


**THE EMIRATE OF DAMASCUS IN THE EARLY CRUSADING  
PERIOD, 488-549/1095-1154**

**Jamal M. H. A. Al-Zanki**

**A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD  
at the  
University of St. Andrews**



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by

Jamal M. H. A. Al-Zanki

A thesis submitted to the University of  
St. Andrews, Department of Arabic Studies for the  
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1989

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Jamal M. H. A. Al-Zanki



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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the following thesis has been composed by me; that this work has been carried out by myself, and it has not been presented in any previous application for a higher degree.

Jamal M. H. A. Al-Zanki

Signature:

Date:

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that Mr. Jamal M. H. A. Al-Zanki has done his research under my supervision, and that he has fulfilled the conditions of Ordinance 12 of the University of St. Andrews so that he is qualified to submit the following thesis in application for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

D. E. P. Jackson (Dr.)

Signature:

Date:

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My thanks are also due to the staff of the Library of the University of St. Andrews who have done their best to provide me with most of the references which I needed.

I would like to thank my parents and family who were always of invaluable help, continuous encouragement and sympathy. It is to them that I dedicate this work.

## ABSTRACT

This study "The Emirate of Damascus During the Early Crusading Period 488-549/1095-1154" deals with this Emirate which was established in 488/1095, after the defeat and the murder of Tāj al-Dawla Tutush near Rayy in 488/1095 by his nephew Sultān Berkiyārūq Ibn Sultān Malik-Shāh. The dominions of Tāj al-Dawla, mainly in Syria and the Jazīra divided between his elder sons King Fakhr al-Mulūk Ridwān in Aleppo and King Shams al-Mulūk Duqāq in Damascus. The Kingdom of Damascus comprized south Syria and some parts of the Jazīra such as al-Rahba and Mayyāfāriqīn.

Zahīr al-Dīn Ṭughtekīn, who was Atābek of King Duqāq, became the *de facto* ruler of Damascus during the reign of King Duqāq 488-497/1095-1104. After the death of Duqāq, Ṭughtekīn was to be the real Amīr of Damascus, and his dynasty was to gain control of the Emirate until its fall at the hands of Nūr al-Dīn Maḥmūd of Aleppo in 549/1154.

In this thesis, the following matters are discussed:

1. The conditions which led to the foundation of this Emirate.
2. The role of Ṭughtekīn in establishing his authority in the Emirate.

3. The foreign policy of the Emirate, and the factors which shaped this policy.
4. The effects (on the Emirate) of the coming of the Crusaders particularly those of Jerusalem.
5. Internal rivalries in the Emirate, and their influence on the stability of the Emirate and its external relations.
6. The policy of alliances adopted by the Emirate and the factors which affected this.
7. The influence of the growing power of Zangī of Aleppo and Mosul (521-541/1127-1146) on Damascus and why he did not succeed in annexing Damascus to his united front in Syria and the Jazīra aimed at challenging the power of the Crusaders.
8. The reasons which helped Nūr al-Dīn Maḥmūd Ibn Zangī of Aleppo to annex Damascus to his state in 549/1154.
9. The importance of the military power of Damascus and its role in protecting the Emirate.

Finally a concluding section sums up the achievement of the Emirate of Damascus in maintaining its independence during the period and the role of the Emirate in the Counter-Crusade.

## INTRODUCTION

The historical "jund" of Damascus during the early Crusading period (late 5th till mid 6th century after Hijra/late 11th century till mid 12th century A.D.) has not been the subject of close study. Unfortunately, most modern studies of Syria during this period concentrate only on north Syria (the historical "jund" of Aleppo; examples are C. Alptekin *The reign of Zangī*, 1972, 'I. Khalīl 'Imād al-Dīn Zangī, 1972, N. Elisséef *Nūr al-Dīn*, 1967, C. Hillenbrand, "The Career of Najm al-Dīn Īl-Ghāzī", *Der Islam*, Vol. 58, 1981. It is hoped that this study "The Emirate of Damascus During the Early Crusading period 488-549/1095-1154" will fill a gap in the specialist treatment of this area and epoch.

Researchers in this topic are faced by a paucity of information, and a scarcity of original historical sources. Syria as a whole, especially Damascus, suffered during the period under discussion, not only politically, and as regards economic and social problems, but from a decline in intellectual life as well. Only two contemporary Muslim historians in Syria appeared during this era. Abū'l-Qāsim 'Alī Ibn 'Asākir, the writer of *Tārīkh Madīnat Dimashq* and Ḥamza Ibn al-Galānisī, writer of *Dhayl Tārīkh Dimashq*. Unfortunately, the great study of Ibn 'Asākir, comprising over forty

volumes, does not help us very much with political history during the period in question. Ibn 'Asākir devoted this vast work to the study of scholars, (the 'Ulamā' and the *Ruwāt* of *Ḥadīth*), he rarely mentions political leaders in detail especially during the period under discussion. Ibn al-Qalānisi is still the main historian not only for Damascus, but all Syria, and to some extent for the Jazīra and Iraq during our period. Most later Muslim historians, derive the bulk of their information about Damascus from Ibn al-Qalānisi, including 'Izz al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr, Kamāl al-Dīn Ibn al-'Adīm, 'Izz al-Dīn Ibn Shaddād, Ibn Kathīr, Shihāb al-Dīn Abū Shāma and Ibn Khaldūn.

The main Crusader historian of this epoch is William of Tyre. His book *A History of Deeds Done Beyond the Sea* is one of the main sources for the relationship of Damascus with the Crusaders. Many modern general studies of the Crusades have been consulted in the course of this study particularly K. M. Setton *A History of the Crusades*. (The first hundred years), London, 1969, S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, Vol. II, Cambridge, 1952, J. Riley-Smith, *The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading*, 1986, R. Smail, *Crusading Warfare (1097-1193)*, Cambridge, 1956 and many others.

The study is divided into eight chapters. The first one concerns the situation in Syria before the



establishment of the Emirate of Damascus. Each chapter from chapter two to seven concentrates on the reign of one amīr of Damasucs, from Ḥahīr al-Dīn Ṭughtekīn 488-522/1095-1128 to the last ruler of the emirate Mujīr al-Dīn Abaq 534-549/1140-1154. Chapter Eight is devoted to the army of Damascus. In this study, I deal with the major points of interest with regard to this emirate during this problematic period. Furthermore, I shall examine how the emirate managed to survive during the period, and account for its eventual fall.

SYSTEM OF TRANSLITERATIONCONSONANTS:

ط (medial and final)	ط	t
ب	ب	b
ت	ت	t
ث	ث	th
ج	ج	j
ح	ح	h
خ	خ	kh
د	د	d
ذ	ذ	dh
ر	ر	r
ز	ز	z
س	س	s
ش	ش	sh
ص	ص	ṣ
ض	ض	ḍ
		-a (-at in construct state)

Vowels:

Long:	أ	ā	Short	ا	a
	و	ū		و	u
	ي	ī		ي	i

Doubled: أأ iyy (final form, i)  
وو uww

Diphthongs: أو aw  
أى ay

CHAPTER I  
SYRIA ON THE EVE OF THE CRUSADES

The Emirate of Damascus in the early Crusading period 488-549/1095-1154 which is the theme of this dissertation requires introduction by way of a brief historical background survey of the situation in Syria in general and the conditions which helped to establish the emirate during the period in particular.

Fatimid authority in Syria from the time of their first occupation in 359/969 had wavering fortunes.<sup>1</sup> The honeymoon of Fatimid rule in Syria did not last long. The people of Syria including the Twelver Shī'īs did not recognize the Fatimid authority willingly. One of the main opposition movements in the fifth century after Hijra/the eleventh Christian century, against the Fatimid supremacy originated among the Twelver Shī'īs of Aleppo, Tyre and Tripoli, and the Sunnīs especially of Damascus.

In 455/began 4 January 1063, the Qādī of Tyre, 'Ayn al-Dawla Muḥammad Ibn 'Aqīl, the twelver Shī'ī, announced his independence from the Fatimids. Tyre's independence would endure until 482/1089 when the Fatimid forces headed by Munīr al-Dawla al-Juyūshī managed to restore the Fatimid suzerainty over Tyre.<sup>2</sup> In

457/began 13 December 1064, the Twelver Shī'ī qādī Amīn al-Dawla Ibn 'Ammār announced his independence in Tripoli.<sup>3</sup> In 462/1070, (after seven years of independence in Tyre), the Amīr Maḥmūd Ibn Ṣāliḥ Ibn Mirdās of Aleppo, (Twelver Shī'ī), promulgated his allegiance to the growing power of the Saljūqs at a time when Saljūq power in Baghdad was established, following their wresting of the Abbasid Caliphate from the sway of the Būyids who were Twelver Shī'īs in 447/began 2 April 1055.<sup>4</sup> The emirate of Tripoli, which had been founded in 457/began 13 December 1064 as mentioned above contained Tripoli, Anṭartūs, 'Arqa and Jubayl, and in 473/began 22 June 1080, Jabala, on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea twenty miles south of Lattakia, would be annexed to this emirate. This emirate would lose its independence to the Fatimids in 501/1108, within only a few months of its being captured by the Crusaders in 502/1109.<sup>5</sup>

In 463/1071 a Turkoman commander called Atsiz Ibn Ūq, who was one of the followers of the Saljūq Sulṭān Malik-Shāh, succeeded in restoring Ramla, Tiberias, and Jerusalem to the Saljūqs.<sup>6</sup> After five years, in Dhū'l-Qa'da 468/1076, Atsiz managed to take the city of Damascus from the Fatimids after a long siege.<sup>7</sup>

Although Atsiz did not recover all Syria for the Abbasid Caliphate, he carried out an ambitious plan to overthrow the authority of the Fatimids in Egypt itself, after he had established his authority in Damascus. In

469/1077, only one year after his recovering Damascus for the Saljūqs, Atsiz advanced with twenty thousand men towards Cairo with the object of capturing the city and dominating the whole of Egypt. But the aspirations of Atsiz dissolved in Rajab 469/1077 in east Cairo, when his great army was annihilated by the Fatimid forces headed by al-Afdal the wazīr of Egypt. Atsiz escaped death with only fifteen horsemen and fled to Gaza, then to Damascus. The rest of the army were killed or imprisoned. Although the Damascenes had been suffering under the tyranny of Atsiz, before his defeat by the Fatimids in that battle, they willingly agreed to be under his rule. It seems that the Damascenes still remembered the oppressive rule of the Fatimids. In any event, when Atsiz returned to Damascus, they asked him to improve conditions in their city which had suffered from his confiscation of their properties and his imposition of high taxes.<sup>6</sup> It seems that Atsiz had milked the Damascenes to provide for his campaign against the Fatimids.

After the disaster of Atsiz's forces in east Cairo, the governors of Jerusalem, Ramla and Gaza, then under Atsiz's authority, revolted against their Lord Atsiz and reverted to pronouncing the *khuṭba* in the name of the Fatimid Caliph. But Atsiz recaptured these cities and reestablished the Saljūqs' rule there in this year (969/1076).<sup>7</sup>

In 470/1078, Sulṭān Malik-Shāh gave his brother Tāj al-Dawla Tutush Syria as an iqtā' and promised him whatever he could capture from the Fatimids there for himself. It seems that Sulṭān Malik-Shāh was doubtful of the loyalty of Atsiz of Damascus; therefore, he granted all Syria including Damascus to his brother Tutush. The historical sources of the time do not mention whether in this year Tutush tried to subdue Atsiz of Damascus or not. Anyhow, the conditions in Syria would help Tutush in the next year to annex Damascus peacefully to his authority. Tutush marched with a great army to take over Aleppo from its rebel governor Sābiq Ibn Maḥmūd Ibn Mirdās, who, eight years previously had recognised the authority of the Saljūqs over his emirate as mentioned above. One senior commander of Tutush, Muslim Ibn Quraysh, governor of Mosul, conspired with this rebel governor of Aleppo to force Tutush to give up the siege of the city. Ibn Quraysh had informed Ibn Mirdās about the reinforcements for Tutush led by Turkomān al-Turkī, one of the amīrs of Khurāsān, in the Wādī Baṭnān between Manbij and Aleppo. Ibn Mirdās managed to ambush this relief expedition, and captured it. The disaster which befell the relief expedition, forced Tutush to abandon the siege of Aleppo, and he went back to Diyār Bakr to spend the winter there. Then he captured Manbij, the fortress of al-Ghāba between Manbij and Aleppo, in the spring of this year. With these successes behind him he

occupied the fortress of Buzā'a, fifteen miles to the east of Aleppo and massacred the inhabitants who had plotted a year before against his commander Turkomān al-Turķī, as mentioned above. Then Tutush advanced towards the fortress of A'zāz and captured it. Afterwards, he surprised Aleppo, but he failed in his attempt to take it.<sup>10</sup>

The Fatimids of Egypt were not prepared to tolerate these great successes of the Saljūqs over them, particularly the recapture of the city of Damascus, the most important city in Syria at the time. Therefore, in 471/1079 the Fatimid army headed by Naṣr al-Dawla al-Juyūshī recovered Ramla, Tiberias and Jerusalem in Palestine from Atsiz of Damascus. Then it marched to lay siege to Damascus; Atsiz then appealed to Tutush offering to hand over the city to him and to serve himself under Tutush's command. Tutush hurried to Damascus and was given control of the city before the arrival of the Fatimid forces. Tutush then plotted against Atsiz and eventually had him executed. Tutush was thus successful in taking Palestine, with the exception of the coast from the Fatimids.<sup>11</sup> After his annexation of the city of Damascus to his dominions, he made this city his main base to control all Syria, especially Aleppo, the second most important city in Syria.

In 472/1080, the twelver Shi'ī Muslim Ibn Quraysh of Mosul took over the city of Aleppo with the help of the Ahdāth of Aleppo, who opened the gates of the city to him. Then Muslim Ibn Quraysh who had been promised help by the Fatimids, advanced to lay siege to the city of Damascus which was the headquarters of Tutush, who was involved in fighting against the Byzantine empire in North Syria. Despite their failure the previous year, the Fatimids did not give up their attempts to recover Syria especially Damascus. Tutush hurried to Damascus and foiled this attempt to capture his capital.<sup>12</sup>

In 477/1085 Sulaymān Ibn Qutlumish of Konya restored the city of Antioch to the Muslims from its Byzantine governor al-Firdūs al-Rūmī. When Muslim Ibn Quraysh learnt about the capture of Antioch, he demanded a tribute from Ibn Qutlumish, which the former Byzantine governor had been accustomed to pay him. When Ibn Qutlumish rejected this demand, Muslim Ibn Quraysh marched to take Antioch from him. Muslim Ibn Quraysh's forces were comprehensively defeated near Antioch and he was himself killed in the battle. Ibn Qutlumish hastened to take Aleppo from Ibrāhīm Ibn 'Aqīl the successor of Muslim Ibn Quraysh. But when the news of Ibn Qutlumish's advance reached Ibn al-Ḥutaytī, the commander of the Ahdāth of Aleppo, he appealed to Tutush for help and promised that he would surrender the city to him. Although Tutush's forces had defeated Ibn Qutlumish's



army, Ibn al-Ḥutaytī refused to hand over Aleppo to Tutush as he had promised. Ibn al-Ḥutaytī sent to the Saljūq Sultān Malik-Shāh inviting him to take control of the city instead of his brother Tutush. Tutush however with the help of one of the Aleppo amīrs, called Ibn al-Ra'awī, managed to take over the city, but he withdrew from it towards Damascus when the news of the Saljūq Sultān's advance reached him. According to Ibn al-Athīr, some of Tutush's commanders advised him to fight his brother the Sultān Malik-Shāh near Aleppo. He adds that although there was an opportunity for Tutush's army to win in battle against his Lord the Sultān, he refused to fight against his brother. Ibn al-Athīr says that Tutush justified this by saying that "I shall not destroy my brother's throne under the protection of which I have been granted this power, because that would enfeeble my authority first".<sup>13</sup>

It seems that the problems surrounding the fate of Aleppo worsened the already cool relations between Tutush and his Lord the Sultān Malik-Shāh. Therefore, the Sultān proposed to check the aspirations of his brother Tutush upon whom he had bestowed all Syria as an iqtā'. The first step to weaken Tutush (taken in the same year 479/1086) was that Sultān Malik-Shāh gave the new governor of Mosul, Muḥammad Ibn-Muslim Ibn Quraysh, the rival of Tutush, the main cities in the Jazīra especially those of Diyār Muḍar in order to check

Tutush's expansion into Diyār Bakr which lies to the north east of Diyār Muḍar.

The second step towards weakening Tutush was the designation of a strong governor in Aleppo called Qasīm al-Dawla Āq-Sunqur al-Ḥājib in 480/1087. It seems as though nobody could check Tutush's aspiration to control Syria, except Qasīm al-Dawla one of the strongest governors loyal to the Sultān Malik-Shāh. We shall see in the series of events that Tutush conceived the subtle idea of appointing Qasīm al-Dawla Āq-Sunqur as his own wālī of Aleppo in northern Syria, in an attempt to retrieve the situation.<sup>14</sup>

In Rajab 481/20 September 1099, Āq-Sunqur al-Ḥājib of Aleppo succeeded in bringing 'Izz al-Dawla Naṣr Ibn Munqidh of Shayzar, who was nominally under the authority of Tāj al-Dawla Tutush, under his own authority. It seems that Āq-Sunqur al-Ḥājib had done this to weaken the power of Tāj al-Dawla Tutush in north Syria by getting approval for this from his master the Sultān Malik-Shāh, and thereby to thwart the plan of Tutush to unite all Syria under his control.

In 482/1089, twenty seven years after the independence of Tyre from the Fatimids, the Fatimid armed forces led by Munīr al-Dawla al-Juyūshī recovered Tyre from its rebellious governors the sons of the Qādī

'Ayn al-Dawla Ibn Abī 'Aqīl. Then the Fatimids recaptured Sidon and the remaining dominions of the Emirate of Tripoli, for example, 'Arqa and Jubayl, about twenty miles north of Beirut. It can be suggested that after the success of this Fatimid campaign, all the Syrian coast was recovered by the Fatimids except for Jaffa which was still under the authority of Tāj al-Dawla Tutush.<sup>15</sup> The reason for the inability of the Saljūqs to hold the coastal cities in Syria, was their weakness in establishing a sufficient fleet to confront the strong fleet of the Fatimids.

In 483/1090 Tāj al-Dawla Tutush after a rapprochement with Sultān Malik-Shāh marched with his own forces, combined with the army of Aleppo led by Āq-Sunqur and the forces of Edessa led by the Amīr Būzān to subdue Khalaf Ibn Mulā'ib, the twelver Shī'ī, lord of Hims. They succeeded in recovering this important city for the Saljūqs peacefully, and gave Khalaf Ibn Mulā'ib permission to depart to Egypt.<sup>16</sup>

It seems that this was the first time, since the designation of Āq-Sunqur al-Hājib as governor of Aleppo by the Sultān Malik-Shāh that Āq-Sunqur of Aleppo and Būzān had agreed to cooperate with Tāj al-Dawla Tutush. No doubt they did this after getting approval from their master the Sultān Malik-Shāh.

In 485/1092, Sultān Malik-Shāh ordered Āq-Sunqur al-Hājib, his governor of Aleppo, and Būzān, his governor of Edessa, to obey his brother Tāj al-Dawla Tutush of Damascus with the aim of recovering the whole Syrian coast from the Fatimids of Egypt, the only remaining area in Syria which was still under the authority of the Fatimids. Then they should march to overwhelm the Fatimids in Egypt itself.<sup>17</sup> It can be suggested that this attempt to recapture Egypt, the centre of the Fatimids, for the Abbasid caliphate was the first serious and official endeavour of the Saljūqs to do so. As mentioned above, in 469/1077 "King" Atsiz Ibn Ūq of Damascus tried to recover Egypt from the Fatimids, but his attempt was foiled. It seems that "King" Atsiz Ibn Ūq of Damascus had prosecuted this endeavour without getting official consent from his lord the Sultān Malik-Shāh.

In 485/1092, Tāj al-Dawla Tutush, Āq-Sunqur of Aleppo and Būzān of Edessa marched with their forces to blockade Tripoli, which was ruled by Jalāl al-Mulk Ibn 'Ammār as an independent ruler. As mentioned above, the emirate of Tripoli had announced its independence from the Fatimids of Egypt in 457/1066. According to Ibn al-Athīr, Ibn 'Ammār managed to persuade Āq-Sunqur of Aleppo to give up the siege, after Ibn 'Ammār had showed Āq-Sunqur an ordinance from the Sultān Malik-Shāh confirming his right to Tripoli. Āq-Sunqur therefore refused to carry on the siege of the city,

notwithstanding that Tāj al-Dawla had commanded him to resume it. He said to Tāj al-Dawla Tutush: "I am under your orders (except when you order me) to disobey the Sultān". When Āq-Sunqur of Aleppo abandoned the siege with his forces, Tāj al-Dawla Tutush reluctantly gave up the siege and Būzān did likewise.<sup>18</sup> It seems that after this incident Sultān Malik-Shāh had learnt of the disloyalty of his brother Tāj al-Dawla Tutush, and so Tutush himself hurried to Baghdad to obtain the direct support of the Sultān. As mentioned above, Āq-Sunqur of Aleppo was one of the closest commanders to the Sultān Malik-Shāh, and the Sultān had appointed him as governor of Aleppo in 480/1087 only to block the ambition of his brother Tutush in Syria. While Tutush was on his way to Baghdad, the news of the death of the Sultān reached him, whereupon, he went back to Damascus, to announce himself as Sultān. The divisions among Sultān Malik-Shāh's sons helped Tutush to win support of all the governors in Syria for his claim to the Sultanate including Āq-Sunqur of Aleppo, Yāghī-Siyān Ibn Muḥammad al-Turkomānī of Antioch, and Būzān of Edessa and Ḥarrān.<sup>19</sup> This was the first time since the invasion of Syria by the Saljūqs in 463/1071 that the whole of Syria, except for the coast of Palestine, which was still held by the Fatimids, came under the direct sovereignty of Tāj al-Dawla Tutush as sole ruler.

Tutush marched with ten thousand men to capture

Mosul, the most important city in the Jazīra, from Ibrāhīm Ibn Quraysh Ibn Badrān. He completely overpowered the Banū-'Aqīl, the bedouins of the Mosul area, whose number was estimated at some thirty thousand men near the city of Mosul. Then he took the city of Mosul and its district, for the first time, and appointed 'Alī Ibn Quraysh, the brother of the former governor, as his wālī in Mosul. After his capture of Mosul, and his establishment of his power in Syria and the Jazīra, Tutush sent to the Abbasid Caliph al-Muqtadī to request that he announce his name as Sultān in the *khuṭba*. But al-Muqtadī refused to do so, until such time as Tutush might be able to dominate all the Saljūqs including his nephew Berkiyārūq Ibn Malik-Shāh who had established his authority in Isfahan. Then Tutush marched towards Diyār Bakr and brought it under his control including its two main cities Āmid and Mayyāfāriqīn.<sup>20</sup>

Then he advanced towards Isfahan to subdue the new Saljūq Sultān Berkiyārūq who was his nephew. While he was on his way towards Isfahan, Āq-Sunqur of Aleppo and Būzān of Edessa deserted his army, and joined Sultān Berkiyārūq. For this reason, Tutush was compelled to return to Diyār Bakr. Then he marched towards the city of Antioch whose governor Yāghī-Siyān had revolted against his rule as indeed had the governors of Aleppo and Edessa. But, he could not recover the city and went

back to Damascus in late Dhū'l-Ḥijja 486/began 20 January 1094.<sup>21</sup> In Rabī' II, 487/began 21 April 1094, Tutush marched with ten thousand men and pillaged the countryside around Aleppo. Āq-Sunqur of Aleppo, Būzān of Edessa, Karbūqā, (a new governor of Mosul), and Yūsuf Ibn Abaq of al-Raḥba marched with more than twenty thousand men to meet Tutush there on 8 Jumādā I, 487/3 September 1085 near the river Sab'īn, a few miles from Tall al-Sulṭān. The allies were severely defeated and all the leaders were captured in the field. Tutush killed his traditional rivals Āq-Sunqur of Aleppo and Būzān of Edessa and kept the others as prisoners. Then he marched to capture the city of Aleppo. Some people of Aleppo opened one gate of the city to Tutush's forces.<sup>22</sup> According to 'Imād al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Kātib, the writer of *Nuṣrat al-fatra wa 'uṣrat al-flṭra*. Sulṭān Berkiyārūq was responsible for this disaster to his allies. He claimed that Sulṭān Berkiyārūq not only disappointed his allies by not helping them against Tutush, but also did not even read their appeal for help, as he was engaged in enjoying himself by listening to music and drinking.<sup>23</sup> After he had recovered all Syria, except the Palestine coast which still belonged to the Fatimids, Tutush managed to take control of Edessa and Sarūj, fifteen miles south east of Edessa. Then he marched towards Diyār Bakr, and changed his normal route to avoid the road to the city of Mosul because Berkiyārūq at that time was besieging his younger brother Sulṭān Maḥmūd, in

the city of Mosul. On 15 Shawwāl 485/17 June 1093 Tarkān Khātūn daughter of Ṭafghāj Khān proclaimed her son Maḥmūd, who was only four years old, as Sultān after the death of his father Sultān Malik-Shāh, and she set herself up as a regent for her son Maḥmūd. The city of Isfahan became the centre of Sultān Maḥmūd Ibn Sultān Malik-Shāh, and the Abbasid Caliph al-Muqtadī recognized his Sultanate. While Tutush was on his way to Diyār Bakr, Tarkān Khātūn advanced with her forces to join him. She was proposing to get married to Tāj al-Dawla Tutush in an attempt to gain his cooperation against the Sultān Berkiyārūq whose Sultanate the Abbasid Caliph would recognize on 14 Shawwāl 487/29 October 1094, instead of his younger brother Maḥmūd. But in Ramaḍān 487/began 15 September 1094, she died during her march to meet Tāj al-Dawla Tutush. In the following month, Shawwāl 487/began 15 October 1094, Maḥmūd, her son, himself died of smallpox in Isfahan; then Sultān Berkiyārūq recovered Isfahan, the only remaining dominion of his brother Maḥmūd.<sup>24</sup> The forces of Tarkān Khātūn which were some ten thousand horsemen, were divided into two groups. One joined Tāj al-Dawla Tutush's forces, the other joined Sultān Berkiyārūq.

On the other hand, many detachments from the army of Sultān Berkiyārūq deserted him and joined the army of his uncle Tāj al-Dawla Tutush. It seems that when the new Abbasid Caliph al-Mustazhir Bi-'llāh Ibn al-Muqtadī



observed the growing power of Tāj al-Dawla Tutush, he recognized Tāj al-Dawla as the new Sultān instead of his nephew Berkiyārūq. According to Ibn al-Qalānisī the name of Sultān Tāj al-Dawla Tutush was pronounced in the *khutba* in Baghdad itself. When the Sultān Tāj al-Dawla Tutush acquired this title, he wrote to his elder son Fakhr al-Mulūk Ridwān in Damascus to send the remaining forces of Syria to join him in suppressing Berkiyārūq. Then he marched with his great army towards the village of Dāshīlū, thirty-six miles from Rayy. During his advance the Sultān Tāj al-Dawla Tutush sent to the commanders of Berkiyārūq asking them to accept his authority. They promised him help especially as they had been offered extravagant presents by Tāj al-Dawla Tutush and their master was ill. Yet, they changed their mind when their master Berkiyārūq recovered from what had been a serious illness. Many new forces joined Berkiyārūq in Jarbādhaqān, one hundred miles east of Rayy. In Ṣafar 488/1095, the armed forces of Berkiyārūq, some thirty thousand, met the army of his uncle the Sultān Tāj al-Dawla Tutush in Dāshīlū, and defeated him. According to Ibn al-Qalānisī the Sultān Tutush himself was killed by one of his own troops, who had formerly been a slave of Āq-Sunqur of Aleppo, who had been murdered by Tāj al-Dawla Tutush in the previous year, as mentioned above.<sup>25</sup>

After the defeat and murder of Sultān Tāj al-Dawla

Tutush, his son Fakhr al-Mulūk Ridwān hurried to keep his father's dominions in Syria and the Jazīra.

. This will be discussed in detail in Chapter II, but a knowledge of the political geography of the dominions of Sulṭān Tāj al-Dawla Tutush is necessary to a proper appreciation of what follows. It seems that Syria, most of the Jazīra, parts of Iraq and parts of contemporary Iran were under the authority of the Sulṭān Tāj al-Dawla Tutush. All Syria except the coasts of Palestine was under his direct authority, and most of the Jazīra including Edessa, Sarūj, Harrān, Mayyāfāriqīn, Āmid, Ḥiṣn Kayfā and al-Raḥba were under his authority as well. After his death, Syria kept her loyalty to his sons including its main cities such as Damascus, Aleppo, Jerusalem, Antioch, Ḥimṣ, Hama, Baalbek and Buṣrā. Most of the cities in the Jazīra were lost except for Mayyāfāriqīn, and al-Raḥba; furthermore, all Iraq and Iran were recovered by Sulṭān Berkiyārūq. King Shams al-Mulūk Duqāq Ibn Sulṭān Tāj al-Dawla Tutush established his own kingdom in Damascus, without getting permission from his elder brother King Fakhr al-Mulūk Ridwān of Aleppo. The kingdom of Damascus won many great cities in Syria such as Hama, Baalbek, Buṣrā and probably Jerusalem.<sup>26</sup>

It can thus be seen that the period immediately prior to the one with which this thesis deals was one of

almost continuous struggle for power within the Saljūq family, stretching territorially throughout the Fertile Crescent and extending beyond the Zagros mountains to the east and occasionally even involving forays against the Fatimids in Egypt itself.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Darwīsh al-Nakhīlī, *Fath al-Fāṭimiyyīn lil-Shām*. Alexandria, 1979, p. 174.

<sup>2</sup> 'Umar Tadmurī, *Tārīkh Ṭarāblus al-siyāsī wa'l-ḥadārī 'abr al-'uṣūr*. Vol. I, Second Edition, Beirut, 1984, p. 346-348.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 349.

<sup>4</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, *Dhayl tārīkh Dimashq*. Ed. by H. F. Amedroz, (Leyden, 1908), p. 98.

<sup>5</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil fī al-tārīkh*. Ed. group of historians, (Cairo, n.d.), vol. VIII, pp. 256, 259.

<sup>6</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, pp. 98-99.

<sup>7</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, p. 122.

<sup>8</sup> Ibn al-'Ibrī, Ghriḡuryūs al-Mālṭī, *Tārīkh al-zamān*, ed. Sālim Dakāsh. Beirut, 1986, p. 155.

<sup>9</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, p. 123.

<sup>10</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 122; Ibn al-'Adīm, *Zubdat al-ḥalab min tārīkh Ḥalab*. Ed. Sāmī Dahhān, Damascus. 1954, Vol. II, p. 57; Muḥammad al-Shaykh, *al-Imārāt al-'arabiyya fī bilād al-Shām fī al-qarnayn al-ḥādī 'ashar wa al-thānī 'ashar al-milādiyyain*, Alexandria, 1980, pp. 147-149.

<sup>11</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, p. 126; Abu'l Fidā Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya wa al-nihāya*, Beirut, 1966, Vol. XII, p.119.

<sup>12</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, 127.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 140.

<sup>14</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 120.

<sup>15</sup> 'Izz al-Dīn Ibn Shaddād, *al-A'lāq al-khaṭīra fī dhikr umarā' al-Shām wa'l-Jazīra*, Vol I, ed. S. Dahhān (Damascus, 1963), pp. 255-56; Ibn al-Qalānisī, , p. 120.

<sup>16</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 120.

<sup>17</sup> Sayyid Abdu'l 'Azīz Sālīm and A. al-'Abādī, *Ṭarāblus al-Shām fī al-tārīkh al-Islāmī*, (Alexandria, 1967), p. 67.

<sup>18</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, pp. 160-161.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 166-67.

<sup>20</sup> Suhayl Zakkār, *Madkhal ilā tārīkh al-ḥurūb al-Ṣalībiyya*, (Damascus, 1981), pp. 123-24.

<sup>21</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 124.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 126-127.

<sup>23</sup> al-Faṭḥ Ibn 'Alī al-Bundārī, *Tārīkh dawlat āl Saljūq* (An Abridged Edition of *Nuṣrat al-fatra wa 'uṣrat al-fiṭra*), (Beirut, 1980), third edition, pp. 82-84.

<sup>24</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 127; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, pp. 170-178; al-Bundārī, p. 81.

<sup>25</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, p. 175; Ibn al-Qalānisī, pp. 129-130; Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Ḥusaynī, *Akḥbār al-dawla al-Saljūqiyya*, ed. M. Iqbāl (Beirut, 1984), p. 76.

<sup>26</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, pp. 112-129; Ibn Shaddād, pp. 166, 173, 175, 183, 199, 202, 143, 250-256.

CHAPTER TWO  
 THE REIGN OF ṢAHĪR AL-DĪN ṢUGHTEKĪN  
 488-522/1095-1128

This chapter deals with the reign of Ṣahĭr al-Dĭn Ṣughtekĭn who was the real ruler of Damascus during the reign of King Shams al-Mulūk Duqāq, one of Tutush's sons. According to Ibn al-Qalānisĭ, the most important historian of Damascus at the time, as Ṣughtekĭn had been designated in 488/1095 as Atābek of King Shams al-Mulūk Duqāq, King Shams al-Mulūk Duqāq relied on Ṣahĭr al-Dĭn Ṣughtekĭn to rule the Kingdom of Damascus.<sup>1</sup> It seems that King Shams al-Mulūk won in this year only the title as King of Damascus, but the real ruler of this kingdom was his Atābek Ṣughtekĭn.

Ṣughtekĭn in his early life was Sultān Tāj al-Dawla Tutush's slave, "Mamlūk". When Ṣughtekĭn was young, Sultān Tutush discovered his braveness, nobleness and keenness. Tutush promoted him above his fellow-slave Turkomans in his court and appointed him to different middle-rank positions. This was referred to by Ibn al-Qalānisĭ who was the only historian to make mention of it but he did not describe it in detail. After his success in his positions, Tutush appointed him Isfahsalār of Damascus, the leader of the army of Damascus, and his regent in Damascus when he was out of

the city.<sup>2</sup> During his administration in Damascus as regent of Sulṭān Tāj al-Dawla Tutush, he demonstrated his ability in administering its affairs. He ruled justly and firmly, therefore the people of Damascus liked him and he secured a good reputation in Tāj al-Dawla Tutush's court. In 486/began February 1093, Tāj al-Dawla Tutush gave him Mayyāfāriqīn, an important city in Diyār Bakr, which is considered his first Iqṭā'. Besides that, Tāj al-Dawla Tutush sent his son Duqāq to Ṭughtekīn in Mayyāfāriqīn to give him training. Mayyāfāriqīn gained many advantages from Ṭughtekīn's rule; it became safe and flourished. He succeeded in crushing a plot against his rule and killed the conspirators.<sup>3</sup>

During the year 488/began 11 January, 1095, there was a plot against Tutush's regent who was in Āmid. Ṭughtekīn succeeded in returning the city to his master's authority.<sup>4</sup>

During the rivalry between Tāj al-Dawla Tutush and his nephew, Berkiyārūq from 485 till 488/1092 till 1095, to gain the sultanate, Ṭughtekīn joined him in his last battle near Rayy on 17th Şafar 488/1094 when his master was defeated and killed. Ṭughtekīn was one of Tutush's few leaders who were not killed, but he was captured by the Sulṭān Berkiyārūq.<sup>5</sup>



When the news of the disaster at Rayy reached Fakhr al-Mulūk Riḍwān, the elder son of Sulṭān Tāj al-Dawla Tutush, while he was on his way to help his father, he hurried to Aleppo and took it over from his father's wazīr Abū al-Qāsim al-Ḥasan al-Khwārizmī. After a while Duqāq, Tutush's younger son, arrived from Diyār Bakr in Aleppo after he had managed to survive the disaster at Rayy. While he was at Aleppo, Shams al-Mulūk Duqāq sent secretly to Sāwtekīn al-Khādīm, the regent in the citadel of Damascus, to arrange his flight from Aleppo to Damascus to establish his own kingdom in Damascus independent of his elder brother King Riḍwān. Duqāq managed to escape from Aleppo and arrived at Damascus, and Sāwtekīn persuaded the 'Askar and Ajnād of Damascus to listen to and obey Duqāq. Although the authority of King Duqāq was settled, his brother King Riḍwān of Aleppo would not tolerate this rebellious action of Duqāq. Janāḥ al-Dawla Ḥusayn Ibn AYTEKĪN, husband of Fakhr al-Mulūk Riḍwān's mother, was appointed by Tāj al-Dawla Tutush as Atābek for his son Riḍwān. It seems that Janāḥ al-Dawla Ḥusayn became the first man in Tutush's sultanate after Tāj al-Dawla Tutush's death.<sup>6</sup> On the other hand, during his reign, Sulṭān Tāj al-Dawla Tutush appointed Ṭughtekīn as Atābek for his second son Shams al-Mulūk Duqāq of Mayyāfāriqīn, but he had recommended his amīrs and commanders to listen to and to obey his elder son Fakhr al-Mulūk Riḍwān before the battle at Rayy.<sup>7</sup>

It seems that because of the death of Tutush, Sultān Berkiyārūq might decline to avenge his chief Qasīm al-Dawla Āq-Sunqur al-Ḥājib, his former governor of Aleppo, who was executed by Tāj al-Dawla Tutush in Rabī' II 487/1094 after his defeat and Ṭughtekīn was fortunate that Sultān Berkiyārūq accepted the exchanging of prisoners. As mentioned above, while Ṭughtekīn was in prison, Shams al-Mulūk Duqāq Ibn Sultān Tāj al-Dawla Tutush took over Damascus in cooperation with the Amīr Sāwtekīn al-Khādim, the regent of Sultān Tutush in Damascus, without informing his brother Fakhr al-Mulūk Riḍwān. When Shams al-Mulūk Duqāq became King of Damascus, he became independent from his brother Riḍwān of Aleppo,<sup>6</sup> and when Ṭughtekīn was released in 488/1095, he returned to Damascus. He was well received by King Shams al-Mulūk Duqāq and was reconfirmed in his rank as Isfahsalār of Damascus which he had held since Tutush's time. It does not seem to be of critical importance whether Ṭughtekīn got married to Duqāq's mother before his capture, as Ibn al-Athīr mentions, or later as Ibn al-Qalānisi says. In any event Ṭughtekīn became the master and the first man in Damascus, after he had got rid of Sāwtekīn al-Khādim, in the year 488/1095 by killing him with the compliance of his master King Shams al-Mulūk Duqāq. He reformed the situation in Damascus, and stabilized his rule there.<sup>7</sup> It seems that during the rivalry between Riḍwān and Duqāq, Ṭughtekīn had no

option but to get involved in this rivalry. In 490 (began 19th December 1096), King Riḍwān and his Atābek Janāḥ al-Dawla Ḥusayn, governor of Ḥims, marched to capture the city of Damascus. They withdrew towards their ally Suqmān Ibn Artuq, of Jerusalem, when they were informed that Yāghī-Siyān Ibn Muḥammad al-Turkomānī of Antioch was hurrying to help his ally, King Duqāq and his Atābek Ṭughtekīn. They pursued King Riḍwān and his Atābek, but Riḍwān fled to Aleppo followed by his Atābek, when most of his army had left him.<sup>10</sup>

Later on, Riḍwān and his Atābek advanced to attack Yāghī-Siyān of Antioch, but they withdrew again, when they learnt about the march of Duqāq and Ṭughtekīn to help their ally.<sup>11</sup> Riḍwān appealed to Sulaymān, son of Īl-Ghāzī Ibn Artuq of Samosata and both marched to Damascus for the second time. Riḍwān and Duqāq decided to negotiate peace by the Quwayq River, near Aleppo. They failed to reach an agreement. Duqāq was defeated in battle, and turned back with his Atābek to Damascus. Their ally Yāghī-Siyān fled to Antioch. Suqmān Ibn Artuq, ruler of Jerusalem, had played a great role in Riḍwān's victory in Dhū'l-Ḥijja of 488/began 3 December, 1095.<sup>12</sup> Ibn al-Athīr believed that Duqāq agreed to mention the name of Riḍwān before his name in the *khuṭba* in Damascus and Antioch.<sup>13</sup> If that is indeed true, it still did not mean that Damascus came under the real suzerainty of King Riḍwān.

In 490/began 19th December 1096, Riḍwān was very disturbed when his Atābek Janāḥ al-Dawla Ḥusayn rebelled in this year, and his brother Duqāq did not recognize Riḍwān's real authority over him. In this year, Riḍwān received a messenger from the Caliph of Egypt with marvellous presents demanding that he recognize his authority, make the *khutba* in his name and promise him great military and financial aid for the recovery of Damascus. Riḍwān accepted this offer, but after a few weeks, he changed his mind, when he was severely criticized by his commanders who were Sunnī Turkomans and antagonistic towards the Ismā'īlī Fatimids. Therefore, he reverted to pronouncing the *khutba* for the Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad.<sup>14</sup> Thus can be seen the extent to which the Kingdom of Damascus had faced a real threat from the Kingdom of Aleppo.

In 490/1097, when numerous Crusader forces were on the way to lay siege to Antioch, King Fakhr al-Mulūk Riḍwān, Yāghī-Siyān of Antioch, and Suqmān Ibn Artuq of Jerusalem were on the way to recover Ḥimṣ from the rebel Janāḥ al-Dawla Ḥusayn. Yāghī-Siyān required that the whole army should hasten to the relief of Antioch, but Suqmān opposed him, demanding that the whole army should on the contrary, march to capture Ḥimṣ first, and only then advance to secure Antioch. Anyhow, it would seem then that the Muslims of Syria at that time had no real

appreciation of the serious menace the Crusaders posed. Riḍwān was so disturbed by this disagreement that he went back with the Aleppan forces to Aleppo. Yāghī-Siyān hurried to fortify his city and dispatched his two sons, one to Duqāq, Ṭughtekīn, Janāḥ al-Dawla, and Waththāb Ibn Maḥmūd, the leader of Banū Kilāb, and the other to the Turkomans, Karbūqā of Mosul and other governors in the east to implore them to come to the rescue of Antioch.<sup>15</sup>

It seems that Yāghī-Siyān of Antioch had discovered that his Lord King Riḍwān was not serious in helping him against the great army of the Crusaders, who were besieging his city Antioch. He, therefore, sent to these leaders asking for help. Indeed it seems that Yāghī-Siyān regretted that he had shifted in his alliance from King Duqāq of Damascus to King Riḍwān of Aleppo.

It appears that Riḍwān of Aleppo and Suqmān Ibn Artuq of Jerusalem did not appreciate that the imminent threat of the Crusaders to Syria applied to their dominions in Aleppo and Jerusalem, despite the fact that it was well known at the time that the main objective of the First Crusade was the capture of the holy city of Jerusalem.

According to Ibn al-Athīr, during their siege of Antioch, the leaders of the First Crusade wrote to the Kings of Aleppo and Damascus to inform them that they

had no intention of occupying their territories, probably to prevent them from helping Antioch.<sup>16</sup>

During their siege of Antioch, the Crusaders sent about thirty thousand men to plunder and loot the country around Aleppo. When they reached al-Bāra, about fifteen miles north east of Afāmiya, they killed fifty people there.

They eventually met the army of Damascus there headed by King Duqāq and his Atābek Ṭughtekīn, which had come to answer the appeal of the governor of Antioch. According to Ibn al-Qalānisī, the army of Damascus approached the Franks and killed a number of them. The Franks were forced to turn back to al-Rūj, a region a few miles west of Aleppo, in the direction of Antioch to join their main army, which was besieging Antioch.<sup>17</sup> Matthew of Edessa who is the only non-Muslim historian to mention Ṭughtekīn by name in this campaign, believes that the number of the army of Damascus was thirty thousand and the Franks' army was seven thousand headed by Duke Godfrey, the main leader of the first Crusade, who was saved from death when "the amīr of Damascus called Ṭughtekīn threw himself against the brave Godfrey and felled him from his horse, but was unable to pierce his coat of mail, and so the duke escaped unharmed". Matthew believes, contrary to Ibn al-Qalānisī, that the

Franks defeated the army of Damascus and forced them to flee and then returned to their camp in Antioch.<sup>18</sup>

When King Duqāq, Ṭughtekīn and Karbūqā, the Atābek of Mosul, learnt that Antioch had been captured by the Crusaders, they hurried to try to rescue it. Later on, they were informed that the citadel of the city had still not been captured. They arrived at night at the city; the Franks hurried to enter the city and closed its gates. They became besieged after having been the besiegers of the castle of the city. They built a wall near the mountain to prevent the Muslims descending upon them. They were threatened by starvation and their food supplies were almost exhausted.<sup>19</sup>

In Rabī' II 491/began 17 February 1098, while the Muslims and the Crusaders were engaged with Antioch, one leader of the Crusaders, Baldwin of Boulogne, established the first Crusader state in the East, in Edessa, a region of the Jazīra. He managed to found this new state after he had plotted and murdered its Armenian King Thoros.<sup>20</sup>

It is apparent however that an atmosphere of mutual distrust prevailed amongst the Muslims and that the alliance patched up to attempt the relief of Antioch was a precarious one of convenience. The continuous correspondence between King Riḍwān and Karbūqā of Mosul,

who established strong relations with King Ridwān, the traditional enemy of Duqāq and Ṭughtekīn, made both of them frightened of Karbūqā. Furthermore, Janāḥ al-Dawla of Ḥimṣ, Ridwān's former Atābek, was frightened of Yūsuf Ibn Abaq at this time governor of al-Raḥba. The Turks and the Arabs, (the Bedouins) who came with the army of Waththāb (the amīr of Banū Kilāb) deserted the relieving force and returned home without permission. On 1st Rajab 491/5 June 1098 when the Franks decided that the alternatives were to leave Antioch or die of starvation, Karbūqā prevented his army from attacking the Franks until they had all left the city. When the Franks prepared for fighting Karbūqā was frightened by their great number. His Turkomans fled without real fighting, then he himself fled followed by Duqāq and Ṭughtekīn. The Crusaders then took over the citadel on 6th Rajab 491/11th June 1098, and obtained possession of Antioch,<sup>21</sup> which was one of the most important and heavily fortified Islamic cities in north Syria. The Crusaders made this city and its surrounding area into a state called the Principality of Antioch led by Prince Bohemond I. There is no doubt that the divisions among the Muslim leaders, who hurried to the relief of Antioch, was one of the main reasons for their failure to achieve their aim of rescuing this important city.

In Sha'bān 491/began 3 July 1098, only one month after the fall of Antioch at the hands of the



Crusaders, the Fatimid army headed by the wazīr of Egypt al-Afḍal Amīr al-Juyūsh marched to Palestine to restore it to the Fatimids. The Amīr Suqmān Ibn Artuq and his brother Īl-Ghāzī failed with their Turkoman forces to defend their iqtā' of Jerusalem from al-Afḍal's forces; therefore, Jerusalem and all of Palestine returned to Fatimid authority. (The holy city of Jerusalem was to fall into the hands of the Crusaders in the same month, on 22nd Sha'bān of the following year 492/began 14 July 1099.)<sup>22</sup>

Although the siege of Jerusalem by al-Afḍal lasted more than forty days,<sup>23</sup> the historical sources mention nothing as to whether Suqmān of Jerusalem requested help from either Damascus or Aleppo. It seems that both the Kingdom of Damascus and the Kingdom of Aleppo were not ready at that time to protect the city of Jerusalem, which was the main objective of the Crusaders' campaign. Both Kingdoms conceived that even if they had managed to save Jerusalem from falling into the hands of al-Afḍal, they would still not have been able to save it from the innumerable forces of the Crusaders.

On 14th Muḥarram 492/began 28 November 1098, the Crusaders captured Ma'arrat al-Nu'mān, a big city on the road between Aleppo and Hama, and treacherously annihilated its people after they had promised them safety. Then, the Crusaders advanced towards the city of

Jerusalem in late Rajab of the same year. They laid siege to the city and captured it on 22 Sha'bān 492/14 July 1099 only four weeks before the Fatimids' relief headed by the Fatimid Wazīr al-Afḍal arrived at the city. The Crusaders killed all the people of Jerusalem, including the Jews, with the exception of the Christians of the city.<sup>24</sup> It seems that the massacres of Ma'arrat al-Nu'mān and Jerusalem affected the Muslims' approach towards dealing with their enemies, and we shall see later how Muslims would retaliate for these massacres by killing civilian Crusaders. It also seems to have resulted in one of the few occasions in Islamic history that Muslims killed civilian people in their wars against their adversaries.

The victory of the Crusaders in 'Asqalān on 14th Ramaḍān 492/began 14 August 1099 over the Fatimid forces headed by al-Afḍal confirmed their superiority in Palestine, especially when al-Afḍal and his close commanders fled to Egypt by sea and left 'Asqalān to face its fate. But the Crusaders accepted from the people of 'Asqalān twenty thousand dinars as tribute to give up their siege of the city. According to Ibn al-Qalānisī, al-Afḍal's forces numbered ten thousand men, and they lost in battle before 'Asqalān about two thousand and seven hundred men.<sup>25</sup> There is little doubt that after this success of the Crusaders in establishing their power in Jerusalem, Antioch and Edessa, the threat

they posed to the Muslims of Syria especially those of Damascus became critically serious.

In Ṣafar 493/began 18 December 1099 King Duqāq marched towards Diyār Bakr to suppress his rebellious governor of Mayyāfāriqīn, a big city with a castle in north east of Diyār Bakr; the governor, one Altāsh, had revolted against him there. King Duqāq however managed to restore order there and came back on the first of Shawwāl the following year 494/6 November 1100. It seems that even though the threat of the Crusaders to Damascus and other Muslim cities in Syria was serious, that did not stop the Kingdom of Damascus maintaining control of its own territories. Later on the Kingdom of Damascus would lose the city of Mayyāfāriqīn, the only city of its dominions in Diyār Bakr, after the death of Sulṭān Tāj al-Dawla Tutush. In Rabī' I of 494/began 4 January 1101, the Crusaders of Edessa gained a victory over the Amīr Suqmān Ibn Artuq of Sarūj. Then they took possession of the city of Sarūj, a small city on one of the tributaries of the Euphrates River, about eight miles south east of Edessa, which had been under Suqmān's control.<sup>26</sup> In Sha'bān 494/began May 1101, while King Duqāq was in Diyār Bakr to suppress his rebellious wali of Mayyāfāriqīn, as mentioned above, Ṭughtekīn accepted the offer of Ibn Ṣulayḥa, the qāḍī of Jabala, a city on the Mediterranean coast, south of the city of Lādhiqiyya, to surrender Jabala to Damascus. Ibn

Şulayḥa, who was ruling this city independently, had succeeded in thwarting four attempts by the Crusaders to capture his city. It seems that his forays against the Crusaders were among the most remarkable feats of resistance to the great forces of the Crusaders in view of the small number of his troops, when we compare his power with other Muslim powers in Syria such as Aleppo, Damascus and Tripoli. Ibn Şulayḥa was convinced that the Crusaders would never let him rule the city despite the fact that they had failed to capture it four times. For this reason, he wrote to ʿUḡhtekīn to take over the city, as has been mentioned above. It seems that Ibn Şulayḥa conceived that Damascus was the only power in Syria that was able to protect Jabala. While Ibn Şulayḥa was in Damascus, Ibn 'Ammār of Tripoli suggested that ʿUḡhtekīn hand over Ibn Şulayḥa, his former governor of Jabala, and his assets to him for which he would pay him three hundred thousand dinars. ʿUḡhtekīn refused to betray Ibn Şulayḥa, who had trusted him. It appears that ʿUḡhtekīn's honesty would help him to gain many allies later on.<sup>27</sup> Būrī Ibn ʿUḡhtekīn, the new governor of Jabala, is said to have misruled Jabala and according to Ibn al-Qalānisī, this kind of failure was unusual in the Kingdom of Damascus during that time. The people of Jabala wrote to Ibn 'Ammār of Tripoli to take over the city which had been under his authority previously. He took over the city and captured Būrī. Ibn 'Ammār then sent Būrī to his father ʿUḡhtekīn and informed him

about his bad behaviour and he justified what he had done against Būrī because he was afraid that if the city remained under his son's rule, the Franks would occupy it.<sup>28</sup>

In late Jumādā II 495/late April 1102, Ṭughtekīn received a demand from Ibn 'Ammār of Tripoli concerning the danger caused to his city, which was besieged by a commander of the Crusaders called Raymond of Saint Gilles. Ṭughtekīn sent two thousand men, who joined the army of Ḥimṣ and marched towards Anṭartūs, on the coast of the Mediterranean sea, about five miles south of Maraḳiya. According to Ibn al-Athīr, the estimated number of the Crusaders was three hundred men. 'Umar Tadmurī, one modern Arab historian, believes that further help came from the Maronites of Mount Lebanon and the countryside around Tripoli.<sup>29</sup> When the army of Damascus saw the flight of the army of Ḥimṣ from the Franks at the beginning of the fighting, it also fled to Damascus. Then the Crusaders captured the city of Anṭartūs, which had belonged to Ibn 'Ammār of Tripoli.<sup>30</sup>

In Sha'bān 496/began 2 June 1103, the people of Ḥimṣ wrote to Ṭughtekīn to asking him to take over their city. This request came after their city had reached a desperate situation especially after the murder of their ruler Janāḥ al-Dawla Ḥusayn by the Bāṭinīs of Ḥimṣ.

Ṭughtekīn hurried to the city arriving before the Franks, who also marched to capture it. He took over the city of Ḥimṣ, which was ruled independently from the Kingdom of Aleppo by Janāḥ al-Dawla and restored order, thereby relieving the city. When Raymond of Saint Gilles learnt about Ṭughtekīn's having taken control of the city, he went back with his forces without achieving his aim.<sup>31</sup> It seems that the internal dissension in Ḥimṣ and the threat of the Crusaders, facilitated the annexation of this important city to the Kingdom of Damascus.

In Ramaḍān 496/began 9 June 1103, al-Afḍal the wazīr of Egypt sent his fleet and army to Jaffa headed by his son Sharaf al-Ma'ālī Ḥusayn. Then he wrote to Ṭughtekīn asking him to cooperate with his army against the Franks. Ṭughtekīn accepted this alliance, and ordered his army to march to Jaffa.

But events in Damascus intervened to obstruct the departure of his army. Ibn al-Qalānisī, the only historian of the time who mentions this relationship between Ṭughtekīn and al-Afḍal, says nothing about these events.<sup>32</sup>

Also, in Jumādā II 496/began 13 March 1103, King Duqāq and his Atābek Ṭughtekīn restored the city of al-Raḥba, a strategic city on the Euphrates river on the

main trade route between Iraq and Syria. It was the first stop for those travelling from Arabia to Syria, and it was possible for any one who controlled al-Raḥba to dominate north Syria. The reason for their action was that the rebel governor of al-Raḥba, who was a Turkish slave, called Ḥasan, announced his independence from the Kingdom of Damascus and killed some of his own subjects who rejected his revolution against his Lord King Duqāq.<sup>33</sup>

In Sha'bān 497/began 29 April 1104, King Baldwin I, the new king of Jerusalem, occupied Acre, and its Fatimid governor, Zahr al-Dawla Banā al-Juyūshī fled from his own city to Damascus. Then the Crusaders of Jerusalem took the city by the sword. The Fatimid governor went back to Egypt, and justified his flight from the Crusaders. Al-Afḍal, wazīr of Egypt, accepted his excuse as being his only means of escape from the Franks.<sup>34</sup> It seems that this easy victory and others of the Crusaders over the Fatimids of Egypt, assisted the Crusaders in establishing strongly their power in Syria, thus threatening all the Muslims of Syria including the Kingdom of Damascus.

On 12 Ramaḍān 497/8 June 1104, King Duqāq died after a long illness. Duqāq's mother Ṣafwat al-Mulk who was the wife of Tuḡtekīn, persuaded her son Duqāq to give Tuḡtekīn the succession to his kingdom until such time

as Duqāq's son Tutush, who was only one year old, become mature.<sup>35</sup> It appears that Ṭughtekīn became the regent of the young King Tutush Ibn Duqāq and *de facto* ruler of Damascus.

In the same year, Ṭughtekīn recovered from a dangerous disease. It seems that this illness caused him to try his best to rule justly and he pardoned many of his own dissidents. Many people moved to Damascus, when they heard about his justice and generosity. The Emirate of Damascus became much safer than it had been before.<sup>36</sup>

Before his death, King Duqāq had put his brother Artāsh in jail in the town of Baalbek which belonged to the Emirate of Damascus. After King Duqāq's death, Ṭughtekīn freed Artāsh, and appointed him as King of Damascus instead of his nephew Tutush Ibn Duqāq in 25 Dhū'l-Hijja 497/18 September 1104.<sup>37</sup>

It seems that Ṭughtekīn had designated Artāsh to be king of Damascus in order to win the support of Sultān Muḥammad who had accused Ṭughtekīn of taking charge of Damascus without getting his own approval. According to Ibn al-Qalānisī, Artāsh's mother warned her son against Ṭughtekīn who, she thought, was plotting to murder him. Artāsh believed his mother and fled to Baalbek to gather an army to fight Ṭughtekīn. He wrote to King Baldwin I of Jerusalem asking for help against Ṭughtekīn, but



Baldwin could not grant his help to Artāsh. Then Artāsh marched with his ally Āytekīn al-Ḥalabī, the rebellious governor of Buṣrā towards the city of al-Raḥba to assemble forces against Ṭughtekīn. Āytekīn al-Ḥalabī probably gambled in his alliance with Artāsh against his lord Ṭughtekīn.<sup>39</sup> It happened that in Ṣafar 498/began 22 October 1104, Tutush Ibn Duqāq died,<sup>39</sup> which meant that Ṭughtekīn had no obligation to designate any person to rule Damascus because King Duqāq had no other successor. In the same year 498/began 23 September 1104, Ṭughtekīn received a letter from the head of the Egyptian army in 'Asqalān called Sanā' al-Mulk, son of al-Afdal, wazīr of Egypt, requesting military help to fight the Franks. It seems that al-Afdal, who was an Ismā'īlī was trying at that time to establish good relations with the Sunnīs of Syria especially Ṭughtekīn of Damascus.<sup>40</sup>

Ṭughtekīn without hesitation sent first of all an armed force, being about thirteen hundred cavalry. According to Ibn al-Athīr, this army included his best Turkoman Archers, headed by his main commander, Iṣbahbudh Ṣībāwu. On the other hand, Ibn al-Qalānisī believes that Ṭughtekīn headed this army by himself.<sup>41</sup>

It seems that in spite of the fact that Ṭughtekīn was nominally under the authority of the Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad, he believed that the Fatimid Caliphate would help the cause of fighting against the Franks, who were

enemies of both the Fatimid Caliphate and the Abbasid one. Also, Ṭughtekīn's support for the Fatimid Caliphate would help the interests of Ṭughtekīn in Syria especially in the remaining Fatimid dominions such as Tyre and 'Asqalān, which would possibly be dominated by him in the future. According to Ibn al-Qalānisī, the Fatimid army consisted of more than ten thousand men. On the other hand, Ibn al-Athīr estimated the number of the Fatimid forces to be five thousand plus thirteen hundred from Damascus, and the Crusaders to be thirteen hundred horsemen and eight thousand foot soldiers. Both armies met near the city of Ramla; Fulcher of Chartres mentions that when the Egyptians surrounded the Franks, under King Baldwin I, the Damascus archers showered them with arrows. When the Damascene archers finished firing, they drew their swords and attacked the Franks in close combat. King Baldwin with a few men managed to save those under Damascene attack. Once he had managed to overpower the Damascenes, he crushed the remainder of the army.<sup>42</sup>

In the same year, Ṭughtekīn suffered from another serious disease. During his illness he received a request for help for Tripoli from its independent ruler Amīr Fakhr al-Mulk Ibn 'Ammār against the Franks. Furthermore, he also learnt that Suqmān Ibn Artuq of Mārdīn had allied himself with Jekermish of Mosul to fight the Franks. Because of his fear of dying and

because there was nobody, not even his son Būrī, to defend Damascus from the Frankish threat, he wrote to Suqmān of Mārdīn to take over Damascus. Suqmān marched to Damascus to receive it from Ṭughtekīn, then to Tripoli to rescue it from the Franks. While Suqmān was on his way to Damascus, Ṭughtekīn regretted having invited him, when Ṭughtekīn's commanders warned him about the dangers inherent in this, recalling that Sultān Tāj al-Dawla Tutush had killed Atsiz of Damascus in Rabī' I, 471/began 12 September 1078, when Atsiz gave Tāj al-Dawla the city.<sup>43</sup> At first, Ṭughtekīn's disease got worse, but he recovered quickly, when the news of Suqmān's death on his way to Damascus reached him. Upon Suqmān's death, his army turned back to Mārdīn.<sup>44</sup> It seems that the death of Suqmān ensured the independence of the Emirate of Damascus, and prevented the Artuqids from playing any particular part in the history of Syria at this stage. The Artuqids would have the opportunity during the reign of Īl-Ghāzī Ibn Artuq of Aleppo from 511 till 516/May 1117 till November 1122.

In early Sha'bān 498/began 17 April 1105, Ṭughtekīn suppressed the rebellion of Kumushtekīn al-Khādīm of Baalbek. The rumour about the disloyalty of this governor made Ṭughtekīn do this.<sup>45</sup> It seems that Ṭughtekīn was not prepared to tolerate suspicions about the loyalty of his governor whose city Baalbek was on the main highway between Damascus and the city of

Tripoli, which was suffering from the attentions of the Crusaders.<sup>46</sup> He then marched to the city of Rafāniya, about fifteen miles north west of the city of Ḥims, which belonged to the Franks. He succeeded in destroying its fortress and killing many Franks and returned to Ḥims.<sup>47</sup> It appears that this was the first success of Damascus over the Crusaders.

According to Ibn al-Qalānisi, in 498/began 23 September 1104, the Amīr Sharaf al-Ma'ālī, son of al-Afḍal the wazīr of Egypt, wrote to Ṭughtekīn asking him to be his ally against the Crusaders. Ṭughtekīn replied that he was too busy. It seems that Ṭughtekīn was engaged in establishing his authority in the Emirate. He soon marched to Buṣrā, the main city in Ḥawrān in south Syria, ten miles west of Sarkhad, to take action against his rival, King Artāsh, son of Sulṭān Tutush and his rebellious governor Āytekīn al-Ḥalabī of Buṣrā, who had allied themselves with the Franks against him. But, while he was on his way to Buṣrā, he changed his mind and joined the Egyptian army in 'Asqalān to fight the Franks. After the usual defeat of the Egyptian army, Ṭughtekīn advanced to Buṣrā again. He brought King Artāsh and his ally Āytekīn under control, accepted their excuses and gave them robes of honour and some iqṭā's to placate them. Anyhow, Ṭughtekīn did not reappoint Artāsh to his former position.<sup>48</sup>

In Rabī' II, 499/began 12 December 1105, Ṭughtekīn destroyed and looted the Frankish fortress called 'Al'āl, between the Sawād of Tiberias, which lies on the east of Lake Tiberias, and the region of al-Bathniyya, which is located between the River Jordan and the region of Hawrān. Then he went back to Damascus.<sup>49</sup>

In 500/began 2 September 1106, the Franks devastated al-Sawād, a big region which lies between the east of al-Ghūr of Jordan and the region of al-Balqa', Hawrān, and Jabal Banī 'Awf, a mountain between al-Sawād and region of al-Shurāt. The people of the area, who were probably under the authority of Damascus, complained to Ṭughtekīn about the Franks. While Ṭughtekīn was camping in al-Sawād, Amīr 'Izz al-Mulk of Tyre attacked the Frankish fortress Toron (Tibnīn), which was ten miles east of Tyre.

When Baldwin of Jerusalem learnt about this, he hurried from Tiberias to save the fortress of Toron, which had just been built by Hugh de St. Omer, Lord of Tiberias. At the same time, Ṭughtekīn marched and attacked the Frankish fortress near Tiberias, only Ibn al-Qalānisī mentions this event but does not give its name; Ṭughtekīn occupied it and killed its guards. Then, he withdrew to Zurrā in Hawrān, probably to fight the Franks in open combat in this big region. According to

Ibn al-Qalānisi, the Crusader forces turned back to the city of Tiberias, while the Damascene forces were preparing themselves for fighting. Then Ṭughtekīn went back to Damascus. According to William of Tyre, contrary to Ibn al-Qalānisi, the attack on the fortress of Toron came from Ṭughtekīn, not from the governor of Tyre. He adds that the seventy Frankish guards succeeded in defeating the Damascene forces which were estimated at four thousand, but Hugh de St. Omer, the leader of the Frankish guards, was killed in this engagement.<sup>50</sup>

In Sha'bān, 501/began 16 March 1108, the Amīr of Tripoli, Fakhr al-Mulk Ibn 'Ammār visited Damascus to discuss the matter of visiting Baghdad to plead for help from Sulṭān Muḥammad against the Franks, especially those besieging Tripoli. Ṭughtekīn sent his son Būrī with Ibn 'Ammār to Baghdad. In Ramaḍān 501/began 16 April 1108, during the visit of Ibn 'Ammār to Baghdad, his cousin and regent in Tripoli called Abū al-Manāqib Ibn 'Ammār, announced his independence from Ibn 'Ammār himself and returned Tripoli to Fatimid allegiance. This was the first time Tripoli had been returned to Fatimid authority since its revolution against the Fatimids in 457/1066 as mentioned in Chapter One.

It can be suggested that one of the main objectives of Ṭughtekīn's sending Būrī to Baghdad was to persuade Sultan Muhammad that he was still loyal to his rule.

Būrī succeeded in achieving this objective, by producing extravagant presents for the Sultān.<sup>51</sup> It appears that Ṭughtekīn used his money to achieve his aims not only with Sultān Muḥammad Ibn Sultān Malik-Shāh and the Abbasid Caliph al-Mustazhir Bi'llāh Abū al-'Abbās Aḥmad Ibn al-Muqtadī, but also with many others even with the Franks, as we shall see, when he was to make an alliance with King Baldwin of Jerusalem and the count of Antioch in 509/began 27 May, 1115.

Ibn 'Ammār had been promised help by the Saljūq Sultān Muḥammad, who ordered Sharaf al-Dawla Mawdūd to capture Mosul from the rebellious Jāwlī Suqāwa and then march to rescue Tripoli. Fakhr al-Mulk Ibn 'Ammār turned back to Damascus, joined the Damascus cavalry, and managed to take over the city of Jabala, which had been one of his dominions during his rule over the Emirate of Tripoli,<sup>52</sup> but it seems that Ṭughtekīn could not help him to recover his capital Tripoli from the Fatimids. It seems that the fall of Tripoli to the Fatimids in Ramaḍān 501/began 13 April 1108, was a contributory factor in its fall to the Crusaders on 11 Dhū'l Hijja 502/12 July 1109, as indeed had been the restoration of the Fatimids of Jerusalem in Sha'bān 491/began 5 June 1098 which was followed by the capture of the city by the Crusaders in the following year on 17 Ṣafar 492/13 January 1099.<sup>53</sup>

In the same year, 501/began 22 August 1107, ʿUḡhtekīn with two thousand horsemen and many foot soldiers defeated a nephew of King Baldwin, Gervase of Basoches, the Crusader governor of the city of Tiberias. According to Ibn al-Athīr, the number of the Crusaders in Tiberias was four hundred horsemen and two thousand foot soldiers. Gervase was captured with some troops by ʿUḡhtekīn. ʿUḡhtekīn demanded that the price of the liberation of Gervase of Basoches and his knights should be the three cities of Tiberias, Acre and Haifa. It seems that ʿUḡhtekīn had chosen these cities because if he ruled them, he would cut the main route which connected the Kingdom of Jerusalem with the northern Crusader states in north Syria. Bearing in mind that Sidon, north of Acre, was still in the hands of the Fatimids, King Baldwin refused to pay this ransom and suggested the payment of thirty thousand dinars to free his nephew. ʿUḡhtekīn refused this suggestion, and killed Gervase and some Frankish prisoners with his own hands and sent the others as a present to the Saljūq Sultān Muḥammad possibly in order to gain credit for himself in the eyes of the Sultān. According to Ibn al-Athīr, this victory of ʿUḡhtekīn forced King Baldwin I to make a peace treaty with the Emirate of Damascus for four years, and this peace would soften the defeat of ʿUḡhtekīn the coming year in Sha'bān 502/began 6 March 1109, near the fortress of al-Akama.<sup>54</sup> Also in the same year, King Baldwin laid siege to Sidon from the sea with



the Genoese fleet and from the land with his own forces. The Egyptian fleet surprisingly succeeded in defeating the Genoese fleet, but Baldwin continued his siege by land. When Baldwin learnt that Ṭughtekīn was on the way to rescue Sidon, he gave up his siege of the city.<sup>55</sup> This success of Damascus in rescuing the Fatimid dominions in Syria would go farther later on, and would strengthen the relationship between both sides.

As mentioned above, in Ramaḍān 501/began 13 April 1108, during his visit to Baghdad to appeal for help to relieve his city, Fakhr al-Mulk Ibn 'Ammār lost his control of Tripoli. Abū al-Manāqib Ibn 'Ammār, his cousin, and his regent in Tripoli plotted with the Fatimids and returned Tripoli to Fatimid authority for the first time since 457/began 13 December 1064.

On 1 Sha'bān 502/6 March 1109, five hundred horsemen of the forces of the three Crusader states and many foot soldiers with the help of sixty ships provided by the Genoese laid a formidable blockade on the city of Tripoli from sea and land. The people of Tripoli were disappointed in their expectations of the help from the Fatimid fleet which did not leave Egypt to rescue their city, until 11 Dhū'l-Hijja 502/12 July 1109. Four months and ten days after the investment of Tripoli, the Crusaders succeeded in capturing it by the sword.<sup>56</sup>

It is clear that the fall of Tripoli, which had not been achieved during the reign of Fakhr al-Mulk Ibn 'Ammār who had succeeded in resisting the Crusaders' attempts for more than four years from Rajab 497/began 30 March 1104, till Ramaḍān 501/began 13 April 1108, was accomplished by the Crusaders within only fourteen months of its returning to Fatimid authority. The Fatimids failed to resist the Crusaders for more than four months during their last attempt, from the first Sha'bān 502/6 March 1109. It seems that the fall of Tripoli would enfeeble the resistance of the Emirate of Damascus against the Crusaders, and that the fall of the city would make Ṭughtekīn follow a lenient policy towards the Crusaders especially when he was disappointed in his expectation of Saljūq help which they had promised to Fakhr al-Mulk of Tripoli during his visit to Baghdad in Ramaḍān 501/began 16 April 1108.

In Sha'bān 502/began 6 March 1108, Ṭughtekīn failed to send help to 'Arqa, a city on the Mediterranean, about ten miles north east of Tripoli, because of the snow which continued to fall for two months. 'Arqa which had been taken over by Ṭughtekīn a few months before, was threatened by the Franks who were headed by William Jordan of Tripoli with three hundred horsemen. When the snow stopped, Ṭughtekīn marched with four thousand horsemen to 'Arqa. He was surprised to find out that the

Franks were besieging it. He, therefore, marched to lay siege to the fortress of al-Akama near Rafāniyya, on the road between Rafāniyya and Anṭarṭūs, which belonged to the Franks. It seems that Ṭughtekīn advanced towards this fortress to make the Crusaders abandon the siege of 'Arqa. When the Franks learnt about this action against their fortress, they gave up the siege of 'Arqa and followed Ṭughtekīn. Ṭughtekīn withdrew towards Ḥimṣ when he was informed about the Crusaders' advance towards the fortress of al-Akama. The Crusaders looted Ṭughtekīn's camp without fighting; then they went back to 'Arqa which they occupied peacefully.<sup>57</sup>

It seems that in late 502/1109, especially after the capture of Tripoli on 1 Sha'bān 502/6 March 1109, and his defeat near 'Arqa, Ṭughtekīn was reluctantly compelled to reach a ten-year peace treaty with King Baldwin I of Jerusalem. He agreed in this treaty to divide the revenues of Jabal 'Awf and al-Sawād, an area in the north of al-Balqā' in northern of Transjordan, into three parts. One part for Damascus, the second for the Crusaders and the third for the farmers who were living there.<sup>58</sup>

In 503/began 31 July 1109, after the capture of Tripoli by the Franks, Ṭughtekīn succeeded in securing Rafāniyya from them. After their failure to occupy it, they signed a peace treaty with Ṭughtekīn. According to

this treaty, the Franks gained a third of the produce of al-Biqā' and they received the fortress of al-Munayṭira, (ten miles north west of Baalbek), and the fortress of 'Akkār, eight miles east of 'Arqa. Besides that, the fortresses of Maṣyāf, (fifteen miles south west of Hama), al-Ṭawfān, (ten miles north west of Ḥimṣ), and Ḥiṣn al-Akrād, (fifteen miles west of Ḥimṣ), were to pay a yearly tribute to the Franks.<sup>59</sup> It seems that in this treaty, Ṭughtekīn granted the Crusaders of Jerusalem further concessions.

In Muḥarram 503/began 31 July 1109, the Franks captured Jubayl, a city on the Mediterranean about twenty miles south of Tripoli, which was held by Fakhr al-Mulk Ibn 'Ammār, the former prince of the city of Tripoli. The capture of Jubayl came a few days after the occupation of Tripoli by Bertram of Toulouse, son of Raymond of Saint Gilles. Ibn 'Ammār refused to settle in Shayzar with Ibn Munqidh, the ruler of Shayzar. He preferred to settle in Damascus with Ṭughtekīn, who gave him a big iqṭā' in the territories of Damascus called al-Zabadānī, about fifteen miles north east of the city.<sup>60</sup>

In Jumādā I 503/began 28 November 1109, the Saljūq Sultān Muḥammad wrote to every Muslim governor and commander to place himself in readiness to fight the Franks each with his own army under the nominal

leadership of Mawdūd of Mosul and Sultān Muḥammad demanded that Ṭughtekīn stay in Damascus until the Sultān's own army had marched to join him there. When Ṭughtekīn noticed that the Sultān's army had been delayed, he decided to visit the Sultān in Baghdad to encourage him to hasten the despatch of the army. This visit came after the fall of Tripoli to the Franks in the previous year, when their threat to Syria and Mesopotamia "al-Jazīra" became serious. Ṭughtekīn escorted Fakhr al-Mulk Ibn 'Ammār, the former ruler of Tripoli bringing unique and rare presents to the Sultān and the Caliph. He appointed his son Būrī as his regent in Damascus, and ordered him not to break the peace with the Franks of Jerusalem until he returned from Baghdad.<sup>61</sup> It appears that Ṭughtekīn still did not trust the ability of his son to face the Franks, especially King Baldwin I of Jerusalem.

While Ṭughtekīn was on his way to Baghdad, he heard a rumour that the Sultān would replace him with a new Amīr of Damascus. He, therefore, went back to Damascus. Ibn 'Ammār continued his journey to Baghdad. He was well received by the Sultān. Sultān Muḥammad was disappointed because of Ṭughtekīn's belief in this rumour and his consequent return to Damascus.<sup>62</sup>

In Sha'bān 503/began 25 February 1110, Ṭughtekīn learnt that his governor Kumushtekīn of Baalbek had

established an alliance with the Franks against him and incited them to launch forays against the frontier districts of the Emirate of Damascus. Kumushtekīn sent his brother Bāytekīn to the Sulṭān to worsen relations between the Sulṭān Muḥammad and Ṭughtekīn. Ṭughtekīn tried peaceful means to persuade Kumushtekīn to give up his aggressive actions. But this rebel governor refused, and persisted in his alliance with the Franks. This was the second time that one of the rebel governors of the Emirate of Damascus had contracted an alliance with the Crusaders against his lord Ṭughtekīn. The first one was Āytekīn al-Ḥalabī of Buṣrā in 498/began 23 September 1104, as mentioned above. Also this was the second time that the same Kumushtekīn had revolted against Ṭughtekīn. As mentioned above, Kumushtekīn rebelled in early Sha'bān 498/late April 1105, five years previously, but Ṭughtekīn had managed to subdue him. Ṭughtekīn marched to Baalbek and invested it. He received some of the Aḥdāth of Baalbek, (people's army), who came to fight with him against their governor, into his army. He gave them robes of honour and presents. After a short battle, Kumushtekīn suggested surrendering his city if he were given another iqṭā' as compensation. Ṭughtekīn accepted this proposal and gave him the castle of Sarkhad and accepted his apologies as was his custom in forgiving his disobedient subordinates.<sup>69</sup> It seems that in this sort of way Ṭughtekīn gained many new followers, who had earlier refused to be under his

authority. On 21 Shawwāl 503/13 May 1110, the Crusaders of Jerusalem and Tripoli captured Beirut from the Fatimids after a long siege by sea and land. Then they occupied Sidon peacefully.<sup>64</sup> It seems that the occupation of Beirut by the Crusaders deprived the trade of the city of Damascus of its nearest trading port (Beirut).

In this year, Sultān Muḥammad sent the first well-organised army in the name of the Abbasid Caliphate, headed by Sharaf al-Dawla Mawdūd of Mosul to fight the Franks. According to Ibn al-Qalānisi, this great army could have defeated the entire Crusader forces in the East. While Mawdūd was laying siege to Edessa, the forward outpost of the Crusaders in the East, Ṭughtekīn was informed about the advance of the Crusaders of Jerusalem, Tripoli and Antioch across the Euphrates towards Edessa. He crossed the Euphrates before the Franks. Ṭughtekīn's army and a part of Mawdūd's army prevented the Franks from crossing the river in the direction of Edessa. After a long discussion with his commanders, Mawdūd decided to give the Franks a chance to cross the Euphrates, and tried to trick them into meeting his army in the region near the city of Ḥarrān which lies in a large plain with which the Franks were not familiar. Mawdūd then waited for Ṭughtekīn's army, which was on its way to Ḥarrān to join the Sultān's army.

The Franks saw through the stratagem and, therefore, hurried to Edessa and supplied it; they then turned back by crossing the Euphrates towards their home territories. Even Baldwin, Count of Edessa, joined the Franks and left the city to the Armenians, who were the majority of the population of the city, to protect their city by themselves. Matthew of Edessa, the main Armenian historian at the time, gives us the reason for the Frankish withdrawal from Edessa. He believes that Tancred of Antioch discovered a plot against himself among the Franks in the Levant; he therefore, left Edessa for Antioch, thereby occasioning a withdrawal of all the Franks.<sup>65</sup> It seems that the reason for the withdrawal of the Crusaders was in fact that they had no power to face the army of the Saljūqs headed by Mawdūd of Mosul. When the news of the Franks crossing the Euphrates reached Mawdūd, he sent an army to follow them. This army succeeded in killing and capturing some of the Frankish army, especially the Armenian elements who remained with the baggage in the rear. They looted their baggage there, and turned back to the main army. The Sultān's army advanced to besiege Edessa again. When the news of the Franks' return to their homes reached Tughtekīn, he hurried to protect his own dominions from King Baldwin, who might be expected to take revenge on Tughtekīn for helping Mawdūd's campaign.<sup>66</sup>



Most of Mawdūd's army left him especially the Turkomans, who had come only to loot, and not for a very long campaign. For this and other reasons, Mawdūd abandoned the siege of Edessa. It seems that one of the main fruits of Mawdūd's campaign for ʿUḡhtekīn was that he acquired a strong ally in Mawdūd, who was one of the foremost commanders of the Saljūq Sultān.<sup>67</sup> Furthermore, it seems that ʿUḡhtekīn had observed how envy among the Sultān's amīrs, who had joined Mawdūd's army, caused the failure of this campaign. We shall see later the importance of this mutual accord of ʿUḡhtekīn with Mawdūd in the great cause of the struggle against the Franks.

After Mawdūd's campaign of 503/1110, King Baldwin of Jerusalem started to retaliate against ʿUḡhtekīn. It appears that the justification of ʿUḡhtekīn in joining Mawdūd's expedition was, that his truce with King Baldwin applied only between Damascus and the Kingdom of Jerusalem and did not apply to the county of Edessa. King Baldwin wrote to the Count of Tripoli demanding help against ʿUḡhtekīn, and that he gather his army in Tiberias to join Baldwin's army there. Then Baldwin went back to Jerusalem for some reason about which Ibn al-Qalānisi, the only source mentioning this event, says nothing. Baldwin fell ill for a few days there, which could be held to account for his return to Jerusalem. In late Dhū'l-Ḥijja 504/early July 1111, ʿUḡhtekīn

descended to Ra's al-Mā', north of the region of Ḥawrān in south Syria, then to Lujāt of Ḥawrān, a desert of Ḥawrān in the north of this region. Baldwin's army followed him to al-Ṣanamayn, twenty miles south of Damascus. When Ṭughtekīn learnt about the advance of the Franks, he divided his army into several detachments to cut off their supplies. By this plan, he succeeded in exhausting the Frankish army and forced King Baldwin to sign a new treaty with him instead of the old one of 502/began 11 August 1108. By this peace, King Baldwin I would get a half of al-Sawād (east of the Lake of Tiberias), Jabal 'Awf, al-Ḥabābiyya, (east of Jabal 'Awf), and the territory in which the tribe of Banū'l-Jarrāḥ lived. As mentioned above, in the former year 503/1110, the Damascenes had given the Crusaders of Jerusalem a third of the revenue of al-Sawād and Jabal 'Awf. But in this treaty, the Crusaders got half of the revenue of al-Sawād, and Jabal 'Awf and al-Ḥabābiyya as well. It seems that the failure of the Sulṭān's campaign forced Ṭughtekīn to accept these new conditions.<sup>68</sup>

In late 504/1111, Sulṭān Muḥammad sent a new expedition to fight the Franks. Mawdūd of Mosul kept the leadership of the army. The Sulṭān's army on this occasion consisted of Mawdūd's army, Suqmān al-Qutbī's army, (governor of Akhlāṭ, Armenia and Mayyāfāriqīn) and Aḥmad-Il's army, governor of Marāgha. These armies assembled in Ḥarrān, fifteen miles south east of Edessa.

When they were in Ḥarrān, they received a letter from Ibn Munqidh of Shayzar, ten miles north west of Hama, requesting urgent support against Tancred of Antioch who had built a new fortress opposite Shayzar, near Tall Ibn Ma'shar, as Raymond Saint Gilles had done in 'Arqa a few years previously, when he had blockaded Tripoli. When the Sultān's armies learnt about the siege of Shayzar, they crossed the Euphrates towards Tall-Bāshir which belong to Joscelin, son of the lord of Courtenay. Joscelin succeeded in paying Aḥmad-Il to abandon the siege of his city. Because Aḥmad-Il had the majority of the Sultān's army, when his force abandoned the siege, the rest of the Sultān's army therefore would be forced to give up the siege also which lasted according to al-Ḥāfiz al-Dhahabī forty-five days. Then the Sultān's army marched towards Aleppo. Aḥmad-Il's forces plundered the territories of Aleppo and it seems that Mawdūd had no power to stop this plundering.

Ṭughtekīn had received some letters from the amīrs who joined the Sultān's army before their crossing of the Euphrates inviting him to join them. He doubted the seriousness of their commitment to fight against the Franks. He, therefore, hesitated about combining with their forces. But when he received an official order from the Sultān to join them, he decided to cooperate with them in fighting the Franks. Ṭughtekīn advanced to join them near Aleppo. He was well received by them

especially by those who were expecting extravagant presents from him for he seems to have had a good reputation for generosity. Although they pretended to be pleased when they saw ʿUḡhtekīn, ʿUḡhtekīn noticed that they had no serious intention of fighting. ʿUḡhtekīn worked hard to retain the services of these armies by paying them to stay in Syria to fight the Franks. Also, he learnt that King Riḏwān of Aleppo, the traditional enemy of Damascus, had written to some of these amīrs inviting them to conspire against him. ʿUḡhtekīn suggested that the armies of the Sulṭān besiege Tripoli, which had been captured by the Franks on 1 Sha'bān 502/6 March 1109, and promised them all the supplies they would need; also if the winter came they would be able to stay in Damascus. But they refused this proposal. Owing to his illness, Suqmān al-Quṭbī turned back home, then Aḥmad-Il and Bursuq Ibn Bursuq of Hamadhān followed him. Only Mawdūd's personal 'Askar remained with ʿUḡhtekīn, Mawdūd being the only one serious about fighting the Franks. They advanced to al-'Āṣī (the Orontes river) in the direction of Shayzar to rescue it from the Frankish siege. When the Franks were learnt about the withdrawal of most of the Sulṭān's army and the march of the Muslim army to the Orontes river, they forgot their rivalries and cooperated against ʿUḡhtekīn and Mawdūd.<sup>69</sup>

King Baldwin, Tancred of Antioch and Bertram of Tripoli marched to Tall Ibn Ma'shar which is mentioned above. Ṭughtekīn and Mawdūd were well received by Ibn Munqidh of Shayzar. By cutting their supplies, the Turkomans forced the Franks to give up the siege of Shayzar. Then Mawdūd went back to Mosul after which his alliance with Ṭughtekīn, who went back home as well, became stronger than before.<sup>70</sup>

In 505/began 10 July 1111, the people of Tyre wrote to Ṭughtekīn asking him to take over their city before King Baldwin I could capture it. They did this, because of their disappointment with the Fatimid Caliphate, which sent them no relief. Also, they warned him that if he did not come to help them soon, they would have to surrender to the Franks. Ṭughtekīn sent two hundred horsemen, with many supplies to them and promised them more relief soon. When this news reached King Baldwin I, he hurried to Tyre. He gathered all his powers to lay siege to the city from the land. According to William of Tyre, he blockaded the city from the sea also.<sup>71</sup>

When Ṭughtekīn learnt about the siege of Tyre, he hurried to rescue the city. He sent his men to cut the Frankish supplies and they succeeded in destroying the bridge over the Orontes river on the road which connected Tyre with Sidon. The Franks were then forced to bring their supplies by sea from Sidon. When

Ṭughtekīn perceived that, he attacked the harbour of Sidon, demolished twenty ships and killed some sailors there. Also, he had occupied one of the strongest fortresses called Ḥabis Jaldak prior to his march to Tyre.<sup>72</sup>

The Franks built two wooden towers higher than the towers of Tyre. Ṭughtekīn determined to destroy these towers before the Franks used them in attacking Tyre. He attacked the Franks several times to keep them busy, and to give the people of Tyre ample opportunity to burn the Frankish towers. The Franks understood Ṭughtekīn's plan. They, therefore, dug a huge ditch to protect their towers from fire.<sup>73</sup> According to Fulcher of Chartres and William of Tyre, the people of Tyre built two towers upon their walls on the same night that the Franks finished their towers. Because of these towers which were higher than the Frankish towers, the people of Tyre succeeded in burning the Frankish towers. On the other hand, Ibn al-Qalānisī, who describes the siege of Tyre in detail, believes that the height of the towers on both sides was equal. Once their towers had been burnt, the Franks withdrew to Acre after four and a half months siege of the city. According to Ibn al-Qalānisī, the Franks lost two thousand men, Ṭughtekīn's army had lost only twenty men and the people of Tyre four hundred men. There is no indication in the major Western sources of the time of the losses of the Franks or the role of

Ṭughtekīn in rescuing Tyre. After the withdrawal of the Franks, Ṭughtekīn refused to take over Tyre but promised its people help when they faced any threat from the Franks. It seems that by this action, Ṭughtekīn proved that his fighting against the Franks was not being used as a justification to annex new dominions to his Emirate.<sup>74</sup> One year after this event, in 506/began 28 June 1112 the people of Tyre wrote to Ṭughtekīn asking him to take over their city, as they had despaired of any relief from the Fatimids of Egypt. It appears that now Ṭughtekīn had little option but to accept this offer. He believed that if he did not take over responsibility for Tyre, King Baldwin would take it sooner or later. Ṭughtekīn took over the city and strengthened its fortifications. But he retained the nominal authority of the Fatimids in the city. According to Ibn al-Qalānisi, the people of Tyre "continued to profess allegiance to the ruler of Egypt, and strike coins in his name, and no outward change was made in their practice". King Baldwin meanwhile hurried to capture the city, but was surprised when he learnt that Ṭughtekīn had taken it over before his arrival.<sup>75</sup>

While Baldwin was on his way back towards Acre, he plundered the Damascus caravan on its way towards Egypt. King Baldwin used to intercept the Damascus caravans, which was however considered a breach of his truce and peace treaty with Ṭughtekīn. Ṭughtekīn maintained the

normal authority of Fatimid Egypt over Tyre. He wrote to the wazīr of Egypt, al-Afdal, explaining the reason for his taking over the city, and he pressed him to pay greater attention to the security of Tyre, by protecting it more effectively against the Frankish threat. He emphasized that the Franks would never miss any suitable opportunity to occupy it. Ṭughtekīn also informed al-Afdal that his army would withdraw from the city soon, if al-Afdal could send any one able to protect it from the Franks. Ibn al-Qalānisī makes no comment about any reply from al-Afdal in Egypt to Ṭughtekīn's letter.<sup>76</sup>

In this year of 506/began 28 June 1112, Riḍwān of Aleppo faced considerable domestic problems largely from his governors and commanders who objected to his alliance on this occasion with the Crusaders. Because of his domestic difficulties and the threat posed by the Franks, especially Tancred of Antioch, he wrote to Ṭughtekīn asking for help. Riḍwān promised Ṭughtekīn twenty thousand dinars and many other supplies, if he would help him against Tancred, who was preparing to seize the fortress of A'zāz, the main strategic fortress in the immediate vicinity of Aleppo. Ṭughtekīn accepted this offer from his traditional enemy Riḍwān. This could suggest that Ṭughtekīn viewed a weakening of Aleppo as contributing to an overall weakening of his position in Syria as a whole, faced as he was in Damascus with



continual threat from the Franks. When Tancred of Antioch was informed about the march of Ṭughtekīn towards Aleppo, he abandoned his plan for the occupation of A'zāz. Ṭughtekīn and Riḍwān promised to cooperate against the Franks by helping each other in every way. Also, Ṭughtekīn decided to pronounce the *khuṭba* in the name of Riḍwān in Damascus. But when Riḍwān broke his promise by sending, during Mawḍūd's campaign of 506/began 28 June 1112, only one hundred cavalry to help Ṭughtekīn, Ṭughtekīn realized that Riḍwān was not to be trusted. Ṭughtekīn, therefore, terminated his agreement with Riḍwān. He seems to have thought (mistakenly as it turned out) that Riḍwān would change his previous peaceful policy toward the Franks and that Riḍwān would cooperate with him against them.<sup>77</sup>

In 506/began 28 June 1112, Ṭughtekīn wrote to Mawḍūd of Mosul for help against King Baldwin, who was threatening the countryside around Damascus.<sup>78</sup> Sultān Muḥammad was suspicious of the relationship between Ṭughtekīn and Mawḍūd especially when he heard a rumour that Ṭughtekīn and Mawḍūd were plotting against him. As mentioned above, Ṭughtekīn had pronounced the *khuṭba* in the name of King Riḍwān of Aleppo. 'Imād al-Dīn Khalīl, the writer of *al-Muqāwama al-Islāmiyya lil-ghazw al-Ṣalībī*, suggests that Ṭughtekīn and Mawḍūd were intending to pronounce the *khuṭba* in the name of King Riḍwān instead of Sultān Muḥammad. Khalīl suggests that

their intention was that Ṭughtekīn and Mawdūd would use the name of Riḍwān to be free to unite al-Jazīra and the Muslims in Syria in one front to face the Crusaders in the Levant, and they would not wait for commands coming from Sulṭān Muḥammad. But King Riḍwān's failure to help them caused this plan to miscarry. Ṭughtekīn however sent his son Būrī to the Sulṭān to demonstrate his loyalty to him. When Būrī succeeded in persuading the Sulṭān of the loyalty of his father, and Mawdūd had done likewise, the Sulṭān gave Mawdūd permission to depart to help Ṭughtekīn.<sup>79</sup> When Joscelin of Tall-Bāshir, who since he was himself in Palestine at the time, was nominally under King Baldwin's authority, learnt about the march of Mawdūd with a great army to help Ṭughtekīn, he wrote to Ṭughtekīn remarkably offering Ḥiṣn al-Thamānīn and Jabal 'Āmla. In turn, Ṭughtekīn would compensate him by giving him the fortress of Ḥabis Jaldak, located in al-Sawād, and half of the revenue of al-Sawād. Joscelin thereby would be obliged not to plunder the Emirate of Damascus. Ṭughtekīn refused this offer and marched to join Mawdūd's army in the countryside of Salamiyya, ten miles south east of the city of Hama.<sup>80</sup> According to Ibn al-Qalānisī, on 11 Muḥarram 507/29 June 1113, the Islamic army was surprised when they saw King Baldwin's army near al-Uḡhuwāna, three miles from the city of Tiberias, on the Damascus road. One part of this army hastily marched without real preparation to fight Baldwin's army and attacked it. After three assaults,

the army managed to overpower Baldwin's army and killed two thousand men. According to Ibn al-Qalānisī, Baldwin was captured and freed, because no one could recognize him.<sup>81</sup> On the other hand, Fulcher of Chartres believes that the Turks laid an ambush. They tricked Baldwin into attacking their small army of about five hundred men, then the main army attacked Baldwin's forces.<sup>82</sup> William of Tyre charges Baldwin with the responsibility for this disaster. He believes that Baldwin hastened to meet this army to win a great victory in his own name. He, therefore, did not wait for the armies of Prince Roger of Antioch and Count Pons of Tripoli.<sup>83</sup> After this disaster, the whole army of the Franks was surrounded near the mountains of Tiberias. During this campaign, Ṭughtekīn appealed to the Arabs from Ṭayy, Kilāb and Khafāja to supply the army with water in this place.<sup>84</sup> The Frankish army faced great danger during this period, which lasted about two months.<sup>85</sup> On the other hand, the Franks in their cities especially in Jerusalem, also faced a real threat during the encirclement of their field army near Tiberias. According to Fulcher of Chartres, they did not dare to leave their cities, or even to collect the harvest.<sup>86</sup> Furthermore, according to William of Tyre, the Muslims under Frankish authority in the Kingdom of Jerusalem "treated the entire region as if it had already been brought under their power."<sup>87</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī goes further; he mentions that all Muslims under Crusader authority wrote to Ṭughtekīn to

accept them as being under his rule, and requested guarantees of security from him.<sup>88</sup> Mawdūd and Ṭughtekīn decided after two months that fighting the Franks in this place was not convenient either for the horsemen or the footsoldiers. Besides, most of Mawdūd's army got homesick and bringing supplies became too difficult. For these reasons Mawdūd gave his army permission to go home on condition that they promise to assemble the next spring.<sup>89</sup> William of Tyre and Fulcher of Chartres believe that because of the coming of new pilgrims who might be expected to relieve the surrounded Frankish army, Mawdūd gave up the siege.<sup>90</sup> It is clear that Mawdūd's and Ṭughtekīn's armies achieved more than the two previous campaigns of 503 and 505/1110 and 1112.

In 507/began 18 June 1113, Ṭughtekīn was accused by the Sultān of arranging the murder of Mawdūd of Mosul who was killed by an assassin in the Great Mosque in Damascus. The Saljūq Sultān, Muḥammad, therefore, sent Bursuq Ibn Bursuq of Hamadhān, Juyūsh Bek of Mosul and other Muslim leaders with a great army to kill Ṭughtekīn first and his ally and son-in-law, Īl-Ghāzī Ibn Artuq of Mārdīn, and to capture the Franks' dominions second.<sup>91</sup> Īl-Ghāzī, who was well-known for his disloyalty to Sultān Muḥammad, managed to defeat the Saljūq army headed by Āq-Sunqur al-Bursuqī the former governor of Mosul in late 508 near Ḥiṣn Kayfā. Sultān Muḥammad sent a warning to Īl-Ghāzī after his defeat of Āq-Sunqur al-

Bursuqī. For this reason Īl-Ghāzī left Diyār Bakr for Syria requesting help from his father-in-law, Ṭughtekīn of Damascus, whose relationship with Sultān Muḥammad had got worse after the murder of Mawdūd of Mosul, as mentioned above. Before the march of the Sultān's army, in Ramaḍān 508/began 30 January 1113, Lu'lu' al-Khādim of Aleppo who was in effective control of Alp-Arslān, (Riḍwān's son, and successor), wrote to the Sultān inviting him to take charge of the city before it fell to the Franks. When Bursuq, at the head of the Sultān's army, marched to take over Aleppo, Lu'lu' changed his mind, and wrote to Ṭughtekīn asking him to help him against the Sultān's army and to take over Aleppo for himself; he also requested compensation in the form of an iqtā' in the Emirate of Damascus. Ṭughtekīn, who probably did not expect this great opportunity, accepted this offer and marched with his ally Īl-Ghāzī of Mārdīn with two thousand horsemen to Aleppo. He arrived at the city before the coming of the Saljūq forces and fortified it.<sup>92</sup> When Bursuq found Aleppo formidably fortified, he advanced to the city of Hama, which was under Ṭughtekīn's control. He succeeded in occupying this city. Then he surrendered Hama to Khīr-Khān Ibn Qarāja the ruler of Ḥimṣ. Khīr-Khān of Ḥimṣ and the Banū Munqidh of Shayzar were the only Muslim rulers in Syria still loyal to the Saljūqs that year. When Ṭughtekīn learnt of the fall of Hama at the hands of the Sultān's general in Muḥarram 509/began 27 May 1115, he sent

messengers to Prince Roger of Antioch, with precious presents, to establish an alliance against Bursuq. ʿUḡhtekīn gave him hostages to underpin the alliance. The alliance was signed by ʿUḡhtekīn and Roger. William of Tyre believes that ʿUḡhtekīn signed the same alliance with King Baldwin.<sup>93</sup> It could be suggested that the alliance of ʿUḡhtekīn with the Franks was considered one of the critical events during his rule of the Emirate of Damascus. Fulcher of Chartres justifies ʿUḡhtekīn's alliance, citing his fear of losing his rule in Damascus.<sup>94</sup> And (as mentioned above), according to Ibn al-Athīr, the Sultān ordered Bursuq first to kill ʿUḡhtekīn and Īl-Ghāzī, then to fight the Franks. Therefore, ʿUḡhtekīn made this alliance not only to keep his suzerainty in the Emirate of Damascus, but also to save his own life.<sup>95</sup> According to Ibn al-'Adīm, ʿUḡhtekīn tried his best to prevent the Franks from fighting the Sultān's army. He was afraid that if the Franks defeated the Sultān's army, they would capture all Syria including his Emirate. He, furthermore, believed that if the Franks were defeated by the Sultān's army, he would lose his Emirate to the Sultān.<sup>96</sup> After their waiting for three months in Afāmiya for the Sultān's army which was in Shayzar, the Franks and their allies, ʿUḡhtekīn and Īl-Ghāzī, went back to their respective territories.<sup>97</sup> After their withdrawal, Roger of Antioch marched to rescue Kafartāb from Bursuq. He succeeded in Rabī' II 509/began 26 August 1115 in defeating Bursuq easily in

Dānīth, a village thirty miles south west of Aleppo, and inflicting about three thousand casualties on the Sultān's army. Fulcher of Chartres doubted the seriousness of this alliance of the Franks with Ṭughtekīn and Īl-Ghāzī. He stated that Roger of Antioch alone with his own army achieved this great victory, although the whole army of the Kingdom of Jerusalem together with their allies "Ṭughtekīn and Īl-Ghāzī" had achieved nothing. This statement appears to confirm that Ṭughtekīn was not serious in his alliance, and succeeded in persuading them to withdraw to avoid fighting the Sultān's army.<sup>98</sup>

As mentioned above, Ṭughtekīn took over Tyre in 506/began 28 June 1112 and appointed Mas'ūd as governor to defend the city from the Frankish threat in Dhū-'l-Hijja 506/began 18 May 1113; Ṭughtekīn sent a messenger to al-Afdal, wazīr of Egypt, to demonstrate to him the truly desperate position in Tyre and the importance of sending urgent help there.<sup>99</sup> The messenger was promised help and he got a letter from al-Afdal expressing his consent to what Ṭughtekīn had done with Tyre and he also received robes of honour for Ṭughtekīn and his son Būrī. Tyre became stronger when it received the help from al-Afdal. It appears that the help from the Fatimids made King Baldwin write in Rabī' II 507/began 15 September 1113 to Mas'ūd of Tyre proposing a truce and peace treaty. Mas'ūd agreed to this suggestion and signed a

treaty. Tyre flourished after the signing of the treaty through the increase in its trade with its neighbours.<sup>100</sup>

In Jumādā II 509/began 21 October, 1115, Ṭughtekīn attacked the city of Rafāniyya, fifteen miles north west of Hims, which had been captured by the Franks that year, and recovered it. He also captured all the Frankish guards in this attack. He handed the city to one of his commanders called Shams al-Khawāṣṣ, who was formerly the commander of the 'Askar of Aleppo. Then Ṭughtekīn with his forces went back to Damascus. It sounds as though by resuming his military operations against the Franks, Ṭughtekīn was trying to redeem his previous bad record of making an alliance with the Franks against the Sulṭān's army in early 509/began 27 May 1115, and it seems that he intended to show his allegiance to the Sulṭān specifically by terminating his undertaking to the Franks. Ibn al-Qalānisi who does not mention Ṭughtekīn's alliance with the Franks at all, claims that because of the great victory of Ṭughtekīn over the Franks, some envious people in the Sulṭān's court tried to damage Ṭughtekīn's relations with the Sulṭān's court. Although most of his intimate friends warned him of dangers at the Sulṭān's court, Ṭughtekīn insisted on visiting the Sulṭān personally. As was his custom, he brought with him many precious gifts for the Sulṭān and the Caliph. Sulṭān Muḥammad accepted his apology and issued a new ordinance to endorse



Ṭughtekīn's rule in Damascus and every region he could capture from the Franks later on. Ibn al-Qalānisī, by mentioning the whole text of this long ordinance, credited Ṭughtekīn with a great reputation and a special position in Syria.<sup>101</sup>

Carole Hillenbrand in her study "The Career of Najm al Dīn Īl-Ghāzī", *Der Islam*, Vol.58, 1981, suggested that Ṭughtekīn was not told to break off relations with his ally and son-in-law Īl-Ghāzī. She adds that Ṭughtekīn mediated in Sulṭān Muḥammad's court for Īl-Ghāzī, but he failed.<sup>102</sup>

In 509/began 27 May 1115, King Baldwin I of Jerusalem advanced with his forces and attacked the city of al-Faramā on the eastern coast of Egypt on the Mediterranean for the first time in the history of Crusades. The Fatimids were surprised by this unexpected attack. It seems no official forces from the Fatimids faced the Crusaders of Jerusalem who marched towards the city. According to al-Maqrīzī, the eminent Egyptian historian of the Fatimids, only some Arab (Bedouins) faced the Crusaders. He adds that King Baldwin was killed in this attack on al-Faramā, but his forces did not reveal his death.<sup>103</sup>

Al-Afdal, wazīr of the Fatimids, sent a letter to Ṭughtekīn criticizing him strongly for his carelessness in not informing him concerning the advance of forces of

the Crusaders of Jerusalem. When Ṭughtekīn received al-Afdal's letter, he marched with his forces to help the Egyptians of 'Asqalān against the Crusaders, then he went back to Damascus.<sup>104</sup> It seems he did this to soften the anger of al-Afdal.

In 510/began 16 May 1116, Ṭughtekīn won a new ally, as powerful as his earlier ally Mawdūd. This new one was Āq-Sunqur al-Bursuqī, a new governor of al-Raḥba, who had been replaced by Juyūsh Bek as governor of Mosul the previous year. In this year, Bertram, Count of Tripoli, established a strong fortress in Bārīn east of the Nuṣairī mountains, to control the entrance to al-Biqā'. He then plundered al-Biqā' valley which belonged to the Emirate of Damascus. When the news of the plundering of al-Biqā' reached Ṭughtekīn, who was receiving Āq-Sunqur al-Bursuqī governor of al-Raḥba, they both marched together with their forces to face the Crusaders. They managed to ambush the army of Count Bertram of Tripoli and slaughtered it in the land called 'Ayn al-Jarr, about fifteen miles north west of Damascus. Count Bertram and a few of his own army succeeded in escaping. According to Ibn al-Qalānisī, Bertram did however lose about three thousand men and his main commanders were captured.<sup>105</sup> It seems that this victory is considered as a fruit of the alliance between Ṭughtekīn and al-Bursuqī and their alliance would strengthen the Muslims against the Franks in the future.

In 512/began 24 April 1118, during his advance into the Kingdom of Jerusalem, by crossing the river of al-Yarmūk, Ṭughtekīn received a messenger from the new king of Jerusalem, Baldwin II, the nephew of Baldwin I requesting a new peace treaty. Ṭughtekīn suggested abolishing the previous treaty of 503/began 31 July 1109 concerning the Franks' half share of Jabal 'Awf, al-Ḥabābiyya, the city of Salt (about seven miles north west the city of 'Ammān) and al-Ghūr, a great valley of the river Jordan. The Frankish messenger refused this offer as a demonstration of his power to Ṭughtekīn. Ṭughtekīn then plundered Tiberias, which belonged to the Franks. Then Ṭughtekīn marched to 'Asqalān, which belonged to the Fatimid Caliphate. At the same time, the Caliph of Egypt sent seven thousand horsemen to 'Asqalān to avenge the invasion of Egypt in 509/began 27 May 1115 by King Baldwin I. The head of this Fatimid army met Ṭughtekīn, and informed him that the Fatimid Caliph required him to be under his authority. But Ṭughtekīn remained for two months in 'Asqalān without fighting against the Crusaders and turned back to Damascus. Meanwhile the guards of the fortress of Ḥabis Jaldak surrendered their fort to the Crusaders. Then the Crusaders plundered Adhru'āt, (the modern town of Dar'ā), fifteen miles north west of Buṣrā, which belonged to the emirate of Damascus. Soon Ṭughtekīn was appealed to by the people of the fortress of Ḥabis Jaldak and Adhru'āt which had been pillaged by one

hundred and thirty Crusaders. ʿUḡhtekīn without hesitation sent his son Būrī to pursue the Crusader forces. The Franks took resort to a mountain nearby to regroup and were followed by Būrī. ʿUḡhtekīn, who had great experience in fighting the Franks, advised his son not to pursue the Franks on the mountain. But Būrī did not listen to this advice, and pursued the Franks. The Franks fought desperately and succeeded in slaughtering Būrī's army. <sup>106</sup>

After this defeat of the army of Damascus, ʿUḡhtekīn personally visited Īl-Ghāzī Ibn Artuq, the new governor of Aleppo appealing for help against the Crusaders. It can be suggested that the establishing of Īl-Ghāzī's authority in Aleppo would affect not only the emirate of Damascus, but also the cause of the counter-Crusade from 511 till 516/1117-1123. The story of taking Aleppo by Īl-Ghāzī Ibn Artuq of Mārdīn and Mayyāfāriqīn in 511/began 5 May 1117, begins with the fact that in this year Aleppo, the most important city in north Syria and a strategic asset, faced a serious threat from the Crusaders of Antioch and Edessa who were their neighbours. The situation in the Kingdom of Aleppo was aggravated (especially) after the murder of the eunuch Lu'lu' the regent of King Sulṭān-Shāh Ibn Alp-Arslān Ibn Ridwān. The people of Aleppo reluctantly appealed for help to appeal to Īl-Ghāzī Ibn Artuq of Mārdīn and Mayyāfāriqīn in Diyār Bakr. Īl-Ghāzī Ibn Artuq accepted

that appeal, and took over the city in 511/began 5 May 1117.

Although Īl-Ghāzī had kept his main bases, Mārdīn and Mayyāfāriqīn in north east Mesopotamia, (al-Jazīra) and not Aleppo which was more important than these rather smaller cities in Diyār Bakr, he would get himself involved in fighting the Crusaders in Syria.<sup>107</sup>

It seems that Ṭughtekīn had persuaded his son-in-law Īl-Ghāzī Ibn Artuq to take Aleppo and to ally himself with him against the Crusaders, especially those of Antioch who were planning to take Aleppo.

As mentioned above, in Dhū'l-Ḥijja 512/began 11 March 1119, Ṭughtekīn visited Aleppo and met the new governor Īl-Ghāzī Ibn Artuq. He succeeded in establishing a strong alliance with him against the Franks. While Ṭughtekīn was in Aleppo, he learnt that the Franks had plundered the regions of Ḥawrān, which belonged to the Emirate of Damascus, and killed some people and captured others. Ṭughtekīn marched to the city of Damascus to defend his capital. Īl-Ghāzī made a truce with the Crusaders of Antioch, and then went to Mārdīn to muster Turkomans from Diyār Bakr to fight the Crusaders.<sup>108</sup>

On 15 Rabī' I 513/26 June 1119, Ṭughtekīn with the forces of Damascus and his ally Īl-Ghāzī who succeeded in assembling twenty thousand Turkomans, according to Ibn al-Athīr, or forty thousand according to Ibn al-'Adīm, learnt of the advance of Roger of Antioch with three hundred horsemen and nine thousand footsoldiers towards the valley of 'Afrīn near al-Athārib; they surprised Roger's army and slaughtered Antioch's armed forces in Balāṭ, a few miles north of al-Athārib. According to Ibn al-'Adīm, the Muslim army lost only twenty men, and virtually the whole army of Antioch including Prince Roger of Antioch was slaughtered in the field. Only twenty men escaped death. After this disaster at Balāṭ (the field of the Blood) Īl-Ghāzī Ibn Artuq did not march to capture Antioch, which had lost almost all its forces. According to Ibn al-Qalānisī, the Turkomans were delighted with their loot and were in too much of a hurry to go home to Diyār Bakr. He adds that Ṭughtekīn did not join in this battle personally. Īl-Ghāzī had no "sincere advisor" like Ṭughtekīn to encourage him to capture Antioch. According to Ibn al-'Adīm, the Turkomans of Īl-Ghāzī pushed him to fight the Crusaders with his own army without waiting for the army of Damascus, which did not arrive in time to join his army at Balāṭ. According to Ibn al-Qalānisī, Īl-Ghāzī missed a great opportunity to recover the city of Antioch for the Muslims.<sup>109</sup> It seems that Ibn al-Qalānisī is wrong to blame Īl-Ghāzī for not capturing Antioch, as

it appears that the Muslims at that time had no great interest in obtaining the capitals of the Crusaders' states because if they captured these important cities, the Crusaders in Latin Europe would send another great campaign as did indeed happen in 542/began 2 June 1147, after the fall of Edessa at the hands of Zangī of Mosul and Aleppo, on 26 Jumādā II 539/23 December 1144. This means that the Muslims were planning to exhaust the Crusaders in Syria, so that the Crusaders would be forced to leave Syria to the Muslims. Later on, especially in the early years of Nūr al-Dīn Maḥmūd Ibn Zangī's rule in Aleppo, Nūr al-Dīn would do the same thing with Antioch, when he would annihilate its army in Ṣafar 544/began 11 June 1149 at Innab, thirty-five miles south west of Aleppo.

Before his defeat on "The Field of Blood", Roger of Antioch had requested help from King Baldwin II, who was involved in fighting the men of Damascus near the River Jordan. After his success in driving them away from his territories, he hurried to aid the people of Antioch, who had lost their army in "The Field of Blood". It appears that Ṭughtekīn had sent these forces to keep Baldwin II busy in order to prevent him from helping Antioch. King Baldwin II with the army of the Kingdom and that of Edessa, which was still under his authority as a count of Edessa, marched to Zardānā, fifteen miles south west of Aleppo. When the people of Jerusalem heard about the march of Īl-Ghāzī, they argued with each other

about whether to advance to fight Īl-Ghāzī or to stay in Jerusalem.<sup>110</sup> According to Fulcher of Chartres, Baldwin II advanced to Antioch, which the Turkomans had plundered, and its people did not dare to go outside more than a mile. When they were notified of the approach of Baldwin II, they withdrew towards Aleppo. Then Īl-Ghāzī marched towards Artāḥ, where the Damascene army, headed by Ṭughtekīn joined his army. Then they succeeded in recovering al-Athārib and Zardanā, whose lord had gone to Antioch. Most of the Turkomans of Īl-Ghāzī turned back home after his recovery of Zardanā. Then Īl-Ghāzī and Ṭughtekīn advanced towards Dānīth, and met Robert the Leper the former Crusader governor of Zardanā, who had been in Antioch, with four hundred horsemen plus the footsoldiers. The Crusaders defeated the Muslims at first, but the Muslims managed to force the Crusaders to withdraw to Ḥiṣn Hāb, which belonged to them. Then the Crusaders including those of Jerusalem, Tripoli and the fortress of Zardanā met the Muslims near Dānīth. According to Fulcher of Chartres, many Turkomans and Franks were killed or injured in an indecisive battle which lasted for three days near Ma'arrat Miṣrīn, ten miles north east of Dānīth. He adds that then Baldwin II retired to Antioch and the great part of Īl-Ghāzī's army turned back home.<sup>111</sup> Ibn al-Athīr believes that the armies of Īl-Ghāzī and Ṭughtekīn besieged the Frankish army for three days. But they gave up the siege because Ṭughtekīn was afraid that the Franks would fight



desperately. Also Ṭughtekīn had doubts about the horses of the Turkomans, which fled easily, not like the horses of the Franks which were better trained for fighting than those of the Turkomans. Besides, Īl-Ghāzī had not enough money for the Turkomans to keep them for a long time.<sup>112</sup>

The year 515/began 22 March 1121, Ṭughtekīn lost one of his main allies, al-Afdal, wazīr of Egypt. This wazīr and his father Badr al-Jamālī had ruled Egypt for about fifty years. They had been able to concentrate all the powers in their own hands. The Fatimid Caliph al-Āmir bi-Ahkāmi'-llāh, had his wazīr murdered.<sup>113</sup>

On 23 Jumādā I 518/7 July 1124, the important strategic city of Tyre was captured by the Crusaders. Eight years previously, in 510/began 16 May 1116, Tyre became the only coastal city bar 'Asqalān not occupied by the Franks. King Baldwin II established a fortress called Scandelion between Acre and Tyre, to facilitate its capture. This fortress would be a shelter for the Franks, if they were defeated by the people of Tyre.<sup>114</sup> Baldwin I tried, as mentioned above, in 505/1112 to capture the city, but he failed. Ṭughtekīn played a significant role in foiling this attempt, as mentioned above. William of Tyre believes that Tyre, before its capture by the Franks in 518/began 19 February 1124, was subject to the Fatimid Caliphate. Two parts of it were

ruled by the Fatimid Caliph, al-Āmir bi-Aḥkāmi' llāh, and the third part of it was granted to Ṭughtekīn to protect against the Franks. This last part was not given to Ṭughtekīn as part of his own dominion.<sup>115</sup> On the other hand, Ibn al-Qalānisī gives us more details about the position of Tyre before its capture. He mentions that in 516/began 12 March 1122, the Fatimids of Egypt recovered Tyre from the Emirate of Damascus, when they plotted against its governor Mas'ūd. Tyre now became directly under Egyptian authority. But when the new governor discovered that he could not protect the city without the support of Ṭughtekīn, he wrote to him asking for help. Ṭughtekīn ironically replied that he should have asked not him but the Caliph in Egypt for help. When the Franks learnt about the dismissal of Mas'ūd and the appointment of a new governor, they made preparations for capturing the city. Anyhow, the new governor persuaded the Fatimid Caliph to give the city back to Ṭughtekīn who did agree to take it back and appointed a new governor whom he sent with a group of commanders to protect the city. Ṭughtekīn thought that the people of Tyre, with their new governor, could be relied upon to defend the city, but he was disappointed.<sup>116</sup>

Tyre was one of the most strongly fortified cities at the time. It was like an island encircled by a stormy sea. It was risky to enter the city from the sea, because of its hidden rocks which could cause severe

damage to ships if their sailors were not familiar with the coast and so able to avoid these hidden dangers.

"On the seaside, Tyre was surrounded by a double wall with towers of goodly height at equal distances apart. On the east, where the approach by land lies, it has a triple wall with enormously high and massive towers so close together that they almost touch one another. There was a broad mole also, through which the citizens could easily let in the sea from both sides. On the north, its entrance guarded by two towers, was the inside harbour which lay within the walls of the city. The outer shore of the island received the first violence of the waves and broke the force of the raging sea. Thus, a safe harbour, for vessels was formed between the island and the land, which was entirely sheltered from all winds except that from the north".<sup>117</sup>

In 518/1124, the Franks blockaded Tyre from the sea and the land. According to William of Tyre, "The Christians drew up all their ships on dry land near the harbour, with the exception of one galley that was kept ready for any emergency which might arise. They then dug a deep ditch from the sea outside to that within, thus enclosing and protecting the entire army."<sup>118</sup> They built a great tower higher than the towers of the city, to overlook the entire city. And they made machines to throw big rocks to destroy the walls and towers of the city. The Tyrians were exhausted by the continuous attacks and skirmishes. But they succeeded through the use of their machines in reducing the efficiency of the Franks' machines.<sup>119</sup> Pons, Count of Tripoli, joined the Frankish army during the blockade of the city. His

arrival caused fear to the Tyrians on the one hand, and strengthened the Franks on the other.<sup>120</sup>

The Damascus horsemen in Tyre, who numbered about seven hundred, played a major part in defending the city and encouraging the Tyrians, most of whom were not sufficiently professional in the arts of fighting to defend their city effectively. During the blockade of Tyre, the people of 'Asqalān, who were under the authority of the Fatimid Caliphate, tried to decrease the pressure on the Tyrians by invading the lands of Jerusalem. But they were forced to withdraw. The Tyrians were disappointed by the attempts at help by the Fatimid Caliphate. Ṭughtekīn marched with a great army and encamped in the vicinity of Tyre about four miles from the city,<sup>121</sup> and the Franks heard a rumour that a great Egyptian fleet would come to aid the Tyrians. It was revealed that Ṭughtekīn would keep the Franks sufficiently occupied and give the Egyptian fleet a good opportunity to enter the harbour of the city. When the news of Ṭughtekīn's arrival reached the Franks, they decided to divide their army into three parts. The whole cavalry forces and the mercenary infantry led by the Count of Tripoli and William de Bury, the king's constable "because the King was a prisoner", were to stop Ṭughtekīn's army from advancing towards Tyre. The second part, led by the Doge of Venice Domenico Michiel was to prevent the Egyptian fleet entering the harbour

of Tyre. The last part was to take part in the siege of the city. Ṭughtekīn planned to cross the Orontes towards Tyre, but when he was informed about the Franks' advance towards him, he withdrew to Damascus. No Egyptian fleet had come, therefore the Venetian fleet pulled up their galleys on the land again. All the Frankish armies returned to the siege of the city.<sup>122</sup> When Ṭughtekīn learnt that the Tyrians would surrender to the Franks, after they had been exhausted, he marched again towards Tyre and camped near the river, a few miles from the city. The Franks again sent a part of their army to stop Ṭughtekīn's army. He sent messengers to the Frankish leaders to reach a compromise. On 23 Jumādā I 518/7 July 1124, after very hard arguments, they reached an agreement. The agreement included the following terms: first, the surrender of the city to the Franks, secondly, the Tyrians were to be allowed to leave the city with their money, and the last term was that the Tyrians who wished to stay in the city would be granted the right to keep their homes and their possessions. Most Tyrians left the city except some old people, who could not leave.<sup>123</sup>

Two years before the fall of Tyre, Aleppo suffered again from the Crusaders. On 6 Ramaḍān 516/8 November 1122, Ṭughtekīn lost his reliable ally Īl-Ghāzī who died in al-Fuḥūl, a village near the city of Mayyāfāriqīn. After the death of Īl-Ghāzī, his nephew Badr al-Dawla

Sulaymān Ibn 'Abd al-Jabbār Ibn Artuq, continued to rule over Aleppo, since his uncle had appointed him as governor. In the following year, Badr al-Dawla Sulaymān made a truce with the Crusaders of Antioch to surrender the fortress of al-Athārib, twenty miles west of Aleppo. In Rabī' I 517/began 28 April 1123, the Amīr Balak Ibn Bahrām Ibn Artuq of Khartpirt, nephew of Īl-Ghāzī, captured the city of Aleppo from his cousin Ibn 'Abd al-Jabbār, and managed to settle the situation in the city. According to Ibn al-Athīr, the surrender of al-Athārib made Balak capture the city of Aleppo. The Amīr Balak had captured both King Baldwin II of Jerusalem in Ṣafar 517/began April 1123 near Ḥiṣn Karkar (Gargar), and Count Joscelin, Count of Edessa in Rajab 516/began 5 September 1123 near Sarūj. The Amīr Balak, however, was killed in Rabī' I 518/began 18 April 1124, while he was besieging Manbij which belonged to Ḥassān al-Ba'albakkī. After Balak's murder, Ḥusām al-Dīn Timurtāsh Ibn Īl-Ghāzī received Aleppo on 20 Rabī' I 518/8 May 1124. Then he released King Baldwin II after the latter had paid a great ransom. During the reign of Ḥusām al-Dīn of Aleppo, the city was almost captured by the Franks. According to Ibn al-Athīr, the fall of Tyre on 23 Jumādā I 518/7 July 1124 induced the Crusaders to occupy Aleppo. He adds that Dubays Ibn Ṣadaqa Ibn Mazyad, the Twelver Shī'ī rebellious governor of Ḥilla in south Iraq, encouraged and helped the Crusaders to occupy the city of Aleppo. He did that in case they succeeded in

capturing Aleppo, in the hope that he would be their regent in Aleppo. Dubays Ibn Ṣadaqa Ibn Mazyad persuaded the Crusaders that the people of Aleppo, of whom the majority were Twelver Shī'īs, would help him by encouraging the surrendering of the city. On the other hand, the people of Aleppo wrote to Āq-Sunqur al-Bursuqī of Mosul, who had been reappointed as governor of Mosul in Ṣafar 515/began 22 April 1121, to hasten to take over their city before the arrival of the Crusaders and their ally Ibn Mazyad. When Āq-Sunqur al-Bursuqī took over the city, the Crusaders withdrew from their camp near Aleppo towards their own lands.<sup>124</sup>

In this year, Ṭughtekīn won for the second time the alliance of Āq-Sunqur al-Bursuqī which compensated him for the loss of his early ally Īl-Ghāzī in 516/1123.<sup>125</sup> As mentioned above, in 510/began 16 May 1116, Ṭughtekīn had allied himself with Āq-Sunqur al-Bursuqī of al-Raḥba against the Crusaders of Tripoli.

In 519/began 7 February, 1125, Ṭughtekīn's army joined al-Bursuqī's army in Hama and marched to capture Kafartāb, which belonged to the Franks. They recovered Kafartāb on 3 Rabī' II 519/10 May 1125.<sup>126</sup> Then they marched to besiege the castle of Zardana, which belonged to the Franks. They gave up the siege of Zardana because of its strong fortifications.<sup>127</sup> According to Fulcher of Chartres, Ṭughtekīn joined al-Bursuqī's army, only when

he advanced to besiege A'zāz, not after the capture of Kafartāb. King Baldwin II with the armies of Antioch, Tripoli and Edessa marched to rescue A'zāz. ʿUgtekīn's army and al-Bursuqī's were nearly defeated by the Franks on 16 Rabī' II 519/23 May 1125, and lost about two thousand men according to Fulcher of Chartres. Then ʿUgtekīn withdrew to protect Damascus against the Franks.<sup>128</sup>

In any event, the city of Damascus itself, would be the main target of the Crusaders in 519/began 7 February, 1125, for Baldwin II sent many messengers to the West to assist him in capturing the city of Damascus. Many new soldiers (pilgrims) came from the West to share in this campaign against Damascus. All the princes of the Franks in the East agreed to join this campaign.<sup>129</sup> When this news reached ʿUgtekīn, he wrote to the Turkomans especially in Diyār Bakr for help and made them generous offers. Two thousand Turkoman horsemen joined ʿUgtekīn's army near Marj al-Şuffar. According to Ibn al-Qalānisī, when the news of the assembly of ʿUgtekīn's army near Marj al-Şuffar reached the Franks, they advanced to face him. But according to Ibn al-Athīr and William of Tyre, ʿUgtekīn marched towards one of the Frankish armies numbering about one thousand men, who had come to plunder Marj al-Şuffar, which was one of the most important cultivated areas in Syria. He succeeded in annihilating this army,



of which only a few Franks escaped. He took much loot and obtained the famous holy objects which were in their camp.<sup>130</sup> The news of this disaster reached the main Frankish army, which was besieging Damascus. Because of this disaster, the Franks gave up their siege of Damascus.<sup>131</sup> According to Ibn al-Qalānisī, Ṭughtekīn was nearly defeated in a counter attack directly after this victory and was forced to turn back to Damascus. The next day, he advanced to meet the Franks, but he found out that they had left their camp on their way home.<sup>132</sup>

Unfortunately, on 8 Dhū'l-Hijja 520/26 December 1126, Ṭughtekīn lost his ally al-Bursuqī, who was killed by the Assassins in Mosul. 'Izz al-Dīn Mas'ūd, son of al-Bursuqī, who took over Aleppo and Mosul after his father's death, tried in the following year to capture the city of Damascus. Ṭughtekīn prepared to face him. According to Ibn al-'Adīm, 'Izz al-Dīn Mas'ūd thought that the killers of his father were some people of Hama which was under the rule of the Emirate of Damascus; he therefore bore the people of Syria, especially of Damascus, a grudge. Ṭughtekīn prepared to face him. Mas'ūd died after his capture of al-Raḥba on his way to Damascus. Ibn al-'Adīm believes that he took some kind of poison, while Ibn al-Athīr and Ibn al-Qalānisī believe that his death was caused by a serious illness.<sup>133</sup>

In 522/began 6 January 1128, Ṭughtekīn became seriously ill. Before his death, he stipulated that his eldest son Tāj al-Mulūk Būrī should follow his policy in fighting the Franks and protecting his dominions. After Būrī had accepted this condition, Ṭughtekīn gave orders that he should be his heir in the Emirate of Damascus. Ṭughtekīn died on 8 Ṣafar of this year/11 February 1127. No indication from the main historical sources about his age is given. But it is reasonable to suggest that he was over fifty, because he became a grand father about the twelfth year before his death. According to Ibn al-Qalānisī, on 12 Rabī' II 520/8 May 1126, Ṭughtekīn had sent his grandson Maḥmūd Ibn Būrī to Tadmur with a reliable commander as his Atābek.<sup>134</sup>

## Notes

Full information on all the references quoted is given in the bibliography.

<sup>1</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, *Dhayl tārīkh Dimashq*. Ed. H F. Amedroz. (Leyden, 1908), p. 131.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 131

<sup>3</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 131; Ibn al-Azraq, *Tārīkh al-Fāriqī*, ed. B. A. L. 'Awaḍ, rev. M. S. Ghorbal (Cairo, 1959), p. 237.

<sup>4</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 131.

<sup>5</sup> Ibn al-'Adīm, *Zubdat al-ḥalab min tārīkh Ḥalab*. Ed Sāmī Dahhān. (Damascus, 1954), p. 119; Ḥusayn Amīn, *Tārīkh al-Irāq fī al-'aṣr al-Saljūqī*. (Baghdad, 1965), p. 205.

<sup>6</sup> Ibn al-'Adīm, pp. 119-120; Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 130; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil fī al-tārīkh*. (Cairo, 1929), Vol. VIII, p. 176.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid*, 175.

<sup>8</sup> Ibn al-'Adīm, vol. II, pp. 120-121; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 130.

<sup>9</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 131; Ibn al-Athīr, Vol. VIII, p. 176.

<sup>10</sup> Ibn al-'Adīm, Vol. II, p. 125.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 125-126.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 126.

<sup>13</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, p. 184.

<sup>14</sup> Ibn al-'Adīm, pp. 127-129; Ibn al-Athīr, 184; Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 133.

<sup>15</sup> Ibn al-'Adīm, pp. 129-130.

<sup>16</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, p. 186.

<sup>17</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 134; Ṣafī al-Dīn 'Abdu'l Mu'min al-Baghdādī. *Marāṣid al-iṭṭilā'*, ed. 'Alī al-Bajawī, (Dār iḥyā' al-kutub al-'Arabiyya, n.p., 1954), 637.

<sup>18</sup> Matthew of Edessa, *The Chronicle of Matthew of Edessa.*, Tras. by Ara Edmond Dostourian. (Michigan, 1972), Vol. II, p. 300.

<sup>19</sup> Ibn al-'Adīm, p. 136.

<sup>20</sup> 'A. al-Janzūrī, *Imārat al-Ruhā al-Ṣalībiyya.* (Cairo, 1975), p. 65.

<sup>21</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, pp. 186-187; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 134, 136.

<sup>22</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 135.

<sup>23</sup> Abu'l Maḥāsin Yūsuf Ibn Taghribirdī, *al-Nujūm al-zāhira fī mulūk Miṣr wa'l Qāhira.*, Vol. V, p. 159.

<sup>24</sup> al-Baghdādī, *Marāṣid al-iṭṭilā'*, Vol. III, p. 1288; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 136-37.

<sup>25</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, pp. 136-137.

<sup>26</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 137; Ibn al-Azraq, p. 269.

<sup>27</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, p. 199; Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 139.

<sup>28</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, pp. 199-200; Ibn al-Qalānisī, pp. 139-140.

<sup>29</sup> 'Umar Tadmurī, *Tārīkh Tarāblus al-siyāsī wa'l-ḥaḍārī 'abr al-'uṣūr*. Vo. I, second edition. (Beirut, 1984), p. 404; Ibn al-Athīr, p. 200.

<sup>30</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, p. 210; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 141.

<sup>31</sup> Ibn al-'Adīm, pp. 146-147; Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 142.

<sup>32</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 142.

<sup>33</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, p. 218; Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 142; Suhayl Zakkār, *Madkhal ilā tārīkh al-ḥurūb al-Ṣalībiyya*, p. 75.

<sup>34</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, p. 221; Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 144.

<sup>35</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, p. 222; Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 144.

<sup>36</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 144

<sup>37</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, p. 222; Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 145.

<sup>38</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, p. 222; Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 145.

<sup>39</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 145.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid*, p. 145

<sup>41</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, pp. 228-229; Ibn al-Qalānisī, pp. 148-149.

<sup>42</sup> Fulcher of Chartres, *A History of the Expedition to Jerusalem*. Ed. Harold Fink. (Tennessee, 1969), pp. 185-187; Ibn al-Athīr, pp. 228-229.; Ibn al-Qalānisī, pp. 148-149

<sup>43</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, p. 227; Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 112, 146.

<sup>44</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, p. 127; Ibn al-Qalānisī, pp. 146-147.

<sup>45</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 148.

<sup>46</sup> M. Yūsuf, "The Economic History of Syria During 4th/5th A.H. Centuries/10-11 A.D." Ph. D. Thesis. (Princeton University, 1982), p. 154.

<sup>47</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 148.

<sup>48</sup> Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī, *Mu'jam al-buldān*. (Beirut, 1955), Vol. I, p. 441; Ibn al-Qalānisī, pp. 148-149.

<sup>49</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 149.

<sup>50</sup> al-Baghdādī, *Marāṣid al-iṭṭilā'*, Vol. II, p. 1; Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 151; 'Izz al-Dīn Ibn Shaddād, *al-A'lāq al-khaṭīra fī dhikr umarā' al-Shām wa'l-Jazīra*, Vol I. Ed. S. Dahhān (Damascus, 1963), pp. 86-88; William, Archbishop of Tyre, *History of Deeds Done Beyond the Sea*. Ed. E. A. Babcock and A. C. Krey. (New York, 1976), Vol I, pp. 469-470.

<sup>51</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, pp. 250-251; Ibn al-Qalānisī, pp. 160-161; Tadmurī, *Tārīkh Ṭarāblus*, p. 438.

<sup>52</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, p. 251; Ibn al-Qalānisī, pp. 160-161.

<sup>53</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 163.

<sup>54</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, pp. 255-256; Ibn al-Qalānisī, pp. 161-162; S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, vol. II. (Cambridge, 1952), p. 96.

<sup>55</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, p. 251; Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 162.

<sup>56</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 163; Tadmurī, *Tārīkh Ṭarāblus*, p. 438.

<sup>57</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, p. 256; Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 162.

<sup>58</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 164; al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Dhahabī, *al-'Ibar fī khabar man ghabar*. ed. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Munajjid, vol. IV, (Kuwait, 1963), p. 3; Runciman, p. 96.

<sup>59</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 165.

<sup>60</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, p. 259.

<sup>61</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, pp. 165-166.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 166.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 166-169.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 168.

<sup>65</sup> Matthew of Edessa, p. 370.

<sup>66</sup> Fulcher of Chartres, 198; Ibn al-Qalānisi, pp. 169-170.

<sup>67</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisi, p, 170.

<sup>68</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisi, p. 174; Ibn Shaddād, p. 88. It seems that the editor of *Dhayl tāriḫ Dimashq* copied the name of al-Ḥabābiyya by mistake as al-Jabāniyya.

<sup>69</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisi, 174-178; Runciman, 38.

<sup>70</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisi, 179.

<sup>71</sup> Fulcher of Chartres, 203; Ibn al-Qalānisi, 178; William of Tyre 491.

<sup>72</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisi, 178-179.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., 179.

<sup>74</sup> Fulcher of Chartres, 203; Ibn al-Qalānisi, 181; William of Tyre, 491.

<sup>75</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisi, 182; H. A. R. Gibb *The Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades*. (London, 1932), 129.

<sup>76</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisi, 182.

<sup>77</sup> Ibn al-ʿAdīm, 163.

<sup>78</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, 266; Ibn al-Qalānisi, 184.



<sup>79</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 184; 'Imād al-Dīn Khalīl, *al-Muqāwama al-Islāmiyya lil ghazw al-Ṣalībī*. (Al-Riyād, 1981), 49-50.

<sup>80</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 184. I could not trace the origin of Ḥiṣn al-Thamānīn.

<sup>81</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 185; H. A. R. Gibb, *The Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades*. Trs. of *Dhayl tārīkh Dimashq* by Ibn al-Qalānisī. (London, 1932), 134.

<sup>82</sup> Fulcher of Chartres, 201.

<sup>83</sup> William of Tyre, 494.

<sup>84</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 185.

<sup>85</sup> Fulcher of Chartres, 290; Ibn al-Athīr, 264; Matthew of Edessa, 398.

<sup>86</sup> Fulcher of Chartres, 209.

<sup>87</sup> William of Tyre, 494.

<sup>88</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 185.

<sup>89</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, 266; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 185.

<sup>90</sup> Fulcher of Chartres, 209; William of Tyre, 494.

<sup>91</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, 271; Matthew of Edessa, 311.

<sup>92</sup> Ibn al-'Adīm, 163; Ibn al-Athīr, 269.

<sup>93</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, 272; William of Tyre, 501; 'I. Khalīl, *al-*

*Muqawāma al-Islāmiyya lil ghazw al-Ṣalībī*, al-Riyāḍ, 1981, p. 113.

<sup>94</sup> Fulcher of Chartres, 211.

<sup>95</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, 271.

<sup>96</sup> Ibn al-'Adīm, 175.

<sup>97</sup> Fulcher of Chartres, 212.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, 214.

<sup>99</sup> Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz al-ḥunafā'*. Ed. M. H. M. Aḥmad, Vol. 3. (Cairo, 1973), 51.

<sup>100</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī. 188-89.

<sup>101</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 192-97; Ibn al-'Adīm, 174-177.

<sup>102</sup> Carole Hillenbrand, "The Career of Najm al-Dīn Īl-Ghāzī", *Der Islam*, Vol. 58, 1981, 263.

<sup>103</sup> Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz al-ḥunafā'*, (Cairo, 1973), Vol. III, 53-54.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, 54.

<sup>105</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 197-198; al-Dhahabī, 20. Note that Ibn al-Qalānisī by mistake called Āq-Sunqur al-Bursuqī "the owner of Mosul." Refer to Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, 273.

<sup>106</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, 284; William of Tyre, 514-515.

<sup>107</sup> C. Hillenbrand, 267-69.

<sup>108</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, 284.

<sup>109</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, 288-289; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 200-201; Ibn al-'Adīm, 187-190; al-Dhahabī, 28. Noted that al-Dhahabī estimates the army of Antioch at twenty thousand men.

<sup>110</sup> Fulcher of Chartres, 228-33; Usāma Ibn Munqidh, *Kitāb al-i'tibār*. Ed. Philip K. Hitti, Princeton, 1930, 153.

<sup>111</sup> Fulcher of Chartres, 233-34; Ibn al-'Adīm, 191-192.

<sup>112</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, 288-89.

<sup>113</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 203; al-Dhahabī, 34-35. Note that according to al-Dhahabī, al-Afdal left after his murder a great amount of money, which is a shame to mention. This indication shows us how al-Afdal was interested in collecting his own wealth and at the same time not using it while fighting the Crusaders.

<sup>114</sup> Runciman, 99; William of Tyre, 514-515.

<sup>115</sup> William of Tyre, Vol. II, 12-13.

<sup>116</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 211.

<sup>117</sup> William of Tyre, 8-9.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*, 11-13.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, 14-15.

<sup>123</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 211; William of Tyre, Vol. II, 19.

<sup>124</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, 302, 309, 311, 313, 315-316; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 211-12; Runciman, 171; al-Dhahabī, 42; M. 'A. Ibn al-'Umrānī, *al-Inbā' fi tārīkh al-khulafā'*. Ed. Qāsim al-Samarrā'ī, al-Riyāḍ, 1982, 214.

<sup>125</sup> William of Tyre, 24

<sup>126</sup> Fulcher of Chartres, 279-81; Ibn al-'Adīm, 231.

<sup>127</sup> Fulcher of Chartres, 279.

<sup>128</sup> Fulcher of Chartres, 279-81; Ibn al-'Adīm, 231.

<sup>129</sup> William of Tyre, 40.

<sup>130</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, 322; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 213-214; William of Tyre, 41.

<sup>131</sup> William of Tyre, 41-42.

<sup>132</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 214.

<sup>133</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, 320-21; Ibn al-'Adīm, 236-37; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 216-17.

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*, 214-215, 218-219.

CHAPTER III  
 THE REIGN OF TĀJ AL-MULŪK BŪRĪ IBN ZAHĪR  
 AL-DĪN ṬUGHTEKĪN  
 522-526/1128-1132

In understanding the reign of Tāj al-Mulūk Būrī a survey of the background of the Bāṭiniyya in Syria is an essential element, and of particular importance is the history of the Bāṭiniyya in Damascus. The Bāṭiniyya movement was the main issue facing Būrī during his short reign of four and a half years from 8 Ṣafar 522/11 February 1128 till 21 Rajab 526/6 June 1132.

The Bāṭiniyya movement was the sect, which split from the Ismā'īlīs of Egypt after the death of the Fatimid Caliph al-Mustaṣṣir on 18 Dhū'l-Ḥijja 487/30 December 1094 and were known as the Nizārīs.<sup>1</sup> This sect did not recognize the imamate of al-Musta'li, who succeeded his father al-Mustaṣṣir in 487/began 21 January 1094. They believe in the imamate of Nizār the eldest son of al-Mustaṣṣir. Al-Ḥasan al-Ṣabbāḥ who headed this sect from 487 till 518/1094 till 1124,<sup>2</sup> had established himself in the castle of Alamūt three years before this date. According to Ibn al-Athīr, al-Ḥasan al-Ṣabbāḥ occupied this formidable castle in 484/began 23 February 1091.<sup>3</sup> This sect is well-known by Muslim historians by the name of the Bāṭiniyya or Nizāriyya.

This movement is well known by current historians especially in the west as the Assassin movement. The history of the movement in Syria is problematic as tends to be the case with most secret sects. A possible reason for this is that Bāṭinī historical sources were destroyed by their enemies or possibly the Bāṭinī historians were not interested in writing their own history.<sup>4</sup>

The political confusion in Syria in the early twelfth century helped the Bāṭinīs to establish their Da'wa in a short time there. The rivalry between King Ridwān of Aleppo and his brother King Duqāq of Damascus gave the Bāṭinīs a great opportunity to gain the protection of Ridwān in return for helping him against his brother Duqāq. Also, the absence of a unified authority in Syria helped the Bāṭinīs to establish their Da'wa there. All independent states in Syria such as Damascus, Aleppo, Tripoli and Shayzar, were eager to expand their dominions at the expense of their neighbours. This situation made it impossible for weak states to cooperate against the Bāṭinī movement. Furthermore, the coming of the Crusaders, who established themselves on the Syrian coast, kept Syrian states occupied fighting the invaders rather than fighting the Bāṭiniyya.<sup>5</sup> This was a particularly intractable problem as, while the Crusaders presented an obvious and easily identifiable threat, the insidious

nature of the activities of the Bāṭiniyya made opposition to the Bāṭiniyya difficult to mount, because of the problems of establishing precisely the location of the enemy within.

During the reign of Riḍwān of Aleppo from 17 Ṣafar 488/28 February 1095 till 18 Jumādā II 507/28 November 1114, Aleppo became the main centre of the Bāṭiniyya in Syria. Riḍwān granted the Bāṭinīs of Aleppo his protection in 490/began 19 December 1096. In the same year, the threat of the Crusaders became serious for Aleppo. Many of Riḍwān's commanding amīrs denounced his peaceful policy toward the Crusaders. Riḍwān himself compounded his difficulties by becoming a patron of the Bāṭinīs in Syria. The reason for his protection of the Bāṭinīs was probably his need for their help against his brother King Duqāq of Damascus and his Atābek Tuḡtekīn.<sup>6</sup>

According to Ibn al-'Adīm, the Dā'ī of the Bāṭiniyya in Aleppo called al-Ḥakīm al-Munajjim introduced King Riḍwān of Aleppo to the sect of the Bāṭiniyya. He adds that this Dā'ī worsened the relations between King Riḍwān and his Atābek Janāḥ al-Dawla Ḥusayn of Ḥims.<sup>7</sup> Ibn Taghribirdī in his study *al-Nujūm al-zāhira*, mentions that Riḍwān was the first Muslim leader in Syria at the time to build a Dār al-Da'wa in Aleppo, effectively a school for spreading the Bāṭinī sect in

Syria. He appointed al-Ḥakīm al-Munajjim as the head of this school.<sup>9</sup> It seems that al-Ḥakīm al-Munajjim could be regarded as the personal counsellor of Riḍwān. Riḍwān gave another Bāṭinī leader called Ibrāhīm al-'Ajamī a very important position in Aleppo. This al-'Ajamī became the deputy of the citadel of Aleppo, a very sensitive position in Aleppo.<sup>9</sup>

Because of the protection of Riḍwān for the Bāṭinīs and their efforts, the Bāṭinī movement spread through Sarmīn, al-Jūz, Jabal al-Sammāq, Banū 'Ulaym, Buzā'a, al-Bāb, A'zāz and Afāmiya. Muṣṭafā Ghālib (a modern historian) in *A'lām al-Ismā'īliyya*, mentions that in 496/began 15 October 1102 Janāḥ al-Dawla Ḥusayn of Ḥimṣ conspired against the Bāṭinīs in Ḥimṣ. Then al-Ḥakīm al-Munajjim sent one of the fidāwiyya "commandos" and killed Janāḥ al-Dawla.<sup>10</sup> Al-Munajjim died naturally fourteen days after the killing of Janāḥ al-Dawla of Ḥimṣ on 22 Rajab 496/2 May 1103. M. G. S. Hodgson, the modern western historian, believes that the Bāṭiniyya assassinated Janāḥ al-Dawla in order to take over Ḥimṣ and to get more support from Riḍwān, who had strived to get rid of his former Atābek Janāḥ al-Dawla, his main opponent in Aleppo. After the killing of Janāḥ al-Dawla, the people of Ḥimṣ were frightened of the Bāṭinīs and the Crusaders. Most Turks of the city fled to Damascus, and the people of Ḥimṣ requested help from Ṭughtekīn. Ṭughtekīn marched to Ḥimṣ, took over the city and



settled the situation there. As mentioned in Chapter Two, the Crusaders tried to capture this city after the murder of its master Janāḥ al-Dawla, but Ṭughtekīn anticipated them in this. They, therefore, returned home.<sup>11</sup> Whether the Bāṭiniyya killed Janāḥ al-Dawla on their own responsibility, or whether they got permission from King Riḍwān who was probably planning to get rid of his rebel and former Atābek, the only person to derive real benefit from the murder of Janāḥ al-Dawla was Ṭughtekīn and the Emirate of Damascus. After the death of al-Ḥakīm al-Munajjim, a new leader was sent from Alamūt by al-Ḥasan al-Ṣabbāḥ. This new leader was called Abū Ṭāhir al-Ṣā'igh, (the goldsmith), from Persia as the previous leader was. This new leader was more daring and braver than the previous Dā'ī al-Munajjim.<sup>12</sup>

After the death of Sulṭān Berkiyārūq on 1 Rabī' II 489/31 March 1096, the new Sulṭān Muḥammad had greater success against the Bāṭinīs of Persia. He, furthermore, compelled Riḍwān to change his peaceful policy towards the Bāṭiniyya in Aleppo. In 499/1106, the Bāṭinīs of Sarmīn with the help of the local Bāṭinīs of Afāmiya, overthrew the regime of the city of Afāmiya, which was nominally under the suzerainty of Riḍwān. Although the Bāṭinīs soon lost Afāmiya to the Crusaders of Antioch, Riḍwān took this as reasonable justification for distancing himself from the Bāṭinīs. In the following year Riḍwān oppressed some of the Bāṭinīs in Aleppo and

expelled others from the city.<sup>13</sup>

In 504/began 20 July 1110, a wealthy Iranian called Abū Ḥarb, who was well known for his hostility to the Bāṭinīs, was killed in Aleppo; the people of Aleppo accused the Bāṭinīs of this assassination and launched an attack on them. They killed some of the Bāṭinīs, and no one could stop them, not even Riḍwān.<sup>14</sup>

On 18 Jumādā II 507/30 November 1114, King Riḍwān of Aleppo died and was succeeded by his son Alp Arslān who was only sixteen years old at the time. During his reign, the Bāṭinīs took over the fortress of Bālis on the road from Aleppo to Baghdad, from Alp Arslān.<sup>15</sup>

In the same year, under pressure from Sultān Muḥammad, the twelver Shī'a of Aleppo and the Aḥdāth of Aleppo, Alp Arslān ordered his people to arrest every Bāṭinī in Aleppo. According to Ibn al-'Adīm, over two hundred Bāṭinīs were arrested including their leader Abū Ṭāhir al-Ṣā'igh, while a group of them succeeded in fleeing. Among those who escaped were the Dā'ī Ḥusām al-Dīn Ibn Dimlāj who fled to al-Raqqa in Mesopotamia, and the Dā'ī Ibrāhīm al-'Ajamī who escaped to Shayzar; this was the deputy of the citadel of Aleppo, as has been mentioned above. Al-'Ajamī then fled to Shayzar, and was well received by the governor of the city. According to Ibn al-Galānisī, some of the Bāṭinīs who fled from

Aleppo went to the Crusaders.<sup>16</sup> In the same year, al-'Ajamī rewarded the hospitality of the people of Shayzar by plotting against them and he succeeded in capturing the fortress of Shayzar with one hundred Bāṭinīs from Afāmiya, Sarmīn, Ma'arrat al-Nu'mān and Ma'arrat Miṣrīn during the festival of Easter. He selected this time, because the leaders of Shayzar, the Banū Munqidh, were watching the Easter festivities of the Crusaders outside Shayzar. The reason which attracted the Bāṭinīs of Syria to capturing this city was probably the strategic position of its fortress on the top of a high mountain and their intention was to establish for themselves a base in Syria in order to settle their Da'wa there, as their followers had already done in Persia when they had the fortress of Alamūt. The people of Shayzar soon recaptured their fortress and killed all the Bāṭinīs in the fortress including their leader Ibrāhīm al-'Ajamī.<sup>17</sup>

After the massacre in Aleppo and their failure in Shayzar, the Bāṭinīs transferred their centre to the neighbourhood of Aleppo and to the south of Syria in the emirate of Damascus itself.<sup>18</sup>

In 510/began 16 May 1116, Sultān Muḥammad sent his wazīr Aḥmad Ibn Niẓām al-Mulk against the Bāṭinīs of Alamūt. It is probably that Sultān Muḥammad meant to demolish this movement by destroying its centre in

Alamūt. This campaign failed because of the refusal of the Bāwandids, the neighbours of Alamūt, to help this wazīr.<sup>19</sup> In the following year, another Saljūq attempt led by the amīr of Sāwa, Anūshtekīn Shīrgīr, against the Bāṭiniyya, failed after a long siege of Alamūt. The castle almost surrendered but the news of the Sultān's death forced Shīrgīr to raise the siege.<sup>20</sup> It seems that the failure of these attempts to suppress the Bāṭiniyya in Persia, strengthened the movement in Syria itself.

In 511/began 5 May 1117, Īl-Ghāzī of Mārdīn became master of Aleppo. He decided to establish special relations with the Bāṭinīs in Aleppo. According to Ibn al-Qalānisī, he did so in order to avoid the evil consequences of opposing the Bāṭiniyya.<sup>21</sup> Īl-Ghāzī successfully employed a cunning stratagem against the Bāṭinīs of Aleppo. In 516/began 12 March 1122, while Īl-Ghāzī was on his way towards Mārdīn, he received a messenger from Bahrām al-'Ajamī, the leader of the Bāṭinīs of Syria who was living in Aleppo. Bahrām requested that Īl-Ghāzī cede the citadel al-Sharīf which was in the city of Aleppo to himself. Īl-Ghāzī quietly declared that he had just commanded the destruction of this citadel and claimed that he would give them the citadel if the work of devastation had not already commenced. At once, he sent a message by pigeon to his commander there ordering the immediate destruction of the citadel. When the Bāṭinīs' envoy returned to Aleppo,

he found that the destruction of the citadel had begun. When the Bāṭinīs of Aleppo discovered Īl-Ghāzī's trick, they denounced Īl-Ghāzī's action. Īl-Ghāzī mollified the Bāṭinīs by claiming that he would gladly have handed over the citadel to them if they had requested it secretly and not in public. In Jumādā II 515/began 18 August 1121, Īl-Ghāzī destroyed this strategic and fortified citadel in Aleppo, probably in order to prevent the Bāṭinīs from establishing themselves in Aleppo in the future.<sup>22</sup> According to Ibn al-'Adīm, Īl-Ghāzī ordered his regent in Aleppo, his son Shams al-Dawla Sulaymān to destroy the citadel of al-Sharīf in the city of Aleppo and to dismiss all the soldiers of Riḍwān, the former king of Aleppo outside the city.<sup>23</sup> It seems that the soldiers of Riḍwān were Bāṭinīs.

When Īl-Ghāzī's nephew, Nūr al-Dawla Balak Ibn Bahrām Ibn Artuq, became master of Aleppo in Rabī' I 517/began 28 April 1123, he treated the Bāṭinīs roughly, which was at variance with his uncle's peaceful policy. He arrested the agent of Bahrām, the chief Dā'ī in Syria and expelled the Bāṭinīs from Aleppo in 518,<sup>24</sup> On 19 Rabī' I 518/6 May 1124, Balak was killed by an arrow, while he was besieging Manbij. No historian has accused the Bāṭinīs of killing him, but a fair inference would be that they did indeed kill him, and that one of the Bāṭinīs shot him because he had expelled them from their original centre in Aleppo. Ibn al-Athīr mentions that in

the same year the people of Āmid revolted against the Bāṭinīs in their city probably in order to avenge the killing of their great leader Balak.<sup>25</sup>

On 8 Dhū'l-Ḥijja 520/19 December 1126, the Bāṭinīs killed Āq-Sunqur al-Bursuqī of Mosul and Aleppo. Ibn al-Galānisī mentions that al-Bursuqī was cautious about the Bāṭiniyya.<sup>26</sup> According to al-Ḥāfiz al-Dhahabī, al-Bursuqī oppressed the Bāṭinīs in Aleppo during his rule over Aleppo from Dhū'l-Ḥijja 518/began 9 January 1125 till 8 Dhū'l-Ḥijja 520/25 December 1126. According to Ibn al-Athīr, ten Bāṭinīs killed al-Bursuqī in the main mosque of Mosul during the Jum'a prayer. Investigation subsequently revealed that these Bāṭinīs had come to Mosul several years previously with the intention of killing al-Bursuqī, but they had failed several times and only succeeded in killing him on that date. Ibn al-Athīr added that the prince of Antioch Bohemond II, informed Mas'ūd Ibn al-Bursuqī about his father's murder before he received any official communication from his father's commanders. Ibn al-Athīr appears to have thought that this news reached the prince of Antioch through the Crusaders, who were working as spies among the Muslims.<sup>27</sup>

In 520/began 27 January 1126, Bahrām al-'Ajāmī, the leader of the Bāṭinīs in Syria, succeeded in winning many followers to his sect in Aleppo and Damascus.

During his reign (511-516/1117-1122) Īl-Ghāzī of Aleppo was reluctant to try and persuade his father-in-law Ṭughtekīn of Damascus to allow Bahrām to stay in Damascus. But he asked Ṭughtekīn to pay Bahrām due respect so as to escape the fate associated with crossing the Assassins. Bahrām requested that from Īl-Ghāzī, because he faced many difficulties from the people of Aleppo especially the Twelver Shī'a who had opposed the Bāṭinīs during the reign of Riḍwān of Aleppo (488-507/1095-1112). Ibn al-Athīr mentions that Bahrām might well have been able to occupy the city of Damascus, but did not do so because the majority of the population of the city was Sunnī, and hated the Bāṭiniyya. Also, he mentions that Bahrām did not trust the people of Damascus precisely because they were Sunnīs. Then Īl-Ghāzī suggested to Ṭughtekīn that he give him a fortress as a stronghold for his followers. Whether or not Īl-Ghāzī managed to persuade Ṭughtekīn to surrender the city of Bānyās to the Bāṭiniyya, the fact that Īl-Ghāzī died four years previously to the handing over of this city to the Bāṭiniyya, makes it improbable that Īl-Ghāzī's suggestion played any part in the matter. In Dhū'l-Qa'da 520/began 18 November 1127, the wazīr of Ṭughtekīn called Abū 'Alī Ṭāhir al-Mazdaqānī, an ally of Bahrām, suggested to Ṭughtekīn the surrender of the city of Bānyās.<sup>28</sup>

According to Abū'l-Mahāsīn Yūsuf Ibn Taghribirdī,

al-Mazdaqānī was Sunnī not Bāṭinī, but he was forced to support to the Bāṭiniyya in order to gain the Bāṭinīs' support against his rival the chief of the Aḥdāth movement, the Ra'īs of Damascus Thiqat al-Mulk Mufarrij Ibn al-Ṣūfī.<sup>29</sup> If this conjecture is right, this was a further instance of the Bāṭinī exploitation of the internal problems of Damascus in order to establish themselves in the city, just as they had previously done in Aleppo, when they had supported King Riḍwān against his former Atābek Janāḥ al-Dawla Ḥusayn in 496/began 15 October 1102, as mentioned above. Ṭughtekīn reluctantly handed over the city of Bānyās, one of the main strategic cities in Syria to Bahrām. When Bahrām received Bānyās, in Dhū'l-Qa'da 520/began 18 November 1127, he assembled all his followers in this city and refortified the citadel of Bānyās. The Bāṭinīs in Bānyās became a serious threat to the people of Damascus, because they used to waylay anybody passing near their boundaries. According to Ibn al-Qalānisi, the people of Damascus especially the 'Ulamā', pious people and amīrs suffered at the hands of the sect, but nobody dared to say a word about this movement because of their fear of Atābek Ṭughtekīn and of the "Bāṭinīs' revenge".<sup>30</sup> Ṭughtekīn was disturbed by the Bāṭinīs' activities, but he died before he had the opportunity to take effective action against them.<sup>31</sup>

When on 8 Ṣafar 522/11 February 1123, Būrī succeeded



his father as amīr of Damascus, he continued his father's policy of not showing hostility towards the Bāṭiniyya. Ibn al-Qalānisi describes in detail the anxiety of Būrī who was very disturbed by this sect. He tells us that Būrī hid his plan to destroy this movement even from his most trusted commanders.<sup>32</sup> It seems that Būrī at that time did not have any power to suppress the Bāṭiniyya especially since this movement had attracted many adherents among the people of Damascus. To suppress the sect, he needed public support not only from the Sunnis of the Emirate of Damascus but also from all the other sects such as the Twelver Shī'īs, Druzes and Nuṣairīs. Although Ibn al-Qalānisi does not mention in detail Būrī's plan for suppressing of this sect, we can infer its existence from the series of episodes later on, when all those sects cooperated with Būrī against the Bāṭinīs.<sup>33</sup>

In this year, Bahrām killed one of the tribal chieftains of Wādī al-Taym in the region of Ḥāṣbayya in al-Bīqa', called Burq Ibn Jandal with no apparent justification, but according to Ibn al-Qalānisi purely from his love of shedding the blood of innocent people. It seems, however, that Bahrām killed this amīr to take over his dominions.<sup>34</sup> The brother of this amīr called al-Ḍaḥḥāk, now amīr of Wādī al-Taym, which was inhabited by Druzes, Nuṣairīs, Majūs and others, decided to avenge the blood of his brother. Al-Ḍaḥḥāk with one thousand

men suddenly attacked Bahrām and his followers, who had marched to counter al-Ḍaḥḥāk's forces in Wādī al-Taym. Bahrām and his followers were slaughtered in that attack. One of al-Ḍaḥḥāk's warriors took the head of Bahrām to Egypt to announce the good news of the killing of the Bāṭinī leader in Syria. This warrior received a robe of honours and expensive presents from the Fatimid Caliph al-Āmir bi-Aḥkāmi-'llāh.<sup>35</sup> The historical sources do not mention the exact number of Bāṭinīs who died in this battle, but they declared that the Bāṭinīs suffered great losses. After this battle, the Bāṭinīs succeeded in recovering from this disaster and reestablished themselves in the cities of Damascus and Bānyās. Ismā'īl al-'Ajamī was sent from Alamūt to replace Bahrām as the new leader of the Bāṭinīs of Syria. Al-Mazdaqānī gave more support to the new Bāṭinī leader than he had to his predecessor Bahrām. According to Ibn al-Athīr, the wazīr al-Mazdaqānī appointed another Dā'ī in Damascus called Abū al-Wafā' as Bahrām's successor. This piece of information does however seem doubtful as, in the normal course of events, the selection process for a dā'ī of the Bāṭiniyya could only take place in Alamūt itself. Ibn al-Qalānisī believes that Ismā'īl al-'Ajamī became the head of the Bāṭinīs in Syria and he mentions nothing about Abū al-Wafā'. But it seems that Ibn al-Qalānisī mentions Abu al-Wafā' by another name, Shādhī al-Khādim, who was executed later on in the massacre of Bāṭinīs on 17 Ramaḍān 523/4 September 1129 in Damascus.<sup>36</sup> Ibn al-

Athīr mentions that the authority of Abū al-Wafā' in Damascus became stronger than that of the Amīr Būrī himself, after he received the help of the wazīr al-Mazdaqānī. He adds that al-Mazdaqānī plotted with the Crusaders to hand over the city of Damascus to them in exchange for their giving him Tyre. The Crusaders agreed to attack the city during the Jum'a prayer when all the Muslims in Damascus were preoccupied; the Bāṭinīs were to stand guard at the doors of the mosques to stop the people fighting the Crusaders as they entered the city. When the news of this conspiracy was revealed, Būrī decided to get rid of his wazīr and the Bāṭinīs in Damascus as well. He killed his wazīr and hung up his head in the citadel of Damascus, then ordered the people to kill every single Bāṭinī in the city. On 17 Ramaḍān 523/4 September 1129, ten thousand Bāṭinīs were killed in Damascus which constituted a purge of all the Bāṭinīs in the city.<sup>37</sup>

The population of Damascus in 543/began 22 May 1148 has been estimated at about 130.000 by Abū al-Fidā Ibn Kathīr, the Damascene historian; thus the Bāṭinīs represented a sizeable minority grouping in the city.<sup>38</sup>

Ibn al-Qalānisi gives an indication of the role of the Aḥdāth movement in killing Bāṭinīs in Damascus. This movement played a considerable role in the history of Damascus from the fourth century/the tenth Christian century. Among the Bāṭinī leaders who were killed in

Damascus was Shādhī al-Khādim, one of the followers of Abū Ṭāhir al-Ṣā'igh who was mentioned above as the first leader of the Bāṭinīs in Syria. Abū Ṭāhir had promulgated the Da'wa in Syria in the reign of King Ridwān of Aleppo.<sup>39</sup> After this disaster, Ismā'īl al-'Ajamī of Bānyās feared his subjects would rise against his followers as the people of Damascus had done and he was also frightened that Būrī of Damascus would attack the city. For these reasons, and others unspecified, he decided to hand over the city to the Crusaders. The Crusaders took over Bānyās in late 523/1129 and the Bāṭiniyya of Bānyās left the city, whence they moved to the Crusaders' territories. In early 524/1130 Ismā'īl al-'Ajamī died and Syria for a time was lost to the Bāṭiniyya, as far as providing any sort of base was concerned. Ibn al-Qalānisī indicates that the Bāṭinīs became scattered through the country and Ismā'īl al-'Ajamī, who died in Bānyās in early 524/began 15 December 1129, when it was under the Crusaders' control, and some of his followers settled in the Crusaders' territory. After the disaster of Bāṭinīs in Damascus in 523/1129, the cession of Bānyās and the death of the Bāṭinī leader in the following year, the Bāṭinīs lost all their power in Syria including Damascus. Although two Bāṭinīs succeeded in injuring Būrī on 5 Rajab 525/5 June 1131, these Bāṭinīs did not come from Syria, but rather they came directly from the headquarters of the Bāṭiniyya in Alamūt.<sup>40</sup> The Bāṭinīs were not to regain any

foothold in Damascus during the reigns of Tughtekīn's descendants, and did not reemerge there until after 549/1154 when Nūr al-Dīn took control of the city.

In Dhū'l-Qa'da 523/began 16 October 1129, only two months after the disaster for the Bāṭinīs in Damascus, the city of Damascus faced a new attempt by the Crusaders to occupy it. The importance of Damascus to the Crusaders has been previously mentioned together with their attempt to occupy the city in 519/1125 and their failure to do so. The disaster suffered by the Bāṭiniyya in Damascus in 523/1129, has also been mentioned as has the acceptance of Bānyās by the Crusaders from the Bāṭiniyya and the plot of the wazīr al-Mazdaqānī to hand over the city of Damascus to the Crusaders. There is more than one reason for the invasion of Damascus in 523/1129 by the Crusaders, which can be adduced. Ibn al-Athīr, who is the only historian of the time who mentions the plot of al-Mazdaqānī with the Crusaders to surrender the city of Damascus in return for Tyre by way of compensation, believes that the main reason for this attempt was the failure of this plot. On the other hand, Ibn al-Qalānisī reveals that the killing of the wazīr al-Mazdaqānī, the Crusader acceptance of Bānyās and the disaster suffered by the Bāṭiniyya in Damascus after the killing of the ten thousand Bāṭinīs, who had played an important part in the armed forces of the Emirate of Damascus, all made

the Crusaders believe that their chances of capturing the city in 523/1129 would be more likely to succeed than the preceding attempt in 519/began 7 February 1125. William of Tyre gives us no direct reason for this attempt. But he indicates that the issue of capturing Damascus was adopted by Hugh de Payens, the leader of the new Crusader military movement, the Knights of the Temple. This commander was urged by King Baldwin II and other Crusaders princes in the East to ask the Crusaders of the West for help. All the Crusaders forces in the East and the newcomers led by King Baldwin II marched in 523/1129 to lay siege to the city of Damascus.<sup>41</sup>

William of Tyre does not give us the estimated numbers of the Crusader army in this expedition. He probably omits this to depreciate the Damascene victory and to diminish the Crusaders' discomfiture in this battle. On the other hand, Muslim historians exaggerate the number of the Crusaders in order to magnify the extent of their triumph over them. Ibn al-Qalānisi estimates the number of both infantry and foot soldiers of the Crusaders about sixty thousand men.<sup>42</sup> Ibn al-Athīr estimates the knights at two thousand men with innumerable footsoldiers.<sup>43</sup>

It seems that the number in the Crusader army was not more than thirty thousand men including two thousand knights. If the estimated number of knights is correct,

it means that the Crusaders were suffering from a shortage not only of horses but also of knights at that period. We do not have exact numbers for the Damascene army in this battle from any of the main historians of the time. Ibn al-Qalānisi mentions many volunteers or mercenaries from among the Turkomans and Arab "bedouins" numbering in all some eight thousand troops. These were to help the army of Damascus which was likely mostly of Turkomans. We can also add some seven thousand men from the city of Damascus itself. The whole army of Damascus, therefore, would have numbered thirteen to fifteen thousand men. In Dhū'l-Qa'da 523/began 16 October 1129, the Crusaders advanced from Bānyās towards Damascus, descending on Jisr al-Khashab, six miles south west of the city, and camped there. The Damascene army, Turkomans, and Arabs headed by Murra Ibn Rabī'a advanced in several detachments which faced the Crusaders directly so as to be in a position to engage such of their detachments, as might come forward to attack. The Crusaders did not dare to start their assault for days. The Damascene army discovered that the delay of the Franks to start their attack was because they had sent the pick of their army towards Hawran to collect provisions.<sup>44</sup> William of Tyre tells us that the active part of the army numbered one thousand knights headed by William of Bures, Lord of Tiberias; he describes these knights as "men of lesser rank".<sup>45</sup> Būrī sent his best horsemen headed by Shams al-Khawāṣṣ with the 'Askar of

Hama, Turkomans and Arabs to attack the part of the Crusaders' army when they returned from Hawrān in an area called Burāq, about twenty six miles south west of Damascus. We have however no estimate of the numbers for Shams al-Khawāṣṣ's forces.<sup>46</sup> William of Tyre describes the army of William of Bures as incautious and unprepared for danger. This army was forced into flight and many of them were killed by the army of Shams al-Khawāṣṣ. He does not give us the number of the Crusaders' casualties.<sup>47</sup> Ibn al-Athīr mentions that only William of Bures and thirty-nine other Crusaders survived and escaped from the field of the battle. According to Ibn al-Athīr, however, three hundred Crusader knights were captured and the Damascene army took about ten thousand sheep as plunder.<sup>48</sup> After this disaster the main Crusader army decided to avenge their losses in Burāq, but according to William of Tyre, because of bad weather, they were forced to give up the siege of the city of Damascus.<sup>49</sup> On the other hand, Ibn al-Athīr and Ibn al-Qalānisī believe that the disaster of Burāq and fear of the great army of Damascus were the main reasons for the Crusaders' withdrawal.<sup>50</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī indicates that the people of Damascus had been in great fear of the Crusaders and that they had not dared to leave their city. They had won this unexpected victory in Burāq by the "grace of Allāh" and not by their own powers.<sup>51</sup>



It seems that the appearance of 'Imād al-Dīn Zangī of Mosul in 521/began 17 January 1127 as Atābek of Alp-Arslān Dāwūd Ibn Sulṭān Maḥmūd, and as governor of Aleppo in 522/1128, had a decisive effect upon the course of events in the establishment of a united power which was to affect the future of the Crusader States. 'Imād al-Dīn Zangī through the strength of his personality and his bravery was able to prove to the Saljūq Sulṭāns and Abbasid Caliphs his ability to establish a strong power base in a few years and shake the foundations of the Crusader States in Syria. Furthermore, the appearance of this leader also profoundly affected the future of the Emirate of Damascus. During Būrī's reign, Damascus lost Hama, one of its main cities, to Zangī. In 524/began 15 December 1129, Zangī sent a letter to Būrī requesting help in his campaigns against the Crusaders. After several messengers had been sent by Zangī to Būrī. Būrī complied with the request. But he required Zangī to swear not to plot against the army, which Būrī proposed to send to him. Ibn al-Qalānisī who mentions this oath, does not indicate why Būrī did not trust Zangī at that time. It seems that Būrī still remembered Zangī's plot against the previous ruler of Aleppo after he had captured the city in 522/began 6 January 1128. During his consolidation of authority in Aleppo, Zangī killed Khutlugh Aba, the previous Atābek of the son of Mas'ūd Ibn al-Bursuqī.<sup>52</sup> After he had taken the swearing of a

binding oath from Zangī, Būrī sent his best five hundred horsemen led by his commander the Amīr Shams al-Khawāṣṣ plus the army of Hama led by his son Bahā' al-Dīn Sawinj. The armies of Damascus and Hama were well received by Zangī, but after a few days Zangī conspired against them and imprisoned Sawinj and Shams al-Khawāṣṣ, their commanders and some of their best troops. The others were forced to flee. Then Zangī advanced towards Hama, whose guards had deserted to help him. He captured the city on 8 Shawwāl 524/5 October 1130 without fighting, after which he marched towards Ḥimṣ, which was under its independent ruler Khīr-Khān Ibn Qarāja. Khīr-Khān Ibn Qarāja had had official recognition to rule Ḥimṣ as his iqtā' from 509/began 27 May 1115, during the Saljūq Sultān's campaign against Ṭughtekīn and Īl-Ghāzī. According to Ibn al-Qalānisī, Ibn Qarāja had made an alliance with Zangī against Sawinj and he had incited Zangī against him. Zangī however imprisoned Ibn Qarāja and plundered his baggage and then ordered him to hand over Ḥimṣ for him. Ibn Qarāja sent to his son and his followers in Ḥimṣ requesting them to hand over the city to Zangī. The people of Ḥimṣ refused this order from their leader, as he was under duress. They resisted Zangī's forces for forty days, with the result that Zangī was forced to give up the siege of Ḥimṣ and went back to Mosul with his prisoners Sawinj Ibn Tāj al-Mulūk Būrī and some of his commanders. He sent the other prisoners to Aleppo.<sup>53</sup>

It seems that Zangī did not need any one to encourage him to capture Hama. 'Imād al-Dīn Khalīl in his study *'Imād al-Dīn Zangī* indicates that Zangī at that time had ambitions to capture the whole of the Emirate of Damascus. He started by taking Hama and Ḥimṣ to weaken the city of Damascus "like cutting off both wings of a bird". In this way capturing the city of Damascus should be made easy for him.<sup>54</sup>

Būrī sent many messengers to Zangī to remind him of his oath to him and to ask him to release his son Sawinj. Zangī required a vast ransom of some fifty thousand dinars for the release of Sawinj. Zangī probably demanded this ransom so as to exhaust Damascus economically and to pave the way for its surrender to himself in the future. Būrī reluctantly accepted these terms of ransom but he delayed the payment, probably because he did not have this amount of money immediately available.<sup>55</sup> Zangī's plotting against Sawinj probably proved to Būrī and the people of Damascus, that Zangī was serious about taking control of their Emirate. They, therefore, became singularly cautious with regard to Zangī. It will become apparent how this hatred of the people of Damascus for Zangī caused them to forge an alliance with the Crusaders against him during the reign of Mujīr al-Dīn Abaq 534-549/1140-1154 the last amīr of Ṭughtekīn's family. Zangī's plotting was probably the reason for his failure on two occasions to capture

Damascus; he had engendered feelings of distrust amongst the Damascenes and no one there preferred his rule to that of ʿUg̃htekīn's family.

Later on, Būrī tried his best not to get involved in any conflict with Zangī. This was due maybe to his loss of the best of his horsemen and he, therefore, had not enough power to challenge Zangī's position in Syria. Furthermore, it seems that Būrī realized that Zangī's ambition was to capture not only Hama and Ḥimṣ, but also the whole Emirate of Damascus. For all of these reasons, Būrī was not prepared to risk fighting against Zangī, the first Muslim leader in Syria at that time, and so accepted payment of the vast ransom demanded for the return of his son Sawinj. In 525/began 4 December 1130, however, he managed to get back his son and the other commanders from Zangī without paying this ransom. Circumstances gave Būrī an opportunity to save his son from prison. In this year, the news reached Damascus from Ḥillat Maktūm Ibn Mismār, east of al-Ghūṭa, that Dubays Ibn Ṣadaqa of al-Ḥilla, who had recently been defeated by the Caliph al-Mustarshid bi-'llāh, passed Ḥillat Maktūm Ibn Mismār in order to take over Buṣrā, and that he had got lost there while he was on the way to Ḥillat Marī Ibn Rabī'a in the territories of Sarkhad. Most of his troops had fallen and the rest abandoned him, alone with a few guards, in Ḥillat Maktūm Ibn Mismār. Būrī sent a group of horsemen to take Ibn Ṣadaqa

to the citadel of Damascus on 6 Sha'bān 525/6 July 1131. Būrī imprisoned Ibn Ṣadaqa and treated him generously. He informed the Abbasid Caliph al-Mustarshid about his capture of his rebel Ibn Ṣadaqa. Al-Mustarshid ordered Būrī to keep him in prison under heavy guard until he could send an escort to take Ibn Ṣadaqa to Baghdad.<sup>56</sup> It seems that Būrī did this to gain credit with the Abbasid Caliph as indeed his father Ṭughtekīn had done before him.

When the news of the capture of Ibn Ṣadaqa reached Zangī, he suggested to Būrī the surrender of Ibn Ṣadaqa as a sufficient price for the release of Sawinj and his commanders and that the previously fixed ransom should be dropped. Būrī accepted this offer to save his "beloved son" from Zangī.<sup>57</sup> Ibn al-Athīr added that Būrī initially refused the offer, but he reluctantly had to accept it when Zangī threatened him with laying siege to Damascus and the plundering of its dominions.<sup>58</sup> Būrī did not trust Zangī, who had betrayed his son two years before. He, therefore, did not release Ibn Ṣadaqa until Zangī had released Sawinj and his commanders.<sup>59</sup> In this year Sadīd al-Dawla al-Anbārī, the messenger of al-Mustarshid, arrived at Damascus to discuss certain matters with Būrī. It appears that the main matter of concern was the surrender of Ibn Ṣadaqa to al-Anbārī as mentioned above. He was well received by Būrī. Ibn al-Qalānisī, as was usual when he wrote about something of

which he disapproved, writes briefly and ambiguously of it. He mentions that Būrī answered all the Caliph's questions, but he does not mention any details of these questions. Besides, Būrī gave this messenger lavish presents for the messenger himself and for the Caliph.<sup>60</sup> It seems that Būrī gave the messenger these gifts to encourage him to make a favourable report on his trip to Damascus, and to present the Caliph with convincing reasons for the surrender of his enemy Ibn Ṣadaqa, without consulting him first. During that period, the Caliph was keen to restore the sort of central power exercised by the early Abbasids such as al-Manṣūr, al-Raṣīd, and al-Ma'mūn. Būrī wished probably to involve the Caliph in conflict with Zangī, which would have the effect of turning Zangī's attention from the capturing of the Emirate of Damascus. This was indeed what happened when al-Mustarshid with thirty thousand soldiers went in 527/began 12 November 1132 to try to take Mosul from Zangī without success.<sup>61</sup>

After the murder of the wazīr al-Mazdaqānī in 523/1129 Būrī tried his best to choose a new wazīr. According to Ibn al-Qalānisi, Būrī did not succeed in appointing a suitable wazīr. In 524/began 15 December 1129, Būrī appointed Abū al-Dhū'ād Thiqat al-Mulk al-Mufarrij Ibn al-Ḥasan Ibn al-Sūfī, Ra'īs of Damascus as the new wazīr. Even though this new wazīr was "weak in writing and rhetoric, he was however rational, honest

and experienced in accounting". Ibn al-Ṣūfī did his best to improve the situation in the Emirate, and he chose honest and well qualified employees to assist him. In Rabī' I 525/began 12 February 1131, Būrī dismissed him because of doubts cast upon his honesty, imprisoned him and some of his relatives, and dismissed him from the Ri'āsa of Damascus as well. He appointed Abū al-Faḍl Aḥmad Ibn 'Abdu'l-Razzāq al-Mazdaqānī, a cousin of the previous wazīr who is mentioned above. This new wazīr was successful in his management of the affairs of the vizirate. Ibn al-Qalānisī praises him by claiming that this wazīr had "great knowledge of administrative history". On 5 Jumādā II 525/7 May 1131, the Bāṭiniyya tried to kill Būrī to avenge the killing of their followers in 523/1129. He did not die immediately, but was severely injured in his belly, although he did die of this injury the following year.<sup>62</sup>

As mentioned above, Sawinj was released by Zangī in 525/began 4 December 1130; he then asked his father to release Ibn al-Ṣūfī, the previous wazīr and Ra'īs of Damascus. Although Būrī released Ibn al-Ṣūfī and his relatives, and appointed him to his previous position as Ra'īs of Damascus, he did not make him wazīr as he had been before the appointment of al-Mazdaqānī. Būrī kept his wazīr al-Mazdaqānī even though he had been accused of complicity in an attempt by the Bāṭiniyya to kill Būrī as mentioned above.<sup>63</sup>

On 3 Rajab 525/3 June 1132, when Būrī felt that death, because of his injury by Bāṭiniyya earlier that year, was near, he assembled his main commanders, head officials and 'Ulamā' to consult them about his succession. He suggested to them his eldest son Abū al-Faḥ Ismā'īl. The candidacy of Abū al-Faḥ was unanimously accepted. The assembled dignitaries confirmed their loyalty and obedience to his son Ismā'īl. They prayed to Allāh for his recovery and long life. After the acceptance of their arrangement, Būrī issued an ordinance to appoint his son Ismā'īl his successor. He ordered those present to obey Ismā'īl. Only one year after this meeting Būrī died on 21 Rajab 526/6 June 1132. He was succeeded by his son Shams al-Mulūk Abū al-Faḥ Ismā'īl.<sup>64</sup>



## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 128.

<sup>2</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam*. (London, 1985), p. 49.

<sup>3</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, p. 278.

<sup>4</sup> Muṣṭafa Ghālib, *A'lām al-Ismā'īliyya*. (Beirut, 1964), p. 203.

<sup>5</sup> M. G. S. Hodgson, *The Order of the Assassins*. (The Hague, 1955), p. 89; N. A. Mirza, "The Ismā'īlīs in Syria at the Time of the Crusades", Ph. D. Thesis, (Durham University, 1963), p. 89.

<sup>6</sup> Ghālib, pp. 157-158. Hodgson. p. 89; Mirza, p. 14.

<sup>7</sup> Ibn al-'Adīm, p. 145.

<sup>8</sup> Ibn Taghribirdī, Vol V, p. 205.

<sup>9</sup> Ghālib, pp. 85-86.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 159.

<sup>11</sup> Hodgson, pp. 90-91; Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 142.

<sup>12</sup> Ghālib, p. 158.

<sup>13</sup> Hodgson, p. 92.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 93.

<sup>15</sup> Ibn al-'Adīm, pp. 167-168.

<sup>16</sup> Ghālib, pp. 85-86, 204, 401; Ibn al-'Adīm, pp. 168-169; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 189-190.

<sup>17</sup> Ghālib, p. 86; Hodgson, pp. 94-95; Ibn al-Qalānisī, pp. 190-191.

<sup>18</sup> Hodgson, p. 94; Mirza, p. 20.

<sup>19</sup> Hodgson, 97.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 97-98.

<sup>21</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 215.

<sup>22</sup> C. Hillenbrand, "The Career of Najm al-Dīn Il-Ghāzī", p. 288.

<sup>23</sup> Ibn al-'Adīm, p. 199.

<sup>24</sup> Ibn al-'Adīm, p. 219; Mirza, p. 20.

<sup>25</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, p. 315.

<sup>26</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 214.

<sup>27</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, p. 320-321; al-Dhahabī, p. 46.

<sup>28</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, p. 320; Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 221; al-Dhahabī, pp. 52-53. Note: al-Dhahabī calls the name of Bahrām's family "al-Asad Ābādhī".

<sup>29</sup> Ibn Taghribirdī, vol. V, p. 235.

<sup>30</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 215.

<sup>31</sup> Mirza, p. 221.

<sup>32</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 221.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 221.

<sup>34</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 221; B. Lewis, p. 106.

<sup>35</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, p. 228; Ibn al-Qalānisī, pp. 222-223; al-Maqrīzī, Vo. III, p. 121; al-Dhahabī, p. 52.

<sup>36</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, p. 329; Ibn al-Qalānisī, pp. 222-223.

<sup>37</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, pp. 328-329; Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 223; al-Dhahabī, pp. 52-53.

<sup>38</sup> Abū al-Fidā Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya wa al-nihāya*. (Beirut, 1966), Vol. XII, p. 224.

<sup>39</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 223.

<sup>40</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, pp. 224-230; al-Dhahabī, p. 53. Al-Dhahabī mentions that Bahrām not Ismā'īl al-'Ajamī surrendered Bānyās to the Crusaders.

<sup>41</sup> William of Tyre, pp. 40-42; Ibn al-Athīr, p. 329; Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 225.

<sup>42</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 225.

<sup>43</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, p. 329.

<sup>44</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, pp. 224-25; Gibb, p. 196.

<sup>45</sup> William of Tyre, pp. 41-42.

<sup>46</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 225; Runciman, p. 180.

<sup>47</sup> William of Tyre, p. 42.

<sup>48</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, p. 329.

<sup>49</sup> William of Tyre, pp. 41-42.

<sup>50</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, p. 329; Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 226.

<sup>51</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, pp. 226-227.

<sup>52</sup> Ibn al-'Adīm, p. 243; Ibn al-Qalānisī, pp. 227-228; al-Dhahabī, p. 50.

<sup>53</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 228; Ibn al-'Adīm, pp. 245-246; al-Dhahabī, p. 52.

<sup>54</sup> 'Imād al-Dīn Khalīl, *'Imād al-Dīn Zangī*. (Beirut, 1972), p. 119.

<sup>55</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 228; al-Dhahabī, p. 52.

<sup>56</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, p. 333; Ibn al-Qalānisī, pp. 230-231.

<sup>57</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 231.

<sup>58</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, p. 333.

<sup>59</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, p. 231.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., p. 231.

<sup>61</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *Tārīkh al-dawla al-Atābekiyya*. Ed. A. Tulaymāt. (Cairo, 1963), pp. 47-48.

<sup>62</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, pp. 227-230; al-Dhahabī, p. 55.

<sup>63</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, pp. 229-231. It is not clear precisely what the role of Ra'īs was, but it would appear that he was head of the Aḥdāth "people's army".

<sup>64</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, pp. 232-233; al-Dhahabī, p. 69.

CHAPTER IV  
THE REIGN OF SHAMS AL-MULŪK  
ISMĀ'ĪL IBN TĀJ AL-MULŪK BŪRĪ  
(526-529/1132-1135)

After the death of his father and his succession on 21 Rajab 526/9 June 1132, Shams al-Mulūk Ismā'īl Ibn Tāj al-Mulūk Būrī followed his father's domestic policy. He gained the favour of his soldiers and commanders by paying them increased salaries *al-Jamākiyyāt* (regular payments), and recognizing all iqtā's. As his father had done in keeping his father's wazīr, Shams al-Mulūk kept his father's wazīr al-Mazdaqānī. But he deprived his wazīr of almost all the influence which he had wielded during the time of Tāj al-Mulūk Būrī. He bestowed all the former powers of the wazīr on his Shihna, Yūsuf Ibn-Fayrūz.<sup>1</sup> Ibn Fayruz as mentioned above in Chapter III, had played a great part in suppressing the Bāṭiniyya in Damascus. He and Ibn al-Ṣūfī, Ra'īs of Damascus, had persuaded Tāj al-Mulūk Būrī of the advisability of destroying the Bāṭiniyya in Syria as a whole, as mentioned in Chapter III.

Shams al-Mulūk Ismā'īl did not take any action or decision without consulting his Shihna first. It appears that this is the first and the last time since the reign of King Duqāq of Damascus 488/1095 that the Shihna and

not the wazīr of Damascus became the second man after the Amīr of Damascus. Internal difficulties however beset Shams al-Mulūk from his early days as a ruler. Initially these problems involved his brother Shams al-Dawla Muḥammad of Baalbek. As mentioned above, Baalbek was the main centre of revolution and rebellion for the Emirate of Damascus. Muḥyī al-Dīn Artāsh Ibn Sulṭān Tutush revolted in Baalbek against Ṭughtekīn in 497/began 5 October 1103, as has been mentioned above in Chapter II. Baalbek was also the centre of Kumushtekīn al-Khādīm al-Tājī, the governor of Baalbek who revolted against Ṭughtekīn in 503/began 31 July 1109, with the support of the Crusaders of Jerusalem, as mentioned above in Chapter II. Shams al-Dawla of Baalbek proved refractory within a short time from the accession of Shams al-Mulūk. Not only did he reject the authority of his brother Shams al-Mulūk, but also he took further steps to establish his own independent authority in Baalbek and its districts. He managed to induce the garrisons of the fortress of both al-Labu'a, fifteen miles north east of Baalbek, and al-Ra's, nine miles north east of Baalbek, to hand over their fortresses to him. When Shams al-Dawla did not reply to his brother's request, Shams al-Mulūk pretended to ignore his brother's disloyalty for a while.

Then in Dhū'l-Hijja 526/began 15 October 1132, he advanced with his well-equipped army to the north to

make his brother Shams al-Dawla believe that he was going to fight the Crusaders. Then, he changed his route to the west towards the fortress of al-Labu'a. He attacked the fortress so violently that its people requested him to spare their lives. Shams al-Mulūk spared their lives and took over the fortress. Then he marched to lay siege to the castle of al-Ra's. The people of al-Ra's were spared by Shams al-Mulūk as the people of al-Labu'a had been before. After taking over both fortresses Shams al-Mulūk marched to subdue his brother Shams al-Dawla Muḥammad of Baalbek. Shams al-Dawla fortified his city to resist his brother; he attained much help from the farmers of the Biqā' valley and the surrounding mountains. It seems that the people of Baalbek and the Biqā' valley, who were Twelver Shī'īs encouraged Shams al-Dawla to rebel against his brother. Shams al-Dawla despatched his troops to prevent his brother's advancing army from laying siege to Baalbek. Many soldiers of his force were killed or injured by Shams al-Mulūk's army and the rest fled to Baalbek. Although we have no precise numbers of either army, a possible estimate for this force could be about seven hundred men and that of Shams al-Mulūk about three thousand men. Three days after this battle Shams al-Mulūk besieged Baalbek and bombarded the city using catapults. When Shams al-Dawla discovered his brother's resolve to take the city by force, he sent messengers to his brother to beg forgiveness for all that he had done



against him and requested him to let him continue to rule the city under his authority. Shams al-Mulūk accepted his brother's offer. In early Muḥarram 527/began 12 November 1132, he went back to Damascus very pleased with his easy victories.<sup>2</sup>

His success in establishing his power in Baalbek was followed by another victory in which he recaptured Bānyās from the Crusaders of Jerusalem. The circumstances in the Latin States helped Shams al-Mulūk to achieve this without difficulty and without serious losses. The death of Baldwin II of Jerusalem two years previously on 25 Ramaḍān 525/23 August 1131 is considered to have been a great loss for the Crusaders. His death deprived them of one of the most eminent leaders of the early Crusading period. He strove throughout his twelve years as King of Jerusalem to unite all the Crusaders in Syria. His death enfeebled the Crusader States in Syria.<sup>3</sup> The Crusaders rejected the suzerainty of the new King Fulk of Jerusalem (formerly Count of Anjou), Baldwin's son-in-law. Alice of Antioch, who had reluctantly accepted the authority of her father King Baldwin II, refused to submit to her brother-in-law King Fulk. She again claimed to be regent for her daughter Constance. The Count of Edessa Joscelin II and Pons son of Bertram of Tripoli encouraged Alice in her opposition to King Fulk. King Fulk managed to force all these rebels into submission, but this

consequently left his forces exhausted although he needed them to face the Muslim leaders in Syria.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, King Fulk faced more serious problems in his kingdom later on. Civil war appeared imminent between King Fulk on the one side and his rival Hugh of Jaffa and his ally Roman of Le Puy on the other hand. Hugh of Le Puiset, Lord of Jaffa, announced his independence from King Fulk and captured some parts of the Kingdom of Jerusalem which threatened its solidarity.

During the involvement of King Fulk in this disturbance in his kingdom, his governor in Beirut added a new problem. This governor of Beirut plundered the great caravan of Damascus full as it was of valuable goods. This action was a violation of a treaty between the Crusaders of Jerusalem and Damascus concerning the freedom of trade in transit in both countries. Shams al-Mulūk wrote several times to the governor of Beirut asking him to return the goods taken from the caravan, but he received no answer from this governor. As has been mentioned above, Shams al-Mulūk used to keep his future plans secret to surprise his enemies and probably to save the considerable losses which would have been incurred, if his plan had been known. He used not to inform even his most trusted commanders and personal retinue, in order to achieve a high degree of security for his future plans. He prepared his army for the

recapture of Bānyās, ostensibly to avenge what the Crusaders had done to the Damascene caravan. It seems that this project had been well prepared in advance by Shams al-Mulūk, but it required a reasonable justification, which he was given by the plundering of the caravan. As has been mentioned in Chapter III, Bānyās had been ceded to the Bāṭiniyya in Dhū'l-Qa'da 520/began 21 November 1126, and the Bāṭinīs had handed it over to the Crusaders of Jerusalem after their massacre in Damascus on 17 Ramaḍān 523/4 September 1129. In late Muḥarram 527/early December 1132, Shams al-Mulūk advanced with his army to lay siege to Bānyās. On 1 Šafar 527/11 December 1132, the numerous Crusader guards were astonished by the arrival of the Damascene army. Soon after the closing of the city's gates, Shams al-Mulūk dismounted, then his entire army dismounted also and concentrated their bombardment on the same wall of the city. According to Ibn al-Qalānisi, none of the Crusaders dared to return the fire, but hid themselves from the shower of arrows. The Damascene sappers managed to destroy a part of the wall and entered through it. The Damascenes were able to open the gate of the city and they killed all the Crusaders who had not fled to the castle or the towers of the city. According to William of Tyre, King Fulḳ at that time was on the way to fight his rival Hugh of Jaffa, and did not hurry to rescue the city of Bānyās. Probably he considered that the submission of his rival Hugh of Jaffa was more

important than saving one city of his kingdom from the Muslims of Damascus. The Crusaders hid themselves in the castle and towers of the city, but were disappointed by King Fulk, and so requested peace for themselves and surrendered the city to Shams al-Mulūk Ismā'īl. He agreed to their request, and took the Crusaders as prisoners. Furthermore, he left reliable guards to protect the city; then he turned back towards Damascus. This easy victory, while it pleased the people of Damascus, shocked all the Crusaders who had relied greatly on the fortifications of the city and its numerous garrison. As the Crusaders appeared to be taking more account of the growing power of Damascus under Shams al-Mulūk,<sup>5</sup> and to be taking precautionary measures to contain this power, Shams al-Mulūk exploited the chance to recapture the city of Bānyās, afforded, as it was, by the preoccupation of King Fulk with solving his internal difficulties with Hugh of Jaffa. It seems that Shams al-Mulūk was familiar with the movements of the Crusaders especially those of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, who were his closest neighbours.

After the death of Sultān Maḥmūd Ibn Sultān Muḥammad in Shawwāl 525/began 28 August 1131, Saljūq claimants spent two years fighting each other until one of them, Mas'ūd Ibn Sultān Muḥammad won the Sultanate in Ṣafar 527/began 11 December, 1132.<sup>6</sup>

The rivalry between these claimants will not be discussed in detail as this lies outside the scope of this study. What concerns us here is the effect of this civil strife on Damascus during the period of Shams al-Mulūk's rule. During this period of internal strife in the Saljūq house, Zangī of Mosul and Aleppo was involved in the fighting.

Shams al-Mulūk Ismā'īl used to seize opportunities as has been mentioned above, when he had exploited the fighting amongst the Crusaders to recapture Bānyās. Now again he used Zangī's involvement to recover Hama from Zangī's regent called Sunqur, Ghulām of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Yāghisiyānī, the eminent commander of Zangī. In Sha'bān 527/began 12 June 1133, the Abbasid Caliph al-Mustarshid Bi'llāh, during his involvement in the struggle between the rival Saljūq claimants decided with the consent of Sulṭān Mas'ūd to try and recapture Mosul from Zangī.

In mid-Sha'bān of 527/27 June 1133, al-Mustarshid marched with thirty thousand men to lay siege to Mosul. Zangī fortified Mosul and marched out of the beleaguered city with a part of his army to cut the line of supplies to the Caliph to force him to raise the siege. Zangī's regent in Mosul Naṣīr al-Dīn Jaqar managed to defend the city with the help of Zangī. The siege of the city lasted eighty days from mid-Sha'bān until 5 Dhū'l-Qa'da/27 June 1133 till 6 September 1133, when al-

Mustarshid withdrew to Baghdad without achieving his aim of occupying Mosul. While Zangī was preoccupied with the threat to Mosul, Shams al-Mulūk, who used not to reveal his plans even to his trusted officials and his court, was contemplating the recapture of Hama, but news of his readiness to take Hama reached the governor there, probably through Zangī's spies. According to Ibn al-Athīr, Zangī had spies in most of the important cities of the Islamic world. The governor of Hama then prepared to defend his city against Shams al-Mulūk.

The news of the governor of Hama's state of readiness reached Shams al-Mulūk, but it did not prevent him from recapturing this important city and reannexing it to his emirate.<sup>7</sup> He determined to surprise the people of Hama in late Ramaḍān 527/end of July 1133. Although all his commanders advised him not to implement this plan during the fasting month of Ramaḍān, he insisted on attacking the city on the day of the *'Īd al-Fiṭr*, when the people of Hama would be busy celebrating this most important festival for Muslims everywhere. He launched a severe attack on the city on the day of the *'Īd*, and defeated the guards of Hama without meeting any real resistance. The guards fled to the citadel as did the majority of the people of Hama who reemerged and sued for peace, the guards meanwhile remaining within the citadel. Shams al-Mulūk granted them peace and rewarded them with robes of honour and

returned such spoils as he had acquired. When the garrison in the citadel saw that their army had been defeated, most of them requested peace as the other people had already done. When the governor saw his people surrender, he was also forced to request peace and handed over the city to Shams al-Mulūk, especially as he had despaired of any help from Zangī, who was as has been noted, preoccupied with protecting his main strategic city, Mosul, from the Abbasid Caliph. Shams al-Mulūk entrusted the city of Hama to a reliable garrison and moved off towards Shayzar. He plundered its territories and besieged the city. He raised the siege when the amīr of Shayzar Sulṭān Ibn Munqidh agreed to accept the authority of Damascus and make payment of a considerable sum to Shams al-Mulūk.<sup>6</sup> This was the first time that Shayzar had come under the authority of Damascus since the time of Sulṭān Tāj al-Dawla Tutush Ibn Sulṭān Alp Arslān.

Shams al-Mulūk started the new year of 528/began 7 November 1133, with a new project. This project was to annex fresh land to his Emirate but not as he had done when he recaptured Bānyās and Hama which had previously been under the dominion of Damascus. According to 'Izz al-Dīn Abū 'Abdu'llāh Muḥammad Ibn Shaddād the writer of *al-A'lāq al-khaṭīra fī dhikr umarā' al-Shām wa'l Jazīra*, the well fortified fortress Shaqīf Tīrūn (Belfort), nine miles north east of Sidon, had been under the control of

the Fatimid Caliph. He adds that al-Ḍaḥḥāk Ibn Jandal al-Tamīmī, Ra'īs of the Wādī al-Taym, had taken this fortress from the Fatimid al-Ḥāfiẓ of Egypt, shortly before Shams al-Mulūk captured it on 24 Muḥarram 528/24 November 1133, from al-Ḍaḥḥāk Ibn Jandal. Ibn Jandal played a particular role in overpowering the forces of the Bāṭiniyya in Wādī al-Taym in 522/began 6 January 1128, as mentioned above in Chapter Three. According to Ibn al-Athīr, Ibn Jandal used to play games with the Crusaders and Muslims, because each was looking to win his support against the other.<sup>9</sup>

Some authorities maintain that Ibn Jandal took Shaqīf Tīrūn from the Fatimids on 6 Muḥarram 528/6 November 1133, but it seems that this date is incorrect, because the Fatimids at that time had no authority in Syria except in 'Asqalān which is more than a hundred miles from this fortress. It can be suggested that Ibn Jandal had taken over this fortress during the very early years of the Crusades. Probably the reason for Shams al-Mulūk's capturing this fortress was that Ibn Jandal at the time became an ally of the Crusaders; Ibn al-Athīr, therefore, believes that the reason why the Crusaders attempted to plunder Ḥawrān later on in Dhū'l-Qa'da in the same year (began 27 August 1134) was in retaliation for Shams al-Mulūk's recapture of this fortress lying in the hinterland of Sidon and Beirut.<sup>10</sup>



In this year, an assassination attempted against Shams al-Mulūk failed. In late Rabī' II/began 6 February 1134, one of his grandfather Ṭughtekīn's slaves, called Ilbā, tried to kill Shams al-Mulūk, while he was on a hunting trip, in the vicinity of Ṣaydnāyā and 'Asāl, fifteen miles north of Damascus. Ilbā admitted that nobody had incited him to kill his lord, and he claimed that he had done this to relieve the poor people of Damascus, such as the artisans and farmers, from Shams al-Mulūk's oppression and injustice. On the other hand, he accused Shams al-Mulūk of involving himself only with the military services, and neglecting the civil services. In any event he admitted that other members of the Ghilmān, had plotted with him to kill their lord. According to Ibn al-Qalānisī, these Ghilmān were innocent, but Shams al-Mulūk believed the accusation "without establishing any proof of guilt or the production of any evidence."<sup>11</sup> Ilbā, as he claimed, had done this only for the sake of Allāh; it is not clear why he accused the Ghilmān and Shams al-Mulūk's brother, Sawinj of complicity in this attempt on Shams al-Mulūk's life. It is possible that Ilbā was a Bāṭinī as the Bāṭinīs had made a practice of accusing innocent people in order to create more problems for their enemies. This was indeed the effect for Shams al-Mulūk later on. He killed his brother Sawinj and the others and "went to excess in these evil and tyrannical actions and stopped at no limits", according to Ibn al-Qalānisī.<sup>12</sup> No

historian of the time has accused the Bāṭinīs of the assassination attempt, but we can conclude from Ilbā's behaviour, when he levelled accusations at innocent people, that nobody else except the Bāṭinīs who used to dissimulate and take any action they pleased, to achieve their ends, could have committed this particular crime. Shams al-Mulūk killed his brother Sawinj by locking him in a jail and starving him to death.<sup>13</sup>

As mentioned above, Shams al-Mulūk recaptured Bānyās from the Crusaders in late Ṣafar 527/began 11 December 1132 and took the fortress of Shaqīf Tīrūn from the Crusaders' ally, al-Ḍaḥḥāk Ibn Jandal. Both actions made the Crusaders frightened of Shams al-Mulūk who demonstrated his courage to them by challenging them in southern Syria. Although his father Tāj al-Mulūk Būrī had caused the Crusader invasion of Damascus in 523/1129 to miscarry, he had not been able to prevent their capture of Bānyās in the same year. To avenge the loss of Bānyās and the fortress of Shaqīf Tīrūn, the Crusaders determined to break their treaty with Damascus to protect the transit trade in their territories. In Dhū'l-Qa'da 528/began 27 August 1134, They assembled their forces and advanced to ravage the provinces of Damascus in the region of Ḥawrān, forty miles southeast of the city itself. When news of the Crusaders' march towards the fertile territory of Ḥawrān, reached Shams al-Mulūk, he sent for the Turkomans from the whole of

Syria. Ibn al-Qalānisī, the only Muslim historian to mention this event, does not give us an estimate for both armies, but we can suggest that the Damascene army numbered about five to six thousand men including the volunteer Turkomans, and those of the Kingdom of Jerusalem about the same number. Shams al-Mulūk marched and encamped opposite the Crusaders in Ḥawrān. Both armies spent a few days showering each other with arrows; the Crusaders did not attack the Damascene forces probably because they had not expected to have to face this great army in the field, nor indeed had they expected to meet opposition to what had been essentially a plundering expedition to Ḥawrān. Shams al-Mulūk seized the opportunity offered, while the Crusaders were engaged in this confrontation, and a considerable number of his army advanced to raid the lands of the Crusaders of Acre, Nazareth (al-Nāṣira) and Tiberias. He managed to carry off numerous cattle, beasts of burden, women, children and men according to Ibn al-Qalānisī, "laying waste the countryside with fire and the sword". When news of Shams al-Mulūk's plundering of the Crusaders' lands reached the Crusaders in Ḥawrān, they withdrew directly to their own territories to protect them. The Crusaders had evidently reckoned that Shams al-Mulūk would not dare to plunder and ravage within their own territories; this was probably the first time since Mawdūd's campaign of 507/began 18 June 1113 that Muslims had attacked the Crusaders in the heart of their

Kingdom. Shams al-Mulūk returned after his successful operation by another route called al-Sha'rā, and rejoined his camp in Ḥawrān, because he was expecting a retaliatory attack from the Crusader army as it withdrew. The Crusaders turned back home, sore aggrieved with what had happened to their lands and people. The Crusaders' army was in disarray and each soldier went back to his own territory. Then the Crusaders of Jerusalem requested Shams al-Mulūk to renew the peace between them. Once again Shams al-Mulūk had contrived materially to discomfit the Crusaders and keep the trade route safe. According to William of Tyre, all the Crusaders who had been captured in Bānyās early in the previous year/began 12 November 1132, were to be released under the peace treaty.<sup>14</sup>

In this year, reports were continually received from the neighbouring countries in the territory of the Atābek Zangī concerning the extensive preparations he was making for the siege and capture of the city of Damascus.<sup>15</sup>

On the first of Muḥarram of 529/22 October 1134, Yūsuf Ibn Fayrūz, Shiḥna of Damascus, escaped from Shams al-Mulūk. Ibn al-Qalānisī, attributes his need to escape to reliable news from his close friends that Shams al-Mulūk was plotting against him. But Ibn al-Qalānisī does not mention the specific reason for Ibn Fayrūz's fear of

Shams al-Mulūk. It seems that Shams al-Mulūk, after the failure of the assassination attempt on him, became suspicious of everybody, even his own trusted Shiḥna. Ibn Fayrūz fled to his iqtā' in Tadmur (Palmyra). As we mentioned above in Chapter II, Tadmur in 520/began 27 January 1126, during Ṭughtekīn's reign, had become an iqtā' of his grand son Shihāb al-Dīn Maḥmūd Ibn Tāj al-Mulūk Būrī. During his father's reign Shihāb al-Dīn begged his father Tāj al-Mulūk Būrī to disencumber him of this iqtā'. Tāj al-Mulūk accepted his son's request. During that time Ibn Fayrūz seized the opportunity to apply for the grant of Tadmur as an iqtā' and persuaded some of Tāj al-Mulūk's commanders and trusted friends to accommodate him in this. Ibn Fayrūz received the city during Tāj al-Mulūk's reign. He appointed his son as agent in the city of Tadmur and fortified it. He sent some of his trusted friends to help his young son, and supplied him with every thing he might need in case of siege. Ibn Fayrūz took the city of Tadmur as a refuge in case of emergency. This was what happened, when he discovered that Shams al-Mulūk Ismā'īl was conspiring against him. He learnt this from his close friends in Shams al-Mulūk's court, although he was provided with no proof. Ibn al-Qalānisī mentioned that Ibn Fayrūz, chamberlain (Ḥājib) as well as Shiḥna of Damascus, escaped to Tadmur immediately upon learning that his lord had left the city of Damascus. Ibn al-Qalānisī claimed that Shams al-Mulūk had decided secretly to

confiscate the property of all his professional official commanders and chamberlains including Ibn Fayrūz. It is however hard to see why Ibn al-Qalānisī gives no examples of these confiscations to substantiate his charge. Ibn al-Qalānisī admits that Shams al-Mulūk did not persecute Ibn Fayrūz's relatives when he refused to return to Damascus according to his lord's order. Therefore, if Shams al-Mulūk were to have persecuted anyone in his Emirate it could be presumed that he would have started with Ibn Fayrūz's relative. Although Ibn Fayrūz rejected the order of his lord to return to the city of Damascus, he did not declare his independence. He claimed that "he was in this position (in Tadmur) as a loyal servant of Shams al-Mulūk to protect it".<sup>16</sup>

Muslim historians of this period agree that in this year, 529/began 22 October 1134, Shams al-Mulūk turned from being a wise, brave and intelligent man to being very cruel, foolish and unjust. Ibn al-Qalānisī described his singular personality in detail. He indicates that Shams al-Mulūk at this time became notorious amongst his intimates as well as the common people for his wanton cruelty and unpredictable behaviour which bordered on the insane. He began to confiscate the property of his people including his hitherto trusted officials and chamberlains. He also committed all kinds of misdemeanours which Ibn al-Qalānisī claims to have been well known amongst the

people. Ibn al-Qalānisī adds that Shams al-Mulūk "secretly proposed to confiscate the property of his confidential secretaries, his domestic officers, and personal attendants among the amīrs and chamberlains", and that he decided to start these confiscations with his chamberlain Ibn Fayrūz. If Ibn al-Qalānisī was right in this claim, it is difficult to see how this "secret" came to be revealed to his officials, and to Ibn Fayrūz. Furthermore, Ibn al-Qalānisī accused Shams al-Mulūk of being demented. It seems that Shams al-Mulūk after the flight of his Shihna to Tadmur, lost his authority in most of his Emirate, having no power to control his Shihna Ibn Fayrūz and those in revolt against him. When he was informed of Zangī's determination to capture Damascus he decided to surrender the city to Zangī and to become his vassal. As has been mentioned above Shams al-Mulūk had used not to inform even his trusted officials and amirs about his future projects. This behaviour probably made his officials question the appropriateness of their loyalty and sincerity towards him.

He became as a dictator in Damascus contrary to the ways of his predecessors. It is possible that the flight of Ibn Fayrūz was the prelude to a projected revolt aimed at overthrowing Shams al-Mulūk's rule later on. Ibn al-Qalānisī believes that because of his mental disease, Shams al-Mulūk had written several letters to

Zangī with his own hand, offering to surrender the city of Damascus and stipulating that Zangī allow him to take revenge on his disloyal officials in Damascus. Ibn al-Qalānisi's account suggests that Shams al-Mulūk at this time was sinking into paranoia.<sup>17</sup>

It seems that the situation in Damascus after the flight of Ibn Fayrūz was confused, and Shams al-Mulūk could not restore stability. He appointed a Kurd from Ḥimṣ called Badrān al-Kāfir (the infidel) to handle this situation. But Badrān disappointed Shams al-Mulūk by more confiscations of people's property including that of respectable officials.<sup>18</sup> It seems that it was when Shams al-Mulūk discovered that Badrān would not solve his problems, that he decided to hand over Damascus to Zangī, the traditional enemy of the ruler of Damascus. We cannot judge whether Shams al-Mulūk did that to take revenge on his rebellious officials or to save Damascus from falling into the hands of the Crusaders. Shams al-Mulūk warned Zangī if he would not hasten to take over Damascus, he would surrender the city to the Crusaders and "the sin of the blood of its inhabitants shall be upon his neck [Zangī's]".<sup>19</sup> It seems that what Shams al-Mulūk was doing was neither more nor less than his grandfather Ṭughtekīn had done in 498/began 23 September 1104, when he sent to Suqmān Ibn Artuq to take over Damascus, when he was ill, having decided to hand over the city of Damascus to this leader, who would protect



it from the threat of the Crusaders. Ibn al-Qalānisī had not condemned Ṭughtekīn's request, but he strongly condemned that of Shams al-Mulūk. No Muslim historians of the period have treated Shams al-Mulūk with justice and most have repeated Ibn al-Qalānisī's description of him. Shams al-Mulūk appears to have had no doubts that the fall of Damascus to Zangī was just a matter of time. He, therefore, wanted for both sides (the Damascenes and Zangī) to be spared inevitable losses associated with armed conflict. When the news of the proposal of surrendering the city was revealed, the rebel Ghilmān persuaded the Khātūn Ṣafwat al-Mulk, mother of Shams al-Mulūk to kill her son in order that they might be saved from the punishment which would be meted out by Shams al-Mulūk and Zangī. Ṣafwat al-Mulk killed her son Shams al-Mulūk Ismā'īl and appointed his brother Shihāb al-Dīn Maḥmūd as amīr of Damascus. It seems that the rebels could have killed Shams al-Mulūk without calling upon the assistance of his mother, but they wanted to prove to the Damascenes that the killing of Shams al-Mulūk was the will of all Damascenes including the mother of the Amīr of Damascus. On 14 Rabī<sup>e</sup> II 529/1 February 1135, Shams al-Mulūk Ismā'īl Ibn Tāj al-Mulūk Būrī was killed by his Ghilmān and his wazīr Badrān al-Kāfir had died the day before because of a terrible disease. It is possible that Badrān was poisoned.<sup>20</sup>

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>Ibn al-Qalānisī, pp. 234-235.

<sup>2</sup>Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, p. 338; Ibn al-Qalānisī, pp. 235-236.

<sup>3</sup>Runciman, pp. 185-186.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 187-190.

<sup>5</sup>Ibn al-Athīr, p. 339; Ibn al-Qalānisī, pp. 236-37; William of Tyre, pp. 74-77; al-Dhahabī, p. 70.

<sup>6</sup>Ibn al-Athīr, pp. 333-335, 336-337, 339-40.

<sup>7</sup>Ibn al-'Adīm, p. 253; Ibn al-'Umrānī, *al-Inbā' fī tārīkh al-khulafā'*. Ed. by Qāsim al-Sāmarrā'ī. Second Edition, (al-Riyād, 1982), pp. 217-218; al-Dhahabī, p.70. al-Dhahabī estimates the Caliph's army numbered about twelve thousand men.

<sup>8</sup>Ibn al-'Adīm, p. 253; Ibn al-Qalānisī, pp. 238-239.

<sup>9</sup>Ibn Shaddād, p. 154; Kenneth M. Setton, *The History of the Crusades: The First Hundred Years*. Ed. Marshall W. Baldwin, (Wisconsin, 1969), p. 572; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, p. 342.

<sup>10</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, p. 342.

<sup>11</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisi, p. 241-242; H. A. R. Gibb, *The Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades*. (London, 1932), p. 225. Gibb appears to have missed the sense of *imtahana al-'Askariyya wa 'l-Ra'iyya*, translating this as "have wronged the troops and the civil population".

<sup>12</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisi, p. 242.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 242.

<sup>14</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, p. 342; Ibn al-Qalānisi, pp. 242-243; William of Tyre, p. 76; Gibb, p. 227. Gibb suggests that al-Sha'rā is to the north of the Lake of Huleh and Qunaitra.

<sup>15</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisi, p. 243.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 244-245.

<sup>17</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisi, p. 245; Ibn al-'Adīm, pp. 255-257.

<sup>18</sup> Ibn al-'Adīm, p. 255; Ibn al-Qalānisi, p. 245.

<sup>19</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisi, pp. 245-46; Ibn al-'Adīm, pp. 255-256.

<sup>20</sup> Ibn al-'Adīm, pp. 256-257; Ibn al-Qalānisi, pp. 246-247; al-Dhahabī, p. 77.

CHAPTER V  
THE REIGN OF SHIHĀB AL-DĪN MAḤMŪD  
IBN TĀJ AL-MULŪK BŪRĪ  
529-533/1135-1139

After she had connived in the murder of her son Shams al-Mulūk Ismā'īl, Ṣafwat al-Mulk Bint Jāwli Siqāwa of Mosul designated her other son Shihāb al-Dīn Maḥmūd as the new prince of Damascus, and established herself as *de facto* regent for her son who, despite his not being a minor, was dominated by her. According to Ibn al-Qalānisī, the commanders, chief representatives of the soldiers, and notable persons, were not only sworn to listen to Shihāb al-Dīn Maḥmūd, but also to render obedience to his mother.<sup>1</sup> But this situation would not last for long and Ṣafwat al-Mulk was to lose her almost unlimited authority later on in 532/1138 when she married Zangī of Mosul. Zangī had most probably imagined that by getting married to Ṣafwat al-Mulk, he would gain full power in Damascus, but when he wedded her, he discovered that her influence in Damascus had waned.<sup>2</sup> The news of the assassination of Shams al-Mulūk Ismā'īl, the former Amīr of Damascus, had not reached Zangī as he was on his way to take over supreme power in the city, in accordance with the offer whereby Shams al-Mulūk had agreed to surrender his capital to Zangī, as mentioned above.

After he had crossed the Euphrates, Zangī sent his envoys to the city of Damascus to reach an agreement for the surrender of the city. His messengers then were shocked by the news of Shams al-Mulūk's murder. The Damascene leaders greeted and welcomed Zangī's envoys, but they refused to surrender their city. Besides, they had confirmed to the messengers the determination of the people of Damascus to defend their city by all means within their power. They also urged Zangī to withdraw his troops unconditionally for the safety of both the Damascenes and his own forces. Zangī rejected the offer which he interpreted as meaning that the people of Damascus were at variance with one another and were not united to protect their city. On the other hand, it seems that Zangī suspected that the leaders of Damascus had bribed his envoys and thus encouraged them to give him a distorted report about the situation in the city, and for this reason, he resumed his advance towards the city. In Jumādā I 529/began on 16 February 1135, Zangī's great army camped in the territory of Damascus between 'Adhrā and al-Qaṣīr, which lie ten miles north east of the city.<sup>3</sup> As Zangī approached the immediate vicinity of Damascus the people of the surrounding countryside deserted the villages and moved to the city in order to support the Damascenes against the impending threat posed by Zangī. Zangī moved his camp to al-'Aqaba al-Qibliyya, ten miles from the city to the south, to be

able to observe the movements of the forces of Damascus. He was astonished by the preparations of the Damascenes for the defence of their city. The Aḥdāth of the city played a significant role together with the regular army of Damascus in the protection of their city.<sup>4</sup>

According to Ibn al-Qalānisi, the Great Mosque (al-Masjid al-Jāmi') and "all parts of the city were filled" with volunteers prepared to defend their city against Zangī. It can be suggested that the Great Mosque played a significant role not only on this occasion, but also on many others for the launching of appeals to the people to defend their city against its enemies. The Damascene ambushes outside the city managed to cut off Zangī's supplies, and to capture many of his horsemen. It was because of those actions that many of Zangī's troops surrendered to the Damascenes.<sup>5</sup>

When he failed to take the city by force, Zangī suggested to the leaders of Damascus that they place themselves under his authority and he demanded that the Amīr Shihāb al-Dīn Maḥmūd personally go to pay homage to Sultān Maḥmūd's son Alp-Arslān, and in return Alp-Arslān would bestow upon him a robe of honour and guarantee him a safe return to the city of Damascus. Zangī ruled in Mosul and Aleppo on behalf of Alp-Arslān Dāwūd Ibn Sultān Maḥmūd as Atābek of this sultān. Zangī seems to have been aware that the Amīr of Damascus would not

accept being under his authority directly, and therefore supposed that he might agree to being under the authority of Sulṭān Alp-Arslān. This would have meant that the amīr of Damascus would be nominally responsible to Sulṭān Alp-Arslān and not to Zangī. Shihāb al-Dīn was concerned at Zangī's many conditions, refused to pay homage personally to Sulṭān Alp-Arslān and sent his younger brother Bahrām to do so in his stead. Zangī accepted Shihāb al-Dīn's compromise.<sup>6</sup> Ibn al-'Adīm presents a conflicting picture of this story when he claims that the Damascenes had suffered from a scarcity of food and provisions, but he did not declare whether it was these circumstances that forced the Damascenes to accept Zangī's proposal.<sup>7</sup>

On the other hand, another explanation of this peace agreement, asserts that the Damascenes had pledged (to the Abbasid Caliph al-Mustarshid Bi'llāh) fifty thousand dinars annually to persuade Zangī to refrain from attempting to take over their city.<sup>8</sup> When Ibn al-Qalānisī mentions the involvement of al-Mustarshid in the treaty between Zangī and Damascus, he does not say anything about that. He declares that the association of al-Mustarshid's envoy with the concordat between Zangī and the Damascenes was a coincidence. He states that al-Mustarshid commanded Zangī to relinquish the blockade of the city, and to abandon his interference in the affairs of Damascus. Besides that al-Mustarshid ordered Zangī to

make the *khuṭba* for Sulṭān Alp-Arslān, who was under Zangī's tutelage. The reason for this suggestion of al-Mustarshid which would redound to Zangī's benefit was that he wished to acquire Zangī's aid during his future contest with Sulṭān Mas'ūd.<sup>9</sup> It seems that al-Mustarshid exploited the blockade of the city of Damascus by Zangī to get financial assistance from Damascus and to obtain military aid from Zangī as well, at one and the same time. By giving help to al-Mustarshid, Zangī gained the first formal recognition for the Sultanate of Sulṭān Alp-Arslān who was under his guardianship. Zangī had been striving to get that recognition (of the Sultanate of Alp-Arslān) from al-Mustarshid for a long time, in fact since he had gained the Atābekiyya of Mosul in 521/began 17 January 1127. Although Zangī won this recognition, he would not be able to enjoy the situation for long. His ally al-Mustarshid was to be defeated and killed during his contest with Sulṭān Mas'ūd in Dhū'l Qa'da 529/began 14 August 1135.<sup>10</sup> It is fair to suggest that it was thanks to the struggle between the Caliph al-Mustarshid and Sulṭān Mas'ūd, that the Emirate of Damascus was rescued from early destruction at the hands of Zangī.

On Friday 28 Jumādā I 529/17 March 1135, the name of Sulṭān Alp-Arslān Ibn Sulṭān Maḥmūd was mentioned in the *khuṭba* in the Emirate of Damascus for the first time, instead of the name of Sulṭān Mas'ūd.<sup>11</sup> This meant



probably that the Emirate of Damascus was merely under the nominal and not the real authority of Sultān Alp-Arslān, just as it had been under the nominal authority of Sultān Mas'ūd. Therefore, the position of the Emirate of Damascus was not materially altered. It is likely that Zangī had accepted that as being the first step towards the real subjection of Damascus in the future. On the next day, Zangī withdrew to the north towards Aleppo without achieving his main aim of gaining power over the city of Damascus. When however he was on his way towards Aleppo, he imprisoned Shams al-Khawāṣṣ, the governor of Hama, who ruled the city on behalf of the Amīr Shihāb al-Dīn of Damascus. Zangī replaced him with the former ruler of Kafartāb Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Yāghisiyānī. According to Ibn al-Qalānisī, Zangī dismissed Shams al-Khawāṣṣ owing to the many complaints he had received from the inhabitants of Hama.<sup>12</sup>

The historical sources of the time do not indicate that Shihāb al-Dīn gave Hama to Zangī as the price for giving up the siege of Damascus, but it seems that Shams al-Khawāṣṣ of Hama had betrayed his weakness to Zangī during Zangī's blockade of Damascus.

Ibn al-'Adīm indicates that while Zangī was on his way to lay siege to the city of Damascus, he had met Shams al-Khawāṣṣ. He added that Shams al-Khawāṣṣ went out of Hama to see Zangī, after Zangī had sworn not to

plot against him; Zangī had then marched towards the city of Damascus to lay siege to it. Ibn al-'Adīm gives no details about the meeting between Zangī and Shams al-Khawāṣṣ. But it seems likely that Shams al-Khawāṣṣ was coerced into accepting Zangī's authority, even before Zangī's blockade of Damascus in early Jumādā I, 529/began 18 February 1135.<sup>13</sup> The historical sources of the time state that it was because of the complaints of people of Hama that he replaced Shams al-Khawāṣṣ with another governor, but they do not suggest that Zangī occupied the city with armed forces. It was the second time that Zangī had taken over Hama without resistance, the first time being in late 524/late 1130, as mentioned above, during the reign of Tāj al-Mulūk Būrī.<sup>14</sup>

In Rajab 529/began 18 April 1135, after his taking over Hama, Zangī managed to recapture four fortresses from the Crusaders without much difficulty. These fortresses were al-Athārib, Tall Aghdī, about twelve miles north west of Aleppo, Ma'arrat al-Nu'mān, and Kafartāb. These fortresses which were located near Aleppo, had been the object of the Crusaders' attention for two decades during which they had attempted to establish their power there. Then Zangī marched south towards Montferrand (Bārīn), thirty five miles north west of Ḥimṣ, which belonged to the Crusaders of Tripoli,<sup>15</sup> to invest it. But he resumed his march on Ḥimṣ. Zangī surprised Ḥimṣ in Sha'bān of 529/began 18

May 1135. The city belonged to the sons of Khīr-Khān Ibn Qarāja, and Zangī plundered the surrounding countryside.<sup>16</sup> Then he went back to the city of Qinnisrīn, fifteen miles south west of Aleppo, to help its people against Count Pons, son of Bertram of Tripoli who was on the verge of besieging it.

After he had managed to rescue Qinnisrīn, Zangī resumed his raid on Ḥimṣ and its environs in the last ten days of Shawwāl in the same year. Then he returned to Mosul the next month (Dhū'l-Qa'da/began 14 August 1135).<sup>17</sup>

Zangī continued in his strategy of weakening Ḥimṣ, by plundering its districts and the countryside nearby to reduce the likelihood of a protracted siege. Ḥimṣ was not even officially under Damascene authority; it had been formerly under the nominal rule of Damascus (in Ṭughtekīn's time) from 496 till 509/1103 till 1115 but it still appears to have retained a special relationship with it. The Emirate of Damascus lost the city of Ḥimṣ during the Saljūq Sultān's expedition in 509/1115 against the Emirate, as mentioned above in Chapter II. In 529/1135, the city of Ḥimṣ was ruled by a regent on behalf of the sons of Khīr-Khān Ibn Qarāja, the former master of the city, called Khumārtāsh as an independent city.

When Khumārtāsh realized that he had no power to protect his city from the menace of Zangī, he determined to hand over the city to Shihāb al-Dīn Maḥmūd of Damascus, in return for due compensation. The person who took the initiative in this deal between Ḥimṣ and Damascus, was the Chamberlain of Damascus Sayf al-Dawla Yūsuf Ibn Fayrūz. Ibn Fayrūz was eager to leave his position as governor of Tadmur and to receive in exchange a formidable city such as Ḥimṣ.<sup>18</sup> As mentioned above the Chamberlain had fled from city of Damascus during the time of Shams al-Mulūk Ismā'īl in 529/1135. He appealed to the new Amīr of Damascus to grant him permission to come back to the city, and to settle the exchange agreement between Khumārtāsh of Ḥimṣ and Shihāb al-Dīn Maḥmūd of Damascus. Shihāb al-Dīn authorized Ibn Fayrūz to do this. After long negotiations, it was agreed that Shihāb al-Dīn should receive Ḥimṣ and its citadel, and in return Khumārtāsh would be compensated by being given the city of Tadmur, which then belonged to Ibn Fayrūz.<sup>19</sup> It was clear that Shihāb al-Dīn, at that time, would encourage rivalries among his Ghilmān commanders, especially those who still remembered that Ibn Fayrūz had induced the former Amīr of Damascus Shams al-Mulūk to kill some of their followers, as mentioned above in Chapter IV. For this reason, Shihāb al-Dīn designated the Chamberlain Ibn Fayrūz not as the real governor of the city of Ḥimṣ but as a lieutenant of his commander, the Amīr Mu'īn al-Dīn Anar. Shihāb al-Dīn was

certain that Zangī would not obstruct his project of taking Ḥimṣ, even if this meant that it would return to being officially under his sway. Shihāb al-Dīn travelled to Ḥimṣ himself and took over the city. From Ḥimṣ he wrote to all his commanders throughout his Emirate, to send military supplies to support Ḥimṣ against the threat posed by Zangī. In Rabī' I 530/began 9 December 1135, Shihāb al-Dīn returned from Ḥimṣ to Damascus, after he had strengthened it.<sup>20</sup> Because Zangī was involved in the struggle between the new Caliph al-Rāshid and Sultān Mas'ūd after the murder of al-Mustarshid in 529/1135, he ordered his deputy in Aleppo the Amīr Siwār and his governor of Hama the Amīr Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Yāghisiyānī to launch forays against the environs of Ḥimṣ. Later on after long negotiations, Shihāb al-Dīn and Zangī reached a truce for a specified period but Ibn al-Qalānisi, the only historian of the time to mention the truce, does not tell us how long it was for.<sup>21</sup>

If the year of 530/began 11 October 1135, had been a good year for the Emirate of Damascus, during which it had won a truce with its normal adversary Zangī; it was on the other hand a year of internal dissension in the Emirate. The conflict among the commanders and notables that year, reached its climax. The rivalries extended to the relatives of the Amīr Shihāb al-Dīn, who was represented by his brother Shams al-Dawla Muḥammad of

Baalbek. The story of this struggle started when Shihāb al-Dīn and his mother Ṣafwat al-Mulk allowed Ibn Fayrūz to dwell in the city of Damascus; in return Ibn Fayrūz pledged not to intervene in the affairs of Damascus. It seems that Shihāb al-Dīn summoned Ibn Fayrūz to act as a counter balance to the power of the Amīr Bazwāj, who had become the second man in Damascus after the assassination of Shams al-Mulūk. Bazwāj and the Amīr Anar played a major role in conducting the affairs of Damascus during the siege of the city by Zangī at the end of the previous year, end of 529/1135.<sup>22</sup> Because of their efforts at that time, they became the most eminent leaders in the Emirate. It is likely that Shihāb al-Dīn had failed to check the power of Bazwāj by his support of the Amīr Anar and so, to counterbalance the influence of Bazwāj he brought in Ibn Fayrūz who relied on the Amīr Anar for protection against the possibility of plots against him in Damascus.<sup>23</sup> It can be suggested that Bazwāj understood the reasons behind the return of the Chamberlain Ibn Fayrūz and so he used the rivalry between Shihāb al-Dīn and his half-brother Shams al-Dawla Muḥammad of Baalbek to win the support of Shams al-Dawla to obtain an undertaking from Ibn Fayrūz not to interfere in the politics of Damascus. Furthermore, Bazwāj used the rivalry between Shihāb al-Dīn and his half-brother Shams al-Dawla of Baalbek, to win support from Shams al-Dawla, who had been in the habit of revolting against his brothers, the rulers of Damascus,

as mentioned above, when he revolted against Shams al-Mulūk Ismā'īl in Dhū'l-Qa'da 526/began 13 September 1132.

It seems that the murder of Shams al-Mulūk at his mother's instigation, and the accession of Shihāb al-Dīn had happened without any consultation with Shams al-Dawla Muḥammad. For this reason it appears that Shams al-Dawla considered what had occurred to Shams al-Mulūk to be a plot against the legitimate amīr of Damascus. What increased the tension in Damascus in 530/began 11 October 1135 was the fact that the Chamberlain Ibn Fayrūz did not keep his promise and did interfere in the domestic affairs of Damascus. When Bazwāj discovered this he became apprehensive that Ibn Fayrūz might well obtain the freedom of action in the time of Shihāb al-Dīn, that he had had during the early period of Shams al-Mulūk's reign, as mentioned above.

It seems that Bazwāj had warned Shihāb al-Dīn against giving Ibn Fayrūz more consideration since Ibn Fayrūz appeared to be breaking his undertaking concerning his role in the internal affairs of Damascus. Shihāb al-Dīn Maḥmūd however, instead of taking action to satisfy the Amīr Bazwāj and thereby reducing the tension in Damascus, took further action to lessen the power of Bazwāj and his followers.

On 21 Jumādā I 530/27 February 1136, the Amīr Shihāb al-Dīn and his mother appointed the Amīr Amīn al-Dawla Kumushtekīn al-Atābekī, governor of Sarkhad, as his Atābek and Isfahsalār of Damascus.<sup>24</sup> It seems that the Amīr Shihāb al-Dīn had not designated anyone till that time to occupy these positions. By this means, Bazwāj would be deprived of the position of being the real second man in Damascus.

When Bazwāj observed these measures being taken against him by Shihāb al-Dīn, he hesitated before taking any decisive action, and this hesitancy initially cost him much of his influence in Damascus. After five weeks from the appointment of the new Isfahsalār and Atābek of Damascus, Bazwāj killed Ibn Fayrūz on 27 Jumādā II 530/4 April 1136 in al-Maydān, a few miles south west of the city of Damascus. He justified this action on the grounds that Ibn Fayrūz had not honoured the undertaking mentioned above.<sup>25</sup> After the assassination of Ibn Fayrūz, the members of the 'Askar of Damascus especially the Ghilmān declined to permit Bazwāj to come back into the city unless he was at least prosecuted for this crime. Not only did Bazwāj kill Ibn Fayrūz but he also demanded from the Amīr Shihāb al-Dīn that he dismiss the Amīr Kumushtekīn al-Atābekī from his ranks, and designate himself as his replacement. When Shihāb al-Dīn rejected this demand from Bazwāj, Bazwāj summoned his adherents and laid waste the farmland round the city of Damascus.



Amīr Shihāb al-Dīn assigned considerable armed forces to attack them, but they failed to bring Bazwāj and his followers to battle.

While the conflict between Shihāb al-Dīn and Bazwāj was reaching its climax, the Amīr Kumushtekīn, the Isfahsalār and Atābek of Damascus, was not involved. It seems that he had realized that he could not defy Bazwāj and so he took himself off towards Sarkhad. Shihāb al-Dīn entreated Kumushtekīn to go back to the city of Damascus as his ally against Bazwāj. Kumushtekīn refused to comply even though Shihāb al-Dīn guaranteed his safety and his position as his Isfahsalār and Atābek of Damascus.

Since the majority of the 'Askar of Damascus refused to let Bazwāj return to the city and in addition Shihāb al-Dīn Maḥmūd did not give him permission to do so, Bazwāj and his followers hastened to the city of Baalbek. The Amīr Shams al-Dawla Muḥammad the governor of Baalbek and half-brother of Shihāb al-Dīn greeted the rebels. Later on, many new Turkomans agreed to be under the authority of Shams al-Dawla. Bazwāj's followers began to interrupt the trade routes of Damascus, with the result that Shihāb al-Dīn agreed reluctantly to accept Bazwāj's conditions. By dint of a peace treaty between Shihāb al-Dīn and Bazwāj, Shihāb al-Dīn established Bazwāj as his Isfahsalār and Atābek of

Damascus instead of Kumushtekīn al-Atābekī. In return Bazwāj bound himself to give back what he had looted from Damascus after his murder of Ibn Fayrūz. It emerges that the flight of Kumushtekīn had lessened the resolve of Shihāb al-Dīn to subdue the refractory Bazwāj.<sup>26</sup> Moreover, there is no evidence to show whether the Amīr Anar had done anything in retaliation for the killing of his ally Ibn Fayrūz or to aid his Amīr Shihāb al-Dīn against the rebel Bazwāj.

The domestic situation in Damascus was aggravated when the Amīr Bazwāj and the Chamberlain Sunqur killed one of the most loyal allies of Ibn Fayrūz called Muḥyī al-Dīn Abū al-Dhū'ād Ibn al-Ḥasan Ibn Ḥusayn Ibn al-Ṣūfī Ra'īs of Damascus. It looks as though the Amīr Shihāb al-Dīn had been coerced into giving them permission to kill the Ra'īs, who had played a distinguished part in the crushing of the Bāṭinīs in Damascus on 17 Ramaḍān 523/4 September 1129 as mentioned in Chapter Three. One of the relatives of Ibn al-Ṣūfī, called the Amīr Shujā' al-Dawla, fled to Sarkhad, about seven miles east of Buṣrā,<sup>27</sup> after the assassination of Ibn al-Ṣūfī, to gain protection against Bazwāj from the Amīr Kumushtekīn al-Atābekī, governor of Sarkhad and the former Atābek and Isfahsalār of Damascus.<sup>28</sup>

The Emirate of Damascus was fortunate this year (530/began 11 October 1135) because Zangī, the long-

standing opponent of the Emirate, was involved in the conflict between the Abbasid Caliph al-Rāshid and Sulṭān Mas'ūd. Zangī spent the winter of 530/began 11 October 1135 with al-Rāshid in the district of Mosul.<sup>29</sup> It seems that Zangī was inclined to assist al-Rāshid because of his earlier obligation to his father al-Mustarshid during his struggle with Sulṭān Mas'ūd. Although Zangī had not fully discharged this obligation to support al-Mustarshid, he entered into a more whole-hearted support of al-Mustarshid's son. The reason for that was probably that Zangī accused Sulṭān Mas'ūd of murdering al-Mustarshid at the end of 529/end 1135. By the end of 530/end 1136, Zangī was released from his commitment to al-Rāshid, when al-Rāshid was dethroned on 17 Dhū'l Qa'da of 530/17 August 1136. He was replaced by his uncle al-Muqtafī bi-'Amri'llāh.<sup>30</sup> Had Zangī not been involved in this conflict, he would have been able to conserve his energies for the purpose of taking possession of Ḥimṣ and other dominions of the Emirate of Damascus.

By way of contrast, the year 531/began 29 September 1136 was a year of pacification and reconciliation in Damascus. After long negotiations between the rebels of Sarkhad headed by Kumeshtekīn of Sarkhad and Shujā' al-Dawla Ibn al-Ṣūfī on the one hand, and the Amīr Shihāb al-Dīn, Bazwāj and Chamberlain Asad al-Dīn Akiz on the other hand, Shihāb al-Dīn's side allowed Kumeshtekīn of

Sarkhad and Ibn al-Ṣūfī to come back again to the city of Damascus. Besides that, they agreed to return all the wealth of the rebels which had been confiscated earlier by the Amīr Shihāb al-Dīn. Furthermore, Shihāb al-Dīn granted Ibn al-Ṣūfī the rank of Ra'īs of Damascus, which had been left vacant since the assassination of Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn al-Ṣūfī the previous year.

In early Rajab 531/began 15 April 1137, the Damascenes celebrated the arrival of these leaders in the city of Damascus with a great festival. They all thanked Allāh for His notable success in achieving "that marvellous reconciliation".<sup>31</sup>

Now that the Emirate had succeeded in putting an end to its internal conflicts, it was ready to take part again in the counter-Crusade with the particular objective of the county of Tripoli whose territory was immediately adjoining. Damascus had halted the offensive against the Crusaders since the reign of Shams al-Mulūk, who had launched an attack on the Crusaders in Dhū'l Qa'da 528/began 24 August 1137, and managed to recover Bānyās from the Crusaders of Jerusalem as mentioned above in Chapter four.<sup>32</sup>

In Rajab 531/began 25 March 1137, the Amīr Bazwāj, the chief commander of the Damascus army, invaded the territories of Tripoli. When Count Pons of Tripoli was

informed about Bazwāj's advance into his county, he hastened to meet him. Bazwāj defeated Pons's army after a hard-fought battle near the castle of Saint Gilles (Mount of the Pilgrims). Most of Pons's army succeeded in escaping death, but he himself was captured. As a result of a plot by the Syrian Maronites, who had settled on the heights of Lebanon, Pons was killed. William of Tyre gives no details as to how the Syrians assassinated Count Pons. The Fatimid Caliph al-Ḥāfiẓ li-Dīni'llāh sent his congratulations to the Amīr Shihāb al-Dīn concerning his victory over the Crusaders of Tripoli.<sup>33</sup>

After his victory over the Crusaders, Bazwāj managed to take over the fortress of the Mount of the Pilgrims (Qal'at Sanjīl). Although he had achieved a great victory over the county of Tripoli, Bazwāj's army was not ready to lay siege to the city. Therefore, Bazwāj confined himself to advancing to the north of Tripoli plundering the country and capturing Ḥiṣn Yaḥmur which was known by the Crusaders as Chastel Rouge, eleven miles south east of Anṭartūs. This fortress had been established by the Banū al-Aḥmar who had settled on the mountain of al-Rawādif, it was therefore called after the builders.<sup>34</sup>

It appears that the Syrian Maronites had imprisoned Count Pons and identified him; they then appear to have

handed him over to Bazwāj or the Damascenes who killed him. As usual with William of Tyre, when he reports a Crusader defeat, he records that the majority of the Crusaders who took part in the battle were from the middle class and that few of them were noblemen; but he does not give us an estimate of the casualties. After the murder of his father, Raymond the new count of Tripoli, avenged his father's death by going up to Mt. Lebanon, with the remaining forces of the country, and carrying out a massacre of the Syrians there. But no chronicler of the time reports what steps if any Count Raymond took in retaliation against the Damascenes, who had eventually defeated his father. It was likely that he did not have sufficient power to challenge the Damascenes under their eminent leader Bazwāj. The cooperation of the Syrians with Damascus gives us an indication of the success of Bazwāj in manipulating the strained relation between the Crusaders and the Syrian Christians. It appears that it was the first time that Damascus had used the Syrian Maronites against another branch of the same religion namely western Christian "Crusaders".<sup>35</sup>

In early Sha'bān of 531/began 1 April 1137, Zangī resumed his attempts to take Ḥims. He marched with forces from Mosul and crossed the Euphrates moving in the direction of Ḥims. In addition he ordered one of his most accomplished commanders Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Yāghisiyānī

to precede him with the 'Askar of Hama to lay siege to Ḥimṣ. Zangī had chosen this commander to invest Ḥimṣ, because he thought that such a gifted leader would be able to persuade the governor of Ḥimṣ, the Amīr Anar, to let him take over his city without bloodshed. The Amīr Anar rejected the offer refusing to give up his city and justifying his position on the grounds that he ruled the city only as a regent on behalf of the Amīr Shihāb al-Dīn and thus had no right personally to determine the fate of the city. Furthermore, in Shawwāl of 531/began 22 June 1137, Zangī mobilized five hundred foot-soldiers from Hama and attacked Ḥimṣ for several days; he was however unable to wear down the resistance of the defenders of the city.

According to Ibn al-'Adīm, the Crusaders hurried to the aid of Ḥimṣ, with the result that Zangī lifted the siege of the city. But Ibn al-'Adīm does not report whether the people of Ḥimṣ appealed to the Crusaders for aid. Ibn al-Qalānisi on the other hand says that the reason for Zangī's withdrawal was the strong opposition of the people of Ḥimṣ and he says nothing about help from the Crusaders. It seems then that the people of Ḥimṣ did not ask the Crusaders for aid. If they had done so, it is difficult to see how the Damascenes could have cooperated with Zangī against the Crusaders in early Dhū'l-Ḥijja of the same year 531/began 27 September 1137. This will be discussed below.<sup>36</sup>

In the year 531/began 29 September 1137, the Byzantine emperor John II Comnenus began a great campaign directed at the retaking of Antioch and its adjacent territory from the Crusaders. John's pretext was that the Crusaders had not honoured their oath in 490/1097 to his father, the emperor Alexius I Comnenus, by which they had undertaken to hand over Antioch to him if they could succeed in recovering it from the Muslims. What caused the emperor John to embark on the campaign was the success of Raymond of Poitiers in gaining control over Antioch. In 530/1136, Raymond managed to do this when he got married to the legitimate princess of Antioch, Constance, daughter of Alice, a consort of the former prince of Antioch Bohemond II. At the same time Emperor John II had been striving to dominate the county of Antioch by arranging the marriage of one of his sons to the Princess Constance. Thus, he had missed an important opportunity to gain control of Antioch by peaceful means. The Emperor, then, planned to reduce Antioch by force of arms in Dhū'l-Ḥijja of 531/began 18 August 1137. Emperor John II recaptured Cilicia, which was ruled by the Armenian King Leon I. His next step would be to lay siege to the city of Antioch. In Dhū'l-Ḥijja of 531/began 18 August 1137, John laid siege to the city with a view to recovering it for the Empire. The involvement of John II Comnenus with the Crusaders and his relations with the Emirate of Damascus are



discussed below and the manner of his becoming involved in northern Syria is a crucial element in his later dealings with the Emirate.

While John was besieging Antioch, Zangī gave up the blockade of Hims on 20 Shawwāl 531/11 July 1137, as mentioned above. According to William of Tyre, Zangī had raised the siege so as to be able to lay siege to the strategic and fortified stronghold of Montferrand "Bārīn", which belonged to the county of Tripoli, when he was informed about the defeat of the army of the county of Tripoli by the Damascenes in Rajab in the same year 531/began 25 March 1137, as has been mentioned above. The report from William of Tyre emphasizes the important role played by Damascus in weakening the country of Tripoli.<sup>97</sup> Raymond, the new count of Tripoli, and King Fulk, hurried to the relief of Montferrand. Zangī succeeded in defeating both armies, killed two thousand men and took Count Raymond prisoner. King Fulk escaped death and hastened to the fortress of Montferrand to use it as a shelter for the rest of the defeated forces of the Crusaders. King Fulk appealed for assistance to Raymond the prince of Antioch and Joscelin II Count of Edessa. Although his capital city Antioch was under siege by the Byzantine Emperor John II, Raymond hastened with a troop of his forces to save King Fulk, and he left the remainder to defend the city against the threat posed by the emperor. Joscelin II of

Edessa with his armed forces and the rest of the army of Jerusalem led by William, the patriarch of Jerusalem, also hastened to their King's relief.

The Emirate of Damascus did not stand by as a spectator of what was going on in Syria between Zangī and the Crusaders. While almost all the Crusader forces were engaged in rescuing their King and his followers in the fort of Montferrand, the Kingdom of Jerusalem itself was denuded of defenders, and so the 'Askar of Damascus embarked on a campaign to enfeeble the Crusaders. Amīr Bazwāj led the Damascene forces, and advanced towards Nablus, an unfortified city in Samaria (northern Palestine). He succeeded in gaining great spoils, took many captives and set fire to the countryside around the city of Nablus. Later, he returned unmolested with his forces having suffered no casualties to speak of.

Zangī, however, managed to prevent any news of relief from reaching King Fulk in Montferrand. For that reason Fulk thought that help from the Crusading forces would not arrive when he needed it, with the result that he capitulated under conditions and handed over the fortress of Montferrand to Zangī. Furthermore, he reluctantly agreed to pay fifty thousand dinars as a ransom.<sup>30</sup> In return, Zangī guaranteed the safety of the King and his troops, who were besieged in the stronghold.

One day after the surrender of Montferrand to Zangī, the Crusader's relief expedition reached the fortress. The Crusader leaders blamed their king for his haste in surrendering the fort. Then they returned home without achieving their aim of defeating Zangī's army outside Montferrand.

While Zangī was investing Montferrand, he won an easy victory against the Crusaders of Antioch. It seems that it was a result of the preoccupation of the forces in Antioch with the defence of their city against the Byzantine army, that Zangī was able to recover Ma'arrat al-Nu'mān and Kafartāb. The capture of Montferrand, Ma'arrat al-Nu'mān and Kafartāb, meant that the entire area between Aleppo and Hama was made secure from the Crusaders' depredations and raiding.<sup>39</sup> It can be suggested that these new triumphs for Zangī over the Crusaders contributed to his mastery over Syria and went a long way to endorsing his claim to be the first man in Syria.

After the crucial victory of Zangī at Montferrand, the Byzantine Emperor John II Commenus aborted his plan to take the city of Antioch by force. He then inclined towards joining the Crusaders in an alliance against Zangī. It seems that Emperor John did so, after realizing that the growing power of Zangī would not only

threaten the Crusaders, but also his own interests in Syria as well.<sup>40</sup>

The Emperor stipulated that Prince Raymond of Antioch swear allegiance to him, in return for raising the siege of the city of Antioch under the agreement. Prince Raymond was obliged to let the Emperor enter the city of Antioch and its citadel, whenever he liked. The important condition, that was relevant to the Emirate of Damascus, was that if the Emperor with the aid of the Crusaders managed to occupy Aleppo, Shayzar, Hama and Hims, he would give them to the Crusaders. In return, Prince Raymond would hand over Antioch to the Emperor.<sup>41</sup>

It seems then that had the alliance accomplished its objects, the future of the Emirate of Damascus would have been severely affected. Not only would Damascus lose its principal cities, as for instance Hims, but it would probably lose its independence into the bargain. It seems clear then that the next step for the Crusaders would be the city of Damascus itself. If the project were to meet with success, it would be very difficult for the city of Damascus to protect itself, even if Zangī assisted it with his forces from Mosul. Zangī's supply route for his relief of Damascus would be very long and not as efficient as if he were able to rely on equipment passing along a relatively short route such as Hama or Aleppo.

In Dhū'l-Hijja 531/began 18 August 1137, the Byzantine Emperor embarked upon his campaign against Syria, by despatching messengers to Zangī to emphasize to him that he had no intention of seizing his dominions or any other Muslims' land. The Emperor's messengers were at pains to reassure Zangī that the chief aim of their lord was only to recover Armenia from its rebellious ruler King Leo I. It appears that John was adopting the same stratagem, as the leaders of the First Crusade had adopted in 490/1097 when they asserted to the Kings of Damascus and Aleppo that they had no desire to conquer their land, and that their principal target was the recovery of Jerusalem, as has been mentioned above in Chapter Two.

Zangī trusted the Emperor's word, so he resumed his enterprise of taking over Ḥimṣ and the other lands of the Emirate of Damascus. In Dhū'l-Hijja 531/began 18 August 1137, Zangī advanced with his forces and proceeded to pillage the countryside around Ḥimṣ to wear down the resistance of the city. Then he marched towards Baalbek which was under the control of Shams al-Dawla Muḥammad, the brother of the Amīr Shihāb al-Dīn Maḥmūd of Damascus. Shams al-Dawla was forced to pay a reluctant tribute to Zangī.<sup>42</sup> After that Zangī moved towards the Biqā' Valley and took possession of fort al-Majdal, five miles north of 'Ayn al-Jarr on the road

between Baalbek and Wādī al-Taym, from the Damascenes, probably without real resistance. Then he advanced towards Bānyās to lay siege to it for the first time. It appears that when Ibrāhīm Ibn Ṭurghut, wālī of Bānyās, had observed the humiliation of Shams al-Dawla of Baalbek and the inability of the Damascenes to protect the fortress of al-Majdal, he considered it politic to hand over his town to Zangī peacefully.<sup>43</sup>

When Bānyās was taken by Zangī without a struggle, the Emirate of Damascus lost one of its most strategic, strongly fortified and inaccessible cities. Bānyās became the first city in the Emirate of Damascus to surrender voluntarily to Zangī's sovereignty. Zangī received the city of Bānyās and kept Ibn Ṭurghut as its wālī.<sup>44</sup> It is not improbable that Zangī induced this governor to surrender his town and in return Zangī undertook to recompense him by keeping him on as governor.

According to Ibn al-'Adīm, Zangī spent the winter of 532/began 19 September 1138 in the lands of Damascus and then went back to Hama, but Ibn al-'Adīm gives no details of why Zangī had done this. It seems that Zangī had spent the winter in Bānyās and its districts in order to establish his power there. From Hama he ordered his lieutenant of Aleppo the Amīr Siwār with the army of Aleppo to join his forces in surrounding the city of

Ḥimṣ. Although the historical sources of the time give no estimate for the numbers of Zangī's armed forces, it is likely that he had a considerable army and that he had especially assembled the army of Aleppo at this time. Although Zangī succeeded in overpowering the people of Ḥimṣ at some vantage points around the city, he could not conquer it. Again circumstances were to save Ḥimṣ from the menace of Zangī. Reports of the advance of a vast Byzantine army estimated at about two hundred thousand men with their allied forces of Crusaders in north Syria provided Ḥimṣ with a further breathing space. Information concerning the fall of the fortress of Buzā'a, which was under Zangī's control and was situated only some eighteen miles north east of Aleppo, at the hands of the Byzantine and Crusader forces shocked Zangī. At this time, Zangī discovered that the Byzantine Emperor's promise not to attack Muslim territory in Syria was unreliable. Before he abandoned the siege of Ḥimṣ, Zangī commanded his governor of Aleppo the Amīr Siwār to hurry to defend his city. Furthermore, he assisted his lieutenant with five hundred soldiers including four Isfahsalārs, (chief commanders).<sup>45</sup>

On 9 Sha'bān 532/22 April 1138, as the Byzantine and the Crusader forces reached the territory of Aleppo, Zangī raised the siege of Ḥimṣ and moved towards Salamiyya to disrupt their supply routes.<sup>46</sup>

In early Sha'bān 532/began 15 April 1138, the Byzantine and the Crusader forces marched towards the city of Shayzar to lay siege to it. It seems that they had changed their minds about laying siege to Aleppo with a view to its capture when they encountered strong resistance from the 'Askar and the Aḥdāth of Aleppo. Therefore, they left the lands of Aleppo on 8 Sha'bān 532/22 April 1138 and they occupied al-Athārib the people of which fled out of fear of the advancing host. Then they advanced to invest the fortified city of Shayzar in Sha'bān of this year.<sup>47</sup> According to Ibn al-Qalānisī, innumerable forces of Turkomans, headed by the Amīr Dāwūd Ibn Suqmān Ibn Artuq of Āmid and Ḥiṣn Kayfā who had hurried to the relief of Shayzar, forced the allied armies to abandon their siege and they went back to Antioch.<sup>48</sup> William of Tyre ascribed their withdrawal to the treachery of Emperor John, who appears to have accepted tribute from Sulṭān Ibn Munqidh of Shayzar.<sup>49</sup> On the other hand, Ibn al-Athīr allots Zangī a leading role in contributing to the failure of the allies to take Shayzar. He maintains that Zangī decided to employ strategies to engender doubt among the allies. He persuaded the Crusaders that if the Byzantine Emperor achieved his objectives in this campaign, including the capture of Shayzar, the emperor would destroy the entire Crusader edifice in Syria.<sup>50</sup>



It is probable that it was for this reason that William of Tyre also blamed the Crusaders for their failure to play an effective part in siege of Shayzar. Zangī therefore does indeed appear to have played a considerable role in frustrating this campaign, especially in his supply of relief forces for Shayzar, and in his cutting off his enemies' supply route, when he was camping in Salamiyya as has been mentioned above. As a result of the failure of this combined Crusader and Byzantine campaign, the position of Zangī became so strong in Syria that he was able to reaffirm his claim to be the first Muslim leader in Syria.

This campaign then can be seen to have had significant implications for the future of the Emirate of Damascus. As has been said above the failure of the campaign strengthened Zangī's position in Syria, and had established his position as the protector of all the Muslims in Syria including the Damascenes, whose leaders continued to refuse acceptance of his authority.

It appears then that if the allies had begun their campaign by laying siege to Ḥimṣ, which was indeed one of their objectives as mentioned earlier, this would have forced the Damascenes to appeal to Zangī for help. If this had happened, Zangī's authority in the emirate of Damascus would have gradually increased. Furthermore, if the allies had managed to take Aleppo, Hama, Ḥimṣ and

Shayzar, as they had planned, it would have been very difficult for the Damascenes to protect even their capital from the allied armies. Zangī would then have been faced with helping the city of Damascus from Mosul, a feat which may well have proved beyond even Zangī's considerable capacity because of the distances involved. It appears then that Zangī was planning for a long tussle with the allies as he had sent his baggage to al-Raqqā on the Euphrates, as a precaution against an allied success.

It then appears that the Emirate of Damascus was considerably alarmed at this campaign and was aware of the allies' objectives. It is probable that the Damascenes feared that some of the territory of Damascus (for instance Ḥimṣ) might well be occupied in pursuance of these objectives. For this reason the Emirate sent the Ḥājib Ḥasan to the Byzantine Emperor, with the aim of persuading the emperor to stop this campaign even prior to his capture of Buzā'a on 25 Rajab 532/9 April 1138. This messenger and Zangī's envoy to the Emperor returned to Damascus on the second of Muḥarram of the same year (20 September 1137) about seven months before the occupation of Buzā'a and the beginning of the real threat posed by the campaign.<sup>51</sup>

Furthermore, the Emirate of Damascus was not willing to be a mere spectator of what was going on in Syria nor

to stand idly by before the menace posed by this allied campaign. It therefore dispatched great numbers of its 'Askar to serve with Zangī's army. It seems that one of the conditions of the truce, which had been concluded between Zangī and Damascus in Shawwāl of the previous year 531/began 22 June, 1137, might have been that Damascus should help Zangī in case of an emergency such as that posed by the allied campaign. Even so there was no formal condition to this effect, namely that the Emirate of Damascus should help Zangī whether the allies succeeded or failed. Success of the allied expedition would represent a serious threat to the Emirate. On the other hand, were it to fail, the position of the leaders in Damascus would be very critical, because they would not have fulfilled the religious obligations of helping those Muslims who were their immediate neighbours. If they did not help Zangī their claim to be the legitimate rulers of the Emirate would lose credibility as they would have failed to assist their neighbours, especially Shayzar which was only about twenty four miles north west of Hims, where the territory of Damascus marched with that of Shayzar.

Another interpretation of Damascus' help for Zangī could be that, whereas it might be supposed that Damascus should have sent its aid directly to the amīr of Shayzar and not to Zangī, the Damascenes were endeavouring to obtain credit with Zangī. That was,

indeed exactly what Damascus was to achieve the following month in Ramaḍān, when Zangī made a generous offer of peace to Shihāb al-Dīn Maḥmūd and his new Atābek, the Amīr Anar. On 17 Ramaḍān 532/30 May 1138 after long negotiations between the envoys of Zangī and Shihāb al-Dīn, the deputies reached an agreement.

Shihāb al-Dīn consented to hand over Ḥimṣ to Zangī and wed Zangī's daughter. In return, Zangī agreed to compensate the Amīr Anar, governor of Ḥimṣ with three fortresses namely Bārīn (Montferrand), al-Akama and al-Ḥiṣn al-Sharqī, and also agreed to wed Shihāb al-Dīn's mother, Ṣafwat al-Mulk. As mentioned above, the fortress of Bārīn "Montferrand", which was one of the most strongly fortified and strategically placed forts in Syria, had been recaptured by Zangī the year before in Dhū'l-Qa'da 532/3 April 1138. It appears that the Amīr Anar, who was appointed as Atābek and Isfahsalār of Damascus only one month before the peace treaty between Zangī and Shihāb al-Dīn pursued a new policy in his dealings with Zangī. This policy in brief, aimed to gain Zangī's favour by dealing more tactfully with him, even though Damascus was disinclined to offer him any further concession. Anar presumed that, by his winning Zangī's favour, Zangī would alter his policy which was aimed at annexing all the lands of the Emirate of Damascus to his own emirate or, at the very least, he would leave the leaders of Damascus alone to rule the city of Damascus

and its surrounding territories. The appointment of the Amīr Anar to his new positions was no accident. In the middle of Jumādā I of this year/30 January 1138, the Amīr Bazwāj fled towards Crusader territory, after his relations with the Amīr Shihāb al-Dīn had become severely strained as a result of his "arrogance, treachery and barbarity". Ibn al-Qalānisi, the only historian to mention this event, gives no details as to why Bazwāj had gone over to the Crusaders, but it is likely that he begged them for help against Shihāb al-Dīn. Bazwāj remained in Crusader territory for some time, then he returned to the outskirts of the city of Damascus. It is thus probable that the Crusaders could not provide Bazwāj with the aid he sought. Later he marched to the city of Damascus and camped there with his followers. After long negotiations between the envoys of Bazwāj and Shihāb al-Dīn an agreement was reached of which again Ibn al-Qalānisi gives no details. It seems that Shihāb al-Dīn consented to Bazwāj's conditions solely for the purpose of availing himself of the opportunity of getting rid of this dictatorial leader (who had taken decisions affecting the Emirate without even consulting Shihāb al-Dīn). Shihāb al-Dīn was presented with this opportunity when Bazwāj returned to the city of Damascus with the aim of regaining his position as Atābek and Isfahsalār of Damascus. On 6 Sha'bān/20 April 1138, the Amīr Shihāb al-Dīn plotted with a group of Bazwāj's bodyguards to kill him when he

was staying in the citadel of Damascus.

The plan was well prepared, and Bazwāj's Armenian body guards carried out the murder of Bazwāj. According to Ibn al-Qalānisī, the cause of Bazwāj's assassination, was that "Shihāb al-Dīn bore a grudge against him on account of a certain action of which he disapproved and which had inspired him with an aversion towards him; moreover, he appears to have played fast and loose with public funds, squandering them in gratuities and largess."<sup>52</sup> It sounds as though Shihāb al-Dīn Maḥmūd had decided on a reconciliation with Zangī, but he could not do so without the approval of his Atābek and Isfahsalār Bazwāj. Because of Bazwāj's rejection of the reconciliation proposed, Shihāb al-Dīn determined to get rid of his Atābek by killing him. Ten days after Bazwāj's murder, Shihāb al-Dīn bestowed robes of honour on the Amīr Mu'īn al-Dīn Anar, and designated him to be his Atābek and Isfahsalār of Damascus. Moreover, Shihāb al-Dīn restored the office of Chamberlain for the Amīr Asad al-Dīn Akiz. It seems that the Amīr Bazwāj had dismissed Akiz from his position as Chamberlain while he was in power.<sup>53</sup>

Shihāb al-Dīn appears to have compensated both Anar and Akiz for the persecution they had suffered while Bazwāj had had supreme authority in Damascus. Furthermore, Shihāb al-Dīn gave both Anar and Akiz free

power in the conduct of the affairs in his Emirate.

On 23 Shawwāl 533/24 May 1139, the Amīr Shihāb al-Dīn Maḥmūd was murdered in his bed by three of his personal servants. The leader of the conspiracy was called Albaghash, the Armenian, and the others were Yūsuf al-Khādīm and al-Kharkāwī al-Farrāsh. Albaghash succeeded in fleeing from the city of Damascus, but both Yūsuf al-Khādīm and al-Kharkāwī al-Farrāsh were arrested and were crucified at the Jābiyya Gate in the city of Damascus.<sup>54</sup>

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 246-247; Shihāb al-Dīn Abū Shāma, *Kitāb al-rawḍatayn fī akhbār al-dawlatayn*, Ed. M. A. Ahmad (Cairo, 1956), 80.

<sup>2</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, 259

<sup>3</sup> Gibb, 243; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 247.

<sup>4</sup> Gibb, 177; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 247.

<sup>5</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 247.

<sup>6</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 248; Ibn al-'Adīm, 258; Usāma Ibn Munqidh, *Kitāb al-i'tibār*. Ed. Philip Hitti, (Princeton university Press, 1930), 150-151.

<sup>7</sup> Ibn al-'Adīm, 258.

<sup>8</sup> 'Imād al-Dīn Khalīl, *'Imād al-Dīn Zankī*, Beirut, 1972, 122.

<sup>9</sup> Ibn al-'Adīm, 258; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, 346; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 248.

<sup>10</sup> al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Dhahabī, *al-'Ibar fī khabar man ghabar*. Ed. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Munajjid. (Kuwait, 1963), Vo. II, 433-34; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 249-50.

<sup>11</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 248.



<sup>12</sup> Ibn al-‘Adīm, 259; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 248.

<sup>13</sup> Ibn al-‘Adīm, 257-258.

<sup>14</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, 329-30.

<sup>15</sup> Ibn al-‘Adīm, 259.

<sup>16</sup> Ibn al-‘Adīm, 259.

<sup>17</sup> Ibn al-‘Adīm, 259.

<sup>18</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 252.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid*, 252.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid*, 252.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 252.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 248.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 245.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 253.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 253.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 253-55.

<sup>27</sup> Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad (Shaykh al-Rabwa), *Kitāb nukhbat al-dahr*. Ed. A. Mehren. (Leipzig, 1923), 200.

<sup>28</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 257

<sup>29</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 257; Ibn al-‘Umrānī, 222.

<sup>30</sup> Abu'l Faraj 'Abdu'l Raḥmān Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntaẓam*, (Ḥaydarabād, 1939), 61; Ibn al-'Umrani, 222.

<sup>31</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisi, 261-262.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 242-43.

<sup>33</sup> Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-a'shā fī ṣinā'at al-inshā'*, ed. Muḥammad Ibrāhīm. Cairo, 1913, Vol. 6, 449-451; William of Tyre, 82-83.

<sup>34</sup> 'Umar Tadmurī, *Tārīkh Ṭarāblus*, 499.

<sup>35</sup> William of Tyre, 82-83.

<sup>36</sup> Ibn al-'Adīm, Vol. 2, 261.

<sup>37</sup> Anonymous Syriac Chronicle, Trs. A. S., Tritton as "The First and Second Crusades from an Anonymous Syriac Chronicle", with notes by H. A. R. Gibb, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1933, 275-76.; William of Tyre, 83-88.

<sup>38</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, Vol. IX, 357-358; William of Tyre, 88-89; *Anonymous Syriac Chronicle*, 274..

<sup>39</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Atābeka*, 61.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 62.

<sup>41</sup> William of Tyre, 83-84.

<sup>42</sup> Ibn al-'Adīm, 222-224.

<sup>43</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisi, 263.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., 263.

<sup>45</sup> Ibn al-'Adīm, 264-65; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 263-64.

<sup>46</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, 259-60; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 265.

<sup>47</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 265-66; Usāma Ibn Munqidh, *Kitāb al-I'tibār*, ed., Philip Hitti, Princeton University Press, 1930, 2-3.

<sup>48</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 266.

<sup>49</sup> William of Tyre, 96.

<sup>50</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, 360.

<sup>51</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 263-64; William of Tyre, 95; Anonymous Syriac Chronicle, 279.

<sup>52</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 262, 266-267.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 264.

<sup>54</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 268-69; al-Dhahabī, 92.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE REIGN OF JAMĀL AL-DĪN MUḤAMMAD

#### IBN TĀJ AL-MULŪK BŪRĪ

23 SHAWWĀL 533-8 SHA'BĀN 534/24 MAY

1139-10 APRIL 1140

This second murder involving another Amīr of Damascus, presented the Emirate of Damascus with new problems. After the assassination of Shihāb al-Dīn Maḥmūd, the circumstances surrounding which were obscure, Zangī welcomed the fresh problems faced by the Emirate of Damascus as an opportunity to interfere in its internal affairs. The Amīr Jamāl al-Dīn Ibn Būrī, half-brother of Shihāb al-Dīn, and the Amīr Anar were charged by Ṣafwat al-Mulk, the mother of Shihāb al-Dīn, with complicity in the murder of Shihāb al-Dīn.<sup>1</sup> This accusation is supported by the fact that, after the assassination of Shihāb al-Dīn, the Amīr Anar delivered a letter to Jamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad Ibn Būrī, wālī of Baalbek, inviting him to take charge of the Emirate.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, Jamāl al-Dīn rewarded the Amīr Anar by according him priority, at the expense of the other commanders and notables of Damascus, by giving him Baalbek as an iqtā'. He kept the Amīr Anar as Isfahsalār of Damascus and with the rank of Atābek of the former Amīr Shihāb al-Dīn, even though he did not get married to Shihāb al-Dīn's mother as would have befitted the

rank.<sup>3</sup> Later however after the murder of Shihāb al-Dīn, the Amīr Anar married Jamāl al-Dīn's mother, and so became the real Atābek of the Amīr Jamāl al-Dīn.<sup>4</sup>

No historical sources of the time give her name. As mentioned above in Chapter V, Zangī got married to Shihāb al-Dīn's mother (Şafwat al-Mulk) on 17 Ramaḍān 532/30 May 1138 with the object of gaining real power in Damascus, but he could not secure his position as Atābek of Damascus, because Anar had secured the position of Atābek one month before Zangī's marriage to Şafwat al-Mulk.<sup>5</sup>

It seems that because of the killing of Shihāb al-Dīn, Zangī lost all influence in Damascus, since he was no longer the effective step-father of the Amīr of Damascus. There is some difficulty in determining the precise qualifications for the position of Atābek and also in discerning the criteria for the appointment.

It seems however that the Amīr Anar was the second real Atābek of Damascus. As mentioned above in Chapter II, in 488/1095 ʿUgtekīn became the first real Atābek when he got married to King Duqāq's mother also called Şafwat al-Mulk.<sup>6</sup>

It can be suggested that the revival of rank of Atābek in Damascus in Jamāl al-Dīn's reign proved his incapacity to rule Damascus alone. By getting the

position of real Atābek of Damascus, Anar reconfirmed his position as unofficial amīr of the Emirate of Damascus, a position which he had held since Sha'bān 532/began 15 April 1138.

The historical sources of the time do not mention whether Shihāb al-Dīn had sons or not. If, in fact, Shihāb al-Dīn had indeed had sons, no mention is made of them, nor of whether any of such sons demanded to succeed their father as Amīr of Damascus. It would seem then that if Shihāb al-Dīn did indeed have heirs, they would have been too young to succeed their father and so would have made no noteworthy impact on affairs. Furthermore it seems nobody at that time was in a position to defy Anar's will, and also no historical source indicates whether Amīr Bahrām, the younger brother of the Amīr Shihāb al-Dīn demanded to succeed his brother or indeed whether Bahrām was still alive at that time.

Ibn 'Asākir, a contemporary historian of Damascus of the time, confirms that no person in Damascus disputed the succession to Shihāb al-Dīn. All the leaders and notables of Damascus accepted Jamāl al-Dīn as successor of his half-brother Shihāb al-Dīn.<sup>7</sup>

It has been mentioned that Ṣafwat al-Mulk accused Jamāl al-Dīn and Anar of killing her son Shihāb al-Dīn.

She appealed to her husband Zangī to retaliate against them.<sup>9</sup> Zangī, who was eager to annex Damascus to his territories, accepted this appeal to intervene in the affairs of Damascus, particularly as this request came from the mother of the former prince of Damascus who in addition was Zangī's wife. It seems logical that Zangī would have marched to the city of Damascus to lay siege to it, and to take revenge against Jamāl al-Dīn and his Atābek Anar, who were living there.

When the news of Zangī's march from Mosul towards Syria reached Damascus, the Damascenes tried their best to fortify their city and to provide whatever was needed to resist the threat posed by Zangī. Zangī however avoided Damascus and made his way towards Baalbek. It appears that Zangī marched to Baalbek, possibly to take revenge on Anar, who was governor of Baalbek, as mentioned above.<sup>9</sup> According to Ibn al-Athīr, a favourite slave girl of the Amīr Anar was in Damascus. When he got married to the mother of Jamāl al-Dīn, he sent the slave girl to Baalbek. When Zangī was informed about the slave girl, he sent several letters requiring Anar to surrender the city of Damascus to him, and he would grant such compensation in return as Anar might wish. It can be suggested that when Anar refused to entertain the suggestion, Zangī proceeded to insult Anar by conquering Baalbek and capturing his beloved slave girl.<sup>10</sup> On 20 Dhū'l-Hijja 533/17 August 1139, Zangī with his vast host

descended on Baalbek and laid siege to the city. He set up fourteen catapults bombarding the city day and night.<sup>11</sup> When the seventy Turkomans, the only defenders of the city, realized that they could not protect the city from Zangī, they sued for peace. Zangī consented to their appeals, but he plotted against and killed all these guards, and captured many people including Anar's slave girl.<sup>12</sup> It seems as though Zangī took possession of this slave girl to put pressure on Anar and so induce him to surrender the city of Damascus.

Ibn al-Athīr indicates that one factor which would in due course help to improve the relations between Anar and Nūr al-Dīn Maḥmūd Ibn Zangī, was that Nūr al-Dīn returned this slave girl to Anar.<sup>13</sup> This goes further in demonstrating how the capture of this slave girl worsened the relations between Zangī and Anar.

Zangī's betrayal of the defenders of Baalbek reminds us of his intrigue against Sawinj and his forces in 524/1130 when Sawinj's father Tāj al-Mulūk Būrī sent him to fight with Zangī against the Crusaders.<sup>14</sup> Now the Damascenes found out yet again that Zangī was still not the man to honour his obligations. They were confirmed in the view that, if they gave in to Zangī, as the defenders of Baalbek had done, he would butcher them. For that reason, they strove to protect their city; they were even prepared to appeal for help to the Crusaders.<sup>15</sup>



After he had taken Baalbek, Zangī spent three months in restoring the parts of the city which he had devastated with his catapults. In Rabī' I 534/began 28 October 1139, Zangī embarked on a fresh stage in his efforts to take over the city of Damascus.<sup>16</sup> He moved down the Biqā' valley and sent his messenger to Jamāl al-Dīn asking him to surrender his capital; in return he would grant him whatever compensation he chose. On 13 Rabī' II 534/8 November 1139, when Jamāl al-Dīn had not replied to his offer, Zangī marched towards Dārayyā, a large town five miles south west of the city of Damascus, and camped there. When he reached Dārayyā, Zangī advanced with his army and attacked the vanguard of the Damascene army, and defeated it. The soldiers from the Damascus army, who survived the attack fled to the city, and left their killed and captured comrades to Zangī's forces. Then, five days later on 18 Rabī' II 534/13 November 1139 Zangī launched a raid on the city from the south through an area called al-Muṣallā, a few miles south of the city. He managed to overpower the Aḥdāth of Damascus and al-Ghūṭa, and the city was almost captured by Zangī's army.

According to Ibn al-Qalānisī, Zangī was predisposed towards taking over Damascus by peaceful means; he therefore returned with the prisoners to his camp in Dārayyā. Ibn al-Qalānisī states that Zangī suggested to

Jamāl al-Dīn that he give him Ḥims, Baalbek and another city of his own choice in compensation for the city of Damascus.<sup>17</sup> On the other hand, Ibn al-Athīr claims that one of Zangī's commanders called Kamāl al-Dīn Abū al-Faḍl al-Shahrazūrī recommended that he attack the city and assured him that some commanders of the Aḥdāth of Damascus had promised him that they would open the gates of the city if Zangī were to launch an attack. Ibn al-Athīr added that Zangī refused this proposal because of his fear of the narrow streets of the city, which would prevent his great army from maneuvering freely.<sup>18</sup>

According to Ibn al-Qalānisī, Jamāl al-Dīn considered Zangī's offer carefully, and despite his desire to surrender his capital to him, he was unable to do so.<sup>19</sup> It seems that Jamāl al-Dīn could not accept an offer, which his Atābek Anar had rejected. None of the Damascenes nor even their official Amīr Jamāl al-Dīn could dare to challenge Anar's will. It seems also that a contributory factor in Jamāl al-Dīn's decision not to cooperate with Zangī was that he had contracted an illness, a few days after his receipt of Zangī's offer in early Jumādā I of 534/began 24 December 1139. Jamāl al-Dīn's illness lasted four months, after which he died on 8 Sha'bān of the same year (10 April 1140); meanwhile, Zangī's forces meanwhile were still in camp in Dārayyā.

Jamāl al-Dīn had reigned for a shorter period than any other ruler of the family of Ṭughtekīn. He had ruled Damascus for only about ten months, from 23 Shawwāl, 533/24 May 1139 till 8 Sha'bān of 534/10 April, 1140.<sup>20</sup>

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 269; 'Abdu'l Raḥmān Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Ibar wa diwān mubtada' wa 'l-khabar*, Vo. V, (Beirut, 1961), 524.

<sup>2</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 269.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 269.

<sup>4</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, 364.

<sup>5</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 264-66.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 131.

<sup>7</sup> Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Munajjid, *Wulāt Dimashq fī al-'ahd al-Saljūqī*, (*nuṣūṣ mustakhraja min tāriḫ Dimashq al-kabīr lil-Hāfiẓ Ibn 'Asākir*, Second Edition, (Beirut, 1967), 23.

<sup>8</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al Kāmil*, 364; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 269; Ibn Khaldūn, 524.

<sup>9</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, 364; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 269.

<sup>10</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, 364; Ibn Khaldūn, 524; Anonymous Syriac Chronicle, "The First and Second Crusades from an Anonymous Syriac Chronicle", tr. A. S. Tritton, with notes by H. A. R. Gibb, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1933, 273-74.

<sup>11</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, 364-65.

<sup>12</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, 365; Ibn Qalānisī, 269-70.

<sup>13</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, 365; Ibn Khaldūn, 525.

<sup>14</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 227-28.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 270.

<sup>16</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, 367.

<sup>17</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 271; al-Dhahabī, 93; Usāma Ibn Munqidh, *Kitāb al-i'tibār*, 12; Ibn Khaldūn, 525.

<sup>18</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Atābeka*, 58-59.

<sup>19</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 271; Ibn Khaldūn, 525.

<sup>20</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 271; Ibn Kathīr, 216.

## CHAPTER VII

## THE REIGN OF MUJĪR AL-DĪN

ABŪ SA'ĪD ABAQ IBN JAMĀL AL-DĪN MUḤAMMAD

534-549/1140-1154

After the death of Jamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad on 8 Sha'bān 534/10 April 1140, the commanders and notables of Damascus unanimously agreed on the choice of his eldest son 'Aḍb al-Dawla Abū Sa'īd Abaq (who was later known as Mujīr al-Dīn) as successor to his father. According to Ibn al-Qalānisī, all the Damascene leaders were prepared to listen to the new young Amīr of Damascus.<sup>1</sup> But at the same time they agreed in fact to obey the Atābek Anar, who was the unofficial ruler of Damascus and the *de facto* regent for Abaq in Damascus, (as mentioned in Chapter VI there, there was nobody in Damascus who dared to defy Anar's will).

As was by now his usual practice after the instalment of a new amīr in Damascus, Zangī launched an attack on the city, thinking that division among the Damascene leaders would obstruct their efforts to protect their capital from his attentions. But on each occasion the commanders and notables of Damascus continued to unite with each other in foiling Zangī's plans to exploit this kind of opportunity. Shortly after the accession of Mujīr al-Dīn Abaq, Zangī attacked Damascus, but the Damascenes especially the Aḥdāth

managed to foil his attempt to take the city by an unexpected assault. Therefore, Zangī was forced to pull back to his camp in Dārayyā, five miles south west the city of Damascus.<sup>2</sup> Anar was convinced that Zangī would not give up the siege of the city of Damascus until it had surrendered or been taken by force. Therefore, Anar appealed for help to the Crusaders of Jerusalem, who twenty-four years previously had assisted Ṭughtekīn of Damascus in 509/began 27 May 1115, against the expedition of the Saljūq Sultān Muḥammad to help him to make Zangī withdraw from the city.<sup>3</sup> Anar was obliged in turn to pay the Crusaders twenty thousand gold dinars monthly until Zangī abandoned the siege of the city, and also to help them to force Zangī to surrender Bānyās with the condition that the Damascenes hand over the city to them. Further to establish his *bona fides*, he suggested that he give the Crusaders some relatives of the Damascene commanders as hostages while he was fulfilling his side of the bargain.<sup>4</sup> The leaders of the Crusaders were hesitant about this alliance. It seems they still remembered the alliance of Ṭughtekīn of Damascus and Īl-Ghāzī of Mārdīn with their former leaders in 509/1115 against the Saljūq Sultān, and how Ṭughtekīn and Īl-Ghāzī had not lived up to Crusader expectations in properly shouldering the responsibility of resisting the Saljūq Sultān's campaign of 509/1115. Furthermore, the Crusaders had gained nothing from that alliance, but Ṭughtekīn and Īl-Ghāzī had achieved what they wanted

from it as mentioned in Chapter II. William of Tyre asserts that there were two reasons which had made King Fulk of Jerusalem accept the alliance: the first was the fear of the Crusaders that the fall of Damascus into the hands of Zangī would increase his power; the second one was the restoration of Bānyās to the Crusaders, which was one of the most heavily fortified and strategically placed cities in Syria.<sup>5</sup>

When the Crusaders of Jerusalem eventually approved the alliance and had received the hostages mentioned above, they hastened to send great numbers of cavalry and infantry to assemble at the city of Tiberias for the rescue of the city of Damascus from Zangī, who was in camp at Ra's al-'Ayn (Ra's al-Mā'), in the region of Ḥawrān twenty five miles north the city of Sarkhad, whither he had moved from Dārāyā. The report of the Crusader march to Tiberias, thwarted Zangī's scheme of taking Damascus. The Damascus army, headed by Anar, marched out from the city to await the Crusaders in Nawa, a village in the region of Ḥawrān twenty miles north the city of Adhru'āt (modern Dar'ā in Jordan). When Zangī learnt about the assembling of the Crusaders of Jerusalem and the Damascene forces, he hastily retreated from Ra's al-Mā', thirty fives miles south east of Damascus, towards the valley of the Biqā'. The withdrawal of Zangī was due to his inability to face both the Damascenes and the Crusaders at the same time.<sup>6</sup>



After the allies were assured of the withdrawal of Zangī's forces from the district of Damascus, they agreed unanimously to implement the second step of their agreement that of restoring Bānyās to the Crusaders of Jerusalem. As mentioned in Chapter IV, Bānyās had been taken from the Crusaders of Jerusalem by the Amīr Shams al-Mulūk Ismā'īl on the first of Ṣafar 527/11 December 1132. As mentioned earlier in Chapter V, the wālī of Bānyās (on behalf of Damascus) Ibrāhīm Ibn Turghut, had plotted against his lord the Amīr Shihāb al-Dīn Maḥmūd in Muḥarram 531/began 29 September 1136, and became under the power of Zangī. According to William of Tyre, because of the treachery of Ibn Turghut, the wālī of Bānyās, the Damascenes preferred to restore this city to the Crusaders of Jerusalem rather than have it controlled by Zangī "whom they greatly feared and distrusted".<sup>7</sup> This indication from William of Tyre emphasizes for us that the Damascenes regarded the threat of Zangī to them as more serious than the menace of all their enemies including the Crusaders of the East.

In Shawwāl 534/began 20 May 1140, the Damascenes and the Crusaders of Jerusalem invested Bānyās closely and cut the city off from any help. The Damascene troops

encircled the city from the east, and the western side was blocked by King Fulk's forces. Before the siege the Amīr Anar and King Fulk agreed to request help from Prince Raymond of Antioch and Count Raymond II of Tripoli.<sup>8</sup>

Of the siege itself, William of Tyre, the only historian of the time to give more details of this expedition, writes: "From the hurling engines called petraries they threw huge stones of great weight, which shook the walls and demolished buildings within the city itself." He goes on to say: "Even the defenders though protected by walls and ramparts, scarcely ventured to look upon the assailants without".<sup>9</sup>

The ceaseless raids on the city did not however weaken the vigorous resistance of the people of Bānyās. It became obvious that the allies could not occupy the city until they had established a wooden siege-tower. The materials of the tower were provided to the Crusaders by the Damascenes. The arrival of immense Crusader forces headed by Prince Raymond of Antioch and Count Raymond II of Tripoli, aggravated the difficulties faced by the besieged. Zangī's attempt at providing relief for Bānyās was brought to nothing because of the strength of the forces involved in the siege.<sup>10</sup> When Anar saw that the powers of resistance of the defenders of the city had declined to a low level, he secretly

sent his envoys to the people of Bānyās to induce them to surrender their city. The leaders of Bānyās refused at first, realizing that Zangī's aid would help them to withstand a long siege. But when they found out that Zangī's relief force could not get through, they agreed to surrender their town. But the governor of Bānyās stipulated that he must be compensated with other iqṭā'; also that a part of the revenue of Bānyās should be paid annually to him, and that all the citizens of Bānyās should be given permission to leave the city with all their goods and chattels. Furthermore, those who preferred to stay in the city or in the surrounding countryside should be allowed to remain and to keep their houses and properties.<sup>11</sup>

Anar informed King Fulk about these arrangements, which he had agreed on with the wālī of Bānyās. According to William of Tyre, Anar gave the Crusaders' leaders a well prepared report concerning the negotiations which he had undertaken. And he "urged them with all the eloquence in his power to agree on the treaty." The Crusader leaders unanimously approved Anar's agreement.<sup>12</sup>

On 24 Shawwāl 534 /13 June 1140, all the people of Bānyās departed from their city with all their belongings, as had been approved by that agreement. The governor of Bānyās was compensated for his city, which

the Crusaders of Jerusalem had taken over, as had been agreed with the Amīr Anar. It appears that the siege of Bānyās lasted only about twenty two days; also Anar paid the Crusaders of Jerusalem only twenty thousand gold dinars. Forcing the surrender of the well-fortified city in so short a time, if we compare its surrender with the investment of the city of Antioch on 2 Shawwāl 491/12 September 1097, till the end of Jumādā I 491/June 1098 by the great armies of the Crusaders which (estimated according to Fulcher of Chartres at three hundred thousand men including their families) which lasted nine months, can be considered a great achievement for the Crusaders and the Damascenes. Anar's success in arranging this agreement in such a short time was to save the exchequer of Damascus a great amount of money.<sup>13</sup>

The year 535/began 17 August 1140, was a year of comparative calm, while 534/began 28 August, 1139, had been a year of friction between the Muslims, including the Damascenes, and the Crusaders settled in the Levant. The only serious friction between the Muslims and the Crusaders at this time was between the people of 'Asqalan and the Crusaders of Jerusalem. According to Ibn al-Qalānisī, the people of 'Asqalān thwarted the Crusaders' attempt to capture 'Asqalān and killed a group of Crusaders putting others to flight.<sup>14</sup>

The same thing can be said of the year 536/began 8 August 1141, when the only activity to occur was when one of Zangī's commanders called Lujja al-Turkī, who had deserted from Damascus to Zangī's service managed to defeat the Crusaders of Antioch in the field and killed some seven hundred men.<sup>15</sup>

The year 537/began 27 July, 1142, was one of calm for Damascus, Zangī was involved during this year in establishing his authority in the traditional Kurdish territories by taking over the fortified castle there called Ashab the greatest fortress of the Hakkārī Kurds. In addition, Zangī's regent Siwār in Aleppo was engaged in preventing the Crusaders of Antioch from occupying Buzā'a. There was however no conflict between Zangī and Damascus that year.<sup>16</sup>

Although Zangī in 538/began 16 July, 1142, was involved in establishing his rule in Diyār Bakr especially over the Amīr Ya'qūb Ibn al-Sib' al-Aḥmar, Damascus did not enjoy a calm year.<sup>17</sup> The internal divisions in Damascus played a significant part during the course of the year. As mentioned above, on 17 Sha'bān 532/1 May 1138) the Amīr Anar and the Chamberlain Akiz, became the unofficial rulers in Damascus. Anar even gained the two major ranks in Damascus those of the Atābekiyya and Isfahsalāriyya; meanwhile the Chamberlain Akiz managed to win many

followers and began to challenge Anar's superiority. Anar decided that his best course to eliminate the authority of Akiz and his followers. He approached the problem by methods other than those used traditionally by the am̄irs of Damascus who used to dispose of rivals by killing them. His approach was to imprison his rivals and blind them.

On 3 Jumādā I, 538/13 November 1143, the Am̄ir Anar arrested the Chamberlain Akiz and blinded him by having his eyes gouged out. When Akiz's followers learnt about what Anar had done to their leader, they were prompted to desert Akiz.<sup>16</sup>

In 539/began 14 July 1144, the internal conflict became worse than it had been the year before. Conflict now broke out between Mu'ayyid al-Dīn Abū al-Fawāris al-Musayyib Ibn al-Ṣūfī Ra'īs of Damascus on one side, and on the other Abū al-Makārim the wazīr of the Am̄ir Mujīr al-Dīn Abaq of Damascus and the Am̄ir Usāma Ibn Marshad Ibn 'Alī Ibn-Munqidh, presumably the assistant of the wazīr. The rivalry started when Abū al-Makārim and Usāma Ibn Munqidh defamed Mu'ayyid al-Dīn Ibn al-Ṣūfī to the Am̄ir Anar. Furthermore, according to Ibn al-Qalānisī Abū al-Makārim and Usāma interfered in Ibn al-Ṣūfī's business as Ra'īs of Damascus.

On 21 Muḥarram 539/25 July 1144, Ibn al-Ṣūfī fled to

Kumushtekīn al-Atābekī, governor of Sarkhad and the former Atābek of the Amīr Shihāb al-Dīn Maḥmūd and Isfahsalār of Damascus, for the second time. As mentioned above, Kumushtekīn had been a former ally of Ibn al-Ṣūfī. And in 531/began 29 September 1136, Ibn al-Ṣūfī had escaped to Kumushtekīn of Sarkhad, after the murder of his relative al-Ra'īs Muḥyī al-Dīn Abū al-Dhū'ād al-Mufarrij Ibn Ḥasan Ibn al-Ṣūfī (on 17 Ramaḍān 530/21 June 1136) the former Ra'īs of Damascus. It seems that the Amīr Anar had realized that there was a plot against Mu'ayyid al-Dīn Ibn al-Ṣūfī planned by Abū al-Makārim and Usāma Ibn Munqidh, so he decided to banish them to Egypt and to allow Ibn al-Ṣūfī to come back to the city of Damascus as its Ra'īs.

On 13 Jumādā I 539/30 November 1144, the city of Damascus celebrated the deportation of Abū al-Makārim and Usāma Ibn Munqidh and the return of its Ra'īs Ibn al-Ṣūfī in gratitude for Anar's wisdom in solving this difficulty.<sup>19</sup>

On 26 Jumādā II 539/23 December, 1144, Zangī restored the city of Edessa to the Muslims. The details of the capture of this important city is not directly relevant to the present thesis, but the importance of this event and its effect on Damascus are outlined. This great victory was the most important achievement of the Muslims against the Crusaders since the beginning of the

Crusades in 490/1097. Both the Abbasid caliph and the Saljūq Sultān sent their compliments to Zangī, and Muslims throughout the Middle East celebrated this great triumph.<sup>20</sup>

There is no doubt that this great achievement would have been used as support for Zangī's claim to being the leading Muslim ruler in Syria and the protector of all Syrian Muslims including the Damascenes. Furthermore, it would strengthen any justification he might need for the annexation of Damascus to his growing kingdom. Panic at the growth of Zangī's power developed after the fall of Edessa. Furthermore, after the recovery of Edessa by the Muslims, the Crusaders of the east called for assistance from Western Europe. We shall see that the main aim of the Second Crusade of 543/began 22 May 1148 to 10 May 1149) would be the occupation of the city of Damascus, and not the recovery of the city of Edessa which had been understood as being its primary objective.<sup>21</sup>

About one year after his victory in Edessa, in early Sha'bān 540/began 17 January 1146, reports reached Damascus that Zangī had assembled a great army and had gathered "great numbers of catapults and military machines." Zangī announced that he was preparing for *Jihād*, but he made no declaration about whom he would fight. It seems that he did this to mislead the leaders of Damascus, who would then not prepare themselves for



the defence of their city. The Damascenes however did strengthen their city and mustered all their forces to thwart Zangī's attempt to conquer their city. Zangī gathered his forces in Baalbek which is only about twenty-five miles from the city of Damascus. But the news of a plot against the authority of Zangī in Edessa made him change his mind about continuing with his plan to invade Damascus. Because of the conspiracy in Edessa, Zangī marched to restore order there. Before his advance towards Edessa, Zangī ordered some of his commanders to return with the catapults to Ḥimṣ. It appears that Zangī was frightened that these catapults would be captured by the Damascenes. Ḥimṣ, being more heavily fortified than Baalbek, was a more secure place to leave them. Even when Zangī had managed to restore order in Edessa, he was forced reluctantly to postpone his plan to gain control of Damascus until the following year.<sup>22</sup> But this plan would not be put into operation during Zangī's lifetime, because he was murdered on 6 Rabī' II 541/14 September 1146, while he was laying siege to Qal'at Ja'bar "Dawsar", on the Euphrates river between Bālis and al-Raqqa.

The kingdom of Zangī was divided between his older sons Sayf al-Dīn Ghāzī and Nūr al-Dīn Maḥmūd. Sayf al-Dīn ruled Mosul and inherited his father's problems with the Artuqids in Diyār Bakr, and Nūr al-Dīn ruled Aleppo and inherited his father's difficulties with the

Crusaders and the Damascenes. According to Turkish tradition, the elder son used to gain power after his father's death. Because Nūr al-Dīn was not the eldest son of Zangī, his position in Aleppo was not as strong as it might have been. This was because his elder brother Sayf al-Dīn regarded him as a refractory opponent. We shall see the effects of this situation on Nūr al-Dīn activities especially against Damascus, effects which lasted until Sayf al-Dīn's death in Jumādā I 544/began 6 September 1149. It becomes clear that Nūr al-Dīn who was an experienced and subtle politician, was unwilling to annex Damascus to his kingdom until after his brother's death. In any event, the Emirate of Damascus was unfortunate on this occasion because as the neighbour of Nūr al-Dīn, it was faced with a greater threat than his brother Sayf al-Dīn was likely to pose.

In Jumādā II 541/began 5 November 1146, about two months after the accession of Nūr al-Dīn of Aleppo and Sayf al-Dīn of Mosul, the Crusaders of Edessa headed by Joscelin, the former Count of Edessa, and the Edessan Armenians succeeded by conspiracy in recapturing the city of Edessa from its few guards.<sup>29</sup> The details of this event are outside the scope of this thesis, but it is necessary first of all to assess the importance of these events for Damascus. Nūr al-Dīn's success in recapturing Edessa easily by force within five days proved to all the Crusaders that Nūr al-Dīn was no less dangerous to

them than his father Zangī had been. It was supposed that Sayf al-Dīn not Nūr al-Dīn, ought to have hurried to the relief of Edessa because Edessa is nearer to Mosul than to Aleppo. The success of Nūr al-Dīn in recovering Edessa demonstrated that Nūr al-Dīn would make the Muslim response to the Crusaders his own special preserve; Nūr al-Dīn kept Edessa for himself, and his brother Sayf al-Dīn did not oppose him.<sup>24</sup> In other words, the affairs of Syria including those of Damascus would lie in Nūr al-Dīn's sphere of activity and not in that of Sayf al-Dīn.

In Muḥarram 542/began 2 June 1147, Altun-Tāsh, governor of Buṣrā (Bostrum) and Sarkhad (Selcath), during a visit to Jerusalem, suggested to King Baldwin III, the new king of Jerusalem, and his mother and regent Melisende that he hand over Buṣrā and Sarkhad to them, and in turn they should compensate Altun-Tāsh by granting him a fief. William of Tyre considers that this was due to Altun-Tāsh's antagonism towards his master, the Amīr Mujīr al-Dīn Abaq and his Atābek Anar, but he gave no details about the reasons for this antagonism. At the same time, William of Tyre, who was the main historian of the time of this campaign, did not name the fief which King Baldwin pledged to Altun-Tāsh.<sup>25</sup>

The army of Jerusalem led by King Baldwin III advanced towards Tiberias, and camped near the Bridge of

al-Sinnabra over the Jordan river at the southern end of Lake of Tiberias.

According to William of Tyre, Baldwin was obliged to notify Anar formally, if he intended to enter the territory of Damascus so that he "might have a legitimate time, following the custom of the land, to assemble an army". It would seem that sudden entry into crucial territory "without official notice" was "contrary to the law of treaties."<sup>26</sup> When Anar was informed about the agreement between Altun-Tāsh of Buṣrā and King Baldwin III, he assembled a great army from Damascus and its neighbourhood to recover Buṣrā and Sarkhad for Damascus. King Baldwin III wrote to Anar warning him not to assemble an army without getting permission from him himself. Anar replied after one month accusing King Baldwin III of breaking the terms of treaty between them. Anar warned King Baldwin III not to interfere in the domestic affairs of Damascus by supporting his rebellious subordinate Altun-Tāsh of Buṣrā. In addition, he asked Baldwin III to maintain his good relations with the Damascenes and to keep his peace treaty with Damascus. Furthermore, he promised Baldwin III to compensate him for all the expenses which he had incurred with regard to this campaign if King Baldwin would refrain from taking part in the plan to assume control of Buṣrā and Sarkhad.<sup>27</sup>

King Baldwin III answered Anar's letter by stressing

that he could not refuse the appeal of Altun-Tāsh who was "sincere" in his reliance on the Kingdom of Jerusalem. On the other hand, King Baldwin III showed Anar that he was prepared to compromise. He proposed to Anar that he let Altun-Tāsh go back to Buṣrā. But if Anar insisted on dismissing his governor of Buṣrā, he was to compensate Altun-Tāsh with a considerable iqṭā'. If Anar did this, Baldwin III undertook to keep his peace treaty with the Amīr Mujīr al-Dīn Abaq of Damascus.<sup>28</sup> According to William of Tyre, Anar's desire to adhere to the peace treaty with King Baldwin III was due to his fear from the threat to his emirate from Nūr al-Dīn, his son-in-law. Nūr al-Dīn had married Anar's daughter in the previous year on 23 Shawwāl 541/30 March 1147). This is why Anar proposed to compensate Baldwin III for all the expenses which he had incurred regarding expedition.<sup>29</sup> It can be suggested that even though Anar had established this relationship by marriage with Nūr al-Dīn, he was sure that Nūr al-Dīn would not abandon his father Zangī's attempts to annex Damascus to his emirate.

One of the commanders of King Baldwin III called Bernard Vacher advised him to consent to Anar's proposal and to return home. But the mass of the people, who represented the majority of the army, accused Bernard Vacher of being a traitor, and insisted on carrying on with the march to take over Buṣrā and Sarkhad. Baldwin

was reluctant to refuse the demands of the majority, and he therefore resumed his advance towards Buṣrā by moving along the plain of al-Madān, twenty miles north west of Busra.

In al-Madān, the vast and well-organised army of Damascus shocked the Crusaders, even those who had previously insisted on proceeding with the march. The Crusaders of Jerusalem established their camp and spent that night on the alert. In the morning, the Damascene forces succeeded in surrounding the Crusaders on every side and halting their march. The Crusaders succeeded with great difficulty in breaking through the middle of the Damascene army and resumed their advance towards "Trachonitis", a region of northern Transjordan; the Damascenes however continued to harass the Crusaders by firing arrows at them. In that area, the Crusaders were exhausted from the lack of water, especially since the pools of the region had been spoiled by dead insects. The reason for the fouling of these pools was that this province had faced a terrible plague of locusts. When the Crusaders approached the city of Adratum, probably Adhru'āt in Trachonitis (Transjordan), they anticipated that they would find water to drink. But the people of that city, who were fellow countrymen of the Damascenes, strove to prevent the Crusaders from using the reservoirs of the town. For four days during their stay in the city, the Crusaders did not enjoy any rest, even

during the night, because of the bombardment carried out by the Damascene bowmen. Owing to this harassment, many Crusaders sneaked out of their camp and deserted; meanwhile, the Damascene forces increased in number. The Crusaders tried to counter the Damascenes' missiles, but in vain; indeed they made scarcely any impression at all on the Damascene forces.<sup>30</sup>

On the fourth day of the march, the Crusaders painfully made their approach towards Buṣrā. They managed with many difficulties to get the water despite the Damascene defence. They made their camp near the town where they enjoyed a little rest that night as they waited for the morrow. At midnight a bearer of bad news for the Crusaders informed them that the wife of Altun-Tāsh, the governor of Buṣrā, had betrayed the town and handed it over to the Damascenes. The Crusaders were embarrassed by the news of the surrender of the city, which they had suffered many difficulties in reaching, with the express aim of adding it to their dominions. The Crusaders now unanimously decided to retreat hastily to their own territories whatever the cost. William of Tyre, the only historian of the time who gives many details about this event, describes the terrible situation of the Crusaders by saying: "Now for the first time the Christians [the Crusaders] felt the hardship of their situation in double measure, for their great hope now was gone, and they realized that their efforts had

been all in vain".<sup>31</sup>

On the following day, Nūr al-Dīn's forces arrived to support the Damascenes, because Anar had appealed to him. The coming of an enormous number of Nūr al-Dīn's troops added to the troubles of the Crusaders, who had just started their withdrawal. The Crusaders decided against leaving any of their dead behind as they withdrew so as to make Anar and Nūr al-Dīn believe that they had no casualties, and so would refrain from following them. When Anar and Nūr al-Dīn found that their efforts to capture the Crusaders were in vain, they set fire to the land; the fire, fuelled by dry thistles and grass, doubled the woes of the Crusaders. But a change of wind in the direction of the Damascene forces and those of Nūr al-Dīn lessened the torment of the Jerusalem army. The Crusaders intended to send an envoy to Anar to agree on some compromise, the object of which was merely to give them an opportunity to return home safely. But the Crusaders' envoy perished at the hands of the Damascenes before he had the opportunity of presenting his message.<sup>32</sup>

When the Crusaders approached "Cavea Roab," after several unendurable days, Anar dispatched messengers affirming his good intentions to King Baldwin III and proposing peace. William of Tyre, the only historian of the time to mention these proposals gives no details,



but he does mention that the Crusaders refused to receive them.<sup>33</sup> It seems that Nūr al-Dīn pretended to have had no notion of this mission, so as not to worsen his relationship with his ally and father-in-law, Anar, because it would seem that sooner or later the Emirate of Damascus would be his.

According to William of Tyre, an unknown horseman guided the Crusaders on their return to their homes by way of "Cavea Roab", where they had lost their way.<sup>34</sup> It sounds as though Anar had provided the Crusaders with an unidentified guide to demonstrate his good will and so as not to lose prospects of alliance with them in future against such time as Nūr al-Dīn would try to annex the city of Damascus to his Kingdom.

After the failure of the expedition mounted by the Crusaders of Jerusalem to take over Buṣrā and Sarkhad, the former governor of Buṣrā Altun-Tāsh went back to the city of Damascus without getting a safe conduct, thinking that Anar would forgive his disloyalty to him and his rebellious activities. But Anar sentenced him to be blinded as Altun-Tāsh, while he was in power in Buṣrā, had done with his own brother. Anar confined him to house arrest in Damascus.<sup>35</sup>

William of Tyre gives details of the extent of the Crusaders' losses in this campaign. He says that "No one

now living can remember any equally perilous expedition during the period of the Latins in the Orient which did not result in a decisive victory for the enemy".<sup>36</sup>

After the recovery of Edessa on 26 Jumādā II 539/23 December 1144, by Zangī, the Crusaders of Outremer sent many messengers to persuade the Church in the West to promulgate a new Crusade to save the rest of the dominions of the Crusaders in the East. After great efforts by Pope Eugenius III and Bernard, abbot of Clairvaux, the Holy Roman Emperor Conrad III and King Louis VII of France together with western princes agreed to embark on the Second Crusade.<sup>37</sup> The treatment of the this Crusade here will be confined to its impact on the Emirate of Damascus.

The reports about the number of the Crusader forces embarked on this campaign have been greatly overestimated, particularly by the Muslim sources. According to Ibn al-Qalānisi, the number of the German and French armed forces combined was about one million. It seems that the Crusaders put about this exaggerated number in order to frighten the Muslims in Syria. Ibn al-Qalānisi points out that this estimate originated from the Byzantine Empire and the Crusaders.<sup>38</sup> William of Tyre estimated both German and French armies at about one hundred and forty thousand men.<sup>39</sup> In Jumādā II 542/began 28 October 1147, by the river Bathys near

Dorylaeum the German forces lost a ninth of their army at the hands of the Saljūqs of Iconium. Only seven thousand men, including Emperor Conrad, escaped death in the disaster. After many difficulties, the fleeing forces arrived safely in Nicaea.<sup>40</sup> The French army joined the remnants of the German forces in Nicaea. Then both armies resumed their advance towards Ephesus. On 14 Rajab 541/15 December 1147, in Ephesus, the German emperor ordered his remaining forces to return to Constantinople and he himself returned by sea also to Constantinople.<sup>41</sup>

In early Sha'bān 542/began 27 December 1147, another catastrophe befell the Second Crusade near Laodicea, (modern Denizli), when the French army was negotiating Mt. Cadmus. The Saljūqs of Rum exploited the separation of the vanguard and rear of the French army; they ambushed the rear of the French army and defeated it. According to William of Tyre, some of these forces, including King Louis succeeded in fleeing and then joined the vanguard who had no idea about the disaster which had befallen the rear of the army. As far as is known, no historical sources of the time mention the number of French losses precisely, but it is likely that these were no fewer than thirty thousand casualties. William of Tyre describes this tragic defeat for the French in the following terms:

"That day the glorious reputation of the Franks was lost through a misfortune most fatal and disastrous for the Christians; their valour, up to this time formidable to the nations, was crushed to earth".<sup>42</sup>

At Attalia (Antalya), the French army was further demoralized by the scarcity of food, and many who had survived from the disaster of Laodicea particularly the poor died of starvation. King Louis and his nobles and commanders left their army to proceed on foot, and went by ship the Port of St. Symeon, (al-Suwaydiyya), which belonged to the Crusaders of Antioch.<sup>43</sup> Raymond of Antioch begged King Louis to help him to extend his dominions, but King Louis refused to do so. Then King Louis left for Jerusalem to perform his pilgrimage and to discuss with King Baldwin III what they should do to help the Crusaders of the East.<sup>44</sup>

In Dhū'l-Qa'da 542/began 25 March 1148, Emperor Conrad and his forces landed at the port of Acre. His ships had been provided by the Byzantine emperor Manuel I Comnenus. According to William of Tyre, each of the Crusader states in the East desired to use the Second Crusade in its own interest alone without considering the common good of the Crusaders in general. Each state was eager to utilize the forces of the Second Crusade with a view to enlarging its own dominions.<sup>45</sup>

In Muḥarram 543/began 22 May 1148, after lengthy

arguments and discussions between the leaders of the Second Crusade in Acre, they decided at last to try and take the city of Damascus.<sup>46</sup> According to William of Tyre, the reason for the choice was that this city was a major threat to the Crusaders of the East.<sup>47</sup> It can be suggested that the real menace to the Crusaders of the East at that time was not the Emirate of Damascus but the threat posed by Nūr al-Dīn of Aleppo. It seems that Damascus at that time no longer represented any considerable threat to its allies, the Crusaders of Jerusalem. As mentioned above, Nūr al-Dīn made the threat he posed to the Crusaders particularly clear when he recovered Edessa in Jumādā II 541/began 5 November 1146, and helped the Damascenes against the Crusaders of Jerusalem in Muḥarram 542 /began 2 June 1147 when they tried to annex Buṣrā and Sarkhad to their dominions.

The Crusaders chose to launch their attack on the city from the west. According to William of Tyre, the Crusaders selected that direction for two reasons. The first one was that, if they succeeded in dominating this highly fortified area, it would be easy for them to overcome the city. The second reason was that this position would provide their forces with water and food, especially fruits. But according to a modern Arab historian Aḥmad Zenū, the western side of the city was the least fortified area of Damascus.<sup>48</sup> It seems that the Crusaders selected this position to surprise the

Damascenes who did not expect an attack from so great an army from that direction for geographical reasons, as that western side of Damascus is surrounded by mountains. The Damascene forces managed to prevent the advance of the Crusaders across the Baradā River for a while. But when the Emperor Conrad led the attack with his German forces, he defeated the Damascenes and forced them to flee to the city. By that victory the Crusaders forced the river crossing and camped in "widespread ranks around the city, and, without opposition, enjoyed at pleasure the river and the orchards thus won by force."<sup>49</sup> The Damascenes embarked on new tactics to stop the advance of the Crusaders by placing tall beams of immense size in the roads opposite the Crusaders' camp as an obstruction. According to Ibn al-Qalānisi, the Crusaders achieved a position around the city which had not been achieved by a non-Muslim aggressor since the capture of Damascus by the Muslims in 17/638.<sup>50</sup> By contrast, according to Muslim historians of the time, the Crusaders started their siege of Damascus from the South then moved to the East.<sup>51</sup> The western historians of the time, including William of Tyre and Ibn al-'Ibrī, the Syrian historian, give the treachery of some of the Crusader leaders of the East as a particular reason for the failure of the expedition to capture the city. They believe that Anar bribed these leaders to persuade the Crusaders that they should leave their advantageous position on the western side of the city and move to the

eastern side. These leaders persuaded their sovereigns that the eastern side was less well protected than the western one; there were "no protecting orchards and neither river nor moat to hinder the approach to the fortifications."<sup>52</sup> It should however have been apparent that the eastern side was in fact the most heavily fortified side of the city. According to William of Tyre, these "traitorous leaders" induced their lords to move to the new position which did not provide the Crusaders with enough water and food supplies, even for a few days. The Crusader leaders discussed the matter of returning to the position which they had been induced to leave. But they discovered that the Damascenes had hastened to re-establish themselves even more strongly than before. The Damascenes now not only barricaded the area with vast beams, but with immense masses of rocks and positioned a large body of orchards there, so preventing all possibility of entrance. The Crusaders of the West who had trusted the Crusaders of the East discovered their treachery. For this reason, they decided to withdraw from Damascus without accomplishing their objective of taking over the city. All the Crusading forces withdrew towards Jerusalem over the same road by which they had come. According to William of Tyre, the Crusaders of the West then returned home to Western Europe "without glory".<sup>53</sup>

There are various reasons canvassed in explanation

of the failure of the Second Crusade. The first of these suggests that the promise of Emperor Conrad, King Louis VII and King Baldwin to bestow Damascus on Theodore Count of Flanders before the siege of Damascus, let alone its capture, provoked hostility among the Crusaders of the East. Although King Baldwin III and some of the Crusaders of the East accepted this arrangement, many other Eastern Crusading leaders rejected it. According to William of Tyre, those who had rejected Theodore's request, "preferred that the Damascenes should keep their town rather than to see it given to the count" of Flanders.<sup>54</sup>

The second suggestion is that Anar had bribed some of the Eastern Crusading leaders to give up the siege of the city, as mentioned above.<sup>55</sup>

The third suggestion is that Anar tricked both the Crusaders of the East and the West as well. He wrote to the Crusaders of the West warning them that if they did not give up the siege of the city, he would surrender the city to Sayf al-Dīn of Mosul, who had assembled all the forces of the Muslim East against them. At the same time, he wrote to the Crusaders of the East threatening them that they faced alternatives neither of which was in their interest. The first of these namely that he hand over the city of Damascus to Sayf al-Dīn, would make it most difficult for them to retain their



dominions in the East (including the holy city of Jerusalem, the main prize of the Crusaders). The other alternative namely that the Crusaders of the West would capture the city of Damascus and establish a new Crusader state in the East, would result in their domination of all the other Crusader states in Syria.<sup>56</sup>

It seems that Anar bribed some of the Eastern Crusading leaders to persuade their rulers to abandon the siege of the city of Damascus. The final suggestion is that it was the splendid resistance of the Damascenes and their allies to the Crusaders during the siege of the city which led to its failure. Although no forces arrived either from Sayf al-Dīn of Mosul or Nūr al-Dīn of Aleppo, their promise of help for the people of the Emirate of Damascus encouraged the Damascenes to resist the major threat which the Crusaders posed to their city. No contemporary historian denies the bravery of the Damascenes in facing this grave threat.

The Second Crusade, of 543/began on 22 May 1148, against the city of Damascus, and the co-operation of the Kingdom of Jerusalem with the other Crusaders put the continuing validity of the truce between Damascus and Jerusalem in question.

After the withdrawal of the Second Crusade, the Crusaders of Jerusalem began to plunder and loot the dominions of the Emirate of Damascus, especially in

Ḥawrān. In Muḥarram of 544/began 11 May 1149, Anar was reluctant to march against the Crusaders of Jerusalem despite their plundering and devastation in the Ḥawrān area. Anar appealed to the Bedouin to help him against the Crusaders. His aim was to resume his truce with the Crusaders of Jerusalem, because they had cut off the trade routes of Damascus. The Crusaders of Jerusalem were however compelled to renew their truce for another two years and reduce the annual tribute on Damascus after Anar had launched raids against them in Ḥawrān.<sup>57</sup> It seems that not only was keeping the Damascus road open important for the leaders of the Damascenes, but also their alliance with the Crusaders of Jerusalem was an essential element in protecting them from the threatened capture of Damascus by Nūr al-Dīn.

It can be suggested that Nūr al-Dīn was aware that Damascus would not abandon its policy of alliance with the Crusaders of Jerusalem. To break that alliance, Nūr al-Dīn wrote to Anar offering his personal assistance to the 'Askar of Damascus in their operations against the Crusaders of Antioch.<sup>58</sup>

Although Anar's armistice with Jerusalem was not related to Antioch, sooner or later this new alliance between Anar and Nūr al-Dīn would indeed affect Anar's alliance with Jerusalem. Furthermore, it sounds as though Nūr al-Dīn would be likely to exploit the

Damascene involvement in Antioch to weaken both Damascus and Antioch and to strengthen his own power in Syria into the bargain. It seems that Anar was suspicious of Nūr al-Dīn's intentions in that, if he were to join the army in person, Nūr al-Dīn would have the opportunity of imprisoning him; therefore on 10 Ṣafar 544/19 June 1149, Anar sent one of his eminent commanders, the Amīr Mujāhid al-Dīn Būzān Ibn Māmīn with a considerable number of soldiers from Damascus to deputize for him. Anar ordered Mujāhid al-Dīn to obey Nūr al-Dīn, and serve him with all the forces at his disposal. Anar's justification of his own remaining in the city of Damascus with the rest of Damascene army was that he wished to settle the situation in Ḥawrān where the Bedouin were refusing to transport Damascus trade with their own camels.<sup>59</sup>

On 21 Ṣafar 544/29 June 1149, Nūr al-Dīn with great help from Damascus achieved a major victory, near the fortress of Innab against Prince Raymond of Antioch. Almost the entire army of Antioch was slaughtered including their Prince Raymond who was well known for his bravery among the Crusaders of the East. After this victory, the combined armies of Nūr al-Dīn and Damascus laid siege to the city of Antioch, one of the most heavily fortified cities at that time in Syria. Nūr al-Dīn thought that her people would surrender to him because of the catastrophe suffered near Innab. the

people of Antioch however declined to yield to Nūr al-Dīn as they imagined that the Crusaders would hurry to their relief.<sup>60</sup>

In Jumādā I 491/June 1098, (fifty-three years previously) about three hundred thousand Crusading forces had taken nine months to capture this city<sup>61</sup> and it sounds as though this was too difficult for Nūr al-Dīn whose mustered army was of only about six thousand men. In spite of this, Nūr al-Dīn left part of his army to continue the siege of the city and marched with the rest to lay siege to Afāmiya (Apamea). He managed to recover Afāmiya without bloodshed and then came back to Antioch to resume the siege. He endeavoured to induce the people of Antioch to come out to fight his army in the field as indeed their count had done earlier. But the people of Antioch recognized this particular stratagem. Therefore, they did not leave their city with the result that they were successful both in limiting casualties and saving Antioch. Nūr al-Dīn did not give up the siege until the people of Antioch recognized his title over all the lands near Aleppo. The historical sources of the time, however, give no details about this treaty between Nūr al-Dīn and the people of Antioch. Then Nūr al-Dīn turned back to Aleppo and the Damascene forces went back home.<sup>62</sup> Nūr al-Dīn reaped the benefit of his alliance with Damascus in his victory by Innab.

During his campaign in Ḥawrān, Anar had left his forces in the field and he himself returned to Damascus. It appears that some emergency had forced him to go back to the city. While in the city, he suffered severely from diarrhoea. Although he was sick, he insisted on rejoining his forces in Ḥawrān so as to complete his mission there by way of reaching an agreement with the bedouin of that region. While there he contracted the dangerous disease of dysentery and returned to the city of Damascus on 7 Rabī' II (14 August 1149), dying there after twenty five days.<sup>63</sup>

With the death of his Atābek Anar in early Jumādā I, 544/began 6 September 1149, the Amīr Mujīr al-Dīn had a golden opportunity to reign freely in his emirate without the interference of any strong official in Damascus. It seems then that the reason for the assembly of all the notables and commanders of Damascus after the death of Anar, in the citadel where Mujīr al-Dīn himself was living was to gain support for Mujīr al-Dīn to rule independently. All the commanders and notables of Damascus including Ḥusām al-Dīn Būlāq, the Ra'īs Mu'ayyid al-Dīn Ibn al-Ṣūfī and Mujāhid al-Dīn Būzān agreed to listen to Mujīr al-Dīn.<sup>64</sup>

It appears that Mujīr al-Dīn was afraid of the increasing power of Mu'ayyid al-Dīn Ibn al-Ṣūfī, Ra'īs of Damascus, and his brother Zayn al-Dawla Ḥaydara. It

seems that Mujīr al-Dīn had no power at that time to remove these leaders. Therefore, he detained their followers in prison to reduce their power in Damascus. Mu'ayyid al-Dīn and Zayn al-Dawla assembled their followers among the Ahdāth and the trouble-makers of Damascus near their houses to protect themselves in case Mujīr al-Dīn attempted to imprison them. When Mujīr al-Dīn saw their preparations, he sent to reassure them that he had no intention of persecuting them. They did not trust him however, so they marched the following day with their followers towards the prison, broke into it, and released such of their followers as had been detained. When Mujīr al-Dīn was informed about this rebellious action, he assembled his forces to suppress the malcontents. But his leading personnel persuaded him to solve this problem by peaceful means.

In view of the length of the negotiations and the measure of disagreement between Mujīr al-Dīn and the rebels, Mujīr al-Dīn was understandably reluctant to reappoint Mu'ayyid al-Dīn as Ra'īs and Wazīr of Damascus as well, which would have confirmed him as the leading person in Damascus. Besides that, Mujīr al-Dīn was forced to dismiss some of the more distinguished personalities in Damascus including al-Sallār Zayn al-Dīn Ismā'īl, Shihna of Damascus.<sup>65</sup>

Meanwhile, the Crusaders devastated and plundered Hawrān, which was in the territory of the Emirate of

Damascus. It seems that Nūr al-Dīn used these attacks by the Crusaders of Jerusalem on Ḥawrān to test whether, after the death of Anar, Damascus could maintain the same cooperation with him against the Crusaders as had operated in Muḥarram 543/began 22 May 1148 and in Ṣafar 544/began 9 June 1149, as mentioned above. Furthermore it seems that Nūr al-Dīn exploited these raids of the Crusaders of Jerusalem to force the Damascenes to break their alliance with them. It could be supposed that the rulers of Damascus would ask for help from Nūr al-Dīn against the Crusaders of Jerusalem. But what in fact happened was the opposite. Nūr al-Dīn wrote to the Damascenes to send one thousand horsemen under a reliable commander to fight the Franks in Ḥawrān. It seems that Nūr al-Dīn did this to bring pressure to bear on the rulers of Damascus. Mujīr al-Dīn, however, rejected Nūr al-Dīn's offer, whereupon Nūr al-Dīn marched towards the city of Damascus to compel the Damascenes to help him. According to Ibn al-Qalānisi, the Damascenes had made a defensive alliance with the Crusaders of Jerusalem. Therefore, the Damascenes appealed for relief from the Crusaders of Jerusalem, who were engaged at the time in rebuilding the city of Gaza as a stronghold from which to attack 'Asqalān. A part of these Crusader forces reached Bānyās to assist the Damascenes against Nūr al-Dīn. Nūr al-Dīn camped in Manāzil al-'Asākir, a few miles south of the city of Damascus. On 26 Dhū'l-Ḥijja 544/25 April 1151, he sent a

strong letter to Mujīr al-Dīn and his Ra'īs, stressing his request for help against the Crusaders, and giving more details about his policy towards Damascus. In this letter, Nūr al-Dīn mentioned another justification for his request for Damascene help; it was to assist in the deliverance of 'Asqalan and other cities occupied by the Crusaders. The Damascene leaders insisted on their refusal to help Nūr al-Dīn, and they warned him of the power of their allies the Crusaders of Jerusalem, who were ready to help them in the event of his attacking them.<sup>66</sup>

When he received the reply, Nūr al-Dīn determined to advance with the intention of launching an attack on the city of Damascus the following day. But heavy rain prevented him from doing so. According to Ibn al-Galānisī, certain reports reached Nūr al-Dīn who abandoned his intention of attacking the city of Damascus. It seems the reports Nūr al-Dīn received suggested that the Damascenes would accept his authority in Damascus. On 1 Muḥarram 545/30 April 1150, the Damascenes reached an agreement with Nūr al-Dīn. They agreed to be under Nūr al-Dīn's authority and pronounce the *khutba* in his name. In turn, Nūr al-Dīn bestowed on Mujīr al-Dīn and his Wazīr and Ra'īs of Damascus Mu'ayyid al-Dīn robes of honour; then he returned to Aleppo on 16 Muḥarram 545/15 May 1150.<sup>67</sup> As mentioned in Chapter Five, in Jumādā I, 529/began 18 February 1135,



Shihāb al-Dīn Maḥmūd of Damascus had consented to pronounce the *khuṭba* in the name of Zangī of Mosul and Aleppo, but it did not mean that Zangī's authority in Damascus was more than nominal. The same situation now obtained as between Mujīr al-Dīn and Nūr al-Dīn.

By the beginning of 546/began 20 April 1151, Damascus faced another and more serious threat of capture from Nūr al-Dīn. In this latest campaign Nūr al-Dīn assembled a great army numbered at about thirty thousand men. In this campaign Nūr al-Dīn applied the new strategy of exhausting the economy of Damascus. On 12 Muḥarram 546/1 May 1151) Nūr al-Dīn marched towards Damascus and camped in the lands of al-Hajīra and Rāwiya near 'Adhrā. Then he sent detachments to plunder the crops of territory in the Ghūṭa of Damascus. During that time, he wrote to the rulers of Damascus reminding them that his object was not to destroy their country, but to induce them to join forces with him in the campaign against the Crusaders. This time, the Damascene leaders did not reply to Nūr al-Dīn. On 23 Muḥarram 546/12 May 1151, Nūr al-Dīn moved his camp to the area east and west of Masjid al-Qadam, and as far as the al-Qiblī mosque to the south of Damascus. According to Ibn al-Qalānisi, no hostile forces had dared to advance as far as this for some time past. During that time, the Franks of Jerusalem advanced to relieve the Damascene leaders. When the news of their march reached the people of

Damascus, many of them especially the 'Ulamā' and pious people were disappointed, because they would have been happy to be under Nūr al-Dīn's rule. In any event, on 25 Ṣafar/12 June 1151, in the same year, Nūr al-Dīn gave up the siege of the city, when news of the Crusaders' march towards Damascus reached him. He then advanced towards al-Zabadānī to induce the Crusaders to face his forces in open combat there.<sup>68</sup> In addition, Nūr al-Dīn sent four thousand horsemen towards Ḥawrān to cut off the supplies of the Crusaders there.<sup>69</sup> It appears that Nūr al-Dīn was informed that the price of the Crusaders' help against him would be the fortress of Buṣrā, which, as has been mentioned, the Damascenes had striven to save from the Crusaders in Muḥarram 542/began 2 June 1147 four years previously. Therefore, he dispatched these forces to prevent the Damascenes and the Crusaders from joining forces to compel the rebellious ruler of Buṣrā to give up his city in the Crusaders' favour. After some days the Crusader forces headed by King Baldwin III, arrived in the city of Damascus. Mujīr al-Dīn and his wazīr Mu'ayyid al-Dīn Ibn al-Ṣūfī were disappointed with the small size of the force sent by their Crusader allies. The Frankish forces preceded the Damascene troops in the advance towards Buṣrā. When the Franks of Jerusalem were informed about the forces sent by Nūr al-Dīn to Ḥawrān, they took refuge in Lujāt Ḥawrān (the desert of north eastern Ḥawrān). When the Damascene forces joined the Franks there, they marched

to lay siege of Buṣrā. It seems that the Franks and the Damascenes were not ready for a long siege, and when the governor of Buṣrā, one Surjāl, confronted them with his forces, they gave up the siege of Buṣrā. In the second ten days of Rabī' I/began 27 June 1151, the Damascenes and the Frankish forces went back home without achieving their aim of taking Buṣrā.<sup>70</sup>

On 21 Rabī' I 546/7 July 1151, within a few days of the Damascene return to Damascus, Nūr al-Dīn resumed his policy of exhausting Damascus by plundering Ḥawrān, Marj al-Ṣuffar and al-Ghūṭa. Mujīr al-Dīn appealed to his people especially his troops and the Aḥdāth to protect their city, but few of them joined him to fight Nūr al-Dīn's forces, thereby departing from their earlier practice of giving him firm support. No real fighting took place between the two forces. On 24 Rabī' I 546/10 July 1151. Nūr al-Dīn camped in area of al-Qaṭī'a near the city of Damascus. On 10 Rabī' II, 546/26 July 1151, after protracted negotiations between both parts, Mujīr al-Dīn agreed to rule Damascus as a regent of Nūr al-Dīn for the first time. To confirm this arrangement Mujīr al-Dīn visited Nūr al-Dīn in Aleppo on 12 Rajab 546/25 October 1151.<sup>71</sup> It seems that even Mujīr al-Dīn accepted Nūr al-Dīn's authority, but he refused to abandon his peace treaty with the Crusaders of Jerusalem. This is supported by the fact that in late Sha'bān of the same year/began 14 November 1151, some Turkomans attacked

Bānyās, which belonged to the Franks of Jerusalem at that time, and defeated its governor and his forces in the field. The governor was the only person to escape death in the attack. Mujīr al-Dīn hurried with his troops to punish the Turkomans. He was unable to catch the main body of the Turkomans but caught up with some of them encumbered by booty which they had taken from the Crusaders. Mujīr al-Dīn was able to return the plunder to the Crusaders who took their revenge for the Bānyās incident by raiding in al-Biqā' in early Ramaḍān in the same year/began 12 December 1151.<sup>72</sup>

548/began 27 March 1153, was an important year in Crusading history. In this year, the Crusaders managed to capture 'Asqalān, the last Muslim port on the Levantine littoral.<sup>73</sup> The Crusader capture of 'Asqalān however is only discussed here in the light of its impact on the Emirate of Damascus. On 13 Muḥarram 548/11 April 1153, Mujīr al-Dīn marched with his forces to join Nūr al-Dīn. Then they advanced towards the fortress of Aflis (Afis), twenty miles north east of Ma'arrat al-Nu'mān on the road from Ma'arrat al-Nu'mān to Aleppo, and took it by force. After that they marched in the direction of Bānyās with ten thousand men, but they changed their direction and advanced to the river al-A'waj, (fifteen miles south of the city of Damascus), when the appeal for help from 'Asqalān reached them. According to Ibn al-Qalānisi, the capturing of Bānyās

which belonged to the Crusaders of Jerusalem, should have been easy because most of the Crusaders of the East were engaged in laying siege to the city of 'Asqalān. But Nūr al-Dīn's forces and those of the Damascenes separated and returned home. Neither army succeeded either in helping 'Asqalān or in taking over Bānyās. Ibn al-Qalānisī gives no excuse for either of the leaders, Nūr al-Dīn or Mujīr al-Dīn, for their failure in this matter. The Damascene army arrived home on 11 Rabī' I 548/5 June 1153, and Nūr al-Dīn's forces returned to Ḥims. <sup>74</sup> According to Abū Shāma, the author of *Kitāb al-rawḍatayn fī akhbār al-dawlatayn al-Nūriyya wa al-Ṣalāḥiyya*, fighting had occurred between Nūr al-Dīn's troops and those of Mujīr al-Dīn before they went back home. <sup>75</sup>

About three months after the Damascene forces' return to Damascus, friction seems to have broken out once more among its leaders. This time the split happened within the family of Ibn al-Ṣūfī. A rivalry emerged between Mu'ayyid al-Dīn Ibn al-Ṣūfī Ra'īs and Wazir to the Amīr of Damascus and his brother Zayn al-Dīn Ḥaydara. Mujīr al-Dīn backed Zayn al-Dīn, therefore the position of Mu'ayyid al-Dīn was shaken. On 19 Jumādā I/10 August 1153, this difficulty was resolved by the deportation of Mu'ayyid al-Dīn to Sarkhad. Then Mujīr al-Dīn appointed Zayn al-Dīn Ibn al-Ṣūfī as his new wazir instead of his brother Mu'ayyid al-Dīn. But Mujīr

al-Dīn discovered later on that the new wazir was unreliable and dishonest to the extent of accepting bribes; he, therefore, dismissed Zayn al-Dīn and designated a new wazir, one 'Atā' al-Khādīm, the Druze governor of Baalbek.<sup>76</sup> It seems that this is the first time that a Durzī had become wazir in Damascus.

On 29 Jumādā I, 548/24 July 1153, 'Asqalān fell into the hands of the Crusaders peacefully despite an eight months siege. It is not proposed to discuss the reasons for the capture of this important city in detail, but the role of Damascus in this disaster and its effect on Damascus in the following year 549/began 18 March 1154, will be indicated. As mentioned above, Nūr al-Dīn and Mujir al-Dīn had intended to relieve 'Asqalān. It seems that Damascus was not seriously committed to the provision of real support for the campaign of Nūr al-Dīn, probably because it did not want to lose its alliance with the Crusaders of Jerusalem. Therefore, Nūr al-Dīn was unable to face the Crusaders in a position which was far from his supply routes, and indeed the only power capable of doing this was Damascus.<sup>77</sup> Ibn al-Athīr considers that the fall of 'Asqalān hastened Nūr al-Dīn's annexation of Damascus to his kingdom so as to establish a united front in Syria to challenge the Crusaders.<sup>78</sup>

According to Ibn al-Athīr, Nūr al-Dīn hastened to

take over the city of Damascus, because he was sure that the next step of the Crusaders would be to threaten the city of Damascus directly.<sup>79</sup> On this occasion, Nūr al-Dīn facilitated his annexation of Damascus by inducing Mujīr al-Dīn to get rid of his reliable new Druze wazīr 'Aṭā' al-Khādim which left Mujīr al-Dīn to face him alone. According to Ibn al-Athīr, Nūr al-Dīn would have been unable to conquer Damascus if 'Aṭā' al-Khādim had been in power. It was for this reason that Nūr al-Dīn urged Mujīr al-Dīn to get rid of this wazīr. Ibn al-Athīr added that 'Aṭā' al-Khādim asked Mujīr al-Dīn before his hanging not to kill him, because there was a plot then being hatched against Mujīr al-Dīn. But Mujīr al-Dīn did not listen to 'Aṭā' al-Khādim's advice and had him executed on 25 Dhū'l-Hijja 548/10 February 1154, only forty days before Damascus fell to Nūr al-Dīn.<sup>80</sup>

In addition, Nūr al-Dīn had deprived Damascus in Dhū'l-Qa'da 548/began 23 January 1154, of the Aleppo trade, which eventually caused a rise in the prices of food and severe shortages in the city of Damascus, probably for the first time since 488/1095. Many people died in the city because of this shortage of food.<sup>81</sup> While Damascus was suffering from this depressing situation, Nūr al-Dīn wrote to the Aḥdāth of Damascus requesting that they open the gates of the city to him when he arrived with his forces. The Aḥdāth of Damascus consented to this request of Nūr al-Dīn's, and when he

marched towards the city on 3 Ṣafar 549/18 April 1154, they opened the gates of the city to him. Nūr al-Dīn's forces entered the city, and Mujīr al-Dīn fled to the citadel with his notables to protect himself. According to Ibn al-Athīr, Mujīr al-Dīn promised his allies the Crusaders of Jerusalem great tribute and the city of Baalbek; however, while the Crusaders of Jerusalem were on the way to help Damascus, Mujīr al-Dīn surrendered his citadel, and Nūr al-Dīn gave him Ḥimṣ as an iqtā'.<sup>82</sup> The Crusaders had thus missed the last opportunity to help their allies in Damascus, and Mujīr al-Dīn lost his position as Amīr of Damascus for ever. The fall of the city of Damascus to Nūr al-Dīn brought the Emirate of Damascus in the line of Tuḡhtekīn to a close and a new phase in the Muslim struggle against the Crusaders opened with the Zangids in control of Muslim Syria.



## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 271.

<sup>2</sup> Gibb, 257; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 271; al-Dhahabī, 94.

<sup>3</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, Vol. IX, 267; Ibn Khaldūn, 525-26.

<sup>4</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 272; William of Tyre, 105-106.

<sup>5</sup> William of Tyre, 105-106.

<sup>6</sup> al-Baghdādī, *Marāṣid al-Iṭṭilā'*, Vol. 3, 1391; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 272; William of Tyre, 106-107.

<sup>7</sup> William of Tyre, 107.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 108.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 108.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 109-110.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 112.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 112.

<sup>13</sup> Gibb, 260; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 272.

<sup>14</sup> Gibb, 363.

<sup>15</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 274.

<sup>16</sup> Gibb, 264; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Atābeka*, 64. Ibn al-Qalānisī, 276.

<sup>17</sup> Shihāb al-Dīn Abū Shāma, *Kitāb al-rawḍatayn fī akhbār al-dawlatayn*, ed. Muḥammad H. Aḥmad, Vol. I, Cairo, 1956, 91-92.

<sup>18</sup> Gibb, 264; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 277.

<sup>19</sup> Gibb, 265; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 277-278.

<sup>20</sup> Gibb, 267; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, Vol. VIII, 539; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 279-280; al-Dhahabī, 106; Ibn al-‘Ibrī, *Tārīkh mukhtaṣar al-duwal.*, 206.

<sup>21</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, Vol. IX, 20; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 298.

<sup>22</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 284.

<sup>23</sup> Gregory the Priest, *The Continuation of Matthew of Edessa*, Vol. II, 445; Ibn al-‘Adīm, 290; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Atābeka*, 86-87; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 288; Abū Shāma, *Kitāb al-rawḍatayn*, Vol. I, 125-126.

<sup>24</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Atābeka*, 87; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 288; Ibn al-‘Ibrī, *Tārīkh al-zamān*, 161; Abū Shāma, *Kitāb al-rawḍatayn*, Vol. I, 124-125.

<sup>25</sup> Gibb, 279; William of Tyre, 147.

<sup>26</sup> William of Tyre, 147.

<sup>27</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisi, 289; William of Tyre, 147.

<sup>28</sup> William of Tyre, 147-148.

<sup>29</sup> Gibb, 275; Ibn al-Qalānisi, 288-289; William of Tyre, 148-149.

<sup>30</sup> William of Tyre, 149-52; James B. Pritchard, *The Times Atlas of the Bible*, (London, 1987), 151, 156, 168.

<sup>31</sup> William of Tyre, 151-152.

<sup>32</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisi, 289; William of Tyre, 153-155.

<sup>33</sup> William of Tyre, 156.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 156.

<sup>35</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisi, 290.

<sup>36</sup> William of Tyre, 157.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 163-164.

<sup>38</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisi, 297.

<sup>39</sup> William of Tyre, 167.

<sup>40</sup> Ḥusayn Mu'nis, *Nūr al-Dīn Maḥmūd*, Cairo, 1959, 208; Runciman, 268; William of Tyre, 170-72.

<sup>41</sup> K. M. Setton and M. W. Baldwin, eds. *A History of the Crusades: The First Hundred Years*, Madison, 1969, 497; William of Tyre, 174.

<sup>42</sup> William of Tyre, 175-78.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 179.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 179-180.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 182.

<sup>46</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, Vol. IX, 20; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 298.

<sup>47</sup> William of Tyre, 186.

<sup>48</sup> Aḥmad Zenū, *Tārīkh Dimashq al-qadīm*, Damascus, n.d, 389.

<sup>49</sup> Mu'nis, 220; William of Tyre, 190.

<sup>50</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 298.

<sup>51</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, Vol. IX, 20; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 298.

<sup>52</sup> Ibn al- 'Ibrī, *Tārīkh al-zamān*, 163; William of Tyre, 191.

<sup>53</sup> William of Tyre, 191-195.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 194.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 194.

<sup>56</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Atābeka*, 89.

<sup>57</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 303-304.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 304.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 304.

<sup>60</sup> Gibb, 292; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 304-305; Abū Shāma, 9-10; al-Dhahabī, 120-121; Ibn al-'Ibrī, *Tārīkh al-zamān*, 164. Notice that according to al-Dhahabī, one thousand and five hundred men of Antioch were killed in this battle and the same number were captured by Muslims.

<sup>61</sup> William of Tyre, 106.

<sup>62</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 305-306; al-Dhahabī, 121.

<sup>63</sup> al-Dhahabī, 121; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 306.

<sup>64</sup> Gibb, 295, Ibn al-Qalānisī, 306.

<sup>65</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 307-308;

<sup>66</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 308-309; Ibn al-'Ibrī, *Tārīkh al-zamān*, 166-67.

<sup>67</sup> Gibb, 299-300; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 309-310; Ibn al-'Ibrī, *Tārīkh al-zamān*, 166-67.

<sup>68</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 312-314.

<sup>69</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 314; Ibn al-'Ibrī, *Tārīkh al-zamān*, 167.

<sup>70</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 314-315.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 315-317.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, 317.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, 321-322.

<sup>74</sup> Abū Shāma, 224; Gibb, 315.

<sup>75</sup> Abū Shāma, 224.

<sup>76</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 321.

<sup>77</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, 45; al-Dhahabī, 129; Ibn al-‘Ibrī, *Tārīkh al-zamān*, 168.

<sup>78</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, 45.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, 45.

<sup>80</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Atābeka*, 107; Ibn al-‘Ibrī, *Tārīkh al-zamān*, 169-170.

<sup>81</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 325.

<sup>82</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 327-328; al-Dhahabī, 135-136.

CHAPTER VIII  
THE ARMY OF DAMASCUS

It is the purpose of this chapter, now that the general history of the Emirate of Damascus has been discussed, to look in more detail at the army of Damascus itself. It has become clear that the predominant activity of the Emirate during the period under discussion was a martial one. The Damascene armed forces played an effective part in the history of Damascus during the period. In this chapter, the following issues that are relevant to the army of Damasucs will be dealt with:

- a) The structure of the army.
- b) The payment of the troops.
- c) The main military ranks.

(A) The Structure of the Army:

It is possible to say that the armed force can be classified into five groups. This classification is not only related to the origins of these groups, but also to the nature of their services. Some of these groups served as official regular troops, and others served on a voluntary basis in case of emergency. The first group was the Turkomans; the second, the Ahdāth; the third,

the Kurds; the fourth, the Arab "bedouins"; the fifth, the volunteers. Each group will be dealt with in turn.

The Turkomans:

It is essential to observe, firstly, how the Turkomans came to be in a position of influence in Syria in the political as well as the military system. The emigration of the Turkomans to Khurāsān, Iraq, the Jazīra, Syria and Asia Minor from the 5th century/11th century, while the Saljūqs were establishing their power in the central lands of the Abbasid Caliphate, had a significant impact on the history of the region during the mediaeval period. These migrations would affect not only Syria including Damascus, but also the Byzantine Empire, and Latin Europe. Twenty six years before the start of the Crusades, after the victory of the Saljūqs at Manzikert on 20 Dhū'l-Qa'da 463/8 August 1071, over the Byzantines, the Turkomans managed to seize a large portion of Anatolia from the Byzantine Empire. The capture of Anatolia by the Turks was a distant omen of the final collapse of the Byzantine Empire in 1453 at the hands of the Ottomans.

By the time of the coming of the Crusaders in 489/began 31 December 1095, and their taking of parts of Syria and the Jazīra from the Saljūqs, the Turkomans had become the main element in the struggle there.<sup>1</sup>



It seems that the first groups of Turkomans that entered Syria in 456/began 25 December 1063, (called al-Nāwkiyya) when 'Aṭiyya Ibn Ṣāliḥ Ibn Mirdās the lord of Aleppo appealed to them for help against his rebel nephew Maḥmūd Ibn Naṣr. This group of Turkomans who were led by Harūn Ibn Khān succeeded in overcoming Maḥmūd Ibn Naṣr. These Turkomans were not authorized to enter the city of Aleppo at that time, but the renewed struggle between 'Aṭiyya Ibn Mirdās and his nephew Maḥmūd Ibn Naṣr helped them to get into the city of Aleppo. Their leader Ibn Khān obtained great power in the city. The appeal for help to the Turkomans by 'Aṭiyya Ibn Mirdās also was the beginning of a great political change not only in Aleppo but in the whole of Syria including Damascus. 'Aṭiyya Ibn Mirdās who was an Arab "bedouin" from the tribe of Kilāb used these Turkomans to maintain his authority over his tribe. Even though he managed to subdue dissenters in the tribe of Kilāb by this expedient, he could not check the ambitions of the Turkomans, who were the coming power in Syria.<sup>2</sup>

We thus have a picture of how the Turkomans came to be involved in Syria as an influential force, and the question of how they established their position not in Syria as a whole, but in Damascus in particular, must now be addressed.

Al-Nāwkiyya were the first of the Turkomans to

migrate to Southern Syria and they settled in the city of Tyre in 463/began 9 October 1070. This group of Turkomans headed by Qarlū, the nephew of Ibn Khān, entered Syria under the authority of the independent ruler of Tyre, the Qādī Ibn 'Aqīl. This group were not even under the authority of the Saljūq Sulṭān, but their deeds in Syria would facilitate the recovery of Syria for the Abbasid Caliphate. As mentioned above, the migration of the Turkomans to Syria would weaken the Arab tribes, which had been the main power in Syria at that time. The rulers in Syria such as the Banū Mirdās in Aleppo, employed the Turkomans to suppress such rebel Arab tribes as the Banū Kalb around Aleppo, and the Banū Kilāb in the countryside surrounding Hama. After the submission of the Arab tribes in Syria, the Turkomans became the major power bloc in Syria.<sup>3</sup>

When the Turkomans inhabited North Syria, especially Aleppo, they carried on ravaging and looting Asia Minor. They made the city of Aleppo a centre to sell their loot from the Byzantine Empire and in the years 459 and 460/1066-1168, the Turkomans sold seventy thousand slaves and much other booty. The prices of slaves and other commodities decreased sharply in Aleppo, a slave girl was sold for only two dinars, and a buffalo only for one dinar.<sup>4</sup> This is further evidence of the increasing influence of the Turkomans in Syria, not just in politics and military matters but in the economic

sphere as well.

Between 461/1068 and 463/1071, the Byzantine Emperor Romanus Diogenes led three campaigns to stop raids of the Turkomans against Asia Minor (west Anatolia). In the first two expeditions, Romanus Diogenes did not obtain decisive triumphs and in the third campaign the Byzantine army was completely defeated at Manzikert, near Lake Van by the Saljūq army. In 463/began 9 October 1071, the Saljūq Sultān Alp-Arslān, with only fifty thousand men, defeated over one hundred thousand Byzantines headed by the Emperor himself.<sup>5</sup>

During Sultān Alp-Arslān's campaign in 463/1071 to capture Aleppo from the rebellious Maḥmūd Ibn Naṣr Ibn Mirdās of Aleppo, who was nominally under the rule of the Saljūq Sultān, the al-Nāwkiyya Turkomans left North Syria for the South in the direction of the Mediterranean coast especially the environs of Tripoli and Tyre and other such places. They did so, because of their fear of the anger of the Sultān whose authority over themselves they refused to recognize.<sup>6</sup>

In 464/began 29 September 1071, Maḥmūd Ibn Naṣr Ibn Mirdās of Aleppo called for help from the al-Nāwkiyya against the Byzantines who were threatening Aleppo. The al-Nāwkiyya headed by Qarlū managed to fend off the Byzantine menace. Then the al-Nāwkiyya turned back home

to south Syria, and left a garrison in Aleppo consisting of one thousand cavalry led by Aḥmad-Shāh.<sup>7</sup>

In 463/1071, Atsiz Ibn Ūq al-Khwārizmī, one of the main commanders of Sultān Alp-Arslān, assembled the Turkomans in south Syria and marched to capture Palestine from the Fatimids. He succeeded from 463/1071 till 467/1075 in capturing Ramla, Jerusalem, Tiberias and Acre.<sup>8</sup> In 468/began 16 August 1075, the city of Damascus was suffering from internal divisions, which helped Atsiz to take the city peacefully in Dhū'l-Qa'da 468/began 8 June 1076. The city of Damascus was restored to the authority of the Abbasid Caliphate for the first time since the occupation of the city by the Fatimids in 359/969.

In 469/began 5 August 1076, Atsiz marched with twenty thousand men including Turkomans, Arab "bedouins" and Kurds to invade Egypt to overthrow the Fatimid Caliphate there. But his army was annihilated in east Cairo in Rabī' I 469/began 3 September 1076.

After this catastrophe for the Damascene forces, Atsiz succeeded in keeping his leadership of the Turkomans and his authority in Damascus and most of Palestine.

In 470/began 25 July 1077, Sultān Malik-Shāh granted

his brother Tāj al-Dawla Tutush all Syria as an iqtā'. It seems that this ordinance of Sulṭān Malik-Shāh deprived Atsiz of the leadership of the Turkomans. Therefore, he was forced to hand the city of Damascus over to Tāj al-Dawla Tutush, when the city was being besieged by the Fatimid army led by Naṣr al-Dawla al-Juyūshī, who had come to avenge Atsiz's attempt to capture Cairo one year previously. Atsiz lost not only the leadership of the Turkomans, but also his life when Tāj al-Dawla executed him a few days after his taking of the city.<sup>9</sup> At the same time, the al-Nāwkiyya lost their leader Qarlū in 464/1072 who died in this year. Aḥmad-Shāh succeeded this leader as chief of this group of the Turkomans. In 467/1074, the al-Nāwkiyya replaced the new amīr of Aleppo Shabīb Ibn Maḥmūd Ibn Naṣr with his elder brother Naṣr Ibn Maḥmūd.<sup>10</sup> After the death of Naṣr Ibn Maḥmūd on 1 Shawwāl 468/10 May 1076, his successor Sābiq Ibn Maḥmūd Ibn Naṣr ruled Aleppo under the regency of Aḥmad-Shāh. During the struggle between Sābiq and his brother Waththāb Ibn Maḥmūd, the tribe of Banū Kilāb supported Waththāb Ibn Maḥmūd against his brother Sābiq with a view to overthrowing his rule in Aleppo. In the region of Qinnisrīn, only one thousand and five hundred Turkomans headed by Aḥmad-Shāh defeated about seventy thousand men from the Banū-Kilāb.<sup>11</sup> From this great victory of the al-Nāwkiyya Turkomans a certain superiority of the Turkomans over the Arabs in Syria can be inferred.

After this misfortune, Waththāb Ibn Maḥmūd of the Banū Kilāb appealed for help from Sulṭān Malik-Shāh Ibn Sulṭān Alp-Arslān. In 470/1077, Sulṭān Malik-Shāh gave Waththāb Ibn Maḥmūd Aleppo as an iqtā' and granted the rest of Syria to his own brother Tāj al-Dawla Tutush. Tutush marched with an immense army including the remaining forces of the Banū Kilāb and Muslim Ibn Quraysh who brought the army of Mosul to lay siege to Aleppo. Muslim Ibn Quraysh of Mosul, who was an Arab of the Banū 'Aqīl, sent secretly to Sābiq Ibn Maḥmūd of Aleppo to encourage him to resist the forces of Tāj al-Dawla Tutush. Muslim Ibn Quraysh was opposed to the alliance of the Arabs of the Banū Kilāb with the Turkish Saljūqs against their Arab brothers of the Banū Kilāb in Aleppo. Then Sābiq Ibn Maḥmūd of Aleppo sent to the Banū Kilāb, the allies of Tutush, suggesting that they desert Tutush. He notified them that he intended to guarantee their own lands and their good name but that if Aleppo were lost to Tāj al-Dawla Tutush, their power in Syria would be eclipsed for good. The forces of the Banū Kilāb who had joined Tutush agreed to withdraw from the siege of Aleppo. Moreover, Muslim Ibn Quraysh with his forces left the army of Tutush as had been agreed. The majority of the Banū Kilāb returned home and some of them entered Aleppo to help Sābiq Ibn Maḥmūd.

The forces of Mosul withdrew to Mosul having sold

supplies to the people of Aleppo in order to support them against Tutush. When Tutush found out that he had been betrayed, he abandoned the siege of the city.<sup>12</sup> The establishment of Saljūq authority in Syria, excluding the Palestine Coast in the late fifth century/late eleventh century, as has been pointed out in Chapter One, effectively rendered the Turkomans supreme as a military power in Syria.

Having established that the Turkomans were the major military force in Syria as a whole, we turn to their specific role in the army of Damascus. As has been mentioned in Chapter Two, Ṭughtekīn of Damascus was of Turkoman origin; this seems to have helped him to persuade many Turkomans to serve in his army. As mentioned above in Chapter Two, in 487/1094 Ṭughtekīn went during Tutush's time to Mayyāfāriqīn in Diyār Bakr to be Atābek of Shams al-Mulūk Duqāq son of Tāj al-Dawla Tutush. It appears that his presence in Diyār Bakr, the main centre of settlement for the Turkomans, helped Ṭughtekīn to establish a strong relationship with the leader of the Turkomans there. This good relationship with the leader of the Turkomans was of invaluable assistance to Ṭughtekīn in emergencies. As mentioned above in Chapter Two, after the Crusaders' capture of Jerusalem in Sha'bān 492/began 16 May 1099, King Duqāq of Damascus and his Atābek Ṭughtekīn marched with the 'Askar of Damascus to recover Mayyāfāriqīn from a

subordinate governor who had revolted against the authority of Damascus. It sounds as though the importance of Mayyāfāriqīn as a main centre of the Turkomans in Diyār Bakr, being, as it was, a main military source for the Kingdom of Damascus, forced King Duqāq and Ṭughtekīn to undertake this expedition.<sup>13</sup> Despite the fact that Diyār Bakr, including Mayyāfāriqīn would be lost to the Kingdom of Damascus later on (as mentioned above in Chapter Two), this did not stop Damascus requesting assistance from the Turkomans of Diyār Bakr. It was therefore hardly surprising that Ṭughtekīn should make an alliance in 511/began 5 May 1117 with Īl-Ghāzī Ibn Artuq of Mārdīn and Ḥiṣn Kayfā, the main leader of the Turkomans in Diyār Bakr. In addition, Ṭughtekīn gave his daughter as a wife to his ally Īl-Ghāzī, probably to reinforce this alliance.

From the reign of Ṭughtekīn, the Turkomans became the main source of military power in the Emirate. From Ibn al-Qalānisi, it can be inferred that the official Turkoman forces, who were conscripted into the regular army of Damascus, were known simply as Turks. On the other hand, such Turks, as served in the Damascus army on a voluntary basis were usually called Turkomans.<sup>14</sup> These volunteer Turkomans played an effective part in helping Damascus, especially when under threat from outside. The first mention we have of these irregular forces is in 500/began 2 September 1106, when Ṭughtekīn



marched with the armed forces of Damascus including the volunteer Turkomans towards the Sawād of Tiberias and managed to capture a fortress there from the Crusaders of Jerusalem. Ibn al-Qalānisī is the only historian of the time to mention this event but, does not name the fortress.<sup>15</sup> Also in 510/began 16 May 1116, when Damascus was being harassed by the Crusaders, Ṭughtekīn appealed for relief from the Turkomans. Two thousand volunteer Turkomans hastened to Damascus to cooperate with the regular army in the struggle against the Crusaders. Ibn al-Qalānisī mentions that a great number of these Turkomans launched several raids on the Crusaders in Marj al-Ṣuffar. Because of these assaults, the Crusaders were constrained to withdraw and return home.<sup>16</sup> Also, in 523/ began 25 December 1128, during the course of the siege of the city of Damascus by the Crusaders, the Turkomans hastened to relieve Damascus, Although we have no estimated number for the Turkoman volunteers, Ibn al-Qalānisī states that one of the main reasons which compelled the Crusaders to abandon their siege of the city was their anxiety at the great number of Turkomans. Ibn al-Qalānisī who does not usually give estimates of numbers, reckoned the number of the Crusader forces in this campaign at over sixty thousand troops. If sixty thousand Crusaders had been terrified by the great numbers of the Turkomans, this comment gives us some indication of the importance of the Turkomans for Damascus. Also, the historical sources of the time do

not give us an estimate of the number of Turkomans who had helped the Damascus army against the Second Crusade during their siege of Damascus in 543/began 22 May 1148. However, Abū al-Fidā' Ibn Kathīr, a Damascene historian of the time points out that one hundred and thirty thousand men from Damascus joined in the fighting against the Crusaders.<sup>17</sup> This seems however not to be an estimate only of the forces involved in the fighting, but of the whole population of Damascus. It seems that a possible estimate for the Damascene force is only about thirty thousand, and it also probable that over ten thousand Turkomans came to the assistance of Damascus. However, no historical sources of the time give us any indication of the number of troops of Turkoman origin in the regular army of Damascus; it does seem however that about 80 per cent of the Damascus army were of Turkoman origin. It appears that the regular soldiers of Turkoman origin in the army of Damascus used to live in the city of Damascus. On the other hand, the volunteer Turkomans used to live in the districts surrounding Damascus.<sup>18</sup> Furthermore, it would appear that the majority of the commanders of the Damascene army were Turkomans, because they had Turkish names such as Siwār, Lujja al-Turkī, Bazwāj, Kumushtekīn, etc. The Turkomans served not only as regular and volunteer troops in Damascus, but also as private guards of the amīrs of Damascus.<sup>19</sup>

## II. The Aḥdāth:

The movement of the Aḥdāth in Syria was established in the fourth/tenth century. The Aḥdāth were named by Muslim historians of the time as al-Zanāṭira, al-Shuṭṭār and Zu'ār. This popular movement consisted mainly of poor people. The history of the movement is problematic because of the lack of sources dealing with it. The main centres of the movement were the cities of Damascus and Aleppo. It seems however that this movement did not spread further than these two big cities, especially in the fourth century/tenth century. It sounds as though the reason for the establishment of the movement was the weakness of the political authority in Syria during that time. When the official government failed to establish the situation in these cities and to maintain the rights of the oppressed people by their own power, the people of these cities founded the movement to secure their rights themselves. The main objective of this movement was to protect the poor people from oppression by the rich. In time, this civil movement shifted to being a military one, and became a considerable military power in both Damascus and Aleppo. The Aḥdāth in each city worked independently of one another.<sup>20</sup> Since this research is concerned with the Emirate of Damascus, the history of this movement in Damascus will be the prime focus of our attention. In 359/969, the Aḥdāth of Damascus almost thwarted the Fatimid attempt to capture the city which at the time was nominally under the

authority of the Abbasid Caliph. But the notables and a group of Damascene traders disappointed the defenders of the city by agreeing to surrender the city to the Fatimid leader Ja'far Ibn Falāh. Then the Ahdāth unwillingly halted their resistance and handed the city over to Ja'far Ibn Falāh.<sup>21</sup>

In 363/began 20 October 973, the Fatimid Caliph al-Mu'izz bi-Dīni-'llāh acquiesced in the request of the Ahdāth that Zālim Ibn Mawhūb al-'Aqīlī be dismissed as governor of Damascus. He then appointed a new wālī Jaysh Ibn Ṣamsāma instead of the former one.<sup>22</sup>

In 368/began 8 August 978, after the defeat of the rebellious governor of Damascus Alptekīn by the Fatimid army led by the Fatimid Caliph al-'Azīz himself, the leader of the Ahdāth in Damascus Qassām al-Turāb managed to dominate the city. He announced himself as governor of Damascus, and recognized formal Fatimid authority over the city. The Fatimid Caliph al-'Azīz, who had probably realized the effective role of the Ahdāth in Damascus pretended to confirm the new governor in his position. But in the following year 369/began 29 July 979, al-'Azīz sent four thousand warriors to recover Damascus from the Ahdāth. But the Fatimid forces could not crush the Ahdāth. The Fatimid army withdrew from the city when Qassām al-Turāb undertook not to surrender the city to any ruler recognizing Abbasid authority. But two

years later in 371/began 29 July 979, under the pressure of the notables of Damascus, Qassām al-Turāb was compelled to surrender Damascus to the Fatimid forces. Even though the Aḥdāth yielded to the Fatimid power, they did not lose their special position as a paramilitary movement in the city.<sup>23</sup>

In 388/began 3 January 998, Bishāra al-Ikhshīdī, the new Fatimid governor, conspired against the leaders of the Aḥdāth. Two hundred members of the Aḥdāth including their twelve commanders were massacred during a party which had been arranged by Bishāra, who then ordered his forces to kill members of the Aḥdāth in Damascus, al-Ghūṭa and Marj al-Ṣuffar. According to Ibn al-Qalānisi, three thousand members of the Aḥdāth were killed in that massacre. This event tells us how the Aḥdāth had won a great number of followers not only from the city of Damascus but also among the surrounding areas such as al-Ghūṭa and Marj al-Ṣuffar.<sup>24</sup> It seems the calamity which had befallen the movement of the Aḥdāth, almost destroyed the movement as a whole. But there was resurgence of the Aḥdāth after the mid fifth century/eleventh century. The main historical sources of the time say nothing about this movement from the time of the massacre until 458/began 3 December 1065. In this year, the Aḥdāth revolted against the Fatimid governor Amīr al-Juyūsh Badr al-Jamālī.<sup>25</sup> It seems that unstable Fatimid rule in Damascus, assisted the Aḥdāth in

securing a great number of adherents. Within less than one century from 359/969, till 458/1066, sixty eight Fatimid governors were appointed as wālī of Damascus.<sup>26</sup> In 468/began 16 August 1075, Damascus suffered from famine and internal divisions between the Fatimid armed forces and the Ahdāth of Damascus. When the Turkoman leader Atsiz Ibn Ūq, who was under Saljūq authority, was informed about this situation, he hurried with his Turkomans forces to lay siege to the city. It seems that the Ahdāth made the Fatimid wālī Zayn al-Dawla Intiṣār Ibn Yaḥyā surrender the city to Atsiz. By this surrender of Damascus, the city was restored to the Abbasid Caliphate for the first time since 359/began 14 November 969.<sup>27</sup>

In 489/began 31 December 1095, during the reign of King Duqāq Ibn Tutush of Damascus, 488-497/1095-1104, the Ahdāth played an effective role in protecting the city in the face of an attempt by King Ridwān Ibn Tutush of Aleppo to seize the city from his brother King Duqāq. Although King Duqāq and his Atābek Ṭughtekīn with the 'Askar of Damascus were involved outside the city, the Ahdāth of Damascus and the rest of the forces of the city succeeded in foiling this attempt.<sup>28</sup>

In Sha'bān 503/began 25 February 1110, the Ahdāth of Baalbek endorsed Ṭughtekīn against their rebellious governor Kumushtekīn al-Khādim al-Tājī.<sup>29</sup> This shows us

how the movement of the Aḥdāth had spread not only in the city of Damascus but also among other cities of the Emirate. Furthermore, it gives an indication that not only the Sunnīs in the Emirate were attracted by this movement, but also other sects such as the Twelver Shī'īs of Baalbek. Baalbek in the time under discussion was one of the main centres of the Twelver Shī'īs in the Emirate.

It appears that the main duty of the Aḥdāth was to maintain security in the cities of the Emirate as a form of "people's army". But sometimes in case of emergency, they helped the regular Damascene army outside the cities. In 519/began 7 February 1125, the Aḥdāth helped the 'Askar of Damascus to frustrate the attempt of the Crusaders of Jerusalem to ravage the region of Ḥawrān which belonged to Damascus.<sup>30</sup> On 17 Ramadān 523/began on 28 August 1129, the Aḥdāth played the major part in the crushing of the Bāṭinīs in the city of Damascus. It seems that the leader of the Aḥdāth was Ra'īs of Damascus during the period under discussion. When Ibn al-Galānisī mentions the massacre of the Bāṭinīs in Damascus, in that year, he commended the role of the Ra'īs of Damascus Thiqat al-Mulk Abū al-Dhū'ād Ibn al-Ṣūfī.<sup>31</sup> In Shawwāl 534/began 22 June 1140, the co-operation between the regular army of Damascus and the Aḥdāth was a major factor in thwarting the attempt of Zangī of Mosul and Aleppo to take the city of Damascus.<sup>32</sup>

In Muḥarram 543/began 22 May 1148, the Aḥdāth, the 'Askar of Damascus and the volunteers (al-Mutaṭawwi'a) stopped the Crusader expedition from occupying the city of Damascus.<sup>33</sup> It seems that Nūr al-Dīn Maḥmūd Ibn Zangī of Aleppo realized that he could not hope to take Damascus until he had won the support of the Aḥdāth of Damascus. It seems that many members of the Aḥdāth movement preferred to be under Nūr al-Dīn rather than under the Amīr Mujīr al-Dīn of Damascus. According to Ibn al-Qalānisī in 546/began 20 April 1151, during the siege of Damascus by Nūr al-Dīn's forces, only a few of the Aḥdāth joined the 'Askar of Damascus to defend the city, contrary to their previous practice.<sup>34</sup> Only three years later in 549/began 18 March 1154, the Aḥdāth of Damascus plotted with Nūr al-Dīn Maḥmūd against the Amīr Mujīr al-Dīn and opened the gates of the city for the army of Nūr al-Dīn.<sup>35</sup> The end of the era of Tuḡhtekīn's family was compassed by the hands of the Aḥdāth who had previously been loyal to this family.

It can thus be seen that the Aḥdāth, who had initially emerged as a movement identified as the representation of disaffected and oppressed elements of the population of Damascus itself, had developed into an organisation of considerable formal influence, not just in Damascus itself but in other cities of the Emirate as well.



### III. The Kurds:

The conscription of the Kurds into the Muslim armies had started in the early years of the Saljūqs (early fifth/eleventh century).

Ten thousand Kurds joined the army of Alp-Arslān in the battle of Manzikert on 20 Dhū'l-Qa'da 463/8 August 1071, against the Byzantine Emperor Romanus Diogenes. Their expertise in archery and their capacity to endure harsh living conditions coupled with other military virtues were the main reasons for the preference for Kurdish troops in the Muslim armies.<sup>36</sup> The first indications of their service in the army of Damascus date from 469/began 5 August 1076. King Atsiz of Damascus assembled twenty thousand men including Turkomans, Kurds and Arabs to invade Egypt and to demolish the Fatimid Caliphate in Cairo.<sup>37</sup> The main historical sources of the time do not mention anything about the part played by the Kurds in the Damascene army during the early period of the rule of Tuğhtekīn's family. The first mention of the Kurds is in 539/began 4 July 1144, when the only commander of the Kurds at that period the Amīr Mujāhid al-Dīn Būzān Ibn Māmīn established a mosque near the gate of al-Farādīs. This shows us that a possible estimate for the number of the Kurds in the Damascene army was some hundreds, because that commander (Mujāhid al-Dīn Būzān) was the only

Kurdish commander in the army of Damascus. This does however, establish that a Kurd had won, the highly military rank of amīr under the Damascus Emirate and it seems that an amīr in the Damascene army, used to command about one thousand persons. As mentioned above in Chapter VII, the Atābek Anar sent this Kurdish amīr with a great number of the Damascene forces in 544/began 11 May 1149 to join Nūr al-Dīn's forces of Aleppo against the Crusaders of Antioch.<sup>38</sup> It is however difficult to infer more than that there were a significant number of Kurds in the army of Damascus and that they had a considerable reputation as archers and as good soldiers in general.

#### IV The Ghilmān:

The Ghilmān were the slave troops who used to serve in the Muslim armies. Even before the time of the preeminence of Ṭughtekīn and his family in Damascus, the Ghilmān had served in the Damascene army during the reign of King Atsiz of Damascus 468/1175 till 471/1079. During King Atsiz's campaign to invade Egypt in 469/1076 seven hundred Ghilmān deserted from Atsiz's army to the Egyptian army, which was headed by Badr al-Jamālī. This number of Ghilmān was not the whole number of Ghilmān in the Damascene army, which altogether numbered some twenty thousand men including the Ghilmān.<sup>39</sup> Ṭughtekīn of Damascus conscripted many Ghilmān into the Damascene

army. These Ghilmān were known as al-Ghilmān al-Atābekiyya after their master the Atābek Ṭughtekīn. It seems that the commanders of these Ghilmān were also slaves, usually called Ḥujjāb. The influence of the Ghilmān increased so as to become an important element during Shams al-Mulūk Ismā'īl's reign.

In 529/began 22 October 1134, they plotted with Shams al-Mulūk's mother Ṣafwat al-Mulk to kill her son Shams al-Mulūk.<sup>40</sup> According to Ibn al-Qalānisī, Shams al-Mulūk had his own Turkish Ghilmān, who had played a significant role in recovering Hama in 527/began 12 November 1132 from Zangī of Mosul and Aleppo.<sup>41</sup> It seems that the majority of Ghilmān who had served in the army of Damascus during our period were Turks.

#### V. Arabs or "Bedouins":

As mentioned above, the coming of the Turkomans to Syria in about mid-fifth century/mid eleventh century, had weakened the power of the Arabs there. It seems that the Arabs rarely joined the Damascene regular army. The Arabs had previously been accustomed to service in the army of Damascus as volunteers. In 470/1078, the Arabs of the Banū Kilāb helped the Sultān Tāj al-Dawla Tutush of Damascus to recover Syria and place it under the authority of the Abbasid Caliphate.<sup>42</sup> In 487/1094, the Banū Kilāb led by Waththāb Ibn Maḥmūd Ibn Ṣāliḥ marched

with the army of Fakhr al-Mulūk Ridwān, son of Tāj al-Dawla Tutush to support his father's forces in the neighbourhood of Isfahan where he was focussing his attempt to win the sultanate.<sup>43</sup> It seems that in 503/began 31 July 1109, the Arabs helped Ṭughtekīn during Mawdūd's campaign against the Crusaders. According to Ibn al-Qalānisī, many people of Syria assembled with the Damascene army. It seems that these people of Syria were Arabs, as Ibn al-Qalānisī refers to them as such. In 507/began 18 June 1113, while the Sulṭān's army led by Mawdūd and the Damascene forces were surrounding the Crusaders' armies near the mountains of Tiberias, the Arabs of Ṭayy, Kilāb and Khafāja supplied the Muslim forces with water there.<sup>44</sup> Although these Arabs did not support the Damascene forces with direct military assistance, it does seem that they provided water for the army on this occasion which was an essential service and supplied it with weapons too. In Dhū'l-Qa'da 523/October 1129, the Arabs led by Murra Ibn Rabī'a, played a significant part in thwarting the Crusaders' attempt to invade the city of Damascus as mentioned above in Chapter Three.<sup>45</sup> We therefore see that Arab irregulars played some part in reinforcing the regular forces but that in general the role of the Bedouin was confined to providing logistical assistance albeit this was of an essentially material nature.

The Volunteers (Al-Mutatawwi'a):

The volunteers in the Damascene army played an important part in protecting the Emirate against its enemies. There is a difference however between the volunteers ("Mutatawwi'a" and the "Ajnād"). The Ajnād (who do not merit a subsection of their own) were those who either held Iqtā's or worked with the owner of an Iqtā'. They served in the army of Damascus only when they were ordered to do so by the ruler of Damascus. Seemingly the Ajnād were more regular troops rather than voluntary forces. The voluntary soldiers however joined the Damascene army willingly without any official commitment to the Amīr of the Emirate. It seems that the Crusades had revived the spirit of "Jihād" (the Holy War) among the Muslims, especially the people of Damascus. Moreover, the cruelty of the Crusaders during their early years in dealing with the conquered Muslims such as the people of Jerusalem, and Ma'arrat al-Nu'mān, had made many of the inhabitants emigrate to safer places. The city of Damascus was the favourite city for these refugees to live in. When the Crusaders managed to take possession of the city of Sidon in 504/began 20 July 1110, the entire population of the city moved to Damascus including the army of Sidon.<sup>46</sup> The same thing happened to the Tyrians in 518/1124.<sup>47</sup> It seems that the emigration of these citizens to Damascus increased not only the population of Damascus, but also the regular

and the voluntary troops in the Emirate. Ibn Kathīr, the only historian of the time to give an estimate of the population of the city of Damascus during the period under discussion, mentions that one hundred and thirty thousand people joined in the resistance against the Crusader expedition of Muḥarram 543/began 22 May 1148 to take the city. It seems that estimate is not of the forces of the city only, but rather of the entire population of the city (including the armed forces as mentioned above in Chapter Seven). Muslim historical sources of the time praised the role of the 'Ulamā' such as the old scholar "Faqīh" Abū al-Ḥajjāj Yūsuf al-Findilāwī, who rejected the request of the Atābek Anar that he refrain from joining the fighting against the Franks because of his seniority in terms of age. Thus he fought against the Crusaders as a volunteer and was killed on the battle field qualifying thereby for martyrdom.<sup>48</sup> It appears that the valour of this old scholar and other volunteers encouraged considerable numbers of the Damascenes to join in defending their city from the Crusaders. One group of volunteers, called al-Ḥarāmiyya, (the robbers) specialised in cutting off the supply routes of the enemy. It can be suggested that these Ḥarāmiyya did not receive any payment from the Emirate, but whatever loot they managed to lay their hands on was to be their reward. In 505/began 10 July 1111, Ṭughtekīn formally authorized al-Ḥarāmiyya to plunder and pillage the armed forces of the Crusaders of

Jerusalem who were laying siege to the city of Tyre. This shows us that al-Ḥarāmiyya did not operate at will but that they were to some extent under the control of the amīrs of Damascus.<sup>49</sup>

#### B. The Payment of the Troops:

There were several methods of paying the Damascene armed forces. The first one was Jāmakiyyāt (regular payments) of the troops, probably monthly allowances corresponding to a form of salary. Jāmakiyyāt were paid only to the regular troops. Tāj al-Mulūk Būrī and Shams al-Mulūk Ismā'īl increased these Jāmakiyyāt when they won power in the Emirate of Damascus.<sup>50</sup> It appears that the Jāmakiyyāt were not decreased during the period when Tuḡhtekīn and his family were in power. The second kind of payment was the military Iqṭā'. The Amīrs of Damascus used to grant their commanders military Iqṭā's and in turn each commander was obliged to provide the Amīr of Damascus with a certain number of soldiers in case of need. These troops were called Ajnād, not 'Askar (the regular armed forces). Each owner of a military Iqṭā' had to provide his soldiers with all they needed including their military supplies. The owner of an Iqṭā' used to spend two thirds of the revenue of his Iqṭā' on the needs of his troops, and it seems that there was a Diwān of Iqṭā's in the Emirate charged with distributing and managing the affairs of these Iqṭā's. All Ajnād,

including their commanders had to be registered in this Diwān.<sup>51</sup> The historical sources of the time unfortunately do not tell us how much each soldier of the 'Askar or member of the Ajnād received monthly.

It seems that the Amīrs of Damascus distributed Iqtā's outside the city of Damascus; the historical sources of the time suggest that the Amīr of Damascus did not grant military Iqtā's in the city of Damascus or in the immediately surrounding areas such as al-Ghūṭa, the most cultivated region in Syria.<sup>52</sup> The historical sources of the time give us some examples of these military Iqtā's. In Sha'bān 496/began 11 May 1103, King Duqāq of Damascus gave his Atābek Ṭughtekīn the city of Ḥimṣ as an Iqtā'. In 500/began 2 September 1106, the Amīr Ṭughtekīn of Damascus granted a commander of the Turkomans named Iṣfahbud al-Turkomānī, Wādī Mūsā, on the road from Damascus to the Ḥijāz), Ma'āb, (a city in the region of al-Balqā' to the east of the Dead Sea,<sup>53</sup> al-Jibāl (north of the region of al-Shurāt (Guadarrama Mountains), to the south of the Dead Sea,<sup>54</sup> and the region of al-Balqā'.<sup>55</sup>

In addition, in 502/began 11 August 1108, Ṭughtekīn bestowed upon the Amīr Fakhr al-Mulk Ibn 'Ammār, the former ruler of Tripoli, the region of al-Zabadānī and its territories.<sup>56</sup> In 542/began 2 June 1147, the Amīr Mujīr al-Dīn Abaq of Damascus granted his trusted



Kurdish commander the Amīr Mujāhid al-Dīn Būzān Ibn Māmīn, Ḥiṣn Sarkhad in the region of Ḥawrān south of Damascus, as an iqtā'.<sup>57</sup>

### C. The Military Ranks:

The main military ranks of Damascus can be classified into the following:

1. Al-Isfahsalār
2. Al-Ra'īs
3. Al-Shihna

#### 1. al-Isfahsalār:

Al-Isfahsalār was the head of the army of Damascus, and leader of the Damascene army in battle. As mentioned above in Chapter Two, in 487/began 21 January 1094, Sultān Tāj al-Dawla Tutush of Damascus designated Ṭughtekīn as Isfahsalār of the army of Damascus. It can be suggested that Ṭughtekīn kept this rank during the reign of King Duqāq Ibn Tutush of Damascus 488-497/1095-1104. Ṭughtekīn maintained this position for himself when he was the ruler of the Emirate from 12 Ramaḍān 497 till 8 Ṣafar 522/8 June 1104 till 11 February 1128. The historical sources of the time do not indicate whether the Amīr Tāj al-Mulūk Būrī of Damascus and his son the Amīr Shams al-Mulūk Ismā'īl appointed any military leader to this position during their reign. It appears

that they also kept this important position to themselves, as Ṭughtekīn had done. Both of them used to lead the Damascene army in person. But during the reign of the Amīr Shihāb al-Dīn Maḥmūd of Damascus, he designated Amīn al-Dawla Kumushtekīn al-Atābekī, a governor of Buṣrā and Sarkhad as Isfahsalār in Jumādā I 530/began 6 February 1136.<sup>58</sup> After the flight of this Isfahsalār to the fort of Buṣrā during the internal disputes in Damascus in the same year, the Amīr Shihāb al-Dīn Maḥmūd appointed the Amīr Bazwāj as the new Isfahsalār.<sup>59</sup> After the murder of the Amīr Bazwāj in Sha'bān 532/April 1138, by the Amīr Shihāb al-Dīn himself, the Amīr Shihāb al-Dīn granted this rank to the Atābek Mu'īn al-Dīn Anar, a man of very strong personal qualities. After the death of Anar on 3 Jumādā I, 544/9 September 1149, the Amīr Mujīr al-Dīn Abaq of Damascus kept the rank of Isfahsalār for himself.<sup>60</sup> It seems that Mujīr al-Dīn Abaq did not give this position to any person, because he suspected that any holder of the rank of Isfahsalār would obtain great influence in the Emirate as Anar had done during Anar's *de facto* rule over Damascus from 532 till 544/1138 till September 1149.

## (2) Al-Ra'īs:

The Ra'īs of Damascus was head of the Ahdāth (the

people's army), the immediate superior of the Shiḥna or chief of police.<sup>61</sup> A brief background of the Aḥdāth has been given earlier in this Chapter. Amīn al-Dawla Abū Muḥammad Ibn al-Ṣūfī was the first Ra'īs of Damascus during the reign of King Duqāq. After the death of this Ra'īs in 497/began 5 October 1103, Ṭughtekīn of Damascus designated Abū al-Majāli Sayf and Abū al-Dhū'ād al-Mufarrij, the sons of the former Ra'īs as co-holders of this position. It seems that later on Abū al-Dhū'ād al-Mufarrij won this position and kept it for himself alone. Abū al-Dhū'ād played a significant part in assisting his lord the Amīr Tāj al-Mulūk Būrī of Damascus to suppress the Bāṭiniyya in Damascus on 17 Ramaḍān 523/4 September 1129.<sup>62</sup> This Ra'īs was appointed also as the Wazīr of Būrī, in addition to his position as Ra'īs of Damascus. In Rabī' I, 525/began 2 February 1131, Būrī dismissed Abū al-Dhū'ād Ibn al-Ṣūfī from his positions, both as Wazīr and as Ra'īs of Damascus. In Dhū'l-Hijja of the same year/began 24 October 1131, after the mediation of Sawinj Ibn Tāj al-Mulūk Būrī, Būrī reappointed Abū al-Dhū'ād Ibn al-Ṣūfī as sole Ra'īs of Damascus. Abū al-Dhū'ād kept this rank until Ramaḍān 530/began 5 June 1136, when his master the Amīr Shihāb al-Dīn Maḥmūd of Damascus plotted with his Atābek Bazwāj against this Ra'īs and killed him. In 531/began 29 September 1136, one relative of the former Ra'īs called the Amīr Shujā' al-Dawla al-Musayyib Ibn al-Ṣūfī, was appointed as Ra'īs of Damascus.<sup>63</sup> In 544/began 11 May

1149, this Ra'īs, who later on would be called Mu'ayyid al-Dīn, forced his lord the Amīr Mujīr al-Dīn Abaq of Damascus to designate him as his wazīr.<sup>64</sup> This illustrates how strong the Ra'īs was. In 547/began 8 April 1152, the Amīr Mujīr al-Dīn Abaq dismissed this Ra'īs from both his positions, and exiled him to the fort of Sarkhad in Hawrān. Mujīr al-Dīn Abaq appointed Zayn al-Dawla Haydara Ibn al-Ṣūfī (who later on would be called Zayn al-Dīn), the brother of former Ra'īs, as Ra'īs of Damascus. But Mujīr al-Dīn executed this Ra'īs in 548/began 27 March 1153, probably on account of his concern that the Ra'īs was conspiring against him.<sup>65</sup> Then Mujīr al-Dīn designated Raḍī al-Dīn Abī Ghālib al-Tamīmī as the new Ra'īs of Damascus. This al-Tamīmī was the first Ra'īs of Damascus who was not from the family of Ibn al-Ṣūfī, a family which had monopolized this rank for a long time, namely since the reign of King Duqāq of Damascus.

### (3) Al-Shihna:

The head of the police, during the period under discussion was called the Shihna. The Ra'īs of Damascus was the immediate superior of the Shihna.<sup>66</sup> The duties of the police were to keep the internal situation peaceful and to punish offenders. Ḥiṣn al-Dawla Bakhtiyār was the first Shihna of Damascus during this period and he had held office from the reign of Sulṭān

Tāj al-Dawla Tutush of Damascus.<sup>67</sup> He kept his rank until his death on 15 Sha'bān 511/16 December 1117. His son al-Sallār 'Umar succeeded him in this rank.<sup>68</sup> In Rabī' II 516/began 10 August 1122, the Shiḥna of Damascus al-Ḥājib Fayrūz died. It seems that the former Shiḥna al-Sallār 'Umar had been dismissed from this rank some time before this year, and replaced by al-Ḥājib Fayrūz.<sup>69</sup> Yūsuf Ibn Fayrūz was appointed Shiḥna after his father Fayrūz in 516/began 12 March 1122. Ibn Fayrūz with his superior Abū al-Dhū'ād Ibn al-Ṣūfī, Ra'īs of Damascus, played an important part in crushing the Bāṭiniyya on 17 Ramaḍān 523/4 September 1129.<sup>70</sup> This Shiḥna had been one of the closest friends of the Amīr Tāj al-Mulūk Būrī of Damascus and later on of his son the Amīr Shams al-Mulūk Ismā'īl. But in 529/began 22 October 1134, Yūsuf Ibn Fayrūz was suspicious of his master Shams al-Mulūk Ismā'īl, and so he fled to the city of Tadmur. It seems then that Shams al-Mulūk Ismā'īl appointed al-Sallār Zayn al-Dīn Ismā'īl as Shiḥna after the flight of Ibn Fayrūz. It seems then that the influence of this new Shiḥna was not as strong as that of Ibn Fayrūz, especially when Mu'īn al-Dīn Anar became Atābek of the Amīr Shihāb al-Dīn Maḥmūd of Damascus and Isfahsalār of Damascus from Sha'bān 532/began 15 April 1138 till 3 Jumādā I 544/began 9 September 1149. After the death of Anar, al-Sallār Zayn al-Dīn Ismā'īl strove to challenge the influence of his superior the Ra'īs of Damascus and the Wazīr Mu'ayyid al-Dīn al-Musayyib Ibn al-Ṣūfī, but

he gave up. Then he fled to Baalbek fearing the tyranny of Mu'ayyid al-Dīn Ibn al-Ṣūfī.<sup>71</sup> There is no certain information concerning the appointment of a new Shiḥna after the escape of al-Sallār Zayn al-Dīn Ismā'īl.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>Zakkār, *Madkhal ilā tārīkh al-ḥurūb al-Ṣalībiyya*, 16-17.

<sup>2</sup>Ibn al-Qalānisī, 92; 'Umar Tadmurī, 347; Zakkār, 77, 127-129, 133-134; Ibn al-'Adīm, Vol. I, 291.

<sup>3</sup>Zakkār, 113-134; Shākir Muṣṭafā, "Dukhūl al-Turk al-Ghuzz ilā bilād al-Shām", *Tārīkh bilād al-Shām*, University of Jordan, 1974, 344-349.

<sup>4</sup>Zakkār, 136-37; Ibn al-'Adīm, Vo. II, 11.

<sup>5</sup>Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, Vol. VIII, 110; Zakkār, 138-139.

<sup>6</sup>Zakkār, 152-53.

<sup>7</sup>Ibn al-Qalānisī, 102-104; Zakkār, 154.

<sup>8</sup>Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, 110; Zakkār, 156-157.

<sup>9</sup>Ibn al-Qalānisī, 112; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, 126.

<sup>10</sup>Zakkār, 166.

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*, 169.

<sup>12</sup>Ibn al-'Adīm, Vol. II, 57; Zakkār, 171-174.

<sup>13</sup>Ibn al-Qalānisī, 137.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 225,.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 151.

<sup>16</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 213; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, Vol., VIII, 322; William of Tyre, Vol. II, 41-42.

<sup>17</sup> Abū'l Fidā Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya wa'l-nihāya*, Beirut, 1966, Vol. XII, 224.

<sup>18</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 225.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 187.

<sup>20</sup> Zakkār, 80-83.

<sup>21</sup> Ibn Kathīr, Vol. XI, 266-267; Zakkār, 83-84..

<sup>22</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 4-9; Ibn Kathīr, 277.

<sup>23</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 21-22; Ibn Kathīr, 292-93; Zakkār, 87.

<sup>24</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 53-54; Zakkār, 87.

<sup>25</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 93; Ibn Kathīr, Vol. XII, 93.

<sup>26</sup> Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Khalīl al-Ṣafadī, *Umarā' Dimashq fī al-Islām*, 2nd edition, Beirut, 1983, 192-195.

<sup>27</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 108; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, Vol. VIII, 122.

<sup>28</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 132. Ibn al-'Adīm, Vol. II, 125.



<sup>29</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 166.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 213.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 223-225.

<sup>32</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 271.

<sup>33</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, Vol. IX, 20; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 298.

<sup>34</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 315.

<sup>35</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Atābeka*, 107; Ibn al-'Ibrī, *Tārīkh al-zamān*, 170.

<sup>36</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 102; Muḥsin M. Ḥusayn, *al-Jaysh al-Ayyūbī fī 'ahd Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn*, Beirut, 1st edition, 1986, 69.

<sup>37</sup> Shākir Muṣṭafā, 373.

<sup>38</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 282, 304-305.

<sup>39</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 190; Shākir Muṣṭafā, 373.

<sup>40</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 232, 246; Ibn al-'Adīm, 256.

<sup>41</sup> Ibn al-'Adīm, 253; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 239.

<sup>42</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 112.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 127.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 185.

<sup>45</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, Vol. VIII, 329; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 225.

<sup>46</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 171.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 211.

<sup>48</sup> Ibn Kathīr, Vol. XII, 223-24; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 298.

<sup>49</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 178.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 220, 234.

<sup>51</sup> Muḥsin Ḥusayn, *al-Jaysh al-Ayyūbī fī 'ahd Ṣālah al-Dīn*, (Beirut, 1986), 130-132.

<sup>52</sup> Muḥsin Yūsuf, "The Economic History of Syria During 4th/5th A.H. Centuries after Hijra/10-11 A.D.", Ph. D. Thesis, Princeton University, 1982, 103.

<sup>53</sup> al-Baghdādī, *Marāṣid al-iṭṭilā'*, Vol. III, 1418.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 1216.

<sup>55</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 158-159.

<sup>56</sup> Ibn Kathīr, *al-Kāmil*, Vol. XII, 171.

<sup>57</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 296.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 253.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 255.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 306.

<sup>61</sup> Mīrza, "The Ismā'īlīs in Syria at the Time of the Crusades", Ph.D., Durham University, 1963, 23-24; Ibn al-'Adīm, 249-250.

<sup>62</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 224; Ibn Kathīr, Vol. XII, 200.

<sup>63</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 261.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 307-308.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, 324, 325-321.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, 224.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, 132.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, 198.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, 208.

<sup>70</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, Vol. VIII, 328-29; Ibn al-Qalānisī, 224; Ibn Kathīr, Vol. XII, 200.

<sup>71</sup> Ibn al-Qalānisī, 307.

## CONCLUSION

From its earliest days, the Emirate of Damascus faced various challenges which threatened its sovereignty. These dangers came from several quarters as for example the Kingdom of Aleppo 488-511/1095-1117, Sultān Muḥammad the Great Saljūq particularly in 509/1115 and the Crusaders of the Levant especially in 543/1148, and Zangī of Mosul and Aleppo (521-541/1127-1146); furthermore, the Emirate was itself riven with internal dissension. Because of these threats faced by the emirate, it was compelled to pursue a series of compromise policies to counter these various hazards, and on occasion Damascus allied itself with former enemies to face new ones. It cooperated with Sultān Muḥammad's campaigns against the Crusaders of the Levant in 503/1110, 504/1111 and 506/1112. But when Sultān Muḥammad sent an expedition against Damascus itself, it made common cause with its former enemies, the Crusaders, against its nominal lord, the Sultān. In addition, Damascus formed an alliance with Nūr al-Dīn Maḥmūd of Aleppo against the Crusaders. But when the threat posed by Nūr al-Dīn to Damascus became more critical than that posed by the Crusaders, Damascus shifted its ground to gain the help of the Crusaders against its former ally Nūr al-Dīn.

During the early years of the emirate, the major threat to Damascus stemmed from its neighbour and rival the Kingdom of Aleppo. By the time of the coming of the Crusaders to Syria in 490/1097, and the establishment of their power there, the menace of Aleppo had declined. Aleppo's best endeavours were directed rather towards the protection of its territories from the threat of the Crusaders, than to any hostile plans against Damascus. On the other hand, while Damascus was freed from the threat of Aleppo, the danger to it from the Crusaders became acute. To counter this Crusading threat, Damascus strove to save the remaining dominions of the Fatimids in Syria from falling into the hands of the Crusaders. Damascus did this not to enhance the authority of the Fatimids in Syria, but to weaken the growing power of the Crusaders by using the Fatimids of Egypt. Thus Damascus maintained its good relations with the wazīr al-Afdal, the *de facto* ruler of the Fatimid Egypt, until his murder in 515/1121. For example, Damascus helped the Fatimid dominions of Sidon in 502/1109, Tyre in 505/1102 and 518/1124, and 'Asqalān in 498/1104 and 511/1117, against the Crusaders. Furthermore, Damascus entered into an alliance with the independent emirate of Tripoli from 497 till 501/1104 till 1108 not only to secure the sovereignty of Tripoli, but also to lessen the danger which the Crusaders posed to itself, in that the Crusaders at this time were planning to found a new Crusader county in the region of Tripoli, which would

march immediately with the Emirate of Damascus.

Most of the alliances of the Emirate of Damascus from 490/1097 till 521/1127, were devoted to countering the threat of the Crusaders to itself. By its compact with Īl-Ghāzī of Aleppo and Mārdīn from 511/1118 till 516/1122, Damascus achieved with Īl-Ghāzī a great victory over the Crusaders of Antioch at Balāṭ in 513/1119. This triumph forced the Crusaders of Jerusalem, the real threat to Damascus, to assist the Principality of Antioch, which had lost all its armed forces in this battle.

With the appearance of Zangī of Mosul and Aleppo (521-541/1127-1146) as the main Muslim power in Syria, and the emergence of his scheme to establish a united front in Syria and the Jazīra against the Crusaders, his threat to Damascus became more serious than that of the Crusaders themselves. Although Zangī managed to take the main cities of the Emirate of Damascus such as Ḥimṣ in 532/1138 and Baalbek in 534/1139, he still could not annex the city of Damascus itself. The help afforded by the Crusaders to the Damascenes was the principal factor in the failure of Zangī to annex the city to his dominions. On the other hand, the Crusaders used their alliance with the Damascenes to weaken the growing power of Zangī in Syria and the Jazīra.

The Crusader expedition of 543/1148 against the city of Damascus, did not prevent the Damascenes from maintaining their policy of alliance with the Crusaders against the threat of Nūr al-Dīn of Aleppo (541-569/1146-1174). But the capture by the Crusaders of 'Asqalān, the last remaining coastal city in Syria in Muslim hands in 548 /1153, made Nūr al-Dīn hasten to annex the city of Damascus in the following year 549/1154.

It can be suggested that the fall of the Emirate of Damascus in 549/1154 was due to the following factors:

1. The threat of the Crusaders:

The arrival of the Crusaders with great armed forces, and the establishment of their principalities in the Levant made it apparent that the scattered and weak independent Muslim emirates in Syria such as Damascus, Aleppo, Tripoli and Shayzar would not be able to make a serious challenge to the position of the Crusaders nor would they be able to make an effective response to the threat which they posed. The only Muslim power which was in a position to do so was the Saljūq sultanate itself. But when Sultān Muḥammad failed to achieve this through his four campaigns of 503/1110, 504/1111, 506/1112 and 509/1115, it became clear that if the Muslims in Syria could not unite to defend the rest of their dominions,

they would lose all their territories to the Crusaders. Damascus played a significant part in blocking the menace of the Crusaders to the Muslims of Syria. Damascus contracted alliances with Īl-Ghāzī of Aleppo 511-516/1117-1122 and Āq-Sunqur al-Bursuqī of Mosul and Aleppo 518-520/1124-1126 and other Muslim powers against the Crusaders.

These alliances among Muslim leaders in Syria were not sufficient to win decisive victories over the Crusaders. With the appearance of Zangī of Mosul and Aleppo (521-541/1127-1147), this policy of alliances among the Muslims of Syria was shifted to one of the Muslims of Syria and the Jazīra under Zangī. The main step in achieving this united front against the Crusaders was the annexation of the "main" city in Syria, Damascus. Although Zangī failed to complete his scheme by taking Damascus, his son Nūr al-Dīn (541-569/1146-1174) managed to do so in 549/1154. The annexation of Damascus to the Kingdom of Nūr al-Dīn, opened the way to the union of Syria and Egypt in 564/1169. It seems that the coming of the Crusaders to Syria not only hastened the fall of the weak independent emirates in Syria including Damascus, and the unification of the Muslims of Syria, but also helped indirectly in the recovery of Egypt for the Abbasid Caliphate for the first time since Sha'bān 358/began 30 April 969.



## 2. The Geographical Expansion of the Emirate of Damascus:

The geographical extension of the Emirate of Damascus caused many problems in itself. In the early years of the emirate, its geographical boundaries expanded to include many regions very far from the city of Damascus, the capital of the emirate, such as Mayyāfāriqīn, and al-Raḥba in the Jazīra. These far-off cities were the first to revolt against the authority of Damascus. Mayyāfāriqīn revolted in 493/1100, and al-Raḥba rebelled in 496/1103. These cities revolted before the nearer ones such as Buṣrā in 497/1104 and Baalbek in 503/1110. It seems that the weakness of the central power in the city of Damascus over these distant cities induced them to rebel against the Damascene rulers. This is why we see that when Damascus had lost its suzerainty in these distant cities later on it did not try to recover them. It also seems that the distance of Buṣrā from the city of Damascus (about seventy-three miles) was one of the main reasons for its regular rebellious actions against the authority of Damascus. The city revolted against Damascus on several occasions, e.g. in 497/1104, 542/1147, 546/1151. All these revolts exhausted the Emirate of Damascus, and added further to its burdens.

### 3. Internal Dissension:

The Emirate suffered from internal schism which stemmed not only from the rebellious governors, but also from its notables and commanders. Most main cities of the Emirate such as Baalbek, Buṣrā, Sarkhad, Mayyāfāriqīn, al-Raḥba and Ḥimṣ rebelled against the authority of Damascus at one time or another. Some of these cities were well known for their rebellious actions, such as Baalbek and Buṣrā.

There was faction and dissension, however, not just among the governors of the emirate, but also among the notables, commanders and members of the royal family itself. Shams al-Dawla Muḥammad of Baalbek revolted in 526/1132 against his brother the Amīr Shams al-Mulūk Ismā'īl of Damascus. In 532/1137, the Amīr Bazwāj, one of the more eminent commanders of Damascus, revolted against his master the Amīr Shihāb al-Dīn Maḥmūd. Furthermore, in 544/1149, Mu'ayyid al-Dīn Ibn al-Ṣūfī, Ra'īs of Damascus, rebelled against his lord the Amīr Mujīr al-Dīn Abaq of Damascus. The murder of two amīrs of Damascus, Shams al-Mulūk Ismā'īl (526-529/1133-1135) and Shihāb al-Dīn Maḥmūd (529-533/1135-1139) was another example of the internal conflict among the Damascene leaders. All these internal divisions, exhausted the power of the emirate and added to its difficulties over and above its external ones.

#### 4. The Wise Policy of Nūr al-Dīn Towards Damascus:

As mentioned above, Zangī failed to annex the city of Damascus with his own armed forces. The reason for this was that he could not obtain the support of at least a portion of the Damascene population against their rulers. Capturing a heavily fortified city such as Damascus posed insuperable problems, unless help from within the city was forthcoming. The Damascenes refused the authority of Zangī because of Zangī's reputation for clandestine plotting against them, as exemplified by his plots against the Damascene forces in 524/1130, which had come to join his army against the Crusaders. In addition, in 534/1139 Zangī broke his oath guaranteeing the lives of the garrison of Baalbek. His son Nūr al-Dīn however with his wise policy towards Damascus managed to persuade many of the Damascenes to support him against their master the Amīr Mujīr al-Dīn Abaq. As mentioned above in Chapter Seven, with the help of the Ahdath of Damascus, Nūr al-Dīn seized the city of Damascus in 549/1154.

It seems that the immediate reason for the fall of the Emirate of Damascus (488-549/1095-1154), was this subtle and successful policy of Nūr al-Dīn directed as it was towards engendering confidence and credibility amongst the people of the city.

A Chronicle of Principal Events  
during the Emirate of Damascus in the Early  
Crusading Period

- 359/969: The capture of Damascus by the Fatimids of Egypt.
- 455/began 4 Jan. 1063 Qādī of Tyre, revolts against the Fatimids.
- 457/began 13 Dec. 1064: Amīn al-Dawla Ibn 'Ammār of Tripoli announces his independence from the Fatimids.
- 462/began 20 Oct. 1069: Maḥmud Ibn Mirdās of Aleppo announces his loyalty to the Saljuqs.
- 463/began 9 Oct. 1070: Atsiz Ibn Ūq, a Saljūq commander recovers Ramla, Tiberias and Jerusalem from the Fatimids.
- 468/began 16 Aug. 1075: Atsiz recovers Damascus from the Fatimids.
- 469/began 5 Aug. 1076: King Atsiz Ibn Ūq of Damascus fails to destroy the Fatimid Caliphate.
- 470/began 25 July 1077: Malik-Shāh grants his brother Tāj al-Dawla Tutush Syria as an Iqṭā'.

- 471/began 14 July 1078: The Fatimids recover Ramla, Tiberias and Jerusalem from King Atsiz of Damascus.
- 471/October 1079: Tāj al-Dawla Tutush takes over Damascus from Atsiz Ibn Ūq.
- 471/began 14 July 1079: Muslim Ibn Quraysh of Mosul captures the city of Aleppo from Ibn-Mirdās.
- 477/began 10 May 1084: Sulaymān Ibn Qutlumish of Konya recovers Antioch for the Saljūqs from the Byzantines.
- 480/began 8 April 1087: Qasīm al-Dawla Āq-Sunqur al-Hājib is designated as governor for the Saljūqs in Aleppo.
- 482/began 16 March 1089: The Fatimids recover Tyre from its rebellious governors, sons of Qādī 'Ayn al-Dawla Ibn Abī 'Aqīl.
- 484/began 23 Feb. 1091: Tutush suppresses Khalaf Ibn Mulā'ib of Ḥimṣ.
- 485/began 12 Feb. 1092: Tutush fails to take Tripoli from Jalāl al-Mulk Ibn 'Ammār.
- 485/began 12 Feb. 1092: Maḥmūd Ibn Sulṭān Malik-

- Shawwāl 487/began 15 Oct.  
1094: Shāh succeeds his father as the Sultān of the Saljūqs.
- 1094: Berkiyārūq receives recognition as Sultān of the Saljūqs from the Abbasid Caliph al-Muqtadī.
- 487/began 21 Jan. 1094: Al-Ḥaṣan al-Ṣabbāḥ establishes the movement of the Bāṭiniyya.
- 17 Ṣafar 488/1095: Sultān Tāj al-Dawla Tutush is defeated by his nephew Berkiyārūq and his dominions are divided among his sons King Riḍwān of Aleppo and King Duqāq of Damascus.
- 488/1095: Tuḡtekin becomes Atābek of King Duqāq of Damascus.
- 488/began 11 Jan. 1095: Bāṭiniyya wins support of King Riḍwān of Aleppo to occupy Damascus.
- 490/began 19 Dec. 1096: The failure of King Riḍwān of Aleppo to occupy Damascus.
- 490/1097: The defeat of King Duqāq of Damascus by his brother King Riḍwān of Aleppo near

- the river of Quwayq.
- 490/1097: The capture of Antioch by the Crusaders.
- Rabī' II 491/10 March 1098: Baldwin of Boulogne establishes the first Crusader County in Edessa.
- Sha' bān 491/began 3 July 1098: The Fatimids recover Jerusalem from Suqman and Īl-Ghāzī sons of Artuq.
- 22 Sha' bān 492/14 July 1099: The Crusaders capture Jerusalem from the Fatimids.
- 14 Ramaḍān 492/14 August 1099: The Crusaders overcome the Fatimids near 'Asqalān.
- Ṣafar 493/began 18 Dec. 1099: King Duqāq of Damascus recovers Mayyāfāriqīn from his rebellious governor.
- Rabī' I 494/began 4 Jan. 1101: The Crusaders of Edessa defeat Suqmān Ibn Artuq and capture Sarūj.
- Sha' bān 494/began May 1101: King Duqāq of Damascus receives Jabala from Ibn Ṣulayḥa.
- 494/1101: Ibn 'Ammār of Tripoli

- recovers Jabala from the Damascenes.
- Late Jumādā II 495/early April 1102: The Damascene forces are defeated by the Crusaders near Anṭartūs.
- Sha'bān 496/late May 1103: Damascus annexes Ḥimṣ, after the murder of its governor Janāḥ al-Dawla Ḥusayn by the Bāṭiniyya.
- Jumādā II 496/began 13 March 1103: Damascus recovers al-Raḥba.
- Sha'bān 497/began 29 April 1104: The Crusaders of Jerusalem capture Acre.
- 12 Ramaḍān 497/8 June 1104: King Duqāq of Damascus dies and is succeeded by his Atābek Ṭughtekīn.
- 25 Dhū'l-Ḥijja 497/18 Sept. 1104: Ṭughtekīn appoints Artāsh Ibn Sulṭān Tāj al-Dawla Tutush as King of Damascus.
- 497/1104: King Artāsh flees from Damascus, and Ṭughtekīn becomes the Amīr of Damascus.
- Ṣafar 498/began 22 October 1104: Ṭughtekīn sends help to the



- Fatimids of 'Asqalān  
against the Crusaders of  
Jerusalem.
- 498/1104: The Crusaders defeat the  
Fatimids and the Damascenes  
near Ramla.
- 498/May 1105: The death of Sultān  
Berkiyārūq, he is succeeded  
by his brother Muḥammad.
- Ramaḍān 501/began 13 April  
1108: The Fatimids recover  
Tripoli from Fakhr al-Mulk  
Ibn 'Ammār.
- 501/1108: Ṭughtekīn defeats the  
Crusader governor of  
Tiberias Gervase of  
Basoches.
- 502/1109: Ṭughtekīn helps people of  
Sidon against the Crusaders  
of Jerusalem.
- 11 Dhū'l-Hijja 502/12 July  
1109: The Crusaders occupy  
Tripoli from the Fatimids.
- Sh'abān 502/began 6 March  
1108: The Crusaders capture  
'Arqa.
- Late 502/July 1109: Ṭughtekīn signs a truce  
with the Crusaders of

Jerusalem.

- Muḥarram 503/August 1109: The Crusaders seize Jubayl.  
 Sha'bān 503/began 25 Feb.  
 1110: Ṭughtekīn suppresses his rebellious governor Kumushtekīn of Baalbek.  
 21 Shawwāl 503/13 May 1110: The Crusaders of Jerusalem occupy Beirut from the Fatimids.  
 503/began 31 July 1109: The failure of Mawdūd's campaign against the Crusaders.  
 Late Dhū'l-Ḥijja 504/early July 1111: Ṭughtekīn forces King Baldwin I of Jerusalem to sign a new truce.  
 505/began 10 July 1111: Ṭughtekīn helps people of Tyre against the Crusaders of Jerusalem.  
 506/began 28 June 1112: Ṭughtekīn accepts the offer of people of Tyre to take over their city.  
 11 Muḥarram 506/29 June 1113: Mawdūd of Mosul and Ṭughtekīn defeat the Crusaders of Jerusalem near al-Uḡḡuwāna.  
 18 Jumādā II 507/30 November

- 1114: King Riḍwān of Aleppo dies, succeeded by his son Alp-Arslān.
- 509/began 27 May 1115: Sulṭān Muḥammad sends Bursuq Ibn Bursuq of Hamadhān against Ṭughtekīn and Īl-Ghāzī of Mārdīn. Bursuq captures Hama from Ṭughtekīn.
- Jumādā II 509/began 21 Oct.
- 1115: Ṭughtekīn recovers Rafāniyya from the Crusaders of Jerusalem. Then he deserts it.
- 509/1115: Sulṭān Muḥammad issues an ordinance to confirm Ṭughtekīn's rule of the Emirate of Damascus.
- 509/1115: King Baldwin I of Jerusalem attacks al-Faramā in Egypt.
- 510/1116: Bertram, Count of Tripoli, builds fortress of Bārīn.
- 510/began 16 May
- 1116: Ṭughtekīn and Āq-Sunqur al-Bursuqī of Mosul defeats Count Bertram of Tripoli in 'Ayn al-Jarr.
- 511/began 5 May 1117: Īl-Ghāzī of Mārdīn receives

- Aleppo.
- 512/began 24 April 1118: Ṭughtekīn helps 'Asqalān, which belonged to the Fatimids, against the Crusaders of Jerusalem.
- 15 Rabī' I 513/26 June 1119: Īl-Ghāzī of Aleppo and Ṭughtekīn defeat Roger of Antioch in Balāt. Roger himself is killed in the battle.
- 515/began 22 March 1121: The murder of al-Afdal, wazīr of Egypt.
- 516/began 12 March 1122: The Fatimids recover Tyre from Ṭughtekīn.
- 516/November 1122: The death of Īl-Ghāzī of Aleppo and Mārdīn.
- Rabī' I 517/began 28 April 1123: Balak Ibn Bahrām Ibn Artuq captures King Baldwin II of Jerusalem.
- 518/1124: Ṭughtekīn receives Tyre again from the Fatimids.
- 20 Rabī' I 518/8 May 1124: Balak Ibn Bahrām of Aleppo is murdered.
- 23 Jumādā I 518/7 July 1124: The Crusaders capture Tyre from Ṭughtekīn.
- 518/1124: Āq-Sunqur al-Bursuqī of Mosul takes over Aleppo

- from Timurtāsh Ibn Īl-Ghāzī.
- 518/1124: The death of leader of Bāṭiniyya al-Ḥasan al-Ṣabbāḥ.
- 3 Rabī' II 519/10 May 1125: Aq-Sunqur al-Bursuqī of Mosul and Aleppo and Ṭughtekīn recover Kafarṭāb from the Crusaders.
- 16 Rabī' II 519/23 May 1125: The forces of Āq-Sunqur al-Bursuqī and Ṭughtekīn are defeated by the Crusaders of the East.
- 519/1125: The failure of the Crusaders' attempt to capture Damascus.
- Dhū'l-Qa'da 520/began 18 Nov.
- 1126: Bahrām al-'Ajamī, the leader of the Bāṭinīs in Syria, establishes his power in Damascus, and receives Bānyās from Ṭughtekīn.
- 8 Dhū'l-Hijja 520/26 Dec.
- 1126: The murder of Āq-Sunqur al-Bursuqī by the Bāṭiniyya.
- 8 Ṣafar 522/11 Feb. 1128: The death of Ṭughtekīn, and his son Tāj al-Mulūk Būrī

- succeeds him as Amīr of Damascus.
- 522/began 6 Jan. 1128: Zangī of Mosul receives Aleppo.
- 522/6 1128: The defeat and the murder of the leader of the Bāṭinīs in Syria Bahrām al-'Ajamī by al-Ḍaḥḥāk Ibn Jandal, Amīr of Wādī al-Taym. Ismā'īl al-'Ajamī succeeds Bahrām as a leader of the Bāṭinīs in Syria.
- 17 Ramaḍān 523/4 Sept. 1129: The murder of al-Mazdaqānī, Wazīr of Tāj al-Mulūk Būrī of Damascus and the massacre of Bāṭinīs in Damascus.
- 523/began 25 Dec. 1128: The Crusaders of Jerusalem receive Bānyās from the Bāṭinīs.
- Dhū'l-Qa'da 523/16 Oct. 1129: The failure of the Crusaders to take Damascus.
- 8 Shawwāl 524/5 Oct. 1130: Zangī captures Hama from the Emirate of Damascus.
- 5 Rajab 525/5 June

- 1131: The Bāṭinīs fail to kill Būrī of Damascus.
- 6 Sha'bān 525/6 July
- 1131: Būrī of Damascus captures Dubays Ibn Ṣadaqa of Ḥilla.
- Sha'bān 525/began 1 June
- 1133: The death of King Baldwin II of Jerusalem. He is succeeded by his son-in-law Fulk.
- Shawwāl 525/began 28 Aug.
- 1131: The death of Sulṭān Maḥmūd Ibn Muḥammad and the rivalry among his sons to win Sultanate.
- 12 Rajab 526/began 6 June 1132:
- Būrī dies and is succeeded by his son Shams al-Mulūk Ismā'īl.
- Dhū'l-Ḥijja 526/began 15 Oct. 1132:
- Shams al-Mulūk Ismā'īl of Damascus suppresses his brother Shams al-Dawla Muḥammad of Baalbek.
- Muḥarram 527/began 12 Nov. 1132:
- Shams al-Mulūk Ismā'īl of Damascus recovers Bānyās from the Crusaders of

Jerusalem.

1 Shawwāl 527/August

1133:

Shams al-Mulūk Ismā'īl of Damascus recovers Hama from Zangī of Mosul and Aleppo.

Dhū'l-Qa'da 527/began 22

June 1133:

The Abbasid Caliph al-Mustarshid Bi'llāh fails to seize Mosul from Zangī.

Muḥarram 528/began 1 Nov.

1133:

Shams al-Mulūk Ismā'īl of Damascus occupies Shaqīf Tirūn taking it from al-Ḍaḥḥāk Ibn Jandal, Ra'īs Wādī al-Taym.

9 Rabī' II 528/6

February 1134:

The failure of a murder attempt against Shams al-Mulūk Ismā'īl.

Dhū'l-Ḥijja 528/October

1134:

Shams al-Mulūk of Damascus plunders Acre and drives the Crusaders of Jerusalem to renew the truce with Damascus.

Muḥarram 529/began 22

Oct. 1134:

Mas'ūd Ibn Sulṭān Muḥammad obtains the Sultanate of



529/1135:

the Saljūqs.

Shams al-Mulūk Ismā'īl of Damascus asks Zangī of Mosul to take over Damascus.

14 Rabī' II 529/1 Feb.

1135:

Shams al-Mulūk Ismā'īl of Damascus is murdered by his mother Khātūn Ṣafwat al-Mulk and is succeeded by his brother Shihāb al-Dīn Maḥmūd.

Jumādā I 529/began 16

Feb. 1135:

The Damascenes foil attempt of Zangī of Mosul to take Damascus.

Jumādā I 529/began 16

Feb. 1135:

Zangī takes over Hama from Damascus.

Dhū'l-Qa'da 529/began

14 August 1135:

The murder of the Abbasid Caliph al-Mustarshid Bi'llāh by the Bāṭinīs.

Sha'bān 529/began 18

May 1135:

Zangi fails to take Ḥimṣ from son of Khīr-Khān Ibn Qarāja.

530/began 11 Oct.

- 1135: Damascus receives Ḥimṣ from Khumartāsh, a regent on behalf of the sons of Khīr-Khān Ibn Qarāja.
- 21 Jumādā I 530/27 Feb.
- 1136: Shihāb al-Dīn Maḥmūd designates Kumushtekīn al-Atābekī as Atābek and Isfahsalār of Damascus.
- Jumādā II 530/began 26
- March 1136: The Amīr Bazwāj, one of the Damascene commanders, becomes the Atābek and Isfahsalār of Damascus.
- Rajab 531/began 25
- March 1137: Amīr Bazwāj plunders the territories of Tripoli, and defeats Pons of Tripoli.
- 20 Shawwāl 531/11 July
- 1137: Zangī defeats King Fulk of Jerusalem and takes the fortress of Montferrand.
- Dhū'l-Ḥijja 531/began
- 18 August 1137: Bānyās surrendered to Zangī.
- Sha'bān 532/began 15
- April 1138: The Byzantine and the Crusader forces fail to

- capture Shayzar.
- Sha'bān 532/began 15  
April 1138: Shihāb al-Dīn of Damascus kills the Amīr Bazwāj. Anar becomes Atābek and Isfahsalār of Damascus.
- Ramaḍān 532/June 1138: Peace treaty between Zangī and Shihāb al-Dīn of Damascus. Zangī receives Ḥimṣ from the Damascenes.
- 23 Shawwāl 533/24 May 1139: Shihāb al-Dīn Maḥmūd of Damascus is murdered, and succeeded by his brother Jamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad (formerly Shams al-Dawla of Baalbek).
- 20 Dhū'l-Ḥijja 533/17 August 1139: Zangī takes Baalbek from the Damascenes.
- 8 Sha'bān 534/10 April 1140: Jamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad of Damascus dies, while Damascus is besieged by Zangī. His son Mujīr al-Dīn Abaq succeeds him under the regency of the Amīr Anar.
- Shawwāl 534/began 20

May 1140:

The Damascenes with their allies, the Crusaders of Jerusalem, capture Bānyās from Zangī. The Damascenes grant the Crusaders of Jerusalem Bānyās as the price of their help against Zangī, who was trying to capture Damascus.

26 Jumādā II 539/23 Dec.

1144:

Zangī recovers Edessa for the Muslims from the Crusaders.

6 Rabī' II 541/14 Sept.

1146:

Zangī is murdered. His kingdom is divided between his older sons Sayf al-Dīn Ghāzī in Mosul and Nūr al-Dīn Maḥmūd in Aleppo.

Jumādā II 541/October

1146:

Nūr al-Dīn of Aleppo recovers Edessa from the Crusaders who managed to recover the city for five days.

Muḥarram 542/began 2

June 1147:

Atābek Anar and Nūr al-Dīn foil the Crusaders of

Jerusalem's attempt to take  
Buṣrā and Sarkhad.

Muḥarram 543/began 22

May 1148:

The Second Crusade fails to  
take Damascus.

Muḥarram 544/began 11

May 1148:

The Damascenes and the  
Crusaders of Jerusalem  
renew their truce and peace  
treaty.

21 Ṣafar 544/29 June

1149:

Nūr al-Dīn of Aleppo, with  
help from Damascus,  
achieves major victory near  
the fortress of Innab  
against Prince Raymond of  
Antioch and his armed  
forces, and recovers  
Afāmiya.

Jumādā I 544/began 6

Sept. 1149:

The death of Anar, Atābek  
of the Amīr Mujīr al-Dīn  
Abaq of Damascus.

Muḥarram 545/began 30

April 1150:

The Damascenes agree to be  
under the nominal authority  
of Nūr al-Dīn of Aleppo.

546/began 20 April

- 1151: The Damascenes with help from the Crusaders of Jerusalem thwart an attempt of Nūr al-Dīn to take over Damascus.
- Rabī' I 546/began 27  
June 1151: The Crusaders of Jerusalem fail to capture Buṣrā from the Damascenes.
- 10 Rabī' II 546/began  
26 July 1151: Mujīr al-Dīn of Damascus agrees to be under the authority of Nūr al-Dīn.
- Rabī' I 548/began 5  
June 1153: Mujīr al-Dīn of Damascus and Nūr al-Dīn of Aleppo fail to relieve the people of 'Asqalān from the blockade of the Crusaders.
- 9 Jumādā I 548/10 August  
1153: Mujīr al-Dīn replaces his wazīr Mu'ayyid al-Dīn Ibn al-Ṣūfī with the brother of this wazīr called Zayn al-Dīn Ḥaydara.
- Jumādā I 548/August  
1153: The Crusaders seize 'Asqalān from the Fatimids.

25 Dhū'l-Ḥijja 548/10

Feb. 1154:

Mujīr al-Dīn kills his new  
Durzī wazīr 'Aṭā' al-  
Khādim.

3 Ṣafar 549/18 April

1154:

The fall of Damascus at the  
hands of Nūr al-Dīn of  
Aleppo, and the end of the  
rule of Ṭughtekīn's family  
in Damascus.

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## APPENDIX

Dates in this appendix are given with reference to the Christian era only.

ABBASID CALIPHS:

al-Muqtadī bi-Amri-'llāh	1075
al-Mustazhir bi-'llāh	1194
al-Mustarshid bi-'llāh	1118
al-Rāshid bi-'llāh	1134
al-Muqtafī bi-'llāh	1135-1160

Fatimid Caliphs:

al-Mustanşir Abū Tamīm	1035
al-Musta'li Abū al-Qāsim	1095
al-Āmir bi-Aḥkāmi-'llāh Abū 'Alī al-Manşūr	1101
al-Ḥāfiẓ Abū al-Maymūn 'Abdu'l-Majīd	1130
al-Ẓāfir Abū al-Manşūr Ismā'īl	1149
al-Fā'iz Abū al-Qāsim 'Īsā	1154

Great Saljūq Saltāns:

Malik-Shāh Ibn Alp-Arslān	1072-1092
Maḥmūd Ibn Malik-Shāh	1092-1094
Berkiyārūq Ibn Malik-Shāh	1194-1104
Muḥammad Ibn Malik-Shāh	1104-1118
Aḥmad Sanjar Ibn Malik-Shāh	1096-1157

Saljūq Sultāns of Iraq

Maḥmūd Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Malik-Shāh	1118-1131
Dāwūd Ibn Maḥmūd	1131
Ṭughril Ibn Muḥammad	1132-1133
Mas'ūd Ibn Muḥammad	1133-1152
Malik-Shāh Ibn Maḥmūd	1152
Muḥammad Ibn Maḥmūd	1153-1159

Saljuqs of Konya:

Sulaymān Ibn Qutlumish	1081-1086
Qilij-Arslān	1092-1107
Malik-Shāh Ibn Qilij-Arslān	1107-1116
Mas'ūd Ibn Qilij-Arslān	1116-1156.

Artuqids of Ḥiṣn Kayfā and Āmid:

Suqmān Ibn Artuq	1101-1104
Ibrāhīm Ibn Suqmān	1104-1108
Dāwūd Ibn Suqmān	1108-1148
Qarā-Arslān Ibn Dāwūd	1148-1174

Artuqids of Mārdīn:

Īl-Ghāzī Ibn Artuq	1108-1122
Timurtāsh Ibn Īl-Ghāzī	1122-1152
Ālī Ibn Timurtāsh	1152-1176

Kings of Jerusalem:

Godfrey (Duke of Lower Lorraine)	1099-1100
Baldwin I	1100-1118

Baldwin II	1118-1131
Fulk (of Anjou)	1131-1144
Baldwin III	1144-1162

Princes of Antioch:

Bohemond I	1098-1104
Tancred	1104-1112
Roger De Salerno	1112-1119
Bohemond II	1126-1136
Raymond of Poitiers	1136-1149
Constance (daughter of Bohemond II)	1149-1153
Reynald of Châtillon	1153-1160

Counts of Tripoli:

Raymond I (of Saint Gilles)	1102-1105
William Jordan	1105-1108
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