

CITIZENS' CORRUPTION TOLERANCE IN PERU:  
A BEHAVIORAL APPROACH

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## INTRODUCTION

### Corruption and Tolerance

The day of September 14<sup>th</sup>, 2000, can be considered a turning point in Peruvian politics, one of those dramatic moments whose impact is still very much present throughout the years, affecting the whole political experience of an entire generation. That day, passed 6pm, congressmen Fernando Olivera, Luis Iberico, and Susana Higuchi from the political party *Frente Independiente Moralizador* (FIM), were in the middle of a press conference in the Bolívar Hotel, a few blocks away from the National Parliament<sup>1</sup>. Both Olivera and the FIM had by then earned for themselves a name between the few references in Peruvian politics regarding active efforts to fight corruption in the higher levels of government, a pursue that had been ongoing since the decade of the 80's, during the first administration of Alan García. Having been particularly active over the previous years, when the Fujimori regime was starting to show some serious signs of wearing, and scandals involving corruption of its highest ranks had started to surface, the role of the FIM and other political actors that may be considered of *opposition* was being put to the test, in a year that was already tainted by massive public perception of electoral fraud and State capture ending with Alberto Fujimori as constitutional president for a third consecutive term.

The first cassette of what would be later dubbed the *vladivideos*, in reference to the President's main advisor Vladimiro Montesinos, was exhibited for the attentive eyes of all the press corps and the Nation at large, in a show that could easily be described as abominable: Montesinos himself was seen in a small office of the National Intelligence System, of which he was considered to be a powerful figure (if not the head), sitting down with *turncoat* congressman Alberto Kouri, negotiating in monetary terms the latter's departure from *Perú Posible* (PP) and his recruitment in the ranks of the government's party. In short, the video was showing the effective bribing of a congressman to change his political allegiance, conducted by the person who had been publicly acknowledged throughout the past decade to be Fujimori's right hand. Although such kind of activities had always been something of a

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<sup>1</sup> Caretas, N° 1637, "El Procurador en su Laberinto", September 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2000.

possibility, considering the country's long history of high-level corruption and the collapse of the party system, such public display of *privatization* of a public office, as Rasma Karklins (2005) would probably call, had never occurred in Peruvian history, let alone presented in such a climate of political instability and media coverage.

This first vladivideo, as time would show, proved to be just the proverbial 'tip of the iceberg', as in the months to follow hundreds of videos showing Fujimori's advisor bribing and discussing corrupt (and other illegal) affairs involving members of the highest structures of the country would be brought to light, displayed by the newly-found *independent media*, which included almost every stakeholder in national politics: From journalist, media owners, congressmen, military officials, and judges, to showmen, soccer players, and private entrepreneurs. The public moneys seemed to be endless and for the taking, until eventually the list of convicted figures included president Alberto Fujimori himself, who had to be extradited from Chile after spending some years running from Peruvian justice in Japan. This overarching and far-reaching situation was not to be downplayed. In the words of Catherine M. Conaghan (2005, p. 243), "[n]ever in the history of Latin America had the hypocrisy and venality of a ruling elite been so thoroughly documented, and completely exposed on prime-time television."

In an interview published on April 2001, the appointed Minister of Justice of the transition government, Diego García-Sayan, referred to the state of corruption in the country in the following terms:

[Referring to Montesino's *mafia*] "How did this huge corruption machine appear in Peru? Without a doubt, the mafia took over Peruvian institutions with the *tolerance* and interference of a big part of Peruvian society... What to do so it doesn't happen again? It's about, then, identifying the objective conditions that existed in our institutionalization and the *citizens' behavior that tolerated this situation to get produced and progress*<sup>2</sup>. There are ethical and institutional matters that need to be identified to be able to face them and successfully fight the corruption phenomenon."<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Italics are ours.

<sup>3</sup> Translated from the Spanish. CARETAS, N° 1666, "Anticorrupción, Operación Tenaza," April 19<sup>th</sup>, 2001.



But what does that supposedly *tolerance of corruption* means, and why is it important? First, let's address the issue of corruption, and its impact on the different subsystems of a national polity.

Corruption is a common blight that all countries of the international community suffer, albeit in different levels. Its distorting consequences are felt throughout all the subsystems of a country, with particularly corrosive consequences to economic, political, and social relations. Corruption erodes democracy by breaking the rule of law (Seligson, 2002, p. 410; Bratton, 2007, p. 106), hindering the effective exercise of civic and political rights (Bailey, 2006), and damaging any process of inclusion of the most vulnerable sectors of the population (McCann and Redlawsk, 2006, p. 797; Warren, 2004); it damages the economy by reducing the total amount of foreign direct investment (Habib and Zurawicki, 2002), diverting resources from productive to rent-seeking activities (Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman, 2005, p. 577; Morris, 2004, p. 4; Goudie and Stasavage, 1998, p. 113), increasing transaction costs (Seligson, 2002, p. 409), and limiting the availability of information required to conduct regular business operations; and probably in the most pernicious dimension, corruption reallocates public resources away from areas such as education and health (Mauro, 1995, 1997), and, overall, it reduces the level of generalized trust that society requires to develop social capital (Uslaner, 2008; Rothstein, 2005, p. 131), which in time has a direct effect on both democracy and economic growth. These consequences are felt even more deeply in developing countries, where the resource diversion has a direct impact on the poor by limiting the amount and quality of social programs, and where political clientelism affects political choices and participation (for a comprehensive review of issues related to corruption see Heidenheimer and Johnston, 2002).

Despite the amount of corruption studies currently available, it wasn't until the mid-90s that they became an important feature of social sciences. This 'new interest' in the causes and consequences of the phenomenon was a response to two different circumstances: First, the end of the Cold War shifted the priorities of the international public agenda, and corruption became not anymore a problem that could be easily overlooked by the primacy of other geostrategic interests in the 'fight against communism', but a heavy burden for the economic growth of the industrialized

countries and a source of inefficiency for the global market. The drive was naturally spearheaded by the United States, where anti-corruption reforms had been in its international policy agenda for the past three decades, since it enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA) (Weiss, 2009). And second, the newly developed research tools made possible the objective measure of different corruption indicators that fostered an increasing number of papers empirically testing long-overdue theoretic approaches.

These new circumstances have given place to the emergence of a scientific trend that could be succinctly defined as the “*new economics of corruption*” (as dubbed by Ades and Di Tella, 1997) and the *new politics of corruption*. These two approaches depart from the practices of previous decades, and try to apply empirical evidence in their assessments. Moreover, in the case of the political approach, finally a controversial debate has been settled: corruption is no longer seen with the capability of functioning as the ‘grease in the gears’ (Huntington, 1968), but is now widely considered to be pernicious for the political system. Most importantly, as we have mentioned, corruption is treated by the new empirical research as a threat for political legitimacy, and therefore, democracy in general. This problem is suspected to have especially important ramifications for countries where democracy hasn’t been totally consolidated, like in the region of Latin America.

While some research has focused on the impact of democracy over corruption, there have been some attempts to invert this causal direction, particularly in the area of political support for democratic regimes. These studies have treated political support mainly as *regime legitimacy*, using victimization survey data to address the dangers of corruption on the citizen opinion (Seligson, 2002); but there are also new attempts to go further, and to add the ‘punishment’ dimension as negative political support, developing for this purpose the idea of *individuals’ tolerance of corrupt activities* within a society (Cameron et al., 2009). The importance of this new construct has been succinctly summed in the following way: “Apart from influencing evaluations of government’s performance, a variation in corruption tolerance or one may even say corruption acceptance, may impact regime support in general, political trust, and political behavior” (Tverdova, 2007, p. 9).

Going back to the specific Peruvian context, if we understand in similar terms the *tolerance to corruption* that García-Sayan was referring to as the citizens' permissiveness in front of acts of corruption, then we may easily say that the situation hasn't much improved since then. Regarding tolerance towards high-level corruption, in 2006 the ex-president Alan García Pérez, whose first government had continuously been denounced as highly corrupt, and who himself had to flee the country under the same charges in 1992, managed to end in second place of the presidential runoff of 2001 and was surprisingly elected for a second government in 2006. In 2011, Keiko Fujimori, daughter (and interim First Lady) of the imprisoned ex-president Alberto Fujimori, ran for presidency with a success level that positioned her in a close second place behind current president Ollanta Humala Tasso.

Such popular support of large sectors of the population for corrupt politicians says a lot about the role that corruption plays in Peru. The Peruvian *ad hoc* attorney general for cases of corruption, Antonio Maldonado, made in 2005 the following dramatic comparison:

“<sup>4</sup>[W]hen the Nuremberg trial took place the 22<sup>nd</sup> defendant was the German society, because Hitler cannot be explained if not for the German society that promotes or tolerates him. In the Peruvian case such social self-criticism hasn't occurred. It suffices to see the polls. There are important sectors whose heart is with [Alberto] Fujimori.<sup>5</sup>”

From his words we can evidence that the citizens' involvement in the sustenance and reproduction of corruption is a real and acknowledged fact in both the academic<sup>6</sup> and political circles. On the other hand, the citizens' participation in low-level corruption such as bureaucratic bribery also continues to run high: Transparency International's (TI) Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) reports an average of 17.8% for the period 2005-2010 of surveyed people declaring to have paid a bribe in the previous twelve months<sup>7</sup>.

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<sup>4</sup> Translated from Spanish.

<sup>5</sup> Caretas, N° 1885, “El Procurador en su Laberinto”, August 4<sup>th</sup>, 2005.

<sup>6</sup> Similar words as Antonio Maldonado's are expressed by Eduardo Dargent (2005, p. 383).

<sup>7</sup> Statistics performed by us.

Nevertheless, and probably as a result of the highly differentiated levels of technical capabilities that have marked the guidelines and agendas of the pre and post ‘measurement revolution’, much of the new research strongly focuses on sophisticated models of econometric measurement without taking the same degree of attention over the theoretical backbone of each specific study. Whereas corruption studies have addressed in a profuse way the determinants and characteristics of bureaucratic corruption, on one side, and those of the private economic agents (either national or international) on the other, the impact and determinants of the citizen’s participation in a corrupt transaction have been approached in relation to political definitions such as trust, legitimacy, and support, while his/her impact on the reproduction of corruption itself has been mostly ignored (or modestly suggested). With few exceptions, the citizen is understood so far as being in the periphery and just having a passive role in corruption<sup>8</sup>.

#### Plan for the present study

If citizens’ tolerance towards corruption is as damaging as Peruvian officials and international scholars have suggested, then, what forms does it take, and what are its determinants in the case of Peru? The main objective of the present study will be to answer these two main questions and thus to correct the current scholarly trend by filling up the void regarding the relation between the citizenry and corruption. This effort implies four concatenated aims: First, a clear definition of the construct needs to be developed, accounting for the different forms that it may take; second, the analysis of corruption tolerance will require the identification and employment of a theoretically grounded indicator, based on the preceding definition; third, a theoretical model for the potential determinants of corruption tolerance will be constructed; and

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<sup>8</sup> Karklins (2005, p. 155), however, orderly expresses her discomfort with such situation: “[T]here are three types of actors who need to be considered in any anti-corruption strategy: the corrupter, the corruptee, and the third actor. Although the main goal is to deter people from initiating corrupt acts to begin with, a narrow focus on the first actor can limit results. Corrupters rely on the passive or active collaboration of second actors, and in many situations it is easier to deter corruption by focusing on this second link in the process of ‘misuse of public power.’ *If potential victims and other third actors become galvanized to work to prevent corruption, it is possible to limit or even reverse the spiral of corruption.*” (Italics are ours)

fourth, we will use all these instruments in the analysis of the phenomenon as experienced by the Peruvian citizenry. This last step will be accomplished by the employment of the Latin American Public Opinion Project's (LAPOP) AmericasBarometer dataset of 2006 for the country case of Peru, developed by the Vanderbilt University. Therefore, this study can be said to be twofold: A theoretical model of citizens' corruption tolerance will be built upon the literature suggestions and requirements, and with it will be possible to explain why Peruvians behave as usually depicted by national officials such as Diego García-Sayan and Antonio Maldonado. The results will show that individuals in that country tend to support corrupt politicians when they have more information, political knowledge, partisan attitudes, economic satisfaction, democratic and community-oriented values, and positive attitudes toward the corruption phenomenon; and they punish them when they perceive high-level corruption to be generalized, and they are more politically efficacious. With regards to low-level (or petty) corruption, Peruvians will be shown to collude when they also have tendencies to economically support their communities, and when they feel politically dissatisfied; on the other hand, they will stand for their own rights and reject to be extorted by public officials when perceiving that others are also standing for themselves, and when effective complaint mechanisms are available.

The study is divided in two parts. Part One consists of the first five chapters, in which the complete theoretical model for the study of corruption tolerance is developed: Chapter 1 starts by disaggregating the possible interactions of the citizen with corruption in three parts –high-level, low-level collusion, and low-level extortion; then, it reviews existent literature on the term 'corruption tolerance' in order to identify common and differentiated usage, finding in general a preference to associate the citizen's tolerance with his/her attitudes towards malfeasance, and a small but important tradition on implicit tolerance as electoral behavior, nonetheless; it finishes by addressing the importance of corruption tolerance for the overall level of corruption in a society. Chapter 2 applies the tripartite corruption scheme found in the previous chapter, and builds the theoretical models for high-level and low-level corruption tolerance; for the former, a model of *vertical accountability* is adopted, which envisages the manifestation of corruption tolerance as the last stage in a process that starts with available information, and finishes with the punishment of corrupt political actors; for the latter, the Theory of Planned Behavior is called to

represent tolerance as an action determined by attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control; throughout the chapter, an argument is made for the superiority of a *behavioral approach* to the tolerance indicator in front of the traditional attitudinal perspective. Chapters 3 and 4 undertake the test of our behavioral (or action-based) indicators, further confirming our previous assumptions regarding the non-equivalence of attitudes to behavior. In the case of high-level corruption (Chapter 3), two indicators are especially constructed for this task reflecting the politician's *history* and *electoral offer*, which will allow us to recreate the citizen's vote as a degree of support or punishment for corruption; after this, ordered logistic regression is employed to test the relation between our behavioral indicator of high-level corruption tolerance and a classic attitudinal one, resulting in a statistically significant, but small, coefficient. In the case of low-level corruption (Chapter 4), a theory-driven selection of indicators will allow the disaggregation of data between collusion and extortion, a difference not originally contemplated in the data set; and the employment of a similar statistical technique as the one used in the previous chapter will show that, for the most part, attitudes and behavior regarding low-level corruption tolerance, in its deviant or compliant form, are statistically unrelated. Finally, in Chapter 5, we identify all potential determinants of corruption tolerance based on the models developed earlier and the theoretical and empirical progress of past literature.

Part Two consists of the last five chapters, where the study turns to the empirical analysis and interpretation of the specific determinants behind the levels of corruption tolerance in Peru, drawing from the models and indicators developed in the previous section. In Chapters 6 and 7 we analyze the statistical impact of the multiple factors identified over the behavioral indicators of Peruvians' corruption tolerance. For high-level corruption tolerance, a combination of principal-components factoring analysis and more simple aggregation techniques is employed to create a composite indicator for each variable, using survey questions of the LAPOP's dataset of 2006; then, a Structural Equation Model is built, partially mirroring the dynamic of the vertical accountability process. For the analysis of low-level corruption, the same strategy for the creation of composite indicators is adopted, and Spearman's rank correlation is applied to test the two sets of variables pertaining to cases of collusion and extortion. Chapters 8 and 9 elaborate on the findings of the previous two chapters,

by taking statistical results into perspective and drawing explanations completely embedded in Peruvian reality; the result is a holistic approach (involving historical, political, sociological, economic, and anthropological information on Peru) that interprets seemingly enigmatic relations, evidencing and clarifying the complex state of corruption tolerance in the country. Finally, Chapter 10 concludes with a review of the outcomes of this study, warning about some shortcomings that warrant caution in the straight adoption and implementation of the empirical results, and suggesting some future venues for research and policy consideration.

## PART ONE

### DISAGGREGATED CITIZEN-CENTERED MODELS FOR THE STUDY OF CORRUPTION TOLERANCE



CHAPTER 1  
LITERATURE REVIEW:  
THE IMPORTANCE AND USAGE OF *CORRUPTION TOLERANCE*

1.1. THE POSITION OF THE CITIZEN IN A CORRUPTION SCHEME

Corruption is by itself a complex phenomenon. Its usual illegality (if not unethically) prompts all actors engaged in its performance to stay in the ‘shadows’, to act away from the scrutiny of the public eye in their exchange of financial and other desired assets for public power. Contrary to other criminal forms, corruption is believed to be particularly damaging, for it doesn’t exploit individual victims, but instead feeds over the entirety of the polity, thus stressing the social bounds that link all of its members. The most common definition of this phenomenon, which will be used in the present study, states that corruption is the *misuse of public office for private gains* (Balán, 2011, p. 4; McCann and redlawsk, 2006, p. 798; UNODC, 2004, p. 11; Anderson and Tverdova, 2003, p. 92; Seligson, 2002, p. 408; Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman, 2005, p. 577; Treisman, 2000, p. 399) that “occurs at the interface of public and private sectors” (Rose-Ackerman, 1997, p. 31). This seemingly innocuous definition involves, hence, such activities as pork barreling, electoral fraud, embezzlement, nepotism, cronyism, State capture, racketeering, bribery, etc.

A main element to keep in mind in any analysis of corruption is that, in some direct or indirect way, there will always be a form of tax over the citizenry at large as a consequence. That is what gives corruption its uniqueness. Such externality can take the form of economic, political, or social costs, as briefly reviewed in the introduction. Because of that externality, then, some authors have suggested to think of corruption as a dynamic model consisting of three actors: A benefactor (usually in the form of a private person), a beneficiary (usually in the form of a public official), and a third, disadvantaged actor (society) (Spengler, 2010, p. 8; Karklins, 2005, p. 155). Although this model can best describe any type of corrupt exchange that includes a bribe, with some leniency its potential could be stretched to include scenarios such as graft or racketeering; regardless of its non-mutually exclusive

categories, it supplies us with a basic scheme to position our societal actors and simulate their possible interactions.

When placing the citizen in such tripartite scheme, it comes as obvious that he/she may occupy the same positions as the roles that drive his/her political interactions in society: A passive player in the process of political decisions (as most of the population is in representative democracies, most of the time), and reactive in the stage of policy implementation. As a passive player, the citizen can mainly be described as part of the unorganized civil society, and therefore understood for the purposes of this study as the third, disadvantaged actor in a corrupt exchange; this is the reason why corruption (in all of its forms) is hidden from the public, as it victimizes all others that are excluded (Uslaner, 2008, p. 9). On the other hand, citizens also have an opportunity to engage in corruption themselves in every opportunity when they encounter the public sphere. Bribery of low-ranking public officials is a very common phenomenon in most developing countries, and it is performed by men and women acting as private citizens (although there is nothing private in illegally paying their way through official interactions with agents of the State). In such cases, the person adopts the role of the benefactor, the ‘corruptor’ as it is commonly referred to.

If we subscribe to this description of the possible roles of the citizen in a tripartite corruption scheme, we can conclude, then, that he/she has a part in both categories of high-level and low-level corruption<sup>9</sup> (Uslaner, 2008, p. 132). We may think of this distinction as the two-fold nature of the individual: *A political and an economic animal*. Our argument shouldn’t be interpreted as the identification of mutually exclusive roles of the citizen, but rather of the two possible scenarios that

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<sup>9</sup> We prefer to use these terms instead of the also commonly employed grand/petty or political/bureaucratic corruption. The distinction between grand and petty corruption has been said to be monetary, highlighting the importance of the ‘profitability’ of the act (UNDP, 2008, p. 8; Uslaner, 2008, p. 10-11). On the other hand, although usually used as synonyms of the previous terms, the distinction between political and bureaucratic corruption informs the nature of the actors involved, where political (or administrative) corruption “*involves political decision-makers*” (Amundsen, 1999, p. 3) as opposed to ‘street-level’ officials (Khan, 2003, p. 4; Andvig et al., 2000, p. 13). Both distinctions have their deficiencies: A focus on the size of the bribe or the financial assets exchanged completely avoids considerations regarding the actors involved (although different authors tend to equalize the amounts of money to the ranks of the official actor, which is not always the case in real life), and therefore the possible reaction of the citizenry; while an exclusive focus on the official’s rank is a somehow unclear criteria to discriminate cases, due to the heterogeneity of selection processes and extension of duties of public offices (Liiv, 2004, p. 11).

may confront him/her as an average member of the unorganized civil society<sup>10</sup>. High-level corruption (HLC) is understood as any corrupt activity involving high officials of the administrative and political system, on one hand, and economic agents engaging in a sizable activity outside of the scope of individual patterns, on the other. In this scenario, as explained by Morris (2008, p. 392; see also Németh et al., 2011, p. 61; Uslaner, 2008, p. 14; and Tverdova, 2007, p. 3), would be futile to look for corrupt interactions involving the citizen as a direct actor (for example, in cases involving procurement or State capture). Low-level corruption (LLC), conversely, involves the interaction between lower-ranks government officials and regular citizens driven (for the most part) by economic incentives.

Moving beyond the tripartite model, a commonly added complexity to corruption studies is the disaggregation of LLC between *collusive* and *extortive* bribery (Uslaner, 2008, p. 37; Khan, 2003, p. 5), which describe the nature of the two possible relations between corruptor and corruptee. Collusive corruption is a situation where both directly implicated actors engage in a corrupt transaction in order to obtain some benefit which they are not entitled to. Extortive corruption, on the other hand, “means that the government official has the discretionary power to refuse or delay a service... in order to extract a rent from the private agent in the form of a bribe” (Brunetti and Weder, 2003, p. 1804). In this way, it is possible to appreciate that the incentives to engage in one form or the other of LLC corruption are quite different<sup>11</sup>.

Looking into it from a different, but supportive, perspective, we can also see the relevance of these two ways of categorizing the citizen’s relation to corruption by addressing some intuitive considerations regarding the individuals’ potential evaluation of HLC and LLC. To do this, we borrow from past studies to elicit some questions whose answers will prove to reflect in more familiar and practical terms the same kind of theoretical conclusions that we have derived above.

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<sup>10</sup> The ‘average’ citizens of whom we will talk throughout this study should not be confused with citizens occupying public posts, elected leaders, or even members of civic groups.

<sup>11</sup> Probably the most transparent description of collusive and extortive scenarios can be found in Bauhr and Nasiritousi (2011). In their description, the authors refer to collusion as a situation where a bribe is given to gain advantages not entitled to, whereas extortion occurs when services that citizens are legally entitled to are conditioned upon a bribe (p. 3).

- **How is the citizen involved in corruption?** As the distance between individuals and the State seems to have acquired complex ways, due to the varying degree of the latter's intervention in daily life and the subsequent size of its apparatus, the limits between public and private spheres are not always clear, and in many instances they are permeated by the presence of corruption. The points of contact between them are usually as mundane as paying bills, filing taxes, receiving traffic tickets, and the like, whereas every certain number of years citizens are called upon to cast their vote in support of new or old representatives. That is the general sum of the public's involvement in the political subsystem. In the same way, their relation with corruption mirrors their relation with the State: Citizens can engage themselves in LLC in any of those points of contact mentioned above, but are usually restricted in their interaction with HLC to those reactive moments of electoral participation, when they have the opportunity to punish a corrupt politician, or to reward a honest one. For this reasons, his/her involvement in corruption clearly differentiates between LLC and HLC.
  
- **How does it affect him/her?** In the words of Rasma Karklins (2005, p. 68), "corruption is bad if it occurs at the highest level of government, because that endangers the interest of the entire state, whereas individual corruption is seen to involve the interests of only a few people." Her words can be interpreted as concerning the individual's self-image over the outcomes of corruption: When it happens in the highest levels of the government, all members of the polity feel tricked and lied to, their moneys robbed and their trust betrayed; however, corruption of the kind of petty payments to low wage officials may seem as almost a private matter, something that only affects the ones involved, and maybe one or two individuals that may be neglected as a consequence. For this reason, the difference between ending up *losing*, or potentially *winning*, from corruption, mirrors again the difference between HLC and LLC<sup>12</sup>. However, there is a detail that Karklins' account does not consider at that moment, but which is picked up in another point of her study (2005, pp. 20, 150): Every corrupt interaction which the citizen engages in does not

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<sup>12</sup> Uslaner (2008, p. 9) also describes the "excluded party" of political corruption (HLC) as "almost always the loser in the corrupt transaction".

necessarily work in his favor, not just regarding the possible legal ramifications, but because he/she may be forced to pay for something that was already his/her right to obtain in the first place. Obviously, we are talking about cases of extortion. Therefore, an extra possible effect on his/her wellbeing might be a detrimental one, positioning him as a *winner* of the corrupt transaction *only in cases of collusive LLC*, whereas the opposite will be true in cases of HLC and extortive LLC.

- **What are the general consequences of such event?** Inequality. Either through the big amounts of money involved in cases of grand corruption, or the small, petty payments to local bureaucrats, corruption always pushes in the direction of economic and social inequality. Uslaner (2008) partially proposes and tests this assumption: “Grand corruption is all about inequality –officials and entrepreneurs getting rich illegitimately. Petty corruption doesn’t create a big income gap” (p. 44). However, petty corruption of the one designated here as *extortive LLC* can also have sizable effects, as van Vuuren (2004, p. 16) finds in the case of South Africa: The poor’s “inability to access basic services due to the demand for bribes will further deepen socio-economic cleavages and contribute to their alienation from the democratic process”. Hence, once more, we identify two separate ‘cuts’ having detrimental consequences for the individual’s wellbeing. Contrary to Uslaner’s warning that only high-level corruption is perceived as increasing a society’s inequality (2008, p. 137), we posit that another necessary analytical cut for the effect of corruption must be performed between extortive and collusive LLC, where the former must be considered harmful, and only the latter relatively innocuous.
- **Who gets benefitted?** Although the answer to this question directly draws from the arguments presented in the previous three, there is an obvious but important factor that makes this question important for the definition of a citizens stand on the matter of corruption: If the individual gets harmed by it, then, who benefits? Members of his/her kinship? Fellow partisans? Other citizens of his/her socio-economic group? The answer to this question is important to understand how might the individual possibly feel and react when confronted with a corrupt scenario. In societies where trust is not widespread,

and people identify and rely more (or exclusively) on familiar ties, “they will feel less guilty about acting dishonestly to people who are not part of their moral community” (Uslaner, 2008, p. 49). In other words, collusive LLC would not necessarily be judged as pernicious to the individual, as he/she is directly benefitted by it, or at least gives him/her the means to do so. However, when others in the higher spheres of the government are seen acting in a similar way, the public reaction drastically shifts to one of disapproval and rejection<sup>13</sup>. Similarly, addressing the circumstances where regular citizens are seen their money stolen not by distant political leaders, but by venal street-level public officials, the classic corruption-scholar Robert Klitgaard (1988, p. 191) considered that “[e]xtortion seems a particularly nasty form of corruption. It leads not only to inefficiencies but the alienation of citizens from their government.” Although there always exist the possibility that individuals might feel more lenient towards surrendering a small bribe to a extorting bureaucrat than they may feel towards politicians treating the State as their private fiefdom, we consider Klitgaard to be intuitively correct and expect citizens to also resent the predatory behavior of officials that, after all, are paid with public moneys. Therefore, and once again, a simple distinction between LLC and HLC would be insufficient to account for the public reaction towards all kinds of corruption, as extortion will probably be perceived too as benefitting others in a power position, whereas collusion at least provides the citizen with a benefit (even if only potentially).

To sum up the above discussion, any attempt to analyze the role of civil society regarding corruption invariably requires us to consider splitting the corruption variable into three distinct dimensions: High-level corruption (HLC), low-level collusive corruption, and low-level extortive corruption<sup>14</sup>.

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<sup>13</sup> Uslaner (2008, p. 92), posits that “grand corruption makes people... more envious of those who have become wealthy by dishonest means, while petty corruption has little effect on people’s attitudes”, implying that the idea of the *other*, the rich and powerful members of society being the ones getting benefitted from corruption while the rest see their own situation worsen, makes all the difference regarding public attitudes about corruption.

<sup>14</sup> The only situation where the division of the citizen’s position in a corruption scheme between three different dimensions may appear to be insufficient is that of *clientelism* or patronage. Such scenario, involving the selling of votes or other forms of political rights in exchange for material benefits (either individual or communal), could theoretically be described as high-level extortion or collusion (depending on the sense of entitlement to the benefits that may pervade that particular polity).

## 1.2. CORRUPTION TOLERANCE: A LITERATURE REVIEW

As mentioned earlier, the interaction between citizens and corruption has been determinant in studies related to trust, legitimacy, and others; but in recent years there has appeared a new interest in the role of the citizen as a determinant him/herself of the preservation and perpetuation of corruption, especially in underdeveloped countries: Studies addressing the corruption tolerance among citizens. In itself, this new venue of research appears to be trying to fill a void in previous corruption-related studies, but being a recently developed perspective, it still struggles with some basic elements and characteristics of what ‘corruption tolerance’ as a specific concept should cover. This fact is made explicit by Blake (2009, p. 96) when he states that “despite interest in public attitudes toward corruption, to date there has been almost no systematic, cross-national research into the determinants of citizens’ tolerance of corruption”.

A point in case can be made by quickly reviewing some of the studies that has addressed the concept of ‘corruption tolerance’ either by directly constructing it as dependent or independent variable, or by referring to it in a rather natural, every-day meaning.

The literature on citizen’s corruption tolerance can be divided in two main groups: a) tolerance as citizen’s support for corrupt politicians; and, b) tolerance as citizen’s willingness to engage in corruption. The first group can be further divided in overt and covert support, depending on the research focus in reelection rates and/or voting behavior<sup>15</sup>, or mere attitudes towards politicians or political institutions, respectively. An example of corruption tolerance as overt support can be found in Chang and Kerr (2009), where they link corruption tolerance with the citizens’ behavior to “throw the rascals out” (p. 5). Other studies treating tolerance as overt support have a stronger emphasis on the link between corruption scandals and

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However, due to the decision to focus our analysis on average citizens not pertaining to any specific political division inside the country, and considering the fact that clientelism by definition involves the segregation of citizens between insiders and outsiders, we maintain HLC as a single construct and reserve the case of clientelism for its inclusion in the study of the determinants of high-level corruption tolerance in Chapter 5.

<sup>15</sup> For a quick review of the literature on corruption scandals and their electoral consequences, see Barberá et al. (2012, pp. 5-6).

reelection rates, and while they use the concept of tolerance in a barely explicit (and even entirely implicit) way, they have a longer history of existence and much work have been done around them. Such is the case of the work from Peters and Welch (1980) and Hibbing and Welch (1997), where they assess the effect of corruption charges in congressional elections. This early approach have been followed more recently by Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2012, p. 13), who ask if Brazilian voters are more “tolerant of corruption when politicians provide public goods”; and by McCann and Redlawsk (2006) and Chang and Golden (2004), showing that partisanship has an important impact on the judgment of corrupt scenarios, and that voters in Italy are as tolerant as American voters, respectively.

On the other hand, studies including the specific concept ‘corruption tolerance’ treated as covert support are found in Tverdova (2007, p. 9), where she succinctly comments that “tolerance... of corruption... may impact regime support in general”; Seligson (2002, p. 427), where he designates a respondent as “tolerant of corruption” when he/she lacks recognition of bribery of a deputy as a corrupt act; and, Gillespie and Okruhlik (1991, p. 87), when referring to tolerance of corruption as the level of social pressure over incumbents for the eradication of malfeasance. A similar treatment of the construct is given in the words of Tanaka (2005, p. 365), who posits that the citizens’ tolerance of corruption is a function of the efficacy of the government in supplying tangible benefits to the population. However, the most important example of this line of research is given by Manzetti and Wilson (2009, p. 89), who include in their empirical study of public support for corrupt governments a measure of corruption tolerance operationalized as the *justifiability of bribe-taking*. Finally, isolated mentions of corruption tolerance are present in Redlawsk and McCann (2005, p. 265) and Durand (2005, p. 287).

Corruption tolerance has also taken the form of, or been operationalized as, the citizens’ willingness to offer and/or justify a bribe and the ability to recognize such behavior as corrupt. Although not all authors would subscribe to this description of citizens’ *low-level corruption tolerance* (LCT) when referring in one way or the other to the concept, it does represent an inclusive approach that may be either explicit or implicit at different levels in this group of literature. Sautu (2002) develops a scale in order to classify middle-class citizens of Buenos Aires, Argentina,



according to their level of “tolerance-resignation” (p. 4), derived from answers to hypothetical cases of LLC such as bribing a policeman or getting a license through a ‘middle-man’ (p. 6). This same description of the individual’s willingness to engage in bribery can be detected in the analysis presented by Del Castillo and Guerrero (2003), although in a more subtle and implicit way, as in Moyal et al. (2004), where even though tolerance is not explicitly mentioned, it can be understood from the context (determinants of citizens’ proclivity to offer a bribe). Regarding the justifiability of the corrupt act, Moreno’s (2002, p.6) “index of corruption permissiveness”, Gatti et al. (2003, p. 7), and Blake (2009, p. 102) use the same question regarding attitudes toward bribe taking: ‘Is someone “accepting a bribe in the course of their duties” justifiable?’ Their intention, as Moreno’s index clearly indicates, is to assess bribery’s legitimacy as a socio-political instrument, somehow close to the “routinization” of corruption that Salzman (2009, p. 5) postulates for petty corruption in Latin America. Finally, Del Castillo and Guerrero (2003, p. 26) report the results of a survey conducted by the Mexican chapter of Transparency International, which found that up to 18.7% of heads of household did not recognize a *mordida* (bribe) as a form of corruption.

Aside from employing the basic description (and some future tenets) of what has been referred to as LCT, several studies have explicitly used the construct in varying degrees. Campos-Ortiz (2010, p. 22) categorizes tolerant and intolerant subjects based on their willingness and defense of corrupt behavior, as opposed to “previous experience”. In an analysis of perception of corruption among Estonian citizens, Uslaner (2008, p. 162) posits that “ordinary people are more tolerant, perhaps because they have experienced petty corruption more often”, while the Open Society Institute (2002) thoroughly employs this concept to describe some elements of the accession process of the new members of the European Union (Karklins, 2005, p. 67). But such worries are not a particularism of that region, but it is also a matter of worry in Latin America. With a behavioral intervention in Brazil in mind, Taylor (2009, p. 167) suggests that corruption tolerance may be reduced “through education and media awareness programs”; and Ortiz and Calderon (2005, p. 139), and Morón (2005, p. 147), call attention to the results of a national poll conducted in 2002 by NGO *Pro-Ética* showing the Peruvian citizens are highly tolerant to LLC.

Finally, only one study undertakes the task of measuring corruption tolerance as understood by both main groups reviewed above: Cameron et al (2009), following an experimental approach to the study of corrupt behavior among citizens in Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore, emphasizes the level and frequency of *punishment behavior* and that of *engagement in corruption*, understanding them as two sides of a citizen's corruption-related activity.

As we can see, the concept of *corruption tolerance* has indeed been around the scholarly production since the beginning of the new century, in both explicit and implicit ways, in an increasing rate. However, to the moment, only one study (Chang and Kerr, 2009, p. 4) has cared to define it as a first step for its scientific inclusion in properly constructed corruption studies, while the rest remain using it in vague and anecdotic terms. Such carefree approach has resulted, as it can be perceived above, in a heterogeneous operationalization of the construct, which can be either considered a set of perceptions, attitudes, or behavior, depending on the specific author and objective, with a seemingly higher preference for an attitudinal equation. There is, on the other hand, an important scholarly tradition that employs the basic idea behind corruption tolerance as a pattern of electoral conducts and actions, an approach that has been favored more in cases of *high-level corruption tolerance* (HCT).

Whereas the recent group of work suggest a diversity of technical and methodological strategies that enrich the discussion over the citizens' involvement in their society's level of corruption, their lack of homogeneity in the construction of the corruption tolerance concept prompts the need for some basic and common terms for the definition and operationalization of this multidimensional concept.

### 1.3. THE IMPACT OF CITIZENS' CORRUPTION TOLERANCE ON THE OVERALL LEVEL OF CORRUPTION

The level of corruption in any particular society is said to depend to a large extent on the decisions that citizens take when confronted with corrupt scenarios. Not only this is implicit throughout the reviewed literature treating the concept of corruption tolerance, but it is masterly pointed by Manzetti (2000, p. 139) when

explaining that “high corruption takes place when: (1) many checks and balances among the three branches of government and the institutional mechanisms to combat corruption are weak or are not used; (2) there are no self-restraints in profiting from corruption as commissions reach extremely high levels; and (3) corruption is so widespread at any social level as to be accepted and tolerated.” This perspective takes for the topic of corruption what has already been pointed out in the literature dealing with tax evasion. In an enlightening analysis of the causes of different levels of tax evasion in Chile and Argentina, Marcelo Bergman (2009) revisits the concept of equilibrium to explain why the same basic system of tax collection proves to be effective in Chile but fails in the case of Argentina. His argument is that the interaction between voluntary compliance on the one hand, and the role of enforcement on the other, can develop in a stable environment of compliance or non-compliance equilibrium, upon which the citizen makes rational decisions based on the expected choices of others. In its basic terms, Bergman presents a model where individual compliance is based on, and reproduced by, society itself, and the final aggregated result depends as much on this society-based consideration as on the level and strength of governmental enforcement.

The same case seems to be the one raised by Manzetti in his list of three factors for an environment of high corruption. The first two, checks and balances and the level of self-restraint, are none other than the set of formal and informal “constraints that shape human interactions” (North, 1990, p. 3) on the governmental side of the political system. The third factor, which will be the center of our research efforts, refers to the citizen’s compliance to that corrupt set of formal and informal rules, his/her acceptance and coexistence with corruption in society. As advanced by the theory of tax compliance, we can then address the level of corruption in any country mostly by referring to the characteristics of the formal institutions (understood only as the legal governmental structures, and the bureaucratic and political culture of those who fill such structures) and the level of corruption tolerance among the citizens. By doing this, we will be able to see that the main theoretical contribution of the present study will be to develop an appropriate tool for the identification of the different determinants of corruption tolerance in a given community, and from there to empirically assert the conditions upon which efficiently employ the scarce public resources in the fight against corruption in Peru.

#### 1.4. SUMMARY

In this chapter we saw that the appropriate way of addressing corruption tolerance from the side of the citizen should undoubtedly start by identifying the different roles he/she may cast in a corruption scheme, which is a consequence of the multiple types of corruption that exists in society. Although many authors and International Organizations tend to approach it as a single and unified construct (a major example being Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index), scholarly production has been able to disaggregate it following two different divisions, which we adopt here in relation to the citizen's potential direct or indirect involvement: High-level versus low-level corruption, and collusion versus extortion.

Past literature mentioning or treating corruption tolerance has also followed the divergent lines of HLC and LLC, with the former describing it as the citizen's support for corrupt politicians, and the latter as the citizen's willingness to offer a bribe and his/her ability to recognize such behavior as corrupt. In cases of HLC, such support has been described in more overt or covert terms, depending on their focus on behavioral or attitudinal responses, respectively, while studies addressing corruption tolerance in cases of LLC have mainly operationalized it as an attitudinal response. Concerning the identified difference between collusive and extorted bribery, however, there is no work that could be found mentioning (or even assuming) tolerance towards instances of extortion, a problem resulting from the scarce academic production on that specific type of corruption.

Finally, and before moving on to the concrete work on the tolerant construct, this chapter presented an argument about the importance of understanding its mechanisms, from the citizens' perspective, for the evolution of corruption on a national level. The extent to which corruption is spread in society is said to be the result of the state of legal institutions, and the degree to which members of the polity accept and comply with practices of malfeasance in those formal structures. In this way, we can see that the level of corruption tolerance in the citizenry can potentially account for as much as half of the pervasiveness of graft and bribery in both high and low levels of the political-bureaucratic system. The reason is real and intuitive: Without individuals supporting corrupt leaders in government, and others who accept

to pay a bribe in order to gain access to lawful or unlawful services, corruption would promptly decay from lack of resources.

CHAPTER 2  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:  
BUILDING THE CONCEPT OF CORRUPTION TOLERANCE

As we have seen, the concept of corruption tolerance, and as a consequence its operationalization, is not homogeneous in regard to the political dimensions it includes. Interestingly enough, only one author engages in the task of explicitly defining corruption tolerance: It denotes “citizens’ proclivity to condone a political actor’s engagement in corrupt transactions” (Chang and Kerr, 2009, p. 4). Whereas we don’t oppose this definition, we think it is unable to cover the whole range of the citizen’s relations with corruption that can impact a political system. This seems evident when we try to apply the concept to the framework developed earlier regarding the role of the citizen in a corrupt transaction. This role was decided as tripartite: a) the citizen as the disadvantaged party in a scenario of high-level corruption; b) the citizens as the willing benefactor in a scenario of collusion; and, c) the citizen as the forced, losing party in a scenario of extortion. When these roles are re-casted in reference to the level of tolerance towards the corrupt activity in case, we will see that each one of them bends the concept in a very specific way.

In the first case, the citizen’s corruption tolerance can be addressed as his/her *support* for the corrupt politician(s), which has as a main consequence the impact on vertical accountability that is implied in any democratic system. In the second case, what has been addressed as corruption tolerance in a collusive transaction, implies a deviant behavior (in sociological terms) in favor of corrupt activities. This can be succinctly regarded as *corrupt deviance*. Finally, in the third case, although the citizen’s reaction towards a scenario of extortion hasn’t been contemplated so far in the literature regarding corruption tolerance, we believe it is important to include it in order to cover all the citizen’s roles, and in such effort we consider that any tolerance of extortion should be understood as *corruption compliance*.

In this way, we can see that, although corruption tolerance invariably entails the citizen’s involvement in the perpetuation of corruption in society, the meaning it has for the individual, as well as the determinants and characteristics of such

behavior, varies greatly depending on the specific role casted<sup>16</sup>. Table 2-1 synthetizes the observations made.

TABLE 2-1. DISAGGREGATED CITIZENS' CORRUPTION TOLERANCE

	High-level Corruption	Low-level Corruption
Collusive	-----	Corrupt Deviance
Extortive	Corruption Support	Corruption Compliance

Having reached a strong first point from where to construct a theory of corruption tolerance, and in order to be able to use the categorization developed above, it is necessary to operationalize each dimension of the concept by following step by step the process through which a citizen develops and expresses a particular level or amount of corruption tolerance. To this objective we turn now.

#### 2.1. HIGH-LEVEL CORRUPTION TOLERANCE (HCT): THE 'VERTICAL ACCOUNTABILITY' APPROACH

When Canache and Allison (2003) studied the impact of corruption perception on political support, they seemed to be tapping into the main core of what HCT is all about: "A vital step in combating political corruption is for citizens to be able to hold leaders accountable when they engage in malfeasance" (p. 2). For this kind of accountability to exist, they explain, three requirements must be fulfilled. First, citizens must be able to accurately perceive corruption when it exists. This implies that the process through which citizens hold their leaders to some level of accountability starts with the ability to acknowledge the reality involving corruption around the acts of government<sup>17</sup>. The authors make explicit notice that this perception must be accurate in order to be of any help for the democratic system. Second, citizens need to adjust their opinions of the relevant actors according to the previously

<sup>16</sup> The first attempt to address the effects of citizen involvement regarding different levels of corruption can be found in Salzman (2009).

<sup>17</sup> On the impact of corruption perceptions over electoral behavior, for the case of Poland, see Slomczynski and Shabad (2009, pp. 12-13).

perceived corruption. While corruption is currently unavoidably understood as pernicious for the political system, that does not entails an automatic reaction in the form of protest from the political subjects. For accountability to exist, the citizen must go through the internal process of calibrating his/her attitudes toward the political leaders in direct relation to the level of corruption perceived in the behavior of those leaders. And third, the citizen must punish in some way the corrupt actor. This is the final step where the internal attitudes translate into external behavior; or to put it in another way, the change in covert support emerges as a variation in the overt support.

To sum up, what Canache and Allison (2003) were proposing is that vertical accountability (O'Donnell, 1998) happens when the process presented in Figure 2-1 is satisfied:


FIGURE 2-1. THE PROCESS OF VERTICAL ACCOUNTABILITY



In their study, Canache and Allison focused only on the presence of the requirements for punishment, leaving the actual punishment aside, and hence describing a still incomplete picture of corruption tolerance understood as the lack of vertical accountability. As we have seen in other authors, and the position that is going to be taken throughout this research, the main characteristic of corruption tolerance in a high-level corruption (HLC) scenario must be found in the absence of punishment for the corrupt party. If it's particularly the lack of punishment what will describe the corruption tolerance in a society, the first three consecutive stages described in the chart above could be very much present in the same context as corruption tolerance. Graphic 2-2 reproduces the 'vertical accountability' process in a scenario of HCT.



FIGURE 2-2. HCT AS THE LACK OF VERTICAL ACCOUNTABILITY



As we can see, in a scenario of HCT there are just two constant that we can identify. First, there must exist some kind of information about corrupt activities involving members of the government that is available to the citizens through the mass media<sup>18</sup>; and second, no punishment from the part of the citizen appears as a consequence of that information. Condensing it into a proper definition, we can say that HCT is the **citizen’s behavioral adherence to condone the corrupt behavior of the political actor**. Working backwards, we could define also (with the intention of managing proper indicators later) the attitude, perception, and information linkage. Following our punishment-centered definition of HCT, the *corrected attitudes* stage of the process will be defined as the citizen’s moral adherence to the political actor, whereas the *perception* stage will be defined as the degree to which a citizen believe that the political actor is involved in corrupt practices (which are condemned by definition). Finally, the *information* stage will be the availability of information to the public related to corrupt activities involving the political actor.

With the proper definitions laid down, the next logical step is to find a suitable indicator for measurement. We partly follow in this study the approach used by McCann and Redlawsk (2006) and focus in the voting behavior in congressional and presidential elections, understanding for corruption tolerance the action of *voting for a candidate in spite of its corrupt character*. This by no means imply that voting behavior is the only indicator with the potential to tap into HCT, but just that for the

<sup>18</sup> Karklins (2005, p. 112) has referred to the availability of information to punish corrupt politicians as “[a] fundamental precondition for accountability”. On its importance, see Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2012), Barberá et al. (2012, p. 18), and Bagenholm (2009, p. 18); through its impact on *perception*, see Németh et al. (2011, p. 61).

aims of this study it presents itself as the more feasible given the available sources of data and the trends already developing on the topic. Such strategy is also favored by Uslaner (2008), although for the analysis of anti-corruption<sup>19</sup>. Additionally, in Peru (the specific country case that will occupy us later), it can be clearly perceived that the elections are the main venue of vertical accountability (Sanchez, 2010, p. 6) and political participation (Masías and Segura, 2006, p. 106). Hence, we find suitable to equate the electoral act of voting to the punishment or support for specific levels of corruption.

#### Attitude-behavior congruency and HCT measurement

Having gone this far, we can now see some of the problems surrounding the recent efforts to tab in any way into the level and implications of corruption tolerance in cases of high-level corruption. First, the studies that show a bigger concern in focusing specifically on the tolerance construct are the ones that treat it as covert support (with the important exception of Chang and Kerr, 2009), hence not been able to explicitly cover the entire process as we have described it, specifically in relation to their lack of inclusion of the *punishment* stage, voting behavior. Second, the operationalization of covert support doesn't follow the basic considerations for an improved accuracy in attitude-behavior (A-B) congruency<sup>20</sup>.

The decision of previous research to discard a study of corruption tolerance in attention to all four stages of the vertical accountability process described before, signifies the necessary preclusion of any determinant that may block the transition from attitudes to action, and hence account for a partial story. Beyond this self-evident issue, however, it can be accepted that, if the intention to stop at the attitudinal level has to do with the possibility of using those measures as a proxy for actual punishment, they could still arrive to nearly conclusive results. Scholarly efforts since the 1970's has been showing encouraging rates of success in the area of A-B congruency when concentrating in the prediction of voting behavior (Schuman

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<sup>19</sup> In his study of trust and corruption in United States, Uslaner 2008, p. 228) argues that “[since] the Progressive Party focused primarily on clean government and structural reform, support for it is a *reasonable proxy for public support in a state for anti-corruption initiatives.*”

<sup>20</sup> A-B congruency can be understood as the degree of correlation between attitudinal measures of a latent disposition, and “behaviors that are not elicited by formal measurement procedures” (Schuman and Johnson, 1976, p. 161).

and Johnson, 1976), meaning that even when a HCT study is not measuring the actual voting behavior of the citizens, it can still bring important results (although not complete) if measuring for the same citizens' attitudes toward a particular candidate. Further development in A-B studies carried on by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) showed that measuring the specific attitude towards a behavior, instead of the attitude towards a person or an object, increases the possibility of predicting actual behavior, implying for the sake of our research that a measure of a citizen's willingness to punish a particular corrupt political actor could also predict his/her political behavior when punishment is an option (as in the case of electoral processes) and bring close results to uncovering his/her corruption tolerance level.

Nonetheless, most of the literature reviewed earlier regarding corruption tolerance miss these two possible alternative measurement approximations (meaning 'attitude towards a particular corrupt political actor' and 'attitude towards punishing a particular corrupt political actor') and it decides in one way or another to measure the citizens' *attitude towards a corrupt act* ('how wrong would it be if the political actor...?') without any further context. This treatment is most explicit when looking at the cases of Manzetti and Wilson (2009, p. 92) and Blake (2009, p. 102), where what is stated as an indicator for "tolerant of corruption" in the former, is called an indicator for "attitudes toward bribe taking" in the latter. As it will be explained in detail later, attitudes towards an action can be a powerful predictor when referring to one's action, what we have called 'attitudes toward the behavior'; but in the case of HCT, the classic measurement of attitudes can be actually described as a measurement towards corruption itself as an object<sup>21</sup>, and hence producing little A-B congruency<sup>22</sup>.

All this said, the selection of a casted vote as an indicator for HCT still deserves some additional comments before we can continue with its testing.

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<sup>21</sup> It is important to clarify that A-B congruency can effectively use the attitudes toward the object as a powerful predictor for voting behavior given that the object measured is the one over which the voting behavior is expressed. In this way, the attitude towards a candidate could predict voting for him/her or not, while attitude towards corruption should theoretically be able to predict the voting behavior in a referendum for an anti-corruption piece of legislation.

<sup>22</sup> The problem of congruency will be explained in further detail when we talk about the principle of compatibility in the construction of the low-level corruption tolerance indicator.

### The indicator of HCT: A problem of degrees

In 1972, Howard Schuman reproduced the results of a series of survey questions that were trying to assess the racial attitudes of white Americans in 1969. When asked about a simple, hypothetical scenario where a case of discrimination in a job interview against an African American was committed, most respondents showed disagreement with the validity of such discriminating behavior. Nevertheless, when confronted with the same hypothetical case in a context where economic and democratic values were added into the scenario, the rate of responses showed an increasing tolerance towards discrimination against African Americans in the same job interview. The intention of Schuman (1972, p. 352) was to show that this technique to measure attitudes was a “[test] of adherence to a single principle under various degrees of practical difficulty or counter-pressure” and that, as such, it didn’t mean that respondents were showing some kind of incongruence between questions, but that reality could be better capture in a survey by means of recreating the various sources of stimuli that make an individual behave in one way or the other.

The exact same problem can be said to affect corruption tolerance and voting behavior. When asking a citizen about his/her attitude toward an imaginary corrupt politician, there is no surprise that the citizen may express his/her disagreement with that behavior and find it punishable. The reason for such an answer is that the corrupt actor was shown in a vacuum, a particular case that very rarely can be found in reality<sup>23</sup>. The most similar scenario could only be found by experimentally controlling every socio-economical and demographic variable that could determine the political support of a single citizen for a corrupt and a non-corrupt politician; the result will most likely, if not always, be the support for the non-corrupt politician<sup>24</sup>. In an electoral process, nevertheless, voters must weight different and sometimes contradictory values to decide in which direction to orient their political support. It is precisely in this case where we could see in action the degree to which a citizen can

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<sup>23</sup> Zaller (1992, p. 49) have expressed this same idea when arguing that “individuals answer survey questions by averaging across the considerations that are *immediately* salient or accessible to them”. (Italics are ours)

<sup>24</sup> In the words of Barberá et al. (2012, p. 3), “it is almost trivial to argue that, among a number of candidates, citizens will prefer to choose one that is not involved in illicit activities, *caeteris paribus*.”

tolerate corruption, by placing such factor against other reasons for voting for a particular candidate<sup>25</sup>. In a scenario where different candidates hold a different record of corrupt activities (it doesn't matter if this record is objective or created by the media), the decision of the voter can be interpreted as the **minimum level of corruption tolerance as expressed by a higher emphasis in other features of the candidate**. To say it shortly, the more corrupt the candidate for whom the citizen is voting, the more tolerant of high-level corruption that citizen is.

Hence, we complete the above construction by saying that the individual's HCT level is based on the minimum tolerance of the citizen expressed by voting in spite of the ratio of information about the corrupt character and the position of fight against corruption (in an index of electoral offers) of the candidate. When addressing congressional instead of presidential elections, the focus on the candidate might be switched to that of the party because of the lack of individual congressmen information available in most surveys regarding voting behavior.

## 2.2. LOW-LEVEL CORRUPTION TOLERANCE (LCT): THE BEHAVIORAL APPROACH

As stated in Chapter 1, the category of low-level corruption (LLC) is better understood as an encompassing level that in deeper analysis involves two related but distinct sub-categories of corrupt behavior: collusive corruption, a transaction where the citizen acts as a benefactor in order to secure an advantage which he/she is not legally entitled to; and extortive corruption, a transaction where the citizen is put in the role of the disadvantage party as he/she tries to secure a service which he/she is legally entitled to but that is conditioned upon his/her engagement in the transaction. The implications of this dichotomic division are most relevant in an analysis of the citizen's engagement in LLC because it allows us to focus on the basic motivations behind his/her decision to engage in it.

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<sup>25</sup> This phenomenon is what Rundquist et al. (1977, p. 957) dubbed "the trading theory of corruption voting". McCann and Dominguez (1998, p. 495) find, indeed, empirical results showing that, in the case of Mexican citizens, "for the most part they vote on the basis of considerations other than their perceptions of electoral fraud and corruption."

The point is made explicit by Bauhr and Nasiritousi (2011, p. 3) when they propose the usage of the analogous greed/need corruption concepts, which declares the opposite motivational nature of both phenomena. In the first case, citizens engaging in the act are mainly identified by a general attitude of *greediness*, as they actively and willingly corrupt government officials in order to get an advantage or benefit that is normally refused to the rest of their fellow countrymen/women. The second case describes a rather different scenario, where citizens are forcibly and unwillingly put in a situation where they have to participate in a corrupt transaction (often in the way of bribing) in order to gain access to services that are legally available to him/her, but that are denied; in other words, the citizens in this case only act corruptly because they *need* to.

Whereas the greed/need conceptualization highlights the literature's void regarding the specific reasons for a person's corrupt behavior in markedly different scenarios, they do so by taking account of the two extremes in a continuum. While we do acknowledge the stereotypical description of the circumstance behind both kinds of corrupt citizens, we think it is more appropriate to engage their construction without including *a priori* the specific motivations that we want to discover behind them. For this reason, and refocusing in the task of understanding corruption tolerance, in the following sections we shall understand as collusive corruption the citizens' **deviant behavior** in favor of a corrupt collusive transaction, and extortive corruption as the citizens' **compliant behavior** with a corrupt extortive transaction.

Being these two behaviors of a different nature, although coexisting overall in the same level or dimension (LLC), we expect them also to represent two different sets of attitudes and motivations towards corruption. The model we will use in their analysis, and eventually in the assessment of the specific determinants behind each of them, however, will be one and the same. In the following lines we will present the basic elements of the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB), an action model developed by Icek Ajzen (1985) through which is possible to predict and understand human behavior, and we will develop a LCT scheme based on it.


### The Principle of Compatibility and the Theory of Planned Behavior.

The problem of attitude-behavior (A-B) congruency was for a long time regarded as the biggest impediment to accept any theory based on attitudes and personal traits as determinants of human behavior, due to its long and consistent lack of statistically significant validation through empirical data. Any number of studies trying to predict and explain specific behaviors during the decades between 1950 and 1970 were able to find only small to moderate correlations of the A-B nature (Schuman and Johnson, 1976). A meta-analysis of 109 investigations during those years reviewed by Ajzen and Fishbein (1977) found nonsignificant results for 25 of them, while the remainder rarely showed correlations in excess of 0.40. The problem, as this same authors elaborated on, was that the bulk of A-B research was trying to link general attitudes to rather specific actions. An example of that trend would be the efforts to correlate a white person's general attitude towards African Americans, to some specific act like engaging an African American in conversation or signing a petition toward extended civic rights towards that group. Although attitudes were assumed to predispose human behavior, research was so far unable to predict people's specific behavior toward attitudinal objects.

To understand better the relation between attitudes and behaviors, Ajzen (2005) explains, we have to discard the belief that verbal responses (as the ones assessed in a standard questionnaire, for example) reflect a person's attitude whereas nonverbal actions are measures of behavior. In reality, both kinds of responses are equally valid behaviors to be used as indicators of a latent disposition, and for these indicators to be compatible at least their target and action elements (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977) should be assessed at identical levels of generality or specificity. Hence, a *principle of compatibility* was proposed to finally deal with the major problems of A-B congruency. What it implied to A-B studies was that their measurement objective should go beyond the simple assessment of both attitudes and behaviors toward the same object, and assess specifically the attitudes *toward the behavior* of interest. As a result, the employment of surveys directed at these latter attitudinal measurements were found to increase the predictive power from only 0.13 to a correlation of 0.54 (Kraus, 1995).

The subsequent development of a complete model not just to predict human behavior, but to understand it as well, had to attend to the principle of compatibility in the inclusion of other elements directing human action. The Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB), designed by Icek Ajzen (1985), postulates that the *intention* to perform (or not to perform) a behavior is the most important immediate determinant of that action, and that, further on, this intention is a function of three basic determinants: The *attitudes toward the behavior*, the *subjective norm* surrounding it, and the *perceived behavioral control* behind engaging in it. Finally, each one of these dimensions is constructed upon a set of *beliefs*; hence, these are regarded as the basic informational foundation of intentions and behavior. Figure 2-3 graphically shows the elements of the TPB.

FIGURE 2-3. THE THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOR (TPB)



To interpret correctly the process supported by this model, we need to understand the meaning behind each construct, even if succinctly. “Intentions are assumed to capture the motivational factors that influence a behavior; they are indications of how hard people are willing to try, of how much of an effort they are planning to exert, in order to perform the behavior” (Ajzen, 1991, p. 181). The attitude towards the behavior, unlike general attitudes toward institutions, people or objects, is the individual’s positive or negative evaluation of performing the behavior; behind this evaluation are beliefs regarding the likely outcomes or consequences of performing it. The subjective norm, on the other hand, is the individual’s perception of social pressure to perform or not perform the behavior; this pressure is based on beliefs about important referents approving or disapproving the behavior, or even the



same referents themselves engaging or not engaging in it. The third determinant of the intention will be the perceived behavioral control (PBC), or the sense of ability that the individual has about performing the behavior of interest; this ability is based on the individual's beliefs about both his/her self-efficacy and control over the behavior (Ajzen, 2002).

The TPB represents a theoretically sound and empirically potential model to understand the individual's decision to pay a bribe, either acting in a deviant or a compliant way. While the model adopted for the analysis of HCT draws heavily on political theory and models of democratic accountability due to the main political role envisaged upon the citizen in the behavioral manifestation of tolerance towards HLC, a more psychologically strategic approach is necessary to gain an insight on activities that a big part of the citizenry would probably consider 'private', albeit illegal. If it's true, as we have argued earlier, that LLC elicit a fundamentally distinct set of emotions and rationale, it would be indeed advisable to get a step closer to the mind of our study subjects, and get the support of a vast tradition of political thinking produced by social psychology.

Although Ajzen's TPB is obviously not the only potential model that may be applicable to the specific context of the present study, it is by far the most widely accepted and empirically tested model in existence, with both the simplicity to bridge the distance between the scientific requirements of a political scientist and the behavioral insights of social psychology, and the complexity to include the most important determinants of the individual's engagement in corruption, as it will be shown in Chapter 5. Since its introduction in the mid-1980s, the TPB has been applied to more than 600 studies<sup>26</sup> on an increasing variety of research fields expanding from health behaviors to environmental actions. Several meta-analyses of this empirical literature provide a sizable support for the postulates of the TPB: For a wide range of different behaviors, attitudes, subjective norm and PBC were found to correlate with intentions in average up to 0.60, 0.42 and 0.46, respectively. What is more, the multiple correlations for the prediction of intentions were found to range from 0.63 to 0.71. Finally, intentions have been found to predict behavior with

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<sup>26</sup> As of January 2012, from a quick search on the official Icek Ajzen's TPB bibliography website: <http://people.umass.edu/aizen/tpbrefs.html>

considerable accuracy, with meta-analyses reporting an overall correlation of 0.53, while PBC explains approximately an additional 2 percent of the variance in behavior (Ajzen, 2005). This last result, although showing only a small increase in the model's predictive power, should be expected to rise as the level of volitional control of the specific behavior under investigation decreases. Thus, in total, the TPB can be said to represent a paramount model for the prediction and further understanding of human behavior in a wide range of activities.

Before we can proceed with our argument, however, there are three final points about Ajzen's model shown above that we need to explain. First, the theory assumes that the relative importance of attitudes, subjective norm and PBC depends on the intention under investigation. In other words, for some behaviors the most important determinant will be the attitudes toward it, while for others will be the subjective norm or the PBC. The clearest case of their relative weights can be found between the intention to perform a routine behavior that can be said to be highly under volitional control, compared to a behavior that depends on other people or upon which we may or may not have all the knowledge required. In this case, PBC would be expected to have an important impact on the prediction of the latter intention, but not on the prediction of the former. In the same way, for some intentions to emerge, the subjective norm will be expected to be more important than for others. The specific theoretical reasons for the relative weights of the components, however, are not contemplated by the theory, and it leaves any explanation *ex-post facto* in an empirical analysis (Bagozzi, 1992, p. 183).

Second, it should be noticed that the model suggests the possibility of an interaction between attitudes, subjective norm and PBC. This point, also, has to be empirically discovered and explained regarding the specific intention of interest.

And third, the model proposes that PBC, together with intentions, can be used also to predict actual behavior. A dotted arrow graphically represents this point in the above figure. Two rationales support the link. First, PBC is expected to help a person persevere in his/her intention to successfully engage in the behavior; even holding intentions constant, a higher PBC should increase the probabilities of performing the intended behavior. Second, the theory proposes that PBC can be used as a *proxy* for

the measurement of actual behavioral control. As the theory proposes, intentions may only be expressed in actions as long as the individual has the real capability to do so; otherwise, the intention will not be able to evolve into action. In addition, the TPB proposes that, to the extent that an individual's PBC is realistic, it can be used to predict the probability of a successful behavioral attempt, and thus serve as a proxy for actual behavioral control (Ajzen, 1991). However, reserves have to be made about the accuracy of that approach regarding actual control. As Armitage and Conner (2001, p. 474) express, "given the extant literature on 'illusions of control'... it seems likely that PBC will rarely reflect actual control in a very accurate way".

#### Previous implementation of the TPB for the study of corruption

Having Ajzen's theory produced such a vast amount of literature on a diversity of scientific topics, it comes as a surprise to find that only three studies have attempted to incorporate it, in one way or the other, to the study of bribery. Samart Powpaka (2002) uses the TPB to assess the different determinants behind the act of collusive bribery, using a sample of Thai managers to that objective. His model represents a first effort to understand the briber's motivations to engage in corruption completely under a framework of TPB<sup>27</sup> directed at organizational corruption. However vague the policy recommendations sprouted from the results of his study may be, it shows the possibilities of using the model to deepen our understanding of why people engage in bribery based on a sound theoretical framework, without falling into simplistic empirical results highlighting the individual's characteristics as either *homo economicus* or *homo politicus* (Nyborg, 2000).


Later on, and recognizing Powpaka's lead in the use of behavioral models for the study of bribery, Rabl and Kühlmann (2008) proposes initially a Model of Effortful Decision Making and Enactment (Bagozzi et. al., 2003) to discover the personal-based determinants of corrupt behavior in interaction with the business context. The model, which can be described as extremely complex and sophisticated for empirical analysis, was found to be unfeasible for the purposes of the study, and many of its elements had to be discarded as a consequence. When a revised model

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<sup>27</sup> In fact, Powpaka does introduce a minor modification to expand the construct of PBC. This will be described later in detail.

was presented for new analysis, its remaining structure was graphically presented as Figure 2-4 shows.

FIGURE 2-4. RABL AND KÜHLMANN’S REVISED MODEL OF CORRUPT ACTION



This “Model of Corrupt Action” (Rabl and Kühmann, 2008, p. 479) was used again later for the study of the impact of situational influences (specifically the size of the bribe, time pressure, and the degree of abstractness of the business code) on the decision to bribe (Rabl, 2011). The intention was to analyze the influence that the situational factors exert over the subjective decision making process, i.e. over the determinants contemplated in the model. Without needing to refer to Bagozzi’s Model of Effortful Decision Making and Enactment (MEDME), we can see that Rabl and Kühmann’s revised model is basically a derivation of Ajzen’s TPB<sup>28</sup> with the inclusion of *desire* as an element that influences intention (Bagozzi, 1992) and that mediates most of the effects of attitudes and subjective norm. As a last modification to the TPB, Rabl keeps the PBC as a determinant of intention but not of desire, in

<sup>28</sup> The complete description made by Rabl (2011, p. 4) explains that “the model [of corrupt action] is based on the Model of Effortful Decision Making and Enactment (Bagozzi et al., 2003) and represents a modified extension of Ajzen’s (1991) Theory of Planned Behavior that also integrates the distinction between desire and intention, that is motivation and volition, as elements drawn from the Rubicon Model of Action Phases”. We believe this description overestimates the revised model as it is.

direct allusion to Bagozzi's MEDME<sup>29</sup>. The final result, as we may appreciate, is that Rabl and Kühlmann's model preserves the basic idea behind the TPB's model.

However we decide to analyze the process through which the individuals decide to engage in corruption, we can see that an action model based on the elements described by the TPB has much to offer in our path to unravel the motivations behind bribery. In the next lines we will address some modifications of our own in order to make the TPB more suitable for the study of LCT, which, even though will preserve almost entirely the structure suggested by Ajzen, needs to be commented in order to interpret correctly any results derived from it.

#### Some modifications to the TPB: Unfolding the LCT indicator

As stated earlier, we will use the TPB's model to construct a proper indicator for LCT. If the theory allows us to predict and understand human behavior, first we need to correctly identify which is the specific behavior that we are interested on. Having the possibility to be either of a collusive or extortive nature, as we saw before, the main element common to both types of LLC from a citizen's standpoint will be the transfer of goods in order to acquire the legitimate or illegitimate services. For ease and convenience, we will refer to these transacted goods as *bribe*. However, before the bribe can occur, it has to be explicit or implicitly offered or surrendered, depending on which type of LLC we are focusing on. What we are implying here, in other words, is that the deviant and compliant behaviors cannot be seen as unitary behaviors, but rather as processes that include a behavioral *attempt* and a subsequent behavioral *goal*. This separation implies, quite correctly, that as bribery is not a behavior entirely under volitional control, it is better to distinguish between both elements.

The division of the overall behavior between behavioral attempt and goal was included originally in the first model of the TPB (Ajzen, 1985), but was later dropped, as Ajzen himself explains, because of the high correlations found by early work on

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<sup>29</sup> The theoretical reasons for this decision escape our grasp. Bagozzi himself goes from including PBC as a determinant of desire (Perugini and Bagozzi, 2001), to reallocate it as a determinant of implementation intention (Bagozzi et. al., 2003), to finally describe it in relation to desire again (Perugini and Bagozzi, 2004).

the model between ‘trying to perform a behavior’ and the ‘actual performance’<sup>30</sup> (1991, p. 182). Bagozzi and Warshaw (1990), however, picked up on the importance of distinguishing between the two concepts and included it in their Theory of Goal Pursuit (TGP), proposing that “to encompass goals [in a model of human behavior] is to replace behavior with *trying*<sup>31</sup> as the dependent criterion” (p. 129). Following then the principle of compatibility to reformulate the TPB’s determinants of behavior, the result will describe a model where trying to achieve a goal is determined by the intention to try, which in turn is determined by the attitudes and subjective norm toward trying<sup>32</sup>.

The division between attempting or trying to achieve a goal (by performing one or more specific actions), and the goal itself, can be shown to be of particular importance for the construction of a LCT indicator by posing a simple example. The actual occurrence of a corrupt transaction, in other words a bribe, depends in a self-evident interaction between choices taken by both the citizen and the public official. If at least one of those two actors completely refuses to engage in bribery, then the result will be a scenario where corruption was avoided. However, from this scarce information, it is impossible so far to say anything else about the corruption tolerance of either one of the actors; simply put, the absence of bribery does not tell us anything about how inclined was the citizen or the public official to bribe or to be bribed, respectively. The absence of bribery can be very well a product of a low level of LCT among public officials, *or the lack of a purely economical necessity for the individual to actively pursue it*, without caring about the level of LCT among citizens. By the same token, a scenario where bribery did in fact take place, although we do not know which side initiated the transaction, we can be sure that them both demonstrated a corruption tolerance behavior. What this mean, simply put, is that an indicator of the *occurrence* of bribery only impacts the level of LCT when bribery actually took

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<sup>30</sup> The model that continued being used later, although it acknowledged the difference between behavior and goal, presumed that the incorporation of PBC was enough to allow for an accurate prediction of behavioral goals over which people have only limited volitional control, and therefore stayed with the unitary construct of behavior.

<sup>31</sup> Italics are ours.

<sup>32</sup> Regarding PBC, however, Bagozzi and Warshaw (1990) say nothing and do not even include it in their original model. For this reason, and following Ajzen’s main intention of using PBC under scenarios of incomplete volitional control, we consider that is necessary to continue treating it in relation to the behavioral goal (which is, after all, the stage under consideration when thinking about behaviors under limited control), and not in relation to the behavioral attempt.

place, but tells us nothing about the level of LCT otherwise. As we analogously elaborated for the case of the HCT indicator, a measurement of the incidence of bribery in a given population should be read as **the minimum level of corruption tolerance in that given population as expressed by the actual engagement in bribery**. This strategy is particularly useful in cases where no data regarding the details of LLC transactions is available but only for its occurrence, and when the formal and informal institutions of bureaucracy are reportedly highly permeable to corruption, putting bribery under the individual's complete volitional control.

A perfectly constructed indicator for LCT, however, should be able to measure the behavioral *attempt* to engage in corruption, be it of a collusive or extortive nature. Although this approach is theoretically correct, it is necessary to notice that while the distinction between indicators measuring the attempt to bribe and those measuring the actual bribing is of particular relevance for the case of LCT as deviant behavior (collusive corruption), the distinction between both measurements loses theoretical significance when approaching LCT as compliant behavior (extortive corruption). Even when we can imagine a situation where a citizen, for ignorance of his/her rights regarding the request and usage of public services, may try (out of his/her free will) to bribe a public official in order to gain access to a desired service that he/she is actually entitled to, we find it highly improbable. Being a scenario of extortive corruption characterized by the public official denying access to a rightly service in order to force the citizen into a corrupt exchange, what we expect to find in reality is that either result of a measurement of the incidence of bribery, meaning the occurrence or not occurrence of bribery, will tell us with high accuracy the level of LCT of a citizen regarding his/her compliance behavior, as it will be assumed that the citizen's attempt to bribe in this scenario will always accomplish the goal. To put it in other words, to talk about a citizen's behavioral attempt to bribe in a case of extortion against that same citizen seems empirically unreasonable, as he/she is being forced into a behavior he/she wouldn't engage in out of self-motivation, therefore not being relevant to consider the dimension of behavioral attempt in this case.

A graphical example of the elements involved in each case is shown in Figure 2-5 and Figure 2-6.

FIGURE 2-5. LCT-DEVIANT IN A MODEL OF TPB





FIGURE 2-6. LCT-COMPLIANT IN A MODEL OF TPB



To sum it up, a perfectly theoretically-grounded measurement of LCT as deviant behavior will imply the **behavioral attempt to bribe a public official in order to gain some unlawful benefit**, while the measurement of LCT as compliant behavior will imply the **behavioral goal achievement of bribing a public official in order to gain access to a lawful service**.

It appears clear now, therefore, the substantive difference between a measurement of LCT following the guidelines of the TPB, and the usual measurement of LCT as reviewed earlier. While the latter clearly represents an indicator of attitude toward bribery, and in this way only one of the determinants (although possibly the most important, as meta-analyzes has found for a majority of different behaviors) that affect intention, the former involves the combined effects of attitude, subjective norm



and PBC, and thus representing a more eclectic view of the motivations behind bribery.

#### A final comment regarding the function of PBC

Some issues have to be clarified before we can start working on the foundational determinants of LCT of each type. Whilst the theory describes PBC as the confidence in one's ability to perform the behavior of interest, encompassing both self-efficacy and control, we think it is necessary to expand the latter meaning of control in order to take a proper account of the multiple elements that may impact a person's decision to engage in bribery. Although it is not stated in an explicit manner, we see reasonable to expand Ajzen's (2002, p. 680) description of "controllability (the extent to which performance is up to the actor)", to include the approach taken by Powpaka (2002) for the study of managerial corruption, who based on a focus group interview determined that it was more relevant to include a *perceived choice* variable (i.e. the power or chance of choosing to give or not give a bribe) instead of the classic PBC. The perceived choice can be understood in this context as control over *not performing the behavior*. The main distinction between both constructs resides in the inclusion of the ability to refuse the behavior in question, while the usual measure of PBC was just interested in the positive impact of control over intention and behavior.

Following Ajzen's (1991) double rationale for directly linking PBC to behavior, we can assume that, holding intentions constant, both perceived choice and the classic measure of PBC should have an additional (although opposite) impact on behavioral goal based on the idea of perseverance and actual control.

The stronger defense for adopting Powpaka's position in our research comes from the fact that, in order to include any set of beliefs related to the measure of perceived choice (if that is in fact the requirement of the research), we would need just to invert the direction of the behavior of interest, and we would find that the beliefs related to perceived choice fall perfectly under the classic measures of PBC. To give an example, in Powpaka's study the perceived choice comes in the form of options (or lack of options) to secure an important business contract without resorting to bribery. As we can see, while the lack of options other than bribery cannot be interpreted as a regular issue of PBC, or ability to perform the behavior, it can be

appropriately used under the construct of perceived choice. However, if we would choose only to revert the behavior, meaning to select ‘refuse bribery’ instead of ‘engage in bribery’ as the dependent behavior, the lack of options to secure an important business contract without resorting to bribery would clearly be able to be considered as a regular part of PBC. In this way, we consider that the inclusion of perceived choice in the overall definition of PBC is in order for the appropriate study of a bribery behavior.

By the same token, if we accept the previous postulate as theoretically correct, we would re-interpret the meaning of behavioral intention and say that it represents how much effort a person is planning to exert to perform *or not to perform* an action.

### 2.3. SUMMARY

Translating the role of the citizen in the three different types of corruption identified in Chapter 1, to the construct of corruption tolerance as was reviewed from past literature, we were able to conceptualize them in the following terms:

- High-level corruption tolerance (HCT): The citizen’s behavioral adherence to condone the corrupt behavior of the political actor (corruption support).
- Low-level corruption tolerance – collusion (LCT-deviant): The behavioral attempt to bribe a public official in order to gain some unlawful benefit (corrupt deviance).
- Low-level corruption tolerance – extortion (LCT-compliant): The behavioral goal achievement of bribing a public official in order to gain access to a lawful service (corruption compliance).

Such definitions were reached, first, through a commitment with a citizen-centered theory that is reflected in the adoption of the terms *support*, *deviance*, and *compliance*, all of which are grounded in the individual’s tolerant reaction to the three corrupt scenarios. And second, through the adoption of theoretical models that were found with the potential to best suit our analytical requirements, and which favor the equation of corruption tolerance with actual behavioral manifestations.

In the case of HCT, a scenario that mainly involves the relationship of the citizen with the higher skeleton of the polity, the concept of ‘vertical accountability’ (O’Donnell, 1998) was employed to describe the process by which individuals develop a political response to scandals of high-level corruption, running through four consecutive stages: Information, perception, attitudinal change, and punishment. Since the actual punishment of the corrupt political actor was found to be the necessary last step for the manifestation of corruption *intolerance*, we decided that a behavioral approach best suited the selection of a proper indicator, and suggested that the act of voting should provide the most promising possibilities (for empirical and technical reasons). Therefore, the future indicator of HCT is worded as *voting for a candidate despite its corrupt character*, which will reflect the minimum level of HCT as expressed by a higher emphasis in other features of the candidate. Finally, it is proposed that the so-called ‘corrupt character’ might be operationalized by reference to his/her past official conduct, and his/her electoral offer for the future.

LCT, on the other hand, required a radically different approach that found in the terrains of social psychology a good fit for the analysis of the individual’s subjective mechanisms for engaging in deviant and compliant corrupt behaviors. Adopting the model described by the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB), deviance and compliance were described as the behaviors of interest that may be explained and predicted by reference to the individual’s attitudes towards the action, the subjective norm surrounding its performance, and the perceived behavioral control and/or choice over it. From this perspective, an indicator was proposed that could measure the ‘minimum’ level of corruption tolerance of a citizen by addressing his/her *actual engagement in bribery*, a strategy that, besides respecting the logic of the model, allows us to take advantage of the available information contained in the LAPOP data set.

CHAPTER 3  
ATTITUDES VS. ACTIONS:  
DEVELOPMENT AND EMPIRICAL TEST OF A  
HIGH-LEVEL CORRUPTION TOLERANCE BEHAVIORAL INDICATOR  
(FOR THE CASE OF PERU)

In the previous chapter we have seen that, following a vertical accountability approach, the tolerance towards corruption as manifested by citizens is only clear in the last stage of the process, meaning when an actual punishment is sought against the corrupt politician. From this realization, an argument followed providing reasons for differentiating between attitudes toward high-level corruption (HLC), and the behavioral punishment embodied by the citizens' act.

If in Peru, as we have commented earlier, the electoral processes can be regarded as the main venues of accountability and political participation (Masías and Segura, 2006; Sánchez, 2010), it is still unclear the precise corrupt potential of the various candidates running for office in any given presidential or congressional election. Leaving aside potential partisan influences skewing some of the electoral information provided by the media, due to the delicate nature of the topic most public and private sources of political discourse tend to remain silent regarding the relative positive or negative influence of the most important leaders of the country over the state of HLC. Therefore, before attempting to solve the issue about the appropriateness of an attitudinal indicator as a proxy for behavior, we will need to develop our own indicator of *behavioral* high-level corruption tolerance (HCT) in clear and consistent terms to test our assumptions.

3.1. INTRODUCTORY INFORMATION ABOUT PERUVIAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS

Presidential elections: Peru, 2006

Electoral processes in Peru have never been easy to analyze, partly because of the numerous and diverse issues that change in importance and saliency between one election and the other, and partly because of the characteristics of the constituency and the electoral system. Although many of these topics (however important) are not the main concern of the present study, some specific points need to be clarified if we are to address the relative corruption-potential among the candidates in 2006.

As García and Meléndez (2006) show through a quantitative review of the voting tendencies in this and previous presidential elections, the Peruvian electorate can be regarded as volatile: Not only do people's vote migrate from one political tent to another between elections, but often the results of different polls addressing the voters' intention up to one month before the process do not match the results in the ballot box. This certainly suggests a low level of partisanship in the Peruvian citizenry, but also the importance of the public stands adopted by candidates during, and even before, the electoral campaign.

A related issue, concerning the electoral system, is the provision about the electoral dates, inaugurated by the Constitution of 1979 (Canchari, 2011), which stipulates that both presidential and congressional elections must be held on the same day. Such circumstance creates a pressure towards a *symbiotic* perception of both types of vote, resulting often in what has been called *voto de arrastre*, or "coattail effect" (Lucinda, 2005, p. 426): The sympathies for a candidate influences the perception of the party, and creates a tendency for matching the ballots on both presidential and congress runs. This fact is clearly evidenced in the table built by Dietz and Myers (2007, p. 69), which we partially reproduce in Table 3-1.

TABLE 3-1. NATIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS IN PERU, 1980-2000

<u>Year</u>	<u>Election</u>	<u>Winner (Party)</u>	<u>% Vote</u>
1980	Presidential	AP	45.2
1980	Senate	AP	40.9
1980	Deputies	AP	38.9
1985	Presidential	APRA	53.1
1985	Senate	APRA	51.3
1985	Deputies	APRA	50.1
1990	Presidential 1R <sup>33</sup>	FREDEMO	30.0
1990	Senate	FREDEMO	32.3
1990	Deputies	FREDEMO	30.1
1995	Presidential	C90-NM	64.4
1995	Congress	C90-NM	51.0
2000	Presidential 1R	C90-NM	49.9
2000	Congress	C90-NM	42.0
2001	Presidential 1R	PP	36.5
2001	Congress	PP	26.3

The information provided by the above table is important in the sense that it supports our comments about the existence of a coattail effect in Peru, which combined with a lack of party institutionalization (Tanaka, 1998) and acute personalization (the *caudillo* mentioned by Taylor, 2005; Romero, 2007; Masías and Segura, 2006), resulted in a popular equalization of the congressional vote to the presidential<sup>34</sup>. For this reason, any consideration regarding the citizens' vote favoring or punishing a specific candidate would need to include both sets of political actors<sup>35</sup>.

<sup>33</sup> 1R refers to the first-round of the presidential elections.

<sup>34</sup> Although the problem of party institutionalization and the appropriate differentiation between the dynamics of both legislative and executive branches are highly significant in themselves, and deserve scholarly attention from the perspective of democratic engineering, for our discussion of corruption tolerance and support they may be rather blunt. Simply put, the non-separation of opinions about

Since 2001, as part of the restructuration of the electoral system, the single-district arrangement introduced by the Constitution of 1993 for the congressional elections was changed for a multiple electoral district, equivalent to each one of the 24 regions (*departamentos*) of Peru plus the constitutional province of Callao<sup>36</sup>. When including the fact that there is also the image of the double preferential vote, it follows that an attempt to focus on the personal history and electoral promises of each of the candidates to national congress would be a monumental task. For the 2006 elections, there were 2,585 candidates for congress across 25 political parties. If we consider only the 6 parties which garnered most of the votes (*Unión por el Perú* – UPP, *Partido Aprista Peruano* – APRA, *Unidad Nacional* – UN, *Alianza por el Futuro* – AF, *Frente de Centro* – FC, and *Perú Posible* – PP), we would still be having 743 candidates to consider<sup>37</sup>.

A possible shortcut out of this electoral marsh could be to just focus on the political parties, instead of the individual candidates. However, as most of them are selected from the ranks of the party (or are invited to run) taking into account their notoriety in a particular district, and they may win a seat in congress either from the amount of votes obtained by the party, or directly by themselves through the preferential cast, their relationship with the political organization they represent is highly undetermined. It seems completely feasible that many citizens may vote for a particular candidate considering only his/her personal and professional attributes, without considering his/her party label; and, equally feasible (and common in the Peruvian congress), that once seated the congressman may choose to brake ranks with the party, become independent, join another party, or simply antagonize his/her fellow partisans by voting in a non-coordinated way in the process of legislative production. Therefore, the party label would tell us very little about the level of HCT among the

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presidential and congressional candidates should be taken as a given, a contextual variable that needs to be included in the formula, be it a correct or incorrect process of vertical accountability.

<sup>35</sup> Although its impact on potential interventions over the citizens' level of HCT would deserve further study, at this time it's impossible to accurately discriminate the importance (and even the meaning) of such *sympiotic* perceptions as the one discussed here. What it's possible to suggest here, however, is that for the discussion of HCT, Peruvians may be correct in letting congressional corruption scandals affect their presidential preferences, as the nature of the candidate's environment (political party) can have manifold implications for his/her eventual performance in office.

<sup>36</sup> In 2009 an additional electoral district was created by dividing the Lima Region between "Lima Provinces" and Lima. (<http://www.congreso.gob.pe/ntley/Imagenes/Leyes/29403.pdf>, accessed on November 25, 2012)

<sup>37</sup> [http://portal.jne.gob.pe/informacionelectoral/estadisticaelectoral/1\\_1.pdf](http://portal.jne.gob.pe/informacionelectoral/estadisticaelectoral/1_1.pdf)

citizens who chose a certain congressional candidate, leaving us with the only reasonable option to select the *presidential* candidates for a verifiable indicator of HCT, and to include (as was argued earlier) information from their political parties' *congress list*.

A final comment regarding the real conditions for the development of a HCT indicator in line with the argument presented in the theoretical framework of Chapter 2 has to do with the role of the party platforms in the electoral campaign. As can be remembered, it was postulated that such an indicator should include both the candidates' *history* related to corruption scandals, and their *anti-corruption promises*. The former is naturally obtained from the media (first step in the vertical accountability process); the latter, can be obtained from the media, the party platforms, or both. Because the media coverage of the candidate's stand on different corruption and anti-corruption issues may actually be included under the data gathering of his/her *history*, the present study will focus on the official documents released by the political parties containing their detailed government project<sup>38</sup>.

#### Presidential candidates of 2006

The most voted Peruvian presidential candidates in the first round of 2006, in descending order, were<sup>39</sup>: Ollanta Humala – UPP (30.6%), Alan García – APRA (24.3%), Lourdes Flores – UN (23.8%), Martha Chávez – AF (7.4%), Valentín Paniagua – FC (5.8%), Humberto Lay – *Restauración Nacional* (RN) (4.4%). In the following lines we present a very brief corruption-related *résumé*, which, although not being thorough, should provide an introductory image of their stance in the subject.

- Ollanta Humala (UPP): Major Humala jumped to fame in October of 2000 when he led a minor military uprising in the town of Locumba, with the support of army reservists of the south coast of Peru. The purpose of that

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<sup>38</sup> In support of this position, Masías and Segura (2006, p. 103) assert about the presidential campaign of 2006: "In previous processes, there was no doubt that a candidate's personality and experience or his party affiliation, against the party platforms, were the determinant factors behind electoral preference. These patterns seem to have changed somehow, for there is evidence of a reasoning that incorporates, in the adoption of a decision course, the party platforms, but not the party or the political tendency. The intuition about this change is what seems to explain why the campaigns were centered in the exposition of such platforms."

<sup>39</sup> <http://www.web.onpe.gob.pe/modElecciones/elecciones/RESUMEN/GENERALE/14.pdf>



‘heroic’ action, as was regarded by many Peruvians at that moment, was to condemn the illegitimate third government of president Alberto Fujimori and the corruption of the military, which was then being exposed in the *vladivideos*<sup>40</sup> scandal. This first appearance in the public arena granted him an image of anti-corruption champion, particularly among inhabitants of rural and impoverished areas of the coast and the Andes, and was further reinforced (although in a more radical overtone) by Ollanta’s brother, Antauro, who continued working on a future political platform for the 2006 elections through the production and distribution of the nationalist tabloid *Ollanta* (Montoya, 2009). Although it’s necessary to discriminate between the activities of radical nationalist Antauro Humala, who is currently purging prison for a second uprising in December of 2004<sup>41</sup>, and those of presidential candidate Ollanta Humala, there is a clear connection between some of the statements of the Humala family members regarding extreme anti-corruption measures (including a proposal for the imposition of the death penalty to corrupt officials) and Ollanta’s heavy reliance in popular disenchantment with what was being perceived as widespread corruption in the State. Nonetheless, with the proximity of election day other issues regarding the actual probity of Humala as a honest candidate started to surface, putting into question the original objective behind the Locumba uprising of 2000, the political group that was accompanying him in the presidential run, and his links to Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez (Schmidt, 2007; McClintock, 2006; Mäckelmann, 2006).

- Alan García (APRA): Many things have been said and analyzed over the years about the first government of ex-president García (1985-1990), particularly involving the level of corruption reached in Peru during his administration, and the criminal charges brought on him during the decade of 1990. In here we would like to refer to the words of Alfonso Quiroz (2008, pp. 346-347), who, making a brief review of the corruption scandals involving the image of

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<sup>40</sup> *Vladivideos* is the popular name given to the about 700 videotapes left behind by Alberto Fujimori’s main advisor Vladimiro Montesinos, on which he recorded his meetings and conversations regarding all kinds of subjects, the most important ones being corrupt deals.

<sup>41</sup> Regarding the participation of Ollanta Humala in the *Andahuaylazo* conducted by his brother, there are contradictory positions at best. For a review of the facts and context, see Montoya, 2009.

García, recounted: “The principal charges against [him] in 1991 included illicit enrichment as a public official resulting from undeclared income of dubious origin, and probable illegal gains from direct involvement in the Mirage and BCCI cases. Later charges included demanding and receiving bribes from the Italian state agency that financed the construction of Lima’s electric train system. Former senior officials, including Mantilla, García’s last minister of the interior, faced charges.” More scandals still implicated APRA members in the years before the presidential elections of 2006, one case showed, as Regional Presidents belonging to the party were implicated in corrupt activities (McClintock, 2006).

- Lourdes Flores (UN): The center-right, social christian candidate from National Unity can be regarded as the closest representative of a middle point between the corruption-anticorruption continuum. If on one hand her *honesty and sincerity* (PUCP, 2006, p. 8) is perceived by 9.4% of Peruvians to be her most important attributes as a presidential candidate, on the other her position in front of governmental corruption has always been rather weak, with only sporadic activism which can be largely attributed to her longstanding situation as member of an opposition party. Schmidt (2007, p. 816), for example, comments that Flores “enjoyed a reputation for honesty and hard work” throughout the pre-electoral year 2005, but Mäckelmann (2006, p. 16) makes the precision that her communicational campaign has mainly been focused on the issues of “health, education, and the generation of employment.” Those are the circumstances under which we suggest that Flores should be seen as a case of corruption-*neutrality*, a characteristic that is also present in her political activity during the Fujimori regime. At the beginning of the 1990’s, she had an active and prominent role in the generalized effort to make ex-president Alan García face justice for charges of corruption, a fact that Quiroz (2008, p. 346) acknowledges by considering her part of the “new breed of anticorruption politician[s]”, together with Fernando Olivera and Pedro Cateriano; at the end of the decade, she would take again over the role of active opposition, engaged in the task of stopping the pro-Fujimori electoral fraud of 2000. This time, Flores is referred to as part of the “truth squad” (Conaghan, 2005, p. 206), who, along with later minister of Justice Diego García-Sayan and

congresswoman Anel Townsend, joined the Organization of American States (OAS) meeting in Windsor, Ontario, with the objective of garnering international pressure over the illegitimate re-reelection of Fujimori. However, from an objective perspective, both instances of anti-corruption stands taken by Flores can be regarded as politically-driven, not only due to her position as an opposition leader, but because both of them happened to occur in distinctively dramatic episodes of Peruvian politics, when the majority of the population were also severely frustrated with the increasing scandals of governmental corruption. Clearly, the designation of businessman Arturo Woodman (known for his dealings with the Fujimori-Montesinos duo during the 1990's – Durand, 2005) as her first vice-president for the running formula didn't help her position in the fight against corruption (McClintock, 2006, p. 102), nor did her party's behavior during the congressional period 2001-2006 (in cases like the congressional report on corruption under Fujimori's government, where UN largely lined with the remaining pro-Fujimori forces – Zapata, 2005), or even the inclusion of pro-Fujimori candidates in UN's congressional list of 2001 (Taylor, 2005).

- Martha Chávez (AF): The openly pro-Fujimori candidate of 2006 had an enthusiastic record for bending the rules in order to provide political and legal *back-up* during ex-president Fujimori's government. According to Ugarteche (2005), Chávez was part of a group of congressmen that regularly met with the President's main advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos, to develop legal strategies to derail any case of human abuses or corruption that may arrive to the congressional commissions of Intelligence, Investigation, and Economy, in exchange for bulky payments. Zapata (2005) recounts, in the same line, the legislative proposal defended by Chávez in 1995 to grant amnesty to the members of the paramilitary death-squad *Colina*, which were involved in "selective assassinations" (p. 263). This and other cases pointing to her active participation in the government's strategy to seize and retain power throughout the 1990's, and the aim to continue doing so for the period 2000-2005, are described in detail by Catherine Conaghan (2005). What is of more interest for us now, is Chávez's position regarding all these issues in the presidential campaign of 2006. We refer to the words of Schmidt (2007, p.

815) in order to start grasping the profound meaning that Martha Chavez's candidacy represented for the continuation (or return) of Fujimori's legacy in power: "Fujimori chose Congresswoman Martha Chávez to run on the ticket of *Alianza por el Futuro* (Alliance for the Future), comprising the two major pro-Fujimori organisations [sic] from the 1990s, *Cambio 90* (Change 90) and *Nueva Mayoría* (New Majority). Not coincidentally, the alliance's logo was 'AF', Alberto Fujimori's initials." It's important to remember that by the time of the 2006 campaign, Fujimori was impeded to obtain any public office, and was even being prosecuted for several charges, including corruption. However, Chávez's intention to get a bloc in congress in order to help Alberto Fujimori's case was rather obvious, not least of all for the inclusion of Fujimori's own daughter, Keiko, running as the head of the congressional list (McClintock, 2006), but most evidently for the creation of a 'catchy' song for the campaign called *el chino va a volver*, or 'the chinese man will come back'<sup>42</sup> (Mäckelmann, 2006).

- Valentín Paniagua (FC): The case of the candidate of *Frente de Centro*, or Center Front, can be described as diagonally opposite to that of Martha Chávez. After ex-president Fujimori resigned to office in November of 2000, Paniagua swore as interim president to conform a Transitional Government that would call for new presidential and congressional elections in 2001, and would set in place (and in record time) the basic anti-corruption architecture to prosecute the corrupt members of the previous regime and recover the stolen assets (Peña-Mancillas, 2011; Jorge, 2008; Calderón, 2006). In general, his is a government remembered as successful, where his political support to the anti-corruption effort was considered decisive, and his personal attributes were since then linked to words such as *honesty* (McClintock, 2006, p. 100), *transparency* (Taylor, 2005, p. 572), *ethics* (Peña-Mancillas, 2011, p. 5), *scrupulous* (Franco, 2001, p. 16), and *morality* (Ford, 2003, p. 194). These are all of them descriptions of not only the government that Paniagua presided (2000-2001), but also of his individual political value that are repeated once

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<sup>42</sup> 'Chinese man' was Alberto Fujimori's friendly nickname since the beginning of his political career, in the presidential campaign of 1990.

and again in virtually all scholarly and documentary reviews of his person and administration.

- Humberto Lay (RN): As a political newcomer, very little can be said of the Protestant minister Humberto Lay from the perspective of his corruption-anticorruption potential. Before the presidential campaign of 2006, Lay had intended to participate in the 2001 elections, but early in the effort suspended the legal subscription of his political party National Restoration in order to participate in the *Iniciativa Nacional Anticorrupción* (National Anticorruption Initiative) by request of President Valentín Paniagua (Transparencia, 2008).

### 3.2. DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDICATOR

#### Ranking of corruption-related *résumé*

In order to objectively develop a HCT indicator based on the relative corruptibility of each of the main Peruvian presidential candidates of 2006 (in other words, a *ranking* of their corruption potential), a topic that may be seen as particularly problematic and controversial, this study conducted what Kimberly Neuendorf (2001) would describe as *quantitative interpretative analysis*, a method resembling that of content analysis but which constructs its categories in a progressive way, close to the idea of grounded theory, and ends up quantifying its results and reorganizing them in specific arrangements.

The data used as primary source for this *ranking* is provided by the Peruvian newsmagazine *Caretas*, which is considered the leading source of political and investigative journalism in the country, with more than 50 years of work. Although its level of impartiality hasn't been scientifically addressed, in general terms its content covers most of the Peruvian political spectrum, and different perspectives and opinions are usually published in order to reflect the complexity of the subjects. Assuming the unbiased coverage (in both content and extension) of corruption-related stories involving different political tents, all the information published in the Careta's

digital version<sup>43</sup> was processed for the period between September 22, 2000 (first issue published after the burst of the *vladivideos* scandal), and April 7, 2006 (last issue published before the first round of presidential elections). This means 283 issues, in total.

The details of the information regarding corrupt (and anti-corrupt) activities of the six major candidates of 2006, and their political parties, are presented in Appendix 1. The corruption-related categories developed in the process of analysis are as follows:

- **Corruption (C):** Cases where the party/candidate is directly or indirectly involved in the commission of a corrupt act.
- **Against anti-corruption (-AC)<sup>44</sup>:** Cases where the party/candidate shows tolerance to corruption, either by action or omission, or attacks/ignores AC principles.
- **Not corruption (-C):** Cases where a point is made against previous information involving the party/candidate in the commission of a corrupt act.
- **Anti-corruption (AC):** Cases where the party/candidate actively pursues/supports the fight against corruption *without having as a motive to earn equivalent political return*.

As it can be observed, the four corruption-related categories are presented in a continuum that, to use the vocabulary of HCT, extends from high tolerance to low tolerance of corruption. At least one of these categories can represent each one of the pieces of information regarding the corrupt potential of the 2006 candidates, with some cases involving two categories. Other categories included to analyze the data were: Party or candidate involvement (or both), and the title/body presentation<sup>45</sup>. To

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<sup>43</sup> <http://www.caretas.com.pe/Main.asp?T=3098>

<sup>44</sup> About -AC, Karklins (2005, pp. 28, 33) states that, during privatization phases in post-Communist countries, the image of “all” politicians got tainted “since few among them made a visible effort not only to avoid personal involvement [in corrupt deals], but to look for effective countermeasures to constrain their colleagues. The lack of preventive work by more honest politicians is a significant part of the corruption experience... In addition to... active corruption of legislators, there also is passive corruption in the sense of omission and dereliction of duty”


<sup>45</sup> Such a differentiation allows us to consider the relative importance given to the information, depending on the position where the corruption-related reference is included (either in the title or the body of the press article).

account for the relative importance of party/candidate and title/body distinctions, the following formula was applied

$$Ct + (Cb / 2) + \{ [ Pt + ( Pb / 2 ) ] / 2 \}$$

where Ct stands for *candidate in title*, Cb for *candidate in body*, Pt for *party in title*, and Pb for *party in body*. In other words, although each piece of information (disregarding the length) was given ‘1 point’, a *body* point was valued as half of a *title* point, and points given for information involving the candidate’s party, and not the candidate him/herself, were valued as half also<sup>46</sup>. The results, excluding cases where more than one category was adjudicated, are presented in the Figure 3-1.

FIGURE 3-1. HLC-RELATED INFORMATION ACROSS CATEGORIES




Finally, points were added and aggregated across corruption-related categories in the following way:

$$\{ (C) + (-AC) - (-C) / [ (C) + (-AC) - (-C) ] + (AC) \} \times 100$$

<sup>46</sup> The time lag between the news coverage and the presidential election of 2006 is not considered as a discriminatory element due to its expected irrelevance. Regarding the same strategy, in their study of corruption scandals in Spain, Barberá et al. (2012, p. 18) explain: “We also examined whether the ‘timing’ of the corruption scandal had a significant effect. We expected corruption scandals that broke out shortly before the election to decrease incumbent’s vote share even further. This result would be consistent with existing theories about citizens’ use of heuristics when making their electoral decisions... However, we found null results: corruption scandals that emerged in 2007 and 2011 were as equally likely to be punished as those that broke out earlier in the electoral cycle.”

The product, presented in Figure 3-2, gives us the percentage of news regarding corruption (plus the ones against anti-corruption, and minus the ones denying corruption) from the total of corruption-related information, for each candidate/party.

FIGURE 3-2. PERCENTAGE OF NEGATIVE HLC-RELATED INFORMATION



Therefore we conclude that, regarding the corruption-related *history* of the six most voted candidates in the first round of the presidential elections in Peru of 2006, the ranking is as follows, in order of their anti-corruption potential:

1. Valentín Paniagua
2. Humberto Lay
3. Ollanta Humala
4. Lourdes Flores
5. Alan García
6. Martha Chávez

#### Ranking of anti-corruption offer

In the previous section we have quantitatively resolved the question behind the presidential candidates' probity to conduct public affairs. Now, we shall do the same for the candidates' offers (included in the their party platforms) in order to analyze the



voters' reaction to the potential benefits that each candidate may bring to office in the fight against corruption. With this objective, we employ quantitative content analysis (as described by Neuendorf, 2001) to assess the importance of the 'corruption construct' in the party platforms officially presented by each of the six most voted candidates for Peruvian national elections in 2006<sup>47</sup>, with the exception of Martha Chávez's *Alianza por el Futuro*, which didn't present any.

The complete dictionary of corruption and anti-corruption-related terms is included in Appendix 2, along with the cases generated from the analysis. The categories considered were: Corruption/anti-corruption usage; implicit (the 'corruption construct' is assumed from the reference to anticorruption-related terms) or explicit (the construct is mentioned in any variant); and the 'structural independence' of the construct, which is nothing more than the length of its reference<sup>48</sup>. However, only the second and third categories were considered for the final ranking, which was calculated based in the formula

$$\{ [ \text{explicit (2) implicit (1)} ] \times [ \text{length - word (1) sentence (2) paragraph (3) subchapter (4) chapter (5)} ] \} / \text{Total amount of words in the document}$$


where the numbers in parenthesis are the *points* given to each observation of the construct in order to calculate the weight of each party platform, and 'total amount of words in the document' refers to the entire content of the party platform. Consequently, the **lower ratio of points/total will mean higher anti-corruption offer**. The results are presented in Figure 3-3.

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<sup>47</sup> The documents can be downloaded from: <http://agenciaperu.com/especiales/elecciones/planes.html>, last accessed on November 27, 2012.

<sup>48</sup> The length can be considered to be a *word* (construct with or without attached adjective and standing with other concepts), a *sentence* (statement about the construct, standing alone or repeated), a *paragraph* (two or more sentences), a *subchapter*, or a *chapter*.

FIGURE 3-3. RATIO OF THE CORRUPTION CONSTRUCT IN PARTY PLATFORMS



From this table, we can conclude that the candidates of 2006 who made the fight against corruption a bigger issue of their party platforms, in relative terms, are:

1. Humberto Lay
2. Valentín Paniagua
3. Alan García
4. Ollanta Humala
5. Lourdes Flores
6. Martha Chávez<sup>49</sup>

#### Composite ranking

After obtaining results pertaining to the relative importance of the presidential candidates in terms of their corruption-related *history* and electoral *offer*, we proceed to recombine both rankings by averaging the positions, an approach also employed by Transparency International in the construction of their annual Corruption Perception Index (Thompson and Shah, 2005). However, the present study will take into account the average level of media exposure and readership prevalent in Peru, and consider

<sup>49</sup> Although *Alianza por el Futuro* did not, in fact, presented a party platform for the elections of 2006, we include Martha Chávez in the ranking for comparison purposes between this and the previous ranking regarding the candidates' *résumé*.

the importance of party platforms as *half* of that of Careta’s coverage<sup>50</sup>; in other words, when averaging both rankings, the candidates’ positions as discovered by the content analysis of the platforms will take half its value. Table 3-2 presents the final, composite ranking of corruption-potential of the Peruvian presidential candidates of 2006.

TABLE 3-2. COMPOSITE RANKING OF CANDIDATES’ CORRUPT CHARACTER

Presidential candidate	Composite ranking
Valentin Paniagua – FC	1
Humberto Lay – RN	1.25
Ollanta Humala – UPP	2.5
Lourdes Flores – UN	3.25
Alan García – APRA	3.25
Martha Chávez – AF	4.5

As we can see, there is a tie between the candidates Lourdes Flores, from *Unidad Nacional*, and Alan García, from APRA. To decide their relative placement, we draw supportive data from an intention poll conducted in 2006 (PUCP, 2006) in Lima and other cities of the country, which included a question regarding the “principal reason for casting their vote in support of the candidate...” The resulting information about four of the six candidates included in the present study is presented in Tables 3-3 through 3-6<sup>51</sup>.

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<sup>50</sup> Even though party platforms have gained importance for issue-saliency, they are still to be considered as less accessible (and therefore less influential) to voters than other massive sources of political news and information such as the media. This approach is also argued by Bagenholm (2009, p. 9) regarding the relative importance of party manifestoes and the media in Europe.

<sup>51</sup> All information in the tables is translated from Spanish.

TABLE 3-3. INTENTION POLL – OLLANTA HUMALA

What is the principal reason you will vote for Ollanta Humala?	
Options	Total
<b>Will fight against corruption</b>	<b>30.9</b>
Nationalist	17.5
Good proposals	13.1
Military	13.0
New politician	11.2
Others	5.0
Will improve health and education	4.3
Will increase employment	3.8

TABLE 3-4. INTENTION POLL – ALAN GARCÍA

What is the principal reason you will vote for Alan Garcia?	
Options	Total
Experienced politician	30.2
Good proposals	23.4
Will increase employment	15.3
APRA's candidate	8.1
Close to the people	7.6
Will improve health and education	5.0
<b>Will fight against corruption</b>	<b>0.5</b>
Had a good government	3.7
Others	4.4

TABLE 3-5. INTENTION POLL – LOURDES FLORES

What is the principal reason you will vote for Lourdes Flores?	
Options	Total
Good proposals	31.9
Woman	25.8
<b>Honest and sincere</b>	<b>9.4</b>
Will improve health and education	8.4
Leadership	7.2
Will increase employment	5.7
<b>Will fight against corruption</b>	<b>4.9</b>
Smart	3.4
Others	3.2

TABLE 3-6. INTENTION POLL – VALENTIN PANIAGUA

What is the principal reason you will vote for Valentin Paniagua?	
Options	Total
<b>Honest and sincere</b>	<b>37.7</b>
Had a good government	16.5
Experienced politician	12.9
Serious and correct	12.6
Will improve health and education	9.3
Smart	4.7
Will create employment	1.8
<b>Will fight against corruption</b>	<b>1.0</b>
Others	3.6

Adding the anticorruption-related information in the above tables in Table 3-7, we find that the resulting ranking is equivalent to the one presented in Table 3-2.

TABLE 3-7. INTENTION POLL – COMPOSITE

What is the principal reason you will vote for (anti-corruption) ?	
Options	Total
6. Valentin Paniagua	38.7
5.	
4. Ollanta Humala	30.9
3. Lourdes Flores	14.3
2. Alan Garcia	0.5
1.	

The order taken by the four candidates included in the PUCP poll, hence, mirrors the composite ranking developed from their *history* and *electoral offer*, and helps us untie the scores of Flores and García. Therefore, and following this partial support, we conclude that the candidate from APRA should be considered more potentially corrupt than his counterpart from *Unidad Nacional*. With this information, finally, the set is ready to test the relation between an attitudinal and an action-based (or behavioral) indicator of HCT.

### 3.3. TEST OF THE HCT INDICATOR

In order to apply the previously elaborated ranking to the LAPOP database of 2006, the self-reported information regarding “for which candidate did you vote for President in the last presidential elections?” coded PERVB3<sup>52</sup> is recombined, becoming now a quantitative indicator of HCT, read as the ‘minimum tolerance of the citizen’ expressed by *voting in spite of the ratio of information about the corrupt character and the position of fight against corruption* (in an index of electoral offers) of the candidate.

<sup>52</sup> Appendix 3 presents a complete list of the variables, indicators, categories and codes regarding HCT included in this study.

On the other hand, an attitudinal indicator of HCT is obtained from the question “an unemployed individual is the brother-in-law of an important politician, and the politician uses his influence to get his brother-in-law a job. Do you think the politician is 1) corrupt and should be punished, 2) corrupt but justified, or 3) not corrupt?” coded DC13<sup>53</sup>, where the answers can be described as intolerant, tolerant, and highly tolerant of corruption, respectively, following the logic of the present study.

Employing ordered logistic regression analysis, the voting behavior is regressed on the attitudes toward HLC, and the results are presented in Table 3-8.

TABLE 3-8. IMPACT OF ATTITUDES OVER ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR

VOTE	COEFFICIENT	STD. ERROR	Z
ATTITUDE	0.218*	0.108	2.02

N = 1178

\* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001

Evidently, there is in fact a sizable and statically significant impact of attitudes over the citizens’ electoral behavior. Translating this result to probabilities, we find a more clear interpretation of the way that attitudes manage to affect the punishment capabilities of the electorate. As we can see in the Table 3-9, a change in attitudes from highly tolerant to intolerant of corruption positively impacts on the amount of support for the three more honest candidates, whereas an inverse trend would benefit the two more potentially corrupt candidates (Alan García and Martha Chávez); the importance of attitudes over behavior is somehow unclear, however, for the case of the support for Lourdes Flores, possibly evidencing her corruption-*neutral* stand as mentioned earlier in the brief about each candidate.

<sup>53</sup> The frequency of observations (n=1178) for each category is 914 (77.59%), 232 (19.69%), and 32 (2.72%), respectively.

TABLE 3-9. PROBABILITIES OF VOTING FOR A CANDIDATE,  
BASED ON ATTITUDES TOWARD CORRUPTION

	Intolerant attitude	Tolerant attitude	Highly tolerant attitude
<b>Valentín Paniagua</b>	5.87%	4.77%	3.87%
<b>Humberto Lay</b>	3.10%	2.57%	2.11%
<b>Ollanta Humala</b>	36.72%	33.00%	29.23%
<b>Lourdes Flores</b>	23.26%	23.75%	23.72%
<b>Alan García</b>	28.09%	32.25%	36.56%
<b>Martha Chávez</b>	2.96%	3.66%	4.51%
<b>Total</b>	100%	100%	100%

In a simpler fashion, we resort to the descriptive statistics regarding attitudes and behavior, tabulated in Table 3-10. As we can appreciate, more the 30% of surveyed people who stated that the corrupt behavior in question (nepotism) was indeed “corrupt and punishable”, still decided to cast their votes in support of the two most potentially dishonest presidential candidates of 2006, hence not actually living up to that punishment they thought would be appropriate for such politicians. How can A-B congruency address this problem? The only option left is to rely in the actual voting behavior of the citizenry, and to regard their attitudes exclusively as a potential determinant for that behavior.

TABLE 3-10. PERCENTAGE OF ATTITUDES VERSUS BEHAVIOR REGARDING HCT

	Corrupt and punishable	Corrupt but justified	Not corrupt
Valentin Paniagua	5.69%	5.60%	3.12%
Humberto Lay	2.74%	3.88%	3.12%
Ollanta Humala	37.53%	28.88%	37.50%
Lourdes Flores	23.74%	22.84%	15.62%
Alan Garcia	27.13%	35.34%	40.62%
Martha Chavez	3.17%	3.45%	0.00%
Total	100%	100%	100%



### 3.4. SUMMARY

By resorting to the quantitative interpretative analysis of the main political magazine in Peru, *Caretas*, throughout the issues published during the five years and a half previous to the Peruvian presidential elections of 2006; and quantitative content analysis of the party platforms of five out of the six most voted presidential candidates in that election, we were able to construct two separate rankings in order to account for the relative position of the candidates of 2006 in corruption-related *history* and *offers*. After combining them in a single, composite ranking, the results showed that, from the most honest to the most corrupt character in terms of their political background and their promises for the future, Peruvian candidates of that year were presented in the following order: (1) Valentín Paniagua; (2) Humberto Lay; (3) Ollanta Humala; (4) Lourdes Flores; (5) Alan García; and, (6) Martha Chávez. This ranking, over which we were later able to develop the indicator of HCT, could also be partially assumed from the description of each one of the candidates that was conducted at the beginning of the chapter, drawing from the information provided by numerous academic sources; however, due to the sensitive nature of the topic, a scientific approach for data gathering was necessary to preserve and secure the required level of neutrality.

With the previously unavailable input now at hand, a ‘recombination’ of the information presented by LAPOP’s AmericasBarometer 2006 regarding the self-reported voting behavior in the first round of presidential elections was applied in line with it. The result was the development of a behavioral indicator of HCT as proposed in Chapter 2, which read ‘voting for a candidate in spite of its corrupt character’, a requirement that we consider to have fulfilled.

Finally, an ordered logistic regression of our behavioral HCT indicator on an attitudinal indicator of the same dimension showed that they are, in fact, statistically related. However, the size of the effect wasn’t big enough (as evidenced by the actual probabilities of a behavioral change) to consider *attitudes* a reliable proxy for a

behavioral HCT. If not for the argument developed earlier regarding the theoretical framework for the study of corruption tolerance, such result would posit the question of the appropriateness of both indicators equally (as it becomes necessary to choose one of them for the operationalization of HCT). However, our discussion in the previous chapter already assumed most of the statistical relations we found here, and hence, we have now the road clear for the usage of a properly behavioral indicator, and the subsequent inclusion of attitudes as a potential determinant, among others, for the analysis of HCT.

CHAPTER 4  
ATTITUDES VS. ACTIONS:  
EMPIRICAL TEST OF A  
LOW-LEVEL CORRUPTION TOLERANCE BEHAVIORAL INDICATOR  
(FOR THE CASE OF PERU)

The importance of any measurement of corruption tolerance, be it attitude-based or action-based, consists in the degree of internal validity that we can hold it to. If the way we operationalize the phenomenon under consideration is in any way flawed, biased, or just fails to tap into the main components of interest, then it follows that any conclusion about the causes and consequences of the phenomenon will be biased as well. While it is common to find different problems of operationalization of concepts in the social sciences, we should always strive for the closest approximation to the actual concept we are trying to study.

As we have seen in Chapter 2, the study of corruption tolerance from the point of view of deviant and compliant behavior theoretically requires from us the assessment of the actual behavior (engagement in bribery<sup>54</sup>) instead of relying on the classic attitudinal measures that are found in the literature. In the identification of a proper indicator of low-level corruption tolerance (LCT), we have elaborated on this point by adopting Icek Ajzen's Theory of Planned Behavior, which regards attitudinal measures as an incomplete account of the determinants of any specific behavior. Focusing on LCT, we will test this assertion by way of comparison. If, as expected, we find only a mild relation between attitudes towards bribery and the individual's

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<sup>54</sup> As the LAPOP's questionnaire does not include any item that would allow us to measure the specific behavioral *attempt* for cases of LCT-deviance, we will rely entirely on the *actual occurrence* of bribery, making the cautionary alert to treat this measure (for cases of collusion) as *the minimum level of corruption tolerance in that given population*. This strategy seems plausible, as offered in Chapter 2, based on the fact that Peruvian "formal and informal institutions of bureaucracy are reportedly highly permeable to corruption". The Global Integrity Report 2007 developed by the NGO Global Integrity regarded Peruvian law enforcement (48/100) and whistle-blowing measures (21/100) as *very weak*. This suggests, in line with many accounts of low-level corruption in Latin America in general, that if a citizen *attempts* to bribe, he/she will most likely succeed.

actual decision to engage in this form of corruption, we will be one step closer to unravel the different elements that determine a citizen's corruption tolerance level.

The Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) AmericasBarometer – 2006 provides us with survey data to tap on both attitudes and behavior towards LLC in the case of Peru. The variables and indicators included in the analysis, and their original codification, are presented as follows<sup>55</sup>:

- Action-based indicators:
  - o EXC11: During the last year, to process any kind of document (like a license, for example), have you had to pay any money above that required by law?
  - o EXC14: Have you had to give a bribe to the courts during the last year?
  - o EXC15: In order to be attended to in a hospital or a clinic during the last year, have you had to give a bribe?
  
- Attitude-based indicators:
  - o EXC18: Do you think that the way things are, sometimes giving a bribe is justified?
  - o EXC19: Do you think that in our society giving bribes is justified because of the poor public services, or do you think it is not justified?
  
- Additional variables:
  - o SGL2: How have they treated you or your neighbors when you have had dealings with the municipality?
  - o EXC6: During the last year, has any public official asked you for a bribe?

#### 4.1.ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

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<sup>55</sup> Additionally, Appendix 4 presents a complete list of the variables, indicators, categories and codes regarding LCT included in this study.

To test the relation between attitude-based and action-based indicators of LCT, we first create a composite ordinal variable from EXC11, EXC14 and EXC15 (all the questions regarding actual bribery, considering only the data for those subjects that have indeed had interactions with public institutions in all three cases), and use ordered logistic regression analysis to regress it on the widest of the attitudinal questions, EXC18. This analysis will tell us if the attitudes toward bribery are a good predictor of the actual engagement in it. It should be noted, however, that this initial composite variable will not differentiate between deviant and compliant corruption. The results are shown in Table 4-1. As we can see here, the impact of attitudes over behavior gives a high coefficient of 0.95, while it reaches statistical significance at  $p < 0.05$ .

TABLE 4-1. IMPACT OF ATTITUDES OVER BEHAVIOR (THREE CASES)

BRIBE	COEFFICIENT	STD. ERROR	Z
ATTITUDE	0.959*	0.432	2.22

N = 146

CRAGG-UHLER (NAGELKERKE) R<sup>2</sup> = 0.043

\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Translating this result to predictive probabilities, it means that a change of attitudes from “non-justifiable” to “justifiable” derives in an increase of the probabilities of engaging in corrupt behavior from 11% to 22% for a ‘one-time’ bribery, from 4% to 9% for a two-times bribery, and from 0.9% to 2.5% for a three-times bribery; conversely, a more tolerant attitude towards corruption reduces the predictive probabilities of avoiding it from 82% to 65%.

To further test the relation between both variables, we dichotomize the values of the composite between ‘no incident’ (zero-times) and ‘incident’ (one or more times) of bribery over the same amount of time, and we include all the subjects that have had interactions with a public institution in *at least one* of the three cases. We use a simple chi-square test to check if there is any statistical relation, and the results

are presented in Table 4-2. This time, we find statistical non-significance in the relation between attitudes and behavior, which suggests that the importance of attitudes in shaping actual behavior depends on the frequency of interactions between the individual and the public sphere. To lend (or withdraw) support to this assumption, we repeat the analysis for individuals showing the *minimum frequency of interactions* (the opposite population from the one used in Table 1), which means using the data for subjects that had interactions with a public institution in *only one* of the three cases exposed by EXC11, EXC14 and EXC15. Results are presented in Table 4-3.

TABLE 4-2. IMPACT OF ATTITUDES OVER BEHAVIOR – DICHOTOMIC (ALL SUBJECTS)

BRIBE	ATTITUDE		TOTAL
	NO	YES	
NO	687	197	884
YES	90	30	120
TOTAL	777	227	1,004

PEARSON CHI2(1) = 0.445; P = 0.505

TABLE 4-3. IMPACT OF ATTITUDES OVER BEHAVIOR (ONE CASE)

BRIBE	COEFFICIENT	STD. ERROR	Z
ATTITUDE	-0.276	0.404	-0.68

N = 577

CRAGG-UHLER (NAGELKERKE) R2 = 0.002

\* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001

As assumed, this time again the simple logistic regression shows statistical non-significance and even an inverted coefficient for the effect of attitudes over behavior, which lends support to the intervenient effect of the *frequency rate* of private/public spheres interactions.

Following the argument presented by the theoretical framework, however, it is required to get past the general level of corruption tolerance behavior, and to be able to differentiate between deviant and compliant corruption in the analysis of the relation between attitudes and behavior toward corruption. This task is accomplished by inserting in the analysis the survey question coded EXC6, which refers to the occurrence of *being asked for a bribe by a public official*. This question is treated as tapping directly on cases of extortive corruption (as suggested by Orces, 2009). To prove its feasibility as such, it would be expected for victimization (exc6) to have an important impact on the citizen's attitudes toward the way the public servant has treated him/her (sgl2). To test it, we use ordered logistic regression analysis to regress SGL2 on EXC6. The results are shown in Table 4-4. As expected, the coefficient is both of important effect size (0.48) and statistically significant ( $p < 0.01$ ).

TABLE 4-4. IMPACT OF VICTIMIZATION OVER ATTITUDES TOWARD PUBLIC SERVANT

TREATMENT	COEFFICIENT	STD. ERROR	Z
VICTIMIZATION	0.487**	0.166	2.93

N = 1,371

CRAGG-UHLER (NAGELKERKE) R<sup>2</sup> = 0.007

\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

TABLE 4-5. PAYMENT OF A BRIBE BY OWN INITIATIVE OR VICTIMIZATION (THREE CASES)

BRIBE	VICTIMIZATION		TOTAL
	NO	YES	
NO	102 89.47%	14 42.42%	116 78.91%
1-TIME	10 8.77%	11 33.33%	21 14.29%
2-TIMES	1 0.88%	7 21.21%	8 5.44%
3-TIMES	1 0.88%	1 3.03%	2 1.36%

<b>TOTAL</b>	114	33	147
	100%	100%	100%

Now, it's possible to disentangle the composite ordinal variable used in Table 4-1 (subjects that interacted with public institutions in all three cases during the past year)<sup>56</sup> by tabulating it with EXC6 (request for a bribe). Table 4-5 presents the number of cases that can give us a distinction between deviant and compliant corruption.

As we can see, 58% of citizen's that were confronted (victimized) with a request for a bribe decided to comply with it, showing what the literature has called a *need* behavior. On the other hand, only 10% of those who were NOT asked for a bribe ended up giving one, clearly suggesting the possibility of a situation of *greed* corruption. Although none of the survey questions employed here allow us to state beyond reasonable doubt that the specific occurrence of victimization corresponds to that of the payment/refusal of a bribe (due to the exclusion of any measure of the frequency of those situations), we may still derive strong arguments if it can be proven that in fact a bribe request (victimization) influences the decision to pay it, as it would intuitively be expected. Table 4-6 presents the ordered logistic regression of the chosen composite ordinal variable on the variable coded EXC6.

TABLE 4-6. IMPACT OF VICTIMIZATION OVER BEHAVIOR (THREE CASES)

<b>BRIBE</b>	<b>COEFFICIENT</b>	<b>STD. ERROR</b>	<b>Z</b>
<b>VICTIMIZATION</b>	2.488***	0.459	5.42

N = 147

CRAGG-UHLER (NAGELKERKE) R2 = 0.258

\* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001

<sup>56</sup> For ease of exposition we have chosen to limit the analysis presented here to only one of the three composite models used before, and with that objective we employ the one showing the most promising results for the impact of attitudes over behavior so far. When using the other two composite variables, the results for *deviant* and *compliant* corruption show that in every case the regression fails to reach statistical significance (and a counter-logic negative coefficient in three out of the four analyses). All four logistic regression analyses are included in Appendix 5.



As expected, there is an important influence (2.48,  $p < 0.001$ ) of “victimization” over the decision to bribe or not. Hence, even though it is impossible from the survey questions to match both measures to the same event, the results of the regression provides enough support to the assumption that they are, in fact, parts of the same incidents.

To continue testing the relation between attitudes and behavior toward low-level corruption, now more readily delimited by the differentiated cases of deviant and compliant corruption, we shall turn to the more specific question about attitudes toward bribery *due to poor public services* (exc19). The ordered logistic regression of the behavioral composite ordinal variable on this variable, *for the subset of cases that were not asked for a bribe*, should tell the collusive part of the story between attitudes and behavior. Table 4-7 presents the results. We can see that the relation between the two variables is statistically non-significant, although showing an otherwise interesting effect size (0.678).

TABLE 4-7. IMPACT OF ATTITUDES OVER BEHAVIOR – CORRUPT DEVIANCE (THREE CASES)

BRIBE	COEFFICIENT	STD.	Z
		ERROR	
ATTITUDES (GREED)	0.678	0.723	0.94

N = 113

CRAGG-UHLER (NAGELKERKE)  $R^2 = 0.013$

\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Finally, the only test left to perform in this section is for the cases of clear extortion: The relation between corruption compliance and attitudes toward it. Unfortunately, there is no question in the LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey that allows for such analysis, as no question is asked regarding people’s opinion about being victimized by a public official. However, since the widest attitudinal question in the survey (exc18) allows for the inclusion of both deviant and compliant attitudes, it would be suspected that any important relation between compliant attitudes and

behavior should be able to be tapped into through a weak (at least) impact of general attitudes over specific extorted behavior. To test this possibility, we use again ordered logistic regression analysis to regress the composite ordinal variable (actual bribery) on EXC18, *for the subset of cases that were asked for a bribe*. The results are shown in Table 4-8. Once again the regression gives a statistically non-significant result, with a coefficient of 0.414. However, it is important to notice that the lack of significance may be a result of the exceptionally low number of cases included in this particular regression. Therefore, further data collection may be necessary in the future.

TABLE 4-8. IMPACT OF ATTITUDES OVER BEHAVIOR – CORRUPTION COMPLIANCE (THREE CASES)

BRIBE	COEFFICIENT	STD. ERROR	Z
ATTITUDES	0.414	0.665	0.62

N = 33

CRAGG-UHLER (NAGELKERKE) R<sup>2</sup> = 0.013

\* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001

#### 4.2. SUMMARY

The results presented in this chapter aimed at conclusively resolve the discussion regarding the appropriateness of an attitudinal measurement of the phenomenon of low-level corruption tolerance (LCT). As in the case of high-level corruption, the theoretical framework developed earlier in the present study made a strong argument for the usage of a behavioral approach to the analysis of corruption tolerance, with the intention of eventually unraveling its determinants and characteristics.

In the previous pages, it has been shown that an attitude-based indicator of LCT cannot be used as a proxy for actual deviant (or compliant) behavior regarding bribery. We reached this conclusion by focusing on the data for the Peruvian subjects that had the most encounters with public institutions, as provided by the LAPOP

AmericasBarometer 2006 database. Although these subjects reported to have behaved in a clearly consistent way with their attitudes regarding bribery, such consistency couldn't be found when disaggregating the analysis between cases of collusion (deviant behavior) and extortion (compliant behavior). Furthermore, the capacity of attitudes to predict behavior completely disappeared when considering all subjects in the database, or only the ones that had the minimum frequency of interactions with public institutions over the previous year. This results evidence the same kind of problems that inspired social psychologist Icek Ajzen and Martin Fishbein to develop their *principle of compatibility* (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977), as described in Chapter 2.


Been this the case, we are compelled to follow the logic presented in the theoretical framework supporting the higher validity of a purely action-based model of LCT, and undertake the effort of finding and explaining the various individual determinants behind the decision to engage in corruption on these specific terms.

CHAPTER 5  
THE DETERMINANTS OF CORRUPTION TOLERANCE

5.1. THE DETERMINANTS OF HCT

From here, and following the HCT process showed in Chapter 2, we can set up a number of determinants that can cause the evolution from information to punishment to be broken and devolve in a scenario of high-level corruption tolerance. Figure 5-1 shows the major determinants associated with a HCT scenario.

FIGURE 5-1. THE POTENTIAL DETERMINANTS OF HCT



The variables selected above come in big part from a profuse literature on corruption that, as mentioned in the introduction, has been developed from the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century and more importantly from the decade of 1990. We will go into each one of them taking special care to explain the internal logic of their impact in the particular step of vertical accountability.

The first stage of the process starts with the formation of citizen's perception. All other elements and 'noise' being cast aside, this cognitive process should go without alterations as people perceive accurately what the original information is transmitting; however, we will find that this assumption is contested usually by reality, and in the particular case of corruption perception it can be affected by four different considerations: media exposure, political awareness, partisanship (or political allegiance), and bureaucratic culture. **Media exposure** refers to the classic measurement approach for political knowledge acquired from the news ("learning from news"), which involves assessing the level of exposition of the individual to the mass media (Rhee and Cappella, 1997). The importance of this first determinant is easily understood given that any information that a citizen may have about high-level corruption (HLC) can inevitably only come directly or indirectly from the media, as opposed to popular perceptions of low-level corruption (Morris, 2008). In order for the citizen to perceive any corrupt activity that may be affecting the government, he/she must first have some degree of exposure to the main sources of HLC information. As Chang and Kerr (2009) prove for the case of the African countries, media exposure has an important impact on the level of corruption perception among the citizens<sup>57</sup>. The same logic stands behind Uslaner's (2008, p. 36) words, when he recounts that "[c]ountries with high newspaper readership and democracy have less corruption", and also those of Karklins (2005, p. 6), who states that "people in a democracy tend to hear much more about corruption than in nondemocratic systems that censor the news." In short, the media is widely accepted to be the main vehicle for the spread of corruption-related information, as we have commented earlier in this study, and the level of individual exposure to it is naturally a key element for the punishment of corrupt politicians. Therefore, we may propose the following hypothesis:

**HCT-H1:** Higher media exposure relates to lower HCT.

Nevertheless, and as recounted by Rhee and Cappella (1997), this basic logic of information absorption has increasingly being challenged over the past decades as

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<sup>57</sup> Although they extend that impact to corruption tolerance, they don't include in their model a linkage between perception and tolerance. For this reason, we believe that any impact that media exposure can have over corruption tolerance must logically come from its impact on corruption perception.

an insufficient concept to account for the entire individuals' learning process, based on the intervening power that other related variables may have in the formation of political knowledge. The most important challenge in this sense has come from the scholarly attention to the multidimensional concept of political sophistication, or '**political awareness**' as Zaller (1992) calls it. In his own words, political awareness refers to "the extent to which an individual pays attention to politics *and* understands what he/she has encountered" (p. 21), and as such it denotes the cognitive engagement of the recipient as opposed to his/her affective engagement or the lack of engagement. To put it more clearly, it refers to the understanding of political communications<sup>58</sup>. In our model, political awareness represents a necessary addition in order to control for the possible intervening effect of the frequency of delivery of a specific piece of information by the news, being the logic that a low rate of transmission of information would only be mitigated by a high level of political awareness. Consequently, the following hypothesis is proposed:

**HCT-H2:** Higher political awareness relates to lower HCT.

Hence, together with media exposure, both variables are proposed to be the minimum necessary for a regular citizen to be able to absorb any available information about corrupt activities and interpret it as such; any decrease in media exposure and political awareness would, on the contrary, limit citizen's ability to perceive corrupt activities in the government and hence increase his/her level of corruption tolerance.

The next constraint in the information-perception link is the citizen's political allegiance, or **partisanship**. McCann and Redlawsk (2006) find that Republican and Democratic voters in United States express different opinions on what constitutes corrupt behavior in a context where such instances were connected to scandals involving the Republican Party; similarly, in another study both authors find at least partial support for the same link, if only when corruption is understood as "favoritism" as opposed to "lawbreaking" (Redlawsk and McCann, 2005, p. 270).

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<sup>58</sup> The impact of political awareness over the individual's ability to process information is also noted by Blais et al. (2005, p. 8), who find that the most aware Canadians were almost four times more prone to perceive corruption under the government of Jean Chrétien.

Chang and Kerr (2009, p. 15) made the same line of observations when they found that partisans of the incumbent party in various African countries had systematically less perception of national government officials being involved in corrupt activities vis-à-vis non-partisans, and Anderson and Tverdova (2003) even extended these partisan consequences to the impact of attitudes toward the government<sup>59</sup>. In the words of Adam Brinegar (2009, p. 145), regarding attitudes about corruption in Chile, “[p]artisanship reflects an expected distrust among the opposition and an expected trust among the governing party about [anti-corruption] reform.” If partisanship is theoretically and empirically considered to have such a distorting effect on an individual’s perception and evaluation of corruption-related information, therefore, the following hypothesis may naturally be derived for the purposes of the present study:

**HCT-H3:** Higher partisanship relates to higher HCT.

Finally, the national ‘**bureaucratic culture**’ has been suggested to play a distorting or enhancing feature in the citizens’ perception of what constitutes a corrupt behavior. An eloquent piece of evidence of such obstacle, produced however from the perspective of petty corruption, is presented by del Castillo and Guerrero (2003, p. 26), who report that in Mexico City up to 18.7% heads of household did not connect the image of a bribe to that of a corrupt behavior<sup>60</sup>; in other words, one fifth of Mexican subjects weren’t able to perceive their own bribing behavior as corrupt. From this perspective, we cannot help but wonder if these circumstances may be mirrored by the cases involving political figures, and the potential incapacity of many citizens to understand the corrupt nature of some ‘scandals’. Van Vuuren (2004, p. 12) states in his analysis of South Africa:

“Media attention on cases of alleged grand corruption such as the arms deal has raised public awareness about what constitutes an act of corruption. This, combined with a greater awareness among citizens of their rights to fair administrative action may have resulted in respondents reporting corrupt behavior in 2003 that might have been regarded as ‘normal’ practice in 1998.”

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<sup>59</sup> Given the aggregate nature of the data used in their research, however, it is not possible to assert that the impact wasn’t actually on corruption perception, instead of directly on attitudes.

<sup>60</sup> Similarly, Karklins (2005, p. 68) reports that in Latvia “respondents struggled to distinguish ‘gifts’ from ‘bribes’ and ‘corruption’.

Clearly, there is a connection between this idea of bureaucratic culture and political awareness; however, what differentiates both constructs is the change in focus from the individual's lack of skills to appropriately process news, to the society's popular tradition regarding public affairs<sup>61</sup>. From this distinction, then, the following hypothesis is presented:

**HCT-H4:** A more corruption-friendly bureaucratic culture relates to higher HCT.

The second stage in the process of vertical accountability implies the adjustment of attitudes toward the corrupt politician in line with the previously perceived information about his/her corrupt activities. Or to put it in fewer words, it implies the negative recasting of the political leader's image. There are five factors identified by the corruption literature as being able to disrupt the formation of this appropriate attitudinal response to perceived corruption: economic satisfaction, clientelism, perceived generalized high-level corruption (HLC), democratic values, and attitudes toward HLC. **Economic satisfaction** refers to the way in which people evaluate a number of aspects of the government based primarily on their assessment of their own economic satisfaction, raising the possibility that they may accept certain levels of corruption if the actors involved offer and deliver a higher economic status compared to their cleaner political rivals. In this line of thinking, Manzetti and Wilson (2006, p. 138) find that, in the case of Argentina, "corruption only affects confidence (in government) when it is combined with economic dissatisfaction". While this link is fairly obvious and intuitive, most of the literature has some issues regarding the exact dimension of satisfaction measured. Although common expectations suggest that people will support candidates or incumbents who better represent their *economic interests* despite issues involving corruption ("positive externality", Barberá et al., 2012, p. 16; Brinegar, 2009; "economic voting", Lucinda, 2005, p. 418; McCann and Dominguez, 1998), there is also empirical evidence of an independent effect of the individual's *economic status and self-evaluation* on both perception and attitudes

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<sup>61</sup> This position is expressed by Salzman (2009) when, talking about the case of Latin America, posits that the acceptance and rejection of certain types of corruption is "linked to societal norms of distinct political cultures" (p. 7), and by doing so gets close to an anthropological approach of corruption. Karklins (2005, p. 101) also suggests the social construction of acceptable public behaviors against private ones as a fundamental determinant to what we have called HCT.



toward high-level corruption (Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 2012; Chang and Kerr, 2009, p. 17; Tverdova, 2007, p. 7; partially supported by Redlawsk and McCann, 2005, pp. 270-271). Therefore, we would expect both dimensions of economic satisfaction in relation to HCT to be statistically significant, and the subsequent operationalization of this variable will have to account for them. In conclusion, the literature takes the lead for the inclusion of the following hypothesis in our study:

**HCT-H5:** Lower economic satisfaction relates to lower HCT.

**Clientelism**, very much like economic satisfaction, has also been argued to constrain the necessary process of accountability through the exchange of votes (and other modes of political support) for “whatever favors they can muster” (Manzetti and Wilson, 2009, p. 81). In their study, Manzetti and Wilson (2009p. 84) assert that “corrupt governments, in spite of their bad reputations, may survive because they are able to buy off voters (or at least enough voters) through clientelistic networks”. In that scenario, citizens would behave as clients and develop a positive view of the leader even if (and sometimes because) he/she engages in corrupt activities<sup>62</sup> (Chang and Kerr, 2009). This relation between economic hardship, clientelism, and corruption tolerance is also acknowledged by Blake (2009, p. 100), who states that “poverty forces most citizens to focus on basic survival concerns that form a fertile breeding ground for clientelist [sic] politics and weaken the prospects of citizen activism to prevent corruption.” As economic considerations have already been discussed earlier, here we focus in the potential effect of clientelistic tendencies over the level of HCT:

**HCT-H6:** Higher clientelistic tendencies relate to higher HCT.

The third important factor to consider in this stage is the citizens’ **perception of generalized high-level corruption** pervading their society. As del Castillo and Guerrero (2003, p. 2) state, “corruption tolerance has a lot to do with the perception

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<sup>62</sup> The same results are implied in an anthropological study of poor Bolivian citizens conducted by Sian Lazar (2005). She finds that people of El Alto, Bolivia, are willing to accept and condone some level of corruption from their leaders as long as they provide *obras* (basic infrastructure) for the community.

that the individual has of himself and of the society where he/she interacts”<sup>63</sup>. This is so because citizens assess different candidates in an electoral process based in relative and not absolute terms, meaning that the value of any political attribute is set based on the comparison between the different electoral options. If a citizen believes that all politicians are unavoidably corrupt, then the threshold of corruption that any politician can be engaged in before the citizen changes his/her attitude towards him/her will be higher. Karklins (2005) adopts this position as a pivotal theme of her study, and, borrowing the words of Philip Pettit<sup>64</sup>, reproduces:

“[One view is]<sup>65</sup> that people in power are inevitably corrupt: that is, in republican terms, that such people inevitably make their decisions by reference not to considerations of the common good but rather to more sectional or private concerns. This attitude represents a general cynicism about people, in particular about those individuals who seek and get power. The other interpretation is that people in power are not inevitably corrupt but are inherently corruptible: while they may actually make their decisions on a proper, impartial basis, they cannot be relied upon to continue to do so if there are no blocks or checks on the abuse of their power. This attitude is not so much cynicism about those who happen to have power as a realism about what power can do to anyone who gets it.” (Karklins, 2005, p. 98)

Hence, Pettit’s idea of cynic citizens implies a permissive and submissive reaction, if any, when confronted with information regarding corrupt deals in the highest spheres<sup>66</sup>. The solution, following his argument, would be the formation of a more *realistic* citizen, who, understanding the dangers of unaccountable leaders, became engaged in their scrutiny. We may say, in short, that if citizens believe that all politicians are corrupt, then no one is (for the effects of vertical accountability). This seems to be the case in Lazar’s research (2005) when she suggested that for the residents of El Alto there might exist degrees of corruption that may be acceptable given the reality of the circumstances: “Since most people felt all politicians to be equally corrupt, the issue of corruption did not enable electors to choose between the political parties. Ultimately, they assessed the value of a politician despite and beyond

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<sup>63</sup> Translated from Spanish.

<sup>64</sup> Pettit, Phillip. 1997. *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

<sup>65</sup> Brackets from source.

<sup>66</sup> However, contrary to their own expectations (and ours), Blais et al. (2005, p. 12) found empirical evidence showing that cynic Canadians actually became “more angry” when confronted with information regarding high-level corruption.

their presumed corruption” (p. 222). Clearly, Lazar’s words fit perfectly our argument regarding HCT, in the sense that we would expect a higher perception of generalized corruption to make it more difficult for citizens to condemn the behavior of any particular corrupt politician. Phrasing it in an appropriate hypothesis:

**HCT-H7:** Perception of generalized HLC relates to higher HCT.

The next determinant of HCT to consider is the individual’s **democratic values**, which have been suggested to affect the level of permissiveness of some corrupt behaviors among citizens. Moreno (2002), for example, makes the argument that the justifiability among citizens of corrupt practices may be considered a cultural trait, exemplified by the fact that countries with a lower tradition of democratic institutions show higher rates of corruption “permissiveness” (p. 13). Although the author doesn’t go into the details of his index<sup>67</sup>, and more importantly the indicator used taps only into petty corruption behavior, it is nonetheless an alluring position. Such argument drifts away from the previous discussion regarding bureaucratic culture (focused in the possibility of appropriate perception), and enters the more diffuse dimension of the individual’s *democratic roots or commitment*. From an elemental perspective, O’Donnell (1998, p. 121) posits that democratic expectations “have the consequence of demanding a high degree of transparency in political decision making, and transparency creates a climate in which corruption does not thrive.” Partially for this reason, but building on a vast literature in both democracy and corruption fields, the negative relation between both constructs has become almost axiomatic in current scholarly production, with the exception of empirical studies regarding ‘new democracies’ (Morris, 2004, p. 3; Anderson and Tverdova, 2003, p. 105). These considerations, for example, inspire Karklins (2005, p. 99) to suggest that even from the popular construction of the State and its power, and the relation between the public and private spheres, we can appreciate a society’s tolerance towards HLC in rather consistent terms. However, as Karklins herself notices (2005, p. 7), democratic regimes also face much greater pressure to reduce their levels of corruption, mostly due to the inherent mechanisms of such system. If

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<sup>67</sup> The author doesn’t try to unravel the meaning of the index used, indiscriminating between the possibility of the respondent not being able to interpret the behavior as corrupt, and the respondent interpreting it as such but still expressing its justifiability.

democracy is to fail in addressing this problem, there are always societal forces that will exert various degrees of pressure (with support from the citizenry) to undo the liberal reforms and go back to old authoritarian ways. To pick up O'Donnell's terms once again, if corruption doesn't thrive in a political climate of transparency, at least it becomes more evident, naturally bringing the perception of its occurrence to higher levels. Grounded or not, such perception may produce the image that corruption is more widespread under a democratic regime than it was before, therefore deterring support for such system. In those circumstances, we would expect a less corruption-tolerant citizen to reject democratic institutions, as he/she would see them as facilitating malfeasance, in a completely opposite logic than the one expressed earlier in this paragraph. It's clear, then, that the relation between an individual's democratic values and his/her level of HCT have a complex relation, whose direction cannot be clearly assumed *a priori*. The following hypothesis is worded in a way that accounts for such problem:

**HCT-H8:** Individual democratic values and HCT are statistically related.

The final determinant associated with the possibility of appropriately correcting one's attitudes in line with perceived corruption-related information, are the individual's **attitudes toward HLC**. Because such feature is self-evident in its impact over the citizens' punishment behavior (as presented for the case of LCT in Chapter 2), we won't stop to go into its details. It should suffice to explicitly lay down the logic behind it, even if such exercise would prove to be unnecessary: The importance of corruption scandals over the individual's opinion of the political candidate is dependent on his/her opinion about the positive or negative nature of HLC; if the individual finds HLC to be 'despicable', he/she will also find any candidate involved in it unsuitable for office. Conversely, if the individual has no problem with the idea of HLC in his/her society, then, his/her opinion of the political candidate won't change, and he/she will omit the corruption-related information from his/her electoral calculation. In few words, our hypothesis is as follows:

**HCT-H9:** Better attitudes toward HLC relate to higher HCT.

Finally, the last stage of vertical accountability requires the attitudes to be converted in real punishment against the corrupt political leaders. Just one factor has been found with the potential to obstruct this natural manifestation: a citizen's sense of self-efficacy. **Self-efficacy**, or *political efficacy* for the objective of the present study, refers to the individual's self-perceived capabilities to attain specific goals, including the resolute respond to environmental demands (Madsen, 1987, p. 571). A citizen's sense of self-efficacy is, in its most basic expression, the belief that he/she can exert some influence in political affairs, direct efforts toward successful political action, and be involved in overall political change (Gecas, 1989, p. 310). On the other hand, a citizen's low level of political efficacy can be expected to hinder any effort towards a political goal, including the punishment of a corrupt politician by means of casting a vote for an electoral adversary. As an example of such relation, a common indicator of political efficacy<sup>68</sup> is presented by Tanaka (2005, p. 371) to address the individual's feeling that "through citizen action is possible to make [political] power accountable<sup>69</sup>", as part of his effort to empirically argue for a reduction in the level of corruption tolerance among the Peruvian citizens. Following his lead, we choose to posit the validity of the following hypothesis, the last one for the model of HCT:

**HCT-H10:** Lower political efficacy relates to higher HCT.

## 5.2. THE DETERMINANTS OF LCT AS A DEVIANT BEHAVIOR

In Figure 5-2 we show the process through which behavioral and normative beliefs determine attitude and subjective norm towards a bribery attempt, respectively, and control and choice beliefs determine the perceived behavioral choice and control over bribery. The rest of the model reflects what we have already discussed earlier about the ways these beliefs ultimately decide behavior<sup>70</sup>.


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<sup>68</sup> Citing data from a study conducted by Martín Tanaka and Patricia Zárate ("Valores democráticos y participación ciudadana en el Perú, 1998-2001", Lima: IEP-USAID, 2002), the author uses the survey question "how much do you agree or disagree with the following phrase: "The politicians decide what they want and there's nothing I can do to stop it"" (translated from Spanish) (Tanaka, 2005, p. 372).

<sup>69</sup> Translated from Spanish.

<sup>70</sup> It needs to be noted that the selection of beliefs behind 'attitude towards trying to bribe', four in total, respond to Ajzen's description of "[linking] the behavior to a certain outcome" (2005, p. 123), while at the same time integrates his more comprehensive model (Ajzen, 1985) that includes outcomes

FIGURE 5-2. THE POTENTIAL DETERMINANTS OF LCT – DEVIANT BEHAVIOR



In this way, we can see beliefs (1) and (2) regard the outcomes of a successful attempt, belief (3) regards the outcome of a failed attempt, and belief (4) regards the outcome of the process. On the other hand, regarding the beliefs (5) and (6) behind the subjective norm, it can be noted that we decided to use Ajzen’s (2005) comment over the referents’ engagement or not engagement in the behavior as the belief’s core. Lastly, belief (7) refers to the individual’s perceived control, while beliefs (8) and (9) refer to the individual’s perceived choice over engaging or not engaging in the behavior.

When we talk about attitudinal beliefs, Fishbein and Ajzen (2010) describe them as the result of a twofold process: First, there is the belief that a certain behavior will bring about a specific outcome; and second, there is the evaluation of the outcome. When addressing the issue of bribery, attitudinal beliefs will be formed based on the expected result of such a behavior, and the positive or negative opinions citizens may hold about them. The first of these beliefs, naturally, is the idea that bribery is **bad for society**. This is a rather obvious statement, empirically found

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of both successful and failed attempts, with Bagozzi and Warshaw’s (1990) attitude toward the process of striving to reach the goal.

through a series of in-depth interviews commented by Karklins (2005, p. 68) where interviewees seem to differentiate between *bribes* and the idea of corruption, the latter being associated with a negative impact on others; furthermore, subjects regard bribery justifiable only as long as “it has no negative consequence for society”. The same pattern is informed by Barr and Serra (2008, p. 24) who, by conducting experimental research, conclude that subjects are “less likely to offer bribes” when negative externalities were included. However, what is not entirely clear is the *evaluation* that people may hold regarding such negative outcome, as they would only refrain from causing harm to others to the same degree that they believe others deserve such considerations. If citizens don’t trust others in society, or they don’t feel they have a stake in others’ lives, the result will most likely be a better attitude towards bribery. Eric Uslaner (2008, p. 53) states, for example, that “[w]hen some groups in a society are considerably worse off than others, they may feel more reliant on corrupt behavior to get their ‘fair share’.” Not surprisingly, considering the levels of inequality and trust in Peru, López-Cálix et al. (2009, p. 128) find that most of the financial “leakage” in the *Vaso de Leche* (Glass of Milk) Program corresponds to assets directly managed by beneficiaries or their representatives. Therefore, by considering the obviously negative outcome of bribery, the remaining question is how much do Peruvian citizens think that society is worth protecting, a question that includes their fellow countrymen as much as the State (Assies et al., 2002). From this argument, the following hypothesis can be developed:

**LCT-H1:** Citizens will refrain from engaging in bribery if they have a better evaluation of their society.

The second determinant of LCT-deviant is the belief that paying a bribe is **more economically convenient**, understanding this in terms of any material or immaterial resource (time, money, effort, etc.). In the words of Campos-Ortiz (2010, p. 19), citizens are more inclined to engage in collusive bribery when such action is seen as “serving some purpose – eg., avoiding red tape or supplementing a low wage”, thus linking it to some convenient outcome. The same conclusion is reached by del Castillo and Guerrero (2003) after conducting interviews with focus groups in Mexico City, and in a rather suggestive way by Frank and Schulze (2000), who find that economic students are more prone to corrupt transactions. Similarly, Karklins

(2005) reports that the problem of *red tape* is a common justification among citizens for engaging in petty corruption. Due to the general acceptance of this obvious outcome of bribery, what is left to see is how important it is for citizens to be materially (or immaterially) benefitted. In other words, although in itself the economic gains of bribery might always be perceived as positive, there may be substantial differences between different individuals and the importance they assign to such outcome. Therefore, a second hypothesis is presented in those evaluative terms:

**LCT-H2:** Citizens will engage in bribery if they hold its potential benefits in higher esteem.

Peruvian normativity clearly states, through the provisions included in Law N° 28355<sup>71</sup>, that the “active corruption” of a public official is punishable by 3-5 years of imprisonment, in cases where the official acted without stepping out of the limits of his/her function, and by 4-6 years if the official was corrupted to act in transgression of his/her duties. Thus, bribery can be **legally harmful** if actually detected and convicted, and such possibility must necessarily be present in the individual’s considerations before engaging in that illicit behavior, as the evaluation of the consequences is, in any case, obviously negative. However, as many citizens in Latin America are aware of, petty corruption is a very common thing that transpires in a daily basis without any of the parties involved facing any legal damage. Del Castillo and Guerrero (2003) argues that, for the inhabitants of Mexico City, there are always corrupt alternatives to the formal application of the law, hence eroding its effective implementation for the punishment of bribery. And the consequences are clear enough: As Blake (2009, p. 96) explains, “[w]here a circle of impunity is perceived within the government, citizens find it harder to maintain an outright rejection of corruption because such a position seems like folly.” Consequently, the following hypothesis may be presented for the individual’s decision to act in a collusive way:

**LCT-H3:** Citizens will engage in bribery if they perceive the legal bodies of the State to be ineffective.

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<sup>71</sup> [http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/mesicic3\\_per\\_ley28355.pdf](http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/mesicic3_per_ley28355.pdf)



The individual's attitudes toward collusive bribery can be a consequence of objective considerations regarding his/her fellow countrymen, its convenience, and the potential legal consequences; but can also be a result of more subjective determinants, such as seeing a bribe as fundamentally **unethical**. This is the case when citizens feel that there is something essentially wrong with corruption, something that escapes the immediate material consequences or benefits, and that reflects on their own image as members of society. However, as observed by Karklins (2005), the legitimacy of the regime, its policies and institutions, and ultimately the State, play a pivotal role in the construction of those anti-corruption *ethics* to an extent that without the citizen's satisfaction with the political environment, bribery becomes an acceptable and justifiable behavior:

“[O]fficials and the citizenry are much more likely to observe the law and be guided by public spiritedness if they believe that a government has the right to rule and does so in a way that promotes the public interest. If, on the contrary, citizens see the regime or specific institutions as repressive, predatory, or incompetent, their support wanes and they tend to focus on their personal good.” (Karklins, 2005, p. 92)

Uslaner (2008, p. 188) corroborates the preceding statement, explaining that the “ethical dilemma” of individuals facing corruption is much smaller to the degree that they perceive the same corrupt behavior in their political leaders (which is always considered reprehensible). Clearly, there is a connection with the corruptibility of the government and other high-ranking officials; however, the point we are trying to make here exclusively emphasizes the legitimacy of the legal order of society, how it can be perceived as only complementary of other more *personalized* alternatives, and how these conditions diminishes the ethical dilemma behind bribery (del Castillo and Guerrero, 2003; Assies et al., 2002). If the non-unethicality of low-level corruption stems from the illegitimacy of the political environment, and its evaluation is also constrained by the latter, then it's possible to posit the following hypothesis:

**LCT-H4:** Citizens will engage in bribery if they perceive the formal institutions of the country to be ineffective/illegitimate.

Moving on now to the *descriptive* beliefs concerning subjective norms, we are interested in addressing the individual's perception that **others are engaging in**

**bribery.** Although this connection is completely explicit in the model adopted, there is also plenty of literature that supports such approach. Uslaner (2008, p. 27) states that “[o]ur actions reflect not only our own desires and beliefs, but also how we feel that others will act... If you believe that ‘everyone is corrupt,’ you will follow the herd and act corruptly yourself.” This, ultimately, would devolve in a situation resembling the *tragedy of the commons*, or as Rothstein (2005) describes it, a “social trap” in which the perception that everyone else is involved in wrongdoing ends up becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy<sup>72</sup>. Therefore, this interactive model behind the decision to engage in bribery is widely recognized as crucial in explaining an individual’s behavior (Karklins, 2005; del Castillo and Guerrero, 2003), and it doesn’t just apply to cases of collusive (deviant) corruption, but also to cases of extortion (compliance), as people may feel more comfortable with the idea of surrendering a bribe if they perceive such reaction to be normal and in line with social expectations. Consequently, the following hypothesis is presented:

**LCT-H5:** Citizens will engage in bribery if they perceive that most other people are doing the same.

As already mentioned earlier, the **perceived high-level corruption** involving the country’s elites can also be a source of tolerance towards collusive bribery, a way of justifying the individual’s own behavior by reference to others’, although the mechanism and inner logic is somehow different. In this case the inspiration for the illicit act comes straight from the resentment with other groups that are considered to have an advantageous (if not opportunistic) power position, and seen them getting illicit profits without meeting any justice: “This does not mean that people believe that [bribe] payments are morally justified, but only that the means to support your in-group, especially if you see a dominant out-group as privileged, become less troublesome”, asserts Uslaner (2008, p. 51). This justifiability of bribery (if not morally speaking) is also addressed by Karklins (2005) in similar terms, emphasizing the citizens’ perception of corrupt activities in the top as a subjective *self-approval* to

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<sup>72</sup> Quoting Bardhan, Rothstein (2011, p. 100) adds that “corruption represents an example of what are called frequency-dependent equilibria, and our expected gain from corruption depends crucially on the number of other people we expect to be corrupt”. Morris (2008, p. 401) finds such statistical linkage between participation and perception in his analysis of Mexican states.

engage in petty corruption themselves. For the present study, hence, a hypothesis is presented in the following terms:

**LCT-H6:** Citizens will engage in bribery if they perceive widespread high-level corruption.

Concerning control and *choice* beliefs, Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p. 170) argue that they are a result of two considerations (as in the case of attitudinal beliefs): First, the belief that a certain condition will be present to allow the control or the choice over a certain behavior (in our case, bribery); and second, the perceived power of such condition “to facilitate or impede the performance of the behavior”. The present study will focus only on the first of these considerations, as there is no data in the LAPOP survey that would account for the second.

The next determinant to consider in our model, then, is the citizens’ perception that **public officials are corruptible**, which is closely connected to the perception that *others* are also engaging in petty corruption. The reason is fairly obvious: Without corrupt officials, there wouldn’t be individuals paying bribes; and without the latter, the former wouldn’t exist either. Here, thus, we have a reciprocal relation where the behavior of one group influences, and is dependent on, the behavior of the other. As Karklins (2005, p. 43) states, “*anticipation*<sup>73</sup> of what others in society expect or how they will act” is the basis for the spread of a culture of corruption, a reasoning that Blake (2009, p. 97) builds on, stating that “[i]f citizens perceive the police as protecting certain criminals or eliciting bribes themselves, it becomes harder to develop and retain a consistent rejection of corruption.” In other words, the interaction between an individual’s perception of the bureaucratic environment and his/her own decision to comply with the law follows an adaptive process, which concludes with the appropriate response based entirely on the circumstances. Such process is described by del Castillo and Guerrero (2003) for the Mexican case, but is also statistically found by Moyal et al. (2004) in Uruguay, and by Cabelkova (2001) in Ukraine. Consequently, we produce the following hypothesis for the Peruvian case:

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<sup>73</sup> Italics are ours.

**LCT-H7:** Citizens will engage in bribery if they perceive public officials to be corruptible/corrupted.

While Peruvian citizens may perceive that they have some control over the possibility of bribing, due to the common idea of Peruvian bureaucrats being corrupt, they also may be forced to engage in such illicit activity if they perceive that there is **no other economical choice or alternative**. “Poverty forces most citizens to focus on basic survival concerns that form a fertile breeding ground for clientelism”, Blake (2009, p. 100) stated and we cited for the determinants of HCT. This idea of “survival” as a pivotal determinant of bribery, stemming from the individual’s income and economic satisfaction, is also a major element in Karklins’ (2005) analysis of post-communist countries, and recognized by Uslaner (2008, p. 188) when he suggests that “playing at the edge of moral acceptability is the only way to survive” in many underdeveloped societies, where citizens pay the corrupt price out of pure necessity. And this situation is not exclusive of collusive bribery, but also determines the perceived choices besides complying with an extortionist’s demand, particularly in cases where the individual cannot afford to lose a certain service. According to the ISS National Victims of Crime Survey – 2003 (van Vuuren, 2004), while the third and fourth more common cases of bribe request by a public official in South Africa involved some exploitation of the vulnerable condition of the citizen (employment/jobs and pension/social welfare), half of the people reported having complied (49% and 51%, respectively), and the rate increased for payments regarding water/electricity access (73%). Therefore, it’s completely possible to identify cases where citizens accept the heavy burden of corruption on themselves when this is seemed as the only way to gain access to the services they depend on<sup>74</sup> (Uslaner, 2008; Karklins, 2005). For the present study, we hypothesize that, in Peru:

**LCT-H8:** Citizens will engage in bribery if they perceive that there is no economical alternative, and if they cannot afford to lose the service.

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<sup>74</sup> In the case of Peru, Durand (2005, p. 295) reports (although in purely anecdotic and non-empiric historical terms) that the “fatal occurrence of a series of recessive and inflationary crises was an element of the broader context that needs to be taken into account because it loosened up the retaining walls of corruption, extending its tolerance” (translated from Spanish).

Finally, many citizens may feel alienated from the legal and enforcement bodies of society, and perceive that, when confronted with a corrupt official, it may be **dangerous to refuse to pay a bribe**. To assert this idea, we refer to the interviewees' reports in del Castillo and Guerrero (2003, p. 14) about “<sup>75</sup>bribery for *fear* of the implications that may carry not offering an illicit payment.” In such situations, the individuals explain to see a bribe as a way to secure their own safety through money, particularly when the agents of the law are considered treacherous, or even involved in criminal activities beyond petty corruption. The exact same argument is reported by Karklins (2005), further suggesting the lack of *safe choices* by which individuals in these countries may be able to refrain from engaging in collusive corruption.

Based on those accounts, we can propose a hypothesis for bribery in the following terms:

**LCT-H9:** Citizens will engage in bribery if they perceive that is dangerous to do otherwise.


### 5.3. THE DETERMINANTS OF LCT AS A COMPLIANT BEHAVIOR

Moving on to the determinants of compliant (extorted) bribery, Figure 5-3 describes the literature-driven suggestions behind such phenomenon, described in the same model as before with the corrections proposed in the theoretical framework of Chapter 2.

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<sup>75</sup> Translated from Spanish.

FIGURE 5-3. THE POTENTIAL DETERMINANTS OF LCT – COMPLIANT BEHAVIOR



Although extortion is a commonly acknowledged and mentioned problem in the corruption literature, as it has been commented before, the lack of any systematic study of this particular case of low-level (or petty) corruption necessarily hinders our possibilities to assume the generally salient beliefs behind the individual's compliant behavior in such situations, as we did for the case of collusive corruption. The reduced number of determinants included in the model is a graphical proof of those limiting circumstances. Moreover, two of the five beliefs identified (3 and 5) have already been addressed in the previous section due to their substantial similarities respecting both collusion and extortion, leaving us with only three determinants that may be said to correspond exclusively with the citizen's corruption-compliance. These can be introductorily described as attitudinal beliefs (1) and (2)<sup>76</sup>, and choice belief (4).

<sup>76</sup> As explained in the theoretical framework, these cannot possibly be described as *attempt* beliefs, but only as behavioral. This is because there are no empirical reports concerning the occurrence of failed extorted payments: While the actual payment of a collusive bribe would denote the *minimum tolerance level*, the payment of an extorted bribe will always represent the *actual tolerance level* of the citizen, as he/she would not attempt to bribe a public official out of his/her own initiative when there is no *need* or benefit behind such payment. The only possible sequence showing extortion tolerance is the public official's demand for a payment in order to provide a service to which the citizen is entitled, and the subsequent compliance.

The first identified determinant to review is the belief that a **bribe helps the underpaid public official**. Although such statement from an extortion victim may sound counterintuitive, we find some grounds to regard it as plausible at least. First, there is the common reference in the corruption literature, particularly from the economics field, that low wages of public officials may work as an incentive to engage in petty corruption (Tanzi, 1998, p. 572; Dadalauri, 2007; Khan, 2006, p. 20; Lendeng, 2010); Campos-Ortiz (2010), for example, presents experimental results showing that subjects are more inclined to resort to rent-seeking behaviors if the situation is framed as supplementing low salaries. If this is the case (as most likely is), then the perception of that reality may indeed make citizens more tolerant of surrendering some money to help those public officials in distress. Del Castillo and Guerrero (2003, p. 23) arrives to that conclusion:

“<sup>77</sup>[W]e find an image of policemen as the victims and the last link of a huge chain of corruption, as private performers of alternative [sic] and with miserable salaries, and who by the same token can be justified. We have presented above the way in which it’s perceived that they are extorted from inside their own police corporation, and how they are apparently demanded for specific quotas in case they wish to have a police motorcycle, a patrol, a new uniform, to improve their equipment or to have the possibility of enjoying a day off.”

As a bribe has the obvious outcome of generating an extra rent for the public official, what remains to be seen is if this result is evaluated as positive, which will occur to the same degree that citizens believe public officials deserve it. In other words, the individual’s satisfaction with the bureaucratic service can be regarded as the primary source of the belief that public workers indeed deserve extra income. With that logic in mind, the following hypothesis is presented:

**LCT-H10:** Citizens will surrender a bribe if they are satisfied with the work of public officials.

A second attitudinal belief that may be present in the individual’s calculation of an extortion’s outcome is the **sense of impotency** that may pervade him/her as a consequence of his/her compliant behavior. This idea is closely related to the concept

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<sup>77</sup> Translated from Spanish.

of self-efficacy (introduced in the section involving the determinants of HCT), which refers to the individual's perceived capacity to control his/her surroundings. As there is no concrete research regarding the impact of the citizen's self-image over his/her vulnerability to corrupt victimization, we can only assume the possibility of a link connecting them both. Therefore, an original hypothesis is presented:

**LCT-H11:** Citizens will not surrender a bribe if they hold a high perception of self-efficacy.

The final determinant of LCT-compliance to address can be said to relate to the feeling that is dangerous to refuse to bribe a public official, which was described in the previous section. The collapse or malfunctioning of the legal apparatus, set in place to protect the rights of the citizenry, is clearly an important determinant behind the individuals' conduct; therefore, the presence of **ineffective (or blatantly dangerous) complaint mechanisms** and other redress venues have the natural consequence of stripping the citizen of any choice but to comply with illicit requirements. If these measures are in place, however, an active citizenry fighting and denouncing cases of extortion can be expected; at least that is the message behind Kohen's (1998) argument in defense of the expansion of civic participation and guarantees in Argentina, for example. Unfortunately, in underdeveloped countries is much more common to find a negative trend, as Karklins (2005, p. 66) explains:

"A survey conducted in Armenia in 2002 found that few citizens are prepared to report bribery to the law enforcement agencies, because they do not believe that any action will be taken. In the words of a housewife: 'They have it all – the power, the connections, and the force. I'm not going to fight them. I'd rather give them the couple of dollars they ask for and spare myself an endless bureaucratic ordeal.'"

The same situation is reported by van Vuuren (2004, p. 15), who shows that up to 73% of surveyed South Africans who were victimized by corrupt officials, but didn't report the incident, declared having inhibited from doing so due to the beliefs that such an action "would not have changed anything" (46%), or because they were "afraid of being victimized" even further (27%). In consequence, we apply the same argument, an hypothesize that:



**LCT-H12:** Citizens will surrender a bribe if they perceive that complaining to a higher authority is either useless or dangerous.

#### 5.4. SUMMARY

To discover the specific determinants of the phenomena of high-level and low-level corruption tolerance in Peru (an objective which is the core of Part Two), multiple variables have been identified throughout the corruption literature (and studies on other topics) with the potential to account for the differing levels of tolerance among individuals, in terms of political support, and deviant and compliant behavior. Based on them, we made several assumptions regarding their relation with HCT and LCT as operationalized in the present study, all of which will be later tested by statistical means in Chapters 6 and 7. These hypotheses are:

##### Hypotheses regarding the determinants of high-level corruption tolerance

- **HCT-H1:** Higher media exposure relates to lower HCT.
- **HCT-H2:** Higher political awareness relates to lower HCT.
- **HCT-H3:** Higher partisanship relates to higher HCT.
- **HCT-H4:** A more corruption-friendly bureaucratic culture relates to higher HCT.
- **HCT-H5:** Lower economic satisfaction relates to lower HCT.
- **HCT-H6:** Higher clientelistic tendencies relate to higher HCT.
- **HCT-H7:** Perception of generalized HLC relates to higher HCT.
- **HCT-H8:** Individual democratic values and HCT are statistically related.
- **HCT-H9:** Better attitudes toward HLC relate to higher HCT.
- **HCT-H10:** Lower political efficacy relates to higher HCT.

##### Hypotheses regarding the determinants of low-level corruption tolerance

- **LCT-H1:** Citizens will refrain from engaging in bribery if they have a better evaluation of their society.
- **LCT-H2:** Citizens will engage in bribery if they hold its potential benefits in higher esteem.

- **LCT-H3:** Citizens will engage in bribery if they perceive the legal bodies of the State to be ineffective.
- **LCT-H4:** Citizens will engage in bribery if they perceive the formal institutions of the country to be ineffective/illegitimate.
- **LCT-H5:** Citizens will engage in bribery if they perceive that most other people are doing the same.
- **LCT-H6:** Citizens will engage in bribery if they perceive widespread high-level corruption.
- **LCT-H7:** Citizens will engage in bribery if they perceive public officials to be corruptible/corrupted.
- **LCT-H8:** Citizens will engage in bribery if they perceive that there is no alternative, and if they cannot afford to lose the service.
- **LCT-H9:** Citizens will engage in bribery if they perceive that is dangerous to do otherwise.
- **LCT-H10:** Citizens will surrender a bribe if they are satisfied with the work of public officials.
- **LCT-H11:** Citizens will not surrender a bribe if they hold a high perception of self-efficacy.
- **LCT-H12:** Citizens will surrender a bribe if they perceive that complaining to a higher authority is either useless or dangerous.

## PART TWO

### CORRUPTION TOLERANCE AMONG PERUVIAN CITIZENS

## CHAPTER 6

### ANALYSIS OF THE DETERMINANTS OF HIGH-LEVEL CORRUPTION TOLERANCE IN PERU

With the complete set of tools obtained from the theoretical developments presented in Part One, we are now able to move on and focus our efforts in the study of Peru as a specific case. In this chapter we will undertake the empirical analysis of the various determinants of high-level corruption (HLC) identified in Chapter 5. For this task, the first step will be to determine which items in the LAPOP AmericasBarometer – 2006 database can be used as indicators for each variable, following the wording of the ten hypotheses posited earlier. Appendix 3 presents a complete list of variables, indicators, codes, categories, and expected relation of each of them with the behavioral measure of high-level corruption tolerance (HCT); however, to conduct an analysis both feasible and clearly interpretable, multiple manipulations of data will be performed, which need to be addressed first.

#### 6.1. CREATING COMPOSITE INDICATORS

After identifying the potential measures for each variable (determinant), we proceed to combine them into composite indicators by employing either principal-components factoring analysis, which allows us to “summarize a set of individual indicators while preserving the maximum possible proportion of the total variation in the original data set” (OECD, 2008, p. 26), or a more simple aggregation process.

Although the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient is generally advised as a necessary test for the selection of indicators to be considered, it is noted that internal consistency of the selected items should only be sought when they are considered to be measures of the *same uni-dimensional object* (OECD, 2008), as the coefficient’s meaningfulness may vary due to their relation with the latent construct as either *cause* or *effect* (Neuendorf, 2011). Hence, although we will report on the alpha coefficient of each set of indicators, we advice to interpret the results of such analysis with leniency.

Additionally, we will consider only the observations for the subjects that reported to have voted for one of the six major candidates of the Peruvian presidential elections of 2006, leaving aside subjects who did not vote, or voted in blank (N=1194).

The internal consistency of the seven measures related to **media exposure**, after being standardized, was 0.54. Next, a polychoric correlation matrix was developed to account for the nature of the indicators (ordinal), and promax rotation<sup>78</sup> was applied. The results are presented in the Table 6-1 (n=1158).

TABLE 6-1. FACTOR LOADINGS FOR ‘MEDIA EXPOSURE’

Indicator	Factor 1	Factor 2	Uniqueness
pervb8c	-0.215	<u>0.870</u>	0.345
pervb8d	<u>0.430</u>	0.255	0.663
a1	<u>0.562</u>	-0.054	0.705
a2	<u>0.825</u>	-0.122	0.384
a3	<u>0.723</u>	-0.052	0.504
a4i	0.073	<u>0.596</u>	0.605
pol2	0.232	<u>0.536</u>	0.561

Based on the exhibited high loadings (hereinafter  $\geq 0.400$ ; Asakawa and Okano, 2009), consequently, two factors are predicted, dubbed *media exposure – regular* (pervb8d, a1, a2, and a3, all of them concerning official media outlets) and *media exposure – casual* (pervb8c, a4i, and pol2, concerning casual sources). These factors are hypothesized to be **positively** related to HCT.

To build a single composite indicator of **political awareness**, an index was developed by summing up the correct answers to three questions about the Peruvian political system (gi2, gi3, gi4), an approach favored by Zaller (1992) and Carreras (2012). The results are presented in Table 6-2.

<sup>78</sup> Rotation is a technique commonly employed in factor analysis to make initial results more understandable and readable. Promax is a specific type of oblique rotation generally used for large datasets, as it is computationally faster.

TABLE 6-2. INDEX OF 'POLITICAL AWARENESS'

Correct answers	Frequency	Percentage
0	71	5.95
1	349	29.23
2	591	49.5
3	183	15.33
<b>Total</b>	1194	100

The index is hypothesized to be **negatively** related to HCT.

For the case of **partisanship**, an index was developed as a result of averaging the measures reflecting such construct (pervb12 and cp13), and taking into account if the subjects indeed identified or not with a political party (vb10) as a requirement to consider the former. The results are presented in Table 6-3.

TABLE 6-3. INDEX OF 'PARTISANSHIP'

Level of partisanship	Frequency	Percentage
0	802	67.17
1	18	1.51
1.5	85	7.12
2	127	10.64
2.5	85	7.12
3	36	3.02
3.5	28	2.35
4	13	1.09
<b>Total</b>	1194	100

This index is hypothesized to be **positively** related to HCT.

The internal consistency of the two measures of **bureaucratic culture**, after being standardized, was 0.35, which is not surprising considering their unequal meaning to citizens. Following the logic of this determinant as hindering the appropriate perception of corruption, we are interested in knowing specifically if the subject can understand the question's case as corruption; therefore, we combined categories 1 and 2 ("corrupt"), and changed the value of category 3 ("not corrupt") to zero. Next, a polychoric correlation matrix was developed, and promax rotation was applied. The results are presented in Table 6-4 (n=1174).

TABLE 6-4. FACTOR LOADINGS FOR 'BUREAUCRATIC CULTURE'

Indicator	Factor 1	Uniqueness
dc1	<u>0.914</u>	0.164
dc13	<u>0.914</u>	0.164

This resulting factor is hypothesized to be **negatively** related to HCT.

For the determinant **economic satisfaction**, it was decided to divide the indicators between *economic interest* (pervb13), and two measures of *economic income and self-evaluation* (idio1 and q10d), in line with the theoretical and empirical support drawn from the literature in Chapter 5. The intention was to allow the future analysis of any interaction between both constructs, which ultimately could determine their impact over HCT. The internal consistency of the two measures of economic income and self-evaluation, after being standardized, was 0.51. Next, a polychoric correlation matrix was developed, and promax rotation was applied. The results are presented in Table 6-5 (n=1187).

TABLE 6-5. FACTOR LOADINGS FOR 'ECONOMIC INCOME AND SELF-EVALUATION'

Indicator	Factor 1	Uniqueness
idio1	<u>0.846</u>	0.284
q10d	<u>0.846</u>	0.284

This resulting factor is hypothesized to be **negatively** related to HCT.

The internal consistency of the four measures related to **clientelism**, after being standardized, was 0.58. Next, a polychoric correlation matrix was developed, and promax rotation was applied. The results are presented in Table 6-6 (n=1184).

TABLE 6-6. FACTOR LOADINGS FOR ‘CLIENTELISM’

<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Factor 1</b>	<b>Uniqueness</b>
cp2	<u>0.852</u>	0.273
cp4a	<u>0.840</u>	0.295
cp4	<u>0.836</u>	0.302
np2	<u>0.658</u>	0.567

This resulting factor is hypothesized to be **negatively** related to HCT.

The internal consistency of the five measures related to **perceived generalized high-level corruption**, after being standardized, was 0.66. Next, a polychoric correlation matrix was developed, and promax rotation was applied. The results are presented in Table 6-7 (n=1127).

TABLE 6-7. FACTOR LOADINGS FOR ‘PERCEIVED GENERALIZED HLC’

<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Factor 1</b>	<b>Uniqueness</b>
exc7	0.238	0.943
b2	<u>0.597</u>	0.644
b13	<u>0.839</u>	0.295
b21	<u>0.745</u>	0.444
b14	<u>0.836</u>	0.302

As the indicator exc7 did not exhibited a high enough loading ( $\geq 0.400$ ), it was removed and the analysis repeated. The results are presented in Table 6-8 (n=1156).



TABLE 6-8. REVISED FACTOR LOADINGS FOR ‘PERCEIVED GENERALIZED HLC’

Indicator	Factor 1	Uniqueness
b2	<u>0.607</u>	0.632
b13	<u>0.844</u>	0.288
b21	<u>0.751</u>	0.436
b14	<u>0.838</u>	0.298

This resulting factor is hypothesized to be **negatively** related to HCT.

For the case of **democratic values**, we divided the indicators between two different (but hypothetically correlated) variables: *Community-oriented values* (measured by an index of the amount of subject’s contribution – cp5, cp5a, and cp5b) and *democratic values per se* (jc13 and b6). The internal consistency of the two measures related to democratic values *per se*, after being standardized, was 0.18, which is not surprising given the nature and specificity of the survey questions. Next, a polychoric correlation matrix was developed for jc13, b6, and the index dubbed *contribution*, and promax rotation was applied. The results are presented in Table 6-9 (n=1134).

TABLE 6-9. FACTOR LOADINGS FOR ‘DEMOCRATIC VALUES’

Indicator	Factor 1	Factor 2	Uniqueness
jc13	<u>0.717</u>	-0.323	0.365
b6	<u>0.781</u>	0.282	0.325
contribution	0.031	<u>0.923</u>	0.149

As expected, the analysis shows two factors present; *community-oriented values* (factor 2) is hypothesized to be **negatively** related to HCT. *Democratic values* (factor 1), on the other hand, cannot be expected to have a clearly positive or negative relation to HCT, due to the nature of its indicators.

To build a composite indicator of **attitudes toward high-level corruption**, we operate once again on dc1 and dc13 (questions regarding the justifiability of specific corrupt scenarios) as we did before in the case of the *bureaucratic culture* determinant. This time, we simply exclude the observations regarding category number 3 (“not corrupt”), to focus on the subject’s attitude regarding a perceived case of corruption. The internal consistency of the two measures, after being standardized, was 0.29, which again is not surprising considering their unequal meaning to citizens. Next, a polychoric correlation matrix was developed, and promax rotation was applied. The results are presented in Table 6-10 (n=1141).

TABLE 6-10. FACTOR LOADINGS FOR ‘ATTITUDES TOWARD HLC’

Indicator	Factor 1	Uniqueness
dc1	<u>0.882</u>	0.222
dc13	<u>0.882</u>	0.222

The resulting factor is hypothesized to be **positively** related to HCT.

The internal consistency of the four measures related to **political efficacy**, after being standardized, was 0.21, an indeed particularly low alpha coefficient. Next, a polychoric correlation matrix was developed, and promax rotation was applied. The results are presented in Table 6-11 (n=501).

TABLE 6-11. FACTOR LOADINGS FOR ‘POLITICAL EFFICACY’

Indicator	Factor 1	Factor 2	Uniqueness
prot2	<u>0.551</u>	-0.374	0.549
cp8	<u>0.689</u>	0.096	0.518
cp5d	<u>0.633</u>	-0.072	0.593
np1b	-0.030	<u>0.836</u>	0.299
np1	<u>0.653</u>	0.171	0.248
muni11	0.144	<u>0.672</u>	0.531

Based on the exhibited high loadings, consequently, two factors are predicted, dubbed *external political efficacy* (prot2, cp8, cp5d, and np1, all of them measuring actual behavioral self-efficacy) and *internal political efficacy* (np1b, and muni11, measuring attitudinal or perceived self-efficacy). These factors are hypothesized to be **positively** related to HCT.


## 6.2. STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELING

Now that we have the composite indicators for each determinant, we proceed to lay them in a structural equation model (SEM) following the basic shape of the vertical accountability approach presented in Chapter 2, with two important changes. First, we will treat the determinants of the latent variables ‘perception’ and ‘attitudes’ as indicators themselves of the accountability stages reached by the subject<sup>79</sup>, meaning that the latter will be reflected in the conduct measured by the former; this is graphically represented by the arrows going from the accountability stages of perception and attitudes to the measured variables. Second, some connections are added to the original theoretical model to allow for potential correlations between some of the determinants, based on logical interdependences, and to consider the possible direct impact of ‘perception’ over behavior (HCT), by-passing the stage of *corrected attitudes*; although such connection is not anticipated by the theoretical model, we would like to test that assumption against factual data. In Figure 6-1 we present the first SEM built for the purposes of HCT (N=1194), employing the method of ‘maximum likelihood with missing values’ to account for the heterogeneous number of observations across the variables.

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
<sup>79</sup> Such stages, from an individual’s perspective, might be referred to as ‘*low perceptibility*’ and ‘*tolerant attitude*’.

FIGURE 6-1. THEORIZED SEM OF A VERTICAL ACCOUNTABILITY PROCESS (HCT)



After omitting the statistically non-significant paths originally modeled, the final equation is presented in Figure 6-2, with a Root Mean Squared Error of Approximation (RMSEA) of 0.064.

FIGURE 6-2. MODIFIED SEM OF A VERTICAL ACCOUNTABILITY PROCESS (HCT)



The standardized coefficients of the statistically significant paths are presented in Table 6-12.

TABLE 6-12. THE DETERMINANTS OF HCT IN PERU

	Measured variables ->	Perception -> attitude	Attitude -> behavior	Perception -> behavior	Influence over behavior	Hypothesized direction of influence
<b>Media exposure casual</b>	0.42	-0.198	0.114	-0.153	<b>-0.074</b>	+
<b>Media exposure regular</b>	0.33	-0.198	0.114	-0.153	<b>-0.058</b>	+
<b>Political awareness</b>	-0.189	-0.198	0.114	-0.153	<b>0.033</b>	-
<b>Partisanship</b>	-0.669	-0.198	0.114	-0.153	<b>0.117</b>	+
<b>Income and economic evaluation</b>	-0.175		0.114		<b>-0.020</b>	-
<b>Perceived generalized HLC</b>	0.538		0.114		<b>0.061</b>	-
<b>Community-oriented values</b>	0.429		0.114		<b>0.049</b>	-
<b>Democratic values</b>	0.825		0.114		<b>0.094</b>	?
<b>Attitude towards HLC</b>	0.115		0.114		<b>0.013</b>	+
<b>External political efficacy</b>	0.096				<b>0.096</b>	+

### 6.3. RESULTS

The previous analysis resulted in the confirmation of a straight path between perception of corruption and actual punishment, suggesting a non-linear process of vertical accountability as previously assumed for HCT. Additionally, the SEM shows an expected covariance between media exposure ‘casual’ and ‘regular’ (0.274), and between both of them and ‘political awareness’ (-0.243 and -0.235, respectively). Most importantly, however, was the finding of some enigmatic relations between the identified potential determinants of corruption tolerance, and the behavioral indicator of HCT. As a way to conclude the current chapter, we present the interpretation of the final influence of each determinant, as found by the structural equation modeling:

- Lower amount of information through casual contacts relates to less tolerance of high-level corruption.
- Lower amount of official information relates to less tolerance of high-level corruption.
- Higher political knowledge relates to more tolerance of high-level corruption.
- Higher partisan contacts relates to more tolerance of high-level corruption.
- Less economically satisfied individuals are less tolerant of high-level corruption.
- The less high-level corruption citizens perceive in general, the more tolerant they are.
- More community-oriented people are more tolerant of high-level corruption.
- Stronger democratic values relates to more tolerance of high-level corruption.
- Better attitudes toward high-level corruption relates to more tolerance of such phenomenon.
- Less political efficacy relates to more high-level corruption tolerance.

CHAPTER 7  
ANALYSIS OF THE DETERMINANTS OF  
LOW-LEVEL CORRUPTION TOLERANCE IN PERU

The second part of the main analytical stage of this study involves the identification of the statistically relevant determinants of low-level corruption tolerance (LCT) as experienced by the actual Peruvian citizens. As we previously found, the literature on low-level (or petty) corruption provides multiple factors (theoretically and empirically) that may, to varying degrees, hinder or encourage an individual's willingness to engage in bribery. From such exercise (described in Chapter 5), twelve hypotheses were drawn.

The present Chapter focuses on the empirical test of those hypotheses for both models of LCT, as appropriate, namely *deviant* and *compliant*. Although part of this analysis will mirror the same kind undertaken in the previous chapter concerning HCT, some important differences are present which need to be addressed before conducting any analysis.

7.1. METHODOLOGY: PROXIES AND CORRELATIONS

The first concern presented by the adopted TPB model is the type of data that may be considered feasible for analysis. As has been explained in Chapter 2, the TPB draws attention to the specific behavior under study, which is low-level corruption (LLC) or plain *bribery* in our case, and the behavioral, normative, and control (and *choice*) beliefs underpinning its execution; therefore, such sets of beliefs must be worded following the logic of the behavior they are assumed to be linked to. That is the essence of the principle of compatibility. However, as the LAPOP's AmericasBarometer 2006 is not by itself a corruption-centered survey, the individual information available in the dataset does not consider some of the cases we have identified as potential determinants of LCT, hence only allowing for the employment of *proxy* variables that will stand for the more LCT-specific beliefs. Therefore, we advise to interpret the results with caution, understanding that a more specific set of



questions may raise some discrepancies. The indicators from the Peruvian dataset of 2006 (N=1500) considered for each variable of the two LCT models are presented in Appendix 4.

Following the rationale presented in the previous Chapter, we employ principal-components factoring analysis to reduce the number of indicators available to composite ones, when necessary, which will allow for a better handling of the data. Again, Cronbach's alpha won't be considered to be a reliable test of the appropriateness of the chosen indicators, especially due to the employment of *proxies*<sup>80</sup> that are not expected to be related between each other, but rather to capture as many dimensions of the underlying construct as possible. For this reason, we will omit this test.

A second and more important concern involves the appropriateness of employing a regression model, in any of its varieties, as is common practice in most contemporary social research (including our own practice in previous chapters). To present this issue, we refer explicitly to the words of the creators of the TPB model, Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p. 124):

“Our discussion suggests that a given belief's contribution to the overall attitude, and its ability to account for variation in the attitude, can be discerned by examining the value of the  $b \times e$  product and its correlation with the overall attitude. It has sometimes been proposed... that a better way of identifying the relative contributions of different beliefs is to regress the overall attitude on all belief-by-evaluation products and to use the regression coefficients as estimates of each belief's importance as a determinant of attitude. It should be realized, however, that the regression coefficients in such an analysis represent the *unique* variance in attitudes explained by each of the beliefs. When two beliefs are highly correlated with each other, only one will receive a high regression weight, and the other would thus be regarded as unimportant. From a psychological perspective, this conclusion will often be invalid... It would be unreasonable to conclude... that the other beliefs were irrelevant or that considering the other beliefs did not add important information to our understanding of the attitude... Disregarding the second belief because it did not have a significant regression coefficient would be a mistake”.

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<sup>80</sup> Contrary to proxies, the test of internal consistency (alpha) is used to assess multiple items serving as *direct measures* of an underlying construct.

For the reasons exposed above, we choose to employ the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient ( $\rho$ ) as it is suited to handle ordinal variables of the kind included in the LAPOP dataset, and to examine directly the correlation between *beliefs* and *behavior*<sup>81</sup>. Besides the feasibility of this strategy being explicitly acknowledged by the creators of the TPB model themselves, it fits perfectly the current capabilities of this study, particularly regarding the available variables of the LAPOP dataset, which do not include measures of descriptive norms, behavioral control/choice, or intentions to engage in bribery.

## 7.2. CREATING COMPOSITE INDICATORS

The first set of measures to compound is of those related to the individual’s **evaluation of his/her society** (it1, cp5c, b6). We started by inverting the values of ‘b6’ to align their expected relation to LCT in the same direction as ‘it1’ and ‘cp5c’; next, a polychoric correlation matrix was developed to account for the nature of the indicators, and promax rotation was applied. The results are presented in Table 7-1 (n=630).

TABLE 7-1. FACTOR LOADINGS FOR ‘EVALUATION OF SOCIETY’

Indicator	Factor 1	Uniqueness
it1	<u>0.718</u>	0.484
cp5c	<u>0.430</u>	0.815
b6	<u>0.682</u>	0.535

This resulting factor is hypothesized to be **positively** related to LCT-deviant.

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<sup>81</sup> This strategy is supported by Fishbein and Ajzen (2010), who, in addition to their traditional belief-attitude/norm/PBC-intention-behavior step-by-step analysis, also describe “the explanatory value of beliefs”: “The stronger the correlation, the more the belief in question discriminates between those who do and do not perform (or intend to perform) the behavior in question” (p. 206). This decision is not a minor one, since it has been proposed in the theoretical framework of Chapter 2 that PBC has a potential direct impact on behavior; therefore, a direct correlation of beliefs over behavior will effectively by-pass a possible focus on this path.

In the case of the individual’s **esteem for the potential benefits** of bribery, we have decided to individually assess the two identified indicators (lgl3 and cp5a), as the possible gains of analyzing these two different dimensions of the hypothesized belief might outweigh the scarcity of those derived from a reduction process. Both indicators are hypothesized to be **positively** related to LCT-deviant.

For the belief that the **legal bodies of the State are ineffective**, a polychoric correlation matrix was developed to account for the nature of the indicators (aoj12 and b1) after we had inverted the values of ‘b1’ to align them in the same hypothesized direction as ‘aoj12’, and promax rotation was applied. The results are presented in Table 7-2 (n=1385).

TABLE 7-2. FACTOR LOADINGS FOR ‘EFFECTIVENESS OF LEGAL BODIES’

<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Factor 1</b>	<b>Uniqueness</b>
aoj12	<u>0.782</u>	0.389
b1	<u>0.782</u>	0.389

This resulting factor is hypothesized to be **positively** related to LCT-deviant.

For the belief that the **formal institutions of the country are ineffective and/or illegitimate**, a polychoric correlation matrix was developed to account for the nature of the indicators (b3, b32, muni15, and pn4) after we had inverted the values of ‘pn4’ to align them in the same hypothesized direction as the rest, and promax rotation was applied. The results are presented in Table 7-3 (n=1345).

TABLE 7-3. FACTOR LOADINGS FOR  
‘EFFICACY/LEGITIMACY OF FORMAL INSTITUTIONS’

<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Factor 1</b>	<b>Uniqueness</b>
b3	<u>0.602</u>	0.637
b32	<u>0.812</u>	0.340
muni15	<u>0.671</u>	0.549
pn4	<u>0.562</u>	0.684

This resulting factor is hypothesized to be **negatively** related to LCT-deviant.

For the belief that **most others are engaging in bribery** (H5) we employ the indicator pertaining to the belief that **public officials are corruptible/corrupted** (H7), as there is no single question in the LAPOP survey focusing in the individual’s perception of his/her fellow citizens concerning corruption. However, as suggested in in Chapter 5, both variables are intrinsically related, for there are no corrupt officials without corrupt citizens; therefore, we consider appropriate the usage of ‘exc7’ to test both hypothesis 5 and 7. This indicator is hypothesized to be **negatively** related to both LCT-deviant and LCT-compliant.

In the case of the individual’s perception that **high-level corruption is widespread**, we have again decided to individually assess the two identified indicators (muni6 and n9), as the possible gains of analyzing these two different dimensions of the hypothesized belief might outweigh the scarcity of those derived from a reduction process. Both indicators are hypothesized to be **negatively** related to LCT-deviant.

For the belief that there is **no economical alternative to bribery**, a polychoric correlation matrix was developed to account for the nature of the indicators (idio1, q10, and q10d) after we had inverted the values of ‘q10’ to align them in the same hypothesized direction as ‘idio1’ and ‘q10d’, and promax rotation was applied. The results are presented in Table 7-4 (n=1418).

TABLE 7-4. FACTOR LOADINGS FOR ‘ECONOMICAL ALTERNATIVE TO BRIBERY’

<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Factor 1</b>	<b>Uniqueness</b>
idio1	<u>0.714</u>	0.490
q10	<u>0.783</u>	0.387
q10d	<u>0.861</u>	0.258

This resulting factor is hypothesized to be **positively** related to LCT-deviant. Additionally, it will also serve as the composite indicator for the probability that the

individual **cannot afford to lose the service**, therefore forcing him/her to surrender a bribe; again, in such case, this factor is hypothesized to be **positively** related to LCT-compliant.

For the belief that **it's dangerous to refuse to pay a bribe**, three indicators were identified pertaining two potentially different dimensions. For this reason, with regards to the principal-components factoring analysis of 'b18' and 'b10a', a polychoric correlation matrix was developed to account for the nature of the indicators, and promax rotation was applied. The results are presented in Table 7-5 (n=1475).

TABLE 7-5. FACTOR LOADINGS FOR 'DANGEROUS TO REFUSE'

Indicator	Factor 1	Uniqueness
b18	<u>0.855</u>	0.269
b10a	<u>0.855</u>	0.269

This resulting factor is hypothesized to be **negatively** related to LCT-deviant. On the other hand, 'aoj1' is hypothesized to be **positively** related.

Turning now to the indicators and variables for the LCT-compliant model, we start by addressing the individual's **satisfaction with the work of public officials**. We identify two indicators (st1 and st2) tapping in such construct. Again, a polychoric correlation matrix was developed to account for the nature of the indicators, and promax rotation was applied. The results are presented in Table 7-6 (n=1459).

TABLE 7-6. FACTOR LOADINGS FOR 'SATISFACTORY WORK OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS'

Indicator	Factor 1	Uniqueness
st1	<u>0.892</u>	0.204
st2	<u>0.892</u>	0.204

This resulting factor is hypothesized to be **negatively** related to LCT-compliant.

For the belief that surrendering an extorted bribe is **against the individual's perceived self-efficacy**, a polychoric correlation matrix was developed to account for the nature of the indicators (prot2, cp8, cp5d, and np1), and promax rotation was applied. The results are presented in Table 7-7 (n=633).

TABLE 7-7. FACTOR LOADINGS FOR 'PERCEIVED SELF-EFFICACY'

Indicator	Factor 1	Uniqueness
prot2	<u>0.623</u>	0.612
cp8	<u>0.677</u>	0.541
cp5d	<u>0.650</u>	0.577
np1	<u>0.626</u>	0.608

This resulting factor is hypothesized to be **positively** related to LCT-compliant.

Finally, in the case of the individual's perception that **complaining to a higher authority is either useless or dangerous**, we have again decided to individually assess the three identified indicators (muni10, b10a, and aoj1), due to the high heterogeneity of the dimensions represented by them and the possibility of extracting much more information from each one of them, as opposed to the benefits of their aggregation. Both 'muni10' and 'b10a' are hypothesized to be **negatively** related to LCT-compliant, while 'aoj1' is hypothesized to be **positively** related.

### 7.3. SPEARMAN'S RANK CORRELATIONS

In this section we will get the Spearman's rho for the correlations between the single and composite indicators (factors) presented above, on one hand, and the behavioral indicator of bribery with dichotomized values ('no incident': zero-times;

‘incident’: one or more times), which includes all the subjects that have had interactions with a public institution at least once in the previous twelve months, as described in Chapter 4. The first model to be tested will be that of LCT-deviant.

TABLE 7-8. CORRELATION BETWEEN DETERMINANTS  
AND BEHAVIOR OF DEVIANT BRIBERY

	<b>Bribe (rho)</b>	<b>p</b>	<b>n</b>	<b>Hypothesized direction of influence</b>
Evaluation of his/her society	0.058	0.247	398	+
Esteem for the potential benefits (lg13)	0	0.995	856	+
<b>Esteem for the potential benefits (cp5a)</b>	-0.133	0.007	411	+
Legal bodies of the State are ineffective	0.05	0.148	824	+
<b>Formal institutions of the country are ineffective/illegitimate</b>	-0.079	0.024	815	-
Most others are engaging in bribery	0.035	0.304	874	-
High-level corruption is widespread (muni6)	-0.033	0.333	874	-
High-level corruption is widespread (n9)	-0.037	0.275	880	-
Public officials are corruptible/corrupted	0.035	0.304	874	-
No economical alternative to bribery	0.055	0.11	851	+
Dangerous to refuse to pay a bribe (b18 & b10a)	-0.037	0.266	880	-
Dangerous to refuse to pay a bribe (aoj1)	-0.054	0.417	227	+

As it's possible to appreciate from Table 7-8, only two determinants were found to be statistically significant: The individual's esteem for the potential benefits of corruption, and his/her perception regarding the efficacy and legitimacy of Peruvian formal institutions. Now, we will test the model of LCT-compliant.

TABLE 7-9. CORRELATION BETWEEN DETERMINANTS  
AND BEHAVIOR OF COMPLIANT BRIBERY

	<b>Bribe (rho)</b>	<b>p</b>	<b>n</b>	<b>Hypothesized direction of influence</b>
Satisfaction with the work of public officials	-0.077	388	127	-
Detrimental to perceived self-efficacy	-0.01	0.939	62	+
<b>Most others are engaging in bribery</b>	-0.306	0	125	-
<b>Complaining is useless/dangerous (muni10)</b>	-0.258	0.128	36	-
Complaining is useless/dangerous (b10a)	-0.049	0.581	128	-
Complaining is useless/dangerous (aoj1)	0.086	0.538	54	+
Cannot afford to lose the service	0.042	0.637	126	+

This time, only one of the determinants was found to be statistically significant: The individual's perception that others are paying bribes when extorted. However, due to the small number of observations and its sizable rho, we consider appropriate to include 'muni10' (the belief that complaining is useless or dangerous) as a second determinant of the Peruvian LCT-compliant level, even though it did not reach statistical significance. As its 'n' was as small as 36, it is completely feasible that the p value would actually decrease to significant levels if there would be more observations. In any case, we recommend interpreting these results with caution.

#### 7.4. RESULTS

The above results showed that for each of the two models of LCT, two determinants had some real impact on the individual's decision to engage or not in bribery: For collusive bribery, hypothesis 4 was corroborated while hypothesis 2 showed an opposite relation to LCT than the one expected; for extorted bribes, on the



other hand, hypotheses 5 and 12 were corroborated. All other assumptions regarding the reasons why individuals may engage in petty corruption failed to be significant for the Peruvian case.

As these variables were measured in most cases through the employment of proxy indicators, we judge appropriate to take a few steps away from the theoretical constructs included originally in the models, and to address them through the specific meaning of their measured indicators in the next stage of the analysis, where the results will be interpreted in the context of Peruvian reality. Parallel to the wording of the questions presented in Appendix 4, we present the main results of this chapter:

- Less economic support to the community relates to less engagement in collusive corruption.
- People who feel more satisfied with politics, engage less in collusive corruption.
- People who believe that others don't surrender to extortion, are less tolerant of extortive corruption.
- People who believe that redress channels are effective, are less tolerant of extortive corruption.

CHAPTER 8  
DETERMINANTS OF HIGH-LEVEL CORRUPTION TOLERANCE  
IN PERUVIAN CONTEXT

Up until now, our efforts has been guided by the necessity to quantitatively measure the phenomenon of citizens' corruption tolerance in Peru, and to identify the specific determinants, through different statistical techniques, that cause or relate to it. We found that between the factors that positively impact in citizens' behavioral tolerance regarding high-level corruption (HCT) are the amount of information which the person is exposed to, his/her level of political awareness, partisanship and economic satisfaction, the commitment to democratic values, the level of participation in community affairs, and the actual attitudes the citizen has respecting high-level corruption. Negatively impacting in HCT, we found the perceived level of generalized high-level corruption, and the beliefs regarding external political efficacy.

It is possible to appreciate that some of these quantitative results are, at first sight, at odds with many of the assumptions that we previously derived from the literature in relation to the expected sign of the influence. This is the case, to give one example, of the impact of political awareness (or knowledge). Intuitively, it had been expected to find that people would be less tolerant of high-level corruption to the same degree that they had acquired sufficient political information and awareness; in other words, citizens who are more aware of the pernicious effects of such type of corruption, should at the same time be the ones less willing to support a candidate with a high propensity to conduct him/herself in a corrupt way. This, however, was refuted by the data from LAPOP. The results of the equation modeling showed that, in reality, Peruvian citizens who are more prepared to deal with political issues, those that one would expect (or desire) to have an active participation in public affairs and to support essential anti-corruption reforms, actually are more inclined to vote for corrupt candidates in national presidential elections. How can we explain this?

In order to understand the results of Chapter 6 it is necessary to take a closer look to the evolution of these determinants in the concrete case of the Peruvian reality. By somehow leaving the essentially quantitative approach that the present

study has adopted until now, this chapter aims at assessing the conditions surrounding each of the identified determinants in their natural context, and to interpret their relation to corruption tolerance in a way that allows us to find meaningful patterns in citizens' behavior. Only through the process of converting numbers and quantified relations into significant explanations, will the study be able to deliver some answers behind the reasons for supporting corruption in Peru.

#### 8.1. HIGHER EXPOSITION TO INFORMATION RELATES TO HIGHER HCT

This is the first determinant in our model that challenges common academic intuition. Hypothetically, it was expected that people who consume more public information, either from the mass media outlets (official information) or from private/individual sources (such as the internet, political propaganda, and casual conversations), would have the possibility to perceive the corrupt or honest nature of the presidential candidates, and therefore cast an informed vote based on it. However, some characteristics of Peruvian society may contradict this assumption and explain our results.

##### Mass media and Peruvian politics

Historically, mass media in Peru has been prone to behave more like a political actor than a simple source of public information; what is more, this media as political actor has many times shown even partisan characteristics. In the words of Catherine M. Conaghan, “[t]he paradigm of impartiality and neutrality, so pivotal to the development of North American journalism, was never fully embraced in the Peruvian media” (Conaghan, 2005, p. 20). As she briefly accounts, throughout the twentieth century Peruvian media outlets (primarily in the form of newspapers and magazines first, then in television broadcast) have recurrently taken ideological and/or class interests as their own, sold the editorial lines to political parties or movements, and have even been founded as a kind of *soapbox* for political purposes. In this circumstances, it doesn't come as a big surprise that Peruvian media has sometimes played a major role in sustaining corrupt governments, or in one way or another benefiting the less effective candidate in terms of anti-corruption reforms. A quick review of the last three decades should make this fact apparent.

The first government of Alan García Pérez (1985-1990) saw very few corruption scandals surfaced in its first two years, due mostly to the tolerant attitude of newspaper, radio and television owners who at the time were being benefited by their proximity to the government (Quiroz, 2008). Through privileged access to subsidized dollars and influential connections, García secured an unofficial silence regarding many incidences of low and high-level corruption permeating the government and the party's ranks, which tended to fuse at an increasing speed (Durand, 2005). By the end of his government, it wasn't a secret to any Peruvian that the president's party, APRA, has undergone a systematic takeover of civil service posts and institutions. Although early concerns related to political and bureaucratic corruption were raised since the beginning by opposition deputy Fernando Olivera, it wasn't until García's attempt to nationalize the country's banks in 1987 that mass media started to actively oppose the government, and as a result increasing number of corruption scandals started surfacing in public debate.

However, it wasn't until the second period of Alberto Fujimori's government that the media's complicity in sustaining high-level corruption reached record levels. From the early 1990's the country's media outlets had timidly contested Fujimori's autocratic style, being usually harassed by members of the government and the National Intelligence Service (SIN) especially after the 1992's 'self-coup'. An example of some of the pro-government editorial line that gradually appeared was the case of Frecuencia Latina (Channel 2), owned by majority stockholder Barus Ivcher, which until late 1995 was scorned by critics as the "SIN network" due to its sympathetic coverage of government activities and the proximity of Ivcher with top administration officials (Conaghan, 2005, p. 142). In time, as many Peruvians suspected and were actually able to appreciate for themselves after the fall of the regime in 2000, the government effectively bought the editorial line of most television stations and tabloids<sup>82</sup>, and some of the most important newspapers in the country, in order to provide sufficient support to Fujimori's electoral rerun (Quiroz, 2008; Ugarteche 2005; Dargent, 2005). As Schmidt (2000) recounts, the government's

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<sup>82</sup> Fujimori's government was indeed particularly aggressive in the control of editorial lines. Through the SIN's control of the tabloids, or *prensa chicha*, Conaghan (2005, p. 251) comments, "low-income Peruvians were fed a steady stream of propaganda that high-lighted the president's great successes and trashed opponents in every conceivable way."

dominance over the content of news coverage by 1999 got to such a point that even a media mogul was reported saying that broadcasters could no longer give favorable attention to opposition parties without becoming subject to official and unofficial economic sanctions.

Although the post-Fujimori era saw a recovery in freedom of the press, this by no means meant that the Peruvian media had left its historical partisan role in electoral processes. Regarding the state of Peruvian journalism, Alfonso Quiroz states:

“The media or ‘fourth power’ has made major contributions to uncovering corruption and informing the public of same [sic]. The role of the media is essential in maintaining public vigilance of graft and corruption. However, corrupt political and business interests continue to threaten the independence of major TV networks and newspapers in Peru. The legal settlement of pending issues regarding ownership and control over major networks was complicated by the prosecution of media moguls charged with corruption.” (Quiroz, 2008, p. 427)

To say it again, more explicitly, even though press freedom in Peru may have recovered after the nefarious Fujimori regime of the 90’s, it remains highly politicized and therefore hasn’t reached appropriate levels of impartiality and neutrality, two aspects that are essential to fight corruption in the highest spheres of government. Even when the media is not been pressured (openly) by the government, for example in the case that the party in power is not running for office, it is still heavily influenced by private interests. Such was the context of the 2006 presidential elections, where the mainstream media mobilized during the first round in support of the Christian-democrat candidate Lourdes Flores, against the candidacy of political newcomer Ollanta Humala (and on a smaller scale against Alan García) (Masías and Segura, 2006).

The first assumption that is possible to conclude from this quick review of Peruvian media, and in light of the quantitative results of the previous chapter, is that people might be exposing themselves to information that restricts their accurate perception of corruption regarding specific political actors, and in that way rendering their ability to punish corrupt politicians completely useless. This problem seems to

deepen when considering that most people tend to expose themselves to information sources that will reinforce existing preferences or orientations. With such a distorted image of the political menu during national elections, it seems completely plausible and even expected that citizens who consume more mainstream information will consequently be subject to a corruption-related history that will not reflect reality, not even the one presented by all media outlets taken as a group. Hence, Peruvian citizens might have a better chance to punish corrupt behavior, and to reward honest politicians, if they consider more than just one outlet of information; paradigmatically, it would seem appropriate to conclude that people who stand in front of the corner *kiosk* (a habit that is widespread in Peru for getting informed without spending any money) will have a better tool to fight corruption than those who exhaustively read just one chosen newspaper.

Directly related to this interpretation of the effect of media exposure, a possible explanation regarding the relation between what we have dubbed *casual* information and HCT may be in the same line as the story proposed above: The less amount of influence exerted over the individual by his/her peers will allow him/her the possibility to assess correctly the convenience of different electoral options, without the interference of politically biased information. Or from the opposite perspective, individuals who expose themselves to more casual information will be unable to cast an informed vote regarding the corruptibility of his/her candidate of choice. This assumption, however, requires further research, preferably in the way of ethnographic (or other qualitative) design.

Alternative explanation: ‘Disensibilization’ and ‘over-sensibilization’

Notwithstanding the historical support to the effect of media exposure over HCT in Peru that has been developed above, two supportive hypotheses should be considered. First, there is the possibility of an ‘over-exposition’ to corruption-related news in the period of 2001-2006, which would mean that people who consume more news might become less sensitive to corruption scandals involving presidential candidates or their parties. Kalin S. Ivanov has already reported this problem for the international community, when stating, “if anticorruption rhetoric lacks tangible results, it may reinforce popular cynicism about politics” (Ivanov, 2007, p. 39). When corruption stories are presented on the headlines of major news outlets in the country

on a regular basis (or even daily, as it happened with the *vladivideos* that were incessantly showed and discussed in 2001), and the culprits are not incarcerated (or not with hefty enough convictions) then it naturally occurs that citizens will develop an emotional resistance to these kind of information, and reports of corruption will end up mainly as a media show (Kohen, 1998, p. 4). Such effect seems to have taken place in the period referred to earlier.

The spectacular fall of the Fujimori regime in the late 2000 prompted a huge national movement in support to the anti-corruption efforts of the Transitional Government headed by Valentin Paniagua (2000-2001). However, this popular interest in the extent of unfolded corruption started to wane as a consequence of the natural cycles of political attention, when normalcy is restored and new demands and interests are pushed forward in the public agenda (Weyland, 2000). Public agents and journalists uncovered fresh corruption scandals, but they couldn't attract the same levels of popular attention, as they were correctly considered petty compared to the ones incurred in the previous decade. Alongside this movement towards generalized higher tolerance of high-level corruption came a gradual saturation of the media with incessant information regarding cases of petty corruption pervading the government of Alejandro Toledo and members of the congress, and congressional and governmental commissions and sub-commissions charged with the task of investigating current and past corruption (Quiroz, 2008), ending most of the time in no apparent results. All these circumstance may have finally incurred in a process of popular 'disensibilization'<sup>83</sup> about high-level corruption, especially among those citizens who consume information in a higher basis.

A second, but complementary, possibility refers to the situation involving the opposite group of people, namely those who has less exposition to the media. When accounting for this subjects and their reduced tolerance towards high-level corruption (HCT), it is very much probable that this group would remain over-sensitive long after the debacle of the Fujimori regime, as they may be unaware of the real improvements in anti-corruption legislation and policies undertaken in the period

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<sup>83</sup> Németh et al. (2011, p. 62) similarly suggest that “[i]f corruption spreads intensively in a country, then the majority of people will sooner or later become indifferent to it or get mixed up in corruption practices and turn into accomplices.”

2001-2006, most extensively by the Transitional Government but also under the presidency of Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006). To back this assumption, we draw again from the work of Alfonso Quiroz:

“Transparency in budgetary transactions and hiring in public sector institutions has improved markedly through specific legislation (laws 2780 and 27482) that encourage the establishment of official websites for information dissemination and the publication of civil servants’ income tax returns. However, public opinion polls of the overall transparency of the state continued to rate it low because of general mistrust of government officials and issues of limited effective transparency.” (Quiroz, 2008, p. 427)

What is proposed here, therefore, is the possibility that many citizens may still characterize the electoral process, and the electoral candidates, in a situation of generalized high-level corruption, which the results have shown that also impacts on a lower HCT. This connection, however, is not initially supported by the data. The Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (or Spearman’s rho) test between both types of information exposition (official media and *casual*) and our *generalized high-level corruption* factor results in statistical non-significance in both cases. Said in another way, there is no apparent correlation between remaining relatively ignorant of the progress made in the anti-corruption field, and perceiving that corruption in the higher political spheres is widespread.

#### Making information exposure a tool against corruption

To sum up: How, if Peruvian citizens are to develop the appropriate perception of high-level corruption represented by the electoral options, can low HCT actually be nurtured? Although additional qualitative research seems advisable to come with a definitive answer to this problem, from the previous examination of the Peruvian reality we can assume that the best individual strategy to punish corrupt candidates will be to stay open and receptive to multiple media sources of information, making an effort to screen for pieces of factual information while purging any partisan or other types of private bias that may come with the news<sup>84</sup>. Additionally, the results of our model suggest that besides looking out for media

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<sup>84</sup> Which is not to say that Peruvian media outlets wouldn’t benefit from an increase in the amount and quality of analytical opinion among their coverage, as long as they guarantee the neutrality and impartiality of the editorial line (Sanchez, 2010).



manipulation, citizens may have a better luck at processing corruption-related information by staying away from the influences of private (and openly politicized) opinions that they may encounter in daily life.

Notwithstanding this conclusion, it is worth noting that, even while staying impervious to the bulk of mass media, citizens would still be able to obtain important corruption-related information over which base their electoral decisions in other ways. Such is the case of the popular manifestations in support of the government's intervention over the ownership of television agency Frecuencia Latina, which took place in 1997. Gonzalez (1998) refers in that event to the existence of oral and informal circuits that got activated with the purpose of sharing messages and ideas, as it may have similarly occurred in support of Fujimori's presidential run in the first electoral round of 1990. In both opportunities, as it will later be further elaborated, citizens manifested a decline in their levels of HCT, and if Gonzalez is right, it occurred with the intervening effect of such informal circuits. Such discussion suggests that, although statistically pernicious in our 2006 data, exposure to *casual* sources of political information could as well work in particular cases as a catalyst to fight perceived high-level corruption. The potential dependency on circumstantial factors makes those *casual* sources an interesting topic for future research.

## 8.2. HIGHER POLITICAL AWARENESS RELATES TO HIGHER HCT

Another instance of enigmatic results is provided by the statistical relation between the citizen's level of political awareness, measured by means of factual political knowledge, and HCT. As seen in Chapter 6, against our hypothetical and intuitive expectations the relation between both variables showed a positive, rather than negative, sign, indicating that people who are more politically aware would also tend to be more tolerant towards potentially corrupt presidential candidates when casting their vote. However, a review of the corresponding literature brings some support to the logic of our results<sup>85</sup>. If this is indeed the case, then a contextualization

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<sup>85</sup> In a cross-country study aimed at assessing the characteristics that impact on the individual's perception of corruption, Tverdova (2007) finds that more educated people in more corrupt societies have a more benign evaluation of corruption, contrary to her (and our) expectations.

of this relation is needed in order to explain the rather negative effect of education over corruption tolerance.

#### Socialization process and legality in Peru

Talking about the rule of law in Peru, Oscar Ugarteche (2005, p. 109) explains that the way in which Peruvians assimilate the idea of “law” is heavily influenced by the historical development of the State. In colonial times, he comments, the justice system clearly differentiated the role of indians, white individuals, and members of nobility in society, and laws were enacted following this pattern of thought. Furthermore, this entire order emanated directly from the figure of the King of Spain, who was above the law. From those circumstances, Ugarteche believe to see a connection between the importance (or dominance) of the law over an individual’s behavior, and his/her relative position in the social structure. This would explain why such a big part of the present Peruvian population actively believe that the law is only applicable to the ‘losers’ of the economic and political distribution of power, and hence actively pursue a position that would informally entitle them to act above the legal control of the rest of society. The impact of this set of beliefs is by no means negligible. There is in Peru a set of mind that mandates the emulation of others who may seem immune to the legal prescriptions, and it gets incarnated in non-cooperative and illegal behaviors and the overarching (but dissimulated) admiration of the ‘winners’ from the part of the citizenry that have no material option but to follow the rules (Portocarrero, 2005).

In terms of corruption tolerance, such scenario of disdain for the rule of law gets enunciated in the famous Latin American quote ‘*steals but builds*’, which in general terms means that high-level corruption might be tolerated if the political leader does his/her work of supplying benefits (Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 2012, p. 9), and is not actually caught red-handed. This tolerance, and even admiration and respect, of politicians that manage to circumvent the rules and make private profits without being subordinated by the force of the legal institutions at the end, relates to the concepts of *myth system* and *operational code* (Reisman, 1979, Chapter 1); in other words, drawing from the previous arguments, there is a set of rules for the losers of society and a different one for the winners.

Such reading of Peruvian society could explain the reasons behind the continuous and increasing popular support for ex-President Alberto Fujimori throughout all the period 2001-2006. It would also explain the levels of support behind Callao's Mayor Alexander Kouri, notorious character not only for his generally acclaimed municipal government but also for his proximity to the nefarious Vladimiro Montesinos (Ugarteche, 2005, p. 110). Gonzalo Portocarrero elaborates:

“<sup>86</sup>In order to understand why Montesinos wasn't stopped despite the large criminal record that he had accumulated before 1990, we need to consider that the image of Montesinos needs to be seen against the background of a society where the *pendejada*<sup>87</sup> is praised, as synonym of manhood, cleverness and self-confidence, where the offender is tolerated and the relation between individuals, more than support between fellow citizens, is about complicity. His wrongdoings don't disqualify him.” (Portocarrero, 2005, p. 233)

For the case that prompt us, that of HCT, we can conclude based on the previous description of Peruvian social norms pertaining corruption, that the positive statistical impact of political awareness may evidence the continuity of a colonial mindset which envisions politics as an instrument for private profit: To understand the inner workings of the political process results in a perverse incentive to acquire political knowledge in order to obtain rents from the State (for those who can gain access to it), or in a generalized state of cynicism for those who are only spectators of political and bureaucratic corruption. Putted in another way, Peruvian citizens who are familiar with politics may be used to read and hear about corruption, and be less inclined to punish it in the ballot box.

#### Awareness and corruption

Partial statistical support for this claim comes from the result of a Spearman's rho test regarding the correlation between our measure of political knowledge and the individual's perception of the extent of corruption among public officials<sup>88</sup> (rho=-0.119, p<0.001, obs.=1160). Hence, we can say that politically aware people are also more aware of the levels of corruption in the country. If, as the structural equation model showed, they are also more tolerant of high-level corruption, it is only logic to

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<sup>86</sup> Translated from Spanish.

<sup>87</sup> Slang, deeply rooted in the Peruvian culture, which means 'dirty trick'.

<sup>88</sup> Question coded EXC7 in the LAPOP database.

conclude that citizens who know the most about actual cases of corruption in Peru discard that information as unimportant in their electoral preferences.

Such is the situation for the vast majority of Peruvians, who think of the State as the winners' spoils (Durand, 2005). This fact is apparent in the content of the *vladivideos*, where members of the military, judiciary system, congress, media, entrepreneurs, and even entertainers were shown being bribed by the President's main advisor, all the while believing (to a certain degree) that their behavior was normal and justifiable, part of the benefits of having contact with political power (Dargent, 2005).

### 8.3. HIGHER PARTISANSHIP RELATES TO HIGHER HCT

Partisanship, as past literature has established, can have an important influence in the individual's capacity to perceive high-level corruption, and to react accordingly. Due to the inherent bias that political affiliation imposes over objective evaluations, members (and sympathizers) of different political parties tend to disagree over the quality, importance, and even veracity of corruption-related news. These tendencies would naturally get exacerbated during electoral processes, as candidates challenge each other's views and perspectives about national issues; and when followers are not supporting the party from a particular platform, they provide their human resources in the hope to gain some private benefits later in case of victory. With so many interests (altruist or self-inspired) on the line, it doesn't come as a shock that partisans will neglect to give priority to concerns that affect the image of their political leader, such as corruption. Indeed, as we found in the previous chapter, this intuitive assumption holds for the case of the 2006 presidential elections in Peru.

#### APRA's political allegiance: A historical case in point

Such kind of tolerant behavior stemming from the ranks of Peruvian parties is nothing new. In the recent past, one of the parties that excelled in the high levels of HCT of its members was the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), the oldest, and by most accounts the biggest, political party in Peru. After being in the public scene for over half a century, the APRA's first government came in 1985 with

the presidency of the young leader Alan García Perez (1985-1990). Despite much enthusiasm, however, the emergence of a poorly managed economic crisis and the scandals and stories of high and low-level corruption that started flourishing in the media during the second half of its government caused a great dissatisfaction with both the APRA and the so-called *traditional parties*<sup>89</sup>. Particularly widespread was the accurate perception that increasing numbers of Apra's militants and sympathizers were taking over public jobs and institutions, even when they didn't have the technical requirements to fulfill the tasks (Durand, 2005). Other instances where the HCT of APRA's partisans and party members was observed were against the corruption allegations that came immediately after the end of Garcia's government, and lasted throughout the entire decade of the 90s. In every occasion, experts affiliated to the party took first stage offering legal refutations regarding the unconstitutionality, the technical impropriety, and the political bias of such efforts to bring legal consequences to the multiple cases of corruption implicating directly or indirectly the figure of ex-President García<sup>90</sup>. The same conduct couldn't be observed, however, when party members were displaced to secondary positions due to ideological and other disparities with the group led by García. In such occasions, as the one involving APRA's elected deputy Vargas Haya in 1985, those 'rogue' *apristas* were counted between the first ones who denounced the government's inability to fight corruption (Quiroz, 2008).

However tolerant that APRA sympathizers might have been considered, the partisanship tendency to obscure any rationalization of corruption-related information has never really being absent from the political calculus of presidential, congressional, and even municipal candidates. It is a part of the Peruvian *operational code*, one that vast portions of the citizenry is quite aware of, that party militants would turn a blind eye (and many times even actively participate themselves) when confronted with allegations of corruption involving their political representatives (Dargent, 2005). Hence, a usual comment regarding the extent of patron-client relations in Peruvian

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<sup>89</sup> Adding an increasing problem of subversive terrorist attacks in large regions of the country, including the capital, caused an irreversible alienation of the citizenry against most historical political parties. This context would eventually lead to the collapse of the party system in Peru, and the rising of *outsiders* in the political scene (Tanaka, 1998).

<sup>90</sup> In line with our argument, it is very eloquent that even in the midst of popular dissatisfaction and multiple claims of corruption, the APRA still managed to pull about a forth of the electorate (Schmidt, 1996) in the presidential elections of 1990.

politics, as in other countries of Latin America (Bailey, 2009), is common practice in scholarly production regarding corruption in the region. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that, while partisanship was found to be statistically significant for the level of HCT, *clientelism* was not. This circumstance points to the conclusion that, most likely, the relation between partisanship and HCT runs through ideological and/or emotional mental processes, and is not specifically derived from a completely private calculation of material benefits.

#### 8.4. LOWER ECONOMIC SATISFACTION RELATES TO LOWER HCT

As hypothesized earlier in this study, the results of the structural equation model showed that individuals who feel less satisfied with their personal economic status are also less tolerant of high-level corruption. This statistical relation is in line with the intuitive idea that, due to the economic distortions caused by corruption (widely researched and corroborated by the literature), people are not inclined to tolerate the appropriation and exploitation of public resources while they are kept with unsatisfied needs, which in many instances in Peru generate situations where not even the basic needs of the individual are met. It is not a matter of political culture or social norms anymore, as was the case of the influence of political awareness over HCT, but the reality of a big part of the population that is counted by statistical tools as living in extreme poverty. For them, our results show, political leaders that misuse the power entrusted to them and end up worsening the economy of the common people should be consequently punished, at least in terms of their electoral possibilities.


#### Economic trends in Peru: 80s, 90s, and 2000s

The individual's economic satisfaction is deeply intertwined with his/her general evaluation of multiple issues of national interest, including that of corruption. Furthermore, the government's failure to address acute social problems may even be perceived by part of the population as being a result of high-level corruption practices involving the political leaders. Such was the case, as Quiroz (2008) comments, of the deep economic crisis faced, and partially instigated, by the first government of Alan García (1985-1990) during his last two years as President, and the citizens' perception

that failed public investments were all instances of graft. Such public dissatisfaction, which originated from the disastrous economic situation of the country, quickly transformed into public support for legal actions against various leaders of the APRA regime, including of course president García.

To better understand the Peruvian logic that punishes corruption when individual economic satisfaction lowers, it is necessary first to take a look at some of the main indicators of interest for the economic well-being of a nation.

FIGURE 8-1. PER CAPITA GDP AND POVERTY RATES, PERU, 1980-2007




(source: Jaramillo and Saavedra, 2010<sup>91</sup>)

As we can appreciate in Figure 8-1, Peruvian annual growth rate in terms of GDP per capita for the period July 1980-2007 has had clear periods of dramatic change. What deserves attention here, in particular, are the specific periods surrounding national presidential elections. By the time the first round of the presidential elections of 1990 took place, Peruvian economy was in the midst of a deep recession, with GDP per capita on free fall and poverty levels on a staggering high record for the entire period. Five years, later, however, the economy seemed to be steadily recovering, and poverty was dropping.

<sup>91</sup> “Sources: GDP in 2005 U.S. dollars (purchasing power parity) from the National Institute of Statistics (INEI); 1985-96 poverty rates from the Living Standards Measurement Study (ENNIV); 1999-2007 poverty rates from the National Household Survey (ENAHO). Authors’ calculations.” (Jaramillo and Saavedra, 2010, p. 222)

This trend was shortly lived, as in 1997 GDP per capita started stalling and poverty increased again, and it wasn't until 2001 that things started looking better of the Peruvian population. By the end of 2006, poverty had been reduced in over 15% and the economy was steadily on the rise, with no signals of abate. Jaramillo and Saavedra (2010) describe this entire process as having four distinguishable phases, which matches our succinct interpretation of the data. Additional indicators follow the general trend depicted above.

FIGURE 8-2. MONTHLY EMPLOYMENT INDEX IN PRIVATE SECTOR, 1997-2006



Data source: Ministry of Work and Employment Promotion (MINTRA)


Here in Figure 8-2 we see the progression of employment rates for the last two important phases of the period considered by Jaramillo and Saavedra (2010). Again, it is apparent the recovery obtained from 2002 onwards, which sharply contrasts the trend that was being followed during the latter part of the 90's.

The same tendencies are observed one more time (although somehow softened around the turn of the century) when looking at the evolution of consumer spending<sup>92</sup> in Figure 8-3.

<sup>92</sup> Consumer spending, also called consumer consumption or expenditure, is the amount of money that households spend on goods and services in order to satisfy their needs.



FIGURE 8-3. PERU CONSUMER SPENDING, 1986-2006




Source: [www.tradingeconomics.com](http://www.tradingeconomics.com) | Central Reserve Bank of Peru

Electoral behavior: An economic reading against corruption, 1990-2006

What does this all mean for the level of HCT in the Peruvian citizenry? For the sake of simplicity, let's present the argument by focusing on the corruption-related history of ex-President Alberto Fujimori and his political parties<sup>93</sup>, and their performance in the 1990, 1995, 2000<sup>94</sup>, 2001, and 2006 presidential elections.

FIGURE 8-4. ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE IN FIRST ROUND OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF PRO-FUJIMORI POLITICAL PARTIES, 1990-2006



Data source: [www.perupolitico.com](http://www.perupolitico.com)

<sup>93</sup> *Change 90 (C90), New Majority (NM), and Let's Go Neighbor (VV)*. For the electoral process of 2000 these three parties were grouped in the alliance Peru 2000. In 2001, being banned from political participation, the remaining pro-Fujimori factions supported *Popular Solution*, an electoral alliance between VV and *With Force Peru*. For 2006, a new alliance of pro-Fujimori parties was erected, called *Alliance for the Future (AF)*.

<sup>94</sup> Due to the amount of evidence regarding electoral fraud in the 2000 elections, we use the percentage of votes estimated by the exit poll from Apoyo (Conaghan, 2005).

With some precaution, it's possible to extrapolate the tendencies shown in Figure 8-4 over the movements of the Peruvian economy, and find some similarities. First, when Alberto Fujimori first ran for president in 1990, amidst a severe economic crisis and a public outcry for changes including a more aggressive fight against corruption, he may have embodied the hopes for a clear cut with the past, not least of all evidenced by his campaign slogan "honesty, technology, work" (Schmidt, 1996, p. 343). Peruvians were tired of the so-called 'traditional' parties, and were ready for a change that would involve a more honest management of public affairs. In time, however, Fujimori proved to be not much different from previous leaders, and from the beginning of his government some stories involving corrupt activities in his close circles started to surface. But the news about corruption couldn't compete with the most acclaimed successes accomplished by Fujimori's first government, such as the apprehension of terrorist leaders and the gradual victory in the fight against subversive groups, the control of inflation, and the recovery of the economy (Zapata, 2005; Taylor, 2000; Weyland, 2000). Indeed, as Conaghan (2005, p. 78) notices, during the presidential campaign of 1995 "[p]oll after poll showed that the most salient issues in the minds of voters were economic ones"<sup>95</sup>. The ongoing improvement of the economic performance, linked to better individual conditions, granted Alberto Fujimori enough support to win the presidency for a second period in 1995<sup>96</sup>.

As economic conditions started to plummet in 1997, so did the approval of Fujimori's regime; additionally, multiple instances of corruption and other scandals started to have frequent coverage in some opposition media outlets<sup>97</sup>. The point we want to make here is that the electoral support for the regime, and therefore the level of HCT, was being clearly influenced by the overall performance of the economic indicators, and from an individual perspective the level of economic satisfaction of the citizenry<sup>98</sup>.

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<sup>95</sup> According to a poll cited in Schmidt (2000, p. 118), pro-Fujimori voters explicitly stated to have done so driven by economic reasons (7.7%) over the President's honesty (2.8%).

<sup>96</sup> Taylor (2005) also makes the point of Peruvians' tolerance of authoritarianism in exchange of economic stability during in the aftermath of Fujimori's *self-coup*.

<sup>97</sup> As we have recounted before, the last years of the regime saw both high-level corruption brought into light, with the vast majority still kept in the shadows until Fujimori's fall in the late 2000.

<sup>98</sup> Conaghan (2005, p. 186) states, "discontent with political aspects of *Fujimorismo* intersected with growing concerns about Peru's poor economic performance."

Still, Fujimori's presidential campaign, which included a vast mobilization of the State machinery in order to secure popular electoral support and manifold promises of economic funding to poor and rural areas, managed to draw 43.6% of the votes according to exit polls on the day of elections (Conaghan, 2005). The economic conditions of the country hasn't even gotten close to the levels of 1990, either, and many Peruvians seemed willing to continue backing a regime marked by suspicions of state capture (Dargent, 2005).

After the fall of the Fujimori regime in November of 2000, new elections were announced for 2001, in which a feeble pro-Fujimori group managed to gather no more than 2% of the valid votes. Although the economy continued to fall all the period leading to the inauguration of Toledo's government<sup>99</sup>, it's impossible to assert that in this particular case there was a relation between lower economic satisfaction and lower HCT. The proofs about systemic corruption against hundreds of figures belonging to all subsystems of the country was just too overwhelming for most of the previous followers of Fujimori's government, and hence what has been called by Francisco Durand the "moral reserve" of society (Durand, 2005, p. 291) took place. This newly found intolerant behavior towards high-level corruption would be shortly lived, though.

Finally, the 2006 elections saw a recovery in the levels of HCT among the citizenry. As the economy changed direction and followed an impressive pattern of growth (Schmidt, 2007) that remains steady until the present<sup>100</sup>, so did the electoral choices of important numbers of the population who showed their support for representatives of past governments previously decried as corrupt without abate. Such were the cases of the recovery in voters' support for Martha Chavez, hardcore defendant of ex-President Alberto Fujimori, and especially the electoral success of ex-President Alan García, who had already surprised most political analyst in his 2001 campaign that brought him close to office.

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<sup>99</sup> For a brief description of the economic conditions leading to the 2001 elections, see Franco (2001).

<sup>100</sup> For a rebuttal of some pessimistic reviews of the Peruvian economy during Toledo's presidency, see Taylor (2005).

The best explanatory review of the victory of a political actor who had in the past being accused of various incidents of corruption, and was considered by most Peruvians to have held one of the most corrupt governments of the previous twenty five years, specially when considered in front of other electoral options that were without a doubt more honest and uncorrupted, is presented by Roberto Masías and Federico Segura (2006). We reproduce their comments:

“<sup>101</sup>In this search for explanatory variables regarding Garcías victory, we can mention the fact that public opinion tended to recognize in him a government of continuity with the economic policies of Toledo’s government, which had favorable results for the country. As it is known, the country grew 4,19% on average in 2001-2005 and had an average inflation of 1,94%. The image of a violent, improvised and anti-system Ollanta Humala, basically confronted with the big capitals, besides his relation with president Chavez of Venezuela, benefitted Alan Garcia, because in the second round he managed to attract the votes of the private sector and of those who incline for a market economy with limited state intervention.” (Masías and Segura, 2006, p. 21)

Thus, Alan García (Quiroz, 2008), and to a smaller degree Martha Chavez, can be regarded as having benefitted from the improving economic conditions of many Peruvians (and their worries about the possibility of a setback), who consequently, following our empirical results, were more inclined to cast aside their concerns about high-level corruption<sup>102</sup>. In more technical terms, it is then reasonable to believe that the level of economic satisfaction may be related to the idea of *political sensibility*: When there is satisfaction with the economy, corruption may not even enter the politic-economic calculations behind the act of voting for a chosen candidate.

#### Economy, perception, and information: Additional links

Additional support to the previous argument is provided by a statistically significant Spearman’s rho coefficient (-0.1389,  $p < 0.001$ , obs. = 1149), which shows that economic satisfaction is indeed correlated to our measure of *perceived*

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<sup>101</sup> Translated from Spanish.

<sup>102</sup> It is also illustrative that Ollanta Humala, the third more potentially honest candidate in 2006 according to our own estimates, won most of the votes in 18 regions of the country, “5 of them – all located in the southern sierra – with more than 50% of the vote. He was also the strongest performer in Lima’s populous shantytowns.” (Schmidt, 2007, p. 817) Alan García, on the other hand, won in four regions of the north coast. Economically and historically speaking, the levels of poverty are considerably higher in the Peruvian sierra compared to the coast.

*generalized high-level corruption*. In other words, when citizens feels dissatisfied with their individual economic conditions, they also perceive that corruption is running unchecked across the political higher spheres; and when they approve of the way the economy is performing, their perception of high-level corruption is reduced. Hence, both determinants of HCT work hand by hand to cause a decline (or increase, given the circumstances) in the citizens' tolerance of high-level corruption.

To conclude this review of economic satisfaction and HCT, it is necessary to include an additional possibility that would add an extra dimension to the above discussion: As people in lower economic conditions would also tend to consume less information (Conaghan, 2005) the relation between media (and *casual*) exposure and HCT might be heavily determined by the citizen's economic satisfaction. Indeed, this seems to be the case, as the Spearman's rho test shows ( $\rho=0.187$ ,  $p<0.001$ ,  $\text{obs.}=1151$ ). The result of this simple correlation suggests that the level of economic satisfaction may also have an added indirect influence not theoretically assumed by our model. Future work on the determinants of HCT from a qualitative perspective should consider this additional venue of influence in the model.

#### 8.5. GENERALIZED HIGH-LEVEL CORRUPTION RELATES TO LOWER HCT

In this section we engage in the discussion of yet another piece of information regarding HCT that contradicts our original assumption. Inspired on the idea of the routinization of corruption (Salzman, 2009) that somehow pervades Latin American societies, Peru included, we expected that the perception of a 'rotten' political leadership would develop in the growth of cynical citizens who would be more tolerant of high-level corruption. Such relation, actually, manifested in the opposite direction in the LAPOP data. A new look at these findings, formulated in the above statement 'generalized high-level corruption relates to lower HCT', forces us to see the connection from a different pair of lenses. It now seems quite reasonable, indeed, to assume that in a scenario where most political options wear marks of past (and potential) corrupt activities, the citizenry at large will tend to be in high-alert and to lower its HCT.

But, what if we would invert the circumstance, and to restate the relation by saying that *controlled and particularized instances of high-level corruption causes an increase in HCT*? Evidently, there is a dissonant effect in the relation when presented in this way. It implies that Peruvians are more willing to, and actually do support more corrupt politicians when the political scenario is filled with enough honest and clean officials and representatives. To answer Adam Brinegar's (2009, p. 132) question, "[d]oes a country's internationally low level of corruption – or the perception of citizens about low levels of corruption because of elite discourse – mitigate accountability?", we have to say that, for the Peruvian case, the answer is 'Yes'. How can we explain this?

#### Corruption cycles and moral reserve

To put things in perspective, we are saying that Peruvian citizens tolerate high-level corruption when it's controlled, but become intolerant when it is perceived as widespread. This may be so due to the fact that corruption in Peru is rather a constant, an element that has been present since the beginning of the republic era, and even before, during colonial times, corruption (although not necessarily considered so by legal standards of the time) was a very common activity, part of the way public affairs were handed. Commenting only on the period starting from the independence in 1821, Alfonso Quiroz states:

“[T]he history of Peru has been in part the history of successive cycles of corruption followed by very short anticorruption reform periods that are brought to an end by antireformist vested interests... There has been no historical period or cycle of little or no corruption; all the cycles surveyed were characterized by moderately high, high, and very high indicators of corruption.” (Quiroz, 2008, p. 432)

In this order of things, it isn't shocking that Peruvians might have gotten used to the existence of corruption scandals involving the government and important politicians, and that consequently they learned how to cope with that reality. A perfect example may be the trends of anti-corruption mobilization that spanned from the infamous *vladivideos*. As it was mentioned earlier, the fall of Fujimori took place in a context where the so-called “moral reserve” of society (Durand, 2005, p. 291) was being massively activated in all strata of Peruvian society after a long period of stagnation that can be said to have lasted almost the entire decade of the 1990's. As

Quiroz (2008) posits, the sudden realization of the extension and complexity of the regime's corruption couldn't be tolerated even in a country like Peru, and a drastic (although temporary) change in the attitudes and behavior of the citizenry towards this national endemic problem occurred. "Corruption seems to be tolerated, even in countries with weak institutions, only up to a certain degree" (Quiroz, 2008, pp. 416-417).

In the eve of this new historical opportunity, the mostly acclaimed 'virtuous' transitional government of Valentín Paniagua was possible in the middle of a fast collapse of the engineered pro-Fujimori apparatus in Congress. This transitional period saw an impressive popular and political mobilization in support of the apprehension and prosecution of the corrupt hosts of the previous regime, and the recovery of stolen assets, and for this purpose a great deal of legal reforms had to be undertaken in the briefest time possible (Peña-Mancillas, 2011; Jorge, 2008; Calderón, 2006).

What happened afterwards, sadly, was a steady process where anti-corruption efforts were gradually brought to a halt, first by a negligent management under Toledo's government (2001-2006), and later by the prioritization of other issues, and even the reversion in the anti-corruption effort (Quiroz, 2008), under García's second government (2006-2011) (Peña-Mancillas, 2011). From this perspective, as Quiroz (2008) would probably agree, Peru turns the wheel of the corruption-anticorruption cycle and experiences the new resistance of antireformists, or at least tolerant, groups. The moral reserve is quickly depleted, and after the crisis is perceived as having been weathered, most Peruvians are ready to move on to new issues, thus stop pushing forward for a new generation of reforms or even for the appropriate institutionalization of previous ones (Weyland, 2000).

#### Modern cycles: Peru, 1990-2006

The same tendencies for HCT as the ones described above can be observed in the presidential elections for the period 1990-2006. To show this, we proceed to compare the percentage of valid votes obtained in the first round of elections by political parties divided in two groups: Those who were perceived as potentially

corrupt, and those perceived as potentially honest. In Table 8-1 we present the details of both groups.

TABLE 8-1. MAIN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES AND THEIR ELECTORAL SUPPORT, PERU 1990-2006


1990			2000		
Candidate	Party	Votes %	Candidate	Party	Votes %
<i>Vargas Llosa</i>	FREDEMO	33%	Fujimori	Perú 2000	44%
<i>Fujimori</i>	C90	29%	<i>Toledo</i>	PP	46%
Alva Castro	APRA	22%	<del>Andrade</del>	SP	3%
Henry Pease	IU	8%	<del>Salas</del>	Avancemos	2%
Barrantes	IS	5%	<del>Castañeda</del>	SN	2%
<del>Cáceres</del>	FNTC	2%	<del>Salinas</del>	APRA	1%
1995			2001		
Candidate	Party	Votes %	Candidate	Party	Votes %
Fujimori	C90-NM	64%	<i>Toledo</i>	PP	37%
<i>Perez de Cuellar</i>	UPP	22%	García	APRA	26%
Cabanillas	APRA	4%	<i>Flores</i>	UN	24%
<del>Toledo</del>	CODE-PP	3%	<i>Olivera</i>	FIM	10%
<del>Belmont</del>	OBRAS	2%	Boloña	SP	2%
<del>Diez Canseco</del>	AP	2%			
Data source: www.perupolitico.com Note: Potentially honest candidates are written in italics; candidates not considered for further analysis are written with strikethrough.			2006		
			Candidate	Party	Votes %
			<i>Humala</i>	UPP	31%
			García	APRA	24%
			<del>Flores</del>	UN	24%
			Chávez	AF	7%
			<i>Paniagua</i>	FDC	6%
			<i>Lay</i>	RN	4%



What the table presents is the relation of all presidential candidates for the period 1990-2006 that are among the six most voted, and had received at least 1% of the valid votes. The ones belonging to each of the groups can be identified by *italics* in the case of ‘*potentially honest*’, and by regular type in the case of ‘potentially corrupt’; the ones that have strikethrough (~~for example~~) have not been included in any of the groups, mostly due to lack of sufficient data<sup>103</sup> (1990-2001) or because of their evident neutrality in the matter (2006). Nevertheless, it is reassuring to consider that those omitted cases have in no case accounted for more than 1/10 of the electorate (2% in 1990, 7% in 1995, 8% in 2000) with the sole exception of Lourdes Flores in 2006, who was placed in the middle range by the ranking developed in Chapter 3, therefore not creating any foreseeable problem.

Thus, we recreate the *patterns of electoral support* for potentially honest and corrupt candidates for the same in Figure 8-5.

FIGURE 8-5. ELECTORAL SUPPORT FOR CORRUPT AND NON-CORRUPT POLITICAL PARTIES, 1990-2006



To interpret the above graph, we shall make a brief recount of the state of corruption during those electoral encounters keeping in mind that our discussion

<sup>103</sup> The unavailability of data includes both quantitative measurements of corruption-related news, and the theoretical difficulty of controlling for the actual manipulation of the media and the possibilities of the citizenry to discriminate between different sources of information.

involves not particularly the level of corruption affecting the government's image, but the presence or absence of a situation of *generalized* high-level corruption.

#### Fujimori's cycle: 1990-2000

After a decade of growing corruption involving the constitutional governments of Fernando Belaunde (1980-1985) from Popular Action (AP), and Alan García (1985-1990) from the APRA (Taylor, 2005), most Peruvians were in a severe process of disaffection with the traditional political parties, which were being blamed for the raging economic crisis and increasing internal violence. The perception of high-level corruption, influenced by the economic conditions of the country (as we have reviewed earlier), affected not only those parties actually involved in scandals, but the entire spectrum of politics. As Schmidt (1996, p. 325) reports, only 17% of surveyed Peruvians trusted political parties, compared to a dramatic 77% that declared to mistrust them. In such scenario of perceived corruption affecting most political parties, and in line with our argument, lauded writer and semi-independent candidate Mario Vargas Llosa<sup>104</sup>, from FREDEMO, and newcomer Alberto Fujimori<sup>105</sup> (C90) received 62% of the valid votes between the two of them, while the traditional parties could only raise 35%.

Five years later, for the presidential elections of 1995, the country's situation had changed drastically, in both political and economic terms. The economic crisis was finally abating and giving path to growth in the GDP, inflation was being kept under control, and the fight against internal guerrillas was being won. In the political sphere, although the crisis of the party regime was showing no signs of improvement, new actors appeared on the scene, with Javier Perez de Cuellar deserving a special mention. Albeit having shown some reluctance at participating in the 1995 presidential elections, due to what was considered a 'not-even' scenario, the

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<sup>104</sup> Vargas Llosa had actively begun his political career since the campaign against the nationalization of the banks pursued by García in 1987. Although throughout the 1990's campaign tried to identify himself as an 'independent' politician, the fact that he was running as the head of the FREDEMO, a coalition of 'traditional' right-wing parties, eventually determined his electoral defeat. (For another interpretation of the electoral results, however, see Schmidt, 1996)

<sup>105</sup> About Fujimori's figure as an honest and non-corrupt candidate, we refer to Lewis Taylor's words: "[B]uffeted on all sides by economic and political chaos of epic proportions, voters lost patience with the political class and their party organisations [sic], in the 1990 general elections opting for an 'outsider' who was untainted by accusations of incompetence or corruption – Alberto Fujimori." (Taylor, 2000, p. 392)

renowned diplomat and ex-Secretary General of the United Nations eventually stepped up to the opportunity, founding the political party Unity for Peru (UPP) and refusing to make any coalition with the vituperated traditional parties, contrary to what Vargas Llosa had done in 1990 (Conaghan, 2005).

With no other potential threat for Fujimori's aspiration, the electoral attention was naturally on Perez de Cuellar; other independent candidates were still unknown to the vast majority of the electorate, and the APRA was still under fire by accusations of corruption regarding its 1985-1990 government. In a focus group related by Schmidt (2000, p. 107), citizens of Lima described the diplomat as "honorable", while the image of president Fujimori was that of "crafty if not duplicitous". Indeed, this perception of the President was drawn from an increasing number of journalist investigations and public scandals that tended to show him as a person that would use any means necessary to accomplish power, not least of all corruption. As Conaghan (2005) reviews in her narrative about Fujimori's regime, from 1990 to 1995 there were several occasions when, despite the increasing harassment being suffered from the State's apparatus, the independent media were informing of shady, illegal, and/or corrupt activities involving Fujimori's family (case of used clothe and APENKAI<sup>106</sup>, denounced by Fujimori's wife herself), his electoral campaign (misuse of public employees and case 'General Rodríguez'<sup>107</sup>), and suspicions of state-capture (suggestions of electoral fraud on the making and manipulation of the National Electoral Jury – JNE<sup>108</sup>). What is more, as in the case of corruption allegations made by Fujimori's wife, Susana Higuchi, against his family, most Peruvians reported believing her<sup>109</sup>.

However pressing were the allegations of corruption against the regime, Perez de Cuellar couldn't garner more than 22% of the valid votes, granting the victory in first round to incumbent Alberto Fujimori. Such results support once again our argument regarding the ironic effect of lower levels of generalized high-level corruption on HCT.

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<sup>106</sup> Zapata, 2005, p. 252.

<sup>107</sup> Conaghan, 2005, p. 82.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid., p. 93-94.

<sup>109</sup> 67% from Apoyo's poll (Conaghan, 2005, p. 87).

The second part of Fujimori's government was marked by a systematic capture of most public institutions, made possible by the most extended and complex corrupt network that had ever taken power in Peru. These events, however, were only known to the public after the fall of Fujimori from power in November of 2000. For the presidential elections in April of 2000, however, most of the regime's corruption was kept hidden, but still the little evidence of obscure transactions and maneuvers that was made public by the investigative media that remained in opposition represented a clear increase from the limited scandals that surfaced in the previous five-year-period. And these corruption-related stories didn't involve just the executive branch anymore, either. There were evident cases of legislative capture (turncoats moving from the ranks of the opposition into the government's party<sup>110</sup>), politically motivated congressional actions against the Constitutional Tribunal, dubious and partisan-driven legislative production, attacks against press freedom (cases Varus Ivcher and Frecuencia Latina), editorial purchase (sensationalist press called in Peru *prensa chicha*<sup>111</sup>), and harassment of opposition municipal mayors and consequent desertion of many of them to increase the ranks of C90-NM<sup>112</sup>. In other words, national, regional, institutional, and even private actors were increasingly being involved in shady dealings with a government that was being perceived more and more as corrupt and authoritarian. Even opposition leaders as Alberto Andrade and Luis Castañeda Lossio were publicly accused of corrupt dealings by some of the government financed tabloids<sup>113</sup>, a concerted attack that eventually showed to have some results.

Under such circumstances of an evident generalization of high-level corruption reports affecting multiple actors and institutions of the political and social spheres, it is not surprising, considering the quantitative results of our structural equation model, that the levels of HCT among Peruvian citizens had gone down again, although not yet as low as it was in 1990, or as it would only one year later for the presidential elections of 2001.

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<sup>110</sup> "During the first six months of 1996, desertions from the ranks of the opposition and 'independents' increased the number of votes that C90-NM could potentially count on for an amendment vote in congress." (Conaghan, 2005, p. 121)

<sup>111</sup> Conaghan, 2005, p. 158.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid., pp. 166-167.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid., pp. 169, 186. Also, Schmidt, 2000, p. 125.

### Rise and fall of moral reserve: 2001-2006

As the electoral process of 2001 has already been discussed, it's only necessary to point out some additional features that couldn't be contemplated before. Although we focused before on the impact that the *vladivideos* had on the Peruvian frame of mind regarding high-level corruption, the point that our model of HCT made clear wasn't only that of the effect of perceived *governmental* corruption, but that of *generalized* corruption, involving thus multiple actors from different political affiliations. The best example of this generalization of problem across Peruvian elites is Federico Salas, presidential candidate in 2000 for Let's Move Forward (*Avancemos*). After Salas made a name for himself as the honorable and committed Mayor of Huancavelica (the poorest region of Peru<sup>114</sup>), position that awarded him the recognition of *Caretas* magazine<sup>115</sup> for his courageous efforts to get governmental support to the impoverished population of his region, his entrance into national politics managed to garner 2% of the valid votes. However, as from the inauguration or the third period of Fujimori's government, Federico Salas became another addition to the already bulked ranks of Perú 2000 with the surprising office of Prime Minister. This event, evidently, made him a focal point of criticism, as his action made him the most infamous turncoat of the final stage of the Fujimori regime.

In post-Fujimori Peru, regular citizens got used to find on the daily news constant surprises pertaining the diversity of characters that in one way or another participated in the huge corrupt façade that became the government in the last years of the 1990s. From ex-soccer stars to opposition members of the congress, from popular rock singers to Army generals, nobody seemed to have a secured position as the country's honesty champion (Ford, 2003; Franco, 2001; Conaghan, 2005). Even close colleagues of reputed corruption-fighters (Schmidt, 2003) were involved in the *mafia* that was being exposed. And such media show was presented night after night on television for all Peruvians to watch.

The results of the first round of the 2001 presidential elections, presented in Figure 8-5, show that HCT touched a record low for the 1990-2006 period, while Durand's (2005) "moral reserve" spiked. From this account, the surprise of most

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<sup>114</sup> <http://www.huancavelicaperu.com/pobreza.htm#1>

<sup>115</sup> *Caretas*, N<sup>o</sup> 1497, 26-12-1997.

political analysts regarding the incredible electoral comeback of ex-president Alan García seems now only part of the constant in Peruvian history of a real, if not always high, tolerance towards corruption. The point of interest here, therefore, is to continue looking for the direction of the HCT, be it either on the downside or on the rise.

Although the government of Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006) was also fertile in corruption scandals, and the newly found freedom of the press took full advantage of the opportunity to cover such kind of sensational stories (most of the time such scandals never amounted to more than petty corruption on high circles), the level of generalization didn't come even close to that observed during the 1990's (in retrospective). This is why many Peruvians considered corruption to be even more widespread<sup>116</sup> in 2006, as Transparency International's CPI suggested, but probably more localized (government's party) and minimized (involving small sums of money). Perceived widespread corruption under Toledo's government may have been mere attitudes regarding bureaucracy in general, or government officials in particular, and not necessarily a passive extendable to political alternatives during the electoral process. Still, more precise measures of corruption perception than the ones currently existing are required to support this assertion. What can be said for now is that, by 2006, the support for honest and potentially anti-corruption leaders was decaying, while HCT was, once more, increasing.

#### Perception of generalized HLC and additional links

To sum up, the low level of generalized scandals of political corruption may allow the support of potentially corrupt leaders, as happened in 1995 and 2006, either by reelecting the incumbent (1995), or electing a new president with no better *résumé* (2006). On the other hand, a sense of generalized high-level corruption pervading the political spectrum may cause a turnover towards the candidate perceived as less corrupt (1990, 2000, 2001). Finally, the non-relation to information exposition commented earlier suggests that, while a higher amount of corruption-related information may develop into higher tolerance of corruption, it has no impact on the individual's perception of *generalized* high-level corruption. In other words,

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<sup>116</sup> This kind of "generalized corruption, but involving smaller amounts and less sophistication" (Tanaka 2005, p. 360) may do great damage to the legitimacy of the government, but is not really compatible to the kind we have been arguing about in this section.

frequency and importance of news have independent and opposite effects on individual's HCT. This would explain why TI's CPI fails to describe Peruvian electoral tendencies regarding corruption tolerance.

To part from the present discussion, we would like to comment on two alternative explanations regarding the role of perceived generalized high-level corruption. The first one suggests that the level of individual economic satisfaction may also cause the relation depicted above. Indeed, the Spearman's rho test shows a correlation between economic self-evaluation and perception of HLC ( $\rho = -0.139$ ,  $p < 0.001$ , obs.=1149). Further analysis is required to untangle this connection. The second alternative is that the perception of generalized high-level corruption might only be mirroring the perceived corruption of the government, which would go in line with our introductory assessment of corruption tolerance in Peru ('accepted when inside normal levels'). The correlation between perceived generalized HLC, and the individual's opinion regarding how government is handling corruption inside its own structures (coded "n9" in the LAPOP database) gives a supportive result ( $\rho = 0.482$ ,  $p < 0.001$ , obs.=1147). This second reading would highlight some problems that most measurements of corruption carry, which is the impossibility of differentiating perception of corruption in the government from that of the general political spectrum. For the purpose of the present study, we can only recognize that both may have an interactive relation possibly determined by a feedback mechanism. Again, further examination in the form of qualitative research is required.

#### 8.6. HIGHER COMMUNITY-ORIENTED VALUES RELATE TO HIGHER HCT

Originally derived from a factor analysis of multiple measures related to *democratic values*, the citizen's self-reported proclivity to contribute to the solution of community problems (either with their time, energy, or money) was grouped and labeled *community-oriented values* in the present study. As Chapter 6 showed, the relation of this factor to the level of HCT had a positive sign, telling a rather bleak story about the electoral decisions of the most active members of society, who could

even be said to form the social capital of Peru<sup>117</sup>. The theoretical expectation embedded earlier in the present study suggested the probability that people who are more active and cooperative in their communities, should also have a lower tolerance towards high-level corruption; after all, as we reviewed in the introductory section, corruption has invariably a distorting effect over the national economy, creates inequality, and redirects public spending away from social programs and towards sectors that are less transparent and allow for corrupt dealings. Therefore, how are we to explain that socially responsible Peruvians prefer to vote for potentially corrupt candidates, instead of choosing a more honest leader for themselves? The answer goes through the process of understanding the historic relationship between popular and rural communities, and elected (or autocratic) leaders.

#### The fulfillment of ‘citizenship’ in Peru

Citing another study, Weyland (2000, p. 496) comments on the social demands of Peruvian citizens, especially the ones of lower economic conditions:

“Based on conversations with 600 inhabitants of Lima’s popular districts, Parodi and Twanama (1993:63-65) found that according to prevailing conceptions, political leaders constantly need to provide socioeconomic benefits in order to maintain their following.”

If the kind of trust developed by the highly proactive citizens of these communities is in fact of the kind called by Uslaner (2002) *particularized trust*, hence not being appropriate for the construction of social capital, it is completely possible and understandable that examples of community values would go hand by hand with a proclivity to prioritize patronage relations instead of pursuing the punishment of corrupt leaders. As higher HCT actually entails not the actual preference for corrupt politicians, but a lower concern for such issues, it will be completely reasonable then to expect Peruvians with high community-oriented values, who sacrifice multiple resources for their fellow citizens, to also sacrifice the importance of corruption-related news in their electoral calculations, and to support candidates who make the best economic offers not for the individual’s benefit, but for that of the entire community. This last aspect of the relationship is reflected in the statistical non-

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<sup>117</sup> Indeed, the Spearman’s rho test shows that community-oriented values and the level of trust in fellow community members are related ( $\rho = -0.088$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ,  $ob. = 1171$ ).



significance of clientelistic tendencies in our structural equation model, implying a collective-driven interest from the part of the citizen in supporting corruption, as opposed to a purely individualistic one. At the same time, it suggests the perseverance of a traditional type of social and political organization where patron-client relations are still the foundations of the communal economy, even if in this case we have to understand the *client*<sup>118</sup> in the figure of the community as a whole. Such social composition is characteristically opposed to modern formulas of citizenship and democratic representation, exactly the ones that engage and invest in anti-corruption reforms.

Such trends of governmental sponsorship of electoral and/or politically-driven public investments in projects of community-development, although can be traced from a historical perspective since a long time ago, will be briefly reviewed in the following lines by focusing on the government of Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000), who, as Zapata (2005) recognizes, was able to draw popular support by the funding of small projects of direct and evident social impact on a scale not accomplished by any of the previous populist governments in Peruvian history.

#### Collectivist clientelism under Fujimori's regime

For the presidential elections of 1995, a common and important example of the use of public resources to captivate voters was the arbitrary spent of moneys from the National Fund of Compensation and National Development (FONCODES), institution that provided the government with an unusually and “truly discretionary” (Schady, 2000, p. 303) source of financing, which were to be used as a tool for political mobilization. Indeed, in his study, Schady (2000) finds quantitative proof that the allocation of funds from FONCODES followed an electoral logic of two objectives: First, the projects for implementation were selected from areas where the political impact in favor of Fujimori's reelection would have the most success rate; and second, public works should serve to recover the depressed support for his

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<sup>118</sup> Most recounts of Fujimori's government highlight the usage of clientelistic network as a tool of political mobilization of popular sectors, and allegiance of rent-seeking public officials and corruptible actors (for example, Zapata, 2005, p. 256; and, Taylor, 2005, p. 569). For our discussion of community-oriented values, we only consider the case pertaining to the first group, and even then just the State's financing of community-shared actives (such differentiation is also made by Quiroz, 2008, p. 369).

government as demonstrated by the results of the 1993 constitutional referendum, which was backed by a feeble 52% of voters compared to 48% of Peruvians who voted against the constitutional project<sup>119</sup>. This spending pattern, finally, had the expected results (Schmidt, 2000).

In real terms, the 1995 campaign saw a massive spending display from the State, in which social programs were heavily funded and public works personally inaugurated by president Fujimori on an increasing rate, all in order to secure Fujimori's second term in power (Weyland, 2000; Conaghan, 2005). Schmidt (2000, p. 104) reports that, with the funds resulting from the wave of privatizations, foreign loans, and greater tax revenue, various types of public works (among the favorites of the President were schools, roads, and health posts) targeted at the poor increased by 60% in 1994 and an additional 90% in 1995. It's difficult, therefore, not to see a clear intentionality in the way that the government was spending the country's resources in relation to the proximity of the presidential elections. By the same token, it's not hard to understand Fujimori's victory in first round. In the eloquent words of Catherine M. Conaghan (2005, p. 95), "[T]he biggest problem was that Pérez de Cuéllar failed to make a compelling case that he could do a better job than Fujimori in delivering the concrete economic benefits and neighborhood improvements that voters wanted." In other words, the importance of corruption was considered trivial next to the possibility of seen their communities improved for poor Peruvians.

The same pattern of community-oriented values' prioritization occurred during Fujimori's second period, specifically in cases like the public efforts to control the damages caused by *el Niño* phenomenon in 1997-1998 (Broad and Orlove, 2007), of which president Fujimori took personal charge and subsequently drew an increase in his popularity, albeit scandals of corruption (Zapata, 2005; Dargent, 2005).

This argument suggests that, from a historical and realistic perspective, Peruvians has tended to prioritize the kind of State-society relations that would better fit their material needs as a collectivity, although not necessarily (and enigmatically)

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<sup>119</sup> Source: [www.perupolitico.com](http://www.perupolitico.com)

as particular individuals, while sacrificing their capacity and willingness to punish corrupt leaders.

The operationalization of ‘clientelism’: *Citizen empowerment*

Regarding the differentiation between community values and clientelism, however, there exists the possibility that our measurement of clientelism did not, in fact, tap effectively this construct. The measurement of political clientelism is not an easy task, and one usually has to resort to proxy variables. This is the strategy that the present study adopted by using survey questions regarding the self-reported instances when the individuals had approached public officials with a request. However, if this proxy measure is not effectively tapping clientelism, then it would be currently not possible to state that community-oriented values is an independent variable from that of clientelism. In order to examine this possibility, we conduct a Spearman’s rho test between both constructs. The results show that they are correlated ( $\rho = -0.225$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ,  $obs.=1125$ ), which means that, for the LAPOP data, more clientelism relates to more community-oriented values. However, in a subsequent test we find that clientelism also correlates with our *efficacious behavior* factor ( $\rho = 0.328$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ,  $obs.=496$ ), indicating that higher levels of the former relate to practices evidencing more political efficacy from the part of the individual. Such results clearly show a big deal of discrepancy from a logical stand: Even if we accept, from the Peruvian case, that community-oriented citizens are actually more inclined to behave in a clientelistic way, there is still no reasonable connection between depending on the government to solve one’s problems and, at the same time, behaving in a political efficacious way; in fact, aside from their statistical correlation, such connection challenges common logic.

The above results regarding our measurement of clientelism may indicate that its operationalization in the present study actually taps into levels of *citizen empowerment*, a middle point between community-oriented and political efficacy. This would possibly explain why it correlates with higher levels of both variables, while they have opposite effects on HCT, and thus failing to reach statistical significance according to the results of our structural equation model. Therefore, it is possible to assume that the impact of community-oriented values on HCT may include the effect of real clientelistic tendencies, not tapped in the present study.

## 8.7. DEMOCRATIC VALUES RELATE TO HIGHER HCT

The last enigmatic relationship that the structural equation model reveals, regarding the Peruvian determinants of HCT, is the influence that self-reported support for the democratic system have over citizens' levels of corruption tolerance. As the data from LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2006 shows, Peruvians who are more committed to the ideals of democracy, also tend to vote for more potentially corrupt presidential candidates. If theoretically, as well as from a vast scholarly production, democracy and corruption are supposed to have an antithetic relation, how are we to explain the behavior of the Peruvian electorate? This phenomenon is rather complex.

### An instrumental view of democracy

The experience of the Peruvian citizenry with democratic regimes can be said to be feeble, if not disappointing. Throughout its republican history, Peru has had as many authoritarian (and some straight dictatorship) as democratic administrations, and this tendency has continued until the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century: constitutional presidency of Manuel Prado (1956-1962) (which ended with a *coup d'état*), Military *Junta* of 1962-1963, the first government of constitutional president Fernando Belaúnde (1963-1968) (which ended with a *coup d'état*), Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces (1968-1980), second government of Belaúnde (1980-1985), first government of Alan García (1985-1990), and government of Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) (which included a *self-coup* in 1992 to close the congress and create a new Constitution). This historic swing between different constitutional and governmental arrangements has inevitably created an equal strain on the political and civic values of different sectors of the population. When linked to the unstable economic history of the country, particularly of the last four decades, it's possible to make some assumptions regarding the level of citizens' support for democratic governments. As Monzón et al. (1997) find at the beginning of Fujimori's governments, Peruvians were going through a process of alienation from the main democratic structures of the State, and it comes to reason that the authoritarian practices seen during the decade of the 1990's (Meléndez and León, 2010) have only worsened the chances of democracy spreading its roots in a growingly cynic population. In its current state, many Peruvians only support democracy to the same

degree that they expect the economy to keep growing under a democratic rule, and not due to its inherent political and social benefits.

At the same time, for most of the 1980's and 1990's, democratic governments had been increasingly seen as a source of corruption and mismanagement of economic affairs. The above mentioned 'swing' between democratic and authoritarian values, heavily influenced by purely economic motivations, had a central role in the 1985 presidential campaign; as Quiroz (2008, p. 340) explains:

“[t]he growing perception of the inadequacy of liberal democracy to solve urgent problems raised the stakes in favor of the populist, state-interventionist positions embraced by the young Aprista candidate Alan García Pérez who promised honesty and urgent measures to overcome the crisis.”

The conception of democracy as a mere tool or instrument, and not an end by itself, was also recognized to be a major characteristic of the Peruvian public opinion in the creation of the *Plan Verde*, or green plan, a secret project envisioning a militaristic intervention (coup d'état) against Garcia's government that was devised in 1988 (Quiroz, 2008; Conaghan, 2005). In such documents, which were later obtained and made public by an influential magazine in 1993, the citizenry was considered to tolerate, if not support, such an intervention due to the increasing disaffection with the government caused by the corruption scandals and the economic crisis. Although this plan was never fully materialized as originally envisioned, its appropriation by Vladimiro Montesinos and later implementation in the form of the *self-coup* in 1992 demonstrated that the tenets regarding Peruvian attitudes behind it weren't mistaken.

The closure of the Congress in April of 1992 came with the President's discourse regarding the de-legitimization of the Peruvian representative democracy, and with a call for a more 'direct' way of popular participation. Fujimori blamed the current democratic institutions, such as the Congress and the traditional political parties, as a source of corruption and overall private interests, a form of corrosive institutionalization that was responsible for all the country's evils (González, 1998). As Taylor (2005, p. 568) comments, the “Government of Emergency and National Reconstruction” that Fujimori announced, and the programmatic measures (in the form of decrees) that were implemented as a result, were broadly supported by

Peruvians of all classes; this reaction to the temporary but unconstitutional suspension of democratic representativeness could only be possible thanks to the popular resentment towards the rampant administrative corruption and the economic handling of the previous government, and the perception that most traditional politicians in the Congress of 1990 were crooks.

However, as Schmidt (2000, p. 126) states, “Peruvians have also consistently emphasized institutional constraints over vertical accountability” ever since Fujimori’s *self-coup*, which can be interpreted as a popular refusal in the post Cold War era to just renounce all forms of democratic control and to give Fujimori absolute control. Although Peruvians didn’t seem too interested in actively participating in public affairs through the formation of grass-roots organizations (mostly because of the delicate economic situation of most of the population during the entire decade), they still considered necessary for some institutional order of checks and balances to be in place. In other words, people deemed necessary the provision of control and channels of accountability in the political system, even if they were willing to sacrifice their own political representation for the sake of economic stabilization and administrative reform.

#### Democracy versus anti-corruption: The 2006 elections

The brief exposition of the democratic-authoritarian strains, and their relation to economic well-being of the Peruvian society brings us to the presidential election of 2006. As it has been mentioned earlier, the candidates who received the bulk of votes for the first round election were Ollanta Humala (30.6%) from UPP-PNP, Alan García (24.3%) from APRA, and Lourdes Flores (23.8%) from UN. Looking into the AmericasBarometer 2006 data, on the other hand, we find that the order of the results is replicated with small variances in the distribution of electoral support, this time with Humala garnering 36.1%, García 29.1%, and Flores 23.1% of the valid votes; what is important to notice here, however, is that in the actual event and in our data base, those three candidates combined managed to pull 78.7% and 88.3%, respectively. Therefore, it is completely feasible that their relative image as democratic or authoritarian leaders might be the main influence responsible for the effect found on HCT in this specific data set.

Such reading seems appropriate, indeed, if the relation between democratic support and corruption tolerance could be attributed to the number of observations that reported to have voted for Humala, on one hand, and for Lourdes Flores or Alan García, on the other.

The reason behind this assumption are the big issues raised during the 2006 campaign about Humala's authoritarian tendencies, inspired in his military path and his 'heroic' uprising in the town of Locumba in October 29, 2000<sup>120</sup>, and further fueled by recurring racial and ultra-nationalist comments of members of his family (Montoya, 2009). Flores and García, by contrast, were considered democrats, the latter having been an active member of the opposition against the Fujimori regime, especially during the last years of the 1990's, and the former having at least, during his 1985-1990 government, "respected the basic *rules of the game*<sup>121</sup> of the [democratic] system and called for new elections at the end of his term" (Masías and Segura, 2006, p. 113). These democratic badges weren't just missing in the case of the candidate Ollanta Humala, but serious concerns about the possibility of him becoming a Peruvian version of president Hugo Chavez of Venezuela (who throughout the presidential campaign voiced his support and sympathy for Humala) were becoming common headlines in Lima's newspapers. For all these reasons, most Peruvians identified Humala as being "violent", "anti-system<sup>122</sup>", and "against the big capitals" (Masías and Segura, 2006, p. 115). Considering the impressive record that the Peruvian economy was showing at that moment, it comes as no surprise that, this time, Humala's authoritarian image wasn't received with the same open arms as did Fujimori's *self-coup* or other interventionist offers, as Garcia's in 1985.

#### The preference for liberalism or clean government

Made explicit, our argument suggests that pro-democracy Peruvians are willing, given the appropriate circumstances, to accept potentially corrupt leaders as

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<sup>120</sup> Caretas, N° 1643. *¿Fue en Tierra de Nadie? La Sublevación de Ollanta*. November 2, 2000.

<sup>121</sup> Italics are ours.

<sup>122</sup> This common label in Peruvian politics depicts, in general terms, a candidate or politician that stands against the current economic model (liberal), that is considered an *outsider* of the party system, and shows lack of respect for basic democratic tenets, such as freedom of press and the division of powers ("Un *antisistema* estará en la segunda vuelta del 2011", <http://perueconomico.com/ediciones/39-2009-nov/articulos/454--un-antisistema-estara-en-la-segunda>, accessed on November 21, 2012).

long as they remain respectful of basic democratic institutions and guarantee economic stability. This seems to be the case in 2006, when voters who were more supportive of democratic rules had to choose between potentially corrupt but liberal options (Alan García, and to a lesser degree Lourdes Flores) and an honest but potentially authoritarian candidate (Ollanta Humala), and voted for the formers. Not surprisingly, then, a Spearman's rho test shows that higher democratic support correlates with individual economic satisfaction ( $\rho=-0.115$ ,  $p<0.001$ ,  $\text{obs.}=1128$ ), another determinant that also has been found to impact in higher levels of HCT. Therefore, what we find in the Peruvian case is the instrumentalization of democratic rule in line with the tenets of liberal economy, which has been supporting economic growth for the past two decades. If democratic rule would fail to support this materialistic view of politics, it would be promptly discarded, as indeed occurred in 1985 and 1992; however, if democracy is partnered with economic growth, even when challenged by the prospects of a corrupt government, the levels of HCT will tend to rise.

An intuitive counter-explanation, however, would be that pro-democracy Peruvians are somehow more aware of the historical costs of governmental corruption, which Quiroz (2008) has shown to be much higher under authoritarian regimes than democratic ones: "The historical persistence of systemic corruption was intimately tied to an institutional and political tradition of patrimonial and centralizing executive power undermining necessary checks and balances." (Quiroz, 2008, p. 433) That would leave us with a clear evidence of democratic support having concrete value by itself, and not just as a reflection of economic conditions, as voting for more potentially corrupt candidates in the 2006 presidential elections would be in the pursue of a democratic government, which in time would be the most efficient result in terms of public resources being lost to corrupt activities. However, sadly, there is no statistical support for this alternative, as not even the simple Spearman's rho test managed to find statistical significance in the correlation between democratic values and political awareness ( $p=0.934$ ,  $\text{obs.}=1134$ ).



## 8.8 BETTER ATTITUDES TOWARD HCT RELATE TO HIGHER HCT

The results of our structural equation model showed, as previously theorized, that citizens who hold better attitudes (or less contempt) towards politicians involved in high-level corruption are also more inclined to vote for them. Reversed, we can say that people that are more critical of such kind of behavior are also less inclined to vote for corrupt (or potentially corrupt) candidates.

As this relation is completely straightforward (much like the relations found in the models of LCT), we find no need to contextualize it in Peruvian reality.

## 8.9. LOWER EXTERNAL POLITICAL EFFICACY RELATES TO HIGHER HCT

The last determinant of HCT found by our structural equation model is the level of individual political efficacy as denoted by his/her self-reported actions, as opposed to measures of internal self-efficacy which mostly describes the individual's attitudes or opinions towards the importance he/she has in the political community, and the possibilities to change his/her environment. In this case, while internal political efficacy factor did not reach statistical significance, and was hence discarded, lower external political efficacy resulted in higher corruption tolerance. This result was concretely hypothesized earlier. In the following lines, we will try to put it in context, focusing on some incidences or cases that would suggest such kind of non-efficacious behavior from the part of the Peruvian citizens.

From a sociological perspective, we find that the individual's interest in, or motivation for, tossing away their vote in favor of a corrupt political leader derive from the persistence of patron-client relationships in the Peruvian political culture, but follows a more passive logic: While the client is actively looking for some kind of benefit that may be produced from the selling of his electoral right, the political inefficacious seems to be holding his end of the bargain just for the *feeling* of security or the necessary space that gives him. This space will be the minimum conditions over which the individual can function for his/her own interests. In this way, political

inefficacy conveys the idea of dependency, which is not necessarily related to the idea of convenience as clientelism is. Portocarrero (2005, pp. 222-223) explains:

“<sup>123</sup>On the other side, lying can be a defense mechanism for the dominated, incapable of saying the (whole) truth when in front of the of the patron. Inhibited, afraid, it’s not possible for them to be openly faithful to their own wishes. The *deception*<sup>124</sup> is a ‘ruse’, is to stay sideways, next to the master, not in front of him, so as to preserve a space of autonomy.... [T]here is everything: Masters, slaves, citizens. This figure even inhabits our own personal microcosms. In that labyrinth of positions, the first thing to get lost is the sincerity. Cautiously, people don’t say no, they prefer the ‘*mecida*’”<sup>125</sup>.

The meaning of Portocarrero’s description of the Peruvian political cosmos is straightforward: People that are citizens only in paper, but not in reality, develop a strategy to deal with the perceived *authority* that involves faking support, granting in that way the act of voting as a mere formality. Portocarrero (2005, p. 227) concludes: “[I]n Peru we are used to authoritarian models; we are looking for an Inca, or a good patron, or to be protected”; such is the reason why citizens may surrender their vote to corrupt politicians if they feel in such a subordinate and weak position.

#### Political subjects during Fujimori’s regime

In Peru, as has been explained before, there are many known cases of politically-driven allocation of public funds and resources to both reward geographical areas with high concentration of partisans, and punish areas that have been unfavorable to the leader during elections. One example presented earlier was that of the FONCODES (Schady, 2000), during Fujimori’s government. However, as opposed to cases of clientelism or community-oriented support, what we are looking for here is the presence of governmental intimidation and other more aggressive tactics that may explode the vulnerability and the lack of political empowerment of the citizens. Again, the Fujimori regime provides with some textbook examples.

Taylor (2000) informs about some forms of intimidation of voters practiced by public officials under the instructions of members of the government, during the campaign for Fujimori’s re-reelection of 2000. One of such was the threatening of

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<sup>123</sup> Translated from Spanish.

<sup>124</sup> Italics are ours.

<sup>125</sup> Italics are ours. *Mecida* is a Peruvian slang that means ‘taking for a fool’.

vulnerable voters by officials of the Food Aid National Program (PRONAA), who continuously warned beneficiaries that the program would come to a stop if Fujimori weren't to be reelected; additionally, poor part-timers working for the program were forced to distribute public propaganda. The same use of State employees was enforced in the National Project for Water and Soil Conservation (PRONAMACHS). Taylor (2000, p. 401) also reproduces the comments of a poor peasant regarding these "extortions" from officials of social programs: "The governor told us that us that we must vote for Fujimori, otherwise food and other assistance would stop. Many people were afraid". To be sure, all these events depict the occurrence of intimidation from the part of the powerful over the weak; the difference between them and cases of clientelism is the same that applies to cases of extortive and collusive bribery. Politically inefficacious citizens are not to be considered looking to exchange their vote for some material benefit, but to surrender it as a way to show the 'master' that they are willing to play along, that they don't deserve to be punished.

A legacy of the internal conflict between the military and the subversive guerrillas that extended from the 1980's until the mid-1990's, was the sense of vulnerability of rural and impoverished citizens that were systematically repressed and victimized by both conflicting sides. That complete disempowerment was shown to play a role in the vote for Fujimori in the presidential elections of 1995 and 2000 (Schmidt, 2000, 2002; Taylor, 2000), when electoral watchdogs raised fears involving the direct or indirect influence of the military presence in many rural areas. In any case, as was commented before, there has always been reason for poor peasants to fear that their vote is no really as secret as the law states, and that even if they are not individually pointed as presenting opposition, the community as a whole could be punished for showing low electoral support for the leader.

When the citizenry develops this kind of feelings regarding their own role in the State, and they behave accordingly to those fears and sense of self-inefficacy, then it logically follows that corrupt politicians can't be punished for their misdeeds, even electorally, as doing so would endanger the reproduction of material conditions necessary for survival. More than a discussion about the actual governmental capabilities to retaliate opposition voters, what it's at stake is the construction of Peruvians' self-image as political actors, and not just political subjects.

## 8.10. SUMMARY

We found that more informed and politically sophisticated Peruvians are, against our expectations, more tolerant of HLC, probably due to the influence of historically biased media, and the corrupting interaction between a colonial mindset that favors the ability to generate rents and power without regards for ethical constraints, on one hand, and the extended cynicism among educated citizens as a result of the common exposure to corruption scandals, on the other. They also tend to absolve electorally dishonest leaders by putting first partisan values, constraining their rightful exercise of vertical accountability and leaving the problem for institutional actors to handle. The same appears to happen with the more economically satisfied members of society, only seem to worry about the damaging effects of corruption to its full extent when the economy starts declining. Hence, material conditions are a key condition through which Peruvians analyze the legitimacy of the ruling elites, much to our worry.

A reduction in the individual's perception of HLC as a generalized phenomenon, covering virtually the entirety of the political system, and his/her appraisal of the community he/she lives in, translated in the amount of effort he/she is willing to exert to support it, have also been found to be two determinants empirically related to higher levels of HCT. The first describes the Peruvian cycles of corruption, characterized by a constant increment in the spread of corrupt activities until a tipping point, after which the cycle restarts with low levels of malfeasance just to go eventually back up. This aspect of Peruvian reality is sadly consistent with the accounts of Quiroz (2008) and Durand (2005). HCT also follow those cycles, and reacts to few cases of graft with high tolerance, moving in the opposite direction as corruption spreads to all political quarters. Such movement denotes the commonly acknowledged Latin American tendency to peacefully coexist with 'acceptable' levels of corruption, only denouncing it and adopting an active opposition when the situation becomes intolerable. Indeed, Peruvians worry more about the future of their communities than the future of corrupt politicians. Although not exactly reflecting clientelistic tendencies (another variable that did not reach statistical significance), this second result evidences the level of dependency of many rural and impoverished communities on governmental assistance, and the traditional reliance on a politically

paternalistic figure to which offer their support in exchange for protection; in sum, the selling of political rights for local development.

As many young and/or not fully developed democracies, many Peruvians still cherish the military regimes of the past through an almost romantic and skewed memory of the economic and social conditions. This difficulty in the construction of democratic institutions has not been eased by the rampant corruption and economic crisis experienced (and allowed) by constitutional regimes in the past decades, to the point that against all odds, democracy and malfeasance goes hand by hand in the minds of a big part of the citizenry. This perception, however, has a very real reflection on reality, as pro-democracy citizens are found to be willing to support potentially corrupt leaders as long as they secure the stability of the system, whereas others would sacrifice their political participation for the punishment of wrongdoings.

The last two factors that were found to increase the level of HCT among Peruvians were, not surprisingly, their attitudes toward the phenomenon, and a low exercise of political efficacy. Very much like their prioritization of the local community, citizens that do not express any sense of political power seem to be willing to toss away their votes to keep the favor of their leaders, as they may perceive that doing otherwise would be a futile effort either way. Therefore, looking for the causes of the spread of HLC in Peru, we would need no more than to look for those individuals who feel alienated from the polity to understand that, in Peru, it might well be the case that there are as many subjects as there are citizens. The consequences follow naturally: As Sánchez (2010, p. 13) states, “it’s impossible to fight corruption effectively without the participation [of the private sector].”

CHAPTER 9  
DETERMINANTS OF LOW-LEVEL CORRUPTION TOLERANCE  
IN PERUVIAN CONTEXT

In the previous chapter we have engaged in a historical approach to the interpretation of quantified relations between various economical and political variables, and HCT. In the present chapter we adopt the same strategy with respect to low-level corruption tolerance (LCT). The multiple correlations performed in Chapter 7 showed that people who don't support their community by economic means, and also those who are more political satisfied, tend to engage less in collusive bribery. On the other hand, perceiving that most other people accepts to pay an extorted bribe (in order to gain access to a service which they are legally entitled to), and regarding administrative complaint mechanisms as mostly ineffective, cause the citizen to be tolerant of extortive corruption.

Most of these results were expected based in the hypothesized relations suggested (or empirically demonstrated) by previous literature, and due to the inherent logic of the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) described in the discussion of the LCT's theoretical framework, there is no real need to contextualize the statistical results as it was for the case of the determinants of HCT. Indeed, most of the relations described above are by themselves self-explanatory. However, a quick review of the meaning behind them will still be undertaken, trying to reflect the patterns of Peruvian micro-political behavior that may have bigger (and more complex) consequences than that of LCT.

9.1. LESS ECONOMIC SUPPORT TO THE COMMUNITY RELATES TO LOWER LCT-DEVIANT

Operationalization issues and interpretation

The present study has made a case for the employment of proxy variables to measure the basic determinants behind attitudes, subjective norm, and PBC, based on corresponding scholarly production on the topic. Fishbein and Ajzen (2010) have

explained that, although this approach should not be considered the most appropriate for the task (indeed, they advice to rely on individual *salient beliefs*, p. 100), there are many instances of research involving the use of the TPB that rely on beliefs' selection as "collected from the literature" (p. 109). In the present study, we stretched the model to include the employment of proxies; however, the interpretation of the results of the Spearman's rank correlation coefficient tests must keep in mind the specific survey questions used as indicators. Such is the case of 'economic support to the community', which was one of the two indicators that were set in place in the effort to capture the individual's opinion about collusive bribes being more *economically convenient*. The reason behind it has been described earlier: To recount, people who believe that a bribe represents a more convenient solution to a problem in economic terms, will hold improved attitudes towards that behavior. To measure this perspective, we needed to consider the belief that bribes have indeed such a convenient result, and that such a result is considered important or valuable. As the first belief is rather obvious by itself<sup>126</sup>, we focused on the second one, and applied a logic connection where the importance of saving time and/or money will naturally have priority for more materialistic and self-interested individuals<sup>127</sup>. Two questions in the LAPOP database offered that information, one of which being "having donated time or money to address a problem in the community". Our reasoning was that, people who hold time/money as very precious, even to the point to resort to corruption for it, would be less inclined to donate it. If that were the case, then it would naturally follow that individuals who don't collaborate on the solution of their community's problems, would also tend to engage more in collusive bribery.

However, the Spearman's rho coefficient showed that the actual relation between both variables was of the opposite sign as expected, implying that our hypothesized argument was wrong: In reality, self-centered citizens engaged less in corrupt deals than their more community-oriented counterparts.

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<sup>126</sup> Collusive bribes, by definition, are transactions inspired in some material benefit for both actors involved, with a subsequent lose for society as a whole.

<sup>127</sup> Although a material benefit would be considered generally desirable, the actual importance of such benefit will be relative to the specific individual in question.

The first intuitive explanation that can be suggested to interpret this odd result points to an important presence of people who may not be willing (or capable) to spend additional money to solve (or to facilitate the solution of) problems, either communal or their own. On the opposite side, people who are economically capable of supporting their community would also be capable to engage in corruption. However, this explanation seems too blunt, and would still leave reasonable doubt regarding the association between giving money to the community and paying bribes, if for no other reason than to be able to afford it.

#### Corporative ethics and the rise of the modern citizen

Trying to find another feasible explanation more embedded in cultural traits, we find that, possibly in the same logical structure as in the case of HCT, Peruvians manifest what Sánchez (2010, p. 2) has called “corporative ethics”, which would be a behavioral pattern deeply rooted in their cultural legacy. This ethical characteristic, Sánchez explains, would demand people to benefit first the family, and then, progressively up, the clan, the community, the party, etc., from the close, homogeneous circles, to the more distant ones. In consequence, therefore, such corporative ethics mandate to benefit the State at large as a last condition, after the duties to the direct associates are fulfilled. If that is the case, then, it’s understandable why individuals who support their community will have no repairs in engaging in bribery to obtain some private benefit; and, if they do not manifest the same pattern of social norms, they will be less inclined to favor either their community (through the investment of private material resources) or themselves (through their participation in illegal transactions).

What this line of argument seems to suggest is a kind of departure from the traditional cultural legacy depicted by Sánchez (2010), by which Peruvians would be showing a break from a previous self-image as members of a close community, and the development of a citizenship fully aware of their role and that of the State’s. In other words, a deeper interpretation of the statistical relation between economic support to the community, and collusive bribery, would indicate a tendency to clearly differentiate the public from the private sphere, an improvement over a common problem in most developing countries. If the individual considers him/herself a citizen, a political member of the society by own rights, then the responsibility for the



solution of communities' problems clearly rests in the State and its institutions, and the citizen may see that his/her action should be aimed at influencing policy making and implementation (through administrative and legal channels) instead of personally undertaking the task of solving them. Such is the reading of the Peruvian reality that Catalina Romero (2007, p. 103) makes when she states that "the exercise of power relations don't fully become depersonalized"<sup>128</sup> across different socio-economic levels, which is the reason why many Peruvians migrate to more advanced countries in the pursue of a role not tied to kinship or friendship.

A partial statistical test of this assumption, however, is not possible at the time, due to the limitations and serious concerns raised regarding the propriety of our *clientelism* variable.

#### Alternative explanation: Back to economics

A competing interpretation of the relation between the variables under consideration, could suggest that people who economically support their community might belong to a lower economic strata, hence being more prone to choose collusive bribery as an economically efficient solution; however, not only the latter proposition has been proved to be invalid (having *no economic alternative* didn't correlate with engagement in collusive bribery), but the indicator of economic support to the community correlates with both *household income* ( $\rho=-0.154$ ,  $p<0.001$ , obs.=543) and *household economic satisfaction* ( $\rho=0.149$ ,  $p<0.001$ , obs.=570), indicating that people who don't support their community are actually the ones of lower economic strata. This leads us, finally, back to our original an intuitively naive interpretation: People who don't have the material resources to contribute, can't afford to bribe either.

## 9.2. MORE POLITICAL SATISFACTION RELATES TO LOWER LCT-DEVIANT

Moving on to more familiar grounds, it's rather easy to understand the reason behind the statistical relation between the citizen's political satisfaction and his/her

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<sup>128</sup> Translated from Spanish.

behavior when interacting with representatives of the government. As was addressed in Chapter 5, a process of delegitimization of state institutions and political bodies naturally translates in a change of the ways people interact with them. Talking specifically about petty (or low-level) corruption, from an economical perspective is understandable to find individuals resorting to bribery a last channel for getting from the State what is perceived as rightfully theirs (Karklins, 2005), or from game theory to appreciate the logic behind people's decision to stop complying with rules and regulations (Bergman, 2009). But, how does the delegitimization of Peruvian political institutions affect citizens' behavior?

The idea of popular disenchantment with political leaders and the regimes and institutions that support them, as has been addressed earlier for some determinants of HCT, and the consequent erosion of healthy citizenship, is nothing new (nor specific) to the study of corruption. Portocarrero (2005) notices the gradual reduction of tax collection and institutionalization as an aftermath of Fujimori's fall and subsequent unveiled of the systemic corruption inside (among many other institutions) the National Superintendent's Office of Customs and Tax Administration (SUNAT), stating that "<sup>129</sup>the fact of not paying taxes has become legitimized" (Portocarrero, 2005, p. 220) among Peruvians. Quiroz (2008, p. 340) makes the same kind of connection regarding the process of popular alienation from democratic institutions following a spread of corrupt practices in both public offices and "daily life". In these cases we see the inverted direction from the one found in Chapter 7: The link from corruption to a declining perception of regime legitimacy (a classic thesis from Seligson, 2002).

But the reality of life under a democratic regime (and any other kind of regime, for that matter) in Peru is that individuals heavily resort to their feelings and understanding regarding the legitimacy of the State and the government, when having to interact with bureaucratic officials and choosing appropriate strategies. As the intermediation of civic associations and popular organizations have diminished over the decades of the 80's and 90's (for various reasons that are not the subject of the present study), and at the same time the democratic engineering has imposed multiple

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<sup>129</sup> Translated from Spanish.

(but legally impervious) institutional actors standing between the people and the leaders, many Peruvians have got no other choice than to resort to personal relations to obtain the benefits they deem legitimate from the State (Romero, 2007), the same kind of relations that foster collusive bribery.

In this way, either as an emotional reaction to the perceived illegitimacy of the State, the regime or its representatives, or as a strategic behavior aimed at negotiating scarce and necessary public resources, Peruvians are found to rely on collusive bribery in their interactions with unresponsive bureaucrats.

### 9.3. PERCEIVED NORMS RELATE TO LCT-COMPLIANT

The relation between the individual's perception regarding the actions and behavior of others, and his/her own actions and behavior, is a rather straightforward one. Although the same connection didn't reach statistical significance in the case of collusive bribery, when turning to extortion the Spearman's rho test found that, as hypothesized, Peruvians tend to emulate the socially accepted reaction when confronted with a scenario of extortion<sup>130</sup>.

Due to the possibility of such a transparent interpretation, and the otherwise current lack of Peruvian (or Peruvian-centered) scholarly literature on the subject, we find no reason to go any deeper in the contextualization of this determinant for the Peruvian case.

### 9.4. MORE EFFECTIVE MECHANISMS OF COMPLAINT RELATES TO LOWER LCT-COMPLIANT

The final determinant of LCT, specifically for cases involving extortion, is the individual's perception of the effectiveness of redress channels and/or complaint mechanisms. When the citizen's access to lawful services is refused, either directly or

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<sup>130</sup> Although the variable coded EXC7 in the LAPOP data cannot be interpreted as a direct question about extortion, an argument was presented supporting its usage in such way.

by harassment strategies, many considerations can pass through his/her mind; all these were included earlier in our model of LCT-compliant. Here we will discuss the importance of legal securities behind his/her decision over surrendering or refusing to pay an extorted bribe.

#### The state of Peruvian complaint mechanisms

Described by the Peruvian official response to the questionnaire of the second round of analysis of the Follow-Up Mechanism for the Implementation of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (MESICIC), by 2006 there weren't in place any substantial mechanisms to help and protect whistleblowers<sup>131</sup>; aside from formal redress venues, there wasn't any specific policy regarding the implementation of user-friendly practices for such cases, and there was yet no legislation contemplating actual measures to protect citizens from reprisals. Probably for this reason, the general perception among the Peruvian citizenry was that, against corrupt officials and their cronies, there was nothing much to do. Ford (2003, p. 200) reports the results of the First National Survey About Corruption and Governability conducted by *Apoyo, opinión y Mercado* in 2002, where 58% of the subjects reported not having denounced an act of bribery<sup>132</sup> due to the beliefs that the guilty parties wouldn't be punished, there was no way of proving it, and the procedures were too complex. Such amount of people sharing the same opinion regarding the effectiveness and worthiness of relying in redress mechanisms describes in a blunt way the *state of the art* of Peruvian anti-corruption reforms in 2002. Four years later, whatever the institutional changes undertaken by the government were, the public perception of their capability to refuse to surrender an extorted bribe hadn't got much better. In the Fourth National Survey Corruption 2006 developed by *Proética* and *Apoyo*, 44% of subjects reported not having denounced bribery due to the beliefs that the guilty parties wouldn't be punished and that there was no way of proving it (Proética, 2007, p. 125).

#### Citizens' legal *analphabetism*

Such sense of vulnerability against corrupt officials is, hence, widespread among the Peruvian population, having its worth impact on people of scarce resources

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<sup>131</sup> [http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/mesicic2\\_per\\_sp.htm](http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/mesicic2_per_sp.htm)

<sup>132</sup> Unfortunately, the Apoyo, Opinión y Mercado data didn't differentiate between cases of collusion and extortion, rendering their results of limited support to our study.

(U4, 2008, p. 3). As Armando Guevara (2006, p. 10) posits, the deep economic and symbolic inequalities cutting across so many different social and geographic groups in Peru, “prevent the universal validity of the official law and generates its social illegitimacy.” In other words, the economic reality of part of the population (which creates a situation where these are more subjects than citizens) translates into a state of legal ‘analphabetism’ or overall pessimism, and could be the origin behind their tendency to surrender when extorted. Such hypothesized relation is statistical significant, indeed, showing that the perception of effective complaint mechanisms correlates well with income ( $\rho=0.272$ ,  $p=0.085$ ,  $obs.=41$ ) and one measure of economic satisfaction<sup>133</sup> (q10d [ $\rho=-0.48$ ,  $p<0.01$ ,  $obs.=41$ ]), therefore indicating that the capacity to denounce an extortion may be hindered by the individual’s economic status. On the other hand, perceptions of effective complaint mechanisms failed to correlate with either the level of education, or the rural-urban environment.

For the effects of our discussion over LCT-compliant, it implies that any anti-corruption reform that stays in the legislative and regulatory part of the production, without implementing effective and economical mechanisms allowing citizens the complete exercise of their rights (in this case, the right to refuse a bribe and to denounce the offender), is doomed to have limited results. It also highlights, lastly, the heterogeneous reality of the Peruvian population (for not using the denomination of ‘citizens’) and the importance of a consequent and responsible policy formulation to address the issues behind their legal analphabetism, in order to bring down the scourge of corruption.

## 9.5. SUMMARY

The study of low-level corruption tolerance (LCT) among Peruvians found that they willingly engage more in bribery when they show stronger ties to their communities in terms of financial investment in the solution of collective problems, suggesting a potential division between the trends of political culture among different sectors of society, from a traditional one that envisages close ties as the means for

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<sup>133</sup> In an ordered logistic regression of all the variables contained in the paragraph, only Q10D showed a statistically significant coefficient (-1.905;  $Z=-2.38$ ;  $obs.=41$ ).

social wellbeing, to a more 'modern' and liberal that constructs the image of the citizen as a member of a wider collectivity with impersonal ties to his/her means of welfare. This interpretation, however, should be taken with caution, as further statistical analysis would be needed to corroborate our assumptions.

As expected, Peruvian citizens also showed to be influenced by the political environment in their decision to bribe, tending to engage more in LLC when they felt less satisfied with their local and national representatives, and the way in which the system was working. Since democracy was recovered in 1980, after more than a decade of military regime, it has spawned a variety of economic and political rights (although in a non-linear evolution) that often seem to clash with the material reality of formal institutions, and the actual performance of legal mechanisms. Because of such distance between the public and the leaders, brought by the complex structure of democratic rule and the undelivered benefits of electing national representatives that fail to solve the most urgent problems of society, Peruvians find bribery as an acceptable alternative strategy to fulfill their necessities.

Finally, they were more inclined to surrender a bribe when extorted if they thought that others were also reacting in the same way, but were able to defend their rights and refuse to be extorted when effective complaint mechanisms were available. However, the conditions in the country are far from ideal, and vast sectors of the population remain in a constant state of legal 'analphabetism', which is partly a consequence of the level of economic inequality, and the limited access to effective bureaucratic services in many regions of the country. The real capacity to exercise their rights, therefore, stands between the citizens and their possibility to reject extortion.

These findings suggest that Peruvians show tolerance to low-level corruption as a result of the socio-political environment, where their behavior is determined by the conditions of those contact points between the private and public spheres.

## CHAPTER 10

### CONCLUSIONS

There is no such thing as ‘the end of the road’ in the phenomenon of corruption. Whenever graft and malfeasance become widespread in a society, to the point where scholars and journalist may call it systemic, there is an increment of an opposite force in society, one characterized by honesty and transparency championed by a variety of actors, that applies stress to the political system in search for change. This counter-effort does, however, hide a complexity that involves more materialistic and cynic interests than the ones publicly hold. Because the political discourse doesn’t perfectly mirror (or sometimes even approach) the drives behind political actors, a more effective and efficient look into the problematic of corruption in any given society might come from the understanding of the level and patterns of corruption tolerance among the various societal actors. The present study has tried to address such concept in the case of the citizenry, unraveling some surprising results that usually avoid the common intuition of policy makers in Peru.

There are no corrupt periods alternating honest ones, nor governments or generations. Corruption is always a problem of degree, a state of equilibrium between factual circumstances and civic virtues that gives a particular polity its characteristics. This is true for Peru as for any other country. What changes, due to governmental intervention, public experience, or international pressure, is the amount of corruption that is accepted under certain conditions, and as those are in continuous change, so is the level of corruption tolerance. Hence, a comprehensive analysis of its singularities may in fact shade the necessary light to stop aimlessly drifting from one corruption cycle to the other, with no more understanding of their reasons but anecdotic recounts and popular decries for reform.

Corruption tolerance, as we saw in Chapter 2, can be defined as the *citizens’ behavioral adherence to condone the corrupt behavior of a political actor*, in cases of high-level corruption (HLC), and as the *citizens’ bribery of a public official to gain access to some lawful or unlawful service or benefit*, for cases of low-level extortion (LLC-compliant) and collusion (LLC-deviant), respectively. From these definitions

two important things become apparent. First, an individual's tolerance can be disaggregated in exactly the same way as corruption, based on the assumption that different types of malfeasance have heterogeneous outcomes for him/her, and naturally, such results would consequently induce different attitudinal and (possibly) behavioral patterns in the citizen. Second, they present an argument for the operationalization of corruption tolerance as a specific behavior, departing from previous emphasis in the person's attitudes or perception. This decision, besides being theoretically appropriate, highlights the importance of a behavioral intervention on society as the main result of any sound study regarding corruption. As Robert Klitgaard (1988) would probably agree, it makes no sense to research a social problem if there is no intention to directly or indirectly support some kind of policy implementation or State intervention in pursue of its solution and eradication. What have an impact on the level and practices of corruption are not the public *attitudes* towards it, but how these manifest in actual practices of social, economic, and political interaction. To be clear, we are not trying to say that the study of attitudes towards corruption is not important, but rather that it can be conceived only as a proxy for the citizens' behavior, assuming that in fact both dimensions are empirically congruent. Unfortunately, this transition from opinions to actions does not appear to be one of Peruvians' qualities.

Antonio Zapata (2005, p. 268) describes Peru as a society deeply marked by an inner contradiction between corrupt and honest tendencies, a reading that is also made by Quiroz (2008). Although most Peruvians would proclaim to reject the basic tenets of corruption, particularly governmental one, they continue to elect leaders with a long history of public misconduct and graft, and routinely engage in petty corruption themselves, either at will or by force. Such incidence of malfeasance throughout society cannot be explained only by reference to politicians and bureaucrats, or to entrepreneurs and institutional private actors. Average citizens are deeply engrained in the reproduction and sustain of corruption, though they may choose to turn a blind eye to the fact, and for that reason we would need to look no further than at society itself to find the reasons for the spread of the problem in the country. However, such exercise could only take us so far, requiring from us, as a next step, to elucidate the reasons and determinants behind such tolerance of corrupt acts. This task was undertaken in the second half of this study.



The statistical results of the Structural Equation Modeling performed in Chapters 6 showed that a higher exposition to casual and official information; more political awareness, partisan involvement, and economic satisfaction; people who are more community-oriented and those who hold democracy in higher esteem; and better attitudes toward the phenomenon of HLC, all relate to higher levels of HCT. On the other hand, a higher perception that HLC is generalized, and higher external political efficacy, relate to lower levels of HCT.

In the case of LCT, the Spearman's rank correlation coefficients obtained in Chapter 7 showed that more economic support for the community, and less political satisfaction, relate to a higher tolerance of collusion, while a lower trust in the effectiveness of complaint mechanisms, and the perception that other citizens are tolerating LLC, relate to a more compliant behavior towards extortion.

Some of these results highlight the necessity to resort to historic, economic, sociological, and anthropological accounts of Peruvian reality in order to fully understand the meaning of our statistical results. In other words, a multidisciplinary approach is required to interpret the emergence of such relations in the Peruvian context. This effort was undertaken in Chapters 8 and 9, producing a detailed and final description of the situation of corruption tolerance in the country, where we were able to identify the specific circumstances surrounding all and each one of the statistically significant variables, shedding light over an otherwise dark and confusing set of relations.

Although 'explanatory' and 'descriptive' are two terms that may come to mind when talking about the kind of analyses performed in Chapters 6 and 7, and in Chapters 8 and 9, respectively, such distinction may be inappropriate in this study. Due to its cross-sectional design, it is not possible to grant 'causality', but only *relation*, between the variables considered here; while we may be able to explain the occurrence of corruption tolerance in Peru in 2006 by reference to the variables found statically significant during the analysis, there is no way to know if the same variables cause the phenomenon *over time*. For this reason, we consider that the reliance on purely statistical measures, first, and the later resort to a more ethnographic and holistic approach, must be considered the main difference between the chapters of

Part 2, a strategy that was considered to be crucial in understanding the complex phenomenon of corruption tolerance as expressed by Peruvian citizens.

### Policy considerations

The emphasis given in this study to the behavior of the citizenry parts from a traditional focus on institutional actors such as the bureaucracy and economic agents. Although not ignoring the importance of the latter (as showed by their inclusion in the model of HCT), we posited that a citizen-driven explanation of the spread of corruption in a society represents as much as half of the potential success of any national reform, to which policy makers should pay as much attention as that given to legal and/or organizational strategies. Rasma Karklins (2005, p. 97) subscribes to such opinion:

“A polity can be made more honest by institutional structures and procedures. Yet [formal] institutions alone cannot safeguard good politics: that also requires public spiritedness and commitment to the public good... Even the best rules can be circumvented, and thus a non-corrupt polity relies *most of all on the quality of the behavior of its citizens and their representatives*<sup>134</sup>.”

Having identified the determinants of Peruvian HCT and LCT, a crucial question rises as a consequence: What would be the best strategy to reduce the citizens' tolerance to malfeasance, and to materialize that honesty to which most of the population expresses preference? Some of the findings, indeed, may suggest a road to achieve better levels of civic spiritedness through carefully targeted behavioral interventions in the areas we have found to be statistically related to corruption tolerance. However, would an effort to control corruption be always the most efficient activity? Regarding bureaucracy, Klitgaard (1988, p. 24) develops the idea of “*optimal level of corruption*”, positing that, given the required resources to control public misconduct and the estimated benefits of that effort, the optimal level “*is not zero*”. His logic calls attention to the actual benefits that may be expected from the hypothetical eradication of corruption, and the means adopted and material resources spent to reach that goal: “[P]olicies to crack down on corruption have costs in terms of the organization's effective performance of its primary mission” (Klitggard, 1988, p. 195). If we consider it as a trade, as Klitgaard suggests, a society's anti-corruption

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<sup>134</sup> Italics are ours.

drive should extend to the degree that corruption itself is pervasive and its consequences distorting. And the same idea may be applied to the reduction of corruption tolerance in a realistic perspective. The results obtained in the present study should be understood as a description of the state of HCT and LCT in Peru, and not a set of policy recommendation ready for implementation. Without a doubt, nobody would agree with the idea that the reduction of corruption tolerance should be undertaken at the cost of reducing media exposition and political awareness; that, certainly, would have equal or worst consequences than political graft. Nor democratic values should be attacked in order to obtain support for more honest candidates for office. Whether we agree with her or not, Catalina Romero (2007) highlights the importance of Alan García's success in the Peruvian presidential elections of 2006 as the victory of "<sup>135</sup>the politician against the *outsider*, and this could be the first indicator of a promising democratic scenario" (p. 92), notwithstanding García's long history of involvement in corruption scandals from his first government, against the fierce anti-corruption campaign wielded by his main opponent Ollanta Humala. Certainly, her position continues with the rhetoric of democracy as the most valuable political asset in society, by and for itself, even at the cost of HLC. With no intention to engage in such debate, we only suggest that an effort to reduce corruption tolerance among the citizenry may not be worth the rejection of democratic values for most of Peruvians.

A better approach, hence, would be to disconnect the relation between democratic support and corruption tolerance, via institutional reforms; and the same would partially apply to the impact of skewed and sensationalist information. Either through the implementation of behavioral interventions in line with the identified factors (as in the case of political efficacy), or by correcting some of the dynamics that cause the undesired effect (such as the relation between economic satisfaction and HCT), most of the recommendations would fall into the grounds of carefully engineered institutional reforms. However, here we want to briefly comment on one area that is usually portrayed as being fundamental in an anti-corruption (AC) effort, aiming directly at the citizens' perception and attitudes towards corruption: The role of public education.

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<sup>135</sup> Translated from Spanish.

Taylor (2009, p. 166), arguing that “public support matters” for AC, describes the situation of popular understanding of corruption in Brazil:

“There are also a number of ways in which whistleblowing is encouraged by various bureaucracies such as the Contraloria Geral da União, at least at the federal level. But there have been few broader efforts to educate the public at large about the pernicious effects of corruption and to enlist public support in fighting it. Instead, the emphasis on investigation and the absence of any perceived sanctions against corrupt acts tends to contribute to apathy.”

The same warning can be made for Peru. As Ortiz and Calderón (2005, pp. 133-134) caution, the outcome of institutional and legal changes depends on the cultural codes of conduct and the perceived benefits of those reforms. Without proper communication between the social and political actors, and a learning process aiming to equate the legal and social realities, what Michael Reisman (1979, Chapter 1) dubbed the *operational code* and the *myth system*, respectively, the best policy intentions have very little possibilities of success. Education, with that objective, entails “raising awareness and providing foundations to the community (children, adults, public sector, private sector, foreigners) about the phenomenon of corruption, securing their support in the fight against this scourge” (Sanchez, 2010, p. 13). Following our argument, Sanchez (2010, p. 13) proposes a “virtuous circle” composed by *deterrence*, *prevention*, and *education*. We couldn't agree more.

#### Future venues of research

As we mentioned earlier, the concept of corruption tolerance describes the amount of graft and malfeasance that is accepted in a society under certain conditions, all of which can be purposively manipulated or altered by international pressure, governmental intervention, and public experience. This is true for the case of the unorganized civil society, as for any other societal actor such as the bureaucracy, political leaders, entrepreneurs, non-governmental organizations, etc., that may be considered a *stakeholder* in a given country. The vertical accountability model developed for HCT partially describes such shared responsibility by describing the existence of high-level corruption as a function of both formal institutions and the citizens' corruption tolerance; however, it is predictable that the failure of anyone of them to control malfeasance might be compensated by the inclusion of other

influential actors into the model (in a process that would be similar to the description of the elements behind the level of low-level corruption), moving beyond the tolerance towards the phenomenon as emphasized in the present study. In sum, although the citizenry needs to be considered a key actor, it is by no means the only one, and future research on the subject needs to contemplate the possibility of depicting a complete picture of the dynamics of national corruption.

As a societal actor, then, the citizens' actions and motivations are susceptible to governmental intervention and naturally-evolving public experience; the former is usually addressed in most applied research on corruption, and the second can only be recounted (and sometimes predicted) from a historic analysis. However, the international community is an added actor that just recently has started to emerge in the national-level efforts to control corruption. This 'environmental actor', external to the national polity, has deepened its influence over the course of the past two decades on the extent and implementation of anti-corruption policies and regulations adopted in many countries around the world (Wei and Zhang, 2010; ACCI, 2007), particularly through the works of International Organizations in the creation of such legal mechanisms as the United Nations' Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and many other treaties and platforms allowing the subscribing parties to publicly declare their commitment to fight corruption on specific areas, and to take the necessary steps to implement the policy consequences of such legal instruments. Thus, the citizenry now have the added pressure of the international community, an element that will play in the future as much a role as the national government in shaping the level of corruption tolerance of individual citizens and all other stakeholders vulnerable (directly or indirectly) to foreign pressure. That is the final element to fully understand the dynamics of national corruption.

The citizen has an inherent duty to fight corruption, either by denouncing it, actively showing their political dissatisfaction with corruption scandals, supporting honest and transparent leaders, or by refusing to resort to it. In the words of Karklins (2005, p. 165), working on post-communist societies:

“Public values and views are expressed in discourse, which creates a climate of either corruption apologia or social rejection. Anti-corruption work needs to limit tolerance for both petty and grand corruption. Honest people are the core constituency for reform, but to date all too many post-communist citizens participate in petty corruption and tolerate it in others. Yet many are also angry, especially about high-level corruption. When designing anti-corruption strategies, this ambivalence should be anticipated.”

As the source of political power, and the main force of the polity, the citizenry have much more influence in the health of the State than it usually realizes, and such passivity can be considered essential in the emergence of many of the social, economic, and political evils that are present in Peru. This has been the primary assumption of the present study, over which a carefully structured model and analysis of the citizens’ tolerance of malfeasance was constructed. If all members of Peruvian society are, as many authors consider (Ford, 2003, p. 202; Sanchez, 2010, p. 15), essential to bring corruption to a halt and provide the foundations for the development of the State, we were concerned over the void in past corruption literature regarding such an essential actor. To say it in fewer words, there was no significant model to account for the determinants of corruption tolerance among citizens, thus lacking the required scholarly support to a voiced warning: Without the participation of society, there is no way out from the harms of graft and malfeasance. Such is the historic lesson that many Peruvians have now come to realize, after the dramatic events that welcomed the country to the new century, and a reality that popular, academic, and politic circles can’t afford to continue ignoring.



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APPENDIX 1  
Information Regarding Corrupt (and Anti-corrupt) Activities  
of the Six Major Candidates of 2006, and Their Political Parties

# issue	Date	Party	Candidate	Extract	Condition (party)	Condition (candidate)	Title-Body
1637	22/09/00		Martha Chávez	... constitucional diseñado por Alberto Bustamante, <b>Martha Chávez</b> y Miriam Schenone –con el visto bueno de <b>Montesinos</b> –,	-	C	B
1640	12/10/00		Martha Chávez	... <b>montesinistas</b> apoyados por halcones como <b>Martha Chávez</b> intentarían frustrar la ratificación de las reformas constitucionales en la segunda legislatura...	-	C	B
1640	12/10/00		Martha Chávez	<b>Aybar</b> Cancho en prisión,... describe la manera cómo <b>Montesinos</b> participaba de este tipo de operaciones y cómo la congresista <b>Martha Chávez</b> ,... también conocía los hechos...	-	(-) AC	T
1641	18/10/00		Martha Chávez	<b>Martha Chávez</b> de Ocampo no descartó la posibilidad de tratar el tema de una <b>amnistía</b> (ver aparte), como había revelado Fernando Olivera.	-	C	B
1643	2/11/00		Martha Chávez	"Las declaraciones del narcotraficante Demetrio Chávez que pretenden involucrar a Vladimiro <b>Montesinos</b> en actividades <b>ilegales</b> no tienen ningún fundamento y forman parte de una confabulación y campaña antipatriótica".	-	(-) AC	B
1643	2/11/00		Ollanta Humala	... ilegitimidad del régimen, de lo fraudulento de las últimas elecciones y de la <b>corrupción</b> de algunos de los altos mandos de las Fuerzas	-	AC	T
1644	9/11/00		Martha Chávez	<b>Ugaz</b> recibió el respaldo de todos los sectores políticos... sin embargo, <b>Martha Chávez</b> ... habrían acudido donde el Presidente, a <b>quejarse</b> amargamente.	-	(-) AC	B
1645	16/11/00		Alan García	<b>Alan García</b> y <b>Vladimiro Montesinos</b> : las acusaciones sin pruebas y las pruebas sin atenuantes.	-	C	B
1650	21/12/00		Valentín Paniagua	... aprobación en el Congreso del paquete de leyes extraordinarias <b>anticorrupción</b> ... la dupla <b>García Sayán-Ugaz</b> se apuntó un primer gran...	-	AC	T
1650	21/12/00		Ollanta Humala	... se trasunta el grado de <b>corrupción existente</b> . Todo eso mientras el comandante <b>Ollanta Humala</b> ... purgan prisión justamente por <b>levantarse</b> ...	-	AC	T
1651	28/12/00		Valentín Paniagua	... pasar al retiro a decenas de <b>generales</b> ..., vinculados de algún modo al círculo de <b>Vladimiro Montesinos</b> y su socio Alberto Fujimori.	-	AC	B
1652	11/1/01		Alan García	... vídeo grabado por Alfredo <b>Zanatti</b> en el que ... asegura que las imputaciones que hizo contra <b>García</b> en 1995 eran <b>falsas</b>	-	(-) C	B
1654	25/01/01		Valentín Paniagua	Luego del vómito negro de la <b>corrupción</b> , ... régimen transitorio que <b>Paniagua</b> preside, pero lo que no resulta discutible es su <b>austeridad republicana</b> .	-	AC	T

1655	1/2/01		Valentín Paniagua	... apuntaba hacia... Valentín <b>Paniagua</b> , a quien Pereda acusó de haber recibido <b>dinero</b> ... de uno de los testafierros mayores del <b>ex asesor</b> .	-	C (-) C	T
1656	8/2/01	APRA		... vídeo estrella de la semana: <b>Agustín Mantilla</b> , el jefe de campaña del <b>APRA</b> en las elecciones del 2000, siendo "coimeado" por... <b>Montesinos</b> .	C	-	B
1656	8/2/01		Alan García	... coincidencia hace suponer que el Apra, o por lo menos <b>García</b> , tiene, aunque lo niegue, un <b>acuerdo</b> subterráneo con un sector del <b>fujimorismo</b> .	-	C	T
1660	8/3/01		Valentín Paniagua	La iniciativa ha sido asumida por el canciller Javier <b>Pérez de Cuéllar</b> , suscribirá la <b>Carta Democrática Interamericana</b> .	-	AC	B
1662	22/3/01		Lourdes Flores	... terrible dilema... de <b>Lourdes Flores</b> : ¿hasta qué punto, ...vale la pena recibir el apoyo de la <b>clase política y empresarial corrompida</b> durante el <b>fujimorato</b> ?	-	(-) AC	B
1663	29/3/01		Valentín Paniagua	.. <b>Valentín Paniagua</b> concedió facultades al procurador ad hoc, <b>José Ugaz</b> y a los procuradores adjuntos... para interponer acciones judiciales contra <b>Fujimori</b> .	-	AC	B
1665	11/4/01		Alan García	No cargar la administración pública con una <b>burocracia partidaria</b> ... No detener ni negociar las condiciones de la <b>lucha contra la corrupción</b> .	-	(-) AC	T
1666	19/4/01		Valentín Paniagua	La <b>lucha contra la corrupción</b> que está impulsando el <b>gobierno de transición</b> es integral y la está enfrentando a través de muy diversas y trascendentes acciones.	-	AC	T
1666	19/4/01		Humberto Lay	... Baldo Kresalja (empresario y abogado), <b>Humberto Lay</b> Sun, Alvaro Rey de Castro (psicoanalista), Mónica Sánchez (actriz) y Jorge Santistevan de Noriega (ex Defensor del Pueblo)	-	AC	B
1668	3/5/01		Alan García	...la amenaza del <b>clientelismo</b> , que es de una altísima probabilidad, porque <b>AGP</b> necesita al Partido Aprista para que sea la tropa de su proyecto caudillista.	-	(-) AC	T
1669	10/5/01	APRA		...en los países vecinos (que no usaban <b>MUC</b> ). Esto produjo un negocio adicional a los fabricantes, distribuidores y farmacéuticos <b>allegados al régimen</b> .	C	-	B
1670	17/5/01	APRA	Alan García	...Matanzas en los penales, casos de <b>corrupción</b> durante su gobierno y acogerse a una figura como la <b>prescripción</b> ; escupirá uno. ...	C	(-) AC	B
1670	17/5/01		Ollanta Humala	...tratamiento que se dio a la rebelión del comandante <b>Ollanta Humala</b> , cuyo comportamiento se contrastaba con el de la <b>corrupta cúpula montesinista</b> .	-	AC (-) AC	B
1671	24/5/01		Alan García	<b>Olivera</b> denunció la existencia de una sociedad civil constituida en París por <b>Alan García</b> y su esposa... para realizar la <b>compra</b> de un inmueble...	-	C (-) C	T
1674	14/6/01		Martha Chávez	... indignación de la Dra. <b>Chávez</b> resulta desproporcionada y absurda... se ha pasado casi 9 años defendiendo a capa y espada a varios de los mayores <b>ladrones...</b>	-	(-) AC	T
1675	21/6/01		Valentín Paniagua	La semana pasada trascendió que el Presidente Valentín Paniagua respalda al general Medina, y le dio su aval para que se defienda públicamente.	-	(-) AC (-) C	B
1676	28/6/01		Valentín Paniagua	... primera vez que el Presidente <b>Paniagua</b> se manifiesta de modo tan enérgico sobre la <b>extradición</b> de <b>Fujimori</b> , ...con la presencia de <b>Machiavello</b> en Lima.	-	AC	T

1676	28/6/01		Valentín Paniagua	... se realizó en Lima la Primera Conferencia Nacional <b>Anticorrupción</b> , inaugurada por un memorable discurso del Presidente <b>Valentín Paniagua</b>	-	AC	B
1678	12/7/01		Martha Chávez	... aprobadas antes de la caída del <b>régimen</b> : la de las <b>interceptaciones telefónicas</b> , que bajo la batuta de <b>Martha Chávez de Ocampo</b> no llegó a ninguna parte; ...	-	C	T
1679	19/7/01		Valentín Paniagua	... las trascendentes iniciativas del <b>Gobierno de transición</b> han coincidido con los objetivos del proyecto de <b>Acceso a la Información...</b> del Consejo de la Prensa Peruana	-	AC	B
1680	26/7/01		Valentín Paniagua	... ciclo del <b>gobierno de transición</b> se abre con la promulgación del paquete de leyes que han permitido procesar a los involucrados en la red de <b>Vladimiro Montesinos</b>	-	AC	T
1681	2/8/01	AF		Las acusaciones constitucionales contra... a los 11 congresistas y ex congresistas fujimoristas que se reunieron con Vladimiro Montesinos, entre otras.	C	-	B
1682	9/8/01		Valentín Paniagua	... anticorrupción en la sociedad. Y si se hace siguiendo la línea trazada por la <b>Comisión Nacional Anticorrupción</b> creada por el gobierno de <b>Valentín Paniagua</b> , mejor.	-	AC	B
1683	16/8/01		Alan García	... muchos de los que estaban contra <b>García</b> ... en el aspecto económico, y en acusaciones de <b>corrupción</b> , que no han sido despejadas en su totalidad.	-	C	B
1683	16/8/01		Valentín Paniagua	... contradicciones destaca el Reglamento... de Inteligencia aprobado durante el <b>Gobierno Transitorio...</b> decreto supremo de <b>cuestionable carácter secreto</b> .	-	(-) AC	B
1684	23/8/01		Valentín Paniagua	La <b>autoridad moral</b> de <b>Paniagua</b> fue eficiente para convocar a nuevas y limpias elecciones, enérgica para meter a varios <b>generales en la cárcel</b> , ...	-	AC	B
1684	23/8/01	AF		... inhabilitar de toda función pública a 17 miembros del <b>régimen fujimorista</b> -entre los que destacan las ahora ex congresistas <b>Luz Salgado</b> y <b>Carmen Lozada</b> ...	C	-	T
1686	6/9/01		Alan García	<b>Cecilia Valenzuela</b> hace público el... que tiene "pruebas" de que <b>AGP</b> "negoció" con <b>Montesinos</b> la solución de sus problemas judiciales.	-	C	T
1687	13/9/01		Alan García	<b>Cecilia Valenzuela</b> mostró los documentos en los que <b>Montesinos</b> y Mendel Winter refieren sus contactos con <b>Alan García</b> . Las declaraciones existen...	-	C (-) C	T
1687	13/9/01	APRA		Propuesta por <b>Jorge del Castillo</b> , la ley es extensiva también a quienes participaron en la obtención de pruebas condenatorias sobre actos de <b>corrupción</b> .	AC	-	B
1687	13/9/01		Alan García	Probablemente en eso se basa la periodista para afirmar que ella ha demostrado que hubo un pacto entre <b>García</b> y <b>Montesinos</b> .	-	C	B
1691	11/10/01	APRA		<b>Olivera</b> protagoniza un segundo escándalo. ... Esta vez intentó relacionar al <b>congresista aprista</b> César Zumaeta con el desmentido que <b>Vladimiro Montesinos</b> hiciera esa vez, ante legisladores y periodistas, acerca del supuesto "arreglo"	C (-) C	-	B
1691	11/10/01		Martha Chávez	fue en el <b>SIN</b> donde se redactó el recurso de amparo que presentó <b>Chávez</b> contra el fallo del Tribunal Constitucional... para el caso de <b>Fujimori</b> .	-	C	B
1698	29/11/01		Alan García	En 1991 el " <b>Informe Lark</b> " -que acusaba a <b>Alan García</b> de poseer más de US\$ 50	-	(-) C	B



				millones en bancos del extranjero- se reveló como un <b>fraude...</b>			
1704	17/1/02	FC		Orlando Caminada Dulanto, gerente general de Invermet, sería un eslabón importante de una cadena de <b>corrupción</b> en la <b>Municipalidad de Lima</b> .	(-) AC	-	T
1704	17/1/02	FC		... campaña presidencial de <b>Somos Perú</b> , el partido contrató los servicios pirotécnicos... <b>pago</b> se habría realizado con fondos de la <b>Municipalidad de Lima</b> .	C	-	T
1705	24/1/02	FC		El <b>alcalde</b> reconoce <b>errores</b> acerca de cómo enfrentó políticamente el <b>problema</b> . Asegura tener la <b>consciencia limpia</b> . Está investigando a sus hombres...	(-) AC	-	T
1706	31/1/02	FC		... desde que <b>Barba</b> lo avala en conferencias de prensa y señala con mecha <b>acusadora</b> a miembros del <b>entorno de Andrade</b> , luce una ordenada raya al...	(-) AC	-	B
1709	21/2/02	FC		A <b>Andrade</b> le agobian estas noticias. Confía en que la Justicia aclarará todo y se lamenta por la <b>corrupción</b> que pudiera existir en las instancias...	C	-	T
1715	4/4/02		Valentín Paniagua	US\$ 15 mil supuestamente girado al <b>ex ministro de Defensa</b> , ...Walter Ledesma por parte de Tzvi Sudit, comerciante de armas vinculado a <b>Vladimiro Montesinos</b>	-	(-) AC (-) C	T
1726	20/6/02		Martha Chávez	Denuncia contra <b>Martha Chávez</b> por haber coordinado en el <b>SIN</b> el recurso de amparo en contra del referéndum que impedía la <b>re-reelección</b> .	-	C	B
1734	15/8/02	FC		<b>Andrade</b> ... En la Comisión de Fiscalización del Congreso lo estarían <b>investigando por 62 supuestas irregularidades</b> , muchas de las cuales fueron derivadas a la Contraloría.	C	-	B
1741	3/10/02	APRA		... 30 mil dólares que recibió de <b>Montesinos</b> para la campaña electoral del Apra, sin que su partido lo supiera, según <b>Mantilla</b> ha sostenido con obstinación.	C (-) C	-	T
1745	30/10/02	FC		<b>Andrade</b> también hace frente a las baterías que <b>Rafael Rey</b> descarga en su contra. Su última <b>acusación</b> apunta al Gran Parque de Lima, obra que...	C	-	B
1757	30/1/03	APRA		... que se comprenda en la investigación a <b>Mantilla</b> el periodo de <b>1985 a 1990</b> , y el pleno lo acepta, acataré esa decisión.	C	-	T
1760	20/2/03	APRA		<b>Mantilla</b> ... disciplinado militante, se puede presumir que se <b>corrompió</b> ... guarda dólares y secretos en nombre de un <b>partidario bien mayor</b> .	C	-	T
1768	16/4/03		Martha Chávez	...reuniones de negociación en las que habrían participado <b>Montesinos, Martha Chávez</b> , ... los <b>hermanos Aybar Cancho</b> y una serie de intermediarios y <b>traficantes</b> .	-	C	B
1769	24/4/03	APRA		...compras efectuadas al final del <b>gobierno aprista</b> serían, a juicio de las investigaciones en el Congreso, el origen de las <b>coimas</b> que alimentaron las cuentas de <b>Mantilla</b> .	C	-	T
1769	24/4/03	APRA		La denuncia aprobada unánimemente por la <b>Comisión Mulder</b> el martes 22, acusando a <b>José Ugaz</b> de los delitos de receptación y falsedad genérica...	(-) AC	-	B
1770	30/4/03		Valentín Paniagua	... estuviera preparando una lista bastante representativa -con el ex presidente <b>Valentín Paniagua</b> a la cabeza- de personalidades políticas y culturales en apoyo a	-	AC	B

				<b>Ugaz.</b>			
1770	30/4/03		Lourdes Flores	La reconsideración de Ugaz, pedida además por <b>Lourdes Flores</b> , fue dejada de lado.	-	AC	B
1770	30/4/03	APRA		... horas antes de que la CF rechazara -con votos de PP y el FIM, más la <b>abstención del Apra-</b> el pedido de reconsideración a favor del <b>ex Procurador.</b>	(-) AC	-	B
1771	8/5/03	AF		... a <b>Keiko</b> le conviene responder a las acusaciones que se le achacan. Tres delitos: <b>hurto agravado, peculado y usurpación de funciones.</b>	C	-	B
1772	15/5/03	APRA		... <b>Mantilla</b> asegura que... corresponden a " <b>donaciones</b> " de partidos amigos del aprismo-, el próximo en ser convocado podría ser el ex presidente <b>Alan García.</b>	C (-) C	-	T
1772	15/5/03		Ollanta Humala	La empatía del carismático líder nace el 29 de octubre del 2000, cuando el teniente coronel <b>Ollanta Humala</b> se subleva a la <b>cúpula militar adicta a Montesinos.</b>	-	AC	B
1774	29/5/03	APRA		... interrogatorio a su hermano <b>Miguel Angel (Mufarech)</b> en la Comisión de Fiscalización del Congreso... <b>cuestionado presidente aprista de la Región Lima.</b>	(-) AC	-	B
1778	26/6/03	APRA		En la actualidad, el clan Arana tiene una significativa influencia en la <b>base aprista</b> de Pueblo Libre... núcleo original de las empresas que conforman la <b>Corporación Septentus.</b>	(-) AC	-	T
1779	3/7/03	APRA		<b>Olivera</b> intenta acusar al <b>congresista aprista</b> César Zumaeta de haber ingresado a la Base Naval para entrevistarse con <b>Vladimiro Montesinos.</b>	C (-) C	-	B
1781	17/7/03	APRA		...depósitos de apertura de las cuentas de los hermanos <b>Mantilla</b> (aproximadamente <b>US\$300 mil</b> ) provinieron de los más de US\$10 millones que recibieron los israelitas...	C	-	T
1784	7/8/03	AF		... <b>Fujimori</b> ... nuevo proceso por peculado a raíz de su participación en la irregular entrega de <b>US\$ 15 millones</b> a <b>Vladimiro Montesinos</b> para que el ex asesor fugara...	(-) AC	-	B
1785	14/8/03	AF		... proceso abierto contra <b>Fujimori</b> ... por los delitos de <b>peculado</b> , asociación ilícita para delinquir y contra la fe pública.	(-) AC	-	T
1789	11/9/03	AF		... en 1993 en la cual se observa al <b>ex presidente</b> preparando un <b>sobre con dólares</b> y ordenando su entrega a Vidal Bautista, ex jefe del Pronaa.	(-) AC	-	T
1789	11/9/03	APRA		... documentos bancarios que evidencian presuntos <b>desvíos de dinero</b> del gobierno regional de Ancash hacia cuentas personales de su presidente, <b>Freddy Ghilardi.</b>	C	-	B
1790	18/9/03	APRA		<b>Max Ramírez García</b> , presidente de la región San Martín, fue finalmente <b>expulsado del partido</b> y denunciado por la Comisión de Fiscalización del Congreso... ante el Ministerio Público	AC	-	T
1790	18/9/03	APRA		<b>Freddy Ghilardi</b> , presidente regional de Ancash... espera junto a <b>Miguel Angel Mufarech</b> -Lima Provincias- que el Legislativo se pronuncie...	C	-	T
1790	18/9/03	APRA		encuentre en el gesto algún símil con el momento en el que le tocó romper con su ex colaborador <b>Agustín Mantilla</b> , acusado de recibir dinero de <b>Vladimiro Montesinos.</b>	C	-	B

1791	25/9/03		Alan García	<b>Valenzuela</b> lanzó una "bomba" que ligaba a sus dos bestias negras, <b>Montesinos</b> y <b>García</b> ... el Doc habló con Alan cuando estaba en Panamá.	-	C	B
1793	9/10/03	APRA		... <b>Fredy Ghilardi</b> , el Partido <b>Aprista</b> ha decidido la creación de un <b>Tribunal de Honor</b> que analice cada una de éstas y se pronuncie respecto a cuál pueda ser la mejor sanción aplicable...	AC	-	B
1794	16/10/03	APRA		... la dirigencia del <b>APRA</b> anunció su <b>respaldo</b> al cuestionado presidente de la región Ancash, <b>Fredy Ghilardi</b> . El partido esperará lo que diga el Poder Judicial antes de tomar acciones más drásticas...	(-) AC	-	B
1794	16/10/03	APRA		... denuncias que apuntan al propio presidente regional de Puno, <b>David Jiménez Sardón</b> . Lo acusan de haber recibido una <b>coima</b> de S/. 800 mil soles.	C	-	B
1795	23/10/03		Alan García	... <b>AGP</b> no dijo -y se dice que no dirá- nada respecto a las expresiones de la <b>señora Toledo</b> (las mismas que lo acusaron de haberse <b>enriquecido a su paso por el poder</b> ...	-	C (-) C	T
1795	23/10/03	AF		... declaraciones de <b>José Kamiya Teruya</b> , ex secretario general de la Presidencia, quien explicó al Ministerio Público cómo <b>Fujimori</b> dispuso de al menos <b>US\$ 3.8 millones</b> en donaciones.	(-) AC	-	B
1798	13/11/03	APRA	Alan García	Al mismo tiempo, deslindan fuertemente con cualquier acercamiento a <b>Alan García</b> y al <b>PAP</b> por temas de <b>corrupción</b> y derechos humanos.	C	C	B
1798	13/11/03	FC		( <b>Raúl Diez Canseco</b> ) Acusado de haber beneficiado con <b>exoneraciones tributarias</b> a Germán de la Fuente, <b>padre de su pareja</b> Luciana, mediante un decreto supremo...	C	-	T
1800	27/11/03	FC		La comisión investiga si hubo funcionarios implicados en el presunto delito de <b>tráfico de influencias</b> en la dación del <b>DS 047</b> ...	C (-) C	-	T
1801	4/12/03	AF		Han pasado casi tres años desde que se iniciaron las investigaciones judiciales a la <b>red de corrupción de Vladimiro Montesinos y Alberto Fujimori</b> .	(-) AC	-	T
1809	5/2/04		Valentín Paniagua	El periodista <b>Beto Ortiz</b> arrojó sillao por doquier e incluyó en su larga lista de <b>acusados</b> a... <b>Valentín Paniagua</b> , ex presidente. Todos lo rectificaron.	-	C (-) C	B
1811	19/2/04		Alan García	El italiano <b>Sergio Siragusa</b> , ex asesor comercial del consorcio Tralima que dijo haber pagado " <b>comisiones</b> " a <b>Alan García</b> en 1986, presentó ahora una extraña...	-	C	B
1817	1/4/04	AF		... la estrategia de <b>Fujimori</b> se divide en dos flancos: uno, el partidario, presidido por Carlos Orellana, y otro, el mediático, dirigido por <b>Carlos Raffo</b> .	(-) AC	-	B
1831	8/7/04	APRA		Seis consejeros <b>apristas</b> de la región lo acusaron de malos manejos administrativos en obras viales y de <b>cobros ilegales</b> en las direcciones educativas de la región.	C	-	B
1832	15/7/04	UN		<b>Rafael Rey</b> es un político tolerante con el fujimorismo y la agrupación política que lidera (Renovación Nacional) también presentó <b>firmas falsas</b> al momento de inscribirse.	C	-	B
1834	5/8/04	UN		... la agrupación de <b>Rafael Rey</b> y José Barba Caballero (Renovación-CODE) presentó	C	-	B

				la mayor cantidad de adherentes, 2'255,770, es decir, <b>más del 15 %</b> del universo electoral...			
1838	2/9/04	UN		El congresista <b>Rafael Rey</b> llama delincuente a Toledo por el tema de las <b>firmas</b> , pero exonera del mismo calificativo a <b>Fujimori</b> . Se trata de una campaña...	(-) AC	-	T
1839	9/9/04	APRA		... negociaciones entre sectores <b>apristas y oficialistas</b> ... el <b>partido de Alfonso Ugarte</b> toleraría la baja de los miembros del equipo del procurador ad hoc <b>Luis Vargas Valdivia</b> a fin de mes...	(-) AC	-	B
1840	16/9/04	APRA		... <b>Olivera</b> determinó que las investigaciones contra el <b>APRA</b> ocupaban un lugar más preponderante que el cúmulo de expedientes de <b>Alberto Fujimori y Vladimiro Montesinos</b> .	C	-	B
1841	23/9/04	UN		Por increíble que parezca, el <b>Municipio de Lima</b> simplemente <b>no informa</b> qué empresas ganaron hasta ahora <b>licitaciones</b> y en qué condiciones.	(-) AC	-	T
1843	7/10/04	UN		Asimismo, si se quiere hablar de <b>firmas</b> , se puede investigar también las de la organización de <b>Rafael Rey</b> .	C	-	B
1844	14/10/04	AF		... <b>US\$ 59.4 millones</b> los entregados a <b>Fujimori</b> desde los Ministerios de Defensa, Interior, Institutos Armados y Servicio de Inteligencia "para solventar sus <b>gastos personales</b> ".	(-) AC	-	B
1850	25/11/04		Martha Chávez	... congresista suspendida <b>Martha Chávez</b> y al ex congresista Luis Cáceres Velásquez, acusados por Pinchi de haber recibido <b>dinero ilícito del Doc.</b>	-	C	B
1851	2/12/04		Valentín Paniagua	... <b>Paniagua</b> el favorecer a los notarios durante su administración, presentándose luego un <b>conflicto de intereses</b> al trabajar para ellos una vez que retornó a la práctica privada.	-	C (-) C	T
1852	9/12/04		Alan García	Otros le enrostran que votara por la prescripción del delito de <b>enriquecimiento ilícito</b> del que se acusaba a <b>Alan García</b> .	-	C (-) C	B
1857	20/01/05	UN		... tres partidos (Perú Posible, <b>CODE-Renovación</b> y Perú 2000) tienen denuncias en el Poder Judicial por <b>falsificación de firmas</b> ...	C	-	B
1858	27/01/05		Alan García	... siguieron con las revelaciones del ex <b>patriota</b> (transformado luego por el FIM en un vulgar mercenario) quien supuestamente sabía de un <b>audio Montesinos-García</b> ...	-	C (-) C	B
1858	27/01/05	UN		"...desarticulado a Barba Caballero y a <b>Rey</b> , que estaban en posición ya de querer independizarse. Barba, que estaba yendo para el otro lado, y Rey, nuevamente ya empiezan a <b>entrar acá</b> ."	C	-	T
1859	3/2/05	UN		... acercarlo a <b>Rey</b> era, según fuentes confiables, edificar una " <b>oposición artificial</b> " que disgregaría la opción de voto alejándola del auténtico bloque opositor al <b>fujimorismo</b> .	C	-	T
1859	3/2/05		Martha	Uno de los desencuentros más notorios que salió a la luz pública fue el protagonizado	-	C	B

			Chávez	por <b>Martha Chávez</b> , acusada de recibir <b>US\$ 20 mil de Montesinos...</b>			
1861	17/2/05		Alan García	Otro tema que abordará, se prevé, es el de la <b>corrupción</b> , empezando por las <b>altas esferas actuales</b> . ... no han acatado la decisión de rebajar los <b>sueldos de los congresistas</b> .	-	AC	B
1861	17/2/05		Martha Chávez	Para Chamorro no procede la reincorporación de <b>Chávez</b> porque no ha concluido el <b>proceso judicial</b> , al haber apelado a la sentencia el fiscal supremo.	-	(-) C	T
1864	10/3/05	UN		... habrían existido <b>irregularidades</b> en el primer lote de <b>firmas</b> entregadas por la agrupación <b>Renovación</b> para su inscripción en las elecciones generales del 2006.	C	-	T
1866	23/3/05	APRA		... <b>Apra</b> es ahuyentar los fantasmas de la estatización de la banca, hiperinflación, racionamiento, populismo a ultranza, demagogia y más de un <b>caso de corrupción</b> del primer gobierno aprista.	AC	-	B
1867	31/3/05	UN		... se espera que en el Congreso desfile una serie de nombres vinculados al caso <b>Code-Renovación</b> , entre las que se encuentran...	C	-	B
1867	31/3/05	UN		¿No es lógico deducir que, en esto de las <b>firmas</b> , usted está actuando <b>por encargo</b> de los rezagos del <b>anterior régimen</b> ?	C	-	T
1871	28/4/05	UN		... existen indicios de una <b>masiva falsificación</b> en <b>CODE-Renovación</b> , por lo que solicitará una prórroga de sus atribuciones para seguir con esa investigación.	C	-	B
1872	5/5/05	UN		... “la existencia de una organización criminal” dedicada a la <b>falsificación de firmas</b> en <b>Code-Renovación...</b> La pelota le cae sólo a <b>José Barba Caballero</b> y a su esposa...	C	-	B
1876	2/6/05	AF		Los comandos <b>naranjas</b> lo vitorearon y lo anunciaron: “Se siente, se siente, <b>Fujimori presidente</b> ”. Y la Interpol, mientras tanto, lo tiene con el código rojo...	(-) AC	-	T
1881	7/7/05	AF		<b>Fujimori</b> tendrá cinco minutos en la televisión estatal... al amparo de los derechos electorales otorgados por el JNE y la ONPE a <b>Sí Cumple</b> , el apéndice fujimorista del momento.	(-) AC	-	T
1882	14/7/05	UN		Las <b>afirmaciones de Diez Canseco</b> alcanzan a la bancada de <b>Unidad Nacional...</b>	C	-	B
1882	14/7/05	APRA		... del total de la votación del pleno 18 de los que <b>votaron a favor</b> son del <b>Apra</b> y 13 de Perú Posible.	(-) AC	-	B
1883	21/7/05	FC		... ambas <b>denuncias han demostrado ser insustanciales</b> . En el caso del <b>Manacaru</b> , se comprobó que la medida de exoneración del IGV dictada a favor del “suegro”...	(-) C	-	B
1886	11/8/05		Valentín Paniagua	... necesidad de suscribir una hoja de ruta que garantice la estabilidad constitucional... El primer punto de este acuerdo es la <b>iniciativa nacional anticorrupción</b> .	-	AC	B
1887	18/8/05	APRA	Alan García	... gobierno honrado y de lucha frontal contra la <b>corrupción e impunidad</b> , incluyendo expresamente el caso de <b>Alan García y su gobierno</b> ”, dice una de las cláusulas del documento.	C (-) C	C (-) C	T

1888	25/8/05	UN		... Elva Llanos Seminario al ver su nombre en el acta de Constitución del Comité del <b>Partido Popular Cristiano</b> en Casma. “ <b>No pertenezco a ningún partido político</b> ” insistió.	C	-	T
1888	25/8/05	FC		Elva pasó de la sorpresa a la <b>indignación</b> cuando comprobó que su nombre también aparece como militante de “ <b>Somos Perú</b> ”.	C	-	T
1888	25/8/05	AF		... <b>aparece como afiliado a tres partidos políticos</b> , “Cambio 90”, “Sí Cumple” y “Alianza para el Progreso”... milita en <b>Cambio 90</b> , sin embargo inexplicablemente aparece también como afiliado n° 2 de Sí Cumple.	C	-	T
1890	8/9/05	APRA		... congresistas de prestigio como... <b>Mauricio Mulder</b> asumieron la defensa de lo indefendible y justificaron la actuación del JNE ante las <b>inscripciones fraudulentas</b> ...	(-) AC	-	T
1890	8/9/05	UN		... congresistas de prestigio como <b>Ántero Flores Aráoz</b> ... asumieron la defensa de lo indefendible y justificaron la actuación del JNE ante las <b>inscripciones fraudulentas</b> ...	(-) AC	-	T
1890	8/9/05		Martha Chávez	En 1996 <b>chuponearon</b> y acosaron a Javier Pérez de Cuellar y a otros líderes de la oposición. <b>Martha Chávez</b> encubrió la implacable <b>persecución política</b> .	-	C	B
1890	8/9/05		Ollanta Humala	... la obtención del padrón bien podría servir de material para una <b>falsificación de firmas masiva</b> . Algo que <b>Humala rechazó</b> de plano cuando se le interrogó al respecto.	-	C (-) C	B
1896	20/10/05	UN		El secretario general del <b>PPC</b> , Luis Bedoya de Vivanco, le dio a <b>Barba</b> un ultimátum para aclarar las <b>denuncias</b> .	AC	-	B
1898	3/11/05	AF	Martha Chávez	Reggiardo, <b>Chávez</b> y Delgado Aparicio celebran la posibilidad de configurar una <b>bancada</b> diseñada para <b>limpiar judicialmente a Fujimori</b> , ocupado en azuzar el improbable fantasma del regreso.	C	C	T
1900	17/11/05	AF		Al testimonio de <b>Montesinos</b> se suma el de <b>Matilde Pinchi Pinchi</b> . ... sobre las <b>remesas del SIN a Palacio de Gobierno</b> .	(-) AC	-	T
1902	1/12/05		Ollanta Humala	“El comportamiento de <b>Humala</b> ha sido limpio, en la medida que él ha desenvainado su espada sólo para <b>cortar</b> el nudo de la <b>corrupción</b> y para demostrar que condena...	-	AC (-) AC	T
1902	1/12/05	APRA		... “a los <b>corruptos</b> que han desprestigiado al partido y han lucrado del poder, que <b>no pasarán</b> en sus intenciones de candidatear en las filas <b>apristas</b> ”.	AC	-	B
1902	1/12/05	FC		“Los <b>informes</b> deben ser conocidos <b>antes de la primera vuelta</b> ”, coincide Víctor Andrés García Belaunde, presidente de <b>Acción Popular</b> .	AC	-	B
1902	1/12/05	RN		... Humberto Lay Sun, lanzado por <b>Restauración Nacional</b> . En sus filas hay ex miembros de <b>Cambio 90, Nueva Mayoría y Vamos Vecino</b> .	(-) AC	-	B
1903	9/12/05	AF		<b>Carlos Raffo Arce</b> - Jefe de prensa de “Sí Cumple” y <b>vocero de Fujimori</b> .	(-) AC	-	B
1903	9/12/05	APRA		Jorge del Castillo del <b>PAP</b> ... cambios específicos en la forma de designar al Contralor de la República y de los procuradores, para “despolitizar la <b>lucha contra la</b>	AC	-	B

				<b>corrupción”.</b>			
1903	9/12/05	RN		“Se abstuvo en la votación sobre el pago inmoral de desinstalación”, citó como ejemplo. Alejos, en cambio, afirma que lo sacaron porque denunció la infiltración de fujimoristas en RN.	AC (-) AC	-	B
1904	15/12/05		Ollanta Humala	<b>Humala</b> se levantó supuestamente <b>contra Fujimori</b> , pero no pone reparos en <b>negociar con sus acólitos</b> . Y contrata los servicios de uno de ellos para asesorarse legalmente.	-	AC (-) AC	T
1904	15/12/05	UPP		Lo acusó de <b>tráfico de influencias</b> y haber sustraído documentos con el fin de beneficiar a personajes de la red de <b>Vladimiro Montesinos</b> .	C	-	B
1904	15/12/05		Martha Chávez	Al ser <b>absuelta</b> ... estaría habilitada no solamente para reintegrarse al Congreso, sino también para postular en las elecciones del 2006.	-	(-) C	B
1905	22/12/05	UPP		... <b>Torres Caro</b> lo acusaron de ser hombre de la ex fiscal de la Nación <b>Blanca Nélide Colán</b> , que hoy purga condena debido a ser fiel ficha de <b>Vladimiro Montesinos</b> .	C	-	B
1905	22/12/05	APRA		... involucraron a <b>funcionarios públicos y representantes del Estado</b> que infringieron los reglamentos electorales “para <b>favorecer apetitos personales</b> ”.	AC / C	-	B
1906	29-12-05	APRA		La Contraloría y la ONPE investigan las <b>denuncias</b> de uso de <b>fondos públicos</b> en las elecciones internas <b>apristas</b> .	C	-	B
1907	12/1/06		Ollanta Humala	... levantamiento de Locumba en el 2000 y los “posibles nexos fujimontesinistas” de Ollanta Humala son...	-	(-) AC	T
1907	12/1/06	APRA		... <b>se quedaban con</b> el 10% de acciones de todas las empresas que se fundaban. – Quién puede avalar esa <b>infamia</b> , qué fortuna si hasta me quitaron el trabajo, mis acciones...	(-) C	-	B
1907	12/1/06		Lourdes Flores	... garantizar la aplicación de la ley para garantizar seguridad ciudadana y luchar sostenidamente <b>contra la corrupción</b> . La sensación de impotencia es la que exacerba la violencia...	-	AC	B
1907	12/1/06		Valentín Paniagua	... es preciso concertar esa acción en áreas fundamentales tales como... la reforma de la estructura del Estado, la <b>lucha contra la corrupción</b> y contra el terrorismo y el narcotráfico...	-	AC	B
1907	12/1/06	APRA		... sostiene irresponsablemente que “sin <b>Fujimori</b> las elecciones son un fraude”. En las filas del <b>Apra</b> hay creciente indignación.	(-) AC	-	B
1907	12/1/06	APRA		En Cañete denunciaron <b>votación fraudulenta</b> a favor de Fidel Chumpitaz... En Sayán no hubo elecciones pero <b>pasaron actas</b> con 548 votos a favor de Edmundo Guardia.	(-) AC	-	B
1908	19/1/06	UN		... 296 regidores se habrían aumentado en un año las <b>dietas indebidamente</b> en todo Lima... como <b>Marco Parra</b> , próximo candidato al Congreso por <b>Unidad Nacional</b> .	C	-	B
1908	19/1/06	UPP		... <b>Torres</b> era Fiscal presionó por órdenes de <b>Vladimiro Montesinos</b> para que el ex congresista del Frepap Javier Noriega se pasara al <b>oficialismo</b> .	C	-	B

1909	26/1/06	UPP	Ollanta Humala	... más de una mancha presentan los aspirantes a una curul por el <b>Partido Nacionalista</b> . Muchos de ellos enfrentan cargos por <b>lavado de dinero, estafa, agresión, apropiación ilícita...</b>	C	AC	T
1909	26/1/06	UPP		<b>Carlos Torres Caro...</b> ha <b>negado</b> las versiones periodísticas que lo sindicaban como el fiscal ad hoc nombrado por Blanca Nélida Colán para <b>limpiar el caso de falsificación</b> de firmas conocido como “el huanucazo”.	(-) C	-	B
1909	26/1/06		Alan García	... advirtió que no dará paso a los “ <b>malos apristas</b> ” que solo piensan en llegar al Congreso para satisfacer sus <b>intereses personales</b> .	-	AC	B
1909	26/1/06		Martha Chávez	“Con <b>Martha Chávez</b> presidente, <b>Fujimori</b> estará presente”.	-	C	B
1910	2/2/06	UPP	Ollanta Humala	Fue un duro golpe para <b>Ollanta</b> , sin duda, pero su reacción fue la más acertada. “No sólo hemos <b>sacado</b> a las personas que tienen <b>investigaciones en la Fiscalía</b> , sino también...”	C	AC	T
1910	2/2/06		Ollanta Humala	Sus nexos con elementos montesinistas tampoco han sido aclarados. ... fue acusado por dos de sus subalternos de haberse <b>apropiado</b> de <b>US\$ 2,800 dólares</b> de una terrorista.	-	C	B
1910	2/2/06	FC		El congresista <b>acciopopulista Jhony Lescano</b> presentó un proyecto de ley para levantar el <b>secreto bancario</b> de todos los <b>candidatos</b> a cargos de elección popular...	AC	-	B
1910	2/2/06	UPP		... denuncias y acusaciones periodísticas. –Todo empezó cuando alguien me acusó de <b>manipular el caso de Genaro Delgado Parker</b> , el ‘ <b>Huanucazo</b> ’ y el del congresista Noriega Febres.	C (-) C	-	B
1911	9/2/06		Ollanta Humala	... tienen una conexión con <b>Ollanta</b> : el Huallaga. El teniente coronel EP (r) <b>Carlos Enrique Rodríguez Cateriano</b> estuvo preso nada menos que por <b>narcotráfico...</b>	-	(-) AC	T
1911	9/2/06	UN		... congresista <b>Antero Flores Aráoz</b> , quien ha anunciado que impulsará un <b>recorte de las atribuciones del TC</b> . En medio de la polémica...	(-) AC	-	T
1911	9/2/06	UN		... ‘La Ventana Indiscreta’ ha publicado el domingo pasado (5/2/2006) una relación de los ‘ <b>anticuchos</b> ’ de la <b>lista congresal de Unidad Nacional</b> .	C	-	B
1911	9/2/06		Ollanta Humala	<b>Humala</b> había designado, entretanto, una <b>comisión revisora...</b> Sin embargo, no se le ocurrió mejor idea que nombrar a <b>José Vega Antonio</b> como presidente de esa comisión.	-	AC (-) AC	B
1911	9/2/06	UN	Lourdes Flores	... <b>suspendió su gira</b> por el sur de la República a fin de <b>esclarecer</b> la condición de algunos de sus candidatos, también acusados de <b>afrontar investigaciones</b> y procesos en el Poder Judicial.	C	AC	B
1911	9/2/06	UN	Lourdes Flores	... cuestionada desde algunos medios por la presencia de personajes como <b>Horacio Cánepa</b> , involucrado en el llamado “ <b>Huanucazo</b> ”. “Ni nací ayer ni me formaron como	C	AC	B



				delincuente”.			
1911	9/2/06	UN		El congresista <b>Rafael Aíta</b> (UN) ha propuesto una ley para <b>limitar la inmunidad</b> de los legisladores.	AC	-	B
1912	16/2/06	AF		–Hay una campaña de <b>persecución política</b> . Muchas de las personas que están en la lista y otros que están en la cárcel son personas que se han dedicado íntegramente a sacar al país de la quiebra.	(-) C	-	T
1913	23/2/06	AF		<b>Dellepiane</b> no se cansa de alegar su <b>inocencia</b> y esgrimir, entre otras cosas, que en el video 888 <b>Vladimiro Montesinos</b> lo declara un obstáculo.	C (-) C	-	B
1914	2/3/06		Ollanta Humala	<b>Humala</b> repitió el patrón de sus discursos: La <b>coima</b> es la mayor institución peruana, la <b>clase política tradicional</b> tiene sus días contados...	-	AC	B
1915	9/3/06	AF		... “ <b>El Chino va a volver</b> ”, le canta al ex presidente... <b>Alianza por el Futuro</b> en una discoteca de Los Olivos fue una fiesta electoral. Durante el mismo concierto del dúo <b>Raffo-Keiko</b> ...	C	-	B
1915	9/3/06		Ollanta Humala	... conclusiones del informe sobre el insólito <b>robo</b> de tres documentos del legajo militar de <b>Ollanta Humala</b> ... Partido Nacionalista, sus <b>contactos militares</b> parecen llegar al más alto nivel.	-	C	T
1915	9/3/06	UN		... acusado de recibir <b>dinero</b> del <b>Doc</b> para pasarse a las filas del fujimorismo en el 2000, su inclusión en la lista de <b>Unidad Nacional</b> fue defendida a capa y espada.	C	-	B
1916	16/3/06		Martha Chávez	... <b>Martha Chávez</b> y la soltó en medio del baile que se había apoderado de la discoteca... mientras intentaba articular pasitos de baile al “ <b>Ritmo del Chino</b> ”.	-	(-) AC	B
1917	23/3/06		Ollanta Humala	El mismo que el 13 de febrero instó a su audiencia en un mitin a “ <b>denunciar</b> a todos estos alcaldes <b>corruptos</b> para que salgan a lomo de burro”.	-	AC	B
1917	23/3/06		Ollanta Humala	El 29 de octubre del 2000 a la una de la madrugada <b>Vladimiro Montesinos</b> huía a Panamá en el velero <b>Karisma</b> . A la misma hora los <b>Humala</b> se sublevaban.	-	(-) AC	B
1917	23/3/06		Ollanta Humala	... lanzó atarantadamente la especie de un <b>audio Humala-Montesinos</b> . Según la información recabada por CARETAS, <b>Popy</b> sabría de la supuesta cinta desde el año 2004.	-	(-) AC	B
1917	23/3/06	UN		... <b>Unidad Nacional</b> por Lima con el número 33 es <b>Carmen Rosa Chávarry Chimoy</b> . ... anuncia en un <b>evento proselitista</b> el sorteo de una <b>mototaxi</b> ... y varios artefactos electrodomésticos.	(-) AC	-	B
1918	30/3/06		Ollanta Humala	... el cambio de Arequipa a la base de <b>Locumba</b> se debió a un pedido expreso de Cano Angulo, otras versiones señalan que <b>Vladimiro Montesinos</b> hizo la <b>recomendación</b> .	-	(-) AC	B
1918	30/3/06		Ollanta Humala	... Antauro Humala sobre una supuesta <b>confiscación de medios de comunicación</b> en un posible gobierno de su hermano...	-	(-) AC (-) C	B

1918	30/3/06	AF		... algunos, como <b>Alianza por el Futuro</b> de Martha Chávez, prefirieron evitarse la molestia y <b>no rindieron cuentas</b> de nada.	(-) AC	-	B
1919	7/4/06	UPP		.. inicialmente creyó en el proyecto de <b>Ollanta Humala</b> y se desengañó de la peor manera: Con los contactos afines a <b>Vladimiro Montesinos</b> enraizados en su comando de campaña.	(-) AC	-	T
1919	7/4/06		Valentín Paniagua	Ejemplares la firmeza con la que se <b>enfrentó</b> a los secuaces de <b>Vladimiro Montesinos</b> , el orden con el que llevó al país de retorno por la democracia y la sobriedad que demostró...	-	AC	B
1919	7/4/06		Martha Chávez	“El objetivo es fortalecer la agrupación ( <b>Alianza por el Futuro</b> ) en el Congreso, pero no seré <b>títere</b> ni clon del presidente <b>Alberto Fujimori</b> ”.	-	(-) C	B

APPENDIX 2  
 Dictionary of Corruption and Anticorruption-related Terms  
 and Generated Observations

Corruption-related terms							
compra	colusión	ilicito	impunidad	tarjetazo	asalto	inhabilitar	soborno
captura	extorsión	denuncia	nepotismo	compadrazgo	fraude	lobby	presión
mafia	influencia	Fujimori	década 90	cáncer	traición	patronaje	irregular
cohecho	abuso	Montesinos	decadencia	robo	delinquir/delito	clientelismo	proselitismo
coima	conflicto de intereses	fujimontesinismo	copamiento	enriquecimiento	contrataciones/empleados fantasmas	indebido	
Anticorruption-related terms							
transparencia	idóneo	veeduría	declaración jurada	contraloría	X		
honestidad	rendición de cuentas	vigilancia ciudadana	auditoria	fiscalizar			
ética	Participación ciudadana	lucha	acceso a la información	independencia			
moral	control	cruzada	erario/tesoro	autonomía			

<b>C/AC:</b> Intention of the usage - <b>Corruption</b> (1) or <i>Anti-corruption</i> (2)
<b>Implicit/explicit:</b> Implicit (1; the construct is assumed from the reference to AC), Explicit (2; the construct is mentioned in any variant)
<b>Length:</b> Structural independence - Word(s) (1; construct with or w/o attached adjective and standing with other concepts), Sentence (2; statement about the construct, standing alone or repeated), Paragraph (3; two or more sentences), Sub-chapter (4), Chapter (5)

Party	C / AC	Implicit / explicit	Length	Keywords-in-context	Page	DxE
UPP	1	2	2	... una patria envilecida donde la <b>corrupción</b> ha carcomido la vida publica...	3	4
UPP	1	2	2	... videos que mostraron la <b>compra de conciencias</b> de los propietarios de algunos...	6	4
UPP	1	2	2	Queremos desterrar la <b>corrupción</b> que cobijo el neoliberalismo fujimontesinista...	10	4
UPP	2	2	2	... Estado social y democrático capaz de enfrentar la <b>corrupción</b> , ...	11	4
UPP	2	1	2	Promoveremos la <i>transparencia</i> y efectividad en las compras estatales...	32	2
UPP	2	2	3	... lo que se conoce como " <b>la captura del regulador</b> ". Esto significa declinar ante...	38	6
UPP	2	1	2	... esta materia estarán orientadas a <i>despartidizar e independizar</i> dichos organismos.	39	2
UPP	2	1	1	... valores como el compromiso con el servicio publico y la <i>honestidad en la función</i> .	39	1
UPP	2	1	1	... y, lo mas importante, que sea <i>ética y moralmente idóneo</i> .	42	1
UPP	2	2	2	... investigación parlamentaria que ha sido denunciados por indicios de <b>corrupción</b> .	43	4
UPP	2	1	1	Evaluación de la <i>idoneidad</i> y calidad de la fiscalización efectuada a las empresas...	46	1
UPP	2	1	2	<i>Rendición de cuentas</i> de los congresistas por necesidades del servicio...	52	2
UPP	2	1	1	... predecible, efectivo, <i>autónomo e independiente</i> en sus decisiones en todos...	53	1
UPP	1	2	2	... cuando debieron enfrentar a la justicia por sus vinculaciones con <b>redes mafiosas</b> .	53	4
UPP	2	2	2	Priorizaremos la lucha contra la <b>corrupción</b> en que el magistrado que infrinja...	53	4
UPP	2	1	1	... experiencia de los postulantes; la moral, <i>honestidad y ética</i> profesionales.	54	1
UPP	2	2	1	... étlico causantes de muerte, <b>cohecho</b> y <b>corrupción</b> de funcionarios. Asimismo...	54	2
UPP	2	1	2	... <i>rendición de cuentas</i> , afirmación de la <i>transparencia</i> publica y desarrollo de medios de participación ciudadana en el <i>control</i> .	54	2
UPP	2	2	2	<b>Corrupción</b> cero, eliminación de <b>coimas, tarjetazos y compadrazgos</b> .	54	4
UPP	2	1	2	Habrá <i>rendición de cuenta</i> obligatoria en todos los niveles de gobierno...	56	2
UPP	2	1	2	Establecimiento de Sistemas de <i>Participación y Control Ciudadano</i> a nivel de provincias y distritos.	56	2
UPP	2	1	2	Establecimiento de <i>veedurías ciudadanas</i> en lo administrativo como órgano de...	56	2
UPP	2	2	4	Cruzada nacional contra la <b>corrupción</b> .	57	8
UPP	2	2	2	... patriótico de combatir la <b>corrupción</b> que deteriora la sociedad peruana, ...	57	4

UPP	2	2	1	... cruzada nacional para sancionar a las <b>mafias</b> y luchar contra el narcotráfico, ...	57	2
UPP	2	2	3	Combatiremos contra el <b>cáncer de la corrupción</b> que ataca a nuestra sociedad.	57	6
UPP	1	2	2	... "que esta bien que los funcionarios <b>roben</b> , lo importante es que las obras se vean".	57	4
UPP	2	2	3	... creando una cultura de lucha contra la <b>corrupción</b> , para sensibilizar a todos...	57	6
UPP	2	2	2	La lucha <b>anticorrupción</b> será una política de Estado permanente y de largo plazo...	57	4
UPP	2	2	2	La cultura contra la <b>corrupción</b> será formativa y encargada...	57	4
UPP	2	1	2	... iniciativas legislativas tendientes a perfeccionar la <i>transparencia</i> de las compras...	57	2
UPP	2	2	2	Instalaremos la Comisión Nacional <b>Anticorrupción</b> , independiente, autónoma, ...	57	4
UPP	2	2	2	... para los casos de extradición, <b>enriquecimiento ilícito</b> , concusión y <b>cohecho</b> .	57	4
UPP	2	1	2	... redes de <i>vigilancia ciudadana</i> , comités cívicos distritales... de <i>transparencia</i> .	57	2
UPP	2	2	2	... valores en la lucha <b>anticorrupción</b> , premiaremos el valor civil para evitar y <i>denunciar</i> ...	57	4
UPP	2	2	2	... aliados estratégicos de la lucha contra la <b>corrupción</b> y una herramienta...	58	4
UPP	2	2	3	La lucha contra la <b>corrupción</b> será preventiva y la ley será aplicada con rigor...	58	6
UPP	2	2	2	... buenas practicas y crear nuevos modelos de normas <b>anticorrupción</b> .	58	4
UPP	2	2	2	... liderazgo <i>moral, ético</i> , ... participación de todos en la lucha contra la <b>corrupción</b> .	58	4
UPP	2	2	1	... en casi todos los casos son medios de sobreexplotación y <b>corrupción</b> .	65	2
UPP	1	2	1	... Hay <b>corrupción</b> .	66	2
UPP	2	2	2	... Declarando una lucha frontal contra la <b>corrupción</b> .	71	4
UPP	2	2	1	... mediante la profundización de los criterios de lucha contra la <b>corrupción</b> , ...	78	2
<b>Total</b>						141
APRA	2	2	1	Cruzada contra la <b>corrupción</b> y el trafico de drogas ilícitas en todos los ámbitos...	11	2
APRA	2	2	2	... Estado y la sociedad civil en la lucha contra la <b>corrupción</b> .	16	4
APRA	2	2	2	... penalicen cualquier acto de <b>corrupción</b> en el gobierno y fuera de el.	41	4
APRA	2	2	2	Luchar implacablemente contra la <b>corrupción</b> en las diferentes instituciones...	42	4
APRA	2	2	4	Lucha contra la <b>corrupción</b> .	43	8
APRA	2	2	2	... verdadera cruzada contra la <b>corrupción</b> en cuyo contexto se enfatizaría...	43	4

APRA	2	2	2	... impunidad, el <b>abuso</b> del poder, la <b>corrupción</b> y el atropello de los derechos.	43	4
APRA	2	2	2	... ley, de solidaridad y de <b>anticorrupción</b> , que elimine las practicas violatorias...	43	4
APRA	2	2	2	... independencia de la Procuraduría en la investigación de denuncias de <b>corrupción</b> .	43	4
APRA	2	2	2	... sentencias a los acusados por <b>corrupción</b> y evitar que estos sigan siendo...	43	4
APRA	2	1	2	Promover la designación <i>transparente</i> de las autoridades judiciales, así...	15	2
APRA	2	1	2	Ejecutar medidas de <i>moralización, transparencia y acceso a la información</i> de la...	21	2
APRA	2	1	1	... seguridad alimentaria y nutricional con un enfoque participativo y <i>transparente</i> .	24	1
APRA	2	1	1	... mecanismo modernos... que busquen la eficiencia y <i>transparencia</i> en el manejo...	28	1
APRA	2	1	1	... en el contexto de las recomendaciones de la CERIAJUS respetando su <i>autonomía</i> .	13	1
APRA	2	1	1	... renegociar aquellos que por falta de equidad y <i>transparencia</i> , afecten los intereses...	32	1
APRA	2	1	1	Velar por el desempeño responsable y <i>transparente</i> de la función pública.	43	1
APRA	2	1	4	Política de <i>transparencia</i> y libertad de expresión.	43	4
APRA	2	1	2	... de los <i>ciudadanos a solicitar y recibir información</i> , ... y la <i>transparencia</i> y difusión...	43	2
APRA	2	1	2	... una cultura de <i>transparencia</i> , de <i>rendición de cuentas</i> y de difusión de los actos de...	44	2
APRA	2	1	2	Establecerá un sistema <i>transparente y justo</i> de asignación de la publicidad estatal.	44	2
APRA	2	1	2	... en la especialidad de “PROMOTORES DE <i>ETICA PUBLICA</i> ” y promover la formación...	43	2
APRA	2	1	2	Promover la <i>vigilancia ciudadana</i> de la gestión pública y el fortalecimiento...	43	2
APRA	2	1	2	... facilitar el libre, oportuno y completo <i>acceso a la información</i> estatal.	44	2
APRA	2	1	2	... el <i>acceso a la información</i> del Estado y la <i>publicidad de los actos de la administración</i> ...	44	2
APRA	2	2	2	Regular la función pública para evitar su <i>ejercicio en función de intereses particulares</i> .	43	4
APRA	2	1	2	... contratado previo <i>concurso público y sus resultados publicados</i> en los portales...	14	2
APRA	2	1	2	... <i>Contralor</i> General de la República sea nombrado por el Congreso Nacional a...	43	2
APRA	2	1	2	... <i>Contraloría</i> General de la República tenga plena <i>autonomía</i> respecto a los poderes...	43	2
APRA	2	2	2	Erradicar la <i>utilización proselitista</i> del aparato estatal y la formación de <b>clientelas</b> .	14	4
<b>Total</b>						83
UN	2	2	1	... en general, un país donde no exista <b>corrupción</b> de ninguna índole.	5	2

UN	2	2	1	... moral para los cargos de Contralor, Procurador <b>Anticorrupción</b> , Defensor del...	31	2
UN	1	2	2	... existe ineficiencia y <b>corrupción</b> , y de que la justicia sirve intereses...	36	4
UN	2	2	4	<b>Política anticorrupción.</b>	42	8
UN	1	2	3	... Cualquier clase de <b>corrupción</b> es mala y atenta contra el desarrollo...	42	6
UN	1	2	3	... confluyen para favorecer la <b>corrupción</b> de todo tipo...	42	6
UN	1	2	3	... que las entidades más <b>corruptas</b> sean las que se conducen sin liderazgo...	42	6
UN	1	2	3	... protagonistas de la <b>corrupción</b> grande y pequeña se sienten a salvo...	42	6
UN	2	2	3	... firme compromiso político del más alto nivel de no tolerar la <b>corrupción</b> . ...	42	6
UN	2	2	2	... institucionales para luchar contra la <b>corrupción</b> . Se tratará de una...	43	4
UN	2	2	2	... plan anual de lucha contra la <b>corrupción</b> para ser desarrollado en todas las...	43	4
UN	2	2	2	... procedimientos y trabas burocráticas... que puedan propiciar actos de <b>corrupción</b> .	43	4
UN	2	2	2	planteará iniciativas legislativas en materia de lucha contra la <b>corrupción</b> .	44	4
UN	2	2	2	... ciudadanos sobre presuntos actos de corrupción o contravención...	44	4
UN	2	2	2	... Especial, conocida como justicia <b>anticorrupción</b> , mejorando sus recursos...	44	4
UN	2	2	2	... ente coordinador del sistema <b>anticorrupción</b> , en el que participen representantes...	44	4
UN	2	2	2	... internacionales relativos a la lucha contra la <b>corrupción</b> , priorizando...	44	4
UN	2	2	2	... internacionales de lucha contra la <b>corrupción</b> , tales como la Convención...	44	4
UN	2	2	2	... dirigidas a revertir la altísima tolerancia de los peruanos frente a la <b>corrupción</b> ...	45	4
UN	1	2	1	... como por algunos actos de <b>corrupción</b> en que incurrieron ciertos altos...	48	2
UN	1	2	1	Escasez de efectivos y recursos, deficiente distribución, alta percepción de <b>corrupción</b> .	50	2
UN	2	2	1	... cada localidad. b) Lucha contra la <b>corrupción</b> . C) Bienestar y dignificación...	50	2
UN	2	2	1	... en vincularla con: a) La lucha contra la <b>corrupción</b> ; b) El cuidado...	56	2
UN	2	2	1	... aspectos de lucha contra la <b>corrupción</b> hasta la dotación de los equipos...	56	2
UN	2	2	1	... agendas comunes en cuanto a lucha contra la <b>corrupción</b> ; lucha contra la pobreza...	57	2
UN	1	2	1	... privatización de la violencia (narcotráfico, terrorismo, <b>corrupción</b> , trata de...	61	2
UN	2	1	1	... técnico supervisor para asegurar la <i>transparencia</i> y calidad de los programas.	12	1

UN	2	1	1	... ejercerá un rol subsidiario y promoverá Asociaciones Público Privadas <i>transparentes</i> ...	30	1
UN	2	1	1	... asegurar la completa <i>transparencia</i> y el buen funcionamiento de las reglas de...	31	1
UN	2	1	2	... la promoción de la <i>ética</i> y la <i>transparencia</i> en espacios públicos y privados.	45	2
UN	2	1	2	... asegurar la <i>transparencia</i> en el otorgamiento de concesiones, dar la máxima difusión...	100	2
UN	1	2	3	... intervenido durante el <i>régimen fujimorista</i> , etapa en la cual se produjo un <b>copamiento</b> ...	36	6
UN	2	1	2	... como privadas, en materia de promoción de la <i>ética pública</i> .	44	2
UN	2	1	1	... enfatizar la eficiencia en el uso de los recursos y el <i>control</i> de los mismos.	9	1
UN	2	1	3	... de resultados, fiscalización y <i>control de gestión</i> ... adecuada <i>rendición de cuentas</i> .	31	3
UN	2	1	2	... mucho más costoso ceder a <i>presiones de privados</i> e incurrir en <i>irregularidades</i> .	43	2
<b>Total</b>						121
AF						0
FC	1	2	1	Sistema educativo centralizado, desfinanciado y con altos índices de <b>corrupción</b> .	8	2
FC	2	2	2	... sancionar drásticamente los actos de <b>corrupción</b> , fomentando el ejercicio <i>ético</i> ...	9	4
FC	2	2	2	Lograr un sistema <b>anticorrupción</b> activo, eficaz y <i>transparente</i> .	16	4
FC	2	2	2	Combatir la <b>corrupción</b> existente en muchos programas sociales.	17	4
FC	2	2	2	Lucha contra la <b>corrupción</b> .	44	4
FC	2	2	4	Lucha contra la <b>Corrupción</b> .	44	8
FC	2	2	2	... nuevo diagnóstico que describa el estado de <b>corrupción</b> en el Perú.	44	4
FC	2	2	2	Pacto político <b>anticorrupción</b> que defina un Plan o Programa Nacional de Lucha...	45	4
FC	2	2	2	Fortalecer el Sistema <b>Anticorrupción</b> de acuerdo a los objetivos definidos en el Plan.	45	4
FC	2	2	2	Impulsar el desarrollo normativo <b>anticorrupción</b> que permita contrarrestar...	45	4
FC	2	2	2	... de Inteligencia Financiera y a las <i>procuradurías, fiscalías</i> y juzgados <b>anticorrupción</b> .	45	4
FC	2	2	2	Modificar la ley y reglamento de la Comisión Nacional <b>Anticorrupción</b> .	45	4
FC	2	1	2	Mejorar los indicadores de <i>transparencia</i> en la administración pública.	40	2
FC	2	1	2	... accedan libremente a los <i>portales de transparencia</i> y otros medios de difusión...	43	2
FC	2	1	2	... sanciones a quienes no cumplan con la <i>ley de transparencia</i> , así como...	43	2



FC	2	1	1	Asegurar la responsabilidad y <i>transparencia</i> en la gestión de la administración...	44	1
FC	2	1	1	... del Ministerio de Defensa, <i>transparentando</i> el gasto sin que esto permita develar...	46	1
FC	2	1	1	... administrativos del Ministerio del Interior, <i>transparentando</i> el gasto.	46	1
FC	2	1	2	... recursos, así como de <i>rendición de cuentas</i> por parte de los actores educacionales...	9	2
FC	2	1	2	... permanente política de <i>vigilancia social</i> y <i>rendición de cuentas</i> , tanto en la gestión...	9	2
FC	2	1	2	Garantizar el <i>acceso a la información</i> y promover la <i>rendición de cuentas</i> en...	42	2
FC	2	1	2	... <i>participación</i> ciudadana y de la sociedad civil organizada en la planificación, ejecución y <i>control</i> ...	40	2
FC	2	1	2	... mecanismos de <i>participación de los ciudadanos en el control</i> de los actos del gobierno.	41	2
FC	1	1	1	... público que no responde a las exigencias de descentralización y de <i>control</i> .	23	1
FC	1	1	1	...integrar al ciudadano en la toma de decisiones y en el <i>control</i> de la gestión pública.	43	1
FC	2	1	2	... por parte del sistema nacional de <i>control</i> , y su <i>independencia</i> del poder político.	44	2
FC	2	1	2	Implantar mecanismos de <i>vigilancia ciudadana</i> .	41	2
FC	2	1	2	... Presidente de la Corte Suprema y el Contralor, sea elegidos por el Congreso.	41	2
FC	2	1	2	Fortalecer la <i>autonomía e independencia</i> de las organizaciones estatales de defensa...	28	2
FC	2	1	2	... ente <i>autónomo</i> que ejerza la función de <i>control</i> y aplicación de sanciones.	41	2
<b>Total</b>						81
RN	2	2	2	... consideramos que la lucha contra la <b>corrupción</b> es el compromiso impostergable...	3	4
RN	2	2	3	... presente es vencer la <b>corrupción</b> . Este será un esfuerzo que partiendo...	3	6
RN	2	2	2	... lucha contra la <b>corrupción</b> apoyada en una adecuada, clara y radical...	3	4
RN	2	2	2	... por "la cultura política de la <b>corrupción</b> ", buscamos ser un motor poderoso para...	4	4
RN	1	2	2	... terrible cáncer de la <b>corrupción</b> con sus secuelas de empobrecimiento... <i>moral</i> ...	6	4
RN	1	2	1	... crisis de valores, una <b>corrupción</b> generalizada, inequidad y estructuras...	8	2
RN	2	2	3	... salir adelante si continua la <b>corrupción</b> , porque sobre ella no se puede...	8	6
RN	2	2	3	... este facilitando la <b>corrupción</b> . Si solo se eliminara la <b>corrupción</b> en la administración...	8	6
RN	2	2	2	Legislación adecuada, clara y radical contra toda forma de <b>corrupción</b> .	8	4
RN	2	2	2	Detectar y eliminar la <b>corrupción</b> aplicando drásticas medidas para combatirla...	11	4

RN	2	2	1	... permitan combatir la <b>corrupción</b> , así como el establecimiento de...	17	2
RN	2	2	4	<b>Anticorrupción</b>	24	8
RN	2	2	3	Detectar y eliminar la <b>corrupción</b> en todas sus manifestaciones. Fomentaremos...	24	6
RN	2	2	1	... la delincuencia, la <b>corrupción</b> organizada, el tráfico ilícito de drogas...	25	2
RN	2	2	2	... que permitan combatir la <b>corrupción</b> . Asimismo como el establecimiento...	25	4
RN	2	2	2	... esfuerzo frontal contra la <b>corrupción</b> , cultivando valores <i>éticos</i> y cívicos, ...	33	4
RN	2	1	2	... Ministerio público, con absoluta <i>independencia, autonomía, ética y transparencia</i> .	17	2
RN	2	1	2	... solida de valores, con principios <i>éticos</i> y procedimientos <i>transparentes</i> .	25	2
RN	2	1	2	... surgimiento de una clase política impregnada de altos valores <i>éticos y morales</i> .	25	2
RN	2	1	2	... FFAA y PNP a fin de eliminar cualquier posible <i>irregularidad</i> en estos procesos.	30	2
RN	2	1	1	... la nación; con capacidad, <i>honestidad</i> , responsabilidad y eficiencia para gobernar.	12	1
RN	2	1	2	procurando nombrar funcionarios <i>honestos y probos</i> conscientes de su...	24	2
RN	2	1	2	... sistemáticamente los procedimientos de <i>control</i> en todos los niveles de la...	24	2
<b>Total</b>						<b>83</b>

APPENDIX 3  
Variables, Indicators, Categories and Codes Regarding HCT

Determinant	Code	Indicator's survey question	Categories	Relation to HCT
<b>Media exposure</b>	pervb8c	Did you receive or have knowledge of material about the candidates or political parties, their CV and/or their party platforms?	(1) Yes (2) No	+
	pervb8d	Did you watch any of the shows of "La mitad más uno" in Channel 7, on which the presidential candidates presented their party platforms?	(1) Yes (2) No	+
	a1	How frequently do you listen to the news on the radio?	(1) Everyday ~ (4) Never	+
	a2	How frequently do you watch the news on TV?	(1) Everyday ~ (4) Never	+
	a3	How frequently do you read the news in newspapers?	(1) Everyday ~ (4) Never	+
	a4i	How frequently do you read the news on the Internet?	(1) Everyday ~ (4) Never	+
	pol2	How often do you discuss politics with other people?	(1) Daily ~ (5) Never	+
<b>Political awareness</b>	gi2	What is the name of the President of Congress in Peru?	(1) Correct (2) Incorrect (8) Do not know (9) No Answer	+
	gi3	How many provinces does the country has?	(1) Correct (2) Incorrect (8) Do not know (9) No Answer	+
	gi4	How long is the presidential term in Peru?	(1) Correct (2) Incorrect (8) Do not know (9) No Answer	+
<b>Partisanship</b>	vb10	Do you currently identify with a political party?	(1) Yes (2) No	-
	pervb12	How close do you feel to that party you sympathize with?	(1) Very Close ~ (4) Do not feel close	-
	cp13	The meetings of a political party or movement? You attend them...	(1) Once a week ~ (4) Never	-
<b>Bureaucratic culture</b>	dc1	A congressperson accepts a bribe of then thousand dollars from a company. Do you think that what the congressperson did is...	(1) Corrupt and should be punished (2) Corrupt but justified (3) Not corrupt	+
	dc13	An unemployed individual is the brother-in-law of an important politician, and the politician uses his influence to get his brother-in-law a job. O you think the politician is...	(1) Corrupt and should be punished (2) Corrupt but justified	+

			(3) Not corrupt	
<b>Economic interests</b>	pervb13	How much do you think that party represents your interests?	(1) A lot ~ (4) Not at all	-
	idio1	How would you describe your economic situation overall?	(1) Very Good ~ (5) Very Bad	-
	q10d	The salary that you receive and the total family income...	(1) Is enough, you can save ~ (4) Is not enough, you can not cover your basic needs	-
<b>Clientelism</b>	cp2	In order to solve your problems have you ever requested help or cooperation from a congressperson?	(1) Yes (2) No	-
	cp4a	In order to solve your problems have you ever requested help or cooperation from any local authorities (mayor, municipality, prefect)?	(1) Yes (2) No	-
	cp4	In order to solve your problems have you ever requested help or cooperation from any ministry, public institution or state agency?	(1) Yes (2) No	-
	np2	Have you sought help from or presented a request to any office, official or councilman of the municipality within the past 12 months?	(1) Yes (2) No	-
<b>Perceived generalized HCT</b>	exc7	Taking into account our own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is...	(1) Very Common ~ (4) Very Uncommon	-
	b2	To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Peru?	(1) Not at all ~ (7) A lot	-
	b13	To what extent do you trust the National Congress?	(1) Not at all ~ (7) A lot	-
	b21	To what extent do you trust the political parties?	(1) Not at all ~ (7) A lot	-
	b14	To what extent do you trust the Central Government?	(1) Not at all ~ (7) A lot	-
<b>Democratic values</b>	cp5	In the past year have you contributed or tried to contribute toward the solution of a problem in your community or in your neighborhood?	(1) Yes (2) No	+
	cp5a	Have you donated money or material to help address a problem in your community or in your neighborhood?	(1) Yes (2) No	+
	cp5b	Have you contributed your own work or manual labor?	(1) Yes (2) No	+
	jc13	In your opinion would a military coup be justified when there is a lot of corruption?	(1) Yes (2) No	+
	b6	To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of Peru?	(1) Not at all ~ (7) A lot	+
<b>Attitudes toward HC</b>	dc1	A congressperson accepts a bribe of then thousand dollars from a company. Do you think that what the congressperson did is...	(1) Corrupt and should be punished (2) Corrupt but justified (3) Not corrupt	+
	dc13	An unemployed individual is the brother-in-law of an important politician, and the politician uses his influence to get his brother-in-law a job. O you think the politician is...	(1) Corrupt and should be punished (2) Corrupt but justified	+

			(3) Not corrupt	
<b>Self-efficacy</b>	prot2	During last year, did you participate in a public demonstration or protest?	(1) Sometimes ~ (3) Never	+
	cp8	Did you attend the meetings of a committee or council for community improvements? You attend them...	(1) Once a week ~ (4) Never	+
	cp5d	Have you tried to help organize a new group to resolve a neighborhood problem or to bring about any improvement?	(1) Yes (2) No	+
	np1b	To what degree do you think municipal officials pay attention to what people ask for in town hall meeting or other meeting convened by the mayor?	(1) Very much ~ (3) Not at all	+
	np1	Have you attended a town hall meeting or other meeting convened by the mayor in the past 12 months?	(1) Yes (2) No	+
	muni11	How much influence do you think you have on what the municipality does?	(1) A lot ~ (4) None	+
<b>Education</b>	ed	What was the last year of education you passed?	total number of years	
<b>Household income</b>	q10	Into which of the following income ranges does the total monthly income of this household fit, including remittances from abroad and the income of all the working adults and children?	(00) No Income ~ (13) Above \$2000	
<b>Area (urban-rural)</b>	ur		1. Urban 2. Rural	
<b>Governmental AC</b>	n9	To what extent would you say the current Government combats government corruption?	(1) Not at all ~ (7) A lot	

APPENDIX 4

Variables, Indicators, Categories and Codes Regarding LCT

Deviant determinant	Code	Indicator's survey question	Categories	Relation to LCT
<b>Bad for society</b>	it1	Now, speaking of the people from here, would you say that people in this neighborhood are generally...	(1) Very trustworthy ~ (4) Untrustworthy	+
	cp5c	Have you been attending community meetings about some problem or some improvement?	(1) Yes (2) No	+
	b6	To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of Peru?	(1) Not at all ~ (7) A lot	-
<b>Economically convenient</b>	lg13	Would you be willing to pay more taxes to the municipality so that it could provide better services or do you believe that it would not be worth it to do so?	(1) Willing (2) Not worth it	+
	cp5a	Have you donated money or material to help address a problem in your community or in your neighborhood?	(1) Yes (2) No	+
<b>Legally harmful</b>	aoj12	If you were a victim of a robbery or assault, how much faith do you have that the judicial system would punish the guilty party?	(1) A lot ~ (4) None	+
	b1	To what extent do you think the courts of justice in Peru guarantee a fair trial?	(1) Not at all ~ (7) A lot	-
<b>Unethical</b>	b3	To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of Peru?	(1) Not at all ~ (7) A lot	-
	b32	To what extent do you trust the Mayor's office of your municipality?	(1) Not at all ~ (7) A lot	-
	muni15	How interested do you think the Mayor is in the people's participation in the work of the municipality?	(0) Not at all ~ (3) Very	-
	pn4	In general, with the way in which democracy functions in Peru, would you say that you are...?	(1) Very satisfied ~ (4) Very dissatisfied	+
<b>Most people attempt</b>	exc7	Taking into account our own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is...	(1) Very Common ~ (4) Very Uncommon	-
<b>High-level corruption</b>	muni6	How much confidence do you have that the Mayor's office manages funds well?	(0) None ~ (3) A lot	-
	n9	To what extent would you say the current Government combats government corruption?	(1) Not at all ~ (7) A lot	-
<b>Officials are corruptible</b>	exc7	Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is...	(1) Very Common ~ (4) Very Uncommon	-

<b>No economical alternative</b>	idio1	How would you describe your economic situation overall?	(1) Very Good ~ (5) Very Bad	+
	q10	Into which of the following income ranges does the total monthly income of this household fit, including remittances from abroad and the income of all the working adults and children?	(00) No Income ~ (10) Above \$1000	-
	q10d	The salary that you receive and the total family income...	(1) Is enough, you can save ~ (4) Is not enough, you can not cover your basic needs	+
<b>Is dangerous to refuse</b>	b18	To what extent do you trust the National Police?	(1) Not at all ~ (7) A lot	-
	b10a	To what extent do you trust the system of justice?	(1) Not at all ~ (7) A lot	-
	aoj1	If you were the victim of a crime, did you report the incident to any institution?	(1) Yes (2) No	+
<b>Compliant determinant</b>	<b>Code</b>	<b>Indicator's survey question</b>	<b>Categories</b>	<b>Relation to LCT</b>
<b>Helps underpaid officials</b>	st1	Regarding the official dealings that you or someone from your family has had with the national police at some time, do you feel...?	(1) Very satisfied ~ (4) Very dissatisfied	-
	st2	Regarding the official dealings that you or someone from your family has had with the courts or justice tribunals at some time, do you feel...?	(1) Very satisfied ~ (4) Very dissatisfied	-
<b>Makes me feel impotent</b>	prot2	During last year, did you participate in a public demonstration or protest?	(1) Sometimes ~ (3) Never	+
	cp8	Did you attend the meetings of a committee or council for community improvements? You attend them...	(1) Once a week ~ (4) Never	+
	cp5d	Have you tried to help organize a new group to resolve a neighborhood problem or to bring about any improvement?	(1) Yes (2) No	+
	np1	Have you attended a town hall meeting or other meeting convened by the mayor in the past 12 months?	(1) Yes (2) No	+
<b>Most people surrender</b>	exc7	Taking into account our own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is...	(1) Very Common ~ (4) Very Uncommon	-
<b>Ineffective/dangerous compliant</b>	muni10	If you carried out any official dealings or requested any document at the municipality in the past year, did they address your problem or request?	(0) No (1) Yes	-
	b10a	To what extent do you trust the system of justice?	(1) Not at all ~ (7) A lot	-
	aoj1	If you were the victim of a crime, did you report the incident to any institution?	(1) Yes (2) No	+
<b>Can't afford to lose service</b>	idio1	How would you describe your economic situation overall?	(1) Very Good ~ (5) Very Bad	+
	q10d	The salary that you receive and the total family income...	(1) Is enough, you can save ~ (4) Is not	+

			enough, you can not cover your basic needs	
	q10	Into which of the following income ranges does the total monthly income of this household fit, including remittances from abroad and the income of all the working adults and children?	(00) No Income ~ (13) Above \$2000	-
<b>Attitude</b>	exc18	Do you think that the way things are, sometimes giving a bribe is justified?	(0) No (1) Yes	
	exc19	Do you think that in our society giving bribes is justified because of the poor public services, or do you think it is not justified?	(0) No (1) Yes	
<b>Behavior</b>	exc11	During the last year, to process any kind of document (like a license, for example), have you had to pay any money above that required by law?	(0) No (1) Yes	
	exc14	Have you had to give a bribe to the courts during the last year?	(0) No (1) Yes	
	exc15	In order to be attended to in a hospital or a clinic during the last year, have you had to give a bribe?	(0) No (1) Yes	
<b>Officials' treatment</b>	sgl2	How have they treated you or your neighbors when you have had dealings with the municipality?	(1) Very well ~ (5) Very badly	
<b>Ask for a bribe</b>	exc6	During the last year, has any public official asked you for a bribe?	(0) No (1) Yes	



APPENDIX 5  
 Additional Logistic Regression Analyses  
 Concerning Attitudinal and Behavioral Indicators of LCT

TABLE A5-1  
 PAYMENT OF A BRIBE BY OWN INITIATIVE OR VICTIMIZATION (ALL SUBJECTS)

<b>BRIBE</b>	<b>VICTIMIZATION</b>		<b>TOTAL</b>
	<b>NO</b>	<b>YES</b>	
<b>NO</b>	823 92.06%	76 59.38%	899 87.96%
<b>YES</b>	71 7.94%	52 40.62%	123 12.04%
<b>TOTAL</b>	894 100%	128 100%	1,022 100%

TABLE A5-2  
 IMPACT OF ATTITUDES OVER BEHAVIOR – CORRUPT DEVIANCE (ALL SUBJECTS)

<b>BRIBE</b>	<b>COEFFICIENT</b>	<b>STD. ERROR</b>	<b>Z</b>
<b>ATTITUDES (GREED)</b>	-0.471	0.368	-1.28

N = 878  
 CRAGG-UHLER (NAGELKERKE) R2 = 0.005  
 \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001

TABLE A5-3  
 IMPACT OF ATTITUDES OVER BEHAVIOR – CORRUPTION COMPLIANCE (ALL SUBJECTS)

<b>BRIBE</b>	<b>COEFFICIENT</b>	<b>STD. ERROR</b>	<b>Z</b>
<b>ATTITUDES</b>	-0.222	0.391	-0.57

N = 127  
 CRAGG-UHLER (NAGELKERKE) R2 = 0.003  
 \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001

TABLE A5-4  
PAYMENT OF A BRIBE BY OWN INITIATIVE OR VICTIMIZATION (ONE CASE)

BRIBE	VICTIMIZATION		TOTAL
	NO	YES	
NO	506 94.76%	34 66.67%	540 92.31%
YES	28 5.24%	17 33.33%	45 7.69%
TOTAL	534 100%	51 100%	585 100%

TABLE A5-5  
IMPACT OF ATTITUDES OVER BEHAVIOR – CORRUPT DEVIANCE (ONE CASE)

BRIBE	COEFFICIENT	STD. ERROR	Z
ATTITUDES (GREED)	-1.944	1.024	-1.90

N = 524  
CRAGG-UHLER (NAGELKERKE) R2 = 0.037  
\* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001

TABLE A5-6  
IMPACT OF ATTITUDES OVER BEHAVIOR – CORRUPTION COMPLIANCE (ONE CASE)

BRIBE	COEFFICIENT	STD. ERROR	Z
ATTITUDES	3.36e-17	0.700	0.00

N = 51  
CRAGG-UHLER (NAGELKERKE) R2 = 0.000  
\* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001