Readings
in Peace & Conflict
Studies

Edited by:

Kayode Soremekun, Ph.D
Sheriff Folarin, Ph.D
Daniel Gberevbie, Ph.D
Duruji Moses, Ph.D

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Table of Content

Acknowledgment

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Chapter Eleven:
Post-Conflict Peacebuilding

By

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and

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Introduction

Africa post-colonial society is lumbered with conflicts (Tarekegn, 2005). The world witnessed an increased number of intrastate conflicts since the end of the Cold War like the civil struggles in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador, Eritrea-Ethiopia, Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Colombia, Kosovo, and the recent Arab Revolution in Syria, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya etc. just to mention a few states which have drawn the attention of the international community (Sollenberg & Wallensteen, 1996; Marshall & Gurr 2003). The study by Uvin (2002, p.5) on conflict reveals that the concord between peace, development as well as security has become the fundamental subject of the international conflict management discourse.

During the Cold War period, the super powers attempt to intervene in restoring peace amongst world powers was difficult and in fact almost impossible, however, the post-Cold War dynamics has been quite different in that after the end of the Cold War, new opportunities for international collaboration in approaching armed conflict and

establishing lasting peace became open (Filipov, 2006). One of such international collaboration came under the umbrella of Post Conflict Peacebuilding (PCPB). This reveals that the spotlight of international conflict management has progressively moved from peacekeeping, to peacebuilding (Tschirgi, 2004). De Coning (2008, pp.85-110) was of the view that peacebuilding is ever more seen as the shared agenda or structure under which peace, security, rule of law, human rights and development dimensions can be brought together under one common strategy at the national level. The ever improving strategic management of conflict influenced the UN reform proposals of the 2005 World Summit, in the establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission. Also, in Africa, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) adopted a Post-Conflict Reconstruction Framework in 2005 and the AU adopted a Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy in 2006 all revealing the eminent attention the subject of peacebuilding has gained amongst countries, institutions and scholars.

Peacebuilding was adopted by the UN as one of the mechanisms with which it will respond to post cold war conflicts alongside preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping (Tschirgi, 2004). Despite these recent developments and the newness of the term peacebuilding, external assistance for post-war rebuilding can be traced back to the reconstruction of postWorld War II Europe and Japan. Peacebuilding has been embraced as an approach for conflict management. It has achieved some successes in Bosnia, Herzegovina and El Salvador because they have sustained the peace and have failed in some other places. However, a longitudinal research states that there is about 44 percent likelihood for a country reaching the end of conflict to regress into it in the next five years (Collier, 2003). Despite the fact that Post conflict peacebuilding

has gained more popularity now in the contemporary societies than in the immediate aftermath of WW11, it is clear that there are eminent challenges that should be addressed which include the security threats posed by terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the new arms race among states, decline in the consensus between and among international actors in the post cold war era, and the problem of internal-external disconnect.

This section is structured into seven parts. Part one serves as the introduction, part two considers the historical development and the concept of the post conflict peacebuilding (PCPB), part three looks at dimensions and elements of peacebuilding, part four discusses post-conflict peacebuilding paradigm, part five examines the approaches and steps in peacebuilding, part six explores the challenges limiting the successes of PCPB activities, and part seven serves as the conclusion.

Historical Development and the Concept of Peace-building

(a) Historical Development

The address Boutro Ghali gave in 1992 marked the period the term peacebuilding entered the international vocabulary and became widely used (Maiese, 2003). In the 1990s, the concept was used interchangeably with conflict prevention, conflict management and post-conflict reconstruction (Tschirgi, 2004, p. i). Conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding agendas became seen as 'two sides of the same coin', particularly in countries that are post conflict arenas. Peacebuilding became a strategy for conflict prevention (Tschirgi, 2004). Also during this era of post cold war, PCPB was seen as an international obligation and responsibility. It became a collective commitment of the UN as well as other international actors to mitigate

causes of violent conflicts in conflict-torn societies. The impetus for peacebuilding came from multiple sources but found its strongest expression at the United Nations so much that throughout the 1990s, the UN provided both the rationale and the operational principles for post-conflict peacebuilding. However, international approach to PCPB is rooted in the "liberal peace" derived from the tradition of Western liberal theory and practice (Dobbins et al, 2005). Throughout the cold war era, the international community and the UN limited their efforts in the milieu of conflicts to humanitarian relief, peacemaking and peacekeeping activities. Post-conflict reconstruction was excused from their goal (Tschirgi, 2004, p.1).

Between 1992 and 2001, the hitherto limitation of the scope of PCPB was expanded. It encompassed military issues like security sector reforms; political issues like national dialogues, early elections, the expansion of political rights, and the establishment of rule of law; humanitarian issues, human rights, and socio-economic issues like reforms for speedy recovery and rehabilitation at the policy and operational levels. As the role of the Security Council expanded beyond immediate crisis management, the UN's peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions/ activities became increasingly intertwined (Call, 2004 cited in Tschirgi, 2004; Repertoire of the practise of the Security Council, 1998).

(b) Concept of Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding is difficult to define and even more difficult to achieve in practice (Cousens, 2001). The concept has been defined in various ways. A series of definitions by institutions, a body of approaches and even individuals are given below to help understand the nitty-gritty of the

subject of focus- PCPB. The Minimalist approach defines it as the averting or prevention of a revisit or return to violence. It searches for indications of structural alterations and changes of the economic, social and political factors that had led to or caused the conflict. The instrumentalist approach identifies worthwhile short-term changes underpinning the peace, which can contribute to more sustainable societal transformation in the long run (Tschirgi, 2004). Galtung (1969, p.167-191) observed that Spence gave a normative definition of peacebuilding as:

> Those activities and processes that focus on the root causes of the conflict, rather than just the effects; support the rebuilding and rehabilitation of all sectors of the war-torn society; encourage and support interaction between all sectors of society in order to repair damaged relations and start the process of restoring dignity and trust; recognize the specifics of each post conflict situation; encourage and support the participation of indigenous resources in the design, implementation and sustainment of activities and processes; and promote processes that will endure after the initial emergency recovery phase has passed.

In 1996, the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative defined peacebuilding as a short-term activity, "a life-line" thrown to countries emerging from conflict (Tschirgi, 2004). One of the definitions that takes a long-term focus see PCPB as a chain of strategies designed to promote a secure and stable lasting peace in which the basic human needs of the population are met and violent conflicts do not recur (Evans, 1993, p.39). Peacebiuilding Commission (2007, p.6) supports the view that peacebuilding is not an activity or set of activities, but rather a framework that entail the goals and purposes, of post-conflict interventions.

From the definitions above, it is evident that peacebuilding *involves a range of approaches and transformative processes which could be* short and long-term approaches and needs, it concedes both effects and root

causes or sources of conflict or tension which include historical, socio-economic and political elements like military culture and proliferation of weapons, their effects and *seeks to mitigate them* (Spence, 2001, pp.137-138). Therefore, the essence of post-conflict peace-building is basically political even though it comprises activities which exceed the political realm, like development cooperation, humanitarian assistance, protection of human rights and institution building.

It is essential to note that PCPB actually begins when a cease-fire agreement or peace agreement, which empowers the international community to support the peace process is being executed. It develops through three stages, namely *a stabilisation phase, a transitional phase,* and *a consolidation phase.* The process ends when the host society has developed the competence to handle, control and sustain its own peace process without supports from the external context (De Coning, 2008, pp.85-110). The interval between the first deployment of peacekeepers and the beginning of peace building is often referred to as the twilight zone (Peacebiuilding Commission, 2007).

A unique attribute of a peace building is interdependence which takes many divergent forms (Lederach, 1999). No single agency, actors or even network can achieve the ultimate goal of the peace building system on its own. Each actor contributes a part of the whole. It is the collective and cumulative effect of these individual actors and activities that builds momentum towards sustainable peace and development. The success of each individual activity will ultimately yield the success of the total collective and cumulative effect of the overall undertaking while the failure of individual actors could impede the overall goal of PCPB (Smuts, 1987; De Coning, 2008; United Nation, 2006).

1.   Dimensions and Elements of Peace building

Just like there are various views on the definition of PCPB, there are also divergent notions on the dimensions of peace building. For instance, the UN Secretary-General's Note on Integrated Missions (2006) lists seven dimensions, namely: political, development, humanitarian assistance, human rights, rule of law, social and security. Smith (2003) and NEPAD's Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework for Africa (NEPAD, 2005) include humanitarian assistance as part of the socio-economic development category and as part of the peace building process while scholars like Weir (2006) differ on this view of including humanitarian activities in the process. For scholars like Matthew, Brown & Jensen (2009) there are only four dimensions of peace building, the socio-economic development, good governance, reform of justice and security institutions, and the culture of justice, truth and reconciliation. For Tschirgi (2004), they are political liberalization, economic liberalization, security and psycho-social dimensions.

The elements of peace building refer to its building blocks, constituents, components or facets that help to create stable peace. According to the Peace biuilding Commission (2007) they are disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of Combatants. Filipov (2006) added to the disarmament of combatants political and economic concessions aimed at stabilizing the state, development of infrastructure, and consolidation of the legal, financial and political systems. Ghani et.al. (2007) and Swarbrick (2007) differ slightly from the above views by adding the re-establishment of the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force. It can be observed that a common denominator of the views of the above named scholars and institutional report is the disarmament of rebels.

The African Union's Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Framework (African Union, 2006) mentioned that PCPB comprises six constitutive elements, including gender as a self-standing element. Post-conflict peacebuilding is built on the premise that physical security, political stability, social reconciliation, and economic reconstruction are integrated elements of a domestically owned enterprise in which external actors need to play a supportive role (Tschirgi, 2004). Values like peace, development, human rights, and democracy are also as key elements of an international conflict prevention and peacebuilding agenda, collectively, they constitute a normative framework for international action (Tschirgi, 2004; UN, 1992; UN, 1995). According to Tschirgi (2004), the core element that lies at the center of peace building is the establishment of a legitimate political authority which can provide security, avoid a relapse into violent conflict and also undertake longer-term socio-economic reconstruction efforts.

2. Post-Conflict Peace building Paradigm

According to Church & Shouldice (2002), since the early 1990s, peace building interventions began to exhibit certain common characteristics. These widespread characteristics are the Operational Principles of Post-Conflict Peace building or post-conflict peace building paradigm. They are worth mentioning. First, PCPB has several pillars which have been identified differently by different actors. However, there is consensus that peace building has political, social, economic, security and legal dimensions which are all important. Peace building is nevertheless understood to be a highly political project involving the creation of a legitimate political authority that can prevent the rebirth of violence (Tschirgi, 2004). There is the hierarchy of priorities which requires an

overall political strategy. Secondly, establishing security is considered the pre-requisite for post-conflict peace building.

Another is the issue of ownership. The consensus view of this subject of ownership is that the indigenes of the war-torn society must own and be in charge of the reconstruction process. They must actively be involved in setting the agenda and leading the process. There are external actors. They provide support critical for post-conflict reconstruction. Sometimes the supports are coloured by national interest they often make their actions, activities and motivation incompatible with the political realities in the war torn societies. Proper mechanisms have been established to ensure that external and internal actors work within a coherent strategy, establish priorities, and mobilize the necessary resources (Tschirgi, 2004).

A commitment to building the capacity of the citizens of the conflict ridden countries from the earliest stages is vital for sustainability of peace. The next is time element. There are two dimensions to time in post-conflict reconstruction. Apt, opportunistic and quick-impact interventions are critical in influencing peace building outcomes. Nonetheless, PCPB itself is a long-term process that may take a long time to bear fruit. Timely response is not a necessary condition for the establishment of peace. Sufficient, predictable and flexible funding is indispensable to supporting post-conflict reconstruction. Appropriate funding mechanisms are indispensable to have impact on the ground in a timely manner. Post-conflict reconstruction involves appropriate responses at the local, national, regional and international levels. Lastly, accountability is an essential principle (Orr, 2004; OECD, 2001)

At the bottom of these principles is the acknowledgment that external actors need to play an important role in post-conflict peace building, which is a long-term, home grown and political process. They have invested efforts in enhancing their own guidelines, capacities, operations, institutional arrangements and compiling serial lessons learned from their operations (Tschirgi, 2004).

The Steps in Peace building Process

Peace building in any country is a long lengthy process requiring much time and effort. Research has observed that countries suffering serious internal conflicts face the difficult challenge of making the transition from highly-polarized political relations and war-weakened economies to revitalized economies capable of providing the basic needs of all citizens and political systems meaningful participation in the decisions shaping their future. Nevertheless, if a good strategy is designed, countries can succeed political transformation with less pain and become a democratic country. Strategies to enhance effective and efficient peace building in any country therefore include transitional justice, the need to form a representative government, strengthening security base, making a new constitution, economic reconstruction, and national reconciliation. The steps therefore include the following:

(a)   Transitional Justice

First and foremost, peace building cannot be measured simply by the mere absence of bloodshed. It is assessed by the moral quality of the outcome. Meaning that, any peace building effort requires at least some degree of justice, and justice requires punishment of the guilty (International

Middle East Peace Research Center [IMPR], 2012; Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2010). International Middle East Peace Research Center [IMPR] (2012) observed that although opening up old wounds is always problematical, however, it is the starting point in the direction of peace and democracy in a country would be the establishment of an investigative committee or a truth commission to discover individuals, particularly government officers and military personnel, who were responsible for acts of violence. In the final analysis, no peace can be durable without a sense of justice. This would be basically similar to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission model. South Africa assumed that it could understand and to some extent expurgate itself of apartheid and apartheid's abuses by haring the testimony of about 22,000 victims. The country, subsequent to the truth hearings, also began to write a truthful history acceptable to all contending parties (Christie, 2000; Shea, 2000).

(b)   Representative Government

A representative government is a government chosen by the general consensus of the people to represent them in government through an election. If a real progress is to be made towards peace and democracy, a representative government freely elected must be formed as quickly as possible in post-conflict countries. The first two or three elections in the post-conflict phase may be a source of great tension, as they constitute one of the first real tests of the extent to which all parties can play an authentic role in determining the direction of the country (IMPR, 2012).

(c) Strengthening Security

For peace and sustainable development, security is a necessary condition.

One of the major problem often confronting post-conflict countries is the constant fear of people being killed or wounded during confrontation by mafias, hooligans, and thieves that operate with relative impunity in the interim period (Yilmaz, 2009). Particularly new criminals in post-conflict countries are demobilized combatants and officers, still possessing their weapons but no new livelihood. Hence the vital need to fortify its security base. The termination of the conflict in post-conflict countries offers a unique opportunity to address fundamental imbalances in the relationship between security forces and the rest of the society, imbalances that contribute to conflict and make sustainable development more difficult to achieve. In order to successfully consolidate internal and external security after cessation of hostilities, it is usually necessary discharge government troops, to disband opposition and paramilitary forces, re-define the doctrine and missions of the security forces, train civilian security analysts to fulfil watchdog functions, reform military and police education systems to address the goals of democratic societies, institutionalize mechanisms to conduct formal assessments of security needs and terminate extra legal forms of recruitment to the security forces (IMPR, 2012). In summary security entails disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, the control of small arms, light weapons and security reforms (Johnson, 2004).

(d)   A New Constitution

Another quintessential step that would enhance peace building in post-conflict countries is the drafting of a new constitution. According to Lerner (2011), he defined a constitution as the foundational legal document from which the entire national system of rules derives. Put differently, it is the cornerstone for the rule of law. He asserted that once a

constitution has been drafted and imposed by a small group of elites from the victorious party, the foundation is less democratic and likely fragile. Constitution making should involve a process of national dialogue allowing competing perspectives and claims, hence facilitating reconciliation among conflicting groups (Yilmaz, 2005). Yet enabling a broad spectrum of society to participate in shaping the constitution means that the process will take significantly longer to complete, entail higher administrative costs and greater debate, and possibly result in some compromises that might otherwise be avoided. On the other hand, it may also produce a constitutional system that is more widely accepted, more stable, and more supportive of peace (IMPR, 2012).

Furthermore, the new constitution of any post-conflict country should also emphasize international norms of human rights, non-discrimination, tolerance, and it should be the vehicle of the development of liberal democracy. In this respect, the constitution should virtually guarantee a representative government in which the executive is accountable to the electorate, an independent judiciary, competing political parties, a clear separation of the state and political parties, periodic elections in which all adult citizens freely participate, detailed guarantees in the area of criminal procedure, special protection of minority rights, freedom of expression, as well as effective means of redress against administrative decisions (IMPR, 2012).

(e)   Economic Reconstruction

Economic reconstruction is also crucial in the process of peace building and democratization. Although in some countries for instance, Libya, the uprising was not directly caused by economic distress. Nevertheless, the

economic dimension of any post conflict country is very vital. It is important to note that, a state characterized by unjust distribution of national wealth and poverty is one where social rivalry is likely to grow. The existence of economic well-being, on the other hand, may give different groups a stake in the system and enhance the country's security level (Horowitz, 2000; International Middle East Peace Research Center [IMPR], 2012). However to mend the economic deficits in any post-conflict country, the international community could be supportive in a number of ways. For example, it can offer technical assistance to implement reconstruction efforts and rehabilitate the basic infrastructure. Early action is especially needed to help rehabilitate the infrastructure that is crucial to economic revival, and stabilize both the currency and financial institutions.

(f)   National Reconciliation

Finally, a durable peace necessitates the transformation of hostile relations. Just as lengthy civil strives undermine institutional and economic capacity, they also severely weaken the social fabric of a country by destroying communities, engendering a culture of violence, creating a sense of mistrust that makes collaboration on long-term efforts difficult to achieve, and wreaking psychological traumas. For instance, in Libya, there are about 140 tribes and clans that are generally in conflict with one another (Falk, 2011; Lerner, 2011; Ayhan, 2011). The uprising further deepened old hatreds among many tribes as well. What's more, the tribes supporting the Ghaddafi regime during and before the uprising are now having a hard time in adjusting themselves to the post-conflict situation. But somehow national reconciliation is necessary in the country. Rival groups have all to develop a working

trust to make it possible for existing and future problems to be dealt with in a constructive way (IMPR, 2012).

According to the International Middle East Peace Research Center (2012) which posited that one vital way to ease relational problems and build trust among hostile groups would be track-two diplomacy. Track-two diplomacy is an unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups aiming to develop strategies, influence public opinion and organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict (Montville, 1990). If they are well-organized and undertaken for a reasonably long time, people-to-people interactions often working through problem-solving workshops, mediated or facilitated by psychologically-sensitive third-parties, may provide an opportunity for disputants to examine the root causes of their conflict and to identify obstacles to better relationships. Moreover, by allowing face-to-face communication, they may help participants arrest the dehumanization process, overcome psychological barriers, and focus on relationship building (Davies and Kaufman, 2002; Yilmaz, 2005).

The conclusion emerging from the above steps indicates that if the peace building process outlined above is successfully completed, the country may tend towards the direction of democracy. However, it is important to note that this is not an easy task because the post-conflict society faces complex and large set of issues that must be addressed rapidly. Resolving the myriad of institutional, economic, social, and political problems takes on a heightened urgency as many of these issues are related to the conflict itself. Failing to respond in a timely fashion may create the conditions for a return to organized violence. Coping with such challenging tasks and building peace in any country are not likely

through the efforts of one actor only. Multi-level efforts must be put by several actors, domestic and international. Particularly important is to encourage the participation of third-parties that operate independent of big-power political interests and that are somehow trustworthy as so many competing tribes in Libya are the least equipped to design a durable peace by themselves. Besides, the parties' capacity to meet the demands of peace building is severely constrained by institutional weaknesses, as well as limited human and financial resources. Hence, right supports by right third-parties are crucial in the peace building process in any country (IMPR, 2012).

Challenges limiting the success of PCPB activities

In the course of implementing PCPB, there are challenges encountered by actors at all levels and commitments to PCPB are under threat from various sources. The first relates to the delicate constraint of security threats posed by terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the new arms race among states. Also, agreements/ consensus between and among international actors in the post cold war era have declined and the international system is divided, and lack of consensus on the threats to international peace and security among other things presents overwhelming challenges to the entire peacebuilding project (Tschirgi, 2004).

The problem of the negative balance or internal-external disconnect is another challenge. This refer to the continuous focus of external actors on their own activities, capacities and mechanisms which tends to overshadow the more pressing need to strengthen the capacities of domestic actors. Put differently, it connotes the inability of international actors to acclimatize their assistance to the political dynamics and

domestic political realities of the war-torn societies they seek to support. It manifests at the conceptual, policy, operational and institutional levels. For instance, the debates on the Darfur crisis and the peace process in the Sudan exposed the discriminating political sensitivities among the UN's member states. There is a conflict of interest and purpose in Afghanistan and Iraq between the US, Russia and other countries. The reason for the rush is not far from the geo-strategic importance of the states and the security interests of powerful external actors. However, the United States remains the critical player via its influencing policies (Dobbins et al., 2003; Orr, 2004). Other peacebuilding needs, as in the Sudan, Burundi and the DRC, have attracted limited political attention and resources despite their necessity and enormity (Tschirgi, 2004). Unless the internal-external disconnect is addressed the efforts directed at peacebuilding will continue to yield little results in terms of achieving sustainable peace and development (Tschirgi, 2004; Bastian & Luckham, 2003; Reilly, 2003; De Coning, 2008).

Not too delinked from the problem of negative balance is the dominance of external agencies in the internal/external relationship. Relationships between internal and external actors are very asymmetric and characterized by patronage (Pouligny, 2005: 495510). The challenges external actors face like finding credible internal actors, internal actors' lack of time, resources, technical expertise which make them unable or unwilling to establish a meaningful relationship with bilateral and multilateral donors have often been impediment to PCPB (Peacebuilding Commission, 2007).

The increasing number of conflict reoccurrence in post-conflict areas have prompted some scholars to believe that current post-conflict peacebuilding strategies fall short of securing lasting peace in these

regions. States such as Sierra Leone and Liberia have been fluctuating between war and peace, which decrease the chances of ceasefire and societal peace. It has been observed that short-lived periods of relative peace have usually been established after foreign aid and international experts have been allocated to the regions. The concerted efforts of the local governments, NGOs, and various international actors achieve relatively easy the short-term goals of political and economic stability in the country. However, once the foreign financial aid and international assistance is gradually reduced, the states fail to sustain the peace due to the lack of local human resources that are able to continue the already initiated policies. The poor social development in these areas inevitably affects the long-term goals of peacebuilding, thus, exposing the country to a risk of conflict reoccurrence (Filipov, 2006; Tschirgi, 2004).

Countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and El Salvador have sustained the peace for sometimes while foreign aid and international expertise have been gradually reduced over the years, the countries have developed strong social programs to supplement the political and economic stability and sustain peace (Filipov, 2006). Indisputably, international assistance is crucial in building the foundations for the creation of lasting peace. However, excessive foreign interference in terms of economic resources and know-how usually create heavily aid-dependent states. These foreign assistances rarely devise and implement policies that will build strong civil society ready to support peace without external assistance. One of the challenges of peacebuilding is addressing the root causes of the conflicts. More often than not when peace agreement are held without critically addressing the root causes/factors lying at the root of the original crisis continues to fester and pose challenges to peace consolidation and peacebuilding (Peck, 1999;

Filipov, 2006).

There is now broad consensus that contradictory policies and fragmented programmes entail a higher risk of duplication and failure of PCPB. In the study conducted by the Joint Utstein Study of peacebuilding in which 336 peacebuilding projects executed implemented by Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Norway in the 1990s, it was observed that, lack of coherence was the most significant obstacle to sustainable peacebuilding (Smith, 2003, p. 16). It was observed that over 55% of the programmes evaluated lacked link to a strategy of a larger country which undermines their sustainability and the ability to achieve strategic goals (De Coning, 2008).

Another problem is the lack of co-ordination that is partly due to widely recognized factors some of which have been mentioned above like the multitude of actors, the high cost in time and money that effective co-ordination entails; the need for donors to satisfy their own constituencies and serve their national interests; competition for influence and visibility between donors; and the general unwillingness of actors to limit their margin for tactic by the discipline of coordination' (Uvin, 1999). Coordination can entail developing strategies, determining objectives, planning, sharing information, dividing roles and responsibilities, and mobilising resources (Minear & Chellia, 1992). It should be recognised, however, that not all the agents in the system need to be engaged in all coordination activities (De Coning, 2008).

A severe threat to the peacebuilding agenda arises from the deep political divisions that have emerged within the international community

following the US-led war on terrorism and the war in Iraq. They cut across multiple divides that are not just ideological, developmental or geographic in nature undermining efforts to define a common and collective framework for international action in the early years of the 21st century. There are profound discrepancy as to what constitutes the top priorities for the international community and how to address them within the Security Council, at the General Assembly, within regional organizations, and even among allies to mention just a few bodies. The "international compact" that was articulated in the Millennium Declaration, An Agenda for Peace and An Agenda for Development endorsed at the end of the Cold War seems to have lost its hold. There is at present no similar alternative to give direction or cohesion to the efforts of the international community to address the multiple threats and challenges even the United Nations, which represents the collective international will needs reform (Tschirgi, 2004).

3.   Conclusion

The section examines the relevance of PCPB and the aftermath of violent conflicts in societies. It observes that the problems of corruption, negative balance or internal external disconnects, the dominance of external agencies, the increasing numbers of conflict reoccurrence in post conflict areas, avoiding to address the root cause of conflicts, lack of coordination and the absence of an overall strategic frame work, and timeliness in providing responses and resources demean the success of PCPB activities in conflict zones. Also, the clashes of interest, deep political divisions among prominent international actors and profound discrepancy as to what constitutes the top priorities for the international community and how to address them within the Security Council, at the General ssembly, within regional organizations, and even among allies

to mention just a few bodies have posed threats to the efficacy of PCPB. However, because of the human innate quest for security and safety, the breakdown of peace processes and the relapse of a number of countries into violent conflict especially in Africa, and the emergence of new conflicts building post-conflict peace will continue to gain global attention and assistances years to come despite its multiple shortcomings and weakness.

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