

refer to the Menippeans will fail to consult it at his peril. C. has deserved well of Varro and indeed of classical scholarship. He closes the work with a warm tribute to the support of his wife ('Elle sait par expérience que partager la vie d'un universitaire chercheur n'est pas une sinécure') and his four children—they will perhaps be even

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AGAINST THE SCEPTICS

A. HALTENHOFF: *Kritik der akademischen Skepsis. Ein Kommentar zu Cicero, Lucullus I–62*. (Studien zur klassischen Philologie 113.) Pp. 226. Berlin, etc.: Peter Lang, 1998. Paper, DM 29. ISBN: 3-631-33440-0.

This revised doctoral thesis offers a commentary on §§ 1–62 of the *Lucullus*, that is to say on Cicero's introduction and on Lucullus' speech against Academic scepticism. The commentary is preceded by a German translation and a short introduction.

No Latin text is printed. H. follows Plasberg's 1922 Teubner, signalling his few departures by an asterisk in the translation. Asterisks should be added at § 12 [32.15 Plasberg] ('*illa*' for '*illi*'); at § 24 [39.26–7], where Plasberg's punctuation is significantly altered; and at § 28 [41.8–10]—see p. 164. At § 43 [48.15–16], where Plasberg obelizes, it is not clear what text H. translates. Some of his judgements are inferior to Reid's; one or two are correct (e.g. '*καταληπτόν*' for '*ἀκατάληπτον*' at § 18 [36.9]); and the dark sentence at § 16 [34.20–2] is illuminated by the observation that '*nihilne . . . investigata sunt*' does not refer to the post-Academic period (p. 107). (Lucullus means: 'Perhaps the ancients did not discover anything, but at least they tried—and later Academic quibbling cannot efface their merit'. H.'s interpretation is plausible; but it requires some change to the text, e.g. '*postea quod*' for '*postea quam*'.)

The translation, so far as I am able to judge, is accurate. In a few places there is room for doubt: at § 10 [31.8], 'unentschieden' is odd for '*integram*' (but see p. 80); at § 13 [33.13], 'Unterstützung . . . gewährt haben' is feeble for '*auctores fuisse*' (but see p. 89); at [33.14] the subject of '*suspiciantur*' is '*seditioni cives*' (pace p. 89 n. 8); and at [33.16] '*mentiri*' has its usual sense, in *Luc.*, of 'speak falsely' (but see p. 90). Half a dozen similar niggles might be added.

The commentary shows a decent knowledge of the secondary literature. (By the standards of doctoral theses, H. refers to it sparingly; and he has an excellent note to explain why: p. 15 n. 1.) The notes are intended to be philosophical rather than philological or historical. But there are numerous philological remarks, most of them sane and helpful. And I commend the brisk observation on p. 84: 'source-critical speculations do not in fact advance our understanding of the work'. (But H. does not always heed his own advice. The speculations about the 'original prologue', p. 68, are fanciful; the claim that '*sequitur*' at § 30 [42.5] refers to the order of discussion in 'the treatise of Antiochus' is eccentric.)

There are also numerous historical notes, some of them otiose and a few of them dubious. I still see no reason to believe that Antiochus' chief function 'on the staff of Lucullus' was diplomatic rather than recreational (p. 64). Was there in Cicero's time

'an increased need for a philosophy appropriate for the conduct of life', and did such a need make the Academic disputes seem 'Academic' (p. 77)? Why think (p. 79) that a 'purely "negative" philosophy' could not entrance anyone? (Arcesilaus and Carneades were charmers: see § 60.) The link between Arcesilaan scepticism and the philosophy of Plato 'can certainly no longer be reconstructed completely and precisely' (p. 96). What in antiquity can be? And we know more about the 'sceptical Plato' than H. lets on. The speculations about Democritus on p. 214 are irrelevant: in § 55 [53.30] the reference is to the ancient *physici* in general.

The philosophical notes are largely concerned to establish parallels (in Cicero, in Sextus), and to fix *Luc.* in the historical development of the New Academy. Much of this is well done, though not much is novel. There are also notes of a more strictly philosophical kind. Here H. is sometimes ill at ease. At § 21 [37.32] it is urged that '*haec*' refers to 'general concepts', and not to judgements (p. 141); and this determines H.'s interpretation of the section. But the reference of '*haec*' at 37.32 can scarcely be different from the reference of '*haec*' at 37.30, where it indisputably refers to judgements. 'It is doubtful whether, as Cicero says, the definition of *κατάληψις* was a matter of dispute . . .; the really controversial question was not: What is *κατάληψις* but rather: Is there any *κατάληψις* at all?' (p. 112). But the Stoic answer to the first question is in fact dubious and it was in fact doubted. As H. notes, 'Philo declared that knowledge is possible and rejected the <Stoic> definition—no doubt because he saw it as unsatisfiable' (p. 120; the last clause is entirely unwarranted). Antiochus' claim that Philo ends up in the scepticism he most feared (§ 18) is supported by a lousy argument. But it is not a *petitio principii* (pace p. 120), nor is there a *petitio* in § 22 (pace p. 148). (If H. is weak on *petitio*, he is also weak on circular argument: see p. 216.)

H.'s criticism of § 19 depends on the assertion that 'hearing cannot hold on to its perceptions' (p. 132). But I can remember a tune as easily as a face. Nor do I understand the reference to 'the strongly subjective components of taste and smell' (p. 135). In § 20, the enhanced perception of experts is not directed toward special 'aesthetic' properties' (pace p. 133): as the example shows, Lucullus alludes to the fact that a trained musician hears a tune faster than I do (see p. 135). The contrast between 'passive' sensation and 'active' thought (p. 140), as common as it is obscure, is not found in Cicero's text. 'Under these conditions, a *memoria falsorum* becomes impossible' (p. 146). But it is, trivially, never possible to remember what is false, nor does Cicero suggest otherwise.

'The comparison with the scales <in § 38> might give the impression that assent is not in the power of the *animus*' (p. 190): it is not the comparison which gives this impression, but the use of the formula '*necesse est*' [46.4]. 'The rigour of the Stoics in questions of first principles, their formal pedantry, and their excessive systematisation . . . often hide the intuitive plausibility which many of their notions from the beginning possess' (p. 191). What sort of animal 'intuitive plausibility' might be I do not know, nor why it should engage affection. But it is plain that most Stoic doctrines were, from the start, self-consciously paradoxical. 'It is surprising that the power of the evident, so confidently affirmed a moment ago, should now be doubly limited <in § 45>' (p. 201). The 'power' of the evident (whatever that might be) is not limited; rather, Lucullus reminds us that the evident is not always evidently evident. You may falsely think that it is evident that P, and you may falsely think that it is not evident that P. To avoid such mistakes, you need the nose and the application of a truffle-hound.

H. has not read the literature on soritical arguments and does not understand what a sorites is: on p. 207 there is a mysterious reference to 'the dialogical principle

of proof'; a footnote observes, as though it were pertinent, that the sorites is called a *genus interrogationis*; and H. irrelevantly adduces Aristotle, *SEI* 179a35. In § 54 Lucullus would indeed grossly misrepresent the Academic argument were '*eosdem*' at [53.28] to signify numerical identity (so p. 213); but it does not and he does not. On § 60 H. comments that that 'the passage is not easy to understand and requires a detailed analysis' (p. 218). The analysis contains some unconvincing remarks about the alleged 'esoteric teaching' of the New Academy, and it ends with an interpretation which I do not understand (p. 220). In § 60 there is, for once, nothing to worry over. Lucullus turns briefly to the Academic practice of arguing *contra omnia* and *pro omnibus*. The practice is supposed to be the best—perhaps the only—path to the truth. Then what truths have the Academics discovered, asked Lucullus. And answer came there 'None'. The rest is drollery.

Luc. is a difficult work, in parts outrageously difficult. A reader will grasp at any straw in the wind. H.'s commentary has faults; but it is generally competent and often enlightening. It does not supplant Schäublin et al., and it does not replace Reid. But it need not blush to lie beside them on the shelves.

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DE FINIBUS

†L. D. REYNOLDS (ed.): *Cicero, De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum* (Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis). Pp. xxiv + 233. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. Cased, £18.99. ISBN: 0-19-814670-1.

After the late Mr Reynolds's editions of Seneca (*Letters* and *Dialogues*) and Sallust in the Oxford series, the merits of this one come as no surprise.

Faithful to a no longer binding tradition, R. has put his preface into clear and elegant Latin. His text rests on seven manuscripts of his choice (eight are listed, but presumably B and E, being twins, count as one?) out of some 150 extant. Their relationships are duly established and illustrated from their readings. How much here is additional to Madvig's great work (3rd edn, 1876) and how much in divergence from it is perspicuously set forth. As for what came between: 'After Madvig investigation of these matters progressed step by step; scholars in various ways paved the way for the presentation of these manuscripts (*ad hos libros edendos*). But nobody has attempted a thorough (*funditus*) re-examination of the whole matter.' A footnote supplies a summary of such past contributions. Only a fellow specialist could properly evaluate these eighteen authoritative pages. There follows a list of thirty-two editors and eighty-one scholars referred to in the edition, with bibliographic accompaniments.

And so to the text. I think R. as an editor might fairly be described in a now topical phrase: a compassionate conservative. Not a dedicated upholder of traditional nonsense, though occasionally letting it lie unmolested, but 'happiest in conjectures "of the type commonly called brilliant—neat and pretty changes of a letter or two"' (*CP* 74 [1979], 77) and very seldom advancing one of his own; that said, an intelligent and independent judge. Anyway, critical genius would be wasted on the *De Finibus*. Not only is the manuscript tradition better than most, but since Madvig and others before and after him removed its detectable errors, that is by the beginning of the last century, little was left to do. For the problems that remain the author is evidently for the most part responsible. As usual in his philosophical treatises, Cicero wrote in a hurry, from

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