

NOTES ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The Beginnings of International Government.* *Definition and Implications of International Government.* In the preface to her *Study of International Government*, published about 1924, Dr. Jessie Wallace Hughan, an unmistakably American author, thus defines her topic: " 'International' carries two simple and related meanings: pertaining to two or more nations, and concerning different nations in common. 'Government' signifies the exercise of authority in the administration of the affairs of a state, community, or society. 'International government,' therefore, is the exercise of authority in the administration of the affairs of two or more nations."

This is simple, short, and snappy, as are many American phrases coined for a people who are daily taught to think in headlines, to read in subways, and to worship what a clever author has called "the ideal of acceleration." As a sincere admirer of American business methods, and as the grateful owner of an American motor-car, I should be the last to sneer at the process of thinking in headlines and reading in subways, or at the cult of acceleration. But if there is one thing which cannot be profitably done in a hurry, it is abstract intellectual analysis. Let us therefore, with as much old-world leisure as the distinctly new-world estival atmosphere of Geneva will permit, consider these concepts a little more closely. The definitions we will arrive at will doubtless be less simple, short, and snappy than the above. Possibly, however, by positing while not pretending to solve what is assuredly a complicated problem, they may no less usefully contribute to its elucidation.

If, discarding all dictionaries and disregarding all academic discussion, we analyze the notion of government in the light of historical experience, I believe we shall agree that it contains two essential elements, without either of which there can be no true government. The first of these is authority, that is, the competence and ability to command and to be obeyed in the political sphere. The second is order, that is, a certain scheme, or method, or plan, to which the governed are made to conform.

* An address delivered before the Geneva Institute of International Relations, July 28, 1930.

There may be authority without government, as in the case of the purely arbitrary rule of a brigand chief or a political boss. And there may be order without government, as in the elaboration of a treatise on politics. But where there is both order and authority, political authority exercised to enforce some kind of political order, then there is bound to be government. The authority may be dictatorial, as in Fascist Italy, or liberal, as in classical Athens; the order may consist in a multitude of hard and fast rules, as in the Soviet Union of the five-year plan; or it may consist in a few general principles as in "muddling through" Great Britain. Whenever and wherever is authority and order, then and there is government.

Now what about international government? By that term we may mean—and it is well not to confuse the different meanings—either government by two or more nations or the government of two or more nations.

Examples of international government in the first sense are the rather unfortunate historical instances of so-called *condominia*; also the present administration of the Saar Basin. In the latter case, a territory has been governed for the last ten years by an international commission appointed by the Council of the League of Nations, an international body. If the mandated areas were administered by the League of Nations, as was at first proposed, and not by mandatory powers on behalf of the League, as is actually the case, we should have another example of international government in the first sense. As a matter of fact, the mandate system does not offer an example of international government. This is so, not because the League of Nations is not an international body, but because the powers it exercises over mandated territories are not those of government, but only of supervision.

Examples of international government in the second sense, that is to say, the government of an international community, are, for very significant reasons, much more difficult to find. Monarchical rulers of two or more countries bound together in a personal union, such as the kings of England and Hanover before 1837 or the kings of Sweden and Norway before 1905, might have been said to exercise international government. As a matter of fact, they did not. Likewise, during peace negotiations, the power or powers victorious over a coalition of allies, enforcing its or their will simultaneously on two or more defeated enemies, might be spoken of as temporary inter-

national rulers. I do not know whether the term has ever been used in that connection.

The Peace Conference of Paris in 1919, to be sure, is sometimes given as an example of international government. That is so, however, rather because the victorious governors formed an international group than because they laid down the law for the international community of the defeated. Nor is the government of a confederacy or of a federal state, such as the British Empire or the United States of America or the Swiss republic, ever spoken of as an international government.

If we pass in review all historical examples of government in which several political units were subjected to a common rule, we shall never, I believe, discover a single example of what any of us would be tempted to call international government. And still it was with a view to speaking of the states assembled in the League of Nations that I was asked to discuss the beginnings of international government. What is the explanation of the riddle? It is very simple—or, rather, there is no riddle at all, but only the loose expression of a vague idea.

Some of us are apt to think of the League as an example of international government, less because the members may seem to form a community of governed than because they may seem to form a community of governors. They are thought of as governing, not as being governed—of governing one another, it is true, but not as being governed one by another.

If one were to suggest in public that a state member of the League of Nations was being governed by any one but its own exclusive self, he would be evicted from office if an official, defeated at elections if a candidate, and possibly censured even if only a mere professor. In my opinion, such treatment, although excessive, would, in the case of the professor at least, not be unreasonable. As we shall see presently, it is not true to say today, although I sincerely hope that it may become less untrue at a not too far distant date, that a state member of the League of Nations is governed by the international body of which it is a part.

It, of course, follows that if members of the League are not really governed from Geneva, they together, as a League of Nations, govern no one, except as we have seen, the Saar Basin, and that only as a temporary expedient. If, therefore, the League is not engaged in

international government in the second sense of the term, it cannot truly be said to be engaged in it in the first. If no state and no group of states consents to be the object of international government, the community of states forming the League can clearly not be an agency of international government.

Indeed, if we wished to sacrifice current linguistic usage to logically precise phraseology, we could show that there is a contradiction involved in the term "international government." Government, as we have seen, is authority to enforce order. A nation or a state is, according to orthodox theory, a sovereign unit. Even if we discard the classical doctrine of absolute sovereignty as an ideal, we must admit that in ordinary parlance a nation or a state ceases to be a nation or a state when it submits to a superior authority. New York is not a state in the international sense, in spite of its size, wealth, and population, which in Europe would almost entitle it to rank as a great power. Nor do New Yorkers constitute a nation. Why not? Simply because, submitting as they do, in theory at least, to the will of the federal government, they are not politically independent.

Now if a nation forfeits its status as a nation by bowing to the authority of a superior government, then clearly international government is a misnomer. Either there is government—and then it is not international, but supernational, or rather world government—or there are independent nations—and then there is no international government, although of course there may be international coöperation or organization.

The term international government is therefore ambiguous or over-ambitious. It is ambiguous if used to describe a hypothetical world government, as ambiguous as the term interstate government would be to describe the constitutional system of the United States or the term intercantonal government to describe that of Switzerland. And it is over-ambitious if used to describe what goes on in Geneva, for, as we shall see, that is hardly government at all.

Now this is not a mere quibble, as it may seem to some at first glance. All those who expect the League of Nations effectively to prevent war, to promote disarmament, and to reorganize the world in accordance with the best economic interests of the inhabitants of the globe more or less consciously think of it as a super-state or a world government. When they do so consciously and intelligently, they may be bold enough to admit it, as did Mr. Oscar Crosby in his

book entitled *International War: its Causes and its Cure* (1919), or, more recently, Mr. H. G. Wells in several of his writings. But when they do so unconsciously, as vast numbers of people all over the world do today, they are apt to allude to the League as an institution of international government—in that case a convenient term for the muddle-headed and a phrase adequate only for the expression of a confused idea.

My insistence on this point is not due to any academic verbal frenzy, such as we professors sometimes seem to indulge in with the delight of perversity. My wish is only to call attention to the dangers of a term which, unless clearly understood, necessarily promotes loose thinking on what is to my mind one of the fundamental questions in international relations.

In order to soothe those whom this pedantic discussion may have irritated and to show that my views, even if deemed startlingly heterodox, are not confined to academic circles, let me quote from the illustrious author of the *Outline of History*. In this statement, drawn from an article entitled *Delusions about World Peace*,¹ the main point I have sought to make is particularly stressed. It is indeed stressed with an emphasis that would seem impertinent and that would be exaggerated on the part of anyone not an intellectual genius, legitimately enjoying the novelist's privilege of over-statement. "One real test of pacifist sincerity," says Mr. Wells, "is to be found in the pose toward national independence. To anyone who will sit down for five minutes and face the facts squarely it must be evident that the organization of world peace, so that war will be impossible and disarmament secure, involves some sort of federal authority in the world's affairs. At some point there must be the certainty of a decision upon all disputes of races and peoples and nations that would otherwise necessitate war. And this authority must clearly have the power to enforce its decisions. Whatever navies and armies survive, other than police forces for local and definite ends, must be under the control of this central authority. It may be a committee of national representatives or what you will, but central authority there must be. Pax Mundi, like the Pax Romana or the Pax Britannica, must be the only sovereign power within its realm. If you are not prepared to see your own country and your own flag so far sub-

¹ H. G. Wells, *The Way the World is Going* (London, 1928), pp. 149-150.

ordinated to collective control, whatever protestations of peaceful intentions you make are either made unintelligently or else in bad faith. Your country cannot be both independent and restricted. Either you are for Cosmopolis or you are for war.”

Does International Government thus Defined and Understood Exist Today? We have seen that, speaking strictly, international government is a misnomer. Taking it, however, in the sense of supernational or world government, let us see whether any beginnings of it may be said to be apparent on the international horizon today. Let us examine first whether there is any order in the relations between states, and then whether there is any authority competent to enforce that order.

It has become the fashion amongst students of international affairs to speak of our contemporary world as offering the spectacle of international anarchy. This significant phrase should not blind us to the fact that there is today much more order in international relations than there ever has been in the past, that not only has peace come to be regarded as the normal condition of international relations, but by far the largest number of political, economic, and intellectual dealings between different states and their nationals take place without injustice or friction. In case of difficulty, national laws or international treaties recognized as valid by both parties and administered by unchallenged national or international tribunals provide a peaceful and orderly means of settlement.

Unfortunately, there remain several possibilities of disagreement, and among them some of the gravest sources of conflict. I shall not attempt to enumerate all the classes of cases in private international law where no one guiding principle of solution is adopted by all states, and which are therefore not susceptible of a settlement legally satisfactory to all parties. Such cases, numerous and troublesome though they be as occasions of disputes between individuals and as symptoms of international disorder, are not the most serious. They are seldom more than pretexts for interstate conflicts. Moreover, their number tends to diminish with the not too difficult progress of private international law. The real subsisting international anarchy lies elsewhere. It is to be found in the fundamentally unsatisfactory and unsettled relations between the states themselves, much more than in those between the respective citizens.

Briefly to circumscribe this anarchy, we may say that it springs

from three distinct sources. One is the still persistent reluctance of most states to agree once and for all to accept the jurisdiction of an independent tribunal and to abide by its decision whenever there is a generally recognized law or legal principle applicable to the case in dispute. The recent very noticeable progress of so-called compulsory arbitration tends to narrow this hotbed of disorder. But it will subsist until all states have, without any reservation and without any time limit, accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of some international court of justice. Up to date (July 28, 1930), 28 signatories, out of some 70 so-called sovereign states, have finally accepted the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice, under Paragraph 2 of Article 36 of its Statutes. But among them there are as yet only two great powers, Germany and Great Britain; and in no case has this step been taken without some often important reservations or conditions.

We are here, however, in the presence of a rapidly spreading system of legal international order. It is to be hoped and, I think one may add without undue optimism, expected, that our generation or the next may see the completion of this very happy evolution. It is coming to be more and more generally recognized that, as M. Briand had the courage to say on the platform of the Ninth Assembly, "there is no dishonor even for a Great Power to go to The Hague and to return disappointed." As Professor Laski has rightly said,² "To suggest that a nation is humiliated by being proved in error is as wise as to suggest that trial by battle is likely to result in justice. A power, indeed, which urges its prestige as a means of evading international jurisdiction is fairly certain to be wrong."

The progress of compulsory arbitration, important as it is, is, however, far from tending to the establishment of a complete international order. The second element of anarchy in the present situation is the absence of any pacific means of modifying international law without the consent of all states concerned. Existing international order may be fundamentally unfair on certain important points, and it is bound, unless altered, to become more and more so in course of time. Certain frontiers may be indefensible on grounds of justice. The very unequal distribution of colonial possessions and natural resources may be rightly resented, not only by those who have been despoiled, but

² *Op. cit.*, p. 167.

even by the large majority of mankind. Certain limitations of independence may seem unjustified, not only to people struggling for emancipation, but even to the disinterested onlooker.

No matter how revolting to the general sense of justice, and no matter how threatening to peace, international law, even if administered by a court of justice whose jurisdiction would be universally recognized, affords no redress in such cases. Diplomatic negotiations, mediation by the Council of the League, consultation by *ad hoc* commissions, international conferences, and discussions before the Assembly under Article 19 of the Covenant may achieve something, but only if the beneficiary of an unfair advantage consents to relinquish it. If he does not, the international community is helpless. It is in the position of a state whose constitution refused to allow for legislation by majority and contained no provisions permitting its own amendment. As Professor Brierly said in the course of a remarkable lecture on "The Function of Law in International Relations" two years ago, "The problem of the peaceful incorporation of changes into an existing order is the supreme problem of statesmanship, national or international. Whenever it is not frankly faced and solved, revolution in the national, and war in the international, field will always in the long run burst the fragile dams of legal formulas by which we vainly try to stabilize a changing world. The paradox of all law is that it cannot keep its vitality unless there exist legal means of overriding legal rights in a proper case, but if we believe that the law exists for men and not men for the law, it is right that this should be so. Within a well-ordered state the pressure for change is more or less successfully canalized by a legislature, which can weigh demands and judge what changes are just, and when. In the international sphere the problem has not yet found its solution."³

The third source of international anarchy lies in the fact that many phenomena of international importance are at present still beyond the orbit of international law. Whereas in the preceding case an international tribunal, if consulted, is bound to render a decision contrary to the dictates of justice, because the law itself is unjust, here it cannot even be consulted, or is bound, if consulted, to remain mute, because there is no law for it to apply.

A state may strangle its neighbors by means of its tariff policy. It

³ In *Problems of Peace* (3rd ser., London, 1929), p. 297.

may oppress its own nationals or exclude all foreigners from the enjoyment of its natural resources. It may make the most elaborate and threatening preparations for a war of aggression, and thereby oblige its neighbors either to enter into a ruinous race of competitive armaments or to submit to any one of those forms of pressure and bullying to which disproportionate force has so often given rise in the past. The world of sovereign states as at present organized is equally helpless in the presence of such policies, which, while not illegal, are as disruptive of international order as they are threatening to peace. To quote Professor Laski once more: “. . . the notion of an independent sovereign state is, on the international side, fatal to the well-being of humanity. The way in which a state should live its life in relation to other states is clearly not a matter in which that state is entitled to be sole judge. That way lies the long avenue of disastrous warfare of which the rape of Belgium is the supreme moral result in modern times. The common life of states is a matter for common agreement between states. International government is, therefore, axiomatic in any plan for international well-being. But international government implies the organized subordination of states to an authority in which each may have a voice, but in which, also, that voice is never the self-determined source of decision. . . . England ought not to settle what armaments she needs, the tariffs she will erect, the immigrants she will permit to enter. These matters affect the common life of peoples; and they imply a unified world organized to administer them.”⁴

So much for international order, which, as we have seen, is the rule, and international disorder, which, while exceptional, is still, and I may add increasingly, dangerous in a constantly shrinking world. Now how about authority—that authority without which even complete and perfect order is not government? Without the authority to impose and to enforce order, there is not only no government, but there can likewise be no security. This is, in fact, the only justification for government on the international, as on the national, plan. If nations or individuals could be relied upon willingly to accept and faithfully to observe, as self-imposed law, all the suggestions of a duly qualified advisory agency, then government, national or international, would be superfluous, as it is necessarily always more or less

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 65.

oppressive. No government! Such is, therefore, the plea of the thoroughgoing anarchist. He is an anarchist, not because he favors disorder, but because he believes in the possibility of spontaneous order. In the national field, however, the anarchist is looked upon as a dangerous utopian, and by no one with as much suspicion and intolerance as by those conservatively-minded members of the community for whom the dangerous utopian on the international plan is he who most insistently clamors for some form of supernational government.

Now, supernational government and absolute national sovereignty are, as we have seen, logically and historically incompatible. The authors of the Covenant of the League of Nations, wisely recognizing that any frontal attack on the sacrosanct citadel of national sovereignty was doomed to failure and would only, if attempted, spell disastrous defeat for their whole undertaking, deliberately refrained from it. Who could blame them when, timid and cautious as they made the document, it still proved too revolutionary for the people of the United States and too threatening for senators' sense of national independence? Who could blame them when the first Assemblies, interpreting Articles 10 and 16, went still further in the desire to limit the authority of the League and to reduce the obligations of its members? Who could blame them when, later on, the Draft Treaty of Mutual Guaranty in 1923 and the Protocol of Geneva in 1924, which were conscious reactions against this tendency, proved unacceptable to all non-European states? And who could blame them today in Europe when, more than ten years later, even M. Briand, perhaps the boldest internationalist on the front of the political scene, has felt bound in his famous Memorandum to insist on his fervent respect for the absolute sovereignty of the states between whom he proposes to establish a federal bond?

The League, therefore, having no authority over its members, because its members will accept no binding obligations toward it, is not an institution of government. It is, if you please, a government by persuasion. But that is a literary phrase without any scientific meaning. Government by persuasion is persuasion and not government.

But, it may be asked, are there not at least some beginnings of government in the League? Are there no moral forces at work in Geneva which, even without governmental authority, tend to guide the wills of the sovereign states toward some common goal? Taken in this sense, I think we may reply in the affirmative. Although much has

been said about the famous "spirit of Geneva" which may sound well in a political speech or in a post-prandial address, but which would be out of place in a scientific lecture, there is no doubt in my mind that there is here an environmental influence which does contribute to promote international coöperation. It is not, as some of my fellow-citizens like to believe, the influence of the historic city-republic of Geneva. It is rather the result and the expression of an international *esprit de corps* which may well prove to be the embryo of a future world patriotism.

When leading statesmen of fourteen countries meet three or four times a year as members of the Council in Geneva, or when leading statesmen of some fifty nations spend a month together as members of the Assembly, discussing and trying to solve problems of common concern in a spirit of conciliation and friendliness, they become something more than mere plenipotentiaries of their respective sovereign states. A new loyalty toward the League, or even toward mankind as a whole, is sometimes discernible, which makes for mutual concessions and thereby for something in the nature of a common policy. The best proof of the reality of this intangible and imponderable spirit is to be found in the fact that, when these statesmen return to face their respective national parliaments, they are invariably accused by their respective nationalists of having succumbed to the diplomacy of their sly and wicked foreign antagonists.

Neither the Assembly nor the Council governs the world, or the League of Nations, or any of its members. But they do undoubtedly exercise a certain influence on the shaping of national policies. In this sense, beginnings of international government may be detected in Geneva. What there is, really and obviously, on the other hand, is international coöperation and international organization.

In the evolution which seems to carry the nations of the world from absolute isolation to real federation, three successive phases may be distinguished. The first is that of free and spontaneous coöperation. This stage started with the beginnings of intercourse and diplomacy and progressed very rapidly with the advance of population, wealth, industrial science, and trade. Already before the World War it had reached such development and intensity that in various technical fields it had given rise to international unions, just as in the political field it has since the most ancient times led to defensive and offensive alliances of different types.

The second phase in this evolution may be described as that of voluntary and self-imposed organization, of which such unions and alliances were the prototypes, and of which the League of Nations is the most recent expression and the most perfect instrument. In this phase, the source of all power and of all decision still remains with the individual nations. But they agree, under certain conditions, for a certain time, in certain contingencies and for certain well-defined purposes, to conform their respective policies to certain generally accepted principles. They even go so far, in a few exceptional circumstances, as under Article 15, Paragraph 7, of the Covenant, or under the Optional Clause of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court, or under the General Act of 1929, or under various bilateral treaties, as to bind themselves to submit to the verdict of a foreign authority. In so far, but in so far only, international organization may be said clearly to foreshadow the third phase of this evolution, the final phase of world government.

In this progressive development, the states members of the League are unequally prepared to participate, or rather are not all prepared to go equally far. France and her Continental allies, who have everything to gain and nothing to risk by the establishment of an order of things in which present frontiers will be guaranteed by the combined forces of the League, seem in some respects ready to go farthest in the direction of world government. But when it is suggested that there, of course, can be no such government without the power to revise existing treaties, if the interests of the greater part of the community should demand such revision, even France and especially her eastern allies become most insistent on the sacred character of their sovereign rights.

The discontented states of the world, i.e., those against whom the peace treaties were drawn up—the defeated Central Powers, Italy, a disappointed victor, and China, the victim of her allies' triumphs, assume the opposite attitude. They are for League government in so far as League government means the possibility of redrafting the map of the world, but vigorously opposed to it when it implies the collective stabilization of the present conditions.

The European ex-neutrals, who are all small states, wish to strengthen the League in its judicial functions, but are very reluctant to endow it with more political power. They are content with international organization which, in their view, implies the general appli-

cation of the principle of compulsory arbitration. But League government, which, they fear, would mean government by the Great Powers, has no attractions, and is indeed not without its terrors. The weakness of their position resides in the fact that, while they impatiently demand disarmament, they are unwilling to make the sacrifices of national independence which international guarantees—without which there can be no general disarmament—inevitably demand. The attitude of Great Britain in its present temper is not very different, although it is, of course, based on other political and geographical considerations.

The non-European states are, on the whole, still in the phase of international coöperation. They are sometimes ready to consider a measure of international organization, but they are always resolutely averse to any form of world government. Whether they belong to the League, as Japan, the British dominions, and the smaller Latin American republics, or whether they participate only in its technical activities, as do the United States, Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina, their policy is fundamentally the same. They are for coöperation, because coöperation means enhanced prosperity. They are suspicious of organization, because organization may imply troublesome obligations. And, with the possible exception of Japan, they are violently opposed to world government, because world government would seem to threaten their privileged economic position, endanger their newly won independence, and too closely associate them with all that is objectionable in the intolerable continent of Europe. For states so disposed, the platonic vows of the Kellogg Pact and the pious aspirations of disarmament discussions are the last word in the art of preventing war.

As for Soviet Russia, it, of course, occupies a place by itself. In the eyes of Moscow, coöperation with capitalistic nations would be a futile farce were it not an adventure offering some opportunities for revolutionary propaganda and some possibilities of obtaining foreign credits. International organization is meaningless and world government the sole desirable goal, world government implying, of course, the incorporation of the rest of the universe in the Union of Federated Socialist Soviet Republics.

Such, in very rough outline, is the map of the globe, as I see it, when considered from the point of view of international relations. Even the most enthusiastic friend of world government must admit

that from such beginnings to that goal, "it's a long, long way to Tipperary!"

Why World Government is Desirable and Why it is Still Almost Universally Opposed. Let us, in conclusion, ask ourselves why mankind should appear to be blindly groping for some form of world government and why it should still be so reluctant to advance deliberately in that direction.

In our sceptical age, almost all moral axioms may be, and are in fact, questioned. Were one to ask, however, whether peace is preferable to war, harmonious coöperation to hostile rivalry, and prosperity to poverty—in a word, life to death—even our agnostic humanity would almost unanimously answer in the affirmative.

Now, without some form of supernational authority entrusted with the duty of maintaining peace, securing disarmament, and promoting prosperity—that is to say, the duty of governing mankind in the exclusive interests of mankind—the coveted goal would appear even theoretically inaccessible. "Either you are for Cosmopolis or you are for war," as H. G. Wells declared in the above quoted lapidary formula. The story of all recent and successful federations would seem to confirm this view. "Either you are for a United States of America, for a unified Germany, for a Swiss confederacy, for a kingdom of Italy, or you are for war, stagnation, and poverty." Thus spoke the American federalists of 1787, the promoters of the German Zollverein in the first half of the nineteenth century, the Swiss progressives in 1848, and the Italian patriots of the *Risorgimento*.

But why does not all civilized, pacific, and forward-looking humanity speak like Wells today? The reasons are obvious. In the first place, there is as yet in the twentieth century no world patriotism comparable in vital intensity to the American, German, Swiss, or Italian patriotism of the eighteenth and nineteenth. The millenaries of common aspirations, strife, and suffering which mankind has lived through since the beginnings of time have not yet given rise to a true and strong feeling of world solidarity. The disruptive forces of different origin, race, tradition, language, culture, and religion are still far more potent than the uniting forces of common experience and common interest.

In the second place, the love of freedom and independence, perhaps the most powerful impulse of individuals and nations, still blocks the road to federation. Freedom and independence, the necessary con-

ditions of self-assertion, are not only highly prized advantages but have come to be sublimated into sacred ideals. Generations in all countries have striven, bled, and died for the cause of freedom and independence. Is it surprising that men today should resent the very thought of a superstate conceived as depriving them of these blessings?

To be sure, any well considered plan of world government should tend to enlarge and not to limit individual freedom, and indeed also national independence in the best sense of the term. By doing away with war, crushing armaments, suicidal rivalry, and all the hindrances and restrictions of national sovereignty, it should appear as an instrument of human emancipation and not of oppression. It would, of course, be, not a foreign government, but a coöperative institution, destined to protect individual and collective rights of self-determination and not to impose any uniform system of local and national administration. Differences of culture, language, and religion would be treasured as necessary conditions of life and progress.

All this may be true, and indeed obvious; but it is not yet understood by the man in the street, be it Main Street, Wall Street, the Strand, Under den Linden, la Rue de la Paix, or even Quai Wilson. In this connection, I venture to suggest that the term *Cosmopolis* is exceptionally unfortunate as the name of a world state, since it would seem to evoke an imposed uniformity of type much more than a peacefully organized and harmoniously federated diversity of local and national units.

The third main obstacle on the road to a world government results from the very unequal stages of national development we have noted above. If set up tomorrow, a world state would almost necessarily imply a very unequal, and therefore unfair, distribution of benefits and sacrifices. Some countries, and above all the United States of America, are large, thinly settled in comparison to their natural resources, and relatively secure from foreign aggression. Others, on the contrary, especially in Europe, are small, over-populated, and hedged in on all sides by threatening neighbors.

While the two previously mentioned obstacles, and especially the second, should be overcome with comparative ease by education and enlightenment, the third strikes me as insuperable for the present and the near future. Time alone, the progressive equalization of economic and social conditions which it seems bound to bring about, cumulative experience of the dangers for all, and even for the most

protected, of sovereign states, and the constantly growing realization of the real solidarity of the most fortunate and the least fortunate of the human family may gradually lead us all on with a more assured gait toward some form of that supernational government of which we are today witnessing the timid and halting beginnings.

Let me close with a last quotation from Professor Laski which may serve, with some qualification, as both a summary and a conclusion: "The implication, in a word, of modern conditions is world government. The process, naturally enough, is immensely more complicated than the government of a single state. The spiritual tradition of coöperation has still to be created; the difficulty of language has to be overcome; the application of decisions has to be agreed upon in terms of a technique that is still largely unexplored. The only source of comfort we possess is the increasing recognition that modern warfare is literally a form of suicide, and that, as a consequence, the choice before us is between coöperation and disaster. That was the sense which, in 1919, led the makers of the Peace of Versailles to strive for the mitigation of its inequities by the acceptance of the League of Nations. The latter, indeed, is the façade of a structure which has not yet been called into being. But it has at least this great importance, that it constitutes an organ of reference which goes beyond the fiat of a given state. It is, in fact, either nothing, or else a denial of national sovereignty in world-affairs. It is upon the basis of that denial that we have to build."⁵

With the end of this statement, spirited and speculative as everything that flows from its brilliant author's pen, I find myself unable fully to agree. The League of Nations is a "denial of national sovereignty" neither in the intention of its founders nor in actual practice. Still less is it "nothing." It is, as I see it, an attempt to build up international coöperation on the foundations of national sovereignty. As such, it is not, and cannot be, an inviolable temple of peace. But it is more than a happy façade. It is, in my view, an invaluable structure, both in its present admittedly limited potency and especially—if I may be allowed a final architectural simile—as a most necessary bridge leading from the international anarchy of the past over into the well-ordered world government of the future.

WILLIAM E. RAPPARD.

University of Geneva.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 227.