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#### **Summary**

 Methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* (MRSA) transmission in hospital wards is associated with adverse outcomes for patients and increased costs for hospitals. The transmission process is inherently stochastic and the randomness emphasised by the small population sizes involved. As such, a stochastic model was proposed to describe the MRSA transmission process, taking into account the related contribution and modelling of the associated microbiological environmental contamination. The model was used to evaluate the performance of five common interventions and their combinations on six potential outcome measures of interest under two hypothetical disease burden settings. The model showed that the optimal intervention combination varied depending on the outcome measure and burden setting. In particular, it was found that certain outcomes only required a small subset of targeted interventions to control the outcome measure, while other outcomes still reported reduction in the outcome distribution with up to all five interventions included. This study described a new stochastic model for MRSA transmission within a ward and highlighted the use of the generalised Mann-Whitney statistic to compare the distribution of the outcome measures under different intervention combinations to assist in planning future interventions in hospital wards under different potential outcome measures and disease burden.

#### **INTRODUCTION**

 Healthcare associated infections (HAIs) are adverse events that can arise during hospitalisation. Multidrug-resistant organisms (MDROs), for example methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* (MRSA), are common causes of these HAIs with patients typically becoming colonized with the organism prior to developing an infection. Treatment options for MDROs are becoming increasingly limited due to the relative scarcity in development of new treatments compared with the rate of resistance acquisition [\[1\]](#page-21-0). As such, the role of routine infection control and prevention (ICP) practices are of great importance in reducing the occurrence of HAIs.

 Intervention studies which typically investigate the effects of one or a combination of interventions in reducing HAIs provide a good first line of evidence for particular interventions to be incorporated into routine ICP practices. These studies also assist in building mathematical model representations of the healthcare setting. Such models then allow for further probing of the effects of the interventions which may not have been feasible or potentially ethical to investigate in a clinical setting but could prove useful in assisting decision-making, particularly when hospital resources are severely limited. The model findings could also provide recommendations for future intervention studies.

 Susceptible patients are typically modelled to be colonized (a state which precedes an infection) through a forcing term (referred to as the force of infection) which is a function of the number of colonized patients currently present in the ward as well as the colonized hospital staff in the ward at the time and also contact frequency. As hospital staff are not routinely screened for pathogen colonization [\[2\]](#page-21-1), obtaining high quality data on hospital staff has proven difficult.

 That said, the vast majority of mathematical models consider vector based cross- transmission between patients and transiently contaminated healthcare workers (HCWs) to be the dominant transmission mechanism for MDROs such as MRSA [\[3\]](#page-21-2). Only a small number of papers have considered alternative transmission routes typically by incorporating a constant source (such as in Forrester et al. [\[4\]](#page-21-3)). Even fewer have explicitly modelled environmental contamination as an alternative transmission route [\[5,](#page-22-0) [6,](#page-22-1) [7,](#page-22-2) [8,](#page-22-3) [9,](#page-22-4) [10\]](#page-22-5). However, such models only calibrated the parameter estimates related to the environmental contamination to match observed patient incidence rather than using environmental contamination data.

 This paper presents a stochastic model for ward MDRO transmission based on patient dynamics, as patient data are typically more readily available compared with hospital staff, coupled with a time series model of environmental contamination which was parametrised by environmental contamination data. Due to the low reported prevalence of HCW carriage [\[11\]](#page-22-6), the small proportion of nosocomial outbreaks attributable to HCWs [\[2\]](#page-21-1) and the few adverse outcomes reported for HCWs [\[11\]](#page-22-6), we assumed that transmission is implicitly facilitated by HCWs, who are temporarily contaminated with MRSA through contact with an MRSA-positive patient or environmental contamination, due to the limited mobility of patients, as is also common practice in similar modelling studies [\[4,](#page-21-3) [10,](#page-22-5) [12,](#page-22-7) [13\]](#page-23-0). Inclusion of HCWs typically involves substantial simplification of realistic HCW dynamics [\[8,](#page-22-3) [14\]](#page-23-1) or substantial additional data collection to account for the heterogeneity between HCWs [\[15,](#page-23-2)[16](#page-23-3)[,17](#page-23-4)[,18](#page-23-5)[,19\]](#page-23-6) beyond the scope of this study.

 The model was run under two settings; the first is based on MRSA dynamics in a developed country (UK and Switzerland study estimates were used here) where MRSA data and parameters are more easily readily sourced, and the second is for a

 hypothetical scenario where the pathogen is more readily transmitted and not as easy to detect. The second setting could be representative of a novel pathogen in the healthcare setting, a new strain of MRSA that is more virulent than existing strains or perhaps reflective of a resource-poor setting such as in low-income countries [\[13\]](#page-23-0) where such modelling studies could be a great benefit. The impact of five common healthcare interventions [\[3\]](#page-21-2) and their various combinations were investigated for six potential outcome measures under both settings separately. Limitations and future directions in model development are provided in the Discussion.

#### **METHODS**

#### **Model formulation**

 The model proposed is for a single ward setting and comprises of: (i) a ward-level patient arrival process; (ii) an individual-based model for patient transitions in the ward; and (iii) a time series model for the level of environmental contamination. 103 At any time  $t$ , patients in the ward are categorized based on their MRSA status 104 where they can be in the susceptible group  $(S(t))$ , the undetected MRSA colonized 105 group  $(C_{xd}(t))$ , the detected with MRSA colonization and undergoing appropriate 106 treatment group  $(C_d(t))$ , the undetected MRSA infected group  $(I_{xd}(t))$ , or the 107 detected with MRSA infection and undergoing appropriate treatment group  $(I_d(t))$ . A 108 schematic illustration of the model is provided in Figure 1 with  $E(t)$  representing the ward environmental contamination levels.

 The model is an example of Discrete Event Simulation (DES), a technique that is widely used in health care research [\[20,](#page-23-7) [21,](#page-24-0) [22\]](#page-24-1). While perhaps more commonly

 used in scheduling problems, DES has also been applied to investigate pathogen transmission [\[21\]](#page-24-0). DES provides a flexible modelling approach to represent individual patient transitions during their hospitalisation episode, allowing for the inclusion of stochastic variability (important for small population studies such as in a hospital ward) and effects of individual patient information.

117 Patient admissions into the ward are modelled as a right-censored (at ward capacity 118 M) Poisson process  $(A(t) \sim Po(\lambda))$  with a Binomial variable to separate arrivals to 119 either susceptibles  $(AS(t))$  or colonized (but not detected, i.e. $C_{xd}$ )  $(AC(t))$ . It is 120 assumed that patients cannot be infected on admission (as infected patients are 121 typically isolated or cohorted to reduce transmission risk to other patients). Excess 122 arrivals, beyond the ward capacity  $M$ , are assumed to be allocated to a separate 123 ward thus creating the right censoring in the arrival process.

124 The likelihood for the admissions at time  $t$  can therefore be written as:

$$
P(A(t) = i, AS(t) = j, AC(t) = i - j | Y(t - 1))
$$
  
= 
$$
\begin{cases} \frac{\lambda^{i}}{i!} \exp\{-\lambda\} {i \choose j} \vartheta^{j} (1 - \vartheta)^{i - j} & 0 \le i < Y(t - 1) \\ \sum_{l = Y(t - 1)}^{\infty} \frac{\lambda^{l}}{l!} \exp\{-\lambda\} {l \choose j} \vartheta^{j} (1 - \vartheta)^{l - j} & i = Y(t - 1) \end{cases}
$$

125 where  $Y(t)$  is the number of empty beds in the ward at time t and  $\vartheta$  is the 126 proportion of admissions that arrive susceptible.

127 The admissions at time  $t$  will then be assigned to the empty beds in the ward but will 128 not undergo the individual patient transitions until the next time point.

129 The individual-based model, which is for patient transitions in the ward, processes

130 each patient present in the ward at each time point based on the patient's current

 MRSA status. The following assumptions were used to formulate the individual-based model patient transitions:



increasing function of  $E(t)$ ,  $C_{xd}(t - 1)$ ,  $C_d(t - 1)$ ,  $I_{xd}(t - 1)$  and  $I_d(t - 1)$ . Specifically,

154 the following form for  $f_E$  was used

$$
f_E(t) = 1 - \exp\{-\nu(t)\Delta t\}
$$

155 where  $v(t) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 C_{xd}(t-1) + \beta_2 C_d(t-1) + \beta_3 I_{xd}(t-1) + \beta_4 I_d(t-1) + \beta_5 E(t)$ 156 is the instantaneous hazard of being colonized, or also known as the force of 157 infection for this model, and  $0 \le f_E(t) < 1 \forall t$ . Lastly,  $p_S = (1 - f_E)(1 - p_L)$ . 158 Each undetected colonized patient  $C_{xd}$  is detected with probability  $\rho$  (assumed to be 159 the screening test sensitivity). Otherwise, the undetected colonized patient can either 160 leave the ward with probability  $q_L$ , develop an infection with probability  $q_L$ , or remain 161 colonized in the ward with probability  $q_c$  such that  $q_l + q_l + q_c = 1$ . No additional 162 structure is imposed on these probabilities values as it is assumed that each 163 colonized patients will have the same probability values. 164 Each detected colonized patient  $C_d$  can either leave the ward with probability  $q_l$  or 165 remain colonized and detected with probability  $1 - q_L$ . Due to a lack of information to 166 differentiate the probability of leaving for undetected and detected colonized patients, 167 these were assumed to be same. One of the interventions considered (DECOL) 168 increases the probability of leaving for just the detected colonized patients.

169 Each undetected infected patient  $I_{xd}$  can either be detected with probability  $\rho$  or 170 remain undetected with probability  $1 - \rho$ .

171 Each detected infected patient  $I_d$  will have a probability  $r_c$  of recovering (transitioning 172 to  $C_d$ ) where

$$
r_c(t|\psi, ti_k) = 1 - \exp\{-\psi(t - ti_k)\}\
$$

173 is an increasing function of the difference of the current time  $(t)$  and the time the 174 individual k became infected  $(t_{ik})$ . In other words, it is assumed that the longer a 175 patient is infected, the more likely the patient will recover at the next time point. An 176 infected patient remains infected with probability  $1 - r_c$ .

177 By definition, only the (approximate) date that a patient is detected to be colonized or 178 infected is available from hospital surveillance databases. The transition times from 179 susceptible to undetected with MRSA colonization  $(t c_k)$ , and subsequently 180 undetected infection  $(t_{ik})$  are typically imputed from a range of plausible values 181 between the patient's admission date  $(a_k)$  and first positive screening test date  $(d_k)$ 182 where the full conditional for  $(tc_k, ti_k)$  can be written as

$$
(1 - \rho)^{N_F(t_i)} exp \left\{ \sum_b \log \nu(t_b) - \sum_d S(t_d) \nu(t_d) (t_{d+1} - t_d) \right\} q_l exp \{-q_l (t_i - t_{ck}) \}
$$

183 where  $tc_k < ti_k$ ,  $N_F(it_k)$  is the number of false negative screening test results for 184 patient k given  $ti_k$ , the b subscript indexes time points where a susceptible patient 185 becomes colonised between  $tc_k$  to patient k's discharge and the d subscript indexes 186 the time points where  $v(t)$  changes between  $a_k$  and  $tc_k$ . The expression can be 187 evaluated for all potential  $(tc_k, ti_k)$  values to obtain a discrete distribution to be used 188 in a Metropolis-Hastings step within a Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm to impute 189 these unobserved quantities and estimate the remaining model parameters [\[4,](#page-21-3) [14,](#page-23-1) 190 [23\]](#page-24-2).

 An autoregressive-moving average time series model with exogenous covariates 192 (ARMAX) [\[24\]](#page-24-3) is used to describe the environmental contamination levels  $E(t)$ . The exogenous covariates assumed to be contributing to the levels of environmental 194 contamination at time t are the  $C_{xd}$  and  $I_{xd}$  patients in the ward at time  $t - 1$ . It is assumed that detected (colonized and infected) MRSA patients undergo the decolonization treatment which halts shedding from the patient to the environment.

197 The orders of the ARMAX model are determined using the auto.arima() function 198 in the R package forecast [\[25\]](#page-24-4).

#### **Parameter values**

The model parameter values used for the normal burden setting simulations are

summarized in Table 1. Additional details of the parametrisation are provided in the

supplementary material. The normal burden setting is reflective of MRSA burden in a

typical hospital ward in a developed country. These parameters values are also used

in the high burden setting simulations with the following modifications:

205 1. there is an additional factor of two multiplying  $v(t)$ 

## 206 2. the probability of a colonized patient developing an infection  $q_i$  is doubled and

- 207  $q_c$  is reduced accordingly to ensure  $q_L + q_I + q_c = 1$
- 208 3. there is decreased sensitivity in the screening test,  $\rho = 0.6$

 i.e. we assumed that in this setting, the hypothetical pathogen is more likely to colonize susceptible patients, colonized patients more readily develop an infection and it is harder to detect the presence of the pathogen. The high burden setting attempts to mimic either the MRSA dynamics in a developing country [\[26\]](#page-24-5) or a novel 213 strain of pathogen that is more virulent and less readily detected by routine surveillance.

215 There was no available source to estimate the parameter  $\omega$  which represents the 216 difference between colonized and infected patients on the force of infection. The  $\omega$  value in the Results section was 1 as a reflection of the lack of information on the parameter. Alternative values of 0.1 and 1.9 were also investigated in the parameter sensitivity analysis (provided in the supplementary material). We found that the AR,

220  $C_{xd}$  and  $C_d$  outcomes (defined below) were particularly sensitive to a low value of  $\omega$ 221 (giving a stronger influence to colonized patients) in both normal and high burden 222 settings. Distributions of AR outcome for the different values of  $\omega$  are provided in 223 Figure 2. Similar plots for the other outcomes and parameters are provided in the 224 supplementary material.

### 225 **Interventions**

226 Five common intervention strategies were considered in the model investigation 227 below:

- 228 1. no colonized on admission (COA) (.  $\vartheta = 1$ ) where all patients who are
- 229 colonized on admission are assumed to be detected on admission and 230 isolated elsewhere, i.e. universal screening [\[27\]](#page-24-6)
- 231 2. improved environmental cleaning (ENV) which halved the intercept term in the 232 environmental time series model  $(\alpha_1)$  [\[28\]](#page-24-7).
- 233 3. improved contact precaution practices (CP) which decreases  $\nu$  by a factor of  $\xi$ 234 where  $\xi$  was set to 0.75 [\[29\]](#page-24-8).
- 235 4. perfect screening test sensitivity (SENS) where test sensitivity  $\rho$  was set to
- 236 1[\[14\]](#page-23-1).
- 237 5. improved decolonization treatment for colonized patients (DECOL) where the
- 238 probability for a  $C_d$  patient leaving the ward is now  $q_L + \Delta$  (with the probability
- 239 of staying adjusted accordingly) [\[14\]](#page-23-1).
- 240 We considered six outcome measures for the investigations. They are the attack rate
- 241 (AR) defined as the average of the force of infection  $v(t)$  [\[14\]](#page-23-1) as well as the
- 242 cumulative numbers of

- 243 patients who were colonized on admission (AC),
- 244 patients who were colonized but not detected  $(C_{\text{rd}})$
- 245 detected, colonized patients  $(C_d)$
- 246 patients who were infected but not detected  $(I_{xd})$ , and
- 247 detected, infected patients  $(I_d)$ .

248 Note that there is a slight abuse of notation where  $C_{xd}$ ,  $C_{d}$ ,  $I_{xd}$  and  $I_{d}$  refer to the 249 cumulative number of patients in each group for the outcome measures, but the 250 time-varying prevalence of the groups in the model.

251 Due to the stochastic model formulation, each intervention setting was simulated 252 1000 times and we compared the distributional differences of the outcomes rather 253 than just point estimates of the outcomes.

254 Pairs of distributions (denoted generally by  $X$  and  $Y$  here) were assessed using the 255 generalized Mann-Whitney statistic which estimates the parameter  $\theta = P(Y > X) +$  $\overline{1}$  $\frac{1}{2} P(Y = X)$  using  $\widehat{\theta} = \frac{U}{mn}$  where  $U = \sum_{i=1}^{m} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \mathbb{1}(Y_j > X_i) + \frac{1}{2}$ 256  $\frac{1}{2} P(Y = X)$  using  $\hat{\theta} = \frac{\theta}{mn}$  where  $U = \sum_{i=1}^{m} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \mathbb{1}(Y_j > X_i) + \frac{1}{2} \mathbb{1}(Y_j = X_i)$  with 257  ${Y_i; j = 1, ..., n}$  and  ${X_i; i = 1, ..., m}$  being samples from the Y and X distributions 258 respectively. Confidence intervals for  $\hat{\theta}$  were computed based on Method 5 of 259 Newcombe [\[30\]](#page-25-0).

260 Following the definition above, values of  $\theta$  larger than 0.5 indicate that the Y is 261 stochastically larger than X and, conversely, values of  $\theta$  less than 0.5 indicate X is 262 stochastically larger than Y. For the results below,  $\theta$  values between 0 and 0.2 (and 263 similarly between 0.8 and 1) are considered strong evidence that the two 264 distributions are substantially different. Intermediate  $\theta$  values between 0.2 to 0.4 (or 265 0.6 to 0.8) are assumed to provide weak evidence of a difference between the

266 distributions. Values of  $\theta$  close to 0.5 (between 0.4 and 0.6) indicate that there is no evidence that the two distributions being compared are dissimilar.

## **RESULTS**

 The results for the normal burden setting and high burden setting are summarized below. More detailed comparisons of the interventions combinations for all outcome measures using the generalized Mann-Whitney statistic are provided in the supplementary material.

273 The results for the AC,  $I_{xd}$  and  $I_d$  outcomes were similar for both the normal and high 274 burden settings, and discussed together here. Results for the AR,  $C_{xd}$  and  $C_d$ outcomes are discussed separately for the normal burden setting and high burden

setting.

 The most important intervention for the AC outcome was the COA intervention which eliminates the possibility of colonized patients being admitted. As such, the COA intervention (and any other intervention combinations which include COA) greatly outperforms interventions of any size which do not include the COA intervention in both settings. Any intervention combination which includes the COA intervention achieved 0 AC, whereas intervention combinations without the COA intervention produced AC distributions with 95% intervals that do not include 0.

284 The performance of the interventions on the  $I_d$  outcome was very similar to that for 285 the  $I_{xd}$  since the only transition to Id is through  $I_{xd}$ , i.e. eliminating the  $I_{xd}$  would also 286 eliminate the  $I_d$  population. As such, only the results for the  $I_{xd}$  results are discussed 287 for brevity as identical inferences apply to the  $I_{xd}$  outcome. The SENS intervention 288 was the most important intervention for the  $I_{xd}$  outcome as having perfect sensitivity

would allow detection of all colonized patients prior to infection developing. As such,

the best performing intervention of any size will include the SENS intervention.

291 However, it should also be noted that the  $I_{xd}$  outcome is generally small for the

292 normal burden setting with even the baseline  $I_{\text{rd}}$  having a 95% interval of [0, 2]

(Table 2).

In contrast with the normal burden setting, the SENS intervention (or any

combination which includes the SENS intervention) was substantially more

296 favourable in the high burden setting (Table 5). The SENS intervention substantially

outperformed all intervention combinations which excluded the SENS intervention

here.

## **Normal burden setting**

 Table 2 provides the numerical summary of the six outcome measures under the baseline and the various combinations of the five interventions investigated. The baseline scenario refers to the case without any interventions.

There were great improvements in reducing the AR outcome when increasing the

number of interventions by up to three with the optimal triplet being {COA, ENV, CP}

 $(2.66 \ (2.20.3.31) \times 10^{-3})$ . This triplet outperformed the best single intervention (CP)

306 with AR of 4.32 (3.69, 5.05)  $\times$  10<sup>-3</sup>) and intervention pair ({COA, CP} with AR of

307 3.35 (2.88, 4.01)  $\times$  10<sup>-3</sup>). The addition of one extra intervention (either DECOL or

SENS) did not seem to have a drastic effect on the AR distribution

309 (2.50 (2.13, 3.02) ×  $10^{-3}$  and 2.53 (2.19, 2.92) ×  $10^{-3}$  respectively). However, there is

310 a benefit in implementing all five interventions (AR = 2.39 (2.11, 2.71)  $\times$  10<sup>-3</sup>)

compared with just the best three interventions.

312 For the  $C_{xd}$  outcome, the two best performing pairs ({ENV, CP} and {COA, CP} with 313  $C_{xd}$  of 17.59 (10, 27) and 17.60 (9, 28), respectively) performed slightly better 314 compared with the best single intervention (CP with  $C_{xd}$  of 20.78 (12, 31)). A similar 315 performance gain was noted when comparing the best intervention triplet ({COA, 316 ENV, CP} with  $C_{xd}$  =14.29 (6, 24)) to both the best performing pairs. There does not 317 appear to be substantial changes in the  $C_{xd}$  difference when comparing across the 318 best performing triplet, quartets ({COA, ENV, CP, SENS} and {COA, ENV, CP, 319 DECOL} with  $C_{xd}$  of 13.65 (6, 23) and 13.94 (6, 23) respectively) and the combination 320 of all interventions (13.44 (6, 22)), indicating that there is little gain from considering 321 anything beyond the best performing triplet in reducing the distributional outcome of 322  $C_{xd}$  for this scenario.

323 Comparing across different intervention sizes for the  $C_d$  outcome, there are notable 324 reductions in support for considering additional numbers of interventions up to the 325 best performing intervention triplet ({COA, ENV, CP} with  $C_d$  of 13.96 (6, 24)). The 326 best performing single intervention for the  $C_d$  outcome was COA (24.22 (14, 36)) and 327 the best performing intervention pair was {COA, CP} (17.21 (9.5, 27)). There are no 328 discernible difference in the  $C_d$  outcome distributions in implementing all five 329 interventions ( $C_d$  = 13.43 (6, 22)) or either of the two best performing quartets 330 identified ({COA, ENV, CP, DECOL} and {COA, ENV, CP, SENS} with  $C_d$  of 13.32 331 (6, 22) and 13.95 (6, 23) respectively) compared with having just the best performing 332 intervention triplet (with  $\theta$  estimates ranging from 0.46 to 0.50).

#### 333 **High burden setting**

 The mean and 95% intervals for the six outcome measures across the different intervention combinations considered are listed in Table 4. Compared with the baseline scenario in the normal burden setting (Table 2), we see notable increases 337 in the average AR,  $C_{xd}$ ,  $C_{d}$ ,  $I_{xd}$  and  $I_{d}$  outcomes but a slight reduction in the AC outcome likely due to the decreased number of admissions overall as colonized and infected patients stay in the ward longer.

340 For the AR outcome in the high burden setting, there is evidence to consider

341 implementing the maximum number of interventions possible (subject to resource

342 constraint) beginning with the CP intervention (12.44 (10.14, 14.83)  $\times 10^{-3}$ ), followed

343 by the SENS intervention ({CP, SENS} with AR of 9.50 (8.35, 10.79)  $\times$  10<sup>-3</sup>), either

344 the COA or ENV intervention ({COA, CP, SENS} with AR of 7.88 (6.77, 9.14)  $\times$  10<sup>-3</sup>

345 or {ENV, CP, SENS} with AR 7.97 (6.71, 9.24)  $\times$  10<sup>-3</sup>) or both ({COA, ENV, CP,

346 SENS} with AR 6.25 (5.10, 7.53)  $\times$  10<sup>-3</sup>), up to all five interventions

 $(5.55 \ (4.73, 6.46) \times 10^{-3})$ . The reduction in the AR distribution when moving from the 348 best performing quartet to all intervention was not as drastic as the other increases 349 in intervention sizes.

350 Only small gains were obtained from increasing the size of the intervention

351 combinations sequentially for the  $C_{xd}$  outcome. More notable reductions were

352 obtained by moving from the best performing single intervention (CP with  $C_{xd}$  of

353 45.46 (30, 61)) to at least one of the best performing triplets ({ENV, CP, SENS},

354  $\{COA, ENV, CP\}$  or  $\{COA, CP, SENS\}$  with  $C_{xd}$ 's of 36.57 (23, 50), 37.24 (22, 53)

355 and 39.21 (26, 55) respectively), and similarly from one of the best performing

356 intervention pairs ({ENV, CP}, {CP, SENS} or {COA, CP} with  $C_{xd}$ 's of 40.95 (28,



#### **DISCUSSION**

 The results obtained from the proposed stochastic model showed that there are differences in the optimal set of interventions depending on the outcome measure of 372 interest as well as the burden setting of the pathogen (as summarized in Table 6). 373 For the AC outcome,  $I_{xd}$  and  $I_d$  outcome measures where one of the interventions

 considered eradicated the respective outcome measure (COA for the AC outcome 375 and SENS for both  $I_{xd}$  and  $I_d$ ), only that particular intervention was required. This 376 finding, particular for the  $I_{xd}$  and  $I_d$  outcome measures, may not be terribly realistic given that there is always some amount of delay between sample collection and the 378 corresponding action based on the screening results. However, the  $\theta$  performance 379 measure still showed that in the normal burden setting, eradication of  $I_{xd}$  and  $I_d$  was  only a slight improvement compared with the other intervention combinations and the 381 baseline on the account of the already low baseline  $I_{xd}$  and  $I_d$  prevalence. This is not 382 the case in the high burden setting where eradication of the  $I_{xd}$  and  $I_d$  outcomes with the SENS intervention was drastically different from the other intervention combinations which exclude SENS and the baseline scenario. The addition of the aforementioned small delay would have affected all scenarios considered equally and would unlikely have changed the finding in the normal burden setting. It is also unlikely to change the findings in the high burden setting unless the delay was substantive (of the order of days).

 The model presented used parameter estimates combined from multiple sources. While it would be ideal if the model parameters were all obtained from one source, this is frequently not the case in such modelling studies where the hypothetical investigations considered typically require some form of data collation from multiple sources in order to fully parametrize the model [\[5,](#page-22-0) [6,](#page-22-1) [7,](#page-22-2) [8,](#page-22-3) [9,](#page-22-4) [10\]](#page-22-5). It could also be argued that this provides such modelling studies with a level of flexibility that could not be obtained from clinical intervention studies. The lack of additional individual patient data for this study also precluded demonstration of the full utility of the individual-based patient transition component in the model. For this application, only 398 the patient transition from  $I_d$  to  $C_d$  was based on their individual infection times (see 399 expression for  $r_c$ ). However, the model can readily include individual-specific covariates into other transition probabilities in the model as well.

 There are a number of extensions to the stochastic model proposed here that were not considered. Most of these extensions also involve additional data structures that are not readily available.

 One such extension is to generalize the force of infection term such that the colonization threshold is no longer constant [1]. Under the current model formulation, the probability of a patient being colonized is only a function of the current force of infection. However, the generalization proposed in Streftaris and Gibson [1] allows for this transition to also depend on the accumulation of the force of infection terms from a patient's admission date to their colonization date. This quantity is known as the colonization threshold and requires prior knowledge or imputation of the colonization date in order to compute it. This extension is another approach to incorporate patient heterogeneity into the model, specifically related to patient susceptibility.

 Another potential extension is to extend the one ward model to a multi-ward model 415 using one of the meta-population models [\[31,](#page-25-1) [32\]](#page-25-2) such as the multi-patch models (where each patch represents a ward) or more generally, temporal network models taking into account the fact that the edges between nodes change quite frequently with staff shift changes, and patient admissions and discharges, making the temporal 419 element of the network more important [\[33,](#page-25-3) [34\]](#page-25-4). The high-frequency contact data required for such models have only recently started to be collected [\[35\]](#page-25-5) and could prove to be a promising research avenue in providing a realistic, detailed representation of hospital pathogen transmission in a ward.

 The inclusion of explicit representations of HCWs' roles in the pathogen transmission could be considered in extensions of the model presented here. While having explicit representation of HCWs allows for more realistic investigation of HCW-related interventions, this extension requires either incorporation of additional model assumptions on the HCWs' behaviours, or substantial additional data collection as HCWs are known to be highly heterogeneous population with different HCW

- categories (e.g., nurses, physicians, technicians) having differing patient contact
- rates, compliance levels to infection control and prevention practices, and work
- schedules [\[15](#page-23-2)[,16](#page-23-3)[,17](#page-23-4)[,18](#page-23-5)[,19\]](#page-23-6). Also, due to the low carriage rates among HCW
- reported [\[11\]](#page-22-6), frequent screening of HCWs would be required in order to accurately
- quantify the temporary contamination status of HCWs, which is associated with high
- cost and staff time. It is also likely that this extension would require the
- aforementioned multi-ward extension to realistically capture the impact of HCWs in
- MRSA transmission as HCWs tend to work across multiple wards.

## **SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL**

Supplementary material is available on the Cambridge Journals online website.

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## **DECLARATION OF INTEREST**

None

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## 547 **Table 1**: Parameter values for the stochastic model describing MDRO transmission in a hospital ward



 \* Unpublished observations are estimates obtained from fitting a non-homogeneous Poisson process to the data. More details provided in the supplementary material.

AR, autoregressive; MA, moving average.

	AR $\times$ 10 <sup>3</sup>	AC	$\mathcal{C}_{xd}$	$C_d$	$I_{xd}$	$I_d$
baseline	6.14(5.15, 7.17)	20.91 (12.50, 30)	28.53 (17, 41.5)	48.24 (34, 63)	0.56(0, 2)	0.56(0, 2)
<b>COA</b>	4.82 (4.04, 5.71)	$\mathbf 0$	24.79 (14, 37)	24.22 (14, 36)	0.27(0, 2)	0.27(0, 2)
<b>ENV</b>	5.14 (4.30, 6.22)	21.22 (13, 30)	24.10 (13, 35)	44.26 (31, 58)	0.51(0, 2)	0.50(0, 2)
CP	4.32(3.69, 5.05)	21.52 (13, 30)	20.78 (12, 31)	41.29 (30, 55)	0.47(0, 2)	0.47(0, 2)
<b>SENS</b>	5.69 (4.98, 6.43)	22.07 (14, 31)	27.13 (17, 40)	49.20 (36, 64)	$\mathbf 0$	$\overline{0}$
<b>DECOL</b>	5.57 (4.79, 6.61)	23.57 (15, 34)	27.57 (16, 41)	49.91 (36, 66)	0.59(0, 2)	0.58(0, 2)
COA, ENV	3.84(3.13, 4.76)	$\mathbf 0$	19.94 (10, 32)	19.44 (10, 30)	0.23(0, 1)	0.23(0, 1)
COA, CP	3.35(2.88, 4.01)	$\mathbf 0$	17.59 (10, 27)	17.21 (9.5, 27)	0.18(0, 1)	0.18(0, 1)
COA, SENS	4.58 (3.95, 5.35)	0	23.98 (13, 37)	23.98 (13, 37)	$\mathbf 0$	0
COA, DECOL	4.50 (3.88, 5.32)	$\mathbf 0$	24.26 (13.5, 36)	23.70 (13, 35)	0.27(0, 2)	0.27(0, 2)
ENV, CP	$3.64$ (3.00, 4.37)	21.76 (13.5, 31)	17.60 (9, 28)	38.37 (26, 51)	0.47(0, 2)	0.46(0, 2)
ENV, SENS	4.77 (4.08, 5.52)	22.43 (14, 31)	23.33 (13, 35)	45.76 (32, 61)	0	$\overline{0}$
ENV, DECOL	4.65 (3.84, 5.55)	23.74 (15, 33)	23.37 (13, 35)	45.98 (32, 61)	0.55(0, 2)	0.55(0, 2)
CP, SENS	4.05 (3.56, 4.57)	22.80 (14, 32)	19.83 (11, 30)	42.63 (30, 57)	$\mathbf 0$	0
CP, DECOL	3.98(3.42, 4.67)	23.97 (14.5, 33.5)	20.37 (11, 31)	43.25 (30, 58)	0.58(0, 2)	0.58(0, 2)

552 **Table 2:** Numerical summaries of output measures for normal burden setting.





553 **Table 3:** Summary of intervention combination comparisons for the normal burden

554 setting.







556 **Table 4:** Numerical summaries of output measures for high burden setting.





# 557 **Table 5:** Summary of intervention combination comparisons for the normal burden

558 setting.







 **Table 6:** Overall order of importance for the five interventions considered under the normal and high burden setting. // denotes exchangeability in the order of the interventions and || denotes the optimal sized interventions i.e. addition of interventions to the right of the || symbol would not affect the associated outcome 564 measure.



#### **Legends for figures**

 Figure 1: Compartmental diagram for the MRSA transmission model incorporating environmental contamination. The solid black lines represent patient transitions between the different states as well as admissions and discharges (only for the  $S(t)$  and  $C_{xd}(t)$  compartments). The red dashed lines denote the contribution from the various compartments to the colonization process while the black dashed lines 572 show the compartments contributing to the evolution of the  $E(t)$  compartment.



 Figure 2: AR outcome for normal burden (left plot) and high burden (right plot) 575 settings. The x-axis denotes the baseline, low  $\omega$  value and high  $\omega$  value (moving from left to right).

