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Submitted by-David Nozadze

**Impediments to the Development of European Union's Common Security and  
Defence Policy**

Supervisor – Stefano Braghiroli. PhD

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I have written the Master's thesis independently. All works and major viewpoint of the other authors, data from other sources of literature and elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced.

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## Abstract

The global geopolitical rift has presented challenges as Russia's revisionism policy, a spread of Islamic extremism and terrorism, instability in Eastern and Southern neighbourhood causing migration crisis, the rise of ultranationalist populism igniting Euro-scepticism. The situation requires a coherent and comprehensive approach from the European Union, however, we observe the lack of motivation and sufficient instruments to react. The European security initiatives finally resulted into Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), however, Europeans inability to deliver an effective response to existing challenges is encapsulated into impediments derived from differences of views and goals of leading EU members. Therefore this work is designed to explore European security and defence initiative focusing on problem *why CSDP failed to expand and develop deeper*, and respond to the research question *what are such a wide differences of views on CSDP of leading European countries such as the UK, France and Germany?* Our tasks in the dissertation are at first to identify major strategic divergences of leading EU member states such as the UK, France, and Germany and secondly to identify and describe key factors that have contributed to those strategic divergences. To respond stated research tasks within dissertation has been used case study method exploring three EU state to see differences in their motivations and goals and trace the process in order to identify key ruptures which facilitated impediments to European security initiative. During research, we identified stumbling blocks which have been generalised into conclusion. It emphasises major problem of post-World War II European order inherited in modernity where the USA holds hegemonic power and plays the decisive role in foreign and security affairs of Europe preventing the emergence of European power core. The nature of EU and its internal settings are also causing for the imperfection of system which cannot overcome obstruction and develop the common defence. In addition, some states perceive European integration in foreign and security area as a threat to own sovereignty inducing them to act it in opposition.

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## **Abbreviations**

ASEAN	-----	Association for South-East Asian Nations
ARF	-----	ASEAN Regional Forum
BBC	-----	British Broadcasting Company
BOT	-----	British Overseas Territories
BRICS	-----	Brasil, Russia, India, China, South, Africa
CAP	-----	Common Agriculture Policy
CSDP	-----	Common Security Defence Policy
CFSP	-----	Common Foreign Security Policy
CTBT	-----	Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
CJTF HQ	-----	Combined Joint Task Force Headquarter
DSACEUR	-----	Deputy Supreme Allied Command Europe
DFID	-----	Department for International Development- United Kingdom
EDI	-----	European Defence Identity
EDA	-----	European Defence Agency
EDTIB	-----	European Defence Technological and Industrial Base
EEAS	-----	European External Action Service
ESDP	-----	European Security and Defence Policy
EUSR	-----	EU Special Representative
EMU	-----	European Monetary Union
FYROM	-----	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
FNC	-----	Framework Nations Concept
GAC	-----	General Affairs Council
GNI	-----	Gross National Income
HADES	-----	Short-range ballistic pre-strategic nuclear missile
HR	-----	High representative
HMS	-----	Her Majesty's Ship
IGC	-----	Intergovernmental Conference
LOI	-----	Letter of Intent

NATO-----North Atlantic Treaty Organisation  
NSS SDR-----National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence Review  
OCCAR-----Organisation for joint armaments cooperation. Translation from French  
OSCE-----Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
PfP-----Partnership for Peace  
PSC-----Political and Security Committee  
SACT-----Supreme Allied Command Transformation  
SDR----- Strategic defence Review  
SME-----Small and Medium Enterprises  
TEU-----Treaty Establishing the European Union  
USAID-----US Agency for International Development  
UKIP -----United Kingdom Independence Party  
WEU -----Western European Union

## CHAPTER 1

### 1.1 Introduction

Is the EU able and willing to develop Common Security Defence Policy (CSDP) as an effective instrument and if so what conditions are obstructing the process? These questions will be the focus of this thesis. The topic of EU's security became most relevant after Russia's aggressive revisionism resulting into the occupation of Crimea, and emergence and expansion of Islamic State extrapolating terrorism in Europe. After attacks in Paris, the first time in the history of the EU France evoked the mutual assistance/defence clause CSDP article 42(7). During several days Europe was united in support of France, however, everything has been gradually watered down. Once more it became clear how diverse sovereign interests of European capitals have a negative effect on European security supporting only its illusory meaning.

Why did EU Commission's President Jean-Claude Juncker's idea supporting the creation of European armed forces to address EU's political relevance<sup>1</sup> caused fierce criticism from the UK's Conservative party spokesman on defence and security retired General Geoffrey Van Orden. He criticised initiative as being damaging British national interests and commented on the issue *"This relentless drive towards a European army must stop. ... However, the EU's defence ambitions are detrimental to our national interest, to NATO, and to the close alliances that Britain has with many countries outside the EU – not least the United States, Gulf allies, and many Commonwealth countries"*<sup>2</sup>.

The development of European defence instruments seems logical in the context of gradual integration resulting into some degree of political unity and economic strength creating preconditions for further increase of power. This reason acquires more weight particularly in the context of the revival of turbulence in Eastern and Southern neighbourhood of EU. Many political and economic factors facilitated institutional and capability developments, however, it developed neither effective nor autonomous instrument relevant to the existing environment. The dissertation is intending to study the case of CSDP phenomena and factors affecting to its level of development.

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<sup>1</sup> Das Sontag 8 March 2015

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/08/jean-claude-juncker-calls-for-eu-army-european-commission-military>



Within dissertation, we scrutinise frontrunners of European security the UK, France and Germany to find out their role from the initial phase and further effect on the existing condition of CSDP.

For the UK it was way to stay in play on European affairs while refusing to participate in other areas of European integration facing threat to appear on margins. Britain was motivated by the possibility to control rules from inside to protect own national interests, also ensure NATO's role intact and secure US's presence in European foreign and security policy.

For France European security and defence initiative was a possibility to play a vital role in European affairs, exert own influence reducing American grip on the continent and alternate absolute dependence on NATO as security instrument. However, preserving own sovereignty in foreign, security and defence policy by channelling process into the intergovernmental format.

For Germany, it was a chance to play a central role in concentrating European power under foreign and security policy and give clout to EU play global role same time being restrained itself by domestic settings.

Further member states discovered that they have also common interests involved which would facilitate domestic economies. Cooperation under security defence auspices would give impetus to defence industry creating such capabilities which could resist to American defence giants.

The following dissertation is organised into five chapters, first, is Introduction providing a general historical overview of the development process, introduces its drivers. The second chapter offers theoretical framework applied through the dissertation, defines problem statement, research tasks, methodology how research will be organised and operationalisation with the elaboration of hypothesis and discussing pursued variables. The third chapter will provide an empirical analysis of documents, the Fourth chapter synthesises our findings and the fifth chapter will offer the conclusion.

## **1.2 Historical overview of ESDP/CSDP development**

European Security development is going back to the first Franco-British Defence Treaty of the Dunkirk in 1947, followed by Treaty of the Brussels in 1948. In 1948 based on defence orientated Treaty of Brussels has been established the Western European Union (WEU) grouping members of EU and NATO. However, it remained institutionally

underdeveloped with limited influence. Most of its activities were effectively phased out in 1999 and transferred to EU followed by its dissolution in 2011. In 1949 has been established North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) collective defence alliance which superseded all existed treaties and underwrote European security during the Cold War and beyond. The security guarantee was provided mostly by the United States, which rapidly assumed the hegemonic position in the alliance. In 1950 France introduced the idea of Common European Defence, however, in 1954 French Parliament rejected ratification of the agreement. Another French initiative voiced by President Charles de Gaulle In 1961 was Fouchet plan as part of the own grand design for Europe which failed to start. Until the end of Cold War European security issue was related to NATO, however, new era triggered different process including establishment of European Union. Maastricht Treaty establishing European Union (TEU) 1992/1993 laid the ground for further and deeper institutionalisation conceptualising European foreign affairs establishing Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) which foresaw the future framing of common defence policy that could lead to a common defence. Changed environment and Balkan crisis aggregated EU states to use CFSP framework in order to start developing its defence dimension. The periodical Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC) in mid-nineties addressed a number of issues in foreign, security and defence area facilitated by France and Germany. Their initiative had important implications on other members attracting their support or contrary discontent<sup>3</sup>. The Franco-German initiative has been gradually promoted via series of EU Council meetings.

The Treaty of Amsterdam 1997<sup>4</sup> introduced amendments facilitating the creation of defence policy which considered the creation of common defence<sup>5</sup>(TEU Art.26). Also, they created the position for High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. In 1997 change of political spectrum of the UK triggered its new Labour

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<sup>3</sup> White Paper on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, Volume II. Germany, I. Basic positions of the Federal Government with regard to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference.

[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/igc1996/pos-de\\_en.htm](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/igc1996/pos-de_en.htm)

White Paper on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, Volume II. France.

[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/igc1996/pos-fr\\_en.htm](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/igc1996/pos-fr_en.htm)

<sup>4</sup> adopted in 1997 entered into force in May 1999

<sup>5</sup> Part One Substantive amendments Amsterdam Treaty

Government of Tony Blair to change its position in regards to European security<sup>6</sup>. This important shift leads to Saint-Malo Franco-British Declaration 4 December 1998. In 1998 UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and President of France Jacques Chirac met to discuss European security and defence matters in Saint-Malo, France. They signed Letter of Intent (LOI) on Franco-British Defence cooperation and issued Joint Declaration on European Defence. The LOI included “Cooperation in crisis management and operations” aimed to establish cooperation allowing implementation of joint military operations within and beyond NATO territory where NATO is not taking lead<sup>7</sup>. However, most important breakthrough was Joint Declaration on European Defence stating that “*Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces*”<sup>8</sup> this was an unprecedented step to frame European security aspirations independently from US (Howorth, J. 2014.p 7). From Saint-Malo France was expecting to achieve EU security and defence autonomy while the Britain was expecting that European capabilities development would facilitate to become better partners in NATO. The Franco-British initiative attracted other EU countries, a week later at the Vienna European Council 11-12 December the other member states indicated support for the initiative. The Saint-Malo declaration caused cautious attention and alert in the USA. Official position of Washington has been enunciated by US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in her speech preventing Europeans from Decoupling from NATO, Duplication of defence capabilities and Discrimination of non-EU NATO members like Turkey or Norway to participate in operations<sup>9</sup>. According to Jolyon Howorth before Saint-Malo meeting, Washington was persuading London to have influence on Europeans to increase their burden share on

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<sup>6</sup> Informal EU summit in October 1998 in the Pörschach, Austria. Austrian Presidency Informal Summit Press Conference, Downing Street website at <http://www.number-10.gov.uk>

<sup>7</sup> UK/French Letter of Intent on Cooperation in Crisis Management and Operations.

<sup>8</sup> <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/French-British%20Summit%20Declaration,%20Saint-Malo,%201998%20-%20EN.pdf>

<sup>9</sup> “*First, we want to avoid decoupling: NATO is the expression of the indispensable transatlantic link. It should remain an organisation of sovereign allies, where European decision-making is not unhooked from broader alliance decision-making. Second, we want to avoid duplication: defence resources are too scarce for allies to conduct force planning, operate command structures, and make procurement decisions twice-once at NATO and once more at the EU. And third, we want to avoid any discrimination against NATO members who are not EU members.*” (Albright, 1998)

own security<sup>10</sup>. The US position has continued impact on European capitals for all way on of development Saint-Malo initiative. Still, Saint-Malo declaration launched process involving rounds of EU Council meetings and intergovernmental interaction of member states.

Following EU council in Cologne (3-4 June 1999) laid the ground for an institutional framework with the further emphasis on creating capabilities. It established The General Affairs Council (GAC) - forum for regular meetings of the foreign and when appropriate defence ministers, The Political and Security Committee (PSC) - the permanent entity hosting representatives at ambassador level with political/military experts located in the Brussels; the EU Military Committee hosting military representatives for making recommendations to the PSC; and the EU Military Staff including situation centre. During Cologne Council, former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana has been appointed to the position of HR for CFSP being the ideal candidate to reduce Washington's fears about "Decoupling".

Next European council meeting in Helsinki (10-11 December 1999) defined the scope of military headline goals. The Helsinki European Council agreed upon force size(60.000), structure, the range of operational tasks and technical characteristics. They negotiated its institutional and legal underpinning, modalities for cooperation with NATO and principles for participation into operations for non-EU member countries and decision making<sup>11</sup>. However, it considered Washington's position and newer pursued goal to lay ground for autonomous European Army<sup>12</sup>. Next important step became Berlin Plus agreement (1999-2003) EU's advancement with its ESDP project required formalisation of cooperation with Alliance, for that reason has been decided to use WEU and NATO arrangement inaugurated in Berlin1996. The "Plus" in Berlin Plus agreement is the reference to the fact that NATO-EU arrangements are seen in the context of evolution WEU-NATO 1996 Berlin agreement<sup>13</sup>. The Berlin Plus agreement established EU-NATO interaction framework including availability

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<sup>10</sup> Author refers to the former British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) official who confirm Washington's desire to stimulate British officials to engage in close cooperation with European leaders "we would not have touched Saint-Malo with a bargepole". (Howorth, 2014: 52-53).

<sup>11</sup> [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/acfa4c.htm](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/acfa4c.htm)

<sup>12</sup> Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999, Chapter II, paragraph 27

<sup>13</sup> Merlingen, M, Ostrauskaite, R. Gascone, G. 2008, p-144. 2008 *European Security and Defence Policy and Implementation Perspective*.

of NATO's capabilities for EU-led operations, assignment of Deputy Supreme Allied Command Europe (DSACEUR)<sup>14</sup> for commanding EU-led operations allocating to him new operational staff and support mechanism from EU<sup>15</sup> and political supervisory body in EU<sup>16</sup>. First results of Berlin Plus agreement made EU capable of launching its first-ever military operation within CSDP framework, operation "Concordia"2003 in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and "Althea"2004 in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Next step was Lisbon EU Council 2009 which in many respects was important in regards to European security the Lisbon Treaty sought to strengthen foreign and external security policy. It rearranged High Representative's position, changed the name of ESDP on CSDP and allocated to it the separate section in the TEU and finally, it broadened the potential policy scope of CFSP and CSDP.

The interval from autumn 1998 through the end of 1999 was the most significant in the history of EU in developing its defence and security policy. During this period was achieved most progress focusing on military capabilities development. Actions produced expectations that it will end up with something more than just policy and institution. After Helsinki European Council framework of institutional and military aspects of ESDP was clearly defined. In 2000-2002 ESDP focused on capabilities development. Considerable progress has been achieved in 2000, however, during 2001 overall situation became more complicated since the US launched the global war on terror.

Since then about 33 missions and operations contributing to stabilisation and security in Europe and neighbouring countries has been launched in a duration of 2003-2014. Under Civilian Headline Goals capacity buildings have brought its results, the missions initially including Police, strengthening the rule of law, empowerment of civilian administration and civil protection later extended to monitoring and strengthening EU Special Representative (EUSR) offices exceeded expectations. The geography of missions initially launched from Western Balkans spans to the South Caucasus, from Africa to the Middle East and Asia. The scope of operations has greatly diversified in the strengthening actions in police and the wider rule of law sector, monitoring borders

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<sup>15</sup> [http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/berlin/index\\_en.htm](http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/berlin/index_en.htm)

and peace agreements. The demand on the Petersberg tasks military component is decreasing giving way to civilian missions. EU managed to find its niche as being a primary asset for post-conflict reconstruction and civilian mission's enforcer in various crises.

### **1.3 Drivers behind ESDP**

In this section referring to J.Howorth's *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, we underline several drivers underpinning early ESDP initiative. The process has been stimulated by different developments within the historical context.

At first end of Cold War changed Western priorities to sustain the massive force, it also caused US's strategic interest shift from Europe to Asia-pacific. During 25 years 1988-2004 France reduced its military capabilities by 44%, Germany by 42% and the UK by 35%, dramatic downsize was followed by defence budgets reduction. Post Cold War European defence reduction and US's shift in Asia-Pacific caused extensive power vacuum which had to be filled by Europeans. (Howorth, J. 2007.pp 95-101).

The second driver developed as a result of EU defining itself as a normative power for the definition of own identity and promoting own values worldwide. Thus EU had to react to security challenges in its close neighbourhood Balkans, South Caucasus, and the Middle East to uphold its world image. Europe's new role required adequate instruments to react on conflicts. ESDP was a salvation of the alliance since NATO's heavy-set was not adequate to respond crisis.

The third driver derived as a result of wars in Balkans in the 1990s that pressured European states to develop own security agenda. It was clear that sooner or later Balkan states will become members of EU as being part of geographical Europe.

The fourth driver appeared as a result EU's development as strongest economy gave powerful momentum to political development. EU's ambition to become political actor gave a strong impetus to member states political unity, its increased political influence required credible military instrument which became ESDP project.

The fifth driver became defence industry, during decades after WWII in Europe and in US defence industry has grown up significantly. Traditionally defence industry was subsidised by national governments. After Cold War defence sectors in Europe started to restructure and rationalise resulting into massive privatisation. Thousands of defence companies struggled to secure stable contracts without state support and compete with

US rivals on market. The optimal choice seemed to be the creation of the well-managed system which could balance demand and procurement avoiding closing of companies and increase of unemployment. As an example, we see that European Defence Agency (EDA) was amongst first institutions emerged within CSDP framework.

## CHAPTER 2

### 2.1 Theoretical framework

The neoclassical realism is the general theoretical framework of the dissertation which would offer a wide array of instruments. Neoclassical realism has been elaborated at the end of 20 century by Gideon Rose, it combines *structural realism's stringent account of the structure and classical realism's broad understanding of agency* (Running, 2011). The theory delimits central place to the concept of relative power- *the capabilities and resources with which states can influence each other* as the independent variable (Rose, 1998). Neoclassical realism argues that relative material power establishes the basic parameters of country's foreign policy. The theory brings two independent variables: first, the domestic politics where political elites or actual political leaders perceptions on relative power defines foreign policy. Second, the strength of a country (Rose,1998)- which is based on the level of delegated authority or trust by society to the state apparatus for using national resources for foreign policy ends. By other words, the relative power dynamics drive policy but the people and institutions actually make it. From this perspective, CSDP is driven by power dynamics the rise of Europe for different reasons and conditions- but shaped by European people responding to their own desires and needs(Running 2011).

In order to better organise unit level variables pursued by G.Rose in his theory, I will use a wide scope of Domestic Settings conceptualised by J. Duffield. Duffield explains that domestic settings are a combination of firstly National capacity which determines the ability of the state to pursue different courses of action and secondly national predisposition which defines necessity, effectiveness, and appropriateness thus desirability of some particular policy (Duffield.J, 1998). National capacity encompasses more material dimension of a nation such as population, economy, military capability. National predispositions encompass mostly political culture. Therefore having the opportunity to discuss agency on unit/state level and balance of power within the structure on an international level will considerably increase our scope and inventory for further research.

Based on short historical overview further research will include three major European powers as Britain, France, Germany and their transatlantic partner and superpower the US. The presence of European states indicates that we will encounter to a wide range of



diversity, in addition, the presence of the US will unfold transatlantic theme where alongside diversity emerges balancing in relation to the US and to each other in wider context. According to neoclassical realism theory, ESDP initiation could be explained as a result of increased relative power of Europe (Economy+political unity) which acquired impulse and trajectory for further development in foreign and security area. That fits G.Rose's idea of relative power as an independent variable which affected EU's foreign policy outcome. However, we consider here intervening variables as political elites perceptions on systemic incentives and state strength having authorisation from society to use national resources for foreign policy aims.

The most important factors what European leaders had to consider and interpret into their decision were: at first, the shift of the US focus from Europe to Asia-Pacific. That shift implied an increase of Europeans share on own security while they were reducing significantly own defences to reduce expenses. The second factor was Balkan wars which were gaining its momentum in the dangerously close proximity of European capitals causing a mass influx of refugees. This crisis became a serious challenge for Europeans for the reason US refused to get involved in conflict causing NATO to keep away as well at the initial stage till 1995. While it became obvious that Europeans were not able to deal themselves with the crisis the US and NATO became involved sidelining bumbling Europeans causing their dissatisfaction. That explains why the British, French and German leaders came out with a particular interpretation of systemic pressures which pushed to align to launch ESDP as a project which would offer the instrument for security while US and NATO were not interested in engaging.

This case brings forward another issue of European countries. As a result of historical developments, European countries are very diverse in many aspects and different in their domestic and foreign/international policy, strategy aims and in the alliance as well. Systemic pressure induced Britain, France and German to align to launch ESDP while without incentives doubtfully they would come out with this decision. European diversity concluded into power dynamics on the state level is not the only factor to consider in the research but also structural balance on the international level. While mentioning about balance within structure I eschew with its K. Waltz's typical understanding which instrumentalizes hard balance of power or threat within structural realism as a tool for survival and matter to grapple with a superpower. Traditional

structural realism in relation to CSDP derives by varying three possible outcomes as Barry Posen described<sup>17</sup> and Sten Rynning criticised<sup>18</sup> CSDP as a balancer of the US power, CSDP as the anchoring US in Europe and finally CSDP as an instrument to balance Germany. According to S. Running structural realism is separating material conditions with subjective factors describing motives behind CSDP in result deriving by ideas that it is either attempt to adopt to post-Cold War power dynamics or attempt to balance US power without recognising the futility of intentions. These explanations are missing the point what in fact Europeans and Americans want from CSDP because from wider picture factors of agency is excluded (Running,2011,p.33).

Since balancing appears within the structure as a systemic feature we will introduce soft balancing described by Rober Pape as a major tool. Pape conceptualised soft balancing as *”actions that do not directly challenge... military preponderance but that use nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressively ... military policies. Soft balancing using international institutions, economic statecraft, and diplomatic arrangements<sup>19</sup>”*

Soft balancing will be useful to explain the US-UK transatlantic endeavour within Europe and Franco-German cooperation. As a result of historical developments the Britain is US's strategic ally and bridge to Europe, France and Germany are Transatlantic allies to the US, however, their relationship is defined by different factors. France and Germany are strategic partners in Europe and primary drivers of EU integration process. The Georg W. Bush's unilateral policy of preventive actions against rogue states worldwide and particularly int the MiddleEast caused negative effects for its European allies (Pape,2005). Moreover, it caused the rise of concerns among global powers such as Russia and China instigating hard/soft balancing against it. In addition to those factors, US unilateral actions undermined UN's credibility and created dangerous precedents which the Russia used to unfold its revisionist approach in result occupying Georgian, Ukrainian territories and acquiring a major position in Syria. Mentioned developments triggered Europe's decision to start soft balancing against the

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<sup>17</sup> Posen.B, 2006, *European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?*, Security Studies, pp 149-186.

<sup>18</sup> Rynning.S, 2011, *Realism and the Common Security and Defence Policy*, JCMS pp 23-42

<sup>19</sup> Pape.R, 2005, *Soft Balancing Against United States, International Security*, pp 7-45

US unilateral aggressive policy based on Franco-German power core. Such state of affairs raised dilemma for the Britain either align with France and Germany and facilitate degradation of the US domination in Europe or stay with the US and using same soft balance strategy to prevent developing European power core. R. Pape's soft balance theory will be a useful tool to apply to described context and explain Europe transatlantic interplay.

Above discussed factors triggers us to explore strategic differences between leading European states which affect their policies in relation to EU in general and in relation to foreign and security policy particularly.

## **2.2 Research Problem, Question and Tasks**

Above discussed historical development, drivers or geostrategic factors emerged as a result of the natural development of state of affairs, however, impediments were a result of human intention and state reasons to serve own interests.

The dissertation will define research problem as—*Why has the CSDP failed to develop and expand deeper?*

The CSDP has relevance as an object of common interests of member states within the framework of the EU since its early stage of institutional development, however, security and defence issues are organic parts of a sovereign state.

Conducted revision of Europe's leading states some of the major factors shaping their positions towards European security we identify the primary research question:

*Why do the UK, France and Germany have such widely different views on the CSDP?*

The aim of this research is to explore the range of causative factors that prevent the EU from developing a united and coherent approach towards effective defence capabilities.

The tasks of research are:

- 1) To identify major strategic divergences of EU states such as the UK, France, and Germany
- 2) To identify and describe key factors that have contributed to these strategic divergences.

## **2.3 Research Methodology**

The dissertation is an effect orientated case study, seeking to explicate and explain all factors which having marginalising effect on CSDP, by the purpose to address research tasks stated we have chosen to conduct a case study with process tracing. Based on our

intention have been identified three countries the United Kingdom, France and Germany to be studied and identify how they contributed to EU CSDP development process. Those countries have been chosen for a reason since they are similar in many respects and they are considered as being in the forefront of European affairs since the end of WWII. As we already studied from historical overview the UK, France and Germany laid the ground for the ESDP later CSDP development but varied in their attitudes and strategy for time to come. The UK, France and Germany are European democratic societies, they are relatively large countries possessing similar economic power and population. Existing differences of aspirations in global or regional context, the structure of bilateral relationships with other partners and involvement into the global milieu in different geographical locations providing us with enough evidence to conduct the case study. We will trace process since 1998 when the first time has been launched process until recent time. For this reason, we will examine official documents and respective leaders speeches reflecting state's foreign and security policy to identify their role in global dynamics and particularly their position in regards to European security considering factors and conditions contributing to their attitudes. The research will be divided into three phase: I phase will analyse documents; II phase will make synthesis and III phase will draw to the conclusion.

## **2.4 Variables**

To elaborate above-stated research question within academic methodological research framework I pursue in this thesis set of variables:

### **Dependent Variable (DV)–EU's leading countries strategies towards the deeper development of CSDP**

The strategy towards deeper CSDP could be elaborated as deliberate exploitation of existing national ideational, or material means in a particular way explicated into attitudes and actions of state to achieve desirable outcome towards or within EU's CSDP resulting into its comprehensive development as common European defence<sup>20</sup>, regression or maintaining status unchanged. The CSDP is the common military-civilian dimension of the EU providing general framework of EU's defence policy. It outlines principles of generation of common civilian or military capabilities, defines tasks, areas and cases of operational engagement and responsibilities in relation to common

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<sup>20</sup> 42(3) Treaty of European Union, Consolidated version.

security. CSDP as an institutional part of EU describes structure and rules of the decision-making process, due to its nature CSDP is primarily subjected to member states decisions. CSDP includes the framework of cooperation with NATO their interrelation allows the share of operational capabilities.

At first, we have to create clear picture how EU leading member states has an effect on CSDP, clarifying all aspects of states and CSDP correlation outlining major factors which could be placed into different context provides an opportunity to proceed with the elaboration of independent variables. For operationalization of different variables will be outlined time period since 1998-until now. The reason is that December 3, 1998, Saint-Malo Franco-British declaration became marking the moment for European Security and Defence Policy. The process previously propelled by Franco-German cooperation then picked-up by Britain in late 1998 caused interests of other EU member states launching integration process in defence area which is ongoing at present. The UK, France and Germany will be taken as model countries for analysis.

Operationalization of dependent variable will be conducted in two directions to illustrate the ideational and material commitment of states:

The first direction will illustrate states strategy towards CSDP, thus should be analysed defence white papers explicating states strategic vector in foreign, security and defence policies in general and particularly in regards to European Security and Defence Policy. States strategies could be graded according to their level of support low, medium or high coupled with the timetable. This table will illustrate fluctuation of national strategies over the time period.

Another aspect to be measured is the level of states material commitment into CSDP. This aspect could be measured by comparing the ratio of states Gross National Income (GNI) and its financial contribution to the CSDP operations. Data is based on Athena Mechanism established by Council of Europe December 2011. Athena is establishing principles of financing common costs of operations having military or defence implications which cannot be financed from EU budget. Also, will be reviewed states participation and personnel contribution into CSDP civilian and military operations.

### **Independent Variable 1-Level of global role aspirations**

Countries presented within the study are regional leaders, characterised by global aspirations on various degrees. Their development throughout history was linked with power expansion, conquering and acquiring new territories for resources acquisition, increase of influence and establishing control on important trade routes within the continent and overseas. Turbulent legacies of modern nation-state formation have its implications even today, their high degree of aspirations in foreign, security policy and trade requires constant/consistent presence and participation or initiation in shaping various milieus providing international political influence which is materialised into different political or economical benefits. Global aspiration requires states political determination based on national predisposition with its political culture, capability and agility to influence the situation in different geographical locations effectively through civil or military means. The possession of assets and freedom of action is the decisive aspect for regional or global leadership. Countries with high aspirations are less eager to submit their sovereignty to alliance where supranational foundation prevails on national. Close scrutiny of states global aspiration in various fields and geographical areas which require political and power capabilities would serve to explain their level or reasons of commitments in states union's CSDP.

*Hypothesis1(H1). Countries with high global aspirations will be less likely to increase their commitment to supranational institutions which limits their freedom of action in foreign and security dimension.*

We assume that as higher is the level of global role aspirations as more capabilities it should generate and ensure its sovereign rights to engage in various interactions in the global context are not limited by the supranational organisation. Measuring global role aspirations level has its purpose, at first, it will illustrate which of model countries has higher aspiration level and actually engaged in global affairs in various geographical locations for different reasons. The object of interaction, intensity, coherence, character and result of engagement will be differentiated on low, medium, the high scale which will be connected to timetable with similar time range 1998-till now. The aspiration scale coupled with timetable will illustrate countries raise or decrease of global role aspiration. The inferences derived from empirical data analysis will prove or disprove our hypothesis.

### **Independent variable 2- The level of integration into the European Union**

Membership and level of integration in the EU outline member states level of institutional integration into policy areas competencies, its level of readiness to undertake, transfer and apply domestically responsibilities and policies defined by the union in various fields including security and defence.

The defining variation of integration level will illustrate the correlation between support of deeper CSDP development and other variables such as level of global role aspiration within conditions framed by transatlantic relationship. Based on our observations we can draw inferences that support or falsifies our hypothesis.

*H2 the higher the level of a member state's integration into EU the higher will its support for deeper CSDP development.*

For measuring independent variable should be defined level of countries acceptance and adherence to major agreements or regulatory frameworks of states union, for this purpose should be analysed states parliaments' ratification of those fundamental agreements with the European Union, should be defined the level of engagement in EU policies developments in different areas.

### **Independent variable 3 - the level of transatlantic cooperation**

The transatlantic cooperation is the overarching format of the interaction of European states with the US and NATO. The nature of cooperation within this framework is defined by the fact that the US is the world superpower, moreover, it is initiator and major contributor of NATO which is Europe's primary security instrument capable of dealing with wide range of tasks including military and political component. The US possessing strongest influence on the world based on its determination, military and economic power being driver of most processes over the world. Membership of NATO as the multilateral framework of institutionalised political and military cooperation provides security guarantees. Close transatlantic relations for European states facilitates to promote their influence or acquiring beneficial positions in the world's political and economical processes. Importantly superpower's interests are involved in the Europe including security, defence and trade, therefore it seeks to extend its influence over the EU, and NATO beyond its primary role is one instrument of it. As already mentioned close transatlantic cooperation between the US and European state is beneficial for both sides one having the privileged relationship with the US can acquire the advanced

position in world's political arena increasing their influence and reach in turn supporting US interests in EU as example US-UK special relations.

*H3.As far the Transatlantic framework provides for EU states security guarantees and possibility to benefit from the privileged relationship with the US less will be their support to deeper CSDP development.*

The examination of the transatlantic framework engagement level variation will provide us understanding about as an exogenous factor affecting the UK's, France's and Germany's position in regards of CSDP.

The variable could be examined trough the study of bilateral and multilateral cooperation agreements in security, defence and trade sphere.


Based on conceptualization and operationalization of variables we developed the structure of their interdependence.

The variation of the France, Germany's and the UK's, global role aspirations same as their level of support of EU integration and their relations within transatlantic framework has the direct effect on their commitment level into deeper CSDP development.

IV-1 has direct effect to DV, by variation of state's global role aspiration subsequently will change the level of commitment to the deeper CSDP, for example, UK's high level of global aspirations affecting its decision to commit itself to the deeper development of CSDP which will constrain its sovereignty.

IV-2 has a direct impact on DV by variation of its EU integration level will change its level of support of deeper CSDP, for example, Germany, it perceives its role as a regional leader supporting closer and deeper integration of EU subsequently supporting deeper CSDP development.

IV-3 has a direct impact on DV by variation of the level of transatlantic cooperation will change states level of support to CSDP deeper development.





## **2.5 Methodology for official documents analysis**

To address our problem statement and to comply with the methodological framework we intend to examine the validity of hypothesis through analysing six documents having different spatial and temporal origin representing states foreign, security and defence policy. The analysis will be conducted in order to define states strategies towards EU's defence matters, their attitude towards EU's integration, their global role aspiration, and their scope of cooperation with the USA and NATO. The results will be compared to each other to acknowledge motivation and factors underpinning states action.

Analysis will be conducted in two stages: during first stage will be analysed three documents dating 1994 to 1998 in relation to historical event Saint-Malo Franco-British Declaration (4 December 1998) those are: the UK Strategic Defence Review 1998, French Strategic Defence Reform Program of President J. Chirac 1996, and White Paper on the Security of the Republic of Germany and the Situation and Future of the Bundeswehr 1994. The reason for choosing this particular historical event is that declaration signed by British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac in 1998 became the deriving point for CSDP intensive developments for next several years.

During Second stage will be analysed three most recent documents in relation to current political developments. The second group of documents are The UK National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, French White Paper Defence and National Security 2013 and Germany's White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr 2016.

Those documents are equal carrying the same function in respective states as an outline for states strategies for foreign security and defence policies. To analyse selected documents will be used narrative analysis method. This method allows us to maintain a wide spectrum of interested for us issues nonetheless giving the possibility to examine them deeper.

The comparison of results of documents analysis relevant to two temporal periods will provide us ground to prove or disprove our hypothesis and later contribute to the conclusion.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **Narrative Analysis**

#### **3.1 Strategic Defence Review 1998**

Strategic defence Review (SDR) 1998 is official document submitted by Secretary of Defence Georg Robertson. The document based on its assessment of new post-Cold War era is guidance to remodel British defence policy and Armed Forces in the response to changing world. SDR is based on foreign policy, therefore the primary orientation of the UK's defence responding to the factors emerging from changing world. SDR was a declaration of foreign and security policy of newly elected (May 1997) Labour party government of Tony Blair. Submitting SDR was the great possibility to capitalise on the initiatives and failures of previous conservative government (1979-1997). Their motto of "New Labour" was affecting their initiations in foreign policy and defence same as in the areas as education, health and social welfare.<sup>21</sup> In 1998 the UK absorbed presidency of EU Council great chance for Blair to show his effectiveness to the international audience and regain Britain's position in forefront of European affairs.

#### **The UK's global role aspiration expressed within SDR 1998**

The SDR represents an open declaration of the UK to take increased responsibility as the great power on the world stage. The narrative is constructed through articulation of different argumentations derived from a reassessment of changing the strategic environment. Should be mentioned important factor as national predisposition which allowed empowering ideas supporting the UK's global ambitions expressed in SDR. Britain's greatness and exceptionalism were equally supported by all political parties, therefore actions taken to reform the Armed Forces trading capacity for capabilities and undertake expensive nuclear deterrence reform acquired popular support. According to SDR to advance Britain's global position was the reason for its economy structure including dependence on export, imported raw materials and investments. British trade spread out beyond Europe was not confined to EU or US demanding continuous interaction with its foreign partners worldwide. British exports proportion in GDP is

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<sup>21</sup> Blair, T. 2010, *A Journey*.

higher than those of US, Japan Germany or France. Britain is investing more of its income in the developing world than France, Germany and Italy together (SDR 1998), presumably to exploit opportunities of the cheaper labour force and lower production expenses. Foreign direct investment into Britain provides nearly 20% of manufacturing works (19) which could be important to support employment rate of middle/ lower class electorate to maintain their support. SDR admits Britain's dependence on supplies of raw materials above all oil making argument for its engagement into Gulf region. For this reason, Britain has the well established network of military outposts to secure its transportation routes stretching from Mediterranean including Gibraltar and Cyprus (Akrotiri and Dekalia sovereign base areas) through red sea Strait of Aden, United Arab Emirates (Al Minhad air base) giving access to Gulf region and then further to South Asia. Amongst arguments supporting UK's global aspirations is the fact that Britain possess 13 overseas territories most of those territories have an important strategic location, hosting British or US military bases. Several million British citizens are living abroad, some of them on military duty, by the beginning of 1998, Britain had 25.000 troops deployed in Northern Ireland and elsewhere. Britain's structure of international relations and membership of different regional or global political and international organisations requires UK's participation and upholding its responsibility (20). In the following paragraph, SDR discuss security outside of Europe, protracted conflicts in the Middle East making an accent on explosive situation in Iraq. This line of reasoning pursued in SDR explains why Britain should uphold its global role avoid restraining itself with European affairs.

### **The UK's engagement into EU integration process expressed in SDR 1998**

The SDR does not dedicate an important place to EU, within document there is only one sentence mentioning EU as an institution which has a role to preserve and extend economic prosperity and political stability through the CFSP(39). The UK's ambitions to participate in EU's integration process was always insubstantial, Britain's interest in European affairs is outlined according to two interests points such as European security and defence industry acquiring favourable condition on European armaments market.

Wars in Balkans had the deteriorating effect on wider European security, threatening by spill-over of violence and influx of large masses of refugees. SDR emphasises the

indispensable role of NATO as security instrument and then in this context discuss the role of WEU and European Defence Identity (EDI) but it never discusses EU as a framework for European security. This situation is quite odd because after four-month British government radically changed its position and joined Germany to promote the idea about absorbing WEU within EU's structure.

Britain's ambitions to launch extensive rearmament required close cooperation with other European states. SDR emphasises the importance of British defence industry providing jobs for over 400,000 people and earning the country around £5Bn from exports each year (162). The British government was committed to maintaining strong defence industry considering reduction of Western European armies has significantly affected industry sector (164). The pressure on defence industry in the US already pushed to rationalise production and implemented aggressive marketing to dominate in European and other markets. Defence industry became a catalyst to engage in initiatives to establish a common and favourable framework within EU<sup>22</sup>. SDR outlined that European governments should harmonise the requirements their Armed Forces and find cooperative solutions. By that, they would avoid unnecessary duplication of production costs, research and development. For this purpose government addressed issues of intellectual property rights which would hinder restructuring and sign Letter of Intent defining the tentative schedule.

### **The UK-Transatlantic cooperation within SDR 1998**

The transatlantic framework was always a priority, US-UK interdependence in military and trade dominated its foreign policy. SDR emphasises the importance of European cooperation with North America within NATO context as "*uniquely effective political and military alliance*"(39). The SDR explicates most important moments which are indirectly related to the UK-US bilateral cooperation. At first, while the UK is discussing optimisation of nuclear arsenal by downsizing existing and introducing the US made Trident missiles. This decision was pragmatic and implied maintaining US-British special relations intact in the agenda of new Labor government. At second, its support to pressure Saddam Hussein's regime to comply with UN resolutions. The UK-NATO cooperation is emphasised as a primary instrument to maintain peace and

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<sup>22</sup> Projects included Euro fighter Tornado, large capacity strategic airlift planes A400M Airbus and many other.

stability, its unique nature allows to bring its closest ally the US into play of European security and defence and achieve a favourable balance of power acquiring major role for already 50 years. SDR praises NATO for its engagement in Bosnia and Kosovo operations and supports NATO initiatives of enlargement to East and to create Partnership for Peace (PfP) mechanism.

The dominant idea within SDR is the formation of Joint forces<sup>23</sup> which would facilitate its global ambitions "*For conflict prevention, peace support, crisis management and war ...This applies to NATO commitments, operations under the auspices of the UN or other international organisations,*"<sup>24</sup>

These extensive changes were the result of experiences of first Gulf and Balkan wars additionally considering UK's national interest to hold the strong grip on oil-rich Gulf region and safeguarding transportation routes.

### **The UK's strategy towards ESDP defined in SDR 1998**

For defence and security, WEU is to be more frontline „*The Western European Union has an important role in fostering defence co-operation amongst its members, in conflict prevention and, particularly, peacekeeping. Development of the European Security and Defence Identity within NATO will enable the Western European Union to carry out these roles more effectively.*” (39). This statement is important because SDR was submitted and presented in May 1998, however, the UK radically changed its attitude until November of the same year, Tony Blair and Goerge Robertson pursued an utterly different policy in regards of WEU, EU and its defence. That provides argumentation that Britain's leadership's shift in favour to ESDP Sept/Oct 1998 was due to interpreting systemic pressures existed before or raised after submission of SDR according to neoclassical theory.

### **3.2 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence Review 2015**

National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence Review 2015 (NSS SDR2015) also called as *A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom* is document submitted by David

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<sup>23</sup> Joint Rapid Reaction Forces, Joint RN/RAF fixed wing Force (Joint Force 2000), Joint Battlefield Helicopter Command, Joint Army/RAF Ground Based Air Defence organisation, Deployable Joint Force Headquarters and greater powers for Chief of Joint Operations. Joint Defence Centre, New Strategic Lift assets

<sup>24</sup> Strategic Defence Review 1998, Joint Rapid Reaction Forces 91. P32

Cameron in 2015. This document is interesting in the context of discussing British government's views on security and defence before upcoming elections on BREXIT. The main focus of the document is Britain's economy as the ground for national security, other accents are made on the reconfiguration of Britain's Armed Forces, ensuring the effectiveness of security and intelligence agencies and instrumentalization of diplomatic service to promote Britain's interests and project its influence.

### **The UK's Global aspiration expressed in NSS SDR 2015**

Global influence projection in the document is national security objective two, Britain is utilising comprehensive approach to extend its own influence through the diplomacy, supporting DFDI programs in the South Asia, the Middle East and Africa, the skilful instrumentalization of defence Engagement and promoting its attractiveness through the soft power application using British Council and BBC as assets.

According to document, Britain's global aspiration strategy includes close interlink with allies who share its geostrategic interests and values such as *NATO countries including US and Canada, European countries, and Australia, New Zealand and Japan*. Britain is going to maintain UN's 0,7% GNI spending on development and strengthen security and prosperity partnership in Gulf, Africa and Asia Pacific. Britain is looking for the partnership with growing powers, to be able to promote and protect own interests in the future.

### **The UK's support to EU Integration NSS SDR 2015**

In the context of BREXIT assessing Britain's government's attitudes towards EU during Prime Minister Cameron's government is particularly interesting. NSS SDR has been submitted on November 21 of 2015 while Anti-EU sentiments were already strong in Britain, at this time negotiations on the better deal for the UK has been ongoing. The interesting point is that subchapter European Union is outlined in a positive manner bringing forward benefits of coexistence and cooperation. Subchapter states that European security and prosperity is essential for Britain's security and prosperity. It supports *dynamic, competitive and outwardly focused Europe*. NSS SDR discusses EU as an important complementary instrument to NATO possessing political and economic instruments as sanctions or assistance programs effectively utilised in case of Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Document in positive context describes achievements of

CSDP format listing military or civilian operations worldwide (5.41). The document emphasises its interests in facilitating close cooperation between EU-NATO in areas such as cyber and countering hybrid threats working in the capacity building in other states (5.42). The document emphasises EU's importance as credible trade partner bringing statistical data (5.43). The document also mentions negotiations between UK and EU for better condition and surprisingly mentions that at the end of 2017 will be held the referendum on membership in EU which in fact has been held in June 2016.

### **The UK-Transatlantic relationship expressed in NSS SDR 2015**

Within transatlantic framework the UK emphasises the importance of UK-US special relationship and explains its contribution to it, at first Britain's European and global reach and influence, intelligence, the strategic location of British overseas territories, military interoperability and UK's ability to undertake war-fighting independently or as a lead nation in a coalition (5.29). According document to maintain their relationship is pragmatic to be coupled with the strongest economy in the world (5.30). The document is voicing intent to strengthen the interoperability of two armed forces, including collaboration on different programs including US's intent to place its aircraft in the UK. Another point of junction for the US-UK transatlantic relationship is their central position in NATO and including their nuclear capabilities available for NATO's deterrence. US-UK are closest partners to support security and stability in European neighbourhood, Middle East, Africa and Central Asia, (5.33). To fight against extremism, terrorism, corruption, climate change and promotes rule of law by enhancing cooperation with fragile states and regions building joint DFID-USAID programmes. UK emphasises its commitment to spend 2% GDP spending on defence to meet NATO's priority requirements, The UK is planning in 2017 to lead Very High Readiness Joint Task Force which was formed in response to Russia's aggression in Ukraine. The UK is also planning to provide its Typhoons for Baltic Air Policing Mission, its ships and Army units participated in joint-combined training in Baltic to reassure its NATO partners. Britain is also planning to join German-US Trans-Atlantic Capability Enhancement and Training (TACET) initiative in the Baltic states and Poland.

### **The UK's strategy towards CSDP expressed in NSS SDR 2015**

Since 1998 Saint-Malo Franco-British declaration changed many things including Britain's attitude towards EU in general including CSDP. Within SDR Britain does not discuss CSDP as such, it is mentioned couple times in general terms. As a result of analysis, we learned that Britain prefers to extend its bilateral cooperation framework in the area of security and defence rather than to use the multilateral framework such as CSDP. The document emphasises Franco-British defence and security cooperation based on Lancaster House Treaty 2010. Since Saint-Malo this treaty between UK and France became most important, it encompasses the full range of cooperation areas starting from forces interoperability to nuclear cooperation and defence industry.

### **3.3 Defence Strategic Reform 1996, France**

The Document acquired for analysis represents supporting speech delivered by President Jacques Chirac in Military school, Paris February 23, 1996. This speech represents Defence Strategic Reform of President Chirac that became broad reform program for reform. The document is obtained from President of France official website.<sup>25</sup> The preceding document "*1994 Livre Blanc Sur la Defense*" Defence White Paper has been developed during the presidency of Francois Mitterrand and submitted by prime Minister Edouard Balladur, however, this document has never triggered important reforms.

In 1995 the presidential elections won former prime minister (1974-76, 1986-88) and Mayor of Paris Jacques Chirac, the established political stalemate was an opportunity to offer own reforms and gain political support domestically and internationally.

The speech delivered in military school was a starting point for defence strategic reform.

### **France's global role aspiration expressed in Strategic Defence Program 1996**

France's global ambition is the main idea pursued within speech, mentioned areas of points reform were contributing to France's international stance and domestic political discourse. Chirac mentions that collapse of Soviet Union established fertile ground for

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<sup>25</sup> [http://www.jacqueschirac-asso.fr/archives-elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/francais/interventions/discours\\_et\\_declarations/1996/fevrier/allocation\\_aux\\_armees\\_prononcee\\_par\\_le\\_president\\_de\\_la\\_republique\\_a\\_l\\_ecole\\_militaire.192.html](http://www.jacqueschirac-asso.fr/archives-elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/francais/interventions/discours_et_declarations/1996/fevrier/allocation_aux_armees_prononcee_par_le_president_de_la_republique_a_l_ecole_militaire.192.html)

In the archives, until 2002 English versions are not available, therefore, the quality of translated script from French to English by Google is very poor.



European integration which is enrooted in profound solidarity. Chirac states that peace remains fragile and brings into play UN as the main actor to *state the international law, prevent and contain crisis and conflicts*. France as a permanent member of Security Council takes an active part and ensures that UN has the necessary means to accomplish its mission. Chirac is meaning French forces which are playing the vital role in Bosnia and elsewhere “*Our country, as a permanent member of the Security Council, takes an active part and to ensure that the UN has the means necessary to accomplish its mission*” (18). In this context promotion of the idea of projectable forces seems timely and logical. By mentioning the role of French troops in first Gulf War and in Bosnia indicates its desire to participate in the global affairs. In addition to its Security Council obligation projectable force idea serves for extending its foreign and security policy out of French metropolis of course including its foreign territories(77).

Another important aspect where its global ambitions can be seen is nuclear deterrence reform. President Chirac declared outlined the scope of reform which included: Strategic Oceanic Force should have had four ballistic missile submarines two of them on patrol while other two in docs.

Chirac proposed closing the ground-based nuclear base Albion Plateau which became unnecessary and expensive. A new ballistic missile M51 was ready to change old M45. He proposed to abolish HADES which was designed to participate during Cold War in deterrent manoeuvre as theatre ballistic missile. Nuclear deterrence reform was indicating that in new era France was stepping in with modernised capabilities and ready to uphold its global position.

### **France’s support to EU integration process expressed in Strategic Defence Reform 1996**

France together with Germany was an active supporter of EU integration process, many policies as Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) or ESDP has been developed either by the initiative of France or with its active participation. EMU and Schengen zone agreement was important policies in the scope of integration dragged through by Franco-German cooperation. By that time Franco-German cooperation already included in agenda European Union defence matters, Chirac admits that this reform should give a strong impulse to their relation and incorporate the UK as well as an important partner. He expects that France and Germany will remain as the engine of

European defence (37). France's commitment into EU integration is traced through its undertakings in the defence industry and market regulation as well (89). Above mentioned reform was not possible without a profound restructuring of the defence industry. Chirac announces the creation of two major industrial centres in electronics and aerospace which should be competitive to better engage in international competition.<sup>26</sup> He supports reform in armament acquisition and triggering competitiveness amongst domestic and foreign companies.

### **France-Transatlantic cooperation expressed in Strategic Defence Reform 1996**

France's cooperation with the US is not aggregated within speech. However, it goes as the background within part of speech discussing nuclear deterrence capabilities. At the end of 1980's has been disclosed fact about Franco-American cooperation over nuclear deterrence capabilities since 1969. In early 1990's during the presidency of Mitterrand France took responsibility to stop nuclear tests and close its test site, however, before terminating program he renewed nuclear tests in order to get processable data to perfect computer software for future laboratory simulations (Running.S). In June of 1996, France signed the cooperation memorandum with the US about the exchange of nuclear test data and later same year September 24 it signed Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Within speech, NATO is voiced only once in the context of solidarity stating France's bounds to its NATO Allies, EU partners and Africa (34). Nonetheless, should be mentioned that defence reforms include many activities which imply close cooperation with NATO military structure that played a role in France-NATO rapprochement. The next important moment in the text is a demand of President Chirac that reformed Armed Forces must respond to French ambition to build credible European defence and combine the dual role of the military arm of the EU and the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance (35).

### **France's strategy towards ESDP defined in Strategic Defence Reform 1996**

President Chirac voices his position towards European defence which is definitely supportive. He brings defence reform to offer French forces as defence arm of Europe. Projectable force idea also comes as a solution for European security related problems

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<sup>26</sup> EADS and Thompson CSF were on the list of top 10 global defence industry companies. Global security.

considering Balkans. By that time France already actively was involved in developing the idea of EU defence, it was closely cooperating with Germany in regards to integration process including security and defence amongst other areas of EU integration. France together with its closest European partner Germany already created Brigade contributing into Euro corps.

### **3.4 French Defence White Paper 2013**

French White Paper on Defence and National Security 2013 is most recent guiding document after 2008. Document submitted by François Holland represents views and intentions of the recent French government. The document includes 7 chapters discussing French position in the new strategic landscape, foundations of the strategy for defence and national security, the state of the world, Frances engagement in the Atlantic alliance and in the EU, the way to implement the strategy and the resources required. The French national defence and security strategy discussed in White Paper are based on two fundamental aspects as France's sovereignty and s its will to contribute to the international security.

#### **France's global role aspirations expressed in White Paper 2013**

In White paper, France focuses on Africa from Guinea to Somalia including Sahel Arabian Maghreb, the Mediterranean to the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden.

France is taking an active stance in Arabian Peninsula and Gulf region. It developed defence cooperation with three states in the region as Qatar, Kuwait, and United Arab Emirates, France has established a joint military base in Abu-Dhabi, signed the military cooperation agreement with Bahrain and has the close relationship with Saudi Arabia. France intends to maintain grip in South Asia since trade relations are the priority for France and Europe. France is a part of Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia. It supports the role of EU in the ASEAN regional forum (ARF). France has a close relationship with South Korea and Japan, moreover, France supports the security of several countries in the region as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam. In addition to description of Frances engagement with different regional players France has its own overseas territories spread from Atlantic to Pacific and from Antarctic to Arctic <sup>27</sup> some of those territories are regional hubs attracting near located powers to

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<sup>27</sup> The Antilles-French Guinea, New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Wallis et Futuna, Reunion Island, Mayotte, The Iles Eparses, French Southern and Antarctic Lands (TAAF), The Archipelago of Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon.

interact and develop different agenda for cooperation. Some of them are oil rich, possess abundant fishery resources or have a strategic location for trade or transportation allowing France to engage with different regional leaders and organisations in cooperation. Its overseas territories are amongst factors which triggered active participation of France in global politics.

### **France's attitude to EU integration expressed in White Paper 2013**

In the recent document, we observe that France's relation to EU integration process goes in line of supporting building its defence and security nature and EU's collaborative and coherent response to challenges. France considers the development of European approach to defence and security is a priority, it believes that magnitude of united European response would have much greater effect than solely taken national responses. France expects that knowledge and experiences of its own and other member states gained in crises would be appreciated and shared for the greater benefit of Europe, moreover, France expects from European External Action Service together with EU Defence Agency to play a stronger role in crisis management. France is ready to act to ensure the development of strategic vision in the European framework grounded on the analysis of shared risks and threats affecting internal security or CSDP. It intends to enable discussions between national parliaments and within EU to facilitate public understanding of strategic challenges. White Paper emphasises that “*stabilisation of EU's neighbourhood represents a major element of security for all member countries*”. France is suggesting “*better coordination of civil and military resources and the union's procedures*” which in turn must be adapted to its operational role. White Paper highlights common for EU states circumstances caused by 2008 crisis which inflicted restraints affecting defence spending and procurement projects<sup>28</sup>. Grounded on this fact France promotes pragmatic approaches and specific strategy to overcome established the situation, precede capabilities building and stimulate defence industry dynamics. One approach France is supporting is to engage in pooling and sharing capabilities. Another way is to start close cooperation within the framework of OCCAR (the organisation for joint armaments cooperation), which can offer additional levers for

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<sup>28</sup> The French defence budget has been reduced from 1,7% to 1,5% excluding pensions. Some 34 000 defence related jobs both civilian and military will be favourable until 2019. Simon, I., *Setting the Tone*. The RUSI journal.

European countries to manage their armament acquisition and encourage European capability development, even attracting states with modest resources. The third point is “*the development of the European defence market and consolidation of European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB)*”. France intends with European partners to promote the idea of establishing close coordination between NATO and EDA facilitating European defence industry development within NATO's smart defence and EU's pooling and sharing programs. Those initiations are perceived to be matter of soft balancing of US hegemonic power in Europe (Oswald.F,2006)

### **France-Transatlantic cooperation expressed in White Paper on Defence 2013**

USA's role in European security as the indispensable partner is already well rooted. France has its own vision for US engagement into European security, it accepts the idea that European countries need to heed the US call for more burden sharing in military spending, but sharing will be more efficient if it will foster the development of the European defence industry. France supports the idea that stepping up for own and neighbourhood security will positively affect the relationship between Europe and USA. Increasing Europe's ability to respond to its own security challenges would probably ascend its global status. After 50 year divorce, France reintegrated into NATO's military structure and reclaimed its rightful place as one of the founding members in 2009. Within the transatlantic framework, White Paper rejects the idea that France will go alone only defending own vital interests disregarding any regional or global responsibilities. It also dismisses the idea that France would delegate its future to the USA and NATO although Alliance is the pillar for French defence policy. France upholds its position towards effective European defence strategy, however, taking in account existence of stumbling blocks. Then follows priority for defence and national security strategy based on fundamental prerequisites: “*the sovereignty of national decisions, complete engagement in a dynamic Atlantic Alliance, and proactive and ambitious position in regards of EU*”. France is keen to increase Alliance nuclear deterrence might by joining its nuclear capabilities contributing to the security of the Allies. France expects that NATO's developed military capacity to act within collective defence framework for the different type of conflicts should become the ground for crisis response operations against emerging threats and in collective security operations. Frances relation with NATO is influenced by the assigning Supreme Allied Command

Transformation (SACT) commanding position to French general though that it can influence on overhauling of Alliances means for action. France is convinced that its sovereignty will not be affected and will have guarantees of the free decision in all circumstances nonetheless it is fully engaged in Alliance command.

France does not draw the line between NATO and EU as rival organisations, it perceives them as complementary. France pursues to facilitate close and pragmatic cooperation between two organisation in regards of NATO's Smart Defence and EU's Pooling and sharing programs to stimulate European defence industry. It accentuates that US engagement into European security will be much stronger if Europe will increase its defence spending, however, may not happen unless defence spending fosters the development of the European defence industry. The defence industry has important place into its security agenda contributing every year 25%-40% to whole export including more than 4000 Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) generating annual revenue of 15 billion euro.

### **France's strategy towards CSDP expressed in White Paper 2013**

White Paper states that "*current context makes a pragmatic revitalization of the CSDP possible and urgent*". France is convinced that US military reorientation to the Asia-Pacific region makes EU states to raise their responsibilities and engage in complex stabilisation operations to defuse instability pockets around Europe. According to these scenarios, European framework including CSDP will be central to mobilise civilian and military instruments. France considers that partnership between US and EU will be strengthened if EU will assume responsibility for its security. White Paper voices its position that impetus should come from highest political level such as European Council. EU Council should "*initiate guidelines on three major topics: the mission of the CSDP, the capabilities to be developed in common and industrial strategies relating defence*". It also encourages to be issued EU "*White Paper clearly defining the EU's interests and strategic objectives and contribute to the wide debate on the security and defence*". This initiative coordinated at a higher level must acquire serious support to achieve real effects. France is keen to the EU's pragmatic approach to increasing forces operational capabilities of the forces deployed under CSDP. It is also convinced that it's already time to start close coordination between member states for standardisation of

education, training and force generation. France is ready to contribute capabilities such as intelligence, surveillance, in-flight refuelling, and strategic transportation.

### **3.5 German White Paper 1994**

German White Paper represents official document issued on 05 April 1994, submitted by Federal Chancellor Dr Helmut Kohl and Federal Minister of Defence Volker R  he. The document is designed for domestic and foreign audience equally. The German defence white paper of 1994 is the successor of 1987 white paper and remained valid until 2006. This is a comprehensive document which includes seven chapters emphasising German unification process, world situation and Germany's position in it, the concept of Germany's security and defence policy, German security policy and areas of its activity, Bundeswehr in the future, in a transitional period and its role in society. The context of the document is grounded on the number of important historical developments as the unification of Germany and withdrawal of Soviet/Russian forces, wars in Balkans, foundation and rise of European Union.

#### **Germany's global role aspiration expressed in White Paper 1994**

Document described the fact of GDR-FRG unification and withdrawal of Soviet/Russian troops presumably provided strong psychological and economical impulse to German society resulting into ascending political position in wider Europe. Through document it is visible that nation considering political aspects of its past preferring to pursue carefully balanced foreign policy, there is the notion that Germany is starting gently preparing the ground to assert its global role. Discussing Germany as emerging power of the 1990s and early 2000s we should consider limitations set by national predisposition shaping its foreign and security policy. German political culture and ideology expressed in 1949 and 1990 constitution prohibited the foreign use of military power and limited its functions within the country as well. Another aspect having influence is political fragmentation in Bundestag<sup>29</sup> and nature of the democratic regime. Taking together those factors and combine to the ongoing formation of modern German identity would provide an answer why Germany did not pursue assertive foreign and security policy in the same manner as Britain or France to aspire global power role. However, would be wrong to say that Germany abandoned its Global

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<sup>29</sup> Election resources to the German Bundestag on the internet <http://www.electionresources.org/de/>

objectives at all, it just exploited different strategies which were less eye striking and more balanced. The evidence is visible in several moments found in the document. The first and most strong supportive argument is found in the text where Germany is announcing its readiness to assume the responsibility of a permanent member of UN Security Council (469)<sup>30</sup>. Germany needed broad support, therefore, its security policy had to address global needs while avoid being too assertive and cause a repulsive effect. The centrality of this particular issue in German political establishment then and now indicates about rising ambitions of its global role. The second moment is emphasised within the context of discussing regional developments. Germany is willing to absorb increased responsibility and to participate in shaping regional milieu as possessing central position within Europe. White Paper analyses post-Soviet countries and importance of political process there, it focuses more on Russia and Ukraine by virtue of their size, location and their economic and military potential including nuclear capability, outlines their problems and emphasizes that “*good Russo –German relations are important element for the future European system, of security and stability*” (223). In regards of Ukraine White Paper considers the role of Ukraine in security and stability in Central Eastern Europe and beyond “*The federal government considers a democratic, economically sound and independent Ukraine to be a factor of European stability*”(224). The document expresses the position in regards to nuclear arms control and it claims that Ukraine “*must fulfil its arms control obligation*” to eliminate all nuclear weapon systems and join Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon state according to the trilateral declaration issued by the USA, the Russian Federation and Ukraine on 14 January 1994. The third moment is visible while analysing Germany's views and attitudes in conjunction with the global problems and challenges. Germany calls to elaborate the concerted cohesive instrument to engage in crisis or conflict prevention “*it may also be necessary to employ military means to prevent, confine or terminate violence or war*” (256). This particular declaration is emphasising changing nature of Germany's foreign and security concept which had short lash before and starting to transform into more engaged and active player. The White Paper became

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<sup>30</sup> Germany is a third largest contributor after USA and Japan. It aspired to UN Security Council's permanent member seat in 2000 and 2004. Germany acquired Security Council's permanent members support, however, due to differences of the opinion of other European countries its application was declined.



starting moment to negotiate more complaint conditions to use military force outside of Germany mostly in Peacekeeping and crisis response operations. Bundestag allowed the use of military assets in principle in foreign operations, however, German participation and rules of engagement into operations remained the subject of discussion on a case by case.

### **Germany's support to EU integration process expressed in White Paper 1994**

The end of Cold War induced the US to shift to the Asia-Pacific and middle East, thus European countries and particularly Germany could exert own influence. The EU in the early 1990s was a regional power with great economic potential and ambition to assert its political role on a global level. Germany decided to support EU's influence expansion through facilitating integration process thus increasing own influence as well as possessing economic and political strength (white paper 208). Germany's active participation was an important enabler to launch the European Monetary Union and the Schengen Area Agreement. Franco-German cooperation for CFSP development resulted in ESDP process initiation and development. Germany's activity aimed not only increasing EU's and own influence but contribute to common European security *"Integration with the European democracies in the European union, for democracy, the rule of law and prosperity in Europe mean peace and security for Germany, too"*(308).

### **Germany-Transatlantic cooperation expressed in White Paper 1994**

Within White Paper there is no extensive discussion about Germany-US cooperation, Transatlantic and NATO framework of cooperation is the only context which makes explicit Germany's position in this regard. Transatlantic cooperation for Germany remains important to point, close relations with the United States represents common security assurance for Germany(410). Another point is that Germany perceives the US as a focal to maintain inner balance within European continent, its military presence in Europe viewed as important expression of solidarity (421) *"the lasting transatlantic alliance, based on a community of values and similar interests, with the United States as a world power, for the potential of the USA is indispensable for international stability"*(308). Intensification of European integration by expanding EU with Common Foreign Security Policy encompassing WEU's revitalisation and ESDI capabilities development (318). Germany looks ways to *clarify* constitution to actively participate in

international peacekeeping operations on the basis of the UN charter or under auspices of the CSCE to be a dependable partner. In regards of NATO Germany based on the example of former Yugoslavia calls that besides the ability to mount a collective defence, it should transform to be able to "*support international conflict prevention and crisis management efforts and preserve peace*". Germany's such position was caused by a negative experience in Balkans while European states failed to steer crisis without US and NATO engagement.

### **Germany's strategy towards ESDP expressed in White Paper 1994**

Germany's position towards EU's defence initiatives is utterly supportive but not obsessive. It expresses its expectations that Maastricht Treaty 1993 which established a ground for the economic, monetary and social union would provide strong impetus progressive framing of common European defence. Germany's strategy is to enhance Europe's ability to take military action by expanding the WEU's operational role gradually incorporating it into EU's structures and to help shape Europe's Security and Defence Identity within NATO framework. Germany welcomes assignment of Petersberg tasks as a new operational role to WEU it is convinced that WEU together with NATO becoming partners of UN and CSCE in international conflict prevention and crisis management. Germany supports conditionality before undertaking operational actions by WEU it must be in compliance with UN charter. Also, a decision must be unanimous and member states have right to participate or opt out based on states constitution. Germany expects that WEU's gradual incorporation into EU will be an important step to framing Common Defence Policy leading to common defence (440). White Paper emphasises Franco-German cooperation as driving force behind European unification. The Franco-German relationship has also military dimension including the joint brigade and Defence and Security Council, moreover, in the close future relationship will lay the foundation for a Common Security and Defence Policy in Europe (447). Amongst other aspects of Franco-German cooperation was mutual interests in armaments, research and development including about hundred common projects(451).

### **3.6 White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr 2016**

The German Defence White Paper is a most recent official document issued in 2016 submitted by Federal Minister of Defence Dr Ursula von der Leyen. The document is discussing key elements of German Security Policy, its security environment, strategic priorities key areas of engagement in German security policy, the Bundeswehr of the future its tasks, missions, capabilities and adaptation for the future.

#### **Germany's global role aspiration expressed in White Paper 2016**

Germany's global player role is emphasised through the accepting the task to care about "peace" as it is enshrined in the constitution. Germany after the decade of silence once again voiced its intention to become UN's effective instrument "*Germany remains willing to assume greater responsibility as a permanent member of a reformed Security Council*" and contributing to it. Interestingly after issuing White Paper series of discussion followed in local media and European academia emphasising fears instigated by Germany's increased ambitions as a global player including active utilisation of military assets for its foreign and domestic policy.

#### **Germany's support for EU integration expressed in White Paper 2016**

Since 1990's EU became part of Germany's political culture and ground for rising own influence. The White Paper says for Germany EU stands for political stability, security, freedom and prosperity, therefore, it is in German national interests to deepen EU integration. The White paper precedes that "*only a united and strong Europe will be able to effectively shape the global order in a way that reflects the interests of its citizens*". Germany formulates argumentation for supporting the increase of EU's supranational power. The White Paper argues that the "*importance of the EU for the pursuit common European goals will continue to increase*", while individual power and influence of large European countries decrease due to the rapidly increasing role played by emerging global actors in other parts of the world. In order to exert sustained influence in international affairs, EU member states should delegate some of their sovereign rights to the EU level. Germany expresses its support to further integration process in the area of foreign and security policy. Here is mentioned Germany's participation in developing recently submitted EU's Global Foreign and Security Policy Strategy, and declares readiness to empower EU to act in foreign and security policy

area. White Paper admits that European Neighbourhood Policy should be instrumentalised as a vital instrument to contain instability and crisis in neighbouring countries and don't allow to proliferate it in EU.

### **German-Transatlantic cooperation expressed in White Paper 2016**

German-USA relations are discussed within the context of a multi-polar world order where power distribution is changing between countries same as between states and non-state actors. Germany perceives that US will continue to have an influence on international security, however, considering US's economic and political developments European countries will be pushed to take on more responsibilities to pursue common European security objectives. It rises issue of questioning post-Cold War peace order built by European states and the US in the context of Russia's aggressive revisionism resulting into the occupation of Crimea. Germany is sure that Russia's actions will have negative and far-reaching consequences for Germany and Europe. In the context of increased instability, Germany mentions NATO as primary security guarantor especially while military build up is taking place in neighbouring countries. White Paper mentions that Germany benefits from NATO's strategic nuclear deterrence and underlines its support to build missile defence system in response to the threats of proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Germany prides NATO's acquired ability to participate in international crisis management. It also mentioned its contribution to Alliance by introducing Enable and Enhance Initiative (E2I) as part of Defence Capacity Building as an instrument for crisis management. Another initiative promoted by Germany is Framework Nations Concept (FNC). FNC is a key contribution to the European defence cooperation debate which would allow preserving European capabilities through sustained cooperation. Nonetheless, German position towards NATO is constructive and comprehensive still it is looking to facilitate generating synergy out of cooperation with NATO with its unique but primarily military instruments and EU which possess a wide range of instruments including diplomacy, security, economic, trade, energy and regional development.

### **Germany's strategy towards CSDP expressed in White Paper 2016**

White Paper discusses CSDP as a part of foreign and security policy which represents a new area of EU's further integration. It emphasises that EU possessing its civilian and military means in the framework of CSDP can achieve special effect through the careful

orchestration of the diplomatic, economic, financial, energy and development assets since nature of existing and future contingencies requires flexible and comprehensive responses. In order to promote CSDP development, Germany is trying to incorporate EU's East flank by widening interaction within Weimar Triangle (Germany, France and Poland). Germany proposes to intensify permanent structured cooperation referring to Treaty of Lisbon (Article 42(6) and 46TEU) to strengthen NATO's European pillar. To cope with geopolitical shifts and sustain EU's political influence Germany is promoting European Security and the Defence Union and proposes to focus at first on gradual and concrete refinement of CSDP as agreed previously in 2013, 2015 EU councils, at second to engage in permanent structured cooperation as defined in Treaty of Lisbon, At third intensive interaction based on bilateral and multilateral relations in defence policy between EU states finally increased capabilities in NATO's European pillar. Germany is convinced to establish European Security and the Defence Union must be developed three areas of CSDP those are: *"the enhancement of its structures, the integration of civilian and military capabilities and strengthening European defence industry"*. Germany calls for harmonisation of capabilities achieving interoperable, coherent, comprehensive set of European capabilities by using multinational solutions coupled with EDA to launch projects. Germany intends to establish permanent civil-military operational headquarter with civil-military planning and command and control capability. Importantly European defence industry is the focus of the White Paper discussed in the context of CSDP empowerment. The White paper emphasises the necessity to developing competitive defence industry to support development of European security." Germany is convinced about the need to consolidate European defence industries and invite EU Commission, EDA and key partners to facilitate Europeanization of defence industries and harmonisation of arms export guidelines. For the same reason, the German government is committed to support key national technologies which are based on Bundeswehr requirements and make them available for export. White paper provided 14 points comprehensive strategy of the German government in relation to CSDP and the European Defence Union. This comprehensive approach illustrates Germany's dedication to supporting CSDP nonetheless its NATO engagement is substantial.

## **CHAPTER4**

### **Synthesis**

The realism offers us instruments to discuss incentives/pressures derived from the international structure and neoclassical realism empowers us to discuss domestic settings that are important factors to be accounted in the assessment of differences between the Britain, France and Germany. Nonetheless, all three states are sharing many commonalities still their Global and European aspirations are results of different structural and domestic settings. Here we will make a synthesis of findings in analytical part combine them with global or domestic issues and summarise as causes for their particular choices in respect of global role aspiration, support to EU integration or transatlantic cooperation.

#### **4.1 Differences in Global Role Aspiration**

##### **a. International settings**

The Britain, France and Germany are western European democratic states playing important role in international politics. They are members of NATO, EU, OSCE, Council of Europe, Group of 7 and Group of 20 also they are part of Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon. Britain and France are permanent members of UN Security Council while Germany is active aspirant on the same position. Membership of those organisations provides privileges and constraining responsibilities as well.

The Britain traditionally is perceived to be strong Atlanticist, its policy preference is based on its privileged relationship with the US and its key role in NATO. This factor is underpinned not only by structural incentives and favourable relative power dynamic but by domestic settings as well. However, such preference creates dichotomy more Atlanticist means less Europeanist. The Britain's cooperation within transatlantic framework combined with increasing material power offered to it advantageous position globally. It became coupled with the US as its strategic ally, however, directly affected by Washington's foreign policy distancing it from European aspirations and EU integration. Thus, Britain's cooperation with other states including its European partners in security sphere is strongly affected with its transatlantic cooperation framework<sup>31</sup>.

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<sup>31</sup> Post WWII developed cooperation including the US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement the ground for nuclear cooperation and UK-USA mutual agreement for cooperation in signals intelligence so-called Five Eye agreement incorporating Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom and the United States. This format of cooperation

Transatlantic cooperation provides the strong ground for the US-UK dominance in Europe hence pushing France and Britain to occupy the opposing position and engage in soft balancing to defend European integration. Thus the Britain's vital interest is to maintain existing system intact by counterbalancing and obstructing anything which is perceived to be damaging to the UK-US interests and CSDP is one of it. For example, we bring the UK's negative role in 2014 negotiation to increase member states contribution into Athena mechanism which is an instrument to finance civilian missions and common costs for military operations within CSDP framework (Novaky,2016). The Britain's actions against European integration happening not only for the US-UK dominance but also due to existing permissive domestic conditions and division within EU as well. In Asia the Britain is represented by Five Powers Defence Arrangement between UK, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore, this framework also having military implications provides ground for exerting its influence in south Asia and Pacific. Finally, should be mentioned Commonwealth of Nations incorporating 52 former members of British Empire and establishing a ground for their multifaceted cooperation including trade. As we already see the UK has broad presence globally involving trade diplomacy and military, however, maintaining its position within EU was important precondition to stay relevant for the Europe and US equally otherwise the Britain will lose its unique role to be the US's bridge to Europe and expectedly will affect European power balance. To mitigate expecting decrease of influence in Europe as a result of BREXIT the Britain energetically started increasing its role as Europe's important security actor by participation in capability building in the Baltic States and Poland.

France's bilateral and multilateral commitments are extensive as well, however, it is perceived to be the epitome of the European state. France's location and ideology in contrast to the Britain's provides a strong impetus for its European leadership.

Traditionally France was occupied by the idea of united Europe thus France is Europeanist however its opposition to Atlanticism is complex phenomena. Britain's and France's complex structure of international relations demands and facilitates active

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provides ground for major English-speaker states to gather and share intelligence which is utterly important in the information age. However, nature of existing cooperation prevents member states to share intelligence information and technologies to the third party or invite another member state without the consent of all parties. Another constraint for Britain appears in regards to UK-US defence agreement the Britain is incentivized to keep close ties with the US to ensure own nuclear deterrence which is mainly based on the US trident missiles.

participation and increased global stance. France has a strong presence in Africa, South Asia and enhancing its reach in Gulf region. The post-Cold War relative power dynamic gave impetus to France's foreign policy gradually pushing forward on the European stage. However, established global unipolarity with the US domination and European security challenges pressured France to at first, balance its own European aspirations with transatlantic engagement and at second develop a strategy how to balance US power in Europe. The US-UK pivot domination in Europe causes French discontent since De Gaulle, however, it realises that transatlantic partnership is a necessary measure for European security taking into account EU's internal division and underdeveloped defence capabilities. For this reason, France in a delicate way to not alienate major security ally aligns with Germany which is major European economic driver to conduct soft balancing. The Franco-German block is promoting EU integration which is perceived to be the example of soft balance (Oswald.2006). Another way to balance US power in Europe is taking more share on own security in NATO and investing into CSDP development as well (Oswald.2006). However, France maintains the close partnership with the transatlantic alliance in case if there will be a necessity to hard balance Russia's expansion threatening European order. An additional incentive for the Britain's and Frances global role aspiration is possession of overseas/foreign territories. The Britain has 14 France 13 overseas/foreign territories. Those territories of Britain and France are scattered over the world mostly in Atlantic, Pacific and the Indian Ocean bringing them strategic importance. Those territories have very different level of sovereignty and institutional arrangements, however, London and Paris retain defence and foreign relation authority. This aspect pressures them to formulate own foreign and defence policy in wider horizon and level up their global role. Nonetheless, France has high global ambitions same as the Britain it lacks important structural incentive as namely privileged relations with superpower which would empower its ambitions. Therefore France's and Britain's global ambitions are similarly high but to implement those aspirations they have different conditions.

As a result of the collapse of Communist block and Unification, most of the international structural constraints were reduced. Germany was given chance for the self assertion in a environment. As a result of Unification Germany's relative power increased significantly offering opportunities to achieve its foreign and security policy



goals at least in long term (Duffield 1998). Germany became an active participant in international politics gradually after falling of Berlin Wall underpinned by power dynamic and popular support, it aspires permanent membership of Security Council. Germany is balanced Europeanist and Atlanticist pursuing pragmatic foreign policy. It has extensive bilateral relations, taking the active role in transatlantic relations, Germany is intensifying its engagement in the Middle East, Maghreb, Afghanistan, Asia, Africa and Latin America. However, its foreign policy focus encircles at first European affairs and after extra-continental. Germany is a major driving power of European integration trying to facilitate coherence in foreign and security policy. Germany acknowledges the importance of maintaining good transatlantic relations, however, it is willing to promote European integration. For this reason, Germany is aligning with France to increase European leverage against the US interference in European affairs and mitigate Britain's constraining effect. Germany already voiced its support to the idea of the creation of European armed forces under control of EU parliament that would facilitate the solution of security related threats and eventually will increase of European influence.

#### **b. European Security**

European security landscape significantly changed after the end of Cold War, subsequently disappeared threat of major nuclear war. That caused structural incentives of the Western block until the Balkan crisis has erupted, since then Europe is facing the different type of security threats as local, low intensity protracted crisis, intermingled with terrorism which could be easily extrapolated in European capitals. Another threat of Russia's aggressive revisionism can become a serious concern for Europe. As a matter of fact, the US is not willing to engage in existing and emerging crisis in Europe and its immediate neighbourhood leaving it on Europeans unless either its own interest are not endangered or major war will not burst out threatening of existing order. The structural pressures in regards to security induced European capitals to start thinking about own instrument to deal with security since primary European security instrument NATO is influenced by Washington, therefore it may be also less willing to engage in particular crisis and spend US taxpayers money, that became another reason for soft balancing US power in Europe. In this situation European military might plays role thus Britain and France are main role players while Germany is considerably constrained

moving on secondary roles sometimes using chequebook diplomacy without combat engagement. However, we witnessed that in absence of NATO and US interests France depending on own capabilities intervened in Mali and Chad its former colonies to resolve growing crisis. However, later it managed to bring CSDP missions on the ground. Here we conclude that security threats can create structural pressures, depending on their origin and scale inducing the US and NATO's fully/limited engagement or induce Europeans to take care of themselves. In that case, Britain's role is defined by many variables among them position of Washington and particular case that defines who will be in lead. France's role importantly increases as having interventionist posture while Germany's role decreases due to constraining domestic settings.

### **c. Domestic settings**

The National capacity of the Britain and France are more or less similar taking in account population, life expectancy, GDP and prospects of economic growth according to World Bank data, military power are almost even. Germany is a leader among them but inferior in military power.

The Britain's and France's national capacity combined with political culture were always supportive to exert their influence beyond own metropolis to conquer important territories acquire political and material benefits. This factor became a hallmark of a current political culture which even today defines foreign policy and stimulates ambitious global posture. Germany in contrast due to its location and size always was the European centre of gravity. Due to its negative historical experience, Germany chose to constrain its global ambitions by its constitution.

National governments played important role in developing global ambitions. As Rose suggests foreign policy outcome is the result of variation of relative power interfered by leaders' interpretation of systemic incentives and by the support of population (Rose, 1998). The political leaders of the Britain, France and Germany in early 90's interpreted systemic changes as beneficial opportunities. Britain's Labor party with Prime Minister Tony Blair acquired population support by promoting idea of bringing changes in the Britain, thus he was devoted to bringing new stream domestically, moreover material power existed at the moment allowed Blair to shape foreign policy that would prove its

effectiveness taking some unorthodox for Britain decisions as deeper engagement with EU. In contrast, David Cameron's Conservative government was struggling to stabilise own economy after 2008 financial crisis which had the profound effect on public opinion developing fertile ground for Euro-skepticism. Moreover, the Euro-skepticism was well rooted inside of Conservatives that allowed UKIP to aggregate and voice anti-EU feelings in front of a domestic and European audience. Therefore British domestic discontent induced to formulate foreign policy in relation to EU which eventually led to the breakup. After BREXIT vote new hastily formed government is left with the task to rule out difficult divorce, therefore recent government's input in increasing Britain's global ambitions are less in contrast to Labor government in 1997. Moreover, future EU exit process is promising to be expensive bringing economic losses subsequently downgrading the Britain's relative power, therefore its Prime Minister T. May's government's global ambitions at the moment is moderate do not match to the notion expressed in the SSN SDR 2015.

The French government of J. Chirac inherited the country with high unemployment, increasing debt, disorientated electorate and a sense of political stagnation. Those factors played pressuring role to launch extensive reforms and assure nation to put France on track to its glory. Power dynamic and domestic factors affected Frances foreign policy demanding active foreign political position. In addition, the shift of the US strategic imperatives into Asia-Pacific created an opportunity for France to exert its influence in Europe and in South neighbourhood. The recent government of Francois Holland inherited multiple crises established in Europe and domestically. In this situation, the only solution was to strengthen European position under the Franco-German leadership to withstand external and internal pressure and increase pro-European power balance. That strategy has a positive effect on the crisis increased their influence and acquired positive international and domestic perceptions. Taking into account above-mentioned factors we conclude that external and domestic incentives played an important role in Foreign policy pursued by both presidents J. Chirac same as F. Holland establishing high global role aspiration but sustaining their European position.

In the case of Germany different set of factors affecting its moderate global ambitions expressed in foreign policy. The government of Chancellor Helmut Kohl Christian

Democrat Union (CDU, 1982-1998) was an active driver of many European initiatives, however, the Unification of FRG and GDR was his primary task. The unification process required time, commitment and resources. This process lasted from 1990 to 1995, German government paid about 15,550 billion Deutsche Marks equal to € 7,950, 59 billion to Russia for withdrawal of former Soviet forces<sup>32</sup>. However, the investments made by Germany during unification were much more. Recent German government under Chancellor Angela Merkel inherited different situation, Germany's stable domestic situation with increasing economy is affected by multiple European crises threatening by the major disarray of the EU. Thus Germany as central in Europe is forced to absorb leading position together with France and ensure European unity and coherence. The popular support for policy's implemented by Chancellor Merkel government and Germany's role in EU predisposes to resurrect German identity as a European leader. The Same argument is reinforced by bringing an example of stating its ambition to take place in Security Council as a permanent member in former and recent White Papers. Consequently, the German government is playing an important driving role to formulate Germany's foreign ambition in support of European integration more than ever, based on material power country possess and popular support.

The different system incentives/pressures, power dynamics and popular support affect national governments to different foreign ambitions. In the 90s international structural incentives triggered all three states to support ESDP initiation. However, during last decade international and domestic situation pushed Britain in opposite direction. In contrast, similar international changes caused France and Germany maintains support to CSDP deeper development. The Franco-German alliance is demonstrating strong leadership focused on achieving EU unity, coherence to stabilize situation and promote integration which in turn eliminates insecurity, assures domestic stability and promotes global position. In contrast, Britain's leadership in an existing situation while lacking popular support, expecting to sustain material power degradation pursues introvert policy and has much obscured global ambitions interpreted in its foreign policy.

Based on conducted study we formulate our inference in regards to hypothesis one which stated: *“Country that has high global aspirations is less likely to increase its*

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<sup>32</sup> German White Paper, 1994, 112-113

*commitment to a supranational institution in order to preserve own freedom of action in foreign and security dimension*". The international structural incentives, relative power dynamics and domestic settings play a decisive role in formulating policies towards the supranational institution. As we already witnessed Britain having high global aspiration in 90's supported ESDP, France having high global aspiration still supports CSDP, while Germany supports it to increase its own global role. Therefore we state that hypothesis one could be sustainable only with the constellation of certain international and domestic conditions.

#### **4.2 Differences in Supports to EU Integration Process**

The UK's support to EU integration process is traditionally insubstantial, its basic reasons joining EEC were absolutely mercantile, the Britain was never obsessed with idea that European Economic Community in the future would become a global political player. Moreover, the Britain is ideologically Atlanticist therefore not Europeanist. The structural pressures caused by the collapse of Soviet Union induced Britain to stay closer to EU to avoid pitching especially in the 1990s until world political picture has become clear. In addition, T. Blairs' European aspirations played an important role to get closer to EU. Consequently, its engagement into European ESDP development was the best way to stay on leading position and steer up the process from inside. Over time EU's political and economic influence increased causing Britain's concerns. Franco-German tandem supporting European integration process made possible of rising EU's supranational power subsequently putting in question Britain's fundamental value of own sovereignty and therefore its leading position. The interpretation of rising EU supranational power in London was in stunning contrast to the Britain's political culture which is based on possessing sovereignty associated with a monarchy the bedrock for a united country and with British material and ideational possessions. Submission of British sovereignty in favour of increasing EU supranational power is absolutely unacceptable for any political party and nation itself influencing the British leader's decisions. Another concern has developed gradually due to an increase of EU's relative power Franco-German block started soft balancing the US which was seen in economy foreign and security policy. Because of those reasons Britain's attitude toward EU integration is negative since it means delegating more supranational power and reducing

own sovereignty and degradation of the US-UK pivot dominance. CSDP deepening would increase EU's supranational power in foreign, security and defence policy area totally contradicting Britain's national interests.

France's support of EU integration process is much higher than the British's, France is traditionally European state promoting European values. It supports the rise of European influence, however, prefers the intergovernmental format of relations rather than delegating all powers to EU and contributing to its supranational clout. France always has been a country with centralised power (monarchy, the presidency) in contrast of prevailed federalism in Germany. France benefits from own initiation of Common Agriculture Policy, it actively participated in EMU and Schengen zone agreement and supported CFSP and ESDP development. It has an influence on EU Energy market through third Energy Package regulation and can influence on energy providers like Russia or Africa. Support of EU integration is the best way to reduce US grip on Europe, defence integration over CSDP means defence industry and market development, France already benefited from joint armament projects and it will get more if there will be united European approach to this issue. However, principal differences between the French and British governments patronising national defence industries makes it hard to negotiate a common position.

Germany's support of EU integration process is traditionally strong as being central European country. Its domestic predisposition is supporting Germany's contribution to increasing EU's supranational power since traditions of federalism is strong today as well. Germany same as France is main European driver, it was the initiator of EMU introducing Euro also it actively supported Schengen zone agreement, it supported enlargement process and neighbourhood policy development. Since fall of Berlin wall and reshuffle of European order, Germany started supporting the development of European security and defence agenda including the idea of European Army under EU's supranational authority (under EU parliament control). For Germany increase of EU's world influence is proportional of increasing own influence. Developing of EU's foreign, security and defence instruments means bringing stability in EU's neighbourhood where the US and NATO neglect to engage. We already witnessed Germany's ability to mobilise and direct EU in the resolution of Eurozone crisis or

stepping in promoting sanctions against Russia in the response to annexation of Crimea as a result dramatically increasing its European and global influence.

Germany supports further European integration in the area of CSDP in order to achieve the goal of establishing common European defence union to acquire more instruments for security, autonomy from the US hegemony and increase Europe's global influence.

Based on above discussed we can prove our hypothesis refereeing on Britain VS France and Germany that as higher is state's integration into EU on the example of France and Germany as more is its support for deeper CSDP development.

### **4.3 Differences in Transatlantic Cooperation**

The UK- US cooperation has its complex underpinnings, sentimental attachment to the English-speaking peoples and the Anglo-Saxon heritage has established a foundation for the US-UK friendship. Cooperation in nuclear, military, intelligence, diplomacy and technology makes those two countries closest transatlantic allies. Washington-London pivot which is strongly bound in many areas makes it nearly impossible to dissolve their special relationship without serious harm to the own political position. Due to the fact that US's often undertakes unilateral steps concerning security in European neighbourhood increases Europeans discontent which is left to deal with aftershock like in the case of Iraq. Since the UK is strongly coupled with the US this factor automatically places it into opposing camp. Washington perceives CSDP as a counterbalance to the US power, counterproductive to NATO and harmful for its transatlantic relations (Sloan, 2000). The UK prefers to support NATO as an unquestioned instrument of European security and maintain existing relationship with the US than facilitating CSDP development. Taking in account fact that NATO is the only instrument for Europe with a wide range of capabilities where the US holds superior position and it is capable of responding to Russian threat in contrast of underdeveloped CSDP with complicated decision-making system, makes another reasonable argument why UK is not interested in supporting and investing into CSDP development.

France–US cooperation has a 200-year history, nature of relations is friendly and cooperative. White Papers discussing the US within several contexts: as a strategic partner within the wider framework of security related issues and as major EU trade partner. France-US, bilateral cooperation includes trade, military, nuclear and space. Within the framework of Alliance to fight ISIL two countries signed in Washington 2016 Joint Statement of Intent- including close cooperation to fight security related issues in Sahel and the Middle East their mutual cooperation included several areas of mutual interest as operational intelligence, space, cyber, nuclear, biological, and chemical defence<sup>33</sup>. Another agreement signed is The Military Space Cooperation Arrangement<sup>34</sup> followed to Framework Agreement in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes 2007. This agreement provided ground to extend their cooperation and sign an additional agreement for establishing space surveillance framework- Agreement on Cooperation in Space Situation Awareness 2011<sup>35</sup>. In addition to White Paper trade and investment between the United States and France are substantial. The US is the top destination for French investment and the United States is the largest foreign investor in France.<sup>36</sup> Nonetheless, France's does not support the US hegemony over Europe still in the wider framework it supported the US in first Gulf war, in the Afghanistan. France supports US operations in Sahel and Middle East even today as a political ally of a superpower.

France-NATO relations differ time to time in 90s France was out of Alliance's military structure, however, acknowledging the need to join back. New 2015 White Paper describes NATO as primary security instrument and takes a realistic approach towards EU's CSDP considering stumbling blocks to its deeper development. France is expecting that sooner NATO will take a decisive role in crisis response operations rather than EU's CSDP framework will become capable of doing so. France places NATO and EU as complementary to each other allowing dealing with wide range of contingencies and threats. France realises that none of them is ideally fit to respond to

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<sup>33</sup> US Department of Defence Joint Statement of Intent.  
<https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Joint-Statement-of-Intent-between-the-US-and-France.pdf>

<sup>34</sup> US Department of Defence, U.S., France Signe Bilateral Cooperation Agreements.,  
<https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1014192/us-france-sign-bilateral-cooperation-agreements>

<sup>35</sup> Space News. France, U.S. Sign Framework Agreement for Space Surveillance Cooperation.  
<http://spacenews.com/france-us-sign-framework-agreement-space-surveillance-cooperation/>

<sup>36</sup> U.S. Census, Foreign Trade, Trade with France. <https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c4279.html>



recent security problems, therefore, should be instrumentalized best available options in response to particular challenges.

Germany-US cooperation counting its history since 1790, recently they are friendly and cooperative. The US played an important role for Germany since the end of WWII, recently Germany's power increased, however, the US still has its presence in the wider context of security and stability of Germany and Europe. Moreover, in a situation when Russia put under question rules based Euro-Atlantic order established since WWII Germany agrees that Europe must take more responsibility for own security. In addition to white paper, US-Germany has extensive trade relations which are not discussed in the document. In 2015, the US became Germany's fourth largest supplier of goods and the leading export market. Moreover, the German firms employ over 670,000 American workers. Together, German and American companies offer more than one million jobs on both sides of the Atlantic.<sup>37</sup> Nonetheless, Germany has most developed trade relations with the US this condition does not play role in supporting European security system development.

Germany is becoming an increasingly important member of NATO it promotes different initiatives to achieve synergy by harmonising planning, training and acquisition of capabilities. It supports NATO's partner countries capability building through the different initiatives. It also supports NATO's deterrence building including missile defence and proposes a constructive dual approach to Russian threat. Germany supports an approach that there are areas where NATO supposed to work together with EU to achieve a greater effect. Germany is admitting that NATO has transformed to address the various security-related crises which are a positive factor, however, it acknowledges that CSDP needs more extensive development in order to be an effective instrument for Europeans together with NATO.

In response to hypothesis three, we state that according to analysis Transatlantic framework represents indispensable security instrument for the Britain, France and Germany equally currently same as before. Moreover, NATO security umbrella provides a condition for Britain, France and Germany to pursue their global ambitions reducing their vulnerability. Unless the Alliance represents indispensable security

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<sup>37</sup>U.S Department of State. U.S. relations with Germany, factsheet.  
<https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3997.htm>

instrument where traditional power distribution guarantees effective decision-making and coherence it will remain a preferable option for its members. NATO's transformative ability in the response to modern security challenges creates a condition where further CSDP development could be assessed as an unnecessary duplication of capabilities or effort that contradicts to principles of transatlantic cooperation. However, the modern security landscape uncovers areas, where NATO's capabilities are limited by different settings and EU's format is more appropriate. In response to Russia's revisionism policy, NATO focused on a military buildup in the frontline region, while EU instrumentalized sanctions against Russia as its political lever. In Ukraine-EU conducts Advisory Mission to assist the Ukrainian authorities in the sustainable reform of civilian security sector while NATO's active engagement in Ukraine would cause aggressive reciprocal activities from Russia's side.

In this work we disprove hypothesis 3 *“As far the transatlantic framework provides for EU states security guarantees and possibility to benefit from a privileged relationship with the US less will be their support to deeper CSDP development”*. by inference that as long the US maintains its hegemonic position in NATO dictating its policy principles as reasonable will be building capable CSDP framework.

#### **4.4 Differences in Strategies towards CSDP**

The states strategies towards ESDP/ CSDP differ in its support level and substance. The UK's position towards EU in general explicated in SDR 1998 does not reflect any supporting attitude or strategy at all. Later in 2015 the UK SDR already expresses its attitude which could be characterised as negative towards CSDP. Britain in recent documents in the wake of Euro-skepticism became focused on expanding its bilateral relations with France and Germany in security and defence area rather than use CSDP's multilateral framework. Moreover, we already discussed main reasons why Britain is obstructing CSDP deeper development. At first, because it will cause an increase of EU's supranational power in the expense of sovereignty. At second CSDP is perceived to be an instrument to balance US dominance in Europe.

France in contrast to Britain is supportive Chirac in his Defence Strategic reform 1996 offers French forces to Europe as defence arm. This situation is absolutely different in

recent White Paper which is explicating more precise proposals to reinitialize CSDP. France calls for the more active role of EEAS, it intends to facilitate EU's national parliaments and EU parliament open discussion over CSDP in order to facilitate public understanding of strategic challenges. It proposes the creation of EU White Paper to promote the EU's interests and strategic objectives. France encourages member states to fight emerging crisis pockets in Africa, Middle East, in Caucasus and Balkans-Kosovo. France proposes to establish close cooperation between NATO and EDA facilitating European defence industry within smart defence and pooling and sharing programs. Soon after issuing recent White Paper France brought on European Council initiative to increase common costs for military operations within Athena mechanism. Unfortunately EU member states were not coherent on this issue and the Britain easily opposed this initiative (Novaky, 2016). That example illustrated the weakness of the existing decision-making system, however, after BREXIT there will be more permissive conditions to push through new initiatives contributing to CSDP development.

Germany from the beginning expresses its support to common European defence policy. Germany's strategy towards European security and defence on early stages included close cooperation with France establishing Franco-German alliance. Recent document express more precise strategy. It facilitates CSDP development by attracting East European Atlanticist state Poland and promoting it within Weimar Triangle format including Germany France and Poland. It facilitated and consulted EEAS for EU's Foreign and Security Policy development. It proposed to intensify permanent and structured cooperation between member states. Germany promotes European Security and Defence Union based on CSDP which should undertake extensive "*enhancement of structure, the integration of civilian and military capabilities and strengthen European defence industry*". Germany is intending to establish CSDP's civil-military command and control capability. Germany proposes to undertake practical actions to facilitate the consolidation of European defence industries together with EU Commission, EDA and other key partners. It intends also harmonisation of arms export guidelines in EU.

At the end we can state that Britain's initial impulsive engagement has been watered down quickly and recently its support to CSDP is insubstantial. France and Germany were amongst engines of CSDP from the beginning and recently as well, this effort will

make possible of EU defence integration and create a strong ground to balance US unilateral policy in regards to Europe and its neighbourhood. France and Germany are intending comprehensive revitalization of CSDP after the Britain leaves Union.

## **Conclusion**

Based on conducted study we can consolidate several reasons creating the impediments to European Common Security and Defence Policy deeper development resulting into common European defence. Before concluding our research we illustrate major divergences:

Atlantic is (UK, Germany) VS Europeanist (France, Germany)

Globalist (UK, France) VS Regionalist (Germany)

Intergovernmentalist (UK, France) VS Federalist (Germany)

Interventionist (France, UK) VS Civilian (Germany)

Permissive domestic settings(UK, France) VS Constraining domestic settings(Germany)

European order established after WWII allowed to the USA to absorb hegemonic power in Europe and dominate in its foreign and security issues. Europe's primary security instrument NATO represents Washington's instrument to proliferate its interests in Europe preventing the emergence of alternative security mechanisms. Post-Cold War reality introduced unipolar world with the US superpower. However, unipolarity is the less sustainable triggering emergence of other regional poles. The emergence of EU as European power pole is reality and development of own foreign, security and defence nature is the matter of time. The Washington perceives CSDP to be an instrument to balance US power in Europe threatening existing order. For this reason, US either neglected or resisted Europeans initiatives and attempts to take control of own foreign and security policy beyond NATO framework, position voiced by M. Albright is one example of it. To maintain a strong grip on European affairs US relies on its closest European ally the UK which prevents establishing Franco-German counterbalance core in Europe. Therefore CSDP deeper development will be obstructed until US hegemonic power tends to maintain its presence in Europe in the same position.

As a fact, security and defence matters always were a directory of high politics where states were not willing to seize their sovereignty in favour of increasing supranational capability of EU. As our case study illustrates the increasing EU's supranational clout caused repulsive reaction of the UK. The development of CSDP is framed within intergovernmental scopes and demands the unanimous decision of European Council<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Article 42 section 2 TEU

where many different interests of Member States are colliding. Thus achieving cohesion among other member states is the primary challenge for France and Germany.

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