

**DYNAMICS OF GLOBAL AND REGIONAL PIRACY 1996 to 2013
: THE EVOLUTION OF SOMALI PIRACY**

by

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In an attempt to provide a comprehensive explanation of Somali piracy, this study investigates not only a wide range of piracy issues from both historical and regional perspectives, but also the deeper context of Somali piracy as a particular regional phenomenon. This study adopts a multimethod research. It uses a quantitative approach as a nested framework for a comprehensive qualitative analysis. A process-tracing method based on classification and congruence techniques was then applied to construct a causal mechanism model, which helped to discover how the relevant factors worked together to produce Somali piracy.

This study identifies and traces five evolutionary stages of Somali piracy from its genesis to its demise. Then, this study provides an evolutionary causal model to explain the complex dynamics of Somali piracy. This study explicitly argues that the full development of Somali piracy led to establishing a symbiosis with local governance and community through an embeddedness of crime. This study also discovers interesting and synchronizing trends among militia groups, including Al-Shabaab and the Somali pirate organizations. It finds that the synchronizing trend is inherently related to local state formations. Consequently, the linkage supports the main argument of this study that Somali piracy is a salient reflection of regional power dynamics with regard to state reformation processes. It also denotes the limits of Somali piracy that have resulted in its decay since 2011.

This study leads to several conclusions. First, piracy is an inherently ambiguous issue since it transgresses conventional security boundaries based on the Westphalian concepts of state. Second, piracy is a salient manifestation of complex dynamics among diverse factors with regard to the state reformation process in Somalia. Third, it is necessary to build a causal mechanism consisting of multiple factors at various levels to overcome the limitations of previous studies. This causal model approach can be extended to other examples of regional piracy. Finally, sound policy-making should consider regional contexts as well as the dynamics of the multiple factors that have shaped Somali piracy.

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

This thesis is a pioneering study to formulate a theoretical explanation of the dynamics of the evolution of piracy. It is based on an extensive data set of 5,846 piracy incidents from 1996 to 2013. All the recorded incidents are coded for an intensive analysis. The thesis also covers all the recorded hijacking incidents in the 18-year period, including a systematic compilation of approximately 600 maritime hijacking and hijacking-related incidents. This study employs a multimethod approach to explore the complex characteristics of contemporary piracy in general and the evolution of Somali piracy in particular. Multiple methods are used to investigate the effects of hypothesized factors underlying piracy incidents throughout the world. Among the major regional piracy cases, this study focuses on the evolution of Somali piracy because it has emerged as a unique piracy phenomenon in the 21st century.

About 600 publications have provided analyses of the piracy phenomena since World War II. However, a comprehensive explanation for the reemergence of the age-old maritime crime has not emerged. Through a critical review of previous studies, this study attempts to provide an alternative explanation for the unique maritime crime patterns in the Horn of Africa. This study uses multiple perspectives to overcome the limitations of previous studies on piracy while investigating the influences of the causal factors at various levels of analysis. It poses the following research questions to guide the investigation process as follows:

- What answers about piracy have previous studies provided?

- What drawbacks and limitations do previous studies have?
- What are the general and diverse characteristics of piracy across time and space?
- How can the emergence of modern piracy, specifically Somali piracy, be explained?
- What makes Somali piracy different from other examples of regional piracy?
- How can the evolution of Somali piracy towards an organized criminal enterprise be understood and explained?
- What has caused Somali piracy to decrease in recent years?

This study identifies several limitations in previous studies on piracy such as overly limited research scope; normative assumptions about the state; linear assumptions about specific causes of and effects from piracy; and monolithic perspectives. This study critically examines the possible causes of piracy incidents that are present in most of the previous research. It analyzes distribution of piracy incidents in major piracy-prone regions over the 18-year period using multiple statistical analyses. Beyond disproving state-centered explanations, the results suggest that only Somalia showed causal associations with piracy incidents. This opens up an alternative way to explore the questions surrounding piracy. Accordingly, this study conducts intensive investigation of all the recorded hijacking incidents from 1996 to 2013. All the recorded maritime hijacking and relevant incidents are coded and compiled in a systematic data scheme. Among them, 340 maritime hijacking incidents and many related incidents, such as land-based kidnapping, are intensively investigated and analyzed based on congruence patterns and process-tracing techniques.

The investigation begins with the five evolutionary stages of Somali piracy, from its genesis after the collapse of the Barre regime in 1991 to its disappearance in 2013. Based on an intensive empirical investigation, this study extracts evolutionary causal factors that affect Somali piracy

incidents directly and indirectly. On the macro level, global and regional factors are included. At the state level, state collapse and an endemic authority crisis are regarded as the direct cause of the local governance crisis in the prolonged civil war situations and as something that has generated a state reformation process. The governance crisis opened a gate for private entrepreneurs to provide government functions. For example, the coastal defender role became a key converter between legal and illegal governance functions by which Somali piracy entrepreneurs were able to exploit the opportunity for criminal profits. In addition to local factors, this study traces all the hijacking incident details in terms of capacity building such as organization, finance, and networking ability. The organizational factors are also supported by the unique nature of the Somali economy, permissive inducements for crime, porous borders, and the Somali global diaspora. Thus, this study constructs a causal mechanism model to contextualize all the relevant factors that work together to produce the final outcome: Somali piracy enterprise as a violence-managing agency in relation to state reformation processes.

The comprehensive analysis reveals that Somali piracy has evolved along with the complex dynamics of multiple factors in various dimensions, from global to local. In the evolution of piracy, the coastal defender role provides a cover-up for justifying the blurring between legal and illegal enterprises. In the conversion process, the embeddedness of crime works as a core mechanism. Therefore, this study argues that the embeddedness of crime in Somali local society is a crucial mechanism in the evolution of Somali piracy. The argument calls for understanding Somali piracy not as a pathological symptom of a failed state, but essentially as a salient manifestation of the complicated dynamics of the state reformation process.

This study explains Somali piracy by describing how its organizations reach their full development through an evolutionary mechanism. It vividly demonstrates both the complex architecture and operational dynamics. Most importantly, this study discovers the synchronous trends among militia groups, including Al-Shabaab and Somali piracy organizations. Thus, the converting role of the coastal defender and its evolving relationship with militia groups underscore the key role of embedded crime as a causal mechanism. Finally, this study draws out the implications of the unique features of Somali piracy for a regionally-based sound policy opposing Somali piracy while supporting Somali indigenous capacity building.

This thesis consists of multiple chapters to explain the complex features of piracy. The outline of this dissertation follows:

II. World Piracy: Past and Present

This chapter discusses the general characteristics of piracy across time and region. By comparing these characteristics, the chapter outlines their key common features throughout the varying forms of piracy. This chapter also shows the limits of current counter-piracy policy.

III. Research Design and Methods

This chapter explains the research methods, a mixed method for elaborating a theoretical explanation of evolution of Somali piracy.

IV. Review of Literature and Alternatives

This chapter discusses the contributions and limitations of existing studies of piracy while suggesting the necessity of a comprehensive study of piracy dynamics over time in particular contexts.

V. Actual Causes of Contemporary Piracy and Alternatives

This chapter discusses the results of the quantitative analyses. It also highlights the limitations of quantitative approaches.

VI. The Evolution of Somali Piracy

This chapter offers detailed insights into the evolution of Somali piracy. It identifies five evolutionary stages of Somali piracy, from its genesis to its demise.

VII. Evolutionary Causal Factors

Based on an intensive empirical analysis, this chapter suggests evolutionary causal factors that have affected Somali piracy incidents.

VIII. Dynamics of Somali Piracy

This chapter provides an evolutionary causal model to explain the complex dynamics of Somali piracy while explicitly arguing that the development of Somali piracy was facilitated through the embeddedness of crime.

IX. Implications of Somali Piracy

This chapter discusses policy implications based on the research results and evaluation of the Somali piracy organizations. It suggests that Somali piracy should be understood as a salient manifestation of the complex dynamics of the state reformation process in Somalia. It also suggests that sound policy making should be based on clear understanding of the two different

major dimensions of piracy: that is, securitized piracy as an uncountable danger, and as an inherently endogenous crime as a countable and manageable risk.

X. Conclusions

This chapter offers some suggestive conclusions. Challenging the transgressing nature of piracy as the dominant model, it suggests that the complex dynamics of the state reformation process should be a primary focus while arguing that the causal mechanism model reveals the complexity of the issue and the importance of multiple factors.

2.0 WORLD PIRACY: PAST AND PRESENT

2.1 PIRACY IN HISTORY

From ancient times until the 19th century, piracy occurred largely in the seas of three different continents: Europe, Asia, and the Americas. States in Europe and Asia, the oldest terrains for civilization, were forced to fight various types of maritime piracy when they expanded their power. In ancient times when the seas were not governed by any state, they were a center of contention among coastal states and peoples. Sea raiding and piracy mostly occurred in the Mediterranean Sea where coastal powers such as the peoples of the Aegean and Adriatic, the Phoenicians, the Athenians, and the Romans contended with one another for power. It was the Roman Empire that finally imposed order by force in the seas after Pompey the Great cleared the pirate bases in BC 67. The lawless sea was tamed for the first time by the overwhelming force of an empire.

Rome was the first entity to designate piracy a crime (Kraska 2016: 6, Konstam 2011: 20). Piracy reemerged during the Middle Ages and lasted into the early 19th century in the Mediterranean Sea. Most of these pirates, also called corsairs, were Muslim or had connections to Muslim powers that sponsored pirate activities to complement their limited territories. The last Muslim pirates, active mostly in Algiers, Tunisia, and Morocco, were defeated by the American navy in the early 19th century (Kraska 2011: 26).

In ancient Asia, piracy was first recorded by a Chinese monk writing about the Melaka pirates in the 5th century who disrupted sea lane traffic between India and East Asia (Konstam 2011: 288). Along the archipelagic sea lanes, the seas of South China and Southeast Asia provided good conditions for both conventional traders and illicit marauders. The sea lanes have largely been infested by piracy ever since land powers established these trade routes.

Two different types of piracy evolved in Asia. A few coastal states accumulated their power over the seas by exploiting the vulnerability of the archipelagic sea lanes. The maritime empire of Srivijaya based in Palembang, Sumatra rose to power by exploiting the lucrative spice trade beginning in the 7th century and lasting about 700 years (Eklöf 2006: 5-6). In the 15th century, the Malacca Sultanate also took advantage of the sea routes through force. The Sulu region between the Southern Philippines and the eastern coast of contemporary Malaysia Borneo has been home to some of the most resilient peoples engaging in piracy in the world, including the Samal, the Tausug, the Illanun, and the Sea Gypsies. The Tausug (meaning “people of the current”) rose to a Sultanate in the mid-15th century and this was only relinquished when American power defeated the Spanish authority in 1899. Today, the sea people of the Sulu region are mainly members of current rebel groups active in the Southern Philippines (Eklöf 2006: 42-3).

In Northeast Asia, the Wokou were an enduring threat to the coastal regions of China and Korea from the early 13th century to the late 16th century. Later, the Wokou became multinational sea bandits consisting of Japanese, Chinese, and Korean pirates. There were also quasi-state level pirates such as Zheng Zhilong, who dominated the current Taiwan Straits and adjacent waters in the 17th century (Konstam 2011: 290), and Zheng Yi and his wife Zheng Yi Sao who appeared in the early 19th century (Kraska 2011: 19-20). The original places of the origin of the legendary

Chinese pirates were Fujian and Guangdong provinces near the South China Sea, which in modern times is a center of both piracy and crime (Kraska 2011: 16-7).

The third region where piracy emerged was the Caribbean Sea near Central America, where the Spanish Main was the primary target of diverse forms of piracy. Famous Western pirates such as Sir Henry Morgan, Sir John Hawkins, and Blackbeard were active in the region from the late 17th Century to the early 18th century, and mostly targeted Spanish treasures (Konstam 2011: 127-138; 188-200). The Caribbean pirates disappeared after the British Empire decided to purge them from the early 18th century onwards (Kraska 2011: 31). Finally, the invention of the steamship helped state forces eradicate the pirates during the early 19th century (Kraska 2011: 31; Konstam 2011: 275-284). Nowadays, these marauders have become icons of a romantic notion of piracy that amuse modern consumers of culture by distorting the real face of piracy.

There are some common characteristics of piracy across time and space, although the differences in context should not be overlooked. First, piracy is basically an opportunistic behavior for economic gain that exploits the vulnerability of trading ships. Second, piracy frequently appeared when states expanded their influence across the seas, such as corsairs under the Islamic Empire during the Middle Ages and the Caribbean pirates from the 16th to the early 19th century. Third, the activities of pirates often significantly reflected the balance of power. The Roman Empire ruled the seas by clearing sea rebels and pirates such as the Carthaginian, Phoenician, and Cilician pirates. The Spanish Empire was seriously damaged by the activities of state-sponsored pirates such as the privateers from England and France, countries which effectively used piracy as a method of warfare (Kraska 2011: 283). Fourth, there have been universally vague concepts of sea territory that opportunistic piracy has been able to exploit.

There has been no clear boundary between maritime exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and sovereignty (Prescott 1986). Simply, the sea is too vast for state powers to control. Finally, the availability of technology has been beneficial to pirate activity. For pirate activity, fast and nimble ships and maneuverability at sea have been crucial. The availability of arms has also been an important factor enhancing the power of piracy. These common features - except for piracy as a method of warfare - are also evident in the re-emergence of contemporary piracy.

2.2 CONTEMPORARY PIRACY

Pirates almost disappeared from the early 19th century onwards when the Western powers actively projected maritime power, except for parts of East Asia and Southeast Asia including the Sulu region. Suppression of piracy was so successful because ship modernization outstripped the capacity of pirates and their slow ships. The emergence of steamships that could overwhelm pirate sailing ships was critical (Kraska 2011: 31-3). It was also hard for pirates to obtain fast armed ships due to their costs and difficult operating processes. Secondly, modern naval powers have been able to maintain enough capacity to secure critical maritime routes since the late 19th century (Kraska 2011: 32). Additionally, naval buildups during World Wars I and II largely eliminated piracy (Eklöf 2006: 12-3).

In the late 20th century, piracy reemerged stemming in part from similar reasons to those that caused historical piracy and in part from an array of other causes. One of the issues is the vulnerability of modern ships. They present a very tempting target for several reasons. In modern times, most merchant ships are internationally prohibited from arming themselves. The exceptions are military and security ships (Payne 2010: 41; Kraska 2011: 70-3). Moreover, only

a few crew members are now needed to handle a large ship because technology enables ships to operate in automated modes. For example, on a very large crude oil carrier, with more than 100,000 dead-weight tons, which is often equivalent to or more than four times the length of a football field, fewer than 15 to 20 crew members are necessary to handle all the complex operations. These vessels typically operate without any self-defense equipment (Burnett 2002: 11-3). Modern seafarers are not the traditional muscular sailors of the past; they are more like licensed professionals.

As global trade has rapidly increased, the number of ships sailing along major sea-ways has grown. These ships have become easy targets for lightly armed pirates. The democratization of technology (Buzan and Herring 1998: 131) has helped modern pirates arm themselves with light and medium-level weapons such as pistols, machine guns, grenades, and even RPGs (rocket-propelled grenades), as well as GPS tools. Supposedly, pirates have also taken advantage of internet communication technology to obtain intelligence about targets including information about vessels, their cargo, and navigation routes (Bahadur 2011)¹. With small and high-speed boats, pirates can easily gain access to any target ship, including large tankers. They can climb aboard using a strong light-weight folding ladder to take control of the ship (Payne 2010: 101). Therefore, modern pirates are agile, aggressive, and capable of reviving the fear instilled by ancient pirates.

After the end of World War II, many independent states emerged from the old Western empires. They were politically independent, but did not have enough capacity to control their territories and protect their sovereignty (Jackson 1990). Many recently created states are not yet considered nations, but as multi-ethnic states with many different languages, cultures, and traditions. The greater the diversity and size of the state, the more difficult it is for it to

consolidate. Minority groups have always revolted against major dominant ethnic groups. The Banda Aceh and minor peoples in the Sulu area have been among the dissident groups, and have persistently participated in piracy activities in Southeast Asia.

The obscure boundaries between maritime territories have also caused disputes among states. The conflicts often led state law enforcement and military personnel to participate in piracy activities indirectly (Eklöf 2006: 131; 141-3). For example, the Sukarno government of Indonesia implicitly allowed its naval forces to threaten the independence of Malaysia. Until recently, the poorly financed military organizations of Indonesia have also been suspected of participation in piracy.

The most violent piracy activities were not committed by weak illicit state actors, but by the coastal people of a relatively stable state: Thai people against Vietnamese boat people. From 1975 to 1977, Thai fishermen-turned-pirates, with their connections to criminal syndicates, committed the most violent acts of piracy including looting, brutal murder, rape, and human trafficking in modern piracy history. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) later investigated the crimes. Unfortunately, no one was accused and prosecuted (Eklöf 2006: 18-34). The Thai piracy case showed that the most frequently attributed causes of piracy such as poverty, state capacity, geography, and sanctioning culture—are not necessarily appropriate explanatory variables for piracy (Eklöf 2006:18-34). This case suggests that piracy occurs whenever opportunities are inadvertently provided by vulnerable targets at sea.

China's entry into the world trade regime seemed to be a bridge between Cold War piracy and post-Cold War contemporary piracy regarding the phantom ship phenomenon. In 1979, the Far Eastern Regional Investigation Team (FERIT), funded by the International Chamber of Commerce, found that 27 out of 48 ship disappearances were suspicious. The lost

ships were later discovered with forged registrations (Eklöf 2006:66-67). The phenomenon of phantom ships continued throughout the 1990s. The disappearances of the M.V. Spica in 1994 and the Anna Sierra in 1995 are representative cases illustrating the connections between phantom ships and piracy that lasted from the late 1970s until the 1990s (Eklöf 2006:68-83; Williams & Vlassis 2001:176-178). Interestingly, Chinese connections were suspected not only in criminal syndicates but also in legal offices, including coastal officers and naval officers of the People's Liberation Army of China (Murphy 2010: 54-9). The arrest in 1992 of Captain Emilio Chenko, the infamous head of a pirate criminal syndicate, in 1992 showed the prevalence of phantom ships and piracy in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea (Eklöf 2006:68-70).

Thus, most cases of piracy were recorded in East Asian waterways until the end of the 20th century. With the end of the Cold War and the exponential growth of global trade and newly opened economies, such as those of China and India, piracy again boomed until the mid-2000s. After counter-piracy methods were initiated by major littoral states in Southeast Asia (Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand), with help from outside forces, piracy was effectively controlled in the region. However, piracy has not all disappeared. Many pirates remain active in less visible areas such as the Sulu region, and their activities are unrecorded. Considering the general causes of piracy and its supportive environments, piracy in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea seems almost impossible to eradicate.

This research found that piracy in Southeast Asia reached a peak in 2000, with a record 74 incidents in the Malacca Straits, 116 in Indonesia, and 244 in all of Southeast Asia, (out of a total of 465 in the world). The Horn of Africa became the center of piracy from 2007 until 2011. The frequency of organized criminal activity and the scope of the activities of Somali piracy are greater than those of other piracy-prone regions (Chalk 2008; Hansen 2009). Damage from

Somali piracy is estimated to be much greater than that in other regions (Gilpin 2009; K. Hurburt 2010). This study finds that the total numbers of hijacked vessels and kidnapped crew are 376 and 5,274 respectively between 1996 and 2013. The numbers might be historical records concerning the number of hijacked ships and kidnapped hostages, and the durations of the hostage situations.

Somali-based piracy is mostly attributed to the failed state conditions that have persisted since the collapse of Dictator Siad Barre's regime in 1991. As Murphy (2011) points out, however, the causes of the spike in piracy in Somalia are much more complex than can be explained by a single factor. Until recently, Somalia was not a piracy-infested area. The northern autonomous Puntland, one of the areas where Somali pirates originate, is populated by traditionally pastoral societies. Although Somalia's coastline is with the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, a global choke point (please see Appendix IV for the world choke points), the geographic features do not provide an advantageous point of maneuverability like those of the Archipelagic Southeast Asian areas, which have lots of hiding places among the numerous islands and straits.

Poverty can be viewed as one of the leading causes of piracy. However, it is not the sole cause of piracy given Somali piracy was not active when the country suffered from massive starvation due to natural disasters, such as droughts and floods in the 1990s. Although a piracy incident occurred in 1991, it was not an act of organized piracy. It was just an instant expression of rage against foreign vessels. The coastal Somali people believed that foreign fishing ships had devastated their living conditions. Moreover, there is no historical tradition of sanctioning piracy as an indication of the prowess of youth as in the Sulu region. Somalia is not a traditional piracy-prone area, but rather the geographical location of a global choke-point. Nevertheless, as Murphy stated, "Somali piracy represents the most significant challenge to maritime security since the

end of World War II” (Murphy 2011:163). In other words, much more sophisticated approaches are necessary to comprehend piracy in the Gulf of Aden. For example, the international networks of Somali people abroad and international relations with the Somali state and clan networks have added more complications to the already complex phenomenon. The current policy has focused on deterring piracy and, as Murphy (2011:135-7) has argued, this has fundamental limitations. Even so, Somali piracy incidents have decreased from 2011, although it is too early to determine that the piracy threat has completely disappeared.

The Gulf of Guinea is another region with rising piracy rates, with both the frequency of incidents and the levels of violence increasing. Most of the piracy cases in the region have occurred off the coast of Nigeria, particularly from the Niger Delta. Reportedly, bandits and criminal organizations are nested in the Niger Delta area, where Nigerian rebel groups such as the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force and the Niger Delta Vigilantes have been pushing for the regional development for indigenous people since 2003. Most of the pirates are well armed and mainly target tankers. They are expanding their activity into the adjacent coasts of neighboring states, such as Benin, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In November 2012, the UN made a recommendation to convene a regional summit to form a united force against piracy following a call to action from Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (UN 19 November 2012).

There are two other minor spots where piracy occurs: South Asia and South America. In South Asia, most pirates are based near the Chittagong area in Bangladesh (IMB Annual Piracy Report 1996-2006). During the Sri Lankan Civil War, the Tamil Tiger rebels employed methods of piracy during their fight against the Sri Lankan government. They disappeared after the government cracked down on them. Since their disappearance, the Bay of Bengal has become the

most piracy-prone area in the region. South American coastal areas also suffer from piracy. The IMB has reported incidents of piracy along the coastlines of Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, Haiti, and Colombia since the 1990s. These pirates are highly organized and violent, and have automatic weapons, although many of the attacks occurred when ships were docked rather than at sea.

Four common features are found in both ancient and contemporary piracy. Pirates always exploit vulnerable points of state governance, and this is common across different time periods. The basic nature of piracy as a crime of opportunity has not changed. Piracy tends to emerge in periods of expanding maritime trade. Piracy crimes mostly tend to be transnational in nature given the exploitation of maritime boundaries by pirates. Finally, availability of technology always matters. For example, Vikings enjoyed high-speed and easily maneuverable lengthy ships to easily penetrate lands and places alongside sea and river edges. Without technology, pirates have historically not been able to practice their activities. It is not a matter of technology per se, but rather one of employing skills of technological asymmetry, as contemporary pirates enjoy small and cheap but fast and easily maneuverable ships and weapons (Eklöf 2006: 58-59).

However, crucial differences should not be overlooked, as modern piracy appears to have more enterprise-type management and operations for maximizing profits, while minimizing risks and costs. The summary in table 1 highlights the points of contrast and commonality between historical and contemporary piracy. Somali piracy appears a little different from general piracy. Though it does not own its turf, it uses local areas to support its long-term negotiation operations. It also relies on significant manpower to accommodate hostage situations. Finally, Somali pirates justified their existence in terms of their role as a coastal defender, which has quite a similarity with the privateer role in ancient piracy. So far, Somali piracy features both


similarities to and differences from traditional piracy, which drives some of the research focus of this study.

Table 1. Comparison between Ancient and Contemporary piracy

| Features | Ancient Piracy | Contemporary Piracy |
|------------|--|--|
| Difference | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Owning turfs 2. Relying on large ships and man power 3. Privateers linked to state sponsors | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Only managing operating bases 2. Outsourcing vessels and man power 3. Contractors with diverse networks |
| Common | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Inherently crime of opportunity 2. Emerging in trade expansion periods 3. Exploiting vague sea territory 4. Utilizing technological availability | |


2.3 DIVERSE PATTERNS OF REGIONAL PIRACY

Most contemporary piracy incidents have occurred in four regions: Southeast Asia, East Africa, West Africa, and South Asia. The four regions have led piracy incident trends from 1996 to 2013. Besides South Asia, the three main piracy-prone areas led the world's hijack incident trends (91.5% of 555 hijack incidents) for the eighteen-year period (See Appendix I & II and bibliography of data sources). However, the successful piracy trends are diverse among the regions. As chart 1 shows, this research discovered that 97.8% of ransom-seeking piracy occurred in the three piracy-prone areas, with Somali piracy almost exclusively focused on acquiring ransoms, especially from 2005 onwards. This research found out that Somalia, including the Gulf of Aden, executed 60.4% of the total worldwide hijacks and 79.1% (185) of the ransom-seeking piracy incidents. This study estimates that Somali pirates raked in more than \$380 million for the eighteen-year period, while the other areas earned less than \$1 million (about \$0.15~\$0.2 million in West Africa and \$0.6 million in Southeast Asia respectively). Thus, the scale, success, and profitability of Somali pirates were unique in modern piracy history.




(See Appendix II.2 for data sources and data compiling processes.)

As chart 2 shows, two regions have led in the number of world maritime hijacking incidents. Southeast Asian piracy led the frequency of hijack incidents until 2004, but was eclipsed by Somali piracy from 2005 to 2011. Piracy types in Southeast Asia are much more diverse than in the rest of the world. For example, as the chart below shows, the Southeast Asian regions, including the South and East China Seas, recorded a total 48 (90.6%) phantom ship² (Abhyankar 2001) incidents out of a total 53 such incidents worldwide for the 18-year period.




(See Appendix II.2 for data sources and data compiling processes.)


As chart 3 shows, phantom-ship piracy peaked in 2002 and began to decrease from 2003. It appears to almost disappear from 2013 onwards as advanced tracking technologies (e.g. Automatic Identification System and Sea Lojack) have progressively been applied to most international vessels. Hijack incidents in Southeast Asia led the trend until 2004, while those by Somali pirates topped total frequency levels until 2012. Piracy incidents in West Africa are also unique. Though its number is much smaller (645 incidents or 11% of the total of 5,846 incidents for the 18-year period) than those of the other two regions, its success rate (79.8%) is higher than those of the other two regions (78.7% in Southeast Asia and 38.8% in East Africa).



(See Appendix II.2 for data sources and data compiling processes.)

Chart 4 and 5 show that piracy incidents for oil are highly concentrated in Southeast Asia and West Africa. A total of 17 incidents occurred in Southeast Asia and the East/South China seas for the 18-year term. Most incidents were committed by transnational syndicates of Chinese triads and syndicates tied to local pirate gangs (One-Webb 2006: 76). Interestingly, oil piracy began to increase rapidly from 2010. Reportedly, many of the attacks off West Africa were committed by the Niger Delta oil crime syndicates who were once members of the Niger Delta Emancipation Movement (MEND). The MEND was a political militia group based in the Niger Delta region (Peel 2010).





(See Appendix II.2 for data sources and data compiling processes.)

Additionally, there were a total of 71 piracy incidents with political underpinnings during the 18-year term. Among them, 29 (41%) incidents occurred in Southeast Asia. Many of the attacks were carried out by the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) Rebellion (Aspinall & Crouch, 2003) and their associated pirate gangs in northern Sumatra Island region until 2008. Other political incidents in Southeast Asia were committed by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) or Abu Sayyaf in the southern Philippine areas. In East Africa, most of the political type piracy (17 incidents) was committed by the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) or al-Ittihad al-Islami. The SSDF became a military unit pushing for the creation of the autonomous Puntland state in northeast Somalia. The al-Ittihad al-Islami became part of the Al Shabaab rebellion group. Al Shabaab (Mujahideen Youth Movement) is an Islamist militant group in Somalia that tries to impose a rigid form of sharia. Hizbul Islam was a Somali Islamist insurgent group, which is now merged with Al Shabaab (Stevenson 2010; Richard 2011). In West Africa,

the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and its linked pirate gangs committed most of the 13 politically motivated piracy incidents. Additionally, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) committed most of the piracy incidents (8 incidents) in South Asia until 2006.

Overall, piracy in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea has the longest and most enduring history (Burnett 2002). The types of piracy, levels of sophistication, and networks are the most diverse in the world. Piracy in the regions has targeted almost everything on ships, from crew members' personal belongings, cargo, vessels, and even people for the purpose of human trafficking. Though most piracy incidents in the Malacca Straits are classified as opportunistic robberies aimed at vulnerable targets (Valencia 2006), their linkage to other crimes is highly sophisticated (Chatherine 2009). As the phantom ship cases show, piracy has also been a vehicle of inland organized crime syndicates. The traditionally permissive environments of piracy in the region have set them apart from other piracy-prone regions (Eklöf 2006). Their violence levels are equally diverse, ranging from simple theft to mass murder with automatic rifles and bombs. Highly organized local bandits and independent movement groups such as the Moro National Liberation Front, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Abu Sayyaf, and Jemaah Islamiyah have inflicted the most serious violence (Hastings 2008; 2009).

These organized crime groups are mostly based in Southern Mindanao in the Philippines. Piracy has been decreasing since littoral states initiated multilateral coordinated patrols beginning in 2004. It appears that piracy is temporarily dormant because the frequency of piracy incidents fluctuated as the Indonesian government attempted to crack down in the 1990s (Eklöf 2006). Thus, it would be premature to conclude that piracy has disappeared in the region; indeed, piracy incidents have increased again since 2010.

Somali pirates have maintained an international support network, including intelligence, plotting, financing, operation, and booty money redistribution, not just in the Somali region, but also in other international states such as Yemen, Kenya, and even among Somalis based in the Western world (AP 2008; James 2011). Somali pirates expanded their activity to the Indian Ocean and even the Strait of Hormuz (Cold 2010). Somali piracy focused mostly on ransom money through ship hijacking because the poor infrastructure of Somalia led the pirates to prefer cash (Hastings 2010). There are about five major piracy organizations in Somalia (Murphy 2011). Though most pirates are from Puntland, their major bases are in South and Central Somalia, for example, in Mudug, Hobyo, and Mogadishu. Piracy organizations have greatly expanded, both domestically and internationally through the unique clan networks of Somalia. Fishermen turned pirates are just one part of the organization. There are muscle men, navigators, planners, locators, liaisons, negotiators, and financiers who are connected to the Islamic *hawala* remittance system (Murphy 2011). Somali piracy has grown rapidly, threatening international maritime security in the region around the Gulf of Aden (Sullivan 2010).

Somali pirates were not so different from other pirates in the world until the 1990s. They began to evolve quickly to an enterprise level starting in 2005 (Murphy 2011). There were triggering events that caused the Somali people to develop and increase the sophistication of their criminal enterprises. For example, ransom money was not paid for the MV Sea Johanna, kidnapped in December 1998, in spite of initial demands for \$6.5 million by a group from the Islamist organization al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI). However, organized pirates calling themselves the Somali Marines successfully received a ransom of over \$300,000 for the LPG carrier Feisty Gas in 2005 (Murphy 2011). The case seems to be one of the triggering events for the rapid

evolution of Somali piracy to a highly organized level and suggests that success bred imitation and emulation.

Piracy incidents in the Gulf of Guinea are mostly related to oil theft. Pirates in the Gulf of Guinea mostly attack oil and gas tankers from oil-producing regions, such as the Niger Delta and offshore oil rigs (Peel 2010; Marc-Antoine Pérouse 2012). Although these pirates are organized, they were not professionals according to the IMB reports, at least until 2009. With the cooperation of regional states and outside forces supplied by countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, the Nigerian government has enhanced patrols, and incidents of piracy have decreased since 2009. This research found out that the number of incidents in Nigeria was 37 in 2008, but decreased to 28 in 2009, 21 in 2010, and 11 in 2011. However, piracy incidents have increased in the coastal areas of the neighboring states of Nigeria. Benin had 20 piracy incidents in 2011, a sudden jump from zero in 2010. Piracy in Guinea also increased from 1 incident in 2008 to 5 in 2009, 6 in 2010, and 5 in 2011. Reportedly, the Nigerian pirates have expanded their activity areas to adjacent seas, avoiding the Nigerian government patrols (IMB Annual Piracy Report 2008-2013). For example, pirate gangs stole jet fuel worth five million USD by hijacking the tanker Itri on January 16th, 2013. The criminal operation was done within a week. Calling it petro-piracy, Murphy (2013) recently argued that Nigerian oil piracy is the most profitable illegal business.

All the piracy-prone countries have suffered similar patterns of domestic issues, such as violent regime changes or collapse, poverty, inequality in resource distribution and long-term civil wars. However, successful piracy patterns differ across the regions. Most Nigerian pirates originated in the Niger Delta, where the oil wealth has been a cause of local resentment due to its destructive consequences on the political economy and natural environment (Peel 2010). The

unequal distribution of oil wealth is regarded as a fundamental cause for the rise of the MEND rebels, who have been responsible for many oil theft piracy incidents. Indonesia also suffered from domestic instability issues (such as the Aceh rebellion for the independence of East Timor) sustained turmoil and regime changes until 2004. This study found out that piracy incidents rapidly increased from 1996 (53 total, up from 37 in 1995) when the Suharto regime faced serious internal resistance from diverse political and ethnic factions. The incidents hit a peak in 2003 with 119 recorded cases in Indonesia. Many of the hijack and ransom-seeking incidents were committed by the Aceh rebels. The incident frequency, especially the hijacking incidents, largely decreased (down to 15 in 2009) after the Indonesian political economy had successfully recovered - from 2006 onwards.³

The worst-case example of a regime collapse has been in Somalia. Piracy as an organized crime has widespread social, political, and economic effects that often extend beyond state and regional boundaries. The effects of Somali piracy have had enormous repercussions transnationally and globally. However, Somali piracy was not at a serious level until 2004. As the quantitative analysis will demonstrate, state failure was not a direct cause of ransom-seeking Somali piracy. The results of this study suggest that Somali piracy incidents began to increase from 2005 (45, including incidents in the Gulf of Aden) even though the Transitional Federal Government existed from 2004. It temporarily decreased in 2006 (18) because the Union of Islamic Courts tried to eliminate the bases from which pirate groups operated. However, the number of incidents began to soar from 2007 (42) and continued to increase until 2010 (234) and 2011 (233). Unlike other regional piracy, Somali pirates focused on ransoms, probably because the Somali economy is not directly linked to the flows of the world economy, as Nigeria and Indonesia are. In the isolated economy, foreign cash, especially the US dollar, is the most useful

resource for an economic reward (Bahadur 2011: 113-4). The international currency enables the Somali pirates to build their symbiotic environments, particularly in some of the local Somali areas such as Himan & Heeb and the coastal towns of Puntland. Local residents could enjoy new economic opportunities such as *khat* (a narcotic leaf) and the loan business for the pirates. Among the several prominent Somali pirate leaders, Afweyne (nickname of Mohamed Abdi Hassan) built the most successful criminal empire with his large flow of ransom income and international business networks. His legalized companies, such as Indian Ocean Consultation and Central Air Aviation, have continued under the management of his son (Abdulkadir Mohamed Afweyne) and his business partners in the Himan Heeb areas (UN Monitoring Report 2014). In brief, the Somali piracy business could flourish by taking advantage of the malfunctioning governance of central and local states until 2012 when the frequency began to decrease rapidly (73 in 2012 and 13 in 2013).

As table 2 suggests, piracy incident patterns are explicitly or implicitly related to regional issues. Not just frequency trends, but also types of maritime crime are closely related to the critical issues in each particular regional context. Modes of counter-piracy and their effects are also related to the regional contexts.

Table 2. Comparative Table of Different Piracy Incidents by Regions

| Regions | Features | Types | Peak Time | Pirate Gangs | Regional Issues |
|----------------|-------------|---|--|--|---|
| Southeast Asia | Diverse | Opportunistic Robbery/Political Piracy/Phantom Ship/Hijacking for Smuggling | 1996-2004 (Rising again from 2011) | Diverse: local bandits, international syndicates & political rebels | Political economic instabilities in Indonesia & Philippines |
| East Africa | Ransom only | From a small bandit group to a Large criminal enterprise | 2006-2011 | Political Militia (before 2004) & Clan based syndicates (after 2004) | Protracted civil wars, defunct paper state and fragile local governments |
| West Africa | Oil Theft | Oil crime syndicate | Intermittently (2001-04 &2011~) | MEND tied pirate gangs. | Distribution of oil wealth in the Niger Delta |

2.4 LIMITS OF COUNTER-PIRACY MEASURES

Primarily, two different approaches have been applied to the piracy-prone regions. The first one is to seek to control piracy through regional initiatives, which have been adopted in Southeast Asia near the Malacca Straits and in West Africa near the Gulf of Guinea. The second counter-piracy approach seeks to curb piracy incidents with external forces by dispatching international naval ships. The costs are lower, and the equipment much simpler in the first approach (Graf 2011).

In the Gulf of Guinea, Nigeria is the only country with multiple naval vessels. Other regional states do not have such a capacity. Even the Nigerian Navy has a very low (28 percent) operational capacity (Bridger 2013). It appears that counter-piracy measures have been applied to the region in an ad hoc mode. Thus, the international community was urged to establish a

coordinated control over regional piracy. For example, “the UN Security Council called for a comprehensive regional approach to combat threats of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea” (UN News Centre 2013). As a result of the effort, The Critical Maritime Routes in the Gulf of Guinea Programme (CRIMGO) (with €4.5 million funds for a three-year duration) was launched in January 2013 (EU Press 10 January 2013). However, there is no clear sign of effective control over regional piracy around the Gulf of Guinea. Piracy incident records (41 in 2011, 52 in 2012, and 47 in 2013) show that West African piracy is not curbed. Reportedly, piracy incidents increased ahead of the Nigerian election (Reuters 7 October 2014).

In regards to the cooperative and organizational aspects, there are diverse bilateral cooperative networks among the four littoral states and main user states in the Malacca Straits - Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand. Efforts to control piracy in the Malacca Straits have exhibited evolutionary progress from the Shangri-La Dialogue (intergovernmental security forum since 2002), the Trilateral Coordinated Patrols by three littoral states of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore (codenamed MALSINDO Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrols since 2004), and Malacca Straits Patrols (a set of cooperative security measures by four littoral states including Thailand) to the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) 2006, an Information Sharing Center initially funded by Japan but managed under Singaporean initiatives (Ong-Webb 2007). Moreover, there are numerous multilateral networks centered on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) such as ASEAN Plus Three, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), and The East Asia Summit (EAS)⁴, as well as other diverse defense networks. Information sharing is also important and Singapore’s

Information Sharing Center (ISC) is an accompaniment to the IMB piracy reporting center which has been operating in Kuala Lumpur since 1992.

There are several coordination networks against Somali piracy in the Gulf of Aden: 1) Operation Atlanta (EU), 2) Operation Ocean Shield (NATO), 3) The Combined Maritime Forces (CMF, The U.S. initiative), 4) The Combined Task Force (CTF 152), 5) the Maritime Security Centre-Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), 6) Djibouti Code of Conduct (IMO Initiative), 7) New York Declaration (Multilateral Commitment Signs), 8) Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), 9) The South Asia and Africa Regional Port Stability Cooperative (SAARPSO). Unfortunately, Somalia as a defunct paper state does not provide any active roles in any of the coordination networks for counter-piracy measures. Though Somalia has launched its counter-piracy measures, such as the Kampala Process in 2011 and the Puntland Marine Police Force (PMPF in 2012), the country as such does not demonstrate any real evidence of actual control capacity (Ahmed 2013).

The different results and varying effectiveness of counter-piracy measures are closely related to regional capacity and context. In assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of counter-piracy measures in the Malacca Straits, it has been found that high levels of control capability can be reached with the limited resources and overlapping networks. This is in stark contrast with the results of piracy control in East and West Africa. Though there has been no hijacking incident around the Gulf of Aden since 2013, there is no clear sign of the elimination of Somali piracy – although it has certainly declined sharply. International intervention contributed to stopping piracy, but as long as problems with the onshore status of Somalia persist, this could prove to be no more than a temporary respite.

The contrasting results of counter-piracy policy can also be understood in terms of the differences in regional capacity. For example, the share of the amount of total world exports in

Southeast Asia is about 6.9%, while the number is around 0.1% at best in the states around the Gulf of Aden (WTO 2010). The GDP gap between the two regions also reveals a significantly different capacity for an effective counter-piracy measure (please see Appendix V for detailed data). The total GDP (947,715 million USD in 2010) of Southeast Asian states was more than ten times the total GDP of the Gulf of Aden States (93,029 million USD in 2010) (WTO 2010; the World Bank 2010, CIA World Fact Book 2010).

The gaps in priority and capacity among littoral states and user states are significant barriers. In Southeast Asia, Singapore and other main user states such as the United States, China, and Japan have treated piracy as a serious maritime security challenge. Indonesia and the Philippines had more serious domestic stability issues as well as longer coast lines and larger territorial waters than other regional states until 2004 (Eklöf 2006). Similarly, East and West African states, like Indonesia before 2004, have had more pressing domestic issues. For them, piracy is not a direct threat to internal stability. For example, the Somali people, especially in the Puntland region, welcomed the financial support and treated pirates as heroes and guardians of their coastal interests until 2011 (Shortland 2011; Bahadur 2012).

There are also other obstacles to an effective counter-piracy policy, such as vague legal codes for piracy prosecution, permissive environments, and competitive relationships among the neighbor states. For example, thirteen Somali pirates captured by the Dutch frigate *Eversten* in early December 2009 were released because no country was willing to prosecute them. The problems with the definitions of piracy have revealed the limitations of modern international systems, at least regarding their universal legality (Karim 2011; Kiser 2010). The difficulty of sanctioning cultures of piracy (Eklöf 2006) and corruption (Murphy 2008; Hastings 2010) are also major hindering elements. Moreover, the competitive relationships among the littoral states

have been a potential hurdle in establishing cooperative counter-piracy networks. For example, the three littoral states, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, have had conflicting territorial and sovereignty issues since their independence.

Despite the difficulties, counter-piracy control in the Southeast Asian areas has been evaluated as effective (Graf 2011; Bridger 2013), whereas the two other areas are still troublesome (Ahmed 2013; Oliveira 2013). Table 3 compares counter-piracy measures among the three piracy-prone regions. There are two primary reasons for the different results: low threat perception and inadequate capacity of regional states in the piracy-prone regions. Though international organizations such as the UN, NATO, the EU, and ASEAN have urged the regional states to develop effective counter piracy measures, the regional peoples have perceived much lower levels of threat from piracy. For local people in Somalia and Nigeria, the pirates were perceived as defenders against the destruction of resources by foreign companies (Hansen 2009; Bahadur 2012). Ultimately, however, the regional states in the piracy hot zones had insufficient capacity to control piracy by themselves. The exception is Southeast Asia. As the Indonesia economy has risen with increasing socio-political stability since 2004, piracy incidents have markedly decreased, especially around the Malacca Straits, a crucial bottle neck of global trade. Unfortunately, regional states in East and West Africa have yet to display a similar capacity.

There are some critiques of piracy threat arguments (Menkhaus 2009; Murphy 2011) because there has been no actual evidence that modern piracy has threatened international security. About 0.1% of total transiting vessels (about 200,000 vessels annually through the Gulf of Aden) were attacked in East Africa in 2011. In other words, piracy is not a major direct threat to international security, though it appeared to be a global problem due to the international character of shipping and the upsurge of media-driven reports. Two incidents were committed by

Al Qaeda (US warship Cole on October 12, 2000 and the tanker Limburg on October 6, 2002). Actual damage levels were not as serious as the terrorist group intended. Nevertheless, the cost (up to 20 billion USD) of piracy should not be overlooked (Anna 2010; Financial Action Task Force 2011).

Table 3. Comparison of Counter Piracy Measures by Regions

| Region | Threat Perception | Major Targets | Risk | Mode of Counter Piracy | Effectiveness |
|----------------|--|--|-----------------|----------------------------|---------------|
| Southeast Asia | High to International | Diverse | Increasing Cost | Regional Initiative | High |
| East Africa | High to International/ Low to Somalia | Large vessels for ransom/small vessels for mother ship | Increasing Cost | Outside Intervention | Temporary |
| West Africa | High to International/ Low to Nigeria | Oil Tanker and Supply ships | Increasing Cost | Ad hoc regional initiative | Low |

In other words, piracy is not an international threat but a local problem based in a regional context, though it appears to be an international security issue. The nature of piracy incidents and their patterns reflect the onshore problems in the particular regional states, as the three piracy-prone regions demonstrate. Therefore, threat perception and counter-piracy initiatives by regional states, not by outside forces, are crucial for the emergence of successful counter-piracy measures.

This chapter discussed the general characteristics of piracy across time and regions. It also identified the key features of piracy. Maritime piracy is an inherently transnational crime as

long as the sea is not fully territorialized by states. The history of the modern Westphalian nation state, however, is much shorter than that of piracy. The common features of piracy, as discussed in this chapter, are present in contemporary piracy. The only difference is in the flexibility of piracy operations and the structure of pirate organizations. The diverse patterns of regional piracy also show that the patterns of maritime crimes are inherently connected to regional contexts. Finally, this chapter suggested that effective counter-piracy measures are critically dependent on the initiatives of regional states.

In summation, piracy has appeared as an international threat, but actually is a local context-driven crime issue. The incident patterns and characteristics are echoes of onshore issues in particular regional contexts. Regional counter-piracy initiatives are key to successful counter-piracy measures. The next chapter provides descriptions of research design and methods. It also emphasizes the necessity of multi-method research design and causal mechanism models.

3.0 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

A single method cannot uncover the causal mechanism of the evolution of Somali piracy since it is a product of complex dynamics among multiple factors. A multi-method approach is necessary to understand a multi-dimensional phenomenon and shed light on the complicated process of the evolution of Somali piracy. Thus, this study uses a mixed method approach utilizing quantitative and qualitative techniques and data to examine evolutionary trends in piracy organizations. Quantitative analyses will be employed to conduct cross-case comparisons, while attempting to identify correlation factors for piracy incidents by piracy incident types and time periods. These analyses will also help determine whether Somali piracy is a coherently unique case or not.

The correlational values do not specify causal processes in concrete ways. Qualitative analyses help ultimately to build a causal mechanism to illuminate the evolutionary processes. Several case study techniques are utilized for the qualitative causal analysis. The overall principle is guided by structured and focused comparison (Eckstein, 1968, Dunn and Swierczek 1976; George & Bennett, 2005). The principles of structured and focused comparison enable researchers to make systematic comparisons based on accumulated data with coherent data classifications. The principles form a crucial foundation, not only for the overall research direction, but also for a comparative within-case analysis of particular types of piracy in specific places (Somalia in this study) over time.

3.1 QUANTITATIVE METHOD: THEORY-DRIVEN LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS

Binary logistic regression offers probabilities that success or failure occurs when the dependent variable is a binary categorical variable. The probabilities generated by logistic regression depend on the independent variables as predictor variables. Unlike standard linear regression analysis based on ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, it relies on maximum likelihood estimates. The estimates offer information about the magnitude and direction of the difference between two variables in unstandardized effect sizes. It means that researchers can interpret the estimates directly from the original units of measurement such as temperature in degree Celsius and unemployment rate as a percentage. Therefore, this study can interpret the constant effects of independent variables directly with odds ratios across different values of variables.

Two binary logistic regression models are tested over multiple time sets. The models of this research examine the designated variables with 5,846 piracy incident cases from 1996 to 2013. Thus, the sample size is 5,846. The primary research question is “What factors are contributing to the success or failure of the different piracy incident types: successful piracy incident, hijacking piracy and ransom gaining piracy.” Three binary categorical dependent variables are tested in the logistic regression analysis: 1. successful incident (1) vs. failed incident (0); 2. successful hijacking piracy incident (1) vs. all other piracy incidents (0); and 3. successful ransom gaining piracy incidents (1) vs. all other piracy incidents (0). The following charts with tables show distributions of the piracy incidents by type. Hijacking piracy and ransom gaining piracy led the distributions of piracy incidents between 2005 and 2012. As this study found, most of those highly organized piracy incidents, hijacking and ransom gaining piracy, were committed by Somali pirate groups.

Chart 6. World Piracy Incidents, 1996-2013






Chart 7. World Hijacking Piracy Incidents, 1996-2013





The first model tests whether or not a failed state is a significantly coherent factor impacting the odds-ratio of the three piracy incident types. Among the major macro-factors, state failure has been regarded as a primary cause of piracy enterprises. Many studies have suggested that failed states provide a better opportunity for large-scale criminal activities such as terrorism and piracy. (Rotbert, 2004; Menkhaus, 2004; Sörenson, 2008; Hastings, 2008; Ghani & Lochart, 2008; Kraska, 2011; Marley, 2011). These studies of piracy incidents have used failed state indexes from different sources such as the World Bank, the Fund for Peace, and the Ibrahim Index (Hastings, 2008; Rice & Patrick, 2008; Daxecker & Prins, 2009). However, it is questionable whether these composite indexes can truly reflect the dynamic evolution of piracy. The failed state concept could be a glossy term that disregards a concrete analysis of actual security threat elements such as poor law enforcement, extreme poverty, and fragmentation

(Patrick, 2011: 19-22). Somali piracy did not directly evolve to the enterprise level before 2001, despite 10 years of failed state conditions.

The first model consists of the variables below.

The primary hypothesis is that successful piracy incidents, including hijacking and ransom piracy, are more likely to occur in failed states. The dependent variables are the types of piracy incident mentioned above.

1) Main test variable

Failed state. *World Governance Indicator (WGI)* from the World Bank was used as a primary proxy variable to represent the level of state failure because it covered the entire 18-year research period. The *Failed State Index (FSI)* from Fund for Peace was also used as a complimentary variable because it only covers the nine-year period between 2005 and 2013. As Mankhaus (2009a: 21-25) argues, many piracy experts have applied the concept of failed states to their analyses of the causes of piracy. State failure has been regarded as a rudimentary cause of piracy and its increase over time (Nincic, 2008). There are several failed state indexes that identify the level of state failure, such as the *FSI*, the *WGI*, and the *Mo Ibrahim Index of African Government (IAG)*. The indexes have been popularized through the media.⁵ They are composite indices based on the combined calculation of various sub-indices. One criticism is that the indices do not facilitate a real understanding of local or regional state-level problems because they arbitrarily create a chaotic image (Beehner & Young, 2012). The worst states in a failed state index are perceived as totally chaotic. This study tested the actual usefulness of the controversial term in understanding the real relationship between state failure and piracy incidents.

2) Control variables.

There are two different kinds of control variables selected for testing the hypothesis.

Location effect. This variable is crucial in understanding the characteristics of an incident. Indonesia has a mix of neighboring states in terms of state strength. Singapore is a strong state, while Malaysia is a mid-level state. Every state adjacent to Somalia and Nigeria is categorized as a weak or even failed state. These location-wide effects can be a determinant for what types of maritime crimes are more likely to happen. Location effect was measured by the number of neighboring countries where piracy incidents occurred.

Experience of success. This is an important variable in determining whether piracy organizations have evolved over time. If previous success had had a positive impact on piracy incidents, then piracy organizations would have attempted to target higher-value targets more often (Coggins, 2009; Iyigun & Ratisukpimol, 2011). This means that piracy would likely to have occurred more often. Experience of success is an important variable to determine whether there is a learning-by-doing effect. It was measured with rate of successful piracy incidents over total piracy incidents in the previous year.

Country dummy variables. 71.8% of the total piracy incidents occurred in three leading piracy-prone areas: East Africa, West Africa, and Southeast Asia. Thus, this study tested whether or not the three piracy-prone countries of Somalia, Nigeria, and Indonesia as dummy variables, are significant predictors of piracy incidents relative to other countries.

The second model tests alternative factors to identify their causal relevance to the odds of the piracy incident occurring. The second model consists of the variables bellow.

Institutional Strength. Institutions are essential vehicles for modern state governance (Ghani, 2008; Rotberg, 2004). Many newly independent post-colonial states have suffered from

low levels of institutionalization. Thus, lower institutional strength can be a positive environment for high-level criminal activities. Many piracy experts attribute a significant increase in piracy to institutional weakness (Hastings, 2008; Hansen, 2009; Murphy, 2010; Kraska, 2010).

Fragmentation. Most post-colonial states have had integration issues regarding diverse ethnic peoples within a state's boundaries. Most piracy hot zones are in highly fragmented societies. Even institutional strength does not always help social integration because of inherent differences between a modern state and ethnic boundaries. Somali piracy groups take advantage of their clan networks, as do rebel groups in Nigeria and Indonesia.

Unemployment. Most weak and failed states have serious troubles due to a low-level of economic activity. In determining economic effects on a micro-level, either GDP per capita or the unemployment rate are used. This study will use unemployment rate because it can better capture participation in a criminal organization as an alternate employer. Another neglected point is that Somalia is not the poorest country in terms of GDP per capita. Since 1995, it has done better than its neighboring countries in its overall level of wealth (Leeson, 2007a:698-699). This ironic fact suggests that unemployment rate is a better predictor of piracy. Moreover, piracy incidents have tended to increase after local law enforcement failed to pay salaries to officers—for example, in Somalia (Hansen, 2009:32-33; Bahadur, 2011:35-37).

Extreme poverty. Poverty, in general, is not an accurate indicator of participation in criminal activity. The concrete level of poverty is a more helpful indicator. People often break the moral codes of states suffering extreme poverty due to natural disaster, economic turmoil, or civil war. As indicated by captured pirates, extreme poverty provides physiological and psychological motivations to potential pirates (Hirsi, 2011:14, 21). It is also related to higher risk-taking that could result in ransom piracy, which requires more daring behavior than simple

robbery. For example, the MV Naviluck was attacked by Somali pirates on January 12, 1991, which is recorded as the first piracy incident. However, it was not an organized crime, but rather an expression of resentment. The ship was burned and sunk by the enraged coastal people who thought that their hunger and deprivation were aggravated by rapacious foreign vessels. The incident seems to have triggered the development of Somali piracy. Yet, more advanced piracy organizations only appear more than a decade later.

Police officer to population ratios. This is a very concrete indicator for examining whether law enforcement can actually handle the criminal threats in a state. States suffering from low funding for law enforcement cannot provide enough policing power to defend their citizens and sovereignty. Indonesia suffered increased piracy incidents related to low levels of law enforcement until 2005 (Vagg, 1995; Hastings, 2010:27, 157). With help from its neighboring states and outside forces, however, Indonesia began to control maritime crimes. Nigeria also has chronically low levels of law enforcement. Somalia is the worst case because even a local state, Puntland,⁶ could not offer salaries to any marine police officer for a time.⁷ Criminal organizations do not have to worry about being caught in such a lawless situation.

Livestock and Cereal Yield. Livestock and cereal are important daily staples for living in piracy-prone regions. They are also crucial bases of the regional economy. The changing yields might be related to piracy incidents if hunger and desperate living conditions drive local people to participate in the maritime crime. (Please see Appendix I for model equations and description of data and sources.)

3.2 QUALITATIVE METHODS: CAUSALLY DRIVEN CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

In qualitative analyses, it is imperative to construct a coherent and reliable table of comparative analyses which can lend credible validity to the exercise. In this study, a pattern matching technique is utilized (Campbell 1966; 1975). However, a basic strategy of content analysis is based on an intensive case analysis. The intensive case analysis will be constrained by analytical coding in a given text, through which coders can minimize the probability of over-inference or making an assumption beyond the actual contextual meaning of the text (Dunn and Swierczek 1977). This is structured-focused comparison with dependent variables that vary as much as possible. This study will also follow an informed judgment in the coding and analysis process for the qualitative dimension that is enough to support research validity and reliability, while minimizing cost and time in employing multiple coders and calculations of the inter-measure of reliability (Dunn and Swierczek 1977).

Typological classification

Ever since Weber argued for the “ideal type” research strategy, typology has been a profound method of comparative analysis. As Bailey (1994:26-32) argues, a typology does not have to contain all the properties of one type of phenomenon. An important criterion is whether one typology can reflect the practical combinations of possible properties of a phenomenon (Bailey, 1994:26-32). In this study, piracy incidents and organizations were classified alongside the property or attribute variables. Then, the property variables, under the organizational, financial, and network headings, were coded in a binary manner. Therefore, there are various piracy organizations with different values of the attributes.

The general robbery type of piracy incident contains less value in features of the capacity criteria. It indicates that the incident cannot be an element of a durable criminal organization.

However, as many criminal enterprises have demonstrated, an enterprise type of piracy incident can be a key element of a criminal enterprise. Regarding the core characteristics of criminal enterprise, Hill (2006: 8) delineates four key features: durability, hierarchy, involvement in multiple crimes, and some governance functions. The characteristics of the criminal enterprise concept have been discussed in many criminological studies (Shelling 1967; 1976, Liddic 1999, Reuter 1983; 1985; 1989). Liddick (1999) criticized the flaws of an enterprise model that simply relies on the assumption of invisible hands. As Hagan (1993) argued, the development of a criminal organization is not just based on the economic interests, but also on social relations. Thus, this thesis attempts to incorporate the multiple features of a criminal organization in the criteria scheme while also reflecting economic, organizational, and social features. Therefore, Somali piracy enterprise can be defined as a durable criminal organization with many of the features of criminal organizations in terms of organization, finance, and network.

This study sets fourteen criteria to differentiate piracy incidents between general robbery type piracy and enterprise type piracy. Each criterion is coded in a dummy manner: 0 or 1. The type of a piracy incident is determined based on the sum calculation of the total value. For example, if an incident scores 8 or higher, the incident is classified as an enterprise type of piracy incident.

1) Organization Capacity: Scores from 0 to 8

(1) A Number of participants: Small vs. large. A larger number of participants represent a higher level of organizational capacity. According to Hansen (2009:36), piracy groups tend to consist of around 12 to 35 pirates. The number of pirates in each piracy operation, however, has increased. More than 100 pirates from different groups took part in hijacking the MV Faina on

25 September 2008.⁸ This highlighted the ability of Somali pirates to hijack a cargo ship armed with heavy artillery in front of armed naval ships.

(2) Operation capacity: Low vs. high

Level of equipment: Modern Somali piracy has used advanced equipment, not just in terms of arms, but also in navigation tools, such as high speed boats, mother ships, and GPS devices. The advanced level of equipment implies higher operational intensity and sophistication.

Size of target ship: Somali pirates have been able to seize very large cargo ships, such as the *MV Faina* and the *Sirius Star*. Before the year 2000, they could not hijack large vessels. As their abilities grew, they acquired the skills to capture large vessels, even in front of armed naval ships (Hansen, 2009:24, 57-58).

(3) Hijacking location: Coastal vs. open seas

The fact that pirates are operating far from their base of operations means that they have better abilities than ever before. Somali pirates have used mother ships to sail through open sea areas since 2009 (UN Monitoring Group, 2011:33-34).

(4) Violence Control: Violent vs. controlled.

Violence has an inverse relationship with piracy capacity. Most pirates, not just in Somalia, are very violent. Pirates in Southeast Asia and the Gulf of Niger have displayed high levels of violence. When pirates are linked with rebel groups, they do not even hesitate to kill ship crews and passengers. However, Somali piracy groups have strongly controlled their appetite for violence and have left very low numbers of casualties (Percy and Shortland, 2010:17-19). Though some hostages died during hijacking operations, there were no actual victims shot by pirates until 2011.⁹ Recent pirates use more mannered operations to calm down

hostages and to control situations in a rational way. Thus, an increase in violent behavior implies a lower level of piracy capacity.

(5) *Leadership: Autocratic vs. entrepreneurial*

The traditional relationships between captain and crews were autocratic in most shipping industries. Caribbean pirates had close to democratic leadership, in which captains had very limited privileges. Modern shipping industries have mixed forms of relationships under capitalistic management systems (Leeson, 2007). In Somali, militia-linked piracy incidents occurred under autocratic leadership. However, entrepreneurial leaders, such as Afweyne, run organizations like business companies. The entrepreneurial leaders became dominant from 2005. The evolution of Somali piracy organizations has shown various elements, such as division of labor and roles of experts like negotiators and accountants. Somali piracy organizations also exhibited a sophisticated level of ransom negotiations with more advanced management skills. For example, Boyah, a retired legendary piracy leader, displays somewhat autocratic leadership, while Afweyne, an ex-public servant who is now regarded as the retired kingpin of Somali pirates, ran piracy organizations like a startup venture company (Hansen, 2009:23-25; Bahadur, 2011:33-34, 264). Therefore, there are variations in the leadership of Somali piracy organizations over time.

(6) *Management hierarchy: Vertical vs. horizontal*

Company-style piracy organizations have more horizontal management and functional structures. Thus, the management hierarchy evolved from the vertical to horizontal style among the members of piracy organization.

(7) *Structure of organization: Mechanical vs. functional*

Though Somali piracy organizations are clan-based criminal groups, some company-style

organizations recruit people from different clans based on their expertise. They have also developed sophisticated rules of operation and organization. These evolutionary signals are quite similar to other modern criminal enterprises, which have emulated the management of capitalistic companies and their organizational structures. They have functional positions based on expertise, such as bookkeepers, money handlers, attackers, and holders. Modern Somali piracy organizations have very similar structures of organization and management. There are financiers, bookkeepers, negotiators, ship holders, hostage managers, and actual kidnapers. They have also developed rules of operation while upholding customary Somali law, Xeer (Hansen, 2009:26; Bahadur, 2011:115-119).

(8) Code of Conduct: Ad hoc vs. coded rules

Finally, all the pirates were hired based on contracts. They should observe the coded rules. As contract documents of MV Victoria incident (2009) shows, the written rules are meticulously monitored and disciplined (UN Monitoring Report 2013).

2) Financial Capacity: Scores from 0 to 3

The higher ransoms imply better operational capacities. The shrinking difference between required ransom and final ransom is also an indicator that a piracy organization has acquired better abilities than ever before. The following terms are considered for determining a type of piracy incident.

(1) Financial structure: single investor vs. multi-investor

Multiple investors imply that a piracy organization is similar to a shareholder company.

(2) Acquired ransom amount

More than half million ransom income can be an indicator that an organization can grow further because it can re-invest part of the revenue.

(3) Difference between demanded ransom and final ransom

The large gaps between them imply that the pirate leader groups execute a calculated negotiation tactic, which signify a trait of modern company style business negotiation.

3) Network Capacity: Scores from 0 to 3

Advanced network capacity enabled pirate groups to involve various political and economic affairs in both local and central governance. As this study demonstrates, following terms of network capacity evidently support the connection between the criminal groups and local governance.

(1) Negotiation period

Longer negotiation period (more than a month) indicates that the pirates have strong local support from their networks.

(2) Outside connection: limited or wide¹⁰

As Afweyne's connections suggested, Somali piracy organization expanded their network outside their criminal turfs including central political figures and even global Somali diaspora connections.

(3) Involvement in other crimes¹¹

As Somali piracy evolved progressively, it involved multiple crimes, such as hijacking other vessels by using a hijacked vessel as a mother ship, kidnapping the crew for additional ransom negotiation, and killing the crew. It indicated that the Somali piracy organization developed one of the key features of a durable criminal enterprise. (Please see Appendix II for detailed description)

Congruence

The congruence technique can be useful to identify a variation between the independent and dependent variables. In this study, the congruence technique is used analytically to compare the changing variations of the independent factors with the changing characteristics of the property attributes of Somali piracy organizations over time.

For example, incident patterns of Somali piracy were quite different after 2005 when they largely focused on ransom gains. This research found out that multiple factors, such as state collapse, authority crisis, and complicated civil war situations, are congruent with the emergence of advanced piracy incidents. These congruencies are examined through process tracing techniques that follow changing incident patterns in Somali piracy.

Process tracing

Finally, the process tracing technique is used to track the evolutionary processes and to draw causal paths for the emergence of piracy enterprises in Somalia over time. As George and Bennet (2005) argued process tracing seeks to identify the intervening causal process between the independent and dependent variables. Intervening variables are linked to identify causal changes and construct a conditional causal path (Van Evera 1997). For example, state failure can be a primary condition for piracy to emerge, but it is not a sufficient condition. The changing conditions of other factors such as economic and natural disasters, might also be crucial to facilitating the rise of piracy. The causal path would then consist of necessary and sufficient factors.

The causal factors can be confirmed by increasing evidence based on Bayesian logic. Increasing posterior evidence helps researchers determine the causal factors (Bennett and Checkel 2015: 190). A systemic analysis structure is necessary to execute the determining process. This research built classification systems for evidence collection for structured and

focused comparison. A systemic structure of templates of evidence collection has also been built to trace the changes of incident patterns with regard to the causal factors.

For example, piracy incidents classified as an enterprise type did not appear until 2005 in Somalia. This advanced type of piracy peaked in 2010 (63 incidents). The changing numbers of the enterprise type of piracy have helped determine the relevant factors, such as state collapse, protracted civil wars, and a governance crisis. Other important clues have been found by tracing the changing values of piracy incidents (from 0 to 14) and changing the component values in the organization, and its financial and network capacity. A piracy incident required, at least, a score of eight to be classified as an enterprise type of piracy. Average scores of incidents remained less than 8 until 2007 in Somalia. The average scores jumped to 8.86 in 2008. The implication is that contextual causal factors, such as a governance crisis and the embeddedness of crime, affected the changing scores. In the sub-component part, the average score of an organization's capacity also increased more than double from 2.36 in 2007 to 5.18 in 2008 (please see chart 30 in Chapter VII for entire value changes). Then, the causal inference can be enhanced again by the changing values of the subcomponents and the increasing number of similarly patterned incidents.

More concrete examples can also be found in the actual coding process of major incidents. For example, the fishing boat Bahari Hindi was hijacked on April 17, 1997 by a local Puntland state leading militia-tied faction. Though it was connected to the powerful military group, their organization's capacity score was 2 in terms of the overall piracy operation. Thus, the final sum of the scores was 5. Consequently, it was not classified as an enterprise type of piracy (please see Stage 2 of Chapter VI for a detailed description). Most piracy incidents in Somalia show similar patterns and scores through 2004. The scores in both sums and

components begun to increase from 2005. MV Feisty Gas was the first classified incident of an enterprise type of piracy: 8 for sum, 6 for organization capacity, 1 for financial capacity, and 1 for network capacity. The interesting difference from previous incidents was that it was hijacked by multiple organizations with multiple investors (please see Stage 3 of Chapter VI for a detailed description). The scores, then, reached a perfect level in Freighter Hansa Stavanger (please see Stage 4 of Chapter IV for detailed description).

Actual applications of these process tracing techniques are extensively demonstrated from Chapter VI to VIII. These changing values in both sums and components provided clear clues about the relationship between the advancement of Somali piracy and the changing regional and local contexts. As the number of similar incidents with synonymous patterns increased, the relations between the evolution of Somali piracy and the contextual factors are evidently corroborated. The results provided a robust basis for establishing a causal mechanism model.

3.3 CONSTRUCTION OF A CAUSAL MECHANISM MODEL

A good research design provides support for a study's theoretical hypotheses. Prior to designing in the social sciences, the investigator must decide what the study intends to explain and related goals. Accordingly, in this study, a necessary procedure is to define Somali piracy in relation to other contemporary piracy activities. This study initially sets Somali piracy as a deviant case from the general piracy observed in most other piracy prone areas, such as Indonesia and Nigeria. Setting Somali piracy as a deviant case has several implications. First, the patterns and characteristics of Somali piracy are unique with an exclusive focus on ransom, especially from

2005 onwards (which has no parallel in the entire history of piracy). Second, this distinctive maritime crime raises the question of whether it has generalizable conditions or not. If the conditions have generalizable elements, it is natural to ask: what constitutes the conditions? If not, it is also natural to question what conditions make Somali piracy a completely deviant case. The third implication is how to understand this unique form of piracy in terms of illuminating the unknown conditions. The final implication is how the unknown conditions impacted the evolution of Somali piracy. Thus, the primary purpose of this study is not just to find the conditional factors but ultimately to uncover the working processes of these factors on the evolution of Somali piracy by demonstrating how multiple factors work together to facilitate the evolution of Somali piracy.

To discover the working processes of the factors, a monolithic research design is not enough to capture both the factors and the working processes. A statistical correlation analysis can be nothing but a mere summary of the variable relations between the factors as an independent variable and the evolution of Somali piracy as a dependent variable. Ragin (2008: 22) identified the limitations of the correlation analysis in terms of two major defects: (1) only limited to relative differences in effects between designated factors and (2) jumbled analyses with different kinds of causal assessment. Most statistical analyses of Somali piracy do not succeed in avoiding these limitations. Several arguments are made for the correlation between weak governance and the development of sophisticated types of piracy (Hastings, 2009; Percy & Shortland, 2010; Daxecker & Prins, 2015), but the studies ignored variations in the stability of local governance in Somalia (Tayman-Ghoshal, 2012). Though the studies contribute to finding a link between state fragility and the rise of the piracy, they do not provide a proper explanation of

how Somali pirates could develop such an advanced operational capacity within the context of changing governance over time.

Therefore, this study uses quantitative analysis not just to provide a summary of relations between variables, but also to elicit the implications of a deviant case, Somali piracy. This study and its critical examination of the relationships among its relevant variables are also informed by previous studies. In other words, the purposes of the quantitative analysis in this study are first to critically examine the effects of the hypothesized factors such as state political factors (e.g., governance status, institutional strength, and police power); economic factors (e.g., poverty and livestock index); and social factors (e.g., fragmentation) with other compounding factors. These factors including time as a variable and success rates as indications of capacity development of the pirates over time. The second purpose is to examine which piracy prone areas consistently include the different incident types over time. As the results of statistical analysis confirm, Somalia as a country dummy variable consistently includes all the piracy incident types over time. This suggests that Somali piracy might be a deviant case, which could also be helpful in detecting unobserved variables by comparing it with general piracy cases (Gerring 2007; Lieberman 2005). The third purpose is to compare different effect sizes of the factors over time in order to find a meaningful cut point of the time period, that help understand which particular period influence emergence of piracy. Finally, the approach seeks to invoke theoretical questions for the qualitative analysis in terms of a nested analysis strategy (Lieberman 2005). Therefore, the quantitative analysis of this study is to be an initial gateway to investigate the complicated process of Somali piracy's evolution over time. It is designed ultimately to overcome the shortcomings of analytical positivism solely based on the numerical correlational summary.

Quine (2004) suggested that methodological holism could overcome critical limits. Consequently, this study seeks to build a holistic construction of a causal mechanism of the evolution of Somali piracy. This is because the evolutionary process has taken multiple factors together over a longer time period than the time than present studies generally assume. Though there are several noticeable qualitative studies on the unique development of Somali piracy based on intensive fieldwork (Hansen 2009; Bahadur 2011), they do not suggest that a finely articulated causal mechanism affects the evolution of Somali piracy, probably due to the limited purpose of their research.

This study adopts the causal mechanism as a core framework for the analytic process based on methodological studies of case analyses and process tracing analyses (Eckstein 1975; Dunn 1977 & 1980; Yin 1994; Ragin 1998 & 2000 & 2008; Beach & Pederson 2013; Bennett & Checkel 2015). Elster defined a mechanism as a recurring causal patterns that is triggered under unknown conditions (Elster 1998: 45; 2007: 36). Thus, building a causal mechanism requires causal-process observations (Benett & Checkel: 211-236), which can provide helpful clues about the contextual process of the evolutionary mechanism (Collier 2010: 184). In other words, building a causal mechanism with causal-process observation is an evidence-confirmation process based on a Bayesian logic of inference, one that persistently updates confidence levels by examining posterior evidences (Bennett, 2015: 290). Process tracing is the most crucial method in building a causal mechanism because it helps improve causal inference through the findings from the observation process (Mahoney 2011: 124).

By employing the process tracing analysis, this study attempts to explain the evolutionary process of Somali piracy by building a causal mechanism, and ultimately to suggest an alternative approach to piracy research in a comprehensive way. In the process tracing analysis,

there are several crucial check points, according to Beach and Pederson (2013: 163-170). Key check points are listed and tested as below. The thorough procedures of the analysis with the steps below would help establish a reliable theory of piracy evolution in Somalia, which also could be applicable to other evolutionary processes in significant piracy-prone areas.

1) Conceptualization of Variables

All the variables, including the dependent variable (Somali piracy), are conceptualized based on both the theoretical perspectives and empirical corroborations.

2) Set Theoretic Composites of Independent Variables

As Ragin (2008: 2) states, social science studies are fundamentally about sets and set relations among the conceptualized factors, and this study delineates multiple sets of factors. At the macro level, global factors represent an important shared set. Power rivalry in the local dimension is a shared set at the regional level. State collapse and the accompanying crisis of authority are treated as a state-wide shared set since the fall of the Barre regime in 1991. These macro factors impact local factors through the compound nature of prolonged civil wars. Governance crises impacted the embeddedness of crime through the coastal defender role in the context of the local factors. At the middle level, a piracy organization is defined either as an opportunistic robbery type or a highly organized enterprise type. To trace the evolutionary process between the two primary types, all the recorded hijack incidents are investigated and classified by three criteria of capacity building: organization, finance, and network. Four complementary sub-facilitators are also considered in tracing the evolution of Somali piracy, such as the nature of the Somali economy, permissive inducements, porous borders, and the roles of the global diaspora.

3) Case Selection

Based on the identification of Somali piracy as a unique piracy case, each piracy incident committed by Somali pirates is classified as either a general robbery type of piracy or as an enterprise type of piracy, based on the principle of case selections (Ragin 2008: 3). The goal here is to distinguish between Somali piracy incidents that are most likely typical cases and those that are least likely typical cases. Data coding frames were then used to classify each incident as one of the two types of piracy based on the calculation of the sum of scores of all the traceable hijack incidents by Somali pirates in order to test the configurative connections among the factors. The coding frames also reflect various supplemental information of the hijack incidents such as vessels, pirate leaders, piracy groups, anchored places, and durations of captivity with release date, crews, and cargo. These systematically collected data sets help identify the actual evolutionary processes of Somali piracy.

4) Building a Theoretical Mechanism

This study builds a theoretical mechanism with interconnected elements based on the intensive empirical data analysis for the last eighteen years of Somali piracy incidents, from 1996 to 2013. It also extends its analytical period to before the primary time set to trace the genesis of Somali piracy incidents to include 1991- 1995, after the dictatorial regime collapsed. The study also identified that the interconnected elements are individually insufficient but necessary and non-redundant elements of the theoretical mechanism, working together for the evolution of Somali piracy, which are the so-called INUS conditions (Mackie 1988; Beach & Pederson 2013: 3 & 30). INUS is also defined as "insufficient but non-redundant parts of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the occurrence of the effect" (Mackie 1988). Finally, all the causal factors are explicitly and systematically interconnected to the final

outcome of the Somali criminal enterprise like mechanical parts of a machine functioning together to produce an output.

5) Applicability for Subsequent Empirical Research

The analysis of this study was carried out based on extensive data sets, which can be expandable to longer periods than the eighteen-year term. The data sets and coding schemes can also be recalibrated for applying them to other piracy-prone regions. Therefore, it can be used for future research by re-tuning the data analysis sets and frames with the set-theoretic causal mechanism.

This chapter explains the research methods, a mixed method for elaborating a theoretical explanation of evolution of Somali piracy. In the quantitative analysis, the selection of variables is based on present studies and theories of piracy. In the qualitative analysis, case study techniques are intensively used to construct a causal mechanism model. The combination of process-tracing by using both quantitative and qualitative methods enables researchers to extend the research realms to other piracy-prone regions for future research.

The primary purposes of this research has been to uncover the shadowy working evolutionary process of Somali piracy organization. It has examined theories on Somali piracy and attempted to revise and refine them. Ultimately, this research tries to offer a robust theory of contemporary Somali piracy phenomenon. This chapter highlights the advantages of the multi-method research design and methods. In the next chapter, current studies of piracy are introduced while critically discussing their limits.

4.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

4.1 LITERATURE REVIEW OF PIRACY AND CAUSES

As of August 2015, approximately 600 articles and books on maritime piracy and its causes had been published since the end of World War II (Jan & Christian 2015). Konstam (2011) provides an overall description of piracy from the ancient to the modern world. His other publications also provide interesting depictions of the Caribbean pirate 'Blackbeard' (2006) and the historical power rivalry between Spain and England (2009). These works are an introduction to the complex characteristics of piracy; however, they do not provide a sufficient explanations of modern piracy and its differences from historical piracy. Several introductory descriptions of modern piracy highlight the dangers of maritime crime (Burnett 2002, Langewiesche 2004, Cawthorn 2009, Payne 2010). A general understanding of the background of modern piracy is well summarized in the works of maritime experts (Payne 2010, Kraska 2011, Marley 2011).

David Marley suggests seven underlying preconditions for the reemergence of piracy:

1. the sharp reduction of Western merchant ships in the total number of trading ships around the world,
2. large automated ships with smaller crews,
3. a vast expansion of territorial waters,
4. persistent vacillation in defining piracy,

5. the shifting of trading centers to Asia,
6. abuse of flags of convenience,
7. the proliferation of light arms (Marley 2011: 38-9).

These preconditions reflect the prevalent perspectives of most experts and journals on the state of piracy today. However, these conditions do not provide explanatory variables across time and space or for particular regions. For example, piracy has been prevalent in Southeast Asia regardless of trade hubs. Nor do these preconditions provide an explanation for different piracy types in various locations.

Martin Murphy (2010) suggests more analytical and case-wide factors that contribute to the emergence of piracy:

- (1) legal and jurisdictional opportunities,
- (2) favorable geography,
- (3) conflict and disorder,
- (4) under-funded law enforcement/inadequate security,
- (5) permissive political environments,
- (6) cultural acceptability/maritime tradition, and
- (7) reward.

These factors could be useful in explaining both the general features and the regional differences for diverse piracy cases. Yet, they do not show a progressively replicable research scheme for explicating diverse region-specific piracy.

For a concrete understanding of specific piracy incidents by region, numerous publications have focused on particular piracy prone regions, such as Southeast Asia and the Gulf of Aden. Piracy studies on Southeast Asia (a long-term piracy prone region) were published

before contemporary piracy received widespread international attention. For example, the criminal aspect is explained well in relation to the specific context of the negative consequence of the unstable economy around the Malacca Straits (Vagg 1995). According to Vagg, piracy is another crime of opportunity that exploits and responds to the vulnerable points of poor political and economic conditions, such as unemployment, poverty, and porous borders. Peter Chalk provides insightful explanations of regional piracy in terms of political and security implications (1998). Overall trends are well summarized in many well-known publications (Abhyankar 2006, Eklöf. 2005; 2006, Ong-Webb 2007, Young 2007, Chatherine 2009).

However, piracy studies did not regard the maritime crime as a serious international issue (let alone global) until the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001. Moreover, two maritime terror incidents after 9/11 raised warnings about a possible conflation between piracy and terrorism. 9/11 shifted the scope of piracy studies to include the possible danger of maritime terrorism disrupting global commerce. This dangerous possibility was widely discussed (Valencia 2006, Abhyankar 2006, Chalk 2008) and examined (Hastings 2008; 2010). In this connection, the concept of failed state gained significant traction with regard to the fundamental cause of piracy in regions such as in Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Gulf of Aden, and the Gulf of Guinea.

Two issues in regard to the failed state concept have been widely discussed (Murphy 2007, Chalk 2008, Sörenson 2010) and examined (Hastings 2009, Daxecker & Brandon 2015). The first is whether state fragility or state failure is connected to the increasing number of piracy incidents. Many piracy experts have shared the opinion that state failure is inherently connected to increasing piracy incidents (Murphy 2007, Chalk 2008, Jablonski & Oliver 2012, Daxecker & Brandon 2009; 2015). The second issue is whether the failed state concept can be a crucial lever for the advancement of understanding of different piracy types. Hastings, for example, argues

that highly advanced piracy incidents hardly occurred in failed state conditions (2009, 2010). Though political motivation should not be overlooked (Robert 2009), the conflation possibility between piracy and terrorism is, realistically, hardly likely to occur for several reasons, including the difference in purposes, logistic difficulties, and indigenous resistance (Chalk 2008, Menkhaus 2009, Hasting 2010).

As the linear relationship between political crisis and piracy was questioned, the discussion of modern piracy shifted to economic perspectives. The combined effect of poverty and opportunity has been discussed. Vagg (1995) provides the background explanation for piracy incident trends around the Riau Archipelago during the early 1990s based on these combined effects. Anderson (1995) attempts to provide an economic perspective on historical piracy. Recent studies have investigated the effects of economic factors on piracy incidents and the emergence of piracy as an advanced type (De Groot, Rablen & Shortland 2011, Percy & Shortland 2011; Jablonski and Oliver 2012) of business enterprise. Though those studies provide possible links between economic factors and piracy, their relationships are at best indirect (Ravallion 2001, Hansen 2009).

Several recent studies have focused on the business characteristics of piracy (Leeson 2007 a; b, Percy & Anja, Hansen 2009, Hersi 2011, Murphy 2015). Those explanations offer a tangible depiction of contemporary piracy as long as pirates always seek economic gains by exploiting vulnerable points of targets in the absence of law and institutional enforcements. Those approaches remind us that piracy is an example of organized crime, where modern capitalistic principles prevail by maximizing profits while minimizing risks. The focus is placed on the characteristics of piracy organizations and their development. Leeson argues (2009) that pirates are clearly rational actors. The rational actor model is also used to explain the

unique characteristics of Somali piracy (Percy & Shortland 2009; 2010; 2011; Hansen 2009). Percy and Shortland explain Somali piracy in terms of modern business principles with regard to similar criminal enterprises, such as the Mafia and drug cartels. Hansen (2009) emphasizes the importance of leadership in the progressive development of Somali piracy. An entrepreneurial organization requires different properties from a general organization, such as entrepreneurial leadership, a spirit of risk-taking, expertise, high flexibility, innovative methods, and high reward (Deakins 2009, Minniti 2010). In fact, this study confirms that entrepreneurial leadership provides a core role, as Hasan Afweyne, a famous Somali pirate kingpin, exemplified. Nevertheless, it is not clear how Somali pirates developed advanced entrepreneurial skills, such as employing the mother-ship tactic as an innovative adaptation, professional negotiation as an advanced business tactic to maximize gains, and the use of complex financial structures for ransom transactions.

Besides the political and economic factors, technological and regional crises subject to global changes are also considered to be reasons behind the rise of modern piracy. Asymmetry in the utilization of technology is one of the primary causes of piracy. Those who can take advantage of modern fishing technologies, such as trawling equipment, sonar systems, and large vessel operation became the winners in the fishing industry, while poor coastal fishermen were the losers. Along the Malacca Straits, in other Southeast Asian coastal regions, and off the Somali coast, seafood resources have been devastated by advanced fishing industries. The local people have lost their source of income and in response to economic dislocation turned their attention to criminal activities. People in Aceh, located in the upper western part of Sumatra, have suffered from the depletion of fishing resources by Malaysian and Singaporean trawling ships (Ong-Webb 2007). This technological asymmetry is also evident in the illegal dumping of

waste by foreign ships, which pollutes the coastal environments. The most egregious case involved the dumping of toxic materials near the Somali coast, which severely damaged coastal living conditions (Abdullahi 2009). The depletion of fishery resources, as well as the dumping of waste by ships outside the region, has created resentment that, for some, justifies the piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Malacca Straits (Abdullahi 2009, Bowden 2010, Russel & ebrary Inc. 2010, Bellish 2013).

The regional crisis is linked to increasing piracy (Chalk 2008). It is believed, based on the IMB and IMO piracy reports, that piracy in Southeast Asia increased after the 1997 financial crisis. The financial crisis that originated in Thailand shook the entire political economy of Indonesia (Ong-Webb 2007, Chalk 2008, Chatherine 2009). The Indonesian economy suffered and the country experienced political upheavals, such as the fall of the Suharto regime and internal wars with ethnic minority groups. Piracy increased too. It can be suggested, however, that developing economies provided even more chances for piracy to develop, as Indonesian piracy revealed, because of dislocation by immigration, unemployment, and a large pool of unskilled youths (Vagg 1995, Hastings 2010).

Finally, the long-term instability of a state (Menkhaus 2004) provides an enabling environment for local power contenders concerned with extracting resources. Somali piracy did not begin immediately after the collapse of the Said Barre regime. Before 2005, the number of piracy incidents in the adjacent regions along the Gulf of Aden did not reach more than fifty. Nevertheless, this study confirms that long-term instability facilitated a high degree of lawlessness in which local criminals and power contenders were able to share resources in Somalia.

4.2 LIMITS OF EXISTING STUDIES

Piracy studies have provided useful grounds for understanding the piracy phenomenon from several relevant perspectives. However, the explanations touch only a part of the complex picture of piracy. It is not enough to construct a kaleidoscopic picture of contemporary piracy to illuminate the complex dynamics with their complicated backgrounds. There are several limitations in the present studies that undermine efforts to provide a comprehensive explanation. Most research is focused on macro factors, such as globalization, state failure, economic factors, and terrorism. Though these factors have a significant influence on most security issues, they are not sufficient to understand particular types of piracy incidents, such as ransom-seeking piracy in the Gulf of Aden and petro-piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. The quantitatively oriented research has relied on limited data sources, such as the IMB and IMO. Some of the studies also used composite index data for measuring state fragility from the World Bank. Although quantitative analysis skills can help researchers identify the covariant relationships between the macro independent variables and the dependent variables of piracy incidents, these skills alone are not enough to illuminate the dynamics of piracy incidents in different regional contexts.

Securitized perception is also important in understanding piracy. It means that piracy issues have been overly securitized with regard to terrorist threats. Since the 9/11 terrorist attack in the U.S., most international security experts and researchers have been highly attentive to possible links with terrorism in any security issues. These focused concerns drove a narrowly bounded policy on the elimination of terrorist nests. U.S. security concerns have mostly focused on fighting against Al-Shabaab (Mujahideen Youth Movement), a militant Islamist group in Somalia that aims to impose a rigid form of sharia. Hizbul Islam was a Somali Islamist insurgent group that merged with Al Shabaab, a group aligned with Al-Qaeda. Many security researchers

have also warned of the possibility of conflation between terrorism and piracy (Richardson 2004, Zachary 2004, Burgess 2006). However, piracy experts have determined that the actual possibility is very low due to essentially different *modus vivendi* and goals (Ong-Webb 2007, Murphy 2007; 2011, Chalk 2008, and Bateman 2010). In fact, there have been no actual reports of maritime terrorism since the USS Cole attack in 2000 and the French supertanker Limburg in 2002. The important point is that the threat of piracy might be wrongly viewed because of the concern with terrorism. As recent research argues (Percy & Shortland 2010), the real threat of piracy is that piracy organizations could be embedded in newly formed state organizations in Somalia.

Private institutions and the media tend to exaggerate the actual threats and costs of piracy. With regard to the media focus on piracy, Eklöf and Bateman stated that commercial organizations like IMB have instigated international attention by disseminating piracy reports while the mass media has broadcast hostage situations and rescue efforts. They also claimed that such a focus has distorted the complex realities of piracy issues while exaggerating the dangers (Eklöf 2006: 88-109, Bateman 2010: 19-22). The actual cost of piracy damage for crews was estimated to be less than \$1,000 USD, and the probability of piracy accidents is less than 0.02 percent. Moreover, the total cost of piracy damages is less than 0.002 percent of total global trade (Eklöf 2006: 99, Murphy 2007:20). Piracy cannot be considered a cause of the global economic crisis. Rather, it is a collateral result of regional instability, which could produce a ripple effect through globalized political and economic networks, including diverse criminal units. Considering the potential ripple effect, efficient and effective counter-measures should be based on an understanding of the root causes of piracy.

Moreover, only a few studies have tried to incorporate local context into the primary analysis. A few articles and publications have provided local contexts (Hansen 2009, Murphy 2010, Bahadur 2011, Marchal 2011), but they are not enough to see the whole picture of the piracy phenomenon and its entire life cycle from its birth to its demise. Thus, present studies have faced fundamental issues inherent in piracy research.

The first issue is the scope of time, space, and dimensions of multiple factors. It is rare to see an otherwise comprehensive piracy study explaining a long-term trend of piracy incidents across regions and time. Several attempts have been made by compiling a large amount of incident data (Coggins 2009, Daxecker & Prins 2015). Even these studies, however, do not provide a causal explanation of the long-term trends in contemporary piracy in terms of dynamic contexts at various levels, from the global to the local. Secondly, the limited scope of these studies also neglects the major causal factors within state-focused political and economic indicators, such as state fragility, indexes of institutional strength, GDP-related data, and various poverty data. As this study suggests, such data help to approximate only partial effects of the state-based factors. The limited availability of data, especially in poor regions, could also incur reliability issues because, for example, researchers can only rely on presumed estimation based on relevant measurement. Most seriously, the state-focused explanations tend to overlook the influence of local contexts. Most of the contemporary piracy incidents since 1991 have occurred in particular local areas of a country. Modern piracy incidents have never been a state-wide problem. One of the main piracy bases in Southeast Asia, Aceh, is located at the tip of Sumatra Island. The base of the Tamil Tiger, who committed many politically driven piracy acts until 2009, was at the edge of Sri Lanka, not the entire country. Piracy incidents in Africa

also originate in particular local areas such as the Niger Delta in the Gulf of Guinea and several coastal areas of Somalia in the Gulf of Aden.

The third problem is static and linear assumptions about the causal factors and their influence on piracy incidents. For example, it is difficult to explain why ransom-seeking piracy only occurs in particular regions. State collapse could explain enabling situations for maritime crimes. However, it alone does not clearly explain the advancement of piracy incident patterns and the emergence of different types of piracy in changing circumstances in particular regions. Economic factors can only provide a general sense of the motivation and rationale of individual piracy actors. They do not help to understand why Somali pirates, for example, had to develop cooperative relations with local stakeholders over the long term, such as elders, militia, and political groups, including Al-Shabaab. The shortcomings of economic-centered approaches based on assumptions of rationality have already been highlighted by many criminal studies (Kleemans & Van De Bunt 1999, Kleemans & De Pott 2008). In the development of criminal networks and organizations, social relations are more crucial bedrocks than the invisible hands of rationality (Reuter 1983, Kenney 2007: 27-9). Most of all, static and linear assumptions about the state and the economy have conjured a recurring leitmotif of troubled states as fixable failed states.

The final problem is that most current studies have relied on a monolithic approach while overlooking historical and sociological perspectives on piracy incidents. Political perspectives focusing on state failure have produced, at best, a failed policy towards the Somali crisis by suggesting a rebuilding of the Somali central state, which has never been successful. Economic perspectives focusing on rational choice and opportunity have failed to provide an understanding of the changing dynamics of piracy actors and organizations and their relationships to their


surrounding environments while explaining only either increasing or decreasing economic opportunity costs. The fixated images of troubled states, such as Somalia and Nigeria, have contributed to numerous short-sighted intervention policies that ironically complicated crisis situations, as happened in Somalia (Gourevitch 2004, Paris 2004).

This chapter discusses the various explanations and approaches of piracy, from a general introduction to focused studies of contemporary piracy, with special emphasis on Somali piracy. This chapter denotes the limits of existing studies in terms of their limited research scopes, static and linear assumptions, and monolithic perspective. It calls forth the necessity of a comprehensive study of piracy dynamics over time in regional contexts. The next chapter provides the actual analysis results of the quantitative analysis and discusses alternative approaches using qualitative methods.

5.0 ACTUAL CAUSES OF CONTEMPORARY PIRACY AND ALTERNATIVES

5.1 PATTERNS OF WORLD PIRACY

As Chart 9 below shows, the overall frequency and distribution patterns of maritime piracy are segmented with periodic fluctuations across major piracy-prone regions, for example, Southeast Asia, East Africa, West Africa, and South Asia (Bangladesh and Sri Lanka). The four regions comprise 83% of the total number of world piracy incidents from 1996 to 2013. Moreover, besides South Asia, 71.8% of the total number of incidents occurred in the three main piracy hot zones. Furthermore, 95% of hijacking incidents out of a total of 555 occurred in those regions. This study also found that Somalia and the Gulf of Aden have witnessed 60.4% (335) of the total number of worldwide hijackings and 79.1% (185) of all ransom-seeking piracy incidents, while earning at least 380 million USD for the period. The two regions led the world piracy incident trends interchangeably. Until 2004, the trend was led by incidents in Southeast Asia. After 2005, the trend was led by incidents in East Africa.



(See Appendix II.2 for data sources and data compiling processes.)

The fluctuations in the trends by region and time may require forms of time-series plots to see the co-variance between piracy incidents and relevant factors. Charts 10, 11, and 12 visually show that co-variances do not exist between the failed state index and piracy incidents in major piracy-prone regions. Though Indonesia (Chart 12) appears to show co-variance between 2010 and 2012, it is not clear whether or not the co-variance really exists. These time-series plot charts imply that co-variance might not exist between the relevant factors and the piracy incidents. However, it is too early to answer questions related to co-variance. Cross correlation tests might provide clues to the co-variance.

Chart 10. Time-series plot for piracy incident and Failed State Index in Somalia






Chart 11. Time-series plot for piracy incident and Failed State Index in Nigeria





Cross Correlation Tables

Table 4. Cross correlation table for Somalia

| | Total incident | WGI | InstStr | Unemp | pov | frag | police | live | cereal | successr |
|----------------|----------------|---------|---------|---------|-----|------|---------|---------|---------|----------|
| Total Incident | 1 | | | | | | | | | |
| WGI | -0.4735 | 1 | | | | | | | | |
| InstStr | 0.8283 | -0.5103 | 1 | | | | | | | |
| Unemp | 0.1225 | -0.1536 | 0.1074 | 1 | | | | | | |
| Pov | . | . | . | . | 1 | | | | | |
| Frag | . | . | . | . | . | 1 | | | | |
| Police | 0.7340 | -0.3413 | 0.3545 | 0.1504 | . | . | 1 | | | |
| Live | 0.5202 | -0.3358 | 0.0839 | 0.2744 | . | . | 0.8111 | 1 | | |
| Cereal | -0.2303 | -0.2375 | -0.5523 | -0.2261 | . | . | 0.2897 | 0.3592 | 1 | |
| Successr | -0.1480 | -0.1785 | -0.1499 | 0.3030 | . | . | -0.1012 | -0.1408 | -0.2796 | 1 |

Table 5. Cross correlation table for Nigeria

| | Total incident | WGI | InstStr | Unemp | pov | frag | police | live | cereal | successr |
|----------------|----------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|------|--------|---------|---------|----------|
| Total Incident | 1 | | | | | | | | | |
| WGI | -0.2448 | 1 | | | | | | | | |
| InstStr | -0.4401 | -0.7072 | 1 | | | | | | | |
| Unemp | 0.3781 | -0.2047 | 0.1090 | 1 | | | | | | |
| Pov | -0.2685 | -0.1650 | 0.5486 | -0.3384 | 1 | | | | | |
| Frag | . | . | . | . | . | 1 | | | | |
| Police | . | . | . | . | . | . | 1 | | | |
| Live | 0.6044 | 0.7467 | -0.9067 | 0.1602 | -0.5923 | . | . | 1 | | |
| Cereal | 0.4096 | 0.3964 | -0.7946 | 0.1122 | -0.8141 | . | . | 0.7741 | 1 | |
| Successr | -0.3513 | -0.4597 | 0.5269 | -0.0748 | 0.1808 | . | . | -0.6307 | -0.2759 | 1 |

Table 6. Cross correlation table for Indonesia

| | Total incident | WGI | InstStr | Unemp | pov | frag | police | live | cereal | successr |
|----------------|----------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|------|--------|--------|--------|----------|
| Total Incident | 1 | | | | | | | | | |
| WGI | -0.6019 | 1 | | | | | | | | |
| InstStr | 0.4476 | -0.6360 | 1 | | | | | | | |
| Unemp | 0.0634 | -0.2608 | -0.2427 | 1 | | | | | | |
| Pov | 0.4855 | -0.6968 | 0.8649 | -0.2543 | 1 | | | | | |
| Frag | . | . | . | . | . | 1 | | | | |
| Police | . | . | . | . | . | . | 1 | | | |
| Live | -0.4641 | 0.7467 | -0.8474 | 0.2067 | -0.9461 | . | . | 1 | | |
| Cereal | -0.3909 | 0.7670 | -0.8946 | 0.1354 | -0.9488 | . | . | 0.9512 | 1 | |
| Successr | -0.2090 | 0.3185 | -0.1536 | -0.5103 | -0.1512 | . | . | 0.1604 | 0.2331 | 1 |

(WGI=World Governance Indicator, InstStr=Institutional Strength, Unemp=unemployment, pov=poverty, frag=fragmentation, police= police ratio, live= livestock, Cereal=Cereal yield, successr: piracy incident success rate)

The correlation tables above provide limited correlations between variables. In Somalia, the WGI (as a proxy variable of failed state) does not show a high level of correlation with piracy incidents. However, institutional strength shows a high correlation with piracy incidents. Police ratio shows a mid-level correlation (0.566) with piracy incidents. All other variables show low correlations with piracy incidents. In Nigeria, failed state shows a low correlation with piracy incidents. Institutional strength has a mid-correlation (-0.5808) with piracy incidents. In economic terms, a mid-high correlation exists between livestock and piracy incidents (0.6537). The unemployment rate has a mid-correlation (-0.506) with piracy incidents. Finally, Indonesia

does not show high correlations, except a moderate correlation (-0.6019) between WGI and piracy incidents. Additionally, fragmentation and police ratios show no correlation values in all cases because the variables have almost no variances.

Overall, the correlation results do not show a clear association. Failed state still does not show a high correlation with piracy incidents. All other variables also do not show a consistent correlation with piracy incidents. It is difficult to draw a conclusive relation between the hypothetical factors and piracy incidents. Nevertheless, it is too early to determine that there are no significant correlations between the hypothetical factors and piracy incidents. Sample size is limited to 18 years of data of piracy incidents and relevant factors. Logistic regression tests with a large sample size (n=5846) might suggest a better clue. To statistically answer questions of possible associations between relevant factors and piracy incidents, this research adopts binary logistic models for examining coherent and robust relations between selected factors and piracy incidents by both different piracy types and time sets.

5.2 ANALYSIS FROM LOGISTIC REGRESSION TESTS

Two logistic models are tested. Three dependent variables are examined: successful piracy incidents, hijacking piracy, and ransom gaining piracy. Successful piracy incidents is a crime actually perpetrated by criminals against a vessel and crew on the sea. Total incident indicates all the recorded incidents, including those attempted and those that failed. Hijacking piracy is an incident in which pirates hijack and control a vessel and crew for a certain amount of time for criminal purposes. Ransom gaining piracy covers piracy incidents in which pirates acquired a ransom after hijacking a vessel and kidnapping its crew.

The first model explores whether the failed state index is a coherently significant factor across different types of piracy incidents. The second model as an alternative factor set examines what factors are consistently associated with piracy incidents by type and different time sets. The model is designed to find meaningful clues for understanding the changing trend of piracy incidents over the 18-year period. The second model consists of the following factors: institutional strength and police ratio to population as political factors; poverty and unemployment as economic factors; and fragmentation as a social factor. As a daily living staple and supplemental proxy for the economic factors, indexes of livestock and cereal yield are also added since these piracy-prone regions rely highly on agricultural products. Both models are also tested with controlling factors such as success rate, border effect, time effect, and country dummy. The success rate (actual incidents over total incident in a state¹²) tests whether a learning-by-doing effect on piracy incidents trends exists. The border effect (number of neighbor countries) shows whether there is a geopolitical effect on piracy incident trends. The analysis seeks to identify whether or not a coherent direction exists in piracy incidents trends over time. Briefly, this study found no coherently significant factors on piracy incidents across different types and time sets. The overall results provide limited clues on the relationships between designated independent variables and piracy incidents. For example, failed state is a significant factor only with successful hijacking incident. However, interpretation is challenging because the results suggest that improvement in state governance can be a positive predictor of an increase in hijacking piracy incidents.

Description of Statistical Test Results

Table 7.1. Results of Logit analysis for the 18 year term: Model A (n=5846)

| 1996-2013 (observation =5,479) | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|----------------------|-----|-------|----------------------|-----|-------|-----------------------|-----|-------|
| | Successful Incident | | | Hijacking Incident | | | Ransom Incident | | |
| | LR chi2(6)= 982.95 | | | LR chi2 (6) = 536.64 | | | LR chji2 (6) = 383.30 | | |
| | Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 | | | Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 | | | Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 | | |
| | pseudo r2=0.1468 | | | pseudo r2=0.1425 | | | (pseudo r2=0.1853) | | |
| Variables | Odds | | S.E. | Odds | | S.E. | Odds | | S.E. |
| WGI | 1.008 | | 0.082 | 1.428 | *** | 0.026 | 0.731 | | 0.214 |
| Success Rate | 10.853 | *** | 1.851 | 0.584 | * | 0.111 | 0.389 | * | 0.197 |
| Border Country | 1.123 | *** | 0.025 | 0.945 | | 0.494 | 0.96 | | 0.072 |
| Somalia | 0.407 | *** | 0.08 | 15.058 | *** | 3.097 | 6.903 | *** | 4.41 |
| Indonesia | 0.774 | *** | 0.068 | 1.421 | ** | 0.767 | 1.587 | | 0.458 |
| Nigeria | 0.758 | | 0.115 | 3.084 | *** | 1.285 | 2.806 | ** | 1.134 |
| _cons | 0.417 | *** | 0.057 | 0.105 | *** | 0.464 | 0.023 | *** | 0.01 |

(* indicates significance levels with following criteria: *<0.1, **<0.05, ***<0.001. For example, * means that the estimate number has less than 10% error term in population. Smaller error term means stronger significance level with less error term in population.)

1) WGI

WGI as a failed state variable has significant odds on hijacking piracy incidents. 1.4218 odds mean that each one-degree increase in WGI will increase the odds of hijacking piracy incidents 1.428 times, after controlling for the other variables. However, it is a puzzle because a majority of hijacking incidents occurred in the three piracy prone countries with very low governance indexes. In fact, hijacking piracy incidents decreased after failed state indexes increased in Somalia and Indonesia.

2) Controlling Variables

Success rate shows only high positive odds with successful piracy incidents. It has negative odds with hijacking and ransom gaining piracy incidents. A one-unit increase in success

rate will increase successful piracy incidents 10.853 times. However, the increase in success rate will also decrease the odds (41.6%) of hijacking piracy incidents and the odds (61.1%) of ransom gaining incidents. It means that the success experience may facilitate advanced piracy incident types, as well as hijacking and ransom gaining piracy, though the latter two at lower success rates. The number of the border country, as a variable for location effect, in a state where piracy incidents occurred has a similar direction at much lower magnitude. Among country dummy variables, only Somalia has significant odds ratios across piracy incident types. However, Somalia has negative direction in relation to successful piracy incidents. It appears that Somalia has higher positive odds with hijacking and ransom piracy incidents than other countries, while having negative odds with successful piracy incidents.

This study used FSI from Peace for Fund Institution instead of WGI. However, the direction is opposite with much smaller magnitude. For example, the odds ratio is 0.990 on hijacking piracy incidents, indicating that one unit increase of FSI will decrease hijacking piracy incidents at 0.01 odds. The direction is opposite with successful hijack incidents but a very small magnitude at 1.005 odds (see result tables for Appendix 1.2). The results add more puzzling points. Thomas (2010) criticized the problem of construct validity with the WGI because of wrong data and a lack of empirical evidence. The confusing results could be caused by the construct validity problems. Therefore, failed state indexes such as WGI and FSI cannot be a meaningful predictor of piracy incidents in realistic aspects.

Table 7.2. Results of Logit analysis for the 18 year term: Model B (n=5846)

| 1996-2013 (Observation =5,019) | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------|-----|-------|-----------------------|-----|-------|-----------------------|-----|--------|
| | Successful Incident | | | Hijacking Incident | | | Ransom Incident | | |
| | LR chi2 (12) = 906.70 | | | LR chi2 (12) = 577.95 | | | LR chi2 (12) = 412.70 | | |
| | Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 | | | Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 | | | Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 | | |
| | pseudo r2=0.1468 | | | pseudo r2=0.1628 | | | pseudo r2=0.2049 | | |
| Variables | Odds | | S.E. | Odds | | S.E. | Odds | | S.E. |
| Institution | 0.999 | | 0.017 | 0.982 | | 0.026 | 0.98 | | 0.038 |
| Unemployment | 0.961 | ** | 0.014 | 0.921 | *** | 0.025 | 1.028 | | 0.033 |
| Poverty | 0.992 | *** | 0.003 | 0.988 | *** | 0.004 | 0.984 | *** | 0.005 |
| Fragmentation | 0.85 | | 0.292 | 1.266 | | 0.781 | 2.866 | | 3.082 |
| Police Ratio | 0.998 | *** | 0 | 1.001 | * | 0.001 | 0.997 | *** | 0.001 |
| Livestock | 1.004 | * | 0.002 | 1 | | 0.004 | 0.97 | *** | 0.007 |
| Cereal | 1 | *** | 0 | 1 | | 0 | 1 | | 0 |
| Success Rate | 3.191 | *** | 0.72 | 0.306 | *** | 0.111 | 0.389 | * | 0.221 |
| Border Country | 1.053 | * | 0.03 | 0.952 | | 0.494 | 0.819 | * | 0.093 |
| Somalia | 0.365 | *** | 0.081 | 8.518 | *** | 3.097 | 19.603 | *** | 11.769 |
| Indonesia | 0.725 | * | 0.14 | 2.27 | ** | 0.767 | 2.071 | | 1.094 |
| Nigeria | 1.304 | | 0.26 | 3.864 | *** | 1.285 | 7.533 | *** | 4.219 |
| _cons | 1.914 | | 1.018 | 0.57 | | 0.464 | 2.427 | | 3.031 |

1) Institution

Institution does not have significant odds with piracy incidents. Though two nine-year period results show significant odds with successful piracy incidents in both periods and hijacking piracy incidents in the latter period between 2005 and 2013. The magnitude is very low.

2) Unemployment

Unemployment has negative odd ratios with successful piracy incidents (0.961) and hijacking piracy incidents (0.921). In contrast, the odds ratio with ransom gaining piracy indicates that increasing unemployment in one unit will increase by 1.028 odds of ransom gaining piracy incidents. Nevertheless, it is of a very small magnitude. Unemployment also does not show coherently significant odds with piracy incidents in other period test sets.

3) Poverty

Poverty has significant odds ratios with piracy incidents in a negative direction except with ransom gaining piracy incidents. However, it is also at a very small magnitude. An increase in one unit of extreme poverty will result in decreases of successful piracy incidents (0.39 odds) and hijacking piracy incidents (0.012 odds).

4) Fragmentation

Fragmentation has no significant odds.

5) Police Ratio

Police Ratio has significant odds with piracy incidents. However, the degree are very small. For example, increasing one unit of police ratio results in decreasing piracy incidents at odds of 0.002 on successful piracy incidents. In contrast, the direction is opposite with hijacking piracy incidents at 0.001 odds.

6) Livestock and Cereal

Though livestock and cereal have a few significant odds as shown in the results table, the magnitudes imply very small impacts or none.

7) Control Variables

Control variables show similar results with those of the failed state Model A. Only magnitudes of the odds ratios are generally lower than those in Model A. For example, success rate has lower odd ratios with successful piracy incidents and hijacking piracy incidents in Model B than those in Model A. Country dummy variables also show the same significant directions with smaller impact sizes on piracy incidents.

Summary of Statistical Test Results

In brief, the remaining test results also show that none of the independent or control variables have any consistent association with piracy incidents. The odds ratios indicate that none of the failed state indicators, WGI and FSI, have any practically significant effects. The hypotheses of failed state cannot be fully supported. The WGI as a proxy variable of the failed state concept does not show a coherently significant association with piracy incidents across different types of incidents except on the odds of hijack incidents. The WGI is incoherent and cannot be a basis for meaningful interpretation. In the alternative variable set, model against the failed state, unemployment, and poverty are significant variables. This means that improving employment and poverty conditions could increase the chances of piracy incidents. Unlike the putative assumption of their positive effects, piracy incidents are more likely to occur during decreasing unemployment and poverty. However, the odds ratios are too small. Considering the small variation, the odds ratios are almost negligible. The alternative model provides a clue about the negative relations between the economic factors and the odds of piracy incidents across incident types. Low rates of unemployment and poverty are associated with high odds of piracy incidents. Test results of the other period sets also do not show consistent associations, but rather very limited relations. (See Appendix I.2 for explanation and result tables).

Logistic regression tests of this research reveal very limited clues regarding relations among several causal factors and piracy incidents across different time periods. First, the results suggest that there is no meaningful relation between failed state and piracy incidents. Although the status of failed state has a significant relation to hijack piracy, it is probably valid only after 2008. This study also used FSI and the results again do not provide any meaningful relationship among factions and piracy incidents. Most of all, odd ratios, even in significant relations between

FSI and piracy incidents across time sets and piracy incident types, are too small to interpret a meaningful effect. Thus, it is hard to determine whether failed states actually affect piracy incidents in a causally coherent direction.

On the other hand, the alternative variable set provides only partial clues about the relationship between politico-socio-economic factors and piracy incidents in relative terms. First, institutional strength appears to be in reverse relation to piracy incidents, but the odds ratio is not valid with hijacking and ransom piracy. The odds ratios are also very small, which means institutional strength does not provide a meaningful association with piracy incidents. Second, economic factors such as unemployment and poverty are reversely associated with piracy incidents. It means that improving economic conditions increase the probability of piracy incidents. This is probably because participation in piracy activity could be expected to obtain greater gains in very poor institutional environments when economic situations are slightly improved in pastoral and agricultural states such as Somalia and Nigeria. The results could also be supported by the rational choice theory of economics, which is used to explain the motivations of pirate activities in some studies (Anderson 1995, Leeson 2010, Shortland 2011). Nevertheless, the odds ratios at significant levels are not consistently high enough to be decisive factors. It is still premature to determine that economic factors serve as necessary factors in piracy incidents. Interestingly, livestock is significantly related, particularly to ransom piracy. Considering that the Somali economy is highly reliant on livestock, there could be a natural relationship between them. Yet, the odds ratio is too small to determine it as a constant.

Though several effects on piracy incidents, including effect of failed state on hijacking piracy incidents are significant, it is because the large sample size pushes the standard errors down to a point that odd ratios have significant effects, which is a simple artifact of measurement.

However, those measures have no practical significance. This is the validity problem that Thomas' study of WGI (2010) warned because a composite index that lack construct validity always tends to produce practically insignificant results. Thus, the overall statistical analysis provides very limited clues. More advanced statistical analysis than the logistic model could help to find more conclusive results. In fact, running a quantitative analysis with the state-based data is challenging since it is highly unlikely to change the trends in the states with very small variations of relevant factors. It means that the variations of the indexes of the factors, such as institutional strength, economic conditions, and social fragmentation have very limited association with piracy incidents.

Ironically, the difficulty of statistical analysis confirms the limitations of the present studies relying on quantitative analyses with limited time and space frames. This study attempts to expand the frames of time and space with various sets of factors to overcome the limitations. However, the test results do not give decisive confirmations across time, space, and regions. Perhaps in the future, more advanced statistical models with big data sets will yield more clues than this study. Presently, this study suggests that there are no universally applicable factor sets for piracy incidents across time, regions, and states. Nevertheless, the test results provide several clues that ultimately call forth a systemic qualitative analysis.

First, it may be wrong to assume that failed states directly affect piracy incidents. Second, economic factors have only relative relations with trends and types of piracy incidents. In other words, there is no simple one-directional interpretation between them. Third, the effects of economic factors can be better understood with the combined effects of political and other social factors. Advanced piracy incidents are more likely to occur when relatively better conditions prevail related to the political and economic factors. Fourth, only Somalia shows the most

coherent associations with piracy incidents across different times and types. It means that the Somali state has more associations with piracy than other states. It implies that there must be more complicated hidden factors working on Somali piracy incidents, particularly with regard to ransom piracy. Therefore, the unique patterns of Somali piracy require systemically designed qualitative analyses, while they explicate the hidden factors that are not visible in the quantitative analyses that mostly rely on state-based variable sets.

In fact, piracy incidents are not nationwide crimes today. Most piracy incidents in Southeast Asia occur around Sumatra Island and the seas of Indonesia. The Niger Delta area is a primary origin of the maritime piracy crimes in Nigeria. Moreover, Somaliland, a self-proclaimed independent Somali state, has been almost free from ransom-seeking piracy. Most piracy incidents in the Horn of Africa originated in Puntland and several coastal and rural towns of Middle and South Somalia. As long as contemporary piracy incidents originated in particular local areas of coastal states with relatively low levels of performance compared to neighbor states, it is necessary to delve into the context of the local environments, while connecting diverse causal factors in various dimensions.

5.3 ALTERNATIVES FOR A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

Several fundamental assumptions might underlie the limitations in the previous studies. First, most studies use monolithic perspectives, assuming that a primary cause directly influences the rise of modern piracy, including Somali piracy. Such monolithic perspectives have led the studies to produce shortsighted analyses and policy suggestions. For example, globalization and state fragility issues do not directly affect the emergence of Somali piracy. To overcome these

limits, this study takes multiple perspectives, including a sociological one, to comprehensively illuminate the unique evolutionary process of Somali piracy.

Second, many international security studies have still embarked on normative and fixed assumptions of modern nation-states, such as Rotberg's (2002; 2004) exemplary marking of a clear distinction between a normal state and a failed state. This normative assumption about states has led researchers to view Somali piracy as a pathological symptom of state failure. However, this research finds that Somali piracy would be better understood as part of a state formation process through complex dynamics among local power contenders, such as local warlords, local elders, and violent entrepreneurs (Hagmann and Heohne 2009: 51). Thus, this study takes a view of the state not as a static leviathan, in Hobbesian terms, but rather a dynamic, contending field among diverse power seekers, in terms of Tilly (1975; 1985; 1992). Thus, the Somali civil war situation is regarded as a state formation process, as major power factions have sought to realize their own state forms in Somalia since its independence in 1960.

Third, there are crucial distinctions between the state formation processes of the European states and African states. Tilly's term can be applied to African states with the legacy of the Western colonial era (Niemann, 2007). Many micro-state formation processes have also been observed in Africa (Herbst 1990). During the national and local state formation process in constant conflict mode, militarization and clashes among diverse power factions have become ritualized patterns of interaction among the regional states and local power contenders. To incorporate this dynamic of complex conflicts in the Horn of Africa into the body of the causal analysis, this study regards the Horn of Africa as a regional security complex (Mesfin 2011).

Finally, there is a missing link between the background factors and the emergence of Somali piracy. Sociological perspectives provide a thread to weave the causal links. Unlike the

fixed image of state collapse as a situation of anarchy, Somali society has regenerated the social orders by recovering traditional customs based on pastoral democracy (Little 2003; Abdisalam 1994; Lewis 2002), which were disrupted during the Colonial era and the Barre regime (Mesfin, 2011). The resilience of Somali society and its modus vivendi were also deeply involved in the emergence of Somali piracy, including its modus operandi. In other words, the activities of Somali pirates are highly embedded in the local community through their traditional clan lineages (Please see Appendix III for the major clans in Somalia). For the causal linkage, the concept of crime embeddedness is applied based on the works of sociologists such as Granovetter (1973, 1974, 1983), Hagan (1993), Hagan and McCarthy (1995) and Vargas (2014). The embeddedness of crime in local Somali society is a key interlocutor to the organizational activity of Somali piracy and its evolution. The important roles of social relations and local contexts are also suggested in other regional criminal studies (Hobbs 1998a, b, 2000; Kenney 2007). Moreover, the local contexts and social relations with regard to crime embeddedness are essentially related not just to the evolutionary process by creating a symbiosis but also to the devolution of Somali piracy activity. As ransom-seeking piracy requires a long-term negotiation, pirates cannot successfully engage in it without local support from Somali society.

Thorstein Veblen emphasized the interrelations between economic actions and socio-cultural and historical contexts, which constitute an enduring institution (Diggins 1978). Economic activity is not carried out by atomistic individuals who pursue maximum utility purely based on rational calculation (Granovetter 1975). Thus, finally, this study defines the Somali piracy groups not as purely rational organizations but as violence-managing agencies (Volkov 2002). Volkov studied the Russian Mafia, in which competition among the violent enterprises provided a unique window into state formation. Just as the Russian Mafia pursued fixes to social

problems, Somali pirate leaders have sought a stationary ruler (Olson, 1993) by transforming their criminal enterprise into a legal one while obscuring their criminal legacies through the social networks in Somali society. For example, Afweyne successfully transformed his criminal empire into a legitimate business by founding an air transportation company. Even after he was arrested on October 13, 2013, the company continued to be run well by his co-partners, including his son.

Therefore, multiple perspectives can help illuminate the complex evolutionary process of Somali piracy by properly employing a causal mechanism approach. The causal mechanism, consisting of multiple parts in various dimensions, will be explained based on multiple-perspectives. Each of them will provide a theoretical ground for explaining a matching concept of a relevant phenomenon. The regional political dynamics will be illuminated from the perspective of regional security complex theory. The state and its governance issues will be explained in relation to an authority crisis with the help of the theory of state formation. The embeddedness of crime concept from sociological theory will be delineated as a key mechanism in the evolution of Somali piracy. Thus, Somali piracy action groups will be regarded as violence managing agencies in which organized violence becomes an important resource in the regeneration process of state formation in both local and central governance. Finally, the causal mechanism model will show how the multiple causal elements have worked together in the evolution of Somali piracy.

There are no universal factors that affect piracy incidents and their evolution. As the statistical tests in this study show, it would be very unfruitful to identify the universal factors with the limited scope of research in terms of time, space, and perspective. This study does not aim to find universally applicable factors, but to pave a different research frame that could shed

light on the evolutionary processes of particular types of piracy in the broad contexts of the multiple factors at play. In other words, this study attempts to build a pioneering alternative approach to overcome the given limitations of piracy studies by demonstrating that a generally applicable framework of the evolution of Somali piracy could also be useful for understanding other regional piracy clusters.

The results of the quantitative analyses were discussed in this chapter. No consistently associated variables with piracy incidents were found. Failed state variables did not provide invariant relations with piracy incidents. The results were reminders of the limitations of state-based quantitative analyses, leading to the necessity of a comprehensive qualitative analysis. This chapter also suggested that multi-perspectives based qualitative research, including sociological studies, could produce a fruitful analysis for configuring a holistic picture of Somali piracy. The next chapter shows how the evolution of Somali piracy occurred from 1991 to 2013 with detailed descriptions of major incidents.

6.0 THE EVOLUTION OF SOMALI PIRACY

6.1 FIVE EVOLUTIONARY STAGES OF SOMALI PIRACY

This study, based on intensive empirical investigation, divides the evolutionary process of Somali piracy into five stages. This approach facilitates the comparison of changing levels of Somali piracy since the Barre regime collapse in 1991. Thus, the process helps identify the factors determining the evolution of Somali piracy.

The famous portrait of a failed state is expressed as total anarchy (Kaplan 1994). Unlike this image, however, there are in fact three distinct phenomena of Somali state failure: the protracted collapse of the central government, protracted armed conflict, and lawlessness (Menkhaus 2004: 8-12). For analytical purposes, this study converts the state phenomena into three conceptual criteria of status of collapsed state: state, civil war, and governance. The five stages will be explained not only in terms of the changing status of Somali piracy but also in terms of the distinct conceptual notions of state collapse. This analytical scheme will help this study to discern the congruent patterns and finally to identify the determining causal factors and their mechanisms. By drawing an entire life cycle of Somali piracy from its birth to its decaying and mutation to other criminal activities, this chapter provides a comprehensive picture of the evolution of Somali piracy.

1st Stage: Embryonic Period

Table 8. Stage 1 Frequency Features

| Year | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 |
|------------------------|---------|--------|--------|--------|---------|
| World Total (Somalia) | 107 (3) | 115(0) | 103(1) | 92 (4) | 170(14) |
| Somali Hijack (Ransom) | 1 (0) | 0 (0) | 0 (0) | 2 (1) | 1 (0) |

(See Appendix II.2 for data sources and data compiling processes.)

Statistical analyses suggest that there are two significantly different periods of piracy incident frequencies: 1996-2004 and 2005-2013. However, the genesis of Somali piracy harks back to the first five years of the protracted civil wars in Somalia when local militia factions began to recognize the benefits of ransoms. The frequency table shows the increasing trend from 1994 to 1995. In 1991, there were a total three piracy incidents. Enraged local fishermen set the MV *Naviluck* (on January 12, 1991) on fire in response its illegal fishing. Two other incidents were committed by local militia. Two other incidents of piracy appeared to be politically motivated piracy as the relevant militia attempted to control their coastal sovereignty. The first ransom-gaining piracy incident occurred in 1994. It was carried out by local Majerteen (a dominant clan in Puntland, northeastern Somalia) militia. Two SHIFCO (Somali High Seas Fishing Company) fishing vessels were hijacked on December 15, 1994, and released on Jan. 9, 1995, after a one-million USD ransom was paid to the clan-based militia.

To understand the background of those incidents, they need to be viewed in light of the actual circumstances of the Somali situation in terms of the three distinctive aspects of state failure. There were seven Somali militarized factions fighting against the Barre regime in the period after the Ogaden War (1977-1978). Except AIAI (Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya), all the factions were formed on the basis of clan lineage. Among the factions, USC (United Somali Congress of Hawiye clan) successfully brought down the Barre regime's Mogadishu government in January

1991. However, this was just the beginning of a prolonged civil war since no faction could predominate during the collapse of the regime. Civil wars occurred not just among factions but also within the same faction. USC was split into two rival factions: the faction led by General Hussein Farah Aideed (the Habar Gidir sub-clan of Hawiye) and the Ali Mahdi faction (the Abgal sub-clan of Hawiye). The turf wars among the factions were severe in central and south Somalia (Marchal 2007). International efforts also failed to resurrect a Somali state. Yet, northwestern Somalia spared itself and the region by creating its own independent state, Somaliland, headed by the Isaaq clan, which led the Somali National Movement (SNM). The northeastern region was also relatively peaceful. The region was controlled by the Majerteen clan faction, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF).

The power struggles rendered formal governance useless in all Somali regions. However, customary laws helped provide some informal governance in many local areas. One of the local governance imperatives was to have sovereign control over Somali coastal areas since those areas suffered from illegal fishing (One Earth Future 2015), as the retaliation against MV Naviluck exemplified. As a leader of SSDF, Abdullahi Yusuf commanded Abdihahid Mahamed Hersi. According to Bahadur (2011:31), Abdiwahid Mahamed Hersi, known as Joaar, ran a small lobster fishing company in which Boyah, the father of Somali piracy, was one of the employees. Joaar became the director general of the Puntland Ministry of Fisheries in 2004. It has been speculated that he must be involved in Somali piracy due to his background (Bahadur 2011: 31).

Joaar formed a vigilante group to end predatory fishing in 1993. It was the first semi-legal privateer group under the Majerteen faction rule in northwestern Somalia. It failed because the local maritime warlord overwhelmed the small vigilante group (Hansen 2009: 31). Interestingly, Somali piracy leaders, such as Boyah and Garaad, began their piracy activity at this

stage. Governance troubles in coastal areas provided a niche for the early pirates to engage in their criminal activity, while local governance efforts opened an opportunity for a semi-legal cover of the crime. Thus, the Somali pirates developed their basic skills in this period. According to Hansen (2009: 22-3), several features were noticeable, such as multiple attacks within a short period, financing expeditions, selecting vulnerable targets that were readily accessible, and returning to bases for resupplies. Hansen also suggested that the relatively peaceful situations in coastal Somali towns provided a conducive environment within which to hone the essential skills of maritime crime (Hansen 2009: 31-2).

Understanding this early stage reminds us that Somali piracy was an endogenous crime driven by the initial nature of the Somali civil war (Marchal 2011). In other words, the embryonic genes of Somali piracy were created by the local governance situation in which local militia and opportunistic fishermen-turned-pirates began to engage simultaneously in their criminal activity against foreign fishing vessels. Table 9 summarizes the main feature of the first stage. The key nexus point between governance problems, a distinctive phenomenon of state failure, and the creation of the Somali specific types of piracy was privateer activity against predatory foreign fishing vessels. The embryonic genes of Somali piracy, however, needed a breeding ground during the first reconciliation period that started in 1996.

Table 9. Features of Stage 1: 1991-1995

| Status | State | Civil War | Governance |
|---|-------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------|
| Features | Regime Collapse | Intense Faction Wars | Predatory & Customs |
| Coastal Defender: | Privateers led by Joaar | | |
| Key Stage Features: Creation of Embryonic Genes | | | |
| Pirate Leaders | Organization | Stakeholders | Pattern Features |
| Ex-Fishermen (e.g., Boyah and Garaad) | Privateers led by Joaar | Local Militia and Warlords | First Ransom Piracy |

2nd Stage: Natural Seeding Period




Table 10. Piracy Trends in East Africa in the Second Stage

| Year | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 |
|------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| East Africa Total | 7 | 11 | 22 | 17 | 33 | 32 | 29 | 25 | 15 |
| East Africa Hijack (R) | 1(0) | 3(2) | 4(4) | 4(4) | 1(0) | 5(5) | 3(3) | 1(0) | 0(0) |
| Total Ransom | 0 | 0.7 | 0.13 | 0.1 | 0 | 0.4 | 0.45 | 0.4 | 0 |
| Average Detention | 1 | 43 | 99 | 64 | 2 | 78 | 76 | 180 | 0 |
| Hostage No. | 0 | 54 | 64 | 26 | 0 | 55 | 47 | 27 | 0 |

(R=Ransom Piracy, Total Ransom=Total ransom revenue in million USD, Average detention=average captivity time in day per hijacked ship and kidnapped crew, Hostage number=rolling hostage number by year. Please See Appendix II.2 for data sources and data compiling processes.)

Somali piracy represented a small portion of world piracy incidents during this period. Hijack incidents were also led by Asian regions, as the trend charts show. However, very important features of Somali piracy were determined at this stage, not just by the opportunistic fishermen turned pirates, but crucially by the privateer activity of the local Puntland government. Several surrounding circumstances and events likely shaped the determinants of Somali piracy. This period was marked by several failures of state reconciliation efforts with neighboring states such as Djibouti, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Kenya (Elmi 2010). The Transitional National Government (TNG) existed only from 2000 to 2003 since the factions supported by Ethiopia were not allowed to join the temporary government. The next TFG mediated through the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was also unsuccessful since Hawiye clan factions and local leaders were suspicious of its leadership and saw it as a proxy of Ethiopia. Facing strong resistance from factions in Mogadishu, the government had to set up its capital in Baidoa. Civil war status became localized as mini state formations emerged in the wake of Somaliland splitting off from the federal Somali state. These civil wars were mostly contained in local areas such as northwestern Puntland, south Juba valley, north Sool, and Southwest Bay and Bakool (Menkhaus: 30). Those local conflicts combined with the fragile central state worsened the governance problems that were exacerbated by limited resource availability.

In Puntland, one of the solutions for the resource issue was to hire private security firms in order to control illegal fishing, while obtaining an extra resource pool. The Puntland government hired the British Hart group in 1999. Hart security fulfilled the coastal defender role that the Joaar-led privateer group had aspired to in 1993. The Hart group, however, withdrew due to a local civil war between the Abdullahi Yusuf faction and Jama Ali Jama's faction in Puntland. It was later replaced by the Somali Canadian Coast Guard (SomCan), run by a member of the

Somali diaspora, Ali Taar, until 2005. The primary activities were fining illegal fishing ships and selling fishing licenses. The revenue was split between the Puntland government and the privateers. Until 2000, Somali piracy continued to increase, as the frequency trend table 10 shows. The trends turned downward in 2001, when the private security firms worked more effectively. There were several reasons for the decreasing trend. First, the roles of private security companies worked well. Second, increased military clashes in local areas, such as the Puntland and Bay regions, limited opportunities for pirates in 2002. Third, conflict situations in Somali central areas became less severe from 2003. When the TFG was established in 2004, it seemed that a temporary recovery of the social order and peace might prevent Somali pirates from re-engaging in their criminal activity.

Nevertheless, the seeds of Somali piracy were naturally growing through privateer practices. In fact, many active pirate members were originally employees of the private security firms (Hansen 2009: 42; Bahadur 2012:177). The other striking observation is that 18 of the total of 22 hijack incidents, 18 involved ransom payments. Indeed, this study found that Somali pirates gained about two million USD ransom revenue. This suggests that ransom-focused piracy was seeded in this period. Until 2002, no organized piracy action group was confirmed except private security companies as privateers licensed by the Puntland state since 1999. It is known that, in 2003, Afweyne began to look for maritime criminal ventures (Hansen 2009). However, his activities did not result in actual ransom gaining until 2004. This stage is rather a seeding period, naturally engendered by privateer practices. This is quite similar to ancient piracy in the Mediterranean and Caribbean. Under the loose confederated feudal system, competing regional states gave privateers a letter of marque that gave them a semi-legal authority to prey on vessels of rival powers.

During this period, Somalia continued to break up into mini-state formations in most local areas except Mogadishu and its vicinity. Puntland, as a newly created mini-state, was loosely confederated with the Somali Federal Government (SFG). The SFG utilized private security firms to enhance its poor resource pool, while also using them to assert its sovereign grip on its coastal area. In turn, the privateer practices naturally seeded the Somali piracy features such as hijacking and ransom focusing crime. However, the seeding activity was under the radar of international security, especially after the 9/11 attacks. Moreover, a series of terrorist attacks in Kenya from 1988 to 2003 and maritime terrorist attacks in 2000 and 2002 by Al-Qaeda emboldened the terror driven security perception that either overlooked the dangers of Somali piracy or tended to perceive it as a terror nexus node. The table below highlights the summary features of this natural seeding stage. This is followed by profiles of the major incidents in this stage, profiles that help us understand the emerging characteristics of Somali piracy.

Table 11. Features of Stage 2: 1996-2004

| Feature/Crisis | State | Civil War | Governance |
|--|---|-------------------------------|--|
| | TNG & TFG Failed Reconciliation | Intermittent & Localized | Creation of Mini States Customary Laws |
| Coastal Defender: | Hart (1999~2002) & SomCan (2002~2005) | | |
| Key Stage Features: <u>Natural Seeding of Somali Piracy</u> | | | |
| Pirate Leaders | Organization | Stakeholders | Pattern Features |
| Ex-Fishermen (e.g., Boyah and Garaad) Ex-Govt. Officers. | None (Preparing for Marine based in Eyl) | Local Militia and Warlords | Slight Increase of Hijacking for Ransom |

The following incidents are selected to highlight the major features of this period. All the profiles are based on multiple sources. The primary sources were taken from the IMB annual piracy report. The documents of information were sourced from diverse global and local media and institution reports. They were meticulously scrutinized for validity and reliability. The collected data was then systematically reviewed using the analysis scheme in this study.

Considering the duplicate contents of documents and data, the profiles do not tag the information source. Information sources are provided, however, if data was taken from exclusive sources.

In this stage, those incidents were committed by military factions tied to local militia groups, such as SSDF and AIAI. Though the pirates held the vessels and crew more than a month, the ransom amount remained low. Overall, most incidents remained the general robbery type of piracy. Eyl and Kismayo were the main bases for their operations.

Profiles of Major Incidents

FV Bahari Hindi (Hijacked on Apr. 17, 1997 near Garacad Somalia)

(Ransom in USD: K=100,000 USD and M=1 million USD)

| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|---|--------|--------------|-----------|------------|
| | | SSDF | | |
| 06-10-1997 (55) | 200K | Leader | Eyl | 5(35.7) |
| | | Yusuf Ahmed | | |
| Description: A Somali faction linked to SSDF detained a Kenya-registered ship for its illegal fishing. It was attacked again in 1998 and held in Garaad. (Ecop-marine 2 September 2001) | | | | |
| Implication: This was militia-linked piracy. Yusuf Ahmed could have been involved. | | | | |

(Scores: level of a piracy incident from 0 to 14/ (%): converted score to %)¹³

MV Alfa BG (Hijacked on Jan. 13, 1998 near the Somalian coast)

| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|---|--------|----------------------|-----------|------------|
| | | Unknown | | |
| 02-14-1998 (32) | 130K | Leader | Eyl | 5(35.7) |
| | | Somali Military Unit | | |
| Description: The ship was hijacked by uncontrolled military units after having an engine failure. The ransom was remitted to an account in a Somali bank. (IMB Annual Piracy Report 1998) | | | | |
| Implication: This was militia-linked piracy of a vulnerable target with links to international money. | | | | |

MV Sea Johana (Hijacked on Dec. 30, 1998 near Kismayo, Somalia)

| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--|--------|-------------------------|-----------|------------|
| | | al-Itihad al-Islam | | |
| 05-14-1999 (136) | 100K | Leader | Kismayo | 6(42.9) |
| | | Hassan Abdallah & Turki | | |
| Description: An AIAI-linked militia based in Kismayo hijacked the ship and kidnapped its 21 crew members. The ship was sold to other Somali businessman in the same year for US \$100,000. (Allafrica.com 21 March 2000) | | | | |
| Implication: This was militia-linked piracy against a vulnerable target. | | | | |

General Cargo Salwah (Hijacked on Mar. 14, 1999 at about 50km from the Somalian coast)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|---|---------|-------------------|-----------|------------|
| | | SSDF tied militia | | |
| 06-30-1999 (106) | Unknown | Leader | Eyl | 5(35.7) |
| | | Unknown | | |
| Description: The Belize flag bearing cargo ship was supposedly hijacked by an SSDF-tied local militia. The ship and 19 Ukrainian crew members were released after 106 days. (FAS Anti-Shipping Message Ref#: 1999-36) | | | | |
| Implication: This was militia-linked piracy of a vulnerable target | | | | |

Barge Mad Express (Hijacked on Jul. 04, 2000 at Bargal, Somalia)

| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--------------------------|--------|---------------|-----------|------------|
| | | Local militia | | |
| 07-06-2000 (2) | 0 | Leader | Bargal | 1(7.1) |
| | | Unknown | | |

Description: A local militia group hijacked the ship. Within two days, the Hart Group, a British security firm, succeeded in resolving the incident near Bargal. (New York Times 12 September 2001)

Implication: The foreign security firm demonstrated its capacity for counter-piracy.

FV Bahari Kenya (Hijacked on Jun. 28, 2001 at Bosaso, Somalia)

| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--------------------------|---------------|---------------------|-----------|------------|
| | | (SSDF Tied) Militia | | |
| 12-01-2001 (155) | UK (est.400K) | Leader | Eyl | 5(35.7) |
| | | Unknown | | |

Description: About 30 Somali gunmen hijacked the fishing vessel, which had 33 crew members. The local court of Eyl imposed a fine of US \$750,000 on the boat owner and US \$150,000 on the captain for their illegal fishing. The British security firm Hart did not interfere and merely reported the incident. (New York Times 12 September 2001, Daily Nation 17 September 2004)

Implication: The incident showed grounds for justification of Somali piracy in relation to the local community. It also implied that the Somali pirates learned and developed the ransom business based on this justification.

(Est: estimation based on similar incidents at the same period)

Bulk Carrier FV Beira 3&9 (Hijacked on Apr.01, 2003)

| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--------------------------|---------------|---------------------|-----------|------------|
| | | Private Coast Guard | | |
| 11-01-2003 (180) | UK (est.400K) | Leader | Kismayo | 5(35.7) |
| | | Local Warlord | | |

Description: Beira 3 and Beira 9 were hijacked by local militia for the service payment of private guards who sought compensation because they did not get payment for their private security service. These vessels must have been involved in illegal fishing. The crew of FV Beira 9 was robbed again on July 31, 2003 at Mombasa anchorage, Kenya (Daily Nation 17 September 2004).

Implication: This was militia-linked piracy on illegal fishing vessels. The incident indicates that Somali piracy ships remained privateers in the name of coastal defense until this time.

3rd Stage: Startup Period





Table 12. Piracy Trends in East Africa in the Third Stage

| Year | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 |
|---------------------------|--------|------|--------|
| East Africa Total | 59 | 30 | 64 |
| East Africa Hijack(R) | 20(20) | 6(4) | 13(11) |
| Total Ransom | 2.57 | 1.85 | 4.24 |
| Enterprise Type of Piracy | 13 | 3 | 5 |
| Avg. Detention | 64 | 47 | 60 |
| Hostage No. | 252 | 107 | 197 |
| Off Somalia Hijack | 0 | 0 | 2 |

(See Appendix II.2 for data sources and data compiling processes.)

As the charts and table above showed, Somali piracy began to increase its hijackings, whereas Asian piracy continued to decrease after 2004. Somali piracy temporarily stepped back in 2006 when the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) crushed piracy bases in Harardheere and Hobyo and arrested rising pirate leader Afweyne. The rising trend resumed immediately in 2007, however, after the UIC was defeated by Ethiopian troops. In this period, several contextual conditions were advantageous to Afweyne, giving him an opportunity to test and prove his concept of criminal business.

The UIC challenged the TFG because the latter was not popular among local Somali leaders. When the UIC occupied Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, Ethiopia sent troops because of its alarm over the rise of another nationalist Somali state after the Barre regime. The struggle for a Somali central state became an international war as Eritrea sent supporting resources immediately after Ethiopia entered the civil war. The Somali civil war became intense and complicated as neighboring countries, as well as the U.S., became involved in order to rebuild a central state tailored to their respective security concerns. Several local governments such as Puntland and the central and southern areas of Somalia fell into troubled times. When Abdullahi Yusuf brought most of his militia to the fragile TFG, he also drained the budget of the Puntland government.

Thus, Puntland state faced troubled governance with several critical issues. First, the Puntland economy was declining due to not only to the budget drainage, but also hyperinflation from natural disasters and counterfeiting Somali currency. Puntland also suffered from severe drought between 2002 and 2004. The drought ended with a historical tsunami on December 26, 2004 that devastated coastal towns of the east coast of Somalia. Moreover, the new president of Puntland, Mohamoud Mussa Hersi (aka, Adde), could not establish himself as a viable leader. As

a member of the Somali diaspora in Canada, he did not have a strong clan lineage in the Isse Mahamoud subclans of Majerteen areas, such as Eyl and Garacad, where Somali ransom piracy began to germinate. Those political-economic troubles left Puntland governance almost destroyed. One of the governance problems occurred from the defunct coastal defender role since SomCan was dismissed in 2005 due to criminal involvement by its security guards (hijacking FV Sirichainava 12 on March 16, 2005). Additionally, a nominal mini-state, Galmudug, adjacent to southern Puntland, was created with no actual governance capacity. The region comprises towns such as Hobyo and Haradheere dominated by Habar-Gidir clans (a major subclan of Hawiye). All this provided a major opportunity for criminal entrepreneur Afweyne.

The seed of Somali ransom piracy was cultivated through the creation of the Somali Marine led by Afweyne. Mohamed Abdi Hassan, well-known as Afweyne, began to form a criminal startup in 2003 with the help of pirate veterans such as Boyah and Garaad. He hailed from the Habar-Gidir Saleeban clan that dominated the Galmudug coastal towns. He founded the 'Somali Marine,' which was a piracy alliance based on clan associations between the subclans of Majerteen and Habar-Gidir. As a startup venture, Afweyne carefully designed the Marine as a highly efficient criminal organization by reducing cost while raising the capacity for high profit. The group employed a mixed organization and management structure, somewhere between a military hierarchy and a business model (Hansen 2009: 22-24). He also had the help of pirate veterans (Bahadur 2011: 32-34). For the best result, the clan line was replaced by professionalism. Thus, functional divisions based on expertise were more weighted than the clan lineages. The Somali Marine worked like a sophisticated operating syndicate, and the key figures included pirate veterans such as Boyah and Garaad. During this period, the primary target changed from illegal fishing ships to large commercial vessels.

Afweyne set the bases of the Marine initially in Eyl because those pirate veterans had already staked out their operational turf with the help of the local clan networks. Afweyne took advantage of the defunct governance area through the clan networks. Then he moved his bases to Hobyo and Haradheere, where he obtained support from his clan people. The Marine alliance began to break off via the clan lines as profits soared from 2007 onwards. For example, Garaad moved and established his own marine named National Volunteer Coast Guard (NVCG) in the southern coastal town Koyema, where his clan people dominate (Bahadur 2011: 34). In this evolutionary stage, this study discovered that the Marine alliance as a specific form of Somali piracy gradually replaced the role of coastal defender while also underlining its promising business potential.

The advancement resulted in increasing piracy incidents (153) and more than quadrupled ransom revenue. The Somali pirates led by the Marine alliance obtained more than \$8 million USD (about 8.66) from 35 ransom-gaining incidents. 21 ransoming-gaining incidents are classified as enterprise types of piracy based on the criteria of Chapter 2. Somali piracy was ready to leap forward toward the full enterprise level in the next stage. Thus, the most important change was in the leadership and organization principles, from an opportunistic robbery type to an enterprise type of piracy by accumulating capital and know-how (Bahadur 2011: 35). Somali piracy was progressing toward a revenue-creating industry in this stage through an incubating criminal startup, while advancing its revenue generating operations based on modern enterprise principles. For example, acquiring negotiation skills by demanding high ransom in the initial stage and gradually lowering demands of ransom helped the Somali pirates to take and maintain the initiative in the negotiation process with the hijacked vessel companies.

In brief, the seeds of Somali piracy were cultivated by a criminal entrepreneur through the activity of the criminal piracy startup, which was a pathological output of the severe governance problems caused by the complicated civil wars. Somali piracy as a business venture began to be accepted in the coastal community by covering its criminal activity under the name of coastal defense. Piracy crime was beginning to be embedded into the local community affairs at this stage (Bahadur 2011: 42). As table 13 shows, in the summary of the 3rd stage, the role of coastal defender is a key interlocutor between legal maritime control and illegal criminal enterprise. The profiles of major incidents will show clear pictures of the advancement of Somali piracy.

Table 13. Features of Stage 3: 2005-2007

| | | | |
|---|--|---|------------------------------------|
| Feature/Crisis | State | Civil War | Governance |
| | TFG vs. The UIC | Complicated & Intense | Empty Governance |
| Coastal Defender: | SomCan (2005) & Marine Alliance as a Piracy Action Group | | |
| Key Stage Feature: | Startup Enterprise | | |
| Type of Leader & Pirates | Organization | Stakeholders | Pattern Features |
| Fishermen Turned (Boyah and Garaad) Ex-Govt. Officer (Afweyne) | Marine Alliance led by Afweyne National Volunteer Coast Guard led by Garaad | Local Militia and Warlords Criminal Entrepreneur | Proving Profits of Ransom Business |

Militia tied incidents did not appear at this stage. Thai fishing vessel *Sirichainava* 12 indicated a critical problem of Somali led security companies. It showed that the employees of a private security company could become a piracy action group at vulnerable moments. All other incidents showed advanced levels of piracy operation and organization with high ransom revenue. Moreover, hijacking a general cargo *Danica White* and a chemical tanker *Golden Nori* indicated that the pirates had changed their main targets to large commercial vessels. Though the activity of Somali pirates was temporarily halted, enterprise type of piracy incidents emerged at this stage. Following incident profiles also showed that Hobyo and Haradheere in Galmudug region evolved into new bases of Somali piracy operation during this period.


Profiles of Major Incidents

FV *Sirichainava 12* (Hijacked on Mar. 16, 2005 at about 50 km from Caluula, Somalia)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|---|--------|--------------------------------------|-----------|------------|
| | | SomCan (Somali Canadian Coast Guard) | | |
| 03-18-2005 (2) | 0 | Leader | Unknown | 1(7.1) |
| | | Ali Taar (Owner of SomCan) | | |
| Description: Three employees of SomCan hijacked the fishing vessel. The Puntland government revoked the contract with SomCan right after this incident. (Hiiraan online 12 January 2009) | | | | |
| Implication: The Hart-SomCan debacle revealed the limits of coastal defense by private companies. The incident also suggests that the private security companies provided important resources of Somali pirate activity, such as navigation, combat and hijacking capabilities. | | | | |

MV *Feisty Gas* (Hijacked on Apr. 10.2005 at 355 km from Mogadishu)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--------------------------|--------|-----------------|-----------|------------|
| | | Marine Alliance | | |

| | | | | |
|---|------|----------------------|---------|---------|
| 04-27-2005 (17) | 315K | Leader | Unknown | 8(57.1) |
| | | Afweyne+Boyah+Garaad | | |
| Description: The vessel was a LPG tanker owned by a company in Hong Kong (The Economist 19 May 2013). The Hong Kong shipping company wire transferred the ransom money to a bank in Mombasa. The money handed over to a man who was supposed to be Somali (Eaglespeak 18 November 2005). This incident was the first jackpot for the Marine alliance. (Bahadur 2011: 36). | | | | |
| Implication: This was a demonstrative case of the ransom business model that signified 2005 as a turning point for expanding the activity, but it also incurred international attention because of its possible connection to terrorism. | | | | |

FV *Zhong I No. 218* (Hijacked on Aug.16, 2005 around Kismayo Port, Somalia)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|---|--------|--------------------------------|-----------|------------|
| | | NVCG + JVA | | |
| 01-26-2006 (164) | 375K | Leader | Koyema | 4(28.6) |
| | | Garaad+ Warlord of Juba valley | | |
| Description: This ship was hijacked by the Garaad-led National Volunteer Coast Guard (NVCG) alongside the Juba Valley Alliance (JVA) militia and held near Koyema Island, Kismayo. Koyema was an early base for the Garaad gang. Other Chinese fishing vessels, Cheng Qing Feng and Shin Lian Fa No. 36, were also hijacked together with the ship. A gang fight erupted between NVCG and JVA (Pearl and Dragonette, 14 September 2005) | | | | |
| Implication: This was Garaad's own prize after he became an independent leader. Ransom was required as a fine for illegal fishing, indicating the self-justification used to cover up criminal activity. | | | | |

MV Torgelow (Hijacked on Oct. 03, 2005 near Kismayo, Somalia)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--|--------|----------------------|------------|------------|
| | | Marine Alliance | | |
| 11-29-2005 (42) | 100K | Leader | Haradheere | 9(64.3) |
| | | Afweyne+Boyah+Garaad | | |
| <p>Description: This involved MV Ibn Batouta and MV Semlow. The three leaders jointly dealt with three vessels and demanded US \$500K. (SAP 3 November 2005) They agreed to US \$300K, valuing each vessel at US\$100K. The gunmen used MV. Semlow to hijack MV Ibn Batuta while she was en route to Elmaan Port north of Mogadishu. Another UN aid ship, the MV Miltzow, was also attacked. (BBC 12 October 2005)</p> | | | | |
| <p>Implication: Counter evidence against the justification of the Somali coastal defender role because the hijacked vessels were the UN aid ships to deliver food for Somali people.</p> | | | | |

MV Panagia (Hijacked on Oct. 18, 2005 at about 213 km east of the Somali Coast)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--------------------------|--------|-----------------|-----------|------------|
| | | Marine Alliance | | |
| | | | | |

| | | | | |
|--|------|----------------------|------------|----------|
| 11-26-2005 (39) | 700K | Leader | Haradheere | 10(71.4) |
| | | Afweyne+Boyah+Garaad | | |
| Description: This was the largest ransom case for the Marine alliance up to 2005. The first incident of international cooperation occurred when NATO responded to the emergency call from the vessel. (USNI 28 March 2013) | | | | |
| Implication: MT San Carlo was hijacked by the same pirates on Oct. 20, 2005 and released with a US \$650K ransom. (Khaleej times 27 April 2006) Somali piracy became alarming to international agencies. | | | | |

FV Dong Won No. 628 (Hijacked on Apr. 04, 2006 at about 70 km from Hobyo)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--|--------|-----------------------------|------------|---------------|
| | | Marines-Central Coast Guard | | |
| 07-30-2006 (117) | 800K | Leader | Haradheere | 9(64.3) |
| | | Afweyne | | |
| Description: The Afweyne pirate gang hijacked the vessel in the name of coastal protection. (IOL 31 July 2006) The vessel was initially commandeered to Hobyo and later moved to Haradheere. (Kim & Kim 2007) | | | | |
| Implication: First, it indicated that there was no working authority in the central Somali government. Dongwon had a fishing license from the TFG. (SAP 13 April 2006) Second, the local response was not welcoming of the ransom business until that time. According to a detailed field report (Kim & Kim 2007), pirate gangs were hired by Afweyne from diverse parts of Somalia based on their expertise and contractual relations. After this incident, the pirate activity of Afweyne was temporarily halted until the UIC was defeated by the Ethiopian Army. | | | | |

FV *Mavuno No. 1 & 2* (Hijacked on May 15, 2007 at about 257 km from Mogadishu)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--------------------------|--------|--------------|--------------------------|------------|
| | | NVCG | | |
| 11-04-2007 (174) | 700K | Leader | Ras Assuad (N.Mogadishu) | 8(57.1) |
| | | Garaad | | |

Description: This hijacking was carried out by Garaad’s NVCG.
Implication: The attacks have been on the rise since Islamists were ousted in January 2007. (NYT 5 November 2007) Given that Ching Fong Hwa 168 (Hijacked on May 28, 2007) was another fishing vessel, in 2007 Garaad seemed to be focusing on fishing vessels near Mogadishu and Haradheere.

General Cargo *Danica White* (Hijacked on Jun. 02, 2007 around 178 NM off the Somali coast)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--------------------------|--------|--------------------------|------------------|------------|
| | | Marine | | |
| 08-22-2007 (83) | 723K | Leader | Hobyo/Haradheere | 11 (78.6) |
| | | Afweyne + Boyah & Garaad | | |

Description: This ship was hijacked an estimated 178 nautical miles off the Somalian coast.

The USS Carter Hall, part of a US task force, chased the pirates and the vessels but called off the pursuit because they lacked jurisdiction. (CNN 6 June 2007)

Implication: Afweyne was the sole orchestrator while Boyah and Garaad served as a second-in-command, which indicated their cooperative relationship during the offshore hijacking operation. (Shippingwatch 16 October 2013)

Chemical Tanker *Golden Nori* (Hijacked on Oct. 28, 2007 at 223 km from Bosaso, Somalia)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--------------------------|--------|--------------------------|-----------|------------|
| | | Coast Guard | | |
| 12-12-2007 (45) | 1.5M | Leader | Eyl | 9(64.3) |
| | | Boyah+Abdi Yusuf+Lobster | | |

Description: This was the first million-dollar lottery for Boyah. Abdi Yusuf was an operation commander. Lobster, one of the leading pirate commanders in Puntland, participated as an investor. As part of the deal, the American military guaranteed Boyah and his team safe passage off the hijacked ship. Puntland security forces, waiting on shore to arrest the brigands, could only watch as US Navy helicopters escorted the pirate skiffs to land and allowed the pirates to disembark. (Bahadur 2011: 21-2, 131, 273; The Guardian 24 May 2011)

Implication: This incident highlighted the limited capability of Puntland security forces, as they could only watch over the hijack and release operations.

4th Stage: Booming Period





Table 14. Features of Stage 3: 2005-2007

| Year | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 |
|---------------------------|--------|--------|--------|
| East Africa Total | 128 | 231 | 262 |
| East Africa Hijack(R) | 43(37) | 57(36) | 88(37) |
| Total Ransom | 52 | 77.97 | 120.24 |
| Enterprise Type of Piracy | 33 | 35 | 63 |
| Average Detention | 68 | 74 | 200 |
| Hostage Number | 835 | 991 | 1371 |
| Off Somalia Hijack | 0 | 2 | 31 |
| No. Mothership Use | 5 | 15 | 64 |

(See Appendix II.2 for data sources and data compiling processes.)

This was the high time of the Somali ransom piracy business. Witnessing the positive results, new pirate leaders such as Yare, Yulux, and Garfanje joined the burgeoning enterprises. Their backgrounds are diverse, from former restaurant owner Yare to local militants such as Yulux and Garfanje. Abdulkadir Mohamed Afweyne, son of the Somali pirate kingpin Afweyne, also succeeded his father's criminal business. The pirate action groups were spawned under the new influx of the new leader groups with diverse investment routes such as pirate stock markets in Haradheere and financial participation of the overseas Somali diaspora. According to the UN Monitoring Group (2012), the groups were largely divided into two big umbrella groups: Puntland and Hobyo-Haradheere syndicates. Thus, the Marine alliance became the progenitor of numerous pirate action groups. The newly created groups, however, formed along clan lines while collaboration for ransom operations also aligned with the major clan groups. These included the subclans of Majerteen in Puntland and Hawiye in central Somalia. The clan lines turn out to be a more robust adhesive for the violent groups, including Al-Shabaab, than the enterprise principle set by the founding entrepreneur Afweyne. In other words, the clan association of the Marine alliance was divided along clan lines, while clans collaborated with each other for joint operations based on contracts. The different clan-based piracy gangs worked together only under pre-arranged contracts.

The total piracy incidents (621) in the Horn of African regions accounted for more than half of the world piracy incidents (1191). A total of 110 ransom-gaining incidents out of 196 hijack incidents occurred. Operational capacity reached a high point in this period. The number of times a mother ship was used jumped to 84 from just one use in the previous period. 33 incidents occurred off Somali coastal areas. The number of ransom-gaining incidents classified as an enterprise type of piracy rapidly increased to 132 from 21 in the previous stage. The

estimated ransom revenue was more than \$166 million USD, which was enough to change local governance. Thus, Somali pirates enjoyed a golden age, reaching the full enterprise level of piracy.

In this period, the TFG was reformed as a coalition government by aligning with other major factions, such as moderate factions of the UIC, the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia, and Ahlu Sunna Waljama (a moderate Sufi militia). A break-off military unit of the UIC rose to become Islamic forces such as Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam. They soon fought each other in mid-2009. Al-Shabaab finally won the battle, occupying most of central and southern Somalia in 2010. The Somali civil war became intense and more complicated than ever as the TFG, with the help of international forces and AMISOM, had to fight an Islamic militia group loyal to the global terrorist group Al-Qaeda.

Meanwhile, defunct governance in Puntland created an almost perfect soil for ransom piracy activity in 2008. The Puntland state was temporarily suspended due to the budget crisis caused by the resource drain of the civil war. Somali law enforcement employees could not receive their salary. With hyperinflation between 2006 and 2008, the living conditions became worse. Moreover, the creation of Himan & Heeb inside Galmudug in 2008¹⁴ provided a perfect chance for the Afweyne led pirate groups, since the new state areas were dominated by the same clan as Afweyne (Habar-Gidir Saleeban).

Now, there were no working counter-piracy movements, either inside or outside Somalia, until 2009. The pirates did not have to worry about being arrested. Though SomCan re-entered the private security business in July 2008, the company's capacity was already outnumbered by the soaring Somali pirate groups. The contract expired in October 2009. The Somali piracy action groups almost completely replaced the role of coastal defender. They even boasted of their

achievements by celebrating their ransom parties in coastal towns such as Eyl, Hobyo, and Haradheere. They were welcomed not just as an effective coastal defender, but also as a job creator. Somali piracy had created a symbiosis with the local community and governance.

As the Islamic militia group rose to a dominant force in rural areas of central and southern Somalia, the Somali pirates and the Islamic military group coexisted in central and southern Somalia where the Hobyo-Haradheere syndicate, led by Afweyne's group, expanded its turf through clan ties. The pirates successfully created a symbiotic environment with the local community by providing some of the government functions, such as job creation, social welfare services, and security. This study discovered that more than 11 ransom-gaining incidents were connected to some degree to the Al-Shabaab militia. Among them, five incidents were connected to the Ras Kamboni Brigade, a break-off militia group from Al-Shabaab (See Appendix VII). Such symbiotic relations with political militia groups and local community through clan lines generated diverse job functions for the ransom industry such as negotiators, accountants, and holder groups. These became key positions in ransom piracy operations.

For example, as a top negotiator, Abdi Saed Bafe Looyan lived in Dubai between 2001 and 2003. He speaks English, Arabic, Urdu, and Somali. He also worked for many local public organizations such as Jubba Airways in Bosaso as an office manager; and at a local women's NGO in Garowe, the capital city of the Puntland state, as a project manager for managing USAID funds (SomaliaReport, May 3, 2012). Mohamed Abdi Garaad, a notorious pirate kingpin, is his cousin. As an expert negotiator, Looyan rose to become a key man in the ransom negotiation process. Looyan was involved in more than 20 ransom-gaining incidents (See Appendix VIII). As an expert negotiator, he worked for both syndicates regardless of their clan lines.

Table 15. Features of Stage 4: 2008-2010

| Feature/Crisis | State | Civil War | Governance |
|---|--|---|---|
| | TFG vs. Al-Shabaab | Complicated & Intense | Defunct |
| Coastal Defender: <u>SomCan (2008) & Piracy Action Groups</u> | | | |
| Key Stage Feature: <u>Booming</u> | | | |
| Type of Leader & Pirates | Organization | Stakeholders | Pattern Features |
| Fishermen Turned (Boyah and Garaad) Ex-Govt. Officer (Afweyne) Businessmen Militia | Puntland Syndicates Hobyo-Haradheere Syn. | Local Militia and Warlords Criminal Entrepreneur Elders Local Politician Islamic Militia Groups | Highly Organized Sophisticated Influx of Ransom Symbiosis with local community |

The above table summarily shows the complex dynamics of Somali piracy with regard to contextual factors. At this stage, several incidents pulled international attention, such as *MV Faina* and *MV Sirius Star*. Somali piracy had become a matter of great international security concern. Indeed, profiles of major incidents reveal very clearly the alarming level of Somali piracy at this stage. As the following incident profiles highlighted, Somali piracy became a million-dollar business enterprise. In total, 131 incidents are classified as an enterprise type of piracy. Pirates in each syndicate operated in their clan dominant town as anchorage places suggest. Garacad became a joint operation town among different clan based piracy syndicates. Following profiles also show newly rising piracy groups with various backgrounds.

Profiles of Major Incidents

Passenger Vessel *Le Ponant* (Hijacked on Apr. 04, 2008 at about 203 km from Bosaso, Somalia)



After the hijacking, two pirates were standing with the Kalashnikov on the upper deck of *Le Ponant*. Two skids were pulled by the French luxury yacht.

| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|---|--------|----------------------------------|-----------|------------|
| | | Coast Guard | | |
| 04-11-2008 (7) | 2.15M | Leader | Eyl | 8(57.1) |
| | | Boyah+Jama (operation commander) | | |
| Description: A French luxury yacht was hijacked by Boyah’s gang. (Bahadur 2011: 22, 157) A French commando ambushed the pirates after the ransom was paid. Three pirates were killed, and six were sent to Paris. Seventy villagers showed up to offer guarding services to the yacht and its crew. (AFP 18 April 2008) | | | | |
| Implication: Eyl became a pirate haven. | | | | |

General Cargo *Amiya Scan* (Hijacked on May 25, 2008 at about 241 km from Bosaso)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--------------------------|--------|---------------------|-----------|------------|
| | | Puntland Syndicates | | |
| 06-24-2008 | 2.8M | Leader | Eyl | 9(64.2) |

| | | | | |
|---|--|---------------|--|--|
| (31) | | Boyah + Yulux | | |
| Description: Isse Yulux, an investor and leader, received 30 % of the ransom amount. (United Nations Security Council 2013:108) | | | | |
| Implication: Yulux began to emerge as the leader of a new generation of pirate leaders. | | | | |

Yacht *Rockall* (Hijacked on Jun. 23, 2008 on off the Somali coast)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--------------------------|--------|---------------|-----------|------------|
| | | Sanaag Group | | |
| 08-14-2008 (52) | 1M | Leader | Eyl | 8(57.1) |
| | | Hanaano | | |

Description: A German yacht called *Rockall* was hijacked by Hanaano’s Sanaag pirate gangs and held near Las Qoray. Pirates kidnapped three crew members and held them in the inland Sanaag area. Sanaag group was an offspring branch of the Eyl-based Puntland syndicates. The leader, Fu'aad Warsame Seed, also known as "Hanaano", was a 45 to 50-year-old member of the Warsengeli/Reer Haaji sub-clan who learned his piracy skills from the Eyl pirates. (The Local, a German media, 18 May 2009)

Implication: The Sanaag region is a contested area between Somaliland and Puntland. Khatumo State, an unrecognized region, also claims it as its territory. Hanaano had a connection with the Puntland Minister of the Interior, General Abdullahi Ahmed Jama “Ilkajjir,” who was a member of the Warsengeli sub clan. This strongly indicated the importance of the clan connection and its relevance to the formation of local states through the clan link. Hanaano contributed over US \$200,000 to Ilkajjir’s presidential campaign in Puntland. (piracy-studies.org 17 March 2010)

General Cargo *Stella Maris*

(Hijacked on Jul. 20, 2008, at about 229 km from Basaso, Southeast of Al Mukalla of Yemen)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--|--------|-----------------------------------|-----------|------------|
| | | Joint bet. Marine + Puntland Syn. | | |
| 09-10-2008 (52) | 2M | Leader | Garacad | 12 (85.7) |
| | | Afweyne& Tiiceey+ Yulux +Garaad | | |
| <p>Description: This was a joint operation between the Marine and Puntland syndicates. Many leaders were involved, including Afweyne as a financier, his son Abdikadir Mohamed Abdi as a top leader, and Tiiceey, who was the first governor of Himan and Heeb state in Galmudug region, as a facilitator. Isse Mohamud Yulux (or Yusuf) from Puntland, who hailed from the Majerteen Ali Saleeban clan (or Omar Mohamud), was also involved as a main investor and a leader. He took 30% of the ransom amount. Abdullahi Farah Qarey also served as a professional negotiator. Garaad also participated as a leader. Garacad became a joint operation area among the major pirate gangs. (United Nations Security Council 2013:108)</p> | | | | |
| <p>Implication: The hijacking revealed that the Somali piracy business was supported by a complex web of businessmen, such as investors, facilitators, and logistics suppliers. For example, Hawa Dirie Ahmed worked as a provider of khat, a narcotic leaf. Known as “Hawo Five”, she is the second wife of a pirate leader Mohamed Osman Mohamed “Gafanje”. As a new generational leader of Somali piracy, Gafanje eventually became a top leader of the Hobyo-Haradheere syndicate.</p> | | | | |

Chemical Tanker *Bunga Melati 2 (Dua)* (Hijacked on Aug. 19, 2008 at 213 km from Bosaso)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--------------------------|--------|---------------------|-----------|------------|
| | | Marine+ NVCG+ Boyah | | |

| | | | | |
|--|----|------------------------|-----|--------------|
| 09-29-2008 (41) | 2M | Leader | Eyl | 10 (71.4) |
| | | Garaad+ Afweyne+ Boyah | | |
| Description: The tanker was hijacked within the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) of Gulf of Aden that was set up one week before. (Al Jazeera 20 August 2008) | | | | |
| Implication: According to a Bahadur interviewee (Bahadur: 267), the IRTC ironically provided an easy pool of targets. | | | | |

Bulk Carrier *Iran Deyanat* (Hijacked on Aug.21.2008 at about 261 km from Bossaso)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--|--------|--------------------------------------|-----------|------------|
| | | Joint Operation bet. Marine and NVCG | | |
| 10-10-2008 (52) | 2.5M | Leader | Eyl | 10(71.4) |
| | | Garaad +Afweyne | | |
| Description: The Iranian vessel was hijacked in the security corridor of the Gulf of Aden by 16 pirates on two speed boats. The total number of pirates was more than 100 including 50 vessel guards. (The Long War Journal 22 September 2008) The vessel had suspicious and hazardous cargo as a result of which, reportedly, 16 pirates died. (Fox News 30 September 2008) | | | | |
| Implication: This study found out that there was an increasing number of participating pirates (more than 100) and clear divisions of labor. | | | | |

MV *BBC Trinidad* (Hijacked on Aug. 21, 2008 at about 144 km from Bosaso)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|-----------------------------|--------|---|-----------|------------|
| | | Joint Operation among multiple clan based gangs | | |

| | | | | |
|---|------|--|-----|----------|
| 09-11-2008 (21) | 1.1M | Leader. Garaad+ Afweyne+ Boyah | Eyl | 10(71.4) |
| <p>Description: This incident highlight a highly sophisticated operation and negotiation process. The incident revealed many crucial features of Somalia’s piracy industry. In the hijacking operation, a total of 18 pirates with machine guns and two RPGs hijacked the vessel in a short amount of time in the security corridor of the Gulf of Aden. (Gulf News, 16 September 2008) The vessel was carrying pipes and other equipment for the oil industry from Houston, Texas to Muscat, Oman. Even anti-piracy training, a warning from a Chinese ship, and evasive maneuvers with high vigilance could not prevent the vessel from being hijacked by the newly risen sea marauders. The pirates also showed their skill in avoiding detection by naval ships by navigating the vessel in a zigzagging path before anchoring at the final destination near Eyl.</p> <p>The negotiation process was like a typical modern business deal, except that it was a life or death situation. During the two-week haggling situation, the shipper side was assisted by the German Federal Office of Criminal Investigation (BKA) and a British security company as a crisis management team (Spiegel 16 September 2008). On the pirate side, there were multiple participants who took on different roles throughout the entire operation, including hijacking from Garaad’s NVCG gangs, guardians from different clan-based pirate gangs (from the Afweyne and Boyah gangs), and the skilled professional negotiator Abdi (UN Monitoring Report 2012; AP 19 April 2009). The pirate groups used a diverse set of negotiation skills, including mock execution and fake warnings of killing sprees (AP 19 April 2009).</p> <p>Additionally, the negotiation process for the ransom amount revealed the typical tactic of the Somali ransom-based piracy: call high but end low. Pirates initially demanded US \$8M but accepted a US \$1.1M offer from the shipping company (NPR September 16, 2008). It seemed that Garaad’s gang had to manage too many cases at the same time (including <i>Iran Deyanat</i>, <i>Irene</i> and other ships). Therefore, they might have asked for help from other pirate organizations and tried to finish the negotiations quickly. That is why they were suddenly satisfied with US \$1.1 M in spite of the large decrease from the initial demand of US \$8M.</p> <p>The ransom delivery process also demonstrated a well-arranged protocol for a secured delivery. First, German Bremen Bank collected the ransom money in US \$20 bills that were packed into two large pilot suitcases. The ransom was first delivered to Nairobi, Kenya by a British security firm. Then, it was delivered by a helicopter to a small tugboat in the port city of Mombasa. Finally, the tugboat reached the hijacked vessel seven days after the money was first packaged. Additionally, the dividing of the ransom clearly showed that the pirates consisted of multiple clan-based gangs, as the money was dispersed into 18 bags to pay the different pirate groups. (Spiegel 16 September 2008)</p> | | | | |
| <p>Implication: There were multiple implications of advanced Somali piracy and increasing danger.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Around that time the company also suffered other piracy attacks and hijacking of the ships. <i>MV Beluga Fortune</i> (Boarded), <i>BBC Orinoco</i> (boarded), and <i>Beluga Nomination</i>. (Somalia Report 29 January 2011) This incident eventually drove Germany to dispatch naval vessels to the Gulf of Aden. 2. It is evidence that Somali piracy had evolved into a syndicate type of criminal enterprise. BBC Trinidad was initially hijacked by a subgroup of Garaad gang. However, the actual | | | | |

operation and negotiation processes revealed that multiple clan-based gangs were involved. This syndicate type of activity based on loose clan-based networks was repeated in subsequent incidents.


3. It also revealed the rising role of experts in the entire negotiation process, including the roles of interpreters and risk-control agents. There were two agents from the German Federal Office of Criminal Investigation (BKA) and experts from a well-known British security company.

4. It became clear that Somali pirates preferred cash delivered directly to their own site. It can be interpreted that they prefer cash in US dollars not only because of its characteristics as a hard currency but also because of its onsite transparency, which enables participating groups to share the ransom according to pre-arranged contracts.

5. The incident also suggested that Somali pirates obtained the know-how to calculate not only values of the hijacked ships and crews but also the entire costs of the operations. The Somali pirates progressively developed an efficient management system for the overall ransom business process.

6. Additionally, this and subsequent incidents demonstrated their advanced operating capacity. They also showed that they could manage ship routes in ways that strengthened their negotiating position. For example, they did not directly sail the hijacked ship to their final anchored place, Eyl. They instead moved the ship to different locations to create a distraction and to increase anxiety prior to the negotiation.

MV *Faina* (Hijacked on Sep. 25, 2008 at about 543 km from Mogadishu)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--------------------------|--------|--|-----------|------------|
| | | CRC (Initial) +Joint with Multi Pirate Gangs | | |
| 02-06-2009 (133) | 3.2M | Leader | Eyl | 12(85.7) |
| | | Afweyne +Garaad +Boyah+ Tiiceey | | |

Description: About 50 attackers under Afweyne’s command hijacked the vessel. The number increased to more than 100 after Afweyne requested help from other piracy groups to protect their booty from international naval forces, such as the US Navy’s Arleigh Burke-class destroyer *Howard*, the Ticonderoga-class missile cruiser *Vella Gulf* and other US warships, and the Russian frigate *Neustrashimy*. (Washington Post 30 September 2008,

abc News 20 February 2009, CNN 2 October 2008) Israeli-owned Ukrainian-flagged vessel loaded with 33 Soviet-made T72 tanks and other munitions was officially headed to Mombasa, Kenya but ultimately destined for South Sudan (The Guardian 27 Saturday 2008). The Russian captain died of heart disease due to the shock of the hijacking. Secret correspondence between a Kenyan intelligence agency and Tiiceey revealed that he had an active role as a highly paid facilitator for the ransom business. As a negotiation tactic, the pirate initially demanded US \$35M and reduced the amount to US \$20M, US \$8M, and finally US \$5M. (BBC 10 October 2008; Bahadur 2011: 33-38, 82-4)

Implication: The implication of the incident resonated beyond East Africa by renewing worldwide attention on piracy. Locally, Al-Shabaab took a serious position by warning the pirate groups of the need to burn down the vessel. Regionally, Kenya and Somali central and local governments, including Himan & Heeb of Tiiceey, had to engage in the negotiation processes, though they had poor capacities for counter-piracy. Internationally, it led the UN to pass UN Resolution 1838 on October 7, 2008, which called for the active engagement of international naval forces, including NATO, in the fight against piracy. After this incident, NATO and other international forces from Russia, India, and China began to patrol the seas around the Gulf of Aden and Somalia. Somalia fell under international watching eyes. Finally, this incident demonstrated that Somali pirate groups clearly began to break away from each other along various clan lines. The hijackers claimed their organization was the Central Regional Coast Guard (CRC), which was actually directed by Afweyne. It indicated that the Marine alliance was no longer a cross-clan collaborative organization. It suggested that Somali piracy action groups had regrouped along clan lines and turfs where particular clans were dominant. It also gave a clue as to the limits of the ransom-based criminal business because the final revenue sizes of each piracy group were relatively small due to an increasing number of participants and operational costs. Garaad complained that “everyone involved in the MV Faina hijacking ‘only got a few thousand’” (Bahadur 2009: 233).

Tanker *Sirius Star* (Hijacked on Nov. 15, 2008 at about 786 km from Mogadishu)



Ransom was being dropped by a parachute (upper-right photo).

| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--|--------|--|------------|------------|
| | | CRC (Initial) + Many clan based pirate gangs | | |
| 01-09-2009 (55) | 3M | Leader | Haradheere | 13(92.9) |
| | | Afweyne +Said +Multi Leaders | | |
| Description: The very large crude carrier (VLCC: three times the size of a US aircraft | | | | |

carrier) with a full load of 2 million barrels of crude oil (almost a quarter amount of Saudi Arabia’s daily production) was hijacked by Afweyne-led pirate gangs (who claimed to be CRC, a group that hijacked MV Faina and other large vessels around the same time). The VLCC, which was owned by a subsidiary (Vela International Marine Ltd) of the Saudi Arabian state oil company Saudi Aramco—which owns 18 more VLCCs—was heading from Saudi Arabia to the US via the Cape of Good Hope. (The New York Times 19 November 2008) The attack happened right after international naval forces began to patrol the Horn of African region in response to the MV Faina hijacking incident. It was estimated that the pirate gang spent three to four days capturing the largest prey ever while taking advantage of the low free board due to the heavy load. (Xinhua 18 November 2008) From Nov. 18, 2008 the pirate groups from various clan-based syndicates began to set the negotiation by demanding a US \$25M ransom within 10 days. (The Guardian 20 November 2008) Several pirates were drowned due to the weight of the ransom money and the windy sea waves after they captured part of the final ransom (US \$3.5M) on their tiny boats. (BBC 9 January 2009; Bahadur 2012: 37-38)

Implication: This incident led to more active engagement from international naval forces. Saudi Arabia joined the international naval patrol after the incident. An Indian warship destroyed a pirate mothership in the Gulf of Aden. (The Hindu 30 January 2011) The volatile price trend of the international oil market also influenced the deal. Islamic militia groups also showed strong interest by sending a warning sign to the hijack groups. It appeared that Somali pirates could operate beyond the security corridor in the Gulf of Aden. In fact, the end of the Southwest Monsoon (from June to September) enabled them to operate in the Somalian sea. In this year, Afweyne-led pirate groups carried out most large ransom-gaining operations with the help of other clan-based pirate gangs.

General Cargo *Blue Star* (Hijacked on Jan. 01, 2009. at about 336 km from Bosaso)




| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--------------------------|--------|------------------------------------|-----------|------------|
| | | Puntland Syndicate | | |
| 03-04-2009 (63) | 1.78M | Leader | Eyl | 12 (85.7) |
| | | Yulux (Single Leader and Investor) | | |

Description: About 15 heavily armed pirates hijacked the ship near the Yemeni port of Aden while carrying 6,000 tons of fertilizer. (Washington Times 2 January 2009) One crew member died in captivity under unknown circumstances. Pirates demanded US \$6M while

threatening to kill the 28 hostages. (IOL 15 March 2009)

Implication: The Northeast Monsoon (from December to March) might have pushed the Somali pirates back into the internationally secured corridor of the Gulf of Aden, which implies that they were not yet afraid of the international naval forces. Another important implication is that Isse Yulux (who hailed from Majerteen Ali Saleeban or Mohamud Majerteen) led his own piracy operation and took 50% of the ransom amount, which indicates that new leaders had begun to emerge. Later, Isse Yulux (and other pirate leaders such as Garaad, Aargoosto, and the negotiator Ghani) established links to the current mayor of Ras Hafun through the marriage of the mayor's daughter to Aargoosto. Ras Hafun had been the main base of the Yulux pirate gang. (Somalia Report 20 April 2012) Thus, this incident showed that maritime crime was embedded in local governance through clan ties.

Bulk Carrier *Saldanha* (Hijacked on Feb. 22, 2009. at about 214 km from Las Qoray)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--------------------------|--------|--|-----------|------------|
| | | Puntland Syndicate | | |
| 04-25-2009 (63) | 1.9M | Leader | Eyl | 12 (85.7) |
| | | Geography (Single Investor and leader) | | |

Description: The bulk carrier, which was loaded with coal and heading to Slovenia, was hijacked by Geography, or Juqraaffi, leader of the Garowe pirate gang. Garowe is the capital city of Puntland, where many unemployed youths were recruited for maritime crime. Hence, the city became a core hub of Somali pirates. (Al Jazeera 17 June 2009) Geography and Computer (who led the hijacking of MV *Victoria*) also led the hijacking of MV *Patriot* together (Apr. 25, 2009). (ABS-CBN News 28 April 2009)

Implication: As a new generation leader, Geography took more than 50% (USD \$1.3M) of the ransom. It was a single investor type of operation.

Freighter *Hansa Stavanger* (Hijacked on Apr.04.2009 at about 554 km from Mogadishu)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--------------------------|--------|--|------------|------------|
| | | Joint bet. Puntland & Hobyto-Haradheere Syndicates | | |
| 08-03-2009 (122) | 2.75M | Leader | Haradheere | 14(100) |
| | | Afweyne + Yare+ Garaad + Farahow + Shirweyne | | |

Description: The German freighter was hijacked by Afweyne-led pirate groups with emerging leaders such as Yare, Farahow, and Shirweyne. The pirate leader Garaad used it as a mothership and shield against international naval ships on MV *Maersk Alabama*. German special forces and US naval forces planned to rescue the ship and crew, but they folded the operation due to possible casualties from the strong resistance of Garaad-led gangs. The pirates initially demanded US \$15M, which was gradually decreased to \$3M as the negotiation proceeded with a British security firm. (Spiegel 11 August 2009)

Implication: The end of the Northeastern Monsoon (from December to March) enabled the Somali pirates to move operations back to the West Indian ocean, as the ship had been hijacked off the Somalian sea (about 580 km/315 NM southeast of Mogadishu). At the time, the Somali pirate organizations exhibited two major trends. First, multiple leaders were involved in one ransom gaining operation. Second, there were multiple uses of the hijacked ship. *Hansa Stavanger* was used not just as a mothership for other hijacking operation but also as a shield against possible attacks from international naval forces. Most of the leaders were part of the grand Hobyto-Haradheere (HH) group of syndicates with the exception of Garaad Abdi Yare (meaning small Abdi/full name: Hussein Mohamed Abdi or Abdullahi Farah Hassan), who was connected to both regional syndicates. Abdi Yare hailed from the sub-clan Isse Omar Mohamud of Majerteen. He was originally from the fishery industry and became a khat dealer. Around this time, he was a field commander. He became an independent leader of a Somali piracy enterprise and earned more than US \$2.5M million in 2010 alone. He had been involved in more than 15 hijacking operations since 2008. Farahow (who hailed from the Habar Gidir Saleeban clan) and Shirweyne were connected to the Hobyto-Haradheere syndicates and were involved in multiple hijacking operations, including the hijacking of the Spanish fishing trawler *Alakrana* (2009) and the yacht *Choizil* (2010).

Tug *Buccaneer* (Hijacked on Apr. 11, 2009 at about 200 km from Bosaso)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--------------------------|--------|--------------|-----------|------------|
| | | Sanaag | | |
| 08-09-2009 (121) | 4M | Leader | Las Qoray | 8(57.1) |
| | | Hanaano | | |

Description: This was the Sanaag group’s last hijacking operation. (BBC 11 April 2009)

Implication: After this incident—which had a string of bad luck, including drifting with a fuel shortage and arrest—the Sanaag group was dispersed though its clan connection with the Puntland Interior minister, which allowed for their release from Yemeni prison. However, Las Qoray in the Sanaag region continued to be one of main bases of the Puntland syndicate. After 2012, it became a hub of the Las Qoray illegal fishing network, led by Yusuf Aalim Osman, a Bosaso-based businessman from the same Warsangeli sub-clan as Yassiin Khalid Osman, the military commander of Al-Shabaab in Northeastern Somalia (UN Monitoring Report 2014).

FV *Alakrana* (Hijacked on Oct. 2, 2009 at about 201 km from Xiis)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--------------------------|--------|--------------------------------------|-----------|------------|
| | | Joint bet. H.H.+ Puntland Syndicates | | |

| | | | | |
|---|-------|--|------------|---------|
| 11-17-2009 (47) | 3.5 M | Leader | Haradheere | 14(100) |
| | | Afweyne +Farahow +Yare + Shirweyne+Tiiceey | | |
| Description: A fully developed enterprise type of piracy was committed through joint syndication between Hobyo-Haradheere and the Puntland syndicate. A wedding party funded by the ransom revenue was held in Haradheere. Afweyne and Tiiceey facilitated the operation. (RT News 19 November 2009) | | | | |
| Implication: The importance of corporation-style financing rose because the operation was funded through the pirate stock market in Haradheere. (Pacific Standard 9 December 2009) Credit- and loan-based pirate activities also supported it. However, the incident brought out the need for private security firms to protect vessels during the entire ransom negotiation processes and in the aftermath of the incidents. However, gang fights showed the limits of the joint venture between different clans. Around this time, Afweyne handed over his role to his son and worked as a financier and facilitator behind major hijacking operations. | | | | |


Container Kota Wajar (Hijacked on Oct. 15, 2009 at about 1,089 km from Mogadishu)



(Note: F=facilitator)

| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|---|--------|------------------------------------|------------|------------|
| | | H.H. Syndicate | | |
| 12-28-2009 (75) | 4M | Leader | Haradheere | 14(100) |
| | | Afweyne (F) +Mohamed + Tiiceey (F) | | |
| Description: The container ship, which was en route to Mombasa, was hijacked off the Somali sea around 1,100 km from Mogadishu by Hobyo-Haradheere Syndicate (HHS) gangs. (Eaglespeak 15 October 2009) It was used as a mothership for other hijacking and kidnapping operations for transforming the British couple Paul and Rachel Chandler (from the yacht Lynn Rival). (The Independent 30 October 2009) It was also used to provide fuel for MV Ariana, hijacked on May 2, 2009 and released on Dec. 10, 2009 with a US \$2.8M ransom (RT 25 Dec, 2009). | | | | |
| Implication: This was highly sophisticated enterprise-type piracy. | | | | |

Yacht *Lynn Rival* (Hijacked on Oct. 23, 2009)




| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--------------------------|--------|---|------------|------------|
| | | H.H.S | | |
| 11-14-2010 (388) | 1M | Leader | Haradheere | 14(100) |
| | | Buggas +Yare +Omar + Afweyne (F) + Tiiceey(F) | | |

Description: It was the longest hostage situation (388 days) at the time. Two British sailors were kidnapped after their yacht, *Lynn Rival*, was hijacked by a new piracy startup leader Buggas and his pirate gang. Buggas hailed from the Habar Gidir Saleeban clan, the same clan as Afweyne and Tiiceey. The sailors were transferred to *Kota Wajar*, which was subsequently hijacked by Afweyne-led pirate gangs. They were moved to Amara in inland Somalia, a town that was under Himan and Heeb State and governed by Tiiceey. Afweyne and Tiiceey worked as consultants and facilitators of the hostage situation. (New York Times 5 October 2011) Other pirate leaders, such as Yare and Omar, were involved as investors. The large ransom was paid by the hostages’ family and civil society donations not only from their country but also from a Somali immigrant society in England. (Al Jazeera 14 November 2010) The yacht was abandoned by the pirates and found by the British Navy. (New York Times 5 October 2011)

Implication: This incident showed that Afweyne already ran a grand piracy enterprise and extended its business to include loans, khat distribution, brokerage of negotiation deals, and many other relevant business ventures. Afweyne did not have to direct piracy anymore because he was already on the top of the food chain of the Somali piracy industry. The hostage couple published their ordeal later. The book “Hostage” includes details of Somali pirate activity and its links to the Somali community (Chandler P & Chandler R 2011). It also suggests that clans fight over various issues, including land use, grazing rights, and even the ransom business, which is a violent ritual for local Somali people. Elders who abide by the Somali customary law, Xeer, played an essential role in the conflict resolution. Thus, it was somewhat natural for the elders to get involved in the ransom business under the ritualized conflict resolution mechanism (Bahadur 2011: 115).

VLCC *Maran Centaurus* (Hijacked on Nov. 29, 2009 at about 1,500 km from Haradheere)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--------------------------|--------|---------------------------------------|------------|------------|
| | | Joint bet. H.H. & Puntland Syndicates | | |
| 01-18-2010 (51) | 9M | Leader | Haradheere | 14(100) |
| | | Multi leaders | | |

Description: It was hijacked on an open sea spot about 1,500 km away from Haradheere by a Puntland pirate action group. The pirates used it as a double bargaining tool for both the ransom and the release of their imprisoned comrades. The VLCC tanker was loaded with nearly 2 million barrels of oil, over US \$150M at the market price. (BBC 18 January 2010) Two ransom transactions occurred for the double bargaining. The First one (US \$7M) was parachuted in cash, as was usual in the Somali piracy business. The second one (US \$2M) was transferred via the international banking system. It was the largest ransom amount up to that time. (VOA News 17 January 2010) After the ransom was delivered, Haradheere pirate gangs outnumbered and attacked the Puntland pirate action group. Puntland pirates asked international naval forces for protection from the attack. More than six pirates were killed during the gun fight. (Garowe Online 19 January 2010)

Implication: First, the hijacking location was the farthest from the Somalian coast up to that time, which suggests that Somali pirates progressively enhanced their operational capacity in the open sea area of the Indian Ocean. It also suggests that they became afraid of the presence of international naval forces, as they avoided the security corridor. Second, intense gang battles with increasing casualties began to signal the breakdown of the clan alliance of the Marine alliance. Third, the increasing amount of ransom precipitated more violence in the local Somali community. The violence and the critical casualties gradually gave rise to anti-piracy movements in local Somali towns. Additionally, the involvement of international banking speaks to the role of the Somali diaspora in the international financing of the piracy business.

MV Asian Glory (Hijacked on Jan. 1, 2010 at about 1,500 km from Hobyo)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--------------------------|--------|----------------|------------|------------|
| | | H.H. Syndicate | | |
| 06-11-2010 (164) | 2.4M | Leader | Haradheere | 14(100) |
| | | Yare (50%) | | |

Description: The vessel—which was heading to Saudi Arabia from Singapore loaded with 2,405 South Korean made cars—was hijacked by Abdi Yare’s pirate gangs around the center of the Indian Ocean. The ship was also used as a mothership to hijack MSC *Anafi*, which resulted in fierce gun battle. (novinite.com 9 April 2010) It was the fourth hijacked ship out of a total of five ships hijacked between Dec. 25, 2009 and Jan. 1, 2010. All five ships (MV *Socotra I*, MV *Navios Applon*, chemical tanker *St. James Park*, MV *Asian Glory*, and chemical tanker *Pramoni*) were hijacked by Yare-led pirate gangs. (CNN 2 January 2010)

Implication: Yare had become an independent pirate leader and financier who acquired more than US \$2.4M in 2010 alone by gaining a 30% to 50% cut from the ransom proceeds (Fox 11 March 2011). As a former businessman in fishing and khat distribution, he quickly climbed the ranks of the Somali piracy industry. Thus, this incident demonstrated how an ordinary Somali businessman could become a successful business leader in piracy. Abdi Yare showed how to quickly accumulate a large amount of capital in the burgeoning piracy enterprise.

MV Ro-Ro Iceberg 1 (Hijacked on Mar. 29, 2010, about 300 km from Las Qoray)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--|--------|---|-----------|------------|
| | | Puntland Syndicate | | |
| 12-23-2012 (1000) | 4M | Leader | Garacad | 13 (92.9) |
| | | Boyah (Captured)+Yusuf+ Canbe + Lobster+ Abdirahman | | |
| <p>Description: The ship was heading to Jebel Ali in the UAE from the Port of Aden when it was hijacked just 10 miles outside the port. Multiple leaders were involved in the incidents. Lobster (or Mohamed Aargoosto), Canbe, and Isse Yulux led the operation. Boyah and Aden Abdirahman Ismail took on financier roles. Both leaders were later captured by the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) when it rescued the hostage on Dec. 23, 2012. All pirates involved hailed from sub-clans of Majerteen and used northeastern coastal towns as their bases, including Bandar Beyla, Kulub, Ras Qoray, and Garacad, where the sub-clans of Majerteen were dominant. Though the ship and 17 of its crew members were released on Oct. 23, 2011, six Indian crew members remained hostage until Dec. 23, 2012. It was one of the longest captivity ordeals after MV <i>Albedo</i> (hijacked on Nov. 26, 2010 and released 1,128 days later), MV <i>Asphalt Venture</i> (hijacked on Sep. 28, 2010 and released 1,493 days later) and FV <i>PRANTALAY 12</i> (hijacked on Apr. 18, 2010 and released 1,773 days later, which is the longest ordeal in the hostage records of Somali piracy). Two crew members were dead. One committed suicide by jumping overboard under poor conditions. Another crew member died of malnutrition. The chief engineer was also abducted by the pirates and taken to unknown inland places for extra negotiation for the release of their imprisoned comrades in India (Somalia Report 8 February 2012).</p> | | | | |
| <p>Implication: The incident revealed the ugly realities of the ransom business with regard to its various stakeholders. First, the pain and ordeal of the crew were aggravated because the shipper side and even states of the crew paid little attention to the negotiation. The 24-member crew consisted of six Indians, nine Yemenis, four Ghanaians, two Sudanese, two Pakistanis, and one Filipino. No state governments took any responsibility for releasing the crew. (Somalia Report 8 February 2012) Second, the long and harsh negotiations were often halted due to conflicts among the pirate groups and the ship owners. Thus, the lengthy negotiation not only aggravated the situation of the crew members and their families but also undermined the sustainability of the ransom-based business. In terms of the hijacking operation, the incidents revealed interesting features. Pirates painted over the original name of the ship and renamed it SEA EXPRESS. It was not used as a phantom ship, as was the case in Southeast Asian piracy incidents, but as a means to hijack other commercial vessels by decoying them while hiding their existence from international naval forces. Abdullahi Abshir Boyah (or Farah Hirsi Kulan Boyah from Isse Mahamoud Majerteen of Eyl) ended his pirate life when he was imprisoned in Puntland. However, other leaders, such as Yulux and Lobster, continued to expand their areas of activity. In 2012, they transformed their criminal business into private guard services for illegal fishing and smuggling while forming the Qandala-Hafun network, which is linked to not only local politicians but also to an ideological Islamic leader, Sheikh Abdulqaadir Muumin of Al-Shabaab in the Northern Puntland region via their shared clan lineage—Ali Saleeban Majerteen (UN Monitoring Report 2014). With the later hijacking incidents of FV <i>Prantalay (11, 12 & 14)</i> and MT <i>Asphalt Venture</i>, Somali pirates became increasingly violent as international naval forces began to successfully interrupt their criminal activities. Along with other counter-piracy</p> | | | | |


forces, the Indian Navy aggressively engaged in maritime battles against Somali pirates on open seas. In response to the aggressive engagement, Somali pirates began to abandon the original principle of not killing hostages.

VLCC *Samho Dream* (Hijacked on Apr. 04, 2010, 1,666 km from Eyl)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|---|--------|---|-----------|------------|
| | | Joint Syndicate bet. H.H. & Puntland Syndicates | | |
| 11-06-2010 (217) | 9.5M | Leader | Hobyo | 14 (100) |
| | | Garfanje + Fatxi + Ilyass + Yare + Lobster + Ranbow + Hussein | | |
| Description: This ship was used to hijack the Panama-flagged tanker <i>Polar</i> along with a hijacked Iranian FV. The crew members of the Iranian fishing vessel were rewarded by the pirates for its cooperation in hijacking the tanker <i>Polar</i> and were released with no ransom. (Safety4Sea 22 November 2010) | | | | |
| Implication: Some of the leaders, such as Garfanji and Yare, began to build their own army with the ransom money. | | | | |


MV *RAKAFRIKANA* (Hijacked on Apr. 11, 2010, 983 km from Mogadishu)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--------------------------|--------|------------------------------------|-----------|------------|
| | | 1st Emergence of Ras Kamboni + IOC | | |

| | | | | |
|---|----|-------------------------------------|---------|---------|
| 03-09-2011 (332) | 2M | Leader | Hamdule | 14(100) |
| | | Madobe + Afweyne + Buundo+ two more | | |
| Description: The ship was hijacked by a faction of the Ras Kamboni brigade. The whole operation was orchestrated by the Indian Ocean Consultant Company (IOC). The vessel was anchored at Hamdule, which is located between Hobyo and Haradheere. (Ecoterra International 11 March 2011) | | | | |
| Implication: It was the first incident in which Ras Kamboni was involved. Ras Kamboni was a paramilitary group active in southern Somalia that was led by Sheikh Ahmed Madobe. Madobe was one of the leading groups of Hizbul Islam, which has been merged with Al-Shabaab since 2010. He departed Al-Shabaab to control his own political turf in early 2010. After this incident, Ras Kamboni was involved in more than nine hijacking incidents in partnership with IOC, which was part of the H.H syndicates led by Afweyne. Those incidents with Ras Kamboni strongly suggest that as Somali piracy evolved crime became embedded in local politics and governance. On May 15, 2013, Madobe was elected as the first president of Somalia's southern Jubaland region, which functioned as a buffer zone between Kenya and Somalia. (Garowe Online 15 May 2013) | | | | |

MT ASPHALT VENTURE (Hijacked on Sep. 28, 2010, about 350km from Mombasa)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--|--------|---|-----------|------------|
| | | IOC + Ras Kamboni | | |
| 04-15-2011 (200) | 3.6M | Leader | Kulub | 14(100) |
| | | Farah +Afweyne+ Tiiceey+ Suhufi+ Madobe | | |
| Description: This was recorded as another harsh ordeal for the kidnapped crew because the Somali pirates used them to further negotiate the release of their colleagues who were imprisoned in India by holding 7 out of 15 Indian crew members hostage even after they released the vessel. (maritime security news 3 July 2014) The seven crew members were released four years later on Oct. 30, 2014 after an undisclosed ransom was paid to the pirates. (VOA News 31 October 2014) Unfortunately, the ship accidentally sank in the South China Sea in 2014. (OCEANUSlive 21 January 2014) | | | | |
| Implication: This incident demonstrated the increasingly harsh ordeals of the kidnapped crew. The Somali pirates began to abandon their violence control principle. Another important implication is that the leader groups were divided by their functional roles. For example, Afweyne's IOC did not directly intervene in the ransom business operations but instead provided professional services such as financing, consultation, and negotiation | | | | |

services (UN Monitoring Report 2014). As an expert piracy consultation company, IOC ran like a Wall Street finance and consultation firm operating on behalf of diverse startup companies.

FV *GOLDEN WAVE 305* (Hijacked on Oct. 09, 2010, 14 km from the Somali coast)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--------------------------|--------|---------------------------|------------|------------|
| | | Ras Kamboni +IOC | | |
| 08-02-2011 (282) | 635K | Leader | Haradheere | 14 (100) |
| | | Madobe + Multiple leaders | | |

Description: The vessel, also known as KEUMMI 305, was hijacked by the Madobe-led Ras Kamboni paramilitary group, which was based in Jubaland and fighting against al-Shabaab. The ship was notorious for its illegal and reckless fishing. It was also used to execute punishment for illegal fishing. The ship’s company was bankrupt and had difficulty paying the ransom. With the help of the South Korean government, the ship’s owner was able to pay the ransom (around US \$635K). (Scoop 16 February 2011)

Implication: This incident indicates a crime-embedded connection between between local governance and Somali piracy as a violent enterprise because Madobe with his militia group Ras Kamboni became the dominant political faction in Jubaland from 2010 onward. (Garowe Online 6 November 2013)

MT *YORK* (Hijacked on Oct. 23, 2010, 173 km from Kenyan coast)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--|--------|---|-----------|------------|
| | | Joint bet. Ras Kamboni and H.H. Syndicate | | |
| 02-25-2011 (138) | 4.5M | Leader | Garacad | 14(100) |
| | | Madobe + Yare + Farahow +Buundo | | |
| Description: The ship was hijacked by pirates who used FV Golden Wave 305 as a mothership. (VOA News 23 October 2010) The LPG tanker was also used to hijack the MV BELUGA NOMINATION on Jan. 22, 2011. (Der Spiegel 1 February 2011) A faction of pirates led by Raas Kamboni and Farahow from HH syndicates participated in the hijack operation. Yare and Bundo invested in the operation fund. | | | | |
| Implication: The ship was used as a moving platform for multiple maritime crimes. The vessel was one of five motherships used by the same pirates to extend their range into the Indian Ocean. Along with the chemical tanker, MV <i>Hannibal II</i> , MV <i>Polar</i> , MT <i>Motivator</i> , and MV <i>Izumi</i> were hijacked and used as moving platforms to expand pirates' field of operation and tactics. (Der Spiegel 1 February 2011) | | | | |

MV *Hannibal II* (Hijacked on Nov. 11, 2010, 1,633 km from Bargaal)




| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--|--------|--------------------|-----------|------------|
| | | Puntland Syndicate | | |
| 03-17-2011 (127) | 2M | Leader | Garacad | 14(100) |
| | | Garaad+Yare | | |
| Description: It was used as a mothership to hijack MV Blida on Jan. 1, 2011. (Ecoterra International 16 January 2011) | | | | |
| Implication: A sea hopping tactic was used for serial hijacking. A Pakistani motorized sailing vessel (MSV) was used to hijack Hannibal, which was used to hijack <i>Kantari</i> , which was then used to hijack <i>Lakmali</i> . <i>Lakmali</i> was in turn used to hijack <i>Lakmini 03</i> , with which they finally hijacked MV <i>Blida</i> . Those small MSVs were used to hijack larger vessels for the ransom business of the two-month operation. (Eurasia Review 4 April 2011) | | | | |

MV Yuan Xiang (Hijacked on Nov. 12, 2010, about 1,000 km from the Omani coast)




| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|---|--------|--------------------|-----------|------------|
| | | Puntland Syndicate | | |
| 06-08-2011 (207) | 2.1M | Leader | Hobyo | 14(100) |
| | | Garaad | | |
| <p>Description: The ship was hijacked by Garaad pirates, who also hijacked MV <i>Suez</i> on Aug. 2, 2010. Duffle bags containing the US \$3.6M ransom for both ships were confiscated by the Somali federal government and the Puntland law enforcement forces while being delivered by expert negotiation company agents. Garaad threatened to withdraw the deals if they were not released. (Somalia Report 1 June 2011)</p> | | | | |
| <p>Implication: The incident revealed the cost of delivery fees, including a lawyer's fee (around US \$0.2M), crisis consultant fees and expenses (around US \$0.35M), and the actual delivery fee (up to US \$0.35M). The overall cost was US \$900K, which suggests that Somali ransom piracy invited diverse service enterprises from legal sectors. (Somalia Report 24 May 2011)</p> | | | | |

MV Albedo (Hijacked on Nov. 26, 2010, 2,268km from Haradheere)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--|--------|--|------------|---------------|
| | | H.H. Syndicate | | |
| 06-06-2014 (1,288) | 1.1M | Leader | Haradheere | 13(92.9) |
| | | Dheere+Guushaaye+Duuban+Hamarrow+Sayruuq | | |
| <p>Description: This incident caused an immense cost not only in the value of the vessel with cargo but also in the life of the crew with their families. This incident was one of the longest ordeals for the kidnapped crew. Only seven Pakistani crew members were released on Aug. 02, 2012 after US \$1.1M ransom was paid. (Somalia Report 31 July 2012) The remaining 16 crew members were held until July 2013 when the ship sank, which led to the drowning of four crew members and seven pirates. (Reuters 8 July 2013) The remaining 11 men were freed on Jun. 6, 2014. (The New Yorker 20 April 2015) The pirate group had multiple commanders and investors. Dheere (commander, aka Hassan Abdi Abdirays) and Duuban (an investor) hailed from the Habar Gidir Saleeban clan based in the Mudug region. Another pirate group was led by Guushaye (commander), Hassan Hamarrow (investor), and Ahmed Sayruuq (investor) from the Galgaduud region. Part of the ransom was raised from NGO funding in Pakistan. This group of pirates was also part of the MV <i>Orna</i> hijacking on Dec. 20, 2010 in which a hostage was shot to death as a warning sign to shipper sides. (Somalia Report 6 August 2012)</p> | | | | |
| <p>Implication: The MV <i>Albedo</i> and MV <i>Orna</i> incidents suggest that the Somali pirates eventually lost their ability to control against hostages, which was an important principle and negotiation bedrock of the ransom business. The incidents also indicate that actual earnings began to decline, as the negotiation time was elongated with increasing casualties and costs.</p> | | | | |

MV Thor Nexus (Hijacked on Dec. 25, 2010, 1,110 km from Bargaal)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|-----------------------------|--------|--------------------------------------|-----------|---------------|
| | | Joint bet. H.H. & Puntland Syndicate | | |
| 12-04-2011 (344) | 5M | Leader | Hobyo | 14(100) |
| | | Yare + Multiple leaders | | |

Description: About eight pirates were killed during a gang fight between piracy groups. Looyan was involved in this incident as a professional negotiator. Looyan is a relative of the pirate leader Yare. (Somalia Report 11 April 2011)

Implication: At this time, dividing the ransom among pirates became a complex issue that caused civilian casualties. It increased the negative perception of Somali piracy in local society (Somalia Report 20 April 2011).

FV *Shiuh Fu No.1* (Hijacked on Dec. 25, 2010, about 210 km from Madagascar coast)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--------------------------|--------|---|-----------|------------|
| | | Galmudug Syndicate (a H.H. Syndicate) | | |
| 07-17-2012 (569) | 3M | Leader | Hobyo | 13 (92.9) |
| | | Fatxi + Mohayadi Ali + Cali + Heero Shariif | | |

Description: This was a ‘running away with money’ case. The hijack was committed by rising Galmudug pirate groups with multiple leaders and investors. Pirate commanders amputated a captain’s hand to enforce the ransom deal. The *illalo* group led by Cali and Heero Shariif (a professional holder group in Somalia) absconded to Mogadishu with the US \$3M ransom while the commander and investor groups chased them. The piracy groups were mostly Hawiye clan-based gangs, including a faction of the Sacad clan and the Fatxi group as well as other supporting clan groups from Majerteen. Dir. Mohayadin Ali was one of the main investors. (Somalia Report 19 July 2012)

Implication: The incident showed that Somali piracy had evolved highly complicated networks with multiple player groups, which were as follows: the hijacking, holder, investor, and commander groups as well as many supporting groups. It also showed that there were some conflicts, cheats, and fights among the pirates.

FV Vega 5 (Hijacked on Dec. 28, 2010, 30 km from Mozambique coast)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--|--------|--------------------|---------------------|------------|
| | | Galmudug Syndicate | | |
| 05-15-2011 (136) | 5M | Leader | On Sea (Haradheere) | 14(100) |
| | | Ilyaa | | |
| <p>Description: This ship was hijacked by Ilyaa-led Galmudug syndicates. The Galmudug syndicates were part of the grand Hobyo-Haradheere syndicate. Ilyaa was a rising pirate leader who hailed from the Murasade sub-clan of Hawiye. The vessel was initially anchored near Haradheere. It had been used as a mothership until the Indian Navy arrested the pirates on Mar. 15, 2011. The Indian Navy seized 61 pirates and rescued 13 crew members from the vessel. (BBC 14 March 2011) The two remaining Spanish seamen were released two months later after US \$5M was paid. They were held on a hijacked Italian-flagged oil tanker, MT <i>Savina Caylyn</i>, which was captured by the pirates on Feb. 8, 2011. (Somalia Report 15 May 2011)</p> | | | | |
| <p>Implication: Reportedly, Al-Shabaab received US \$100K on May 14, 2011 right after the pirates received the ransom from Spain. (Reuters 6 July 2011) In fact, the real receiver group turned out to be the Ras Kamboni Brigade led by Madobe, who broke ties with Al-Shabaab in February 2010. The incident is another strong indicator of crime embeddedness in local politics, as the military group and the leader became the leading political group in Jubaland in 2013. (Garowe Online 6 November 2013) An important implication of this incident is that Somali pirates increasingly committed multiple crimes in one hijack operation. From 2011 on, they also began to engage in kidnapping of not only crew from the hijacked ship but also foreign visitors on land.</p> | | | | |

5th Stage: Decaying Period





Table 16. Piracy Trends in East Africa in the Fifth Stage

| Year | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 |
|-----------------------|--------|-------|------|
| East Africa Total | 275 | 96 | 25 |
| East Africa Hijack(R) | 63(21) | 26(4) | 2(0) |
| Total Ransom | 145.14 | 41.64 | 21.5 |
| Enterprise Piracy | 39 | 9 | 0 |
| Average Detention | 113 | 204 | 0.5 |
| Hostage Number | 736 | 484 | 34 |
| Off Somalia Hijack | 36 | 10 | 0 |
| No. Mothership Use | 37 | 18 | 0 |

(See Appendix II.2 for data sources and data compiling processes.)

Although the number of incidents in the Horn of Africa reached its peak in 2011 (275 out of a total of 489 incidents worldwide), Somali pirate activity began to decrease in that year. In 2012, the number of successful incidents dropped to 96, continuing to slide down to 25 in 2013. The number of hijacking and ransom demand incidents decreased to 62 and 21 in 2011 from 93 and 38 in 2010, respectively, and this downward trend has continued until recently. In 2013, only two hijackings were recorded with no ransom gaining in 2013. Now, Somali piracy appears to be disappearing. However, the leading groups have not stopped their activities, but have moved from piracy to other endeavors such as acting as private guards for illegal fishing and transportation businesses. Thus, a key to this period is understanding it as a time of decay and simultaneous transformation of activity.

There are a number of reasons for the downward trend such as the complications arising from the increasing competition among clan-based pirate gangs and the increasingly effective anti-piracy initiatives by both domestic and international counter-piracy forces. Moreover, during this period, the cost of Somali piracy operations soared, whereas actual profits became smaller. When Afweyne tried to borrow money from his friends for his piracy business in 2003, the amount was just about \$2,000 USD (Bahadur 2011: 33). The preparation cost increased to about \$48,000 USD for hijacking the MV Victoria in 2009.¹⁵ In 2011, the investment amount soared to two million USD to hijack the MV Savina Caylyn, which signified a falling profit rate in spite of the large amount of the ransom (\$11.5 million USD).¹⁶ Moreover, as the World Bank report suggests (2013), the Somali pirate groups had to pay a cut of their ransom revenue as political capital at least from late 2010 after Hizbul Islam occupied Haradheere, one of the major pirate enclaves. Therefore, the Somali piracy business model fell into a vicious cycle of decline, at least from late 2010. Finally, major pirate leaders such as

Boyah, Garaad, and Afweyne, were arrested, which indicated a significant loss of impunity and was a signal of doom for Somali piracy.

The Federal government of Somalia was founded and recognized internationally in 2012. Al-Shabaab retreated from major coastal towns such as Haradheere, Mogadishu, and Kismayo from late 2012. At the same time, Somali piracy began to be dis-embedded from local communities and governance. In Puntland, the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF), which had been active since 2010, became a part of the Somali Marine Force of the federal government of Somalia in August 2011. In addition to the containment effects of international naval forces since 2010, the institutionalization of maritime law enforcement has worked well since 2011 with international support. Finally, the major pirate leaders quit the decaying criminal business in 2013, moving their activities into different areas. The pirates from the Puntland syndicate turned their business into smuggling and private security for illegal fishing by foreign vessels, which is ironic considering their initial motivation (UN Monitoring Report 2013)¹⁷. Pirates from the Hobyo-Haradheere Syndicate progressively transformed their piracy business into a consultation business in early 2011 by creating the Indian Ocean Consultation Company (IOC). The progressive transformation finally resulted in the establishment of Central Air Aviation in 2012. When the first flight of a white Dornier 228 aircraft landed at the airport of Adado, capital city of the Himan and Heeb state, from Mogadishu on 19 May, 2012, it signified the successful transformation. Afweyne is the leading investor and management leader in the company. The company has been running well with a total of 8 passenger and cargo aircrafts, delivering people and goods, including the narcotic leaf khat, even after Afweyne was arrested on 13 October, 2013.

Table 17. Features of Stage 5: 2011-2013

| Feature/Crisis | State | Civil War | Governance |
|---|--|--|--|
| | FGS vs Al-Shabaab | Decline of Al-Shabaab | Gradual Recovery |
| Coastal Defender: PMPF with Somali Marine Force & Private Security Guards. | | | |
| Key Stage Feature: <u>Decaying and Transforming</u> | | | |
| Type of Leader & Pirates | Organization | Stakeholders | Pattern Features |
| Ex-Fishermen Ex-Govt. Officers Businessmen Militia Warlords | Puntland Syndicates Hobyo-Haradheere Syn. Indian Ocean Consultation Ras-Kamboni | Local Militia & Elders Criminal Entrepreneur Local Politician Warlords Islamoc Militia | Complication Losing Ground Anti-Piracy |

The following profiles of major incidents signify major features of Somali piracy at this state. Though Somali pirates earned the highest amount of ransom by hijacking VLCC *Smyrni* at this stage, the revenue trend changed downward. There have been no more successful ransom gaining piracy after the pirates earned \$9.5 million USD by hijacking VLCC *Smyrni* on May 10, 2012.

Profiles of Major Incidents

MV *BLIDA* (Hijacked on Jan. 01, 2011, 670 km from the Somalian coast)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--------------------------|--------|--------------------|-----------|------------|
| | | Puntland Syndicate | | |
| 11-03-2011 (307) | 2.6M | Leader | Hobyo | 14(100) |
| | | Garaad+ Yare | | |

Description: This was the final outcome after long and costly operations using the sea hopping tactic. There were constant feuds and conflicts among not only among participating pirate groups but also the shipper side. Negotiations were not smooth. Garaad, one of the leaders, fired the first negotiator “Ali” and hired Looyan, who, as a proficient negotiator, required a higher portion of the ransom as a proficient negotiator. As the negotiations became tough, the owner tried to abandon the ship. (Somalia Report 3 November 2011) The final ransom was paid by the owner side’s “War Risks” insurance. (Somalia Report 7 November 2011) However, there were legal disputes between crew and the owner side over their salary during the captivity period. Later, a Mombasa court gave the sailors the right to sell the ship to cover their salary (US \$200K). (The Star 6 February 2013)

Implication: This incident strongly signaled the decline of the Somali piracy business. The Somali pirates could not repay all their investors and suppliers during the long operation. Even the leader group, including the negotiator Looyan, cheated their colleagues and investors. Garaad, as a leader and investor, took US \$600K out of US \$2.6M. However, he did not properly pay his followers and suppliers. According to local sources, he complained that the final amount of money in his hands had dwindled to an amount much smaller than the initial cut. Despite the high ransom amount, many of the pirates ironically lost their money because of the long duration and high cost of the operation as well as fraud from the leader group. Somali pirates also suffered from raids by Somali law enforcement around this time. (Somalia Report 7 November 2011)

MV *Leopard* (Hijacked on Jan. 12, 2011, 893 km from Bargal)



| Release Date(Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|-------------------------|--------|---|-----------|------------|
| | | IOC++Joint Op. | | |
| 04-30-2013 (878) | 6M | Leader | Hoby | 13(92.9) |
| | | Fatxi+ Ilyaas+ Yare + multi investors and leaders | | |

Description: MV *Leopard* was hijacked by pirates who used FV Shih Fu No.1 as a mothership. The incident also involved kidnapping crew for extra ransom. The six seafarers in the vessel (two Danes and four Filipinos) were snatched and moved to the seized Taiwanese fishing vessel that was operating as a mothership. The ship was later abandoned by the pirates. (Somalia Report 7 August 2011) The participating pirate syndicates consisted of a variety of pirate gangs: 1) the Fataxi group, a well-known pirate group in the Mudug region; 2) Ilyaas, a well-known pirate commander from the Murarsade sub-clan of Hawiye; and 3) Yare’s gang. A professional holder group (Illalo in Somali) led by Sarif and Heeryod that hailed from the Sacad clan was also involved. Afweyne’s son and Mohayadin worked as investors. Overall, all of them belonged to the emerging Galmudug syndicate and were linked to local militia. It is highly likely that militia groups linked to Ras Kamboni were involved in the incidents because they were also involved in other relevant incidents, such as the FV Shih Fu No. 1 case. As was frequently witnessed around this time, there were gang fights over ransom and loan money between rival gangs and clans. A pirate in Haradheere said that Ilyagoon moved the hostages to the outskirts of Garacad, where his clan, the Dir, was more dominant. Such a move could have provoked a clash between the Dir and Sacad clans. (Somalia Report 17 April 2012)

Implication: As the MV *Blida* incident implied, the whole operation became increasingly complicated, with various competing pirate groups and relevant militia groups. These complications contributed to the gradual decline of Somali piracy.

VLCC *Irene SL* (Hijacked on Feb. 09, 2011, 371 km from the Oman coast)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--------------------------|--------|---|-----------|------------|
| | | Joint bet. Mandek group + Puntland Syn. | | |
| 04-07-2011 (58) | 13.5M | Leader | Hobyo | 14(100) |
| | | Diriye Robley + Garaad | | |

Description: The vessel was hijacked by the Mandek group using MSV *AL WA'ALA* (which was hijacked on Jan. 1, 2011) as a launching mothership. The pirate group was led by Diriye Robely and based in Hobyo. The tanker was delivering US \$200M worth of crude to the US. The oil price was fluctuating at around US \$110 a barrel at the time. Garaad was involved as an investor. ABdiweli Yusuf Cilmi was identified as a pirate logistical supplier for the operation. (SomaliaReport 8 April 2011)


Implication: The pirate groups earned 13.5 million USD. It is the highest amount of ransom in Somali piracy incidents, which broke the previous record of ransom amount from MV *Savina Caylyn* (11.5 million USD). (SomaliaReport 8 April 2011) Though it appeared that Somali piracy was still flourishing, it had begun to decay due to increasing failures and decreasing profits as well as effective controls by international naval forces.

Private Yacht *S/V Quest* (Hijacked on Feb. 18, 2011, 352 km from the Oman coast)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--|--------|----------------|-----------|------------|
| | | Puntland Syn. | | |
| 02-22-2011 (5) | 0 | Leader | On Sea | 7(50) |
| | | Mohamud +Farah | | |
| <p>Description: The hijacking ended in tragedy. It was committed by a Puntland syndicate led by Mohamud (commander) and Farah (investor) from Bayla in Puntland. The pirates killed the four American hostages following orders from the leaders when the US Navy ambushed them. After hearing gunfire early in the morning on Feb. 22, US forces boarded the vessel and discovered that the crew of four had been killed. Two pirates were killed and 13 were detained by the US naval forces. (The Independent 23 February 2011) The bodies of two additional pirates were also found. A total of 17 pirates were arrested. Shinbin, the negotiator, was also arrested later for his involvement in this and other hijacking incidents. Some of the pirates were sentenced to life in prison (30-year-old Ali Abdi Mohamed and 31-year-old Burhan Abdirahman Yusuf). (FBI 14 November 2013) Four US Navy warships comprised the response force: the aircraft carrier USS <i>Enterprise</i> (CVN 65), the guided-missile cruiser USS <i>Leyte Gulf</i> (CG 55), and the guided-missile destroyers USS <i>Sterrett</i> (DDG 104) and USS <i>Bulkeley</i> (DDG 84). (Somalia Report 23 February 2011)</p> | | | | |
| <p>Implication: Showing a clear signal of decaying, the Somali pirates become increasingly violent around this time facing decreasing profits with falling success rate and increasing costs.</p> | | | | |

MV DOVER (Hijacked on Feb. 28, 2011, 64 km from the Oman coast)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--|--------|------------------------|--------------|------------|
| | | Puntland Syndicates | | |
| 09-30-2011 (215) | 3.8M | Leader | Bandar Beyla | 14(100) |
| | | Yulux+ Hussein+ Garaad | | |
| <p>Description: The hijacking was initially committed by an Ise Yulux-led pirate group in conjunction with the Garaad gang. The pirate group was targeted by the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) for the ambushing and killing of seven Puntland soldiers in Hul An.</p> | | | | |

The negotiator, Mohamed Ghani (Omar Mohamud Majerteen clan), was also involved when hostages of the Danish *SY ING* were held on *MV Dover*. (Somalia Report 28 September 2011) After this incident and that of *SY ING*, Yulux and his gangs were forced to run north by Puntland law enforcement. (Somalia Report 3 June 2012) Yulux was an ex-restaurant owner who quickly climbed the ladder to become one of the major leaders of Somali piracy in 2009. (Somalia Report 6 June 2012) His gangs consisted of more than 140 pirates with clan support networks (from the Ali Saleeban sub-clan of the Majerteen clan).

Implication: At that time, major pirate leaders became targets of the local law enforcement.

MV ROSALIA D'AMATO (Hijacked on Apr. 21, 2011, 898 km from Bargaal)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--------------------------|--------|--------------------|-----------|------------|
| | | Puntland Syndicate | | |
| 11-26-2011 (220) | 600K | Leader | Garacad | 14(100) |
| | | Canbe +Ahmed | | |

Description: The Italian vessel was on its way to Bandar Imam Khomeini, Iran from Paranagua, Brazil when it was attacked by a single skiff. (EU NAVFOR Somalia 1 December 2011) The vessel was hijacked by Puntland syndicates led by Canbe, a famous pirate commander from the Omar Mohamud sub-clan of Majerteen Darod. (Somalia Report 26 November 2011)

Implication: This incident also showed that Somali pirates faced the limitations of the ransom piracy business, including mounting costs of operation, reduced share and income, and increasing anti-piracy trends from both local and international forces. After a long negotiation period (220 days), Somali pirates earned only 600,000 USD, much smaller amount than previous incidents. (Somalia Report 26 November 2011) Considering the large scale of operations in time and resources, the actual profit margin was small, or even it could be negative margin. The Somali pirate groups became increasingly involved in land-based kidnapping from this time, including the kidnapping of British tourist Judith Tebbutt from a northern Kenya resort (Sept. 11, 2011), French tourist Marie Dedieu (Sept. 17, 2011), two Spanish aid workers, Serra and Thiebaut (Oct. 13, 2011), two Canadian aid workers, Buchanan and Thisted, one American journalist, Michael Scott Moore (Jan. 6,

2012), and two Kenyan aid workers (July 10, 2012). (Somalia Report 19 January 2012, Neptune Security Group 5 March 2014)

VLCC *Smyrni* (Hijacked on May. 10, 2012, 1,194 km from Bargaal)



| Release Date (Captivity) | Ransom | Organization | Anchorage | Scores (%) |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------|-----------|------------|
| | | Hafun Synd. | | |
| 03-10-2013 (306) | 9.5M <i>(The last Jackpot)</i> | Leader | Huridiyo | 13(92.9) |
| | | Yulux (Chased)+Ahmed | | |

Description: The tanker was hijacked by Yulux-led gangs from Hul Anod (a small town just south of Hafun and north of Bandar Beyla in North Puntland). The oil tanker avoided the first attack, but the pirates regrouped with a nearby mothership and captured it. Aside from the leader and the primary investor, Isse Yulux, there were multiple stakeholders, including commander Gacan Barwaaqo (who got a 20% cut), Isse Abdulahi as one of four investors, and Illalo group. PMPF attacked the pirate gang but failed to rescue hostages. Yulux and his gangs were chased by law enforcement until he announced that he was quitting in March 2014. (Garowe online 4 May 2014) The Suezmax vessel was the largest to be hijacked since February 2011. The vessel was initially commandeered to Garacad and then to Haradheere and Hobyo in Galmudug, but the pirate group faced possible counter-piracy attacks on them in the towns where before 2010 they had enjoyed their luxury celebrations. (Somalia Report 3 June 2012) They finally chose Hurdiyo in northern Puntland because it lacked any official government or law enforcement presence. (Somalia Report 18 May 2012) This was the final ransom-gaining operation for the Somali pirates.

Implication: The US \$9.5M was the final jackpot for Somali pirates. After this incident, there have been no more successful hijacks. All further hijacking attempts were foiled by either international naval forces or local anti-piracy law enforcement. Moreover, the major pirate leaders were arrested or quit their roles while negotiating their amnesty with local and central governments in Somalia. Garaad was arrested by the Iranian naval forces on Mar. 26 or Apr. 6 of 2012 after his pirate gangs hijacked a commercial ship (MV *Eglantine* on Mar. 26 or *Xiang Hua Men* on Apr. 6) near Iran. (Somalia Report 4 June 2012) Afweyne quit his piracy business in January 1st, 2013. He was arrested with his government partner Tiiceey at Brussels International Airport on Oct. 13, 2013. (The Independent 15 October 2013) Garfanje, a top leader of the Afweyne criminal enterprise,

was also arrested on Apr. 18, 2014. (Garowe online 19 August 2014) However, their activities have continued in other areas of crime such as smuggling, trafficking, and private security for international fishing vessels. It is interesting and ironic that the once self-proclaimed coastal defenders against foreign vessels became protectors of illegal fishing.

6.2 SUMMARY OF THE EVOLUTIONARY STAGES OF SOMALI PIRACY

Table 18. Incident Trend Summary of Five Evolutionary Stages of Somali Piracy


| Stage/Year | 1.1991~1995 | 2.1996~2004 | 3.2005~2007 | 4.2008~2010 | 5.2011~2013 |
|---------------------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|----------------|----------------|
| World Piracy (Y.A) | 587 (117) | 2825 (314) | 776 (259) | 1191 (397) | 1057 (352) |
| East Africa Piracy (Y.A) | 29 (6) | 192 (21) | 153 (51) | 621 (207) | 396 (132) |
| East Africa Hijack (Y.A.) | 4 (1) | 20 (2) | 43 (14) | 196 (65) | 101 (34) |
| Ransomed Piracy (Y.A) | 1 | 16 (2) | 34 (11) | 110 (37) | 25 (8) |
| Ransom Revenue (Y.A) | 1 | 2.18 (0.2242) | 8.66 (2.89) | 173.37 (57.79) | 208.28 (69.43) |
| Enterprise piracy (Y.A) | 0 | 0 | 21 (7) | 132 (44) | 48 (16) |
| Average Captivity (Max) | 16 (16) | 69 (194) | 61 (225) | 125 (1773) | 134 (990) |
| Hostage Number (Y.A) | N.A | 273 (30) | 556 (185) | 3197 (1066) | 1254 (418) |
| Off Somalia Hijack | 0 | 5 | 2 | 33 | 46 |
| Mothership Use Number | 0 | 1 | 1 | 84 | 55 |


*(Y.A): yearly average (rounded)/ Ransom in million USD/ Average Captivity=average captivity time in day per hijacked ship and kidnapped crew, Hostage number=rolling hostage number, Off Somalia Hijack=Somali piracy incidents outside the Economic Exclusive Zone of Somalia, Mothership Use Number=Number of Mothership, a captured ship to hijack bigger vessels, use by pirates. (See Appendix II.2 for data sources and data compiling processes.)

The table above evidently suggests that the evolution of Somali piracy did not occur chronologically. It rather evolved with changing influences of causal factors at multiple levels from the international to the local levels. Before 2004, average annual piracy incidents in East Africa remained at 21. The number increased in 2005 by more than twice (from 21 to 51). Then, the increasing trend jumped by more than four times of the previous stage (from 51 to 207 in yearly average). The steeply upward trends are also represented in major features of Somali piracy incidents such as ransom revenue and the frequency of enterprise type of piracy with its advanced capacity.

However, the trends in other features, such as captivity length, hostage number, off-Somalia hijacks, and mothership use number reflect the double-edged nature of the ransom piracy business. Securing an anchoring place is a highly important bedrock for the ransom business. It also means that local support is an essential element for long-term ransom negotiation. Moreover, the anchored places are closely related to the primary enclaves of Somali


piracy because the pirates mobilized local community support from the coastal towns. As explained above, most of the anchored places are tied to the clan-based town networks. This study traces the changing trends of anchored places. The pictures below (Maps 1 to 4) along the evolutionary stages (from 2nd to 5th) vividly show the changing grounds of Somali piracy groups.





Somali Piracy Map: 2005-2007


Map 2. Major Anchored Places for Hijacked Vessels in the 3rd stage Harardheere and Hobyo in Galmudug took 50%. Together with Eyl and Koyema (base of Garaad NVCG), the anchored places by the marine alliance took at least 77%.



Somali Piracy Map: 2008-2010

Map 3. Major Anchored Places for Hijacked Vessels in the 4th stage

Though the marine alliance fragmented into various syndicates based on clan ties, the most anchored places were still in Puntland and Galmudug, where local governance status was almost defunct at this stage.



Map 4. Major Anchored Places for Hijacked Vessels in the 5th stage

The ratio of vessels anchored off the Somali coastal towns increased more than twice from 16% in the fourth stage to 34% in this stage. The change symbolizes two significant trends. First, Somali pirates increasingly use multiplatform tactics with the hijacked vessels. They use the hijacked vessels for multiple purposes, such as mothership, decoying, refueling, and sea hopping for long-term operations. Second, it reflected Somali piracy groups' partial loss of their supporting land territory and safe heavens.

Though the marine alliance fragmented into various syndicates based on clan ties, the most anchored places were still in Puntland and Galmudug, where local governance status was almost defunct at this stage.

Detailed descriptions and explanations of evolution of Somali piracy are highlighted in this chapter. The five evolutionary stages are depicted with vivid illustrations of major incidents over the evolutionary process from the piracy movement's birth to decay. The analysis showed how regional and local factors, such as state failure, prolonged civil war, and the governance crisis, are closely connected to the evolution of Somali piracy. The next chapter explains what factors are related to the evolutionary process in both indirect and direct ways.

7.0 EVOLUTIONARY CAUSAL FACTORS

The process tracing observations help identify the determining factors in the evolution of Somali piracy. By eliciting the congruent patterns, based on a pattern-matching technique, (Campbell 1966; 1975) this study was able to confirm the evolution of causal factors in various dimensions, from the global and regional levels to local and organizational levels. Since the evolutionary stages provide a historical landscape, historical changes in global and regional circumstances are primary factors. The nature of these changes and their influence on the crisis in Somalia should be of primary concern with regard to the evolutionary process of Somali piracy. The intervening causal factors that have actually affected the development of Somali piracy under the influence of these historical changes can then be explained. This study finds that the embeddedness of crime due to a crisis in local governance is a key to the growth of Somali piracy. Maritime crime had been accepted in the name of coastal protection, justified by the governance crisis in major piracy loci such as Puntland, Galmudug, and Jubaland. This study provides some analytical explanations for the evolutionary factors.

7.1 CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE GLOBAL LEVEL

Despite what might have been optimistically forecast (Freedman 2005), anticipated changes due to globalization have not been completed. Globalization has not meant the end of history, as

one Hegelian scholar declared in an epic statement (Fukuyama 1992). It has instead unleashed many unexpected issues such as terrorism, state failure, refugees, financial crises, and transnational crime - as if a Pandora's Box was mistakenly opened. The piracy-prone regions have mostly suffered from the uneven changes wrought by globalization in each different context of the regional security complex.

In the global dimension, several key changes contributed to the re-emergence of piracy from the late 1980s onwards. Politically, many developing and under-developed states have revealed critical vulnerabilities in regime security along with changing international power dynamics after the end of the Cold War. In the Horn of Africa region, several states such as Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan have experienced several regime collapses and catastrophic civil wars. The regimes could not sustain themselves once the great powers retreated from the region due to its reduced strategic importance. The Somali Barre regime collapsed in January 1991 when the regime failed to control military resistance from various clans-based factions through patronage and coercion methods (Menkhaus 2004). The Mengistu regime in Ethiopia collapsed just months later in May 1991.

Both countries engaged in a regional hegemonic war to determine their state boundary during the 1977-78 Ogaden War. Aftermaths of the interstate war directly affected the fates of the autocratic regimes after the end of the Cold War. The aftermath was not simply regime collapse. Ethiopia had to let Eritria be an independent state in 1993 after a long resistance movement for independence since 1961. Sudan was divided into Islamic North Sudan and Christian led South Sudan in 2011 after a long civil war that began in 1972. Briefly, the changes of global power dynamics indirectly undermined regime security.

Economically, globalization trends have rapidly increased diverse resource transactions, including human, based on global communication and transportation networks. Maritime trade volume has doubled each decade since World War II (Rosenberg 2009). The ascending trend has been accelerated since 1990, delivering about 5.7 billion tons of cargo with about 1.25 million seamen and involving about 8,000 ports worldwide (Ong-Webb 2006). About 80% of the vessels in commercial traffic move on international sea lanes. Due to the hard-edged competition in the globalized market, international vessels are heavily loaded with cargo. Each ship is slowed by a low free board because of the overloaded cargo. Geographically, Somalia is located at the corner and edges of the Horn of Africa, where about 200,000 international vessels transit annually. The slow-moving cargo vessels with small numbers of crew and no armed protection become a natural prey when the ships pass at low speeds through and around the Gulf of Aden. The genetic seeds of Somali piracy naturally emerged out of the broader context.

7.2 POWER RIVALRY AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL

The global common denominators penetrate mostly through regional dynamics because a region consists of distinctively autonomous and interdependent states and units (Buzan 1985). Due to geographic adjacency, regional security issues are felt differently through the regional dynamics, even though globalized political and economic threats and opportunities dominate regional security issues. Buzan argues (1985) that the regional security complex consists of interdependent sets of units in a region. The essence of the regional security complex is that its "major process of securitization, de-securitization or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another" (Buzan, Wæver, &

De Wilde 1998: 201). Even though the influence of global common denominators is reflected differently within local contexts (Buzan, Wæver, & De Wilde 1998: 84-90), it is necessary to examine the regional contexts.

The regional security issues in the Horn of Africa have revealed several key characteristics, which make the region distinct from other regions. First, a colonial legacy remains in all the states in the Horn of Africa. Somalia was colonized by France, Britain, and Italy. After independence in 1961, a large part of the post-colonial Somali state was fragmented again by neighboring states and independence movements. The Ogaden region in the west part of Somalia was re-colonized by Ethiopia as a security buffer. The southern edge portion of current Jubaland in Somalia was annexed by Kenya, and has recently been used as a buffer zone against Somalia for Kenya's security. As a result of the independence movements from Ethiopia, two Somali populous states acquired their independence: Djibouti in 1977 and Eritrea in 1993. Ethiopia lost direct sea access and became highly sensitive to the changing power dynamics of neighboring states. Second, the foremost unique feature in the regional security complex is that there has been no regional hegemon, but instead constantly failing challengers such as Barre's Somalia and Mengistu's Ethiopia.

Third, the colonial legacy and constant rivalry among the regional states have made them militarized states (Mesfin 2011). The inherent fragility of the neopatrimonial African states with their nepotistic leadership (Williams 2006) relies on foreign assistance in order to buttress their low authority against both internal and external enemies. Thus, the historical patterns of amity and enmity vested in the regional rivalry (Buzan 1985) reflect the most salient characteristics of the regional security complex in the Horn of Africa. Indeed, the ever-present internal and external crises in the regional states have drained their resources for the security of

the militarized African states while deepening their dependency on foreign aid. Thus, the regional states have not been able to develop a capacity for self-reliance. Instead, they have always fallen into an entangled crisis with neighboring states, that with Somalia looming particularly large. This is why the rise of the UIC (Union of Islamic Courts) has triggered serial interventions of neighboring states since 2006. When Ethiopia invaded Somalia to crush the UIC in December 2006, Eritrea began to engage in a proxy war against Ethiopia through its Somali partners (Mesfine 2011; Elmi 2010).

Fourth, the internal and external crises have been exacerbated by the rise of the Islamic movements as an attempt to re-define the troubled state in terms of religious orthodoxy. Thus, it is somewhat inevitable for the movements to clash with various secular factions tied to foreign powers. Somalia has become an epic nexus of clashes between secularism and the fundamentalist Islamic movements, which have ultimately shaken the central authority of Somalia as an independent nation state.

Those conflict characteristics of the regional security complex in the Horn of Africa have influenced the status of the Somali state in both direct and indirect ways. The regional rivalry characterized by crises has also made the Somali civil war ever more complicated since 2006. The Somali crisis has spilled over into neighboring states such as Kenya, Ethiopia, and Uganda. As Al-Shabaab grew in the environment of vicious cycles, so did Somali piracy.

7.3 STATE COLLAPSE AND AUTHORITY CRISIS AT THE STATE LEVEL

The complicated interplays among the regional states have created a volatile regional security complex (Mesfin 2011). The intensified conflicts within and between the regional states have

weakened the authority and function of the central governments. Somalia has suffered from malfunctioning central governance in a paper-state condition (Menkhaus 2004). It is just presumed that a failed state is the primary cause of the global and regional security crises, such as terrorism, piracy, and refugees. While being criticized theoretically and empirically (Mesfin 2011; Tilly 1975 & 1985 & 1992), the normative and teleological concept of state cannot be a basis for the origin of Somali security issues. Instead, the state can be better understood as a formative field of power dynamics through diverse forms of warfare (Tilly 1985).

The nature of Somali state collapse reflects incompatible approaches by domestic power factions and neighboring states, as well as international forces such as the U.S. and the UN. All the domestic power factions are based on clan lineage, except AIAI as a pioneering Muslim movement. Each clan based faction attempted to create its own state based on the clan networks. However, the Muslim movements have attempted to move beyond the clan lines by pursuing a rigid Muslim country under Sharia law. This signaled a warning sign to neighboring states such as Ethiopia and Kenya because it reminded them of memories of the predatory war by the Barre regime under the name of 'the great Somalia' (Lewis 2002). Other Muslim actors in the Horn of Africa also want to create a Muslim state. On the other hand, the international forces expect the new Somali state to be a secular Western style liberal democratic one (Elmi 2010). Thus, they have intervened in the state reformation process in various ways. Ethiopia has sponsored proxy powers, such as SSDF and Puntland, while confronting any pan-Somali Muslim movements such as AIAI and Al-Shabaab. Such entangled power interplays have made the Somali central state highly fragile. The convoluted turmoil of the state reconstruction processes ultimately creates a state authority crisis since no power has become dominant. The authority crisis of the central state results in a loose confederation of the various factions based on the clan lineage reflecting a

feudal system of the Middle Ages. Meanwhile, there have been alternative attempts to establish mini-states based on clan lineage. Considering the fact that piracy incidents occurred near the coastal areas of Somalia (until the third stage), the real causal factors can be found in the local states.

Therefore, the clues related to the fracturing of Somalia are found in the regeneration processes of the local micro states with inherent characteristics of local governance. The representation struggles for constructing their own imagined communities divide largely into two directions: propping up a federalized central state and establishing an independent state. Somaliland declared its own independence right after the collapse of the Barre regime in 1991. Following the Somaliland model (Hoehne 2009), in 1998 Puntland announced its independence, but remained a member state of the Somali Federation. Other micro states have continued to emerge up until recently, including Khatumo in the Sool region, Himan & Heeb, Galmudug in the central region, and Jubaland in southern Somalia. Only a few states have acquired their independent status from the fragile federal government when they demonstrated a sufficient power and governance capacity. Briefly, the regeneration process of local governance and mini-local states has resulted in a reformation process toward a new Somali federated state with Somaliland separated.

Several key features of the state reformation processes are relevant to the emergence of Somali piracy. First, all the newly federated Somali central governments have faced serious challenges, not just from severe resource scarcity, but also from the authority crisis. For example, when the TFG was finally established in 2004 after long negotiations in neighboring countries, the government led by Abdullahi Yusuf, the founder and the president of Puntland state, did not set up its capital office in Mogadishu, but in Baidoa because of severe resistance from local

Muslim movements and other factions. Yusuf was not a welcomed leader for them because he was backed by Ethiopia, which was a foe to the Somali nationalistic leaders (Menkhaus 2004, Hoene 2009). He was also blamed for the default budget crisis in Puntland since he drained a lot of resources, including his personnel security forces, out of Puntland (Elmi 2010, Hansen 2009, Bahadur 2011). After 2004, piracy trends increased except during the temporary halt in 2006 when the UIC occupied Mogadishu and arrested pirates. Moreover, the resource drainage resulted in failure to pay the salaries for law enforcement officers in Puntland in 2008 when Somali piracy began to rapidly increase. Thus, the authority crisis with resource scarcity and troubled governance highly likely increased piracy in the coastal areas.

Second, the foreign aid dependency and intervention by neighboring and international forces have ironically hampered the stable establishment of the central authority, while crowding out self-reliance capacity building (Harper 2012, Woodward 2013). The ineffective foreign intervention and aid dependency have driven the local governing forces, including warlords and Muslim leaders, into an endless melee for gaining fragile authority and resources. The dependency with resource scarcity has also aggravated the authority crisis.

Finally, the authority crisis and struggle for resources with the foreign interventions have made the civil wars ever more complicated than the interstate wars that raged during the Barre regime period. When the UIC announced a new Somali government in Mogadishu in 2006, while controlling various local warlord factions, it signaled a risk not just to neighboring states, but also to international powers, especially the U.S. because of its possible linkage to al-Qaeda. Ethiopia immediately sent troops to Mogadishu. Eritrea automatically began to launch a proxy war by supporting the violent Islamic movements (Elmi 2010, Mesfin 2011, Woodward 2013). Especially from 2007, the domestic power struggles became entangled with foreign interferences

such as Ethiopia, Kenya, and later the UN AMISOM backed by the Western powers. Although the UIC was defeated by the Ethiopian forces, it ironically woke up diverse Somali nationalistic and Muslim forces and also provided an opportunity for Somali piracy action groups to grow rapidly. In other words, al-Shabaab and Somali piracy action groups, as transnational criminal organizations, could grow out of the complex natures of the complicated civil wars since 2007 by taking advantage of the melee for a take-off opportunity. Therefore, those complicated civil wars, combined with the authority crisis, provide the background contexts for the fluctuating trends in the third stage of the evolution of Somali piracy.

7.4 GOVERNANCE CRISIS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

The mini-state formation trends have led to the governance crisis because most mini-states do not have enough resources or the administrative capacity to realize their political goals. Only Somaliland has shown its own governance capacity by securing stable revenue from the regional international trade route. Somaliland has taken advantage of the Berbera port as a transit hub between Africa and the Middle East. All other newly formed mini-states have faced major governance challenges. For example, in 2006, the budget size was estimated at around USD \$30 million in Somaliland, while it was around USD \$18 million in Puntland (Elmi 2010: 124). For the localized warfare and state formation, securing profitable trade ports is essential. Besides Somaliland, all other new mini-states failed to acquire such a profitable resource channel, though they did acquire the port locations, such as Bosaso in Puntland and Adado airport in Himan & Heeb.

As the civil war was contained in the local areas near the boundaries of clan turfs and borders of the mini-states, the local states have drained their resources for the fragmented warfare while failing to secure a profitable resource pool. Several critical issues also exacerbated the governance challenge, such as hyperinflation, natural disaster, and counterfeit currency. Local governance collapsed through the escalating crisis as the powerful leaders of the micro-states eventually drained the limited resources to secure their power positions and resources in the fragile central government. This is what happened in 2008 in Puntland in the fourth stage of Somali piracy evolution.

The complicated, prolonged civil war eventually provided a window of opportunity for violent organized crime groups, such as Al-Shabaab and the pirate action groups. On the one hand, the Islamic militant groups fought against the proxy enemies of their international foes for their own imagined community in the south and central regions of Somalia. On the other hand, Somali piracy action groups could develop their organization and capacity in the defunct governance areas, such as Eyl and Garacad in Puntland, Hobyo and Haradheere in Galmudug, and Himan & Heeb states. In other words, the creation of local states with no governance capacity created a good opportunity for the rising crime groups. For example, there was no governing hand at all when journalist Bahadur visited Eyl in 2009 (Bahadur 2011: 175-187). The coastal town remained notorious as a piracy haven until 2011. Simultaneously, it is also famous for the birthplace of the second president of Puntland, Abdirahman Mohamud Farole. The only shared element is the clan lineage: the Osman Mahamoud subclan of Majerteen. Many pirate leaders in the Puntland piracy syndicates hail from the clan, such as Abshir Boyah and Mohammed Mussa Saeed 'Aargoosto'.

Table 19. Major Local States with Piracy Connection

| State | Governor | Clan Tie | Piracy Group |
|--------------|---|--|---|
| Puntland | Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed :1998-2004 | Sub Clans of Majerteen | Puntland Piracy Syndicates |
| Himan & Heeb | Mohamed Aden Tiiceey :2008-2013 | Habar Gidir Saleeban sub clan of Hawiye | Hobyo-Haradheere Piracy Syndicates & IOC |
| Jubaland | Ahmed Mohamed Islam (Madobe): 2010-Present | Ogaden Darod | Hobyo-Haradheere Piracy Syndicates & IOC |

Table 19 shows that the most salient connection through the clan lineage is found in the creation of Himan & Heeb with regard to piracy leaders and their activity. Himan & Heeb is located between Puntland and central Somalia in the west of Galmudug. The state is dominated by the Habar Gidir Saleeban subclan of Hawiye. It is the clan of the major pirate leaders in the Hobyo-Haradheere piracy syndicates, such as Mohamed Abdi Hassan 'Afweyne' (meaning 'big mouth' in Somali), his son Abdiqadir Mohammed Abdi, and Mohamed Osman Mohamed 'Garfanje'. The founder of the state was Mohamed Abdullahi Maalim Aden 'Tiiceey', who hailed from the Habar Gidir Saleeban clan. He was supported by Somali diaspora organizations, such as the United Somali Diaspora, established in October 2007. He is also a very close friend and partner of Afweyne.

According to the UN Monitoring Report (2014), both Tiiceey and Afweyne (See Appendix VX) were involved in many notorious ransom piracy incidents from 2008 to 2012, such as the ones involving the MV Stella Maris (July 2008 with \$2 M ransom), the MV Faina (September 2008 with \$3.2M), the Indian Ocean Explorer (March 2009 with \$0.45M), and FV Aride (October 2012 with \$5.2M). Tiiceey's Himan & Heeb state appeared to be a criminal state when the local villagers demonstrated their support for the pirates, while criticizing their arrest by the FBI in October 2013 at a Belgium airport (UN Monitoring Report, 2014).

The governance crisis and the crime connection through the clan lineage created a source for securing additional resources while asserting sovereignty. One of the resource tapping methods has been outsourcing the work of a coastal guard to private security firms because the maritime sovereignty has been challenged by predatory foreign vessels, especially in the coastal areas of Puntland. By outsourcing the role of coastal defender, the Puntland government sought to acquire an additional resource pool by sharing the fishing license profits with the contracted firms and securing its sovereignty claim. Ironically, the policy of privatizing coastal defense to overcome the governance crisis became a core accelerator of the evolution of Somali piracy.

7.5 THE COASTAL DEFENDER ROLE

There is a common ground that the Somali pirates share to defend their criminal action. It is the coastal defender role against foreign depredation of their maritime resources. The coastal defender role has also been justified with a ‘Robin Hood’ image through the sharing of proceeds with the crime-embedded local communities (Shortland 2011). The rage against foreign vessels has strong grounds. Coastal resources have been plundered by foreign fishing vessels since the collapse of the Barre regime. About \$300 million USD of seafood is stolen every year. The ‘illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU)’ fishing has devastated the Somali maritime environment (One Earth Future, 2015). The lists of foreign fishing vessels’ countries are also generally matched by the main target country lists of the Somali pirates (See Appendix VI). Interestingly, the changing trends of the estimated catch suggest a justifiable basis for the coastal defender role since the amount began to decrease from 2005. Moreover, dumping toxic waste that damaged the Somali coastal environment infuriated local people in the coastal areas (ICG,

2009). As fish stocks were depleted by foreign vessels, the Somali coastal people began to attack the foreign ships from the early 1990s.¹⁸ Two different reactions against the foreign illegal fishing were formed under the name of the coastal defense. The first one is a top-to-bottom approach. Considering the poor resource capacity in Puntland, political leaders use private contractors for public purposes.

Table 20. Contracted Security Firms for Coastal Control in Puntland

| Time | Company | Governor (Leader) | Limits |
|--------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------|---|
| 1. 1993 | Privateer group led by Joaar | Yusuf | Overtaken by local warlord |
| 2. 1999-2002 | British Security Firm Hart | Yusuf | No Local Ties |
| 3. 2002-2005 | SomCan (Somali Canadian Coast Guard) | Yusuf & Adde | Fired after a hijacking incident by its employees |
| 4. 2008-2009 | SomCan | Adde | Overtaken by Somali pirate groups |

As table 20 shows, there were several security firms for coastal defense. The maritime security work started with a privateer group led by Puntland Fishery Ministry Joaar. The British Security Firm ‘Hart’ then took the role. ‘SomCan’ (Somali-Canadian Coastguard) took the position from 2002. It was managed by Somali-Canadian Ali Taar, who was an ex-cab driver in Toronto and belonged to a prominent clan (Omar Mohamud, a sub-clan of Majerteen Darod) of Puntland President Yusuf¹⁹ during the political infights and civil wars in Puntland (Pitney Jr& Levin 2012: 52; Bahadur 2012: 59-75). The SomCan was disbanded in 2005 after some of their security employees hijacked a Thai fishing vessel, the Sirichainava 12, demanding \$800,000 as ransom. The SonCam acquired the contract again in October 2008; however, it expired the next year (June 2009) because it was overtaken by the build-up of the Somali pirate groups. The failures of private security firms aggravated the Somali Coast Guard situation and encouraged the employees to seek new opportunities including piracy.

The governance failure allowed the public role to be led by the criminal groups because the second reaction, as a bottom-up approach, began with the natural attacks of local fishermen-turned-pirates on foreign fishing vessels. Gradually, they began to band and form an armed group from the early 1990s. Their initial pirate action was an emulation of the private firms by imposing fines on the foreign vessels. For example, they did this to three Taiwanese fishing trawlers: Zhong I (No. 218), Cheng Qing Feng, and Shin Lian Fa (No. 36). They demanded a fine of USD \$5,000 per crew and \$50,000 per ship. It was a joint hijack operation between Garaad-led piracy gangs and other pirate gangs based in Jubaland. Final ransom is estimated at about USD \$125,000 per vessel. All the ships were released in 2006 after the ransom amount was paid. As explained, Somali pirates eventually overtook the role of the coastal defender from 2008 after SomCan was completely disbanded.


Thus, the coastal defender role has had a justifiable basis since it only attacked foreign vessels. Maritime crime was embedded in local affairs as a way of defending coastal resources since the foreign parties were regarded as a cause of the misery of the Somali people (Hansen 2009; Murphy 2009). The coastal defender role became a key leverage onto the next step of the evolutionary progress toward a piracy enterprise.

7.6 EMBEDDEDNESS OF CRIME IN LOCAL COMMUNITIES

The failure of the private security firms is smoking gun evidence that maritime crime is embedded in local governance. In other words, the coastal defender role was replaced by Somali pirate groups while creating a symbiosis with local communities. Where violence was privatized it obscured the distinct line between private violence and formal politics (Collins 2009:171-2). It

led to the embeddedness of crime (Hagan 1993), whereby crime was accepted and integrated into a local society as a part of community maintenance (Hansen 2009; Murphy 2009:43). In local governance, the embeddedness of crime is entrenched in the local community and politics within the tradition of the Somali pastoral society where violence is always managed through a blood compensation method involving compulsory payment for lives loss among the Diya group under the Somali custom law of Xeer (Lewis 2002). As Tilly argued (1985: 335), the embeddedness of crime created a symbiotic relationship between private violent groups such as warlords and criminal leaders, and local society through which a system of crime-embedded governance was generated (Menkhaus 1998: 222). The endogeneity of crime-engendering dynamics has been demonstrated in other criminal studies since it is a local response fit to local demand for global changes (Block 1991, Hobbs 1998 a;b, Rawlinson 1998). The embeddedness of criminals and criminal activity was entrenched gradually in the major pirate zones, such as Eyl, Garacad, Hobyo, and Haradheere, where no functional governance existed. In other words, the embeddedness of crime with regard to Somali piracy activity was a particular local reaction that suited local needs to adapt to the changing circumstances in the global, region-wide, international, and state dimensions.

The evolution of the embeddedness of crime is confirmed through the evolutionary changes of Somali piracy incidents and their changing patterns. Hijacking vessels and kidnapping crews needed safe places for their risky operations. As chart 21 shows, the frequency of hijacking piracy incidents in Somalia was very low until 2004. Total number of the sea hijacking incidents was 22 from 1996 to 2004. The number suddenly jumped to 22 in 2005 from zero in 2004 and resumed its increase from 2007 (13) after a temporary halt in 2006 (8). The number reached a peak in 2010 (93). It began to decrease from 2011.



(See Appendix II.2 for data source and data compiling processes.)





Chart 23. 2005-2013 Anchored Places





(See Appendix II.2 for data source and data compiling processes.)

Besides the changes in the coastal defender role, other evidence of embeddedness of crime in local governance and community is found in the safe zones of piracy operations. As charts 22 and 23 show, the operational places were relatively scattered from 1996 to 2004 in comparison with 2005 to 2013. The number of hijack incidents in the latter period is more than 15 times higher, which is a stark difference. Without the help of the crime-embedded zones, the number would not have reached high levels after 2005. The zones were concentrated in coastal towns in Puntland and Galmudug, where several clans dominated, including Habar Gidir Saleeban, Osman Mohamud, and Isse Mohamud.²⁰

The embeddedness of crime also worked as a transformer from politically relevant piracy to more economically oriented pirate actions. As charts 24 and 25 show, Somali hijack piracy incidents in the period of 1996-2004 were mostly caused by political groups such as Al-Ithihad al-Islam (AIAI) and Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF).²¹ Since 2005, political

groups tied to piracy incidents have been very rare. The embeddedness of crime provided a nourishing environment for the criminal start-ups pioneered by Afweyne.

* Major organizations linked to maritime crimes²²





(Eyl Syn.: Ely based piracy syndicate, ION/IOC: Indian Ocean Network/Indian Ocean Consultation Company-An offshoot of Hobyo-Haradheere Piracy Syndicate, NVCG: National Volunteer Coast Guard, H.H.S.: Hobyo-Haradheere Piracy Syndicate, Punt Syn.: Puntland Piracy Syndicate; See Appendix II.2 for data source and data compiling processes.)

7.7 CRIMINAL STARTUP BY A VIOLENT ENTREPRENEUR

As Hansen argues (2009), Mohamed Abdi Hassan Afweyne was a crucial game-changer who transformed Somali piracy into a flourishing business activity embedded in local affairs, including political affairs. Before his emergence, most pirate leaders were ex-fishermen, such as Boyah and Garaad. Boyah, who is regarded as a founding father of Somali piracy, was a lobster fisherman in Eyl, Puntland (Bahadur 2012). Garaad was also a fisherman in Garacad who became a commander of the Boyah led pirate gangs and later became an independent pirate leader of NVCG. According to Hansen (2009) and Bahadur (2012), Afweyne, a former public officer in Puntland, changed the nature of piracy activity from 2003 by promoting a multi-clan piracy organization. The cross-clan network beyond a local community is an important bedrock for the evolution of Afweyne's piracy enterprise that ultimately transformed its business features into diverse enterprises, including an air transportation company, by utilizing diverse weak ties (Granovetter 1973; 1974; 1983) beyond the narrow local clan lines which began in Haradheere. He trained pirate candidates with the help of the pirate veterans Boyah and Garaad. He also set the rules of a business enterprise, including the reinvestment principle (Hansen 2009).

However, his innovative business model was not fully proven as a highly profitable one until 2007. He was arrested by the Hasan al-Turki led Islamic militia in 2006. Afweyne hijacked a Korean fishing vessel, Dongwon No.628, on April 4th, 2006. He was arrested by a military force sent by Hasan al-Turki, who led an Islamic force after he released the vessel with ransom USD \$800,000 on July 30, 2006. He was released later with the power of his ransom money and his clan networks in the UIC (Hansen, 2009; Bahadur 2012) when the UIC controlled most central areas of Somalia. The profitability of his business model was proved in 2007 when he and his criminal partners earned more than USD \$4 million in ransom from eleven successful


hijacks, which was USD \$385,454 per hijack operation (a high increase in ransom amount per hijack operation from 2005 (USD \$218,500 per hijack operation)).



(See Appendix II.2 for data source and data compiling processes.)


Charts 26 and 27 highlight the change of the main leaders participating in piracy since the involvement of Afweyne. The big difference is that all the major leaders in the chart (2005-

2013 leaders) are not related to political movements. Yare, a former businessman, and Garfanje, a second top pirate kingpin of Hobyo-Haradheere Syndicate (H.H.S) were led by Afweyne and Ilyaas. Ilyaas is a well-known pirate leader from Murasade, a subclan of Hawiye, who was involved in many hijack piracy incidents, such as MV Leopard on Jan. 12, 2011 with USD \$6 million ransom and MV Savina Cayln on Feb. 8, 2011 with USD \$11.5 million and Rosalia D' Amato on April 21, 2011 with USD \$600,000. A Pirate leader Isse Yulux, hailed from Majeerten Osman Mohamud, rose to be a pirate kingpin after 2011. With his fellow partners such as Mohamed "Dhafoor" (commander) and "Aargoosto" (investor), he was involved in multiple incidents such as the Danish Yacht ING on Feb. 24, 2011, which involved USD \$3.5 million, the MV Dover on Feb. 28, 2011 (USD \$3.8 million), and the MT Royal Grace on Mar. 2, 2012 (USD \$5.5 million). His operation base is in the Ras Hafun Bargal area of Puntland. As a newly emerged pirate leader, since 2011, he was also not directly related to any political organizations except his own clan.



(MV=Merchant Vessel/ FV=Fishing Vessel / MSV=Motorized Sailing Vessel/See Appendix II.2 for data source and data compiling processes.)

Therefore, the role of the game changer was to transform the entire realm of Somali piracy into a durable enterprise. As charts 28 and 29 suggest, the portion of all ship targets made up of fishing vessels as an original target for the coastal defenders declined from 27% to 22%. After 2005, the hijacked fishing vessels were not general targets for the Somali ransom business but rather used as mother ships²³ to hijack a bigger merchant vessel. A pirate, Hussein Musse Waddani, confessed that actual targets of the ‘Somali Coastal Defender’ had nothing to do with the real foreign predators. Despite his emphasis on the role, he confesses that “We don't target one type of ship”. It is quite contradictory to his initial emphasis on the role when he stated “We are the special guards of Somali coast, till to find an effective government I will keep my duty on my people and my country”. He was involved in hijacking the MV Bosphorus Prodigy on Dec. 16, 2008 with an estimated ransom of about one million USD. He is one of the Puntland Syndicate's members based in Eyl.




(See Appendix II.2 for data source and data compiling processes.)

7.8 CAPACITY BUILDING AND ORGANIZATIONAL EVOLUTION

Until the idea of the piracy business proved to be profitable, Afweyne and his companions, such as Boyah and Garaad, had to pass through a learning-by-doing process. A criminal kingpin is not made in one day. Criminals can build up their capacity only through actual participation and a learning-by-doing process (Kenney 2009). The newly organized 'Somali Coast Guards', as a start-up, needed to accumulate knowledge and capital. Until 2006, it was regarded simply as one of the coastal militias, as Afweyne was viewed as one of the competing warlords. Though Hansen (2009) argued that Afweyne organized the 'Coast Guard' as a venture business around 2003²⁴, the results were limited by its poor capacity and political pressures. In 2004, there were no successful hijack incidents in Somalia. In the next year, there were several noticeable hijacks, such as the MV Feisty Gas, the MV Semlow, and the MV Panagia.²⁵ However, the actual results²⁶ were not particularly lucrative until 2007.

This study measures the evolutionary process of Somali piracy organizations with scored multiple factors based on the systematic data analysis frames. There is a total of 14 components for measuring a degree of organizational development, which is largely divided into three sub-divisions such as organizational capacity (six components), financial capacity (three components), and network capacity (three components). There are more than 14 additional components to support the measurement. The analysis suggests that Somali piracy began to progressively evolve into a durable criminal enterprise with effective organizational practices from 2005.


7.8.1 Development of Organizational Capacity



(See Appendix II.2 for data source and data compiling processes.)

As chart 30 shows, organizational capacity did not reach its peak (8) until 2008. Though the mother ship tactic was used for 2005 incidents, it was a temporary measure. However, growing organizational capacity was reflected in variations of the mother ship tactics, such as multiple platform uses with hijacked vessels, hijacking a vessel for purely mother ship use, decoying purpose, and “sea hopping.” “Sea hopping” was first described in the MA Arzoo incident on 28 Feb., 2010 (Bahadur 2012: 143). Pirates used the ship to hijack another Indian dhow after they realized its damaged condition. The Indian dhow was also used to hijack a Seychellois fishing boat, Galate, which was again used to hijack an Iranian merchant ship, Al Abi. The pirates were eventually caught by the Seychellois coast guard. Another interesting sea-hopping tactic was applied when Somali pirates hijacked MV Blida and Hannibal II on 11 Nov., 2011 and MV Blida on 1 Jan., 2011. Garaad led the pirate syndicate that initially hijacked a Pakistan MSV on 9 Nov., 2010, which was used to hijack Hannibal II. Then, Hannibal II was used to hijack the

fishing vessel Kantari, which was used again to hijack two fishing vessels (Lakmali and Lakmali 03). Finally, they were used to hijack the MV Blida.




(See Appendix II.2 for data source and data compiling processes.)

Chart 31 shows the trends of pure mother ship use starting in 2009. Pure mothership means that Somali pirates hijack a small fishing vessel or a small MSV to use it purely as a mothership in order to hijack large commercial vessels. The trend was accelerated by increasing financial capacity, especially from 2008 onwards. The growing uses of mother ships also suggests that Somali piracy organizations could adapt to diverse contingent situations with longer and larger operational capabilities. Organization capacity could be further developed by earning a sizable ransom amount since 2007. When a pirate told Captain Perera of MV Rozen (hijacked on 2. Feb., 2007) that they were only interested in big ships, the words epitomized that they were neither coast guards nor local bandits anymore, but a well organized criminal venture deeply embedded in the ransom business.²⁷ Briefly, the charts suggest that the development of organizational capacity began in 2005 and reached its peak in 2008 when the Somali pirates

emerged as a potential threat to international maritime security through several notable incidents, such as BBC Trinidad (hijacked on Aug. 21, 2008), and MV Faina (hijacked on Sep. 25, 2008), and a very large crude oil carrier (VLCC) Sirius Star (hijacked on Nov. 15, 2008).


7.8.2 Evolution of Financial Capacity

The total ransom revenue was estimated to be more than USD four million in 2007, more than twice the previous year's earnings (USD \$1.85 million). However, the revenues of the following years dwarfed the previous earnings. In 2008, total ransom gains reached about USD \$30 million. In 2009, the Somali pirate organizations earned more than USD \$72 million (up to more than USD \$80 million). Bahadur (2010) estimates that this was more than four times Puntland's annual budget of USD \$18 million in 2009. In other words, it was enough money to corrupt and change local communities and their governance. It has been argued that Puntland became something akin to a narco-state (Menkhaus, 2009, 24) by creating a stable symbiosis (Shortland & Percy, 2010: 21) based on the criminal revenue. The revenue size reached a peak point in 2011, as chart 32 shows, since ransom deals from previous years were realized as the negotiation terms lengthened.



(See Appendix II.2 for data source and data compiling processes.)



Chart 33 shows that Somali piracy organizations reached the top level financial capacity from 2010 with the highest frequency of maximum financial capacity (38). Financial capacity is measured in three criteria as mentioned above. The highest point is three if an incident is valued with 1 in all three criteria. 38 incidents were evaluated with the highest value (3) in 2010. It resulted in the highest ransom based revenue (more than USD \$145 million) in 2011²⁸. Moreover, the pirate stock market, opened in the middle of 2009, provided an ample opportunity for potential participants beyond the local areas (Jorisch, 2011). It enabled the Somali people, including the global diaspora, to participate in the criminal enterprise, while enhancing the symbiotic relations between the criminal groups and the Somali people across regions and even countries.²⁹ It also led to the development of its network capacity.



(See Appendix II.2 for data source and data compiling processes.)

7.8.3 Network Capacity


This increasing financial capacity enabled the Somali pirate leaders to grow their network capacity in local communities and even in central politics. The increased network capacity helped the criminal enterprise to execute their operations for longer terms. Chart 35 demonstrates trends in the network capacity building. As mentioned above, the network capacity is evaluated in three criteria: negotiation period, outside connection, and involvement in multiple crimes. If an incident is evaluated in the highest network capacity, the score is 3. As bar chart 35 shows, 40 incidents were evaluated at the highest value 3 in 2010. As chart 34 shows, the longest detention days was 1773. It was FV Prantalay 12 incident which was hijacked on 18 April 2010. The ship was destroyed by Monsoon on July 12 2011 (Somalia Report 14 August 2011). Four Thais were released on 27 February 2015 (BBC 27 February 2015). This long hostage situation means that the longer the pirate organizations have to handle hijacked vessels and kidnapped crew, the more they need to utilize diverse resources based on the network capacity. It also implied the limitation of Somali piracy as explained in later chapter.



(See Appendix II.2 for data source and data compiling processes.)

The increased network capacity is also found in the number of incidents related to militia as shown in chart 36. As mentioned previously, there were crucial differences among militia related to piracy incidents before 2005 and those after 2005. In fact, there were no militia related piracy incidents from 2004 to 2009. The frequency suddenly soared in 2010. It turns out that Somali piracy organizations and leaders have managed a pragmatic network of ties with Al-Shabaab through their clan lines since 2010 by paying a cut of their ransom incomes³⁰. The UN

Monitoring Group Report (2011) describes this as “clan-based, pragmatic, and linked to specific geographic locations,” such as Haradheere and Kismayo. Chart 35 network capacity also shows the trend.



(See Appendix II.2 for data source and data compiling processes.)

Within the clan-based ties, Afweyne was the foremost figure capable of building a far-reaching and weak-tie network, even beyond Somali borders. In early September 2009, Afweyne and his pirate partners such as Gafanje, Garaad, and Boyah visited Libya to attend the ceremony celebrating Gaddafi's fortieth anniversary in power. Behind this strange tie, the hidden sponsor was 'Zakarie Hussein Arreh', who has been a key political figure in the Somali parliament of the TFG. Afweyne obtained a diplomatic passport from the presidential office of the Transitional Federal Government of Somali (FGS) in 2012. It allowed him to travel to Malaysia in April 2012 (UN Monitoring Report, 2014). According to the UN Monitoring Report (2014), Afweyne also exchanged emails involving financial transactions with Kamal Hahir Hassan 'Gutale', who is the former Chief of Staff of the FGS, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. He is known to be a

cousin of Afweyne. The wide network of weak ties became a crucial resource for further transformative evolution into other lucrative business areas such as piracy consultancy and the air transportation business.

7.8.4 Sub-Facilitators

In addition to the evolutionary process of Somali piracy organizations, there are several sub-facilitators that made the crime operation work quite smoothly. First, the unique nature of the Somali economy since the collapse of the Barre regime became a primary sub-facilitator. There are three pillars of the Somali economy: livestock, re-export, and remittances (Marchal 2012). The livestock trade with the Gulf States is crucial in the Somali economy (Majid 2010). Around 65 percent of employment in Somalia is linked in some way to the livestock sector and livestock exports, making up around 80 percent of Somalia's export earnings (FSNAU 2013). The economy of the self-claimed independent Somaliland is highly dependent on the exports of livestock through the Berbera port. The Bosaso port in Puntland state is another important route for the livestock trade. However, most coastal areas in Puntland and Galmudug do not directly benefit from the livestock trades. Thus, participating in piracy could provide another avenue to acquisition of money for the relatively poor areas. The second important component of the Somali economy is the re-export of imported goods to neighbor countries, such as Kenya and Ethiopia, for circumventing the high import duties across porous borders (Little, 2006; Umar & Baulch, 2007: 8). The conveyor belt role also provides an explanation of how Afweyne and his partners expanded their criminal enterprise into the logistics business in 2012.

Finally, remittance is an importance source of income for the Somali people, according to a 2013 Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit – Somalia (FSNAU-Somalia) report. Indeed,

more than 70 percent of the Somali people receive overseas remittances. The vulnerability in the Somali remittance system is that most Somali recipients receive such payments from only one overseas sender. This has critical implications: youths, or any member of a Somali family, could be recruitment targets as foot soldiers for Somali pirate gangs if they lose the lifeline. The impact of barring remittances on the lives of the Somali people would be huge unless Somalis find an alternative lifeline. The report states that the average remittance amount reportedly received in Somaliland (USD \$271/month) was much higher than in Puntland (USD \$98/month). It implies that there are more inducements for piracy activity in Puntland than in Somaliland since unemployed youths can be more easily lured into this lucrative criminal activity.

Secondly, there are also permissive inducements such as blurred lines between legal and illegal activities, relative poverty, positive rewards, and the unique money transfer system called *hawala or xawilaad*.³¹ As embeddedness of crime provides a fertile ground for the piracy groups for crossing blurred legal boundaries, the relative poverty in remote areas and positive rewards provide sufficient motivation for Somali youths to be involved in maritime crime. Additionally, the unique Somali money transfer system becomes a lubricating conduit, making the whole operation smooth from investment to redistribution of the proceeds.

Finally, porous borders with constant territorial disputes have enabled transnational criminals to easily move across the country's borders. The frequency of hijackings off the Somali coast began to soar in 2010. The Somali pirates could access most coastal areas of the Indian Ocean countries, including India. When Somali pirates hijacked the tanker Fairchem Bogey on August 20, 2011 they waited two weeks for an opportune moment for the hijacking within the seaport of Salalah, Oman. One of the farthest locations of Somali pirate activity occurred when hijackers used the three Thai fishing vessels Prantalay 11, 12, and 14 as operation

platforms at Minicoy Island near India, which is 2,700 kilometers away from Mogadishu. These incidents also indicate increasing operational capacity from 2009 onward.

Somali pirates even kidnapped a tourist in Kenya on September 11, 2011. A British tourist, Judith Tebbutt, was kidnapped from a hotel room at the Kiwayu Resort in Kenya, while her husband was beaten by the kidnappers. The kidnapping was committed by pirate groups of the Indian Ocean Network, a sub-branch of the Hobyo-Harardheere syndicate led by Afweyne. Tebbutt was released after 191 days with payment of a \$1.1 million USD ransom. Significantly, Al-Shabaab also took a cut of the ransom. The porous borders also give a clue to how the Somali criminal groups could build international logistic routes for smuggling a diversity of goods such as charcoal and the narcotic Khat.

Finally, the Somali global diaspora provided a sub-facilitator role. Somali diaspora networks have proven a highly effective transaction system, not just in money, but also in actual goods, including Khat, the charcoal trades, and even human trafficking (Marchal 2002;2006, Little 2006, Umar &Baulch 2007). According to the UN Monitoring group report (2014), there has been more than one and a half million (up to 1.8 million) Somali diaspora members moving regionally and globally since the collapse of the Barre regime in January 1991. A majority (about one million) of Somalis (as refugees in most cases) have migrated to neighboring countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya. The rest moved to Europe, the U.S., Canada, and some Middle Eastern countries (e.g., Yemen and UAE). The migration patterns also reflect the diversification of the Somali diaspora's composition. Somalis in refugee camps have rare opportunities to participate in the rebuilding processes of the collapsed state, but they become recruiting targets for the Islamic militant movements, such as AIAI, Hizbul Islam, and Al-Shabaab. On the other hand, Somali immigrants in rich countries have better access to the rebuilding process and also to

business opportunities. Many elite Somali diaspora members from the rich countries participated in the process. For example, the Puntland state President Abdirahman Farole (2009-2014) was a Somali immigrant in Australia. He was a doctoral candidate in Melbourne's La Trobe University (Bahadur 2011: 70). The first president of Somaliland and other major founding members were also immigrants in England. The global connections and influence of the Somali diaspora have also occurred in business areas such as coastal security, transportation, finance, and telecommunications (Nenova, 2005). Thus, it was not strange for the global Somali diaspora to become entangled in the Somali piracy business.

According to the UN Monitoring Report (2012), there are numerous transactions between pirates and the Somali diaspora. The report identified several financial transfers linked to Somali piracy hijack incidents, such as the MV Al Khaliq (2009), MV Orna (2010), MV Irene SL (2011), Zirku (2011), MV Rosalio D'Amato (2011), and MV Enrico Ievoli (2011). The World Bank Report on pirate financial trails (2013) also confirmed that negotiators received their service charge via overseas accounts, mostly in Dubai, by using the diaspora networks. For instance, in the cases of the MV Pompei and MV CEC Future, the negotiator required the ship owners to send money as their service charge to the overseas bank accounts in the UAE. In the case of the MV CEC Future, hijacked on November 7, 2008, US\$75,000 was wire transferred to the pirate negotiator in addition to US \$1.7 million in ransom (World Bank Report 2013).

This chapter explains what factors actually affected the evolution of Somali piracy, looking at various dimensions from global to local levels. It suggests that Somali piracy emerged out of complex dynamics. Changing circumstances indirectly affected the emergence of Somali piracy by weakening the regional regime security in the Horn of Africa. A state collapse provided a germinating environment for maritime crime in Somalia. However, it influenced it

through the subsequent governance crisis and the authority crisis in both central and local governments. In addition, the embeddedness of crime was a key factor actually facilitating the evolution of Somali piracy under the guise of the coastal defense role.

In the crime-embedded local communities, the roles of entrepreneurial leaders were crucial in the progressive development of piracy organizations as criminal enterprises. Sub-facilitators such as the unique natures of the Somali economy, permissive inducements, porous borders, and the role of global diaspora were also important. Therefore, this chapter demonstrates the dynamic evolution resulting from key causal factors. The next chapter demonstrates how the complex factors work together to render the evolutionary process toward the emergence of a criminal enterprise, which created a symbiosis with local communities.

8.0 DYNAMICS OF SOMALI PIRACY

8.1 EVOLUTIONARY CAUSAL MECHANISM

Somali piracy did not emerge in a vacuum, and explaining the complexity of its causes and effects is a significant challenge. It is a multidimensional phenomenon with diverse aspects, including a successful criminal entrepreneurial element that changed the operation of Somali piracy into a durable enterprise by utilizing organized violence as a source of capital accumulation. From the global to the local dimension and even to the micro dimension, there are congruent connections leading to the emergence of the Somali piracy enterprise. There is no single and stand-alone factor that entirely determines the nature of Somali piracy. A diversity of factors in various dimensions have operated together to create Somalia's unique piracy enterprise over the long period after the collapse of the Barre regime.

Global factors as wide common denominators do not directly influence the emergence of the Somali piracy enterprise. They work only through the regional security complex. The characteristics of the regional security complex in the Horn of Africa, including persistent rivalries among the regional states and neopatrimonialism, directly affect the authority crisis in the Somali central state, having fostered a chronic dependency on foreign aid. The rivalry has also contributed to the complexity of civil war situations that were already complicated by various power-seekers, including the Islamic militias and warlords. In turn, the constant power

struggles that attended the fragile state's formation led to the embeddedness of crime in local and even central governance. Thus, the regional security dynamics indirectly influenced the emergence of Somali piracy through the channels of crime-embedded local communities. Therefore, the embeddedness of crime in local communities in Puntland and Mudug directly provided a fertile soil for piracy activity from the second stage of the Somali piracy evolution.

Somali piracy was catalyzed into a business start-up by a violent entrepreneur, Afweyne, by promoting dual roles from the third stage onwards. The front role was to play up the coastal defender image thereby exploiting the rage of the Somali people in coastal communities. However, the real role was to find a durable business enterprise by exclusively focusing on ransom earning through the sophisticated operations of hijacking vessels and kidnapping crews. The start-up business model proved to be fruitful from 2007 with the learning-by-doing process. By building up their organizational capacity based on trial-and-error maritime criminal activity, Somali pirates earned enough revenue to change local governance. They did so by enhancing their network capacity through the unique clan structure and presence of clan members in both local and even central governments. Finally, Somali piracy reached its summit in terms of overall capacity and total ransom revenue during the fourth stage, which signified the emergence of the Somali piracy enterprise as a criminal business entity. However, the Somali piracy enterprise has showed critical limits since 2011, such as increasing complications from increasing anti-piracy efforts, a decreasing success rate, and falling profits. Nevertheless, some of the pirates successfully transformed their criminal activities into semi-legal ones, such as private security guard services for illegal fishing and the Air Transportation Company.





Figure 1. Causal Mechanism Model

The figure above shows vividly how the factors work together through the evolutionary stages. The evolutionary causal mechanism of the Somali piracy enterprise is a result of a complex dynamic process of multiple factors in various dimensions (global, local, and individual). It is not a criminal unit that suddenly popped up on the open seas. It is rather a salient manifestation of dynamic characteristics of the regional security complex and Somali state re-formation. Each factor is an insufficient but non-redundant (Mackie 1998) part of the complex process that created the Somali piracy enterprise. Each part is also unnecessary in itself to achieve the final outcome, Somali piracy enterprise. However, each part contributed to the criminal enterprise, either directly or indirectly.

8.2 FULL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOMALI PIRACY ENTERPRISE



(See Appendix II.2 for data source and data compiling processes.)

Somali piracy reached the peak of its growth in 2010. Nourished by the governance crisis, its advancement was further boosted by the progressive capacity-building from the sub-facilitators. In 2010, Somali piracy was responsible for 104 of a total 262 attempted incidents. There were 93 successful hijacking incidents in East African regions, which led to 38 ransom-gaining incidents. These brought in about \$145 million USD in 2011.³² As chart 37 shows, the enterprise type of piracy recorded 63 hijacking incidents (about 68% of the total). Another trend in Somali piracy capacity shows that the average score of piracy incidents was highest (9.08) in 2010. Fourteen incidents of the enterprise type of piracy incidents were recorded with a high score of 14. The year 2010 was a golden one for Somali piracy, having matured into what appeared to be a durable business enterprise.

Somali pirates were systematically organized based on rules of business operation and their expertise and function. They also developed their own innovative tactics (Smith 1980: 376) such as use of motherships, sea hopping, and negotiation skills. The innovative tactics enabled them to adapt to quickly changing circumstances. Somali pirate groups demonstrated their adaptive capability through skillful tactics. Pirates and experts were often recruited beyond the narrow sub clan lines. Yare, the notorious negotiator, worked for both the Puntland and Hobyo-Haradheere syndicates, though he had clan ties to the Puntland syndicate. Overall leadership styles were highly business oriented with a strong preference for low costs and high returns. The success of the Somali piracy business enabled Somali pirates to influence politics and governance in local communities such as Eyl, Garacad, Hobyo, and Haradheere. It also involved multiple crime activities such as using phantom ships³³, kidnapping on land, and maintaining criminal ties with other organizations including Al-Shabaab.

Somali pirate organizations show the four defining elements of a criminal organization: durability, hierarchy, involvement in multiple crimes, and function of government (Hill 2006: 8). Somali piracy successfully evolved into a mature enterprise by demonstrating the profitable cycles of operation. The major pirate leaders developed a business-oriented management hierarchy that allowed them to commit multiple crimes. Some of them even successfully transformed their activity into other legal or semi-legal business areas. Finally, the Somali piracy industry offered government functions, such as coastal protection, the creation of service jobs, and provision of social welfare by sharing their ransom cuts with the local community. Therefore, Somali piracy became an entrenched part of local community affairs and governance by creating a powerful symbiosis.

For analytical purposes, this study compares the stages by several features. The five stages are examined not only in terms of the changing status of Somali piracy, but also in terms of the distinctive forms of state collapse and reconstruction. This analytical scheme will identify the congruent patterns, causal factors, and their working mechanisms. Table 21, figure 2, and 3 summarily show key features and leading organizations along the evolutionary stages of Somali piracy from 1991 to 2013. In the progressive process, the changing natures of the coastal defender role show that it is a core converter between legal and illegal activity. The role was in a gray area during the initial periods of the Somali civil wars and mini-state formations (between the first and second stages of the evolution). That role was gradually replaced as the civil war became complicated during the third stage. The role was completely fulfilled by Somali piracy action groups during the 4th (booming) stage, when local governance in several mini-states, such as Puntland and Galmudug, fell into crisis. It was a result of a progressive evolution in which Somali criminal entrepreneurs successfully exploited the particular nature of Somali lawlessness through the crime networks embedded in the local communities. Militarized clannism (Samatar 2013), based on Somalia's unique pastoral democracy (Issse-Salwas 1994, Lewis 2002), contributed to the rapid growth of piracy action groups during the fourth stage, in which loose syndications among the competing clans became a natural form.

Table 21. Key Features of the Evolutionary Stages of Somali Piracy

| Stage/feature | Governance Issues | Coastal Defender | Pirates | Stakeholders | Characteristics |
|---------------|--|---|--|---|--|
| 1.Embryonic | State Failure | Privateers | F.T.P & Militia | Militia | Opportunistic Thug & Semi-legal Privateers |
| 2.Seeding | Failed State Reconstruction | Privateers | Privateers & Marine alliance | Local Militia & Warlords | Experienced Pirates with privateer experience |
| 3.Startup | TFG vs. the UIC & Fragile Governance | Privateers Marine Alliance NVCG | FTP Ex-Govt. Officer | Local Militia, Warlords & Criminal Entrepreneur | A Startup Venture Form with face cover of Coastal Defender |
| 4.Booming | TFG vs. Al-Shabaab & Defunct Governance | Piracy Syndicates with Clan ties | FTP Ex-Govt Officer Businessmen Militia | Local Militia Businessmen Elders & Politicians Diaspora | Highly Organized Influx of Large Ransom Revenue Symbiosis with local community |
| 5.Decaying | FGS vs Al-Shabaab Re-Building Governance | PMPF with Somali Marine Force Private Security Guards | F.T.P Ex-Govt. Officer Businessmen Militia Warlord | Local Militia &Elders Criminal Entrepreneur Local Politician Warlords Islam Militia | -Complication -Losing Grounds -Effective Anti-Piracy |

Evolution of Somali Piracy Organization




Figure 2. Evolution of Somali Piracy Organizaitons along the five stages

8.3 COMPLEX ARCHITECTURE AND DYNAMICS

The following picture of Somali piracy operations and organizations illuminate the complex dynamics of Somali piracy. The overall operation of Somali ransom piracy is divided into five steps. Fundraising is the first step for making seed money to prepare primary items such as speed boats, weapons, food, fuel, and equipment for navigation and hijack operations. Hansen (2009: 35) suggests three types of investment structures, which are essentially related to the sharing structure of ransom: single, shareholder, and incorporation-style multi-shareholder type. Single investors as single owners prepare all the necessary money and equipment. The single investor can take at least 50% of the ransom revenue or more. A pirate investor and leader 'Geography' earned \$1.3 million USD (about 68%) out of \$1.9 million USD ransom from hijacking MV Saldanha on February 22, 2009. However, the multi-shareholder styles, including the incorporation style, became a major type of investment structure around 2008. From 2009, the fundraising channels became more diversified through the piracy stock market in Haradheere. 72 piracy companies were listed, and it was expected that local communities would benefit by promoting participation in investment channels (Reuter Dec.1.2009). The multi-shareholder style of investment as in the form of a modern capitalistic incorporated company, however, is a double-edged sword. It helps increase local participation in sharing the jackpot money. It also caused chronic conflicts over the ransom sharing issue because of the difficulty of managing the complicated interest structure with different participants.




Figure 3. Complex Dynamics of Somali Ransom Piracy Enterprise Operation

Training, the second step, became important as Somali piracy was organized under the startup venture principle from 2003. Two aspects of the operation were important in the training step: navigation and the hijacking itself. In navigation, veteran seamen are important human resources for training and actual operations on the sea in hijacking operations. Masquerading pirates as a coast guard unit became a basic approach to targeting ships because it provided cover for the hijack crime and enabled smoother operations where a normal coast guard was virtually non-existent. Thus, the roles of veteran pirates as former seamen and ex-employees of the private security coast guard are important. Boyah and Garaad were veteran pirates who had backgrounds working as key trainers. Later, they became prominent pirate leaders as Afweyne's enterprise grew.

The third state is the most thrilling and risky step in the operation. A unit of hijacking pirates consists of multiple parts, not just in the pirates' roles, but also in the roles of skiff commanders. As a piracy venture becomes organized for the particular goal of hijacking vessels

to gain ransom, the role of the commander requires multiple capabilities. First, the commander should be acquainted with sea navigation and allocates available resources. One unit of the sea operations team is usually loaded with about one week (up to ten days) of supplies (Bahadur 2011: 232). If the team were lucky enough to find prey within one week, the pirates do not have to worry about losing their way back home. The one-week supply is not enough to bring them back to their home base, for example, from the IRTC (Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor), where international commercial vessels often become prey for the sea hunter. In other words, sea operations are quite dangerous. The hunting team also bears the risk of exposure to international naval forces. If the venturing team runs out of supplies, they hijack a small fishing vessel, usually from Yemen and Iran, or an MSV from Pakistan and India. They use the vessels as their mothership for multiple purposes—such as resupplying, hiding, and decoying. For international vessels, including the naval ships, they look like an ordinary group of fishermen or seamen so that the hunters may failed to anticipate an attack from them. The sea hunter could then catch lonely and vulnerable prey. It is rare to use advanced navigation and spotting tools such as GPS trackers. They usually rely on their own eyes by watching 360 degrees while floating on the open sea. Their preferred targets are big commercial vessels with a low freeboard moving at slow speed and with a large amount of cargo.

When Somali pirates find and approach a target vessel, they shoot several warning shots, shouting their justified purpose of protecting the Somali coast and catching the ship for its illegal trespassing. If the vessels do not yield to their warning, the pirate ship silently approaches a blind spot of the target ship while distracting the attention of the target's bridge by spraying bullets. The first climber, using the specially made hooked ladder to board the target ship, is awarded extra bonuses such as doubled salary and a luxury SUV car. The hunting field commander needs

another capability: speaking basic English. He commands his fellow pirates to search all the crew and gather them at one controlling place, claiming their justified purpose for the capture. The commander has to communicate with both crews and the central committee of pirate organizations simultaneously, while also controlling all outside communication from the crews. Looting the supplies on the hijacked ship and the personal property of its crew is pretty normal. After confirming the successful hijacking, the commander contacts his leader groups, inquiring about their possible anchoring places. The leader group consisting mostly of investors and pirate leaders tries to acquire a safe dock because it is highly critical not just for securing the captured crews, but ultimately for prevailing in the negotiation process that can be protracted. Here, the situation begins to be a little complicated because the hijacking commander has to deal with multiple stakeholders such as the shipper side (including crew), the pirate side (including central leader groups on land), and even counter-piracy forces that could nullify the prize of their life-risking venture. The commander also should monitor whether the vessel is moving toward the pirates' anchoring place as commanded because the captains of the hijacked ships often try to detour to earn extra time until the arrival of international naval forces. This is the exact hoax skill that Captain Philips used during the successful rescue operation by U.S. naval forces. Thus, if the field commander fails to control all possible situations, he could eliminate the possibility of securing a large ransom, and he and his crewmembers could be killed or arrested, as the MV Maersk Alabama incident demonstrated well.

The anchoring and negotiating step is the most complicated of the entire operation. As the right side of figure 3 show, the complex dynamics between multiple stakeholders lead to scenes of heightened tensions and conflicts between them. The role of the attacker group (*Xeebjoog* in Somali) ends at the moment of ransom-sharing. The orchestrating role of the

operation is handed to the pirate leader group. Among them, the roles of the pirate leader, such as Afweyne, Boyah, Yulux, and Yare, are indispensable. First, they should have vast networks of local and even central sponsors such as local political leaders and government officers in order to safeguard the whole complex ransom acquiring operation. Second, they should lead the central committee to facilitate the ransom negotiation process. According to Bahadur's interview with pirate leader Boyah, the local elders and sponsors also participate in the committee meetings (Bahadur 2011: 13-24). There is no orthodoxy of leadership because participants are concerned only with their own interests, based on their status, while pretending they are not participants in piracy crime. The pirate leaders must manage the diverse interests of local leaders and, simultaneously, the complex dynamics of the ransom negotiation operation with the multiple stakeholders.

The negotiations and hostage management are supported by multiple expert service groups such as negotiator (*dilals* in Somali) and holder groups (*illalo* in Somali). In order to facilitate the negotiation process, Somali pirates use a diversity of violent and threatening methods to control hostages such as beatings, exposure to full daytime heat on deck, performing mock executions, and even killing a hostage if the negotiation is not going well. Showing a Janus face, negotiators try to assure hostages that they can be trusted while pretending to care about them. They use various psychological tactics such as helping crew call their families, making death threats for non-cooperation, and seducing them with rewards. The Iranian crew of a hijacked fishing vessel was rewarded after they cooperated during the pirate hijack operation MV Polar, as described in the VLCC Samho Dream incident profile. Hostages have also been used as double bargaining chips to release imprisoned pirate comrades, as described in the incident profiles of VLCC Maran Centaurus, MV Asian Glory, and MT Asphalt Venture. Thus,

the hostages are negotiation levers for diverse purposes at the cost of their lives and often have to bear considerable pain and misery.

During the negotiation period, diverse social and financial service groups provide necessary functions to manage the hostage situation. Most consumption by pirates and even hostages (e.g., curing injured hostages) is paid based on credit. Money lenders and accountants provide the financial service. The role of the accountant is also important in counting the value of hijacked cargo and kidnapped crews, which helps set the possible ransom amount. The accountants also book all the expenses of the whole operation and work as money counters and dividers after the ransom is delivered. Social service groups also provide important daily management functions such as a supply of the narcotic leaf khat, cooks, and providers of daily needs, including medical care.

In the final step of obtaining the ransom, letting the crew go, and releasing the vessel, it is not always a happy ending, as often depicted in the celebration parties. Bloody gun fights over the lion's share of the ransom have become increasingly frequent since 2009 as amounts and the number of stakeholders has increased. The symbiotic structure of the Somali piracy enterprise was, for a while, maintained by the cycle of re-investment in the launch of other hijacking operations. Ordinary pirates consume the earnings mostly within six months by enjoying luxuries such as cars, alcohol, khat, and women. After they spend all the money, the foot soldiers join another life-risking operation. However, the leaders spend their money on different things such as bribes and social donations totaling about 5-10% of the ransom (*Qaraan* in Somali). In addition to reinvesting ransom revenue into hijacking operations, pirates invest it in lawful enterprises such as real estate, equipment lending, loans,

and even the founding of transportation enterprises. Central Air Aviation led by Somali pirate kingpin Afweyne is one of the center pieces of the investment portfolio.




Figure 4. Symbiotic Structure of Somali Piracy Enterprise
(See Appendix X for complimentary information about two major piracy syndicates in Somalia)

The whole operational process and the architecture of the Somali piracy syndicate reflect their symbiotic relationship with the local community and governance as depicted in the picture above, especially in northern and south-central Somalia. The organizational structure and operation are managed under a loose syndication among various participants based on contract and clan kin lineage. Though the clan lineage posits as a core interlocutor of the loose syndicate, functional contracts often breach the clan barrier as a result of the enterprise principle set initially by Afweyne: keeping costs low while seeking maximum profit. It is why expert negotiators, as key middlemen such as Yare and Shinbin, could work beyond the clan line by using their proven expertise.

Thus, the organizational architecture is largely divided into three different classes: leader group, service group with middlemen, and foot soldiers at the bottom of the predatory food chain. The targets of Somali piracy might have similar class structures. The shipping company, investor of the company, and counter-piracy commanders are in the leader class. The expert negotiator company, insurance company, law firm, and delivery agents work as middlemen. Finally, the crew members and their families reside at the bottom of the hierarchy, while enduring the most traumatic suffering from the hijacking ordeals. According to a report (One Earth 2016), 25.77 percent of the hostages have suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The majority of the crew were from developing or poor countries such as the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. Similarly, most of the foot soldiers in Somali piracy who risk their lives on the open sea were recruited from poor urban and rural areas such as Galkayo, Eyl, Hobyo, and Harardheere. They are between 20 and 40 years old with low-literacy and an elementary education. Some of them have no formal educational background due to the prolonged civil war. Though they were recruited through clan ties, the clan lineage might make them blind to their lot in the hierarchy of Somali piracy. In the long-term war economy of Somalia, those illiterate and unemployed youths who have hardly had normal lives can be easily lured to the risky ventures or the Islamic military factions. In reality, they barely escape their vicious life cycles. At best, they are arrested and sent to a rich western country where they can enjoy hunger-free daily life in prison. At worst, they are simply dead after being drowned in the open sea or shot to death by law enforcement.

However, the leader group members mostly do not have to risk their lives. Pirate leaders like Afweyne, who is well-connected to local governance and politics, have been able to thrive. Some of them, among leaders (such as Afweyne and Garfanje) in the Hobyo-Harardheere

syndicates, even successfully transformed their activity into other legalized enterprises. In other words, Somali pirate leaders with the capacity for networking and using connections are like modern company CEOs (chief executive officers), demonstrating their executive capabilities through the ransom business. In other words, the structure and operations of Somali piracy may be quite similar to modern capitalism.

8.4 EVOLVING RELATIONS WITH MILITIA GROUPS

As the table below shows, there have been evolving relations between Somali pirates and militia groups. Before 2010, there were about 20 incidents which were tied to militia groups. The most relevant group was the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), which was one of the major rebel groups against the Barre regime and also a foundational military group in the Puntland State. One of the major leaders was Abdullahi Yusuf, who was the first president of the Puntland State. Another group was Al-Itihad al-Islam (AIAI) led by Hasan al-Turki and Dahis Awyeh³⁴ who were related to piracy incidents in 1998 and in 1999. However, there was no direct organizational link between the Somali piracy and militia groups. Incidents were occasionally committed by factions within the political militia groups under the name of coastal defense.

Table 22. Features of Relation to Militia and Politicians

| State | Governor | Tied Militia | Militia Leader | Clan Tie | Piracy Group |
|-----------------|--|-------------------------------|--------------------------|--|---|
| Puntland | Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed :1998-2004 | SSDF | Abdullahi Yusuf & | Sub Clans of Majerteen | Puntland Pirates |
| Himan & Heeb | Mohamed Aden Tiiceey :2008-2013 | Hizbul Islam & Al-Shabaab | Aden Hashi Farah Ayro | Habar Gidir Saleeban sub clan of Hawiye | Hobyo- Haradheere Syndicates & IOC |
| Jubaland | Ahmed Mohamed Islam (Madobe): 2010-Present | Hizbul Islam & Ras Kamboni | Madobe | Ogaden Darod | Hobyo- Haradheere Syndicates & IOC |

As Somali pirates have created a symbiosis with the local community, a coexistence pattern has emerged through the clan linkages. A total of 19 incidents were related to the organizational links between the Somali piracy syndicates and the Islamic militant groups such as Al-Shabaab and Ras Kamboni. Of those, the Ras Kamboni militia led by Sheikh Ahmed Mohamed Islam ‘Madobe’ was involved in at least half the incidents.


First, both organizations share an image of the defender role in Somalia. As Al-Shabaab was projected as the state’s lone defender (Marchal, 2009), piracy was also seen as a coastal defender against outside plunderers (Menkhaus, 2009). Second, the defender image was also leveraged by the complicated civil war situations since 2007. Both groups could successfully exploit the entangled conflict situation for their rise (Barnes and Haruun 2007). Third, the role of the diaspora was also similar. In Somali piracy operations, members of the diaspora participated as financiers and often facilitators. One of the leading piracy facilitators was Mohamed Aden Tiiceey, who was a U.S. citizen and the first president of the Himan & Heeb state. There were also many active participants in both organizations from the diaspora groups in several western countries such as the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Finally, clan lineage and

clan rivalry do matter in both violent organizations (Hansen, 2008). Among the clan lineages, the Habar Gidir clan link in central Somali regions, such as Galmudug and Mogadishu, is at the center of the connection. As a representative leader of Al-Shabaab, Aden Hashi Farah Ayro (Hansen, 2008) shares the same clan lineage with major leaders of the Hobyo-Haradheere piracy syndicate. Hasan Abdi Afweyne, who is the most successful Somali pirate leader, also hails from the same clan lineage. Another clan link is found in the Ali Saleeban clan (a sub-subclan of Darod Majerteen) in the Puntland state. Sheik Abdul Qadir Muumin, as an ideological leader of Al-Shabaab Northeast, shares a clan link with major pirate leaders such as Yulux and Aargoosto in the Puntland piracy syndicates (UN Monitoring Report 2013).

Thus, the evolving relations resulted in the organizational links between them by the pirates providing a share of the ransom money. Since Hizbul Islam conquered Haradheere in May 2010, the Islamic militant could control the pirate enclave. After Hizbul Islam was merged into Al-Shabaab, the latter group effectively began to tax and coordinate pirates under their control. Unlike their predecessor group³⁵, they chose co-existence due to their financial strain from defeats suffered in Mogadishu during the 2010 Ramadan Offensive. Therefore, the political developments arising from the complicated civil war situation ironically enabled two apparently different violent groups to exist together through the clan link by sharing the ransom revenue. Therefore, the embeddedness of crime that came out of the entangled political situations created a shared space for the violent criminals, enabling them to profit together.

8.5 LIMITS OF SOMALI PIRACY

The benefits of the learning-by-doing process began to erode from early 2011. Chart 38 shows the declining ransom-gaining incident trend since 2009. The portion of ransom gaining incidents peaked in 2008 (representing 28.9% of total piracy incidents in East Africa). It began to decline from 2009 (15.6%). The rate of ransom gaining incidents in relation to the total number of hijack incidents also continued to decrease from 2009 (from 88% in 2008 to 65.5% in 2009). The declining trends indicate that real profitability was already on the decrease from 2009, although the amount of ransom revenue continued to grow until 2011 when Somali pirates earned about \$145.14 million.



(See Appendix II.2 for data source and data compiling processes.)

When pirate groups fought each other over the ransom after they hijacked the MV Blida on January 1, 2011 it signified the limits of Somali piracy. Pelton (2011) described the incident in terms of several key declining features such as curbing profits from ransom; evacuating pirate enclaves as a result of an increasing anti-piracy stance in the local community; and the increasing

difficulty of hijacking operations. Piracy became a less attractive criminal activity because Somali piracy had entered a vicious cycle. Thus, the internal and external constraints made Somali piracy activity contract. Internally, as the number of participants and shareholders increased, as shown in the picture of the complex dynamics of Somali piracy, increasing complications created various counter-effects.

First, gang fights over ransom frequently occurred between different clan-based pirate groups. Reportedly, there were at least three clan-based gang fights over ransom during negotiations in 2011, including the hijacking of the MV Savina Caylan, the MV Polar, and the kidnapping of Buchanan and Thisted on land. The MV Savian Cayln was hijacked on February 8, 2011 by a joint syndicate of the Saad Clan (a sub-clan of Hawiye) and the Omar Mohamud (a sub-clan of Majerteen) under the leadership of Ilyaaas (a notorious pirate leader who hailed from Muradade clan, a sub-clan of Hawiye). According to a Somalia report (2011), the gang fight erupted after Ilyaaas's group released the Indian hostages of the ship with \$11.5 million USD. The fight occurred among the three clan based groups. They had invested more than \$2 million USD in the operation. This event signified the internal limits of the Somali piracy business.³⁶

The MV Polar was hijacked on October 30, 2010 by a joint syndicate between the Indian Ocean Consultation Company (IOC - an offshoot of the Hobyo-Haradheere syndicate led by Afweyne) and the Puntland Syndicate using the VLCC Samho Dream³⁷ and an Iranian fishing boat as mother ships. Garfanje (from the IOC) and Hayle (from Puntland Syndicate) led the operation as leader groups, while Rage (IOC) and Lobster (Puntland) participated as investors. The ship and the crew were released on August 26, 2011 after a ransom of \$7.7 million USD was paid. The two groups had fought over the ransom amount in July 2011, but the seeds of the conflict germinated in late 2010, the height of the Somali piracy activities.

The kidnapping of two aid workers, Jessica Buchanan and Pual Thisted³⁸, on October 25, 2011 also signified another critical limit to Somali piracy. They were kidnapped by the Hobyo-Haradheere syndicate led by Said Harawo. A group with another syndicate led by Said Harawo hijacked the *Albedo* and used it as a multipurpose platform for the piracy operation. The pirate gangs fought over the use of the *Albedo*, as Harawo was using it to imprison the aid workers. Besides this incident, there have reportedly been five more land-based kidnapping incidents since 2011, including the kidnappings of Judith Tebbut (Sept 11, 2011), Marie Dedieu (September 17, 2011), Serra and Thiebaut (October 14, 2011), Michael Scott Moore (Jan 6, 2012), and two Kenyan workers with one Somali doctor (July 10, 2012). Except for the kidnapping incident of the Kenyan workers in 2012, all the reported incidents were committed by Somali pirate syndicates.

Second, as the gang fights continued to occur throughout 2011 and 2012³⁹, the overall cost and number of casualties increased with the lengthy negotiation periods that had become more common since 2010. Among 1,581 hostages in 2011, there were 13 injured and eight killed. In the *MV Orna* incident (hijacked on December 20, 2010), a warning kill occurred during the negotiation process. Somali pirates also often lost their ships with foot soldiers aboard. Six pirate boats were reported missing on December 12, 2011 (Somalia Report 2012). These trends signaled a violation of the Somali piracy management principles such as the rules regarding controlled violence and cost efficiency, which were initially established by the pioneer entrepreneur, Afweyne. The prolonged operations in both sea and land imposed higher costs and casualties on Somali pirate operations, and the Somali piracy business became less profitable.

Thirdly, the increasing complications and tendency toward violence brought local resistance. After Abdul Rahman Mohamed Farole was elected as president in Puntland, he

declared his commitment to eliminate piracy in January 2009. He launched several progressive campaigns with international assistance. First, he increased salaries for law enforcement positions. For example, the salary for a court judge was increased from \$80 USD per month to \$200 USD per month⁴⁰. He also enhanced prison facilities in Bosaso after agreements with several countries such as France, Russia and Egypt in which they allegedly handed over pirate suspects to Puntland. (ABC News 3 Jan. 2009).

The situation reports in Bargal⁴¹ and Garacad in Puntland showed that the Somali pirates were gradually being expelled from the local communities. In 2011, about 200 pirates were active in the Bari areas of Puntland. Somali pirates were reported as stealing many local fishing boats, up to 19 in 2011. This raised serious concerns in most coastal towns. (Somaliareport March 18, 2011). Pirates began to be unwelcome by the local communities. While the pirates were playing a hide-and-seek game with Puntland law enforcement, the local community finally established the Bargal Anti-Piracy Committee in early 2011. Bargal and Garacad as a crime-embedded local community had been a pirate haven until 2010. The coastal towns began to dis-embed the embeddedness of crime by themselves after experiencing damage. The Bargal Anti-Piracy Committee agreed on seven articles to prohibit any piracy-related activity, including no weapons, alcohol, or drugs. (Somalia Report Feb.21.2011).

Garaad was a well-known pirate leader, who hailed from the Isse Mohamoud clan (a sub-clan of Majerteen) and whose hometown was Garacad. He was a respected fisherman-turned pirate leader who worked his way up the ladder from being a pirate foot soldier to an independent leader by successfully hijacking more than 10 international commercial vessels. In December 2011, however, Garaad-led pirate groups were forced to leave the Garacad area because of the

anti-piracy trends after serial attacks from the Puntland law enforcement. Now, the criminal leader was unwelcome in his hometown.

Additionally, recovery of the fishing industry in the coastal towns decreased the chance for Somali youths to participate in criminal activity. The Puntland state began to offer training for fishermen and identified them with a new identification mark through which international counter-piracy and local coast guards could tell their identity (Somaliareport October 17, 2011). As a positive result, the coastal town's fishing revenue increased beginning in 2012 (Somalia Report April 30, 2012).

Externally, the international counter-piracy measures began to be more effective, at least from 2011. Besides the impact of the international naval forces, there were many interesting incidents in the attacking trends. Somali piracy activity basically relied on asymmetric warfare against the large naval vessels from various international states. Interestingly, there were many mistaken attacks on the naval vessels by the Somali pirates from 2009 onward. Those incidents also showed their limited operational capabilities.

From the shippers' side, following the Best Management Practice Instructions (BMPI) actually helped crews expel the pirates from their vessels (Hansen 2012). Various security installations⁴² and armed security guards also contributed to the self-defense measures against the sea bandits. One of them, the use of citadels and private security guards, turned out to be highly effective (BBC Nov 29, 2012)⁴³. For instance, when Somali pirates boarded the MV Beluga Fortune on 24 October 2010, they failed to open the citadel. The crew could communicate with naval forces. The next day, the pirates abandoned their hijacking operation when a warship arrived.

Thus, the effective internal and external measures made Somali piracy activity unsuccessful, while pirate leaders had to fight each other to cope with the increasing cost and risk. Somali piracy business was becoming unprofitable. In 2011, the number of piracy incidents decreased to 80 from 104 in 2010. The number continued to fall to 36 in 2012, and finally dropped to 12 in 2013. The declining trends are also shown in the decreasing numbers of released ships and hostages, accompanied by shrunken revenue. In 2012, pirates released a total of 36 ships, down from 88 in 2011. The total revenue also fell from about \$145 million USD in 2011 to about \$36 million USD in 2012. The dropping trend continued in 2013 when the Somali pirates earned \$21 million USD by releasing a total of eight vessels with 114 hostages. There were no successful ransom-gaining piracy incidents in 2013 in the East African region.

Finally, major pirate leaders were arrested or chased out of their enclaves. Boyah was finally captured after his group, with other syndicate leaders, hijacked the MV Iceberg 1 on March 29, 2010. Boyah was regarded as a founding father of Somali piracy (Bahadur 2011). He was arrested by Puntland law enforcement during the rescue operation. Garaad was also captured by Iranian forces when his group attempted to hijack a cargo ship near the Iranian coast.⁴⁴ Finally, the Somali pirate kingpin Afweyne, the most successful pirate on top of the criminal food chain, was arrested on October 13, 2013 by the FBI and Belgian law enforcement at the Brussels international airport. He and his partner Mohamed Aden Tiiceey were lured to the airport for filming a fake documentary, a joint covert operation.

Somali piracy was dis-embedded from local community and governance. However, as explained in the evolutionary stages chapter, piracy has not completely disappeared. Though Afweyne and Tiiceey went to the law enforcement court, their business empire is still running actively under the leadership of Afweyne's son. It is questionable where the remnants of the

Somali piracy groups survived, as most of them disappeared or changed their modus vivendi to serve as private guards for the illegal fishing industry in Puntland. This question can be answered by reconstructing an understanding of Somali piracy - not as a transient criminal activity - but as a multi-dimensional phenomenon and a salient manifestation of the regional and local dynamics.

In this chapter, the working process of the causal mechanism model is vividly explained with illustrations of the Somali piracy organizations. It clearly demonstrates that Somali piracy is a byproduct of the complex dynamics of the various factors in the contexts of the state-reformation process since the collapse of the Barre regime in 1991. The interconnections between the evolution of Somali piracy and the state re-formation process are also evident in the evolving relations of the Somali piracy organization to militia groups including Al-Shabaab. Finally, this chapter explains why Somali piracy began to decay in 2011. The Somali ransom piracy business could not be sustained with the increasing complications and risks and falling profits. The overall implications of Somali piracy and its evolution is discussed in the next chapter.

9.0 IMPLICATIONS OF SOMALI PIRACY

9.1 POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS: RE-UNDERSTANDING SOMALI PIRACY

Somali piracy has been viewed as a serious maritime crime, but also as a stereotypical result of state failure. Somalia has been labeled as a prime example of state failure (Langford 1999: 61; Menkhaus 2007a: 68). A few scholars have already pointed out the historical normality of state failures (Tilly 1975, 1992; Eisenstadt 2003, 1998). However, the label strongly implies that the disease should be cured or fixed in pathological and normative terms (Verhoeven 2009). The stereotype of Somalia has also been applied to most African states, portraying them as deviant others of western societies (Hill 2005). The scientifically packaged terms of the state failure, such as a failed state index and world governance indicator, have also contributed to the reification of the state reality as a perverted one (Tilly 2004). In fact, the distorted images of African states are not in the minds of the objects, African states and peoples, but in the eyes and orientation of the subjects, the western viewers (Young 1994). The orthodoxy of the failed state paradigm has misled them to the fallacy of short-sighted policies toward Somalia without paying attention to the complicated background of a complex situation (Bilgin & Morton 2004; Simons & Tucker 2007).

Somali piracy has been understood as a natural outcome resulting from a failed state because Somali pirates seemingly are not concerned with legal enforcement or punishments. In

other words, as Buzan (2000) suggests, Somali piracy has been securitized in the eyes of the outside forces, which have called forth extraordinary countermeasures. The costly maintenance of international naval forces epitomizes the extraordinary nature of counter piracy actions. Many studies of Somali piracy have emphasized the dangers of Somali piracy regarding its chain effects on regional economy and security. The increase of many living expenses and food prices is presumed to have been caused by the influx of ransom money. The Somali piracy business is also believed to have expanded its criminal areas to other illegal activities such as smuggling, human trafficking, and even funding for Al-Shabaab. Thus, the criminal businesses are regarded as a rudimentary factor in the interruption of Somali nation-building.

Some aspects of the ransom influence are true. For example, Somali pirates paid up to three times the regular price for *khat* (normally \$50 per kilogram). However, other accusations are dubious. Reports of the UNODC (2012) and the World Bank (2013) disprove the putative arguments. In fact, the price hikes of living expenses and other goods were rather caused by other natural and human disasters and errors. One of the real aspects of the economic trouble is that hyperinflation was a chronic problem even before the regime collapsed. There are several contextual factors behind the economic troubles.

First, Somalia has experienced a series of natural disasters, such as the 2004 tsunami and frequent droughts. The natural disasters were a rudimentary cause of the price increases. Second, trade in Somalia has been largely monitored and controlled by regional international monitoring regimes, such as the UN Security Resolution series for an arms embargo and the ban on the charcoal trade. These trade barriers also increased prices. Third, smuggling and human trafficking are much older criminal businesses than the piracy in Somalia, as reported by the UNDOC 2012. Finally, those smuggling businesses also contributed to the price increase. Of

course, some Somali piracy leaders joined the illegal trafficking business. However, the size of their participation is relatively insignificant in the overall scales of the illegal economies in the entire Horn of Africa (UNDOC 2012). Moreover, Somali piracy organizations and their main figures have not actively participated in the military Islamic movement of Al-Shabaab. They have rather taken the role of logistic supplier and have provided partial funding for the protection of their businesses. Historically, rent or racketeering are not new in terms of relations between political-military organizations and criminal organizations.

The results of this study explicitly challenge the simple image of Somali piracy as a result of state failure. Of course, it does not deny that Somali piracy activity hampers Somali nation-building. Rather, it corrects the order of the causal flows with regard to the evolution of Somali piracy. Briefly, the evolution of Somali piracy has been one of the by-products of the ongoing process of state reformation, in which the governance crisis and the embeddedness of crime provide key nourishing grounds for the illegal coastal defender role in coastal areas of newly created local states. Those problems and illegal activities are not caused directly by Somali piracy, but rather are outcomes of the complex dynamics in the security complex of the Horn of Africa region.

Therefore, the author of this study argues that Somali piracy should be re-understood not just in terms of maritime security, but ultimately in terms of the state regeneration process. As long as statehood is itself a contested concept beyond the Westphalian definition (Teschke 2003), a state reformation process in Somalia (a post-colonial state) is always subject to evolving circumstances constituted by both internal and external power dynamics. Somali piracy and its evolution are apparent outcomes of the complex dynamics. The complicated evolutionary

process can be better illuminated based on a complex causal mechanism, as this study demonstrates.

As this study discovered, the Somali piracy organization can be better understood as a violence managing agency resembling other criminal organizations, such as the Russian mafia (Volkov 2002). The evolutionary movements of Somali piracy organization showed a similar trend with those of other militant groups in certain respects, such as SSDF, Al-Shabaab, and Ras Kamboni. All the militant organizations are essentially related to the reformation process of the Somali state in both the central and local regions. The rise of the Islamist militant groups, key violence organizers for their own state formation, for example, had similar germination and preparation periods to those of Somali piracy groups during the third stage. When the Transient Federal Somali Government failed to recover central authority, both groups enjoyed explosive growth during the fourth stage. The prolonged civil war situations, with the intervention of outside forces, opened a new window of opportunity for diverse power contenders in both central and local states, as well as global diasporic power seekers such as Yusuf in Puntland, Aden Tiiceey in Himan & Heeb state, and Madobe in Jubaland. As this study demonstrates, their governance efforts are implicitly and explicitly connected to the activity of the violent criminal groups.

Both groups have retreated and transformed their modes of activity since 2011. Al-Shabaab has increased relentless terror attacks outside Somalia since 2012, as was horribly exemplified in the Westgate Shopping Mall attack on September 21, 2013. Somali pirate leaders have turned their attention to other criminal and legal areas such as smuggling, private security for foreign illegal fishing vessels, and the transportation business. Therefore, the synchronized trends between the two different violence-managing agencies have strongly supported the

arguments of this study that the Somali piracy organization as a violent enterprise is a salient manifestation of the complex power dynamics in the security complex of the Horn of Africa region. Of the power dynamics, particular contexts of local governance such as the governance crisis and the embeddedness of crime provided a nurturing space for the natural development of Somali maritime crime.

9.2 POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Unlike the putative understanding of Somali piracy, this study demonstrates that it is not a direct result of state failure, but rather a byproduct of the complex dynamics of diverse power contenders in the Horn of African region. The causal mechanism of the evolution of the Somali piracy enterprise clearly shows that the embeddedness of crime in the local community and governance is the core interlocutor in the evolutionary mechanism. In fact, the social relation factor was a double-edged sword for Somali pirates. Somali piracy has decreased because Somali pirates have lost local support, a key element for the stable operations in ransom negotiations. Thus, Somali pirates have had to transform the focus of their activities into other legal or semi-legal areas that could regain local support.

The local anti-piracy movements signify an important point of departure from the conventional policy approach to maritime crime. As explained in the previous chapters, the patterns and operational features of regional piracy reflect the local problems and context of each regional security complex. The petro piracy in Nigeria and its adjacent states is a representation of the problems of the Niger Delta region. The diverse incident patterns and the various changes along the archipelagic seas near the Southeast Asian states suggest that the region is inherently

vulnerable to piracy due to its geopolitical nature and choke point for global commerce. Somali piracy and its dynamic evolutionary patterns are reflective of the local and regional power competition. As a violence-managing agency, it is part of the state reformation process in Somalia.

Therefore, the actual risk of Somali piracy should be separately clarified from uncountable dangers for proper policy-making. Luhmann (1993) argues that risk and danger should be semantically differentially understood in the intersubjective decision making process. Risk is a probable understanding of a given vulnerable situation, while danger is an interpretation of an actor about an external factor that cannot be easily measured. In other words, risk is a measurable threat, while danger is an unmeasurable one due to the unpredictability of the external factor in the interpretation agency. Thus, the interactive process of defining risk and danger is a highly agency-centered activity (Boholm 2012: 291). In reality, agency tends to be confused with risk and danger by emphasizing points of danger needing clarification, as Bohlm (2012) shows in his linguistic analysis of the usages of terms.

Truly helpful policy-making regarding piracy as an international security issue should start with the distinction between risk and danger. As this study demonstrates, Somali piracy is not a danger to international security. However, it poses a probable risk not only to international commerce, but inherently to domestic policy and governance in Somalia because the piracy enterprise could again nurture a criminal state through the embeddedness of crime in local and even central governance. Moreover, it is hard to eradicate the embeddedness of crime once the criminal entrepreneurs realize the profitable attraction of the power contenders in both central and local states (Anderson 2009). The region-wide networks of the narcotic leaf, *khat* (Dirie 2012, Kimenyi 2010, Omar 2012) and the charcoal industry (UN Monitoring Report 2014,

Reuters 2014) have been sending alarming signals. The Central Air Aviation, founded by Somali pirate kingpin, Afweyne, plays a key logistic role by delivering fresh khat leaf every day beyond the porous borders. Moreover, the illegal private security guards, transformed from Puntland piracy syndicates, can change their mode of operation into lucrative piracy for ransom in any vulnerable situation caused by a future local governance crisis.

As the distinction between risk and danger with regard to Somali piracy becomes clear from the analysis of this study, practical policies could be elicited. First, the overused concept of the failed state based on the normative pre-judgment should be discarded. The pre-judgmental securitized concept has distracted analysts and policy-makers from understanding the true nature-of the Somalia crisis. Second, the policy analysis should pay attention to the resilience of Somali society based on pastoral clannism. Militarized pastoral clannism (Markakis 1993) has remained a rudimentary cause of constant struggles among various power and resource contenders. It is also, ironically, one of the clients in many militarized activities, including Somali piracy, as discussed in terms of the evolving relationship with the militia. Thus, understanding the complex natures of the pastoral clannism as a core feature of Somali society is important for devising a succinct policy analysis. Third, the inherent nature of Somali piracy should not be overlooked. Somali piracy appears to be an international danger because Somali pirates target foreign vessels. However, it is inherently a local crime, as the other international crimes are endogenous in their basic nature (Block 1991: Bobbs 1998: Rawlinson 1998). The following policy implications, including sound counter-piracy policy, could be considered.

First, there are always gaps in the perception and interaction between the actual emergence of piracy activity in local contexts and the responses of international agencies. Before 2005, there was no specific mention of piracy in the UN Monitoring Group Report series. The

risk of Somali piracy was first mentioned in 2008 as a sub-chapter of Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahidiin (later Al-Shabaab) in the 2008 UN Monitoring Group report. The initial connection was understood in possible relation to the Military Islam Movement without acknowledging the real characteristics of Somali piracy. As this study shows, the year 2008 was when Somali piracy successfully evolved into a piracy enterprise exclusively through the ransom business, while the local community welcomed the piracy activities as a coastal defender. It has taken more years to come to the conclusion that Somali piracy is not directly related to the Islamic Military Movement, as a number of different interpretations have been published since 2012, even though Somali piracy had already begun to decline in 2011. Thus, the perception and interaction gaps between local communities and international security alert agencies indicate that initial signals always tend to come up with a pre-judged image and overrated danger, not real risk. Thus, the securitization process facilitated extra-ordinary counter piracy measures, resulting in the dispatch of international naval forces that could not actually solve the real problems of the Somali piracy issue, but just deterred it by forcefully and temporarily curbing the probability of an incident.

The temporary success of cost-ineffective and over wrought counter-piracy measures could also hamper the road to real policy-making. Though the extraordinary measure appears to have successfully reduced piracy activity in the Horn of Africa, the essential causes remain untouched. Thus, the second policy implication is about whether the current counter-piracy efforts are truly effective with regard to the true nature of Somali piracy. As this study suggests, the many leaders of the Somali pirates have successfully transferred their activities into other areas such as the transportation business and supply of private security guards for illegal foreign fishing vessels. Therefore, the root causes of the Somali piracy have not disappeared at all. They just changed to appear more legal and safe to obtain public support in local communities. As the

2014 UN Monitoring Report shows, there were strong demonstrations in Himan & Heeb State after the pirate Kingpin Afweyne and the governor Tiiceey were arrested at Belgium Airport on October 13, 2013. Local people in the state do not think that they are criminals, whereas international agencies regard them as key crime facilitators and leaders. This strongly implies that the current counter-piracy efforts and their results are temporary. It also suggests that the crime activity of the Somali pirate leaders will continue as long as they can acquire local support through the embeddedness of crime in local governance.

The third policy implication, then, is about how to reduce the embeddedness of crime in local and even central governance. Here, an important approach should not be based on a pathological judgement of the embeddedness of crime because one of the root problems is caused by the pastoral clannism of Somali society. As the local communities have been able to dispel the piracy activity by themselves, at least virtually, since 2011, acknowledging the indigenous potential of Somali society could be a focal point of counter-piracy measures. Thus, the intervention and the control initiative should be handed over to the local leadership as long as local leaders and the communities can share the same goal of controlling maritime crime. Therefore, encouraging the local community and international security agency to share a common goal must be the core agenda for policy-making with regard to how to reduce the embeddedness of crime. The roles of international forces and agencies remain indirect supporters rather than directly engaging in the costly counter-piracy warfare. International stakeholders could help the local initiatives to control the embeddedness of crime by providing key resources such as surveillance systems, patrol boats, and training systems for the Somali marine force. Combined counter-piracy measure have already been proved in other regions. The combination

of local initiatives and indirect support from outside forces has successfully worked to curb Southeast Asian piracy since 2004.

Finally, understanding the Somali piracy issue as a salient reflection of the local contexts would lead to a sound development approach. As the effects of political and economic developments in Indonesia proved, increasing development capacity is a core pillar for a substantial policy against transnational crimes including piracy. Thus, the development issue cannot be separated from the security issues. As other regional piracy issues reflect the local status of political economic development, Somali piracy is a very clear result of poor development and dependence on foreign assistance.

In fact, foreign assistance and state formation with outside intervention have never been successful in Somalia (Elimi 2010, Harper 2012, Woodward 2013). Ironically, the international conference for the state formation has become a profitable industry for the power factions (Lewis 2002: 266), while crowding out the indigenous development potential (Harper 2012). Making a paper central-state by use of external forces is only to provide a windy route to the power factions. The poor result of assistance tells that the development focus should be changed from what went wrong to what worked well. It might be a fruitful point of departure from the ill-fated efforts. One proven example is found in the process of Somaliland state formation. The leaders of Somaliland combined the traditional social system with a modern parliamentary political system (Hoene 2009). They also put a large effort into eliminating piracy, expecting Somaliland to be a piracy-free zone as an internationally recognized independent state. As a result, it has invited international assistance to fund local enterprise movements. The Somali Renewable Energy Forum⁴⁵ is a good example of this with a multi-track development approach (Seyle 2015).

Additionally, the routes of Somali piracy enterprise could be an indicator of its potential. As the activity zones of Somali piracy expanded to the entire West Indian Ocean, the activity routes interestingly overlapped with the thousand-year-old trade routes between Europe and Asia (Chaudhuri 1982 & 1985). Relying on the motorized sailing vessels (MSV), mostly from Yemen, India, and Pakistan, Somali merchants, either illegally or legally, utilized well the sea routes. In fact, many ports of Somalia as a porously bordered state are used to trade a diversity of goods, including the banned charcoal and other illegal products—in order to evade customs taxes. Utilizing Somalia's peculiar geopolitical position, Somali businessmen have already demonstrated their risk-embracing entrepreneurship (Murphy 2009). The Nairobi economy in Kenya has also been revived through Somali entrepreneurs (Harper 2012).

Though this study does not focus on the development policy for the piracy-prone regions, the analysis results suggest the key points. Therefore, the development approach could have better focal points if growth potentials were considered. First, it is necessary to posit that Somalia is a Levant trade route between African states and the Middle East and South Asian states in the grand Indian Ocean's political and economic belts. Second, the development potential should be directed toward the Somali political economy by promoting the entrepreneurship, not just in the trans-regional places, but essentially within the Somali state.

This chapter identifies real policy implications based on the analysis of this research. The main argument is that Somali piracy should be viewed as a clear reflection of the complex state reformation process in Somalia. Thus, it leads to another policy consideration by suggesting that counter piracy policy should be grounded in the regional and local contexts. It also denotes that piracy is not an uncountable danger, but a countable risk. This thesis provides key arguments for this study of piracy in the concluding chapter.

10.0 CONCLUSIONS

The piracy issue has perplexed security experts because it crosses fine boundaries of conventional international security. Modern piracy incidents involved multiple security areas. Piracy appears to be a global security issue since international commercial vessels are attacked. The targeted vessels and crews also denote its global characteristics. However, it is a locally grown crime. Though the global factors open the opportunity for piracy, the local factors actually engender the occurrence of crime. The piracy issue has been securitized rather than illuminating the real dynamics under the surface of reported incidents.

The cost and risk of piracy are also somewhat overrated. The world total GDP in 2010, at the height of Somali piracy, was estimated to be about \$74.5 trillion USD (The World Bank 2013). The cost of piracy as estimated by an international agency (e.g. One Earth Future 2011) was between \$7 billion and \$20 billion USD. Depending on the calculation criteria, the cost is at best between 0.0094% and 0.027% of global GDP. The size and power of the contemporary world economy have more than enough space to absorb the shock, as the insurance industry and relevant enterprises such as expert negotiation companies and ransom delivery agencies quickly adapt themselves to the unique maritime crimes.

Most previous studies of piracy have relied on monolithic and reductionist assumptions about piracy. Somali piracy has been characterized as a typical example of failed state issues. Such simple linear causation has ironically led to rebuilding central state policy as a *deus ex*

machina, which is supposed to solve all the problems of the failed state. Ironically, the fallacy also aggravated the Somali crisis as outside forces imposed inherently incompatible solutions on it. Thus, the real causal backgrounds have not been clearly explicated in terms of how the multiple factors are interactively related to each other in order to lead to the development of the advanced piracy incidents as organized crime.

This study unravels the riddle of Somali piracy by conducting an intensive investigation into the complex dynamics of the relevant factors. It overcomes the limitation of previous studies by articulating the diverse factors under a causal mechanism. The causal mechanism model shed a holistic light on the complex contexts of the Somali piracy phenomenon, while reducing the blind spots of the monolithic perspectives. The causal model clearly demonstrates the working mechanism behind the curtain of Somali piracy incidents. Therefore, the evolutionary causal mechanism helps systemically to contextualize the real working flows by articulating the various factors based on empirical evidence.

The piracy phenomenon cannot happen separately from other relevant factors. The causal mechanism approach suggests that a phenomenon emerges from a complex mechanism in which multiple factors work together in particular circumstances. The dynamic causal mechanism of the evolution of the Somali piracy enterprise clearly demonstrates that Somali piracy has clear echoes of the complicated contexts of the Somali civil war in the Horn of Africa security complex. In the causal mechanism, the embeddedness of crime is the essential interlocutor to the piracy enterprise, which also reflects the current nature of the Somali local states and societies, a core bed rock for the state reformation process. In turn, this study also suggests that sound policy-making should be refocused on the local social relations and their unique natures with regard to the embeddedness of crime.

Therefore, this study convincingly offers following conclusions.

1. Piracy is an essentially ambiguous issue because it transgresses conventional security frames based on the Westphalian state boundary. It has obfuscated security experts and policy-makers.
2. Piracy is a salient manifestation of complex dynamics of diverse factors with regard to the state reformation process in Somalia. This study successfully demonstrates the working mechanism of the evolution of Somali piracy based on an empirically and theoretically grounded causal model.
3. This study contributes to establishing a scientific research frame for the piracy phenomenon by demonstrating the causal mechanism to encompass the complex dynamics of the multiple factors.
4. This study provides a pioneering ground for the theoretical study of piracy, not just as a maritime crime, but also crucially as a pinpointed part of complex dynamics with regard to the state formation process. Therefore, the causal mechanism model can be applied to other regional piracy with similar confounding factors. In Nigeria, for example, petro-piracy has been undergoing similarly complex dynamics. The interesting features of piracy can be better illuminated by the causal mechanism approach.
5. Finally, the solution of rebuilding the central state has been applied as if a *deus ex machina* could solve the problem to end the complex tragedy. However, it has brought nothing but temporary stopgaps as represented in the serial failures of the fragile central governments. The fate of the fragile government in Somalia has still been dependent on foreign aid. Thus, for sound policy-making, this study suggests a region-specific policy that includes counter-piracy and that refocuses the policy angle on the indigenous nature

of the Somali state and society. Currently, the agenda is urgently focused on the elimination of Al-Shabaab. However, the development of the state capacity of Somalia by Somali initiative should not be off the table of the policy agenda. There is no one-shot solution. However, this study can suggest one caveat in the policy agenda table: distinguishing between unmeasurable danger and measurable risk should be posited as an initial approach to detecting policy issues. As has been proven in the effectiveness of local anti-piracy movements, Somali piracy is not an unmeasurable danger, but a measurable risk that can be better handled by local initiatives.

Perhaps Somalia has been cast by the power contenders as an object of imagined community (Anderson 1984). In reality, Somalia is a community that has been virtually dependent on outside powers. The security problems of Somalia such as piracy and militarized religious movements are by-products of the complicated state formation process. Somali piracy appeared to be a deviant case in the history of maritime crime. In fact, it can be understood as a natural reflection of the complex contexts of the regional and international power dynamics.

The causal mechanism and the approach of this study could be further applied to other cases of regional piracy by retuning the focus to a regional context. The crime embeddedness concept could be applicable for understanding the emergence of MEND and its relation to the petro-piracy in Nigeria. It is also applicable to the piracy incident patterns of regional political piracy, such as the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and GAM in Sumatra, Indonesia, where the embeddedness of crime must provide fertile soil for the growth of the politically bred piracy incidents. In future research, the causal mechanism underlying these orientations should be targeted. The results of this study could then be a pathfinding guide.

APPENDIX I.1

STATISTICAL MODELS AND TEST RESULTS

Model A:

$$\text{Ln} \left[\frac{\hat{Y}}{1-\hat{Y}} \right] = C + \beta_1 FI + \beta X + \alpha_1 T_1 + \alpha_2 T_2 + \varepsilon$$

Unit of analysis: Individual piracy Incident

Sample Size: 5846 World Piracy Incidents from 1996 to 2013.

C: Constant

Y1: Whether or not the piracy incident is the successful piracy incident (1) or not (0).

Y2: Whether or not the piracy incident is the successful hijacking piracy incident (1) or not (0).

Y3: Whether or not the piracy incident is the successful ransom gaining piracy incident (1) or not (0).

FI: Failed state index (WGI or FSI)

X : Control variables; country dummy, location effect (Number of neighbor state), previous success experience of piracy

Model B:

$$\text{Ln} \left[\frac{\hat{Y}}{1-\hat{Y}} \right] = \beta_1 IS + \beta_2 FM + \beta_3 UE + \beta_4 EP + \beta_5 PC + \beta_6 LS + \beta_7 CR + \beta X + \alpha_1 T_1 + \alpha_2 T_2 + \varepsilon$$

Unit of analysis: Individual piracy Incident

Y1: Whether or not the piracy incident is the actual incident (1) or not(0).

Y2: Whether or not the piracy incident is the hijack piracy(1) or not (0).

Y3: Whether or not the piracy incident is the ransom piracy (1) or not(0).

IS: Institutional strength of the country at the year of the piracy incident

FM: Fragmentation of the country at the year of the piracy incident

UE: Unemployment rate of the country at the year of the piracy incident

EP: Extreme poverty of country at the year of piracy incident

PC: Police officer to population ratio of the country at the year of the piracy incident

LS: Livestock yield of country at the year of the piracy incident

CR: Cereal yield of the country at the year of the piracy incident

X: Control variables: Same with Model A

*** Description of Quantitative Variables**

| Variable | Measurement | range | Data Source |
|--|---|---------------------------|---|
| Piracy Incident/Type: outcome | Dummy variable (successful incident: 1, failed incident: 0) | 0 or 1 | IMB, IMO, Ecoterra International & Media Sources |
| Piracy Incident/Type: hijack | Dummy variable (successful hijack: 1, the other: 0) | 0 or 1 | IMB, IMO, Ecoterra International & Media Sources |
| Piracy Incident/Type: ransom | Dummy variable (ransom-gaining incident: 1, the other: 0) | 0 or 1 | IMB, IMO, Ecoterra International & Media Sources |
| Failed State Index (World Governance Indicator, WGI) | Continuous variable (Averaged Governance Indicator of 6 sub-indicators) | -2.5~2.5 (bigger= better) | The World Bank. (http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators) |
| Failed State Index (FSI) | Continuous variable (Composite Index of 12 | 0~120 (bigger=worse) | the Peace for Fund (http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/) |

| | | | |
|----------------------------|--|------------------------------|---|
| | sub-indicators) | | |
| Location Effect | Discrete variable (Number of Adjacent Country to Piracy Incident Country) | 0~ | The number of bordered countries. |
| Success Rate | Continuous variable (Successful Incident No./Total Incident No. in previous year) | 0~1 | Calculation from IMB, IMO, Ecoterra International & Media. |
| Institutional Strength | Continuous variable | 0~25 (bigger=worse) | The Polity IV Project (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm) |
| Fragmentation | Continuous variable (Averaged Index of culture & Ethnicity diversity) | 0~1 (bigger=more fragmented) | James Fearon (2003). "Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country". Journal of Economic Growth 8: 195–222. |
| Unemployment Rate | Continuous variable | 0~100 (%) | The World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS) |
| Extreme Poverty | Continuous variable, Poverty headcount ratio at \$2 a day (PPP) at 2005 international prices (% of population) | 0~100 (%) | The World Bank. Data collected in Sept 2015. |
| Police Officer Rate | Continuous variable (Police Officer per 100,000) | 0~1000 (‰) | UN Offices on Drug and Crime. |
| Livestock production index | Continuous variable (Weighted Average between 2004~2006 = 100) | 0~ | The World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.PRD.LVSK.XD) |
| Cereal yield | Continuous variable (kg per hectare) | 0~ | The World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.YLD.CREL.KG) |
| Country Dummy | Dummy variable. Country Dummy of Somalia, Nigeria, Indonesia | 0 or 1 | IMB, IMO, Ecoterra International & Media Sources |

APPENDIX I.2

STATISTICAL TEST RESULTS AND EXPLANATION FOR THE OTHER TIME PERIOD SETS

Model A with Failed State Index

| 2005-2013 (observation =2,915) | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|---|-----|-------|--|-----|-------|--|-----|--------|
| | Successful Incident LR chi2(6)= 811.59 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 pseudo r2=0.2129 | | | Hijacking Incident LR chi2 (6) = 390.19 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 pseudo r2=0.1568 | | | Ransom Incident LR chji2 (6) = 290.41 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 (pseudo r2=0.2067) | | |
| Variables | Odds | | S.E. | Odds | | S.E. | Odds | | S.E. |
| FSI | 1.005 | ** | 0.003 | 0.990 | *** | 0.026 | 0.990 | | 0.012 |
| Success Rate | 14.871 | *** | 1.851 | 0.667 | | 0.260 | 0.043 | * | 0.037 |
| Border Country | 1.148 | ** | 0.049 | 1.033 | | 0.060 | 1.330 | ** | 0.167 |
| Somalia | 0.324 | *** | 0.070 | 13.702 | *** | 5.15 | 32.267 | *** | 31.588 |
| Indonesia | 0.928 | | 0.144 | 1.154 | ** | 0.307 | 6.040 | * | 4.173 |
| Nigeria | 0.499 | *** | 0.096 | 3.487 | *** | 1.047 | 11.309 | *** | 9.211 |
| _cons | 0.237 | *** | 0.044 | 0.124 | *** | 0.033 | 0.023 | *** | 0.010 |

Two Period Sets: 1996-2004 and 2005-2013

Model A (1996-2004 n=2825, 2005-2013 n=3021)

| Variables | 1996-2004 (obs=2,622) | | | | | | 2005-2013 (obs=2,857) | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------|--|------|---|-------|--|-------|--|------|---|--------|--|-------|-------|-----|-------|-------|-----|-------|
| | Successful Incident (pseudo r2=0.054) | | Hijacking Incident (pseudo r2=0.027) | | Ransom-gaining Incident (pseudo r2=0.098) | | Successful Incident (pseudo r2=0.214) | | Hijacking Incident (pseudo r2=0.162) | | Ransom-gaining Incident (pseudo r2=0.208) | | | | | | | |
| | Odds. | S.E. | Odds. | S.E. | Odds. | S.E. | Odds. | S.E. | Odds. | S.E. | Odds. | S.E. | | | | | | |
| WGI | 1.014 | | 0.119 | 1.543 | ** | 0.295 | 0.963 | | 0.346 | 0.913 | | 0.108 | 1.664 | *** | 0.309 | 0.378 | * | 0.21 |
| Success.Rate. | 5.073 | *** | 1.233 | 0.976 | | 0.464 | 1.354 | | 1.04 | 18.537 | *** | 4.777 | 0.451 | ** | 0.175 | 0.044 | *** | 0.037 |
| Border.Country | 1.071 | *** | 0.028 | 0.908 | * | 0.047 | 0.853 | | 0.085 | 1.214 | *** | 0.047 | 0.997 | | 0.055 | 1.235 | | 0.164 |
| Somalia | 0.276 | *** | 0.09 | 9.54 | *** | 4.929 | 15.39 | *** | 12.75 | 0.406 | *** | 0.115 | 20.18 | *** | 9.205 | 2.775 | | 3.042 |
| Indonesia | 0.67 | *** | 0.078 | 1.784 | ** | 0.4 | 1.396 | | 0.538 | 1.006 | | 0.154 | 1.112 | | 0.286 | 4.531 | *** | 2.615 |
| Nigeria | 1.095 | | 0.284 | 2.461 | ** | 0.986 | 3.073 | ** | 1.744 | 0.559 | *** | 0.112 | 3.894 | *** | 1.202 | 4.084 | ** | 2.687 |
| _cons | 0.864 | | 0.192 | 0.08 | *** | 0.031 | 0.021 | *** | 0.014 | 0.219 | *** | 0.045 | 0.112 | *** | 0.033 | 0.011 | *** | 0.009 |

Model B (1996-2004 n=2825, 2005-2013 n=3021)

| Variables | 1996-2004 (obs=2,487) | | | | | | 2005-2013 (obs=2,622) | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------|--|------|---|-------|--|--------|--|------|---|-------|--|-------|--------|-----|--------|----------|-----|----------|
| | Successful Incident (pseudo r2=0.063) | | Hijacking Incident (pseudo r2=0.056) | | Ransom-gaining Incident (pseudo r2=0.117) | | Successful Incident (pseudo r2=0.210) | | Hijacking Incident (pseudo r2=0.186) | | Ransom-gaining Incident (pseudo r2=0.246) | | | | | | | |
| | Odds. | S.E. | Odds. | S.E. | Odds. | S.E. | Odds. | S.E. | Odds. | S.E. | Od. | S.E. | | | | | | |
| Institution | 0.916 | *** | 0.023 | 1.073 | | 0.052 | 0.961 | | 0.068 | 1.081 | *** | 0.029 | 0.896 | *** | 0.035 | 0.904 | | 0.081 |
| Unemployment | 0.978 | | 0.02 | 0.894 | *** | 0.032 | 0.944 | | 0.046 | 0.918 | *** | 0.022 | 0.93 | | 0.051 | 1.168 | | 0.111 |
| Poverty | 0.998 | | 0.004 | 0.981 | ** | 0.008 | 0.986 | | 0.012 | 0.991 | ** | 0.004 | 0.986 | ** | 0.006 | 0.976 | ** | 0.011 |
| Fragment. | 1.103 | | 0.474 | 0.241 | | 0.213 | 0.615 | | 1.249 | 0.693 | | 0.426 | 10.233 | ** | 11.846 | 0.002 | ** | 0.006 |
| Police | 0.997 | *** | 0.001 | 1.002 | * | 0.001 | 0.999 | | 0.002 | 0.998 | ** | 0.001 | 1 | | 0.001 | 0.991 | | 0.002 |
| Livestock | 1 | | 0.006 | 1.025 | ** | 0.011 | 1.027 | | 0.01 | 1.001 | | 0.005 | 0.993 | | 0.007 | 0.937 | *** | 0.013 |
| Cereal | 1 | | 0 | 1 | | 0 | 1 | | 0.002 | 1 | *** | 0 | 1 | *** | 0 | 1 | | 0.001 |
| Success Rate | 2.528 | *** | 0.755 | 1.32 | | 0.819 | 1.921 | | 0.926 | 3.063 | *** | 1.184 | 0.198 | *** | 0.111 | 0.283 | | 0.315 |
| Border.Country | 0.993 | | 0.033 | 0.993 | | 0.06 | 0.799 | | 0.131 | 1.148 | ** | 0.068 | 0.91 | | 0.095 | 0.791 | | 0.268 |
| Somalia | 0.364 | *** | 0.121 | 16.35 | *** | 10.817 | 54.562 | *** | 0.152 | 0.221 | *** | 0.797 | 12.145 | *** | 6.561 | 60.668 | ** | 105.51 |
| Indonesia | 0.613 | * | 0.158 | 3.095 | ** | 1.63 | 2.555 | | 0.859 | 0.871 | | 0.279 | 2.015 | | 1.143 | 2.416 | | 3.167 |
| Nigeria | 2.678 | *** | 0.887 | 5.146 | *** | 3.249 | 11.024 | *** | 0.74 | 0.892 | | 0.262 | 3.928 | *** | 1.761 | 2.598 | | 2.631 |
| _cons | 9.639 | *** | 8.097 | 0.004 | *** | 0.007 | 0.008 | * | 2.164 | 0.784 | | 0.688 | 4.811 | | 6.881 | 3.34E+07 | | 2.07E+08 |

Three Time Period Sets: 1996-2001, 2002-2007, and 2008-2013

Model A (1996-2001 n=1701, 2002-2007 n=1900, 2008-2013 n=2245)

| Variables | 1996-2001 (obs=1,563/ ransom obs=1,509) | | | | | | | | |
|----------------|---|-----|-------|------------------------------|-----|-------|------------------------------|-----|---------|
| | Outcome (pseudo r2=0.0449) | | | Hijack (pseudo r2=0.0533) | | | Ransom (pseudo r2=0.2310) | | |
| | Est | | S.E. | Est | | S.E. | Est | | S.E. |
| WGI | 1.316 | * | 0.210 | 1.571 | * | 0.377 | 2.233 | | 0.987 |
| Success.Rate. | 5.533 | *** | 1.814 | 0.789 | | 0.460 | 0.898 | | 0.933 |
| Border.Country | 1.079 | ** | 0.033 | 0.935 | | 0.052 | 0.934 | | 0.112 |
| Somalia | 0.655 | | 0.287 | 13.768 | *** | 8.761 | 158.75 | *** | 178.888 |
| Indonesia | 0.848 | | 0.129 | 0.891 | | 0.276 | 1.210 | | 0.793 |
| Nigeria | 1.098 | | 0.398 | 1.524 | | 0.998 | . | | . |
| _cons | 0.768 | | 0.204 | 0.099 | *** | 0.047 | 0.019 | *** | 0.017 |

| 2002-2007 (obs=1,783) | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------|-----|-------|------------------------------|-----|--------|------------------------------|-----|--------|
| Variables | Outcome (pseudo r2=0.0998) | | | Hijack (pseudo r2=0.0896) | | | Ransom (pseudo r2=0.1699) | | |
| | Odds | | S.E. | Odds | | S.E. | Odds | | S.E. |
| WGI | 0.720 | ** | 0.097 | 1.457 | | 0.385 | 0.727 | | 0.331 |
| Success.Rate. | 4.950 | *** | 1.535 | 2.199 | | 1.671 | 0.935 | | 0.968 |
| Border.Country | 1.170 | *** | 0.047 | 0.972 | | 0.068 | 0.810 | | 0.126 |
| Somalia | 0.153 | *** | 0.055 | 30.721 | *** | 22.466 | 13.862 | *** | 14.757 |
| Indonesia | 0.564 | *** | 0.082 | 3.138 | *** | 0.877 | 3.049 | *** | 1.366 |
| Nigeria | 0.969 | | 0.267 | 2.766 | ** | 1.174 | 3.482 | *** | 2.072 |
| cons | 0.606 | ** | 0.148 | 0.026 | *** | 0.016 | 0.024 | *** | 0.020 |

| 2008-2013 (obs=1,563/ ransom obs=1,509) | | | | | | | | | |
|---|-------------------------------|-----|-------|------------------------------|-----|-------|------------------------------|-----|---------|
| Variables | Outcome (pseudo r2=0.0449) | | | Hijack (pseudo r2=0.0533) | | | Ransom (pseudo r2=0.2310) | | |
| | Odds | | S.E. | Odds | | S.E. | Odds | | S.E. |
| WGI | 1.316 | * | 0.210 | 1.571 | * | 0.377 | 2.233 | * | 0.987 |
| Success.Rate. | 5.533 | *** | 1.814 | 0.779 | | 0.460 | 0.898 | | 0.933 |
| Border.Country | 1.079 | ** | 0.033 | 0.935 | | 0.052 | 0.934 | | 0.112 |
| Somalia | 0.655 | | 0.287 | 13.768 | *** | 8.761 | 158.75 | *** | 178.888 |
| Indonesia | 0.848 | | 0.129 | 0.891 | | 0.276 | 1.210 | | 0.793 |
| Nigeria | 1.098 | | 0.398 | 1.524 | | 0.998 | . | | . |
| cons | 0.768 | | 0.204 | 0.099 | *** | 0.047 | 0.019 | *** | 0.017 |

Model B (1996-2001 n=1701, 2002-2007 n=1900, 2008-2013 n=2245)

| 1996-2001 (obs=1,470/ ransom obs=1,416) | | | | | | | | | |
|---|-------------------------------|-----|--------|------------------------------|-----|--------|------------------------------|-----|----------|
| Variables | Outcome (pseudo r2=0.0554) | | | Hijack (pseudo r2=0.0772) | | | Ransom (pseudo r2=0.3160) | | |
| | Est. | | S.E. | Est. | | S.E. | Est. | | S.E. |
| Institution | 0.897 | *** | 0.029 | 1.083 | | 0.064 | 1.072 | | 0.135 |
| Unemployment. | 0.952 | * | 0.027 | 0.923 | | 0.046 | 1.015 | | 0.108 |
| Poverty | 0.994 | | 0.005 | 0.983 | * | 0.009 | 0.906 | *** | 0.034 |
| Fragment. | 0.812 | | 0.441 | 0.326 | | 0.342 | 1.074 | | 2.228 |
| Police | 0.996 | *** | 0.001 | 1.003 | * | 0.002 | 1.007 | | 0.005 |
| Livestock | 1.017 | * | 0.009 | 1.000 | | 0.016 | 0.934 | * | 0.036 |
| Cereal | 1.000 | | 0.000 | 1.000 | | 0.000 | 1.000 | | 0.000 |
| Success Rate | 1.543 | | 0.684 | 0.909 | | 0.678 | 0.375 | | 0.434 |
| Border.Country | 0.982 | | 0.038 | 1.036 | | 0.070 | 0.859 | | 0.165 |
| Somalia | 0.252 | *** | 0.113 | 16.234 | *** | 12.644 | 11870.52 | *** | 32088.45 |
| Indonesia | 1.073 | | 0.378 | 1.660 | | 1.158 | 176.675 | * | 473.812 |
| Nigeria | 1.890 | | 0.827 | 2.652 | | 2.273 | . | | . |
| _cons | 21.03 | ** | 26.743 | 0.038 | | 0.086 | 7.316 | | 26.800 |

| 2002-2007 (obs=1,694) | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------|-----|-------|------------------------------|-----|---------|------------------------------|----|--------|
| Variables | Outcome (pseudo r2=0.1028) | | | Hijack (pseudo r2=0.1286) | | | Ransom (pseudo r2=0.1721) | | |
| | Odds | | S.E. | Odds | | S.E. | Odds | | S.E. |
| Institution | 0.979 | | 0.033 | 0.942 | | 0.081 | 0.975 | | 0.114 |
| Unemployment. | 1.000 | | 0.028 | 0.637 | *** | 0.064 | 0.975 | | 0.091 |
| Poverty | 0.993 | | 0.005 | 1.000 | | 0.016 | 1.011 | | 0.020 |
| Fragment. | 0.953 | | 0.595 | 0.046 | ** | 0.064 | 2.614 | | 5.502 |
| Police | 0.998 | *** | 0.001 | 1.006 | ** | 0.003 | 1.000 | | 0.003 |
| Livestock | 1.000 | | 0.011 | 0.993 | | 0.019 | 0.981 | | 0.026 |
| Cereal | 1.000 | *** | 0.000 | 1.000 | * | 0.000 | 1.000 | | 0.000 |
| Success Rate | 2.424 | ** | 0.960 | 1.633 | | 1.658 | 1.515 | | 1.996 |
| Border Country | 1.100 | | 0.064 | 1.066 | | 0.100 | 0.722 | | 0.134 |
| Somalia | 0.374 | ** | 0.150 | 97.862 | *** | 122.887 | 23.265 | ** | 30.358 |
| Indonesia | 0.452 | ** | 0.155 | 72.442 | *** | 74.899 | 3.079 | | 3.638 |
| Nigeria | 3.006 | *** | 1.214 | 13.637 | *** | 11.705 | 2.892 | | 3.223 |
| _cons | 1.905 | | 2.564 | 3.776 | | 10.070 | 0.133 | | 0.546 |

| 2008-2013 (obs=1,470/ ransom obs=1,416) | | | | | | | | | |
|---|-------------------------------|-----|--------|------------------------------|-----|--------|------------------------------|-----|----------|
| Variables | Outcome (pseudo r2=0.0554) | | | Hijack (pseudo r2=0.0772) | | | Ransom (pseudo r2=0.3160) | | |
| | Odds | | S.E. | Odds | | S.E. | Odds | | S.E. |
| Institution | 0.897 | *** | 0.029 | 1.083 | | 0.064 | 1.072 | | 0.135 |
| Unemploy ment. | 0.952 | * | 0.027 | 0.923 | | 0.046 | 1.015 | | 0.108 |
| Poverty | 0.994 | | 0.005 | 0.983 | * | 0.009 | 0.906 | *** | 0.034 |
| Fragment. | 0.812 | | 0.441 | 0.326 | | 0.342 | 1.074 | | 2.228 |
| Police | 0.996 | *** | 0.001 | 1.003 | * | 0.002 | 1.007 | | 0.005 |
| Livestock | 1.017 | * | 0.009 | 1.000 | | 0.016 | 0.934 | * | 0.036 |
| Cereal | 1.000 | | 0.000 | 1.000 | | 0.000 | 1.000 | | 0.000 |
| Success Rate | 1.543 | | 0.684 | 0.909 | | 0.678 | 0.375 | | 0.434 |
| Border Country | 0.982 | | 0.038 | 1.036 | | 0.070 | 0.859 | | 0.165 |
| Somalia | 0.252 | *** | 0.114 | 16.234 | *** | 12.644 | 11870.52 | *** | 32088.45 |
| Indonesia | 1.073 | | 0.378 | 1.660 | | 1.158 | 176.675 | | 473.812 |
| Nigeria | 1.890 | | 0.827 | 2.652 | | 2.273 | . | | . |
| _cons | 21.030 | ** | 26.743 | 0.038 | | 0.086 | 7.316 | | 26.800 |

APPENDIX II

QUALITATIVE DATA CODING AND COMPILING PROCESSES

1. Data Coding Process

a. Coding Scheme

Analysis Part 1. Case Environment

1. Piracy Incident Date:
2. Target Ship Info. : Name of Ship/Type/Flag
3. Status: Anchored or Steaming
4. Casualty: death/injury/Ship damages
5. Location:
6. Outcome: Failed/Attempted/Boarded/Hijacked

Analysis Part 2. Piracy Operation

1. Number of Pirates
2. Operation Capacity:
3. Hijacked Location
4. Violence

Analysis Part 3. Piracy Organization

1. Leadership
2. Management Hierarchy
3. Structure of Organization
4. Code of Conduct

Analysis Part 4. Other Terms

1. Financial Structure
2. Acquired Ransom Amount
3. Difference between Required and Final Ransom
4. Negotiation Period
5. Outside Connection
6. Involvement in other crimes.

Analysis Part 5. Type of Piracy

* Judge Criteria: Total value 8 or more= Enterprise type of piracy = 1

Total value 7 or less = Robbery type of piracy = 0

b. Case Coding Criteria

Part 1 Operation Terms

1. Participant Number: Less than 10=0 vs. Otherwise=1 (10 or more)
2. Operation Capacity: One small boat AND/OR armed with light weapons (ex.: knife & Pistol) =0 vs. Two or more boats armed with automatic weapons (ex.: rifles & RPG) = 1
3. Hijacked Location: Coastal (or near territorial waters) areas= 0 vs. Open seas (or out of pirates' origin countries) = 1
4. Violence: Violence including killing crews without code of conduct = 0 vs. Controlled violence with code of conduct = 1 (Violence only for intended purposes like ransom negotiation)

Part 2 Organization Terms

1. Leadership: Autocratic (ex: militant, commando style & thug leader) = 0 vs. Entrepreneurial = 1 (ex: business organizer, investor & venture capitalist)
2. Management Hierarchy: Vertical (strict control by upper command) = 0 vs. Horizontal = 1 (partnership characteristics among piracy participants)
3. Structure of Organization: Mechanical (based on kinship & clan networks) = 0 vs. Functional = 1 (based on expertise across kinship and clan networks)
4. Code of Conduct: Ad hoc (relying on leader's capability) vs. Coded rules = 1 (coded of conducts by division of labor and division of roles, such as fundraiser, book keeper, negotiator, field actors and hostage management)

Part 3 Other Terms

1. Financial structure: Simple finance structure (Single investor) = 0 vs.
complex finance structure (multi-shareholders) is coded in 1.
2. Acquired ransom amount: Small (Less than \$500,000) = 0 vs.
Large (More than \$500,000) = 1.
3. Difference between required and final ransom: Small (less than \$1million) =
Large (More than \$ 1 million) = 1
4. Negotiation Period: Short (less than a month) = 0
Long (More than a month) = 1
5. Outside Connection: Limited within kinship and clan connection = 0 vs.
Wide = 1 (Beyond single clan connection)
6. Involvement in other crimes: No other crime connection = 0 vs.
Other crime involvement = 1

c. Case Coding Analysis Form

| Terms | Property | Codes |
|--------------|---|--|
| CASE ID | Coding Date | Day/Month/Year |
| | 1 st Coder Name | |
| | 2 nd Coder Name | |
| | Data Source | |
| | Case ID | Date + Country |
| Environment | Date | Day/Month/Year |
| | Target Ship | Name/Type/Flag |
| | Status | Anchored or Steaming |
| | Casualty | Death/Injury/Ship Damages |
| | Location | Geographic Location |
| | Outcome | Failed/Attempted/Boarded/Hijacked |
| Operation | Participant No. | Small (0) vs. Large (1) |
| | Operation Capacity | Low (0) vs. High (1) |
| | Hijacked Location | Coastal (0) vs. Open Seas (1) |
| | Violence | Violent (0) vs. Controlled (1) |
| Organization | Leadership | Autocratic (0) vs. Entrepreneurial (1) |
| | Management Hierarchy | Vertical (0) vs. Horizontal (1) |
| | Structure of Organization | Mechanical (0) vs. Functional (1) |
| | Code of Conduct | Ad hoc (0) vs. Coded rules (1) |
| Other Terms | Financial Structure | Simple (0) vs. Complex (1) |
| | Acquired Ransom Amount | Small (0) vs. Large (1) |
| | Difference bet. Required and Final ransom | Small (0) vs. Large (1) |
| | Negotiation Period | Short (0) vs. Long (1) |
| | Outside Connection | Limited (0) vs. Wide (1) |
| | Involvement in other crimes | No=0 vs. Yes=1 |

2. Compiling Process for both Quantitative and Qualitative analysis

Data Sources

a. For Primary Incident Data

IMB Annual Piracy Report 1992-2013

FAS Anti-Shipping Activity Messages 1990-1999

IMO Piracy Report

Ecoterra International

Somalia Report

b. Data sources for Qualitative Coding: International and Local media sources

(See bibliography of data sources for Profiles of Somali Piracy Incidents)

Compiling Process

1) Identifying Primary Data of a Piracy Incident

| | | | | |
|-----|---|---|---|--|
| 5. | 04.08.2008 0300 LT Steaming Hijacked | Yenegaan Ocean Tug Panama 1101 7342500 | Off Bosasso, Somalia | Pirates attacked and hijacked the tug underway. They took the crew hostage and sailed the tug into Somali coastal waters. To date the where about of the crew and vessel is not known. |
| 6. | 18.09.2008 0250 UTC Steaming Hijacked | Centauri Bulk Carrier Malta 12812 7701354 | 02.22.13N – 050.55.15E, 250 NM Off Mogadishu, Somalia | Five armed pirates in a speedboat attacked the ship underway. They took hostage 25 crewmembers and hijacked the ship. The ship is anchored near Hobyio. The crew and ship was released on 27.11.2008. It is believed that a ransom was paid for the safe release of the crew and ship. |
| 7. | 21.09.2008 0200 UTC Steaming Hijacked | Capt. Stefanos Bulk Carrier Bahamas 39035 9227194 | 02:30:00N – 051:59:30E, Off Somali Coast, Somalia | Four pirates in three speedboats attacked and successfully boarded the ship underway. They took hostage 19 crewmembers and hijacked the ship. The ship is anchored off Hobyio. The crew and ship was released on 06.12.2008. It is believed a ransom was paid for the safe release of the crew and ship. |
| 8. | 25.09.2008 1310UTC Steaming Hijacked | Faina Ro-Ro Belize 10931 7419377 | 02:10N – 050:40E, East Coast of Somalia | Armed pirates boarded and hijacked the ship underway. The ship is anchored off Hobyio. The pirates are holding 21 crew as hostage. The Master died of a heart attack onboard. Negotiations in progress. |
| 9. | 14.11.2008 Early Hours Steaming Hijacked | Tianyu No. 8 Fishing Vessel China - | Off Southern Somalia | Pirates boarded the fishing vessel, hijacked it with its 24 crew members, and sailed the vessel into Somali waters. No further details available. |
| 10. | 15.11.2008 0723 UTC Steaming Hijacked | Sirius Star Tanker Liberia 162252 9384198 | 04:41S – 048:43E, Off Southern Somalia | Armed pirates attacked and hijacked the tanker underway. They have taken hostage 25 crew members. Owners informed that the vessel is anchored off Somali coast. Negotiations in progress. |

2008 IMB Piracy Report

| | |
|--------------|----|
| Africa | |
| somalia | 1 |
| Gulf of aden | 2 |
| nigeria | 3 |
| ghana | 4 |
| Ivory coast | 5 |
| Red sea | 6 |
| senegal | 7 |
| mauritania | 8 |
| kenya | 9 |
| cameroon | 10 |
| guinea | 11 |
| madagascar | 12 |
| Sierra leone | 13 |
| tanzania | 14 |
| mozambique | 15 |
| angola | 16 |
| liberia | 17 |
| benin | 18 |

Country Code

Faina
Ro-Ro
Belize
10931
7419377

Code: 20080925001
2008 – year
0925 – Month/Date
001 – Country Code

2) Collecting Relevant Data

3) Conducting Initial Analysis

Isse Mohammed (From MV Faina incidents, ...

"The fact that this took so long, that's not good," said **one of the pirates, Isse Mohammed**, in a telephone interview. "But we got the cash in hand, and that's good. That's what we're interested in."

Mr. Isse added that his gang would continue "hunting ships" because "that's our business." According to the pirates and maritime officials in Kenya, the ship's owners paid **\$3.2 million** — in cash, **dropped by parachute** — and on Thursday evening the last of the heavily armed pirates made their way off the ship. But first, Mr. Isse said, he had to escape. Ever since the Ukrainian ship was hijacked by Somali pirates in dinghies, it had been ringed by American warships determined to keep the pirates from unloading the weapons.

Mr. Isse said that the pirate leaders were **divvying up the money in Xarardheere**, a notorious pirate den near the ship's anchorage, and that he and his colleagues had deputized young gunmen to stay aboard until all the pirate leaders had gotten away. Only then, he said, would the ship be released.

Sugule Ali (From MV Faina incidents on 25 Sept 2008)

"We would never reduce the ransoms," pirate spokesman **Sugule Ali** told the Associated Press in a satellite telephone interview from the **Faina**. The Somali government on Wednesday authorized foreign powers to use whatever force is necessary to free the ship from the pirates. Asked about fears that a foreign country might attack — as French commandos have done in the past to free hijacked ships — **Ali insisted his pirates will fight back**.

"That will never happen again," Ali said. "Anyone who tries to attack us or deceive us will face bad repercussions."

Somalia's president, **Abdullahi Yusuf**, urged foreign nations to help Somalia fight piracy.

The government has lost patience and now wants to fight pirates with the help of the international community," he said Wednesday in a radio address. Ali also distanced himself from reports quoting a leader of Somalia's Islamic insurgency, who urged the pirates to destroy the ship if they are not paid.

"We have nothing to do with insurgents or terrorist organizations, we only need money," Ali said, adding that a plan was in place to release the ship and its crew of 20 once the ransom was paid. The pirates' spokesman **Sugule Ali** said in October that the ship was originally destined for Sudan from the Kenyan port city of Mombasa as a stevedore.

Ali said once the pirates receive the ransom and leave the ship safely, it and the crew will be freed. He was not afraid of international warships


intervening because of the amount of arms aboard the ship.

| | | |
|----------------|--|-----|
| Operation ↕ | Participant No.↕ | 1↕ |
| | Operation Capacity↕ | 1↕ |
| | Hijacked Location↕ | 1↕ |
| | Violence ↕ | 0 ↕ |
| Organization ↕ | Leadership↕ | 1↕ |
| | Management Hierarchy↕ | 1↕ |
| | Structure of Organization↕ | 1↕ |
| | Code of Conduct↕ | 1↕ |
| Other Terms↕ | Financial Structure ↕ | 1↕ |
| | Acquired Ransom Amount↕ | 1↕ |
| | Difference bet. Required and Final Ransom↕ | 1↕ |
| | Negotiation Period↕ | 1↕ |
| | Outside Connection↕ | 1↕ |
| | Involvement in other crimes↕ | 0↕ |

4) Recoding Data


| CaseID | Ship | Date | Location | D.Ransom | A.Ransom | ReleaseD | Anchored | Det.D | Leader | Major Victim | #Victim | Negotiator | | | |
|-------------|-----------------------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|------------------------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|
| 20080925001 | MV Faina (Global Media Hot) | 2008-09-25 | Somalia | 35000000 | 3200000 | 2009-02-06 | Evl | 133 | Afweyne+Garaad+Boyard+Tuceey | Ukrainians | 21 | | | | |
| Sum | Pi# | Capa. | Loc. | Vio. | Lead. | M.H. | O.STR | Code | F.STR | Acq.R | R.Dif. | Neg.T | ConnT | O.Crime | Fuzzy |
| | 12 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 85.71 |

--Continually updating data sets based on new findings



5) Compiling & Producing Analytical Tables and Charts


Chart 1. Piracy Incident Trend by World and Major Regions



| Year | Total | East Africa | West Africa | Southeast Asia | South Asia |
|------|-------|-------------|-------------|----------------|------------|
| 1996 | 180 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 1997 | 220 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 1998 | 180 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 1999 | 250 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 2000 | 450 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 2001 | 350 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 2002 | 380 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 2003 | 420 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 2004 | 350 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 2005 | 280 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 2006 | 250 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 2007 | 280 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 2008 | 350 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 2009 | 400 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 2010 | 500 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 2011 | 450 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 2012 | 300 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| 2013 | 250 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |


| Year | TEP | C%/TEP | AEP | C%/AEP | ESR | C%/ESR | EHP | C%/EHP | REHP | REHP/A | ERP | C |
|------|-----|--------|-----|--------|-------|--------|-----|---------|-------|--------|-----|----|
| 1996 | 7 | | 6 | | 85.71 | | 1 | | 14.29 | 16.67 | 0 | 0 |
| 1997 | 11 | 57.14 | 6 | 0.00 | 54.55 | -36.36 | 3 | 200.00 | 27.27 | 50.00 | 2 | 2 |
| 1998 | 22 | 100.00 | 18 | 200.00 | 81.82 | 50.00 | 4 | 33.33 | 18.18 | 22.22 | 4 | 4 |
| 1999 | 17 | -22.73 | 10 | -44.44 | 58.82 | -28.10 | 4 | 0.00 | 23.53 | 40.00 | 4 | 4 |
| 2000 | 33 | 94.12 | 11 | 10.00 | 33.33 | -43.33 | 1 | -75.00 | 3.03 | 9.09 | 0 | 0 |
| 2001 | 32 | -3.03 | 13 | 18.18 | 40.63 | 21.88 | 5 | 400.00 | 15.63 | 38.46 | 5 | 5 |
| 2002 | 29 | -9.38 | 11 | -15.38 | 37.93 | -6.63 | 3 | -40.00 | 10.34 | 27.27 | 3 | 3 |
| 2003 | 25 | -13.79 | 9 | -18.18 | 36.00 | -5.09 | 1 | -66.67 | 4.00 | 11.11 | 0 | 0 |
| 2004 | 15 | -40.00 | 7 | -22.22 | 46.67 | 29.63 | 0 | -100.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0 | 0 |
| 2005 | 59 | 293.33 | 28 | 300.00 | 47.46 | 1.69 | 20 | | 33.90 | 71.43 | 20 | 20 |
| 2006 | 30 | -49.15 | 14 | -50.00 | 46.67 | -1.67 | 6 | -70.00 | 20.00 | 42.86 | 4 | 4 |
| 2007 | 64 | 113.33 | 27 | 92.86 | 42.19 | -9.60 | 13 | 116.67 | 20.31 | 48.15 | 11 | 11 |
| 2008 | 128 | 100.00 | 60 | 122.22 | 46.88 | 11.11 | 43 | 230.77 | 33.59 | 71.67 | 37 | 37 |
| 2009 | 231 | 80.47 | 63 | 5.00 | 27.27 | -41.82 | 57 | 32.56 | 24.68 | 90.48 | 36 | 36 |
| 2010 | 262 | 13.42 | 105 | 66.67 | 40.08 | 46.95 | 88 | 54.39 | 33.59 | 83.81 | 37 | 37 |
| 2011 | 275 | 4.56 | 96 | -16.10 | 31.27 | -21.97 | 63 | 28.41 | 22.91 | 73.26 | 21 | 21 |
| 2012 | 96 | -65.09 | 36 | -58.14 | 37.50 | 19.91 | 26 | -58.73 | 27.08 | 72.22 | 4 | 4 |
| 2013 | 29 | -73.96 | 12 | -66.67 | 48.00 | 28.00 | 2 | -92.31 | 8.00 | 16.67 | 0 | 0 |


Chart 31. Trends of Enterprise Type Piracy Incidents





APPENDIX III

SOMALIA CLAN MAP AND STRUCTURE





Hawiye (Central/Southern Somalia)



APPENDIX IV

WORLD CHOKE POINTS AND MAJOR SEA LANES

A. The World (Oil) Choke Points


| Chokepoint | Location | Link | Daily Oil Flow (m bbl/d) | Alternate | Threats | Notes |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|--|--|---|--|
| The Strait of Hormuz | b/t Oman & Iran | The Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman & the Arabian Sea | 15.5 in 2009 (17 in 2008) | The 745 mile long East-West Pipeline | Iran's position | 33% of seaborne trade & 17% oil trade worldwide |
| The Strait of Malacca | b/t Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore | The Indian Ocean to the South China Sea & Pacific Ocean | 13.6 in 2009 (14 in 2007) | Lombok & the Sunda strait (adding 3 or more days) | Piracy & Terrorism (Peak at 2004 but decreasing since 2006) | Over 60,000 vessels per year & alternate pipeline under construction or proposal |
| The Suez Canal | Egypt | The Red Sea & Gulf of Suez with the Mediterranean Sea | 2 in 2010 | The Southern tip of Africa, adding about 6,000 miles | Transient phase of Egypt politics | SUMED pipeline as an alternative to VLCC or larger. LNG flow is Increasing |
| The Strait of Bab el-Mandab | b/t Yemen, Djibouti & Eritrea | the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea | 3.2 in 2009 (4 in 2008) | The same above. Can block the Suez Canal | Piracy and Terrorism (Continually Increasing) | Somali pirates continue to expand No. of attack and range |
| The Bosphorus & Dardanelles | Turkey | The Black Sea with the Sea of Marmara & the Sea of Marmara with the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas for the Dardanelles | 2.9 in 2009 (3.4 at its peak in 2004) | None for westward from the black and Caspian Sea & several pipeline projects under development | Traffic Accidents due to difficult waterways to navigate | Divide Asia from Europe. Only half a mile at narrowest point. |
| Panama Canal | Panama | The Pacific Ocean with the Caribbean Sea | 0.8 in 2009 | Around the tip of South American | No Specific Threat except limited | Not a important oil route and limited. |

| | | | | | | |
|----------------|---------|--|---------------------------|-------------------------|--|--|
| | | and Atlantic Ocean | | adding over 8,000 miles | capacity (only ships of less than 100,000 dead weight tons can pass) | But the most busiest sea lane |
| Danish Straits | Denmark | The Baltic Sea (From Russia) to Europe | 3.3 in 2009 (2.4 in 2005) | None except pipelines | No Specific Threat | Russian has been increasing its oil export through the sea lanes |

- m bbl/d: million barrels per day

B. Major Sea Lanes

Figure 5: West-east, north-south: maritime routes and disruption



Source from UNOSA Global Report on Maritime Piracy: A Geospatial Analysis 1995-2013

Figure 9: Piracy areas and anti-piracy national forces



APPENDIX V

GENERAL ECONOMIC INDICATOR OF THE PIRACY PRONE STATES

* General Economic Indicators of ASEAN States

(Source from WTO data base: <http://stat.wto.org/Home/WSDBHome.aspx?Language=E>)

*ASEAN States in 2010 (million US\$, share=share in world total exports)

| | GDP | Trade per Capita | Trade to GDP ratio | Export | Import | Share |
|-------------|---------|------------------|--------------------|---------|---------|-------|
| Singapore | 222,699 | 161,763 | 404.9 | 351,867 | 310,791 | 2.31 |
| Malaysia | 237,804 | 13,840 | 177.8 | 198,801 | 164,733 | 1.3 |
| Indonesia | 706,558 | 1,222 | 49.6 | 157,818 | 131,737 | 1.04 |
| Thailand | 318,847 | 5,737 | 138.3 | 195,319 | 182,400 | 1.28 |
| Philippines | 199,589 | 1,335 | 67.8 | 51,496 | 58,229 | 0.34 |
| Brunei | 10,732 | 33,621 | 103.8 | 9,200 | 2,950 | 0.06 |
| Cambodia | 11,343 | 984 | 128.3 | 5,030 | 7,500 | 0.03 |
| Laos | 7,492 | 454 | 51.8 | 1600 | 1800 | 0.01 |
| Myanmar | 35,226 | 141 | 52.8 | 8,749 | 4,807 | 0.06 |
| Vietnam | 103,572 | 1,774 | 157.3 | 72,192 | 84,801 | 0.47 |

* States around the Gulf of Aden

| | GDP | Trade per Capita | Trade to GDP ratio | Export | Import | Share |
|----------|--------|------------------|--------------------|--------|--------|-------|
| Kenya | 31,409 | 500 | 65.2 | 5,151 | 12,090 | 0.03 |
| Eritrea | 2,117 | NA | NA | 12 | 690 | 0 |
| Djibouti | 1,049 | 935 | 83.4 | 95 | 420 | 0 |
| Ethiopia | 29,717 | 145 | 44.1 | 2,238 | 8,552 | 0 |
| Yemen | 26,365 | 836 | 74 | 8700 | 9700 | 0.06 |
| Somalia | 2,372 | NA | NA | 300 | 798 | NA |

(* Somalia data is obtained from CIA The World Fact Book)

* State in the Gulf of Guinea

| | GDP | Trade per Capita | Trade to GDP ratio | Export | Import | Share |
|-------------------|---------|------------------|--------------------|--------|--------|-------|
| Benin | 5,233 | 418 | 40 | 1,099 | 1,434 | 0.01% |
| Cameroon | 19,147 | 678 | 40 | 3,289 | 4,943 | 0.02% |
| Equatorial Guinea | 9,013 | 32606 | 170 | 6,947 | 6,259 | 0.04% |
| Gabon | 9,684 | 8891 | 85 | 5,502 | 3,987 | 0.03% |
| Nigeria | 159,017 | 1036 | 43 | 64,226 | 49,191 | 0.34% |
| Sao Tome | 167 | 876 | 72 | . | . | . |
| Togo | 2,477 | 532 | 97 | 983 | 1,245 | 0.01% |

(* Data is obtained from the World Bank. Trade per capita (2010~2012) is gained from WTO)

Economic Indicators of Indonesia

(Source: The Growth and Development of the Indonesian Economy by Stephen Elias and Clare Noone)


: <http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2011/dec/4.html>



Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, February 13, 2011.

Indonesia – Share of World GDP*

At PPP exchange rates




* IMF forecast from 2011
Source: IMF

APPENDIX VI


ESTIMATED AMOUNT OF FISHERY RESOURCE BY FOREIGN SHIPS

Estimated Catch Amount of Fishery Resources by Foreign Vessels

Estimated catch by foreign vessels and Somali vessels in Somali waters, 1981–2013.




Estimated Catch Amount by Country



(Source from One Earth Future (2015) Securing Somali Fisheries. Denver, CO: One Earth Future Foundation.)

1996-2013: List of Countries for the IUU Fishing



APPENDIX VII

AL-SHABAAB AND RAS KAMBONI INVOLVED INCIDENTS

● Al-Shabaab & Ras Kamboni

| Ship | Date | Ransom | Captivity | Piracy Group | Militia Group |
|----------------------------|----------|--------|-----------|--------------------------|------------------------|
| MV Rak Afrikana | 10-04-11 | 2 | 332 | H.H.Syn. (IOC) | Ras Kamboni |
| FV Tai Yuan 227 | 10-05-06 | 1 | 268 | H.H.Syn. (ION) | Ras Kamboni |
| MT ASPHALT VENTURE | 10-09-28 | 3.6 | 200 | H.H.Syn. (IOC) | Ras Kamboni |
| FV Golden Wave 305 | 10-10-09 | 0.635 | 282 | H.H.Syn. (IOC) | Ras Kamboni |
| MV IZUMI (ISUMI) | 10-10-10 | 4.5 | 138 | H.H.Syn. (IOC) | Ras Kamboni |
| MT YORK | 10-10-23 | 4.5 | 138 | H.H.Syn. | Ras Kamboni |
| MSV See Queen | 10-10-23 | 0 | 8 | Al- Shabaab tied Militia | Al-Shabaab/Ras Kamboni |
| M/V MSC PANAMA | 10-12-10 | 7 | 271 | H.H.Syn. | Al-Shabaab |
| FV SHIUFU FU No.1 | 10-12-25 | 3 | 569 | H.H.Syn. | Al-Shabaab |
| MSV AL SHAMSHIR | 10-12-28 | . | . | Ras Kamboni | Ras Kamboni |
| FV Vega 5 w/2 spanish crew | 10-12-31 | 5 | 136 | H.H.Syn. | Al-Shabaab |
| Barge DN 127 | 11-01-01 | 0.7 | . | H.H.Syn. | Al-Shabaab/Ras Kamboni |
| MV Leopard | 11-01-12 | 6 | 878 | H.H.Syn. | Al-Shabaab/Ras Kamboni |
| MV Beluga Nomination | 11-01-22 | 5 | 81 | Puntland Syn. | Al-Shabaab/Ras Kamboni |
| FV Morteza | 11-01-27 | 0 | 58 | H.H.Syn. | Ras Kamboni |
| MT Savina Caylyn | 11-02-08 | 11.5 | 317 | H.H.Syn (Ilyaaas' gang) | Ras Kamboni |
| MV Sinar Kudus | 11-03-16 | 4.5 | 46 | H.H.Syn. (IOC) | Ras Kamboni |

| | | | | | |
|--------------------------|----------|-----|-----|--------------------------|------------------------|
| FV NN PAKISTAN | 11-04-09 | . | . | Islam Insurgents | Ras Kamboni |
| Judith Tebbutt (L.K) | 11-09-11 | 1.1 | 191 | H.H.Syn. (IOC) | Ras Kamboni |
| Marie Dedieu (L.K) | 11-09-17 | 0 | 15 | Ras Kamboni Tied Militia | Al-Shabaab/Ras Kamboni |
| Serra and Thiebaut (L.K) | 11-10-13 | 0.5 | 645 | H.H.Syn. (IOC) | Ras Kamboni |

APPENDIX VIII

MAJOR NEGOTIATOR INVOLVED INCIDENTS

● Looyan (Negotiator)

| Ship | Date | Ransom | Captivity | Piracy Group |
|-----------------------------------|----------|--------|-----------|---------------------------|
| LPG Tanker Longchamp | 09-01-29 | 1 | 63 | Puntland Syn+H.H.Syn |
| Win Far 161 | 09-04-06 | 0.4 | 312 | Puntland Syn.+H.H.Syn |
| General Cargo Malaspina Castle | 09-04-06 | 2 | 34 | Eyl Syn |
| Bulk Carrier Patriot | 09-04-25 | 1 | 21 | Puntland Syn |
| MV Ariana | 09-05-02 | 2.8 | 193 | Marine (H.H.S.) |
| General Cargo Victoria | 09-05-05 | 1.8 | 45 | Puntland Syn. |
| Bulk Carrier Navlos Apollon | 09-12-28 | 1 | 62 | H.H.Syn |
| Chemical Tanker St James Park | 09-12-28 | 3 | 137 | Puntland Syn+H.H.Syn |
| Vehicle Carrier Asian Glory | 10-01-01 | 2.4 | 164 | H.H.Syn |
| Product Tanker Al Nisr Al Saudi | 10-03-01 | 7 | 282 | Puntland Syn+H.H.Syn |
| Bulk Carrier Frigia | 10-03-23 | 1 | 129 | H.H.S |
| VLCC Samho Dream | 10-04-04 | 9.5 | 217 | Joint Syndicate |
| Chemical Tanker MARIDA MARGUERITE | 10-05-08 | 5.5 | 285 | Puntland Syn |
| Chemical Tanker Panega | 10-05-11 | 1.5 | 122 | Puntland Syn +H.H.Syn |
| CT MV OLIB G | 10-09-08 | 3 | 487 | Puntland Syn |
| MT Polar | 10-10-30 | 7.7 | 240 | H.H.Syn(IOC)+Puntland Syn |
| MV Hannibal II | 10-11-11 | 2 | 127 | Puntland Syn |
| MV Jahan Moni | 10-12-05 | 4 | 99 | Galmudug+ Puntland Syn |
| MV Thor Nexus | 10-12-25 | 5 | 344 | Puntland Syn.+H.H.S |
| MV BLIDA | 11-01-01 | 2.6 | 307 | Puntland Syn |

| | | | | |
|---------------|----------|------|-----|----------------------------|
| VLCC Irene SL | 11-02-09 | 13.5 | 58 | Puntland Syn(Mandek group) |
| MV SININ | 11-02-12 | 4 | 183 | H.H. Syn. |

● Joseph (Negotiator)

| Ship | Date | Ransom | Captivity | Piracy Group |
|----------------|----------|--------|-----------|----------------------------|
| MV EMS River | 10-12-27 | 3 | 65 | Puntland Syn |
| SY ING & Danes | 11-02-24 | 3.5 | 195 | Joint Op. w/ Puntland Syn. |
| MV Susan K | 11-04-08 | 5.7 | 90 | Puntland Syn |

● Abdi (Negotiator)

| Ship | Date | Ransom | Captivity | Piracy Group |
|----------------------|----------|--------|-----------|----------------------------|
| Tanker Sirius Star | 08-11-15 | 3 | 55 | CRC+Joint (AdenN)+100 More |
| General Cargo Pompei | 09-04-18 | 2.8 | 72 | Puntland Syn +H.H.Syn |

● Adam (Negotiator)

| Ship | Date | Ransom | Captivity | Piracy Group |
|----------------------|----------|--------|-----------|-------------------------|
| MV IZUMI (ISUMI) | 10-10-10 | 4.5 | 138 | H.H.Syn(IOC) |
| MV Beluga Nomination | 11-01-22 | 5 | 81 | H.H.Syn(IOC)+Rascamboni |

APPENDIX IX

INCIDENT LISTS BY MAJOR LEADERS AND FACILITATORS

- Abdullahi **Boyah** Abshir (Issa Mohamu/Musa Issa subclan of Majerteen Darod): called a father of Somali pirates (Bahadur)/ arrested in May 2010)

| Ship | Date | Ransom | Captivity | Piracy Group |
|---|----------|--------|-----------|-----------------------|
| MV Feisty Gas | 05-04-10 | 0.315 | 17 | Eyl Alliance |
| MV Reef Malindi | 05-05-22 | E | 41 | Eyl Alliance |
| MV Samar I | 05? | E | | Marines |
| MV Idun | 05 | E | | Marines |
| MV IBN Batouta | 05-09-26 | 0.1 | 8 | Coast Guard |
| MV Torgelow | 05-10-03 | 0.1 | 42 | Marines |
| MV Miltzow | 05-10-12 | 0 | 4 | Coast Guard |
| MV Panagia | 05-10-18 | 0.7 | 39 | Coast Guard |
| MT San Carlo | 05-10-20 | 0.65 | 29 | Somali Marines |
| Cruise/Passenger Ship Seabourn Spirit #crew | 05-11-05 | 0 | 0 | Coast Guard |
| MV Julia 54 | 05-12-07 | E | 100 | |
| General Cargo Rozen (WFP ship) | 07-02-25 | 0.1 | 41 | Marine |
| General Cargo Danica White | 07-06-02 | 0.72 | 83 | Marine |
| Chemical Tanker Golden Nori | 07-10-28 | 1.5 | 45 | Coast Guard |
| Luxury Yacht Le Ponant | 08-04-04 | 2.15 | 7 | Coast Guard |
| General Cargo Amiya Scan | 08-05-25 | 1.25 | 31 | Eyl Alliance? |
| Chemical Tanker Bunga Melati 2 (Dua) | 08-08-19 | 2 | 41 | Marine+NVCG+Boyah |
| Bulk Carrier Iran Deyanat | 08-08-21 | 2.5 | 52 | Cross Joint Clan Syn. |
| MV BBC Trinidad | 08-08-21 | 1.1 | 21 | Cross Joint Clan Syn. |
| Carre D'AS IV Yacht | 08-09-02 | 0 | 15 | Eyl Syn? |
| General Cargo Al Mansourah^ | 08-09-03 | 1.5 | 25 | Eyl Syn? |
| Chemical Tanker MT Stolt Valor | 08-09-15 | 1.1 | 62 | Puntland Syn |

| | | | | |
|----------------------------|----------|-----|------|---------------------------------|
| MV Faina | 08-09-25 | 3.2 | 133 | CRC+Joint |
| Chemical Tanker Action | 08-10-10 | 1 | 64 | Eyl Syn |
| Bulk Carrier Yasa Neslihan | 08-10-29 | 1 | 71 | Eyl Syn |
| Bulk Carrier Bright Ruby | 08-09-10 | 1 | 36 | Joint Syndicate (H.H +Punt Syn) |
| General Cargo Marathon | 09-05-07 | 1.3 | 48 | |
| MV Ro-Ro Iceberg 1 | 10-03-29 | 4 | 1000 | Puntland Syn |

- Mohamed Abdi Hassan **Afweyne** (Habar Gidir Saleeban subclan of Hawiye):
the Founder of Somali Marine/Arrested in October 13 2013.

| Ship | Date | Ransom | Captivity | Piracy Group |
|--------------------------------------|----------|--------|-----------|------------------------|
| MV Feisty Gas | 05-04-10 | 0.315 | 17 | Eyl Aliance |
| MV Reef Malindi | 05-05-22 | E | 41 | Eyl Aliance |
| MV Semlow | 05-06-26 | 0.01 | 100 | |
| MV Samar I | 05? | E | | Marines |
| MV Idun | 05 | E | | Marines |
| MV IBN Batouta | 05-09-26 | 0.1 | 8 | Coast Guard |
| MV Torgelow | 05-10-03 | 0.1 | 42 | Marines |
| MV Miltzow | 05-10-12 | 0 | 4 | Coast Guard |
| MV Panagia | 05-10-18 | 0.7 | 39 | Eyl Aliance |
| MT San Carlo | 05-10-20 | 0.65 | 29 | Eyl Aliance |
| MV Laemthong Glory | 05-11-07 | 0.3 | 27 | NVCG |
| FV Feng Jung 16 | 05-11-30 | 0.125 | 63 | NVCG |
| Dhow Bhakti Sagar | 06-02-26 | 0.025 | 32 | Marine |
| Product Tanker Lin I | 06-03-29 | 0.5 | 109 | Marine+Other Militia |
| Fishing Tanker Dong Won No.628 | 06-04-04 | 0.8 | 117 | Marine |
| General Cargo Rozen (WFP ship) | 07-02-25 | 0.1 | 41 | Marine |
| General Cargo Mariam Queen | 07-05-03 | 0.1 | 24 | Marine? Or Son.Can? |
| Dhow Al Caqiq (or Al Aqueed) | 07-05-24 | 0.1 | 28 | Marine? Or Son.Can? |
| General Cargo Danica White | 07-06-02 | 0.723 | 83 | Marine |
| Fishing Vessel Playa De Bakio | 08-04-20 | 1.2 | 9 | Marine |
| General Cargo Stella Maris | 08-07-20 | 2 | 52 | Marine + Puntland Syn. |
| Chemical Tanker Bunga Melati 2 (Dua) | 08-08-19 | 2 | 41 | Marine+NVCG+Boyah |
| Bulk Carrier Iran Deyanat | 08-08-21 | 2.5 | 52 | Cross Joint Clan Syn. |
| MV BBC Trinidad | 08-08-21 | 1.1 | 21 | Cross Joint Clan Syn. |
| Chemical Tanker Bunga Melati 5(Lima) | 08-08-29 | 2 | 29 | Marine+NVCG |

| | | | | |
|--|----------|------|-----|---------------------------------|
| Bulk Carrier Bright Ruby | 08-09-10 | 1 | 36 | Joint Syndicate (H.H +Punt Syn) |
| Chemical Tanker MT Stolt Valor | 08-09-15 | 1.1 | 62 | |
| Bulk Carrier Centauri | 08-09-18 | 1.3 | 70 | |
| Bulk Carrier Capt. Stefanos | 08-09-21 | 1.2 | 76 | Marine |
| MV Faina | 08-09-25 | 3.2 | 133 | CRC+Joint |
| Chemical Tanker Genius | 08-09-26 | 1 | 53 | |
| Chemical Tanker Action | 08-10-10 | 1 | 64 | |
| Bulk Carrier African Sanderling | 08-10-15 | 2 | 89 | Marine |
| Bulk Carrier Yasa Neslihan^** | 08-10-19 | 1 | 71 | Eyl Syn |
| General Cargo CEC Future | 08-11-07 | 1.7 | 71 | Eyl Syn? |
| Chemical Tanker Stolt Strength | 08-11-10 | 2.2 | 7 | Puntland Syn+H.H.Syn |
| Fishing Vessel Tianyu No.8 | 08-11-14 | 1 | 87 | H.H.Syn |
| Tanker Sirius Star | 08-11-15 | 3 | 55 | CRC+Joint (AdenN)+100 More |
| LPG Tanker Longchamp | 09-01-29 | 1 | 63 | Puntland Syn +H.H.Syn |
| Yacht Catamaran Serenity | 09-03-16 | 0.02 | 175 | Puntland Syn+H.H.Syn |
| Chemical Tanker Bow Asir | 09-03-26 | 2.4 | 16 | H.H.Syn |
| Yacht Indian Ocean Explorer | 09-03-28 | 0.45 | 87 | H.H.Syn |
| Freighter Hansa Stavanger | 09-04-04 | 2.75 | 122 | Puntland Syn +H.H.Syn |
| General Cargo Pompei | 09-04-18 | 2.8 | 72 | Puntland Syn +H.H.Syn |
| MV Ariana | 09-05-02 | 2.8 | 193 | Marine(H.H.S) |
| General Cargo Almezaan | 09-05-02 | 0 | 5 | H.H.Syn |
| General Cargo Charelle | 09-06-12 | 1 | 185 | H.H.Syn |
| Fishing Vessel Alakrana | 09-10-02 | 3.5 | 47 | Puntland Syn +H.H.Syn |
| Container Kota Wajar + | 09-10-15 | 4 | 75 | H.H.Syn |
| Bulk Carrier De Xin Hai | 09-10-19 | 4 | 71 | H.H.Syn |
| Bulk Carrier Al Khaliq | 09-10-22 | 3.2 | 110 | H.H.Syn |
| Yacht Lynn Rival (w/t Paul and Chandlers KL) | 09-10-23 | 1 | 388 | H.H.Syn |
| Fishing Vessel Thai Union 3 | 09-10-29 | 3 | 130 | H.H.Syn |
| Bulk Carrier Delvina | 09-11-05 | 3.5 | 43 | H.H.Syn |
| Bulk Carrier MV Filitsa | 09-11-11 | 3 | 83 | H.H.Syn |
| Chemical Tanker Theresa VIII | 09-11-16 | 3.5 | 121 | H.H.Syn |
| Chemical Tanker St James Park | 09-12-28 | 3 | 137 | Puntland Syn +H.H.Syn |
| MV RAK AFRIKANA | 10-04-11 | 2 | 332 | Raskamboni+ H.H.Syn(ION) |
| MT ASPHALT VENTURE | 10-09-28 | 3.6 | 200 | H.H.Syn(ION) |
| FV Morteza | 11-01-27 | 0 | 58 | H.H.Syn |
| MV Sinar Kundus | 11-03-16 | 4.5 | 46 | H.H.Syn/Mudug |
| MV Free Goddess | 12-02-07 | 2.3 | 236 | Puntland Syn. |

- Mohamed Abdi **Garaad** (Issa Mohamu/Musa Issa subclan of Majerteen Darod):
the leader of NVCG/Arrested in April 2012.

| Ship | Date | Ransom | Captivity | Piracy Group |
|---|----------|--------|-----------|-----------------------|
| MV Feisty Gas | 05-04-10 | 0.315 | 17 | Eyl Aliance |
| MV Reef Malindi | 05-05-22 | E | 41 | Eyl Aliance |
| MV Samar I | 05? | E | | Marines |
| MV Idun | 05 | E | | Marines |
| FVZhongI No.218+ ChengQingFeng+ ShinLianFANo.36 | 05-08-16 | 0.375 | 225 | NVCG |
| MV IBN Batouta | 05-09-26 | 0.1 | 8 | Coast Guard |
| MV Torgelow | 05-10-03 | 0.1 | 42 | Marines |
| MV Miltzow | 05-10-12 | 0 | 4 | Coast Guard |
| MV Panagia | 05-10-18 | 0.7 | 39 | Coast Guard |
| MT San Carlo | 05-10-20 | 0.65 | 29 | Somali Marines |
| MV Laemthong Glory | 05-11-07 | 0.3 | 27 | NVCG |
| FV Feng Jung 16 | 05-11-30 | 0.125 | 63 | NVCG |
| General Cargo Nimatullah | 07-04-01 | 0.002 | 5 | NVCG? |
| Fishing vessel Mavuno No.1 & No.2 | 07-05-15 | 0.7 | 174 | NVCG |
| Fishing Vessel ching fong hwa 168 | 07-05-28 | 0.2 | 157 | |
| General Cargo Dai Hong Dan | 07-10-28 | 0 | 1 | |
| General Cargo Victoria | 08-05-17 | 1 | 6 | NVCG? (H.H.Syn) |
| Chemical Tanker Bunga Melati 2 (Dua) | 08-08-19 | 2 | 41 | Marine+NVCG+Boyah |
| Bulk Carrier Iran Deyanat | 08-08-21 | 2.5 | 52 | Cross Joint Clan Syn. |
| Chemical Tanker Irene | 08-08-21 | 1.5 | 49 | Garaad Syn |
| Chemical Tanker Bunga Melati 5(Lima) | 08-08-29 | 2 | 29 | Marine+NVCG |
| MV BBC Trinidad | 08-08-21 | 1.1 | 21 | Cross Joint Clan Syn. |
| Yacht Catamaran Serenity | 09-03-16 | 0.002 | 175 | Puntland Syn+H.H.Syn |
| Chemical Tanker Nipayia | 09-03-25 | 1 | 45 | Puntland Syn. |
| French yacht Tanit | 09-04-04 | 0 | 7 | Garaad? |
| Freighter Hansa Stavanger | 09-04-04 | 2.75 | 122 | Puntland Syn.+H.H.S |
| Win Far 161 | 09-04-06 | 0.4 | 312 | Puntland Syn.+H.H.S |
| MV Maersk Alabama | 09-04-07 | 0 | 5 | NVCG |
| Bulk Carrier Irene E.M | 09-04-13 | 2 | 154 | NVCG |
| General Cargo Sea Horse | 09-04-14 | 0.1 | 7 | NVCG |
| MV Safmarine Asia | 09-04-14 | 0 | | NVCG |

| | | | | |
|----------------------------|----------|------|-----|----------------------------|
| The MV Liberty Sun #U.S.A | 09-04-14 | 0 | | NVCG |
| Bulk Carrier Frigia | 10-03-23 | 1 | 129 | H.H.Syn |
| CT MOTIVATOR | 10-07-04 | 2 | 196 | Puntland Syn. |
| MV Suez | 10-08-02 | 2.1 | 317 | Puntland Syn. |
| CT MV OLIB G | 10-09-08 | 3 | 487 | Puntland Syn. |
| Pakistan MSV | 10-11-09 | | | Puntland Syn. |
| MV Hannibal II | 10-11-11 | 2 | 127 | Puntland Syn. |
| MV YUAN XIANG | 10-11-12 | 2.1 | 207 | Puntland Syn. |
| FV KANTARI 12 | 10-11-29 | | | Puntland Syn. |
| FV LAKMALI & FV LAKMINI 03 | 10-11-30 | 0 | 41 | Puntland Syn. |
| MV EMS River | 10-12-27 | 3 | 65 | Puntland Syn. |
| MV BLIDA | 11-01-01 | 2.6 | 307 | Puntland Syn. |
| MSV AL WA'ALA | 11-01-01 | 0 | | Mandek group |
| VLCC Irene SL | 11-02-09 | 13.5 | 58 | Mandek group |
| SY ING & Danes | 11-02-24 | 3.5 | 195 | Joint Op. w/ Puntland Syn. |
| MT Gemini | 11-04-30 | 10 | 215 | H.H.Syn(IOC) |
| MV Eglantine | 12-03-26 | 0 | 7 | Puntland Syn. |
| Xiang Hua Men | 12-04-06 | 0 | 1 | Puntland Syn. |

- Hussein Mohamed Abdi **Yare** (Omar Mahmud subclan of Majerteen Darod):
affiliated in both Puntland and Hobyo Haradheere Syndicates.

| Ship | Date | Ransom | Captivity | Piracy Group |
|--|----------|--------|-----------|------------------------|
| Bulk Carrier Bright Ruby | 08-09-10 | 1 | 36 | Puntland Syn.+H.H.Syn |
| Chemical Tanker Nipayia | 09-03-25 | 1 | 45 | Puntland Syn. |
| Freighter Hansa Stavanger | 09-04-04 | 2.75 | 122 | Puntland Syn.+H.H.Syn |
| Win Far 161 | 09-04-06 | 0.4 | 312 | Puntland Syn.+H.H.Syn |
| General Cargo Pompei | 09-04-18 | 2.8 | 72 | Puntland Syn.+H.H.Syn. |
| Fishing Vessel Alakrana | 09-10-02 | 3.5 | 47 | Puntland Syn.+H.H.Syn |
| Yacht Lynn Rival (w/t Paul and Chandlers KL) | 09-10-23 | 1 | 388 | H.H.Syn |
| Bulk Carrier Navios Apollon | 09-12-28 | 1 | 62 | H.H.Syn |
| Vehicle Carrier Asian Glory | 10-01-01 | 2.4 | 164 | H.H.Syn |
| Chemical Tanker Pramoni | 10-01-01 | 3.7 | 56 | H.H.Syn |
| MSV Faize Osmani | 10-01-14 | 0 | 17 | H.H.Syn |
| Product Tanker Al Nisr Al Saudi | 10-03-01 | 7 | 282 | Puntland Syn.+H.H.Syn |
| FV N.N. | 10-03-02 | 0 | 243 | H.H.Syn |
| Bulk Carrier Frigia | 10-03-23 | 1 | 129 | H.H.Syn |
| MSV Vishva Kalyan VRL No.2315 | 10-03-26 | 0 | 16 | H.H.Syn |
| MSV Nar Narayan | 10-03-26 | 0 | 11 | H.H.Syn |
| MSV Sea Queen | 10-03-26 | 0 | 11 | H.H.Syn |
| MSV Krishna Jyot | 10-03-28 | 0 | 5 | H.H.Syn |
| MSV Al-Kadri | 10-03-28 | 0 | 5 | H.H.Syn |

| | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|----------|-----|-----|-----------------------|
| MSV Safina al Bayatiri | 10-03-28 | 0 | 11 | H.H.Syn |
| MSV Al Izaji | 10-03-28 | 0 | 11 | H.H.Syn |
| MSV ATCT | 10-03-28 | 0 | | H.H.Syn |
| MSV Al Barari | 10-03-29 | 0 | | H.H.Syn |
| VLCC Samho Dream | 10-04-04 | 9.5 | 217 | Joint Syn |
| Chemical Tanker MARIDA MARGUERITE | 10-05-08 | 5.5 | 285 | Puntland Syn. |
| Chemical Tanker Panega | 10-05-11 | 1.5 | 122 | Puntland Syn.+H.H.Syn |
| MT York | 10-10-23 | 4.5 | 138 | Puntland Syn.+H.H.Syn |
| Pakistan MSV | 10-11-09 | | | Puntland Syn. |
| MV Hannibal II | 10-11-11 | 2 | 127 | Puntland Syn. |
| MV Orna | 10-12-20 | 1.2 | 314 | H.H. Syn(ION) |
| MV Thor Nexus | 10-12-25 | 5 | 344 | Puntland Syn.+H.H.Syn |
| MV BLIDA | 11-01-01 | 2.6 | 307 | Puntland Syn. |
| Bulk Carrier SAADI | 11-01-01 | 0 | | H.H.Syn |
| MV KHALED MUHIEDDINE K | 11-01-20 | 2.5 | 126 | Puntland Syn.+H.H.Syn |
| KL Serra and Thiebaut | 11-10-13 | 0.5 | 645 | H.H.Syn(ION) |

- Mohamed **Garfanje** (Sacad subclan of Hawiye) in H.H. Syn.:
a top leader of Afweyne piracy groups/Arrested on 18 August 2014

| Ship | Date | Ransom | Captivity | Piracy Group |
|---------------------------------|----------|--------|-----------|--------------------------------|
| FV N.N. | 10-03-02 | 0 | 243 | H.H.Syn |
| VLCC Samho Dream | 10-04-04 | 9.5 | 217 | Joint Syn |
| Chemical Tanker GOLDEN BLESSING | 10-06-28 | 2.8 | 132 | Joint Syn |
| MV Polar | 10-10-30 | 7.7 | 240 | H.H.Syn(IOC)+Puntland Syn |
| FV NN (Reg:4/3810& 3386) | 10-12-07 | 0 | 76 | Puntland Syn. |
| FV NN (Reg:3785) | 10-12-07 | 0 | 65 | Puntland Syn. |
| FV NN (Reg:4050) | 10-12-07 | 0 | 65 | Puntland Syn. |
| Chemical Tanker Samho Jewelry | 11-01-15 | 0 | 7 | Puntland Syn.+H.H.Syn |
| MT Gemini | 11-04-30 | 10 | 215 | H.H.Syn(IOC) |
| FV ARIDE | 11-10-30 | 5.1 | 172 | H.H.Syn(IOC) |
| KL Michael Scott Moore | 12-01-06 | 1.6 | 990 | Saad Clan pirates+H.H.Syn(ION) |

- Isse **Yulux** (Ali Saleeban subclan of Majerteen Darod) in Puntland Syn.

| Ship | Date | Ransom | Captivity | Piracy Group |
|-----------------------------------|----------|--------|-----------|-----------------------------|
| General Cargo Amiya Scan | 08-05-25 | 1.25 | 31 | Eyl Alliance? |
| General Cargo Stella Maris | 08-07-20 | 2 | 52 | Marine + Puntland Syn. |
| General Cargo Blue Star | 09-01-01 | 1.78 | 63 | Eyl/Puntland Syn. |
| Product Tanker Al Nisr Al Saudi + | 10-03-01 | 7 | 282 | Puntland Syn.+H.H.Syn |
| MV EMS River | 10-12-27 | 3 | 65 | Puntland Syn. |
| SY ING & Danes | 11-02-24 | 3.5 | 195 | Joint Op. w/ Puntland Syn. |
| MV Dover | 11-02-28 | 3.8 | 215 | Joint Op. w/ Puntland Syn. |
| Dhow Al Yasin | 11-03-27 | 0 | 12 | Puntland Syn. |
| MV Susan K | 11-04-08 | 5.7 | 90 | Puntland Syn. |
| MT Jubba XX | 11-07-16 | 0.2 | 79 | Joint Op. w/ Puntland Syn. |
| MV Leila | 12-02-15 | 0.25 | 55 | Puntland-Hafun Syn |
| MT Royal Grace | 12-03-02 | 5.5 | 371 | Puntland-Hafun Pirate Gangs |
| MT Symrni | 12-05-10 | 9.5 | 306 | Hafun Syn |

- Abdulkadir Muse Hirsi Nur
(aka. **Computer**: Isse Mahamud subclan of Majerteen Darod) in Puntland Syn.

| Ship | Date | Ransom | Captivity | Piracy Group |
|------------------------|----------|--------|-----------|---------------------------|
| Bulk Carrier Patriot | 09-04-25 | 1 | 21 | Puntland Syn. |
| General Cargo Victoria | 09-05-05 | 1.8 | 45 | Puntland Syn. |
| Chemical Tanker Panega | 10-05-11 | 1.5 | 122 | Puntland Syn.+ H.H.Syn |

- Pirate Leader Hassan Abdi **Dheere** (or Abdirays) in H.H.Syn (IOC)

| Ship | Date | Ransom | Captivity | Piracy Group |
|-----------------------|----------|--------|-----------|--------------|
| MV Albedo | 10-11-26 | 1.1 | 1288 | H.H.Syn |
| M/V MSC PANAMA | 10-12-10 | 7 | 271 | Galmudug Syn |
| MV Orna | 10-12-20 | 1.2 | 314 | H.H.Syn(ION) |
| KL Judith Tebbutt | 11-09-11 | 1.24 | 191 | H.H.Syn(ION) |
| KL Serra and Thiebaut | 11-10-13 | 0.5 | 645 | H.H.Syn(ION) |
| FV Naham 3 | 12-03-26 | | 518~ | Galmudug Syn |

- Himan & Heeb Governor Mohamed Aden **Tiiceey** (Habar Gidir Saleeban subclan of Hawiye)
: Facilitator & Sponsor/ Arrested in October 2013

| Ship | Date | Ransom | Captivity | Piracy Group |
|---|----------|--------|-----------|---------------------------|
| General Cargo Stella Maris | 08-07-20 | 2 | 52 | Marine + Puntland Syn. |
| MV Faina | 08-09-25 | 3.2 | 133 | CRC+Joint |
| Yacht Catamaran Serenity | 09-03-16 | 0.02 | 175 | Puntland Syn+H.H.Syn |
| Yacht Indian Ocean Explorer | 09-03-28 | 0.45 | 87 | H.H.Syn |
| Fishing Vessel Alakrana | 09-10-02 | 3.5 | 47 | Puntland Syn.+H.H.Syn |
| Container Kota Wajar | 09-10-15 | 4 | 75 | H.H.Syn |
| Yacht Lynn Rival (w/t Paul and Chandlers KL) | 09-10-23 | 1 | 388 | H.H.Syn |
| MT ASPHALT VENTURE | 10-09-28 | 3.6 | 200 | H.H.Syn(ION) |
| MV Orna | 10-12-20 | 1.2 | 314 | H.H.Syn(ION) |
| FV Morteza | 11-01-27 | 0 | 58 | H.H.Syn |
| MV Sinar Kudus | 11-03-16 | 4.5 | 46 | H.H.Syn |
| MT Gemini | 11-04-30 | 10 | 215 | H.H.Syn (IOC) |
| FV ARIDE | 11-10-30 | 5.1 | 172 | H.H.Syn (IOC) |

APPENDIX X

THE STRUCTURE OF SOMALI PIRACY SYNDICATES

Importance of Clan

Clan is an essential nexus element in every corner of Somali society. The clan ties are also crucial in managing piracy syndicates. Following structures of two major Somali piracy syndicates also show the importance of the clan links and turfs. All the data and information are based on intensive investigation on Somali piracy incidents. UN Monitoring reports on Somalia (2010-2014) provide very useful data and information of the clan tied activities. Local media (SomaliaReport) and non-profit institution (e.g., SPA) provide also very helpful information of Somali pirates' activity with regard to their clan turfs. This studies collected all the available data and information based on the sources. However, it is not a complete summary of structure of Somali piracy syndicates due to limited accessibility to the original source in Somali language. If there are any errors and flawed information, all the faults can be attributed to limited accessibility of author of this thesis. Though this is not a main target of this thesis study, it would be a complimentary window of the dynamics of Somali piracy.

Hobyo-Haradheere Piracy Syndicates

1. Major Active Areas (See Map 3 in p119 & 4 in 120 for information of locations)

1) Galmudug Region: Garacad, Hobyo, Haradheere

* Garacad is a town for joint operation with the Puntland piracy syndicates

2) Central Somalia: Elman, Mogadishu

3) Jubaland: Kismayo

2. Major Clans and their dominant towns

: subclans of Hawiye: see Appendix III for clan structure)

1) Habar Gidir Saleeban (or Suleiman) and Sacad (or Sa'ad) based at Hobyo and Haradheere

2) Abgal and Habar Gidir Cayr at Haradheere

3. Leaders and Their profiles

: Selected out of about 20 leaders with confirmed data. (pirates leaders are also financiers, investors and facilitators.)

| Name | Clan (Hawiye) | Profile | Incidents involved |
|--|-----------------------|---|---|
| Mohamed Abdi Hassan 'Afweyne' (big mouth in Somali) | Habar Gidir Saleeban | The founder of Somali Marine (born in 1950 or 1957). | See appendix VX |
| Abdiqadir Mohamed Abdi | Same as above | Son of Afweyne | See appendix VX |
| Mohamed Osman Mohamed 'Gafanje' | Habar Gidir Sacad | Top leader with his militia unit | See appendix VX |
| Mohamed Shirweyne | Unknown (uk) | Leader & Organizer/Direct Contact with Garfanje | Alakrana, Hansa Stavanger and Choizil |
| Abdirahman Abdullahi Haji or 'Suhufi' (journalist in Somali) | Habar Gidir Saleeban | The first cousin of Ahmed Abdisalan Haji Aden, Somalia's current Ambassador to Ethiopia co-founder/managing partner and former director of programs of the Mogadishu-based radio 'HornAfrik' in direct contact with pirate leaders ' <u>Gafanje</u> ' | FV 'Jahan', MV 'Asphalt Venture', and MV 'Samho Jewelry', and the kidnappings of Michael Scott Moore, Médecins sans Frontières aid workers, and Danish Demining Group employees |
| Ilyaa | Habar Gidir Murrasade | A well-known pirate commander/leader | MV Savina Cayln |
| Mahad Mohamuud Nuur 'Nasser' | Unknown | Director General of Indian Ocean Consultation Company (IOC), a piracy business consultation company founded by Afweyne. | |
| Khlaif Dahir | Unknown | A leader of the pirates in Garacad | MT Marida Margeuerite |

4. Sponsors

| Name | Profile | Connections |
|--|--|---|
| Mohamed Aden Tiiceey | Former governor of Himan & Heeb | See appendix |
| Abdi Nur Siad 'Abdi Wal' (Habar Gidir Ayr of Hawiye) | An warlord and a co-founder of the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism | Connected to pirate leader 'Suhufi' |
| Kamal Gutale or Kamal Dahir Hassan 'Gutale' | Working with the Ministry of Justice & Constitutional Affairs as an advisor and personal assistant to former minister of foreign affairs in Somali Federal Government. | As a cousin of Afweyne, he opened a bank account for him. |
| Zakaria Hussein Arreh | A member of Djibouti intelligence/a member of Somali Parliament in 2009/Contact with leading Somali politicians including Gutale. | A supporter for Afweyne and his activities. He arranged the travel to Tripoli for Afweyne and his seven pirate fellows (eg., Garfanje and Garaad) to attend celebration |

| | | |
|------------------------------------|---|--|
| | | marking President Gaddafi's fortieth anniversary in power in September 2009. |
| Abdifatah Hassan Afrah | Current Governor of Hiraaan region | Pirate financier and investor with Zakaria |
| Aruse Nur Shuriye, a.k.a NUR Lugey | Running the local "Walaalaha Company" which owns and manages Adado Airport in Himan & Heeb state. | Pirate investor and business partner with Afweyne |

Puntland Piracy Syndicates

1. Major Active Areas in Puntland

: Eyl, North of Bandar Beyla & Bari, Ras Hafun, Sanaaq and Garacad (Joint Operation town with H.H.Syn)

2. Major Clans and their dominant towns (subclans of Darod)

- 1) Isse Mahmud subclan of Harti Majerteen (or Mohamud) at Eyl
- 2) Omar Mahmud subclan of Majerteen at Garacad
- 3) Osman Mahmood (or Mohamud) subclan of Majerteen in the Northern anchorages (ex: Ras Hafun)
- 4) Reer Haji subclan of Harti Warsangelin ("Hanaano" pirate group) in the Sanaaq area of Northern Puntland

3. Major Leaders

| Name | Clan | Profile | Incidents involved |
|--|---|---|---|
| Abullahi Abshir Boyah | Issa Mohamud/Musa Issa subclan of Majerteen Darod | Ex-Fisherman Called Father of Somali Piracy /Arrested in May 2010 | See Appendix VX |
| Mohamed Abdi Garaad | Issa Mohamud/Musa Issa subclan of Majerteen Darod | Ex-Fisherman Leader of NVCG /Arrested in April 2012 | See Appendix VX |
| Isse Mohamud Yusuf or Yulux | Ali Saleebaan OR Reer-Aden/Omar-Mohamud/Majerteen Darod | A renowned pirate leader | See Appendix VX |
| Mohammed Mussa Saeed 'Aargoosto' (a.k.a. lobster) | Osman mohamoud subclan of Majerteen Darod | Pirate leader and investor | Golden Nori (2007), Marida Marguerite (2010), Samho Dream (2010) and Golden Blessing (2010) |
| Abdulkadir Muse Hirsi Nur 'Computer' | Isse Mahamud subclan of Majerteen Darod | Ex-police officer | See Appendix VX |
| Hussein Mohamed Abdi (Abdullahi Farah Hassan or Abdi Yare) | Omar Mahmud subclan of Majerteen Darod | Also Affiliated with H.H.Syn. | See Appendix VX |
| Fuad Hanaano | Reer Haji subclan of Darod-Harti-Warsangeli | Leader of Sanaag piracy group | Yacht Rockall (2008), CT Karagol (2008), |

| | | | |
|---------------|---------|------------------------------------|---|
| | | | Tug Buccaneer (2009) |
| Mohamed Ahmed | Unknown | Bargal (Puntland) syndicate leader | MV Blida/ MSV Al Khalil/MV ROSALIA D'AMATO/FV Al-Khalil/MT Symrni |


4. Sponsor



1. General Abdullahi Ahmed Jama Ilkajir, the former interior minister of Puntland, supported Hanaano and his Sanaag pirate group. The share the same clan lineage.
2. Abdullahi Eid (Ali Saleeban subclan of Majerteen Darod) is linked to current Puntland president Abdiweli Mohamud Ali Gaas. He is the interior and municipalities affairs adviser to the Puntland President. He brokered amnesty of Yulux in 2014. They share the same clan lineage.

Estimate Revenues by Major Piracy Organizations

These estimations are based on sum calculation of the relevant incidents by the major Somali piracy organizations and their leaders. The sum figures do not reflect the exact amount due to overlapped calculation. It is intended to provide helpful clues to approximate the features of revenue created by Somali piracy.

(Calculated in USD)





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ENDNOTES

¹ Bahadur pointed out that the intelligence capability of Somali pirate were exaggerated (Bahadur 2011: 52-54)

² A "phantom ship" is a hijacked commercial vessel for various criminal purposes.) Taking advantage of the flagship convenience, the criminal groups use fake documents to register a hijacked ship after changing its name and outside look (Abhyankar, 2001).

³ These figures in piracy incidents are based on the research results of this study. Original figures are obtained from variety of sources. Primary incident figures are taken from the IMB Annual Piracy Reports and relevant media sources.

⁴ ASEAN Plus Three is a forum to coordinate cooperation between ASEAN and three Northeast Asian nations (China, Japan, and South Korea) since 1997. Asian Regional Forum (ARF) is a multilateral dialogue on security issues in Asia Pacific Region since 1994. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is a forum for 21 Pacific Rim states to promote free trade and economic cooperation since 1989. The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) is an inter-regional forum between the EU and ASEAN Plus Three since 1996. The East Asia Summit (EAS) is a forum of among major states in Asia including major stakeholders such as the U.S. and Russia since 2005.

⁵ For example, *Foreign Policy* magazine has published the failed states index annually.

⁶ Puntland declared an independent state on May 5, 1998 while remaining a part of Somali federal system. Due to poor capacity and longtime civil wars, Puntland has suffered from

various problems such as poverty, crime, and natural disasters. For example, the 2004 tsunami directly hit the Puntland coast. Puntland failed to pay security forces in April 2008. The public security system was broken for a while. Some of the security forces turned to piracy.

⁷ Puntland's law enforcement has been in chronic failure and at risk of a meltdown, due to low funding. The Puntland government has frequently failed to pay salaries to its police officers since 1998 (Bahadur, 2011:35; Hansen 2009). Many unemployed law enforcement officers have participated in pirate activity to earn a living.

⁸ The *MV Faina* was delivering 33 Soviet-made T-72 tanks, weapons, and ammunition to Kenya. NATO and other relevant states, such as Russia, UK, and the US, worried that terrorists might acquire the weapons. The pirates initially required US\$35 million. The ship and crews were released after a ransom of US\$3.2 million was paid on 5 February 2009. The attack was carried out by Garaad, a famous piracy leader, and his pirate group. Later, other pirate groups also participated after the request of Garaad, due to his falling resources (Bahadur, 2011:38, 82-83).

⁹ There is one case in which Somali pirates killed a hostage in 2012 over a delayed ransom. Hassan Abdi, an active pirate commander in Haradhere, said by telephone that "the killing was a message to the owners of the ship who paid no heed to our ransom demands" (from Huffington Post World News; http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/01/somali-pirates-hostage-killed_n_1848937.html). Before 2011, almost no Somali pirates killed hostages during negotiations, though some hostages were killed during hijacking operations.

¹⁰ Including state administration and overseas links

¹¹ For example, terrorism, and drug trafficking

¹² The IMB indicates that total incident is about all the reported and recorded maritime incidents including attempted and failed incidents by criminals. Actual incident is that maritime crime really occurred by criminals including pirates. The success rate was calculated based a calculation of the number of actual incidents over the number of total incident in a year in particular country coast.

¹³ The scores are accounted based on the case coding scheme. Incidents with score less than 8 are classified as general robbery type of piracy. Incidents with 8 or more (up to 14) are classified as enterprise type of piracy. The percentage scores are converted from the score to indicate easily the level of piracy incidents following Ragin's fuzzy score principles (Ragin 2000). See Appendix I for detailed description of the coding schemes.

¹⁴ Galmudug was created by several warlords in 2006. The mini-state tried to incorporate Himan & Heeb region which is dominated by Habar Gidir Saleeban clan of Hawiye. But the clan leaders in Himan & Heeb declared their independence in 2008. The first president of Himan & Heeb was Mohamed Abdullahi Moalim-Aden "Tiiceey" who was a core business partner with Somali piracy king pin Afweyne. They also share the same clan lineage (UN Monitoring Report 2014; Somalia Report 04/08/2012 'What is Galmudug?':

<http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/3120>).

¹⁵ The MV Victoria was hijacked by the Computer (Abdukhadar Said Hersi) led pirate gangs (A Puntland piracy group) on May 5, 2009. Bahadur estimated the start-up costs of Computer's hijacking of the MV Victoria at \$48,445 USD (2009: p. 232). The pirates gained \$1.8 million USD from the incident. Looyan worked as a negotiator.

¹⁶ The MV Savina Caylyn was on the way to Malaysia from Sudan and had evaded capture by pirates several times before. It was hijacked on February 8, 2011, by Ilyaas led pirate gangs with a joint syndicate operation from two clans (Sacad sub-clan of Hawiye and Moar Mohamud, a sub-clan of Majeerteen). The pirates used a Spanish FV Vega as a mother ship to hijack the ship.

Somaliareport:http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/2411/Division_of_Savina_Caylyn_Ransom_Fuelling_Rifts

¹⁷ For example, two former pirate leaders, Mohamoud Yusuf 'Yulux' and Mohammed Mussa Saeed 'Aargoosto', became involved in the illegal fishing and security operations in Puntland coastal areas.

¹⁸ The attacks in 1991 included three against cargo ships (MV Naviluck, the MV Valdora, and an unknown French vessel) and a Somali police boat moored in Kenya. In 1993, pirates fired on the Somalian Glory. Finally, in 1994, the HVM Bonsella, four other cargo ships, and two SHIFCO fishing trawlers were attacked.

¹⁹ In 2008, Yusuf as president of The Transitional Federal Government (TFG), also tried to contract with Secopex, a French Security Firm, for the Somali coast guard. He suggested the same deal as he did with Hart. It was not contracted due to the political problems of the TFG. The Secopex deal shows several constraints and clues to another seed of crime embeddedness in Somalia. Ambivalence in Abdullahi Yusuf's position in dealing with foreign companies revealed that the basic onset of the political leader was highly relied on foreign aid.

²⁰ There are mainly three sub-sub clans of Dorod Majeerteen in Puntland and its vicinity areas. They Isse Mohamud, Osman Mohamud and Omar Mohamod. Among many sub-sub clans

of Hawiye, Habar Gidir Saleeban people reside largely in the following areas, Hobyo, Haradheere, Garacad and Himan and Heeb state, which was the crucial base of the developed piracy organization led by Afweyne. Habar Gidir Sacad in Galmudug region which has overlapped territorial claims with Habar Gidir Saleeban have often fought against the Habar Gidir Saleeban for their pastoral reign (Lewis 2002). The fight mode also replayed during gang fights among the clan based pirate groups for up-taking ransom.

²¹ AIAI was led by Hasan Al Turki, a well-known Islamic religious leader and a leading figure of many violent Islamic movements including al-Shabaab. SSDF was led by Majerteen rebellion leaders, including Yusuf, during the Barre regime. It became a military backbone of Puntland State.

²² Puntland indicates 'Puntland pirate syndicate led by Boyah and Afweyne. Al-Qaeda involved in two major maritime terror: attacks on the US warship Cole (2000) and French Tanker (2002). ION indicates 'Indian Ocean Network' which evolved into 'Indian Ocean Consultants (IOC) Company from 2011. The ION and IOC are an offspring organization out of the wide Hobyo-Haradheere syndicate (H.H.S.) (UN Monitoring Report 2014). NVCG stands for 'National Volunteer National Coastal Guard' led by Garaad, one of Somali pirate kingpins. Marine or Central Regional Coast Guard is a pirate organization led by the Somali pirate kingpin Afweyne.

²³ A mother ship is a hijacked vessel used as a platform to hijack a bigger vessel for a large ransom. Mothership tactics began to increase rapidly in 2009. Most of the hijacked fishing vessels, especially from Iran, Yemen, and India, have been used purely as mother ships since 2009.

²⁴ According to Bahadur (2012), the new criminal venture led by Afweyne and his colluders as a pirate veteran began in 2004. Considering the low incident frequency (15 in total in the East African region) in 2004, and the rapid increase in 2005 (59 with 21 ransom piracy incidents), the Somali Coast Guard began to actively commit its maritime crimes from early 2005.

²⁵ The MV Semlow was a UN Food Aid vessel to Somalia, which was also used to hijack another UN aid ship, the MV IBN Batouta. All the recorded ransom piracy incidents were committed by the Coast Guard Groups.

²⁶ Estimated a total revenue in 2005 is of about \$ 2.5 million, which is \$160,000 per each hijack and kidnapping incident. The revenue is shrunken to about \$1.85 million in 2006 due to the political pressure from the military Islamic group led by Hasan al-Turki. The revenue size began to increase rapidly from 2007 with more than \$4 million total revenue (about \$350,000 per each successful operation).

²⁷ The hijacking of MV Rozen (chartered by the World Food Program) was committed by Afweyne-led pirate gangs. The final ransom was USD \$100,000 after 41 days of detention in spite of the pirate's demand of USD one million. At the time of this incident, Afweyne was still regarded as one of the local warlords. An interview was published by the Guardian (<http://www.theguardian.com/news/blog/2008/oct/01/somalia.armstrade>)

²⁸ The year gap between incident frequency with the highest financial capacity and the actual revenue is due to the time gap between hijack dates and Release Dates. From 2009, the negotiation periods or detention dates had been elongated due to various reasons, which became a signal of both the strength and the weakness of Somali piracy business model. Among 37

actual ransom gaining incidents in 2010, only 17 vessels were released in the same year. The longest record (1,000 days) of vessels held is MV Iceberg, which was hijacked on March 20, 2010 by Boyah-led piracy syndicate and released on December 23, 2012. However, four Thai crew of FV Prantalay 12 hijacked on April 18, 2010, were released after 1,773 days on February 27, 2015.

²⁹ There were 72 registered pirate companies in the stock market. For example, the Spaniard fishing vessel Alakrana was financed through the stock market. It was hijacked on October 2, 2009, and released after 47 days with \$3.5 million USD ransom. It was committed as a joint venture between the Puntland and the Hobyo-Haradheere pirate syndicates. Tiiceey, the governor of Himan and Heeb state, was also involved in the operation.

³⁰ Afweyne's Son, Abdulkadir Mohamed Afweyne, acknowledged the fact, in an interview, that Al-Shabaab taxed the incomes. (Somalia report, 04/02/2012: http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/3196/Interview_With_Abdulkadir_Mohamed_Afweyne).

³¹ The trust-based money transfer system, as a Somali version of Western Union, could be an indirect fuel of the conflict economy. (A Lindley, "Between 'dirty money' and 'development capital': Somali money transfer infrastructure under global scrutiny," African Affairs 108/433, 524).

³² Due to the lengthy negotiation time, there were gaps between the incident dates and the actual ransom gaining time.

³³ A phantom ship is a hijacked ship run by pirates or other criminal groups with fake registration documents. Phantom ship incidents have been frequent incidents in Southeast Asia (Abhyankar, 2006). There were at least two reported 'Phantom' ship incidents by the Somali pirates in 2010, such as MV Iceberg 1 (hijacked on March 29, 2010) and FV Tai Yuan 227 (hijacked on May 6, 2010). The Somali pirates repainted the hijacked vessels with different names. The difference from the phantom ship incidents in Southeast Asia is that Somali pirates did not intend to sell the phantom ships. They rather used them as decoying vessels for a long-term operation on high seas.

³⁴ Sheikh Hasan Hersi "Al-Turki" is well known Islamic clergy and leader of Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI). He was classified as a terror supporter since 2004 under US Presidential Executive Order 13224. Later, he joined Hizbul Islam and Al-Shabaab. He died in 2015 due to chronic illness. According to Somalia terror experts (Jamestown report 2015), he was not a main figure of Al-shabaab but remained in marginal position as a symbolic leader. His son-in-law is Sheikh Ahmed Mohamed Islam 'Madobe' (Darod from Ogaden region of Ethiopia) who led Ras Kamboni movements after departing from Al-Shabaab. His militia group involved multiple piracy incidents including land based kidnapping since 2010. Now, he becomes the first president of the Jubaland state, a buffering autonomous state between Northern Kenya and Southern Somalia since April 2013.

*Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys is the head of the shura council (legislative council) of the UIC. Aweys is also one of the former leaders of al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI). He has been also listed as terror supporter since November 2001 under the same executive order. He hails from the

[Habargidir/Ayr](#) subclan within the Hawiye clan. He is regarded as one of the spiritual leaders of the Somali Islamic Militia. In June, 2013, he was caught by Somali security forces.

³⁵ Once Hasan Al-Turki led Islamic militia as a faction of the UIC crushed the Somali pirate nest in 2006 calling piracy *Haram* (un-Islamic and forbidden). After Afweyne's marine hijacked a Korean fishing vessel Dong Won No. 628, the Islamic militia attacked Haradheere and arrest him. Somalia pirate movements were temporarily suspended after the arrest. However, Afweyne was released soon after bribing them thru his clan network.

³⁶ Local residents of Haradheere complained about the gang fighting: 'It happens constantly, when pirates get a ransom they fight together, sometimes causing a number of casualties. We are afraid of the pirates because when they are fighting, they shoot openly, without taking any notice of the residents," said one resident, Abdurahman Madoobe. Mostly they fight over the ransom and over drugs including *khat*, so during *khat* time, night time and when they have received the ransom, we must be very cautious because anything can happen, he added.'" (Somaliareport December 29 2011,

http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/2411/Division_of_Savina_Caylyn_Ransom_Fuelling_Rifts)

³⁷ Very large crude carrier (VLCC) Samho dream was hijacked on April 4, 2010 in a Joint effort between the Puntland and Hobyo-Haradheere syndicates. See the profile of the incident for detailed information.

³⁸ Two hostages were rescued by American commandos operating in an anti-terrorism unit called Joint Special Operations Command Horn of Africa located in Djibouti specifically to

launch raids in the region under AFRICOM. Eight pirates were killed, and between four and six pirates were arrested.

³⁹ In 2012, gang fights were reported over the ransoms of the FV Aride (Oct 30, 2011) and MV Leopard (hijacked on January 12, 2011). The FV Aride was sunk by monsoon waves. Pirates used it as a mothership and took the engine from the boat, and are preparing to use it on another vessel being built in Harardhere. Two Seychellois fishermen, Rolly Tambara and Mark Songoire, were kidnapped in an act committed by the IOC led by Garfanje and Duulaye. According to the UN monitoring report (2014), Tiiccey, the governor of the Himan and Heeb state, was involved as a facilitator. They were released on April 15, 2012 after \$5.1 million USD was paid. The MV leopard was stopped by a joint syndicate led by Ilyaas, Fatxi, Yare, and Afweyne's Son Abdulkadir Mohamed Afweyne. It was released on April 4, 2013, after \$6 million USD was paid.

⁴⁰ News from www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/newsPrint.php?newsID=5482.

⁴¹ Bargal is a coastal community with about 7,000 people in the Bari district located on the edge of northeast of Puntland. The village was hit by the 2004 tsunami (December 26, 2004), which devastated their living conditions. The community was also used by an Al-Qaeda-linked militia as a hiding place.

⁴² The following installations have helped the self-defense measures: water jets (high pressure water cannons), sonic guns (high-frequency sound-powered guns), citadels (safe room with radio communication), laser guns (laser beams to visually distract pirates), barbed wire and lubricant foam. However, some anti-piracy installations have shown poor effect. For example, when Boyah led Somali pirates tried to hijack a cruise ship, the Seabourn Spirit on November 5,

2005, an acoustic device LARD (long range acoustic device, so called sound cannon) did not deter their attacks.

⁴³ In the report, Rear Admiral Duncan Potts, the Operation Commander of the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) in the region determined that Somali piracy is a waning criminal activity due to four effective counterpiracy factors, such as the deployment of armed private security, better management practices, preemptive actions by combined international naval forces, and local intolerance.

⁴⁴ There are different reports of his arrest. Somaliareport tells that he was arrested after he and his group hijacked a Panamanian-flagged cargo vessel, the Xiang Hua Men by Iranian forces. The UN monitoring report (2012) suggests that he was arrested after his group attempted to hijack the MV Eglantine.

⁴⁵ See their web site for more detailed information: <http://shuraako.org/forums/sref>.