

**The Untold Story: The Role of the Department of Foreign Affairs
and International Trade in Canadian Foreign Intelligence**

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Abstract

Of the Canadian agencies involved in intelligence work, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) has tended to be overlooked. In fact, DFAIT acts as a collector, analyzer and disseminator of foreign intelligence. It is actively involved in foreign intelligence collection, participates in international intelligence sharing, and contributes to the Canadian intelligence-community. This thesis explores and highlights for the first time DFAIT's involvement in foreign intelligence work, albeit selectively, over the past sixty years.

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- A mi amor y cariño

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Intelligence means knowledge.

-Sherman Kent¹

The foreign ministry is in the business of collecting information.

-Basil Robinson²

Everything we do is overt intelligence.

-Allan Gotlieb³

Chapter One: Introduction

According to one authority, the discussion of intelligence issues in Canada has been a “political taboo.”⁴ Certainly there has been relatively little academic and public discourse in Canada about intelligence structures, methods and policies.⁵

It is the case that in all countries much secrecy surrounds intelligence matters. The Canadian public seems particularly poorly informed and unaware of government operations and procedures in regards to intelligence, and this unawareness also extends to members of

¹ Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* (Hamden: Archon Books, 1965), 3. Kent's definition of intelligence is one of the most commonly used by intelligence practitioners and academics in scholarly work.

² Basil Robinson, Interview with author, December 6, 2003, Ottawa, Ontario.

³ Allan Gotlieb, telephone interview with author, September 23, 2003.

⁴ Peter G. Russell, telephone interview with author, August 8, 2003. Alistair Hensler, a former Assistant Director of the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS), explains that “the norm has been for a small cadre of public servants to address intelligence-related matters behind closed doors instead of seeking broader opinions from the public or even from their own colleagues in government. (Alistair S. Hensler, “Canadian Intelligence: An Insider's Perspective,” *Canadian Foreign Policy* 6, no. 3 (Spring 1999): 127)

⁵ Martin Rudner notes that “in the words of British scholar Christopher Andrew, [intelligence] is the “missing dimension” of international studies” (Martin Rudner, “Intelligence Studies in Higher Education: Capacity-Building to Meet Societal Demand,” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 18, no. 3 (2009): 110). Andrew's comment highlights the lack of discussion of intelligence in the foreign policy literature and international relations text books. The late Geoffrey R. Weller also mentions that only a “few courses on the topic are currently offered in [Canadian] universities, and even fewer programs of study contain an intelligence component” (Geoffrey R. Weller, “Assessing Canadian Intelligence Literature: 1980-2000,” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 14, no. 1 (2001): 56). In 2008, only eight Canadian universities were teaching intelligence courses on a part-time or full-time basis. In regards to Canadian scholarly research, Rudner noted that “out of more than 1,800 Canada Research Chairs established in Canadian universities since 2000 under that federal initiative to promote academic excellence in priority

Parliament (MPs) and government officials. Until recently, the Canadian government only had a handful of publications on the subject matter available in the public domain.⁶ The government has traditionally followed a cautious policy, ensuring that intelligence structures and operations are hidden from prying eyes.

Another factor may be that Canadians believe Canada has a record and an international image as a peacekeeper, a promoter of world peace and helpful fixer in international relations.⁷ The governments of Canada and many Canadians may worry that an association with foreign intelligence operations might contradict this benevolent image in the world.

One Canadian government department in particular does not openly discuss its intelligence role - the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT).⁸ Nor is

fields identified by the universities themselves, not one was dedicated to Intelligence Studies. Not a single one" (Rudner, "Intelligence Studies in Higher Education: Capacity-Building to Meet Societal Demand," 113).

⁶ The most commonly referenced government documents on Canadian intelligence are those of the Privy Council Office (PCO) and several commission reports. See Canada, Privy Council Office, *The Canadian Security Intelligence Community: Helping Keep Canada and Canadians Safe and Secure*, (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 2001); Canada, Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, *A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities*, 2006, <http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-bcp/commissions/maher_arar/07-09-13/www.ararcommission.ca/eng/EnglishReportDec122006.pdf>; Canada, Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, *Second Report: Freedom and Security Under the Law*, Vol 2, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1981).

⁷ Don Munton and Tom Keating, "Internationalism and the Canadian Public," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 34, no. 3 (September 2001), 520. Other Canadian academics also discuss the theme of Canada as a helpful fixer, international broker, peacekeeper and promoter of internationalism, see Mark Neufeld, "Hegemony and Foreign Policy Analysis: The Case of Canada as a Middle Power," *Studies in Political Economy* 48 (1995), 7-29; Andrew Cooper, *Canadian Foreign Policy: Old Habits and New Directions* (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1997); Kim Richard Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1997); Andrew Cohen, *While Canada Slept: How We lost Our Place in the World* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd, 2003); and Tom Keating, *Canada and World Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd, 1993);

⁸ The Department has changed its name several times, from External Affairs, to External Affairs and International Trade, to the current name. This thesis uses the appropriate name for each particular period in history, or else it refers to DFAIT and its predecessors as the "the Department."

that role mentioned often by academics and the media.⁹ Nevertheless, the Department is much involved in foreign intelligence work, is an active participant in the Canadian intelligence community, and a participant in international intelligence sharing. In fact, the Department acts as a collector, analyzer and disseminator of foreign intelligence. This thesis will explore and highlight the Department's involvement in foreign intelligence work, selectively, over the past sixty years.

1.0 Concept of Intelligence

The concept of intelligence has been defined simply as being information, knowledge or hindsight of past, present and future events.¹⁰ The concept of intelligence used in this thesis is somewhat narrower. As defined by Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt in *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence*, intelligence is "information relevant to a government's formulation and implementation of policy to further its national security interests and to deal with threats from actual or potential adversaries."¹¹

⁹ For example, the Department of Foreign Affairs rarely if ever described its intelligence activities in its annual reports, although most of the activities of its other units are at least mentioned. When required, the Department did acknowledge the existence of certain intelligence-related units, such as the former "Defence Liaison (2)" division. Of all the texts on Canadian foreign policy, only a few feature the Department's foreign intelligence functions, and most do not even mention them. One of the few texts that does is now forty years old: James Eayrs, *The Art of the Possible: Government and Foreign Policy in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961). Prominent texts or other books on Canadian foreign policy that do not discuss intelligence or foreign intelligence issues, include: Kim Richard Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy* (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1997); Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott and Kim Richard Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993); David B. Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown, *Canada's International Security Policy* (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1995); Arthur E. Blanchette, ed. *Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-2000: Major Documents and Speeches*, (Ottawa: Golden Dog Press, 2000); Don Munton and John Kirton, eds. *Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases*, (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1992); and Duane Bratt & Christopher J. Kukucha ed. *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates & New Ideas* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2007).

¹⁰ Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, 3.

¹¹ Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence*, (Dulles: Brassey's, 2002), 1.

A similar definition is provided by Blair Seaborn, now a retired Canadian diplomat and former Intelligence and Security Coordinator at the Privy Council Office (PCO). Seaborn suggests that:

foreign intelligence is information and analysis relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of a foreign state, person, or organization. It includes data of a political, economic, military, security, technological or social nature, obtained from overt as well as covert sources. Its purposes are to protect Canada's interests, to facilitate the foreign and defence policy process, and to provide advantage in the pursuit of overall foreign and defence policy objectives.¹²

Whatever precise definition is used, observers and practitioners alike agree the basic purpose of intelligence is to provide adequate information to government officials so they may make timely and decisive policy decisions.¹³ Shulsky and Schmitt indicate that the "adversary" is not necessarily an enemy *per se*; it could be a friendly government with which one is negotiating an economic agreement or other treaty.¹⁴ In most cases a government is seeking an advantage over others so it can "maximize the benefits."¹⁵

There are numerous ways of categorizing intelligence. One distinguishes foreign intelligence and other types such as security and criminal intelligence. Another typology distinguishes political, military and economic intelligence. This thesis will return to discussing these various types of intelligence in later chapters.

1.1 Intelligence Cycle

¹² James Blair Seaborn, "Commentary No. 45: Intelligence and Policy: What is Constant? What is Changing?," a *Canadian Security Intelligence Service publication*, (June 1994), <<http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/cmmntr/cm45-eng.asp>>.

¹³ For other definitions of foreign intelligence, see, Michael Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 47-51; and Kurt F. Jensen, *Cautious Beginnings: Canadian Foreign Intelligence 1939-1951* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), 2.

¹⁴ Shulsky and Schmitt, *Silent Warfare*, 1.

¹⁵ Shulsky and Schmitt, *Silent Warfare*, 1.

This thesis will make use of the characterization of intelligence processes known as the intelligence cycle, a concept that presents as cyclical the processes of the tasking, collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence. In the process of tasking, the government identifies something that is of concern to it and requests its intelligence agencies to collect further information. Collection is the physical process of gathering raw information through various methods. Analysis/assessment is the process of “identifying significant facts, comparing them with existing facts and drawing conclusions.”¹⁶ Dissemination is the process of providing government officials with “intelligence product” for their use in making policy decisions. Dissemination can also involve international sharing of intelligence and product. These four aspects form the stages of intelligence work.

Foreign intelligence, my main focus here, comes in various forms, reflecting collection through several different methods. One type is human intelligence (HUMINT), the collection of information from human sources. Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is collection of information through interception of electromagnetic waves, which include radio, radar, and other electronic emissions. Another type method of intelligence is open source intelligence (OSINT), the collection of information in the public domain through the use of non-clandestine methods, such as reading newspapers, watching television, researching through the Internet, or interviewing people. Most if not all intelligence agencies today gather OSINT to some extent, in addition to other types. Indeed, one estimate is that eighty percent of the contents of intelligence assessments represent open source material.¹⁷

¹⁶ Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*, 100.

¹⁷Kurt F. Jensen, e-mail message to author, December 26, 2008.

The government of Canada has dedicated agencies to collect SIGINT (the Communication Security Establishment) and security intelligence (the Canadian Security Intelligence Service). These agencies contribute to Canada's ability to understand the threats it faces and operate effectively in the international system. Their role will be discussed more fully in Chapter 2. Canada also has an agency specializing in HUMINT, and that is the Department of Foreign Affairs and its predecessors.

1.2 Canada's Foreign Intelligence Debate

Almost all countries conduct foreign intelligence operations. Canada, however, is one of the few Western industrialized countries that does not have an explicit or dedicated foreign intelligence agency, one similar in purpose to the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, also known as MI6). Both Japan and New Zealand are in a similar situation. In New Zealand, the government operates the External Assessments Bureau (EAB), an assessment unit, that does not collect intelligence or deal with security matters. EAB informs the government generally on international relations.¹⁸ New Zealand does have other agencies and departments that collect foreign intelligence in a limited form, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) has foreign intelligence collection capabilities.

In Japan, the Cabinet Research Office (NAICHO) is an assessment unit that uses OSINT and other information in the reports it produces. Japan too has other intelligence structures that have foreign intelligence capabilities, such as the three internationally-

¹⁸ Nicky Hager, *Secret Power: New Zealand's Role in the International Spy Network* (Nelson: Craig Potton Publishing, 1996), 268.

oriented ministries, the Ministry of Finance (MOF), International Trade and Industry (MITI) and Foreign Affairs (Giamusho).¹⁹

Both Japan and New Zealand have supplemented their lack of a dedicated foreign intelligence agency by using their respective foreign ministries, and other government departments and agencies that have access to the international system and relevant capabilities, to collect foreign intelligence. Both countries, like Canada, also have foreign intelligence sharing-agreements with their allies, of which the United States tends to be the main supplier of foreign intelligence to these countries. More will be said later on this point.

For decades there has been a limited debate about Canada's foreign intelligence capability.²⁰ This debate entered the public domain in the late 1970s as a result of the *Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police* (also known as the McDonald Commission), which looked into Canada's foreign and domestic intelligence capabilities, and which led to the formation of CSIS. The Commission report discussed Canada's intelligence strengths and weaknesses but did not explicitly offer any recommendations on the matter of the country's foreign intelligence operations in general. Over the past several decades, a number of academics, politicians and past and present intelligence officials have contributed arguments on the matter of whether or not Canada needs a foreign intelligence agency similar to the CIA. No consensus has emerged from this debate about whether such an agency should be created or whether it should be

¹⁹ John Vito Deluca, "Shedding Light on the Rising Sun," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 2, no. 1 (Spring 1988), 10-11.

²⁰ Geoffrey Weller notes "some attention has been paid over the past few years to the matter of whether or not Canada should have a foreign intelligence service. Canada is one of very few Western powers not to have such a service, and the issue has produced a modest debate in the academic literature." (Geoffrey Weller,

independent or such a capability should be placed inside some other department or agency.²¹

A key element of the foreign intelligence debate is whether or not Canada should have an agency primarily to conduct clandestine HUMINT, by sending operatives abroad, and/or establishing agents in foreign countries to pass intelligence to Canadian officials. Some advocates acknowledge that establishing such an agency overnight is not possible, and that it would take a significant investment to develop one. Whether or not creating such an agency is politically possible is another question.

The tragic events of September 11, 2001 raised again the foreign intelligence debate. Following 9/11, Deputy Prime Minister John Manley said that the Chrétien government would not consider the creation of a foreign intelligence agency.²² Instead, the government responded by increasing funding to existing agencies and departments involved in limited foreign intelligence collection. Liberal David Pratt initiated a private

"Assessing Canadian Intelligence Literature: 1980-2000," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 14, no.1 (2001): 54.)

²¹ On the Canadian foreign intelligence debate, see, Stuart Farson, "Accountable and Prepared? Reorganised Canada's Intelligence Community for the 21st Century," *Canadian Foreign Policy* 1, no. 3 (Fall 1993): 43-66; Stuart Farson, "Is Canadian intelligence being re-invented?" *Canadian Foreign Policy* 6, no. 2 (Winter 1999): 49-83; Thomas D'Arcy Finn, "Does Canada Need a Foreign Intelligence Service," *Canadian Foreign Policy* 1, no. 3 (Fall 1993): 149-162; Alistair S. Hensler, "Creating a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service," *Canadian Foreign Policy* 3, no. 3 (Winter 1995): 15-35; Alistair S. Hensler, "Canadian Intelligence: An Insider's Perspective," *Canadian Foreign Policy* 6, no. 3 (Spring 1999): 127-132; Peter G. Russell, "Should Canada Establish a Foreign Intelligence Agency?" *A Paper written for the Security Intelligence Review Committee*, December, 1988; John Starnes, "Canadian Internal Security: The Need for a New Approach, New Organization" *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, (1979): 21-26; Richard Kott, "Reinventing the Looking Glass: Developing a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service" (master's thesis, University of Calgary, 2002), <http://www.jmss.org/2003/spring-summer/documents/kott-mss_dissertation.pdf>; Jérôme Mellon, "The Missing Agency: The Case for a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service" (master's thesis, University of Salford, 2002), <<http://circ.jmellon.com/docs/view.asp?id=370>>; Barry Cooper, "CFIS: A Foreign Intelligence Service for Canada" *Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute Publication* (2007), <<http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/CFIS.pdf>>.

²² *Cnews*, "Canada will not create its own foreign spy agency, says John Manley," April 10, 2002, <<http://www.canoe.ca/NationalTicker/CANOE-wire.Cda-Spy-Agency.html>>.

member's bill (Bill C-409) in March 2003 proposing the creation of a foreign intelligence agency.²³ The Bill failed after its first reading, but it brought the issue out in public.

The matter of a foreign intelligence agency was raised again during the 2006 election. The Conservative Party announced their intent, in the *Conservative Party of Canada Federal Election Platform*, to “create a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Agency to effectively gather intelligence overseas, independently counter threats before they reach Canada, and increase allied intelligence operations.”²⁴ The Conservatives won a minority government but a decision to create a foreign intelligence agency was not at the top of their agenda. In 2007, Public Safety Minister Stockwell Day informed a House of Commons committee “that his government has had second thoughts.”²⁵ Day said there were two problems; first, the financial cost would be enormous; and second, development of such an agency would take an extensive amount of time.²⁶ He suggested the government would present legislation in 2008 to change the mandate of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) in order to enhance its limited foreign intelligence capabilities. The minister later appeared to be giving second thoughts to this promise as well.²⁷

²³ Bill C-409, *An Act to establish the Canadian Foreign Intelligence Agency Canada*, 2^d Sess., 37th Parliament, 2002-2003, 1st reading, March 17, 2003, <http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/2/parlbus/chambus/house/bills/private/C-409/C-409_1/C-409_cover-E.html>.

²⁴ Conservative Party of Canada, *Stand Up for Canada: Conservative Party of Canada Federal Election Platform 2006*, 13 Jan. 2006, <<http://conservative.ca/media/20060113-Platform.pdf>>.

²⁵ Gloria Galloway, “No New agency for foreign intelligence, top spy says,” *The Globe and Mail*, May 29, 2007, A5.

²⁶ Galloway, “No New agency for foreign intelligence, top spy says.”

²⁷ Honourable Stockwell Day, “Key Note Speech” at the 2007 annual conference of the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS), September 2007.

The point here is that the foreign intelligence debate has rarely acknowledged the extent of DFAIT's foreign intelligence work, or its extensive involvement in HUMINT.²⁸ This thesis will not debate the merits of having or not having a foreign intelligence agency but will outline the Department's role in collecting and analyzing foreign intelligence and describe its collection of HUMINT.

1.3 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) is the ministry responsible for Canada's external relations and management of Canada's representation abroad. It represents the government in all international meetings, conducts consular affairs and extends Canadian diplomacy throughout the world. DFAIT operates embassies and consulates through which Canada's interests are pursued internationally. In addition to these well-recognized tasks, it is actively involved in foreign intelligence. As noted earlier, the Department has a long history of participating in foreign intelligence work.

The Department, however, rarely discusses its foreign intelligence work in the public domain. For example, its annual departmental reports do not always acknowledge its foreign intelligence work or units.²⁹ Such information was discovered from the Department's *Acronyms and Symbols* website.³⁰

²⁸ The Harper government did not, at least publicly, raise the idea that foreign intelligence functions might be placed in DFAIT. Many articles provide a superficial description of DFAIT's foreign intelligence work, see Jérôme Mellon, *The Missing Agency: The Case for a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service* (master's thesis, University of Salford, 2002), <<http://circ.jmellon.com/docs/view.asp?id=370>>; Alistair S. Hensler, "Creating a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service," *Canadian Foreign Policy* 3, no. 3 (Winter 1995): 15-35; Alister S. Henseler, "Canadian Intelligence: An Insider's Perspective," *Canadian Foreign Policy* 6, no. 3 (Spring 1999): 127-132; Stuart Farson, "Is Canadian intelligence being re-invented?" *Canadian Foreign Policy* 6, no. 2 (Winter 1999): 49-83.

²⁹ This researcher has compiled a list of intelligence structures of the Department for the past sixty years by analyzing its annual reports. In some years these reports list the intelligence units and in others they do not. See, for example, External Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Annual Report 1990-1991: Overview*,

1.4 Diplomatic Reporting VS Intelligence Collection

Within international relations “diplomacy aims to further a nation's primary interests while preserving international order. It is the tool that states use to get their way without arousing the opposition or animosity of other states.”³¹ Theoretically one job of diplomats is to ascertain the concerns and plans of the host state, or others, may be in political, military, or economic affairs.

A regular duty of Canadian diplomats abroad is to report information of political, economic or strategic value to Canadian government, via the Department of Foreign Affairs. This function is called diplomatic reporting. The purpose of diplomatic reporting is to inform the home government about “the personalities, perspectives, reasoning, motivations, objectives and actions of foreign decision makers.”³² The information comes from various sources, including government publications, academic publications, and media reports (i.e. OSINT) as well as from confidential sources - information that represents HUMINT. This information is then incorporated with that from “trade, political, economic, or various functional bureaux” to inform policy makers.³³

Over the last decade the development of the Internet has likely increased the use of open sources, relative to diplomatic reporting. Still, one should not ignore the ability of diplomats to access information through their contacts; these can and will never be

Ottawa, ON, 1991, and Department of External Affairs, *Report of the Department of External Affairs*, Ottawa, ON, 1950.

³⁰ Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), *DFAIT Acronyms and Symbols*, April 2008, <<http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/departement/auditreports/syms-en.asp#Symbol>>.

³¹ Gordon C. Schloming, *Power and Principle in International Affairs* (Orlando: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1991), 600.

³² Charles W. Freeman, Jr., *Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy*, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 24.

replaced entirely by the Internet. As long as there are closed societies in the world, and maybe as long as states continue to try to keep secrets, diplomats will be needed.

Arthur Andrew states that governments spend a significant amount of money on diplomatic reporting, funds which tend to be separate from their overall intelligence budgets.³⁴ Diplomatic allowances are provided so that information can be acquired from various settings in which diplomats may find themselves. "Cocktail parties, the bane of diplomatic life, [are] simply marketplaces where information [is] acquired and paid for in whisky and in kind," notes Andrew.³⁵ Of course, not all formal and informal gatherings will guarantee new information for diplomats. The hope however is that "mildly alcoholic environments" will loosen the tongues of government officials to eagerly listening diplomats.³⁶ Diplomatic reporting thus combines both OSINT and HUMINT collection.

Most information is provided freely by individuals without any expectation of a reward. As one former Canadian ambassador states in regards to diplomatic reporting, "It is intelligence-gathering in a fundamental sense, requiring analytical and communication skills as well as an ability to network with counterparts from a wide variety of cultures."³⁷ Most countries place intelligence officers in diplomatic positions to conduct clandestine collection, and establishing secret intelligence networks abroad. The purpose of such individuals is very clear though not often explicit.

³³ David C. Reece, *A Rich Broth: Memoirs of a Canadian Diplomat*, (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1993), 200.

³⁴ Arthur Andrew, *The Rise and Fall of Middle Power: Canadian Diplomacy from King to Mulroney* (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company Ltd., 1993), 132.

³⁵ Andrew, *The Rise and Fall of Middle Power*, 132.

³⁶ Andrew, *The Rise and Fall of Middle Power*, 132.

³⁷ Derek H. Burney, *Getting It Done: A Memoir* (McGill-Queen's University Press 2005), 29.

The legality of conducting diplomatic reporting is based on the *1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations*. Article 3.1(d) states that “the functions of diplomatic mission consist, *inter alia*, in ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the receiving State, and reporting thereon to the Government of the sending State.”³⁸

The boundary between diplomatic reporting and clandestine collection is in fact very unclear. It is very difficult sometimes to distinguish any difference. Related to HUMINT is what is sometimes called “gray intelligence” (also spelled “grey”). One definition states that “Gray intelligence which is neither entirely Open Source nor Clandestine in origin. Such intelligence is obtained by asking for it (very nicely, in fact).”³⁹ Another definition says that gray intelligence is “information which is not published or widely diffused, but to which access can nevertheless be granted, provided one knows that its exists and has adequate channels of communication...Personal letter, private conversation and the like are also forms of grey [intelligence]; although they are not confidential, their combination with open information can be very revealing.”⁴⁰ Gray intelligence thus pushes the boundaries of diplomatic reporting into subtle and relatively non-intrusive forms of clandestine collection. Historically, diplomatic reports were the most important form of foreign intelligence for the Department.

1.5 International Intelligence Cooperation

As noted, Canada does not have an explicitly-dedicated foreign HUMINT agency. To some extent, Canada compensates by receiving foreign intelligence from its allies. Michael

³⁸ United Nations, *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations*, April 18, 1961.

³⁹ Kurt Jensen, “Toward a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service,” *Bout de Papier* 22, no. 2 (2006): 22.

⁴⁰ Jon Sigurdson and Patricia Nelson, “Intelligence Gathering and Japan: the Elusive Role of Grey Intelligence.” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 5, no. 1 (1991): 21.

Herman, writes that “[countries] share intelligence when faced by common threats.”⁴¹

Among the common threats to Canada and the allies have been the Nazis, the Communist bloc and international terrorism. To counter these threats, the western allies created long-term intelligence, security and defence cooperation and sharing agreements and institutions (such as, the BRUSA Agreement, the UKUSA Agreement, and the North American Treaty Organization (NATO)).⁴²

The allied countries undertake a shared responsibility to contribute to and support intelligence cooperation. As Herman notes “there is always more information potentially available than any agency can collect by itself.”⁴³ To gather intelligence on the USSR, Canada took advantage of its location to place SIGINT bases in northern and western Canada to collect Soviet signals. As will be shown later, Canada also gathered intelligence in Indochina and Cuba in the 1950s and 1960s and shared it with the USA and other allies when they had less access to these areas.

Canada was fulfilling a perceived responsibility to cooperate with its allies. Canada could not simply receive intelligence and not assist its allies when it could. Herman indicates that “doing an ally a favour may produce a return which continues under its own momentum for decades.”⁴⁴

Canadian foreign intelligence operations, some of them conducted by DFAIT and its predecessors, represented Canada's commitment to allied foreign intelligence-sharing on the basis of the principle of *quid pro quo*. The Department also contributed to the broader

⁴¹ Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*, 201.

⁴² The BRUSA and UKUSA Agreements will be discussed in chapters 3 and 4, respectively.

⁴³ Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*, 204.

⁴⁴ Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*, 209.

alliance intelligence effort through the work of what was known as the Special Intelligence Section and the Interview Program Section. Both mimicked already established structures in the allied countries. Thus, the Department's intelligence structures and activities, the focus of the present thesis, need to be placed in the context of this broader western intelligence cooperation effort.

1.6 Objectives and Questions

This thesis will focus on two general questions pertaining to the role the Department has played in Canada's foreign intelligence operations. First, what structures has it established internally to deal with intelligence and how did these contribute? Second, what sort of intelligence operations, particularly HUMINT-related, has the Department conducted abroad? The thesis will selectively describe four areas of the Department's foreign intelligence work in the chapters from 1909 to the present day, specifically collection, assessment, cooperation and sharing.⁴⁵

This thesis will begin by describing Canada's current foreign intelligence community, and the relationship DFAIT has to the other members thereof (Chapter 2). Chapter 3 provides a brief overview of the origins of the Department and its foreign intelligence capabilities and structures. In particular, this chapter will provide an outline of the intelligence units that have existed in the Department since the 1950s. Chapter 4 explains in more detail the development and operations of two departmental foreign intelligence structures, the Special Intelligence Section and the Interview Program. Chapter 5 describes two cases of the use of Canadian diplomats to collect foreign intelligence in the field - in

Indochina and Cuba. Finally, Chapter 6 will summarize the material presented here and make the basic case that the Department has been much more involved in foreign intelligence work than has been acknowledged.

It should be noted, this thesis is not and cannot be a complete account of DFAIT's work in foreign intelligence. It can only provide a selective account of what is available in the public domain. It would almost certainly be an impossible task to identify all of the Department's work in foreign intelligence, especially when much of it remains classified.

1.7 Methodology

The methodology employed in this thesis is largely primary and secondary document analysis and personal interviews. Many of the primary documents used in this thesis are from the Library and Archives Canada (LAC), the Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH) at the Department of National Defence (DND), and the DFAIT Library. The documents include internal histories of intelligence structures, intelligence memorandums and reports. The Department's annual reports, audits and directories for the past sixty years produced valuable "intelligence."⁴⁵ The documents provide insight into the Department's operations and the type of intelligence work it produced.

The secondary information used in this thesis is that written by academics and researchers. These publications provided both a substantial amount of valuable information and an indication of what is not known.

⁴⁵ The thesis will not discuss dissemination of intelligence because much needed information cannot be found in the public domain.

⁴⁶ James Eayrs recommended a review of the Department's annual reports to identify changes in the Department's structures over time, based on his work for *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World*, ed. Zara Steiner (Westport: Meckler Pub, 1982), in which he had an article on External Affairs. (James Eayrs telephone with author, July 25, 2003.)

This researcher also conducted interviews of individuals involved in various ways with the intelligence activities of the Department.⁴⁷ Some of these interviewees worked in intelligence structures while others were at a senior administrative level. A few interviewees were academics who came into contact with the Department's intelligence structures due to their research. Most of the interviewees were referred to the author by Don Munton or by other interviewees, an example of the so-called "snowball" technique. All of the interviewees were informed of the basic guidelines for contemporary research on human subjects and given the opportunity to request that the interview, or parts thereof, be off-the-record. It should be noted that many of the interviewees were being asked questions about developments or work decades ago, and memory loss could have been an issue. In order to deal with this problem almost all interviewees were asked general questions about the Department's foreign intelligence work rather than detailed questions about specific events. The interviewees for this thesis were Allan Gotlieb, Arthur Menzies, Basil Robinson, Blair Seaborn, Gerry Wright, James Eayrs, John Hadwen, John Starnes, Kurt Jensen, Peter Johnston, and Peter Russell.

This thesis used case study analysis to illuminate the Department's foreign intelligence work. These cases reflect aspects of this work but do not constitute a representative sampling let alone a complete picture. We will not be able, even eventually, to understand the Department's intelligence activities and operations without the sort of background information provided here and perhaps in similar future work.

⁴⁷ On July 8, 2003 the University of Northern British Columbia (UNBC) Research Ethics Board approved the ethics review for this thesis. See Appendix A.

Chapter Two: Canada's Foreign Intelligence Players

The Canadian intelligence community performs all the classic functions of intelligence agencies and of the familiar “intelligence cycle”— it collects, assesses and disseminates foreign intelligence.¹ It also engages in international intelligence liaison and cooperation.² The intelligence community comprises a group of federal level agencies and departments, some but not all of which have a primary mandate in intelligence work (such as SIGINT or security intelligence), and some of which have a specific intelligence interest or mandate as part of a broader organizational mission. Canada does not have a comprehensive or central intelligence agency. The norm in other countries is to have one agency dedicated to a single form of intelligence collection (e.g. in the United States the CIA is the dedicated foreign intelligence agency). The members of the Canadian intelligence community thus must work together on many types of problems and seek consensus on community-wide, national and international issues, and on both operational and structural issues.³

As discussed in Chapter 1, Canada does not have a clandestine foreign HUMINT agency. However, the Canadian intelligence community does collect foreign intelligence. The perception presented by academics and media is that Canada does not collect foreign HUMINT.⁴ This traditional method of foreign intelligence collection can be considered old

¹ For more information on the intelligence cycle, see Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt, *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence* (Dulles: Potomac Books, 2002), Chapter 1.

² For further discussion on intelligence cooperation and sharing, see Michael Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Chapter 12.

³ Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*, 305.

⁴ Kurt F. Jensen agrees that there are misunderstandings regarding Canadian foreign intelligence capabilities. He states, “Misconceptions over Canadian access to foreign intelligence persist and are characteristic of the

technology, and often highly glamorized and publicized.⁵ This chapter will describe some of the methods that are not as well publicized, but employed by Canada to collect foreign intelligence.

This chapter will describe the agencies and departments that are currently involved in foreign intelligence collection, assessment, dissemination, and international cooperation or sharing. The agencies and departments involved are the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), the Department of National Defence (DND) and Privy Council Office (PCO). While each of these engages in a different type of foreign intelligence work, all have an operational relationship with the Department of Foreign Affairs, the prime consumer of foreign intelligence. This chapter will also discuss the mandate of each of these; however, it will not trace their history and evolution. At the end of each section there will be a brief comparison with comparable intelligence agencies in allied countries, given that the Canadian intelligence community operates in an intelligence context.

It is important to note that some published articles and scholarly works imply that the Canadian intelligence community only consists of certain government departments and agencies and does not include DFAIT. For example, Lieutenant-Commander Ted Parkinson in

very limited scholarship on this facet of Canadian intelligence history. As information on this feature of Canadian foreign policy interests and tools becomes available, any misreading of Canadian involvement in foreign intelligence will diminish." (Kurt F. Jensen, *Cautious Beginnings: Canadian Foreign Intelligence 1939-1951* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), 2.

⁵ Kurt F. Jensen, e-mail message to author, September 2, 2008.

his 2006 article on the foreign intelligence debate does not acknowledge the contributions of the Department of Foreign Affairs to foreign intelligence.⁶

In both the media and academic literature there are preconceptions about the Department of Foreign Affairs. Many people are not aware of its involvement in foreign intelligence work or assume it merely passively receives intelligence products. The purpose of this thesis is to contest these assumptions and describe the reality in Canada.

2.0 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) is not usually considered to be one of Canada's major intelligence organizations.⁷ As we shall see in this chapter, it is in fact one of the most important. As will be shown in the following chapters, it has maintained an internal intelligence structure since World War II and has engaged in foreign intelligence operations at least since the 1940s.

Does DFAIT even have a mandate to collect foreign intelligence? As the former Auditor General of Canada, L. Denis Desautels, notes in his 1996 report "the foreign intelligence functions carried out by...Foreign Affairs and International Trade fall within the general ambit of the legislation setting up those departments."⁸

The *1985 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Act* arguably allows the Department to collect foreign intelligence. Section 10.1 of the *Act*, entitled "Powers,

⁶ Lieutenant-Commander Ted Parkinson, "Has the Time Arrived for a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service?" *Canadian Military Journal* 7, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 16. For other sources that understate or even ignore the DFAIT's work, see Jérôme Mellon, "The Missing Agency: The Case for a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service" (master's thesis, University of Salford, 2002), <<http://circ.jmellon.com/docs/view.asp?id=370>>; Alistair S. Hensler, "Creating a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service," *Canadian Foreign Policy* 3, no. 3 (Winter 1995): 15-35; Hensler, "Canadian Intelligence: An Insider's Perspective," *Canadian Foreign Policy* 6, no. 3 (Spring 1999): 127-132.

⁷ For a list of texts that feature intelligence functions, see Chapter 1, footnote 9.

Duties and Functions of the Minister,” states that these powers “extend to and include all matters over which Parliament has jurisdiction, not by law assigned to any other department, board or agency of the Government of Canada, relating to the conduct of the external affairs of Canada, including international trade and commerce and international development.”⁹ The Act does not explicitly give the Department a foreign intelligence mandate, but makes clear it is responsible for matters, broadly speaking, outside the borders of Canada and thus should be involved in all international operations of the government. Therefore, it can be argued that the Department is, if not responsible for intelligence, then at least mandated to be involved in foreign intelligence matters.

At DFAIT, the Security and Intelligence Bureau (ISB) as of 2008 is the central unit for intelligence and security.¹⁰ ISB has two responsibilities: first, ensuring the security and safety of DFAIT personnel, infrastructure and property in other countries; and second, providing the Minister of Foreign Affairs with the foreign intelligence needed for policy development. ISB’s security divisions include the Information and Technical Security Division (ITSD), which conducts computer security such as checking DFAIT’s facilities for electronic (i.e., eavesdropping) devices; the Corporate Security Division (ISD), responsible for personnel security and advising on government-wide security policy; and the Security Operations and Personnel Safety Division (ISR), that deals with the physical security of

⁸ Canada, Office of the Auditor General of Canada, *The Canadian Intelligence Community: Control and Accountability*, November 1996, <<http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/9627ce.html>>.

⁹ Canada, *Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Act*, 1985, c. E-22, <<http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/ShowTdm/cs/e-22///en>>.

¹⁰ DFAIT generally uses symbols not acronyms to identify its divisions (e.g., ISB); however, several units are identified by proper acronyms. For more information, see Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), *List of Acronyms/Symbols*, April 21, 2008, <<http://www.international.gc.ca/department/auditreports/syms-en.asp>>.

DFAIT facilities abroad. ISD also assists the Department to respond to crisis situations in the world, if necessary on a twenty-four hours a day basis; provides risk assessment for foreign government officials traveling to Canada; and handles expulsion of foreign diplomats.

On the intelligence side the main division of ISD is the Foreign Intelligence Division (ISI). It oversees the collection, assessment/evaluation and dissemination of foreign intelligence, and acts as a consultant to the other parts of the department. ISI acts as a central hub of the Department's intelligence cooperating and sharing with other members of the Canadian intelligence community and allies.

Within the federal government, the cooperation and sharing arrangements are with primary and secondary partners.¹¹ The primary partners are the RCMP, CSIS, CSE, DND, PCO, and the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC). The secondary partners are Transport Canada, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), and Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC).¹² The primary partners share intelligence with DFAIT while the secondary partners mostly receive the Department's intelligence products. As the sections below will show, DFAIT has a close relationship in matters of foreign intelligence with each of the primary partners.

As noted in Chapter 1, it is difficult if not impossible to distinguish the diplomatic reporting of Canadian embassies abroad and that of other countries from the gathering of intelligence. The only distinction is in the means used, not in the sort of information

¹¹ Canada, Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, *A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities*, 2006, <http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-bcp/commissions/maher_arar/07-09-13/www.ararcommission.ca/eng/EnglishReportDec122006.pdf>, 194.

¹² *A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities*, 194.

obtained. The *Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar* notes this important aspect of the Department's foreign intelligence work:

The actual number of staff who deal in “big-I” [covert] intelligence at DFAIT is small, and they are essentially confined to ISI [the Foreign Intelligence Division] and ISD [Security Intelligence Bureau]. Those who deal in small-I [open source or OSINT] intelligence are far more numerous, because that is the business of almost all geographic branches in the Department.¹³

By “small I-intelligence” the Commission is referring to diplomatic reporting and open sources available in Canada, including the mass media. As already mentioned, foreign-service officers (FSOs) posted abroad write diplomatic reports. Canada and its allies exchange these reports on a regular basis. ISI uses these various sources for preparing its intelligence reports.

ISI oversees two programs that engage in gray intelligence collection of HUMINT. These are the Interview Program Section (ISIW) and Global Security Reporting Program (GSRP). ISIW debriefs Canadian citizens and others who have access to economic, political, social, scientific or military aspects of foreign countries. (This program is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4). The interviewed individuals have knowledge not found in Canada. This program does not however conduct clandestine collection. ISIW in its original form was created over fifty years ago and has resided in the Department for over thirty years.

A more recently created program is the Global Security Reporting Program (GSRP) which involves the use of FSOs posted abroad to collect “information pertaining to security

¹³ Canada, Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, *Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Factual Backgrounder*, Vol II, 2006, <http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-bcp/commissions/maher_arar/07-09-13/www.ararcommission.ca/eng/Vol_II_English.pdf>, 580.

and stability issues.”¹⁴ Kurt F. Jensen indicates that these FSOs “have a specific mandate from which deviation is not permitted.”¹⁵ They operate in the same manner as other diplomats but with a very specific focus. FSOs under the GSRP are not burdened by the typical administrative work that most diplomats must complete on a daily basis. As a result, Jensen argues, “their reporting output is substantially greater than possible by traditional embassy officers.”¹⁶ The number of FSOs assigned to this program is not known.

Every country in the world has a ministry or a department responsible for foreign affairs and external relations. Most of these institutions handle foreign intelligence through very similar methods as the Department of Foreign Affairs. The counterparts of DFAIT are the State Department in the United States and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in Britain, both of which perform foreign intelligence functions. The former operates the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) and the latter operates the Research and Analysis Department. Both these intelligence units provide assessments and reports about international problems of concern to the agency and the government.

2.1 Royal Canadian Mounted Police

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) is Canada's federal police force. It is located in every province and territory. Its primary duty is to ensure the domestic peace and security of Canadians by enforcing federal Canadian laws. Intelligence is a vital aspect of RCMP investigations. It collects information “involving organized crime, high technology

¹⁴ Kurt Jensen, “Toward a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service,” *Bout de Papier* 22, no. 2 (2006): 22.

¹⁵ Jensen, “Toward a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service,” 22.

¹⁶ Jensen, “Toward a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service,” 22.

crime and illegal migration.”¹⁷ These activities do not stop at the border because they are all transnational in nature. For example, an organized criminal group in Canada will trade illicit drugs for illegal weapons across the border, and this organization will naturally make every attempt to conceal the movement of these weapons into Canada. The RCMP will try to identify and capture the individuals involved in the operation in Canada and to work with authorities on the other side.

Criminal intelligence is defined as information that “the police should know in order to counter and apprehend those engaged in organized crime, smuggling, extortion, terrorism and the like.”¹⁸ The difference between criminal intelligence and foreign intelligence is that the former focuses on specific activities of groups that disrupt the peace of society, while the latter broadly deals with security and foreign affairs. As Michael Herman says, criminal intelligence “targets the criminal rather than the crime.”¹⁹ The type of intelligence collected by the RCMP is mostly in the HUMINT and SIGINT forms.

The RCMP operates the Criminal Intelligence Directorate (CID) that “collects and analyzes intelligence to support criminal investigations.”²⁰ According to its mission statement the CID “is to provide a national program for the management of criminal information and intelligence which will permit the RCMP to detect and prevent crime having an organized, serious or national security dimension in Canada, or internationally as

¹⁷ Canada, Privy Council Office, *The Canadian Security Intelligence Community: Helping Keep Canada and Canadians Safe and Secure*, (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 2001), 6.

¹⁸ James Blair Seaborn, “Commentary No. 25: Intelligence and Policy: What is Constant? What is Changing?,” a *Canadian Security Intelligence Service publication*, June 1994, <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/comment/com45_e.html>.

¹⁹ Michael Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*, 350.

²⁰ *The Canadian Security Intelligence Community*, 5.

it affects Canada.”²¹ Within the CID are three branches: the National Security Intelligence Branch (NSIB), National Security Operations Branch (NSOB) and Threat Assessment Branch. The NSIB is responsible for national and international assessment, coordination, monitoring and direction of all national security investigations and intelligence.²² The NSOB coordinates investigations related to security across Canada.²³ The Threat Assessment Branch is responsible for the support of multiple areas, which include “protection of embassies, consulates or missions within Canada; internationally protected persons; airports, carriers and air routes; and the Canadian executive cadre.”²⁴

The RCMP maintains liaison with other police forces around the world and is a member of Interpol, the international police organization that promotes information-sharing to deal with transnational crime. Interpol can enact international police notices for persons of interest. These people are “wanted by national jurisdictions (or the international criminal tribunals, where appropriate) and Interpol's role is to assist the national police forces in identifying or locating those persons with a view to their arrest and extradition.”²⁵

The relationship between the Department of Foreign Affairs and RCMP in the past has involved both cooperation and tensions, even animosity. The McDonald Commission noted differences between the Department and RCMP Security Service. “In some ways,” the report says, “the tension and suspicion between the two bodies is almost inevitable: the Department of External Affairs is committed to an easing of international tensions based on co-operation and understanding; the Security Service tends to view the activities of many

²¹ *A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities*, 45.

²² *A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities*, 96.

²³ *A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities*, 98.

²⁴ *A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities*, 100.

foreign countries with deep suspicion. The result is a difference of views on the threats to this country's security which originate abroad."²⁶ Interviewees for this thesis agreed that the relationship between the two organizations tends to be cooperative, but they did not see eye to eye on some issues. The McDonald Commission notes that problems between two such institutions was not unique to Canada, and mentions that in other countries tensions exist between diplomatic and police-security structures.²⁷

One area of concern to both institutions was matters of *persona non grata* (PNG). This term is applied to diplomats who have violated the conditions of their positions, and are no longer welcomed in the host country. PNG is most often applied when persons with diplomatic immunity are caught spying on host soil or would be charged with a criminal offence were it not for the immunity.

Peter Russell, an academic and government researcher suggests that External Affairs and the RCMP had differing perspectives when approaching situations that involved PNG:

External Affairs people often thought it would be better to really keep your eye on these people, and find out a lot more about them and how extensive their contacts and networks, particularly if they had Canadians hidden away who are really spying for the foreign country. In other words, get the whole network instead of just as soon as you find a diplomat doing something that's espionage-oriented, and blowing the whistle and getting them sent home. External Affairs people did not think [the RCMP] had as long range of a view as they should have.²⁸

The RCMP's preference was to take action against foreign diplomats. It was focusing on the individuals rather than the broader context of the actions they committed. It was common knowledge in the Western intelligence community that the Soviet Union's intelligence and

²⁵ Interpol, "Wanted," April 15, 2008, <<http://www.interpol.int/Public/Wanted/Default.asp>>.

²⁶ Canada, Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, *Second Report: Freedom and Security Under the Law*, Vol 2, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1981), 648.

²⁷ *Second Report: Freedom and Security Under the Law*, 648.

security service, the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB), sent intelligence officers abroad under the guise of 'diplomats' – as do other intelligence organizations such as the CIA and British SIS. Soviet diplomats were particularly on the RCMP's surveillance watch-list. John Starnes, a retired diplomat and former head of the RCMP Security Service, states that the “RCMP regarded [Soviet] diplomats as the enemy.”²⁹

The RCMP Security Service tended to demand “prompt expulsion” of an offending diplomat while External Affairs “either through fear that Canadian diplomats will be expelled in reprisal or because of the timing of a certain diplomatic initiative, has not always agreed to declare these diplomats *persona non grata*.”³⁰ Peter Johnston states that situations of PNG were particularly delicate if the Canadian government was negotiating a trade deal with the Soviets at the same time.³¹ There was always the possibility if Canada expelled a Soviet “diplomat” that Moscow would refuse to conclude a deal.³²

The Department and RCMP did attempt to mitigate problems in the 1970s through a consultation process. The Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (Security and Intelligence) and the Director General of the Security Service met regularly and discussed issues of concern to both the two institutions.³³ It is not known how successful the consultation process was in resolving disputes between them.³⁴

²⁸ Peter Russell, telephone interview with author, August 8, 2003.

²⁹ John Starnes, interview with author, December 10, 2003, Ottawa, Ontario.

³⁰ Starnes, interview.

³¹ Peter Johnson, telephone interview with author, November 10, 2003.

³² Johnson, telephone interview.

³³ *Second Report: Freedom and Security Under the Law*, 649.

³⁴ Starnes has indicated that he could not recall there being such an 'arrangement' during his time at the Security Service. When he was at DEA there were sporadic consultations with the RCMP (Starnes, interview).

It is also not known whether problems still exist today between the Department and RCMP. In 1984, the mandate and duties of the Security Service regarding foreign diplomats were transferred to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), although the RCMP has apparently retained an interest in these and related issues.

The Department and RCMP at present have a memorandum of understanding (MOU) under which a senior RCMP officer is located at ISI offices to conduct liaison and facilitate information sharing. This individual also briefs both organizations about relevant issues. The liaison officer does not have direct access to DFAIT files but must request it from ISI officers or other division personnel. The liaison position can be seen as a communication and consultation channel between RCMP and DFAIT.

All countries have agencies to collect and assess criminal intelligence. Rough equivalents of the RCMP are the American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the British Metropolitan Police (Scotland Yard). These agencies have the authority to investigate criminal activities and arrest individuals. At the same time, the FBI operates a specific division devoted to foreign counterintelligence operations – a function in Canada now given to CSIS.

2.2 Canadian Security Intelligence Service

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) is Canada's civilian security intelligence agency.³⁵ Its primary duty is to protect the security of Canadian society and investigate threats to it. The Service investigates and analyzes threats to Canada's national security and advises government departments and agencies about “activities which may

reasonably be suspected of constituting threats.”³⁶ CSIS was established in 1984 when the former RCMP Security Service was split off from the Force, a recommendation of the McDonald Commission.

Section 12 of the *CSIS Act* broadly states: “The Service shall collect, by investigation or otherwise, to the extent that it is strictly necessary, and analyse and retain information and intelligence respecting activities that may on reasonable grounds be suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada.”³⁷ Given this mandate for security intelligence, CSIS does not have a broad mandate to collect foreign intelligence such as information regarding the political, social, and military situation in another country. CSIS is empowered with a narrow mandate to collect foreign intelligence “within Canada” at the behest of DFAIT and National Defence under Section 16.

The *CSIS Act* authorizes the Service to collect security intelligence but does not explicitly mandate the agency to conduct foreign intelligence operations *per se*. CSIS itself however emphasizes that its *Act* “was consciously drafted to contain no restriction at all about where the Service may collect such information.”³⁸ Therefore, CSIS can collect security intelligence abroad and the Service acknowledges it conducts such operations.

In 2001, shortly after the events of 9/11, CSIS Director Ward Elcock announced to the Parliamentary Immigration Committee that “the reality is we do operate abroad, we do conduct enquiries abroad, we do conduct covert operations abroad - and in that respect, in

³⁵ On the nature of security intelligence, see Michael Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Chapter 10.

³⁶ *The Canadian Security Intelligence Community*, 7.

³⁷ Canada, Department of Justice Canada, *The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) Act*, May 9, 2008, <<http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/c-23/index.html>>.

respect to threats to the security of Canada, [we] have essentially the same powers as . . . the (Central Intelligence) Agency would in the United States.”³⁹ There is no information in the public domain about the specific requirements that CSIS must fulfill in order for it to operate abroad.

The Act defines security intelligence as simply, “threats to the security of Canada.”⁴⁰ It identifies three categories of threat: political violence and terrorism; espionage and sabotage; and foreign-influenced activities. CSIS is not restricted to investigating these activities; it can, for example, also investigate transnational crime and electronic warfare.⁴¹

CSIS uses a full range of methods of intelligence collection. It can seek information from the Canadian public (HUMINT). CSIS can place human sources or recruit agents in a theatre of operations (again, HUMINT collection). The Service also has the ability to conduct SIGINT operations such as wire-tapping (although only after receiving a judicial warrant). CSIS routinely uses open-sources such as media reports, academic and foreign publications and other documents (OSINT). It receives intelligence from other members of the Canadian intelligence community. CSIS can obtain intelligence from foreign governments and intelligence organizations. In 2004, CSIS acknowledged it had “250 relationships with foreign agencies in approximately 140 countries.”⁴²

³⁸ Canada, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, *Backgrounder No. 16 - Operations Abroad*, May 2004, <<http://www.csis.gc.ca/nwsrm/bckgrndrs/bckgrndr16-eng.asp>> .

³⁹ Bruce Cheadle, “CSIS undertakes covert spy ops abroad, despite public misperception, says director,” *Canadian Press*, October 18, 2001. An important difference between CSIS and the CIA is that the former is restricted to security intelligence while latter collects foreign intelligence broadly speaking.

⁴⁰ *Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act*.

⁴¹ Electronic warfare is the non-conventional method of using information technology to disrupt or destroy vital electronic infrastructure.

⁴² Canada, Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), *2004-2005 CSIS Annual Public Report*, May 16, 2008, <<http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/nnlrprt/2004/rprt2004-eng.asp>> .

The CSIS Act specifically outlines several areas where CSIS and the Department of Foreign Affairs work together. Under Section 13.3, CSIS can enter into an arrangement with a foreign state or international organization after the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness consults the Minister for Foreign Affairs. This consultation process is intended to ensure that Foreign Affairs is aware and approves of CSIS' arrangements with a foreign government or its agencies.

One manifestation of such CSIS foreign operations is the operation of Security Liaison Posts. These posts involve positioning CSIS liaison officers in foreign countries primarily for “the exchange of security intelligence information which concerns threats to the security of Canada.”⁴³ A security liaison officer (SLO) has four specific duties: “maintain and develop channels of communication with foreign agencies with which the Service has approved arrangements; carry out security screening activities in support of the Immigration Screening program; report to CSIS headquarters on any matter related to Canadian security interests; and undertake specific reliability checks as requested by the Mission Security Officer.”⁴⁴ SLOs are responsible to the Canadian ambassador and have to inform the ambassador about their operations.

Section 16 of the *CSIS Act* allows CSIS to conduct another type of limited intelligence operations involving foreigners but only under certain conditions. DND or DFAIT can request the assistance of CSIS in collecting foreign intelligence, but only within

⁴³ Canada, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, *The CSIS Mandate*, February 2004, <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/backgrnd/back1_e.html>.

⁴⁴ Canada, *SIRC Report 2003-2004: An Operational Review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service*, October 21, 2004, <http://www.sirc.gc.ca/annual/2003-2004/sec1a_e.html>.

Canada.⁴⁵ Foreign nationals or representatives of a foreign government in Canada can be targeted by CSIS for collection of intelligence pertaining to “the defence of Canada or the conduct of the international affairs of Canada.” CSIS admits that the *Act* does not limit its “collection of intelligence about threats to the security of Canada nor limits its the techniques.” It “is restricted in its ability to collect non threat-related foreign intelligence in relation to the defence of Canada or the conduct of the international affairs of Canada.”⁴⁶ Therefore, the type of intelligence it collects in Canada will greatly vary from intelligence collected abroad. The Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), CSIS's oversight body, acknowledges that CSIS has conducted a number of operations under Section 16 in the past two decades.⁴⁷

CSIS conducts overt and covert surveillance operations of foreign diplomats in Canada. The government restricts the mobility of some foreign diplomats in Canada (such as those from Iran, Saudi Arabia and China). They must have permission from the Department of Foreign Affairs if they wish to travel more than forty kilometres outside of their posted city. Affected diplomats must send their travel itinerary to the Department and “extensively document where they intend to go, how they intend to travel and why they are going there.”⁴⁸ The Department sends this information to CSIS for a security review and the Service advises “whether the trip is acceptable.”⁴⁹ CSIS does sometimes

⁴⁵ On the CSIS – CSE MOU, see Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), *SIRC Report 2001-2002: An Operational Audit of Canadian Security Intelligence Service*, September 30, 2002, <http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/pdfs/ar_2001-2002-eng.pdf>, 14-15.

⁴⁶ CSIS, *Backgrounder No. 16 - Operations Abroad*.

⁴⁷ *SIRC Report 2001-2002*.

⁴⁸ Richard Cleroux, *Official Secrets: The Story Behind the Canadian Security Intelligence Service* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1990), 141.

⁴⁹ Cleroux, *Official Secrets*, 141.

recommend prohibiting certain trips because the location is off-limits.⁵⁰ Once the Department grants the foreign diplomat permission to travel, a CSIS office closest to the travel location will be alerted and may conduct surveillance of the diplomat's activities. If CSIS discovers the diplomat has deviated from the planned itinerary, the Department is informed about this occurrence and appropriate action is taken. The Department's response may be to expel the diplomat from Canada, to take other action, or to ignore the situation, depending on various factors, including the kind of activity the individual was involved in.

The Department of Foreign Affairs can ask CSIS to provide background information about a new diplomat being sent to Canada, especially whether this diplomat has taken part in espionage or criminal activities in any previous postings. For instance, in January 2001, a Russian diplomat, Andrey Knyazev, killed an Ottawa woman and seriously injured another in a drinking and driving accident. The media reported that the Department of Foreign Affairs was aware that Knyazev had a history of drunk driving in Canada.⁵¹ The Department acknowledged it failed to act because diplomatic protocol was unclear in dealing with diplomats driving while under the influence of alcohol.⁵²

CSIS and the Department have a MOU which authorizes CSIS to post a liaison officer within DFAIT at ISI. The functions of the liaison officer are similar to the RCMP liaison previously mentioned. The CSIS position is designed to facilitate a two-way flow of

⁵⁰ Cleroux, *Official Secrets*, 141.

⁵¹ *Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC)*, "Appeal quashed for former Russian diplomat," April 29, 2002, <<http://ottawa.cbc.ca/regional/servlet/View?filename=knyazev020429>>.

⁵² Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), *Statement by The Honourable John Manley, Minister of Foreign Affairs, On the Knyazev Case*, March 14, 2001,

information. As already described in this section, there are areas where CSIS and DFAIT work together, and one may assume the liaison officer is actively involved in facilitating this relationship.

In October 2004, CSIS created the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC), designed to encourage government departments and agencies that deal with national security to cooperate and share intelligence.⁵³ The partners in ITAC are CSIS, RCMP, DFAIT, PSEPC, Transport Canada, CBSA, PCO, CSE, Health Canada, Department of Justice, Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Environment Canada, Department of Finance, Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre (FINTRAC), Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) and Sûreté du Québec (SQ).⁵⁴ ITAC exchanges and shares threat assessment information with foreign partners, specifically the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre in Britain, the National Counterterrorism Center in the United States, the National Threat Assessment Centre in Australia, and the Combined Threat Assessment Group in New Zealand.⁵⁵

The primary duty of ITAC is to “produce comprehensive threat assessments, which are distributed within the intelligence community and to relevant first-line responders, such as law enforcement, on a timely basis.”⁵⁶ ITAC produces classified weekly reports called Intelligence Digests and also a Threat Assessment Priority List that is sent to partners

<http://w01.international.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.aspx?isRedirect=True&publication_id=378241&Language=E&docnumber=2001/12>.

⁵³ Canada, Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), *Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC)*, April 2007, <<http://www.csis.gc.ca/nwsrm/bckgrndrs/bckgrndr13-eng.asp>>.

⁵⁴ Canada, Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC), *Key Partners*, April 29, 2008, <<http://www.itac-ciem.gc.ca/prtnrs/index-eng.asp>>.

⁵⁵ *A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities*, 141.

⁵⁶ Canada, Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), *Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC)*.

informing them on its work.⁵⁷ CSIS created ITAC to try to facilitate intelligence sharing, to facilitate greater understanding by agencies, and to encourage more effective cooperation, as well as analysis.⁵⁸ The real issue was to get people from different agencies looking at the same problem and to be able to access their own data banks if they thought there was something in them which might help find solutions to problems.⁵⁹

Most countries have a security intelligence agency similar to CSIS. In the United States the FBI is the national security intelligence agency. The British Security Service (MI5) is also primarily engaged in security intelligence. Both agencies operate domestically and have some representation and liaisons abroad. It thus can be assumed that CSIS interacts and cooperates with these agencies.

2.3 Communications Security Establishment

The Communications Security Establishment (CSE) is Canada's offensive signals intelligence (SIGINT) agency and the most secretive member of the Canadian intelligence community. SIGINT is the collection of "radio, radar, and other electronic transmissions."⁶⁰ The predecessor of CSE, the Communications Branch of the National Research Council (CBNRC) was established in 1945 from SIGINT structures supporting Canada's war effort. For over sixty years CSE and its predecessor (Examination Unit (XU) and CBNRC) operated without a legislated mandate, under an Order-in-Council.⁶¹ In 2001, the Canadian

⁵⁷ *A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities*, 141.

⁵⁸ Canada, Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), *Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC)*.

⁵⁹ Confidential source, interview with author.

⁶⁰ Philip Rosen, *The Communications Security Establishment: Canada's Most Secret Intelligence Agency*, (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 1993), <<http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/bp343-e.htm>>.

⁶¹ Prior to 1974 most Canadians were not aware that Canada was collecting SIGINT. Rosen mentioned, "the existence and functions of the Communications Branch of the National Research Council did not come to public attention until 1974, when they were revealed on a CBC television program [Fifth Estate]. Canada's part

government enacted the *Anti-Terrorism Act* which explicitly and publicly outlined CSE's mandate.

CSE has three main duties: SIGINT collection, information security (INFOSEC) and technical and operational assistance to federal law enforcement and security agencies.⁶² Its primary duty however is SIGINT collection of foreign signals from its bases located across Canada and analysis of these signals.⁶³ Philip Rosen states that there is no definitive description of CSE's SIGINT operations, "upon which 80% of its budget is spent."⁶⁴ CSE's second duty, INFOSEC operations, involves preventing "compromising emanations from electronic equipment," and ensuring the security of government data and communications.⁶⁵ CSE's third duty, technical and operational assistance, involves supporting the work of CSIS, DFAIT, RCMP and other organizations.

CSE's mandate places operational limits on its intelligence collection, specifically it is not thus authorized to direct intelligence activities at Canadians or any person in Canada.⁶⁶ However, the "Minister of National Defence may authorize CSE to intercept private communications in Canada."⁶⁷ The *Anti-Terrorism Act* states four conditions must be fulfilled in order for interception of such communications:

in the UK/USA Agreement was revealed only on 24 March 1975, in responses by the Honourable C.M. Drury, then Minister of State for Science and Technology, to questions before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Miscellaneous Estimates." (Rosen, *The Communications Security Establishment*.)

⁶² Canada. Communications Security Establishment, *What We Do*, November 9, 2005, <<http://www.cse.dnd.ca/home/whatwedo-e.html>>.

⁶³ It is known that CSE has SIGINT bases in Alert, Nunavut; Leitrim, Ontario; Gander, Newfoundland; and Masset, British Columbia. (Martin Rudner, "Canada's Communications Security Establishment from Cold War to Globalization," *Intelligence and National Security* 16, no. 1 (2001): 98.)

⁶⁴ Rosen, *The Communications Security Establishment*.

⁶⁵ Rosen, *The Communications Security Establishment*.

⁶⁶ *A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities*, 144.

⁶⁷ *A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities*, 144.

“(a) the interception will be directed at foreign entities located outside Canada; (b) the information to be obtained could not reasonably be obtained by other means; (c) the expected foreign intelligence value of the information that would be derived from the interception justifies it; and (d) satisfactory measures are in place to protect the privacy of Canadians and to ensure that private communications will only be used or retained if they are essential to international affairs, defence or security.”⁶⁸

Although not officially acknowledged, it is widely assumed that CSE monitors the electronic communications of foreign embassies in Canada. According to Rosen, “CSE listens in to radio and telephone communications between embassies in Ottawa and their home countries, or between embassies and their consulates; monitors all national and international telephone calls; listens in to many foreign radio communications; and reads the electromagnetic transmissions from embassy typewriters, word processors, etc.”⁶⁹ CSE conducts such operations in order to protect Canadian security and ensure foreign governments are not attempting to influence domestic politics and society.

The Department of External Affairs and its successors have had an important relationship with Canada's SIGINT agencies since World War II. The Department was involved in the establishment and operations of the Examination Unit in 1941 and later the successor organization, CBNRC. In the present day, the Department of Foreign Affairs maintains a relationship with the CSE. Located in the ISI division of the DFAIT is the Client

⁶⁸ Bill C-36, *Anti-Terrorism Act*, 1st Sess., 37th Parliament, December 18, 2001, <http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses=1&Mode=1&Pub=Bil1&Doc=C-36_4&File=199>.

⁶⁹ Rosen, *The Communications Security Establishment*.

Relations Unit (ISIF). ISIF's mission is to disseminate "special" intelligence; it is jointly staffed by DFAIT and CSE.⁷⁰

CSE and the Department have at least one formal memorandum of understanding (MOU). The basic agreement "establishes and structures arrangements necessary to [try to] ensure that government institutions working together in common areas of activity, collaborate effectively, exchange information and do not duplicate each other's efforts."⁷¹

The CSE-DEA MOU is technically-oriented, and discusses the establishment of a T1 fibre optic service between the two.⁷² The MOU stipulates that CSE will reimburse the Department for the costs of using and maintaining the service.⁷³ There is no detailed reference to intelligence sharing between the agency and the Department, but such activity can be inferred. Presumably sharing of information occurs over the fibre optic line. The *Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar* indicated that "the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade is the CSE's largest intelligence client, partly because DFAIT manages Canada's foreign relations on behalf of all Canadian departments and agencies."⁷⁴

The Department and CSE have cooperated on so-called 'embassy collection.' Former CSE employee Mike Frost alleges his agency used Canadian embassies to begin collecting

⁷⁰ CSE has Client Relations Officers posted in several security and intelligence agencies and departments, in order to make available SIGINT material which is carefully controlled. (*A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities*, 146).

⁷¹ Canada, *Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) and External Affairs and International Trade Canada (EAITC)*, sections marked "Confidential," August 27, 1992. This document was received through an informal access to information request (Department of National Defence, Request Number: (A) 1999-01002).

⁷² *Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) and External Affairs and International Trade Canada (EAITC)*,

⁷³ *Memorandum of Understanding between the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) and External Affairs and International Trade Canada (EAITC)*.

SIGINT in the 1970s. He explains that the government sent CSE officers abroad under the cover of an 'employee of National Defence,' and gave them a diplomatic passport and immunity.⁷⁵ Canadian ambassadors in the target country were informed about the embassy operation in a joint CSE-Foreign Affairs meeting in Ottawa, or informed by a CSE officer conducting a survey of the site for its potential in embassy collection.⁷⁶ (It is a standard departmental procedure to inform the ambassador of everything Canadian government departments or agencies do in a country.) These SIGINT operations differ from CSE's previously discussed embassy collection in Canada, in that the embassy is used as a base instead of being the target.

It is not known whether CSE still conducts these operations in the present day, but it seems highly likely. Officially the Department and CSE do not acknowledge they conduct such operations, for obvious reasons of secrecy and because they violate international law, specifically Article 3.1(d) and 27.1 of the 1961 *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations* to which Canada is a signatory.⁷⁷ Under Article 27.1, countries are required to have consent from the host government to set up a wireless transmitter/receiver on embassy's premises. Needless to say such permission is rarely requested.

Secrecy limits the release of information on the Department's relationship with CSE. One interviewee for this thesis, Allan Gotlieb, a former under-secretary (deputy minister) for External Affairs, nevertheless acknowledged the existence of embassy collection. "I'm

⁷⁴ *A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities*, 145.

⁷⁵ Mike Frost, *Spy World: How C.S.E. Spies on Canadians and the World* (Toronto: Seal Books, 1995), 128 and 129.

⁷⁶ Frost, *Spy World*, 128 and 146.

⁷⁷ *Vienna Convention On Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocols*, April 18, 1961, <www.un.int/usa/host_dip.htm>.

not clear [as] to what is disclosed and how much is known under the *Official Secrets Act*,” Gotlieb stated, “but you know there is the Communications [Security] Establishment, which is a passive receiver of electronic intelligence and embassies do play a role [and] in that respect in terms of facilities or may play such a role.”⁷⁸ Notably, Gotlieb’s name is mentioned in Frost’s book in relation to CSE’s embassy collection. In the late 1970s, when CSE began its first foray into embassy collection it needed to enlist the support of External Affairs. The official approached, according to Frost, happened to be Gotlieb.⁷⁹

SIGINT agencies in allied countries include the American National Security Agency (NSA) and the British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). All these SIGINT agencies have one common trait; they are very secretive about their duties and operations. Furthermore, SIGINT agencies tend to be the largest and most expensive intelligence organizations operated by governments. The costs reflect not only the scale of such operations but also the rapid development of information technology, which has required upgrading SIGINT and cryptographic technology. As discussed briefly in the next chapter, all cooperate and are inter-connected under the terms of the so-called “UK-USA” agreement.

2.4 Department of National Defence

The Department of National Defence (DND) is the central authority for the command and control of Canada’s military forces. With respect to intelligence, DND focuses “largely on foreign based threats, and military capabilities and operations.”⁸⁰ The military and foreign intelligence it collects is both “tactical—relating to the disposition of the enemy’s

⁷⁸ Allan Gotlieb telephone interview with author, September 23, 2003.

⁷⁹ Frost, *Spy World*, 112

⁸⁰ *A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP’s National Security Activities*, 148.

troops and equipment in the field—[and] strategic, relating to longer-term capabilities in the light of total military strength and the capacity to maintain it.”⁸¹ DND also collects and analyzes intelligence on domestic threats, most often employing military police in conjunction and cooperation with the RCMP and/or CSIS.

Relatively recently, circa 2001, an internal National Defence report warned that budget cuts had “caused an erosion in the intelligence-staffing capability.”⁸² David Charters suggests that this weakness was in fact a chronic problem.⁸³ Since then, however, the Department appears to have taken some pains to demonstrate that it is focussed on and augmenting its intelligence capabilities.⁸⁴

The Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI) coordinates the collection of intelligence for DND. Under the CDI is the Director General of Intelligence Division (J2 Intelligence Directorate) that provides military intelligence “on issues involving the use or potential use of the Canadian Forces abroad.”⁸⁵ J2 is an assessment unit for political and military information, and operates twenty-four hours a day.

National Defence operates a large and sophisticated intelligence capability that collects various types of intelligence, especially HUMINT, SIGINT, and imagery intelligence

⁸¹ Seaborn, “Commentary No. 25: Intelligence and Policy: What is Constant? What is Changing?”.

⁸² David Charters, “The Future of Military Intelligence within the Canadian Forces,” *Canadian Military Journal* 2, no. 4 (Winter 2001): 47. Charters cites a newspaper article quoting what was presumably a leaked version of the report.

⁸³ Charters, “The Future of Military Intelligence,” 47.

⁸⁴ Major L. H. Rémillard, “The “All-Source” Way of Doing Business – The Evolution of Intelligence in Modern Military Operations” *Canadian Military Journal* 8, no. 3 (Autumn 2007): 19-26; Commander Josh Barber, “An Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Vision for the Canadian Forces” *Canadian Military Journal* 2, no.4 (Winter 2001): 41-46.

⁸⁵ *The Canadian Security Intelligence Community*, 8.

(IMINT).⁸⁶ DND has a unit devoted to the collection of battlefield IMINT via airplanes and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) – a capability upgraded by the Harper government.

In 2008, the Canadian media discovered that DND operates a secret HUMINT unit in theatres of operations. This unit is called the Human Intelligence Company. The CBC reported that this unit was established so that the CF could “gather information on overseas missions in places like Afghanistan.”⁸⁷ Soldiers in this company are trained to collect and analyze information from a wide variety of human sources, which could be contacts on the streets or other people they encounter.⁸⁸ The unit questions and debriefs individuals in order to understand activities and the operational situation in a region. The Human Intelligence Company can recruit and oversee spy networks made up of local intelligence agents.⁸⁹ DND will not confirm the number of personnel and operational budget of the unit. It did acknowledge that this unit has been working in Afghanistan since CF began operations in the country.

The Canadian Forces Information Operations Group (CFIOG) and the Canadian Forces SIGINT Operations Centre (CFSOC) are the principal DND SIGINT organizations. “The CFIOG has a mandate for SIGINT intelligence activities delegated by the CSE, which include support to domestic and international military operations.”⁹⁰ The CFSOC is tasked with the analytical responsibilities.⁹¹ DND may intercept private communications and foreign

⁸⁶ Imint is the collection of intelligence information via satellite and aerial photography.

⁸⁷ Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), “*Intelligence soldiers in Afghanistan since start of mission: commander*,” May 26, 2008, <<http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2008/05/26/military-intelligence.html>>.

⁸⁸ CBC. “*Intelligence soldiers in Afghanistan since start of mission: commander*.”

⁸⁹ CBC. “*Intelligence soldiers in Afghanistan since start of mission: commander*.”

⁹⁰ *A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities*, 148.

⁹¹ *A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities*, 148.

intelligence that begins or ends in Canada, but only to assist security agencies and under their direction.⁹²

Details of the present intelligence relationship between the DND and DFAIT are not publicly available. In the past, however, the two institutions worked closely in the area of intelligence. The case study in Chapter 4 on the Special Intelligence Section describes one joint operation. Military attachés also have a role in intelligence work.

A military attaché is unique within the diplomatic system. The duties of an attaché tend to be information collection and reporting, advising the ambassador about military issues, assisting in the acquisition or selling of military equipment and representing the government at diplomatic functions. The primary purpose of a military attaché, however, is intelligence collection. Pawel Monat, a Polish military attaché who defected to the United States, describes the position in these terms: “in every land and language, the term military attaché is only a synonym for spy.”⁹³

Alfred Vagts, author of *The Military Attaché*, argues that “a great deal of information about the armies, navies, air forces and war potentials of foreign countries can readily be obtained...from service manuals, parliamentary reports and other papers.”⁹⁴ In short, it is OSINT. Vagts' statement is valid in countries that have an openness of information. In such places where information tends not to be published or is heavily censored, the military attaché will have more difficulty.

⁹² A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities, 148.

⁹³ Charles W. Freeman Jr., *The Diplomat's Dictionary* (Washington: Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 31.

⁹⁴ Alfred Vagts, *The Military Attaché* (Princeton: Univ Press, 1967), 189.

Historically, military attachés had a significant role in the diplomacy of nations. For instance, in 1890 France began using smokeless powder in its munitions and the French War Minister decided to exclude all foreign attachés from observing its army's operations.⁹⁵ Consequently, the German military attaché indicated that the Kaiser would likely retaliate by excluding French attaché from German military operations, which would have inevitably created problems for French-German relations.⁹⁶ The War Minister worried about French media criticizing the government for allowing foreign attachés to observe secret testing.⁹⁷ Nevertheless, the tests "were to be so large a scale" that any methods of concealment would be ineffective, and allowing access would ease French-German relations.⁹⁸ Vagts explains the primary assumption was to "let them learn something about us so that we can learn even more about them."⁹⁹ Thus, the reasoning that underlies the exchange of military attachés is essentially the idea of *quid pro quo*, the same principle that underlies intelligence cooperation in general. (See Chapter One.)

A confidential Canadian (Department of External Affairs) memorandum explicitly outlined the role of a Canadian military attaché for both diplomatic and intelligence work. The document states DND began to "bring our [attaché] procedures in line with British and United States practice" in 1946, specifically in the "appointment, training, duties and administration" of military attachés.¹⁰⁰ The alignment was to ensure that all three countries had compatibilities and interoperability in their attaché operations throughout the world.

⁹⁵ Vagts, *The Military Attaché*, 198.

⁹⁶ Vagts, *The Military Attaché*, 198.

⁹⁷ Vagts, *The Military Attaché*, 199.

⁹⁸ Vagts, *The Military Attaché*, 199.

⁹⁹ Vagts, *The Military Attaché*, 199.

At the same time, DND indicated that every military attaché would be effectively trained for the duty, and have the necessary foreign language training needed for the post.¹⁰¹

DEA realized the use of Canadian military attachés was to provide “the Canadian government a direct source of information concerning the organizations, progress and value of military forces and military resources” of the host country.¹⁰² A military attaché must keep informed about the economic and political situation in the country, in order to understand the context in which its military operates, as well as about current military developments.¹⁰³ In another memorandum DND specifically indicated the duties of Canadian military attachés. The first duty, as accredited diplomats, was to represent their own military service in the country they are posted. The second duty was “to avoid any suspicion that they are endeavouring to secure secret information through illicit means.” Furthermore, the “attachés must have no relations whatever with persons acting or professing to act as spies or secret agents,” because of the danger of an attaché being placed into a compromising situation.¹⁰⁴

Canadian military attachés have other duties that are linked to the first two. They are required to create relations “with the corresponding service and with any other persons or organizations which may assist [them] in acquiring information.”¹⁰⁵ Attachés must “take

¹⁰⁰ Memorandum, “Military Attaches,” sections marked “Confidential,” May 14, 1946, in Vol. 12 of *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, ed. Donald M. Page (Ottawa: Dept of External Affairs, 1977), 11.

¹⁰¹ Memorandum, “Military Attaches,” 11.

¹⁰² Memorandum, “Military Attaches,” 12.

¹⁰³ Memorandum, “Military Attaches,” 13.

¹⁰⁴ Enclosure, “Instruction for Naval, Military and Air Attaches,” sections marked “Secret,” 1946, in Vol. 12 of *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, ed. Donald M. Page (Ottawa: Dept of External Affairs, 1977), 15.

¹⁰⁵ Enclosure, “Instruction for Naval, Military and Air Attaches,” 17.

every opportunity” to observe and visit any military exercise or facility to determine the “standard of the equipment and training which prevails in the corresponding service.”¹⁰⁶

A military attaché receives a list of subjects to observe-specific types of information requested by intelligence officials in Ottawa.¹⁰⁷ Before departing for any official visit to a military centre or theatre of operations, an attaché was supposed to inquire if there was any specific information needed by the Director of Intelligence.¹⁰⁸

Military attachés were required to follow stringent protocols to avoid being declared *persona non grata* (PNG). An attaché must complete applications to visit facilities and theatres of operations, if necessary, as well as notify local commanders. An attaché was not ask for classified information “unless instructed to do so by his Director of Intelligence.” The same caution applied to visiting “confidential practices or experiments,” since the host country could ask its attaché to do the same in Canada. Military attachés are expected to make informal contacts with military personnel, from whom they can acquire “background knowledge for an appreciation of the general views prevailing in the Armed Forces of the foreign country.” DND also requests military attachés to establish acquaintances with non-service officials, individuals who did not work in any of the military institutions but interacted with those who did.¹⁰⁹

On December 13, 1946 the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), a community wide committee that doubt with intelligence assessments, wrote a secret memorandum on the requirements needed prior to posting any military attaché. The posting of an attaché must

¹⁰⁶ Enclosure, “Instruction for Naval, Military and Air Attaches,” 17.

¹⁰⁷ Enclosure, “Instruction for Naval, Military and Air Attaches,” 17.

¹⁰⁸ Enclosure, “Instruction for Naval, Military and Air Attaches,” 17.

¹⁰⁹ Enclosure, “Instruction for Naval, Military and Air Attaches,” 18.

take into consideration the “overall intelligence policy,” and the demands of the military divisions. JIC recognized that Canada could not develop a world-wide network for intelligence collection, nor “compete with the United Kingdom and the United States” in such work.¹¹⁰ JIC believed that any expansion of attachés must be relative to the development of intelligence capacities in Ottawa, for example, the ability to do analysis of raw information.¹¹¹ JIC expected that the personnel who filled attaché positions would be “capable of obtaining intelligence results.” It is counterproductive to select “officers by reason only of their seniority in the Service.”¹¹²

What was the DEA view on deploying military attachés? The under-secretary in 1946 was Lester B. Pearson, and “he agreed with the principle set out in the [DND] paper, namely that the reason for appointing Service Attaché was for intelligence.”¹¹³ Although, he did disagree with some of the specific postings put forward by the Forces and by JIC, based on the view that there was insufficient reasoning for certain postings.¹¹⁴ In 1950, the Chief of Staff conducted a review of attaché positions, and the Minister of National Defence presented a report to the Cabinet Defence Committee. One of the major concerns of the Chief of Staff was, interestingly enough, “the need to perform independent Canadian assessments of the validity of United Kingdom and United States intelligence, particularly

¹¹⁰ Memorandum, “Report on the Requirements for Service Attaché Post,” sections marked “Secret,” December 13, 1946, in Vol. 12 of *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, ed. Donald M. Page (Ottawa: Dept of External Affairs, 1977), 22.

¹¹¹ Memorandum, “Report on the Requirements for Service Attaché Post,” 22.

¹¹² Memorandum, “Report on the Requirements for Service Attaché Post,” 23.

¹¹³ Memorandum, “Office of the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Second Political Division,” sections marked “Secret,” November 2, 1946, in Vol. 12 of *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, ed. Donald M. Page (Ottawa: Dept of External Affairs, 1977), 20.

¹¹⁴ Memorandum, “Office of the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Second Political Division,” 20.

where they disagree.”¹¹⁵ Another concern was that an attaché from one military service could not do the work of another.¹¹⁶ For example, a naval attaché would not be able to understand fully the intricacies of air force operations. Thus, separate attachés representing the different services might be required.

At one time the Chief of Intelligence and Security (CIS) within DND conducted administrative and training for military attachés.¹¹⁷ Presently, the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (DCDS) has those responsibilities.¹¹⁸ In 1990, Canada had military attachés in twenty-one countries and attachés were accredited to a total of forty-two. In 2008, military attachés were posted in thirty-two countries and accredited to one hundred and forty-one.¹¹⁹ The increase in numbers clearly indicates a growing and continuing importance of military attachés in diplomacy and intelligence.

To summarize, Canadian military attachés represent our government and military institutions, but unlike diplomats deployed by the Department of Foreign Affairs, their duty to collect HUMINT is an understood part of their daily operations. Despite the fall of the Soviet Union in 1990, the placement of attachés has continued and increased. As long as Canada takes part in UN peacekeeping operations, produces military technology, and maintains membership in defence coalitions there will always be a need for military attachés for this country.

¹¹⁵ Memorandum, “Disposition of Service Attaches,” sections marked “Secret,” April 21, 1950, in Vol. 16 of *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, ed. Greg Donaghy (Ottawa: Dept of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1996), 15.

¹¹⁶ Memorandum, “Disposition of Service Attaches,” 15.

¹¹⁷ Major Gérald Baril, “Military attaches...our diplomats abroad,” *Sentinel*, 26 (1990), 28.

¹¹⁸ Baril, “Military attaches...our diplomats abroad,” 28.

¹¹⁹ Baril, “Military attaches...our diplomats abroad,” 28; and Colonel Bruce McQuade, e-mail to author, July 29, 2008.

In the United States, the Department of Defense (DoD), as is well-known, conducts extensive military and foreign intelligence operations. The DoD does not have one single intelligence structure for collection and assessment, but rather several organizations: the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) (the prime assessment agency), Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), US Marine Corps Intelligence, and Air Intelligence Agency (AIA). The UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) similarly provides such intelligence for British forces and the British government. A key arm is the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS).

2.5 Privy Council Office

The Privy Council Office (PCO) is the central agency of the Canadian government. The PCO “provides non-partisan advice and support to the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and Cabinet committees.”¹²⁰ In the area of intelligence, its role is to determine intelligence priorities, promote effective coordination among the intelligence community and assist agencies and departments in “propos[ing] strategic priorities to ministers.”¹²¹

The PCO has two intelligence-related units that provide support to the government: the Security Intelligence Secretariat and the International Assessment Staff (IAS). In 2005, the Conservative government established the National Security Advisor (NSA), as the title implies, is the senior advisor to the Prime Minister and Cabinet on national security matters. He or she provides advice on foreign policy and security issues and coordinates the activities of the security and intelligence community. He or she is also the Deputy Minister

¹²⁰ *The Canadian Security Intelligence Community*, 13.

¹²¹ *A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities*, 196.

(responsible for policy direction) for the CSE and ITAC.¹²² In addition, the NSA has a relationship with allied governments.

The Security Intelligence Secretariat is an advisory unit to the prime minister and governmental departments, and to “ministerial decision-making on security and intelligence matters.”¹²³ IAS produces assessment reports on international conditions and possible implications for Canada. The focus is “on countries that are authoritarian, unstable, involved in conflict, or for other reason, are of concern to Canada and the international community.”¹²⁴ IAS analysts work with “all source” intelligence to produce their assessment reports. These sources can be open and public (such as the media and academic publications), or classified such as diplomatic reports, HUMINT and SIGINT material. The unit also receives and employs intelligence assessments from allies.

From 1985 to 1989, Blair Seaborn, a former Canadian ambassador and was the Intelligence and Security Coordinator at PCO (the forerunner position to that of the NSA). Part of his job was to chair the Intelligence Advisory Committee.¹²⁵ He regarded the Department of Foreign Affairs intelligence work as very important to the Canadian intelligence community. “The contribution made by the Department...was extremely valuable. They had a damn good analytical shop in External Affairs, as they did in the Department of National Defence.” Those were the two main contributors to the writing of our reports... the main contributors to the end product.”¹²⁶

¹²² *A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities*, 197.

¹²³ *The Canadian Security Intelligence Community*, 14.

¹²⁴ *The Canadian Security Intelligence Community*, 14.

¹²⁵ ISC was a position that coordinated intelligence within PCO and intelligence community.

¹²⁶ Blair Seaborn, interview with author, Ottawa, Ontario, December 8, 2003.

In 1993, the government moved the bulk of the intelligence assessment staff of the Department of Foreign Affairs to the PCO's IAS (prior to the changeover the IAS was a coordinating secretariat). The IAS was henceforth to provide centralized analysis. Some experts concluded that the Department "[was] left with virtually no intelligence analysis capacity."¹²⁷ The rationale behind this transfer may have been to save money,¹²⁸ but the move may also have been guided by the notion that a central agency like the PCO or another intelligence agency was the place where most of the intelligence assessment should be done. This view is disputed by other experts, who argue that intelligence assessment is best done close to the substantive expertise and to the potential users of the intelligence.¹²⁹

Intelligence coordination is a major role of the PCO. The Clerk of the Privy Council chairs a deputy minister-level group called the Interdepartmental Committee on Security and Intelligence (ICSI). It "discusses strategic policy and resources issues, considers sensitive national security matters, reviews proposals destined for Cabinet and recommends the annual intelligence priorities" for the intelligence community.¹³⁰ The Assistant Secretary for Security and Intelligence at PCO chairs the Intelligence Policy Group (IPG), an assistant deputy minister (ADM) level group from across the Canadian government and intelligence community. The IPG provides a "forum for policy and operational

¹²⁷ Christopher Spencer, "Intelligence Analysis under Pressure of Rapid Change: The Canadian Challenge," *Journal of Conflict Studies* 16, no. 1 (Spring 1996), <<http://www.lib.unb.ca/Texts/JCS/bin/get.cgi?directory=S96/articles/&filename=spencer.htm>>. One of these experts, Stuart Farson, believes the Department's numbers have since been replenished. (Stuart Farson, e-mail to author, May 23, 2003.)

¹²⁸ Stuart Farson, "Is Canadian Intelligence Being Re-invented?" *Canadian Foreign Policy* 6, no.2 (Winter 1999): 59.

¹²⁹ Confidential source, interview with author.

coordination within the community.”¹³¹ The Executive Director of IAS chairs the Intelligence Assessment and Coordination Committee (IACC), made up of representatives from various government departments and agencies that deal with intelligence. The purpose of IACC is to “produce papers that take a longer-range view of foreign developments, but are still of immediate interest to decision-makers.”¹³² PCO and Foreign Affairs had a MOU under which both institutions provide personnel and management for the IAS.

While most countries see a need for intelligence to be centralized they do not always pursue this goal in identical ways. The closest equivalent to Canada’s PCO with respect to intelligence functions is to be found in the United Kingdom, where the key body is the Joint Intelligence Committee that reports to the prime minister and cabinet. In the United States, the director of the CIA used to be simultaneously the “Director of Central Intelligence” (DCI) and in theory responsible for intelligence coordination across the American intelligence community. In Washington, however, the various intelligence agencies are notoriously autonomous, at least as autonomous as most other American government departments. The DCI was thus often unable to provide genuine coordination. In the aftermath of 9/11, and the report of the 9/11 Commission,¹³³ President George W. Bush created the position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI), a position intended to provide greater centralization and coordination of intelligence. The DNI was however not richly endowed with resources to achieve this goal. The “jury” of intelligence experts and

¹³⁰ *The Canadian Security Intelligence Community*, 13.

¹³¹ *The Canadian Security Intelligence Community*, 14.

¹³² *The Canadian Security Intelligence Community*, 15.

¹³³ Unites States of America. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States [9-11 Commission], *Report*, (2004), <<http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/index.htm>>.

practitioners is still out on whether or not this modest restructuring is going to make a difference.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter has provided an overview of Canada's current foreign intelligence community. It should be clear that Canada has a substantial structure for collecting, assessing and disseminating intelligence. The fact that Canada does not have a dedicated foreign clandestine HUMINT agency clearly does not prevent the classic functions of foreign intelligence from being performed. It should also be clear from this chapter that the Department of Foreign Affairs itself has both an internal intelligence capability and a prominent and central role in the overall Canadian intelligence community -- capabilities and a role most often overlooked in discussions of the Department and Canadian foreign policy. The following chapter will describe the Department's early involvement in foreign intelligence work.

Some of the information that a foreign ministry needs to function comes from sensitive sources.

-John Hadwen¹

Chapter Three: Departmental Intelligence Structures

The previous chapter described the roles of the components of the present day Canadian intelligence community, including those of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Several questions arise from that chapter. When did the Department begin collecting intelligence? How did the Department organize its intelligence structures and how did they evolve over the post World War II period? This chapter attempts to provide answers to these questions. It briefly describes the intelligence structures created in the Department over a half century. Information about these structures has not previously been available, and the purpose of this chapter is to provide some understanding of the Department's intelligence units. (Chapters Four and Five will provide some illustration of the intelligence operations, including intelligence collection, in which the Department has engaged in the postwar period.) Generally, this chapter and subsequent ones will show that the Department is and has been much more involved in foreign intelligence work than is acknowledged in public or has been shown in the existing academic literature or government publications.²

¹ John Hadwen, interview with author, December 6, 2003, Ottawa, Ontario.

² The recent and prominent exception to this generalization is Kurt F. Jensen, *Cautious Beginnings: Canadian Foreign Intelligence 1939-1951* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008). Other sources that describe and provide some accurate information about the Department's foreign intelligence work are the following, see Jeffery Richelson, *Foreign Intelligence Organizations*, (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1988); Philip Rosen, *The Communications Security Establishment: Canada's Most Secret Intelligence Agency* (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 1993), <<http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/bp343-e.htm>>; Canada, Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, *A New Review Mechanism for the RCMP's National Security Activities*, 2006, <

3.0 Early Years

Before exploring “how” the Department organized itself for intelligence work, we must first understand the conditions that prompted the development of such capabilities. There is little information available about the Department's intelligence capabilities prior to 1940. As a result, no specific case studies can be presented about this early period. Yet one must understand the Department's role at that time.

Confederation in 1867 did not provide Canada with the full sovereign authority of an independent country or with the necessary structures to conduct external relations. At the time, Great Britain still managed the foreign relations of the dominions. It would not be until the 1931 Statute of Westminster that Canada legally had authority to decide its own foreign policy. In these early years, therefore, there was no urgency to create a department for external affairs. Nevertheless, Canada did pursue its own foreign interests in several instances in the 1870s, for example with fishing treaty negotiations (while under the supervision of the British).

The need for “small I-intelligence” in diplomatic relations was recognized when Great Britain and Canada were dealing with the United States in the Alaskan boundary dispute of 1899. Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier asked Joseph Pope, a senior public servant, to prepare the government's case in the boundary dispute. Pope would quickly learn that

[13/www.ararcommission.ca/eng/EnglishReportDec122006.pdf](http://www.ararcommission.ca/eng/EnglishReportDec122006.pdf)>; Canada, Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, *Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Factual Backgrounder*, Vol II, 2006, <http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-bcp/commissions/maher_arar/07-09-13/www.ararcommission.ca/eng/Vol_II_English.pdf>; and Canada, Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, *Second Report: Freedom and Security Under the Law*, Vol. 2 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1981).

the government lacked basic information about vital Canadian interests.³ At that time, Canada was a passive receiver of British intelligence but had little capacity and no formal structures for collation, assessment and analysis let alone collection of intelligence. When Pope gained access to some information from officials at the British Foreign Office they insisted the documents were for “personal use” and that he return them to London and “not to pass them on to [his] successor.”⁴ In another situation, a US State Department official assisting Pope with finding information on the Russian occupation of Alaska became apprehensive about providing Pope with documentation.⁵ This individual believed his actions might be considered treasonable.

Pope later proposed that the Canadian government create a department to manage Canada's external relations.⁶ All diplomatic despatches would be referred to this department, and its staff would analyze international issues concerning the country.⁷ Pope suggested that if a new department could not be created, the responsibilities should be given to the secretary of state.⁸

Prime Minister Laurier responded by establishing the Department of External Affairs (DEA) in 1909 to handle Canada's growing involvement in international relations. At a minimum, the government needed clerical work to collect and file information from abroad. As James Eayrs, the author of *The Art of the Possible: Government and Foreign Policy in*

³ James Eayrs, *The Art of the Possible: Government and Foreign Policy in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), 124.

⁴ Eayrs, *The Art of the Possible*, 125.

⁵ Eayrs, *The Art of the Possible*, 125.

⁶ John Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume 1, The Early Years, 1909-1946* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990), 31.

⁷ Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume 1, The Early Years, 1909-1946*, 31.

⁸ Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume 1, The Early Years, 1909-1946*, 31.

Canada, explains, the establishment of the Department was a result of a need for organized and comprehensive information to guide early Canadian foreign policy.⁹ At the time, the government did not have what Sherman Kent calls basic descriptive intelligence, “the groundwork which gives meaning to day-to-day change and the groundwork without which speculation into the future is likely to be meaningless.”¹⁰ The first head of the Department, Joseph Pope, sought to rectify that situation. While the very creation of External Affairs in 1909 was itself a reflection of a perceived need for what could be considered foreign intelligence, Eayrs notes that “it was only slowly that Canadian governments came to appreciate the intimate connection of intelligence...and the quality of their external affairs.”¹¹

External Affairs, once established, did not instantaneously produce copious intelligence for Ottawa policy-makers. DEA produced no intelligence before the late 1930s. The government needed to establish embassies around the world to collect information.¹² Even by the late 1930s to early 1940s the Department only had half dozen missions in the world and a very small staff in Ottawa.

3.1 Intelligence in World War II

When Nazi Germany invaded Poland in 1939, it began World War II. Japan's aggressive advances in Asia to expand its empire had begun in the late-1930s but war in the Pacific is usually seen as beginning with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. The war mobilized all available resources (i.e. human, economic, technological, industrial, and

⁹ Eayrs, *The Art of the Possible*, 126.

¹⁰ Eayrs, *The Art of the Possible*, 126, quoting Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* (Hamden: Archon Books, 1949), 11.

¹¹ Eayrs, *The Art of the Possible*, 126.

military). The war had a significant affect on allied countries. In particular, it prompted a high degree of cooperation and sharing on both the military and intelligence fronts. The allies needed to coordinate and share in many areas, including “human intelligence, signals intelligence, ocean surveillance, photographic aerial intelligence and...the production of intelligence estimates.”¹³ This wartime cooperation and sharing was the beginning of intelligence agreements arranged over the next several decades.

3.2 Intelligence in World War II: Censorship and Debriefing

The overall activities and role of External Affairs greatly developed in World War II, including foreign intelligence activities. During the war, intelligence structures gathered information from censorship activities. The British had informed the Canadian government that its newspapers might contain information that could be useful to the enemy and needed to be “censored.”¹⁴ The British also advised DEA that “intercept[ing] messages, if properly organized and analyzed,” had great potential as intelligence information.¹⁵ In other words, “it was the collation and evaluation of many pieces of seemingly insignificant information that held the potential for shedding light on conditions in enemy territories or on details of enemy war fighting dogma.”¹⁶ The government however lacked an organized system to coordinate the activities of censoring and analyzing the mail of prisoners of war (POWs) as well as that of others.

¹² Eayrs, *The Art of the Possible*, 127.

¹³ Jeffrey T. Richelson and Desmond Ball, *Ties that Bind: Intelligence Cooperation between the UKUSA Countries - the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand* (North Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1985), 1.

¹⁴ Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume 1, The Early Years, 1909-1946*, 268.

¹⁵ Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume 1, The Early Years, 1909-1946*, 268.

¹⁶ Kurt Jensen, *Cautious Beginnings: Canadian Foreign Intelligence 1939-1951* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), 73.

In the departmental history, John Hilliker states that the government began by creating an interdepartmental committee “to direct and harmonize censorship activities.”¹⁷ There were several departments conducting censorship activities. “The army was responsible for telegraph censorship, the Post Office looked after postal censorship, and National War Services carried out press censorship.”¹⁸ These activities, as Jensen indicates, “were hampered by an absence of central focus. No one seemed to be in charge.”¹⁹

The DEA was not directly responsible for censorship activities, but became involved in the planning and policy direction because of the potential for intelligence information. Jensen notes that the DEA “was not an enthusiastic participant in actual censorship.”²⁰ Tommy Stone, an External Affairs official who came to specialize in intelligence, developed many of the Department's intelligence structures and methods including its role in censorship. Stone instigated a systematic approach “whereby censorship workers sorted out the intercepts as they came in and put them in appropriate files.”²¹ The intercepts the various departments handled were not signals intelligence (SIGINT) related, but rather mail that was sent by or destined for German and other POWs interned in Canada and mail entering and leaving Canada in general.

The censorship activities analyzed the mail of POWs, even though such operations were illegal under the *Geneva Convention*.²² It was learned that German censors were “lax

¹⁷ Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume 1, The Early Years, 1909-1946*, 268.

¹⁸ Jensen, *Cautious Beginnings*, 75.

¹⁹ Jensen, *Cautious Beginnings*, 75.

²⁰ Jensen, *Cautious Beginnings*, 75.

²¹ Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume 1, The Early Years, 1909-1946*, 268.

²² Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, The Early Years*, 268.

in scrutinising airmail” being sent to POWs held in Canada.²³ Such letters provided intelligence about the effectiveness of allied bombings, insights into German morale, and even logistical information about paralyzed German U-boats.²⁴ This intelligence also allowed the allies to determine the “thrust and weakness of enemy propaganda that needed to be countered.”²⁵

The Department's intelligence operation did not employ particularly sophisticated methods for handling and destroying POW mail. “On one occasion,” Hilliker explains, “junior officers had to be deployed on Parliament Hill to rescue intercepts blown about when an unexpected updraft in an East Block fireplace sent them swirling up the chimney before they could be burned.”²⁶

Around the end of 1941, G. P. de T. Glazebrook took over the work of Stone. He recommended a centralized supervision of the work, because many departments were involved in censorship activities.²⁷ In 1942, the Cabinet War Committee appointed Colonel O. M. Biggar as the director of censorship in order to supervise the various jurisdictions involved in censorship activities.²⁸ Biggar's office would eventually produce reports on “German morale and impartiality of neutral countries” from the information that was collected from censoring mail.²⁹ Hilliker claims that DEA relied “considerably” on these

²³ Don Page, “Tommy Stone and Psychological Warfare in World War Two: Transforming a POW Liability into an Asset,” *Journal of Canadian Studies* 16, no. 3&4 (Fall-Winter 1981): 112.

²⁴ Page, “Tommy Stone and Psychological Warfare,” 112.

²⁵ Page, “Tommy Stone and Psychological Warfare,” 112.

²⁶ Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume 1, The Early Years, 1909-1946*, 268.

²⁷ Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume 1, The Early Years, 1909-1946*, 268.

²⁸ Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume 1, The Early Years, 1909-1946*, 268.

²⁹ Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume 1, The Early Years, 1909-1946*, 268.

reports, but mostly in areas of particular concern for the Department.³⁰ He does not specifically list areas of concern, but mentions the French islands of Saint Pierre et Miquelon off Newfoundland as examples.³¹

The DEA and National Defence also had responsibility for debriefing German soldiers (for HUMINT) captured by the allies and sent to Canada for internment. Historian Don Page indicates that both Stone and Glazebrook “appreciated how information derived from POWs could be used for intelligence and propaganda.”³²

One purpose of the debriefing operations was to search for collaborators among the POWs. Some of them were willing to write and broadcast propaganda messages for the allies. External Affairs and National Defence “educated” POWs about democratic principles, making them more valuable in psychological warfare. The hope was that these individuals would “encourage surrender, discount Axis propaganda and foster collaboration for allied psychological warfare.”³³ Some POWs had strong convictions and resisted attempts to change. Page notes that 3,220 people were identified who could not be “educated” due to their ideological convictions.³⁴ Page suggests, that “by taking an active part in political warfare, Stone hoped that External Affairs would become privy to valuable intelligence about European developments that it would not otherwise receive.”³⁵

In addition to debriefing German POWs held in Canada, External Affairs (in coordination with National Defence) also on several occasions coordinated debriefings of

³⁰ Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume 1, The Early Years, 1909-1946*, 268.

³¹ Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume 1, The Early Years, 1909-1946*, 268.

³² Page, “Tommy Stone and Psychological Warfare,” 112.

³³ Page, “Tommy Stone and Psychological Warfare,” 114 and 115.

³⁴ Page, “Tommy Stone and Psychological Warfare,” 115.

³⁵ Page, “Tommy Stone and Psychological Warfare,” 112.

repatriated Canadians who had been held in Europe or Asia. The first debriefings were conducted in the summer of 1942 with nine Canadian women returning from Europe.³⁶ These women provided information regarding “the general dissatisfaction among German Christians toward the Nazi regime...the quality and availability of commodity items for civilians, [and] the impact of the early bombings on the German people.”³⁷ Canadians returning from Asia were also debriefed in New York, under the direction of Lester B. Pearson, the senior Canadian diplomat in Washington, DC. These interviewees were missionaries and diplomats who had been working in North and South China, Hong Kong, Manchuria, Indochina, Japan and Korea.³⁸ The interviewees provided information about Japanese military deployment and logistical operations in the various regions.³⁹

In another case, DEA and National Defence sent a military intelligence officer and Herbert Norman, a Canadian diplomat repatriated from Japan, to Rio de Janeiro to join a ship, the *SS Gripsholm*, which was returning from Japan bound for New York.⁴⁰ The *Gripsholm* had Canadians on board and the DND officer and Norman were dispatched to debrief them.⁴¹ This program, essentially a specialized HUMINT operation ended quickly after all Canadians were repatriated.

3.3 Postwar Development and Expansion

As noted earlier, initially the Department's intelligence work consisted of very simple clerical work, basically collation and filing of information received from abroad. During the

³⁶ Jensen, *Cautious Beginnings*, 85.

³⁷ Jensen, *Cautious Beginnings*, 85.

³⁸ Jensen, *Cautious Beginnings*, 86.

³⁹ Jensen, *Cautious Beginnings*, 86.

⁴⁰ Jensen, *Cautious Beginnings*, 88.

⁴¹ Jensen, *Cautious Beginnings*, 88.

1940s, DEA's intelligence work began to change and evolve because of the demands World War II was placing on the government and the need to cooperate and share intelligence with allies. Canada's geography also provided an advantage, allowing its wartime intelligence effort to include collection of information from a wide area that included the Asia-Pacific, South America and parts of Europe. Canada's involvement in the war would set a precedent for the future development of Canada's overall intelligence structures and methods.

Canada's foreign policy expanded in the post-war era. There was at the same time a greater need for foreign intelligence to support the government's initiatives. The emergence of the Cold War and the political divide between East and West impelled Canada into providing greater assistance to its Western allies in the struggle against Communist expansion in the international system. External Affairs needed foreign intelligence structures to support Canadian policy initiatives. The allies saw a need to extend foreign intelligence collection, assessment, and sharing into the post-war years, which resulted in Canada joining several intelligence agreements.

In 1948 Canada joined a very secretive multilateral security and intelligence sharing and cooperation arrangement known as the UKUSA Agreement. Its members are the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Martin Rudner suggests that the primary goal of UKUSA, which still exists, is "cooperation in sharing of SIGINT technologies, in targeting and operational matters, and in exchange of foreign

intelligence collection.”⁴² The key national intelligence agencies thus currently involved are the US National Security Agency (NSA), Great Britain’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Canada’s Communications Security Establishment (CSE), Australia’s Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) and the New Zealand Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB). The UKUSA “is not a single treaty document but rather a set of Anglo-American agreements, Memoranda of Understanding and exchanges of letters.”⁴³ Canada is also involved in many foreign intelligence arrangements related to or developed from UKUSA, virtually all of which are secret. Jeffrey T. Richelson and Desmond Ball state “there are numerous other agreements, both multilateral and bilateral, which govern the exchange of intelligence information between these countries. Moreover, there are unwritten agreements, based on convention and working practice, which in many cases are just as important as the written agreements.”⁴⁴ It is believed that External Affairs actively contributed to these agreements because of its responsibility for Canada’s external relations, and representation of the Canadian intelligence community internationally.

As a result of the new and expanded demands of the postwar era, the Canadian government expanded its foreign intelligence capabilities. Some new foreign intelligence structures were created within External Affairs and National Defence. Others involved DEA as an active participant and manager of foreign intelligence activities.

During this period, the Department became actively involved in development and organization of many important foreign intelligence structures. A key foreign intelligence

⁴² Martin Rudner, “Canada’s Communications Security Establishment from Cold War to Globalization,” *Intelligence and National Security* 16, no. 1 (2001): 109.

⁴³ Rudner, “Canada’s Communications Security Establishment,” 109.

⁴⁴ Richelson and Ball, *Ties that Bind*, 135.

coordinating body was the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) based in National Defence – modelled after the similar British structure. Little has been written about the Canadian JIC and it is sufficient for present purposes to note that it met weekly and “approved assessments of information from all sources bearing on events currently happening or likely to happen in the near future,” of concern to the government.⁴⁵ The JIC had representatives from various other agencies and departments and its chair was a representative from External Affairs.

Under the direction of the JIC was the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB).⁴⁶ The JIB had four foreign intelligence related duties. One was “to collect and collate the information required for defence purposes.”⁴⁷ Second, it was to provide information for Canadian military operational planning.⁴⁸ Third, it was to “collect, collate, and provide information on the topography, communications, economic and industrial war potential of foreign countries as required by the various intelligence and planning staffs.”⁴⁹ Finally, the JIB was to access “all available Canadian sources of overt information on foreign countries” not under the existing authority of any other intelligence agency in Canada.⁵⁰

The Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS) was another structure under the JIC. The JIS was a community-wide intelligence assessment unit that periodically made assessment reports.⁵¹

⁴⁵ Peter Johnston, *Cooper's Snoopers and Other Follies: Fragments of a Life* (Victoria: Trafford Publishing, 2002), 97.

⁴⁶ Jensen, *Cautious Beginnings*, 140.

⁴⁷ Jensen, *Cautious Beginnings*, 145.

⁴⁸ Jensen, *Cautious Beginnings*, 146.

⁴⁹ Jensen, *Cautious Beginnings*, 146.

⁵⁰ Jensen, *Cautious Beginnings*, 146.

⁵¹ Jensen, *Cautious Beginnings*, 148.

The JIS was considered a “virtual organization” because it had no permanent staff.⁵² The DEA was an active participant in the JIB and JIS as well as the JIC.

3.4 Defence Liaison 2 (DL2)

In November of 1948, External Affairs established the Defence Liaison Division (DL) to co-ordinate defence policy and foreign intelligence matters with other departments and allies. The acting under-secretary of state for external affairs, Escott Reid, at the time was involved in negotiating the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and he advocated the creation of a liaison division with the military. DL was designed to provide liaison with other departments,⁵³ particularly with National Defence, and to promote “policy co-ordination in this vital area,” reducing “the disarray that existed at the time.”⁵⁴ Reid was delighted with the development of the Defence Liaison division, noting that “one minor advantage of the present system is that it provides 'cover' for the more secret security and intelligence work.”⁵⁵ In other words, DL's name, did not suggest its intelligence functions.⁵⁶

The director of DL had a greater role than simply overseeing and operating the division; this individual was also the chairman of or representative on many community-wide intelligence and security committees.⁵⁷ For example, Harry Carter states that “the

⁵² Jensen, *Cautious Beginnings*, 148.

⁵³ John Hilliker and Donald Barry, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume II, Coming of Age, 1946-1968* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995), 53-54.

⁵⁴ Harry H. Carter, *Draft manuscript of Canada's Department of External Affairs*, 37.

⁵⁵ Memorandum, “Report to Mr. Heeney From Mr. Reid,” sections marked “Confidential,” June 27, 1949, Library and Archives of Canada [hereafter LAC], RG 25 Vol. 6183, File 1086-L-1-40, Part 1-1.

⁵⁶ The above noted memo from Reid to Heeney noted G.G. Crean, a departmental employee, conducted a survey of the Department's overall intelligence work in the summer of 1949.

⁵⁷ In 1961, Defence Liaison assisted the Department with several key government committees, in some instances by representing the Department or providing appropriate information. These committees included the Joint Planning Staff, Panel on Economic Aspects of Defence Questions, Sub-Panel on the Economic Aspects of Defence Questions, Advisory Committee on Northern Development, Ad Hoc Committee on Emergency

head of Defence Liaison sat by invitation on the Joint Planning Committee, a sub-committee of the Chiefs of Staff” at National Defence, and occasionally was the chairman of the committee.⁵⁸ The Joint Planning Committee prepared “studies on current and future strategic and operational problems.”⁵⁹ The Head of DL was also the chairman of the JIC.

Shortly after the establishment of DL, in December 1948, Evan Benjamin Rogers, a foreign-service officer in the Department's Information Office, proposed the creation of a political and economic intelligence unit for the Department while conducting a study of psychological warfare. “It occurred to me,” he said, “that both psychological and economic warfare would require an intelligence organization, and that, as they be drawing a good deal of information from the same sources, it might be economical to establish a joint intelligence organization.”⁶⁰ His proposal contained detailed information about the structure, the organization of files, and the sharing of information with other departments and agencies.⁶¹ At the time of Rogers' memorandum, the Department was undergoing a massive restructuring. Rogers' proposal was however a reflection of the Department's growing needs for a specialized and separate division to handle foreign intelligence work.

In 1949 External Affairs decided to separate DL into two divisions, due in part to increasing work-load. What became known as Defence Liaison 1 (DL1) conducted liaison with National Defence, the United States and NATO. Defence Liaison 2 (DL2) was

Planning, Dew Line Coordinating Committee, and Permanent Joint Board on Defence and Canada-United States Committee on Joint Defence.

⁵⁸ Carter, *Draft manuscript*, 45.

⁵⁹ Memorandum, “Paper on Coordination of Defence and Foreign Policy for Royal Commission on Government,” sections marked “Confidential,” October 3, 1961, LAC, RG 25, Vol. 6183, File 1086-L-1-40.

⁶⁰ Memorandum, “Political and Economic Intelligence,” sections marked “Secret,” December 14, 1949, LAC, RG 25, Vol. 6183, File 1086-L-1-40, Part 1-1.

responsible for security and intelligence matters. Robert A. MacKay became the head of DL1, while Gordon Gale (Bill) Crean became the head of DL2.

One DL2 veteran, Peter Johnston, indicates that it was “a central point of storage of intelligence and exchange of intelligence” between External Affairs and other departments and agencies, especially the JIC.⁶² DL2 did not actually collect intelligence. Raw intelligence as well as processed intelligence came from Canadian diplomats abroad (through political and other reporting), from the broader Canadian intelligence community and from Canada's allies.

DL2 had a relationship with the Communications Branch of the National Research Council (CBNRC), the predecessor of CSE, and thus some responsibility for Canadian signals intelligence. During the 1950s and 1960s the CBNRC received policy direction from the head of DL2, who was also the “Director of Communications Security” (DCS).⁶³ In fact the DCS out ranked the director of CBNRC in issues relating to operations. The DCS provided guidance on the targets CBNRC should be engaging, and was also responsible for speaking for CBNRC in government and dealing with problems that arose.⁶⁴ One former head of DL2, John Starnes, claims that this DCS position was a “silly thing.”⁶⁵ Starnes explains that he did not have the expertise and technical “know how” for dealing with many CBNRC matters.⁶⁶ The DCS position existed from 1954 to 1972 until it was eliminated.

⁶¹ Rogers' memorandum notes, regarding the availability of intelligence, there is a “tremendous amount of political and economic intelligence which we receive but never digest.”

⁶² Peter Johnson, telephone interview with author, November 10, 2003.

⁶³ Johnston, interview.

⁶⁴ Johnston, interview.

⁶⁵ John Starnes, Interview with author, December 10, 2003, Ottawa, Ontario.

⁶⁶ Starnes, interview. Starnes suggested during this interview that someone from CBNRC itself should have played this role.

DL2 also chaired various intelligence committees. As noted above, the head of DL2 served as the representative from External Affairs on the JIC and was its chair. Years later, DL2 continued to have an important relationship with the successor of JIC, the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC).⁶⁷ An individual from DL2 ranks would occasionally act as the chair of the IAC.⁶⁸ The IAC was an intelligence management committee, co-ordinated intelligence activity within the Canadian community.

In the area of security, DL2 was responsible for the security of departmental personnel and physical property owned by the Department abroad. The security of personnel included protecting individuals from being compromised by the Soviets and their allies. A secondary duty was maintaining liaison with the RCMP Security Service. There was (and remains) an overlap between foreign policy and domestic security issues. The RCMP conducted surveillance of Soviet diplomats in Canada who might be conducting espionage on Canadian soil, but was not responsible for overall matters of diplomacy or foreign relations. The RCMP would advise the Department, but it was External Affairs that would advise the government on the nature and timing of any action, such as expelling the individual. DEA was broadly concerned about relations with the USSR and also wanted “to ensure that a watchful eye was kept on the police” while the RCMP “quite naturally assumed that it was more important to catch [Soviet] spies than to curry favour with the Soviet government.”⁶⁹ The two organizations occasionally disagreed over declaring suspected spies *persona non grata* (PNG).

⁶⁷ In the late 1980's the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) was divided into two separate organizations: the Intelligence Policy Group (IPG) and Intelligence Assessment Committee (IAC).

⁶⁸ Hadwen, interview.

⁶⁹ Johnston, *Cooper's Snoopers*, 90.

An example of a DL2 security and intelligence concerns can be found in a “secret” memorandum from 1960. Written by Robert M. Middleton, it was sent to the acting under-secretary by then head of DL2, John Starnes. The subject was the “Situation in Cuba” and the broader context of the memorandum was the seriously deteriorating relationship between the United States and Cuba.

You may be interested in the following extract from Letter No. L-565 of August 23 [1960] from the Embassy in Havana concerning the departure of dependants [sic] of U.S. Embassy staff members:

“The completely unofficial evacuation of wives and dependants of U.S. Embassy personnel has progressed to a further stage...Last week...the State Department (stated in a telegram) that it was assumed that the Embassy would strongly urge staff members to send wives and dependants home. The officer in charge of the emergency planning at the U.S. Embassy has informed us that he expects, if the situation does not improve materially, that within ten days the “urge” will be changed to “order”. As a result, nearly all wives and children of U.S. Embassy personnel have returned, or will be returned to the United States within the next week or ten days...”.

For your information we have been making a practice over the past few weeks of examining all correspondence from our mission in Havana for similar “Indicators” of developments in Cuba.⁷⁰

This memorandum is an example of DL2's evaluation work. Based on reports from the Canadian embassy in Havana, DL2 was ensuring that senior officials in External Affairs were aware that the United States government was in the early stages of evacuating Americans from Cuba. Aside from highlighting the importance of this fact, and that Washington may have been preparing for an even more serious conflict with Cuba, DL2 was likely also implicitly raising the possibility that the Department might consider a similar evacuation of Canadians.

DL2 existed until 1968,⁷¹ when it became the Security and Intelligence Liaison Division. No explanation can be found for this restructuring and renaming of DL2. It might be related to the integration of the JIB into the Department that same year or to the election of a new government in Ottawa and changes in senior officials. The name change was significant historically, however, in that it marked the first time External Affairs used the word “intelligence” in naming an internal unit. This change also represented the first of many name and structural changes to come.

3.5 Evolution of DEA/DFAIT Intelligence Structures


The next four decades saw numerous, sometimes rapid, organizational changes in the Department with respect to intelligence. These changes have never previously been tracked systematically. Research for this thesis however allows, for the first time, at least a summary of the organizational shifts. The evolution of the Department's intelligence structures is presented in Figure 1.⁷²

⁷⁰ Memorandum, “Situation in Cuba,” sections originally marked “Secret,” August 31, 1960, LAC, RG 25, Vol. 5048, File 2444-40-40, Part 4. This memorandum was provided to the author by Don Munton.

⁷¹ John Starnes recalled that during 1958-1962 an internal decision was made to destroy DL2 documentation to make space in the division. Such action may explain in part the difficulty in locating DL2 documentation at the LAC (Starnes, interview).

⁷² Figure 1 was compiled with information available in the public domain rather than classified or declassified material. The author used primarily the annual reports of the Department of External Affairs and its successors, available in the departmental library in the Lester B. Pearson Building, see, for example, Canada, Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Annual Report 1990-1991: Overview* (Ottawa: External Affairs and International Trade Canada, 1991) and Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Report of the Department of External Affairs* (Ottawa: Printer to the King's Most Excellent Majesty, 1950). Figure 1 may contain some inaccuracies because of gaps in documentation, government secrecy and restrictions on appropriate documentation. Nevertheless, this Figure accurately shows that the Department has been involved in foreign intelligence work for over sixty years.

Figure 1.0 DEA/DFAIT Foreign Intelligence Structures (1948-2008)



Notes: The figure attempts to show both major departmental units and substructures. Solid line arrows point to a successor unit. Broken lines and broken line boxes indicate autonomous or semi-autonomous units within bureaus. For example, the Security Intelligence Liaison Division was the successor unit of DL2 while the Special Research Bureau (SRB) was the successor organization of the JIB. The SRB and its successor, the Bureau of Economic Intelligence, were autonomous units in the Department until the mid-1980s.

3.6 Bureau of Intelligence Analysis and Security (BIAS)

In 1978, the Bureau of Security and Intelligence Liaison was renamed the Bureau of Intelligence Analysis and Security (BIAS). The new Bureau was composed of six divisions and one unit: the Security Division, Political Intelligence Division, Economic Intelligence Division, Interview Division, Intelligence Services Division, and the Co-ordinator for Emergency Preparedness.

The Security Division was responsible for protecting DEA personnel and property abroad and managing counter-espionage operations. The McDonald Commission report claims that “foreign intelligence agencies have attempted to penetrate the Canadian government by compromising its personnel posted abroad, and gaining access to communications emanating from Canadian missions.”⁷³ The Security Division was to assist in detecting such hostile activities and preventing them from occurring. Furthermore, the McDonald Commission notes that “the decision to grant or deny a diplomatic visa” (a responsibility of External Affairs) will have an important effect on the extent to which foreign intelligence officers in the guise of diplomats are admitted to Canada.”⁷⁴ Responding

⁷³ Canada, Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, *Second Report: Freedom & Security under the Law*, Vol. 2, (Ottawa: The Commission, 1981), 85.

⁷⁴ Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 85.

to potential foreign intelligence operations in Canada was a shared responsibility of the Department and the RCMP (as noted earlier).

The Political Intelligence Division (also called the Intelligence and Analysis Division for a short period in the 1980s) had the duty of compiling information about various geographic areas of the world. Its information came from country and regional desks within the Department, from allies and other sources as well.⁷⁵ Information was collected through both overt, gray and covert means and reflected “political, economic, and social trends.”⁷⁶ IAD reports described the effects of political events abroad on Canada's internal security, and were, of course, shared with the Canadian intelligence community and Intelligence Advisory Committee.

The McDonald report provides very little information on the role of the Economic Intelligence Division (which was originally a separate bureau called Bureau of Economic Intelligence (BEI)) and the Co-ordinator for Emergency Preparedness. The Economic Intelligence Division was the successor of SRB and responsible for “collation, storage and reporting of economic intelligence.”⁷⁷ The Co-ordinator for Emergency Preparedness was responsible for preparing and protecting Canadian missions and its personnel abroad from terrorist attacks, and for conducting and co-ordinating the government's response to international incidents (including terrorism).⁷⁸

⁷⁵ Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 86.

⁷⁶ Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 86.

⁷⁷ Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 86.

⁷⁸ Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 86.

BIAS operated until late 1985. During its time, BIAS dealt with many international incidents such as the Iranian student takeover of the American embassy in Tehran in 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and the 1982 Falklands war.

3.7 Foreign Intelligence Bureau

In January 1986 the government integrated External Affairs with the trade part of the Department of Industry and Trade, forming the Department of External Affairs and International Trade. BIAS was reorganized and renamed the Foreign Intelligence Bureau the same year.

The Foreign Intelligence Bureau maintained responsibility for political and economic intelligence and still provided intelligence products to policymakers and other departments. There were four divisions in the Bureau: the Economic Intelligence Division, Interview Division, Political Intelligence Division and Intelligence Services Division.⁷⁹

These divisions were actually restructured and/or simply renamed units from BIAS. The Economic Intelligence Division was the successor of BEI. It was divided into four geographical areas: Europe, Africa and Middle East, Americas and Asia and the Pacific.⁸⁰ The Economic Intelligence Division was responsible for analyzing and reporting economic intelligence to the relevant departments in government. Richelson does not explain the duties of the Political Intelligence Division, but it was also divided into geographical units: Africa and Middle East, Asia and Pacific, Europe and Americas.⁸¹ The Political Intelligence Division most likely collected and assessed information relating to political situations in

⁷⁹ Jeffery Richelson, *Foreign Intelligence Organizations*, (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1988), 81.

⁸⁰ Richelson, *Foreign Intelligence Organizations*, 81-82.

⁸¹ Richelson, *Foreign Intelligence Organizations*, 82.

foreign countries and their effects on Canada. The Intelligence Services Division was responsible for the more technical aspects of foreign intelligence work, such as “administrative, data management, communications, and liaison functions.”⁸²

The Department's annual report for 1989-1990 mentions that the Foreign Intelligence Bureau was involved in evacuating Canadians from China in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square incident.⁸³ The report does not provide specifics about the Bureau's operations but it seems reasonable to assume the Bureau helped assist government policy during international crisis situations.

3.8 Foreign Assessment Bureau

In September 1990, the Foreign Intelligence Bureau was renamed the Foreign Assessment Bureau. Continuing the work of the Foreign Intelligence Bureau at the Department, the Bureau established the Gulf Assessment Group during the 1990-1991 Gulf War and provided “the Department with evaluated intelligence on the crisis and subsequent war in the Persian Gulf.”⁸⁴ The Bureau also maintained responsibility for representing the Department within the Canadian intelligence community. In fact, the Bureau assisted the Intelligence Advisory Committee in drafting many “assessed intelligence reports which were discussed interdepartmentally,” and later distributed to government officials and ministers.⁸⁵

⁸² Richelson, *Foreign Intelligence Organizations*, 82.

⁸³ Canada, Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Annual Report-Department of External Affairs Canada* (Ottawa: External Affairs and International Trade Canada, 1989): 149.

⁸⁴ Canada, Department of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Annual Report 1990-1991: Overview* (Ottawa: External Affairs and International Trade Canada, 1991): 73.

⁸⁵ Canada. External Affairs and International Trade Canada, *Annual Report 1990-1991*, 73.

In the mid-1990s, during a period of significant government spending cuts and organizational change, the Foreign Assessment Bureau became the Security and Intelligence Bureau (ISD). The operations of ISD greatly expanded and included a wide range of intelligence and security activities (these functions were discussed in some detail in the previous chapter).

3.9 Conclusion

This chapter has presented a glimpse into the initial reasons for Canada's decision to create the Department of Foreign Affairs, and emphasizes the perceived need for intelligence to inform the country's emerging international roles. In ensuing decades, the Department's involvement in foreign intelligence work grew. So did its formal structures. This chapter has also provided a summary of the evolution of these structures, compiled here for the first time. Although it was initially, from the 1920s until 1941, a consumer of foreign intelligence, External Affairs did not remain a passive recipient of intelligence products from its allies. The Department became actively involved in foreign intelligence coordination domestically and in international arrangements for sharing intelligence. Much of the Department's work involved liaison with foreign intelligence allies but its contribution was not merely in the well-known area of SIGINT collection and in intelligence analysis. The following chapters present three illustrative case studies of the Department's human intelligence collection operations over the postwar period.

Chapter Four: Departmental Structures and Intelligence Collection

Was External Affairs involved in collecting intelligence as well as processing it? This chapter presents two case studies illustrating the operations of foreign intelligence structures established at the Department. These cases show that, relatively early in its history, units within External Affairs were involved in gathering and analyzing intelligence. The cases selected are ones where reasonably detailed information is now available in the public domain.

The first case focuses on operations of the Special Intelligence Section (SIS) from 1942 until 1945 (thus predating DL2). The second case describes the Interview Program Section which was established in 1953 and still exists today, having undergone some changes over the decades. SIS and the Interview Program Section share two traits, beyond the common purpose of intelligence collection and analysis: a niche specialization in their duties and a small number of personnel.¹ Neither had a broad mandate and both involved a relatively small proportion of the Department's time, efforts and finances. These structures fulfilled a specific duty that was part of Canada's overall foreign intelligence effort and its contribution to allied intelligence.

4.0 Special Intelligence Section (SIS)

During World War II, Nazi Germany and its allies employed sophisticated cipher machines in their military and diplomatic operations. While there were numerous variants,

these cipher machines were collectively referred to as Enigma machines, and employed the most powerful encryption and decryption system created at that time. Canada and its allies invested a great deal of effort, time, personnel and finances to intercept and decode Axis radio communications. Information resulting from the allied decryption operations against German communications was called ULTRA. Information obtained from breaking the Japanese diplomatic code was called "Magic." Canada also contributed to the allied cryptographic effort.

On June 9, 1941 the Canadian cabinet through an executive order established a collection and cryptanalysis organization called the Examination Unit (with the acronym XU).² It was Canada's first signals intelligence (SIGINT) "agency" and was placed within the National Research Council (NRC), in part to hide it from public scrutiny and enemy infiltration. "The original intention in establishing the Examination Unit was to provide means by which the activities of [the] Legation maintained in Ottawa by the Vichy authorities might be observed."³ Vichy France was a collaborative regime allied to Nazi Germany after the defeat of France in 1940. The Vichy diplomats in Ottawa employed ciphers in their diplomatic communications. The primary duty of the XU was to intercept and decrypt their diplomatic messages. The Free French and Imperial Japan were also targets. The Canadian operations included four intercept stations: at Rockcliffe in Ottawa (to

¹ To put the staffing of SIS in perspective, DEA had less than a hundred Foreign Service Officers working in Ottawa and abroad during the early 1940s. In 1946, the Department administered twenty-six diplomatic postings.

² For a comprehensive history of the Examination Unit, see Gilbert de B. Robinson, ed., *A History of the Examination Unit, 1941-1945*, (1945), DND, ATI request A-1996-00798. This document discussed both historical and technical aspects of the Examination Unit operations, intelligence production and sharing. It was obtained through an unofficial Access to Information request to DND.

pick up the Vichy signals), and in Amherst, Nova Scotia; Victoria and Riske Creek, British Columbia.⁴ These stations and the cryptographic work of the XU were the Canadian part of the broad allied SIGINT efforts, led by the British Government Code and Cipher School and American SIGINT agencies, and formalized by the “BRUSA” Agreement of 1943.⁵ The BRUSA arrangements were the forerunners of the postwar UKUSA Agreement of 1947-48.

External Affairs had a close relationship with the XU. The Department provided financial and organizational assistance to establish the Unit and had representatives on the “Y” Committee that planned its operations and provided tasking and direction. While the XU intercepted and decrypted SIGINT, it did not have the capability to translate and analyze the decoded material and provide finished reports to the government and Canada’s allies.⁶

In September 1942, DEA established the Special Intelligence Section (SIS) as a translation and intelligence assessment unit to complement the XU. The Department gave the SIS responsibility for “selecting, editing and otherwise interpreting the material which was produced in the Examination Unit.”⁷ The Section was physically located at the XU offices at 545 Laurier Ave East,⁸ and staffed by DEA personnel, but these individuals were

³ Robert G. Riddell, “French Intelligence,” in *A History of the Examination Unit, 1941-1945*, ed. Gilbert de B. Robinson, (1945), 60.

⁴ Nigel West, *The Sigint Secrets* (New York: Quill, 1986), 259.

⁵ Nigel West, *The Sigint Secrets* (New York: Quill, 1986), 259.

⁶ Gilbert deB. Robinson, “Strachey and Kendrick Periods,” in *A History of the Examination Unit, 1941-1945*, ed. Gilbert de B. Robinson, (1945), 28.

⁷ Egerton Herbert Norman, “Intelligence Relations with Outside Departments: Special Intelligence Section of the Department of External Affairs,” in *A History of the Examination Unit, 1941-1945*, ed. Gilbert de B. Robinson, (1945), 50.

⁸ Memorandum, “Untitled,” establishment of Special Intelligence Section, *Key correspondence/photocopies from the Communications Security Establishment*, 25 September 1942, Directorate of History and Heritage, [hereafter DHH], File 1568-40C, 168.

not considered members of the XU.⁹ The Department “was directly interested not only in the administration but the products of the Examination Unit.”¹⁰ The “Y” Committee agreed that SIS was “to have access to all sources of secret information available to the Department of External Affairs.”¹¹ Since the XU received information from Canada’s allies, the SIS had access to that information as well. Tommy Stone, who acted as intelligence coordinator for External Affairs, saw the work of SIS as a way for Canada to begin to meet its commitment to the *quid pro quo* of intelligence sharing.¹²

The head of External Affairs’ SIS was a Canadian diplomat named Egerton Herbert Norman.¹³ Norman was born and raised in Japan and studied at Cambridge University, receiving a Ph.D. His dissertation was eventually published as a book entitled, *Japan’s Emergence as a Modern State: Political and Economic Problems of the Meiji Period*.¹⁴

⁹ Norman, “Intelligence Relations with Outside Departments: Special Intelligence Section of the Department of External Affairs,” 50.

¹⁰ Norman, “Intelligence Relations with Outside Departments: Special Intelligence Section of the Department of External Affairs,” 50.

¹¹ Memorandum, “Minutes of Meeting of Advisory Committee on the Examination Unit,” *Key correspondence/photocopies from the Communications Security Establishment*, 23 September 1942, DHH, File 1568-40C, 369.

¹² Peter St. John, “Canada’s Accession to the Allied Intelligence Community,” *Conflict Quarterly* 4, no. 4 (1984): 13.

¹³ E. Herbert Norman became a tragic victim of Cold War politics and American national security. He was branded a Communist spy numerous times by certain American officials in the 1950s, and committed suicide in April 1957. On the life of Norman, see Charles Taylor, *Six Journeys: A Canadian Pattern* (Toronto: Anansi, 1977) or Roger Bowen, *Innocence is not Enough: The life and Death of Herbert Norman* (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre Ltd., 1986). For the prosecution case against Norman, see James Barros, *No Sense of Evil: Espionage, the Case of Herbert Norman* (Toronto: Deneau, 1986). In 1990, the Canadian government asked an academic to conduct an investigation on the case of Norman, and report on charges Norman was a communist spy. His conclusion was that Norman did have Communist sympathies but he was never a spy, see Peyton V. Lyon, “The Loyalties of E. Herbert Norman,” *Labour/Le Travail* 28 (Fall 1991). The Canadian government, however, did not give Lyon access to certain key documents, including Norman’s personnel file (Peyton V. Lyon, personal communication to Don Munton, 1991). Interestingly, James Littleton, author of *Target Nation: Canada and the Western Intelligence Network*, described Norman’s relationship with the Americans as “a bitter irony” since the American intelligence community agencies were consumers of his intelligence work.

¹⁴ E. Herbert Norman, *Japan’s Emergence as a Modern State: Political and economic problems of the Meiji period* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940). The book is now recognized as a classic in its field. A former colleague of Norman’s describes the book “as a fundamental, sociological, economic and historical

Norman joined External Affairs and served in Japan from 1940 to 1942 as a language officer and third secretary at the Canadian legation in Tokyo. After Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, allied diplomats were placed under house arrest for seven months, including Canadian diplomats. Norman spent most of his time in the legation library studying Japanese.

In September 1942, Norman returned to Ottawa and to External Affairs and was enlisted into the ranks of SIS. Individuals with command of the Japanese language were invaluable to the intelligence communities in Canada and allied countries. British Security Coordination (BSC), a cover organization for the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) based in New York City, asked DEA to send them Norman.¹⁵ Stone objected to the transfer of Norman during the war because he was needed in Canada.¹⁶

As head of SIS, Norman was selected as chairman of the "Y" sub-committee for assignments. The "Sub-Committee reviewed the interception analysis of Canadian monitoring stations in co-ordination with United States and United Kingdom requests, readjusting the assignments of circuits for monitoring stations to meet fresh requirements."¹⁷

Alongside Norman in SIS was Arthur R. Menzies. Menzies was born in China and educated in Japan. He spoke various Chinese dialects, as well as French, and had travelled widely in the Asia-Pacific region. At the time Menzies was in the Section, from November

analysis of the change over of the Tokugawa military government to the Meiji Restoration" (Arthur Menzies, interview with author, December 8, 2003, Ottawa, Ontario).

¹⁵ The head of BSC was William Stephenson, a Canadian. For a somewhat embellished account of Stephenson's work, see William Stevenson, *A Man Called Intrepid* (New York: Ballantine, 1976). BSC had both intelligence and propaganda tasks.

¹⁶ Memorandum, "Untitled," British Security Committee (BSC) and Herbert Norman, *Key correspondence/photocopies from the Communications Security Establishment*, July 31, 1942, DHH, File 1568-40C, 354.

1942 until February 1944, he was the only person in DEA who specialized in China.¹⁸

Eventually, G.W. Hilborn would replace him in February 1944; Hilborn's foreign language specialty however was Spanish. The stenographic, research and clerical staff consisted of three people, Miss G. Parsons, Miss F. Roxborough and Miss R. Bogue.¹⁹

The overall role of SIS personnel was to ensure material intercepted and decrypted by XU was properly translated, collated, analyzed, categorized and transformed into intelligence products. Norman argues the importance of "the task of filing each message, Japanese and French, building up a system of cross references, and making cards on each proper name and subject was essential to the work of this section."²⁰

The work of the SIS was divided among the personnel "based on their expertise." Norman conducted analytical work on Japan and Menzies focused on French traffic. In an interview with Menzies, he jokingly suggested, "Norman did Japan and I did everything else, including the laundry."²¹ Some of the traffic translated and analyzed by SIS from the Asia-Pacific region consisted of traffic between the Vichy government and its diplomatic missions.²² Vichy France maintained administration of France's largest colony in Asia, French Indochina (now, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam) and also maintained diplomatic missions in Japan and Occupied China (Chinese territory invaded and captured by Japan in 1937). In September 1940, Japan used its alliance with the Vichy government to establish

¹⁷ Norman, "Intelligence Relations with Outside Departments: Special Intelligence Section of the Department of External Affairs," 57-58.

¹⁸ Menzies, interview.

¹⁹ Norman, "Intelligence Relations with Outside Departments: Special Intelligence Section of the Department of External Affairs," 51.

²⁰ Norman, "Intelligence Relations with Outside Departments: Special Intelligence Section of the Department of External Affairs," 51.

²¹ Menzies, interview.

strategic military bases in French Indochina. Collecting intelligence on the Indochina region thus helped to understand how the Japanese were operating and what the Vichy French were thinking and doing.²³

The XU was also intercepting and decrypting high and low grade traffic between Japanese missions in Europe, South America and Tokyo. The European centres targeted were, "Berlin, Moscow, Stockholm, Lisbon, Salo (Italian Fascist puppet regime), Zagreb, Berne and Vatican City."²⁴ The South American centres were Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru. These intercepts were provided to SIS for translation and analysis.

The limited resources at SIS had an affect on the production of intelligence reports. When Norman was planning to attend an intelligence meeting in Washington, DC on October 31, 1942, Stone notes, "Norman's absence from Ottawa means approximately a fifty percent closing down of activities of his little organization."²⁵ The other fifty percent was Menzies.

During the 1940s there was little academic research or literature in Canada on Asian countries.²⁶ Norman's and Menzies' background knowledge about Asia meant part of their job was to provide a general understanding to government officials about Asian society, culture, religion, politics, norms and values. For instances, Menzies states that there were "distorted views of Japanese [people] both in the US and Britain because of the Kamikaze

²² Norman, "Intelligence Relations with Outside Departments: Special Intelligence Section of the Department of External Affairs," 51.

²³ Menzies, interview.

²⁴ Norman, "Intelligence Relations with Outside Departments: Special Intelligence Section of the Department of External Affairs," 52.

²⁵ Memorandum, "Untitled," Herbert Norman's trip to the United States, *Key correspondence/photocopies from the Communications Security Establishment*, October 21, 1942, DHH, File 1568-40C, 382; and

approach to warfare. Some people in the allied side considered the Japanese were not human. Part of the job was to understand the background of the Japanese and traditions of the Samurai."²⁷

SIS reported on a number of different subject matters from around the world. The focus, according to Norman, was primarily diplomatic material with small amounts of economic and military information.²⁸ Norman did not explain what constituted diplomatic material, but one can assume he was discussing political agendas, issues, plans and statements from Axis governments about the war and their allies. In some instances Japanese diplomatic traffic from South America mentioned the names and activities of pro-Axis politicians in Chile and Argentina, or discussed the internal wrangling in the countries.²⁹ In other instances, Vichy diplomatic traffic from Japan provided information about internal discord. As one External Affairs official said:

Messages from this source [Vichy diplomatic missions] contained occasional comment of considerable importance on the attitude of the Japanese Government and as the collapse of Germany approached, the Vichy representative in Tokyo provided evidence from inside Japan of the growing concern of Japanese leaders over the worsening situation, of divisions amongst Japanese military and political leaders and of the effects of air-raids.³⁰

Memorandum, "Teletype Message," *Key correspondence/photocopies from the Communications Security Establishment*, October 24, 1942, DHH, File 1568-40C, 385.

²⁶ Menzies, interview.

²⁷ Menzies, interview.

²⁸ Norman, "Intelligence Relations with Outside Departments: Special Intelligence Section of the Department of External Affairs," 52.

²⁹ Norman, "Intelligence Relations with Outside Departments: Special Intelligence Section of the Department of External Affairs," 52.

³⁰ Riddell, "French Intelligence," 61-62.

The intelligence product of SIS was distributed and disseminated to External Affairs and the directors of air, military and naval Intelligence as well as to allies.³¹ It is reasonable to infer that SIS translation and analysis capabilities provided important information about the war.

An example of SIS analytical work is found in a secret memorandum dated October 16, 1943 written by Norman. The analysis is based on information provided by the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to Norman. The focus of the memorandum is the strategic significance of Sumatra (an island of Indonesia) to Japanese operations in the South Pacific.

In 1940 Imperial Japan had expanded its empire in South East Asia but was dependent on the seas for logistical support and thus had to dominate the South-Asian seas. The United States had opposed Japanese expansionism, and gradually imposed trade embargos and sanctions. Pre-war Japan had been heavily dependent on key American supplies, such as oil, but the US terminated all oil exports in the summer of 1941 after Japan expanded into French Indochina. The island of Sumatra became a key source of natural resources for Japan, including oil and bauxite, used in the production of aluminium which was critical to aircraft manufacturing. Herbert Norman's memorandum noted that:

[Sumatra] is the most strategically placed of all the Netherlands East Indies. It is a base which threatens Singapore and commands the Straits of Malacca; it is considered by the Dutch as an ideal place on which to land agents. It is the richest oil producing part of the Indies since at least half of the oil of the Indies comes from this inland, particularly from the refineries at Pangkalan, Berandan and also in Palembang. It is believed that the 1942 production of the island was 30,000,000 barrels, representing quite an increase. It would cover at least half of Japan's annual requirements. The Japanese look to Sumatra and Bintan islands for 80% of their bauxite ores. If deprived of these resources the Japanese would have to draw on

³¹ Memorandum, "Untitled," Special Intelligence Section and intelligence sharing, sections marked "Most Secret," June 22, 1943, Library and Archives Canada [hereafter LAC], RG 24, Vol. 29163, File WWII-5, Part 2.

their stockpiles which are of poor grade and at latest estimates, would not last very long – not more than a year.

Bangka and Billiton, small islands off the coast of Sumatra, produce four times the amount of tin which Japan needs. Sumatra is also valuable for the supply of rubber.³²

Norman's assessment of the island made clear it would be a prime target. Sumatra also acted as a Japanese central logistics hub in South-East Asia. Its reconquest "would represent a very heavy blow to Japan, probably more than any one island in the whole archipelago."³³

A July 1944 Magic Diplomatic Summary noted that "any Allied action that cuts off, or materially reduces, Japan's bauxite imports will have an immediate effect on her aluminium production. In turn this will lower her aircraft production within six months."³⁴ Action against Sumatra would thus significantly disrupt Japan's war machine.

Norman's memorandum supported the allied military strategy in the South-Pacific at the time. In late 1942, American General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, commenced the "island hopping" strategy. This strategy involved "bypass[ing] heavily fortified Japanese positions and instead concentrate[ing] the limited allied resources on strategically important islands that were not well defended but capable of supporting the drive to the main islands of Japan."³⁵ The allies blockaded and isolated Japanese military forces, ensuring Japan could not resupply and reinforce positions. On January 24 and 29, 1945 the British mounted Operations Meridian One and Meridian Two on the oil

³² Memorandum, "The Japanese in the Netherlands East Indies," sections marked "Secret," 16 October 1943, LAC, RG 24, Vol. 29163, File WWII-5, Part 3, 4.

³³ Memorandum, "The Japanese in the Netherlands East Indies," sections marked "Secret," 16 October 1943, LAC, RG 24, Vol. 29163, File WWII-5, Part 3, 4.

³⁴ Bruce Lee, *Marching Orders: The Untold Story of World War II* (New York, Da Capo Press: 2001), 234.

refineries on Palembang, Sumatra.³⁶ These attacks were successful; “critical aviation fuel output of these plants [was] reduced by seventy-five percent.”³⁷ Norman’s assessment of Sumatra’s oil production was proved correct.

Gilbert de B. Robinson, a mathematician and codebreaker at the XU, states that the intelligence community “came to depend on Norman’s summaries.”³⁸ Robinson also notes that SIS work based on “reports of Japanese diplomats from Europe and South America were of the greatest value in forming a picture of the progress of the war.”³⁹

In the United States, OSS was an “avid consumer.”⁴⁰ At the same time, access to SIS product was restricted; OSS officials were “permitted only to read them in [Lester B.] Pearson’s [embassy] office in Washington.”⁴¹ In return, OSS would share “certain weekly bulletins and other confidential research data, particularly on the Far East.”⁴² In the case of G2 (US military intelligence), SIS operated an informal sharing agreement that was designed to exchange intelligence to make “comparisons of method, particularly interpretation of material, etc.”⁴³

Canada shared SIS intelligence with Britain and it was sent via BSC. Arrangements were made between BSC and XU to establish a telekrypton (T/K) link, a secure radio communication system. The partners decided that “high grade material of current

³⁵ *Wikipedia*, s.v. “Island Hopping,” <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Island_hopping>.

³⁶ *Wikipedia*, s.v. “Operation Meridian,” <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Meridian>.

³⁷ *Wikipedia*, s.v. “Operation Meridian,” <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Meridian>.

³⁸ Gilbert deB. Robinson, “Strachey and Kendrick Periods,” 32.

³⁹ Gilbert deB. Robinson, “Strachey and Kendrick Periods,” 32.

⁴⁰ St. John, “Canada’s Accession to the Allied Intelligence Community,” 14.

⁴¹ St. John, “Canada’s Accession to the Allied Intelligence Community,” 14.

⁴² Memorandum, “Untitled,” Special Intelligence Section and intelligence sharing, sections marked “Most Secret,” 22 June 1943, LAC, RG 24, Vol. 29163, File WWII-5, Part 2.

⁴³ Memorandum, Special Intelligence Section and intelligence sharing.

intelligence value,” was to be sent by T/K, “while low grade material [would] come by bag.”⁴⁴ Sorting and organizing of the data would be completed by BSC.

In January 1945, as the war was coming to its conclusion, DEA closed SIS. Norman Robertson, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, acknowledges, “this small unit has fulfilled a very useful purpose, but in view of the fact that its work was no longer as essential as it had been and in view of the shortage of staff in this Department, I came to the conclusion that it would be wisest to draw it to an end.”⁴⁵ Norman and Hilborn returned to regular duties in the Department, however both continued reading and summarizing Japanese and Vichy French diplomatic traffic for External Affairs. The wartime creation of SIS marked the beginning of a greater intelligence role for the Department and of its work with SIGINT.

4.1 Interview Program Section

Continually since 1953, the Canadian government has operated a foreign intelligence program designed to collect HUMINT through debriefing of Canadians and others who go abroad. The Interview Program Section (ISIW) was once located in DND and, was transferred to External Affairs about thirty years ago. It still resides in what is now the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. There are very few references to the Program and its predecessors in academic, government or other publications.⁴⁶ The

⁴⁴ M. R. Oliver, “Unit Establishment,” in *A History of the Examination Unit, 1941-1945*, ed. Gilbert de B. Robinson, (1945), 76.

⁴⁵ Memorandum, “Untitled,” Disbanding of Special Intelligence Section, sections marked “Secret,” 11 January 1945, LAC, RG 24, Vol. 29167, File WWII-33.

⁴⁶ I found one sentence in a public source discussing the Interview Program Section; see Peter Russell, “Should Canada Establish a Foreign Intelligence Agency,” *A Paper Written for the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC)* (December 1988). The RCMP operated an interview program in the past, but it is not clear if

only article on the Interview Program is by a FSO, Kurt F. Jensen.⁴⁷ Jensen provides some understanding of why it is difficult to research the Interview Program. He indicated that it is “the method of collection [that] is sensitive, not the information itself, and the source needs protecting.”⁴⁸ Both the methods employed by the Department and information obtained are classified.⁴⁹

The Interview Program Section does not employ covert tactics to collect intelligence. It basically asks ordinary Canadians and others (others can be defectors, asylum seekers, immigrants or refugees, etc) to provide observations from their foreign travels, generally of a political, military, social, and scientific nature. The information collected from the interviewees is HUMINT and a form of gray intelligence collection - it “is neither entirely Open Source nor Clandestine in origin.”⁵⁰

The first discussion of debriefing ordinary people came at a JIC meeting in May 1948.⁵¹ At the meeting, it was proposed that the JIB might collect open source intelligence from “commercial firms, learned societies, libraries, and travellers.”⁵² On June 1, 1948, the JIB was authorized by the Chiefs of Staff Committee to do “some limited interviewing” of

it exists today. See preface in Jack L. Granatstein and David Stafford, *Spy Wars: Espionage and Canada from Gouzenko to Glasnost* (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1990).

⁴⁷ Kurt F. Jensen, “Canada’s Foreign Intelligence Interview Program, 1953-1990,” *Intelligence and National Security* 19, no. 1 (Summer 2004): 95-104. For a news media’s perspective on Jensen’s paper, see, Stewart Bell, “Ottawa has used citizens as spies abroad since 1953: It’s not advertised,” *National Post*, September 25, 2002, A1.

⁴⁸ Kurt F. Jensen, interview with author, December 8, 2003, Ottawa, Ontario.

⁴⁹ During the analysis of the Department’s organizational charts there was no description found of ISIW or its predecessors in the annual reports.

⁵⁰ Kurt F. Jensen, “Toward a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service,” *Bout de Papier* 22, no. 2 (2006): 22.

⁵¹ Jensen, “Canada’s Foreign Intelligence Interview Program,” 97.

⁵² Jensen, “Canada’s Foreign Intelligence Interview Program,” 97.

foreign travellers.⁵³ JIB only debriefed immigrants, defectors, and some Canadian citizens for socio-political and economic information on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.⁵⁴

In March 1951, again at a JIC meeting, member organizations discussed the creation of a permanent fulltime structure for debriefing but no actions were instigated. In August 1951 an allied intelligence agency approached George Glazebrook, the chairman of JIC and head of DL2, for information collected from “immigrants, defectors and others in Canada.”⁵⁵ Shortly after, Canada created a permanent debriefing program.

The organizing of such a program began in March 1952. Allied countries encouraged the Canadian government “to proceed with establishing an interview organization to facilitate a greater exchange of intelligence, highlighting the considerable intelligence value which existed from such relatively overt intelligence gathering.”⁵⁶ Allied countries had been debriefing foreign travellers and defectors since World War II. For instance, the CIA had a similar structure. In June 1952, General Charles Foulkes, Chairman of Canada’s Chiefs of Staff Committee, met with the American Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), Walter Beddell Smith, to inform him that Canada was in the process of establishing a permanent debriefing organization. Details of the liaison arrangements with the United States, for this unit, were to be worked out.⁵⁷

⁵³ Jensen, “Canada’s Foreign Intelligence Interview Program,” 97.

⁵⁴ Jensen, “Canada’s Foreign Intelligence Interview Program,” 97.

⁵⁵ Jensen, “Canada’s Foreign Intelligence Interview Program,” 97. Jensen did not identify which allied agency approached the JIC, but it is very likely that it was the CIA.

⁵⁶ Jensen, “Canada’s Foreign Intelligence Interview Program,” 98.

⁵⁷ Jensen, “Canada’s Foreign Intelligence Interview Program,” 98.

The JIC presented a proposal for establishing what was described as an “Interrogation Organization.”⁵⁸ Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent, opposed the use of the term “interrogation” for the new unit.⁵⁹ The word “interrogation” implied the use of coercive tactics to force individuals into providing information. The name was quickly changed to “Interview Organization.” In April 1953, an order-in-council established the new unit and placed it in the JIB.⁶⁰

The JIB however did not control planning and direction for the Interview Program. The policy direction and guidance initially came from the Chiefs of Staff Committee. In 1960 the policy direction responsibility would shift to the Privy Council Office’s Intelligence Policy Committee.⁶¹ This change had a significant affect on the Interview Program’s mandate. The original mandate dictated that it would focus on defectors and immigrants from Communist countries, and those who had “backgrounds of particular interest and had left their country of origin less than three years earlier.”⁶² After 1960, the mandate included interviewing Canadians in general who had travelled to Communist countries.

The Interview Program identified Canadian citizens who were going abroad through a unique situation. Canadian citizens often approached government departments (including External Affairs) for travel information. This was a time when the West knew very little about the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. In 1961, the government authorized briefings of Canadians who were going to travel abroad.⁶³ Canadian travellers

⁵⁸ Jensen, “Canada’s Foreign Intelligence Interview Program,” 98.

⁵⁹ Jensen, “Canada’s Foreign Intelligence Interview Program,” 98.

⁶⁰ Jensen, “Canada’s Foreign Intelligence Interview Program,” 98.

⁶¹ Jensen, “Canada’s Foreign Intelligence Interview Program,” 98.

⁶² Jensen, “Canada’s Foreign Intelligence Interview Program,” 98.

⁶³ Jensen, “Canada’s Foreign Intelligence Interview Program,” 99.

often requested information about commercial, industrial, scientific, historical, cultural and political matters.⁶⁴ Occasionally, the RCMP would also provide information in order to help protect people from being compromised by Soviet intelligence and its allies.⁶⁵

How did the Interview Program recruit people? Individuals were not coerced, induced with money or promised assistance in the future.⁶⁶ They volunteered, after being approached or they themselves approached the Interview Program to share their information. At first, the Interview Program usually approached individuals, by letter, after the people had travelled abroad, asking whether they would meet with one of its members. The letter indicated the information the traveller provided would be “used only in the interests of national security.”⁶⁷ Jensen indicates that “for various reasons this was not a good way to make contact and the letters were discontinued.”⁶⁸ In other instances, émigré groups “spontaneously contact[ed] the Interview Program to offer their assistance.”⁶⁹ Many of these people did not support the policies of their former countries.

What types of people were interviewed? Initially, the unit chose only to interview engineers, technicians, business people, academics and scientists. Later it realized that anyone travelling abroad might have useful information for the government. Would be recruits were generally agreeable to provide information; “there were relatively few

⁶⁴ Jensen, “Canada’s Foreign Intelligence Interview Program,” 99.

⁶⁵ Jensen, “Canada’s Foreign Intelligence Interview Program,” 99.

⁶⁶ Jensen, “Canada’s Foreign Intelligence Interview Program,” 99.

⁶⁷ Jensen, “Canada’s Foreign Intelligence Interview Program,” 100.

⁶⁸ Kurt F. Jensen, e-mail to author, February 24, 2005.

⁶⁹ Jensen, “Canada’s Foreign Intelligence Interview Program,” 100.

instances of refusals to assist.”⁷⁰ Interestingly, people were often pleased that the government regarded their observation as of high importance.

The Interview Program would select 150 to 200 people annually who were deemed qualified as observers, and had experience in a subject matter or had visited a specific country, particularly Communist countries such as the Soviet Union, Cuba, or China.⁷¹ These countries were closed societies and the Canadian government had very little knowledge about the internal workings of these countries. General cultural, economic, political and societal information that is available in the West was difficult to find in these countries. Interviewees were selected on the basis of the type of information they could provide to the Program.⁷² Moreover, the interviewers would take into account such aspects as education, employment and military service.⁷³

Were the same people interviewed more than once? It seems the Interview Program did not conform to a single formula. In most instances people were only debriefed once because they had no other opportunity (i.e. only travelled once) to gain access to additional information of interest. Some people were debriefed on more than a single occasion, if they had consistent access to information (for example, regularly visiting a specific country of interest to Canadian government) or gained access to some other information of interest.

For short period in 1958 the Interview Program also made contact with potential interviewees before they travelled. The Program staff advised the prospective travellers to

⁷⁰ Jensen, “Canada’s Foreign Intelligence Interview Program,” 100.

⁷¹ Jensen, “Canada’s Foreign Intelligence Interview Program,” 100.

⁷² Jensen, “Canada’s Foreign Intelligence Interview Program,” 100.

⁷³ Jensen, “Canada’s Foreign Intelligence Interview Program,” 100.

respect the customs and laws of the country but asked them to pay attention to particular areas or matters of interest to the government. They were not asked to use intelligence collection devices or to take photographs, make sketches, or take notes that were not related to their visit. Such actions could have aroused suspicion and jeopardised the individual's visit or work in the country at that time or in the future.⁷⁴ Nevertheless, the Interview Program needed to inform senior External Affairs officials and receive approval before any contact was made with an individual.⁷⁵ Jensen states that use of these pre-visit briefings was short-lived because "the danger of sending untrained observers into hostile areas with specific intelligence collection requirements is self-evident."⁷⁶

The Interview Program was relatively prolific, although the quantity of reports it produced varied based on the time period and the subject matter in question. Jensen notes one estimate that between 1953 and 1965, 455 reports were produced about the Soviet Union and China.⁷⁷ Other documentation suggests that the Program produced over 500 reports in general during 1960-1965.⁷⁸ For example, one interviewee who specialized in electro-chemistry provided information that led to no less than eleven reports totalling 215 pages.⁷⁹ People with such specialized areas of expertise presumably were of significant importance to government officials and intelligence agencies.

The Interview Program underwent structural changes in the latter 1960s. Until 1966, the JIB had been located in DND. The Pearson government decided to amalgamate

⁷⁴ Jensen, "Canada's Foreign Intelligence Interview Program," 99.

⁷⁵ Jensen, "Canada's Foreign Intelligence Interview Program," 99.

⁷⁶ Jensen, "Canada's Foreign Intelligence Interview Program," 99.

⁷⁷ Jensen, "Canada's Foreign Intelligence Interview Program," 101.

⁷⁸ Jensen, "Canada's Foreign Intelligence Interview Program," 101.

⁷⁹ Jensen, "Canada's Foreign Intelligence Interview Program," 101.

various DND divisions as a part of the unification of the Canadian Forces (CF). The integration of the army, navy and air force into one combined force also affected the three service intelligence divisions, JIB and other intelligence organizations. The newly formed DND intelligence organization was headed by a Director General, Intelligence (DGI). JIB personnel resented the restructuring because they had a broad intelligence mandate which extended beyond DND.

On April 1, 1968 the JIB was moved to External Affairs, as was the Interview Program.⁸⁰ Once there, the JIB was renamed the Special Research Bureau (SRB) and operated as a “separate entity” of the Security and Intelligence Liaison Division.⁸¹ The Interview Program was renamed at this time, becoming the “Domestic Contact Section,” and was attached to the SRB. Of the fifty-six personnel at SRB, five officers “constituted the Domestic Contact Section.”⁸² In 1979, the Interview Program became a part of the Intelligence Analysis Division (IAD) and the rest of the Bureau was integrated into the intelligence division.⁸³ These changes occurred as part of a restructuring of security and intelligence duties for the External Affairs. As Jensen claims, External Affairs wanted to end SRB’s “autonomous status” within the Department and to be able to influence the Interview Program.⁸⁴ Nevertheless, the most radical change for the Interview Program came in 1985, when the Department reorganized the intelligence structures again and formed the Foreign

⁸⁰ Jensen, “Canada’s Foreign Intelligence Interview Program,” 102.

⁸¹ Jensen, “Canada’s Foreign Intelligence Interview Program,” 102.

⁸² Jensen, “Canada’s Foreign Intelligence Interview Program,” 102.

⁸³ Jensen, “Canada’s Foreign Intelligence Interview Program,” 103. The name of the main intelligence structure was Bureau of Intelligence Analysis and Security.

⁸⁴ Jensen, “Canada’s Foreign Intelligence Interview Program,” 103.

Intelligence Bureau. Under this new Bureau the Interview Program became a separate directorate, for the first time not connected to any other unit.⁸⁵

After the Program was moved to DEA, its operations did not undergo any radical changes, at least until the 1980s. The staff level remained the same, about five to six interview officers. The Interview Program still targeted Communist countries and later other countries viewed as closed societies were added.⁸⁶ Significant changes to the Interview Program's mandate did come until the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellite states after 1989.

Since its creation in 1953, the Interview Program has weathered political storms, departmental budget cuts and repeated restructurings. It has also adapted to radical changes in the international system such as the end of the Cold War. Jensen acknowledges that "the Interview Program...had to reinvent itself" to assure its survival for the future.⁸⁷ Its ability to collect useful specialized gray HUMINT for the Department, intelligence community and allies presumably helped protect it from more fundamental restructuring and disbanding.

No operational case studies of the Interview Program in action can be found in the public domain. A CIA debriefing program called Operation Redskin can however be used as an example of how the Interview Program may have operated and employed ordinary citizens to collect Humint. In 1953, the British and Canadian air attachés were the first Westerners to see and report the development of new the Soviet Tupolev TU-4 long-range

⁸⁵ Jensen, "Canada's Foreign Intelligence Interview Program," 103.

⁸⁶ Jensen, "Canada's Foreign Intelligence Interview Program," 103.

⁸⁷ Jensen, "Canada's Foreign Intelligence Interview Program," 103.

bomber.⁸⁸ The US and its allies continued a coordinated effort to observe strategic Soviet military locations and equipment. David Owen, author of *Hidden Secrets*, states that CIA used these sightings and others to implement Operation Redskin, a debriefing operation.⁸⁹ This operation provided “nondiplomatic visitors from the West with a list of things to watch for on the other side of the Iron Curtain.”⁹⁰ These individuals did not need to change their travel itineraries or make contact with particular people, but were asked to make notes on “the color of the smoke from a particular factory chimney, or the registration letters of the airplane on which they flew.”⁹¹ As the Soviet Union began easing travel restrictions on visitors, the CIA expanded these operations.⁹² Owen claims that Operation Redskin was a successful program; for example, it produced detailed reports about surface-to-air missile sites, intercontinental ballistic missile sites and military production factories.⁹³ The Interview Program was likely modelled on the success of Operation Redskin or similar operations, given that it employed similar methods.

Little is known about the technical aspects of the Interview Program, especially the operational methods used to extract information from interviewees and the necessary skills of interviewers. Some relevant information can be gleaned from a declassified *Studies of Intelligence* document on debriefing, and another document on interrogation methods.⁹⁴ The former, a CIA paper, discusses a joint debriefing of a Cuban defector. An article on

⁸⁸ David Owen, *Hidden Secrets* (Toronto: Firefly Books Ltd, 2002), 70.

⁸⁹ Owen, *Hidden Secrets*, 71.

⁹⁰ Owen, *Hidden Secrets*, 71.

⁹¹ Owen, *Hidden Secrets*, 71.

⁹² Owen, *Hidden Secrets*, 71.

⁹³ Owen, *Hidden Secrets*, 71.

interrogation describes the uses and failures of torture and lists the necessary skills of an interrogator. Some of this information can be applied to understand the operations of the Interview Program.

B. E. Layton states that interview sessions follow particular patterns before, during and after the meeting. Prior to beginning any debriefing a background check is essential to ensure that the session will deal with the interviewee's knowledge.⁹⁵ Next the interviewer develops a set of questions that follows a logical pattern to the end of the session, and "[beginning] with more technical subjects and [concluding] with more general [ones]."⁹⁶ Organizing the session in this way allows the interviewee to answer questions first relating to a topic with which he or she is most familiar. These may then enhance greater cooperation and allow questions in other areas.⁹⁷ After the interview session the raw information is analyzed and disseminated.

Debriefing of defectors, the CIA notes, should occur as soon as possible; a prolonged wait likely reduces the value of the information gained.⁹⁸ "A person who has some special knowledge gained from travel, from residence in a foreign country, or perhaps from an interest in some esoteric branch of the arts or science" may be able to identify what might

⁹⁴ B. E. Layton, "The Joint Debriefing of a Cuban," *Studies in Intelligence* 7 (Summer 1963): 57-61; and William R. Johnson, "Tricks of the Trade: Counterintelligence Interrogation," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, (Summer 1986): 103-113.

⁹⁵ Layton, "The Joint Debriefing of a Cuban," 58.

⁹⁶ Layton, "The Joint Debriefing of a Cuban," 59.

⁹⁷ Layton, "The Joint Debriefing of a Cuban," 59.

⁹⁸ Layton, "The Joint Debriefing of a Cuban," 59.

otherwise be unidentified in, for example, aerial photography.⁹⁹ Interviews can thus complement and assist other types of intelligence collection.

The necessary skills of an interview officer are somewhat equivalent to an interrogator, minus the ability to use force to collect information. William R. Johnson lists four skills that make good interrogators: experience in analysis of file material, a working knowledge of psychology, understanding of themselves and their own emotions, and patience.¹⁰⁰ All of these skills most likely apply to an interview officer. Johnson states that an “interrogator, like a priest or doctor, must have a talent for empathy, a personal need to communicate with other people, a concern for what makes other people tick.”¹⁰¹ Knowing how to deal with people’s emotions creates a bond of trust and allows the interview officer to obtain information more easily.

4.2 Conclusion

In conclusion, the Interview Program’s proven ability to collect foreign HUMINT over half a century has contributed to Canadian foreign intelligence collection and analysis. It has done so for a relatively small cost since the Program has remained relatively small in size. Development of the Interview Program, and likely its operations, reflect Canada’s involvement in international intelligence cooperation and liaison arrangements.

These two case studies show that the Department of External Affairs has long been actively involved in foreign intelligence work. In the case of SIS, the Department provided personnel and direction in the operation of the unit. The Interview Program was initially

⁹⁹ Dino A. Brugioni, “The Unidentifieds,” in *Inside CIA’s Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency’s Internal Journal, 1955-1992*, ed. Bradford Westerfield, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 10.

¹⁰⁰ Johnson, “Tricks of the Trade: Counterintelligence Interrogation,” 105.

¹⁰¹ Johnson, “Tricks of the Trade: Counterintelligence Interrogation,” 105.

established outside of External Affairs but later incorporated and operated as one of its units. Both structures were created with the Department's support and, to some extent, under operational control or influence.

Both the SIS and Interview Program were also intelligence structures established to support not only Canada's but also its allies' intelligence needs. While the Examination Unit was originally created during World War II, it survived the end of the war. As noted in Chapter 2, its successor, the Communications Branch of the National Research Council (which in turn became the Communications Security Establishment or CSE), was a key player in the so-called "UKUSA" agreement and thus part of the Western intelligence effort aiming its attention at the Soviet Union. That cooperative Cold War effort yielded one of its most significant successes in the "Venona" operation.¹⁰² At least one analyst has observed that "Canadian traffic analysts are believed to have made a valuable contribution to the overall operation."¹⁰³ The following chapter will describe some of the Department's intelligence operations abroad.

¹⁰² On Venona, see Norman Polmar and Thomas B Allen, *Spy Book: The Encyclopaedia of Espionage* (New York: Random, 1998), 575-8.

¹⁰³ West, *The SIGINT Secrets*, 259.

You can call it spying if you want, but it's not, it's not, it's not.

-James Eayrs¹

Chapter Five: Collecting Intelligence Abroad

In many conventional views of international affairs, foreign intelligence operations and international diplomatic processes seem to represent different worlds. As noted in Chapter One, however, the reality is that most if not all countries conduct not only covert, but also gray foreign intelligence operations through their embassies. Espionage and diplomacy are not the polar opposites they are often assumed to be. Indeed, some of the basic tasks involved are not at all dissimilar. Countries send intelligence officers from foreign intelligence agencies abroad to gather intelligence, and provide them with “official cover” in diplomatic positions. Foreign ministry personnel also gather information abroad, and do so using many but not all of the same techniques used by intelligence officers. The Global Security Reporting Program (GSRP) mentioned in Chapter 2 is an example of present day diplomatic foreign intelligence gathering program.

Canada’s Department of External Affairs and its current successor, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, are no exception. They have used Canadian posts abroad to collect foreign intelligence, often to be shared with Canada’s allies. Given Canada’s lack of an intelligence agency specializing in HUMINT, much intelligence collection was done by diplomats, most of it limited to non-clandestine/gray intelligence operations. (Military attachés are also posted to many Canadian missions abroad (as noted in Chapter

Two) but the focus here is on the activities of the diplomats.) In short, the Department's intelligence collection work was not confined to activities carried out at home, such as those of Herbert Norman's SIS and the Interview Program.

It is not possible to survey the Department's foreign intelligence activity or to show its full extent. The documentary evidence is simply not available to do so and the secrecy of these operations probably ensures there is little confirming evidence. This chapter thus aims to provide examples of Canadian operations abroad in order to suggest what was done. It will provide two studies as examples of External Affairs' approach to and methods of foreign intelligence collection in the field. These two case studies illustrate Canadian willingness to cooperate in the collection and sharing of foreign intelligence with its allies. The first focuses on operations conducted in the former French Indochina (Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam) while Canada was a member of the International Commissions for Supervision and Control (ICSC) following the Geneva Accords of 1954. The other case study examines intelligence operations conducted out of the Canadian embassy in Cuba in the 1960s.²

5.0 Canada and the International Commissions for Supervision and Control

In the aftermath of World War II France attempted to reassert itself as a colonial power in the world and specifically in French Indochina. However, France was unable to win its colonial war and on July 20, 1954, signed the Geneva Accords, ending the so-called First Indochina War. The Accords created three International Commissions for Supervision

¹ James Eayrs, telephone interview by author, July 25, 2003.

² The two case studies will both rely on existing secondary sources rather than original archive documents. The ICSC case is drawn principally from James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada - Indochina: Roots of Complicity* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983) and the Cuba case is drawn from Don Munton, "Our Men in Havana: Washington and Canadian Intelligence on Castro's Cuba, 1959-1963" (paper presented, 2002

and Control (ICSC), one each for what are now called Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, to supervise the peace and ensure the signatories were complying with the stipulations.³ The Commissions were not expected to enforce the cease-fire or provide military forces to impose peace.

Three members of the ICSC were designated: India, Poland and Canada.⁴ India was made the chair because of its non-aligned status in international affairs, while Poland and Canada were chosen to represent the Soviet bloc and the Western alliance, respectively. None of Canada's allies officially proposed its nomination; the Chinese foreign minister, Chou En-lai, nominated Canada, instead of the alternative, Belgium, to the Commissions, and his suggestion was accepted⁵

The ICSC were not under the control of or subordinate to the UN. At the time, the Canadian government believed, or claimed, "participation will be fully in harmony with our responsibilities as a member of the world organization."⁶ The role of ICSC, Ottawa noted, was to act in a "solely supervisory, judicial, and mediatory" capacity as a go between for the parties involved.⁷

Robert A. Mackay, acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, sent a letter of instruction to the Canadian representatives traveling to the initial ICSC meetings on July 28, 1954. The letter not only provides details about inspection teams, language, finance

Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) Conference, Ottawa, Ontario, September 29, 2002) (soon to be an article). Both of these sources utilized primary documents.

³ The Geneva Accords required France to cease military activities in Indochina, grant the region independence, and allow free elections to occur.

⁴ Diplomats that served on ICSC have written a book about their experiences, see Arthur E. Blanchette, ed., *Canadian Peacekeepers in Indochina: 1954-1973*, (Kemptville: Golden Dog Press, 2002).

⁵ Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, 49.

⁶ *External Affairs*, "Indochina - Membership on International Commission," (August 1954): 258.

and other matters but also explains the role of the Canadian delegation. Mackay emphasized what the Department referred to as “judicial impartiality.”

While it will no doubt be assumed - and correctly - that Canada's representatives on the three Commissions will reflect a Western outlook in their approach to the problems which the Commissions will have to solve, it is important that they should at all times do their utmost to maintain an attitude of judicial impartiality in the performance of their duties. In particular, it would seem to be imperative that we should impress upon the Indians our attitude of objectivity and fairness so that, when the Commissions have important decisions to take, we could hope that they would give our views serious and favourable consideration, particularly when majority reports will have to be submitted to the Geneva powers.

While we do expect to keep our friends and allies, when appropriate, informed of the work of the Commissions, we do not intend thereby to let them direct our decisions. Moreover, in accepting to participate, we have not taken it upon ourselves to favour any cause or interest, other than seeing to it that the Geneva Agreements are properly executed. In the circumstances, every reasonable effort should be made to avoid giving the impression of partiality in the performance of your duties.⁸

The stance of “judicial impartiality,” however much it was assumed in the early years of the ICSC work, would become harder and harder to maintain by the latter 1950s. The Canadian government at first had been very reluctant to join ICSC. The *New York Times* headline, reported on its front page, was “Canada Cautious on Indochina.”⁹ The government was concerned with whether ICSC was going to fail from the outset and if unanimity was needed for all decisions.¹⁰ The Canadian government made a valid argument that acceptance of ICSC membership would create a strain on the limited personnel available from both DEA and DND, taking into consideration the fact that Canada had

⁷ “Indochina - Membership on International Commission”

⁸ Letter, “Instructions to Canadian Representatives to the New Delhi Meetings in Indochina,” sections marked “Confidential,” July 28, 1954, in Vol. 20 of *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, ed. Greg Donaghy (Ottawa, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1997), <<http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/department/history/dcer/details-en.asp?intRefId=910>>.

⁹ Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, 53.

existing military commitments in Korea and Western Europe. At the same time, the government was greatly worried how the United States would react to Canada's possible ICSC membership.¹¹

Prior to Canada's acceptance of membership on July 27, 1954, the Canadian Ambassador to the United States, A. D. P. Heeney, went to the State Department to inform the Americans that the Canadian ICSC delegation would provide intelligence collected in the field.¹² The Canadian government's actions were, as Eayrs states, an attempt "to induce the US administration to become more supportive than it then seemed to be of Canada's acceptance."¹³ Pearson told Heeney to emphasize that any intelligence provided to the Americans should not be discussed in the public; otherwise Canada "would have to reconsider the whole policy of passing on information to the United States."¹⁴

Canadian officials thus collected and shared intelligence with the United States and other allies from the outset of its involvement with the ICSC. What is not clear from the available documents is when Canada's intelligence and liaison operations ended. The ICSC continued to exist through the 1960s, although it was greatly hampered by the ongoing American stage of the war and had become virtually ineffectual. The Commission eventually ceased to operate in 1972. There is no doubt, therefore, that Canada had ended its intelligence operations from within the ICSC by that point if not earlier.

The United States became involved in Indochina in September 1950 when it sent a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) to advise French forces struggling against the

¹⁰ Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, 53.

¹¹ Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, 53.

¹² Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, 242.

¹³ Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, 242.

communist supported “Viet Minh.” At the time, the basic American approach to dealing with the perceived threat of communism was its foreign policy strategy of ‘Containment’ -- preventing the spread of communism to other countries through political and military support. After the defeat of French forces in 1954, the US began to support South Vietnam against the North, beginning what became known in the United States as “the Vietnam War.” Eventually, as is well known, US involvement evolved from military training to full combat operations. A prime rationale was the so-called “domino theory” which held that, should South Vietnam be taken over by communist North Vietnam, then all of the countries of Southeast Asia would, in turn, like dominoes, fall to communism. The evident American concern about developments, especially in Vietnam, during the 1950s, made Washington interested in whatever intelligence Canada could provide from its vantage point on the Commissions.

What types of intelligence collection did Canada employ in Indochina? The Canadian ICSC delegation largely collected HUMINT during their inspection work, and much of it of the “gray intelligence” variety. The representatives used similar methods to those used by other diplomats and attachés, such as observing military positions and operations and interviewing people in the field. Although Canadian SIGINT operations during World War II had focused in part on Indochina, as it was then a French colony under the control of the Vichy government (see Chapter Three), there is no information suggesting the Communications Branch of the National Research Council (CBNRC) conducted any post-

¹⁴ Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, 242-243.

World War II operations in Indochina. There is also no evidence in the public domain of any “embassy collection” operations there.

Both DEA and DND provided personnel for the Canadian ICSC delegations. The first Canadian commissioner was Brigadier Sherwood Lett. The Canadian Commissioner in the mid-1960s was James Blair Seaborn, a senior foreign service officer.¹⁵ While many External Affairs personnel served on the Canadian delegation, the inspection teams consisted mostly of military officers because the technical nature of much of the work required that expertise. In the early years of the ICSC, Commission personnel travelled throughout Indochina to observe the actions of the signatories to the Geneva Accords and assess compliance.¹⁶

As indicated in Chapter Two, military attachés usually collect intelligence on behalf of governments. The Canadian military personnel in Indochina, however, were not formally attachés as they were part of the Canadian delegation to the international commissions.

5.1 Sharing Indochina Intelligence

Robert MacKay’s letter of instruction to the Canadian ICSC delegation also contained a section entitled “Reporting,” which explained that the Canadian ICSC delegation was to collect and provide “intelligence” to Canada’s allies:

In sending reports on the New Delhi meetings, and subsequently from Saigon, you should bear in mind our obligation and desire to keep the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, the United States and France informed. To simplify our task in this

¹⁵ Indeed, some estimates are that one-third of Canada’s foreign service officers ultimately participated in the ICSC.

¹⁶ The author asked Seaborn about the structure of the Canadian ICSC delegation. He indicated that “I just had a handful of civilians from External Affairs and most of [the delegation] were military. Most of the staff, I guess seventy to seventy-five percent or more, were military officers, most of them scattered ... in teams around South Vietnam and North Vietnam” (James Blair Seaborn, interview with author, December 8, 2003, Ottawa, Ontario).

regard, it might be helpful if you were to send reports in a form which could be shown to these Governments. Please inform us what information has been given to the local representatives of these Governments. Any further comment which you might wish to add of a more restricted nature might be sent in a supplementary telegram marked "for Canadian eyes only". We are studying the possibility of setting up a separate series of communications along the lines of CRO Circular telegrams which would facilitate the transmission of information on the Indochina operation to our friends, and will notify you of any procedural changes in communications which might be required in this connection.¹⁷

This section of the letter makes clear the Department explicitly authorized providing intelligence. It identifies the consumers of Canada's intelligence, and confirms that it would be provided to these countries either directly from the delegation or from DEA headquarters. The countries mentioned (except France) are, of course, the members of the UKUSA intelligence agreement (see Chapter Three).

Blair Seaborn has confirmed some information found in this letter. "Some of [the intelligence] was passed through Ottawa...[and] there was a lot of sharing, largely because of the fact that through the Commission we had to make regular trips to North Vietnam. Therefore, [we] had physical access to see what was happening in that country, which the Americans did not have, unless they had agents up there."¹⁸

There is very little mention in official documents of intelligence-sharing with allies other than the United States. Eayrs' cites one External Affairs memorandum marked, "Passed to UK-US-Australian agencies by JIB" – a rare case of unambiguous evidence of intelligence-sharing.¹⁹ There is also evidence from Australian documents of Canada's intelligence-sharing with the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), that country's

¹⁷ "Instructions to Canadian Representatives to the New Delhi Meetings in Indochina."

¹⁸ Seaborn, interview.

¹⁹ Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, 248.

agency specializing in HUMINT. Toohey and Pinwill claim “the major business conducted between ASIS and the Canadians centred on the acquisition of Canadian reports on North Vietnam in the early 1960s. These were reports produced discreetly by Canadian members of the International Control Commission.”²⁰ They thus suggest that the ICSC exchange represented the main focus of the liaison between Canada and the ASIS. (Canadian and Australian SIGINT agencies had their own liaison under the UKUSA agreement.)

Eayrs also notes that the intelligence-sharing was not one-way. The Americans willingly shared intelligence with the Canadians from the beginning of the operation in Indochina.²¹ When DEA approached the State Department for intelligence information it replied, “[it] would be glad to make available post reports and like information.”²² Eayrs claims the intelligence provided to DEA was to assist the Canadian commissioners and “argue the United States’ case within the three Indochina commissions.”²³

The Department passed three types of intelligence to the allies. The first type related to commission activities that provided an “insider's knowledge of the state of play within ICSC Vietnam, ICSC Laos and ICSC Cambodia.”²⁴ Eayrs believes that the American government saw a great importance in this form of intelligence because “[its] programs for training armed forces in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos attracted the critical attention of the communists,” and eventually came under the microscope of ICSC.²⁵ Information from the Canadian delegation could have warned the Americans of impending discussion within the

²⁰ Brian Toohey and William Pinwill, *Oyster: The Story of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service* (Port Melbourne, Victoria: Mandarin Australia, 1990), 86.

²¹ Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, 249.

²² Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, 249.

²³ Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, 249.

²⁴ Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, 243.

Commissions and allowed them to prepare for any criticism about their actions in Indochina.

The second form of intelligence related to conditions in the area, but particularly in North Vietnam. Seaborn says, "the Americans obviously were interested in whether I could tell them, or what other people there could tell them, about the economy, the political situation."²⁶ North Vietnam was a closed society, and thus it was difficult to obtain such information. The ICSC members, however, could collect important information, for example, about the morale in the north.²⁷ A Canadian ICSC representative provided intelligence to the Americans in Hanoi about Vietminh actions of preventing emigration, and the "deliberate obstructive tactics in order to delay the Commission team until they had dispersed refugees."²⁸

The third form of intelligence was military-oriented. Part of the Canadian delegation's duty was to "supervise and inspect the rotation of units and groups of personnel and the arrival and departure of personnel as authorized [by the *Geneva Accords*]."²⁹ Seaborn claims that "[Canadian military personnel] had some opportunities to certainly observe what was happening; that was one of their jobs, to know if there were guns coming in or other violations of the cease-fire agreement, and in due course undoubtedly sharing it with other allies, the co-chairman and probably the United States as

²⁵ Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, 244.

²⁶ Seaborn, interview.

²⁷ Seaborn, interview.

²⁸ Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, 245.

²⁹ *Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam*, July 20, 1954, <<http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/genevacc.htm>>.

well.”³⁰ Pearson assured the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, that “Canadian military officers on the Commission had been secretly instructed to take advantage of every opportunity for observing military preparations or activities in Vietminh territory.”³¹

Information also came from non-military personnel. The head of the Canadian medical services in South Vietnam would later note that:

Back in the summer of 1965 we would give the Americans any tidbits we picked up - anything we thought of importance to the Americans we would tell them. When the Americans bombed oil storage tanks outside Hanoi we had a delegation in Hanoi who took a number of pictures on the ground of the oil tanks being blasted by American planes....often information I supplied was passed on.³²

Eayrs maintains that military intelligence was the most important form for the Americans, given their role in training and equipping military forces in South Vietnam and later their direct military involvement.³³

Military officers in the Canadian delegation produced the *Monthly Intelligence Review*, which contained information collected from inspection missions. This review reported on a wide variety of information. For example, a “[Canadian] member in Pakse reports that the airfield there is being enlarged. He also advises that the Laotian Navy have three small craft moored in the river at Pakse...One of the craft mounts a 50 calibre machine gun.”³⁴

The Americans occasionally requested specific types of intelligence. In May 1956, for example, the State Department asked Canadian officials for information on the ICSC’s

³⁰ Seaborn, interview.

³¹ Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, 245.

³² Alje Vennema, “Why didn’t we speak out,” *Canadian Commentator* 15 (Jul-Aug 1971): 7.

³³ Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, 245.

³⁴ Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, 248.

awareness of the arrival in North Vietnam of Chinese, Czech and East German military technicians and “whether the Commission had received reports of the movement of military personnel into the Chinese and Soviet embassies in Hanoi.”³⁵ In another case, the CIA asked if it could debrief Commission members returning from their tour of duty in Indochina.³⁶ Ambassador Heeney supported the American proposal, but the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Jules Léger, did not. He responded, “we would prefer...to continue the policy of not permitting CIA direct access to our officers or to military personnel.”³⁷ Eayrs notes that there were however “exceptions to the rule.”³⁸ And Ottawa was apparently less concerned about other American agencies. In November of 1956 a former Commissioner for ICSC Laos was debriefed by the State Department.³⁹ Eayrs notes that several years later the policy changed unofficially, and “one CIA officer...used to come regularly to Ottawa specifically to talk with returning ICC members.”⁴⁰

The Canadian officials with the ICSC assumed the other members of the Commissions, particularly the Poles, were not only aware of Canadians actions but also were themselves conducting similar operations. “I think they perfectly well knew what we were doing,” notes Blair Seaborn.⁴¹ Similarly, “the Poles were keeping an eye on any information they could pick up on South Vietnam which might be of interest to Moscow.

³⁵ Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, 244.

³⁶ Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, 248.

³⁷ Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, 248.

³⁸ Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, 248-248.

³⁹ Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, 249. Eayrs does not mention the name of this individual, but it was most likely either Paul A. Bridle or perhaps Léon Mayrand. Mayrand was the Commissioner for Laos from 1954 to 1955. Bridle’s tour of duty lasted until 1956.

⁴⁰ Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, 249.

⁴¹ Seaborn, interview

We certainly knew that, but we just did not talk about it," adds Seaborn.⁴² "We had enough wrangling about the Commission."⁴³

Douglas Ross, author of *In the Interests of Peace: Canada and Vietnam 1954-1973*, provides a different interpretation of the Canadian intelligence operations in Indochina. While he barely mentions the intelligence aspects of the Canadian participation in the ICSC, he does acknowledge intelligence collection and sharing did occur. The Canadian personnel on both "mobile" and "fixed" teams, he notes, could collect information on North Vietnamese (Democratic Republic of Vietnam or DRVN) troop deployments and weapons capabilities. Ross, however, minimizes these activities.

First, he claims the Canadian intelligence was only "marginally significant."⁴⁴ Second, he emphasizes the limitations on the actual intelligence collected during the ICSC work:

Considering the obstruction and deception such investigations always encountered, it is doubtful if information of particular significance was ever obtained. The DRVN 'guided tours' were invariably unproductive. Much more could be learned from May Day parades and laudatory articles in the DRVN press about the 'vigilant,' capable units of the [People's Army of Vietnam] PAVN.⁴⁵

Ross fails to mention here that the delegation had considerable access to North Vietnam, something the Americans did not have. Moreover, the Canadian delegation would photograph bomb damaged areas, locations of strategic equipment, buildings, roads, bridges and storage facilities. This information was strategic intelligence and had significant value to support the American war.

5.2 Controversy regarding Indochina Intelligence Sharing

⁴² Seaborn, interview

⁴³ Seaborn, interview.

⁴⁴ Douglas A. Ross, *In the Interests of Peace Canada and Vietnam, 1954-1973* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), 208.

When *The Globe and Mail* eventually uncovered the Canadian delegation's secret operations, in July 1965, the newspaper reported that the Americans changed their policies and tactics based on Canadian reports in North Vietnam.⁴⁶ Two years later, *The Montreal Star* provided further information and claimed that Canadian officials in ICSC were “functioning as spies when they were supposed to be serving as international civil servants.”⁴⁷ The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) alleged that the US embassy in Saigon received reports before they were being sent to Ottawa for analysis.⁴⁸

Ross questions these criticisms, arguing that the idea of objectivity “was a myth peculiar to Canadian journalists and left-liberal systemist [sic] academics.”⁴⁹ He also argues that “all Canadians were instructed to exhibit great care in not compromising publicly in any way their self-declared status as impartial, objective observers in Indochina.”⁵⁰

Despite the evidence, the government held to the longstanding claims. Both Prime Minister Pearson and the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Paul Martin Sr., denied the accusations. The government released the following statement, “Members of the Canadian delegation in Vietnam are not engaged in clandestine or spying activities. These Canadians, just like other members of the international truce commission, carry out a quasi-diplomatic task which includes observation of local conditions and discussions with the local authorities

⁴⁵ Ross, *In the Interests of Peace Canada and Vietnam*, 208.

⁴⁶ *The Globe and Mail*, July 31, 1965, cited by Victor Levant, *Quiet Complicity: Canadian Involvement in the Vietnam War* (Toronto: Between The Lines, 1986), 194. The Globe also noted that the despatches sent by emissary Blair Seaborn (who was also at the time, the Canadian ICSC Commissioner) during and after his missions to Hanoi on behalf of the U.S. “received immediate high-level attention in Ottawa and Washington.”

⁴⁷ Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, 249.

⁴⁸ Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, 249.

⁴⁹ Ross, *In the Interests of Peace Canada and Vietnam*, 207.

⁵⁰ Ross, *In the Interests of Peace Canada and Vietnam*, 207.

of both North and South Vietnam.”⁵¹ In the House of Commons, Tommy Douglas, leader of the New Democratic Party (NDP), questioned Pearson as to whether “information such as photographs, tape recordings or other information has been turned over at any time by any Canadian military personnel to the United States authorities.”⁵² Pearson denied that the Canadian delegation was conducting clandestine operations. It may have been strictly true that clandestine operations were not employed and perhaps unnecessary. But the Prime Minister was implicitly acknowledging there had been sharing.

To summarize, the DEA actively provided foreign intelligence to Canada's allies during its diplomatic mission in Indochina. Canada's intelligence-sharing was not a short-term operation. This case study has shown that Canadian diplomats (and soldiers) had important foreign intelligence collection roles.

5.3 Canadian intelligence operations in Cuba, 1960s

Another case of the DEA's involvement in foreign intelligence collection abroad is its operation in the late 1950s and early 1960s in Cuba. In January 1959, Fidel Castro and his 26th of July forces overthrew the repressive regime of Fulgencio Batista in Cuba. Initially, both the American and Canadian governments quickly recognized the new Cuban regime. Castro would become a threat to American national security only when he began nationalizing American-owned businesses (such as the International Telephone and Telegraph Company (ITT) and United Fruit Company (UFC)), and expropriated lands without providing any financial compensation to American owners. Eventually, Castro's anti-

⁵¹ Levant, *Quiet Complicity*, 194.

⁵² Levant, *Quiet Complicity*, 195.

American stance and his promotion of socialist ideals led to hostilities between Cuba and the United States.

The American government reacted with two policies. US President Dwight Eisenhower gradually imposed trade restrictions that led to a complete embargo on trade relations between the two countries. The fallout from the trade embargo resulted in Castro seeking assistance from other countries, especially the Soviet bloc. Before Eisenhower left office he approved the planning of a covert operation to assist and train Cuban exiles to overthrow the Castro regime. The eventual attack, ordered by President John F. Kennedy, would become known as the "Bay of Pigs" incident. In late 1960, Castro also "accused the United States of using its embassy in Havana for spying, and demanded a drastic reduction in the number of personnel stationed there."⁵³ The American administration responded by ending diplomatic relations and permanently closing its embassy on January 3, 1961.⁵⁴

Canada's response to the Castro regime differed from that of the Americans. The Canadian government was against the increasing presence and influence the Soviets were exerting on Cuba. Yet, it did not support operations to forcibly remove Castro from power. The Canadian government followed the British policy that "it was appropriate to maintain diplomatic relations with countries whether or not one approved of their internal politics."⁵⁵

⁵³ Don Munton, "Our Men in Havana: Washington and Canadian Intelligence on Castro's Cuba, 1959-1963" (paper presented, 2002 Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) Conference, Ottawa, Ont, September 29, 2002) (soon to be an article): 2.

⁵⁴ Since the late 1970s, the United States has maintained, in the absence of a formal diplomatic relationship, a small presence in Cuba in the form of a "US Interests Section." It operates out of the building that was the American embassy until 1961. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reported in February 2003 that these individuals were experiencing an increase of harassment (sexual entrapment and unauthorized entry into diplomatic residences) from the Cuban government, see, Stephen Gibbs, "Cuba harassing US Diplomats," *British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)*, February 7, 2003, <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/2735157.stm>>.

⁵⁵ Munton, "Our Men in Havana," 3.

Similarly, Ottawa also thought it was “appropriate to maintain trade relations with these same countries, subject to restrictions mutually agreed to by the western allies.”⁵⁶ The Canadian government's decision to maintain its embassy in Cuba became both a political and a strategic intelligence advantage.

Don Munton has documented that Canadian diplomats conducted intelligence collection operations out of the Canadian embassy in Cuba after the closing of the US embassy, and that Ottawa shared this intelligence with the US and UK. Whereas in the ICSC case, the Canadian government approached Washington and offered to share intelligence from Indochina, this time the Americans first approached Canada (and Britain) for intelligence on Cuba.⁵⁷ Whereas military observers on the Canadian ICSC delegation performed most of the intelligence field work in Indochina, diplomats from External Affairs conducted the operations in Cuba. In other respects, the intelligence liaison arrangement regarding Cuba was quite similar to that undertaken in Indochina.

It is believed that in early 1961, the State Department approached the Canadian embassy in Washington for intelligence on Cuba, “presumably including reports from the Canadian embassy in Havana.”⁵⁸ The timing of such a request could not be a coincidence. The loss of their embassy weakened the Americans' ability both to gather intelligence themselves and to run agents in Cuba since they no longer had a base of operations on the island.

⁵⁶ Munton, “Our Men in Havana,” 3.

⁵⁷ Mexico also shared intelligence with the United States from its own embassy in Havana. The reports of the Mexican Ambassador to Cuba, Fernando Pámanes Escobedo, were passed to U.S. consular officer, Francis Sherry, in Mexico City during the late 1960s. See Kate Doyle, “Double Dealing: Mexico's Foreign Policy Toward Cuba,” March 2, 2003, <<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB83/index.htm#sidebar>>.

⁵⁸ Munton, “Our Men in Havana,” 4.

The Canadian embassy in Cuba collected intelligence on the political situation, socio-economics, and the military.⁵⁹ The political intelligence was specifically focused on two aspects: evaluating the influence of Communism in the Cuban government and determining the extent of domestic support for Castro.⁶⁰ To take one example, Malcolm Bow, the Canadian chargé d'affaires, conducted a tour of the eastern provinces of Cuba in 1961. Bow discovered that Castro's government had initiated the construction of housing, centralized schooling for children in the region and the development of "luxurious tourist resorts." "He found a distinct "proletarian" emphasis to the reconstruction programs of the government."⁶¹ The quality of life in Cuba was being enhanced, but Bow also saw "evidence of the evils of authoritarianism, indoctrination and regimentation" in Castro's regime.⁶²

Canadian diplomats provided the Americans with information relevant to what became the Bay of Pigs failure. The CIA assumed that the planned invasion would prompt the rise of popular opposition against Castro. The Canadian embassy indicated in August 1960, however, that there was relatively minor opposition to Castro's government.⁶³ Again, just months prior to the actual Bay of Pigs operation, diplomats reported the main opposition group had disbanded making unlikely any overthrow of the government.⁶⁴

The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis brought the world to the brink of World War III. The Canadian embassy in Havana did not detect the deployment of missiles but did report

⁵⁹ In mid-1961, the Canadian government selected a new ambassador to Cuba, George Kidd. Munton speculates that Kidd may have been chosen because of his experience as a DL2 officer.

⁶⁰ Munton, "Our Men in Havana," 7.

⁶¹ Munton, "Our Men in Havana," 7.

⁶² Munton, "Our Men in Havana," 7.

⁶³ Munton, "Our Men in Havana," 8.

⁶⁴ Munton, "Our Men in Havana," 8.

specific information related to the Soviet military build up on the island.⁶⁵ In August, Canadian diplomats reported the arrival and presence of Soviet military personnel in Cuba, and they observed “a column of tanks and vehicles with Russian drivers on a highway.”⁶⁶ The Canadian diplomats also conducted a “drive-by” operation to observe the presence of Soviet military personnel.⁶⁷ In the aftermath of the crisis, the embassy staff kept a close watch of the activities on the island in order to ensure that the nuclear weapons were removed from the country.⁶⁸

Canadian diplomats gathered HUMINT from Cubans, talking to individuals about their experiences and observations. Some of the people the embassy personnel interviewed, “included members of the anti-Castro forces in Cuba as well as senior government officials, and such individuals as released prisoners, a shipping company employee, a government engineer, a senior Cuban civilian pilot (who had flown for RCAF), and a variety of unnamed sources whose identity the embassy chose not to reveal to Ottawa.”⁶⁹ The embassy in Havana also interviewed Canadians travelling in Cuba, and reported their views to Ottawa – a sort of “interview program” in the field.

In March of 1962, DL2 sent a message instructing the embassy in Havana to copy its dispatches directly to the Canadian embassies in London and Washington.⁷⁰ “The purpose in having the telegrams sent to Washington and London, of course, was to expedite them

⁶⁵ Munton, “Our Men in Havana,” 8.

⁶⁶ Munton, “Our Men in Havana,” 8-9.

⁶⁷ Munton, “Our Men in Havana,” 9.

⁶⁸ Munton, “Our Men in Havana,” 9.

⁶⁹ Munton, “Our Men in Havana,” 5.

⁷⁰ Munton, “Our Men in Havana,” 10.

being handed on to the respective governments.”⁷¹ The embassy in Cuba was told to mark information that should not be shared with the allies (as “Canadian Eyes Only”). Information relating to Canada-Cuba economic relations was usually not shared.

Occasionally Washington made direct requests. In July of 1961, the Americans asked for a list of publications they wished to acquire from Cuba. Specifically, they wanted the daily Communist Party newspaper *Hoy*, the *Cuban Sugar Year Book* and the *Annual Report of the Consolidated Railroads of Cuba*.⁷² During the Cuban missile crisis Washington asked for Canadian views on how Cubans had reacted, and whether radio broadcasts of Voice of America were being jammed by the Castro regime.⁷³

The Canadian embassy in Havana did not have a military attaché among its staff.⁷⁴ The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) discussed the appointment of an attaché and proposed the idea to External Affairs.⁷⁵ When DEA asked newly appointed ambassador George Kidd for his opinion on the matter, “he argued such a request from Canada might well be regarded with great suspicion by the government of Cuba.”⁷⁶ Kidd marked his letter, “Not for distribution to DND.”⁷⁷ As a result of not having a military attaché, embassy diplomats were required to conduct some military related work, for instance, “taking pictures of and writing detailed reports on the annual January Cuban military parade in Havana” and observing military bases.⁷⁸

⁷¹ Munton, “Our Men in Havana,” 10.

⁷² Munton, “Our Men in Havana,” 11.

⁷³ Munton, “Our Men in Havana,” 11.

⁷⁴ Munton, “Our Men in Havana,” 9.

⁷⁵ Munton, “Our Men in Havana,” 9.

⁷⁶ Munton, “Our Men in Havana,” 9.

⁷⁷ Munton, “Our Men in Havana,” 9.

⁷⁸ Munton, “Our Men in Havana,” 9.

What was the justification for DEA to share intelligence with the Americans?

Munton suggests three possible explanations. First, "Canada may have been seeking to influence United States views and policy toward Cuba" through intelligence sharing. Second, Canada may have hoped that by cooperating and sharing intelligence, the American government would tone down its criticisms of Canadian foreign policy towards Cuba. Third, Canada may have provided intelligence as a part of its obligation to allied intelligence cooperating and sharing.⁷⁹ This was the time of the Cold War and Canada likely wanted to do what it could to provide better Western intelligence on Soviet activities in Cuba.

The intelligence sharing was certainly not a result of a close Canadian-American relationship; at the time, relations were at an all time low. Canadian Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker and US President John F. Kennedy never had a great liking for each other; especially when Diefenbaker stalled on the question of accepting American nuclear weapons on Canadian soil. During the Cuban missile crisis Kennedy never consulted Diefenbaker about the crisis or about NORAD being placed on defense condition 3 (Defcon), though such consultation was required under the NORAD treaty. Diefenbaker was quoted calling Kennedy "a boastful son of a bitch" and feared his lack of political experience would start another war.⁸⁰

The third explanation for providing intelligence, as a part of Canada's assistance to the allied intelligence cooperating and sharing agreements, seems the most probable.⁸¹ Seaborn states that "the Americans and British have always been very generous with their

⁷⁹ Munton, "Our Men in Havana," 14.

⁸⁰ Canadian Broadcasting Centre (CBC), "Indepth: Canada-U.S. Relations Prime Ministers and Presidents," July 7, 2006, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/canada_us/pms-presidents.html>.

⁸¹ Munton, "Our Men in Havana," 16.

sharing of intelligence, and you feel some obligation to give them a little bit back. If we have some, we will want to share it. We are not major contributors, but we felt that it was worthwhile sharing what we had.”⁸²

To summarize, Canadian diplomats in Cuba gathered foreign intelligence for the United States during the 1960s. The Department willingly supported these operations, once again, in part because of the Soviet threat to North America and in part because of the norm of *quid pro quo* in intelligence cooperation. Canada's relationship with Cuba was an intelligence asset for the Americans.

5.4 Conclusion

In conclusion, these two case studies are useful examples of intelligence operations conducted by External Affairs and of the kinds of intelligence liaison activities in which the Department has long been engaged. While intelligence studies have examined the roles of CSIS and other agencies in the collection of foreign intelligence, and examined the role of Canada's Communications Security Establishment (CSE) in international intelligence cooperation, they have paid insufficient attention to the role of External Affairs in both collection and international dissemination.

The assumption that the Department does not conduct foreign intelligence operations is thus clearly false. International law even permits diplomats to collect overt “intelligence” in a host country and Canadian diplomats have taken full advantages of this provision. The actions of the diplomats did not so much tread a fine line between diplomacy and intelligence collection as exploit the gray area between the two. Both case

⁸² Seaborn, interview.

studies also show that Canada's foreign intelligence work assists its allies and provides an intelligence advantage.

Intelligence brings texture to knowledge.
-Kurt Jensen¹

Chapter 6: Conclusion

This thesis began by posing two central questions. First, what structures has the Department of Foreign Affairs established to deal with intelligence and what were their roles? Second, what sort of foreign intelligence collection operations, particularly HUMINT related ones, has the Department conducted?

Since 1909 the Department of External Affairs and its successors have promoted Canada's external relations and managed its representation abroad. At the same time, its involvement and participation in foreign intelligence work developed and expanded beyond simple clerical work to more sophisticated operational work. The point was made here that there is not really any sort of clear line that can be drawn between standard "diplomatic reporting" and intelligence collection. Most of the Department's foreign intelligence-related work can be categorized as "grey intelligence;" it "is neither entirely open source nor clandestine in origin."²

Chapter 2 presented a description and analysis of Canada's current foreign intelligence players and their relationship with DFAIT. This chapter showed that DFAIT is a central organization of foreign intelligence collection, assessment and sharing in Canada. The Department has a specific unit devoted to foreign intelligence work, the Foreign Intelligence Division (ISI), which oversees the collection, assessment/evaluation and

¹ Kurt F. Jensen, interview by author, Ottawa, Ontario, 8 December 2003.

² Kurt F. Jensen, "Toward a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service," *Bout de Papier* 22, no. 2 (2006): 22.

dissemination of foreign intelligence, and acts as a consultant to the other parts of the department. ISI also acts as a central hub of the Department's intelligence-sharing with other members of the Canadian intelligence community and allies. ISI oversees two programs that engage in non-clandestine collection of HUMINT: the Interview Program Section (ISIW) and Global Security Reporting Program (GSRP).

Chapter 2 also examined the relationships the Department has with the Canadian intelligence community. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and DFAIT have a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in place to facilitate liaison and intelligence sharing. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and DFAIT work together in several areas of intelligence collection within Canada and abroad under the CSIS Act. They also have a MOU to facilitate liaison and intelligence-sharing (e.g., CSIS officers posted at ISI offices). DFAIT is a member of CSIS' Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC). Located in the ISI division of the DFAIT is the Client Relations Unit (ISIF), jointly staffed by DFAIT and CSE. ISIF's main mission is to disseminate special intelligence. It is alleged that CSE and DFAIT have cooperated on so-called "embassy collection." One interviewee for this thesis, Allan Gotlieb, a former under-secretary (deputy minister) for External Affairs, acknowledged the existence of embassy collection. Finally, DFAIT and the Privy Council Office (PCO) cooperate and share intelligence, and once jointly managed the International Assessment Staff (IAS).

Chapter 3 looked briefly at the reasons the government originally established the Department of External Affairs (DEA) and argued the key need was essentially an intelligence requirement. At that time, Canada was a passive receiver of British intelligence but had little capacity and no formal structures for collation, assessment and analysis let

alone collection of intelligence. James Eayrs explains that the establishment of the Department was a result of a need for organized and comprehensive information to guide early Canadian foreign policy.³ Furthermore, Eayrs notes that “it was only slowly that Canadian governments came to appreciate the intimate connection of intelligence...and the quality of their external affairs.”⁴

The chapter then posed several questions: How did the Department organize its intelligence structures and how did they evolve over the postwar period? The activities and role of External Affairs developed during World War II, when the Department was thrust into foreign intelligence activities. It actively participated (directly and indirectly) in analysis of SIGINT intercepts, intercepting mail as part of Canadian censorship activities, debriefing German POWs, and debriefing repatriated Canadians who had been held in Europe or Asia.

Canada’s foreign policy and foreign intelligence work expanded in the post-war era, as a result of the Cold War and the need to support foreign intelligence agreements signed during the war and extended into the post-war. The UKUSA Agreement of 1948 is one of the most important of Canada's secret multilateral security and intelligence sharing and cooperation arrangements. It is assumed that the Department has actively contributed to these agreements because of its responsibility for Canada's external relations and its involvement in the Canadian intelligence community.

During the post-war period, the DEA became actively involved in development and organization of many key foreign intelligence structures in Canada. The DEA assisted in the

³ James Eayrs, *The Art of the Possible: Government and Foreign Policy in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), 126.

⁴ Eayrs, *The Art of the Possible*, 126.

creation of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB) and the Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS). DEA personnel were chairs and members of these structures. In November 1948, External Affairs established the Defence Liaison Division (DL) to coordinate defence and foreign intelligence matters with other departments and allies. The Head of DL was also the chairman of the JIC and JIB.

By 1949 External Affairs decided to separate DL into two divisions, due in part to increasing work-load. Defence Liaison 2 (DL2) became responsible for security and intelligence matters. DL2 personnel continued to chair various intelligence committees. DL2 had a relationship with the Communications Branch of the National Research Council (CBNRC), the predecessor of CSE, and thus some responsibility for Canadian signals intelligence. For about twenty years the head of DL2 was also the "Director of Communications Security" (DCS) for CBNRC.⁵ In fact the DCS out ranked the director of CBNRC in issues relating to operations.

The next four decades saw numerous, sometimes rapid, organizational changes in the Department with respect to intelligence. This thesis provides, for the first time, what might be termed the "organizational history" of the structures created by the Department to handle foreign intelligence matters over this period. The evolution of these structures has not previously been traced in their entirety.

Chapter 4 presented the first two of four case studies on the Department's foreign intelligence structures and collection efforts. The first case focused on operations of the Special Intelligence Section (SIS) from 1942 until 1945 (thus predating DL2). External Affairs

⁵ Peter Johnson, telephone interview with author, November 10, 2003.

had a close relationship with Canada's SIGINT agency, the Examination Unit (XU). The Department provided financial and organizational assistance to establish the Unit and had representatives on the "Y" Committee that planned its operations and provided tasking and direction. The Special Intelligence Section (SIS) was a translation and intelligence assessment unit to complement the XU. The head of SIS was a Canadian diplomat (and scholar on Japan), Herbert Norman. The Department gave SIS responsibility for "selecting, editing and otherwise interpreting the material which was produced in the Examination Unit."⁶ SIS translated and analyzed Vichy French, Free French and Imperial Japan signals traffic. Tommy Stone, who acted as intelligence coordinator for External Affairs, saw the work of SIS as a way for Canada to increase its contribution and provide the *quid pro quo* of intelligence sharing.⁷ In the United States, the OSS was an "avid consumer" of SIS intelligence products, as were the British.⁸ In January 1945, as the war was coming to its conclusion, DEA closed SIS.

The second case study focused on the Interview Program Section (ISIW). Since 1953, the Interview Program has collected HUMINT through debriefing of Canadians and others who go abroad. The Interview Program does not employ covert tactics to collect intelligence. It basically asks ordinary Canadians and others to provide observations from their foreign travels, generally of a political, military, social, and scientific nature. They volunteered, after being approached, or they themselves approached the Interview

⁶ Egerton Herbert Norman, "Intelligence Relations with Outside Departments: Special Intelligence Section of the Department of External Affairs," in *A History of the Examination Unit, 1941-1945*, ed. Gilbert de B. Robinson, (1945), 50.

⁷ Peter St. John, "Canada's Accession to the Allied Intelligence Community," *Conflict Quarterly* 4, no. 4 (1984): 13.

⁸ St. John, "Canada's Accession to the Allied Intelligence Community," 14.

Program to share their information. Initially, the unit chose only to interview engineers, technicians, business people, academics and scientists. Later it realized that anyone travelling abroad might have useful information for the government.

On April 1, 1968, the JIB, the unit that housed the Program, was moved from Department of National Defence (DND) to External Affairs, as was the Interview Program, due to departmental consolidation.⁹ Once there, the Interview Program was renamed the “Domestic Contact Section” and operated as a “separate entity” of the Security and Intelligence Liaison Division.¹⁰ Its operations did not undergo any radical changes until the 1980s. Since the creation of the Interview Program Section in 1953, it has weathered political storms, budget cuts and departmental restructuring.

Chapter 5 presented the third and fourth case studies on the Department's intelligence collection abroad. In 1954 Canada joined the International Commissions for Supervision and Control (ICSC) to supervise and oversee the end of hostilities in Indochina. Canada's official role in the ICSC was to act in a “solely supervisory, judicial, and mediatory” capacity.¹¹ Prior to Canada's acceptance of membership, however, the Canadian Ambassador to the United States, A. D. P. Heeney, went to the State Department to inform the Americans that the Canadian ICSC delegation would provide intelligence collected in the field.¹² Lester B. Pearson wanted to ensure that any intelligence provided to the Americans should not be discussed in the public; otherwise Canada “would have to reconsider the

⁹ Kurt F. Jensen, “Canada's Foreign Intelligence Interview Program, 1953-1990,” *Intelligence and National Security* 19, no. 1 (Summer 2004), 102.

¹⁰ Jensen, “Canada's Foreign Intelligence Interview Program,” 102.

¹¹ *External Affairs*, “Indochina - Membership on International Commission,” (August 1954), 258.

¹² James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada - Indochina: Roots of Complicity* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983), 242.

whole policy of passing on information to the United States.”¹³ Providing intelligence to the Americans was clearly a sensitive matter.

Canadian officials none the less collected and shared intelligence with the United States and other allies – basically the “Five Eyes” of the UKUSA arrangement, from the outset of Canada’s involvement with the ICSC. Both DEA and DND provided personnel for the Canadian ICSC delegations. The Canadians gathered HUMINT and used similar methods to those used by other diplomats and attachés, such as observing military positions and operations and interviewing people in the field. As Blair Seaborn commented, we “had physical access to see what was happening in that country, which the Americans did not have, unless they had agents up there.”¹⁴

The Department passed three types of intelligence to the allies: intelligence related to commission activities; intelligence related to conditions in the area, especially North Vietnam; and military-oriented intelligence.

The Canadian media uncovered the delegation's secret operations and claimed Canadians were “functioning as spies when they were supposed to be serving as international civil servants.”¹⁵ The government denied the accusations. Nevertheless, Canada's ICSC intelligence-gathering and sharing lasted for almost twenty-years.

The last case study focused on the Department's intelligence collection in Cuba during the 1960s. The Canadian embassy in Havana, at the request of Washington, began intensively collecting foreign intelligence after the United States broke diplomatic relations

¹³ Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, 242 and 243.

¹⁴ James Blair Seaborn, interview with author, December 8, 2003, Ottawa, Ontario.

¹⁵ Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, 249.

with the Castro government. The Canadian embassy in Havana collected intelligence on the political, socio-economic, and military situation. While the embassy did not detect the deployment of missiles during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, it did report specific information related to the Soviet military build up on the island.¹⁶ Canadian diplomats also gathered HUMINT from Cubans and others. The foreign intelligence work in Cuba was again a reflection of Canada's commitment to allied intelligence cooperating and sharing agreements. As Seaborn states, "the Americans and British have always been very generous with their sharing of intelligence, and you feel some obligation to give them a little bit back."¹⁷ Canada collected and shared intelligence with its allies because of perceived common threats and because of its desire to fulfill the *quid pro quo* norm of Western intelligence.

6.0 Final Thoughts

It is hoped this thesis will contribute to a greater discussion at the academic level about Canadian foreign intelligence issues and particularly about the considerable role of the Department of Foreign Affairs. This thesis also shows that intelligence issues can be researched and discussed in the public domain without violating government secrecy. This thesis shows that the Department has long been actively involved in many aspects of foreign intelligence work. The Canadian foreign intelligence debate needs to acknowledge that the Department is not simply a consumer of foreign intelligence but also a producer of it.

¹⁶ Don Munton, "Our Men in Havana: Washington and Canadian Intelligence on Castro's Cuba, 1959-1963," (paper presented, at 2002 Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) Conference, Ottawa, Ontario September 29, 2002) (soon to be an article): 8.

¹⁷ Seaborn, interview.

This thesis adopted a descriptive approach to highlight the Department's foreign intelligence work. As indicated, there is no existing comprehensive account of its intelligence operations. The basic descriptive information presented in this thesis will however allow others to proceed to analyze and/or theorize about the Department's operations. This thesis therefore may serve to enhance theoretical discussions and debates on Canadian foreign policy and intelligence.

This thesis like all other theses encountered several limitations. The most obvious limitation was government secrecy – an intrinsic part of the intelligence area. Information relating to the subject matter was very difficult to find in the public domain, and is released very slowly by the government, if at all. For that reason, it was necessary and desirable to conduct the interviews that are part of this thesis. The organization history of the Department's intelligence units, presented in Chapter 3, is likely not entirely correct and complete. It is, however, the best that can be done with the available sources. Given the difficulties of obtaining documentary evidence, the case studies examined here are not as recent as might be desirable, let alone current – with the exception of the on-going Interview Program. Further research and analysis in this area must be conducted in the near future as further information becomes available.

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Appendix A: Ethics Review Memorandum



UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN
BRITISH COLUMBIA

Research Ethics Board

MEMORANDUM

To: Harjit Virdee

Don Munton
International Studies Program

From: Alex Michalos, Chair
Research Ethics Board

Date: July 8, 2003

Re: Ethics Review 2003.0603.054
Silent Institution: The Role of DFAIT in Canadian Foreign Intelligence
Collection

Thank you for submitting the above noted proposal for review by the Research Ethics Board. Your proposal has been reviewed and approved. You may begin your research.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me.

Sincerely,

Alex C. Michalos, Chair
Research Ethics Board