


**THE FACTORS WHICH INFLUENCE THE SELECTION OF
PHYSICAL TARGETS BY TERRORIST GROUPS**

Charles John Michael Drake

**A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St. Andrews**



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
University of St. Andrews

The factors which influence the selection
of physical targets by terrorist groups.

A thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Charles John Michael Drake.

August 20th 1996



ABSTRACT


The aim of terrorism is to influence a group of people or institutions - the psychological target or targets - by attacking the appropriate physical targets in order to prompt the desired response. Several factors influence the selection of physical targets by non-state terrorist groups. These include the ideology of the terrorist group concerned, the strategy adopted by the group and its capabilities, its need to take account of external opinion - including that of supporters, the measures adopted to protect likely targets, and the security environment within which the terrorist group operates. In addition, decision-making is affected by the dynamics within the group which are in turn affected by the psychological pressures of clandestinity and the frequent risk of death or capture which many terrorists run.

The relationship between these factors varies from group to group, which is inevitable given the idiosyncratic nature of most terrorist groups, and the different circumstances in which they find themselves. However, it can generally be said that ideology sets out the moral framework within which terrorists operate - and which determines whether terrorists judge it to be legitimate to attack a range of target. After this, the determination of which targets it will actually be beneficial to attack depends upon the strategy which the group has adopted as a means of achieving its political objectives. The determination of their strategic objectives depends upon the effects which the terrorists hope their attacks will achieve. Thus, strategy further refines the range of targets initially delimited by the group's ideology.


The other factors mentioned tend to act as constraints upon the group, partly - as with security measures - in restricting them from carrying out the types of attacks which they would desire, but also in encouraging them to carry out attacks on certain targets in the hope of gaining benefits such as the approval of their supporters, or of gaining publicity for their cause. Underlying all of this is the human factor, whereby relations within the group, the impact of psychological pressure, and individual differences in moral judgements may influence the targets chosen by terrorists.

Declarations


I, Charles John Michael Drake, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 100,000 words in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me, and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.

Date: August 20th 1996. Signature of candidate: .


I was admitted as a research student under Ordinance No. 12 in October 1990 and as a candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in October 1990; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of St. Andrews between 1990 and 1996.

Date: August 20th 1996. Signature of candidate: .

I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and Regulations appropriate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of St. Andrews and that the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in application for that degree.

Date: 22 Aug '96. Signature of supervisor: .

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In memory of

Charles Thomas Drake

1915-1963

Acknowledgements

In the course of my research I have incurred numerous debts. First and foremost my family has provided the moral, emotional, and financial support throughout all of my studies without which I could not have coped. For this and for much else I am profoundly grateful.

The University of St Andrews, the David Russell Trust, and the School of History & International Relations at the University of St Andrews, all provided financial assistance without which any question of my carrying out research would have been purely academic.

I would like to thank Professor Paul Wilkinson for taking me on as a research student and having supervised my work without having once expressed doubts as to whether it was achievable or, more importantly, going to be achieved. Several other members of the Department of International Relations at St Andrews deserve my thanks for their guidance and support. Julian Crowe is also worthy of special mention for having shown me that computers do not necessarily eat people.

I am indebted to the library staffs at the universities of St Andrews, Aberdeen, Bradford, the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, and the Linenhall Library in Belfast. A number of people assisted me with interviews.

It is invidious to single out people for friendship, but amongst several others I would particularly thank Robin and Ailsa Hill (and Katie), Mike Page, and Magnus Ranstorp for tolerating me as a Departmental colleague, and Antonio Fernandes, Joao Lima, Shaun Mesher, and Luis Pinto for their friendship and forbearance as flatmates. I am particularly grateful to Bruce and Fiona Scharlau for their friendship and hospitality, and for Bruce's indefatigable proof-reading and commentary on my work. To Jim and Maggie Davies I would like to add particular thanks.

In keeping with tradition, any mistakes in this work are my responsibility.

GLOSSARY

Abbreviations for groups, organisations, posts and publications. Where relevant the states within which they originated, where they are based, or where they primarily operate, are in brackets.

17N - Epanastaiki Organosi 17 Noemvri (Revolutionary Organisation 17th November). Greece.

ACDEGAM - Asociacion de Campesinos y Ganderos del Magdalena Medio (Peasants and Ranchers of the Magdalena Medio). Colombia.

AD - Action Directe (Direct Action). France.

AIS - Armee islamique du salut (Islamic Salvation Army). Algeria.

ALF - Animal Liberation Front. United Kingdom.

ALN - Acao Libertadora Nacional (Action for National Liberation). Brazil.

AN - Avanguardia Nazionale (National Vanguard). Italy.

ANUC - Asociacion Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos (National Association of Peasant Users). Colombia.

AP/RN - An Phoblacht/Republican News. Ireland/United Kingdom.

ATO - Ammunition Technical Officer.

B2J - Bewegung 2 Juni (June 2nd Movement). Germany.

BATF - Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. USA.

BBE - Bijzondere Bijstands Eenheid (Close Combat Company of the Royal Dutch Marines). The Netherlands.

BR - Brigade Rosse (Red Brigades). Italy.

BR/PCC - Partito Comunista Combattente (Fighting Communist Party). Italy.

CCC - Cellules Communistes Combattantes (Fighting Communist Cells). Belgium.

CCP - Chinese Communist Party.

CIA - Central Intelligence Agency. United States of America.

CPI - Communist Party of India.

CPI(M) - Communist Party of India (Marxist).

CPI(M-L) - Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist).

- DAS - Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (Administrative Security Department). Colombia.
- DC - Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democrats). Italy.
- Dev Sol - Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary Left). Turkey.
- DKP - Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (German Communist Party).
- DST - Direction de Surveillance du Territoire (). France.
- EOKA - Ethniki Organosis Kypriakou Agoniston (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters). Cyprus.
- ERP - Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo (People's Revolutionary Group). Argentina.
- ERT - Washington DC Police Emergency Response Team. United States of America.
- ETA - Euzkadi ta Askatasuna - (Basque Homeland and Liberty). Spain/France.
- FAA - Federal Aviation Agency. United States of America.
- FARC - Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia).
- FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation. United States of America.
- FIS - Front Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Front). Algeria.
- FLN - Front de Liberation Nationale (National Liberation Front - FLN). Algeria.
- FLQ - Front de Liberation du Quebec (Quebec Liberation Front). Canada.
- GAL - Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberacion (Anti-terrorist Liberation Group). Spain/France.
- GIA - Groupes Islamique Armee (Armed Islamic Group). Algeria.
- GIGN - Groupe d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale (National Gendarmerie Intervention Group). France.
- GOC - General Officer Commanding.
- GRAPO - Grupos de Resistencia Antifascista, Primero de Octubre (First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Groups). Spain.
- GSG9 - Grenzschutzgruppe 9 (Border Protection Unit 9). Germany.
- HRU - Hostage Rescue Unit.

- INLA - Irish National Liberation Army. United Kingdom/Ireland.
- JDL - Jewish Defence League. United States of America
- JKLF - Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front. Jammu & Kashmir province, India.
- JRA - Japanese Red Army. Japan.
- KPD - Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Communist Party of Germany).
- KLA - Khalistan Liberation Army. The Punjab, India.
- KLF - Khalistan Liberation Front. The Punjab, India.
- LTTE - Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Sri Lanka.
- MSI - Movimento Sociale Italiano (Italian Social Movement).
- MI5 - Military Intelligence section 5, (Security Service). United Kingdom.
- MI6 - Military Intelligence section 6. Also known as SIS (Secret Intelligence Service). United Kingdom.
- MAS - Muerte a Secuestradores (Death to Kidnappers). Colombia.
- MIC - Military-Industrial Complex.
- MK - Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation). South Africa.
- MNF - Multi National Force in Lebanon, 1982-1984.
- NAR - Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari (Armed Revolutionary Nuclei). Italy.
- NVA - North Vietnamese Army.
- NYCPD - New York City Police Department. United States of America.
- OAS - Organisation Armee Secrete (Secret Army Organisation). Algeria and France.
- OIRA - Official Irish Republican Army. United Kingdom/Ireland.
- OP - Observation post.
- PCC - Partito Comunista Combattente - (Fighting Communist Party). Italy.
- PCI - Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party).
- PIRA - Provisional Irish Republican Army. United Kingdom/Ireland.

PFLP - Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
Israel/Jordan.

PFLP-GC - Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
General Command. Israel/Jordan.

PKK - Partije Karkaran-e Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers Party).
Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Syria.

PL - Prima Linea (Front Line). Italy.

PLO - Palestinian Liberation Organisation. Israel/Jordan

PSI - Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party).

PWG - People's War Group. Andhra Pradesh province, India.

RAF - Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army Faction). Germany.

RAID - Recherche, Assistance, Intervention, Dissuasion
(Research, Assistance, Intervention, Dissuasion).
France.

RIR - Royal Irish Regiment. United Kingdom.

RPV - Remotely-piloted vehicles

RUC - Royal Ulster Constabulary. United Kingdom.

RZ - Rote Zellen (Revolutionary Cells). Germany.

SAS - Special Air Service. United Kingdom.

SBS - Special Boat Squadron. United Kingdom.

SL - Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path). Peru.

SLA - Symbionese Liberation Army. United States of America.

SO12 - Metropolitan Police Special Operations branch 12
(Special Branch). London, United Kingdom.

SO13 - Metropolitan Police Special Operations branch 13
(Anti-terrorist Branch). London, United Kingdom

SO19 - Metropolitan Police Special Operations branch 19
(Force Firearms Unit). London, United Kingdom.

SOE - Special Operations Executive. United Kingdom.

SWAT - Special Weapons and Tactics team. United States of
America.

TREVI - Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism and Violence.

UDA - Ulster Defence Association. United Kingdom.

UDR - Ulster Defence Regiment. United Kingdom.

UP - Union Patriotica (Patriotic Union). Colombia.

UVF - Ulster Volunteer Force. United Kingdom.

VC - Viet Cong. Vietnam.

VCP - Vehicle check-points

VM - Viet Minh. Vietnam.

WGH - Wehrsport Gruppe Hoffmann (Hoffman Military Sports Group). Germany.

WSGA - Wyoming Stock Growers Association. USA.

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Introduction

Objective.

Determining the factors involved in terrorist target selection is, in a sense, rather like determining a murder in a detective novel. The difference is that with the novel one starts with a victim, and the task is to identify the perpetrator through establishing the motive, the means, and the opportunity, but with target selection whilst one generally knows the three factors, the task is to identify who is likely to become the victim.

Of over 6,000 works on terrorism published between 1968 and 1988 few deal directly with the factors which encourage terrorists to select some targets whilst restraining them from selecting others.¹ Whilst Bowyer Bell and Smith have produced books which examine the logic behind the strategy and tactics of the Provisional IRA (PIRA), and Robert Clark has looked at some of the factors which influence the targeting strategy of the Basque group ETA (Euzkadi ta Askatasuna - Basque Homeland and Liberty), few works have concentrated solely upon the general factors which help determine terrorist target selection.² This study is not an attempt to predict exactly what specific groups will do, nor is it an up-to-the-minute guide on the latest terrorist groups to emerge. The aim is to examine the activities of terrorist groups throughout history, and see whether one can discover those factors which are important in determining terrorists' selection of physical targets.

-
- 1) A.P.Schmid & A.J.Jongman. Political Terrorism: A new guide to actors, authors, concepts, data bases, theories, and literature, (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 1988), 177.
 - 2) J.Bowyer Bell. IRA Tactics and Targets: An Analysis of Tactical Aspects of the Armed Struggle, 1969-1989, (Swords, Ireland: Poolbeg, 1990). M.L.R.Smith. Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement, (London: Routledge, 1995). R.P.Clark. The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980, (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), 123-280. R.P.Clark. "Patterns in the Lives of ETA members" and "Patterns of Eta Violence: 1968-1980", P.H.Merkl (ed). Political Violence and Terror: Motifs and Motivations, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).

A definition of terrorism

Initially, it is necessary to define what is meant by the terms *terrorism* and *terrorist*. By doing this can one differentiate terrorism from other types of political violence which a group may use.³ Unfortunately the terms terrorism and terrorist have become useful labels of abuse which politicians and partisan commentators use to attack people or actions of which they do not approve. For example, in July 1991, David Levy, then the Israeli Foreign Minister, described the Arab nations' trade boycott of Israel as "economic terrorism".⁴ Gearty has observed that:

the words 'terror' and 'terrorism' have come to be regarded as such powerful condemnations that all those looking for a suitable insult have wanted to appropriate them.⁵

However the fact that a term is misused is not a good reason why it should be abandoned as somehow discredited or politicised, and Gearty specifically rejects doing this.⁶ By way of comparison Crick observes that although the term 'democracy' may be misused or appropriated by undemocratic governments, this is no reason to abandon it as unusable.⁷

To be valid the concept of terrorism needs to be defined. There have been several attempts to define terrorism, of which Schmid and Jongman list thirty-five.⁸ The elements which differentiate terrorist acts from other forms of political violence are that the specific acts of violence come as a surprise to the people whose persons or property is attacked, that the violence is intended to make an actor - the psychological target of the violence - behave in a particular way by the use of recurrent intimidatory violence, and that there is always an underlying if not explicit threat that future violence may be serious and even lethal. The physical violence is not necessarily aimed directly at the

3) M.Crenshaw Hutchinson. Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954-1962. (Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1978), 20.

4) "Israel attacks G7 linking of boycott with settlements" The Guardian, (London), July 19th 1991.

5) C.Gearty, Terror, (London: Faber & Faber, 1991), 5.

6) C.Gearty, Terror, 151.

7) B.Crick. In Defence of Politics, second edition, (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1982), 56.

8) A.P.Schmid & A.J.Jongman. Political Terrorism, 32-38.

person or people to be influenced - the psychological target, but at making him or them behave in a particular way.

Although the term *terrorism* has been adopted for this type of political violence, the induction of terror is not always the aim of terrorist attacks. Martha Crenshaw has commented that the:

... effect may range from terror among those in the direct audience, among whom there are physical victims, to shock, curiosity, sympathy, or even admiration in groups that are not directly threatened, that only indirectly form an audience. Terrorism is not always or solely intended to produce the emotion of terror, but it is always intended to have psychological implications that influence political behaviour and attitudes.⁹

What is important is not generally the induction of terror as an end in itself, but that the succession of attacks is meant to create a psychological reaction in a person or group of people to make them act in a way which the attacker desires. The use of violence may also be as much a way for the attackers to vent their anger at a given person or group of people rather than being part of a carefully calculated campaign. However to be acts of political terrorism they must be associated with a political conviction, however incoherently understood or expressed.

Accordingly, in this study terrorism is defined as the recurrent use or threatened use of politically-motivated and clandestinely organised violence, by a group whose aim is to intimidate an actor or actors in order to make him or them behave in a way which the group desires.

There is still the problem of defining what one means by terming a person or a group as *terrorist*. Gearty labels specific acts as *terrorist acts*, rather than label groups as *terrorist* in themselves. Instead of attempting to compose a conclusive definition of terrorism, he believes that one should see acts of violent subversion as existing on a continuum which proceeds from acts of lethal non-state violence intended to cause terror at one end of the scale, to minor acts of armed subversion at the other.¹⁰ Clark also believes that the groups involved in such violence should not be classified as *terrorists* because terrorism is a method

9) M.Crenshaw Hutchinson. Revolutionary Terrorism, 21.

10) C.Gearty, Terror, 151-152.

rather than an aim. Thus, Clark would describe ETA as a political group which from time to time may use terrorism rather than as a terrorist group.¹¹

These are credible arguments, but they assume that a group is only a one-dimensional body and ignore the fact that a group can be multi-faceted. In the same way that it is possible for somebody to be a socialist, stamp collecting, teacher, the one activity not by definition excluding the others, so it is possible for a political group to be a terrorist group if it carries out terrorist acts. This does not mean that the group is solely, or even mainly, dedicated to terrorism, but it does mean that the group carries out terrorist acts. Thus, for the purposes of this thesis, a terrorist is somebody who in some form actively assists or participates in an act of terrorism, and a terrorist group is one which carries out terrorist acts.

The parameters of research

This thesis is concerned with the activities of non-state terrorist groups and not with all forms of terrorism. It does not examine the actions of states or state bodies except when they have an impact on terrorist groups. In some cases terrorist acts are clearly carried out directly by the military, police, intelligence, or other branches of the state apparatus. This type of terrorism includes both the operations of intelligence agents against recalcitrant emigres as allegedly practiced by the Libyan intelligence agencies in the 1980s, and the liquidation of internal critics, as practiced by the Argentine military government of the late 1970s and early 1980s.¹² Such activities do not fall within the purview of this thesis as this is terrorism by the state.

Some critics argue that in carrying out research on non-state terrorism one is ignoring the far larger phenomenon

11) R.P.Clark. The Basque Insurgents, xv-xvi.

12) U.S.Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs. Libya under Qadhafi: A Pattern of Aggression, Special Report No.138 (Washington DC: U.S.Dept of State, January 1986), 1. R.Gillespie. Soldiers of Peron: Argentina's Montoneros, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 244-252. J.Burns. The Land That Lost It's Heroes: Argentina, The Falklands and Alfonsín, (London: Bloomsbury, 1987), 20-23.

of state terrorism.¹³ George, and Herman and O'Sullivan develop the argument that one cannot legitimately examine the former without examining the latter, and that if one does it is somehow proof of a right-wing, uncritically pro-western outlook.¹⁴ This argument assumes that research is meant to fulfil a political agenda rather than to satisfy curiosity. It is rather like condemning medical researchers who concentrate on examining the common cold as being in favour of cancer.

There are other types of indirect government involvement in terrorism which, whilst not direct in the sense that the government dictates the minutiae of strategy and gives direct orders to the perpetrators, nevertheless indicate the strong involvement of a government or of its agencies. For example with regard to the activities of GAL (Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberacion - Anti-terrorist Liberation Group) which assassinated suspected ETA activists in southern France, or death squads in Latin America and elsewhere which kill suspected dissidents, the line between state terrorism and non-state terrorism has been deliberately blurred by the authorities. In these cases the state, or at least elements within the state apparatus, appear to have supported the formation of these groups, and quite possibly provided funding and equipment to the groups as deniable assassins.¹⁵

-
- 13) E.S.Herman. The Real Terror Network: Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda, (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1985), 21-25. E.S.Herman & G.O'Sullivan. The Terrorism Industry: The Experts and Institutions That Shape Our View of Terror, (New York: Pantheon, 1989), xii, 45-47, 152, 157. A.George. "The Discipline of Terrorology", A.George (ed). Western State Terrorism, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 77.
- 14) E.S.Herman & G.O'Sullivan. "'Terrorism' as Ideology and Cultural Industry", A.George (ed). Western State Terrorism, 39-40, 57-62, 68-69. A.George. "The Discipline of Terrorology", 92-93.
- 15) "Gonzalez drawn into 'death squad' scandal", The Independent, December 10th 1988. "'Dirty war' scandal worsens", The Independent, December 21st 1994. "Madrid sues over 'dirty war' claims", The Independent, January 11th 1995. "The noose is tightened around Felipe's neck", The Guardian, February 23rd 1995. P.Taylor. States of Terror: Democracy and Political Violence, (London: BBC Books, 1993), 98-104. M.S.Diokno. "'Guardians of Democracy': Vigilantes in the Philippines", and J.Caceres. "Violence, National

In other cases state support can take the form of sponsorship of existing groups in the shape of training and material backing, an example being the support given in the early 1980s by the governing Congress Party in India to the Sikh militant Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwali, and to the Tamil separatists of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka.¹⁶ Another example is provided by the support in terms of weapons, training, and safe haven given to the Red Army Faction, originally a terrorist group in West Germany, by the East German intelligence services.¹⁷

Lastly there are those cases where members of state agencies become involved in terrorism of their own volition, apparently without having the support of the government. An example of this is provided by the alleged connivance of sections of the Italian intelligence agencies with fascist terrorist groups in Italy in the 1960s and 1970s.¹⁸

One may ask whether the killing of dissidents or suspected insurgents by off-duty policemen acting with

Security and Democratisation in Central America", M.Kirkwood (ed). States of Terror: Death Squads or Development?, (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1989), 48-53, 105-107.

- 16) M.J.Akbar. India: The Siege Within, (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1985), 189. M.Tully & S.Jacob. Amritsar: Mrs Gandhi's Last Battle, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1985), 57-61, 105, 121. B.Vaughn. "The Use and Abuse of Intelligence Services in India", Intelligence and National Security, 8, no.1, (January 1993).
- 17) J.Schmeidel. "My Enemy's Enemy: Twenty Years of Co-operation between West Germany's Red Army Faction and the GDR Ministry for State Security", Intelligence and National Security, 8, no.4, (October 1993). B.A.Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, Ph.D, University of St Andrews, 1991, 56-61. "East was haven to German terrorists", The Times, June 15th 1990. "More German terror suspects seized", The Independent, June 16th 1990. "Arrests expose E Germany's terrorist links", The Independent, June 20th 1990.
- 18) C.Seton-Watson. "Terrorism in Italy", J.Lodge (ed). The Threat of Terrorism, (Brighton, England: Wheatsheaf, 1988), 92-93, 105-106. M.Bull. "Villains of the Peace: Terrorism and the Secret Services in Italy", Intelligence and National Security, 7, no.4, (October 1992). "Italians blame shadowy powers for bringing terror to Florence", The Independent on Sunday, May 30th 1993. The underlying thesis in P.Willan. Puppet Masters: The Political Use of Terrorism in Italy, (London: Constable, 1991), is that many right-wing terrorist groups in Italy were manipulated and directed to a degree by the Italian secret services.

official connivance, is really non-state activity. The actions of such groups are considered here because there are non-state groups which claim to act in support of the authorities - what Bruce calls pro-state terrorism - without having the backing of the state.¹⁹ Such activities are the actions of groups rather than of the state, even if they receive unauthorised support from individuals within the state apparatus. Any study of terrorism which neglected groups which have had contacts either with governments or with disaffected members of a state's security forces, would give a disproportionate emphasis to communist and separatist groups and would play down the significance of conservative and fascist groups.

Finally this study concentrates upon groups which constitute serious threats to life, or extensive damage to property, for the purposes of politically-motivated intimidation. Statistics released by the US State Department indicate that a proportion of what is sometimes defined as terrorism includes acts of arson.²⁰ Whilst such activities are not totally overlooked, the focus is upon groups which have deliberately carried out life-threatening actions, or which have systematically caused serious damage to property over a period of time.

A further complication is the fact that, although a small number of terrorist groups may provide a focus of attention, due to their longevity, lethality, or prominence of their victims. Martha Crenshaw illustrates the differing life-spans of terrorist groups when she lists seventy-seven fairly well-known groups which have used terrorism. Of these, forty-six had existed for over ten years, twenty existed for

19) S. Bruce. "The Problem of 'Pro-State' Terrorism: Loyalist Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland", Terrorism and Political Violence, 4, no.1, (Spring 1992). S. Bruce. The Red Hand: Protestant Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 268-270.

20) U.S. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1989, (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, U.S Department of State, April 1990), 6. U.S. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1990 (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S Department of State, April 1991), 40.

five to ten years, and eleven had a life-span of between one and five years.²¹ An example of the large number of small and rather insignificant and unpublicised terrorist groups is provided by Italy. According to Moss a total of 597 'group signatures' - 484 left-wing and 113 right-wing - were responsible for only one-fifth of terrorist actions in Italy between 1969 and 1980. The Red Brigades were only responsible for a small minority of the actions for which responsibility was claimed, and 80% of actions were unattributed to any specific group.²² Pisano states that 297 'left-wing groups and sixty-four right-wing groups claimed responsibility for terrorist attacks in Italy between 1975 and 1986 but notes that some groups gave more than one name in order to hamper investigations.²³ In her study of Colombia, Pearce refers to dozens of localised right-wing death squads, formed by landowners and narcotics syndicates, with the help of elements of the armed forces, most of which operated locally.²⁴ She claims that in 1989 there were 140 death squads, of which only eight were organised at a national level.²⁵ The point to note is that terrorism is not necessarily confined to articulate, well organised, well armed, or long-lived organisations, but that groups with these attributes attract more attention and provide more material in the form of communiques, news coverage and so forth for researchers and journalists. Consequently they attract more research and thus seem more common than they really are.

Summary.

The purpose of this study is to determine the motive, means, and opportunity which influence the selection of physical targets by terrorist groups. As with a good fictional murder, the relevant information does not present

21) M.Crenshaw, "How terrorism declines", Terrorism and Political Violence, 3, no. 1, (Summer 1991), 76-77.

22) D.Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 1969-1985, (London: Macmillan, 1989), 2.

23) V.S.Pisano. The Dynamics of Subversion and Violence in Contemporary Italy, (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1987), 38, 51.

24) J.Pearce. Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth, (London: Latin American Bureau, 1990), 7, 195.

25) J.Pearce. Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth, 217.

itself in such neat categories, but can be identified by going through the relevant material.

Terrorism is defined in this study as the recurrent use or threatened use of politically-motivated and clandestinely organised violence, by a group whose aim is to intimidate an actor or actors in order to make him or them behave in a way which the group desires. A terrorist is somebody who in some form actively assists or participates in an act of terrorism, and a terrorist group is one which carries out terrorist acts. Having defined the area of study it is now necessary to examine the types of terrorism.

Terrorist Typologies

Introduction.

There are many types of terrorism. Differences exist concerning the political motivation of the groups concerned, their resources, the nature of their operations, and the targets which they select. The aim of this chapter is to examine and categorise terrorist activities so as to provide some sort of order to the various forms which terrorism can take.

Classification of targets.

The classification of targets brings some sort of order to the otherwise disparate types of people and things attacked by terrorist groups. Some types of category do not need much explanation. Although each terrorist group's campaign is unique, it is possible to construct categories which can be applied across all groups. In their extensive guide to the literature on terrorism, Schmid and Jongman list ten different grounds upon which one can construct typologies.¹ Classifications of strategies and group ideologies are examined later. In this chapter the categorisations used refer to the classification of targets.


When examining terrorist target selection one must be aware that there is often more than one target for a terrorist operation. As well as the *physical* target there are those people or groups of people whose behaviour the terrorists wish to affect by their attacks - what are termed here as *psychological* targets. Jenkins notes that: "Terrorism is aimed at the people watching, not at the actual victims. Terrorism is theater", although he qualifies this by examining other reasons for terrorists operations.² The same point is also made by Crenshaw and Wright who refer to indirect target groups - what they term audiences - whose behaviour the terrorists may wish to affect.³ In practice a

1) A.P.Schmid & A.J.Jongman. Political Terrorism, 40.

2) B.M.Jenkins. International Terrorism: A New Kind of Warfare, (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, June 1974), 4.

3) B.M.Jenkins. International Terrorism: A New Kind of Warfare, 4-7. B.M.Jenkins. International Terrorism: The Other World War (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, November 1985), 9-11. M.Crenshaw

single attack may be intended to influence the behaviour of more than one psychological target. Thus if one wanted to construct a simple model of how terrorism works, it would be something like:



In this study, unless otherwise qualified, the term *target* is confined to those people or things which are physically attacked.

Before dealing with the more complex definitions, it is as well to deal with the common distinction between soft and hard targets. A *soft* target is one which has little or no protection, whilst a *hard* target is one which has a substantial degree of protection.

Apart from this, targets are classified, firstly according to the degree of preparation goes into the terrorist operation, and secondly according to the purposes which attacking them are supposed to fulfil. These categories are quite broad so as to enable comparisons to be made between groups. More detailed categories could be used but may be so specific as to only be applicable to a narrow range of groups, thus preventing comparisons.

Pre-planned targets and targets of opportunity.

Not all targets are painstakingly selected beforehand. On the one hand there are *pre-planned targets*, where terrorists have deliberately selected the target to be attacked and then go about carrying out the attack. Examples of this would be a highly complex operations like the aforementioned kidnapping of Aldo Moro in April 1978, or the

Hutchinson. Revolutionary Terrorism, 36-38, 137.
 J.Wright. Terrorist Propaganda: The Red Army Faction and the Provisional IRA, 1968-1986, (London: Macmillan, 1991), 77.

assassination of the Spanish Prime Minister Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco in December 1973.⁴

Pre-planned attacks need not be aimed at specific individuals. The bombing of Bologna railway station in August 1980, which killed eighty-five people, would have required advance planning to select the target and to assemble the bomb, even though it was intended to kill and injure whatever people were in the station at the time, rather than specific individuals.⁵ Likewise, the PIRA ambush of British paratroopers at Warrenpoint, county Down on August 27th 1979, a meticulously planned operation which resulted in the death of eighteen soldiers, was aimed at killing soldiers in general, rather than at killing specific individuals within the British Army.⁶ However, the operation had been planned in advance, thus the soldiers were pre-planned targets.

On the other hand there are *targets of opportunity*. These targets appear when a person or thing, falling within the class of what the terrorists see as targets, suddenly becomes vulnerable to attack and the terrorists take advantage of the opportunity. This is far more likely to

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- 4) A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked: Terrorism and Conflict in the Italian State, (London: Marion Boyars, 1989), 108-115. J.Agirre Operation Ogro: The Execution of Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco (New York: Quadrangle, 1975).
- 5) The identity of the group responsible for the Bologna bombing has not been conclusively established. Four members of a fascist group were convicted of carrying out the bombing in 1988, but their convictions was overturned on appeal in 1990. There are a number of theories concerning the identity of those responsible and their motives for carrying out the attack. C.Seton-Watson. "Terrorism in Italy", 94. P.Willan. Puppet Masters, 13-14, 160-167, 170-173. S.Christie. Stefano Delle Chiaie: Portrait of a Black Terrorist, (London: Anarchy Magazine/Refract Publications, 1984), 25, 109, 113. G.Harris. The Dark Side of Europe: The Extreme Right Today, new edition, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994), 115, 118. C.Schaerf, G.de Lutiis, A.Silj, F.Carlucci, F.Bellucci, S.Argentini. Venti Anni di Violenza in Italia: 1969-1988, two volumes, (Rome: ISODARCO, n.d), 866.
- 6) P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA (London: Heinemann, 1987; Corgi, 1988), 314-315. K.J.Kelley. The Longest War: Northern Ireland and the IRA (London: Zed Books, 1988), 305. D.Hamill. Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland, 1969-1984, (London: Methuen, 1985), 249-250. M.Urban. Big Boys' Rules: The Secret Struggle against the IRA, (London: Faber & Faber, 1992), 85-86.

happen where the terrorist group has selected categories of people as legitimate targets, for example police officers or members of an ethnic group, rather than specific individuals. It is also more likely to occur when the terrorist group is large, for the simple reason that the more group members there are, and the more geographically dispersed they are, the more chance there is of them encountering a target of opportunity.

When an entire class of people has been selected as a potential target, the possibility for them becoming targets of opportunity is greatly increased. Catholics in Northern Ireland have been abducted and killed after they wandered into areas where members of Protestant terrorist groups have been present. Thus, in Belfast in the early hours of June 26th 1966, four Catholics entered a pub where a group of extreme Protestants were indulging in a heavy drinking session. The group's leader, Augustus 'Gusty' Spence, went up to the bar, and upon the basis of the newcomer's southern Irish accents, told his colleagues that the men were IRA members, although at that time the IRA was practically extinct. Thereupon Spence and his colleagues waited outside the pub and shot the Catholics when they emerged, killing one of them.⁷ Similarly, in the early 1970s a UVF gang in west Belfast picked up Catholics from the streets and killed them, frequently after prolonged torture.⁸ Similar attacks on members of ethnic minorities by European fascists are often the result of decisions which are abruptly made when an identifiable victim happens along, or following a surfeit of alcohol on the part of the attackers.⁹

In the early 1970s many of the soldiers attacked by the PIRA could be defined as targets of opportunity. Frequently

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- 7) M.Dillon & D.Lehane. Political Murder in Northern Ireland, (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1973), 29-35.
S.Bruce. The Red Hand, 14.
- 8) M.Dillon. The Shankill Butchers, (London: Hutchinson, 1989; Arrow, 1990). S.Bruce. The Red Hand, 173-181.
- 9) R.Hill & A.Bell. The Other Face of Terror: Inside Europe's Neo-Nazi Network, (London: Grafton, 1988), 152, 153-154, 211. The question as to whether some of the more random attacks should be regarded as acts of terrorism is discussed in T.Bjorgo. "Terrorist Violence against Immigrants and Refugees in Scandanavia: Patterns and Motives", T.Bjorgo & R.Witte. Racist Violence in Europe, (London: Macmillan, 1993), 34-38.

gun-battles were not pre-planned, but occurred when PIRA members picked up some guns from the quartermaster in the morning and drove around their area looking for soldiers to fire upon.¹⁰ These targets were targets of opportunity.

Categorising target by purpose of attack.

Another way to classify targets is according to their occupation. The statistics produced by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) classify those killed in the troubles in Northern Ireland according to their role in the security forces or as civilians - adding the qualification that the latter category includes suspected terrorists.¹¹ Similarly the report Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1989 produced by the US State Department classifies the targets of terrorism as; Military, Government, Business, Diplomatic, Other.¹² This is a perfectly valid way of classifying targets, although one can end up with rather a lot of unclassified 'others'.

This method of categorisation is based upon an observable fact - the function or occupation of those who are attacked, so it is possible to collate relatively objective statistics. Thus for the purposes of statistical analysis the description of targets by function is ideal if one accepts that this is the reason for them being targeted rather than some other factor.

An alternative to classifying targets according to their function is to classify them according to the effect which the terrorists hope will result from attacking these targets. Crenshaw does this in her study of the Algerian war of 1954 to 1962.¹³ However, categories based upon the purpose of the targets being attacked, in that ideally one should know the motives of the attackers in the case of each attack. This is not always possible. Although terrorists sometimes reveal the rationale behind their attacks in communiques,

10) P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 192-193, 196-197. F.Martin (director). Behind the Mask, (London: Activision, 1989), video, interview with Brendan Hughes.

11) Royal Ulster Constabulary. Chief Constable's Annual Report 1991, (Belfast: Royal Ulster Constabulary, 1992), 79.

12) U.S.Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1989, viii, 4, 6.

13) M.Crenshaw Hutchinson. Revolutionary Terrorism, xv.

there is the question as to whether these can always be taken on trust. As with any form of communication by a political group, a terrorist group will wish to put the best possible interpretation upon its actions. Communiques sometimes represent an attempt by the terrorist leaders to put an acceptable gloss on an action which they would rather had not occurred.¹⁴ A further complication is that some terrorist groups frequently do not issue communiques.¹⁵ Thus, classifying targets according to the motive of the terrorists can involve an attempt to second-guess the terrorists.

For the purpose of classifying targets by the terrorists' purpose in attacking them the following terms are often used in this study.

■ Symbolic.

■ Functional.

■ Logistical.

■ Expressive.

These terms relate to the reason why the terrorists are believed to have selected these people or things as an object for their attack.

The categories are not mutually exclusive in that a target may be attacked for more than one reason. Thus, as mentioned above, Aldo Moro was kidnapped by the Red Brigades in April 1978 because the Red Brigades hoped to gain the freedom of some of their comrades by kidnapping him - thus making him a logistical target, and because they felt he symbolised the Italian Christian Democrats - thus making him a symbolic target.

Symbolic targets.

Symbolic targets are those where the primary motive for the attack is to prompt a reaction in the psychological target. This can be for a number of purposes. Terrorists may attack a target so as to draw attention to the group and their cause. The PIRA assassination of Lord Mountbatten in 1979 is reported to have prompted the following exchange

14) M.Crenshaw Hutchinson. Revolutionary Terrorism, 142.

J.Bowyer Bell. IRA Tactics and Targets, 27, 48, 111-112, 115.

15) A.P.Schmid & A.J.Jongman. Political Terrorism, 160.

between a journalist from New Zealand and a Sinn Fein official.

'Why did you kill a harmless old man like Mountbatten?' asked a journalist who called *Sinn Fein's* office from New Zealand. 'Why are you calling me from New Zealand?' came the reply from the Falls Road.¹⁶ (*Italics in original.*)

Thus Mountbatten was not killed because of anything which he might have done himself. As Bishop and Mallie point out, his military career had never brought him near Ireland, and having presided over India's secession from the British Empire he was a totally inappropriate symbol of colonial oppression.¹⁷

A more detached rationale for the Mountbatten attack was given by a member of the PIRA Army Council:

Killing this man had the aim of making the world understand - and first and foremost the British - that there is a state of war in this country. Given his personal importance there was inevitably going to be enormous publicity attached to this operation. ... we had no hatred for him as a person. It is the society, the military and the political machine he symbolized that we were aiming at.¹⁸

This is remarkably similar to the comment made by Dan Breen - an IRA member during the Irish Rebellion of 1919-1921 - concerning the unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Lord French in Dublin in December 1919. French was the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland and a former commander of the British Army in France during the First World War.

Against the old soldier himself we had no personal spite, but he was the head of an alien Government that held our country in bondage. We knew that his death would arouse the world to take notice of our fight for freedom. His name was known throughout the civilised world.¹⁹

As with the Mountbatten killing, French was attacked because of what he represented and because the terrorists thought that his death would get widespread attention for the Irish republican cause. As Breen concludes, if the attempt on

16) K.J.Kelley. The Longest War, 306.

17) P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 313.

18) C.L.Irvin. "Terrorists' Perspectives: Interviews", D.L.Paletz & A.P.Schmid (eds). Terrorism and the Media (Newbury Park, California: Sage, 1992), 78-79.

19) D.Breen. My Fight for Irish Freedom, revised and enlarged edition, (Dublin: Anvil, 1964), 84.

French had been successful, people around the world would have thought "Ireland must have a grievance. What is it?".²⁰

Targets do not have to be prominent in order to have a symbolic value. Peter Gurney, the former head of the Explosives Section of London's Metropolitan Police Anti-Terrorist Squad, has divided PIRA attacks in England between what he terms 'spectaculars' and 'pot-boilers'. Pot-boilers, which in the rest of this study are termed *irritants*, are low-level attacks such as the use of small incendiary devices to burn shops and property, and bomb hoaxes, the aim being to cause inconvenience and aggravation as a niggling reminder to the British that the Provisionals are still a problem which will not go away whilst the British remain in Northern Ireland. The object of irritants is to keep up a constant minimum level of aggravation and inconvenience. When they become relatively commonplace even killings, such as the killing of individual soldiers and police officers in Northern Ireland, can come into the category of irritants rather than spectaculars. For the Provisionals, unless a large number of the security forces are killed in one operation, their deaths serve to keep the subject of the Northern Irish conflict alive in the backs of the minds of the British public, but they no longer grab the headlines. *Spectaculars* on the other hand are attacks intended to cause major damage and to put the Provisional IRA campaign, and hence the Northern Ireland conflict, at the top of the political agenda.²¹ A senior Provisional reinforced this stating that whilst they and the security forces had reached a stalemate, the PIRA retained the ability to bring the overall situation to a crisis.²²

Even a relatively little known person can take on a symbolic value because of the office which they hold or the job which they perform. In the Basque Country members of the Spanish Civil Guard (Guardia Civil) are frequently killed by ETA, whilst in Northern Ireland uniformed members of the British Army or the RUC are killed by the Provisional IRA,

20) D.Breen. My Fight for Irish Freedom, 84.

21) P.Gurney. Braver Men Walk Away, (London: Harper Collins, 1993), 213.

22) T.P.Coogan. The IRA, (Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1987), 604.

not because they pose an immediate threat to the terrorists, but because they provide a readily recognisable symbol of what the group is fighting against.²³ Thus, the PIRA has always set a high premium on killing British soldiers because they are a more suitable symbol of the British presence in Ireland than members of the local security forces - the RUC and the UDR/RIR.²⁴ Thus a symbolic target need not be prominent in itself, but must attain a sufficient degree of prominence through being attacked to influence the psychological target.

Functional targets.

Functional targets are people or objects whose destruction removes a threat to the terrorist group. The most obvious example would be the case of a terrorist being confronted by an armed opponent where he had to either kill the opponent or risk being killed or apprehended. Such cases may occur when the police have trapped a terrorist who then tries to shoot his way out in order to avoid death or arrest. For example, in October 1974 the Red Brigadist Roberto Ognibene shot dead a Carabinieri marshal in an unsuccessful attempt to escape from a patrol which had lain in wait for him at a BR safe-house.²⁵ Likewise in June 1975 Ilich Ramirez Sanchez - widely known as 'Carlos' - shot his way out of a Paris flat where he had been cornered, killing two officers of the French DST (Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire), wounding another, and killing the informer who had betrayed him.²⁶

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- 23) S.Segaller. Invisible Armies: Terrorism into the 1990s, revised edition, (London: Sphere Books, 1987), 100. E.MacDonald. Shoot the Women First, (Fourth Estate, 1991; London: Arrow, 1992), 14-15, 22, 33. J.Bowyer Bell. IRA Tactics and Targets, 29.
- 24) "IRA switch to mortar and landmine campaign", The Guardian, March 16th 1985. G.Adams. The Politics of Irish Freedom, (Brandon: Dingle, Ireland, 1986), 121. "What's on the agenda now is an end to partition", The Irish Times, December 10th 1986. "IRA rings changes to restore balance of terror", The Guardian, May 5th 1987.
- 25) A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 86. V.S.Pisano. The Dynamics of Subversion and Violence in Contemporary Italy, 157. C.Schaerf et al. Venti Anni di Violenza in Italia, 414.
- 26) R.Deacon. The French Secret Service, (London: Grafton, 1990), 257. C.Dobson & R.Payne. The Carlos Complex: A Study in Terror, revised edition, (London: Coronet,

However the threat need not be so immediate. Police or intelligence officers who are involved with the investigation of terrorist groups, and the facilities which they use, are a prime target. The targeting of such police and intelligence operatives does have a symbolic aspect in that the successful elimination of such people can be exploited for its' propaganda potential by the terrorist group. In 1977 the Sinn Fein newspaper Republican News carried PIRA statements applauding the killings of Detective Constable Patrick McNulty, whom the Provisionals claimed was a member of the RUC Special Branch in Derry, and of Captain Robert Nairac, a British Army Intelligence officer.²⁷ However, this is a secondary benefit for the terrorist group. These are primarily functional targets because they pose a direct threat to the terrorist group. A section in a British Army report on the PIRA in 1978, notes:

The terrorists are already aware of their own vulnerability to Security Force intelligence operators and will increasingly seek to eliminate those involved.²⁸

One of the great successes of the IRA in the rebellion of 1919-1921 was to paralyse the British intelligence system through the systematic elimination of police and intelligence operatives. An IRA agent noted that even if a dead detective was replaced, the new man would not have his knowledge of the situation.²⁹

In addition to targeting individuals, facilities used by investigators have also been targeted. In September 1992 a 2,000 pound PIRA bomb destroyed the forensic science laboratories in Belfast. The destruction of the laboratories

1978), 63-68. G.Rosie. The Directory of International Terrorism, (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 1986), 258.

- 27) "Derry Brigade Warning to RUC Secret Police", Republican News, February 12th 1977. C.Ryder. The RUC: A Force Under Fire, (London: Methuen, 1989), 172. "SAS Captain Executed", Republican News, May 21st 1977. M.Dillon. The Dirty War, (London: Hutchinson, 1990; Arrow, 1991), 161-187. M.Urban. Big Boys' Rules, 53-57. F.Holroyd & N.Burbridge. War Without Honour, (Hull, England: Medium, 1989), 47, 55, 74-78.
- 28) S.Cronin. Irish Nationalism: A History of its Roots and Ideology, (Dublin: The Academy Press, 1980), 348. R.Fagilot. Britain's Military Strategy in Ireland: The Kitson Experiment, (London: Zed Books, 1983), 233.
- 29) T.P.Coogan. Michael Collins: A Biography, (London: Hutchinson, 1990), 78.

- which in 1991 handled nearly 32,000 items involved in over 5,000 cases - hampered the attempts of the authorities to build up cases against terrorist suspects, and showed how an object, albeit one staffed by humans, can become a functional target.³⁰

Logistical targets.

Logistical targets are those which are attacked in order to provide resources (funds, papers, weapons) for the group. Any terrorist organisation which deploys a number of more or less full time operatives, and which has to secure safe houses, rent cars and hotel rooms; buy weapons, and carry out other activities, has to obtain money from somewhere in order to function. In countries where it is necessary to carry identity documents, raids have been carried out in order to obtain the necessary paperwork. Thus on November 16th 1971 the Red Army Faction raided the town hall at Neustadt am Ruebenberge and stole blank passports, identity cards, and official seals. Five days later, on November 21st they raided the town hall in Langgonns, Hessen, and took identity cards and more official stamps.³¹

The methods used to obtain money, materials, or personnel vary considerably. Straightforward methods such as bank robbery can net fairly large amounts of money in a short space of time. Starting in 1879, bank robbery was a common method used by Russian revolutionary groups of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to secure sufficient funds to operate.³² More recently Carlos Marighela, who led the Action for National Liberation (Acao Libertadora Nacional - ALN) in Brazil in the late 1960s, saw bank robbery as a

30) "Damage in huge blast put at £20m", The Independent, September 25th 1992. "Court laboratory bombed by IRA", The Times, September 25th 1992. "Brits haven't a clue", "War News: Lab Flattened", "IRA strikes at Diplock system's heart", An Phoblacht/Republican News (hereafter AP/RN), October 1st 1992. "'Troubles' chronology: Wed Sep 23", Fortnight, no 311, (November 1992), 34.

31) S.Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group: The Inside Story of a Phenomenon, trans. A.Bell, (Hamburg: Hoffman & Campe Verlag, 1985; London: Bodley Head, 1987), 115, 116. J.Becker. Hitler's Children: The Story of the Baader-Meinhof Gang, (London: Granada, 1978), 234-236.

32) W.Laqueur. The Age of Terrorism, (London: Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1987), 112.

useful source of funds and useful training for other activities.³³ Robbery has continued with groups as diverse as the Red Army Faction, the Provisional IRA, the PLO, and the remnants of the French OAS carrying out robberies in order to raise funds.³⁴ In March 1992, following the second raid in six weeks on the post office in Camlough, county Armagh, it was reported that during the troubles in Northern Ireland £18 million had been taken in 17,000 robberies.³⁵

Another logistical method is to kidnap people and then hold them to ransom. This can take the form of seizing a person and then hiding them somewhere until the ransom is paid. Alternatively people can be kidnapped and held until comrades of the kidnapers are released from imprisonment, and of course the kidnapers can present a list of several demands. Behind the demands lies the threat that if the kidnapers terms are not met the hostage will be killed.

A very successful kidnapping occurred on September 19th 1974 when the Montoneros, an Argentine Peronist group, kidnapped the sons of the founder of the grain and flour company Bunge y Born - both also being senior executives in the company. One was released early for health reasons, but the other was not released until June 20th 1975 after a number of conditions had been met, the most important being the payment of \$60 million.³⁶

Other kidnappings achieve more modest sums. In March 1983 ETA kidnapped the president of a bank which had recently

33) C.Marighela. "Handbook of Urban Guerrilla Warfare", "Guerrilla Tactics and Operations", For the Liberation of Brazil, trans. J.Butt & R.Sheed, (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1971), 72, 81, 111-112.

34) "IRA suspected as raiders get away with £2m", The Independent, January 8th 1992. "Brooke going soft on IRA says bishop", The Times, January 8th 1992. "IRA fund-raising blamed for surge in Irish robberies", The Independent, May 22nd 1990. P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 194, 223, 391. W.Laqueur. The Age of Terrorism, 97. J.Adams. The Financing of Terror, (London: New English Library, 1986; New English Library paperback, 1988), 117-120. A.Horne. A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962, (London: Macmillan, 1977; Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1979), 553.

35) "Raiders target the country post offices", The Independent, March 17th 1992.

36) R.Gillespie. Soldiers of Peron, 180-182. R.Clutterbuck, Kidnap, Hijack and Extortion, (London: Macmillan, 1987), 157-158.

collapsed. Initially the group demanded 1,200 million pesetas (£6 million), but ultimately released him on payment of 150 million pesetas (£750,000).³⁷ However, ETA have also instituted a form of extortion termed a 'revolutionary tax'. They contact wealthy individuals and threaten to kill them unless they pay a set amount to ETA annually.³⁸ If the victims pay, they are not harmed. If they do not they may be kidnapped, killed, or deliberately wounded.³⁹

Kidnappings aimed at obtaining the release of comrades from imprisonment have also occurred fairly frequently. Usually the terrorist group will take a hostage, hide them in a secret location somewhere, and then demand the release of their comrades as the condition of the hostages safe release. The Uruguayan National Liberation Movement (Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional - MLN), also known as the Tupamaros, carried out a number of kidnappings in the early 1970s. On July 31st 1970 the Tupamaros kidnapped Dan Mitrione, the Chief Public Safety Advisor at the American Embassy in Montevideo, and the Brazilian Consul.⁴⁰ The Tupamaros demanded the release of 150 of their comrades, and alleged that Mitrione was a US agent responsible for the torture of Tupamaros in Uruguayan police custody. The authorities rounded up a number of suspected Tupamaros, including much of the leadership. On August 10th 1970 Mitrione's body was found dumped. The Tupamaro prisoners were not released by the authorities, but the Brazilian Consul was freed on February 21st 1971 after his family paid \$250,000 ransom.⁴¹ Subsequently the Tupamaros kidnapped other diplomats and businessmen, both in order to secure the release of comrades, and to extort money.⁴²

37) M.Bles & R.Low. The Kidnap Business, (1987; London: Star, 1988) , 198-199.

38) R.P.Clark. The Basque Insurgents, 227-228. E.MacDonald. Shoot the Women First, 33. M.Bles & R.Low. The Kidnap Business, 200-214.

39) R.P.Clark. The Basque Insurgents, 227-228.

40) A.Labrousse. The Tupamaros: Urban Guerrillas in Uruguay, trans. D.Livingstone, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1970; Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1973), 100.

D.Ronfeldt. The Mitrione Kidnapping in Uruguay, (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1987), 6-7.

41) A.Labrousse. The Tupamaros, 127. D.Ronfeldt. The Mitrione Kidnapping in Uruguay, 29.

42) For more detail of one of these kidnappings from the perspective of the victim see G.Jackson. People's

A West German group which in its initial stages derived inspiration from the Tupamaros, to the extent that one of their predecessor groups called itself the Tupamaros West Berlin, was the June 2nd Movement (Bewegung 2 Juni - B2J).⁴³ The B2J was a relatively small group which on February 27th 1975 kidnapped the Chairmen of the West Berlin Christian Democrats, Peter Lorenz.⁴⁴ He was released the day after the German authorities released five imprisoned members of their group, and put them on a flight to Aden.⁴⁵

More recently, in 1989 and 1990, members of the Medellin cocaine cartel took journalists, businessmen, and the manager of a football team hostage. These were seen by the cartel as 'bargaining chips' to be used to prevent the Colombian Government from apprehending members of the cartel member's families, and to force the Government to back down over its threat to extradite cartel members to the USA.⁴⁶

Attempts to obtain money through a form of kidnapping can be far more overt as happens in the case of hijackings, or in sieges where terrorists openly hold hostages within a building. In these cases no attempt is made to conceal the general whereabouts of the hostages, although their precise location within the aircraft or building might not be known. The aim is to trade the safe return of the hostages for the release of colleagues of the terrorist group.

In June 1985 Trans World Airways Flight 847 from Athens to Rome was hijacked by members of the Lebanese Shia Islamic group Hizbollah.⁴⁷ They demanded the release of 766 Lebanese

Prison, (Faber & Faber, 1973; Newton Abbot, England: Reader's Union, 1974).

- 43) F.Lopez-Alves. "Political Crises, Strategic Choices and Terrorism: The Rise and Fall of the Uruguayan Tupamaros", Terrorism and Political Violence, 1, no.2, (April 1989), 216. B.Baumann. Wie Alles Anfieng. How it all Began: The Personal Account of a West German Urban Guerrilla, trans. H.Ellenbogen & W.Parker, (Munich: Trikont Verlag, 1975; Vancouver: Pulp Press, 1977), 49-50.
- 44) B.A.Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 179.
- 45) J.Becker. Hitler's Children, 297-298. S.Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group, 286-289. B.A.Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 40.
- 46) "Drug barons threaten to kill hostages", The Independent, November 1st 1990.
- 47) J.T.Choi. Acts of violence against civil aviation: historical survey, perspectives and responses, Ph.D,

prisoners who were held in the Israeli detention camp at Atlit, the withdrawal of Israeli troops and the Israeli-created South Lebanese Army (SLA) from southern Lebanon. Later they demanded the release to Algiers of a comrade who had been arrested at Athens Airport, and threatened to kill the seven Greek hostages on board if he was not released. On June 15th one of the hostages, a US Navy diver, was shot dead at Beirut.

The hijacking ended on June 30th after negotiations through the Syrian Government and Nabih Berri, the leader of the Lebanese militia group AMAL. The terrorist caught at Athens had been freed on June 15th, and the Lebanese held in Atlit were freed over a period of three months, although the Israelis claimed that this had always been their intention. Other demands were not met. The Israeli and SLA presence in southern Lebanon was not withdrawn. In the course of the hijacking, the release of two Lebanese held in Madrid for an attempted assassination was demanded, and the terrorists also demanded the release of seventeen Shia prisoners in Kuwait, allegedly involved in bombing the US and French Embassies there in 1983.⁴⁸ Neither of these demands were met. In December 1984 a Kuwait Airways flight from Dubai to Karachi had been hijacked in an unsuccessful attempt to free the seventeen Shias in Kuwait, and the subsequent hijacking of a Kuwait Airways flight from Bangkok to Kuwait in April 1988 also failed to gain the release of the Shia prisoners.⁴⁹ They were eventually freed when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990.

The fact that a target has a logistical value does not necessarily preclude it from having a functional or symbolic

University of St Andrews, 1992, 206-243. E.F.Mickolus, T.Sandler, J.M.Murdock. International Terrorism in the 1980s: A Chronology of Events. Volume II, 1984-1987, 219-225. G.Rosie. The Directory of International Terrorism, 280.

48) E.F.Mickolus, T.Sandler, J.M.Murdock. International Terrorism in the 1980s: A Chronology of Events. Volume I, 1980-1983, (Ames, USA: Iowa State University, 1989), 468-469.

49) E.F.Mickolus, T.Sandler, J.M.Murdock. International Terrorism in the 1980s: 1984-1987, 139-142. G.Rosie. The Directory of International Terrorism, 168-169. R.E.Hill. Problems of international cooperation to improve standards of aviation security with reference to the passenger, Ph.D, University of St Andrews, 1990, 56-94.

value as well. When members of the Palestinian organisation Black September seized eleven Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics, they had three aims according to Fatah's head of security and intelligence Salah Khalaf, known as Abu Iyad.⁵⁰

... to affirm the existence of the Palestinian people; to give our cause resounding coverage - positive or negative, it mattered little - by taking advantage of the extraordinary concentration of mass media at Munich; and finally, to force Israel to release fedayeen [members of the various Palestinian resistance groups] in a number initially fixed at 200.⁵¹

The fact that the operation ended in the death of all of the hostages and several of the terrorists did not stop it from being a success, in fact it probably highlighted the Palestinian cause far more than a peaceful resolution and exchange of captives would have done. Thus, although intended to fulfil logistical objectives, the Munich kidnappings actually fulfilled a symbolic objective by forcing the Palestinian question onto the international agenda.⁵²

The assassination of Resident Magistrate Alan Bell in Dublin on March 26th 1970 shows how a person can be both a logistical and functional target. Bell was investigating the location of bank accounts holding funds which had been raised by the IRA and Sinn Fein. Whilst on a tram on his way to work, a group of young IRA men apprehended him, took him off the tram and shot him in the street.⁵³ By killing Bell they

50) There is some debate as to whether Black September, named expulsion of the various Palestinian groups from Jordan which began in September 1970, was truly an independent organisation, or a front organisation for Fatah operations. See H.Cobban. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power and Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 54-55. A.Iyad & E.Rouleau. My Home My Land: A Narrative of the Palestinian Struggle, trans. L.B.Koseoglu, (Paris: Fayolle, 1978; New York: Times Books, 1981), 98. A.Gowers & T.Walker. Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Revolution, revised paperback edition, (London: Corgi, 1991), 117-120. A.Frangi. The PLO and Palestine, trans. P.Knight, (Frankfurt: R.G.Fischer Verlag, 1982; London: Zed Books, 1983), 120.

51) A.Iyad & E.Rouleau. My Home My Land, 106.

52) A.Iyad & E.Rouleau. My Home My Land, 112-113.

53) R.Kee. Ourselves Alone: Volume Three of the Green Flag, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1972; Quartet, 1976), 101. C.Townshend. The British Campaign in Ireland, 1919-1921: The Development of Political and Military

not only eliminated a functional threat, they safeguarded their logistical resources.

Expressive targets.

One cannot ignore human caprice, and terrorism can be an emotional response to a situation rather than a part of an overall strategy. The lone anarchists who carried out bomb and knife attacks in France in the 1890s frequently appear to have been motivated by personal anger at perceived injustices rather than by political programmes.⁵⁴ Auguste Vaillant's bomb attack on the Chamber of Deputies on December 9th 1893, for which he was executed, seems to have been inspired as much by despair at the poverty in which he and his family were living as by any symbolic political motive.⁵⁵ Likewise, Emile Henry, who bombed the Cafe Terminus in Paris in February 1894, claimed at his trial that among the bourgeoisie there were no innocents, and that it was therefore justifiable to attack them for their oppression of ordinary people. He stated:

I wanted to show the bourgeoisie that their pleasures would no longer be complete, that their insolent triumphs would be disturbed, that their golden calf would tremble violently on its pedestal, until the final shock would cast it down in mud and blood.⁵⁶

Lupsha deals with this phenomenon, citing indignation as a possible motive for carrying out an act of political violence.⁵⁷ He defines indignation as;

... the attitude and behavioural manifestations of wrathfulness because of unworthy or unjust treatment.⁵⁸

Merari refers to a similar concept in discussing 'expressive terrorism' citing the terrorist campaigns by South Moluccans in the Netherlands and the Armenian Secret Army for the

Policies, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 65.
T.P.Coogan. Michael Collins, 188.

54) G.Woodcock. Anarchism: A History of Libertarian Ideas and Movements, (USA: The World Publishing Company, 1962; Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1975), 286-295.

J.Joll. The Anarchists, second edition, (London: Methuen, 1979), 113-119. D.Miller. Anarchism, (London: J.M.Dent & Sons, 1984), 111-112.

55) G.Woodcock. Anarchism, 292. J.Joll. The Anarchists, 113.

56) J.Joll. The Anarchists, 118.

57) P.A.Lupsha. "Explanation of Political Violence: Some Psychological Theories Versus Indignation", Politics and Society, 2, no. 1, (Fall 1971).

58) P.A.Lupsha. "Explanation of Political Violence", 102.

Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) as examples.⁵⁹ Arguably the South Moluccan campaign was quite rational in that they perceived a need to highlight the political position of the Moluccans, and did so. ASALA on the other hand appears to have been largely motivated by the desire to exact revenge against the Turks for the death of 1½ million Armenians in 1915, although it does call for an independent state in the formerly Armenian provinces of Turkey.⁶⁰

Such motives can also apply to individual operations where revenge is a major motivation. In June 1984 Chief of the Indian Army Staff, General Vaidya ordered the storming of the Sikh Golden Temple in Amritsar - the holiest Sikh shrine - during operations against Sikh militants and terrorists. The Temple was severely damaged and many Sikhs were killed, including the militant leader Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. The Sikhs did not forget. In August 1986, at Pune in southern India, Sikh terrorists on motor cycles overtook and fired on the car of the retired General Vaidya, killing him and wounding his wife and bodyguard.⁶¹

It can be more difficult to fit attacks on expressive targets into a study of terrorist target selection than the other three categories. Due to the fact that such attacks have an emotional motivation, one cannot necessarily divine the logical processes which provide the rationale for attacks on symbolic, functional, and logistical targets. However it is important to remember that with terrorism, as with other human activities, not all decisions taken are coldly logical.

59) A.Merari. "Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency", Terrorism and Political Violence, 5, no. 4, (Winter 1993), 237.

60) K.Tololyan. "Martyrdom as Legitimacy: Terrorism, Religion and Symbolic Appropriation in the Armenian Diaspora", P.Wilkinson & A.M.Stewart (eds). Contemporary Research on Terrorism, (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987; 1989), 93. W.Laqueur. The Age of Terrorism, 227. J.E.Vorbach. "Monte Melkonian: Armenian Revolutionary Leader", Terrorism and Political Violence, 6, no. 2, (Summer 1994), 178.

61) "Terrorists kill India's former army chief", Far Eastern Economic Review, August 21st 1986. "Vaidya killers hanged", The Hindu: International, October 17th 1992. M.Tully & S.Jacob. Amritsar, 155-191. M.J.Akbar. India: The Siege Within, 201-205.

Types of terrorist operation

There are several types of terrorist operation.⁶² The typology employed in this section is based upon the nature of the operation. The categories are:

- Assassination.
- Discriminate attack.
- Mass casualty attack.
- Abduction.
- Siege.
- Hijacking.
- Sabotage.
- Mass destruction attack.

An *assassination* is an attack which is intended to kill a specific person or specific people. The target need not be well known or powerful, but the attack must have been aimed at killing that person or those people in particular. A lethal attack on, for instance, a police officer, which is aimed at killing any police officer, is not an assassination because the object of the attack is not a specific person. However if a specific police officer is selected and attacked then it is an assassination. Other people may be killed or injured in the course of an assassination attempt, but these casualties are incidental, or are at most secondary targets - such as bodyguards - who have to be eliminated so that the terrorists can attack their primary target. This was the case with the Tamil suicide bomber who killed the Congress Party leader and former Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, together with herself and about twenty bystanders at an election rally in Madras in April 1991.⁶³

A *discriminate attack* is an attack where the aim is kill or injure human targets from a specific category of people, but not necessarily specific individuals. Again an example of this would be an attacks on uniformed police

62) B.M.Jenkins. The Lessons of Beirut: Testimony before the Long Commission, (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, February 1984), 2.

63) "Rajiv Gandhi assassinated in bomb blast", The Times, May 22nd 1991. "Rajiv Gandhi murdered by bombers at election rally", The Independent, May 22nd 1991. "What One-Eyed Jack knows", The Independent, July 1st 1991.

officers, but it could apply to a broader group, such as any member of a particular religious or ethnic group. Other people may be harmed by the attack, but, again, this is incidental to the objective, as occurred in county Armagh, Northern Ireland, in July 1990 when a landmine detonated by a Provisional IRA unit killed three RUC officers and a Catholic nun.⁶⁴

A *mass-casualty attack* is one where the aim is to kill or injure as many people as possible with little regard as to the types of people harmed. To call such attacks indiscriminate would not be totally accurate as most attacks contain a degree of discrimination with regard to the people or objects harmed, or the location of the attack. At the very least terrorists tend to ensure that their own supporters are not harmed. An example occurred in April 1986 when Nizar Hindawi - who was reportedly working for Syrian intelligence - duped his unsuspecting pregnant girlfriend into carrying a bomb on board an aeroplane. He specifically chose a flight belonging to the Israeli airline El Al because he was allegedly instructed by Syrian intelligence officers to attack Israeli targets.⁶⁵ Whilst he did not know the people likely to be on board the aeroplane - with the exception of his girlfriend - by specifically choosing El Al he was showing a degree of discrimination in that his victims were likely to be Jewish, Israeli, or at least flying to Israel in an aeroplane operated by an Israeli airline. Other attacks, such as the detonation of powerful bombs in public places, are undoubtedly intended to kill or injure a large number of people irrespective of who they are as specific individuals.

An *abduction* is an operation where a person is seized and taken to a secret place where they are held pending their release or their death. Such operations frequently take the form of kidnappings where the terrorists attempt to gain some form of benefit - usually a ransom or the release of

64) "IRA blast kills nun and three RUC men", The Times, July 25th 1990. "Catholic nun and three RUC men killed by IRA landmine", The Independent, July 25th 1990.

65) P.Wilkinson. "Designing an Effective International Aviation Security System", Terrorism and Political Violence, 5, no. 2, (Summer 1993), 105. E.F.Mickolus, T.Sandler, J.M.Murdock. International Terrorism in the 1980s, 1984-1987, 376-378. S.Emerson & B.Duffy. The Fall of Pan Am 103, (London: Futura, 1990), 199-200.

prisoners - in return for the release of the person abducted. The ostensible aim of the kidnapping in March 1978 of former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro, was to secure the release of Red Brigade prisoners, although it was also probably intended to derail the accommodation between the Italian Christian Democrats and the Italian Communist Party by precipitating a political crisis.⁶⁶ In other cases there may be no intention of freeing the victim. In September 1990 a PIRA unit stopped a minibus just after it had crossed from the Republic of Ireland into Northern Ireland, and abducted an RUC officer. He was interrogated, then shot, his body being found a few days later.⁶⁷

A siege - sometimes termed a barricade and hostage incident - occurs when terrorists seize hostages and then barricade themselves behind cover with the intention of holding them until their demands are met. Usually such operations are pre-planned, as occurred when Arab-Iranians seized the Iranian Embassy in London in April 1980, and held the people there hostage. The terrorists' chief aim was to publicise their demand for autonomy for their area of Iran, but they also demanded the release of ninety-one prisoners held in Iran and safe conduct out of Britain.⁶⁸ However, terrorists who are trying to evade capture may seize hostages and try to bargain their way out of captivity. This happened in London in December 1975 when four PIRA members running from the police, broke into a flat and seized the couple who lived there. Although the terrorists demanded a getaway aeroplane, one of them subsequently said that they were

66) P. Willan. Puppet Masters, 219. A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 151, 157, 160. Interview with Prospero Gallineri in "Secret History: The Last Days of Aldo Moro", Channel 4, television, July 20th 1992.

67) "Murdered RUC man's body found", The Independent, September 14th 1990. "IRA admits shooting of sergeant", The Times, September 19th 1990. B. O'Brien. The Long War: The IRA and Sinn Fein, 1985 to Today, (Dublin: O'Brien Press, 1993), 207.

68) Sunday Times Insight Team. Siege: Prince's Gate, London, April 30-May 5 1980, (Feltham, England: Hamlyn, 1980), 31, 45, 52, 61-62. E. F. Mickolus, T. Sandler, J. M. Murdock. International Terrorism in the 1980s, 1980-1983, 40-42. P. Schlesinger. Media, State and Nation: Political Violence and Collective Identities, (London: Sage, 1991), 31.

playing for time, hoping that other PIRA members would recover equipment from their safe house.⁶⁹

A *hijacking* is an operation where the terrorists seize control of a vehicle, such as an aircraft, ship, or car. The terrorists often seize the occupants as bargaining counters with a government or some other actor. The Dawson's Field incident of 1970, where PFLP members hijacked three aircraft of different nationalities is an early example of hijacking aircraft and their passengers in order to exert pressure on several governments.⁷⁰ In an interview carried out before these hijackings, the leader of the PFLP, George Habash, pointed out that hijackings fulfilled another purpose.

Though the West may have been shocked by it, the hijacking of the planes was popular among Palestinians and the Arab masses in general - and to us that matters a lot. The struggle is far from being a purely military one; it is psychological too, and we have to raise the morale of the masses while at the same time harassing the Israelis.⁷¹

Another example, the hijacking of the Mediterranean cruise ship *Achille Lauro* in October 1985, appears to have been precipitated by the discovery of armed Palestinians aboard the cruise ship. The initial plan was to disembark at the Israeli port of Ashdod and to attack whatever they found there. Nevertheless, once forced into the open the terrorists held the passengers hostage, killing one, demanded the release of fifty Palestinians from Israeli prisons, and also demanded safe conduct to a destination of their choice. Whilst they received safe conduct from the Egyptian Government, their aircraft was intercepted in international airspace by US Navy jets and forced to land in Italy where four kidnapers were imprisoned.⁷²

69) G.McKee & R.Franey. Time Bomb, (London: Bloomsbury, 1988), 326-347.

70) P.Snow & D.Phillips. Leila's Hijack War: The True Story of 25 Days in September 1970, (London: Pan, 1970).
G.Rosie. The Directory of International Terrorism, 94-96.

71) G.Chaliand. The Palestinian Resistance, 167.

72) D.C.Martin & J.Walcott. Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of America's War Against Terrorism, (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), 235-257. O.North & W.Novak. Under Fire: An American Story, (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 199-211. S.Segaller. Invisible Armies, 250-271.

An act of sabotage is an attack intended to cause material damage to a specific material target. Although there may be no intention to harm human targets there is always the possibility that people will get hurt whatever the intention of the terrorists. Examples include the numerous incendiary attacks which the Provisional IRA carried out on commercial premises in Northern Ireland and England throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s.⁷³

A mass destruction attack on the other hand is intended to cause a large amount of material damage. Prime examples of these would be the two massive bombs which the PIRA detonated in the City of London in April 1992 and April 1993, where Lloyd's List quotes insured losses at £350 million in the former case and £650 million in the latter.⁷⁴ However the potential risk to human life in such attacks was emphasised by the death of three civilians with over seventy-five injured in the 1992 explosion, and one killed with over fifty injured in that of 1993.⁷⁵

It should be noted that more than one category of attack may be used in an operation. For example a large bomb could be intended to cause both mass casualties and mass destruction, although in practice most large bombings are primarily intended to cause one or the other.

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- 73) "Incendiary devices increasingly used in terror attacks", The Independent, December 2nd 1991. "IRA switch tactics with store firebombs, disruption of rail commuters and mortar attack on Downing Street, The Guardian, January 11th 1992. "IRA claims responsibility for planting firebombs, The Independent, September 2nd 1991. "Mainland attacks admitted by IRA", The Times, September 2nd 1991.
- 74) "Insured loss may hit £150m", Lloyd's List, February 12th 1996.
- 75) "London counts the cost of IRA bombs", The Independent, April 13th 1992. "Back-to-work City defies the IRA", The Times, April 13th 1992. "City bomb claims may reach £1bn", The Independent, April 14th 1992. "Troubles chronology: Apr 10", Fortnight, May '92. "IRA City bombers identified by police", The Independent, July 15th 1992. "Cost will exhaust pool of insurance money", The Independent, April 26th 1993. "One bomb: £1bn devastation", The Independent on Sunday, April 24th 1993. "Taxpayers foot IRA bomb bill", The Times, April 26th 1993. "Security to be stepped up in City after blast", "Toll of injured rises to 51", both in The Independent, April 26th 1993.

Summary.

The aim of this chapter has been to bring some degree of order to the multiplicity of operational and target types which one may encounter in a study of terrorist operations. Firstly, targets can be divided between the physical target - the person or object actually attacked, and the psychological target - the people whom the terrorists wish to influence.

Targets can also be divided between pre-planned targets and targets of opportunity. A pre-planned target is one where the terrorists have already selected a target and planned the attack some time in advance. A target of opportunity on the other hand, is one which suddenly, and with little warning, presents itself to the terrorists - who proceed to attack it or not as they see fit at the time.

Specific terrorist operations can be divided into eight types: assassination, discriminate attack, mass casualty attack, abduction, siege, hijacking, sabotage, and mass destruction attack. The terrorist group in question may use some or all of these operations as part of their campaign. Not all groups use the full repertoire of operations, but select those which fit in with the objectives which they wish the attack to achieve.

Terrorist targets can also be categorised according to the reason why they have been attacked. Where the aim is to affect the psychological target, the target attacked can be deemed a symbolic target. This is the type of attack which is most often associated with the terrorising aspect of terrorism, although the perpetrators of the attack may be trying to induce other psychological feelings such as anger or irritation. Where the aim is to remove a direct threat to the group the target of the attack can be said to be a functional target. When terrorists carry out an operation where the aim is to increase the assets of the terrorist group - for instance by getting money or freeing comrades - the target can be considered a logistical target. Lastly, where the terrorists attack a person, institution, or object for primarily emotional reasons, the target is an expressive target. In many cases terrorist attacks may fall under more than one category because of the multiplicity of motives.

Terrorist attacks are very rarely isolated incidents. A terrorist attack carries the implicit threat that others will

follow until the political aims of the terrorists are fulfilled. To understand the logic behind the selection of particular targets, it is helpful to see terrorist operations within the context of the overall designs of the group concerned. Whilst to outsiders terrorist actions may appear to be purposeless, in practice they are closely tied to the political beliefs of the terrorists.

The Effect of Ideology

Introduction.

In his study of political culture, Rosenbaum defines ideology as:

The degree to which an individual has an explicit, structured set of political values or attitudes that help him to interpret and respond to political events; this may involve a fairly coherent belief system (such as 'conservatism' or 'socialism') or a set of isolated but related beliefs.¹

Thus, an ideology can range from a coherent series of principles to a muddled collection of gut prejudices. In the case of some ideologies - particularly religion or separatism, but others as well - one may also find that an ideology includes historical or even semi-mythical beliefs.² What is important in the context of this study is that ideology provides a motive - and in some cases a formula - for action. In this study the term *ideology* refers to the beliefs, values, principles, and objectives, however ill-defined or tenuous, by which a group may define its distinctive political identity and aims, and justify its actions. Terrorism itself is a method, not an ideology.

One should distinguish between the professed ideology of the group and the actual beliefs of individual members. Whereas the leaders of the group often have a good understanding of, and allegiance to, the ideology of the group, the followers may have a less distinct idea of what the group stands for. This is illustrated in the accounts of various far-right organisations in Britain in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and in the letters from imprisoned Italian fascists in di Giovanni's compilation.³ The organisers at the

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- 1) W.A.Rosenbaum. Political Culture, (London: Nelson, 1975), 120.
 - 2) M.Kramer. "Sacrifice and Fratricide in Shiite Lebanon", Terrorism and Political Violence, 3, no. 3, (Autumn 1991), 32-33. K.Tololyan. "Cultural Narrative and the Motivation of the Terrorist", D.C.Rapoport (ed) Inside Terrorist Organizations (London: Frank Cass, 1988)., 221. A.T.Q.Stewart. The Narrow Ground: The Roots of Conflict in Ulster, revised edition, (London: Faber, 1989), 180-181. J.Darby. "The Historical Background", J.Darby (ed). Northern Ireland: The Background to the Conflict, (Belfast: Appletree Press, 1983), 15.
 - 3) R.Hill & A.Bell. The Other Face of Terror, 95, 121-122, 125, 157, 169. Searchlight. From Ballots to Bombs: The

top of such groups usually believe in a fairly specific political ideology, and have clear political objectives, but for many of their followers a sufficient motive for belonging to the group is provided by adherence to the group and a visceral dislike of the 'enemy'.

In some cases the connection between terrorist activity and political ideology may not be straightforward due to other influences. For instance, the desire of groups or communities to dominate the area they live in can take precedence over abstract ideological considerations. Thus, in Sri Lanka, the Punjab, Peru, Northern Ireland, and elsewhere, communal, social, and economic rivalries may account for the selection of local targets by a group which bases itself upon a broader ideological justification. Gearty argues that where violence is mainly used to achieve communal goals one is not really dealing with political terrorism as it is understood in the West.⁴ However, achieving local dominance is relevant to the exercise or maintenance of power and may well relate to the success or failure of a wider conflict. Therefore it is in itself a use of violence in order to achieve political ends.

Categories of ideology.

Whilst ideology generally sets the limits within which terrorists select their targets, different ideologies provide different targets. The ideological categories used to classify groups in this study are:

- Separatism.
- Religion.
- Liberalism.
- Anarchism.
- Communism.
- Conservatism.

Inside Story of the National Front's Political Soldiers, (London: Searchlight, after 1989), 16-19.
C.di Giovanni. Light from Behind the Bars: Letters from the Red Brigades and Other Former Italian Terrorists; True Stories of Terror, Agony and Hope, (Slough, England: St Paul Publications, 1990), 95, 99-100.

4) C.Gearty, Terror, 102.

- Fascism.
- Single-issue.
- Organised Crime.

Separatism. The concepts of separatism and nationalism are inextricably linked. There are several theories as to what makes up a nation, and consequently several definitions of nationalism.⁵ This study adopts the definition of Smith who defines nationalism as:

... an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential 'nation'.⁶

In this study a separatist group is one which aims at gaining political independence for a given geographical area and population from the governance of what the group perceives as a foreign political unit, either for the purposes of gaining total independence, or to attach themselves to a state with which they feel a greater affinity. Separatist groups believe that they represent the interests and aspirations of a national or ethnic group - whether or not that group realises it - by seeking to liberate them from the current 'foreign' rulers.

Separatism is a narrower concept than nationalism. Whereas all separatists are nationalists, not all nationalists are necessarily separatists. Some groups espousing nationalism do not wish to separate from their existing state. Fascist and conservative groups often declare their loyalty to their nation, although fascists usually wish to change the nature of the state itself, whilst conservatives generally wish to preserve it. A separatist terrorist group is one which uses terrorism for that end.

Examples include ETA in the Basque country in Spain, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka,

5) For a selection see J.Hutchinson & A.D.Smith (eds). Nationalism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). M.Williams (ed). International Relations in the Twentieth Century: A Reader, (Basingstoke, England: Macmillan, 1989), 42-77. E.J.Hobsbawm. Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, second edition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). A.D.Smith. National Identity, (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1991).

6) A.D.Smith. National Identity, 73.

who wish to set up separate states for the Basques and Tamils respectively.⁷ Alternatively, separatist groups like the Greek-Cypriot group EOKA in the 1950s, or the present-day Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland, wish to secede from the existing government and join another state - in these cases Greece and the Republic of Ireland.⁸

Religion. Like separatism, religion commands from its adherents a high degree of fealty to an intangible entity. As with separatism's relationship to nationality, people are generally born into their religion. Whereas people usually choose whether or not to be communists, liberals, fascists, or whatever other ideology they may adopt, their religion and nationality is something which they generally inherit.

Members of a religious terrorist group use terrorism to promote their perception of the doctrines and political interests of their religion. This includes groups such as the Armed Islamic Group (Groupes Islamique Armee - GIA) in Algeria, Hizbollah in the Lebanon, and the Jewish Underground which flourished in parts of Israel in the early 1980s.⁹ Groups promoting an extensive political role for their religion believe that their governments are morally obliged to govern according to the tenets of that religion.

This study does not examine those millenarian groups that do not have definable political aims. A millenarian group is one which believes that some form of apocalyptic change is at hand, and "... anticipates collective, earthly,

7) F.Llera, J.M.Mata & C.L.Irwin. "ETA: From Secret Army to Social Movement - The Post-Franco Schism of the Basque Nationalist Movement", Terrorism and Political Violence, 5, no. 3, (Autumn 1993)", 106.

G.Samaranayake. "Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka and Prospects of Management: An Empirical Inquiry", Terrorism and Political Violence, 3, no. 2, (Summer 1991), 80.

8) G.Grivas - Dighenis. Guerrilla Warfare and EOKA's Struggle, trans. A.A.Pallis, (London: Longmans, 1964), 91-92. M.Dillon. The Dirty War, 482.

9) "Algerian dissident seeks UK asylum", The Independent, August 6th 1994. M.Crenshaw. "Political Violence in Algeria", Terrorism and Political Violence, 6, no. 3, (Autumn 1994), 265, 269-272, 273. M.Kramer. "Hizbullah: The Calculus of Jihad", M.E.Marty & R.S.Appleby (eds). Fundamentalisms and the State, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993). E.Sprinzak. "From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism: The Case of the Gush Emunim Underground", D.C.Rapoport (ed) Inside Terrorist Organizations.

imminent, total, supernatural salvation".¹⁰ In the case of Christian millenarianism for instance, it can either mean that Christ will come before the millenium, destroying the existing order in the process, or that incremental human action will bring about an apocalyptic millenium, after which Christ will come.¹¹ The majority of such groups are not violent.¹² Where they have been - primarily in the USA - they appear to have been motivated by an extreme right-wing political agenda rather than by their religious beliefs as such. Millenarian groups which carry out violence in the hope that they will hasten the coming of Christ or any other divinity are not covered by this study their aim is not to influence the behaviour of other people but merely to cause carnage for religious purposes.

Liberalism. Liberal ideology promotes the establishment of democratic methods of representation in government, the equality of individuals before the law, and the maintenance of the civil rights of the individual. A liberal terrorist group is one which uses terrorism in order to secure a government of this nature.

Some people may have difficulty in accepting that a liberal group could use terrorism as a weapon, or in defining any group which uses terrorism as 'liberal'. Referring to the use of the term 'terrorist' as a perjorative, Jenkins has perceptively noted that "Terrorism is what the bad guys do".¹³ As liberals, in the broadest sense of the term, tend to be seen as the 'good guys', the concept of a liberal terrorist group is seen by some as a contradiction in terms. Gearty notes his own disinclination to bracket the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa - which he sees as a liberation movement - with the Provisional IRA, Red Brigades, or Red Army Faction.¹⁴ This is really to confuse means and

10) M.Barkun. "Millenarian Aspects of 'White Supremacist' Movements", Terrorism and Political Violence, 1, no. 4, (October 1989), 410.

11) M.Barkun. "Millenarian Aspects of 'White Supremacist' Movements", 410.

12) M.Barkun. "Millenarian Groups and Law Enforcement Agencies: The Lessons of Waco", Terrorism and Political Violence, 6, no. 1, (Spring 1994), 93.

13) B.M.Jenkins. Terrorism Works - Sometimes, (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, April 1974), 2.

14) C.Gearty, Terror, 3-4, 98.

ends. Terrorism is a method which can be used by 'good guys' or 'bad guys'. What distinguishes the groups is not the method which they use, but the objectives for which terrorism is being used.

There are historical examples of liberal terrorist groups. The People's Will in Russia in the 1870s and 1880s and the Social Revolutionaries in the early twentieth century were primarily concerned with the overthrow of the Tsarist autocracy and the introduction of democratic reforms.¹⁵

Laqueur has described the Russian terrorists of the 1870s and 1880s as "liberals with a bomb" and notes their condemnation in 1881 of the assassination of American President James Garfield, on the grounds that normal political activity was possible in the USA.¹⁶

The ANC provides a recent example of terrorism being used by a group with a liberal ideology. The ANC's political programme - the Freedom Charter of 1955 and subsequent amendments - was not radical by democratic norms. It was not an anti-white document, but called for the political and legal equality of all South African citizens, a moderate redistribution of wealth, and the limited nationalisation of parts of the economy.¹⁷ Thus, the Charter was largely a statement of traditional western liberal values, with a modest element of economic radicalism. Until 1985 ANC violence - carried out by Spear of the Nation (Umkhonto we Sizwe - MK) was ideally supposed to take the shape of sabotage and self-defence, but from 1985 bomb attacks were made on whites in general.¹⁸

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- 15) E.Crankshaw. The Shadow of the Winter Palace: The Drift to Revolution, 1825-1917, (London: Macmillan, 1976; Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1981), 303-305. Z.Ivianski. "Fathers and Sons: A Study of Jewish Involvement in the Revolutionary Movement and Terrorism in Tsarist Russia", Terrorism and Political Violence, 1, no 2, (April 1989), 145. B.Savinkov. Memoirs of a Terrorist, trans. J.Shaplen, (Millwood, New York: Kraus Reprint, 1972), 175, 195. P.Wilkinson. Political Terrorism, (London: Macmillan, 1974), 65.
- 16) W.Laqueur. The Age of Terrorism, 18, 70.
- 17) H.Holland. The Struggle: A History of the African National Congress, (London: Grafton, 1989), 99, 213-214. H.W.Degenhardt (ed). Revolutionary and Dissident Movements: An International Guide, (Harlow, England: Longmans, 1988), 327-328.
- 18) A.P.Schmid & A.J.Jongman. Political Terrorism, 655-656. H.Holland. The Struggle, 129, 132, 138-141, 205-206.

Anarchism. As an ideology anarchism is resistant to an authoritative definition. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon - according to Woodcock the first person to accept the title 'anarchist' - is quoted as saying to an admirer of his 'system'; "My system? I have no system!".¹⁹ One can generally say that anarchists oppose the authority of one group of people over other people, and oppose the idea of power being exercised by the possessors of private wealth. They also believe that the state is an unnecessary and oppressive institution, and wish to replace it with structures which operate on a cooperative, voluntary basis, and which are directly answerable in detail to those on whose behalf they administer.²⁰

An anarchist terrorist group is one which uses terrorism in order to overthrow the existing system of government, and replace it with one which accords with anarchist thought. Examples of anarchist terrorists include the French anarchists of the late nineteenth century and the Angry Brigade in Britain in the early 1970s.²¹

Communism. Communism has a solid core of fundamental principles. These derive from the writings of Karl Marx in the third quarter of the nineteenth century, and the revision and adaptation of these ideas in the first quarter of the twentieth by Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, later known as Lenin. Marxist-Leninist communism professes that in any society there is a constant struggle between the ruling classes who own the instruments for the distribution of wealth and power, and the classes who work for them. In industrial societies Marx termed the capitalist ruling class as the *bourgeoisie* and the ruled industrial working class as the *proletariat*. Communists see the state as an instrument of repression which

19) G.Woodcock. "Anarchism: A Historical Introduction", G.Woodcock (ed). The Anarchist Reader, (Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1977), 13-14.

20) D.Robertson. The Penguin Dictionary of Politics, (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1986), 7-8.
G.Woodcock. "Anarchism: A Historical Introduction", 21-27.

21) G.Woodcock. Anarchism, 286-295. J.Joll. The Anarchists, 130-138. D.Miller. Anarchism, 111-112. G.Carr. The Angry Brigade: The Cause and the Case, (London: Victor Gollancz, 1975). Angry Brigade. The Angry Brigade, 1967-1984: Documents and Chronology, (Bratach Dubh Anarchist Pamphlets, 1978; London: Elephant Editions, 1985).

the bourgeoisie uses to maintain their wealth and power. Whilst Marx saw developing class consciousness as leading to inevitable victory of the working class, Lenin believed that a small, clandestine revolutionary leadership is required to provide the necessary impetus.²² Hence the development of Marxist-Leninist communism, where a small revolutionary vanguard would lead the masses to victory and true communism. Later variants take into account the work of subsequent followers of Marxism-Leninism, in particular those of the Chinese communist leader - later premier - Mao Tse-tung, and Latin American communist revolutionaries such as Che Guevara and Carlos Marighela.²³

Communist terrorist groups aim at overthrowing the existing political and economic system through the use of terrorism, in the hope that the violence will politicise the masses and incite them to rise up and destroy the capitalist system. Examples of communist terrorist groups include the Red Brigades and Front Line in Italy, the Red Army Faction and the June 2nd Movement in Germany, the Japanese Red Army, Shining Path in Peru, and the Naxalites in India.

Conservatism. There are various types of conservatism, but it has a consistent core of beliefs, the essence of which is that conservatives desire to defend the existing social, economic, or political order against radical change. Where radical change has occurred, conservatives may try to achieve a reversion to the earlier state of affairs.²⁴ A conservative terrorist group is one which uses terrorism in order to defend the existing order, or to gain a reversion to an

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- 22) K.Marx & F.Engels. The Communist Manifesto, trans. S.Moore (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1967), 79-94. V.I.Lenin. What is to be Done? Burning Questions of our Movement, English translation, (Stuttgart: Dietz, 1902; Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1947), 31, 37-43, 115-117, 125-126.
- 23) Mao Tse-tung. Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, three volumes, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965). Mao Tse-tung. Basic Tactics, trans. S.R.Schram, (New York: Praeger, 1966). C.Guevara. Guerrilla Warfare, (New York: Praeger, 1961; Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1969). C.Marighela. For the Liberation of Brazil.
- 24) D.Robertson. The Penguin Dictionary of Politics, 65. R.Scruton. The Meaning of Conservatism, 21. N.K.O'Sullivan. Conservatism, (New York: St Martin's Press, 1976), 9. R.Kirk (ed). The Portable Conservative Reader, (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1982), xv-xviii.

earlier arrangement. As with liberalism, some may find difficulties in reconciling the idea of conservatives carrying out terrorist attacks, but the fact is that some groups with a conservative political ideology have used terrorist methods.

Conservative terrorism is frequently manifested as a form of political vigilantism, although vigilantism is not confined to conservative groups. Rosenbaum and Sederberg define vigilantism as:

Acts or threats of coercion in violation of the formal boundaries of an established sociopolitical order which, however, are intended by the violators to defend that order from some form of subversion.²⁵

Vigilantism is not necessarily a political action and one can distinguish between vigilantism as a method of controlling crime and vigilantism as a method of social or political control.²⁶ Of the former type Rosenbaum and Sederberg note:

... vigilantism tends to connote rowdy cowboys lynching an unfortunate horse thief. It is commonly summarized as 'taking the law into one's own hands'.²⁷

However, vigilantism can also be used as a form of political terrorism in order to consolidate existing power structures. Like terrorism, political vigilantism is not in itself an ideology but is a method. Conservative vigilantes intimidate and attack those whom they perceive to constitute a threat to the existing order.

There have been a number of conservative terrorist groups. The Secret Army Organisation (Organisation Armee Secrete - OAS), flourished in French Algeria in 1961 and 1962, and sought to prevent the independence of Algeria from France because its members believed that independence would harm the interests of the Europeans who had been settling there since the 1830s.²⁸ Similarly, the Ulster Defence Association and the Ulster Volunteer Force have both attempted to prevent the secession of Northern Ireland from

25) H.J.Rosenbaum & P.C.Sederberg. "Vigilantism", Comparative Politics, 6, no. 4, (1974), 542.

26) A.P.Schmid & A.J.Jongman. Political Terrorism, 46.

27) H.J.Rosenbaum & P.C.Sederberg. "Vigilantism", 542.

28) A.Horne A Savage War of Peace, 30-32, 441, 488.
P.Henissart. Wolves in the City: The Death of French Algeria, (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1971), 21, 243, 316.

the United Kingdom to the Republic of Ireland because they fear that this would harm Northern Irish Protestants.²⁹ Lastly, a number of Colombian land owners, narcotics dealers, and military officers set up scores of 'death squads' in the 1980s, in order to protect themselves and their political interests against left-wing guerrillas, trade unions, peasant movements, and reforming governments, by intimidating or eliminating their perceived opponents.³⁰

Fascism. Fascism is a revolutionary doctrine based upon some fairly distinct tenets. These include a belief in the intrinsic superiority of one's self-perceived race, a desire for non-democratic authoritarian government over an homogenous organic nation, and - normally - the visceral dislike or hatred of those people who are seen to be somehow different from the perceived norm.³¹ The most obvious characteristic of fascism is its racialism. This can take the attribute of extreme nationalism, but at its most extreme one finds the racial ideology of the Nazis where supposedly inferior races are deemed to be only worthy of destruction.³²

Fascists wish to transform the social, political, and economic relationships within society, asserting that society's interests can best be served by the imposition of authoritarian leadership by an elite.³³ This elite need not be formed of already existing political elites in liberal

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- 29) D.L.G.Hall. The Ulster Defence Association: A Case of Change and Continuity, M.Social.Sc, Queen's University, Belfast, 1988. S.Bruce. The Red Hand. S.Nelson. Ulster's Uncertain Defenders: Loyalists and the Northern Ireland Conflict, (Belfast: Appletree Press, 1984).
- 30) "King Coke", The Independent, July 21st 1990. "In Medellin, walls do not a prison make", The Independent, August 8th 1992. J.Pearce. Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth, 1, 177-178, 247. A.M.Bravo. "Frontier culture takes to cocaine", M.L.Smith (ed). Why people grow drugs: Narcotics and Development in the Third World, (London: Panos, 1992), 75. C.Watson. "Guerrilla Groups in Colombia: Reconstituting the Political Process", Terrorism and Political Violence, 4, no. 2, (Summer 1992), 95-96.
- 31) G.Harris. The Dark Side of Europe, 17.
- 32) A.Hitler. Mein Kampf, trans. R.Manheim, (London: Pimlico, 1992), 258-263, 363-369, 512. Z.Sternhell. "Fascist Ideology", W.Laqueur (ed). Fascism: A Reader's Guide; Analyses, Interpretations, Bibliography, (Wildwood House, 1976, Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1979), 328.
- 33) A.Hitler. Mein Kampf, 405-406, 409-410.

democracies, indeed fascists tend to see the existing political elites as effete and corrupt. Ultimately fascists aim to establish an organic, homogeneous state, based upon the primacy of order and loyalty to the state, or to a broader racial loyalty such as the pan-European ideal held by some European fascists.³⁴

Fascists generally yearn for strong, heroic leadership figures, rather than for the seemingly mundane politicians of everyday life. Ordinary people, even the supposedly ethnically pure, are seen as a mass or herd, to be led by a strong leader.³⁵ Allied to this is a form of nihilism, with a propensity towards the use and glorification of violence. Fascist ideologists, such as Evola, have raised the status of violence and warfare from a matter of policy, to a virtuous activity in their own right.³⁶ Jones notes this tendency amongst the members of the Freikorps, right-wing paramilitary groups in Germany after the First World War. These put down communist risings with great brutality and served as a predecessor to Hitler's NSDAP (Nationalsozialistische deutsche Arbeiterpartei - National Socialist German Worker's Party), otherwise known as the Nazis.³⁷

Fascism does not have a core of written works in the same way that communism does. Whereas Hitler's Mein Kampf may fulfil that role for some, many post-war Italian fascists derived inspiration from the Italian writer Julius Evola, whilst some British fascists are said to derive ideas from

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- 34) G.Harris. The Dark Side of Europe, 17, 28-31, 223.
R.Drake. "Julius Evola and the Ideological Origins of the Radical Right in Contemporary Italy", P.H.Merkl (ed). Political Violence and Terror, 76-77. R.Drake. The Revolutionary Mystique and Terrorism in Contemporary Italy, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1989), 120, 124, 128-129.
- 35) A.Hitler. Mein Kampf, 73-75, 165, 308, 341-342, 408-410.
P.Wilkinson. The New Fascists, revised edition, (Grant McIntyre, 1981; London: Pan, 1983), 9-10. G.Harris. The Dark Side of Europe, 17. D.Mack Smith. Mussolini, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1981; Granada, 1983), 218-219, 235. R.Drake. The Revolutionary Mystique and Terrorism in Contemporary Italy, 3.
- 36) D.Mack Smith. Mussolini, 115, 216, 289. T.Sheehan. "Myth and Violence: The Fascism of Julius Evola and Alain de Benoist", Social Research, 48, (Spring 1981), 57-58.
R.Drake. The Revolutionary Mystique and Terrorism in Contemporary Italy, 119, 129, 130.
- 37) N.H.Jones. Hitler's Heralds: The Story of the Freikorps, 1918-1923, (London: John Murray, 1987), 105, 111.

Gregor Strasser, a contemporary of Hitler who stressed the anti-capitalist nature of Nazism and was killed during the Nazi purges of June 1934.³⁸ In the USA some of the quasi-religious, fascist-anarchist groups which have developed in recent years take much of their inspiration from a fictional work called The Turner Diaries, which envisages the overthrow of a dictatorial Zionist government in America by a group of terrorists who achieve their aim through acts of apocalyptic destruction.³⁹ Fascism shows a tendency to be coloured by local influences and local ideologues and the nature of fascist groups varies from one place to another.

European examples of fascist terrorist groups include New Order (Ordine Nuovo - ON), a group which flourished in Italy from the 1956 until the late 1970s, the Hoffman Military Sports Group (Wehrsportgruppe Hoffman), which flourished in West Germany in the 1980s, and a smattering of small fringe groups in other European states.⁴⁰

Over the last fifteen years or so a strange fascist-anarchist hybrid has evolved in the USA which regards any form of government above the state level as evil, but nevertheless retains strong authoritarian and racialist views. Groups such as the 'Covenant, Sword, and Arm of the Lord', The Order, Posse Comitatus, and various other white supremacist, anti-Jewish, and anti-federal government groups,

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- 38) R. Drake. "Julius Evola and the Ideological Origins of the Radical Right in Contemporary Italy", 62, 77-78.
 T. Sheehan. "Myth and Violence", 48, (Spring 1981), 50-51. C. di Giovanni. Light from Behind the Bars, 39.
 A. Bullock. Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, revised edition, (London: Book Club Associates, 1973), 136-138, 237, 303, 402. R. Hill & A. Bell. The Other Face of Terror, 292-293.
- 39) M. Barkun. "Millenarian Aspects of 'White Supremacist' Movements", 416-417, 430. J. Kaplan. "The Context of American Millenarian Revolutionary Theology: The Case of the 'Identity Christian' Church of Israel", Terrorism and Political Violence, 5, no. 1, (Spring 1993), 34, 46, 65 n.28.
- 40) P. Willan. Puppet Masters, 43. S. Christie. Stefano Delle Chiaie, 18-19. H. J. Horchem. "Terrorism in Western Europe", R. Clutterbuck (ed). The Future of Political Violence: Destabilization, Disorder and Terrorism, (London: Macmillan, 1986), 152-153. G. Harris. The Dark Side of Europe, 107-142. B. Hoffman. Right-Wing Terrorism in West Germany, (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1986), 3-4. T. Bjorgo & R. Witte (eds). Racist Violence in Europe, *passim*.

have developed a rag-bag of ideologies. Some of these groups refer to the federal government as the Zionist Occupation Government (ZOG), and proclaim that the federal government is part of a conspiracy - often Jewish, which plans to hand America over to a dictatorial world government. Apart from the racialist and religious aspects of these ideologies, and the authoritarianism of many of the groups, some of the American anti-federalists would also appear to be anarchistic in their self-proclaimed individualism and hostility to the American state, resulting in attacks on tax offices, and federal buildings and officials.⁴¹ This serves to emphasise the extent to which the beliefs of specific groups can straddle the conventional ideological categories.

Single-issue. A single-issue group is one which confines its political actions to a restricted area of politics. Such groups may not intend to change the system of government and radically alter social or economic relationships - although individual members may wish to do so. Instead they try to exert influence or pressure over relatively narrow policy areas. Non-terrorist examples of such pressure groups included Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, the British Union Against Vivisection (BUAV), and Amnesty International.

A single-issue terrorist group is one which uses terrorism to promote its objectives. Examples include some animal liberationists in Britain and some anti-abortionists in the USA. The Animal Liberation Front (ALF) in Britain, with its various off-shoots such as the Justice Department

41) "Militiamen go to war on American gun laws", The Daily Telegraph, November 21st 1994. "Militias gird loins for the great battle", The Guardian, April 22nd 1995. "A holy war, home grown in America", The Sunday Telegraph, April 23rd 1995. "With God and gun, rugged individualism turns to hate", The Sunday Times, April 23rd 1995. "The Enemy Within", The Observer, April 23rd 1995. "FBI puzzles over 'Gestapo' train wreckers", The Independent, October 11th 1995. "Militia muscles in on town", The Guardian, November 14th 1995. "War on the range", The Guardian, November 22nd 1995. "Two arrested over US tax office bomb", The Daily Telegraph, December 29th 1995. "Tax grudge clue in Reno bomb plot", The Independent, December 30th 1995. M.Barkun. "Millenarian Aspects of 'White Supremacist' Movements", 414, 423, 428, 429. J.Kaplan. "The Context of American Millenarian Revolutionary Theology", (Spring 1993), 38, 42, 49.

and the Animal Rights Militia, has carried out bomb attacks and sabotage over the cause of animal rights in the United Kingdom. Some American anti-abortionists have carried out assassinations and bombing campaigns against abortion clinics and their personnel.⁴²

In the USA, groups opposed to various forms of development or environmental degradation have carried out acts of sabotage, but thus far have not killed or injured anybody. In 1927 farmers in the Owens Valley in California bombed the newly-constructed aqueduct which drained water from the valley to the city of Los Angeles, but failed in their attempts to stop the diversion or get the compensation which they sought.⁴³ More recently the environmental group Earth First! has opposed environmental degradation such as widespread tree-felling, but has only used forms of sabotage such as damaging electricity pylons, vandalising machinery and carried out tree-spiking. Spiking - the insertion of spikes into trees which may be felled, can be dangerous as chain-saws or the saws in lumber-mills can rebound or break up at speed if they hit a spike.⁴⁴

The single-issue category does not include terrorist groups carrying out attacks linked to an issue area but which have wider ambitions. Thus, the Revolutionary Cells in West Germany attacked the offices of firms involved in the extension of the runway at Frankfurt Airport, whilst ETA assassinated managers and engineers involved in the construction of a nuclear power station at Lemoniz in the

42) "Four legs good, two legs bad: a recipe for terror", The Independent on Sunday, August 28th 1994. D.Henshaw. Animal Warfare: The Story of the Animal Liberation Front (London: Fontana, 1989). R.Garner. Animal politics and morality, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 215-242. "Killing for Life", The Independent, magazine supplement, September 10th 1994. "Where doctors wear bullet-proof vests", The Daily Telegraph, October 20th 1994. "Vengeance", The Economist, January 7th 1995. B.Hoffman. Recent trends and future prospects of terrorism in the United States, 21.

43) W.L.Kahrl. Water and Power: The Conflict over Los Angeles' Water Supply in the Owens Valley, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 305-306.

44) "The wild defence of the wild", The Sunday Correspondent, June 3rd 1990. "Breaking the monkeywrench", The Independent, magazine supplement, March 2nd 1991.

Basque Country.⁴⁵ In both cases the groups concerned had wider political aims.

Single-issue ideologies are generally straightforward. They tend to oppose what they see as an evil rather than campaign in favour of something. Thus the animal rights groups oppose what they see as systematic cruelty against animals and the anti-abortion groups oppose abortion. In both cases the various groups concerned believe that the groups whose interests they claim to represent, animals and unborn children respectively, are as entitled not to have pain or death inflicted upon them as adult human beings. Whilst these groups may wish to mobilise public support, they believe that these rights should override the views of the majority.⁴⁶ Single-issue terrorists believe that they are entitled to use violence in order to prevent evil acts, to gain revenge on the perpetrators, or to publicise the injustices which they believe to be occurring. The nature of the targets attacked underlines this approach.

Organised Crime. In this study a criminal group is a group which commits acts in breach of the criminal law primarily in order to obtain material benefits. The term *organised crime* refers to groups which have a permanent or semi-permanent organisation and which tend to concentrate on those crimes which bring in a constant flow of income.⁴⁷ Depending on the laws in the state concerned this could include running protection rackets, fraud, the production and distribution of illegal narcotic drugs, and dealing in prohibited goods such as illegal weapons. For an organised criminal group to be considered a terrorist group it must use

45) P.Janke. "Europe", R.Clutterbuck (ed). The Future of Political Violence, 99. R.P.Clark. The Basque Insurgents, 100, 105, 107.

46) P.Singer. Animal Liberation: A New Ethics For Our Treatment of Animals, (New York: Avon, 1977), 1-26.
P.Singer. The animal liberation movement: it's philosophy, its achievements, and its future, (Nottingham: Old Hammond Press, no date), 5-10.

F.Ginsburg. "Saving America's Souls: Operation Rescue's Crusade against Abortion", M.E.Marty & R.S.Appleby (eds). Fundamentalisms and the State, 557, 573-574.

D.Henshaw. Animal Warfare, 33-34, 92-93.

47) P.Williams. "Transnational Criminal Organisations and International Security", Survival, 36, no 1, (Spring 1994), 106.

terrorist methods in order to achieve political objectives which further its interests.

With criminal organisations a grey area emerges at the intersection between crime and political terrorism, in trying to determine which operations are straightforward criminal operations, and which ones are acts of political terrorism. Crime-related violence is generally intended to secure personal material gain through robberies, extortion, and other criminal activities, although it is possible that informers and efficient law-enforcement officers will also be attacked as threats. However, the groups studied here go further.

The Sicilian anti-Mafia magistrate, Judge Giovanni Falcone divides the crimes of the Mafia into three levels.⁴⁸ The first level consists of the everyday crimes which provide the economic rationale of the organisation; smuggling, extortion, kidnapping, and the like. The second level includes those crimes which are an indirect consequence of the first level crimes, for example the killing of a Mafia member who has somehow wronged the organisation. However, it is the third level which concerns this study, those killings which are carried out to ensure the survival of the organisation.

... the murder of a Prefect of Police, of a Police Commissioner, of a difficult magistrate.⁴⁹

Although some of the crimes at the second level may be of relevance to this study, it is those of the third level which are of particular interest where they are intended to obtain specific political objectives. Attacks against targets outside this framework are also relevant to this study when they are designed to affect political events.

This pattern has been notable in Italy and Colombia, where criminal organisations have used violence to gain immunity from the law or to safeguard their interests.⁵⁰ According to Falcone:

48) G.Falcone & M Padovani. Men of Honour: The Truth About the Mafia, (Paris: Edition 1, 1991; London: Fourth Estate, 1992), 160.

49) G.Falcone & M Padovani. Men of Honour, 160.

50) R.D.Tomasek. "Complex Interdependency Theory: Drug Barons as Transnational Groups", W.C.Olson & J.R.Lee (eds). The Theory and Practice of International Relations,

Political problems as such do not overly concern [the Mafia] as long as it does not feel a direct threat to its power or its profits. It satisfies itself with electing 'friendly' administrators and politicians, and occasionally members of the organisation itself. This is in order to direct the flow of public spending, or to pass laws which will favour its opportunities for profit, while stopping other laws which could adversely affect it.⁵¹

However:

This does not mean that Cosa Nostra [the Sicilian Mafia] can't turn its hand to politics if it needs to. It did so in its own violent and hasty way, assassinating men who were causing it problems⁵²

The Colombian narcotics organisations have used similar methods. Whilst organised criminality is not a recognised ideology, in Italy and Colombia it is inextricably linked with politics. It requires quiescence if not complicity from the authorities, public officials, politicians, in relation to the activities of the criminal organisation and also requires the eradication of serious threats to the organisation's existence or activities.⁵³ Such threats do not just consist of those people or institutions which pose a direct or immediate challenge to the organisation, but those groups or groups which may create a political climate which is inimical to the criminal organisation's activities.

It may be argued that such actions cannot be properly classified as an act of political terrorism because they concern the furtherance of the group's criminal activities of trying to maximise profits and evade capture. These groups do not have an intelligible overriding political programme, nor do they desire to replace or shore up an existing order, save where this has a direct impact upon the criminal group. However, even when criminal groups act to protect their own interests, these actions constitute a direct and fundamental threat to the stability and sovereignty of the state. By using violence to intimidate the authorities into placing organised crime beyond the scope of the law, these groups are pursuing an objective which is ultimately political.

(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1994), 281-282.

51) G.Falcone & M Padovani. Men of Honour, 157.

52) G.Falcone & M Padovani. Men of Honour, 159.

53) G.Falcone & M Padovani. Men of Honour, 157-158, 161-162.

Catanzaro notes with regard to the Mafia, that as its national and international financial interests have expanded, and it has become more heavily involved with the activities of public bodies, particular with the appropriation of public funds, so it has become increasingly involved in political decision-making.⁵⁴ Likewise, in Colombia drug traffickers intervened directly in the political process when they threatened the authorities with carnage and chaos if they extradited major traffickers to the USA.⁵⁵ By attacking the legal and political system - the Colombian drug cartels threatened and assassinated judges, policemen, and a national Presidential candidate - the criminal groupings attempted to limit the actions of the political system in areas which affected them, and largely succeeded.⁵⁶

Organised criminal groups also appear to have political preferences. Narcotics trafficking groups in Colombia have colluded with conservative terrorist groups in attacking left-wing politicians, union organisers, and peasant leaders. According to Rensselaer Lee:

... [Colombian] cocaine barons share a common political agenda that includes blocking the extradition of drug traffickers, immobilizing the criminal justice system, and selectively persecuting the Colombian left.⁵⁷

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- 54) R. Catanzaro. Men of Respect: A Social History of the Sicilian Mafia, (Padua: Liviana Editrice spa, 1988; New York: Free Press, 1992), 214-216.
- 55) P. Williams. "Transnational Criminal Organisations and International Security", 111. "Escobar dies, and the cocaine trade gets stronger", "Obituary: Pablo Escobar", both in The Independent, December 4th 1993.
- 56) J. Pearce. Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth, 1, 194-195. P.D. Scott & J. Marshall. Cocaine Politics: Drugs, Armies, and the CIA in Central America, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 76, 90. S. Strong. Whitewash: Pablo Escobar and the Cocaine Wars, (London: Macmillan, 1995), 138-153. "Colombian police close in on drug baron", The Independent, April 13th 1990. "Colombia moves to protect lives of election candidates", The Independent, May 5th 1990. "Mother's Day of mourning as car bombs kill 26", The Independent, May 14th 1990. "Colombian drug dealers' bombs kill 26 shoppers", The Times, May 14th 1990. "King Coke", The Independent, July 21st 1990. "Going ... Going ... Gone", The Guardian, December 4th 1993. "The king is dead ... long live cocaine", The Independent, weekend supplement, December 11th 1993. "Escobar dies, and the cocaine trade gets stronger", "Obituary: Pablo Escobar", both in The Independent, December 4th 1993.
- 57) Quoted in P.D. Scott & J. Marshall. Cocaine Politics, 80.

Likewise, the Mafia was, until the recent disintegration of the Italian political establishment, heavily involved with the Christian Democrats, with extreme conservative economic interests and probably with fascist terrorist groups.⁵⁸ Thus to say that all organised crime is totally apolitical is inaccurate.

Although particular terrorist groups can be placed within the categories outlined above, each group has its own characteristics and curiosities. In the same way that the beliefs of the two main conservative political parties in France may differ greatly from each other and from those of the Conservative party in Britain or the Christian Democrats in Germany, so terrorists broadly within the same ideological camp may still have greatly differences in their beliefs. Variations of opinion between ideologically similar groups are noteworthy because they provide an insight into the thinking of the terrorists and may affect target selection.

The categories are not mutually exclusive and it is perfectly possible for a group to hold to more than one political aspiration. The beliefs of some groups form ideological hybrids mixing elements of different ideologies. For instance the categories of communist and separatist are listed separately, but the Basque group ETA, together with its political partner Herri Batasuna (HB), considers itself to be both separatist and Marxist.⁵⁹ In practice this caused several splits in ETA in the 1960s and 1970s.⁶⁰

Similarly the Palestinian group Hamas can be described as both a religious group and as a separatist group. It combines doctrines which it claims to be a true interpretation of basic Islamic tenets with the desire to set

58) "A creaking system faces its final test of strength", The Guardian, April 6th 1993. R.Catanzaro. Men of Respect, 181.

59) Herri Batasuna. The 'Herri Batasuna' the Basque Country needs. Herri Batasuna. The Recognition of Democratic Rigths [sic] in Basque Country, 3-4, 5. R.P.Clark. The Basque Insurgents, 275-276. F.Jiminez. "Spain: The Terrorist Challenge and the Government's Response", Terrorism and Political Violence, 4, no. 4, (Winter 1992), 111.

60) B.Pollack & G.Hunter. "Dictatorship, Democracy and Terrorism in Spain", J.Lodge (ed). The Threat of Terrorism, 127-130. F.Llera, J.M.Mata & C.L.Irwin. "ETA: From Secret Army to Social Movement", 115-116.

up an Islamic Palestinian state in the territories which now include Israel, the Israeli-occupied territories of the west bank of the Jordan, and the areas currently under the governance of the PLO.⁶¹ Insofar as it is an Islamic group Hamas can be classified as a religious terrorist group, but it is also separatist because it advocates Palestinian autonomy from Israeli control.

The role of ideology in target selection.

The political ideology of a group largely defines how its members see the world around them. Events and the actions of various people - both potential targets and other actors - are interpreted in terms of their perceived relevance to the terrorists' cause, even if the actors concerned were not thinking of the terrorists at the time when they carried out their actions. Thus, a separatist terrorist will see matters in relation to the perceived oppression of his country, whilst a conservative terrorist will see it in terms of perceived subversive threats to the existing order. For instance, according to Patricia Hearst, Emily Harris of the Symbionese Liberation Army justified the possibility of law students being killed by a bomb under a police car on the grounds that:

Those law students are studying to be lawyers and they'll go to work for some big, piggy, corporation, and so they are pigs too.⁶²

For the terrorist concerned, the student's action in studying law, was seen in terms of Harris' ideological mindset rather than their own perception of what they were doing.

Likewise, in 1977 the Provisional IRA carried out a short-lived campaign of assassination against prominent businessmen on the grounds that the very presence of such firms was felt to underpin the British occupation of Northern Ireland.⁶³ Doubtless the businessmen concerned had never seen

61) H.M.Cubert. "The Militant Palestinian Organizations and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process", Terrorism and Political Violence, 4, no. 1, (Spring 1992), 32-33.

62) P.C.Hearst & A.Moscow. Every Secret Thing, (London: Methuen, 1982; Arrow, 1983), 351.

63) "Change of tactics by the Provos", Financial Times, February 4th 1977. "Can Ulster sustain its pepperpot investment", The Guardian, February 4th 1977. "Gunmen fail in bid to assassinate two leading Belfast businessmen", The Irish Times, February 11th 1977.

their actions in this light, but the terrorists tendency to see any action in terms of their own ideological concerns meant that they became targets. The importance for this study is that the effect of ideology on the world-view of terrorists can determine how they view people and institutions in relation to their cause, and how their view of the existing situation influences their view of the action they should take. As will be seen later, this affects broader strategic ideas, but it also has a direct impact on target selection.

When a group takes the decision to use violence, an early step is to determine who or what will be attacked. The ideology of a terrorist group identifies the 'enemies' of the group by providing a measure against which to assess the 'goodness' or 'badness', 'innocence' or 'guilt' of people or institutions. This gives rise to the idea that certain targets are somehow 'legitimate' targets. The concept of the legitimate target should not be confused with common or legal notions of guilt and innocence. For instance members of the ALF frequently claim that although technically breaking the law, they are in fact responding to a higher law which compels them to act as they do.⁶⁴ Similarly, a member of the Provisional IRA has commented:

... I don't expect to be judged by your rules: if Brits do that, then they'll see the IRA as a lot of ruthless maniacs which by their definition I suppose we are. Ruthless, definitely yes: and maniacs if that's what people are who're never going to see sense as you define it, well yes that'd be an appropriate word. The IRA has its own logic and oh no it's not yours.⁶⁵

An example of the difference in such 'logic', between the terrorists' perception and that of the more generally accepted institutions, occurred in April 1991 when the Red Army Faction shot dead Detlev Rohwedder, the head of the agency responsible for overseeing the privatisation of companies formerly owned by the East German state. Following the assassination the editorial in the London-based newspaper The Independent condemned the RAF as, "... a tiny band of

"Businessmen not expendable, unlike Brit troops",
Republican News, March 26th 1977.

64) D.Henshaw. Animal Warfare, 31, 100-101.

65) T.Parker. May the Lord in His mercy be kind to Belfast,
(London: Jonathon Cape, 1993), 324.

sick people representing no views beyond those concocted in their own closed minds", whilst the newspaper's obituarist called Rohwedder: "... one of the good guys on the German political scene".⁶⁶ However, the RAF communique following the assassination accused Rohwedder - who had previously been State Secretary in the West German Economics Ministry - of having sold arms to fascist regimes in the Third World, and of having traded nuclear know-how for uranium from the apartheid regime in South Africa. They called him:

One of those armchair murderers who daily go over dead bodies and who in the interest of power and profits plan the misery and death of millions of human beings.⁶⁷

and went on to condemn him as a "brutal reorganizer" when manager at Hoechst Chemicals. They also condemned the expansion of Germany, the imposition of 'free market economics' on East Germany and the Third World, and condemned the nature of capitalism and the price it exacted from those in the Third World.⁶⁸ By killing Rohwedder the RAF believed they were striking at the roots of the development of a racialist and capitalist "Greater Germany" and were sending a message to people in the former East Germany.⁶⁹

The point to note here is that the moral and political perception of the terrorists was vastly different from that represented by the newspaper because, concerning both political philosophy and the acceptability of terrorist violence, the terrorists and the newspaper editorialists saw Rohwedder through the prism of totally different ideologies. The killing of Rohwedder was perfectly in line with RAF ideology. Whilst, as a senior businessman, they saw Rohwedder as a potential target, the RAF specifically selected him because of his symbolic value - as a symbol of the threat of a 'Greater Germany' following reunification, and as a leading symbol of German capitalism - whose death would mobilise support amongst workers in the former-East Germany. For the

66) "Germany tested to its limits", The Independent, April 3rd 1991. "Obituary: Detlev Rohwedder", The Independent, April 3rd 1991.

67) Y.Alexander & D.Pluchinsky. Europe's Red Terrorists: The Fighting Communist Organizations, (London: Frank Cass, 1992), 79.

68) Y.Alexander & D.Pluchinsky. Europe's Red Terrorists, 79-84.

69) Y.Alexander & D.Pluchinsky. Europe's Red Terrorists, 82.

RAF the killing of Rohwedder was not only an effective use of violence, judged by their ideology they would have seen it in some respects as a moral act.

Terrorists seek to identify their victims as being in some way 'guilty', and deserving of the treatment meted out to them by the terrorist group.⁷⁰ This absolves the terrorist - at least temporarily - of feelings of guilt for his actions because a person who is defined as an enemy deserving punishment, obviously deserves to be attacked. This legitimises the terrorists actions in their own minds, in those of their followers, and they hope in the minds of those people who are uncommitted.

Thus in July 1990 the Provisional IRA killed the Conservative MP Ian Gow with an under-car bomb because he was a close friend of the then Prime Minister and was deemed to be "... central to policy decisions...".⁷¹ He was seen as part of the 'British war machine' responsible for the British presence in Northern Ireland, and was therefore categorised as a legitimate target. In their terms he was guilty of active opposition to the Provisionals and of support for the 'British war machine'., and his friendship with Margaret Thatcher and association with her policies made him an even more tempting target.⁷²

Such rationalisation is not confined to terrorist groups, and is common in wartime. According to Glenn Gray:

The basic aim of a nation at war in establishing an image of the enemy is to distinguish as sharply as possible the act of killing from the act of murder by making of the former an act deserving all honour and praise.⁷³

Thus, during the Second World War British soldiers killed their German adversaries, and vice versa, because they were the enemy, despite holding little personal animosity towards them as individuals.⁷⁴ Aerial bombing raids against German

70) B.M.Jenkins. International Terrorism: The Other World War, 16.

71) "Gow killed because of his influence on Thatcher, IRA says", The Independent, August 1st 1990.

72) D.McKittrick. Endgame: The Search for Peace in Northern Ireland, (Belfast: Blackstaff, 1994), 89-90.

73) Quoted in R.Holmes. Firing Line, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1985; Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1987), 360.

74) J.Ellis. The Sharp End of War: The Fighting Man in World War II, (Newton Abbot, England: David & Charles, 1980;

cities were presented to the British people as revenge for similar raids by the German Luftwaffe, and the malignancy of the German people was cited by Churchill as one of the justifications for the raids.⁷⁵ Thus, when necessary dehumanising the enemy can be done by democracies as well as by terrorists.⁷⁶

For terrorists, in addition to a person or thing being seen as a legitimate target, attacking that target must usually be seen to achieve a purpose. The importance of terrorist operations being clearly justifiable is emphasised by Abraham Guillen who notes:

In revolutionary war any guerrilla action that needs explaining to the people is useless; it should be meaningful and convincing by itself.⁷⁷

Terrorists would probably think of an attack on a functional target, such as an effective police officer, as justifiable because it eliminates a threat to the group. On the other hand the selection of a symbolic target requires rather more in the way of justification if attacking it is to have any meaning. There are some targets which can be legitimately attacked within the constraints of the group's ideology, and some which cannot.⁷⁸

London: Corgi, 1982), 319-320. R.Holmes. Firing Line, 370, 373-375.

- 75) A.Calder. The People's War: Britain 1939-1945, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1969; Granada, 1982), 566-567. M.Hastings. Bomber Command, (London: Michael Joseph, 1979; Pan, 1981), 125-126, 135-136. M.Walzer. Just and Unjust Wars, 256.
- 76) For a more detailed discussion of the moral arguments concerning area bombing see M.Hastings. Bomber Command, 144-147. G.Best. Humanity in Warfare: The Modern History of the International Law of Armed Conflicts, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1980; Methuen, 1983), 267-285. M.Walzer. Just and Unjust Wars, 255-262.
- 77) A.Guillen. "What can be done? (Strategy of the Urban Guerrilla)", D.C.Hodges (ed). Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla: The Revolutionary Writings of Abraham Guillen, trans. D.C.Hodges, (New York: William Morrow & Co, 1973), 266.
- 78) B.M.Jenkins. The Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism, (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, July 1985), 7. Der Spiegel, August 7th 1978 cited in G.Bass et al. Motivations and Possible Actions of Potential Criminal Adversaries of US Nuclear Programs, (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, February 1980), 7. B.M.Jenkins. High Technology Terrorism and Surrogate War: The Impact of New Technology on Low Level

Consequently, an important effect of ideology on terrorists is that it transforms people or objects into representative symbols. Thus, in March 1985 Ezio Tarantelli, a Professor of Economics at the University of Rome and adviser to the Italian Government, was shot dead by the PCC (Partito Comunista Combattente - Fighting Communist Party; a faction of the Red Brigades) because they deemed him "one of the most authoritative technical-political exponents in the service of large capital".⁷⁹ Members of the security forces in Northern Ireland have been seen by Irish republicans as 'Brits' to be 'stiffed' [killed] or as a 'uniform' representing the 'occupying force' in Ireland.⁸⁰ Likewise, loyalist terrorists in Northern Ireland have regarded Catholics as 'taigs' - a derogatory term for Irish Catholics. Six Catholic men drinking in a country pub were shot dead by loyalist gunmen, one of whom called them "Fenian bastards", the Fenians being a nineteenth century republican revolutionary movement.⁸¹ A loyalist who bombed a pub in a Catholic area in 1974 said years later:

We dehumanised the other side and branded them animals. We didn't think of them in terms of them being people. If we couldn't get the IRA, we would have to slaughter members of the Catholic community who after all seemed to support them.⁸²

By reducing people to mere ciphers it clearly becomes easier to justify killing them.

This approach is illustrated by a member of the Red Brigades describing how a person can be deemed a legitimate target.

... you carry out an enquiry on someone so there is a sort of political enquiry beforehand, but psychologically

Violence, (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, January 1975), 11.

79) Red Brigades - Fighting Communist Party. "Communique on the Assassination of Ezio Tarantelli, a Rome University Economics Professor, in Rome on 27 March 1985", Y.Alexander & D.Pluchinsky. Europe's Red Terrorists: The Fighting Communist Organizations, (London: Frank Cass, 1992), 203.

80) P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 182, 195. K.Toolis. Rebel Hearts, 126, 357-358.

81) "UVF gunmen 'laughed as they fled' pub massacre", The Guardian, January 25th 1995. S.Bruce. The Red Hand, 54. M.Dillon. The Shankill Butchers, xxiv, 24, 65, 166.

82) "Tragedy of Ulster's relentless cycle of violence", The Independent, February 6th 1992.

it becomes something different, you single out someone who is responsible; it is not the State as before ... with policemen, and the Flying Squad [but] real physical people, this chap does this ... and has done that and you start a trial ... The trial begins when you single out someone on paper, that is to say, you make a person correspond to a political need ... that chap is responsible, it is him right here and now, there is already a trial logic ... when you've already decided that he is guilty ... and what makes you different is the penalty, the penalty that you allot to that person who is guilty of those things ... he is not even a person any more, he has been emptied and you load him up with other crimes, other responsibilities.⁸³

A repentant Brigadist, Massimiliano Bravi, has also noted:

The ideals of justice turned into murderous violence directed against the men who represented the State (the human being totally crushed in his social role) and in our eyes they were the guardians and perpetrators of every possible injustice and social suffering. They were 'the unjust' and we were the 'avengers'.⁸⁴

The question of guilt or innocence is therefore subject to the moral imperatives of the terrorists rather than to legalities. A similar line of thought emerges from a PIRA member, demonstrating the idiosyncratic nature of terrorist's morality.

Our definition of who the enemy is isn't one which follows the same line as yours either. We regard all people who support the armed forces of the British Government in any way as legitimate targets. ... We'll define whether someone's helping the security forces or not: it's not for you to make the definition and criticise us for not agreeing with it. I don't know if I make that clear: probably not and if that's so then I have to say it doesn't greatly matter to me.⁸⁵

Hence, whilst a workman involved in the construction of a police station might see himself as an innocent civilian, the Provisionals see him as a 'collaborator', and therefore liable to 'execution'.⁸⁶

One does not have to carry out or fail to carry out some action in order to be deemed a legitimate target. Just

83) R.Catanzaro. "Subjective experience and objective reality: an account of violence in the words of its protagonists", R.Catanzaro (ed). The Red Brigades & Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy, 190-191.

84) C.di Giovanni. Light from Behind the Bars, 61.

85) T.Parker. May the Lord in His mercy be kind to Belfast, 325-326.

86) "'We remain totally committed and confident in victory' - Oglagh na hEireann", AP/RN, February 14th 1991. "The IRA statement", AP/RN, January 23rd 1992. P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 421.

being who or what one is may be enough to condemn a person or institution in the eyes of a terrorist. The notion of culpability can take on a rather perverse nature. For example, the Japanese Red Army terrorists who carried out the Lod Airport massacre in Israel in May 1972 did so in the cause of Palestinian nationalism. The PFLP justified the death of the Puerto Rican pilgrims who made up the bulk of the victims on the grounds that by being in Israel they were held to have tacitly recognised the Israeli state.⁸⁷

Crenshaw makes the point that during the Algerian Rebellion of 1954 to 1962 the FLN saw bomb attacks upon European civilians as legitimate. Although as individuals European civilians may not have harmed Algerians or the cause of Algerian independence, their very presence - being who they were where they were - made them symbols of French and European settler authority in Algeria. Moreover, by virtue of being Europeans, the death and injury of these civilians had a direct influence on the conflict because it polarised the European from the Algerian population. Hence, for Crenshaw:

Although it is often cited as a definitional aspect of terrorism, the problem of 'innocence' or 'guilt' is in reality a matter of moral perspective. 'Innocent' victims are best interpreted as people who have no direct influence on the outcome of the revolutionary conflict.⁸⁸

One might argue with this redefinition of the term 'innocent', but Crenshaw is right in believing that the terrorist's judgement of what is or is not a legitimate target is largely subjective. That subjective judgement is frequently based upon a morality which is derived from the group's ideology.

This approach explains how being a member of a particular religion or race can make one a target for terrorist attacks without objectively seeming to have done anything blameworthy. For instance, a building housing the Delegation of Argentine-Israeli Associations and the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association was bombed in July

87) W.R.Farrell. Blood and Rage: The Story of the Japanese Red Army, (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1990), 142. B.M.Jenkins. International Terrorism: The Other World War, 48.

88) M.Crenshaw Hutchinson. Revolutionary Terrorism, 19.

1994.⁸⁹ As the attack was thought to be in retaliation for an Israeli attack on a Hizbollah base in the Lebanon the previous June, a Lebanese authority on the Hizbollah was asked why Jews were targeted in Argentina rather than in Israel. The reply was that:

The Jews of Israel come from Poland, from Russia, from Europe or from Latin America ... What is the difference? It is the same.⁹⁰

Thus, any Jews were collectively seen as a legitimate target for attacks which aimed at punishing a specific institution - the state of Israel - to which they were perceived to be affiliated.

Not every terrorist attack on every target is preceded by a detailed ideological examination. Where the target is readily identifiable and any decisions as to the guilt of the target have been made, the selection of the target is quite straightforward. Bishop and Mallie point out that the initial PIRA decision to kill British soldiers did not require much thought.

Their response had been a return to IRA traditional practices. According to Cahill [allegedly one time head of the PIRA Belfast Brigade and later Chief of Staff] no formal decision was taken over the legitimacy of shooting soldiers - 'military targets were always on'. By opening up on the Army they were simply resuming hostilities against anyone in the Queen's uniform in a war that they had never declared over.⁹¹

Likewise, in November 1987 a PIRA spokesman noted that there was no need for a local unit to hold a meeting with senior members of the group in order to gain permission to carry out a bombing against soldiers.⁹² The decision that British soldiers were a legitimate target had been settled a long time ago by republican ideology and did not need to be discussed before every operation.

As well as determining potential targets ideology also allows terrorists to displace the blame for their actions

89) "16 killed in bomb attack on Jewish groups in Argentina", The Independent, July 19th 1994. "Explosion levels building housing Jewish groups", The Guardian, July 19th 1994.

90) "Hizbollah adopts an 'eye for an eye' tactic", The Independent, July 20th 1994.

91) P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 171.

92) "Bombing 'devastating' to IRA", The Independent, November 11th 1987.

onto other people. According to Abu Iyad, the Black September operation at the Munich Olympics in September 1972, which resulted in the death of eleven Israeli athletes, was caused by the International Olympic Committee and the international community as a whole failing to accord proper recognition to the Palestinians. Likewise, he attributed the bulk of the deaths to the German rescue attempt at Furstenfeldbruck Airport rather than to the terrorists decision to carry out the operation in the first place.⁹³ Similarly, Iyad refers to the kidnappers who seized five diplomats in the Saudi Embassy in Khartoum in March 1973 as having been "forced to execute" two Americans and a Belgian when Sudanese forces stormed the Embassy.⁹⁴ Similarly, the leader of a group of Palestinian hijackers who seized a Lufthansa aeroplane in October 1977 is quoted as having stated "We don't want to shed blood ... but as the imperialist fascist West German regime rejects our demands we have no choice", and at another point claimed "What happens now is solely the fault of the fascist German government and of Helmut Schmidt".⁹⁵

Provisional IRA and republican spokesmen have similarly claimed that all deaths in the Northern Irish are ultimately the responsibility of the British for not leaving Northern Ireland.⁹⁶ In January 1987 the Provisionals claimed they were forced to carry out bombings against commercial premises in Northern Ireland by the authorities' claim that normality had returned to Belfast.⁹⁷ Thus, the terrorist's ideology often allows them to blame other people for the consequences of their own actions.

Sometimes, the ideological justification for an attack is supplied after the attack has occurred rather than having been worked out beforehand. It appears that the higher levels of the Provisional IRA have justified actions by local units

93) A.Iyad & E.Rouleau. My Home My Land, 106, 111.

94) A.Iyad & E.Rouleau. My Home My Land, 102. G.Rosie. The Directory of International Terrorism, 260-261.

95) S.Aust. The Baader-Mein Hof Group, 530. Also see P.Koch & K.Hermann. Assault at Mogadishu, trans. J.Man, (Hamburg: Stern, 1977; London: Corgi, 1977), 139-140.

96) "All killings and tragedies stem from British interference", Republican News, February 25th 1978. D.McKittrick. Despatches from Belfast, (Belfast: Blackstaff, 1989), 86.

97) "IRA warns of more bombs", The Observer, February 1st 1987.

after the event, although they would not have sanctioned the operations they had received prior notice.⁹⁸ Moss records that in some cases in the late 1970s the Red Brigades in Turin did not issue their communique justifying an attack until after they had seen the press reaction, and tailored it accordingly.⁹⁹ According to Willan, during this period BR targeting was based on slipshod research and trivial considerations, and that on one occasion after they shot and wounded the wrong person, they rewrote the original communique so as to give the impression that the victim had been their intended target.¹⁰⁰ Thus, whilst ideological considerations lay out the parameters within which terrorists select their targets, one must not imagine that all attacks are necessarily particularly well thought-out in ideological terms.

Targeting patterns of different ideological groups.

One of the ways of illustrating the influence of ideology on terrorist targeting is to compare the types of targets attacked by different groups. Differences between groups with different ideologies, and similarities between groups with similar ideologies, may demonstrate to a degree the extent to which ideology affects target selection. A comparison of people killed by the republican and loyalist terrorist groups in Northern Ireland is instructive because it illustrates the differences in target selection between separatist groups and conservative groups operating within the same geographical arena with a background of mutual communal antipathy, whilst a similar comparison between the Red Army Faction and the Red Brigades allows one to contrast groups with broadly similar though distinct communist ideologies operating in different areas.

Case study: republicans and loyalists in Northern Ireland.

In general separatist terrorists tend to attack those people who are members of, or cooperate with, organisations which they see as representing the occupier. For instance,

98) M.Dillon & D.Lehane. Political Murder in Northern Ireland, 256. J.Bowyer Bell. IRA Tactics and Targets, 27, 48, 116.

99) D.Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 58.

100) P.Willan. Puppet Masters, 201-202.

the Basque group ETA selected the Civil Guard (Guardia Civil) - a national paramilitary-style police force whose members are generally recruited outside the areas in which they serve, national police, and the military as their primary targets.¹⁰¹ According to Clarke, law enforcement officials and members of the armed forces make up 68% of those killed by ETA and 40.5% of those wounded between 1968 and 1980, whilst Llera, Mata, and Irwin estimate that policemen and military officers make up 59.1% of the total fatalities caused by ETA operations between 1968 and 1988.¹⁰² Of these the heaviest casualties occurred amongst the Civil Guard.¹⁰³ Clark alleges that, in the 1960s and early 1970s the Civil Guard were widely feared in the Basque provinces, and this - together with their role in the eyes of ETA members as symbols of Spanish occupation - would give some indication as to why they were seen as an automatic target.¹⁰⁴

Conservative terrorist groups use terrorism in order to protect the existing interests of the people they claim to represent and, sometimes, to protect the state from what they claim to be subversion. In Colombia in the 1980s for example, vigilante 'death squads' were set up by large landowners, cattle-ranchers, drug traffickers - who often become landowners using drugs money, and members of the Colombian armed forces.¹⁰⁵ The initial task of Colombian conservative terrorist groups such as Death to Kidnappers (Muerte a Secuestradores - MAS) and the Association of Peasants and Ranchers of the Magdalena Medio (Asociacion de Campesinos y Gaderos del Magdalena Medio - ACDEGAM), was supposedly to combat communist guerrillas such as the April 19th Movement (Movimiento 19 de Abril - M-19), and the Revolutionary Armed

101) R.P.Clark. The Basque Insurgents, 40.

102) R.P.Clark. "Patterns of Eta Violence: 1968-1980", P.H.Merkl (ed). Political Violence and Terror, 136. F.Llera, J.M.Mata & C.L.Irwin. "ETA: From Secret Army to Social Movement", 132.

103) R.P.Clark. "Patterns of Eta Violence: 1968-1980", 136. B.Pollack & G.Hunter. "Dictatorship, Democracy and Terrorism in Spain", 126.

104) R.P.Clark. The Basques: The Franco Years and Beyond, (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1979), 170-174. Private information.

105) J.Pearce. Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth, 177-178, 247. Amnesty International. Political violence in Colombia: Myth and reality, (London: Amnesty International, 1994), 52.

Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - FARC).¹⁰⁶ However, they also targeted members of the FARC's successor political party, the Patriotic Union (Union Patriotica - UP), peasant groups such as the National Association of Peasant Users (Asociacion Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos - ANUC), trade unionists, and other groups seeking to change the balance of political power in Colombia.¹⁰⁷

According to Pearce over 700 members of the UP were killed between 1985 and March 1989, and by 1994 Amnesty International estimated that the figure had risen to 1,500.¹⁰⁸ Hundreds of trade unionists and workers have been killed, particularly if they were taking strike action against their employers.¹⁰⁹ Ordinary workers appear to have been killed in order to intimidate others, whilst judges and those investigating such killings have been threatened and killed.¹¹⁰ Although such killings have been condemned by members of the Government, plantation owners, employers, and ranchers publicly equated peasant movements and trade unions with subversion and communism, and the death squads justified the assassination as action against subversives.¹¹¹ Thus the Colombian conservative terrorists demonstrate a targeting pattern one might expect by targeting those whom they believed to be subversive of the existing order.

The respective patterns of ETA and the Colombian death squads are replicated to an extent by the separatist and conservative terrorists in Northern Ireland. For the

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- 106) "King Coke", The Independent, July 21st 1990. "In Medellin, walls do not a prison make", The Independent, August 8th 1992. J.Pearce. Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth, 177, 247. C.Watson. "Guerrilla Groups in Colombia", 95-96.
- 107) J.Pearce. Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth, 1, 260-261. A.M.Bravo. "Frontier culture takes to cocaine", 75. C.Watson. "Guerrilla Groups in Colombia", 96. P.D.Scott & J.Marshall. Cocaine Politics, 89.
- 108) J.Pearce. Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth, 239, 262. Amnesty International. Political violence in Colombia, 1.
- 109) J.Pearce. Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth, 252-253, 260-261.
- 110) J.Pearce. Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth, 243, 249, 254-255. Amnesty International. Getting away with murder, 74, 88-89.
- 111) J.Pearce. Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth, 196, 253, 262. Amnesty International. Political violence in Colombia, 58, 61-62.

republicans, and in particular the Provisional IRA which is the largest republican terrorist group, target selection is fairly simple. Anybody who is a member of the security forces, or who aids them, is automatically considered a legitimate target. One of the ways in which they define their enemies is to denounce them as members of the 'British war machine'. This is a fairly wide ranging category which the Provisionals use to classify all those whom they consider to be involved in the struggle against themselves. Thus, as well as the Army, RUC, UDR/RIR, and the other British armed services such as the Navy and Air Force, it also includes contractors who work on military or police buildings in Northern Ireland, politicians or officials involved in the formulation of policy towards Northern Ireland, informers, and anybody whom the PIRA deem to be actively collaborating with the security forces.¹¹²

Despite criticism that many of their targets are, according to republican ideology, fellow Irishmen, the Provisionals have accommodated the targeting of Northern Irish security forces within their ideological framework by claiming that as members of the 'British war-machine' the RUC and UDR/RIR are legitimate targets, as well as denouncing them as sectarian organisations.¹¹³

A problem faced by the loyalist terrorists in Northern Ireland is that whilst republican terrorists can identify security force members relatively easily, it is difficult for loyalists to identify and target members of republican terrorist groups. As a result they often attack any Catholics, believing them to be sympathetic to republican terrorism, or at the very least culpable for not putting

112) "The men of war promise third violent decade", The Independent, September 29th 1990. "'We remain totally committed and confident in victory' - Oglagh na hEireann", AP/RN, February 14th 1991. "The IRA statement", AP/RN, January 23rd 1992. J.Bowyer Bell, IRA Tactics and Targets, 29-32.

113) "The men of war promise third violent decade", The Independent, September 29th 1990. "Freedom's soldiers laid to rest in historic Tyrone", AP/RN, June 13th 1991. "UDR 'comes of age': Loyalist militia renamed", AP/RN, July 25th 1991. "Terrorists in and out of uniform", AP/RN, July 4th 1991. "Royal salute to Murder Regiment", AP/RN, June 4th 1992.

pressure on the Provisionals to stop their campaign.¹¹⁴ Thus in April 1971 an article in the newsletter of the Woodvale Defence Association - a loyalist vigilante group in an area of Belfast - stated:

It has been proved regardless to what community relations or some MPs say, the biggest percentage of the Catholic population are backing the IRA.¹¹⁵

In January 1972 the same newsletter commented:

... the Catholic community is the IRA. For this we make no apology. ... no-one, not even clever journalists or politicians can deny this is the truth.¹¹⁶

In many respects this suspicion of tacit Catholic complicity with republican terrorist groups appears to have been shared by many ordinary Protestants in Northern Ireland.¹¹⁷ By attacking Catholics, loyalist terrorists hoped to put pressure upon the PIRA to stop its campaign and to prevent governmental moves towards a united Ireland.¹¹⁸ The attitude was summed up in October 1993 by a spokesman for the Ulster Freedom Fighters when he said:

We are out to terrorise the terrorists. To get to the stage when old grannies up the Falls will call on the IRA to stop, because it is ordinary Catholics that are getting hit, not the provos behind steel security doors.¹¹⁹

Sectarian attacks also provided a means for loyalist terrorists to obtain a form of revenge. As Bruce points out, apart from the relatively small number of active republicans, loyalists did not have identifiable enemy targets.¹²⁰

114) S.Bruce. The Red Hand, 261, 277. S.Nelson. Ulster's Uncertain Defenders, 120. M.Dillon. The Shankill Butchers, 17.

115) D.L.G.Hall. The Ulster Defence Association, 32-33.

116) D.L.G.Hall. The Ulster Defence Association, 81.

117) "Gritting it out on Border farmlands", The Irish Times, March 3rd 1983. "Centre of hatred returns to Armagh", The Irish Times, November 23rd 1983. J.Darby. Intimidation and the Control of Conflict in Northern Ireland, 136-137. S.Bruce. The Edge of the Union: The Ulster Loyalist Political Vision, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 42-43. T.Parker. May the Lord in His mercy be kind to Belfast, 293-294.

118) "Loyalist group threatens Catholic massacre", The Independent, September 8th 1993. "Loyalists come out shooting to defend lost cause", The Times, September 9th 1993.

119) "For Queen and Country", The Guardian, supplement, October 19th 1993.

120) S.Bruce. The Red Hand, 58, 277.

However, the loyalists could respond to republican attacks by attacking Catholics, rationalising the attacks on the grounds that those whom they killed were somehow responsible for republican actions. In July 1976 a loyalist newsletter claimed:

TABLE 3.1
KILLINGS PERPETRATED BY LOYALIST AND REPUBLICAN GROUPS
IN NORTHERN IRELAND: 1969-1993.

	LOYALIST		REPUBLICAN	
	Number	%	Number	%
British Army ^a	1	0.1	448	26.3
UDR/RIR ^a	3	0.4	236	13.9
RUC ^a	6	0.7	297	17.4
Prison officers ^a	2	0.2	25	1.5
Alleged informers	16	1.9	65	3.8
Security force workers ^b	0	0.0	35	2.1
Internal feuds ^c	46	5.4	45	2.6
Opposing terrorists ^d	28	3.3	27	1.6
Political activists ^e	32	3.8	12	0.7
Overtly sectarian ^f	670	79.3	152	8.9
Other ^g	41	4.9	363	21.3
Total number killed	845	100.0	1705	100.1

n.b. Percentages are rounded up or down to nearest 0.1%.

Loyalist category includes UDA, UVF, PAF and all other loyalist groups. Republican category includes PIRA, OIRA, INLA, IPLO, and all other republican groups.

a Includes former members.

b Civilian contractors and direct employees carrying out work for the security forces.

c Loyalists killed by loyalists and republicans killed by republicans.

d Republicans killed by loyalists and loyalists killed by republicans.

e Nationalists and republicans killed by loyalists and unionists and loyalists killed by republicans.

f Catholics killed by loyalists primarily because of their religion and Protestants killed by republicans for the same reason.

g Excludes killings outside Northern Ireland. Excludes terrorists killed by their own bomb but includes other unintended deaths.

Source: M.Sutton. Bear in mind these dead ... An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland, 1969-1993, (Belfast: Beyond the Pale Publications, 1994), 196-203.

We can say without fear of contradiction that 98% of 'innocent' Roman Catholic victims have, in fact, contributed either by actual presence, or by giving

information, thereby assisting in the murder of Loyalists.¹²¹

The claims that the victims were active republicans were generally false.

The pattern shown above in Table 3.1 may be somewhat skewed by the gap between the intentions of the terrorist group and the results actually achieved. However, one can see that in their lethal attacks the separatist republicans appear to have primarily targeted members of the security forces, although a sizeable percentage of people have been killed because they were Protestant and a large number of attacks have involved the unintended deaths of bystanders. For the loyalists on the other hand, attacks have been mainly directed against the supposedly subversive Catholics, with a relatively small though sizeable number of republican terrorists or political activists being killed, and a fair number of other loyalists also being killed.

The concentration of loyalist attacks against Catholic civilians confirms that the Catholic population as a whole is seen as a target. The communal nature of much of the violence in Northern Ireland can be seen in the number of sectarian killings on both sides, but there is a much higher concentration of primarily sectarian killings amongst the human targets attacked by the loyalist groups than by the republican groups. This is what one would expect to see with a conservative terrorist group which regards a particular community as suspect or subversive.

Case study: the Red Brigades in Italy and the Red Army Faction in West Germany.

There are also differences in targeting patterns between groups with similar ideologies in different locations. Looking specifically at the ideology of two distinct groups - the Red Brigades in Italy and the Red Army Faction in West Germany - one finds that although the ultimate aims were similar - to overthrow the capitalist system, there were important ideological differences which translated into differences in target selection. These differences were publicised when documents captured by the Italian police in June 1988 revealed the relative failure of

121) D.L.G.Hall. The Ulster Defence Association, 256.

the RAF and the BR faction known as the Fighting Communist Party (Partito Comunista Combattente - BR/PCC) to agree a coordinated strategy - a particular aim of the RAF at that time.¹²²

TABLE 3.2
CATEGORIES OF PEOPLE KILLED, WOUNDED OR KIDNAPPED BY
COMMUNIST TERRORIST GROUPS IN ITALY AND WEST GERMANY.

	Italy: 1970-82		W.Germany: 1967-91 ^a	
	Number	%	Number	%
Police	69	23.1	9	7.7
Judicial	13	4.3	4 ^b	3.4
Penal	14	4.7	0	0.0
Political	27	9.0	5 ^c	4.3
Business	85	28.4	5	4.3
Media	9	3.0	17 ^d	14.5
Others	82 ^e	27.4	77 ^f	65.8
Total number	299		117	

- a. To April 2nd 1991.
 b. Includes officials or politicians in judicial-related posts.
 c. Includes senior officials.
 d. Includes sixteen injured in bombing of Springer offices.
 e. Includes seventeen targeted doctors.
 f. Includes sixty people killed or injured in attacks on US military facilities.
 n.b. Percentages rounded up or down to nearest 0.1%.

Sources: D.Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 1969-1985, (London: Macmillan, 1989), 38. B.A.Scharlau. "Chronology of Major Events", (Unpublished manuscript, 1992). D.Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group (1972-1991)", Y.Alexander & D.Pluchinsky (eds). European Terrorism Today & Tomorrow, (Washington D.C.: Brassey's (US), 1992), 57-79, 84-86.

The targeting pattern of communist terrorist groups in Italy and West Germany can be seen above in Table 3.2, though as mentioned one must allow for discrepancies between what the terrorists intended to do and the actual result. Additionally, the small number of attacks involved in the West German example, combined with the fact that many of the anti-American attacks were bombs which aimed at causing heavy casualties, means that the attacks on American military

122) Red Brigades & Red Army Faction. "Excerpts from Notes of a Meeting between the Red Brigades and Red Army Faction in January 1988". Y.Alexander & D.Pluchinsky (ed). Europe's Red Terrorists, 219-227.

facilities caused a high proportion of the casualties inflicted by the German communist terrorists. Nevertheless, the table demonstrates some important points and highlights differences between the Italian and West German cases.

Firstly the police make up a relatively high proportion of casualties. In the Italian case this is evident from the figures. In the West German case, if one discounts the sixty casualties at U.S. bases, police officers make up 15.8% of the total casualties. However, the West German policemen were either secondary targets - as was the case when three bodyguards were killed during the Schleyer kidnapping, or became casualties when terrorists resisted arrest. In 1971 Ulrike Meinhof stated that the RAF would not target police officers who were not specifically trying to harm them.¹²³ On the other hand, whilst twenty-seven Italian police officers were killed or injured trying to arrest terrorists or as bodyguards to a primary target, the remaining thirty were deliberately selected as functional targets, or as symbolic targets in order to directly attack and demoralise the 'functionaries' of the state.¹²⁴

A contrast also exists between the targeting of the business sector by Italian communist terrorists compared to the West German groups. With the exception of the bombing of the Springer publishing works in 1972, and the kidnapping of Hans-Martin Schleyer in 1977, the RAF did not target businessmen for assassination or abduction until the mid 1980s. After this point the RAF targeted high-level businessmen who represented the 'Military-Industrial Complex' or international capitalism as a whole. When the RAF shot Ernst Zimmerman, the Chairman of the Federal Association of the German Aeronautics, Space, and Armaments Industry, at his home in Munich in February 1985, they justified the killing on the grounds that Zimmerman's federation:

... had the function to push through the interests of the MIC here in this state, on the Western European level, and thus on the international level.¹²⁵

123) S.Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group, 143.

124) D.Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 38. L'Espresso, February 24th 1980. L'Espresso, October 31st 1982.

125) D.Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group

Thus Zimerman was seen as a representative symbol of the MIC.

Likewise, in July 1986 the RAF detonated a bomb in a cart, killing Dr Karl-Heinz Beckurts and his driver on their way to work. Beckurts was a director of the electronics firm Siemens, and a member of the nuclear energy working group of the German National Industries Association. As such the RAF said that he represented

... the course of international capital in the current phase of political; economic, and military strategy of the overall imperialist system ... Siemens - like almost no other company in the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] - represents the concentrated power and aggression of the most reactionary factions of the bourgeoisie organized by the military-industrial complex.¹²⁶

Subsequent business targets - Alfred Herrhausen, Chairman of the Deutsche Bank, killed by a car-bomb in November 1989, and Detlev Rohwedder, the Director of the Treuhandanstalt [Trusteeship Office for East German State Property], shot dead by a sniper in April 1991 - were both characterised by the RAF as men who represented the capitalist system's attempt to dominate and subjugate the lives of western workers, workers in the Third World, and of workers in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Soviet system.¹²⁷ The important point to note is that the attacks were aimed at highlighting wide issues rather than specific industrial conflicts, and thus the human business targets of the Red Army Faction were high-ranking businessmen whose death would gain publicity, rather than middle-managers involved in industrial disputes.

In contrast, the Italian groups were well organised in some of the factories and gave a high political priority to intervening in domestic industrial conflicts. The Red Brigades targeted managers where companies were involved in

(1972-1991)", Y.Alexander & D.Pluchinsky (eds). European Terrorism Today & Tomorrow, (Washington D.C.: Brassey's (US), 1992), 67.

126) D.Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group", 69.

127) Red Army Faction. "Communique on the Assassination of Alfred Herrhausen, Chairman of Deutsche Bank, in Frankfurt on 30 November 1989", Red Army Faction. "Communique on the Assassination of Detlev Rohwedder, President of Treuhandanstalt, in Dusseldorf on 1 April 1991", Y.Alexander & D.Pluchinsky (eds). Europe's Red Terrorists, 68, 80.

conflicts with their staff, although in other cases, as with the Front Line attack on a business school, Italian communist terrorists attacked the business sector in general.¹²⁸ Those managers who were attacked tended to have supervisory or personnel functions rather than high-level executive positions.¹²⁹ Attacks usually took the form of maiming, with the victims being shot in the legs. Although a senior manager bled to death after being shot in the leg in September 1978, it was not until 1980 any were deliberately killed; one at Marghera near Venice and two in Milan.¹³⁰ The decision to kill the managers in Milan - Renato Briano of Magneti Marelli and Manfredo Mazzanti of Falck - was not taken by the BR leadership, but by a dissident, factory-based section of BR which called itself the 'Walter Alasia column' in memory of a Milan BR leader who died in a gun-battle with the police in 1976.¹³¹ The BR condemned the actions of the Walter Alasia column as undisciplined, although the Veneto column of BR was responsible for the killing in January 1980 of Silvio Gori - a manager at the Marghera plant of Petrolchimico, and kidnapped and later killed Giuseppe Taliercio, the personnel manager of the Montedison plant at Marghera where a number of workers had been made redundant.¹³²

From the mid-1980s sections of the BR, which by then had fragmented, carried out lethal attacks on prominent people in the industrial sector. However these were generally advisers rather than businessmen.¹³³ After Professor Ezio Tarentelli - an economist, trade union consultant and adviser to the Italian Government - was shot dead at the University of Rome in March 1985, a BR communique branded him as a man

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- 128) A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 75-76, 99. D.Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 81-117. V.S.Pisano. The Dynamics of Subversion and Violence in Contemporary Italy, 169. E.MacDonald. Shoot the Women First, 176-177.
- 129) D.Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 85.
- 130) D.Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 85. C.Schaerf et al. Venti Anni di Violenza in Italia, volume one, 736.
- 131) A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 93.
- 132) A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 188-189. V.S.Pisano. The Dynamics of Subversion and Violence in Contemporary Italy, 163, 165.
- 133) A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 210, 212, 215-216. D.Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 79, 80.

who had "... learned the arts and techniques of capitalist exploitation ...", and accused him of framing policies which would lead to the imposition of lower working standards upon ordinary workers.¹³⁴ In contrast to the RAF's target selection, the BR targets in the mid-1980s were high-level government consultants or appointees rather than prominent businessmen.

Although both the RAF and BR targeted senior political or official figures, the nature of the targets differed. Those attacked by the Red Army Faction tended to be quite senior officials. For example Dr Gerhold von Braunmuehl, the head of the political department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was shot dead in October 1986. Assassination attempts were made in September 1988 on Dr Hans Tietmeyer, a state secretary in the Ministry of Finance and later head of the Bundesbank, and in July 1990 on Hans Neusel, the second-ranking official in the Ministry of the Interior, and the official in charge of internal security.¹³⁵ No attacks have been made by the RAF on senior German politicians, although in 1975 the June 2nd Movement kidnapped Peter Lorenz, the Christian Democratic Union (Christlich-Demokratische Union - CDU) candidate for Mayor of Berlin.¹³⁶

On the other hand, despite the professed BR aim to attack the 'Heart of the State' the political human targets attacked by the various communist groups in Italy have mainly consisted of junior and middle-ranking members of political groups.¹³⁷ The exceptions were the attacks on the semi-official academic advisers mentioned above, and the kidnapping and subsequent killing of the former Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978. Twenty-four of the twenty-eight political targets killed, wounded, or kidnapped by Italian communist terrorists between 1968 and 1982 were members of the conservative Christian Democrats (Democrazia Cristiana - DC), who were the major partners in the various ruling

134) Red Brigades - Fighting Communist Party. "Communique on the Assassination of Ezio Tarantelli", Y.Alexander & D.Pluchinsky. Europe's Red Terrorists, 203-204.

135) D.Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group", 70, 71-72, 74-75.

136) S.Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group, 286-288. J.Becker. Hitler's Children, 297-298.

137) A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 120.

coalitions in Italy between 1945 and 1993.¹³⁸ These attacks were in line with the BR 'Strategic Resolution' of November 1977 which aimed to:

ATTACK, HIT, LIQUIDATE AND DEFINITELY ROUT THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY, AXIS OF THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE STATE AND OF THE IMPERIALIST COUNTER-REVOLUTION.¹³⁹

The Red Brigadists saw the DC as having a central role in the 'Imperialist State of Multinationals', and attacked them accordingly.¹⁴⁰ Four-fifths of the attacks on the Christian Democrats occurred between 1977 and 1979. Attacks on DC property in Rome occurred about once a fortnight during that period, putting the party in what Moss terms "an acute sense of being under siege".¹⁴¹

Although both the Red Army Faction and the Red Brigades were avowedly communist groups, there were notable differences in their ideology and this affected their choice of targets. The BR put a much higher premium upon the overthrow of the Italian state, whilst the RAF saw their objective as the destruction of international capitalism and imperialism. Furthermore, the original anarchistic outlook of the original leaders of the Red Army Faction contrasted with the origins of the BR in the Italian Communist Party, and might have translated itself into a greater concentration on targets with a greater symbolic value.¹⁴² Whilst the RAF attack higher-profile targets than the Red Brigades, reflecting their ideological opposition to international capitalism, the Red Brigades, with their roots in the northern Italian factories and opposition to the Italian state, concentrated far more on attacking local factory managers and police officers. Ideology was not the only reason for the differences in targeting strategy - for example, the BR had many more members than the RAF and could carry out more actions, including actions against less

138) D.Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 120.

139) A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 108.

140) D.Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 122.

141) D.Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 120.

142) S.Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group, 10-12, 63, 76-77, 146-149. J.Becker. Hitler's Children, 17, 62, 109, 264, 366 ff.2.

prominent targets. However, the RAF could have attacked low-profile human targets with much greater ease than the high-profile targets which were attacked, but deliberately chose not to. The differences in targeting pattern illustrate that the differing ideologies of the groups greatly affected which targets they chose.

Summary.

The political ideology of a group defines how it sees the world. In the context of terrorist target selection, ideology identifies those people, objects or institutions which can be considered as legitimate targets because the terrorists regard them as culpable of an offence according to the group's beliefs. As the Northern Irish, German, and Italian examples show, differences in target selection can be found between terrorist groups operating in the same areas but with different ideologies, and even between groups with similar ideologies but operating under different circumstances. Other influences affect the behaviour of members of a terrorist group, but a factor which they have in common is that they share allegiance to an ideology which provides the underlying rationale for their actions. Ultimately, the ideology provides a framework of beliefs upon which political decisions are based, and provides a motive for action. However, to be effective, ideas must be translated into action, and one of the ways in which this is done is through the development of a strategy.

Strategy

Introduction.

In an article Michael Howard defines strategy as:

... the deployment and use of armed forces to attain a given political objective.¹

This study adapts that definition in that a strategy is taken to be the plan by which a terrorist group seeks to deploy and use its resources with the aim of achieving its ultimate political objectives.

The role which strategic thought plays in determining the activities of terrorists differ greatly between groups. Since their actions are generally dictated by their own perceptions rather than from a detached standpoint there are dangers in assuming that terrorists - or other actors in politics - behave in a way which is objectively rational. In practice, the pressures connected with surviving as a terrorist do much to distort a person's ability to make rational decisions. However, except where their actions are wholly expressive, most terrorists do try to relate their violent acts to specific objectives.

There is a risk of making overly detailed generalisations about the actions of terrorist groups. A model which seeks to explain the strategy of groups as disparate as the Animal Liberation Front, the Palestine Liberation Organisation, and a vigilante death squad, runs the risk of either needing so many caveats as to make it inoperable, or of being so blandly general as to be of little utility. Nevertheless, general observations can be made about the impact of strategic considerations on terrorist target selection.

The place of terrorism in strategic planning.

Terrorism is only one of a number of methods which a group may use as part of its strategy for achieving its political goals. For those who do use it, terrorism may be merely one means to an end. The overall strategy of a group may include other violent methods ranging from riots to

1) M.Howard. The Causes of War, (London: Maurice Temple Smith, 1983; Unwin, 1984), 101. For other definitions see L.Freedman (ed). War, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 191-244.

conventional warfare, and also include non-violent methods such as civil disobedience and constitutional political activity. The intention of the Irish republican movement to simultaneously pursue a strategy embracing political and violent action was put forward most eloquently by the Director of Publicity for Provisional Sinn Fein, Danny Morrison, at the Sinn Fein annual conference in 1981.

Who here really believes that we can win the war through the ballot box? But will anyone here object if, with a ballot paper in this hand and an Armalite in this hand, we take power in Ireland?²

Similarly, soon after the Provisional IRA announced their ceasefire on August 31st 1994, a Sinn Fein representative stated:

One thing we all know is that the struggle is not over. We are into a new and important phase of the struggle.³

Thus, the republican campaign for a united Ireland would continue with a strategy which - for the time-being - did not include the use of anti-state violence, but was an 'unarmed strategy'.⁴ This example, and the fact that the ceasefire ended in February 1996, also demonstrates that groups can change their strategy over time.⁵

The foundations of a terrorist group's strategy are often found in the world-view prescribed by their ideology. This makes sense as the ideology lays down the political objectives towards which their strategy should be directed, shapes the way in which terrorists see the world around them, and therefore shapes their choice of the most appropriate strategy to adopt. For example, the Red Brigade's leaders believed that the Italian political and economic system was reorganising due to a state of crisis, with the possibility of a coup d'etat by the authoritarian right.⁶ Their terrorist

- 2) L. Clarke. Broadening the Battlefield: The H-Blocks and the Rise of Sinn Fein, (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1987), 208. P. Bishop & E. Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 378.
- 3) "IRA declares peace", The Independent, September 1st 1994.
- 4) B. Rowan. Behind the Lines: The Story of the IRA and Loyalist Ceasefires, (Belfast: Blackstaff, 1995), 84. E. Mallie & D. McKittrick. The Fight for Peace: The Secret Story behind the Irish Peace Process, (London: Heinemann, 1996), 311-312, 381-384.
- 5) E. Mallie & D. McKittrick. The Fight for Peace, 363.
- 6) A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 75, 76, 81-82. D. Moss The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 59, 83, 85-86, 124. Red Brigades - Fighting Communist Party.

strategy, which aimed at undermining the system with a view to encouraging a working-class revolt, appears thoroughly logical provided one accepts the basic premises of their ideology. Likewise, if one accepts that Irish republican ideology in the early 1970s saw the British presence in Northern Ireland as a colonial one, and considers that Britain had recently herself of an empire - sometimes under pressure of terrorism as in Palestine, Cyprus, and Aden - it was logical for the PIRA to suppose that the British would withdraw from Northern Ireland given sufficient violence.⁷ Whether or not one accepts their basic premise, their ideology led to a strategy which sought to transform Northern Ireland into a liability which the 'colonial' British Government would be glad to dispose of.

In his study of the military strategy of the Provisional IRA, Smith confirms the link between ideology and strategy, stating that a group's strategy should logically proceed from its ideology, taking into account the context within which the group operates. However, he believes that in practice the PIRA's strategy in the early-1970s derived directly from the historical ideology of militant Irish republicanism without any great appreciation of other relevant factors.⁸ Thus, instead of what Smith sees as the logical progression:

IDEOLOGY—————>	ANALYSIS—————>	STRATEGY
(basic motivation and the definition of objectives)	(evaluation of military instrument within context but inevitably affected by normative influences and values of ideology)	(employment of military instrument in policy to achieve ends)

he believes that the strategy of the Provisional IRA at that time was more dependent on ideological preconceptions, and can best be described as:

"Communique on the Assassination of Ezio Tarantelli", 205. P. Willan. Puppet Masters, 203.

7) M. McGuire. To Take Arms: A Year in the Provisional IRA, (London: Macmillan, 1973; Quartet, 1973), 12, 69.

P. Bishop & E. Mallie, The Provisional IRA, 171.

8) M. L. R. Smith. Fighting for Ireland?, 140.

IDEOLOGY—————>	STRATEGY—————>	RATIONALISATION
(basic motivation)	(employment of military instrument to suit ideology not circumstances of conflict)	(retrospective explanation of military instrument)

For Smith, the ideological predisposition of Irish republicanism towards the use of violence determined strategy with little reference to other factors. When the Provisional IRA began their campaign in 1970, killing British soldiers was already a deep-seated part of the republican heritage.⁹

This emphasises the point that one must not be overawed by the term *strategy* into imagining a complex or mysterious process, and avoid retrospectively imposing a rational and symmetrical pattern of decision-making upon a process which may well be rushed and conducted under great pressure.¹⁰ The long-term plans of terrorists - however crude they may appear - are strategies. For instance, in the mid-1970s a PIRA leader described their campaign as "... blattering on until the Brits leave".¹¹ Whilst this might not appear to be a particularly sophisticated strategy, it outlined a credible strategy of psychological attrition with the achievement of a definite political goal - the 'Brits' leaving Northern Ireland - as the long-term objective.

Even with terrorist groups possessing a clear political objective, there sometimes appears to be little sense of planning beyond preparing for the next attack. Jenkins noted in the mid 1970s that many terrorist groups fail to make the progression from the tactical concerns of planning specific operations to devising an overall strategy to achieve their ultimate political objectives.¹² Although the terrorists know what their political objectives are, and are convinced of the need for violence to attain them, they do not know how to use violence effectively. One could draw a parallel with someone who wishes to get from point A to point B and has the use of

9) P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 171.

10) J.Bowyer Bell. "Revolutionary Dynamics: The Inherent Inefficiency of the Underground", Terrorism and Political Violence, 2, no. 2, (Summer 1990).

11) "Inside the IRA", The Sunday Times, July 3rd 1977.

12) B.M.Jenkins. Soldiers versus Gunmen: The Challenge of Urban Guerrilla Warfare, (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, March 1974), 4.

a car to make the journey, but does not possess an accurate road map. Consequently, he ends up driving around aimlessly in the hope of finally reaching his destination. In this situation a form of strategy through inertia may develop. Indeed, Crenshaw believes that terrorism, once started, ultimately takes on a momentum of its own and there is little reason to believe that a strategy will be substantially altered unless it is seen to be demonstrably failing.¹³

Not all terrorist campaigns last long enough to develop beyond their initial stages.¹⁴ As noted earlier, many terrorist groups only carry out a small number of attacks before ceasing to operate. Other groups may last long enough to carry out a series of attacks and issue some communiques before they are put out of action. The Angry Brigade in Britain only lasted as a really effective terrorist group between mid 1970 and late 1971, and became largely inactive following the arrest and conviction of the group's leaders, whilst in Belgium the Fighting Communist Cells (CCC- Cellules Communistes Combattantes) was similarly broken up by a number of arrests in December 1985 after carrying out twenty-six bombings in Belgium over a fourteen month period.¹⁵

Other terrorist campaigns have been protracted, and in these cases it is possible or even likely that strategies will be altered over time in order to adapt to changing circumstances or changes in the group's capability. It is also possible that, due to capture, death, or 'retirement', the people initially making strategic decisions for the terrorist group will have been replaced by people with a different outlook. Thus, Israeli assassination squads and internal feuds have killed leading members of the PLO, in Germany a number of the Red Army Faction leaders have been

13) M.Crenshaw "The Concept of Revolutionary Terrorism", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 16, no 3, (September 1972), 394.

14) For information on the longevity of various terrorist groups see Table 1 in M.Crenshaw, "How terrorism declines", 76-77; and Figure 2 in Y.Alexander & D.Pluchinsky (eds). Europe's Red Terrorists, 47.

15) Angry Brigade. The Angry Brigade, 1967-1984, 40-66. Y.Alexander & D.Pluchinsky (eds). Europe's Red Terrorists, 148-150.

imprisoned over the years, and in Northern Ireland the INLA has lost leading members in internal feuds.¹⁶

The Provisional IRA provides an example of the changes to be seen in a groups' long-term strategy. They have changed their terrorist and political strategy - though not their ultimate political objectives - on a number of occasions. Their original strategy was to maintain a high level of violence and kill a large number of security force members in a short period of time. By the mid 1970s this strategy had been largely suppressed by an intensive security force commitment which led to the death or capture of a large number of PIRA members, and demonstrated the ability of the British Government to endure a certain level of violence within the Province.¹⁷

In response the Provisionals switched to a protracted 'long war' terrorist campaign, which consisted of a lower level of violence combined with the political mobilisation of the Catholics of Northern Ireland by Provisional Sinn Fein.¹⁸ The objective of the 'long war' strategy was to gradually wear down the resistance of the British Government and public by maintaining a lower but constant level of violence against a number of targets - primarily the security forces and civil and commercial targets in Northern Ireland and England, with

16) On the changes in the leadership of the Red Army Faction see D.Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group". and B.A.Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany. On the INLA see J.Holland & H.McDonald. INLA: Deadly Divisions, (Dublin: Torc, 1994), 229-230, 282-299. On the policy of assassinating leading Palestinian terrorists see D.Tinnin. Hit Team, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1976; Futura, 1977). D.Raviv & Y.Melman. Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community, (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1990), 184-192, 393-398.

17) "Ulster's rocky road to peace", The Observer, (London), December 15th 1977. P.Bishop & E.Mallie, The Provisional IRA, 321. P.Taylor. Beating the Terrorists: Interrogation in Omagh, Gough and Castlereagh, (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1980), 80-81, 154-158, 193-194. M.Dillon. Killer in Clowntown: Joe Doherty, the IRA and the Special Relationship, (London: Hutchinson; Arrow, 1992), 59.

18) T.P.Coogan. The IRA, 581. L.Clarke. Broadening the Battlefield, 32, 35. K.J.Kelley. The Longest War, 233-236, 243.

the occasional spectacular attack in order to maintain a climate of widespread apprehension.¹⁹

In August 1994 the PIRA leadership altered its strategy again when it temporarily ceased the use of violence against the state and the economy, followed by the loyalist groups the following month.²⁰ However both loyalist and republican groups continued to injure or kill people whom they alleged were 'anti-social' elements such as criminals or drug traffickers, to a greater extent than they did before the ceasefire. As well as the overtly-stated aim of curbing criminality - in particular drug-trafficking - it seems likely that this also represented a strategic decision to maintain the compliant nature of the local population in case of a resumption of the conflict.²¹ Thus when the Provisionals ended the ceasefire with a bomb in the Docklands area of London in February 1996, they would not have felt the need to worry excessively about the risk of overt repudiation from the Catholic areas of Northern Ireland.²²

This example shows how terrorism can be integrated into a broader strategy for the purpose of achieving political goals. In general terrorists do not view their actions as uncoordinated violence and have some idea of the overall

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- 19) "The men of war promise third violent decade", The Independent, September 29th 1990. "'We remain totally committed and confident in victory' -Oglaigh na hEireann", AP/RN, February 14th 1991. "The IRA statement", AP/RN, January 23rd 1992. T.P.Coogan. The IRA, 604, 693. J.Bowyer Bell, IRA Tactics and Targets, 29-32. L.Clarke. Broadening the Battlefield, 56-57. B.O'Brien. The Long War, 152.
- 20) "IRA declares peace", The Independent, September 1st 1994. "Loyalists match IRA ceasefire", "Combined Loyalist Military Command statement", The Independent, October 14th 1994.
- 21) L.Kennedy. "Rough Justice", Fortnight, November 1995. "How the guns kept drugs out of Belfast", The Independent, December 21st 1995. "Godfathers of violence step up beatings to keep grip on power", The Daily Telegraph, December 29th 1995. "Murky motives for giving drug dealers rough justice", The Guardian, January 3rd 1996. M.O'Doherty. "Dealing in Death", New Statesman & Society, January 22nd 1996. B.Rowan. Behind the Lines. For a republican viewpoint see "Drugs in the Six Counties: A Secret Society", AP/RN, January 25th 1996, and "Drugs summit targeted North", AP/RN, February 1st 1996.
- 22) "'The ceasefire is over': IRA bombers blast London", The Independent, February 10th 1996. "Bomb shatters IRA ceasefire", The Times, February 10th 1996.

effects which they want their violence to achieve. They believe that these effects will in turn help them to achieve their political goals. For this reason the effects which the terrorists wish their violence to achieve - their strategic objectives - need to be examined.

The strategic objectives of terrorist groups.

The strategic objectives of terrorists are not the same as their ultimate political objectives, but are the long-term effects which they wish to impose on their psychological target through the use of terrorist violence. The success of a terrorist strategy depends upon the terrorists finding the type of pressure or encouragement to exert upon their psychological target in order to produce the desired responses. For instance a group which wishes to gain a great deal of publicity for its cause will not progress far if it confines itself to unpublicised acts of sabotage against unimportant buildings or institutions. Therefore it will probably select targets against whom attacks will gain a great deal of attention for the group and its cause. Similarly, it would be a waste of effort and possibly counter-productive for terrorists to cause a widespread panic by indiscriminately killing large numbers of people with mass-casualty bomb attacks if their aim was to intimidate a specific group of people into behaving in a certain manner. To be effective they would have to select their physical targets in such a way that their psychological targets were frightened into compliance and were aware of the likely consequences if they did not comply with the wishes of the group.

The strategic objectives which groups pursue through the use of terrorism can vary greatly, and some groups seek to maximise the impact of their actions by pursuing more than one objective. In her study of the FLN, Crenshaw identifies a number of psychological reactions which terrorist groups may seek to evoke through their acts, ranging from curiosity to terror.²³ When pursuing their strategic objectives, the goals which the terrorist group hopes to achieve go beyond the immediate consequences of a terrorist act, and relate

23) M.Crenshaw Hutchinson. Revolutionary Terrorism, 21.

directly to creating the conditions where the group may achieve their political objectives.

The strategic objectives which terrorists may pursue have been assembled into seven categories. Some of them have been adapted from categories used by Martha Crenshaw and Thomas Perry Thornton.²⁴ The categories are:

- Threat elimination.
- Compliance.
- Disorientation.
- Attrition.
- Provocation.
- Advertisement.
- Endorsement.

They are explained below.

Threat elimination consists simply of the elimination of those people, organisations, or objects which pose a direct threat to the members or interests of the terrorist organisation. This would include the killing of informers, effective investigators, or anybody whose actions threatened the group. The elimination of threats makes it much easier for the group to concentrate upon achieving other strategic objectives and ultimately its political goals. A classic example of threat elimination was the campaign of assassination which the Dublin IRA under Michael Collins waged against the police and military intelligence services in the city between 1919 and 1921, and which the IRA waged against informers and intelligence officers in other parts of Ireland.²⁵ Likewise, the assassination by the Mafia of the top two investigating magistrates in Sicily in the summer of

24) M.Crenshaw Hutchinson. Revolutionary Terrorism, 41-85. T.P.Thornton. "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation", H.Eckstein (ed). Internal War: Problems and Approaches, (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964).

25) T.P.Coogan. Michael Collins: A Biography, (London: Hutchinson, 1990), 78, 116-117, 129, 157-160. C.Townshend. The British Campaign in Ireland, 41-42, 129-130. T.Barry. Guerrilla Days in Ireland, (Dublin: The Irish Press, 1949; Tralee, Ireland: Anvil, 1962), 18-19, 99-107. E.Butler. Barry's Flying Column: The story of the I.R.A.'s Cork No.3 Brigade 1919-21, (London: Leo Cooper, 1971; Tandem, 1972), 120-122.

1992, led to the immediate resignation of seven other senior investigating magistrates on the island. However, over the longer term the killings galvanised the Italian authorities into taking more effective action against the Mafia.²⁶ The elimination of threats is a strategic objective of interest to all forms of terrorist group.

Compliance occurs when the psychological targets obey the will of the terrorist group for fear of attacks upon themselves or upon people or objects of great value to them. The terrorist's strategic objective is to establish control in the relationship between the terrorists and the psychological target for the purposes of furthering the terrorists ends. In practical terms such a strategy ensures that the terrorists are able to secure whatever logistic support they need and to protect themselves against the risk of informers or internal dissidence. Ideally it should also give the terrorists sole political leadership amongst possible sympathisers, and prevent effective opposition.

A group which intends to cause *disorientation* aims to destroy the certainties of everyday life by the use, or threatened use, of violence. This strategic objective comes closest to the classical understanding of terrorism in that the aim is to create a constant feeling of anxiety in the psychological target and to destroy the psychological target's faith in the capacity of anyone to protect it. The strategic objective of disorientation can be differentiated from the strategic objective of compliance in that whereas with the latter one can obtain relief from fear by complying with the terrorist's demands, with the former there is no certain course of action which the psychological target can take which will relieve the anxiety caused. The terrorist's aim is to cause anxiety as an end in itself in the hope that this will induce the desired reaction. Colonel Roger Trinquier, who was heavily involved in French counter-insurgency operations during the Algerian conflict of 1954-

26) "Mafia strikes one more from its enemy hit-list", The Times, July 20th 1992. "Sicilians clash with police after being banned from funeral", The Times, July 22nd 1992. A.Stille. Excellent Cadavers: The Mafia and the Death of the First Italian Republic, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1995), 373-377.

1962, has outlined his understanding of the intent and effect of the terrorist campaign of the FLN against civilians.

In the street, at work, at home, the citizen lives continually under the threat of violent death. In the presence of this permanent danger surrounding him, he has the depressing feeling of being an isolated and defenseless target. The fact that public authority and the police are no longer capable of ensuring his security adds to his distress. He loses confidence in the state whose inherent mission it is to guarantee his safety. He is more and more drawn to the side of the terrorists who alone are able to protect him.

The intended objective, which is to cause the population to vacillate is thus attained.²⁷

Thus, the terrorist group frightens the population at large and makes them more likely to act as the terrorists wish.

The objective of such attacks may also be to intimidate the authorities into acceding to the demands of the terrorist group by threatening to undermine the ability of the government to govern a fear-ridden population. For instance, the use of indiscriminate mass casualty car-bombings by powerful drug trafficking groups in Colombia was aimed at producing chaos in order to undermine the authority of the Government. The political aim there was the limited one of intimidating the government into agreeing not to extradite drug traffickers.²⁸ Alternatively the aim may be to induce a sense of anxiety in a smaller group of people in order to destroy their ability to function effectively. For instance the campaign of assassination against the nobility by the People's Will in Tsarist Russia was intended in part to break the will of the ruling class to continue ruling.²⁹

If the group openly uses such methods it is unlikely to be seeking any form of support from the types of people being attacked. It is therefore more likely to be used against people the terrorists regard as enemies, or at best as manipulable and dispensable. Alternatively, as with the

27) R. Trinquier. Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964), 16-17.

28) "Mother's Day of mourning as car bombs kill 26", The Independent, May 14th 1990. S. Strong. Whitewash, 282-284. "Car bomb kills 18 as Maoists extend terror tactics to Lima", The Times, July 18th 1992.

29) G. Tarnovski. "Terrorism and Routine", P. Kropotkin. "The Spirit of Revolt", both in W. Laqueur (ed). The Terrorism Reader, 82, 96.

Italian fascist groups examined later in this chapter, the terrorists may try to conceal their identity and hope to benefit from the instability caused by the attacks.

A strategic objective of attrition is one where the terrorists intend to erode the will of the psychological target, without necessarily destroying its political, economic, or military capability, by attacking physical targets on which the psychological target sets some value. Whilst not precluding large-scale attacks, the emphasis of such a strategy is upon a continual series of small-scale attacks over a period of time in the hope that cumulatively these will break the psychological target's resistance.

For the terrorists, it is important that the physical targets attacked are ones upon which the psychological target places a fairly high value. If it does not, then the attacks will not have the debilitating effect desired by the terrorists. A classic case of this is the Provisional IRA's campaign to force the British Government to withdraw from Northern Ireland, primarily by putting pressure on two psychological targets - the British governing classes and the British public - with attacks on the British Army and upon civil targets in Northern Ireland and England.³⁰ A PIRA spokesman has outlined the rationale behind the attacks on British soldiers.

Our aim is to create such psychological damage to the Brits that they'll withdraw. Sick of the expense, the hassle, the coffins coming back to England.³¹

Following the bombing of the railway line at Clapham Junction in February 1991, and the ensuing disruption, the PIRA stated:

The economic cost of disruption to daily life in Britain will continue to rise as long as the British government and its army continue to occupy part of Ireland's national territory.³²

30) M.McGuire. To Take Arms, 69. L.Clarke. Broadening the Battlefield, 40-42, 56-57. T.P.Coogan. The IRA, 579, 604, 693. K.J.Kelley. The Longest War, 202-203, 210, 265. P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 250, 332. B.O'Brien. The Long War, 23, 152. G.McKee & R.Franey. Time Bomb, 18-19, 308, 330.

31) T.P.Coogan. The IRA, 604.

32) "British pay price as IRA strikes", AP/RN, February 14th 1991.

Again, after the assassination of Ian Gow MP in July 1990 a PIRA representative said:

The war which Britain wages in Ireland has inflicted a very heavy price on all sections of our people. ... The IRA have quite forcibly told the British, the British Establishment, those who legislate for the war in Ireland, that they too will have to pay a price.

It's our intention, and we have the means, to continue to exact that price from the British Establishment. We will increasingly bring the war to the attention of the British public, and to the doorsteps of those who sustain the conflict. And their lifestyles will not stand the strain that our lifestyles do for we have nothing.³³

Thus the Provisionals' attacks have been intended to induce a British withdrawal from Northern Ireland by the attritional effect of their attacks upon the endurance of two psychological targets - the British governing classes, and the British public.

Provocation occurs where the terrorist group carry out actions in the hope of making the psychological target - in this case the enemy - act in a way which will alienate those people who were previously uncommitted or possibly even unsympathetic towards the terrorists, as well as people who sympathise with them. For insurgent groups the aim is often to provoke repressive security measures by the authorities in order to make them unpopular and to increase the popularity of the insurgents. This idea was popular in the 1960s amongst communist Latin American insurgents in the 1960s such as Che Guevara and Carlos Marighela.³⁴ The premise behind such actions is that the authorities, once provoked, will act in a heavy-handed or brutal fashion, unintentionally goading the public into furthering the objectives of the terrorist group through non-cooperation with the authorities or even direct support for the terrorists.

For example, in Northern Ireland in May 1992, a spate of incidents occurred around the town of Coalisland, county Tyrone. British soldiers appear to have entered bars and

33) "The men of war promise third violent decade", The Independent, September 29th 1990.

34) C.Guevara. "Guerrilla Warfare - A Method", W.Laqueur (ed). The Guerrilla Reader, 203-204. C.Marighela. "Problems and Principles of Strategy", and "The Handbook of Urban Guerrilla Warfare", For the Liberation of Brazil, trans.J.Butt & R.Sheed, (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1971), 46, 95.

assaulted civilians, in one case after a colleague had his legs blown off by a bomb. Accounts of the incidents and photographs of soldiers attacking civilians appeared in a national newspaper, providing a propaganda opportunity which the republican press exploited to the full.³⁵

Conversely, fascist groups have carried out actions in the hope that they will be blamed on anti-state groups, and provoke a security clampdown on the supposed subversives. A document concerning the 'strategy of tension' in Italy in the 1960s and 1970s - where mass casualty bomb attacks were intended to cause an atmosphere of political crisis and lead to a call for an authoritarian government - makes it clear that these actions were to be carried out in such a way as to implicate 'communist and pro-Chinese' organisations.³⁶

It is important for terrorists seeking to provoke a response to determine who they wish to provoke into a reaction, what type of reaction they want, and how to provoke that reaction. This is difficult to gauge and groups should be careful. The Tupamaros in Uruguay in the early 1970s provoked the military into overthrowing the democratic government - which they did want, and crushing the Tupamaros with utter ruthlessness - which they did not.³⁷

A strategic objective of *advertisement* is intended to make people aware of the existence of the terrorists and their cause. Such operations are primarily designed to gain publicity for the group, or possibly to lift the spirits of those people in whose interests the terrorists may believe themselves to be acting. In practice most overt terrorist

35) "Paratroops accused of pub attacks", The Independent, May 15th 1992. "Ulster Para officer suspended after claims of violence", The Times, May 15th 1992. "Ulster brigadier 'insensitive to human rights'", The Independent, May 26th 1992. "Send them home", Coalisland exposes British army terror", both in AP/RN, May 21st 1992. "Army involved in new harassment dispute in Ulster", The Independent, May 27th 1992. "Picture backs claims of rifle butt assault", The Independent, May 30th 1992. "British army chief removed but paras remain", "Anglian Regiment thuggery in Derry", both in AP/RN, May 28th 1992. "Six Paras face clashes charges", The Times, September 29th 1992.

36) S.Christie. Stefano Delle Chiaie, 32. P.Willan. Puppet Masters, 23.

37) F.Lopez-Alves. "Political Crises, Strategic Choices and Terrorism: The Rise and Fall of the Uruguayan Tupamaros", 226, 232.

activities advertise the terrorist group and their cause just by happening, but some groups carry out operations whose primary aim is the maximisation of publicity. A prime case of this was the spate of high-profile operations by Palestinian groups in the early 1970s, including a number of aircraft hijackings and the PLO kidnapping and subsequent killing of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1972. As Khalil Foutah, of the Palestine Affairs Center noted in 1990:

In the 70s when we started hijacking planes, I mean the Palestinian movement, well they were trying to publicize the cause and were asking the media to come and cover the cause. What they did in Munich, for example, they did it for the newspapers, probably because during that time, before 1982, there was only one side of the story presented. Nobody mentioned us.³⁸

Jenkins has noted with regard to Palestinian terrorism in the 1970s:

Without endorsing terrorism, one must wonder what success they could have won had they operated within the established bounds of conventional warfare and polite diplomacy.³⁹

By carrying out such operations, some Palestinian groups felt that they finally gained recognition of their existence, if not initially of their cause.

Attacks aimed at gaining *endorsement* are those which are calculated to mobilise support for the group concerned. In such cases the terrorists carry out actions which they hope will receive the approval of their supporters and possibly that of people who are merely curious or who are totally uninvolved or uninterested in the terrorists' cause.

For instance, the PFLP leader George Habash noted the motivating effect which such actions had on those who favoured the Palestinian cause when the PFLP hijacked three aircraft in September 1970 in order to secure the release of Palestinian prisoners in West Germany, Switzerland, and Britain.

The struggle is far from being a purely military one; it is psychological too, and we have to raise the morale of the masses while at the same time harassing the Israelis.⁴⁰

38) C.L.Irvin. "Terrorists' Perspectives: Interviews", 78.

39) B.M.Jenkins. International Terrorism: A New Kind of Warfare, 6.

40) G.Chaliand. The Palestinian Resistance, 167.

Thus, in addition to the concrete gains of obtaining the prisoners release, the hijackings were also aimed at gaining the support of the Palestinian people for the PFLP and the Palestinian cause in general. Furthermore, it advertised the Palestinian cause to the wider world, demonstrating how a single operation can contribute to the achievement of more than one strategic objective. Another example of this has been the attacks on unpopular people by the Shining Path - a Peruvian communist group examined below in greater depth - which have been carried out at least partially in order to gain popular support for the group.⁴¹

In other cases the terrorists may seek to gain support at the expense of other groups espousing a similar ideology. Kramer refers to this when he refers to the 'imitative rivalry' which existed between two Lebanese Islamic groups - Hizbollah and Amal - in the mid 1980s. Although open conflict later broke out between the two, for a period of about five years the rivalry was expressed in several ideological forms, one of which manifested itself in the form of each attempting to outdo the other in the amount of damage inflicted upon the Israelis in southern Lebanon and the Western presence in Beirut.⁴² A similar rivalry appears to have existed between the Red Brigades and Front Line in the late 1970s, particularly in Milan where Moss notes that Front Line attacks had a greater tendency to be aimed at human targets than in Florence where there was less competition from BR.⁴³

Terrorist groups can pursue a number of these strategic objectives simultaneously as part of their overall campaign if they have sufficient resources. In Revolutionary Terrorism Crenshaw demonstrates how the FLN did this during their rebellion against the French in Algeria by, for instance, carrying out mass-casualty bomb attacks against the European population of Algeria with the aim of disorientating and scaring them on the one hand and the assassination of

41) R.H.Berg, "Peasant Responses to Shining Path in Andahuaylas", D.S.Palmer (ed). Shining Path of Peru, (London: Hurst & Co, 1992), 93. T.D.Mason & J.Swartzfager. "Land Reform and the Rise of Sendero Luminoso in Peru", Terrorism and Political Violence, 1, no. 4, (October 1989), 531.

42) M.Kramer. "Sacrifice and Fratricide in Shiite Lebanon", 35.

43) D.Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 73.

dissident Algerians with the aim of ensuring overall compliance amongst Algerians on the other.⁴⁴

Similarly, when examining the strategy of the Provisional IRA as detailed in their training manual, one can see that their aim has been to achieve a number of the strategic objectives outlined in this chapter.⁴⁵ In this case the strategic objectives involved are placed in brackets after the goal outlined by the PIRA.

1. A war of attrition against enemy personnel which is aimed at causing as many casualties and deaths as possible so as to create a demand from their people at home for their withdrawal. (Attrition and Advertisement.)
2. A bombing campaign aimed at making the enemy's financial investment in our country unprofitable while at the same time curbing long term financial investment in our country. (Attrition and Advertisement.)
3. To make the Six Counties as at present and for the past several years ungovernable except by colonial military rule. (Disorientation and Provocation.)
4. To sustain the war and gain support for its ends by National and International propaganda and publicity campaigns. (Endorsement and Advertisement.)
5. By defending the war of liberation by punishing criminals, collaborators and informers. (Endorsement, Compliance, and Threat Elimination.)


Arguably the Provisionals have also attempted to achieve disorientation amongst the Protestant population of Northern Ireland and the public in England through their use of bombs in public areas, although they deny that this is done deliberately.⁴⁶ The extent to which one aspect of their strategy - the killing of British soldiers - fulfils a number

44) M.Crenshaw. Revolutionary Terrorism, xv, 36, 39, 44-46, 57, 41-85.

45) T.P.Coogan. The IRA, 693. B.O'Brien. The Long War, 23.

46) "11 die in Cenotaph blast", The Independent, November 9th 1987. "Attacks fits into a pattern of errors", The Independent, April 13th 1989. "Bombings indicate new direction in mainland campaign", The Times, February 19th 1992. "Damage in huge blast put at £20m", The Independent, September 25th 1992. "'Troubles' chronology: Wed Sep 23", Fortnight, no 311, (November 1992), 34. "IRA bombers kill child, 4", The Independent on Sunday, March 21st 1993. "Tim Parry, victim of IRA bomb blast dies after ventilator is switched off", The Independent, March 26th 1993. D.McKittrick. Despatches from Belfast, 146-151. "Brits put civilian lives at risk", AP/RN, January 30th 1992. "We are doing all in our power to shorten this war", AP/RN, March 12th 1992.

of strategic objectives, can be outlined using the model outlined near the beginning of this study.



In practice, within the overall compass of their long war strategy, the Provisionals have pursued a number of strategic objectives simultaneously, whilst at times putting more emphasis on one aspect than on others.

Each terrorist campaign is unique and the categories discussed above merely represent an attempt to bring some sort of system to their activities. Terrorist planners, or the people who execute terrorist operations, do not think in terms of neat strategic categories, but in relation to the differing concrete circumstances which they face. As well as the differences between the strategies of different terrorist groups, one can also find that the strategies of a single terrorist group can change over time, and this inevitably affects target selection. In order to understand how strategic considerations may affect a terrorist group's selection of targets it may be useful to consider the development of a specific group's strategy in its entirety, see how this has varied over time, and try to determine what factors have influenced it.

Case Study: The Red Army Faction in West Germany.

In some respects the RAF is atypical in that it has lasted for a very long time - about twenty-five years - compared to other European communist groups, and the attacks carried out by the group have been executed with a high

TABLE 4.1
 TARGETS ATTACKED BY THE RED ARMY FACTION
 APRIL 2nd 1968 - APRIL 2nd 1991

	HUMAN TARGETS					MATERIAL TARGETS					OTHER	
	Pol	Off	CJS	Bus	NATO	Pol	Off	CJS	Bus	NATO		Rob
1968									2			
1969												
1970								1			5	
1971											4	
1972			3		2				1			
1973												
1974			1									
1975	1		1									
1976											1	30+a
1977			1	2								b
1978												
1979					1						1	
1980												
1981					2							c
1982											1	
1983												
1984					1						2	1
1985				1	2		2	1	20+			20+d
1986	1		1			1	4	3	1			
1987												
1988	1				1							
1989				1				1				
1990	1							3				
1991	1											

KEY: Pol=Political. Off=Official. CJS=Criminal Justice System (police, judiciary, lawyers, penal system and associated premises - includes prison escapes), Bus=Business, NATO=Military personnel or installations belonging to members of the NATO alliance (Mainly American but includes attacks on German and Canadian personnel or installations). Rob=Robberies carried out (for money, weapons, or official documents). Other=attacks on other targets (includes those attacks where nature of target is not described in sources).

SOURCE: B.A.Scharlau. "Chronology of Major Events", (Unpublished manuscript, 1992). D.Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group (1972-1991)", 57-86. (Pluchinsky covers 1972-1991.)

- a 30+ bombings of unspecified targets after suicide of Ulrike Meinhof in May 1976.
- b Several bombings after suicides of Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, and Jan-Carl Raspe in October 1977.
- c Unspecified number of bombings after death of Sigurd Debus on hunger strike in April 1981.
- d Twenty-three incendiary attacks and fifteen bombings against various targets (half against NATO, others unattributed) during RAF hunger strike of December 4th 1984 to February 2nd 1985.

degree of precision and with relatively few mistakes. However, this very precision makes the group suitable for analysis concerning target selection because, unlike other groups, there is less chance of mistakenly counting accidental victims of terrorist attacks as the intended victims. It is therefore possible to extrapolate from the group's recorded activities those influences which may affected the strategy of terrorist groups.

The changes in the strategy of the RAF can, to a degree, be seen in Table 4.1 which shows the types of targets attacked by the group and its original founders between April 1968 and April 1991. This table shows those planned actions which have definitely been attributed to the RAF by Scharlau or Pluchinsky. It is possible that a number of relatively minor events have not been included. Incidents where a number of people have died have been classified as one attack, being attributed to the primary target. An example of this is the kidnapping of employers leader Hans-Martin Schleyer where his bodyguards and driver were killed during the abduction. In this case Schleyer, (a business target) is counted as the target of the attack rather than the bodyguards (a criminal justice system target) whose deaths were - for the terrorists - a secondary consideration.

To comprehend the strategy of the Red Army Faction one must understand the ideology which formed their political objectives. The RAF saw themselves as the vanguard of a wider framework of anti-imperialist communist groups. Founded during the latter stages of the Vietnam War, they believed that the demonstrative effect of their attacks against imperialism in the heartland of the capitalist West - as represented by the personnel and installations of the US armed forces in Germany - would act as an inspiration to groups elsewhere and hence encourage worldwide revolution and the overthrow of capitalism.⁴⁷ This involved RAF opposition to the institutions of the capitalist West German state, but the group was not primarily interested in the overthrow of the West German Government and seizure of power there.⁴⁸

47) M. Baumann. Wie Alles Anfing, 100. J. Becker. Hitler's Children, 264.

48) B.A. Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 33, 83. H. Horchem. "The Lost Revolution of

Their primary strategic objective was to advertise their cause - in particular those matters about which they felt strongly - and to mobilise the support for worldwide revolution amongst potential sympathisers within West Germany and elsewhere. In this respect they were very different to the more insular Red Brigades in Italy, and failed to form a cooperative working arrangement with them, although they did manage to establish an understanding with one of the factions which emerged when the BR splintered in the early 1980s.⁴⁹

In addition to ideological considerations, an important constraint upon the RAF was that their relatively small manpower limited the number of operations which they could carry out. Thus, to gain widespread attention they had to ensure that a high proportion of their attacks were spectacular. The relatively limited scope of what they deemed to be legitimate targets ruled out the easier option of gaining attention by causing mass casualties, so instead they generally attacked prominent targets with a high symbolic value.

A point to note is that the RAF received some aid in terms of refuge, training, and possibly equipment, from outside groups. These were Palestinian separatist groups in the early 1970s and the East German intelligence agencies. The East German intelligence agencies seem to have stepped up their support for the group in the early 1980s and may have had some input into discussions regarding strategy as well as providing them with the material wherewithal to launch attacks using relatively sophisticated equipment.⁵⁰ This might have influenced strategy and target selection at that time.

West Germany's Terrorists", Terrorism and Political Violence, 1, no. 3, (July 1989), 354.

49) Red Brigades & Red Army Faction. "Excerpts from Notes of a Meeting between the Red Brigades and Red Army Faction in January 1988", 222, 226. Red Brigades/Fighting Communist Party & Red Army Faction. "Joint Communique: PCC with Red Army Faction, dated September 1988", Both in Y.Alexander & D.Pluchinsky (eds). Europe's Red Terrorists.

50) B.A.Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 32, 44, 58-59. S.Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group, 89-99, 118. J.Schmeidel. "My Enemy's Enemy", 66-67. H.Horchem. "The Decline of the Red Army Faction", Terrorism and Political Violence, 3, no. 2, (Summer 1991), 64.

Pluchinsky notes that from the early 1980s RAF operations could be divided between the more complex attacks carried out by the fifteen to twenty-five full-time terrorists at the top or 'commando' level of the group, and easier operations carried out by the second-rank 'Illegal Militants' or 'Resistance' level RAF members. He states that a pattern evolved whereby a commando-level group would attack a high-profile target and release a communique which set out current ideological thinking, and that resistance-level terrorists would follow this prompt with a cluster of attacks against lower-profile material targets of a related nature.⁵¹ Thus, the assassination in July 1986 of a board member of a major West German company with links to the arms trade, was followed by a series of bomb attacks on companies or buildings associated with NATO or the armaments industry.⁵² Such a cluster of attacks, labelled an 'offensive' by the RAF, would then peter out until the next 'offensive'.

A constant feature of the RAF strategy was the attacks aimed at the US presence in Germany. Whilst the terrorist's protest was primarily against the alleged iniquities of imperialist military activities in the Third World rather than the American presence in Germany as such, the German-based US forces provided a readily available and, to the terrorists, appropriate symbol of the American-centred imperialist system. Thus, most of these RAF attacks were against US military facilities rather than other symbolic American targets.

The first operation where the RAF deliberately caused a pre-planned fatality - as opposed to killing police officers whilst resisting arrest - occurred in March 1972 when a bomb killed an American Colonel and wounded thirteen other people at Fifth US Army Corps HQ near Frankfurt. A communique condemned "US imperialists" for bombing North Vietnam and stated:

West Germany and West Berlin are no longer a safe hinterland for the extermination strategy in Vietnam. ... there will no longer be any place in the world where they

51) D.Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group ", 49.

52) D.Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group ", 68-69, 84-85.

can be safe from attacks by the revolutionary guerrilla units.⁵³

In May 1972 another bomb killed three US soldiers, this time at the HQ of the US Army Europe in Heidelberg. The communique which followed also alluded to the American presence in Vietnam.⁵⁴

Following the suicide of the RAF's founding first generation of leaders in 1976 and 1977, the pattern of anti-American attacks was continued by a second generation of leaders. The initial attacks included two attempts to kill senior US generals (Haig in 1979, Kroezen in 1981), and there were also attacks on US military installations and other NATO facilities in West Germany. Later, during the ninth RAF hunger-strike in the prisons between December 4th 1984 and February 2nd 1985, the second-rank Resistance level of the RAF carried out thirty-eight bombings and incendiary attacks, half of which were directed against NATO facilities.⁵⁵ The most lethal anti-NATO/US attack in the 1980s took place on August 7th and 8th 1985 when an RAF commando-level unit killed a US serviceman to obtain his identity documents, and used them to gain access to the US air-base at Rhein-Main, where they left a car-bomb which killed two people and injured about twenty.⁵⁶ The RAF justified the attack - in the face of criticism from supporters of an ordinary US serviceman - by claiming that the air base was a centre for the organisation of US-inspired wars in the Third World, and that the serviceman concerned had chosen to join the American armed services.⁵⁷ More recently a non-military American

53) D.Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group ", 57. B.A.Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 298.

54) B.A.Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 299. D.Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group ", 59.

55) H.Horchem. "The Decline of the Red Army Faction", 66.

56) B.A.Scharlau. "Chronology of Major Events", (Unpublished manuscript, 1992). B.A.Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 305. D.Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group ", 67-68.

57) B.A.Scharlau. "Chronology of Major Events". B.A.Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 305. D.Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group", 67-68.

target was attacked in February 1991 when an RAF group strafed the US Embassy in Bonn with gunfire. This occurred during the Second Gulf War where US forces were taking the prominent role in the war against Iraq, and the subsequent communique accused the USA of "... taking the lead in the war of extermination against the Iraqi people".⁵⁸

Whilst a constant series of anti-American attacks can be seen in Table 4.1 other aspects of the RAF's campaign have lasted for shorter periods. In the initial phase of the campaign in 1970-1971, when the group was led by the founder members, the RAF devoted much of their activity to carrying out robberies. These included bank robberies intended to obtain money, break-ins at two town halls in order to obtain blank official documents and official stamps, and the theft of weapons from a US Army base. This is an understandable feature in the setting up of a terrorist group which - at this stage - had little outside support and few resources of their own. Horchem refers to the period 1970 to 1972 as the RAF's 'logistic build-up'.⁵⁹ A slight resurgence of such activities can be seen in three robberies during the period 1982 to 1984, presumably to make up for the weapons, documents, and money seized in the police raids which followed the arrest of the 'second generation' leadership.⁶⁰

In addition to seeking to obtain material resources, the RAF also tried to free imprisoned comrades following the capture of many of the founder members of the group. This was a reflection upon the effectiveness of the sophisticated internal security apparatus which the Federal German Government put into place during the 1970s and maintained thereafter.⁶¹ However it also represented a partial shift

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- 58) D.Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group ", 76.
B.A.Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 308.
- 59) H.J.Horchem. Terrorism in West Germany, (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1986), 15.
- 60) D.Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group ", 48.
- 61) B.A.Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 198-225. H.J.Horchem. Terrorism in West Germany, 15-17. For a highly critical account of the development of internal security measures in West Germany see S.Cobler. Law, Order and Politics in West Germany, (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1978).

from the original strategic objectives of the group, to an attempt to satisfy the logistical and emotional requirements of the group by freeing their colleagues.

The heavy targeting of criminal justice personnel between 1972 and 1977 - relative to the small total number of RAF actions - is indicative of the pressure to free the prisoners which the RAF wished to place upon the judicial and legal system. Other operations whose objective was to secure the release of prisoners included an embassy siege (Stockholm, April 1975), the assassination of the Federal Prosecutor General (Siegfried Buback, April 1977), and two abductions (the banker Juergen Ponto - killed during the attempt in July 1977; the industrialist and employers' leader Hans-Martin Schleyer - abducted in September 1977 and killed the following month). In the case of the abductions the RAF emulated the successful example of the June 2nd Movement in West Berlin. In February 1975 the B2J had secured the release of imprisoned comrades, the payment of a ransom, and a great deal of publicity, when they kidnapped Peter Lorenz, the Christian Democrat candidate in the West Berlin mayoral elections.⁶²

After the failure to obtain the release of the imprisoned RAF leaders, and the suicides in prison of Meinhof in 1976 and Baader, Ensslin and Raspe in 1977, attacks aimed at obtaining the release of prisoners abated.⁶³ Nevertheless, concern with the prison issue did not disappear. Both Pluchinsky and Scharlau note that RAF communiques following attacks often complained about the conditions in which prisoners were held, and a high proportion of attacks occurred during or soon after the frequent hunger strikes by imprisoned RAF members. In March 1993 the RAF blew up a prison being constructed near Darmstadt to demonstrate their concern regarding prison conditions.⁶⁴ Scharlau also notes that for the RAF the hunger strikes performed the function of

62) S.Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group, 286-288, 435. P.Taylor. States of Terror, 74-75. A.P.Schmid & J.de Graaf. Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media, (London: Sage, 1982), 48-49.

63) H.Horchem. "The Decline of the Red Army Faction", 65.

64) P.Taylor. States of Terror, 189. J.Schmeidel. "My Enemy's Enemy", 69 n.2.

politicising and mobilising sympathisers to the point that some joined the group.⁶⁵

Logistical factors like gaining funds or the release of prisoners were not the only considerations which led to some aspects of RAF strategy being emphasised more than others. Ideological imperatives also led to changes in strategy as reflected by the types of target attacked. In the mid 1980s the RAF attempted to form, and lead, an alliance of western European communist terrorist groups. This was in line with their belief that the capitalist powers were seeking to create a strong western Europe as an economic and military pillar of the imperialist world order. RAF communiques from the mid 1980s onwards often sought to portray their operations as attacks upon European capitalism and contained frequent calls to other groups to act together against western European capitalism and imperialism.⁶⁶ They appear to have reached a working arrangement with the French communist terrorist group Direct Action (AD - Action Directe) and - concerning theoretical matters at least - with the BR/PCC in Italy to operate as a 'West European guerrilla'.⁶⁷

This 'West European guerilla' strategy was combined with an RAF campaign of attacks against what it termed the 'Military-Industrial Complex' (MIC), an interdependent and overlapping series of political, official, military, and business institutions with links to the military, to NATO, or to the nuclear industry. According to the RAF:

The military-industrial complex (MIC) is of decisive importance in the following areas which are central to

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- 65) D.Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group ", 50-51, 54. B.A.Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 61-62, 93-99, 101.
- 66) D.Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group ", 49-50, 74, 75. H.Horchem. "The Decline of the Red Army Faction", 69-70.
- 67) Red Army Faction & Direct Action. "RAF and Direct Action communique of January 1985 entitled 'For the unity of West European revolutionaries", Red Brigades/Fighting Communist Party & Red Army Faction. "Joint Communique: PCC with Red Army Faction, dated September 1988". Both in Y.Alexander & D.Pluchinsky (eds). Europe's Red Terrorists.

capitalist reconstruction: research and production of new technologies, electronics, and weapons war economy.⁶⁸

Whilst this reflected the ideological preoccupations of the RAF, in view of East German support for the RAF it should be noted that this interpretation also accorded with the Warsaw Pact aim of destabilising support for NATO and frustrating the build-up of American nuclear weapons in western Europe.

In addition to attacks on military facilities, the RAF also attacked companies and individuals within companies or government service whom the RAF deemed to be part of the MIC. This can be seen in the series of attacks on business targets from the mid 1980s onwards. For example, on February 1st 1985 two RAF members shot Ernst Zimmerman, the chairman of the Federal Association of the German Aeronautics, Space, and Armaments Industry and also chairman of the Munich Motor Turbine Union (MTU) - a company which made parts for tanks.⁶⁹ The subsequent communique outlined the thinking behind their MIC strategy and explained why Zimmerman was killed:

[The Federal Association of which Zimmerman was chairman] had the function to push through the interests of the MIC here in this state, on the Western European level, and thus on the international level. By attacking the pillars of imperialist power in the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany]/Western Europe, we take a hand in the mounting crisis and determine its course and its solution for the offensive war of the liberation.⁷⁰

A week earlier a French communist group, Direct Action, had assassinated General Rene Audran - Director of the International Affairs section of the French Ministry of Defence, and responsible for French arms sales abroad, contract negotiations, and international arms cooperation. AD saw him as representing the growth of Franco-German political and military cooperation. Symbolically the AD communique was in French and German and Horchem believes that the Audran and Zimmerman attacks were coordinated.⁷¹ If so this is an

68) D.Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group ", 66.

69) D.Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group ", 66.
B.A.Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 97.

70) D.Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group ", 66.

71) Direct Action. "Communique on the assassination of General Rene Audran, Director of International Affairs at the French Ministry of Defence in Paris on 25

example of the way in which objectives connected to different strands of the RAF strategy could be fulfilled by a single attack. As well as an attack on the military-industrial complex, the Zimmerman and Audran attacks represented the practical working of the 'Western European guerrilla' approach. Both aspects of the attacks were highlighted in the relevant communiques where the RAF and AD highlighted their view of the role of the military-industrial complex, and advertised the existence of the Western European Guerrilla.

Subsequently, in July 1986, the RAF assassinated Karl-Heinz Beckurts, a company director of Siemens and chairman of an industrial working group on nuclear energy. Their communique claimed that Beckurts and the companies he worked for represented:

... the concentrated power and aggression of the most reactionary factions of the bourgeoisie organized by the military-industrial complex.⁷²

Attacks against material targets from the middle 1980s were also often against business targets which the RAF deemed to be connected to the MIC. For instance, on July 24th 1986 an RAF unit bombed a laser research institute, wrongly thinking that it was involved in research concerning the American anti-intercontinental missile laser-defence system, called the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) and unofficially known as 'Star Wars'. The following day another RAF group bombed the premises of Dornier Aerospace. In mid-September 1986 an RAF bomb exploded in a Munich office building housing the offices of Panavia Aircraft and a number of NATO-related agencies.⁷³

Not all of the attacks against the concept of a powerful western Europe were directed against business

January 1985", Y.Alexander & D.Pluchinsky (eds). Europe's Red Terrorists. M.Dartnell. "France's Action Directe: Terrorists in Search of a Revolution", Terrorism and Political Violence, 2, no. 4, (Winter 1990), 472-473. H.Horchem. "The Decline of the Red Army Faction", 68.

72) D.Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group ", 69.

73) B.A.Scharlau. "Chronology of Major Events", (Unpublished manuscript, 1992). B.A.Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 306. D.Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group ", 84-85.

targets. In October 1986 an RAF commando-level unit shot dead Gerold von Braunmuehl, the head of the political unit at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In their communique the RAF deemed the victim:

... one of the central figures in the formation of Western Europe's policies in the imperialist system as a whole.⁷⁴

The communique accused NATO and various European institutions of implementing the "strategic, political, economic, and military plans and projects of the imperialistic bourgeoisie of Western Europe".⁷⁵ Thus, whilst the overall objective of the RAF remained constant - the overthrow of the system of imperialism and world capitalism, the emphasis placed on attacking different aspects of that system varied over time.

In the final stage of the RAF's existence, before its seeming dissolution in the early 1990s, the group struck at people and institutions which it saw as representing the rise of a more powerful united Germany as part of a powerful, imperialist, western Europe. The killing in April 1991 of Detlev Rohwedder, the head of the agency responsible for privatising state industries in the former East Germany, was the most graphic illustration of this aspect of the RAF's campaign.⁷⁶ First the RAF made the ritualistic denouncement of Rohwedder as having been involved in the export of arms and uranium, and of ruthless management practices at the chemical giant Hoechst. The communique proceeded to accuse him of carrying out the German Government's desire to destroy the security provided for ordinary people by the existing economic and social structure in East Germany in order to make it suitable for domination by the capitalist system.⁷⁷ The communique went on to condemn plans for a nationalistic 'Greater Germany', to condemn the soulless materialism which the RAF believed was being forced upon the people of the

74) D.Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group ", 70.

75) D.Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group ", 70.

76) "East German reform hit by murder of privatisation chief", The Times, April 3rd 1991.

77) Red Army Faction. "Communique on the Assassination of Detlev Rohwedder, President of Treuhandanstalt, in Dusseldorf on 1 April 1991", Y.Alexander & D.Pluchinsky (eds). Europe's Red Terrorists, 81-82.

former East Germany, and to oppose the imperialist domination of the Third World. The communique summed up much of the RAF philosophy when it concluded:

ACHIEVE THE CONDITIONS FOR HUMANE AND SELF-DETERMINED LIFE IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE REACTIONARY GREATER GERMAN AND WESTERN EUROPEAN PLANS FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF PEOPLE HERE AND IN THE THIRD WORLD.

Red Army Faction
4 April 1991⁷⁸

This statement reaffirmed the RAF's anti-imperialism, its opposition to capitalism at home and abroad, and the importance placed on revolutionary struggles in the Third World.

With the fall of communism in central and eastern Europe in 1989, and the reunification of Germany in 1990, the RAF were hamstrung by the fact that these areas were no longer available as a safe haven. In April 1992, in the wake of conciliatory comments from the German Interior Minister, Klaus Kinkel, an RAF communique offered to end the campaign.⁷⁹ They conceded that their campaign of assassination had exacerbated the situation which the RAF sought to oppose, and had failed to mobilise widespread support. However, they demanded the release of RAF prisoners in ill-health or who had been imprisoned for long periods, and that remaining RAF prisoners should be held together until their release. Since then an RAF bomb demolished a prison being constructed near Darmstadt in March 1993, whilst in July 1993 an RAF member and a member of the GSG9 anti-terrorist squad were killed in a shoot-out at Bad Kleinen in north-eastern Germany.⁸⁰ The RAF appears to have become dormant - at least for the time being.

78) Red Army Faction. "Communique on the Assassination of Detlev Rohwedder", 84.

79) B.A.Scharlau & D.Philips. "Not the End of German Left-Wing Terrorism", Terrorism and Political Violence, 4, no. 3, (Autumn 1992), 110-115. Red Army Faction. "Communique, dated 10 April 1992, offering to Suspend the RAF's terrorist Campaign against the German State", Y.Alexander & D.Pluchinsky (eds). Europe's Red Terrorists, 85-89.

80) "Shooting mystery tarnishes German anti-terrorist squad", The Independent, July 6th 1993. "Elite squad faces the axe", The European, July 8th-11th 1993. "Bonn 'errors' in shoot-out", The Independent, August 19th 1993. P.Taylor. States of Terror, 189. J.Schmeidel. "My Enemy's Enemy", 69 n.2.

A few points can be made about the RAF's strategy and the way in which this affected target selection. The most important point to note is that the RAF's leaders saw their role as to highlight the iniquities of the capitalist and imperialist system by the use of violence so as to stimulate potential revolutionaries around the world. At the same time they often sought to highlight specific issues - for instance, the Vietnam War, the treatment of RAF prisoners, or poverty in the Third World - as a part of their overall campaign. In order to do this they had to gain attention by selecting high-profile targets for attack. Relatively few of their pre-planned attacks aimed at threat elimination. They only eliminated immediate threats such as police officers who were about to capture the terrorists. Likewise, none of their attacks were aimed at enforcing the compliance of the public to the RAF's demands, or even of specific parts of the public, with the exception of robberies and operations intended to put pressure upon the authorities to release RAF prisoners. The strategic objectives of the RAF were to advertise their cause and to gain the endorsement of revolutionaries elsewhere with a view to increasing support and gaining recruits.

In order to achieve these goals it made sense to attack high-profile human targets, even though these were often more heavily protected than other targets. Of the thirteen men against whom the RAF carried out pre-planned attacks, six were protected by bodyguards.⁸¹ As will be seen later, this pattern of target selection has not been the case with other groups, where there is generally a discernible shift over time towards attacking softer targets. With the RAF however, it seems likely that because their relatively small manpower limited the number of operations which the group could carry out, they had to ensure that a high proportion of these attacks were spectacular enough to gain widespread attention. The relatively limited scope of what they deemed to be legitimate targets ruled out the easier options of gaining publicity by carrying out mass casualty attacks against civilian targets, so instead they attacked high-profile

81) D.Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group ", 55.

targets with a high symbolic value , which included ordinary members of the US military.

Even though their manpower was limited, their record in attacking heavily protected human targets shows that they had both the weaponry and the technical expertise to carry out such operations successfully. This may have been attributable to a degree to the help which they received from Palestinian terrorists and from East German agencies. Pluchinsky seems to consider that the RAF has not been particularly successful with eleven out of twenty-four operations being considered tactical or operational failures (that is either the operation failed in its immediate objective - such as killing a specific person, or in its longer-term objective - such as trading a hostage for imprisoned comrades).⁸² Suffice to say that if a similar percentage of PIRA operations had been successful they would have decimated the security forces in Northern Ireland.

There were relatively few attacks upon law enforcement personnel. As mentioned, the RAF did not attack ordinary police officers as a matter of policy. They did, however, carry out attacks against high-profile law enforcement targets. For example in August 1975 the group set up a multiple rocket-launcher opposite the Federal Prosecutor's office in Karlsruhe - though this did not go off, and in July 1990 detonated a car bomb in an attempt to kill the State Secretary with responsibility for internal security at the Ministry of the Interior.⁸³ However these were both highly symbolic targets. It is curious that the RAF did not seriously target police investigators or intelligence personnel, given the threat posed by the security apparatus, but it seems likely that the group did not view them as a threat which needed to be eliminated. Also, they might have

82) D.Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group ", 55-56. In this article Pluchinsky states a 45% success rate, but as he considers eleven out of twenty-four operations were tactical or operational failures (roughly 45%), it would seem that the remaining thirteen (roughly 55%) were successes.

83) D.Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group ", 61-62, 74-75. B.A.Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 302, 308.

seen attacks on the police as a diversion of scarce manpower resources which could be better used against targets where the results would be more beneficial to their cause.

In sum, the overall strategy of the RAF was geared to obtaining as much publicity as possible for both their overall cause - worldwide communism and anti-imperialism, and to highlight specific issues. In doing this they had to make effective use of their slender manpower and rather more ample weaponry and technical expertise. This resulted in a campaign with a high proportion of tactically difficult attacks on high-profile human targets together with a greater number of attacks on softer material targets. However, whilst the RAF's campaign was successful in advertising the issues with which the RAF was concerned, it was unsuccessful in gaining the endorsement of many people either within or outside Germany. Overall the terrorist campaign was - as the RAF admitted in their last communique - unsuccessful in terms of achieving their political objectives.⁸⁴ Given the breadth of the RAF's political objective - the overthrow of capitalism around the world - it could be argued that no strategy would have succeeded, but it is true to say that even as a means of mobilising support for the cause, the RAF's strategy was remarkably unsuccessful.

Whilst an examination of the RAF's strategy is instructive in terms of showing how strategy can affect target selection, it would be wrong to promote this particular group as a particular model from which universal lessons can be drawn. Other terrorist groups have operated under different circumstances and with different opportunities. To gain a balanced perspective on the influence of strategy upon target selection these need to be considered.

The effect of strategy on target selection.

It is important to understand how the strategic objectives which terrorists set themselves may determine their selection of targets. To maximise the likelihood of

84) B.A.Scharlau & D.Philips. "Not the End of German Left-Wing Terrorism". Red Army Faction. "Communique, dated 10 April 1992, offering to Suspend the RAF's terrorist Campaign against the German State".

achieving their strategic objectives terrorists have to select their targets with a degree of care. It can prove difficult to gauge precisely what the reaction will be to a terrorist act, or to the terrorist's strategy. Terrorist attacks might not produce the desired effect and may prove counter-productive if they alienate actual or prospective supporters.

The degree of strategic planning involved can vary between groups. Some groups or individuals use terrorism where the violence is primarily an expressive act rather than one which aims to influence other people's behaviour. In such cases one could say that the psychological target of the terrorist act is the terrorist himself. The previously mentioned French anarchists of the 1890s are an example of people using terrorist violence primarily as a means of personal catharsis rather than as part of a planned strategy. Similarly, racial attacks by European fascist terrorists in the 1990s seem to have been motivated more by a desire to cause pain to immigrants, non-whites, and non-conformists, rather than by any clearly discernible strategic thought.⁸⁵

The strategic objectives of other terrorist groups appear to be planned in great detail and are heavily derived from the ideological preconceptions of the group. An example of this can be seen in the attempts of the Peruvian communist group Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso - SL) to apply strategic principles derived from the writings of Mao Tse-tung.⁸⁶

The basis of Mao's theories is the use of guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare is a form of warfare where semi-formed military formations seek to wear the enemy down with hit-and-run attacks, whilst avoiding full-scale battles, until the enemy is so weak that he can be defeated in open battle. Guerrilla warfare is not the same as terrorism in

85) T.Bjorgo. "Terrorist Violence against Immigrants and Refugees in Scandanavia: Patterns and Motives", 38-39. Hasselbach suggests that longer-term planning has started to evolve amongst German and Austrian neo-Nazis. See I.Hasselbach & T.Reiss. Fuhrer-Ex: Memoirs of a Former Neo-Nazi, (London: Chatto & Windus, 1996), 274-276.

86) Mao Tse-tung. "Problems of strategy in China's Revolutionary War", Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, volume 1. Mao Tse-tung. "On Protracted War", and "Problems of strategy in guerrilla war against Japan", both in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, volume 2.

that the guerrilla's objective is ultimately to defeat the enemy in battle, either by themselves or with the assistance of other existing military forces.⁸⁷ Terrorism by itself cannot achieve such a military victory and is primarily intended to have a psychological effect. However, terrorism is often used by groups involved in guerrilla warfare.

The Maoist model of rural guerrilla insurgency was based on the assumption that the population of 1930s China consisted mainly of the rural peasantry. In contrast to the concentration on urban workers by Marx and Lenin, Mao saw the peasantry as a potentially revolutionary class. He believed that the role of the Chinese Communist Party was to mobilise the peasants in the areas where the communists had a presence. These formed fairly secure safe havens or base areas where the communist forces were relatively safe from attack and could assemble supplies and gain recruits.⁸⁸ Giap - who put many of Mao's ideas into practice in against the French, Americans, and South Vietnamese authorities in Vietnam - points out that one way of securing such an area once occupied was to kill opponents - termed 'traitors', and to gain public support by eliminating unpopular people such as landlords.⁸⁹ Once the safe area was secured the communists could start forming sizeable armed forces - both guerrillas and the regular 'Red' Army - to fight their opponents. Given the disparity between the initially weak communist forces, and the more powerful opposition, the aim of the communists was to stay on the defensive militarily, avoiding clashes where the Red Army could be destroyed in its entirety. Once the opposition had over-extended its forces in pursuing both the Red Army and the communist guerrillas, the Red Army would

87) W.Laqueur. The Age of Terrorism, 147-148.

88) Mao Tse-tung. "On correcting mistaken ideas in the Party", 106. Mao Tse-tung. "Problems of strategy in China's Revolutionary War", 192. Mao Tse-tung. "Report of an investigation of the peasant movement in Hunan". Mao Tse-tung. "Pay attention to economic work", 129-136. Mao Tse-tung. "Be concerned with the well-being of the masses, pay attention to methods of work", 146, 149. Mao Tse-tung. "On correcting mistaken ideas in the Party", all in Selected Works, volume 1, 106. "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party", Selected Works, volume 2, 323.

89) V.N.Giap. People's War People's Army: The Viet Công Insurrection Manual for Underdeveloped Countries, (New York: Praeger, 1962; Bantam, 1968), 17, 83.

be able to push back the enemy offensive, thus gaining more time to consolidate.⁹⁰ At the same time the communists would go on the offensive politically, increasing their support amongst the peasantry, thus increasing their material resources and manpower.⁹¹

Mao's strategy for the communists to build up their own forces whilst wearing down those of the opposition, meant that the war would take on the pattern of an initial defensive phase, during which the communists avoided defeat, followed by a period of equilibrium during which the communists consolidated their hold in the countryside and built up their regular forces. Finally the Red Army - now militarily superior - would take the offensive, penning the enemy into the towns and finally defeating him in open battle.⁹²

Ironically, bearing in mind the school of followers which he acquired, Mao was particularly insistent that whilst one could adopt some useful ideas from other conflicts, one could not derive universal strategic precepts from the specific circumstances of a particular conflict.⁹³ For Mao the relevant factors included the vast geographical size of China, the social and economic development of the country, and the relative strength of the enemy compared to the forces of the Chinese Communist Party.⁹⁴ This emphasis upon the particular circumstances of a conflict is relevant to the Peruvian example because the case of the Shining Path demonstrates how the Maoist model has been adapted to the circumstances of the conflict in Peru.

The Shining Path has conducted a rural revolutionary strategy which has broadly been based on the Maoist model.

90) Mao Tse-tung. "Problems of strategy in China's Revolutionary War", 211-220.

91) Mao Tse-tung. "Problems of strategy in China's Revolutionary War", 202. Mao Tse-tung. "Problems of strategy in guerrilla war against Japan", 84.

92) Mao Tse-tung. "Problems of strategy in China's Revolutionary War", 213. Mao Tse-tung. "Problems of strategy in guerrilla war against Japan", 85. Mao Tse-tung. "On Protracted War", 136-140.

93) M.Tse-tung. "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War", 179, 181, 189. M.Tse-tung. "On Protracted War", 121.

94) M.Tse-tung. "On Protracted War", 197-198.

Indeed the original SL leader, Abimael Guzman, sees himself as the ideological successor to Mao.⁹⁵ However, SL has also grafted on elements of the grievances and beliefs of the Andean Quechua indians in order to construct and maintain a base of support in Ayacucho province, and has undertaken urban operations.⁹⁶

As Mao prescribes, Guzman spent a great deal of time in building up a support base for SL amongst the rural population in Ayacucho. From the formation of SL in 1970, until the start of the violence in 1980, Guzman built up an organisation, working full-time on the project from 1976 onwards.⁹⁷ Since 1980 SL has fought what it has termed 'A War of Little Wars' or as Smith describes it:

... a thousand little wars spread across the Andes. Each skirmish is fought on its own terms, without the adversaries necessarily being aware that war has broken out ... The oppressor is not an abstract regime but the priest, the schoolteacher, the judge, the police officer, the engineer, or the government bureaucrat.⁹⁸

Some of the targets which would be selected in a traditional Maoist campaign have been attacked by SL. Smith notes that when estimating the possibilities of operating in a particular area, the SL will find out who is the most unpopular person in the community, and also which people are the most respected. The former will be killed, whilst the

95) S.Strong. Shining Path: The World's Deadliest Revolutionary Force, (London: Harper Collins, 1992), 71.

96) S.Strong. Shining Path, 29, 40-43, 71, 75-76, 84-85, 91, 99-102. M.L.Smith. "Taking the High Ground: Shining Path and the Andes", G.Gorritti. "Shining Path's Stalin and Trotsky", both in D.S.Palmer (ed). Shining Path of Peru, (London: Hurst & Co, 1992), 19-20, 27, 151. T.D.Mason & J.Swartzfager. "Land Reform and the Rise of Sendero Luminoso in Peru", 529. W.A.Hazleton & S.Woy-Hazleton. "Sendero Luminoso: A Communist Party Crosses a River of Blood", Terrorism and Political Violence, 4, no.2, (Summer 1992), 68.

97) S.Strong. Shining Path, 36-39. W.A.Hazleton & S.Woy-Hazleton. "Sendero Luminoso", 66-68.

98) M.L.Smith. "Taking the High Ground: Shining Path and the Andes", 19-20.

latter will be persuaded or pressurised into cooperation or at least neutrality, or else made to leave.⁹⁹ Locally unpopular targets such as landlords, shopkeepers and administrators, have been killed by the Shining Path.¹⁰⁰

Where a rural village or religious community has opposed the Shining Path, or development programmes and facilities have been started which might act as an alternative focus of loyalty, the organisation has carried out attacks and in some instances large-scale massacres as a demonstration of the consequences of non-compliance.¹⁰¹ Furthermore, because of the growth of the Peruvian capital, Lima, SL has organised urban cells, and has tried to develop social programmes - whilst attacking those organised by other bodies - in order to mobilise support amongst the poor migrants from country areas. In addition, indiscriminate car bombs were detonated in Lima in the early 1990s with the aim of creating chaos, the objective being to loosen the hold of the authorities over the population by threatening the security of ordinary people.¹⁰² These terrorist activities are in addition to guerrilla attacks upon the Peruvian Police and Army which aim to expel the institutions and influence of

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- 99) M.L.Smith. "Taking the High Ground: Shining Path and the Andes", 25.
- 100) R.H.Berg, "Peasant Responses to Shining Path in Andahuaylas", 93. T.D.Mason & J.Swartzfager. "Land Reform and the Rise of Sendero Luminoso in Peru", 531.
- 101) "In the killing fields of Peru", The Guardian, supplement, April 6th 1994. S.Strong. Shining Path, 148-149, 181, 183. B.J.Isbell. "Shining Path and Peasant Responses in Rural Ayacucho", D.S.Palmer (ed). Shining Path of Peru, 73-74. R.H.Berg, "Peasant Responses to Shining Path in Andahuaylas", 92. T.D.Mason & J.Swartzfager. "Land Reform and the Rise of Sendero Luminoso in Peru", 531. S.Woy-Hazleton & W.A.Hazleton. "Shining Path and the Marxist Left", D.S.Palmer (ed). Shining Path of Peru, 216.
- 102) "Peru's guerrillas make slum into a 'shining example'", The Independent, November 30th 1991. "Car bomb kills 18 as Maoists extend terror tactics to Lima", The Times, July 18th 1992. "Terror grips Peru's capital as rebels take on the state", The Guardian, August 17th 1992. "The end of a long march down the Shining Path", The Independent, October 3rd 1992. S.Woy-Hazleton & W.A.Hazleton. "Shining Path and the Marxist Left", 214. M.L.Smith. "Shining Path's Urban Strategy: Ate Vitarte", D.S.Palmer (ed). Shining Path of Peru, (London: Hurst & Co, 1992), 127-128, 136, 138.

the Peruvian state from areas which SL intends to take over with a final view to taking Lima itself.¹⁰³

SL has maintained its broad allegiance to Maoist principles, but in co-opting some of the concerns of the Andean Indians, and by extending its operations to Lima, the Shining Path has also adopted Mao's advice to fit strategy to the political and social realities of the existing situation. In terms of target selection SL has sought to follow Maoist strategy in building up initial support in the countryside with a view to isolating the cities, but has used methods of a far greater brutality than Mao or Giap were willing to concede - in writing at least.

An example of the effect of strategic considerations at the other end of the ideological spectrum can be seen in the case of fascist terrorists in Italy. Table 4.2 shows a number of the mass casualty bomb attacks carried out by fascist groups or linked groups from the late 1960s onwards. In his account of the activities of the fascist terrorist Stefano Delle Chiaie, Stuart Christie cites a 1969 document concerning the so-called 'strategy of tension' from one of the Italian groups to the Aginter Press, a fascist front organisation in Lisbon. This states:

Our belief is that the first phase of political activity ought to be to create the conditions favouring the installation of chaos in all of the regime's structures. This should necessarily begin with the undermining of the state's economy as a whole so as to arrive at confusion throughout the whole legal apparatus. This leads on to a situation of strong political tension, fear in the world of industry and hostility towards the government and the political parties.¹⁰⁴

The document makes it clear that these actions are to be carried out in such a way as to implicate 'communist and pro-Chinese' organisations.¹⁰⁵ In fact the first suspects arrested for the explosion in the Banca Nazionale dell'Agricoltura in the Piazza Fontana, Milan, on September

103) S.Strong. Shining Path, 110, 121-122, 135-136.

104) S.Christie. Stefano Delle Chiaie, 32. Willan dates the document from November 1968. P.Willan. Puppet Masters, 23.

105) S.Christie. Stefano Delle Chiaie, 32.

12th 1969, were anarchists although the likely culprits were fascists.¹⁰⁶

TABLE 4.2
LETHAL MASS CASUALTY BOMB ATTACKS AGAINST CIVILIAN TARGETS
IN ITALY WHERE FASCIST GROUPS OR MAFIA ARE THE SUSPECTS.

Date	Location	Dead	Injured
December 12th 1969	Lobby of National Agricultural Bank, Milan.	17	88
May 28th 1974	Anti-fascist rally, Piazza della Loggia, Brescia.	8	94
August 4th 1974	Bologna - Florence <i>Italicus</i> train, tunnel near Bologna.	12	105
August 1st 1980	Second-class waiting room, Bologna railway station.	85	177
December 23rd 1984	Naples - Milan <i>Rapido 904</i> train, tunnel near Bologna.	15	267
May 27th 1993	Car bomb outside Uffizi Gallery, Florence.	5	30
July 27th 1993	Car bomb outside Royal Villa Art Gallery, Milan.	5	20

Source: A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 21. "Uffizi gallery blast strikes at heart of Italian culture", The Times, May 28th 1993. "Italians blame shadowy powers for bringing terror to Florence", The Independent on Sunday, May 30th 1993. "Italian bombings leave five dead", The Times, July 28th 1993. "President says bombs will not halt renewal", The Independent, July 29th 1993. "Executive held over Uffizi bomb", The European, February 8th-14th 1996. N.B. The casualty figures vary slightly from one account to another particularly with regard to the number of people injured.

As well as corresponding with the strategic objectives of the Italian fascists' groups, such a strategy is perfectly in line with the dictates of fascist ideology. It corresponds to the idea that the mass of people are manipulable, what Hitler called "... a herd of sheep and blockheads".¹⁰⁷ Also, the idea that a crisis is necessary before the fascists seize power accords with the situation in Italy in 1922 and Germany in the early 1930s. In those cases the crisis was genuine, and was aggravated and exploited by the use of fascist street violence.¹⁰⁸ For later breeds of fascists, the necessary widespread anxiety was to be created by the destruction of everyday security due to seemingly arbitrary explosions.

106) A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 22, 60. P.Willan Puppet Masters, 123.

107) A.Hitler. Mein Kampf, 73.

108) D.Mack Smith. Mussolini, 56-65. A.Bullock. Hitler, 187-250.

Their hope was that this would propel the public to turn to a strong leader or provoke a military coup.¹⁰⁹

Additional attacks have been carried out with the apparent aim of causing several fatalities but with less success. For example on the same day in December 1969 as the bomb in Milan, another bomb failed to explode in another Milanese bank, and three bombs went off in Rome injuring fourteen people but without causing fatalities.¹¹⁰ Similarly, in Rome in the early hours of July 28th 1993, bombs at the Basilica of St John Lateran and at the church of San Giorgio in Velabro injured a total of eighteen people.¹¹¹

A report at the time of the bomb outside the Uffizi Gallery in Florence in May 1993 linked the type of explosive used there to that used in the bomb on the *Rapido 904* train in December 1984, and in the Mafia assassination of the Sicilian anti-Mafia magistrate Judge Giovanni Falcone in May 1992.¹¹² Shawcross and Young suggest that the *Rapido 904* bombing was possibly carried out in order to divert attention from the activities of the Mafia, by a group which included fascist terrorists, the Mafia, and the Camorra.¹¹³ This, together with the likely collusion of elements in the Italian security and criminal justice establishment, indicates probable cooperation between fascist groups and Italian organised criminal groups.¹¹⁴

Such an alliance is not surprising as - with the possible exception of the *Rapido 904* bombing - the attacks have taken place at times of political turbulence when the existing political order, including the apparent immunity of organised criminal groups, was perceived to be at risk. These

109) P. Willan. Puppet Masters, 23. V.S. Pisano. The Dynamics of Subversion and Violence in Contemporary Italy, 51.

110) P. Willan. Puppet Masters, 123.

111) "Italian bombings leave five dead", The Times, July 28th 1993. "President says bombs will not halt renewal", The Independent, July 29th 1993.

112) "Italians blame shadowy powers for bringing terror to Florence", The Independent on Sunday, May 30th 1993.

113) "Mafia terrorist campaign feared", The Independent, May 16th 1993. T. Shawcross & M. Young. Mafia Wars: The Confessions of Tommaso Buscetta, (Glasgow: Fontana, 1988), 299-300. P. Willan. Puppet Masters, 173-177.

114) "Executive held over Uffizi bomb", The European, February 8th-14th 1996. "Italian police arrest the Mafia's 'boss of bosses'", The Independent, May 21st 1996. P. Willan. Puppet Masters, 173-177.

risks consisted of the success of the PCI up to the early 1980s, and from revelations in the early 1990s concerning organised crime and the corruption of the Italian political and business establishment.¹¹⁵ In such a situation the creation of a state of disorientation amongst the public has obvious advantages for the fascist, conservative, and criminal groupings concerned, and would therefore be a highly desirable strategic objective.

For most terrorist groups the elimination of threats, potential threats, and dissidents is an important element of terrorist strategy. However the way in which they are eliminated, and the amount of publicity which their elimination receives is also important and hence may affect target selection, the method of attack, and the way in which an attack or threat is both executed and justified. In his memoirs George Grivas, the commander of the Greek-Cypriot group EOKA in the 1950s, records an order which he gave for the killing of a man who had informed on his colleagues under interrogation.

The execution will be a lesson to everyone, showing that no one may ask for pardon on the excuse that their treachery was due to torture.¹¹⁶

Radio Athens, which strongly supported EOKA's policy of Cypriot union with Greece, aided the group by broadcasting the names of alleged informers, thus bringing communal pressure to bear on dissidents or potential dissidents within the Greek-Cypriot community.¹¹⁷ According to Foley, by mid 1956 EOKA had killed fifty informers, and both Dewar and Paget note the large proportion of Greek-Cypriots killed by the group, an indeterminate number of whom were merely suspected of being informers.¹¹⁸

115) "Last supper at the bribery banquet", The Independent, March 4th 1993. "Rotten to the core", The Independent on Sunday, April 11th 1993. "Andreotti 'was Mafia's man at the heart of the state'", The Guardian, March 30th 1993. "Andreotti accused of ordering murder", The Independent, June 10th 1993. A.Stille. Excellent Cadavers, 390-403.

116) G.Grivas - Dighenis & C.Foley (ed). The Memoirs of General Grivas, (London: Longmans, 1964), 159.

117) C.Foley. Legacy of Strife: Cyprus from Rebellion to Civil War, (London: Longmans, 1962; Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1964), 66.

118) C.Foley. Legacy of Strife, 59. M.Dewar. Brush Fire Wars: Campaigns of the British Army since 1945, (New York: St

As well as dissuading potential informers, EOKA's strategy was intended to exert control over the civil population. The bulk of the Greek-Cypriot population appears to have backed the group willingly, but EOKA also used threats against recalcitrants.¹¹⁹ British products were boycotted on EOKA's orders and, after a dispute over schools flying the Greek flag in defiance of the authorities, children were kept away from the state-run schools.¹²⁰ Crawshaw cites a leaflet which she claims was circulated to parents who continued to send their children to state schools.

With regret we have observed your anti-national behaviour in sending your child to the Technical School where our enemies may corrupt his spirit with their propaganda. There exist out own proper schools which offer Greek culture and education.

If you do not decide to transfer your child to a Greek school then you and your child will be branded as common traitors. Your own name and that of your child will be published so that you will be despised by the people and condemned wherever you may be.

There is still time.

EOKA, 14 July, 1957.¹²¹

Dewar alleges that school headmasters were intimidated by EOKA, and states that by spring 1956, only eighty-one out of 499 elementary schools remained open.¹²² Thus, whilst they could count on majority support within the Greek-Cypriot community, EOKA achieved almost total compliance through the use of threats and violence against dissidents, and maximised the effect by ensuring that such violence was widely publicised.

Summary.

The examples examined in this chapter indicate the effect which strategy can have on terrorist target selection. They show how important ideology is in the formulation of strategic thinking, but ideology is not by itself the only

Martin's Press, 1984), 77. J.Paget. Counter-Insurgency Campaigning, (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), 140, 144.

119) J.Paget. Counter-Insurgency Campaigning, 142-148.

120) N.Crawshaw. The Cyprus Revolt: An account of the struggle for union with Greece, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978), 312. C.Foley. Legacy of Strife, 43, 114.

121) N.Crawshaw. The Cyprus Revolt, 243.

122) M.Dewar. Brush Fire Wars, 73. N.Crawshaw. The Cyprus Revolt, 145.

factor to influence the selection of physical targets. Other factors such as the activities of the security forces, the nature of support for the group, and external political events are also important.

The aim of a terrorist group is to induce a particular response from a chosen psychological target by the use of violence. Whilst the tactical objective is to carry out specific operations successfully, the aim of a group's strategy is to attain the groups longer-term political objectives. A strategy may consist wholly of the use of terrorism, or terrorism may form only part of a broader strategy which includes other methods such as guerrilla warfare or conventional politics.

The role of strategic thinking in terrorist operations varies from one group to another. Some groups, such as the Shining Path, have devised pre-planned overall strategies embracing methods such as guerrilla warfare or overt political activity in addition to terrorism. At the other extreme, other groups, such as some of the racialist groups in Europe, have used terrorism in a spontaneous, unsystematic and haphazard fashion which almost defies the appellation of the term strategy to their activities. Their violence often seems to be expressive and to have no particular end in mind except to cause hurt and fear. Despite this disparity between groups in the level of strategic thought employed, some aspects of terrorist strategy do bear examination in determining the extent to which they might affect terrorist target selection by nearly all terrorist groups.

An important point to note is the centrality of the group's ideology in devising its strategy. By designating legitimate targets, the ideology of the group sets out the parameters within which the group operates. Ideology can also provide terrorists with the outline of a strategy which suggests the types of targets to be attacked. This has particularly been the case with communist groups which have adopted the strategic thought of theorists such as Mao and Marighela. However, as Smith and Bowyer Bell argue in the case of the Provisional IRA, the strategy of other groups may be derived from the ideology and historical background of the

group.¹²³ However, ideology does not by itself determine strategy, and does not determine the selection of targets. Whilst it may be used by the group to determine those targets which it is considered legitimate to attack, it cannot explain why one legitimate target may be chosen over another.

The next factor which affects the selection of targets is the strategic objective or objectives which the terrorists have set themselves - in other words the effect or effects which they wish their violence to achieve. Terrorist's strategies are intended to achieve political objectives. They are designed to maximise the pressure on the psychological target to act in the way which the terrorists desire. Obviously, a group which wishes to disorientate the public will use different methods to one which wishes to gain the positive support or endorsement of the public and accordingly they will choose different targets. Thus, whilst fascist groups in Italy sought to frighten the public into calling for an authoritarian ruler by carrying out the mass-casualty bombings outlined above, communist terrorist groups in the same country sought to gain the support of striking workers by attacking industrial managers, particularly in companies such as Fiat where industrial relations were poor.¹²⁴

In assessing the motive, means, and opportunity which determine terrorist target selection, one can see that the wish to influence the psychological target in a particular way, through an appropriate strategy of violence, provides terrorists with an important motive for their actions. Consequently, strategy - like ideology - can be considered an important part of the terrorist's motive when selecting their targets. However, terrorist strategies are not based purely

123) M.L.R.Smith. Fighting for Ireland?, 139. J.Bowyer Bell, IRA Tactics and Targets, 26-28.

124) G.C.Caselli & D.della Porta. "The history of the Red Brigades: organizational structures and strategies of action (1970-82)", R.Catanzaro (ed). The Red Brigades & Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy, 75. A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 57, 77-79. D.Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 83, 84. Associated Press, October 4th 1979. "A Torino un dirigente FIAT ferito dalle Brigate Rosse Avera suo figlio in braccio", Corriere della Sera, October 5th 1979. C.Schaerf et al. Venti Anni di Violenza in Italia, 842. V.S.Pisano. The Dynamics of Subversion and Violence in Contemporary Italy, 61, 78.

upon motives, but are limited by practical constraints. As the example of the Red Army Faction shows, terrorists have to take into account the constraints placed by their own capabilities, the protection around potential targets, and the environment within which the terrorists have to operate. Whereas abstract strategic thinking deals in the results desired from terrorism, tactics are concerned with the practical means which are used to achieve those results and involve the mechanics of terrorist operations.

Tactics

Introduction.

Although terrorist operations vary in their methods and objectives they usually involve a number of stages. Terrorists may not consciously think of themselves as following these stages, but it is likely that they will include the following stages in their operations.

- Setting up a logistical network (such as safe houses, weapons dumps, identity papers, vehicles).
- Selection of potential targets.
- Gathering information on potential targets.
- Reconnaissance of potential targets.
- Planning an operation.
- Insertion of weapons into the area of operations.
- Insertion of operators into the area of operations.
- Execution of the operation.
- Withdrawal of operational team.
- Issue of communiques.

If the operation is a kidnapping or hijacking then the captivity of the hostage, receipt of ransom or released colleagues, and any other actions, will also have to be dealt with.

Some operations may require a great degree of planning, or may require the acquisition of detailed information, whilst others can be carried out almost on the spur of the moment. Similarly, the planners of an operation may not consciously deal with each stage of an operation because the practices involved are instinctive. Nevertheless, these stages are usually a component of any terrorist operation.

Setting up a logistics network.

The logistics of a terrorist group consist of the support structure necessary to sustain it. A logistics network includes the means to transport weapons and personnel, to house members of the group without arousing suspicion, and generally to allow the group to function. It includes the provision of safe houses, weapons dumps,

vehicles, and whatever identity documents might be appropriate.

For a prolonged terrorist campaign to be sustained at a fairly high level of intensity, some form of logistics network is necessary, so that members of the group have places to stay, places to hide their weapons, and are able to sustain themselves without being discovered. In cases where members of the terrorist group have not yet been detected and forced into clandestinity by the authorities, some of the features of the logistical structure may be superfluous. This has largely been the case with 'part-time' terrorists such as members of the Revolutionary Cells in Germany and the 'irregular' members of the Red Brigades in Italy, who only devote some of their time to terrorist activities.¹ These terrorists can openly lead a relatively ordinary life with somewhere to live and a legal identity, and they have no difficulty in obtaining the ordinary means of sustenance. They can operate as terrorists using their own identity, vehicles, and residences until they are detected. However, once they have been identified as terrorists they can become so dependent upon the logistical infrastructure that it becomes difficult to carry out basic functions of normal life - such as renting or buying accommodation and buying food - without running the risk of detection.²

For this reason some terrorist groups set up a logistics network before they start their campaign of violence. In Cyprus, George Grivas spent the best part of three years setting up the organisation EOKA, and its infrastructure before the terrorist campaign began.³ McKittrick reports that the Provisional IRA is thought to have set up a network of safe houses and weapons dumps in Great Britain in the mid 1980s, soon after they received

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- 1) B.A.Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 42, 61-62. H.J.Horchem. Terrorism in West Germany, 6. A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 78. G.C.Caselli & D.della Porta. "The history of the Red Brigades", 73, 88.
 - 2) J.Bowyer Bell. "Revolutionary Dynamics: The Inherent Inefficiency of the Underground", 202.
 - 3) G.Grivas - Dighenis & C.Foley (ed). The Memoirs of General Grivas, 13-32.

large shipments of weapons and explosives from Libya.⁴ However their campaign of sustained terrorist violence in England did not begin until 1988, after the logistical structure for the campaign had been set up.

Setting up a logistics network for one operation is only necessary when the operation itself is complex. Thus the kidnappings of Moro and Dozier in Italy, and of Schleyer in Germany, necessitated the renting or purchase of flats to be used to hold the abductees whilst negotiations were carried out for the terms of their release. Similarly, in the aftermath of the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi by the LTTE in April 1991, the Indian police unearthed a large network which was set up in order to support the assassination attempt.⁵

On the other hand, for one-off attacks upon targets of opportunity, or for isolated low-intensity attacks, a specifically dedicated logistics structure is not necessary and would probably be an encumbrance. For several vigilante groups, because they are frequently tolerated by the authorities or at least by some of the agencies of the state, the requirements for a clandestine support network are not great. In Colombia, vigilante death squads seem to have operated with a high degree of impunity. Consequently members of these groups would not have had to live a clandestine life.⁶ Likewise, unlike the Provisional IRA and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) was not banned in Northern Ireland until July 1992. As a result, whereas people whom the authorities could prove to be PIRA members - admittedly a difficult task without evidence of terrorist-related activities - had to live clandestine lives as mere membership is an offence, members of the UDA were not so constrained until July 1992.⁷

4) "Semtex stockpile the key to IRA's wider campaign", The Independent, June 4th 1990. "The IRA", The Independent on Sunday, November 22nd 1992. "IRA mainland campaign 'likely to last for years'", The Independent, November 24th 1992.

5) "What One-Eyed Jack knows", The Independent, July 1st 1991. "Entering a Decisive Phase", India Today, February 28th 1995.

6) J.Pearce. Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth, 177, 196, 205.

7) J.Cusack & M.Taylor. The Resurgence of a Terrorist Organization - Part 1: The UDA, A Case Study, Terrorism and Political Violence, 5, no 3 (Autumn 1993), 3.

In contrast, the problems of trying to sustain a clandestine existence provided communist terrorist groups in Italy with some of their greatest problems. Under Italian law, people are required to carry identification documents and there are laws which require that people renting accommodation register the tenants of the residence. This makes it much more difficult to maintain clandestinity and makes it imperative for the group concerned to assemble a network which can allow activists to remain underground in safety.⁸

The selection of potential targets.

A potential target is a person, thing, or category of people or things which the terrorist group may choose to attack, rather than somebody or something which they have chosen to attack. The selection of potential targets is the process by which the group decide which targets they might consider attacking before they have taken into account other factors which determine which targets they will attack.

The selection of a category of people or things as targets need not necessarily be well thought out before an operation takes place. Use of the term 'operation' may give the impression of a meticulously planned and painstakingly organised action. Whilst with a pre-selected target this is normally the case, where a target of opportunity presents itself, there is little if any planning. Provided that the general category of targets has been agreed, in however rudimentary a fashion, it is quite possible that the terrorists will carry out an attack immediately. This has often been the case with Belfast Catholics who have been attacked by loyalist terrorists, or non-Europeans attacked by racialist extremists in some European states.⁹

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- 8) E.MacDonald. Shoot the Women First, 141. G.C.Caselli & D.della Porta. "The history of the Red Brigades", 73. D.Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 55, 145. C.Seton-Watson. "Terrorism in Italy", 103.
- 9) M.Dillon & D.Lehane. Political Murder in Northern Ireland, 29-35. M.Dillon. The Shankill Butchers, *passim*. S.Bruce. The Red Hand, 14, 173-181. For an account and chronology of racialist killings in Europe, including both motiveless attacks and politically directed killings see "Death in Europe: the toll for 1992", Campaign Against Racism & Fascism, (London), 12, (January/February 1993). "Deadly Europe", Campaign

The killing of Jimmy Brown, leader of the republican splinter group known as the Irish People's Liberation Organisation (IPLO), in August 1992, was such an opportunistic attack by a rival within the group. The man who was in a car with Brown, stated that they had pulled up by a man Brown knew when the man unexpectedly produced a gun and shot Brown dead. According to the witness there was no way that the killer could have known that Brown would be there at that time.¹⁰

When operations are pre-planned a number of potential targets may be selected on the basis of their ideological legitimacy as targets with the intention of choosing one of them as the final target after other factors have been considered. This occurred when Aldo Moro was kidnapped by the Red Brigades in March 1978. The Brigadist's aim was to capture a leading politician in order to draw attention to the cause of the Red Brigades, to highlight the impotence of the Italian state, to prevent a political alliance between the Christian Democrats and the Communist Party, and to question a leading Christian Democrat about the corruption which the Red Brigades suspected lay at the heart of the Italian state.¹¹ They also demanded the release of Red Brigadists being held prisoner.¹² However, there had been other potential targets. The BR had considered kidnapping the Prime Minister - Giulio Andreotti, or a former Prime Minister and President of the Senate - Amintore Fanfani.¹³ It was only after the BR decided that Fanfani's personal routine was too unpredictable and Andreotti's protective security too tight, that the BR decided to kidnap the relatively routine and

Against Racism & Fascism, 18, (January/February 1994). For a detailed local account of the nature of racial attacks see Director of Housing, Oldham Metropolitan Borough. Racial Harassment Policy, unpublished local government report, (Oldham, England: Oldham Metropolitan Borough, December 7th 1988), 28-30.

- 10) J.Holland & H.McDonald. INLA, 335, 338.
 11) A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 26, 38-40, 109-110, 146, 177. D.Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 155. P.Willan. Puppet Masters, 216-217, 271-273.
 12) P.Willan. Puppet Masters, 219. A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 151, 157, 160.
 13) A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 108. P.Willan. Puppet Masters, 222.

poorly protected Moro.¹⁴ Thus, whilst the selection of Moro, Fanfani, and Andreotti as potential targets was based on the Red Brigadist's ideology and strategy, other factors determined that Moro was selected.

Gathering information on potential targets.

Once the potential targets or categories of targets have been decided upon, the group can carry out the research necessary to discover where the target is likely to be located. The ideal is where members or sympathisers of the terrorist group have personal knowledge of the activities of potential targets. The anti-Tsarist terrorist Savinkov, who was active in the early twentieth century, describes the usefulness of Tatiana Alexandrovna Leontyeva, the daughter of the Vice-Governor of Yakutsk province, and an aristocrat by birth. She was well connected with "... rich and official St Petersburg", had the opportunity of being presented at the Imperial Court, and with time could become a lady-in-waiting to the Empress. Although she wished to be an active terrorist, Savinkov preferred her to gather information whilst unknown to the police as a terrorist sympathiser. Later in his account Savinkov cites a colleague's description of Leontyeva as "pure gold".¹⁵

More recently, in July 1977 the Chief Executive of the Dresdner Bank, Jurgen Ponto, let Susanne Albrecht - the daughter of a family friend - into his house with two of her friends. He was shot dead during the ensuing Red Army Faction kidnap attempt.¹⁶ In the aftermath the Federal Interior Minister commented:

... there is no capitalist who does not have a terrorist in his own intimate circle of friends or relations. ... There are no circles, however high, in our society - and this is the really alarming thing - which do not have

14) A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 40-41, 108. P. Willan. Puppet Masters, 223-224.

15) B. Savinkov. Memoirs of a Terrorist, 79, 120. R. Hingley. The Russian Secret Police: Muscovite, Imperial Russian and Soviet Political Security Operations, 1565-1970, (London: Hutchinson, 1970), 96-97.

16) D. Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group", 61. S. Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group, 406-408.

people like Susanne Albrecht somewhere in their immediate or more distant vicinity.¹⁷

This point was echoed by the German correspondent of The Times in 1993 when he noted that the network of sympathisers and supporters for the RAF were well placed to identify members of the German elite and discover weaknesses in their security.¹⁸

Sometimes sympathisers just happen to be in the right place at the right time. According to Coogan, during the Irish Rebellion of 1919-1921 the post office in Dublin put the cousin of Michael Collins - effectively the operational leader of the IRA - in charge of handling secret coded messages. The cousin of another IRA man was a typist in Dublin Castle, at that time the headquarters of the British administration in Ireland, where she had access to information which included the names and addresses of intelligence operatives.¹⁹ Additional sources of information were: some detectives in the political 'G' section of the Dublin Metropolitan Police (DMP), policemen with access to the RIC cipher codes, a secretary in the headquarters of the 6th Army Division in Cork, and a senior civil servant in Dublin Castle.²⁰

More recently, both republican and loyalist terrorists in Ireland have received information from well-placed sympathisers. The Provisional IRA has been able to obtain highly sensitive information from the RUC, the prison service, the Northern Irish Civil Service, and the Gardai in the Republic of Ireland, either by intimidating people within these organisations, or through sympathisers who work in them.²¹ In the same way some members of the security forces

17) S.Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group, 418.

18) "Culture of violence cuts deep in Bonn", The Times, July 6th 1993.

19) T.P.Coogan. Michael Collins, 82-83.

20) T.P.Coogan. Michael Collins, 75-84, 107, 147-148.
D.Neligan. The Spy in the Castle, (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1968).

21) "Teenagers who enlist for terror", The Independent on Sunday, August 5th 1990. P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 287-288. "Informers die after policeman's betrayal", The Daily Telegraph, March 22nd 1981. C.Ryder. The RUC, 242-244. "Leaked messages from RUC 'may help terrorists'", The Independent, June 18th 1991. "Maze officer who helped IRA to kill colleague gets life", The Times, June 22nd 1990. "Prison warder given life for role in IRA murder", The Independent,

in Northern Ireland have passed information on suspected republicans to loyalist terrorists, allowing them to locate targets for assassination.²²

Alternatively, terrorists can gain access to secret information by electronic means. In the mid 1970s the Provisional IRA was found to have been intercepting security force communications with phone taps, and by the mid 1980s at the latest was able to intercept radio messages by the use of scanners capable of intercepting radio communications. This information allowed PIRA units to locate and either avoid or attack security force units.²³ Likewise, Fisk reports that units of the Armed Islamic Group in Algeria are said to have radio scanners which they use to intercept messages to police patrols, thus aiding them in setting up ambushes.²⁴

Electronic eavesdropping has also aided the assassination of specific people. Pearce states that narcotics traffickers in Colombia tapped the telephone of the Attorney General, Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, before his assassination in April 1984.²⁵ Similarly, it has been reported that the Sicilian Mafia learned of the movements of an anti-Mafia magistrate, Paolo Borsellino, by tapping his mother's telephone. Borsellino, together with five police

June 22nd 1990. "IRA spy jailed by Dublin court", The Times, February 8th 1991. "IRA used Garda file to target man", The Independent, April 17th 1991. "Dublin admits Garda leak to IRA", The Independent, April 17th 1991. "Former Garda jailed for giving IRA information", The Independent, February 1st 1992.

- 22) "Supergrass fears may have prompted poster displays", The Independent, February 6th 1990. "Tories urge inquiry into smear plot allegations", The Times, February 6th 1990. "RUC receives Stevens report on loyalist leaks", The Independent, April 6th 1990. "Report finds RUC collusion", The Independent, May 18th 1990. S.Bruce. The Red Hand, 212-218, 261-264. D.McKittrick. Endgame, 154.
- 23) Miami Herald, January 29th 1979. F.Doherty. "SIGINT used by Anti-State Forces: A Case Study of Provisional IRA Operations", C.Bledowska (ed). War and Order: Researching State Structures, (London: Junction Books, 1983). M.Dillon. The Dirty War, 71-72. P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 405.
- 24) "Perfect ambush on the road to Paradise", The Independent, March 10th 1995.
- 25) J.Pearce. Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth, 194.

bodyguards, was killed by a bomb placed outside his mother's flat on July 19th 1992.²⁶

Information can often be gleaned from publicly available sources. In a humorous article in The Spectator D.J.Enright made an interesting point.

This book is dangerous, it must be banned.

It names names and states addresses, it reveals careers and important positions, lists antecedents and marriages (potential for blackmail) and children who can be kidnapped and held as hostages. It specifies places of resort where ambush can be laid by terrorists. Not even recreation will be safe from assassins.

The book could easily fall into hostile hands. It must be taken out of circulation.

Entitled *Who's Who*, it is published by A & C. Black of London. The sequel is *Who Was Who*.²⁷

A brief examination of the 1988 copy of Who's Who provides a very useful list of private addresses for anyone wishing to cut a swathe through the British political elite. Included are the home addresses of Roy Mason - a former Northern Ireland Secretary much reviled by the Provisional IRA, the late Nicholas Ridley - then Environment Secretary and member of the Cabinet, Christopher Patten - at that time Minister for Overseas Development, but also a former junior minister in Northern Ireland, and Anthony Blair - at that time a backbench MP, but now leader of the Labour Party.²⁸ For their campaign of assassination in England the Provisional IRA are believed to have identified the home addresses of prominent individuals from open sources such as Who's Who, the Civil Service Year List, the Army List, and television broadcasts.²⁹ Thus the presence of somebody in such sources makes it more likely that they will be selected as a target.

This can have drawbacks for the group carrying out the research because they may be using outdated information. When the PIRA set off a bomb at the former home of a former

26) "Car bombers kill another top Italian judge", The Times, July 20th 1992. "Tentacles that tie down the Italian state", The Independent, August 6th 1992. A.Stille. Excellent Cadavers, 372-373.

27) "Ban!", The Spectator, April 15th 1989.

28) A & C.Black Ltd. Who's Who 1988: An annual biographical dictionary, (London: A & C Black, 1988).

29) "Bookworms who burrow for IRA", The Sunday Correspondent, August 12th 1990. S.O'Doherty, The Volunteer: A Former IRA Man's True Story, (London: Harper Collins, 1993), 140.

Conservative Party Treasurer Lord McAlpine in June 1990, The Independent reported that it was still listed as his home in the then current edition of Who's Who.³⁰ In the same way, when the PIRA tried to assassinate the former Cabinet Secretary, Lord Armstrong in August 1990, they placed the bomb under a car parked in the drive of a house which he had moved away from, but which was last listed as his home in Who's Who in 1976.³¹

The information revealed after police raids on terrorist safe houses can be quite revealing about the ways in which they gather information. When the police searched a flat in November 1990, which had allegedly been used by two PIRA men, they found a 1979 copy of Who's Who together with a list of potential targets.³² On the list were Sir Charles Tidbury - chairman of the William & Mary tercentenary trust and a former worker for the Conservative Party - with details showing his London and country addresses, and car registrations of two neighbours. Also found were details concerning two previous Northern Ireland Secretaries, Roy Mason and James Prior, senior politicians including Sir Geoffrey Howe, Douglas Hurd, Sir Geoffrey Johnson-Smith - a Conservative MP, Major-General Sir Julian Thompson, General Sir Michael Trant, Sir John Fieldhouse - former Chief of the Defence Staff, and Major-General Sir John Acland. Newspaper photographs of some of these people were also attached. On another occasion the police found a hit list at a safe house in Luton. This had the names of various senior and middle-ranking politicians and businessmen. The terrorists had also noted the private addresses and family details of senior military personnel, and had made notes describing the most convenient routes to their homes.³³

30) "McAlpine bomb indicates switch in IRA campaign", The Independent, June 14th 1990.

31) "Car bomb attack on Thatcher advisor fails", The Independent, August 7th 1990. "Peer target of botched car bombing", The Guardian, August 7th 1990.

32) "'IRA hit list and arsenal' were found in car", The Independent, January 23rd 1992. "Prior the top target on IRA hit list court told", The Times, January 23rd 1992.

33) "Arrests failed to stop attacks", The Independent, December 7th 1990.

Other terrorists use such methods. On July 6th 1977 Willy Peter Stoll - a member of the Red Army Faction - visited the Hamburg Institute of International Economics and requested information on Jurgen Ponto - the Chief Executive of the Dresdner Bank, and Hans-Martin Schleyer - the President of the West German Employers Federation. He claimed this was for a thesis on leading economists.³⁴ Twenty-four days later, on July 30th Ponto was shot dead during the attempt to kidnap him. On September 5th of the same year Schleyer was kidnapped and six weeks later was killed. According to Schiller, members of the Berlin-based June 2nd Movement used a book entitled The Rich and Super-Rich in Austria when selecting a target for abduction. They chose an Austrian textile manufacturer, Michael Palmers who was described in the book as often moving large sums of money, and who preferred payment in cash.³⁵ The B2J kidnapped him in November 1977, receiving a payment of DM 4.3 million in return for his release.³⁶

An article in a newspaper might give a terrorist many of the details which he or she needs in order to plan an attack. In April 1994 The Spectator outlined many useful details concerning the then British Permanent Representative to the European Community, Sir John Kerr. The article mentioned that Sir John lived at 17 Rue Ducale in Brussels, worked at 6 Rond-Point Schumann, and provided an interesting detail about his routine. Every week he briefed officials from the British Government. This involved a journey to London:

... which begins at the crack of dawn every Friday when Theo, his ginger-chopped Flemish driver, takes him in the armour-plated Jaguar to Zaventem airport, whence he catches the 7 a.m. red-eye to London.³⁷

Thus the article identified the type of car in which Kerr travelled and what his chauffeur looked like, allowing

34) S.Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group, 423. J.Becker. Hitler's Children, 345.

35) D.T.Schiller. "The European Experience", B.M.Jenkins (ed). Terrorism and Personal Protection (Stoneham, Massachusetts: Butterworth, 1985), 56-57.

36) B.A.Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 303.

37) "Fine, remarkable, dirty and devious", The Spectator, April 9th 1994.

the assassin or kidnapper to positively identify the target, and gave useful details about Sir John's travel arrangements. This would make him a more tempting target than somebody about whom the potential assassins or kidnappers knew nothing. In line with best practice the routes of potential target should be varied, but these can become predictable over time unless much care is taken.³⁸

In practice terrorist attacks on mobile targets are very common. According to Russell and Miller 95% of abductions occur when the victim is in transit between home and work and 80% whilst the victim is in a vehicle whilst Scott states that 85% of all kidnappings and assassinations occur whilst the victim is in transit, though the latter term is undefined.³⁹ In a comparative sample of political and non-political murders in Northern Ireland, Lyons and Harbinson found that whereas 85% of the non-political murders were committed in the home of the victim with only 12% occurring when travelling, with political murders only 6% occurred in the home and 74% occurred when travelling.⁴⁰

It may seem that too much emphasis has been placed upon the possible effect of the release of a relatively small amount of information. However, people have been picked out as possible targets on the basis of seemingly insignificant snippets of knowledge. In 1972 the Basque group ETA selected the Spanish Prime Minister as a likely target for kidnapping or assassination when a minor part of his daily routine - the fact that he attended church at 9 a.m every day - became known. He was killed by a car-bomb in December 1973.⁴¹

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- 38) A.J.Scott. "Transportation Security", B.M.Jenkins (ed). Terrorism and Personal Protection, 358-359. P.Taylor. States of Terror, 80-82, shows how, despite route changes, it was possible for the Red Army Faction to launch an attack on the Commander of NATO forces in Europe, General Alexander Haig, in 1979.
- 35) C.A.Russell & B.H.Miller. "Terrorist Targets and the Executive Target", Y.Alexander & R.A.Kilmarx (eds) Political Terrorism and Business: The Threat and Response, (New York: Praeger, 1979), 69. A.J.Scotti. "Transportation Security", B.M.Jenkins (ed). Terrorism and Personal Protection, 354.
- 40) H.A.Lyons & H.J.Harbinson. "A Comparison of Political and Non-Political Murderers in Northern Ireland", 195.
- 41) J.Agirre. Operation Ogro, 3.

Furthermore, British diplomats have been targets for both abduction or assassination over the past three decades.⁴²

With targets of opportunity information gathering is not as important. Attacks on these targets are normally carried out by individuals or groups who place themselves somewhere where targets are likely to present themselves. An example of this would be laying an ambush for a security force patrol in an area where such patrols are relatively frequent. For such an attack the terrorists usually must have some idea as to the likely location of possible targets, and have the appropriate weapons available.

Reconnaissance of potential targets.

For a pre-planned attack to succeed, the terrorists must usually establish where the target will be at a specific time. In the case of a fixed unprotected target, such as a building, this is not a problem. Similarly, if the intention is to leave a bomb in a public place where it can cause the maximum damage to people or surroundings, then the terrorist does not need to carry out much in the way of reconnaissance.

However, if the target is a specific person or mobile object it is usually necessary to establish where the target will be at a given time. Even if it is immobile the terrorists need to know whether it is protected. They have to do this to gauge the degree of force needed to overcome any protective security, and to plan their escape after the operation has been carried out.

The withdrawal of the operational team will be examined later in this chapter, but, with the exception of attackers who do not expect to survive the attack themselves, most operations are planned on the assumption that they will only proceed if there is a reasonable chance of the attackers

42) C.E.Baumann. "Diplomatic Kidnappings", B.M.Jenkins (ed). Terrorism and Personal Protection. A.Selth. Against Every Human Law: The Terrorist Threat to Diplomacy, (Rushcutter's Bay: Australian National University Press, 1988), 18-31, 182. Central Intelligence Agency. Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980, (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1981), 10. J.Gellner. Bayonets in the Streets: Urban guerrilla at home and abroad, (Don Mills, Ontario: Collier-Macmillan Canada, 1974), 92-128. G.Jackson. People's Prison. J.Bowyer Bell. IRA Tactics and Targets, 71-72. P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 308-309.

escaping.⁴³ Apart from the natural desire to survive on the part of the individual, most terrorist groups are not large enough to be able to risk heavy losses on a regular basis.

The priority for terrorists seeking to attack a human target is to establish whether the target has a routine. Most people do, unless they deliberately vary it in order to avoid becoming a target. The requirements of work or other patterns in one's life, mean that people govern their lives according to the dictates of the clock. For example, in January 1982 Italian police found written details concerning the observation of a Rome magistrate's routine by potential assassins.

In the morning he opens the curtains around 7.30. Between 8.15 and 8.25 the men of his escort arrive outside the house. There are usually 3 of them: one stays at the wheel, the second gets out and looks around, the third goes up to the house and comes back with him. Between 8.30 and 8.40 ...⁴⁴

Reports concerning the observation of security force patrols by ETA and the Provisional IRA show that reconnaissance is used to establish the routine of members of enemy organisations, as well as that of specific individuals. By observing the patterns of patrols for instance, terrorists can determine when a security force patrol is likely to be in a particular place, and when it is likely to be vulnerable. In relation to a planned Provisional IRA ambush of a British Army patrol in May 1980, Dillon notes how the terrorists observed that vehicles were slowed down or stopped by the traffic lights at a busy junction. The ambushers commandeered a house overlooking the junction, and with an M60 medium machine-gun and rifles, waited for a military vehicle to appear. In this case it was in vain as the ambushers were themselves under surveillance, and the house was stormed at the cost of one soldier killed.⁴⁵

Reconnaissance is frequently carried out by a separate terrorist unit to the one which actually carries out the attack. In line with the reorganisation of the Provisionals into a tightly-run cell system in the late 1970s, Dillon

43) B.M.Jenkins. International Terrorism: The Other World War, 17.

44) Corriere della Sera, January 13th 1987.

45) M.Dillon. Killer in Clowntown, 83-104.

notes that the reconnaissance of a potential target will often be carried out by an intelligence cell, with the attack itself being carried out by an Active Service Unit (ASU).⁴⁶ In the same fashion, Clark lists the reported activities of an intelligence cell of ETA which was arrested in May 1980. For four or five Sundays in a row they monitored the movements of a former Mayor of Bilbao in order to pass the information to an ETA assassination team. The resulting attempt was unsuccessful. The same group gathered information on the airports at Bilbao and Vitoria, in particular on the Civil Guard patrols which protected them. The intelligence cell obtained photographs, blueprints, and other information concerning electric power plants in Vizcaya Province, together with a list of people occupying key positions in the plants. They also gathered information concerning two members of the national police force who lived in Algorta.⁴⁷

Even for a target which is immobile, terrorists may carry out reconnaissance to ensure that the operation can be carried out according to plan. Katayama states that three members of the Japanese Red Army flew to Tel Aviv in September 1971 in order to reconnoitre Lod Airport. This included taking photographs within the airport.⁴⁸ Likewise, two suspected PIRA members are reported to have been seen reconnoitring a Royal Marine training base in Devon in June 1990 whilst under police surveillance, and police believed that PIRA members observed the Royal Marine barracks at Deal in Kent for two weeks before they bombed it.⁴⁹ Another raid on a PIRA safe house outside London found, amongst other things, Ordnance Survey maps of the areas around Salisbury Plain and Aldershot, areas which contain military bases.⁵⁰

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- 46) M.Dillon. Killer in Clowntown, 62. Details of a PIRA document captured in 1977 which outlined the reorganisation can be found in L.Clarke. Broadening the Battlefield, 251-253.
- 47) R.P.Clark. "Patterns in the Lives of ETA members", 301.
- 48) Y.Katayama. Terrorism in Japan since 1969: A study of the activities of the Japanese Red Army, Ph.D, University of Aberdeen, 1989, 82.
- 49) "'IRA hit list and arsenal' were found in car", The Independent, January 23rd 1992. "Bandsman tells jury of escape in Deal bombing", The Independent, December 11th 1990.
- 50) "Arrests failed to stop attacks", The Independent, December 7th 1990.

An example of the way in which a routine aspect of one's life can lead to a vulnerability is the way in which churchgoing can become a rather hazardous practice for potential targets. Attacks upon targets who are in church, or are on their way to or from church or other places of worship, have long been popular. The victim is off-guard, and their presence at church is usually known in advance due to the predictability of service times.⁵¹ He cites the assassination attempt upon Lorenzo and Giuliano de Medici at the Duomo in Florence in 1478 as an instance of this, but there are more recent examples to hand.⁵² In April 1925 the Bulgarian Cabinet was nearly wiped out by a bomb in the Sveta Nedelia Cathedral in Sofia.⁵³ Irish republican terrorists from the 1920s up to the present have assassinated or attempted to assassinate pre-selected individuals at church services, or on their way to or from them.⁵⁴ The most prominent victim was Kevin O'Higgins - at that time Irish Vice-President, Minister of Justice and Minister for External Affairs - who was shot dead by members of a republican splinter group on his way to mass near Dublin on July 10th 1927.⁵⁵

Attacking particular target groups is also easily undertaken if one attacks places of worship. All one has to know is when people are likely to be in the building for

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- 51) F.L.Ford. Political Murder: From Tyrannicide to Terrorism, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985), 136.
- 52) F.L.Ford. Political Murder, 137.
- 53) A.D.Harvey. "Research Note: The Attempt to Assassinate the Bulgarian Cabinet, 16 April 1925", Terrorism and Political Violence, 4, no. 1, (Spring 1992).
- 54) R.Bell, R.Johnstone, R.Wilson (eds). "Chronology of events: 16.1.83", Troubled Times: Fortnight Magazine and the Troubles in Northern Ireland 1970-1991, (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1991), 196. "Catholic judge killed by IRA", The Times, January 17th 1983. "Family ambushed by IRA after Mass", The Times, April 9th 1984. The Guardian, April 9th 1984. "Travers murder weapons used in six other Belfast killings", The Guardian, April 10th 1984. "Gunmen 'switched target'", The Guardian, April 11th 1984. T.Barry. Guerrilla Days in Ireland, 18-19. J.Bowyer Bell. IRA Tactics and Targets, 65-67.
- 55) T.De Vere White. Kevin O'Higgins, (Dublin: Anvil, 1948; 1986), 240-242. J.J.Lee. Ireland, 1912-1985: Politics and Society, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 154.

religious services. Thus by attacking the mosque at Hebron, the Jewish terrorist Baruch Goldstein, was able to kill twenty-nine Palestinian Muslims.⁵⁶ Similarly, synagogues were attacked in Paris, Antwerp, Rome, and Vienna in the 1980s by terrorists aiming to attack Jewish targets.⁵⁷ In Northern Ireland in November 1983, a group from the INLA sprayed the Mountain Lodge Gospel Hall in Darkley, county Armagh, with gunfire. Three Pentecostal Protestants died and seven were injured.⁵⁸ Eight years earlier Loyalist gunmen had shot two Catholic students dead as they emerged from a church in Belfast.⁵⁹ In all of these cases identification of the targets was simple, because by being at the place of worship in question the targets revealed their religious affiliation, and thus minimised the need for detailed reconnaissance.

Planning the operation.

Having selected potential targets, and carried out a detailed enough reconnaissance to detect any vulnerabilities, the terrorists next determine how to attack the target. This aspect of the operation may be quite sketchy. When a target of opportunity suddenly presents itself to a terrorist group, little in the way of planning is necessary. Bruce and Dillon describe how Catholics and members of rival loyalist paramilitary groups became the targets of a UVF team on the Shankill Road, Belfast, when they were unfortunate enough to stray into the area where that group held sway.⁶⁰ In such cases little planning is necessary.

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- 56) "The massacre of the innocents", The Independent, February 26th 1994. "Anger and violence erupt across the Muslim world", Independent on Sunday, February 27th 1994. "Israel and PLO try to save peace", The Sunday Times, February 27th 1994. "Soldiers say Hebron killer was not alone", The Independent, March 18th 1994.
- 57) G.Rosie. The Directory of International Terrorism, 53, 251.
- 58) "Three die as gunmen fire on congregation", The Guardian, November 21st 1983. "The deadly gospel of a mad dog movement", The Guardian, November 22nd 1983. "The hateful logic of the Pentecostal killings", The Economist, November 26th 1983. J.Holland & H.McDonald. INLA, 225-227.
- 59) "Family ambushed by IRA after Mass", The Times, April 9th 1984. The Guardian, April 9th 1984.
- 60) S.Bruce. The Red Hand, 54-56. M.Dillon. The Shankill Butchers, 65, 192-195, 198, 207.

On other occasions a great deal of time may be spent on planning attacks. Bowyer Bell disputes whether terrorists on the run have the time to formulate complex operations whilst at the same time evading the attentions of the security agencies.⁶¹ Alternatively, the former Carabinieri officer Capotorto suggests that terrorists have a great deal of time available in which they have little else to do but plan their operations.⁶² The circumstances of different groups may vary, but the weight of the evidence suggests that Capotorto is closer to the reality. Bowyer Bell's account relates more closely to the very intense period of encounter gun-battles in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s where a number of PIRA members would drive around their area looking for soldiers to fire upon.⁶³ That was a period of incessant violence, and as Bowyer Bell recognises elsewhere, since that period a greater degree of planning takes place before PIRA attacks are carried out, even against straightforward military targets in Northern Ireland.⁶⁴

This can be seen from the above-mentioned attempt to ambush British Army convoys in Belfast in 1980 and PIRA spokesmen have admitted that it is now more difficult to attack British soldiers successfully.⁶⁵ The way in which patrols are now coordinated in mutually supporting patterns, operating in tandem with strategically placed observation posts, makes it more difficult for terrorists to be sure that they can get away safely after an attack.⁶⁶ For that reason

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- 61) J.Bowyer Bell. "Revolutionary Dynamics: The Inherent Inefficiency of the Underground".
- 62) G.Capotorto, "How Terrorists look at Kidnappings", B.M.Jenkins (ed). Terrorism and Personal Protection, 3.
- 63) P.Bishop & E.Mallie, The Provisional IRA, 192-193, 196-197, 246. Interview with Brendan Hughes in F.Martin (dir). Behind the Mask, video.
- 64) J.Bowyer Bell. IRA Tactics and Targets, 61-65.
- 65) "IRA admits mounting difficulty in Ulster attacks", The Guardian, January 7th 1984. "IRA rings changes to restore balance of terror", The Guardian, May 5th 1987.
- 66) M.Dewar. The British Army in Northern Ireland, (London: Arms & Armour Press, 1985), 180-186. D.Hamill. Pig in the Middle, 119, 133, 141. M.Dillon. The Dirty War, 398-417. The veracity of Dewar's remarks on operational methods can be judged by the fact that they have been partially reproduced in a republican magazine. "Operational comments of a British Army officer", Iris, 11, (October 1987).

the previous unplanned mode of attack is not only obsolete, but potentially suicidal.

Terrorist groups do not plan their operations in a uniform fashion. With the exception of targets of opportunity, there is normally some form of planning. With small autonomous groups, such as the first generation of the Red Army Faction, planning seems to have been done in the manner of general discussion by those directly involved, although with the process dominated by the more vocal members of the group.⁶⁷ On the other hand the Red Brigades, at least in their most successful period in the mid 1970s, had what Caselli and della Porta term a "centralised and oligarchic bureaucracy".⁶⁸ Plans were approved by the Executive Committee, and then delegated to the columns for execution, although Moss states that there were considerable differences between the theory of a highly centralised organisation and the practice of a fairly decentralised one where local groups picked their own targets and disregarded orders from above.⁶⁹ In the PIRA, because the control of weapons is usually at the brigade or battalion level - one level above the operational active service units, plans for attacks generally have to be cleared at the next level above before they are allowed to proceed.⁷⁰

The insertion of weapons into the area of operations.

The weapons used by terrorists can vary from the crudest of weapons up to extremely sophisticated explosive devices. On the one hand Allen Feldman quotes a UDA gunman as saying:

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- 67) S.Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group, 92-93. B.A.Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 176. J.M.Post. "Hostilite, Conformite, Fraternite: The Group Dynamics of Terrorist Behaviour", International Journal of Group Psychotherapy, 36, no 2, (April 1986), 216.
- 68) G.C.Caselli & D.della Porta. "The history of the Red Brigades", 82. A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 84-85.
- 69) D.Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 57.
- 70) "Bombing 'devastating' to IRA", The Independent, November 11th 1987. L.Clarke. Broadening the Battlefield, 252. B.O'Brien. The Long War, 158. P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 312.

You can go in and terrorize your next-door neighbour if you have a hammer in your hand.⁷¹

On the other hand the Red Army Faction bomb which killed the President of the Deutsche Bank, Alfred Herrhausen, in 1989, was detonated by a photoelectronic cell which projected an infra-red beam across the road onto a reflector which returned it. When Herrhausen's car broke the beam the bomb exploded, fatally wounding Herrhausen.⁷²

Knives or heavy, blunt objects can be used against people or objects which have little in the way of protection.⁷³ The Naxalites, an Indian Maoist movement which flourished in the late 1960s and early 1970s, used knives partly because of the psychological effect which the use of such ferocious methods would have upon landowners - what the Naxalites termed 'feudal elements' - whom the Naxalites wished to scare out of the countryside of West Bengal.⁷⁴ Such weapons also have the advantage that if one is stopped by the police with a knife or a hammer, it is possible to make up some form of explanation. Trying to explain away a pistol or a quantity of explosives could be somewhat difficult by comparison.⁷⁵ As a result such weapons, whilst limited in the amount of damage which they can do, are relatively easily transported to the place of an operation.

Other weapons are more difficult to get into the area where the operation is to take place. From the terrorists point of view, the ideal would be for the attackers to carry the weapons to the area of operations, use the weapons, and then withdraw. Sometimes this happens. In 1977 Patricia Clough, Rome correspondent for The Times, described how the typical maiming attack was carried out by communist terrorist groups in Italy.

The scene is almost always the same: the victim leaves his home for work at the usual hour and on the way to his

71) A.Feldman. Formations of Violence: The Narrative of the Body and Political Terror in Northern Ireland (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991) 48.

72) U.S.Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security. Terrorist Tactics and Security Practices, (Washington DC: U.S.Department of State, 1994), 3-9.

73) M.Dillon. The Shankill Butchers, 66-67.

74) B.Dasgupta. The Naxalite Movement (pub New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1974), 40, 45-46.

75) S.Bruce. The Red Hand, 183-184.

car, bus stop or office, notices two or three young people in jeans standing idly in the street.

As he approaches they pull out pistols, aim carefully at his legs and fire repeatedly. He falls, shouting for help, while his assailants run to a waiting car and are driven off at speed.⁷⁶

In cases like this the weapons appear to be carried to and from the attack by the terrorists. The risk is that they may be apprehended either before or after the operation and, arrested for possession of an illegal weapon if not killed in a gun-fight. If forensic evidence such as ballistics tests can link the weapon to terrorist operations, the person found in possession of the weapon could be charged with participation in whatever killings, woundings, or other offences, have been carried out with that weapon.

For this reason some groups use couriers to move weapons to the point where they are to be used, or to a safe house which is close to the point where the attack is to take place, and then remove them after they have been used. Thus a gunman can only be caught in possession of a gun for the short period when he is using it, or waiting for the target to appear.⁷⁷ By minimising the amount of time that a gunman has possession of the gun, the chances of him being apprehended with it are also minimised. Terrorist groups are rarely large enough to be able to afford the loss of their most skilled operators, whether gunmen, bomb-makers, or bomb-setters. In some cases, the operator might be suspected by the authorities and is therefore more liable to be stopped and searched even if he cannot be arrested. The courier on the other hand should be somebody who is not suspected by the authorities, who is not likely to arouse suspicion, and who is ultimately more expendable than a skilled terrorist operator.

Getting bombs into the area of operations is in some ways similar to the problems involved in moving guns, except that some bombs are far bulkier. Small bombs can be carried on the person. The incendiary devices used by the PIRA as part of their economic campaign are no larger than a cassette

76) "Scenario for a knee-cap job in Italy", The Times, July 23rd 1977.

77) G.Grivas - Dighenis. Guerrilla Warfare, 66. A.Feldman. Formations of Violence, 42-45. P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 247-248.

tape holder, and can easily be carried into a shop by a terrorist, and then placed so as to cause damage.⁷⁸ Bulkier bombs can also be moved into position if adequately disguised. Thus one PIRA member noted:

... if someone is to carry a bomb in a pram, it is better that a woman is pushing the pram, because a man doing that might attract attention".⁷⁹

Women seem to be frequently used to carry guns or bombs on the supposition that the security forces, or anybody else who is looking out for terrorist attacks, will be less likely to suspect a woman of involvement in terrorist activities, or indeed search her.⁸⁰

Large bombs have been carried in vehicles. Putting a bomb into a car or another form of vehicle is a common way of getting it into the proximity of the target.⁸¹ In March 1985 an attempt was made, allegedly with the connivance of the CIA and the Lebanese intelligence agencies, to kill the spiritual leader of the Hizbollah, Sheikh Fadlallah, with a massive car bomb in Beirut. The attempt failed, but eighty people were killed in the explosion.⁸² The bombing of the Israeli Embassy in London in July 1994 was carried out with a bomb placed in the boot of a car which was then parked close to the Embassy.⁸³ Extremely large bombs have been placed in larger vehicles. The bombs which devastated the Baltic Exchange in the City of London and damaged the A5 flyover at Staples Corner in April 1992 were placed in vans, and the bomb which

78) "New devices used in NI explosions", July 12th 1983.

"Incendiary devices increasingly used in terror attacks", The Independent, December 2nd 1991.

"Simplicity of incendiary device makes disruption easy", The Guardian, December 24th 1991.

79) E.MacDonald. Shoot the Women First, 158.

80) E.MacDonald. Shoot the Women First, 73, 169. G.Grivas - Dighenis. Guerrilla Warfare, 66. A.Horne. A Savage War of Peace, 184-186.

81) B.A.Salamanca. "Vehicle Bombs: Death on Wheels", N.C.Livingstone & T.E.Arnold (eds). Fighting Back: Winning the War Against Terrorism, (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1986), 40-42.

82) D.C.Martin & J.Walcott. Best Laid Plans, 219-220.

B.Woodward. Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987, (London: Simon Schuster, 1987), 395-398.

83) "Iran blamed for embassy car bomb", The Times, July 27th 1994. "Hunt for woman car bomber", The Daily Telegraph, July 27th 1994.

wrecked buildings around Bishopsgate, again in the City, in April 1993 was placed in a truck.⁸⁴

At an extreme there are those bombs which are brought to the area of the operation by what can be termed 'suicide' bombers, that is people who will carry the bomb to the target and detonate it whilst so close to the explosion that they are likely to be killed themselves. This method is neither new nor necessarily confined to religious groups. In 1881, an assassin from the People's Will was killed by the powerful bomb which he threw at the carriage of Tsar Alexander II, whilst Savinkov describes how Social Revolutionaries carried bombs to the vicinity of their intended targets and detonated them in the expectation, not necessarily realised, that they too would be killed in the explosion.⁸⁵

Suicide bomb attacks are commonly used by the Sri Lankan LTTE, as noted regarding the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi at Madras in April 1991.⁸⁶ A similar method was used to kill Sri Lanka's President Premadasa in May 1993, whilst suicide bombers have killed several members of the Indian and Sri Lankan military by running into troop emplacements and convoys with explosives strapped to their bodies.⁸⁷ Islamic groups such as Hizbollah and Hamas have also used suicide bombers, usually driving vehicle bombs into protected targets such as the Hizbollah attacks on the US Embassies in Beirut and Kuwait in 1983. However, unprotected targets have also been attacked. In April 1994 a Hamas suicide car bomb attack was made on a school bus at Afula in Israel, killing eight

84) "IRA bombs were biggest ever", The Independent on Sunday, April 12th 1992. "London counts the cost of IRA bombs", The Independent, April 13th 1992. "Back-to-work City defies the IRA", The Times, April 13th 1992. "Security to be stepped up in City after blast", The Independent, April 26th 1993. "Taxpayers foot IRA bomb bill", The Times, April 26th 1993. B.O'Brien. The Long War, 272-273.

85) E.Crankshaw. The Shadow of the Winter Palace, 315-318. B.Savinkov. Memoirs of a Terrorist, 48, 58-70.

86) "Rajiv Gandhi assassinated in bomb blast", The Times, May 22nd 1991. "Rajiv Gandhi murdered by bombers at election rally", The Independent, May 22nd 1991. "What One-Eyed Jack knows", The Independent, July 1st 1991.

87) "Suicide bomber murders president of Sri Lanka", The Independent on Sunday, May 2nd 1993. "Tamil Tigers blamed as bomb kills president", The Times, May 2nd 1993. "Dignity and death with the Freedom Birds", The Independent on Sunday, May 26th 1991.

people including the bomber, in revenge for the above-mentioned massacre of twenty-nine Muslims in the Hebron mosque by Baruch Goldstein.⁸⁸

There are also cases where people are forced or tricked into planting bombs by terrorists. The use of such 'proxy' bombs by the Provisional IRA became fairly common in Northern Ireland, and more recently in England. In such cases a person is held by members of the group and told that friends or members of his family, who are also being held by the terrorists, will be harmed if he does not drive a vehicle containing a bomb to the location of the target. Usually the person has enough time to get away from the vehicle before it explodes.⁸⁹ However, in a refinement of that tactic, on October 24th 1990, PIRA groups held the families of three men, and tied the men into vehicles which they were told to drive into British Army checkpoints. Two of the bombs detonated, killing six soldiers and one of the 'proxy' bombers and injuring another thirty-five people.⁹⁰ In all three cases the Provisionals claimed that the men concerned were 'collaborators', people carrying out work which the PIRA deemed to be helping the security forces. Thus the dead civilian 'proxy' bomber was a kitchen assistant for the Ministry of Defence.⁹¹ However, it appears that the Provisionals have stopped using a method which resulted in the death of the proxy due to the revulsion which this caused amongst people who were normally their supporters.⁹²

88) " Hamas takes revenge for Hebron", The Independent, April 7th 1994. "Nine die in suicide attack on school bus", The Times, April 7th 1994. "Rabin dubbed traitor as Afula buries its dead", The Times, April 8th 1994.

89) "IRA 'Proxy Bombs' Blast Belfast", The Times, July 26th 1974. "'Human-bomb' attack fails", The Independent, December 21st 1990. "'Human bomb' attack denounced", The Independent, February 5th 1991. "Taxi forced to cruise West End with IRA bomb", The Independent, June 17th 1992. "Mini-cab drivers 'in deep shock' after hijacking", The Independent, April 26th 1993. "IRA's new tactic breaches security forces' defences", The Independent, October 25th 1990.

90) "IRA uses human bombs", The Independent, October 25th 1990. "Seven dead in IRA 'human bomb' attacks", The Times, October 25th 1990. "Sitting ducks for the IRA killers", The Sunday Correspondent, October 28th 1990.

91) "IRA uses human bombs", The Independent, October 25th 1990. "Hume denounces IRA 'cowards'", The Independent, October 26th 1990.

92) B.O'Brien. The Long War, 52, 56.

Proxies can also be tricked into carrying bombs. In April 1986 Nizar Hindawi, reportedly a Jordanian working for Syrian military intelligence rather than a non-state group, packed a hold-all for his girlfriend who was due to fly on an El Al flight from London to Tel Aviv. He had promised that he would follow her out, and that they would be married there. In fact Hindawi had placed a bomb in the hold-all without his girlfriend's knowledge. The bomb, which was found by El Al security staff at Heathrow, was timed to explode while the aeroplane was in flight.⁹³

The insertion of the operator or operational team.

The successful execution of a terrorist operation demands that the relevant operational member or members of the terrorist group are able to get into a position where they can attack the target. In some cases this means getting physically close to the target and staying close to the target when the attack takes place. At other times this is not necessary.

Where there is little protection for a human target whom the terrorists have decided to kill, a close quarter assassination is a simple option. This merely requires that the assassin gets close to the target, kills him or her, and gets away. In an interview in 1983, the then INLA leader Dominic McGlinchey pointed out the importance of getting close to the target for attacks with a gun.

... I usually like to get in close, to minimise the risk for myself. It's usually just a matter of who gets in first and by getting in close you put your man down first. ... I wouldn't be as good as they are at shooting it out over distances because I don't get the opportunity for weapons and target training like they do. So I believe in getting in close.⁹⁴

Of course access to the target is much easier if one of the terrorists is a relation or friend, as was noted above in the case of Jurgen Ponto, the chairman of the Dresdner Bank who was shot dead during a kidnapping attempt in July 1977.

93) E.F.Mickolus, T.Sandler, J.M.Murdock. International Terrorism in the 1980s: 1984-1987, 376-378. S.Emerson & B.Duffy. The Fall of Pan Am 103, 199-200.

94) K.Heskin. "The Terrorists' Terrorist: Vincent Browne's interview with Dominic McGlinchey", Y.Alexander & A.O'Day (eds). Ireland's Terrorist Dilemma, (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986), 100.

Gun attacks can also take place from a longer range, obviating the need to overcome close protection around the target as long as the gun and ammunition are powerful enough. In April 1991 the Red Army Faction assassinated Detlev Rohwedder, the head of the Treuhand, an agency responsible for privatising or liquidating companies in the former East Germany. Rohwedder was shot dead as he worked in the study of his Dusseldorf villa by a sniper from across the street using a precision made rifle.⁹⁵ In August 1993 a police raid in Belfast found, amongst other weapons, a Tejas .50 calibre rifle, reported to be capable of firing armour-piercing rounds up to a range of between one and three miles. At about the same time a similar rifle was being used to kill soldiers and police officers in the border areas of Northern Ireland.⁹⁶

Terrorists can often plant bombs quite openly. An indiscriminate bombing can be carried out by leaving down an innocuous bag or package - which in fact contains a bomb - in a public place. To do this it is not necessary to overcome any security arrangements or inspections, although in some cases bombers have been detected, usually on recordings examined after the event, on closed circuit television (CCTV). Thus in March 1993 two English-born members of the Provisional IRA were recognised and arrested after the police released still pictures from a security camera which showed them planting a bomb outside Harrods department store in London.⁹⁷ In the case of the explosion in the Grand Hotel at Brighton in October 1984, which killed five people and nearly killed members of the British Cabinet, the bomb was placed

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- 95) "German terror group admits assassination", The Independent, April 3rd 1991. "East German reforms hit by murder of privatisation chief", The Times, April 3rd 1991. "The gap left by Rohwedder", The Economist, April 6th 1991. B.Hoffman. "Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends, and Potentialities", Terrorism and Political Violence, 5, no.2, (Summer 1993), 16.
- 96) "Long-range rifle in Ulster haul", The Independent, August 18th 1993. "American sniper rifle found in arms cache", The Times, August 18th 1993. "One-mile range rifle found", The Daily Telegraph, August 18th 1993.
- 97) "Video 'filmed IRA bombers at Harrods'", The Independent, April 14th 1994. "English-born bombers get 30 years for IRA blasts", The Guardian, May 14th 1994. "'Proud' IRA bombers jailed for 30 years", The Independent, May 14th 1994.

nearly a month beforehand, being detonated by an adaptation of the timer device from a video recorder. The bomber had booked a room in the hotel, and when a colleague arrived, assembled and planted the bomb almost at leisure. The bomber and his accomplice left the hotel weeks before the bomb exploded.⁹⁸

In other cases getting the assailants close to the target can involve rather more effort. The problems which the terrorists can face are avoiding recognition before the attack is carried out, thus alerting the target or those protecting the target, and overcoming the physical security protecting the target. An example of how both were achieved in one operation is provided by the abduction of Aldo Moro, the President of the Italian Christian Democratic Party and a former Prime Minister who was kidnapped in Rome on March 16th 1978, and held for fifty-five days before being killed.

When the Red Brigades were planning to kidnap Aldo Moro one of the problems they had to overcome was the physical security provided by five armed bodyguards, two in the car containing Moro, and three in an escort car which followed. They decided to overcome this by killing all of the bodyguards with overwhelming firepower. This involved a number of terrorists armed with automatic weapons. The problem was how to place a number of people with sub-machine guns in the proximity of the ambush site in Via Fani in such a way as not to arouse suspicion. The kidnappers had noticed that the area around the Via Fani was popular with staff from the Italian airline Alitalia. Consequently they bought caps and stole material similar to that used by Alitalia, and made uniforms from it. Each terrorist in the firing team carried a leather bag similar to those used by Alitalia staff to carry clothes, toiletries and so forth necessary when flying abroad; except in this case they carried sub-machine guns. The firing team was able to shelter by a bar which had gone out of business. On the morning of the ambush, a white Fiat 128 estate car with diplomatic licence plates overtook Moro's convoy and deliberately reversed into Moro's car. The escort car was unable to stop and hit Moro's car from behind. The driver and passenger in the Fiat 128 got out and shot the

98) P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 423-424.

bodyguards in Moro's car whilst the men in Alitalia uniforms took their guns from the bags, stepped out from the cover afforded by the bar, and raked the escort vehicle with gunfire. The wounded bodyguards were finished off with shots to the head whilst Moro, who had not been wounded, was dragged from his car and bundled into a Fiat 132. Thus the abductors succeeded in neutralising Moro's security, by disguising some of the abductors, by the use of overwhelming firepower, and by the speed of the operation.⁹⁹

The execution of a terrorist operation.

The previous example demonstrates that, with the exception of the latter stages of sieges or hijacks, the main characteristic of a terrorist operation is speed. According to Scotti the Moro abduction took only forty-five seconds from the moment when Moro's car was stopped to the bundling of Moro into a van brought for the purpose.¹⁰⁰ George Grivas recommended in the 1950s that ambushes of military patrols or convoys should not be allowed to last for more than five minutes.¹⁰¹ The aim is to carry out the operation in such a way that the active part of the operation has been concluded before the target or any possible reinforcements have had the time to react effectively.

Bombings or attacks with guns should only take as long to execute as is needed to fire a shot or detonate a bomb. Indeed, as with the Brighton explosion, the person placing the bomb need not necessarily be in the vicinity when the bomb explodes if it has a timer, anti-handling device, or any mechanism which is capable of triggering an explosion without needing the bomber to positively set the device off himself. The main condition is that the job is done properly. Apart from the publicity, and possibly the shock to the psychological target, there is little point in attempting to kill somebody or destroy something and then failing to do it. It represents a waste of resources and provides the enemy with the opportunity to protect that target against future

99) A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 113, 117. P. Willan. Puppet Masters, 214-215. P. W. Little. "Abduction and Assassination Reconsidered", TVI Report, 8, no. 3, (1989), 17-18.

100) A. J. Scotti. "Transportation Security", 354.

101) G. Grivas - Dighenis. Guerrilla Warfare, 63-64, 100.

attacks. For this reason an effective terrorist operation should be conducted in such a way as to minimise the chance of failure. Thus Rajiv Gandhi's assassin, a suicide bomber, walked right up to him before setting off her explosives.¹⁰² Likewise, various accounts of gun attacks at close-quarters show that the assailants frequently shoot the victim a number of times - once or twice to get them on the ground, and then a few shots into the head to make sure they are dead.¹⁰³

Close quarter bomb attacks are obviously dangerous for the perpetrator, although obviously this is not a problem for suicide bombers the terrorists because the perpetrator is not expected to survive. An example of this would be the occasion in April 1983 when a member of Hizbollah drove a vehicle-bomb into the US Embassy in Beirut and detonated it, killing 63 people.¹⁰⁴ However, small explosive devices such as hand grenades or small bombs can be thrown at either human targets, or at material targets such as vehicles or buildings, sometimes with lethal effect.¹⁰⁵ Once the operation has been executed the most important factor for the terrorist is the ability to escape.

The withdrawal of the operational team.

Except in the case of suicide bombers, proxy bombers, hijackings, and sieges, terrorist groups plan their operations on the assumption that the attackers must get away immediately after the operation has been carried out. Even when the terrorists do remain in the public eye for a while, they usually have some idea as to escape plans. Thus in

102) "Rajiv Gandhi murdered by bombers at election rally", The Independent, May 22nd 1991. "What One-Eyed Jack knows", The Independent, July 1st 1991.

103) "IRA kills leading Ulster politician", The Times, December 8th 1983. "Attacks on perjury personnel", AP/RN, December 8th 1983. T.P.Coogan. Michael Collins, 116. T.P.Coogan. On the Blanket: The H-Block Story, (Dublin: Ward River Press, 1980), 205, 232. P.Taylor. States of Terror, 106.

104) R.Fisk. Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War, (London: Andre Deutsch, 1990; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 478-480. D.C.Martin & J.Walcott. Best Laid Plans, 104-105.

105) "Soldier and boy hurt in IRA 'coffee jar' bomb attack", The Independent, April 28th 1992. "Limpet mine raid on police car wounds 21 people", The Independent on Sunday, June 28th 1992. D.McKittrick. Despatches from Belfast, 195. B.O'Brien. The Long War, 154-155.

December 1975 a terrorist group led by Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, widely known as 'Carlos', stormed the Vienna conference of OPEC (Oil and Petroleum Exporting Countries), and took the various government ministers there hostage.¹⁰⁶ Carlos mentioned to one of the ministers his plan to demand that the kidnappers and their hostages be flown safely out of Austria. According to Dobson and Payne they were originally to be flown to Tripoli, but ended up in Algiers.¹⁰⁷

Where the operation involves leaving a bomb to explode some time afterwards, the withdrawal of the terrorists is not really a problem. In other cases someone has to remain in the vicinity of the target until the operation is concluded. Examples of this include a shooting, or a bomb which requires that the terrorist can see the target when detonating the device - for example a remote-controlled land-mine.¹⁰⁸ In these cases the terrorist group must plan some form of getaway before carrying out the operation.

The most obvious example of the need for a getaway plan is when an abduction takes place. For the Moro kidnapping the escape route was well planned. After the bodyguards had been eliminated, Moro was bundled out of his car into a waiting Fiat 132 and driven off. One of the abductors left on a motor-cycle whilst the others left in a Fiat 128. The Fiat 132 was only driven for a relatively short distance, before Moro was transferred to a Fiat van. This was driven to an underground car park, where Moro was put into a packing case which was loaded into another Fiat van. From there Moro was taken to a safe flat which had been prepared in the Via Montalcani.¹⁰⁹

106) There is some dispute as to who sponsored this operation. Dobson and Payne mention Iraq, Algeria, Libya, and the PFLP as 'more obviously interested parties', with the USSR as having an interest in seeing the kidnapping succeed in weakening OPEC. Yallop on the other hand points the finger more directly at Iraq acting through the PFLP. C.Dobson & R.Payne. The Carlos Complex, 126-127. D.Yallop. To the Ends of the Earth: The Hunt for the Jackal, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1993), 375-376, 378-379.

107) C.Dobson & R.Payne. The Carlos Complex, 99, 119. D.Yallop. To the Ends of the Earth, 396-397.

108) "IRA land-mines hard to detect", The Guardian, April 10th 1990.

109) A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 110-118. P.Willan. Puppet Masters, 238.

Even less sophisticated operations require an escape route. When carrying out sniper attacks, the Provisional IRA and the INLA place a premium on 'runbacks', that is a secure, short, escape route from the vicinity of the attack to either a safe house, or to a car which will get them away from the area.¹¹⁰ Dillon's account of planned PIRA attacks on British Army patrols emphasises that a great deal of attention was placed on the terrorists knowing beforehand where to run to after the shooting had ended.¹¹¹

When the escape route is not planned or reconnoitred sufficiently the results can be fatal for the terrorists concerned. In February 1992 a Provisional IRA unit, consisting of at least four men, attacked an RUC station with a truck-mounted heavy machine-gun and automatic rifle fire. After the attack the PIRA unit drove the truck to the car park of a church a mile or so away, where they planned to dump the truck and transfer into cars that they had left there. A British Army unit, probably Special Air Service, was waiting there and killed four Provisionals.¹¹² The amount of time spent getting from the attack site to the change-over point was excessive, and the terrorists appear to have made no attempt to secure the change-over site before the truck returned. They were sitting ducks for the Army ambush and suffered the consequences of not planning a withdrawal properly.

The issue of communiques.

Usually, though not always, the terrorist group will issue a communique after an operation in order to justify the attack, and often to propagate their political beliefs. On the other hand some groups do not claim responsibility for operations. After the assassination of the Sri Lankan Minister of State for Defence General Wijeratne in March 1991, the new Defence Secretary brushed aside denials of

110) A.Feldman. Formations of Violence, 42-45. P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 247-248.

111) M.Dillon. Killer in Clowntown, 85

112) "Four shot dead as army traps IRA gang", The Times, February 17th 1992. "Army jubilant at killing of IRA men", "Soldiers lay in wait for IRA gang to return", both in The Independent, February 18th 1992. "Cleared IRA man shot by SAS, The Times, February 18th 1992. B.O'Brien. The Long War, 232-234.

responsibility by the Tamil Tigers on the basis that they never claim responsibility for operations.¹¹³ Indeed the LTTE strenuously denied responsibility for the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991, despite the fact that following the killing the Indian police unearthed an extensive LTTE network which was almost certainly involved.¹¹⁴ An illustration of this element of terrorist tactics, and of the way in which a terrorist operation takes place, can be seen in the assassination of the Northern Irish unionist politician, Edgar Graham.

Case study. The assassination of Edgar Graham: Belfast, December 7th 1983.

Edgar Graham's killing was an example of a typical close quarters assassination of a relatively unprotected target. Graham, a twenty-nine year old law lecturer, and by all accounts a young 'rising star' in the politics of the Ulster Unionist Party, was shot dead outside Queen's University, Belfast, on December 7th 1983.¹¹⁵ Coogan states that Graham was involved in advising the Northern Irish prison service, and Kelley believes that he had written a report recommending a ban on Sinn Fein, the internment of Sinn Fein's leaders, and the expulsion of republicans from public bodies in Northern Ireland.¹¹⁶ Most notably, as is shown in a letter which Graham wrote to The Times, he had strongly and publicly supported the use of 'supergrasses', that is the acceptance of the uncorroborated statements of informers as evidence in the trials of suspected terrorists in the juryless 'Diplock' courts.¹¹⁷ This was at a time when

113) "LTTE denies hand in killing of Wijeratne", The Hindu: International Edition, March 16th 1991. "LTTE blamed for Wijeratne's killing", The Hindu: International Edition, March 23rd 1991.

114) "Plotting Eelam's future", The Independent, June 15th 1991. "Head of Gandhi murder squad dies after siege", The Independent, August 21st 1991. "Enough evidence to implicate LTTE chief", The Hindu; International Edition, February 8th 1992.

115) "IRA kills leading Ulster politician", The Times, December 8th 1983.

116) T.P.Coogan. The IRA (Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1987), 690. K.J.Kelley. The Longest War, 357-358.

117) "Letters: Use of supergrasses in N Ireland", The Times, September 17th 1983. For details of the use of supergrasses see S.C.Greer. "The Supergrass System in Northern Ireland", P.Wilkinson & A.M.Stewart (eds).

both republican and loyalist terrorist groups in Northern Ireland found themselves coming under increasing pressure because of the use of the supergrasses by the authorities. Thus he was a potential terrorist target.

The assassination of Edgar Graham was described in some detail in a report in The Times.

The terrorists struck soon after Mr Graham ... had walked from his car and was talking with a colleague on the pavement near the university's law library.

Two men in casual dress came out of the university buildings. One of them pulled a high velocity pistol from a folder of papers and shot Mr Graham in the back of the head at point blank range.

As he fell to the ground, blood pouring from the wound, the gunman fired three more shots before running off and passing the pistol to his colleague.

... As a lecturer on his way to a regular tutorial, Mr Graham's movements would have known within the university.¹¹⁸

Although Graham had a pistol for personal protection, the account in The Times noted that he had no opportunity to use it.

The following day the Sinn Fein publication An Phoblacht/Republican News carried their account of the killing, provided the PIRA's rationale for it, and concluded with a threat to those who opposed them.

Today's execution of Edgar Graham by the IRA should be a salutary lesson to those loyalists who stand full-square behind the laws and forces of the repression of the nationalist people.

Edgar Graham and his colleagues rejoiced in the assassinations of republicans whether or not they were IRA volunteers or unarmed political activists. And Mr Graham himself supported the corruption of even British law on the use of show trials and paid perjurers.

Let the loyalist politicians, who make the ammunition for the British army, UDR and RUC to fire, understand that they cannot escape the repercussions of their incitement to murder and repression.¹¹⁹

This last comment was clearly meant to intimidate those who had publicly supported the use of supergrasses. The Sinn Fein

Contemporary Research on Terrorism. T.Gifford.
Supergrasses: The use of accomplice evidence in Northern Ireland, (London: The Cobden Trust, 1984).

"How the informer casts a shadow over justice in Ulster", The Guardian, July 29th 1983.

118) "IRA kills leading Ulster politician", The Times, December 8th 1983. For the PIRA account see "Attacks on perjury personnel", AP/RN, December 8th 1983.

119) "Incitement answered", AP/RN, December 8th 1983.

President , Gerry Adams, was subsequently reported to have said that the PIRA contention was that Graham was "... trying to heap on further repression".¹²⁰

This example demonstrates the characteristics of a close quarters assassination of a target of medium-level importance. As The Times observed, Graham's routine was obviously quite well known. The assassins knew when and where to find him, and he was attacked when he was totally off-guard. The assassin concealed the weapon until the last possible moment, and once Graham was down the assassin ensured that he was dead by firing more shots into his head at close range. Having killed Graham, the assassin transferred the weapon to a courier so as not to be caught in possession of it, and made a rapid withdrawal from the scene of the attack. Soon after the assassination a communique was released seeking to justify the attack by reference to the supposed iniquities of the victim, and threatening similar attacks upon others who supported the Government. A possible result of the death of Edgar Graham was to discourage young men and women from becoming involved in constitutional politics in Northern Ireland.¹²¹ Thus the terrorists showed that they had the motive, means, and opportunity to carry out this killing.

Summary.

Terrorist operations are not merely concerned with killing people or destroying objects. To produce the intended political and psychological effects the terrorists must attack the right people or objects and preferably achieve their intended result without being killed or captured themselves. Attacks on targets of opportunity are by definition relatively unplanned except insofar as the assailants have their weapons available at the time. Therefore some of the points in this chapter do not apply. However, where a degree of planning has gone into an attack one will normally find that the terrorists have carried out a number of steps which will make a successful result more likely.

120) "We've Got the Spectators Involved", Newsweek, January 16th 1984.

121) Conversation in Belfast, September 1993.

These steps include choosing suitable targets, gathering information on these targets, planning the operation, and then, where appropriate, ensuring that the terrorists get away after the operation. The easier it appears to be for the terrorists to carry out these actions with regard to a potential target - for example the ease with which they can find out where a human target lives or works - the more likely it is that that target will be attacked. This is an important factor in determining the element of opportunity available to the terrorists, and may determine whether they attack one target rather than another. However, in order to carry out an attack, the terrorists must have the necessary resources.

The Capabilities of Terrorist Groups

Introduction.

The capability of a terrorist group can be defined as its ability to carry out terrorist operations. Some groups may be capable of carrying out operations against hard targets which are protected by sophisticated security measures, whilst others may only be capable of carrying out attacks against relatively soft targets. Three factors can be said to determine the capabilities of a terrorist group: the quality of the group's leadership, the membership of the group, and the material resources available.

The quality of leadership.

Terrorist groups are usually created by a leader or nucleus of leaders who formulate and explain an ideology which has the capacity to attract adherents and spur them on to action. The leaders then have to devise ways of translating the ideology and the desire for action into concrete terrorist operations. Having done this they must be able to justify their actions in the terms of their ideology. The ability of the leaders to fulfil these functions adequately.

With the Red Brigades for example, this nucleus was formed in 1969-1970 by Renato Curcio and Mara Cagol of the Metropolitan Political Collective in Milan, and ex-members of the Federation of Young Italian Communists (FGCI - Federazione Giovanile Comunista Italiana) such as Alberto Franceschini.¹ Similarly, Yasser Arafat, Salah Khalef (later known as Abu Iyad), and other Palestinian students studying in Cairo in the early 1950s, mobilised support within the Palestinian Student's Union and formed al-Fatah, which became the core of the Palestine Liberation Organisation when it was founded in 1964.² In other cases the formation of the group can be more diffuse. The June 2nd Movement in West Germany

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- 1) D.Salvioni & A.Stephanson. "Reflections on the Red Brigades", Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs 29, no. 3, (Fall 1985), 491-492. A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 70-76. G.C.Caselli & D.della Porta. "The history of the Red Brigades", 72.
- 2) H.Cobban. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation, 21-31. A.Frangi. The PLO and Palestine, 95-102.

consisted of a number of groups, what Scharlau terms *cliques*, which clustered around a common leadership. In fact B2J was a relatively small organisation whose estimated membership varied between thirteen people in 1971 and forty in 1976.³ Likewise, the Ulster Defence Association originated in the formation of several separate Protestant vigilante groups in urban areas of Northern Ireland in 1970, and these only adopted the loose confederal structure of the UDA in the early summer of 1971.⁴

Where a group has a pre-history of sorts - such as the PIRA, or has an institutional base - such as MAS in Colombia, there may be a tradition or a skeletal framework to fall back upon. With the Provisional IRA in 1970 and ETA in the late 1960s, a skeleton structure and historical tradition were already in place, and a core of people existed to keep these almost defunct organisations from going out of existence. Thus the leaders did not have to start from scratch. Likewise, with MAS in Colombia, a nucleus of leaders existed in the drug-trafficking groups, the military, and other governmental and business institutions. However, with the communist and fascist groups in Italy and Germany, and larger groups such as the Palestine Liberation Organisation, Shining Path in Peru, and the LTTE in Sri Lanka, although shaky foundations for the cause may have existed in the shape of a conventional political party or faction, the terrorist groups had to be created virtually from scratch.⁵

In some cases a nucleus may fail to attract adherents or supporters to the cause and the group will fail to maintain sufficient momentum to stay in existence. This appears to have been the case with many of the small Italian communist and fascist groups, but it might equally be applied to a group such as the Angry Brigade in Britain, which was very active for a short period but did not long survive the arrest of the leading members of the group. Alternatively, when several members of the PIRA leadership were imprisoned

3) B.A.Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 179.

4) S.Bruce. The Red Hand, 46-50. D.L.G.Hall. The Ulster Defence Association, 10, 25, 42-43, 336-337.

5) See the special issue on "Political Parties and Terrorist Groups", Terrorism and Political Violence, 4, no. 2, (Summer 1992).

or interned in the early 1970s, the group merely continued to operate in an uncoordinated and more violent fashion under the decentralised control of less experienced and less politically conscious young activists.⁶ Some smaller groups - for example the Revolutionary Organisation November 17th (Epanastaiki Organosi 17 Noemvri - 17N), a highly nationalistic Greek communist terrorist group, have only ever consisted of a small core and have concentrated upon carrying out meticulously-planned high-profile operations.⁷ Thus there has been no need for them to expand much beyond the original small nucleus.

The ability of the terrorist leadership is important. A degree of intelligence is obviously an advantage in a terrorist leader, but this should not be confused with formal academic ability. The fact that terrorists tend to start their activities at an early age may mitigate against them being in a position to enter further or higher education. Furthermore, the material success which further education can bring may divert such people from the risks inherent in terrorism. However, the leaders must be capable of translating their political ideology into a set of beliefs which are attractive and comprehensible to the other members at the very least, and ideally to supporters and potential sympathisers as well. A former PIRA member notes that one reason why a particular Derry Provisional rose in the organisation in the 1970s was that:

He was articulate and could explain publicly where we were at. That was unusual in the IRA and it secured his place very early on and kept him there because he is still able to think.⁸

Similarly, one of the reasons why Gudrun Ensslin was able to lead the first generation of the RAF, in combination with the

6) "Defector who finds life too quiet", The Times, February 22nd 1973. "Internment: the big gamble for both sides", The Independent on Sunday, November 17th 1991. M.Dillon & D.Lehane. Political Murder in Northern Ireland, 247, 257-258.

7) G.Kassimeris. "Greece: Twenty Years of Political Terrorism", Terrorism and Political Violence, 7, no. 2, (Summer 1995), 80. A.Corsun. "Group Profile: The Revolutionary Organization 17 November in Greece (1975-91)", Y.Alexander & D.Pluchinsky (eds). European Terrorism Today & Tomorrow, 93-94. Y.Alexander & D.Pluchinsky. Europe's Red Terrorists, 90.

8) K.Toolis. Rebel Hearts, 308.

forceful Baader, was her ability to translate the groups actions and beliefs into the pseudo-Marxist jargon which appealed to other members of the group.⁹

Another notable factor amongst terrorist leaders is a high degree of dedication and single-mindedness with regard to the political cause involved. Bowyer Bell, who has met various terrorist and insurgent leaders over the years. has referred to their:

... very deep and very narrow political beliefs ... they have a tunnel vision as far as alternatives in political action are concerned. Having chosen a particular way, which however translated means arms [sic] struggle, they can see no other alternative and that seems to be true with all of them.¹⁰

When reading the biographies or autobiographies of terrorist leaders such as Savinkov, Collins, Begin, Grivas, or MacStiofain, one is struck by the driven and dedicated nature of these men.¹¹ The willingness to subordinate all other concerns to the demands of the organisation, and the perspective that this is morally correct, means that whilst the terrorist leaders might have a strong sense of moral values, they are also capable of rationalising acts of great ruthlessness. Thus, following the execution of two Jewish terrorists in Palestine in 1946, Menachim Begin - then head of the Irgun - ordered that two British soldiers should be abducted and hanged, and in addition had their bodies booby-trapped with explosives, in order to dissuade the British from carrying out any more executions.¹²

9) S.Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group, 92-93. J.Becker. Hitler's Children, 94, 110-111.

10) I.Salan, chairperson, "Psychology of leaders of terrorist groups", International Journal of Group Tensions, Vol 12, 88.

11) B.Savinkov. Memoirs of a Terrorist. T.P.Coogan. Michael Collins. M.Begin. The Revolt, revised edition, (1952; London: W.H.Allen, 1979). G.Grivas - Dighenis. Guerrilla Warfare. D.Barker. Grivas: Portrait of a Terrorist, (London: Cresset, 1959). S.MacStiofain. Revolutionary in Ireland, (Edinburgh: Gordon Cremonesi, 1975).

12) M.Begin. The Revolt, 288-290. R.D.Wilson. Cordon and Search: With 6th Airborne Division in Palestine, (Aldershot, England: Gale & Polden, 1949), 132-134. E.Tavin & Y.Alexander (eds). Psychological Warfare and Propaganda: Irgun Documentation, (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc, 1982), 229-230. L.Collins & D.Lapierre. O Jerusalem!, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1972; Pan, 1973), 95.

One of the most important qualities of terrorist leaders is the ability to learn from their own experience, and from that of others. In February 1991 a PIRA spokesman describing operational aspects of PIRA's strategy stated:

New tactics are discussed beforehand and then analysed afterwards on the basis of their effectiveness.¹³

The PIRA's former chief of staff noted that by 1972 the Provisionals had built up a fund of experience which the British authorities would be unable to remove.¹⁴ A practical example of the use of such experience can be seen in the development of the 'one-shot sniper'. Essentially, rather than getting caught up in a gun-battle with the better-armed, better-trained, and more numerous British troops, from late 1972 the PIRA used snipers who would fire one shot and then retreat to a safe place before they could be located and caught or killed.¹⁵ An earlier example of the ability of an Irish republican leader to learn was shown by Michael Collins in 1920 following the IRA ambush of a police detective in Dublin. Although mortally wounded, he was able to run to his house after being hit several times. Collins analysed what had happened and ensured that in future members of his assassination squad would carry heavier calibre .45 pistols instead of .38s.¹⁶

However, it would be over-stating the case to say that terrorists necessarily learn from their experiences. For instance the Red Brigades knew that whilst the public reacted ambivalently to attacks on politicians and business managers, attacks which killed ordinary people, such as uniformed police officers, were widely unpopular and damaged support for the group to the extent that they issued statements defending their actions.¹⁷ Nevertheless, in January 1979 they caused mass protests - and vast damage to their cause - when they shot dead a popular worker who had denounced a work colleague for distributing BR literature.¹⁸ Furthermore, one

13) "'We remain totally committed and confident in victory' - Oglagh na hEireann", AP/RN, February 14th 1991.

14) S.Macstiofain. Revolutionary in Ireland, 246.

15) S.Macstiofain. Revolutionary in Ireland, 301-302.

P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 247-248.

16) T.P.Coogan. Michael Collins, 117.

17) A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 92, 123, 126, 186.

18) "Italian Terrorists Kill a Union Aide", Washington Post, January 25th 1979. "Italian labour protest over

could argue with some degree of justification that if the the communist terrorists in Europe in the 1980s had any great capacity to learn, they would have realised that whilst individual operations may have been tactically successful their campaigns were largely futile in strategic terms.

Terrorist leaders can also learn from the experience of other groups. During the 1950s, some members of the IRA who were destined to form the core of the Provisional IRA in the 1970s, were imprisoned in England with members of the Greek-Cypriot terrorist group EOKA, and from their own account learned from them.¹⁹ According to various sources PIRA members have also consulted books on guerrilla warfare and insurgency by the likes of Barry, Begin, Guevara, Mao, and Taber.²⁰ Similarly, the Italian publication in 1970 of Marighela's "Handbook of Urban Guerrilla Warfare" or "minimanual" by Giangiacomo Feltrinelli - a publisher who set up the a forerunner to BR, the Partisan's Action Group (Gruppo di Azione Partigiani - GAP) in 1969 - provided the Red Brigade leadership with a blueprint for organising a revolutionary communist group and for its subsequent strategy.²¹

Other groups have drawn direct lessons from the experiences of others. As will be seen later, some West German terrorists received training from Palestinian terrorists in the 1970s. Similarly, following a suicide bombing by Hamas in Tel Aviv on October 19th 1994 which killed twenty-two people and injured forty-five, a spokesman for the group claimed that Hamas leaders had learned how to

killing", Financial Times, January 26th 1979. "Hero's funeral for party victim", Financial Times, January 29th 1979. C.Seton-Watson. "Terrorism in Italy", 110. A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 100, 175-176. D.Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 227, 285 n42.

19) S.Macstiofain. Revolutionary in Ireland, 74-79.

20) S.Macstiofain. Revolutionary in Ireland, 43-44, 47.

L.Clarke. Broadening the Battlefield, 30. M.Dillon. Killer in Clowntown, 261. R.Taber. The War of the Flea: Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practice, (St Albans, England: Paladin, 1970). M.McGuire. To Take Arms, 69. T.P.Coogan. The IRA, 693.

21) A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 49. A.Jamieson. "Entry, Discipline and Exit in the Italian Red Brigades", Terrorism and Political Violence, 2, no.1, (Spring 1990), 1, 3-4.

carry out such operations from the Lebanese Islamist group Hizbollah when Hamas leaders were exiled to southern Lebanon.²²

Leadership within terrorist groups can operate at a number of levels. Where the operational group is part of a larger organisation - such as the Shining Path, the LTTE, or Hizbollah - a fairly rigid hierarchy is formed with fixed lines of command delegating some powers of decision to the lower levels.²³ With smaller terrorist groups which still cover a wide geographical area, for example the Provisional IRA and the Red Brigades, organisational structures generally have some form of hierarchy, with an overall leadership cadre and a chain of command over the various sub-groups below. Within these sub-groups there are also likely to be leadership structures - whether formal or informal - with certain people making operational decisions. Where the members of these sub-groups also try to develop ideological policies independent of the overall leadership, there is a possibility of splits developing within the organisation, examples being the split between the Official IRA and the INLA, and between the Red Brigades and the Walter Alasia Column of BR.²⁴

In a very small group whose members live in the same area, it is unlikely that a formal bureaucratic pattern of organisation will evolve. Group structures are normally informal, and leadership roles tend to devolve upon those with the most forceful or persuasive character. As mentioned, Andreas Baader was able to exercise leadership of the original Baader-Meinhof group by his rude and forceful behaviour. Similarly Lenny Murphy, who led a UVF group in the

22) "Hamas has learnt the lessons of Lebanon", The Independent, October 20th 1994. B.Hoffman & D.K.Hoffman. "The RAND-St Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism, 1994", Terrorism and Political Violence, 7, no. 4, (Winter 1995), 219.

23) S.Strong. Shining Path, 99-101. S.V.D.Samaranayake. Political Violence in the Third World: A Case Study of Sri Lanka, 1971-1987, Ph.D, University of St Andrews, 1990, 238-241. M.Ranstorp. "Hizbollah's Command Leadership: Its Structure, Decision Making and Relationship with Iranian Clergy and Institutions", Terrorism and Political Violence, 6, no. 3, (Autumn 1994), 304-316.

24) J.Holland & H.McDonald. INLA, 17-118. A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 173, 182-183.

Shankill district of Belfast, appears to have commanded his group through a combination of charisma, audacity, and fear.²⁵ According to Hearst, Donald DeFreeze, who called himself Cinque Mtume, appears to have controlled the other eight members of the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) in California through a combination of bombast, constant criticism, and occasional violence.²⁶ In such cases the groups effectiveness - or at least its levels of activity - may be enhanced by a determined and forceful leader.

Obviously, one of the main determinants of the effectiveness of a terrorist leader is his ability to plan operations and to link them to the political objectives of the group. Whilst terrorist leaders like Baader and Murphy ruled through force of character - and it should be noted that Murphy was very effective at terrorising the Catholics of Belfast - other terrorist leaders attain their position through a generally acknowledged respect for their operational or political abilities. George Grivas, who led the Greek-Cypriot EOKA against the British in Cyprus in the 1950s, was a staff officer in the Greek Army before the Second World War, and he meticulously laid down both the organisation of EOKA and gave personal consent to many of the operations carried out by EOKA members.²⁷ Likewise, the leading Derry member of the Provisional IRA mentioned above receives a great deal of respect because of his operational abilities and his willingness to assume the same risks as his subordinates.²⁸ According to one republican source he "... has the respect and confidence of the volunteers. He's seen as their man. They trust him".²⁹

Although a degree of political astuteness - the ability to match violent methods to political objectives and explain the connection between the two - appears to be a prerequisite for the overall leadership, this is not necessarily the case

25) M.Dillon. The Shankill Butchers, 8, 12, 49, 59. S.Bruce. The Red Hand, 173.

26) P.C.Hearst & A.Moscow. Every Secret Thing, 139-140, 154, 161, 198, 201.

27) G.Grivas. Guerrilla Warfare, 25, 47-48. D.Barker. Grivas, 25-29, 51-52, 79-80, 119, 139-140.

28) K.Toolis. Rebel Hearts, 294-296, 308, 309-310. P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 197-198.

29) "Bogside fighter turned to politics", The Independent, August 26th 1993.

for local leaders.³⁰ Whilst PIRA leaders such as Francis Hughes and Jim Lynagh were very effective operationally, their reported lack of political sophistication means they would not necessarily have made effective leaders of the overall republican movement.³¹

Bruce notes that amongst the Scottish supporters of the loyalists in Northern Ireland, it was accepted that a man could be a good organiser, but "just not cut out for the rough stuff".³² However, most groups appear to want at least a degree of demonstrated operational competence. Thus, the rise of the criminologist Giovanni Senzani, to the leadership of the Naples column of the Red Brigades in the early 1980s is only partially explicable by his ability to link the operations of the BR to wider theoretical precepts. Like his rival BR leader Mario Moretti - who was presented as being more straightforwardly 'militarist' - Senzani also planned operations.³³

A final characteristic which can determine the effectiveness of a terrorist group's leadership is experience. The psychologist David Canter has noted that non-political criminals become more competent with experience, and there is little reason to suspect that the same does not apply to terrorists.³⁴ Although the stresses of a prolonged clandestine or semi-clandestine life may lead to exhaustion or disillusion, the more experienced the group leaders are the more likely it is that their competence will improve. The existence of a high degree of continuity amongst the PIRA

30) K.Toolis. Rebel Hearts, 247. P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 13, 318-320.

31) D.Beresford. Ten Men Dead: The story of the 1981 Irish hunger strike, (London: Grafton, 1987), 152-157.

L.Clarke. Broadening the Battlefield, 162-163.

D.Hammill. Pig in the Middle, 268-269. P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 456. M.Urban. Big Boy's Rules, 223-224. B.O'Brien. The Long War, 142.

32) S.Bruce. "Criminality and Vigilante Politics; The Scottish Protestant Case", Conflict Quarterly, Spring 1986, 20.

33) Corriere dela Sera, January 10th 1982. "Red Brigades key planner is betrayed", The Daily Telegraph, January 11th 1982. D.Salvioni & A.Stephanson. "Reflections on the Red Brigades", 501. A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 183-184. P.Willan. Puppet Masters, 326.

34) D.Canter. Criminal Shadows: Inside the Mind of the Serial Killer, (London: Harper Collins, 1994; 1995), 214, 220, 294, 297-298.

leadership has been noted.³⁵ According to a security force source in November 1991:

The fact is that the IRA are very, very good. When you're a terrorist and a good one you don't make many mistakes. They've had 22 years experience. Most soldiers are here for 18 months then away again.³⁶

Another security force source noted:

The essential attributes of their leaders are better than ever before. Some of their operations are brilliant, in terrorist terms.³⁷

For groups which lose their leadership cadre early in the campaign, acquiring such a degree of competence would be more difficult.

Ultimately a terrorist group is dependent upon its leadership - whether formally or informally designated - to provide it with the impetus for action, and to maintain the momentum once it has started. The leaders of a terrorist group at the overall command level have to be able to articulate the ideology of the group in such a way as to attract and retain enough support to keep the group in existence, and to translate the ideology into a strategy. Leaders at the operational level have to be able to translate this strategy into operations. Ideally these leaders must be capable of thinking beyond the next operation. The greater the ability of the terrorist leaders, the more likely it is that the group will select targets which serve their political and ideological purposes.

The membership of the group.

For the purposes of this study a member of a terrorist group is somebody who plays an active role in terrorist operations or in actively maintaining support and logistical elements such as the collection and analysis of information, weapons procurement, the maintenance of arms dumps and safe houses, and the movement of weapons. It does not include sympathisers or even supporters if their role does not go beyond providing passive support or taking part in legal

35) J. Bowyer Bell. IRA Tactics and Targets, 14.

36) "Internment: the big gamble for both sides", The Independent, November 17th 1991.

37) "Internment 'only way to beat IRA'", The Independent, November 17th 1991.

activities such as overt fund-raising or political activities.

An aspect of a terrorist group which contributes to its ability to carry out operations is the number of members which it has. It is a fairly obvious point that the more members which a group has the more operations it can carry out. In addition a larger terrorist group can obtain more information in relation to possible targets because it has a greater number of people who can acquire or simply overhear potentially useful information. Of course it may be the case that a smaller group has better targeting information on specific individuals because it has members who have a suitable professional or social standing. The People's Will in 1880s Russia was fortunate to possess members who had access to members of the Tsarist court. One member, a skilled workman in the Winter Palace in St Petersburg, planted a bomb below the Tsar's dining room in February 1880, killing ten people and narrowly failing to kill the Tsar himself.³⁸ In general however, a larger group such as the PIRA will have more members in potentially useful areas such as the civil service, as well as simply having more members who are likely to pick up casual gossip.³⁹

The size of the terrorist group will also determine, to a degree, the complexity of the operations which they can carry out. Relatively simple operations such as assassinations, mass-casualty bombings, and similar attacks do not require the participation of many terrorists. However, an operation such as the abduction of a high-profile person is more complex and requires an assault team, somebody to sort out the logistics such as transport, safe houses, and possibly any subsequent communications with the authorities or any other interested parties. The Moro kidnapping of 1978 involved an assault team of at least six or seven people, with another two to four acting as drivers or blocking off the Via Fani as Moro was dragged from his car and the bodyguards were killed. Ten BR members were found guilty of

38) E.Crankshaw. The Shadow of the Winter Palace, 297.
R.Hingley. The Russian Secret Police, 64.

39) "Teenagers who enlist for terror", The Independent on Sunday, August 5th 1990. P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 287-288.

involvement with the abduction and murder of Moro, and arrest warrants were issued for two more.⁴⁰ An alternative route was taken by ETA in 1973, when they decided to kill rather than kidnap the Spanish Prime Minister Carrero Blanco because killing him was easier and required fewer resources.⁴¹ Thus, to an extent, the size of the group can determine the types of operation which it can carry out.

The individual calibre of terrorists can be defined as their ability to carry out terrorist operations effectively. Generally terrorists have to carry out operations which are deemed to be illegal by the state in which they conducted, all the time trying to avoid the attentions of the security forces or other enemies. The better they are at planning and carrying out operations, and at evading death or capture in the process, the more effective they are as terrorists. Thus their calibre is a mixture of intelligence, nerve, and an ability to carry out technical tasks such as bomb-making and the use of firearms.

Terrorist groups often consist of people who knew other members of the group socially before they became group members. In some cases the connections are based around family networks. Provisional IRA members frequently have other members of their family - fathers, uncles, brothers, and so forth - in the organisation.⁴² Likewise, Islamic paramilitary groups in the Near East, for example Hizbollah and Hamas, appear to be frequently organised around family ties.⁴³ In the Lebanon one result of this has been that some terrorist operations - including the taking of western hostages in the Lebanon - have been partially aimed at gaining the freedom of imprisoned family members.⁴⁴

40) A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 113, 117, 122. P. Willan. Puppet Masters, 215.

41) J. Agirre. Operation Ogro, 2-3, 57-58, 72.

42) M. Dillon & D. Lehane. Political Murder in Northern Ireland, 144. F. Burton. The politics of legitimacy: Struggles in a Belfast community, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), 109, 22, 23. P. Bishop & E. Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 290-291.

43) "Spirit of hope confronts a deadlier terror", The Daily Telegraph, October 20th 1994. A. Ashkenasi. "Social-Ethnic Conflict and Paramilitary Organization in the Near East", P. H. Merkl (ed). Political Violence and Terror, 317.

44) C. Coughlin. Hostage: the complete story of the Lebanon captives, (London: Little, Brown & Co, 1992), 79, 92,

In other cases the links within the group are between friends and acquaintances. According to Marnham, nine members of a Lyons-based cell of the French communist group Direct Action (AD - Action Directe) seem to have been recruited by their former schoolteacher.⁴⁵ Communist terrorists in Italy and West Germany also seem to have recruited people who were already in the circle of friends or acquaintances of people who were members of the group.⁴⁶ In ETA, cells have often consisted of people who were members of the same cuadrilla - the term for the groups of young people who socialise together in the towns and villages of the Basque country - or were recruited by older fellow members of one of the semi-political hill-climbing clubs which proliferate in the area.⁴⁷

The Provisional IRA provides examples of various relationships existing between group members before they joined the group. According to Bishop and Mallie, about 80% of Provisional IRA members in the late 1980s had a father, brother, or uncle who had been involved in the republican movement.⁴⁸ In some cases a number of family members have been active members of a republican terrorist group at the same time. The Grew brothers from county Armagh, Seamus and Dessie, were both in the INLA at about the same time, Seamus being killed by the RUC in 1982 and Dessie in a British Army ambush in 1990 - six years after he had left the INLA to join the PIRA.⁴⁹ Similarly, of the three PIRA men killed in an ambush by the SAS near Carrickmore, county Tyrone in August

104. E.F.Mickolus, T.Sandler, J.M.Murdock. International Terrorism in the 1980s: 1980-1983, 468-469. E.F.Mickolus, T.Sandler, J.M.Murdock. International Terrorism in the 1980s: 1984-1987, 139-142. G.Rosie. The Directory of International Terrorism, 168-169.

45) P.Marnham. Crime and the Academie Francaise: Dispatches from Paris, (Harmondsworth, England, 1993), 9, 16.

46) C.Novaro. "Social networks and terrorism: the case of *Prima Linea*", R.Catanzaro (ed). The Red Brigades & Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy. A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 103-107. B.A.Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 163-170.

47) R.P.Clark. "Patterns in the Lives of ETA members", 298-299, 304-305. P.Taylor. States of Terror, 88-93.

48) P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 13.

49) J.Holland & H.McDonald. INLA, 83, 217-218, 258, 280 n.1.

1988, two - Gerard and Martin Harte - were brothers.⁵⁰ In rural areas in particular, units often appear to have been based around the strong personal relationships between members rather than any formal organisation. Urban states that Jim Lynagh's unit in east Tyrone and north Armagh was run largely on the strength of his character and the personal loyalty of other members to him, and that this was typical of units in the area.⁵¹

When considering the rationality of terrorist behaviour, it is important to note that terrorist group members are, in general, psychologically normal. The fact that terrorists are frequently killers or the accomplices of killers may make them seem abnormal to an observer for whom lethal violence is largely an abstract concept. However, the ability to kill or injure people against whom one has no personal animosity is not confined to terrorists. Members of the armed forces are trained to kill and may often have to kill other combatants in wartime but, as Ellis shows, Allied soldiers were also capable of killing unarmed German soldiers in certain circumstances.⁵² Ordinary people are also sometimes capable of deliberately killing unarmed civilians. In March 1968 ordinary American troops massacred between 200 and 700 Vietnamese villagers in the village of My Lai.⁵³ Similarly, in the aptly-titled Ordinary Men, concerning a German field police unit during the Second World War, Browning shows how working and middle-class, middle-aged conscripts from Hamburg followed orders to shoot dead Jewish men, women, and children in cold-blood. Over time they became calloused to such behaviour and more willing to kill.⁵⁴

50) "Ambushes feared linked to shoot-to-kill policy", June 4th 1991, The Guardian. M.Sutton. Bear in mind these dead ... An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland, 1969-1993, (Belfast: Beyond the Pale Publications, 1994), 165.

51) M.Urban. Big Boy's Rules, 223-224.

52) "Taught to kill, not to pity", The Independent on Sunday, March 21st 1993. R.Holmes. Firing Line, 366. J.Ellis. The Sharp End of War, 318-320.

53) M.Maclear. Vietnam: The Ten Thousand Day War, (London: Thames/Methuen, 1981; 1982), 373-378. M.Walzer. Just and Unjust Wars, 309-315.

54) C.R.Browning. Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battallion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland, (New York: Harper Collins, 1992; 1993), 1-2, 55-70, 77, 102, 191.

Research concerning non-terrorists confirms the ability of ordinary people to inflict pain in appropriate circumstances. In the 1960s the psychologist Stanley Milgram carried out a series of experiments which demonstrated that subjects were willing to inflict powerful electric shocks upon other people if ordered to do so by a person in authority.⁵⁵ Likewise, an examination of torturers employed by military governments in Greece and Argentina found that:

... apart from traits of authoritarianism and obedience, and ideological sympathy for the government, there is little evidence that torturers are markedly different from their peers - at least, until the point where they are recruited and trained as torturers.⁵⁶

Although the experience of killing may, over time, lead to the individual becoming calloused, there is little reason to assume that people who kill or torture as part of their profession are psychologically different to ordinary people.

Research concerning terrorists generally confirms this view. Studies by Lyon and Harbinson, and Heskin in Northern Ireland, and by Ferracuti and Bruno in Italy, suggest that insurgent terrorists are at least as intelligent and emotionally stable as normal people.⁵⁷ On the other hand fascist terrorists in Italy do seem to exhibit signs of emotional instability and aggression whilst those in Germany

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- 55) H. Brown. People, Groups, and Society, (Milton Keynes, England: Open University Press, 1985), 16-19. K. Heskin. Northern Ireland: A Psychological Analysis, (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1980), 87-88.
- 56) L. Williams. "Through the eyes of a torturer", Amnesty Campaign Journal for Amnesty International British Section, (London), May/June 1995, (issue 73).
- 57) H. A. Lyons & H. J. Harbinson. "A Comparison of Political and Non-Political Murderers in Northern Ireland, 1974-84". K. Heskin. "The psychology of terrorism in Northern Ireland", Y. Alexander & A. O'Day (eds). Terrorism in Ireland, (London: Croom Helm, 1984). K. Heskin. Northern Ireland: A Psychological Analysis, 74-93. F. Ferracuti. "A Sociopsychiatric Interpretation of Terrorism", Annals of the American Academy, 463, (September 1982), 130. F. Ferracuti & F. Bruno. "Psychiatric Aspects of Terrorism in Italy", I. L. Barak-Glantz & C. R. Huff (eds). The Mad, the Bad, and the Different: Essays in Honor of Simon Dinitz, (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1981), 207.

were less well qualified and had jobs of lower status than their left-wing counterparts.⁵⁸

An exception to the view of the terrorist as a psychologically normal person is Jerrold Post who, largely but not wholly on the basis of studies carried out by the German government, has speculated that terrorists are "... marginal, isolated, and inadequate individuals from troubled family backgrounds".⁵⁹ Post, and the German psychiatrist Lorenz Bollinger, do believe that terrorists frequently display the characteristics of a process termed splitting, whereby one's strengths are attributed to oneself, but weaknesses and failings are projected outwards and blamed upon others. This process is reinforced by the ideology of the group.⁶⁰ However, Post also notes elsewhere that there is no evidence to suggest that terrorists are psychopaths, and that on the contrary, evidence suggests that they are in most respects normal.⁶¹ The problem with Post's approach is not that it is necessarily wrong with regard to the experience of terrorism in Germany, but that it is not necessarily applicable elsewhere.

One notable difference which Post notes is that people who join terrorist groups which have a degree of support from their host community are more likely to have well-adjusted characters than people who join groups which appear to be divorced from the community. Thus members of the Basque group ETA or the communist Red Brigades in Italy have received support in the past because of their identification with causes which were felt to have some historical justification

58) F.Ferracuti & F.Bruno. "Psychiatric Aspects of Terrorism in Italy", 209. E.Kolinsky. "Terrorism in West Germany", J.Lodge (ed). The Threat of Terrorism, 75-76.

59) J.M.Post. "Notes on a Psychodynamic Theory of Terrorist Behaviour", Terrorism: An International Journal, 7, no 3, (1984), 241.

60) J.M.Post. "Terrorist psycho-logic: Terrorist behaviour as a product of psychological forces", W.Reich (ed) Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 27. L.Bollinger. "Terrorist conduct as a result of a psychosocial process", P.Pichot, P.Berner, & K.Thau (eds). Psychiatry: The State of the Art. Volume 6: Drug Dependence and Alcoholism, Forensic Psychiatry, Military Psychiatry, (New York: Plenum Press, 1985), 388.

61) J.M.Post. "Terrorist psycho-logic", 26.

- the Basque struggle in the first instance, and the anti-fascist partisan war between 1943 and 1945 in the second. However the Red Army Faction had relatively little popular support and consequently the group members became more isolated from the world outside the group.⁶² This view of terrorists having a more stable outlook because they can relate to an ordinary community life is borne out by Clark's study of ETA, and also by White and White's study of the Provisional IRA.⁶³ The effect of living in an enclosed circle of people - with only other terrorists for company - is examined later, but the inward-looking nature of the group seems to be reinforced in groups which have few supporters or sympathisers amongst whom they can relax and obtain moral support.

Some general observations can be made about terrorists. First, they tend to be recruited when they are young. From a study of eighteen terrorist groups, Russell and Miller suggest that the average urban terrorist is between twenty-two and twenty-five.⁶⁴ Studies of individual groups tend to bear this out. From an analysis of sixty-seven PIRA members killed in Belfast between 1969 and 1988, White and White found that the average age at recruitment into the organisation was nineteen years and four months.⁶⁵ Clark found that ETA recruits tended to be in their mid-twenties when recruited or first arrested, and Weinberg and Eubank found that in Italy the majority of members of left-wing groups (72.8%) and right-wing groups (80.1%) were under twenty-nine years old when first identified as terrorists.⁶⁶ There is some differentiation between the ordinary members

62) J.M.Post. "Notes on a Psychodynamic Theory of Terrorist Behaviour", 246, 247, 250.

63) R.P.Clark. "Patterns in the Lives of ETA members", 283-284, 293-294. R.W.White & T.F.White. "Revolution in the City: On the Resources of Urban Guerrillas", Terrorism and Political Violence, 3, no. 4, (Winter 1991).", 110, 115-116.

64) C.A.Russell & B.H.Miller. "Profile of a Terrorist", L.Z.Freedman & Y.Alexander (eds). Perspectives on Nuclear Terrorism, (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc, 1983), 47.

65) R.W.White & T.F.White. "Revolution in the City", 111.

66) R.P.Clark. "Patterns in the Lives of ETA members", 286. L.Weinberg & W.Eubank. "Leaders and Followers in Italian Terrorist Groups", Terrorism and Political Violence, 1, no. 2, (April 1989), 167, 169.

who are in their late teens and twenties, and the leaders of the groups who tend to be a few years older.⁶⁷ Other studies of specific terrorist groups show this pattern of young ordinary members, with leaders who are a few years older, to be quite common.⁶⁸

There are exceptions. The average age of the German left-wing terrorists surveyed was higher on average than for most other groups, but this disguises the fact that members of the Red Army Faction in Germany were much older on average than members of the contemporaneous June 2nd Movement.⁶⁹ Italian right-wing leaders tend to be quite a bit older than the average, and their ordinary members are somewhat younger.⁷⁰

A possible consequence of the nature of terrorist leaders and the youth of their followers is that they tend to be impatient by nature. In an article on the importance of organisational factors in analysing political terrorism, Crenshaw has noted that "Terrorists are often individuals who are impatient for action", and that they give action priority over talk.⁷¹ The comments of some terrorists seem to bear

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- 67) C.A.Russell & B.H.Miller. "Profile of a Terrorist", 47-48. K.L.Oots. "Organizational Perspectives on the Formation and Disintegration of Terrorist Groups", Terrorism, 12, no. 3, (1989), 144. L.Weinberg & W.Eubank. "Leaders and Followers in Italian Terrorist Groups", 169.
- 68) I.Salan, chairperson. "Psychology of leaders of terrorist groups", 96. L.Weinberg & W.Eubank. "Leaders and Followers in Italian Terrorist Groups", 167, 169. B.A.Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 129. "Teenagers who enlist for terror", The Independent on Sunday, August 5th 1990. J.Bowyer Bell. "Career Moves: Reflections on the Irish Gunman", Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 15, no. 1, (January-March 1992), 74. T.P.Coogan, The IRA, 668-671 lists the ages of thirty-eight IRA prisoners who escaped from the Maze Prison in Northern Ireland in March 1983. The vast majority were in their mid to late-twenties, and appear to have been in their late-teens to mid-twenties when first imprisoned.
- 69) C.A.Russell & B.H.Miller. "Profile of a Terrorist", 47. B.A.Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 129.
- 70) L.Weinberg & W.Eubank. "Leaders and Followers in Italian Terrorist Groups", 167.
- 71) M.Crenshaw "An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism", Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs 29, no. 3, (Fall 1985), 474-475.

this out. In a letter in 1971, Michael Baumann - who was later to join the June 2nd Movement in Germany - wrote:

WORDS CANNOT SAVE US! WORDS DON'T BREAK CHAINS! THE DEED ALONE MAKES US FREE! DESTROY WHAT DESTROYS YOU!⁷²

Similarly, Hall notes a loyalist group terming itself the 'Ulster Militants' stating:

We do not believe in defence but attack ... but we got sick and tired of training with only a general idea of what we were supposed to be training for. We wanted action and were not allowed to have any.⁷³

Other statements by loyalist terrorists reinforce this view of the primacy of action.⁷⁴

Irish republicans have historically had a low opinion of those whom they deem to be compromising 'politicians' rather than 'soldiers'.⁷⁵ In west Belfast in the early 1970s, Burton observed that, of the young men of the neighbourhood, the PIRA members were the ones who appeared to have an aura of "urgent activity" about them.⁷⁶ As one former PIRA activist said of his youthful actions in retrospect, "You can't let politics ruin a fuckin' war".⁷⁷

This is not to say that terrorists are necessarily impulsive. Guzman spent ten years laying down the foundations for the violent campaign of the Shining Path in Peru, whilst the amount of time which some groups will spend in planning a single operation is testament to their patience.⁷⁸

A characteristic of some terrorists is their persistence in the face of adversity and the ultimate possibility of death. To take three PIRA members for example, Jim Lynagh was imprisoned for four years in Northern Ireland and for four years in the Republic, Dessie Grew was imprisoned four times, whilst Mairead Farrell spent nearly ten years in prison. All three were subsequently killed on

72) B.Baumann. Wie Alles Anfing, 72.

73) D.L.G.Hall. The Ulster Defence Association, 82.

74) D.L.G.Hall. The Ulster Defence Association, 75, 77.

75) C.Townshend. Political Violence in Ireland, 366. P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 276, 285. B.O'Brien. The Long War, 34. K.Toolis. Rebel Hearts, 294-295.

76) F.Burton. The politics of legitimacy, 111.

77) B.O'Brien. The Long War, 34, 40.

78) S.Strong. Shining Path, 36-39. W.A.Hazleton & S.Woy-Hazleton. "Sendero Luminoso", 66-68.

operations.⁷⁹ In summing up Irish republicans whom he had met, Padraig O'Malley notes:

Members of the Republican movement whom I have spoken with in the course of this inquiry were highly intelligent, extraordinarily motivated, relentlessly committed to their course of action, imbued with a puritanical obsession - you might even say a tyrannical obsession - with wanting to do right and to be seen to do right, which makes their actions all the more frightening.⁸⁰

Likewise, with Inge Viett, who was a member of first the B2J and then the RAF, twice escaped from prison, in 1973 and 1976. She shot a policeman who tried to arrest her in Paris in 1981, before 'retiring' to East Germany in 1983. She appears to have simultaneously been an agent for the East German Ministry for State Security (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit or Staatssicherheitsdienst known as the MfS or Stasi) and was arrested in 1990 after German reunification.⁸¹

Another characteristic of terrorists which is not often remarked upon is the degree of courage which is sometimes necessary in the commission of their actions. Several terrorists have been willing to die in pursuit of their aims. Between 1969 and 1993, 256 members of the Provisional IRA were killed by the security forces, by rival terrorist groups, or by the premature detonation of their own bombs.⁸² Their determination is well illustrated by the willingness of prisoners to fast to death in pursuit of political status or other changes in prison conditions. Between 1974 and 1981 twelve Irish republicans died on hunger strike - two in England in 1974 and 1976, and ten during the H-Block hunger strikes of 1981.⁸³ Similarly, in West Germany two RAF members

79) "Key figures allegedly behind attacks on the Continent", and "Web of terror that spread across Europe", both in The Independent, April 3rd 1991. B.O'Brien. The Long War, 142. J.Adams, R.Morgan, & A.Bambridge. Ambush: The War Between the SAS and the IRA, (London: Pan, 1988), 136-140.

80) P.O'Malley. Biting at the Grave: The Irish Hunger Strikes and the Politics of Despair, (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1990), 285.

81) J.Schmeidel. "My Enemy's Enemy", 64-66. B.A.Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 299, 301. E.MacDonald. Shoot the Women First, 227-228.

82) M.Sutton. Bear in mind these dead, 195-205.

83) See D.Beresford. Ten Men Dead. L.Clarke. Broadening the Battlefield.

starved themselves to death in order to change their prison conditions - Holger Meins in November 1974 and Sigurd Debus in April 1981.⁸⁴ In addition, there is the previously mentioned example of the members of groups such as Hamas, Hizbollah, and the LTTE who carry out suicide attacks. Whilst terrorists generally use methods which minimise the risks to themselves, and often carry out attacks which are perceived as callous, it is wrong to assume that they lack courage.⁸⁵

The technical ability of terrorists varies considerably. It is not necessary for somebody to be well-trained in military techniques for them to be able to carry out certain types of terrorist operation. Uncomplicated attacks against relatively undefended targets do not require much in the way of training. Thus in the late-1960s and early 1970s many of the attacks carried out by the Naxalites in India - were stabbings against relatively soft targets such as traffic policemen, wealthier peasants, and lower-ranking members of the Communist Party of India (Marxist).⁸⁶ Such attacks were suitable for the relatively primitively-armed Naxalites, suited the Santal tribals who were initially heavily-involved with the rural aspects of the Naxalite campaign, and had a greater psychological impact than attacks with guns or explosives would have done.

However, for terrorists wishing to carry out more complex operations, competence in the use and construction of weapons, and the ability to plan operations is extremely useful and generally comes with experience. Some terrorists have had training in the handling of weapons and planning of operations. Such training might be provided by an organisation or a government which supports the cause of the terrorist group, or which merely wishes to support the group

84) B.A.Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 93-99, 300, 304.

85) Merari argues that some of the suicide bombers in Lebanon were either coerced or duped into taking part in such operations. A.Merari. "The readiness to kill and die: Suicidal terrorism in the Middle East", W.Reich (ed) Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 194-196.

86) B.Dasgupta. The Naxalite Movement, 44-45, 83, 87. E.Duyker. Tribal Guerrillas: The Santals of West Bengal and the Naxalite Movement (pub Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987), 84, 127.

in causing damage and destruction to a perceived enemy. In some cases the training is provided by other terrorist groups due to some feeling of solidarity or mutual advantage. For example, from the late 1960s the PLO helped to train members of the June 2nd Movement and the Red Army Faction, whilst reports suggest that in the 1980s members of Italian and German fascist groups received training from Christian Falangists in the Lebanon and from Palestinian groups.⁸⁷ In these cases the trainers felt they had a common enemy to those whom they trained - western imperialism in the case of the Palestinians and communism in the case of the Falangists.

Some governments have also provided terrorists with training. Such training has either been provided directly to the terrorist groups, or indirectly when members of the armed forces have joined terrorist groups during or after their military service. An example of the former was demonstrated in the mid-1980s when members of the LTTE received training from the Indian armed forces at training camps in the province of Tamil Nadu.⁸⁸ This was before the ill-fated intervention of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka between 1987 and 1990. Similarly, the East German Stasi provided training and a safe haven for members of the RAF and B2J, apparently because aiding the activities of these groups was seen as a way of destabilising the western alliance system.⁸⁹

Members of the armed services or other security force members who become involved with terrorist groups can be divided between those who are still in the security forces when their terrorist involvement occurs, and those who have already left. The former case includes the already-mentioned involvement of fifty-nine military officers in the MAS conservative death squads in Colombia, where although the definite involvement of the authorities is not proven, there

87) B.Baumann. Wie Alles Anfing, 49-50. S.Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group, 89-101. P.Willan. Puppet Masters, 165-166. C.di Giovanni. Light from Behind the Bars, 98, 104. H.J.Horchem. Terrorism in West Germany, 10-11, 12-14.

88) B.Vaughn. "The Use and Abuse of Intelligence Services in India", 11-12.

89) J.Schmeidel. "My Enemy's Enemy", 66-67. B.A.Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 56-61.

is a strong suspicion that the officers were acting with at least tacit support from some governing elements.⁹⁰ In the early 1990s members of Colombian police units are also alleged to have carried out the killings of suspected left-wing terrorists, political activists and human rights campaigners, as well as killing vagrants, petty thieves and other people deemed 'undesirable' by traders and other commercial elements.⁹¹ Similarly, in Northern Ireland serving members of the UDR/RIR have been involved in loyalist terrorist activities including attacks on Catholic targets. According to Ryder, between the regiment's formation in 1970 and March 1979, over thirty UDR members were convicted of serious terrorist offences. This included five UDR members convicted of murder, five of manslaughter, ten for arms and explosives offences, and four for serious assaults.⁹²

Former members of the military or other security forces can also provide a degree of expertise for terrorist groups. In his account of the Direct Action group based around Lyons. Marnham points out that the bomb-maker in the group - Maxime Frerot - had been trained in the use of explosives when carrying out his national service as a paratrooper in the French Army.⁹³ Similarly, Bruce mentions that the expertise of ex-servicemen made a contribution to the activities of loyalist terrorist groups in Northern Ireland, and that some UDA and UVF members joined the UDR in order to receive training and to gain access to weapons and intelligence. However, he also notes that the existence of locally-recruited security forces also provides a form of safety-valve as a way of defending the existing political order for those who might otherwise join the loyalist groups. He speculates that this drain of talented recruits left the loyalists with a poorer talent pool to recruit from.⁹⁴

A good bomb-maker does not necessarily require military training as expertise can come from elsewhere. Joseph

90) J.Pearce. Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth, 177. Amnesty International. Getting away with murder, 36.

91) Amnesty International. Political violence in Colombia, 21, 24-28.

92) C.Ryder. The Ulster Defence Regiment: An Instrument of Peace? (London, Methuen, 1991)., 182-183.

93) P.Marnham. Crime and the Academie Francaise, 9, 11-12.

94) S.Bruce. The Red Hand, 216-218, 225, 271-273.

O'Connell, who constructed the detonator devices for the bombs used by a PIRA unit active in London and south-eastern England in the mid-1970s, had previously worked as a radio operator and electronics trainee for the Marconi electronics company in Cork.⁹⁵ In practice a terrorist bombing campaign does not need many bomb-makers. As long as the method of priming the bomb is simple enough to be carried out by untrained people, and there are sufficient people prepared to carry the bombs to their targets the bombs themselves can be constructed by a small number of bomb-makers.⁹⁶ However, failure in this respect can be costly. Between 1969 and 1993 over 100 PIRA members were killed by the premature explosion of their own bombs, just over one-third of the total number of PIRA members killed.⁹⁷

The capability of ordinary terrorists can be seen as an amalgam of the skills and abilities which they possess. These in turn can determine the types of operations which they are capable of carrying out. To take an extreme example, there would be little purpose in entrusting somebody who had little training or technical sense with firing a complex portable anti-aircraft system. Thus, to an extent, a terrorist's ability may be measured according to his technical ability with weapons. In addition, personal abilities such as intelligence and courage are also useful, because it is more likely that someone possessing these attributes will carry out an operation successfully. Lastly, as a rule, the more terrorists which a group possesses the greater the number and complexity of the operations which they can carry out. However, in order for their capabilities to be put to the best use, they need suitable weapons.

The weapons available.

Even if a terrorist group has extremely talented leaders and highly trained and committed members, without suitable weapons the capability of the group is extremely limited. This does not mean that every group needs masses of

95) G.McKee & R.Franey. Time Bomb, 9, 61, 63, 337. M.Dillon. The Enemy Within, (London: Doubleday, 1994), 137.

96) For accounts of such terrorist bombing operations see L.Collins & D.Lapierre. O Jerusalem!, 116-120, 179-182. S.O'Doherty. The Volunteer, 69-71.

97) M.Sutton. Bear in mind these dead, 197.

the latest and most sophisticated weaponry. The use of knives and axes by the Naxalites has already been noted, and as a UDA gunman has noted:

You can go in and terrorize your next-door neighbour if you have a hammer in your hand.⁹⁸

However, it is undoubtedly true that, provided members have the technical competence, the availability of powerful weapons can greatly extend the capability of a terrorist group to attack targets possessing various levels of protection.

The means by which a terrorist group can obtain weapons are many and varied. During the Second World War a communist group adopted the slogan:

Any household has a knife; if you have a knife, you can get a pistol; if you have a pistol, you can get a rifle; if you have a rifle, you can get a machine-gun. Get on with it comrades: get armed!⁹⁹

Whilst this may seem somewhat ambitious, some groups have undoubtedly gained their initial armaments at least by raiding the resources of the police and military. Throughout 1970 members of Japanese communist terrorist groups raided a number of the small two to three man urban police huts - known as a koban - in order to obtain weapons.¹⁰⁰ Similarly, in May 1979 Corriere della Serra reported that five members of a group calling themselves the Proletarian Combat Squad (Squadre Proleterie di Combattimento) had raided a police section house in Turin, taking the uniforms, weapons, and identity cards from two policemen.¹⁰¹ Weapons can also be obtained by chance. Dillon notes an occasion in 1989 when two members of a plain-clothes military surveillance team had to be swiftly evacuated from the Falls area of west Belfast after being confronted by a group of young PIRA members. In their car they left behind a Heckler and Koch sub-machine gun which the Provisionals gratefully appropriated.¹⁰²

98) A.Feldman. Formations of Violence, 48.

99) M.R.D.Foot. Resistance, (Eyre Methuen, 1976; London: Granada, 1978), 55.

100) Y.Katayama. Terrorism in Japan since 1969, 49.
W.R.Farrell. Blood and Rage, 96-97.

101) "Terroristi denudino due vigili rubando le loro divise armi a tesserini", Corriere della Serra, May 1st 1979.

102) M.Dillon. The Dirty War, 478.

Some terrorist groups - mainly espousing conservative or fascist ideologies - have been supplied with weapons by sympathisers within the security forces. Groups which have members serving in the security forces will generally have little difficulty in obtaining at least some weapons. In Colombia and other parts of Latin America, it seems likely that terrorist groups which are linked to the police, military or military-approved paramilitary groups have either used their ordinary service weapons when carrying out attacks, or have obtained buckshee weapons and ammunition.¹⁰³ During the recent troubles in Northern Ireland, loyalist terrorists have raided UDR depots using inside information to obtain weapons, and on occasion have also been directly supplied with weapons by sympathisers or members within the regiment.¹⁰⁴

Terrorists can also obtain weapons on the legal and illegal arms markets. The relatively unrestricted gun laws in the USA have made it possible to openly purchase small arms up to the level of automatic and semi-automatic rifles in gun shops.¹⁰⁵ In the early 1970s many of the Armalites obtained by the PIRA were bought in the USA in small consignments and then smuggled over to Ireland in suitcases or hidden in normal cargoes.¹⁰⁶ The Red Brigades also appear to have bought a few of their weapons from gun shops in Italy, using false identity papers to make their purchases.¹⁰⁷

With the break-up of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc, weapons formerly held by the Soviet Army and newly developed weapons appear to have come onto the market in the West.¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, the low costs of arms manufacturers in

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- 103) Amnesty International. Political violence in Colombia, 42, 52, 94-95. Amnesty International. Getting away with murder, 34-36.
- 104) S.Bruce. The Red Hand, 218. C.Ryder. The Ulster Defence Regiment, 152, 158-161, 175, 179-181. M.Dillon. The Dirty War, 219-220.
- 105) F.S.Pearson. The Global Spread of Arms: Political Economy of International Security, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994), 61.
- 106) P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 295-296. J.Holland. The American Connection, (New York: Viking Penguin, 1987; Dublin: Poolbeg, 1989), 81-83. J.Bowyer Bell. The Secret Army, 439.
- 107) R.Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 53.
- 108) "'Assassin' guns seized in raids on arms ring", The Independent, May 25th 1995. F.S.Pearson. The Global

the former Soviet bloc and Far East allow them to develop cheap small arms which would be suitable for a terrorist group. According to a report in September 1994 whereas a standard European-made hand-grenade, costs about £8, one made in China costs £3, and whilst a sophisticated European rifle costs about £400, a Russian-made AK47 costs about £60.¹⁰⁹ In addition, recent Russian weapons are extremely well-suited for use by both security forces and terrorists alike. They include a small silenced pistol, a silenced assault rifle based upon the AK47 which is capable of penetrating body armour, and a silenced sniper rifle. In addition a new 350mm long handgun has been developed which is capable of firing automatic bursts, has an extending stock so that it can be fired from the shoulder, and is reportedly capable of penetrating all types of military body armour.¹¹⁰ Such weapons would be extremely useful to a terrorist group. A recent television programme concerning weapons exports from Bulgaria indicates that arms dealers there would not enquire too closely as to the final destination of weapons which they supply.¹¹¹

As well as buying weapons on the open market, terrorists can also obtain them from foreign supporters or sponsors who are not directly involved with the group concerned, but who for one reason or another wish to either help the group or harm the enemies of the group. Governments can be extremely useful suppliers of weapons and other resources to a terrorist group as they have access to money and the arms market, and can obtain weapons without too many questions being asked. If necessary, governments can move weapons around the world using the diplomatic bag, and store them in embassies if necessary.¹¹² Examples of governments supplying weapons and other forms of aid to terrorist groups,

Spread of Arms, 61. R.Fleming & H.Miller. Scotland Yard, (London: Michael Joseph, 1994), 5.

109) "The arms suppliers go to war", The Independent on Sunday, business supplement, September 4th 1994.

110) P.Paganacci. "Weapons of the Russian Special Forces", RAIDS, UK edition, (January 1995).

111) "The Cook Report", ITV, television, June 13th 1995.

112) U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs. Libya under Qadhafi, 1. P.Seale. Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire, (New York: Random House, 1992), 105, 149, 242-243.

include Iranian aid to the Lebanese Shia Islamic group Hizbollah, and American aid to the conservative Nicaraguan Counter-revolutionaries (contrarevolucionarios - Contras) who fought the Sandanista Government of Nicaragua in the 1980s.¹¹³

The greatest material boost which the Provisional IRA received in recent years was the shipments of arms from the Libyan Government of Colonel Gaddafi. Gaddafi had supplied some weapons to the Provisionals in the early 1970s as part of his general opposition to 'imperialism', but in the mid-1980s he appears to have chosen to supply the PIRA because of the police siege of the Libyan Embassy in London in April 1984 following the fatal shooting of a policewoman and the subsequent expulsion of Libyan diplomats.¹¹⁴ According to The Economist the RUC has estimated that by November 1987 the Libyans had given the IRA six tons of Semtex plastic explosive, twenty SAM-7 anti-aircraft missiles, about 1,500 Kalashnikov AK47 automatic rifles, 1½ million rounds of ammunition, fifty RPG7 rocket launchers, ten flame throwers, and a number of medium and heavy machine-guns, 12.7mm DSKH heavy machine guns.¹¹⁵ According to McKittrick, the Libyan

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- 113) R.H.Shultz. "Iranian Covert Aggression: Support for Radical Political Islamists Conducting Internal Subversion Against States in the Middle East/Southwest Asia Region", Terrorism and Political Violence, 6, no. 3, (Autumn 1994), 285, 286, 290. M.Ranstorp. "Hizbollah's Command Leadership", 307, 310. B.Woodward. Veil, 177, 225-228, 275, 355-356, 388-392, 465-467, 481-483. C.Dickey. With the Contras: A Reporter in the Wilds of Nicaragua, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985; London: Faber & Faber, 1986), 143, 161-162, 166-171, 180-181, 211. H.E.Vanden. "State Policy and the Cult of Terror in Central America", P.Wilkinson & A.M.Stewart (eds). Contemporary Research on Terrorism, 265-267. O.North & W.Novak. Under Fire, 249-250.
- 114) "Voyage into business of terror", The Independent, January 12th 1991. P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 246, 305-306. J.Adams. Trading in Death: The Modern Arms Race, (London: Hutchinson, 1990; Pan, 1991), 17-30.
- 115) "Arming the IRA: The Libyan Connection", The Economist, (London), March 31st, 1990. "Gadaffi admits training IRA elite", The Sunday Times, June 21st 1992. "RUC chief proposes national police units", The Independent, July 22nd 1992. B.O'Brien. The Long War, 144. Statistics vary from one source to another.

shipments provided the Provisionals with enough weaponry to continue their campaign for at least another decade.¹¹⁶

An interesting case of terrorists receiving indirect help from a government may be found in the case of Afghan mujahedeen who were supplied by the US government with various weapons including Stinger anti-aircraft missiles and were trained in their use by the Americans.¹¹⁷ Subsequently, a report in The Independent suggested that Algerians who fought alongside the mujahedeen in Afghanistan have turned up in the current civil war in Algeria, whilst the possible use of anti-aircraft missiles in terrorist attacks against aircraft has become a major concern of the US Department of State.¹¹⁸ The concern is particularly acute as reports suggest that some of the Stingers were diverted to Iran, a state which the US Government has long regarded as being a sponsor of terrorist groups and activities.¹¹⁹

The influence of foreign sponsors on the selection of terrorist targets has varied. For instance as well as providing safe haven and training, the East German Stasi appears to have recruited West German communist terrorists as agents. However, the extent to which this affected target selection is not clear.¹²⁰ On the other hand, although James Adams claims that the PIRA plan to bomb a military parade in Gibraltar in 1988 was a form of payoff to Gadaffi by humiliating Britain on the international stage, there is

116) "Libyan arms fuel surge in terrorism", The Independent, May 8th 1990. "IRA has enough Semtex for 15 years", The Independent on Sunday, March 19th 1995.

117) J.Adams. Trading in Death, 58-64. J.Salata. "MANPADs: The Potential for Use as a Terrorist Tactic", U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security. Terrorist Tactics and Security Practices, 90-94. The acronym MANPAD stands for Man Portable Air Defence System. Another frequently used term for portable and non-portable ground to air missiles is SAM (Surface to Air Missile).

118) "Algerian extremists murder 12 foreigners", The Independent, December 16th 1993. J.Salata. "MANPADs", 102.

119) J.Salata. "MANPADs", 93-94. J.Adams. Trading in Death, 70-71. F.S.Pearson. The Global Spread of Arms, 55. R.H.Schultz. "Iranian Covert Aggression", 283.

120) J.Schmeidel. "My Enemy's Enemy", 64-66. H.Horchem. "The Decline of the Red Army Faction", 61, 63-65. B.A.Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 58-59.

little evidence to suggest that the Provisionals have allowed outside actors to influence their operations.¹²¹

In other cases this type of relationship has greatly influenced the types of target selected by a terrorist group. The Palestinian group Fatah Revolutionary Command (FRC) run by Sabri al-Banna - otherwise known as Abu Nidal, has had a number of sponsors throughout the years. The FRC has been provided with shelter and training facilities as well as weapons and logistical support by, respectively, the Iraqi, Syrian, and Libyan Governments over a number of years since the mid 1970s. As a result, the relationship between the FRC and the sponsoring governments has resembled that of a mercenary group and its paymasters, with the terrorists carrying out attacks to suit the political interests of their sponsors as well as attacking their own favoured targets.¹²²

Terrorists can also make weapons themselves. The manufacture of home-made guns is not particularly common because of the relative availability of guns on the open market or from sponsors. However, primitive home-made pistols were used by the Mau Mau in Kenya in the 1950s, and in the late 1960s and early 1970s the Naxalites of West Bengal used pipe-guns triggered by pulling a string.¹²³ Even in sophisticated western states, there have been cases of home-made guns being manufactured. In October 1990 a former member of the British Army was jailed in Northern Ireland for making sub-machine guns for the UDA. The components were manufactured at Shorts aircraft factory in Belfast and supplied to the man, who assembled the guns at a workshop in county Down.¹²⁴ Similarly, in February 1992 French police arrested Pedro Gorospe Lertxundi, thought to be ETA's quartermaster, in a villa near Bayonne. Police found home-made pistols, and sub-machine guns based upon the Israeli

121) J.Adams. Trading in Death, 29. M.Dillon. The Dirty War, 431. "IRA hunts for top-level mole", The Observer, March 13th 1988.

122) P.Seale. Abu Nidal, 109-151. H.Cobban. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation, 55, 96-97, 165.

123) H.Willmott. "Kenya in Revolt", R.Thompson & J.Keegan (eds). War in Peace: An Analysis of Warfare since 1945, (London: Orbis, 1981), 111. B.Dasgupta. the Naxalite Movement, 83.

124) "Ex-soldier made guns for loyalists", The Independent, October 6th 1990.

Uzi. Reportedly many of the guns were manufactured for sale to eastern European and middle eastern customers.¹²⁵ However, most terrorist groups use mass-manufactured guns.

A home-made weapon which the Provisional IRA has been using since 1972 with a moderate degree of success has been the home-made mortar using cut-down oxyacetylene canisters as the tube, and with home-made projectiles. Although there is some dispute over their accuracy of these mortars, with several civilians having been injured by stray projectiles, the mortars have been used with some effect since 1979.¹²⁶ The development of mortars has allowed the PIRA to carry out several attacks against security force targets in Northern Ireland which had been protected against attack from bombs, guns and rockets by the use of reinforced barriers. In February 1985 a mortar attack on an RUC station in Newry, county Down, killed nine police officers.¹²⁷ However, a subsequent mortar attack in Newry in November 1986 injured thirty-five civilians.¹²⁸ Since 1990 at the latest, the reliability of the mortar detonators has been improved by a gyroscopic device which ensures that the detonator is always at 90° from the point of impact and is therefore more likely to detonate successfully.¹²⁹ Mortars have since been used in England to attack the British Cabinet at 10 Downing Street in February 1991, and to carry out two attacks on Heathrow Airport in London in March 1994.¹³⁰

Bombs are commonly assembled by the terrorists themselves. Guidebooks such as The Anarchist Cookbook give

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- 125) "Spain hails arrest of ETA chief", The Independent, February 22nd 1993.
- 126) "Terrorists keep faith with a weapon that rarely kills" The Independent, February 8th 1991. "The day John Major missed his lunch", The Sunday Times, February 10th 1991.
- 127) C. Ryder. The RUC, 310-312.
- 128) D. McKittrick. Despatches from Belfast, 206.
- 129) "IRA's deadly new weapon", The Sunday Correspondent, May 20th 1990.
- 130) "IRA bombers attack No 10 War Cabinet", The Independent, February 8th 1991. "Mortar bombs realise worst fears of police", The Daily Telegraph, February 8th 1991. "Yard 'powerless' to avert new attack", The Guardian, February 8th 1991. "Police comb Heathrow for more mortars", The Independent, March 12th 1994. "Tanks threat turns the screw on airport bombers", The Sunday Times, March 13th 1994. "Flight chaos as bomb warnings close airports", The Independent, March 14th 1994.

directions for the construction of relatively simple devices and recently bomb-making information has become available on the Internet.¹³¹ Quite powerful and sophisticated weapons can be constructed using components readily available in electronics and other shops. After the arrest of a Japanese Red Army member near New York in April 1988, police officers found that many of the components of his bombs had been bought from ordinary electronics and department stores.¹³² Likewise, in June 1990 a bomb-expert in the RUC told an American court that the PIRA had detonated bombs from a distance by using rewired radar detectors readily available in the electronics chain store Radio Shack.¹³³ More recent reports suggest that the Provisionals have also used a photoflash slave unit as a detonator, attaching it to a bomb and setting it off from up to 800 metres with a flashgun.¹³⁴ Other examples of the use of everyday merchandise in bombs includes the use of the timers in video-recorders to detonate time-delayed or sleeper bombs weeks or even months after they have been primed, and the use of small electronic timers in incendiary devices.¹³⁵ The availability of electronic goods is unavoidable in a mass consumer society, but it does make it easier for terrorists to obtain the components necessary to construct sophisticated explosive devices, and thus extends their range of possible targets.

In some cases home-made bombs are relatively low-powered anti-personnel devices such as the low-powered grenades used by the Naxalites in Calcutta in 1970-1971, and

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- 131) W.Powell. The Anarchist Cookbook, (Lyle Stuart Inc, 1971; Secaucus, New Jersey: Barricade Books, 1989). "Over-taxed and under siege", The Independent, April 24th 1995. "America wakes up to its paranoid army", The Independent, April 25th 1995.
- 132) W.R.Farrell. Blood and Rage, xvii-xix.
- 133) "IRA 'using rewired US radar detectors as bomb detonators'", The Independent, June 7th 1990.
- 134) "Photoflash bomb threat to the public", The Scotsman, March 16th 1994. "IRA's 'Russian roulette' detonator", The Times, March 16th 1994.
- 135) "Security alert sent to police before bombing in Brighton", The Times, October 15th 1984. "Long delay IRA fuses not new", The Guardian, October 15th 1984. "RUC irked by claims of long-delay IRA bombs", The Daily Telegraph, October 16th 1984. P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 423-426. "Simplicity of incendiary device makes disruption easy", The Guardian, December 24th 1991.

PIRA's nail-bombs consisting of cans packed with explosive and nails or other shrapnel.¹³⁶ Similar hand-thrown grenades, such as the 'drogue' bombs used by the Provisionals from the late 1980s onwards, have proved capable of penetrating lightly-armoured vehicles because although the outer shell of the bomb was made from household items such as baked bean tins, they contained Semtex - a relatively-powerful plastic explosive.¹³⁷ Booby-trapped home-made bombs have also been used by the Provisionals including a bomb inside a football which was placed inside the perimeter of an RUC station in county Antrim - doubtless in the hope that a police officer would move the ball or even kick it, and a bomb inside a tin of chocolates which was given to a soldier manning a checkpoint in county Tyrone as a 'Christmas present'.¹³⁸

The explosive components of a bomb can also be home-made. The IRA has used home-made explosives since the bombing campaign in England in 1939-1940, and since the early 1970s the Provisionals have used various mixtures of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil (ANFO), of sodium chlorate and nitrobenzene (COOP), and later of ammonium nitrate and nitrobenzene (ANNI).¹³⁹ Whilst these bombs could sometimes be quite destructive, more recently large PIRA bombs based on similar components and weighing well over 1,000 pounds caused massive destruction in the centre of Northern Irish towns and in the City of London in the early 1990s, and were also used to attack military and police facilities.¹⁴⁰ A similar bomb,

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- 136) B.Dasgupta. The Naxalite Movement, 79-80, 83. P.Gurney. Braver Men Walk Away, 116-117. D.Barzilay. The British Army in Ulster, volume 2, (Belfast: Century Services Ltd, 1975), 129.
- 137) B.O'Brien. The Long War, 154-155. D.McKittrick. Despatches from Belfast, 195. D.McKittrick. Endgame, 85.
- 138) "Ball bomb", The Independent, March 31st 1992. "Soldier given IRA bomb in chocolates tin", The Independent, December 24th 1992.
- 139) M.Dillon. The Enemy Within, 27-28. J.Bowyer Bell. The Secret Army, 150, 153. J.Adams. Trading in Death, 9-10.
- 140) "Biggest IRA bomb defused", The Independent, September 6th 1991. "IRA City bomb was fertiliser", The Independent, May 28th 1992. "Damage in huge blast put at £20m", The Independent, September 25th 1992. "Shock wave of destruction was created by a dealy mixture", The Independent, April 27th 1993. "Explosion could have wrecked city centre", The Daily Telegraph, August 13th 1993. B.O'Brien. The Long War, 214, 238-239.

thought to consist of about 5,000 pounds of ammonium nitrate-based fertiliser and fuel oil, destroyed a federal government building in Oklahoma City in April 1995 and killed 168 people.¹⁴¹ These bombings demonstrate that the lack of a powerful pre-manufactured explosive need not prevent terrorists from seeking to carry out mass-casualty attacks or a mass-destruction attack.

A recent development in the use of home-made weapons was the manufacture of the nerve gas sarin by a Japanese religious group the Supreme Truth Sect (Aum Shinri Kyo). The release of sarin on the Tokyo underground in March 1995 killed twelve people and injured up to 5,500, and Japanese police reportedly believe the group were also responsible for the death of seven people from similar nerve gas poisoning in Matsumoto, Nagano Prefecture in June 1993. Whilst a definite motive for the attack has not been conclusively established, at the time of the attack in March 1995 the cult was coming under increased surveillance and pressure from the police due to suspected abductions by the cult.¹⁴² Later reports suggest that the Tokyo attacks were concentrated on parts of the underground network close to police headquarters.¹⁴³

The types of weapon available to a terrorist group is exceptionally important in determining the types of target which it can hope to attack successfully. For instance, the possession of silencers for firearms means an attack can be carried out without guards or bystanders being aroused. According to Ryder a PIRA assassin used a silenced pistol to

141) "Bomb built for damage, not slaughter", The Independent, April 22nd 1995. "FBI widens hunt as Republicans race to back Clinton's tough line", The Guardian, April 25th 1995. "FBI piles up evidence against McVeigh", The Independent, April 28th 1995. "FBI 'close' to arresting bombers", The Independent, May 22nd 1995.

142) "Poison terror in the subway", The Independent, March 21st 1995. "Religious cult suspected of gas attacks", The Times, March 21st 1995. "Doom-cult linked with 'sarin affair' a year ago", The Independent, March 22nd 1995. "Strange Aum life for cult children", The Guardian, April 20th 1995. "Tokyo gas attack cult leader held", The Guardian, May 16th 1995. "Aum cultists admit making nerve gas", The Independent, May 18th 1995. "Aum sect guru faces trial for murder", The Independent, June 7th 1995.

143) "Aum cult doctor admits making sarin nerve gas", The Independent, October 25th 1995.

kill a police officer in a pub in Newry, county Down, in June 1981.¹⁴⁴

The clandestine nature of terrorist operations means that smaller firearms are generally more suitable because they can be easily concealed when being moved and when approaching the target. The tendency towards the miniaturisation of guns demonstrated in Table 6.1 has aided terrorists in this respect.¹⁴⁵ Unlike the other guns the Ingrams can be fitted with a silencer. Both ETA and the Ulster Volunteer Force are reported to have taken delivery of Ingrams'.¹⁴⁶

TABLE 6.1
RELATIVE SIZE AND RATE OF FIRE OF MACHINE-GUNS: 1884-1970

Model and Year	Length (Inches)	Weight (Pounds)	Rate of fire (Rounds/minute)
Maxim (1884)	46.50	40.00	600
Thompson (1928)	33.75	10.75	800
Ingrams MAC 10 (1970)	10.50	6.25	1,145

Source: I.V.Hogg & J.Weeks. Military Small Arms of the 20th century, (London: Arms & Armour Press, 1977), 98, 101-102, 220.

The trend towards miniaturisation can be most clearly seen in the reduction of size of different versions of the highly successful Israeli Uzi sub-machine gun of the 1950s. Whereas the original Uzi weighed 8.9 lbs and was 18.9" long, the newer mini-Uzi weighs 6.3 lbs and is 14.7" long.¹⁴⁷ More recently a semi-automatic pistol version has been developed with a length of 9.5" and weighing 4.7 lbs.¹⁴⁸ Longer-range firearms are also relatively small. The American Armalite, which the PIRA used from the early 1970s onwards, was easily

144) C.Ryder. The RUC, 253-254.

145) R.Clutterbuck. "Trends in Terrorist Weaponry", Terrorism and Political Violence, 5, no. 2, (Summer 1993), 130, 132.

146) R.P.Clark. The Basques, 155. S.Bruce. The Red Hand, 169.

147) E.C.Ezell. Small Arms of the World: a basic manual of small arms, twelfth edition, (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1993), 131.

148) T.Gander. Combat Pistols: A manual of modern handguns, (Wellingborough, England: Patrick Stephens Ltd, 1989), 77-80. R.Adam. Modern Handguns, (London: Quintet, 1989), 111.

folded-up for the purposes of storage and concealment.¹⁴⁹ Thus the trend towards smaller weapons, whilst being of use to law enforcement officers who also need concealed weapons, has undoubtedly aided terrorists.

Explosives have also become more powerful and more stable over the years. When Guy Fawkes and other Catholic conspirators conspired to blow up King James I of England - together with the Houses of Parliament - in Westminster on November 5th 1605, they planted several barrels of gunpowder in the cellars beneath. Likewise in December 1800 a group of French royalists attempted to assassinate Napoleon Bonaparte by placing a barrel of gunpowder on a cart along a route which he was known to take. Unfortunately for them the primitive time fuse failed to function properly and the bomb detonated after Napoleon had passed.¹⁵⁰ In both of these cases the explosives were bulky and therefore not particularly portable and were also dependent upon relatively crude methods of detonation.

In the nineteenth century developments in the manufacture of explosives transformed their role as a weapon of political protest and rebellion.¹⁵¹ The invention of dynamite provided revolutionaries with a much more powerful explosive than had been hitherto available.¹⁵² The invention of nitroglycerine, and its stabilisation with gelatine, provided a stable, powerful, and portable explosive - gelignite.¹⁵³ Tests at the time of the Fenian bombings in London in the 1880s showed that relatively small bombs of 4½" x 2½" with a nitroglycerine base were capable of causing a great deal of damage to anybody in the immediate vicinity.¹⁵⁴

149) J.Holland. The American Connection, 82. P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 169.

150) F.L.Ford. Political Murder, 216-217. W.Laqueur. The Age of Terrorism, 101.

151) J.Most. Revolutionare Kriegswissenschaft, (New York: Drud und Berlag des Internationalen Zeitungs=Beireins, 1885). Published with The Beast of Property, (New Haven: International Workingmen's Ass'n, 1884), in one volume, (New York: Kraus Reprint, 1983).

152) W.Laqueur. The Age of Terrorism, 104.

153) K.R.M.Short. The Dynamite War: Irish-American Bombers in Victorian Britain, (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1979), 1-2, 55, 64-65, 105, 128-129, 181, 205. W.Laqueur. The Age of Terrorism, 104.

154) K.R.M.Short. The Dynamite War, 181.

More recently the development of stable, durable, and powerful plastic explosives has given terrorists a greater degree of flexibility in their use of bombs. The Libyan shipments of the plastic explosive Semtex made a great difference to the PIRA's capabilities. It is a stable, malleable, and powerful explosive. Its great advantage over other types of explosive is that only a relatively small amount is necessary to produce a powerful explosion from, for example, a two pound under-car bomb.¹⁵⁵ However, it is worth noting that a former Metropolitan Police explosives expert, Peter Gurney, maintains that Semtex is about 1.3 times as powerful as TNT, and thus whilst powerful, it is not the 'super-weapon' which some accounts make it out to be.¹⁵⁶

The chapter concerning security measures shows how protective barriers, armour-plated vehicles, and other forms of security can protect a target, and how the possession of suitably powerful weapons can make it possible to attack such targets. Terrorists' possession of a variety of weapons makes it costly for all possible targets to be adequately protected. However, in order to obtain suitable weapons and carry out other aspects of terrorist operations, it is generally necessary for a terrorist group to have money

The financial base.

Terrorist groups need money in order to buy weapons and their components, to rent or buy transport and accommodation, acquire or forge documents, and provide for the living expenses of their members. Conceivably, a group such as the Animal Liberation Front in Britain or the Revolutionary Cells in Germany, can get by without large funds because most of their members are part-time terrorists who have jobs or other means of sustenance, and who do not use particularly sophisticated weaponry for their operations. However a group with a substantial number of full-time members, has to maintain an infrastructure of safe houses, courier links, and weapons dumps. Whilst some of these resources can be provided free by sympathisers, they generally require money.

155) "IRA 'transformed' by Libyan arms donation", The Independent, March 7th 1991.

156) P.Gurney. Braver Men Walk Away, 151, 214.

As noted, several terrorist groups gain such funding by carrying out bank robberies, kidnappings, and by extorting money from businesses, private citizens, and even governments with the threat that refusal to pay will result in violent retribution. Groups have also obtained money through legal and semi-legal methods. In addition to methods which rely on violence or the threat of violence, the Provisional IRA is also reported to have obtained money through illegal methods such as tax fraud, smuggling, the operation of unlicensed gaming machines, and from legitimate methods such as public collections, pubs, drinking clubs, taxi firms, shops and other legitimate businesses which both raise money, and allow the Provisionals to launder illegally obtained money.¹⁵⁷

Another lucrative source of funds for some terrorist groups has been the drugs trade. In Peru the Shining Path has raised much of its income through 'taxes' on traffickers, whilst also taking steps to prevent the major traffickers from forcing down the prices charged by peasant coca growers. According to Rumrill the Shining Path raised \$25-30 million when coca prices were at their height in August 1989.¹⁵⁸ In Colombia communist, conservative, and criminal terrorist groups have raised money from drugs trafficking. When, in the early 1980s, the communist Colombian Armed Revolutionary Force (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas - FARC) raised money by extorting protection money from narcotics traffickers, death squads were set up and financially supported by narcotics traffickers and other wealthy groups in order to kill and intimidate suspected communists and other threats to the traffickers and the Colombian economic

157) "IRA fund-raising blamed for surge in Irish robberies", The Independent, May 22nd 1990. "Dealing in the business of fear", Financial Times, January 7th 1992. "IRA suspected as raiders get away with £2m", The Independent, January 8th 1992. "Inquiry into IRA city pub links", The Irish Times, September 9th 1992. "Irish pubs suspected of laundering IRA funds", The Independent, September 28th 1992. "The IRA", The Independent on Sunday, November 22nd 1992. J.Adams. The Financing of Terror, 197-228. D.McKittrick. Despatches from Belfast, 146-151.

158) S.Strong. Shining Path, 114, 122, 125. J.E.Gonzales. "Guerrillas and Coca in the Upper Huallaga Valley", D.S.Palmer (ed). Shining Path of Peru, 108, 121-122. R.Rumrill. "The highs and lows of a cocaine economy", M.L.Smith (ed). Why people grow drugs, 86, 89.

elites.¹⁵⁹ Whilst the RUC has conceded that the Provisional IRA is not involved in the drugs trade, members of the loyalist Ulster Volunteer Force and of the republican Irish People's Liberation Organisation have been active in importing and distributing drugs in the province.¹⁶⁰

Some terrorist groups have been financially supported by governments. In some cases this has been done willingly. According to Ranstorp, Hizbollah received an estimated \$30 million from the Iranian government in 1985, rising to \$64 million in 1988 and possibly over \$100 million by the 1990s - although much of this went to support Hizbollah's social and political activities - whilst Shultz reports that Iran gave the Palestinian group Hamas \$30 million in 1992 and \$20 million in 1993.¹⁶¹ Likewise, in 1983 the US Congress approved an allocation of \$24 million for the CIA to spend on the Nicaraguan Contras, before the Boland Amendments technically restricted the uses to which US aid to the Contras could be put, and approved a further \$100 million in October 1986. This was in addition to moneys diverted to the Contras from the covert sale of American weapons to Iran in the mid 1980s.¹⁶²

In other cases governments have provided money as the price of preventing terrorist attacks. Seale claims that the Abu Nidal's Fatah Revolutionary Command raised \$50 million from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. If they failed to pay when Nidal demanded his organisation attacked targets

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- 159) C.Watson. "Guerrilla Groups in Colombia", 88-89, 94-96.
 A.M.Bravo. "Frontier culture takes to cocaine", 73, 75.
 J.Pearce. Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth, 1, 177-178, 247. Amnesty International. Political violence in Colombia, 52. J.Adams. The Financing of Terror, 269.
- 160) "Terrorists 'run Ulster drugs trade'", The Independent, February 7th 1992. "Action against drugs puts gunmen in 'policing' role", The Independent, November 3rd 1992. "IRA looks set for victory over terrorist faction", The Independent, November 4th 1992. J.Holland & H.McDonald. INLA, 311-313, 319-320. S.Bruce. The Red Hand, 194. J.Adams. The Financing of Terror, 289.
- 161) M.Ranstorp. "Hizbollah's Command Leadership", 321.
 R.H.Shultz. "Iranian Covert Aggression", 290, 297.
- 162) O.North & W.Novak. Under Fire, 21-22, 234-238.
 B.Woodward. Veil, 301, 470, 481-485, 488, 509.
 J.Ranelagh. The Agency: The Rise & Decline of the CIA, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986; Sceptre, 1988), 718-719.

such as diplomats and civil aircraft belonging to that state, as well as bombing civilian targets within the state.¹⁶³

The importance of documentation.

Terrorists frequently need documents in order to obtain access to target areas, to pass security checks at ports, airports and other international crossing points, and to maintain a clandestine existence. Some groups, such as the Fatah Revolutionary Command, have the ability to forge documents.¹⁶⁴ Likewise, A police raid on a PIRA safe house in Luton in 1990 found, amongst other things, a number of forged Home Office passes.¹⁶⁵

In other cases documents have been obtained by force. When the Proletarian Combat Squad raided the Turin police section house in April 1979, as well as taking the weapons of two police officers they also took their identity cards.¹⁶⁶ Some of the earliest actions of the Red Army Faction in Germany involved raids on town halls in order to obtain official stamps, blank passports, and blank identity cards.¹⁶⁷ In August 1985 an RAF group shot dead an American soldier - Edward Pimental - outside a Wiesbaden nightclub and stole his identity card, which they used the following day to gain access to the US Air Force base at Rhein-Main. The bomb which they planted there killed two Americans.¹⁶⁸

Lastly, terrorist groups can be supplied with documents by sympathetic or sponsoring governments. According to Seale Abu Nidal's Fatah Revolutionary Command has in the past been supplied with documents - particularly passports - by both Iraq and Libya. Real passports are of much more value than forged ones, giving terrorists a false but verifiable

163) P.Seale. Abu Nidal, 28, 129-130, 204.

164) P.Seale. Abu Nidal, 125, 206.

165) "Arrests failed to stop attacks", The Independent, December 7th 1990. "IRA arms cache men sentenced to 30 years in prison", "A 42-day watch that netted top police targets", both in The Times, December 7th 1990.

166) "Terroristi denudino due vigili rubando le loro divise armi a tesserini", Corriere della Serra, May 1st 1979.

167) S.Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group, 115, 116. J.Becker. Hitler's Children, 234-236.

168) D.Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group", 68-69. B.A.Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1991, 62.

identity and the scope to travel across borders and within countries with little hindrance.¹⁶⁹

Summary.

If the terrorist's ideology and strategy supply them with much of their motive, the tactics and capabilities supply them with their means. When selecting its targets, a terrorist group's options are circumscribed by its capabilities. Although the weapons possessed by the group are one of the more obvious determinants of what can be attacked, the ability of its leaders to motivate ordinary members and plan operations is crucial to its success, whilst the quality of its ordinary members determines whether those weapons and other resources are used effectively. The financial base of the group determines whether the group has the wherewithal to function over a long period, and the need to maintain this base can dictate that the terrorists attack certain targets in order to obtain money or to eliminate threats to the group's finances. Although groups with few full-time members and relatively primitive weapons can function without a large financial base, more sophisticated groups need the money to pay for weapons, safe houses, transport, and the living costs of their clandestine members. Lastly, in order for members of a clandestine group to stay at liberty, it is useful for them to be able to obtain documents such as passports, ID cards, and any other documentation which will enable them to move from one place to another without arousing suspicion and risking arrest. Whilst these factors may influence the ability of a terrorist group to attack particular targets, the opportunity to do so is limited by the protection given to those targets.

169) P.Seale. Abu Nidal, 23, 88, 100, 149.

Target Protection

Introduction.

A practical problem which confronts a terrorist group wishing to carry out an attack is the extent to which the target is protected. Some targets, such as an unarmed civilian and unguarded buildings, are totally unprotected. Others, such as senior politicians and officials, or government ministries and embassies have elaborate and expensive forms of protection in order to preempt attacks or to protect the targets if an attack takes place. This chapter examines the ways in which targets are protected, to see the effect which this can have upon terrorist target selection.

A distinction can be made between *static* targets - which remain in the same place for a relatively long period, and *mobile* targets, which are generally moving. An obvious example of a static target would be a building, but human targets - such as a person in their home or giving a speech at a podium - would also fall into this category. The most obvious mobile target would be a moving car, or more pertinently the occupant or occupants of the car. However it could also include a walking person, or a material target such as a moving train. For the purposes of this study, a temporarily immobile target, such as an aeroplane at an airport, a train in a station, or a parked car, counts as a static target because it is deliberately immobile at the time when it is attacked or has a bomb affixed to it. It follows from this that the same person can be a mobile target when he is in a moving car and a static target when he is in one limited area for a length of time.

The protection of static targets

The protection of static targets differs from those of mobile targets. With static targets, reliance is placed on controlling access to the area where a potential target is located, setting up detectors and barriers to deter, detect, and deflect an attack, and to provide the means of reacting if an attack takes place. The amount of protection afforded to a static target will vary according to its perceived importance, the resources available, and the risk of an attack taking place.

One rule which can be applied to the protection of both static and mobile targets is that the less public knowledge there is about the target the better. If the terrorists do not know where the target is they cannot attack it. The aim of a potential target must therefore be to assume as low a profile as is commensurate with their responsibilities and a tolerable lifestyle. In its' guidelines to American families living abroad the State Department advises:

A single concept, more than any other, should permeate all planning activities, namely "LOW PROFILE". In other words, DO NOT draw attention to yourself as an American by driving a big American car, subscribing to U.S. magazines, etc; blend in to local environs.¹

Business executives who are felt to be potential targets are advised to remove their names and addresses from telephone books and company directories.² The practice of minimising knowledge concerning the movement of potential targets can reach to the very top. Geraghty quotes a 1987 article in The Mail on Sunday which noted that although the then Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, was to begin a high-profile campaign concerning the future of Britain's inner-cities, the details of the places she was to visit and the times when she was to visit them were withheld for security reasons.³

Often the necessary information can be gleaned from publicly available sources. As mentioned in the last chapter, for their campaign of high-profile assassination attempts in the early 1990s the Provisional IRA used various open sources to identify the home addresses of prominent individuals.⁴ Similarly West German terrorist groups such as the Red Army Faction (RAF) and the Berlin based June 2nd Movement are known to have used library sources, newspaper clippings, and

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- 1) U.S. Department of State, Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC). Security Guidelines for American Families Living Abroad, (Washington DC: U.S. Dept of State, n.d), 2.
 - 2) D.E.Wurth. "The Proper Function and use of the Private Sector Bodyguard", B.M.Jenkins (ed), Terrorism and Personal Protection, 314.
 - 3) T.Geraghty. The Bullet-Catchers: Bodyguards and the World of Close Protection, (London: Grafton, 1988; 1989), 18-19.
 - 4) "Bookworms who burrow for IRA", The Sunday Correspondent, August 12th 1990.

books such as The Rich and Super-Rich in Austria when selecting targets for abduction or assassination.⁵

Whilst a normal person or building will not usually have much in the way of protection, with more heavily guarded static targets the protective measures are more sophisticated and also exert control over an area. In these cases protection is not dependent upon one particular measure, but upon several 'layers' or 'rings' of defensive measures and barriers which make up an integrated system of physical protection. The aim of the system is to detect threats, assess the nature of intrusions, and delay intruders long enough for sufficient response forces to either neutralise the threat or, if necessary, evacuate the target.

If the static target concerned is a high-profile person, there is a fair chance that the target, and possibly any bodyguards, will be protected by some form of body armour.⁶ As Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher was frequently accompanied by uniformed armed police officers wearing bullet-proof vests whilst a reporter who accompanied the Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams for a few days in late 1993 reported that Adams wore a light bullet-proof jacket.⁷

With a high-profile human target out of doors the terrorists will almost certainly encounter armed bodyguards. A heavily-guarded human target will be protected by establishing an outer ring of bodyguards to control access, keep an eye on incomers, and detect any possible dangers. These bodyguards will ideally be able to observe anybody coming close to the target. Those bodyguards closer to the target deal with any immediate threat, if necessary by placing themselves between the target and the attacker.⁸

Although bodyguards may not be able to stop a determined attacker, part of their deterrent effect is that

5) D.T.Schiller. "The European Experience", 51, 57.

6) M.Dewar. Weapons & Equipment of Counter-Terrorism, (Poole, England: Arms & Armour Press, 1987), 138-175 *passim*.

7) "Local Hero", Esquire, (London), December 1993/January 1994. T.Geraghty. The Bullet-Catchers, 206.

8) "SAS shield for Mrs Thatcher", The Daily Telegraph, May 17th 1987. "Scotland Yard: Terror", ITV, television, February 3rd 1994. D.E.Wurth. "The Proper Function and use of the Private Sector Bodyguard", 323. R.Fleming & H.Miller. Scotland Yard, 146. T.Geraghty. The Bullet-Catchers, 204-211.

an attacker would not escape, and would quite probably die, after an attack.⁹ For example at a parade held in Donegall Place, Belfast in September 1993 to commemorate the seventy-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Royal Air Force, it was possible to get within about five yards of the Northern Ireland Secretary, the Commander in Chief of British Forces in Northern Ireland, and the Lord Mayor of Belfast. The first two at least would have been prime targets for the Provisional IRA. Around these people were a number of what appeared to be plain-clothes bodyguards. In the vicinity there were several armed police officers and soldiers in uniform patrolling, stopping vehicles from entering the area, and checking the bags of pedestrians though not searching the pedestrians themselves. A surveillance helicopter hovered constantly overhead. Given the security precautions an attacker with a grenade or concealed weapon could have launched a brief attack, but it is highly unlikely that they would have escaped or indeed survived.¹⁰

Protecting buildings or people within the buildings is different in that permanent physical barriers and other protective devices can be installed. At the most basic level the physical protection of buildings consists of little more than reinforcing the usual access points through which an assailant may gain access, such as doors and windows. For example in Northern Ireland in July 1994, a group of armed UFF members attempted to gain entry to a mainly Catholic pub in Annaclone, county Down, on a day when the pub contained forty people watching the football World Cup Final on the television. Their intention was to spray the people in the pub with gunfire, a so-called 'spray job', designed to cause the maximum number of casualties. A similar attack on a west Belfast betting shop in February 1992 had killed five people, whilst attacks on rural pubs in October 1993 and June 1994 had killed eight and six people respectively.¹¹ However, the

9) "SAS shield for Mrs Thatcher", The Daily Telegraph, May 17th 1987.

10) Personal observation, Belfast, September 12th 1993.

11) "Loyalist gunmen kill five in new Belfast bloodbath", The Independent, February 6th 1992. "Loyalist avengers slaughter five", The Times, February 6th 1992. "'The gunmen are savage, sinful, wicked, depraved'", The Independent, November 1st 1993. "Major set to invite Hume to Ulster talks", The Times, November 1st 1993.

Annaclone attack was foiled because the landlord, fearing a similar attack on his pub, had locked the heavy outer doors to the pub when the football match started. Unable to get through the doors the UFF members fired through the windows, but only succeeded in injuring people with the flying glass.¹²

In a similar fashion, after Sinn Fein members were increasingly targeted by loyalist groups in the late 1980s and early 1990s, some protected their homes with front doors toughened with Macrolan perspex on the back, and with steel internal doors beyond these to prevent anybody from gaining access to the rest of the house.¹³ The upgrading of protective measures by Sinn Fein members was specifically recognised by the UFF. In a statement in October 1993 they specifically referred to "... the provos behind steel security doors" when justifying their attacks on ordinary Catholics.¹⁴

Terrorists attempting to gain access to a more heavily protected building would encounter a greater number of obstacles. Where a building, such as the police stations in Northern Ireland, is at risk of attack from gunfire, bombs, and mortars or rockets, they may be protected by concrete blast-walls, high wire-fencing, metal-sheeting, and other forms of barrier, as well as having watch-towers, lighting, and closed circuit TV (CCTV) aimed at detecting attacks as soon as possible.¹⁵ Entry to restricted areas is generally limited to certain people entering through a few access

"New wave of Ulster violence feared", The Independent, June 20th 1994. "Reprisal fear after Catholic pub killings", the Times, June 20th 1994. "Loyalists get life terms for pub atrocity", The Guardian, February 25th 1995. "UFF four get life for pub massacre", The Independent, February 25th 1995.

12) "Publican's fear averted massacre", The Independent, July 19th 1994. "Bar's locked doors foiled UFF gunmen", The Guardian, July 19th 1994.

13) "The price of survival in a divided land", The Independent on Sunday, October 18th 1992. "Local Hero", Esquire, (London), December 1993/January 1994. "Victimised", Fortnight, no.320, (September 1993), 9. "Sinn Fein death part of sustained assault", The Independent, August 10th 1993.

14) "For Queen and Country", The Guardian, supplement, October 19th 1993.

15) "State-of-the-art building for a state of siege", The Times, supplement, November 21st 1992.

points - normally doors or gates with security barriers. Terrorists seeking to gain access through these points would have to get past guards checking identity (ID) cards, or alternatively open locked doors which only open on the production of an electronic card or 'key' which is read by a sensor. The security system automatically unlocks the door if the correct card is presented, but the terrorist would need such a card - or would need to be able to get hold of one. Sensor systems are often supplemented by entry-phones or the need to type in a Personal Identification Number (PIN) on a key pad at the door - rather like the codes used by cash dispensers outside banks.¹⁶ Thus to gain entry through conventional access points without causing a disturbance the terrorists would probably need a convincing ID card, possibly an electronic card which matched the records on a computerised record, and would have to know the appropriate PIN.

For more easily accessible targets such as sports events and airports, barriers such as walls and barbed wire fences - possibly reinforced by patrols - restrict entry to certain access points where some controls can be applied.¹⁷ In the best-protected complexes terrorists would encounter barriers designed to make it physically difficult to enter the protected area, except through guarded access points. These barriers may include walls, fences, and ditches, possibly reinforced with barbed wire, razor wire, or other edged materials. They will be illuminated by powerful lights, thus ensuring that the dark of night would offer no cover.¹⁸ Even if the terrorists surmounted the first set of barriers

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- 16) PAC International. Access Control Equipment: Data Sheet, (Stockport, England: PAC International Ltd, July 1993). Bel-Tech Security Products. Bel-Pac 1000 1-2 door access control: BT1000, (Ilford, England: Bell Security Ltd). Visonic. Company profile & Product Catalogue, (Biggleswade, England: Visonic Ltd, n.d). R.J.Healy. "Protecting the Office", B.M.Jenkins (ed). Terrorism and Personal Protection, 348.
- 17) R.Clutterbuck. Kidnap, Hijack and Extortion, 76. E.Best. "An Interview with Ed Best, Director of Security at the Los Angeles Olympics", TVI Journal, 5, no. 2, (Fall 1984), 5.
- 18) "Anti-IRA security costs must rise, police say", The Independent on Sunday, September 23rd 1990. R.Clutterbuck. Kidnap, Hijack and Extortion, 73, 84.

they may encounter guard dogs and patrolling security guards.¹⁹

In addition they would quite probably be detected by intruder detection systems (IDS) such as acoustic cables - which detect sound or vibration, and passive infra-red detectors which detect body-heat and movement.²⁰ Whilst few physical barriers are totally impregnable, if proper alarms are in place they can give a warning to the defenders of the target and impose a delay upon an intruder which gives the defenders time to assess the nature of the threat and to react to it with the resources at their disposal. If closed circuit TV is installed the intruders might be seen by security staff in a central control room, thus allowing the guards or their supervisors to determine the scale of the intrusion. Even if the terrorists are not caught immediately, video recordings attached to the CCTV system can allow them to be identified after the event, and provide evidence of their presence.²¹

Unless the terrorist's aim is simply to plant a bomb inconspicuously they will have to neutralise whatever resistance they encounter there. Whatever the terrorists are seeking to do, there is a good chance that an important target will be protected by armed guards of one form or

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- 19) "Israel to deploy dogs on borders in attempt to curb Islamic suicide bombers", The Guardian, January 30th 1995. "Israel brings in dogs", The Independent, January 30th 1995. M.Dewar. The British Army in Northern Ireland, 131. D.Barzilay. The British Army in Ulster, volume 2, 185-187.
- 20) Advanced Design Electronics & the Home Office. The simple guide to choosing an alarm system, (Advanced Design Electronics Ltd). Modern Security Systems. Detection Devices: Passive Infra-Red Movement Detectors, (Hemel Hempstead, England: Modern Security Systems Ltd, November 1992). R.Clutterbuck. Kidnap, Hijack and Extortion, 74. Private Information.
- 21) "Video 'filmed IRA bombers at Harrods'", The Independent, April 14th 1994. "English-born bombers get 30 years for IRA blasts", The Guardian, May 14th 1994. "'Proud' IRA bombers jailed for 30 years", The Independent, May 14th 1994. "Framing the Villains", New Statesman & Society, January 28th 1994. "Long lens of the law", The Independent, July 6th 1994. Sensormatic CamEra. Sensormatic CamEra: The World Leader in Loss Prevention, (Warrington, England: Sensormatic CamEra Ltd, n.d). Modern Security Systems. Could YOU use an extra pair of eyes?, (Hemel Hempstead, England: Modern Security Systems Ltd, November 1992).

another. Most airports have armed guards on the premises, and the same applies for many of the premises which terrorists may wish to attack.

Having accomplished their task, the terrorists still have to get away. First they have to evade or neutralise any guards who are still present. They then need to get clear of the target area before reinforcements arrive. Due to the risk of such intervention, the greater the delay or likely delay which the terrorists encounter in penetrating the defences of the protected area, the less likely it is that terrorists wishing to survive will try an attack, or persist with it once it has started to slow down.²²

Although an individual or a small group faced by terrorist intruders may have to rely on the resources they have on site to combat them, larger organisations or government installations can hope for a quicker response. A PIRA member in Belfast reckoned that the British Army could seal off an area within two to three minutes of an incident taking place.²³ It is also estimated that armed police officers could be sent to any of the foreign embassies in London within a similar period, whilst the helicopters operated by the Metropolitan Police can reach any spot in London within fifteen minutes.²⁴ Incidents at targets with a lower priority may not receive such a rapid response. In 1990 a senior civil servant at the Ministry of Defence estimated that an unarmed police presence was able to reach a Royal Ordnance factory in the Thames Valley area within three minutes of the alarm being given, but conceded that an armed presence would take rather longer.²⁵

Terrorists may wish to plant a bomb which will explode after they have gone. In areas open to the public, such as shops or railway stations, the risk of detection is not such a problem as there is generally little in the way of protective measures. It is possible that somebody might

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- 22) R.Clutterbuck. Kidnap, Hijack and Extortion, 73-74, 82.
G.Wardlaw. Political Terrorism: Theory, tactics, and counter-measures, revised edition, (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 169-170.
- 23) K.Toolis. Rebel Hearts, 125.
- 24) R.Fleming & H.Miller. Scotland Yard, 207, 296.
- 25) U.K. House of Commons. The Physical Security of Military Installations in the United Kingdom, (HC-171), (London: HMSO, 1990), par. 358-359 p. 27-28, par.745-747 p. 58.

notice a suspicious package and notify the authorities, or in the case of an attack on a specific person or object, a search may find the bomb before it is due to explode.²⁶ However, the main risk to the terrorist is that he may be seen on CCTV and either captured or have his movements recorded, allowing the authorities to identify him.

Explosives may be also be smuggled into a building, as happened when a vehicle-bomb exploded in an underground car park beneath the World Trade Centre in New York in February 1993, killing six and injuring 1,000.²⁷ Similarly, a bomb with a long-delay timing device was smuggled into a room in the Grand Hotel in Brighton, and concealed behind the bath panels about three weeks before the Conservative Party Conference in October 1984. The resulting explosion killed five people and nearly killed the Prime Minister and several members of her Cabinet.²⁸ Since the Brighton bombing, events such as political party conferences have required extremely costly and overt security measures with room-sweeps, baggage checks, and the presence of armed policemen.²⁹

Smuggling guns or bombs onto an aeroplane is more difficult as precautions are generally taken to prevent hijacks or bomb-attacks. At airports dogs may be used to sniff for concealed weapons or explosives, but various forms of manufactured detectors are more commonly used.³⁰ In addition, whereas previously a terrorist was able to check in baggage containing a bomb and then not board the aeroplane, many airlines now have baggage reconciliation systems which

26) R.Fleming & H.Miller. Scotland Yard, 145. T.Geraghty. The Bullet-Catchers, 199-200.

27) "Death in the afternoon: bombers hit New York", The Times, February 27th 1993. "New York bomb to be rebuilt", The Times, February 29th 1993. "Tapes reveal role of FBI in bombing", The Independent, November 9th 1993.

28) "Security alert sent to police before bombing in Brighton", The Times, October 15th 1984. P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 423-426.

29) "Bournemouth 'under siege' in £2m security operation", The Independent, October 9th 1990. "Threat to conference 'extremely high'", The Times, October 9th 1990.

30) J.D.Baldeschwieler. "Explosive Detection for Commercial Aircraft Security", Terrorism and Political Violence, 5, no. 2, (Summer 1993).

should ensure that baggage which is not attributable to a boarded passenger will be removed and will not fly.³¹

Finally, it is possible that the targets which a terrorist group may wish to attack are spread around an even larger open area, like a city. In January 1991, the head of the London Emergency Planning Information Centre conceded:

Frankly, if a terrorist group really wanted to make a mess of London, they could. ... We would not be able to cope. By that I mean we would be limited to chasing after the effects of a disaster.³²

The very size of a major city makes it difficult to protect all of the possible targets, particularly if the range of targets is broad. During the PIRA bombing campaign in England - and particularly London - in the early 1990s, Terry Kirby pointed out "... a guard cannot be mounted over every railway line and shop doorway".³³ As long as a hostile terrorist group is operating effectively, it is simply impossible to provide absolute physical protection to the transport and commercial structure of a major city. Attempts to do so over the long-term would be prohibitively costly and would deplete the resources available to protect specific potential targets.

The French Government discovered this during the series of bomb attacks carried out in Paris between December 1985 and September 1986 by a pro-Iranian group. The attacks killed thirteen and injured 250. Although suspects were finally convicted for the attacks, it was investigative action taken after the attacks which achieved this. During the attacks the Government was almost helpless.³⁴

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- 31) P.Wilkinson. "Designing an Effective International Aviation Security System", 109, 111.
J.D.Baldeschi. "Explosive Detection for Commercial Aircraft Security", 100.
- 32) "Eve of destruction", Time Out, January 16th-23rd 1991.
- 33) "IRA moves to strike economic targets", The Independent, December 24th 1991.
- 34) "Terrorism's other target", The Times, September 18th 1986. "Paris holds 8, says terrorist ring is broken", International Herald Tribune, March 27th 1987. "How Iran's mullahs held Paris to ransom", The Independent on Sunday, January 28th 1990. "Politics and the bombers of Paris", The Independent, February 3rd 1990. "20 years for Paris bomber", The Independent, March 10th 1990. "Tunisian sentenced to 20 years in prison", Associated Press, March 10th 1990. Y.Bodansky. Target

A degree of protection can be afforded by the deployment of large numbers of soldiers. This is considered in more detail later, but it should be noted that such measures can make it difficult for terrorists to operate in the areas where these measures are implemented because of the danger of interception on the way to or from an attack. A similar reasoning appears to have been behind the decision of the security organiser for the 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles to deploy 12,000 uniformed - though unarmed - security guards in addition to the normal law-enforcement agencies.³⁵ (This is assuming that the terrorists do not have the backing of sympathetic elements of the security forces, or indeed have members within the security forces. If they do then the terrorists may find their path is smoothed quite considerably.)

Intense surveillance of an area can also make it difficult for terrorists to carry out their operations undetected. For a long time in West Belfast, an observation post on the top of Divis Flats allowed the British Army to observe much of the area, whilst covert observation posts in the roofs of houses or in abandoned buildings supplied information over the radio concerning suspicious activities.³⁶ This was supplemented by up to three helicopters equipped with surveillance equipment constantly hovering over the district.³⁷ Helicopter surveillance is also used by the Metropolitan Police in London during public events such as the Trooping of the Colour as a way of trying to spot any suspicious activities.³⁸ As noted above, the installation of CCTV can afford blanket coverage of a defined area to the police in a central control room, and if

America: Terrorism in the US Today, (New York: SPI Books, 1993), 226-246.

35) E.Best. "An Interview with Ed Best", 4-5.

36) D.Hamill. Pig in the Middle, 238. M.Urban. Big Boys' Rules, 41-42. M.Dewar. The British Army in Northern Ireland, 185-186.

37) Personal observation: Belfast, September 1991. D.Hamill. Pig in the Middle, 238. M.Urban. Big Boys' Rules, 117-118.

38) "Scotland Yard: Trooping the Colour", ITV, television, February 10th 1994. R.Fleming & H.Miller. Scotland Yard, 297.

necessary the recordings can provide evidence in any subsequent trial.³⁹

The setting up of checkpoints can disrupt terrorist operations by making it difficult for them to move or carry out operations undetected. Following a number of PIRA bombings in London and Manchester a series of checkpoints were set up in both cities.⁴⁰ A police superintendent in London commented at the time:

Terrorists have to move about and transfer their weapons from location to location. The presence of this type of road-block should have a deterrent effect as they run a risk of being detected.⁴¹

Such methods have been common in the Catholic urban areas in Northern Ireland throughout the recent troubles, with west Belfast being ringed by checkpoints.⁴²

The deployment of checkpoints can be reinforced by restricting the number of access points open to traffic in a defined part of an urban area. Following the damage caused by two massive bombs in the City of London in 1992 and 1993, vehicle access to the City was closed-off at eighteen points and restricted to seven entry points which had police checkpoints.⁴³ Such measures were common in Belfast from the 1970s up to the mid 1990s.⁴⁴ In his study of a Catholic enclave of Belfast in the early 1970s, Burton reports that of the sixteen possible ways to drive into 'Anro', only three were open, and these were frequently manned by soldiers at checkpoints. The others were either barricaded with dragons

39) "Framing the Villains", New Statesman & Society, January 28th 1994. "Long lens of the law", The Independent, July 6th 1994.

40) "Police set road-blocks in effort to deter IRA", The Independent, December 7th 1992. "Police introduce IRA road-blocks in Manchester", The Independent, December 8th 1992.

41) "Police set IRA road traps", The Independent, December 6th 1992.

42) "One-dimensional policing", Fortnight, May 1993.

43) "A bombshell for London's drivers", The Independent, June 22nd 1993. "Police to cordon off City from bombers", The Independent, July 1st 1993. "Gridlock fears over City road blocks", The Independent, July 2nd 1993. "The Scared Mile", The Guardian, supplement, August 3rd 1993. "Checkpoints security in City to be scaled down", The Guardian, January 30th 1995.

44) "Belfast goes to work, London goes to pieces", The Independent on Sunday, February 24th 1991.

teeth, sheet metal, or concrete lumps.⁴⁵ More recent reports concerning west Belfast and PIRA activities in the Markets area of Belfast seem to confirm that access points from Catholic areas were also limited as a means of restricting terrorist activities.⁴⁶

Ultimately the very design of an urban area may be affected by the desire to hamper the operations of terrorists. Such considerations are not new to town-planning. The broad, straight Parisian boulevards planned by Hausmann in the 1860s were designed to allow charges by the police, infantry, and cavalry to be more effective, and to make it difficult for rebels to erect barricades successfully.⁴⁷ More recently, town planning in Northern Ireland appears to have taken security considerations into account. According to Ryan:

Military considerations influence every aspect of life in Northern Ireland. The new motorway system was constructed in Belfast in the 1980s with a careful eye on the sectarian geography and the need to ensure rapid access to potentially troublesome estates. Town planning in Northern Ireland is subordinate to the requirements of the security forces. Whereas in Britain, pedestrian-only zones and restricted parking areas are casually patrolled by parking wardens, in Northern Ireland the Army is in control.⁴⁸

This view is at least partly borne-out by a newspaper report in 1983 which stated that in Belfast the security forces were involved in aspects of town-planning through a coordinating committee in the section of the Northern Ireland Office which dealt with urban-planning.⁴⁹ The main aim appears to have been to cut down on the number of 'sectarian interfaces' in Belfast, where members of one community came up against the other. The segregation was effected by walls and wide roads with access points controlled by the security forces. Subsequent reports on the sectarian geography of Belfast seem

45) F.Burton. The politics of legitimacy, 18.

46) "Family defies IRA wrath over taxi firm clash", The Guardian, June 1st 1993. "War News: punishment shooting", AP/RN, April 1st 1993. "One-dimensional policing", Fortnight, May 1993.

47) D.Thomson. Europe Since Napoleon, revised edition, (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1966), 270.

48) M.Ryan. War & Peace in Ireland: Britain and the IRA in the New World Order, (London: Pluto, 1994), 124.

49) "Checkpoint Paddy, Checkpoint Billy", The Irish Times, May 5th 1983.

to confirm that the move towards greater segregation was grounded in people's desire for safety within their own religious community, but also confirmed that the trend was desirable from the perspective of immediate security concerns.⁵⁰

Thus a terrorist in a heavily-protected urban area who seeks to transport weapons or carry out an operation, will encounter a number of problems. Gaining access to a protected area in a vehicle is only possible through certain access points. If the terrorist is already wanted for an offence and is recognised, or merely lacks sufficient proof of identification, he could be detained at a check-point. Similarly, such a search could find weapons or other incriminating materials. Even if he avoids this, once he carries out an operation there is a strong possibility that he will be located within minutes and, if under observation from the air or on CCTV, he will find it difficult to evade detection, interception by the security forces, and either detention or death.

When examining the use of protective measures against terrorist or other attacks, it should be borne in mind that the systems put in place may not function properly. Skimping on costs by paying low wages to security guards can lead to either poor quality guards or guards working long hours or moonlighting to make up their income and ending up tired.⁵¹ Whilst dogs can also be used to detect intruders and to detect explosives concealed within vehicles or within other objects, like humans they can also become tired and lose concentration if used for overly-long periods.⁵² In practice

50) "Troubles prompt moves to fortresses'", The Independent on Sunday, November 1st 1992. "Apartheid deepens on streets of Ulster", The Independent on Sunday, March 21st 1993. "Concern grows in Ulster as divisions continue", The Independent, March 22nd 1993.

51) U.K. House of Commons. The Physical Security of Military Installations in the United Kingdom, par. 56-57 pp. xix-xx, par. 602 p. 47, par. 625-627 p. 49, par. 852-856 pp. 66-67. P.Wilkinson. "Designing an Effective International Aviation Security System", 112.

52) "Israel to deploy dogs on borders in attempt to curb Islamic suicide bombers", The Guardian, January 30th 1995. "Israel brings in dogs", The Independent, January 30th 1995. P.Wilkinson. "Designing an Effective International Aviation Security System", 110. M.Dewar. The British Army in Northern Ireland, 131.

some CCTV systems are badly maintained and do not operate, or even if they do the video facilities do not work.⁵³ According to a recent report the police have found that in many shops the camera surveillance systems "... produce pictures of such poor quality that identifying suspects on them is nearly impossible", although this can sometimes be overcome by equipment which enhances unclear video images.⁵⁴ As to restricting access, after a protective perimeter had been set up around the City of London in late 1993, journalists found that it was still possible to drive vehicles in without being examined.⁵⁵ Thus there can be, and often are, shortcomings in security systems. On the other hand, without careful and lengthy observation, or a source on the inside, it would be a rash terrorist who took such shortcomings for granted when planning an attack on a static target.

The protection of mobile targets.

As noted, attacking human targets in transit - whether they are in a private car, in a form of public transport, or on foot - is a popular method amongst terrorists.⁵⁶ A member of the INLA commenting on the PIRA assassination of RUC officers noted that:

The Provies nine times out of ten will bang him as he's getting out of his car and bang him when he's getting into his car or put a bomb into it.⁵⁷

If the terrorist knows where the target will start his or her journey and where it will end, he has located at least two definite points where an attack can take place. If the course of the journey is also known then the terrorists' options

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- 53) "Carlton Club camera had not been switched on", The Independent, June 28th 1990. "Faults on 60% of security video-cameras", The Independent on Sunday, July 8th 1990. "Video camera failed to record conference on terrorism", The Times, September 29th 1990.
- 54) "Framing the villains", New Statesman & Society, January 28th 1994. "Film aids hunt for City killer", The Independent, December 19th 1994.
- 55) "City cordon fails to cause disruption", Financial Times, July 6th 1993. "The Scared Mile", The Guardian, supplement, August 3rd 1993.
- 56) C.A.Russell & B.H.Miller. "Terrorist Targets and the Executive Target", 69. A.J.Scott. "Transportation Security", 354. H.A.Lyons & H.J.Harbinson. "A Comparison of Political and Non-Political Murderers in Northern Ireland", 195.
- 57) A.Feldman. Formations of Violence, 75.

grow even wider. The target is particularly vulnerable whilst in a car because cars are comparatively easy to ambush, easily surrounded, and hard to get help to, whilst the target is trapped in a confined space and can do little to evade the terrorist attack.⁵⁸

For the terrorist wishing to attack a specific mobile target, the first objective is to determine a definite time when the target will be in a particular location, and will be vulnerable.⁵⁹ Thus, the aim of the target and the people responsible for defending it will be to prevent the assailant from gaining such information, if possible by adopting a low profile, if not by restricting the knowledge which becomes available.

Consequently a terrorist might find that the intended target makes it difficult to predict where he will be at a given time by, for example, varying the routes which he takes to and from work and the times at which he takes them.⁶⁰ During the recent troubles in Northern Ireland, judges have frequently changed routes and cars between offices and court in an attempt to avoid falling into a recognisable routine.⁶¹ This can cause problems for the terrorist, but as Tony Slinn, editor of International Security Review, notes:

You may change your route to work each day, but when you drive out of your front gate, you've got to turn either right or left, and the terrorist knows this too.⁶²

Clutterbuck states that for this reason most abductions take place close to the target's home.⁶³

An example of the dangers of attackers gaining knowledge regarding the target can be seen in the May 1942 assassination of Reinhard Heydrich - the Governor of what the Nazis termed Bohemia-Moravia - by Czechoslovaks parachuted in from Britain. Local members of the Czech resistance obtained

58) G.Capotorto. "How Terrorists look at Kidnappings", 5.

59) A.J.Scotti. "Transportation Security", 361

60) R.Clutterbuck. Kidnap, Hijack and Extortion, 81.

A.J.Scotti. "Transportation Security", 356-357, 358-359.

61) "Nightmare for the judges on 24-hour vigil", The Guardian, January 6th 1988.

62) "Nightmare for the judges on 24-hour vigil", The Guardian, January 6th 1988.

63) R.Clutterbuck. Kidnap, Hijack and Extortion, 80.

information about Heydrich from the domestic staff who worked for him in a castle outside Prague because:

Despite the SS guard which surrounded the Hradcany castle, security within the walls was slack. The Nazis employed Czech domestic staff but paid little attention to their activities. The servants were treated as part of the furniture and were in an ideal position to supply information.⁶⁴

The watchmaker who repaired the castle's clocks had to enter every room of the building, whilst his work repairing the watches of the German garrison allowed him to pick up useful gossip. He told the assassins that Heydrich was to fly from Prague to Berlin on May 27th 1942, confirming that he would be driven to his office on the morning of that day before leaving.⁶⁵ The Czechs ambushed Heydrich who was mortally injured by a bomb thrown at his car in a suburb of Prague.⁶⁶

Having identified the movements of the target the terrorists have to overcome whatever protective measures have been taken. The terrorists' approach to these measures will depend upon the nature of the operation. If the aim is to destroy the target any method will suffice as long as it causes the necessary damage without compromising other aims the terrorists may have, for example by killing uninvolved bystanders. If however the aim is abduction, a more subtle use of violence is necessary in order to ensure that the intended hostage is not killed prematurely.

The forms of protection for a mobile human target can vary greatly. In the case of an unguarded pedestrian there is none, in which case a knife or a heavy blunt instrument would suffice for an assassination. This occurred in May 1882 when the Chief Secretary for Ireland and his Under-Secretary were stabbed to death in Phoenix Park, Dublin, by members of a small republican secret society.⁶⁷ Several ordinary victims

64) C.MacDonald. The Killing of SS Obergruppenfuhrer Reinhard Heydrich: 27 May 1942, (London: Macmillan, 1989), 149-150.

65) C.MacDonald. The Killing of SS Obergruppenfuhrer Reinhard Heydrich, 166.

66) C.MacDonald. The Killing of SS Obergruppenfuhrer Reinhard Heydrich, 169-190. The account of the ambush differs slightly in M.R.D.Foot. Resistance, 205-206.

67) C.Townshend. Political Violence in Ireland, 166.
J.Waldron. Maamtrasna: The Murders and the Mystery, (Dublin: Edmund Burke, 1992), 17. R.Kee. The Green

of terrorist attacks have been killed when unarmed and away from cover, although guns rather than knives or blunt objects tend to be the more common instruments of dispatch in the West.

Alternatively the targets may be wearing some form of body-armour. From the 1971 onwards uniformed members of the security forces on patrol in Northern Ireland frequently wore flak jackets or other forms of body armour as a matter of course.⁶⁸ A PIRA spokesman acknowledged that as the body armour of the security forces was improved, the terrorists found it more difficult to kill them whilst they were on duty.⁶⁹

Terrorists seeking to attack a heavily protected mobile target will encounter rather more in the way of obstacles. The terrorists need to have some idea of how well the target is protected. There is little point in shooting at a car if the car is too heavily armoured for the bullets to penetrate. A car which has been protected as much as possible will have reinforced body-panels, bullet-proof glass, protection for features such as the engine, radiator, and petrol tank, 'runflat' tyres capable of absorbing hits from high-velocity bullets, and a means of communicating with possible reinforcements.⁷⁰ Such a car may be proof against several types of gunfire and relatively small explosions. For instance, in January 1981 at Tynan Abbey in county Armagh, PIRA members encircled an armoured RUC car and poured repeated bursts of gunfire into it without physically harming the occupants.⁷¹

However few armoured cars can protect the occupants against a very large explosion. When ETA set off a culvert bomb under the car of Spanish Prime Minister, Admiral Carrero Blanco in December 1973, the resulting explosion threw his

Flag: A History of Irish Nationalism, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1972), 383.

68) M.Dewar. The British Army in Northern Ireland, 196. C.Ryder. The RUC, 121.

69) "IRA rings changes to restore balance of terror", The Guardian, May 5th 1987.

70) "SAS shield for Mrs Thatcher", The Daily Telegraph, May 17th 1987. A.J.Scotti. "Transportation Security", 361-368.

71) C.Ryder. The RUC, 245. M.Urban. Big Boys' Rules, 223.

car over a five-storey building killing him and his driver.⁷² Likewise, the Chairman of the Deutsche Bank, Alfred Herrhausen, was killed by an explosion in November 1989 despite being protected by a 2.8 ton armoured Mercedes. Members of the Red Army Faction placed a shaped shrapnel bomb on the back of a pedal-cycle which was placed on the side of the road where Herrhausen was likely to be sitting and at the height where they reckoned that Herrhausen would be sitting in the car. The bomb, containing twenty-two to forty pounds of TNT as a propellant, blasted an armoured door into Herrhausen and threw the car over eighty feet across the street. Whilst Herrhausen bled to death his chauffeur only received relatively minor injuries.⁷³ Against such devices there is little defence short of travelling in an armoured personnel carrier (APC) or taking to the air in a helicopter. Even then the former can be vulnerable to mines or anti-tank rockets, and the latter to heavy machine-guns or portable surface to air missiles.⁷⁴

If the terrorist operation is to be an abduction, a major problem will be the presence of bodyguards. Not all targets have government-supplied bodyguards, but targets perceived as important are often heavily protected.⁷⁵ With a mobile target the role of a bodyguard is to prevent attacks on the target by taking evasive measures, and failing that to protect the target once an attack occurs.⁷⁶ Ideally the target's car will be accompanied by one or more cars containing armed bodyguards ready to react to an attack. If necessary the driver of a car containing a mobile target

72) "How to murder your prime minister", The Economist, June 29th 1974.

73) D.Pluchinsky. "RAF Assassination of Alfred Herrhausen", U.S. Department of State. Terrorist Tactics and Security Practices, 6. D.Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group", 73.

74) "IRA claims it shot down army helicopter", The Independent, February 12th 1990. J.Salata. "MANPADs". P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 246.

75) "Huge costs force Yard to review VIP security", The Independent on Sunday, February 4th 1990. "Top IRA target is stripped of his bodyguards", The Sunday Correspondent, August 5th 1990. "End of a bullet-proof era", The Independent, June 21st 1991.

76) D.E.Wurth. "The Proper Function and use of the Private Sector Bodyguard", 320, 324-328.

should be capable of taking some form of evasive action if an attack seems imminent. If the terrorists succeed in stopping a car containing a government-protected target they must reckon upon the bodyguards having guns and being proficient in their use.⁷⁷ In such cases time constraints mean that the bodyguards have to be neutralised swiftly, probably by killing them.

Target protection and terrorist target selection.

Terrorists confronted by a target which has been protected against their desired means of attack have three choices: they can give up altogether, they can seek to attack the same target by different means, or they can attack a different target. It is difficult to determine the extent to which protective measures deter potential terrorists from carrying on because one cannot measure events which have not happened. Studies concerning ordinary criminal activities seem to show that overt protective measures deter criminals from carrying out attacks at the site where the measures are in place. American studies indicate that the overt presence of guards is the one factor which bank robbers take into account when deciding whether to rob a particular bank.⁷⁸ Similarly, since the installation of closed circuit television cameras backed up by mobile police units, street crime in Newcastle-upon-Tyne's town centre reportedly dropped by 20% whilst in Airdrie it dropped by three-quarters.⁷⁹

Although this may hold true for ordinary criminals, it may not always be the case for terrorists whose motivation is political rather than financial. The existence of protective measures may prompt the terrorists to vary the methods used to attack a given target. Although this may involve greater risks, higher costs, or just the need to spend more time working out ways of overcoming the protective measures in place, the terrorists may deem this worthwhile. By attacking a well-protected target they will have demonstrated their

77) R.Clutterbuck. Kidnap, Hijack and Extortion, 81-82.

78) A.J.Alexander. "Getting the Most from Scarce Resources", TVI Journal, 5, no. 2, (Fall 1984), 28.

79) "Framing the Villains", New Statesman & Society, January 28th 1994. "Long lens of the law", The Independent, July 6th 1994. "They've got an eye on you", The Independent, November 2nd 1994.

ability to attack whatever targets they wish, intimidating other potential targets and possibly securing more attention for their cause.

There are a number of examples. In their first telephone communique after the abduction of the former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro in the Via Caetani in Rome in April 1978, the Red Brigades stated:

This morning our organization brought the attack to the heart of the state. You'll hear from us again as soon as possible. Moro is only the beginning.⁸⁰

Mario Moretti, who is said to have planned the operation, subsequently stated:

In Rome at that moment there were tens of thousands of police and carabinieri dispersed throughout the metropolitan area, but in Via Caetani, for those few minutes, we were superior.⁸¹

Similarly, after the RAF's assassination of Alfred Herrhausen, their communique stated that:

... the perpetrators of this [imperialist] system must know ... that they will not have any place in the world where they can be safe from the attacks of the revolutionary guerrilla units.⁸²

By attacking hard targets some terrorists hope to give the impression that they can attack whatever targets they wish and gain as much publicity as possible.

The Provisional IRA has always held this attitude. In the early 1970s a PIRA member said of bomb attacks in the heavily-guarded centre of Derry city:

Once the security forces decided to put security barriers around the town our strategy was then to break through them. It was - how many bombs can you get inside their net? Every bomb we got inside was looked upon as a victory for us.⁸³

Similarly, after the mortar attack on 10 Downing Street in February 1991, they stated:

Today an active service unit of the IRA successfully breached the greatly enhanced wartime security surrounding 10 Downing Street by launching a mortar attack in the heart of the British establishment.

... let the British government understand that while nationalist people in the Six Counties are forced to live

80) A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 120.

81) A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 15.

82) Y.Alexander & D.Pluchinsky. Europe's Red Terrorists, 68.

83) K.Toolis. Rebel Hearts, 305.

under British rule, then the British cabinet will be forced to meet in bunkers.⁸⁴

This emphasised their demonstrated ability to breach the protective measures in place, and their ability to do so again, whilst the Sinn Fein newspaper An Phoblacht/Republican News pointedly noted the amount of publicity which their attack had received from newspapers in Britain, Ireland, and the rest of the world.⁸⁵ Similarly, in April 1993, after the destruction caused by their second large bomb in the City of London, the Provisionals again boasted of their ability to pierce the increased security measures which had been put in place after the first big bomb in April 1992.

These latest attacks underline both the ability and the determination of our volunteers to breach whatever level of security the British authorities are capable of mounting.⁸⁶

Thus, in addition to the physical and psychological damage caused, the PIRA wished to demonstrate that their attacks could not be stopped by protective measures.

The practical measures which the terrorists use can either involve using a method which will overcome the protective measures in place, or a method which circumvents them. Protective measures can be overcome by using more powerful weapons, or by using a method of approach which negates their effectiveness. As an example of the former one can examine the difficulty which the Provisional IRA found in killing British soldiers in the 1980s. This was partly due to soldiers being increasingly well-protected by newly-developed body armour, and because the Army had adopted patrolling methods which made it difficult to attack them and escape successfully. In 1989 McKittrick noted that on-duty soldiers were protected by flak jackets, armoured vehicles, and fortified bases, and tended to go out in patrols of twelve or more in particularly dangerous areas.⁸⁷ Also, as the Troubles

84) "British heartland rocked by IRA mortars", AP/RN, February 14th 1991. "Planned for months", The Daily Telegraph, February 8th 1991.

85) "London chaos through the world's eyes", "IRA 'SCUDS' steal Gulf headlines", "Another mortar for ould Ireland", all in AP/RN, February 14th 1991.

86) "The Flowers and the Tears", Evening Standard, (London), April 27th 1993.

87) "Attack intended to mark twenty years of the Troubles", The Independent, September 23rd 1989.

progressed the regular British Army made up a lower proportion of the security forces in Northern Ireland - the balance consisting of an expanded RUC and UDR - and thus provided less targets.⁸⁸ As Table 7.1 shows the number of soldiers killed dropped greatly both in absolute terms and as a proportion of deaths in proportion to deaths amongst the local security forces.

TABLE 7.1
SECURITY FORCE DEATHS IN NORTHERN IRELAND.
DIVIDED INTO FOUR-YEAR PERIODS: 1970-1993.

YEAR	RUC ^a	UDR/RIR ^b	Army	Total
1970-1973	43	39	204	286
1974-1977	63	42	71	176
1978-1981	54	39	70	163
1982-1985	62	31	37	130
1986-1989	43	30	40	113
1990-1993	27	20	22	69
TOTAL	293	201	444	938

a Includes RUC reserves and part-time RUC

b Includes part-time UDR/RIR.

n.b. This table includes nineteen security force members killed by loyalists or mistakenly killed by other security force members. The vast bulk of security force deaths have been caused by republican groups.

Sources: Royal Ulster Constabulary. Chief Constable's Annual Report 1993, 96. M.Sutton. Bear in mind these dead, 195-205.

Republican spokesmen repeatedly stated that they would prefer to kill British soldiers than members of the locally-recruited security forces because they were a better symbol of colonial rule, and because dead soldiers had more of an impact on British opinion than dead RUC or UDR members.⁸⁹ The practical problems were outlined by a PIRA spokesman.

We would prefer to be hitting Brits than cops because of the need to focus on British rule. But because the Brits are more sophisticated and because of their body armour we have to take considerable risks. The IRA has inadequate guns to penetrate the armour so we have to get in close for head or stomach shots⁹⁰

88) S.Bruce. The Red Hand, 297.

89) "IRA rings changes to restore balance of terror", The Guardian, May 5th 1987. "What's on the agenda now is an end to partition", The Irish Times, December 10th 1986. G.Adams. The Politics of Irish Freedom, 121.

90) "IRA rings changes to restore balance of terror", The Guardian, May 5th 1987.

As a result of the difficulties encountered, throughout the 1980s the Provisionals showed a greater tendency to use bombs or other explosive devices rather than guns to kill British soldiers. This can be seen in Table 7.2.

TABLE 7.2
BRITISH ARMY FATALITIES AND FATAL INCIDENTS
CAUSED BY IRISH REPUBLICAN GROUPS.
DIVIDED INTO FOUR-YEAR PERIODS: 1970-1993.

	Deaths		Fatal Incidents	
	Shot	Explosion	Shot	Explosion
1970-1973	123	74	117	49
1974-1977	42	29	35	20
1978-1981	27	43	23	18
1982-1985	10	26	7	14
1986-1989	8	31	7	15
1990-1993	9	12	9	7

N.B. A Fatal Incident is one where at least one member of the British Army, excluding the UDR/RIR, has been killed. Deaths and fatal incidents classified as being caused by explosives include bombs, rockets, and mortars.

Source: Calculated from M.Sutton. Bear in mind these dead.

With bomb attacks on the security forces however, there was always the possibility of killing or injuring civilians, with all the problems which that implied for the image of the PIRA amongst its own supporters as well as outsiders. This occurred several times, most notably at a Remembrance Day Parade in Enniskillen in November 1987. On that occasion eleven civilians were killed and sixty-three injured as the result of a bomb which was supposed to kill members of the Ulster Defence Regiment.⁹¹

The problem was at least partially overcome in the early 1990s when the Provisionals obtained a more powerful gun, reported to be the Barrett L82A1 sniper rifle.⁹² A similar Tejas .50 calibre gun was captured by the RUC during a house search in Belfast in August 1993.⁹³ The five-foot

91) "11 die in Cenotaph blast", The Independent, November 9th 1987. "Bombing 'devastating' to IRA", The Independent, November 11th 1987. "IRA's toll of civilian death grows despite public stance", The Independent, April 13th 1989. P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 459.

92) "Provos now using deadly US rifle", The Sunday Independent, (Dublin) September 6th 1992.

93) "American sniper rifle found in arms cache", The Times, August 18th 1993.

long Barrett 'light-fifty' fires a heavy .50 calibre armour-piercing shell at a speed of 2,800 feet per second. It can penetrate steel-plate at a range of over one mile and a

TABLE 7.3
BRITISH ARMY FATALITIES AND FATAL INCIDENTS
CAUSED BY IRISH REPUBLICAN GROUPS: 1980-1993

	Deaths		Fatal Incidents	
	Shot	Explosion	Shot	Explosion
1980	5	3	5	3
1981	4	6	4	2
1982	5	15	2	5
1983	0	5	0	5
1984	4	5	4	3
1985	1	1	1	1
1986	0	4	0	3
1987	2	1	2	1
1988	3	18	2	6
1989	3	8	3	5
1990	1	6	1	2
1991	1	4	1	3
1992	2	1	2	1
1993	5	1	5	1

N.B. Excludes a Royal Navy recruiter killed by a bomb in 1988.

Source: Calculated from M.Sutton. Bear in mind these dead.

Barrett reportedly killed Iraqi soldiers at a range of 1,800 metres during the 1991 Gulf War.⁹⁴ It was easily capable of smashing through the flak jackets worn by the police and military in Northern Ireland and could be fired from a long distance from the patrol, thus making it easier to escape after the attack. Between September 1992 and August 1993 such a gun killed six security force members in the border areas of south Armagh and south Fermanagh.⁹⁵ The resulting increase in deaths from gunshots can be seen in Table 7.3. The problem

94) "American sniper rifle found in arms cache", The Times, August 18th 1993. "Hidden Deaths", The Independent, magazine supplement, August 20th 1994. Y. Debay. "The Legion tests new weapons", RAIDS, August 1993. R. Adam. The World's Most Powerful Rifles & Handguns, (London: Quintet, 1991), 118.

95) "Policeman becomes third victim of IRA sniper", The Independent, February 26th 1993. "RUC men killed by sniper and bomb", The Times, February 26th 1993. "Sniper kills soldier in border attack", The Independent, July 18th 1993. "Victim of sniper was 'dedicated soldier'", The Times, July 19th 1993. "Sniper attack leads to security search", The Independent, August 2nd 1993. "Army searches for cover against IRA's deadly sniper", The Times, August 2nd 1993.

presented by body armour was overcome by a more powerful weapon, albeit one which was awkward to transport and which was only available in small numbers.

Protective measures can also be overcome by terrorists who merely crash through them. The deterrent effect of protective measures is partly based on the assumption that a terrorist will not survive after carrying out an attack, and consequently does not apply to terrorists who expect to die as an integral part of the operation. This was demonstrated in the mid 1990s when the Islamic Palestinian groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad carried out a series of suicide bombings in the Gaza Strip and the Israeli-occupied west bank of the Jordan, and within Israel itself. The terrorists simply walked or drove up to the target concerned, and then detonated the bomb, killing themselves in the process.⁹⁶ In October 1994 one of the bombers recorded a message on video before carrying out an attack on a bus in Tel Aviv, killing twenty-two people.

We will continue our brave suicide operations. ... There are many young men who long to die for the sake of God.⁹⁷ Such people are not likely to be deterred by security measures which threaten their lives once they have carried out the attack.

The circumvention of defences is achieved by carrying out an attack which does not rely on penetrating through the defences so much as go around them. For instance, bombs can be sent directly to their target as occurs when letter-bombs are sent to targeted individuals through the post.⁹⁸ However, small x-ray devices in the office or home can be installed to

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- 96) "Gaza in grip of suicide bombers", The Independent, December 17th 1993. "Hamas has learnt the lessons of Lebanon", The Independent, October 20th 1994. "Suicide bus bomber kills 22", The Daily Telegraph, October 20th 1994. "Gaza suicide bomber kills 3 Israeli troops", The Independent, November 12th 1994. "Bus stop bombers kill 19 in Israel", The Independent, January 23rd 1995. "Suicide bombers rock Middle East peace", The Guardian, January 23rd 1995.
- 97) "Israel steps up war on Hamas", The Daily Telegraph, October 21st 1994. "Arab village stunned by martyrdom", The Daily Telegraph, October 22nd 1994.
- 98) "Ministers are targeted by letter bombs", The Independent, April 26th 1995. "Death in the post", The Guardian, May 15th 1995.

detect letter-bombs for people who are thought to be at risk.⁹⁹

Where the identity of the target is generic rather than specific, this may involve attacking similar targets in a setting where they are less secure. For example, due to the increasing difficulties in killing British soldiers in Northern Ireland, PIRA attacked them in England and on the Continent. Between January 1st 1988 and December 31st 1990 they killed fourteen soldiers in England and seven soldiers and air force members on the Continent, compared to thirty-nine soldiers and one naval recruiting officer in Northern Ireland over the same period.¹⁰⁰

Where the target is a specific person or thing, the method of attack may be changed. Again ordinary criminals show how this occurs. Due to improved bank security in Britain in recent years, bank robbers have circumvented protective measures by kidnapping the families of key holders, thus forcing them to open the bank without raising the alarm. Although the Home Office does not specifically link these statistics, it is notable that whilst robberies against building societies dropped from 1,086 in 1991 to 770 in 1993, with only 262 in the first seven months of 1994, the total number of kidnappings in Britain increased 70% over the two year period to the end of 1992, bringing the yearly figure to 929.¹⁰¹

An example of a terrorist attack circumventing protective measures is provided by the PIRA attack on the British Cabinet when it met in the Prime Minister's residence at 10 Downing Street in February 1991. Security in Downing Street was increased in the 1980s by various measures designed to strengthen the structure of the building which is essentially a large house, albeit greatly modified, in a terrace of houses. This had been supplemented by the

99) "Anti-IRA security costs must rise, police say", The Independent on Sunday, September 23rd 1990.

100) M.Sutton. Bear in mind these dead, 161-176. Royal Ulster Constabulary. Chief Constable's Annual Report 1994, (London: HMSO, 1995), 102.

101) "Family held hostage in bank raid", The Independent, January 9th 1991. "He was almost home when the nightmare began", The Independent, May 13th 1993. "Gangs target families as 'soft option'", The Independent, September 14th 1994.

installation of CCTV cameras and electronic sensors in the immediate area and culminated in 1989 with the erection of 10 foot-high gates at the Whitehall end of Downing Street and barriers at the other end, thus cutting the street off to public traffic. Due to the 1991 Gulf War, the threat of Iraqi-sponsored attacks meant that protective measures had been increased beyond those normally in place.¹⁰² The PIRA unit circumvented the gates and other protective measures by using a home-made mortar placed in the back of a van. The van was parked at an angle on Whitehall, about 200 yards from 10 Downing Street, and whilst the van-driver escaped on the pillion of a motor-cycle, the mortars fired three projectiles. One exploded when it hit a cherry tree in the garden of 10 Downing Street, about 40 feet short of the Cabinet Room, whilst the other two overshot and landed in some public gardens just beyond. Had one of the projectiles been on target it seems likely that several members of the Cabinet would have been killed, but in the event nobody was seriously hurt.¹⁰³ Thus the PIRA largely negated the measures designed to stop attackers from gaining access to Downing Street by firing mortar projectiles over them.

As well as changing their methods of attack, increased protective measures may also lead terrorists to choose different targets. This has been borne out by a group of American economists using economic assumptions to explain patterns in international terrorism.¹⁰⁴ Their theory seeks to

102) "Breaching the core of Whitehall's defences", The Scotsman, February 8th 1991.

103) "IRA bombers attack No 10 War Cabinet", The Independent, February 8th 1991. "War cabinet escapes IRA mortars", The Times, February 8th 1991. "The day John Major missed his lunch", The Sunday Times, February 10th 1991. P.Gurney. Braver Men Walk Away, 1-8.

104) W.Enders, T.Sandler & J.Cauley. "UN Conventions, Technology and Retaliation in the Fight Against Terrorism: An Econometric Evaluation", Terrorism and Political Violence, 2, no 1 (Spring 1990). W.Enders, T.Sandler & G.F.Parise. "An Econometric Analysis of the Impact of Terrorism on Tourism", (unpublished manuscript). W.Enders & T.Sandler. "Evaluating Policies Aimed at Thwarting Terrorism: A VAR-Intervention Approach", (unpublished manuscript, July 1990). W.Enders & T.Sandler. "The Causality between Transnational Terrorism and Tourism: The Case of Spain", (unpublished manuscript, November 1990). E.I.Im & J.Cauley. "Cycles and Substitutions in Terrorist Activities: A Spectral Approach", Kyklos, 40, no 2

explain how individuals or groups allocate finite resources between different activities.¹⁰⁵ Underlying this model is the assumption that in their deployment of resources, terrorists will act like:

... a rational being who maximises beneficial returns and minimises costs, while responding to restraints."¹⁰⁶

However, the writers acknowledge:

No economic theory is meant to explain all forms of terrorism or to apply to all incidents. Since an economic theory is necessarily an abstraction, based on simplifying assumptions, the theory applies only to those cases which satisfy the assumptions under which the generalization has been drawn.¹⁰⁷

The economists conclude that the terrorists will almost always pick the softest possible targets commensurate with the desired gain, on the grounds that the 'price' to be paid in overcoming counter-measures - in terms of risk, time and resources - is significantly lower.¹⁰⁸

The economists examine cases of target hardening, such as the fortification of American embassies from 1976 onwards, and the installation of metal detectors at American and other airports from 1973 onwards. These counter-measures led to a decrease in attacks on the targets thus protected because the 'price' of operations against them was increased by the counter measures. On the other hand it was found that measures which protected certain targets, without positively reducing the resources of the terrorist groups concerned, merely diverted attacks onto less well protected targets or

(1987)). T.Sandler, W.Enders & H.E Lapan. "Economic Analysis Can Help Fight International Terrorism", Challenge (January/February 1991). T.Sandler, J.T.Tschirhart & J.Cauley. "A Theoretical Analysis of Transnational Terrorism", American Political Science Review, 77 no 1 (March 1983). T.Sandler et al. "Economic Methods and the Study of Terrorism", P.Wilkinson and A.M.Stewart (eds). Contemporary Research on Terrorism, (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987).

- 105) E.I.Im & J.Cauley "Cycles & Substitutions", 6;
T.Sandler, W.Enders & H.E.Lapan "Economic Analysis" 12-13.
- 106) T.Sandler et al. "Economic Methods", 178.
- 107) T.Sandler, W.Enders & H.E.Lapan "Economic Analysis", 11.
- 108) W.Enders & T.Sandler. "Terrorism & Tourism: Spain", 1.
W.Enders & T.Sandler. "Evaluating Policies Aimed at Thwarting Terrorism", 1, 5. W.Enders, T.Sandler & J.Cauley. "UN Conventions, Technology & Retaliation", 86.

led to different means being used to attack the same target. This is particularly the case when a similar target to the protected one could be attacked by a different 'cheaper' method.¹⁰⁹

The economists have termed this shift in targets *substitution*, meaning that the terrorists substituted a 'cheaper' target or method in place of a more 'expensive' one. Thus the fortification of American embassies led to a decrease in terrorist attempts to occupy or otherwise attack them, but led to an increase in attacks upon Americans outside the security of the embassy compounds.¹¹⁰ Initially the economists also thought that there may be a substitution from aircraft hijacking into kidnappings but say that a refinement of the methods of verification used shows that there was no significant substitution from aircraft hijacking into other non-aircraft hostage incidents.¹¹¹ Thus substitution means that rather than attack hard targets, terrorists switch their attacks to less well-protected or softer targets.

Some of the attacks carried out by terrorist groups suggest that they commonly substitute targets. Attacks by Palestinian groups against Israeli or Jewish targets in third countries seem to be prompted, at least partly, by the fact that they are not as well protected as targets within Israel. Since 1968 Palestinian groups have attacked Israeli or Jewish targets outside Israel, with incidents such as the kidnapping and killing of eleven Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in September 1972, and the seizure of the Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro* in 1985 being merely some of the most prominent.¹¹²

Hizbollah has acted in a similar fashion in the 1990s. Following the Israeli assassination of the Hizbollah Secretary-General, Sheikh Abbas al-Musawi - together with his wife and infant son - in February 1992, the Hizbollah did not

109) W.Enders & T.Sandler. "Evaluating Policies Aimed at Thwarting Terrorism", 4.

110) T.Sandler, W.Enders & H.E.Lapan. "Economic Analysis" 15.

111) W.Enders, T.Sandler & J.Cauley. "UN Conventions, Technology & Retaliation," 96. W.Enders & T.Sandler. "Evaluating Policies Aimed at Thwarting Terrorism", 21.

112) S.M.Katz. Guards Without Frontiers: Israel's War Against Terrorism, (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1990), 23-31. D.C.Martin & J.Walcott. Best Laid Plans, 235-257.

retaliate by attacking a target in Israel, but instead destroyed the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina, with a car bomb the following month, killing about thirty people.¹¹³ Likewise, after an Israeli helicopter-gunship assault on a Hizbollah base in the Lebanon killed up to fifty recruits in June 1994, a bomb destroyed the Delegation of Argentine-Israeli Associations the following month, killing ninety-six. Although Hizbollah did not claim responsibility for the attack, reports suggest that they were responsible.¹¹⁴

An examination of security force and related deaths in Northern Ireland during the recent Troubles also indicates a shift from harder to softer targets within the context of a declining number of deaths overall. As Table 7.1 above shows, whilst the rate of regular British Army soldiers killed declined quite steeply between 1970 and 1993, the rate of RUC and UDR deaths remained fairly constant until the mid 1980s, and declined less rapidly than that of the Army thereafter. This tendency becomes even more pronounced if one bears in mind that the figures for the Army are partly inflated by incidents where more than five soldiers have been killed in a single attack, (Warrenpoint, August 27th 1979 - eighteen dead; Ballykelly, December 6th 1982 - eleven dead; Lisburn, June 15th 1988 - six dead; Ballygawley, August 20th 1988 - eight dead), whereas only one single attack has inflicted similar casualties upon the local security forces (Newry, February 28th 1985 - nine RUC dead).¹¹⁵

113) "Hezbollah chief dies in gunship attack on car", The Times, February 17th 1992. "Lebanon's pain, but whose gain?", The Independent, February 18th 1992. "Suicide bomber blew up embassy", The Times, February 19th 1992. "16 killed in bomb attack on Jewish groups in Argentina", The Independent, July 19th 1994. "Bomb kills 22 at Jewish Centre", The Times, July 19th 1994. M.Ranstorp. "Hizbollah's Command Leadership", 314, 339n.

114) "Israel wreaks vengeance on Hizbollah camp", The Independent, June 3rd 1994. "Hizbollah bury their unseen dead", The Independent, June 4th 1994. "Israel moves troops to Lebanese border", The Guardian, June 4th 1994. "Explosion levels building housing Jewish groups", The Guardian, July 19th 1994. "Hizbollah adopts an 'eye for an eye' tactic", The Independent, July 20th 1994. "Bomb alarm Britain ignored", The Independent on Sunday, July 31st 1994.

115) M.Sutton. Bear in mind these dead, passim.

The reduced number of soldiers killed relative to total security force casualties can be partly explained by the reduction of regular troops as a proportion of the security forces deployed in Northern Ireland - from about 17,200 out of a total of 32,400 in 1973 to about 9,700 out of 28,900 in 1989.¹¹⁶ However, as Bowyer Bell and McKeown point out, it is also due to the fact that whilst British Army members in Northern Ireland are on more or less constant alert, members of the RUC and UDR are far more vulnerable as they live within Northern Ireland and can therefore be more easily attacked off-duty.¹¹⁷ In addition, from 1985 onwards the Provisionals targeted businessmen and their employees who were carrying out building work or providing services for the security forces, killing twenty-seven between 1985 and 1993. Thus the reduction in the targeting of the regular British Army in Northern Ireland, compared to the targeting of the RUC, the UDR/RIR, and civilian contractors to the security forces, can be seen as an example of target substitution caused by the increasing difficulty of killing British soldiers in Northern Ireland.

Summary

The protective measures taken to protect a target greatly affect the terrorist's opportunity. Protective measures affect a terrorist groups choice of targets in a number of ways. Firstly, the number of targets which can be protected is limited by the expense of providing protection. During the period of the maximum terrorist threat in Italy between the mid 1970s and early 1990s, the security services are reported to have provided 3,681 bodyguards to protect 671 assorted politicians, judges, and businessmen. The average cost of an armoured car in Italy was estimated at \$70,000.¹¹⁸ Likewise, in 1990 personal protection costs were reported to

116) S. Bruce. The Red Hand, 297.

117) J. Bowyer Bell, IRA Tactics and Targets, 29-30.
M. McKeown. Two Seven Six Three: An analysis of fatalities attributable to civil disturbances in Northern Ireland in the twenty years between July 13th 1969 and July 12th 1989, (Lucan, Ireland: Murlough, 1989), 7, 21-22.

118) "End of a bullet-proof era", The Independent, June 21st 1991.

take up over 5% of the budget of the Metropolitan Police.¹¹⁹ Such protection cannot be given to all potential targets.

Whilst some protection might be possible, some people or material targets cannot be given the absolute maximum of protection because it would not be possible for them carry out their normal business. With embassies for example, the precautions necessary to provide absolute protection would divert so much manpower from their primary mission and would make the embassy so inaccessible to those whom it is meant to do business with, that it would not function effectively.¹²⁰

The limitations on the amount of protection possible creates vulnerabilities which in turn provide terrorists with opportunities.¹²¹ The terrorists choose which targets they wish to attack whilst - in the absence of information on the group - those trying to frustrate them can only make more or less informed judgements as to which targets they need to protect. Consequently the initiative in a terrorist campaign generally lies with the terrorists.

As a terrorist campaign progresses, one will find that whilst the people trying to protect potential targets react to attacks by protecting new targets or hardening existing ones, the terrorists can select new targets or categories of targets or devise new methods or weapons to attack existing hardened targets.¹²² There is, to an extent, a reciprocal relationship between the terrorists and their opponents.

Ultimately it is in the interests of the terrorist group to select targets which will maximise the political or material benefits accruing from an attack whilst minimising the risks and material costs to themselves. As a result, they will tend to select the softest possible legitimate targets. However, they may expand their definition of legitimate targets until they include targets which are also easy to attack. Occasionally terrorists may select harder targets because of the publicity value of a successful attack on such

119) "Huge costs force Yard to review VIP security", The Independent on Sunday, February 4th 1990. "Anti-IRA security costs must rise, police say", The Independent on Sunday, September 23rd 1990.

120) B.M.Jenkins. The Lessons of Beirut, 5.

121) B.M.Jenkins. Lessons of Beirut, 4.

122) P.Gurney. Braver Men Walk Away, 185.

a target and the impression of strength which such an attack may give.

One should be careful not to see the relationship between target selection and target protection as purely reactive. Whilst it is undoubtedly true that terrorists have to take security measures into account, neither they, nor their opponents, are necessarily limited to merely reactive strategies. Both sides are also capable - within limits - of taking initiatives which will alter the 'rules of the game' overall. One way in which this can be done is the way in which the security forces operate.

The Security Environment

Introduction.

Terrorist groups are severely affected by the matrix of laws and institutions which, ideally, protect the state and the public from crime and disorder. In this study this matrix is termed the *security environment*. The basis of the security environment in a liberal democracy is the various statutes - known collectively as *the law* - which constitute the rules which constrain those aspects of human behaviour judged to be undesirable. The law is enforced by a series of institutions - known collectively as the criminal justice system - which deal with the prevention, detection and punishment of crime. The primary elements of the criminal justice system are the legal system, the police, and the penal system. These institutions carry out the procedures whereby those who break the criminal law are detected, detained, tried, and - if found guilty - punished.

An understanding of the criminal justice system is useful in order to understand how it hampers terrorists and why members of the system are often selected as targets. The legal system includes the laws, the courts, the judiciary, and the legal profession: in short the institutions responsible for determining whether people have broken the law and for deciding the appropriate measures to be taken against those found guilty. The police are responsible for apprehending suspects and preparing evidence for court. They, and other security agencies, are also responsible for gathering information on potential and actual threats, and for the physical protection of potential targets. The penal system is responsible for the confinement of those who have been found guilty of breaking the law and sentenced to imprisonment. In some cases it is also responsible for the rehabilitation of prisoners. The penal system includes the prisons, prison staff, and allied support services such as the probation service. Taken together these three elements - the legal system, the police, and the penal system, make up the criminal justice system and underpin the rule of law within a state.

Where the normal policing and law-enforcement structure can no longer maintain order, the authorities may deploy the

armed forces. This will often be accompanied by comparatively repressive emergency laws and greatly strengthened powers for the security forces - that is the police, the intelligence agencies, and the military. Gwynn mentions three instances where the armed forces might be deployed to restore order: where police numbers are insufficient to maintain the existing law and the army's role is simply to reinforce the police; where civil control and the system of policing have totally collapsed and the army is needed to maintain order in the absence of the police; and where an internal 'small war' has broken out against an organised enemy.¹ Like Field Marshal Haig in the 1920s, Gwynn believes that the deployment of armed soldiers should be a signal that lethal force might be employed, but he also argues that the army should only use the minimum force necessary when supporting the civil power.² To summarise, in a liberal democracy restraints may be placed upon the activities of a terrorist group by the law, by the criminal justice system, and as a last resort by the armed forces.

In a totalitarian or authoritarian state, where the state's institutions may act in a thoroughly repressive manner, terrorists may face the same obstacles, but to a much greater degree. Laws can be drafted in such a way as to label the actions of peaceful opponents as criminals. The police may act as the partisan instruments of the government - arresting people on the grounds of mere suspicion or because of their political affiliations, whilst in some countries the police have set up official or semi-official death squads. Likewise, the prisons may serve as a means of incarcerating real or suspected political opponents, and of intimidating

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- 1) C.Gwynn. Imperial Policing, (London: Macmillan, 1934; 1936), 3-4, 16. Gwynn systemised doctrine concerning the use of the military in support of the civil power. Until recently British military doctrine concerning military aid to the civil power was based upon colonial precedents. See M.Dewar. The British Army in Northern Ireland, 219-220. I.F.W.Beckett. "Guerrilla Warfare: Insurgency and Counter-insurgency since 1945", C.McInnes & G.D.Sheffield. Warfare in the Twentieth Century: Theory and Practice (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 206-207.
- 2) C.Gwynn. Imperial Policing, 32, 14. K.Jeffrey & P.Hennessy. States of Emergency: British Governments and Strikebreaking since 1919, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), 14.

their friends and families. Finally, in some countries the use of military force has not been seen as a last resort to be used sparingly, but as a desirable tool of oppression. This scenario is worth bearing in mind as it is far from uncommon and, as Laqueur notes, it is much more difficult for terrorists to operate in a security environment which is founded on a policy of severe repression.³

The role of the security forces.

For the sake of clarity in defining the respective roles of the police and the military, this study will take as its model the theoretical division of labour between the police and the military in Great Britain. In this case the police are responsible for enforcing the law and for the maintenance of public order. This involves investigating offences against the law and seeking to convict the offenders through the due processes of the legal system. Whilst the military can be called upon to aid the civil power, this is ideally an act of last resort and the role of the military should be the protection of the state from external threats. With this model in mind, the security force response to terrorism can be divided into five broad functions.

- *Intelligence*: The gathering of information and its analysis with other information to develop it into intelligence.
- *Investigation*: The investigation of specific illegal incidents.

3) W.Laqueur. The Age of Terrorism, 6, 154. Amnesty International. Getting away with murder. As an example the behaviour of the Argentine military junta between 1976 and 1983 is well documented. See Amnesty International. Argentina: The Military Juntas and Human Rights, Report of the Trial of the Former Junta Members, (London: Amnesty International, 1987). Argentina, Comision Nacional sobre la Desparicion de Personas. Nunca Mas: A Report by Argentina's National Commission on Disappeared People, (English translation), (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1984; London: Faber & Faber/Index on Censorship, 1986). R.Cox. "Total Terrorism: Argentina, 1969 to 1979", M.Crenshaw (ed). Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power: The Consequences of Political Violence, (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1983). J.Burns. The Land That Lost It's Heroes, 20-23.

- *Protection*: The physical protection of potential targets.
- *Public order maintenance*: The prevention of disorder through the open deployment of police or troops.
- *Armed response* : The use of lethal force to eliminate a specific threat.

The intelligence, investigative, and protective functions are standard practice in states that are not experiencing a terrorist problem. The effects which protective functions have upon terrorist activities were examined in the previous chapter.

The maintenance of public order and deployment of an armed response are generally only necessary in abnormal circumstances. In the case of mass violence, such as a riot, the police or other security forces may use equipment such as batons, riot shields, and tear gas to disperse those whom they deem to be disturbing public order. On the other hand if the nature of the problem is such that lives are directly threatened, then armed police or soldiers may be deployed and the person responsible for the danger shot dead. For example, this occurred in Melbourne in December 1994, where armed police killed a man who had been shooting at bystanders.⁴

The roles of the police and the army in a terrorist campaign are different. Whereas the military aim in wartime is to locate, identify and physically destroy the enemy, the role of the police is to enforce the law by apprehending and convicting law-breakers.⁵ The different roles of the component parts of the security forces affect the security

4) "Melbourne gunman who killed two shot dead by police marksmen", The Independent, December 6th 1994.

5) E.Bramall. "The Place of the British Army in Public Order", and R.Mark. "Keeping the Peace in Great Britain: The Differing Roles of the Police and the Army", both in P.J.Rowe & C.J.Whelan (eds). Military Intervention in Democratic Societies, (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 82-84, 85-88. J.R.Thackrah. "Reactions to Terrorism and Riots", J.R.Thackrah (ed). Contemporary Policing: An examination of society in the 1980s, (London: Sphere, 1985), 148. P.Wilkinson. Terrorism and the Liberal State, second edition, (London: Macmillan, 1986), 46. T.F.Baldy. Battle for Ulster: A Study of Internal Security, (Washington DC: National Defence University Press, 1987), 115.

environment within which terrorists operate. The first place where this is evident is in the sphere of intelligence.

Intelligence.

In defining what is meant by the term *intelligence*, the main distinction to be made is between intelligence and information. Using Northam's definitions, information is a fact or facts which come to the notice of the relevant agency. Intelligence is the product of the assessment and analysis of the information available.⁶

To carry out an effective investigation the police need to develop sufficient background intelligence. Building up a fund of information about neighbourhoods and suspects is part and parcel of ordinary police-work and is not confined to counter-terrorist work.⁷ The necessary knowledge is often obtained by the collection of information from local gossip, paid agents, informants, and the interrogation of suspects or people who are suspected of possessing information. The use of informers is a central part of the conduct of normal police operations against organised criminals such as drug traffickers and armed robbers as borne out by comments by Sir Kenneth Oxford, formerly Chief Constable of Merseyside, Sir Paul Condon, Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, and other police officers.⁸ Similarly, by far the most valuable

6) G.Northam. Shooting in the Dark: Riot Police in Britain, (London: Faber & Faber, 1989), 77.

7) British Society for Social Responsibility in Science. TechnoCop: New Police Technologies, (London: Free Association Books, 1985), 20-24. G.Northam. Shooting in the Dark, 77-81. K.Oxford. "Patterns in a Labyrinth", A.R.Brownlie (ed). Crime Investigation: Art or Science, (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1984), 10. R.Baldwin & R.Kinsey. Police Powers and Politics, (London: Quartet, 1982), 59-82, 287-289.

8) "'I don't seek it, but ... it could happen within 10 to 20 years'", The Independent on Sunday, June 20th 1993. "Three top police informers killed", The Independent on Sunday, May 23rd 1993. "Rise of the gunmen", Evening Standard, (London), August 16th 1993. K.Oxford. "Patterns in a Labyrinth", 10. M.Maguire & C.Norris. The Conduct and Supervision of Criminal Investigations, 15-16, 78-79, 89-95. N.Darbyshire & B.Hilliard. The Flying Squad, (London: Headline, 1993), 79-80, 105, 214-215. M.Short. Lundy: The Destruction of Scotland Yard's Finest Detective, (London: Grafton, 1991), 88-104. D.Hobbs. Doing the Business: Entrepreneurship, The Working Class, and Detectives in the East End of

background information against terrorists comes from informers within the group passing on information to the police.

Effective intelligence work can greatly damage a terrorist group, by allowing the security forces to frustrate terrorist operations in advance, and to apprehend terrorist group members and resources. In Italy in the late 1970s the shrewd use of informers allowed General Dalla Chiesa, head of the Carabinieri anti-terrorist campaign, to capture most of the leaders of the Red Brigades and Front Line, together with several ordinary terrorists, within a relatively short period.⁹ Similarly, the arrest of leading members of the Angry Brigade - a British anarchist group which carried out a series of bombings between 1969 and 1972 - led to the effective demise of the group.¹⁰

Information gained from informers can allow the security forces to frustrate or deter attacks. This could be done, for example, by deploying a heavy security presence in the vicinity of the target. Although ostensibly the security forces might seem to be carrying out routine operations, the terrorists would be deterred from carrying out the operation.¹¹ In December 1991 the Chief Constable of the RUC stated that security force measures were interrupting four out of five terrorist attacks, whilst in June 1994 The Director General of the Security Service (MI5) - the British internal intelligence agency - stated that the security forces prevented around four out of five attempted terrorist operations in Northern Ireland.¹² A senior member of the Provisional IRA put the proportion of operations which were not carried out due to security force activities at around

London, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 195-196, 203, 208, 212.

9) A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 174, 177, 179-180, 195-198. D. Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 178-180. P. Willan. Puppet Masters, 285.

10) "10 years' jail after majority verdict", The Times, December 7th 1972.

11) M. Urban. Big Boys' Rules, 213.

12) "Devastation from bomber who got through", The Guardian, December 14th 1991. S. Rimmington. The Richard Dimbleby Lecture 1994: Security and Democracy - Is There a Conflict?, (London: BBC Education, 1994), 9.

nine out of ten, and another PIRA spokesman has stated that thousands of operations have been cancelled.¹³

Alternatively informers can give the authorities information - contact information - which in conjunction with other information and analysis allows the security forces to intercept the terrorists. This can lead to the capture of weapons and the apprehension or death of terrorists. As an example, in June 1993 the PIRA made a statement in An Phoblacht which outlined the damage which an alleged informer had inflicted upon the organisation over a three year period.

During this period he was directly responsible for the arrest of at least six IRA Volunteers, three of whom narrowly escaped execution by the crown forces. He was also responsible for the seizure of weapons, explosive devices and material, laterly [sic] five tons of fertiliser in the Dairy Farm in Poleglass. He also informed on Volunteers who took part in IRA operations and about numerous houses, buildings, vehicles used by ourselves and also on young Volunteers joining the IRA.¹⁴

The alleged informer was found shot dead on a rural track in county Tyrone, near the Irish border.¹⁵

The fear of intelligence operations means that the terrorists have to spend a great deal of time and effort trying to evade detection. Toolis and Elliot point out that when carrying out a complex operation terrorists often need safe houses, cars, money, and false documents, as well as the arms and ammunition necessary to carry out the attack.

Each purchase, each rented house provides a potential clue and a potential trail of evidence for its Special Branch and MI5 pursuers. The IRA men therefore go to extremely elaborate lengths to lay false paper trails based on fictitious identities and provide themselves with emergency escape routes in the event of detection.¹⁶

In a similar fashion, members of the Red Army Faction and the French group Direct Action obtained false documentation and constructed false identities in order to evade police

13) C.Foley. Legion of the Rearguard: The IRA and the Modern Irish State, (London: Pluto, 1992), 220. "'We remain totally committed and confident in victory' - Oglagh na hEireann", AP/RN, February 14th 1991.

14) "Informer worked for RUC for three years", AP/RN, July 1st 1993.

15) M.Sutton. Bear in mind these dead, 190.

16) "Lethal mix of brutality and blunders", The Sunday Correspondent, June 17th 1990.

intelligence systems.¹⁷ Taking these precautions takes up time and disrupts terrorist operations.

The terrorists' loss of material resources can be considerable. Following the Libyan shipments to the PIRA of the mid 1980s, the Irish Police (Garda Siochana - Civic Guard) - launched a major operation to capture weapons which had been stashed in the Republic. Between the start of 1985 and May 1993, according to figures quoted by O'Brien, the Gardai made 557 arms finds, discovering 825 guns, about 339,600 rounds of ammunition, 484 explosive devices, and 2,170 items of bomb-making equipment.¹⁸ In Northern Ireland between the beginning of 1985 and the end of 1993 the RUC found 2,121 firearms and 29.6 tons of explosives, although not all of these related to PIRA or other republican groups.¹⁹ The massive size of the Libyan shipments meant that the Provisionals still had sufficient weaponry for many years activity but the fact remains that intelligence-related activities by the security force restricted the group's ability to function, by forcing it to waste time and resources on hiding weapons and evading detection when those resources could have been used in attacking targets.²⁰

Due to the threat which they pose, intelligence operatives and their informers are prime targets for any terrorist group. The classic example of the elimination of intelligence operatives occurred on the morning of Sunday, November 21st 1920. A group of IRA assassins known as 'The Squad' located and killed between twelve and nineteen British Army officers - accounts vary - the bulk of whom were intelligence officers.²¹ One of the IRA's agents - a detective in the political 'G' Division of the Dublin

17) S.Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group, 115. J.Becker. Hitler's Children, 234-235. S.Segaller. Invisible Armies, 47-48.

18) B.O'Brien. The Long War, 145-149.

19) Royal Ulster Constabulary. Chief Constable's Annual Report 1993, (London: HMSO, 1994), 98-99.

20) "Arming the IRA: The Libyan Connection, The Economist, (London), March 31st, 1990. "Libyan arms fuel surge in terrorism", The Independent, May 8th 1990. "RUC chief proposes national police units", The Independent, July 22nd 1992. "IRA has enough Semtex for 15 years", The Independent on Sunday, March 19th 1995.

21) T.P.Coogan. Michael Collins, 157-160. C.Townshend. The British Campaign in Ireland, 129-130.

Metropolitan Police - noted that the death of a detective meant the loss of his experience.

The British could replace a detective. But [the new detective] couldn't step into the dead mans shoes and knowledge.²²

A report made in 1922 regarding the role of intelligence in the Irish rebellion, confirmed this.²³

This view was reinforced in June 1994 when twenty-five senior personnel from the RUC Special Branch, British Army Intelligence, and MI5 were killed in a helicopter crash in Scotland. A columnist noted that whilst no intelligence sources or information had been lost, the experience in assessing and using the information had been. Furthermore, the personal relationships which made the system work more smoothly had been seriously disrupted.²⁴ For this reason British intelligence operatives and their informers are targeted by the PIRA, a point noted in a 1978 British Army report.²⁵ Some British undercover operatives detected by terrorists in Northern Ireland have had to call in reinforcements or shoot their way out of trouble, and in some cases they have been killed.²⁶ From the perspective of the terrorists this would mean that the threat posed by that person had been eliminated.

Similarly, George Grivas, the military head of EOKA, describes why he ordered the assassination of a member of the Cyprus Special Branch.

For some months Superintendent E.N.Peirce, of the Special Branch, had been trying to penetrate my courier service in Limassol and we had to be rid of him. . . . [Following the assassination attempt] Although seriously wounded, Peirce survived; but he was in hospital for several weeks

22) T.P.Coogan. Michael Collins, 78.

23) GHQ Ireland. Record of the rebellion in Ireland in 1920-21 and the part played by the Army in dealing with it. Volume II. Intelligence, (A-2448-2), 4-5.

24) "An incalculable loss for MI5", New Statesman & Society, June 10th 1994.

25) Taken from the 'Glover Report' of 1978 as reproduced in R.Fagilot. Britain's Military Strategy in Ireland, 233. S.Cronin. Irish Nationalism, 348.

26) M.Dillon. The Dirty War, 404-405, 478. M.Urban. Big Boys' Rules, 43-44, 141-142. K.J.Kelley. The Longest War, 275. M.Sutton. Bear in mind these dead, 108, 110.

and troubled us no more. His career was at an end and I slept the better for it.²⁷

Israeli agents have been killed by Palestinian terrorists. In January 1973 an Israeli intelligence officer, Baruch Cohen, was shot dead in a Madrid cafe by a Palestinian student whom he believed he had recruited as an agent within the circles of Palestinian exiles. According to Katz, Cohen was the Brussels station chief of the Israeli external intelligence agency Mossad (ha-Mossad le-Modiin ule-Tafkidim Meyuhadim - Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks).²⁸ More recently, in February 1994, one Shin Bet officer was killed and two others wounded when they were ambushed in Beltounia, near Jerusalem, whilst on their way to a meeting. The 'Izzedine al Qassem Brigade' - the armed wing of the Palestinian Islamic group Hamas - claimed responsibility for the attack.²⁹ Again this was an example of terrorists diminishing the threat to themselves, and attacking the morale of their opponents, by eliminating an intelligence officer and, they doubtless hoped, eliminating his knowledge and expertise.

Investigation.

The investigative role of the police during a terrorist campaign closely parallels their role in combating normal crime.³⁰ Their aim is to find out who has broken the law, to locate and detain the offender, and to build up a sufficient body of evidence to convict that person in a law court. To do this in the case of a terrorist incident the police initially need enough information to give them a lead as to which organisation has broken the law, though this is not a problem if the terrorists concerned claim responsibility for the act.

27) G.Grivas - Dighenis & C.Foley (ed). The Memoirs of General Grivas, 128.

28) Raviv and Melman place Cohen in the the Israeli domestic intelligence agency Shin Bet (Sherut ha-Bitachon ha-Kalai - General Security Service), whilst Taylor and Katz place him in Mossad. D.Raviv & Y.Melman. Every Spy a Prince, 187-188. P.Taylor. States of Terror, 55-62. S.M.Katz. Guards Without Frontiers, 43.

29) "Israeli agent is shot dead", The Guardian, February 14th 1994.

30) For an outline of normal practice concerning criminal investigations in Britain see M.Maguire & C.Norris. The Conduct and Supervision of Criminal Investigations. T.Colman. Incident into Evidence: Operational Police Skills, (Maidenhead, England: McGraw-Hill, 1989).

Once the police have this information they can try to determine which person committed the offence and then try to locate them. However, whilst the police can use intelligence as a means of identifying and locating suspects, unless they have the power to imprison suspects without trial they have to assemble sufficient evidence to convict the suspect of the offence with which he has been charged. The evidence may come in the form of statements from witnesses - law-enforcement officers, civilians, or former-terrorists - or confessions from the terrorists themselves, and may be supplemented by film from covert surveillance video cameras or closed circuit television, and forensic evidence. Where membership of a specific organisation is a crime in itself, the aim may be to prove that an individual is a member of that group. In cases where membership is not a crime, as was the case with the Ulster Defence Association until 1992, the police have to prove that a specific criminal offence has been committed.

As a result of the threat which investigations can pose to terrorists, the various elements involved in the investigative process are often selected as targets. During the peak years of Red Brigade activity in Italy - in the late 1970s and early 1980s - police investigators were frequently attacked. For instance, in June 1978 Antonio Esposito, police chief for the town of Nervi and former head of the Genoa anti-terrorist squad, was shot dead by two brigadists as he travelled to work by bus. He had been involved in the investigation of a number of Red Brigade kidnappings and directed an operation in connection with the 1976 assassination of the Genoa Public Prosecutor Francesco Coco, resulting in the arrest of suspected Red Brigadist Giuliano Naria.³¹ Other high-ranking policemen attacked by the Red Brigades include the chief of the Venice anti-terrorist squad, Alfredo Albanese, who was shot dead at a road crossing in his car in May 1980, and Nicola Simone the deputy chief of the Rome anti-terrorist squad known as the DIGOS, whom the Red Brigades wounded during what seems to have been a kidnap

31) Corriere della Sera, June 23rd 1978. "Red Brigades gunmen kill police chief as he rides to work on a bus", The Times, June 22nd 1978.

attempt in January 1982.³² In an unusual case the head of the Naples Flying Squad, Deputy Police Commissioner Antonio Ammaturo, was shot dead with his driver in July 1982 by the Naples column of the BR. He had been very active against the Camorra - the Neapolitan equivalent of the Mafia - leading to speculation that the Naples column of the - by then - badly split Red Brigades was trying to obtain the support of the Neapolitan criminal classes by assassinating an efficient officer.³³

As well as attacking investigators, terrorists may also kill or threaten witnesses who give important evidence against their members. In January 1972 a local unit of the PIRA killed a witness who was to testify against three of their members for the comparatively minor offence of burning a bus.³⁴ In the early 1980s the relatives of some of the 'supergrasses' - terrorists who gave evidence against their fellow republican and loyalist paramilitaries - were kidnapped in an attempt to make the witnesses retract their evidence.³⁵ Similarly, in Italy in 1981, Red Brigadists kidnapped and then killed the brother of the former Brigadist Patrizio Peci when he gave evidence in court.³⁶ Witnesses also form a major target for criminal groups involved in political terrorism. Since he turned state's evidence in 1984, Tommaso Buscetta has been one of the most productive

32) "Terror squad chief murdered in Venice", The Guardian, May 13th 1980. Corriere della Sera, May 13th 1980. "Anti-Terrorist Officer Shot in Rome", International Herald Tribune, January 7th 1982. The Irish Times, January 7th 1982. Corriere della Sera, January 7th 1982.

33) Corriere della Sera, July 16th 1982. Corriere della Sera, July 16th 1982, July 19th 1982, July 26th 1982, August 3rd 1982, August 30th 1982. P. Willan. Puppet Masters, 333-334.

34) P. Bishop & E. Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 241. M. Dillon & D. Lehane. Political Murder in Northern Ireland, 53-54. "Chronology of events: 18.1.72", R. Bell, R. Johnstone, R. Wilson (eds). Troubled Times, 153.

35) "The Armalite and the Ballot Box", Magill, July 1983. Also see C. Ryder. The RUC, 286. "Six held as INLA hostages freed", The Guardian, August 19th 1983. "Informer's wife freed as INLA rethinks tactics", The Guardian, August 27th 1983. "IRA frees father of informer", The Guardian, September 27th 1983. "Chronology of events: 22.12.82, 16.5.83, 25.8.83", R. Bell, R. Johnstone, R. Wilson (eds). Troubled Times, 195-196, 196, 197.

36) A. Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 189-190.

state witnesses which the Italian authorities has ever used against the Mafia, including allegations against leading Italian politicians.³⁷ By March 1995 it was reported that the Mafia had killed eleven of Buscetta's relatives, partly to punish him, and doubtless partly to discourage other people from turning state's evidence.³⁸

Not all evidence comes from human sources. Forensic evidence has become increasingly important as a way of identifying suspects and gaining convictions in court. It includes fingerprints, DNA traces, lead residue from firearms, traces of the components of explosive devices on either skin or clothing, or any other form of substance which may be attributed to the suspect and which would prove his guilt.³⁹ Thus, laser technology picked up a small sweat and palm impression on a hotel register left by the PIRA member who planted the bomb at the Grand Hotel in Brighton in 1984.⁴⁰ Similarly, in August 1994 a man was convicted of carrying out bombings for the PIRA on the basis of clothing fibres found on the barbed wire surrounding a bombed oil terminal, a footprint, and traces of Semtex explosive found in the boot of the mans' car.⁴¹ However, the misuse or incorrect interpretation of forensic evidence can also lead

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- 37) "Supergrasses target Andreotti", The Independent on Sunday, April 11th 1993. "Andreotti accused of ordering murder", The Independent, June 10th 1993. "Judge deals blow to Andreotti over journalist's murder", The Times, June 10th 1993.
- 38) "Rome turns a blind eye to Mafia's killing spree", The Independent, March 8th 1995.
- 39) "Caught with suspicious genes", The Independent, April 4th 1995. "World's first national DNA bank opens", The Guardian, April 11th 1995. "We need your DNA", The Guardian, supplement, April 21st 1995. M.Dillon. The Dirty War, (London: Hutchinson, 1990; Arrow, 1991), 32, 48. "One day their prints will come", The Sunday Correspondent, August 12th 1990. B.Lane. The Encyclopedia of Forensic Science, (London: Headline, 1992; 1993).
- 40) "Police comb 'bomber's lair'", The Sunday Correspondent, September 24th 1989.
- 41) "IRA terrorist guilty of bombing Tyneside sites", The Independent, August 22nd 1994. "Threads from his clothes convicted IRA terrorist", The Times, August 22nd 1994. "IRA bomber sentenced to 25 years", The Independent, August 23rd 1994.

to wrongful convictions as occurred in the case of the 'Birmingham Six' in 1975.⁴²

Terrorists have sought to combat the use of forensic evidence by a number of methods. Urban describes how, to avoid leaving forensic traces, the PIRA adopted measures such as wearing balaclavas to avoid photographic identification, wearing rubber gloves when handling weapons, wearing boiler suits over normal clothes during operations, and bathing soon after an operation.⁴³ Likewise, according to Pluchinsky by the 1980s the Red Army Faction had become sophisticated in the avoidance of leaving behind forensic evidence after an operation.⁴⁴ However terrorists can use more direct measures to combat the use of forensic evidence. In September 1992 the PIRA used a 2,000 pound vehicle bomb to destroy the Northern Irish forensic science laboratories in Belfast.⁴⁵

Public order maintenance.

In general public order maintenance consists of crowd control by the security forces - generally the police - seeking to prevent disorder or riots at events such as football matches, industrial disputes, and demonstrations. These can often be dealt with by the large-scale deployment of police officers, sometimes in riot-gear.⁴⁶ Such situations carry the risk of violence, and sometimes of death and injury, but combating a terrorist campaign requires additional measures because of the threat of deliberately targeted lethal violence.

The first job of the security forces in a terrorist campaign is to contain the terrorists, by making it more difficult for them to operate. Having done this they can take measures to capture or eliminate members of the terrorist

42) C.Mullin. Error of Judgement: The Truth about the Birmingham Bombings, revised edition, (Swords, Ireland: Poolbeg, 1990), 285-298.

43) M.Urban. Big Boys' Rules, 115.

44) D.Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group", 80.

45) "Damage in huge blast put at £20m", The Independent, September 25th 1992. "Court laboratory bombed by IRA", The Times, September 25th 1992. "'Troubles' chronology: Wed Sep 23", Fortnight, no 311, (November 1992), 34.

46) S.Uglow. Policing Liberal Society, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 76-77, 80-83. G.Northam. Shooting in the Dark, *passim*.

groups. Overt and covert methods can be used to achieve these aims. The overt methods include sending out patrols, the setting up of check-points, and house-searches for weapons or suspects.

The point of carrying out overt patrols is to make it difficult for terrorists to move weapons around and set up attacks. According to Michael Dewar, a former battalion commander in the British Army:

Patrolling in Northern Ireland has two main purposes: domination of the ground, so as to deny the enemy freedom of movement and, secondly, to get to know the area intimately in order to build up a detailed knowledge of the area and its inhabitants.⁴⁷

Whilst the domination of the ground is important because it denies terrorists the opportunity to deploy for an attack, it can also provide the terrorist with what an RUC officer described as "... a classic slow-moving target".⁴⁸

To be effective in deterring attacks, security force patrols need to be organised around a pattern rather than haphazardly deployed in the hope of bumping into the enemy. The coordinated deployment of a number of small patrols, moving swiftly in an unpredictable pattern, denies snipers or other attackers a guaranteed escape route after they have carried out an attack.⁴⁹ By making a subsequent escape unlikely one also makes the execution of a terrorist attack unlikely, with the exception of attackers who expect to die in the process.⁵⁰ In his study of a Catholic area of west Belfast between September 1972 and April 1973, Burton notes that whilst the intermittent patrolling of a conventional infantry regiment was fairly ineffective, the constant patrols and ambushes carried out by the Parachute Regiment limited the freedom of action of the local PIRA, killed many of its members, and reduced it to near impotence.⁵¹

Other overt activities where drivers or pedestrians have their identification documents checked and where they may be searched - for instance mobile vehicle check points (VCPs) and static road blocks - make it difficult for

47) M.Dewar. The British Army in Northern Ireland, 180.

48) D.Hamill. Pig in the Middle, 44.

49) D.Hamill. Pig in the Middle, 119, 141. M.Dewar. The British Army in Northern Ireland, 182.

50) A.Feldman. Formations of Violence, 41-45.

51) F.Burton. The politics of legitimacy, 112-113.

terrorists to move personnel, weapons, and supplies around the area affected. As noted in the last chapter, road-blocks and vehicle check-points have been widely used during the recent troubles in Northern Ireland, and occasionally in England.⁵² Similarly, Duyker notes that intensive security operations by the Indian Army against Naxalites in Birbhum, West Bengal, between July and November 1971 severely restricted the group.⁵³

The scale of such operations can be very large. In the two months following the kidnapping of Aldo Moro in 1978 the various Italian security forces set up 72,000 road-blocks, and questioned 6½ million people.⁵⁴ However, whilst such methods may disrupt the ability of terrorist groups to move people, weapons and messages in the affected area, surveys in Northern Ireland indicate that they also cause a great deal of resentment on the part of the people subjected to them, and this may help the terrorists by creating sympathisers and possibly recruits.⁵⁵

As well as trying to intercept terrorists and their equipment and disrupt their activities through patrols and check-points, the security forces can also try to achieve the same ends by searching property. During the Moro kidnapping the Italian authorities searched 37,000 dwellings, whilst in Northern Ireland between 1970 and 1993 a total of 354,524

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- 52) "Security alert as IRA admits bombings", The Independent, December 5th 1992. "Police set IRA road traps", The Independent, December 6th 1992. "Police set road-blocks in effort to deter IRA", "Belfast security measures accepted as normal", both in The Independent, December 7th 1992. "Roadblock police stop drivers at gunpoint", The Times, December 7th 1992. "Police introduce IRA road-blocks in Manchester", The Independent, December 8th 1992. "Home Office resists pressure for wider stop-and-search rules", The Times, December 8th 1992. D.McKittrick. Despatches from Belfast, 196-202. Unattributable interview, September 1993.
- 53) E.Duyker. Tribal Guerrillas, 92-93.
- 54) P.Willan. Puppet Masters, 224.
- 55) A.Guelke & F.Wright. "On A 'British Withdrawal' from Northern Ireland" and A.M.Gallagher. "Civil Liberties and the State", both in P.Stringer & G.Robinson (eds). Social Attitudes in Northern Ireland: The Second Report, 1991-1992, (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1992), 49-50, 83-84. A.M.Gallagher. "Policing Northern Ireland: Attitudinal Evidence", A.O'Day (ed). Terrorism's Laboratory: The Case of Northern Ireland, (Aldershot, England: Dartmouth, 1995), 54-55.

searches were carried out in both occupied and unoccupied houses.⁵⁶ By searching houses or entire areas, the security forces can achieve a number of aims. If they are acting on specific information they may find terrorists or terrorist weaponry. An example of this is provided by the case of an estate agent who allowed the security forces to bug empty houses where he allowed PIRA members to hold meetings and stash weapons. A number of arms caches were found in house searches based upon the information provided by the bugged conversations.⁵⁷

In other cases the aim of house-searches is to find as much material as possible by sealing off an area and carrying out a blanket search of the buildings and people within. This can be effective in finding material, and the need to guard against such searches means that the terrorists have to take time-consuming precautions. During the terrorist campaign by the Irgun and 'Stern gang' groups in Palestine in the late 1940s, such searches were called 'cordon and search' operations. Wilson describes 'Operation Shark', an attempt by four British Army brigades to carry out a cordon and search operation in Tel Aviv between July 30th and August 2nd 1946.⁵⁸ According to Wilson the Army checked 100,000 people, detaining 787 for further questioning, and found 176 rifles, four machine-guns, twenty-three mortars, 127,000 rounds of ammunition, and a large quantity of explosives.⁵⁹

However, such operations tend to involve a large number of soldiers, providing the terrorists with targets. Furthermore the upset and damage caused by searches to people whose homes and lives have been disrupted can also cause a great deal of animosity to the security forces.⁶⁰ This point is more relevant when one remembers that in Northern Ireland the bulk of house searches have been concentrated in the

56) P. Willan. Puppet Masters, 224. W.D. Flackes & S. Elliott. Northern Ireland: A Political Directory 1968-93, 472.

57) M. Dillon. The Dirty War, 309-325.

58) R.D. Wilson. Cordon and Search, 66-74.

59) R.D. Wilson. Cordon and Search, 71. Menachim Begin, the Irgun leader and later Israeli Prime Minister, mentions having to hide in a secret compartment in his house during this operation; M. Begin. The Revolt, 227-229.

60) P. Devlin. Straight Left: An Autobiography, (Belfast: Blackstaff, 1993), 147, 149. D. McKittrick. Despatches from Belfast, 196-202.

relatively small geographical areas where republican terrorist groups have been most active, and the impact on these communities is therefore all the greater.⁶¹

An extreme example of the animosity which overt military activities can arouse is provided by the widespread search of the Falls area in west Belfast by the British Army between July 3rd and July 5th 1970.⁶² During the searches, the Army is reported to have found approximately fifty pistols, thirty-five rifles, fourteen shotguns, six automatic weapons, one hundred home-made bombs, a grenade, 250 pounds of explosives, 21,000 rounds of ammunition, and eight two-way radio sets.⁶³ However, the searches were extremely destructive of property, riots occurred in the course of the operation, and five civilians were killed during gun-battles between the Army and gunmen from the Official IRA. The troops used large amounts of tear-gas to contain public disorder, causing a great deal of physical distress to people in the Falls area and generating widespread animosity towards the Army.⁶⁴ Hammill has described the operation as a military success and a political disaster, and a British Army officer who later commanded a battalion in Northern Ireland has noted: "The events of 3-5 July changed a sullen Catholic community into a downright hostile one".⁶⁵

As a measure of the effectiveness of a large overt military presence in repressing terrorist activities, Table 8.1 and Figure 8.1 show the relationship between the levels of security force activity in Northern Ireland in terms of house-searches, and the number of terrorist incidents which

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- 61) K.Boyle, T.Hadden, & P.Hillyard. Ten Years on in Northern Ireland: The Legal Control of Political Violence, (London: Cobden Trust, 1980), 26-27. P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 167, 205.
- 62) B.Markworthy. "The Falls Road Curfew: Army tactics and Catholic attitudes, 1970", A.Brown (ed). War in Peace, volume six, (London: Orbis, 1985), 1382.
- 63) The statistics concerning the number of weapons found varies somewhat between accounts. See P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 159-161. K.J.Kelley. The Longest War, 147. J.Bowyer Bell. The Secret Army, 377. D.Hamill. Pig in the Middle, 37. M.Dewar. The British Army in Northern Ireland, 47.
- 64) P.Devlin. Straight Left, 128-131. D.Hamill. Pig in the Middle, 37-39.
- 65) D.Hamill. Pig in the Middle, 39. M.Dewar. The British Army in Northern Ireland, 47.

occurred between 1970 and 1989. One needs to take care in trying to draw emphatic conclusions from statistics. As the experience of the security forces has increased over time it is possible that the number of houses which are searched has decreased as the security forces are better able to target their searches, although a number of blanket searches still seem to occur, possibly to protect sources of information which would be compromised by actions which revealed too clearly the type of information possessed by the


TABLE 8.1
LEVELS OF TERRORIST AND SECURITY FORCE
ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND: 1970-1989

	Security force personnel ^a	House Searches	Shootings & explosions
1970	14489	3107	366
1971	17146	17262	2778
1972	29411	36617	12010
1973	32365	74556	5996
1974	32096	74914	3891
1975	31925	30002	2202
1976	32129	34919	2774
1977	32267	20724	1447
1978	32724	15462	1210
1979	31903	6452	1150
1980	32404	4106	922
1981	30954	4104	1540
1982	30728	4045	766
1983	29147	1497	690
1984	28533	1282	527
1985	28259	812	385
1986	29103	1818	564
1987	28828	2474	910
1988	28878	4136	790
1989	28841	3027	790

a. British Army, UDR, and RUC. Since the late 1970s the police have carried out many military-style operations such as patrolling and the setting up of check-points. Sources: S.Bruce. The Red Hand, 297. Irish Information Partnership. Agenda: Information Service on Northern Ireland and Anglo-Irish Relations, sixth edition, (London: Irish Information Partnership, 1990), 316. W.D.Flackes & S.Elliott. Northern Ireland: A Political Directory 1968-93, 471, 472.⁶⁶

66) There are some slight differences concerning the number of house searches between Flackes and Elliot, and G.Hogan & C.Walker. Political Violence and the Law in Ireland, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989), 62. For this table the figures in Flackes and Elliot have been used.

FIGURE 8.1: House searches & terrorist incidents in N.Ireland: 1970-88



authorities.⁶⁷ However, there does appear to be a correlation between the number of shootings and bombings and the level of security force activity as measured by the number of house-searches. This seems to show that a rise in terrorist activity - measured as bombing and shooting incidents - tends to be followed by an increase in house-searches and a subsequent drop in the number of terrorist activities. Indeed this would partially explain the deep trouble which the PIRA found itself in by the mid 1970s. It also partially explains why the PIRA felt obliged to switch from a strategy involving a high-level of violence, to a less intense 'long war' strategy, allowing them to conserve their resources, and avoid the attritional effects of the previous strategy.⁶⁸

The main function of the security forces in their public order role lies primarily in disrupting operations and in discouraging terrorists from carrying out operations.⁶⁹ By maintaining a visible and pervasive presence through the setting of checkpoints and frequent patrols, the army makes it extremely difficult if not impossible to concentrate in large numbers for attacks. In addition, by maintaining a permanent presence the troops are able to prevent widespread open intimidation of the populace by guerrillas or terrorists.⁷⁰

However, intensive security force operations can provoke widespread dislike of the security forces and the authorities, and this can translate into support for at least some of the activities of the terrorists. An example of unpopular measures used by the security forces has been the activities of the Israeli Army in the areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip occupied by Israeli forces. The Israelis have a long-standing policy of destroying the houses of the families or helpers of alleged Palestinian terrorists.⁷¹ According to O'Brien, between 1967 and 1977 1,224 houses were

67) D.McKittrick. Despatches from Belfast, 198.

68) M.Dillon. Killer in Clowntown, 59. M.Dillon. The Dirty War, 58. P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 331-332. T.P.Coogan, The IRA, 601, 604.

69) M.Urban. Big Boys' Rules, 11, 238.

70) J.J.McCuen. The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy of Counter-insurgency, (London: Faber & Faber, 1966), 121.

71) S.M.Katz. Guards Without Frontiers, 96, 136. P.Wilkinson. Terrorism and the Liberal State, 158.

destroyed or sealed-up by the Israeli authorities. The Arab-British Centre states that a further 135 houses were sealed or demolished between May 1985 and July 1st 1987, whilst O'Brien states that between 1987 and 1989 this happened to a further 224 houses.⁷² During the Palestinian unrest known as the intifada, the Israelis blew-up the homes of the families of suspected terrorists, or houses from which attacks have allegedly been launched.⁷³ Merari, Prat, and Tal remark that in early 1988 security measures such as house-searches were carried out in an "intentionally rude" manner as a means of cowing the Palestinian population. The Israeli Army also destroyed the houses of people who had been throwing stones or petrol bombs.⁷⁴ Such methods are, to say the least, unlikely to win hearts and minds.

The terrorists may try to prevent the security forces from gaining a degree of dominance by attacking them. In Northern Ireland, the Provisional IRA has aimed at reducing the presence of the police in particular, and the security forces in general, in areas bordering the Republic of Ireland. By November 1992 an estimated 330 attacks on RUC stations throughout the Province had meant that any stations being built had to be heavily fortified.⁷⁵ By damaging RUC stations, attacking fixed vehicle checkpoints, and then assassinating contractors or their employees who carried out repair work on them, the PIRA hoped to force the police and the other security forces back from the border.⁷⁶ Due to the withdrawal of contractors from doing work for the security forces, repair work was done by military engineers, thus

72) W.V.O'Brien. Law and Morality in Israel's War with the PLO, (New York: Doubleday, 1991), 243. No author named. Punishing the Innocent: House Demolition and Sealing in the West Bank, (London: Council for the Advancement of Arab-British Understanding, 1987), 19.

73) W.V.O'Brien. Law and Morality in Israel's War with the PLO, (New York: Doubleday, 1991), 243.

74) A.Merari, T.Prat & D.Tal. "The Palestinian Intifada: An Analysis of a Popular Uprising after Seven Months", Terrorism and Political Violence, 1, no. 2, (April 1989), 183.

75) "State-of-the-art building for a state of siege", The Times, Saturday Review, November 21st 1992.

76) "Ulster checkpoints to be closed over 'human bomb' raids", The Independent, March 20th 1991.

increasing the number of military targets for the PIRA.⁷⁷ In interviews and articles the PIRA and their supporters have emphasised the isolation of Army and police barracks and the lengths to which the Crown forces have to go to keep such bases functioning.⁷⁸

To a degree they appeared to have achieved this aim by the early 1990s. In a report in November 1991, security force sources admitted that in some rural areas, PIRA groups were able to move around in large numbers, and that, on occasion, Army patrols had been outnumbered by the PIRA.⁷⁹ In another article, an RUC officer is reported to have said:

At the moment the RUC's role along the border could be described as passive. We don't go out of the station - well out of say 30 days we might go about five days, 10 days maximum, and that can only be done with an army support team.⁸⁰

When the RUC did venture out, their patrols consisted of eight men, with an escort of up to twelve soldiers. In such circumstances it is difficult to enforce the law or maintain public order effectively.

Armed response.

In warfare the aim is ultimately to win by concentrating superior forces against the enemy at a time and place of one's choosing.⁸¹ Therefore, as well as carrying out measures designed to hinder terrorist operations, security forces often actively attempt to intercept terrorists on

77) "The Provo's easiest coup", The Times, August 8th 1986. "The gunman's shadow falls across Ulster business", Financial Times, August 11th 1986. "Army deploys 1,000 extra men in Ulster repair work", The Daily Telegraph, September 7th 1991. P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 421.

78) "War News: Guerrilla War bites deep in 1991", AP/RN, January 2nd 1992. "IRA destroys main British border post", AP/RN, January 2nd 1992. "Growing crisis for British army", AP/RN, January 30th 1992. "British under pressure on check points", AP/RN, June 11th 1992. "The background to the Teebane ambush", AP/RN, January 23rd 1992.

79) "Internment 'only way to beat IRA'", The Independent, November 17th 1991.

80) "Border blues", Fortnight, April 1992, 25.

81) H.Strachan. European Armies and the Conduct of War, (London: Unwin Hyman, 1983), 2, 96.

terms advantageous to the security forces.⁸² Much of this involves covert methods including information-gathering, surveillance, and the setting of ambushes.

This is more difficult when countering a terrorist campaign than when fighting conventional forces, or indeed a guerrilla army. In urban terrorist campaigns, the terrorist conceals himself in the anonymity of the town or city. The authorities in liberal democracies are constrained by the law which, in the absence of legislation allowing imprisonment without trial, means that a terrorist cannot be arrested until the authorities have sufficient evidence to imprison him. The measures which were deemed tolerable for conflicts in former colonies - such as food rationing, strict controls on movement, and a rather more casual attitude towards the death of suspects - will generally not be tolerated for conflicts at home.⁸³ By way of contrast to colonial conflicts one can note the uproar which occurred in Germany after a known RAF terrorist was killed in questionable circumstances in July 1993, or the continuing questions in Spain as to whether the Government authorised GAL death squads to kill Basque activists in France in the 1980s.⁸⁴

Thus, it is generally necessary for the counter-terrorist to amass sufficient intelligence so as to be able to apprehend the terrorist or thwart his actions before they occur. In Northern Ireland attempts have been made to anticipate terrorist operations and to ambush the terrorists when they are vulnerable. To make such operations legally and morally palatable such operations have generally taken place when the terrorists are clearly armed.⁸⁵ Such ambushes often occur at PIRA arms caches.⁸⁶ In order to carry out operations

82) R. Trinquier. Modern Warfare, 26. F. Kitson. Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping, (London: Faber & Faber, 1971), 95.

83) N. Barber. The War of the Running Dogs: The Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960, (London: 1971; New York: Bantam, 1987), 250. Unattributable information.

84) "Shooting mystery tarnishes German anti-terrorist squad", The Independent, July 6th 1993. "Elite squad faces the axe", The European, July 8th-11th 1993. "Bonn 'errors' in shoot-out", The Independent, August 19th 1993. "Madrid sues over 'dirty war' claims", The Independent, January 11th 1995. P. Taylor. States of Terror, 98-104.

85) M. Urban. Big Boys' Rules, 164.

86) M. Dillon. The Dirty War, 370-372.

PIRA members - either couriers or the gunmen themselves - have to go to these caches to pick up their weapons. If the security forces find out where these weapons are, they can deploy covert teams near the caches. The PIRA members can then be apprehended or killed at minimal risk when they go to collect the weapons. Urban gives the example of an ambush carried out in December 1983 where an SAS ambush killed two members of the Provisional IRA who had just retrieved weapons from a cache, and in October 1990 an SAS team killed two PIRA members at an arms cache in County Armagh.⁸⁷

In other cases the British Army has ambushed PIRA members about to carry out an operation, or on their way back from one. Brigadier Peter Morton describes how in 1976 he planned to lay ambushes at the spot where the PIRA had planted a bomb. When the PIRA volunteer arrived at the observation point from which he would detonate the bomb, the troops would ambush him.⁸⁸ Although in this case the ambush did not take place, in April 1986 an identical ambush resulted in the death of Seamus MacElwaine, the commander of the PIRA in south Fermanagh, and the capture of another PIRA member.⁸⁹ The worst PIRA loss suffered in a single action occurred at Loughall, county Armagh, where eight or more terrorists were ambushed as they attempted to destroy a police station using a bomb in the shovel of a mechanical digger. The security forces were expecting the attack and the SAS were waiting in ambush, killing eight terrorists, but

87) "IRA man killed by Army wanted for corporal's murder", The Independent, October 10th 1990. M.Urban. "Who dares, need not fear inquests", The Spectator, May 23rd 1992. M.Urban. Big Boys' Rules, 63, 118, 173-177. J.Adams, R.Morgan, & A.Bambridge. Ambush, 97-100. "IRA man killed by Army wanted for corporal's murder", The Independent, October 10th 1990. "Man shot by army 'had record of violence'", The Times, October 10th 1990. "Web of terror that spread across Europe", The Independent, April 3rd 1991.

88) P.Morton. Emergency Tour: 3 PARA in South Armagh, (Wellingborough, Northamptonshire: William Kimber, 1989), 126-127. T.Geraghty. Who Dares Wins: The Story of the Special Air Service, 1950-1980, (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1980), 152-153.

89) M.Urban. Big Boys' Rules, 218-219.

also killing an uninvolved man who was driving through the area.⁹⁰

Overall, between April 1976 and November 1987 the SAS killed twenty-five members of the Provisional IRA compared to nine who were killed by uniformed troops, and five who were killed by the RUC.⁹¹ In terms of military results, ambushing terrorists is an effective method, but as Urban points out it can create martyrs for the terrorist cause.⁹² When such ambushes go wrong, an example being the mistaken shooting of a civilian who stumbled across an arms cache in 1978, the political consequences for the authorities are damaging, not to mention the consequences for the victims and their families.⁹³ Thus it is possible for a militarily successful security force operation to have adverse political consequences. However, it is crucial for terrorists to remember that they may be under observation, and take the necessary precautions. To fail in this may be fatal.

The most conspicuous example of the use of armed response units against terrorists has been the use of hostage rescue units (HRUs). These units' responsibility is to release captives who are being held by armed captors, and includes situations which are not terrorist-related. Incidents such as GSG9's (Grenzschutzgruppe 9 - German Border Police Group 9) rescue of passengers on a hijacked Lufthansa aeroplane at Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1977, and the SAS's rescue of hostages being held in the Iranian Embassy in London in 1980 have shown the utility of setting up such units.⁹⁴ Police units such as the Washington Emergency Response Team (ERT) also frequently include negotiators who

90) M.Urban. Big Boys' Rules, 227-237. J.Adams, R.Morgan, & A.Bambridge. Ambush, 107-118. B.O'Brien. The Long War, 141-142.

91) M.Urban. Big Boy's Rules, 248-251, 254.

92) M.Urban. Big Boy's Rules, 82-83. Private information. As an example of the coverage of terrorists' deaths by a sympathetic publication see, "Freedom's soldiers laid to rest in historic Tyrone", AP/RN, June 13th 1991. "Obituaries: Kevin Barry O'Donnell", AP/RN, February 20th 1992.

93) D.Hamill. Pig in the Middle, 229-231. T.Geraghty. Who Dares Wins, 155-160. C.Ryder. The RUC, 216.

94) P.Koch & K.Hermann. Assault at Mogadishu, trans. J.Man, (Hamburg: Stern, 1977; London: Corgi, 1977). Sunday Times Insight Team. Siege: Prince's Gate, London, April 30-May 5 1980, (Feltham, England: Hamlyn, 1980).

will attempt to persuade the hostage-takers to surrender peacefully if possible.⁹⁵ The ability to negotiate successfully is dependent upon the location of the siege. If it is on territory controlled by authorities which control the HRU, or which are friendly to them this is much easier.

If, however, the captives are being held in a place where the local powers are hostile to the rescuers, then the opportunities for such negotiation are limited because the authorities do not control the cordon, if there is one, around the area concerned. Thus during the 1976 hijacking of an Air France flight from Tel Aviv to Paris the captives were held on the aircraft at Entebbe Airport, near Kampala in Uganda, where the government was hostile to the state of Israel. Thus Israeli negotiations with the kidnappers or the Ugandan government were conducted in the knowledge that the Israelis did not command the means of entry and exit to or from the aircraft, and did not have the possibility of setting up a long-term siege of the aircraft to starve out the captors.⁹⁶

The relevance of hostage rescue units to terrorist targeting strategy is that the successful deployment of HRUs has made holding hostages in a siege far more dangerous for the terrorists. This is a factor which terrorists need to take into consideration when assessing the feasibility of an operation, and the type of hostages to be seized.

When attempts to rescue hostages are unsuccessful the consequences can be grim. Even if the HRU succeeds in eliminating the hostage-takers, the hostages themselves may be killed. The most notable early example of this was the death of all of the Israeli athletes taken hostage in Munich during the 1972 Olympics.⁹⁷ More recently, in November 1985 an attempt by an Egyptian unit to storm a hijacked EgyptAir

95) J. Teenbrook. "ERT Negotiators", RAIDS, UK edition, March 1993.

96) W. Stevenson. 90 Minutes at Entebbe, (New York: Bantam, 1976). M. Hastings. Yoni: Hero of Entebbe, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979), 215-231.

97) G. Rosie. The Directory of International Terrorism, 206-208. H. Cobban. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation, 54. P. Seale. Abu Nidal, 83-85.

aeroplane at Luqa Airport in Malta resulted in the death of fifty-seven hostages.⁹⁸

The authorities involved may also find their prestige seriously damaged by the failure of a hostage-rescue operation. This occurred in 1980 when the American Delta Force failed to rescue US diplomats being held by students in Tehran with the connivance of the Iranian authorities. Eight members of the unit died when a helicopter collided with a transport aeroplane. Although in this case the hostage-takers were not strictly non-state terrorists, the example is relevant because the failure of the mission directly harmed President Carter's re-election campaign in 1980.⁹⁹

TABLE 8.2
INTERNATIONAL HOSTAGE/SIEGE TERRORIST INCIDENT: 1976-1985

	Barricade/hostage	Hijack
1976	6	6
1977	11	9
1978	19	6
1979	16	29
1980	31	36
1981	32	32
1982	18	30
1983	35	6
1984	6	10
1985	2	7

Source: US Department of State.¹⁰⁰

- 98) J.Adams. Secret Armies, 89-95. G.Rosie. The Directory of International Terrorism, 106-107.
- 99) See C.A.Beckwith & D.Knox. Delta Force, (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1984; Fontana, 1985). P.B.Ryan. The Iranian Rescue Mission: Why It Failed, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1985). S.E.Ambrose. Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938, seventh edition, (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1993), 300-302. H.Smith. The Power Game: How Washington Works, (London: Fontana, 1989), 711.
- 100) Robert A.Friedlander (ed). Terrorism: Documents of International and Local Control. Volume IV: A World on Fire, (London: Oceana Publications Inc, 1984. U.S. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1983 (Washington DC: Office for Combatting Terrorism, U.S. Department of State, September 1984). U.S.Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1984 (Washington DC: Office of the Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-Terrorism, U.S Department of State, November 1985). U.S.Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1985, (Washington DC: Office of the Ambassador at Large for Counter-Terrorism, U.S Department of State, October 1986).

It is difficult to ascertain whether the increased deployment of HRUs since the late 1970s has resulted in terrorists being less likely to attempt such operations. US State Department statistics concerning international terrorism - that is terrorism which involves the citizens or territory of more than one state - indicate that this might have occurred. The figures for barricade-hostage incidents and hijackings for the period 1976 to 1985, are shown in Table 8.2.

The use of HRUs seems to have altered the way in which terrorist groups go about executing hijackings or other forms of hostage-taking. Terrorists may try to hold their captives in an area which is not controlled by the authorities. This is only really possible if the hostages were captured outside the jurisdiction of a state which might try to rescue them, as with the western hostages in the Lebanon, or in the case of the hijacking of an aeroplane or a ship.

If possible the kidnappers might also disperse the hostages around a number of geographically separate locations. This lessens the ability of potential rescuers being able to locate the hostages. Even if they do, they are less likely to have the confidence and resources to plan and carry out a number of simultaneous operations.¹⁰¹

The kidnappers may also move the hostages frequently so as to make it difficult for a rescue mission to be mounted. Although the western hostages in the Lebanon were often grouped in the same building they were moved around Beirut and other parts of the Lebanon.¹⁰² Likewise, when TWA Flight 847 was hijacked in June 1985 soon after leaving Athens, the aeroplane was constantly flown between the airports at Algiers and Beirut. When in Beirut some hostages were also taken from the aircraft and distributed around the city in order to make a successful rescue more difficult.¹⁰³ By making hostage rescue operations as difficult as possible, and by making it clear that the hostages will die if such an attempt is made, the terrorists can try to ensure that even

101) P.B.Ryan. The Iranian Rescue Mission, 100. J.Adams. Secret Armies, 130.

102) C.Coughlin. Hostage, 110, 349, 352, 358.

103) J.Adams. Secret Armies, 274. J.T.Choi. Acts of violence against civil aviation, 206-243, 210. R.Fisk. Pity the Nation, 607.

if they do not achieve their original demands, those responsible for ordering a hostage rescue mission will suffer adverse political consequences.

International police and legal cooperation.

An additional problem for terrorists is the trend towards international cooperation over matters such as intelligence sharing or the extradition of terrorist suspects. This can be due to bilateral agreements between states, treaty obligations between states belonging to a common international organisation, or the conditions laid down by international law. The effect of this can be to make life more difficult for members of the terrorist group. Leaving the territory of the state in which they have committed their offences may no longer mean that terrorists can relax the precautions which they take to avoid detection.

An example of an agreement affecting the ability of a terrorist group to operate, is that between Spain and France. Until the mid 1980s the French authorities did very little to prevent the Basque separatist group ETA from using France, and in particular the parts of the Basque Country which are located in south-west France, as a haven from which to plan operations and to which their operatives could retreat after an operation. No extraditions to Spain took place.

This situation changed, largely because a group of mercenaries calling themselves the Anti-terrorist Liberation Group (Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberacion - GAL), and possibly sponsored by elements of the Spanish state, assassinated up to twenty-seven suspected Basque separatists in France between 1983 and 1987. Nine of the dead are reported to have had no provable links with ETA.¹⁰⁴

Following these attacks the French authorities clamped down upon ETA activities in France, extraditing five suspects to Spain and deporting a further twenty-three from France in 1984 alone.¹⁰⁵ Basque exiles from Spain were forbidden to

104) "'Dirty war' scandal worsens", The Independent, December 21st 1994. "Madrid sues over 'dirty war' claims", The Independent, January 11th 1995. "Spain drops judge from GAL death squads inquiry", The Guardian, January 25th 1995. "The noose is tightened around Felipe's neck", The Guardian, February 23rd 1995. P.Taylor. States of Terror, 97-104.

105) P.Taylor. States of Terror, 104.

live in the departments adjoining the border with the Spanish part of the Basque Country, and from 1987 onwards France extradited ETA suspects to Spain without requiring the production of an extradition warrant.¹⁰⁶ A series of top ETA members were arrested in France throughout the mid and late 1980s and into the 1990s, including the arrest of what were believed to be the three most senior ETA leaders in the south of the country in March 1992.¹⁰⁷

This affected ETA's targeting. A state which extradites terrorist suspects may find itself coming under attack - either as a form of revenge or to discourage such action in future. ETA carried out attacks upon French business interests and material targets in the Basque Country, including Renault car dealerships, a furniture store, and French-registered vehicles. Some of these attacks coincided with extraditions, whilst an attack on a French-registered truck occurred on the evening of an ETA members' funeral.¹⁰⁸ According to Llera, Mata, and Irwin, ETA made over 500 attacks on French material targets over an unspecified five year period.¹⁰⁹ So far ETA's displeasure at the actions of the French Government has not translated itself into attacks against human targets, perhaps out of fear of even more severe actions on the part of the French authorities.

The criminal justice system and security forces as targets.

In addition to their functions, the criminal justice system and the security forces are symbols of the state. By selecting police officers as targets, terrorists - in

106) S.Segaller. Invisible Armies, 96. F.Jiménez. "Spain: The Terrorist Challenge and the Government's Response", 118.

107) "Visit by Chirac crowns success of co-operation on Eta raiders", The Times, November 7th 1986. "Net closes in on ETA unit of 'quiet men'", The Guardian, April 16th 1990. "Eta reels after arrest of top leader", The Independent, September 25th 1990. "Spanish alert after Eta chiefs captured", Financial Times, March 31st 1992. "Spain rejoices but awaits ETA reprisal", The Guardian, March 31st 1992. "Spain hails arrest of ETA chief", The Independent, February 22nd 1993. P.Taylor. States of Terror, 97-104.

108) E.F.Mickolus, T.Sandler, J.M.Murdock. International Terrorism in the 1980s: 1984-1987, 551, 561, 629, 630, 639.

109) F.Llera, J.M.Mata & C.L.Irwin. "ETA: From Secret Army to Social Movement", 131.

particular those with a revolutionary ideology - may seek to encourage the masses to revolt by showing that the state is vulnerable and can be attacked.¹¹⁰ If the attacks force the security forces to lower their profile or withdraw from an area this has both functional and symbolic importance because it shows that the writ of the state no longer runs in that area. This allows the terrorists more freedom of action to operate against the authorities and to extend their influence over the population.

At the most extreme extent, if the state can be sufficiently weakened it may collapse, or the conflict may be 'militarised' by the military taking over the government, as occurred in Uruguay in 1972 and Argentina in 1976. However, even where the tactical objectives of the terrorists are more modest there are sound reasons for trying to minimise the influence of the law enforcement agencies in an area.

As well as eliminating a threat to the terrorist group, for insurgent terrorists the targeting of police officers and the system of law enforcement can also be attributed to the desire of the terrorists to weaken the state. In August 1983 a spokesman for the INLA said:

The INLA believes that we have the right to destroy that [judicial] system. Every person involved in that system, be they police, judges or informers will be held accountable for their actions.¹¹¹

Police officers have been targets in some insurgent terrorist campaigns, though not in all. As Table 8.3 shows, in the major European terrorist campaigns of recent years the proportion of police victims has varied relative to the overall total. Not all groups have made a point of specifically targeting the police. In The Urban Guerrilla Concept written in 1971, Ulrike Meinhof suggested that police officers who did not act against the RAF would not be attacked.

The cop who finds himself in the contradictory position of being a 'little man' and a capitalist lackey, a low wage-earner and a police officer of monopoly capitalism,

110) R. Debray. Revolution in the Revolution? Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America, (trans. B. Ortiz), (France: 1967; Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1968), 51.

111) "Informer's wife freed as INLA rethinks tactics", The Guardian, August 27th 1983.

is not under an absolute compulsion to act. We shoot when we are shot at. We spare the cop who spares us.¹¹²

Whilst they attacked senior security officials the RAF did not generally select ordinary police officers as targets unless they were acting as bodyguards for the primary target of an attack.

TABLE 8.3
NUMBER OF POLICE OFFICERS KILLED BY TERRORIST GROUPS

	Police killed	Total Victims	Police as %
Communist terrorists in Italy (1970-82) ^a	57	131	43.5%
Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland (1970-93) ^b	265	1653	16.0%
INLA in Northern Ireland (1970-93) ^b	13	122	10.7%
ETA (1968-82) ^c			
Police	62	349	17.8%
Civil Guard	103	349	29.5%
TOTAL	165	349	47.3%
Red Army Faction in Germany (1968-92) ^d	5	25	25.0%

Sources: D.Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 38. M.Sutton. Bear in mind these dead, 196. (The total number of PIRA killings excludes 102 PIRA members killed by their own bombs.) Guardia Civil report cited in R.P.Clark. "Patterns of Eta Violence: 1968-1980", 142n7. D.Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group (1972-1991)". Unpublished chronology supplied by B.A.Scharlau.

Some terrorist groups have targeted ordinary police officers in an attempt to lower police morale. According to a member of the Irish National Liberation Army:

It demoralizes the police stiffing [killing] them at home. Everybody and particularly a cop wants to come home off the job and relax, and the doorstep murder fucks up every cop that's looking for that relaxation. Not only the cop, you take the wife; the wife is going to demand that he gets out when one of his mates gets whacked. That's the whole purpose of that type of operation. You see, they can cope with the violence on the street in the Republican areas. They expect it there, it's part of the job, but when you hit the house or the car as he's coming home from work they hate that. They can't cope with it in the home.¹¹³

112) S.Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group, 143.

113) A.Feldman. Formations of Violence, 76.

According to L'Espresso, the Red Brigades targeted ordinary police officers so as to affect police morale.¹¹⁴ BR justified these attacks on the grounds that whilst the capitalist state could replace its leading members, it could not operate without its lesser functionaries.¹¹⁵ However communiques from BR also sought to portray some attacks as revenge for specific actions by the state. Thus, in November 1979 two carabinieri were shot dead whilst drinking coffee in a cafe in Genoa, supposedly in revenge for the suicide of an imprisoned Genoese BR member the previous month.¹¹⁶ Later the same month, the Red Brigades shot dead another police officer, whom they subsequently described as an 'executioner in disguise'.¹¹⁷

Terrorist operations against the criminal justice system are not merely confined to attacks on the police. Terrorist operations which are most directly concerned with the penal system are those which are intended to allow imprisoned terrorists to escape. In October 1867 an attempt to break open the prison van containing Fenian prisoners in Manchester resulted in the death of one of the police escorts, whilst a bomb placed against the wall of Clerkenwell prison in London that December killed twelve people. Neither attempt was successful in releasing any prisoners and some of the would-be rescuers were hanged for murder.¹¹⁸ More recently, the first particularly violent act of the Red Army Faction - though it did not use that name at the time - occurred in May 1970 when Ulrike Meinhof and three comrades rescued Andreas Baader at gunpoint whilst he was in a local library accompanied by a police escort.¹¹⁹

114) L'Espresso, February 24th 1980.

115) L'Espresso, October 31st 1982.

116) Associated Press, November 21st 1979. "Gunmen murder Italian police", Financial Times, November 22nd 1979. C.Schaerf et al. Venti Anni di Violenza in Italia, 850.

117) "Policeman shot dead as terrorists go on trial", Financial Times, November 27th 1979. "Brigades victim", The Guardian, November 28th 1979. C.Schaerf et al. Venti Anni di Violenza in Italia, 851.

118) C.Townshend. Political Violence in Ireland, 36-37. W.Laqueur. The Age of Terrorism, 104, 113. D.G.Boyce. "'A Gallous Story and a Dirty deed': Political Martyrdom in Ireland since 1867", Y.Alexander & A.O'Day (eds). Ireland's Terrorist Dilemma, 14.

119) S.Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group, 83-86. J.Becker. Hitler's Children, 124-129.

In attempting to gain the release of imprisoned comrades or affect their conditions of imprisonment a terrorist group will not necessarily restrict its attacks to members of the penal system. The German left-wing terrorist groups in the 1970s, sometimes in collaboration with the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine), centred many operations around attempts to release imprisoned comrades, but did not often attack prison staff.¹²⁰ Their operations included; the seizure of the West German Embassy in Stockholm in 1975 by members of the Socialist Patients' Collective (Sozialistisches Patienten Kollektiv - SPK) who had joined the RAF, the Revolutionary Cells' (Revolutionaere Zellen - RZ) involvement in the hijack which ended at Entebbe in 1976, and the 1977 RAF kidnapping of Schleyer.¹²¹ All centred on demands for the release of imprisoned German terrorists. In addition the 1977 PFLP hijackers of a Lufthansa jet demanded the release of German communist terrorists in addition to Palestinians held in Germany.¹²² With the exception of the Schleyer kidnapping all of these operations resulted in the death or capture of the terrorists involved and all of the operations failed to gain the release of the terrorists.

Another aspect is the role which prisons play in legitimising or delegitimising the terrorist group. By imprisoning terrorists in the same way that ordinary criminal offenders are imprisoned the authorities hope to delegitimise their activities, and by extension legitimise the moral authority of the government. Terrorists on the other hand have a vested interest in combating this view, and have used violence to reinforce their efforts to do this.

This was seen in Northern Ireland after 1976 when the British government abolished the 'special category' status for prisoners convicted of scheduled terrorist offences, and sought to bring them under the auspices of a version of the criminal justice system.¹²³ Between 1976 and 1981 the

120) B.A.Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 91-93.

121) S.Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group, 289-292. J.Becker. Hitler's Children, 315-322. B.A.Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 45. W.Stevenson. 90 Minutes at Entebbe, 16.

122) P.Koch & K.Hermann. Assault at Mogadishu, 79.

123) T.P.Coogan. On the Blanket, 48, 161.

Provisional IRA and the INLA launched a series of protests and hunger strikes in the prisons in Northern Ireland, and killed prison officers. Between April 1976 and the end of the hunger strike in August 1981 eighteen serving prison officers at various grades were killed by the PIRA or INLA together with a retired prison officer and his wife.¹²⁴

Terrorists have also attacked members of the penal system to highlight allegations concerning poor prison conditions, and force the people running the penal system to concede to prisoner's demands. In Italy both the Red Brigades and Front Line have killed or injured prison officers and other people associated with the penal system in an attempt to put pressure upon the authorities to change specific aspects of the penal system, or merely to continue the attack upon the state.¹²⁵ A notable example of this is the D'Urso kidnapping.

On December 12th 1980 the Red Brigades kidnapped Judge Giovanni D'Urso, amongst whose responsibilities was the allocation of terrorists to high-security prisons. Their demand was for the closure of the high-security prison on the island of Asinara, near Sardinia, for an end to the isolation of imprisoned terrorists, and for the publication and transmission of documents drawn up by BR prisoners.¹²⁶ On December 31st 1980 BR also assassinated Carabinieri General Enrico Galvaligi who was deputy director for security in the high-security prisons.¹²⁷ The Italian government closed the prison at Asinara, and some Italian newspapers and radio stations cooperated in publicising the prisoners' documents.¹²⁸ On January 15th 1981 D'Urso was released.

124) M.Sutton. Bear in mind these dead, 89-132. T.P.Coogan. On the Blanket, 153. L.Clarke. Broadening the Battlefield, 77, 92.

125) A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 145, 150-151, 210. V.S.Pisano. The Dynamics of Subversion and Violence in Contemporary Italy, 157-170. D.Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 38, 145. E.MacDonald. Shoot the Women First, 187.

126) V.S.Pisano. The Dynamics of Subversion and Violence in Contemporary Italy, 68. A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 184-185.

127) V.S.Pisano. The Dynamics of Subversion and Violence in Contemporary Italy, 68. A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 184.

128) A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 184-187.

A threefold motive can be seen for this particular operation. In the first place there was the symbolic importance of humiliating the Italian authorities, and in particular Judge D'Urso.¹²⁹ Secondly, the operation was prompted by a recognition of the need to consider the increasing proportion of Brigadists who were in prison rather than outside.¹³⁰ Lastly it reflected a particular interest of the Brigadist in charge of the operation, Giovanni Senzani, an academic criminologist specialising in research of the penal system. During D'Urso's thirty-three day captivity Senzani questioned him in detail about the operation of the prisons, and about people operating within the penal system.¹³¹

Finally, members of the legal system may be attacked as a means of delegitimising the state. Thus, in making the legal system inoperable by assassinating judges and lawyers, and by intimidating witnesses, the terrorists may hope to provoke the authorities into emergency measures which will reduce the legitimacy of the government in many peoples eyes. This has the added merit of disrupting the judicial procedure in specific cases.

The legal system has vulnerabilities which can provide terrorists with potential targets. During the trial of members of the French communist terrorist group Direct Action in December 1986, one of the accused asked the judge how long police protection for the jurors would last for. When the jurors were told that protection would only be provided for only fifteen days, and found out that the defence had demanded and been given their names and addresses a month before the trial, a number of them declared themselves medically unfit for jury service. The trial had to be postponed and, as a result, the French authorities brought in provisions to replace ordinary juries with a panel of seven judges for terrorist trials.¹³²

129) A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 187.

130) A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 183. D.Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 152.

131) A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 184. P.Willan. Puppet Masters, 326-327. V.S.Pisano. The Dynamics of Subversion and Violence in Contemporary Italy, 68.

132) "Paris tested over terror trial", The Independent, February 23rd 1987. "Leaders of Action Directe

Likewise, judges and lawyers can be directly intimidated. According to Pearce, when, in 1985, the Colombian Supreme Court of Justice was about to hear an application for the annulment of the extradition treaty with the USA, each justice received the following note.

We are writing to you to demand favourable positions for our cause. We do not accept resignations, we do not accept sabbaticals, we do not accept fictitious illnesses ... Any position taken against us we shall take as an acceptance of our declaration of war. From prison, we will order your execution and with blood and lead we will eliminate the dearest members of your family.¹³³

On November 6th 1985, the day when the Supreme Court was due to hear the case, the communist group M-19, probably with the backing of drug-traffickers, seized the Colombian Palace of Justice building in Bogota. In the ensuing siege eleven of the twenty-four Supreme Court justices died, including the four who made up the Court's constitutional arm.¹³⁴ In December 1986 the Supreme Court suspended the extradition treaty with the USA.¹³⁵

Attacks can also be intended to intimidate defending counsel. Loyalist groups in Northern Ireland have targeted lawyers whom they think are too sympathetic - or possibly too successful - when defending republican suspects or representing the interests of the families of republicans. According to Patrick McGrory, a Catholic solicitor who had defended PIRA members in court:

In the minds of certain people I've as a result identified myself with the IRA's point of view. I don't: I've never agreed with the use of violence. ... the point's been reached once more where if people are arrested and brought to trial for terrorist offences, the mere idea that somebody's prepared to defend them is absolute anathema. It's unfortunate but I am afraid it's unavoidable now that my practice has become identified with a political cause.¹³⁶

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- terrorist group seized", The Guardian, February 22nd 1987. P.Marnham. Crime and the Academie Francaise, 14.
- 133) J.Pearce. Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth, 194. Also see S.Strong. Whitewash, 144.
- 134) S.Strong. Whitewash, 145-148. R.A.Hudson. "Colombia's Palace of Justice Tragedy Revisited: A Critique of the Conspiracy Theory", Terrorism and Political Violence, 7, no. 2, (Summer 1995).
- 135) J.Pearce. Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth, 182, 194. S.Strong. Whitewash, 152-153.
- 136) T.Parker. May the Lord in His mercy be kind to Belfast, 237.

Thus, Patrick Finucane, a solicitor who often represented republicans or their families in court, was shot dead by the UFF in February 1989.¹³⁷

The desire to discredit the legal system by making it inoperable has also provided the motive for attacks upon judges and lawyers - including lawyers for the defence. In 1976 the Red Brigades issued threats, not just against judges and lawyers who acted against them, but against those who attempted to act in their defence at the collective trial of fifty-two alleged brigadists in Turin. In order to make it more difficult for the state to prosecute brigadists as criminals, and thus discredit the legal system, the defendants dismissed their defence lawyers. Under Italian law the state had to provide replacements, but the brigadists stated that they did not recognise the right of the court to try them, and would regard any replacement lawyers nominated by the court as enemies. Accordingly, on April 28th 1977, Red Brigadists shot dead Fulvio Croce, the President of the Turin lawyer's association, who had been given the responsibility of organising replacement lawyers for the defendants and was therefore seen as an enemy. The death of Croce also made it difficult, in the short-term at least, to find lawyers willing to defend the brigadists.¹³⁸ In West Germany in the 1970s defence lawyers were also threatened, and in some cases attacked by communist terrorist groups whose members they were defending in court, for much the same reason as the BR attacked defence lawyers.¹³⁹

137) "IRA defence solicitor killed", "Shooting marks broadening of targets", both in The Guardian, February 13th 1989. "Hogg told by Dublin to retract remarks on Ulster solicitors", The Independent, February 15th 1989.

138) D.Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 229-233. A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 98-99. "Death of Turin editor shot by terrorists", The Times, November 30th 1977.

139) "Uproar as terrorism trial opens in Berlin", The Times, April 12th 1978. "Scuffles and insults disrupt Berlin terrorist trial", The Times, April 13th 1978. "German terror trial lawyers attacked", The Times, June 1st 1978. "Berlin court to rule on 'terror' lawyer", The Guardian, June 8th 1978. "Terror trial lawyer cleared of aiding escape", The Guardian, June 10th 1978. "Kidnap trial lawyers threatened", The Times, June 15th 1978. "Lawyers trapped in bitter struggle", The Times, November 13th 1978. S.Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group,

The PIRA has threatened lawyers involved in prosecuting suspected Provisionals.¹⁴⁰ As the PIRA and their supporters have made clear, they wish to place the authorities in a position where they effectively 'declare war' on the PIRA, forcing them to treat the group as a moral equivalent. In 1988 Danny Morrison, then the publicity director for Sinn Fein, stated:

What is at issue is that the British Government pretends it is somehow morally superior to its opposition and that it is using the civil law.¹⁴¹

By preventing the normal legal procedures from operating, the PIRA could portray the situation between itself and the British Government as a war, and try to achieve a degree of moral parity with the Government. Indeed, where insurgent groups are concerned this desire for moral parity can be seen as one of the motives for attacking the criminal justice system and security forces as a whole.

Summary.

The security environment affects the targeting strategies of terrorist groups in a number of ways. In the first instance it acts as a restraint upon the activities of terrorists. The investigative and punitive functions of the criminal justice system force, combined with the intelligence, public order maintenance, and armed response activities of the security forces, compel terrorists to adopt a clandestine or semi-clandestine existence. This takes up time and makes it more difficult for a terrorist organisation to move personnel and equipment, to organise attacks and to communicate between different sections of the group if it is more than a single small group. The alternative - near-impunity for terrorists - has been seen where order has broken down and militias have arisen as in the Lebanon in the 1970s and 1980s and in Bosnia in the early 1990s, or where a terrorist faction has received the tacit support of elements of the security forces as occurred in Italy in the 1970s and

296-297, 303-307. J.Becker. Hitler's Children, 323-324. B.A.Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 66, 303. J.Wright. Terrorist Propaganda, 87-88.

140) "Nightmare for the judges on 24-hour vigil", The Guardian, January 6th 1988.

141) "Declare war, says IRA", The Guardian, March 9th 1988.

Colombia in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Thus an effective system of enforcing the law and public order creates a large obstacle for the terrorist, and is accordingly a target.

Terrorists of all ideologies can secure concrete benefits by targeting elements of the criminal justice system. By its very existence the policing component of the criminal justice system is at least a nuisance and at most a danger to most terrorist groups, although it is not much of a problem for people belonging to terrorist groups which have the tacit or even active support of the police or of other elements of the state system. These factors cause some terrorist groups to target those elements of the police and criminal justice system which pose a threat to them. Thus as well as being a symbolic target, those members of the police force, or other intelligence-gathering units, who pose a direct threat to the terrorist organisation, are also functional targets.

For revolutionary terrorist groups an attack upon the police, the legal system, or the penal system, is also a symbolic attack upon the state. By attacking various aspects of the criminal justice system, revolutionary terrorists can demonstrate their rejection of the legitimacy of the state and show the vulnerability of the state to violent revolutionary action. By demonstrating the relative impotence of the organs of state in preventing terrorist attacks the terrorists may hope to show that the state lacks both the ability and the popular support to counter the terrorist's cause. Such attacks may advertise the terrorist's cause and encourage others to join the terrorists. In addition the terrorists may hope that their attacks will provoke the authorities into repressive measures which will alienate the civil population and lead them to turn to the terrorists. Even terrorists who do not have revolutionary aims may attack those elements of the criminal justice system whom they wish to intimidate into obedience, or whom they suspect of complicity with supposedly subversive elements. For these reasons the criminal justice system and the security forces are frequently prime targets of terrorist groups.

Lastly, terrorists are liable to attack the penal system, directly or indirectly, to secure the release of

their colleagues from prison. Direct attacks target prison staff or people connected to the penal system. Indirect attacks take the nature of operations - such as taking hostages - aimed at releasing comrades by gaining leverage over the politicians and officials who are ultimately in charge of the penal system.

Overall, the security environment, and the institutions which maintain it, restricts a terrorist group's freedom of action and consequently modifies its behaviour from what it would ideally like to do. However, it also provides the terrorists with targets and motives for attacking them. The danger presented by the security forces - in particular those elements working directly against the terrorists - makes them an obvious functional target. In addition, because these institutions such as the law, the police, and the armed forces represent the authority of the state, they are an ideal symbolic target for terrorists hoping to attack that authority and provoke the security forces into committing reprisals as a part of a strategy intended to advertise the terrorist's cause and mobilise popular support. Thus the security environment provides the terrorists with motives, restricts some opportunities, and supplies others.

The influence of external factors

Introduction.

Terrorists' actions are meant to have an effect upon their surroundings and are worthless if they do not. In turn terrorists are affected by their surroundings. They are dependent, to a greater or lesser extent, upon the support of people who are not clearly members of their group, but who operate on its' fringes or merely give the group tacit support by withholding assistance from the group's opponents. There is also that part of external opinion which is indifferent or even hostile to the activities of the terrorists, which can frustrate the terrorist's desires. Apart from any other consideration, it is often people who have no fixed opinion, or who are antagonistic to the group, whom the terrorists see as the psychological target to be influenced.

Support for terrorist groups.

The relationship between a terrorist group and the rest of society can be complex. Whilst society can affect the terrorist groups actions, these actions in turn affect the attitude of sections of society towards the group. Fitzpatrick points out that during the Irish Rebellion of 1919-1921 there was no shortage of "strong-willed and bellicose men" to lead a fight against British rule, but in some areas there was a lack of demand for such leadership.¹ The existence of a favourable environment was necessary for IRA leaders to recruit supporters and ultimately members. As this factor affects the capabilities of the group, it must be considered.

Both Wright and Schmid divide the 'audience' for the actions of insurgent terrorist groups into a number of categories.² Both examine insurgent terrorism, and Wright examines those elements in society which are likely to support the terrorist group, or at least feel neutral. One

1) D.Fitzpatrick. "The Geography of Irish Nationalism: 1910-1921", Past and Present, 78, (February 1978), 118.

2) J.Wright. Terrorist Propaganda, 77. A.Schmid. "Terrorism and the Media: Freedom of Information vs Freedom from Intimidation", L.Howard (ed). Terrorism: Roots, Impact, Responses, (New York: Praeger, 1992), 105.

should also consider how the reaction of the various elements in society will affect non-insurgent terrorist groups - for example conservative vigilantes - and the effect of elements opposed to the terrorists.

The relationship between a terrorist group and society has been likened to a series of concentric rings, with the core of terrorist leaders at the centre. In November 1987, a spokesman for the Provisional IRA outlined the nature of their support.

Our support is in concentric rings. The centre is the republican movement; the next is the nationalist community in the north, followed by the south then solidarity groups, left groups and finally international sympathy.³

Similarly, Scharlau gives a diagrammatic representation of support for communist terrorist groups in West Germany which spreads outwards from the core of active terrorists in a series of concentric circles, through various levels of support, to the uninvolved areas of society.⁴ Pluchinsky puts forward a similar model in relation to the Red Army Faction using the analogy of a pyramid, with the hard core RAF commando level at the apex and the other various levels of support broadening out into greater numbers the further away they are from the core of active terrorists.⁵

Viewed from the standpoint of a terrorist group's objectives, society can be divided into categories. These categories are quite distinct, with some blurring at the edges between one and another. From the most favourable to the terrorists to the least favourable the categories are:

- *Members.* Those in the terrorist group who carry out violent operations or provide active support for them.
- *Supporters.* Those who support the political objectives and methods of the terrorist group. They may provide general logistical help such as food, money, or shelter if called upon, but generally do not have any role in operations.

3) "Bombing 'devastating' to IRA", The Independent, November 11th 1987.

4) B.A.Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 164-165.

5) D.Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group", 52.

- *Potential sympathisers.* Those who do not support the methods used by the terrorist group, but generally favour the same political objectives. They do not provide any form of tangible support for the terrorists, or necessarily have any sympathy for them. However, the terrorist leaders may see them as a constituency which can be turned against the terrorist's opponents or even as a group within which a degree of sympathy can be cultivated.
- *Uncommitted.* People who have no opinions concerning the terrorist groups' political objectives or methods.
- *Unsympathetic.* Those who have no opinions concerning the objectives of the terrorist group, but are opposed to their methods.
- *Opponents.* Those who are opposed to the aims and methods of the terrorist group.
- *Enemies.* Those who violently oppose the aims and methods of the terrorist group. Active enemies - such as hostile terrorist groups - may use similar or identical methods to the terrorist group which they are opposed to.

The size of these categories differs greatly from one terrorist group to another and the proportionate size of one category to another can also vary greatly. Thus one group may have a very small number of supporters with large sections of the population uncommitted, whilst another group may have sizeable support, but be opposed by a large proportion of the population. This is illustrated by contrasting the rather different patterns of support shown in Table 9.1 for the Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Red Army Faction.⁶

6) "A difficult war to win", The Financial Times, Northern Ireland Survey, November 26th 1991. "Legacy of 'Bloody Sunday'", The Independent on Sunday, January 5th 1992. M.Urban. Big Boys' Rules, 31-32. "The IRA", The Independent on Sunday, November 22nd 1992. P.Bishop & E.Mallie, The Provisional IRA, 391. T.P.Coogan. The IRA, 604. D.Pluchinsky. "An Organizational and Operational Analysis of Germany's Red Army Faction Terrorist Group", 50, 52. H.Horchem. "The Decline of the Red Army Faction", 66. B.A.Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 61-62, 65. J.Power. Against Oblivion: Amnesty International's fight for human rights, (Glasgow: Fontana, 1981), 130, 133. S.Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group, 231, 250-251. J.Becker. Hitler's Children, 305. H.Horchem. "The Decline of the Red Army Faction", 66.

TABLE 9.1.
CATEGORIES OF OPINION IN RELATION TO THE PROVISIONAL IRA AND
THE RED ARMY FACTION.

	Provisional IRA	Red Army Faction
<i>Members.</i>	About 250-650 active terrorists and auxiliaries.	15-25 active terrorists at the commando level. 20-50 'illegal militants' at the 'resistance' level. Imprisoned terrorists.
<i>Supporters.</i>	Some members of Sinn Fein. Part of the Catholic population in N.Ireland. A small number of people in the Republic. Some individuals outside. Foreign supporters such as the Libyan government.	Between 400 and 2000 people. Individuals at the 'resistance' level of the RAF. People in support groups such as Red Help (Rote Hilfe). Lawyers who carry messages in and out of the prisons. E.German intelligence agencies.
<i>Potential sympathisers.</i>	The majority of Catholics in N.Ireland. A high proportion of people in the Republic. Irish emigre groups, and some people on the political left outside Ireland.	Fringe groups in German politics. 'Alternative' groups like the Greens. Disadvantaged groups and revolutionary movements in the Third World.
<i>Uncommitted.</i>	The bulk of foreign public opinion.	The bulk of foreign public opinion.
<i>Unsympathetic.</i>	The British Government and political elite. Much of public opinion in Great Britain.	The bulk of W.German public opinion.
<i>Opponents.</i>	N.Ireland Protestants. The main unionist parties in N.Ireland.	The W.German government and the main political parties and institutions.
<i>Enemies.</i>	Loyalist terrorists.	

Calculating support for the Provisional IRA shows how determining the size and nature of support for the terrorists is difficult because supporters may lie outside the formal structure of the organisation. Although Sinn Fein forms the political wing of the republican movement - PIRA being the military wing, it is too simplistic to see support for PIRA as being calculable from the number of votes which Sinn Fein receives. A survey in May 1989 suggested that about one fifth of Sinn Fein voters were opposed to the use of violence for political ends, and one third believed that Sinn Fein should renounce the PIRA campaign.⁷ On the other hand, a poll undertaken in the Irish Republic in 1979 showed that 42% accepted the legitimacy of the PIRA's political motivation, and 21% supported their activities to some degree, 8% declaring moderate or strong support.⁸ This is a much higher level of support than the 2% to 5% which Sinn Fein has been able to mobilise in elections in the south.⁹ It is likely that some republicans vote for the mainstream parties as being more relevant to their everyday concerns in the Republic, whilst they support the Provisionals' activities in relation to Northern Ireland.¹⁰

As a generalisation, and measured by accepting some correlation between support for Sinn Fein and support for the PIRA, it would be accurate to say that PIRA gains most of its active support from Catholics in some rural areas and in the more deprived urban areas of Northern Ireland.¹¹ A smaller but useful level of support can be found in the Republic of Ireland, and some support can be found amongst Irish emigre groups - particularly in the USA, extreme left-wing grouplets in Great Britain and Europe, and, occasionally, foreign sponsors such as the Libyan government.¹²

7) C.Irvin & E.Moxon-Browne. "Not many floating voters here", Fortnight, May 1989.

8) P.O'Malley. The Uncivil Wars: Ireland Today, (Belfast: Blackstaff, 1983), 276, 301. T.P.Coogan. The IRA, 594.

9) "Labour fires first salvo on Irish privatisation", The Times, November 30th 1992.

10) P.O'Malley. The Uncivil Wars, 276, 301. K.J.Kelley. The Longest War, 304.

11) "Not many floating voters here", Fortnight, May 1989.

12) T.Downes-Le Guin & B.Hoffman. The Impact of Terrorism on Public Opinion, 1988 to 1989, (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1993), 16. J.Holland. The American Connection. "Deutsche Terroristen helfen IRA-

How terrorists may directly influence the public.

Most acts which terrorists carry out in pursuit of their objectives will influence the public indirectly by forming their views of the terrorists and their cause. However, terrorists can also affect the public directly by actions aimed at gaining the compliance or endorsement.

Intimidation is one way of doing this. It can take the form of killing, injuring, or threatening people who inform against the terrorists, who publicly defy terrorist edicts, or who merely criticise the terrorists. By such means some terrorists may hope to frighten people into compliance. As mentioned, in Peru Shining Path terrorists have attacked villages and religious communities opposing them, and development programmes and facilities which might act as an alternative focus of loyalty. These attacks have included large-scale massacres as a demonstration of the consequences of disobedience.¹³

In their relations with the public, terrorists use combinations of intimidation and exhortation. Whilst some of their violent actions may be aimed at scaring people into aiding them - or at least not opposing them - others can

Kommando", Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March 13th 1980. "Meinhof gang 'help IRA'", The Guardian, March 15th 1980. "Student anarchist who became 'fixer' for IRA", The Independent, June 9th 1990. "Leftwing politics led to terror campaign", The Guardian, May 14th 1994. J.Adams. Trading in Death, 17-30. "Voyage into business of terror", The Independent, January 12th 1991.

- 13) "In the killing fields of Peru", The Guardian, supplement, April 6th 1994. "Peru's guerrillas make slum into a 'shining example'", The Independent, November 30th 1991. "Terror grips Peru's capital as rebels take on the state", The Guardian, August 17th 1992. "The end of a long march down the Shining Path", The Independent, October 3rd 1992. "Maoist rebels in Peru kill 28 peasants", The Independent, September 9th 1993. S.Strong. Shining Path, 148-149, 181, 183. B.J.Isbell. "Shining Path and Peasant Responses in Rural Ayacucho", 73-74; R.H.Berg, "Peasant Responses to Shining Path in Andahuaylas", 92; M.L.Smith. "Shining Path's Urban Strategy", 127-128, 136, 138; S.Woy-Hazleton & W.A.Hazleton. "Shining Path and the Marxist Left", 214, 216; all in D.S.Palmer (ed). Shining Path of Peru. T.D.Mason & J.Swartzfager. "Land Reform and the Rise of Sendero Luminoso in Peru", 531. Amnesty International. Peru: Human Rights in a Climate of Terror, (London: Amnesty International, 1991), 23-24.

conceivably be intended to garner their support. Various terrorist groups such as ETA, the Naxalites in India, and the Red Brigades in Italy, have attacked targets which they believe are unpopular with the elements of the public which are sympathetic to the terrorist's cause. However their success in doing this can depend on the type of society within which they operate.

However, relations between terrorists and the public can be rather more complex than one of straight intimidation. The case of the Provisional IRA illustrates this with regard to a group which has roots in one side of a conflict which has aspects of communal antagonism. PIRA is not an outside body which has imposed itself upon the working-class Catholic population of Northern Ireland, it is indigenous in much the same way that Northern Irish loyalist terrorists are indigenous to parts of the Protestant working-class.¹⁴ As the RUC Chief Constable remarked, "The reality is that terrorists reside and operate within each community".¹⁵ Members of the PIRA are often family members, friends of the family, former school-mates, or belong to a range of other personal relationships which might lead people to give them tacit if not active support.¹⁶ In turn the Provisionals have become aware that such support could stop if they overstep the boundaries of acceptable behaviour.¹⁷ Thus, as well as providing support, the relationship places limits on the activities of the group.

However, PIRA's position is reinforced by threats. They have made it clear that those who inform against the PIRA, or who help the security forces in minor ways such as working on security force bases, are liable to be killed.¹⁸ Sutton

14) S.Nelson. Ulster's Uncertain Defenders, 15.

15) Royal Ulster Constabulary. Chief Constable's Annual Report 1993, 11.

16) M.Dillon & D.Lehane. Political Murder in Northern Ireland, 144. F.Burton. The politics of legitimacy, 109, 22, 23. P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 290-291.

17) F.Burton. The politics of legitimacy, 109. See Danny Morrison's comment in P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 173.

18) Gerry Adams interviewed in "Inside Story: The Informer", BBC1, (television), November 24th 1992. "The men of war promise third violent decade", The Independent, September 29th 1990. "'We remain totally committed and confident in victory' - Oglai na hEireann", AP/RN,

estimates that between 1970 and the end of 1993 the PIRA killed fifty-nine alleged informers and twenty-seven contractors or their employees who worked for the security forces.¹⁹ This does not include people who have been injured or intimidated because of their opposition to aspects of republican political or terrorist actions, for instance the Belfast politicians Gerry Fitt and Paddy Devlin, the SDLP leader John Hume, and the 'Peace People' - a group who opposed republican violence, all had their homes attacked by republicans in the 1980s, Devlin eventually being driven out of Andersonstown by the attacks.²⁰

The terrorist use of force within the community is not always unpopular, provided it is directed against those seen as deviants. Following on from the IRA's precedent in the rebellion of 1919 to 1921, the PIRA has acted at the local level as a vigilante force in Northern Ireland.²¹ The activities of the Provisionals in the early 1970s made it extremely difficult for the RUC to police ordinary crime in some Catholic areas, giving the PIRA the opportunity to demonstrate that it could protect the Catholic community not only from outside elements such as sectarian assassins, but from 'anti-social' criminal elements within.²²

In August 1977 the Derry City PIRA, claiming to be reacting to 'numerous complaints', warned bar and off-licence owners not to supply alcohol to under age drinkers, warning:

February 14th 1991. "The IRA statement", AP/RN, January 23rd 1992.

19) M.Sutton. Bear in mind these dead, 196.

20) P.Devlin. Straight Left, 151-152, 285-286. L.Clarke.

Broadening the Battlefield, 131-132, 151-152, 166.

M.Rees. Northern Ireland: A Personal Perspective,

(London: Methuen, 1985), 304-305. D.McKittrick.

Despatches from Belfast, 6. P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The

Provisional IRA, 289.

21) M.Kotsonouris. "Revolutionary Justice - the Dail Eireann

Courts", History Ireland, 2, no. 3, (Autumn 1994).

C.Townshend. Political Violence in Ireland, 335.

C.Townshend. The British Campaign in Ireland, 68-69.

22) P.Bishop & E.Mallie, The Provisional IRA, 270, 246. No

author named. Volunteer Seamus Twomey, 12. Interview

with Dr. Joe Hendron, "Dispatches: Law of the Ghetto",

television. J.Darby. Intimidation and the Control of

Conflict in Northern Ireland, 159, 157-162. "The

benefits of a community police force", Republican News,

(Belfast), August 27th 1977.

... any resulting action that will be taken will rest solely on the shoulders of those who put profit before the morality and well being of our youth.²³

Fourteen years later, the Belfast PIRA was warning drugs traffickers:

There is no instant or simple solution but for our part we in the IRA will deal militarily with those who are gaining profit from the misery of others, misery which they are responsible for creating and for which we will hold them fully accountable.²⁴

Such warnings were not just issued to those supplying underage drinkers or drug-users. A 1979 communication from the Belfast Brigade of the PIRA refers to a crackdown on "... Thugs, Vandals, Sex Offenders and Muggers ..." within nationalist Belfast at the request of the local population.²⁵ In a warning to petty criminals, in 1991 a PIRA representative stated:

We will not of course permit individuals to inflict hardship on their own community unchecked.²⁶

Inevitably, mistakes have been made where the wrong person has been knee-capped, or a badly carried out knee-capping has resulted in the loss of a leg.²⁷

McCann outlines cases where the Provisionals have acted in order to avoid losing support. He reports that in December 1992 it was only after severe public pressure had been brought to bear on them to do something that the Derry PIRA knee-capped a man alleged to have sexually abused children.

Given the fervour with which local people were demanding action ... it is fair to say that the republican movement might have lost support in the area had its armed wing not exacted retribution.²⁸

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- 23) "Warning to Derry bar owners and off-licences", Republican News, August 27th 1977.
- 24) "War News: IRA action against drugs trade", AP/RN, October 10th 1991. "IRA orders shooting victims to quit country", The Independent, October 7th 1991.
- 25) K.J.Kelley. The Longest War, 292.
- 26) "IRA interview: Defending the community", AP/RN, December 19th 1991.
- 27) K.J.Kelley. The Longest War, 290. "Kneecap victim in IRA plea", The Irish Times, (Dublin), September 9th 1992. "IRA expulsion order lifted", The Irish Times, September 10th 1992.
- 28) "Few tears over IRA rough justice", The Independent on Sunday, December 20th 1992.

In May 1994 McCann reports that similar pressure was brought to bear on the Derry Provisionals to maim members of an alleged paedophile ring, but they declined to act.²⁹

Vigilantism also provides a respectable way for PIRA to eliminate competing republican terrorists within Catholic areas. This happened when the PIRA killed one member of the IPLO (Irish People's Liberation Organisation) and wounded ten others on the grounds that they were peddling drugs in nationalist areas.³⁰ McKittrick remarked:

... they [the authorities] may regret the fact that the IRA has displayed its strength, asserted its authority in republican districts in the clearest possible way, and will be able to claim credit for dealing with a social problem that the security forces had not managed to deal with successfully.³¹

The two feuding wings of the IPLO subsequently announced that they were disbanding as a result of the Provisionals' action.³²

Finally, the Provisionals have taken action against loyalist terrorists in their assumed role as defenders of the Catholic community in Northern Ireland. This role has been crucial to the Provisionals, as it was the failure of the IRA to defend Catholic areas in 1969 and 1970 which led to the PIRA splitting away. For instance, during 1993 and 1994 the Provisionals and the INLA carried out a series of attacks against alleged loyalist terrorists in an attempt to prevent increasingly successful loyalist attacks on Catholics and particularly on Sinn Fein members. In one incident, on the Shankill Road, Belfast in October 1993, a PIRA bomb intended to kill senior members of the Ulster Defence Association killed one PIRA bomber and nine Protestant civilians. Again much of the impetus for these republican attacks came from demands from republican supporters that something be done to

29) "Northern Exposure", New Statesman and Society, May 27th 1994.

30) "Action against drugs puts gunmen in 'policing' role", The Independent, November 3rd 1992. "RUC chief fears IRA plans to intensify mainland campaign", The Times, November 3rd 1992.

31) "IRA looks set for victory over terrorist faction", The Independent, November 4th 1992.

32) "Loyalist group threatens Catholic massacre", The Independent, November 7th 1992. "IRA claims demise of death group", The Times, November 7th 1992.

stop the loyalist attacks. However, they resulted in a spiral of reprisal killings against Catholics.³³

The Provisionals receive a fairly high degree of support in certain Catholic areas due to personal links, and a degree of support for their political aims if not for their methods. In describing the relationship between the Provisionals and the Catholic population of Northern Ireland Moxon-Browne notes:

The image of a small band of ruthless criminals holding a cowering population to ransom is a comforting illusion but it has little to do with reality.³⁴

However, there are limits to the degree of dissent which the Provisionals will tolerate without retaliation. Overall, the relationship between the Provisionals and the Catholic working-class is best summed up by Mary Holland's term of "quiescent ambivalence".³⁵

In the case of other smaller groups, operating in more homogenous societies, support may be much less. Whilst there was some sympathy for the Red Army Faction in 1970-71, before they had killed anybody and confined their attacks to low-level bombings and arson, by the late 1970s 85% of the people polled were in favour of a more severe penalties

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- 33) "Loyalists target of sustained campaign", The Independent, October 25th 1993. "Catholic front line waits in fear for retribution", The Independent, October 26th 1993. "It's going to be a tragedy for people in the Ardoyne", The Guardian, October 25th 1993. "Assassins are on the rampage", The Independent, October 27th 1993. "'The gunmen are savage, sinful, wicked, depraved'", The Independent, November 1st 1993. "Major set to invite Hume to Ulster talks", The Times, November 1st 1993. "Anatomy of an atrocity", The Guardian, November 29th 1993. "New wave of Ulster violence feared", The Independent, June 20th 1994. "Reprisal fear after Catholic pub killings", The Times, June 20th 1994. "Ulster awaits backlash after IRA guns down loyalist", The Independent, July 12th 1994. "Backlash feared as IRA kills leading loyalist", The Guardian, July 12th 1994. "Loyalists pledge to avenge shootings", The Independent, August 2nd 1994. E.Mallie & D.McKittrick. The Fight for Peace, 198-199, 309-310. B.Rowan. Behind the Lines, 37, 52-53, 106-108, 111-112.
- 34) E.Moxon-Browne. "The Water and the Fish", P.Wilkinson (ed). British Perspectives on Terrorism, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), 50.
- 35) M.Holland. "The Growing Desperation of the British Army", Magill, December 1979.

for terrorists.³⁶ The remoteness of their ideology from the day-to-day concerns of ordinary Germans meant that there was no reservoir of anti-state sympathy for them to tap into in the same way that the PIRA could amongst Northern Irish Catholics. In general, groups which establish a strong communal identity are in a much stronger position than those without one.

The effect of societal divisions on targeting.

Whilst some societies appear to be harmonious to the point of homogeneity, others are bitterly divided, and a vast swathe are somewhere in between. Communal divisions within a society - that is divisions between communities which see themselves as distinctly different - can affect terrorist target selection because they affect the size and composition of the categories of support outlined above. These divisions can provide supporters and sympathisers for a terrorist group within their own community, and also provide enemies in the shape of groups hostile to their community. In such a situation the terrorists may carry out attacks on the 'enemy' community in order to advertise their cause and mobilise support within their own community.

Where there are severe communal tensions based upon ethnic, religious, or economic differences, there seems to be a likelihood of terrorism aimed at asserting the dominance of one community by another, or conversely at protecting a weaker community from such dominance. In terms of fatalities Northern Ireland is only a relatively minor example of this phenomenon. Tamil, Sinhalese, and Muslim groups in Sri Lanka have massacred large members of each others communities in order to gain local dominance, or in revenge for previous massacres.³⁷ For instance, in April 1992 The Independent reported that members of the LTTE had killed fifty Muslim villagers, whereupon Muslims attacked nearby Tamil villages,

36) C.Hewitt. "Terrorism and Public Opinion: A Five Country Comparison", Terrorism and Political Violence, 2, no.2, (Summer 1990), 152, 153, 158, 163. S.Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group, 154.

37) "Tamils kill 350 Muslims in Sri Lanka", The Independent, August 13th 1990. "Civil strife makes Sri Lanka a tropical hell", The Independent, April 8th 1991.

killing twenty Tamils.³⁸ In no single violent incident since 1969 have twenty people been killed in Northern Ireland. (The two incidents relating to the Northern Irish conflict which involved twenty or more deaths occurred outside Northern Ireland, in Dublin in May 1974 and in Birmingham, England in November 1974.³⁹)

The state of Punjab in India in the 1980s and early 1990s provides a good example of bitter communal rivalries resulting in terrorism. The Punjab was greatly affected by the capital-intensive 'Green Revolution' in Indian agriculture in the 1960s. Whilst bringing greater prosperity if averaged out over the population, it is arguable that it produced greater differentiation between richer farmers who could afford to invest in the latest agricultural technology, and the poorer farmers who could not and thus could not survive in the new agricultural economy.⁴⁰ Oberoi claims that the process of differentiation forced the higher-caste jat Sikhs, who often made up the farming class, to work amongst lower-caste harijans, thereby causing much resentment amongst the jats and exacerbating the religious differences between the Sikh and Hindu groups in the province.⁴¹ Since the early 1980s Sikh terrorists have deliberately killed unarmed Hindu civilians living in the Punjab - including some large-scale massacres - in order to force them out of the province with the aim of creating an homogeneous Sikh state - Khalistan.⁴² By their words and actions some religious and separatist terrorist groups clearly wish to sharpen differences between members of their own religion and other communities.⁴³

38) "74 villagers killed in Sri Lankan massacres", The Independent, April 30th 1992.

39) M.Sutton. Bear in mind these dead, 60, 68.

40) T.N.Madan. "The Double-edged Sword: Fundamentalism and the Sikh Religious Tradition", M.E.Marty & R.S.Appleby (eds). Fundamentalisms Observed, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993)", 612. M.J.Akbar. India: The Siege Within, 170.

41) H.Oberoi. "Sikh Fundamentalism: Translating History into Theory", M.E.Marty & R.S.Appleby (eds). Fundamentalisms and the State, 264.

42) "India train massacre caps year of violence", The Independent, December 29th 1991. "Sikh extremists massacre factory managers", Financial Times, March 12th 1992. "Sikh militants shoot 20 dead in street", Financial Times, March 20th 1992.

43) T.N.Madan. "The Double-edged Sword", 607.

However, the economic tensions between communities could also do much to explain the attacks.

Some societies seem more prone to support the activities of terrorist groups or other law-breakers than others, particularly where respect for the systems of government and justice have been eroded. Hobsbawm and Angiolillo both explore the existence in peasant societies of what Hobsbawm terms *social bandits*, that is bandits who receive popular support because they are seen to stand for the alleviation of injustice and symbolise resistance to unpopular authority.⁴⁴ This idea has parallels with PIRA in Northern Ireland, ETA in the Basque country, and various groups in the Kashmir province of India, where a substantial number of people have seen insurgent groups as reactions to existing injustices or to the behaviour of the security forces.⁴⁵ In such circumstances support for terrorism is likely to be higher than in a society where the law is respected.

Such attitudes are not restricted to separatist conflicts. A poll conducted in Italy in the early 1960s demonstrated a high degree of public alienation from the governmental and economic systems at a time of relative economic prosperity in Italy.⁴⁶ Only 3% of Italians expressed pride in their governmental and political institutions -

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- 44) E.J.Hobsbawm. Bandits, second edition, (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1985), 17-29. P.F.Angiolillo. A Criminal as Hero: Angelo Duca, (Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1979), 1-16.
- 45) F.Burton. The politics of legitimacy, 106-108. S.Belfrage. The Crack: A Belfast Year, (Andre Deutsch, 1987; London: Grafton, 1988), 88. R.P.Clark. The Basque Insurgents, 169-172, 174-176, 180-182. "Valley of violence", Far Eastern Economic Review, May 24th 1990. "Indian ferocity alienates Kashmir", The Independent, July 23rd 1990. "Kashmiris find cold comfort in Pakistan haven", The Times, July 23rd 1990. "Security forces raze Kashmir town centre", The Independent, October 3rd 1990. "Indian villagers tell of mass rape by soldiers", The Independent, March 19th 1991. "Kashmiri villagers tell of gang rapes by Indian soldiers", The Times, April 4th 1991. "In the shadow of the gunmen", The Sunday Times, December 29th 1991.
- 46) S.Verba & G.A.Almond. "National Revolutions and Political Commitment", H.Eckstein (ed). Internal War, 230. A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 32, 51, 57. V.S.Pisano. The Dynamics of Subversion and Violence in Contemporary Italy, 23.

compared to 30% in Mexico, and 3% expressed pride in the Italian economic system - compared to 24% in less economically-developed Mexico.⁴⁷ This disillusion extended across people with varying degrees of political participation.⁴⁸ One must be careful in drawing conclusions from such data, but it is noticeable that during the industrial unrest of the 1970s, Italian industrial workers were relatively ambivalent in their attitude towards Red Brigade attacks on politicians and industrial managers.⁴⁹

On the other hand the BR killing of ordinary police officers, such as the bodyguards of Justice Coco in June 1976 and of Aldo Moro in March 1978, prompted widespread public opposition to the Red Brigades, forcing the brigadists to make defensive and defamatory comments about the police officers killed.⁵⁰ Similarly, the BR killing in January 1979 of Guido Rossa - a worker at the Italsider car works and a PCI member, prompted large protests, with an estimated crowd of 250,000 at his funeral, and did much to destroy support for BR in the factories and on the left in general.⁵¹

Divisions within society can affect terrorist target selection. The decisive factors are the extent to which the terrorists allow themselves to be influenced, and the degree to which the communal group they belong to perceives the existence of an enemy group. Terrorists with a secure core of support within a specific community - however obtained - can probably afford to carry out attacks against the perceived communal enemy which would not be tolerated if they were against groups not seen as legitimate targets. On the other hand groups dependent upon fairly widespread backing have to ensure that the bulk of their attacks can be justified to

47) S.Verba & G.A.Almond. "National Revolutions and Political Commitment", 222.

48) S.Verba & G.A.Almond. "National Revolutions and Political Commitment", 226.

49) D.Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 101-104. A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 100, 123-124.

50) A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 92, 123, 126, 186.

51) "Italian Terrorists Kill a Union Aide", Washington Post, January 25th 1979. "Italian labour protest over killing", Financial Times, January 26th 1979. "Hero's funeral for party victim", Financial Times, January 29th 1979. C.Seton-Watson. "Terrorism in Italy", 110. A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 100, 175-176. D.Moss. The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 227, 285 n42.

their supporters in ideological terms. If they do not, it can prove difficult to secure public cooperation by intimidation alone.

Groups which do not have a wide base of support, generally those whose ideology is more abstract, are not so bound by the need to satisfy a section of public opinion. On the other hand, without such support they are very much dependent upon their own resources and cannot hope to expand - a position which is probably sustainable only by groups - such as large drugs traffickers, which already possess sufficient resources. However, the way in which terrorist actions are perceived can also depend upon the medium through which they are received.

Terrorists and the media.

Gerry Adams has described acts of violence by the Provisional IRA as 'armed propaganda' because they put the issue of the British presence in Ireland onto the political agenda.⁵² The media undoubtedly has had an effect on the activities of some terrorist groups because it means that terrorists who wish to publicise their cause or other concerns through the media have to ensure that they carry out actions which are sufficiently newsworthy.

Several terrorist actions have been specifically aimed at gaining publicity. In Argentina in September 1973, members of the Trotskyist People's Revolutionary Group (Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo - ERP) kidnapped the executive of a newspaper and forced the paper to carry an advert urging Argentines to support Peron in the forthcoming elections.⁵³ Other terrorist groups have put pressure on the print and electronic media to carry statements and communiques, usually by abducting people.⁵⁴ In June 1995 an American anarchist known as the 'Unabomber' because of his predilection for sending parcel bombs to scientists at universities and elsewhere, stated that he would stop his activities if his 30,000 word statement on the "Future of Industrial Society"

52) G.Adams. The Politics of Irish Freedom, 64.

53) A.P.Schmid & J.de Graaf. Violence as Communication, 25.

54) A.P.Schmid & J.de Graaf. Violence as Communication, 48-49. N.C.Livingstone. The War Against Terrorism, (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1982), 66.

was printed in major American newspapers. In the event this was done by the New York Times and the Washington Post.⁵⁵

Other groups have been similarly enamoured of the power of the media, and have chosen either their targets or the location of their attacks in order to maximise media attention. During the Algerian War of 1954 to 1962 a leader of the separatist FLN emphasised this, stating:

Is it better for our cause to kill ten of our enemy in the countryside of Telergma, where no one will speak of it, or one in Algiers that will be mentioned the next day in the American press?⁵⁶

Behr also recounts an FLN spokesman at the United Nations who justified bomb attacks upon European civilians in Algiers in 1956-1957 by stating:

You must realise that every time a bomb explodes in Algiers we are taken more seriously here.⁵⁷

More recently Schmid and de Graaf quote a PIRA spokesman as noting in the early 1970s that for publicity purposes one bomb in London's Oxford Street was worth ten bombs in Belfast.⁵⁸ Over twenty years later PIRA spokesmen were still using versions of that phrase.⁵⁹ Similarly, following the PIRA mortar attack on 10 Downing Street in February 1991 the republican press noted the amount of coverage which the attack generated in the British, Irish, and international press with some satisfaction.⁶⁰

Some terrorists also believe that general coverage of their activities will generate publicity for their cause. Patricia Hearst - who was abducted in Berkeley in February 1974 by a quasi-communist group which called itself the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) - claims that they were

55) "Death in the post", The Guardian, supplement, May 15th 1995. "Misfit's lonely downfall", The Guardian, April 5th 1996. "Have they now caught the Unabomber", The Independent, April 5th 1996.

56) G. Fairbairn. Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare: The Countryside Version, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974) 287, n7.

57) E. Behr. The Algerian Problem, (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1961), 112.

58) A.P. Schmid & J. de Graaf. Violence as Communication, 43.

59) M. Dillon. The Enemy Within, 211.

60) "IRA 'SCUDS' steal Gulf headlines", AP/RN, February 14th 1991. "Another mortar for ould Ireland", AP/RN, February 14th 1991. "London chaos through the world's eyes", AP/RN, February 14th 1991.

"absolutely publicity-crazy" and were "media-freaks" who constantly listened on the radio for mentions of themselves.⁶¹ According to Baumann, himself a member of the June 2nd Movement in the early 1970s, the Red Army Faction believed that media reports about guerrillas fighting in Germany would help to inspire revolution against imperialism in other parts of the world.⁶² After terrorist actions, or during them in the case of prolonged abductions, terrorists often make use of the media to issue communiques which explain why they have carried out a specific attack, and also try to use the enhanced publicity to proselytise for their cause or to threaten further attacks if they do not get their way. During the Moro abduction between March and May 1978 the Red Brigades issued frequent communiques - usually statements left in locations which were communicated to the newspapers - setting out BR conditions for Moro's release, and claiming to demonstrate the corruption of the Italian Christian Democrats.⁶³ Thus the kidnapping served to advertise the BR's claims as well as being an attempt to free their comrades.

One effect which media coverage may have is that of *contagion* whereby media reports of terrorist violence encourage other discontented groups to use violence and to adopt similar tactical methods.⁶⁴ The Red Brigades are said to have adopted the tactic of the politically-motivated, high-profile kidnap from the Uruguayan Tupamaros.⁶⁵ Miller and Schmid point out that there is little empirical research to prove a link between media coverage of terrorist actions and the occurrence of similar actions elsewhere.⁶⁶ However, based on a study of 168 terrorist attacks against immigrants and asylum-seekers in Scandanavia, Bjorgo notes that such attacks tend to occur in time-related clusters, and that this is probably because one attack sets off a spate of copycat

61) P.C.Hearst & A.Moscow. Every Secret Thing, 78, 151, 43, 68-69.

62) M.Baumann. Wie Alles Anfing, 100.

63) A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 119-171, *passim*.

64) A.P.Schmid & J.de Graaf. Violence as Communication, 122-137.

65) A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 77.

66) D.Miller. Don't Mention the War: Northern Ireland, Propaganda and the Media, (London: Pluto Press, 1994), 247-250. A.P.Schmid. "Terrorism and the Media: The Ethics of Publicity", 558.

attacks elsewhere.⁶⁷ One cannot say for certain that media coverage causes some people to adopt terrorist methods or copy the methods of other terrorist groups, but it seems unlikely that it has no effect.

Having said this, one must not fall into the trap of over-emphasising the importance of media coverage to terrorism. To begin with, in some instances the news media may not be free to report terrorist incidents. Even in liberal democracies governments frequently try to restrict media reporting of the actions or communications of terrorist groups or their supposed allies. In 1971 the Irish Government invoked Section 31 of the Broadcasting Act to restrict interviews with spokesmen of both the Provisional IRA and the Official IRA, and after 1972 they were banned. From 1976 interviews with members of Sinn Fein - the political wing of the republican movement - were also banned.⁶⁸ The ban was lifted in January 1994.⁶⁹ Between October 1988 and August 1994 the British Government banned the transmission of the voices of members of Irish republican and loyalist terrorist groups, and members of groups held to be associated with them - such as Sinn Fein.⁷⁰ In Greece it was made an offence to report the contents of terrorist statements, and in September 1991 seven newspaper editors were imprisoned for publishing the contents of communiques by the communist terrorist group November 17th.⁷¹

Governments are not the only people to suppress the media and journalists have been attacked by terrorists who disapprove of their politics or of what they have written.⁷² Some of the attacks are not lethal. In his autobiography,

67) T.Bjorgo. "Role of the Media in Racist Violence", T.Bjorgo & R.Witte (eds). Racist Violence in Europe, 98-100.

68) L.Curtis. Ireland: The Propaganda War. The British Media and the 'Battle for Hearts and Minds', (London: Pluto Press, 1984), 190-193.

69) "A gag that chokes freedom", The Independent, September 12th 1994.

70) Article 19. No Comment: Censorship, Secrecy and the Irish Troubles, (London: Article 19, 1989), 23-25.

71) "Jail for Greek editors who defied terror ban", The Independent, September 10th 1991. "Editors backed", The Times, September 11th 1991. "Greece in the dock over gagging order on media", The Independent, September 16th 1991.

72) A.P.Schmid & J.de Graaf. Violence as Communication, 44.

Michael Baumann notes how in February 1970 members of the 'Blues' - a anarchist group in West Berlin - beat up a journalist who wrote an uncomplimentary article about them.⁷³ However there are other cases where the intent has been lethal. In November 1977 Red Brigadists shot and mortally wounded Carlo Casalegno, a journalist and deputy-editor of La Stampa who had written articles criticising BR.⁷⁴ Likewise, in May 1984 members of the UVF shot and seriously wounded Jim Campbell, a journalist investigating the activities of a Belfast UVF group subsequently known as the 'Shankill Butchers'. The intention had been to kill him.⁷⁵ In February 1985 members of the Greek Revolutionary Organisation November 17th (17N) shot dead Nikos Momferatos - the publisher of Greece's largest conservative newspaper - and his driver. Momferatos was President of the Association of Athens Newspaper Publishers and a close friend of the leader of the conservative opposition New Democracy Party. 17N claimed that Momferatos' newspaper, like most Greek newspapers, suppressed news of American domination of Greece, of CIA activities, and of the depredations of the Greek bourgeoisie.⁷⁶ Thus, as well as eliminating an opponent the attack was intended to frighten other publishers and members of the press into compliance.

In some cases terrorist attacks on journalists have been more incessant. Since the military coup and suppression of elections in Algeria in January 1992, Islamist terrorists have attempted to silence media criticism by eliminating journalists as a class. In February 1995 twenty-nine journalists were reported to have been killed by terrorists since the outbreak of the conflict, and by early August 1995

73) M.Baumann. Wie Alles Anfing, 54-55.

74) A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 100.

75) M.Dillon. The Shankill Butchers, xi. R.Bell, R.Johnstone, R.Wilson (eds). "Troubles Chronology: 17.5.84", Troubled Times, 199. D.Miller. Don't Mention the War, 274.

76) A.Corsun. "Group Profile: The Revolutionary Organization 17 November", 105, 118. Revolutionary Organisation 17th November. "Communique on the assassination in Athens on 21 February 1985 of Nikos Momiferatos, publisher of Apogevmatini", Y.Alexander & D.Pluchinsky (eds). Europe's Red Terrorists, 94-98.

the total had risen to forty-six.⁷⁷ Ironically newspapers have also been suppressed by the Algerian Government. According to Michael Colomes, the foreign editor of the French weekly Le Point, the conflict in Algeria had not attracted sufficient interest because government suppression and terrorist attacks made it difficult to provide television coverage.⁷⁸

Not all terrorist groups necessarily wish to gain widespread media attention for their actions. The effectiveness of many conservative terrorist groups in Latin America tend to depend on individual threats and the spread of rumours locally for the purposes of intimidation. For example, in Barrancabermeja, Colombia, Amnesty International reports that a group calling itself 'Toxicol-90' which carried out 'social-cleansing' operations against alleged vagrants and petty thieves, distributed leaflets within the city warning of its intentions.⁷⁹ Likewise, news of the killings of trade unionists and workers in Colombia seem to spread by word of mouth rather than mass media coverage.⁸⁰

Amnesty International also reports that Guatemalan trade unionists have received messages from groups - thought to be in the pay of employers or even set up by them - threatening them and their families with injury, abduction, rape, or death if they do not leave their union. In some cases these threats have been carried out.⁸¹ One note, delivered to the pregnant wife of a union activist in August 1995 after a number of previous threats, read:

Remember that you have had a long time and that we have left you alone. If you love your baby, convince your

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- 77) "Islamists kill 29th journalist", The Independent, February 18th 1995. "Algeria murder", The Daily Telegraph, February 18th 1995. "Editors fired at from both sides in a vicious war", The Independent, March 13th 1995. "Algerian woman journalist killed", The Guardian, August 9th 1995.
- 78) "France fears upsurge of Islamic terror", The Independent on Sunday, April 10th 1994.
- 79) Amnesty International. Political violence in Colombia, 19.
- 80) J. Pearce. Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth, 254-255. Amnesty International. Political violence in Colombia, 75-76.
- 81) Amnesty International. Guatemala: Maquila workers among trade unionists targeted, (London: Amnesty International, 1995).

husband since neither of you has taken any notice. But if he loves his baby, he will have to decide now, either leave the union or his wife and child will pay the consequences. ... Ask your husband what he prefers, to have you alive or dead.⁸²

The couple were subsequently told to leave the country within seventy-two hours.⁸³ In such circumstances it is likely that far from wanting media publicity the terrorists would seek to prevent being publically connected with these activities, hoping that the intimidatory nature of such threats would spread to the wider psychological target - the unionised workers - by word of mouth.

On some occasions terrorist groups definitely do not want any form of publicity, as when the media reports unsavoury activities such as extortion for funds or revelations about other terrorist actions. One of the greatest blows to the image of the Ulster Defence Association occurred in August 1987 when a television programme showed secretly-taken film of a senior UDA member trying to extort money from a television journalist posing as a businessman. As a result four UDA members were imprisoned.⁸⁴ Newspaper revelations in 1981 that fascist groups in Britain were attempting to import guns and planned to bomb the Notting Hill Carnival in London, caused similar problems for the groups concerned.⁸⁵

The publicity from operations which go wrong can cause problems. When eleven civilians were killed in Enniskillen in November 1987 by a bomb intended for the military guard at a Remembrance Day parade, the subsequent publicity was disastrous for the image of the PIRA amongst potential sympathisers and the uncommitted. As a PIRA spokesman noted that whilst their core support was unaffected, the outer reaches were "devastated".⁸⁶

82) Amnesty International. Guatemala: Maquila workers among trade unionists targeted, 8.

83) Amnesty International. Guatemala: Maquila workers among trade unionists targeted, 9.

84) "Journalist helped end building site racket", The Independent, December 10th 1988. S.Bruce. The Red Hand, 245, 248. J.Cusack & M.Taylor. "The Resurgence of a Terrorist Organization", 6-8.

85) R.Hill & A.Bell. The Other Face of Terror, 99-106, 216-219.

86) "Bombing 'devastating' to IRA", The Independent, November 11th 1987.

Supposedly bad publicity may not adversely affect the core support for terrorist groups. After the death of two children in the Warrington bombing of March 1993, reports indicated that potential sympathisers in the Republic of Ireland and elsewhere were more likely to withhold support, or even actively oppose the republican movement, thus affecting its political and possibly logistical base.⁸⁷ Mitchell McLaughlin, a Sinn Fein spokesman, noted that from the republican perspective, Warrington 'didn't help'.⁸⁸ However, O'Brien and Gorman argued that despite the opprobrium, the bombing was a PIRA success in that it put the Northern Irish conflict back into the headlines in Britain.⁸⁹

Uncommitted groups may also be affected. Miller reports that in the aftermath of the Enniskillen bombing, polls showed a steep reduction in support in Great Britain for withdrawal from Northern Ireland, from 61% in January 1987 to 40% in late November 1987 - a few days after the bombing. Miller also reports a sharp reduction in support for withdrawal in the opinion polls after the Warrington bomb.⁹⁰ In practice political or strategic gains from mass casualty attacks on civilians are generally only transitory unless sustained attacks take place as with the FLN bombing campaign in Algiers.

Overall the media can be important to a terrorist group because the ability to gain media attention may amplify the influence of the group and its cause. This, in turn, may influence the way in which terrorist groups select their targets. However, there is little evidence to suggest that the prospect of getting publicity leads terrorists to attack targets which they would not normally consider legitimate. However, they may choose to attack those legitimate targets which have a higher news profile than others.

Media attention by itself is rarely vital to the continued existence of terrorist groups, rather the more active groups are newsworthy because of their continued

87) "The angry south, the weary north", The Independent on Sunday, March 28th 1993.

88) D.McKittrick. Endgame, 269.

89) "Caging the godfathers of terror", The Independent, March 26th 1993. E.Gorman. "Back in the frame", Fortnight, June 1993.

90) D.Miller. Don't Mention the War, 279-280.

existence. Schmid and de Graaf believe that terrorist attacks are often intended to fulfil tactical objectives, and the resultant media attention, whilst possibly beneficial, is frequently incidental to the main purpose of an attack.⁹¹ John Conway, the editor of news and current affairs for the BBC in Belfast, estimated in August 1988 that 78% of all violent happenings there were not covered by the media.⁹² Whilst the mass media can be important to terrorist groups, it is more important to some than to others, and for some groups, particularly vigilante-style groups operating in a limited locality, it hardly matters at all.

External political events.

Political terrorism is usually a reaction to a perceived fault in the existing order, whether it be a need to preserve the existing order in its entirety, overthrow it, or affect certain parts of it. In that sense, terrorism is a reaction to the political environment. Hence the reaction of terrorists to specific political events varies from group to group.

The way in which a terrorist group can react directly to a specific political event can be seen in the campaign by Hamas to destabilise the 1993 autonomy accord between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). Since the agreement - under which the PLO governs Jericho and the Gaza Strip with the possibility of this area being extended to the Israeli-occupied West Bank of the River Jordan - Hamas has sought to mobilise Palestinians and Arab governments against the agreement by provoking the Israelis into breaking the agreement and into further military repression. In order to do this bomb attacks have been carried out against civilian targets in Israel itself.⁹³ Between April 1994 and March 1996 thirteen suicide bomb attacks, mainly on buses or near bus queues, killed over 130 people.⁹⁴

91) A.P.Schmid & J.de Graaf. Violence as Communication, 184.

92) Quoted in "Are we feeding IRA bloodlust", The Sunday Telegraph, August 28th 1988.

93) "Bus suicide bomber kills five Israelis", The Daily Telegraph, July 25th 1995.

94) "Portrait of a suicide bomber", The Independent, March 10th 1996.

The pattern for such attacks was seen on October 19th 1994, when a member of the Izzedine al Qassem Brigade of Hamas, killed twenty-two people with a suicide bomb on a bus in Tel Aviv.⁹⁵ The Israeli Army immediately placed travel restrictions on Palestinians who lived in the PLO-administered territories but worked in Israel, and the Prime Minister stated that he was considering tougher laws against suspected terrorists.⁹⁶ A few days later the Israeli Army was reported to be preparing to blow-up the home of the Tel Aviv bomber having put the town where he had lived under a curfew.⁹⁷ Additionally, Hamas attacks on civilian and military targets not only provoked Israeli repression, but drove the Israeli Government to put pressure on the PLO administration to attack Hamas, making the PLO seem like Israel's puppet.⁹⁸ The same pattern of bombing and retaliation occurred after a series of Hamas suicide bombings in the first few months of 1996 killed over sixty Israelis.⁹⁹ The Israeli retaliatory methods were unlikely to win Palestinian hearts and minds for the accords.

Other terrorist groups have been sensitive to political events to an even greater degree. Corsun notes that the Revolutionary Organisation November 17th in Greece appears to be particularly sensitive to political events in Greece and elsewhere.¹⁰⁰ Doyle notes that 17N's attacks have generally

95) "Suicide bus bomber kills 22", The Daily Telegraph, October 20th 1994.

96) "Suicide bus bomber kills 22", The Daily Telegraph, October 20th 1994.

97) "Israel steps up war on Hamas", The Daily Telegraph, October 21st 1994. "Arab village stunned by martyrdom", The Daily Telegraph, October 22nd 1994.

98) "The menacing face of Hamas", The Daily Telegraph, October 21st 1994. "Arabs search for honour in the peace", The Independent on Sunday, October 23rd 1994.

99) "Suicide bombs rock Middle East peace", The Guardian, January 23rd 1995. "Bus stop bombers kill 19 in Israel", The Independent, January 23rd 1995. "Bus suicide bomber kills five Israelis", The Daily Telegraph, July 25th 1995. "Onward march of terrorist violence", The Independent, March 4th 1996. "Calls grow for 'total war' as press loses patience", The Guardian, March 6th 1996. "Israel puts ring of steel around the Palestinians", the Independent, March 7th 1996. "Israeli blockade keeps mother and baby apart", The Guardian, March 19th 1996. "Bombers kin await Israel's revenge", The Independent, March 19th 1996.

100) A.Corsun. "Group Profile: The Revolutionary Organization 17 November", 98, 105-108, 115-116, 117.

related to "... whatever is upsetting Greek public opinion at the time".¹⁰¹ Thus in May 1988 17N bombed a number of Turkish diplomatic vehicles on the eve of a visit from the Turkish Foreign Minister, whilst a series of bombings in a wealthy suburb of Athens was intended to highlight the alleged inconsistency between the conservative Greek Government's austerity measures and the toleration of widespread tax evasion by the wealthy.¹⁰² In early 1991 17N carried out low-level attacks against targets belonging to companies, diplomatic facilities, or other people or property whose countries had been involved on the Allied side in the Second Gulf War against Iraq in January 1991, and they killed a US Army sergeant in Athens in March 1991, linking the attack to the US presence in Greece and the Turkish presence in Cyprus.¹⁰³ In fact in early 1991 a number of European terrorist groups attacked targets or targets belonging to the USA and other members of the Allied Forces.¹⁰⁴

The Provisional IRA has adopted an ambivalent tone over whether they plan operations to coincide with particular dates or events. In late 1978 a PIRA spokesman denied that an upsurge in activity represented a "winter offensive" or a "pre-election blitz" as this would run counter to the long war strategy of attrition which the Provisionals claimed to be waging against the British.¹⁰⁵ Similarly, in 1983 a spokesman stated:

Our tactics are determined by intelligence and logistics - the availability of weapons and personnel. The military

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- 101) "Greek bombers target the tourists", The Independent, June 13th 1994.
- 102) A.Corsun. "Group Profile: The Revolutionary Organization 17 November", 106, 11.
- 103) Revolutionary Organisation 17 November. "Communique on the assassination of Ronald Stewart, a US Air Force Sergeant, in Athens on 12 March 1991", Y.Alexander & D.Pluchinsky (eds). Europe's Red Terrorists, 111.
- 104) U.S. Department of State. Press Statement, March 4th 1991. First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Groups. "Communique on the Bombing of Oil Pipelines in Spain on 22 February 1991", Revolutionary Left. "Undated Dev Sol communique on 'Operation Desert Storm'", and editors comments, Y.Alexander & D.Pluchinsky (eds). Europe's Red Terrorists, 23, 58, 93, 117, 130-131, 233, 249-250.
- 105) M.L.R.Smith. The Role of the Military Instrument in Irish Republican Strategic Thinking: An Evolutionary Analysis, Ph.D, King's College, University of London, 1991, 345.

struggle will not slow down to relate to Sinn Fein's political activities.¹⁰⁶

Joe Austin, a senior Sinn Fein member, made a similar remark to the effect that PIRA attacks on dates symbolic to the republican movement would be self-indulgent posturing and would help the security forces by making attacks predictable.¹⁰⁷

On the other hand, in March 1973 the PIRA specifically detonated a bomb in London on the day of a referendum in Northern Ireland which was likely to show that the majority of people there did not want a united Ireland.¹⁰⁸ In an article in March 1992, a PIRA representative was ambivalent about organising operations around political events, stating that they did not plan operations around political events such as the forthcoming British General Election.

Operations within England and elsewhere are part of our long-term strategy and it would be playing into our enemy's hands to build any degree of predictability into our activities.¹⁰⁹

However he conceded:

... it is fair to comment that operations around major political events do carry the added bonus of forcing the Irish war onto the British political agenda.¹¹⁰

Thus, whilst the spokesman denied that the Provisionals necessarily planned operations to coincide with major political events, he noted the advantages of doing so. In fact the PIRA set off two massive bombs the day after the 1992 British General Election. One badly damaged a major road flyover in west London, whilst the other in the City of London killed three people, injured seventy-five others, and caused about £350 million worth of damage.¹¹¹

Similarly, in February 1996 the Provisionals ended their ceasefire by setting off a bomb in the Docklands area

106) "The Armalite and the Ballot Box", Magill, July 1983.

107) M.L.R.Smith. The Role of the Military Instrument in Irish Republican Strategic Thinking, 311-314.

108) P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 251. J.Bowyer Bell. The Secret Army, 398.

109) "'We are doing all in our power to shorten this war' - IRA", AP/RN, March 12th 1992.

110) "'We are doing all in our power to shorten this war' - IRA", AP/RN, March 12th 1992.

111) "London counts the cost of IRA bombs", The Independent, April 13th 1992. "Insured loss may hit £150m", Lloyd's List, February 12th 1996.

of London, killing two people, injuring about one hundred, and causing damage estimated at £75 million to £150 million. They claimed that had done this because the British Government was stalling and acting in "bad faith" over whether to allow Sinn Fein to participate in all-party talks on the future of Northern Ireland.¹¹² The PIRA statement clearly linked the attack to political developments.

Even if a political event does not have a direct influence on the terrorists cause, occasions such as the OPEC Conference in Vienna in 1975 and the Conservative Party Conference in Brighton in 1984 provide terrorists with opportunities for kidnap and assassination.¹¹³ These attacks occurred because a lot of high-profile targets were known to be in a relatively small area on a specific date. Such opportunities may be rare, and it is hardly surprising if terrorists take them when they can.

Whilst acknowledging that terrorism is frequently a reaction to the perceived political climate in a country, one must be careful not to overstate the extent to which individual terrorist actions are linked to specific political events. Many actions, for example the PIRA killing of a police officer in Northern Ireland or the killing of an immigrant by a fascist group in Germany, are not related to a particular political event, but are part of a continuing campaign of violence with its own internal dynamic. However, on other occasions attacks by terrorist groups seem to be prompted by events - either because the terrorists are reacting to events, or because the events provide the

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- 112) "'The ceasefire is over': IRA bombers blast London", The Independent, February 10th 1996. "Bomb shatters IRA ceasefire", The Times, February 10th 1996. "IRA statement", The Guardian, February 10th 1996. "Statements from republican sources and the prime minister", Financial Times, February 10th-11th 1996. "Damage adds up to £85m", The Independent on Sunday, February 11th 1996. "Insured loss may hit £150m", Lloyd's List, February 12th 1996. "Premiums threat as cost estimate tops £150m", Financial Times, February 12th 1996. "IRA cessation ends after 527 days", "IRA blames Major for end of cessation", AP/RN, February 15th 1996.
- 113) C.Dobson & R.Payne. The Carlos Complex, 126-127. D.Yallop. To the Ends of the Earth, 375-376, 378-379. "Security alert sent to police before bombing in Brighton", The Times, October 15th 1984. P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 423-426.

terrorists with targets or the chance to advertise their cause by carrying out an attack at a time of heightened media attention.

Summary.

To a greater or lesser degree, terrorists have to take account of intangible factors such as public opinion and the social and political atmosphere when selecting their targets. The fact that terrorist groups normally depend on supporters and sympathisers outside the group, as well as group members, means that their freedom of action is constrained. Even if the terrorists feel that they might be justified in attacking certain targets, to do so might risk alienating support with the possible consequence of resources being denied, facilities being refused, and - most deadly for a terrorist group - of people informing to the group's enemies. The desire to persuade potential sympathisers and the uncommitted to support the terrorists cause can also lead to restraints being placed upon target selection. Conversely the terrorists can also take steps to control the civil population. Threats, the use of vigilantism, or judiciously selected assassinations and maimings, can intimidate selected people or whole communities into cooperation with - or at least tacit acceptance of - the terrorists. Likewise, the terrorists may attack unpopular people or institutions in order to generate popular support.

When selecting their targets terrorists may try to maximise the amount and nature of the publicity they receive by choosing targets which have a high publicity value. This can be a double-edged sword. Although terrorist acts may increase the awareness of a groups existence, this does not necessarily have a favourable influence on the way in which the group is perceived. This may not be too important if they believe that all publicity is good publicity, but as the PIRA bomb at Enniskillen or the revelations about UDA racketeering showed, this is far from being the case. Groups wishing to obtain publicity which is favourable to their cause - if not actually supportive - must be careful to select targets which are widely seen as legitimate. The degree to which they do this may depend on their own perception of what is

acceptable, and the extent to which they need support outside their own core of members and supporters.

The influence of social and economic structures can also greatly influence target selection. These structures can cause communal divisions or cleavages based on social class causing certain groups of people to be automatically deemed as enemies. In the Punjab, communal and economic divisions greatly polarised Sikhs and Hindus and provided Sikh separatist terrorists with a motive to carry out mass casualty attacks on Hindu civilians. Similar communal or sectarian attacks have been seen in Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka and are often subsumed beneath the surface of campaigns of terrorism which support or oppose separatism.

Finally, political events can affect target selection. For terrorist groups wishing to influence political developments in their part of the world, the occurrence or likely occurrence of a major political event can be important in influencing target selection. Thus, in Italy in the late 1970s the Red Brigade's desire to frustrate a stabilising 'Grand Compromise' between the Christian Democrat and Communist parties appears to have been pivotal in the Red Brigade decision to kidnap a major Christian Democrat politician - resulting in the Moro abduction of March 1978. A number of political factions wanted the compromise to fail, as fail it did after Moro's death.¹¹⁴ In other cases, such as PIRA's bomb in the City of London in April 1992 after the General Election, a political event provides a useful peg - in terms of media attention already in the area - upon which to hang an operation. Lastly, political events such as conferences can provide targets in themselves because of the wealth of suitable targets which they attract.

Factors external to the terrorist group can provide terrorists with motives, means, and opportunities for their actions. Motives are supplied by the emotions generated in divided societies, by the possibilities for boosting their cause provided by the mass media and by linking their attacks to current events, and by the desire to generate support. The means to carry out their campaign - in terms of both material

114) For a summary of various conspiracy theories see P. Willan. Puppet Masters, 214-324.

aid and facilities such as shelter - are often provided by people external to the group. Finally, opportunities are provided by events - such as conferences - which cause a number of targets to become vulnerable to attack. These - with the possible exception of communal division - are all fairly rational considerations. However, the types of targets selected by terrorists depend not only upon the rational calculation of the factors involved, but also upon internal group dynamics.

The Human Factor

Introduction.

Whilst previous chapters have largely concentrated upon those factors which are dependent upon terrorists making dispassionate operational decisions, one has to bear in mind that one is dealing with people and all their imperfections and unpredictability. Moreover, in the case of terrorist groups these are often people operating under a great deal of psychological and possibly physical pressure. Arthur Schlesinger - an historian who became a member of John F. Kennedy's White House Staff - has noted:

Nothing in my own recent experience has been more chastening than the attempt to penetrate into the process of decision. I shudder a little when I think how confidently I have analyzed decisions in the ages of Jackson and Roosevelt, traced influences, assigned motives, evaluated roles, allocated responsibilities and in short, transformed a dishevelled and murky evolution into a tidy and ordered transaction.¹

The pressures under which terrorist groups operate mean that their decisions are usually made under circumstances much less ideal than those found in government.

Their decisions go through some form of decision-making structure. Even a small informal group such as the Symbionese Liberation Army develops a pecking order, and decisions are filtered through the resulting processes.² In larger groups these processes can be fairly intricate, involving decision-making at a number of levels. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the extent to which this, and the vagaries of human behaviour, have implications for terrorist target selection.

The structure of terrorist groups.

As already noted, terrorist groups tend to have a leader or core of leaders, with followers who might be as adept operationally as the leaders, but who are not as interested or competent in the ideology and internal politics of the group.³ Similarly, some people tend to be better at

1) A.Schlesinger. "The Historians and History", Foreign Affairs, 41, (April 1963), 493, quoted in B.Brodie. War and Politics, (London: Cassell, 1973), 279.

2) P.C.Hearst & A.Moscow. Every Secret Thing, 131-132, 109.

3) D.Beresford. Ten Men Dead, 152.

operational planning than at the execution of operations, although in some groups participation and demonstrated competence in the operational side is often necessary to gain the credibility to assume a leadership role.

Group structures vary. Some terrorist groups are a subsection of a wider organisation, as with the Hizbollah and the Tamil Tigers. In other cases, whilst the wider movement is notionally in charge, in practice the terrorist section has a great deal of autonomy, an example of this being the Combat Organisation of the Social Revolutionary Party in early twentieth century Russia.⁴

Where the terrorist group is an autonomous body, its structure may be bureaucratic and hierarchical like the Red Brigades or the Provisional IRA - though in practice operational decisions often take place near the bottom of the structure rather than descend from the top.⁵ An exception was the Greek-Cypriot group EOKA - which fought a highly effective terrorist campaign against the British between 1955 and 1959. This was organised along highly centralised lines, with its commander, George Grivas, exercising strict - though not total - control over all aspects of operations. Grivas states that had he been captured, EOKA could not have survived because of the degree of centralisation. This mode of organisation might have been as much a result of Grivas' rather authoritarian nature as of any strategic considerations.⁶

Other groups are more amorphous in structure. In small informal groups like the early Baader-Meinhof group or the Symbionese Liberation Army, decisions appear to be decided by force of personality rather than by any formal hierarchical

4) A.Geifman. "Aspects of Early Twentieth-Century Russian Terrorism: The Socialist Revolutionary Combat Organization", Terrorism and Political Violence, 4, no. 2, (Summer 1992), 29, 34-35, 38-39. N.Schlieffman. Undercover Agents in the Russian Revolutionary Movement: The SR Party, 1902-14, (London: Macmillan, 1988), 82-118.

5) A.Jamieson. "Entry, Discipline and Exit in the Italian Red Brigades", 5. A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 84-85. G.C.Caselli & D.della Porta. "The history of the Red Brigades", 74. D.Moss, The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in Italy, 57. J.Bowyer Bell. IRA Tactics and Targets, 27, 48, 116.

6) G.Grivas - Dighenis. Guerrilla Warfare, 25, 69.

structure. At the extreme, the structure of the group may be diffuse as with the Animal Liberation Front in Britain or the Revolutionary Cells (Revolutionaeren Zellen - RZ) in Germany, which consist of independent groups who have little if any contact with each other, and who correspond through a very small number of contacts, or communicate policy lines through publications.⁷ For example in the case of the ALF such communications may take place through articles and communiques in journals such as the *ALF Bulletin*.⁸ As Henshaw points out:

... everyone knew who the targets were, so there seemed little point in having all operations directed from headquarters.⁹

However, if a group carries out an action and then claims it in the name of the ALF, the communique is published in an ALF supporters bulletin and is acknowledged by the ALF as their work.¹⁰ In such a case the divide between group members and non-members is permeable. Part of the reasoning behind such a dispersed structure is that by minimising the contacts between individual groups, and between groups and the national offices, there is less chance of the ALF being infiltrated by the police.¹¹ On the other hand coordinated action is also made difficult.

Zawodny, who served in the Polish Resistance, points out that there is nearly always an intrinsic tension between the need for centralised control in order to coordinate actions, and for decentralisation in order to maintain security from enemy penetration.¹² The risk of sending

7) "The making of a martyr", The Daily Telegraph, February 3rd 1995. B.A.Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 43. H.J.Horchem. Terrorism in West Germany, 6.

8) "Far-Right entering anti-hunt groups", The Daily Telegraph, April 7th 1993.

9) D.Henshaw. Animal Warfare, 51.

10) "The making of a martyr", The Daily Telegraph, February 3rd 1995.

11) D.Henshaw. Animal Warfare, 50.

12) J.K.Zawodny. "Guerrilla Warfare and Subversion as a Means of Political Change". Paper presented at the 1961 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel, St Louis, Missouri, September 6th-9th 1961, 7. J.K.Zawodny. "Internal Organizational Problems and the Sources of Tensions of Terrorist Movements as Catalysts of

messages from the leadership to the active terrorists is that the messages may be intercepted by informers or enemy surveillance. The greater the number of messages, the greater the risk.

This is not such a great problem with small groups - such as the original Baader-Meinhof group - because they only consist of one relatively small group. For larger clandestine groups the overall effect is that operational decisions are made by small groups either on the ground or at the higher levels of the group structure. If the organisation covers more than a small area in terms of geography or population then sometimes, but not always, the small local group operates within the guidelines laid down by the leadership of the organisation.¹³ The impact of this in terms of terrorist targeting can be judged by observing the behaviour of terrorist groups, and by seeking to explain their behaviour through existing theories of group behaviour.

The impact of clandestinity on group behaviour.

The pressures of being in a small group involved in a low-intensity conflict are described in a study of soldiers suffering from mental disorders, who were evacuated from Algeria to France during the Algerian War.

The fighters live a long time in little contained collectivity in the same group, with the same chiefs, and often in physically precarious conditions. Tensions of group and conflicts are facilitated and exacerbated, and the drawbacks and insufficiencies of anyone in the group have important repercussions. In the other hand, friendship is strong and durable, the confidence in the chief is total and the selflessness and sacrifice are very spontaneous. However, the wound or the death of a buddy or of the chief can break the morale and combativeness of the whole group.¹⁴

The degree to which the members of a terrorist group are turned in on themselves in this fashion will vary. Such introspection is not so likely in groups which can operate overtly in certain safe havens, such as Hizbollah, some of

Violence", Terrorism: An International Journal, 1, nos. 3/4, 278.

13) M.Crenshaw. "An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism", 467.

14) L.Crocq, M.Crocq, C.Barrois, G.Belensky, & F.D.Jones. "Low-intensity combat psychiatric casualties", P.Pichot, P.Berner, & K.Thau (eds). Psychiatry: The state of the art, 548.

the Palestinian groups in various sponsoring countries, the LTTE in the Jaffna Peninsula of Sri Lanka, or conservative vigilante groups to whose activities the authorities turn a blind eye.

At the other extreme, such pressures are intense for the hard-core leaders of the Red Army Faction in West Germany and members of the Red Brigades in Italy. These terrorists had to live clandestine, isolated lives in states where the degree and extent of surveillance was high, and the result appears to have been similar to that described for the soldiers in Algeria. According the Italian Red Brigadist Adriana Faranda:

[Clandestinity] means choosing to occupy yourself from morning till night with problems of politics, of organization, with fighting, and no longer with normal life And when you remove yourself from society - even from the most ordinary things - when you no longer share even the most basic experiences or emotions with other people you become abstracted, removed. In the long run you actually begin to feel different - why? - because you are different.¹⁵

Patricia Hearst describes a similar experience when the SLA members were hiding in a house in Los Angeles.

We were cut off from the outside world and lived in an isolated realm of our own. We had only our battery-operated radio for news.¹⁶

She later notes that:

We had turned in upon ourselves in our own private worlds, and beyond ourselves we only had each other. ... The atmosphere in that dirty little safehouse was overwhelmingly oppressive.¹⁷

In a small cell-like organisation of this sort, the group becomes the only source of information regarding the outside world and the only source of confirmation of the rightness of the terrorists actions. In the face of external pursuit the group becomes the sole source of security. The group, or more likely the dominant members of the group, interpret events and ideology for the individual, determine a collective moral code, and determine what is and what is not operationally legitimate.

15) A.Jamieson. "Identity and Morality in the Italian Red Brigades", 514.

16) P.C.Hearst & A.Moscow. Every Secret Thing, 197.

17) P.C.Hearst & A.Moscow. Every Secret Thing, 201.

Former members of the Red Army Faction have testified the extent to which, even before they went underground, they tended to mix only with like minded people.¹⁸ In such circumstances it becomes easy for judgements by the group or by individuals in the group to be affected by self-reinforcing group values rather than more generally held values. In his examination of the political socialisation of West German left-wing terrorists, Wasmund notes that individual terrorists acted as though they were absolved of responsibility for their terrorist actions by the group's ideology.¹⁹ ETA members and their families also appear to lead restricted lives, although they do maintain links with the world outside the organisation.²⁰ As will be seen, much the same applies to members of the Provisional IRA.

Thus, operational decision-making in clandestine terrorist organisations tends to take place in small groups which operate under a high degree of external pressure.²¹ Given this state of affairs, it is worthwhile examining theories on decision-making in small groups in order to see if any might be appropriate in helping to explain the actions of terrorist groups.

Theories of group behaviour and terrorist groups.

There are various theories concerning the ways in which individuals interact within groups. Some of these appear to be applicable to the circumstances in which terrorist groups operate. A factor which is applicable to terrorist groups is the extent to which people are willing to conform either to authority, or to peer pressure. A number of experiments from the mid 1930s onwards have shown a fairly strong tendency for subjects to accept the judgement of their peers if they find

18) K.Wasmund. "The political socialization of terrorist groups in West Germany", Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 11, (Fall 1983), 228, 233.

19) K.Wasmund. "The political socialization of terrorist groups in West Germany", 236. K.Wasmund. "The Political Socialization of West German Terrorists", P.H.Merkl (ed). Political Violence and Terror, 219.

20) R.P.Clark. The Basques, 121-124. R.P.Clark. "Patterns in the Lives of ETA members", 283-284, 293-294, 303-306.

21) Contrasting images of life underground are given by G.Capotorto, "How Terrorists look at Kidnappings". J.Bowyer Bell. "Revolutionary Dynamics".

themselves in a minority.²² The surprising extent to which people obey those in authority - even to the extent of causing pain to others - was demonstrated by the psychologist Stanley Milgram in experiments in the early 1960s.²³ Finally, Janis' study of decision-making in foreign policy, and the phenomenon of 'groupthink' appears to be highly applicable to the activities of terrorist groups.²⁴ Janis defines groupthink as:

... a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' striving for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action.²⁵

As a result the group overestimates its own capabilities, assumes a moral superiority relative to the enemy, closes its mind to alternatives to the agreed consensus, exerts pressure to conform upon group members, and assumes that silence on the part of group members implies consent to any decision made.²⁶

This accent on conformity does seem to apply to terrorists. The Red Brigadist Adriana Faranda has noted that when one is so absorbed in a long-term commitment one accepts decisions, even if one is in a dissenting minority: "You support the others. It's a kind of pact of obedience".²⁷ Scharlau has examined the applicability of groupthink to left-wing terrorist groups in the former West Germany - in particular to the desire of the RAF leadership to escalate the level of violence following the suicide of the leaders of the RAF in Stammheim Prison in 1977. He believes that groupthink might partially explain how the leadership was able to conceive of committing acts - bomb attacks on the

22) H.Brown. People, Groups, and Society, 2-7, 9, 11-15.

23) K.Heskin. Northern Ireland: A Psychological Analysis, 87-88. H.Brown. People, Groups, and Society, 16-19.

24) I.Janis. Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, revised and enlarged, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982).

25) I.Janis. Groupthink, 9.

26) I.Janis. Groupthink, 174-175. J.E.Dougherty & R.L.Pfaltzgraf. Contending Theories of International Relations, third edition, (New York: Harper & Row, 1990), 499.

27) A.Jamieson. The Heart Attacked, 281.

police - which it turned out, the membership was not willing to endorse, and which had to be abandoned.²⁸

One can also see how the Army Council of the Provisional IRA, as described by Bowyer Bell, could be seen as the types of group to which groupthink could apply.²⁹

Mostly the IRA has been dominated at the top by very few commanders, one to three, who are associated on the Army Council or Executive with colleagues they have known for years, often a lifetime. Real power, based on consensus, tacit agreement, like minds, remains at the center within the Army Council, the nexus of the system and still for some the legitimate government of Ireland.³⁰

He also notes that there is an ingrained conservatism and pragmatism within the top levels of the organisation.³¹

Arguably, such a high degree of consensus does not extend throughout the Provisionals, otherwise it is difficult to explain the divisions which followed the ceasefire of 1975-1976, nor why the republican leadership felt it necessary to reassure the membership that the ceasefire of 1994-1996 was in accordance with republican interests and was not an abandonment of the republican tradition.³² However, the fact that the ceasefire of 1994-1996 was largely observed by the Provisional - with the permitted exception of attacks on 'anti-social' criminal elements in Belfast and Derry - demonstrates that the leadership persuaded or commanded a high degree of acquiescence amongst the members.

The concept of 'risky shift' or 'shift to extremity' is also relevant to terrorist target selection. This is the notion that decisions made by groups tend to be more extreme than the individual preferences of members of the group, and are also more extreme than the average of the individual preferences of group members. A number of reasons have been attributed to this phenomenon, including the desire to conform, the desire to appear decisive, and the notion that

28) B.A.Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 187-188.

29) J.Bowyer Bell. IRA Tactics and Targets, 15.

30) J.Bowyer Bell. IRA Tactics and Targets, 14.

31) J.Bowyer Bell. IRA Tactics and Targets, 111-112.

32) For the rise of the northerners & the split in 1986 see: P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 275-287, 310, 315. L.Clarke. Broadening the Battlefield, 29, 84-85, 228-241. E.Mallie & D.McKittrick. The Fight for Peace, 201-202, 314-318, 381-383. B.Rowan. Behind the Lines, 55, 84-85.

one can afford to take riskier decisions as part of a group because one can spread responsibility if things go wrong.³³ Of relevance is the fact that regular soldiers appeared likelier to take risky decisions than student reservists, who in turn took riskier decisions than other students.³⁴ The relevance of this to the behaviour of terrorist groups is that, like regular soldiers, terrorists are - as noted earlier - action-orientated, favouring action over words. By the fact that they are willing to make the change from legality to illegality terrorists show that they are willing to take risks. Thus, if the concept of 'risky shift' is correct - and given the clannish nature of terrorist groups, there are substantial grounds to believe that these theories should be applicable to terrorist groups - then one could expect that terrorists would take greater risks and possibly become more reckless over time. Thus, McKee and Franey's detailed account of the activities of a PIRA cell in London in 1974 and 1975 suggests that as time went on they became more and more affected by a form of bravado. This ended in December 1975 when they openly carried out a gun attack from a moving car on a restaurant in the centre of London. They were chased and trapped by the police in a flat in Balcombe Street, where they surrendered six days later.³⁵

Observation of other groups seems to bear some of these points out. Zawodny - who was a member of the Polish resistance - claims that reckless actions by the more violent or impetuous members of a group, can force the leadership to endorse such actions retrospectively for fear of losing the groups internal cohesion or even splitting the organisation.³⁶ This area has already been touched on in the

33) A.I.Teger & D.G.Pruitt. "Components of Group Risk Taking", Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 3 (1967). S.Moscovici & M.Zavalloni. "The Group as a Polarizer of Attitudes", Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 12, no 2. R.Brown. Group Processes: Dynamics within and between Groups, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 143, 142-158 *passim*.

34) A.K.Semmel & D.Minix. "Small-Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Experimental Approach", L.S.Falkowski (ed). Psychological Models in International Politics, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979).

35) G.McKee & R.Franey. Time Bomb, 330-347.

36) J.K.Zawodny. "Infrastructures of Terrorist Organizations", L.Z.Freedman & Y.Alexander (eds).

chapter concerning ideology, where it was noted that the leadership of some terrorist groups issued retrospective ideological justification for actions of which they disapproved. However, in one case early in the Northern Irish troubles, the PIRA initially denied involvement in an operation which was carried out by one of their own units. In March 1971, Provisional IRA members who had lured three unsuspecting off-duty soldiers into a trap by befriending them in a bar and inviting them to a party. They were shot dead by a roadside outside Belfast. At that time PIRA standing orders were to only attack soldiers who were on duty. Dillon and Lehane argue that the killings may have been instigated by a local unit which believed that the central leadership was insufficiently militant.³⁷

Similarly, Chris Hani, the head of the African National Congress' armed wing, Spear of the Nation (Umkhonto we Sizwe - MK), stated that he allowed bomb attacks on soft white civilian targets such as supermarkets because:

If we don't increase our level of violence, we'll risk losing the support of young blacks in the townships.³⁸

In 1985 the ANC President, Oliver Tambo, noted the difficulties of restraining the relatively untrained and embittered township youths who increasingly made up much of MK, from attacking soft white targets.³⁹

This tendency is not confined to communist and separatist terrorist groups. Studies of racial attacks on immigrants in Scandinavia indicate that group members, particularly those who are relatively new to the group, are put under pressure by other members of the group to carry out riskier attacks than they would do otherwise.⁴⁰

The theories of groupthink and risky shift could provide a partial explanation as to why some terrorist groups

Perspectives on Nuclear Terrorism, 67. J.K.Zawodny. "Internal Organizational Problems and the Sources of Tensions of Terrorist Movements as Catalysts of Violence", 281-282.

37) M.Dillon. The Dirty War, 233-236. P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 177-178. K.J.Kelley. The Longest War, 150. M.Dillon & D.Lehane. Political Murder in Northern Ireland, 255-256.

38) H.Holland. The Struggle, 228.

39) H.Holland. The Struggle, 206, 219.

40) T.Bjorgo. "Terrorist Violence against Immigrants and Refugees in Scandinavia", 40-42.

escalate their campaigns, both in the intensity of their actions and the nature of the targets which they attack. Commenting on German communist terrorist groups Wasmund notes that:

The isolation of the group and the resulting constriction of reality promotes the process of mutual escalation to more and more radical actions.⁴¹

Those who dissent from this can be isolated or threatened with expulsion. Andreas Baader, who established his leadership role in the RAF through a rather venomous and incoherent force of character, demanded conformity by threatening to expel members of the group who were not sufficiently 'tough'. Members who did not subjugate their own judgement to that of the group - for example by protesting that certain operations would endanger bystanders - were isolated by other members.⁴² Having said this, an individual terrorist with a strong enough character can still defy the collective morality. When in 1977 the RAF threatened to bomb three Lufthansa passenger jets if three of their comrades were not released, one of their members, Hans-Joachim Klein made it clear that once the first plane went down he would "tell everything" to the authorities. Soon afterwards Klein left the RAF.⁴³

This leads on to Jenkins' view that terrorists operate under self-imposed moral and practical restraints. He does not believe that terrorists generally indulge in 'pure terrorism' - that is violence aimed at getting the most

41) K.Wasmund. "The political socialization of terrorist groups in West Germany", 235.

42) S.Aust. The Baader-Meinhof Group, 92-93. B.A.Scharlau. Left-Wing Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany, 176, 184. J.M.Post. "Hostilite, Conformite, Fraternite", 216. J.M.Post. "Prospects for Nuclear Terrorism: Psychological Motivations and Constraints", P.Leventhal & Y.Alexander (eds). Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: The Report and Papers of the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1987), 94. J.M.Post. "Terrorist psycho-logic", 33-34. K.Wasmund. "The political socialization of terrorist groups in West Germany", 235. P.Taylor. States of Terror, 80.

43) Der Spiegel, August 7th 1978, cited in G.Bass et al. Motivations and Possible Actions of Potential Criminal Adversaries of US Nuclear Programs, 7.

attention and causing the most alarm due to its sheer randomness.⁴⁴

For years, I have been convinced that the actions of even those we call terrorists are limited by self imposed constraints that derive from moral considerations or political calculations. The growing volume of testimony from terrorists interviewed while still at large, interrogated in prison or testifying at trials has, I believe, borne out that notion.⁴⁵

The moral restraints occur because most terrorists are not "wanton killers" and only see certain targets as legitimate.⁴⁶ He differentiates between left-wing and right-wing groups, believing that left-wing terrorists tend to target the personnel or institutions of the state rather than carry out indiscriminate attacks whilst right-wing groups carry out indiscriminate attacks in order to create a popular clamour for a strong (i.e. right-wing authoritarian) government. He attributes this difference in target selection to ideological differences; the left-wing groups seeing themselves as acting against the state in the interests of ordinary people, whilst right-wing terrorists see ordinary people as a disorganised mass to be manipulated through fear.⁴⁷

Another theory relating to human behaviour which might be worth exploring in greater depth for its applicability to terrorist target selection, comes from David Canter, a criminal psychologist. He notes that serial offenders - in this case murderers and rapists - tend to commit their initial crimes in the vicinity of their place of residence. Later - even if they make a point of carrying out their crimes away from their home area - the pattern of their actions forms a rough circle within which their place of residence is generally located.⁴⁸

The need for a secure runback, and the desire to operate in areas with which one is more familiar might result in similar patterns emerging with terrorist groups operating from a particular base area. It corresponds with the comment

44) B.M.Jenkins. International Terrorism: A New Kind of Warfare, 4.

45) B.M.Jenkins. The Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism, 7.

46) B.M.Jenkins. High Technology Terrorism and Surrogate War, 11.

47) B.M.Jenkins. The Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism, 8.

48) D.Canter. Criminal Shadows, 125-158.

of Sean MacStiophain, PIRA Chief of Staff in the early 1970s, that PIRA members should ideally be from the locality in which they operate, in order to operate within a supportive environment and to have an intimate knowledge of their area of operations.⁴⁹ This has its disadvantages. Clarke points out that in Northern Ireland up to the 1970s, the security forces could often identify who was responsible for a terrorist attack by the location of the initial stages of the operation such as the hijacking of a car.⁵⁰ The author of the PIRA reorganisation document of 1977 also noted this when he stated that it was desirable for cells to operate away from their home territory in order to confuse British intelligence, although the extent to which this actually happened is uncertain.⁵¹

In practice Canter's ideas may be of some relevance in studying a group like the Provisionals. McKeown and McKeever both note that fatalities resulting from the conflict in Northern Ireland are concentrated in particular parts of the Province.⁵² McKeown demonstrates this by showing the number of deaths in areas of roughly equal population - parliamentary constituencies. This is shown in Table 10.1. It is worth noting that different types of operation are also more likely in some areas than in others. Those areas containing a high proportion of Catholics and a low proportion of Protestants have seen a high proportion of deaths resulting from clashes between republicans and the security forces, whilst those with a more even religious spread have a higher proportion of deaths resulting from sectarian attacks. Those areas with a high proportion of Protestants and a low proportion of Catholics have seen a relatively low level of violence overall. Thus one sees republican terrorists carrying out attacks on the security forces in relatively strongly Catholic areas such as Newry & Armagh and west Belfast whilst sectarian attacks by both

49) R.W.White & T.F.White. "Revolution in the City", 107.

50) L.Clarke. Broadening the Battlefield, 41.

51) L.Clarke. Broadening the Battlefield, 252. T.P.Coogan. The IRA, 580.

52) M.McKeown. Two Seven Six Three, 49-54. R.McKeever. "Repartition: An Irish Solution to the Northern Irish Problem". Paper for presentation at ECPR Joint Workshop on Theories of Political Violence in Bochum, West Germany, April 2nd to 7th 1990, 26-32.

republican and loyalist terrorists are more pronounced in areas such as north Belfast.

The pattern also has implications for the likely location of attacks by specific terrorist units. In particular West Belfast, which has a strong concentration of Catholics in the Falls area and is close to the Protestant Shankill, has a high proportion of sectarian attacks and attacks on the security forces. This suggests that terrorists on both sides tend not to operate too far from home areas to

TABLE 10.1
INCIDENCE OF FATALITIES ACROSS THE PARLIAMENTARY
CONSTITUENCIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND
JULY 13th 1969-JULY 12th 1989.

Constituency	ARMED STRUGGLE		SECTARIAN CONFLICT		TOTAL	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
N.Down	1	0.1	5	0.6	8	0.3
Strangford	18	1.2	4	0.5	23	0.8
S.Down	63	4.2	17	2.0	81	2.9
Lagan Valley	32	2.2	32	3.8	75	2.7
Upper Bann	44	3.0	50	6.0	103	3.7
Newry & Armagh	258	17.4	53	6.3	352	12.7
Fermanagh/S.Tyrone	182	12.2	35	4.2	228	8.3
Mid-Ulster	99	6.7	13	1.6	119	4.3
Foyle	235	15.8	14	1.7	275	10.0
E.Londonderry	49	3.3	8	1.0	59	2.1
N.Antrim	1	0.1	5	0.6	8	0.3
E.Antrim	18	1.2	14	1.7	24	0.9
S.Antrim	9	0.6	37	4.4	53	1.9
Belfast North	150	10.1	281	33.5	544	19.7
Belfast West	253	17.0	156	18.6	544	19.7
Belfast South	50	3.4	59	7.0	137	4.6
Belfast East	22	1.5	55	6.6	111	4.0
TOTAL	1486	100.0	838	100.1	2763	98.9

N.B. Percentages rounded up or down to nearest 0.1%. *Armed Struggle* category includes security force personnel and associated civilians killed by republican terrorists, republican terrorists killed by security force personnel, chance civilian fatalities, and accidental republican terrorist and security force fatalities. *Sectarian Conflict* category includes Catholic civilian fatalities due to loyalist attacks, Protestant civilian fatalities due to republican attacks, and accidental or unintended Protestant victims of loyalist activities.

Source: M.McKeown. Two Seven Six Three, 50, 52.

which they can quickly retreat after an operation, with republicans attacking the security forces patrolling their

areas whilst the loyalists attack ordinary Catholics an adjoining area.⁵³ This pattern is not confined to Northern Ireland. With regard to the Basque group ETA, Clark has found that the bulk of actions occur in the areas where the group receives most of its support and recruits.⁵⁴

One should be careful here not to read too much into apparent parallels between the actions of the serial attackers studied by Canter and the activities of terrorists. This is particularly so if the terrorists are prone to carry out attacks abroad - such as Palestinian groups like the PFLP and FRC - or do not have a defined territorial base - such as the Red Army Faction or Japanese Red Army. However, where the terrorist campaign is mainly confined to a given area, and where much of the decision-making takes place at the local level, one might see similar patterns.

Case study: The structure of the Provisional IRA.


The Provisional IRA has a well-defined command structure although, as with any formal design, the reality is somewhat less tidy. In theory the supreme body in the PIRA is the Army Convention, which is made up of delegates from the various PIRA units. It elects the Army Executive, an advisory and oversight committee of twelve. This in turn elects the Army Council - a committee of seven - which elects one of its number as Chief of Staff - a chairman whose power seems to be largely dependent upon force of personality and the respect in which the individual is held.

The Army Council is technically where power and legitimacy lie in the Provisional IRA. General Headquarters (GHQ) coordinates the PIRA campaign, and the activities of the two geographical commands. Northern Command deals with the day to day running of the military campaign in Northern Ireland. Southern Command essentially acts as a logistics base. Under Northern Command and Southern Command are the smaller geographical units at brigade and battalion level as shown in Figure 10.1. These have a coordinating function

53) On this form of loyalist attack see M.Dillon & D.Lehane. Political Murder in Northern Ireland, 177-178, 182, 211-212. M.Dillon. The Shankill Butchers, 159.


54) R.P.Clark. The Basque Insurgents, 185-203.

FIGURE 10.1
PROVISIONAL IRA COMMAND STRUCTURE



Sources: M.Dillon. The Dirty War. B.O'Brien. The Long War. P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA.

FIGURE 10.2
BRIGADE ORGANISATION OF THE PROVISIONAL IRA
IN THE NORTHERN COMMAND AREA



- N.B. a) OC means Officer Commanding.
 b) Cells do not necessarily contain the same number of operatives. For example there might only be one or two snipers.
 c) The number of cells varies from one brigade to another.

Sources: M.Dillon. The Dirty War. B.O'Brien. The Long War. P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA. L.Clarke. Broadening the Battlefield.

within their area. Control over weapons is often held by quartermasters at this level. Active Service Units (ASUs) are the small cells which carry out the bulk of attacks against the security forces and against other targets. They consist of between approximately four and twelve members depending on

the area of operations - with urban ASUs tending to be at the lower end of this scale - and whether they are training people. The companies carry out low-level enforcement activities such as knee-capping joy-riders, creating diversions, acting as couriers for weapons and messages, and gathering intelligence. Membership of the various levels is not mutually exclusive, (with the exception that one may not be a member of the Army Executive and the Army Council).

In theory PIRA strategy is set by the bodies within the shaded area in Figure 10.1. However, the links between this area and the units on the ground can be tenuous due to the need for clandestinity and the minimisation of internal communications in order to avoid surveillance by security organisations. For these reasons the operation of the PIRA is theoretically on a 'need to know' basis with minimal contact between different levels within the organisation or between different cells. One person within an ASU may be responsible for referring ideas up to the brigade level and for transmitting orders from above to other members of the ASU. Communications are deliberately kept to a minimum, and are often conducted either in face to face meetings, or by couriers rather than through quicker but less secure methods.

PIRA members tend to live in a highly-supportive but closeted environment. In the early 1990s a member of the Provisional IRA remarked; "The longer you move in the IRA the more you know you're moving in a very incestuous community".⁵⁵ Whilst the PIRA is comparatively well integrated into the local community, PIRA members and senior Sinn Fein members have had to live within relatively safe Catholic areas for security reasons if for no other.⁵⁶ This is exacerbated by the high degree of residential separation between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland.⁵⁷ A result, according to a senior PIRA member in August 1994, local PIRA units tend to concentrate on their immediate conflict with the police, British Army, and loyalist

55) F.O'Connor. In Search of a State: Catholics in Northern Ireland, (Belfast: Blackstaff, 1993), 125.

56) F.O'Connor. In Search of a State, 125. E.MacDonald. Shoot the Women First, 141. "Local Hero", Esquire, December 1993/January 1994. P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 12.

57) D.McKittrick. Endgame, 36-46.

paramilitaries, to the exclusion of the wider context.⁵⁸ This is also caused by a fairly limited perception, verging on indifference, to the way in which they are viewed by people outside the Northern Irish Catholic community - that is outside their circle of supporters and potential sympathisers. For instance, whilst the Provisionals claim that their attacks on local security forces or contractors for the security forces are not sectarian, they appear to be indifferent to the fact that they are seen as sectarian by the Protestant community.⁵⁹

This localism, in combination with security considerations and the differing circumstances between one area and another, has meant that units are largely allowed to operate on the basis of local initiative. This should mean that they choose their own targets within the guidelines set at the higher levels of the organisation. In practice it can involve the influence of local enmities and the shortcomings of local intelligence-collection.⁶⁰ This was illustrated in November 1987 when a PIRA unit planted a bomb near the Enniskillen war memorial with the intention of killing members of the Ulster Defence Regiment. A PIRA spokesman noted:

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- 58) "No surrender", Fortnight, September 1994, 16. Also see P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 390-391.
- 59) "Ex-Speaker killed by IRA as reprisal", The Times, January 23rd 1981. "Tyrone IRA group one of the most active", The Irish Times, May 11th 1987. S.McAughtry. Down in the Free State, (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1987), 58. M.Dillon & D.Lehane. Political Murder in Northern Ireland, 259-260. J.Darby. Intimidation and the Control of Conflict in Northern Ireland, 136-137. "Gritting it out on Border farmlands", The Irish Times, March 3rd 1983. "Centre of hatred returns to Armagh", The Irish Times, November 23rd 1983. "Troubles prompt moves to 'fortresses'", The Independent on Sunday, November 1st 1992. D.McKittrick. Endgame, 232.
- 60) "A tribal past lingers in modern hate", The Independent, June 4th 1991. "Rising tide of death threats sharpens fear in East Tyrone", The Irish Times, September 8th 1992. "Attempt by IRA to murder church caretaker condemned as sectarian", The Irish Times, September 10th 1992. "The deadly results of pub talk suspicions", The Irish Times, September 14th 1992. S.MacStiofain. Revolutionary in Ireland, 253. T.P.Coogan. The IRA, 472. M.Dillon & D.Lehane. Political Murder in Northern Ireland, 260. J.Bowyer Bell, IRA Tactics and Targets, 27, 48, 110-114, 116.

The unit probably described it to the next most senior person as an attempt to kill three or four soldiers.

Well, we try that several times a week, you don't need to have a meeting about it.⁶¹

Instead they killed eleven civilians and injured sixty-three.⁶² The Enniskillen bombing illustrated the pattern of decision-making within the Provisional IRA, in particular the extent to which decision-making over routine operations is delegated downwards, and the operational short-comings of such a system.

Summary.

Terrorist groups tend to start off as informal groups, but if they survive for long they usually develop a form of hierarchy. However, due to the requirements of clandestinity, decisions are often taken at the operational level by relatively small, introspective, groups within the overall structure. Theories on group behaviour and some practical examples suggest that such groups will tend to follow an authoritative leader and will display high degrees of conformity to group decisions. However, they are also action-orientated and, unless strictly controlled by the leadership, may be prone to taking increasingly reckless decisions as time passes. These latter tendencies increase with the extent to which group members are isolated by clandestinity from personal opinions and judgements emanating from people outside the group. Again, without strong leadership this can lead to an escalation of the campaign in terms of the number and types of targets attacked. When much of the PIRA leadership was interned in 1971-1972, one result was a higher volume of uncoordinated, indiscriminate violence carried out by young, aggressive, and undisciplined terrorists.⁶³

Where the terrorist campaign takes on a localised nature, as in Northern Ireland, one will find that in addition to the precepts of ideology and strategy proclaimed by the leaders of the group, decisions are likely to take

61) "Bombing 'devastating' to IRA", The Independent, November 11th 1987.

62) "11 die in Poppy Day massacre", The Times, November 9th 1987. P.Bishop & E.Mallie. The Provisional IRA, 459-461.

63) M.Dillon & D.Lehane. Political Murder in Northern Ireland, 257-258. M.L.R.Smith. Fighting for Ireland, 120.

into account local enmities, perceptions, and priorities. The factors which determine target selection are manifold, but the question which remains to be answered is how they relate to each other.

Conclusions

Introduction.

At the outset of this study, it was said that terrorist target selection can be seen in terms of motive, means, and opportunity. Even though terrorist groups and their objectives may be wildly different, this observation largely holds true, and provides a means of weaving into a coherent pattern the various strands which have been examined in the previous chapters. At the end it should prove possible to construct a model which, whilst is broad enough to cover the bulk of groups, and at the same time is detailed enough to provide some idea as to why terrorists attack the targets which they do.

Motive.

The terrorist's motive for an attack is the reason why they believe that it may be both right and beneficial to attack that target. A number of elements make up the motive, or more commonly motives, behind a terrorist attack. Although not all of these elements will apply to all attacks, they are not mutually exclusive, and in some respects they are interdependent.

The first element in a terrorist group's motive for attacking a specific target is the ideology of the group. Their reason for existence in the first place is to achieve those political goals which flow from their ideology. In addition to this, the ideology conditions the way in which the terrorists view the surrounding world, or at least those parts of it which they deem relevant to their cause. People, institutions, and events are viewed through the prism of their ideology, leading to an interpretation of them which may bear little resemblance to those perceived by their victims or other actors, but which influences the way in which the terrorist group reacts to them.


Most importantly for this study, ideology enables the terrorists to determine to their own satisfaction those specific people, institutions, or objects which may be seen as 'legitimate' targets. As noted, this notion of legitimacy is not the same as commonly-held notions of guilt and innocence. The terrorists may deem some of their targets to

be 'guilty' of what they may view to be an offence in terms of their ideology, but this concept must be seen in terms of their own idiosyncratic beliefs and indeed may not be based upon any particular action which the target has taken. Thus members of a European communist terrorist group may attack a prominent businessman because he is seen to be part of the capitalist economic system, whilst a Latin American conservative terrorist group may attack members of a trade union as suspected subversives, even though in each case the victims did not see themselves in the terms formulated by the terrorists. Indeed at the extreme people may be attacked because the terrorists deem them to be targets on the basis of an affiliation or grouping such as ethnicity, religion, colour, or merely the fact that by being in a certain place they are deemed to have somehow placed themselves in opposition to the terrorists. At the extreme, such as random mass casualty attacks, the terrorists may believe that all but their own members can legitimately be attacked if it furthers the overriding interest of their cause.

However, whilst ideology provides the basic motive for an attack, it only provides an initial range of targets - sometimes narrow, sometimes very wide - whom the terrorists deem it legitimate to attack. With the exception of strategic and tactical manuals written by ideologists such as Mao, Guevara, and Marighela, ideology does not generally provide the terrorists with a motive for attacking specific targets as a way of furthering their political objectives. Furthermore, terrorists tend not to return to ideological first-principles each time they plan an attack, largely taking for granted their early judgements that certain people or things are legitimate targets. Instead they work to an outline which is generally supplied by their strategy.

A terrorist group's strategy is the general plan or approach by which the terrorists intend to use suitable methods to achieve their political objectives. Whilst it need not be particularly complex, it provides the practical - as opposed to ideological - rationale for an attack because it identifies the practical benefits which the terrorists hope to gain by it. In the chapter concerning strategy these benefits were identified in terms of strategic objectives

such as the elimination of threats to the group, the advertisement of the terrorist's cause, the attrition of their opponent's willpower, and various other objectives. In order to attain these objectives the terrorists have to attack suitable targets. They will not attain their objectives merely by attacking any targets which they consider to be legitimate, indeed to do so may be counter-productive if it provokes the disapproval of their supporters. Returning to the model of terrorism outlined near the start of this study:



the terrorists have to affect the psychological target in such a way that its reaction will gain the desired strategic objectives.

In contrast to conventional warfare, or even guerrilla warfare, where the aim is to attain political goals by achieving physical military objectives, the point of terrorism is to attain political goals by achieving primarily psychological objectives. These may include imposing psychological pressure or even fear upon an enemy, but can also include raising the morale of one's supporters, coercing neutral bystanders, provoking the enemy into actions detrimental to himself, or eliminating threats to the group. This is the point of using terrorism as part of a wider strategy, and in order to do this the terrorists have to attack physical targets which will induce the desired reactions in their psychological targets.

If necessary it would seem that ideological considerations may be overridden, or at least stretched, in order to promote a group's strategic objectives. The Provisional IRA's attacks on senior businessmen in 1977 and those on civilian contractors from 1985 onwards, were both cases where the terrorists attacked people who had previously fallen outside the range of legitimate targets because of the

ease with which they could be attacked and because of the strategic objectives which could be attained by attacking them. Similarly, the Hizbollah's kidnapping of the western hostages in the Lebanon did not involve abducting people who were necessarily in open conflict with Hizbollah, but abducting people whose states could supply weapons to Iran, or apply pressure to have Hizbollah prisoners released from prisons in Kuwait, Israel, and elsewhere. Being somehow affiliated to a state or institution in a position to influence a terrorist's enemy could lead to one being classified as a legitimate target for strategic reasons even if the ideological justification for the act may be rather shaky. Thus the strategy adopted determines, to a degree, the range of targets which the terrorists will think it beneficial to attack.

Those considerations affecting the strategy of the group supply additional motives for the choice of targets. The desire to protect the group can often lead to attacks on people or institutions which threaten the group or constrict its abilities - such as informers, internal dissidents, hostile elements in the security forces, enemy terrorists, and various other threats. However this is a somewhat negative consideration, and terrorists are primarily concerned to carry out attacks which help to achieve strategic by the effect which they have on various psychological targets.

For instance, if terrorists wish to maintain their core support and obtain the endorsement of potential sympathisers, they will generally try to minimise their attacks on targets which have a high degree of public sympathy and maximise their attacks on targets which are unpopular. Likewise, if they wish the attacks to advertise their cause they will probably attack targets which are highly symbolic in relation to it, and which have sufficient publicity value to gain widespread attention. This can be reinforced by the release of statements which attempt to link the attack to their cause, and which may seek to present the terrorists in a favourable light despite the bloodshed or destruction which they may have caused.

On the other hand, if their strategic objective includes enforcing compliance by the psychological target - such as uncommitted or even unsympathetic people - terrorists will attack targets, and possibly release statements, which will create fear and obedience in the psychological target. Similarly, if they wish to disorientate the psychological target - whether it be a small group or a large mass of people - their attacks will aim at creating an atmosphere of uncertainty and anxiety amongst them.

An important point to note in examining ideology and strategy as motives in terrorist target selection, is that whilst strategy may be affected by considerations such as the group's capability, the security environment, and external opinion, such considerations are very unlikely to affect the ideology of the group except over the very long term. Thus ideology provides a fairly rigid framework within which a strategy may evolve and be altered as required.

Finally, in considering those elements which motivate the selection of terrorist targets, one should consider the impact of internal factors. The dynamics within a terrorist group may do much to determine target selection because they can affect the ideology, strategy, and tactics of the group. The selection of targets can be due to factors such as the need for the leadership to keep the members in line and avoid splits, and the extent to which local rather than central factors take priority in determining target selection. In the first place the terrorist leaders may use violence against members whom they believe are threatening to split the group or are otherwise behaving in a disobedient fashion. However, they may also permit attacks which damage the interests of the group if they fear that resistance to such actions will risk a split in the group. This problem may be exacerbated where there are local units of a larger terrorist organisation, who give priority to local factors over the ideological and strategic precepts of the leadership. As the terrorist campaign continues, the psychological effects of clandestinity and the self-reinforcing belief that a strategy of violence is the correct path to choose, may lead the terrorist leaders and their members to behave in an increasingly reckless manner - attacking targets which they

would not have attacked previously and showing less regard for the risk of causing incidental damage or deaths.

The important thing to bear in mind about the elements which constitute the motives for an attack is that they do not function separately, but act upon each other. Thus, the ideology of a terrorist group has an impact upon strategy because it equips the terrorists with a world-view and a moral framework which defines, to a degree, what is acceptable and what is not. The strategy in turn affects - and is affected by other motivating factors such as public opinion and the internal dynamics of the group. These factors can affect the way in which members of the group think and thus, over the long term, affect some aspects of the group's ideology. However, whilst motivating factors may indicate the range of targets which the terrorists may wish to attack, other factors narrow the range of potential targets.

Means.

The means available to a terrorist group are both tangible and intangible. On the one hand there are tangible means such as weapons, financial resources, and personnel. These give the terrorists the physical means with which to carry out an attack. The absence of such resources places constraints on the terrorist's scope in selecting targets. A lack of powerful weapons means that certain targets are too difficult to attack, whilst a lack in the quantity of weapons limits the number of attacks which they can carry out.

The intangible means such as technical skill, strategic ability, political judgement, and the ability to organise both people and resources, allow the terrorists to use the tangible means to the best effect. On the other hand poor operational leadership can result in the failure of operations, the loss of personnel and resources, and in botched attacks which cause unintended deaths or damage, alienate potential sympathisers and supporters, and possibly split the group. Even with those terrorists who are technically competent, a lack of strategic ability and political judgement amongst the leaders can mean that whilst individual operations are successful in material terms, they do not advance the political objectives of the group. The aim

of the leadership must be to synchronise terrorist operations with strategic objectives, otherwise all one has is violence.

The ability of terrorists to attack their targets of choice can be both constrained and enhanced by the means at their disposal. In the obvious sense, their ability to attack targets can be affected by the weaponry at their disposal. However, it must be remembered that this is affected by the ability of the terrorists to obtain them in the first place, necessitating money, contacts, or the ability to carry out straightforward theft.

Attacks on especially soft targets - such as unprotected civilians - may be possible with pistols, crude bombs, or even knives, but successful attacks on heavily-protected targets, such as government members or protected buildings, generally require more powerful or more sophisticated weapons. This is not to say that groups using unsophisticated weapons such as knives are necessarily ineffective. The Naxalites in India in the early 1970s were very effective at attacking civilians and low-grade police officers, and the so-called 'Shankill Butchers' unit of the Ulster Volunteer Force were highly proficient at terrorising Catholic civilians, but neither group attempted to attack particularly hard targets. The only benefit from automatic weapons and explosives for such groups would be the ability to kill larger numbers of civilians more quickly.

On the other hand groups such as the Red Army Faction and the Provisional IRA have proved capable of attacking well-protected targets - such as the chairman of a major bank and the British Prime Minister's residence respectively - because of their ability to make relatively sophisticated weapons. In larger conflicts, such as the LTTE's conflict with the Sri Lankan Government, a terrorist group may also be capable of fighting a guerrilla war or even an open conventional war. Essentially, a groups ability to attack targets of choice - either specific people or objects or those people or objects belonging to a targeted category - depends upon the range of weapons available to it.

This factor leads on to the ability of the terrorists themselves. However well-equipped the terrorists may be in terms of material resources, it is of little use if they are

unable to use them effectively. In the first instance their capability is affected by their competence with weapons. With simpler firearms, bombs, and knives, there is no necessity for a great deal of expertise, but the range of targets available to the terrorists is consequently limited. However, if terrorists are capable of using or indeed manufacturing sophisticated weaponry, it expands the range of targets which they can attack.

If the attacking terrorists are willing to face a certain death, the range of potential targets is greatly increased because protective measures based on the deterrent value of certain death have no worth. Examples include the suicide bombers from the Hizbollah in Lebanon, Tamil militants in Sri Lanka, and Hamas in Israel and the Israeli-occupied territories. In these cases a protection system which depends upon reactive security - for instance guards able to react to an attack - but which lack barriers sufficient to keep assailants out in the first place, becomes worthless. Obviously this greatly increases the means available to those planning the attacks.

Allied to the ability to use weapons is the ability to plan operations. If the terrorists are incompetent when it comes to the mechanics of setting up a logistical network in terms of safe houses and arms dumps, collating information and transforming it into usable intelligence, planning the insertion and withdrawal of the operational team, and the various other aspects of terrorist operations, then they are unlikely to survive for long. For instance, slipshod operations based upon poor intelligence - such as the PIRA bombing of the Remembrance Day Parade in Enniskillen in November 1987 - are as likely to end in the death of bystanders as the intended target.¹ Furthermore, in some cases the Provisionals have attacked somebody, only to find that due to poor intelligence work they had attacked the wrong person.² Thus, shortcomings in the operational

1) D. McKittrick. Despatches from Belfast, 203-207.

2) "11 die in Cenotaph blast", The Independent, November 9th 1987. "Attacks fits into a pattern of errors", The Independent, April 13th 1989. "IRA apologises for murder of Australians", The Independent, May 29th 1990. "Car bomb attack on Thatcher advisor fails", The Independent, August 7th 1990. "Belfast statements",

abilities of the terrorists can seriously impair target selection.

The quality of terrorist leaders is also important. In considering terrorist target selection it has been assumed that terrorists are rational in their use of violence to gain political ends. Those terrorist campaigns which have endured for a length of time - such as that of the Provisional IRA, ETA, the RAF, Shining Path, and various others - are able to do so at least partly because their leaders are capable of learning from their own experiences and where possible from those of other groups, devising long-term strategies, or because the group possesses the capacity to renew its leadership when necessary. Although in the short-term a group without effective leadership may be extremely violent, as was seen with the Provisionals after internment was introduced in March 1971 its violence over time can become less well-focused and less effective. Indeed the Provisionals were ultimately saved by the entry of new blood into the groups' leadership in the mid and late 1970s. Where an effective alternative leadership does exist - as appears to have been the case with the Shining Path in Peru after the arrest of their leader Abimael Guzman in September 1992 - the group may continue to function effectively albeit at an initially reduced level.³ Where no such alternative exists, as was the case with the Angry Brigade in Britain in the early 1970s and the Red Brigades in the early 1980s, the loss of the leadership can mean the demise of the group as an effective force.

Such a demise can be due to the security environment. The extent to which it affects the opportunities available to terrorists will be considered later. However, it should be noted that it imposes restrictions upon the terrorist's means in addition to those already imposed by the group's inherent capabilities. The loss of terrorists, their weapons, and other resources at the hands of the security forces, can have

AP/RN, June 6th 1991. "Regret at Michael Logue's death", AP/RN, June 6th 1991. D.McKittrick. Despatches from Belfast, 206.

3) T.D.Mason & C.Campany. "Guerrillas, Drugs and Peasants: The Rational Peasant and the War on Drugs in Peru", Terrorism and Political Violence, 7, no. 4, (Winter 1995), 164-165, 166.

a great effect upon the ability of a terrorist group to function. Furthermore, the amount of time, effort and material resources used up in evading the security forces also depleted the resources available to carry out attacks. For this reason the security forces are often selected as targets. Of course where the security forces, or elements within the security forces, are aiding the terrorists - or indeed where members of the security forces are also members of the terrorist group - then the ability of the terrorists to obtain intelligence material, weapons, and training is greatly increased, and the need to avoid the threats of the security environment are decreased.

Within the constraints imposed by the means available to them, and by the motives which impel them to choose certain people as legitimate targets, terrorists can select those people or things which they wish to attack. However, to carry out such attacks successfully they need more than motives and means. They need opportunities.

Opportunities.

A terrorist group's opportunity to attack a target is dependent upon the target being vulnerable to assailants with the motive and means to attack it. The terrorists' role in relation to targeting opportunities can be passive or active. On the one hand a potential target may almost deliver itself to the terrorists, becoming vulnerable at a time and place where the terrorist is able to take advantage of the circumstances - in fact a target of opportunity. This is often the case where terrorism runs along communal lines, with attacks taking place against members of the opposing ethnic, social, or cultural community who happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. On the other hand terrorists often have to create their own opportunities if they are to attack their preferred targets. With such pre-planned targets the task of the terrorists is to detect a time and place when their preferred target or target category will become vulnerable. This necessitates some knowledge of the obstacles which the terrorists have to overcome in order to carry out a successful attack.

In practice the people protecting likely targets do not have the means to provide absolute security against an

absolute threat. Instead, within the constraints imposed by the resources available, they aim to provide likely targets with sufficient protection against credible or likely threats. The aim of the terrorists is to penetrate or circumvent that protection. The initial obstacles which restrict the terrorists' opportunities are caused by the security environment within which the terrorists operate. If those defending the target have foreknowledge of the terrorist's intentions they will be able to frustrate the attack by increasing the protection for the target, and possibly capture or kill the terrorists concerned.

The security environment can also restrict the opportunities for terrorists through the overt deployment of security force patrols, checkpoints, document checks, surveillance equipment, and any other methods which make it difficult for the terrorists to move around and to carry the weapons needed for the attack. A heavy security force presence can mean that whilst an attack can be carried out, the chances of the assailant escaping afterwards are correspondingly reduced. Consequently, one of the most important targets for terrorists are those people and institutions who constitute such a threat. This may include informers, police and intelligence operatives and facilities, and the overt security forces whether military or police. By eliminating the constrictions imposed by these threats the terrorists increase their own opportunities to carry out successful attacks on other targets.

Before attacking a potential target the terrorists must be able to locate it and determine a time when it will be vulnerable. Without the ability to gather and analyse intelligence it is unlikely that they will identify those specific people or objects who fall within their range of legitimate targets. Conversely, those people or objects about which the terrorists can gain intelligence, are more likely to be selected as targets. If the terrorists cannot discover a suitable occasion for attacking a target, either because their intelligence gathering capability is insufficient or because the potential target has succeeded in disguising its location, they are unlikely to attack it. Instead they are likely to select another suitable target. Such target

substitution applies to a number of cases where for one reason or another the terrorists are unable to attack their target of choice or indeed identify the most suitable target.

This also applies if the target is felt to be too well-protected for an attack to be practical. The degree of physical protection for a target can vary greatly according to the importance accorded to it and the resources available for its protection. At one extreme, an ordinary person is generally totally unprotected, and provides the softest of targets. On the other hand the physical protection for a hard target can consist of a number of layers: barriers intended to make it difficult for the terrorists to penetrate the perimeter of the protected area, security checks at points of access in that perimeter, alarms which warn of the presence of intruders within the protected area, guards who can try to prevent an attack and who will ensure that the assailant is killed or apprehended if an attack does take place. Finally the target itself can be physically protected, by a bullet-proof jacket if a human target, by armour-plating and bullet-proof glass if a car carrying a target, and by a strengthened structure if a building.

If the target is protected well enough to make it too difficult or too costly for the terrorists to attack it using the means available, they have to decide between three options: to give up altogether; to attack using different means; or to attack a different, more vulnerable target. If they take the first option then they proceed no further with the operation. If they take the second option, attacking the same target by using different means, then they have to acquire the means necessary to carry out the attack. This may be done by using more terrorists to overrun the protection provided to the target, or more powerful weapons. In any case, the intention is to overwhelm the protection or to render it useless. Suicide bombings would fall into this category as they provide terrorists with a way of attacking the target which renders useless the deterrent effect upon which protection often rests.

Alternatively, they may try to bypass the protection, using a method which circumvents it. The mortar attack on 10 Downing Street in February 1991 is an example where the

weapons system employed allowed the terrorists to bypass barriers which had been erected to prevent gunmen, bombers, or vehicle-bombs from getting close to the building. Such attacks might be worth doing if the terrorists perceive sufficient benefits - such as favourable publicity - might be gained from carrying out the attack.

Finally, they may decide to attack a softer target from which they may still derive benefits, and which they can justify attacking in ideological terms. As mentioned in the chapter on tactics, an important reason why the Red Brigades chose to abduct former Prime Minister Aldo Moro in March 1978 rather than Italian Prime Minister Andreotti or Senate President Fanfani, was that Moro was the most predictable and least well-protected of the three. Likewise, the Provisional IRA has attacked British soldiers in England or in Continental Europe, where they are less well-protected and security-conscious than in Northern Ireland.

It should be noted that attacks on soft targets are not necessarily carried out because of the difficulty of attacking a better-protected target. The Tamil Tiger's killing of Sinhalese or Muslim villagers has been executed with the deliberate intention of moving them from areas which the Tigers wish to turn into an ethnically exclusive area which they can control, as is also the case with Sikh terrorists who have killed Hindus in the Punjab. Likewise, the bombing of ordinary Italian civilians has been perceived by fascist terrorists as the most effective way of creating the type of panic which would lead to a public desire for an authoritarian government to restore order. Thus attacks on soft targets are sometimes a reaction to the difficulties of attacking hard targets, but often the fact remains that the soft target concerned is seen as the most appropriate physical target to attack in order to gain the desired reaction from the psychological target. The fact that such targets are easy to attack is, for the terrorists, simply a fortunate coincidence.

How terrorists select targets.

Whilst the factors which influence terrorist target selection can be determined, it is more difficult to generalise about how they interact. This is because, despite


surface similarities, each terrorist group is unique in its personnel, in its ideology, and in the environment within which it operates. Therefore, one must avoid creating models or theories which are so specific that whilst they may fit some groups like a glove, they are totally inappropriate to others.

Bearing in mind this reservation, it is still possible to construct some simple models explaining how terrorists select their targets. This process can best be seen in two stages, the process by which a target is selected, and the process by which the terrorists decide whether to proceed with an attack once they have selected a potential target. The first stage - the selection of a potential target - can best be regarded as a process by which the terrorist's freedom of action is narrowed down by the influence of various factors. Figure 11.1 shows how the dynamics behind terrorist target selection: ideology, strategy, and tactics, are constrained by various other factors. The touchstone for a group's initial decisions about target selection is provided by the group's ideology. This is because the ideology lays down the initial parameters of what can be deemed acceptable behaviour by the terrorists and also enables the terrorists to judge those people who are deemed to be legitimate targets. It cannot be over-emphasised that this concept of 'legitimacy' is seen in terms of the group's beliefs and may often be far removed from what is seen as legitimate or moral behaviour by their enemies or indeed more widely. However, what it does is to set up the mental and moral framework within which the terrorists operate, and provide the terrorists with some sort of value system to which they can refer in deciding what actions they can take, or in seeking to justify them afterwards.

However, ideology does not, and indeed cannot, provide the only reference point for terrorists in selecting their targets. With the exception of some communist writers, ideologies do not generally provide political activists with a blueprint for achieving their political objectives. The decision to use terrorism, rather than - or as well as - other methods, is in itself made in relation to circumstances and the inclination of the people involved, rather than as a

necessary consequence of their ideology. Where the decision to use terrorism has been made, few groups have such a narrow range of legitimate targets or such infinite resources that they do not have to choose amongst the range of legitimate targets which they could attack. The translation of political objectives into concrete actions, and hence the selection of targets is thus crucially shaped by the strategy of the group.

FIGURE 11.1
CONSTRAINTS ON TERRORIST TARGET SELECTION



The strategy of the group is based on an assessment of the reactions which they wish to evoke in certain psychological targets in order to promote their political objectives. The actions of the group should ideally be intended to achieve strategic objectives such as

advertisement, compliance, or whatever the group feels to be most appropriate, as a way of setting the ground for achieving their overall political aims. A terrorist group's strategy can be quite crude and simple. However, by determining what the terrorists wish to achieve by their use of violence, it provides a further refinement to the framework for target selection set by the group's ideology. Whilst ideology sets out the range of people and things which it is legitimate for the terrorists to attack, the strategy sets out those targets which the terrorists believe it will be beneficial for them to attack. This does not mean that the terrorists will make the right decisions in this area, and whether their strategic choices actually prove to be beneficial is a task for hindsight and historians.

However, the setting of strategy does not occur in a vacuum. Terrorists are constrained in their plans by the need for support, by their own capabilities, and by the security environment. To take the first point, terrorists generally need some support from outside the immediate confines of the group. Most terrorist groups - with the possible exception of animal rights terrorists - intend to ultimately benefit some people, whether it be an ethnic group, a social class, or some other constituency, and therefore few terrorists wish to alienate those very people whom they see themselves as helping. Furthermore, in practical terms, terrorists frequently need supporters to provide them with a potential flow of recruits, with at least some of the means to get and hide weapons, and, if they have been identified and have to adopt a clandestine lifestyle, with shelter, food, and possibly documents.

To retain this support - and to discourage erstwhile supporters from betraying the terrorists to their opponents or enemies - the terrorists need to ensure that their activities are not so unpopular with their supporters that they can no longer rely on their support. If the terrorists are powerful enough - for instance if they have effective control of an area - they may be able to enforce the compliance of people to their actions. However if they do not have such control, or even if they do but want active rather than enforced support, they have to tailor their actions so

as to be acceptable to their supporters. If they wish to extend their support base to include potential sympathisers, they need to be even more selective in their attacks, but as was seen in the case of PIRA attacks on alleged criminals or against loyalist terrorists, in some cases the need to maintain the allegiance of supporters can mean carrying out attacks which are disapproved of by others. Consequently terrorists have to ensure that their actions are such that - however much their actions may repulse their enemies or opponents - they do not needlessly repel supporters. Ideally they do not wish to needlessly repel potential sympathisers or those people who are uncommitted. In order to do this they must be able to justify their actions in their own ideological terms.

This particular constraint can cause problems. So far the model of target selection outlined in this chapter has assumed that the strategy of a terrorist group operates within the constraints of what can be deemed as ideologically acceptable - in other words only legitimate targets are to be attacked. However, it might be the case that the terrorists concerned could gain strategic benefits by attacking a target which is not seen as being a legitimate target. For the terrorists themselves this may or may not represent a dilemma. Some terrorists may decide that attacks cannot be made against targets which do not bear some form of guilt in terms of the ideology of the terrorist group concerned, whilst others may feel that the very fact that attacking a particular target fulfils a strategic objective makes it a legitimate target. In the latter case the strategic benefits to be gained override any ideological fastidiousness. If necessary the attacks can be given some form of retrospective ideological justification. This occurred with the previously mentioned examples of the PIRA killing of businessmen in 1977, the Red Brigades' killing of police bodyguards, or the RAF's killing of an American serviceman in Germany in 1985 in order to obtain his identification documents. Whilst the terrorists may attempt to justify such attacks, they can badly damage the terrorists' support base, and unless the terrorists control much of an area and its population- like the Shining Path in Peru or the LTTE in Sri Lanka - they will

tend to avoid carrying out attacks which are unpopular with their supporters unless there is an overwhelmingly important benefit to be gained.

The terrorists' strategic options are also circumscribed by their capabilities. Whilst the terrorists may have a long list of things which they may wish to do, they are constrained by their material resources and by the abilities of their operatives. Terrorists may make misjudgements as to their capabilities and overreach themselves, as ultimately did most of the communist terrorist groups in Europe during the 1970s and 1980s. Even at the tactical level terrorists can make serious and repeated errors of judgement - as is shown by the litany of PIRA members who have been killed by their own bombs. However, there are few examples of terrorists constructing a strategy which they are manifestly incapable of starting.

Finally, the terrorists' strategy is constrained by the security environment. Initially this restricts the terrorists' freedom of action through the need to avoid police surveillance and arrest. However, if the conflict escalates it can also entail surviving - at the most extreme - a severe military crackdown as occurred in Uruguay and Argentina in the mid 1970s, and even to an extent in Northern Ireland at about the same time. Not only can the security environment restrict the terrorists' freedom of action, it can also result in their capability being further restricted through the loss of personnel and resources. Whilst there are opportunities for the terrorists to provoke the security forces into brutal actions which alienate the public - assuming that the security forces do not carry out such actions of their own accord - the constraints placed by their activities are far greater.

Thus the strategic options of the terrorists are affected, and mainly restricted, by factors which in turn restrict their targeting options. Such restrictions continue at the tactical level. The successful execution of the various types of operation outlined in the chapter on tactics is initially constrained by factors such as the capability of the group and the acceptability of certain methods. As an example of the importance of the latter, it is notable that


the PIRA stopped using an otherwise successful tactic whereby on October 24th 1990 three men deemed to be collaborators with the security forces - in fact a kitchen assistant at the Ministry of Defence, a garage owner who had sold goods to soldiers, and a worker in an Army base - were tied into bomb-laden vehicles and forced to drive them into Army checkpoints and installations. Although the attacks were successful - killing six soldiers and one of the drivers - the tactic was widely condemned by nationalist politicians and several Catholics, and was not repeated.⁴

In addition to these restraints terrorists are also constrained by the various protective measures which may be taken to defend specific targets from attacks. The effect of this may be to discourage the terrorists from carrying out any attacks in the extremely unlikely event that they had only selected one specific target for their operations. On the other hand, on the basis of strategic judgement or sheer bloody-mindedness - they may feel that despite the risks inherent in the operation, the strategic benefits to be obtained from attacking the target using the planned methods are great enough to make it worthwhile persevering.

Alternatively, as is shown in Figure 11.2, if the protective measures surrounding the terrorists' initial target are too difficult to surmount using the tactics originally envisaged, the terrorists have the option of either using a different method to attack the same target, or of substituting an alternative target. The former course may be taken where the strategic benefits of attacking that particular target - such as the ability to exert pressure to comply, or the propaganda benefits - are felt to be great enough to justify the increased difficulty of persisting with the attack. However, where there are a number of potential targets, attacking which would yield a roughly equivalent strategic benefit, there is a likelihood that the terrorists will choose to attack the softest target as carrying out such an attack represents the least risk to the terrorists.

4) "IRA uses human bombs", The Independent, October 25th 1990. "Hume denounces IRA 'cowards'", The Independent, October 26th 1990. "Sitting ducks for the IRA killers", The Sunday Correspondent, October 28th 1990. B.O'Brien. The Long War, 56.

FIGURE 11.2
PROCESS OF TERRORIST TARGET SELECTION



Indeed, terrorists wary of taking too many risks may be willing to attack softer targets even if they yield lower strategic benefits than targets which are harder, on the basis that it is necessary to conserve resources for future operations. Thus a long-term strategic perspective may override the benefits which an attack may gain in the shorter term.

From the above factors it is possible to construct a general model of terrorist target selection. Firstly, the general moral framework within which terrorist activities will take place is provided by the ideology of the group. On the whole terrorists will tend to attack those people or institutions which they deem to be somehow guilty - or at least not innocent - of an offence in the terms of the terrorists' ideological and moral outlook.

The range of targets is refined by the strategy of the group concerned. This is important because by its nature, terrorism is a method which - with the exception of expressive attacks - is intended to yield certain benefits by causing people to react to violence or the threat of violence. Unlike conventional warfare where the destruction of the enemy may be an end in itself, a successful terrorist operation is one which, whilst it may result in the destruction of a physical target, is primarily intended to force a psychological target to react in a certain way. Thus the terrorists will generally select physical targets so as to cause the desired reaction in the psychological target. This may occasionally result in the terrorists stepping outside their proclaimed ideological framework, where they perceive that the strategic benefits to be gained from such an attack are felt to be important enough to justify such action. However the terrorists also have to take into account the possibility that such action may damage their standing amongst supporters, with concrete consequences in terms of the loss of facilities and the possibility of betrayal.

Once the terrorists have determined the range of targets which they may 'legitimately' attack, and have determined those which will best fulfil their strategic objectives, they are faced with a number of restrictions in terms of the group's capability, the security environment,

and the protective measures taken to safeguard specific targets. The terrorists' ability to overcome or circumvent these constraints will strongly determine whether they attack their targets of choice, or whether they substitute other targets in their stead. Where the benefits from attacking any one of a range of targets are roughly equivalent, it is likely though not certain that they will attack the most vulnerable. Once the terrorists' ideological and strategic framework has been determined, and they have decided upon a range of legitimate targets, the options which they face are as outlined in Figure 11.2.

However, the ability to predict terrorists actions must be severely qualified. It must always be borne in mind that terrorists are as likely as other people to make curious decisions, misjudgements, and decisions influenced by emotional rather than logical factors. Due to the pressures caused by the danger and clandestinity under which terrorists operate, there is a possibility that they will have a tendency over time to become more blinkered and introspective, and quite possibly to escalate their violence and to become more reckless in their actions. The more isolated terrorists become from the world outside other group members and the cocoon of supporters, the more likely it is that such escalation and recklessness will occur. Paradoxically - and leaving aside the question of resources - the greatest threat of indiscriminate violence in the short term may come from disorganised groups with little outside support rather than from well organised groups with a high degree of support.

Implications for terrorism in the mid-1990s.

An examination of terrorist trends in the 1990s suggests that, despite some changes in the nature of terrorism and terrorist groups in the past ten to fifteen years, the model outlined above still applies. Bruce and Donna Hoffman identify a number of trends in international terrorism in the 1980s and 1990s. By the term *international terrorism* they are referring to incidents which involve the citizens or territory of more than one country, or which are

intended to create international incidents by attacks on airline resources or passengers.⁵

There are problems in using data-bases concerning international terrorism to analyse or predict terrorism as a whole. Firstly, 90-95% of terrorism falls outside the scope of international terrorism.⁶ Furthermore the coverage of events in the Third World by Western news media - and hence the open source material for data bases - is comparatively scanty.⁷ This can lead to an over-emphasis on terrorist acts in countries where the media is better developed, or indeed in which the western media has most interest. Additionally, actions intended to kill foreigners or damage foreign property are more likely to be symbolic acts - and thus intended to gain widespread publicity - than acts of domestic terrorism. This might explain why Hoffman and Hoffman's statistics for 1994 show bombings as the most common tactic of international terrorists - 121 out of 349 terrorist incidents where a tactic is indicated, whereas in Northern Ireland in 1994 there were 348 shootings compared to 222 bombings or bomb defusings, the latter rising to 337 if one includes incendiary attacks as bombings.⁸

Another consideration which may account for differences between trends in the lethality of international terrorism compared to terrorism as a whole is that actions connected with aviation - such as hijackings and mid-air explosions - are on the whole disproportionately likely to be acts of international terrorism. This is because, with a few exceptions, acts against a perceived legitimate target are unlikely to include mass casualty attacks on domestic

5) B.Hoffman & D.K.Hoffman. "The RAND-St Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism, 1994", Terrorism and Political Violence, 7, no. 4, (Winter 1995), 183.

6) B.Hoffman & D.K.Hoffman. "The RAND-St Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism, 1994", 180.

7) C.D.Brockett. "Measuring Political Violence and Land Inequality in Central America", American Political Science Review, 86, no. 1, (March 1992). I.Geldard. Chronology of Terrorism 1989, (London: Intel, 1990), 13.

8) B.Hoffman & D.K.Hoffman. "The RAND-St Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism, 1994", 226. Royal Ulster Constabulary. Chief Constable's Annual Report 1994, 103.

flights.⁹ This relative concentration upon attacks on aircraft can cause an apparent statistical increase in lethality because modern aircraft carry hundreds of people and an aircraft exploding in mid-air is likely to have no survivors due to the drop. An equivalent sized bomb on a bus for instance would almost certainly kill far fewer people.

Given these reservations, the Hoffmans' work finds: the increased prevalence of terrorist acts; that more groups have been using terrorism as a method; and the increased lethality of individual terrorist attacks.¹⁰ Bruce Hoffman also claims that terrorists display an increasing level of ruthlessness and lack of idealism as the groups get older. He argues that over time terrorists may come to see violence as an end in itself.¹¹

The first two elements - the increase in the number of terrorist groups and the increase in the number of terrorist incidents - bear an obvious relation to each other and are not too surprising in a world which appears to have become more volatile since the end of the Cold War. For instance, the demise of the Soviet Union, whilst possibly reducing the degree of state terror, has led to more overt terrorism in Russia and its possessions.¹² Likewise, in northern Africa, tensions due to existing governmental corruption and authoritarianism, and the rise of religious fundamentalism, have been accompanied and exacerbated by rapid population increases leading to large numbers of young people with few prospects. Thus, in Algeria the population rose from nine

9) An exception to this was the mid-air bombing in November 1989 of a flight between Bogota and Cali by Colombian drug traffickers seeking to prevent the extradition of drugs traffickers to the USA. One hundred and seven died. Strong alleges that this was an attempt to kill the Liberal presidential candidate Cesar Gaviria. S.Strong. Whitewash, 225-226.

10) B.Hoffman. "Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends, and Potentialities", 12. B.Hoffman & D.K.Hoffman. "The RAND-St Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism, 1994", 181.

11) B.Hoffman. "Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends, and Potentialities", 15.

12) "Chechenya: how, why and what next?", The Independent January 21st 1996. "Chechen rebels deliver hostages to safety", The Independent, January 25th 1996. "Bomb kills four on Moscow's metro", The Guardian, June 12th 1996. "Three killed as blast rocks Moscow metro", The Independent, June 21st 1996.

million Muslim Algerians in 1954 to 16 million in 1977 and about 29 million by 1994, with about 63% of the population aged under twenty-five.¹³ Whilst such a demographic transition cannot by itself cause terrorism - as was noted in the case of the Punjab - the political and economic strains created by a framework unable or unwilling to sustain such changes, makes a climate of volatility more likely.

The rise in the lethality of individual international terrorist attacks is shown in Table 11.1.

TABLE 11.1
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST
INCIDENTS WHICH INVOLVE FATALITIES: 1990-1994

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
Total Incidents	321	484	341	359	350
Fatal Incidents	64	66	60	86	96
% of incidents which are fatal	19.9	13.6	17.6	24.0	27.4

N.B: A fatal incident is one in which at least one person is killed as a direct result of a terrorist attack.

Source: 'The RAND-St Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism', computer database, 1990-1994.

Bruce Hoffman has attributed this rise in lethality to a number of factors. One of the most important is the rise in the number of terrorist groups with religious or nationalist motives.¹⁴ He believes that religious terrorists may carry out attacks of greater lethality than groups with secular ideologies because the former's actions are "... motivated by a religious imperative ..." and therefore assume the attributes of a "... sacramental act or divine duty" which is unrestrained by other constraints. This lack of constraint is reinforced by the fact that religious terrorists see themselves as outsiders seeking to change a corrupt existing order, and therefore perceive a much greater range of enemies to be attacked. As an example of this lethality, Hoffman notes that whilst Shia Islamic terrorists only carried out 8% of international terrorist incidents between 1982 and 1989, they were responsible for 30% of the deaths. He attributes

13) A.Horne. A Savage War of Peace, 64 & n. D.Fishburn. "North Africa could turn nasty", D.Fishburn (ed). The World in 1995, (London: The Economist Publications, 1994), 81.

14) B.Hoffman. "Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends, and Potentialities", 16.

similar characteristics to militant Christian white supremacists in the USA and Jewish terrorists in Israel.¹⁵

The lethal effect of such terrorism since the early 1990s, and the influence of the campaigns of Kurdish separatists since 1992, and the attacks by Muslim terrorists against foreigners in Algeria and Egypt since 1993, can be seen if one compares the US State Departments statistics concerning the number of casualties - dead and injured - caused by terrorism in the Middle East - including northern Africa compared to that in Latin America where religiously-motivated international terrorism is comparatively rare. It should be borne in mind that the Latin American statistics include two Middle East related attacks in Buenos Aires, Argentina. In March 1992 a Hizbollah suicide vehicle bomb at the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, killed twenty-nine people and injured 242, whilst in July 1994 a bomb - alleged to have been planted by Hizbollah or by people with links to the Iranian Government - destroyed a building housing Argentine-Israeli and other Jewish organisations, killing ninety-six people and injuring 236.¹⁶

FIGURE 11.2

CASUALTIES CAUSED BY INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
IN THE MIDDLE EAST & LATIN AMERICA: 1989-1994

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
Middle East	96	97	33	236	178	235
Latin America	94	92	68	374	66	327

Source: U.S. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1994 (Washington DC: U.S Department of State, 1995).

Thus even the statistics for Latin America bear out the comparative lethality of the type of terrorism practiced in the Middle-East. Hoffman's supposition - that the ideology of the terrorist group crucially affects their range of targets and the type of attacks which they carry out - confirms one

15) B.Hoffman. "Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends, and Potentialities", 17.

16) U.S. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1992, (Washington DC: U.S Department of State, 1993), 25. 'The RAND-St Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism', (St Andrews: University of St Andrews), computer database, 1994. B.Hoffman & D.K.Hoffman. "The RAND-St Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism, 1994", 210.

of the tenets of the model of terrorist targeting outlined in this study.

However, one must however be careful not to attribute this lethality so heavily to the religious impulse of the terrorists concerned that one ignores the methods employed. The previously noted suicide bomb attacks by Palestinian and Lebanese terrorist groups are highly lethal because they largely nullify the deterrent effect of protective measures as the terrorist does not intend, or indeed wish, to make an escape. The suicide bombings by Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Israel between 1994 and 1996 were particularly effective because the bombs could be detonated in the close proximity of their intended victims.

However, the deadliness of these attacks is not just due to the motivation which lies behind them, but depends on the capability of the group to use such lethal methods. In the case of the Palestinian Hamas and the Lebanese Hizbollah this method has been relatively cheap in personnel terms as reports suggest that many of the suicide bombers are highly-motivated sympathisers on the fringe of terrorist activities rather than core members of the groups concerned.¹⁷ However not all such attacks in the Middle East have been by groups motivated primarily by religion. Merari found that out of thirty-one suicide vehicle-bomb attacks in the Lebanon between 1983 and 1986, only seven belonged to overtly religious Shia Muslim groups. Another two belonged to Amal, which whilst Shiite was - according to Merari - primarily concerned with secular issues. The other bombers belonged to groups with non-religious affiliations.¹⁸

Some separatist groups have also carried out suicide attacks. Thus suicide bombings are also effective against military targets as shown by the Kurdish PKK attack on a

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- 17) "Arab village stunned by martyrdom", The Daily Telegraph, October 22nd 1994. "Who are Hamas", The Independent, March 6th 1996. "Hundreds 'wait in line' to commit suicide attacks", The Independent, March 6th 1996. "Hamas recruit reveals ease of enlisting bombers", The Independent, March 8th 1996. "Portrait of a suicide bomber", The Independent on Sunday, March 10th 1996. On Hizbollah see A.Merari. "The readiness to kill and die: Suicidal terrorism in the Middle East".
- 18) A.Merari. "The readiness to kill and die: Suicidal terrorism in the Middle East", 204-205.

Turkish Army parade in the eastern Turkish town of Tuncel in June 1996 which killed five people.¹⁹ As noted the Tamil Tigers have also used suicide bombers to inflict mass casualties. This happened in the central business district of the Sri Lankan capital Colombo in January 1996, when a suicide truck bomb outside the Central Bank killed ninety-one people and injured 1400.²⁰ The relevant point about the LTTE is that they consist of both Hindus and Christians rather than being a religiously-based group. Unlike the cases of Hamas and Hizbollah, it is far more difficult to argue that their willingness to carry out such attacks is motivated by the sort of 'sacramental' motivation mentioned above unless one sees such motivation as dedication to the national cause, rather than as a specifically religious devotion. They also have the advantage of having a ready supply of young people ready to carry out suicide-bomb attacks.²¹

The willingness to kill large numbers of supposed enemies is not confined to religiously-motivated or nationalistic terrorist groups confronting different religions or nationalities. As pointed out previously, the communist Shining Path in Peru has frequently massacred large numbers of fellow countrymen, drugs traffickers in Colombia have killed several Colombians in bomb attacks, and conservative death squads in Latin America have occasionally massacred large numbers of union members or ordinary workers in order to discourage disobedience to the existing social, political, and economic order. Thus, whilst it may be true that religion or an extreme nationalist ideology provides such terrorists with a wide range of potential terrorist targets, the same applies to groups with other motivations - such as fascism or organised criminality - who have also

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- 19) "Suicide-bomb attack kills five in Turkey", The Independent, July 1st 1996.
- 20) "Tiger massacre in Colombo", The Guardian, February 1st 1996. "Sri Lankan suicide bomber kills 60", The Independent, February 1st 1996. "Train bombs kill 70 and injure 600 in Colombo", The Daily Telegraph, July 25th 1996.
- 21) "Dignity and death with the Freedom Birds", The Independent on Sunday, May 26th 1991. "Inside the Tiger Mind", Time, September 16th 1991. "Boys and girls come out to die", The Independent on Sunday, February 26th 1995. "Fanatical Tamils take revenge for Jaffna", The Independent, February 1st 1996.

carried out mass casualty attacks. What is important for the terrorists is whether such attacks can be regarded as legitimate - a point which corresponds with Hoffman's theory, but also whether these attacks further their strategic aims, and whether they have the means and opportunity to carry out such attacks.

Hoffman and Hoffman also note that Americans and American property, form the most common target of international terrorism.

TABLE 11.3
CASUALTIES SUFFERED BY FIVE NATIONALITIES MOST FREQUENTLY
TARGETED BY ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: 1990-1994

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
USA	116	155	76	74	79
UK	33	61	45	54	36
ISRAEL	26	--	--	23	29
FRANCE	16	37	--	--	23
USSR	13	--	--	--	--
TURKEY	--	28	--	35	--
JAPAN	--	17	--	--	--
UN	--	--	--	38	34

N.B. Attacks on UK targets include Irish republican operations in Great Britain, and attacks on French targets include Corsican separatist operations in metropolitan France.

Source: 'The RAND-St Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism', computer database, 1990-1994.

There are a number of reasons for the USA's possession of this rather dubious honour. The US State Department's reports indicate that well over 50% of anti-US international terrorist attacks occurred in Latin America - usually approaching 70-80%.²² This is not surprising if one bears in mind the prominent political and economic presence which the USA has maintained in Latin America practically since the

22) U.S. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1990, 40. U.S. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1991, (Washington DC: U.S Department of State, 1992), 85. U.S. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1992, 59. U.S. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1993, (Washington DC: U.S Department of State, 1994), 71. U.S. Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1994 (Washington DC: U.S Department of State, 1995), 67.

formulation of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823.²³ Quite simply, for any terrorist group wishing to attack a perceived foreign presence, the Americans are the most numerous and noticeable economic and political presence, and hence the most accessible. Furthermore, the emergence of communist revolutionary groups, particularly since the Cuban Revolution of 1959 but also deriving inspiration from Guevara and Mao, has led to an anti-capitalist philosophy which - despite the collapse of communism in Russia and central Europe - has meant that the USA, as the chief capitalist interest in Latin America, is also the most likely target.

In the Middle East, whilst there have not been as many attacks upon US targets, those which have occurred have included the most lethal. These include the death of sixty-three people - including seventeen Americans - when the US Embassy in Lebanon was bombed in April 1983, and the death of 241 American servicemen when the US Marines' barracks in Beirut was bombed in October of that year.²⁴ More recently seven people, two Indians and five US servicemen, were killed by a bomb at an American training facility in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in November 1995, whilst in July 1996 a bomb at an accommodation block in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia was caused the death of nineteen American servicemen and injured up to 160 people.²⁵ Such attacks can be partially explained by the prominence of the USA's military presence in the Middle East. However, it is also closely tied to Arab resentment of what they see as the USA's uncritical backing of Israel and Israel's influence over American policy in the Middle East.²⁶ As a Saudi militant stated after the Dhahran bombing:

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- 23) For an overview of US-Latin American relations see G.Pope Atkins. Latin America in the International Political System, third edition, (Boulder: Westview, 1995), 107-132.
- 24) R.Fisk. Pity the Nation, 480, 515. G.Rosie. The Directory of International Terrorism, 49-50, 51.
- 25) "Bomb kills 11 at US Saudi base", The Guardian, June 26th 1996. "Scenes of carnage return to haunt US", The Independent, June 27th 1996.
- 26) "Lebanese hit by deadly dollars", The Independent, August 1st 1993. "Why Arabs condemn but do not grieve", The Independent, April 21st 1995. "Big bucks keep US lined up in pro-Israel camp", Independent on Sunday, May 21st 1995. H.Smith. The Power Game, 296-316.

We knew that the Americans support the Jews in Palestine and that they are our enemies.²⁷

Furthermore, the opposition of successive US governments to revolutionary Islam, their support for repressive pro-western governments in countries such as pre-revolutionary Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Kuwait, and the common Islamic perception that contemporary Western values - and particularly American values - are inimical to Islam, makes Americans and American facilities prime targets for revolutionary Islamists.²⁸ Quite simply, the ideology of many terrorist groups in the Middle East - primarily Islamic groups but also ostensibly secular Palestinian groups - deems Americans and their property to be legitimate targets, whilst their presence makes them accessible targets.

The applicability of the model also appears to be confirmed by the activities of conservative terrorist groups. Such terrorism has been common in the 1990s. Out of 324 killings by republican and loyalist terrorists in Northern Ireland and elsewhere between 1990 and 1993, 145 people were killed by loyalists.²⁹ In Northern Ireland itself loyalist terrorists killed more people than republican terrorists in the years between 1992 and 1994.³⁰ It is also notable that whilst loyalist terrorists carried out just under twice the number of shootings carried out by republican terrorists in Northern Ireland, republicans carried out more than twice the number of bombings carried out by loyalists.³¹ This indicates the different capacities and strategies of the loyalist and republican terrorist groups in Northern Ireland, with the former concentrating on the assassination of suspected republicans and the 'subversive' Catholic population.

Elsewhere, in July 1996 the Associated Press reported an incident where about twenty rural labourers or members of

27) "Why we reject the West - by the Saudis' fiercest Arab critic", The Independent, July 10th 1996..

28) "Why we reject the West - by the Saudis' fiercest Arab critic", The Independent, July 10th 1996. J.L.Esposito. The Islamic Threat, 91-92, 127-128, 209-211.

29) M.Sutton. Bear in mind these dead.

30) Royal Ulster Constabulary. Chief Constable's Annual Report 1992, 12. Royal Ulster Constabulary. Chief Constable's Annual Report 1993, 11. Royal Ulster Constabulary. Chief Constable's Annual Report 1994, 11, 39.

31) Royal Ulster Constabulary. Chief Constable's Annual Report 1994, 103.

their families had been burned, shot or hacked to death with machetes by up to fifty gunmen in the Bhojphur district of Bihar State in eastern India. According to the police the killers were from the Ranvir Sena - an illegal private militia formed three years previously to defend the interests of upper-caste Hindu landowners. According to the police, the victims of the attack had been organising themselves against exploitation by landowners. The Ranvir Sena had also been blamed for about fifty deaths in the 1994 Bihar State elections.³² Of particular note is the relatively localised nature of the attack, the unsophisticated nature of the weapons required to make a successful attack against a soft target, and the relative lack of discrimination necessary in targeting a community deemed to be generally subversive.

In the same week, a conservative terrorist group in El Salvador sent a one-page communique to members of the foreign press. The 'Major Roberto D'Aubuisson Nationalist Force', denounced as "destabilisers and traitors to the country", people accused of constantly criticising the government of Armando Calderon Sol, leader of the ARENA party.³³ Again, those targeted were portrayed by the terrorists as subverting the existing political order.

The activities of these groups corresponds with the model outlined. The range of targets - in these cases people deemed to be subversive of the existing order - are determined by the terrorists' ideology. Attacking such people appears to cause little concern amongst the terrorists' supporters and is relatively easy. The method of killing is generally simple - using small arms, knives, or bludgeons - at least partly because the physical targets are usually soft targets - normally unarmed and unprotected civilians.

A general factor worth noting is that many terrorist groups in the 1990s are not the hierarchical structures - such as those possessed by the PIRA, Hizbollah, or other such groups - but are instead small diffuse groups. These groups - such as the Animal Liberation Front, the American fascist-

32) "Militia kills 20 in Indian caste wars", The Daily Telegraph, July 13th 1996.

33) "Church leaders on hit list", The Universe, (Manchester), July 14th 1996. "In the face of terror", The Catholic Times, (Manchester), July 14th 1996.

anarchist groups, and the Latin American death squads - act towards a common political agenda, but without a formal central structure to control, coordinate, and if necessary restrain their terrorist activities in order to conform to the wider political and strategic objectives. Thus in April 1995 it was estimated that there were about 100 militia groups in the USA, containing up to 50,000 members, often corresponding via the Internet.³⁴ Such small groups, operating on the basis of their own perceptions and agendas are, as discussed, prone to be dominated by strong personalities within the group. They might, therefore, be more prone to carry out expressive actions directed by individual rage rather than by rational calculation and regard for strategic and political ends, and as a result be more reckless. At the extreme one finds cases of terrorism by solitary individuals. Examples include the afore-mentioned Unabomber in the USA, or Ferdinand Gamper, a German-speaking neo-Nazi who, over a three week period in February and March 1996, killed six Italian-speakers or their associates around the town of Merano in Alto Adige, the German-speaking province of north-eastern Italy.³⁵

This last factor highlights the extent to which terrorist target selection is ultimately shaped by the idiosyncratic processes of the small groups of decision-makers or in some cases by the individuals in charge of groups. The greater the extent to which a group's ideology is unique unto itself, the more the decision-making element creates unpredictability with regard to target selection because it is more difficult to ascribe an underlying ideological rationale to the terrorists' decisions. To a degree this problem was encountered in the 1980s and early 1990s with organised criminal groups in Colombia and Italy which sought to obtain immunity from the law by carrying out disorientating mass casualty attacks against civilians and

34) "Militiamen go to war on American gun laws", The Daily Telegraph, November 21st 1994. "FBI sets its sights on far-right US groups", The Independent, April 22nd 1995. "Militias air battlecries on wilder shores of Internet", The Independent, April 24th 1995.

35) "Gun battle ends hunt for Italian serial killer", The Independent, March 2nd 1996. "Fear and loathing in the Alto Adige", The Independent, supplement, March 7th 1996.

the selective assassination of conscientious law enforcement and state officials. Concerned primarily for their own material gains, such groups believed themselves to be free of the restraints imposed by public opinion and the need for external support. However, the actions of these groups could be understood in terms of their easily-comprehensible overall objectives.

This does not apply to some of the smaller or more outlandish groups which have emerged since the early 1990s. Some of these have the ability to carry out massive attacks with weapons which they themselves have manufactured: for instance the World Trade Center Bombing of February 1993 which killed six people and injured over 1,000, the Tokyo subway gas attack of March 1995 which killed twelve people and injured over 5,000, and the Oklahoma City bombing of April 1995 which killed 168 people.³⁶ In particular, whilst one can question the extent to which the actions of the Aum cult in Japan can be considered as political terrorism, their decision to carry out the first major non-governmental use of poison gas to kill bystanders is an indication of the extent to which a messianic leader-driven group is unconstrained by many of the restraining factors which apply to the more conventional and hierarchical terrorist groups. Indeed the Tokyo gas attack may prove to have broken the taboo against such attacks previously observed by other groups.

What is notable about some of the more eccentric groups which have evolved in the early 1990s - such as the American fascist-anarchists, religious extremists, and bizarre cults - is their combination of outlandish or extreme ideologies with the potential for inflicting massive destruction and a

36) "The \$400 Bomb", Time, March 22nd 1993. "Four found guilty of NY bombing", the Independent, March 5th 1994. "Religious cult suspected of gas attacks", The Times, March 21st 1995. "300 commuters in hospital after new gas incident", The Daily Telegraph, April 20th 1995. "Tokyo gas attack cult leader held", The Guardian, May 16th 1995. "Aum cultists admit making nerve gas", The Independent, May 18th 1995. "Aum cult doctor admits making sarin nerve gas", The Independent, October 25th 1995. "Bomb massacre in Oklahoma", The Daily Telegraph, April 20th 1995. "Bomb built for damage, not slaughter", The Independent, April 22nd 1995. "FBI piles up evidence against McVeigh", The Independent, April 28th 1995. "FBI close to arresting bombers", The Independent, May 22nd 1995.

relative disdain for the restraints of public opinion. Whilst the formula of motive, means and opportunity still applies when explaining target selection by these groups, their actions are more difficult to predict than those of more conventional groups. However destructive the larger and more conventional terrorist groups might be, the rationale behind their attacks can be determined in terms of readily comprehensible ideological precepts. With the more outlandish groups it is more difficult to make general assumptions about their likely actions by referring to broad ideological categories. In order to comprehend the logic behind their selection of targets one has to examine the specific groups and understand their beliefs - however apparently bizarre, their capabilities, and the way in which they make decisions and react to external constraints imposed by the security environment and by the wider society within which they operate.

Recent developments in terrorist targeting are explicable by the model developed in this study. As Hoffman points out the greater lethality of Middle Eastern terrorist groups can be explained by their ideological world-view, but it can also be explained by the strategies which they are pursuing - destabilisation of any Arab-Israeli agreement by Palestinian groups, the ejection of non-Muslims by Islamic extremists in Algeria - and by their use of the particularly lethal method of suicide-bombing. Likewise, the concentration of attacks by conservative terrorists against civilians belonging to communities considered subversive, combines ideological motivation, a strategy aimed at disorientating and enforcing compliance in such communities, and the tactic of attacking extremely soft targets using simple weapons. Even the attacks of the more outlandish sects and isolated groups can be explained if one takes the trouble to divine the motivations, means and opportunity for each group, and does not rely on easy generalisations.

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