

communism is not recognized widely enough, but that the fronts are already too clearly drawn to win *new* adherents by focusing attention upon the evil of communism. The universalistic strategy serves to overcome isolation, to win active supporters; to this, the impression of novelty, of the discovery of a new-found friend, is essential. Thus, the success of the Popular Front strategy essentially depended on the fact that it expressly reversed the Soviet Union's previous policy. Anti-colonialism, of course, has long been proclaimed by the Soviet Union, but its strong impact dates from the emergence of Communist China as a new power entering the Far Eastern arena. In recent times, the impact was further strengthened by novel and dramatic personal appearances made by Soviet leaders in the East.

Another obvious difficulty in connection with the use of the universalistic argument is that it can be effective only where people are strongly motivated to fight. Today, however, few people are eager to fight, and emphasis upon militancy is not the best way to win friends.

But the fundamental reason why the talk about duplicating communist communication strategies is futile is still to be stated. It is that it makes little sense to imitate strategies where the underlying role conceptions and objectives are different. Western communicators cannot imitate their communist counterparts because they do not and cannot think in terms of control and authority relationships when they face their audience. For us, both beliefs and audiences exist in their own right, not merely as data in calculations concerning the control and manipulation of conduct. To improve the resonance of our messages, we have to start from our own presuppositions, and think more deeply about audiences as entities existing in their own right. Western communications policy can derive new strength only from this approach.

## Publicity Versus Diplomacy: Notes on the Reporting of the "Summit" Conferences

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The Big-Three wartime conferences at Casablanca, Moscow, Tehran, Yalta and also the Potsdam conference of August 1945 each produced substantial results by means of compromise. The compromises were made in

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private discussions and reported only in official communiqués approved by all three powers.

Neither the Summit meeting of July nor the Post-Summit meeting of October 1955 produced any substantial compromise, a fact perhaps partly explained by the glare of publicity to which both Geneva conferences were exposed.

The evidence suggests that the success of any high-level international conference is inversely proportional to the publicity the conference receives; that publicity compels the participants to address themselves to the galleries—to the “home,” “directly-concerned,” allied and other world audiences—instead of to those across the table. To the degree that unrestricted communication of the conference proceedings with the world audiences has this effect upon the participants, publicity blocks effective compromise in international conferences.

The communication of the conference proceedings to the world was examined with reference to the following publications: (Soviet) *Pravda*; (Satellite—Polish) *Przekroj* (of Cracow), *Swiat*, *Trybuna Wolnosci*, and *Trybuna Ludu* (of Warsaw); (British) *Economist*, *London Observer*, *London Times*, *Manchester Guardian*, *New Statesman & Nation*, *Spectator*; (French) *Le Monde*; (U. S.) *New York Times*; (Neutral) *Neue Zurcher Zeitung* (Swiss) and *The Eastern Economist* (Delhi, India). Reading of these publications was focussed on the following questions:

- (1) How did the Soviet reports on the *July* conference and
- (2) on the October conference differ most conspicuously from Western and neutral reports?
- (3) What audiences were addressed?

#### JULY

The only business in July was to agree on the issues to be negotiated by the four foreign ministers in October. This produced no conflicts at the conference table and in fact stimulated the correspondents to maximize the rosy optimism which Bulganin and Khrushchev diffused at the first session.

The Soviet reports outdid the Western reports in playing up “the end of the cold war” and “the beginning of a new era,” but the American, British and French reports each gave the prospects the benefit of their serious doubts. *Before* the July meeting the Western papers stressed the points on which the allies should stand firm and viewed the probable outcomes with reserve. *During* the conference the Western papers supported the formal proposals of their respective delegations and forecast a later East-West deadlock on certain issues like free elections in East Germany. *After* the conference the British papers held that the West should beware of Soviet intentions, that the personal contacts with Russian leaders might help some, and that Eden’s pro-

posal was the most workable of the four proposals, though Eisenhower's was the more dramatic.

In contrast, *Pravda* before the conference made big play of Bulganin's optimistic and conciliatory speech before leaving for Geneva and stressed the recent peace moves of the Soviet Union: the Helsinki and Leningrad Peace Assemblies, the World Mothers' Conference at Lausanne, Nehru's visits to Soviet capitals, happy Soviet relations with Tito, the Austrian treaty and others. *Pravda* went all out to describe the new day which would dawn at Geneva but played down all practical details as of minor importance.

*Pravda's* manner of reporting the July conference differed mainly from that of the Western papers (and likewise from its own previous and later performances) in the following respects: it maintained a more hopeful attitude before, during and after the conference; reported more fully on agreements than on disagreements; reported facts with commendable objectivity and reported no "feature material"; printed each of the four preliminary statements in full; and reduced to a minimum its previous criticisms of the Western powers. During the conference *Pravda's* most vigorous criticism was its self-righteous scolding of the *New York Times* and other Western papers which failed to publish each of the four texts in full.

#### OCTOBER

*Pravda's* reporting of the October conference clearly implied a change in the rules since July. Of the statements released by the press attaches of each delegation, *Pravda* published in full only those of the Russian delegation. Statements by other delegations were summarized and quoted selectively with qualifying and belittling phrases such as "as if," "seemingly" and the like. The Soviet proposals and interpretations of the issues were routinely characterized by *Pravda* as "clear," "realistic," "known to all," "acceptable by any reasonable man."

*Pravda's* main tactic was to exploit the analyses made by Western correspondents. Items in the Western press which criticized a position taken by a Western minister were picked up with a regularity which demonstrated close and routine scrutiny of the Western press. Such items were used to document the Soviet argument that the Western ministers were blocking the eagerness of their constituents to accept the peace-making Soviet proposals.

Reports of the conference proceedings by the Western papers differed most conspicuously from those by *Pravda* in that the Western reports accented the "off-beat" whereas *Pravda's* reports were "dead-pan." The Western editorials were analytical; *Pravda's* occasional editorials were blunt. Western reporting (notably in the *New York Times*) sought to humanize the conference; *Pravda* did not. The Western papers made more use of pictures and cartoons for both reports and interpretations. In point of subject emphasis

the Western reports gave relatively more space to German unification and East-West exchanges; *Pravda* gave more to European security and disarmament.

The supply of aid and comfort which the Western correspondents rendered to the Soviet editors was inexhaustible. The value of such aid is suggested by the following examples. Chancellor Adenauer was quoted in an editorial to the effect that the U. S. delegation was expected to take the toughest line with the Russians but had in fact taken the tamest line, and presumably because of the 1956 presidential elections. "Some Republican strategists counted on the popular appeal of the Geneva spirit to offset agrarian disenchantment with the administration's farm policy, particularly in the middle western states."

The *Manchester Guardian* of November 17 termed the conference "barren and disappointing," although the blame was not wholly Mr. Molotov's. It referred to the "farcical" Western proposal which required Communist troops to retreat to the Polish frontiers while the NATO forces stood pat. Mr. Molotov declined to specify the degree of international inspection his government would accept, and the Western ministers never answered his "valid objections to their inspection plans."

#### AUDIENCES ADDRESSED

Each of the four wartime conferences of the Big Three had only one audience, namely the two other members of the conference. Security regulations were tight. But the wide-open publicity afforded both Geneva conferences of 1955 enabled any speaker to address any audience he could reach. The audiences addressed by both Russian and Western spokesmen were essentially four: The "home" audience, the German audience, the allied audience (in the Soviet camp this means the satellites), and "neutral" audiences like India.

(1) *By the Soviet Union.* The *covert intentions* of the Russian delegation were of course never stated by any Soviet official and are best inferred from the statements made and from their several contradictions. The following "covert Russian intentions" may perhaps explain why the Russian spokesmen at Geneva told the power audiences what they were told.

In general, the Russian covert intentions in both conferences may have been to wreck NATO and reduce Western forces in Europe; to facilitate Soviet infiltration of the Middle East; to conceal Soviet intransigence on German unification and on fruitful negotiation; and to persuade the neutrals to accept the Soviet account for the failure of the Geneva conferences to produce results—which is that the Western powers have not yet found "the right approach" to the Soviets' compliance with Western aims.

Molotov's messages to the home audience via *Pravda* included:

"The Soviet delegation sought to persuade the representatives of the three Western powers to follow the directives of the heads of government with regard to European security. They in no way conformed to the decisions of the heads of government."

"We stand for the restoration of German unity on the basis of free all-German elections."

"The West refuses to examine measures for disarmament."

"The Soviet delegation submitted a number of proposals for the development of contacts in the fields of culture, science, press, radio, art, sports, tourism, and so forth. The Soviet delegation, however, found no support from the United States, France or Great Britain."

*To the West German audience* (and also less directly to the neutrals) *Pravda* carried messages like the following:

("Dissolution of the Military Blocs is a Prerequisite to Lasting Peace") October 21. "The Western nations seek normal international relations by the policy of strength. They say that the existence of two German states and the division of Germany explain the unstable situation in Europe. This is false. The main reason for European tension is the division of Europe itself between two conflicting groups of states. The division of Germany was in fact born of the policy of strength. . . . History shows that the outbreak of both world wars was preceded by similar military groupings of European states."

("Good Will Must be Mutual") The U. S. is presented as leading an anti-neutralist crusade, developing military blocs and refusing to disarm. October 25: "It is now clear that certain U. S. circles are unwilling to meet the disarmament problem. Declarations for peace which are not supported by actions are suspect."

The USSR is presented by *Pravda* as the only state which seeks to ease international tensions in a practical way.

October 26: "Americans evade the basic question of disarmament. They would confine the discussion to proposals for the exchange of military information and aerial photography of the U. S. and the USSR, thus diverting attention from the pressing task of ending the arms drive."

*To the Soviet allies* including the satellites and also by indirection to neutrals like India, the following are typical messages:

("Security is Indivisible") October 12: "Security is indivisible both in Europe and in Asia. NATO denies the interests of European security, just as SEATO denies the interests of Asian security."

October 13: "The intention of Iran to join the Turkish-Iraqi-Pakistani alliance is a breach of the Geneva spirit and a renewal of the Western aggressive policy. The attempt to draw Iran into a military bloc shows once more the duplicity of some powers which in words come out for the preservation of the spirit of Geneva, but in deeds are forming aggressive military blocs of increasing size. The actions of these powers imply the continuation of their cold-war policies toward the aggravation of international tensions."

(2) *By the Satellite (Polish) Press.* The Polish press as sampled by the four papers named above stressed the positions taken by *Pravda*, of course, but with overtones which deserve attention.

In general, the comments on the Geneva conferences by the Polish press made more emphatic appeals than were made by *Pravda* to the victims of Nazi aggression. These victims were urged to support the Soviet's opposition to the rearming of West Germany in order to prevent further aggression. More specifically, the Polish press gave full play to the importance of the East German state as a bulwark against West German reclamation of the Oder-Neisse territories and their seven million Polish inhabitants. The Western stand was reported as an unconditional demand for the inclusion of reunified Germany in NATO.

The *Manchester Guardian's* characterization of the Western proposal for German reunification as a "gamesman's move" was stated as "szulerska gra" (cheating game) instead of "posuniecie gracza," the proper translation.

"So long as the East German state exists, no Western-allied military force will be stationed on the Oder-Neisse frontier." (*Przekroj*)

"The brothers Alsop say in the *Herald Tribune* that the Western ministers are hypocritical in their approach to the East-West problems." (*Swiat*)

"The Western proposals would demilitarize half of Poland and a large part of Czechoslovakia and hence leave Poland virtually defenseless." (*Swiat*)

"Can Germany's neighbors—the Poles, the Czechs, the French—be convinced that German rearmament will increase their security?" (*Trybuna Ludu*)

(3) *By the Western Powers.* The Soviet Union profited from the "discipline" of its press to the disadvantage of the Western powers. Molotov's ability to work *selectively* on particular power audiences through his captive press is perhaps a sufficient reason for his insisting on an *open* conference despite the British preference for a closed conference. Also the Russians had large benefits from the undisciplined Western press whose skilled analysts supplied *Pravda* with an abundance of anti-Western arguments well-stated in the Western idiom. *Combat* says "Germany can be united only by abandoning the Paris agreements and setting up a collective security system" and stresses that a policy built on "positions of strength" and the Paris agreements is a "dead policy."

Several Western papers raised the question whether the Western allies really *did* want to reunite Germany since they were unwilling to make any important concessions to that end. It was also noted that the Western proposals were not even good propaganda toward West Germany since the leaders in Bonn regarded the proposals as non-negotiable from the start.

Regarding the French position, it was pointed out that Pinay's statement—"the reunification of Germany is now in the national interest of France"—was made with tongue in cheek and in the virtual certainty that Molotov would reject the Western proposal.

The Western official spokesmen made a united stand and avoided all Soviet traps except the propaganda trap. The Western messages to Germany

and to the neutrals and other power audiences were too much of a pattern to be clearly distinguished. The most genuine humanitarian ring was probably the speech by Macmillan on 17 November which closed with the following paragraphs:

"Peaceloving,' 'democratic,' 'freedom' are words which have a clear and inspiring meaning to us, with deep undertones. They appear to have a wholly different significance to the Soviet government. We stand looking at each other across the great divide.

"I cannot help thinking that last summer's Geneva idyll was not a sham or vague affair. There was genuine longing on both sides of the iron curtain to break down the wretched thing. The terrible fact is that the Soviet Union fears our friendship more than our enmity. Yet this isolation cannot last forever."

#### SUMMARY

In summary the reports on the conference indicated that the open conference virtually prevented genuine diplomacy and necessitated psychological warfare. The free access of the world press to both conferences tended:

(1) To favor a "disciplined" or captive press, e.g., *Pravda*, as against any free press;

(2) To exaggerate the basic differences between the two parties;

(3) To enable a controlled press to exploit such differences by relaying appropriate paraphrases of its spokesmen's remarks to other power audiences than those to which the remarks were primarily directed;

(4) To give the free press of the Western powers the scope to supply the opposition press (e.g. *Pravda*) with arguments for the Soviet positions which are the more convincing to Western audiences because they are pre-stated in Western idioms—a journalistic task beyond the *Pravda* editors; and

(5) To force each speaker at the October conference to formulate his remarks with reference to the outside audiences.

That on balance the Soviet Union won *this* psychological engagement is fairly indicated by the increased cordiality to Russian moves in critical areas like the Middle East and India since the conference ended on 17 November.

## American and Soviet Themes and Values: A Content Analysis of Pictures in Popular Magazines

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The present study seeks to compare the values expressed in the content of two major family magazines of the "picture weekly" class—one in Russia, the other in the United States. Its aim is not, of course, to study communication

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