium between audience shares and programming policies.

This competition increased quality and diversity, which developed further when the Pilkington Committee recommended that a second public channel should provide for specialised and minority interests - BBC 2 (1964). With the same aim, the Broadcasting Act of 1980 set up Channel 4 and the Welsh Fourth Channel S4C (1982).

Today, two public and two commercial channels provide British people with programmes that arguably cover the overall range of their TV needs. Satellite and cable might progressively play an increasing role, although, as mentioned earlier, their audience share is still small.

The break-up of the duopoly

Nowadays, it would be naïve to speak of a duopoly in British broadcasting. The major shift came with the Peacock Committee and the Conservative policies of the Thatcher government that increased competition in the media business. The Peacock report (1985-86) criticised the 'comfortable duopoly' that the BBC and the IBA had enjoyed for nearly thirty years.

The Peacock committee recommended that the British broadcasting system should move towards a consumer sovereignty philosophy. Offer and quality should be regulated by

the taste and demands of the audience, rather than by broadcasters and programming policies. As a result of the Peacock report, some recommendations were legally adopted in the 1990 Broadcasting Act.

By 1996 a new Charter and Licence will re-regulate the BBC and rethink the role of the British public broadcasting service. It is soon to predict the effects that the new broadcasting rules may have as far as programming policies and audience behaviour are concerned. Nevertheless, British broadcasting can be seen as walking towards a major deregulation of the ITV system to allow fair competition with international satellite broadcasters. Also, a rather debilitated public service seems likely to fit in the picture.

The role of independent producers

Over the last two decades independent producers have become the third broadcasting force not only in the British panorama, but in the rest of Europe. The European Community protected independents through the EC 1989 Directive by establishing that a minimum 10% of transmission time of each TV schedule should be provided by European independent producers. The European quota was already being observed by British broadcasters, since both ITV companies and the BBC commission independents to produce up to 25% of their respective products.

In Britain, the 1990 Act distinguishes between full-time publishers represented by broadcasters, and the independent sector, which should get commissions from the former. The British independent sector has two functions: to mediate between big corporations and audiences by setting up small specialised companies, and to provide quality and diversity through flexible production schemes avoiding the complexities of the big corporate structures (Robins and Cornford, 1992: 190-204). The boost to independent production was especially noticeable from the launch of Channel 4. Nowadays, there are more than eight-hundred British companies in this business associated under PACT to protect their trading.

Independent producers, though, are relatively 'independent'. Small companies need to prearrange their sales in order to finance their products beforehand. Broadcasters offer to cover the costs if they retain exclusive transmission rights. Only a few big independent producers can avoid being financially tied up by broadcasters. Moreover, the new competitive dynamics of the British market is unlikely to favour independent production: broadcasters need high audience profile programmes at low cost; the economies of scale required for this are unsuitable for independent companies.

In Scotland, the panorama is similar on a smaller scale. Companies such Skyline Productions depend to a great extent upon the so called full-time publishers, either Scottish or nationwide. In this context, David Kemp, managing director of the Glasgow-based Hyndland TV, argues that the remoteness of the commissioning process damages the opportunities of the Scottish producers.⁷ By contrast, in Catalonia, the independents match the broadcasters because the audio-visual business is younger and, due to the linguistic barrier, less oriented towards external markets, *i.e.*, Spain and Europe.

The British watchdogs

A distinctive characteristic of the British system, which happens to be one of the main differences with Spain, is the control over broadcasting through external bodies. These institutions, independent from broadcasters and politicians, are entitled to keep an eye on programming policies and broadcasting developments. Although their existence does not guarantee in itself the capacity to modify programming criteria and/or the decision-making of broadcasters, their role is worthy of note.

The Queen-in-Council advised by the Government appoints the twelve members of the BBC Board of Governors, 'who are drawn from a variety of social and professional backgrounds' and 'legally constitute the BBC'.⁸ Among other functions, they appoint the director-general and other senior staff and they are ultimately responsible for maintaining programme standards. At present, the question of whether the governors should intervene in managerial affairs or maintain distance from the day-to-day functioning of the

BBC is one of continuing controversy. One of the Governors is the National Governor for Scotland, who at the same time is the Chairman of the National Broadcasting Council for Scotland.

The independent television sector, terrestrial and cable, is under the ITC's control as established in the 1990 Broadcasting Act. The ITC was conceived as a licensing body rather than a broadcasting authority. Its main functions are to supervise programming policies - rather than supply or promote them as the former Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) did - and impose financial penalties if required.

The first task of the ITC was to enfranchise the commercial television companies which would bid to win the right to broadcast in the fifteen ITV regions. The ITC through its power of assessing the 'quality threshold' took into account a set of programming requirements to decide which companies should obtain the licence (Blumler, 1992: 71-72). The winners would fully compete to get advertising revenues and also make profits out of commissions for the network. The ITC regulations require that at least 80% of the local programmes in each of the fifteen areas must be locally produced. The enfranchising process was completed in Autumn 1991.⁹

The winning companies of the three Scottish franchises are Scottish Television (STV) in central Scotland, Grampian Television in Aberdeen and the north of Scotland, and Border Television, in the south-west of Scotland and reaching slightly over the border with England in Cumbria. From January 1993, the new ITV Network Centre has had responsibility for commissioning and scheduling programmes across the fifteen companies. The three Scottish companies thus compete for advertising revenues and commissions with the rest of the ITV broadcasters to keep their respective franchises after the turn of the century.

A new statutory body with jurisdiction over the BBC and the commercial channels was created by the same 1990 Act, the Broadcasting Standards Council. This institution

watches the content of TV and radio programmes, mainly over the treatment of sex and violence and questions of taste and decency. Reports on the audience's complaints and research works are published regularly. Similar tasks were already being developed by the British Complaints Commission, established by the 1980 Broadcasting Act (Curran and Seaton, 1991: 355; Tunstall, 1983: 269-70).

Both the Broadcasting Standards Council and the Broadcasting Complaints Commission are the watchdogs of the British system to regulate questions of content as well as keep on eye on the balance of quality and diversity, as far as the regions, minorities, children and specific interests are concerned. It seems clear that the 1990 Broadcasting Act provided the British system with a deregulated business frame, but established re-regulatory measures to observe the programming standards and the public interest.

2.2.1 British audience and programming policies

The British television channels share the audience as follows: BBC 1, 34%; ITV, 42%, BBC 2, 10% and Channel 4/S4C, 10% (1991-1992).¹⁰ Channels provided through British Sky Broadcasting satellite (BSkyB) and cable registered only 4%, although satellite competition already concerns independent producers.¹¹ Still, even in the multi-channel households, satellite and cable are no match for the four traditional channels. Nowadays, for both only terrestrially equipped and also multi-channel homes, programme consumption shows fairly similar profiles.¹²

In 1991, each Briton spent a weekly average viewing TV of 26 hours and 19 minutes; within this period, British viewers watched 11 hours and 35 minutes of public service. Overall, the audience shares still maintain a fine equilibrium in both general programming (BBC 1 and ITV) and specific interests (BBC 2 and Channel 4). However, whereas BBC 2 and Channel 4 match one another, ITV is gradually getting higher ratings than BBC 1.

The furious competition among the ITV companies pushes their programming strategies towards more popular output.¹³ At the same time, the BBC seems to be redefining its service to provide for a wide range of specialised audiences. Such distinctive policies will gradually break up the equilibrium between public and commercial consumption and change the parameters of their competition. At present, it is unpredictable how the spread of satellite and cable channels will also affect terrestrial television.

In their recent document *Extending Choice*, the BBC's chairman Marmaduke Hussey and director-general John Birt argued that the Corporation was to pursue its public service philosophy by 'making sure that every kind of voice, every kind of conviction, every shade of political opinion, every type of artistic expression, is captured on the BBC.'¹⁴ Following such priorities, the BBC faces a paradoxical task if it is still to keep up its competitive public service with the ITV network.

Up until today private and public terrestrial channels have also maintained a balance in genre production. In other countries, such as Spain, commercial channels schedule higher amounts of imported fiction and light entertainment and a smaller percentage of news and current affairs than public television. In Britain, approximately 40% of the output of both the BBC and the two commercial channels offers news, current affairs and documentaries of all sorts.¹⁵ Fiction - films, TV series and drama - covered around 25% of the four terrestrial channels, and light entertainment only 20%. However, it is argued, these percentages are likely to change with the increase of popular programming.

As far as the audience's preferences are concerned, British taste is inclined towards fiction rather than light entertainment.¹⁶ The British preference for home soap operas has not changed over the decades. *Eastenders* (BBC1) and the Granada production *Coronation Street* (ITV) regularly get around 20 million viewers each.¹⁷ The success of the Australian soap, *Neighbours* (BBC 1) is also remarkable. The predilection for soaps and drama series is shared to a lesser extent by Spaniards, who tend to watch their own

talk-shows and light entertainment programmes, along with American films and comedy (Tubella, 1992: 38-40).¹⁸

British viewers enjoy fiction. Being the most expensive genre to produce, American films and, to a lesser extent, European drama co-productions make up most of the British imports.¹⁹ The 1990 Broadcasting Act establishes that a minimum quota of 80% peak-time programming must be British or European production, to limit the broadcasting of non-European programmes and encourage the production of British drama, which is strong *per se* compared, for instance, to Spain.

Scotland is an inherent part of the broadcasting context described above. The Scottish mass media do not constitute an independent system themselves. Their businesses are directly and indirectly pushed to remain tied to London. The following pages explore the scope of the Scottish media, particularly focusing on television.

2.2.2 The Scottish mass media

Scotland developed its own mass media side by side with the UK national media. The dependence of Scottish broadcasting on the south follows from the political subordination to London. Arguably, the Scottish mass media can not be considered a 'system' because regulations, budgets and policies are mainly decided south of the border.²⁰ Thus, whether the Scottish mass media reflect the political and cultural distinctiveness of the country is a questionable issue. The analysis of *Scottish Women* aims to provide some clues on this subject.

2.2.2.1 Broadcasting in Scotland

Scottish broadcasting is tightly linked to the British scene. Overall, the system described in previous pages applies to Scottish broadcasters, as well as in Northern Ireland, Wales and the English regions. However, the Scottish status as a 'national region', so called in

the Charter of the BBC, provides it with distinctive institutions to protect its identity and to a certain extent, exercise a degree of control over its programmes.

As far as the public service is concerned, the National Broadcasting Council for Scotland, established in 1953, shares responsibility for the public service with the Board of Governors: 'The main function of the Broadcasting Councils is to control the policy and content of BBC radio and television programmes, which are provided primarily for the national regions, taking into account the distinctive culture, language, interests and tastes of their people'.²¹

The three commercial broadcasters - Scottish Television (STV), Grampian TV and Border TV - are regulated by the Independent Television Commission (ITC). The Radio Authority deals with commercial radio and Independent Local Radio stations (ILR) in Scotland.

2.2.2.2 Structure of television in Scotland

Television - public and commercial - has experienced no significant changes since the three independent companies started competing with BBC Television Scotland. Overall, the Scottish television stations were and are constrained by businesses south of the border. Moreover, the process of deregulation of British public broadcasting and the increase of commercial competitiveness will only produce further steps in this direction. Given these conditions, it is hard to believe that the future legislation of British broadcasting will favour the cultural representation of British minorities.

BBC Television Scotland

The Charter of the BBC regards Scotland as a 'national region', as well as Wales and Northern Ireland, whereas England is divided into three 'regions', North, Midlands and East & South. BBC Scotland provides radio and television throughout the country.

Milne (1970) points out that broadcasting in Scotland had a stronger potential before the arrival of television. From then on, television resources were mainly concentrated and/or managed in London. After a short boost to BBC television in Scotland in the fifties, developments became arduous. Despite the recommendations of the Beveridge (1952) and Pilkington (1960) Committees to increase the production of the 'national regions', financial cuts, small budgets, control and restrictions over staff and technical facilities curbed development plans.

In his recent book, Alastair Hetherington, former Controller of BBC Scotland (1975-80), analyses the relationship between BBC Scotland and the London headquarters, which, as Janet Morgan put it, 'is a story of frustration'.²² In January 1977, Hetherington proposed to the BBC's director-general, Sir Charles Curran, to convert BBC Scotland into a directorate so that it could manage its own finances, albeit still subject to 'some central London procedures'.

He (Curran) told the governors that I had known 'for at least a year' that he was wholly opposed to any form of directorate. (...) The regions were not ultimately in control of their affairs in their own right. A directorate based in Scotland would, on the strictly centralist interpretation, have infringed upon the BBC's capacity to make decisions.

(Hetherington, 1992: 31-32)

Hetherington's proposals were refused. Today, the *status quo* in BBC Scotland depends upon London as much as it did in the late seventies. The current head of BBC TV Scotland, Colin Cameron, confirms this, although his views are more optimistic than Hetherington's:

Clearly, we are not the Scottish broadcasting corporation and we are part of the British Broadcasting Corporation. We will always struggle with London in determining our own purposes and our own identity. However, I think that it's better done through understanding and cooperation than through confrontation. I also think that the fact that I've got many years experience in London has actually

helped to improve Scotland's reputation in London and given us the opportunity to argue more coherently our distinctiveness.²³

The role of the person in charge of BBC Scotland is to adapt Scottish broadcasting needs to the limitations (budget, slots, genre) determined in London. As Cameron suggests, that is better achieved by someone who had designed these limitations himself.

According to 1992 data, BBC Scotland produced 600 hours of television opt-outs, including news and current affairs programmes, such as *Reporting Scotland*, *Left, Right and Centre*, *Focal Point* and *Scottish Lobby*. BBC Scotland annually produces around 250 hours of network TV. As far as the latter is concerned, Cameron argues that the priorities of BBC Scotland are drama, comedy, music and arts, acknowledging that London does not rely upon the regions to provide factual programmes. There is a criterion of subordination of peripheral production (national regions and the English areas) to the production of London headquarters.

BBC TV Scotland schedules its regional programmes across BBC 1 and BBC 2 providing 'limited opportunities', as Cameron admits, to choose slots.²⁴ BBC TV Scotland shares the Gaelic Television Fund with the independent companies to broadcast programming in the Gaelic language.

Scottish commercial television

The Scottish ITV broadcasters are institutionally more free than BBC Scotland, but financially constrained by the commercial pressures of the ITV Network Centre. From January 1993, the winners of the three ITV franchises in Scotland - Scottish Television (STV), Grampian TV and Border TV - have needed to compete more fiercely than ever to maintain their contracts. The ITC considered these three companies appropriate to provide their respective areas with a 'suitable range of regional programmes' as well as news and current affairs of national and international interest.

Scottish Television (STV), founded by Roy Thomson in October 1956, is overall the most profitable of the three, in both *regional* and network terms. STV and BBC TV Scotland compete for leadership in the Scottish viewing figures. However, audience ratings reveal that the new commercial policies of the nineties put STV far ahead of BBC.

According to the STV Annual Report of 1992, 'the STV share of viewing in Central Scotland matches the average for ITV, whereas BBC Scotland is under-performing markedly against the BBC's UK average' (STV, May 1993). 'STV was the most watched channel in Central Scotland with viewing levels 30% above those of the second most popular channel, BBC 1' (STV, 1993: 12).

The new ITC arrangements require ITV companies to compete for network commissions. It seems likely, thus, that Scottish programmes production will tend to increase south of the border, arguably at the expense of regional production exclusive to Scotland. The STV detective series *Taggart* already achieves a regular success among the first 25 programmes of the British Top 100. Other STV networked programmes in 1992 were the quiz-shows *Wheel of Fortune* and *Win, Lose or Draw*, both adapted from American formats.

In 1992, Scottish Television produced 795 hours of local production, to expand to 858 in 1993. Among the 795 hours of local production, the company commissioned 116 (14.5%) from independent companies based in Scotland. However, the percentage of production from independents was slightly higher in 1991 (126 hours, 19.3% (STV, 1991)). At the turn of the nineties, STV was strategically commissioning Scottish independent companies to demonstrate the wide scope of its output to the ITC during the franchising process. In line with this, the debate *Scottish Women*, originally produced in-house, was taken over by Skyline Productions in 1991 and taken back to in-house production in 1993. The details of this process are pursued later.

Finally, STV reports that in 1993 the company was commissioned to take up one-third of the funding by the Gaelic Television Committee. STV's Gaelic budget was mainly invested in the Gaelic soap-opera *Machair* (Cormack, 1994a: 122). Today, Gaelic programming seems to be prioritised by STV partially because half of the 65,000 Gaelic speakers live in its transmission area, and also because there is a Gaelic Television Budget to be spent (Cormack, 1993: 106; 1994b: 4).²⁵

Although the British system has centralised mechanisms to control Scottish broadcasting, the latter does not show strong resistance. The next section develops this argument.

2.2.2.3 The Scottish television industry 'goes south'

The British broadcasting system is a centralised and carefully controlled one, specifically in terms of content and access to the media. Overall developments are devised in London. Today, there are three reasons to believe that *regional* programming is unlikely to increase: (i) commercial pressures caused by ITV dynamics, (ii) the threat of the multi-channel offer, and (iii) the historic centralised policies of the BBC. Scotland faces the same obstacles as any other broadcasting business outside London. Given this context, the new regulations and perspectives for both the Scottish commercial and private channels do not seem to leave much room for future manoeuvres towards higher levels of independence.²⁶

In financial and professional terms, the big share of the broadcasting pie is in London. Seventy per cent of British independent companies are based in London and the South-East. The goal of Scottish professionals is fairly similar to the goal of professionals from anywhere else in Britain: to work in or for London. Freelancers and small companies look for any available commissions to survive in this competitive market; larger companies look for large audiences and profitable projects. MacPherson argues that the independent sector of the film and television industry in Scotland has historically depended primarily upon the extension of the UK markets (1991: 374-378). The lack of

a distinctive Scottish language common to the majority of the Scots intensifies the drive to look south. The case study *Scottish Women* confirms this tendency both from the professionals' and the broadcasters' point of view.

As far as quality control and regulation are concerned, the Scottish public broadcasting service, that is, BBC TV Scotland and Radio, is controlled by the National Broadcasting Council for Scotland (NBCS). Kellas insists on the Scottish character of this body by emphasising the composition of its membership - the Church of Scotland, members of the educational establishment and local government. He also maintains that the NBCS shows a strong concern for the 'unity of the country' and the 'integrity of its national identity' (1990: 207). However, its independence and effectiveness is debatable, since they share responsibilities with the BBC Board of Governors.²⁷ The Broadcasting Standards Council (covering all broadcasters) and the Independent Television Commission (ITV companies and C4) exercise their jurisdiction over Scotland as well as the rest of the country.

2.2.2.4 Parochialism vs. distinctiveness

Both commercial and public television channels aim to reflect Scottish distinctiveness without portraying a parochial or narrow-minded image of Scotland.²⁸ BBC Scotland has this ambition both in the network and in its Scottish output: 'to use the network to reflect in some ways Scotland in the UK and (...) here to put money in projects that we can really afford to make and schedule well.'²⁹ STV proposes a more radical approach to the Scottish image of its service:

In 1993 the challenge in Central Scotland is to launch, market and brand the expanded Scottish Television service as singularly 'Scottish'. While fragmentation of audiences is inevitable as channels multiply, our 'Scottishness' will be deployed to defend our share of commercial television advertising revenue in the years ahead.

(Gus McDonald, Managing Director of STV, STV, 1993: 9)

As it will be shown below, the transition of *Scottish Women* from current affairs to light entertainment reflects both a trend towards popular programme-making and the intention of defining a strong boundary between Scottish and UK production.

The 'Scottishness' shows in programmes that reaffirm *the differences*. In terms of content, that means specific programmes on Scottish education, the Church and the Scottish judiciary, documentaries on Scottish history, and last but not least, the transmission of national sporting encounters. Hetherington emphasises the role of religion and sport in reinforcing the Scottish identity in BBC Scotland's policy (1992: 69).³⁰

The lack of self-government and the dependence on the Westminster Parliament place London as 'the' point of reference for any news and current affairs coverage. Scottish politicians represent the interests of their constituencies in London, where most decisions are taken. The Scottish Office is the executive delegation of the British cabinet in Scotland and media reports on Scottish matters show this subordination. The lack of legislative power pushes media coverage south of the border. Proposals by the Conservative government in the mid-nineties envisage an increase of legislative power of the Scottish Grand Committee, which could partially cut the dependence of Scotland on London.

Nevertheless, this dependence is more explicit on news and current affairs than in other genres. Undoubtedly, the former is a primary output of regional programming, inasmuch as it requires a closer look at the concerns of small communities. For instance, before and after the General Election of 1991, issues of nationalism, independence and devolution became topical in Scotland and television reflected them -*Scottish Parliamentary Question Time* (STV) or *Left, Right and Centre* (BBC TV Scotland) were significant examples. However, such programmes do not faithfully mirror how

distinctive their people may feel, but rather how institutions operate and relate to wider contexts.

Exploring other genres reveals that the Scottish character and identity is not only difficult to express, but to define.³¹ Fiction, talk-shows, game-shows, debates, children's programmes generally seek to represent and satisfy the general public's interests and needs. Therefore, such genres are more sensitive to the cultural identity of the Scottish people - their lifestyle - than factual programmes. The *Scottish Women* case study shows the approach of media professionals to issues of cultural identity in television.

From the South's viewpoint, Scottish distinctiveness is also a matter to be considered and wisely treated. A revealing example is provided by Section 67 of the BBC Guidelines for Factual Programmes (London: BBC, 1989):

Programmes, especially those made in a hurry, sometimes offend viewers and listeners in Scotland because they show a lack of awareness of Scottish differences, or conversely because they treat Scotland differently from England when they should not. (...) In government and in other ways Scotland is often different. The Scottish Office has wide responsibilities. (...) Scottish sport is well worth separate attention. It is nearly always independent of English arrangements and it is a source of nationalistic pride which deserves to be recognised.

It is noteworthy that the emphasis is on 'lack of awareness'. The warning by the BBC to its professionals can prevent the agitation of the turbulent waters of the north. The need for writing down the advice just cited illustrates once more the overall control from London headquarters.³²

The parallel evolution of BBC Scotland and STV show that the lack of awareness is not only a matter of political misrepresentation. The Scottish producers want to be present in the British ratings and participate in the business south of the border (MacPherson, 1991). The new media panorama only pushes further in that direction.

The Gaelic Television Fund

Finally, we shall report on the question of the Gaelic Television Fund as an outstanding support of the prior arguments.³³ In 1989, Gaelic broadcasting became a concrete political battle mainly due to the effectiveness of Gaelic lobbies in Westminster.³⁴ The government agreed that a special package of £9.5 million per annum (reduced to £8.7 million in 1993) would fund Gaelic television programmes. According to the provisions of the 1990 Broadcasting Act, the ITC appointed a committee to administer the Gaelic Television Fund.

The confidence that there was money to be invested encouraged the establishment of Gaelic production companies; public and commercial broadcasters competed to gain commissions (Cormack, 1993: 113). Among the latest productions, the soap-opera *Machair* (STV) located in the Isle of Lewis and the Gaelic educational series *Speaking Our Language* (STV) are worthy of note.

Despite the undeniable value of these developments, the Gaelic Television Fund should be seen as a political manoeuvre. Gaelic programmes are unlikely to reach majority targets since this language is spoken by less than 1.4% of the Scots. To this researcher, this financial injection into the Gaelic culture is a smoke-screen to calm down Scottish nationalism and demonstrate London's support for regional distinctiveness. However, as Cormack argues (1993), this policy could be a boomerang if other minority language communities in Britain claimed the same needs.

As argued in the preceding chapter, the Gaelic developments of the nineties reveal the lack of a common front in Scottish cultural matters. The boost to Gaelic programmes contrasts to the precarious situation of other Scottish shows. For instance, in June 1993 the ITV Network Centre questioned its commissioning of the soap-opera *Take the High Road*, since its production for local transmission was not financially viable. However, the popular campaign to save the Scottish soap might have changed the economic

argument of this issue into a political one.³⁵ In 1994, when these lines are written, *Take the High Road* is still running. Besides, STV schedules *Machair*, funded by the governmental package, at peak-time and with English subtitles. The financial logic behind such programming decisions shows that Scottish interests are fragmented and treated as such both in politics and in business.

It can be suggested that if financial resources such as the annual Gaelic broadcasting fund were invested towards increasing the potential of Scottish programming (more correspondents, better equipment, more mobile units), maybe the Scottish programmes would better serve the cultural needs of everyone living in Scotland. It should be up to the Scots to decide what percentage of their broadcasting budgets needs to be invested in Gaelic programmes, since Gaelic is an inherent part of their culture. However, when the British government agreed to fund Gaelic broadcasting, the Scottish broadcasters did not 'look a gift horse in the mouth' and welcomed the money.

The Scottish viewers' preferences

The previous sections presented a rather pessimistic view of television in Scotland. Indeed, there are constraints on the development of both BBC TV Scotland and STV, for which the British broadcasting structure seems quite responsible: (i) the trend of looking South, and (ii) the control over their programming policies, budgets, commissions and slots.

However, the Scottish viewers seem to appreciate the investment that such companies make in home production. The viewing ratings highlight the preference of the Scottish audiences for their own programmes. The audience figures also suggest that programmes made in Scotland and transmitted throughout Britain obtain better results at home than in the rest of the state (Wood, 1993: 5; Mitchell and MacDonald, 1992: 52-53). This is a strong argument to support domestic broadcasting, since, arguably, it

responds to the appeal and needs of its people to a greater extent than the rest of British opt-outs.

The organisation of British broadcasting corresponds to one of a unitary state. The evolution of the Scottish broadcasting system reflects this fact faithfully through the links it maintains at an institutional and business level with Britain as a whole. As the *Scottish Women* production study demonstrates, programmes are tightly linked to the structural characteristics of their broadcasting systems, and therefore, very much dependent on or controlled from the South. The Catalan broadcasting industry presents a remarkable contrast to the Scottish case.

2.3 Broadcast television in Spain

The public broadcasting monopolies in Britain and Spain were broken through distinctive processes. Both systems have public and commercial broadcasting services with a strong tendency towards competition and market strategies. Furthermore, in both state systems there have been processes of decentralisation due to the claims of historical national identities: in Britain, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and in Spain, the Basque Country, Galicia and Catalonia. However, as mentioned earlier, Britain is essentially a unitary state. By contrast, since the restoration of democracy, Spain constitutes to some extent a 'federation' of autonomous regions and nations.

2.3.1 Some key historical facts

Television in Spain developed without respect to freedom of information and opinion under the dictatorship of Francisco Franco. The first Spanish radio law was established before the Civil War (1936-1939), *Ley de la Radiodifusión de 1934*, and the first

national radio network was inaugurated in January 1939. Franco ensured that all broadcasting activities would be controlled by the Director General of Broadcasting, under the minister of National Education. In 1948, Barcelona was already the scene of the first TV demonstrations in Spain during the XVI International Exposition. However, the official inauguration of the public Spanish Television, *Televisión Española* (TVE), took place in Madrid in October 1956.

From then until Franco's death (November 1975), the Spanish public broadcasting corporation, *Radio Televisión Española* (RTVE) operated without democracy and with an explicit and centralised Spanish censorship system. RTVE was one of the dictatorship's apparatus with which to control public opinion and political order (Baget Herms, 1981: 45-95; Vázquez Montalbán quoted in Giró, 1990: 17).

It is only eighteen years since Spain returned to democracy. The whole country needed to be reorganised. The new *Constitución* of 1978 conceived Spain as a pluri-national state divided into Autonomous regions, *el Estado de las Autonomías*. Respect for all languages, cultures and minorities within its territory was also ensured.

The Autonomous Communities were entitled to develop their infrastructures further. Three historical nations voted in favour of home rule and started their respective self-governing processes: the Basque Country, Galicia and Catalonia; nowadays they have their own parliaments and governments, which, however, ultimately depend upon the central state. The new political structure also allowed the breaking of the RTVE monopoly by authorising the establishment of autonomous mass media systems. This happened in January 1983, when the first third channel, Euskal Telebista, started broadcasting in the Basque Country.

Therefore, it is not to be forgotten that Spain has had democratic mass media only since 1975, and it developed during a very delicate transitional period during which the legislators and political parties were very cautious, in order to avoid another military coup

that could put the fragile democracy in danger. To some extent, this explains the extremely centralised character of Spanish media law.

The Spanish state holds the title to any broadcasting service in Spain - public or commercial. In January 1980, a new broadcasting law was approved by the Parliament, *Estatuto de la Radio y la Televisión Españolas*, which established a set of centralising measures: staff appointed by the Government, Parliamentary Commissions to control broadcasting content, a national technical network under the RTVE's jurisdiction and the state as the official holder of any new radio or television stations. The *Estatuto* provides for the creation of new channels to compete with the national public service, RTVE (Villagrasa, 1992: 337-345).

2.3.2 Spanish television and its regulation

Democracy brought the break-up of the monopoly that the two national public channels of RTVE, TVE 1 and TVE 2, had held from 1956. The new third channels were public services for the Autonomous Communities, and, thus, limited to their geographical areas.

Surprisingly, as it was in a democratic country, both Euskal Telebista (Basque Country) and TV3 (Catalonia) started their respective transmissions before the *Ley del Tercer Canal* (December 1983) was passed by the Spanish Parliament. The Basque Country and Catalonia created their own broadcasting public corporations controlled by their own parliaments. Most communities legislated laws to regulate their autonomous media as deemed appropriate. From then on, the Spanish system has presented a politically and culturally divided playground between the central government and the autonomous structures.

Autonomous televisions

Between 1983 and 1993, nine channels were launched under the provisions of the Third Channel law with the same institutional structures as RTVE: an Administrative Council

(constituted by political parties represented according to their parliamentary composition), an Advisory Council (with representatives from significant social, cultural and civil organisations) and a director-general appointed by the government of each Community.

These channels, controlled and partially funded by their respective parliaments, are associated under the public body *Federación de Organismos de Radio y Televisión Autonómicos* (FORTA). FORTA established co-operation and exchanges among channels and a common policy on national and international deals. The main concern of FORTA was, and still is, to be accepted into the European Broadcasting Union (EBU). The Basques and the Catalans, major lobbying forces within it, have struggled to enter the EBU since the early eighties:

If you are not a member of the UER (European Broadcasting Union EBU), you can not have Eurovision images. Access or lack of it to Eurovision material is what distinguishes local television, a small business, almost parochial, from global television, national, an instrument of mass literacy.³⁶

The arrival of commercial channels

In May 1988, two new laws concerning broadcasting were approved by the Socialist government: one on private television, *Ley de la Televisión Privada* and the other on advertising, *Ley General de la Publicidad*. The former authorised the central government to licence three nationwide private channels. The law allows foreign investment up to 25%.

The arrival of commercial channels brought into the Spanish audio-visual market the presence of multi-media corporations, and also a tendency to monopoly of Spanish media ownership. Competition for audience shares increased dramatically when private television channels came onto the Spanish airways. The three private channels launched in 1989 were Tele 5, Antena 3 Televisión and Canal Plus, all partially owned by multi-media corporations.³⁷

With the new private channels, there are now five national channels - two public and three private - competing for advertising revenues and nationwide audience shares. Canal Plus is financed by subscriptions.

Funding

All public television channels in Spain are financed by a mixed system: their own resources (advertising revenues and sales of programmes) and public funding. Several forms of sponsorship are allowed, but no 'licence fee' system supports Spanish broadcasting. Both public or private service are entitled to broadcast commercials, although there are restrictions concerning time and slots.

Advertising regulations attempt to control commercials that can promote violence and sex, use of bad language, act against 'good taste' or encourage the habit of drinking (López-Escobar, 1992: 167-168). The same law limits the amount of advertising to ten minutes per hour of transmission. There are also legal provisions concerning political broadcasting during electoral campaigns.

Lack of external regulation

In the Spanish system, there are no mediators between the governments - central or autonomous - and the mass media. This lack of external regulatory bodies and the system of mixed funding - resources from commercials and public budgets - are the two main structural differences between the British and the Spanish media.

The Spanish broadcasting institutions are exposed to political intrusiveness. All political parties represented in Parliament are proportionally represented in the Administrative Council of RTVE. The government has the power to hire or fire the director-general. This political interference also applies to the Catalan situation (Giró, 1990; de Carreras, 1987; Parés *et al.*, 1981; Costa, 1990). There are some non-official viewers' associations, whose recommendations have little influence in policy making. Matters of

broadcasting are directly debated by MPs and controlled by governments, although overall there is little interference in content and programming policies.

Centralised media law

The complexity of the Spanish media law can be explained by two processes: the transition to democracy and the claims for devolution. Joan Granados, Director General of the *Corporació Catalana de Ràdio i Televisió* (CCRTV) remarks that recent media laws passed by the Spanish parliament fail to respect and preserve the plurinational nature of its state established by the *Constitución Española* of 1978.

Even within democracy, Spain carries the heritage of the old centralising mechanisms, and it is caught by a Jacobin vision of the state and a tendency to go against what it could be the complete and effective recovery of our identity.

(Joan Granados, Director General of CCRTV, 1993: 17)³⁸

The ambiguity of legal texts has been remarked on by de Carreras (1987, 1990) and by Álvarez Monzoncillo (1991); such ambiguity leads to regular friction between central and autonomous powers. When conflicts arise, both Constitutional and Autonomous Courts tend to admit that current legislation allows for different interpretations, which may lead to conflict between the political powers.

Given these circumstances, when television managers from central and autonomous channels negotiate their deals, they apply what in Catalan is called *política de fets consumats*, literally a policy of accomplished facts, but more easily stated as 'shoot first and ask later' (a remarkable contrast to the British manner). Decisions are made and projects are deliberately developed challenging legal constraints. The most noteworthy example was the launch of the Basque and the Catalan channels before legal approval (de Carreras, 1987; López-Escobar, 1992).

The technical network for all television channels within Spain is regulated by the public organism Retevisión controlled by RTVE. Retevisión, created in May 1989, embodies

RTVE (TVE 1 and TVE 2), all channels associated with FORTA and the three commercial stations. However, the Catalan government has recently been entitled to create its own organism which will regulate the Catalan technical network.

The new Satellite law (April 1993) has the same centralised character; RTVE has direct responsibility over the management and regulation of the four television channels that broadcast from the Spanish satellite HISPASAT. Apart from these four new channels, the Spanish Government proposes to allocate three satellite franchises to private companies.³⁹ Yet, there is no current legislation either for cable, or for local radio and television.⁴⁰

Some authors argue that the whole Spanish media law needs to be urgently reformed to clarify responsibilities and transfer power from the governments to the parliaments (Costa in Giró, 1990; de Carreras, 1990). It might be convenient for an external statutory body, such as in Britain, to be created to limit political interference and regulate programming policies. However, it has been argued that such an institution would not escape partisan lobbying due to the youthful stage of Spanish democracy (Fabregat, 1990; Costa, 1990; Gubern, 1992).

The creation of seven new channels has fragmented the audience. TVE 1, the first national public channel, lost its leadership in the audience ratings with the initial launch of the private channels Tele 5 and Antena 3 TV. Although the number of hours of TV available increased more than 90% in three years, the viewers only watched thirteen minutes more television in 1991 than in 1989. According to 1991 data provided by Fundesco (Díaz-Nosty, 1992: 7-9), the Spanish viewer spent a daily average of three hours and seven minutes watching television - 23 hours and 27 minutes per week, a slightly smaller weekly average than the British: 26 hours and 19 minutes.⁴¹

2.3.3 The media system in Catalonia

Catalonia is a nation within the Spanish state. As explained in the preceding chapter, the Catalans have a different political status within Spain than the Scots do within Britain. In 1979, a vote in favour of home rule, *Estatut d'Autonomia de Catalunya*, passed to the Catalan government the right to create and regulate its own mass media.

As mentioned earlier, Catalonia is almost entirely bilingual: up to 90% of the population understand Spanish and Catalan and 65% speak both fluently. The two languages are both officially recognised in all central and autonomous bodies. During Franco's regime, broadcasting services were in Spanish, although some Catalan programmes were transmitted in the late fifties. Local press and magazines in Catalan managed to survive censorship and have had a significant role in the day-to-day use of the Catalan language.⁴²

As far as broadcasting is concerned, since the approval of the *Estatut*, Catalonia has had its own public radio and television stations transmitting entirely in Catalan. The Catalan public broadcasting corporation, *Corporació Catalana de Ràdio i Televisió* (CCRTV) provides four different radio services, Catalunya Radio, RAC 105, Catalunya Informació and Catalunya Música. The public Spanish radio, RNE, has three national and one regional network. There are no private radio or television stations in Catalan. Most of the Spanish private radio networks are based in Catalonia (SER, COPE, Antena 3 Radio) and offer some regional programming.

2.3.3.1 Television in Catalonia

Up until the mid-seventies, the Catalan television scene mirrored the political climate described above. Then the development of new television services reflected a period of democratic enthusiasm and political reinforcement of Catalan cultural identity.⁴³

TVE Catalunya

In the early fifties, RTVE established a transmission centre in Miramar (Barcelona), which soon became the second production centre of RTVE. In 1959, twenty years after Franco's ban on the Catalan language, the first TV programme in Catalan was transmitted: the play *La Ferida Luminosa*. From then until 1967, the only Catalan output was *Teatro Catalan*, 31 Catalan plays. In the early seventies, a new wave of more enlightened politicians from the authoritarian regime allowed an increase of Catalan programming, including a regional news service, magazines (*Giravolt*, *Mare Nostrum*) and talk-shows (*Vostè Pregunta*).⁴⁴

Television in Catalan developed under serious constraints and conflicts. However, in 1983, when the Spanish Parliament had just passed the Third Channel law, TVE Catalunya (RTVE in Catalonia) was producing more than a hundred hours per month in Catalan from its new studios in Sant Cugat. Its contribution to Spain-wide programming also increased 53%. Soon, though, a competitor came along to match TVE Catalunya.

The Catalan autonomous channel: TV3

According to the Third Channel law 1983, the Catalan Parliament established the public entity CCRTV to broadcast through *Televisió de Catalunya* (TVC) and the three radio stations mentioned above. In January 1984, TVC's first channel, TV3, was officially launched during a delicate political climate between both central and autonomous powers; nevertheless, TV3 took off very quickly in the audience ratings (Giró, 1990: 53-60). At the beginning, TVE Catalunya tried to compete with TV3. However, the headquarters of RTVE in Madrid cut down investments and TVE Catalunya gradually took a step back in terms of the quality and quantity of programmes, which consequently favoured TV3's audience figures. From then on, TV3 took the lead in the public television service broadcast in Catalan. Ramon Fusté, former producer of TVE Catalunya and one of the first independent producers in Catalonia, explained this:

TVE Catalunya was no match for TV3, because TV3 managers are Catalans and TVE Catalunya executives are Spaniards. This is the only explanation. TVE Catalunya never existed. There was an intention during the first socialist government with Pere Fèlis (former director of TVE Catalunya) and he resigned because he felt that he was not understood in Madrid; TVE Catalunya is a production plant that could be in Cáceres (...). If the aim of someone is to be the director of TVE in Madrid, he can not work in Catalonia. And if you do, either you let them pressurise you, or you will not last long.⁴⁵

Nowadays, TVE Catalunya works as an experimental centre. First, new programmes are developed and scheduled for Catalan regional programming. Then, if the format proves a success in Catalonia, RTVE decides whether or not to schedule the programmes in Castilian through the nationwide TVE 1 or TVE 2 across Spain.

Linguistic boundaries

Among its legal requirements, the CCRTV must emphasise its Catalan linguistic policy, which is technically expressed as 'normalisation' - to improve the knowledge of Catalan through constant use of a standard dialect. Radio and television are instruments of linguistic diffusion and TV3 and its second channel Canal 33 (1989) have a heavy emphasis on own production and also on dubbing foreign imports.

The linguistic 'normalisation' is TVC's first priority. Such a process started when JR from *Dallas* cried to his mum from his bed in hospital: 'mare' ('mother' in Catalan). (...) We, the professionals working for TVC, think that we are lucky: working for TVC is to work for our country (Catalonia). The signal of TVC is a flag symbolising *the will of a people of existing through their language*.

(Jaume Ferrús, Managing Director of TVC; the researcher's emphasis)⁴⁶

Linguistic boundaries are crucial to the structure of television in Catalonia. Whereas in Scotland, viewers watch programmes mainly in English, whether produced in Scotland or south of the border, in Catalonia, viewers are partly influenced by their linguistic preferences. When TV3 (in Catalan) broke the monopoly of RTVE (TVE 1 and TVE 2 in

Spanish), the audience shares first showed that both public television services offered competitive general programming with targets slightly segmented by language.

In the early days of TV3, its managers felt that audiences were culturally divided and believed that TV3 would not penetrate into the Spanish immigrants' households, mainly in the peripheral urban areas of Barcelona. However, recent research studies carried out by CCRTV prove that this linguistic difference is breaking up.⁴⁷

Funding

As the state public service, CCRTV's capital comes from its own resources - revenues from advertising and sales of programmes - which represent almost 70% of its income (Villagrasa, 1992: 373). The rest is covered by a public budget endowed and controlled by the Catalan parliament.

2.3.3.2 Competition, audience and programming policies

Six years after the break-up of the RTVE monopoly by TV3, four new channels entered into competition: Canal 33 and the three commercial nationwide channels: Tele 5, Antena 3 Television and Canal Plus.

Although the second Catalan channel was not welcomed in Madrid, all the Catalan political parties supported the TVC's proposal for a new service. In 1989, Canal 33 was launched to serve minority interests (sport and cultural programmes), to portray cultural specificity from the *comarques*⁴⁸ and to fight with TV3 the unbalanced representation of television in Catalan that the three commercial channels in Spanish had brought.

Programming policies and audience taste

The Catalans have a wider terrestrial TV menu than the Scots: four public channels and three private, two entirely in Catalan and five in Spanish. The seven channels maintain fierce competition for advertising and audience shares which is unlikely to decline due to

the deregulated nature of the Spanish media business. TV3 and Canal 33, under threat from the increase of competition in Spanish, look for products that can keep up their audience ratings without neglecting their role as a public service. Peak-time is covered by home productions (game-shows, current affairs, drama and talk shows). However, South-American and British soap operas, such as *Eastenders* and *Coronation Street*, are dubbed into Catalan and beat other channels' programmes.

The main consequence of the launch of private television in Catalonia was the homogenisation of genres, slots and schedules, whether public or private services. Most channels produce home light entertainment and current affairs, while drama is mainly imported. Amongst the three commercial and the RTVE channels there is a tendency to import the popularly named *culebrones* - melodrama series generally from Venezuela, Brazil or Mexico.

Through FORTA, the third channels try to compete with national television by sharing imports and exchanging programmes. Arguably, the exchange of formats amongst the Third channels will gradually spread a pattern of portrayal of the autonomous regions' identities in relation to the state. Game-shows, talk-shows and debates, among other formats, reflect *images* of the communities which will progressively reinforce the identification of their peoples through the mass consumption of their popular cultures. Furthermore, FORTA tries to provide the autonomous audiences with programmes involving the participation of the audience such as the one analysed in this study (Peñafiel, 1990: 124).

The Catalan independent producers

The Catalan independent producers are young and have a limited market. According to the EC 1989 Directive, independent production should constitute 15% of TVC's programming, but unfortunately, Catalan independents are still too weak to meet this quota. Surprisingly, though, five years after the European parliament's approval of the EC Directive *Television without Frontiers*, the latter has not been passed yet by the

Spanish parliament. Ferrús argues that this Directive will favour TVC's interests since it increases the quota of home production and it restrains advertising pressure.

TVC, the main broadcaster, aims to promote the growth of small companies and to reduce its in-house production, with the exception of news, sports and current affairs, whose content is to be kept under public control. TVC aims to be able to choose from the proposals of independents to cover fiction, art, culture and entertainment.⁴⁹ However, this demand for Catalan producers emerged only in 1983 and the sector can not yet provide a wide choice.

In Catalonia, there are no data concerning the size and volume of the independent audio-visual sector.⁵⁰ By and large, TVC depends on a few companies for its peak-time production: DCo. S.A, Gestmusic S.A., Torrevisió S.L. and Sargantana Voladora S.L. The show-business group La Trinca owns Gestmusic, which produces mainly light entertainment and game-shows. Joaquim M. Puyal, responsible for most of DCo and Torrevisió's programmes, has created several topical oriented shows, talk-shows and quizzes. Sargantana Voladora is responsible for the peak-time humorous talk-show *Persones Humanes* produced and presented by Miquel Calzada i Olivella, 'Mikimoto'. Since the late eighties, these companies' products have been slotted into prime-time, regularly reaching the highest ratings of TV3 programming (de Carreras, 1987; Tubella, 1992).

At the beginning of this chapter, the preference of the Spanish audience for quiz-shows and light entertainment was mentioned in contrast to the British trend towards fiction and current affairs programmes. The taste of the Catalans and the Spaniards is also rather distinctive. Comparative ratings show that the former have a preference for current affairs and fiction - films, comedy and British and Brazilian soap-operas (Tubella, 1992), whereas the Spaniards watch more *culebrones* and game-shows, the latter also being popular amongst the Catalan audience.⁵¹

2.4 Small broadcasters on the European audio-visual scene

The analysis of the European broadcasting scene goes beyond the scope of this work. However, the continuous transformation of the media business in the international marketplace and the political discourse of a 'European audio-visual space' are two questions that small broadcasters such as STV and TVC, can not ignore.

On the one hand, changes occurring in the international audio-visual market have real consequences even at the level of small broadcasting structures. For instance, the managing director of TVC pointed out that the appearance of the fourth American nationwide broadcaster owned by Fox, had increased the competition amongst the USA's TV channels. Consequently, the pressure to obtain further benefits from exporting programmes to their neighbours, mainly European broadcasters, also increased. Thus, TVC has been pushed to buy its American imports at higher prices, since it cannot cover its audio-visual needs with home or European production.⁵² Similar movements in the international media business - such as mergers of transnational media corporations - may upset small broadcasters.

On the other hand, the 'European audio-visual space', although extensively debated by intellectuals (Mattelart *et al.*, 1984; Schlesinger, 1994; Venturelli, 1993; Paterson, 1993; Collins, 1993; Burgelman and Pauwels, 1992), does not seem to be a tangible reality for television broadcasters operating within it. The representation of 'Europeanness' is far from day-to-day media production. However, such a project is a political aim and cultures should start considering its influence in their respective identities. A 'European audio-visual space' should be built on a generous understanding of cultural diversity, and also on cautious regulatory measures of cultural production and trade within the European Union. Otherwise, the definition of a 'European audio-visual space' may lead to a struggle between the many small audio-visual spaces embraced by the EU. This section

pays particular attention to the European broadcasting scene with regard to its influence in the media of stateless nations.

Increase of television offer; decrease of cultural diversity

From the beginning of the eighties, the majority of Western European countries faced a transformation from the predominance of a public broadcasting monopoly to the quick emergence of multi-channel media.⁵³ This growth in channels has brought a more competitive market-based scenario which gradually leads to the fragmentation of the audience. Multi-channel distribution also increases the demand for television output, which, as argued above, neither the national broadcasters nor the independents can fulfil without imports despite public support for home productions.

In the mid-eighties, this demand was quickly satisfied by American and to a lesser extent Japanese corporations whose productions invaded the European TV schedules with cheap fiction. Their products are produced through economies of scale that the European industry is not capable of sustaining. Some authors have expressed their concern about the homogenising tendency of the European television schedules as well as the foreign 'colonisation' through drama, children's animated features and American shows.⁵⁴ As mentioned in the previous pages, both Scottish and Catalan television show the pressure of this increasing competition, which pushes their home production to the margin.

Broadcasting in small nations: foreign formats vs. cultural identity

There is a positive way to look at this adverse panorama. Broadcasters from small countries may find it challenging to combine the assimilation of foreign formats with the specificity of their own culture. This, it is believed, can be achieved without necessarily endangering cultural identities. Burgelman and Pauwels argue that 'to counteract this segmentation of the audience, broadcasters must elaborate a programme strategy targeted at the loyalty of a national public. To play the card of cultural identity, instead of imitating formulae of successful imports, seems to us the first step in the direction of a coherent and relevant cultural policy' (1992: 182). The key question is what should be

understood by 'playing the card of cultural identity'. The Scottish and Catalan broadcasting scenes presented above show that is not feasible for small broadcasters to lock themselves into their specific cultures ignoring the dynamics of media production elsewhere. Furthermore, adapting foreign formats is not as threatening as it may seem.

Scottish Women and *La Vida en un Xip* illustrate that television formats are skeletons that media professionals explore and accommodate to their audience's preferences. In relation to this, spoken word-based formulae are more likely to respect local cultural manners than imports which basically require to be translated into the local language - fiction and to a lesser extent game-shows. The danger of homogenisation hides, not behind the mechanics and set-up of television programmes, but behind the progressive (unacknowledged) settlement of values and attitudes from foreign cultures that such programmes may take in. It would be naïve to consider that this quiet but fundamental influence can not take place in quiz-shows, topical debates, talk-shows and other sorts of light entertainment. However, these formats allow broadcasters to counterbalance such an influence by reflecting the specificity of their cultures to a greater extent than imported fiction, since their means are based on local participants and content approached from home perspectives.

In relation to European home production, Burgelman and Pauwels are sceptical about the efficiency of small states to produce programmes capable of matching the standards of the dominant audio-visual offer:

We can summarize the situation of small states as follows: they have too limited a market and too meagre financial resources and possibilities of exploitation to be credible and profitable in a unified market. What results are amateurish, but costly productions on the one hand, and negligible distribution on the other.

(Burgelman and Pauwels, 1992: 175)⁵⁵

This statement is debatable. The budgets of home production in Europe are indeed poor compared to, for instance, the American budgets. Besides, the authors provide no

evidence to support the amateurism to which they refer as the consequence of this financial meagreness. Nonetheless, if public broadcasting services in these small countries are to protect their principles by financing innovation and quality in their broadcasting outputs, there is no reason to believe that their home production will be worthless. As far as the 'negligible distribution' is concerned, it is a risk to judge without examining specific cases. In Catalonia, for instance, several home-produced shows have been adapted by other Spanish broadcasters and this could be happening anywhere else in Europe in the near future. In Wales, the S4C's children's animated features *SuperTed* has passed over the British boundaries and conquered the international market.

Two different entities within Europe deal with the problems described above: stateless nations and states. The former have generally limited possibilities of protecting their audio-visual production since they are mainly state-regulated. But how do states confront the new broadcasting scenario?

Deregulation

In some countries, processes of deregulation, which Silj (1992a: 6-7; 1992b: 17-18) defines as the break-down of the broadcasting state monopoly, help to adapt broadcasting structures to this new era.⁵⁶ In Spain, deregulation developed when the provisions of the new law, *Estatuto de RTVE 1980*, broke the RTVE monopoly and opened up the path to the launch of the Spanish autonomous channels. In Britain, deregulatory policies in the 1990 Broadcasting Act developed conditions for a more competitive broadcasting system.

West European television will gradually witness the influence of satellite and cable reception in their terrestrial ratings. Both satellite and cable technologies contribute to increasing competition; their influence on audience shares, though, is still limited, as the British and Spanish cases demonstrate.

Re-regulation

Along with deregulatory policies, countries have established some forms of re-regulation to keep control over content and programming. Silj (1992a: 6-7; 1992b: 17-18) defines re-regulation as those rules imposed upon the new broadcasters to protect the public service. Re-regulation often involves restrictions upon imports from multi-media international corporations, whose products and formats tend to spread quickly and homogenise programming. In relation to this, the 1989 EC Directive and the recent agreements of the GATT in cultural and audio-visual matters show that there is a significant concern about safeguarding a European audio-visual market.⁵⁷ The question is whether such measures will also protect small communicative spaces or will leave them to the fierce competition to which deregulatory practices lead.

The role of external bodies also reflects re-regulatory practices. Examples of those are the British Independent Television Commission (ITC) and the Broadcasting Standards Council. In Spain, there are no independent external bodies that supervise the television output.

Crisis of Public Service Broadcasting?

The fundamental role of public service broadcasting as a guarantee for the rights of small cultural identities has already been discussed. Comparative studies show that overall no country is prepared to hand the control of the mass media to wider entities such as the European Community. Broadcasting is not entirely conceived as a business, although commercial pressures push in this direction. As well as being profitable products, programmes are still considered cultural goods (Hoffmann-Riem, 1992; Blumler and Hoffmann-Riem, 1992; Entman and Wildman, 1992; Silj, 1992b: 40-48).

The principles of public broadcasting services and the conception of the media as instruments of democratic societies are unlikely to be abandoned by governments and broadcasters. The British have made a remarkable effort to explicitly formulate those functions: (i) universal availability, (ii) reflection of national identity and sense of

community, (iii) provision for minorities, all interests and tastes, (iv) independence from the government, (v) competition for quality rather than audience size and (vi) liberating rather than restricting broadcasters.⁵⁸

To summarise: broadcasters of stateless nations in Europe juggle with the dynamics of a highly competitive and unfavourable international marketplace, and also with the psychological pressure of a potential supra-national cultural *imaginary*: Europe. Their legal and political frameworks are committed to the construction of such an *imaginary* and this tends to constrain and confuse the development of their already fragile cultural policies.

2.5 Conclusions

It has been argued that the history and current make-up of British and Spanish broadcasting explain the contrast between the Scottish and Catalan media productions. This contrast will be further explored in subsequent chapters, but it remains to make a number of points here.

First, due to the absence of linguistic barriers, Scottish professionals and projects are inclined to 'go south' and mimic UK programmes, whereas the Catalans - audience and professionals - remain, to some degree, loyal to their own media. Second, in Britain, producers and executives hold a high degree of control over the production process, content, budgets and access of the audience to programmes. The *Scottish Women* case study provides a prime example of this. By contrast, no similar control other than political intrusiveness constrains Spanish broadcasters.

The Scottish television can only be strengthened by walking side by side with developments in British industry. The dependence on London is likely to remain, unless constitutional change gives more power to the Scottish media institutions; nevertheless, any step towards devolution seems improbable with a Conservative government. Given the current *status quo*, it must seem an unfortunate paradox to the Scottish people that the strength of their audio-visual industry depends vitally upon a higher demand of commissions for the networks, which consequently reinforces dependency.

By contrast, the media institutions in Catalonia are protected by their own government and parliament. CCRTV seeks to build structural and legal frontiers between the Spanish and the Catalan management to protect the independence of their policies. The conflict of different cultural identities arises through linguistic boundaries, although the Catalan government does not intervene in any other cultural matter other than the protection of its language. It is, therefore, unlikely that an audio-visual framework integrating the different Catalan speaking areas will be formally and institutionally framed as proposed by Gifreu and Corominas (1991).

CCRTV, while subject to the EC advertising restrictions and pressurised by its Spanish competitors, manages to keep a reasonably successful audience share, even if it is at the expense of quality programming. The Catalan broadcasting service is unlikely to give up the power of communicating with its population in its own language, since the latter is the foundation of its development.

Both Scotland and Catalonia, nations within two European states, are tied to the legal and economic constraints of the EC regulations and exposed to the consequences that the European Union may create. The attractiveness of the competitive audio-visual business and the need to secure their positions in it, may push the Scottish and Catalan broadcasters to neglect (maybe unwillingly) the representation of their respective collective identities. However, considering the arguments expanded above, it seems reasonable to believe that such identities will not be given up easily.

Questions of national identity thus play an important role in defining the strategies of television producers in stateless nations. The first two chapters have explored these questions in relation to the Scottish and Catalan cases, including the state and EU broadcasting contexts. The following pages present an account of the research developed to provide some empirical findings in this field.

Notes

¹ The May 1989 European Directive established certain recommendations and constraints that affect programming policies and advertising schedules. References to it will be explored when required.

² In the mid-eighties, the Catalan government founded the *Centre d'Investigació de la Comunicació*, whose objective is to produce up-to-date accounts and research on the Catalan mass communication structures. A significant example of its contribution is the recent publication of an account of the media in the four richest regions in Europe: Baden-Württemberg, Catalunya, Lombardia and Rhône-Alps: de Mateo, R. (ed) (1993). Apart from this organism, Catalan private publishers always encouraged works on the mass media during and after Franco, as evidence of the lack of press freedom and democracy.

In Scotland, academic work attempts to provide an independent systematic approach of the Scottish media, however there is a lack of official support to do so. Cormack's paper 'Regional Television in the United Kingdom' (in press) is worthy of note.

³ These studies are mainly developed in co-operation among research centres and universities (Browne, 1989; Blumler, 1992; Euromedia Research Group, 1992; Pohoryles, Schlesinger and Wuggenig, 1990), but also encouraged and supported by private broadcasting companies (Silj, 1992a).

⁴ For an in-depth insight into British broadcasting, see Curran and Seaton (1991) and Negrine (1989).

⁵ The British government published a Green Paper on the future of the BBC in November 1992, which was followed by the BBC's response, *Extending Choice*.

⁶ For an interesting insight into future problems of the ITV companies, see Ibbotson, P. 'The rules of the game?' (*The Guardian*, 31-5-93).

⁷ 'Tears for soul of Channel 4' by Rob Brown (*The Independent*, 30-3-1992).

⁸ BBC Royal Charter in Guide to the BBC (1992: 2).

⁹ Cormack in 'Regional Television in the United Kingdom' (in press) explains the recent development of these fifteen ITV companies and the takeovers likely to occur in the future. Such takeovers, he suspects, will leave in the hands of a few the control of independent broadcasting in Great Britain. Such an oligopolistic tendency would compromise the balance of regional programming and reduce the market of independent production companies to a small number of commissioners.

¹⁰ Data published by the BARB (*The Guardian*, 25-11-92).

¹¹ This is the aim of Peter Ibbotson, director of corporate affairs at Carlton Television, in arguing for a revision of the 1990 Broadcasting Act (op.cit.).

¹² According to the information gathered by Julian Cloer ('Miss what you are seeing' in *Cable and Satellite Europe*, November 1992, pp.62-63), after three and a half years of satellite television in the UK, satellite programming is not strong enough to merit a regular place in the British ratings. *Coronation Street*, *Eastenders*, *Casualty*, *Strike it Lucky* are still the favourites in homes where the subscription for other TV services is paid.

¹³ The declarations of former managers at Granada Television illustrate this point. Twelve months after the new ITV franchises were allocated, they expressed their concern about the emphasis of the company on light entertainment ('Plenty of drama and no crisis, insists Granada' by Martin Wroe (*The Independent*, 3-3-1993).

¹⁴ Quote from 'Man with a taste for quality street' by G. Henry (*The Guardian*, 28-11-92).

¹⁵ Information provided by the Euromonitor research programme that involves comparing programming policies of Germany, UK, Italy, France and Spain (Prado, 1992). Complementary data on programming in the UK in comparison to other countries is provided by Tubella (1992: 42-43).

¹⁶ The top game-show scores the tenth position in the Top 100, after nine drama productions (*Broadcast*, 13 Nov.92).

¹⁷ 'Is the telly going down the tube?' (*The Independent on Sunday*, 6-9-92).

¹⁸ Prado's findings (1992) show that there are certain parallels between the preferences of Northern European viewers - British and German. Also, similar patterns of TV viewing apply to Mediterranean television cultures - Italian, Spanish and French.

¹⁹ If we look at the network BBC TV financial costs, an hour of drama (£481,000) is three times more expensive than light entertainment (£159,000) (*Guide to the BBC* 1992).

²⁰ For a view of the Scottish mass media in relation to the politics of the country, see Kellas (1990). Careful overviews of the Scottish media are provided by Meech (1990), Kilborn and Meech (1989) and Hutchison (1978).

Space constraints do not permit an overview of the Scottish press and radio structures. Nonetheless, the distinctive character of the Scottish press needs to be underlined. The Scottish dailies, both broadsheet and tabloids, sell more copies than the UK newspapers distributed north of the border. Remarkable examples are the Mirror Group tabloid *Daily Record* (800,000 copies a day) and D.C. Thomson's *Sunday Post*, which reaches 7 in 10 Scottish adults every Sunday. The Scottish press is less

regulated and dependent than Scottish broadcasting, because there is no specific press law in Britain. However, the Scottish press is subject to Scottish public law; also, some restrictions to avoid monopoly and competition are applied to this industry.

21 BBC Royal Charter, in *Guide to the BBC* (1992:2).

22 Quote from the seminar presentation by Dr. Janet Morgan at Stirling University (11-11-92).

23 Cameron's interview with the researcher (Glasgow, 15-12-92).

24 Ibid.

25 Channel 4 does not produce regional programming, but it transmits STV factual programmes, if they are considered of interest to all British viewers (*Scottish Eye, Scotland's War, Science and Society*).

26 'He (Colin McArthur) believes that there has been a certain pressure on Scottish television producers to privilege an image of Scotland that is widely marketable. Moreover, just as British television is increasingly dependent on the kinds of dramatisation and serialisation which will attract co-production finance and international sales, so Scottish television looks for financial and prestigious approval to London and the independent network.' (Griffiths, 1993: 13)

27 As Hetherington reported (1992: 32), the BBC DG Charles Curran himself considered 'the National Broadcasting Council for Scotland (...) quite "irrelevant" to any managerial process.'

28 For a further discussion on the issue of parochialism, see 1.3.4. in this thesis.

29 Cameron, *ibid.*

30 In formal terms, both BBC Scotland and STV differentiate Scottish output by labeling and stereotyping. Note the number of programmes in both schedules with the words 'Scottish', 'Scotland' or 'Scots' - in STV, *Scotsport, Scottish Action, Scotland Today, Scottish Questions*, and in BBC TV Scotland, *Reporting Scotland*. The Scottish flag, map and traditional costumes are also used to emphasise the Scottish character of their programmes. Again, the lack of a distinctive language common to the whole bulk of the population makes it more difficult to differentiate Scottish programmes, generally in English, from the rest of networked output.

31 The *Scottish Women* case study provides revealing quotes from programme-makers.

32 This 'lack of awareness' might have two different readings. On the one hand, the Scottish mass media might not represent the interests of their people. A second interpretation could be that the Scots do not want to define themselves as either institutionally or politically independent from the rest of the UK. The mass media then reflect the structural dependencies of Scotland on the south, which remain largely supported by the Scottish electorate due to the complicated electoral make up that the Scots find themselves in.

Two crucial occasions, the Referendum of 1979 for Scottish Home Rule and the General Election of 1991 appeared to show that the lack of awareness south of the border can also be explained by the lack of conviction of the Scots of being capable of ruling the country by themselves, but also by a British electoral system unfavourable to political minorities.

33 For further information on the current development of Gaelic broadcasting and programming, see Cormack (1993, 1994a, 1994b).

34 A comprehensive exposition of the Gaelic campaign was provided by the Chairman of the Gaelic Television Committee, John Angus MacKay during a seminar presentation in Stirling University (5-5-93).

35 See the development and impact of such a campaign in the local press (i.e., *Daily Record, The Scotsman, The Herald*, June 1993).

36 Alfons Quintà, former director of TVC, in Giró (1990: 52). The researcher's translation.

37 Canal Plus (PRISA, which owns the Spanish *El País* and 18% of *The Independent*, and Canal Plus in France, both with 25%, the rest among minor participants). *Tele 5* (Anaya editorial company, 25%; ONCE, the Spanish organisation for the blind, 25%, Berlusconi, 25% and the businessman Javier de la Rosa, 25%). Finally, *Antena 3 Televisión* (18%, Renvir, 12.5% TISA-*La Vanguardia*, 12.5% Antena 3 Radio, the bank group Banesto, 18%) (Corbella, 1991). An interesting discussion on the process of centralisation of the Spanish media is provided by AA. VV. (1994) *Concentració i internacionalització dels Mitjans de Comunicació. Repercussions socials i culturals*, Barcelona: CIC. IV Converses a La Pedrera.

38 The researcher's translation.

39 'El consell de ministres adjudica quatre canals de satèl.lit HISPASAT a l'ens de RTVE' (*AVUI*, 4-4-93).

40 In Spain, there are 250 local radio and television stations federated under ATEL, which lobbies to be legalised. It is noticeable that *Televisió Local de Cardedeu*, in Barcelona, unofficially broke the monopoly of RTVE in 1980, three years before the arrival of TV3. In Catalonia, local broadcasting is a strong phenomenon supported by communities, local councils and private organisations. Despite the

lack of legal regulation, no actions are taken against them. For further details, see Corominas i Llinés (1992) and Prado y de Moragas (1991).

41 For further information on Spanish viewing preferences, see Villagrasa (1992).

42 The Catalan mass media present a clear division between those in Catalan and those in Spanish. As far as the press is concerned the market is mainly for dailies in Spanish: the Barcelona-based *La Vanguardia* and *El Periódico de Catalunya*, make up nearly 80% of daily sales in Catalonia and are both owned by Spanish multi-media corporations. *Avui*, the strongest newspaper in Catalan, only accounts for 8% of the daily share.

The Catalan press has been described and analysed by Parés (1984) and Casassús (1987). With respect to the conflict between Spanish and Catalan speakers, see 1.3.2. in this thesis.

43 A detailed ethnographic approach to the history of television in Catalonia is provided by Xavier Giró (1990). Parés *et al.* (1981) and de Carreras (1987) describe the evolution of television during the transition period and the struggles between the central and the autonomous power. Gifreu draws a broad picture of the Catalan media system and communication strategies (1983, 1986, i Corominas (eds.) 1991; 1991: 221-235). Corbella (1991) provides the most up-to-date account of the Catalan media.

44 In *Vostè Pregunta* (1978-1984) 265 Catalan personalities were interviewed live and questioned by the audience by telephone. *Vostè Pregunta* was the first talk-show that the journalist Joaquim M. Puyal produced together with the editor Jordi Mir and the executive producer Ramon Fusté. Thereafter, they devised other audience participation formats, amongst which were the game-show discussion-based *Vostè Jutja* (1985-87) and *La Vida en un Xip*.

45 Ramon Fusté, interview with the researcher (8-1-92).

46 Seminar presentation on TVC's broadcasting policies at the Aula 'Néstor Almendros', Universitat Pompeu Fabra (16-6-94). The researcher's translation.

47 Oleguer Sarsanedas, head of TVC Programming, interview with the researcher (14-1-92). Jaume Ferrús, managing director of TVC, pointed out that a 30% of TVC's potential viewers have difficulty in following word-based programmes in Catalan (such as talk-shows or debates). From amongst the 70% of the Catalan population that understands and speaks Catalan fluently, TVC leads the ratings far ahead of TVE 1 and TVE 2 (Seminar presentation at the Aula 'Néstor Almendros', Universitat Pompeu Fabra (16-6-94).

48 The forty-one geopolitical areas in which the Catalan territory is divided according to the autonomous institutions. These areas are distributed in four provinces: Lleida, Tarragona, Girona and Barcelona. Each *comarca* has a remarkable sense of its own identity which shows in its economic resources and its cultural habits (gastronomy, folklore, religious and lay traditions).

Features of local identities may also be found in the two main areas of cultural division in Scotland - Highlands and Lowlands - and in smaller contexts such as Aberdeenshire, the Borders or the Western Islands.

49 Jaume Ferrús, managing director of TVC, interview with the researcher (12-1-92):

50 An attempt to do so is edited by Jones and Corbella (1989) on the audio-visual industry of fiction. However, it lacks a wider perspective on the independent sector and other genres. In Scotland, McPherson (1991) has developed a qualitative analysis of the Scottish independent audio-visual industry.

51 According to a recent survey (Bosch, 1992), 10% of Tele 5 daily programming is covered by South-American melodrama series. TV3 appears to be the best client of American audio-visual importation (films, sitcoms, drama series).

52 Ferrús, at the above-mentioned Seminar presentation (16-6-94).

53 For an insight into the growth of media corporations in the Western audio-visual world see Tunstall and Palmer (1991). Lange (1991) offers some relevant data in relation to the current world audio-visual panorama. See also Hamelink (1991) on the trends of social communication in the nineties.

54 Schedules cover similar genres on similar slots, regardless of who is funding (Blumler and Nossiter, 1991; Browne, 1989; Ibáñez, 1990; Villagrasa, 1990; Ostergaard, 1992; Tubella, 1992). 80% of Western European television (and 50% of its fiction) comes from the United States and Canada (Tubella, 1992: 72).

55 The discussion of their article may also apply to stateless nations.

56 On this matter, see also Prosser (1992) and Pradié y Salaüm (1991); for the current broadcasting regulation in Britain with regard to the European context, see Hearst (1992). See Flichy for a further reflection on the issue of deregulation (1992).

57 See Schlesinger (1994) for a discussion of the GATT's recent struggle on audio-visual trade. Also, Miller (1993).

58 Broadcast Research Unit, *The Public Service Idea in British Broadcasting. Main Principles*. 1985, quoted in Blumler and Nossiter (1991: 101), Prosser (1992: 177) and Browne (1989).

CHAPTER 3

Unfolding the project: an account of the methods

3.1 Introduction

This research project was devised in Catalonia when the researcher was professionally involved in television production. At the time, television in Catalan was a recent phenomenon of the new democratic mass media. The environment seemed ideal to explore how questions of national identity might affect the Catalan broadcasting scene. The researcher, being a 'participant-observer' of the peak-time public programme *La Vida en un Xip*, had the chance to witness the 'behind the scenes' realities of television production.

This privileged position encouraged the researcher to develop a formal inquiry into those questions. On the one hand, ethnographic techniques, such as participant observation and in-depth interviews with media professionals, were considered the most convenient methods for the purposes of the work. On the other hand, being aware of a strong personal attachment to the Catalan context, it seemed appropriate to choose a comparable country to take some distance from it and offer a different perspective on the broadcasting issue in stateless nations. Later the reasons why Scotland and Catalonia were selected for comparison will be recounted.

However, the design of the project raised a methodological problem. Ethnographic methods involve close contact with television production and professional teams. Thus,

the researcher's prior professional role in *La Vida en un Xip* might have jeopardised an objective analysis and the possibility of comparative research.

Despite this, an insider's professional knowledge of the television format to be analysed was always regarded as an advantage for observing and understanding fieldwork in situations frequently unfamiliar to neophytes. Some of the professional roles being observed had been developed by this researcher during her career in television production. Therefore, the starting point of this research project was in fact the professional background accumulated in setting up television shows which gave this researcher a significant advantage in analysing the empirical material gathered.

For a television journalist to become an observer of her own work was a challenge. It involved stepping out from the mainstream of a day-to-day rushed job and getting an adequate environment to analyse what television production is about, and why it works the way it does. My professional attachment to the aforementioned programme was full-time, vocational and not subject to much criticism on my part. When working in the media, there is little time for reflection because of the time pressure. The choice of Scotland as a location for research provided the desired distance.

Scotland was painted in my mind as a green, romantic, deprived country which had in common with Catalonia a troublesome existence. Like most visitors to Scotland, I expected that its sense of national identity was based on the topical cultural representations that, in fact, constitute its disguised image. As time passed by, I realised that, although there are some parallels in the Scottish and Catalan historical evolution, their peoples have different attitudes towards national issues. Also, the respective influences of Britain and Spain are far from bringing out similarities in cultural matters. The benefit of this work has undoubtedly been to learn that contrast illuminates knowledge and understanding.

Inevitably, the researcher's individual identity as a Catalan journalist is reflected in this work to such an extent that there is an underlying understanding of national and cultural matters from a Catalan perspective. Taking distance is a tough effort for someone who feels strongly about such issues. Frequently and unwillingly, Catalonia becomes the point of reference. Such a proneness to lack of balance is acknowledged. However, it is believed, such a circumstance also contributes to corroborate the view that questions of national and cultural identity need to be framed in specific contexts.

The following pages will justify the use of ethnographic methodology in this work, which follows a similar research tradition to that of other media studies (cf. Elliott, 1972; Cantor, 1971; Gitlin, 1983; Schlesinger, 1987). As this project compares the Scottish and Catalan media industries and two of their television products, the problems and advantages of comparison will also be described.

Behind each ethnographic study, lies the relationship between the researcher and the people submitted to inquiry. Such relationships frequently affect research developments. The data-gathering process will be described, to underline the possible weaknesses of each method according to specific circumstances of time and space. An account of the methods will also allow the reader to understand the limitations of the project and of its findings.

3.2. Ethnography and Comparison

Ethnography and comparison are the two methods combined in the analysis of *Scottish Women* and *La Vida en un Xip*. These two research methods will be presented here in relation to the case studies. First, though, it seems convenient to explain the professional role of the researcher with regard to *La Vida en un Xip*.

3.2.1 The researcher as an insider

In 1988, I joined the Catalan independent company *Disseny i Comunicadors per als Mass Media* (DCo. S.A) as a script assistant in a game-show and in the soap-opera *La Granja*, the introductory drama to the discussion of *La Vida en un Xip*. These two shows were produced by the same team. Professionals switched roles according to the production imperatives of either programme. From 1988 until 1990, the researcher was therefore intermittently involved in minor production tasks concerning the debate itself.

As a script assistant in *La Granja*, this researcher could witness the setting up of the soap opera and how economic factors constrained the creative process. Her role was to supervise the coherence of the storytelling. As far as the debate was concerned, from the beginning different members of the company were asked to get involved in researching the target people that the programme required - experts, witnesses and lay participants willing to contribute. First, this was done in a careless manner, but the involvement was progressively greater. Thus this researcher had the possibility to learn the ropes of the show before this project was devised.

In September 1990, *La Vida en un Xip* started its third season with a new and independent team. I was appointed to coordinate and research the debate, and also to conduct a small section of the show called *Centre de Documentació* in front of the camera. These tasks allowed direct contact with all decision-making and production processes, and access to any information that the programme generated. At this stage, the researcher was conscious of the potential output that the results of intense data-gathering may produce, with the forthcoming research period in sight. In August 1991, I moved to Scotland to conduct this study. *La Vida en un Xip* ran for a further fourth season until June 1992.

3.2.2 Ethnography

'An ethnography may uncover the fragilities, as well as the strengths, of forms of ideological labour.'

(Schlesinger, 1980: 366)

While working in television, one realises that home audiences can not be fully aware of what is being cooked behind the scenes. A television programme involves a great many techniques and processes that are not visible in the final product. To encourage accurate judgments of television shows, it seemed useful to provide media studies with an ethnographic approach to the settings where decisions are made and programmes devised.

In the field of media studies, the ethnographic tradition offers a valuable and exemplary literature. Among other studies, similar approaches to the one used here were developed by Philip Elliott, *The Making of a TV Series* (1972), Philip Schlesinger, *Putting "reality" together* (1987) and Muriel Cantor, *The Hollywood Television Producer: His Work and His Audience* (1971). Such authors explored as 'participant-observers', the processes of television making in the genres of documentary - Elliott, news - Schlesinger - and fiction - Cantor.¹

Following similar steps, this work analyses a different television format, audience discussion programmes, which allows us to explore the role of studio participants in a democratic media system, but also to assess whether broadcasting in stateless nations addresses matters of national identity. As far as is known, such an approach has not been attempted before.

Ethnography, as with any other research method, has its critics and Hammersley (1992) develops a whole monographic discussion to defend it. Our intention here is only to

underline the main objections to ethnography and how they might have affected this particular piece of work.

Access

Access can be the first obstacle to ethnographic researchers because the first step is to gain entrance to the object of study, and it is in the hands of media professionals whether or not to collaborate with an academic project. While being part of a production team, I had the chance to witness how media professionals responded to scholars who attempted to do some research; then it became clear that an outsider would be unlikely to be in 'the right place at the right time' to gather the relevant information.

This access-barrier to outsiders can be explained by a general fear among media professionals of being spied on. Television teams are a community of secrecy: the ones who know the mysteries behind the camera and the keys to success. Unfortunately, researchers depend on whether media professionals agree to release those mysteries for academic purposes.

This is particularly tough when such academic purposes are regarded by media people as of minority interest and use, or even, as a conspiracy against the medium; then access becomes a major problem for an outsider.² Schlesinger's account of his observations at the BBC news room in the seventies is a valuable insight into this problem (1980). By contrast, Newcomb (1991:103-106) describes the advantages of being a script-writer researching in his own professional field. To this researcher, being an insider of the medium facilitated the access to both the Scottish and the Catalan settings.

Participant observation and detachment

A second major criticism of ethnographic methodology is that a participant-observer may be 'seduced' by his/her objects of study. Thus, such an attachment might jeopardise the objectivity of his/her analysis and was probably the major handicap to this work.

However, it seems fair to say that the process of detachment started simultaneously with the development of the project; moving to Scotland was a first step in this direction.

The project was designed as a comparative analysis of Scottish and Catalan television programmes. Being a neophyte in Scottish matters, the choice of ethnographic techniques seemed deemed appropriate to gain knowledge of Scotland. Observation allowed this researcher not only to watch closely television processes, but also to consider the dynamics of Scottish media institutions. The facilities of access to *Scottish Women* and the favourable attitude of the team captivated the researcher in a more naïve way than the Catalan case study. However, the process of detachment from the Scottish context was considerably less arduous.

Being an insider of television, it was certainly an advantage to know on which doors to knock and which rooms might have a secret entrance. By contrast, being a foreigner, the data-gathering was not always easy. First, the fieldwork process was rather more difficult in English than in Catalan. The level of understanding is more accurate in your mother tongue than in a foreign language. During the observation phase, a researcher needs to remain in the background and keep away from the frenetic procedures of production. Thus, the 'linguistic handicap' showed when trying to catch those details that were willingly whispered in some kind of television argot. Overall, though, the researcher did not consciously feel that her comprehension of English affected significantly the data-gathering during the fieldwork.

Interestingly, as far as Scottish media professionals were concerned, being a foreigner was perceived as less 'dangerous' than being a Scot. A scholar whose interest in researching was not, in fact, to have his/her feet inside the industry was unusual. The comparative approach to *Scottish Women* and *La Vida en un Xip* gained the sympathies of both Scottish and Catalan professionals. At this point, the Scots spelt out their roles and dynamics maybe to a greater extent than they would have done if the researcher had

been a native. The professional background of the researcher, being similar to that of the team, also helped to structure the interviews. The similarities between *Scottish Women* and *La Vida en un Xip* were useful to place oneself in the scenario of the research and be aware of the internal pressures.

In Catalonia, the data-gathering was more troublesome than in Scotland. The researcher, who had been a friend, was now a stranger. Someone who everyone had trusted as a member of the team had become an inquisitor, who at the time gave little explanation of how those observations would be used. The Catalan professionals showed less interest than the Scots towards the research and maintained a rather cool attitude, which was perceived as their way to protect the new distribution of roles in the programme. It is only fair to say, though, that they might have assumed that the researcher knew most of the procedures and did not require much explanation. This attitude hinted at reproof to someone who had betrayed their community of secrecy. At times, this situation was hurtful and uncomfortable, but it certainly helped the process of detachment.

3.2.3 Comparison

'The main research target in comparing countries for theoretical ends is variance, practically the full range of human experience.'

(Teune, 1990: 47)

This work shows that comparison is as much about variance as about similarity. Gurevitch and Blumler remark that comparing media systems from different countries requires the researcher to be aware of their distinctive political systems and cultures (1990:306). The distinctions between the Scottish and Catalan media structures with regard to their political status and state dependencies were underlined in the previous chapters. The comparative view of Scottish and Catalan mass media shows more differences than similarities, which confirms the need for media production studies to

take account of the distinctive political, cultural and economic contexts of their respective countries.³

As pointed out earlier, comparing countries may avoid the need to generalise from one particular case to unexplored others, which are frequently assumed to be analogous. In this project, the analysis of two similar formats seems to demonstrate that such similarities should never be taken for granted. The macro contexts mentioned above may modify a (premature) perception of media products, often analysed without taking such variables into account.

Gurevitch and Blumler also point out that the comparative approach is now particularly useful to discover the interdependencies between nationwide communication networks and international corporations in the context of globalisation (1990: 310-312). The previous chapter seems to suggest so.

The above advantages have their counterparts. If misconceived, comparative analysis may fail to avoid the problem of 'parochialism', concentrating on peculiarities rather than finding patterns of equivalence. It can also lead, as mentioned earlier, to an unbalanced account of the case studies. As far as this study is concerned, the researcher was aware that the time available to gain understanding of Scottish matters was far too short. As Gubrium would put it, the researcher had no time to 'learn the ropes' of the Scottish culture before the research was developed (1991: 132-134). On the one hand, despite the two years spent in the country, I was always conscious that my knowledge of Scotland could never match my knowledge of Catalonia. On the other hand, the distance from Catalonia helped me to question assumptions about that country by comparing them to the situation in Scotland.

Teune (1990) points out the need to justify theoretically the choice of the countries to be compared. He also argues that 'once the decision has been made that there is sufficient

“systemness” or connectedness in a country or its society and economy, the next step is where to look. Establishing “systemness” is not easy. (...) The macro characteristics of country must be used theoretically to explain something within it' (1990: 48-49).

Arguably, Scotland and Catalonia are worth contrasting. These two countries were considered suitable for comparison for several reasons: (i) both are nations with a distinctive political status within their respective states, Britain and Spain; (ii) both countries are institutionally dependent at multiple levels upon the central state apparatus, especially their media; (iii) the Scottish and Catalan peoples are not particularly active in modifying their current political status; finally, (iv) both countries are ruled by European democratic political systems, in which freedom of information is guaranteed and media products may be vehicles of expression of the peoples' identity.

The ongoing process of globalisation in Western Europe also motivates the comparison of these two countries, whose cultural identities can be seen to be under threat by foreign products. Therefore, the analysis focuses on home-produced television shows. As argued in Chapter 2, the adaptation of foreign formats to home production is also a potential point for comparison between the selected case studies.

By conducting ethnographic comparison, this study attempted to capture those moments in either case that might show tight links between television production, their political contexts and the dynamics of their political cultures. The following pages describe the research process in detail.

3.3 Research process

The previous section remarked upon the involvement of the researcher with the *La Vida en un Xip* case study. Being aware of such a delicate position, throughout this work the researcher made clear to each interviewee that questions should be answered as if the inquirer were a complete outsider. However, some relationships established long before the project were deeply rooted and may have affected the attitude of interviewees towards the researcher. Having noted that, the following pages aim to describe the different phases of data-gathering.

3.3.1 Research phases in Scotland

The first contact with Scottish Television (STV) was established in September 1991, when I was informed that *Scottish Women* was being produced by the independent Edinburgh-based company Skyline Productions. Skyline cooperated openly with this project all along. At the time, the producer of *Scottish Women*, Leslie Hills, provided immediate access to observe and interview all members of the production team.

The first phase of observation was carried out in October 1991, during the setting up of the sixth series of *Scottish Women* at Skyline, the recordings at STV's Gateway Studios in Edinburgh and the editing sessions at Picardy Television. Open in-depth interviews were conducted with each member of the production team. A first sample of participants was invited to answer a survey, which was designed to gather responses about national identity and the motivation of studio audiences for participating in television shows.

Interviews and contacts continued over that winter. In February 1992, Henry Eagles, the first in-house producer of *Scottish Women*, facilitated access to the files of prior series at STV's Cowcaddens studios in Glasgow. Henry Eagles was interviewed, as well as the head of News and Current Affairs, Blair Jenkins. Gus McDonald, current managing director of STV and inspirer of the programme, was inaccessible. On his behalf, though,

it needs to be noted that the research period overlapped with the franchise bids of the ITV companies in Autumn-Winter 1991 and, thereafter with a frenetic period of business and policy readjustment.

The second phase of observation was developed in March 1992 during the setting up of the seventh series. Skyline kept the same team. Then the second sample of *Scottish Women* questionnaires was gathered. In 1992, STV suspended its agreement with Skyline for the production of a subsequent series. In April 1993, *Scottish Women* was returned to in-house production as a show in the Light Entertainment department. In June 1993, Carol Haining, the new producer, facilitated access for a further observation phase; interviews with the new team were also carried out.

Overall, there were no problems of access to studio recordings, meetings and editing sessions. However, the material from the production process was less easily obtainable. A great deal of data (editorial documents, lists of participants, research papers) was gathered during the recordings, taking advantage of a chaotic atmosphere.

Generally, the team was cooperative and open about the inside of programme making. The researcher developed a friendly relationship with most of its members and managed to help with some mechanical tasks during the Skyline series at Gateway studios.

3.3.2 Research phases in Catalonia

The Catalan fieldwork should be divided into two periods. First, between January 1989 and August 1991, the researcher, as a participant, gathered most of the relevant documents, learned the professional routines and performed several tasks within the show. No formal interviews were carried out; but, in fact, this first period was the most valuable for informal inquiries into decision-making and production.

During the second period (January 1992 - August 1992), the professional became a researcher and developed fieldwork observation and interviews according to the comparative research plan. Most Catalan interviews and field observation had to be squeezed into a fortnight in January, as this was the time available in Catalonia. Within those days, the first sample of the Catalan survey was gathered.

Thereafter, several contacts were maintained with DCo. S.A. through fax. Those contacts allowed me to arrange the survey for the second sample of Catalan respondents in April. Finally, between July and August 1992, the researcher had access to the files of *La Vida en un Xip* at the company's office in Barcelona.

During the phase of participant-observation, the researcher was free to gather research material and attend most editorial and production meetings. A close professional relationship between the researcher, the producer and presenter, Joaquim M. Puyal and the executive producer, Ramon Fusté, secured an accurate understanding of each production stage.

During the second phase, access was fairly restricted, arguably due to two different reasons. First, my detached role ruled out any possibility of access to production and editorial meetings at DCo. S.A. A second reason was the brief period spent in Catalonia, normally at Christmas and Easter when the scheduled editions of *La Vida en un Xip* had been previously recorded. Overall, despite a certain attitude of indifference to this research from some media professionals of *La Vida en un Xip*, their relationship with the researcher was smooth during the development of this work.

3.4 Research methods

In this section, the data-gathering techniques and their process of analysis will be described. Those techniques are: (i) participant-observation, (ii) fieldwork observation, (iii) in-depth interviews, (iv) comparative analysis, and (v) a quantitative survey.

(i) participant-observation

As mentioned above, the researcher was a participant-observer of *La Vida en un Xip* for three years. Professional notes and documents were gathered, such as editorial plans, research papers, lists of topics, backgrounds of participants and press criticisms. To maintain some distance from this period of attachment, the case study will mainly reflect examples from the fieldwork conducted during the fourth season of *La Vida en un Xip*.

(ii) fieldwork observation

Both case studies were based upon notes, programme material and other data gathered during the respective observation phases detailed in the previous section. The researcher attended meetings between producers, directors and presenters, rehearsals, production developments, recordings and live broadcasting, and editing sessions.

During the Scottish fieldwork, the researcher tape-recorded all those sessions to compensate for potential linguistic misunderstandings. All tapes were thoroughly transcribed. In *La Vida en un Xip*, procedures were more informal due to the back-up of the participant-observation data. The new information was compared to prior phases of production and to the transcripts of the interviews.

In both case studies, editorial documents and lists of participants were valuable to figure out the different criteria of selection and the setting up of the discussions. Some of these documents are included in Appendices 2 and 3.

(iii) in-depth interviews

Each member of both production teams was individually approached through semi-structured and in-depth interviews for an average length of sixty minutes. The interviewees were asked to describe chronologically the production process of the show, according to their roles and their relationship with other areas of responsibility. The ongoing programmes were used to exemplify the criteria applied in different tasks (selection of participants and experts, editorial decisions). Producers, presenters, researchers, directors, assistant producers, assistant directors, coordinators and editors from both programmes were interviewed. Their names are included in Appendix 1.

In Catalonia, Jaume Ferrús, the managing director of *Televisió de Catalunya* (TVC), and its director of programming, Oleguer Sarsanedas, were interviewed with regard to *La Vida en un Xip* and to TVC's policies. In Scotland, as mentioned earlier, this wider approach was only possible with Blair Jenkins, head of STV News and Current Affairs. Colin Cameron, head of BBC Television Scotland provided this work with useful thoughts about policy making and national identity in Scotland.

Both the Scottish and Catalan interviews were recorded and thoroughly transcribed: the former in English and the latter in Catalan. Catalan quotes included in this study were translated by the researcher.

(iv) comparative analysis

Both case studies were analysed separately. First, a descriptive account of each programme was put together. Then the comparable variables were confronted: editorial decisions, topics, system of selection of participants and experts, dynamics of discussion; these and other aspects were compared to explore possible patterns of similarity and difference in editorial and production procedures. The results of the comparative analysis are mainly recounted in Chapter 7.

With regard to comparison, *Scottish Women* and *La Vida en un Xip* presented a significant difference: the gender of their studio participants. When the main research phases were developed, *Scottish Women* was a STV Current Affairs department's debate exclusively amongst women. However, in April 1993, the new version produced by the Light Entertainment division included the contribution of some male participants. By contrast, *La Vida en un Xip* was always a forum with a mixed audience.

Such a difference between the two case studies was not considered damaging for comparison of ethnographic production analyses, granted that the specificity of the women's show was taken into account. Although the researcher was rather apprehensive about this point, this contrast brought out unexpected findings concerning the role of women in two distinctive political cultures.

Finally, both case studies include separate sections about the national identity issue. The researcher collected documents from past programmes that had debated 'national identity' concerns, such as nationalism, traditions, racism or culture. Likewise, the interviewees were questioned about their own feelings and also about their professional attitude to the representation of the cultural identities of their countries. Then the interpretation of this material was contrasted to the results of a quantitative survey among studio participants of both programmes.

(v) survey

The survey is the only quantitative technique used in this project. The limited value of this questionnaire as scientific evidence of people's feelings and attitudes is acknowledged. What people think and do can differ greatly from their answers to a survey. Furthermore, the design of questionnaires does not frequently leave much room for detailed explanations. The data to be interpreted consists generally of ticked boxes among a limited number of options.⁴ However, this survey among studio audiences only

claimed to gather illustrative data to support some of the arguments developed throughout this study.

The two first questions of the survey asked the respondents to tick amongst the options available the one/ones that best suited their feelings of national identity. The survey also aimed to examine the motivation of the studio participants in contributing to *Scottish Women* and *La Vida en un Xip*. The last question offered ten possible reasons why a participant might have decided to attend these shows. The respondents were asked to evaluate the options from 1 to 10 according to their priorities.⁵

This survey was designed under pressure. The possibility to carry it out arose suddenly during the first observation phase of *Scottish Women* and there was not much time to design the forms. Also, the producer asked the researcher to formulate concise questions that would not involve much trouble for either the participants or the production team. Once the questionnaire was designed, it was faithfully translated into Catalan to distribute it among *La Vida en un Xip* samples and no modifications to the original version were made.

The survey was distributed among the participants of two editions of each programme -approximately 120 people in each sample. More than 400 questionnaires were returned properly completed. The data was entered into the Macintosh statistic package "Stat View II" to produce tables and graphics that show the comparative data obtained. The results of this survey are presented in Chapter 6.

It needs to be remarked once more that the Scottish samples were only tested among female participants. The survey data provides the percentages of men and women in *La Vida en un Xip*. The researcher acknowledges that this contrast of gender is significantly problematic in the quantitative comparison of the questionnaires' results.

The data gathered through the research methods described above was analysed to provide a comprehensive understanding of how *Scottish Women* and *La Vida en un Xip* were set up and produced. Overall, the analysis showed that behind both television shows, there were cohesive professional routines and coherent approaches to the format, mainly achieved by leading presenters and producers. The previous pages attempted to describe every research step to spot where the weaknesses of this research study might lie. The following section evaluates, in the author's judgment, the scope of the project.

3.5 Limits of the project

Data derived from participant observation and fieldwork provided a comprehensive view of the audience discussion format. The complex relationship of roles within production teams was dug up by individual interviews, which also suggested matters that might have not emerged through observation. This was the case with professionals' comments that explained how the human element, frequently ignored when the programme is observed as a whole, intervened in shaping the programme.

Background material from prior series helped to figure out how professional routines may change over the years within the same format. Press criticisms and audience ratings illustrated the standards of success and impact of *La Vida en un Xip* and, to a lesser extent, *Scottish Women*.

The surveys constituted an illustration of the national identity question in stateless nations; the quantitative data also revealed that these two public television debates are perceived by participants as representative forums of their respective communities. The

sense of dual identity of both Scots and Catalans was, to some degree, confirmed by the results of the questionnaires, showing at once interesting parallels and contrasts.

However, for the purposes of this work, the researcher believed that a complex collective and individual issue such as national identity should be inquired into by an interpretative analysis of people's statements and attitudes. Here, that was made possible by interviewing media professionals and exploring their criteria and, providing a different approach to this issue, by the survey data.

Despite certain limitations, the comparative analysis underlined some similarities of approach to the audience discussion format, and at the same time it revealed how political culture might affect television shows. The researcher believes that ethnographic methods were indispensable to achieve such findings. Arguably, a content analysis approach would have shown distinctions of content and mechanics without providing an in-depth explanation of what caused such distinctions.

Nevertheless, this project has its limitations. First, and foremost, the findings of this work are valid for these two case studies, which are constrained by their political, economic and cultural contexts in the Western Europe of the nineties. This work does not attempt to be representative of all audience discussion programmes in nations without a state. However, its findings can be seen as examples of how the latter's political status can decisively affect the production of their mass media. *Scottish Women* and *La Vida en un Xip* may hopefully help us to understand similar formats in wider contexts. These two case studies are a window through which to look at the evolution of domestic television production in the globalising context of Western audio-visual markets.

This study was conducted in English by a Catalan researcher. The 'linguistic handicap' needs to be considered not as much during the development of the inquiry as during the writing and presentation of the data. Catalan expressions and terminology used in

describing the production process of *La Vida en un Xip* show, once more, that the attachment of the researcher was greater to the Catalan than to the Scottish show. The understanding of the Catalan case was logically deeper than that of the Scottish case. It was worth though accepting these disadvantageous circumstances, if this study might contribute to a better understanding of television production.

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Nevertheless, the process of detachment resolved itself more satisfactorily than expected. In *Scottish Women*, the contact with different production teams helped to create distance and see the programme rather than the people behind it. In the case of *La Vida en un Xip*, the process of detachment had started by breaking the day-to-day contact with the country, and also by writing about past professional experiences. Finally, the fact that the programme ended in June 1992 also mitigated a certain feeling of betrayal that had troubled the researcher since the start. However, as far as the Catalan context was concerned, the heart was somewhat in a continuous battle with the head to maintain a comparison that was balanced and objective. The researcher hopes that, in spite of the methodological difficulties recounted here, the findings of this work will have made them worthwhile.

Notes

¹ For a further criticism of such works, see H. Newcomb (1991: 93-107) who discusses the advantages and disadvantages of ethnography in media studies.

For a comprehensive overview of ethnographic methods in social research, see M. Hammersley (1992) and Bruhn and Jankowski (eds) (1991). T. D. Cook and S. Reichardt (1986) offer an interesting debate around the viability of using quantitative and qualitative methods in social research.

² Mitchell's piece on secrecy in qualitative research offers an interesting classification of 'secrets', among which, it is worth noticing what he calls 'resource secrets': 'information that, if revealed to competitors, might result on a loss of privileged access to resources' (1991: 98). That is probably the fear of most media professionals. Mitchell remarks that the question of secrecy depends very much upon the researcher's knowledge of the objects of study (1991: 101-108).

³ Valuable comparative accounts of broadcasting systems have been developed by Browne (1989) and Etzioni-Halevy (1987). Also a comparative study of communication and culture in Edelstein, Ito and Kepplinger (1989).

⁴ Such criticisms are sharply remarked on by Bourdieu (1972).

⁵ Copies of both the Scottish and Catalan questionnaires are included in Appendix 1.

CHAPTER 4

Scottish Women (1987-1993)

A television debate with a troubled title

4.1 Introduction

Scottish Women was produced by Scottish Television (STV) and networked throughout the country by the other two Scottish ITV companies, Grampian and Border television.¹ The show, which transmitted 109 editions from 1987 to 1993, was first launched by the Current Affairs department and latterly produced by the Light Entertainment department. In 1994, when these lines were written, *Scottish Women* continued in production.

Scottish Women has the structure of most audience discussion programmes: topical debates among a studio audience of lay participants and experts. This case study pursues two strands of research: a detailed account of the production process and the analysis of the show as a Scottish programme.

The hypothesis of this research was that if questions of national and cultural identity were taken into account by *Scottish Women's* programme-makers, the analysis of its production process would reflect them. The findings concerning the 'Scottishness' of this television debate are presented in the last section of this chapter.

Scottish Women involved predominantly female participants. This gender specificity compares with the Catalan show, *La Vida en un Xip*, which always had a mixed audience. Apart from the research interests mentioned above, the *Scottish Women* case

study offered the chance to explore whether the gender composition of the audience determined the editorial and production processes.

In relation to this, though, a point needs to be stressed. It is not the purpose of this work to discuss to what extent *Scottish Women* had feminist orientations. The adjective 'feminist' will be used here to distinguish the approach of the Current Affairs department and Skyline Productions, the independent company temporarily in charge of the show, from the Light Entertainment department's approach. The former stressed the role of women in Scotland as a social group with separate rights, claims and structures, whereas the non-feminist approach of the Light Entertainment department focused on the issues confronting female and male perspectives.

The *Scottish Women* case study also reflects the broadcasting climate of the mid-nineties described earlier. The shift in STV's policies marks the transition from a current affairs oriented debate to a popular format which mimicked the style of *Kilroy* (BBC1), *The Time... The Place* (ITV), *Central Weekend* (CTV), and also similar to *La Vida en un Xip* (TV3). The following pages provide a detailed analysis of the different production periods. The relationship between the broadcaster and the production company Skyline will also be analysed.

4.2 From Current Affairs to Light Entertainment ²

The evolution of *Scottish Women* shows the structural dependence of the Scottish audio-visual industry on the UK market and the current transformation of British television. The original version evolved from a distinctive current affairs discussion towards a popular forum, inspired by the look of America's *The Oprah Winfrey Show*. The criteria of the STV Current Affairs and the Light Entertainment departments appeared to be

radically distinct. The former had maintained a rigid structure and a traditional image over the years, which essentially did not change when Skyline Productions took over the show; but the Light Entertainment department achieved the commercial objectives that the new STV policies aimed at: a popular and entertaining formula with high audience figures.

4.2.1 Watching *Scottish Women*

Scottish Women was a twenty-five minutes topical discussion (forty, in some series) among a hundred women, generally transmitted on Mondays after 10.30 p.m.³

The original set showed a hemispheric forum constituted by rows of seats and the presenter's podium in the centre of the floor. Since the set allowed no access to the rows of seats, the presenter, Sheena MacDonald, had to stand up in the centre, becoming, inevitably, the speakers' point of reference. Before the opening titles, she briefed the viewer about the topic and, once the music was over, she delivered a short introduction via TelePrompTer which set up the first argument for discussion.

In the original version of *Scottish Women* (1987-1992), the set was equipped with an electronic voting system, upon which the dynamics of the discussion depended. This voting system allowed the introduction of new ideas by putting them to the vote: 'Should non-believers have church weddings?', 'Should people with AIDS be identified or quarantined?', 'Should St. Andrew's day be a national holiday?' Each participant had in front of her seat two buttons through which the hundred women voted for or against these or similar questions relating to the topics. The votes were computerised and the results were made available within seconds via a bicolour (Yes/No) pie chart. The results divided the forum between 'Yes' and 'No' supporters, who then developed their opposed arguments during the discussion.

The original *Scottish Women* had no panel of guests. Several experts, though, were invited to inform on technical aspects and lobbying activities, alongside the opinions and personal experiences of the rest of the women. A caption identified the name of each of the hundred speakers. After twenty-five minutes of discussion with no break for commercials, Sheena MacDonald ended the show with a final vote. The credits came up on a blue screen.

When the Light Entertainment department took over in 1993, a new set was built, the traditional voting system eliminated and some men were invited to participate both as experts and witnesses, which contributed to the escape from the current affairs character of the prior series. The set was now a hemispheric platform of seats and a panel of guests. The new scenario was smaller and more accessible, which, consequently, allowed a more dynamic debate, during which the new presenter, Kaye Adams, was able to move freely around the rows of seats and reach every speaker. Apart from a panel of guests, a wide range of experts and witnesses intervened from the stalls. The introduction of witnesses to *Scottish Women* in this latest phase, extended the range of participants of this type of programme.

Since there were no votes, the rhythm of the discussion depended upon the ability of the presenter to direct the agenda. The new *Scottish Women* was ten minutes longer than the prior series and had a break for commercials. After a brief final comment by Kaye Adams, the closing titles came up over the crowd clapping.

4.2.2 History and evolution

The preceding pages have described the two versions of *Scottish Women* to present the show during both the Current Affairs department and the Light Entertainment department production phases. Some historical background to the programme will explain why *Scottish Women* evolved this way.

The set

Sets are the first big investment of a television show. The original *Scottish Women* inherited its set from another programme, which severely constrained the dynamics of the debate.

Gus McDonald, the current managing director at STV who was then head of programmes, was keen on making the audience participate in television. Inspired by the Granada Television debate *Granada 500*,⁴ he decided to test the same debate format with a cross-section of the Scottish population to discuss political issues before and after the General Election of 1986. The programme, produced by Henry Eagles, was called *Scottish Assembly*. The set emulated the shape of a parliament and contained an electronic voting system, which made it the most expensive television scenario ever built in Scotland. After the General Election, *Scottish Assembly* developed into a current affairs discussion programme among a hundred Scots, sampled according to sex, age and geographic distribution across the country.

At the time, the ITV ordered from STV a programme for women to be networked across the UK. Gus McDonald suggested that this should make use of *Scottish Assembly's* set, since the latter was not proving a success. Henry Eagles was asked to transform *Scottish Assembly* into a women's programme. Eagles had argued that the female participants of *Scottish Assembly*, despite being equally represented in the studio, did not contribute as much as men. Consequently, the new debate vetoed male participation to give women the chance to speak. The show was called *Votes for Women*.

Votes for Women was transmitted all over the UK in an afternoon slot and a different version for the Scottish audience went out in the evenings. After the first series, the ITV decided to drop *Votes for Women* from the network because, according to Eagles' the topics were too conventional and the accents of the women too Scottish.⁵ By contrast, the

Scottish Votes for Women, which introduced more challenging topics, succeeded, and STV continued producing it for the Scottish audience. Following the change, *Votes for Women* was retitled *Scottish Women*.

From 1987 until 1992, *Scottish Women* used the old *Scottish Assembly* set, which, although maybe ideal for holding political discussions, imposed rigid dynamics on the discussion. The director, Douglas Napier, had unsuccessfully sought a new set to build a more relaxed environment for the participants. Another demand of the team was to broadcast live rather than to record the show. This idea was also rejected since the size of the old set would have forced STV to have it permanently located in the studios. In 1993, the Light Entertainment department built a new set, which permitted the changes that the prior team had aimed at. The programme, though, was never broadcast live.

Evolution and production periods

Scottish Women underwent three different production periods, which resulted in remarkable differences in terms of editorial criteria. First, *Votes for Women* and the five subsequent series of *Scottish Women* were produced in-house by the Current Affairs department (1987-1990). Henry Eagles was the producer; Sheena MacDonald, who had presented a series of *Scottish Assembly*, conducted the show and June Bell researched it. Other researchers, the director and the production assistants changed over the years. The show was current affairs orientated, covering political and social issues with a feminist and topical approach.

In 1990, before the ITC had completed the ITV enfranchising process, STV commissioned *Scottish Women* from the Edinburgh-based company Skyline Productions, apparently to refresh the editorial approach. However, the debate was still supervised by the Current Affairs department, presented by Sheena MacDonald and directed by the STV man Douglas Napier. The Skyline producer Leslie Hills became the first female producer at STV, which had the added advantage of good publicity for the re-

launch. This second editorial phase focused on social rather than political issues, but it maintained a feminist perspective. In 1992, after three series, STV suspended its agreement with Skyline.

In Spring 1993, *Scottish Women* surprised the audience with a new look: the traditional voting system had disappeared and some male participants had slipped into the audience. The approach of the Light Entertainment department was primarily and obviously to make an entertaining discussion. Jim Brown, the new head of this division, employed the BBC radio producer Carol Haining and the STV news presenter, Kaye Adams, to get the new *Scottish Women* into shape. This third editorial phase strengthened entertainment by focusing on the individual experience rather than social and theoretical perspectives.

The research fieldwork of this case study was mainly developed during the Skyline phase and the first series of the new *Scottish Women* in June 1993. Therefore, the analysis provides a comparison of both production periods.

4.2.3 STV, Skyline, STV

The purpose of *Scottish Women* was to discuss women's issues among women from a women's perspective. Following the current affairs criteria, the discussion was also to supply information about the issues. In 1990, after a first period of settlement, Blair Jenkins, then head of News and Current Affairs, considered that *Scottish Women* needed a change. At the time, STV was about to bid for its ITV franchise. Several programmes were commissioned from independent companies, arguably, to show the ITC that STV was deeply committed to Current Affairs. Skyline Productions was commissioned to produce two STV current affairs programmes: *Scottish International* and *Scottish Women*.

Skyline, the company and the deal

Skyline Film and Television Productions Ltd. were founded in Edinburgh in 1974 and expanded to London in 1983. In 1992, the company entered into a collaborative relationship with Zenith Productions, one of the leading independent producers in the UK, to develop and produce drama for television and cinema. Although it is a Scottish-based company, most of its commissions have been for Channel 4 (*Walkie Talkie*, *Scottish Eye*, *Pioneers of Socialism*, *Years Ahead*, *Shadowing*).

Skyline produced thirty editions of *Scottish Women* (1991-92). Trevor Davies, the Skyline manager in Edinburgh and producer of *Scottish International*, appointed Leslie Hills to produce the female show. Hills' background was in education and the arts. She was also widely connected to women's groups and organisations throughout Scotland: she was on the board of *Engender*, *The Scottish Women's Foundation* for research and campaigning and other Scottish civil organisations.

The Edinburgh branch of Skyline had a full time employee, Jill Punton, who dealt with the administrative and production tasks. Teams were gathered according to the needs of each programme. In the particular case of *Scottish Women*, Leslie Hills employed the researcher Elaine Henry and other freelancers who had worked for Eagles on prior series. The Current Affairs department did however impose some conditions on Skyline in order to smooth the transition.

The deal between the Current Affairs department and Skyline was to produce two series of *Scottish Women* per year following the objectives and procedures of the first in-house production phase. Skyline would take on the editorial and production development, as well as the editing, under the supervision of the Current Affairs department. Jenkins proposed to Hills that she should retain Douglas Napier as the director and Sheena MacDonald as the presenter, and also to involve the latter in the editorial development. The rest of the team was selected by Skyline. The Production Assistant Jill Punton

gathered the lay participants and Elaine Henry researched the topics and the experts. During the recordings, four freelancers helped on production tasks.

Skyline had to record each series within a week at the STV Gateway Studios in Edinburgh. The number of programmes for each series varied according to the availability of transmission dates decided by STV. The broadcaster provided technical equipment, studio facilities, catering for the participants and a crèche. STV was also responsible for all the technicalities, including the voting system, the graphics (captions and pie charts), and the direction of the show.

Skyline was committed to producing the on-line version of each *Scottish Women* ready to broadcast. To edit the show, Skyline employed the company Picardy Television rather than the director himself, which, the latter argued, was cheaper for the company. Consequently, the person who filmed *Scottish Women* and the one who edited it might apply different criteria.

As far as the editorial decisions were concerned, STV and Skyline cooperated during the transition phase, during which Blair Jenkins met regularly with Leslie Hills for her to establish the editorial and production procedures of the show. Thereafter, under the formal supervision of STV, Skyline had full responsibility for decision-making.

Sheena MacDonald collaborated with Skyline during these three series. However, the changes had come as a surprise to her. She was discontented with STV because the company had not involved her in deciding the new production arrangements, but also because STV did not intend to invest in the development of the show (new set, better slot). It appeared that Sheena MacDonald, who had been the key to the *Scottish Women's* success, gradually lost interest in the show and got involved in other projects in London (such as *Right to Reply* (C4)), making it clear that she was tired of presenting the show under such conditions.

The takeover by the Light Entertainment department

Once STV had gained its ITV franchise covering the next decade, the company needed to redefine its programming policies. Jim Brown, the new head of Light Entertainment, confirmed this:

In November 1992, STV had a policy of upping its profile and becoming a major player in the whole network. In their franchise application, they decided that they would make more entertainment hours than anywhere else in the network or regional programming. That was my incentive for coming back home after having worked in the major companies down South.⁶

The franchise application committed STV to produce a debate as part of its regional output. At the time, *Scottish Women* was the only STV programme which satisfied this commitment. The show was re-evaluated by STV's managers, who concluded that Skyline's background was inappropriate to develop *Scottish Women* into a high audience profile format.

As a consequence, Jim Brown took the show back into in-house production to perform the required transformation. According to the producer Carol Haining, STV's managers maintained the programme title because, they argued, a new name might have completely lost the old identity of the show, which had proved a reasonable success over the years. Arguably, though, the title 'Scottish Women' was also maintained as part of the STV policy to reaffirm the Scottishness of its schedule. This argument is pursued in the last section of this chapter.

The purpose of the reform was to produce a lively discussion emulating the format of most audience discussion programmes. Therefore, although the members of the new production team were mostly female, they were chosen among professionals with experience in discussion programmes but who were not necessarily motivated by bringing a purely female perspective into the show. Carol Haining selected the

researchers from among journalists from radio debates (Heather Curley, Laura Young) and print journalism (Heather Day).

After the first fifteen editions, the new version proved a remarkable success in terms of audience figures. According to the Light Entertainment department, the new *Scottish Women* had an average 20% greater share than the Current Affairs version during both Eagles' and Hills' production phases.

The above account of the history and production periods of *Scottish Women* has aimed to establish two points: on the one hand, that this female debate moved from a current affairs and feminist approach, to a light entertainment format, which was based on the STV programming policies of the nineties, and on the other hand, to present the background of the production teams and their goals to see whether they influenced the editorial decision-making and the research of the programme. These points are further developed in the following section.

4.3 Setting up a series

Audience discussion programmes present similar editorial and production processes. Once the purposes of the show have been defined, the development of a series involves the following steps: (i) choosing the issues, (ii) establishing the approach and the agenda, (iii) preparing the editorial material, (iv) selecting the lay participants, the witnesses and the experts, and finally, (v) transmitting or recording (and editing) the programme.

These different stages of production are by and large unseen by the viewer, who often assumes that the participants can be spontaneous and unrestricted during the show.

However, each of these production steps involves economic and political decisions that, as the analysis will illustrate, shape in varying degrees the terms of participants' contributions.

4.3.1 A women's approach

Scottish Women was designed to discuss topics of interest to the whole spectrum of the audience within a women's perspective. The male programme-makers involved in the launch of the show - Gus McDonald, Blair Jenkins and Henry Eagles - made sure that this objective was achieved without being taken over by feminist views. However, it is fair to say that whereas traditionally men have the predominant voice in the public sphere, these professionals offered Scottish women the chance to have their own forum.

Due to the inexperience of STV in producing discussion programmes, first *Scottish Women* relied heavily upon organisations, political parties and lobbies to gather the studio audience, since these were the obvious sources to go to. However, the selection through groups was partially supported by the producers themselves who wanted to show the scope of the female networks in Scotland and give them the chance to speak. Through those 'structured' contacts, the production team started building a database of potential participants.

It would be naïve to disregard the influence on the programme of a certain Scottish feminist culture. During the three production periods, the members of the *Scottish Women* teams were mainly female; consequently, it was predictable that they would underline discriminatory circumstances and deficiencies that women still face in Scotland and in the world, and also that these aspects would eventually be reported on by some Scottish feminists.

Purposes

During the first production period (1987-1990), Henry Eagles was responsible for shaping the show. However, he remarked that each edition was planned jointly with the researchers and the presenter. Eagles' standpoint was that *Scottish Women* had to be controversial by bringing into the studio radical women that could challenge the views of the male viewer. Thus, Eagles was explicitly favourable to gathering contributions from feminist groups.

Nevertheless, in this researcher's view, Leslie Hills was the *Scottish Women* producer most determined to focus the debates on women's perspectives and opinions. When she took over, Hills pointed out that her background and contacts would inevitably affect her editorial style. Maybe to contain this influence, STV asked Sheena MacDonald to share editorial responsibilities with Hills. The producer envisaged *Scottish Women* as a platform for Scottish working class and elderly women to be listened to. Hills was also convinced that the show might gradually contribute to decrease sexual discrimination in Scotland.

Leslie Hills tried to balance information, authenticity and entertainment. Information was provided by a carefully selected range of experts in contrast to the personal opinions and experiences from the lay participants. The short slot of the show left no room for storytelling, which is frequently the most publicly entertaining element of this type of show.

When STV 'killed' the original format and passed the show over to the Light Entertainment department, the new team was told that the programme had to brighten up. The new producer, Carol Haining, also pointed out that *Scottish Women* had been rather middle-class, elitist and needed to widen the spectrum of its participants. This was done by inviting the viewer to participate by phoning directly to the programme. *Scottish*

Women abandoned the old database that STV and Skyline had built, and selected witnesses from amongst phone calls from viewers and personal contacts.

4.3.2 Choosing topics

The selection of topics established the editorial criterion of the different production teams. Choosing topics depended on the producers (generally inspired by the researchers), the presenters, and frequently influenced by the managers above them.

During the first phase at the Current Affairs department, Henry Eagles, Sheena MacDonald and the researchers collectively decided on the issues. This team insisted on topical issues, strongly attached to the current affairs agenda (nurses' strike, the budget 1988, poll tax), but, given the fact that it was the first phase of this female forum, the team also laid a heavy emphasis on women's issues (feminism, positive discrimination, women in politics).

During the Skyline phase, Leslie Hills and Sheena MacDonald discussed their respective proposals for issues which should provide the audience with a better understanding of common people's concerns. Once both women had agreed a list of issues, Blair Jenkins, head of Current Affairs department, supervised it. The researchers did not contribute to the selection of issues. Skyline covered a wide range of questions concerning health and social welfare (smoking, caring, drugs, alcoholism, eating disorders).

With regard to Skyline's choice, Jenkins and Sheena MacDonald had already pointed out to Hills that the programmes were sometimes too serious to attract the whole spectrum of viewers. Hills maintained that despite the issues, the participants had the ability to twist tragedy into providing an unexpected effect which made the programme entertaining. According to the information gathered, the broadcaster never pushed Skyline to modify

the editorial format. At the time, maybe STV had already decided that *Scottish Women* would shortly be changed.

To the Light Entertainment department, the question of whether the issues were 'heavy' or 'light' was irrelevant because each topic had to bring out its entertaining side. The purpose of the new *Scottish Women* was to primarily confront antagonistic views that could provoke controversy among the studio audience. Paraphrasing Kaye Adams, the programme had to reach a balance between 'heat' and 'light'.

Jim Brown, David Scott (head of regional programming) and Carol Haining assembled to discuss a provisional topics list, from which the producer and the researchers then selected the issues that might generate more entertainment and spark. By way of illustration, topics of the new *Scottish Women* were the erotic press, homosexuality, twins and fame.

Despite being pre-recorded, *Scottish Women* always tried to fit into the show specific issues from the current affairs agenda. Two cases in point were the programme on the menopause, which was transmitted when Germaine Greer's controversial book *The Change* was in the headlines, and infertility, televised during British National Infertility Week.

Both the Skyline and the Light Entertainment producers accepted suggestions from their respective heads of departments and from other organisations.⁷ For instance, Blair Jenkins recommended a programme on Saint Andrew's Night, which Skyline turned into a discussion on the female role in Scottish traditions.

4.3.3 The 109 issues of *Scottish Women*⁸

The topics of both *Scottish Women* and *La Vida en un Xip* have been classified according to the same criteria in order to provide a comparative understanding of the different priorities of both programmes and the different production teams involved.

The classification of issues contains eight different groups: 1) Citizenship & Infrastructure, 2) Sociopolitical conflicts, 3) Love & Sex, 4) Women's issues (exclusive to *Scottish Women*), 5) Essential human values, 6) National identity & Culture, 7) Education & Family, and 8) Extrasensory perception. Here, It is useful to call these groupings 'boxes' in order to emphasise that the classifications are arbitrary and that this is one method of classifying these topics.

'Citizenship & Infrastructure' contains a wide range of issues whose common denominator is the exploration of the many diverse aspects of social life and also the facilities provided by the state to its citizens. This group includes economic and political issues as well as questions of habits and health. The other 'boxes' will be commented on in relation to the classification of issues showed below.

The box 'Women's issues' contains programmes which, in the judgment of the author, were chosen because the audience was almost exclusively female. *Scottish Women's* 'National identity & Culture' issues are explored in the last section of this chapter.

In the research period, *Scottish Women* had 109 transmissions: the first 64 were produced in-house by the Current Affairs department, 30 by the production company Skyline and, up until Summer 1993, 15 were produced back in-house by the Light Entertainment department. The table below presents the issues of these three production periods, which allows us to compare the two Current Affairs phases (Current Affairs department STV, 1987-90 and Skyline, 1991-92) with the Light Entertainment series in 1993.

Fig. 4.1 The 109 transmissions of *Scottish Women* (1987-1993)**Table Category / Period**

(number of issues and percentages classified according to categories)

Category	CAd STV (1987-90)		Skyline (1991-92)		CA phase (1987-92)	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
1-. Citizenship & Infrastructure	22	34.4	14	46.7	36	38.3
2-. Sociopolitical conflicts	13	20.3	4	13.3	17	18.1
3-. Love & Sex	9	14.1	2	6.7	11	11.7
4-. Women's issues	8	12.5	2	6.7	10	10.7
5-. Essential human values	7	10.9	1	3.3	8	8.5
6-. National identity & Culture	4	6.3	3	10.0	7	7.4
7-. Education & Family	0	0.0	4	13.3	4	4.2
8-. Extrasensory perception	1	1.5	0	0	1	1.1
Total	64	100	30	100	94	100

Category	LEd (1993)		TOTAL (1987-1993)	
	N	%	N	%
1-. Citizenship & Infrastructure	6	33.3	41	37.6
2-. Sociopolitical conflicts	1	6.7	18	16.5
3-. Love & Sex	4	20.0	14	12.9
4-. Women's issues	0	13.3	12	11.0
5-. Essential human values	2	13.3	10	9.2
6-. National identity & Culture	0	0.0	7	6.4
7-. Education & Family	1	6.7	5	4.6
8-. Extrasensory perception	1	6.7	2	1.8
Total	15	100	109	100

Glossary:**CAd** - Current Affairs department - *Scottish Women* produced by the Current Affairs department at STV.**Skyline** - *Scottish Women* produced by Skyline under the supervision of the Current Affairs department at STV.**CA phase** - production phase which embodies the Current Affairs department and the Skyline production periods.**LEd** - Light Entertainment department - *Scottish Women* produced by the Light Entertainment department at STV.

These tables show the different priorities of the STV and Skyline producers. The analysis of the data during the Light Entertainment department period needs to take into

account that only fifteen programmes had been produced when this research was carried on, although, it is indicative of the new editorial approach. There are relevant contrasts between the two current affairs phases - Skyline's significant increase in the groupings 'Citizen & Infrastructure' and 'Education & Family' in comparison to the Current Affairs department phase at STV. However, the main differences arise between these and the Light Entertainment period.

As the tables show, when *Scottish Women* was first an in-house production, more than 50% of the programmes produced by Eagles dealt with issues of social infrastructure and sociopolitical conflicts. However, it is worthy of note that during this period there were four editions on racism and three on AIDS. Whereas the latter presents an alarming reality in Scotland (Edinburgh was in those days European capital of people infected by HIV), the stress on racism seems to correspond to the personal concern of the producer, as is argued later.

The distribution of issues during the Skyline phase shifted, being concentrated in the first and second groupings (60%). It is noticeable that topics concerning education and family (13.3%), arguably major concerns of the social background of the women that Hills wanted to hear from - the working class and the elderly, were extensively covered in comparison to the Current Affairs department (0.0%) and the Light Entertainment department (6.7%) phases, during which only one programme dealing with those issues was transmitted. Moreover, the background of the producer herself was in education.

Overall, *Scottish Women* focused on community concerns (37.6%) - health, caring, charity, transport, work, wealth - and sociopolitical conflicts (16.5%) - racism, child abuse, rape, drugs. In relation to this, interestingly, the programme-makers regarded a sense of social responsibility and cooperation as one of the founding elements of the Scottish culture.⁹

Issues exclusively concerning women became less frequent after the first three series. In 1993, when men started to appear in the show, issues were presented from a male-female perspective.¹⁰ In June 1993, Kaye Adams arbitrated the first ever *Scottish Women* battle of the sexes: fifty women vs. fifty men. At this point, the editorial practice of approaching each issue from a women's perspective was definitely over.

According to the total data, nearly 13% of the programmes discussed questions of 'Love & Sex'. It is noticeable that this group scored 20% in the last series. With regard to the increase of 'intimate' issues and the lack of political content in the new production era, Brown argued that the agenda of a light entertainment show was deemed to be different, because Scottish current affairs was being comprehensively covered by other STV programmes. Carol Haining and Kaye Adams defended this argument by supporting Brown, which, to the author, suggested that the latter had been specifically told (maybe by STV's managers or by the ITV Network Centre) to brush aside political matters.

4.3.4 Editorial focus

Once the list of topics for each series was decided, there were several editorial documents required for each programme: (i) the briefing notes or agenda of the topic, (ii) the pre-title, (iii), the promotion, (iv) the introduction, and (v) the questions.

A comparative perspective on the editorial approach of Skyline and the Light Entertainment department reveals that the former established some arrangements with the participants to focus the agenda of the discussion, whereas the latter was less bothered about controlling content matters.

(i) Briefing notes

The briefing notes constituted the conceptual guidelines for the issue, which were sent to the studio participants some days before recording. The briefing notes were already part

of the editorial strategy of Eagles' team. In *Skyline*, Leslie Hills established the main arguments which she considered worth discussing and these were illustrated with some press cuttings. The briefing notes were undoubtedly an instrument to set up the content and tone of the discussion, and often, to put across the producer's personal views.¹¹

The Light Entertainment department never sent any information concerning the topic to the participants. Carol Haining argued that the briefing notes might constrain their spontaneity and induce them to think that the programme expected them to consider those points rather than other items of their own interest.

Apart from the briefing notes, there were other editorial pieces drafted by the presenters themselves: the pre-title, the promotion and the introduction to the show. Their proposals were discussed with their respective producers and directors. With regard to the style of those introductions, whereas Sheena MacDonald tried to maintain a neutral viewpoint, Kaye Adams often gave away her own thoughts in order to motivate the studio audience.

(ii) Pre-title

The pre-title was a 'flash' on the issue designed to hook the audience, which was presented before the opening titles:

Your wedding is the happiest day of your life. No? Well, what is it then?

(Weddings, 15-10-91)

Like shelling peas, isn't it? The most natural thing in the world having babies... until you get pregnant that is...!

(Childbirth, 1-6-93).

(iii) Promotion

The promotion was recorded after the discussion with the background of the women who had contributed to the show. Its purpose was to advertise the programme by raising me of the arguments that the discussion would develop:

The perfect wedding - is it possible? What should you wear? Who should you invite? How much should you spend? What's the etiquette second time round? Or when it's shotgun? Dozens of brides offer their experiences - some are old, some are new - so borrow a 'hanky' and a blue half an hour on joining *Scottish Women*.

(Weddings, 15-10-91)

Let me introduce you to my ideal man (brings in dummy) you might think he's a dummy but to me he's Peter Perfect with all the qualities I am looking for. Handsome, humorous, ambitious, sensitive and stinking rich. Shallow, me? Does your ideal mate look anything like this? And perhaps more interestingly, how do you score on this lot's list of priorities (gestures to men) *Scottish Women* goes fifty-fifty tonight for a good thrash around.

(Women vs. Men, 2-6-93)

(iv) Introduction

Before the discussion, the presenter addressed a few statements to the viewer in relation to the content and purpose of the programme. Occasionally, this introduction emphasised the female perspective in relation to the issue:

...And that's very hard - not least, but possibly more so, for women, who are often isolated, marginalised and sometimes not even recognised as needing the special support - such as it is - available to people with HIV.

(From the introduction to AIDS, 15-10-91)

The style of Kaye Adams was remarkably more personal and plain than Sheena MacDonald's. However, due to the lack of an informative approach in this new period, the presenter frequently included some data in this piece:

The most recent figures tell us around sixty-seven thousand babies are born in Scotland in the space of a year. All but 2% are delivered in hospital and the vast majority, happily, make a safe landing. So, everybody happy? Alas, no. (...) Well, we have women here who've done it, women who're thinking about it and as you can tell from the varying sizes of bumps, women who've done more than think.

(From the introduction to Childbirth, 1-6-93)

(v) Questions

In the original version, a dozen questions were prepared for the poll. To a certain extent, those questions defined the agenda of the topic. As mentioned earlier, the voting system determined the rhythm and arguments of the debate. Questions led to two different sorts of discourse: the experts' views (*Does the male menopause exist?*) and the personal experience (*Do you experience PMZ - post menopausal zest?*).¹²

The questions were formulated by the producer and the presenter with suggestions from the rest of the team. During the programme, Sheena MacDonald decided when and which questions would be polled. Some programmes only contained opening and closing questions, whereas others allowed a more quantifiable approach.

Overall, the decision-making process of *Scottish Women* was controlled by female professionals. In *Skyline*, the editorial decisions and documents were carefully planned to cover an agenda that the producer had considered worth discussing. However, the presenter rarely jeopardised the neutrality of the programme and tended to put her own views aside.

The Light Entertainment department did not consider it necessary to brief the participants about the issues beforehand. In contrast to this lack of concern about the content, the dynamics of the show, that is, movements of the presenter, interventions of witnesses, order of speeches, were carefully set up. The new show aimed to tell stories and an overview of the issues, despite the full research developed for each edition, was secondary. Kaye Adams played her role as a show-woman rather than a current affairs journalist. As it will be explained, her attitude on the floor symbolised the metamorphosis of the show.

4.3.5 Production process

The production process of *Scottish Women* consisted of selecting the participants, researching the topic and setting up the list of the women and the seating plans for the recordings. For each series of eight topics, there were four evenings of recording - two programmes per day.

The fieldwork for this thesis was developed during the production of the two Skyline series Autumn 1991 and Spring 1992 and the Light Entertainment department's series of Spring - Summer 1993. Their production procedures were altogether different. Special attention is paid to the distinctive criteria that Leslie Hills (Skyline) and Carol Haining (Light Entertainment department) applied to the selection of experts, witnesses and lay participants.

4.3.5.1 Skyline: a database and a seating plan

The original set of *Scottish Women* had a capacity for exactly one hundred women. Each evening of recording, a hundred and forty women were distributed between the two programmes, and consequently, at least 60% of them attended both. The main production task of the Skyline team was to select those women - lay participants and experts - and to send to them the briefing notes before the recording.

The database and the selection of participants

In 1987, the production team at the Current Affairs department started building up a database, which registered more than eight-hundred potential participants. This database, which was transferred to Skyline in 1991, had the records of women from feminist groups, political parties, local authorities, the Scottish Office and all sorts of Scottish cultural associations with a female orientation. Each record registered the personal and professional details of each woman, as well as her hobbies, political affiliation, ethnicity and interests. Skyline also gathered new women through contacts made by prior

participants and the response to the adverts published in newspapers, magazines and local radio.

Once the dates of recording and transmission were fixed, Jill Punton and Elaine Henry selected from the database potential participants with particular interests in the two issues being recorded that evening or people who simply wished to attend *Scottish Women*. For each Skyline series, Jill Punton selected around six-hundred women, to which she sent a first letter to inform about the recording dates. Once the researcher had distributed the participants over the recording sessions, a second letter was sent to confirm whether they would attend just the one or the two sessions of that evening. The last mail package contained the briefing notes and the registration form.

The programme paid reasonable traveling costs and a £10 fee to each participant. Most women came from Edinburgh and Glasgow. STV considered that *Scottish Women* geographically represented its audience, mainly based in the central belt.¹³

Selecting experts

The briefing notes established the arguments to be discussed and the conflicts to be aired during the discussion. Bearing those in mind, Elaine Henry selected a dozen experts per programme. She contacted the appropriate bodies to invite their relevant figures and gather information. The experts were asked to offer information and guidance. Skyline put no stress on selecting witnesses, although occasionally some key figures were invited. The Beltane May Queen and members of The Clan and the Irvine Lassies Burns Club were a case in point for the programme on traditions.

The usual advisers of the researcher were the Well Women Clinics, the women's unit of Edinburgh District Council, a public relations partnership, the sociology departments at Edinburgh and Stirling universities and other specific projects. Elaine Henry also had personal contacts from her prior work for a feminist bookshop and for Edinburgh

Council. Generally, Elaine Henry, assisted by Jill Punton, researched the series on her own. Once the experts had been selected, the producer and the presenter examined their names and roles to make sure that no standpoints had been missed.

The experts were invited to contribute as part of the hundred women in the stalls. As for the rest of the audience, their names were identified, but not their professional backgrounds. The idea behind this egalitarian treatment was that the hundred Scottish women, despite backgrounds or professional activities, were all equally entitled to talk. By not distinguishing lay participants from experts, the programme-makers disguised - maybe unwillingly - their editorial criteria, since the purposes and procedures involved in selecting each category were different. The former had been invited to inform - they were the ones that held the 'strong views' that Hills pursued, whereas the latter had been guided via briefing notes about the content that the show should discuss.¹⁴ Frequently, this lack of formal distinction between lay participants and experts persuaded the latter not to accept the invitation.

The lists

When the participants for each programme had been confirmed, Jill Punton entered their data into the computer and printed a list with the hundred names for each edition. This list was handed to the STV caption operator who entered into the graphic computer the hundred captions corresponding to the seat number of each woman.

Apart from the captions list, *Scottish Women* had an editorial list which contained the hundred women's personal and professional details: number of children, occupations, interests, organisations to which they belonged, political affiliations and ethnicity. The captions and the editorial lists were crucial to control the form and content of the discussion during the recording.

4.3.5.2 'Opening the participation a wee bit'

The Light Entertainment department applied different production procedures to those recounted above. Following an strategy to brighten up the show and increase the spectacle, the new team frequently devised some sort of colourful illustrations in relation to the issues (music, photographs, clips, demonstrations from the audience). For instance, for the programme on sex crimes, the production recorded a fictional sequence, which portrayed the interrogation of a female rape victim by a male judge to remind the viewer of cases of sexual discrimination in the judiciary. As we will see, portraying social debates through fiction was one of the strengths of *La Vida en un Xip*.

In the Light Entertainment version, the number of participants varied (55-70), but, unlike in prior series, the same person never attended two programmes. Carol Haining wanted to 'open the participation a wee bit': before the production of each new series, on-air promotions of *Scottish Women* offered the viewers two telephone lines for those who wished to attend the show. Gathering people through the telephone, the mechanism broadly used by this kind of show, provided *Scottish Women* with participants not necessarily attached to any organisation, but, as Kaye Adams put it, keen on developing 'the talkative side of the Scots'.¹⁵

The company Action Line gathered phone calls through two lines, one in Glasgow and one in Edinburgh. Since the former registered a larger response than the latter, participants from the East Coast were selected through groups and personal contacts to balance the geographical representation.

Apart from lay participants and witnesses who might be selected from amongst the phone callers, the researchers and the producer used their personal contacts to gather the members of the panel and other experts and witnesses placed in key seats (front rows and central aisle). The panel was to play an antagonistic and controversial role to arouse the audience. With respect to this, *Scottish Women* seemed to be more keen on having a

panel of well-known figures with personal experiences to tell, than a panel of experts. However, the criterion varied according to the issue - the programme on body beautiful had a panel of witnesses whereas the one on transplants was constituted by members of the medical profession.

As far as male participation was concerned, Carol Haining considered that the veto on men was narrow-minded. She devised the issues from a global perspective, trying to confront male and female views, since, she argued, women should not be seen as living in a vacuum:

We say: how do we justify to have a man in there? They have to justify themselves. We are doing a programme on twins, and we wanted mums and dads of twins... We think of topics that can be of interest to women and men, and we say: can we present it in a way that interests men as well?¹⁶

Having said that, Haining remarked that *Scottish Women* would never have a mixed audience unless the title of the show was changed. The presence of male participants had already provoked a hostile reaction from *Scottish Women* fans through letters and phone calls to STV. STV's managers, threatened by losing this loyal audience, were reluctant to abandon the principles of the original format: women would always be a majority in the studio.

Each researcher was in charge of two or three programmes per series. After having interviewed potential guests, experts, witnesses and lay participants over the phone, they selected them: two to five guests in the panel and twenty key experts and witnesses among the rest of the studio audience. These key figures were distributed in a seating plan similar to the one drawn up by Elaine Henry in prior series. Each researcher produced a 'summary' of the show: a document of several pages that described the objectives of the topic, the main arguments for discussion and a transcription of the views of each guest, expert and witness in the studio. The researchers also arranged the

captions, which contained the name of the guests, experts and witnesses and their involvement with the topic. The lay participants remained anonymous. The researcher's summary and the seating plan were similar instruments to the above-mentioned editorial list, to support the presenter during the recording.

4.3.6 At the studio

The production and the technical team put the programme together at the STV Gateway Studios in Edinburgh, where the last editorial meetings took place hours before recording. The two programmes were taped during the evening with a break of an hour to reset the studio facilities.

4.3.6.1 Pre-recording tasks

The women were asked to turn up in mid-afternoon with their registration forms completed, which would allow them to be repaid their travel expenses and the fee of £10. After these formal procedures, they waited in the foyer, where members of the production team made sure that each participant had her seat number in correspondence to the number of her caption. Whilst the women waited, the researchers talked to the experts and witnesses to confirm that they were determined to maintain the arguments or stories that they had explained to them over the telephone.

Editorial briefings

Whereas the Skyline producer held firm control over content and agenda, the Light Entertainment department team was more keen on setting up the show in aesthetic and formal terms. This contrast came across through the different advice given to the presenters by producers and executive producers. During the afternoon, the presenter, the producer, the director and the assistant producer met to rehearse the pre-title, the

introduction and the promotion of each programme to check the content and the technical aspects. They agreed on the tone and the general strategy for the discussion.

Sheena MacDonald and Leslie Hills planned each programme according to the seating plan, the editorial list and the list of questions to put to the vote. They decided which questions and experts would come first and which lay participants were worth paying special attention to, according to the information contained in the editorial list. Once the researcher had talked to the experts in the foyer, she signaled in the seating plan their role and their seat number and had a last briefing with the presenter about them.

Kaye Adams and Carol Haining also discussed the structure of the programme, but particularly the order of interventions and the attitude of the presenter with the different key participants. The presenter had partially scripted her movements and speeches during the programme.

Formal procedures and advice

Once the women had taken their respective seats in the studio, Leslie Hills and Sheena MacDonald pointed out some procedures: 1) the presenter would not identify anybody's occupation, but everyone who wished to say what they did was free to do so; 2) the presenter would not introduce each speaker individually; 3) the editing of the programme would cut the shots of people pressing the voting buttons (apparently, there was general concern about being seen physically voting for one or other option); 4) since the programme was recorded, the women were warned not to use contemporary references; 5) some interventions would be cut during the editing.

In the Light Entertainment series, similar advice was given by Steve Hamilton, the public relations man employed by Jim Brown to warm up the studio audience before Kaye Adams appeared on the floor. The fact that the public relations officer of *Scottish Women* was a man is also indicative of the intention to avoid 'female bonding'.

There were microphones distributed all over the set to amplify the voices of the speakers. In the original setting, technical assistants with hand microphones were placed in the aisles to reach the speakers. In the new set, the members of the panel had individual microphones and the rest of the participants were interviewed by Kaye Adams with a hand microphone.

4.3.6.2 Recording: the word and the camera

Recording a television show involves a team work between the professionals in the gallery, and the presenter and the technicians in the set. During the recordings of *Scottish Women*, the presenters were connected through an earpiece to the gallery, from where the executive producer, the producers and the researchers controlled the rhythm and content of the discussion.

The original *Scottish Women* had a key person in the set overseeing the studio audience, the spotter, who gave the name and seat number of each speaker according to the seating plan. The spotter, Fiona Cumming, was also connected through microphones to the gallery: 'Margaret Mitchell. 54. Confirm'. This information allowed the caption operator to prepare the name of the speaker immediately.

The look of the show changed drastically in the Light Entertainment series of *Scottish Women* and brightened up the atmosphere of the discussion. The old set was painted a pale blue and offered no other sight than the rows of faces. By contrast, the new set had two spaces: the stalls and the panel. Behind the panel, there was an orange and yellow background with some patches of purple, in harmony with the colours of the capital letters 'SW' drawn in the centre of the set.

During the filming of the Current Affairs series of *Scottish Women*, the discussion was shot with five cameras: four of them followed the speakers and a fifth camera was on the presenter. The director, Douglas Napier, was not satisfied with the technical facilities of the programme. First, the twenty-five minute slot forced him to record an extra period of discussion since, he argued, the first ten minutes were, in fact, a warming up of little interest to the debate.

Second, the STV technical equipment for *Scottish Women* did not provide telephoto cameras with which to take close-ups of the speakers. Instead, due to the size of the studio, the closest shot that Napier could get showed the speaker and the person sitting by her side. This shot was not satisfactory since the image of the companion might distract the viewer's attention from the speaker.

Finally, as mentioned earlier, the rigid parliamentary shape of the set constrained the dynamics of speech. The presenter's podium was in the middle surrounded by the rows of seats to which she had no access. The women, instead of interacting and replying to each other's arguments, tended to address their speeches to the presenter. The director, thus, had to show Sheena MacDonald, who might or might not be interested in replying to the previous contribution. The presenter was unwillingly the focal point.

Those problems were pointed out to STV, but, the director was told there was no budget for new facilities. Also, Jenkins argued that the 'parliamentary' attitude of the participants gave dignity and seriousness to the debate. However, when Light Entertainment asked for a new set, STV found the budget for it. The new director, Cliff Martin, shot the show with six cameras: four mobile cameras followed the discussion, one shot the panel guests and one oversaw the studio audience. Kaye Adams had no podium and, therefore, she was shown on the platform among the speakers. As the set was smaller, the cameras managed to shoot the participants individually.

Overall, during the Skyline series, it was noticeable that the technical conditions constrained interaction amongst the women. By contrast, the new distribution of space encouraged the speakers to reply to each other and Kaye Adams was free to intervene when she wanted or she needed to.

4.3.6.3 In the gallery

The small earpiece connected the presenter with the gallery, where only three people were entitled to speak: the director, the production assistant, and the producer.

The director was connected with the cameramen and the rest of technical crew and with the spotter to coordinate the identification of the speakers. The director might occasionally inform the presenter about technical matters (movements, time, sound problems). The production assistant controlled the timing. To Sheena MacDonald, the timing was a guidance, rather than a countdown, since the director would usually record ten extra minutes of discussion on top of the transmission time to allow some flexibility in editing the show. By contrast, Cliff Martin stopped the recording close to the thirty-seven minutes of transmission to avoid cutting interventions.

During the recordings, editorial control was still in hands of the producer and the researchers. It was observed then that the editorial lists, the summary of the programme and the seating plans were used by the respective producers to relay information on the presenters through the earpiece. Occasionally, Hills suggested to Sheena MacDonald to put a question to the vote or stress a certain aspect. She might mention details about the speakers (political affiliation, organisations, personal interests, occupation, religion). However, since the presenter had long experience in conducting the show, this task was merely supportive.

Carol Haining used the summary of the show prepared by the researcher for the same purposes. Haining suggested questions to Kaye Adams to ask interviewees. The producer might suggest to the presenter to introduce people from other rows or to move to other areas of discussion. Since Kaye Adams had no experience of presenting discussion shows, the intervention of the producer was more intense in the Light Entertainment than in the Current Affairs series. The presenter's earpiece is a significant point of comparison with the Catalan show. Overall, the editorial control of *La Vida en un Xip* relied upon the presenter, since there was no direct connection between himself and the rest of the team during the programme.

4.3.6.4 In the scenery

Generally, presenters' popularity makes participants believe that the show is under their control. Participants do as they are told by these popular figures. Both producers and presenters are aware of this situation of power during the performance. A television show is to some extent a ceremony which generates respect and atmosphere. The presenters are the priests and the underlying faith of the participants in them holds back any interference in the ritual. That explains why producers and executive producers, who, like Jim Brown or Leslie Hills, have strong editorial views, take a back seat during the recordings even if they have the means to act (microphones, editorial lists, seating plans).

Thus, the presenters of audience discussion programmes are finally the key to the attitude and tone of the participants, since, the latter tend to mimic the host. In spite of technical constraints or external advice, the show reflects the character of the presenter. *Scottish Women* shows two striking contrasts.

Sheena MacDonald: seeking an interactive discussion

Sheena MacDonald was a scrupulous current affairs journalist who approached participants in a friendly manner without losing, though, her role of impartial referee of the discussion. Before recording, Sheena MacDonald used to warm up the women by testing questions. She often asked whether the women had participated in prior editions of the show. Twice during the fieldwork of this case study, 20% of the audience replied 'Yes'. The presenter also found out through these pilot questions that the majority of participants of the programme on television had no interest in knowing who owned the media or what would be results of the ITV franchise awards (quite discouraging for those who try to offer a better understanding of this industry).

Once all the technicalities had been checked, the director started recording: pre-title, introduction and a first question to start the discussion with: 'Do you welcome advances in reproductive technology?', 'Are you well informed about AIDS?', 'Have you ever been a bride?' The results divided the audience between 'Yes' and 'No' arguments and the debate took off.

The discussion of the old *Scottish Women* was not interactive. Apart from the technical inconveniences described above, the women had frequently practiced their speeches beforehand and their contributions were rarely related to a previous statement. The experts would only very occasionally take a non-specialised approach, usually maintaining a conceptual discourse. The presenter tried to stay back by encouraging conversation among the participants, but she inevitably became some type of Madam Speaker of the discussion.

Since it was unfeasible to fit a hundred contributions into twenty-five minutes, the presenter asked for short and concise speeches to include as many as possible in the on-line edition. The time available and the dynamics of discourse reduced the amount of confessional storytelling and increased the utterance of opinions. Given the technical

changes of the last series, Kaye Adams had a more advantageous setting than Sheena MacDonald to host a vivid discussion.

Kaye Adams, kneeling around the floor

Kaye Adams had a spontaneous and inquisitive character. She never intended to perform a serious role in television and she hoped that her future would rather be as 'the Scottish Oprah' than as 'the Peter Sissons of STV'. *Scottish Women* gave her the chance to prove her abilities.

The new technical setting of the show allowed Kaye Adams to express her own personality to a greater extent than Sheena MacDonald could or might have done. Adams had been told that the programme ought to be spontaneous and sparkling. Thus, she was well-disposed to do anything: she interviewed people on her knees, joked with the audience, pretended that she had a twin sister in the studio and carried dummies around the floor. Her extrovert approach to the show, though, led her sometimes to give away her own views which might jeopardise her neutral role when dealing with other issues or presenting other shows.

Overall, the attitude of the new presenter and the new distribution of participants on the set made the latter feel more relaxed than in prior series, and talk to each other rather than to the host. However, the panel-audience relation worked with some difficulty, since the programme generally started with the witnesses and experts sitting in the stalls, and the analytical views of the panel did not always fit into the storytelling occurring on the platform.

Once the programme was entirely recorded, the producer and the presenter thanked the participants for their contributions. Then the discussions were ready to be edited.

4.3.7 Editing

Cliff Martin recorded thirty-seven minutes of discussion, which just needed a touch of editing for aesthetic details. By contrast, Douglas Napier recorded a longer discussion which needed more than 'cosmetic surgery'. However, as mentioned earlier, he was not in charge of this task. He handed the tapes with the recordings to Skyline.

The task of the off-line version involved reducing the recorded material to the twenty-five minutes of transmission. Leslie Hills and Sheena MacDonald met after the recordings to view the tapes and decide which bits should be cut. Shots of the presenter organising the debate and speeches that contained unsuitable contemporary references were normally eliminated. Leslie Hills would decide to cut contributions if they had no coherence with the issue or if she considered that they added nothing to the discussion.

If a participant asked the programme to leave out her contribution, the producer would consider it. For instance, a woman phoned Skyline after the programme on AIDS. She argued that her husband had died of AIDS and she did not want to appear on television remarking that he died because of his promiscuousness. The producer agreed to cut her intervention. Subsequently, to avoid this problem, Jim Brown asked the women to sign a consent form through which they gave the programme total control over their image and interventions in the show.

Skyline employed Richard Loup Nolan from Picardy Television to do the last touches of editing, that is, to apply technical criteria to the cuts that the producer and her editorial adviser had planned. Leslie Hills directed the editing at Picardy Television with Loup Nolan. When the on-line version was finished, Skyline sent the tapes to the STV Glasgow Studios for supervision. Neither the head of Current Affairs, nor Skyline could think of any particular editorial conflict in editing. *Scottish Women* was then ready for transmission.

4.4 Impact and prospects¹⁷

Scottish Women never scored among the top programmes of STV, however, during the Current Affairs phases (1987-1992), the show maintained a reasonable 30% of the STV share, which, according to Jenkins, was more than STV expected from a female debate. Furthermore, one of the first surprises of STV's managers was that *Scottish Women* was watched by both women and men.

During the series in Autumn 1991, the viewing figures of *Scottish Women* in Central Scotland registered an average of 350,000 viewers and a STV share of 41%. According to the company, over the years the estimated average was of 500,000 viewers. *Scottish Women's* audience was mainly over 55 and their class status was C2DE. However, people between 35 and 54 years old showed also a good viewing level. According to STV, *Scottish Women* did not do as well among the young group (20-34) and the ABC1 class, whose percentages were far below their respective averages for other STV products.

These figures, though, need to be evaluated in relation to the slot and the evolution of the format. *Scottish Women* was generally scheduled after 10.30 p.m. Apart from this late night slot, the show was not on the screen every week of the year. For each series there were two or three months of transmission and then a gap before the next series was ready. The technical and economic constraints also stopped the development of other elements, which would have undoubtedly helped to increase its popularity, as the Light Entertainment department phase demonstrated. According to Jim Brown, when his department took over, *Scottish Women* increased 20% over its prior share.

Press criticism

Skyline pointed out that very occasionally the Edinburgh-based *Evening News* published reviews of *Scottish Women*. The press coverage of the show reveals that media critics concentrated on the connotations of the title of the show rather than the content of the discussions. The presence of non-Scottish accents in a programme called *Scottish Women* was a recurrent criticism over the years.

Another wave of faultfinding came with the new version. The tabloids argued that a programme called *Scottish Women* should never include men among the audience. Kaye Adams argued that the title was still in harmony with the programme because the editorial board was Scottish and female. But titles of programmes do not aim to reflect the identity of the production team, rather the identity of the show. Thus, the decision of STV's managers to maintain the title *Scottish Women* made difficult the transition from a female forum to the partially mixed audience of the new phase.

Impact and feedback

Although audience discussion programmes are editorially determined and controlled by media professionals, the discussion may motivate the participants to take decisions about their own problems as a result of what they gather during the show. The value of the programme lies not as much in the transmission itself, but on the capacity to activate discussion and thinking. And that, it is argued, is a strong case for supporting this kind of programme.

Skyline aimed to activate women's networks in Scotland and bring into the studio women with strong views about the topics. The research was focused on Scottish lobbies, political parties, official organisations, support groups and specific women's projects. Elaine Henry pointed out that this research approach contributed to the creation of new women's groups.

At the community level, several women explained that their participation in *Scottish Women* had modified the perception that people had of them and increased their communication with their families and neighbours. At an associative level, programmes on health issues, in particular, connected people with specific projects and support groups. For instance, after the transmission on the menopause, a viewer from Grampian Television phoned Skyline asking for contacts to establish a support group in Inverness.

During the Skyline production phase, feedback from the audience was gathered through letters and phone calls suggesting new issues and information. This feedback helped the development of the database, but undeniably, reinforced the tendency to rely upon established organisations.¹⁸

Prospects

Before the last Skyline series, the official attitude of the Current Affairs department seemed to predict that the original *Scottish Women* was coming to an end: 'It can't go forever. (...) We are all a bit tired of the programme now and we think that the audience are tired too. There is a way to continue current public affairs issues from a women's prospective, but getting away from this programme'. The above quote by Blair Jenkins anticipated that *Scottish Women* might very well disappear. However, as was explained earlier, the reasons why *Scottish Women* was transformed had little to do with the desire of the audience, but rather with the new programming policies, which pushed the company to produce entertaining shows that would appeal to audiences from other ITV companies.

The original *Scottish Women* produced by the Current Affairs department and, subsequently, by Skyline, did not fit the new goals of STV since the show was, indeed, rather local and colourless. At the time, STV was designing a modern image for the company with the change of its logotype and more visual and brighter programmes. *Scottish Women* discussed social and current affairs issues which frequently highlighted

political differences between North and South. By contrast, the project and approach of Jim Brown for the light entertainment version of the show fitted nicely into the current trends, and went ahead.

The audience figures of the more recent transmissions (June 1993) show that the STV viewers prefer the new to the old: Kaye Adams is getting nearly 50% of the STV share on a similar slot to the Skyline series' (Mondays, 10.30 p.m.). Lighter and brighter than Sheena MacDonald's show, the Light Entertainment version of *Scottish Women* manages to achieve what STV needs for today's programming: high audience profile entertainment.

4.5 A Scottish perspective on *Scottish Women*

In the first chapter, it was suggested that cultural identity is reflected through the *images* that the members of the community build of themselves and their lifestyles. Audience discussion programmes contribute to building spaces in which the members of the community can discuss their individual and collective identities. Likewise, such programmes may display 'a portion of the public sphere', particularly in small nations such as Scotland. Later, the attitude of Scottish broadcasters towards their distinctiveness within the British industry was explained. It was argued that the political and cultural dependency of Scotland on London were mirrored by the programming policies and the structure of the Scottish broadcasting organisations. Here, we look at the specific case of *Scottish Women*.

Scottish Women discussed similar issues to *La Vida en un Xip*, and possibly to any other show of its kind. Those universal issues had been chosen by the teams of two Scottish

companies - STV and Skyline, and then discussed by Scottish people from a Scottish perspective during the show. Were the media professionals of *Scottish Women* aware of that? Did they take into consideration questions of boundaries, accents or the political sensitivity of their people? The following pages explore the attitude of the programme-makers in relation to these questions.

4.5.1 Scottishness? Some responses from media professionals

This section explains how the programme-makers made sense of 'a' Scottish national identity in relation to *Scottish Women*. Overall, these media professionals found it hard to define what the Scottishness meant to them, what might make the Scots different from other peoples, and most of all, what might characterise *Scottish Women* as a product of Scottish culture. Some of their responses are transcribed below:

I don't know... I would have to speculate... There is a particular sense of humour: you have to keep joking, because if you don't joke, things will be even worse... I will probably be wrong about what I am going to say, but I would say that when you put a hundred Scottish women together, they can be much more radical than a hundred women from anywhere else.

(Leslie Hills, Skyline producer, 21-11-91)

It's difficult for me to say because I am Scottish... I suspect that by and large it would be the same wherever you made it... and I don't think that the programme would work any less well in England or Wales.

(Douglas Napier, director, 29-10-91)

What a question!... Oh, my God! That's not a question I can answer... I wouldn't say that there is anything in particular that characterises it (the programme) as Scottish... People feel strongly Scottish, but what is the Scottish culture?

(Elaine Henry, researcher, 31-10-91)

I don't know if the Scottish women are different from the rest, to be honest... I don't know if the Scots are terrible different... the Scots like to think that they are different, but I am not sure that they are different.

(Henry Eagles, Current Affairs department producer, 11-12-91)

I think that the programme illustrates the diversity of Scottishness.... I think that the Scots have always been voyagers and have always welcomed free trade and ideas and that is expressed by the programme. As far as the Scottishness is concerned, people find that they have things in common through their personal experiences, rather than any exclusive sense of national identity. And that is what is important.

(Sheena MacDonald, presenter, 17-12-91)

If we've got a spread of people there, that is representative of a whole range of national identities, because I don't think that one does exist in Scotland.

(Carol Haining, Light Entertainment department producer, 9-6-93)

I don't think that making programmes for Scotland is any different from making programmes for England or anywhere else in the world... but you must reflect the Scottish identity and take some considerations in relation to that, absolutely!

(Jim Brown, head of Light Entertainment department
and executive producer, 9-6-93)

As a nation, the Scots can be very defensive, very chip on their shoulder, and very unwilling to debate with somebody who is at a different level. (...) Scots do seek information, they are very inquisitive and very humorous... They are not shallow, by and large. Even the uneducated Scots tend to have an edge to them... and having worked in England, I see that as a difference between the English and the Scottish culture.

(Kaye Adams, presenter, 3-6-93)

The responses of these native Scots raise a range of aspects of the national and cultural identity debate discussed earlier. Is there a perception of 'a' Scottish culture? The researcher, despite being continually in touch with the structure of the Scottish civil society, doubted whether this was the case. Should the media professionals take into consideration the Scottish cultural and political specificity to make television

programmes? The interviewees said yes, but they could not tell how a Scottish programme was different from any other. Are the Scots more humorous, radical, defensive, receptive than the rest of the British people? Maybe. As far as these professionals were concerned, the answers to such questions were rather speculative and vague. But, most of all, the interviewees admitted that they had never thought much about them.

Their perceptions of the Scottish distinctiveness covered a wide spectrum of human characteristics (humour, radical attitude, defensiveness, open-mindedness), inspired to some extent by a stereotyped anti-English definition of the Scots. Overall, though, they admitted that the Scots are 'different'. This vague conviction reflects a central problem in the concept of national identity: whereas it seems difficult to reason what makes a people distinctive from others, the conviction that this distinctiveness exists, as Kellas argues (1991), arises from the 'emotional appeal' of national identity feelings.

The key question, thus, is whether there is a personal belief in a Scottish identity, rather than if a Scottish identity exists as such. The common denominator to most of the responses just cited seems to be that a Scottish national and cultural identity, whatever this may mean, exists. The question to answer now is how these media professionals showed this belief during the production of *Scottish Women*.

The answer can be found by exploring three different questions: (i) which STV policies were applied to *Scottish Women* as a Scottish programme, (ii) how the Scottishness of the participants was perceived by both programme-makers and outsiders, and finally, (iii) how the different production teams faced their tasks in relation to national and cultural identity issues.

4.5.2 *Scottish Women* and STV's policies

STV's policies concerning the political status of the nation within the UK broadcasting industry were discussed in Chapter 2. It was argued there that Scottish dependence on London relies as much upon the structure of the media organisations and the fierce competition among the ITV companies, as upon the goals of the media professionals and the preference of the Scots for network programmes.¹⁹

Carol Haining admitted that the Light Entertainment version of *Scottish Women* had been inspired by similar shows produced in the South. Thus, the shift of *Scottish Women* analysed in previous pages only confirms that if STV endeavours to survive within the network, its programmes need to harmonise with the style determined by the latter.

However, even after the renewal of the format, the title 'Scottish Women' was maintained as a claim on its Scottish character, as a sign of its national identity. In relation to this, Blair Jenkins remarked that STV programmes do express the concern of the company about this issue:

Clearly, this is a very important issue for us. We take the view that we serve a very distinct culture and community. We started on the assumption that the Scots are a nation with different customs, traditions, attitudes from other parts of the UK. (...) We have done a lot of research on this, and we believe that the Scots want us to reflect a distinctive Scottish view in almost every area of life.

But, how does Scottish distinctiveness come across? Titling the show *Scottish Women* evidenced an intention of demarcation. Blair Jenkins argued that this policy of titling corresponds, according to the surveys carried out by STV on these matters, to the will of the viewer to promote and preserve the Scottish identity. Is Scottishness, thus, only about names?

People want a broadcasting Scottish identity..., but they don't want to be funny, the funny Scottish identity. Kilts and tartan are stereotypes and people don't live

like that. The vast majority of the Scots live in very big cities; it's a very industrial country and a lot of this industry has now just collapsed and disappeared... It's an area with huge social problems... and there's no point on giving them a false image of Scotland.²⁰

STV insists that the new ITV system will progressively increase the opportunities for Scotland to produce regional programming. However, the case of *Take the High Road*, despite popular protests against the network's decision to axe the show, still suggests otherwise.²¹ The viewing figures are at the top of the broadcasters' agenda and the Scottish programmes need to break into the network output to survive.

Whereas people from minority cultures with their own mother tongues tend to remain loyal to their indigenous television channels (as in the case of Catalonia), Scotland faces a completely different panorama. The vast majority of the Scots are English-speakers and monolingual. Therefore, as Blair Jenkins argues, they do not stick to Scottish programmes for national or sentimental reasons, but for quality or entertainment. That is why STV asked Jim Brown to convert the unusual *Scottish Women* into a more common format which was already proving a success in the rest of the Anglo-Saxon market.

4.5.3 Participants and nationalism

The title *Scottish Women* determined the expectations that home audiences might have about the programme and attached to it a sense of national belongingness, which, therefore, was subject to personal interpretation.

As mentioned earlier, the common criticism in the press of *Scottish Women* concerned the Scottishness of the audience. According to the programme-makers, the media critics expected the programme to be crowded with Scottish accents rather than people living in Scotland. Thus, the participation of non-Scottish accents was criticised, frequently through nasty nationalistic statements against the ethnic origin of the participants.

Nonetheless, the team of *Scottish Women* assumed that Scotland has a significant number of English immigrants and members of other ethnic minorities. Thus, any woman living and working in the country was entitled to attend the show. Leslie Hills was convinced that the programme should not police people's national identity feelings, granted that the women were prepared to talk about the issues in relation to the Scottish context. This perception of belonging to the place where people live was shared by Henry Eagles, the first ever producer of *Scottish Women* :

You work here, your family live here, you have relationships here, you are part of the culture, you are part of the fabric, and that makes you Scottish. Your accent, your colour, your ethnic minority, your views, don't matter. All that matters is that when you go home, you go home somewhere which is in Scotland.

Eagles had strong thoughts on this matter. The above quote explains to some extent why he planned four editions on racism and problems of ethnic integration in Scotland, in two of which the studio was filled with Scottish women from ethnic minorities. Jenkins and Eagles mentioned that during and after these transmissions, STV received a significant number of phone calls complaining about the presence of non-Scottish women in the show. As anywhere else in the world, repressed national identities do register a percentage of narrow radicalism that tends to be xenophobic and racist. Unfortunately, *Scottish Women* seems to provide some evidence of it.

As far as nationalism is concerned, the confrontation between the Scots and the English is possibly the most popular debate in Scotland. *Scottish Women* had already discussed the Scotland-England rivalry in the past and the new team was considering putting the question on the spot again. According to Kaye Adams, this antagonism reflects a cultural difference between the Scots and the English, which she had the chance to witness when there was a non-Scot on the panel:

We should try very hard to get Scottish people in those protagonist-antagonist roles. (...) Last night we had the editor of GQ from America and a woman from England, and they were good... but I must admit that while we were doing it, it went through my head: 'should we be getting people down from England?', because I could feel the very different perspectives there from the bulk of the audience and these two people out front. They were operating at different levels and it was a cultural thing... The audience might have been thinking: 'What the hell they have to go to London to get some tight-arsed Home Counties type?'... and we did it again.

Whereas Skyline looked for the *Scottish Women's* experts in Scotland, the STV producers, Eagles and Haining, did not hesitate to invite people from other places - America, England, Ireland or Wales. According to Jim Brown, 'if you are making a programme for a Scottish audience, and the best people for that come from London or Manchester, then the programme has to be foremost'. However, the title of the programme, *Scottish Women*, inevitably forced the programme-makers to justify such decisions.

In order to avoid it, in 1993, the Light Entertainment department proposed a new name: *BroadTalk*. Haining wanted to dust off the national and gender connotations of the title: 'They (the audience) would always be more open if it was called *BroadTalk* and I think we should have done that, but there were reasons, I was told, for us not doing it, which were political'. STV maintained the name and required the programme-makers to select the bulk of the audience from amongst Scots.

4.5.4 Topics and identity

During the Current Affairs department phase (1987-1990), *Scottish Women* covered a wide range of political issues which not only referred to questions of Scottish national identity and culture (England, church and the state, nationalism), but also to the political status of the nation within Britain (the budget, the monarchy, right-wing politics, the poll

tax, work). According to the producers, the economic and political structural deficiencies of Scotland, for which Westminster tended to get the blame, were sharply raised by the participants.

This choice of political discussions was followed neither by Skyline nor by the Light Entertainment department. On the one hand, Skyline focused its national identity issues on cultural rather than political matters (traditions, football). On the other hand, Carol Haining believed that the Scottish cause had lost political strength over the years, and consequently, her choice of topics had to reflect the fact that the Scottish people were not as politically motivated as they had been. The Light Entertainment department also argued that the STV current affairs programmes extensively covered those political issues that *Scottish Women* had debated in the past. The latter argument makes some sense, but embraces a lack of conception of the show as a democratic platform to discuss any aspect - political or not - that might affect the Scots.

Scottish Women was the only open debate on STV that allowed the Scots to express their views. If political issues were not to be discussed in this forum, only journalists and people selected to intervene in programmes such *Scottish Questions* would be in a position to talk about them. This policy reflects once more that STV (and commercial television in general) little values questions of democracy in relation to public participation. Thus, the *Scottish Women* case study suggests that STV's new policies overwhelmingly conceive television programmes as economic rather than cultural goods.

4.5.5 'A great sense of solidarity'

Several members of the different production teams mentioned that if the Scots had something in common it was their strong sense of community and solidarity:

People fight for the Scottish people, even in situations of poverty, loss of jobs, and they take care of themselves. There is a strong sense of social justice and provision for as many people as possible... They are probably less class conscious than the rest of the UK. There is a feeling that wherever background you come from, you can mix with everyone else.²²

The above quote seems to support to some extent the argument of egalitarianism discussed earlier in relation to the Scottish cultural discourse. However, Carol Haining insisted that this sense of solidarity belonged to the past, and that the Scottish people of the nineties wanted to move forward:

There was a great sense of solidarity, of the union movement in Scotland, there was a real socialist feeling in Scotland and I think that is lessened now, is less important to the Scottish people now, there is not such a keen sense of nationality.

Whether a question of the past or the present, it is true that community issues were central to *Scottish Women* when the programme followed a current affairs orientated agenda. Furthermore, the selection of participants from among the structured civil society (support groups, lobbies and political parties) strengthened this perception of 'togetherness' of the Scottish culture.²³

Leslie Hills wanted the show to explain why in Britain the current social structures were weakening the Scottish civil institutions and why Scotland needed a change so desperately. According to Skyline, community affairs ought to be discussed because they are the basic concerns of the Scottish people (health, education, AIDS, caring). Given these purposes, it is not surprising that the viewers of *Scottish Women* during the Current Affairs based series were predominantly lower-middle and working class people and the selection of participants favoured those groups and their interests.

By contrast, the light entertainment approach overlooked the social perspective and focused on the individual experience: frequently, the panel was constituted by witnesses

instead of experts; the women were gathered without the mediation of external bodies and the programme did not send out any orientation to prepare a common agenda. The new *Scottish Women* wanted to tell personal stories rather than explain why certain stories happened to be.

Closing titles

The analysis presented above suggests that *Scottish Women* modified its editorial priorities to attune to the political and economic policies of the broadcaster. The production teams and the choice and treatment of the issues reflected those changes faithfully. The evolution of the show also demonstrated a will to open channels of participation to the viewer.

However, broadly speaking, the controlled political culture of the UK media described in Chapter 2 does not tend to favour audience discussion programmes. Television debates involve a certain level of unpredictability, and also require from the audience a capacity to explain their thoughts and experiences whereas traditionally members of a small élite, those coming from privileged backgrounds, have been the ones entitled to speak in television.

Carol Haining explained that STV's managers thought that Scots would not be extrovert and talkative enough to discuss intimate matters on television. Maybe that explains why *Scottish Women* for so long maintained such rigid dynamics of discussion and underlined the social rather than the individual dimension of the issues. However, the European trends of homogenisation and competition affected STV and pushed *Scottish Women* towards a format that today is one of the most popular in West European television.

The new version of *Scottish Women*, despite being chained to the British and European audio-visual scenes, did not lose its Scottish identity, since the programme manifested not only the policies of its broadcasters, but also the attitude and criteria of the people who made it:

I am Scottish, we (the editorial team) are Scottish, the audience is Scottish. That is the Scottishness of *Scottish Women*. I don't think I could ever be conscious of bringing a Scottish perspective to the programme because it is intrinsically a Scottish programme.

(Kaye Adams, presenter, 3-6-93)

Despite Adams' confidence, *Scottish Women* was and is subject to the different perspectives of what Scottishness might mean to every person and institution involved in the making of television.

The following chapter explores similar questions to the ones analysed above in relation to *La Vida en un Xip*. This Catalan show was produced by a small independent company, whose main figures had a strong role in the recovery of Catalan culture in the media. The next chapter looks at this show in relation to Catalonia, a stateless nation with similar political and social constraints to those of Scotland.

Notes

¹ *Scottish Women* was networked by Grampian TV and Border TV, with the exception of the first series of 1993.

² The three phases interlocked in the analysis may confuse the reader. To set up a clear terminology: this study refers to *Scottish Women's* old format (Current Affairs department STV (1987-1990) and Skyline (1991-92)) as 'the original version' and to the Light Entertainment department version (1993) as 'the new version'.

³ The number of participants was reduced from 100 to 55-70 by the Light Entertainment department (1993).

⁴ Debate programme among five-hundred people from Lancashire.

⁵ Egails also added that the network demanded politically orientated discussions without as open a range of topics as in the Scottish version. Furthermore, the network edition was recorded just before the Scottish one, which made the climate of the latter more heated than the former.

⁶ Jim Brown, head of Light Entertainment at STV, interview with the researcher, 9-6-93.

⁷ The sociology department at Stirling University proposed to Skyline a discussion on crime. The information gathered during the programme was offered for academic use.

⁸ See 'The 109 transmissions of *Scottish Women*, in Appendix 2.

⁹ See the last section of this chapter.

¹⁰ That is why the Light Entertainment department editions on infertility and the erotic press have not been classified as women's issues.

¹¹ Appendix 2 contains two of these briefing notes.

Revealing examples of Hills' personal approach are: 'The menopause has received little attention from a male dominated health service and menopausal women are generally the butt of ribald jokes or derision in our society'. (Briefing notes: Life begins at 50? (Menopause), 16-10-91). 'Is the 25 of January a red letter day for the waitresses clad in uncomfortable and impractical "traditional" tight black skirts and white blouses who scuttle between the speeches?' (Briefing notes, 'Bah, Humbug!' (Traditions), 16-10-91)

¹² See Appendix 2 for the questions on reproductive technology and smoking.

¹³ See Chapter 6 for background information about both the participants of *Scottish Women* and *La Vida en un Xip*.

¹⁴ The lack of a distinctive panel makes unfeasible to offer an account of the backgrounds and professions of the experts, as in the *La Vida en un Xip* case study.

¹⁵ Adams, interview with the researcher (3-6-93).

¹⁶ Haining, interview with the researcher (9-6-93).

¹⁷ See viewing figures corresponding to 29-11-91 (Skyline) and 7-6-93 (Light Entertainment department). The viewing figures of Grampian TV and Border TV were not available to this research.

¹⁸ Among the fieldwork developed in the Current Affairs department at STV, the *Scottish Women* files from the 4th series, in May 1990, contained incoming letters from several organisations, which suggested issues and participants. Among those organisations, there were *Women's Group, Pakistan Art and Library Circle, Strathclyde Regional Council, Lothian Regional Council, Jewish Communities of Edinburgh, United Kingdom Federation of Business and Professional Women, Women's Support Project, Church of Scotland Women's Guild, Catholic Press and Media officer* and several individuals. Most of them were replies to the programme's demands for contacts.

¹⁹ At this point, Kaye Adams and Sheena MacDonald admitted themselves to be clear examples of journalists that look south for their professional future: 'If I was offered *The Oprah Winfrey Show* in London tomorrow, I am afraid, I would take the job.' (Adams, 3-6-93)

²⁰ Jenkins, interview with the researcher (16-12-91).

²¹ See 2.2.2.4. in this thesis.

²² Jenkins, *ibid.*

²³ Haining pointed out that 'there is a strong debate in Scotland about who are more local and articulate, the East Coasters or the West Coasters, and from this (the response of the audience to participate), the evidence suggests that they were the West Coasters'. It is worth noting that most of the interviewees made reference to the distinctive cultures between Glaswegians and people from Edinburgh.

CHAPTER 5

La Vida en un Xip (1989-1992)

Social debates through fiction and reality

5.1 Introduction

La Vida en un Xip was launched in January 1989 by TV3, the first channel of the Catalan public television, *Televisió de Catalunya* (TVC). The programme was designed and produced by the independent company *Disseny i Comunicadors per als Mass Media* (DCo. S.A). TV3 transmitted 143 editions of *La Vida en un Xip*, which finished in June 1992.

The *La Vida en un Xip* case study explores the Catalan audio-visual industry in relation to the national identity question in Catalonia. In Chapter 2, it was argued that Catalan broadcasters face a double challenge: to produce indigenous formats according to the legal provisions for a public service in Catalan, and to remain competitive with the rest of the television channels, public and private, mainly in Spanish. The relationship between the programming policies of the Catalan broadcaster and the independent company DCo. S.A. will be analysed. Specific stages of the production process of *La Vida en un Xip* reveal the strategies of the programme-makers in relation to national and cultural identity issues in Catalonia. The findings of this analysis are presented in the last section of this chapter.

La Vida en un Xip was an audience debate with a similar structure and principles to these of *Scottish Women*. These two case studies aimed to unveil how media organisations and their programming policies might determine their content and style. The evolution of

Scottish Women showed the transition from a current affairs to a light entertainment philosophy within today's British commercial television. *La Vida en un Xip* reflects a mixture of both public and commercial criteria, which overall attunes with the principles of the public broadcasting service in Spain. The first section of this chapter describes the structure of the programme; later, an analysis of its production is presented.

The findings of these research perspectives will (hopefully) explain why *La Vida en un Xip* became a window through which Catalans looked at their culture. The case, thus, warrants analysis to achieve a better understanding of the country and its media.

5.2 A product of a craft audio-visual industry

La Vida en un Xip was put together by a team of media professionals, who in the late eighties founded one of the strongest Catalan independent production companies, DCo. S.A. The programme was designed to be a high audience profile format to match the peak-time programmes of the other channels. At the time, Spanish private television stations were about to be launched and, consequently, the competition between the Spanish RTVE public channels and the Catalan TV3 would increase dramatically.¹ The evolution of *La Vida en un Xip* reflects the adaptation of TVC's programming policies to face the new scene. Over the years, this show strengthened, as *Scottish Women* did, its potential for entertainment and spectacle. The description of the show's evolution will illustrate this point.

Public television in Catalan is possibly the strongest instrument of the Catalan political institutions - autonomous government and parliament - to portray and reaffirm the cultural identity of their people and improve the social use of the Catalan language. *La Vida en un Xip* had to stick to these purposes. The approach of its programme-makers to TVC's

programming policies will be explained below. First, though, the design and dynamics of the show are described.

5.2.1 Social debates through fiction and reality

La Vida en un Xip was devised as an audience discussion programme, although its format had two original features. The debates were preceded by episodes of a domestic soap-opera called *La Granja*. Also, the programme commissioned an opinion poll on the given topic of discussion from among a cross-section of the Catalan population, the results of which were revealed during the show. The intention of surveying social matters with the help of the computers with which the polls were carried out was the reason behind the title of the show: 'life in a chip'.²

'Does fame change people?', 'As a consumer, do you frequently feel deceived?', 'Is it true that men are polygamous and women are not?', 'Can you live without God?', 'Is it worth having children?' *La Vida en un Xip* asked 143 questions like those just cited and invited Catalans to offer their views. The show, thus, provided both a qualitative and a quantitative overview of the issues. The questions divided the studio audience between 'Yes' and 'No' supporters, who explained their respective arguments. Then the opinion poll provided the views of the Catalan population on the subject matter.

TV3 broadcast *La Vida en un Xip* every Friday evening from 9.15 p.m. until midnight. Three hours of a live television debate would possibly be an unacceptable proposal to British broadcasters. However, the variety of elements of *La Vida en un Xip* justified its length. Nonetheless, the reason TVC agreed with such an unusual slot is explained by other means.

The show was designed, produced and presented by one of the pioneer journalists of broadcasting in Catalan, Joaquim M. Puyal i Ortiga, whose team had already run

successful shows for TVE Catalunya and TV3. Given the shortage of audio-visual production in Catalan and the dependence of the Catalan broadcaster on proposals from a few independent producers, TVC's managers were keen on scheduling Puyal's programmes. One of the costs was that his projects were generally rather complex and needed long slots to develop. The structure of *La Vida en un Xip* is an outstanding example.

'La nit del Xip'

'Friday, Xip's night' was a slogan that TV3 launched to advertise the show, which was then popularly known as *El Xip*. The programme was transmitted live every Friday night from October to June for thirty-nine weeks, with a break over summer. *El Xip* had two distinctive blocks: fiction (the episode of the soap-opera *La Granja*) and reality (the discussion in the studio).

First, Puyal, located in a simulated office, introduced the show by inviting the viewer to watch the weekly episode of *La Granja*. The intention behind this soap-opera was to establish the connection between fiction and reality through their common concerns, that is, the issues discussed. *La Granja* portrayed the Catalan lifestyle through 'a microcosm of lower-middle class people³, whose fictional lives mirrored social and individual conflicts which would be later explored by the participants in the studio.

La Granja was linked to the discussion through an ingenious transitional sequence, which this study refers to as the 'link-gag'. The link-gag was a dialogue between the presenter and one or two characters of *La Granja*. While the closing titles of the soap-opera were rolling over the screen, the viewer was shown the presenter's office, where he had also been watching the episode through a television monitor, which then allowed Puyal to catch the characters by surprise in *La Granja*. Presenter and character, fiction and reality, talked from their respective sets about the fortunes and misfortunes of life as if both belonged to the same reality. The script of the link-gag was carefully set up to

conduct a step by step conversation leading to the weekly topic.⁴ Once the latter was spelt out, the presenter invited the viewer to witness the discussion in the studio. This first part of the programme - *La Granja* and the link-gag - was recorded. The rest of the show was live.

After the first commercial break, the second part of *El Xip* was similar to most audience discussion shows. An overview of the set showed a panel of guests - experts and witnesses - sat behind a crescent shaped table, a hundred people - the lay participants - distributed in rows of seats, the presenter's podium and a journalist at the right side of the panel who conducted the section *Centre de Documentació*.

The latter, who was also the coordinator of the show, presented the panel mentioning the names, address and professions of experts and witnesses, who were placed facing the studio audience. During their interventions, a caption also identified their names and professions. First, for thirty-minutes the experts developed a debate on the issue. These guests generally held antagonistic standpoints based on their agreement or disagreement with the question. After the second commercial break, Puyal introduced the witnesses.

The witnesses of *El Xip* were 'storytellers' whose profiles had been previously defined by the editorial board of the show to provide eccentric or unusual characters. Each witness had an average of ten minutes to explain his/her case. Unlike the experts, witnesses were individually interviewed to reinforce their stories. Once experts and witnesses had intervened, Puyal abandoned his podium and walked around the stalls to encourage debate amongst the lay participants. Two hostesses helped him to reach the speakers with hand microphones. During this part, which lasted approximately forty minutes, the panel would also exchange their views with the audience.

During the show, Puyal established regular contact with the *Centre de Dades*, which was located in a different set from which members of the team attended phone calls from the

viewers. The journalist Sílvia Cópulo, who was also the assistant producer of the show, channelled criticisms and questions from the home audience to the people in the studio.

At the end, *Centre de Documentació* introduced the results of the opinion poll, which were graphically presented through bar charts. The opinion poll was briefly commented on by the experts. Finally, *Centre de Dades* explained the next topic and invited the viewer to participate. The closing titles came up over the background of the studio audience clapping.

5.2.2 Evolution of the show

The dynamics described above were not quite the same when *El Xip* was first launched in 1989. Then the show put less stress on interviewing witnesses and offered a greater informative coverage of the issues than in subsequent years. As with *Scottish Women*, *El Xip* gradually reinforced entertainment and disregarded, albeit never completely, its current affairs basis.

During its first production period (1989, 26 editions), *El Xip* was solidly current affairs orientated. The programme surveyed three topical issues generally related to the news of the week among a cross-section of the Catalan population. These opinion polls were sponsored and carried out by the saving bank Caixa de Catalunya. Only one of the three issues was discussed in the studio.

During this first period, the storylines of *La Granja* portrayed situations related to the topic of discussion. During the link-gag, three different characters commented on the three questions being polled. At that time, the weekly episode of the soap-opera was entirely recorded on Friday mornings and included topical references to increase the sense of temporal specificity.

El Xip had then a hundred lay participants and a panel of three experts. Some key lay participants were researched to guarantee a range of views among the crowd, which was a first attempt to search for witnesses.

After the first production period, DCo. S.A and Caixa de Catalunya suspended their agreement. During the second phase (1989-90, 39 editions), *El Xip* surveyed only the topic of discussion. The production team selected six witnesses - three 'Yes' and three 'No' supporters - who were individually interviewed from their respective seats at the front row of the platform.

A major shift developed during the third production period (1990-91, 39 editions). To release the presenter from the formal constraints of the discussion, *El Xip* invented the *Centre de Documentació*, which introduced the panel, presented blocks of information about the issues during the discussion, gathered the questions from the studio audience and commented on the results of the opinion poll.

El Xip also introduced the *Centre de Dades*, located in a different set and connected with the studio through a big screen on the right of the presenter. There, the live response from the viewers to the discussion was gathered through telephone lines and Sílvia Cópulo selected and reported on the most valuable comments. The *Centre de Dades*, though, had also been devised to bring some spark into the discussion. As Cópulo put it, *Centre de Dades* was 'a window of fresh air to make people smile when the debate became too heated'.⁵

Witnesses then established an interactive discussion with the experts, moving between the social perspective of the topics and their personal cases. Among the studio audience, some key lay participants were also located in strategic seats.

La Granja had developed into an autonomous drama series with its own opening and closing titles, but still functioning within the formal frame of the show. The storylines were independent, since the production constraints of filming did not allow it to maintain its link to the current affairs dynamics of the discussion. The link-gag, though, was still recorded just before transmission maintaining the same purpose and structure. This format was the final version of *El Xip* (1990-92, 78 editions).

Both *La Granja* and the discussion over the years reinforced the potential for entertainment. The former reflected script and film techniques similar to the British soap-operas. The latter brought into the studio witnesses with touching stories and participants prepared to demonstrate their abilities.

5.2.3 *El Xip*, a programme for TV3

El Xip, like *Scottish Women*, evolved side by side with the transformation of the television industry in Catalonia described earlier. The evolution of the show demonstrates once more that the media business and broadcasting institutions carry weight in shaping television formats. In relation to this, the following quote by the producer Joaquim M. Puyal shows his self-awareness:

The messengers hardly have any power.⁶ Likewise, those who have the power make the presenters believe that they are important and reward them. In fact, the power means to be able to establish a message in line with those who are the real transmitters, those who hold the capital (private media) or the political power (public media) of our broadcasting institutions. If we tried to control the message ignoring these transmitters, the effort would be wasted. (...) In relation to this, I can say that the press critic reviewer whose articles I always read, has never written a line about me. Despite having produced programmes from my country and in my language for so long, I have never been reviewed in this medium. Clearly, the network of the economic power is in Madrid.

(Puyal, 2-6-94; the researcher's translation)⁷

The arrival of private television channels pushed the media business a step further to be managed in the Spanish capital. Jaume Ferrús, managing director of TVC, remarked that TV3 was forced to modify its programming policies to compete with the private channels: 'to keep ourselves competitive in this market, we promote certain products, mainly entertaining films, which are not necessarily good films. But, most of all, we look for humour. (...) We also try to keep our entertainment and current affairs programmes free from politics'.⁸ Beside the need for beating its competitors, *El Xip* pursued other purposes, which are examined with regard to TVC's programming policies and the background of DCo's professionals.

5.2.3.1 TV3 programming policies and *El Xip*

El Xip has been described as a product of a craft audio-visual industry since broadcasting businesses in Catalan are fairly underdeveloped compared, for instance, to Scotland, where the BBC and STV started providing for the Scottish audience in the early fifties. TV3 was only launched ten years ago and the first production companies were established when TV3's ratings proved that there was an audience interested in Catalan programmes.⁹

In Catalan and from Catalonia's viewpoint

TV3 is a public channel with very specific functions to accomplish according to the legal provisions of the public broadcasting corporation in Catalonia, CCRTV. For a start, as a public service, TV3's programmes must provide information, education and entertainment having Catalonia as the immediate point of reference. Also, as a Catalan institution, TV3's programmes are an instrument for spreading and publicising the standard use of the Catalan language. *El Xip* was to serve these principles.

More fiction

Another TVC policy is to encourage the development of fiction; however, the Catalan audio-visual industry can not sustain a drama production competitive with the foreign markets. TVC's managers admit that it is cheaper for TVC to buy *Eastenders* from the BBC and dub it into Catalan, than to produce episodes of *La Granja*. However, fiction is a genre to be developed since, according to Oleguer Sarsanedas, head of programming, it reaffirms the feelings of collective identity:

Fiction is one of the clues to building a strong cultural identity. In this audio-visual era, it is crucial to have proper and culturally similar heroes from cinema and video to recognise your own identity.¹⁰

Dco had already introduced fiction in some of its products and *La Granja* fitted nicely into this picture: TVC's managers maintained that *El Xip*'s soap-opera was achieving higher audiences than the Australian *Neighbours* (*Veïns*) or the British *Coronation Street* (*El meu carrer*), because, they argued, the former presented in a realistic manner the lifestyle of the Catalan audience.¹¹

Representing the territory

The territory, it was argued earlier, is one of the structural elements of the nation. TVC broadcasts all over Catalonia reaching a potential audience of more than six million people, whereas STV's transmission area only reached half of the Scottish population. According to Ferrús and Sarsanedas, TVC aims to reaffirm the territorial unity of Catalonia by producing programmes which can report to some extent the interests and conflicts across the country.

For instance, in 1985, Puyal and Fusté launched the game-show *Vostè Jutja*, which presented a topic for discussion through a fictional case. The latter was judged by two contestants, a prosecutor and a defender, whose performances were evaluated by five popular juries - individuals selected by lots - located every week in different points of

Catalonia. *Vostè Jutja* was a successful attempt to convey entertainment, fiction and social concerns. *El Xip* developed from this.

Audience participation

TVC and DCo tend to involve the audience in their programmes, either through the telephone or direct contribution in the studios. The structure of *El Xip* allowed a wide circuit of audience participation: experts, witnesses, studio audience and criticisms of the viewers through the *Centre de Dades*.

With respect to the participants' contributions, both TVC and DCo considered that television owes them respect: laughter should be brought with the participants and never at their expense. This broad warning stopped *El Xip* from going too far in the selection of witnesses. However, ethical criteria to veto a participant were only applied if he/she might offend the audience. Overall, *El Xip* considered that every person was responsible for his/her own biography.

From the above it can be argued that *El Xip* satisfied the main objectives of TVC's programming policies: (i) to produce an original domestic product to cover one of TV3's peak-time evenings, (ii) to promote fiction, (iii) to be entirely transmitted in Catalan, (iv) to inform about Catalan social reality, and (v) to do so with the participation of people selected from across the country. The design appeared to please both broadcasters and producers. And soon *El Xip* took TV3 to the top of the ratings in Catalonia. Who was responsible for this project?

5.2.3.2 DCo. S.A, the programme-makers

DCo. S.A was then one of the few profitable independent production companies in Catalonia. Successful programmes produced by DCo are the game-shows *Tres Pics i Repicó* (1988-91) and *El Joc del Segle* (1991-93), and the debate shows *Vostè Jutja*

(1985-87), *Polèmic* (1992-93) and *Dret a Parlar* (1993-94). All these programmes, commissioned by TV3, included audience participation mechanisms, which was a prime motif of DCo's designs.

The company was founded in 1988 by Puyal, the executive producer Ramon Fusté and the director Lluís M. Güell, former head of programming at TV3.¹² The editorial board of the company included the linguist Jordi Mir, the sociologist Xavier Altarriba, the script executive Jaume Cabré, and the journalist Antoni Bassas, producer and presenter of DCo's shows.

Joaquim M. Puyal i Ortiga, a journalist and a linguist, started his career in radio during the dictatorial regime. His interest in the recovery of the Catalan language motivated him to transmit the first football match in Catalan, and then to develop sporting terminology in this language. From the mid-seventies until he started producing for TV3, Puyal worked for RTVE Catalunya presenting and directing several shows both in Catalan and in Spanish. In 1993, he was awarded with the *La Creu de Sant Jordi* (a prize from the Catalan autonomous government) for his work as a journalist. Eventually, Puyal left DCo. In Autumn 1993, he founded a new production company, Torrevisió S.L., which produced a remarkable success with the talk-show *Un Tomb per la Vida* (1993-94).¹³

Ramon Fusté, a former producer at TVE Catalunya and manager at DCo, started with Puyal when the latter presented *Vostè Pregunta* on that channel. Jordi Mir, editorial editor at DCo and also linguistic advisor for Puyal's football transmissions, is a key figure in relation to this case study, since his opinions had a strong weight when producing issues on Catalan national and cultural identity.

These media professionals, all born Catalans, work together to produce high audience profile television products. Since DCo's projects tended to attune with the TVC's programming requirements, the company got favourable deals with the latter. However,

Dco was founded to avoid the bureaucratic procedures of the Catalan public broadcasting corporation, whose deficiencies, Fusté argued, mimicked those of RTVE. The executive producer stresses that Dco, as a small company, provided a flexible structure of production, whereas the Catalan public corporation might have put up financial and administrative barriers to the development of their shows. Fusté wanted to avoid that: 'By creating Dco, we bought the right to be wrong, to set up the programmes as we liked them and to succeed with them'.¹⁴

Dco. S.A, based in Barcelona, had some full-time employees: Marisol Bolós and Ramon Gassió, in charge of the administrative management, and Àngel Esteban, head of production. Researchers, presenters, assistant producers and other professionals were temporarily employed according to the specific needs of each project.

Do they also go south?

In the early nineties, Dco faced a dilemma. Being aware of the small size of the Catalan audio-visual industry, the company needed to look for wider markets, although its media professionals preferred to produce Catalan programmes in their careful manner. Nowadays, Spanish autonomous television stations through FORTA offer small production companies the chance to sell programmes to other associated channels and increase their returns. The expansion was inevitable: Dco eventually 'went south' to produce similar formats for other Spanish autonomous channels when Joaquim M. Puyal had already left the company. As in Scotland, in Catalonia business shapes culture.¹⁵

5.2.3.3 *El Xip*, the deal

TVC's managers considered that a public service broadcasting should provide debate forums to offer the audience the chance to speak on television. To Jaume Ferrús, though, the design of *El Xip* was ambitious and challenging, since audience discussion programmes had never been produced in Spain before. Although Mediterranean cultures

are, arguably, more talkative and extrovert than Northern Europe's, TVC was rather apprehensive about the response from the audience to the demand for live contributions. Despite their fears, given the need for peak-time Catalan domestic shows to compete with the Spanish channels, TVC was not in a position to reject a project endorsed by Puyal, and *El Xip* went ahead.

In 1989, TVC committed its first channel TV3 to broadcast *El Xip* every Friday evening for 26 weeks at peak-time and during approximately 180 minutes. TVC and DCo agreed on the same arrangements for the subsequent seasons in 1990, 1991 and 1992. TVC was responsible for the technicalities and the image of the show, since *El Xip* was entirely filmed and edited in TVC's studios. However, the director of *La Granja* and the director of the discussion were employed by DCo. The latter had unrestricted control over the editorial content and production process. The legal agreement established that Puyal would be the producer and presenter, and Ramon Fusté, the executive producer of the show.

DCo. S.A ought to produce a twenty-five minute weekly episode of *La Granja*, filmed with TVC technical equipment and personnel (lighting, sound, cameramen, sets). Actors, actresses, storylines scriptwriters and directors were employed by DCo. S.A. As far as the live debate was concerned, TVC provided its studio 1 and all the technical facilities.

The presenter was entitled to modify the distribution of the four commercial breaks, and extend the transmission time, if required. As a result of this, the last news broadcast was frequently delayed. The News Department presented formal complaints to TVC's managers about it. However, Jaume Ferrús argued that: 'according to TVC's surveys...it was clear that the audience appreciated the length of *El Xip*.'¹⁶ The response was utterly positive: *El Xip* maintained a loyal audience during four years and scored

regularly amongst the top three programmes of Catalan television. The following pages analyse the editorial and production processes that made this show succeed.

5.3 Making the show: 'la cuineta'

'La cuineta' means 'the little kitchen', the nickname that the production team used to refer to the tasks of putting the programme together. This section analyses the secrets of the 'cooks'.

5.3.1 Purposes and 'Common Sense'¹⁷

The underlying principle of *El Xip* was to portray Catalan 'common sense'; or more simply, the team worked on the basis of what they intuitively perceived that the 'common people', the majority of the people living and working in Catalonia, might think and understand about the issues. Since the show had to represent 'common sense', the editorial and production processes emphasised the experiences of quotidian life and the individual rather than the social dimension of the issues.

It annoyed me that television was always a reserved medium, exclusive to the *élites*. And I think that it was interesting that, since television is a medium that connects with the mass, the mass should be able to reflect themselves on the screen as directly and accurately as possible. (...) I found it interesting to endow television with the capacity of influencing, promoting reflection and provoking controversy.¹⁸

El Xip, thus, aimed to inform, to entertain (controversy being one of the strategies for the discussion) and to reflect on the past and present of the Catalans: 'We couldn't plan our

job only to achieve high audience figures. We had to be aware of the need to inform and publicise important aspects of our collective identity'.¹⁹

5.3.2 *La Granja* and the link-gag

La Granja and particularly the link-gag were planned to portray the issues of the discussion given the scriptwriters' judgment of what Catalan social reality was like. *La Granja*, a microcosm of lower-middle class people, was set up in a small café where the neighbours of a urban street met to tell their 'common' stories. The characters of *La Granja* portrayed the values of a liberal democratic society - ambition for economic progress, family welfare and strong community links - which is, arguably, the overall ideology of the wide Catalan middle-class.

La Granja was written by the writer Jaume Cabré in collaboration with Antoni Colomer and Jesús Borràs. The scriptwriters were briefed about the topics beforehand to see whether the storylines could reflect them. Occasionally, the process was the other way around: a storyline induced the discussion of a specific issue.²⁰ The scripts were supervised by Puyal and Jordi Mir, the editorial adviser.

The transition of *La Granja* from being chained to the agenda of the discussion to surviving on its own merits, was shown by the style of the two different directors. To emphasise the link between fiction and reality, the first director, Lluís M. Güell (1989; 1989-90), shot the stories and the space as if the viewer was spying on *La Granja* through a window. When Orestes Lara took over (1990-92), *La Granja* was already standing on its own feet, which allowed the new director to apply a less faithful approach to 'reality'.

The link-gag was a three-page dialogue between the presenter and the character/s of *La Granja*. This script was drafted by Cabré and rewritten by Puyal, who included his personal views and comments. The actors/actresses of *La Granja* regarded the link-gag

as the most difficult role to perform in the show since there was no boundary between the real person and their impersonation. Puyal introduced *ad lib* questions to obtain spontaneous reactions from the actors about the issues and reveal the person behind the mask of the character. This strategy weakened even more the thin boundary that *El Xip* established between fiction and reality. In the last section, the link-gag is analysed as a strategem of the programme-makers to favour or criticise arguments for and against the issues.

The link-gag and the live discussion were not filmed by the person in charge of *La Granja*, which gradually strengthened the distance between the two blocks. The former were first directed by Jordi Roure (1989; 1989-90), and latterly by Emiliano Moro (1990-91; 1991-92). Puyal interfered intensely in directing both link-gag and discussion since these were the parts in which he starred.

5.3.3 Choosing topics

El Xip was set up to discuss social debates with the participation of an audience, which was conceived as a group of individuals, rather than as citizens of 'civil society'. Unlike *Scottish Women*, *El Xip* belonged neither to the current affairs nor to the light entertainment divisions. Thus, the show had no preconceived agenda to stick by. It was up to *El Xip*'s editorial board to decide which topics were worth discussing. A general premise, though, was that the issues had to relate to the quotidian life of the majority and 'this should be pursued escaping from partnerships, slogans and interests from the different lobbies'.²¹ Politics were generally avoided, particularly three months before and after any electoral campaign.

The *El Xip*'s editorial board was constituted by Puyal, the editor, the sociologist, the assistant director, the coordinator and the members of the Advisory Committee - outsiders to the production process selected by Puyal to supply external advice. The

editorial board put forward their proposals for topics to Puyal, who, taking those into account, decided the final list trying to balance 'heavy', 'light' and controversial questions. TV3 did not interfere in this process.

The viewing figures were also a guide to which topics were of most interest to the audience and, thus, which areas of discussion were worth pursuing. Puyal seemed convinced that the programme was only a vehicle to remind people of their own concerns:

In this country, where people have fought so hard to defend their freedom and rights, it is worth using the liberty that we enjoy now to provoke social debates that obviously exceed the time available to the programme. (...) These debates are already in the street, television picks them up and presents them at *the level of spectacle that the medium requires*. If it works, people watch them because television has its own seductive mechanisms. And then, people recover those conflicts, perhaps unaware that they were already part of their own concerns. (...) Television is a good excuse to remind people of the *evidence* that surrounds them.²²

To this researcher, though, *El Xip* can not be seen as a mere 'vehicle' of social debates, but rather as a product, whose editorial and production processes shaped the issues as suited the format best. Puyal seems to disregard the production process that he himself orchestrated. The challenge, thus, is to explore which 'seductive mechanisms' were applied to talk about what and who were the participants selected to discuss them.

5.3.3.1 The 143 issues of *La Vida en un Xip*²³

For 143 weeks, *El Xip* was a forum for public discussion. Although its life was shorter than *Scottish Women's*, *El Xip* transmitted 34 editions more. The sense of continuity over those four years contributed to reinforce the perception of *El Xip* as the forum of the community, which, as argued earlier, is one of the effects of audience discussion programmes. Such an effect allows us to consider these programmes significant spaces of a potential 'public sphere' in the media.

It is again difficult to classify the issues to satisfy everybody's views. To apply the same criteria to the Catalan show as to *Scottish Women*, the 'boxes' described there are also used to make sense of *El Xip*'s issues: 1) Citizenship & Infrastructure, 2) Essential human values, 3) Love & Sex, 4) Sociopolitical conflicts, 5) Education & Family, 6) National identity & Culture, and 7) Extrasensory perception. The group missing is, of course, Women's issues, since *El Xip* never discussed them as such. In the table below, the order of the 'boxes' goes from the most to the least populated groups. The data shows the thematic evolution of *El Xip* over the years (number of issues and percentages according to the categories listed above):

Fig. 5.1 The 143 transmissions of *La Vida en un Xip* (1989-92)

Seasons	1989		1989-90		1990-91		1991-92		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1-. Citizenship & Infrastructure	4	15.4	8	20.5	12	30.6	13	33.3	37	25.8
2-. Essential human values	6	23.1	8	20.5	7	18.0	9	23.1	30	21.0
3-. Love & Sex	3	11.5	7	18.0	7	18.0	5	12.8	22	15.4
4-. Sociopolitical conflicts	5	19.3	6	15.4	4	10.3	6	15.4	21	14.7
5-. Education & Family	3	11.5	5	12.8	4	10.3	4	10.3	16	11.2
6-. National Identity & Culture	3	11.5	3	7.7	3	7.7	2	5.1	11	7.7
7-. Extrasensory perception	2	7.7	2	5.1	2	5.1	0	0.0	6	4.2
Total	26	100	39	100	39	100	39	100	143	100

The table shows that *El Xip* maintained the same criteria over the years and a fine balance among the different themes. However, the group 'National Identity & Culture' decreased substantially in relation to the other 'boxes' which confirms the above-mentioned argument that TV3 and particularly *El Xip*'s team tried to avoid issues that could incite political discussions.

'Citizenship & Infrastructure' was the main focus of *El Xip*: one in four programmes dealt with those questions (25.8%). This percentage is significantly smaller than *Scottish Women's* (38.7%), since the Scottish show was for long current affairs orientated. In *El Xip*, 'Citizenship & Infrastructure' doubled its percentage during the last two seasons, because the topics chosen within this category confronted antagonistic attitudes which stimulated the discussion (employees and employers; the young and the old; the *bon vivant* vs. the pro-healthy lifestyle).

In *El Xip*, 'Essential human values', which require an introspective and philosophical approach, were quite popular (21%) in comparison to *Scottish Women* (9.2%). This choice tells us about the capacity of *El Xip* to set up a peak-time debate on issues that normally would not appeal to the bulk of the audience (God, suicide, loneliness, obsessions, friendship). The selection of touching witnesses was generally the hook of these programmes.

Unlike *Scottish Women*, *El Xip* discussed more Sex & Love than Sociopolitical conflicts. As mentioned above, *El Xip* was focused on the individual human experience and, consequently, intimacy was at the top of the agenda. Moreover, issues of Love & Sex set up a battle of the sexes among the participants, which heated the show up. Also, for Catalan (and Spanish) Catholic society whose social habits were repressed by an orthodox religious education the attraction to discuss such tabooed questions in freedom was strong.

Again, the Catalans discussed education and family matters more frequently than the Scots (11.3% vs. 4.6%). In Mediterranean societies, families are the essential point of reference for individuals, whereas, Northern Europeans seem to detach sooner from the family structure.²⁴

It is also worth noticing that *El Xip* spent more than fifteen hours of public television to discuss Extrasensory perception issues (paranormal phenomena vs. magic, possessed by devils, telling the future). The Spanish tradition of black magic, exorcism, witchcraft and spiritualism, which sustains the very lucrative industry of prediction, justifies to some extent this contrast with *Scottish Women* (4.2% vs. 1.8%).

National identity & Culture embodied eleven programmes focused on the two most frequently expressed identity conflicts of Catalan society: the use of language and the role of football in reinforcing national pride. Those issues and the editorial strategies behind them are analysed in the last section of this chapter.

5.3.3.2 Editorial decision-making

El Xip had a provisional list of topics before the beginning of each season. However, since the programme was live and each edition was only prepared seven days before broadcasting, Puyal only made a final decision about the issues a month in advance. Then, he briefed the Advisory Committee and the production team about them.

Advisory Committee

The function of the Advisory Committee was to suggest the editorial approach: the question to be discussed, the agenda to cover and the profiles of experts and witnesses to select. Their proposals helped Puyal to devise the show. Members of this Committee were, apart from the sociologist and editorial editor of the programme, major figures of the Catalan mass media, a psychiatrist, a lawyer, a businessman, a society affairs correspondent and several writers. With their advice, the producer formulated the question.

The question and the promotion

'Would you give your body for transplants?', 'Would you try to avoid the suicide of a friend?', 'Are you a jealous person?', 'Can humankind advance without spoiling the Nature?' The question set up the grounds for the discussion: some viewers would argue 'Yes' and others would argue 'No'. On the basis of this antagonism, experts, witnesses and lay participants, also opinionated, performed their respective roles during the show.

The promotions of *El Xip* publicised the question and also the procedures for taking part in the programme. These adverts were recorded a week in advance and screened seven days per week. The promotions were drafted by members of the production team who suggested arguments for and against the question. Finally, Puyal wrote the final version.

Are cultural expressions made in Catalonia in Castilian part of the Catalan culture? On Friday we will debate a controversial question. Should any expression of human activity: literature, mass media, social life, made nowadays in Catalonia be considered Catalan culture whether it is made in Catalan or in Castilian? If you agree, because you think that everything is Catalan culture, regardless of the language you use to transmit it, phone the 'Yes' number, 253.55.77. We need you to defend your point of view. Because for sure there are also many people who would say 'No', that would disagree with considering part of Catalan culture something done in Castilian. The 'No' number is 254.10.11. We want to represent all sorts of opinions. Can Catalan culture be expressed in Castilian? We will find out on Friday. As usual, live, in *La Vida en un Xip*.

(Promotion for Catalan culture in Castilian, 2-11-90)

The 'Yes' and 'No' answering machines of *El Xip* worked seven days per week. The tapes registered the name, telephone number, address and the opinions and experiences of each potential participant in relation to the issue.

The summary card

The production team had a weekly meeting to decide the rest of the editorial strategy, which was detailed in 'the summary card': (i) the title of the topic, (ii) the question to be

surveyed, (iii) the approach to the issue, and (iv) the profiles of experts, witnesses and lay participants.

(i) the title

In the studio, behind the panel, a big transparency showed an image related to the issue and the title of the topic: 'Prisons', 'Fame', 'Housing', 'Adoption'. During the discussion, this transparency was exchanged with the logo of the programme. The 143 titles of *El Xip* corresponded to the topics explored earlier.

(ii) the opinion poll

La Vida en un Xip surveyed 192 questions: 143 concerning the issues and 49 concerning topical affairs which had been polled when *El Xip* first started focusing on three questions rather than one. A sample of over 800 people, which was a cross-section of the Catalan population according to sex, age and geographical distribution, were polled every week on the subject matter.

The opinion poll was generally the question formulated as a declarative sentence: 'I would give my body for transplants', 'I would try to avoid the suicide of a friend', 'I am a jealous person', 'Humankind can advance without spoiling the Nature'. There were five possible answers: 'I totally agree', 'I agree a little', 'I am indifferent', 'I totally disagree' and 'I disagree a little'. When Caixa de Catalunya withdrew its sponsorship from *El Xip*, the survey was ordered from the company Dympanel S.A. The poll was carried out on Thursdays and the results were sent to TV3 on Fridays. The sociologist Xavier Altarriba extracted the significant comments from the data and the *Centre de Documentació* presented his interpretation of the poll at the end of the show.

Altarriba argued that the survey was the sole scientific element of *El Xip*, since the discussion was a gathering of opinions which tended to be slanted. However, the relevance of the opinion poll to the show weakened over the years, being latterly reduced

to the announcement of the results. Maybe, a feasible explanation for this evolution was that the press had regarded the polls as a claim by *El Xip* to be the voice of the country. Indeed, how the results were reported emphasised this perception: 'The majority of the Catalans are optimistic', 'The Catalans don't think that we should blame the children who fail their exams', 'Most Catalans are satisfied with their sexual lives'.²⁵

(iii) the approach

The summary card contained guidelines for the researchers in terms of content and selection of participants. The approach frequently established what should and what should not be discussed during the show:

It shouldn't be a programme to talk about drugs or AIDS. It is not either a debate to discuss the errors of the judiciary, or to question the appropriateness of specific sentences. We have to speak about the use of the prisons: once a prisoner is in jail, what do you do with him/her? What percentage does come out rehabilitated? Should murderers be in the same jails as rapists?

(Summary Card, 3-4-92, Prisons)

It should be a programme to speak about sex with sensitivity. It should be a programme to offer sexual advice, but also raise a laugh.

(Summary Card, 22-5-92, Sexual needs)

(iv) the profiles

The selection of participants was the key to the success of the programme. Participants - experts, witnesses and lay public - were chosen both to inform and entertain. Experts were selected to make sense of the issues in an intelligible manner. Witnesses were gathered and trained to shock the audience, and finally, lay participants were encouraged to fight. *El Xip* did not need to set up an agenda, because the strength of the show relied on the participants' performance: what they might say, granted that it was true, was not what mattered the most.

The summary card established the specific areas of information to be covered by each expert, the profile of witnesses and the general views that the audience might bring up. The main task of the production team was to find suitable people for these profiles. These three groupings are analysed below.

(iv.i) the experts

Given the assumption that experts in audience discussion programmes to some extent represent the intellectuals, *El Xip* showed clearly that television has little room left for them. Television audiences require a straightforward message which is not in the nature of the intellectual discourse. The intellectuals, thus, face a dilemma: either they renounce contributing to television (and therefore, to an important part of the public sphere), or they adapt their discourses to the needs of this medium. Some experts on *El Xip* chose the latter path and became regular collaborators of the programme. Others, as Cópulo and Altarriba remarked, were not prepared to face interaction with the studio audience and refused to intervene. Altarriba regarded the confrontation of experts - lay participants as one of the democratic values of the format:

It is important that ordinary people are given the chance to question those who are theoretically experts. That is part of cultural democracy, isn't it? But it creates hostility among some people... they dislike the fact that lay participants can reply to them in plain speech based on experience... Some experts do not want to mix with the mass.²⁶

El Xip, though, had to bring in some experts, since they were the watchdogs of its public function: they provided information and evaluated the comments from other participants according to their knowledge of the field.

Each programme invited at least three figures, two of whom were partisan: one expert would argue in favour of the 'Yes' answer and another in favour of the 'No'. A third figure maintained a neutral viewpoint to offer an informative account. This latter role

was generally covered by academics and professionals. The antagonistic roles (Yes/No) were mainly taken on by journalists and members of the star system whose convictions or personal experiences had slanted their views on the subject matter. The summary card defined the profiles of the experts:

Someone from the Catholic Church, a theologian, someone who does not believe any of this stuff - possibly Linares de Mula, if he agrees with being sceptical - and a journalist who can describe different experiences - ask Pepe Rodríguez to come.

(Summary Card: Possessed by devils, 11-1-91)

A philosopher who will give the technical approach, a cold view from a young woman, a romantic view from an intellectual such Terenci Moix or Carme Riera (writers) and someone without any concern about it, sceptical.

(Summary Card: Love's disillusion, 17-5-91).

DCo had a participants' database in which nearly six-hundred experts were registered according to their *curricula vitae* and views on particular matters. The database allowed this study to classify their professional backgrounds, which confirms that these intellectual roles were mainly covered by journalists (and writers), and professionals giving practical advice:

Fig. 5.2 Experts' backgrounds
La Vida en un Xip (1989-92)

Backgrounds & Occupation	89		89-90		90-91		91-92		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Journalists (& Writers)	18	23.0	25	19.2	28	18.0	48	22.7	119	20.7
Public domain	25	32.2	34	26.2	46	29.7	69	32.7	174	30.3
Special guests & 'Star system'	8	10.3	21	16.2	20	12.9	32	15.2	81	14.1
Politicians & Civil Servants	12	15.4	11	8.5	15	9.7	24	11.4	62	10.8
Sporting institutions	1	1.3	-	-	6	3.9	13	6.1	20	3.5
Church	4	5.2	2	1.5	5	3.2	-	-	11	2.0
Academia	9	11.4	16	12.3	18	11.6	20	9.5	63	11.0
Sociologists, Anthropologists & Philosophers	5	6.4	13	10.0	12	7.7	15	7.1	45	7.8
Historians	2	2.5	1	0.8	4	2.6	3	1.5	10	1.7
Linguists	2	2.5	2	1.5	2	1.3	2	0.9	8	1.4
Professional practitioners	26	33.4	45	34.6	50	32.3	62	29.4	183	31.9
Doctors	6	7.7	13	10.0	16	10.3	9	4.3	44	7.7
Psychologists psychiatrists	8	10.3	12	9.2	12	7.7	11	5.2	43	7.5
Business managers & Economists	2	2.5	9	6.9	9	5.8	21	9.9	41	7.1
Judiciary	5	6.4	9	6.9	8	5.2	8	3.8	30	5.2
Technicians & Engineers	1	1.3	1	0.8	4	2.6	8	3.8	14	2.4
Teachers	4	5.2	1	0.8	1	0.7	5	2.4	11	2.0
Total experts	78	100.0	120	92.3	142	91.6	199	94.3	539	93.9
Repetitions	-	0.0	10	7.7	13	8.4	12	5.7	35	6.1
Total guests	78	100.0	130	100.0	155	100.0	211	100.0	574	100.0

The data above confirm the points made earlier: the experts' views on *El Xip* were mainly provided by journalists and writers (20.7%), supported by the informative role of professional practitioners (31.9%). Thus, members of academia appeared to be left behind other backgrounds that involved closer contact with the people. To guarantee a popular approach to the issues, *El Xip* gradually brought into the panel members of its Advisory Committee. In the table above, the number of repetitions identifies the members of the Advisory Committee who attended the show more than once.

The number of experts increased over the years: from an average of three per panel in the first two periods, to an average of five members in the last season. The increase in

guests responded to the increasing stress of *El Xip* on the panel rather than the studio audience. During this latter phase, members of the star system were often invited to offer their views on their specific fields (media, cinema, sport, entertainment), whilst at the same time, their popularity hooked the audience (30.3%). This strategy tried to counterbalance the competition of talk-shows running on the same slot on other channels. Politicians and civil servants were only invited when the issue required the official views of political or social institutions. It is worth noting that, according to the percentages shown on the table above, the choice of experts in relation to their backgrounds maintained a remarkable stability throughout the years.

Mariona Anglès, first coordinator of *El Xip* (1989; 1989-90), and latterly Sílvia Cópulo (1990-91; 1991-92) were in charge of finding the experts, generally through their own contacts and with some help from the Advisory Committee. They interviewed each expert and transcribed his/her views faithfully. Cópulo tried to balance men and women on the panel, although *El Xip* never applied positive discrimination to equally represent both sexes in the audience.

(iv.ii) witnesses

El Xip expected the participants to explain their individual experiences and opinions. However, people were not used to talk in public since studio audiences had always been used simply to clap and laugh. The lay participants, who were to represent the common concerns, needed a little push. This encouragement resulted in the discovery of the witnesses, whose contributions condensed perhaps the wittiest human interest of *El Xip*: they explained what the lay participants had no courage to explain.

Witnesses are amateur storytellers of intimacies whose role opens up a new path to use television as a platform to discharge anxieties and problems. The witnesses of *El Xip* were generally extreme cases (a man dying of AIDS, the mother of a girl dying for lack of a heart transplant). By way of illustration, in February 1990, a young girl explained

that she had decided to attend *El Xip* to spell out for her parents that she was a lesbian, because she not found courage to tell them in person.

Conxita Golanó, who was responsible for the gathering of these characters (1990-92), distinguished two different types: one sort was convinced that his/her case would help other people to face their own problems, and another was the exhibitionist type keen on publicising personal matters. Their discourses - often dramatic tales - were distressing. To provide the witnesses with a comfortable location, they were moved from the stalls to the panel, which also allowed their number to vary according to the topic: some programmes required several witnesses whilst others required none. The summary card also contained the number and the profiles of these figures, generally two or three witnesses for each position (Yes/No):

We should find someone with positive sexual experiences and someone who never enjoyed sex, someone explaining the advantage of faithfulness and someone with experiences outside the marriage.

(Summary card: Sexual needs, 29-11-91)

Conxita Golanó and René Esteve looked for suitable characters among the phone calls gathered by the Yes/No answering machines. If the former failed to provide them with fitting cases, they used alternative sources (support groups and organisations). By and large, though, the witnesses offered their stories to the show by telephone.

The witnesses were also registered in the participants' database, and over the years, a network of witnesses' information was set up.²⁷ *El Xip* also established informal contacts with radio programmes of the same style. Some profiles were directly researched in the street (homeless, dealers, prostitutes, street vendors). As with the selection of experts, lobbies pressurised the team to be in the show; however, any direct proposal from organised collectives was strongly rejected.²⁸

The researchers interviewed the witnesses and transcribed their stories. If a witness made a false statement, the *Centre de Dades* was able to transmit live a reply from relatives or witnesses who might wish to contradict them. The researchers selected the most sharp, witty and convincing characters. Overall, the witnesses proved to be the most entertaining element of *El Xip*, and at the same time pulled the discussion towards the anecdotal side of the issues.

(iv.iii) the lay participants

Originally, the show was designed to give people from the street the chance to be the stars. However, at the beginning, *El Xip* could not rely exclusively upon the lay participants since people had no experience on talking in public. Nevertheless, they acquired confidence over the years, and latterly vibrant controversies occurred on the platform.

The set had the capacity for a hundred people who had already taken sides by telephone to *El Xip*.²⁹ Isabel Cortadellas, researcher on the studio audience, scrutinised the tapes from both answering machines registering the name, telephone number, address and the views of each potential participant. Then Cortadellas had a brief interview over the telephone to select a representative number of Yes/No supporters, balanced by sex and age. Most participants came from Barcelona and its metropolitan area (AMB). Some topics gathered up to 1,500 phone calls (traffic, separation, sex, prisons), but the average was 500-700. Cortadellas had a 'black list' with the names of recurrent participants to avoid repetitions. *El Xip* aimed to have a crowd of individuals prepared to confront opinions and experiences:

I look for fighters because the day after the home audience will talk about the quarrels and arguments of the crowd rather than the informative content of the show.³⁰

The summary card generally specified that the intrusion of specific lobbies or campaigners should be avoided.³¹ However, there was no time to find out much about each participant and specific pressure groups frequently slid into the show.

The bulk of the participants were 'Catalan speakers, middle-aged and middle and working class'. However, Cortadellas argued that, as the programme settled down, the lay participants gradually reflected the reality of the Catalan society (immigrants and natives, youth, people from rural areas).³² The researcher also pointed out that women were more keen than men on attending the show, although, in fact, the former contributed as much as the latter. By contrast, the case of *Scottish Assembly* seemed to have shown that in Scotland women were less talkative than men in mixed company. As far as professional background was concerned, housewives, retired people, salesmen and teachers were recurrent participants. University lecturers, business people and the liberal professions were rarely in the stalls.³³ Potential witnesses who had finally been rejected by the researchers, were invited as key participants among the audience and briefly interviewed during the discussion.

The participants of *El Xip* were not paid: the experts were given a sculpture produced for the programme by Manuel Àlvarez, the witnesses were repaid their travel expenses, and the lay participants were thanked for their contributions.

5.3.3 Coordination

The coordinator was the mediator between Puyal and the production team to monitor the procedures and make sure that the summary card was rightly interpreted. *El Xip* had three coordinators: Mariona Anglès (1989; 1989-90), this researcher (1990-91) and Eva Rebollar (1991-92).

During the week, the coordinator researched and produced a document on the topic (press cuttings, data from organisations, main arguments), which was given to Puyal and Cópulo to be used as background information during the show. The coordinator, supervised by the executive producer, made the production arrangements for the experts (travel procedures, accommodation) and ordered the opinion poll and the transparency from the companies contracted to provide these services. Latterly, the coordinator was the journalist who presented the *Centre de Documentació*.

5.3.5 Last arrangements

Live television involves nerves and rushing around. The production and editorial processes described above were developed in five days. On Thursday evenings, Puyal had a final meeting with the research team, the director of the live discussion and the coordinator. Each of them reported on their respective tasks. The director took notes about the members of the panel to prepare the shooting strategy. The coordinator handed the presenter the weekly folder, which contained an individual report for each member of the panel, the seating plan of the studio with the seats of the key participants, and the research summary. Then Puyal privately prepared the strategy of the show and decided the order in which the panel would be interviewed.

At the studio, Cópulo and the research team planned the interventions of the *Centre de Dades*: what criticisms might come from the viewers, which report should be given on the response from the answering machines, and also with which jokes Cópulo would try to tease the presenter.

The executive producer and the editorial editor distributed the lay participants according to the seating plan, which placed the key participants in the front rows and close to the aisles. The lay participants were briefed about the procedures of the discussion, but not

about the content. They were asked to talk directly without raising their hands, to argue with each other and, if they wished, ask questions of the panel.

The Yes and No witnesses were briefed in two separate rooms to avoid confrontations before the show. The researchers read their reports to them to confirm that their stories had been faithfully transcribed and that they would stick to these.

Cóppulo and the public relations officer of the programme attended to the experts, trying to keep their conversation away from the topic. Shortly before the show, Puyal explained his strategy: if the aim was to encourage a lively discussion, the Yes and No experts would offer their views first, and if the programme was to provide guidance and information, the technical perspective would be the one to start with.

The director shot *El Xip* with four mobile cameras and a boom. Due to the interaction between experts, witnesses and public, the presenter would ease the task of the director by signaling to the latter the speakers who were about to intervene or his intended movement around the studio. Puyal had a very determined attitude with regard to both the rhythm of the show and the attitude of the participants during the discussion.

5.3.6 Live

El Xip is not a conventional debate in which experts are given words and asked questions. It is not the House of Commons. It is exactly the opposite, whereby you are entitled to intervene any time you wish and to interrupt somebody else's speech, as long as you are polite.... You don't need a license to do anything. Do what you feel like: if you need to leave the studio, please do. The first part is not a sequence of interviews; it must be a discussion or a charming conversation among all of you in terms of theory and concepts that people have to understand. You shouldn't use academic terms. Although probably some of your colleagues will be watching you, the vast majority of the audience does not know anything about the matter and you need to talk simply. If you fail to be straightforward, I will ask you

questions to bring your approach down to earth. We are not going to solve any problem here. We are going to talk through the matter. That's all.³⁴

Puyal's quote just cited describes accurately the mechanics of the show. The presenter encouraged interaction amongst experts, witnesses and audience. Generally, he tried to stand back and let people talk. But, the rhythm of the show was always in his hands. Puyal had an unusual role in the ceremony: remaining somehow invisible to the viewer, he was, to the technicians, the panel and the lay participants, the ubiquitous arbiter of the discussion.

5.4 Response and Impact

El Xip was designed to be a ratings winner and it had the elements to succeed: (i) a popular presenter, (ii) a peak-time slot of three hours on Friday evenings, (iii) an innovative format which included the first ever Catalan soap-opera, (iv) all the technical facilities that DCo asked for from TVC, and (v) a discussion inspired to a certain extent by the repeatedly cited *Oprah* and *Donahue*.

As far as viewing figures are concerned, *El Xip* had a great impact. The show also had a constantly positive response from the media critics. As a result of *El Xip*, there were passionate debates in the press about specific issues. Letters commenting on the show were frequent in the newspapers. Some specific cases showed that, like *Scottish Women*, *El Xip* worked as a platform to make people think and act.

***Watched by 1,200,000 Catalans*³⁵**

According to Jaume Ferrús, managing director of TVC, *El Xip* registered an average of 1,200,000 viewers during its 180 minutes of transmission throughout its life. Every

Catalan watched at least 60 of the 430 hours of *La Vida en un Xip*.³⁶ Also, according to Sarsanedas, head of programming, the share of *El Xip* did not decrease with the arrival of the private channels, whereas the rest of TV3 programming lost 5% of its share.³⁷ *El Xip* was generally amongst the three most watched programmes in Catalonia,³⁸

According to the viewing figures available, the show maintained its audience after 11 p.m.³⁹ Carles Cuní, producer of the radio show *La Nit dels Ignorants* (Catalunya Radio, 12.30 p.m. - 3 a.m.) explained that the debates on *El Xip* carried on after midnight through the phone lines of his programme to such an extent that he proposed to Puyal to co-ordinate both shows.

Impact

Audience discussion programmes are not conceived of as solving problems, but as making people aware of them. However, like *Scottish Women*, *El Xip* occasionally made something happen outside the television studios.

In June 1991, a witness on transplants explained that her fourteen-year-old daughter was about to die because there was no heart available for her transplant. On Saturday, a young boy was killed in a motorbike accident. His parents remembered the above-mentioned witness and contacted *El Xip* to offer the boy's heart to save the life of the little girl, Ada. The transplant went ahead and Ada survived. The Catalan health ministry stated that after the programme, the number of donors increased dramatically.

In April 1992, the recent ex-convict Bernardino Ballester was selected as a key lay participant on prisons. In his speech, Ballester complained about the penitentiary service because it did not provide facilities for ex-convicts like him who was homeless, unemployed and with a family to support. Shortly after, the *Centre de Dades* announced that several viewers had contacted the programme to offer him money and a job. But, another viewer, a jeweller, identified Ballester as the perpetrator of the robbery at his

shop the day before. He phoned the police, who rushed to the TV studios to arrest Ballester at the end of the show. The latter confessed to the robbery and was taken into custody immediately. The police made formal inquiries to find out how the programme had contacted the criminal: Ballester had phoned the answering machines to attend the show.⁴⁰ The press covered this odyssey extensively and the criminal declared that: 'after having attended Puyal's programme, I have a good chance to be the president of the Generalitat de Catalunya'.⁴¹

Press coverage

Unlike *Scottish Women*, *El Xip* was regularly reviewed in newspapers and magazines. The critics paid particular attention to the witnesses and the public, but also to the presenter himself.

Puyal is by far the most popular journalist in the Catalan media of the last decade. Before the arrival of democracy, the star-system in Catalonia was constituted by figures from the Spanish audio-visual industry. When Catalonia started building up its own entertainment industries (cinema, music, media), their respective pioneers became part of the Catalan star-system. The critics' attention to Puyal, though, was not only based on his popularity, but particularly on his interest in the recovery of Catalan culture and in providing television with indigenous formats. Frequently, though, he was attributed roles that exceeded his own capacities as a media professional.⁴²

Success, though, has another side to the coin: 'I am quite immodest, but success has never surprised me. However, I never feel confident with it and I am terribly afraid of failure'.⁴³ The fear that *El Xip* would lose its audience led DCo to terminate the show, against the wishes of TVC's managers. But other versions of *El Xip* continued: in 1992 DCo adapted and produced the same format for the autonomous channels of Valencia and Madrid and in September 1993 the company launched a similar show called *Dret a Parlar* (1993-94). As argued in Chapter 2, the expansion of ideas and formats across the

boundaries of the Spanish autonomous regions might be gradually spreading a common style of portraying the needs of their distinctive communities.

Press criticisms

The press coverage of *El Xip* can be divided into criticism in the national dailies (*La Vanguardia*, *El Periódico de Catalunya*, *AVUI*, *Diari de Barcelona*, *El País*, *El Observador*, *ABC Catalunya*), those in TV and society magazines, and finally, reviews in the local press (*Diari de Sabadell*, *Diari de Terrassa*, *Diari de Girona*, *Diari de Tarragona*, *Diari de Lleida*, *El Segre*, *El Punt*).⁴⁴

The media critics of the national dailies reviewed *El Xip* regularly, and it was generally acclaimed for its ability to provoke discussion. By way of illustration, Joan Barril from *El País* once wrote that the Catalan Parliament and *El Xip* were the key sources to understand what was going on in the country. Josep M. Baget and Víctor Amela (*La Vanguardia*) and Ramon Miravittles and Gabriel Jaraba (*El Periódico*) stressed the sociological value of the debate itself as a democratic forum, and paid special attention to the innovative elements of the format (witnesses and lay participants).

TV guides and magazines published the usual interviews with the stars of *La Granja* and with Puyal and Cópulo. Although the former never satisfied the gossips with news of his personal life, TV magazines reinforced his leading role: *Teleprograma's* competition for 'the most popular character' award went to Puyal in 1990. The prior year it had gone to the Ninja Turtles.

Local newspapers and magazines reviewed *El Xip* when the issues related to specific conflicts in their geographical areas or when members of their communities intervened either in the panel or in the studio audience.⁴⁵ Local newspapers cared for the interests of their own communities and consequently, their criticisms were rather antagonistic

towards the programme, especially when *El Xip* refused to give voice to local problems which might not be of interest to the majority of the viewers.

Criticisms of specific issues

The writer Oriol Pi de Cabanyes remarked intuitively in one of his articles: 'The Catalans only get massively passionate about two ideas, *el Barça* (Barcelona F.C) and our language, and in that order'. By way of illustration, 63 reviews of *El Xip* are classified below according to the issue of the week, which, interestingly, confirms Pi de Cabanyes' point:

Fig. 5.3 63 thematic press reviews
La Vida en un Xip (October 1991 - June 1992)

Reviews in	NP	LP	TVM	SP	Total
Debates on:					
Football	5		1	3	9
Prisons	8	1			9
<i>El Xip</i>	7		2		9
Social use of the Catalan	4	3			7
Youth	6				6
Do you trust your doctor?	3		1		4
Gypsies	3				3
Upper Class	3				3
Barcelona	2	1			3
Depression	2				2
1991	2				2
Others	6				6
Total	51	5	4	3	63

NP - national press

LP - local press

TVM -TV and society magazines

SP - sporting press

Indeed, the edition on football received even more coverage than the extraordinary odyssey of Ballester. Likewise, the programme on the social use of the Catalan language was commented on by both national and local television critics.

The last edition of *El Xip* was set up to explain how its programme-makers had worked over the years. The floor of *El Xip* was crowded with technicians, the characters of *La Granja*, researchers and members of the Advisory Committee who still worked for or had worked for the show. In the panel, Ferrús, managing director of TVC, the script executive Jaume Cabré and the sociologist Altarriba explained, respectively, the impact of *La Granja* and the sociological criteria applied to the show. The executive producer Ramon Fusté and the editor Jordi Mir refused to give up their anonymity. There was also extensive coverage of this unusual good-bye.

Press debates on Catalan matters

Three programmes on National identity & Culture were sharply debated by the Catalan intellectuals in the press.

In February 1989, *El Xip* addressed the issue of bilingual Catalan society. Thereafter, *AVUI* published a series of six articles, through which linguists and politicians debated the socio-linguistic theory of passive bilingualism. The controversy was whether a Catalan speaker should always speak in Catalan, regardless of the language in which he/she was approached.

In April 1989, *El Xip* invited the right-wing politician, Aleix Vidal-Quadras, to comment on the national identity feelings of the Catalans. In the studio audience radical Catalan nationalists reacted against Vidal-Quadras as he stated that Spain should be regarded as a united nation. *AVUI* and *El Periódico* published a series of articles claiming respect for everyone's political beliefs.

In February 1990, Xavier Bru de Sala resigned as general director of Cultural Policy of the Catalan autonomous government. Coincidentally, he had just contributed to *El Xip's* discussion on whether cultural goods in Castilian made in Catalonia should be considered part of Catalan culture. Bru de Sala took sides with the Noes. The newspapers

connected his resignation with his statement, since he implied that literature by well-known writers such as Manuel Vázquez Montalbán or José Agustín Goytisolo were alien to the Catalan culture. The two writers made their points clear through *El Periódico* (28-2-90) and *El País* (10-2-90) respectively. The possible link between Bru de Sala's resignation and his speech on *El Xip* was never cleared up.

These three examples lead us to the last section of this chapter. As in the *Scottish Women* case study, this one also aimed to explore whether the programme-makers had specific strategies to approach sensitive issues such the ones just cited and whether the Catalan national identity question was taken into account by *El Xip*'s professionals.

5.5 *El Xip*, Catalan identity and the 'internal debates'

In the *Scottish Women* case study, the analysis revealed that the representation of the Scottish identity in the programme followed diverse approaches according to the views of the programme-makers and the broadcaster's policies. *El Xip* presents a similar picture in relation to Catalonia.

When discussing TVC's programming policies, it was argued that DCo's products harmonised with the principles of TVC as a public service, and consequently, TVC trusted the former to have full editorial control.

El Xip had been devised to discuss social issues. Thus, political matters generally focused on how the individuals faced a conflict with ideological implications (the defence of their language, their relationship with gypsies and foreigners, their feelings of national identity). *El Xip* called those issues related to National identity & Culture, the 'internal

debates'. The specific editions and the strategies used by the programme-makers to face them are commented on below.

5.5.1 The internal debates

El Xip dedicated 11 of its 143 editions to matters (directly or indirectly) concerning Catalan identity.⁴⁶ In Catalonia, the linguistic issue is the spark that starts the fire of national identity discussions. Both Catalan and Spanish are official in Catalonia and their cohabitation has never been totally harmonious: should Catalan natives have to speak Spanish in their own territory? Should the immigrants learn Catalan? Which language should a native and an immigrant use to communicate?

El Xip discussed the future of the Catalan language (3-2-89), whether everyone living in Catalonia should learn Catalan (23-2-90), the Catalan culture produced in Castilian (2-11-90) and the social use of language (29-5-92). The Catalan linguistic issue was a main concern of the *El Xip* editorial board which explains to some extent the stress on these issues.

In relation to national identity questions, *El Xip* put three political matters on the spot: whether the Catalans only felt Catalan from a national viewpoint (21-4-89), whether the unity of Europe would compromise the future of nationalisms (15-12-89), and whether the Catalan lifestyle was European judged by foreigners living in the country (2-11-90). It is noteworthy that *El Xip* focused on Europe rather than on Spain to emphasise its distinctiveness and reinforce the conception of Catalonia as an independent nation. Europeanness is rooted in Catalonia to a greater extent than in Scotland, due to the proximity of the former to the centre of the continent. The data presented in the next chapter will confirm the different attitudes of both Scots and Catalans in relation to Europe.

Finally, football. Football is undoubtedly the 'national' sport in Spain, and therefore, linked to feelings of belongingness of football supporters. Teams are based in each town or village and rivalries established at local and national level. By contrast to Scotland, Catalonia has no national team. Thus, Barcelona F.C. is the representative of Catalan sporting pride. Barcelona F.C., which is possibly the second biggest club in the world, maintains an intense rivalry with the Madrid teams, particularly noticeable during Franco's regime. At that time Barcelona F.C.'s supporters projected onto the football ground the battle that they could not sustain in politics. There was an overall feeling that *el Barça* - the nickname of the club - meant something else to the Catalans than a mere sporting club: the football players reflected the desire of the country to stand up and be recognised by other peoples. 'Up *el Barça* and up Catalonia' ('*Visca el Barça i visca Catalunya*') was and is still one of the chants of Barcelona F.C.'s supporters.

Both Puyal and Antoni Bassas, producer at DCo, enjoyed a privileged position in observing the nationalistic behaviour of Barcelona F.C.'s supporters, since they reported *El Barça's* football matches for radio. Bassas was always a crucial advisor to set up the profiles of the participants of these shows. *El Xip* ran four debates to hear from them and their rivals.⁴⁷

5.5.2 'The Catalans think...'

El Xip ran polls on the eleven *internal* issues listed in the table below. The results of the polls confirmed that, despite the convictions of the programme-makers and the policies of the broadcaster, the feeling of national identity is not a straightforward matter to the Catalans. The underlying conflicts are due to the cross-cultural relationship between Catalan natives and non-native Catalans:

Fig. 5.4 'National Identity & Culture'
La Vida en un Xip (opinion polls, 1989-1992)

Statement	Date	Yes	No	I.
1-. I speak in Catalan, although I have been addressed in Spanish	3-2-89	50%	45%	5%
2-. From the national point of view, I only feel Catalan	21-4-89	65%	32%	3%
3-. Barça is more than a football club	12-5-89	81%	14%	6%
4-. The union of Europe will destroy nationalisms	15-12-89	41%	47%	12%
5-. Anyone who has lived for a certain time in Catalonia should be able to speak Catalan	23-2-90	86%	9%	7%
6-. It is Barça's responsibility if its team does not win more competitions	6-4-90	74%	16%	10%
7-. The cultural expressions made in Catalonia in Spanish are part of the Catalan culture	2-11-90	57%	38%	5%
8-. Catalonia has reached a European level	14-12-90	86%	12%	2%
9-. The football authorities are prejudiced against Barça	18-10-90	44%	29%	27%
10-. Barcelona F.C. will win the league	13-3-92	73%	14%	13%
11-. When I talk to a stranger, I address him/her in Spanish	29-5-92	54%	43%	3%
* (the same question was asked exclusively to Catalan speakers) ⁴⁸	29-5-92	70%	26%	4%

Glossary:

Yes - percentage of 'I totally agree' plus 'I agree a little'

No - percentage of 'I totally disagree' plus 'I disagree a little'

I - percentage of 'I am indifferent'

According to the above table, the Catalans seem to have a strong feeling of identity: six out of ten people identified themselves as exclusively Catalans. The use of the Catalan language is clearly a strong priority for the Catalans. However, the structural links between Catalonia and Spain reflected in this data are deeply rooted and express some sense of dual cultural identity (Catalan and Spanish). But what were the criteria of the programme-makers that led them to formulate these questions and plan the shows?

5.5.3 The criteria of the programme-makers

Reflecting my Catalan identity is not an artificial attitude, because it is within my professional approach and perception of reality: I look at the world from Catalonia and in Catalan.⁴⁹

From the researcher's own experience with *El Xip*, the statement by Cópulo just cited would be agreed with by most of *El Xip*'s professionals. However, *El Xip* was never used exclusively as a forum for the expression of Catalan national identity. That is not to say that the editorial board disregarded the question. *El Xip* addressed those matters that were discussed in the street, that is, the language, the conflicts with the non-native Catalans and the historical role of Barcelona F.C. as a reminder of the Catalans' national pride. The editorial content of these internal debates was carefully discussed by Puyal and Mir, who is a dedicated observer of issues concerning language and culture in Catalonia. There were strategies to debate those issues without biasing the programme by giving away the convictions of the editorial board.

The question

The question was an instrument to focus on the issues socially rather than politically. Instead of using 'Catalonia' or 'the Catalans', *El Xip* used 'here' or 'our society'. Consequently, the viewers could interpret what those terms meant to them, and the programme-makers maintained their neutral viewpoint.

Social conflicts were also addressed to the viewer as an individual rather than a member of a collective: 'you' and 'it' rather than 'we': 'From a national point of view, do you feel exclusively Catalan?', 'Do you think that it is alright for the supporters of our clubs to chant 'campeones' (champions in Spanish) rather than 'campions' (in Catalan)?'

Selecting material and participants

The *Centre de Documentació* gathered information about the issues in relation to Europe rather than Spain. Spain was only mentioned if developments in Catalonia depended upon state institutions. The participants were selected from among people living in the country and very rarely invited from Spain. However, if a topic required Spanish politicians to represent state policies, the programme invited them. If a topic was the responsibility of both central and the autonomous institutions, *El Xip* represented both in the panel.

Generally, issues on National identity & Culture gathered a higher response from the audience than any others. For instance, the debate on the Catalan culture in Castilian produced nearly 3,000 phone calls. Generally, these potential participants held radical views on either side which provoked furious rows, but did not reflect the attitude of most Catalans. With regard to this, Mariona Anglès, coordinator, admitted that at first people tended to come solely from Catalan backgrounds, but that the social representation became more balanced over the years:

At the beginning of *El Xip*, the audience that dared to come to TV3 to contribute specifically on ideological or politicised topics, were radical defenders of the 'Catalan cause'. When the transmission finished, we used to say that our audience in the studio had not mirrored the Catalan society. However, the great achievement of this programme has been to open the range progressively and bring conflicts and sensibilities from rural areas and immigrants' collectives.⁵⁰

The language of the debate

The linguistic policy of *El Xip* was that the participants were free to choose the language of expression that suited them best.⁵¹ The presenter would always address to the participants in Catalan. If an expert or witness did not understand the language, simultaneous translation into Castilian was provided.

The strategem of fiction

La Granja and the link-gag were fiction. However, as in any soap-opera, *La Granja* had its 'goodies and baddies'. The characters whose storylines portrayed them as negative (mean, selfish, superficial, aggressive) were more likely to be perceived as negative than those who were portrayed as the 'hero' figures. Given these assumptions, the strategem of fiction allowed the programme-makers (consciously or unconsciously) to write scripts which projected their own views upon those characters who were in presumed sympathy with the home audience.

By way of illustration, the dialogue of a link-gag is transcribed below. The debate being introduced was 'Will the unity of Europe destroy the nationalisms?' The dialogue was performed by the presenter and two characters who held two antagonistic viewpoints: Sònia, the oldest daughter of the bar's owner, defended the Catalan separatist ideology and Gassiot, an arrogant middle-class employee of an insurance company, supported the unity of Spain:⁵²

Gassiot:

I am a man of order and especially, realistic... I consider myself as Catalan as you, but I am not a separatist.

Sònia:

You have to be linked to something, if you want to separate... and I don't regard myself as linked to anything!

Gassiot:(progressively annoyed)

Do you see? Without solidarity, how would we get a united Europe?

Sònia:

For goodness sake! The union of Europe does not mean that countries lose their identities... It is the other way around: we have the great chance to claim the rights of stateless nations.

Gassiot:(to Puyal)

We would never agree, Sònia, never...The future is Europe and we have to forget about distinctions and look for elements of unification.

Sònia (ironically):

According to that, you should stop feeling Spanish, because it is a separation from the Italians or Germans, isn't it?

Gassiot:

The Europe of the future will put an end to all these old-fashioned nationalisms...

Sònia:

You are completely wrong: the Europe of the future will allow the oppressed nations, (emphasis) the nationalisms, that are not old-fashioned at all, to liberate themselves from their respective artificial states. (We can see Puyal listening to them. Finally, he intervenes)

Puyal:

Gassiot! Sònia! It seems that this conversation is becoming complex, isn't it?...

Gassiot:(bad tempered)

All right, I am off!

Sònia:

Hey, old chap, you are not going without giving me a goodnight kiss, are you?

Gassiot:(to Puyal)

What could I say? I have known her since she was born. Good-bye, idealist! (he kisses her and leaves).

Puyal:(to the camera)

The dialogue that tonight has led us to the topic of the debate could have been undoubtedly different. There are different ways to focus on this matter: it is a passionate issue that at present is really up-to-date in Europe. How will the Europe of the future be? What role will nationalisms play in it? Will the 'Europe of the Regions' have any real impact? Today, we want to talk about these questions through a constructive and respectful dialogue in the studio. We would like you to join us... (End. Commercial break).

The effectiveness of this strategy was always subject to the viewer's own interpretation, since it depended upon the sympathies that home audiences had for the characters performing the link-gag. Nevertheless, fiction was an effective trick for the programme-makers to claim editorial impartiality for the show, whilst actually putting their views across through the lines of *La Granja*.

Final words

The *La Vida en un Xip* case study aimed to demonstrate that the editorial and production processes of the show were determined by the convictions and style of DCo's professionals. Such convictions were in line with those of TVC's managers, and thus, no significant interference in the editorial content was observed. As follows from the account presented here, the editorial focus of *El Xip* was based not as much on setting up an agenda (as was the case of *Scottish Women*), but on formulating carefully the question that would determine the arguments and the profiles of experts, witnesses and lay participants. Once in the arena, the presenter had his own strategies to guide the discussion, and the editor or the executive producer rarely interfered to advise him. *El*

Xip relied on people rather than ideas and on the presenter rather than other members of the team.

The evolution of the show, as in the *Scottish Women* case, confirmed the gradual loss of space of intellectual discourse on the panels. Audience discussion programmes search for interpreters of social reality capable of articulating the plain and popular message that the medium requires; *El Xip* witnessed the appearance on television of the Catalan 'popular intellectuals', mainly embodied by journalists.

El Xip was innovative because it explored social issues through both fiction and reality. The show also developed a circuit of audience participation: experts - witnesses - lay participants - home audience, which opened the door to the further development of interactive television formulae.

This audience discussion programme was produced by a group of media professionals, whose convictions were deeply rooted in the ideological struggle of Catalonia for the recovery of its cultural rights. *El Xip* showed that the Catalan national identity is as puzzling a question to the Catalans as Scottishness is to the Scots. The results of the opinion polls concerning these matters illustrated this point. The following pages support these findings through the results of a quantitative survey among the lay participants of *El Xip* and *Scottish Women*, which was carried out to gather their views on their feelings of identity and on these shows as platforms of expression of their respective communities.

Notes

- 1 See Chapter 2 for further development of this arguments.
- 2 'Chip' is a tiny wafer of semiconductor material which is used to produce electronic tools such as computers.
- 3 Jaume Cabré, scriptwriter of *La Granja*, from his intervention in *La Vida en un Xip* (26-6-92).
- 4 In the last section of this chapter, the role of fiction in *La Vida en un Xip* is analysed in relation to issues of national identity. An example of the link-gag will be presented to see how the programme brought up ideas through the characters.
- 5 Cópulo's interview with the researcher (13-1-92). The researcher's translation.
- 6 In this context, Puyal refers to 'messengers' meaning the presenters and producers of broadcasting programmes.
- 7 Seminar presentation at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona.
- 8 Ferrús's interview with the researcher (5-1-92). The researcher's translation. DCo, as we will see, was never keen on discussing politics in *El Xip*. In relation to this, the analysis of the 143 issues of *El Xip* reflects a progressive depoliticisation of its agenda.
- 9 Interesting reviews of the first ten years of TV3 are provided by Joan Granados (1993) and Màxim Pujade (1993). Also, see the report 'Diez años que son una vida' by Isabel Clarós, Josep M. Baget i Víctor Amela (*La Vanguardia*. Revista, 5-9-93).
- 10 Oleguer Sarsanedas. Interview with the researcher (14-1-92). The researcher's translation. Interestingly, Colin Cameron, head of BBC Television Scotland, defended this argument in relation to the production of drama and the reaffirmation of Scottish identity.
- 11 In 1994, TV3 launched a Catalan soap-opera, *Poble Nou*, whose major audience success confirms this preference. Jordi Garcia-Soler reflects on the success of this soap-opera in *Poble Nou*, les raons d'un fenomen' (*AVUI*, 14-6-94).
- 12 There is a distinction to be made in terms of terminology. In Spanish and Catalan television, 'director' stands for the person responsible for the whole programme, whereas the British regard as the director the person who interprets the script and decides how the show is filmed. This role, in Catalan broadcasting, is called 'realitzador'. The equivalent to the Catalan director is the British producer, who is in charge of the whole programme. Joaquim M. Puyal, thus, is the (British) producer.
- 13 See "Un Tomb per la Vida", Balanç d'un Programa Estrella' (TVC, 20-6-94), and also 'Puyal cierra un ciclo con su "tomb"' by Cristina Savall (*El Periódico*, 30-6-94).
- 14 Ramon Fusté. Interview with the researcher (8-1-92). The researcher's translation.
- 15 In 1992, DCo got a deal with *Televisió Valenciana* (TVV) and *Televisión Autonómica de Madrid* (TeleMadrid) to produce the format of *La Vida en un Xip*. Puyal was not involved in the production process, which was conducted by the executive producer Ramon Fusté.
- 16 The researcher's translation from the intervention of Jaume Ferrús, managing director of TVC, in *La Vida en un Xip* (26-6-92).
- 17 According to Giner (1985), 'common sense' was defined by Gramsci, in relation to the construction of hegemony. 'Common sense' is linked to civil society - the pool of organisms commonly called private - and distinguished from political society. In civil society, there is the dominance of a particular class, whose power Gramsci calls 'hegemony' and whose instrument is the general acceptance of 'common sense'. According to Giner, 'common sense' ensures the stability of class dominance.
Munné (1974) does not use the term 'common sense'. He defines the 'internal guides of behaviour' as common logic, ideas, thoughts and collective beliefs which we acknowledge through our experience, explanations and observation of the environment. He suggests that they are a consequence of 'common sense, explicit or not'. 'Common sense' is also linked to questions of cultural identity and behavioural habits. 'Common people' consequently refers to those who apply 'common sense' and assume the hegemony of a particular social structure and order. These ideas lie behind the editorial approach of *El Xip*.
- 18 Puyal's interview with the researcher (14-1-92) The researcher's translation.
- 19 Ibid.
- 20 After the episode in which Serafina, the waitress of the little café, died of kidney cancer in 1992, the studio audience discussed 'confidence in the medical profession'.
- 21 Puyal, *ibid*.
- 22 Ibid. The researcher's emphasis.
- 23 The 143 issues of *El Xip* are translated and classified in Appendix 3.
- 24 As in the *Scottish Women* case study, issues were classified according to their editorial approach.

- 25 The last section shows the results of the polls on 'National identity & Culture' issues.
- 26 Altarriba's interview with the researcher (17-1-92). The researcher's translation.
- 27 An example of the witnesses' information network was a 17 year-old boy from Mataró, in the Barcelona area, who participated in *El Xip* to say that 'women should stay at home'. Thereafter, this witness contacted radical right-wing youngsters for the show.
- 28 As far as the lobbies are concerned, during the fieldwork on medical errors (1991-92), Golanó explained: 'This week the president of Usuaris de la Sanitat (Health Service Consumers) phoned me saying that she must be on the panel. I answered, as usual, that the consumers are represented in the audience and the witnesses who complain about the defects of the system'. Interview with the researcher (21-1-92). The researcher's translation.
- 29 Thereafter the second series, a group of thirty people, who were placed at the back rows were not expected to speak to reduce the amount of contributions.
- 30 Cortadellas' interview with the researcher (21-1-92). The researcher's translation.
- 31 From the summary card on war and peace (1-3-91): 'We don't want people talking about the Gulf War, although it will be used as an example'. From 'Has Catalonia reached a European level?' (14-12-90): 'We will fill the audience with foreigners who live and work in Catalonia: we want people from Europe, but also from Africa, America and Asia. We want people from all sorts of backgrounds: agricultural workers and liberal professionals.'
- 32 Interview with the researcher (21-1-92). The researcher's translation.
- 33 The following chapter provides background information from both the Catalan and the Scottish lay participants.
- 34 Puyal, briefing to the experts on medical errors (24-1-92). The researcher's translation.
- 35 See the audience figures provided by TVC from Media Control: dates of transmission: 27-12-91, 3-1-92 and 10-1-92.
- 36 Data provided by Jaume Ferrús during his intervention in the last edition of *El Xip* (26-6-92).
- 37 The qualitative audience research that TVC orders periodically was not made available to this study.
- 38 Reports from January 1992 showed that *El Xip* was the first programme amongst the Catalan viewers (*El Periódico*, 18-2-92).
- 39 Notice that in the same slot as *El Xip*, the second Catalan channel, Canal 33, transmitted the most popular BBC soap opera, *Eastenders* (*Gent del Barri*) reaching only 5% of the viewing share.
- 40 Both cases had substantial coverage in most national papers. 'Un trasplante de corazón salva a Ada' (*Claro*, 28-6-91). 'El Xip torna el Nino a la presó' (*El Punt*, 7-4-92) are significant examples.
- 41 '¿Puede un delincuente llegar a ser jefe del estado?' (*La Vanguardia*, 11-4-92, El Burladero).
- 42 The three quotes reproduced below correspond to press criticisms from three well-known Catalan writers. These quotes were included in reviews of *El Xip* 'Puyal is an 'awakener' of communications' (Josep M. Espinàs, *AVUI*, 21-3-89); 'Puyal, always impartial and honest' (José Agustín Goytisolo, *El Periódico*, 28-2-90) and 'Puyal is the modern version of Pompeu Fabra' (Oriol Pi de Cabanyes, *AVUI*, 4-3-90). The Catalan linguist Pompeu Fabra, wrote the first Catalan Grammar and Dictionary at the beginning of this century.
- 43 Puyal's interview with the researcher (17-1-92). The researcher's translation.
- 44 A selection of these press cuttings is included in Appendix 3.
- 45 For instance, in 1989-90, after the programme on racism, *Diari de Girona* and *El Punt* published several articles on the wave of racial discrimination in some rural areas of Girona.
- 46 See The 143 issues of *La Vida en un Xip* in Appendix 3.
- 47 Blain, Boyle and O'Donnell (1993: 170-182) analyse the media discourse in relation to sporting events comparing the relationship between Scotland and Britain, and Catalonia and Spain.
- 48 According to data provided by the programme, 74.1% of people living and working in Catalonia at the time were Catalan speakers, whereas 25.9% were not.
- 49 Cópulo's interview with the researcher (13-1-92). The researcher's translation.
- 50 Anglès's interview with the researcher (13-1-92). The researcher's translation. The edition on gypsies showed the role of *El Xip* at integrating the different ethnic minorities of Catalonia. The answering machines provided enough gypsies to achieve a balance between fifty gypsies and fifty non-gypsies in the studio audience.
- 51 Out of ten calls, *El Xip* had an average of eight Catalan to two Spanish speakers, however, in the *Centre de Dades*, the team noticed that some viewers, even if they understood Catalan, would not expand on their opinions unless they were addressed by the team in Spanish.

52 The dialogue of this link-gag was transcribed with the researcher's translation from the transmission of 15-12-89.

CHAPTER 6

Dual Identity and Audience Motivation **A survey amongst Scottish and Catalan participants**

The two previous chapters analysed *Scottish Women* and *La Vida en un Xip* in relation to their production processes and their respective links with the Scottish and Catalan audiovisual industries. However, little was mentioned there about the participants' views on the main theme of this study, the national identity question. Before concluding this work the relationship between the participants, the shows and their respective countries warrants some further analysis.

The audiences of *El Xip* and *Scottish Women* were surveyed to explore the national identity feelings of the participants. The results show that, indeed, both the Scots and the Catalans experience feelings of dual identity in relation to their respective nations - Scotland and Catalonia - and states - Britain and Spain. The survey also aimed to see whether both *Scottish Women* and *El Xip* were perceived by the participants as platforms of expression of their respective communities.

6.1 The procedures of the survey

The participants were surveyed twice in each programme with a gap of at least three months between the two samples.¹ Thus, there were two *Scottish Women* and two *La Vida en un Xip* samples. The programmes in which the surveys were carried out did not discuss questions related to 'National Identity & Culture'.

The participants of *Scottish Women* were surveyed on the evening of 17 October 1991 and 21 March 1992, dates of the recordings on smoking and reproductive technology, and television and eating disorders respectively. In the tables below, these two samples are identified as SW1 and SW2 respectively. The Catalan samples were polled on 17 January 1991, date of the discussion on young people's complaints, and on 24 April 1991 on jokes. Again, in the tables, the data from both samples are identified as XIP1 and XIP2 respectively.

One sample of each programme included a larger number of young people than the average of their usual audiences - the Scottish edition on eating disorders and the Catalan on young people's complaints. This choice ensured that there would be youngsters amongst the participants since, although both production teams aimed at a balanced representation of age groups, young people were not keen on attending the shows.

The data from both samples aggregated. The total number of valid questionnaires were 217 from *Scottish Women* and 227 from *El Xip*. The results of those two total samples are identified in the tables as SW1+SW2 and XIP1+XIP2, respectively. The data from the six samples was processed using the Macintosh statistics package "Stat View II". The analysis and the tables are commented on below and the graphics are reproduced in the last section of this chapter.

6.2 The background of the respondents

The questionnaires included three background questions: age, address and occupation, which offered a profile of the audience that regularly attended these debates.

Fig. 6.1 How old are the participants?
(table of age in percentages)²

Sample/Age	under 20	20-38	39-58	over 58
SW1	3.5	61.1	32.7	2.7
SW2	1.9	44.2	36.6	17.3
SW1+SW2	2.8	54.4	35.9	6.9
XIP1	75.6	11.8	8.7	3.9
XIP2	14.6	51.5	25.2	8.7
XIP1+XIP2	27.9	46.9	19.1	6.1

The data reproduced above shows that most participants from both shows were between 20 and 38 years-old. The second largest group was at aged between 39 and 58 years-old. There is a large disproportion between the Scottish and the Catalan audiences due to the fact that more than 75% of the XIP1 sample were youngsters.

In the two case studies, it was argued that the geographical representation of lay participants was difficult since both *Scottish Women* and *La Vida en un Xip* had budget restrictions on the repayment of travel expenses. The studio audiences of both shows were mainly based in large cities, that is, Edinburgh and Glasgow, and Barcelona:

Fig. 6.2 Where do they live?
(table of address in percentages)³

Address	SW1+SW2
Edinburgh	51.0
Glasgow	17.0
Other Scottish cities	30.5
Address	XIP1+XIP2
Barcelona	64.8
AMB (Metropolitan Area)	18.7
Other big cities	3.9
Rural areas	10.9

The comparison of both tables shows that the percentage of people from Glasgow added to the percentage of the Edinburgh-based is close to the percentage of participants from Barcelona only.⁴

Occupations have been summarised as follows: 'employed', 'houseworker', 'student', 'unemployed' and 'retired'. It needs to be remarked that two of the four samples were slanted towards youngsters and consequently, the percentage of students was much higher than the average of most editions. The female audience of the Scottish debate reflects that the main female occupation is still housework.

Fig. 6.3 What do they do for living?
(table of occupation in percentages)

Occupation	SW1+SW2	XIP1+XIP2
Employed	66.4	44.0
Houseworker	21.2	11.7
Student	6.9	40.0
Unemployed	0.0	1.3
Retired	5.0	1.3
No answer	0.5	1.7

The occupational data therefore divides the participants into two groups: the employed and those who presumably spend most of their time at home (houseworkers, retired and unemployed people, and to some extent, students). The number of employed participants who felt motivated to attend this kind of programme is remarkable (*Scottish Women*, 66.4%, and *El Xip*, 44%). Arguably, audience discussion programmes attract a type of active participant who would traditionally feel no motivation to attend other programmes (game-shows, talk-shows).

The audience of *Scottish Women* was entirely female. *El Xip* selected participants from both sexes. According to the data from the XIP1+XIP2, 64% were women and 36% were men. This inequality, as *El Xip's* researcher remarked earlier, was balanced during the debate when both women and men tended to contribute the same.

Those four hundred men and women - mainly middle-aged employed people living in large cities or urban areas - were then required to respond to questions of national identity and evaluate their personal motivation for participating in these two television forums.

6.3 A vague and dual national identity

The respondents were polled about their nationality and their feelings of national identity.

The first question required them to tick the answers that suited their nationalities best.

The following table shows the results:

**Fig. 6.4 The dual nationality of the Scots and the Catalans
(results of question 1 in percentages)**

SW1+SW2

Nationality	%
Scottish	64.0
British and Scottish	13.4
British	12.4
English	3.2
Others	3.7
British and English	2.3
Welsh	0.5
Irish	0.5

XIP1+XIP2

Nationality	%
Catalan	55.6
Spanish and Catalan	20.9
Spanish	19.5
No sense of nationality ⁵	2.2
Others	0.9
Other Spanish nationalities	0.9

Both tables show that the majority of the respondents defined their nationality according to their national context, that is, Scotland and Catalonia respectively. However, more than one in ten Scots and nearly two in ten Catalans chose the option 'British' and 'Spanish', in line with their passports. There is a significant percentage of people who ticked two options, that is, they considered that they had two nationalities, Scottish (or English) and British, and Catalan and Spanish.

This sense of dual nationality became more visible through the answers to the second question. The same questionnaire inquired of the participants about their personal feelings. The results show a contrast with the above tables and also a remarkable similarity between the Scottish and the Catalan percentages.⁶

The question was designed so as that the respondents could choose as many answers as they considered suitable to their feelings. The table below shows the percentages of people who ticked each one of the statements reproduced in the first column.⁷

Fig. 6.5 A dual feeling of national identity
(results of question 2 in percentages)

Scottish statements	SW1+ SW2	Catalan statements	XIP1+ XIP2
<i>I feel as much Scottish as British</i>	29.9	<i>I feel as much Catalan as Spanish</i>	29.6
<i>I feel Scottish and British, but not European</i>	24.0	<i>I feel Catalan and Spanish, but not European</i>	7.4
<i>I feel only Scottish</i>	21.6	<i>I feel only Catalan</i>	20.0
<i>I feel Scottish, and as British as European</i>	21.6	<i>I feel Catalan, and as Spanish as European</i>	38.3
<i>Other nationalities</i>	7.4	<i>Other nationalities</i>	23.5
<i>I feel only British</i>	6.0	<i>I feel only Spanish</i>	3.9
<i>I feel Scottish, but I don't feel either British or European</i>	5.1	<i>I feel Catalan, but I don't feel either Spanish or European</i>	4.8
<i>I feel only European</i>	0.0	<i>I feel only European</i>	1.7
<i>I feel Scottish and European, but not British</i>	0.0	<i>I feel Catalan and European but not Spanish</i>	19.6

One in five respondents felt exclusively Scots or Catalan. However, statements which implied a sense of dual identity showed percentages up to 20%. There was a high number of Catalan participants that considered their Catalan identity to be primary, and the Spanish and European identities as equal seconds (38.3%). The Scots tended to identify themselves as closer to Britain than to Europe. None of the Scottish respondents ticked the option *'I feel Scottish and European, but not British'*. By contrast, a significant percentage of *El Xip's* participants felt Catalan and European, *but not Spanish* (19.6%). As pointed out in the *El Xip* case study, European identity is reflected more strongly in the Catalans than in the Scots. The latter are rather reluctant to see themselves as part of Europe (24%).

The feeling of being a Scot or a Catalan is clearly stated as expressed within the British and Spanish contexts respectively. It is interesting to notice the similar percentage of people who identified with the statement: *'I feel only Scottish / Catalan'* and *'I feel as much Scottish as British / as much Catalan as Spanish'*.

Despite these differences, the reading of these data suggests that there is indeed a complex articulation of national identity in both territories. The small percentage of *'I feel only British'* (6%) and *'I feel only Spanish'* (3.9%), which correspond to those who identified their feeling of national identity with the boundaries of the states, seems to illustrate this. Although these results only apply to the respondents of the questionnaires, the complexity of the answers and the parallels between the two surveys are revealing.

With regard to the feelings of national identity, the tables reproduced above are comparable to the results of a similar inquiry carried out by Moreno in 1986.⁸ Then, the respondents were required to choose only one of the options, which showed a more definite result. Moreno's data also confirmed that more than 54% of the Scots and 79% of the Catalans felt some sort of dual identity.. However, to this researcher, the

complexity of the question of national consciousness can not be reduced to one answer when diverse historical, economic and social contexts set up different political structures. The data from the *Scottish Women* and *La Vida en un Xip* surveys seems to demonstrate this.

The overall impression is that the Scots and the Catalans feel linked to their immediate national context, that is, Scotland and Catalonia, but also bound up with the other boundaries that determine their lives (the state, the European Community). Both the Scots and the Catalans clearly accept their ties with their respective states, the United Kingdom and Spain. However, the feeling of national identity is vague. It seemed difficult for the participants to condense their feelings into only one statement. By and large, it can be concluded that both the Scots and the Catalans experience feelings of dual identity at state and *regional-national* levels. Furthermore, the sense of 'a' European national identity has expanded the conflict, specially amongst the Catalans.

6.4 The links between a television forum and the nation

The final question asked the respondents to reflect on their personal motivation for attending these two television forums. The questionnaire contained ten possible reasons and the respondents had to assign values from 1 to 10 to each statement according to their personal priorities. Five of the possible statements involved a link between the television programme and the nation, Scotland or Catalonia. The other five had no political connotations. The analysis of this question looked for the main priorities of the respondents: the data present the results concerning those statements that were most frequently assigned '1' or '2' in the scale of the participants' priorities. The following table also reveals interesting parallels between the Scottish and the Catalan replies.

Fig. 6.6 Audience motivation⁹

(results of question 3; percentages of 1+2 answers of each statement)

SW1+SW2

<i>I am interested in listening to other opinions on this topic</i>	50
<i>Scotland needs to hear from women talking about these matters</i>	36
<i>I have information and personal comments to offer</i>	25
<i>I am a Scot interested in Scottish matters</i>	23
<i>Scottish Women is our forum to express ourselves</i>	22
<i>Scottish Women helps to improve women's role in British society</i>	16
<i>I enjoy talking about any subject</i>	14
<i>It is a Scottish television programme</i>	5
<i>I would like to talk about my personal experience</i>	3
<i>I like attending television programmes in general</i>	3

XIP1+XIP2

<i>I am interested in listening to other opinions on this topic</i>	37
<i>Catalonia needs to hear about this topic in television</i>	27
<i>I have information and personal comments to offer</i>	22
<i>I am a Catalan interested in Catalan matters</i>	32
<i>La Vida en un Xip is the forum of the Catalans to express themselves</i>	30
<i>La Vida en un Xip helps to improve the communication skills of this region of the state</i>	34
<i>I enjoy talking about any subject</i>	25
<i>It is a Catalan television programme</i>	40
<i>I would like to talk about my personal experience</i>	21
<i>I like attending television programmes in general</i>	28

Both tables indicate that overall the participants of both *Scottish Women* and *El Xip* attended the shows because they wanted to talk about the topics or needed information about them, or because they could supply information to the audience. The Catalans, though, expressed more clearly than the Scots their perception of *El Xip* as a meeting point for discussing the matters of the community (30% vs. 22%). However, these data confirm that the principal appeal of audience discussion programmes is their capacity to make people listen to each other's opinions and put them in contact to discuss their common concerns.

More Catalan participants (21%) than Scots (3%) were prepared to explain their personal experiences. That might strike us as a cultural difference between the Scottish and the Catalan character. This study suggests that the Catalans talked more openly about their intimacies than the Scots, although the success of the new version of *Scottish Women* by the Light Entertainment division seemed to show that, given the right environment, the Scots are prepared to discuss any matter on television.

The links between participating in these television forums and their respective nations were underlined by two different responses: (i) the sense of responsibility in relation to the affairs of the nation: 23% of the Scottish and 32% of the Catalan replies assigned '1' or '2' to the statement '*I am a Scot / Catalan interested in Scottish / Catalan matters*', and (ii) the identification of the programme as 'the' public forum of the community: two in ten of the Scottish women and three in ten Catalans perceived these two programmes as their respective platforms of expression. According to the participants' perception, both programmes seemed to embrace a sense of collective identity in relation to their respective communities. Whilst the participants attach remarkable expectations of representing civil society to these shows, the case studies analysed earlier evidence that television production limits such a representation and establishes mechanisms to control and, if necessary, direct the discussion. These results may hopefully reveal to programme-makers that audience discussion programmes such as *Scottish Women* and *El Xip* carry

political and social implications, or, at least, such is the perception of those who take part in them. In light of this survey, questions of social representation and political attachment to the community should be carefully considered in the process of television production. As analysed in the two previous chapters, such questions are frequently kept aside since decision-making tends to favour those elements that take entertainment in to the show.

The Catalans connected *El Xip* with Catalonia more explicitly than the Scots: 40% contributed to the show because it was a Catalan television programme and 34% attended as they considered that *El Xip* improved the communication skills of *this region of the state*. The qualifier at the end of this statement confirms that Catalonia is perceived by the participants both as a region and as a nation.

The data illustrated the arguments made throughout this study. The cooperation of both the Scottish and the Catalan participants with these surveys and their interest in specifying their personal standpoints corroborates the sensitivity and puzzling nature of the matter itself.¹⁰ The graphics below might hopefully contribute to a final reflection on the comparative perspective of this work, before drawing some final conclusions.


6.5 Graphics

**Age groups
(bar charts)**

Fig. 6.7 SW1+SW2 (217 respondents)

Legend:

<u>Age group</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Count</u>	<u>Age group</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Count</u>
1- under 20	2.8%	6	3- 39-58	35.9%	78
2- 20-38	54.4%	118	4- over 58	6.9%	15




Age groups
(bar charts)

Fig. 6.8 XIP1+XIP2 (227 respondents)

Legend:

<u>Age group</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Count</u>	<u>Age group</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Count</u>
1- under 20	27.9%	64	3- 39-58	19.1%	44
2- 20-38	46.9%	108	4- over 58	6.1%	14




Address
(pie charts)

Fig. 6.9 SW1-SW2 (217 respondents)

Legend:

Place	%	Count
Edinburgh	51.0	111
Glasgow	17.0	37
Other Scottish cities	30.5	66
Ireland	0.0	0
Wales	0.0	0
England	0.0	0
Other countries	0.0	0
No answer	1.5	3



Address
(pie chart)

Fig. 6.10 XIP1+XIP2 (227 questionnaires)

Legend:

Place	%	Count
Barcelona	64.8	149
AMB (Metropolitan Area)	18.7	43
Lleida	2.6	6
Girona	0.9	2
Tarragona	0.4	1
Rural areas	10.9	25
No answer	1.7	4
País Valencià	0.0	0
Illes Balears	0.0	0
Andorra	0.0	0





Fig. 6.11 Occupation
(pie charts)

SW1+SW2 (217 questionnaires)



XIP1+XIP2 (227 questionnaires)




Fig. 6.12 The dual nationality of the Scots
(pie chart of question 1)

SW1+SW2 (217 questionnaires)

Legend

<u>Nationality</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Count</u>
British	12.4	27
Scottish	64.0	139
English	3.2	7
British and Scottish	13.4	29
British and English	2.3	5
Irish	0.5	1
Others	3.7	8
Welsh	0.5	1




Fig. 6.13 The dual nationality of the Catalans
(pie chart of question 1)

XIP1+XIP2 (227 questionnaires)

Legend

<u>Nationality</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Count</u>
Spanish	19.5	45
Catalan	55.6	128
Spanish and Catalan	20.9	48
Others	0.9	211
Other Spanish nationalities	0.9	2
No sense of nationality	2.2	5





Fig. 6.14 The dual feeling of national identity
(pie charts of each option of question 2)¹²


SW1+SW2: 'I feel as much Scottish as British'

29.9% - 65 women replied 'Yes'




XIP1+XIP2: 'I feel as much Catalan as Spanish'

29.6% - 68 people replied 'Yes'




SW1+SW2: 'I feel only Scottish'

21.6% - 47 women replied 'Yes'




XIP1+XIP2: 'I feel only Catalan'

20% - 46 people replied 'Yes'




SW1+SW2: 'I feel Scottish, and as British as European'

21.6% - 47 women replied 'Yes'




XIP1+XIP2: 'I feel Catalan, and as Spanish as European'

38.3% - 88 people replied 'Yes'




SW1+SW2: 'I feel Scottish and British, but not European'

24% - 52 women replied 'Yes'




XIP1+XIP2 : 'I feel Catalan and Spanish, but not European'

7.4% - 17 people replied 'Yes'




SW1+SW2: 'I feel only British'

6% - 13 women replied 'Yes'




XIP1+XIP2: 'I feel only Spanish'

3.9% - 9 people replied 'Yes'




**SW1+SW2: 'I feel Scottish, but I don't feel
either British or European'**

5.1% - 11 women replied 'Yes'



**XIP1+XIP2: 'I feel Catalan, but I don't feel
either Spanish or European'**

4.8% - 11 people replied 'Yes'




SW1+SW2: 'I feel Scottish and European, but not British'¹³

0%- None of the women replied 'Yes'

XIP1+XIP2: 'I feel Catalan and European, but not Spanish'

19.6% - 45 people replied 'Yes'



Notes

- 1 The questionnaires are included in Appendix 1.
- 2 This table includes the results of the two samples of each programme to contrast the age groups of those transmissions which dealt with a higher number of young people. The third and sixth rows show the results of the two samples of each programme analysed together, which did balance the age gap between the two. See the graphics of each case study at the end of this chapter.
- 3 The percentages of 'No answer' (SW1+SW2, 1.5% and XIP1+XIP2, 1.7%) were ignored. The Catalan table includes the three other main cities of Catalonia (Girona, Lleida and Tarragona) under the label 'Other big cities'. The AMB area is the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona, which includes big peripheral urban cities, such as Sabadell, Mataró, Badalona and Sant Boi de Llobregat.
- 4 With regard to this point, the geographical area reached by STV, Scotland's central belt, is smaller than Catalonia, which is entirely covered by TV3's signal.
- 5 Spontaneously, several Catalan questionnaires registered in the space provided for comments the sentence: *No sóc patriota* (I am not a patriot). Due to the significant number of responses of this kind (2.2%), the researcher considered it appropriate to represent this in the table as 'no sense of nationality'.
- 6 See the pie charts at the end of this chapter.
- 7 Notice that the percentages of the table do not result in 100% because the question offered multiple answers.
- 8 Moreno (1986: 156-157).
- 9 Again, notice that the percentages do not result a 100% because of the mechanism of multiple answer.
- 10 There were less than 2% of unanswered questionnaires.
- 11 The percentages of European and other nationalities were recounted together.
- 12 The pie charts of 'Other nationalities' had not been reproduced because the high percentage of the Catalan replies (23.5%) contained jokes and unclassifiable answers.
- 13 Notice that no Scottish participants of *Scottish Women* chose this option. Therefore, the pie chart has been ignored. The pie charts of 'Only European' had not been reproduced because the comparison was not significant (the Catalans, 1.7% and the Scots 0%).

CHAPTER 7

Conclusions.

Television debates: cultural goods of a missing public sphere?

These concluding lines attempt to make sense of the diverse perspectives through which *Scottish Women* and *La Vida en un Xip* have been examined. The findings of this project provide media studies with a revealing insight into questions of national identity, television and social representation in nations without a state.

In the previous chapter, the survey amongst participants of both programmes showed signs of the conflicting levels of identity of both Scots and Catalans. The results also demonstrated that audience discussion programmes are perceived, to some degree, as platforms of expression for their respective communities. The previous chapters explored the production and editorial strategies of the programme-makers with regard to audience participation and questions of national identity. There, the analysis suggested that the setting up of both *Scottish Women* and *El Xip* took into consideration their respective political status. This study reveals that questions of national and cultural identity discussed in the first chapter are manifest in the making of television debates.

However, the examination of the current Scottish and Catalan broadcasting contexts indicated that the media of both countries struggle to combine the representation of their cultural specificity with their objectives in the audio-visual market. This work suggests that current broadcasting businesses force television based amongst nations without states to give priority to economic rather than cultural goals.

Audience discussion programmes were chosen as objects of analysis on the basis that the 'dissection' of their production processes might shed some light on the possibility of a democratic public sphere functioning within television. Furthermore, the case studies suggest that the concept of the 'public sphere' is to be reformulated taking into account three aspects: (i) the new dynamics of the public domain, (ii) the role that individuals want to play in it, and (iii) the procedures that television production establish to shape those 'portions of the public sphere'. The set-up of the shows revealed how audience participation was devised. Thus, the selection process of different social actors within the community - individuals, collective groups, intellectuals and institutions - discloses the constraints that get in the way of a 'public sphere' operating in the media. The conclusions of these two strands of research are presented below.

7.1 Scotland and Catalonia, two media cultures under strain

The first chapter discussed the concepts of nationalism, nation and national identity in relation to culture as the essential element of the process of nation-building. It was argued there that the representations of the community, that is, its *imaginings*, bind their members together (language, history, folklore, religion). This study explored to what extent television contributes to (re)construct and express the cultural identity of the nations. In relation to these issues, *Scottish Women* and *El Xip* were analysed from two different perspectives: (i) as economic goods within their respective broadcasting contexts, and (ii) as products of the Scottish and Catalan cultural identities.

Between polity, economics and culture

The first two chapters framed the Scottish and Catalan case studies within their respective broadcasting structures, which showed how economic and political constraints operate in

audio-visual production within stateless nations. The needs of programme-makers to compete with the products of other channels constrain the scope of the media in nations without states.

The Scottish and Catalan television industries are determined, on the one hand by the broadcasting regulations, market and programming policies of the British and Spanish media systems, and, on the other hand by the project of a European audio-visual space and the dynamics of the international broadcasting market.

The overview of Scottish broadcasting showed the dependence of Scottish television on the British audio-visual industry. The *Scottish Women* case study suggests that STV's programming policies are strongly determined by the ITV network, which, in this particular case, pushes the Scottish company to produce more competitive and popular light entertainment. This policy motivated the transformation of *Scottish Women* and the first consequence was the undermining of its informative goals.

La Vida en un Xip showed a remarkable level of independence from the Spanish media system. First, the Catalan public broadcaster works as an autonomous media structure, although its development can be constrained by the centralised character of Spanish media law. Second, the production company DCo. S.A had neither editorial nor economic constraints to prevent its programme-makers from developing *El Xip* as they decided. Nonetheless, despite the lack of control over content, the *El Xip* case study demonstrates that the Catalan television industry is also induced to undermine its public aims. The current competitive scene of media business pushes all television stations to beat the programming from other channels - public and commercial - fully competing for audience shares and advertising revenues.

The European project of building a common audio-visual space, through which the cultures of different peoples could find their common means, sinks quietly in the minds

of media professionals. Both *Scottish Women* and *La Vida en un Xip*, though, demonstrated that linguistic and cultural barriers might prevent the construction of a united Europe by cultural means. Nonetheless, as the Catalan case showed, there is a tendency to consider Europe as the immediate political and cultural frame outside the nation. European television industries, albeit broadcasting in different languages, might gradually converge into common production styles, which, at the same time, are likely to be reinforced by the policies of the European Community.

Both case studies also manifest processes of homogenisation occurring in the audio-visual world. As mentioned earlier, one of the effects of globalisation is the homogenisation of audio-visual production (genres, formats, production styles). The adaptation of foreign formats to the specificity of cultural identities was regarded as a challenge to small broadcasters. Indeed, *Scottish Women* and *El Xip*, despite being two home-produced programmes, employed similar production processes, and their formulae gradually developed into those of similar British and American television debates which, when these two shows were launched, were already a success in their respective contexts.

Yet, it is worth noticing that both television debates assimilated the format according to their different political cultures. *Scottish Women* intervened directly in the content of the discussion by briefing the participants and establishing mechanisms to induce their participation (editorial lists). By contrast, *La Vida en un Xip* relied upon the presenter's ability to conduct the discussion live. The Scottish case, thus, mirrored a more controlled social and political set of procedures than the Catalan, which relied basically on improvisation.

In nations without a state, programme-makers seem to face a dichotomy between the belief that television should portray, to some degree, their national and cultural identities, and the pressures of the international market to harmonise their production styles and

ideas. To compete in the global audio-visual markets, the media of cultural minorities are under pressure to design high audience profile shows which could be run anywhere regardless of cultural differences.

Indeed, both shows gradually emphasised entertainment as their prime intent. Political agendas were disregarded to avoid emphasising the specificity of their countries and cultures. *Scottish Women* followed this direction. *La Vida en un Xip*, which was originally designed in harmony with the public principles of the Catalan broadcasting corporation, deeply attached to the project of (re)construction of the Catalan cultural identity, walked away from such principles as far as the commitment to a public service permitted.

The current audio-visual panorama forces television channels from minority cultures to go with the flow of the dominant trends of the international market. Competition pushes media products to emphasise first and foremost their function as entertainment. Therefore, small television companies such as TV3 or STV, in order to maintain the loyalty of their audiences, produce programmes whose attractions are humour and spectacle.

In both case studies, the analysis of the production process gave an insight into the mechanisms of television debates to achieve these purposes: light issues related to the private domain, controversies amongst the participants, members of the star system in the panel, witnesses with touching stories to tell, and other occasional elements, such as fiction, music or video-clips, to illustrate the discussion. Given such programming strategies, *Scottish Women* and *El Xip* created spaces of entertainment rather than of public communication.

The comparative analysis of *Scottish Women* and *La Vida en un Xip* demonstrates significant contrasts in the role of programme-makers in the media of stateless nations.

As argued in the preceding chapters, their audio-visual industries do not leave much room for manoeuvre. However, their cultural identities are frequently regarded as political, and thus, their home products are given financial advantages. In small broadcasting industries, such as the Scottish and the Catalan, journalists and producers can develop projects which would be unrealisable in wider broadcasting scenes. The complex and rather risky format of *La Vida en un Xip*, endorsed by the convictions and previous success of its programme-makers, illustrates this argument.

By contrast, *Scottish Women* had no stable team over the years to guarantee an enduring and reliable approach with which to secure the identity of the show. Nevertheless, STV's policy of stressing the Scottish character of *Scottish Women* counterbalanced the potential damage that new production arrangements could have caused to its identity. The (conscious and unconscious) efforts of programme-makers to reflect the Scottish and Catalan identities were not worthless; the participants' perception of both programmes as representative of their respective communities confirmed that such debates were claimed to be more than merely entertaining television shows.

Programme-making and awareness of ambiguity

The overall impression of the two case studies is that questions of national and cultural identity go underground and are willingly hidden - although not buried - from quotidian decision-making.

Stateless nations have a long list of conflicting issues through which, on the one hand the different power structures and institutions clash, and on the other their civil societies may appear culturally divided. Since those issues were likely to set up controversial political discussions, programme-makers tended to avoid them. Therefore, following this strategy, the programme-makers were denying 'common people' the chance to discuss political issues in the only public television forums of both Scots and Catalans. To justify this choice, some programme-makers argued that such issues were not of concern

to their respective societies. However, the response to some debates on 'National Identity & Culture', particularly in the Catalan case, suggests that this argument is highly debatable.

Yet, regardless of the programme-makers' intentions, the above analysis shows that cultural concerns were manifested in *Scottish Women* and *La Vida en un Xip* in varying degrees. The examination of the issues chosen for discussion and the criteria of selection of participants (national origin, linguistic preferences and accents, involvement with particular groups within civil society) demonstrates that media professionals had to take into account both the political status of their respective nations and the conflicts of dual identity. Those considerations, it is argued, provide enough evidence to show that such issues are of extreme sensitivity to people from stateless nations.

In the case of *Scottish Women*, the programme-makers confirmed that the show had to achieve a balanced representation of native-Scots and members of other cultural minorities. The production team admitted that the national origin of the participants was a point to consider, since at times *Scottish Women* had been strongly criticised for bringing into the studio non-native Scots. The *Scottish Women* case study suggests that television programmes can inspire feelings of national identity and ethnocentrism.

As far as *La Vida en un Xip* was concerned, at the beginning, the production team assumed that the representation of Catalan society might be initially slanted by their linguistic preferences (Catalan vs. Spanish), and thus, given the number of immigrants living in Catalonia, the platform was likely to misrepresent them. Gradually, though, *El Xip* focused its ideological issues on the individual rather than the social perspective. Consequently, less risk was taken to incite confrontation of collectives from opposed social and cultural backgrounds. *El Xip* was aware of the potential for conflict when dealing with matters which brought up the divided cultural battlefield between Catalan

natives and 'strangers'. On such occasions, the team tried to avoid the participation of radical pressure groups amongst the lay participants.

Overall, the media professionals interviewed in this study acknowledged the underlying conflicts of the Scottish and Catalan societies, which were approached according to their own convictions and beliefs. The overview of the Scottish and Catalan television industries showed that the national identity question was at the top of the broadcasters' and policy-makers' agenda. However, producers did not show such a determination to bring those issues into discussion, since they dealt directly with the cultural backgrounds of the participants, and thus, with their ambiguities and contradictions. Audience discussion programmes are deemed to reflect the opinions and perceptions of the country of each person involved in the making of television shows (producers, researchers, broadcasters, participants). Consequently, the programmes manifest their different (and often contradictory) views.

Particularly in the Scottish case, the opinions of the programme-makers with respect to Scottish identity appeared to be unclear. Whereas STV's managers considered the 'Scottishness' of their programmes of top concern to their policies, the production team was indecisive about how such a vague concept should come across in the programme. The difficulty of defining *Scottish Women* as a Scottish programme was obvious in the responses from media professionals. However, the title, being an obvious sign of national identity, forced them to consider its Scottish distinctiveness as an issue of prime significance.

By contrast, the programme-makers of *El Xip* appeared to have a stronger national consciousness than the Scottish team. As analysed earlier, the former's personal convictions and interests were manifested in the choice and treatment of the topics. Undoubtedly, the autonomous political structure of the Catalan broadcasting industry facilitates the outlining of boundaries. Also, the linguistic issue reinforces such

boundaries and works as a lubricant to the consolidation of Catalan cultural identity. Unfortunately, the rather fragmented and complex landscape of Scottish cultural identity causes a disadvantageous strain.

The above findings suggest that national and cultural identity issues did intervene in shaping *Scottish Women* and *La Vida en un Xip*. The production teams, most of them native Scots or Catalans, were conscious that people living in their countries experience ambiguous feelings of identity in relation to their states and nations. At times, this awareness of ambiguity led the editorial criteria to swim between two tides: Scotland and Catalonia as nations, and Scotland and Catalonia as political entities which belong to their respective states and to the European Community.

As platforms of social discussion of their respective communities, *Scottish Women* and *La Vida en un Xip* were not only determined by the contradictions of their cultural contexts, but also by the transformation of their public spheres, which, as argued in the first chapter, is a current feature in Western countries.

7.2 Television debates and a missing public sphere

These conclusions finish with a realistic, but hopeful view of the future of democratic public television forums. In the first chapter, it was argued that the audience discussion format has the potential for representing 'civil society'. As Tomlinson remarked, there is still a need for 'viable communities of cultural judgment' through which individuals can understand how they live as they do. Home-produced debate shows serve this need to a certain extent, since the public-spirited intention of a democratic rational discussion lies behind them. As illustrated earlier, television debates are frequently perceived as these small communities of judgment by their participants. This perception raises hopes that

audience discussion programmes will gradually develop their potential for representing their communities according to the new dynamics of television production.

Whether the programme-makers are aware of this potential is, though, a disputable matter. In fact, both case studies show little evidence of this awareness. However, the impact of these shows, which was examined in both case studies, reveals that audience discussion programmes contribute to the construction of civil society. After transmission, discussions carried on through other communicative channels (*e.g.*, a radio programme) and members of their audiences felt pushed to act (*e.g.*, to set-up a support group on the menopause in Inverness). Also, this study reveals that audience discussion programmes attract participants from different backgrounds and levels of activity - employed, unemployed, retired, houseworkers and students. These shows are not restrictive spaces, although production and editorial procedures may dissuade people from highly educated backgrounds from contributing to them. Thus the response and feedback from the audience must be regarded as of prime relevance to the discussion of a 'public sphere' in the media.

In spite of these factors, today television debates are devised according to the imperatives of the audio-visual market, which tend to bury their democratic intentions. Different production procedures showed that the principles of a democratic public sphere in the media do not attune with the competitive rules which globalisation and transnationalisation impose and which the shows are inevitably trapped in. The conception of television forums as spaces of public access relies, not on the conscious imagining of them as such, but on the format itself, which requires programme-makers to bring 'common people' into television and attempt to establish rational communication amongst them.

Due to commercial pressures and the goals of popular entertainment, audience discussion programmes contribute to the construction of a public sphere which lacks the

Habermasian attributes discussed in the first chapter. The findings of this work reveal that, indeed, the concept of the 'public sphere' needs reconceptualising. Considering that audience discussion programmes are spaces where social representation can be achieved, the 'public sphere' should be devised primarily as an environment in which members of a given community get together, exchange views and, arguably, experience communion. Television debates have the potential for contributing to two different processes: the construction of a portion of the public sphere in complex societies, and the reinforcement of a sense of community which, in the case of stateless nations, is particularly crucial. As the last sections of chapters 4 and 5 illustrate, audience discussion programmes do invigorate their collective identities, and contribute to the belief that such identities have a voice in the media.

In relation to the first process, significant transformations were underlined in this study. First, people willing to express their 'commodified everyday life' break into the public domain to reassert their individual and collective identities. Second, the current broadcasting tendencies, which are meant to invest a great deal in entertainment, lead to a lighter conception of the 'public sphere'.

Television debates, economic and cultural goods

Before devising the programme, television makers, as both case studies disclosed, need to take into consideration several questions: (i) the requirements of the product, as an economic product of the audio-visual market, and its formal constraints (budget, set, slot available, commercials), (ii) the potential for releasing information about the issues to the community, that is, the programme as a cultural product, (iii) the position of state, national, local institutions and pressure groups around the issues, and finally (iv) their own intuitive idea of what 'public opinion' and 'common sense' say about those matters. The programme, thus, defines its goals both as an economic and as a cultural good, which, as mentioned above, are frequently mutually exclusive.

According to the findings of this study, the transformation of the public sphere is manifested in television debates through the progressive empowerment of the private domain over the public domain, and a gradual depoliticisation which buries the principles of the historic public sphere.

As both case studies illustrated, the agendas of television debates are furnished in harmony with the ongoing change of contemporary society: that is, the breaking of the private realm into the public and the values of a 'commodified everyday life'. Moreover, the selection of participants and the treatment of their contributions confirm that television debates are not imagined to provide an egalitarian social representation of civil society, but to bring into the scene people with communicative skills to entertain and perform in front of the camera.

The dynamics of television imposes certain styles of speech and attitudes on the participants. As the two case studies have revealed, the traditional discourse of the intellectuals - represented to some extent by the experts - do not seem to fulfil these requirements. Intellectuals are pushed to either change their approach to the public domain or to lose their space in the media. Television debates require the intellectuals to adapt their discourses to the 'seductive mechanisms' of the medium, and thus, to concentrate on shaping their self-presentation rather than their ideas. Such an approach to expertise suggests that the intellectual discourse in the mass media society is forged by a depoliticised and popular conception of social reality.

Whereas the intellectuals face the dilemma of either abandoning their role in the public domain or adapting their discourses to the needs of mass communication, other actors of the political process hold still a position of power to intervene in the public sphere. Audience discussion programmes, as potential emulators of this neutral communicative space, attract power structures. The latter acknowledge that such shows have a strong appeal to the people as spaces of representation. Therefore, they struggle to take part,

and frequently, seem to find their way onto the forum by means of political and economic pressure.

The two case studies contribute another significant element to this discussion: the role of the presenter. Ideally, the 'public sphere' should not be conceived as being guided by any member or minority of the community. However, in audience discussion programmes, the terms of the discourse, time and space are defined and conducted by the presenter, who becomes the referee and has the power to shape this public space according to his/her criteria. Presenters are not merely messengers of the political and economic power of their broadcasting industries. They have a specific weight in the development of communicative spaces and their manners and attitudes contribute to the final output of the debates. The three presenters involved in both case studies showed the many ways in which their role can be developed. Therefore, the process of public discussion needs to take this role into account.

Thus, if issues are selected according to their potential for entertainment; if participants are asked to portray their experiences rather than their ideas, if experts are forced to seduce rather than inform the audience, and finally, if presenters are mediators of the entire set-up discussed above, there is little hope for the construction of an unrestricted communicative space in television.

It follows from the above that a democratic public sphere in the media is unfeasible. Moreover, in the context of stateless nations, because of their delicate political make up and the state and international pressures to conceal the specificity of their national and cultural identities, difficulties in achieving this goal increase.

However, there is a tiny glimmer of hope. It was argued earlier that audience discussion programmes are to some extent presented to the viewers and perceived by them as 'the' forums of their respective communities to discuss common concerns. Presenters are

frequently seen as the voice of equipoise which mediates between the interests of the participants, that is, 'civil society', and the institutions represented in the panel. Thus, in spite of the constraints to which such programmes are subject, the discussion itself is an experience of communion through which different members of civil society (presenters, experts, witnesses, lay participants, institutions and home audiences) examine and seek solutions to common problems. Such platforms then become a vehicle through which the community is imagined.

In the case of stateless nations, whose political structures generally lack public forums of social representation, television debates are likely to be perceived as alternative forums. If television debates guaranteed to each member of the community an equal chance to be represented, the representation taking place in the studio would become a step towards the construction of a democratic public sphere within the media.

Thinking of the future of television debates

This study may hopefully motivate broadcasters, programme-makers and participants of audience discussion programmes to conceive the latter as cultural goods, determined and constrained by specific political, economic and social factors, which, consequently, restrain their potential for representing faithfully the social reality of their communities. It would be desirable that programme-makers reflect on these matters.

The intrinsic value of such formats as communicative spaces should be disguised neither by the 'seductive mechanisms' of the medium itself, nor by the culture of consumption by which their agendas are inspired. To develop these shows towards more democratic settings, civil society, political institutions and television makers should establish networks of feedback to guarantee equal representation and the discussion of topics of all sorts.

As Melucci remarked, the individuals of current complex societies require spheres of social representation. Television seems to be 'the' medium which may potentially enable an interactive environment for the masses. Given the audience discussion format which might provide the means for rational and egalitarian communication amongst people, civil society can not afford to allow the chance to democratically develop such a format be buried by economic imperatives.

The creation of a space for democratic discussion on television also seems to be threatened by the values of post-modernity which gradually eliminate the interest of civil society to intervene in the political process. However, both case studies show that individuals and groups are concerned about social issues and that collective matters mobilise their determination. Ideally, television could be a major influence to restore the capacity of the people to involve themselves in issues which affect them and create spaces in which to discuss the complete meaning of the public sphere.

In such an ideal frame, the Scottish and Catalan mass media, whose programming policies and products manifest underlying problems of political and cultural identity, would also be able to concentrate their goals in two (not mutually exclusive) directions: to find their place in the international audio-visual market, and also to define, represent and strengthen the cultural identities of their respective audiences.

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Appendix 1

List of Interviewees

Copy of the questionnaire *Scottish Women*

Copy of the questionnaire *La Vida en un Xip*

List of Interviewees

Name	Role at time of interview
In Scotland:	
Adams, Kaye	Presenter, <i>Scottish Women</i>
Brown, Jim	Head of Light Entertainment and Executive producer
Cameron, Colin	Managing Director of BBC Television Scotland
Cumming, Fiona	Spotter and production assistant, <i>Scottish Women</i>
Cunningham, Margot	Production Assistant, <i>Scottish Women</i>
Curley, Heather	Researcher, <i>Scottish Women</i>
Eagles, Henry	Ex-producer of <i>Scottish Women</i> and producer at STV
Haining, Carol	Producer, <i>Scottish Women</i>
Henry, Elaine	Researcher, <i>Scottish Women</i>
Hills, Leslie	Producer, <i>Scottish Women</i>
Jenkins, Blair	Head of News and Current Affairs at STV
MacDonald, Sheena	Presenter and editorial advisor, <i>Scottish Women</i>
Napier, Douglas	Director, <i>Scottish Women</i>
Punton, Jill	Production Assistant, <i>Scottish Women</i>
In Catalonia,	
Anglès, Mariona	Coordinator, <i>La Vida en un Xip</i>
Altarriba, Xavier	Sociologist, <i>La Vida en un Xip</i>
Bassas, Antoni	Presenter and producer, <i>La Vida en un Xip</i>
Cóppulo, Sílvia	Assistant producer and presenter of <i>Centre de Dades</i> , <i>La Vida en un Xip</i>
Cortadellas, Isabel	Researcher, <i>La Vida en un Xip</i>
Dorca, Jordi	Assistant director, <i>La Vida en un Xip</i>

Esteban, Àngel	Production manager, <i>La Vida en un Xip</i>
Esteve, René	Researcher, <i>La Vida en un Xip</i>
Ferrús, Jaume	Managing Director of <i>Televisió de Catalunya</i> (TVC)
Fusté, Ramon	Executive producer, <i>La Vida en un Xip</i>
Granados, Joan	Director General of <i>Corporació Catalana de Ràdio i Televisió</i> (CCRTV)
Golanó, Conxita	Researcher, <i>La Vida en un Xip</i>
Mir, Jordi	Editorial adviser, <i>La Vida en un Xip</i>
Moro, Emiliano	Director, <i>La Vida en un Xip</i>
Puyal, Joaquim M.	Presenter and producer, <i>La Vida en un Xip</i>
Rebollar, Eva	Coordinator and presenter of <i>Centre de Documentació</i> , <i>La Vida en un Xip</i>
Sarsanedas, Oleguer	Head of Programming at TVC

Copy of the questionnaire "Scottish Women"

"Scottish Women" Questionnaire

Presentation:

I am Mònica Terribas, from Catalonia. I have come to Scotland to do my thesis on a comparative study between this country and Catalonia on the topic of national identity and television, specifically through the "Scottish Women" debate and a similar Catalan one, on which I used to work in Barcelona. My purpose with this questionnaire is to obtain from you the answers required to the questions below in order to compare them with a similar questionnaire developed with a Catalan audience.

I thank you in advance for your kind help. If you have any questions or comments, please contact me at: *Top Flat -Abbey Court - 56, Abbey Road (Riverside) - STIRLING FK8 1LL (Scotland).*

Name..... Age.....
 Address..... Occupation.....
 Connection with tonight's topic.....

1-. Please mark by ticking () the answer/s you feel best express your nationality (if others, please specify in the space below) Please, note that you can tick more than one:

() *I am British* () *I am Scottish* () *I am English*

Others:

2-. Please choose by ticking () the answer/s that suit/s best your personal feeling (if others, please specify in the space below following the examples given). Please, note that you can tick as many answers as you wish:

() *I feel only Scottish*
 () *I feel only British*
 () *I feel as much Scottish as British*
 () *I feel Scottish, and I feel as much British as European.*
 () *I feel Scottish and British, but not European.*
 () *I feel Scottish, but I don't feel either British, or European*

Others:

3-. Please, read carefully these ten possible reasons for attending "Scottish Women" tonight and establish your priorities by giving numbers: (eg: (1) *I have information and personal comments to offer*). Start with 1 for the most significant to you. Please, note that you can consider as many answers as you wish. If there is any answer you would not choose, do not put any number on it.

"I am attending "Scottish Women" tonight because:

() *I am interested in listening to other opinions on this topic*
 () *I have information and personal comments to offer*
 () *I would like to talk about my personal experience*
 () *I enjoy talking about any subject*
 () *I am a Scot interested in Scottish matters*
 () *"Scottish Women" helps to improve women's role in British society*
 () *Scotland needs to hear women talking about these matters*
 () *I like attending television programmes in general*
 () *"Scottish Women" is our forum to express ourselves*
 () *It is a Scottish television programme*

Any personal comments:

Copy of the questionnaire "La Vida en un Xip"

Enquesta "LA VIDA EN UN XIP"

Presentació

Em dic Mònica Terribas. Actualment, sóc a Escòcia on preparo la meva tèsi que consisteix en un estudi sobre identitat nacional i televisió a aquell país i a Catalunya. Dos dels estudis concrets que estic analitzant són dos debats amb participació directa de l'audiència, "La vida en un xip" i un debat que fa la Scottish Television. "Scottish Women". El meu propòsit amb aquesta enquesta és obtenir les seves valoracions als plantejaments que s'exposen a continuació per tal de comparar-los amb els resultats de l'enquesta que he fet al públic del debat escocès.

Els agraeixo d'antuvi la seva col.laboració i els prego retornin els seus formularis abans no comenci el debat. Moltes mercès.

Nom.....Edat.....

Adreça.....Sexe: F (..) M ()

Ocupació actual.....

1-. Per favor, faci un senyal () a la resposta o respostes que consideri que expressen millor la seva nacionalitat. Si és una altra que les especificades, faci-ho constar a l'espai inferior. Pot escollir més d'una resposta:

() Jo sóc espanyol () Jo sóc català

Altres

.....

2-. Per favor, esculli () la resposta o respostes que s'adequin millor al seu sentiment personal. En aquest cas, també disposa d'un espai adicional per altres especificacions. Pot escollir tantes respostes com li sembli oportú:

Des del punt de vista nacional,

() Jo només em sento català

() Jo només em sento espanyol

() Em sento tan català com espanyol

() Em sento català, i em sento tan espanyol com europeu

() Em sento català i espanyol, però no em sento europeu.

() Em sento català, però no em sento ni espanyol, ni europeu

() Em sento català i europeu, però no espanyol

() Jo només em sento europeu

Altres

.....

Giri full per respondre la tercera pregunta...

Enquesta "LA VIDA EN UN XIP"

3-. A continuació hi ha expressades deu possibles raons que poden haver-lo motivat a assistir aquesta nit a "La vida en un xip". Valori de l'1 al 10 segons les seves prioritats. Comenci encerclant l'len la resposta que reflecteixi el motiu que vostè consideri més important i així successivament, de manera que, si valora totes les respostes, haurà encerclat un número diferent en cadascuna d'elles. Valori tantes respostes com consideri oportú.

Aquest vespre assisteixo a "La Vida en un Xip" perquè

1-. *estic interessat a escoltar altres opinions sobre el tema plantejat.*
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

2-. *puc oferir informació i comentaris personals sobre el tema*
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

3-. *m'agradaria parlar sobre la meua experiència personal*
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

4-. *disfruto parlant sobre qualsevol cosa*
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

5-. *sóc un català interessat sobre qualsevol tema d'interès per Catalunya*
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

6-. *"La Vida en un Xip" ajuda a millorar el nivell de comunicació d'aquesta zona de l'Estat*
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

7-. *Catalunya necessita sentir parlar d'aquest tema per televisió*
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

8-. *en general, m'agrada assistir a programes de televisió.*
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

9-. *"La vida en un xip" és el fòrum d'expressió del qual disposem els catalans*
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

10-. *és un programa català*
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Altres comentaris personals
.....

MOLTES GRÀCIES PER LA SEVA COL.LABORACIÓ

Appendix 2
Scottish Women

The 109 issues of *Scottish Women*

Briefing notes:
'Fertility & Infertility' and 'Whose body, whose baby?'

Questions:
Reproductive Technology and Smoking

Viewing figures:
November 1991 and June 1993

**Citizenship &
Infrastructure**

**Sociopolitical
conflicts**

Love & Sex

**Women's
issues**

The Current Affairs department production period (1987-90)
(the original version)

Votes for Women

Transplants
Nurses strike
Political violence
Drink driving
The budget (1988)
Animal rights
The monarchy
Clause 28

Abortion (2)
Violence against women

Pornography

SW-1

Sir Nicholas Fairbairn

AIDS
Drugs
Delinquency
Racism

Love & Romance Men
Positive discrimination
20 years of Feminism
Women as carers

SW-2

Right wing politics
Leisure
Fat

Racism (2)
AIDS

Sex
Marriage

SW-3

The environment
The world

Racism

Men's clubs
Fertility & Infertility
Women in politics

SW-4

Advertising
Charity
Food & Health
Money
Fashion

Child abuse

Contraception
Pornography
Sexuality

SW-5

Pets
Poll tax
Cancer

Rape

Divorce
Jealousy

Childbirth

**Citizenship &
Infrastructure**

**Sociopolitical
conflicts**

Love & Sex

Women's issues

The Skyline production period (1991-92)
(the original version)

SW-6

The arts
The press
Work
Mental health
The monarchy
Transport

Alcoholism

Love

SW-7

Smoking
Caring
Reproductive technology

Crime
AIDS

Weddings

Menopause

SW-8

The body beautiful
Animal rights
The medical profession
Television
Eating disorders

Drugs

Misogyny

The Light Entertainment department production period (1993)
(the new version)

SW-9

Wealth
Infertility
Erotic press
The body beautiful
Transplants

Sex crimes

Seriously sexy
Monogamy
Homosexuality

Women vs. Men
Childbirth

Essential human values	National identity & Culture	Education & Family	Extrasensory perception
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The Skyline production period (1991-92)
(the original version)

SW-6

War

The family
Houses and homes
Schooling

SW-7

Traditions

SW-8

Young women in
in Scotland
Football

Youth & Education

The Light Entertainment department production period (1993)
(the renewed version)

SW-9

Fame
Ageism

Twins

Spirited word

Glossary

SW- (n)

Scottish Women Series number (n)

BRIEFING NOTES "SCOTTISH WOMEN"

Transmission on Fertility and Infertility

SCOTTISH WOMEN

FERTILITY & INFERTILITY

DOES EVERY WOMAN HAVE THE RIGHT TO BE A MOTHER?

"Most people naturally assume that they can choose when and if to have children and plan their lives accordingly. However, in Britain today as many as one in six couples need medical help to have a child".
(National Association for the Childless)

"The Green Party is convinced that an important aspect of lightening our impact on the land is to reduce our own numbers..... We would encourage people to think about their reproductive as well as sexual responsibilities..... and encourage a gradual but noticeable decline in our own population.
(Green Party Manifesto)

In contrast to the population control advocated by the Green Party, in Romania, the Government have decreed that every woman must have at least 5 children. Abortion is punishable by imprisonment and all miscarriages are reported to the police.

IS THERE SOCIAL PRESSURE ON WOMEN TO HAVE CHILDREN?

IS THERE MORE TO LIFE THAN CHILDREN?

IS ANY STIGMA ATTACHED TO WOMEN WHO DECIDE NOT TO HAVE CHILDREN?

"Those who choose to be childfree believe that the question should be "why don't I have a child" but "why do I want a child?" We endeavour to disprove the myths about childlessness equalling loneliness"
(British Organisation of Non-Parents)

SHOULD MORE MONEY BE SPENT ON RESEARCH INTO INFERTILITY?

Should infertility treatment be available to any woman who requires it?

On a less serious note -

"Do your kids a favour - don't have any" (Robert Orben)

USEFUL ORGANISATIONS

National Association for the Childless, 31 Guthrie Street, Edinburgh
Tel No: 031 225 2464

British Organisation of Non-Parents, BM Box 5866, London WC1V 3XX

Scottish Council for Single Parents, 13 Grayfield Square, Edinburgh
Tel No: 031 556 3899

British Pregnancy Advisory Service, 245 North Street, Glasgow G3
Tel No: 041 204 1832

Scottish Television plc
2 November 1989

OPTIONS OCTOBER 1989

TALKING POINT

Yearning for a child. take a cold shower

Is broodiness a momentary urge which blinds you to reality or a deep, uncontrollable primeval force, asks Elisabeth Winkler

Stuck for an opening line and eschewing the hackneyed cliche of a dictionary definition, I grabbed my 11-year-old daughter and quizzed her instead. 'Broodiness?' she replied. 'That's when women go all soppy and coo over babies, and lose control of their lives.' True, Jessica came into this world a hard-line feminist, but her response sums up a prevailing feeling: that anything relating to that murky underworld of maternal instinct is to be viewed with the utmost suspicion.

Being broody has an unfashionable ring to it – it harks back to the days when a woman was defined by her role as baby-maker. A quick glance at the statistics shows that women have shed this biological expectation: the Office of Population, Censuses and Surveys project that one in six women born in the Fifties will never have a baby.

In this cultural climate, perhaps it's not surprising that broodiness can seem very alien. I should know. In the old days I believed that broodiness was nothing less than social conditioning. The very mention of certain choice words like ovary or womb would make me feel positively nauseous. I didn't like seeing myself as a breeding female; it seemed to belittle me in some way, to make me less of a person.

Then I saw the light. Something happened to unlock a Pandora's box of maternal instinct. Becoming aware of those drives was the making of me. By taking on my traditional female role, the very one I had rebelled against, I discovered a purpose to life which had previously eluded me. Wanting to be a mother rooted me to the ground, clarified my priorities and gave me substance.

I used to think broodiness was such a soppy word. But having experienced it in all its rawness, I hold it in more respect; the desire to have a child is not a soppy feeling. It's earthy and it's driving, and feels like a need as basic as to be fed or loved.

Broodiness comes in different degrees. It's possible to make the decision to become a mother without reference to primeval urges and to experience only the mildest form of side-effects such as the occasional fond look into a passing pram. All well and good as long as the prospect of motherhood is a possibility. The trouble starts when broodiness faces obstacles.

Broodiness is not reasonable. It doesn't wait until you've finished your PhD and it can strike when you are single, making it a very hopeless feeling at times. Its voice becomes more insistent as women reach their late thirties. But perhaps its most iniquitous act is to wield its power over a woman who has no physical means of carrying out the message her body sends her, a woman who is infertile.

When broodiness is thwarted, it suffers a sea change: what started out as a tame creature of genteel longing metamorphoses into a veritable wild beast. It's all very well to tell yourself you are a modern woman who ought

to find satisfaction in other areas than her biological needs – but you've misjudged what you are dealing with. The desire to have a child has a power of its own.

That's not to say unfulfilled broodiness can't be lived with. Like other emotions, it comes and goes in waves. It swells up, washes over you ... and mercifully recedes. Women who have to come to terms with the fact that they won't fulfil their longings, say that with time, the intensity of the pain loosens its grip.

But even if you've had that long-awaited infant, don't think that you've satiated the beast. You might not get off so lightly. I have a friend with three children under five who longs for another child. She knows it's irrational, but has a feeling there's another one 'out there'.

Not everyone is conscious of broodiness, especially if it expresses itself sexually. No, of course you don't want a baby – but you might ask yourself why a) you feel so sexy and why b) contraception seems suddenly so unattractive. Beware those moments. It makes life a lot easier if you can consciously name what's driving you and plan accordingly.

Broodiness cloaked in sexual desire gives you some inkling of the subtle ways of the beast, for it comes in many guises. Some women compare broodiness to falling in love because they become blinded to reality in a similar way. Just as well, because if they were presented with that reality straight off, they would be reaching for the condoms in no time.

Picture this scene: meal-time in your average household – the children are squabbling. Cut to mother: hot, hungry and harassed, and about to erupt with the fish-wife screeching she remembers from her own childhood and swore she'd never emulate.

Savour the contrast: between the rosy little cameo her treacherous hormones had painted for her, and this uncivilised scenario of domestic demands. Who in their right mind would have taken on the chaos? There's no other explanation for it: she was seduced!

For, to succeed, broodiness has to be a powerful desire. It has to compel us and singlemindedly sweep objections aside. It's all very well for concerned friends to counsel us sagely about the downside of motherhood, but that's rather like the days when parents tried to put us off unsuitable boyfriends – their objections appeared to come from a dry, desiccated place, a far cry from our world of passionate anticipation. Just like falling in love, we are wholly engaged with the entrancing thought of setting eyes on, holding and touching the love object – in this case, a sweet baby.

If that sounds familiar to you, dear Reader, now's the time, if you haven't done so already, to do everything in your power to bring about the optimum circumstances for bringing a child into your life. Alternatively ... have a cold shower.

The desire to have a child isn't soppy – it's earthy and driving, like a need to be fed or loved



The Scotsman
Thursday, 17 August 1989

Childless and proud of it . . .

Carol Anne Davis offers hope to those with no intention of bringing up babies

PEOPLE who would never dream of asking for details of my sex life, seem to have no such qualms when it comes to enquiring about the potential end product.

Even market researchers have enquired ("No children yet?") half-way through my ramblings on the merits of tinned over packet soup. When I shake my head they tell me that there's still plenty of time. Explaining — somewhat wearily by now — that I don't want a family, brings reactions ranging from moral indignation to the patronising "You'll change your mind".

Fortunately, BON (the British Organisation Of Non-Parents) exists to ensure that those who don't want to change their minds don't have to. The organisation believes that having children should be a matter of free choice rather than as a result of social pressure, and that the decision not to have children should be respected. Members of the group also endeavour to disprove the myths about childlessness equalling loneliness, citing studies which show that those in old folks homes who haven't had children retain more contact with the outside world than those who do.

Similarly, some of their members are living proof that not all women feel an eleventh-hour hormonal surge. Yet this call of the ovaries is reported so often we younger women often wonder if we should bow to the inevitable and have one now while it's a physiologically easier task.

Another of the pressures brought to bear on young women comes in the form of bereavement articles, in which the widow suggests that only the children kept her going. Journalist Pat Barr and her husband opted for a childfree marriage. Tragically, her husband

Not all women feel that eleventh hour hormonal surge . . .

died. Writing in a BON leaflet, she says: "I must emphasise that this sad circumstance did not then and never has altered my view about having children. The argument that they would be 'a comfort' to the widowed is only valid to those for whom they would be a comfort otherwise."

Not that BON is anti-children — indeed, several of its members work in education and for children's charities. Rather, it is concerned that children of the future have a better quality of life: "We refute those stereotyped and glamourised role models of every woman a happy mother and every man a proud father."

Sadly, such stereotypes don't come solely from the nappy manufacturers and others with a vested interest, but from the parents themselves. We met up with young married acquaintances a few months after they'd had their first child. Both looked baggard, and he had a crop of post-baby acne the

equal of any "before" photograph in a spot cream ad. "So when are you having your first one?" she asked. I said that we weren't, that as fledgling hedonists it took us all our time to support ourselves. "Oh, but it's not happy money," she said. Two years on, at home full-time with a toddler, she suffers frequent bouts of depression and is far from happy.

Root Cartwright has been chairman of BON since 1986. A self-employed businessman in his late thirties, he knew from an early age that he did not want children, and

If parenthood is so joyous how can it be selfish to forego it?

speaks eloquently about the right of the individual not to reproduce. "At present our membership is comprised of 60 per cent couples, 40 per cent single people," he says, adding that the organisation is for men as well as women, and also for parents who respect other people's right to choose.

He believes that pressure to have children comes not only from outside factions, but often from one half of a partnership, and that it is vital the non-consenting party has a source of support. "People become terribly insecure as they get older. They think 'If I don't do it now perhaps I'll regret it later on'."

The organisation first came into being as a response to too much regret. It was formed in 1978 by an offshoot from the National Association of the Childless, who became concerned that some of its members had become unnaturally obsessive in their desire to have children. The group set out to promote a more positive image of remaining childless, or, as BON prefer to call it, childfree.

Unfortunately, such childfreeness is still regarded by many as the ultimate selfish act, though, as one of the organisations leaflets asks: "If parenthood is a joyous and rewarding project, how can it be selfish to forego it voluntarily?" Those who choose to be childfree believe that the question should not be "Why don't I have a child?" but "Why do I want a child?"

In what is often a hostile climate, the occasional newsletter from BON can be reassuring for the voluntary childless, while their leaflet "Am I Parent Material" can help crystallise the situation for those who haven't yet made up their minds. "Membership is basically about support," explains Root, adding that members can write in for advice as membership is too scattered to make meetings viable.

"Responsible and happy parenthood can be marvellous if it is the lifestyle you freely choose," says BON. Sadly, its findings suggest that too many people have children simply because it never occurs to them not to.

● For a membership form, send an sae to BON, Box 5866, London, WC1N 3XX.

BRIEFING NOTES "SCOTTISH WOMEN"

Transmission on Reproductive Technology

"SCOTTISH WOMEN"

BRIEFING NOTES - 17 October

Whose body? Whose baby?Points to consider

Test tube babies and Virgin births make good news for the press. But are they the tip of an iceberg of misery and distress and a growing reproduction industry on which fortunes and reputations rest?

There is outraged condemnation of the woman who dares to want a child without resorting to intercourse with a man. At the other end of the spectrum there is universal joy at the long awaited birth of a baby. The headlines are made possible by advances in reproductive technology. The technology is extraordinary. Our knowledge of genetics and reproduction has increased greatly in the last two decades. The ability to control and manipulate reproduction has been of help to many women but it also raises ethical questions about rights and especially about the rights of a child born as a result. If a child is born as a result of artificial insemination by donor the donor of the sperm is anonymous. But should not the child have a right to know the identity of the genetic father?

There are a number of ways of assisting conception. Most people go to clinics. The Great Majority of clinics are not funded by the NHS. Costs are usually about £100 for a first consultation and £2,000 for each cycle of treatment. In Vitro Fertilisation (IVF) is the best known treatment. All fees must be paid before each treatment starts. Eggs are removed from the woman's body, fertilised by sperm in a laboratory and the embryos put in her womb. (See attached notes.) Any embryos of good quality not used will be frozen and stored and can be thawed and replaced if the procedure fails. There is a further fee for thawing and replacement of embryos.

After a treatment 10-15% of couples give birth to a baby. Multiple pregnancies can result as several embryos are inserted in the womb. Repeated treatments can cause a great deal of stress and work out very costly. Treatment centres have close association with research centres. Women are not obliged to take part in research programmes if they do not wish to do so. However some people think that women's bodies are being used for embryo research and to further the careers of the almost exclusively male consultants.

Women who are not in stable heterosexual relationships report problems on getting help with conception. Who has the right to decide a woman shall not have a baby? Should assisted conception be mainly for the rich? Is there anything wrong with asking another woman to bear your child? Why is a test tube preferred to a womb? Could it be because the test tube can be controlled and the womb cannot?

The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act seeks to control our wombs. It brings all 'artificial reproduction' under the regulation of an Authority. There will be rules for deciding who is "fit" for parenting. Applicants' credentials will be checked out by the police, the social services and the GP. On what criteria will they decide we are "fit"? Clause 26/27 says that in cases of surrogacy the mother is the woman who gives birth to the baby and not the woman who donates her eggs. If the mother is married the law treats her husband as the father unless he can show that he objected to the procedure. The sperm donor has no rights and is not considered the father.

What is surrogacy?

Surrogacy is the act of a woman carrying a fetus and bearing a child for another person or persons, having agreed to hand it over to that person or persons at, or shortly after, birth.

Who might benefit from surrogacy?

Any woman who is physically unable to carry a child at least to viability, or is ill-advised to do so, could benefit. This woman is not necessarily infertile - she and her partner may be able to produce a fertilised egg; but she cannot carry it.

Surrogacy is also able to spare a woman who is capable of carrying a child the inconvenience of doing so. Given that there is so little experience of surrogacy, its emotional effects and its complications, particularly the problems that it might bring to all participants, including the child, surrogacy should be available only to couples who suffer from a medical inability to bear a child and who have explored all other medical means of help without success.

Have the alternatives been considered?

Any couple thinking about surrogacy should have thought first about the alternatives - accepting childlessness, or adoption. While it is accepted that both of these are difficult options, they should have been discussed with a doctor or a counsellor.

REPORT OF THE WORKING PARTY ON INFERTILITY SERVICES.

Treatments

In most, though not all, cases one or more specific problems can be identified, and a form of treatment begun. In treating ovulation disorders, this usually means that the woman takes drugs which mimic the action of various natural hormones and stimulate the ovaries to produce mature eggs. Like most drugs of this nature, they can have side effects in many women (for example mood changes, hot flushes, feeling bloated, headaches and breast tenderness). Although there are no known long term or medically serious side effects, this is not the same as saying that there are none; be sure that you understand why you are taking the drugs, what side effects you may expect, and for how long you may be taking the drug before the situation reviewed.

Tubal Surgery

Tubal surgery is only suitable for some forms of tubal damage and adhesions. It aims to remove the damaged part of the tube and reconstruct the cut ends. Success depends on the extent of damage, ranging from 15-65%.

For many people these treatments work; for others either no apparent cause can be found, or else the problem(s) may result in women considering more invasive treatments like In Vitro Fertilisation and GiFT (Gamete Intrafallopian Tube Transfer).

IVF and GiFT

The aim of all the various forms of IVF and GiFT (DIP1, ZIFT etc.) is to achieve fertilisation of eggs, embryo implantation in the uterus and a pregnancy that ends in a baby. These treatments are very stressful and demanding, partly because of the complex nature of the procedures, but also because things can go wrong at every stage. Basically, a treatment cycle goes as follows:

Ovarian Stimulation


Most IVF units aim to place three embryos in the uterus. This means that at least three eggs and ideally

more have to be collected, as not all eggs will fertilise (normal fertilisation is about 75% of eggs if sperm is normal). Normally only one egg a month is produced, so the woman takes drugs which stimulate the ovaries to produce lots of eggs. These drugs (most commonly Clomiphene, Pergonal, and also a different form of drug, Buserelin or Goserelein) are very powerful, and their effect on the woman's ovaries is monitored by a series of ultrasound scans in the first half of her cycle. Most clinics use a vaginal scanning probe, i.e. the probe is placed in the vagina. In some cases, the drugs cause hyperstimulation, where the ovaries become swollen and painful and fluid accumulates in the abdomen.


Egg Collection

The developing eggs grow in sacs of fluid within the ovaries, called follicles. Only the growth of the follicles can be seen on the scans; the eggs are too small to see. If not enough follicles develop, or if they don't grow at the right rate, the treatment cycle will be "abandoned", and the woman will have to start all over again another month. When the follicles have grown enough, the woman has an injection of another hormone drug (Human Chorionic Gonadotrophin) in the middle of the night, which is supposed to make sure that the eggs are fully mature at the time of egg collection, which happens about 35 hours later. In IVF, eggs are collected with a syringe which is passed through the vaginal wall and into the ovary. In GiFT, eggs are collected via a laparoscope (see Laparoscopy and dye). The man must produce a semen sample, usually at the clinic, by masturbation, on the morning of the egg collection. Up until the time of the egg collection, there is no difference between IVF, GiFT or ZIFT. The diagrams below show how these treatments differ from each other.

ZIFT (zygote intra fallopian transfer)
Eggs are collected, fertilised and placed in the fallopian tubes.




IVF (in vitro fertilisation)
Eggs collected




Fertilised eggs divide during embryo development.




Embryos transferred to the uterus



GiFT (gamete intra-fallopian transfer)
eggs collected via laparoscope



eggs and sperm placed in fallopian tubes



Embryo Transfer

Up to three embryos are put in the uterus with a thin plastic tube which is passed through the cervix. Most women who undergo an egg collection will not become pregnant, even though one or more embryos is transferred to the uterus, because most embryos do not implant. Many embryos which are conceived naturally also do not implant and it seems likely that all the drugs used in IVF may make the implantation rate even lower. Very little is known about the environment that early embryos need, nor about what embryos have to do in order to begin implantation.

Embarking on forms of treatment like IVF or GiFT is a big step to take; many people decide to stop treatment at this point, perhaps to consider adoption or fostering if this is available to them. For others this is the time to begin to accept that they may never have a child.

TESTS

"ALICE IN VITRO"

THE SCOTSMAN
15 AUGUST

HEALTH

A positive stake in the future

There are no miracle cures for infertility but ongoing research and treatment at a Sheffield clinic is offering hope to childless Scots couples. Sue Lieberman reports



One big happy family: Sheffield Fertility Centre has a hardship fund to allow those on low incomes to benefit from the treatment

NEW people think about infertility until it affects them. Yet an estimated one in six couples will find, at some stage, that pregnancy help because of difficulty having a baby. Many of them may have unrealistic expectations as the new techniques developed in the last few years have created a somewhat false image of "miracle" cures for infertility.

Male infertility and unexplained infertility together account for about 10 per cent of all diagnoses. Research into male infertility is negligible, while for women with unexplained infertility, advice to "go home and stop worrying" offers little comfort as the children years go by.

Advice like this was once a common "treatment" — but things are changing. The Sheffield Fertility Centre opened last year with an innovative programme aimed at helping women with unexplained infertility. The SFC has a close relationship with research at the neighbouring James Spence Hospital and provides In-Vitro Fertilisation (IVF) to women for whom investigations at James uncover no obvious cause of infertility. At 30 patients per week, and at a cost per treatment of £800, the SFC is one of the biggest and certainly the cheapest IVF centres in Britain.

Director Dr Elizabeth Lenton explains the background. "Some ten years ago, Professor Len Cooke went to James in work on unexplained infertility. Over the years, his team developed methods for looking at histamines and follicular (egg) development in the ovaries. We perfected techniques for diagnosing hormonal imbalances in the way the egg matures before ovulation. The most step was to use IVF to look at the egg's fertility after ovulation."

Although IVF was pioneered amid much media acclaim in the 1970s, there is only one fully-funded NHS centre, in Manchester. (A second centre is opening in Cardiff.) IVF is expensive. Laboratory and clinical time, together with the powerful drugs normally used to stimulate the ovaries, means that basic costs are usually well over £1,000.

Most IVF takes place in the private sector at anything from £1,000 to £3,000 a time. A few teaching hospitals provide IVF as part of their research. Numbers are usually small, waiting lists long and patients are restricted to three attempts. Dr Lenton comments: "The extra strain on patients must be enormous. A relaxed attitude is very important. To know she is on her last attempt must affect a woman's chance of success." In 1984, Scottish National Association for the Childless found only three centres in Scotland providing IVF (Aberdeen has just opened a fourth). None were fully funded by the NHS, some took very few patients, and their success rate was comparatively low.

Women needing IVF for tubal problems (about 14 per cent of fertility problems) or for unexplained infertility, have few choices in Scotland, couples have minimal chance of IVF through the NHS. The usual option is to go

privately, often to London, at considerable expense. The SFC offers a real alternative. While its main focus is on unexplained infertility, it also offers IVF to women with tubal problems. It differs significantly from other IVF centres. Residual charging fees, it does not use drugs to stimulate the ovaries, for good reason. "If you artificially stimulate the body to produce lots of eggs," explains Dr Lenton, "you lose all the information about the body's natural hormones. That is vital if we are to learn more about unexplained infertility."

Another difference is the quality of care given to patients. The SFC puts a lot of emphasis on this, and patients are in no doubt as to its importance. "You feel like a person here," said one woman. "The nurses and doctors are very caring, and you know they will explain everything to you."

The SFC accepts referrals from all over Britain. At present, about 12 couples from Scotland are on its books. The waiting list is about six months and patients can normally return for any number of attempts. Sadly, the success rate for unexplained infertility is lower than for tubal problems. "We still have a lot to find out, for example,

about the womb and how it helps embryos to implant," says Dr Lenton. "But research goes on at James all the time, and we are constantly putting new things into practice. As the researchers at James learn more about the condition, we should continue to improve our results."

Even low-income couples can take heart. The SFC, which is a charity, has set up a hardship fund for those who can't afford treatment. "We don't want to turn anyone away for lack of money," says Dr Lenton. "We have 10 patients waiting for subsidised treatment, and we try to offer each at least one free session per year."

Helena O'Flaherty, chairwoman of the Scottish National Association for the Childless, is happy to hear that the SFC is helping. "There are nowhere else with such expertise on unexplained infertility, and no other centre gives such excellent patient support. We'd love to see a centre like this in Scotland, where it is so hard for people to get any treatment, let alone good treatment."

A Scottish Fertility Centre may be a long way off. Nevertheless, couples in Scotland can take comfort in knowing that if they can't get the help they need from their local hospital, there is an alternative — and it won't treat the earth.

QUESTIONS "SCOTTISH WOMEN"**Transmissions on Reproductive Technology
and Smoking**REPROTECH:

1. Do you welcome advances in reproductive technology
2. Have you used reproductive technology ?
3. Has reproductive technology gone far enough ?
4. Should men always be allowed to be present in conception ?
5. Should all children have the right to know their fathers ?
6. Should people be able to specify their child's gender ?
7. Should children have access rights to their natural parents ?
8. Do all women have the right to conceive ?
9. Should all RT be available on the National Health?

SMOKING:

1. May I smoke ?
2. Are you or were you a smoker ?
3. Do you smoke now ?
4. Should the sale of tobacco be illegal ?
5. Should smoking be banned in all public places ?
6. Should tobacco advertising be banned from TV ?
7. Should smokers pay for health care ?
8. Should all adverts for tobacco be banned ?
9. Should tobacco be available only on prescription ?
10. Should tobacco firms sponsor sports events ?
11. Should smoking be banned from the workplace?
12. Should work places have smoking rooms?

VIEWING FIGURES "SCOTTISH WOMEN"

November 1991

Source: STV

MEMO

DATE: 29TH NOVEMBER 1991

TO: DOUGIE NAPIER

FROM: VICKI PIPER

SUBJECT: SCOTTISH WOMEN - PROFILE

Here's the profile information you wanted for the student.

This information is based on the data available from the current series (3 weeks so far).

Average TVR 12
 Average 000's: 351,000
 Average Share: 41%

Index 118

Indices for	Adults	Women
20-34	48	41
35-54	107	92
55+	141	160
abc1	86	86
c2de	109	110

This means that the audience is predominantly 55+ and c2de, but there is a good proportion of 35-54's. There are very few 20-34 year olds and abc1's are also below average.

The index is the audience profile v the population profile - ie if the index is 100 that demographic group of the audience is on par with its proportion of the population.

VIEWING FIGURES "SCOTTISH WOMEN"

June 1993

Source: STV

		Monday 14th June 1993		Tuesday 15th June 1993		Wednesday 16th June 1993		Thursday 17th June 1993		Friday 18th June 1993		Saturday 19th June 1993		Sunday 20th June 1993	
		TVR	SR%	TVR	SR%	TVR	SR%	TVR	SR%	TVR	SR%	TVR	SR%	TVR	SR%
1745	Early Evening News	9	24%	9	31%	1745	22	59%	17	56%					
1800	Scotland Today **	13	37%	11	45%	1800	16	44%	11	36%					
1815		16	46%	13	45%	1815	13	37%	11	36%					
1830	Take the High Road **	21	54%	17	40%	1830	10	25%	10	33%					
1845		21	54%	11	40%	1845	9	22%	9	33%					
1900	Scottish Action **	17	48%	14	49%	1900	9	26%	7	25%					
1915		10	53%	17	57%	1915	10	29%	7	24%					
1930	Granouken Street	28	77%	27	79%	1930	4	11%	4	11%					
1945		29	74%	27	76%	1945	4	10%	4	11%					
2000	Wheel of Fortune	21	55%	18	52%	2000	5	12%	5	15%					
2015		20	52%	18	50%	2015	5	14%	7	18%					
2030	World in Action	13	36%	15	43%	2030	8	22%	10	30%					
2045		13	34%	15	42%	2045	8	21%	12	32%					
2100	Peak Practice	21	53%	21	56%	2100	6	14%	8	21%					
2115		21	53%	22	56%	2115	6	15%	8	20%					
2130		21	53%	23	50%	2130	5	14%	7	17%					
2145	News	19	49%	23	50%	2145	5	14%	6	15%					
2200		13	37%	12	40%	2200	4	12%	6	16%					
2215	News	17	38%	16	40%	2215	2	6%	5	15%					
2230	Scottish Women **	10	36%	11	41%	2230	2	7%	7	23%					
2245		10	30%	8	30%	2250	1	5%	8	31%					
2300		11	48%	6	29%	2300	3	13%	9	40%					
2315	Scottish Today **	9	49%	6	40%	2315	4	23%	5	33%					
2325	Pyromaniac (Cliff Clark II)	9	50%	5	40%	2330	4	24%	4	31%					
2345		9	51%	5	47%	2345	4	25%	7	20%					
2400	.. Thanks Margaret Ford Ends	8	55%	3	48%	2400	3	22%	1	18%					
<p>.. Thanks Margaret Ford Ends</p>															
<p>Other Programming</p>															
C4	1800 Children's Ward	C.Scot	SR%	Network	SR%	1305 Scotland Today Lunchtime	4 TVR	SR%	4 TVR	SR%					
C4	1830 The Comedy Show	10%	10%	8%	14%	3 TVR	32%	41%	32%						
C4	2000 Bookside	19%	19%	19%	14%										
C4	2030 Surgical Special	31%	31%	14%	14%										
C4	2100 Cowans	17%	17%	13%	13%										
BBC2	2100 Film	16%	16%	12%	12%										
C4	2310 Unhatched Business	7%	7%	7%	7%										
<p>Wheel of Fortune first week 9.5m Peak Practice 9.5 11.7m</p>															
<p>From Jackie Stevenson Research Assistant</p>															

Appendix 3
La Vida en un Xip

The 143 issues of *La Vida en un Xip*

Viewing figures :
December 1991-January 1992

Selection of press cuttings

Citizenship & Infrastructure

Essential human values

Love & Sex

Sociopolitical conflicts

Season 1989 (26 issues)

Women's inequality
Health service
Traffic
Holidays

Self-satisfaction
Death
Loneliness
Religion
Being old
Our body

Fidelity
Sexuality
Falling in love

Kidnapping
Drugs legislation
Prostitution
Poverty
Sects

Season 1989-90 (39 issues)

Tax policy
Life as a farmer
Justice
Mass media
Old age's life
Motorbikes
Tourism
Does our society work?

Being a child
Illusion
Achieving success
Euthanasia
God
Sense of humour
Money
Christmas

The first love
Dating
Sexuality
Single-married
Physical attraction
Polygamy
Homosexuality

Gambling
Delinquency
Racism
Alcoholism
Abortion
Physical handicap

Season 1990-91 (39 issues)

Armies
Entertainment
Housing
Consumerism
Tobacco
Nuclear energy
Mass sports
Television
Transplants
Patient and information
Neighbours
Pets

Suicide
Right to have children
War and Peace
Being charming
Being successful
Fame
Habits and scandal

Virginity
Dating tourists
Sex at work
Dreary marriage
Contraception
Women's breast
Love disillusion

AIDS
Mental deficiency
Drug users' rehabilitation
Unemployment

Season 1991-92 (39 issues)

Olympic Games
High class
Funerary habits
Saving
Big and small shops
Traffic
Medical errors
Eating & Drinking
Employers-employees
Barcelona
Evolution: past-present
Entertainment
La Vida en un Xip

Obsessions
Adventure
Optimism
Depressions
Having children
Friendship
Jokes
Image
Personalities

Jealousy
Sexual habits
Searching for...?
Partner's defects
Sexual needs

Neighbourhood's patrols
Gypsies
Prisons
Physical disability
Nature vs. progress
Rural crisis


Education & Family	National identity & Culture	Extrasensory perception
<u>Season 1989 (26 issues)</u>		
Youth's future School punishment Artistic aptitudes	The future of the Catalan language Catalan national identity <i>El Barça</i>	Mental power Extraterrestrial life
<u>Season 1989-90 (39 issues)</u>		
Housework Separation Prepared for life Adolescence Parents vs. children	Europe and nationalisms The Catalan language <i>El Barça</i>	Hypnosis Telling the future
<u>Season 1990-91 (39 issues)</u>		
The school Youth's information Adoption Mothers-in-law	Catalan culture in Castilian <i>El Barça</i> and the referees Catalonia, European level?	Possessed by devils Paranormal phenomena
<u>Season 1991-92 (39 issues)</u>		
1991-Youth's views Youth's complaints Teachers Separation	Catalan football clubs Social use of the Catalan language	

VIEWING FIGURES "LA VIDA EN UN XIP"

December 1991

Source: TVC from MEDIA CONTROL

**DIVENDRES 27.12.91 - ADULTS
MEDIA CONTROL**



— TV3 - - - TV1 - - - TV2 - - - TL6 - - - ANS - - - C33
 * TOTAL TEMPS VIST 27.12.91 = 3h. 50'
 TV3 = 24,58 TV1 = 41,38 TL5 = 12,48
 C33 = 2,28 TV2 = 8,28 AN3 = 8,28
 * TOTAL TEMPS VIST 20.12.91 = 3h. 24'
 TV3 = 24,78 TV1 = 38,78 TL5 = 14,38
 C33 = 2,78 TV2 = 9,18 AN3 = 8,48

ADULTS 27/12/91 - MEDIA CONTROL


	TOTAL TV	TV1		TV2		TV3		C33		TL5		AN3	
		AUD.	SH.	AUD.	SH.	AUD.	SH.	AUD.	SH.	AUD.	SH.	AUD.	SH.
10:00am	3,6	1,6	43,2	0,6	17,8	0,1	1,5	0,0	0,0	0,8	21,3	0,6	15,3
10:15	4,0	1,9	46,1	0,7	17,2	0,3	8,0	0,0	0,0	0,7	17,7	0,4	11,1
10:30	4,5	1,2	27,8	1,0	22,2	1,0	23,2	0,0	0,0	1,0	21,7	0,2	4,1
10:45	5,2	1,4	27,5	1,2	23,6	1,2	23,5	0,0	0,0	1,0	19,2	0,3	5,3
11:00am	5,6	2,2	40,2	1,1	18,9	1,2	22,2	0,0	0,0	0,5	9,4	0,3	6,1
11:15	5,5	2,0	36,7	0,8	14,2	1,2	21,2	0,0	0,0	0,6	10,2	0,8	15,4
11:30	6,2	2,4	39,1	0,2	3,2	1,5	24,3	0,0	0,0	0,8	12,3	1,0	16,9
11:45	7,4	2,8	37,4	0,1	1,6	1,3	16,9	0,0	0,0	2,2	29,3	1,1	14,5
12:00pm	8,5	2,1	25,0	0,2	2,4	1,8	20,9	0,0	0,0	2,3	26,6	2,0	23,3
12:15	8,4	1,3	15,0	0,1	1,3	1,7	20,1	0,0	0,0	2,4	28,5	2,6	31,3
12:30	8,7	1,3	14,8	0,4	4,6	1,5	17,5	0,0	0,0	2,5	29,1	2,7	31,0
12:45	7,8	1,4	18,0	1,7	21,6	1,3	16,7	0,0	0,0	0,6	8,3	2,4	30,9
01:00pm	7,9	2,9	37,0	0,5	6,0	1,4	18,1	0,0	0,2	1,0	12,5	1,5	19,1
01:15	8,9	4,5	50,8	0,3	3,3	1,1	12,6	0,0	0,0	1,3	14,1	1,3	14,1
01:30	14,5	6,3	43,7	0,5	3,2	2,3	16,2	0,0	0,0	2,2	15,4	1,5	10,0
01:45	15,7	6,2	39,5	1,0	6,4	2,7	17,1	0,0	0,1	3,0	18,9	1,6	9,9
02:00pm	20,0	3,9	19,6	3,1	15,7	7,8	39,1	0,0	0,0	2,9	14,5	1,5	7,7
02:15	25,1	7,3	29,0	3,7	14,7	8,9	35,2	0,0	0,0	2,5	10,1	1,9	7,6
02:30	31,2	12,7	40,7	1,4	4,4	11,4	36,6	0,0	0,0	2,6	8,3	2,4	7,6
02:	33,4	12,5	37,3	1,4	4,1	13,3	39,9	0,0	0,1	2,7	8,0	2,6	7,8
03	34,0	14,7	43,2	2,2	6,4	10,5	31,0	0,0	0,0	2,2	6,5	3,4	10,1
03:15	34,6	16,0	46,1	3,2	9,2	8,4	24,4	0,0	0,0	2,0	5,9	3,9	11,4
03:30	34,6	17,9	51,6	2,8	8,0	7,3	21,1	0,0	0,0	4,2	12,1	1,2	3,5
03:45	33,4	19,1	57,1	1,0	3,0	5,1	15,2	0,0	0,0	6,5	19,4	0,5	1,5
04:00pm	33,4	19,5	58,5	1,2	3,6	5,9	17,6	0,0	0,0	5,5	16,5	0,3	0,8
04:15	29,2	12,1	41,5	2,1	7,3	7,1	24,4	0,0	0,0	5,8	19,7	1,1	3,6
04:30	22,2	11,3	50,7	1,4	6,2	4,1	18,7	0,0	0,1	1,5	6,6	3,0	13,6
04:45	20,5	10,5	51,4	1,0	4,8	3,7	18,1	0,0	0,0	1,2	5,7	3,2	15,8
05:00pm	18,6	9,5	51,0	0,8	4,5	3,3	17,9	0,3	1,8	1,1	5,8	3,2	17,4
05:15	17,9	8,9	50,1	0,8	4,7	2,6	14,6	0,3	1,9	1,1	6,1	4,0	22,2
05:30	18,0	9,9	54,8	1,6	8,8	1,0	5,5	0,5	2,8	1,2	6,6	3,6	19,8
05:45	17,4	9,7	55,9	1,9	10,9	0,7	4,1	0,5	3,1	1,0	5,6	3,5	19,9
06:00pm	16,4	4,0	24,4	3,1	19,1	2,0	12,1	0,5	3,3	1,6	9,7	4,7	28,5
06:15	17,1	2,6	15,0	5,0	29,2	3,9	22,6	0,7	4,1	1,6	9,1	3,2	18,7
06:30	18,2	2,6	14,3	6,3	34,9	5,1	28,1	1,6	8,8	1,6	8,8	0,8	4,3
06:45	19,2	3,2	16,8	7,4	38,8	5,0	26,3	1,4	7,5	1,1	5,7	0,7	3,8
07:00pm	19,3	4,5	23,6	8,0	41,5	2,6	13,4	1,4	7,4	1,2	6,2	1,4	7,3
07:15	21,3	3,8	17,7	8,8	41,1	4,8	22,3	1,0	4,6	1,3	6,3	1,6	7,3
07:	22,1	8,1	36,7	3,5	15,8	4,3	19,2	3,2	14,6	1,5	7,0	0,9	4,1
07:	23,4	10,6	45,1	1,7	7,3	5,1	21,9	2,5	10,7	1,7	7,3	1,3	5,7
08:00pm	26,7	13,3	50,0	1,1	4,2	5,1	19,3	2,8	10,6	2,5	9,4	1,6	6,2
08:15	28,1	14,4	51,4	1,9	6,7	5,6	19,8	1,1	3,9	2,9	10,3	2,0	7,3
08:30	32,3	10,2	31,5	0,5	1,6	11,7	36,2	2,1	6,4	3,9	12,1	3,0	9,3
08:45	35,9	12,2	33,9	0,0	0,1	13,4	37,2	2,2	6,0	4,3	11,9	2,3	6,5
09:00pm	39,3	13,8	35,1	0,5	1,3	12,4	31,5	1,9	4,8	5,8	14,8	3,1	7,9
09:15	42,5	16,2	38,2	0,5	1,1	11,1	26,2	2,2	5,1	4,9	11,6	4,9	11,6
09:30	46,0	19,0	41,3	0,4	0,9	14,0	30,4	1,6	3,5	5,5	12,0	4,6	10,1
09:45	48,6	19,5	40,0	0,5	1,1	15,9	32,8	1,0	2,0	5,2	10,7	5,1	10,6
10:00pm	48,4	21,4	44,3	3,1	6,4	13,1	27,1	0,9	1,8	6,3	13,1	2,1	4,3
10:15	48,7	22,5	46,2	3,0	6,2	12,7	26,1	0,2	0,4	6,9	14,2	2,0	4,0
10:30	48,6	22,4	46,1	2,3	4,8	11,5	23,7	0,5	1,1	8,1	16,7	2,1	4,4
10:45	49,6	22,9	46,2	1,3	2,5	13,6	27,4	0,0	0,1	7,4	15,0	3,1	6,3
11:00pm	46,1	23,6	51,1	1,7	3,8	12,9	28,0	0,4	1,0	4,5	9,7	2,1	4,5
11:15	42,4	24,5	57,9	0,5	1,1	12,8	30,2	0,0	0,1	3,0	7,0	0,7	1,8
11:30	37,2	16,0	43,1	0,6	1,6	14,3	38,4	0,2	0,6	4,1	11,1	1,2	3,2
11:45	32,2	7,9	24,5	1,3	4,0	13,8	42,9	0,9	2,7	5,9	18,4	1,1	3,5
12:00am	26,4	8,3	31,5	2,2	8,3	7,2	27,2	0,9	3,4	5,1	19,3	1,3	5,0
12:15	21,6	10,1	47,0	2,2	10,3	4,3	19,8	0,6	3,0	2,8	12,8	1,1	4,9
12:30	19,6	11,6	59,2	1,8	9,0	3,2	16,3	0,0	0,0	2,1	10,7	0,7	3,7
12:45	16,3	11,1	67,8	0,6	3,7	2,4	14,5	0,0	0,0	1,2	7,6	0,5	3,1
01:00am	14,9	9,4	63,4	0,7	4,6	2,1	14,1	0,0	0,0	1,3	8,9	0,8	5,4
01:15	13,0	7,2	55,8	0,5	3,5	2,1	16,4	0,0	0,0	1,8	13,7	0,9	6,8
01:30	8,3	0,8	9,5	0,8	10,0	2,5	30,2	0,0	0,0	2,4	28,2	1,5	17,4
01:45	7,6	0,2	2,0	0,8	10,4	3,2	41,4	0,0	0,0	2,0	26,7	1,3	16,8

VIEWING FIGURES "LA VIDA EN UN XIP"

January 1992

Source* TVC from MEDIA CONTROL

DIVENDRES 03.01.92 - ADULTS



Font : Media Control

AUDIÈNCIA ADULTS. Màximes
03.01.92

Font: MEDIACONTROL

CADENES	FRANJA: 10-14			FRANJA: 14-17			FRANJA: 17-20,30			FRANJA: 20,30-23			FRANJA: 23-FI Emis.		
	AUD.	SHARE	PROGRAMA	AUD.	SHARE	PROGRAMA	AUD.	SHARE	PROGRAMA	AUD.	SHARE	PROGRAMA	AUD.	SHARE	PROGRAMA
TVE1	6,1	35,9	Balneari i poder	17,2	57,5	Rubi	12,6	51,0	V	19,7	37,5	Un, dos, tres ...	23,0	45,7	Un, dos, tres ...
La 2	2,0	11,9	Xalernoo	5,9	19,2	Cifres y letras	8,0	46,2	El espíritu del éguila	3,9	12,9	Balneario	3,0	8,3	Margaret B-W
TV3	2,4	14,1	Cine de casa	10,1	33,4	TN Miquela	5,6	20,1	Bona Cultura	12,7	26,6	La vida en un esp	16,9	41,6	La vida en un esp
C33	0,0	0,3	Carta d'invitat	0,0	0,0	Carta d'invitat	1,8	6,3	Tot l'espert	2,0	5,0	Què del Martí	0,0	2,8	Què del Martí
TL5	3,1	18,0	Ans de les ...	6,1	19,9	Remington S.	3,0	15,6	l'hablando se ...?	10,3	19,6	Beverly Hills ...	3,4	8,4	Toni Font
AN3	1,8	29,2	Tan comentes	5,4	25,2	Chicanos	7,2	33,8	Chicanos	9,7	18,4	El caballero azul	10,4	22,2	El caballero azul

SHARE CADENES

CADENES	10-14	14-17	17-20,30	20,30-23	23-FI Emis.	SHARE TOTAL
TVE1	35,2	43,0	31,5	32,5	35,0	35,7
La 2	12,4	8,2	19,3	5,9	4,3	9,2
TV3	16,3	24,3	18,4	25,0	38,2	26,5
C33	0,0	0,0	4,5	2,0	0,9	1,6
TL5	19,1	11,5	9,2	15,3	7,4	11,8
AN3	10,4	8,6	14,1	16,3	12,1	12,8

TEMPS TOTAL VIST: 3h 43'

ADULTS	03.01.92 MEDIA CONTROL													
	TOTAL TV		TV1		La 2		TV3		C33		TLS		AN3	
	ACD.	SH.	ACD.	SH.	ACD.	SH.	ACD.	SH.	ACD.	SH.	ACD.	SH.	ACD.	SH.
10:00 AM	4,8	2,2	46,1	1,4	29,1	0,0	0,9	0,0	0,2	0,5	10,5	0,5	9,9	
10:15 AM	4,5	2,1	46,4	1,7	37,4	0,1	2,9	0,0	0,0	0,4	8,5	0,1	3,2	
10:30 AM	4,2	1,3	30,9	1,2	27,6	0,8	20,4	0,0	0,0	0,5	12,2	0,1	3,5	
10:45 AM	4,8	1,5	31,7	0,9	18,9	1,0	21,4	0,0	0,3	0,8	16,0	0,1	3,0	
11:00 AM	5,2	2,0	37,3	1,2	22,3	1,1	20,9	0,0	0,0	0,5	9,9	0,0	0,2	
11:15 AM	5,2	2,3	44,0	0,9	17,1	1,2	22,0	0,0	0,0	0,5	11,9	0,0	0,8	
11:30 AM	5,2	2,7	51,9	0,2	4,2	0,9	12,3	0,0	0,0	0,9	17,8	0,1	1,1	
11:45 AM	5,4	2,9	54,1	0,4	7,6	0,7	12,4	0,0	0,0	0,7	12,8	0,3	6,2	
12:00 PM	4,9	1,1	21,5	0,1	2,7	0,9	17,8	0,0	0,0	1,2	24,4	1,3	26,3	
12:15 PM	6,0	0,9	14,6	0,2	3,1	1,1	18,4	0,0	0,0	2,1	34,2	1,5	25,1	
12:30 PM	6,0	1,0	17,4	0,2	3,1	0,7	11,4	0,0	0,0	2,1	34,3	1,8	29,2	
12:45 PM	4,8	1,0	21,9	0,2	4,3	1,5	30,7	0,0	0,0	1,1	23,6	0,8	17,3	
01:00 PM	5,3	1,9	36,2	0,2	4,7	1,3	25,5	0,0	0,0	1,2	22,1	0,5	2,8	
01:15 PM	8,2	3,3	40,4	0,7	8,3	1,3	15,7	0,0	0,0	1,7	21,0	0,7	2,1	
01:30 PM	13,4	4,7	35,3	1,5	11,0	2,1	15,7	0,0	0,0	2,7	20,3	1,6	12,2	
01:45 PM	17,1	6,1	35,9	2,0	11,9	2,4	14,1	0,0	0,0	3,1	18,0	1,5	8,9	
02:00 PM	19,9	5,8	29,1	4,4	22,1	4,6	23,2	0,0	0,0	2,3	11,4	1,1	5,6	
02:15 PM	23,7	8,0	33,9	3,3	13,7	6,8	28,6	0,0	0,0	2,6	11,1	1,3	5,4	
02:30 PM	28,1	11,5	40,9	1,0	3,4	9,4	33,5	0,0	0,0	2,4	8,5	1,6	5,6	
02:45 PM	30,3	12,5	41,3	1,5	4,9	10,1	33,4	0,0	0,0	2,4	8,0	2,0	6,7	
03:00 PM	31,5	11,9	37,9	3,8	12,2	8,6	27,4	0,0	0,0	3,0	9,5	3,0	9,6	
03:15 PM	30,8	12,7	41,4	5,9	19,2	6,1	19,8	0,0	0,0	1,9	6,1	3,1	10,2	
03:30 PM	29,6	14,6	49,4	1,7	5,8	7,9	25,6	0,0	0,0	3,8	12,9	0,6	2,1	
03:45 PM	29,8	17,2	57,5	0,9	2,9	5,3	17,7	0,0	0,0	5,1	17,0	0,7	2,4	
04:00 PM	30,5	16,9	55,5	0,5	1,6	5,6	18,4	0,0	0,0	6,1	19,9	0,6	2,0	
04:15 PM	27,0	9,3	34,4	1,1	4,0	7,5	28,0	0,0	0,0	4,1	15,3	3,7	13,7	
04:30 PM	23,3	9,5	40,7	1,5	6,5	4,7	20,1	0,0	0,0	2,3	9,7	4,8	20,7	
04:45 PM	21,4	10,3	47,9	1,2	5,5	2,7	12,7	0,0	0,0	1,6	7,4	5,4	25,2	
05:00 PM	21,2	7,8	36,8	1,7	8,0	2,9	13,9	0,5	2,3	1,2	5,5	6,7	31,5	
05:15 PM	21,2	7,1	33,6	1,6	7,8	2,7	12,8	1,3	6,3	0,7	3,5	7,2	33,8	
05:30 PM	19,7	7,1	36,0	1,8	9,0	2,3	11,6	1,3	6,4	0,3	1,7	6,6	34,3	
05:45 PM	20,3	7,3	35,8	1,6	8,1	2,9	14,4	1,1	5,2	0,5	2,6	6,5	32,0	
06:00 PM	17,9	2,0	10,9	4,6	25,9	4,5	25,0	1,3	7,2	2,1	11,4	2,7	15,3	
06:15 PM	17,3	1,0	5,5	6,6	37,9	4,2	24,6	1,0	5,6	2,3	13,2	1,1	5,1	
06:30 PM	17,9	1,3	7,1	7,1	39,5	5,0	23,1	0,6	3,1	1,9	10,3	0,7	2,7	
06:45 PM	18,1	2,6	14,6	7,6	42,2	4,2	23,4	0,4	2,2	1,9	10,4	0,2	1,2	
07:00 PM	17,2	2,8	16,5	8,0	46,2	3,3	18,9	0,3	1,8	1,5	9,0	0,7	4,3	
07:15 PM	17,2	3,5	20,6	6,4	37,2	2,8	16,0	0,3	1,5	2,0	11,5	1,9	11,1	
07:30 PM	18,9	9,3	48,9	1,4	7,4	3,4	17,9	0,5	2,6	3,0	15,6	1,3	6,7	
07:45 PM	20,8	11,8	56,8	1,3	6,4	3,0	14,4	0,8	3,6	3,0	14,3	0,7	3,4	
08:00 PM	24,7	12,6	51,0	1,7	6,9	4,9	19,7	1,5	6,0	2,4	9,6	1,0	4,1	
08:15 PM	27,9	12,1	43,3	2,8	10,1	5,6	20,1	1,8	6,3	3,0	10,9	1,9	6,9	
08:30 PM	30,6	10,0	32,7	3,9	12,9	8,9	29,2	0,6	2,1	3,4	11,0	2,7	8,8	
08:45 PM	33,1	9,3	28,2	3,7	11,1	10,3	31,2	0,9	2,7	4,6	13,3	3,1	9,4	
09:00 PM	39,2	9,1	23,3	3,7	9,5	10,9	27,8	2,0	5,0	5,3	13,5	5,3	13,6	
09:15 PM	42,5	12,7	29,9	2,9	6,9	12,1	28,6	1,0	2,3	4,9	11,5	6,3	14,8	
09:30 PM	45,2	14,5	31,9	2,7	6,1	12,0	26,6	0,9	2,0	6,4	14,1	7,8	17,2	
09:45 PM	48,0	15,5	32,3	1,1	2,2	12,7	26,6	1,4	3,0	7,0	14,5	9,5	19,9	
10:00 PM	48,5	17,7	35,5	1,5	3,1	10,4	21,4	0,6	1,2	5,1	16,7	2,9	12,4	
10:15 PM	50,1	16,7	33,4	2,0	4,1	10,7	21,3	0,3	0,7	9,6	19,1	5,6	19,2	


ADULTS	03.01.92 MEDIA CONTROL												
	TOTAL TV	TVET		La 2		TV3		C33		TLE		AN3	
	AGD.	SE.	AGD.	SE.	AGD.	SE.	AGD.	SE.	AGD.	SE.	AGD.	SE.	
10:30 PM	52,6	18,4	35,1	2,3	4,4	10,9	20,8	0,6	1,2	10,3	19,6	9,3	17,7
10:45 PM	52,5	19,7	37,5	2,2	4,1	11,6	22,1	0,7	1,2	8,1	15,5	9,7	19,4
11:00 PM	50,4	23,0	45,7	1,9	3,8	13,0	25,9	0,5	1,0	2,0	4,0	9,7	19,3
11:15 PM	46,6	17,9	38,5	1,5	3,2	14,4	30,9	0,2	0,4	2,0	4,3	10,4	22,2
11:30 PM	40,6	8,0	19,7	2,7	6,7	16,9	41,5	0,0	0,1	3,4	8,4	9,5	23,5
11:45 PM	35,6	7,7	21,6	3,0	8,3	16,8	47,3	0,3	0,9	3,2	9,0	4,5	12,5
12:00 AM	29,9	9,0	30,1	1,9	6,4	15,3	51,3	0,5	1,7	2,0	6,6	0,9	3,1
12:15 AM	24,5	7,6	31,2	0,7	2,9	13,1	53,6	0,6	2,5	1,4	5,6	0,5	1,9
12:30 AM	22,9	8,2	35,7	0,4	1,3	11,6	50,6	0,6	2,6	0,9	4,1	0,5	2,2
12:45 AM	21,6	8,3	38,3	0,3	1,2	10,9	50,6	0,3	1,2	0,5	2,4	0,7	3,3
01:00 AM	16,4	8,9	54,5	0,7	4,1	3,9	23,7	0,0	0,0	1,3	7,7	0,7	4,6
01:15 AM	13,3	7,7	57,9	0,2	1,8	2,3	17,4	0,0	0,0	1,8	13,7	0,7	4,9
01:30 AM	8,2	2,2	27,2	0,1	1,7	1,7	20,9	0,0	0,0	2,7	32,5	0,1	1,6
01:45 AM	6,4	2,1	33,3	0,1	0,8	1,1	16,6	0,0	0,0	2,1	31,8	0,1	0,9

VIEWING FIGURES "LA VIDA EN UN XIP"

January 1992

Source: TVC from MEDIA CONTROL

DIVENDRES 10.01.92 - ADULTS



Font : Media Control

AUDIÈNCIA ADULTS. Màximes
10.01.92

Font: MEDIACONTROL

CADENES	FRANJA: 10-14			FRANJA: 14-17			FRANJA: 17-20,30			FRANJA: 20,30-23			FRANJA: 23-FI Emis.		
	AUD.	SHARE	PROGRAMA	AUD.	SHARE	PROGRAMA	AUD.	SHARE	PROGRAMA	AUD.	SHARE	PROGRAMA	AUD.	SHARE	PROGRAMA
TVE1	6,4	35,5	Belleza i poder	18,2	61,5	Rubi	9,2	40,6	Marcades Poirot	21,4	40,4	Un, doe, tres ...	24,7	47,6	Un, doe, tres ...
La 2	2,1	11,9	Xaferruca	5,4	18,1	Cafes y heras	3,8	15,3	L'informatiu V.	2,7	5,2	El verdugo	3,7	8,3	El verdugo
TV3	2,8	14,6	Cos e cos	9,5	34,7	TN Migdia	3,8	15,6	Reina Cuatre	18,2	30,9	La vida en un sep	21,0	47,1	La vida en un sep
C39	0,0	0,6	Carta d'argent	0,1	0,2	Carta d'argent	2,5	11,3	Futbol 82	1,4	4,5	Handbol	0,5	4,4	Mister ED
TL5	3,8	21,0	Teles, Lofgame?	4,8	21,1	Teles, Lofgame?	4,7	21,3	l'hablando se...?	9,3	18,6	Beverly Hills	7,1	16,0	Tutti Fruiti
AN3	2,2	43,1	Tan contentos	4,3	26,8	El infirmo del ...	4,8	35,7	El infirmo del ...	5,7	11,7	Nuevos policia	2,8	5,3	Parico en el ...

SHARE CADENES

CADENES	SHARE TOTAL				
	10-14	14-17	17-20,30	20,30-23	23-FI Emis.
TVE1	38,3	43,4	23,6	35,4	34,4
La 2	9,5	9,5	16,7	4,5	6,9
TV3	7,9	22,6	17,9	29,2	32,4
C39	0,0	0,0	6,2	1,9	0,5
TL5	21,0	14,5	15,2	14,9	16,8
AN3	18,2	7,2	17,2	9,0	3,7

TEMPS TOTAL VIST: 3h 30'

ADULTS	10.01.92 MEDIA CONTROL															
	TOTAL TV		TV1		La 2		TV3		C23		TL5		AN3			
	AGD.	SE.	AGD.	SE.	AGD.	SE.	AGD.	SE.	AGD.	SE.	AGD.	SE.	AGD.	SE.		
10:00 AM	3,0	1,7	57,1	0,3	9,3	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,3	8,7	0,7	22,5
10:15 AM	3,5	1,8	50,4	0,4	12,3	0,1	1,6	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,6	16,5	0,7	19,0
10:30 AM	3,5	1,4	40,3	0,5	14,0	0,0	0,4	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,8	23,6	0,7	19,6
10:45 AM	3,4	1,3	36,9	0,3	8,2	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	1,0	28,5	0,8	24,7
11:00 AM	3,2	1,2	38,4	0,1	1,7	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,9	23,8	0,7	23,1
11:15 AM	3,0	1,4	47,4	0,0	0,2	0,1	2,3	0,0	0,2	0,8	24,7	0,5	15,4			
11:30 AM	2,9	1,3	43,3	0,0	0,8	0,1	4,7	0,0	0,0	0,7	23,9	0,6	20,5			
11:45 AM	2,9	0,9	30,6	0,0	0,0	0,1	4,1	0,0	0,0	1,1	36,8	0,8	26,2			
12:00 PM	2,8	0,4	14,3	0,0	0,0	0,0	1,8	0,0	0,0	0,9	31,0	1,4	51,6			
12:15 PM	3,9	0,9	23,1	0,0	0,0	0,2	5,7	0,0	0,0	0,9	23,0	1,8	44,7			
12:30 PM	5,0	1,4	27,6	0,1	1,1	0,2	4,7	0,0	0,4	0,9	17,6	2,2	43,1			
12:45 PM	5,8	2,0	35,2	1,3	22,2	0,5	8,4	0,0	0,0	0,5	9,1	1,2	20,1			
01:00 PM	7,5	3,5	45,8	0,9	12,1	0,5	6,2	0,0	0,5	1,2	15,8	0,7	9,7			
01:15 PM	12,1	5,3	43,8	1,2	9,6	1,1	9,0	0,0	0,0	2,3	19,0	1,3	11,0			
01:30 PM	15,5	5,8	37,5	1,9	12,4	2,1	13,6	0,0	0,0	3,4	21,8	1,5	9,5			
01:45 PM	17,9	6,4	35,5	2,1	11,9	2,6	14,6	0,0	0,0	3,8	21,0	1,9	10,7			
02:00 PM	22,9	5,9	25,7	2,1	9,1	6,9	30,3	0,0	0,0	4,8	21,1	2,1	9,4			
02:15 PM	25,8	8,2	31,8	1,7	6,8	7,4	28,7	0,0	0,0	4,7	18,1	2,8	11,0			
02:30 PM	27,4	12,0	43,9	0,5	2,0	9,5	34,7	0,0	0,0	3,2	11,6	1,7	6,0			
02:45 PM	27,4	11,9	43,4	0,4	1,6	9,5	34,6	0,0	0,0	3,6	13,1	1,5	6,5			
03:00 PM	28,0	12,3	44,1	2,7	9,6	7,0	25,0	0,0	0,0	3,9	13,9	1,4	5,2			
03:15 PM	29,9	13,8	46,3	5,4	18,1	5,2	17,6	0,0	0,0	3,2	10,6	1,4	4,7			
03:30 PM	29,6	15,5	52,3	3,0	10,2	6,3	21,3	0,0	0,0	3,2	10,8	0,5	1,3			
03:45 PM	29,6	18,2	61,5	3,2	10,8	2,6	8,8	0,0	0,0	4,0	13,6	0,5	1,8			
04:00 PM	29,7	17,4	58,5	2,8	9,3	4,0	13,4	0,1	0,2	4,4	14,8	0,5	1,3			
04:15 PM	26,5	11,8	44,6	2,8	10,4	4,8	18,1	0,0	0,0	4,7	17,7	1,9	7,2			
04:30 PM	19,5	4,3	22,0	2,4	12,2	5,0	25,5	0,0	0,0	3,6	18,7	3,8	19,6			
04:45 PM	16,1	4,2	26,0	2,6	16,3	2,5	15,4	0,0	0,0	2,1	13,3	4,3	26,8			
05:00 PM	14,6	3,6	24,4	2,6	18,0	2,6	18,1	0,0	0,3	1,3	9,2	3,9	26,8			
05:15 PM	14,5	3,1	21,1	1,8	12,7	3,0	20,7	0,0	0,0	0,8	5,6	4,5	31,0			
05:30 PM	12,6	1,9	14,9	2,4	18,6	1,6	13,0	0,0	0,0	1,1	8,4	4,4	34,5			
05:45 PM	13,6	2,1	15,5	2,9	21,1	1,9	13,7	0,0	0,2	0,8	5,8	4,8	35,7			
06:00 PM	12,5	1,3	10,7	2,8	22,2	2,4	19,4	0,2	1,3	1,6	12,5	3,3	26,7			
06:15 PM	10,4	0,8	7,7	2,2	20,8	3,0	28,6	0,1	1,4	2,6	25,1	1,3	12,1			
06:30 PM	10,9	0,9	8,0	2,7	25,2	2,8	26,1	0,7	6,4	2,2	19,9	1,2	11,1			
06:45 PM	12,1	2,1	17,4	2,3	19,3	3,6	29,5	0,6	5,0	1,8	14,5	1,1	8,7			
07:00 PM	13,6	1,9	13,6	2,9	21,3	3,5	25,7	0,8	6,2	2,6	19,0	1,3	9,9			
07:15 PM	14,5	2,9	20,2	2,9	19,8	2,0	13,7	0,6	4,4	2,7	19,0	2,5	19,3			
07:30 PM	18,6	5,4	28,9	2,3	12,4	2,7	14,5	1,9	10,0	3,4	18,1	2,7	14,5			
07:45 PM	22,1	7,9	35,9	2,2	9,9	3,2	14,6	2,5	11,3	4,7	21,3	1,4	6,5			
08:00 PM	22,6	9,2	40,6	2,5	11,0	2,8	12,3	2,2	9,6	3,7	16,3	2,0	8,7			
08:15 PM	24,6	8,1	32,8	3,8	15,3	3,8	15,6	1,8	7,3	3,8	15,5	2,7	10,9			
08:30 PM	30,2	9,1	30,0	1,4	4,5	8,2	27,1	1,4	4,5	5,0	16,5	3,5	11,6			
08:45 PM	33,3	10,9	32,9	0,6	1,9	9,9	29,6	1,1	3,2	5,7	17,2	3,0	9,0			
09:00 PM	38,0	11,4	30,0	1,2	3,3	11,5	30,2	1,4	3,6	6,4	16,7	3,5	9,1			
09:15 PM	41,3	14,0	34,0	2,0	4,7	11,8	28,5	0,9	2,1	4,6	11,2	5,1	12,3			
09:30 PM	46,5	15,8	33,9	2,6	5,6	14,4	30,9	1,2	2,5	5,0	10,7	5,5	11,9			
09:45 PM	48,5	16,8	34,7	2,5	5,2	13,8	28,5	1,3	2,6	5,8	11,9	5,7	11,7			
10:00 PM	49,0	18,5	37,8	2,0	4,1	14,7	30,0	0,6	1,3	7,3	14,8	3,5	7,2			
10:15 PM	50,1	17,3	34,5	2,5	4,9	14,6	29,5	0,4	0,9	9,3	18,6	4,0	8,5			

	ADULTS 10.01.92 MEDIA CONTROL													
	TOTAL TV		TVE1		La 2		TV3		C33		TLS		ANJ	
	AUD.	SE.	AUD.	SE.	AUD.	SE.	AUD.	SE.	AUD.	SE.	AUD.	SE.	AUD.	SE.
10:30 PM	52,9	21,4	40,4	2,7	5,2	13,9	26,3	0,1	0,1	8,9	16,9	3,7	7,1	
10:45 PM	52,4	21,2	40,4	2,4	4,6	16,2	30,9	0,0	0,0	7,8	15,0	2,5	4,8	
11:00 PM	52,0	24,7	47,6	2,9	5,6	16,2	31,1	0,1	0,3	3,2	6,2	2,9	5,3	
11:15 PM	43,5	14,0	28,9	3,6	7,5	19,5	40,2	0,2	0,3	6,4	13,2	2,2	4,5	
11:30 PM	44,6	10,1	22,5	3,7	8,3	21,0	47,1	0,1	0,1	7,1	16,0	1,0	2,2	
11:45 PM	39,9	11,1	27,9	2,7	6,8	17,0	42,5	0,2	0,5	6,1	15,4	0,6	1,4	
12:00 AM	31,1	7,2	23,2	2,2	7,0	11,6	37,3	0,2	0,5	6,9	22,2	0,5	2,5	
12:15 AM	24,4	8,4	34,3	2,0	8,3	6,3	25,9	0,1	0,2	5,3	21,8	0,5	2,2	
12:30 AM	16,5	7,4	44,7	1,0	5,9	2,1	12,4	0,2	1,1	3,7	22,5	1,1	6,7	
12:45 AM	12,0	5,7	47,6	0,7	6,1	1,0	8,4	0,5	4,4	2,7	22,6	0,8	6,5	
01:00 AM	10,5	5,5	52,1	0,5	4,8	1,1	10,1	0,0	0,0	2,6	24,7	0,5	4,8	
01:15 AM	9,7	5,0	51,9	0,5	4,8	0,9	9,5	0,0	0,0	2,7	23,5	0,4	4,5	
01:30 AM	9,0	4,2	46,4	0,5	5,9	1,0	10,9	0,0	0,0	2,3	25,4	0,3	3,2	
01:45 AM	6,6	1,4	21,5	0,7	11,2	1,2	18,7	0,0	0,0	2,3	35,2	0,2	3,6	

SELECTION OF PRESS CUTTINGS "LA VIDA EN UN XIP"

"THE GUARDIAN"

22/5/92

"THE GUARDIAN"

22 May 1992

- EUROPE / Living -



Bar life on the small screen... Joaquim Maria Puyal introducing La Vida en un Xip. Perfect Martian viewing

BAR CHATTERLONIA

Your flying saucer lands in Catalonia. How do you get to know the people? You could go to a bar but, if you are in a hurry, just switch on the television

FIVE minutes to go. The technicians are larking around, eating sandwiches out of silver foil, fiddling with cables. The audience sit tensed in white plastic chairs listening to the pop talk from an elderly TV exec. The chairs are raised so that the camera can catch their faces: one woman's chair is so high her feet dangle a clear six inches above the floor. Drawn from all over Catalonia, about 100 people have come to take part in La Vida en un Xip, the region's most popular television programme, transmitted live on Friday nights on TV3, the Catalan language channel.

La Vida en un Xip literally means Life In A Microchip, expressing the idea of "Life in miniature". One journalist said of La Vida that if a Martian ever came to Catalonia wanting to know who the Catalans were, he would only have to sit in front of the TV for a few hours on Friday night and all would be revealed.

Two minutes to go and the experts are in place. A group of five puffed-up, grey-haired men, they sit on a raised bronze

dais in slightly conifer chairs than the audience, attended to by a waiter with slicked back black hair, black bow tie and crisp white shirt: the set creates a potential for conflict, an us-and-them feeling.

Ninety seconds to go and a man in a razor-sharp blue suit runs onto the set. In one bound Joaquim Maria Puyal clears the bronze dais and starts performing for the audience, joking, chatting, nodding hello, touching them. The ice is broken, the tension forgotten as the presenter charges around, like a Jeremy Paxman on speed.

Over the years La Vida has asked the Catalans if a person can live without God if they would accept that their child were homosexual, or prevent a friend's suicide.

Three weeks ago during a programme about rehabilitating criminals, a member of the audience told how he had come out of prison three weeks before and been unable to find work, had no money and nowhere to live. After the programme the police were waiting to arrest him. He had been

recognised by the owner of a jewellery shop as the man who had robbed him two weeks before.

The technicians leave their sandwiches and the programme gets underway. Puyal occupies a podium on the edge of the audience, facing the experts. As an unseen voice introduces *els VII's*, each face in turn fills up the monitor, rigid, with false smile and high blink rate.

The first half hour of the programme is taken up by La Granja, a spoof sit-com on the issue of the day, written and recorded earlier in the week. For the opening hour of the live transmission Puyal takes a back seat as the experts expound and bicker, the star saying little, but all the time in control, orchestrating the discussion with nods and winks, leading applause and laughter.

"Do you like what they've done to Barcelona?" is tonight's question. Some of the city's key players are here: the architects Bofill and Bohigas, a representative of the city government, and a selection of senior academics and journalists.

Sitting in the canteen before

the programme, Ramon Fusté, from the programme's independent production company DCo.S.A. and the show's executive producer, explains the philosophy: "It's the transferral of bar life to the screen. It may make you laugh or cry, but one thing it doesn't do is leave you indifferent. It makes you take sides."

TV3 is one of the nerve-centres of the Catalan language. In tonight's programme only one participant speaks in Castilian, managing to stir up another issue that greatly excites the Catalans: racism. He complains about the state of one of the city's central streets, Portal del Angel: "There are so many *negros* (blacks) and *sudores* (South Americans) hanging around there. It's unpleasant."

PUYAL brings in the Chinese man sitting next to him, who to applause says that the effort to combat racism is being lost amidst all the talk of urban renewal.

Puyal pounces: "What do you mean by racism?" The man struggles for an explanation,

describing the problems he encounters in his restaurant.

Now Puyal introduces the phone poll. A message has been flashing up on screen inviting viewers to call in with their views.

The results show a firm consensus in favour of the changes that Barcelona has gone through, 95 per cent deeming them positive.

The phone poll acts as a springboard for the studio discussion, introducing the wider public's gripes and grumbles.

One o'clock in the morning and the programme, still going strong, has been on air for three hours. Puyal winds things up by selecting 20 members of the audience to air their grievances, leaving the viewer with a range of unanswered, even unanswerable questions.

The waiter in black tie hurries onto the set to collect the empty glasses as the VII's are ushered off and the unseen voice tells us about next week's programme. "Do men have a stronger sex drive than women?" Tonight Chatterlonia

Dan Glaister

"EL PERIODICO"

24/6/92

"EL PERIÓDICO"

24 de juny 1992

- - OPINION -

Linea directa

THE NEW "SPANISH-CATALONIAN" DICTIONARY

- | | |
|---|--|
| • JORGE PUJOL : GEORGE PUJOL | • LA PEDRERA : THE STONE QUARRY |
| • ANGEL COLON : ANGEL PIGEON | • LA COSTA BRAVA : THE WILD COST |
| • TV-3 : TV-THREE | • BUTIFARRA : CATALAN SAUSAGE |
| • "AVUI" (PERIÓDICO) : TODAY | • EL CORTE INGLES : THE ENGLISH CUT |
| • LOS SEGADORES (HIMNO) : THE HARVESTERS | • LLUIS LLACH : LOUIS LAKE |
| • LA SANTA ESPINA (SANTANA) : THE SAINTLY THORN | • CIU : CONVERGENCE AND UNION |
| • MARTA FERRUSOLA : THAT IS A WOMAN | • CREMA CATALANA : CATALONIAN CREAM |
| • MOZO DE ESCUADRA : YOUNG OF THE SQUAD | • LA "MORENETA" : THE LITTLE DARK GIRL |
| • RIO BESOS : RIVER KISS | • EL "ENSANCHE" : THE SUBURBAN DEVELOPMENT |
| • DIA DEL LIBRO : DAY OF THE BOOK | • EL "NOU CAMP" : THE NEW FOOTBALL PITCH |
| • FUTBOL CLUB BARCELONA : SOCCER CLUB BARCELONA | • LA "GENERALIDAD" : THE "GENERALITY" |
| • LA VIDA EN UN CHIP : THE LIFE ON THE CHIP | • LAS "RAMBLAS" : THE "WATERCOURSES" |
| • LA SAGRADA FAMILIA : THE SACRED FAMILY | • GAUDI : FRANK LLOYD WRIGHT |

the PERICH



"EL PAÍS"

15/10/91

"EL PAÍS"

15 octubre 1991

- CATALUÑA -

LA CRÓNICA

No hay respuesta para el encofrador

JOAN BARRIL

Regresó Puyal con su chip a cuestras y cuando esto sucede parece como si el Parlamento paralelo empezara un nuevo periodo de sesiones. El chip de Puyal hay que verlo de vez en cuando. La gente que sale en la ventana de Puyal se supone que es lo mejor de cada casa, catalanes selectos que el demiurgo de la barba ha seleccionado para acercarse humildemente a la verdad. Incluso los que ya no creemos casi en nada, podemos llegar a sentir una cierta credibilidad por lo que se cuece en estas frases llanas que conforman el coro de la comedia puyaliana. Sin duda, lo mejor del chip de Puyal es ese coro final. A esta asamblea televisiva han llegado gentes que tenían algo que decir. Les tienen ahí sentados en su sillita esperando que el dedo del conductor les dé el tono y poder declamar lo que llevan masticando desde hace una semana. El penúltimo viernes el tema era los Juegos Olímpicos y los asistentes lucían ideas muy entrenadas, guiones para todos los gustos, argumentos casi nemotécnicos de tan repetidos. Puyal los había combinado en su platea con la obsesión perfeccionista que le caracteriza: como plato fuerte un alcalde con acólito, un director general, un presidente del COE y unos cuantos periodistas sin máscara. Como acompañamiento, el cocinero había preparado *crudités* nacionalistas, volovanes atléticos y ensalada de voluntarios olímpicos, todo ello aderezado con un suave perfume de rentabilidad económica y unas picantes inquietudes de circulación, seguridad y otros topicazos.

Ni que decir tiene que uno de los méritos de aquel chip de reapertura estaba en el cartel de grandes invitados. A Maragall se

le achacó en su día que rehusara un debate con el reincidente candidato Cullerell como si el ciudadano perdiera una gran cosa. Pero hace dos viernes el alcalde de Barcelona se prestó a ser interpelado no ya por un contrincante, sino por el público anónimo con ganas de hablar y filtrado por el guión ideológico del programa y de la casa anfítriona. No estuvo nada mal, ni para el invitado que consiguió la pieza, ni para el invitado que aceptó el reto, y el chip fue una muestra de lo agradecida que es una aparición pública y en directo de un personaje de ese calibre.

Condiciones decimonónicas

Pero no todo fue redondo en ese pim-pam-pum de los Juegos Olímpicos. En los últimos años de su vida el escritor Manuel de Pedrolo publicó una novela titulada *Algú que no hi havia de ser*. Y ese título flotaba en la pantalla tras la intervención dramática, llorosa y contradictoriamente anacrónica de un señor llamado Luis, vecino de Zamora, de profesión encofrador en la Villa Olímpica, residente en Barcelona desde hace dos años, quien se dirigió a Maragall para preguntarle por los trabajadores muertos y heridos en accidente en las obras del gran acontecimiento noventa y dos. Maragall dijo que el tal Luis estaba mal informado y que muertos sólo había uno. Y el encofrador Luis, perdido en el chip equivocado y agarrado a su lengua zamorana súbitamente hostil, aún tuvo tiempo de recordar la contradicción entre la gran tecnología punta de esa Barcelona y las condi-

ciones de trabajo decimonónicas que se veían obligados a sufrir sus constructores.

El tema del encofrador Luis parecía serio y grave. Aportaba la duda del fin que siempre justifica los medios. Incorporaba el elemento de la miseria manual en un mundo que se cree en la gloria financiera y ciudadana. Pero nadie hizo el más mínimo caso del testimonio de aquel señor que hablaba en lengua extraña de unos trabajadores igualmente extraños empeñados en esa extraña y pertinaz manía del obrero llorón. Algo está pasando en esta sociedad que entiende la fatalidad de las condiciones de trabajo como un coste a apuntar en la cuenta de resultados, pero que pone el grito en el cielo porque no podremos usar el carril olímpico durante 15 días. Algo está pasando cuando alguien habla de la muerte olímpica y se da cuenta de que sus compañeros de chip nunca perderán el sueño por esas menudencias. Tras el testimonio del encofrador se tenía que haber producido el enorme silencio de los justos en ese chip de incensario. Pero Luis pasó como un pobre que vende *kleenex* en los semáforos. Lo único importante es saber si las medallas se van a dar en catalán, si iremos vestidos de *pubilles* y si se van a enterar de que somos distintos.

En sensibilidad hacia el mundo del trabajo somos absolutamente distintos y distantes. Lo vimos en el chip, uno de nuestros espejos menos deformantes. Y lo hemos visto cada día de esta semana, cuando nos hemos asomado a Sant Cosme con la mirada viciada de un curioso bienestar burgués que ve lituanos en las consejerías y marcianos en los barrios del obrero.

"EL PERIODICO"

19/6/92

"EL PERIÓDICO"

19 de juny 1992

- TELEVISIÓN Y RADIO -



ABIERTO EN CANAL

GABRIEL JARABA

'La vida en un xip', un foro cívico

Son estas horas bajas para la legión de *xipadictos* que se lamentan de la próxima desaparición del exitoso programa de **Joaquim Maria Puyal**, en TV-3. La experiencia de **Puyal** al frente de *La vida en un xip* ha demostrado que los debates no tienen por qué ser cosa de enterados, con los ciudadanos reducidos al papel pasivo de receptores. Anuncia **Puyal** un probable retorno al frente de un nuevo programa de debate; no importa. Lo que este periodista ha introducido en la historia en la televisión de este país ha sido la ruptura del nudo gordiano de los debates, a partir de un talante intelectual que no ha surgido precisamente de la nada: se fogueó en la batalladora radio barcelonesa de los años 60; absorbió el espíritu investigador del ambiente cultural de la ciudad y llevó a una nueva cadena de televisión el espíritu dialogante y tolerante de una generación.

Ahora que **Paul McCartney** cumple 50 años y su aniversario es conmemorado como hito de transformación generacional, el relevo de *La vida en un xip* debiera ser celebrado como homenaje a nosotros mismos, a las gentes que en épocas menos propicias para el diálogo creyeron que la conversación civilizada era imprescindible para vivir en comunidad. Ahora, con sus cuatro temporadas en pantalla, el programa de **Puyal** se ha convertido en un ladrillo —en el buen sentido de la palabra— imprescindible en la construcción de un país desde los medios de comunicación de masas. Por su programa han pasado todo tipo de problemáticas, abordadas con una falta de prejuicios que se echa verdaderamente en falta en el llamado *espacio comunicacional catalán*. Si *La vida en un xip* ha sido un elemento capital de normalización de la vida ciudadana catalana, ello no se ha debido —únicamente— a cuestiones lingüísticas o culturales: el *xip* ha sabido conectar con la Catalunya realmente existente, al margen de mandarinos, rabietas, exclusiones o autoexclusiones. Independientemente de que el futuro recupere o no la fórmula de *La vida en un xip*, con este programa, Catalunya podrá exhibir frente a otras naciones españolas el honor de haber sabido convertir la televisión en un foro cívico. Nadie en otras cadenas puede, de momento, decir lo mismo.

"LA VANGUARDIA"

19/5/92

"LA VANGUARDIA"

19 de maig 1992

- TELEVISION -

OPINIÓN

Barcelona,
Barcelona...

■ LOS ÚLTIMOS sondeos de audiencia facilitados por Eco-tel señalan que "La vida en un xip" es el programa regular de mayor popularidad en Cataluña, y ahora que en TVE ha desaparecido "Un, dos, tres" cabe suponer que va a incrementar todavía ese liderazgo. El "xip" de Joaquim M. Puyal es un verdadero buque insignia de la televisión autonómica, y en su edición del pasado viernes dedicada a Barcelona, la querida Barcelona olímpica de nuestros desvelos y la del inmediato futuro, fue una abrumadora demostración de su capacidad de convocatoria y de su sabiduría y destreza a la hora de llevar el programa.

Puyal sabía muy bien que con un plantel de invitados donde confluían urbanistas dotados, además, de recursos retóricos e incluso histrioncos como Oriol Bohigas, Lluís Racionero y Ricardo Bosfill y barceloneses militantes de pro como Lluís Permanyer y

*El éxito incombustible
de Puyal demuestra
que la televisión sólo
quem a los mediocres
y conformistas*

Huertas Clavería, amén de políticos y arquitectos, la polémica de gran altura estaba servida y debía ocupar una parte prioritaria. El debate ocupó, en efecto, un lugar sustancial en las tres horas y media de diálogo, y esa autoridad fue implícitamente reconocida por los ciudadanos, que les bombardearon con sus preguntas y sus quejas de tal manera que en ningún momento perdieron su protagonismo. Esta edición de "La vida en un xip" será recordada como uno de los clásicos de este espacio, que parece llamado a proseguir su singladura dentro de una máxima exigencia de interés y calidad.

El éxito incombustible de Puyal viene a demostrar, en fin, que la televisión sólo quem a los mediocres y los conformistas, pero no a los grandes profesionales ni a quienes se toman en serio su trabajo. Puyal pertenece por derecho propio a esa elite tanto en la faceta de director de todo un complejo entramado de producción (donde se ha rodeado de un equipo cohesionado y plenamente rodado) como en la conducción del debate, donde ha de confiar en sus propios recursos y en ese carisma ante el público que no es sólo una gracia divina, sino también, y sobre todo, el fruto de un particular sentido del perfeccionismo.

J. M. BAGET HERMS

"AVUI"

8/4/92

"AVUI"

8 d'abril 1992

- EDITORIAL -

Bernardino

VICENÇ VILLATORO

Segur que va haver-hi moltes persones que quan van saber de l'atracament a una joieria de Sabadell en què l'atracador havia apuntat un nen amb una pistola van pensar que cal mà dura i escarment per als delinqüents, que la justícia és massa tova. Segur que quan va sortir Bernardino Ballester al *Xip* d'en Puyal parlant de la seva vida passada a la presó, moltes persones —entre elles algunes de les d'abans— es van emocionar i van pensar que la societat és molt injusta amb persones com ell i que potser en fem un gra massa. Només per casualitat, aquesta vegada es tractava en les dues ocasions de la mateixa persona: l'atracador anònim que mereix la condemna i la víctima de la societat que mereix la simpatia. Vull dir que el mateix personatge era capaç de generar en les mateixes persones sentiments i actituds absolutament contraposats. Quan detenien Bernardino a les portes de TV3 la contraposició queda en evidència.

El cas és significatiu. En primer lloc il·lustra un fenomen prou típic: quan allò que considerem negatiu, condemnable, pren un rostre concret, una biografia i una argumentació, la condemna es matisa. Però també la perplexitat dels espectadors davant del cas d'en Bernardino és la concreció d'una perplexitat més general sobre el tracte als delinqüents. Des del segle passat hi ha una literatura —i no és pejoratiu— sobre el determinisme social en la delinqüència, una branca del realisme que ha presentat la delinqüència com una malaltia social difícil d'extirpar, perquè el que està malalt és el conjunt del cos social. Bernardino, al *Xip*, va exercir —fins i tot amb picardia— aquesta línia literària. Però el mateix ciutadà que es commou per la seva narració s'indigna, naturalment, quan l'atracuen. I tota l'admirable literatura *progre* sobre la responsabilitat del conjunt social potser explica formidablement la qüestió, però no la resol. I potser la indignació de després de l'atracament, quan el ciutadà crida a favor de la mà dura, és injusta en les seves explicacions dels fets, però el ciutadà es pensa —erròniament— que això li ofereix si més no una solució. Del progressisme, el diagnòstic. Del reaccionarisme, la teràpia. Funcionem una mica així, tot i que en aparença siguin incompatibles. Bernardino es va beneficiar durant deu minuts de les simpaties de la compassió i patirà durant mesos la recepta de l'ordre. Certament, és contradictori. Però, fins ara, l'única alternativa a això han estat les bones intencions.

"EL PAIS"

6/4/92

"EL PAIS"
6 d'abril 1992
- CATALUNYA -

LA CRÓNICA

Un presidiario en un 'chip'

RAMÓN DE ESPAÑA

Si un marciano aterrizara en Barcelona y me preguntara cuál es la mejor manera de conocer a los catalanes, le recomendaría que viera cada semana *La vida en un xip*, pues no hay otro programa que nos defina tan bien como el del multicolóquio que dirige Joaquim Maria Puyal. Todas las variaciones posibles de nuestro famoso *very* encuentran su lugar en *La vida en un xip*, y hasta alguna que otra aproximación a nuestra no menos famosa *rauca*. En este programa la gente discute con vehemencia, pero sin acritud. Todos están convencidos de tener cosas muy importantes que decir y van al *xip* a soltarlas, pues si no las sueltan revientan, aunque de manera muy correcta, supongo. Especialmente dedicado a la Cataluña profunda, *La vida en un xip* constituye un retrato ejemplar de nuestra sociedad. Cada vez que lo veo (y espero que al marciano le suceda lo mismo) llego a la conclusión de siempre: para bien o para mal, esto es lo que hay.

Lo que nunca puede imaginar es que *La vida en un xip* fuera seguido con interés en las comisarías de policía, pobladas, en general, por honestos funcionarios venidos de fuera de Cataluña para los que este

monumento audiovisual a la catalanidad debe de resultar un tanto exótico y un punto incomprensible (especialmente si hace poco que han llegado y aún tienen problemas para entender el idioma). Seguro que ni el propio Puyal sospechaba que los policías seguían su programa, cosa que acabamos de descubrir gracias a la espectacular detención a la que fue sometido en las puertas de TV-3 uno de los participantes en la edición del pasado viernes. Bernardino Ballester se llama este señor que en el transcurso del debate sobre la eficacia o ineficacia de las prisiones consiguió, con un discurso tremendamente humano y algo melodramático sobre la sucesión de desgracias en que ha consistido su achuchada vida, meterse a todo el mundo en el bolsillo y lograr, aparte de un dinerillo que nunca viene mal en estos tiempos que corren, tres ofertas de trabajo. No está nada mal para alguien que dos días antes de su brillante aparición televisiva dice que atracaba una joyería en Sabadell y que no se cargó al dueño porque la pistola se le encasquilló. Nada mal para alguien que estuvo encarcelado por un lomo de miedo y que probablemente se sentía se-



Joaquim Maria Puyal.

guro en el *xip* porque pensaba, como yo, que los policías no veían ese programa.

Sobre la habilidad de su discurso no se admiten dudas. El hombre consiguió emocionarnos no sólo a los asistentes al debate, sino a sus propios organizadores, quienes salieron en su defensa cuando la poli-

cia le echó el guante en la puerta de TV-3, como si salir por televisión fuera equiparable con la inmunidad parlamentaria. Curioso personaje el tal Bernardino, alias *el Nino*. ¿Tantas ganas tenía de salir por la *tele* para llegar a arriesgarse tanto? ¿Le habrá parecido la detención un precio justo por esos 15 minutos de gloria televisiva que, según decía el difunto Andy Warhol, le corresponden hoy en día a todo ciudadano? Quién sabe. Lo único que queda claro en todo este asunto es que los policías son admiradores de Puyal, lo cual, no me lo negarán, constituye un paso de gigante en la asimilación de los emigrantes por parte de la sociedad catalana.

Discusión ponderada

Puestos a especular, no sería del todo desahellado suponer que quizá los mandos de la policía recomiendan a sus subalternos la visión semanal del programa de Puyal. Así se familiarizan con el idioma de su nuevo hogar y aprenden a entender, gracias a los diálogos y directos de los protagonistas de *La granja* y el ponderado modo de discutir de los asistentes al debate, el carácter local. Si *La vida en un xip* es capaz de conseguir que un marciano entienda a los catalanes, mucho más fácil lo tendrá un gallego o un extremeño, ¿no es cierto? Si yo fuera Puyal, estaría encantado de ampliar mi audiencia de forma tan espectacular.

"EL TEMPS"

13/6/92

56 / SOCIETAT / EL TEMPS 13-7-92

TELEVISIÓ

EL TEMPS entre els bastidors del darrer programa

L'últim xip

26 de juny. El final. 1,2 milions de telespectadors d'audiència mitjana. Com deia *The Guardian*: "Si voleu saber com són els catalans, mireu *La Vida en un Xip*".

2 0.05 h. Vestíbul de TV3. Després de tots els controls d'identificació per accedir al recinte de Televisió de Catalunya, els participants de l'últim Xip fan temps. Tots es coneixen: són els actors protagonistes de *La Granja* i els seus acompanyants. Es petonegen i s'abraquen. La Laia, la filla petita de la Carme i el Joan de la sèrie, arriba amb la seva mare de debò, però no s'està d'abraçar la seva mare de ficció. Entre la colla, hi ha en Soteres i el Brillant, menys agitanat, més mudat. A poc a poc, la tertúlia es va fent grossa. Arriben altres actors i alguns membres del comitè assessor, ideòlegs habituals del Xip, com Magda Oranich, Manuel Roglan o Raimon Martínez Fraile.

Un crít expeditiu d'una guàrdia de seguretat posa en marxa el grup cap a l'edifici de Programes de TV3. Mentre enfilen camí cap al plató número 1, Jaume Ferrús, director de la casa, topa amb el grup. Observa encuriós els actors. Com si els recordés d'alguna sèrie. Tothom té, tanmateix, la mateixa destinació. Ferrús, juntament amb el psicopsicòleg Xavier Altarriba, un altre antic col·laborador de Puyal i el guionista de *La Granja*, Jaume Cabré, formen la taula d'avui.

A l'avantsala de l'estudi d'emissió, una mica de xampany, refrescos i quatre còctels per a matar la gana. Les nits d'ante-

na de *La Vida en un Xip* són llargues.

20.35. Encara som a l'avantsala del plató. Tothom ignora els canapès. Ningú no vol xampany. La gent comença a repenjar-se a les parets, buscant un lloc per seure. Fa estona que estan drets. El piscolabis allargassat permet l'arribada de més convidats tocarardans: Ignasi Riera, Manuel Delgado i Josep M. Ureta, amb filla i fill, respectivament, i d'Emili Teixidor. I de més actors: arriba el mala peça del Sergi, el primer xicot de la Sònia, aparellat de veritat amb la Carme Conesa, la presentadora de torn de *Betes i Films*. I la Núria Hosta, blanc immaculat de cap a peus. Hi són tots: la Cris, que fa d'amiga de la Sònia, la Mercè, la infermera del metge. I el metge també. L'Orestes Lara, el director d'actors de *La Granja*, s'ho mira tot com un cowboy escèptic entre el seu bestiar boví. A mesura que passa el temps, la gent es neguiteja. ¿Encara no ens criden?

20.55 En Jordi Mir, coordinador del programa surt amb un plec de fulls a la mà i fa, nerviós, cap a la porta. Falta algú. La situació esdevé tensa. Puyal puja a fer un cop d'ull. Va amb texans. Encara no s'ha canviat. Aquest, l'últim Xip, ¿serà el més descoordinat? Res d'això, a la televisió sempre es va escanyat.

21.05 Finalment, Puyal es posa davant



Joan Corbellà Práctic. No és tan sobri un habitual del Xip, on ha sortit més que ningú; és del comitè assessor. A més, pren cafè amb la Mari Pau Huguet. Sana.



José Sandoval. Periodista. Escriu a la secció "rons" de *La Vanguardia*. Forma part del comitè assessor de Puyal. És un dels talps preferits per la jet-set.



José Maria Huertans. Periodista, ara dels d'abans i gat vell. Ha aparegut en diversos xips sense ser membre del comitè assessor.

la porta de l'estudi i crida l'atenció dels presents. Fem rotllana al seu voltant. Amb un sol crit, fa callar tothom. Comença a parlar: explica als alumnes l'esquelet del programa d'avui, un programa gens encotillat. A base d'intervencions lliures. Però sobre aquesta teòrica llibertat, tothom haurà de saber en quin ordre de presentació parlarà. Puyal comença a passar llista d'oradors. "¿Qui no hi és, no compta i es passa al següent, d'acord?". S'aprova sense discussió. I Puyal allitona: "El Xip d'avui consisteix a presentar-nos a tots els qui el fem, les entranyes del programa. Ha de ser una cosa distesa

i alegre. Podeu dir el que vulgueu. Però sobretot, no caiguem en cap moment en un excés de cofoisme, no som els millors". Tothom creu.

A la resta de l'univers, la gent veu l'últim capítol de *La Granja*, que ja està en antena. S'acosta l'últim Xip.

21. 20. Per fi tothom assegut a lloc. Els de *La Granja* i els opinadors s'asseuen a les grades del plató. La resta, parents i amics, en una petita tribuna fora del decorat. Tècnics i càmeres fan proves amb la *dolly*, la càmera amb coll de girafa. Els focus s'encenen i s'apaguen. Corre-

disses pertot arreu: regidors, acompanyants dels convidats, hostesses dentífries i tot aquell personal que cobra perquè els pannellistes tinguin una ampolla d'aigua i un got. L'argot del programa combina, sense problemes, ideologia i lingüística. Els pannellistes són els personatges que pel fet de ser experts en alguna matèria, situen el debat en el terreny dels conceptes. Marquen, doncs, el canemàs ideològic mínim del programa. I són una invenció lingüística del puyalisme que prefereix anomenar els opinadors amb el llenguatge dels media nord-americans.

Des de la graderia, el Xip sembla una maqueta de paper pinotxo feta a escala massa gran. Puyal a la seva trona queda amagat de les grades. Un aparell de televisió permet de seguir les imatges de l'últim episodi de *La Granja* en emissió. Jordi Mir repassa amb alguns participants l'ordre d'intervencions. Mentrestant, a *La Granja*, l'Àvia Angelina plora davant el dibuix d'una masia que ja no tornarà a ser seva.

El Puyal, ara ja amb pantalons de pinces i l'americana de rigor, s'enfila al capdamunt de la tribuna per convèncer Manuel Delgado perquè es quedi al programa. Delgado s'excusa. "No puc".

A la TV, el Mercader demana a la Glòria si es vol casar amb ell. Ella li engalta: "M'ho pensaré". La cara del Mercader s'il·lumina i corre a dir-ho a tothom.

21.40 Puyal comença el botifarró. Aquest argot ja sóna més casolà. El botifarró és l'espai enregistrat en què el Puyal parla amb els personatges de *La Granja*. L'anomenen així perquè actua de falca entre els dos espais del programa: l'episodi de *La Granja* i el debat al plató. Ideològic també: relliga ficció amb aires de versemblança i realitat.

Josep Sandoval arriba l'últim i corre, ajupit, cap al seient; rialler i silencios, s'estalvia de demanar disculpes.

Puyal insisteix per darrera vegada so-



Pepe Rodríguez. Periodista especialitzat en secció. Anava al Xip com a expert. Habitual del Xip que no forma part del comitè assessor.



Ignasi Alora. Escriptor sindicalista, gastrònom obsessament vocacional i nacionalista cultural. Membre del comitè assessor del Xip i polemista malicós.



Margda Orriols. Advocada experta en casos de divorci, diputada per IC al Parlament. Membre del parlament i integrant del comitè assessor del Xip.

58 / SOCIETAT / EL TEMPS 13-7-92

Els professionals passen a la rereguarda



Hauria pogut semblar un d'aquells geperman barbaforis que alcen el puny dret amb aires de contundència militar. Malgrat la seva oratòria metòdicament hipnòtica i una protectora espatlla granfítica, a Joaquim Maria Puyal i Ortiga, l'han salvat sobretot els ulls. Al triangle frontal, entre les celles sinuoses i les conques brillants, hi recrea els millors mecanismes de la seducció televisiva. Arqueja, aprofundeix i, si convé, intimida. Mai no llambrega ni especula. Els braços i el cos remarquen el gest. Però Puyal concentra el poder en la mirada: el millor recurs de l'estrella televisiva, però també símbol de l'autoritat insolent d'un director que entreveu qualsevol petita desviació de càmera i controla, implacable, la tensió dramàtica del debat. La mateixa disposició de la trona de fusta, des de la qual encarrila *La vida en un xip*, ja indica qui mana al plató. Damunt el petit espai de la credença, quatre folis escrits a mà amb l'esquelet del programa, l'ordre d'intervencions i els talls de publicitat. A un cantó de la taula, una alarma digital digna de qualsevol basar

de la Barceloneta. La feina no vol luxes. Sota la trona i a la seva dreta, les fileres de públic i els falsos estucats damunt els quals dos sacrificats treballadors de la casa mouen les girafes del so. Al centre del plató, una petita rotonda feta de làmines de coure. Just davant Puyal, una càmera fixa. Només per als seus ulls. Darrere el seu clatell, una pantalla gegant de televisió d'on l'atabalada Sílvia Cópulo el comunica amb el món exterior. A la seva esquerra, la mesa dels pannellistes. I, just fora de focus, a pocs metres, hi té Jordi Mir, el coordinador del programa, amb qui Puyal baixa a deliberar mentre el realitzador fa una escombrada o un pla fix entre els convidats. El *Xip* no és, i ho remarca, feina d'un figurí

El puyalisme realment existent —la productora, l'equip, els seus— ha decidit que el fenomen Puyal deixi pas al segell Puyal. L'última nit del *Xip*, una mica de xampany i prou, Joaquim Maria Puyal es va limitar a suïcidar-se en públic. Sense excessos sentimentals. Ara Puyal depèn només d'ell mateix. Tornarà. X.B. / O.M.

bre el to del programa: "Sobretot, fugiu del cofoisme exagerat. No exagerem. Si voleu, una mica de sentimentalisme no està malament..." Al fons, pregunten pel resultat del partit de Dinamarca i Alemanya. Segons abans que les càmeres punxin en directe, Puyal va disparat cap a un fotògraf que acaba d'entrar "¿Puc saber qui és aquest senyor?". L'informen i el deixa treballar. Al plató no hi ha res que se li escapi.

Toni Bassas, l'últim a arribar, corre com una exhalació a asseure's al costat de la seva dona, la Mariona, col·laboradora de Puyal a la primera etapa del *Xip*.

TV3 anuncia que a partir de dilluns comença la reemissió de *La Granja*. El país respira tranquil.

Darrere els caps dels pannellistes apareix sobreimprès L'ÚLTIM XIP.

El pilot de la càmera s'encén. En Quim està a l'aire. Mira el món sencer i somriu. Torça una mica la boca. Se li fan una rastellera d'arrugues al voltant d'uns ulls que s'empetteixen amb la riulla. Ja és el Puyal de la tevè. "Som aquí, acabant d'ordenar les coses per al *Xip* d'avui..."

La resta, per als fans de Puyal, és una joia de videoteca. Altres devien trobar-lo ensofit. Es tractava de mirar-se al mirall. Amb satisfacció sempre matisada. El públic civilitzat —tots aquells qui creuen en la tolerància, el respecte a l'opinió i una difuminada però evident categoria de valors progressistes— va gaudir amb l'últim *Xip* com si es tractés d'una festa familiar. Perquè, com a les seves festes familiars, ningú no va perdre les formes, però tampoc no va semblar gens fred. Sílvia Cópulo ensabonava un Joaquim Maria lleument envermellit. En Soteras i en Gassiot filaven el paper d'actors posant-se en qüestió les respectives adscripcions futbolístiques, i Brillant denunciava un cas peculiar de racisme contra el seu personatge. Als entreactes publicitaris, curses d'obstacles cap a lavabos i sales de passos perduts. I una senyora ovació que el gol sud del plató —Nani Riera i Emili Teixidor entre altres— va dedicar a l'eixelabrada victòria danesa en l'Eurocopa.

Quatre hores després, l'últim *Xip* s'ha acabat. Josep M. Ureta, col·laborador de l'equip del Puyal, desperta el seu fill que s'havia quedat adormit al seient. Per ell, el *Xip* havia durat més del compte. Per Puyal també.

Xènia Bussé
Oriol Malló

Els veritables amos de La Granja.



Jaume Cabré.

ARXU

Gent del Barri a la catalana. Una comparació fàcil. Però quan a la mateixa hora, pel Canal 33, repeteixen *Eastenders* la majoria de televidents concentra la seva atenció en una petita colla d'amics i familiars de la granja, del casal, d'un hipotètic barri menestral d'una Barcelona esbossada en llonzes de mitja hora setmanal que aquest estiu, gràcies a les repesques de les reemissions, es convertiran en trenta minuts diaris. Es tornarà a plorar les desgràcies del Mercader, a somriure les facècies del Soteres, i a murmurar sobre els xicotets de la Sònia. Però l'èxit no ha estat tan sols d'un excel·lent quadre d'actors: a un dels millors realitzadors de dramàtics de la televisió d'aquest país, Orestes Lara —que, quan li ho han permès a TV3, ha realitzat produccions tan impactants com *La Rambla de les Floristes*, amb Rosa Maria Sardà—, i a un prodigi d'escriptor vuit-centista, Jaume Cabré, que ha fet de les teranyines narratives un poc habitual *modus vivendi*, els pertany part de l'èxit.

En aquest interludi estiuenc, TV3 i DCo, la productora de la sèrie i de *La vida en un xip*, negocien les rendes de *La Granja*. Televisió de Catalunya està més que interessada perquè DCo els faci alguna proposta concreta. Allò que tothom calla és si es tractarà d'una sèrie nova o de seguir recreant vespres de divendres. Però Jaume Cabré, co-responsable del guió i responsable de l'escriptura de la sèrie, pensa passar un estiu feliç fora de *La Granja*. Li faria mandra mirar-se-la de nou. I, mentrestant, fa balanç: "Per una

banda, els personatges en una sèrie com aquesta que acumulen història al llarg dels capítols són molt agraïts. T'és relativament fàcil de treballar-hi si entres a l'ona, però, d'altra banda, l'organització de la sèrie en 150 capítols que insisteixen en una mateixa matèria narrativa t'acaben fent venir ganes de sortir d'aquest món". Les "reines" argumentals de *La Granja* són els seus mateixos personatges. L'equip de guionistes —bàsicament Jaume Cabré, Jesús Borràs i Antoni Colomer—, els van construir a partir d'arquetips: el fatxenda, la dona de caràcter, el marit tabalot... Tots tenien el caràcter establert des del començament. Calia, doncs, que a partir dels diàlegs, de la parla, s'anés evidenciant la seva manera de ser. "Als inicis ens va servir de molt buscar frases que cada personatge repetia sovint. Així, per exemple, el Mercader diu sovint '¿M'entén el sentit de la paraula?' El Brillant, entra a *La Granja* i sempre fa 'Salut i peles' o es dirigeix a un altre personatge dient-li 'Hola Flanagan'..."

I a partir dels tics personalitzats, s'hi introduïen certes sorpreses. Noves facetes. Les que trobem, per exemple, en el personatge d'en Soteres (Joan Borràs). Als primers capítols fa, tal com pertoca, de senyor gran, però quan conviu amb els problemes de la Bet, l'hostessa veïna —la mateixa Montse Guallar d'*Amor a primera vista*—, o amb un antic amor interpretat per Montserrat Carulla, l'estabilitat es capgira. Són canvis de rasant perfectament estudiats: "Cada any establim uns

quatre o cinc capítols que se centaven especialment en un dels personatges: en la primera part ens vam centrar en la Carme, el segon any en el Mercader, el tercer, en el Soteres i el Gassiot, en el quart hi van entrar personatges laterals com la Susanna."

El guió, tot i mantenir una coherència des del principi, ha hagut d'introduir novetats, canvis no previstos com l'invent d'un "final" per a un personatge, ja que l'actor havia decidit plegar (el cas de la Serafina). Tant és. Tothom és intercanviable, perquè, en termes de Cabré mateix, es juga al joc de l'autoengany. "Els personatges es fan creïbles perquè recorden els mateixos personatges del nostre entorn, són de tot arreu i no són ningú en concret. I com que tampoc no són herois ni s'expliquen en funció de cap èpica, com que viuen la normalitat d'un ambient local, d'un llenguatge proper, pots arribar a creure't que tot existeix encara que la granja no puguis trobar-la enlloc" L'autoengany és el triomf del realisme, just allò que la sèrie sempre ha intentat. Quan els ramats de turistes visiten els platons de TVC, molts palpen amb mans tremoloses els enganyosos decorats de *La Granja* i descobreixen que la cafetera del bar funciona, no s'acaben de creure que, els espectres de la seva sèrie preferida, se'ls han inventats individus contractats per a escriure, dirigir i interpretar. Cabré i Orestes, els amos conceptuals de *La Granja*, tenen corda per estona.

X. B. / O. M.