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Young, John and Macinnes, Allan (2010) *The weckherlin project : crown, parliament and competitive intelligence*. In: *Parlamentos a lei, a prática e as representações. Da idade média à actualidade. Assembleia da República, Lisbon*, pp. 381-389. ISBN 9789725565513

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PARLAMENTOS:
A LEI, A PRÁTICA E
AS REPRESENTAÇÕES
Da Idade Média à Actualidade

PARLIAMENTS:
THE LAW, THE PRACTICE AND
THE REPRESENTATIONS
From the Middle Ages to
the Present Day

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2



CENTRO DE ESTUDOS
INTERDISCIPLINARES
DO SÉCULO XXI
UNIVERSIDADE DE COIMBRA

Título / Title Parlamentos: a Lei, a Prática e as Representações: Da Idade Média à Actualidade
Parliaments: The Law, The Practice and the Representations: From the Middle Ages to the Present Day

Coordenação Científica / Scientific Coordinators Maria Helena da Cruz Coelho e Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro

Edição / Publisher Assembleia da República - Divisão de Edições / Publishing Department

Tradução / Translation Anouk Torres e Zara Almeida

Revisão / Revision Helena Alves e Sonia Nobre

Fotografias / Photography Pedro da Silva

Design Nuno Timoteo

Paginação / Pre press Undo, Lda

Impressão / Printing Fernandes & Terceiro

Tiragem / Print run 600 exemplares / copies

Depósito Legal / Legal Deposit 321 212/10

ISBN 978-972-556-551-3

Lisboa Dezembro de 2010

Lisbon, December 2010

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Nota do editor

Esta obra contém os discursos e os textos dos autores apresentados na 60.ª Conferência ICHRPJ - Comissão Internacional para a História dos Parlamentos e das Instituições Representativas, ocorrida em Lisboa e em Coimbra de 1 a 4 de Setembro de 2009, com o alto patrocínio da Assembleia da República e da Universidade de Coimbra. As sessões de abertura e encerramento são transcritas em português e em inglês e as comunicações na língua original.


Note by the publisher

This book contains the speeches and the texts presented by their authors in the 60th International Commission for the History of Representative and Parliamentary Institutions (ICHRPJ) which took place in Coimbra from the 1st to the 4th September 2009 under the high patronage of the Assembly of the Republic and the Coimbra University. The opening and closing sessions are transcribed in Portuguese and English. The presentations are written in the original language.

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THE WECKHERLIN PROJECT: CROWN,
PARLIAMENT AND COMPETITIVE
INTELLIGENCE



Competitive Intelligence seeks to provide a competitive edge, identify risks and opportunities and find new and profitable directions of travel for multi-national companies and government agencies.¹ In furtherance of these goals, Competitive Intelligence, both strategically and tactically, draws heavily on the imagery and aphorisms of warfare. Military strategists from Sun Tzu in 500 B.C. to Karl von Clausewitz in the nineteenth century are quoted approvingly to demonstrate that the expansion of business, like the extension of politics, requires the pursuit of war by other means. The leading French school for the promotion of Competitive Intelligence is the *École de Guerre Économique*. Competitive Intelligence is itself a product of the Cold War as operatives of the United States, Central Intelligence Agency carved out careers for themselves in the private sectors, usually in multi-national companies. War by other means could be ethical and legal, but as befitting the founders of Competitive Intelligence, not to the extent of compromising reasons of state or client confidentiality. From the perspective of its leading practitioners, Competitive Intelligence should be viewed as part of an organisation's risk management activity not its information services. For Competitive Intelligence achieves its distinctiveness by its research driven fieldwork. This fieldwork is validated through simulated warfare, notably by rational choice theory expressed through war gaming. However, there is a yawning void in such a Competitive Intelligence perspective. At no time have the methods, processes and fieldwork integral to Competitive Intelligence actually been tested and validated against historical intelligence gathering in the course of actual wars.

I

How valid is an actual historical perspective for the development of Competitive Intelligence? Any such perspective must offer readily accessible material that offers unique and challenging insights that will give added value as well as historical depth to Competitive Intelligence. The readily accessible material is found in the 15 volumes of largely untapped, archival sources that constitute the Georg Rudolph Weckherlin Papers, within the extensive Trumbull Collection in the British Library; a unique, cohesive and manageable set of papers for British intelligence gathering, processing and decision making in the mid-seventeenth century.² These operations ranged from Iberia to Scandinavia, but focused primarily on France, the Netherlands and Germany. The history of British intelligence in the mid-seventeenth century, within the context of the Thirty Years War in Europe and the civil wars within Scotland, England and Ireland required decision making, nationally and transnationally, under extremely competitive and stressful conditions. The historical perspective, in turn, gives added value to Competitive Intelligence's staged monitoring of competitors. Historical British intelligence no less than contemporaneous Competitive Intelligence required to collect and decode information; to convert this information into intelligence through the process of classification,

¹ U. Ganesh, C.E. Miree & J. Prescott, 'Competitive Intelligence Field Research: Moving the Field Forward by Setting a Research Agenda', *Journal of Competitive Intelligence and Management*, vol. 1, 2003, pp. 1-12.

² British Library [BL], Trumbull Collection, vols. CXXXV-CXCIX, Add. MSS 72, ff. 426-40.

integration and analysis; to communicate this intelligence to key decision makers; and to anticipate and counter any adverse competitor actions. But historical British intelligence not only interpreted, communicated and used processed information; it was also prepared to disseminate its collated intelligence selectively and with a public spin through newsletters and other printed copy to maintain competitive advantage in actual theatres of war. The project proposes to concentrate on two scientific samples of intelligence gathering by rival interests over successive periods of five years. In both periods, the competitors were involved in intelligence gathering for the business of governance. In the first period, from 1638 to 1642, Charles I was attempting to fend off revolution initially in Scotland, then in Ireland and England while attempting, on the one hand, to gain overseas support and on the other, to prevent the wholesale descent into civil war in all three kingdoms. That he failed in all aspects questions the competence of his intelligence gathering operations. In the second period, from 1643 to 1647, Scottish Covenanters and English Parliamentarians allied to defeat Charles I, sustained international diplomacy as well as their war effort through the Committee of Both Kingdoms and attempted to manage the press at home and abroad. In contrast to Charles I, the Committee of Both Kingdoms ran relatively successful intelligence gathering operations until their governance was sundered by internal rivalries, clashing priorities and differing weightings accorded to peace negotiations with Charles I and his allies, the Confederation of Irish Catholics.³

II

The 15 volumes of the Weckherlin Papers consist of over 3000 pages of documentation that relate to diplomatic correspondence, memorials, lists, diaries, polemics and cryptography. This unique archival material is written in various languages – predominantly Latin, French, English and German (high and low) supplemented by Italian, Spanish and Portuguese. That these papers have been largely unused, notwithstanding their established provenance, is primarily an indictment of the continuing insularity and introspection that afflicts British and especially English history. While the advent of "New British History" since the 1990s has led some English historians to take a more rounded picture of political developments within the British Isles, there is still a prevailing tendency to rely on official published sources when looking at diplomatic and international relations:⁴ the contemporary Competitive Intelligence equivalent would be to rely on Intelligence Technology rather than original fieldwork. Historical writing on intelligence gathering still tends to focus on internal state security in early modern Britain.⁵ Critical lacunae remain. There is little awareness about intelligence

³ A.I. Macinnes, *The British Revolution, 1629-1660*, Basingstoke, 2005; D. Scott, *Politics and War in the Three Stuart Kingdoms, 1637-1649*, Basingstoke, 2004; A. Woolrych, *Britain in Revolution, 1625-1660*, Oxford, 2002.

⁴ J. Scott, *England's Troubles: Seventeenth-century English Political Instability in a European Context* (Cambridge, 2000); D.L. Smith, *Constitutional Royalism and the Search for Settlement, c.1640-1649*, Cambridge, 1994.

⁵ A. Marshal, *Intelligence and Espionage in the Reign of Charles II, 1660-1685*, Cambridge, 1994.

gathering giving a competitive edge in international relations or that the most effective diplomacy involved informed risk taking.

However, a new generation of Scottish and, to a lesser extent, Irish historians have opened up diplomatic history in a more thorough and archivally competent manner. Outstanding work has been accomplished in several key areas – on Swedish and Dutch support for the Scottish Covenanters;⁶ on Spanish and papal backing for the Irish Confederates;⁷ on Scottish and British aid for the recovery of the German Palatinate during the Thirty Years War; and on the incapacity of Charles I to secure support from the Danes, the Spanish, the German Empire and the French.⁸ Nevertheless, the importance of France to all protagonists in the wars for the three kingdoms remains grossly underworked. The Weckherlin Papers offers an informed corrective to this position, both for the density of intelligence gathering from France in the 1640s and from the extensive intelligence networks built up by Weckherlin principally among French Huguenots and other Reformed Protestants in continental Europe. Thus, Weckherlin ensured that the Committee of Both Kingdoms between 1644 and 1646 was in receipt of regular reports from the French Court through their Parisian agent Rene Angier, a former courtier in Paris now reinstated as British resident.⁹

From the accession of Charles I in 1625, Weckherlin served first as Latin Secretary, then Secretary Interpreter for the German and French tongues. His particular responsibilities between 1638 and 1642 were to help Charles I wrestle with British engagement and non-engagement in the Thirty Years War and, simultaneously, to restrict the export of revolution from Scotland through the armed intervention of the Covenanters in Ireland and England. With the spread of civil war to England, Weckherlin sided with the Scottish Covenanters and English Parliamentarians. Employed as Secretary for Foreign Tongues by the Committee of Both Kingdoms, Weckherlin's particular responsibilities between 1643 and 1647 was to maximize diplomatic support for the Covenanters and Parliamentarians and, simultaneously, to minimize foreign intervention in support of the beleaguered Charles I. Once the extensive Weckherlin Papers are translated and transcribed prior to coding and analysis for interdisciplinary compatibility, they offer an unrivalled and original opportunity not just to fill up gaps in historical knowledge or process of governance between Crown and Parliament but to explore the historical roots of Competitive Intelligence. There are three reasons for this: Weckherlin not only built up an extensive network of agents in the service of Charles I, but he further cultivated and expanded his intelligence network while in the rival employ of the

Committee of Both Kingdoms; Weckherlin ran both intelligence and counter-intelligence operations, fleetingly between 1638 and 1642 but substantively between 1643 and 1647; as a former press censor for Charles I, Weckherlin was particularly adept at the black arts of propaganda once the advent of civil wars brought about the end of censorship and the emergence of newsletters and other vernacular sources to manage the news and spin current affairs.

III

The Scottish Covenanters played an important role in the establishment of the Committee of Both Kingdoms in 1644. The Committee of Both Kingdoms was the one British institution that arose out of the 1643 Solemn League and Covenant. The committee oversaw conduct of the civil war in England and Ireland and promoted international diplomacy on behalf of the Covenanters and Parliamentarians between February 1644 and October 1646. The Committee of Both Kingdoms had an extensive, if mutable, remit, keenly debated at its instigation; subject to periodic review as members and responsibilities were added; and the focus of rival antagonisms among the main players in the peace and war groupings in the English Parliament. For Gerolamo Agostini, the Venetian Secretary in England, the Committee of Both Kingdoms, as a council of state, was a Scottish initiative that qualified the English Parliament's control over domestic affairs and took the initiative in international relations. On the English side, the Committee of Both Kingdoms developed from the Committee of Safety formed in 1642. The Committee of Both Kingdoms was obliged to share direction of the war effort, initially with the Committee to Reform the Lord General Essex's Army, which dealt with the composition of regiments, and then with the Army Committee, which was primarily concerned with supply. Meeting the costs of the Covenanting armies in England and Ireland remained the responsibility of the Committee at Goldsmith's Hall for Scottish Affairs.¹⁰

The *British* roots of the Committee of Both Kingdoms, however, can be traced back to the commission for the Conservators of the Peace that had been established by the 1641 Treaty of London, which thereafter developed into the commission for negotiating the Solemn League and Covenant in Edinburgh on behalf of the English Parliament and the Scottish Estates. The English and Scottish commissioners were thereafter reconstituted as the Committee of Both Kingdoms.¹¹ Scottish members on the Committee of Both Kingdoms were in a minority, yet they enjoyed a disproportionate influence. Scottish numbers were raised from four to 11 in July 1644, after five more MPs were added prior to the Battle of Marston Moor.

⁶ A. Grosjean, *An Unofficial Alliance: Scotland and Sweden, 1569-1654*, Leiden, 2003; J.R. Young, 'The Scottish Parliament and European Diplomacy 1641-1647: The Palatinate, The Dutch Republic and Sweden' in S. Murdoch ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War, 1618-1648*, Leiden, 2001, pp.77-106.

⁷ T. Ó hAannrachán, 'Disrupted and disruptive: continental influence on the Confederate Catholics of Ireland' in A.I. Macinnes & J. Ohlmeyer eds, *The Stuart Kingdoms in the Seventeenth Century: Awkward Neighbours*, Dublin, 2002, pp. 135-50.

⁸ S. Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart, 1603-1660*, East Linton, 2000; D. Worthington, *Scots in Habsburg Service, 1618-1648*, Leiden, 2003.

⁹ BL, Turbull Papers, vol. CXCI, Add. MSS 72,434, ff. 21-178.

¹⁰ A.I. Macinnes, *The British Revolution 1629-1660*, Basingstoke, 2005, pp. 162, 272, footnote 20; A.I. Macinnes, 'The Scottish Moment, 1638-45', in J. Adamson (ed.), *The English Civil War*, Basingstoke, 2009, pp. 143-4; J. Adamson, 'The Triumph of Oligarchy: The Management of War and the Committee of Both Kingdoms, 1644-1645', in C.R. Kyle & J. Peacey (eds.), *Parliament at Work: Parliamentary Committees, Political Power and Public Access in Early Modern England*, Woodbridge, 2002, pp. 101-27.

¹¹ Macinnes, *British Revolution*, p. 162. For the Conservators of the Peace, see Young, 'The Scottish Parliament and European Diplomacy', pp. 81-4, and J.R. Young, *The Scottish Parliament 1639-1661: A Political and Constitutional Analysis*, Edinburgh, 1996, pp. 54-62.

Committee business was usually managed by Sir Archibald Johnston of Wariston, a leading committed and radical Covenanter closely aligned to the Marquis of Argyll. The committee was viewed within English parliamentary circles as an executive committee. Seven members of the House of Lords and 14 members of the House of Commons, together with the Scottish commissioners in London, constituted its original membership. Final decisions on the making of war and peace, however, were never ceded to the committee. Meeting at Derby House in London, the committee was empowered to negotiate with foreign states as well as serving as an official channel for dealings between the Covenanters and the Parliamentarians. However, to effectively carry out its diplomatic functions and oversee the war effort by land and sea against not only the Royalists in England but also the Catholic Confederation in Ireland, the committee would have needed to have operated as a federal executive.¹²

There was important liaison between the Scottish Committee of Estates and the British Committee of Both Kingdoms concerning the promotion of foreign policy. During the period of Covenanted parliamentary rule in Scotland, a system of parliamentary session and interval committees was in operation. Session committees sat during sessions of parliament, whereas interval committees sat between parliamentary sessions or between parliaments. The Committee of Estates was the most important parliamentary interval committee and it operated as a provisional government between parliamentary sessions and parliaments. A Committee of Estates was constitutionally created in the June 1640 parliamentary session (8th June), although it had its origins in a body known as the 'Tables'. The Tables had emerged in 1637-8 as the Covenanters' organisational structure in their struggle with Charles I. The most important 'table' was the fifth table or executive table, which constituted the leadership of the movement and it also directed Covenanted policy. In the 1640 parliamentary session, the Tables were essentially reconstituted as the Committee of Estates. The Committee of Estates was originally perceived to be a temporary expedient, but it developed into a permanent feature of Scottish parliamentary life and the Covenanted administration of Scotland. The committee had a basic two-tier structure based on an Edinburgh section and an army section (to accompany the Covenanted army in England), but this sectional structure was expanded in the mid-1640s to consist of an Edinburgh section, three separate sections to accompany Covenanted armed forces in Scotland, England and Ireland, and a diplomatic section for negotiations with the English Parliament in London. Membership of the Committee of Estates was not restricted to members of Parliament and the size of the committee over the period was flexible. The different sections were to liaise with each other and the committee also played an important role in co-ordinating links between Edinburgh and the Scottish localities. In particular, it played an important co-ordinating role with the shire committees of war which raised troops for the Covenanted armies.¹³

¹² MacInnes, *British Revolution*, p. 162; Young, 'The Scottish Parliament and European Diplomacy', pp. 86-7.

¹³ J.R. Young, 'The Scottish Parliament and the War for the Three Kingdoms, 1639-1651', *Parliaments, Estates and Representation*, 21, (2001), pp. 108-9.

The Committee of Estates, as noted above, played an important role in Covenanted diplomacy and foreign policy. The 1640 Committee of Estates was involved in abortive negotiations with the Dutch and English parliamentarians for the creation of a tripartite political confederation.¹⁴ In the aftermath of Covenanted intervention in the English Civil War on the side of the English Parliament and the 1643 Solemn League and Covenant as a British confessional confederation, the 1644 Committee of Estates was at the forefront of negotiations with the Dutch and the Swedes to extend the British Solemn League and Covenant into a wider European Protestant defence league. On 10th May 1644, several weeks before the meeting of the First Triennial Parliament on 4th June 1644 according to the terms of the 1640 Triennial Act, the Edinburgh section of the Committee of Estates sanctioned a diplomatic mission to the United Provinces of the Dutch Republic. Thomas Cunningham, resident at the Scottish staple at Campvere, was appointed Commissioner and Ordinary Agent and he was issued with a set of ten instructions. These focused on the securing of arms and raising finance, securing aid for the distressed British in Ireland, and cementing closer religious links with Dutch Protestants.¹⁵ The religious component can be clearly identified in the instructions that were given to Cunningham. The Committee of Estates expressed the hope that the Dutch would 'not only joyne with the kingdoms of Scotland, England and Ireland in this Solemne League and Covenant for opposing poperie and prelacie and and establishing the true religion, but also invite all other Christian princes to doe the lyke'. Cunningham later gave a speech to the Estates of Holland and Westfriesland in which he stated that these estates should consider 'if in this conjuncture of tyme it were not as fitt and necessary as beneficiall and expedient for all Protestant Potentates and Republicques to enter or joyne in the same or suchlike Solemne Covenant with the kingdoms of Great Brittain, and so go on unanimously against the commone enemy'.¹⁶

Closer diplomatic contacts with the Swedes were also taking place both before, during and after the 1644 Parliament. The 1644 Scottish Parliament dealt with proposals for a British confederation with Sweden. Hugh Mowatt, a Scotsman in the service of Queen Kristina of Sweden as a Swedish representative in the United Provinces, was dispatched to the British Isles to secure a confederal alliance and levy 2000-3000 Scots for Swedish military action against Denmark-Norway. Mowatt was in Edinburgh by the time that the 1644 Parliament opened on 4th June.¹⁷ Robert Baillie, a noted Covenanted minister of the Church of Scotland, noted that 'The Swedds has sent agents for a strict league with us'.¹⁸ By 25th June the Scottish Parliament had established a session committee to consider the Swedish proposals. This provides a useful reminder that Parliament also established session committees to consider European

¹⁴ Young, *The Scottish Parliament*, pp. 28-9; Edinburgh University Library, 'Transactions of the Committee of Estates of Scotland, August 1640-June 1641', Dc. 4. 46, f. 93.

¹⁵ Young, 'The Scottish Parliament and European Diplomacy', pp. 87-92; E.J. Courthope (ed.), *The Journal of Thomas Cunningham of Campvere, 1640-1654*, Scottish History Society, third series, vol. XI, Edinburgh, 1928, pp. 82-7.

¹⁶ *The Journal of Thomas Cunningham of Campvere*, pp. 86-7, 109.

¹⁷ Young, 'The Scottish Parliament and European Diplomacy', pp. 93-6.

¹⁸ R. Baillie, *Letters and Journals, 1637-1662*, D. Laing (ed.), 3 vols., Edinburgh, 1841-2, vol. II, p. 191.

diplomatic and foreign policy issues, such as session committees that were in operation in August and November 1641 respectively to consider Charles I's manifesto for the restitution of the Palatinate (August) and then the provision of 10 000 troops to be sent to Germany (November). Mowatt's instructions of 1644 envisaged a mediatory role for the Scottish Parliament in both Swedish-Danish relations and Anglo-Scottish relations.¹⁹ Hence Queen Kristina was keen that 'the staites of Scotland wold be mediators betuix her, England, and moue them to accept of her and her realms to enter in that mutuall league with Britane for defence of religion'.²⁰ The Scottish members of the Committee of Both Kingdoms played an important role in the Swedish negotiations and a key link here was Sir Archibald Johnston of Wariston.²¹

Covenanting diplomatic links with France have remained relatively unexplored, however, and as noted above the French connection is particularly noticeable in the Weckherlin correspondence. Indeed, the importance of France to all protagonists in the wars for the three kingdoms remains grossly underworked. Therefore this project will not only conduct further original research into the French connection concerning the Covenanters in general, but also the relationship between the Covenanters, the Committee of Both Kingdoms and France in international diplomacy in particular. The existing historiography concerning Covenanting links with France has focused on the following areas. The first area relates to Covenanting international diplomacy with the emergence of the Covenanting movement and its desire for legitimate recognition from other European powers in its struggle with Charles I. The Covenanters had established their own Dutch press outlets by 1639, when they rather than the court of Charles I, were the first to receive embassies openly from Sweden and Denmark as well as covertly from France.²² Abbé Chambre alias Thomas Chambers, a Scottish Jesuit, first made contact with the leadership of the disaffected Scots in the autumn of 1637 under the guise of boosting recruitment for the Scottish regiment in French service since 1633. Rewarded by becoming almoner to Cardinal François de Richelieu, Chambers returned to Scotland to report on Covenanting affairs prior to the Bishops' Wars of 1639-40. Despite his religious affiliations, the Covenanters expediently used him as their chief contact with Richelieu. By 1640, Chambre was the unofficial Scottish envoy to the French Court.²³ Yet there is no evidence from the Scottish side to link such covert contacts with the official French embassy to the Court of Charles I. Louis XIII in September 1638 had despatched to London M. de Bellièvre, who took Jean de Montereul with him as his secretary. Montereul continued in England until June

1641.²⁴ Neither de Bellièvre nor Montereul seem to have been associated with a letter drafted by the Covenanting leadership, but never delivered to the French Court in 1639. Charles I revealed the existence of this letter two days before the opening of the Short Parliament in April 1640. This parliament in London earned its soubriquet from its prompt dismissal after failing to vote funds for the king to oppose the Covenanters on the renewal of the Bishops' Wars. The letter to the French Court had justified recourse to arms by the Covenanting Movement and upheld free constitutional assemblies to prevent Scotland becoming 'a conquered province, as Ireland, under subjection to England'. There was no intent to renounce the Stuarts and the Covenanters were not seeking to renew their allegiance to France – an option exercised by the Catalans at the outset of 1641 after their revolt against the Spanish monarchy. Nevertheless, the letter allowed Charles to taunt the commissioners sent from Scotland to negotiate with him whether they had come 'as ambassadors or as subjects'. The Scottish commissioners were then detained and their leader, John Campbell, Lord (later Earl) of Loudoun, a signatory to the draft, was incarcerated in the Tower of London for two months.²⁵

The second identifiable area of Covenanting links with France is with the Covenanting British agenda with the Solemn League and Covenant of 1643. As with the Bishops' Wars, the Covenanting leadership was intent on securing covert support from France, the foremost European power in the continuing fight against the Spanish and French Habsburgs. As early as January 1643, William Kerr, third earl of Lothian, had been despatched to France to reinvigorate the reciprocal civic, military and commercial privileges of the 'auld alliance'; but also to sound out the prospects of French backing for Charles I and the Catholic Confederates of Ireland. In the course of this mission Louis XIII died and the task of governing France on behalf of his infant son Louis XIV passed to a regency government headed by the Queen Mother, Anne of Austria, but dominated by Cardinal Jules Mazarin as first minister. During the nine months that Lothian remained in France, he ingratiated himself at the French Court by facilitating recruitment of Scottish troops to bolster the French presence in Germany and Italy. Diplomatic ties from the Bishops' Wars were also revitalised by Lothian's contact with Abbé Chambre, almoner to the late Cardinal Richelieu, who set up a correspondence between the Queen Mother and Argyll. Lothian's main achievement was that he seemingly convinced Mazarin not to give assistance to Charles I on the grounds that the combined forces of Scottish Covenanters and English Parliamentarians would be too strong for the Royalists and the

¹⁹ *Idem*, pp. 78-81, 94-100.

²⁰ Sir J. Balfour, *Historical Works*, J. Haig (ed.), 4 vols., Edinburgh, 1824-5, vol. II, p. 210.

²¹ Young, 'The Scottish Parliament and European Diplomacy', pp. 93-5, 103-4.

²² A. J. Mann, *The Scottish Book Trade, 1500-1720: print, commerce and print control in early modern Scotland*, East Linton, 2000, pp. 83-4; S. Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart, 1603-1660*, East Linton, 2000, pp. 90-116; Rigsarkivet Copenhagen [RC], TKUA, A II, no. 14, Akter og Dokumenter nedr. Det politiske Forhold til England, 'korfit Ulfelds or Gregers Krabbes Sendelse til England, 1640'.

²³ D. Stevenson, *The Scottish Revolution 1637-44: The Triumph of the Covenanters*, Newton Abbot, 1973, pp. 184-7; Sir William Sanderson, *A Compleat History of the Life and Raigne of King Charles I*, London, 1958, pp. 208, 286-7, 293.

²⁴ *The Diplomatic Correspondence of Jean de Montereul and the Brothers De Bellièvre, French Ambassadors in England and Scotland, 1645-48*, J.G. Fotheringham (ed.), 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1898-99, vol. I, p. xvii.

²⁵ National Library of Scotland [NLS], Wodrow MSS, folio lxiv, fo. 82; Huntington Library, California [HL], Bridgewater & Ellesmere MSS, EL 7811, 7819-21, 7823-30, 7837; Argyll & Bute District Archives [ABDA], Argyll Papers, 40.534; J. Gordon, *History of Scots Affairs, 1637-41*, J. Roberston & G. Grub (eds.), 3 vols., Aberdeen, 1841, vol. III, pp. 7-9, 32-6, 125, 133-46, 148-53; G. Burnet, *The Memoirs of the Lives and Actions of James and William, Dukes of Hamilton and Castleherald*, London, 1838, pp. 162, 168-73.

Catholic Confederates in Ireland, with or without French reinforcements.²⁶

During his time in France, Lothian had informed Charles I of his diplomatic activities through his Secretary of State, William Hamilton, first Earl of Lanark (and brother of the Marquess of Hamilton, the king's leading adviser on Scottish affairs). On his return in October, Lothian made a courtesy visit to the king at Oxford where he was promptly arrested and incarcerated in Bristol Castle for six months. Ostensibly, he was imprisoned following reports that he was to serve as lieutenant-colonel in the Covenanting army of intervention in the English Civil War. Lothian's close confinement also served to deny the Covenanting leadership accurate information about the situation at the French Court while an envoy, a certain Monsieur de Boisivon, was despatched to Scotland at the behest of Charles I. He was accredited not by Mazarin or the Queen Mother, but by the king's uncle, Gaston, Duc d'Orléans. The king's action against Lothian was also indicative of a renewed Royalist militancy in the wake of the Solemn League and Covenant. When Hamilton, who had refused to sign the Solemn League and Covenant, arrived in December to report on the Scottish situation, he was denounced and thrown into prison. His brother Lanark was dismissed as Secretary of State.²⁷

The French envoy turned out to be a rather quixotic, self-serving diplomat with a penchant for exaggeration and distortion that wholly undermined his credibility in France as well as Scotland. He claimed that Lothian had really been sent to France to treat with the Huguenots. The only evidence of Lothian being engaged outwith his official remit was when he used his stay to boost his library, furnishings and art collection. Argyll was correctly identified by de Boisivon as the controlling influence in Scotland. His alleged absolutism (*Le Marquis d'Argueil est icy absolu*) was pursued without any semblance of knowledge about foreign affairs which were left to the messianic inclinations of Alexander Leslie, first Earl of Leven, who pressed for a Protestant crusade that would soon extend from England to France and on to Rome to vanquish the Anti-Christ. These claims had the same ring of authenticity as the purported attempts of the Covenanting leadership to have him assassinated; claims belatedly made after he had retired from Edinburgh, heavily indebted from gambling throughout his November stay, to pursue hunting and other leisurely pursuits around Manchester.²⁸ His protracted posturing enabled the Covenanting leadership to spin reports on current affairs in order to heighten the sense of anticipation in England about the arrival of the Covenanting army, once adequately funded, to implement the Solemn League and Covenant.

The Scottish Commissioners serving on the Committee of Both Kingdoms retained international influence in two key areas –

²⁶ *Correspondence of Sir Robert Kerr, First Earl of Ancrum and his son William, Third Earl of Lothian*, D. Laing (ed.), 2 vols, Edinburgh, 1875, vol. I, pp. 142-3, 147-9; National Archives of Scotland [NAS], Clerk of Penicuik Papers, GD 18/2429-30/2432, /2434 & Lothian MSS, GD 40/2/2/11; BL Trumbull Papers, vol. CXCIII, Add.MSS 72, 434 ff. 1-2, 5-8.

²⁷ *Correspondence of Ancrum & Lothian*, vol. I, pp. 146-7, 152-9, 162-70; NAS, Lothian MSS, GD 40/12/5; D. Scott, *Politics and War in the Three Stuart Kingdoms, 1637-1649*, Basingstoke, 2004, pp. 61, 80.

²⁸ *Montreuil Correspondence*, vol. II, pp. 539-63; NAS Clerk of Penicuik Papers, GD 18/2424, /2426, /2440, /2444 & Lothian MSS, GD 40/2/2/13.

the Palatinate and France. In 1642 Lothian had persuaded Elector Louis Frederick not to become embroiled in the Royalist cause. Instead he should place his hopes on regaining the Palatinate through the joint efforts of the Covenanters and Parliamentarians. Lothian, in turn, was receptive to overtures from the Elector in 1643 to lobby on behalf at the French Court. The Elector in the course of 1644 and again in 1645 pushed the Scots on the Committee for assistance in the recovery of the Palatinate, even stating on the former occasion that he would come to London to lobby in person. But he had to be content with a statement, endorsed by Johnston of Wariston on behalf of the Scots, that his restoration would be a British priority once issues of war and peace were resolved with Charles I. The Scottish commissioners in London as well as the Covenanting leadership in Edinburgh were also intent on maintaining their own distinctive as well as joint British links to France following the failure of tripartite peace negotiations with the king at Uxbridge in February 1645.²⁹

The period from 1638-45 has recently been described as the 'Scottish Moment', which marked a British programme of confessional confederation (literally a Solemn League and Covenant) to establish a godly monarchy in association with godly commonwealths in all three Stuart kingdoms.³⁰ These seven years represented the only occasion in which a Scottish-led agenda prevailed in the British Isles during the early modern period. Scottish Covenanting influence declined, but was certainly not extinguished in the period covered by Weckherlin to c. 1647. The Montrose rebellion against Covenanting rule in Scotland in 1644-5, with a series of military defeats inflicted on Covenanting armies before the rebellion was finally suppressed, weakened the Covenanters' military reputation. The growing importance of Oliver Cromwell and the New Model Army in the English Civil War, the rise of Independency as a political force and increased Scotophobia also tended to weaken the Covenanting position. It also became increasingly clear that the settlement of Ireland was to be an English affair and Covenanting influence in Ireland was to be curtailed, despite the large numbers of Scots in the north of Ireland. The centrality of Ireland to British revolutionary politics was reflected in the Committee for Irish Affairs, hitherto a sub-committee, taking over from the Committee of Both Kingdoms at Derby House in 1646. The decision of the Covenanting leadership to withdraw the Covenanting army from England in return for payment of arrears of pay and to leave Charles I under the sole jurisdiction of the English Parliament at the end of the First Civil War in England in 1646 led to a political backlash in Scotland. The Engagement invasion of England in 1648 to defend the king was a military disaster and a resulting coup d'état in Scotland in the autumn of 1648 led to the formation of a radical Covenanting regime, initially backed by Oliver Cromwell. The desire of this regime to have a Covenanted monarchy over all three kingdoms and its eventual coronation of Charles II in 1651 as a Covenanted king ultimately led to the Cromwellian invasion and conquest of Scotland in 1651. The British confessional confederation of 1643 was supplanted by the Britannic Engagement of 1647-8

²⁹ *Correspondence of Ancrum & Lothian*, vol. II, p. 491; BL, Trumbull Papers, vol. CXCIV, Add. MSS 72, 435 ff. 27-8 & vol. CXCVI, Add. MSS 72, 437 ff. 17-18, 20-9, 54-5, 84, 86-8 & vol. CXCVIII, Add. MSS 72, 439, f. 87.

³⁰ Macinnes, 'The Scottish Moment, 1638-45', pp. 125-152, 126.

that dropped confederation in favour of an incorporating union; such a union did exist from 1654, but it was one based on conquest and it was hastily abandoned with the restoration of the Stuart monarchy in 1660 and the return to the 1603 Anglo-Scottish dynastic union.

Conclusion

International diplomacy has emerged as one of the most dynamic and vibrant areas of the recent historiography of the Covenanting movement. Important linkages have been and can be further made between Covenanting participation in the war for the three kingdoms and the conduct of diplomacy in British and European terms (with both being fundamentally interlinked). The Committee of Both Kingdoms was a critical body for this form of diplomacy, albeit the Scottish Committee of Estates also played an important role. The international importance of Scottish participation on the emphatically British Committee of Both Kingdoms is an understated feature of the historiography of the wars for the three kingdoms. The Weckherlin papers constitute an excellent resource for pursuing these developments further, especially Covenanting diplomatic links with France within a wider British context. The French connection to the war for the three kingdoms needs to be rehabilitated and re-evaluated. The application of Competitive Intelligence theories and models, with appropriate information technology, provides an innovative opportunity for the study of diplomatic history in the context of the Committee of Both Kingdoms. Furthermore, this important historical case study offers an opportunity for the discipline of history to make a meaningful contribution to the 21st century study of Competitive Intelligence.