

Frimpong-Ansah is on surer ground in his criticism of Nkrumah at Cabinet meetings in 1965, when ministers and advisers were unable to point out economic errors or even to disagree with him. It was in this later period that Nkrumah's isolation led him into serious errors of judgement.

Great emphasis is placed on the rôle of cocoa in the economy – the whole of one chapter is devoted to an econometric analysis – and on its political impact, in creating a new urban élite as 'articulate contestants to the authority of the colonial government' (p. 66). But his policy prescriptions are a little ambivalent. He stresses the need for diversification of the monocrop economy, but also argues the case for incentives to expand cocoa production. He accepts P. T. Bauer's condemnation of the price distortions of the marketing board system, and even accuses it of causing the 'decay' and 'destruction' of this key export sector. These are strong words; yet nowhere does he estimate the macro-economic opportunity costs if price incentives for cocoa expansion had attracted limited resources away from other sectors, including food in the long run. Moreover, his analysis of supply elasticities in response to cocoa prices, although rigorous and backed by comprehensive statistical series, depends on somewhat narrow assumptions and appears to ignore the highly variable nature of the crop itself; the devastating effects of the drought of 1983 were only the most extreme example of this.

As a central banker and a believer in monetary – often monetarist – orthodoxy, it was perhaps predictable that the author would accept the World Bank view of the 'success' of Ghana's Structural Adjustment Programme. He does, however, criticise the S.A.P. on two main counts: first, following John Loxley's *Ghana: economic crisis and the long road to recovery* (Ottawa, 1988), for its total neglect of food production during the first six years; and secondly, for the excessive financial dependence on the World Bank and the I.M.F., involving a rapidly growing debt burden, most of which can neither be rescheduled nor annulled and carries onerous conditionality. But I do find it surprising that he ignores the devastating social effects of the S.A.P., as documented in Unicef's two-volume *Adjustment with a Human Face* (Oxford, 1987 and 1988) and elsewhere.

In spite of a few questions concerning Frimpong-Ansah's political judgement, and some doubts as to whether his fascinating account of affairs, seen from a financial centre of power, sits comfortably alongside the mathematical presentation of his econometric research, *The Vampire State in Africa* is to be welcomed as a significant contribution to 'political economy'.

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**Les Islamistes algériens face au pouvoir** by AÏSSA KHELLADI  
Algiers, Éditions Alfa, 1992. Pp. 203. AD 110.

The emergence of Islamism and its popularity in Algeria has surprised many Maghreb specialists. Indeed, Algeria, which was ruled by a secular modernist party, the *Front de libération nationale* (F.L.N.), that led the country to independence in 1962, was considered by many knowledgeable persons to be

the least likely place in the Arab/Islamic world to turn to Islamic fundamentalism. The F.L.N. ruled virtually unchallenged until the popular but bloody uprising in October 1988. The tragic events compelled the régime to initiate political reforms and to allow the creation of rival parties. However, the main beneficiary of the democratisation process by the end of 1991 was the *Front islamique du salut* (F.I.S.), whose leaders made no secret about their aversion to 'democracy'. How did Algeria, a long-time model for third-world nations, arrive at such a situation?

*Les Islamistes algériens face au pouvoir* offers convincing explanations of recent developments. According to Aïssa Khelladi, a well-informed Algerian journalist, Islamism is the product of the F.L.N., whose leaders failed to modernise the country and who refused to recognise their shortcomings. His thesis is that a religious lobby, which favoured the evolution of the movement, operated quietly within the F.L.N., and that the régime, anxious to keep total control over society, pursued a zealous policy of Islamisation.

Certainly, the growing presence of Islamists within the F.L.N. had been visible during the 1960s, not least because the Egyptian President, Gamal Abdel Nasser, eager to rid his own country of fundamentalists, had responded favourably to requests for teachers of Arabic by sending hundreds of them to Algeria as *coopérants*. Thereafter, in the field of education, the state created its own 'grave-diggers', i.e. all those trained teachers with little or no future. In 1975, President Houari Boumédiène sent back most Egyptian teachers, and closed down the Islamic institutes. At the same time, however, he claimed that the best way to promote Islam in Algeria was for a mosque to be constructed in each socialist village. Whereas there were only 2,000 mosques in the country in 1962, their number had increased to over 11,000 by 1992, of which 6,000 had been built by the state. After 1988, the F.I.S. was in control of most if not all the mosques, which had by then become political forums.

The author shows that the Islamists in Algeria drew most of their ideas from abroad, and that they neglected the outstanding works of indigenous thinkers, such as Malek Benabi. This partly explains the popularity of the Iranian Revolution for some Algerian fundamentalists who regarded this as proof that an Islamic path to power was possible. As for those who helped to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan, their narration of *mujahideen* resistance took on mythological proportions. Libya, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, for various reasons, were also among the countries that sponsored the Algerian Islamists. The latter built their strength, however, upon the failures of the F.L.N. régime, whose leaders are blamed for using Islamic ideology to legitimise their rule, and for attempting to produce a synthesis between Islam and socialism which was bound to fail.

Khelladi emphasises the F.L.N.'s responsibility for the growth of the Islamist movement. The state, in fact, favoured the spread of Islamist ideology by building thousands of mosques, by founding Islamic institutes, by flooding television with religious programmes, and by allocating substantial resources to the holding of international seminars on Islamic thought. The author is quite correct in posing the question: 'How can one accuse the state of having fought Islam when most of its representatives have always been careful, often in a pathological fashion, to present themselves as "irreproachable Mus-

lims''?' (p. 162). The state's contradictory policies vis-à-vis the Islamists encouraged them to become increasingly audacious in their words and actions. In fact, President Chadli Bendjedid showed extreme leniency towards the excesses of the movement's leaders. Worse still, the F.L.N. never understood the real nature and aspirations of the Islamists, let alone their grievances.

The F.I.S. was not, as often portrayed by the western media, simply a party of violence and intolerance. In fact, according to Khelladi, 'it was a movement that succeeded in mobilising a marginalised youth around an existential project, a moral order, an immanent justice where redemption is a permanent idea' (p. 99). It greatly influenced the underprivileged, most of whom were members of the lumpenproletariat that had been created by the dislocation of traditional society. The Islamist movement also appealed greatly to the unemployed; to the *hittistes* or 'wall-holders' with no other occupation; to those with a diploma in Arabic but with no job (the *Arabophones*); to students in the physical sciences; and to tradesmen hostile to state socialism who contributed financially to the construction of numerous mosques, as well as to the activities of the F.I.S.

The Islamists succeeded in their mobilisation campaign although the F.I.S. did not have a coherent programme. Despite much talk about the *shari'a*, the movement's leaders used the arguments of those whom they derided as being secular in order to make suggestions for solving Algeria's economic problems. Despite some sympathy for the Islamists at times, Khelladi clearly shows the reactionary nature of those whose main objective was not progress, but simply concern with a mythical and regressive past.

*Les Islamistes algériens face au pouvoir* contains a very informative section on the different Islamist organisations, including the conservative, peaceful *confréries* or 'brotherhoods'. The last part of the book and the postscript are most revealing, even if some of the author's interpretations are questionable. However, he persuasively analyses the discreditable tactics used by Bendjedid to maintain himself in power, as well as the opportunistic manoeuvres of the F.I.S. leader, Abassi Madani. Although Khelladi claims in his preface that his only aim is to reveal a few historical landmarks in the evolution of the Islamist movement in Algeria, he has done more than that by demonstrating in a timely work the responsibility of the F.L.N. in helping the Islamist movement to grow, despite the totalitarian nature of the régime and the regressive character of the Islamists.

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**The Political Economy of Third World Intervention: mines, money, and U.S. policy in the Congo crisis** by DAVID N. GIBBS  
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\$29.95.

United Nations intervention in the Congo during the early 1960s drew accusations of American economic imperialism from some unexpected quarters. In the House of Commons the Labour Opposition witnessed the