

# Images of "Japan" in Postcolonial Taiwan: Contested Terrain of Memory and National Identity

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Images of “Japan” in Postcolonial Taiwan:  
Contested Terrain of Memory and National Identity

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## Introduction

In 2009, the Japanese Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) aired a special program “Japan Debut,” a series of documentaries to commemorate the 150th anniversary of the opening of the Yokohama port. Subtitled “First-class Nation of Asia,” the series features Taiwan in its first episode, delving into the colonization of the island from 1895 to 1945, and gives prominence to interviews with a handful of Taiwanese elderlies who experienced the occupation first-handedly. The episode shows how Japan, in its fervent pursuit of becoming a “first-class nation (一等国)” to emulate western powers, clobbered local oppositional forces through violent means, and then exploited the island and its people. It underscores how the occupation met with stubborn resistance by the Taiwanese natives and how the rebel movements were ruthlessly clamped down by the imperial power. Highlights reveal how the empire, in defining its Taiwanese subjects as an inferior species and employing segregation policies to anchor their inferiority, consequently distilled deep-rooted anti-Japan sentiments among the people. The program, produced by a major Japanese media agency and hence carrying substantial weight in representing the Japanese voice, seems to be self-reflective and self-deprecating in its presentation of Imperial Japan’s colonizing process. Interestingly, however, its depiction of Japan as a callous colonizer aroused unexpected controversy and polarized opinions among Taiwanese questioning NHK’s historical viewpoint of that colony–Taiwan.

Concerned how the documentary would undermine current Taiwan-Japan relationship, for instance, Taiwanese associations like Taiwanese Residents Association in Japan 在日台灣同鄉會, Friends of Lee Teng-hui Association in Japan 日本李登輝

之友會, as well as a handful of conservative Japanese organizations protested against NHK.<sup>1</sup> Among those who were interviewed in the documentary was Ke De-san 柯德三, a Japanese-educated 87-year-old man, an elite in his times. After the episode was aired, Ke protested that, while he addressed both merits and demerits of the Japanese rule, NHK chose to air only his criticism of colonial discrimination and exploitation. He spoke of his concern that NHK's selective editing would falsely convey an anti-Japan sentiment to the Japanese audience, and subsequently harm Taiwan's relations with Japan. Ke was joined by over eight thousand people (among whom 150 were Taiwanese) in his questioning of NHK's "unbalanced" presentation of the historical period. Ke and other protesters' reaction further instigated criticism in online political forums, questioning the station's stance. While the former colonized in Asia demands apology from Japan for its wartime brutality, a protest against NHK's seemingly repentant piece on how Japan had wronged its colonized people seems to go against the grain of postwar political correctness. NHK's penitent remembrance towards Taiwan's colonial past, perhaps, sits nicely with the expectations of the postcolonial generation in Taiwan. But for Ke and other Taiwanese like him, NHK's relegation of Japan's colonial presence in Taiwan as malevolent violence, in turn, is an oversimplification or misreading of their memory. Ke and his fellow protesters objected the story that NHK has placed on top of the formerly colonized, whose stringent view of their colonial experience as victimization did not adequately attend to the diverse aspects of that experience.

If the expressed nostalgia raised an awkward problem for NHK's (or Japan's) self-reflection as a former colonizer, the ostensible yearning for a ruling that is linked to oppression is no less an embarrassing narrative for the Taiwanese. The postcolonial

generation's understanding and reconstruction of such memories in Taiwan are also a contested dialectics of remembering and forgetting. What's more, the political oppression of nearly 40 years (1949-1987) of martial law imposed by Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) that replaced Imperial Japan after World War II further widened the generational gap of historical memories. To quickly sino-nize Taiwan, the KMT administration imposed language policies that suppressed Taiwanese dialects (including Hoklo, Hakka and aboriginal languages) as well as any vestige of Japanese, rendering the generation of men and women that had thus far relied on the Japanese language to acquire information illiterate and muted. For the next generation, the nationalist ruler further implemented Sinocentric curriculums that indoctrinated the pupils with anti-communism, and with Chinese nationalism centering on the ideology that Chiang's "Free China" would eventually recover the land they lost to the Chinese communists.<sup>2</sup>

Wu Nien-jen's 1994 autobiographical film, *Tousan: A Borrowed Life* 多桑, is a paradoxically vivid and vague rendition of such a postcolonial generation and its attempt to reconstruct the life and memories of its predecessors—an attempt caught in the interstices of two political hegemonies, namely Chinese nationalism and Japanese colonialism. In *A Borrowed Life*, Wu fixes his attention on Sega, his *tousan* (父さん, Japanese for father), through the innocent, often obstructed gaze of a child. Because Sega seldom talks about himself and his past to his children, his life is pieced together by bits of adult conversations or episodes that the child cannot quite grasp. Without making much of it, the child overhears that, as a teenager, Sega witnessed the slaughter of Taiwanese elites in front of Chiayi train station during the infamous 228 Incident.<sup>3</sup> After setting up a makeshift ritual on the side of the street to pay tribute to a doctor who



was killed, his then employer fired him for fear of being dragged into the dangerous chaos. Sega fled from the southern town of Chiayi to the northern tip of the island, and became a miner earning meager wages barely enough to support his family. For him, everything Japanese is of superior quality: Japan-made products work better and last longer; Japanese swear words communicate his contempt better; even Japanese pornographic models are more attractive than those in America's *Playboy* magazine. If he is at home, he tunes in to Japanese radio news, and his greatest wish is to visit Mount Fuji and the Imperial Palace in Tokyo one day. From the child's limited purview, *tousan's* dogged fondness of Japanese commodities and adherence to a "Japan" that he has never visited is inexplicable. But neither the child nor his siblings display an active interest in pursuing the matter. Inside the familial context, *tousan's* anachronous attachment to "Japan" creates a rift between himself and his Chinese-educated children. One afternoon he tries to help his daughter whose assignment requires her to draw the national flag of Republic of China (Taiwan). He colors the symbol of the sun red, and enrages his young daughter, who laments that it is all wrong. "Go take a look at Japan's *hinomaru* flag!" he yells in response. "The sun should be red! You are cursed by the devil if you see a white sun." Exasperated, his daughter curses him in mandarin Chinese, calling him a "traitor (to the Chinese nation)! A running dog! A Wang Jingwei!"<sup>4</sup> This heated, emotional exchange between father and daughter demonstrates how political conflicts in the history enters the private domains of domesticity, and how identities shaped by opposing regimes divide two generations in a family (see figure 1.1). Whereas *tousan* uses "Japan" as his standard point of reference to define the Chinese, or even the American, the young daughter is taught at school to use a Sinocentrism-based loyalty as a rule of thumb.

In the film, Wu positions his child self as a passive observer, neither passing

judgment on nor offering justification for his father's actions as a failing patriarch. His obstructed understanding of his father and, in turn, his father's incapacity to effectively articulate his past nostalgia and present discontent, echo the experience of others in their respective generations. The similarity the film-goers find between Wu's *tousan* and their own silenced fathers and grandfathers demonstrates how this generational distance is a collective experience shared in different families. At the end of *A Borrowed Life*, *tousan*—who at this point is plagued by a lung disease acquired in the mines, which makes it painful for him to breathe—chooses to end his life by leaping out a hospital window. Wu's narrator speaks as he stands on the other side of a curtain, staring at the projected silhouettes of doctors trying to revive his father's lifeless body: "as I stood there, lost in reverie, I suddenly remembered when, many years ago, *tousan* took me to the cinemas but went on his own spree at some mysterious place (a bordello), leaving me in a dark place filled with weak sobs." This scene encapsulates the curtains of cultural and political barrier that separates the postcolonial generation's effort to perceive the past and the actual memories itself. As the postcolonial generation inherits memories of the colonial, they seem to be held at the threshold, trying to make sense of the shadows and lights of the past (see Figure 1.2).

All of the films (as well as some media presentations of the term *koumin* in Chapter 2) selected for this study are produced by the younger, postcolonial generation who have not experienced the Japanese colonial period, but have grown up with related behaviors, anecdotes and images. One of the threads I use to tie together the various presentations of memories in this thesis is Marianne Hirsch's conceptualizing of "postmemory,"<sup>5</sup> which specifically foregrounds the importance and validity of the "generation after" as a carrier of a memory that "belonged" to another generation, despite its inclination towards the imaginative. Although Hirsch examined the case of

the descendants of holocaust survivors, her affirmation of remembrance without experience is particularly significant, at this critical junction, to the nascent boom of the young Taiwanese engagement with memories of the colonial period. Given how such colonial memories had been purposefully discontinued by the state, the younger generation's remembering involves not only overcoming social amnesia, but even more work lying in the area of reconciling with, or removing a politically transposed memory. From this I deduce that the re-production of the "Japanese past" and its reception by the society are heavily based on one's "imaginative investment."

The construction of postmemory affirms how the present is instrumental in shaping the past in collective memory.<sup>6</sup> However, I find its emphasis placed on the imagined and creative perception of "postgeneration" suggest that the extra emotions postgenerational memories re-create, gravitating towards the personal realm of remembrance, before it is transmitted into the public sphere. In other words, not only would postmemory be teeming with presentism, but it would also be overflowing with personal emotions.

In Taiwan, the construction of "postmemory" is twice removed from the actual colonial memory and history due to the postwar education that hinged on Sinocentrism, which inclines to relegate Japanese culture exclusively as an oppressive other. However, when playing back the fragmented, mediated episodes of memory, each soundbite and pixel resonates with personal meaning and emotions. The emotional factor, compounded by a nationalist education, suggests that the younger Taiwanese generation's reshaping of the colonial memory is thus, as Hirsch puts it, "mediated [...] through an imaginative investment and creation."<sup>7</sup> Today, more than 20 years after Wu Nien-jen's film cinematically depicting the liminality of his generation's understanding of another generation's nostalgia for a condemned past, how is "Japan" manifested in

modern Taiwan? How have we reshaped our views towards *tousan* and others like him—whose colonial nostalgia poses certain political problematics? I believe that in face of current political contentions with China, Taiwan is rethinking its relationship with Chinese nationalism and Japanese colonialism. Whatever fragments the *tousans* wittingly or unwittingly communicated to their children are now repeatedly revisited and renegotiated.

My dissertation intends to study the trajectory of how “Japan” has transformed in postcolonial Taiwan, by way of closely reading contemporary Taiwanese films and their paratexts. As the Taiwanese commemorate the 71<sup>st</sup> anniversary of the end of WWII in 2016, I contend that we, like Wu Nien-jen’s self-portrayal as a sympathetic, yet befuddled child, have time and again attempted to revisit what was behind the curtains. The texts I analyze in this dissertation, whether cinematic, literary, or journalistic, significantly represent an effort to lift the curtains. Together they form a patchwork of personal loss, shame and Taiwan’s slow, unique process of self de-colonization. I suggest that for the postcolonial Taiwanese, the editing and resurrection of fragments of memory to the collective consciousness is a discursive means of coming to terms with what was inflicted upon Taiwan. Just as the prewar Japanese imperialists needed to justify their occupation of Taiwan by claiming that it is for the good of “Greater East Asia,” the Taiwanese ex-colonized, too, currently need to negotiate their foothold in why matters of their hearts seem to conflict with those in others’ heads. For instance, part of Ke’s concern stems from NHK’s elimination of his acknowledgement of wartime engineer Hatta Yoichi’s 八田與一 contributions to Taiwan and his relationship with Hatta’s son. For him, this particular account of memory is as valid as the highlighted discrimination he suffered in an elite Taipei high school he attended with Japanese

youths. Due to NHK's option to select the negative comments over positive ones for a uniformed storyline, the interviewee's memory is thus mutilated and compromised. In order to come to terms with past trauma with full understanding, both the good and the bad must be examined, though the questions of what was good and what was bad are at best slippery because they hinge on "memory." I contend that, like Wu Nien-jen's on-screen surrogate, Taiwan navigates the contested terrain of colonial history with an abundance of empathy for the last generation, but from contrasting, limited, and at times unreliable vantage points that make a singular definition of colonial memory impossible.

In particular, while the "bad" of colonialism seems irrefutable, what "good" could have come of it is a terrain of contestation. Taiwanese literature professor Chu Huei-chu claims that it is an "unconditional embracing and admiration for modernity" that nursed this postwar pro-Japan complex. Chu observes that when Taiwanese nativists reminisce about their Japanese past, infrastructures and modernized constructions are used as evidence to rationalize Japan's imperial rule: transportation network, education system, and basic infrastructure were established as early as the 1920s; and to meet Imperial Japan's military needs, Taiwan was efficiently industrialized in the late 1930s. As Japan's rule entered western modernity, philosophy, culture and concept of "nation," Taiwan subsequently rose from an immigrant society to something closer to a "metropolitan." As these imported western goods and ideas emitted an appealing "fragrance of civilization," "the Japanese colonial rule came to embody more than suppression and exploitation."<sup>8</sup> This enticing "fragrance," having been introduced by the Japanese, would therefore always be infused with a strong scent of Japaneseness. However, I argue that, although the embrace of modernity may be "unconditional" as

Chu suggests, the former colonized does not lack in criticism against the colonizers' intentions. If the NHK documentary accounted for anything, it is that Japan's former subjects are well aware of the coercion and exploitation that went hand in hand with colonization. The formerly colonized's desire to culturally identify with a modernizing society is burned by the acute awareness that they cannot lay claim to legitimate ownership of such culture.

Whatever fringe benefits one may reap, colonial hierarchy perpetuates the Otherness of the subaltern. As an old Taiwanese man formerly conscripted as a Japanese soldier said in his interview for the NHK special, "even if young Japanese may not understand, please publicize this message to the Japanese people who are over eighty years old: I hope they will be able to know to what extent the Taiwanese have gone to help the Japanese. We have given our lives to the nation." While this segment could easily evoke sympathy in the viewers for their servitude to an apathetic regimen, I contend that the old man's plea serves more than as evidence of indoctrination. Perhaps the reason these former subjects of the Rising Sun strive for recognition by their former oppressor is not that they need to cling on to past memories, but that they do not want to be forgotten.

Yet why do the colonized generation fear oblivion? Moreover why do they seek recognition from the authority that supposedly oppressed them? This is a question often posed to Taiwan by other Asian countries, and even by Taiwanese themselves. While many are eager to provide an answer attributing the cause to either the success of colonial "enslavement" education, or disillusionment with the Chinese nationalist regime, both combined have limitations explaining the relationship between the *tousan* generation and their "Japan." This dissertation aims to reexamine "Japan" in modern day Taiwan (which includes the colonized generation as well as the supposedly

baggage-free postcolonial generations) by looking into the memories of *tousans* and *kaasans* (mother in Japanese) in relation to the island's marginal yet strategic position between the competing neighboring superpowers of Japan and China.

In Taiwan's case, the theoretical tools to discuss colonialism are not readily available because Japanese colonialism is so different from its western counterparts. It is different, for instance, because of its racial and ethnic relations. While white men from a European empire ruled their colored subjects, the Japanese were governing a race that did not look dissimilar from them, and once the colonized mastered the Japanese language, he or she could ostensibly pass for a "real Japanese." Furthermore, post-colonial theories cannot be fitted into Taiwan because the Chinese Nationalist KMT administration is considered by some Taiwanese scholars as yet another colonizer since the KMT government's main interest lay in regaining its strength after the war, while using the island's resources.<sup>9</sup> Their initial plan was to use the island of Taiwan as a military base to recover "China" from communist occupation.<sup>10</sup> Their resolution to eventually return to the space currently occupied by People's Republic of China is further demonstrated by Chiang Kai-shek's will to "temporarily place" his grave, without proper burial, at the Cihu Mausoleum until KMT's victory in recapturing the purloined motherland.<sup>11</sup> After WWII, KMT leader Chiang Kai-shek was appointed by General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers to take over Taiwan, and hence the Taiwanese wish for self-determination and independence from "foreign" ruling was suspended indefinitely.

The status of the KMT government (Republic of China) experienced upheaval in 1971, when it was replaced by People's Republic Of China in the United Nations, and again in 1979 when diplomatic ties with the United States were severed. To consolidate their legitimacy and position as rulers of the Taiwanese, it was crucial for the KMT to

create a memory to be shared by mainlanders and Taiwanese locals alike. They resorted to shared ancestry, and Chinese Nationalism, to emphasize the shared destiny of these two conflicted groups. This is evident in the flurry of patriotic songs that were marketed as pop songs and continuously broadcasted through mass media, such as “Descendants of the Dragon” (1978), “Ching-hai Prairies” (1981), which stressed that, bonded by blood, Taiwanese residents are truly Chinese, and are inheritors of five thousand years of Chinese glory. Meanwhile textbooks in schools have continued to focus on facts about Chinese history and geography, whereas information about the island remains peripheral.

The Taiwanese is comprised of several ethnicities—Hoklo, Hakka, Aboriginal, and *waishengren* 外省人, an overgeneralizing term that encompasses all the mainland Chinese that arrived after 1945, despite differences among themselves. However, when we discuss “Japan” within the nationalist framework, it is necessary to distinguish two groups— *bendiren* 本地人 and *waishengren* 外省人. Both come from historical backgrounds that are closely intertwined with “Japan,” but due to the colonial structure and Sino-Japanese wars, each could have completely opposing viewpoints. Cultural critics have noted how pro-Japan attitude is linked to pro-Taiwanese independence groups, and anti-Japanese sentiments have much to do with pro-China stances. Their different Japanese experiences are apparently what set the Taiwanese natives apart from the Chinese newcomers. The tension between supporters of these opposing teams is further complicated by the phenomenon of “Japanophiles” (哈日族)—a term that was coined in the early 1990s observing how Japan is sweeping the young Taiwanese off their feet with its “soft power,” a cultural power that has followers in the two conflicting groups.



It is true that KMT successfully distilled in the people a sense of national integrity as a “China” of a uniformed language, heritage, and definite boundaries. The portrait that KMT promoted of China was a unified nation-state in which every subject speaks in the same tongue, shares the same blood lineage, and upholds the same ideology (see figure 1.3). After WWII, in the context of the Cold War, the Taiwanese were educated to believe that their future lies in China, when KMT leads them in recovering the land purloined by the Chinese Communists. However, Taiwan’s being expelled from the United Nations in 1972 dispelled the myth of its unshakable sovereignty and legitimacy as “China” in the international arena. The world now recognized Chiang’s rival state as the *real* China. This, compounded with the local people’s frustrations with KMT’s internal ruling, further undermined the foundations of Taiwanese subjectivity. Therefore, Taiwan’s case in its relations with Japan not only reveals the insufficiency of postcolonial theory, but also points to a necessity to reconsider how an individual’s perceived past can meander into the public domain and becomes collective memory, and, in turn, how memory itself becomes part of the national identity. Normative decolonization occurs when former subjects examine the colonial legacy and challenge previously established narratives, but in the case of Taiwan, the decolonization process of the subjects is hindered by a transposed nationalist framework that readily deems such legacy as nothing more than enslavement. When official history writing is deemed questionable, private personal memories thus become instrumental in the collective constructing of a subjectivity free from the imposition of yet another subjugating identity.

The complicated and contradictory nature of Ke’s reaction towards NHK, then, cannot be summed up by postcolonial theories but invites us to investigate Taiwan’s problems, which also resist postcolonial theories. In his essay “The Dosan (*tousan*)

Generation,” Leo Ching examines the same NHK episode and points out that the “nostalgia” of the Japanized generation is the result of a desire to distinguish one’s Taiwanese subjectivity from China, that by strengthening one’s relations with Japan, the ties with China could be watered down. Ching notes that “these attitudes are associated not with “Japan” per se, but with the perceived Japanese ‘period’.”<sup>12</sup> Taking a cue from Ching’s study, I want to extend the discussion of *tousans*’ linkage with a “Japan” locked in the past, by focusing on the act of memory.<sup>13</sup> *Tousans*’ view of “Japan” is not merely rosy sentiments of longing, but their memory is a political act of coming to terms with one’s past and reclaiming one’s subjectivity. In this dissertation, I argue that memory is a political act and can be shared, not confined to a particular individual or period of time. The person who experienced an event is the sole owner of the memory, but once it is mediated, it could transform into collective memory. The mass media is an efficient way to transmit the original soundbites and picture to any receiving end, creating what Benedict Anderson calls an “imagined community.” This is the reason I choose to investigate Taiwan’s colonial memories through films, online forums, and written/oral literature.

My research seeks to examine the ways in which the collective memory of Japan, or the imagination of “Japan,” affects the collective search for a Taiwanese subjectivity and a distinctively Taiwanese identification. I use several exemplar films, documentaries and literary work that span several different genres to examine the sentiments of the “silenced generation” towards Japan, and closely study recent Taiwanese films made by successors of the said generation, dealing with “Japan,” and their possible “idea of their fathers’ idea of Japan.” Media coverage of the films and ensuing cultural critiques will also be the subject of my research.

I am aware that the project of examining favorable accounts of colonial memory is a perilous one because it runs the risk of corroborating Japan's neoconservative group's attempt to justify the empire's controversial acts during wartime. The Taiwanese colonial nostalgia is at times dangerously self-denigrating when linked to the Japanese right wing nationalists, who contend that wartime Japanese occupation in various Asian colonies can be invariably justified due to economical development and modernization following Japanese ruling. Yet the multiplicity and conflicting ideologies, however irrational or illogical, are important clues to investigating the complicated power structure and identity formation, which transcends the Taiwanese/Japanese, oppressed/oppressor, colonized/colonizer, subservience/resistance binaries. My focus lies not on Japan per se, nor is my work a revisionist attempt to recreate Japanese colonialism in a favorable light. Instead I direct my attention to how, not only the *tousans'* generation, but also modern Taiwan, comes to terms with its past as the colonized, and realizes that, by negating the past, a nation's trauma can not be undone. In an attempt to map out the numerous threads of colonial remembrance, I also examine the presentation of colonial memories from various aspects: from the testimonials of a marginalized demographic group to that of social elites, from documentaries to cinematic imaginations, and from Taiwanese to Japanese presentation.

The dissertation is organized thematically. My first chapter investigates the memories of Taiwanese comfort women. Naturally, the traumatic experiences that they endured while serving in "comfort stations," a euphemism for Japanese military brothels, and which the United Nations has decreed a system of sexual slavery in 1996, is a far cry from the colonial nostalgia that others of the same Japanized generation might express. The site of my analysis is two documentaries commissioned by the Taipei Women's Rescue Foundation (TWRF), *Grandmother's Secret* in 1997, and *Song*

*of the Reed* in 2013. Both films serve the same purpose of raising social awareness of the women's plight, and demanding the Japanese government for compensation and a formal apology. I examine why the TWRP found it necessary to produce two documentaries featuring the trauma testimonies of the same women. By juxtaposing the two films, I trace a shift in their portrayal of "Japan." As the 1997 film provides a raw, harrowing introduction to the women's trauma, their female bodies and innocence are presented as having fallen prey to a callous, perverse "Japan." Sixteen years forward, although *Song of the Reed* interviews the same subjects, it seems to have eliminated the nationalistic narrative that relegates the "Japanese" as the same cruel, perverse enemy that the Nationalist Chinese had engaged in an eight-year-long War of Resistance with. Rather, *Song of the Reed* addresses the problematics of the victim and colonial nostalgia—in particular, how its subjects' discourses stray from aforementioned narrative, articulating their memory even if it does not adhere to a victim's storyline.

I contend that the *Song of the Reed* is a conscious effort—on director Wu Hsiu-ching's part as well as the TWRP—to restore the women's subjectivity, and that such effort reflects a societal change in perceiving the women's tragedy in relation to a superimposed nationalist framework. Her highlighting the healing workshops that the women attended is instrumental in shedding light on the individuality of their life stories, which often undermines a unified, established "perfect victim" narrative.

I will also reconsider the prevalent belief that the comfort women issue is further marginalized in Taiwan due to its incongruity with a "new historical narrative," with which Taiwan distinguishes itself from China.<sup>14</sup> By investigating the publication of Kobayashi Yoshinori's *Taiwan-ron* in Taiwan, and the ensuing incidents of protests, apologies, and mitigation, I argue that the importance of this issue is not marginalized, but in fact highly politicized. Indeed, the Taiwanese comfort women issue is treated

differently from comfort women narratives in other countries, because of its incongruity within the complex postcolonial relationship between Taiwan and Japan as its former colonizer. The binarism of victim/oppressor, and Taiwan nationalism/Japan colonialism, only provides a partial view of the women's memories. The women's traumatic memories and those of colonial nostalgia, however, need not to be mutually exclusive. From the shift of focus in the two TWRF documentaries on Taiwanese comfort women, I observe a cognizant move away from the traditional narrative of the colonized that constructs "Japan" as a perverse Other to one that allows diverse presentations of "Japan." Furthermore, to break free from Taiwan's particular entanglement in politicizing/nationalizing an essentially humanist issue, I suggest that the redress movement advocates need to procure justice for Taiwanese comfort women outside the nationalist framework, by accommodating varying, at times contradictory, colonial memories.

In Chapter Two, I track the trajectory of the term "koumin 皇民," an antiquated word from the Japanese times that remains in active use in modern Taiwan, its complex significance existing only in the particularity of Taiwan's current sociopolitical context. Its original honorific meaning "subjects of the emperor" has taken on a significant transformation. Today its implications have multiplied, but the term is generally used colloquially to ridicule the Taiwanese (by the Taiwanese) if they are politically or culturally inclined towards Japan, therefore betraying the established "Chinese" identity. Its particularity in the spatial and historical context of postcolonial Taiwan reflects a collective anxiety of liminality, an identity oscillating between Chinese nationalism and Japanese colonialism.

Specifically Chapter Two is interested in the desire and search for Taiwanese

identity that the *Koumin* writers 皇民作家 ironically tease out. Their literary works depict an acute awareness of the difference between a Taiwanese and an imperial subject, while mapping out the necessary steps that a non-Japanese subject takes to become a *koumin*— a “true Japanese.” Prior to the lifting of martial law, they were branded as scandalous and received harsh criticism from the literary circle in postwar Taiwan. But since the 90s, they were excavated by scholars seeking alternative interpretations of their work.

Among the authors of *Koumin* literature that faced defacement after the surrender of Japan, I chose Chou Chin-po (周金波) as my subject in Chapter Two because his refusal to redress himself after the war seems to resonate with the colonial nostalgia articulated by other writers of his time. While they scrambled to rectify their names and offer interpretations to conform to Chinese Nationalist mainstream notion of Japan as the enemy state and claimed that they themselves, too, were victims, Chou kept his silence even when editors of *Collection of Taiwanese Literature* branded his work, “The Volunteer Soldier,” as “utter *Koumin* literature”—a text that, “written by ignorant youths that destroyed part of the Taiwanese national consciousness,” represents “the fact that the enslavement (奴化) movement was successful.”<sup>15</sup> Chou is not unlike his peers who found themselves muted after the war; Chou, who chose not to offer any self-explanations, perhaps resembles those who stubbornly held on to their idea of “Japanese spirit/value.” In an attempt to understand the obstinacy of his *koumin* stigma, I closely read the text of “Volunteer Solider” to examine its exclusion from “realistic novels that portrayed the Taiwanese’s struggles of undergoing *koumin*ka movement.”<sup>16</sup>

All that was unsaid by Chou Chin-po strike a cord with Taiwan’s former President Lee Teng-hui’s vocality of his own Japaneseness. Lee’s seemingly unabashed

proclamation of being a Japanese person before WWII ended, or when he visited the Yasukuni Shrine after the war to pay tribute to his brother whose spirit was enshrined there, never fails to draw criticism. And like critics of Chou, critics of Lee also try to contain him in the word, *Koumin*, a “‘Japanese’ without the recognition of Japanese citizenship.” But there is also a significant difference between them. While Chou Chin-bo’s literary efforts are embedded in history, Lee Teng-hui’s indefinable identity of “becoming Japanese/Taiwanese” is a present continuous operation. In other words, whereas Chou was a *koumin* under a colonial framework, Lee is a postcolonial *koumin* as his constant links to past and present Japan is seen as a desire for continuation of his Japanese experience. To investigate Lee’s supposed desire to continue a colonial Japan/Taiwan relationship, I examine the anxiety and commotion that Lee stirred in the Taiwanese media in the summer of 2015, when he confessedly stated, in an essay submitted to Japan’s *Voice* magazine, his devotion in fighting for the Japanese Empire during his conscription. There came normative attacks on his betrayal to his “Chinese roots” as well as his position as the former president of the Republic of China. But there were also voices that redirected attention to the element of memory in his recount. I argue that the dialectics of remembering and forgetting evoked by Lee’s constant provocation is essential to redressing the memories of “becoming Japanese” and “*koumin*” as the postcolonial Taiwanese move on to “becoming Taiwanese.”

In Chapter Three, I will discuss contemporary films produced by the younger generation who had not undergone Japanese education, paying attention to how the director, who was educated by KMT-edited textbooks that emphasized Japan’s crimes and inhumanity during wartime, viewed the previous generation’s notion of “Japan.” French historian Pierre Nora, in his study of the relation between history and memory,

remarks that collective memory is “in permanent evolution, open to the dialectic of remembering and forgetting, unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to manipulation and appropriation, susceptible to being dormant and periodically revived.”<sup>17</sup> Recent Taiwanese films that touch upon the topic of colonial “Japan,” and the reception and interpretation by the viewers, closely mirror the collective memory’s quality of being in a constant flux. Furthermore, the “memory” that is invented in the films is more than a romanticization of the Japanese colonial past or simply a background to foil the storyline. I will examine the media representation of the Japanized generation’s memory by studying the following films by the now-renowned director, Wei Te-sheng: *Cape No. 7* (2008), *Seediq Bale* (2011), and *Kano* (2014, produced by Wei and directed by Umin Boya) as well as the entailing critiques regarding their presentation of “Japan.”

The first section of Chapter Three discusses the element of in-betweenness prevalent in the films, as the characters struggle with multiple identities. The second part investigates the sense of liminality<sup>18</sup> in Wei’s construction of “Taiwanese identity”—a throbbing, incomplete sense of being neither here nor there; a constant state of “becoming.” In both sections, I close in on the cinematic texts. *Cape No. 7* is a blockbuster whose success is considered something of a social phenomenon in Taiwan. Despite the film’s popularity, however, its portrayal of an unfinished love story between a Japanese teacher and his deserted Taiwanese student prodded the sensitive nerves of some viewers who believed that the Taiwanese schoolgirl’s yearning for the love of Japanese teacher represents “Taiwan’s own yearning to be recolonized,”<sup>19</sup> and prompted some critics to question the “Taiwanese subjectivity.”<sup>20</sup> While the plot is purely fictional, and the wartime romance receives little actual screen time, the reactions it spurred demonstrate that the memories of Taiwan’s colonial history and “Japan” are



susceptible to different interpretations.

Next I look into the release of *Seediq Bale* in 2011, the year that marked the hundredth anniversary of the Chinese Nationalist government. Celebrations aside, the most popular topic of the year, most Taiwanese would point out, was the release of Wei's *Seediq Bale*, a high-budget epic film that portrays the story of the Wushe Incident from the perspective of the aboriginals rather than the dominant Han-Chinese ethnic group. While the media focused on the production of the film as "pride of Taiwan," the film inevitably triggered a string of political and historical discussions revolving around the presentation of historical realism, heroism versus savagery, as well as the shaping of the Japanese characters. In an interview, Wei mentions that when he invited Japanese actors to perform in this film, he had specified to them that "the film is not going to vilify the Japanese." However, his attempt seems to have slipped through some viewers, who exclaimed their thrill as the Seediq rebels charge at and slaughter the Japanese troops. The public recalls the nationalistic criticism Wei had received for *Cape No. 7*, and wonders what they have to say now that *Seediq Bale* centers on the aboriginals' resistance against Japanese rule.

The 2014 production of *Kano* completes Wei's "Taiwan trilogy" (or "*koumin* trilogy," as some argue). The film, set in 1931, is a story about a tri-racial mongrel baseball team struggling to achieve its ultimate glory to play at Japan's revered Koshien Baseball Tournament under the guidance of a Spartan Japanese coach. Although fans contend that the film should be enjoyed purely as a chronicling of Taiwan's sports history, its historical particularity and Wei's insertions of colonial elements all suggest that it cannot be read simply as a sports bildungsroman. The presentation of overall harmony among the races of Hoklo Taiwanese, Aboriginal, and Japanese working towards one unified goal invited criticism questioning the preproduction of this ideal

“template of colonial policy,” comparing it to colonial Japan’s propagandist film, *Sayon’s Bell* (サヨンの鐘, 1943) which portrayed an aboriginal girl’s willing servility to the Japanese empire. A propagandist reading of film that portrays a colonial ideal at this juncture in Taiwanese history makes very little sense. Such interpretation is more telling in revealing the critique’s uneasiness with colonial history than Wei’s sentimentalized depiction of prosperity and modernity under Japanese rule. In this vein, one can observe the construction of a new tradition of postmemory in the dialectics between the colonial sensibilities presented Wei Te-sheng’s films and their nationalistic critics. The opposing camps’ ceaseless conversations regarding the memories demonstrate the younger generation’s ambition to reclaim or conserve the once-manipulated, or deleted, past.

Chapter Four focuses on three documentaries produced by Japanese directors, *Taiwan Jinsei* (2008) and *Taiwan Identity* (2013) by Sakai Atsuko, and *Wansei Back Home* (2015) by Tanaka Mika (who is half Taiwanese). Their works on a collection of interviews with the Japanized Taiwanese (Sakai), and Taiwanized Japanese (Tanaka), arguably epitomize a missing dialogue between Japan and the Taiwanese *tousans* and *kaasans* who have thus far articulated a desirable Japanese experience to an audience that do not share the same sentiments. In *Taiwan Jinsei*, Sakai aims to shed light, to the Japanese audience, on how a group of Taiwanese elders who “were once Japanese” lived after the “real” Japanese left, and how some of them held on to their previous identity and “Japanese spirit.” Her second documentary, *Taiwan Identity*, looks into a darker page in the history of Taiwan, discussing the ensuing turmoil that the Japanized Taiwanese’s now-wrong identity has brought upon them—the infamous 228 Massacre and White Terror—and their perpetual sense of displacement, of being neither Japanese

nor truly Taiwanese.

Tanaka Mika's *Wansei Back Home* focuses on subjects whose direction of gaze moves in a diagonally opposite direction. *Wansei* 湾生 is a derogatory term to describe Japanese who were born in Taiwan during the Japanese colonial period (1895-1945). After their repatriation to Japan after WWII ended, they felt a distinctive "Taiwanese-ness" in them that separated them from the other Japanese, and perceived Taiwan as their "homeland." Similar to the "tousans" in Taiwan, the *wanseis* also endured silencing and obscurity due to discrimination against the "impurity" of their (Japanese) identity. And like the *tousans*, the silencing was unable to contain their mounting, problematic nostalgia for the past. Tanaka's *Wansei Back Home* reverses the course of home-coming, strongly suggesting that the *wanseis*'s returning to Taiwan to seek their roots is another form of repatriation.

Juxtaposing both the Japanized Taiwanese's and the Taiwanized Japanese's diasporas in their respective "homelands" poses an important rupture in the perception of colonial history. There are narratives that cannot be contained in the binarism of the colonizer/colonized or the master/subaltern. I also argue that their colonial nostalgia is not a yearning for the return of colonialism, but a selective remembrance to keep values that they associate with the particular temporal context, or in Pierre Nora's words, "certain sites where historical continuity persists."<sup>21</sup> Interestingly, the different subjects of *Taiwan Jinsei* and *Wansei Back Home* are delineated both as people who were "tossed about and teased by torrents of history 歴史に翻弄された" by the Japanese (see figure 1.5), suggesting a sense of futility of personal struggles against the grand narrative of history. Perhaps it is with the sense of futility that Sakai's and Tanaka's documentaries invoke empathy in the viewers for the elders' collectively "wrong"

identities. I contend that the preservation and reshaping of these memories are the younger generation's effort to reincorporate what was left out of official history back into the fold of collective memory.

Unlike Ke De-san's generation, the younger Taiwanese did not experience the imposition of allegiance from Japan to KMT's (Taiwanese) "China." They do not need to struggle with contradicting pulls between the oppressed experience as a colonized, and the attractive advancement of modernity. Their mass consumption of the "fragrance of modernity" via trendy gadgets or the ever enticing J-pop culture is more or less guilt-free. Identifying with Japanese character in a film or TV show could well be contained neatly in realms of consumerism. However, like Ke and the people of his time, their memory of Taiwan's colonial past, though obtained by a secondhand postmemory, is shaped by the social context in which they live. While this form of memory feels more distant, it is no less tangible. As the official writing of history in Taiwan is deemed a suspicious source of information, the act of (post)memory is a competition with those in the dominant position for the privilege of articulating Taiwan's past. With the change in political climate, "what is Taiwanese?" has become an important question, and the Chinese popular memory created by the KMT was insufficient in distinguishing the Taiwanese subjectivity. Hence, the once obfuscated Japanese past is enlisted in a new dialectic of remembering and forgetting. How is remembrance of "Japan" significant in balancing the equilibrium of Chinese nationalism? To what purpose had the new generation "manipulated" or "appropriated" their grandparents' memory? These are some of the questions I would like to find the answers to. Taiwan today seems indecisive, disparate, or even schizophrenic in its historic viewpoints, as the title of Ke's autobiography, *My motherland is Japan, my fatherland is Taiwan: confessions of a "Japanese-speaking tribe" Taiwanese*, (2005, 母国は日本、祖国は台湾: 或る日本語

族台湾人の告白) implies. Taiwan's plethora of past occupations by foreign hands have each left their fingerprint on what constitute legitimacy, justice, or the "truth." Hence, the young generation's de-colonization efforts, interpretation of "Japan" in their culture and formation of "becoming Taiwanese" is, in fact, no less complicated than Ke's generation.

## Chapter 1

### Revisiting Trauma, Re-Visioning “Japan”:

#### the Remaking of Taiwanese Comfort Women Documentary

A young man in the audience raised his hand during the discussion session at the screening of *Song of the Reed* (蘆葦之歌) in 2013.<sup>1</sup> *Song of the Reed* is a Taiwanese documentary highlighting the life stories of five survivors of military sexual slavery (comfort women) during the Asia-Pacific War. He commented on one comfort woman’s testimony, in which a potential romance with a Japanese soldier was briefly mentioned. “She must have remembered wrong,” said the man, expressing his incredulity of the testimony. “Such a [Japanese] figure,” he continued, “probably did not exist. He must have been made up by her wishful thinking.” His dubiety at the elder woman’s memory is perhaps due to the awareness of the shifty nature of memories. But more likely it has to do with the incongruity between this anecdote and the paradigmatic narratives of the comfort women: stories about abducted women who were forcibly thrown into sexual slavery to aggressive Japanese soldiers. The film’s incidental capturing of a “good” memory during traumatic times reveals how memories often stray from prescriptive scenarios of justice and national dignity.

Indeed, trauma testimonies at times deviate from our notions of a “perfect victim.” The young man’s skepticism also reflects the ambivalence and anxiety of the current Taiwanese consciousness in determining what contradictory roles Japan played in the colonial past. Were the Japanese exploitive masters or benevolent instructors? After nearly 70 years of the island’s unresolved colonialism and re-colonization by the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang; hereafter KMT), Taiwanese, both the Japanized

and their KMT-educated descendants, still find themselves in a tangled web of (Japanese) nostalgia and (Chinese) nationalism. Many a Japanese-educated elder would give a nostalgic testimony of the Japan Era. A few would even go so far as to wishfully consider themselves actual Japanese.<sup>2</sup>

It is typically assumed, however, that the Taiwanese comfort women who lived during the same period as they did would remember differently. They would depict the Japanese colonizers as militant and brutal, just as other East Asian communities like China and Korea do. Their memories of Japan seem displaced in the small interstice between a Chinese nationalist antagonism towards a war enemy and a paradoxical Taiwanese nostalgia for an ex-ruler. I expected the Taiwanese comfort women's redress movement to be a straightforward quest for an official acknowledgment from Japan. However, in the course of my research on this subject, I have come to see it as a paradoxical, discursive discourse that challenges not only Japan, but Taiwan's own reflection upon its status as a formerly colonized, and its concept of itself as a "nation," and the incongruity within its own "imagined community."

This chapter focuses on the aspect of memories that touch on the comfort women issue—not just of the survivors themselves, but also of other colonial subjects who lived with them during the same period. Compared to the exorbitant amount of media hype on Japanese colonial occupation of Taiwan, studies on and records of Taiwanese comfort women seem scarce. As the women recount their painful experiences with a militantly brutal system that swindled them out of their sexual innocence and normal lives, sometimes they are met with counter-memories from their Taiwanese contemporaries who came to the defense of their offender. For example, memories of those who believed in the integrity of the Japanese military of providing better management and care for the comfort stations, and those who alluded to the practice in poor households

that sold their daughters into prostitution.

The first section of this chapter examines the two films—*Grandmother's Secret: the stories of Taiwanese Comfort Women* and *Song of the Reed*—both produced by the Taipei Women's Rescue Foundation (TWRP), documenting the comfort women's highly politicized stories of their protest against the Japanese government and their survival. Specifically it draws attention to the shift in focus in the continued endeavor of the two documentaries, and the discrepancy between personal memories, and the impact created on postcolonial narratives in Taiwan. The earlier production's telling of the women's stories puts forth a strong accusation against a perverse, brutal "Japan," placing the onus of making amends entirely on the perpetrator; whereas the recent presentation takes on a psychotherapeutic approach, highlighting a more pluralistic portrayal of "Japan" as well as some of the victims' willingness to come to terms with "Japan." The shift from condemnation to reconciliation not only reshapes the victim's relationship with trauma memory, but it also implies a renewed gaze on Imperial Japan. The second section will be devoted to the analysis of personal and political boundaries of these memories, and how they contest with other colonial memories. The discourses of the two films move in diametrically opposing directions: *Grandmother's Secret* pushes the personal trauma outward into the public sphere to inform, whereas *Song of the Reed* pulls the issue inward, focusing on the objective process of healing. I also use Kobayashi Yoshinori 小林善紀's *Taiwan Ron* 台灣論 to illustrate the tension and contentions between the positive memories of the Japanese colonial regime and the comfort women movement narratives, which often lean toward nationalistic criticism against "Japan" as a national enemy. Colonial memories presented in *Taiwan Ron* that argue coercion was not involved in the conscription of the women do not necessarily signify support for the



Japanese military's organized sexual violence, nor an attempt to cover up for Japan's war crimes, but, if taken as a fact, demonstrate the limitation of one's knowledge and experience. I agree that justice needs to be demanded, but I argue that contesting memories need not negate each other; instead, looking into the area of disputed memories could reveal the complexities of relationships between the colonized and their colonizers, as well as the internal relationship among the former colonized. Not only is it necessary to help the women to come to terms with their trauma, but the internal oppositions inside Taiwan regarding the colonial past must come to terms with each other.

### **The Secret and the Song**

*Song of the Reed*, a 2013 production, is the second documentary on the comfort women presented by TWRF, featuring the aging former comfort women and the process of making peace with their past. The film's predecessor was produced in 1997, five years after the initial outcries emerged against the Japanese military's systematic sexual violence during World War II. *Song of the Reed* interviewed the same subjects, who delivered similar accounts of their terrible experiences as they did 16 years before. But why do we need another film on this same subject? How does the 2013 documentary's revisiting of the Taiwanese comfort women depart from its predecessor? As the memories of Japan as a perpetrator persist, did time serve to harden, or soften the gaze towards this "public enemy?"

Titled *Grandmother's Secret: the Stories of Taiwanese Comfort Women* (阿嬤的秘密：台籍「慰安婦」的故事), the 1997 documentary provided a platform for the women to divulge their illicit pasts to the public, secrets that they had hidden from their

own families out of shame and fear of dishonor. Captured on camera, their pain and accusations against the Japanese government were raw and dramatic (see Figure 2.1). In one footage, a woman flings her body against her mother's gravestone, wailing like a child. "If only you knew what they did to me!" she weeps bitterly. In another, she lifts a corner of her shirt to reveal a long, red, gnarling scar that resulted from being injured while working as a comfort woman. The grating sound bites and striking images viscerally convey the harsh reality that the women faced, and carve out a space in viewers' collective memory for the women's trauma. Beside the gory exposure of old scars, physical and emotional, which were directly inflicted by the Japanese military, this film also sheds light on the indirect wounds it imposed—the women's sense of shame and their broken lives after their return.

In this documentary, some of the interviews were conducted at the site where the women's torment took place. Strolling down a path in leafy rural Hualian, Lin Shen-chung 林沈中 leads her interviewer to the abandoned mine where she was first raped as a 17-year-old girl, and then repeatedly and surreptitiously trucked back, along with other young girls, to the pitch dark cave everyday for more torment and humiliation. One of the interviewers, human rights attorney and founder of TWRF, Wang Ching-feng 王清峰, gently rubs her back and apologizes for having to bring her back. Apologetic as Wang is, "bringing her back," revisiting the locale of the infliction is an important element in this film. At the time of filming, it was clear that the women's personal trauma needed to enter the public sphere, where it would encounter an audience, who has been unknowingly sharing the same space as the trauma, would listen and learn of what happened. The title "Grandmother's Secret" suggests reluctance on the women's part to divulge these particularly traumatic memories, but also, perhaps inappropriately,

lures the viewers with the prospect of learning someone's clandestine past. Given the humanitarian nature of TWRF, this choice of presentation is perhaps a strategy on the foundation's part to bend the disinterested Taiwanese public's ear to listen to what the women need to say.

The documentary brought another comfort woman, Lu Man-mei 盧滿妹, overseas to Hainan Island 海南島 to tell her story. "Everything is different now," she repeats to her interviewer, waving a hand at the landscape and new building structures. A school stands at the site where her comfort station once was. The shot shifts to innocent faces of young school girls, whose obliviousness to the old woman's sufferings and the history of the locale is transparent. The camera then shifts again, to a local man explaining that the tiles on his roof are taken from the wartime Japanese constructions and that he lined the material on his roof using the same techniques the Japanese had used. This clip is indicative of how easily comfort women can be swept under the rug of history, had Lu Man-mei not revisited the site and retell her story. While remnants of old building blocks are repurposed and shift shape into another institution, the women's trauma takes on the invisible form of internal struggle.

"Long ago when a bride-to-be is rejected after the engagement, the man's family would have to pay hush money (遮羞費, translated into "fee to hide shame") to compensate for the damage of her reputation," Lu Man-mei says when she speaks of asking for compensation from the Japanese government.<sup>3</sup> It is telling that she compares her experience of rape and sexual torment to that of a rejected bride. According to traditional codes of ethics, for a woman to be turned down by her betrothed, whether or not the marriage has been consummated, results in her virtue being irreversibly sullied. The rejection brings shame not only onto the woman, but her entire clan. Having been

passed on by numerous men to other men, Lu Man-mei's association of her past as a comfort woman with the repeated denouncement of a banished bride, reflects her mourning of not just her tormented youth, but the irretrievable loss of her value as a woman. The damaged prospect of a marriage and how a tarnished reputation hinders her rehabilitation in a patriarchal society add insult to the bodily injuries that were inflicted upon her.<sup>4</sup> Indeed, as the film reveals, after their return most interviewees faced rejection from family members and later their husbands. To avoid gossip they start anew by uprooting and relocating to other towns, but there further hardship awaits for women with scarce resource and no support. All interviewees struggle with poverty and broken relationships with their partners. They see this post-comfort-women struggle as a direct consequence of the Japanese army's abuse, and therefore hold Japan accountable for their rape, and everything that happens since then.

In interviews in *Grandmother's Secret*, several women emphasize their sexual inexperience prior to their captivity. Between sobs, Huang A-tao 黃阿桃 discloses that she was a "clean and pure maiden" at the time of victimization; in Lin Shen-chung's testimony, a male voice (that belongs to her translator, as she speaks little Chinese) tells/translates that she was a seventeen-year-old virgin. This was before the 2001 publication of *Taiwan Ron*, a Japanese comic by Kobayashi Yoshinori which somehow ignited the pointless argument regarding whether all comfort women should be considered victims if some had volunteered their bodies. The stress on sexual inexperience does not really count as an attempt to clarify against doubts regarding their virtue. It is reported that some of the women were already working as prostitutes prior to working for the military brothels, or may have voluntarily applied for the position rather than being coerced into it. The emphasis on their sexual innocence in the film risks perpetuating

that their pain is only grievable if their bodies were untouched by debauchery before their downfall, that their cause is worth supporting and blames are placeable on the Japanese if they were “good women.” The implications, while dismissible to the modern viewer, are telling of the ostracization the Taiwanese society displayed to the women after their fall from grace. (Indeed, the observation of family banishment or self-imposed exile recurs in the second documentary and I will discuss the harsh environment for the comfort women’s rehabilitation later in the chapter.) Taiwan’s predominantly patriarchal ideology at the time, as presented in *Grandmother’s Secret*, which evaluated a woman’s virtue by her (lack of) sexuality, could be considered an accomplice in the tormenting of the women.

In stark contrast to the women’s innocence, the film’s portrayal of *Japanese* image is not only brutal, but also dark and perverse. Wu Hsiu-mei’s 吳秀妹 testimony describes her cell in Guandong, China, and how her bed was positioned underneath a small sky window in the ceiling. Many times, either during “work” or during her break, she sees a silhouette of a man looming over the window, peering into her space. Her narration voices over an irksome animation of a man’s dark shadow growing in a window, against the backdrop of a moonlit night, his eyes glistening and peering down at the woman. This animation depicts not only the *Japanese* violation into the women’s physical boundary, but the invasion of their psychological domain. While the portrayal is based on the woman’s narration, the ghoulish characterization is based on the director’s simulation of the comfort woman’s fear. The director’s attempt to give the intruders outside the window a terrifying quality renders them a horrible Other, one that the Taiwanese viewers ought to despise and expel. Or perhaps, given the comfort women’s then marginalized and forsaken position, the caricature is a tactic to embrace

this Other back into the fold by creating an even more aberrant Other.

This was in the early stages of readying the appeals to Tokyo, when the Taiwanese society was still muddled with the conceptualization of “comfort women.”<sup>5</sup> *Grandmother’s Secret* cannot afford to rely on nuance to convey the women’s suffering and urgency. Hence the cameras readily zoom in on the spectacles of heightened drama, urging the viewers to look closely at writhing scars and tearful grimaces. The women’s innocence and pain offer a sharp contrast against the coercion and brutality of Imperial Japan and later, the coolness and indifference of a post-war Japanese government. The purpose of the documentary was clear—to inform the Taiwanese public of the elder women’s ordeal and to gather enough momentum to demand accountability from a powerful government. It prompted the women to revisit the site of victimization, and remap the repressed past. Even so, the Tokyo Supreme Court rejected their final appeal in 2009, and until today the Japanese government has not yet issued an apology or compensation that the women and their support groups deem acceptable.

In 2013, the making of *Song of the Reed* took a dramatic turn on the same issue. Urging the Japanese government for formal apology and proper compensation is still relevant and resolute, but the emphasis has shifted to helping the former comfort women make peace with their trauma (see Figure 2.2). Like its 1997 predecessor, it is charged with emotions and its camera still closely follows facial expressions of the surviving women, clinging onto their every word and emotion. However, instead of focusing on the spectacles of trauma, director Wu Hsiu-ching 吳秀菁 takes the approach of highlighting their healing process through documenting the Comfort Women Healing Workshops, hosted by TWRF. The women’s stories are retold through sessions of group therapy, which allows the viewers to see the women forming

relationships and connecting with one another through their mourning. This greatly departs from the previous documentary where there is a clear cut between the segments of each woman's story.

Along with soothing violin background music, *Song of the Reed* inserts quotes from the Ecclesiastes 3:7: "A time to kill, and a time to heal; a time to break down, and a time to build up; a time to weep, and a time to laugh; a time to mourn, and a time to dance; [...] A time to rend, and a time to sew; a time to keep silence, a time to speak." This religious passage, titled "To Everything There is a Season," instills a sense of calmness among the women experiencing tumultuous upheavals of emotions. It is significant because it offers "a structure of feeling" to the documentary that aims to capture divergent sides of the stories. When each incident is given an allotted frame in time, pain and trauma can be expected to eventually yield to the (seemingly impossible) task of healing.

In this respect, it is interesting to note that, quite contrary to previous productions (films and books) on the subject of the trauma of comfort women, *Song of the Reed* includes positive presentations related to colonial "Japan." In one of the group therapy sessions, the elder women dance merrily to "Momotaro," (see Figure 2.3) a traditional Japanese children's ballad that many of the colonized generation are familiar with. Conceivably, they may have learned this song as children, and it is linked to their memory of an age that harks back to innocence and purity, when their bodies and minds were still unspoiled by war. The choice of this song suggests that TWRP and the survivors, though struggling with a Japanese-inflicted trauma, do not exclude "Japan" memories when "a time to dance" approaches. Wittingly or unwittingly, the atrocities of a Japanese military brothel and the better times in life that contained Japanese

influences are rendered separable.

Though tackling a highly sensitive and nationalistic issue, *Song of the Reed* is also different from other productions in that it offers an alternative image of comfort women as well as the “Japanese,” with the inclusion of long-time Japanese sympathizers, who appeared to have established camaraderie with the women. The Japanese supporters were also interviewed and given air time to express their thoughts, lending “Japan” a more direct form of representation than secondary presentation through the testimonies of the women. The documentary, for instance, underscores visits to Taiwan by members of a support group from Japan including Aitani Kunio 藍谷邦雄, an attorney, and Shiba Yoko 柴洋子, Asai Kiriko 淺井桐子. Shots of them engaged in warm greetings with the women display softer, more personal links between the citizens of the two nations regarding this thorny subject. “We’ve been friends for decades, haven’t we?” Aitani says in a footage, to a bed-ridden Lu Man-mei, one of the survivors, who converses with him fluently in Japanese. One supporter from Kyoto is quoted as having said, while reflecting on the urgency of issuing a state apology, “very soon [after all the comfort women pass away], the people who can forgive us will no longer be there.” The portrayal of these Japanese figures challenges the normative portrayal of Japan as a cool, uncaring political mechanism, impervious to discussions of Japan’s past war crimes. The documentary’s highlight on friendship between the Taiwanese comfort women and their Japanese sympathizers seems to exude optimism regarding the possibility of reconciliation between the colonized and the colonizer (albeit not the actual colonizer/perpetrator themselves).

Even so, *Song of the Reed*’s takes of the elder women often suggest that the women have lived in a liminal space between life and death since their time in captivity, which



ranged from one to three years. They are now in their 80s or 90s, making their time as comfort women a relatively small portion in their long lives. Wu's shots of Hsiu-mei as she sits alone in her living room offers the viewers a taste of liminality for what seems like an eternity. The woman's expression does not reveal to the viewers whether she is staring into a television or mere blankness. The only motion comes from her electric fan that mechanically breathes air into the shot. She appears to be doing nothing, or she could be waiting—for the next sentence in an ongoing conversation, or for someone to enter the room. This moment of nothingness is magnified through the camera, and impregnated with meaning (see Figure 2.4). More than twenty years have passed since their first protest, and the women are still waiting for a closure.

The quality of liminality does not eclipse Wu's portrayal of the women's subjectivity in articulating their trauma, however. Wu separates "the comfort woman experience" from the women themselves, and rewrites trauma by breaking the mold of a stereotypical image of abuse victims. Situated in the interstices of grand narratives of nations, the comfort women are easily seen as a faceless group sharing the same tragedy. In the earlier days of protests, the women guarded their privacy by covering their faces with wide brim hats and masks; in some press conferences, they sat collectively behind a large board revealing only their feet. But Wu's documentary shows that, though sharing similar grief and the same goal, the group of individuals have more than one corporate, monolithic voice. In filming the women's healing process, she captured varying degrees of various emotions: the expected anger and anguish, but also forgiveness and moments of peace. An exalting highlight of the film is a scene of (self-) reconciliation when Hsiu-mei quietly talks to a token, an empty chair draped in fabrics of her choice, which represents all the Japanese soldiers who tormented her: "regardless of our entangled past, I now set you free. I forgive you." She then tells another token

that symbolizes her young self: “I also forgive you. I know you had a difficult time. You were cheated. I know you did not mean for it to happen.” In a televised interview, Wu concludes that *Song of the Reed* represents the reconciliation between nations and people.<sup>6</sup> While Hsiu-mei’s testimony and forgiveness concern only herself, it is an uplifting indication of a possibility that the comfort woman, a marginalized figure whose perpetrator has not admitted to committing his crimes, can make peace with trauma and her past self. Focusing on their healing process somehow liberates the women from the passive role of a victim, because it allows them to strip off the sense of shame from the label of “comfort women,” and voice their “forgiveness” to their perpetrator. It is ironic that such forgiveness is unasked for. It seems that they are pitching this pardon into the void at best because there is no actual recipient. It only serves to demonstrate their willingness to come to terms with a terrible past. This forgiveness in no way absolves the Japanese government of its duties to make amends, as TWRP, which produced the documentaries, is adamant in their pursuit of procuring adequate compensation. However, despite the unresolved status regarding state compensation and formal apologies, the 2013 Taiwanese documentary offers an alternative route to remedy a national trauma. *Song of the Reed’s* shift of focus to comfort women as a humanitarian issue, rather than a transnational political one, lifts the trauma above the contentions of political dispute.

### **The Comfort Women Issue in Taiwan**

Deemed a Japan-friendly country, Taiwan is often considered an anomaly from other former Japanese colonies. Yet the voices of the Taiwanese comfort women who suffered outrageous sexual and psychological abuse—abuse condoned by the Imperial Japanese Army—remain an incongruent factor contributing to the ambivalence of the Taiwanese

gaze towards Japan. The women's identity as Taiwanese and as comfort women resists categorization, like a jagged piece of puzzle that would not fit into place. They share a common perpetrator with the comfort women from Korea and China where hostility against Japan remains high for 70 years after the war ended. Their compatriots, however, often harbor favorable views of Imperial Japan, looking towards the vestiges of modernizing effort from the colonial past of Taiwan—robust architecture and well-crafted infrastructures still in use. Though the atrocious details in their testimonies—coercion, daily rape and abuse by succession of soldiers, irreparable damages to their bodies and rehabilitation into society—garnered attention and sympathy from their countrymen, the reluctant momentum it gathered was not enough to make demands to the Japanese government for a formal apology and compensation in a similar powerful fashion as the Koreans did.<sup>7</sup> There is an impression that those who gave their cause the most vocal support are people who fled to Taiwan from mainland China with General Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist troops, who also see Japan as the common aggressor.<sup>8</sup> In the following pages, I will discuss how contending memories of the Japanese era and the frictions between different political ideologies affect the presentation and formation of the Taiwanese comfort women discourse.

In February 1992, a former representative at the House of Representatives in the National Diet of Japan, Hideko Itoh 伊東秀子, uncovered three telegraphs in the archives of the library of the National Institute of Defense Studies in Japan. Dated March 12th, 1942, they were requests sent to the Japanese Army to ship fifty healthy “comfort personnel” to Borneo. The personnel were girls conscripted by the Japanese military commander in Taiwan at the request of the South Regions Headquarters. The evidence of Taiwanese comfort women's existence thus came to light, and immediately

TWRF rose to the task of investigating and collecting testimonials of the survivors. Their effort has managed to raise some previously unheard voices. However, due to Taiwan's complex relationship with Japan, the women's personal past and even their private bodies have become a public arena, where opposing political discourses are pitted against each other, each fighting for the right to interpret the trauma. The women's stories were quickly incorporated by oppositional camps to create a narrative of "Japan" that fits with their ideology. Yet what makes this more complex is that the women's memories, experiences, and perspectives are diverse and occasionally deviate from a paradigmatic narrative. For over twenty years, with lukewarm sympathy, the Taiwanese society is still trying to figure out how to place their comfort women within the framework of Taiwanese subjectivity and its relationship with its former colonizer.

Wu Tzu-hsuan notes in her research that the comfort women redress movements have not met with adequate support from the Taiwanese people not only due to bias and overall disinterest in their cause,<sup>9</sup> but also the hindrance by the "Japanese generation's" belief that these women entered the service voluntarily. In her defense for the redress movement, she vehemently dismisses such belief as unsubstantiated by any "historical documents to prove their allegations." Wu's castigation of the lack of support for the comfort women in Taiwan does make an important point: the redress movement runs the double tasks of beseeching the Japanese government to recognize their pain, *and* justifying themselves as actual victims not just to the Japanese but also to their own people. However, Wu's failure to honor contending memories, whether she approves or not, highlights the dilemma of oral history—its limit of representing one person's personal experience and perspective. And more often than not, memories have the tendency not to fully corroborate with "historical documents."

Political scientist Shogo Suzuki also notes in his 2011 research the "dearth" of

attention paid to Taiwanese comfort women. He indicates that the memories of the Taiwanese comfort women have been overridden by a “new historical narrative” in Taiwan’s pursuit of constructing a Chinese Other, namely, a “new” brand of identity created to distinguish Taiwan from China, and to counter KMT’s Sinocentric education.

<sup>10</sup> This “new narrative” would emphasize the benign aspects of the Japanese colonial regime, while drawing attention to KMT’s historical wrongs. And as an unintended result, the comfort women’s plight received less support as it runs against the grain of this narrative. He further draws example from presidential advisor Shi Wen-long 許文龍’s comments—presented in the form of comics by Yoshinori Kobayashi’s 2001 publication of *Taiwan Ron*—which denies that comfort women were forcibly recruited. Under such a political climate, Taiwanese comfort women lack a consolidated national force to push for an apology from the Japanese government, partly due to political disputes over the construction of Taiwanese identity. He attributes the inadequate attention for Taiwanese comfort women to the insufficient memory space on the part of Taiwanese society, so that other memories are prioritized over comfort women memories for societal acknowledgment and the nation’s to-do list.

I contend that arguments between political parties (mainly, parties that uphold a more Sinocentric philosophy and a more pro-independence liaison) did not further aggravate the comfort women issue’s marginalization in the Taiwanese society, or have kept in check the memories resurfacing since the 1990s. The comfort women issue had not been pushed out of collective memory by “competing memories,” but contrarily, it became the center of attention in the battles of the parties. Indeed, since the comfort women plight first came to the knowledge of the public in 1992, it has been more or less deemed as a KMT campaign. It seems to sit better with the KMT notion of a wartime

“Japan,” one that instigated the Rape of Nanking, that resulted in the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of civilians; one that the Nationalist Chinese (KMT) were at war with for eight years, resulting in a weakened Chinese nation and broken homes. In this vein, the Japanese brutality inflicted upon the women is counted towards the brutality against Chinese during the Sino-Japanese war. When KMT retreated to Taiwan, one of its tasks was to construct a unified, homogenous Chinese identity, and any Taiwanese counter-Japan efforts were considered or incorporated as part of its campaign. However, I argue that Taiwan’s construction of what Shogo Suzuki refers to as a “Chinese Other” identity does not necessarily exclude the memories of comfort women. There is more to Taiwan’s construction of subjectivity than the Japan/China dichotomy, and indeed, if Taiwan positions itself as “Chinese Other,” memories that are incongruous with the Othering will be pushed further out of the collective memory. But these memories do not negate the trauma articulation of the Taiwanese comfort women.

In Japan, history textbooks have evoked criticism regarding the limited presentation or exclusion of the information on comfort women.<sup>11</sup> Since the first appending of comfort women history in 2001, Taiwanese history textbooks have not been less contentious. In July 2015, a group of high school students stormed the Ministry of Education in Taiwan and staged a sit-in against the ministry’s approval of “minor readjustment” to curriculum guidelines. Among many proposed changes, the textbook presentation of comfort women rose to the center of argument. The curriculum committee proposed to append a passage that states “all comfort women were forced,” whose accuracy was questioned by a student activist.<sup>12</sup> The exchange revived the old “volunteer or forced” debate, and quickly steered into precarious directions. As heated debates and legal threats by the ministry ensued, the events culminated in one of the leader student activists committing suicide. Some interpreted his death as a drastic

measure to push for change to the curriculum guidelines, which are considered by protesters to have “pro-China links.”<sup>13</sup>

Nearly a month after the student’s death, *United Daily News* 聯合報 published an essay in an opinion column indicating that if the student had watched *Song of the Reed* and had been enlightened by its “provided evidence” of the plight of comfort women, he would not have taken his life for a false political belief.<sup>14</sup> The editorial then suggested that the student’s tragedy had been incited by the Democratic Progressive Party 民進黨 presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen and her party’s support of a wrong curriculum guideline, and urged them to watch the documentary as well. TWRP promptly reacted the following day, releasing a public statement against the editorial that the fight for comfort women is a humanitarian issue, and strongly condemns any media or party to use the women, the documentary, or the Foundation for their political gain.<sup>15</sup> This is the second statement that TWRP released regarding the curriculum changes to the presentation of comfort women. It states that such actions obfuscate focus on the women’s adversity, and impede the growth of the comfort women narrative in Taiwan. As the only organization in Taiwan that advocated for the comfort women’s redress movement for the past two decades, the statement speaks volumes in reclaiming the victims of Japanese war crimes from the framework of Sino-Japanese opposition and patriarchal discourse. This exchange illustrates how readily Taiwanese cultural hegemony dominates the interpretation of female trauma, and that TWRP has honed its awareness on the trespassing of nationalist discourse upon the female body and female voice.

As psychoanalyst Peng Jenyu points out in her studies, the Taiwanese public tends to link the efforts of TWRP and comfort women to the KMT party and its liaisons.<sup>16</sup> It

is because, when understood within the nationalist framework of pro-unification with China or pro-Taiwan independence, the comfort women issue becomes one that could sting the pro-independence camp and their liaisons with a benign version of “Japan” (either present or past). Dismissive of the editorial’s politicization of the women’s tragedy, the TWRF statement shows its resistance against affiliation with this political background, and steers in the direction of something more universal than the China/Japan dichotomy. Concluding the statement, TWRF further underlines its neutrality to any political parties, attesting that the foundation belongs to the whole “Taiwanese society,” and that in search for the possibility to reconcile, opposition and hatred need to be cast aside. However, this should not be read as acquitting Japan of the responsibility for their war crimes. Although the advocates of Taiwanese comfort women strive to elevate the issue above the domestic, ideological disagreements, it is hard to say if such de-politicization effort could extend to transnational discourse. When met with challenges of varying historical viewpoints, political mobilization, or international justice, the private/domestic discourse of Taiwanese comfort women could once again face problematics of being instrumentalized and their cause risks becoming dissipated, or incorporated into the domineering discourse.

From the arguments between the aforementioned camps emerged a difficult question that had long left the comfort women debate unsettled: “was the woman a willing participant?” Peng has insightfully reframed this question by posing a new question of whether Japan’s “comfort women system” is seen as sexual slavery or sexual industry.<sup>17</sup> At first glance, her query may seem unnecessary, for in 1996, the United Nations concluded in a special report to U.N. Human Rights Commission that Japan needs to make amends for its involvement in forcing women into sexual slavery. Since then, this special report has ruled as consensus in the countries dealing with the



comfort women issue. Peng's observation, however, sheds light on the complexity of the issue, and in particular, on why "willing participation" rhetorics continues to gnaw at the issue. The comfort women received treatments that greatly differed depending on the location, the degree of aggravation of the war, and the women's race. In the case of Taiwanese comfort women, they were often sent to privately owned brothels, whose operation required visiting soldiers to purchase tickets to receive sexual service. This ostensible form of business transaction obscures the hidden nature of rape and slavery, and feeds the rhetoric that a military prostitute is, in fact, a wage-paying job that women of challenging social strata would willingly apply for. However, regardless of the methods of conscription, Peng agrees that, given the inhuman treatment of the female bodies and the suppression of free will in the brothels, along with the imminent threat of death, the system is essentially sexual slavery. Indeed, most of the Taiwanese comfort women were born from families of lower social strata, and while some may have entered the service knowing its true nature,<sup>18</sup> the abuse they endured in the camps does not deny them their victimhood.

"Willing participant or not?" appears to be a cruel, irrelevant question to pose to the victims of sexual violence, but its repeated, and perhaps inevitable, emergence indicates the public's desire to weigh the extent of Japan's crimes. The effect, or damage it causes to aggravate or lessen Japan's responsibility for the women is beyond the scope of my discussion. My focus is how these exchanges from opposing sides shape the view of the younger Taiwanese generation, including the aforementioned student activists, on Taiwan's relationship with Japan. The descendants of the Japanized generation did not experience the colonial period firsthand. Their judgment of Japan is shaped by anecdotes in their private circle of family (which could be positive), and history lessons they took at school, designed and written by the KMT government (which are most

likely negative).<sup>19</sup> The supporters of the comfort women nicknamed them “ah-ma,” or Grandmother, perhaps in an attempt to draw more familial empathy from the public on this issue. By appropriating the women as everyone’s own grandmother, the women’s personal humiliation expands to the level of a national indignation, and their trauma becomes inheritable by the whole community.

During a 2003 workshop session for former comfort women,<sup>20</sup> the women were asked to extract good memories from their harrowing past. About half of the attending women had something to speak of regarding positive encounters with “good Japanese men.” They reminisced about gentleman-like Japanese soldiers who were their love interests in the war zones. At least two women used the word “love” to describe their relationship, while some said they were grateful to the said men for having treated them kindly. Such romance, born out of “transaction” and born into multiple facets of taboo—race, nation, sexuality, victim/oppressor relation—is significant in its simultaneous innocence and transgression. These memories are seldom discussed and rarely publicized, not because their transgressions are unable to serve any discourses, but because such memory can instead pose as a debilitating undercurrent. The memories of romance that were extracted from this particular workshop were presented in “Ah-ma’s Paper Airplane” 阿嬤的紙飛機, a website launched by ten Taiwan University students (see Figure 2.5). As they stated, their intention for creating this platform is to create interest in their generation about the comfort women issue, using a younger, more creative design. All data and material on the site are credited to TWRF, though on TWRF’s own webpage, this particular documentation cannot be found. The curation of memories on this project calls attention to the young generation’s ambition to reconstruct the past. Their selection of the presentation of trauma memories reflects not

only the appeal of romance to younger audience, but suggests the capacity to accommodate the almost infinitely complex experiences of a comfort woman and its potential risks of debilitating the nationalistic framework. Romantic relationship with or a desire for a Japanese soldier not only paints him in a favorable light, but seems likely to weaken the demand for redress from a supposedly brutal “Japan.” In this vein, a new dynamic and interpretation of trauma, Taiwan and its coloniality is to be expected. Where normative presentation of trauma stresses the glooms of victimhood, the younger generation seems to be eager to explore other aspects of the traumatic experience.

As women of tarnished reputation and bottom social and economics strata, former comfort women remain the subaltern of the subalterns throughout their lives. Ostensibly, their stories appear to have been engulfed in the interstices of nationalism and colonialism. But in a turn of speech, the testimonies of the Taiwanese comfort women can be subversive to both of the political frameworks. Their memory of trauma may repudiate the Japanized generation’s popular narrative of a pragmatic Japanese rule, but memories of a lost lover render the testimony flawed and incongruous with establishing the Japanese colonizer as an aggressor. Is it possible to honor the comfort women’s loss while acknowledging benign memories of colonial Japanese experience? Interestingly, the comfort women themselves do not seem to discriminate against these memories, but TWRF has opted to curate them out of their webpage.

In the colonial/national rhetoric, a pursuit for personal justice can easily expand to become a quest for national dignity. When one accepts a comfort woman as a victim of Japanese violence, one needs to be convinced that Imperial Japan was a violent assailant who infringed upon not only the women’s personal dignity, but also debased the dignity of their people and nation. In order to maximize the momentum to press the Japanese government to respond, I believe the national dignity was tactically enlisted by TWRF

in their earlier pursuit to form a cohesive social consciousness. However, to hear one of the abused members to divulge her desire for a Japanese soldier adds to the volatility of the Taiwanese construct of such dignity, similar to how the Japanized generation's positive memories are accused of eclipsing the Taiwanese subjectivity.

### **Taiwanese Comfort Women Issue and “Japan”**

On several occasions, the postwar Japanese government has apologized for the atrocities committed against comfort women during the war. However, the apologies have not been deemed acceptable, due to their lacking in the Diet's backing and the tendency to be contested by rightwing, conservative officials, rendering them invalid. This section, however, is not interested in analyzing Japan's foreign policies and hesitance, but I am more interested in highlighting Taiwan's notion of “Japan” as affected by these apologies to explore the changes of the two countries' postcolonial relationship.

One of the most notable prototypes of apologies occurred on August 4<sup>th</sup>, 1993. Chief Cabinet Minister Yohei Kono 河野洋平 confirmed that the wartime Japanese military was involved in operating comfort stations, and that many women were recruited “against their own will, through coaxing, coercion, etc.” He further extended his apologies and remorse to “all those, irrespective of place of origin, who suffered immeasurable pain and incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women.”<sup>21</sup> However, his apologies had not been pre-approved nor adopted by the Japanese Diet, and therefore regarded as Kono's individual regrets. In 1995, on the 50th anniversary of the end of WWII, Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama 村山富市 made an address that Japan's “colonial rule and aggression [...] caused tremendous damage

and suffering,” and expressed his “remorse and [...] heartfelt apology.”<sup>22</sup> As of December 2015 when Japan offered South Korea a “final,” “irreversible” apology to Korean comfort women, the Murayama Statement was the only one backed by the Japanese Cabinet, therefore deemed as the only official apology that Japan has made for its wartime aggressions.<sup>23</sup> However, for the comfort women, as well as for other groups, such as the representatives of the British former prisoners of War, it was considered defective for its lack of clarity.

In June 1995, the Murayama administration made an effort to set up Asia Women’s Fund (AWF) to issue compensation to comfort women. The fund was rejected by countries including South Korea and Taiwan. This is mostly due to its operation relying heavily on civil volunteers and private donations to provide monetary compensation, which was largely interpreted by Korean and Taiwanese activists as Japan’s poorly veiled attempt to dodge legal responsibility for its war crimes. Although a handful of women accepted the fund in Korea, the Netherlands, the Philippines, and Taiwan, others were promptly discouraged from doing so by the distrust of Japan’s intentions. In Taiwan, TWRP lobbied the then Taipei Mayor Chen Shui-bian 陳水扁 (President of Taiwan, 2000-2008) and Province Governor James Soong 宋楚瑜 to provide the women with state subsidy and medical support so that they would not have to accept the fund out of want. TWRP’s Reports on Comfort Women cite that the Taiwanese comfort women were encouraged not to accept money from AWF, a Japanese “half-public, half-private” organization,<sup>24</sup> which required the women to give up any accusations against the Japanese government. To keep the women from giving in, the Taiwanese government provided NT\$500,000 for each woman, which was matched by private donations, allowing each woman to receive NT\$ 1 million for waiting out for a formal

apology and compensation.<sup>25</sup> TWRF's firm stance and publicizing on refusing compensation through AWF deepened the Taiwanese public's impression that Japan is coyly shunning proper redress. But at this time, the Taiwanese—responses towards Japan's dealing with the issue were delimited to diplomatic formalities. According to Professor Yeh De-Lan's report, it was not until the 2001 publishing of *Taiwan Ron* that the Taiwanese society took serious interest in the issue.<sup>26</sup>

The publication of Kobayashi Yoshinori's (1953-) comic book *Taiwan Ron* touched upon a delicate nerve in Taiwan's ambivalent relationship with Japan. Kobayashi expresses in *Taiwan Ron* a tiredness from a self-defeating historical view (自虐史觀, roughly translated as self-castrating historical view). On his trips to Taiwan, he declares to have recovered the Japanese glory that he has been searching for, alive and well in the formerly colonized people. He attributed the benevolent qualities he found in the people to their colonial education and urges his Japanese audience to find pride and honor in their nation once again. Though he demonstrates an extensive understanding of Taiwanese history, his viewpoint is undoubtedly biased and questionable in his interpretations of colonialism and Japanese legacy. His portrayal of Japanese colonialism leans heavily towards the modernity aspect—proclaiming that Taiwan's prosperity grew from Japan's colonial legacy—without addressing the nature of colonialism nor the price that the colonized had to pay for this modernization.

The comic sold well in Japan. In Taiwan, copies were going like hot cakes as a mob of legislators and supporters raided the largest bookstore in Taipei, grabbed the books, and burned them on the sidewalk along with a Japanese flag. Elmer Feng, the legislator who led the action, denounced the book and said that publishing of the book “injured Taiwan's national dignity.” By national dignity, Feng was referring to Kobayashi's

interview with Shi Wen-long (1928- )—pro-independence supporter, founder of a successful conglomerate, and Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian’s presidential advisor—who was quoted as having said that the Taiwanese comfort women voluntarily responded to the Japanese army’s call for military prostitutes. Shi was forced to publicly apologize for his crude remarks even though Kobayashi later admitted that Shi had not actually mentioned that the comfort women offered themselves to better their lives, but that it was a “generally known concept in Japan.”<sup>27</sup> While pan-blue (referring to KMT Party and their alliances) politicians burned books, the pan-green (referring to Chen Shui-bian’s DPP and alliance parties) politicians were buying the books in bulk as their protest. The brawl lasted for weeks, eventually culminating in the government’s brief ban on Kobayashi’s entry in the country.<sup>28</sup>

The unravelling of the events provided an opportunity for open discussion regarding the comfort women issue in Taiwan and revealed how provocative and emotional this issue can be to an initially “disinterested” public. Unfortunately, as Professor Chen Kuan-hsing points out in his *Reflections on Taiwan Ron*, the general public’s conversation stopped short at political partisan debates. Peng questioned in her 2014 study why the brief mentioning of comfort women could conjure so much contention. The plethora of biased observations that Kobayashi made, including his emphasis on corruptions and aggressions of the Chinese Nationalist Party’s rule and watering down Japan’s own colonial rule, did not make it on the discussion tables. She observes how *Taiwan Ron*’s presentation of comfort women became the battleground of extreme supporters of pro-(China) unification and pro-(Taiwan) independence: “as if comfort women trauma can be directly related to *wai sheng* group’s (外省, roughly translated as mainlander, referring to Chinese that migrated to Taiwan after WWII)

traumatization, and promoting the comfort women cause relegates you to the anti-Japan camp. As if independence supporters will naturally love Japan, and uphold Japanese militarism.”<sup>29</sup> Indeed, what *Taiwan Ron* amplified was not only Kobayashi’s Japanese yearning for past glory, but Taiwan’s overall politicizing of Japan’s colonial legacy.

This is well-demonstrated by what Koo Kwang-ming—a long-time Taiwan independence-advocate—told a reporter from *New York Times*: “[the protesters] appear to be going after Japan, but they are going after Chen’s government.”<sup>30</sup> In this vein, the comfort women issue is a ruse used to invoke guilt and shame in the Taiwanese who remember Japan in a more favorable light. As the collective sexual violation is elevated from a personal level into the public sphere, and the comfort women’s personal trauma becomes a matter of national dignity, people with positive views of Japan’s colonial rule are easily stupefied by the simple question: “what about the comfort women?” Indeed, how can one comfortably pursue a pretty rosy picture of the colonial days, a time when their sisters lived in hell?

I contend that apart from being trapped in the dichotomy of two ideologies, another possibility that the argument highlights here is the battle of memories. Shi Wen-long’s comments are admittedly insensitive and crude to the plight of comfort women. However, if his belief in the legitimacy of the army’s recruiting system was sincere, would it actually stem from memories of what he learned of it during the colonial period? His knowledge of what truly occurred may be flawed, but (under that presumption that he believes in what he remembers) can one accuse him of false memory? In other words, if a memory is preferred or ends up dominating another, it is possibly because it fits better into the mainstream discourse, but not because the memory is inferior or *wrong*. Even when the majority’s memory overrides that of the minority’s, there is no guarantee that the suppressed memory is completely diminished.



Rather, it is merely temporarily written over, a palimpsest of the preferred narratives of the successive rulers.

Varying life experiences define the delimitations of memory. This is not only due to temporal boundaries, but also because no memory is omniscient at the time of an occurrence. This is perhaps what makes Shi Wen-long's supposed testimony for *Taiwan-Ron* so vulnerable. While he may have wholeheartedly believed in the integrity of the Japanese Army's recruiting methodology, his absolution is only privy to his own cognition.

Wu Tze-hsuan notes in her thesis that she was puzzled by the "odd Passion for Taiwan" displayed by Alice King (金美齡, 1934- ), a presidential counselor for President Chen Shui-bian at the time of *Taiwan Ron*'s publication. A fierce independence advocate featured in the comic book, King bluntly announced in a televised debate that she has neither time nor interest to aid the comfort women in their appeal to Tokyo. She also dismisses her debate partner's statement that "there is only one historical truth."<sup>31</sup> King argues that a history written by each nation represents its own standpoint and does not necessarily represent the truth. To those who have readily accepted the victimhood of comfort women, that numerous testimonies claim most comfort women volunteered themselves either for the state's great cause or because the military brothels provided better work benefits seems highly insensitive and plain wrong. Indeed, when a 96-year-old elder I interviewed in 2011 stated that, to his knowledge, there were no forced comfort women, I was simply taken aback. However, as Professor of Taiwanese history Lee Xiao-feng proposes, these are *their* memories.<sup>32</sup> Memories differ from historical facts in that they are highly personal, their accuracy is questionable (though may not need to be), and they do not adhere to any set of agenda

unless their owner willfully wants them to be.

In March 2007, when the U.S. Congress introduced a resolution that urged Japan to “formally acknowledge, apologize, and accept history responsibility [...] for its Imperial Armed Forces’ coercion of young women into sexual slavery,” Prime Minister Shinzo Abe responded to it by remarking that there was no concrete evidence of coercion<sup>33</sup> while Abe’s Foreign Minister Aso Taro 麻生太郎 reacted by calling it an “extremely regrettable” bill, which was “not based on objective facts.”<sup>34</sup> But then, on April 26th, 2007, Shinzo Abe expressed his “deep-hearted sympathies that my people (I find his use of “my people” very interesting. Is he apologizing to victims who were “Japanese”?) had to serve as Comfort Women. [...] I express my apologies” in a joint press conference with President Bush in Washington.<sup>35</sup> This apology, perhaps inappropriately, was accepted by Bush, who expressed appreciation for Abe’s “candor.”

Shortly thereafter, in July 2007, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution that demanded Japan to acknowledge and accept its war responsibility, as did the European Union, the Netherlands, and Canada.<sup>36</sup> Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan followed suit on November 11th, 2008, by passing its own “Taiwanese Comfort Women Resolution.”<sup>37</sup> The resolution came as a form of internal reconciliation in Taiwan, as legislators from the opposing camps of KMT and DPP issued a joint proposal to the government. While official backings for the women’s long quest seem “exhilarating,” as TWRF enthusiastically put it in its newsletter to “Friends of Comfort Women,”<sup>38</sup> up until the present no further progress was made regarding a satisfactory apology and compensation.

Fast forward to December 28th of 2015, the new Shinzo Abe government made amends with South Korea, granting an \$8.3 million for compensation and a formal,

irreversible apology.<sup>39</sup> Taiwan's President Ma Ying-jeou immediately instructed the Taiwan representative in Tokyo to push Japan for a negotiation on the same issue. But for some in Taiwan, it seems doubtful for the Taiwanese comfort women to be granted the same wish. New Party Legislator, and former president of TWRF, Yeh Yu-lan 葉毓蘭, blamed the Taiwanese society for "pandering to Japan" 媚日, using the aforementioned anti-curriculum guideline protest as an example.<sup>40</sup> She then lambasted former President Lee Deng-hui (1988-2000) for his proclamation that the comfort women issue has "already been resolved." Lee was under fire earlier that year for accepting an interview with Japan's *Voice* magazine, in which he stated that he considered Japan as his "motherland" when he served the Japanese military during WWII. Regarding the comfort women issue, he is convinced that it has been resolved, possibly referring to a relevant clause to 1952 agreement of the San Francisco Peace treaty, which ran: "in order to display generosity and friendship to the people of Japan, the Republic of China [Taiwan] voluntarily gives up claims to the services that Japan is obligated to provide according to Article 14, Clause A, Line one of the treaty of San Francisco."<sup>41</sup>

Varying political agendas render varying interpretations and meanings to the comfort women's memories. Protesters and campaigners of the comfort women issue have expanded the women's personal tragedy to that of a national scale. The personalness of these memories was used as evidence to testify against Japan's ability to be a fair ruler to its colonial subjects. On one hand, memories of Imperial Japan as a strict yet lawful ruler created lingering impressions that it would only conscript women of questionable virtue to the army; on the other, memories as comfort women is a direct testament and condemnation against such conviction. The conviction may be faulty, but

memories cannot be because they rely on what the present makes of them. The diversity of memories may be the reason that the Taiwanese comfort women seem to have a smaller voice and a smaller platform while the comfort women campaigners in Korea and China seem to have formed a more or less united, and hence, more powerful voice.

## **Conclusion**

At the end of 2015, the seventieth anniversary marking the end of WWII, the TWRF announced their plan to build a museum to document the lives and ways of living of Taiwanese women since the 1900s, highlighting the comfort women stories. The group of museum organizers told a *Los Angeles Times* correspondent that “it has been a long, lonely quest to get the Taiwanese to remember [the] women.”<sup>42</sup> This is not because the people are forgetful, but perhaps due to a conscious decision to override memories of this trauma. Polls show that the majority of Taiwanese people in 2016 see themselves as Taiwanese, while the number of those who consider themselves Chinese have flatlined.

<sup>43</sup> For many, to speak of antagonism against wartime Japan is an indication of political affinity with Communist China, who has always proclaimed that Taiwan is part of China. Executive director Kang Shu-hua further disclosed that fundraising for this project has been difficult, because the people see the comfort women as a political issue, or “a matter of hatred toward Japan,” resulting in scant support.

But from the shift of focus we see in *Song of the Reed*, TWRF has come a long way from the accusatory narrative that emphasized brutality and Othering of Japan. Named “Ah-ma Museum,” the museum’s Chinese name is directly translated into “Grandmother’s Home.” Unlike the government-approved Martyrs’ Shrine of the Loyal 忠烈祠, it is not a temple that enshrines national heroes, but a more neutral space

(museum) that offers the public a place to remember and to recognize the violence inflicted upon women throughout history. To acquire the fund to materialize the memories, the Foundation resorted to a popular online platform of crowd-funding. That the funding is sourced from individuals from around the internet, whose faces are unseen and motives unknown, liberates the project from partisanship. This would return focus and subjectivity to the women and their memories, and hopefully, break the grasp of nationalist rhetorics on the issue. However, as with all museums, the items chosen for exhibition reflect partiality and preference. How will the memories be curated? Who has the power to curate the presentation of trauma? These are questions that we must keep asking.

TWRF states in their website the necessity to record the comfort women's testimonies that "history should not be forgotten though the women have perished."<sup>44</sup> I contend that the movement to gain justice should not be fueled by nationalistic rhetoric of us against the Other, or of opposing political camps that choose to support the women or the Japanese government based on their political stands. We need a new, alternative approach to pursue the comfort women issue, not only for survivors who still remain, but also for us, the unwilling keepers of the tangled, ambivalent web of memories.

## Chapter 2

### “Why Use ‘Keigo’ If You Are Not a ‘Koumin’?”:

#### Kouminka and Its Discontent

The Taipei mayoral election approached the final, fervent stage in November 2014. In a desperate attempt to drum up votes, some politicians resorted to the invocation of the antiquated ghost of “enslavement by Japanese colonialism,” trusting that its sensationalism would draw in certain supporters. One of the candidates, Ko Wen-je 柯文哲, came under attack regarding his ancestral history. Ko’s grandfather had complied with the Japanese name-changing policies during the colonial times. Ko’s main opponent was Chinese Nationalist Party (hereafter KMT, 國民黨) candidate Lien Sean, and his father, Lien Chan 連戰, who had been the honorary Chairman of the KMT and former Taiwanese Vice President, addressed Ko as Aoyama Wen-je 青山文哲, and made conjectures about his national identification for having been brought up in a family that had been Japanized in the past. “I can’t say what you would call that,” prompted Lien. The audience he was addressing—namely, the Chinese Anti-Independence National Protection Mobilization Meeting 中國人反獨護國動員大會—responded in consonance: “Traitor (to the Han race) 漢奸!”<sup>1</sup> The following day, another heavyweight KMT veteran, former Taiwanese Premier Hau Pei-tsun 郝伯村 further drove home the point, referring to Ko as a descendent of a *koumin* 皇民, Imperial Japan’s loyal subjects.<sup>2</sup> In this frame, all who complied with colonial policies is categorized as a brainwashed subject of Japanese colonialism, which Hau asserted also

includes former President Lee Teng-hui 李登輝. The anachronistic accusation and its implications were met with immediate refutation by historians and commentators in online forums, arguing that the Taiwanese were not in the position to decide against policies when the island was ceded to Japan in 1895.

Among the tidal waves of critics against Lien and Hau's vitriol, Taiwanese history dignitary and democracy activist Chen Fang-ming's essay was among the most read and widely distributed in the social media. Chen called the employment of the epithet humiliating<sup>3</sup>: "To call a Taiwanese traitor or *koumin* is extremely cruel. The Taiwanese never chose to become Japanese. Taiwan was mindlessly ceded to Japan [...] during a time when China was too incompetent to heed even its own safety." He likened the former *koumins* to French writer Guy de Maupassant's "Boule de Suif/Butterball," a young woman who unwillingly sleeps with a Prussian enemy to save the lives of her fellow French companions, only to be scorned later by the now-saved companions for losing her dignity.<sup>4</sup> Chen concludes, "Such is the preposterousness of human nature, to *push one's daughter into the fire pit* (Taiwanese colloquial meaning to sell into a brothel) and at the same time ask her to guard her virtues." As a prominent figure of democratic movements and native history in Taiwan, Chen is not usually one to uphold a Sinocentric historic view. However, in his retort against Lien and Hao's accusation, his comparison of Taiwanese *koumins* to the tragic fate of "Butterball," seems to have inadvertently fallen into the trappings of Chinese nationalistic framework. In what way should being called a *koumin* be humiliating? Specifically what is the virtue that Taiwanese had supposedly lost? Here, the measurement of humiliation and virtue of a Taiwanese under Japanese rule seems to slip too easily into the Chinese nationalist politics.

Lien's defeat in the mayoral election later in December 2014, however, does not mean *koumin* stopped being used as a dirty word in Taiwan. For instance, in July 2015, a news anchor was ridiculed for flaunting inappropriate usage of the Japanese language when she interviewed a famous Japanese actor. She was booed by netizens for using an impolite form of Japanese, “たのしいでしょう?” (roughly translated as “ya having a good time?”) in a semi-formal circumstance. A Taiwanese entertainer came to her rescue, suggesting that proper Japanese need not be expected of the newswoman. He commented: “Why use honorific speech (敬語, *keigo*) if you are not an imperial Japanese subject (*koumin*)?”<sup>5</sup> The casual usage of the word, even if outside political contexts, is revealing regarding the Taiwanese people's ambivalent relationship with their colonial past, and begs further discussion on the multiple definitions and use of *koumin* after WWII.

Forty years after Japan obtained Taiwan as its colony, and at the height of the second Sino-Japanese war tensions, the Japanese government mobilized the *Kouminka* movement 皇民化運動, a radical form of assimilation campaign with the intention to turn the Taiwanese into “true Japanese,” true subjects of the emperor. While assimilation (同化, *douka*) had long been part of Japan's colonial policy, due to the impending war the *kouminka* movement was more systematically implemented, and with a greater sense of urgency. This was done to enlist not only more manpower to pitch into the battlefields, but also to ensure the Taiwanese people's loyalty to aid the Empire. According to Leo Ching, the *kouminka* movement is more than an intensified version of assimilation policy that Imperial Japan had employed since the early stages of its occupation. Ching delineates *kouminka* as an internalization of a subjective strife over two identities and maintains that “the politics of identity in [*kouminka*] represented



the ways in which the onus of becoming Japanese had shifted from the colonial state to the colonial subjects.”<sup>6</sup>

To become a “true Japanese” required making the following changes: master the national language (国語, *kokugo*, which refers to Japanese); alter one’s family name to a Japanese one; join the volunteer soldier campaign; and reform native religion and customs. Although the changes were not strictly enforced in Taiwan, the people who complied were able to receive benefits, such as extra supplies and food rationing for their households; members of families who were certified as *kokugo katei* (国語家庭, national language household) were given priority over others to enter choice schools or given jobs in government-run companies. According to historian Chou Wan-yao’s research, the act of being certified is theoretically considered an honor.<sup>7</sup> Her findings further relate that the way the colonized rose to the calling of volunteer soldiers often had less to do with succumbing to the empire, but more to do with proving one’s capacity, that they can do better than the ethnically Japanese.<sup>8</sup> Given the provision of material rewards, or a competitive will to demonstrate one’s ability, it is difficult to gauge whether the people’s motives were truly inspired by the Empire’s call.

While neither the true motivation nor extent of Taiwanese commitment to their colonizer could be measured, their postwar KMT rulers regarded all people who had lived under Japanese rule as having been “enslaved,” and “poisoned” by colonial education. Hence they were in dire need of re-reformation regarding their national identification, and were rendered disqualified from their previous posts. Forced away from their singed homes in China, memories blistering from warring with Japan, the newcomers had an opposite view of Japan from the Taiwanese, who underwent a decade of intensive assimilation policies (1936-1945). The Chinese people’s distrust and vitriol

towards their enemy, Japanese, were projected onto the former subjects of the emperor. For these subjects, KMT's determination to de-Japanize the island was yet another demand to reconstruct one's identification. Without the "correct" national identification, or capacity to learn a new tongue (Mandarin Chinese) quickly, many of the Japanized generation, not necessarily limited to those who were affirmed model *koumins*, were subsequently subjected to decades of shaming, still evident in today's news (aforementioned).

This chapter discusses the *koumin* and its mutating definition in Taiwan—first as Imperial Japan's image of a paradigmatic subject, and later as a symbol of defamation for "betraying one's (Chinese) roots," or a stigma exemplifying "self-imposed servility" for those who hold their colonial experiences and Japan in a favorable view. I shall analyze the term and its implications and ramifications in the Taiwanese society using the literary works of "*koumin*ka writers," including Chou Chin-po's "The Volunteer," and examine how current discourses of former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui and his contemporaries regarding Taiwan's relationship with Japan resonate with the characters in the wartime literature. To read the *koumin* as submission to a foreign regime, and/or to re-envision it as resistance in disguise, are only partial representations of the colonized generation. I contend that acknowledging the nuanced complexity and precariousness of the Taiwanese's reliance on their colonizer for survival is an important step towards decolonization in postcolonial Taiwan.

### **Chou Chin-po and "The Volunteer"**

I will examine Chou Chin-po's 周金波 works as literary forms of documentary of what it meant to be a *koumin* for a Taiwanese intellectual, and what he believed it would take

to be finally recognized as such. The “*kouminka writers*” refer to the writers who supported Japan’s assimilation policies and believed in the prospect of its success. Their works often reflected their engrossment in the topic and a few received high acclaim from the colonial authorities (“The Volunteer” was winner of the *Bungei Taiwan* literary award 文藝台灣賞 in 1942). There were a handful of writers boxed in by the *Kouminka writers* label after the war, when support of Japan became dangerously outmoded, and some of the now defamed writers made several public attempts to reverse the danger they landed in. Chou Chin-po’s own silence and almost complete banishment from the literary circle since the end of the war stands out from the rest. During his lifetime he had not attempted to defend his works. For over five decades, his works were banished from various editions of Taiwanese Literature anthologies, whose collection of the Japanese period leaned towards literature that portray social injustice and clashes with the authorities.

Together with Chen Huo-chuan’s “The Path” (陳火泉) and Wang Chang-hsiung’s “Raging Torrents”(王昶雄), “The Volunteer” (*Shiganhei*, 志願兵) was to be the epitome of “conscripted literature” by the colonial authorities, also known as *Koumin* literature after the war. In postwar Taiwan, however, while Chen’s and Wang’s works were reevaluated as “realistic novels that portrayed the Taiwanese struggles of undergoing the *kouminka* movement,” Chou remained uncontestedly stigmatized due to his own silence and the Taiwanese literary circle’s refusal to translate and introduce his ill-reputed work to the public.<sup>9</sup>

As Chou’s characters in “The Volunteer” actively engage the idea of fully “becoming Japanese,” it is not difficult to see why this piece was conscripted by the *kouminka* movement. However, a closer reading may reveal covert subplots that lie

hidden behind its overt *kouminka* master plot. Stepping outside the traitor/collaborator binary, but still remaining in an ethno-national framework, I see his work as a record of the inner altercation of striking a balance between dual identities (colonized, yet “Japanese”), and the struggles of accepting oneself as “true” to that identity. My reading of “The Volunteer” is two-folds: it faithfully reflects a colonial subject’s earnest desire to be considered equally as one of *them* / “real Japanese,” and at the same time it articulates an intellectual’s anxiety to closing the gap between a culturally backward Taiwan and the modernized, metropolitan idea of “Japan.” I contend that, as a work born under a time of constrictive identity politics, Chou Chin-po did not portray his characters as blind followers of dominant discourse. He gave them a platform to display their complacency as successful mimics of Japanese mannerism, as well as their anxiety due to this mimicry: of perpetually being mere copies of an original; of not being “original” enough. The presentation of an “original Japanese” is noticeably absent, emphasizing the fact that the discussion between the colonized subjects is strictly a Taiwanese interpretation of “Japan,” a Taiwanese imagination of Japanese gaze on the colonized. His work illustrates how the Taiwanese subject, either wholly or selectively, conforms to the outlined image of a “true subject of the emperor” so as to negotiate his position in and against the empire.

“The Volunteer” opens with a pensive protagonist, “I,” now trapped and closed in by mundaneness of his work and family life, reminiscing about his student life in Tokyo. Waiting at the dock to welcome his brother-in-law Cho Meiki 張明貴, who is home on vacation from his studies in Tokyo, “I” meets Ko Shinroku 高進六, a friend who has also come to greet Meiki for the first time. Because of Shinroku’s well-groomed appearance and perfect command of the Japanese language, “I” was under the

impression that he was an inlander (*naichi*, Japan proper),<sup>10</sup> or had graduated from the same elite high school that both he and Meiki attended. He is surprised when Shinroku reveals that he had only attended an elementary school for Taiwanese pupils.<sup>11</sup> After catching up with Meiki, Shinroku left them for the day. But “I” finds this figure so intriguing that he further inquires whether his parents’ marriage is between an inlander and a Taiwanese. Meiki’s reply is no. Shinroku has not continued his education since graduating from public school. He has acquired his command of the National Language and Japanese mannerism working at a Japanese food shop.<sup>12</sup> Shinroku even “wears his *hakama* (traditional Japanese trousers) far more correctly than I can,” Meiki stresses.

Shinroku is apparently less socially and economically privileged than the other two characters, who both extended their education overseas in the “liberating” metropolis of Tokyo. However, his limited formal education and resources do not impair the authenticity of his Japanized mannerism, good enough to be mistaken as an inlander, or at least, of inland-Taiwanese birth, by the seasoned “I.” His successful mimicry seems to have derived from a sincere conviction in “becoming Japanese,” and transcends the barricade of socio-economic class. The protagonist’s immediate association of Shinroku with Japanese blood due to the extent of his Japaneseness also exposes the hierarchical framework in colonial Taiwan. His calculated study of another’s background suggests the presence of an essentialist discrimination which accentuates class division through one’s degree of “Japaneseness.” The existence of such measurement indicates that the assimilation policy slogan “impartiality under His gaze” 一視同仁 does not live up to its claim.<sup>13</sup>

Meiki further reveals that Shinroku unofficially uses a Japanized form of his surname, *Takamine* 高峰, among his circle of friends, long before the authorization of

name reform policy. He divulges this detail with a burst of laughter but “I” does not understand what he found so amusing. Since neither “I” nor Meiki has followed the name reformation policy, Meiki’s ambiguous laughter can be read as ridiculing Shinroku’s approach of pursuing Japaneseness. This invokes the inherent question of the *kouminka* movement: “what constitutes being Japanese?” The government has decreed the four criteria to become “true subjects of the emperor,” but Meiki seems to find whether practicing the particular codes truly counts as “Japanese” doubtful.

Though Meiki sets the same goal as Shinroku of becoming Japanese, his incredulity of how to become Japanese deepens as the characters delve further into the particular codes associated with Japaneseness. Upon receiving a cigarette case as a souvenir from Meiki, Shinroku politely declines by saying that he has quit the habit, because “I wanted to test myself. I wanted to see how much control I have over myself.”<sup>14</sup> He credits his success in abstention to the Patriotic Youth Unit that he has joined and believes that he has become a stronger person owing to “the sacred training for deity-human union” 神人一致 (14). After Shinroku gives a detailed description about achieving deity-human union through the hand-clapping ritual, Meiki exclaims:

“I don’t want to be controlled by ideas like that. [...] It’s true we’re a small and insignificant race; you feel this keenly, too, don’t you? Culturally we’re an extremely backward race, and we can’t do anything about it. Up until now we’ve had no cultural education or training. But even if ‘training to become Imperial subjects’ is what’s urgently needed, isn’t it enough that we make up for what we have been lacking in education and training as soon as possible? All we have to do is to pull our level up to that of the inlanders, right? Do you have to clap your hands to achieve that?” (16)

Shinroku insists that cultural progress does not suffice, but that an injection of “Japanese spirit” to elevate the Taiwanese spiritually is imperative. Here we see their disagreement on the definition of “Japanese spirit,” a loosely defined term that the Japanized generation often use when speaking of their Japanese memory. Chou Chin-po does not attempt to give it a concrete explanation here either. Shinroku argues that it is achieved by simply “living the faith,” while Meiki believes that it is the capacity to be moved by the presence of Japanese symbols like the Double Bridge, the Yasukuni Shrine, or the Imperial Plaza. Although they agree on their having become Japanese, they are confused about the methodology to achieve this goal. I suggest that this exchange is particularly subversive and challenging to the colonizer’s ideal of reforming the colonized. Their debate illustrates the divergent perceptions of “becoming Japanese” that undermine the monolithic discourse that had been laid down by the master. Through their dispute and different practices on what seems to be an integral code—spirituality—to Japaneseness, Meiki and Shinroku unintentionally subverted and mutated the revered Japanization process into a Taiwanized version. To be a Japanese by blood is simple, but to adopt the status through other means exposes how hollow the empire’s grip is on its symbolic expressions of power. Furthermore, that Meiki and Shinroku insist on their own paths, yet agree on their becoming Japanese, is suggestive that their conviction would render the recognition from the empire redundant. “In my case,” proclaims Meiki, “I can tell you definitively that I’ve become completely Japanese. Is becoming Japanese so hard? I don’t think so” (17).

Ten days after this argument, “I” is shocked to find Shinroku’s ultimate pledge to the empire in the newspapers: “Volunteer application in blood oath: Mr. Ko Shinroku.” He hurries over to Meiki’s house to break the news, only to find an agitated Meiki at his door, who seems to have lost sleep over this:

“I went to Shinroku to apologize. He’s ahead of me. Shinroku is the one who will *move Taiwan for Taiwan’s sake*. I am after all a powerless human being who can do nothing for Taiwan. My head is too big. I told him that.[...] He didn’t tell me anything about it beforehand. He pledged himself by slicing into his little finger. I can’t do anything like that. So, like a man, I went and bowed to him.” (21; emphasis mine)

Meiki vows to remake himself and asks “I” to supervise him. As they ascend the narrow staircase, “I” notices that their procession is slow and the staircase seems long.

Chou Chin-po’s arrangement of having the less educated, but more conviction-driven Shinroku to pitch himself to the battlefields seems to indicate that in order to become Japanese, one needs to “theorize less/think less,” a move forward like “horses with their blinds on.” In Shinroku’s words, “we can only pray, we can only act. Unless you act, you gain nothing” (16). Shinroku, convinced in instilling “Japanese spirit” to approach the core of Japaneseness, ultimately chooses the spilling of his Taiwanese blood into the empire. The act of slicing one’s finger to pledge allegiance symbolizes the purging of one’s Taiwanese blood in exchange for a Japanese identity. In the end, though Meiki admits his defeat to Shinroku in their quasi-competition to become Japanese, it is unclear if he will follow suit.

The temptation of becoming a “real Japanese” here is ironic. For to enter this symbolic order, what one needs to trade in is ultimately his life, his sworn loyalty to die for the Japanese empire. But even the surrendering of life does not warrant the eradication of discrimination. Despite the “impartiality under His gaze” slogan, the government makes a distinct separation between “ethnicity” 民族 and “citizen” 公民—so that being Japanese by blood automatically grants one the political and economic



rights, while being Japanese by way of cultural recognition does not warrant such privileges. Leo Ching illustrates this point with the example of the enshrinement of Taiwanese soldiers in the Yasukuni Shrine along with the Japanese who died on behalf of their nation. Their souls were consecrated as “Japanese.” However, after the war their family’s pleas for compensation were denied because they were not recognized as proper Japanese citizens when they were living.<sup>15</sup>

In a 1943 interview regarding the Japanese military’s conscription, Chou said that the theme he set for “The Volunteer” is “how will one *correctly live* in this era?” (237; emphasis mine). He distinguished two types of Taiwanese—one type that calculates every move, the other type holds no theory and proclaims oneself as Japanese—and believed it was the latter who would shoulder the future of Taiwan (236-7). This passage is quoted by critics as evidence of Chou’s admiration for Japanese launching into the Pacific War.<sup>16</sup> To criticize Chou on his inclination towards colonial policy only allows for partial presentation of the colonized collaborator, oversimplifying the identity formation of the volunteer soldier Chou depicts. Through Meiki’s observation, it is evident that Chou was aware that the Taiwanese is “a small and insignificant race” in the eye of its colonizer. Chou’s contemplation on what the colonized needs to do to “shoulder the future of Taiwan” specifically assigns the role of Taiwan’s future-shouldering to the colonized, instead of leaving it in the hands of his master. His question is no longer “should we become Japanese?” but “how to do it *correctly*?” Namely, how does the colonized balance acquiring Japaneseness and a responsibility for bettering the conditions of Taiwan? For Chou, Meiki’s reasoning for becoming Japanese is too utilitarian: “I was born on Japanese territory, raised by Japanese education. I only speak the Japanese language, and if I don’t write with katakana I cannot write at all. There is nothing for me if I can’t be a Japanese.” Chou’s arrangement of Meiki and “I”

admiring the Shinroku's proactive attitude seems to suggest that, despite Shinroku's ambling on like "horse with blinds on," his uncalculating purity and integrity is what would eventually elevate the Taiwanese. True, this may sound like the propaganda message of the kouminka movement. However, Chou's conclusion of intellectuals losing the bid to become a complete *Koumin* to a gung ho character who does not question, in fact, raises suspicion of an intellectual's anxiety, or incredulity of being fully recognized.

### **Redeeming Chou Chin-po**

In historical reality, the uncertainty that Meiki and "I" demonstrate in "The Volunteer" ran parallel with the Japanese colonizer's own uncertainty about the Taiwanese fidelity to the Empire. As the war intensified, the political situation compelled the colonial subjects to prove themselves to the colonizers. At the Taiwan Decisive Battle Literature Convention 台灣決戰文學大會 in 1943, Japanese members proposed to mobilize the Taiwanese-run journal, *Taiwan Literature* 台灣文學, to conscript the writers' loyalty and literature to aid the imperial war. The Taiwanese attendees were reluctant to hand over the journal. As arguments of Taiwanese dedication to the Empire seemed to be spiraling out of control, *Taiwan Literature's* founder, Chang Wen-huan 張文環, quickly came to the defense of the Taiwanese writers: "There is no non-*koumin* literature in Taiwan! Anyone who writes non-*koumin* literature shall be shot!"<sup>17</sup> Chang's manifesto was seen by many as a desperate attempt to salvage the Taiwanese writers from the suspicions of disloyalty and consequent prosecution. After the war, the table completely turned, ironically leaving all impassioned writings that endorsed the colonial policies in an awkward situation.

The year 1979 saw the publication of *Pre-Retrocession Taiwanese Literature* 光復前台灣文學全集,<sup>18</sup> indicating Taiwan's renewed interest in the colonial literature. In their introduction to the anthology, editors Yeh Shi-tao 葉石濤 and Chung Chao-cheng 鍾肇政 stated their intention: "any conscripted works with strong *Kouminka* flavors are omitted from this collection, as our silent and lenient criticism." In 1987, Yeh Shi-tao reiterated his view on Chou Chin-po's literary status in his *History of Taiwanese Literature* 台灣文學史綱:<sup>19</sup>

"As the darkness of war thickens, and the tidal waves of the *Koumin movement* sway, some writers leaned towards the colonial government's propaganda, down the path of pandering to Japan. Such as Chou Chin-po's 'The Volunteer.'"<sup>20</sup>

This was around the time of the lifting of martial law, the Taiwanese writers were still manifesting their adherence to the KMT authorities which deemed *koumin* literature intolerable. However, in 1990, Yeh Shi-tao delineated all literary activities in Taiwan after 1937 thus: "there is no such thing as '*koumin* literature, all that were written were part of 'resistance literature.'"<sup>21</sup> He pleaded for understanding the plights of the writers writing under colonial censorship: "please forgive their sometimes cowardly decisions [...] Under the doubt constriction of survival and oppression, at times it was necessary for them to cater to the rulers, against their convictions. In general, they are heroes, not people who surrendered."

Noting the drastic transition from Chang Wen-huan's "all are *koumin*" to Yeh Shi-tao's "all are resistant," Taiwanese historian Lin Ruey-ming contends that the redress of certain wartime works to non-*koumin* literature has restored certain dignity to Taiwan, and even those which cannot shake off the *koumin* literature stigma (in Lin's view, Chen Huo-chuan's *The Path*) deserve the readers' sympathy and that they still retain value

serving the nation as a cautionary tale.<sup>22</sup> However, what is the predicament that *koumin* writers should “caution” at? What, exactly, did “becoming Japanese” betray? While I agree with Lin that readers should sympathize with the conflicts that the colonized underwent in the wake of a complete identity reformation, I argue that his dogged re-affirmation of certain pieces as evidence of a writer’s dishonor, contrarily, offers the once-colonized little sympathy. The foundation of his statement lies within the traitor/hero binary, where literary expressions exist to serve the nationalistic discourses.

According to Professor Nakajima Toshio’s analysis, there have been various redress actions to strip the *koumin writer* label off of the stigmatized writers, carried out either by literary critics or the writers themselves. But by 1987, it was only Chou’s stigmatization that arbitrarily remained uncontested and undiscussed. Chou himself seemed to have fallen off the edge of earth, except for making two rare appearances at a literary symposium held in his honor in 1993 and 1994,<sup>23</sup> before he passed away in 1996. While Chou kept his silence, Japanese and Taiwanese scholars alike took an interest in reexamining his *koumin literature* label. The recent studies have shown that Chou Chin-po’s works are always discussed in relation to Chou’s identification and *koumin* status. Their contributions to the research of this enigmatic writer are often grounded in either affirming or reversing Chou’s stigma as a collaborator.

For example, though he acknowledged Chou’s discussion on reforming Taiwan, Professor Hoshina Hironobu remarked on the complete absence of the “Taiwanese anxiety and despondency under Japanese rule” in his works,<sup>24</sup> further perpetuating the undesirable label. Contrarily, both Professor Tarumi Chie and Nakajima Toshio hailed Chou Chin-po as a writer who “loved his land, and truly loved Taiwan.” Both critics concluded that rather than being drawn to the politics of Imperial Japan, he, in fact, identified with the prospect of modernity. Since what posed as a substantial problem for

Chou was “[Taiwan’s] lagging behind in the modernizing progress” instead of the forcible imposition of a foreign culture, Tarumi concluded that “it is with this conviction that he made contributions to the *kouminka* movement. And this is evidence that he, in fact, has a deep love for Taiwan.”<sup>25</sup> Taiwanese studies on the writer also follow a similar vein of argument and tended to his identity struggle.<sup>26</sup> Taiwanese historian Chen Pei-feng concurred with Nakajima that Chou’s works focused on breaking feudal culture and vulgar old habits. However, he departs from Nakajima’s view by contending that Chou’s naiveté “cost [him] his subjectivity.” And that to sing the tunes of his colonizers, Chou’s inclination towards the *kouminka* movement is one out of “convenience,” and “lacks proper consideration.”<sup>27</sup> Taiwanese literature student Huang Wen-que stated in her thesis that Chou Chin-po’s later works displayed a departure from Japanese spirituality and a desire to return to “the native, traditional” cultural and spiritual faculty. She then concluded: “it is only when he returned to his own identity that he can discover his value.”<sup>28</sup> My reading of “The Volunteer” departs from those of the critics who brand the work as literature of an opportunist *Koumin*, whose political and literary integrity were considered as lacking. But it does not mean that I necessarily side with critics who are eager to redress the work as non-*koumin* literature, either fueled by a form of patriotism (“love for Taiwan”), or representing a mere reflection on the powerless life of the colonized.

In order to redress Chou Chin-po as a non-*koumin* writer, his critics resorted to the binaries of, not Japan/Taiwan, but the rival Chinese and Taiwanese nationalisms. By considering Chou’s endorsement of the *kouminka* movement as a means to advance his native island, the critics either dissociate Chou from Japanese colonialism and its political implications, or explain away his willing compliance as a form of thoughtless “naiveté.” Neither dissociating (from “Japan”) nor explaining away (as Taiwanese

gullibility), however, actually suffices to delineate Chou Chin-po's ambiguous stance as what Mo Su-wei calls a "colonized native's body with the gaze of a colonizer."<sup>29</sup> Instead, they aggravate the sense of displacement—neither fully Japanese, nor fully Taiwanese—which so many of the colonized experience today. I argue that may obfuscate the objective to truly come to terms with the traumas of the colonial past.

Furthermore, the "love for the land" approach to rid Chou (and other writers of the same category) of the *koumin* epithet is problematic. As proposed in Judith Butler's theory "Frames of War," wars and conflicts divide lives into those that are mourned and considered valuable, and those that are "ungrievable," expelled from the frame of grievability. By rectifying the *koumin* writer through his identification with, or "love" for Taiwan, we run the risk of expelling the colonial subjects who simply embraced "becoming Japanese," who possibly had no vision or resources to improve the "backwardness" of Taiwan. Should the struggle of those who did not display a "love for Taiwan" be relegated as "ungrievable" and consequently, unworthy? If the attempt to atone certain oppressed subjects results in the damning of yet another group of colonial subjects, the purpose of the atonement itself is defeated.

Literary scholar Chu Yo-hsun concludes powerfully in his essay on Chou Chin-po: "I refuse to write him as the gullible type who succumbs to the monolith of history, or to present him as a victim of colonialism who lost all hope. I see [Chou Chin-po] as one of those who fought for their existence—sometimes consciously, other times subconsciously—but always did so in their way."<sup>30</sup> Indeed, if we remove the political frameworks of Chinese nationalism to study *koumin* literature—which might be less strenuous for readers of a new generation, being distanced from colonial trauma—Chou would no longer be a colonial writer who was plagued by guilt or "wrong identities," but simply a "common man" making the best of what the state apparatus dealt him.

Instead of re-envisioning a new meaning for, or completely discarding the *koumin* label off of writers like Chou Chin-po, what we should do is to vigorously revisit it as an integral part of Taiwanese past because *koumin*, along with its definition of the colonized subjects as “a work in progress,” is as an arbitrary, constructed identity as the Taiwanese, the Japanese, the combination of both, or the rejection of either.

If Yeh Shi-tao’s 1990 plea for understanding is any indication, it is that the fate of the so-called *koumins* are entangled in the precariousness of history. The *koumin* writers’ works are a repository of wartime memories. Criticisms of this defamed category and their paced revisions through the course of time are telling in how the changes of political climate affect the critics’ interpretations of the stories. In other words, moral decoding of the *koumin* writers relies heavily on the volatility of the political context in which the critics live. Following this vein, we could also consider the trajectory of *koumin* literature critiques as a chronicle of various manifestos responding to the domineering nationalist discourse at the time. Should the winds of identity politics change, the categorization of *koumin* writers would shift again.

### **Postcolonial *Koumin***

In 1946, a 22-year-old Iwasato Masao stepped off his ship in Keelung Harbor, the location where Chou Chin-po’s characters first congregate at the beginning of “The Volunteer.” Formerly an agriculture economics student at Kyoto Imperial University, Iwasato had “volunteered” to go to war for the Japanese Empire.<sup>31</sup> His brother, also a volunteer soldier, had just been killed in a bomb attack in Manila in the previous year. It was now 1946, and he found himself standing in the rubbles of Keelung as a second lieutenant officer of a capitulated empire.

However, unlike Chou, he would not recede into history. He instead would become a renowned scholar, later a politician, then by a stroke of luck be handpicked by Chiang Ching-kuo 蔣經國—then chairman of the KMT party and President of Taiwan—to be his vice president, and then continue to inaugurate as a mover and shaker of Taiwan. His name was no longer Iwasato Masao. He was Lee Teng-hui, who served as the President of Taiwan for 12 years between 1988 and 2000.

During his presidency his effort went into centering Taiwan in KMT's Sinocentric politics, which had promoted the ideology of an union with China. Since leaving office in 2000, he was expelled by the KMT party for his alliance with pro-independence groups. Furthermore he became increasingly vocal about his nostalgia and ties with Japan. Although having experienced a certain degree of discrimination, he harbored—and still harbors—fond memories of his Japanese education, often relating in public speeches his inspiration by Japanese philosophers like Nitobe Inazo 新渡戸稻造 and the Japanese spirit of Bushido. However, his prominent position in Taiwan does not immunize him against the derisions regarding the *koumin*.<sup>32</sup> Rather, his reverence for the Japanese spirit 日本精神 has led his opponents in the Pan-Blue Coalition (consisting of political parties affiliated with KMT) to portray him as a lackey for Japan.

In June 2007, his visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, against oppositions from both Pan-Blue and Pan-Green coalitions, was berated as inappropriate.<sup>33</sup> Lee explained to the swarm of journalists who congregated outside the shrine: “it is completely personal. Please don't think of anything political or historical. As family, to show respect to my brother by visiting the shrine is something I must do.”<sup>34</sup> His brother, Iwasato Takenori, or Lee Teng-chin, had died in the Philippines in 1945 serving the Japanese navy. His spirit is consecrated in the Yasukuni Shrine. Despite his emphasis



that this was a personal wish to fulfill his filial duty as a younger brother, his trip was, as expected, fraught with political innuendo. The procedure of the former president of Japan's former colony visiting a symbol of Japanese militarism provides an all-too-common trope for KMT's and Beijing's condemnation of his separatist intentions and damaging the China-Japan relationship.

Lee submitted an essay to the September 2015 issue of Japan's *Voice* magazine, in which he discussed Taiwan's process of democratization and his support for Abe Shinzo's domestic policies, among several other issues. When the Taiwanese media caught wind of this publication, only Lee's recount of his and his brother's past as volunteer soldiers grabbed the headlines, which reported that they were "fighting for the Japanese motherland"<sup>35</sup> (see Figure 3.2). Lee's mentioning of his memories is an attempt to differentiate a domestic resistance of the people against their government from the transnational scale of the Chinese resistance against Japan. His intention was to rebuke the KMT administration's official commemoration of the 70th anniversary of "victory in War of Resistance against Japan," calling it an attempt to "curry favor from China."<sup>36</sup> According to the translated report of *South China Post*, he argued that 70 years ago, Taiwan (then a Japanese colony) and Japan were one country" and that "Taiwanese people at the time were no doubt Japanese subjects and they did what they could to fight for their motherland."<sup>37</sup> Taking Lee's words out of the context of Taiwan's position as a Japanese colony, news media hint at Lee's "treason," insinuating his proclamation of "Japanese motherland" as a *koumin's* postcolonial allegiance and desire to continue colonial relationship. The then-incumbent President Ma Ying-jeou responded immediately with vitriol, calling him a traitor and accused the former President of "selling out Taiwan, humiliating its citizens, and lowering himself with his statements pandering to the Japanese." He demanded that Lee retract his remarks and

apologize to all the people of Taiwan.<sup>38</sup> Other KMT politicians threatened to revoke Lee's annual stipend as a former president, seeing him unfit to represent Taiwan as a former president.

Interestingly, according to another (Taiwanese) media which published the full text of Lee's essay, however, Lee reportedly has written: "until 70 years ago, Japan and Taiwan were parts of the same country. Since we were the same country, 'war against Japan' (抗日, referring to the Sino-Japanese wars) was not a fact in Taiwan. I volunteered to join the army, and my brother Lee Teng-chin volunteered for the Navy. We were undoubtedly fighting as a "Japanese," fighting for our motherland."<sup>39</sup> The slight disparity between the two translations carries significant weight. In *South China Post*, Lee's memory of "the Taiwanese people" is spoken on behalf of an entire generation, while in *Storm Media*, he is articulating his colonial experience from his personal and familial background. Mistranslations and mutilated headlines alike deliver confusing messages to the public. Yet this discrepancy between different translations went unnoticed by the public, apparently agitated by the sensationalism of the former President's proclamation of "being Japanese."

Taiwanese historian Chen Fang-ming weighed in on the issue, and maintained that the battlefield of contestation enters on "historical view." He stated that "under Taiwan's currently deformed political structure, the [shaping of] historical view is correlated with who is in power." In short, Chen suggested that Ma administration's own view is but one way of remembering history. Furthermore, Chen also buttressed Lee's view that the 70th commemoration of "victory in War of Resistance" that Ma's administration organized is incongruous to the island's particular historical context. In his view, Ma's historical view embodies a "Chinese experience" that has little to do with the island,

and actually sits more comfortably with the historical narratives of the People's Republic of China. While the Taiwanese should remain critical of the presentation of colonialism, skepticism towards colonial nostalgia does not necessarily indicate that Taiwan should adopt a Sinocentric view of history.<sup>40</sup>

Others, like legislator (of Democratic Progressive Party, a main opposing party to the KMT) and political scientist Kuo Cheng-liang, lambasted that Lee's "*koumin* historical view" belongs only to a small percentage of Taiwanese and should not be inflated as to represent others. Kuo cites several facts with which to measure the scantiness of such percentage: the total population in 1943 was 6,590,000, and the number of Taiwanese soldiers who were conscripted (whether forced or voluntary) was 200,000, taking up a mere 3%; by December 1943, the families who had officially Japanized their names amount to 17,526 households, taking up less than 2%. Furthermore Kuo contends that postcolonial pro-Japan parties, in which Lee plays an important part, exaggerate a "*koumin* historical view" that wipes out all Taiwanese efforts of resistance against Japanese colonialism. He blames Lee's "sympathy offered to the colonizers by the colonized" for exasperating Taiwan's image as a victim of "Stockholm Syndrome" and as an international laughingstock, claiming that "compared to how postwar Koreans reflect on their Japanese colonial experience, the Taiwanese should be ashamed."<sup>41</sup>

Although Kuo believes that providing hard numbers could render the weight of Lee's historical view measurable and provable, the accuracy of such measurement and proof is questionable. Historical views and memories are abstract constructions that involve more than numbers. Ultimately speaking, the smallness of consensus cannot render Lee's memory faulty, or invalid. And more importantly, the question we need to ask is: why render the "*koumin*" shameful to gain respect in the international

community? The *koumin* is only “shameful” when considered in a Sinocentric and nationalistic framework. Kuo’s and others’ similar criticisms of Lee’s “shameful” “*koumin*-hood” not only accentuate Sinocentrism, but perpetuate Taiwan’s colonial trauma.

As I have discussed, due to its repeated appearance in Taiwanese media, *koumin* is an term that refuses to die out with the times. The recent episodes of its use to deride or to identify a specific group of people indicate that the term deserves our scrutinization. While its users assume to know its definition, it is in fact a slippery word whose meaning transforms in different contexts. Originally, it was an honorific word that represented the exaltation of the identity of the colonized subaltern to “imperial subjects.” Though a forceful imposition by Japanese colonialism, it evoked an existential desire to be officially affirmed as a “good Japanese” and was seen as a potential portal to equality with the *actual* Japanese.<sup>42</sup> (In the radical case of Chou Chin-po’s character Shinroku, it has more to do with dying as a good Japanese rather than living as one.) At the same time, for many during the colonial period, it also represented an annihilation of native identity and culture. To ensure absolute loyalty from the subjects, the *kouminka* movement saw a ban on publishing in the native language, as well as abolishment of Taiwanese temples and beliefs. Hence, the notion of *koumin* bears two conceptualizations that are diametrically opposing—that of a confident, model “citizen” and that of a brainwashed, objectified instrument in aiding Japan’s militaristic ambitions.

Under the specific historical conditions of postwar KMT regime, the word *koumin* was further laden with the connotation of enslavement by their wartime enemy. KMT’s antagonism towards Japan constructed the image of the native Taiwanese as an Japanized Other. Due to their Japaneseness, the former *koumins* were rendered

incapacitated and not to be trusted. As the result of KMT's banning of Japanese culture—including speaking and publishing in Japanese language—*koumin* also represented the unmentionable and the shameful. In modern day the usage of this term is still negative, albeit sometimes used humorously to casually dismiss one's fondness for Japanese culture. It is often used with *hanjian*, (漢奸, traitors to the Han Chinese race), *riben zougou* (日本走狗, lackey for the Japanese), and has amassed another denotation of betrayal to a “Chinese” nation. However, *koumin* is the only word used to imply dual identities of Taiwanese and Japanese. In addition to traitor, drawing on the example of Lien Chan's recent defaming of Taipei Mayor Ke Wen-je, it also denotes a traitor who is wealthy and enjoys privileges by collaborating with the rulers.

The evolution of the application of the term *koumin* is not a mere reflection of change of times. My effort to chart out the changes in its meanings in this chapter was to elucidate its quality as a palimpsest. Its meaning at any given time is never singular, but pluralistic and multiplying. When new meanings are introduced, the original message is temporarily overwritten, but cannot be erased, not while people who associate the word with modernity, or status symbol still remain. In Lee Teng-hui's case, he acknowledges how his opponents use it to deride his amiability with his past colonizer, and reversely employs this label to sarcastically refer to himself and his contemporaries. “Lee Teng-hui is still called a *koumin*! What this means I do not know!” He coyly said to reprimand a political incident that incited antagonism between different ethnic groups.<sup>43</sup> Here, his metonymic use of the word is an attempt to invoke in his audience an understanding of the Japanized generation and their strife with balancing multiple identities. *Koumin*, when used by a President or an entertainer, to berate or to ridicule or to delineate an identity, no longer singly represents a Taiwanese's

struggle with identities under the Japanese rule. Rather, this highly politicized locution can generate a new, densely nuanced site that demands thoughtfulness and scrutiny from its users.

That it is deemed inappropriate for a former President to articulate his colonial memories and identity as a former subject reveals a blind spot—that Taiwan’s current view of its colonial past is similar to the identity crisis caused by the *kouminka* movement. The reality of the colonial, if not presented as rife with unbearable strife against oppression and exploitation, is not acceptable in terms of national dignity. This problematic is that of an existential anxiety of “becoming Taiwanese,” that a colonized subject is expected to completely denounce his former master in order to emerge as a “good Taiwanese.” Where the *kouminka* movement instilled an uncertainty of “cannot be Japanese” in the formerly colonized, the ridicule of *koumin* at this historical juncture disseminates an anxiety of “cannot be Taiwanese.” In either case, the term *koumin* was and is an indication of one’s state of incompleteness, that one is en route to becoming and yet has not achieved. A *koumin* is “not really Japanese” in the past, and “not really Taiwanese” in the present, but held in the perpetual state of liminality.

On September 13, 2015, just a few weeks after news of his essay in *Voice* magazine broke out, in reference to the recent discontent over his “Japanese motherland” rhetoric, former President Lee Teng-hui responded: “However, I will say that Japan was also an alien regime. Being a Japanese slave was, in fact, a tragedy.”<sup>44</sup> If Chou Chin-po’s optimistic volunteer soldier, Shinroku, lived through the war, perhaps he would also make this disillusioned observation in hindsight, that the strife of “becoming Japanese” was all for naught. Interestingly, juxtaposing Lee Teng-hui’s postwar confession and the fictional Shinroku’s pre-war conviction seem to piece together a jigsaw puzzle of a *koumin*’s lifelong struggle over identity, showing how adoration and disenchantment

can paradoxically coexist within this struggle. The complexity of *koumin* is a key to understanding the colonial structure. *Koumin* is an agent that delineates the colonial operation with its colonial benevolence and cultural violence, beyond the dichotomy of master and slave. To paint *koumin* singly as a traitor to its kind, a victim or an instrument for its master, is only a partial presentation of a greater picture. By circumventing examination of the stigma, or reading the category of *kouminka* literature merely as colonial trauma prevents the Taiwanese society from fully coming terms with its colonial history.

Chou (1920- 1996) and Lee (1923- ) are contemporaries who lived through the same historical background. Though one lived a quiet life as a closet former writer, while the other made the ultimate grade navigating nationalist politics, the likeness of their codes of identity politics are uncanny. Similar to Chou's refusal to defend his works, Lee's repeated vocalness of his memory as a former Japanese and serving as a Japanese soldier seem unapologetic and equally patient in waiting for the other Taiwanese to come to terms with the colonial past.

It is interesting that Lien Chan and Hao Pei-tsun chose the word *koumin* over *hanjian* 漢奸 to attack their opponent with questionable national identity in the episode with which I opened this chapter. In order to revoke images of traitors to the nation, Lien and Hao's choice of word is telling in their need to drag in the ghosts of colonial Japan. Their reliance on "Japan" in delineating the boundaries between a "good Taiwanese" (fit for a mayoral election) and a "compromised, bad Taiwanese" reflects their own anxiety of being unable to completely override past definitions of *koumin* and other memories. Not only do Lee's accounts of colonial memories repeatedly transgress the boundaries of between "good" and "bad" Taiwanese subjects, but more importantly,

the repeated intrusion of a benevolent Japanese presence threatens KMT's ideology that the Chinese Taiwan (perhaps including the People's Republic of China) and the colonial Taiwan share one common enemy. Moreover, Lien's enlisting of the word *koumin* reveals that he himself is, too, entangled in Taiwan's colonial past.

An ideal postcolonial world for a colonized is perhaps one that, as Chou allegedly said at the end of the 1993 symposium, does not "need anyone to redress [one's] works." As the most vilified "collaborator" or "traitor" in wartime Taiwanese literature, Chou had refused to offer any explanation. His silence appears to hold, ironically, most steadfast to his (now anachronistic) convictions of "becoming Japanese." Rather than hastily remaking a memory or rectifying the interpretation of a piece of work to fit into the mold of a certain political discourse a la mode, what truly matters is coming to terms with the colonial past. The ideal would be a world where stigmas like *koumin* and *kouminka* literature are neutral, objective examples of colonial reality, where neither a redress movement nor justification of one's political inclination is necessary.<sup>45</sup>



## Chapter Three

### Unfinished Ending:

#### Cinematic Presentations of “Japan” and Re-Envisioning History

In the previous chapters, I discussed the social categories of comfort women and *koumin*, both of which are colonial constructions that have acquired multiple definitions in postcolonial Taiwan. Their new definitions and significance are not monolithic, but mutate in different contexts. In this chapter, I shift my focus to the unfinished ending of Japanese colonialism by way of examining three exemplar films: *Cape No. 7* (2008), *Seediq Bale: Warriors of the Rainbow* (2011), and *KANO* (2014), directed or produced by Wei Te-sheng 魏德聖. Each film is a modern attempt at interpreting history and making sense of the Taiwan/Japan colonial relationship. Under a postcolonial context, it is tempting to believe that the colonial past is analyzable through an omniscient viewpoint. However, as the continued re-presentations of comfort women and *koumin* prove, while Taiwan’s colonial period bears a definitive end, emotional constructions tend to exceed their shelf life. It is easy to see the commencement of Japanese colonialism in Taiwan, but even from hindsight, to discuss its sudden, unintended ending is problematic.

Though the topic of Taiwanese colonial history is nothing novel to Taiwanese cinema, the creations and images of Japanese characters have recently taken a significant shift from that of a stereotypical abuser to something that is more complex. From the ruthless, faceless killing machines in patriotic films such as *Eight Hundred Heroes* 八百壯士 (1975), and the more humanized portrayal of colonizers in Hou Hsiao-Hsien’s *The Puppetmaster* 戲夢人生 (1993), to a little guy’s disconsolate sense of

nostalgia for the Japanese past in Wu Nien-jen's *A Borrowed Life* 多桑 (1994), the depiction of Imperial Japan has taken on numerous facelifts. In the context of the recent burst of interest in cinematic re-presentations of “Japan,” I will examine three films to trace the discursive navigation of how Taiwan is coming to terms with its colonial past. While the readings of these modern films can be subjected to national allegorization, I contend that the roles of the “Japaneseness” presented in the films bear more tasks than portraying the villain or foiling the heroic (de)feats of the colonized, and that the presentations’ migration into the mainstream of popular culture reflects the desires and anxiety of a “nation” struggling to find its current position in the world by re-examining its roots.

The three selected films, whether fictional or based on true stories, are characterized by not only the elements of the Japanese colonial empire but also by irresolute, unfinished endings. The jilted Tomoko Kojima in *Cape No. 7* finally learns of her Japanese lover’s true affections, but he is no longer alive; the warriors in *Seediq Bale* fight an impossible battle to resist the imposition of modernization, but are defeated; the baseball team that never expected to win in *KANO* stir high hopes as it finally picks up pace, only to fail anti-climatically at the championship game. Although the outcome of the storyline is predicted since the facts are etched out in history, why are we obsessed with retelling history? Why did the films construct the escalations of emotions and sympathy for the protagonists only to let down when the films end? By re-presenting the endings, do the popular texts reshape memories of the past? To examine how the Taiwanese audience is processing re-presentation of memories, I will use not only the films, but also the “paratexts” generated by discussion in internet forums as well as academic papers as my texts.

As the Japanized generation perish with age, Taiwan has witnessed an increasingly enthusiastic race since the 1990s to excavate and chronicle memories of the past which were, until then, dominated by an official version of history. However, given the conditions that after WWII, Taiwan was consigned to another authoritarian regime that vehemently opposed and negated the Japanese, the nation had been deprived of the chance to engage in proper decolonization. This, combined with the younger generation's upbringing by a more Sinocentric education and compounded by an emotional factor that is inherent in the familial history, means that the navigation process would be complex, varying, and discursive.

In the race to preserve and reinterpret past memories, Wei Te-sheng's presentations of "Japan" have carved out a hefty chunk of space in Taiwanese popular culture and the public's collective consciousness, not only because of his films' remarkable performance at the box office, but also because of their ability to simultaneously amass copious amounts of praise as well as controversy, creating interstices in the traditional anti-/pro-Japan binary when we discuss colonial history. The success of Wei's films can be linked to a particular historical context, in which Taiwanese society endured a series of blows from major political and financial failures on the government's part.<sup>1</sup> Wei and his blockbusters became an affirmative brand of "nativist pride" that delves into events which took place in Taiwan but which are lesser known, concentrating on marginalized people and populations coming together to work towards self-realization.

As a fledgling director, Wei Te-sheng did not directly experience the colonial time himself. The historical references in his films, often obscure to most Taiwanese people, are the results of years of fieldwork and historical research. He dramatizes his findings and churns out popular productions that featured attractive shots of photogenic actors and compelling storylines that lured a massive audience. Wei visually etched in his film-

viewers' minds a space for collective memory: micro-narratives of personal relationships that were deflected or obstructed by a grand historical narrative—a lost love interest, marginalized memories of the aboriginal tribes, or forgotten roots of a favorite national sport—all of which share the common theme of Taiwan's past ties with Japan. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the historical backdrop of colonialism generated heated discussions regarding Taiwan's national identification. Some accused Wei of pandering to the Japanese market, romanticizing a colonial rule that in essence exploited its subjects. While others, contrarily, saw him as anti-Japanese due to his presentation of the Seediq tribe's violent revolt against Imperial Japan. In both camps, Wei's films and their paratexts offer a text with which we can study how Taiwan's younger generation attempts to mitigate guilt, process shame and humiliation, and consequently commence the process of decolonization.

### **The Films**

In 2008, Wei Te-sheng's *Cape No. 7* was released and became a sensational cinematic success and an instant media darling, nothing short of a social phenomenon. The colonial past, which is presented in the form of seven undelivered love letters from a Japanese teacher to his Taiwanese pupil when he is repatriated to his home country after WWII, received little actual screen time, but sparked so much conversation/controversy regarding "national dignity," and "desire to become re-colonized" that the prematurely terminated relationship, too, could be read as a national allegory. In summary, *Cape No. 7* is a romantic comedy that evolves around the coming together of a musical group, whose singular mission is to foil a Japanese singer in the town's upcoming music festival. The male protagonist, A-ga, is a frustrated musician who fails to make a name for himself in the big city. Back home<sup>2</sup>, he lands a job as a mail carrier and finds a

packet from Japan, penned to an antiquated address to a Kojima Tomoko-san 小島友子. Because both the Japanese address and name have long been replaced by new Chinese signifiers, they are unrecognizable to the mailman and cannot be delivered. The packet of love letters lie in quiescent existence until a Japanese girl, also named Tomoko, discovers them in A-ga's room and urges him to deliver them to their designated owner.

*Cape No. 7*'s success created a lasting buzz for Wei's next film, *Seediq Bale* (2011). Prior to the release of *Seediq Bale*, Japan's Tohoku area experienced one of the most devastating earthquakes in its seismic history, and witnessed a continuous outpour of affection and aid from Taiwan.<sup>3</sup> Under an amiable atmosphere that underscored the mutual confirmation of a Taiwan-Japan *kizuna*,<sup>4</sup> *Seediq Bale*'s presentation of a historical trauma that Imperial Japan inflicted on the Seediq tribe nevertheless made its grand entrance, premiering on the Ketagalan Boulevard in front of the Presidential Building, attended by presidential candidates of two main opposing parties, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT)'s incumbent president Ma Ying-jeou 馬英九, and Democratic Progressive Party's Tsai Ying-wen 蔡英文. At this juncture, this specific screening of an indigenous tribal history is telling in Wei's ambition to revisit a beginning, a time well before the conflicts of *waishengren* (外省人, Chinese mainlanders that migrated to the island after WWII) and *bendigren* (本地人, native Taiwanese that had been residing on the island prior to WWII) commenced, to reconstruct collective memories.

The 4.5-hour-long version of the film draws attention to the historical event, the Wushe Incident<sup>5</sup> (霧社事件, 1930), and describes in great detail how Mouna Rudo 莫那魯道, one of the chiefs of the twelve indigenous tribes, comes to the difficult decision of embarking on a war against Imperial Japan, despite his ready knowledge that it would

result in the annihilation of the tribal clans. Convinced that subjugation to Japanese rule would result in the loss of their faith and hunting grounds, the tribes pitch a little over one thousand sword-wielding warriors against Imperial Japan's modernized troops. The uprising ends with the demise of Mouna Rudo and his cohorts, whose integrity "wins" them recognition as "Seediq Bale," or a true man, and who are thereby approved to continue their afterlives at the ultimate hunting ground on the other end of the rainbow. The film also casts a spotlight on two figures: Hanaoka Ichiro 花岡一郎 and Hanaoka Jiro 花岡二郎, two Seediq men raised and educated by the Japanese to serve as "model savages" to their people. Their in-betweenness best illustrates the entangled identities between becoming a Japanese and not quite an aboriginal: on one hand, they struggle with their desire for modernization through colonial transformation but are plagued by the discontent of not being fully recognized as "proper Japanese"; on the other, their strife to bring "civilization" to their tribe to match the colonizer's standards contradicts with their wish to remain loyal to their people's conviction.

In 2014, Wei Te-sheng wrote and produced *KANO* (directed by Umin Boya), a film about how a shoddy high school baseball team eventually makes the grade to compete at the prestigious Koshien 甲子園<sup>6</sup>, the baseball mecca of Japan. This film is based on the true story of the scruffy team from Chiayi Agricultural and Forestry School (嘉義農林学校, *Kagi nourin gakkou*, abbreviated as *Kano*) which has never won a single game due to the players' lack of skill and focus in their practice. The team consists of a mishmash of Japanese, Han Taiwanese and aboriginal players, which is considered inferior to a team consisting of purely Japanese players. Things start to look up when a new Japanese coach, Kondo Hyotaro 近藤兵太郎, arrives in town. Perhaps alluding to the ideal colonial template of interracial co-prosperity, Kondo sees the amalgamation of

racers as a “golden combination,” an opportunity to enhance team performance by bringing in diverse qualities peculiar to each race: “the Japanese are good at defense, the Taiwanese excel at batting, and the aborigines are fast runners.” With a sharp eye for talent, his Spartan trainings lead them to islandwide victories, and ultimately propel them onto the grander stage of the Koshien Baseball Tournament in Japan. Aside from the main plot of the ball games, Kondo’s story offers an important side thread as a dejected baseball coach from Ehime, Japan, who previously walked out on the sport, but then recovers his sense of worth and love for the game through the team’s success. His memories of the failed experience with the previous team he coached—which was constituted of all Japanese players—are often juxtaposed with his training with the mixed ragtag team in Taiwan, whom he feels to be more resilient to his rigorous maneuvers. As underdogs of the sport, together they become one of the strongest teams at the Koshien. Interestingly, the year that the Kano team represented Taiwan at Koshien was 1931, just months after the bloodbaths in the Wushe mountains in 1930. Juxtaposing the boisterous bantering in *Kano* and extreme violence in *Seediq Bale*, Wei’s presentations explore contrasting aspects and sentiments towards the colonial rule.

Wei’s refashioning of “Japan” mirrors a younger Taiwanese generation’s gaze on Japan. The three films examine the colonial relationships of thirty-five years into Japan’s acquirement of the island. From the brutal clashes between supposedly “tamed savages” and the colonial machine that claims their ancestral hunting ground in *Seediq Bale*, to the ideal state of multi-racial collaboration in *Kano*, to unresolved romances after the war in *Cape No. 7*, the image of Taiwan and Japan’s colonial relationship that Wei outlined is multifaceted and at times contradictory. Yet, even in his portrayal of Japanese as suppressors, his application of typical Japanese symbols, such as cherry

blossoms or *Bushido* spirit, follows the aesthetics of Japanese culture and ethics in a favorable light. For example, as in *Seediq Bale* the man responsible for having ordered the poisonous gas<sup>7</sup> on the “savages,” General Kamada Yahiko 鎌田彌彦 is portrayed as hot-tempered and cold-blooded, but his identification of the spirit of *bushido*, or the ways of a true warrior, in the tribesmen towards the end of the film consigns a capacity in him that allows him to recognize noble Japanese traits in a “savage.” Perhaps, the materialization of a romantic, well-learned general, is as fictitious as the buck-teeth ruffians who lined anti-Japan war propagandas.<sup>8</sup> The “Japanese” elements in Wei’s cinematic creations can be considered as conjectural forms of memories to see how different images of “Japan” fit into Taiwan’s current identity politics. The insertions of sentimentalized Japanese symbols and characters, I contend, are a practice similar to what Marianne Hirsch terms “postmemory”— memories of the “generation after,” whose relation with its object is indirectly connected with the past, but mediated through “an imaginative investment and creation.”<sup>9</sup> Rather than as an attempt to revise the colonial past, I see Wei’s invocation of the past as a critique on the flat profiling of colonizers as singularly abusive, which cannot explain the complex nostalgic sentiments that some Taiwanese have towards “Japan.”

### **Between Chinese Nationalism and Japanese Colonialism**

A similarity that *Cape No. 7* shares with the 1980s Taiwan New Cinema, which features art-house films that pioneered the cinematic presentations of Taiwan’s turbulent past, is the attention drawn to the portrayal of the “Japanese.” However, the image of the “Japanese colonizer” here differs greatly from its portrayal in previous Taiwanese-made or Hollywood films that tackle this period. In previous films, the images of the wartime



Japanese are either portrayed as brutes who treat their subjects with an unfair hand, or a featureless, albeit Japanese, face representing a mere part in compliance with its state apparatus. In *Cape No. 7*, the created Japanese colonizer takes the form of a man of education, filled with remorse towards his Taiwanese subject, and capable of seeing his “subject” in a compassionate, even romantic light. More importantly, he conveys in his letter an attempt to distance himself from the imperial system: “I am but a poor teacher. Why must I bear the cross for the faults of an entire empire?” In this context, the viewers are able to humanize a small component of the colonizing apparatus, and even empathize with his sense of powerlessness. Wei’s invitation for the viewers’ empathy is further extended in *Seediq Bale* and *Kano*, where the faces of the colonizers are further given a point of reference, from which explanations could be drawn for each decision and action. In this sense, it is possible to view the acting agents of the imbalanced power structure separate from the structure itself.

For critics who read the film from a nationalistic perspective, the characters represent their nations, and their relationship with one another symbolizes a state-to-state relationship. Hence, the relationship between elder Tomoko and her teacher prematurely ended by repatriating policies at the end of WWII, depicts “Taiwan’s longing for Japan’s love.” Social science researcher Chen Yi-chung sees *Cape No.7* as an accusation against KMT’s “China,” whose intrusion upon Taiwan’s historical timeline tore apart the two lovers. He describes the two Taiwanese/Japanese relationships (colonial Tomoko’s with her teacher and modern-day Tomoko’s with the Taiwanese A-ga) in the film as a “Taiwanese yearning to be recolonized,” and further reminds his readers that representation of the “Chinese” or “mainlander” is absent in the film, which makes it a point to present the diversity in Taiwan’s ethnic backgrounds. From these points he drew two doubts: does this yearning for “Japan’s” love indicate

that the reconciliation between “Taiwan” and the “Republic of China” is not within the foreseeable future? And since the younger generation chooses Japan over China and paints a former colonizer in such a romantic light, what’s to become of the Taiwanese subjectivity?

Chen’s doubts over Taiwan’s identity formation voices the questions of those who believe that a Taiwanese identity should be a fixed one, that is, those who “uphold the continuity and sovereignty of a tradition and culture, and perceive no problem in the internal differentiation of that particular community,”<sup>10</sup> and that one must choose one cultural heritage over another and stick with it. Wei’s inclusion of the Hoklo characters (A-ga and Mou-bei), the aboriginals (Rauma and his father), the Hakka people (Malasun), the Japanese (Dada and Tomoko) is a conscious effort to present the hybridity of Taiwanese society. It is a manifesto of a desire to come to terms with its heterogeneity and dissimilarities, as there is no single, monolithic legacy to adhere to. Sidetracked by the nostalgic presence of “Japan,” Chen’s essentialist bewilderment —“the Chinese is absent”—really underscores the ramification between the multiple camps of the “Chinese,” especially when in fact Hoklo and Hakka are, ethnically speaking, Chinese.

Another critic, Hsu Chieh-lin, interestingly stated that *Cape No. 7*’s success owes much to Japanese support, and commented that the love letters scripted by a Japanese “rambled on about his nostalgia for his previous colony.”<sup>11</sup> In an interview, Wei said that he had penned the letters himself<sup>12</sup>, first in Chinese, and had them translated into Japanese. The letters are narrated in Japanese throughout the film, reiterating the Japanese teacher’s remorse and request for his lover’s forgiveness for jilting her. “I am not deserting you,” the teacher says in one letter, and “Please forgive me and my cowardice,” in another. These words of penitence deviate from the general observations

in reality that the Japanese government has not yet come to terms with its roles and behaviors during the war. As Leo Ching pointed out in *Becoming Japanese*, “Japan’s subordination to American imperialism [...] freed Japan of any responsibility regarding the dissolution of its empires.”<sup>13</sup> Contrary to essentialist/nationalist observations that the popular film panders to Japanese sentiments, the fact that the fictional letters spawned from a Taiwanese author, who mimics the language of a former colonizer and puts words of apology in his mouth, is an arbitrary trespassing on the subaltern’s part. Here, the Taiwanese screenwriter/director takes the initiative and attempts to speak for the silent Japanese empire.

The “subaltern” has spoken, and he channels the voice of the dominant ex-colonizer. We can hear the Japanese colonizer’s narration of his remorse, and at the same time we are well aware that the film is a Taiwanese production by a Taiwanese director, and that the director is conveying “Japanese” emotions by mimicking a “Japanese.” Hsu and Chen’s concerns may lie in the fact that the Taiwanese gaze towards the “Japanese” would only reflect its own “otherness,” which further pushes itself into the periphery, but they overlook its potential for deconstructing the commonly expected notion of “Japan.” Moreover, they also lack “an apprehension of colonial consciousness” and the need to constantly construct and deconstruct taken-for-granted cultures, nationalities, and identities before forming one’s own identity.

Wei’s second film, based on a historical event in 1930, the Wushe Incident, would receive less critiques for “pandering to Japan” for its portrayal of the Seediq Tribe’s resistance against Japan. Wei has stressed that the film is shot from the perspective of the aboriginals rather than the dominant Han-Chinese ethnic group—unlike its predecessors’ take (*Bloodshed on the Green Mountains*, Ch’ing-shan-pi-hsieh, 青山碧

血 1957; *Disturbance in Musha*, Wu-she-feng-yun, 霧社風雲 1965) on the same incident, which were inclined to nationalizing the riot as a heroic uprising against Japanese rule for the sake of Chinese integrity.<sup>14</sup> The repeated process of re-presenting the Wushe Incident is a cinematic form of palimpsest, in which the act of writing over the dramatic texts does not necessarily override them. As layers of texts are laid over the previous texts, the covered texts are not obliterated but temporarily hidden. The construction of Mouna Rudo as a Chinese war hero, though now casted aside as an antiquated cultural memory, may resurface and obfuscate the present reconstruction of the Wushe Incident outside the Sinocentric framework. While the media applaud the production of the film as “pride of Taiwan,” and a “presentation of Taiwanese subjectivity,” the film triggered a string of fervent discussions, political and historical, surrounding the presentation of historical realism, heroism versus savagery, and the presentation of the Japanese characters.<sup>15</sup>

Though history enthusiasts debate how closely the film adheres to the “truth” or historical facts, and question Wei’s position to represent another group of subalterns, Wei consciously stresses his departure from Sino/Han-centric narratives. In an interview, Wei mentions that when he was casting Japanese actors, he made it a point to stress to them that “the film is not going to vilify the Japanese.”<sup>16</sup> Indeed the focal point of the film is placed on the clash between two very different sets of “civilizations,” revisiting the incident from the perspectives of the Taiwanese aboriginals, whose side of the story has often been unheard. Whichever version of “truth” the film offers, it is clear in its ambition to reconstruct the viewers’ mindset that the significance of the Wushe upheaval excludes the long-established notion that the incident is a Taiwanese representative in China’s resistance against Japan.

Historical records of the tribes and the infamous uprising were mostly written by the Japanese officials, because the access to the mountainous regions was denied to Taiwanese peoples after the outbreak of revolts. After WWII, the nationalists misused the indigenous tribes' revolt for their own agenda, branding the act of revolt against Japan as martyrdom for the Chinese nation. Wei's effort to give the indigenous their voice extracts the incident from a Chinese historical framework and gives an alternative take on the event. As stated in the opening of the film, the film script is an adaptation from historical facts, historical facts from the perspectives of the mountain people. As much as Wei underscores the importance of reasoning and the presentation of "objective facts," his re-centering of those who have been marginalized and re-reading of the Wushe Incident, however, run the risk of undermining his own efforts: Whose history/memory did he adapt the story from? Where did the fact end, and where did the "adaptation" begin? Several viewers who profess to be descendants of the Seediq warriors challenged the film's interpretation of subjects—the meaning of the headhunting tradition, Mouna Rudo's possibly less than noble motivation to spark the upheaval, and misinterpretation of their tribal *Gaya* (instructions of the way of life)—and took their issues to the media.<sup>17</sup> Stepping outside the traditional China versus Japan binary framework, the "voicing" of indigenous people reveals a plethora of internal dynamics regarding various notions of the "truth," which suggests the necessity of further study.

However, the aspiration to transcend current-standing political squabbles is met with ambiguous results, as internet forums fill up with comments expressing gratification from the onscreen slaughtering of the Japanese by the Seediq rebels.<sup>18</sup> The reluctance to modify a traditional perspective and the desire to vilify the Taiwanese interpretations of Japan memory, on the part of viewers, reflect limitation and hurdles

that the search for Taiwanese subjectivity encounters. Wei explains in several interviews that his ambition in *Seediq Bale* was to explore the motives behind the actions of each character, whether Seediq or Japanese.<sup>19</sup> He dismisses an interviewer's comment that some interpreted *Cape No. 7* as *pro-Japan*, which perhaps implicates that *Seediq Bale* would be received as anti-Japan.<sup>20</sup> The effort needed to repel the dichotomized framework of anti-/pro-Japan is possibly more herculean than the making of the film. It is interesting to note that meanwhile in the blogosphere, the screening of *Seediq Bale* in Japan has also caused some stir, marveling that "the director who made the pro-Japanese *Cape No. 7* has made an anti-Japanese film!"<sup>21</sup> However, Wei attributes the nature of the bloody conflict to the different faiths of the Japanese and Seediq people: "One of them is a people who believe in rainbows, the other in the sun. [...] They fight for their faiths, forgetting that what they believe in belongs to the same sky," thus downplaying the opposition of political stances while underlining the "sameness" of the two peoples.<sup>22</sup>

While Wei's presentation of the Wushe Incident disaffiliates the feats of Mouna Rudo and his warriors from a grand Chinese national discourse, a law professor Huang Rei-ming posted in a *China Daily* column that *Seediq Bale* "reminds us that the Japanese colonial rule is absolutely not anything as wonderful as pro-independence parties believe. The suffering of the aboriginal people is also part of our collective memory."<sup>23</sup> Meanwhile Wei's history consultant, Seediq historian Kuo Ming-cheng stated that despite his gratitude to the popular film that greatly raised the visibility of the history of his tribe, he found it necessary to publish two volumes of *Truth Bale* to rectify "untrue historical details" in the cinematic presentation.<sup>24</sup> As a descendent of the Seediq tribe, Kuo's attempt to distinguish "true" history from the film suggests the tribe's will

to reclaim the right to articulation. It also highlights an anxiety from a long marginalized group that a presentation of their history from the perspective of the dominant Han Chinese/Taiwanese would be fraught with misunderstanding. Professor Huang Rei-ming's claiming the right to the Seediq memory on behalf of "all Taiwanese" perhaps appears to be too eager to incorporate the aborigine's plight as a general Taiwanese resistance against Japanese rule.

According to Taiwanese historian and ethnographer Huang Chih-hui, the 1991 constitutional reform of changing the official name of Aborigines from *shanbao* (山胞, mountain comrades) to *yuanzhumin* (原住民, indigenous people) not only signifies that the Taiwanese government affirms their status as the original inhabitants on the island, but also establishes that the *waishengren* (外省人, mainlanders) arrived last. As a result, the myth of a singular Chinese race<sup>25</sup> that the KMT government constructed "lost its legitimacy."<sup>26</sup> Regarding the inclusion of the aboriginal's conquest of the island into a presumably ethnic-Han Taiwanese discourse, the borders that define ethnicity and nation need to be reconsidered. If the Seediq warriors fought the Japanese exclusively for their belief, what makes the Wushe upheaval a "Chinese" or "Taiwanese" one, especially since in Wei's version of the story, the presence of the ethnic-Han people is so insignificant? More interestingly, and perhaps more importantly, as Michael Berry asks, "to what extent can the violence committed upon or by "the Other" be reconstituted into national narratives?"<sup>27</sup> Similarly, the Seediq tribe's historic view of and relationship with the Japanese should not be readily assumed as uniform to those of other Taiwanese peoples. As presented in the film, according to the Seediq belief, hatred is terminated once one's enemy breathes his last breath, which means the headhunter and the hunted would continue their relationship in amity in the afterlife. From this, one

could extrapolate, perhaps with some difficulty, that for the Seediq, the slaughter of the Wushe Incident can easily be transitioned into an effort to turn foe into friends.

Perhaps for the sake of a “balanced reportage,” both the “good Japanese cops” and the “mean ones” received equal coverage and detailed portrayal in the film. Even General Kamada Yahiko who ordered the illegal use of poison gas in the film is made more humanized to the viewers in his furious bouts and desperate attempt to terminate the riot. Upon the orders of pitching gas bombs against the aboriginals, the hushed hesitation voiced by Kamada’s subordinates at the round table depicts the softer side of the colonial machine. Prior to participating in the making of the film, Wei revealed that the Japanese actors he hired were not familiar with this part of colonial history.<sup>28</sup> In particular, one of the actors, Ando Masanobu, struggled with the dramatic change in his character, Kojima Genji (小島源治), an officer who befriended the tribes under his supervision but later switched to an extreme retaliation mode after discovering that his wife and children were murdered in the Wushe slaughter. “I explained to [Ando] I truly believe that anyone would seek revenge under such circumstances, whether he is Japanese or not,” Wei said. While this may sound merely like one of the behind-the-scene tidbits, it is significant in reflecting the rawness and sensitivity in dealing with the imaging of a colonial figure, despite the passing of three quarters of a century.

Towards the end of *Seediq Bale*, General Kamada Yahiko comments that he sees the “long lost bushido spirit” in the Seediq warriors. Again, the ex-subaltern’s imagined gaze of the ex-colonizer reversed upon the Taiwanese self is manifested through the general’s voice. Initially, the tribesmen are regarded as simple-minded savages incapable of organizing a revolt against their colonizers, and their revolt is regarded as a series of disorganized “animalistic attacks” by the general. By assigning Seediq



behavior of bravery to the Japanese bushido, the on-screen general not only deems the tribe's unique brand of valor worthy and noble enough to be "Japanese," but he also deconstructs particularity of the Bushido tradition belonging exclusively to the Japanese civilization. His eulogy for the warriors is an embodiment of Wei's, and perhaps Taiwan's, desire to contend with a seemingly monolithic establishment from the margins. The film invites contemplation upon the contradiction between civilization and savagery, especially as noted in Mouna Rudo's catchy and often highlighted lines: "if your civilization means to have us buckle under in submission, I shall show you the pride of a savage." It is through the Wushe uprising that they prove themselves capable of complex mental labor, and also worthy of being recognized as a Japanese *samurai*. The linking of Mouna Rudo to a samurai is also an ironic one, because, in historical actuality, after the war, Mouna Rudo was labeled a national hero by the KMT for his "anti-Japan" resistance. Wei's ruse of the linkage sets Mouna Rudo apart from his long-time malapropos status as a historical Chinese patriot, and emphasizes that his cause is simultaneously very personal and transcendental—he is fighting for his way of life, just as the Japanese are fighting for their emperor, and other peoples fighting for their beliefs. Wei's arrangement of a Japanese general to affirm how the warriors reflect an honor code he upholds says less about the savages successfully "learning" Japanese ways than recognizing how the "other" is really the "same" (See Figure 4.1).

The 2014 presentation of *KANO* is equally fraught with politics regarding its reimagining of the colonial era. Like *Cape No. 7*, it was also released at a time when the Taiwanese society was undergoing a series of internal turbulence of mass protests and reformation movements.<sup>29</sup> The protests, including the March for the Death of Corporal Hong Chung-chiu, and the Sunflower Student Movement,<sup>30</sup> articulated the people's mounting discontent toward the then ruling KMT's opaque administration. Wei and

Umin Boya's upbeat, hot-blooded portrayal of an underdog team on its way to glory offered certain relief to movie-goers. In fact, during the standoff, student organizers of the Sunflower Movement contacted Wei, who gave his consent for a special screening of *KANO* inside the Parliament Hall during the occupation period to show his support for the students' "defense for our democracy."<sup>31</sup> This event led supporters to comment that "the spirit of *KANO* and the spirit of the student movement are essentially the same." They further voiced their concern that this would tie Wei's works to a "perpetually anti-China stance." It is interesting to ask, under what framework can a film about a baseball team's struggles in the colonial times share "essential sameness" as a student movement fighting against a political mechanism to reject its pro-China cultural agenda? Ostensibly, they might be referring to the air of innocence and passion privy to young protagonists who, in hope of making a change, pitch themselves against a monolithic structure in a David-and-Goliath manner. In their struggle to become a force to be reckoned with, the student players in *Kano* work against Japanese bureaucrats' dismissal of their then unimpressive ability and refusal to back them with more funds. This is indeed reflected in the Sunflower students' clashes with "the adults" manning the political machine. However, the combination of a film that harks back to a romanticized period of colonialism and the people's rejection of economically cozying up to China suggests a far more complex process in the collective re-remembrance of *Kano* in postcolonial Taiwan. Although the film and the social movement are common in their passion to make a change in an established system, one cannot overlook the complication that the Kano baseball team achieved recognition under the guidance of a member of Japanese colonialism. Essentially, the Sunflower students' real-life skepticism towards Taiwan's governmental policies sharply contrasts with the celluloid presentation of ingenuous acceptance of the Japanese coach's instructions. To embrace

*KANO* at the site of protest indicates not only a critique of KMT's leadership, but also a selective remembrance of Japanese colonial ruling.

As cultural studies scholar Andrew D. Morris notes, in Taiwan, “explicit recognition of the importance of the colonial era provides an important political context for Taiwanese people’s [...] notions of exactly how “Chinese” they are.”<sup>32</sup> I agree with Morris that it is feasible to gauge one’s (lack of) allegiance to the People’s Republic of China with one’s perception of the colonial past, hence the concern of Wei’s artistic creations being permanently linked to an arbitrary “anti-China” stigma. However, I argue that the sequence of this cause-effect should be reversed. It is an anxiety of losing one’s identity to a “Chinese” one that has resulted in a desire to revisit memories of the colonial. Historian and ethnographer Huang Chih-huei observes the revival of a previously suppressed memory as “an unique form of resistance.”<sup>33</sup> Those who may have resisted the colonial ideal to acquire “Japaneseness” found themselves learning its culture “with enthusiasm once it had been forbidden by the KMT.”

A terrain of such contestation is manifested in *Kano*’s sideline inclusion of Hatta Yoichi 八田與一, an actual hydraulic engineer whose design of the Chianan Canal and Wushantou Reservoir improved the irrigation system in southern Taiwan, and dramatically upped rice productivity. *KANO*’s Hatta is engineered to be a cheerful advisor to the local farmers, and his achievements are literally spelled out on the screen when a Japanese teacher teaches the students at *Kagi* Agriculture and Forestry School the plans and progress of his work. In reality, Taiwan’s Chianan Irrigation Association materialized the memory of Hatta in a bronze statue in his usual pose as he sits contemplating in his work clothes in 1981. Either wittingly or unwittingly, *KANO* reenacts this philosophizing posture as Coach Kondo sits next to the baseball diamond

brooding over his possible role in the baseball team, further reinforcing the image of a colonizer contemplating about his subjects' future (see Figure 4.2). In another poetic scene, a strong gust of wind blows off Hatta's straw hat and carries it through a luscious field of rice. In an attempt to retrieve it, the baseball students chase it, frolicking through the blades of grass until one of them leaps in the air to grasp it. This sideline, irrelevant to baseball training, serves to anchor *Kano* team's connection with the land and its agricultural roots, as well as the particularity of its spatial and historical context.

However, the romanticized symbol of colonial modernity that Hatta represents, for some like writer Huang Rong-zhi, is a hagiographic advertisement of Japan's colonial legacy.<sup>34</sup> Granted, Huang does make a valid point in calling out the exploitive nature inherent in colonialism—that Hatta's dedication to improving the farming conditions could be in service to the empire, rather than the benefit of the Taiwanese farmers. However, his criticism of Wei's remembrance of colonial legacy appears to be sidetracked by the normative “pandering to Japan” rhetoric, which he demonstrated with an example of an elder he knew who grew up in “pseudo Manchukuo.”<sup>35</sup> He commends this particular elder for upholding his ethno-national principle and cultural integrity (as a Chinese), although having received a full Japanese education as well as being a fan for the baseball sport. His use of such example highlights the Sinocentric desire to incorporate Taiwanese colonial memories as one with a “Chinese ethno-national principle.” It also highlights the precise “principle” that many Taiwanese resist when appealing to a heritage that would depart from a Chinese one. For others, like sociologist Albert Tseng, the colonial benevolence portrayed in *KANO* is not a betrayal to the tragic sacrifices that the Seediqs made in exchange for liberation in *Seediq Bale*,<sup>36</sup> countering what Huang contended.

Rather, I suggest that the two films should be juxtaposed to present a better rounded

dialects regarding the malevolence and virtues of colonial modernity. Indeed, the excavation of *Kano*'s obscure history is more than finding material for an inspiring bildungsroman. Colonial nostalgia extracted from Hatta Yoichi's contribution to Taiwan's native, farming landscape and its link to a story of Taiwanese youths (as well as a handful of Japanese) achieving glory under Japanese guidance offers an effective fabric of contestation to examine, in Wei's words, our "insecurity with the Japanese."<sup>37</sup>

Where *Seediq Bale*'s General Kamada finds similarities between Seediq warriors and the aesthetics of bushido, *Kano*'s Coach Kondo and the team's new fans at Koshien affirm not only their *yakyuu damashii* (野球魂, baseball spirit. Its use in the film is close to that of the *Yamato damashii* 大和魂), but also their stupendous tenacity in face of struggle. When the Sapporo team coach comforts his star pitcher who has stormed off the field during their match with Kano, he prematurely admits defeat, saying, "look at them. [...] Not a single ball is given up. We have already lost the game." The affirmation of the Taiwanese team's performance is further strengthened when a news reporter who initially insulted the non-Japanese members proclaims his "complete and utter transformation into a *Kano* fan." The "Japanese" trope of appreciation for Taiwanese quality is well-rehearsed in Wei's brand of films.

However, the "Japanese" gaze here departs from that in *Seediq Bale* or *Cape No. 7* by admiring the Otherness in the players. Their naiveté, machine-like relentlessness, and hybridity render them an alien and exotic quality that sets them apart from other native Japanese teams. The aforementioned journalist describes their winning over the Sapporo team with a headline that matches both teams to elements from their origin: "Under attack of the blazing sun, thousand-year ice melts"—the fieriness of heat and frigidness of cold predicated upon the standard climates of the metropole of Tokyo in mainland

mainland Japan. As a result, in *KANO*, Wei has reversed the essentialist sameness discovered by the “Japanese” gaze on “Taiwan,” to one that divorces Taiwanese as a separate, albeit admirable, entity.

The trope of the “Japanese” gaze runs the risk of perpetuating the cultural hierarchy of Imperial Japan as the definer of colonial Taiwan’s worth. However, the transitioning of the imagined gaze from recognizing sameness with a “savage” to the othering of a highly Japanese team—which serves as a template of “three race under one union”—suggests that the binarism of self/other that many postcolonial sovereignties use to construct their national identities is, in fact, consistently inconsistent in the Taiwanese context.

### **Cultural Liminality: Neither Here nor There**

In a few instances of cultural exchange, certain texts demonstrate their resilience against the tests of cultural intermixing and renewing, and emerge as something neutral and transcendental, its integrity seemingly unscathed. We see an example of such cultural texts in the presentation of Franz Schubert’s *Heidenroslein* in *Cape No. 7*. After delivering two well-received songs at the concert, A-ga’s band’s short repertoire runs out of songs to satiate the crowd’s appetite for an encore. Mou-bei breaks out his yueh-qin, a traditional string instrument that the other members previously voted off the band, and strums the notes of *Heidenroslein*. He gives a solo performance with his traditional instrument until, one by one, his band rejoins him and delivers the Mandarin Chinese version of this 18<sup>th</sup> century German Ballad. In the backstage listening in is the Japanese singer, Atari Kosuke, the actual star of this show. He expresses his familiarity with the number and joins A-ga in his song. Upon Atari’s appearance on the stage, A-ga takes a step out of the spotlight, but Atari holds him by the arm and pulls him back. Side by

side they continue the song, but in different tongues, A-ga singing in Mandarin Chinese, Atari in Japanese. This juxtaposition of the two men, unsurprisingly, invited accusations of and compliments on the “reconciliation between Taiwan and Japan” in not only the Taiwanese media, but also online forums in Hong Kong and China, as well as from a Japanese column writer, Arai Hifumi, who remarks that the concert, for her, symbolizes “the funeral for Taiwan’s Postcolonial era.”<sup>38</sup>

*Cape No. 7*’s use of *Heidenroslein*, or *The Wild Rose*, is an ultimate and important example of cross-cultural exchange. It has its origin in Germany, but has grown roots everywhere else around the globe. A piece of classic that enjoys canonized status in the west, it is interesting to note that it was so incorporated into Wei’s consciousness that prior to making of *Cape No. 7*, he believed it to be a Taiwanese children’s song. It belongs “here,” and also “there.” His choice of *Heidenroslein*, whether he is aware of it or not, is a manifestation of a foreign culture’s seamless integration into a local culture, so seamless that it has lost all its exoticism and otherness. Could this be the ideal result for the search of a Taiwanese identity? With internal dynamics welded into each other, can the negotiation between imperialism, nationalism, and colonialism be resolved?

This “melting pot” idealism does not seem to happen soon. A-ga and his band’s performance is well received, and the film ends with a feel-good factor. But if we have been reading the formation of the band as the formation of Taiwanese subjectivity, we have to wonder: what becomes of the amateur, mishmash band after this one lucky strike? Where is Taiwan going? After *Cape No. 7*, films in search of Taiwanese identities performed well in the box office. The titles *1895* (2009), *Monga* (2010), and *Din Tao: Leader of the Parade* (2012) are self-evident, as the new generation of directors weave their narrations around themes with strong local flavors, like gangster culture and religious festivities, while continuing *Cape No. 7*’s example of incorporating

scenes or languages that are distinctively vernacular (the dialogues in *Cape No. 7* contain Hoklo, Hakka, aboriginal dialects, as well as Japanese and a mere sprinkle of Mandarin Chinese, the official language). This concentration on the marginalized, in my view, represents a desire to make a legitimate claim to something particular, something more than a product of hybridity and ambivalence. The position of the very marginalized almost guarantees that it filters out any influences that are foreign, and carves out an exclusively Taiwanese subjectivity.

Given the complex matrix of Taiwan's multi-ethnicity, history of colonization by various imperial powers, and the subsequent endlessly repetitive process of constructing, deconstructing, and renewal of its subjectivity, the Taiwanese identity seems to be perpetually "in progress." On the surface, it was en route to "becoming Japanese" prior to KMT's arrival in 1945; before Japanese assimilation, learning the Chinese classics was integral to establish oneself; and at present, it seems that Taiwan is preoccupied with identifying the vernacular in search of a subjectivity free from foreign pollutants, or absorbing the foreign elements to make it one's own. The only perpetual certainty for the Taiwanese is, as historian Chen Fang-ming notes, that, due to its geopolitical marginal status, the Taiwanese seem to have a tradition of struggling against a central power.<sup>39</sup>

This predicament of being "stuck" in a liminal status can be found in all the three films. In *Cape No. 7*, liminality is manifested in the form of the seven undelivered letters, and the rainbow, a prevalent image in Wei's films. The love letters, when scattered about in A-ga's bedroom, are trapped in liminal space before they could reach their rightful owner, the elder Tomoko. Before the letters could reach her, they are read by the Japanese teacher's daughter, intercepted by A-ga (who fails to understand the letters' significance because he does not know the Japanese language), and then



“rediscovered” by the younger Tomoko. However, before reaching their rightful recipient, the letters are mere words on paper, their emotions bound by paper and ink and their messages suspended. Their meaning is only released when they arrive at their destination. The “purloined” letters<sup>40</sup> are a moving pivot around which shifting sets of human relationships revolve.

At the end of the film, Kojima Tomoko finally receives the sixty-year-old letters. As her wrinkly hands open the packet that contains the letters from her now-deceased lover, her face is concealed from the viewers, making it impossible to read her emotions. Does it provide her closure to a suspended love affair? Is she relieved, or have the letters summoned the unwanted memories of a bitter past? Is forgiveness granted as he has pleaded? Although Wei lets the Japanese teacher’s voice permeate the film, he does not let this particular subaltern speak. Her reaction is left to the imagination of the audience, thus preserving the air of ambivalence between the imagined Taiwan/“Japan” relationship. Has the apology arrived too late? Had the letters been returned to the teacher’s daughter, or lost in transit, the teacher who begged for forgiveness would have remained un-forgiven, and the elder Tomoko who believes herself to be jilted would also have remained “jilted.” In the end, the letters are retrieved and restored to their rightful owner, restoring power to both.

In *Cape No. 7* and *Seediq Bale*, Wei frequently enlists the image of the rainbow to convey the connection of two different ends. Utilized to signify the bridging of differences and the process of crossing over to reaching the *other* end, the rainbow appears when the lovers converge, and when A-ga toughens up for his performance and becomes a true warrior, according to aboriginal legends. This rainbow theme continues in *Seediq Bale*, aptly titled in English as *Warriors of the Rainbow*. The arched bow of colors is so ubiquitous in the film that one can hardly “unsee” it. As a Seediq symbol of

a bridge that leads the deserving to an abundant afterlife, the rainbow's repeated appearance poses more as a reminder of transitioning between stages than the connection of two separate ends, more than an ultimate reward or destination. The Seediq tribe observes the *Gaya* (set of instructions for way of life) states that a tribesman needs to earn his right to cross the rainbow to a promising afterlife by fulfilling certain tasks (offering blood sacrifice via headhunting is one criterium). The rainbow here represents the passage between a *Seediq* (a man) to a *Seediq Bale* (a true man), and to pass it one needs to pay a toll. The bloody slaughter of the Japanese people in the Wushe Incident would provide the Seediq men the seal of approval to cross that critical bridge. The closing scene depicts the Seediq men crossing a bright rainbow path, symbolizing their admission to the Seediq version of heaven. Yet the overly colorful CGI effect renders the scene kitch, almost to the extent of comedy.<sup>41</sup> The replacement of realistic presentations of gory battles by the fantastical quality of the rainbow seems to indicate the ambiguity, or non-completion of their journey home.

This jovial gang in the closing scene probably excludes two characters: Hanaoka Ichiro and Hanaoka Jiro, two tragic figures who kept themselves out of the bloody incident, their reluctance to conquer their enemy via traditional methods barring them from ancestral recognition. Seediq by birth, but raised Japanese as prototypes of the "tamed savage," the Hanaokas' credentials over-qualify them for their restrained career paths. In spite of their relatively superior educational background, their colleagues of true Japanese blood still put them down as *banjin* (savages), albeit "civilized" ones. Their efforts to "educate" and persuade their people with Japanese civilization, however, are met with jeers from the other Seediqs, who point out the difference between themselves and *them*. Historians debate whether the Hanaokas are accomplices in the Wushe uprising, but Wei portrays them as powerless agents that struggle in vain

to prevent the eventual clash. Wei's portrayal of Hanaoka Brothers' dilemma, neither a "true Japanese" nor a "true Seediq," is telling in the past treatment of "becoming Japanese" status of all non-Japanese on the island (neither Japanese, neither Chinese, neither Taiwanese), and poses a posthumous question to the ex-colonizers: "what would it have taken to be recognized?" In this sense, the question, when directed at the Taiwanese viewers, is also a quest for a definition for "Taiwaneseeness."

In a debate regarding whether to modernize, or conserve tribal life, Mouna questions Ichiro, "when you die, will your spirit enter the Japanese shrine, or our ancestral hunting ground?" His hesitance implies his ambivalent faith in either option for an afterlife, and is revealing in how recognition by a singular authoritative figure could sway one's identification. For the Hanaokas, the dilemma lies in their unwillingness, or inability to choose between his blood ancestors and Japanese values. To select one indicates betrayal to the other, no connecting rainbow seemingly available to bridge the two polarizing ends. After the uprising when the remaining tribespeople commit mass suicide, we see him taking his own life by means of *seppuku*, suicide by means of slicing one's guts, all decked out in a formal kimono. In the end, his simultaneous commitment to his tribe and to Imperial Japan means betrayal to both. Therefore he is caught in liminality, his identity forever suspended. As he directs his sword at his stomach and questions whether he is Seediq or Japanese, Jiro encourages him to "do it, cut open your entangled guts. We do not have to go anywhere. Let us be free wandering spirits." However, his and Jiro's deaths leave more questions than relief: is ceasing to "be" the only solution for the predicaments of ineffective "becoming?" Do their "free wandering spirits" symbolize liberation, or rather, displacement? Or, more optimistically, perhaps one can interpret Ichiro's gesture of taking his life in the

traditional Japanese way as a compromise, because he assigns his body to the Japanese, and his soul to his tribe, and therefore, striking a balance in the tug of war between the two. Instead of a completion of reconciliation, however, the tragic scene embodies the current entanglement of conflicting identifications in Taiwan. While there is ongoing debate, based on historical findings, about how much the Hanaokas knew of the plans of the revolt and to what extent they participated in it, Wei's decision to portray them as sympathetic spectators punctuates the emotional struggle of their liminal situation, which echoes the ambivalent situations of some of the Japanese-educated Taiwanese after the war.

Continuing Wei's theme of ragtag groups of small potatoes coming together to form communal solidarity, *KANO*'s characters follow the tradition of reinventing a predetermined status of being unruly and constantly ridiculed. Parallel to *Seediq Bale*'s presentation of the warriors' and the mountains' boundless vitality, the Kano baseball team's youthful, unbridled energy holds out the promise of transcending the boundaries defined by political hegemony, cultural hierarchy and ethnicity. However, *KANO*'s presentation of the recalcitrant state of this primeval energy soon undergoes a process of reorganization. Though each team member demonstrates impressive strength, it is not until Kondo proclaims: "I am here to bring you to Koshien." He systematically maps out their individual roles on the baseball field, so that their team may redeem the stigma as "the one that has never won anything." In Kondo's process of reining in and assigning energy to pour into different types of skill training, the film's insertion of rain/water motif that is so connected with the destruction and irrigation farmlands also constitutes the recurrent act of reinvention. With water from torrential bouts of tropical storm securely stored in the reservoir, then redirected to where it is needed, previously barren or flooded lands are given new life and purpose. The ultimate dream of attaining

seal of approval to play at the sacred Koshien symbolizes a reservoir where the players' focus is properly gathered. They chant the hallowed name of their goal at the top of their lungs as they navigate through the streets and fields of a then-developing Kagi town. However, after they finally earn their entry ticket to the once unattainable dream, the philosophy that has guided the team thus far shifts from winning for Koshien to "don't lose." Whereas winning marks a definitive end to a battle, the tenet of "not losing" bears a suspended uncertainty to when one's struggle is terminated. Hence, the film barely dwells on their successive victories in Koshien. It is in the final game for the championship, where the pitcher Akira (aka Wu Ming-chieh) injures his right index finger, that Wei positioned the weight of the film.

As blood streams from his cracked fingernail onto the baseball, Akira's performance is weakened by his aggravating pain and the consequent loss of grip over the ball. The optimistic tone that has been hitherto escalating sharply declines. But Akira refuses to step down to let another player pitch, for fearing it indicates his defeat to himself. Some of his teammates confront him, questioning whether his appeal for holding out is borne out of selfish heroism. Hirano Yasuro, an aborigine player comes to his aide and, with great conviction, convinces the others that Akira's desperation would only prompt him to outperform himself. Akira is indeed desperate, for the game is his last with the team, his last chance to materialize their baseball dream. With the consent of his coach and understanding from his teammates, he steps back on the field. The shots alternate between a grimacing Akira, a Kondo who is reaffirming himself for letting his student make the call, and the recorded 50,000 attendees at the stadium biting their lips in anticipation, who at this point have become supporters of the team. The game continues, with Akira as the last batter facing the dramatic opportunity of hitting a grand slam and reversing their losing position of 0 to 4. He hits. The ball is sent soaring

through the sky, and all the players at the base start scramble madly towards the home base. As they dash from one base to the next, the shot cuts to the ball being caught, anti-climatically putting them all out at once. The moment of truth has irreversibly decreed their opponent winner of 1931 Koshien Tournament. However, Akira keeps running until he collapses at the home base, symbolizing his own completion of the game (see Figure 4.3). Moved by this scene, the Koshien crowd burst into a deafening chant: *tenka no kano* 天下の嘉農, “Kano of the world,” in honor of their heroic performance.

Base by base, as Akira traces the contour of the baseball diamond, his advances in spatial context delineates the borders of his battlefield, and elongates the temporal boundary of his state of liminality. Imbued with the qualities of a tragic hero, the moment of his simultaneously futile and meaningful “home” base-coming, paradoxically, places the team as neither a victor, nor a loser. Like Mouna Rudo and the Seediq warriors, the Kano team “wins” recognition as true sportsmen after their defeat. Practiced through a dogged perseverance, the mantra of “don’t lose” projects not towards a utopia that seems to offer a way out of the crisis of not winning the game in reality, but is emblematic of a desire for self-determination. Winning the championship is defined within the framework and by the rules of Koshien, however, “not losing” calls for an autonomous assessment on the Kano team’s part. On the homebound ship, the students asks Kondo how the folks back home would greet them upon their homecoming, whether they would be happy or disappointed. Kondo does not give an answer, but replies that no matter how they are greeted, they will be home in time to see the golden waves of bountiful rice fields. The reference of a rich harvest again echoes not only the baseball team/farm boys’ allegiance to their land, but also signifies the Japanese teacher’s own transition to identify with the island. “Thank you for bringing

me to Koshien,” he quietly tells his Taiwanese students, indicating a reversal of his role as the instructor to that of a beneficiary. Initially Kondo’s dream of returning to Koshien indicates a movement in the homebound direction, but at the end it is the fields of rice across the ocean that awaits his homecoming. While it is typically assumed that colonial influence flows outward from the metropole—in this case, Koshien—*KANO* blurs the categorical distinction by suggesting Kondo’s own liminality and state of becoming.

If *Kano* embodies “the good old days” of the colonial period, with the modernizing irrigation facilities in a thriving farming town, *Seediq Bale* is the poster child of colonial suppression and tragedy under the same movement towards modernity. Strategically, Wei’s successive production of *Seediq Bale* and *KANO* reflects the postcolonial generation’s attempt to comb through varying memories and reconfigure Taiwan’s relationship with its ex-colonizer. Such is not an attempt to put behind past memories, but to delve further into them through the dialectics of remembering and sifting through the stories of another generation, or to collectively forge a “postmemory.” Its application of imagination and creativity is akin to the form of memory proposed by Marianne Hirsch, whose connection to history is mediated not by recall but via imagination and creative faculty.<sup>42</sup> Nevertheless, Wei and his generation’s postmemory would be complicated by nearly 40 years of Chinese nationalist education under martial law, which further removes the memories from their origins by additional layers of deliberate obfuscation and paradoxical interpretations.

As Wei digs into the past, his re-creation or revisiting of Taiwanese characters under Japanese rule often invokes a nativist pride, amid nationalist arguments, that speaks to Taiwan’s actual frustrations with its unsettled (non-) national status and ambiguous identity. *Cape No. 7*, *Seediq Bale*, and *KANO* all reveal a collective desire to see the construction of an identity that can be claimed as particularly Taiwanese

although this “Taiwan identity” is highly mobile and transposable as suggested by A-ga’s professing of his affection to the young Tomoko before the concert: “stay, or I’ll come with you” (see Figure 4.4). In conclusion, I read Wei’s rainbows as a conveyer of a sense of cultural liminality: that before reaching the other end, one’s existence is indeterminable and therefore unsettled. And to read Wei’s three productions as a national allegory, one cannot avoid this sense of in-betweenness as the Taiwanese identity oscillates between Chinese nationalism, Japanese colonialism, and its own internal dynamics between various ethnic or demographic groups. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the term “liminal” suggests a neither-nor-situation, it also implies that at the end of the transit, there is a destination to be reached. The rainbow, after all, is also a symbol of hope.



## Chapter Four

### Homebound

War history has long been a contested subject for postwar Japan. History textbooks are rebuked by its Asian neighbors for not delving deeper into Japan's role as a perpetrator in Asia. At the same time, they have been criticized for the opposite reason, for promoting an image of self-deprecation as a defeated nation. As Japan struggles to regain its footing in the post-war international order, little dialogue could be spared between Japan and Taiwan regarding their colonial relationship. Although former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui and his favorable view of Japanese colonialism enjoy media coverage in Taiwan as well as in Japan, colonized ordinary people's memories of their Japanization experience are met with limited response from their Japanese counterparts. Without documentation or acknowledgment, the Japanized generation's invocations of the past are mere communications with a living ghost, that is, their story-telling serves no other ends other than the mere action of telling it.

As Taiwan attempts to reconnect with its colonial history through new documentaries and films, in recent years Japan has also seen a rise in interest in reconnecting with this shared past. I will examine recent cinematic texts produced by two young female Japanese producers, Sakai Atsuko 酒井充子 and Tanaka Mika 田中実加, whose projects, I contend, actively invite the missing dialogue from the Japanese part, albeit from private sectors. Sakai's documentaries, *Taiwan Jinsei* (2008) and *Taiwan Identity* (2013), aim to expose to the Japanese audience how the generation who received Japanese education as colonial subjects in their formative years, known also as "Japanese-speaking generation (*nihongo sedai*, 日本語世代)," carried on with their

lives after Japan's withdrawal from and KMT China's arrival on the island. Sakai defines her subjects as "the people who were once Japanese," and in the films they still demonstrate a strong sense of belonging to the "Japan" in their memory.

Tanaka's production, on the other hand, is a discourse progressing in the exact opposite direction. Her *Wansei Back Home* (*wansheng hui jia* 「灣生回家」 for the Taiwanese audience, or *wansei kaika* < 湾生回家 > for the Japanese) uncovers the neglected history of *wansei* 灣生, Japanese people born in Taiwan between the years 1895 and 1946 but forced to return to Japan by Taiwan's new Chinese Nationalist ruler when Japan lost the war. On the surface, the subjects in her documentary were beneficiaries of a colonial mechanism while it lasted. However, when they returned home to a war-torn Japan where people distrusted the returnees as outsiders, they soon realized they would identify themselves more as "Taiwanese" than anybody else. The social constructions of the *nihongosedai* and *wansei* are peculiar to colonial Taiwan. They emerge from the same backdrop of history and space, but interestingly their identity and identification move in opposite directions like two parallel lines. While wartime relationships between the two nations seem to be garnering more attention from Japan's younger generation, does this signify a more promising response from Japan to begin a dialogue on the two nations' tumultuous past? It seems that before official reconnection occurs, writing from the margins, as Sakai and Tanaka's productions manifest, is an effective starting point.

### ***Taiwan Jinsei* (2008) and *Taiwan Identity* (2013)**

Aimed to enlighten the modern Japanese on "those who were once Japanese," *Taiwan Jinsei*, (literally meaning "Life in Taiwan"), Sakai Atsuko's 2008 presentation features

the lives of five Japanized Taiwanese from varying social backgrounds and ethnicities: a tea farm worker who learned her Japanese while working in a Japanese-owned coffee farm; a doctor's wife who graduated from an elite school and boasts of proficiency in tea ceremony and Japanese flower arrangement; an aboriginal legislator who fought as a Japanese soldier; a former worker at the Japanese navy who fondly remembers his Japanese teacher and annually visits his grave; and a history museum volunteer who also fought as a Japanese soldier and is also a victim of the atrocious 228 Incident.<sup>1</sup> Sakai's documentary attempts to map out the nostalgic discourses in Taiwan, and her presentation reveals that although the subjects share fluency in the Japanese language and a sense of colonial nostalgia, "Japan" is derived from various fibers of remembrance.

In the documentary, Chen Ching-hsiang 陳清香 (1926- ), for instance, attends her elementary school class reunion in a private box in a restaurant. The large group of men and women are all in their 80s, but the atmosphere is buoyant as they converse with each other loudly in Taiwanese and Japanese. Then the crowd sang their old Japanese school anthem in unison, the heaving of their chests suggesting their enthusiasm. Chen later tells the camera that she is more Japanese than the Japanese, and that if she were a man, she would have volunteered herself for the Kamikaze during the war. This may sound unsettling even for Japan today. However, as William Cunningham Bissell notes, nostalgia is a longing for something that is lost, and could not be repeated.<sup>2</sup> Her strong stance is not based on a desire for the return of the colony but on the knowledge that those days are firmly grounded in the past. In fact, later in the documentary, she solicits Japan's support for Taiwanese independence. On the other hand, Hsiao Ching-wen's 蕭錦文 memory of his loyalty foregrounds his discontent and disillusion against "Japan."

Hsiao fought in Burma as a Japanese soldier. He indignantly protests to his interviewer: “we have been deserted by Japan. Of course, different blood ran in our veins from the Japanese, but our minds are alike when it comes to protecting the nation!” Unlike Chen’s fantastical wish of dying for the Empire, Hsiao’s statement reads more like an accusation against colonial discrimination, and a demand to Japan to recognize the sacrifices he and other Taiwanese soldiers made. The contradictory juxtaposition of Chen’s and Hsiao’s testimonies renders a strong sense of futility to their lives as former Japanese. Although they have sworn allegiance to the Japanese empire at certain points of their lives, it is now rendered useless, or even inappropriate.

In her second documentary, *Taiwan Identity*, Sakai shifts focus onto Taiwan’s colonial nostalgia across nations and regions, their locations spanning from the high mountains of Taiwan’s Mount Ali, across the waters to Yokohama, Japan, and Jakarta, Indonesia. Though continuing the vein of multiplicity in nostalgic discourse and the “Japanese-language generation’s” sense of “having been deserted,” her quests depart from the indulgence in nostalgic feelings for the past to their struggles to survive under a new government, the KMT regime, that saw them as enemies. Compared with subjects in *Taiwan Jinsei*, their nostalgic discourse is further complicated by a truly dark time of torment as they suffered prosecution or the Pacific War first-hand. Each subject also has at least double identities, proven by an array of names given to them at different historical junctures. Their postwar struggle to survive in a transnational context deepens an overwhelming sense of being “left behind” by the Japanese empire.

Director Sakai says that she, as a woman, felt most connected with, among other interviewees, Kao Chu-hua 高菊花 (1932- 2016) known as Yata Kikuko 矢多喜久子, a Tsao tribeswoman who has demonstrated resilience against her misfortunes. Neither

Taiwanese nor Japanese audience may be familiar with her, but she is a prominent figure to historians documenting Taiwan's White Terror period of suppression. Shortly after the end of WWII, her famous father, Kao I-sheng 高一生, a highly educated aboriginal man was imprisoned for two years before being murdered by KMT government officials. Since her father's captivity she had been constantly coerced by secret agents to do their biddings and placed under government surveillance for more than two decades. She told Sakai that before the end of the war, she had always believed herself to be Japanese, living the life of a Japanese. Her family wore *wafuku* (Japanese clothes), ate *miso* soup, and mingled with neighbors who were also believed to be Japanese. After the war, they returned to the traditional way of life in the Tsao tribe, and she found herself unable to eat with her hands in accordance to her traditional tribal manners. Her nostalgia for the past is evident, but it is not clear whether it is geared towards its Japaneseness or life with her Japanized father. In the documentary, at her childhood home, now reformed into a tourist information center, she tells Sakai about her childhood, when her father played the piano for the children. She quickly turns her back and leaves the scene when Sakai asks about her father's arrest.

Kao's life before and after the end of WWII is a drastic contrast. Her description of life under the wings of her father offers a glimpse of her Japanese era through rosy, idyllic lenses. The somberness conveyed through her words, however, deepens the discrepancy between her life as Kikuko and life as Chu-hua. In one scene, Kao displays her father's numerous letters sent home during his time in imprisonment. Sakai notices a repeated emergence of a word, *Usanao*, written in katakana alphabet. Kao explains that it is a code used by her father to evade police scrutiny, and means that he wished for his family to visit him. Until he was executed for treason, his wish of seeing his family

again was never granted. As Chu-hua, she was a fatherless young woman who had to learn quickly to conceal her Japaneseness for protection.

Cheng Mao-li 鄭茂李 (1927- ), also known as Tejima Yoshinori 手島義矩 or Awai Teyakiana in his tribe, is Kao's uncle and a soft spoken man nearly in his 90s. In the documentary, he tells Sakai that he did not despise the war, much to her surprise. Like many other young men of his time, he felt that being a soldier was an honorable symbol of masculinity.<sup>3</sup> At that time he considered himself a “complete Japanese” (*kanzenna nihonjin*, 完全な日本人), and made plans to study in Japan proper after the war. When Japan lost the war, he cried when he realized that his hopes were dashed. “I wasn't ... I couldn't become a Japanese,” he said, followed by a quiet laugh. “We were all working for Japan,” he quietly chuckles again, but stops himself abruptly as if feeling awkward, and runs a hand through his hair. Suddenly his eyes swell with tears, his voice cracks: “when Japan lost the war, we also lost. If Japan hadn't lost, we would still be working for Japan, and we would be taken care of.” At this point Sakai must have started weeping off camera, because the old man started comforting his interlocutor, “Don't cry, don't cry. This is our fate. There's nothing we can do.” As he says this, his niece Kao Chu-hua sits next to him in complete silence.

Cheng's nostalgic discourse seems to depart from Chen Ching-hsiang's and Hsiao Ching-wen's in *Taiwan Jinsei* and somehow falls in a category somewhere in between. His embarrassment at his “inappropriate” strife to become Japanese, and his connection of the capitulation of the empire to the demise of his family gently remind Sakai and her Japanese viewers of how he has been “left behind” by Japan. After the war, the souls of about 280,000 deceased Taiwanese soldiers were enshrined at the Yasukuni Shrine, yet ironically their family and other Taiwanese soldiers are rejected compensation because

they were not truly considered Japanese citizens.<sup>4</sup> As revealed by his light chuckling, Cheng's nostalgia is convoluted by the recognition of his naïveté and memories of his family's subsequent suffering under the new Chinese ruler. The empire that had indoctrinated him about the glory of war not only refused to reward him for his loyalty, but in a sense had left him to fend himself against its enemy. This scene where he comforts his interviewer is significant in that Sakai, a post-war Japanese woman who set out to study and document her nation's former colonial subjects, becomes so enraptured by their colonial discourse that her emotions could not be contained within the boundary between an observer and her subject. Cheng's reversed role as a consoler to an emotional Sakai to curb her sadness is also telling in how the nostalgia discourse traverses across generations and boundaries of a former colonized and (a representation of) a former colonizer. His memories invoked in Sakai not only empathy for his fate, but perhaps something related to her reflection as a representative (to the elders she interviews) of a lost empire and her effort to understand it.

Sakai's next subject takes the Taiwanese nostalgic discourse across the South Seas. The life of Miyahara Eiji 宮原永治 (1922- 2013) is a more fortunate, yet equally fraught with twists, version of Taiwanese Japanese soldiers. Born in Taiwan as Lee Po-ching 李柏青, he would later use the name Miyahara in compliance with colonial Japan's name reformation policy. He was conscripted as a volunteer soldier, and was dispatched to the Philippines, Burma, and eventually Indonesia, where he continued to fight as a Japanese, even four years after Japan was defeated. Along with 900 other Japanese soldiers who refused to surrender to the allies after Japan lost the war, they fought guerrilla wars for the Indonesian National Revolution (1945-1949) that eventually won the nation's independence from the Netherlands. Subsequently, he and

300 Japanese surviving soldiers declined repatriation to Japan. He and his comrades were acknowledged as national heroes by the Indonesian government, who gave him his third alias, Umar Hartono (see Figure 5.1).

In the documentary, Miyahara leads Sakai to tour the Kalibata Heroes Cemetery, where many of the Japanese heroes and his former friends are interred. “I will lie here one day,” he tells the camera, and will be forever enshrined as an Indonesian hero. Sakai asks Miyahara/Lee/Hartono “when the time comes, what nationality will you die with?” (「なに人として死んでいくんてしょうか？」) To which he gives an ambiguous reply, “me? I would go with Indonesia. [...] But on my tombstone they will also have to write my Japanese name and state I am Japanese” (see figure 5.2). Here, the Taiwanese identity seems to have been ruled out, which is understandable or not surprising, given that he has few ties with modern-day Taiwan. Nevertheless the intermittent pauses that punctuate his sentences reveal the discursiveness of his thoughts. He tells Sakai that he returned to Taiwan briefly in the 1974 on a business trip. At his father’s behest, he left in haste due to the precarious circumstances during the White Terror period. After another short pause, he quotes former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui’s “sorrow of being Taiwanese” (「生為台灣人的悲哀」) and grieves over the absence of innocence in his youth due to the wars.<sup>5</sup> While he is certain what would be engraved on his tombstone, his rambling on his thinning ties with Taiwan and the island’s precarious state of nationality is telling. Yet even if he does consider Taiwanese identity an option, his definition of being Taiwanese would differ from the others who still live there. Sakai’s question about which country he would commit himself to after death is especially provoking. What is identity to a dead man? Though death may not necessarily finish off shifty, unsettled issues, it delineates a finite boundary. How the dead is remembered



seems to be a final call, an undebatable definition of the person. Sakai's question is an attempt in finalizing Miyahara's choice, but that he is unable, or unwilling to adhere to a singular identity reveals the possibility of multiple, distinct allegiances co-existing.

The documentary closes with Kao Chu-hua's visit to her parents' grave. As requested by her father before his death, she and her siblings bring beer to pour over his grave, and play him a particular piece of classical music. Here, after a long hike up to reach the site, Kao's brother realizes that he has brought the wrong music. He embarrassingly calls out to his older sister in Japanese, "Kiku-chan! I forgot the CD." "You forgot?" Kao Chu-hua/Kikuko solemnly looks on as the group scramble to locate and play the correct music on a mobile phone. This comical episode in an otherwise somber scene is a stark reminder that the Kao siblings, and the audience, are situated in a vastly different historical and spatial context from the nation's scarring White Terror period that marred the siblings' lives. Not only is the "correct" item easily replaced, but mistakes are not irreparable. With things in order, the siblings align themselves in front of the grave. Her younger brother starts speaking to the ghosts, in Japanese. For the surviving Kao siblings, 70 years after the end of the Japanese era, Japanese remains the language they use to communicate within their family and the language that Kao Chu-hua is most comfortable in. In other interviews with Taiwanese historians, her articulation in Mandarin Chinese are often punctuated by a slip of Japanese words, or cut short by her halting search for words. In the documentary, Sakai has not pressed her on how she identifies herself. But if she must choose, and if the choice of language is any indicator, it can be deduced that it would be the identity she shared with her father before his persecution.

Upon examining the background of Sakai's subjects, their identity formation seems to be dominated by accidental incidents. Through almost no fault of their own, their

lives fortuitously unfolded as one historical happenstance led to another: The Pacific War took an 18-year-old Miyahara to Indonesia where he became an Indonesian hero but dared not return home to a Chinese nationalist Taiwan; Yokohama resident Wu Masao 吳正男 missed his window of opportunity to return to Taiwan due to his detainment in Siberia after the war; Kao Chu-hua had plans to study at Columbia University in the year of her father's arrest and the family's public fall; By a stroke of luck, Kao's uncle, Cheng Mao-li who was also arrested during the White Terror period, was spared and remade his life as a tea farmer; Chang Mikio 張幹男 lost eight years out of the prime of his life in a dissident prison, for having translated a Japanese pamphlet on Taiwan independence. Their articulation of their life stories expresses a yearning for subjectivity, which was stolen from them by a grander historical narrative. "The times were bad," (「時代が悪かった。」) said Kao Chu-hua. "It was a time that nothing could be helped," (「仕様がなない時代。」) said Wu Masao. Neither the Japanese empire nor the Chinese Nationalist-ruled Taiwan treated them well, and neither was held accountable for the misfortunes of the people. In this vein, their words indeed echo President Lee Teng-hui's "sorrow of being Taiwanese," a sorrow of being passed on from one foreign power to the next.

However, the "Japanese generation's" postcolonial sensibility of destitution and nostalgia for the Japanese past should not be read as a collective desire for the return of the colonizer. Chang Mikio, for one, stresses his belief that Taiwan needs to be its own master despite having gone through eight years of reformation by the nationalist KMT. Their shared sensibility does not mean that their nostalgia is unified, and can be lumped together as one monolithic discourse. As ethnographer William Cunningham Bissell points out in his study on postcolonial Zanzibar: "[nostalgia discourses] circulate in a

social terrain in which diverse forms of memory are at play.” When enlisting the nostalgic discourses to reexamine and reshape postcolonial relationships between Taiwan and Japan, it is crucial to “account for multiple strands of remembrance.”<sup>6</sup>

Sakai describes her subjects as “people that were once Japanese,” and their fate as living “at the mercy of the undulation of the era after Japan left Taiwan,” conveying a strong sense of helplessness of the ordinary people in a struggle against the changing tides of global politics. Perhaps, Kao Chu-hua’s segment illustrates this best, when the camera pans over to a small herd of scrawny cats that the old woman has taken in: “Everyone here are stray cats,” she tells the camera, “mi-ahn! Mi-ahn!” (interestingly, the onomatopoeic locution she chose to beckon the cats is Japanese, instead of the Mandarin Chinese “meow” ). As former subjects of an empire that molded them to its liking but subsequently forsook them, their fate was no less capricious than stray cats (see Figure 5.3). Some, like Miyahara/Hartono, managed to survive the war and displacement unscathed, while others, like Kao Chu-hua, were knocked off their feet and had their hands tied down. Their varying remembrance of “Japan” renders this 2013 presentation of nostalgia more complex than the simple indulgence in the lost good times and “having been Japanese.”

### ***Wansei Back Home (2015)***

In a short 1941 essay “Wansei and Wansei [湾生と湾製],” Chou Chin-po 周金波, who would later be dishonorably labeled a *Koumin writer*, enlisted wordplay to reinvent the meaning of *wansei* 湾生.<sup>7</sup> Originally a derogatory term that people from Japan proper used to refer to a second generation Japanese born in Taiwan, Chou’s replacement of a character modified the word as *wansei* 湾製 to mean “made in Taiwan,” which, for

Chou, represents the blurring of the boundary between the Taiwan-born Japanese and Taiwanese. Chou vividly recounted his initial reluctance to greet a Taiwan-born Japanese at a gathering in Tokyo. He described the tension that instinctively rose in him when they were introduced. But the tension was soon replaced by a surge of familiarity when the Japanese said: “I am a *wansei*, too! (Chou’s rendition was: I was made in Taiwan too.) Pleased to meet you.” The word play flipped the original connotation of a belittled origin into a code of identity that blurred the boundary between Taiwanized Japanese and Japanized Taiwanese. Chou’s play on the meaning of *wansei* is lost on the modern-day Taiwanese as well as Japanese. As a term that belongs to a specific historical and spatial context, it has—as Taiwanese historian Chung Shu-min points out—become “an extinct language,” forgotten in history archives and no longer in active use.<sup>8</sup>

In 2015, the term and the amicable exchange between a *wansei* Japanese and Taiwanese were revived, with much fanfare, in Tanaka Mika’s documentary *Wansei Back Home*. The film opens with a Taiwan-born Japanese man in his 80s, Tominaga Masaru’s 冨永勝 (1927- ), searching for his Taiwanese childhood buddies. With a crumpled list of names in his hand, he returns to his village in Hualien, Taiwan, asking locals that cross his path if they have information of the people on his list. The camera captures a series of blows to Tominaga as he crosses one name out after the other when he hears that they have already passed away, his pained frown and teary eyes magnified in closeups. He reminisces how his circle of friends included Taiwanese children as well as children from the Atayal tribe, and proclaims that there was no discrimination in his play group. After many disappointments he manages to find three of his playmates. The men remember each other well, and the joyful reunion dissipates the previously

downcast mood. They stand on the plot of land where Tominaga's home once stood, discussing how large it was and how its yard was full of fruits that Tominaga's family never ate. One of the old men recalls that because his family was poor and he was always hungry, he would sneak into the Tominaga yard and steal fruits. The men chuckle gaily, immersed in past memories. However, this innocent exchange seems to offer a glimpse into the colonial divide between the Japanese boy and his Taiwanese friends, though as playmates they were unaware of this difference.

Tanaka's documentary, however, does not intend to explore the discriminatory structure in colonialism. Instead, her intention is to uncover the story of *wanseis* and their affection for the island that they consider as their homeland. Either consciously or unconsciously, she uses very little language associated with the colonial mechanism in her presentation. Her project highlights the *wanseis*' continual longing for their lost "homeland," and bring to the fore different narratives between colonial Taiwan and Japan. As she maps out the "frontier villages" in the remote locations of east coast Taiwan, the Japanese citizens who answered the government's calls for land reclamation in the untamed east were not aggressive expansionists who robbed the natives of their established enterprise. Rather, they are characterized as adventurous, hand-picked immigrants who harbored dreams of starting anew. The camera moves back to Tominaga's residence in Japan, where Tominaga is joined by a Japanese friend for his interview. The non-*wansei* friend chimes in and recounts a memory of what he learned from his grandmother, neither of them having been to Taiwan: "it was challenging to be approved to go [settle in Hualien]. First you must not have any criminals in your family, secondly you can't have a record of being arrested, thirdly you can't have been spoken ill of by your neighbors! And lastly you must be a property owner. [...] I always joke to Tominaga, your ancestors must be quality folks." These prerequisites disabuse of the

notion that the settlers were possibly thugs and vagabonds, or other marginalized plebeians that the Empire cast away to Taiwan. On the contrary, the carefully selected crew demonstrates the engagement of the Empire to advance the remote “backlands” of the island. For Tanaka, the empire’s resolve in developing the rural area at the expense of some of its “quality citizens” differentiates the settlers from the unilateral, exploitative faces of colonialism.

A slideshow of Hualien in a primitive state around the time of 1910 in the documentary *Wansei Back Home* further delves into the definition of the Japanese presence in the rural context as settlers. Grainy images that contain farmers and laborers in work clothes depart from the official portraits of Japanese colonialism set in the metropolitan Taipei (see Figure 5.4). According to Tanaka, in order to ensure full commitment to the frontiers, the immigration policies decreed that the settlers must bring along all members in their family and dispose of all their real estate properties in Japan.<sup>9</sup> This complete lack of a security net, combined with the suggested hardship, not only serves to underscore the Japanese settlers’ determination to permanently settle in Taiwan, but more importantly, to divorce Tanaka’s *wanseis* from the stereotypical image of colonizers who were guaranteed advantageous positions over the local subjects in the colonial mechanism.

But precisely because the memories that she is rewriting emerge from the geographically marginalized region of Hualien, Tanaka might be able to get away with portraying her subjects as immigrants or settlers rather as the colonizers. Located on the rocky east coast, Hualien was regarded as the “Back Mountain” (後山, referencing the region’s quality of being barren, remote and untamed) by the Chinese Ching Empire and developed much later than the west coast plains. Its less approachable landscape and harsher elements further distanced it from the political heavyweight locales like Taipei,

granting it more leniency from the colonial hierarchy. The Japanese settlers she documented were more laborers than politicians: the memories that were presented were peppered with idyllic, innocent images of life in the countryside. Tanaka is careful to separate their nostalgia for “home” from a colonizer’s political yearning for a lost colony, so that the affection her subjects articulate cannot be interpreted as a lament for the empire’s loss.

Iekura Taeko 家倉多恵子 (1930- ), whose father worked for governor-general, is the only one of Tanaka’s interviewees in the film who brushes shoulders with the colonial ruling class. She visits the campus of Taipei Municipal First Girls’ High School, whose predecessor at the former Taihoku First Girls’ High School (台北州立高等女学校) was Iekura’s alma mater. As she strolls through the buildings, she recognizes many features that she found familiar, including the crimson wooden cabinets that have been in use since her time: “the wood was bare back then. They must have painted over them many times...but it’s still the same.” In Iekura’s words, seeing the old structures feels like she is “going back in time,” and things are “just like they used to be” (see Figure 5.5). When she visits the Presidential Hall—which formerly housed the Office of Governor-General, the familiarity diffusing from the office building compels her to feel that “[her] father might come out from around a corner and start speaking to her.” For her, the building and the school cabinets represent a nostalgic form of constancy. Although they have been painted over many times, its integrity remains the same. The problematics of Iekura’s nostalgic discourse, however, lies in the fact that Taiwan has not been the same since its colonial times. While the shell of the Presidential building or her school cabinets remain, their contents have been long replaced. What she deems as a token that signifies her connection with the past and Taiwan may bear very different

significance. An alumna or alumni from another time could easily make similar comments about the same structures but refer to different symbolic meanings. This does not matter for the old lady, who was clearly elated to see her distant memories so tangible and within reach.

Iekura's indulgence in the past, however, does not indicate her desire for the return of Japan's colonialism. She tells the camera that her high school only admitted a handful of Taiwanese students. There was an impression that the Taiwanese minority always performed exceedingly well academically. Years later after returning to Japan, another classmate revealed to Iekura the reason for their constant academic success—the Taiwanese seniors would advise the Taiwanese juniors that the only way to avoid being belittled by the Japanese is by excelling academically. "I was stunned to find out. [...] As a Japanese student, one is admitted even with mediocre grades," Iekura says quietly. Her contemplation on this matter suggests remorse in her unawareness of her Taiwanese classmates' then struggle with the colonial construct of hierarchy, and implies a renewed perspective of the colonial past from the side of the colonizer. It is only in retrospect that the innocent members of the ruling class recognize the colonial structure.

Iekura's postcolonial reflection on her nation's role in colonialism and war is continued when she revisits the shores of Hualian. At the height of the war, her family evacuated from the metropole of Taipei to Hualian. She remembers how fighting airplanes departed from the Hualian shorelines and glided into the unknown distance. Meanwhile, on land, she and other students dug protective trenches in the sand. In hindsight, she realizes the danger they were positioned in, and how foolish she was of daydreaming about bombing an enemy plane with a hand grenade from where she was digging. "It would have gotten all of us killed, too. But we wanted to do it for our country. War does that to you... this mind control thing." This confession is significant



in representing her awakening from Japan's imperial dreams, and it bears striking resemblance to the words of Sakai Atsuko's Taiwanese volunteer soldiers. Her then placing the empire over her personal welfare resonates with the others' visceral wish to fight in the imperial army. Be it a Japanese school girl or Taiwanese colonial subjects, Japan's mobilization movement in the heat of the war seems to have provoked a shared sensibility in Japanese and Taiwanese subjects alike. In other words, its objectification of people to utilize as an instrument to fight the war was not privy to colonial subjects. Japanese subjects, too, were indoctrinated to die for the sake of the empire.

Paradoxically, despite the *wanseis'* dedication to the Japanese Empire, the actual Empire itself seems to be an abstract, exotic entity to the children born in its extended territory. According to Tominaga, when it snowed in Taiwan's Niitakayama one year (新高山, referring to Mount Jade in Taiwan, Japan's then "new highest mountain"), his teacher sent for someone to fetch snow from the mountain so the schoolchildren can learn about this climatic feature in Japan proper. It was a big event at school when the jug of snow finally arrived from the mountain. But having taken three days to reach the children, the snow had already consolidated into a large frozen chunk of ice. The fundamental difference in climate alone seems to trump other cultural efforts to construct a unified community. Despite the schoolteacher's effort to make the Empire/Motherland vivid and tangible to the pupils, it is abstract and distant to the child's fantastical perception. The Japanese Empire—which had long held an exotic view of its untamed, tropical territory—reversely turned into the stuff of exoticism itself to its overseas subjects.

Tominaga's first encounter with snow in Hualian manifested the imagined motherland's distance and disjuncture to a subject who had not set foot on it. It can also

be read as a precursor of the *wanseis*' struggle to rehabilitate in the motherland after the war. As subjects of a defeated nation, they lost their estates and most of their possessions. What was left to take back to Japan was a stringent list of daily-use items and small sum of cash. In other words, they returned almost empty-handedly. Their return to an impoverished, war-torn Japan proved to be another chapter of hard knocks as they faced discrimination as losers that cost Japan the war, and carriers of foreign diseases and weak characteristics importable from a different climate. The discrimination pushed them further into the margins of the empire, as their fellow Japanese turned them out, unwilling or unable to accommodate them. What they returned to was not the metropole that represented the empire, but a scant prospect for survival, far removed from the modernization that had characterized colonial rule. This diasporic experience in their own land, compounded with their more advantageous positions in the colonial mechanism as one of the colonizers, contributed to their constant yearning for their Taiwanese days.

After their repatriation, it became increasingly evident to the *wanseis* that they were different from the Japanese in Japan proper. For one, they were not welcomed home. Once off the ship, according to Tominaga, they were doused with DDT, then quarantined at a stopgap facility at the port. Due to the shortage of medical facilities, they were confined with consumption patients, which exacerbated their chance of survival. The act of sanitization and isolation may have been executed out of necessity. However, the ensuing social assumption that the returnees' body and spirit were contaminated, or compromised by their experience in the colony speaks volumes. Is there anything in need of cleansing other than possibility of disease? Many altered their names, or kept their *wanseis* identity a secret to shun humiliation. When I met with Tanaka to discuss her work in August 2015, she revealed that among the 223 *wanseis*

she interviewed, only the 22 agreed to have their names and life stories exposed. She assumed that the others' wish to remain in obscurity has to do with the then dominant view that their Japaneseness is compromised as a *wansei*.<sup>10</sup> But otherwise, Tanaka stresses, when the two hundred plus *wanseis* speak of Taiwan, most of them express a strong sense of longing for the land and eagerness to return, which Tanaka defines as homesickness.

Besides being treated as alien citizens, the *wanseis* also became aware of their inner aberrance. Matsumoto Kosei 松本洽勝 (1937-) attributes his relaxed and spacey nature—which a succession of his teachers have criticized—to having been influenced by the Taiwanese climate. His daughter also testifies to his “exotic” personality, saying that she has often wondered whether her father is actually Taiwanese masquerading as a Japanese. Iekura Taeko, who spoke of her fervor to fight for the empire as a schoolgirl, paradoxically identifies herself as a “forever foreigner” (「永久異邦人」) in Japan proper, due to a constant void she feels when she is homesick about Taiwan. Their identity comes from their memories which foreground their connection with the land they once lived in. Ethnicity or nationality has very little to do with the formation of such identity. Rather, the perception of their Taiwaneseeness demonstrates the reciprocal influences between the empire and its colony. Furthermore, the overachieving tendency in a predominantly Japanese setting that Iekura observed in her Taiwanese peers is interestingly manifested in Tominaga's story. Having been scorned due to his *wansei* identity and foreign accent after returning to Japan, Tominaga says that he strived to counter the notion of his inferiority by reading *Genji Monogatari* 源氏物語 out loud everyday. Later when he built his house, the first in his area to be constructed with steel pillars, he announced to everyone that all this was accomplished by a *wansei*. He

proudly displays the name plate at his door, “this marble is from Taiwan, too. [...] The [kanji characters of] my family name are coated in gold powder. People say I’ve made the grade.” Such nostalgic discourse not only contests against mutual influence between the colonized and the colonizer, but changes the ways in which we perceive Japan/Taiwan relationship. Despite the Japanese empire’s effort to assimilate Taiwan, the *wansei*’s diasporic experiences and internalized foreignness reveal that the colony is not a mere recipient of Japanese influence, but is a contributor to societal and cultural changes in Japanese (at least, in the case of the *wanseis*).

*Wanseis*’ nostalgia for Taiwan after their repatriation prompts them to re-examine the Taiwanese influence on their Japaneseness. But subversively, it also calls attention to how these self-proclaimed “Taiwanese” imagine postcolonial Taiwan. This is demonstrated in Matsumoto Kosei’s knowledge of Taiwan’s national anthem, as observed when he drops by an elementary school graduation ceremony during a trip in Hualian. He sings along with the choir when the ceremony commences: “[san min chu yi,] wu dang suo zong [三民主義] 吾黨所宗.../ [The Three Principles of the People] is the foundation of our party....” His Taiwanese companions commend him on being so well-informed on the island. He explains that when the Chinese Nationalists took over Taiwan after the war, as he and his family were waiting to be repatriated, he learned to sing Taiwan’s new anthem. Perhaps, Tanaka inserted this particular episode with the simple intention to demonstrate the *wansei*’s knowledge of and engrossment with Taiwan. However, how the *wanseis* come to identify *their* Taiwan with the national anthem of Taiwan’s incoming ruler is interesting and problematic. The lyrics to the anthem is rife with allusions to the KMT party and its principle in its construction of a nation. The part that Matsumoto was filmed vocalizing translates into “the foundation of

*our party*,” which many contend refers to the KMT party.<sup>11</sup> In this context, domestically speaking, the symbolic meaning of the Taiwanese national anthem is a contested terrain in terms of political representation. While many in the audience in Taiwan are impressed by the *wanseis*’ emotional embrace of Taiwan as a nation, one cannot overlook the possible disjuncture between *wanseis*’ imagined “Taiwan” and the actual multiplicity of the nation.<sup>12</sup> Political symbolism observed in the nationalist anthem by many Taiwanese people appears to be lost in translation/ transition for *wanseis* like Matsumoto. His seemingly apolitical association of the anthem with his “homeland” indicates a disjunction between such imagined “homeland” and Taiwan’s political reality. Furthermore, because the anthem was taught to him by the “victors” of the war whose ruling eventually drove his family out of the island, Matsumoto’s link between the anthem and “homeland” suggests a disconnection with the lost empire he was repatriated to.

For the *wanseis*, under the pretext that their nostalgia is disconnected with political disputes in Taiwan, the National Anthem is emblematic of their connection with Taiwan. By the same token, other popular Taiwanese ballades from the period could also sufficiently convey their tie to the island.<sup>13</sup> Tanaka stresses that the nostalgic discourse has more to do with an emotional affiliation with the land, a form of “love” that “crosses national boundaries and transcends life and death.”<sup>14</sup> She tirelessly iterates that her motivation to bring visibility to *wansei* is not political, but one that encourages the love of and ties between the lands and people. Given that *wansei* is, after all, a term born from the particular colonial discourse, it is not entirely possible to avoid politics. This is probably why Tanaka chooses to let visceral emotions dominate scenes of the Japanese elderlies retracing their lives in Taiwan, and especially when receiving printed copies of their birth certificate. When Iekura receives her copy with the help of officers

of a Taipei Household Registration Office, her eyes tear up and she is overcome with emotions. She tells the camera that she feels as if she is reuniting with her past and her family through the piece of form. After taking moments to recompose herself, she bursts out again: “it is wonderful to have been born in Taiwan.” The documentary then concludes with shots of other *wanseis* receiving their certificates in a formal ceremony in Hualian, against the backdrop of a female soprano singing *Furusato* (ふるさと, homeland). This act of root-seeking and eventually receiving official affirmation of their connection to their “homeland,” according to Tanaka’s interview with the elderlies, is what dispels the sense of void that many of them have carried with them since leaving the island.

### **Japanized Taiwanese and Taiwanized Japanese**

For both Sakai Atsuko and Tanaka Mika, their gathering of oral reports and making of the documentaries commenced in a manner of serendipity. On a trip to Taiwan, Sakai encountered a Taiwanese elderly woman at a bus stop who told her in Japanese that she misses her Japanese teacher. Before she could learn more, her bus arrived. She hopped on and spent her entire trip wondering about the old lady and her Japanese teacher, which prompted her to research more on the “Japanese generation” of Taiwan. For Tanaka, who is a descendent of a *wansei* grandmother who kept this identity secret from her granddaughter while she lived, it was at her funeral when the now grown Tanaka was offered a glimpse into the grandmother’s past from other *wanseis* who came to mourn her. Like so many of the young Taiwanese people, the initiation into the underground society of secret pasts came after the loss of a loved one, and the piecing together of memories and legacies is conducted through bits of clues and anecdotes. The

research is therefore personal and overflowing with emotions. Clues and connections come in forms of faded birth certificates, or carefully preserved scribbles in familial notes. To find a link that would successfully lead one to the next meaningful link depends solely on stumbling upon luck. Many times it also depends on their race with time, as the elderly perish before facts can be confirmed. Sakai's and Tanaka's approach of unravelling the memories by befriending their subjects and gradually extracting personal tales provide an alternative, somewhat disorderly discourse that departs from official history. Theirs is a social history of the common people that is constituted of quotidian practices and personal desires.

Sakai's delineation of the Japanized Taiwanese as "people who have been teased and tossed about by the undulating tides of the times" can be extended to describe Tanaka's Taiwanized Japanese. The particular historical and spatial context they once shared dictates their loss of and separation from family and home. It also compels the hybridity and complexity of their identity—of being simultaneously Japanese and Taiwanese—despite the Empire's seemingly indomitable imposition of Japanization. When we juxtapose the documentaries, it becomes evident that both Japanese and Taiwanese subjects in Taiwan, more or less, appropriated the same indoctrination of conforming to an ideal that the Japanese empire had constructed for them, which is to selflessly dedicate oneself to the empire.

Perhaps one can boldly deduce from the fact that *Taiwan Jinsei*'s Chen Ching-hsiang 陳清香 and *Wansei Back Home*'s Iekura Taeko 家倉多惠子 both testified to their past fervor to die for the nation, that they were equally exploited and stripped of subjectivity in face of war. Strangely, even after the colonized and colonizer parted ways, they faced similar constrictions—albeit in different political climates—that

obstructed the articulation of their memories. Political persecution or social discrimination regarding their identity has taught them to be careful about articulating their nostalgia. That many of them felt the need to hide their past laid down the base for their constant feeling of displacement, and consequent experiences of diaspora in their respective actual homelands. Sakai's Japanized Taiwanese and Tanaka's Taiwanized Japanese both long to reconnect with a past that is irretrievable. Yet at the same time, they realize that their past memories are complicated by their awkward involvement in the colonial framework, and that their nostalgia runs the risk of being presented as a desire for colonialism. Hence, some of Sakai's interviewees appear uncertain of their identity, while Tanaka's subjects keep their nostalgia in check by speaking of redemption towards war and colonialism, and the importance of keeping peace.

However, in spite of their similarities in historical background and wartime experiences, the trajectories of their nostalgic discourse move in opposing directions. Tanaka Mika recounted in a talk that when she met with the Japanese elders, they wanted her to sing Taiwan's National Anthem, or *Yu Yeh Hua* (雨夜花, Flower in a Rainy Night). Contrarily, when she met with Taiwanese elders, they wanted to sing *Kimigayo* (君が代, National Anthem of Japan) or Japanese military songs. Shots taken of the interviewees in front of their bookshelves interestingly reveal that they have been continuously studying each other since they parted ways: the Taiwanese man's bookshelf was full of references on the Japanese language, and his Japanese counterpart stocked his shelf with books on Taiwanese culture and history. Where Taiwan's "Japanese language generation" reveres the virtues of "Japanese spirit," Japan's *wansei* conversely heed the "Taiwanese spirit" as his moral guideline.<sup>15</sup> In a way, each side has been seeking to maintain certain levels of understanding and connection to the other. If



Sakai's and Tanaka's subjects could meet, which songs would they sing? What dialogue would unfold between these two groups of people? It is my wish that they can regale in certain jovial moments during their reunion. But I also wish, after exchanging social pleasantries, they could delve into their old relationship as a colonized and a colonizer, and engage in a dialectics of loss and identities.

*Taiwan Jinsei's* Hsiao Chin-wen's 蕭錦文 accusation of having been "deserted" by the Japanese empire would make for an important thread for such fantastical dialogue. Hsiao acknowledges that "different blood running in our veins" fundamentally sets him apart from other "real" Japanese, but his belief in the Japanese Empire, which was coercively produced by Japan's indoctrination, bears no difference from them. His determination to "protect the nation" was betrayed when the defeated Japan revealed that they were not Japanese. In Judith Butler's view of war, the affected population is divided into two camps, one that is grievable, the other constituted of lives that "cannot be mourned because it has never lived, that is, it has never counted as life at all."<sup>16</sup> Therefore, excluded from the empire's frame of "grievability," the Japanized Taiwanese's loss went unacknowledged and uncompensated. Furthermore, to add insult to injury, a new nationalist government that held antagonist views against Japan, as well as a younger, Chinese-ized generation who were uninterested in their loss, exacerbated their notion of being left behind. For them, what could the *wanseis'* own tales of being marginalized and discriminated against because of their presumed "Taiwanese" offer? Would they feel a strange sense of condolence that the "real Japanese" they competed with had also been scorned? Or would they see their constant revisiting of the island as an (unofficial) Japanese effort of saying they are not deserted?

Either way, Sakai's and Tanaka's quests to understand the generation with a complicated past highlight the precariousness of existence under a rule that requested its subjects to surrender their subjectivity. Their works provide a means of articulation for the elders as well as actively preserving and remembering these memories. In his observation of postcolonial Taiwan, historian Andrew D. Morris contends that the "explicit recognition of the importance of the colonial era provides an important political context for Taiwanese people's notions of exactly how 'Chinese' they are."<sup>17</sup> I agree with Morris that colonial memories of "Japan" in Taiwan were used to separate itself from the Chineseness imposed on them by a Chinese nationalist government, and that memories of "Japan" are indeed instrumental in organizing and shaping what constitutes "Taiwaneseness." However, I contend that there is more to the constant revocation of memories. It enables the coming to terms with a history of loss, the repatriation of the formerly ungrievable into the realm of the grievable. Dom DeLillo wrote in his novel *Underworld* that "longing on a large scale is what makes history." The two female directors' efforts of documenting the longings of the two groups of colonial subjects have supplemented an integral component of Taiwanese (Japanese) history.

In April 2015, Taiwan's Ministry of Culture announced *Wansei Back Home* the winner of the nonfiction category in its annual Golden Tripod Award 金鼎獎. Later in September, the National Academy for Educational Research 國家教育研究院 announced its decision to include the *wanseis'* connection with Taiwan in supplementary material of history textbooks.<sup>18</sup> Three weeks after its release on October 16th, 2015, the film's production crew announced its success as the 7th best film of the year for its blockbuster performance, a rarity for documentary films. However, Sakai's

production has not received as much fanfare. Although this is probably a result of different marketing strategies, the vitriolic attacks on President Lee Teng-hui's memories and experience of fighting for Japan during the war in August of the same year still manifest the challenges of coming to terms with a Taiwanese's nostalgic discourse.<sup>19</sup> As the Taiwanese society embraces the *wanseys*' "homecoming" (see Figure 5.6) as part of its collective memory, it is important to see that the same sentiment is extended to the Japanized Taiwanese's memories to ensure that they, too, can be at home.

## Epilogue

### Becoming Taiwanese

As a first grader in 1983, I learned at school in Taiwan that Chiang Kai-shek was the national savior who fended the clutches of Chinese communism and Japanese colonialism off of the island. Portraits of the late president Chiang adorned the walls of each classroom, and pupils were obliged to pay tribute by bowing their heads to the portrait at certain times in school. For my generation, the *Japanese Devil* was deemed the enemy by Taiwan's postwar history education. We learned of its atrocious crimes against the comfort women and the Rape of Nanking, and its aggression in building the Japanocentric Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, which failed simply because justice prevailed. Colonial rule under the Japanese was a dismal period of time for all Taiwanese, until Chiang Kai-shek came and liberated "us" all. At private home, however, "Japan" was more amicable. My grandmother occasionally hummed old Japanese tunes, and appreciated the craftsmanship of Japanese-made products, saying, "The Japanese make fine things." She also said, "their work ethics is really something." Another elderly relative would reminisce his boyhood and speak of his Japanese teacher who was good and kind. The paradoxical views of the imagined "Japan" existed in strange harmony for me. Though the discrepancy between the two images, public and private, subtly suggested disconcertion, it was not until much later in adulthood that I started wondering.

This experience is not privy to me alone. In 2011, Li-chin Lin (1973- ), illustrator and Taiwanese expatriate in France published *Formose*, an autobiographical graphic novel (*roman graphique*) about her experience growing up in Taiwan under the martial law (1949-1987) and her subsequent search for a "Taiwanese" identity.<sup>1</sup> First published

in France, it won the Students' Choice Literary Prize abroad before winning a nomination in Taiwan's own Golden Comic Award (2013). Episodes of her book explore the politics of the "Chinese" identity being built on debasing native culture and language, and her discovery of a Taiwanese identity that had been previously concealed. Her grandparents, like mine, would occasionally sing Japanese songs. Her response, however, was more dramatic. She would slam her door to shut it out, while belting out "fight the Japs! Resist the Communists! Destroy the traitors 漢奸!" at the top of her lung to purge her space of any Japanese-ness (see Figure 6.1). Much like the young daughter portrayed in Wu Nien-jen's *A Borrowed Life* (1994), she developed a sense of hierarchy between the Chinese and the more vernacular Taiwanese, and felt that she needed to override the "wrong" accents and identities that her grandparents possessed. Her graphic novel, as she says, is a form of "penitence from a former high school student," for having sided with the then mainstream politics and having held her family's Taiwanese roots in contempt.<sup>2</sup>

Interestingly, though her grandmother's use of the Japanese language is essentially a result of foreign imposition from the colonial days, Lin regards it as part of her family's private legacy. To Lin, "Japan's" presence does not represent colonial oppression, but rather, stands as a potent symbol of KMT's role in creating a generational divide within a familial context. Indeed, for the postcolonial generation, "colonial Japan" poses as an integral participant in constructing a Taiwanese identity that distinguishes the Taiwanese from KMT's version of "Chinese." However, over the course of my research, I have come to find that the grappling with colonial memory, as well as the mapping and creating of a postmemory is not targeting KMT or China proper as yet another Other or imagined enemy. Rather, the acts of revisiting the past

can be considered as an attempt, on the part of the second or third generation of the colonized subjects, to redress what had been previously framed and affixed as inferior and shameful. It can further be considered as an act of resistance against an official dictation of what was to be remembered and forgotten and on a more emotional note—as displayed in the writer Lin Li-chin's penitent confession—an endeavor to redeem one's past role as an accomplice in nullifying the previous generation's identity.

Throughout this dissertation, I have examined Taiwan's lingering gaze towards its ex colonizer Japan, and the postcolonial generation's reinventing and rewriting of this memory of Japan, previously hindered by a politically motivated act of manipulation or eradication. By looking at radically incongruous narratives, such as comfort women testimonials, the quasi-honorific turned defaming epithet "koumin" label, former President Lee Teng-hui's "Japanese spirit," and documentaries about Japanized Taiwanese and Taiwanized Japanese, I juxtaposed discourses that were previously fixed as separate historical issues and tried to tease out the interconnectedness of their memories. With the exception of Chapter Two in which I closely read Chou Chin-po's 周金波 1941 short story, "The Volunteer" 志願兵, and compared its similarities with Lee Teng-hui's postcolonial self-analysis as a former imperial subject, the texts I selected are cinematic presentations that share the same core theme: Taiwanese people under the colonial rule. Unlike words in historical texts, their images and soundbites communicate the subjects' experiences more viscerally and directly (albeit still mediated by the screenwriter and the silver screen) to the viewers, and can be considered as a more physical reenactment of memory. Furthermore, marketing strategies that allow the post-screen sessions with the makers of the film not only boost the films' box office performance, but offer an opportunity to clarify and intensify the

filmic experience. In turn, the heightened visibility of the films contributes to an effective imprinting of newly invented memory in Taiwan's collective consciousness.

Marianne Hirsch proposes that postmemory—the memories of the “generation after,” distanced from the actual historical circumstances of memory—is nevertheless connected to its source via an “imaginative investment and creation.” The once-marginalized memories are now immortalized through the artistic rendition and mass (re-)production of images. Departing from the traditional nationalistic framework, the recent creations of the past evoke a plethora of emotions—empathy, nostalgia, sympathy, and even a nativist sense of pride—that greatly vary from mere disdain or hate for colonial Japan. My discussion of these texts centered on a recurring theme that writing from the margins is significant in toppling the myths of historical certitude. Throughout this dissertation, I deliberately refrained from taking the historian stance of examining the accuracy of the presented facts, or upholding the “correctness” of a self-determined Taiwanese ideology. Instead, I highlighted the element of memory, and more importantly, the postcolonial generation's “imaginative investment and creation” as a process rife with political and emotional intentions to uncover “other sides” of the story.

In Chapter One, based on my study of the two makings of Taiwanese comfort women documentary, I argued that in order to garner nation-wide support for the redress movement, the trauma narrative needs to remove the highly politicized issue from accusatory, nationalistic framework that targets Japan as the enemy of the state. As previous studies suggested (Wu 2009, Shogo 2011), the comfort women campaign in Taiwan tends to be outweighed by the island's identity politics. The studies contend that the comfort women's redress movement is overshadowed by the attention drawn to the historical trauma inflicted by the Nationalist Chinese regime, and Taiwan's inclination towards a benignant interpretation of Japanese colonial rule. In other words, the comfort

women issue seems to be deliberately overlooked to give way to constructing a Taiwanese identity distinct from KMT's China, or China proper.

I argued, however, that the “overshadowing” occurs only when the women’s stories are incorporated as part of a nationalist narrative, which somehow categorizes their loss as part of Chinese damages in the Chinese War of Resistance against the Japanese (1931-1937). Indeed, according to psychoanalyst and ethnographer Peng Jen-yu, the Taiwanese public does tend to link TWRF and its redress campaign with the KMT party’s political stance, a stance which mainly holds memories tinged with colonial nostalgic in contempt. *Song of the Reed*, the more recent documentary’s shift in focusing on the women’s individual subjectivity and healing process is instrumental in reclaiming their narratives from a nationalistic discourse, by highlighting the women’s therapy sessions, their own positive memories of “Japan,” as well as sympathetic Japanese supporters. The film does not exonerate Japan for the wartime violence against the female subaltern, but by moving the women’s plights away from an anti-Japan/Pro-China context, it is able to accommodate symbiosis between the women’s trauma memories and their contemporary’s diverging remembrance of colonial Japan. The arguments surrounding the conscription process of the women—specifically, whether coercion was involved, or whether the women were innocent/untainted—demonstrate the limitation of each memory, and indicate that the full picture of history is constituted by memories of either side. Even without portraying the Japanese military as perverse kidnapers of innocent victims, the torment that the women experienced in the “comfort stations” should still be deemed valid and grievable. Memories of trauma, and memories of those who believed that the Imperial Army abided by a somewhat “legitimate” recruitment process should not be considered as mutually exclusive. Instead, they reflect a partial understanding of what had happened.



My investigation of the modernized, societal use of *koumin* (皇民, recognized subjects of the emperor) in Chapter Two was geared towards the rapport of heterogeneous identities and memories. The term emerged from the historical background of the *kouminka* campaign 皇民化運動 during the peak of World War II. It was an intensified version of assimilation policy of “becoming Japanese,” implemented to ensure Taiwanese loyalty for the Japanese empire. According to Leo Ching’s definition, it is an internalization of subjective strife to find equilibrium between Taiwanese and Japanese identities which “represented the ways in which the onus of becoming Japanese had shifted from the colonial state to the colonial subjects.”<sup>3</sup> Ching observes the *kouminka* movement until the end of Japanese colonialism after WWII. However, in today’s Taiwan, the once “honorific” term is very much alive, and is used to deride the former colonial subjects who had then collaborated with the *kouminka* policy. The epithet further expresses disdain for anyone who articulates a colonial nostalgia, or an admiration for Japanese culture. Tracking the trajectory of the term’s mutating meaning, I contended that it reflects part of the Taiwanese society’s incapacity to accept its colonial history. I used the writings of Chou Chin-po (1920-1996) and former President Lee Teng-hui (1923- ) as exemplar texts of colonial *koumin* and postcolonial “*koumin*” respectively to examine what it meant then to become a “Japanese,” and what it signifies today to be a former “Japanese.”

A handful of Japanese scholars have tried to redress Chou Chin-po, who was stigmatized as a betrayal to his (Chinese/Taiwanese) subjectivity in the 70s and 80s. They state that Chou’s literary works express an aspiration to improve his environs and a deep connection with the land 鄉土 (Hoshina 1994, Tarumi 1994, Nakajima 2002). Through a close reading of his contended short story, “The Volunteer,” which had been

stigmatized after the war as a form of betrayal to his (Chinese Taiwanese) roots, I suggested that Chou was deeply concerned with what methods would suffice in order to become Japanese. Specifically, I argued that “The Volunteer” is an important text precisely because it offers a glimpse of the pragmatism of a colonial subject responding to his political situation. Chou’s conclusion of intellectuals losing the bid to become a complete *Koumin* to a gung ho character who does not question, in fact, raises suspicion of an intellectual’s anxiety, or incredulity of being fully recognized.

Lee Teng-hui, however, equipped with the 20/20 post-war hindsight that Chou’s anxious characters did not have, is known to have unequivocally reiterated how his Japanese education benefitted and shaped his character. He is known to have proclaimed that “before the age of 22, [he] was a Japanese.” Not surprisingly, for this he has been attacked by those who hold Sinocentric history views, depreciating him with the epithet of *koumin*. Like Chou’s stubborn silence after the war, Lee seems adamant in offering no self-justification for his “offense.” Yet unlike the silenced Chou, he repeatedly articulates his colonial past, thereby repeatedly upsetting his opponents. I see his repeated trespassing of the “etiquettes” boundary as a former Republic of China President as a subversive attempt to break the nationalist loyalist/traitor dichotomy, all the while invoking others of his generation to remember *their* colonial memories. His constant mention of Bushido, the aesthetics of the warrior’s way, to both Japanese and Taiwanese audience (but to Japan in most occasions), is yet another attempt to foreground his memory as something of value. Furthermore, combined with his advocacy for a Taiwanese subjectivity, the constant allusions to the past and to Japanese experience serve to illustrate the possibility of reinventing the thus far unsettled Taiwanese identity. For Lee and his generation, the colonial nostalgia does not pose

merely as a form of indulgence in the times that are lost, but a means to preserve an integral part of themselves as something of significance.

In Chapter Three, I examined the ways in which director/screenwriter Wei Tesheng's three cinematic texts (*Cape No. 7* 2008, *Seediq Bale* 2011, *Kano* 2014) offer new images of "Japan" that became sites of contestation and memory invocation. In his making of *Seediq Bale*, a film based on the actual events of the Wushe Incident, a 1930 violent clash between the aboriginal tribes and the Japanese colonizers resulting in the near total annihilation of some of the tribes, Wei gave the characters each a *li-chang* 立場, a standpoint from which they perceive what is happening to them, in order to make sense of the characters' (including "bad" Japanese) decisions, and gauge how the incident unfolded the way it did. The creation of the characters' standpoints, though adapted from history, was essentially Wei's own artistic rendering and "imaginative investment." The remaking and re-presentation of the trauma suggest that the memories are open sites that viewers can weigh in to fill in the gaps, and generate more meanings. Previous analyses of Wei's films (Wang 2012, Tseng 2014, Huang 2015) linked them with the (im)possibilities of construction of Taiwanese subjectivity through the vernacular. Other scholars highlighted the discrepancies between Wei's artistic presentation and historical facts (Lin 2011, Chiu 2011). While I agreed that the underpinning of the films correlates with the shaping of Taiwanese identity, I argued that other than approaching this objective through the vernacular particularity of Taiwan, Wei's presentation of an imagined "Japan" greatly reflects the said identity's essentialist anxiety and its liminal state constantly in the process of becoming.

Since the 2008 production of *Cape No. 7*, Wei's "Japan" has often been criticized for being over-romanticized and sentimentalized.<sup>4</sup> The contestation carried over into the

2014 production of *KANO*. With its idyllic portrayal of a burgeoning Taiwanese town excitedly enveloped by the modern conveniences of train rides, radio broadcasts, and the modernized irrigation as an “unconditional embrace of modernity,” Wei was again berated for turning a blind eye to the fact that modernity emerged from the exploitive nature of colonialism.<sup>5</sup> It has been reiterated that colonialism should not be as peachy as Wei has depicted.<sup>6</sup> However, I argued from the perspective of Marianne Hirsch’s postmemory that, though a product of imagination, projection and creation, Wei’s “Japan” is nevertheless a valid form of memory. Hirsch describes this “powerful and very particular “ memory as indirect and fragmented, and “shot through with holes.” But as she claims, postmemory affirms “the pasts’ existence and, in their flat two-dimensionality, they signal its unbridgeable distance.”<sup>7</sup> When we see Wei’s films as a second, or third generation’s representation of postmemories, the question of their incongruity with certain “facts” (namely, other threads of remembrance) is invalidated. What we really should be asking is, *why* does Wei present colonialism in such mannerism? Wei had once described his emotional encounter with the obscure history of Kano thus: “it was as if, at the age of 40, I was just beginning to find out about my family background.”<sup>8</sup> In this impassioned vein, I suggested his practice of postmemory could be considered a subversive act to invoke memories that were politically suppressed after the war, and an endeavor to reconnect with the memories that had been obfuscated through a discontinuation of knowledge of events.

From the prematurely terminated romance between a Japanese teacher and his Taiwanese student in *Cape No. 7*, to a coup d’etat against the Japanese colonizers that resulted in near annihilation of tribal lineage in *Seediq Bale*, to the anti-climactic “almost champion but not quite” feats of a local baseball team in *KANO*, the characters of the three films share a common theme of failing in various epic, glorified ways.

However, they all have, in their strife, earned some kind of validation such as “true love,” “true man,” or “true sportsmen.” Though the films maintain an invigorated, bolstered rhythm, their strife “to be” (as opposed to the perpetual state of “becoming”) and subsequent failure inevitably speak to Taiwan’s actual frustrations with its fluid, unsettled (non-) national status. Like the nature of postmemory, Wei’s “Taiwan identity” is highly mobile, transposable, and in the process of becoming. I read all Wei’s stories as a conveyer of a sense of cultural liminality: that before reaching the other end, one’s existence is indeterminable and therefore unsettled.

Lastly, in Chapter Four, I continued the examination of the “generation after’s” recovering and orchestration of memory through an analysis of films. However, these films significantly depart from those I examined in previous chapters in that they were produced by Japanese female directors, Sakai Atsuko and Tanaka Mika (who is half-Taiwanese). I read their documentaries on Japanized Taiwanese (Sakai) and Taiwanized Japanese (Tanaka) as the agents of the absent Japanese counterpart in Taiwan’s postcolonial discourse.

Sakai’s project targets the Japanese audience to shed light on postcolonial Taiwan after Japan left the island. To her own surprise, she found that instead of bitterness and vitriol directed at Japan, former subjects adhere to the values they acquired during the Japanese period, and their discontent stems from having been “left behind” by their former colonizer. As the people who had to “leave behind” their home after the war, the yearning of Tanaka’s subjects move in the diametrically opposite direction: as Taiwan-born Japanese, their post-war displacement generates a diasporic homesickness for Taiwan. Many of them expressed an internalized foreignness that made their rehabilitation to the Japanese society difficult. The two demographic groups, each suffering a particular brand of diaspora in their respective homelands, are ironically

products of the same historical and spatial context. As the certified Taiwanese feels himself to be Japanese, and the bona fide Japanese proclaims to be Taiwanese, neither feels completely at home with their prescribed identity. Where Taiwan's "Japanese language generation" reveres the virtues of "Japanese spirit," Japan's *wansei* conversely heeds the "Taiwanese spirit" as his moral guideline. More importantly, scrutinized under the colonial framework, both groups, colonized and colonizer, faced exploitation by the state and were equally stripped of subjectivity in the face of a much grander historical narrative. Sakai's delineation of the Japanized Taiwanese as "people who have been teased and tossed about by the undulating tides of the times" also befittingly describes Tanaka's Taiwanized Japanese.

The "generation after" in Taiwan and Japan share many similarities. The Japanese second or third generation, like those in Taiwan, after the war learn little about the colonial past in formal schooling. Furthermore, akin to the Taiwanese youth who stumble into colonial nostalgia and the past, both Sakai and Tanaka unexpectedly waded into their projects, having happened upon their research objects through emotionally high-strung initiation. Their presentation of postmemory is therefore, like all concealed knowledge of events that is dispersed via intimacy, personal and brimming with emotions.

A cross examination between different groups of elders from the Japanized era presents to us conflicting, multiple notions of identities. Take, for example, the comfort women and Kao Chu-hua, a tribal princess from an elite Japanized aboriginal family, who were born around the same time. When comfort women returned to Taiwan from sexual slavery at the end of the war, Kao's and her father's torment was about to commence. As women, they had their bodies used as small, frail bargaining chip to negotiate one's position in the empire, their lives all too easily affected by a simple flick

of fate. Their memories of “Japan,” naturally, impose on the national psyche dispersed versions of self-definitions, self-negations and fractured outcomes. Due to Taiwan’s horrific history of politically maneuvered memories, there is a general anxiety that official history may devour memories, resulting in the defacement of certain “truths.” Because of this contested relationship between authorized history and dispersed discourses of the past, re-presentations of past memories should not be simplified to a faltering artistic rendition, but reified as a political action in itself to draw attention to deliberately obscured versions of the past. The texts that I selected for this study, I believe, are all earnest attempts to capture the memories before they fade into the background. My focus lay not on the factual accuracy of a recollection, but rather on how “historical actors constructed their memories in a particular way at a particular time.”<sup>9</sup>

When the end of martial law lifted in 1987, among many restrictions, the ban on the “Japanese” presence in Taiwan, the island experienced a considerable political and cultural earthquake. The influx of Japanese substances came in the forms of the old and the new: the old being the “boom” of nostalgia and chronicling of memories of colonial Japan, the new being the allure of commodities much sought after by the mass known as Japanophiles. While the latter seems to be newly introduced to the locals, bearing no weight of the past and hence easy to embrace, the aforementioned memories bear deep, entangled roots in Taiwan. Forty years of being silenced did not guarantee the expunging of these memories. Instead, the memories reemerge behind layers of political curtains, albeit as something both familiar and distorted, reverent yet disoriented.

In a lecture at Berkeley in 2000, Polish American writer and descendent of Holocaust survivor Eva Hoffman remarked how people who lived in Eastern Europe after WWII often relied on memory as the “only guarantee of a truthful history.”<sup>10</sup> The

official writing of history had concealed fundamental facts, or simply provided blatant lies, hence “the passionate defense of local knowledge and of fidelity to the past.” Though I cannot compare Taiwan’s political circumstances with Hoffman’s Eastern Europe, I, too, observe a distrust in institutionalized history writing and a thirst to revisit concealed or distorted memories in Taiwan. However, when Hoffman discussed historical trauma that defines moments in history that affirms “group identity” and its “moral status,” such as the Nanking massacre for the Chinese, and the great famine for the Irish American, I see this is where Taiwan appears to be an anomaly in the cultural memory discussions. Unlike memories of the Holocaust or Nanking massacre, which are definitive paradigms that people speak of in a unified, consolidated narrative, Taiwanese societal memory of “Japan” has experienced dissipation and alteration as soon as the nationalist Chinese regime took over. For instance, while Taiwan fought the war on Japan’s side as its colony, the Taiwanese were later indoctrinated that they, alongside the Chinese, fought against it. This rupture in memory guarantees that the research and reshaping of memories would be discursive and layered by various editions of palimpsests. However, perhaps due to the emotional inheritance that so many of the aforementioned writers and film directors have illustrated, including Director Wu Nien-jen and comic writer Lin Li-chin, the “generation after” choose to redeem an obscured familial and communal memory, or in Hoffman’s words, practices of “avowal.” The term, contrary to Freud’s “disavowal,” which signifies a refusal to acknowledge disturbing things or notions that lie in plain sight, means to avow ourselves “to be faithful” to a past even which we have not participated in, in order to safeguard the memory. This avowed faithfulness of not questioning the memories does run the risk of romanticizing and sentimentalizing the past, where it should not be romanticized or sentimentalized. However, even with such a risk, for the second or third



generation of the colonized Taiwanese, it is crucial that the past and memory which constitute present-day Taiwan is acknowledged, deemed “something of value,” as well as vigorously revisited, and laboriously reexamined. What we may derive from the colonial legacy, as we comb through its knots of brambles, is an understanding that (post)memory could enrich the historical tapestry of Taiwan, as well as provide healing for those whose identities are split or wounded.

## Endnotes

### Introduction:

<sup>1</sup> See 「NHK 殖民台灣史節目惹爭議，日多人將提告」 [NHK Colonial Taiwan history program sparks controversy, many in Japan threaten lawsuit], Epoch Times, accessed May 19, 2016, <http://www.epochtimes.com/b5/9/6/24/n2568477.htm>.

<sup>2</sup> See 周婉窈 [Chou, Wan-yao], 臺灣歷史圖說 [*A New Illustrated History of Taiwan*] (Taipei: Linking Books, 2009), 274.

<sup>3</sup> In October 1945, the Allied Forces ceded Taiwan to the KMT-administered Republic of China, an idea which the Taiwanese people initially warmed up to in the hope of gaining national autonomy with a government who shares the same (imagined) ethnicity. However, the people grew disillusioned with the party's oppressive discriminatory policies against them, in addition to its political corruption and devastating economic blunders. On February 27th, 1947, an argument between a cigarette vendor and a police sparked an uprising, which quickly escalated to bloody government clamp down on civilians known as the 228 Massacre, resulting in the death of estimated 10,000 to 30,000 people. The incident further instigated the commencement of KMT's White Terror period (1947- 1987), during which many were imprisoned, executed, or had simply disappeared without explanation. Most of the people who were prosecuted were charged with espionage or treason. For detailed accounts of this national trauma, which had been tabooed in Taiwan until the lift of martial law in 1987, please refer to 《台灣戰後史資料選— 二二八事件專輯》/ Postwar Taiwan Information— Special Collection on the 228 Incident, edited by Chen, Fang-

ming. Chou, Wan-Yao's *A New Illustrated History of Taiwan* (2009) According to historian Cheng Ya-ru, it can be deduced that the Taiwanese nostalgia for Japanese rule developed after having experienced KMT ruling. See Cheng's essay 『消失的「多桑」—戰後台灣歷史記憶的斷裂，掩蓋與重塑』 [The disappearing “tousans”— The interruption, hiding, and reconstruction of Postwar Taiwanese History], *Kám-Á-Tiàm Forum of History: Perspective from Taiwan* (August 8, 2014), accessed July 31, 2016, <http://kam-a-tiam.typepad.com/blog/2014/08/消失的多桑.html>.

<sup>4</sup> Wang Jing-wei 汪精衛 (1883- 1944), was a member of KMT and had engaged in a political dissension with Chiang Kai-shek but lost. During the Japan-Sino war in 1937 he accepted Japan's invitation to form a collaborative government, with him spearheading the organization. This has stigmatized him as a turncoat to the Chinese in nationalist narratives.

<sup>5</sup> In her investigation on descendants of Holocaust survivors and their second hand “memories” of the trauma, Marianne Hirsch assigns this particular form of memory as “distinguished from memory by generational distance and from history by deep personal connection.” See Marianne Hirsch, *Family Frames: Photography, Narratives, and Postmemory*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 22.

<sup>6</sup> Many in memory studies support how the present affects perceptions of the past. As the first scholar to coin the term “collective memory,” which laid the foundation for studies of society remembrances, Maurice Halbwachs suggested that all personal memories are constructed in relation to social structures or institutions, and can only be

interpreted within the frameworks of a group context. He approached the understanding of collective memory through “instrumental presentism,” underlining how present needs shape past memories. Pierre Nora later expanded Halbwachs’ presentism by shifting focus to the manipulation of remembering and forgetting by those in power to construct a collective memory, or form a “tradition” that would help bolster said power, or emerging nation-states. See Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992) and Pierre Nora, “The Era of Commemorations,” in *Realms of Memory: the Construction of the French Past, Vol. III,* ed. Lawrence Kritzman, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New York: University of Columbia Press, 1996), 609-638. Like Halbwachs and Nora, Marianne Hirsch affirms memories’ divorce from the past, but places her emphasis on the generation who have not directly experienced the events.

<sup>7</sup> See Hirsch, 22

<sup>8</sup> Chu, Huei-chu, *The Transplantation and Translation of “Modern”: Postcolonial Thinking in Colonial Literature from Taiwan* (Taipei: Rye Field Publications, 2009), 9.

<sup>9</sup> Despite the postwar KMT-created national discourse that Taiwan and their China share the same blood lineage, many, including former President Lee Ten-huei and scholars see its administration a “foreign” polity and re-colonialism. as See Wang Horng-luen (2012), Huang Chih-huei (2015).

<sup>10</sup> Taiwan's geopolitical status as “base for expansion into the south” (Nanshin kichi, 「南進基地」) during Japanese occupation transformed to “base for restoration of China (from the communists)” (fushin jidi 「復興基地」) under KMT rule.

<sup>11</sup> 陳布雷 [Chen, Bu-lei] et al., 蔣介石先生年表 [Biography of Chiang Kai-shek] (Taipei: Biographical Literature Publishing, 1978), 134.

<sup>12</sup> See Leo Ching, “Colonial Nostalgia or Postcolonial Anxiety: The Dōsan Generation in Between ‘Restoration’ and ‘Defeat’,” in *Sino-Japanese Transculturation: From the Late Nineteenth Century to the End of the Pacific War*, ed. Richard King et al. (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2012), 221.

<sup>13</sup> Leo Ching raised the question about the intimate relationship shared between modern day Taiwan and Japan, suggesting it is an act of non-decolonization, or decolonization in reverse, that retroactively builds a discourse of intimacy between Taiwan and Japan.

<sup>14</sup> Wu 2009, Shogo 2011.

<sup>15</sup> See 葉石濤 [Yeh Shi-tao], 台灣文學史綱 [History of Taiwanese Literature], Kao Hsiung: Chun Huei Publishing, 1987.

<sup>16</sup> See note 14.

<sup>17</sup> See Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire,” *Representations No. 26, Special Issue: Memory and Counter-Memory* (1989): 8.

<sup>18</sup> The term “liminality” refers to the constant state of limbo, of the transitional, neither-nor phase of “becoming” in the Taiwanese’s colonial experience of “becoming Japanese.” I borrowed this term from Victor Turner, who formulated the concept of liminality in 1967 to delineate a state between states, a state of being “betwixt and between.” Based on his anthropological research on the rites of passages of Ndembu Tribe of Zambia, Turner foregrounds the ambiguous stage during which the liminal individual has detached from the society they were previously a part of, and has not yet been successfully incorporated back into the fold after his/ her change, as observed in rituals like coming-of-age and marriage. See Victor Turner, *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure* (New Brunswick: Aldine Transaction, 1995).

<sup>19</sup> See 陳宜中 [Chen, Yi-chung], 『「海角七號」的台日苦戀』 [The tragic love story between Taiwan and Japan in *Cape No. 7*], *China Times Newspaper*, October 9, 2008.

<sup>20</sup> See 許介麟 [Hsu, Chieh-lin], 『「海角七號」：殖民地次文化陰影』 [*Cape No. 7: the residue of colonial subculture*], *United Daily News*, September 25, 2008.

<sup>21</sup> See Nora, “Between Memory and History,” 7.

## Chapter 1:

<sup>1</sup> October 12<sup>th</sup>, 2013, Chin-chin Cinema (親親戲院), Taichung, Taiwan.

<sup>2</sup> For examples, see 『台湾人の老婦が日本人に「みなさん日本精神わかる？」』 / Elderly Taiwanese lady asks Japanese people: “do you know the Japanese spirit?”, Youtube, accessed November 2014, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vyaPdoTRSUY>. This brief video clip documents a group of young Japanese’s encounter with an amiable Taiwanese elder lady during their visit in Taiwan. To their astonishment, she spoke fluent Japanese and claims herself to be a “Japanese.” She summed up her conversation with them by wishing them well, and asks them to “take care of the Japan that is so important to me.” In my opinion, this has transcended becoming “Japanese” in Leo Ching’s words. This former Japanese not only considers herself a true Japanese, but her gesture of trusting “her Japan” to the young people signifies that they are inheriting “Japan” from her.

<sup>3</sup> According to Taiwan’s Civil Code 民法 Article 979, the injured party in a broken marriage engagement (broken off by his/ her betrothed) may claim an equitable compensation in money or a non-pecuniary loss, provided he/ she is not at fault. This is possibly what Lu Man-mei refers to as “hush money” in her interview. Given the code of ethics observed in the traditional societies of Taiwan, which underscored a woman’s wifely virtues in the promoted ideal of marrying no more than only one husband, the monetary compensation would serve to atone the “jilted” woman’s “loss” of virtue and her consequently depreciated value.

<sup>4</sup> In Lu Man-mei's case, she returned home pregnant but the baby died shortly after being born. She relocated to another town to escape gossip and married a man who did not know her history. When he caught wind of her past, their marriage and family life fell apart. See 朱德蘭 [Chu Te-lan], 台灣慰安婦 [Taiwan comfort women] (Taipei: Wunan publishing company, 2009), 428.

<sup>5</sup> An avid supporter for the comfort women cause, writer Li Ao 李敖 observed in 1997 that due to the reluctance of the victims to reveal their faces, for the Taiwanese public the comfort women is still an abstract issue because they cannot connect the term to a real person. Furthermore, many confuse the women with prostitutes. See 汪睿祥 [Wang Ruy-hsiang Wang]. 「李敖義助慰安婦的幕後 用古董字畫拒絕日本人的二度傷害」 [Behind the scenes of Li Ao's support for comfort women, rejecting second degree injury from Japan with antiques and paintings], 商業週刊 [Business Weekly], Issue 509: August 25, 1997.

<sup>6</sup> Director Wu Hsiu-ching talks about her faith and the making of the documentary in an interview with Good News TV. 「傷癒的光影」 [light and shadow of wounds and healing], accessed June 21, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r2q87ndBiU0>.

<sup>7</sup> On July 4<sup>th</sup>, 1999, nine Taiwanese comfort women filed a suit with the Tokyo District Court seeking compensation of \$84,000 (10 million yen) each and an official apology from the national government stating that the acts were executed “under the directions of the Japanese government at that time.” This suit was denied in 2002, and a further



appeal was made to the Tokoy High Court, and then to Supreme Court when that was also rejected. The final appeal that ended the women's legal options in Japan was rejected in 2009 by the Supreme Court. "Comfort Women Japan: Taiwanese Comfort Women," The George Washington University, accessed June 21, 2016, [http://www.gwu.edu/~memory/data/judicial/comfortwomen\\_japan/Taiwanese.html](http://www.gwu.edu/~memory/data/judicial/comfortwomen_japan/Taiwanese.html)

<sup>8</sup> Peng observes how the impression of Taiwanese comfort women issue being associated with Pan-Blue (Blue refers to KMT and its alliances) political inclination. Various political figures that received high media exposure for their work with comfort women include the forerunner of TWRP, Wang Ching-feng 王清峰 served the Lee Deng-hui's KMT as a Control Yuan member; Li Ao 李敖, a famous Chinese-born writer, auctioned off his art collection to support their cause; Ma Ying-jeou took part in the making of an advertisement to promote awareness for the Comfort Women issue in 1997. Many of the comfort women themselves took an inclination towards the KMT as a result. 彭仁郁 [Peng Jenyu], 「過不去的過去：慰安婦的戰爭創傷」 [The past cannot pass: war trauma of comfort women], in 戰爭與社會：理論，歷史，主體經驗 [war and society: theory, history and subjective experience], ed. Wang Horng-luen (Taipei: Linking Publishing, 2014), 493.

<sup>9</sup> See Wu Tzu-hsuan, "Comfort Women: Representation, Redress, and the Politics of Engagement" (MA thesis, Ching Hua University, July 2009): 76.

<sup>10</sup> See Shogo Suzuki, "The Competition to Attain Justice for Past Wrongs: The 'Comfort Women' Issue in Taiwan," *Pacific Affairs*: Volume 84, No. 2 (June 2011), 24.

<sup>11</sup> See Nishino Rumiko and Kim Pu-ja. *Mirai he no kioku* [Memories to the future], Tokyo: Akashi shoten, 2006.

<sup>12</sup> The proposed changes to high school textbooks touts a sino-centric history view. Some of the dubious changes proposed by the curricular adjustment committee convener, Wang Hsiao-po, include “the tallest mountain of our nation is Mount Everest” (which borders Nepal and Tibet), instead of the island’s own Mount Jade.

<sup>13</sup> Key members of the curriculum guideline readjustment committee were integral contributors of organizations that promote controversial mainland policy or convictions. To name a few, committee convener Wang Hsiao-po 王曉波 presides over Alliance for Reunification of China 中國統一聯盟; Chang Ya-chung 張亞中, Ta-ning Hsieh 謝大寧 oversee the operation of Chinese Integration Association 兩岸統合學會; members of the screening council serve the KMT administration as cross-strait policy advisor and financial think tank. Also adding to the controversy is the committee’s lack of professional background in the studies of Taiwanese History. As many as 193 researchers and professors in said field petitioned against the Ministry of Education to revoke its adjustments to high school history curriculum and to respect academic professionalism.

<sup>14</sup> 「若林冠華看過蘆葦之歌」 [If only Lin Guan-hua had watched Song of the Reed], United Daily News, accessed June 25, 2016, <http://udn.com/news/story/7338/1142831-聯合%EF%BC%8F若林冠華看過蘆葦之歌>.

<sup>15</sup> 「黑白集主編，你真的看懂蘆葦之歌了嗎？」 [To the editor of Black and White Editorial, did you really understand *Song of the Reed?*], Civil Media, accessed June 26, 2016, <http://www.civilmedia.tw/archives/36040>.

<sup>16</sup> See footnote 5.

<sup>17</sup> See Peng Jenyu, 451.

<sup>18</sup> According to Kang Shu-hua, executive director of TWRP, investigation conducted by the foundation indicates that although several women had backgrounds working in male entertainment establishments, only one from the 58 surviving Taiwanese comfort women knew the true nature of her work before being sent to an overseas comfort station. See 「自願？被迫？慰安婦課綱爭議的討論盲點」 [Voluntary? Coerced? The blind spot in comfort women and curriculum guideline dispute], Civil Media, accessed June 21, 2016, <http://www.civilmedia.tw/archives/35415>.

<sup>19</sup> Ming-tsung Lee 李明聰's work cites the "emotional heritage" that the younger Taiwanese generation inherits from their Japanese-educated parents or grandparents. See 「親日的情感結構，與哈日的主體——一個跨世代認同政治的考察」 [Emotional structures of Pro-Japanese ideology and the subjectivity of Japanophilia: an examination of cross-generational identification politics], Taiwanese Sociological Society Annual Meeting and Seminar, 2004.

<sup>20</sup> A record of the workshop session, dated April 2nd- 3rd, 2003, can be found in “Ah-ma’s Paper Airplane.” 「當年愛的故事」 [Love stories long ago], Ah-ma’s Paper Airplane, accessed June 29, 2016, <http://ahmaspaperplane.wix.com/ah-ma#!untitled/cigd>

<sup>21</sup> See “Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono on the result of the study on the issue of ‘Comfort Women’”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, accessed June 30, 2016, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/women/fund/state9308.html>.

<sup>22</sup> See “Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama: On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of war’s end,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, accessed June 30, 2016, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/pm/murayama/9508.html>.

<sup>23</sup> For an state apology to be deemed official, Mindy Kotler of Asia Policy Point advises meeting one of the following criteria: “a statement made by a minister in a session of the Diet, a line in an official communique while on overseas visit, or to be definitive, a statement ratified by the Cabinet.” Quoted by Wu Tzu-hsuan, 17.

<sup>24</sup> Shogo Suzuki, 227.

<sup>25</sup> In their appeal to Tokyo district court in 1999, the amount of monetary compensation they asked for was NT\$ 3 million per person.

<sup>26</sup> See Yeh Te-lan’s detailed documentation, 34.

<sup>27</sup> See 「小林善紀：慰安婦出人頭地 非許文龍所言」 [Kobayashi Yoshinori: Shi Wen-long had not commented on comfort women as a means to succeed]. This interview was originally published in China Times on February 25, 2001. Accessed June 30, 2016, [http://forums.chinatimes.com/special/Taiwan\\_women/90022508.htm](http://forums.chinatimes.com/special/Taiwan_women/90022508.htm).

<sup>28</sup> The ban was lifted after the Ministry of the Interiors reconsidered how Taiwan's freedom of speech should apply to Kobayashi. See 「台禁小林善紀入境惹批評」 [Taiwan criticized for banning Kobayashi's entry], BBC Chinese, accessed June 30, 2016, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/chinese/trad/hi/newsid\\_1200000/newsid\\_1204000/1204076.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/chinese/trad/hi/newsid_1200000/newsid_1204000/1204076.stm).

<sup>29</sup> See Peng Jenyu, 492.

<sup>30</sup> See “Cartoon of Wartime ‘comfort women’ irks Taiwan,” New York Times, accessed Jun 30, 2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/02/world/cartoon-of-wartime-comfort-women-irks-taiwan.html>.

<sup>31</sup> See 「金美齡：沒時間，沒熱情替慰安婦求償」 [I don't have time nor passion to plead for Comfort Women], Epoch Times, accessed March 28, 2016, <http://www.epochtimes.com/b5/1/3/16/n58639.htm>.

<sup>32</sup> Lee discusses the difference between conviction and memory/ experiencing a happening in his defense of the “partial truth” of Shi Wen-long's memory. See 「忽然出現一堆台灣史學家？」 [ Suddenly there is a bunch of Taiwanese historians], World

United Formosans for Independence, accessed June 30, 2016, <http://www.wufi.org.tw/>  
忽然出現一堆台灣史專家 ?/.

<sup>33</sup> See “Japan’s Abe: No Proof of WWII Sex Slaves,” Washington Post, accessed June 30, 2016, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/01/AR2007030100578.html>.

<sup>34</sup> See “Japan anger at US sex slave bill,” BBC News, accessed June 30, 2016, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6374961.stm>.

<sup>35</sup> See “President Bush and Prime Minister Abe of Japan Participate in a Joint Press Availability,” The White House, accessed June 30, 2016, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/04/20070427-6.html>.

<sup>36</sup> See legislation in U.S. Congress. “H. Res. 121,” accessed June 30, 2016, <https://www.congress.gov/bill/110th-congress/house-resolution/121>.

<sup>37</sup> See 「立院決議：日應向慰安婦道歉」 [The Legislative Yuan decides: Japan should apologize to comfort women], Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China, accessed June 30, 2016, [http://www.ly.gov.tw/03\\_leg/0301\\_main/leg\\_news/newsView.action?id=45377&lgno=00105&stage=7](http://www.ly.gov.tw/03_leg/0301_main/leg_news/newsView.action?id=45377&lgno=00105&stage=7).

<sup>38</sup> Taipei Women’s Rescue Foundation. A-ma zhiyo Dianzibao No. 18/ Friends of A-ma Newsletter No. 18. November 12th 2008. Quoted by Wu Tzu-hsuan.

<sup>39</sup> See “Comfort Women: Japan and South Korea hail agreement,” BBC News, accessed June 30, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35190464>.

<sup>40</sup> “Taiwan Pandering to Japan Can Not Manage to Get Japan to Compensate its Comfort Women,” Global Research, accessed June 30, 2016, <https://researchglobal.wordpress.com/2015/12/30/台灣媚日爭不到日本賠償慰安婦/>.

<sup>41</sup> However, it is contended that, due to Japan’s establishing ties with People’s Republic of China in 1972, thereby breaking ties with Taiwan, Japan has forfeited the 1952 pact and negates Chiang Kai-shek administration’s waiver of compensation.

<sup>42</sup> See “Taiwan’s complex relationship with Japan affects recognition of ‘comfort women’,” Los Angeles Times, accessed June 29, 2016, <http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-taiwan-museum-20160330-story.html>.

<sup>43</sup> Please refer to “Taiwanese/ Chinese Identification Trend Distribution in Taiwan,” Election Study Center, N.C.C.U., accessed June 29, 2016, <http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/app/news.php?Sn=166>.

<sup>44</sup> 「阿嬤家：和平與女性人權館籌備處」 [Ah-ma’s Home: Peace and woman’s rights museum preparation center], Taipei Women’s Rescue Foundation, accessed January 30<sup>th</sup> 2015, <http://www.twrf.org.tw/p3-service.asp?Class1=aBTLaB36>.

**Chapter 2:**

<sup>1</sup> See 「兒選情告急 父口出惡言 連戰 罵柯文哲混蛋」 [Son's desperate election campaign led father to spew mean words. Lien Chan called Ko Wen-je an “asshole”], Apple Daily, accessed July 20, 2015, <http://www.appledaily.com.tw/appledaily/article/headline/20141117/36212783/>.

<sup>2</sup> See 「郝柏村:柯文哲、李登輝都是日本皇民後裔」 [“Hao Bo-tsun: Ko Wen-je, Lee Deng-hui all Japanese ‘Koumin’ descendents], Storm Media, accessed August 15, 2015. <http://www.storm.mg/article/24736>.

<sup>3</sup> See 「陳芳明：連戰與郝伯村羞辱了所有台灣人」 [Chen Fang-ming: Lien Chan and Hao Pei-tsun humiliated all Taiwanese people], Apple Daily, accessed August 15, 2016, <http://www.appledaily.com.tw/realtimenews/article/new/20141120/509804/>.

<sup>4</sup> The French novella *Boule de Suif*/*Butterball* recounts the story of a prostitute of the name “Butterball,” and a cohort of other travelers fleeing the Prussian-occupied France in a coach. The party is intercepted and detained by a Prussian officer, who later agreed to let them go if “Butterball” consents to sleep with him. As a loyal French nationalist, “Butterball” initially refuses to give in to the enemy, but finally surrendered her body at the persuasion of the increasingly disgruntled group. As soon as the coach is released and approaching safety, her fellow passengers scathingly snubbed “Butterball,” refusing to acknowledge her. See Guy de Maupassant, *Butterball*, London: Hesperus Press, 2003.



<sup>5</sup> See 『男星護花白目主播 「不是皇民幹嘛用敬語」』 [Male entertainer rescues blundering journalist: “Why use *keigo* if you are not a *koumin*?”], Liberty Times, accessed August 20, 2015, <http://ent.ltn.com.tw/news/breakingnews/1377988>.

<sup>6</sup> See Leo Ching, “*Becoming Japanese:*” *Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 97.

<sup>7</sup> See 周婉窈 [Chou, Wan-yao], 「從比較的觀點看台灣與韓國的皇民化運動 (1937-1945)」 [Comparative study of *kouminka* movement in Taiwan and Korea], in 台灣史論文精選 [Selected essays on Taiwanese history], ed. Chang Hsien-yen et al. (Taipei: Yu-shan She, 1996), 173.

<sup>8</sup> See Chou, Wan-yao, 189.

<sup>9</sup> 葉石濤 [Yeh, Shi-tao], 台灣文學史綱 [History of Taiwanese Literature], Kao Hsiung: Chun huei Publishing, 1987.

<sup>10</sup> “Inland,” *naichi* 內地, refers to Japan proper as homeland. This is a distinction made during the Imperial period contrasting Japan proper to its overseas colonies, referred to as *gaichi* 外地.

<sup>11</sup> The Japanese colonial government operated two separate schooling systems. The common school system 公學校 was founded in 1898 for Taiwanese children, as

opposed to the primary school system 小學校 attended by the Japanese children living in Taiwan. The two systems followed different curriculum and used different textbooks, with limited access to resources and equipment for the common schools. Only a few Taiwanese children with affluent, elite familial backgrounds attended school with the Japanese children. See Chiu-Jihn Chen, “Family Photographs, History, and Art Education: A Web of Taiwanese Visual Cultural Signs,” (PhD diss., Pennsylvania State University, 2007), 72.

<sup>12</sup> Here, “National language” refers to Japanese.

<sup>13</sup> In the words of Kobayashi Seizo, the 17th Governor-General of Taiwan in 1937. Quoted by Leo Ching, “*Becoming Japanese:*” *Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 92.

<sup>14</sup> See 周金波 [Chou, Chin-po], 周金波集 [Chou Chin-po Collection], ed. Nakajima Toshio (Taipei: Avanguard Publishing, 2002), 14. All further references will be cited in the text.

<sup>15</sup> See Leo Ching, 23.

<sup>16</sup> Beijing scholar Ji sees this statement as “a sincere adoration to Japan for launching a war” and a failure to see the true intents of the colonizer. See 計璧瑞 [Ji, Bi-ruey], 被殖民者的精神印記: 殖民時期台灣新文學論 [Spiritual marking of the colonized:

Taiwanese New Literature during the Colonial Period] (Taipei: Showwe Information Co.. Ltd., 2014), 127.

<sup>17</sup> According to Japanese scholar Noma Nobuyuki's findings of unofficial records regarding the said convention, as Taiwanese writers Yang Kuei 楊逵 and Huang Te-shi 黃得時 protested against the Japanese attendees' forceful conscription of the literary journals, Chang Wen-huan 張文環 intervened with this powerful line to strike away any accusations against Taiwanese writers as "non-*koumin*," or unfaithful subjects of the emperor. Originally published in 野間信幸 (Noma Nobuyuki), 〈張文環の文學活動とその特色〉/ Literary Activities of Chang Wen-huan and their Characteristics, 關西大學《中國文學紀要》/ Kansai University *Chinese Literature*, April 1992. Quoted in 林瑞明 [Lin, Ruey-ming], 「騷動的靈魂— 決戰時期的台灣作家與皇民文學」 [Restless souls— wartime Taiwanese writers and *koumin literature*], in 台灣史論文精選 [Selected essays on Taiwanese history], ed Chang Hsien-yen et al. (Taipei: Yu-shan She, 1996), 205.

<sup>18</sup> Retrocession 光復 refers to the ceding of the island of Taiwan to Chiang Kai-shek's KMT party. The book's title speaks volumes of its (perhaps merely ostensible) political stance.

<sup>19</sup> Yeh's *History of Taiwanese Literature* was published in February. The martial law in Taiwan was lifted on July 15, 1987. Until then, Taiwan saw the enforcement of Measures to regulate newspapers, magazines and book publication under Martial Law

and the Regulations for the Punishment of rebellions. As a widely respected scholar, Yeh may have written this passage with sincerity, however I feel it is important to point out the general political atmosphere at the time.

<sup>20</sup> See Yeh Shi-Tao (1987), 66. My translation.

<sup>21</sup> 葉石濤 (Yeh Shi-tao), 〈「抗議文學」乎? 「皇民文學乎」?〉 / Resistance Literature? *Koumin* Literature? 《台灣文學的悲情》, 1990 (111-2). According to Prof. Nakajima, he believes that Chou Chin-po might be included in Yeh's updated proclamation. Nakajima, Toshio, 332.

<sup>22</sup> See 林瑞明 (Lin Ruey-ming), 226.

<sup>23</sup> See 清華大學「賴和及其同時代的作家——日據時期台灣文學國際學術會議」綜合座談[Ching Hua University “Lai He and his contemporary writers— Taiwanese Literature During Japanese Occupational Period International Conference], 1994.

<sup>24</sup> See 星名宏修 [Hoshina, Hironobu], 『「大東亞共榮圈」的台灣作家 (二) — 另一種「皇民文學」：周金波的文學型態』 [Taiwanese writers in the “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere II— Another kind of Koumin Literature: Chou Chin-po's literature], in 台灣文學研究在日本 [Studies of Taiwanese literature in Japan], ed. Huang Ying-je, trans. Tu Cui-hua (Taipei: Avanguard Publishing, 1994), 65.

<sup>25</sup> See 垂水千惠 [Tarumi, Chie], 『戰前「日本語」作家—王昶雄與陳火泉周金波之比較』 [Pre-war “Japanese language” writers— comparing Wang Chang-hsiung and Chou Chin-po], in 台灣文學研究在日本 [Studies of Taiwanese literature in Japan], ed. Huang Ying-je, trans. Tu Cui-hua (Taipei: Avanguard Publishing, 1994), 100.

<sup>26</sup> See 莫素微 [Mo, Su-wei], 「鄉關何處—周金波的殖民地之旅」 [Out of place: Chou Chin-po's travels in the colony], *Taiwanese Literature Journal* 5, (June 2004): 226-48

<sup>27</sup> See 陳培峰 [Chen, Pei-feng], 「同化」的同床異夢:日治時期台灣的語言政策、近代化與認同 [The Different Intentions behind the Semblance of “Douka”: The Language Policy, Modernization and Identity in Taiwan During the Japan Ruling Period] (Taipei: Rye Field Publications, 2006), 442-43.

<sup>28</sup> See 黃文雀 [Huang, Wen-que ], 「同化，皇民化與認同：以小說中的人物類型為例」 [Assimilation, Imperialization, Identity: characters in the novels as examples] (Masters Thesis, Chung Hsin University. January, 2011), 40.

<sup>29</sup> See Mo Su-wei, 236.

<sup>30</sup> See 「正確在搖擺—試論周金波小說」 [Definitude is Swaying—On Chou Chin-po's novels], Chu Yo-hsun Blog [朱宥勳], accessed August 20, 2016, <http://chuck158207.pixnet.net/blog/post/11580173-正確在搖擺—試論周金波小說>.

<sup>31</sup> See Shih-shan Henry Tsai's biography of Lee in *Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan's Quest for Identity*. In the summer of 1944, when Japan was losing the war, Taiwanese students in all Japanese universities were requested by their military instructors to "volunteer" for military duties. According to the memoirs of Peng Ming-min who was studying at University of Tokyo, it was an offer that was dangerous to refuse and one that few turned down. Tsai, Shih-shan Henry, *Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan's Quest for Identity* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 45.

<sup>32</sup> Lee mentioned his *koumin* label when discussing an incident of harassment against nationalist veterans. He urges the Taiwanese society to desist splitting of ethnic identity. See 「談洪素珠 李登輝嘆：到現在還被叫皇民，不知道什麼意思？」 [Regarding Hung Su-chu, Lee Teng-hui sighs: I am still addressed as *koumin*, whatever that means], Taiwan People News, accessed July 11, 2016, <http://www.peoplenews.tw/news/9624cad5-52d4-4dd9-8239-78941c1f263d>.

<sup>33</sup> Controversy over Yasukuni shrine includes its enshrinement of 14 WWII war criminals along with others that died for Imperial Japan, including some soldiers drafted from Taiwan and Korea.

<sup>34</sup> See "Taiwan ex-leader in shrine visit," BBC, accessed July 11, 2016, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6729067.stm>.

<sup>35</sup> See “I was fighting for Japanese motherland: Lee,” China Post, accessed July 11, 2016, <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2015/08/21/443830/I-was.htm>.

<sup>36</sup> See “President Ma attends commemoration of War of Resistance against Japan,” Office of the President of Republic of China, accessed August 18, 2016, <http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=35039&rmid=2355>. The news released state: the war of resistance is “the most extensive war of resistance against foreign aggression in the history of the Chinese people, the War of Resistance Against Japan also called for the greatest sacrifices, and had the most far-reaching implications.” It also mentions a list of distinguished guests, including descendants of missionary Minnie Vautrin, “Acting Dean of Ginling Girls College and known as the “American Goddess at the Rape of Nanking,” who helped save the lives of more than 10,000 Chinese citizens.” It is telling that the key words here are “history of Chinese people” and “Rape of Nanking,” which has more to do with China than ROC Taiwan.

<sup>37</sup> See “Ex-Taiwan President Lee under fire for calling Japan the ‘motherland’,” South China Morning Post, accessed August 20, 2016, <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1851501/ex-taiwan-president-lee-under-fire-calling-japan>.

<sup>38</sup> See “Former Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui refers to Japan as ‘the motherland’, infuriates both sides of the strait,” Shanghaiist, accessed July 11, 2016, [http://shanghaiist.com/2015/08/23/former\\_taiwan\\_prez\\_calls\\_japan\\_motherland.php](http://shanghaiist.com/2015/08/23/former_taiwan_prez_calls_japan_motherland.php).

<sup>39</sup> My translation is based on “Japan Broadcast’s” Chinese translation of the full text of Lee’s essay. The Chinese full text can be found here: 「李登輝 Voice 全文中譯」 [Lee Teng Hui Voice essay, Chinese translation of full text], Storm Media, accessed July 11, 2016, <http://www.storm.mg/article/63608>.

<sup>40</sup> See Chen Fang-ming’s own Facebook page. 「誰在出賣台灣？」 [Who is selling out Taiwan?], accessed August 17, 2016, <https://www.facebook.com/fangming.chen.3/posts/679988628768008>.

<sup>41</sup> See 「郭正亮受不了：別縱容李登輝的親日史觀」 [Kuo can not take it: Do not indulge Lee’s pro-Japan history view], Apple Daily, accessed July 11, 2016, <http://www.appledaily.com.tw/realtimenews/article/new/20150823/676253/>.

<sup>42</sup> Journalist Takeuchi Kiyoshi wrote in 1938, that since the people of Taiwan were already Japanese since Japan’s annexation of the island in 1895, “how to be ‘good’ Japanese [yoki nihonjin ni naru] and to complete that process is what the *kouminka* movement is all about.” Takeuchi also defined this as a common goal for the entire Japanese people, not just Taiwanese. Quoted in Leo Ching, 93.

<sup>43</sup> See footnote 17

<sup>44</sup> See “Lee on Colonial Rule: Being a Japanese Slave a Tragedy, but ‘Out Went the Dogs and in Came the Pigs’,” National Policy Foundation, accessed July 11, 2016,



<http://www.taiwannpfnews.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=16663>.

<sup>45</sup> In her acceptance speech after winning the presidential election, Taiwan's new president Tsai Ing-wen vowed that as long as she is president, she will strive to ensure that no one needs to apologize for his identity. 「只要我登總統，沒有一個人必須為自己的認同道歉」 [When I am President, no one would need to apologize for his identification], Storm Media, accessed July 11, 2016, <http://www.storm.mg/article/78785>.

**Chapter 3:**

<sup>1</sup> In 2008, the year *Cape No. 7* was released, the major events in the domestic news concerned with former President Chen Shui-bian's embezzlement scandals, economic decline under a newly elected government, and a less-than-stellar count of medals at the Beijing hosted Olympic Games, adding insult to the injury that Taiwan had long been battling over the dwarfing of nationhood in international arenas. See Wang (2012).

<sup>2</sup> It is significant that Wei Te-sheng removes his protagonist, A-ga, from the northern, metropolitan capital of Taipei to the peripheral town of Heng Chun, located at the southernmost tip of the island. In Taiwan there are (at least) two competing imagined communities: the (other) Chinese, and the Taiwanese, resulting in the opposing opinions of unification (or building a cozier relationship) with China, or Taiwan's own independence. The group that leans towards a Chinese Nationalistic discourse is likely to give their votes to the KMT party, while the group that identifies itself as Taiwanese tend to support the pro-independence DPP party (Democratic Progressive Party). Since the 2000s, the electoral results consistently manifest a geographical split of voting patterns, "north Blue (KMT), south Green (DPP)," which could serve as an indicator of the distribution of the ethnic populations. But, more importantly, it strongly suggests the relationship between locality and the fostering of imagined communities. See "The Geography of Voting Patterns in Taiwan," School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham, accessed November 17, 2016, <http://nottspolitics.org/2011/11/02/the-geography-of-voting-patterns-in-taiwan/>.

<sup>3</sup> See "Donation detail of Government and Civil Units in Taiwan," Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, accessed 30 August, 2015, <http://www.mofa.gov.tw/Newsnodept.aspx?n=D50FBBA67F213089&sms=8B258E760DFE270E>.

<sup>4</sup> Kizuna (絆), or bond of friendship, as mentioned in Prime Minister Naoto Ken's acknowledgment addressed to the international community, with special mentioning of Taiwan's aid. See 「厚重情誼」 [Kizuna: a bond of friendship], Interchange Association Japan, accessed August 30, 2015, [http://www.koryu.or.jp/taipei-tw/ez3\\_contents.nsf/Top/3143E13690B37B6E49257871000914FF/\\$FILE/kizuna.pdf](http://www.koryu.or.jp/taipei-tw/ez3_contents.nsf/Top/3143E13690B37B6E49257871000914FF/$FILE/kizuna.pdf).

<sup>5</sup> The Wushe Incident 霧社事件 refers to an armed uprising that took place in October 1930, to resist long-time Japanese colonial oppression in the mountainous area of Wushe, Taiwan. It was organized by the village chief of Mahebo 馬赫坡社, Mouna Rudo, who teamed up with other villages of the Seediq tribe to carry out the attack, specifically targeting the Japanese who attended the Musyaji Elementary School athletics meet that day. During the massacre, the rebels killed a total of 134 Japanese, and 2 Han-Chinese people dressed in Japanese attire. The resistance was met with severe Japanese military action, and was completely extinguished by the Japanese authority by December of the same year, resulting in the death of over 600 among the 1200 Seediq men that were directly involved.

<sup>6</sup> *Koshien* generally refers to the National High School Baseball Championship of Japan, which has taken place annually since 1915. Though an amateur sport event, its iconic status in baseball history has well established it as one of the quintessential pastimes of Japanese summer, when it is televised and watched nationwide. Teams

represent regional championship from all prefectures of Japan. During the colonial period, teams from Korea, Taiwan, and Manchuria participated in the tournament. See “National High School Baseball Championship,” Baseball-Reference, accessed November 17, 2016, [http://www.baseball-reference.com/bullpen/National\\_High\\_School\\_Baseball\\_Championship](http://www.baseball-reference.com/bullpen/National_High_School_Baseball_Championship).

<sup>7</sup> The Seediq rebels resorted to guerrilla wars after the Wushe uprising. Their familiarity with the mountainous and often treacherous terrain in the area lent them advantage over the two thousand troops dispatched to quell the rebellion by Governor General Eizo Ishizuka. Unable to capture the rebels in spite of their modernized weapons and military units, the Japanese enlisted the use of poison gas to smoke out the men in hiding. According to Rod Thornton, the gas employed was perhaps a type of tear gas called chloracetophenon (CN), but based on description of survivors who had experienced the gas, as well as the accounts of dead villagers found in their homes, it is speculated that it was a more potent and lethal form of gas. At the time, the use of chemical agents was prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 1925. See Rod Thornton, “Wushe Incident,” in *Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Encyclopedia of Worldwide Policy, Technology and History Vol.II*, ed. Eric A. Croddy et al. (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2005), 334.

<sup>8</sup> In *War without Mercy*, John Dower sheds light on racist stereotypes that Japanese and Americans have for each other during the Pacific phase of World War II. See John Dower, *War without Mercy: race and power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986).

<sup>9</sup> See Marianne Hirsch, *Family Frames: Photography, Narratives, and Postmemory*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 22.

<sup>10</sup> See Leo Ching, *"Becoming Japanese:" Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 194.

<sup>11</sup> See 許介麟 [Hsu Chieh-lin], 「海角七號：殖民地次文化陰影」 [Cape No. 7: the residuen of colonial subculture], United Daily News, September 25, 2008.

<sup>12</sup> See 「『海角七号』导演写情书参考旧书信」 [Cape No. 7 Director referenced old letters to compose love letters], Ent.163, accessed November 18, 2016, <http://ent.163.com/08/0808/11/4IQQLE5J00031NJO.html>.

<sup>13</sup> Leo Ching, 186.

<sup>14</sup> A KMT military leader, Chen Cheng (陳誠, 1897- 1965) erected a monument in the name Mouna Rudo in Nan-tou, the leader in the Wushe attack reads “loyalty and brotherhood” (忠膽義肝), which we can presume refers to a Sinocentric loyalty and affiliation.

<sup>15</sup> See Yen (2011).

<sup>16</sup> See 「魏導重用日星— 64歲河原暫緩退休」 [Director Wei places Japanese actors in important roles— 64-year-old Kawahara postpones retirement], China Times,

accessed November 18, 2016, <https://tw.news.yahoo.com/魏導重用日星-64歲河原暫緩退休-213000194.html>.

<sup>17</sup> 「口述傳歷史，誰說才是真」 [preserving through oral history, whose version is the truth], Apple Daily, accessed August 29, 2015. <http://www.appledaily.com.tw/appledaily/article/headline/20110912/33662458/口述傳歷史誰說才是真>.

<sup>18</sup> A viewer posted: “Watching the Japs getting busted is very gratifying” on Yahoo Taiwan movie forum. Aaron, September 11, 2011, comment on yahoo movie forum “Seediq Bale,” [http://tw.movie.yahoo.com/movieinfo\\_review.html/id=3777&s=0&o=0&p=102](http://tw.movie.yahoo.com/movieinfo_review.html/id=3777&s=0&o=0&p=102).

<sup>19</sup> See 「在野蠻與文明的皺褶— 魏德聖x 陳芳明對談電影《賽德克·巴萊》」 [In the creases of savagery and civilization: conversation between Wei Te-sheng x Chen Fang-ming], *Unitas Literary Monthly* 27:11(2011), 34.

<sup>20</sup> See 「魏德聖：我為什麼親日仇日？專訪《賽德克·巴萊》導演」 [Wei Te-sheng: why would I be pro or anti Japan at all?], *South Reviews*, accessed August 29, 2015, <http://www.nfcmag.com/article/3457.html>.

<sup>21</sup> See Gadam\_may\_foot, September 20, 2011 (02:04am), comment on “Pro-Japan *Cape No. 7* director has now...,” Chiebukuro Yahoo Japan, September 20, 2011, [http://detail.chiebukuro.yahoo.co.jp/qa/question\\_detail/q1371656358](http://detail.chiebukuro.yahoo.co.jp/qa/question_detail/q1371656358).

<sup>22</sup> Interestingly, when *Seediq Bale* was released in Japan in April 2013, the trailer targeted at the Japanese movie-goers placed emphasis on different types of Japanese soldiers, contrasting the “good” officer, Kojima Genji, and Yoshimura Katsuhiko, the low-ranking policeman who kindled the discontent of the oppressed tribesmen, and prompted Mouna Rudo to carry out the revolt. It also placed emphasis on the rare female voices that present doubts and questions about the men’s decision for resuming the headhunting tradition, which was schemed without their knowledge. “The men in our tribes are idiots!” exclaims Mouna Rudo’s wife, as the village people are forced into hiding when the Japanese army retaliates the Wu-she slaughter. See 「セテク・バレ予告編」 [Seediq Bale trailer], youtube, accessed August 20, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g5W-PJABiQQ>.

<sup>23</sup> 「日本人將如何看《賽德克·巴萊》」 [how would the Japanese view *Seediq Bale*], Yahoo Taiwan, accessed 29 July, 2013, [http://tw.myblog.yahoo.com/khwang\\_99/article?mid=5346&prev=5347&next=5337](http://tw.myblog.yahoo.com/khwang_99/article?mid=5346&prev=5347&next=5337).

<sup>24</sup> 郭明正 [Kuo Ming-cheng/ Dakis Pawan (Seediq name)], 真相巴萊:賽德克巴萊的歷史真相與隨拍札記 [Truth. Bale.] (Taipei: Yuan-liou Publishing, 2011). And 又見真相: 賽德克族與霧社事件 [Revisiting the Truth: The Seediq Tribe and Wushe Incident] (Taipei: Yuan-liou Publishing, 2012).

<sup>25</sup> As a matter of fact, Huang points out that the ideology of a “Chinese race,” which the Chinese nationalist government sought to instill in the postwar Taiwanese through education, encompasses five ethnic groups— Han Chinese, Manchurian, Mongolian,

Chinese muslim and Tibetan— all of which come together to form a single *zhonghuaminzu* (中華民族, Chinese race). Under this categorization, despite their distinctively different origin and features, the Aborigines of Taiwan were also somehow incorporated as descendants of the Chinese race. See Huang Chih-huei, “Ethnic Diversity, Two-layered Colonization, and Complex Modern Taiwanese Attitudes Toward Japan,” in *Japanese Taiwan: Colonial Rule and its Contested Legacy*, ed. Andrew D. Morris (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), 136.

<sup>26</sup> See Huang Chih-huei, 137.

<sup>27</sup> See Michael Berry, *A History of Pain: Trauma in Modern Chinese Literature and Film* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 99.

<sup>28</sup> See 「魏德聖聊《賽德克·巴萊》：重點是為什麼而戰」 [Wei Te-sheng on Seediq Bale: what are they fighting for?], the Beijing News, accessed July 30, 2013, <http://dailynews.sina.com/bg/ent/film/sinacn/20120510/19363384379.html>.

<sup>29</sup> *Kano* was first released in Taiwan on February 27, 2014.

<sup>30</sup> Tens of thousands of protesters took the street on August 3, 2013 for Hong Chung-chiu 洪仲丘, a young army conscript who died after being punished for misconduct. President Ma Ying-jeou’s public apology and promise of justice and the minister of National Defense’s resignation could not appease the protesters’ doubt of the government’s sincerity for a thorough and just investigation. See “Taiwan Protest over



Hong Chung-chiu Death,” BBC, accessed July 25, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-23561244>. Half a year later, from March 18 to April 10, 2014, a coalition of students and civic groups staged a sit-in at the Taiwanese parliament for 24 days. They protested against a trade pact deal that the KMT was striking with China, for fear of Beijing’s increasing control over Taiwan’s economical development. See “Taiwan students to end China trade deal parliament protest,” BBC, accessed July 25, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-26919305>.

<sup>31</sup> See “Trade Pact Siege: Producer screens ‘Kano’ for students in Legislature,” Taipei Times, accessed July 25th, 2016, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/04/02/2003587101>.

<sup>32</sup> See Andrew D. Morris, “Introduction: Living as left behind in Postcolonial Taiwan.” Japanese Taiwan: Colonial Rule and its Contested Legacy,” in *Japanese Taiwan: Colonial Rule and its Contested Legacy*, ed. Andrew D. Morris (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), 7.

<sup>33</sup> See Huang Chih-hui, 140.

<sup>34</sup> See 「時論：Kano 忘了賽德克巴萊」 [Editorial: Kano forgot all about Seediq Bale], China Times, accessed July 25, 2016, <http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20140110000872-260109>.

<sup>35</sup> The establishment of Manchukuo is not acknowledged by People's Republic of China nor Republic of China (Taiwan), hence when it is referred to it is always addressed as "pseudo Manchukuo."

<sup>36</sup> See Tseng's essay in United Daily News Opinion Column. 「Kano 熱血野球外的歷史叩問：殖民現代性的人本辯證」 [Kano beyond the passion for baseball: a humanistic dialectic for colonial modernity], accessed July 25, 2016, <http://opinion.udn.com/opinion/story/6076/101994>.

<sup>37</sup> See 『十個問題「KANO」沒秘密』 [10 Questions for Kano], originally published in United Daily News, accessed July 25, 2016, <http://blog.ilc.edu.tw/blog/index.php?op=printView&articleId=478876&blogId=145>.

<sup>38</sup> See 新井一二三 [Arai, Hifumi], 臺灣為何叫我哭 [Reasons Taiwan makes me weep] (Taipei: Titen Publishing, 2011), 28.

<sup>39</sup> See 言叔夏 [Yen, Shu-shia]. 「在野蠻與文明的皺褶——魏德聖X陳芳明對談電影《賽德克·巴萊》」 [In the Creases of Savagery and Civilization: conversation between Wei Te-cheng X Chen Fang-ming], *Unitas Literary Monthly* 27, no. 11:30-39.

<sup>40</sup> As A-ga suspended the delivery of the seven letters, the stack of papers are purloined of their significance. Media Professor Chen Ru-shou discusses the delivery of letters in the film comparison to the Laconian reading of Edgar Allan Poe's "The Purloined Letter." Based on Lacon's statement that "a letter always arrives at its destination,"

Chen suggests that the younger Tomoko (played by Tanaka Chie), rather than the aged Tomoko who was the actual subject of the letters, is the “intended” recipient of the letters. See Chen Ru-shou, *穿越幽暗鏡界：臺灣電影百年思考* [Through a Screen, Darkly: One Hundred Years of Taiwan Cinema] (Taipei: Bookman Books, 2013), 149-51.

<sup>41</sup> This colorful scene was irreverently voted “Worst Scene of the Year” by a mock awards ceremony hosted by a small group of film critics. See “Worst Case Scenarios,” Taipei Times, accessed August 30, 2015, <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/feat/archives/2011/12/26/2003521638>.

<sup>42</sup> See Hirsch, Marianne, 22.

## Chapter 4:

<sup>1</sup> Please refer to endnote 3 in Introduction.

<sup>2</sup> See William Cunningham Bissell, “Engaging Colonial Nostalgia,” *Cultural Anthropology* 20, No. 2 (May 2005): 215-48.

<sup>3</sup> Sakai notes here that over 210,000 Taiwanese men fought in the WWII as Japanese soldiers, about 30,000 of which died during the war.

<sup>4</sup> According to the records released by Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare of Japan in 1973, 207,183 Taiwanese served in the Japanese Imperial military service, 30,304 of whom were killed or missing in action. Among the deceased Taiwanese servicemen, 27,864 were consecrated in the Yasukuni Shrine. See 鍾淑敏，沈昱廷，陳柏棕 [Chung Shu-ming, Shen Yu-ting, Chen Bo-zong]，「由靖國神社祭神簿分析臺灣的戰時動員與臺人傷亡」 [Research on Mobilization and Casualties of Taiwanese Soldiers through the Analysis of the List of Enshrined Deities], *歷史台灣* [Historic Taiwan] Issue 10: November 2015, 69. In *Becoming Japanese*, Leo Ching recounts an incident in which a group of Taiwanese aboriginal representatives visit the Yasukuni Shrine. They requested that the shrine “return” to them the souls of their family members who had been enshrined there, but to no avail. See Leo Ching, “*Becoming Japanese:*” *Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 1-4.

<sup>5</sup> Lee Teng-hui famously spoke of “the sorrow of being Taiwanese” in an interview with Japanese writer Shiba Ryotaro 司馬遼太郎 in 1994, published in Shiba’s *Notes of Travels in Taiwan* 台灣紀行. Lee’s “sorrow” refers to Taiwan’s constant state of being occupied by foreign powers, and the Taiwanese people’s subsequent deprivation of subjectivity. 司馬遼太郎[Shiba, Ryotaro], 臺灣紀行：街道漫步 [Notes of Travels in Taiwan], trans. Lee Jin-song (Taipei: Taiwan Tohan, 2011), 519-39.

<sup>6</sup> See Bissell, William Cunningham, 216.

<sup>7</sup> See 周金波 [Chou, Chin-po], 「灣生與灣製」 [*wansei* (born in Taiwan) and *wansei* (made in Taiwan)], in 周金波集 [Collection of Chou Chin-po’s essays], ed. Nakajima Toshio (Taipei: Avanguard publishing, 2002), 193-195.

<sup>8</sup> See 鍾淑敏 [Chung, Shu-ming], 「為大時代的變動留下珍貴的證言」 [Important testimonies for a turbulent times], in 灣生回家 [Wansei Back Home], by Tanaka Mika (Taipei: Yuan-liu Publishing, 2014), 8.

<sup>9</sup> See 田中實加 [Tanaka, Mika], 灣生回家 [Wansei Back Home] (Taipei: Yuan-liu Publishing, 2014). Prior to the official release of her documentary film on October 16th 2015, Tanaka published a book of the same title in 2014 and held approximately 300 talks in Taiwan as an effort to promote understanding of *wansei* and the advent of her film.

<sup>10</sup> I met with Tanaka Mika in Tainan’s National Museum of Taiwanese History on August 15, 2015.

<sup>11</sup> In 1952, democracy fighter and politics critic Lei Zhen 雷震 wrote in his *Future of Control Yuan/ jian cha yuan zhi 監察院之將來* that it is “unwise” to use a “Party Anthem” as a “National Anthem.” He elaborated on how the implied exclusivity—which is evident in lines like “foundation of our party”— would inflict hesitation and division among the people who are not members of the KMT party. In modern Taiwan, when the occasion arises, officials and Presidents that are affiliated with other political parties are known to selectively skip over the lines alluding to the KMT party.

<sup>12</sup> For more media coverage on the *wanseis* and their emotional affiliation with Taiwan’s National Anthem, see 『想台灣就哼國歌 83歲「灣生」回家了』 [Whenever she misses Taiwan, she sings the National Anthem (of Taiwan), 83-year-old Wansei comes home], United Daily, accessed July 21, 2016, <http://udn.com/news/story/7314/1357905-想台灣就哼國歌...83歲「灣生」回家了>. And 『「灣生」爺奶回家，松本領唱國歌』 [Wansei grandfathers and grandmothers return home, Matsumoto lead sings the National Anthem (of Taiwan)], Liberty Times, accessed July 21, 2016, <http://ent.ltn.com.tw/news/breakingnews/1476429>.

<sup>13</sup> For instance, in the documentary Tominaga repeatedly hums and plays the tune of famous Taiwanese ballade “Yu Yeh Hua” 雨夜花/ Flowers in a Rainy Night (1934) on his harmonica. “Yu Yeh Hua” tells the sad tale of a maiden who, after being deserted by her lover, led a lonely and tragic existence. It has been interpreted by some as a national

allegory of Taiwan under Japanese occupation. (see <http://www.hyes.tyc.edu.tw/~sk7/s32.htm> for example). When Placido Domingo performed this song in 2002 in his concert, it was elevated from a local ballade to international high art status and has since come to represent Taiwan in various situations.

<sup>14</sup> As stated on the book jacket of Tanaka's book of the same title, *Wansei Back Home* (2015, second edition).

<sup>15</sup> See Tominaga Masaru's letter to the Liberty Times. 『感動！因為一條「台灣魂」毛巾 89歲灣生寄信「自由」尋人』 [Touching! 89-year-old Wansei writes Liberty Times in search of owner to a towel with imprints of "Taiwan Spirit"], accessed July 21, 2016, <http://ent.ltn.com.tw/news/breakingnews/1541870>.

<sup>16</sup> Judith Butler. *Frames Of War: When is Life Grievable?* (London/ New York: Verso, 2009).

<sup>17</sup> See Andrew D. Morris. *Japanese Taiwan: Colonial Rule and its Contested Legacy*. (London/ New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), 13.

<sup>18</sup> See 『歷史補充教材「灣生回家」，「KANO」等入列』 [*Wansei Back Home* and *KANO* to be included in supplementary history textbooks], Taiwan People News, accessed July 21, 2016, <http://www.peoplenews.tw/news/120be1db-d7e4-4303-ab5b-f1d23636c4e2>.

<sup>19</sup> See chapter 2 for my discussions on Lee Teng-hui and his essay submitted to Japan's Voice magazine regarding his Japanese past, among other political observations he made of Japan and Taiwan.



**Epilogue:**

<sup>1</sup> See Lin, Li-chin. *Formose* was originally published in France in November 2011, its Mandarin Chinese version later published in Taiwan in August 2012.

<sup>2</sup> In her acceptance speech for the Students' Choice Literary Prize in Paris, France on March 22, 2013, Lin Li-chin said: "we were blind and deaf. [...] Because we could not learn the real history of our nation, we became pawns to the autocratic rule. When I was young, I had nothing but disdain for the street protesters against the government. Hence this book, *Formose*, is actually a form of repentance from an ignorant former high school student." See 「巴黎書展獲獎，林莉菁：對無知青春的懺悔」 [Awarded at Parisian book fair, Lin Li-chin: repentance for an ignorant youth], New Talk, accessed August 5, 2016, <http://newtalk.tw/news/view/2013-03-24/34828>.

<sup>3</sup> See Leo Ching, "*Becoming Japanese:*" *Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 97.

<sup>4</sup> See 陳宜中 [Chen, Yi-chung], 『「海角七號」的台日苦戀』 [The tragic love story between Taiwan and Japan in *Cape No. 7*], China Times Newspaper, October 9, 2008. And 許介麟 [Hsu, Chieh-lin], 『「海角七號」：殖民地次文化陰影』 [ *Cape No. 7: the residue of colonial subculture*], United Daily News, September 25, 2008.

<sup>5</sup> See 黃文胤 [Huang, Wen-yin], 『殖民歷史記憶與「台灣」想像：以魏德聖「海角七號」、「賽德克•巴萊」、「KANO」為例』 [Imagining "Taiwan" by

Remembering the Colonial Past: On Film Director Wei Te-sheng's *Cape No. 7*, Seediq Bale, and KANO] (Masters Thesis, National Chung Hsin University, 2015), 40.

<sup>6</sup> See Huang, Wen-yin.

<sup>7</sup> See Marianne Hirsch, *Family Frames: Photography, Narratives, and Postmemory*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 23.

<sup>8</sup> See interview by Shiang Yi-fei. See 『十個問題「KANO」沒秘密』 [10 Questions for Kano], originally published in United Daily News, accessed July 25, 2016, <http://blog.ilc.edu.tw/blog/index.php?op=printView&articleId=478876&blogId=145>.

<sup>9</sup> See Barbie Zelizer, *Remembering to Forget: Holocaust Memory through the Camera's Eye*, (Chicago/ London: Chicago University Press, 1998), 5.

<sup>10</sup> See Eva Hoffman, "Complex Histories, Contested Memories: Some Reflections on Remembering Difficult Pasts," Doreen B. Townsend Center for Humanities (Berkeley: University of California, 2000), accessed June 4, 2015, [http://townsendcenter.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/publications/OP23\\_Hoffman.pdf](http://townsendcenter.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/publications/OP23_Hoffman.pdf).



**Figure 1.1** *Tousan* spoiled his young daughter's assignment of the national flag (of the Republic of China, Taiwan) by coloring in the white sun in the fashion of the *hinomaru*. Here, the girl asks her brother (Wu Nien-jen's on-screen surrogate) "how am I supposed to hand this in?" (Shot taken from the film *A Borrowed Life*, 1994)



**Figure 1.2** *Tousan's* young son sits in the hallway of a bordello, peering through the curtain in an attempt to make sense of the adult world. (Shot taken from the film, *A Borrowed Life*, 1994)



**Figure 1.3** A realistic replica of a propagandist mural from the Taiwanese film, *Paradise in Service* (2014). Murals like this—featuring classic nationalist symbols: a portrait of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, a book of Three Principles of the People 三民主義, and the territory of Chiang’s Republic of China—were common around Taiwan. Note that the delineated territory centers on today’s China. (Shot taken from the film *Paradise in Service*, 2014)





抗獨史陣線7位成員在西門町6號出口旁舉行記者會，公開批評《KANO》腐蝕台灣主體

**Figure 1.4** A band of protesters congregate in front of a cinema to express their dissent about the release of a popular Taiwanese film, *KANO*, about a Taiwanese baseball team's success under Japanese colonial rule. The boards they are holding read: "Refuse to be a *Koumin*, do not watch the film." (Photo taken from <http://newtalk.tw/news/view/2014-02-27/44810>)

ご意見をお寄せいただきありがとうございます。 戻る  
今後のユーザー エクスペリエンス向上のため、この広告を確認いたします。  
広告設定を更新していただく、よりご自分に合った広告が表示されるようになります。

映画 ナタリー natalie

トップページ ニュース 人気の記事 特集・インタビュー 写真いっぱい イベントレポート 制作現場

## 戦争に翻弄された台湾生まれの日本人たちを追うドキュメンタリー「湾生回家」公開

2016年7月29日 10:00 ★ 446

ツイート いいね! ブックマーク G+ Pocket



歴史に翻弄されながらも力強く歩んできた“日本語世代”の台湾の人々の姿を捉えた話題作!  
～かつて日本人だった人々を訪ねて～

### Introduction

**台** 湾で最も波乱に満ちた時代を生きた日本語世代が語る、もうひとつの歴史とは。全国各地で大きな反響を巻き起こし、ロングヒットとなった傑作ドキュメンタリー、待望のDVD化!  
1895(明治28)年から1945(昭和20)年まで、実に51年もの間、日本の統治下にあった台湾。当時の日本は欧米への対抗意識もあり、インフラ整備や治安の維持に力を注いだ。教育の普及にも積極的取り組み、学校教育は日本語で行った。そのため、この時代に教育を受けた人々は日本語を話すことができる、いわゆる“日本語世代”だ。彼らの歴史は、苦難の連続と言っても過言ではないだろう。第二次世界大戦が始まり、台湾人も日本軍として参戦するが、日本は敗戦。やがて、台湾は中国国民党政府による統治の時代を迎えた。しかし、その圧制に対する市民の怒りが、1947(昭和22)年の二二八事件を招く。これをきっかけに、1949(昭和24)年から38年間の長きにもわたり、戒厳令が敷かれる異常事態に、この間、多くの台湾人が激しい弾圧にさらされ、台湾語や日本語の使用も禁じられた。“日本語世代”の台湾人たちは、口をつぐまざるを得なかったのだ。

本作は、台湾各地、そして日本へと舞台を移しながら、“日本語世代”5人の人生を振り返る。時代に翻弄されながらも、ふたつの時代を力強く歩んだ彼らがそれぞれの人生を語るとき、私たちはその言葉の背後に、もうひとつの歴史の姿を垣間見ることになる。

初監督となる酒井光子は、新聞記者を経て、ドキュメンタリー映画の制作・宣伝に関わりつつ、本作の構想を練ってきた。“日本語世代”の老人との偶然の出会いから、取材活動は足かけ7年。台湾のことを広く知ってほしいという強い思いが原動力となり、国や時代を超えた、人間の存在そのものを見つめる大らかで優しいまなざしのドキュメンタリー映画を完成させた。本作は、記録的な観客動員となったテレビ朝日東中野をはじめ、全国でヒット。近づく台湾の、知られざる一面に光を当てた衝撃と感動の作品として大きな話題を呼んだ。

撮影は、中越地震で受けた大きな被害から復興する姿を描いたドキュメンタリー『1000年の山古志』の松根広隆。制作を世間した田辺信彦は、朝日新聞社創刊130周年記念事業作品『地球異変』『地球はいま』など、多くのドキュメンタリー作品にも参加している。ジャズピアニストとして多方面で活躍する廣木光一が、音楽を手掛けた。

特典映像 劇場予告編、監督インタビュー、未収録映像  
邦人特典 豪華版ソフトケース(限定24P)  
スタッフ 監督:酒井光子 制作:藤井田辺信彦(たのこ) 撮影:松根広隆(1000年の山古志) 編集:廣木光一 音楽:廣木光一 編集:樽谷直美  
制作:映画 島谷本業 文楽 文化庁

発売:株式会社マクザム <http://www.maxam.jp> 全国劇場公開作品 100326

¥4,200(税込) MX-3889 本編91分・特典27分 片面1層 MPEG-2 COLOR 複製不能 レンズ拭き止

デジタル日本語版(Dolby Digital)収録  
DTS-ES 5.1ch 音源収録  
NTSC 日本市場用  
DVD VIDEO  
2009年11月24日発売  
©2008年・11月24日発売  
100% Made in the Republic of China

**Figure 1.5** Concomitantly, a Japanese media defines *wanseis* as “tossed and teased by war 戦争に翻弄された” in its 2016 promotion while Sakai Atsuko prescribes her Taiwanese subjects as “tossed and teased by history 歴史に翻弄された” in 2008. (above: shot taken August 3, 2016 from <http://natalie.mu/eiga/news/196229>; below: shot taken from the DVD cover of *Taiwan Jinsei*, 2008)



**Figure 2.1** DVD cover for *Grandmother's Secret*, featuring a snapshot of former comfort woman, Huang A-cao, as she tells her story of abuse by Japanese soldiers.





**Figure 2.2** Re-presenting trauma memory: promotional poster for *Song of the Reed* in August 2015. Departing from the normative images that portray victimhood, the former comfort women are presented smiling with their hands raised to their brows, while the tagline underneath the film title states: “A tribute, to a life that never succumbs to defeat.” (Shot taken from wikipedia, retrieved August 5, 2016 from [https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/蘆葦之歌#/media/File:Song\\_of\\_the\\_seed\\_movie\\_poster.jpg](https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/蘆葦之歌#/media/File:Song_of_the_seed_movie_poster.jpg))



**Figure 2.3** Lin Shen-chung (second left), a social worker, and Japanese supporter Shiba Yoko (first right) dance in unison to the song of Momotaro. (Photo from *Song of the Reed*)



**Figure 2.4** Hsu-mei in her living room. (Photo from *Song of the Reed*)

婦女救援基金會  
Taipei Women's Rescue Foundation

中文 / English

認識婦援 婦援消息 婦援工作 我要捐款 義賣商店 參與婦援 影音下載 會員專區

Google 站內搜尋

首頁 > 婦援工作 > 慰安婦人權運動

### 慰安婦人權運動



她們的故事

阿嬤剪影--蘇寅嬌阿嬤  
身為家中長女的寅嬌阿嬤，為家計到處奔波做工...

TWRF Service

- 親密關係暴力
- 目睹家暴兒少
- 慰安婦人權運動
  - 服務背景
  - 服務對象及內容
  - 她們的故事
  - 倡議工作及校園宣導
  - 重要活動
  - 相關資源
- 人口販運及性剝削防制
- 阿嬤家：和平與女性人權館籌備處

阿嬤的紙飛機  
慰安婦國際關懷計畫

HOME HISTORY STORIES VIDEO B14 ABOUT US

Stories About Ah-Ma



**Figure 2.5** The Taiwanese comfort women on the websites of TWRF and Ah-ma's Paper Airplane highlight a generational divide in the presentation of the same subjects. They share similarities in presenting the photos in black-and-white. The latter, however, gave each woman's testimony its own frame. (Photos from TWRF and Ah-ma's Paper Airplane Webpages)





**Figure 3.1** Cover of *Bungei Taiwan* 文藝台灣, Volume 2, No. 6 (September, 1941), in which Chou Chin-po's "The Volunteer" was first published. (Photo taken from The Taiwanese Literary Data Library of Aletheia University in Taiwan, accessed August 18, 2016 from <http://mttwn.mtwww.mt.au.edu.tw/front/bin/ptlist.phtml?Category=122> )



**Figure 3.2** Headline of a Taiwanese newspaper simplified Lee’s essay to “Lee Teng-hui: Taiwan waged no war against Japan ‘We were Japanese fighting for Motherland.’” (Photo from <https://tw.news.yahoo.com/投書日媒-李-台對日抗戰非事實-020528557.html>)



**Figure 4.1** *Seediq Bale*'s General Kamada Yahiko, mourning the bushido spirit in the Seediq warriors and alluding to the cherry blossoms as a symbol of Japan. (Shot taken from *Seediq Bale: Warriors of the Rainbow*, 2011)





**Figure 4.2** Above: Statue of Hattai Yoichi situated at Wushantou Reservoir. Below: Snapshot of Kondo Hyotaro contemplating about taking on the position of *Kano*'s baseball coach. (Shots taken from <http://hces.tn.edu.tw/chianan/e06.htm>, and the film *KANO*, 2014.)






**Figure 4.3** Wu Ming-chieh arrives at home base after the game has already ended. (Shot taken from the film *KANO*, 2014)



**Figure 4.4** A-ga and Tomoko on the beach: “stay, or I’ll come with you.” (Shot taken from the film *Cape No. 7*, 2008)



**Figure 5.1** Certificate that Miyahara Eiji was conferred the Order of the Rising Sun by the Emperor of Japan in 2008. He received the honor as an Indonesian. (Shot taken from the film, *Taiwan Identity*.)



**Figure 5.2** The tombstone of one of Miyahara Eiji's many Japanese comrades interred at the Kalibata Heroes Cemetery. Both his Japanese name and Indonesian name are inscribed in the stone. (Shot taken from the film, *Taiwan Identity*.)





**Figure 5.3** Kao Chu-hua/ Yata Kikuko and the stray cats she took under her care. (Shot from the film *Taiwan Identity*.)



**Figure 5.4** A picture from the early days of pioneering in Yoshino village in Hualien, Taiwan. The image of villagers in their work outfits set them apart from stereotypical portraits of colonizers in formal attire. (Shot taken from the film *Wansei Back Home*)



**Figure 5.5** Juxtaposition of the present and past of a hallway in Iekura Taeko's former school, Taihoku First Girls' High School, now Taipei Municipal First Girls' High School. (Shots taken from the film *Wansei Back Home*.)





**Figure 5.6** A picture of eight *wanseis*' revisiting of Hualien, as reported in Liberty Times in May 2013. The banner reads “welcome home” (*okaerinasai*, おかえりなさい). (Retrieved from <http://news.ltn.com.tw/photo/local/paper/384060> )





**Figure 6.1** French edition of Lin Li-chin's *Formose*. In this page, she depicts her contempt for her grandmother's fondness of Japanese songs. Retrieved July 15, 2016, <http://www.actuabd.com/Li-Chin-Lin-Formose-Comme-Marjane>

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