

DOCK WORKERS, LABOUR CIRCULATION, AND CLASS STRUGGLES IN DURBAN, 1940-1959

by

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Introduction

While there has been a comparatively large literature on African migrants circulating between wage labour and agricultural production in the reserves, virtually nothing has been written on the state of consciousness of these workers and the struggles in which they have engaged. Liberal social scientists, in defence of the rights of African workers to live in urban areas, have conceived of migrant workers as institutionalized undercutters of wages, and others who have written on the class struggles of workers in South Africa consider that repression and labour circulation have seriously retarded the consciousness of migrant workers. Simons considers that migrant labour is developed by the state as a defence against the emerging African proletariat.

The perpetual rotation of Africans under intensive police surveillance has had a crippling effect on African labour and political organization. The fear of being 'endorsed out' of towns has been a major deterrent to mass action against apartheid. Labour migration accordingly delays the process of consolidating Africans into a class-conscious proletariat. (1)

Simons would perhaps argue that migrant workers were capable of national consciousness, but that, of necessity, they would not be the class-conscious section of the working class as they are emasculated through the institutionalization of labour circulation.

In this paper I wish to focus on a period of class struggles during which time a comparatively "free" form of labour (migrant workers paid on a daily basis in the Durban docks) was transformed into contract labour under a strict labour regime. This took place at a time of intense conflict in Durban, in which the issues of stabilization of the African labour force, employer-state responses to strike action, and specifically the formation of an employers' organization to control labour supply in the docks, were discussed and action taken to limit resistance to existing structures of labour control. In examining these developments I wish to concentrate attention on the struggles of the daily paid (togt) dock workers (both stevedoring and railway workers), who were the most volatile and class-conscious element within the working class in Durban.

The struggles of the dock workers had a significant effect on the development of administrative measures to deal with labour leadership, on the arguments on how to reconcile a smooth-flowing labour supply with tightened influx control, and on the

intra-working class relationships between Indian and African workers. The process of wage determination was initiated for the large mass of unskilled workers in Durban, controls were introduced to contain the flood of workers from the reserves, influx control was implemented for the first time ("endorsing out" became a permanent feature of urban administration), and new relationships between Indian and African political and industrial organizations were born in the aftermath of the riots of January 1949. In Durban, the base was laid for the mass organization of industrial workers which developed in the 1950s with the growth of SACTU (South African Congress of Trade Unions), a phenomenon which placed the Durban area as a leading centre of militant trade unionism and sustained strike action.

The dock workers were a significant, although proportionally small, section of the total African labour force by the late 1930s. As has been described in a number of surveys, the African workers in Durban were concentrated in the tertiary sector (a high proportion of domestic servants, transport and commercial workers), with a growing proportion of workers in industry and construction. (2) The dock workers made up 43 per cent of the section of transport workers; 22 per cent of railway workers and 21 per cent of stevedoring workers. (3) The most profound characteristic of the African labour market in Durban was the extent of labour circulation as evidenced by a preponderance of the working age group (15-60) out of the total African population, and an extraordinarily high masculinity ratio. (4) This notable feature of the African labour force in Durban (possibly similar to features of coastal towns in the Cape) was a result of the emphasis placed before the Second World War on retarding urbanization by a variety of measures controlling land occupation in urban and peri-urban areas and through a state policy reinforcing the role of the reserves in reproducing this particular form of labour. Wolpe has argued (5) that, because the means of subsistence and the reproduction of labour power have been met from subsistence agriculture, the value of labour power of African workers has been reduced.

When the migrant-labourer has access to means of subsistence, outside the capitalist sector, as he does in South Africa, then the relationship between wages and the cost of the production and reproduction of labour-power is changed. That is to say, capital is able to pay the worker below the cost of his reproduction. (6)

This argument applies with particular force to Durban, where the reserves are particularly accessible and where economically active males can be more successfully separated from the household economy, and where, historically, wages have been low even in comparison with lesser developed areas such as Port Elizabeth. Through the encouragement of labour circulation on a large scale by a variety of factors, employers were able to pay a wage which did not provide for the entire needs of an adult man and the cost of raising his family. In 1939/40 the Native Affairs Commission estimated that the migrant worker had, in addition to his wages, a "reserve subsidy" of approximately £30 per annum. (7) Despite the struggles of African workers and their organizations, such as the Industrial and Commercial Union, which had a powerful branch in Durban, during 1920-1938, the most common wage of African workers in Durban was 18s a week - 58 per cent of wages being between 15s and 20s a week. (8)

Dock Workers and Wage Struggles during the War

The dock workers of Durban had a long history of resistance to the general level of wages in the area and their specific conditions of employment. In a broader context they had led the struggles against the imposition of taxes on African labour and the institution of a municipal monopoly in beer brewing. In 1940 the dock workers were a group of approximately 3,000 workers employed by the day by four major stevedoring companies and the South African Railways and Harbour. The dock workers were employed on average 3-4 days a week because of fluctuations in shipping but also because the employers wished to maintain a supply of labour at a level equal to that of the maximum demand which could be made under peak conditions. As in all ports which

have not undergone decasualization, it was in each company's interest to maintain a reserve supply of labour over daily average requirements. This reserve also served the purpose of encouraging competition among workers for the vacancies every day, which, according to classical economic theory, is the means by which wages "reach their level". Behind this reserve stood the relative surplus population of the "reserves" available to replace workers who "struck" for higher wages at the docks, i.e. refused en masse to sign on for the day.

Accommodation for the dock workers (an issue decided in the 1870s) was in barracks constructed by the municipality and some private employers. These barracks were constructed so the greatest number of people possible could live in them. According to an African resident writing to a radical journal in April 1940:

there are narrow, dark, winding stairs, that lead to the room occupying the floor above, and the air is foul ... for 3d a man is given what passes for a bed ... this consists of the frame of a bed with a wooden board in place of the spring ... the men must provide their own blankets ... the rooms are terribly stuffy, the windows being situated so high that it would be a job to open them ... the 'comfort' and 'rest' to be got from sleeping on a wooden board in a room where a harsh light burns throughout the night must be experienced to be appreciated. (9)

Barrack accommodation such as this was condemned by the Smit Commission, which reported that the Bell Street compound (the primary accommodation for togt workers) was 'over-crowded, dirty, and quite unfit for the purpose for which it was being used'. (10) Apart from some extension of the premises, no improvements were made.

The dock workers, who referred to themselves as *inyati* (buffalo, i.e. strong men), had a relatively advanced consciousness as they saw themselves "instrumental" (i.e. the essential means of production) in the labour process in the docks; their labour was central to all work operations in landing and shipping cargo. Their position could be contrasted with those of labourers in industry who performed "service" roles, e.g. sweepers and carriers in garment, leather, footwear, and furniture industries, and with the large number of domestic servants who were atomized among a large number of employers. Even in those industries where African workers were advancing into operative positions, such as the metal industry, their position was not strategic in the labour process, owing to the relatively low level of skill involved in their work and the tight pattern of skilled/operative/labourer relationships.

The dock workers were the only group of workers in Durban who provided leadership from among their own ranks, without relying on an "educated" leadership, during the upsurge in organization in the Second World War. (There was a South African Railways and Harbour Union organized by Philemon Tsele, which operated on a national basis, but the dock workers employed by the railways in Durban owed their allegiance to the togt element in the harbour labour force rather than to weekly employed workers employed by the railways.) Some time in 1939 more than 1,000 togt workers elected Zulu Phungula as their leader. Phungula was a migrant worker from the Ixopo district in Natal and a fiery populist leader who would be a key figure in the struggles of the dock workers. (11) His style of leadership was clearly distinguishable from that of the urbanized intelligentsia who led the African trade unions in Durban during the war years.

The process of wage investigation and determination by the Wage Board set in motion by the wage demands of African workers in 1937 in Durban considerably heightened the consciousness of dock workers and led to a militant outburst of strike activity. Following its investigation, the Wage Board published a wage determination for unskilled labour on 27 September 1940 which benefited 11,410 out of a total of 15,528 workers (73 per cent) from a minimum wage of 20s a week and 4s a day. (12) The togt workers who were already earning 4s a day did not benefit at all even though

their skills were acknowledged, and the mass of unskilled labourers in Durban were brought up to their level. Although their position relative to the average unskilled labourer's wage had deteriorated, the dock workers were experiencing a fairly high level of employment because of stimulated war production. In the year 1939/40 the harbour tonnage (1 harbour ton equals 2,000 lbs) landed at Durban exceeded 2 million tons for only the third time in the history of the port, and the total tonnage handled increased by 493,911 tons over the previous twelve month period. (13) Eight months after the wage determination came into operation, during May 1941, four spokesmen for the dock workers submitted demands for 8s a day to the Commissioner of Native Affairs in Durban. A counter offer was made but not accepted by the workers. (14)

Probably stimulated by two other strikes among African workers in July, the stevedoring workers came out on strike on 17 August 1941. The strike began initially at the Bell Street togt barracks, but soon spread throughout all barracks housing dock workers. The workers demanded 8s per day and 10s for working on Sundays. (15) A meeting of municipal officials, employers, and the police was held on the same day; the stevedoring employers argued that they did not object to any increase (the costs would simply be transferred to the shipping companies they served), but that the change in wages would have to be imposed by government regulation because of long-term contractual obligations in the stevedoring trade. A specific wage investigation by the Wage Board of the stevedoring trade was rejected as too cumbersome and time consuming, and it was decided to call in Ivan Walker (later joint author of 2000 Casualties, a popular history of trade unions in South Africa, which does not mention the heroic struggles of the Durban dock workers), the Controller of Manpower, to ratify wage increases by proclaiming emergency regulations.

Since a strike in harbour affected the strategic shipping situation, Walker was rushed down from Pretoria and discussed the wage issue with two representatives of the dock workers: Zulu Phungula and Willie Kumalo. He chaired a meeting of employers and authorities (16) the day after the strike had begun and brought about agreement on a wage of 4s 6d a day, a cost of living allowance of not less than 6d per day, and special rates for overtime. The workers' representatives did not agree to these proposals as they were "not at the notch" which they would have liked, but it was agreed to go back to work. Despite this offer (17), the dock workers had not accepted that the wage issue was closed. In particular, the position of the railway workers had not been clarified and this was to prove a source of dissatisfaction in the future.

Wage agitation among dock workers continued and, fearing further strike action after a round of strikes by other African workers towards the end of 1941, the railway system manager called together a meeting of railway officials and representatives of togt workers on 11 March 1942. Phungula argued that the stevedoring employers had offered to pay any wage laid down by the government and had agreed to pay 8s per day, but now the workers had been cheated out of their increase. He attempted to drive a wedge between the state officials and the employers: "it would seem that the government is refusing to give us 8s per day, because our employers have already agreed that we should get the 8s." (18) He said the workers had concluded that the government was withholding the wage increases. Workers had to pay for accommodation, dipping of cattle and taxation, and were now also being asked to contribute towards the Paramount Chief's War Fund, he argued. In putting forward the wage demands of the dock workers, Phungula was conceiving of a wage which would enable workers and their families to live under urban conditions, arguing the case for increased wages for productive workers as opposed to white clerical workers, challenging the average going wage for black workers, and implicitly rejecting "scientific" notions such as the poverty datum line as a standard for wage increases.

We have been taught by the Europeans what to eat and we like to eat the same things as the European, for instance eggs and tea in the mornings, we would like to fly in aeroplanes and drive round in motor cars. The shops are full of clothes and motor cars, but we cannot buy these things because we have no money ... We do not want 8s a day, we want 25s a day [the wage of white clerks employed by the stevedoring companies]. Even if we get 8s a day we will not be satisfied. If we had not agreed with our

masters for 8s we would not have asked for that today ... the government only gives us an empty dish to lick. (19)

Walker denied outright that it had ever been agreed to pay 8s, and said there must have been some misunderstanding between workers and the stevedoring employers. The authorities had an interest in denying this increase (which was the existing wage level in Cape Town docks) as it would have changed the cost structure of transport considerably and threatened the whole structure of wages in Durban. Walker debated the issue for a while and then issued an ultimatum: if the workers did not wish to work for less than 8s they could "go home" and other workers would be recruited. Phungula rejected these alternatives and countered the threat by telling the officials: "the government must show us where to go because our homes are here in Durban." Walker's ultimatum showed a new level of resolution by the authorities to deal decisively with the particular conditions of class struggle in Durban and to maintain the overall level of labour circulation in the Durban labour market by blocking the "right" to urban life through increased wages. If necessary, the authorities were prepared to make use of the reserve supply of dock labour and, if this failed, to draw upon the surplus population in the rural areas.

Despite the stevedoring trade having been declared a "controlled industry" in terms of the emergency regulations of 1941 and the ultimatum of the authorities, a further strike broke out on 28 July 1942. The war government was placed in a quandary by this latest strike as it did not want to disrupt shipping even further by punitive counter action. The Department of Labour feared that the use of the military in the harbour to break the strike would retard recruitment in the trade when industrial peace returned, and forbade the Native Commissioner to introduce scab labour. At the same time there was strong pressure for the authorities to come to terms with the strikers because of the strategic implications of a major port being disrupted when the movement of war material was essential.

The strike came under the control of Phungula and ten committee members. Two days after the strike had begun he was arrested and brought out of prison the following day on condition that he urge the workers to return to work. But, when he was brought before the strikers by the police, in a speech incorporating elements of national and class consciousness he told them to carry on the strike. The article which appeared in Inkululeko, written by Wilson Cele (a journalist/trade unionist of the Communist Party), gives a vivid account of the oratory and colour of the event.

When Phungula got out of the car with the police, he greeted the people in the style of Shaka. He then started to address the public: 'The Dutch people have seen that General Botha had fought for them and today they say that the Natives are good; we better fight and die for what we want until we get it. I do not know what will be the outcome of it as they have now even taken our country. Look, we now dig gold for them, diamonds for them, and all they do is to sit on the chairs which can even reach heaven. What makes them not to give us enough money to feed our children?

The Europeans said: 'Well, go to work.' The strikers said 'We won't go', and some of the strikers started speaking to the public. When the white people found out that the strikers were not prepared to go to work, they asked Phungula to tell them that if they went to work he would be released. One of the committee members then asked the white people if they thought that it was Phungula's strike, and told them that all the strikers were after was money. After the meeting, Mr Phungula told the public that he was prepared to go to jail and that the strike should continue. (20)

The uncompromising militancy of Phungula, the inability of the state to co-opt him despite considerable pressure, his radical style and imagery, all reflected the type of leadership produced by the dock workers.

The strategy of using Phungula as a hostage having failed, Walker finally promulgated War Measure 86 on 31 July 1942, which gave the police the authority to expel any togt worker from the municipal area if he refused to work at the prescribed wage. Any labourer refusing to work under these conditions could be fined up to £25 (equivalent to about 100 days' work for togt labourers) or imprisoned for six months, or be liable to both fine and imprisonment. The state used this extreme measure to break up the strike, as the togt workers' demands posed a challenge to the whole position of unskilled wages in Durban. As it was, strike action gained momentum among African workers in industries employing migrant workers in Durban and its hinterland: brick and tile, plaster boards, quarrying, and sugar. A fundamental problem faced by the authorities was the loose form of control over employment at the docks: the togt system regulated only the relationship between workers and their employers during their working hours, and if the labourers decided not to work on a particular day there was not much that could be done in terms of the law that could force them to return to work, apart from expulsion from the urban area. Contract labour would have made the workers liable to prosecution for breach of contract in terms of the service contract but was not considered as appropriate to the labour process in the docks at that stage.

The introduction of scab labour and the threat of expulsion broke the spirit of the strikers, who soon returned to work, and Phungula was brought to court a few days later. A new pattern for dealing with workers' struggles in Durban was brought into operation by the threat and enforcement of expulsion, a pattern which became a standard formula for the repression of strikes in the harbour area. Negotiations would be refused and the whole labour force expelled from the municipal area if necessary, i.e. the regular workers would be replaced by reserve dock workers and migrant labour from the surplus population of the rural areas.

Despite the show of strength of the state, Zulu Phungula's position as leader of the dock workers was not endangered. (21) The local Department of Labour encouraged him to form a trade union which could be given some form of official recognition. In September 1942 the secretary of the Durban Stevedoring Union, Abel M. S. Mhlongo, wrote to the local Divisional Inspector requesting this recognition in respectful terms. "It is hoped that from henceforth grievances will be settled on constitutional lines, also that power tactics will be on both sides avoided." (22) At about this time a meeting was held between Phungula and Veldtman, Chairman of the Cape Town Stevedores' and Dock Workers' Union, at which the veteran labour leader A. W. G. Champion was present; this meeting was probably arranged by the Department of Labour. Veldtman subsequently wrote to the South African police in Durban that peaceful negotiations would be used by togt workers and that there would be no more retarding of the war effort. (23) By adopting more conventional forms of labour organization, Phungula had by no means moderated his position, and a subsequent letter by Phungula and Mhlongo to the Controller of Industrial Manpower in Pretoria made further demands of the order of 25s per day and more. (24) In the negotiations which followed, concessions were made to both stevedoring and railway togt workers. (25) Phungula was told that any further strike action would lead to the immediate replacement of the workers, and against this background he accepted the concessions on the terms offered, i.e. a wage freeze binding for two years. On this basis the state secured industrial peace in the harbour for the war period.

Trade Unions and Defeated Militancy

Having secured its position in the harbour, the state was able to deal firmly with strike action in other industries in Durban, particularly with those strikes involving joint action between African and Indian workers, of which there were a number in late 1942 in the paper, laundry, and textile industries. (26) As a result of inter-racial co-operation initiated and sustained by the Communist Party in Durban, a number of parallel and independent African trade unions had been formed in the early 1940s.

Although the Communist Party provided the initial stimulus and resources for these unions, there was little central direction and control and a variety of tendencies developed, particularly as a number of registered trade unions developed parallel unions for African workers under their control. As the number of African workers in manufacturing industry increased, a united working class was essential for strike action to be successful. Such unity in the paper board making industry (where African workers were in the majority) and in the textile industry (where Indian workers were dominant) secured victories in both cases in 1942. (27)

Encouraged by the growth of industrial militancy and solidarity among workers in Durban, the leadership of registered trade unions representing Indian workers (mainly of the National Bloc group of the Natal Indian Congress) prepared for decisive strike action in 1943, despite the proclamation of War Measure 145 of 1942 in November 1942. As Simons argues, the measure confirmed the subordinate position of African workers. (28) It outlawed strikes by African workers, exposed strikers to a prohibitive maximum penalty of a £500 fine or three years' imprisonment, and imposed compulsory arbitration at the discretion of the Minister of Labour. (29) The struggles which resulted from a "forward" policy in organization and strike action met a monolithic response from capital and the state and caused a serious setback to working-class struggles.

The strike at Dunlop rubber factory which broke out in early January 1943 was decisive in undermining radical leadership in registered trade unions and in causing distrust and hostility between Indian and African workers. During the wage dispute, which was supported by Indian and African employees of the firm, the employers recruited African workers from the reserves in busloads. (30) Despite the efforts of Zulu Phungula, Philemon Tsele of the SAR & H Workers' Union, and Gladman Nxumalo of the Metal Workers' Union, the original work force was replaced and no further Indian workers were recruited. While there were 378 African workers employed in December 1942, in January 1943 290 of these workers were dismissed, and 581 new workers taken on. African employment increased to a peak of 1,250 workers in June and July 1945. (31) Through a selective use of the reserve army of labour, in this case as strike breakers, labour militancy was curbed for the rest of the war period. Zulu Phungula, who was possibly the only person capable of providing inspired leadership to migrant workers, was banished from the Durban area for five years. (32)

As importantly, management from foreign companies (Dunlops played a leading role) and from sectors of industry in Durban, such as the textile industry and stevedoring trade, coalesced in the wake of the Dunlop strike to form the Natal Employers' Association. This Association aimed to provide specialist information on labour issues and "to enable industry to present a united front to extravagant demands of organized labour". The Association was to prove essential in co-ordinating the policies of employers in different firms and industries towards trade unions, and the interests of capital and the state in regard to measures to suppress strike action and implement effectively urban regulations directing the flow of African labour supply.

The effect of the Dunlop strike on Indian workers was to divert organization away from trade unions (in particular from unregistered trade unions of Indian and African workers) towards political action in defence of the Indian community. This change of direction (which I cannot discuss in this paper) was towards more aggressive political action in defence of trading, investment, and residential rights of Indian people, and towards inward looking trade unionism keenly aware of the necessity of protecting selected industries and occupations for Indian employment. In the atmosphere of political independence for India and the excitement of the passive resistance campaign of 1946, contact between Indian and African workers and trade unionists became superficial.

In this situation, the tendency was for African trade unions in Durban to develop "on their own lines" (in fact, some took a strong Africanist line, with pronounced anti-Indian views) and to avoid collective action with registered trade unions. There was, undoubtedly, an increase in hostility between African and Indian workers during this period. Africans saw expansion of industrial employment and

upward mobility in certain industries and occupations (for example, municipal employment and weaving) blocked by Indian workers. The rapid expansion of employment in manufacturing to some extent obscured this problem, but, with the downturn of economic growth in the immediate post-war period, the lines of demarcation became clearer. In other respects, however, although the relationships between African workers and the Indian petty bourgeoisie were basically exploitative, these relationships did facilitate urbanization of African families in areas such as Cato Manor, provide basic infrastructure services such as bus services and retail outlets - all services which could be provided because of the particular position of Indian people as a "buffer group" in the racial hierarchy of urban segregation. In the Cato Manor area there were only a few shacks in 1932; by 1939 their number had grown to 500, and by 1944 there were some 3,000 shacks housing about 17,000 people. (33) About half of the African population in Durban was estimated to be living in shack slums on Indian owned land. Some of these workers were dock workers who caught the early buses into the harbour area.

The demand for African labour increased steadily throughout the war years in the greater Durban area, stimulated by increased war production and by major construction projects in the area. In the immediate post-war period (1945-46 to 1946-47), however, the pace of African employment slackened quite seriously.

African employment in greater Durban area. Private industry.

1944-45	25,078	+2,224	1947-48	29,446	+4,455
1945-46	24,644	- 434	1948-49	32,546	+3,100
1946-47	24,990	+ 346	1949-50	34,058	+1,512

Coupled with these fluctuations in employment opportunities, which were partially made up by rapid employment growth in 1947-48, was evidence of a serious decline in real wages of African workers in the Durban area. In her study of industry in greater Durban area, Katzen records an annual decline in wages of African workers at constant (1937-38) prices between 1946-47 and 1949-50. (35)

Peasant Production, Influx Control and Unemployment Insurance

The uneven development in employment and wages of African workers in the immediate post-war period was coupled with drought conditions in many areas of Natal and Zululand, a factor increasing the "push" factors from subsistence agriculture. Drought conditions were widespread during the year 1944-45, apart from the southern coastal areas, and Msinga and Ladysmith areas were particularly badly hit, the latter being declared a drought area. Cattle losses were particularly heavy in Msinga, Ladysmith, Nongoma, and Hlabisa districts, and there was a severe shortage of mealies. (36) The following year, 1945-46, did not bring relief. There was drought again in many areas of the province, a severe loss of cattle, and a great reduction in harvests. As in the previous year, special arrangements had to be made to ensure that the available mealie supplies were equitably distributed. (37) The migrant workers of Natal and Zululand had experienced considerable impoverishment by the end of the 1940s. In some areas it would not be an exaggeration to talk of the collapse of peasant production, while in the few districts where cereal production was increasing the total output could support only a fraction of the total population of the district. Rapidly declining peasant production meant that the amount of maize imported into each district increased proportionately, which resulted in heavier dependence on wage labour by migrant workers. (38)

Partially in response to the fluctuations in employment levels of African workers within the urban area, but more specifically in reaction to the increased flow of migrant labour to Durban, for the first time in Durban's history the implementation of influx control was seriously considered. The first controls over the direction of flow of labour were, however, controls over movement from the reserve areas. On completion of large scale war contracts for the Defence Department and the Admiralty in 1944, large numbers of African workers were discharged from employment, and

suggestions were made to restrict the flow of labour to the city. At the request of the City Council the Chief Native Commissioner circularized all magistrates in Natal and Zululand to restrict the flow of labour to Durban until employment expanded again. (39) In Durban itself, a campaign was initiated of police raids at night to check on the validity of passes. The considerable decline in employment between 1945 and 1947 was probably the stimulus for the formula agreed upon in 1946 to tighten controls over the presence of Africans in Durban and to initiate criminal proceedings against those workers not registered with the Native Administration Department. (40)

Arising from increased resistance to representative bodies and to the tightening of controls over mobility of African people, a Commission was appointed to investigate the grievances of Africans, in 1947. Justice F. N. Broome, the Commissioner, reported that most whites thought the "Native problem" of Durban could be solved by expelling redundant African workers from the area. Representative of this opinion was an article in a Durban newspaper which reported that between 3,000 and 4,000 African "vagrants" had been repatriated to the reserves by the Native Affairs Department in 1947. "Substantial as this number is, the problem of Durban's surplus Native population is as serious as ever ...", the newspaper concluded. (41) Broome, however, defended the maintenance of a reserve supply of labour within an urban area, in particular to meet the requirements of seasonal industries (Durban has a marked holiday season) and the harbour.

The demands of industry ... fluctuate; all Native labourers cannot be employed all the time. But the requirements of industry demand that there shall be readily available a reservoir of labour that can be drawn upon to meet seasonal demands. This is particularly the case in the harbour area. (42)

The arguments over the necessity to limit the reserve supply of labourers in the urban area and the contrary demands of agriculture came to a head over the issue of unemployment insurance for African workers. The implementation of the Unemployment Insurance Act of 1946 made possible a relatively stabilized urban proletariat to meet the fluctuations in demand for industrially experienced African labour. Since the Act did not expressly exclude migrant workers, it received the fierce opposition of organized agriculture which complained vociferously that migrant labour was being diverted from agriculture to industry. (43) Following an allegation by the Assistant Native Commissioner for Natal that large numbers of African workers were drawing benefits from the unemployment insurance fund, organized agriculture in Natal inundated Members of Parliament with letters and telegrams demanding that Africans should be excluded from the Act entirely and the existing recipients of benefits be placed in agricultural employment. (44) Despite the continued increase in African employment in industry in the late 1940s, African workers struggling to maintain themselves and their families in urban conditions were under pressure from Native Administration officials, landowners threatening eviction, and declining real wages. The few benefits for urban African workers were under pressure and would be restricted later.

General Strike or Racial Conflict?

African organizations such as co-operatives (of which there were 95 in Natal in 1946) and trade unions were unable to meet the demands of the time, and particularly the needs of the migrant workers. Gilbert Coka (a journalist and former ICU organizer) described the trade unions in 1948 as "fast going to sleep", and argued that there had been a backward trend in political organization. (45) Zulu Phungula, who had completed his time of banishment, returned to Durban in 1948 to take up his former occupation of togt worker. On 20 September 1948 he issued a report on the problems of migrant workers in relation to peasant production, describing unemployment, urbanization, under-investment in crop production, rural over-population, and concluding with a demand for higher wages. (46) The main problem, he felt (probably acutely as a togt worker), was employment for the waves of migrant workers streaming into Durban: "One generation came

in yesterday (by train) ... all this generation will never get work." Urbanization of women was taking place with the aim of supplementing male wages to provide collectively for the children, and illicit brewing (*isigata*) was essential for the family to survive. Peasant production, he argued, was becoming impossible because the land had been appropriated by the state for white farmers ("its all farms all over") and intensive farming required a much higher level of capital investment.

Ploughing requires oxen and oxen require grazing grounds and they cost money because we haven't got them ... we have got to hire them. Cultivators, rakes, sowing machines (planters) etc. all cost money. How can one plough because all this [costs] money? A Native has not the money.

A relatively large surplus population was growing in the reserve areas as a product of the homestead expanding within a confined land area.

In the location my grandfather had 5 wives and 20 young men. Let me mention one hut of the 5. My father had 4 brothers. His elder brother married 2 wives, the second had 4 wives, my father had 2, the other had 2 and the 5th had 3 wives. I am not mentioning the 15 half-brothers to him. Let us now look back to my father's brothers living on the area where my grandfather lived. Is this not crowded, because the land does not expand? Which place can be ploughed by the present generation?

Phungula's solution to these problems was to put forward a demand for an increase in wages to £1.5s per day, or £32.10s per month. Armed with these proposals, he approached the African trade unions and political organizations in Durban. He asked a leading member of the African National Workers Federation, Christopher Mbonambi, for support for a general strike, including all races, across industrial divisions, for a demand of a minimum wage of at least £1 a day: a demand which was highly popular among the workers. Mbonambi told Phungula he was putting forward a revolutionary demand which would be quite impossible to accomplish. (47) As the rumours spread through Durban the Divisional Inspector of Labour called in Mbonambi and warned him of the consequences of a general strike. He told Mbonambi to instruct workers that demands should be put in a "constitutional" way, industry by industry, and that the strike movement must be stopped. Mbonambi arranged a large meeting at the Bantu Social Centre, at which Phungula was called upon to explain his strategy. The meeting, which was attended by the Department of Labour officials, the Security Branch, and secretaries of African trade unions, gave Mbonambi a "nasty time" in the beginning. He explained to the workers how to make demands in terms of the existing regulations promulgated in terms of War Measure 145 of 1942, and said it would be impossible to get to £1 from an existing wage of 5s a day: a demand should be made somewhere between. Gradually, despite the popular feeling for a general strike, he won the workers over to his gradualist approach. Phungula returned to his fellow dock workers, "those were the people who understood him well, they did not want to understand what we said at the meeting", said Mbonambi later. Although in retreat, Phungula did not change his views. "He would test out his ideas among the people and when he had the right response nothing would move him from his standpoint." (48)

Despite opposition from the African trade unionists of the time, Phungula had correctly assessed the mood of the African workers and their desire for mass action to change their conditions. Instead of class action, the African workers turned against Indian people - both petty bourgeois shopkeepers and landowners and working class strata.

The riots broke out on 13 January 1949 in the afternoon, after an incident between an African youth and an Indian shop assistant. (49) In the riots which followed, 142 people were killed: 1 White, 50 Indians, 87 Africans, and 4 "others"; a large number of people were injured, and considerable amounts of property were destroyed or damaged. African workers housed in compounds, and the togt workers in

particular, took a leading part in the violence against Indian people. Essau Laflete, considered by the authorities to be the spokesman for Cato Manor, said in evidence to the Commission of Inquiry which followed that the worst attackers of Indian property in Cato Manor came from the Point barracks in the dock area, through the central area of the town into Booth Road, and then on into Cato Manor itself. (50) In the Report of the Commission, the fact that African males were "herded together" in compounds was considered a contributing factor to the riots. "Such congregations of men are ready tinder to any spark, and it is clear that the compound-dwellers took an important part in the excesses." (51) In his evidence to the Commission of Enquiry, Phungula proposed a radical solution to racial conflict and redirected attention to the role of the state generating antagonism among racial groups.

My Lord this land of ours is in a state of great confusion, it is a country that has already been steeped in blood ... if we had our way we would tell the Government ... 'you are no longer competent to govern this country, it will be better for you to hand it over to the coloured people'. (52)

Through selective legislation, the state had given Indian people privileges over African people, whose hearts "are red because of the encouragement which the Government gives to the Indians to lord it over us". (53) Through force of arms African people had become subordinate and would fight back if they had the necessary weapons; "the government is a very grave danger to us ..." (54) Finally, however, he succumbed to the mass feelings of the time and felt that the Indian people should be repatriated, even though they were only as much foreign as the Whites.

Phungula had not given up his idea of a general strike to change the wage structure of Durban. Early in April he called a meeting of bucket workers employed by the Durban Corporation and said that if the employers did not listen to the demands of the workers a general strike would be called. (55) Later that month, he issued a pamphlet as President of the Natal Zulu National Workers' Union, calling on all African workers in the Durban area to strike for £32.10s a month if this demand was not met from 1 May. (56) The strike began on Monday, 2 May 1949, when, according to press reports, 800 stevedoring workers refused to start work. The strike movement spread and involved workers in the ship painting, baking and milling, whaling, timber, sugar and chemical industries. Armed police were called out and were instrumental in forcing the strikers back to work. The general strike did not have the momentum that Phungula would have wished (he was arrested on the first day), but it was certainly more widespread than newspaper reports described. The strike also had the distinction of being the first general strike of African workers in Durban, and popularized the wage demand of £1 a day, a slogan which was the demand of SACTU in the 1950s. (57)

Phungula was brought before the Native Commissioner's Court on the first day of the strike for a judicial inquiry in terms of Section 29 (the vagrancy clause) of the Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1945. The court was filled with African workers and armed police. Evidence was led that Phungula had no visible means of support as leader of the Natal Zulu National Workers' Union, which did not keep proper books of account, and that he had worked only five days in 1948. (58) Phungula said that the people he organized gave him money for food and collections were taken at meetings, and that he had been unemployed for long periods because the employers called him "Hitler" and would not take him on. (59) After hearing evidence that Phungula had persisted in making "excessive" wage demands at a time when tensions had not subsided after the riots, the Assistant Bantu Affairs Commissioner, J. J. M. Stander, ordered that he be banished to Ixopo for ten years and not be allowed to return to Durban. (60) Phungula's banishment was a prelude to a vigorous reassessment of the controls over togt labour and a determination to crush militancy in the harbour area.

Influx Control, Wage Struggles, and the Labour Supply Company

During the early 1950s the stevedoring companies, the municipality, and the state grappled with the problems of maintaining policies which could be in conflict:

influx and tighter administrative controls, a low wage structure, and curbs on militancy. The problem essentially was to ensure access to a reserve army of labour for employers with a state policy of influx control and regulation of all service contracts. The immediate problem of the state in the post-riot situation was to limit the number of surplus workers who could be drawn into radical political and industrial action. Investigations were made by officials of the Native Administration Department into the number of workless African people in the Durban area, and wide publicity was given to the figure of 10,000 "surplus" Africans. (61) On 8 July 1949 it was decided to take decisive action: the Durban City Council decided to enforce strictly the provisions of Proclamation 39 of 1940, providing for prohibition of entry of African work seekers into the urban area if there was already full employment, and for the removal of all unemployed Africans. (62) The implementation of influx control had an immediate effect on African work seekers streaming in from the rural areas. The Native Commissioner for Natal reported that many Africans could not find the work they wanted to do and were forced to accept work at lower wages; in this sense the regulations were serving the function of redirecting labour and depressing wages. The Native Commissioner for Durban reported that the restrictions had resulted in the reduction of the estimated surplus of African workers in Durban from 10,000 to 6,000. (63)

While these restrictions were implemented with the general consent of employers through their representative organizations, the effects of a restricted and directed labour supply affected certain groups of employers more than others. The employers of togt labour were most directly affected and their position was further aggravated by the City Council's policy of refusing to issue any further togt licences until further accommodation was provided by the employers. Following some anxious negotiations and an appeal to the Minister of Native Affairs, a temporary administrative suspension of part of the regulations restricting the issue of togt licences to the amount of suitable accommodation available was made, and the supply of togt labour restored. As a quid pro quo, the stevedoring employers agreed to extend the existing accommodation to provide for 1,500 labourers. With the implementation of the national system of labour bureaux further concessions were granted to togt employers to avoid the employers having to register service contracts every day. (64)

In the short-term, the regulations enabled workers to take advantage of their relative scarcity once they had been registered, and employers complained that some workers were adopting "selective attitudes" in the kind of work they were prepared to do. Despite the banishment of Phungula and the implementation of urban controls, strikes continued in the dock area. After a variety of strikes in the early 1950s, the stevedoring togt workers came out on strike on 1 July 1954 with a demand for 4s.9d a day wage increase. The strike, in which the painting togt workers joined, was well organized, with pickets throughout the harbour area who acted against scab labour. (65) Finally, the Chairman of the Central Native Labour Board, S. D. Mentz, addressed the strikers with armed police standing by, told them to appoint spokesmen, and threatened to have them replaced unless they acted on his advice. The strikers used the occasion to demand the return of Zulu Phungula:

When we are speaking to our employers the Government interferes. The man we want back to speak for us has been taken away. We are still looking for him. (66)

Despite the ultimatum, they refused to appoint a spokesman, and the company served notices on the workers either to go back to work within 24 hours or be charged with trespass. Negotiations began on 8 July between the Central Native Labour Board, executives of Durban stevedoring companies, and nine spokesmen for the togt stevedores. (67) The stevedoring companies finally conceded an increase of 1s.3d per day, with a variety of smaller increments. Mantz recommended the establishment of a permanent labour force on a weekly or monthly basis, "the number of men to be employed based on the lower number of men employed during any week over the past year". (68) Such a system would not eliminate the necessity for casual labour but would reduce the reliance of the stevedoring trade on this form of labour. Further strikes and negotiations with the Central Native Labour Board followed in 1954 and 1956, in which the workers were assisted by Bafana Majosi and Stephen Dhlamini of SACTU.

In the late 1950s the conflict between the stevedoring employers and the state, which had temporarily been resolved in 1950, flared up again. In November 1957 the Minister of Native Affairs, Dr H. F. Verwoerd, announced that most of the stevedoring compounds at the Point dock area would have to go and that only 2,000 African stevedores would be allowed in that area. (69) Employers of labour in the dock area protested that there would be a serious decline in the efficiency of work at the harbour if the workers were housed at Kwa Mashu to the north of Durban, that they would possibly refuse to work overtime because of the long hours which they would be away from their homes, and that there was a possibility that Durban would be by-passed by ships which would be diverted to Lourenço Marques. The Stevedores' Association, which housed 1,520 workers, submitted a memorandum to the Government pointing out the "serious repercussions" which could follow if their compounds had to be demolished. (70) While the future of togt labour was being discussed by officials, the workers responded to the call of the African National Congress for a three-day stay-at-home.

While this strike in April 1958 had mixed success as a national movement, the stevedoring togt workers responded by refusing to work overtime - a sophisticated tactic as overtime was theoretically voluntary. The standard amount of overtime was four hours, but from Monday, 14 April 1958, the workers refused to work after 5 p.m. At first no wage demands were made, but on the Sunday after the overtime ban had begun the workers refused to report for work and demanded higher wages. Negotiations between the workers and employers followed, and the togt workers gained an increase of 1s.6d per day with improved conditions of overtime and better Sunday wages. (71)

The disruption brought about by strike action (the April strike caused considerable congestion in the docks), the official policy of tighter control over surplus labour, contracts of service and accommodation, and the employers' desire to control militancy, brought all parties together for negotiations. The Natal Employers' Association brought the employers, the Department of Labour, the Department of Native Administration and municipal officials together on 27 November 1958. The chairman of the meeting, a stevedoring employer, said the meeting had been called to extend controls over stevedoring labour and to eliminate the togt labour system. A centrally administered compound system had been accepted by the Durban Stevedores' Association, which controlled the large compounds, as an answer to the "complete lack of discipline over the togt labour force". The new system would be introduced by the formation of a separate non-profit making company which would have, as its directors, nominees of each of the existing stevedoring companies in Durban. This company would then control all the barracks then owned by the various companies and all employers would draw on the labour of the labour supply company. While previously a labour out of favour with one company could find employment at another company, with the new system of labour control "undesirable" labour would be eliminated. (72)

The approval of the Department of Native Administration was essential to the plan. The Assistant Secretary of the national Department of Native Affairs, H. H. L. Smuts, outlined the policy of the government to the meeting. He felt that, although there was a great amount of work to be done in the "cleaning up" of Durban, he could see "no objection whatsoever" to the accommodation controlled by the labour supply company. (73) The labour supply company would exercise complete discipline over the workers, and the only aspect not controlled by it would be the actual authorization of the workers to be in the urban area, which would remain with the local authority. In this way the contradictions between the state and employers would be resolved.

The officials were all in favour of the supply company, although the Divisional Inspector of Labour correctly forecast trouble in the transition from togt to a monthly contract system of employment. He optimistically foresaw that the new form of control would permit "weeding out troublemakers" in a short time and "peace in the industry for the rest of your lives". Such were the hopes and anticipations of the Durban Stevedoring Labour Supply Company. (74)

As foreseen, there were severe difficulties in changing the structure of employment in the stevedoring trade to contract labour. The immediate cause for further strike action by togt workers, however, was the wage laid down for stevedoring labourers in the first wage determination for the stevedoring trade. The Wage Board had investigated the trade in 1958 and had received evidence from the local committee of SACTU that some workers were without employment for weeks, that the workers should be paid weekly, and that there should be considerable increase in wages. (75) The workers had looked to the Wage Board for relief but Wage Determination 183 provided no wage increase for labourers, laid down differential rates for winchmen and gangway-men, and included large increases for indunas (foremen), a group which employers were attempting to reinforce. The strike broke out on 24 February, when it became known there would be no increases for labourers and 4s increase for indunas. Two stevedoring labourers were arrested on a charge of assaulting an induna in a compound, and the workers demanded a pay increase proportionate to that granted to the indunas. (76) Instead of negotiations the employers, Department of Labour, and the police went ahead with the plan to force the labour supply company on the workers. All the strikers were dismissed and ordered to leave the premises of the stevedoring companies, a baton charge was made, and about 80 men arrested. (77) The companies took advantage of the now desperate desire of the workers to regain employment to introduce the labour supply company, and the majority of the strikers, together with other workers, were re-engaged on a permanent basis. But the men objected to the new arrangements on the grounds that they could earn more under the previous system if work were available throughout the week (84s per week) as opposed to the 60s weekly wage. Again, they refused to work overtime, and congestion in the harbour resulted. A severe crisis resulted as labour discipline was being threatened with possible strategic implications if linked to a further national stay-at-home movement. The employers then dismissed the entire labour force and recruited new workers from Zululand to take their places. (78) In this way the successful operation of the labour supply company was secured. The pattern of mass discipline established during the war and challenged by the technique of refusing to work overtime was again enforced to break the workers' resistance to a system they correctly saw as dramatically increasing their employers' control over their labour.

Conclusions

In this paper I have set out to examine the consciousness of a particular group of migrant workers as exemplified by their social actions, their demands, and the ideology of their leaders. As a leader, Zula Phungula was (79) possibly unique in articulating the ideology and demands of the migrant workers and having his utterances recorded by civil service stenographers. Phungula was able to avoid the worst aspects of labour organization (despite his inability to keep proper financial records!); the bureaucratization of the ICU, with its internal confusions and financial excesses, and the limited industrial strategies of the African trade unions of the war period. These industrial unions survived during the war period under a fairly benign Department of Labour, but, with the rise to power of the National Party, those in Durban collapsed without a struggle. (80) Despite being described as a "one man show", he was able to avoid all forms of personality cult (compare him to the "great leader" style of A. W. G. Champion) and tried to carry out a wage campaign which would have revolutionized the wage structure of Durban and had decisive effects on peasant production in the reserves. His strategy was, however, limited by the repressive power of the state, although even here he laid down an organization in the compounds which evidence suggests may have survived to the present.

Poulantzas argues that the dominant ideology of a social formation permeates even the political language and ideas of the dominated classes, whose "own" political ideology is often modelled on that of the dominant ideology of legitimacy.

The dominated classes live their conditions of political existence through the forms of dominant political discourse: this means that often they live even their revolt against the domination of the system within the frame of reference of the dominant legitimacy. (81)

He uses this argument to explain the possibility of lack of "class consciousness" in

dominated classes. This argument has particular force when applied to the ideology of racism in South Africa, and Phungula was exceptional in that he could use the dominant legitimacy to justify a particular struggle, and yet on occasion confront the dominant legitimacy with powerful counter argument. In his manipulation of ideology he was prepared to "play both ends" of the migrant labour system: demanding a wage which would make it possible for the worker and his family to live in an urban area, and, alternatively, use rural impoverishment as an argument for such a wage. In many respects he was able to draw attention to the connection between the wage struggle and the struggle in the rural areas - a connection which fuelled the wage and "peasant" struggles of the late 1950s in Natal.

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Notes

- (1) H. J. and R. E. Simons, Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950 (Penguin African Library, 1969), p. 616.
- (2) See R. H. Smith, Labour Resources of Natal (Oxford University Press, 1950), and John R. Burrows, The Population and Labour Resources of Natal (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal, 1959).
- (3) Smith, op. cit., p. 57.
- (4) Ibid., p. 58.
- (5) H. Wolpe, "Capitalism and Cheap Labour Power in South Africa: from Segregation to Apartheid", Economy and Society, Vol. 1, No. 4 (November 1972), pp. 425-456.
- (6) Wolpe, op. cit., p. 425.
- (7) Report of Native Affairs Commission, 1939-40, UG 42, 1941, p. 16. The Native Affairs Commission argued that the urbanized African workers were being undercut by "subsidized" migrant labour from the reserves.
- (8) Smith, op. cit., p. 65.
- (9) The Call, Vol. 1, No. 4 (April 1940).
- (10) Report of the Inter-Departmental Commission on the social, health, and economic conditions of urban Natives, 1942, paras. 208 and 209.
- (11) Daily News, 13 May 1949.
- (12) Union of South Africa, Report of Department of Labour, 1940. Printed annexures to the votes and proceedings of the House of Assembly. Table IV.
- (13) Report of the General Manager of the Railways and Harbours for the year ending 31 March 1940, UG 41, 1940, p. 113.
- (14) This and subsequent references come from records of the Department of Labour held at the Transvaal Archives. I had permission from the Minister of National Education to consult these files, but this permission was later withdrawn without reasons being given. File 1496 Controller of Industrial Manpower, Strike: Stevedoring, Durban.
- (15) Meeting held at Native Commissioner's Office, Durban, 11 March 1942. File 1496.
- (16) Notes of meeting held in the Government Buildings, Durban, on Tuesday, 19th August 1941, in connection with the Native togt labour strike at the Point. File 1496.
- (17) These conditions were published in the form of a proclamation, GN 1163, 1941, in terms of War Measure No. 6 of 1941.
- (18) From the minutes of the meetings it is impossible to establish whether the stevedoring employers did agree to 8s a day, but it is significant that subsequent negotiations were with railway officials who were less compromising.

- (19) Meeting held at Native Commissioner's Office, Durban, 11 March 1942, p. 2.
- (20) Official translation of article in Zulu, appearing in Inkululeko, August 1942. File 1496.
- (21) Phungula was brought before the court under some unspecified charge, but the court case was not reported in the newspapers of the time.
- (22) Abel M. S. Mhlongo to Divisional Inspector of Labour, Durban, 10 September 1942. File 1496.
- (23) Meeting with representatives of stevedoring togt labourers at Durban on Friday, 20th November 1942, p. 1.
- (24) Meeting, 20 November 1942. There was no letter in the file to give the precise level of the wage demands, but in speaking of these demands the Deputy General Manager of the Railways spoke of them as follows: "The wages they asked to be paid were very high and we are sure that neither Phungula nor Sumongo [confusion for Mlongo] ever really expected that such high rates of pay would be granted to non-European workers. Some of the rates mentioned by Phungula and [Mlongo] are higher than those paid to skilled European workers." Pp. 1-2.
- (25) The actual increase in wages was 1s.6d. Meeting, 20 November 1942.
- (26) House of Assembly Debates, 29 February 1943, Cols. 579-582. I am indebted to Baruch Hirson for sources on the strikes preceding the proclamation of War Measure 145 of 1942.
- (27) Ibid.
- (28) Simons, op. cit., p. 557.
- (29) This war measure could have been prompted by the strikes in the Durban harbour as much as by the strikes in the Transvaal.
- (30) Information on the Dunlop strike from M. P. Naicker, interview 12 April 1976.
- (31) Department of Economics, University of Natal, The African Factory Worker (Oxford University Press, 1950), Appendix III, p. 213.
- (32) "Union Leader Deported", Inkululeko, 11 April 1943.
- (33) Department of Economics, University of Natal, The Durban Housing Survey (University of Natal Press, 1952), pp. 344-345.
- (34) M. Katzen, Industry in Greater Durban: Part 1 (Pietermaritzburg, 1961), Appendix 8.
- (35) Ibid., Table 23, p. 25.
- (36) Report of the Department of Native Affairs for 1944/45, UG 44, 1946, p. 116.
- (37) Report of the Department of Native Affairs for 1945/47, UG 14, 1948, p. 24.
- (38) Figures I am gathering on maize production in selected areas provide evidence for the collapse of peasant subsistence agriculture in certain districts where production had formerly been quite high in per capita terms, e.g. Polela and Ubombo.
- (39) Mayor's Minute, Durban, 1944. Native Administration Department, p. 91.
- (40) Durban City Council, Memorandum for Judicial Commission on Native Affairs in Durban, November 1947. Annexure C to Chapter VII.
- (41) Ibid., para. 29.
- (42) Ibid.
- (43) See on this subject Margaret Ballinger, "Industry versus Agriculture: the problem of Native labour", South African Industry and Trade Review, Vol. 40, No. 10 (October 1944), pp. 35T-41T.
- (44) Ilanga lase Natal, 14 February 1948.
- (45) Ibid., 12 June 1948.
- (46) Dock Workers Union, Report of our Workers in Natal, 20 September 1948. File 1496.
- (47) These extraordinary events are not mentioned in Ilanga, whose editor may have been restricted on this issue. The events are, however, corroborated by other African trade unionists of the time.

- (48) These are Christopher Mbonambi's views on Phungula.
- (49) Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the riots of Durban, UG 36, 1949, pp. 4-5.
- (50) Judicial Commission appointed to enquire into the Durban riots, 1949. Transcript of evidence, Volume 1, p. 159.
- (51) Report of the Commission (1949), p. 20.
- (52) Judicial Commission (1949), Transcript of evidence, Volume 1, p. 159.
- (53) Ibid., p. 171.
- (54) Ibid., p. 172.
- (55) Ilanga lase Natal, 14 May 1949.
- (56) Natal Mercury, 3 May 1949.
- (57) See ibid., 3, 4, 5 May 1949.
- (58) Ibid., 3 May 1949, 7 May 1949.
- (59) Ibid., 14 May 1949.
- (60) Ilanga lase Natal, 21 May 1949.
- (61) See ibid., editorial comments, 23 July 1949.
- (62) See Mayor's Minute, Durban, Native Administration Department, 1949, p. 132, and Natal Employers' Association, 7th Annual Report, 1949/50, p. 19.
- (63) Report of the Department of Native Affairs, 1950, UG 61, 1951, p. 44.
- (64) Natal Employers' Association, 7th Annual Report, 1949/50, p. 19.
- (65) Daily News, 1 July 1954.
- (66) Ibid., 5 July 1954.
- (67) Ibid., 8 July 1954.
- (68) Ibid., 9 July 1954.
- (69) Ibid., 21 November 1957.
- (70) Ibid., 22 November 1957.
- (71) Ibid., 21 April 1958.
- (72) Minutes of a meeting ... Durban, 27 November 1958. File 1496.
- (73) Ibid., p. 3.
- (74) Ibid., p. 6.
- (75) Workers' Unity, May 1959: "Dock Strike: the facts".
- (76) Daily News, 25 February 1959.
- (77) Ibid., 26 February 1959.
- (78) South African Institute of Race Relations, Survey of Race Relations, 1958-59 (Johannesburg, 1959).
- (79) Zulu Phungula died circa August 1975.
- (80) Information from trade unionists concerned. One trade unionist reported that, after he had been told the Department of Labour would no longer recognize his union, "we packed up shop".
- (81) Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (London: New Left Books, 1975), p. 223.

