

League in East Pakistan and the Akali Dal in Punjab. With the radicalization of communal politics after the late 1960s, some of these parties shifted from the politics of group representation to campaigns for regional autonomy or independence. Most militant movements and leaders, though, emerged outside of and in opposition to conventional parties; examples are the Tamil Tigers (1976), Bhindranwale's violent campaign for an independent Khalistan (1978), and in Pakistan the Mohajir Quomi Movement (MQM, 1984).

Ahmed's analysis shows how policies of the central state contributed repeatedly and in diverse ways to the emergence and radicalization of communal politics. In some instances states pursued overtly discriminatory policies, such as the "Sinhala Only" legislation introduced in 1956 in bilingual Sri Lanka. In India the interests and electoral victories of regional parties in Kashmir and Punjab were sacrificed to the machinations of a Congress Party determined to maintain power at the center. In Bangladesh the Chakma peoples of the Chittagong Hills have lost their historic autonomy to the center and their land and resources to Bengali settlers from the lowlands. The reader is drawn inevitably to the conclusion that central governments have been principally responsible for the communalization of South Asian politics: Most separatist projects were at their outset reactive, not proactive, and they escalated from conventional politics to violent resistance in response to misguided state efforts to manage conflict.

Sectarian cleavages characterize some South Asian conflicts, but most of the potential separatists are distinguished from those who control central state power by language and separate historical status, not religion. Religiously based challenges are exemplified by militant Hinduism in India (the Bharatiya Janata Party), militant Islam in Pakistan, and militant Buddhism in Sri Lanka (the Janata Vimukti Peramnuva movement). Unlike the separatists who seek substate autonomy or sovereign statehood, these sectarian movements aim at controlling the center, or at least at imposing cultural orthodoxy on heterogeneous societies. In both Pakistan and Sri Lanka sectarians have largely succeeded: Pakistan has largely abandoned the moderate principles of the founding Muslim League to become a theocratic Islamic state, while the Sri Lankan state has given primacy to Sinhalese Buddhist language and culture at the expense of Tamil Hindu culture. In India Hindu nationalists are on the verge of power at the center but, because of the exigencies of coalition-building, have substantially trimmed their position with regard to the status of India's 12% Muslim minority.

It is evident from these examples that religious minorities in South Asia are under pressure mainly because of the efforts of (some elements of) dominant groups to establish the hegemony of their culture and belief system. In Pakistan the pressures are especially severe for the non-Muslims (mainly Christians and Hindus), the Ahmadiyya sect, and Shi'is. The most serious contemporary challenges in Pakistan are not sectarian, however. They arise from communal competition for regional political and economic hegemony. The Mujahirs, descendants of Urdu-speaking Muslim immigrants from Punjab, have come to dominate the urban centers of the province of Sindh, above all Karachi. Resentment against their advantages has prompted a strong Sindh separatist movement. But the Bhutto family is also Sindh, and when in power it has promoted Sindh interests at the expense of the Mujahirs. In reaction, some Mujahirs support a rival separatist project pursued by the terrorist MQM movement.

International factors are implicated in separatist and communal conflicts throughout the region, as Ahmed makes clear

in both the country studies and an excellent concluding chapter. The conditioning factor is the psychological legacy of partition in 1947 and the massacres and population displacement that followed. It is manifest in mutual insecurity of the Pakistani and Indian elites and extreme sensitivity to political activism on behalf of one another's coreligionists (Muslims in India, Hindus in Pakistan). The two countries' rivalry has distorted not only their international politics but also their policies toward minorities within and across their borders. It makes Hindu nationalists highly resistant to accommodations in Muslim Kashmir and has contributed to the ascendancy of Islamist politics in Pakistan. It motivated Indian intervention in East Bengal in 1971, Pakistani training of Muslim Kashmiri separatists, and clandestine Indian support for opposition communal groups in Pakistan.

In summary, Ishtiaq Ahmed has written an impressive comparative analysis of state-building and separatism in a region on which the social science literature is overwhelmingly descriptive. The conclusion builds on and synthesizes the historical and case study evidence to show how state-led modernization and uneven development have led to the reemergence of communal identities throughout South Asia and to separatist movements based on those identities. These movements have deep cultural and historical roots but are not "primordial"; rather, they are a political response to state-promoted political and economic change. In response to these movements all states in the region have in varying degrees relied on force to maintain control and have compromised or abandoned the secular and democratic principles of the first generation of postcolonial leaders.

Ahmed concludes his analysis with recommendations for peaceful resolution of communal conflicts in South Asia. At the international level he calls for engagement by worldwide movements concerned with human rights and points out the vital importance of mitigating the India-Pakistan rivalry. He rejects particularistic ethnic solutions based on redrawing the political map of the region and argues instead for power sharing and regional autonomy within existing boundaries. "A greater share in development coupled with cultural and regional autonomy appears to be the only formula that can create stability and peace within the states and in the South Asian region" (p. 299). The emerging middle classes are potentially a major local force for what Ahmed calls "humane development," including a concerted political effort to reduce state reliance on coercion and to address inequities across communal, class, and gender lines. The vision is grand, and the analysis from which it derives is careful, detailed, and on the whole convincing. *State, Nation and Ethnicity in Contemporary South Asia* is, in sum, a major contribution to the literature on modernization and the resurgence of communal challenges in the global South. And it should stand on its own as a text for courses in South Asian politics.

Democracy and the Marketplace of Ideas: Communication and Government in Sweden and the United States. By Erik Asard and W. Lance Bennet. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 243p. \$59.95 cloth, \$18.95 paper.

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Can one do imaginative political theory without using rational choice? The hard-core rational choice scholars in our discipline would, of course, flatly answer "no." They should take a look at this little book, which theorizes about the present predicament of popular government in two entirely different countries in terms of size, institutions, and political behavior. Asard and Bennet present a beautiful exploration

of the relationship between politicians/parties and the electorate in the 1990s without all the paraphernalia of noncooperative game theory. The result is a most stimulating analysis of the malaise of democracy today.

Despite all their differences, American and Swedish democracy suffer from the same problem: voter dissatisfaction, expressed in electoral volatility if not apathy, with political elites becoming increasingly myopic and opportunistic in their communication with the electorate. Asard and Bennet suggest a new interpretation of these facts by building an intuitive model that combines political communication concepts with neoinstitutional notions. How do they explain the rise of voter individualism and elite cynicism in two such different institutional environments as the gigantic United States and tiny Sweden?

Political institutions, the book argues, are open to invasion from cynical forces when the communication between voters and the politicians/parties is no longer focused upon major ideas but degenerates into media manipulation. Two such major ideas were the New Deal and the so-called Folkhemmet, which canalized the political efforts of people for decades in the two countries, giving clear-cut meaning to electoral combats and legislative work. Since these major ideas have declined in relevance and nothing similar seems to be forthcoming, the authors look for remedy in institutional reform. Thus, for the American liberal democracy, they wish to stem the role of money in U.S. electoral campaigns, limit political advertising on television to make it more equitable, reform the journalistic profession, and finally have PR introduced in the election system. For the Swedish welfare state democracy, they suggest restricting the number of national parties but increasing the number of local government politicians, strengthening the famous system of public enquiries to foster intelligent policymaking, and regulating the use or abuse of political information in the mass media.

If something critical should be stated about this brilliant book, then I would focus upon the "ought" and not the "is." For students who seek a succinct analysis of the politics of the New Deal or the Folkhemmet, this book is worth consulting. But the recommendations seem contradictory and statist in tone. Perhaps government is no longer so powerful that it can accomplish these reforms? Maybe that is the reason the New Deal and Folkhemmet ideas are no longer relevant? I would look for the remedies in more political decentralization and a more vibrant civil society, à la Tocqueville, especially with regard to still very socialist Sweden.

Tethered Deer: Government and Economy in a Chinese County. By Marc Blecher and Vivienne Shue. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996. 265p. \$39.50.

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The research for this book started in the late 1970s when China finally opened to American social scientists for field research and the authors sought to bridge the chasm between elite-centered analysis and studies of grass-roots politics, two trends then prevailing in scholarly research on China. Accordingly, the authors chose to focus on a Chinese county in order to examine how it related to upper levels of the state on the one hand and local governments and society on the other. Shulu (Tethered Deer; renamed Xinji municipality in 1986), the county that became the case for research, is located on the north China plain and not exceptionally advanced politically and economically. It remained more collectivist than many coastal cities as of 1990. The authors observe that

Shulu's "conservatism" was related to its history as a Communist Party stronghold during the Chinese Civil War.

Based on extended field visits made over a decade, the authors have produced a dynamic and variegated portrait of the political economy of Shulu, with insightful comparisons between the late Mao period (1970–78) and the first decade of the post-Mao reforms (1979–90). After an overview of the historical and material settings, the authors present information about the county government and then analyze Shulu's financial structures and relations. They find a highly diverse array of ownership patterns and financial relationships. This is followed by separate chapters on the county government's role in industrialization, commercial development, and urban as well as rural development. In all these policy arenas, state involvement has persisted in the reform era and in some cases, such as the industrial economy, the role of the state has expanded. For leaders in Shulu, the authors point out, it is natural that the state should play a dominant role.

The most striking trend about the Shulu county government was the "unprecedentedly rapid expansion and elaboration" of the bureaucracy over the 1980s (p. 29). As the number of bureaus expanded and county-level bureaus established branch offices, the number of administrative personnel also grew rapidly. Ironically, the state expanded even while more and more socioeconomic activities took place outside state planning. In contrast to the currently fashionable Chinese official policy of government downsizing, the authors explain that the government expansion was neither surprising nor excessive because the state was taking "a much more active role in monitoring and regulating both the obviously beneficial and also the potentially disruptive activities of this burgeoning arena of unplanned endeavor" (p. 32).

In line with the conventional literature, the authors find that the county government was not so much bound to the hierarchical political system as it is tethered to it. While local leaders pay heed to directives and regulations coming from above, they nevertheless find ways to adapt them to local conditions. There is definitely room for local initiative and maneuver, even during the late Mao era. Indeed, the authors argue that the most noticeable role the Shulu county government has played is that of "the developmental state."

The concept of the developmental state may serve as a convenient shorthand, but the authors' use of that concept raises important questions. Implicit in their use of the concept is the notion that "the state itself does not seek to make profits, but rather to create the conditions for enterprises to do so" (p. 209). They claim that the Shulu county government as well as individual leaders have fostered conditions conducive to growth and entrepreneurship but have nevertheless refrained from getting into profit-seeking activities itself. One major case the authors cite is the Hebei Yiji Market, a marketplace set up by the county government to facilitate trade and strengthen regulation. The authors claim that the Shulu government undertook the entire Hebei Yiji project on a nonprofit basis and did not use it to make money (p. 139).

I find such an interpretation questionable, especially because the authors' fascinating discussion of Shulu's fiscal affairs mention that budget expenditures grew twice as much as budgetary revenues. This fiscal situation would provide much impetus for the county to seek new sources of revenue, much of which went into the extra-budgetary accounts. The authors mention elsewhere that many new and revived taxes came into being and Shulu officials both at the county and township levels tightened tax collection (p. 60). Leaving aside the fact that the county government continues to own a significant number of enterprises (thus making the county