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The Role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in National Security Policy Making: Professionalism and Self-Perceptions, 1942-1961

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THE ROLE OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF IN NATIONAL

SECURITY POLICY MAKING: PROFESSIONALISM AND

SELF-PERCEPTIONS, 1942-1961

by

John Charles Binkley

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School

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VITA

The author, John Charles Binkley, is the son of C....
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His elementary education was obtained in the public
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Looking back on nearly forty years of service at the
highest levels of the British government, Lord Hankey asked
the following question:

> ...whether the whole of the control of war should not be
> delegated by the government to the military authority;
> in other words, whether a war should be controlled by
> statesmen or solely by fighting men.[1]

His question is deceptively simple; yet it strikes at the
very heart of any theory of civil-military relations. Whether
it is during peace or during war, the role of the military
in policy formulation is central to the security of the state.
The question is what form that role will take. While it is
correct to say that in democratic societies, based on civilian
control, the military performs in an advisory capacity, that
answer really only begs the question. If the military are to
advise the civilian leadership, then what considerations
should the military officer incorporate into his thought pro-
cess as he strives to fulfill that advisory function

Within any society, that advisory function is restrict-
ed to a handful of senior military professionals who interact
with the political leadership. In the United States, this
advisory function, since the outbreak of World War II, has

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[1]Lord Hankey, Government Control in War (Cambridge:
At the University Press, 1945), 11.

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fallen upon the shoulders of one particular group of military professionals, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By law, they are the "principal military advisors" to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council. Organizationally, the JCS consists of the military heads of the four services, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. They are assisted in their duties by a vast internal organization made up of several thousand military and civilian members. This structure not only advises the civilian leaders on the military aspects of national security questions but it also coordinates and implements the military aspects of the civilian leadership's decisions. Residing within the Chiefs' purview is: the development of war plans, the supplying of military input into the defense budget process, weapon systems acquisition decisions, foreign policy issues, and a multitude of other tasks. All of these have important military and political consequences. The magnitude of these decisions is fully realized when one considers that for almost all of the period since the end of World War II, the defense budget has been the nation's largest single expenditure.

Unfortunately, examining the statutory functions of the Joint Chiefs reveals only the tip of the iceberg concerning their actual role within the national security policy making system. One problem in attempting to determine their

role has been the secrecy that shrouds the inner workings of the JCS. Even governmental task forces examining the activities of the Department of Defense complain that they are not allowed within the inner sanctum of the JCS to observe its operations. Despite this shortcoming, it is apparent that the period between 1945-1960 was crucial in the development of the organization. Although first established during World War II, it was during the first decade and a half after the war that the JCS evolved structurally and defined its relationships with other elements concerned with national security policy. In this regard the Truman and the Eisenhower administrations were the gestation period for the JCS as well as the whole national security policy making structure.

At the outset of this period, the whole structure was organized without any unanimity as to what the final product should look like. Although the National Security Act of 1947 supplied a general framework, it went through three major reorganizations, 1949, 1953, and 1958, as the structure evolved to meet new requirements. With the 1958 reforms the basic structure of the JCS as well as the other elements within the defense community had been finalized. Over twenty years later the nation's military forces are still operating under this basic system. The importance of this gestation period is not exclusively a function of

structure. By the end of the Eisenhower presidency, the basic relationships between the Chiefs and the remainder of the defense policy arena had solidified. The apparent revolutionary changes that occurred in the Defense Department during the 1960s were merely a continuation of the basic trends that already had begun during the 1950s. Thus by the end of this gestation period, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not only completed its organizational development, but had clearly established its role within the defense policy making structure. An understanding of the events surrounding that period is essential to comprehend how and why defense related organizations interact today.

Thus far I have referred to the JCS as part of a national security policy making system. The concept of a policy making system is not as precise a scientific phenomenon as some social scientists would like to believe. Instead, it is merely an intellectual construct consisting of those sub-systems (e.g. individuals, groups, or organizations) whose participation is necessary to reach a decision and to make policy. For the purposes of this study we are concerned with those decisions that involve the national security. While the number of possible sub-systems or actors that might be involved in a particular national security issue are almost limitless, all of those issues ultimately are associated in one way or another with the nation's

military might.

Since the Joint Chiefs are the political leadership's "principal military advisors," they are an integral part of that policy system and thus the process of policy integration. If military power is to have any use it cannot exist within a vacuum, but must support the nation's goals. This requires the development of an integrated political/military policy that carefully considers all aspects of national power before ascertaining the nation's political commitments. Through this process the policy maker guarantees that those commitments are compatible with the ability of the nation to support them. But merely identifying an organization as an actor within a specific policy system tells us little about the role it plays. Attempting to determine, by administrative and structural examination, an organization's influence and manner of participation in the policy arena, places the analyst in a position similar to Plato's cave dwelling characters, who only see vague shadows of reality. Part of the reason for this is that the nature of an organization's participation or role is as much molded by bureaucratic forces and self-perceptions as it is by formal structural relations. In order to more carefully define the nature of an organization's participation, and thus the parameters of its role, I propose a heuristic model that consists of four interdependent variables. Despite the

limitations that are associated with all social science models, it will supply a framework within which an effective understanding of the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in defense policy making may be developed.

The first of the variables is the sub-system's place within the formal organizational and administrative structure. This structure, along with various statutes, charters and functions papers, identify the key participants and define the formal relationships between them. For the JCS, the National Security Act of 1947 and its ensuing amendments supply this skeleton. An understanding of that framework is an essential first step because the role of the JCS is worked out within the context of that formal structure.

The second variable is the sub-system's own internal organizational dynamics. This consists of the nature of its bureaucracy and its organizational goals. These factors determine how the sub-system will respond to outside agencies and what kind of product it will produce as input for the policy system. Within the JCS, the peculiar nature of its bureaucratic structure is instrumental in influencing the type and content of the Chiefs' advisory input. Furthermore, the nature of bureaucracy impacts upon the Chiefs' relationship with other agencies.

The third variable is the perception of other actors within the system as to what role the sub-system should play.

How important those perceptions are in actually molding the sub-system's role depends on the hierarchical relationship that exists between them. Among the various agencies within the national security policy system, the executive leadership's perception of the Joint Chiefs' role is the most important. That leadership appoints the Chiefs, looks to them for advice, and is their superiors within the military chain of command.

The fourth variable is the sub-system membership's own perception of what their role should be. What the Chiefs believe their own role to be is a crucial factor, because those beliefs will motivate them to act in whatever manner is appropriate to that perception. Granted, outside pressures will have some impact, but it can never equal the self-generated beliefs of the Chiefs themselves. In this regard, the Chiefs' perception of themselves as military professionals is quite important. It supplies the normative basis for their participation not only in the policy process, but also for their relations vis-a-vis the parent society. But professionalism is important beyond its ability to shape the behavior patterns of the officer corps; it also forms the basis of much of the administration's perceptions as to the Chiefs role. Those perceptions are founded upon certain historically derived assumptions as to the nature of civilian control of the military, and of the military professional's

role <u>vis-a-vis</u> the government. Those assumptions in turn are inextricably connected to specific interpretations as to the nature of military professionalism and what subjects the professional may advise the government on. An integral part of the officer's advisory function is the determination of what factors to take into consideration while developing that advice. The criterion by which the officer makes that determination is based upon his own interpretation of professionalism. Thus the perception of what is the proper nature of military professionalism not only affects the officer's relationship with other institutions, but also affects the product he inputs into the policy making system.

With this framework in mind, my study of the JCS will proceed in the following manner. First, I will examine the nature of military professionalism and how it specifically developed in the United States. This will supply the definitional basis for the officer's interpretation of what it means to be a professional within the American context. Next, I will examine the formation of the Joint Chiefs as a wartime exigency and attempt to ascertain the role it played during that conflict. With the end of the war, the Joint Chiefs had institutionalized some of its basic internal structures and developed certain patterned relationships with outside agencies. This pre-1947 background will form the necessary basis to analyze in turn each of the four

variables in my role model: the defense organizational structure, the JCS bureaucracy and the impact of bureaucratic relations on the Chiefs, the administration's perceptions of the Chief's role, and finally the Chiefs' own perceptions of their role. Once this has been accomplished I will look at the Chiefs' actual participation in the process of policy integration. This should supply us with enough insight and empirical data from which I can draw some conclusions as to the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

CHAPTER II

MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM AND THE OFFICER CORPS'
ROLE IN POLICY FORMULATION

To understand the role the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff play it is first necessary to comprehend the nature and the historical background of military professionalism. The former supplies the basis upon which the military professional determines what his role in policy formulation ought to be, while the latter, to a great extent, determines exactly what his role will be. It would be a mistake to assume that these factors only impinged upon the American military. On the contrary, a great deal of the organizational framework within which the Joint Chiefs operated was borrowed from Europe. With this in mind this chapter will first proceed to examine the sociological definitions of military professionalism, and then determine in some normative fashion what role the military professional has in the development of national policy. Next, it will examine the manner in which that role has evolved historically in both the Prussian and the American experiences. The Prussian experience, in particular, has a great deal to offer, because the general staff model was designed to offer the military a means of contributing to policy formulation. How that

staff model was transferred to the United States and how it blended with the American approach to professionalism is the framework within which the JCS developed.

It was during the sixteenth century that the military first began to develop into a profession, a development that was inextricably connected to the rise of entrepreneurial capitalism and the Protestant Work Ethic.[2] Prior to this period, there had been military leaders who devoted their lives to combat service, but sociologists do not consider them professionals because they lacked the three fundamental characteristics that separate a professional from other occupations within the society: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. Professional expertise is considered the acquisition of unique knowledge or competency gained through specialized education, training, or experience. Responsibility is the professional's obligation to the service of his society, and the ethical utilization of his expertise. Corporateness is the common bond and sense of unity that exists between members of a profession, and creates the

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[2]Jacques van Doorn, The Soldier and Social Change: Comparative Studies in the History and Sociology of the Military (London: Sage Publications, 1975); Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (New York: Vintage Press, 1964); Bengt Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization and Political Power (London: Sage Publications, 1972); Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, Illinois: Freepress, 1960); Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism: Civilian and Military (New York: A Free Press Paperback, 1967); G. Teitler, The Genesis of the Professional Officers' Corps (London: Sage Publication, 1977).

self-perception that they are different from other social groups. Some of that sense of corporateness is imposed by the profession's own regulations, but some of it is simply a sense of uniqueness and comradery that grows out of a common base of experience.[3]

The feudal or pre-feudal concept of officership was based more on class distinction than on individual competency. "Being a warrior and an officer," according to Coates and Pelligrim, "was simply a facet of the aristocratic feudal responsibility."[4] That responsibility was not to the society, but to a class structure. Further-more, as Coates and Pelligrim point out, the "skills required of the mass of fighting men were directly available in the civilian populace with little if any specialized military training." The result was that the lack of a dis-tinctive corpus of military expertise, plus the class connection to responsibility and corporateness, tended to eliminate pre-modern forms of officership from the profes-sional category.

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[3]Charles Coates and Roland J. Pelligrim, _Military Sociology: A Study of American Military Institutions and Military Life_ (University Park, Maryland: Social Sciences Press, 1965), 201-203; also see Huntington, _Soldier and the State_, 7-19.

[4]Coates and Pelligrim, _Military Sociology_, 204.

As the modern nation-state began to take form through increased centralization, simultaneously a bureaucratic/ technocratic infrastructure came into existence, based upon specialized expertise. Military power was an integral part of the state's consolidation of power and as such the managers of that military power naturally were incorporated into the infrastructure. It was with this modernization process in mind that Swedish sociologist, Bengt Abrahamsson, suggested that one definition of professionalization should be the "historical transition of a particular organization under the impact of major political, economic and technological developments."[5]

The transition that Abrahamsson suggested occurred from the sixteenth century on, but was accelerated by the industrial and technological revolutions that went hand in hand during the latter part of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It led to the mass army, the division organization with its concomitant bureaucratization, the development of new weapons and logistics systems, and the movement toward technical specialization. The nature of warfare now demanded of the military officer skills that were not readily available in the civilian community. During the early stages of this transformation the only specialized

[5]Abrahamsson, _Military Professionalization_, 16.

expertise that the military officer needed, that was not found within his own social upbringing, was in the area of artillery and engineering because of their extensive mathematical basis. At first, the military relied exclusively upon civilian specialists, but during the eighteenth century they began to develop their own military academies which were essentially artillery and engineering trade schools. As nineteenth century industrialism forced the officer to acquire even more complex skills, especially in the area of industrial and logistics planning, the military education system was restructured and most Western nations established post-graduate military schools.[6]

The growth of this unique specialized military expertise not only fostered modern military professionalism, but also the perception on the part of the officer corps that they were indeed professionals. This perception caused the military to redefine its relationship to the society, especially in light of the fact that the officer corps ceased to be merely military hirelings. Now the professional officer wanted the same kind of relationship vis-a-vis society that other professionals enjoyed. An essential

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[6]Phillip H. Stevens, Artillery Through the Ages (New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1965), 15-16; also see Theodore Ropp, War in the Modern World (Durham: Duke University Press, 1959), 16. It was for this purpose that West Point was originally established as an engineering and artillery school. See Stephen Ambrose, Duty, Honor, and Country: A History of West Point (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1966), 12.

aspect of the development of expertise was that the profession took upon itself the responsibility to use that expertise in the name of its client, in this case the society. The military professional sought a doctor-patient relationship analogue. The specific nature of that professional relationship is described in Allan Millet's recent study of military professionalism.

> The professional, however, asks that he, and not his client, set the conditions under which his knowledge and skill are utilized and that the client accept the professional's definition of what the problem really is. In return for his professional authoritativeness, the professional enters a compact with the client not to go beyond the 'functional specificity' of the profession.[7]

It is the nature and the precise definition of this "functional specificity" that has been the cause for a reoccurring debate within the profession. This debate has tended to focus on two contending and prescriptively divergent institutional models. While they have been characterized by Arthur Larson as "radical" and "pragmatic" professionalism and by Donald Bletz as "traditional" and "new" professionalism, they are always associated with Samuel Huntington's The Soldier and the State and Morris Janowitz's The Professional

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[7]Allan Millet, Military Professionalism and Officership in America, A Mershon Briefing Paper #2 (Columbus, Ohio: Mershon Center, 1977), 3.

Soldier, respectively.[8] Both identify the military as a profession, but they markedly differ in their prescription for the professional's role and relationship vis-a-vis the parent society, and the professional's role in an advisory capacity.

Huntington views the professional soldier as primarily a manager of violence in the Laswellian context, i.e., the primary goal of the soldier is to achieve a high degree of expertise within the narrowly defined boundaries of that management function. The military professional becomes the technically proficient, politically neutral tool of the state. In order to achieve this goal, a divergent military, isolated from the larger, more liberal society becomes a necessity. Naturally, this restricts the professional soldier's role in policy formulation to advising on only the military perspective of any issue. To do otherwise would be unprofessional, and theoretically impose a threat to civilian control. Implicitly, such an approach can only be optimized when the officer views the world as a series of easily definable compartmentalized groupings of factors, within which one can discern the military parameter from others.

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[8]Arthur Larson, "Military Professionalism and Civilian Control: A Comparative Analysis of Two Interpretations," Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Vol. II, No. 1 (Spring, 1974); Donald Bletz, The Role of the Military Professional in U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1972), 67-72.

Janowitz, on the other hand, views the military as a sub-system of the larger society. This leads him to reject the radical professionals' isolation and to replace it by a military more congruent with the parent society, i.e., a pragmatic or "constabulary force." Janowitz assumes that as the traditional uses of military power become altered by technological advances and a changing political environment, so also does the traditional dichotomy between war and peace. In its place stands the ambiguous nature of limited conflict, where victory becomes an illusive goal. To operate effectively within such an environment, the constabulary officer corps must be cognizant of the non-military factors which characterize modern international conflict and incorporate those factors into his input.

This debate between the "radical" and the "pragmatic" positions stems from confusion as to the military's role within the state's political structure. "Radicalism" presupposes that war is a uniquely different phenomenon from peace, and concludes that the political and the military aspects of the state are separate. The "pragmatist" rejects this bifurcation of political and military matters, believing instead that war and peace both belong on the same continuum as do other forms of the political intercourse of the state. If the "radical" approach is correct, then the military, based upon the client-professional relationship,

should demand complete autonomy in military matters. Furthermore, the only measure of success and competency within the "radical" perspective can be victory on the battlefield. Maximizing combat efficiency is just one more rationale for the "radical's" claim to autonomy.

The key variable in both of these approaches is the relationship of professionalism to the officer corps' proper role in policy formulation. That, in turn, is based upon what factors the officer incorporates into his analysis and has internalized into his cognitive process. For Janowitz, the lack of such factor incorporation results in an "absolutist" professional, who believes that the objectives of the state are achieved through military victory, and that the more total the victory, the more total the achievement of those goals. Limited war becomes inconceivable since total victory is the only objective worth attaining. For Huntington, the internalization of non-military factors violates the officer's professionalism, and undermines "objective civilian control" which is the only way the state can remain non-militarized. Obviously, Huntington rejects the viability of fusionism, which is the melding of non-military considerations and perceptions with the military ones. Janowitz, on the other hand, demands it. It is within this paradigm that all analysis involving the professional military officers' role in policy formulation resides.

Unfortunately, the radical model has focused its attention on the issue of civilian control of the military, as opposed to the more crucial issue of the development of sound military advice. Both contending positions agree that military power is a necessary tool and should support the policy goals of the state. On this point, they differ little from the ideas of the nineteenth century military philosopher, Carl von Clausewitz. While Clausewitz never addressed these issues in terms of differing sociological models, his examination of the nature of war and the professional soldier's role in policy formulation substantiates the correctness of the pragmatic position.

Clausewitz bases his claim to pragmatism upon his universally famous definition of war:

> War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out the same by other means.[9]

War is not only an act of political intercourse, a form of conflict resolution, but it is also an instrument to achieve political goals. The use of the term "by other means" does not mean that war is different from other forms of political interaction. On the contrary, war is simply one type of political interaction that exists between states, the only

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[9]Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. by J.J. Graham (London: Kegan, Paul Tranch, Traubner, & Co., Ltd., 1908) I, 23.

difference is that it is "settled by bloodshed."[10] There

exists a spectrum of potential instruments at a government's

disposal, ranging from peaceful trade to war itself. None

of these are totally separable from each other just as the

colors of a spectrum are inseparable.

> ...That war is nothing but a continuation of political
> intercourse with a mixture of other means. We say mixed
> with other means in order thereby to maintain at the same
> time this political intercourse does not cease by the war
> itself, it is not changed into something quite different,
> but that in essence, it continues to exist whatever may
> be the form of the means that it uses.[11]

Thus in one sense the term "politics" was broadened to

include all aspects of state power.

For Clausewitz it was axiomatic that the amount of

conflict that existed between states determined how states

interacted and how war or any other tool of statecraft was

used. The greater the importance or emotional tie to a goal

the greater the propensity to use force. Thus the objective

will be the standard for determining the means.[12]

Since war was a political act, military power should

never be divorced from its guiding political policy. Military

action of itself without the successful resolution of

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[10]Ibid., I, 121.

[11]Ibid., III, 121; also see I, xxiii-xxiv.

[12]Ibid.

political conflict becomes "a senseless thing without an object."[13] If it does not have policy to guide it, military power will establish its own calculus of success, which will be measured in military terms, i.e., victory. Janowitz's theoretical model of the absolutist who strives for the defeat of the enemy regardless of the political goals of the state, results from the separation of military power from policy. While the radical theorists may attempt to disconnect themselves from such absolutism, their claim to professional autonomy and the rejection of fusionism is the basis for absolutism. In order to avoid this situation, the rational development of foreign policy by a government must carefully consider its military option.

The process by which a state chooses which instrument to use is the formulation of foreign policy. For policy to be effective, it must conceptualize the political goals of the state and take into consideration the power or capabilities which the state has at its disposal. Out of necessity, the state's military capabilities must be compatible with the state's political goals or commitments.[14] Implicit within this logic was the assumption that a state's policy goals are constrained by the physical capabilities the state has at

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[13]Ibid., I, 122.

[14]Ibid., III, 124.

its disposal. Obversely, a state's capabilities must be structured and utilized in such a manner so as to fulfill its commitments. Only through rational guidance supplied by the political/military decision making structure can a nation avoid imbalancing its commitments and capabilities.

It is in the process of developing this rational policy that the military officer's advisory role comes into play, or as Clausewitz points out that "innermost part of its [war's] domain, where all the other threads meet."[15] That domain is the development of war plans, or in a broader context, the development of policy. If war or power is to be a useful political tool or a political act, then a well organized policy is the key. In many ways, it may have been the most tragic part of Clausewitz's premature death, that Book VIII (which dealt with the question of policy formulation) was only in preliminary draft form. Clausewitz hoped to fully develop his ideas on the spectrum of war "by which everything will be simplified," and to "iron out the many creases in the heads of strategist and statesmen, and at least to show the object of action and the real point to be considered in war."[16] This chapter is critical to our study since it is here that Clausewitz outlines the method by which efficient policy was to be made and the role of

[15]Ibid., III, 99.

[16]Ibid., I, xxiv.

the military officer in that formulation. By doing so he prescribed the proper nature of military professionalism.

From the above, it is easy to come to the conclusion that the crux of good policy is the identification of those goals that the state considers important. That is an over simplification. How does a state arrive at that identification, especially if one considers that the capabilities to achieve those goals must be commensurate with those goals? The apparent solution to this problem is bureaucratic interface between the military officer who deals in capabilities and the politician who supplies the commitments or goals. But there is a danger of being drawn into a chicken and egg dilemma when attempting to discern which should be the dominating factor--the policy or the military force to support it. Despite all the above, this is not as ridiculous a fear as it may appear. While Clausewitz emphasized it would be contrary to his whole theory if "policy makes demands on war it cannot respond to," he was a very practical military officer. He fully realized that the types of problems confronting the professional military advisor necessitate immediate solutions, and normally military solutions at that. This combination creates a situation where it may well be possible to posit logically that capabilities guide commitments, and thus situations ought to be analyzed from that perspective. On

this point Clausewitz answered:

> The subordination of the political point of view to the military would be contrary to common sense, for policy has declared the war; it is the intelligent faculty, War only the instrument, and not the reverse. The subordination of the military point of view to the political is, therefore, the only thing which is possible.[17]

If the military point of view became dominant, it would mean that the military goal had replaced the political goal as the objective of the state. But the term "subordination" contradicts our earlier conclusion that war is a political act. If this is true, then there can be no "military" wars, only "political" ones.[18] In this context, war takes on a multiplicity of meanings from actual military conflict to military planning during peacetime, but such planning without regard to the political environment "becomes nothing more than a combination of a few factors of time and space, directed toward an arbitrary goal."[19] If military planning is to perform any function at all, it must become another form of political planning designed to achieve the political goals of the state.

It is the actual exercise of policy formulation that produces the cohesive direction by which a state achieves

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[17]Ibid., III, 124-125.

[18]Ibid., III, 126.

[19]Quoted in Peter Parot, Clausewitz and the State (London: Oxford University Press, 1976), 379.

its goals. If the synonymous relationship between political and military planning is correct, then the corollary is the absence of any differentiation between the political and the military points of view. Once it is understood that there are no military wars, only political ones; then there is no military point of view, only varied political views with the integration of different modes of effort.

> According to this point of view, to leave a great military enterprise, or the plan for one, to a purely military judgement and the decision is a distinction which cannot be allowed, and is even prejudicial, indeed it is an irrational proceeding to consult professional soldiers on the plan of war that they give a purely military opinion upon what the Cabinet ought to do.[20]

To avoid this not only is bureaucratic interface between the statesman and the soldier required, but intellectual fusion as well. This process can only occur if the soldier incorporates into his intellectual process an awareness of non-military factors. For the officer to preface his advice with the caveat "from the military point of view" is absurd as well as dysfunctional, because "there can be no question of a purely military evaluation of a great strategic issue, or a purely military scheme to solve it."[21] All military considerations and all strategic plans are political in nature. The military officer who fails to

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[20]Clausewitz, On War, III, 126; (emphasis added).

[21]Quoted in Parot, Clausewitz, 380.

incorporate such considerations into his advice is a failure
to his profession because, in the last analysis, "none of
the principal plans which are required for a war can be made
without an insight into political relations."[22]

But what of the civilian political decision maker;
what was his role in the Clausewitzian scheme of things?
Obviously, there must be an inextricable relationship between
the political and the military advisors so policy does
reflect the maxim that war is a political act. The politi-
cian must understand the state's capabilities and work to
keep them in tune with the state's commitments. It is the
politician who must never allow the military point of view
to become dominant by forcing commitments to conform to
capabilities:

> But still more absurd is the demand of theorists that a
> statement of the available means of war be laid before
> the General, that he may draw out a purely military plan
> for the War or for campaign in accordance with those
> means.[23]

In the final analysis, any artificial distinction between
the military aspects of national power and the political
aspects undermines the totality of Clausewitz' approach to

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[22]Clausewitz, On War, III, 126. As part of this
intellectual fusion between the soldier and the civilian,
the civilian decision maker must have an understanding of
the capabilities which his military possess. But even more
important is an understanding of the proper use of the
military instrument. "...a certain knowledge of the nature
of war is essential to the management of political inter-
course." Clausewitz, On War, III, 127.

[23]Ibid., III, 126.

policy making. In order to ensure the realization of that
approach both the soldier and the statesman must reject any
compartmentalization of political from military planning,
and with it the "radical" model of military professionalism.

Thus it is through the "pragmatic" model of profes-
sionalism that the military can exercise "responsibility"
and help pave the way for the effective integration of
political and military policy. While Clausewitz supplied
the intellectual and theoretical framework for the develop-
ment of coordinated political/military policy, he failed to
offer an organizational structure that could implement
this theory. The closest he came was to suggest that the
head of the military should be a member of the cabinet so
"that he may take part in the councils and decisions on
important occasions."[24]   He apparently failed to compre-
hend that modern war had become too complex for one man to
fully understand the ramifications and interrelationships of
various actions. The policy planner needed a staff of
experts to digest that mass of material and to rationally
develop a policy after examining all the possible options.
In theory, such an organization could have been the Prussian
General Staff.

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[24]Clausewitz, On War, III, 127; implicitly Clausewitz
is calling for civilian control of the military, but such
controls were within a fusionist environment.

The formation of the general staff system was sympto-
matic of the managerial revolution that occurred in the in-
dustrial West during the nineteenth century. Whereas earlier
staffs were merely functional specialists, usually in col-
lateral civilian fields,[25] the general staff model offered
the managerial tool to enable the government's leadership to
control and direct its vast resources in time of war.
Scharnhorst, who is considered the father of the modern
Prussian General Staff, realized that the successful use of
the mass army, with its independent corps and divisions,
necessitated the creation of an organization that was
"capable of ensuring the effective subordination of the
independent units to central control."[26] Unfortunately,
concentrating only on controlling combat units ignored the
staff's greater potential. By placing the General Staff at
the highest organizational levels it could effectively
subordinate and control the various elements of national
power, and become in the words of professor Frank Simonie

[25]Alvin Brown, The Armor of Organization (New York:
Hibbert Print Co., 1953), 29-53; Dallas Irvine, "The Origins
of the Capital Staffs," Journal of Modern History, Vol. X,
No. 2 (June, 1938), 166-67; Walter Goerlitz, History of the
German General Staff: 1657-1945, trans. by Brian Battershaw
(New York: Praeger, 1973), Chapter 1.

[26]Quoted in Herbert Rozinsky, The German Army (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1944), 43.

"the bureaucratization of supreme military power."[27]

The precise nature of a general staff has become lost in the confusion of myth and the varied national interpretations of the concept. A staff officer is a primary assistant of the commander. He is a source of information and advice, normally on a specific functional area, and it is through him that orders related to that area are issued and followed up on. While the staff officer may issue orders, he does so only in the name of the commander because a staff officer never commands. As war became more complex, it was necessary to broaden some of the supervisory functions of certain staff officers and they evolved into a managerial elite. Spencer Wilkinson, whose book. The <u>Brain of an Army</u>, greatly influenced the formation of the British and the American staff structures, described the Prussian General Staff in the following way:

> The duties of command are so multifarious that some con-
> sistent distribution of functions among the officers of
> a large staff is indispensable. In Prussia this distri-
> bution is based on a thoroughly rational and practical
> principle. The general's work is subdivided into
> classes, according as it is concerned with the direction
> of the operations against the enemy. All that belongs
> to administration and discipline is put upon one side
> of a dividing line, and upon the other side all that
> directly affects the preparation for or the management
> of the fighting--in technical language, all that falls

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[27]Frank Simonie, "Structure and Policy: The Evolution of the Military Staff", (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1975), 176.

within the domain of strategy and tactics. The officers entrusted with the personal assistance of the general in this latter group of duties are in Prussia called his "general staff." They are specially trained in the art of conducting operations against an enemy...[28]

Wilkinson, as most analysts of the General Staff, has focused his attention on the staff's operational mission, i.e., guaranteeing operational integrity and unity of action. Within this aspect of the General Staff's mission, the "radical" approach to military professionalism dominates, and operational efficiency, combat effectiveness, and the staff officer's technical proficiency are considered paramount. But Wilkinson, in his discussion of the Prussian Staff tends to ignore the staff's planning mission. If one considers the analogue that Wilkinson has constructed by titling his book The Brain of an Army, then the staff's operational mission is similar to that of the human nervous system, while the planning mission is that of the controlling brain. Granted planning occurs concurrently within operational organizations, but at the highest level operational considerations become less important as political/military planning takes place. It is at this level that Clausewitz' call for pragmatism should be implemented. From the practical viewpoint, the Prussian General Staff implemented this dual but interrelated staff function. One group of staff

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[28]Spencer Wilkinson, The Brain of an Army: A Popular Account of the German General Staff, second edition (Westminister: Archibald Constable & Co., 1895), 6.

officers (Truppengeneralstab) were distributed to the field commands to guarantee unity of operations. A smaller group (Grosser Generalstab) remained in Berlin to develop war plans and were concerned with the development of military input into political/military planning. Thus the general staff model consists of military planning at the highest level, and then the operational implementation of those plans through the field commands.[29]

The comparison of the general staff model to a managerial tool is drawn as a result of the developmental analogue between the growth of the state and large corporations. Just as administering large businesses became too complex for the individual entrepreneur to maintain control, so governing of the state became too complex for the individual statesman. Managerial scientists, such as Frederick W. Taylor, suggested that the solution was to be found in the formation of a planning staff. Such a planning department would not only be concerned with the effective day-to-day running of the factory, but also long-term growth and reinvestment. The same is true of the general staff; it would be concerned with not only the immediate operational aspects of war plans, but also long-range

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[29] Carey Brewer, "The General Staff of the German Army: A Lesson in Military Organization," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 82, No. 2 (February, 1956).

policy integration.[30]

The Prussian General Staff had the potential to help institutionalize the integration of political/military policy, but its role and theoretical base became perverted over the remainder of the century due to a narrow definition of military professionalism. The result was an over-concern for its operational function at the expense of policy integration. Slowly, the military point of view became dominate. By the end of World War I, the concept of war as an extension of politics had become reversed as a result of Ludendorff's sophistry. Ludendorff's rule subordinated the political goals of the state to the military point of view as war was totalized. Since he and the General Staff were the true military experts, and the only means of achieving victory in total war was to maximize military efficiency, it was only natural that Germany should be run as a military dictatorship.[31]

In America, on the other hand, Clausewitz was not just perverted, but totally rejected. Instead of the fusionism that was demanded by his theories, diplomacy was

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[30]Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977); see also Brown, The Armor of Organization, 63.

[31]Hans Speier, "Ludendorff: The German Concept of Total War," in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. by Edward Mead Earle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941).

compartmentalized from military planning and a professional

military ethic developed that inculcated this compartmentali-

zation. The reason may be found in a series of inextrica-

bly related factors stemming from America's colonial heritage

and the nature of the military profession.

From the very beginning of the colonial experience,

Americans viewed themselves and their New World as something

quite different from the Europe they left behind. This new

hemisphere represented a rejection of feudalism, Catholicism,

despotism, and political persecution. Out of this particu-

lar world-view developed the American image of war and its

relationship to policy. As the Republic matured, the

colonial sense of escape was transposed into political isola-

tionism and a repudiation of the time honored European system

of Realpolitik.[32] According to the American perception of

the world, only despotic states had power as their goal, and

deceit and secret diplomacy as their means. Americans

apparently believed the line from Pericles' Funeral Oration

"We alone do good to our neighbors not upon the calculations

of interest, but in the confidence of freedom and in a frank

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[32]The question of American idealism and its impact
on American foreign policy was surfaced in the early 1950s
by three major works, Robert E. Osgood, Ideals and Self-
Interest in American Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1953); George Kennan, American Diplomacy:
1900-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952); and
Hans Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1950). For a discussion of the
growth of American idealism see Daniel Boorstin, The Americans:
The Colonial Experience (New York: Vintage Books, 1965).

and fearless spirit."

After rejecting power politics as an acceptable approach, it was logical to establish a clear delineation between war and peace. Since it was the search for power that brought on war, America's liberal optimism posited that democracies would never launch an aggressive war. Thus all wars fought by democracies were, by definition, defensive and just.[33] War became a holy crusade with good ultimately triumphing over evil. Since war was rejected as an act of policy or even as a part of the normal political intercourse or states, it became compartmentalized from diplomacy.

The second factor that led to the bifurcation of diplomacy from military planning was the nation's image of the military. This image, which manifested itself in the form of civilian supremacy and anti-militarism, resulted from America's colonial heritage and Anglo-Saxon traditions. Since England was not a continental power, it was possible to base its army on a militia system; while the fear of another Cromwell made it desirable. Aside from these traditions though, there were practical reasons for the successful transplanting of the militia system to the New World. The communal nature of the early colonies did not allow for

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[33]Robert Tucker, The Just War (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1960), 11.

the luxury of a non-productive military, and the omnipresent Indian threat secured the militia's place in colonial society.[34]

The consequences of this very necessary commitment to the citizen soldier were great. First, it contributed to the myth of the militia's effectiveness and preparedness, which in turn laid the basis for the nation's mobilization posture up to World War II. Second, it obviated the necessity for having a professional standing army. No matter how effective or necessary a professional military became, it was considered a necessary evil that had to be isolated from the mainstream of American society.

Such isolation did occur, both as a requirement of mission and as a desire of the society. The Navy's mode of operation isolated it during its long cruises, and the Army became isolated because of its exile to duty on the frontier. These necessary separations from society conformed to the desires of many of its members. Echoing this sentiment, Albert Gallatin, member of Congress and former Cabinet official wrote:

> The distribution of our little army to distant garrisons where hardly any other inhabitants are to be found is the most eligible arrangement of that perhaps necessary

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[34]Louis Morton, "The Origins of the American Military Tradition," Military Affairs, Vol. XXII, No. 2 (Summer, 1958); Boorstin, The Americans, 351.

evil that can be contrived. But I never want to see the
face of one [soldier] in our cities and intermixed with
the people.[35]

This isolation was made even worse by the attitudes of the

civilian decision makers. Inculcated with the concept of

civilian control, they took the idea too literally, and trans-

lated civilian control into the absence of military input

into the policy making structure. This attitude was not just

restricted to the military's involvement in wartime policies.

William Jennings Bryan's famous cry that military officers

"could not be trusted to say what we should or should not do,

till we actually got into war," referred to peacetime foreign

policy decisions.[36]

That this isolation would have an impact on the self-

perceptions of the officer corps was only natural. Professor

Burton M. Sapin in his study of the military's role in Ameri-

can foreign policy noted that this isolation "was bound to

have some impact on their [the officers'] view of the world,

and more practically, on their ability to consider

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[35]Henry Adams, The Life of Albert Gallatin (Phila-
delphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1879), 304. For a general
overview of the American Public's view of the military, see
Robert Kimble, The Image of the Army Officer in America:
Background for Current Views, Contributions in Military
History Number 5 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press,
1973).

[36]Louis Morton, "Origins of Pacific Strategy,"
Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. XIL, No. 8 (August, 1957), 42.

non-military factors in their planning, training, and operations."[37] Sapin's observation alludes to the growth of "radical" professionalism among the American officer corps. This professionalism restricted the officer from incorporating non-military factors and limited him to looking at the world exclusively from the military point of view. If "radical" professionalism did dominate, it would negate any chance of the officer corps developing "pragmatism," and result in the military officer simply being incapable of supplying the type of advice that the civilian policy maker needed. Just as it is "an irrational proceeding to consult professional soldiers on the plan of war that they give a purely military opinion,"[38] it is equally irrational for the military to perceive the world in purely military terms.

Within this environment, the American military developed all the external manifestations of professionalism: a formalized education system, specialized journals, social

[37]Burton Sapin and Richard Snyder, The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy (New York: Doubleday, 1954), 3.

[38]Clausewitz, On War, III, 126.

organizations, and so forth.[39] Concomitant with these institutions were the internal criteria of expertise, responsibility and social cohesion. While the latter two criteria strengthened the individual's internal solidarity with the group, it was expertise that separated the professional soldier from his arch competitor--the militiamen. It was only natural for the professional, believing in his own expertise, to postulate that war had so fundamentally changed during the second half of the nineteenth century, that only the expert could deal with it. With a certain amount of justification, the professional looked upon himself as the sole reservoir of that expertise. At first his new self-awareness was directed against the professional's old enemy, the militia, but slowly the civilians who "controlled" the professionals became a point of focus. The civilian policy maker was no better prepared to deal with the complex strategic-military issues of modern war than the militia was to fight those wars.

This professional perception of the failure of the American military system was most effectively articulated

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[39]West Point was merely the first of the various institutions that were formed to instill expertise and with it professionalism. In 1881 the Command and General Staff College was formed at Fort Leavenworth, and in 1901 the Army War College was established. Each school was formed with the idea of furthering the professional officer's education in his area of military expertise. The Navy went through a similar experience but slightly earlier, with the Naval War College being established in 1884.

in the writing of one man, General Emory Upton. A Civil War

general and later an instructor at West Point, Upton was the

author of numerous works on military policy. He was writing

his most important work, The Military Policy of the United

States, at the time of his suicide in 1881.[40] This work not

only reflected a growing sense of professionalism, but helped

proselytize it. On the surface, it is a polemical attack

on the traditional American assumption of a militia based

military. It develops a strong argument for a professional

army and an officer corps based upon the criterion of exper-

tise; but the argument implicitly carries beyond the

question of the militia's ability to fight, and questions

the civilian's ability to lead. The fact that the civilians

continue their infatuation with the militia is, to Upton,

just a further exhibition of their lack of understanding

of the complex military realities of the day. For Upton

and many of the professionals, congressional and administra-

tion interference during the Civil War epitomized such

civilian incompetence. "If you want to know who was the

cause of three years of war after we created a disciplined

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[40]Emory Upton, Military Policy of the United States,
reprint of 1904 edition (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968).
Elihu Root was given a copy of the unpublished draft, and
it was the Secretary of War that promoted its publication
in 1904.

army of 600,000 men, it was Stanton."[41] His solution to the

problem that faced the professionals was encapsulated in a

single sentence:

> Under our Constitution, Congress has the power to raise
> and support armies, and subject to the supervision of
> the President, only <u>professional soldiers should command
> them</u>.[42]

Upton was not actually questioning the principle of civilian

control, because he, like most of the other professionals,

had accepted it as part of their professional dogma. It is

just that he sought to isolate war time operations from the

non-professionals. Unfortunately, once expertise became the

criterion for determining control, then civilian control itself

came into question.

The direction in which Upton's arguments would lead

is clearly seen in a somewhat prophetic civil-military con-

flict that occurred some twenty years after his death.

After the Spanish-American War the pacification of the

Philippine Islands was placed under the direction of General

Arthur MacArthur. During his tour, he had a confrontation

over powers and prerogatives with the civilian governor of

the islands, William Howard Taft. Taft's power was based

upon a set of orders issued by the President of the United

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[41]Peter Michie, <u>The Life and Letters of Emory Upton</u>
(New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1885), 423.

[42]Upton, <u>Military Policy</u>, xi; emphasis added.

States. MacArthur viewed such Presidential instructions as "an unconstitutional interference with his preroga- tives as Military Commander of these islands."[43] It is apparent that the elder MacArthur believed that once a military officer had been given a mission, the civilian leadership should allow him to complete it without inter- ference. Such expertise, if unhindered, would not only achieve the required defeat of the enemy, but do it quickly and efficiently. The insertion of non-military factors can only detract from this mission. This example was sympto- matic of the officer corps' acceptance of "radical" professionalism.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the American military professional was exhibiting many of the same traits as his German counterpart. Both claimed, by virtue of their expertise, complete autonomy in military operations, to the exclusion of political considerations; but the American professional, because of his heritage and liberal values, never really threatened civilian control. Unfor- tunately, the bifurcation of political considerations from military planning, which was an offshoot of that same liberal tradition, destroyed any chance of generating the

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[43]Ralph Minger, William Howard Taft and United States Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1975), 48-49. See also Rowland T. Berthoff, "Taft and MacArthur, 1900-1901: A Study in Civil-Military Relations," World Politics Vol. V. (January, 1953).

kind of fusionism that true policy integration demands.
The assumption that fusionism would somehow lead to Prus-
sianization failed to take into consideration the differences
in the political and social structure between the two states.

Despite these impediments to policy integration, the
changing role of the United States during the last part of
the nineteenth century demanded some form of organizational
reform. These efforts culminated after the Spanish-American
War with the formation of the Army General Staff, the Navy
General Board, and the Joint Board of the Army and Navy.
Of these three organizations, only the Army created some-
thing that resembled the European general staff model.
The other two organizations were essentially coordinating
boards without any institutional staff support, and in the
case of the Joint Board no authority.[44]

The Army came out of the Spanish-American War badly
in need of organizational reform. The War revealed its
internal defects to such an extent that they could not be
ignored. The selection of poor camp sites in the Southern
part of the United States, the problems in issuing proper
arms and equipment (to include woolen uniforms to troops
going into a tropical climate), the massive confusion in

[44]Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing for Defense: The
American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 66.

transporting the U.S. forces to Cuba, and the scandals that were reported involving the efforts to supply the troops (to include the infamous embalmed beef scandal), ultimately reflected coordination and planning difficulties. These difficulties in turn highlighted the power struggle between three competing loci of power: the Secretary of War, the Commanding General of the Army, and the bureau chiefs. Although there was no question as to the role of the President as commander-in-chief, "the difficulty," according to Major General Otto Nelson, "arose on the level just below the President where a duality of control existed that had caused bickering and confusion for more than a century."

> Although the Secretary of War was the regularly consti-
> tuted official through whom the President's wishes
> were presumably to be effectuated, the General Command-
> ing the United States Army had come to occupy, through
> a long-standing custom aided by Congressional action,
> a position which was in some respects coordinate with
> that of the Secretary of War.[45]

The result of this duality of command was that many of the subordinate elements within the War Department considered themselves to be under the exclusive control of the Secretary or the Commanding General. The independence that many of the bureau chiefs maintained, based upon political ties to Congress and the tenure of their position, exacerbated this situation. Thus there was no single agency in a

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[45]Otto Nelson, National Security and the General Staff (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946), 14-15.

position to coordinate the various organizations.

In order to implement this badly needed reform, President McKinley appointed Elihu Root as Secretary of the Army. Root came from a business and legal background, and was thus sympathetic to managerial solutions to organizational problems. He "saw clearly how the muddles all stemmed from the failure of the parts of the Army structure to work in unison,"[46] and offered as a solution the creation of a brain to coordinate the service's various activities. The establishment of this brain required two important and interrelated organizational reforms. First, he sought to replace the Commanding General of the Army with a new position, Chief of Staff of the Army. Second, he wanted to create a general staff to help the new Chief of Staff fulfill his duties. Both of these reforms came about in 1903.

These reforms eliminated the duality of command that existed earlier. Even in the Prussian system, where the Chief of the German General Staff actually commanded the army, he did so in the name of the king, who was the commander-in-chief. In place of command, the new American Chief of Staff would head the staff and as such would be the primary advisor to the Secretary of War. Root explained this change of title and function as follows:

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[46]Alvin Brown, The Armor of Organization, 197.

> The title chief of staff---denotes a duty to advise,
> inform, and assist a superior officer who has command,
> and to represent him, acting in his name and by his
> authority, in carrying out his policies and securing
> the execution of his commands. The officer who accepts
> the position assumes the highest obligation to be
> perfectly loyal to his commander, to exclude all per-
> sonal interests from his advice and representation, and
> to try, in the most wholehearted way, to help him to
> right conclusions and to successful execution of his
> policies, even though his conclusions may not agree
> with the advice given.[47]

Superficially, it seemed that this completed the organiza-

tional restructuring.

Unfortunately, Root's reforms failed to take into

consideration the growing sense of professionalism within

the Army and the bureaucratic imperatives of the institution.

In theory the Chief of Staff is powerless to act on his own

for he is not a commander, but he is still the senior

officer within the Army. Within the military frame of refer-

ence the senior officer is normally regarded as the commander.

From the officer corps' perspective, the issue at stake was

the unity of responsibility and authority. The old military

adage, "that a commander is responsible for everything that

his units do or fail to do," reflects the importance of

authority. This, in turn, led the military professional to

want to keep unified the planning function and the command

function. The ultimate responsibility for the actions of a

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[47]War Department, Five Years of the War Department.
Following the war with Spain as shown in the annual Reports
of the Secretary of War, 1899-1903 (1904), 297-98; quoted in
Hammond, Organizing for Defense, 18-19.

staff falls upon the commander of that staff. The result of this institutional desire to merge military responsibility and military authority was that the Army perceived the Chief of Staff as the Commander. As the Chief of Staff began to be considered the senior officer in the service, an issue that was not fully resolved until after the First World War, and as he assumed the role of senior spokesman for the professional establishment, the confusion over his command role simply increased.[48] This duality of functions between planner and commander will be addressed in greater depth in later chapters.

In order to support the Chief of Staff in his planning and coordinating functions, Root proposed to create a general staff along the European model. But the Uptonian professionalism that inculcated the officer corps forced the new staff to become overly concerned with operational and administrative details, to the detriment of its planning function.[49] This was not exclusively the fault of the officer corps. For even if they had been prepared to deal with issues related to policy integration, there was no other agency outside the Army with which to coordinate.

Just as the Army had to initiate reform in order to accomodate the changing American strategic role, so did the

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[48] Edward M. Coffman, The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), chapter 6.

[49] See Nelson, National Security and the General Staff, chapters 2-4.

Navy. The major difference was that the Navy never did accept the highly centralized notions that were implicit in the Root reforms. Instead, it maintained a decentralized structure. The reason was not exclusively narrow profes- sionalism. In fact one may argue effectively, as does Richard Challener, that the Navy, because of the nature of its mission, had a greater understanding of the political realities of the world than did the Army.[50] This sense of pragmatism can be seen in the writings of Alfred T. Mahan. Despite this pragmatism, demands for the creation of a Navy general staff by some of the young turks failed, and the Navy managed to avoid staff centralization up to World War II.

Some marginal internal reform was initiated in the wake of the Spanish-American War. Although a general staff was never created, the Navy did establish the General Board in 1900. This organization had no executive responsibility nor authority. It was primarily a planning agency. In this regard, it may actually have been closer to a general staff than the Army version. One of the major impediments to centralization was the clear distinction between support/ administrative aspects of the Navy, and the combat portion. The former remained under the control of the bureau chiefs

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[50]Richard D. Challener, Admirals, Generals and American Foreign Policy: 1898-1914 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 12-45.

who maintained their autonomy, not only by political power,
but through functional specialization. One abortive effort
to centralize power in the Navy occured in 1915 with the
formation of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations. Paul
Hammond in his study of military organizations suggests that
the original intent by Navy reformers was to establish a
position analogous to that of the Army's Commanding General,
a position that would centralize all naval organization.
Unfortunately, through a combination of internal naval dis-
agreements and the desires of the civilian leadership, such
centralization never occured until World War II.[51]

The Joint Board of the Army and the Navy, formed the
same year as the General Staff, held out the potential for
becoming an organization for policy integration. Originally
established in order to facilitate Army-Navy planning, which
was relatively unsuccessful during the Spanish-American War,
the Joint Board's creation was an essential step toward
policy integration, because the services themselves had to
reach agreement on strategic issues before military policy
could be integrated with political policy. Prior to its
formation, as Lawrence Legere points out, "there never
existed, except in the person of the President himself, any
regular constituted agency to provide coordination of the

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[51]Hammond Organizing for Defense, chapter 3.

planning and activities of the Army and Navy."[52] Root had

considered the creation of a joint planning structure, the

obvious managerial companion to his own Army General Staff,[53]

but the lack of authority and a supporting staff destroyed

whatever value the Board had. One senior officer was so

disenchanted with the structure that he wrote that what was

accomplished "could have been solved by other means or

placed in a waste basket without seriously affecting either

service."[54]

While such criticism was correct, it failed to con-

sider the impact of traditional bifurcation of political and

military policy and its concomitant introverted military

professionalism. The Department of State, "jealous of its

legal and historical responsibility for the formulation and

conduct of America's foreign policy," excluded the Joint

Board from its planning process, thus leaving the military in

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[52]Lawrence J. Legere, "Unification of the Armed
Forces," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University,
1950), 2.

[53]Elihu Root, The Military and Colonial Policy of the
United States: Addresses and Reports, ed. by Robert Bacon
and James Brown Scott (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1916), 431.

[54]Quoted in Legere,"Unification," 57; also see Vernon
Davis, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II:
Organizational Development (Historical Division, Joint
Secretariat, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1972),
Vol. I covers the development of the Joint Board up to the
creation of the JCS after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

a perceived policy vacuum.[55]   The result of this vacuum was
to leave the Joint Board in a quandary.   They were the pro-
fessional military experts who were to advise the civilian
leadership on military matters, but how could they do so
unless they had some idea of the long range goals the
civilian leaders wanted to achieve?   In 1908 the Joint
Board's President, Admiral George Dewey, succinctly expres-
sed this dilemma:

> What may be the facts determining the international
> relations only the administration can know, and until
> this knowledge is communicated to the Joint Board, it
> can not intelligently make recommendations as to the
> specific disposition of the fleet...[56]

Later that year this statement was repeated almost verbatim
when the board informed the President that they could make
no specific recommendation on the defense of the Pacific
until "the facts determining international relations" were
given to them and they were told what policies and interests

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[55]Richard D. Challener, Admirals, Generals, & Ameri-
can Foreign Policy: 1898-1914, 51. In 1909 the Solicitor
of the State Department responded to the Joint Board's call
for a conference with the following statement, "as the
Department of State is charged with the administration of
foreign affairs, and as this conference...falls within the
jurisdiction of this department, it would seem that the
Department of State might well refuse to surrender its prero-
gatives." Quoted in Challener, Admirals, 53. Later in the
1920's the State Department again rejected coordination with
the Joint Board, see Ernest May, "The Development of Political-
Military Consultation in the United States," Political Science
Quarterly, Vol. LXX, No. 2 (June, 1955), 169-172.

[56]Quoted in Challener, Admirals, Generals & American
Foreign Policy: 1898-1914, 51.

they were to defend.[57]

This perceived lack of guidance forced the military at times to rely on their own assumptions, which were naturally produced from a service and military perspective. At times, this resulted in inter-service rivalry which undermined the Joint Board's credibility. At other times, it resulted in advice which was opposite that which the civilian leadership desired.[58] One such example occurred in 1913 during the war scare with Japan. The Joint Board recommended the movement of ships into the Eastern Pacific in an effort to prepare for the worst case. Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels' response to this recommendation was "nothing could be more injurious to peaceful negotiations than the movements recommended and that the Board had exceeded its functions because what it recommended might precipitate war."[59] Secretary of State Bryan remarked:

> While we were discussing how to prevent a threatened war, these men were busying themselves with plans of how to

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[57] Quoted in Morton, "Origins of Pacific Strategy," 41.

[58] For a discussion of how inter-service fighting created havoc on efforts to develop a cohesive plan in regards to the naval bases in the Philippine Islands, see Morton, "Origins of Pacific Strategy;" William R. Braisted, "The Phillipine Naval Base Problem, 1898-1909," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. XXVI, No. 3, (August, 1957).

[59] Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era, Years of Peace, 1910-1917 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944), 163; see Morton, "Origins of Pacific Strategy."

get us in. It is enough for the Army and Navy to make plans when the Commander in Chief calls upon them to do so.[60]

In this case the President dissolved the Joint Board, but it merely illustrates the fundamental problem in integrating American political and military policy. On the one hand, the professional military officer feels that he is not receiving the kind of guidance that is necessary for him to produce relevant military input; on the other hand, the civilian leadership perceives that the kind of advice they do get from the military ignores the broader ramifications of military operations and thus is essentially useless.[61] During the Naval Conferences of the 1920's and 1930's the American naval high command was explicitly excluded for this reason.[62] The history of American policy in the Pacific is

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[60]Ibid., 165. For a further examination of the civil-military problems that occurred during the Wilson Presidency see Warner R. Schilling, "Civil-Naval Politics in World War I," World Politics, Vol VII, No. 4 (July, 1955).

[61]For an examination of this problem see Fred Green "The Military View of American National Policy, 1904-1940," The American Historical Review, Vol. LXVI, No. 2, (January, 1961); May, "Political Military Consultation;" Louis Morton, "Interservice Cooperation and Political-Military Collaboration," in Total War and Cold War, Harry S. Coles, ed. (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1961); Louis Morton, "War Plan Orange: Evolution of a Strategy," World Politics, Vol. XI, No. 2 (January, 1959); Albert C. Stillson, "Military Policy Without Political Guidance: Theodore Roosevelt's Navy," Military Affairs, Vol. XXV, No. 1 (Spring, 1961). For the most detailed study of the pre-World War I period see Challener, Admirals, Generals and American Foreign Policy: 1898-1914.

[62]Raymond G. O'Connor, "The 'Yardstick' and Naval Disarmanent in the 1920's" The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. XLV, No. 3 (December 1958).

a further example of lack of integration.[63] This is not to
say that the State Department was oblivious to the impor-
tance of the military tool, but appreciation did not neces-
sarily lead to integration. Furthermore, bureaucratic
acumen was something fundamentally different from pragmatic
professionalism.[64] This continued compartmentalization of
the political and military spheres, partially brought about
by an exaggerated sense of civilian control of the military,
and partially by the military's own professionalism, continued
until the Second World War.

As war seemed more likely during the late 1930's, the
United States began to develop organizations to facilitate
policy integration. The first of these was the Standing
Liaison Committee of the State, War, and Navy Departments
(usually referred to as S.L.C.) formed in April 1938. Origi-
nally, the Standing Liaison Committee proposed to deal with
the specific problem of German involvement in Latin America,
but it held the potential to become the long missing insti-
tutional means of policy integration. Unfortunately, even

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[63]Morton, "War Plan Orange." Also see Robert J.
Quinlan, "The United States Fleet: Diplomacy, Strategy and
the Allocation of Ships (1940-41)," in American Civil-Military
Decisions: A Book of Case Studies, ed. by Harold Stein
(Birmingham, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1963).

[64]Mable E. Deutrich, Struggle for Supremacy: The
Career of General Fred C. Ainsworth (Washington: The Public
Affairs Press, 1962); for a full discussion of the political
machinations that were occurring in Washington, especially in
regard to the formation of the General Staff, see Otto Nelson,
National Security and the General Staff.

before its first official meeting the seeds of its destruction
were planted. President Roosevelt named the military heads
of the Army and Navy as the service representatives.[65] When
a year later the Joint Board was brought into the executive
office, it was only natural for the military chiefs to look
to the President for guidance and ignore the Standing Liaison
Committee as a coordinating agency.[66] Once this happened
S.L.C.'s lack of corporate contact with the White House,
coupled with traditional bifurcation of military and political
planning, emasculated its effectiveness.[67]

Aside from the Standing Liaison Committee there were
other efforts at coordinating political and military policy.
For a while, weekly meetings between Hull, Secretary of War
Henry L. Stimson and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox tried
to fill the void. In 1940 this unofficial coordination was
replaced by a more formal structure, the War Council. The
Council, consisting of Hull, Stimson, Knox, Chief of Staff
of the Army George Marshall, and Chief of Naval Operations
Harold Stark, met once a week with the President. While it

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[65]Davis, Organizational Development, I. 34-35; Harvey
Mansfield, Walter Millis, and Herold Stein, Arms and the State:
Civil Military Elements in National Policy (New York: Twen-
tieth Century Fund, 1958), 19; see also Legere "Unification,"
196.

[66]William Emerson, "FDR", The Ultimate Decision: The
President as Commander in Chief, ed. by Ernest May (New York:
George Braziller, 1960), 135-136.

[67]Mansfield, Millis and Stein, Arms and the State, 43.

did become in the words of Secretary Hull, "a sort of clear-ing house for all the information and views we had under discussion," it was never fully utilized, partially because of the unique relationship the military had with the Presi-dent. Once the United States entered the war in 1941 politics became secondary and with it the State Department. Despite Hull's protests, the traditional separation between military and political planning became standard operating procedure.[68] As Secretary Stimson recalled, "when Mr. Roosevelt learned to like the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 1942, he allowed himself to dispense with any general meeting on war policy."[69] It was not until 1943 that the problems of the future post-war environment forced the necessity for more coordinated political/military policy planning.

This lack of high level policy integration had its impact on the services as they attempted to formulate long-range strategic plans. The instrumentality for such planning existed in the service war plans divisions, which in theory were being coordinated by the Joint Board. But the Board, although vastly improved since its conception, was still hampered by inter-service distrust, a lack of authority, and a continued perception on the part of its members that they

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[68]Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: MacMillan Company, 1948), II, 1109-1111.

[69]Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in War and Peace (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), 563.

were receiving insufficient political guidance. This resulted
in the same kind of policy vacuum that the Joint Board had
complained of some thirty years earlier. It was on this point
that Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold R. Stark,
emphasized in a January 1941 memorandum:

> ...the desirability of obtaining at once some light upon
> the major decision which the President may make for guid-
> ing our future naval efforts in the event of war and in
> future immediate preparations for war.[70]

On the verge of America's entry into the Second World
War, the basic traits of military professionalism: expertise,
responsibility, and corporateness, had established firm roots
in the United States. Unfortunately, the American military
had accepted the "radical" definition of professionalism. By
its nature "radicalism" emphasized the unique character of
military expertise in order to rationalize its claim to
autonomy in military matters. As the late nineteenth century
world became increasingly dominated by technocratic managers,
the military professionals' claim to be "managers of vio-
lence" seemed appropriate. But the radical's claim to auto-
nomy ultimately led to a bifurcation of military from
political matters. This in turn led to "absolutism" in the
Janowitzian sense. The result was that military power, which
originally had been one of many means to achieve political
ends, now became an end in itself. Victory was the yardstick

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[70]Tracy Kitterage, "U.S. - British Naval Cooperation:
1910-1945" (Joint Chiefs of Staff Historical Monograph),
Chapter XII, pp. 12. (This document was only written in a draft
form in which the chapters were never collated.)

by which the professional measured his own competency. This type of absolutism was completely compatible with America's liberal idealistic philosophy. Since America's domestic consensus on the role of the military, and the officer corps' "radical" professionalism were in congruence, no one questioned the relationship of "radicalism" and the officer corps' responsibility to the society. In fact, within the liberal interpretation, "radicalism" was not only responsible, but ethically correct. If nothing else it kept the officer corps out of the political mainstream and thus guaranteed civilian control.

Ironically the same technological expertise that fostered "radicalism" also required a coordinating agent to organize and effectively use that expertise. Such an organization was the general staff model. But the staff model itself was neutral, not emphasizing either form of professionalism. For the model to work effectively it demanded both forms of professionalism to be working in concert, with the radical skills guaranteeing operational efficiency and the pragmatic skills supporting political/military planning. However, the dominance of "radicalism" meant that the operational function of the staff received primacy over the long-range planning function. The staff could develop highly sophisticated operational plans, but the equally important political/military plans, which helped develop the goals for

which military power existed, would only come about if the officer corps was imbued with "pragmatism."

The result of the primacy of "radicalism" was that the Clausewitzian notion of political/military fusion had been rejected as a threat to the liberal definition of civilian control of the military, and the professional officer's outlook was restricted to the military point of view. This "radicalism" led to a failure to utilize the general staff to its maximum, and appeared to the military officer to cut him off from the kind of policy guidance that he thought was necessary to fulfill his planning function. From the civilian leadership's perspective this "radicalism" resulted in "useless" input into the policy making process. Thus they felt they were not getting "responsible" professional advice. This failure to develop policy integration would result in fundamental problems in planning the military aspects of the forthcoming world war.

CHAPTER III

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor it was apparent to both the British and the American military leadership that some form of common institution was needed to facilitate the interchange of information and to generate a unified military approach to the war. To begin accomplishing this, a conference code named "Arcadia," took place in Washington, D.C. between 24 December 1941 and 14 January 1942. "Arcadia's" purpose was to formulate a political/military blueprint for the early stages of the war, while dealing with the immediate crisis in the Pacific. Out of these conversations came not only a reaffirmation of certain strategic principles, such as the Germany first decision; but also the establishment of a supreme U.S.-British military body to direct the military aspects of the war effort--The Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS). The Combined Chiefs were directly responsible to the President and the Prime Minister as a combined executive. From the very beginning this was exclusively an Anglo-American organization, due in part to the bureaucratic difficulties entailed in incorporating the Russians into the CCS, and in part to the establishment of

spheres of control over the war effort.[71]

Acting in the capacity as the military advisors to

the Prime Minister, the British Chiefs of Staff (COS) were

in a position to discuss authoritatively the British view on

strategic questions. The Americans on the other hand had no

equivalent to the COS except the moribound Joint Board.

Furthermore, the American staff structure had little previous

experience in dealing with inter-nation political/military

policy formulation. The inadequacy of the American system

was clearly conveyed in a letter from Field Marshal Dill to

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[71]Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff,
acknowledged the fact that the war was to be divided up into
two spheres of control; the Americans running the Pacific War
up to the Asian mainland; while the British ran the war in the
Middle East, India, Burma, and the Indian Ocean. The war in
Europe was apparently going to be controlled by the Combined
Chiefs, although the British seemed to have assumed that they
would have more to say because of their commitment and the
resources that had been allocated. Arthur Bryant, Turn of the
Tide: A History of the War Years Based Upon the Diaries of
Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General
Staff (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1957), 254; Vernon
Davis, A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II:
Organizational Development (Historical Division, Joint Secre-
tariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1972), I, 190-200; Grace P.
Hayes, A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II:
The War Against Japan (Historical Section, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, 1953), I, 119; also see "Brief Statement of the Origin
and Composition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," (Historical
Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Novem-
ber 20, 1969, Mimeographed), hereafter referred to as "Brief
Statement;" John Ehrman, Grand Strategy, October 1944-August
1945, Vol. VI of History of the Second World War, United King-
dom Military Series, Grand Strategy, ed. by Sir James Butler
(London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1956), 339. (Here-
after referred to as United Kingdom Military Series, Grand
Strategy.)

Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke:

> There are no regular meetings of their Chiefs of Staff, and if they do meet there is no secretariat to record their proceedings, they have no joint planners and executive planning agency...then there is great difficulty of getting the staff over to the President. He just sees the staff at odd times, and again no record. The whole organization belongs to the days of George Washington.[72]

The creation of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff was a result of the institutional necessity to supply American participation in the "Arcadia" conversations. Although, there was no specific American organizational counterpart to the British Chiefs of Staff, "there never seemed to have been any uncertainty as to what American officers would provide authoritative representation vis-a-vis the British within the Combined Chiefs."[73] The British Chiefs of Staff Committee consisted of the First Sea Lord (Admiral Sir Dudley Pound), the Chief of the Air Staff (Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal), and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (then General, later Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke). The American participants were selected by virtue of the fact that they held positions which corresponded to that of the British Chiefs, or to use the term of the day, they were the "United States opposite numbers." Those officers were U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, Commander-in-Chief

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[72]Dill to Alanbrooke 3 January 1942; Bryant, Turn of the Tide, 233-34.

[73]"Brief Statement," 1.

U.S. Fleet (COMINCH), Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of the

Army Air Forces and Deputy Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army,

Lieutenant General Henry H. (Hap) Arnold, and until March

1942, Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold R. Stark.[74]

The immediate problem that needed to be addressed at

"Arcadia" was the deteriorating situation in the Pacific and

Southeast Asia. General Marshall, who had great faith in

unity of command suggested that the appointment of a unified

theater commander might help stabilize the situation:

> I am convinced that there must be one man in command of
> the entire theater--air, ground, and ships. We cannot
> manage by cooperation...there should be supreme authority

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[74]Based upon the "Opposite Number" formula General
Marshall's position was analogous to that of General Alan-
brooke's. The American Navy's position was complicated by
the fact there was a dual chain of command. Since 18 Decem-
ber 1941 there had been two official heads of the Navy. On
that date the President, by Executive Order, increased the
significance of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, to which
he appointed Admiral King. Stark, the CNO, from then on
concentrated on administrative matters, until his appoint-
ment as Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, in
March of 1942. With Stark's departure, King was the sole
Navy representative on the JCS. Arnold's presence was the
result of the fact that the Royal Air Force was an indepen-
dent entity, and thus the U.S. had to supply an "Opposite
Number." The logical choice was Arnold. Since he was
junior to all the other U.S. representatives he deferred to
them on strategic issues and was generally recognized as
Marshall's subordinate. As the war progressed and U.S. air
power played an increasing role, Arnold's power within the
JCS and CCS grew accordingly so that he was promoted to
five star rank with the other members of he JCS. See "Brief
Statement," 1.

over everyone. Suitable limitations could be imposed to safeguard the interests of each nation.[75]

Marshall's remarks were directed only at the Pacific situation, where he wanted to create a unified command to direct the American, British, Dutch, and Australian (ABDA) forces in the area. The selection of the ABDA commander was extremely political because neither the British nor the Americans wanted to be shackled with the blame for the debacle. For this reason, the British Chiefs first opposed such a command structure, and it was not until the intervention of Prime Minister Churchill that the American position was sustained.[76]

Marshall had first brought up the discussion of a unified command on Christmas Day, 1941, but it was not until

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[75]ABC 4, JCSSs 2, 25 December 1941, "Arcadia" Conference Proceedings, Combined Chiefs of Staff, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas (Hereafter referred to as Proceedings, CCS). General Marshall brought up this question again on 27 December 1941, JCSSs 4, item #5 and inserted a proposed draft of a Unified Command Order, JCSSs 4, annex 1. On 28 December 1941 Prime Minister Churchill agreed to the creation of the ABDA command. This partially reflected the British desire to establish spheres of control. General Wavell received his orders on 10 January 1942, JCSSs 8.

For a further discussion of the creation of the CCS and the formation of the ABDA Command see Davis, Organizational Development, I. 139-178; Hayes, The War Against Japan, I, 45-80; Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1951), 87-106; Maurice Matloff and Edwin Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-42 (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1953), chapter 5; J.M.A. Gwyer, Grand Strategy, June 1941-August 1942, Vol. III, part 1 of United Kingdom Military Series, Grand Strategy, (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1964), 375-388.

[76]Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), 457.

the 10th of January that British General Sir Archibald

Wavell was appointed Supreme Commander in the ABDA theater.

It was during this interval that the Combined Chiefs of Staff

began to take form. The necessity for such an "appropriate

joint body" was obvious to the political leadership of both

nations; but the problem was institutionalizing it, without

allowing, in the words of Harry Hopkins, "everybody and his

grandmother" to be a member.[77] While the Combined Chiefs

had in practice been in operation since the beginning of

"Arcadia," the establishment of a de jure unified commander

demanded the formation of a de jure Combined Chiefs. The

first official meeting of the CCS took place on the 23rd of

January, 1942. With the agreement to a combined document

entitled "Post-Arcadian Collaboration," the basis for all

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[77]Ibid., 469.

future Anglo-American military coordination was set.[78]

The American desire for a unified commander, while operational at the theater level, was simply impractical any higher. No single individual could possibly control the complex military operations needed to conduct world-wide war. Furthermore, neither principal ally could politically afford to hand over the supreme command to an officer from the other nation, especially since the President and the Prime Minister were political equals. Thus the Combined Chiefs had to remain a committee. But even the CCS could not meet continuously, because the military leaders of both nations had to continue to perform their national command functions. A solution was found in naming Washington, D.C.

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[78]Obviously, the CCS had been operating in a de facto manner since the arrival of the British. At the meeting on 13 January 1942, Admiral Pound proposed that arrangements be made to extend combined collaboration outside the ABDA area, JCSSs 11, 13 January, "Arcadia" Conference, Proceedings, CCS. The following day the Chiefs approved the "Post-Arcadian Collaboration" document which specified the existence of the CCS, a Combined Secretariat, and Combined Planners, 14 January, JCSSs 12, Proceedings, CCS. The original first draft of the "Collaboration" was submitted on 10 January, JCSSs 8, annex 4, Proceedings, CCS, but at that time it was rejected and reworked for later submission. The logic of the CCS growing out of the creation of the ABDA command was first noticed in a December 24th paper entitled "Higher Direction of the War in the ABDA area," Lawrence Legere, "Unification of the Armed Forces," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1950), 237-245. The CCS was first publically mentioned in a press release on 6 February 1942, and the President signed the CCS's charter on 21 April 1942, "Brief Statement;" Cline, Washington Command Post, 100-101. It was during this period that the term "combined" began to refer to two or more nations in collaboration, while the term "joint" referred to the inter-service collaboration of one nation.

the permanent seat of the Combined Chiefs and having the British post a liaison group there. This liaison group, commanded by Field Marshal Sir John Dill, supplied permanent British staff counterparts to interface with the growing JCS bureaucracy. Dill's placement in Washington, temporarily created the fear, that he would become an intermediary body between the Prime Minister and the CCS, especially since he would have continual access to the U.S. Chiefs when the full CCS was not meeting. After a great deal of discussion it was decided that there would be no super-war cabinet inserted between the Anglo-American political leaders and their military advisors.[79] While this did eliminate the danger of imposing another bureaucracy over the Chiefs, it did create a situation that allowed for a maximum amount of political guidance as well as interference.

The mere identification of individuals to participate in the joint discussions did not alleviate the inherent problems that Dill had pointed out to Alanbrooke. Obviously, if the CCS was to perform its function and manage the war effort, it needed staff support to monitor and plan specific

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[79]By the seventh meeting of "Arcadia" it was clear that Washington was going to be the permanent seat of the CCS and that the Americans were not going to allow a military representative to be placed between the political leadership and the Chiefs. There was going to be only one Combined Chiefs of Staff. On this point the British gave in and appointed Dill the head of the delegation to Washington and did not make him special representative to the President. JCSSs 11, 13 January 1942, "Arcadia" Conference, Proceedings, CCS. Also see Davis, Organizational Development, I, 183-88.

aspects of the conflict. Such a Combined Staff began to take form shortly after "Arcadia" began. Slowly a series of combined committees were established to deal with functional areas such as plans, intelligence, etc. These committees had both British and American representation, with the U.S. officers being drawn from the JCS's own parallel joint committee structure. Despite Joint Chiefs Historian Vernon Davis' observation that the JCS did not follow any "large and conscious design"[80] as it formed its committees, there were certain factors that helped mold its structure. During the late 1930s the Joint Board began to develop a series of supporting staff committees, most noticeably in the areas of plans and intelligence. These committees were staffed by officers whose primary assignment was to the service staffs of these related fields. They worked together on the Joint Board Committees only as a part-time duty. Thus the members of the Joint Planning Committee were full-time members of the Army General Staff's War Plans Division and the Chief of Naval Operation's War Plans Division. Theoretically, these officers were to "consider this joint work as their most important duty," but invariably they had to devote their primary attention to their own service jobs.[81]

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[80]Davis, Organizational Development, II, 354.

[81]Ibid., I, 30.

Despite this problem the Joint Board's organizational support supplied the nucleus for the forthcoming JCS bureaucracy, which also tended to model itself after the British Chiefs of Staff structure.

Unfortunately, the American staff retained its part-time flavor, as opposed to assigning full-time joint staffers. While the committee structure and the individuals involved changed during the war, the basic pattern of U.S. representation on Combined Committees was that the senior U.S. officers were also the senior service staff specialist in that specific field. Thus the senior US members on the Combined Intelligence Committee were the Chiefs of Army and Navy Intelligence. Similarly, Rear Admiral Richard K. Turner, Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans), COMINCH, was the U.S. Navy representative to the Joint Staff Planners (JPS), and along with an Army Counterpart made up the senior U.S. representation to the Combined Staff Planners (CPS). For the most part these joint committees had to rely on service staffs for support, although some of the committees had permanent sub-committees made up of full-time staff officers to support them.[82]

The part-time relationship between the services and the joint committee reflected an American commitment that

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[82]As an example of how the committee structure worked the JPS consisted of five members, the Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans of COMINCH) and two assistants; and the Chief of the Strategy and Policy Group of the War Department's Operations Division (OPD) and the Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans) of the Army Air Staff.

planning would not occur in a vacuum. By having the senior member of the committee the senior service planner, unity of purpose was achieved. But this relationship also fostered a tendency for the joint planner to support his own service position. The British tried to make their staff planners free agents, whose responsibility was to the committee as a corporate group, and not to the service. Thus the British fully anticipated that their planners might go against their services' interest on some issues. The American officers, on the other hand were used to responding to the desires of their superiors, and achieving concurrence at every level. Thus the American planners tended to be more of a service advocate than their British counterpart. The result was, "not to produce the best paper possible within a reasonable time, but a 'perfect' paper, in which all differences had been adjusted to the satisfaction of the various superiors."[83] The placement of senior staff officers as the U.S. representatives simply exacerbated this problem, which in turn increased inter-service conflicts within the staff. Therefore, the American staff planners might be split along service lines, while the British planners always spoke in a single voice.

Following closely behind the establishment of the Combined Chiefs, was the de jure establishment of the

[83]Davis, Organizational Change, II, 384.

American Joint Chiefs of Staff, who held their first official meeting on 9 February 1942. From the very beginning their functions and duties were never delineated beyond the generalities of coordinating and directing the war effort. For the completion of this mission the JCS was directly responsible to the President. The authority of the Chiefs came from two sources: the members own statutory responsibilities and functions, and their direct relationship to the President. "So long as the Joint Chiefs of Staff retained the confidence of the President," wrote one JCS historian, "the wartime prerogatives of the agency was secure."[84] It was imperative for the Chiefs to maintain the President's confidence and support if they were to sustain their viewpoint before the Combined Chiefs. In order to enhance this working relationship, General Marshall became convinced that a fourth member of the JCS should be designated to preside at the JCS meetings and to maintain a liaison with the White House. In order to placate Admiral King, General Marshall proposed that the new member be a naval officer. Thus on 20 July 1942, Admiral William D. Leahy was appointed to the newly created position of Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy.[85]

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[84]"Brief Statement," 5.

[85]Admiral Leahy was a close friend of the President, and was recalled from his post as Ambassador to Vichy, France.

The appointment of Admiral Leahy was inextricably connected to a series of reforms that occurred within the services. Both services realized that unity of command was essential for victory, but too much centralization in the hands of a chief would strangle the bureaucracy and crush the chief beneath the weight of trivia. Thus the goal was to balance centralization with decentralization so the chief could concentrate on the broad strategic issues. The Army had begun to think about some form of reorganization during the fall of 1941, when it became apparent that General Marshall would not be able to command the American Expeditionary Force as doctrine called for. Such an approach would only be feasible in a one theater war, as in the case of World War I. For a world wide conflict, a new organization was required. Such a reorganization occurred in March 1942, under the direction of Lieutenant General Joseph McNarney. It centralized the diverse elements within the Army into three major commands, Army Air Forces, Army Service Forces, and Army Ground Forces. The latter two commands centralized all non-Army Air Forces logistics and training functions under their control, while the former paved the way for Air Force autonomy. Men and material were then sent from these commands to the theaters of operation. In order to handle the vast planning and operational function incurred by the war effort, the War Plans Division within the General

Staff was redesignated the Operations Division (OPD). It was through the OPD that General Marshall controlled the Army, just as a commanding general would have. This reorganization guaranteed General Marshall primacy in the military sphere, vis-a-vis Secretary Stimson, who increasingly became exclusively concerned with administrative matters.[86]

During the same time period the Navy was also going through a reorganization. While the Army's effort was at controlled decentralization in order to free the Chief of Staff for strategic issues, the Navy had to centralize its organization in order to achieve unity of command. For a variety of reasons, the Navy had developed a dual command structure, with the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) primarily concerned with administrative and planning matters, and the Commander-in-Chief U.S. Fleet (COMINCH) acting as the combat commander. In December 1941 Admiral King was appointed COMINCH, explaining the presence of both Stark and King at the "Arcadia" meetings. Increasingly, it became apparent that this duality was dysfunctional and in March 1942 Stark was relieved of his duties as CNO, thus placing King,

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[86]Davis, Organizational Development, I, 234-37; Otto Nelson, National Security and the General Staff (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946), chapter 8; James E. Hewes, From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900-1963 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1975), 67-78.

who now assumed both the CNO and COMINCH duties, in a position analogous to that of Marshall.[87]

These March reforms tended to supply each service chief with a great deal of wartime power and thus made them less interested in the creation of a super agency along the lines of a chief of a joint general staff. The insertion of such an agency would tend to negate the positive effects of the March reforms. Still the Chiefs, and in particular Marshall, felt that the President needed professional staff assistance to effectively perform the duties of the commander-in-chief.[88] In a March 1942 memorandum, General Marshall explained that his notion of a chief of the joint general staff would not be that of a supreme military commander above the services, "but that the office would be established to provide some one person not at present involved in the War or Navy Departments who would coordinate and brief information and opinions,"[89] so that the President could make the necessary policy decisions.

The role of Admiral Leahy has always been an extremely difficult one to ascertain primarily because, like the

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[87]Davis, Organizational Development, I, 237-8; King's assumption of both Navy offices meant that the Army outnumbered the Navy two to one.

[88]Ibid., I, 239-50.

[89]Ibid., I, 251.

president's commander-in-chief power, Leahy was given a title without a corresponding list of functions. There is a certain amount of ambiguity in Marshall's proposal for a chief of the joint general staff. Undoubtedly, Marshall never envisioned Leahy becoming the commander of all U.S. military forces. This could violate the President's constitutional power, as well as undermine Marshall's own position, that in effect had been elevated to that of commanding general as a result of the March 1942 reforms. Instead Marshall was thinking of a typical military chief of staff who acted as coordinator of the staff, an avenue of expression for the commander, and a means of communication between the commander, the staff, and the commanders in the field. This is precisely the kind of role that Marshall outlined in March 1942. The ability to be a neutral arbitrator between the various factions within a staff is typically one of the chief of staff's primary functions. This explains Marshall's desire to have a neutral chairman for the JCS who could arbitrate inter-service conflicts. This was one of Leahy's strong suits. Not only would his appointment equalize the number of army and navy officers on the JCS, but Marshall "was willing to trust Leahy to be a neutral chairman...."[90]

Originally, the President did not see the necessity for such an individual, maintaining that he was his own chief

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[90]Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall, Ordeal and Hope: 1939-1942 (New York: Viking Press, 1966), 298.

of staff. Although, the President was finally persuaded as
to the value of such a position, his own desire never to let
power reside outside his immediate control tended to degrade
the position.[91] General Marshall pointed out that Leahy
increasingly became "the Chief of Staff to the President and
less the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff...."[92] The apparent
derogatory tone of Marshall's statement conveys the notion
that Leahy was not allowed to become as involved in the formu-
lation of policy as Marshall thought he should by virtue of
his position.[93]

The British Official History, while not describing
this transformation, clearly notes that Leahy's role was to
"explain rather than formulate."[94] The President himself
described Leahy's role as "a sort of 'leg man,' who would
help him [Roosevelt] digest, analyze, and summarize a mass of
material with which he had been trying to cope with

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[91]_Ibid._, 299.

[92]_Ibid._, 300.

[93]The role of General Hastings Ismay, personal Chief
of Staff to the Prime Minister, may have been the model that
Marshall was basing his ideas on. He may also have been
thinking of a role that would be analogous to that of the
Secretary of Defense as the position was first conceived in
1947.

[94]John Ehrman, _Grand Strategy, October 1944-August
1945_, 344.

singlehanded."[95] In the final analysis Leahy became primarily

an avenue of information and feedback between the President

and his military advisors. Unfortunately, as Leahy was drawn

into the President's political conversations toward the end

of the war, this avenue at times became blocked.[96]

Whatever Admiral Leahy's role, his presence greatly

facilitated the operations of the Joint Chiefs, but the lack

of an official organizational charter continued to be a prob-

lem. In January 1943, the Secretary of the JCS circulated a

proposed charter among the Chiefs, who subsequently sent it

to the President for approval. The charter specified that

the Chiefs were to act as the military advisors to the Presi-

dent, make joint plans, issue joint directives, and exercise

jurisdiction over strategy and operations.[97] Leahy, who

opposed such a document, believed that the Joint Chiefs

functioned effectively without one. Since the JCS already

had direct access to the President, Leahy believed that such

a document could only constrain their relationship and limit

the scope of their activity.[98] Apparently, the President

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[95]William D. Leahy, I Was There (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1950), 97-101; after the war Leahy recalled that the relationship of the JCS toward the President was exactly as a staff to a commander.

[96]Pogue, Ordeal and Hope, 300.

[97]Legere, "Unification of the Armed Forces," 246.

[98]Davis, Organizational Development, II, 440.

agreed with his Chief of Staff, because he rejected the

charter with the following note:

> It is my understanding that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
> are encountering no new conditions currently requiring
> clarification of their status or a new definition of
> their functions. It seems to me that such an order
> would provide no benefits and might in some way impair
> flexibility of operations. Consequently, I consider
> the issuance of an Executive Order now as superfluous.
> If at a latter date an Executive Order seems necessary
> to meet a new situation, the matter can be recon-
> sidered.[99]

President Roosevelt's refusal to grant the Joint

Chief's a charter suggests something of his administrative

desires and supplies insight into his perceptions as to what

role the Joint Chiefs of Staff were to play during the war.

It is generally admitted that Roosevelt was a poor admini-

strator, who liked to handle things personally. This personal

control, which maximized his flexibility and allowed him to

utilize his very potent political skills, may help explain

the transition in Leahy's role. This administrative attitude

is part of four interrelated factors that must be considered

in determining the Joint Chief's war-time role. These four

factors were: (1) Roosevelt's war-time political objectives

and his self-perception as commander-in-chief; (2) the

political objectives of the British and their effective

political/military planning structure which sought to

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[99]Quoted in Legere, "Unification of the Armed Forces,"
247.

guarantee the achievement of those goals; (3) the Joint Chiefs' own strategic concepts and self-image as military officers and advisors to the President; (4) the committee nature of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Despite the appearance of unity within the Anglo-American alliance, there existed profound political and strategic differences. To the degree that the membership of the CCS was responsible to the political leadership of their respective nations, these disagreements permeated the military discussions. Due to the committee nature of the Combined Chiefs, none of the members were capable of forcing a successful resolution of an issue except by using the age old political methods of persuasion and compromise. "The combined organization..." one British Chief wrote, "gives us the constitutional right to discuss on equal terms."[100] This equality meant that each Chief had effectively the power to veto any CCS action. Since the Chiefs had no organizational superior other than their political leadership, it was only from that level that a decision could be imposed. When divergent views clashed and compromise failed, the issue had to be dealt with at the highest level. In practice this meant that support by the political leadership determined one's ability to impose one's views on opposing Chiefs.

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[100]Ehrman, Grand Strategy, October 1944-August 1945, 348.

Under such a system, the British possessed certain
inherent advantages. In the first place, the British policy
structure optimized political/military planning and assured
support from the political leadership. In the second place,
the British unity of purpose combined with their preponder-
ance of military resources in the European Theater led to
their dominance in strategy up until 1943.[101] Finally, the
American Chiefs were split over strategic matters, with the
naval representatives far more concerned with the Pacific
Theater than were their army counterparts.[102]

The fact that these inter-service conflicts existed
was partially the fault of the committee nature of the Joint
Chiefs. Just as it was within the CCS, it was impossible to
impose a decision from within the Joint Chiefs on a recalci-
trant member. Thus a great deal of "quiet military diplomacy"

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[101]Ibid., 332, 338.

[102]Bryant, The Turn of the Tide, 279; H. H. Arnold,
Global Mission (New York: Harper and Row, 1949), 338; Henry
L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and
War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), 515.

was required to "reconcile the diverse service theories."[103]

In regard to the Pacific area of operations, where the Joint

Chiefs were autonomous, the services negotiated with each

other over strategic issues as if they were sovereign nations.

Despite these internal conflicts the Chiefs were very reluc-

tant to reveal their differences to any outside agency. To

do so might allow the decision making power to gravitate else-

where. Reflecting on this point, Admiral King remarked that

"matters of major import that required presentation to the

President could be counted on the fingers of one hand. We

usually found a solution. Sometimes a compromise."[104] Under

these circumstances Admiral Leahy performed a vital function,

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[103]Maurice Matloff, "American Leadership in World War II," Soldiers and Statesmen, Proceedings of the Fourth Military History Symposium, USAF Academy, 1970 (Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1973), 94. The individual veto power of a Chief was exemplified in 1942 when the JCS considered cutting back on the number of capital ships that were to be ordered so that more landing craft could be built. Only Admiral King was opposed to this. When Admiral Leahy remarked that it looked as though "the vote is three to one," King replied that as far as he was concerned the JCS was "not a voting body on any matter that concerns the Navy." Quoted in Demetrios Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification: A Study of Conflict and the Policy Process (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), 18.

[104]Quoted in Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification, 19; one example of the conflicts that existed within the JCS was the issue of British naval reinforcement to the Pacific late in the war. The President had agreed to the Royal Navy sending a fleet, but Admiral King was opposed. At a CCS meeting King even refuted the President, to which Admiral Leahy remarked, "I don't think we should wash our linen in public," Andrew B. Cunningham, A Sailor's Odyssey (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1951), 612.

because it was through him that the Chiefs discovered the President's strategic predilections and thus they were able to avoid revealing many of their internal differences. One knowledgable insider, Captain Tracy Kitterage of the U.S. Navy maintained that such a process actually enhanced the President's control over military decisions:

> It may be true that the President formally overruled them [JCS] on a very few occasions, but this was only because informal discussions of the President with Leahy, Marshall, King, and Arnold usually led them to know in advance the President's views. They, no doubt, frequently recognized the advantages of accepting the President's suggestions with their own interpretations, rather than of risking an overruling by presenting formally proposals they knew would not be accepted.[105]

The picture presented of Presidential-JCS interaction is one of decentralization. While this reflected the President's desired mode of administrative control, the nature of such decentralization leads automatically to unstructured lines of communication. General Marshall, in particular, despised such operational methods and complained to British Field Marshal Alanbrooke that there were occasions he did not see the President for four to six weeks at a time.[106] Under these circumstances Marshall was forced to use Admiral Leahy, Harry Hopkins, and even Field Marshal Dill to discover the White House's thoughts on certain matters. At

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[105] Sherwood, _Roosevelt and Hopkins_, 957n.

[106] Bryant, _The Turn of the Tide_, 242n.

other times, though, all the members of the JCS went to the President and discussed strategic issues.[107]   Lawrence Legere has correctly observed that since President Roosevelt was not a skilled administrator, he liked to have "cooperating, but not highly coordinated subordinates," which resulted in the JCS being "tailor-made for his taste."[108]   This structure allowed the President to easily impose his desires on the organization, thus making his attitudes and his role all important.

Probably no aspect of Roosevelt's Presidency is more controversial than his wartime role as commander-in-chief and his impact on military decisions. The reason is the inextricable relationship between these decisions and the subsequent development of the Cold War. Obviously, many of the "military decisions" made during this period had long term political consequences and vice versa. It thus becomes important to ascertain the extent of the President's impact on such decisions.

There is little doubt that Franklin Roosevelt took his responsibilities as commander-in-chief very seriously.[109]

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[107]Leahy, I Was There, 103; Washington Command Post, 104; Kent Roberts Greenwood, American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsideration (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1963), 54.

[108]Legere, "Unification of the Armed Forces," 289-90.

[109]Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1948), II, 1111.

His personal commitment to the President's military function combined with the 1939 order that brought the Army Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations into the Executive Office resulted in a close rapport between the JCS and the White House. Even if the President had had no desire to fulfill his Constitutional role, the very nature of the Combined Chiefs would have thrust him into the military arena.

The extent to which the President controlled military decisions is difficult to determine, due to conflicting impressions and interpretations of his actions. Admiral Leahy stated in his memoirs that the President "was the real Commander-in-Chief of our Navy, Army, and Air Force."[110] Some historians, though, have taken the view advocated by Samuel P. Huntington in his book The Soldier and the State. Huntington maintains that the civilian decision makers unofficially abdicated their responsibilities and allowed the military to run the war. He bases his contention on the belief that the President rarely overruled his military advisors and defended their positions at international conferences. This abdication forced the military to make crucial decisions of a political nature.[111]

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[110] Leahy, I Was There, 345.

[111] Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), chapter 12.

This thesis does supply a rationale to explain the failure of American post-war policy, but the record fails to substantiate it. In a recent study by Kent Roberts Greenfield, formerly Chief Historian of the United States Army, at at least twenty-two examples of Presidential decisions made "against the advice or over the protests of his military advisors," and another dozen examples of Presidential initiatives in strategic matters were identified. Significantly, Greenfield found that the only point of contention between the President and the JCS after 1943 was over the recall of General Joseph Stilwell from China.[112] Greenfield's work paints the portrait of a President deeply involved in the military progress of the war. But why after 1943 was there a sudden absence of conflict between the President and his military advisors? Professor Paul Emerson, in his study of Roosevelt as commander-in-chief, suggests that the President's political goals and the military objectives of the Joint Chiefs coincided near the end of the war, thus abrogating any need for Presidential intervention:

> The political considerations seen by the President and the logistical and strategic considerations seen by the Chiefs paralleled one another in 1943 and afterwards.

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[112]Greenfield, American Strategy, 80. This list by no means exhausts the number of times the President was involved in the decision making process. General Arnold records that it was the President that suggested the island hopping strategy used in the Pacific, Arnold, Global Mission, 372.

The consequence was close concurrence of political and military views.[113]

If Emerson is correct then the President's political goals form the basis for determining the role of the Joint Chiefs.

It is generally assumed that the President's primary wartime goal was victory, possibly even at the expense of post-war problems.[114] While this is essentially true, it may be suggested that victory was only a means to a greater end. James McGregor Burns, in his biography of Roosevelt, describes the President as:

> ...both a soldier of the Faith, battling with his war-
> rior comrades for an ideology of peace and freedom, and
> a prince of the State, protecting the interests of his
> nation in a tumultuous and impious world. His difficulty
> lay in the relation of the two.[115]

The ideological objective that Roosevelt sought was a reformed world based upon his Four Freedoms, but in order to accomplish that goal the evil of fascism had to be eradicated. Within this framework, unconditional surrender was a concrete mani-festation of total war. It was with this framework in mind

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[113]William Emerson, "F.D.R., 1941-1945," in The Ulti-mate Decision: The President as Commander in Chief, ed. Ernest May (New York: George Braziller, 1960), 162.

[114]Joint Chiefs of Staff Historical Division, inter-view with members of the staff, January 1975.

[115]James McGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom (New York: Harcourt & Brace, 1970), 549.

that Roosevelt could say to Churchill,"the political con-
siderations you mentioned are important factors, but military
operations based thereupon must be secondary to the primary
operation of striking at the heart of Germany."[116]

As Burns noted, though, Roosevelt was also a prince
of the state attempting to promote and to protect American
national interest. Winning the war was not only an ideo-
logical goal, but also a very practical political policy.
Central to achieving this goal was keeping the coalition
together. Roosevelt may have spoken in terms of a world
structured on the Four Freedoms, but he apparently envisaged
a world governed by the Four Policemen; the United States,
Russia, England, and China.[117]

Within this overall structure there were stages when
certain policies were more important than others. Paul Emer-
son observed three such periods: prior to the attack on
Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt's main policy was to deter aggres-
sion; after December 1941, and until the end of 1943, the
main goal was coalition unity; after 1943, it was ending the
war in such a way as to avoid any long term commitments to
Europe.[118] Greenfield's study of Presidential military

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[116]Ibid., 548; also see Hans Morgenthau, In Defense
of the National Interest (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1950).

[117]Robert Devine, Roosevelt & World War II (New Ycrk:
Penquin Books, 1970), chapter 4.

[118]Emerson, "F.D.R.," 176.

decisions tend to support Emerson's theory. Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor the main points of contention between the President and the Chiefs were over the allocation of the limited American resources to support Britain and the use of American military and economic power to deter Japan.[119] Once the United States had entered the war the decisions made by Roosevelt were aimed at keeping the coalition together. The most visable manifestation of this policy was Roosevelt's support of the invasion of North Africa (Operation "Gymnast/ Torch"), in which he overturned the American commitment to a cross-channel invasion[120] and rejected the JCS's advice to concentrate instead in the Pacific.[121] Secretary of War Stimson wrote after the war that:

> The Torch decision was the result of two absolutely definite and final rulings, one by the British and the other by the President. Mr. Churchill and his advisors categorically refused to accept the notion of a cross-channel invasion in 1942. Mr. Roosevelt categorically insisted that there must be some operation in 1942.[122]

One consequence of Roosevelt's commitment to coalition unity may have been his neglect for the long term political

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[119]Greenfield, American Strategy, 80-84.

[120]J.R.M. Butler, Grand Strategy: June 1941-August 1942, Vol III, part 2 of the United Kingdom Military Series (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1964), 563-583.

[121]Ernest J. King and Walter M. Whitehead, Fleet Admiral King, A Naval Memoir (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1952), 425.

[122]Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 425.

questions involved in restructuring the post-war world. This

is the thesis advanced by Under Secretary of State Sumner

Wells. Wells believed that this commitment stemmed from the

President's "conviction that as Commander-in-Chief his para-

mount obligation was to permit nothing to jeopardize the win-

ning of the war."[123] Wells may have been wrong though in

believing that short term unity was the President's only

political goal. According to Emerson, after 1943, the Presi-

dent was primarily concerned with winning the war as quickly

as possible in order to avoid any long term commitments to

Europe. Emerson's thesis is based upon a letter from Roose-

velt to Acting Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.:

> I do not want the United States to have the post-war
> burden of reconstructing France, Italy, and the Balkans.
> This is not our natural task....It is definitely a
> British task in which the British are far more vitally
> interested than we are...our principal objective is not
> to take part in the internal problems of Southern
> Europe.[124]

This letter not only reflected Roosevelt's understanding of

the impact of domestic politics on foreign policy, but it

also referred back to his image of the world based on the

Four Policemen. Such a system would leave Europe to the

English and the Russians. Any effort to solve all the

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[123]Sumner Wells, Seven Decisions that Shaped History
(New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1950), 145.

[124]Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition
Warfare: 1943-1944 (Washington: Office of the Chief of
Military History, Department of the Army, 1959), 491.

various and complex political problems in Europe might well

alienate the Russians, whose support was sorely needed to

complete the grand design.

As the war reached its inevitable conclusion, the

necessity for a Russian-American understanding became more

apparent. In a Joint Chiefs memorandum of July 1944, this

issue was discussed:

> After the defeat of Japan, the United States and the
> Soviet Union will be the only military powers of first
> magnitude....The relative strength and geographic posi-
> tions of these two powers preclude the military defeat
> of one of these powers by the other, even if that power
> were allied with the British Empire.[125]

The memorandum concluded that with the end of the war the

British Empire will have "lost ground both economically and

militarily." Based on this analysis it made sense that

Roosevelt would want to postpone any confrontation with the

Russians. Moreover, the faster the war ended the faster the

post-war restructuring of the world could begin, even if

it meant the disruption of the Anglo-American alliance. It

is within this context that Roosevelt's rejection of

Churchill's Balkan schemes must be analyzed. As the war came

closer to its conclusion, the military and political goals of

the United States increasingly coincided. Although there

may have been differences between the President and his

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[125]Ibid., 523-24.

military advisors over specifics, there was a real unity in

purpose between them. Both had as their primary goal the

defeat of the enemy; for the President it was a means; for the

military it was an end. If keeping the coalition together in

1942 meant that the cross-channel invasion would have to be

cancelled and replaced with an invasion of North Africa, then

that was the way it was to be. But as the political and

military goals of the JCS and the President coalesced, the

military point of view appeared to become dominant.

From the beginning, the President's political goals

were the guiding factor in the formulation of strategic

policy, and this was enhanced by the close relationship that

existed between the JCS and the White House.[126] It was to

the President and not to the State Department that the Chiefs

looked for guidance. In fact it was the President who became

the point of coordination for all aspects of policy formula-

tion; much to the dismay of the British:

> The Americans have never been accustomed, in considera-
> tion of military or quasi-military matters, to link
> harmoniously the civil and the military interests. They
> have no War Cabinet and they have no Defense Committee at
> which requirements, both civil and military can be scruti-
> nized and programs formed with due regard for the merit
> of the case. Nor have they any means by which the con-
> flicting views of the several agencies can be harmonized
> and the common policy reached. The whole burden of
> grouping the extravagant demands of the War Department
> and of co-ordinating the action of the many agencies which

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[126]Joint Chiefs of Staff Historical Division, inter-
view with members of the staff, January 1975.

have been created fall on one man--the President.[127]

While the British criticism succinctly analyzed the
failure of American political/military planning and Roose-
velt's mode of administration, it failed to consider that the
committee nature of the Combined Chiefs forced the Chiefs of
Staff of both nations to rely upon their political leadership
in order to achieve a successful resolution of issues before
the CCS. A general study of the major CCS decisions made
during the war reveal an interesting pattern. When the Pre-
sident failed to support the American Chiefs' position in the
face of British unity, it normally failed; when he did sup-
port the American Chiefs, they prevailed. The decision to
undertake the cross-channel invasion is one case in point.

The American commitment to the cross-channel invasion,
which stemmed from the Germany first decision made at "Arca-
dia," was specifically formulated in March and April of 1942.
Almost immediately the British began to disclaim support for
the operation and proposed instead the North African venture.
The Americans fully realized that implementing Operation
"Torch" would postpone the cross-channel invasion to 1943,
at the earliest. For this reason General Marshall fought hard
against the African project. He maintained that the only way
to defeat Germany was to invade the Continent and fight the

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[127]Gwyer, Grand Strategy: June 1941-August 1942,
Part 1, 394.

decisive battle in Northern France.[128] The President on the
other hand, was far more interested in coalition politics
and thus rejected Marshall's advice. At the Casablanca Con-
ference, in 1943, Marshall was again put in a position of
advocating the European invasion without Presidential support.
Before the American contingent left for Africa, the President
held a conference with the JCS and inquired whether the Ameri-
cans should meet the British "unified in advocating a cross-
channel operation." Roosevelt was well aware that the Brit-
ish would be unified in opposition to such a plan and would
recommend a continuation of the Mediterranean strategy. While
Marshall favored a unified confrontation, the President sought
to postpone it and favored some form of compromise. In the
end there was no understanding between the military and their
commander-in-chief. Roosevelt left the Chiefs free to voice
their own views, while remaining uncommitted himself. In the
face of unified British opposition the invasion was cancelled
until 1944.[129]

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[128]Leo J. Meyer, "The Decision to Invade North Africa,"
in Command Decisions, ed. Kent Roberts Greenfield (Washington:
Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the
Army, 1960); Richard W. Steele, The First Offensive, 1942:
Roosevelt, Marshall and the Making of American Strategy (Bloom-
ington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1973); Matloff and
Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942
266-297; Bryant, The Turn of the Tide, 339-40; J.R.M. Butler,
Grand Strategy: June 1941-August 1942, part 2, 563-583.

[129]Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition
Warfare: 1941-1942, 379-380; Winston S. Churchill, Hinge of
Fate, Vol. IV of The Second World War (Boston: Haughton Mif-
flin Co., 1950), 588.

It was not until the President decided to make a stand on the invasion that the American position finally prevailed. Roosevelt first began to support his military advisors during the Washington "Trident" Conference in May of 1943. Within the Combined Chiefs a confrontation was inevitable. The American Chiefs hoped that "the strength of the force to be employed in the Mediterranean will be so limited as not to prejudice the success of a cross-channel operation in 1944."[130] The British on the other hand maintained "the attack on Italy must be carried out relentlessly to insure her elimination from the war and thus opposed weakening allied forces below that level."[131] While this deadlock existed within the Combined Chiefs, a similar confrontation occurred in the White House between the President and the Prime Minister. Although the President's support for the cross-channel attack was by no means as stringent as the American military would have liked, a 1 May 1944 date was agreed upon for the

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[130]CCS 219, Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff, "Conduct of the War in 1943-44," 14 May 1943, Trident Conference, Proceedings, CCS. This was a further defense of CCS 215, Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff, "Invasion of the European Continent from the United Kingdom in 1943-44," 13 May 1943, Trident Conference, Proceedings, CCS. Also see Leahy, I was There, 160.

[131]CCS 229, Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff, "Operations in the European Theater between HUSKY and ROUND-UP," 14 May 1943, Trident Conference, Proceedings, CCS. This was the British response to CCS 215.

invasion.[132] Despite this commitment, Marshall was still

unsure of Roosevelt's support. Not until the first Quebec

"Quadrant" Conference in August 1943 and at the Teheran Con-

ference two months later was the issue fully settled.[133]

Obviously, this has been an over simplification of

the Overlord decision. It has excluded discussing tactical

feasibility as well as Soviet influence. Despite these

weaknesses, it is still useful in leading us to some interest-

ing observations. As long as Marshall failed to have Presi-

dential support he found it simply impossible to force a

successful resolution of the cross-channel issue within the

committee structure of the Combined Chiefs. This was especi-

ally true as long as the Prime Minister was adamantly opposed

to it. Churchill insured this by keeping his Chiefs under

very tight control. According to Lord Portal, Chief of the

Air Staff, Churchill browbeat the CCS "like they were a

bunch of pickpockets."[134] With Presidential support though,

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[132]Mns. 1st meeting, Trident Conference, 12 May 1943
Proceedings, CCS. Also see Richard M. Leighton, "OVERLORD
versus the Mediterranean at the Cairo-Tehran Conferences," in
Command Decisions, ed. Kent Roberts Greenfield (Washington:
Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the
Army, 1960); Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coali-
tion Warfare: 1943-1944 (Washington: Office of the Chief of
Military History, Department of the Army, 1959), 126-146.

[133]CCS 303, CCS 303/1, and CCS 303/3, Quadrant Con-
ference, Proceedings, CCS,

[134]Forest Pogue, "The Wartime Chiefs of Staff and the
President," in Soldiers and Statesmen, Proceedings of the
Fourth Military History Symposium, USAF Academy, 1970 (Wash-
ington: Office of the Chief of Air Force History, 1973), 74.

it was possible for the American military's position to pre-vail.[135] This reinforces the contention that the President was the only point of contact for the coordination of political/military policy. While he might be able to direct the American military toward his political goals, there was no effort made to institutionalize such coordination. If the President did not handle it himself, it simply was not done. At times this resulted in leaving the Joint Chiefs in a guidance vacuum which put the Americans at a disadvantage vis-a-vis their British counterparts.[136] This problem was never more apparent than during the Casablanca Conference in January 1943.

The main issue at the conference was the direction of allied strategy during the remainder of the year. The main point of contention was the American supported cross-channel invasion versus the British desire to continue operations in the Mediterranean Theater. The leading advocate for the American position, as discussed earlier, was General Marshall, who maintained that "Germany must be

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[135]Two such examples of Presidential influence occurred when the President supported the American position on daylight bombing in the face of British opposition, Arnold, Global Mission, 393; and the lack of Presidential support meant that the JCS desire to conduct the "Anakim" Operation in the China-Burma-India Theater could not occur in the face of British opposition; Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944, 139-142.

[136]Cline, Washington Command Post, 104.

defeated by a powerful effort on the continent." He and the

other American Chiefs were anxious to avoid "interminable

operations in the Mediterranean" that would postpone the

invasion indefinitely.[137]

Unfortunately, for Marshall and the other American

planners, their effort was doomed from the start. There were

three factors undermining their position. The first was not

only the lack of Presidential support, but a lack of political

guidance upon which they could base their arguments. The

second was that the British military arguments against the

invasion were extremely valid. The last was that the Ameri-

cans confronted a unified British team supported by its

political leadership.[138] This was in marked contrast to the

American delegation, whose military advisors were themselves

divided over strategic questions.

From the very beginning, the British took the Casa-

blanca Conference very seriously. Arthur Bryant, in his

biography of Lord Alanbrooke, records how the British planned

their confrontation with the Americans with all the care of

a military operation. Prior to the conference, the Prime

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[137]Casablanca Conference, Proceedings, CCS, 208-239.

[138]Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1964), 166; for a general discussion of the Casablanca Conference see, Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944, 18-43.

Minister told his Chiefs of Staff that "they were not to hurry or try to force an agreement, but to take plenty of time, there was to be full discussion and no impatience-- the dripping of water on a stone." While the British Chiefs worked on their American counterparts, the Prime Minister planned to work on the President.[139] Not only were the British better unified for the conference, but they were also better equipped. They arrived with a large number of staffers, an effective communications system, and a six thousand ton ship converted into a floating reference library.[140] In the words of one American planner, General Albert Wedemeyer, the British:

> Swarmed down upon us like locusts with a plentiful supply of planners and various other assistants with a pyramid of plans to ensure that they not only accomplished their purpose but did so in stride and with promise of continuing their role of directing strategically the course of the war.[141]

Wedemeyer went on to note that, "one might say we came, we listened, and we were conquered."[142] In the end the Americans

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[139]Bryant, Turn of the Tide, 445.

[140]Ibid., 443.

[141]Wedemeyer to Handy, 22 January 1943, ANFA Memo 14-23 January, 1943, Box 1, Documents of Allied Commands-CCS, Military Documents, Beddle Smith Papers, Eisenhower Library, Abiline, Kansas.

[142]Ibid.

figuratively "lost their shirts" at the conference.[143]

The British success at Casablanca was due to several factors. Probably, the most important factor was the British unity of purpose, which existed from the Prime Minister down through the staff planners. The Americans, in contrast, not only failed to have the President behind them, but they themselves were internally split. Admiral King at times was ambivalent, at times sided with the British, but constantly supported increased operations in the Pacific.[144] The second important factor was the superior British staffing and preparation. While the British staffers were assigned full time to strategic planning, most of the American staffers had primary responsibility within their own services. This division of their time was reflected in their staff work.

In the end the Casablanca Conference was a perfect example of the type of artificial compartmentalization that existed between American political and military planning. The President's political goals (which obviously had military

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[143]The final destruction of the American effort at Casablanca is revealed in a pair of cables sent from General Wedemeyer to General Handy (AGWAR): 17 January 1943, "We still have our shirts but we have lost a few buttons pd Looks like HUSKY." On 19 January 1943, Wedemeyer wrote, "The shirt is gone...HUSKY is Next." References 245 and 320, "ANFA Cables: Outgoing, 14-26 January 1943, Box 1, Military Documents, Beddle Smith Papers, Eisenhower Library, Abiline, Kansas.

[144]JCS Meeting, 6 January 1943. Casablanca Conference, Proceedings, CCS, 239.

aspects) were totally contradictive to the JCS's military

goals (which had an equal amount of political aspects). The

British on the other hand were fully cognizant of the poli-

tical ramifications of the military decisions to be made at

Casablanca, and acted accordingly. The problem the American

Chiefs faced was one of a lack of guidance. The President

did not support the urgency of the cross-channel invasion,

and the State Department was not involved. The American

Chiefs were determined that there would never be a repetition

of the Casablanca debacle. Massive changes were made within

the JCS structure in order to guarantee that American plan-

ners would be better prepared for their next confrontation

with the British,[145] but restructuring the Joint Chiefs' staff

system could not substitute for the lack of institutional

political/military coordination. In a memorandum written in

June 1943 General Wedemeyer addressed this particular problem:

> The JCS frequently requires information and advice as to
> how the military decisions will effect our foreign and
> national policies, or as to whether the decisions are in
> conformity with international law, or as to what effect,
> if any, their decisions will have on our national
> interests. Some solution will be necessary if we are to
> achieve that unity of national effort which is so well
> exemplified in the British organization.[146]

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[145]Davis, Organizational Development, II, chapter XI.

[146]Cline, Washington Command Post, 317.

One month later General Marshall followed up Wedemeyer's
memorandum with a letter to Mr. James Byrnes, then Director
of War Mobilization:

> The U.S. Chiefs of Staff have been aware for a long time
> of a serious disadvantage under which they labor in their
> dealings with the British Chiefs of Staff. Superficially,
> at least, the great advantage on the British side has been
> the fact that they are connected up with other branches
> of their government through an elaborate but closely knit
> Secretariat. On our side there is no such animal and we
> suffer accordingly. The British, therefore present a
> solid front of all officials and committees. We cannot
> muster such strength.[147]

It is apparent that the American Joint Chiefs of Staff
were acutely aware of the need for better coordination of
political/military policy. Having the President as the sole
point of coordination had been a failure. As the war progres-
sed to its inevitable conclusion, the need for such coordi-
nation became increasingly important. Unfortunately, the
military blamed the breakdown in coordination solely on the
civilian leadership's lack of political guidance. The Chiefs'
concern over this problem manifested itself early, in a Decem-
ber 1942 Joint Staff Planners memorandum entitled, "A Proposed
National War Planning System." This system started with a
"determination of the national concept of the war," by the
civilian leadership. This "national concept of war" included
political, economic, military, and other factors. From there
the military determined a strategic policy, upon which plans

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[147]Ibid., 106.

and operations were based.[148] The proposal was never offi-

cially acted upon, and the Chiefs never did consider that

this breakdown in communications was a two-way street, stem-

ming from the traditional perceptions of both the civilian

and military leadership.

It must never be forgotten that the members of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff were a product of an American system

that inculcated a set of perceptions that resulted in the

compartmentalization of political from military policy.

They had been brought up to believe in civilian control of

the military, which meant, from their perception, that the

civilians controlled all of the political decisions and the

military were to restrict themselves to "purely military"

matters. This view of civil-military relations had been

described by one insider as the "strick constructionalist"

approach.[149] This view was manifest from Admiral Leahy

through the members of the JCS and down to the field com-

manders. Leahy had exhibited a tendency to think in such

"strict constructionalist" terms during his tenure as Chief

of Naval Operations and continued to do so as the Chief of

Staff to the President. During the Potsdam Conference the

British suggested that the term unconditional surrender

needed to be explained in greater detail. Leahy's reaction

[148]Davis, Organizational Development, II, 380.

[149]Joint Chiefs of Staff Historical Division, Inter-
view with members of the staff, January 1975.

was that it was a political issue and thus outside the pur-

view of the Combined Chiefs.[150] General Marshall elaborated

on this theme during an interview in 1957:

> I do not think the military authorities should make any
> political decisions unless they are instructed accord-
> ingly, because the effects are too wide-reaching, there
> are too many influences involved, and it is quite a
> question of how much of this would be familiar to the
> military participants.[151]

What is of interest is the implication by Marshall

that the military officer should not be effectively schooled

in the political ramifications of his actions. But what of

supplying input into the political decision making process?

> We [JCS] probably devoted more time in our discussions,
> our intimate discussions, to such matters [political
> than] to any one [other] subject, because we were fear-
> ful that we might find our whole campaign upset by some
> political gesture. I frankly was fearful of Mr. Roose-
> velt introducing political methods, of which he was a
> genius, into a military thing which had to be on a fixed
> basis.

In expanding this theme General Marshall went on to say:

> [Diplomatic matters were] Mr. Roosevelt's [responsibi-
> lity], and our problem was to be on the guard that the
> military picture--Army, Navy and Air--was not completely
> disjointed by what I will call some irrelevant political
> gestures which were made without due thought to what was
> going on at the time...

As to British criticism that the American Chiefs did not

exhibit any political awareness, Marshall answered that "we

didn't discuss it [political decisions] with them [the Brit-

ish] because we were not in any way putting our necks out as

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[150]Mns. 193rd meeting of the CCS, 16 July 1945, Termi-
nal Conference, Proceedings, CCS.

[151]Pogue, Organizer of Victory: 1943-1945, 316.

to political factors which were the business of the head of state--the President--who also happened to be the Commander-in-Chief."[152]

The portrait of the Joint Chiefs that the Marshall interview reveals is that of a group of officers who are highly cognizant of the political ramifications of military operations, but were equally cognizant of their role within an international committee structure. Thus superficially, the military seemed to be performing their function along the lines that Clausewitz had originally outlined. It also appears to be the antithesis of the Huntington argument. This position is reinforced by Admiral King, who described his role at Yalta as "advisory in nature."[153] Marshall's explanation, moreover, of the JCS's role vis-a-vis the British Chiefs may be an excuse for Leahy's actions on the British query on unconditional surrender. But if the JCS were fulfilling the Clausewitzian perfection of civilian control of the military, then why was the lack of political/military coordination emphasized so extensively by the key members of the wartime administration?[154] Furthermore, if the Chiefs did have real input into the political decision making process, then how is one to explain Admiral King's description of the process

[152]Ibid., 315.

[153]King, A Naval Memoir, 592.

[154]See chapter IV, "Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defense Organization: 1945-1960."

at the Potsdam Conference?

> ...the main business of the conference was the affair of the political heads of state, assisted by the State Department representatives. This was in no way surprising, for it is a long established government practice to reach political agreements without reference to the military forces that must be relied upon to pull the chestnuts out of the fire when the political agreements do not work out as anticipated.[155]

Admiral King's description reflects more than the traditional compartmentalization of politics from military policy. It appears to be a clear contradiction of General Marshall's previous statement; or is it? It would appear that the Chiefs were fully aware of the political ramifications of their military actions, but this awareness may have been only an internal systemic input, and not fully incorporated into the externally transmitted advice consumed by the civilian decision makers. Admiral King was not only criticizing the compartmentalization of policy formulation, but implicitly legitimizing it by virtue of its traditional source. The expectation was that such compartmentalization was part of the American professional military ethic, despite its obvious dysfunctional aspects. This expectation became a self-fulfilling prophesy, by virtue of the inculcation of that expectation. Thus the military officer was fully aware of the political ramifications of the military operations he was planning, but he had been socialized to believe that it was

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[155]King, A Naval Memoir, 611.

not his role to externalize those opinions. Furthermore,

the perception of compartmentalization that had been incul-

cated, led the military officer even to question the value

of integrating political factors into operational decisions.

General Omar Bradley noted that "as soldiers we looked

naively on the British inclination to complicate the war

with political objectives.[156] Mr. Robert Murphy, political

advisor to General Eisenhower's headquarters in Africa, re-

ported not only this naive confusion over the political

aspects of war, but real alienation toward him because of

his role:

> One day an American Major General asked me: "Will you
> please tell me what in the hell the State Department has
> to do in an active theater of war?" He was asking for
> information, so this, in effect, is what I told him:
> "War is a projection of policy when other means fail.
> The State Department is responsible to the President for
> foreign policy.... It was directly concerned in the
> political decisions inevitably to be made during the
> military operations, and it will have to deal with the
> postwar political aspects of this campaign...[157]

While, internally the Chiefs may have perceived the

need for the integration of political perceptions, externally

they manifested the ethic of compartmentalization. When

supplying advice to the civilian decision makers, the Chiefs

prefaced their input with the caveat "from the military point

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[156]Omar Bradley, _A Soldier's Story_ (New York: Henry
Holt and Co., 1951), 531-32.

[157]Robert Murphy, _Diplomat Among Warriors_, 155-156.

of view." They thus looked at extremely political issues
and supposedly analyzed them militarily.[158] This profes-
sionalized attitude was reinforced by the desires of the
civilians, and in particular the President. During the Casa-
blanca Conference Roosevelt did not bring any State Depart-
ment advisors with him primarily because he viewed the con-
ference as "essentially military" in nature.[159] This view
coincided nicely with the military's perception and explains
the lack of State Department involvement in policy formula-
tion all through the war. Furthermore, the President's
apparent desire to compartmentalize decision making allowed
the military to manifest its tendency to make war absolute.
The Chiefs could analyze issues in terms of missions and
objectives, and rationalize goals toward the achievement of

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[158] As typical examples of the type of political deci-
sions the JCS dealt with and then cloaked their recommenda-
tions in military expertise, see the following taken from
Admiral Leahy's papers at the Naval Operations Archives in
Washington, D.C.
　　　Memo to SecWar, 30 December 1944: "There are no
military objections to any occupations of Austria by U.S.
Forces," (in file entitled "Correspondence-1944").
　　　Memo to SecWar and SecNav, April 1945; sub: French
Proposal for Zone of Occupation in Germany and Austria. "The
Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered from the military point
of view the proposals of French Government." The JCS did
not oppose the French getting a zone nor did they oppose the
French return to Vietnam but warned of avoiding American com-
mitment, (found in file "January-April, 1945".)

[159] Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 163; the JCS
Official History of the Second World War goes out of its way
to emphasize the fact that the Chiefs were only involved in
military discussions at Yalta and not any of the political
meetings, Hayes, The War Against Japan, II, 347.

military success. Originally, a product of the marriage of
nineteenth century professional military perceptions and
American moral values, this outlook increasingly became in-
stitutionalized in the twentieth century. This was the view
that was being articulated in 1931 by General Douglas Mac-
Arthur when he said "decisive victory in the field of battle
invariably results in the attainment of the national purpose
for which the appeal to arms was made."[160] During the war
General Marshall reaffirmed this view when he stated that all
strategic decisions were made subordinate to the defeat of
Germany.[161] If this analysis is correct, then the military
considered victory to be the primary goal with political con-
siderations secondary. In order to test this assumption we
will examine the decision in 1945 not to seize Berlin but to
halt at the Elbe River.

This decision was possibly the most important,
if not the most criticized .ecision of the European War. As
the role of Berlin became more important in the subsequent
Cold War, this decision took on new importance. The British

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[160]Walter Millis with Harvey Mansfield and Herold
Stein, Arms and the State: Civil-Military elements in
National Policy (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1958),
113-115. Also see Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier,
Chapter 13; and Chapter II of this dissertation.

[161]Pogue, Organizer of Victory, 197.

in particular have been extremely critical of the American

failure to take this most important "political" objective.

"The Americans," wrote Montgomery, "could not understand that

it was of little avail to win the war strategically if we

lost it politically."[162] Essentially the issue may be

bisected into two sub-questions or issues. The first deals

with the physical ability of the American's to actually take

Berlin before the Soviets. Stephen E. Ambrose in his book

Eisenhower and Berlin, 1945: The Decision to Halt at the

Elbe; develops a convincing case, based on logistics and

military mobility, that the U.S. forces did not have the

physical capability to take the city.[163] While the military

capabilities may well have been an overriding constraint,

the question which is important for our purpose is why was

an attempt not made? The answer to that question is found in

the military's perception of looking at the world from the

military point of view.

The single most important driving force behind Eisen-

hower's decision to halt at the Elbe was his belief, shared

by other military officers, that the war should be ended as

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[162]Bernard Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field Marshal
the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein (London: Collins, 1958),
332.

[163]Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower and Berlin, 1945:
The Decision to Halt at the Elbe (New York: W.W. Norton &
Co., 1960), 88-98.

quickly as possible with as few political complications as possible. This perception was reinforced by Eisenhower's initial directive that ordered him to "undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces."[164] As the war wound down there was an increased fear on the part of the Western Allies that the remnants of the Nazi regime might attempt to continue the war from an Alpine redoubt. This would by no means change the outcome of the war, but would indefinitely lengthen it. Thus the overriding imperative was the destruction of the German Army in the field, whose existence made such a redoubt a possibility. For Eisenhower the decision became a choice between taking Berlin or destroying the German Army.[165] While the fear of the redoubt became the rationalization for a military decision, Berlin was identified as a political objective and the military's desire to avoid political complications led them to avoid Berlin. On the 11th of April, the day that General Simpson reached the Elbe River, Eisenhower made this very point most clearly:

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[164]Forest Pogue, "The Decision to Halt at the Elbe," in Command Decisions, ed. by Kent Roberts Greenfield (Washington: Office of Chief of Military History, 1960), 481.

[165]See Pogue, "The Decision to Halt at the Elbe," 480-81; Ambrose, Eisenhower and Berlin, 70-79.

> From a tactical point of view it is highly inadvisable
> for the American Army to take Berlin and I hope political
> influences won't cause me to take the city. It has no
> tactical or strategic value...[166]

But Eisenhower was not alone in analyzing the situation from

a military point of view. Four days earlier he had appealed

to the Combined Chiefs for guidance on this particular point.

He began by making it very clear that he was basing his plans

on military assumptions; he then went on to discuss the Ber-

lin issue:

> I regard it as militarily unsound at this stage of the
> proceedings to make Berlin a major objective, particu-
> larly in view of the fact that it is only 35 miles from
> the Russian lines. I am the first to admit that a war
> is waged in pursuance of political aims, and if the
> Combined Chiefs of Staff should decide that the Allied
> effort to take Berlin outweighs purely military con-
> siderations in this theater, I would cheerfully readjust
> my plans and my thinking so as to carry out such an
> operation.[167]

It appears that the CCS never considered Eisenhower's appeal

for guidance, which can only be interpreted as confirmation

of his military assumptions.[168]

The decision not to consider taking Berlin was an

example of perceiving an issue in purely military terms. It

is apparent that the military fully understood the "political"

nature of Berlin and for that reason the city was anathema.

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[166]Quoted in Ambrose, Eisenhower and Berlin, 97.

[167]Quoted in Pogue, "The Decision to Halt at the
Elbe," 486.

[168]Ibid.

This compartmentalization of the political from the military
was not only revealed by Eisenhower's communications and the
lack of guidance from the JCS and the CCS but was also mani-
fested by the civilians. In mid-April the representatives
of the European and Russian Affairs Division of the State
Department reported that "for governments to direct movements
of troops definitely indicated <u>political</u> action and that
<u>such movements should remain a military consideration</u> at least
until SHAEF is dissolved and the A.C.C. (Allied Control Com-
mission) is set up."[169] We can thus see that while the mili-
tary did perceive the Berlin decision from a military point
of view, they were conforming to their mandated role. It is
also clear that the Joint Cheifs considered victory to be
the primary goal, with political considerations secondary.
Within this context the Berlin decision makes sense, as much
sense as the JCS commitment to bring the Soviets into the
Pacific War, despite its obvious political ramifications.[170]
The Chiefs supported the President's desire to postpone major
political confrontations with the Soviets until the war was
over. This point was stressed by former Assistant Secretary
of State Sumner Wells:

> It was altogether natural that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
> should constantly warn the President that, whatever the
> theoretical future advantages of trying to settle

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[169]<u>Ibid</u>., 481, footnote #4; emphasis in the original.

[170]Pogue, <u>Organizer for Victory</u>, 505-536.

political and territorial problems during the war, they were offset by the immediate dangers of the controversies with Russia that might be aroused.[171]

As the war came closer to its conclusion, it became more and more difficult to postpone dealing with those political controversies. Moreover, the issues that began to surface were far more political than were the decisions that had had to be dealt with earlier. One issue that was of particular importance was the resolution of the political/military questions revolving around the occupation of enemy territories, especially Germany. In February 1943, the President gave the State Department the proponency for the occupation of enemy countries.[172] Unfortunately, the State Department's mission ran directly into the Chief's control of military operations. By the beginning of 1944 these two organizations were working in opposite directions. The bureaucratic conflict between these two organizations has been completely documented in Paul Hammond's study "Directives for the Occupation of Germany: The Washington Controversy." Hammond identifies the War Department's opposition to the State Department's interference in what the War Department considered a military mission:

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[171]Wells, Seven Decisions, 133-134.

[172]Stimson, On Active Service, 559.

...the War Department viewed civil affairs as an intrusion upon its primary responsibilities, both because these 'non-military'matters seemed to threaten the involvement of the Army in politics, and because they were rivals of military requirements.[173]

Ostensibly, the Chiefs opposed the fusion of civil affairs planning on the grounds of security problems, the desire to postpone political decisions until the termination of the conflict, and because they felt that the European Advisory Commission was controlled by the British. In reality their opposition probably resulted from their inherent desire to compartmentalize planning. At the same time the military was complaining about the lack of guidance upon which to build their plans, they were isolating their own plans from the civilians who needed to coordinate political efforts. Thus the State Department was forced to conduct some of its planning in a vacuum.[174]

The result of such planning can be seen in the failure of political/military coordination of key issues and decisions made toward the end of the war. The American representative to the European Advisory Commission, Ambassador John Winant, was forced to rely on the military to supply him with information on American policy. As a result Ambassador Winant

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[173]Paul Hammond, "Directives for the Occupation of Germany: The Washington Controversy," in American Civil-Military Decisions, ed. by Harold Stein (Montgomery: University of Alabama Press, 1963), 325.

[174]Ibid., 331.

was assured by the War Department that there was "no military necessity for an access stipulation" into Berlin.[175]

In conclusion what can we say about the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Second World War? To some degree Huntington was correct in that the military was given a freer reign than would normally be acceptable under the concept of civilian-control of the military. But Huntington was wrong in drawing the conclusion that they lost their professionalism by virtue of having to make political/military decisions. On the contrary, the military never did lose their professional perception and continued to analyze the world from the military point of view. When they were allowed to make political/military decisions they made them from the perspective that the civilian leadership wanted them to make. A case in point was the Berlin decision, when the State Department supported Eisenhower's views. Obviously, a greater degree of intellectual fusion and political/military coordination would have eliminated some of the worst of the postwar problems, but probably not all of them. As the war neared to its conclusion, the political goals of the President and the military goals of the JCS coincided, thus allowing the military greater impact on the decision making process. As Roosevelt's political goals became more military

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[175]Murphy, _Diplomat Among Warriors_, 232.

in nature this tended to confuse even further the efforts at
political military coordination.[176]

In the long run what were the lessons to be derived
from our study of the war. It is apparent that the President
had greater control over military decisions than he is nor-
mally credited with. The JCS, working within a committee
structure, revealed all the problems and weaknesses that are
normally associated with such systems. This included the
surfacing of inter-service fighting over numerous issues,
some important and some trivial. Furthermore, it was apparent
that the President remained the sole point of coordination
of political/military policy. In this regard the creation
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not substantially improved
the structure from the way it operated at the turn of the
century. One could even argue that the JCS became a focus
for problems that previously were scattered and relatively
benign. Granted in terms of military operations the JCS had
been successful. It allowed for effective interface with the
British Chiefs of Staff and its committee staff structure

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[176]This may well explain Leahy's remark, that the JCS,
in 1945, were under no civilian control, quoted in Huntington,
Soldier and the State, 338. Why should there be when the
civilian and the military objectives coincided perfectly?
Apparently Leahy was referring to some form of objective con-
trol. This problem became complicated in 1945 with the death
of Roosevelt. Truman, coming in somewhat cold to the situa-
tion, was very wary of asserting himself until he became more
familiar with the military and the international situation.

marked the beginning of a joint planning structure, but on the level of political/military planning it had clearly failed.

What was obviously needed was an institution that would break down the compartmentalization of political considerations from the military ones. In such an institution the JCS would be an important element, but not the only one. While institutional measures were established in 1947 its success could not hang upon the existence of mere bureaucratic interface. What was imperative was the destruction of the mindsets that existed in both the civilian and military communities that lead to that compartmentalization.[177] For the military to have meaningful input into the new National Security Council structure created in 1947, the internalized military perception that demanded analyzing the world from strictly a military perspective had to be eliminated. Unfortunately, these kinds of mindsets are difficult

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[177]The civilians felt that the military had no business interferring into what was considered political decisions. This attitude was reflected by Senator Vandenberg, who wrote in his diary, "It remains to be seen whether one of his [Marshall's] general officers [Wedermeyer], who heretofore has sought a chance to testify, will come and still say that our military leaders totally disagree with the commitments made by Roosevelt and Churchill at Casablanca--their function being solely to work out the achievement of the military plans upon which FDR and Churchill agreed." Arthur Vandenberg, Jr. ed. with the collaboration of Joe Alex Morris, The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), 48-50.

to eradicate, and would be a major obstacle in the ensuing efforts during the next decade and a half to develop an institution to facilitate political/military planning.

CHAPTER IV

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND

DEFENSE ORGANIZATION: 1945-1960

Despite the successful outcome of the Second World War, the American political/military decision making and coordinating structure was clearly found to be deficient. The most glaring problem was the lack of an institutional means short of the President to coordinate policy. Not that bureaucratic interface guarantees positive results, but the organizational linkages established by such interface are a necessary prerequisite for political/military coordination. While this defect was minimized during the war by a centrality of purpose and the apparent compatibility of political and military goals, the necessity to coordinate the plethora of post-war political/military problems magnified this flaw. This point was made emphatically clear by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, who sought the solution in some form of war cabinet, "which might have done in war diplomacy what the Joint Chiefs of Staff did in military strategy." For Secretary Stimson the reasons necessitating such an organization were obvious:

> Problems like those of China and France were not merely
> diplomatic, the State Department could not and would not
> take the whole labor of determining in areas where the
> military interest was so significant.[178]

From Stimson's perspective, the problem was not a civilian

problem nor a military problem, but one that demanded the

integration of bureaucratic objectives in order to effectively

develop policy. Unfortunately, since the demise of the Stand-

ing Liaison Committee, no such organization had existed.

Over the next fifteen years, two presidential admini-

strations initiated four major governmental reorganizations

and numerous smaller actions in an effort to achieve policy

integration. Since the Joint Chiefs would be an integral

part of that structure, an examination of these organiza-

tional changes would be a useful guage in determining the

effectiveness of the Chiefs as well as identifying any

fundamental flaws. Understanding this organizational frame-

work is also important for one other reason. It describes

the theoretical relationships that exist between institutions

and supplies the parameters within which these organizations

define their own roles.

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[178]Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active
Service in War and Peace (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1948), 562. There did exist two loosely constructed organi-
zations that are referred to as the war council and war
cabinet. Both were essentially improvised and lacked all
forms of staff structuring to support their efforts. U.S.
Congress, Senate, Committee on Naval Affairs, Report to Hon.
James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy on Unification of the
War and Navy Departments and Postwar Organization for National
Security. Senate Committee Print, 79th Congress, 1st Session,
1945 (Hereafter cited as Eberstadt Report), 54.

During the summer and fall of 1944, the problems relating to occupied territories and post-war planning increased the importance of developing some form of institutional or organizational means of coordination. Out of necessity, the State Department "adopted" the procedure of writing directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for its information. This ad hoc coordination effectively eliminated the service's civilian secretaries from the decision making process. In November 1944, Secretary Stimson, always mindful of his prerogatives, formally objected to Secretary of State Hull, stating that his responsibilities required that he "...must participate actively in the formulation of military policy and in the expression of the military point of view...."[179] This particular point was further raised in a joint memorandum addressed to the Joint Chiefs from the Secretaries of Navy and War.[180] This memorandum was not exclusively concerned with secretarial prerogatives. It noted the lack of any "established agency of the Joint

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[179] Eberstadt Report, 76.

[180] Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy, undated, subject: Coordination of Political-Military Problems Between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy Papers, folder "JCS Misc. Memos," U.S. Naval Archives, Washington, D.C. (Hereafter referred to as U.S. Naval Archives.)

Chiefs of Staff primarily charged with developing for the

Joint Chiefs of Staff political, economic, and fiscal

policy....", and it raised the larger question of political/

military planning at the highest levels:

> In recent months an increasingly large number of problems
> considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff involve questions
> having a political as well as a strictly military aspect.
> In the final stages of the war, as well as in the period
> immediately following the close of hostilities in the
> various theaters political aspects of military events
> inevitably are emphasized and matters affecting the
> overall defense policy of the nation in the post-war
> period emerge. The problems can be of great signifi-
> cance and the full judgment of the Chiefs of Staff and
> the respective Secretaries should be made readily
> obtainable by the other Agencies of the Government, par-
> ticularly the Department of State.[181]

In December 1944, after the retirement of Secretary

Hull, the first steps were initiated to institutionalize

the ideas put forth in the joint memorandum. Hull's succes-

sor, Edward Stettinius, immediately reinstituted the State-

War-Navy Secretarial Committee and helped establish an inter-

departmental organization, the State, War, Navy Coordinating

Committee (SWNCC). SWNCC was given the responsibility for

the working groups that were so necessary for the coordina-

tion of political/military policy.[182] While SWNCC did become

a conduit for the exchange of political/military advice, it

operated at such a low level within the bureaucratic

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[181]Ibid.

[182]Robert G. Albion and Robert H. Connery, _Forrestal and the Navy_ (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 165-166.

hierarchy that it was little "more than a clearing house for information."[183] It was not until October of the following year that the respective departmental secretaries designated it as "the agency to reconcile and coordinate action...and establish policies on political/military questions...."[184] In the final analysis, though, the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee did not have broad enough powers to deal with the issues that it was confronting.[185]

The formation of SWNCC, despite its failures, reflected a very real desire on the part of the civilian leadership to facilitate coordination. Only six days after assuming the presidency, Harry S. Truman wrote in a memorandum that "[today I] Authorized State, War and Navy to confer on matters affecting political and military problems in the war area."[186] Interestingly, the President pointedly placed at the bottom of the page the following notation,

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[183]Eberstadt Report, 54. Timothy W. Stanley, American Defense and National Security (Washington: Public Affairs, 1956), 10.

[184]Stanley, American Defense and National Security, 11, quoting Department of State Bulletin, Vol XIII, No. 333 (1945), 745.

[185]Eberstadt Report, 54.

[186]President's Notations, April 18, 1945, Harry S. Truman Papers, Personal Secretary File, box 82, folder "Presidential Appointment Daily Sheets: April, 1945," Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri. (Hereafter referred to as Truman Papers and Truman Library.)

"Hadn't been done before." The fact that SWNCC had been
operational for almost six months prior to this notation,
is a fitting evaluation of the organization. But the Presi-
dent's desire did not materialize in an organizational
structure to expedite planning. Over a year later, Sec-
retary of the Navy James Forrestal was still echoing the
President's sentiments when he wrote, "what was everywhere
demanded was a far closer coordination of the diplomatic and
military arms, ...better use of the military/political
instrument we possessed."[187]

Thus the civilian leadership was fully aware that the
central problem resided in the coordination of political/
military plans and that in turn revolved around balancing
the nation's commitments (a product of the State Department)
and the nation's military capabilities (a product of the JCS).
They were also aware that existing institutions had failed
to develop the needed integration. Central to this issue
was that the military had to be involved in some aspect of
the decision making process. This had been the thrust of the
joint War-Navy memorandum in the fall of 1944. Inextricably
connected to the solution of inter-departmental coordination
was the need to elicit unified military advice. Thus the
post-war battle over unification was a conflict to solve

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[187] James Forrestal, Forrestal Diaries, ed. by Walter
Millis (New York: Viking Press, 1951), 187.

two interconnected problems; the first, service unification; and the second, inter-departmental political/military policy making. It was in an effort to solve these two problems that the National Security Act of 1947 was written.

The issue of unifying the military services was by no means a new one. While the military was fully cognizant of the advantages to be accrued from joint planning,[188] the idea of political unification was a far different question. Obviously, the Joint Chiefs had played a pivotal role in achieving victory, but inter-service conflicts over everything from strategic policies to Pentagon office space had permeated the war effort.[189] Secretary Stimson, in particular, blamed the committee nature of the JCS for aggravating these differences:

> ...the Joint Chiefs of Staff was an imperfect instrument of top level decision.... It remained incapable of enforcing a decision against the will of its members.. Any officer, even a minority of one, could employ a rigorous insistence on unanimity as a means of defending the interests of his own service.... Only the President

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[188]Lawrence Legere, "Unification of the Armed Forces," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1950), 253.

[189]Stimson, On Active Service, 504-518. One classic case of competition involved the use of aircraft in an anti-submarine role. For a discussion of the different service attitudes see Stimson, On Active Service, 504-516; Ernest King and Walter M. Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1952), 451-459, 465-471; Henry H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York: Harper, 1949), 362-364.

was in a position to settle disagreements by a definite and final ruling.[190]

The Secretary of War felt that unification would eliminate the worst aspects of these conflicts.

While the nation's civilian leadership was identifying dysfunctional aspects in the command structure, the military were reassessing their own internal organization. As early as September 1942, General Marshall asked the Joint Chiefs to eliminate some of the ambiguities stemming from the theater concept of unity of command. The Navy already involved in a series of inter-service controversies, was suspicious of the War Department's intentions and buried the issue in joint committee. But this did not end the desire on the part of both the civilian and military leadership of the War Department to unify the whole military establishment in its own centralized image. From the spring of 1943 on, various organizations within the War Department and the JCS began to study intensively the unification issue.[191] These studies culminated in a memorandum originating from General Marshall, entitled "A Single Department of War in the Post War Period." In this memorandum, Marshall suggested a single

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[190]Stimson, On Active Service, 515-516; also see Eberstadt Report, 61; Otto Nelson, National Security and the General Staff (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946), 586 ff.

[191]Vincent Davis, Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy: 1943-1946 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966), 50-52.

military agency composed of four functional departments, ground, air, naval, and supply. Each of these departments would be directed by an under-secretary and a chief of staff. In place of the present JCS structure, there would be a Chief of Staff to the President and a United States General Staff. While such a unified structure was, for General Marshall, the necessary response to the increased complexity of future wars;[192] it also signified the opening shot of a four year battle over unification. The War Department's centralized approach ran counter to the Navy's decentralized management structure. These organizational differences were compounded by the perceived fear by sea power advocates who, in the words of Lawrence Legere, were "afraid of what might happen if sea power came to be judged by men ignorant of its potentialities."[193]

Within the JCS the reaction to Marshall's memorandum was predictably split along service lines. Despite opposition from the Naval members of the JCS, the Army continued its advocacy for a single military department. In the spring of 1944, during the House of Representative's investigation into "Post-War Military Policy," (the Woodrum Committee),

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[192]Legere, "Unification of the Armed Forces," 250.

[193]Ibid., 402.

Secretary Stimson became the first civilian secretary ever to openly advocate the unification of the services. In his mind, the weaknesses inherent in the JCS committee structure merely reflected the essential structural weaknesses of the whole military system.[194] After Secretary Stimson completed his statement, the Army's proposal for unification was presented by General Joseph T. McNarney of the Army Air Force. His proposal, which reflected Marshall's influence, called for a single Secretary of the Armed Forces, with three under secretaries for the Army, Navy and Air Force, a common supply service and the continued existence of the JCS under a new designation, the United States Chiefs of Staff. This new Chiefs of Staff organization had four members just as its predecessor organization did. Of special interest was the role McNarney gave the Chiefs in determining the budget. While they would be involved in the traditional duties of developing military strategy, they would also make the "general determination of budgetary needs and the allocations involved in their recommended strategic deployment for national defense." The power of the Chiefs in budgetary matters was such that the Secretary of the Armed Forces could

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[194]U.S. Congress, House, Proposal to Establish a Single Department of Armed Forces, Hearings before the Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy, 78th Congress, 2nd Session, 1944, 31 (hereafter cited as Woodrum Committee). Also see Stimson, On Active Service, 519.

only communicate the Chiefs' proposals to the President
with his own recommendations attached. He could not change
them in any way.[195]

The Navy correctly perceived that the plan was the
Army's attempt to force through a _fait d'accompli_. From
that time on, it attempted to fight a rear guard action and
delay the decision.[196] Under Secretary James Forrestal, who
became the Navy's chief spokesman following the untimely
death of Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, attacked the
Army's proposal at its weakest point, the budgetary process.
Forrestal and other Navy witnesses played upon the Congress'
traditional fear of losing civilian control of the military.
In the end, the Woodrum Committee could only recommend post-
poning determination of the issue until the war was over.[197]

While the congressional investigation was in progress,
the Joint Chiefs themselves designated a "Special Committee
for Reorganization of National Defense" to examine the issue.
This committee is usually referred to as the Richardson Com-
mittee, after its senior member, Admiral J. O. Richardson
(Retired). After five months of investigating the issues
and interviewing key field commanders, the committee

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[195]U.S. Congress, House, _Woodrum Committee_, 34-35.

[196]Albion, _Forrestal and the Navy_, 259-260.

[197]Stimson, _On Active Service_, 519.

announced its findings on 11 April 1945. With the exception

of the senior member, the committee was unanimously "in favor

of a single departmental system or organization for the Armed

Forces of the United States".[198] The majority of the committee

felt that unification would increase efficiency, eliminate the

worst aspects of inter-service competition, and guarantee civil-

ian control. In the final analysis, the majority believed that

such unification would lead to better "Correlation of Military

Preparedness and National Policies."[199] Admiral Richardson's

dissent was based upon a dislike for an autonomous Air Force,

fear for the future of the Marine Corps, and a basic abhor-

rence of a single military commander. The Navy rebutted the

majority report with a 160 page document of its own that

attacked every one of the majority's assumptions. While Mar-

shall himself did not fully concur with the highly centralized

view projected by the report, he advocated that it be forwarded

to the President with a statement of principle supporting a

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[198]U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Report of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Special Committee for Reorganization of National
Defense (hereafter cited as the Richardson Report), Leahy Papers,
box 77, folder "Reorganization of the National Defense Structure
and Comments: October and November, 1945," page 1, U.S. Naval
Archives.

[199]Ibid., 43.

a single departmental structure.[200] Internally, the JCS was
so badly split over the report, that it was not forwarded to
President Truman until 16 October 1945, and then it was accom-
panied by the split opinions of the four chiefs.[201]

Although the services' leadership may have agreed on a
superficial level that some form of organizational reform was
needed, service imperatives and fears blocked any consensus on
the format. For the services, the fight over unification was
a foreshadowing of future inter-service conflicts over stra-
tegy, budgets, and resources. Samuel P. Huntington has sug-
gested that "interservice rivalry was the child of unifica-
tion,"[202] but the wartime inter-service conflicts over the
direction of the war effort, resources, and even trivial mat-
ters such as promotions suggest the opposite. It would in-
stead appear that the rivalry was fostered by the tensions
resulting from increased military commitments being carried
out by comparatively decreased resources. The Army's desire
for unification was based on the belief that it would foster

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[200]U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Secretariat,
Historical Division, Major Changes in the Organization of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 1942-1969, 23 January, 1970, 11-12.
(Mimeographed) (Hereafter cited as Major Changes).

[201]Within the same file as the Richardson Report was
also the Navy's 160 page rebuttal, and the Chiefs' written
positions on the Report when it was finally forwarded to the
President. Leahy Papers, box 77, folder "Reorganization of
the National Defense Structure and Comments: October and
November, 1945," U.S. Naval Archives.

[202]Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense: Strategic
Programs in National Politics (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1961), 371.

greater budgetary stability and a more logical and equitable

division of the military budget. Any division of the military

budget would be based upon need, and need would be determined

by the mission of the service. The Navy, preferring to main-

tain the status quo, realized that this logic could be used to

rationalize the Marine Corps out of existence, based on the

grounds of duplication of functions;[203] and a similar rationali-

zation could ultimately lead to the absorption of its carrier

fleet into the newly created and autonomous Air Force.

Previously, the Navy had hoped to either postpone

unification, or if that failed, at least to implement it on

its own decentralized terms. The report of the Richardson

Committee badly undermined that strategy, and the death of

President Roosevelt the day after the report's release destroy-

ed it. The new President was a strong advocate of unification

believing "that the antiquated defense setup of the United

States had to be organized quickly as a step toward ensuring

our future safety and preserving world peace.[204]

In the face of such growing solidarity on the unifi-

cation issue, Secretary Forrestal realized that the Navy

could no longer postpone reorganization, and that unless it

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[203]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Armed Ser-
vices, Hearings on Department of Defense Reorganization Act
of 1958, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, 1958, 360-365. From this
hearing it is apparent that the Marine Corps still had not lost
its fear of being eliminated.

[204]Harry S. Truman, Memoirs of Harry S. Truman (New
York: Doubleday & Co., 1956), II, 46.

wanted to be excluded completely as obstructionist, it had

better supply some acceptable alternative to the Army's

centralization plans. In May 1945, Forrestal stressed this

very point before the Navy's Organization Policy Group:

> Having gone before the Woodrum Committee last year and
> been a party to their postponing consideration at
> that time, I feel that we have got to be very positive
> this time in some kind of plan which is a Navy Plan. I
> don't think we can be negative any further as far as
> Congress is concerned. I don't think the reaction of the
> public last year was too favorable to our position. I
> don't think we can again say "Let's postpone this, let's
> postpone that."[205]

A week later Senator David Walsh, Chairman of the Naval

Affairs Committee, wrote Forrestal a letter along exactly

the same lines, suggesting that the Navy Department make a

"thorough study of this subject" and propose its own plan for

organization.[206]

This political necessity prompted Secretary Forrestal

to ask an old personal friend, Ferdinand Eberstadt, to head

a task force to explore the unification issue. Their friend-

ship had started before the war as members of the prestigious

New York investment firm of Dillon and Read and continued

during the war as members of the Army and Navy Munitions

Board. Specifically, Forrestal asked Eberstadt to prepare

a report on the following questions:

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[205]Albion, _Forrestal and the Navy_, 262.

[206]_Eberstadt Report_, iii, iv.

1. Would unification of the War and Navy Departments under a single head improve our national security?

2. If not, what changes in the present relationships of the military services and departments has our war experience indicated as desirable to improve our national security?

3. What form of postwar organization should be established and maintained to enable the military services and other Government departments and agencies most effectively to provide for and protect our national security?[207]

Eberstadt's report concluded that "unification of the Army and the Navy under a single head" would not necessarily improve the nation's security and that a "coordinated system" based upon decentralization would be more functional. It emphasized the vast administrative difficulties connected with any single secretarial structure, and the dangers to civilian control of the military. As an alternative structure, the Report favored an independent Army, Navy and Air Force, each administered by its own civilian secretary of cabinet rank. In order to deal with the complicated problem of political/military coordination within such a confederated structure, Eberstadt proposed the creation of a National Security Council and a National Security Resources Board. These organizations, whose membership included the service secretaries, would advise the President on policy and coordinate planning and execution.

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[207]Ibid., 1; Albion, Forrestal and the Navy, 227.

The Report found the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be a highly successful organization that should be maintained in its present form. Although it reaffirmed the weaknesses concomitant to a committee structure, it felt that the "record does not indicate that they could have performed their duties better if a supreme military commander had been inserted between them and the President." This was clearly a rejection of McNarney's centralized organization. The Eberstadt Report apparently assumed that the Chiefs could work together in a crisis situation, but that they must be given legal status to define their duties and responsibilities. Furthermore, as an organization they must be integrated into all other aspects of the national planning structure. To facilitate the workings of the JCS, a joint staff was to be provided.

The plan that Eberstadt proposed corresponded extremely well to Forrestal's own views of defense organization. Forrestal, who had fought centralization within the Navy all through the war, realized that the most important aspect of an organizational plan was that it must allow for integration of the various capabilities of all the services. He fully appreciated that on some issues there were bound to be differing professional viewpoints, whether military or civilian; but he felt as Secretary of the Navy "that his task was to create an organization, in which both views could be

freely developed and upon which a decision could be made."[208]

One week after the Eberstadt Report was released the Army countered with a new unification proposal put forth by Deputy Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General J. Lawton Collins. The Collins plan, which addressed only the organization of the military hierarchy, envisaged a single Department of the Armed Forces headed by a single civilian secretary. The JCS was to remain essentially as before, except for the addition of a fifth member, a Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, whose functions were unspecified. The plan furthermore recommended the Joint Chiefs be an advisory body, and as with the McNarney Plan, they be given the authority to prepare and recommend to the President the military budget. The civilian secretary could comment upon, but not amend these budgetary recommendations.[209]

After the release of the Eberstadt and the Collins plans, it was apparent that the services had reached an impasse. Under these circumstances, the President took the initiative and on 17 December 1945 submitted his own plan for unification. President Truman's interest and attitude toward unification can be traced back to an article he wrote for

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[208]Albion, _Forrestal and the Navy_, 277.

[209]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, _Department of Armed Forces, Department of Military Security, Hearings_, 79th Congress, 1st Session, 1945, 157 ff.

Colliers magazine during the 1944 Presidential campaign. In
this article, Truman's arguments for unification were based
on economics and the elimination of waste and duplication.
Underpinning this argument was the apparent conviction that
some type of coordinating and planning authority was needed
to deal with defense problems as an interrelated whole. He
attacked the JCS committee structure and expressed his desire
that "a General Staff in full charge of tactics and strategy,
viewing the nation's offense and defense as an indivisible
whole and totally unconcerned with service rivalries" be
created.[210]

These ideas were easily identifiable in the President's
1945 reorganization plan. As a result of his disenchantment
with the JCS structure, he called for the establishment of a
civilian Secretary of National Defense and a single military
chief of staff. Furthermore, the plan eliminated the present
Joint Chiefs' structure and substituted a military advisory
body with unspecified duties.[211] Thus, in December of 1945,
the President's dislike for the JCS led him to the conclusion

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[210]Harry S. Truman, "Our Armed Forces Must be Unified,"
Colliers. CXIV (26 August 1944), 64.

[211]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Armed
Services, National Defense Establishment, Unification of the
Armed Forces, Hearings on S. 758, 80th Congress, 1st Session,
1947, pt. 1, 9-10. (Hereafter cited as National Defense
Establishment).

that some form of centralization under a single chief of
staff would eliminate the ills of the military organization.
Yet by 22 May 1946, the President had totally reversed himself
and saw a single chief of staff as a threat to civilian con-
trol of the military.[212]

The explanation for this complete reversal may be
partially found in a memorandum written by Clark Clifford on
18 December 1945. In this memorandum, Clifford warned of
the dangers of a single chief of staff and felt that such an
individual would be in a position to "override the civilian
secretaries' views on future controversies."[213] Clifford
argued forcefully that the retention of the present JCS
structure allowed for the continuation of pluralist decision
making and that this in turn permitted diverse views to sur-
face to the attention of the civilian leadership. Such
pluralism maximized civilian control.

The Clifford memorandum goes a long way toward explain-
ing the change in Truman's attitude, but it also surfaced

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[212]Harold D. Smith Papers, Box 1, Truman Library.
This box contains the diary of Mr. Smith who was director
of the Bureau of the Budget. In his diary Mr. Smith notes
that the President desired to institute a single chief of
staff on 13 December 1945. This coincides with his own
unification plan. On the 22 May 1946, Mr. Smith records that
the President had come to see a single chief of staff as a
threat to civilian control of the military. There is no
comment on why the change occurred or when it came about.

[213]Memorandum, Clark Clifford to Samuel Rosenman,
18 December 1945, Clark Clifford Papers, folder, "Post War
Military Unification, Primary Folder," Truman Library.

another possible explanation, the administration's concept

of structuring its relationship with the military. While

Roosevelt had controlled and guided the military by the force

of his personality, Truman looked toward institutions to

accomplish that goal.[214] Clifford was very sympathetic with

Forrestal's belief that foreign policy and military policy

had to be fully integrated, but it was only through insti-

tutions that such integration could be optimized. In a note

written on 13 December 1945, Clifford emphasized that only

in the integration of the nation's "foreign, military, and

economic policies... [was there] hope for preventing our

participation in another war."[215] Unification of the ser-

vices was only one aspect of the effort toward total inte-

gration. Within this framework, though, a single chief of

staff held out a potential danger, not only from the point

of view of stifling diverse opinions, but such an individual

could also develop a narrow perspective of the world around

him. A single chief of staff could potentially be "in no

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[214]Richard Haynes, The Awesome Power: Harry S. Truman as Commander in Chief (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973), 30.

[215]Memorandum, Clark Clifford to Samuel Rosenman, 13 December 1945, Samuel Rosenman Papers, box 4, folder "Unification Folder #1," Truman Library.

position to view the overall problems of politics, diplomacy, and military affairs."[216] It was thus through the instrumentality of a pluralistic Joint Chiefs that such a situation could be avoided.

Conversely, one should not give Clifford total credit for Truman's transformation, nor mistakenly assume that the primary motivation for the National Security Act was efficiency.[217] If the latter was the case, then a single chief of staff would have been ideal. Wilber Hoar, long time chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Historical Division, maintains that the reason for the 1947 legislation was to give guidance to the military.[218] While this is partially true, it is also probable that the administration was as much concerned with controlling the military as directing it. Truman's own perception of the military was essentially one of distrust and dislike. In his later years, the former President described this in language that was typically Trumanese:

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[216]Memorandum, Clark Clifford to Samuel Rosenman, 18 December 1945, Clark Clifford Papers, folder "Post War Military Unification, Primary Folder," Truman Library.

[217]See Paul Hammond, Organizing for Defense: The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961) for an analysis of defense organization based upon efficiency.

[218]Wilber Hoar, "Truman" in The Ultimate Decision: The President as the Commander in Chief, ed. Ernest May (New York: George Braziller, 1960), 185.

> You always have to remember when you're dealing with
> generals and admirals, most of them, they're wrong a
> good deal of the time.... They're most of them just
> like horses with blinders on, they can't see beyond the
> end of their nose.[219]

Naturally, this view did not extend to all the military,

because the President had the greatest respect and confidence

in Leahy, Marshall, and Bradley, but this belief led him to

a total commitment to civilian control, not only in theory,

but in practice.[220] Logically, the President was extremely

protective of his prerogatives as Commander-in-Chief, and

felt that he had to have complete control of the military:

> I took the position that the President, as the Commander-
> in-Chief, had to know everything that was going on. I
> had just enough experience to know that if you are not
> careful, the military will hedge you in.[221]

The ideas of Presidential prerogatives and civilian control

of the military were deeply intertwined. This conviction

was never more evident than during the Truman-MacArthur con-

troversy.[222]

Whatever President Truman's motivations were, it was

the force of his office that generated the inter-service

compromise that resulted in the National Security Act of

[219]Merle Miller, _Plain Speaking: an Oral Biography of
Harry S. Truman_ (New York: Berkley Publishing Corp., 1974),
205.

[220]Truman, _Memoirs_, I, 210.

[221]_Ibid._, 88.

[222]Miller, _Plain Speaking_, 287; Hoar, "Truman," 199-208.

1947.[223] The heart of that compromise was Eberstadt's de-

centralized approach. Central to the legislation was the

creation of a National Defense Establishment headed by a

civilian secretary. Conforming to the Eberstadt view of

decentralization, though, the powers vested in this secretary

were very limited. He was given the power of "general

authority, direction and control," over the three services.

Since the service secretaries were also of cabinet rank, it

meant in a practical sense that the Secretary of Defense's

power was nil. Moreover, the impotent nature of the Secre-

tary's role was exacerbated by the fact that all three of

the service secretaries were also members of the National

Security Council. This political reality was legally

reflected in the fact that the National Defense Establish-

ment was not an executive department.[224] This also led to

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[223] For a full discussion of the political machina-
tions that went into putting the National Security Act
through Congress see Demetrios Caraley, The Politics of
Military Unification: A Study of Conflict and Policy
Process (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966).

[224] It appears that Truman originally did not want the
service secretaries to be of cabinet rank. U.S. Congress,
Senate, National Defense Establishment, 184.

the criticism of too much military influence in the NSC.[225]

In regard to the JCS, there was a surprising consensus of thought on what role the Chiefs were to take and how they were to be structured. Congress, in particular, had great confidence in the organization and stated that its duties should be "substantially as at present and permit functioning in accordance with procedures developed by war experience."[226] Similarly, the military themselves had reached a consensus that whether or not there would be a single chief of staff, the JCS should structurally continue as it had previously. Thus, the original proposals relating to the JCS, developed by the Army and Navy negotiators, Lieutenant General

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[225]Memorandum for the President, 7 February 1947, subject: Comments of the Secretary of State on Draft of Bill to promote the National Security (Fourth Draft, dated January 28, 1947), Clark Clifford Papers, box 17, Unification Correspondence, folder "Unification: Congressional Hearings," Truman Library. In this memorandum General Marshall notes that the proposed establishment of the NSC would "give predominance in the field of foreign relations to a body composed of not less than six, of which at least four would be the civilian heads of military establishments. I think it would be unwise to vest such a council by statute with broad and detailed powers and responsibilities in this field." Marshall went on to say that "there is also a strong feeling that the direction of policy, foreign or domestic, should be dominated by the non-military branches of government." This point was brought out in the interviews conducted by the 1948 Hoover Commission, Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Task Force on National Security Organization (Appendix G), (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), 62. (Hereafter cited as the Hoover Commission.)

[226]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, National Security Act: Report to Accompany S. 758, 80th Congress, 1st Session, 1947, Senate Report 239, 13.

Loris Norstad and Vice Admiral Forest Sherman, were accepted almost in their entirety by Congress.[227]

The provisions of the National Security Act that established the Joint Chiefs of Staff named the Chiefs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and "the Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, if there be one," as its members.[228] The incorporation of Leahy's position is somewhat paradoxical in light of the President's newly acquired dislike for a single chief of staff. While it is true that Truman had a great deal of respect for Roosevelt's Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, and thus may have been motivated to continue the personal relationship, a more plausible explanation may be found in Truman's faith in institutional control of the military. Leahy, by virtue of his proximity to the President and his rank, could serve as a means of control and a conduit of guidance for the Chiefs.

Aside from specifying the membership of the JCS, the National Security Act also identified their functions, starting by naming them the "principal military advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense." Noticeable by its absence

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[227] Major Changes, 17.

[228] The Commandant of the Marine Corps was not considered a member of the JCS in 1947. On 28 June 1952 with passage of Public Law 416 the Commandant was made an equal to the other chiefs when discussing matters affecting the Marine Corps. In practice this has almost always meant the presence of the Commandant at JCS meetings. In 1980 the Commandant was made a full and equal member of the JCS.

was the fact that the Cheifs were not made advisors to the

National Security Council. This apparent anomaly may be

explained by remembering that Truman was deeply concerned

about his prerogatives as Commander-in-Chief. To make the

JCS advisors to a committee that contained individuals out-

side the military chain of command might in some way dilute

this prerogative. In an agendum written in February 1949,

this relationship between the President and his military

advisors was clearly articulated. This agendum suggested

that the President speak to the JCS informally on the fact

that:

> The Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of Defense
> depend upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide the
> professional information, analysis, and decisions upon
> which the President must, in turn, make decisions of
> great moment to the nation. (In this essentially stra-
> tegic, professional process, no authority other than
> the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense and
> the President can intervene.)[229]

Such an outside authority would be the National Security

Council. Moreover, the specific role of the NSC was still

very much in doubt at the time of the passage of the National

Security Act. While its duties were outlined, the nature of

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[229]Undated "Suggested Agenda" from the Secretary of
Defense to the President, Truman Papers, Personal Secretary
File, box 91, folder "Presidential Appointment Daily Sheets:
February 1-15, 1949," Truman Library.

its relationship with the executive was still in question.[230]

Aside from this advisory function, the other specific functions assigned to the Joint Chiefs were:

(1) to prepare strategic plans and to provide for the strategic direction of the military forces;

(2) to prepare joint logistic plans and to assign to the military services logistic responsibilities in accordance with such plans;

(3) to establish unified commands in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the interest of national security;

(4) to formulate policies for joint training of the military forces;

(5) to formulate policies for coordinating the education of members of the military forces;

(6) to review major material and personnel requirements of the military forces, in accordance with strategic and logistic plans; and

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[230]The State Department leadership was opposed to giving too much power to the NSC because it attacked their institutional prerogatives. In the February 7th Memorandum to the President, Marshall, noted that "the constitutional and traditional control of the President in the conduct of foreign affairs, principally throughout our history with the aid of the Secretary of State, is deeply rooted," Memorandum for the President, 7 February 1947, subject: Comments of the Secretary of State on Draft of Bill to Promote the National Security (Fourth Draft, dated January 28, 1947), Clark Clifford Papers, box 17, Unification Correspondence, folder "Unification: Congressional Hearings," Truman Library. The Secretary of State furthermore said that the envisioned legislation would make the Secretary "the automaton of the Council." Acheson also had his doubts about the value of the NSC. Forrestal records that General Norstad believed that Acheson would "try to castrate its effectiveness." Forrestal, Diaries, 315. Also see Chapters VI and VIII for further discussion on Truman's use of the NSC.

(7) to provide United States representation on the
Military Staff Committee of the United Nations in
accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the
United Nations.[231]

To help accomplish these functions, the statute established a

Joint Staff consisting of one hundred officers supplied

equally from the three services.

The formation of the Joint Staff exemplified the pres-

sures that were at work during the unification process. It

seems to have been a foregone conclusion that the Staff's

organization would resemble the existing committee structure

that had evolved during World War II. The Chiefs agreed that

they should name the Joint Staff's director as soon as pos-

sible and allow him to recommend the Staff's internal orga-

nization since that was not outlined in the statute. With

that in mind, Major General Alfred M. Gruenther was appointed

on 25 August 1947 and one month later submitted his recommenda-

tions for the Joint Staff's organization.

General Gruenther's plan kept the basic outline of the

World War II committee structure, although the internal

agencies were renamed. He recommended a structure based

around three full-time staff groups that supported three

senior part-time inter-service committees. As was the case

during World War II, the membership of the committees were

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[231]Public Law 253, Title II, sect. 211(b). Hereafter
cited as National Security Act 1947.

part-time representatives from the service staffs. The staff groups were designated the Joint Intelligence Group, the Joint Strategic Plans Group and the Joint Logistics Plans Group. These three groups would support the Joint Intelligence Committee, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, and the Joint Logistics Committee. In order to guarantee better coordination between the joint committee and its supporting group, the group's director sat in with the senior committee.

The newly created Joint Staff thus consisted of the Director of the Joint Staff and the three joint groups. General Gruenther built his recommendations upon the assumption that the JCS was going to remain a "planning, coordinating, and advisory body, and not an operating or implementing group." But the Joint Staff was not the only organization that supported the JCS. A larger, less distinct institution, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), of which the Joint Staff was a part, was also available for that purpose. Along with the Joint Staff, the OJCS consisted of the Joint Secretariat and a variety of functional committees, such as the Joint Strategic Survey Committee. The specific number and designation of these other agencies changed during the 1947-1958 time frame, but the basic organizational structure remained the same. In October 1947 the JCS approved General Gruenther's recommendations.[232]

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[232]Major Changes, 18-20.

The small size of the Joint Staff guaranteed a continued reliance upon the service staffs for support. This was quite acceptable to the services who wanted to maintain their avenue of expression on service issues and their ability to influence decisions. In practice, an issue was sent out of the Director's office through the Joint Secretariat, to the appropriate joint committee. The joint committee determined which of the Joint Staff groups would support the project. It was within these groups that the actual paperwork was produced, although the service staffs might become involved. Upon completion, the project was forwarded to the appropriate joint committee for concurrence. Before that was accomplished though, a paper might be returned to the joint group for revision or be sent to the service staffs for examination. Either way, the requirement for service concurrence guaranteed the protection of service interests before the project was sent forward to the Joint Chiefs.[233]

There was one major deletion from the original statutory provisions that pertained to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The original version stated that the JCS was to "make recommendations for the integration of the military budget." This was obviously a retention from earlier Army proposals in the budget area. While this deletion enhanced civilian control,

[233]U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953, Department of Defense: Hearings on H. J. Res. 264, 83d Congress, 1st Session, 1953, pp. 144-149. (Hereafter cited as House, Reorganization Hearings 1953.)

it left the JCS without a specific role in the budgetary process. As a result the Chiefs' role in budget matters varied during the period of our study.[234]

The passage of Public Law 253 (the National Security Act of 1947) gave the Joint Chiefs legal status for the first time and identified their place within the policy making structure. The reasons for the deliberate specification of the duties of the Chiefs (as well as other organizations covered by Public Law 253) were twofold. The first was to clearly place the responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs within the governmental system. The second was to indicate not only the extent of the Chiefs' functions, but also their limitations. For the first time in American history, the act attempted to create a single system for the development of political/military planning and policy. Unfortunately, the lines within that system were so complex and overlapping that at times they became totally indiscernible. Despite this complexity, there are three fundamental levels within the system. At the top is a totally civilian level consisting of the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and others. The lower level is that of an

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[234]The original JCS budgetary function was mentioned in a 16 January 1945 memorandum from Patterson and Forrestal to the President. This memorandum states that the JCS "will formulate strategic plans, assign logistics responsibilities to the services in support thereof, integrate the military requirements and, as directed advise in the integration of the military budget." U.S. Congress, Senate, National Defense Establishment, 2.

implementing bureaucracy in charge of any particular function.
In dealing with military questions this level is all military.
In the context of this study, these two levels may be identi-
fied as the political and the military levels or, in functional
terms, developing commitments and developing capabilities. On
defense matters the middle level is made up of mixed civilian
and military agencies such as the National Security Council
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). In theory,
this middle level is the point of contact, or to use contem-
porary bureaucratic parlance, the 'interface' between the
bureaucracies involved in developing commitments and capabi-
lities. The Chiefs, as representatives of an implementing
bureaucracy, enter into the system at this point. It was for
this reason that President Eisenhower considered the Joint
Chiefs the "hinge" between the military establishment and the
higher civilian control.[235] They are positioned at that point
within the system where the nation's commitments and capabi-
lities are meshed and hopefully balanced.

While the Joint Chiefs may have been the hinge between
commitments and capabilities, the National Security Act did
not explain how the various organizations would actually
function. In this regard, the JCS was no different from any

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[235]Andrew J. Goodpaster, "The Role of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff in the National Security Structure," in Issues of
National Security in the 1970's, ed. Amos A. Jordon (New
York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1967), 229.

other organization established in 1947. Obviously, the
Chiefs' advisory function was their reason for being. The
civilian leadership would look to the JCS to supply expert
military advice on military matters. But what exactly a
"military" matter was, was never defined. We can assume, that
given America's traditional compartmentalization of political
from military policy, this implied a "radical" form of pro-
fessionalism. All of the other functions specified in the
statute were specifically related either to developing mili-
tary advice or to maximizing military command and control.
This may partially explain the deletion of the JCS's budget-
ary function. In any case, the role that the Chiefs were to
play would have to be worked out between the institutions
involved.

The provisions incorporated into Public Law 253 concern-
ing the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense
contained certain inherent difficulties and contradictions.
The elimination of these inherent problems would be the
subject of three massive reorganizations and several minor
changes in the Defense Department structure during the Truman
and Eisenhower administrations. The National Security Act
gave the Chiefs dual and sometimes conflicting roles. On
the one hand, as a corporate body, they are the principal
military advisors to the President and the Secretary of
Defense; on the other hand, they are the military heads of

their respective services. As such, they command a bureau-

cracy that has its own imperatives and vested interests. By

virtue of their advisory function, the Chiefs enter into the

highest mixed civilian-military councils such as the NSC, but

are forced to defend their organizational interests and

imperatives in those councils.

Historically, it has proved extremely difficult for the

Chiefs to divorce themselves from their services. This

service connection has probably been the greatest single

criticism leveled against the JCS. One such critic, retired

Lieutenant General James Gavin writes:

> The Chiefs must wear two hats, one as a member of the
> JCS, and the other as a member of their own service.
> In a larger sense, they should keep the national
> interest paramount. But...the record will show that
> interest in the particular service usually prevails,
> although, entirely in a patriotic sense, since their
> background, loyalties, and responsibilities all suggest
> that in this manner the national interest is best
> served.[236]

It may be unreasonable to expect a chief, with over thirty

years of service in a particular organization, to take on a

new set of perceptions or world view. Faultless or not,

this problem must be confronted by each and every chief, as

noted in the following remarks by former Chief of Staff of the

Army, General George Decker:

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[236] James Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age (New
York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), 261.

As service representative...I had the job of trying to
get for my service as much of the resources available
in the National Defense kitty as I could.... As a mem-
ber of the Joint Chiefs...I had the responsibility for
the overall military preparedness of the country.

He went on to say that he reconciled these two roles by

"making as much of the pitch as I could for the Army, at the

same time keeping in mind the requirements of the other ser-

vices."[237] The inherent weakness of leaving it up to the

individual to balance between two such powerful sets of

imperatives is rather apparent. The Truman administration,

and in particular Clark Clifford, thought that the National

Security Act would help alleviate this problem.[238] Unfor-

tunately, as events were to prove such hope was unfounded,

and this was one of the prime motivations for later reorga-

nization plans.

The problem of the Chiefs' double role is inextricably

connected to another dilemma they face; are they commanders,

are they planners, or both? If they are to carry out both of

these functions then it is quite logical for them to wear

two hats. If not, then one of these roles should be elimi-

nated. It is this command role that motivates the Chiefs to

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[237]Interview with General George H. Decker, January,
1975, Washington, D.C.

[238]Undated Memorandum on Issues, Clark Clifford Papers,
box 17, Unification Correspondence, folder "Unification Bill,
Comments and Recommendations," Truman Library.

defend their service interests. This role confusion has always existed, as indicated earlier, in regard to the Chief of Staff of the Army, who by statute, is prohibited from being the commander; but the confusion within the JCS is exacerbated by the command responsibility given the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.[239] The military themselves feel very strongly that planning responsibility and operational control must go hand in hand. The combining of the two roles eliminates the development of "ivory tower planning" by individuals who will never have to worry about actually carrying out their plans. Former Chief of Staff of the Army and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer made this very clear, "to separate planning from operational authority is a gross error."[240]

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[239]The National Security Act of 1947 specifically stated that the Chief of Staff of the Air Force "shall exercise command over the United States Air Force;" Title II, sect. 208(b). As part of the 1958 reorganization command was changed to read "supervision." A similar change occurred in the relationship of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Marine Corps Commandant to their respective services. But a degree of ambiguity still remains. According to The Marine Officers Guide the Chief of Naval Operations commands the operating forces of the Navy and implies that the Commandant is the actual commander of the Marine Corps. Robert D. Heinl, Jr., The Marine Officers Guide, 4th edition rev. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1977), 46, 81.

[240]Interview with General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, January, 1975, Washington, D.C.

A second major problem which arose out of the 1947 legislation was the position of the Joint Chiefs within the chain of command. According to the statute, they were "subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense," and were the principal military advisors to both.[241] By virtue of their service responsibilities, they are also under the service secretaries. The administrative confusion which can result from having three bosses is quite obvious. Furthermore, the mere existence of the Secretary of Defense created not only a potential competitor for the role of principal military advisor to the President, but an official potentially capable of dominating the Chiefs and usurping their functions.

These then were the problems and contradictions implicit within the 1947 legislation that the ensuing amendments in 1949, 1953, and 1958 attempted to rectify. Generally speaking, these changes followed three lines. The first was to centralize power into the hands of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The second was to streamline the chain of command in an effort to eliminate the above mentioned ambiguities. Finally, these changes tried to take command responsibility away from the Chiefs and make them into more of a planning organization. This last point was an essential step in disconnecting the Chiefs from their service parochialism.

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[241] National Security Act 1947, Title II, sect. 211(a).

The original 1947 legislation conformed to Eberstadt's view of decentralization, by creating a weak Secretary of Defense with only "general control" over the Military Establishment, and by allowing the military services to be "separately administered." This approach was institutionalized by giving the services all powers not specifically granted to the Secretary of Defense. At first, this approach was totally acceptable to Secretary Forrestal, but slowly he began to appreciate the inherent disadvantages in such a decentralized system, and he came to realize the Secretary needed greater control over the Military Establishment. In his "First Report" as Secretary of Defense, Forrestal suggested massive reforms designed to enhance and centralize the power of the Secretary:

> The statutory authority of the Secretary of Defense should be materially strengthened, not only by providing him with an Under Secretary, but also making it clear that the Secretary of Defense has the responsibility for exercising "direction, authority, and control" over the agencies of the National Military Establishment.[242]

The elimination of the disabling adjective "general" in front of "direction, authority, and control" was a necessary prerequisite for the centralization of power into the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). As a corollary to this change, Forrestal also suggested that the National Military

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[242]National Military Establishment, First Report of the Secretary of Defense (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948), 3.

Establishment be converted into an Executive Department, with a corresponding reduction in the status of the services and the removal of their representatives from the NSC. In a 8 February 1949 memorandum to the President, these changes were identified as "necessary if he [the Secretary of Defense] is to exercise adequate control over the military services."[243] In order to support the Secretary in his new centralized role, Forrestal called for an increase in the size of OSD.

Secretary Forrestal's recommendations were reinforced shortly afterward by the report of the Military Establishment Task Force of the Hoover Commission. This Commission, officially entitled the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, was brought into existence in 1947 to examine all aspects of the executive branch, especially in terms of economy and efficiency. Former President Herbert Hoover headed the Commission, while Ferdinand Eberstadt headed the Military Establishment Task Force. The Commission's report identified the positions of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the two "critical points" where problems existed in the National Security structure. As for the Secretary, the report supported Forrestal by emphasizing the need to improve the Secretary's "managerial

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[243]Memorandum Clark Clifford, Frank Pace and James Forrestal to the President, 8 February 1949, subject: Revision of the National Security. Frederick J. Lawton Papers, box 7, folder "Correspondence: Director of Staff," Truman Library.

instrument." This meant centralizing his power and increasing the supporting bureaucracy. As for the Joint Chiefs, four major problem areas were identified:

> (1) The JCS has remained detached and remote from the other parts of the National Security Organization and have not become involved in the totality of economic, political and scientific planning. Part of the problem stemmed from a lack of guidance on the part of the NSC, "but their [JCS] own attitude has been one of far too great detachment from the broader tasks of the modern strategic planner."

> (2) The Chiefs are influenced far too much by service considerations which deter efforts at integrating a total military policy.

> (3) The Chiefs themselves are too heavily burdened by service functions, at the expense of their JCS role.

> (4) The JCS is burdened by too many minor matters.

Each of these problem areas contributed in their own way toward diminishing the effectiveness of the JCS in fulfilling their statutory functions. Consistently, the Task Force emphasized the dysfunctional nature of inter-service conflict and the diffusion of energy that resulted from the Chiefs' involvement in service matters. It recommended removing the Chiefs from the chain of command and upgrading the service's Vice-Chiefs so that they could take over more of the service responsibilities. But the Task Force failed to supply any substantive suggestions for rectifying the first problem area. The Task Force criticized the isolated "aloofness" with which the JCS operated; the fact that the JCS had substantially failed to "relate their military

plans" to the nation's economic, industrial, and scientific
capabilities; and that it was difficult to get advice from
the Chiefs. As a superficial solution to the problem, it
was suggested that the Chiefs should become more involved
in the workings of the NSC, and that they should sit in on
more NSC meetings.[244] Unfortunately, this naive panacea
did not fully deal with the fundamental issue that the Task
Force was addressing. In reality the Task Force was criti-
cizing the Joint Chiefs for two separate and distinct faults.
The first was their service parochialism, which could be dealt
with through organizational change. The second was that they
were restricting their outlook to the "military point of view."
The simple solution of more bureaucratic interface and a
larger Joint Staff would have very little effect on such a
narrow "radically" professional outlook.

As a result of the desire for centralization manifest-
ed by Forrestal and the Hoover Commission, President Truman
asked for a reorganization of the National Military Establish-
ment along the lines indicated by Forrestal.[245] Congress

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[244]Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of
the Government, Task Force on National Security Organization
(Appendix G), (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1949), 66-70. (Hereafter cited as the Hoover Commission.)

[245]U.S. President, Public Papers of the Presidents of
the United States (Washington D.C., Office of the Federal
Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1964), Harry
S. Truman, 1949, 163 and 382. (Hereafter cited as Public
Papers).

supported the President by adopting amendments to the National

Security Act that greatly strengthened the power of the Secre-

tary of Defense. This increase in power corresponded to his

new status as head of an executive department, the Department

of Defense (DoD). Possibly, in response to the Hoover Com-

mission's criticism of JCS remoteness, the Chiefs were named

the "principal military advisors" to the National Security

Council, along with their duties as advisors to the President

and the Secretary of Defense.[246] Another explanation for this

change in function may have been the President's growing confi-

dence in the NSC, coupled with the administration's increased

awareness of the complexity of national security problems.[247]

As part of the general trend toward centralization

within the Defense Department, the 1949 legislation establish-

ed the position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

During the Second World War, the JCS acted primarily as the

President's personal military staff. This relationship was

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[246]National Security Act of 1947, Title II, sec. 211(a)
as amended in 1949.

[247]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Opera-
tions, Organizing for National Defense, Hearings before a Sub-
committee on National Policy Machinery, (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1961), I, 573. (Hereafter cited as the
Jackson Committee). In these hearings Admiral Sidney Souers,
Former Secretary of the National Security Council discussed
how President Truman began to take a more controlling hand in
NSC affairs. While the Admiral did not specifically say so,
it may be suggested that the President simply began to get
used to the structure and no longer feared it.

described by Admiral Leahy, after the war:

> He [FDR] was the Commander-in-Chief. He just appointed
> us like he would appoint a staff. . . .We went to the
> President. We dealt directly with the President. We
> were the staff of the President of the United States.[248]

This statement reflected the fact that only the President had

the power to force an issue through the JCS, and partially ex-

plained why Leahy was given the title of Chief of Staff to the

Commander-in-Chief, as opposed to commander of all American

forces. Leahy continued to function in this capacity until

illness forced his retirement in 1949. Before that, however,

his ability to deal with the complex nature of national securi-

ty problems and to minimize inter-service rivalry had diminished

toward the end of his tenure. General Bradley noted Leahy's

ill-preparation, in comparison to what he considered to be the

role of the Chairman of the Joint Chief's of Staff.[249] As

such, Secretary Forrestal began to look elsewhere for the kind

of independent military advice that Leahy should have supplied.

At first, the Secretary looked to General Alfred Gruenther,

Director of the Joint Staff. In 1948, he sought to have the

Chief of Staff of the Army, General Omar Bradley, named as his

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[248] U.S. Congress, House, Reorganization Hearings 1953,
211.

[249] U.S. Congress, House. Committee on Armed Services,
Full Committee Hearings on S. 1843, To Convert the National
Military Establishment into an executive department of the
Government, to be known as the Department of Defense, to pro-
vide the Secretary of Defense with appropriate responsibility
and authority and with civilian and military assistants ade-
quate to fulfill his enlarged responsibilities, 81st Congress,
1st Session, 1949, 2912. (Hereafter cited as House Hearings
1949.)

special military advisor, but both Bradley and Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall opposed the change, maintaining that the General was needed in his present capacity.[250]

Once Leahy had retired, Forrestal turned to retired General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower to temporarily fill the void. By virtue of Eisenhower's age, rank, and experience, it was hoped he would be able to exert some pressure to coordinate the Chiefs. Eisenhower's return to duty was specifically in response to the difficulty the Chiefs were having developing budgets and war plans. As Forrestal wrote to the President:

> It is in these circumstances and against this background that it occurred to me that the talents of Ike, in terms of the identification of problems and the accomodations of differing views, would be highly useful.[251]

The Secretary desired to have available to him "some disinterested separate professional advice from an individual who owned no particular allegiance to one service."[252] For a while, Forrestal thought about creating an independent military committee outside the JCS, consisting of Eisenhower, General

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[250]Major Changes, 21; Forrestal, Diaries, 496.

[251]Letter James Forrestal to Harry S. Truman, 9 November 1948, Truman Papers, Presidential Secretary File, General File, box 120, folder, "Forrestal General." Truman Library.

[252]Memorandum Dwight D. Eisenhower to Walter Kerr, 9 April 1951. Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, 1916-1952 File, Box 59, folder "Walter Kerr," Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene. Kansas, (Hereafter referred to as Eisenhower Papers and Eisenhower Library.)

Ira Eaker (USAF), and Admiral John Towers; all of whom were retired.[253] Ultimately, the Secretary returned to the idea of a chairman of the Joint Chiefs, who could act as a link between the civilian leadership and the JCS, while abrogating the worst aspects of inter-service rivalry. Obviously, such an individual needed to devote his full time to these goals,[254] but Forrestal was by no means suggesting a single chief of staff. It was the individual's duties, not his title, that was important. In this regard, the Secretary noted, "the fundamental question was not whether or not there should be a single Chief of Staff but what the scope of the single Chief of Staff's responsibility as agent of the Secretary should be."[255]

Forrestal's use of the word "agent" to describe the relationship between the proposed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

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[253]Ibid., The idea of the chairman also being retired was discussed extensively; even the Hoover Commission considered using Eisenhower as the model. See U.S. Congress, House, Hearings, 1949, 2788.

[254]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, National Security Act Amendment of 1949: Hearings on S. 1269 and S. 1843, 81st Congress, 1st Session, 1949, 10. (Hereafter referred to as Senate, Hearings, 1949.)

[255]Memorandum to the Director from C. B. Stauffacher, 6 January 1949, Frederick J. Lawton Papers, box 7, folder "Correspondence, Director Staff," Truman Library. It should be emphasized that Forrestal had not lost any of his belief in the Navy's coordinated approach to administration. The chairman would simply facilitate such coordination.

of Staff and the Secretary of Defense reflected his desire to maximize institutional control over the Chiefs. The Chiefs' independence was based on three pillars: their natural prestige and expertise derived from their position as a chief of a service; their statutory function as advisors to the President and the Secretary of Defense; and their other statutory functions enumerated in the National Security Act of 1947. From the practical point of view, the Chief's statutory functions would have to be eliminated before institutional control could be optimized. In a 8 February 1949 memorandum, Forrestal, along with Clark Clifford and Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, advocated the elimination of both of these statutory pillars. They considered it desirable to "delete the specific statutory duties of the Joint Chiefs of Staff" and to designate the Chairman as the "principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense." Moreover, they thought it desirable to reword the provision prohibiting the Secretary of Defense from creating a military staff of his own "in order to make it clear that the Chairman (or Chief), as well as the Joint Staff, can function as the military staff of the Secretary of Defense."[256] These increases in the Chairman's functions were a logical extension of Forrestal's plan to use him as an "agent" of the Secretary and

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[256]Memorandum, Clifford, Pace, and Forrestal to the President, 8 February 1949, subject: Revision of the National Security, Lawton Papers, box 7, folder "Correspondence, Director of Staff," Truman Library.

make him a "responsible head" of the JCS:

> ...the Chairman must be in a position to secure unanimity
> from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or, if he fails to secure
> such unanimity, he must be able to identify the basis of
> the differences of opinion, and he must in such a circum-
> stance have the right to submit to the Secretary of Defense
> his recommendations as to the decisions which the Secretary
> of Defense should make.[257]

Along these same lines, Forrestal also wanted the Secretary to assume the function of appointing the Director of the Joint Staff.[258]

The stripping away of the Chiefs' statutory functions was what Forrestal called the "shadow concept" of control. The administration felt that sweeping legislative changes, such as "abolishing the Joint Chiefs of Staff," would run into politi-cal difficulties. Instead, it opted for the subtler approach of eroding the Chiefs' functions, and with them their indepen-dence, thereby making them more subservient to secretarial con-trol. Such secretarial control would exist by virtue of lack of restrictions. In much the same manner that the elastic clause of the Constitution paved the way for the expansion of Federal power, the elimination of the delimitating statutory provisions would allow for the expansion of the Secretary's power.[259]

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[257]U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings, 1949, 10.

[258]Major Changes, 24.

[259]Memorandum to the Director from C. B. Stauffacher, 6 January 1949, Frederick J. Lawton Papers, box 7, folder "Correspondence, Director Staff," Truman Library.

Generally speaking, the Chiefs were receptive to For-
restal's desire to establish a full-time institutional modera-
tor within the Joint Chiefs. This point was made by General
Bradley during the Congressional hearings:

> In our experience serving as Joint Chiefs, we have come
> to the conclusion that the lack of such a Chairman is a
> flagrant shortcoming of the present organization for
> security. A senior officer, of competent military back-
> ground, who devotes his total time to the Joint Chiefs'
> prescribed functions, and the Joint Chiefs' agenda is
> essential.[260]

But a full-time moderator, equal to the other Chiefs, was a
far cry from the "agent" that Forrestal envisioned. In a 25
March 1949 reply to the Secretary, the Chiefs suggested greater
limitations on the proposed powers of the Secretary of Defense
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Specifically,
the Chiefs recommended that their previously prescribed duties
be included in any future law. They reaffirmed this position
before the Senate by recommending the following: (1) the
Chairman should have no command power; (2) the Chiefs should
keep their statutory functions; (3) the advisory function
should be kept with the Chiefs as a corporate entity and that
the chairman should be part of the JCS and not separate from
it; (4) the Joint Staff is the operating body of the JCS and
that the JCS should appoint the Director, not the Secretary
of Defense.[261]

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[260]U.S. Congress. House, Hearings, 1949, 2879.

[261]Major Changes, 24.

The Chiefs were fully aware of the effect Forrestal's proposal would have on their prerogatives. From the administration's view, the proposals would be a major step in extracting the Chiefs from the chain of command and their command function. This was a crucial step in eliminating service parochialism. From the Chiefs' perspective, the legislation would eliminate them from the decision making process all together. They would, in effect, be relegated to that of the staff of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If we can judge from the form of the final legislation, the Congress appeared to be sympathetic toward the Chiefs in this power struggle with their civilian superiors, although, I would suggest for different reasons. The highly centralized power of the chairman was too close to the "Prussian" model of a general staff to be acceptable. This is not to say that Congress was sanctioning inter-service competition, it is just that Congress felt it was the lesser of two evils.

The 1949 amendment to the National Security Act maintained the Joint Chiefs' corporate advisory function and delineated their specific remaining functions. The chairman would serve for a maximum of four years, except in time of war, and while he had precedence over all other military officers, he had no command authority. The question of precedence represents an interesting study in semantics. It was

clear that nobody, except a few advocates of the centralized army approach, wanted to see the chairman become a uniformed chief of staff. Clearly, the Chiefs envisioned him as the first among equals. The question of his rank, and its relationship to the other services was foremost in the thoughts of the Chiefs.[262] This ambiguous relationship of rank may have prompted the administration to promote Bradley, the new Chairman, to the five star rank of General of the Army, a rank comparable to that which was held by both of his predecessors.

The 1949 legislation further specified that the Chairman could not vote in the JCS. This latter provision had little real importance, since the Joint Chiefs is not a democratic institution. While it is true that they present their various views on programs and send recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, all positions are sent forward whether they are unanimous or not. Bradley noted during the hearings that, "I see no reason to give him [the chairman] the vote as long as it doesn't mean anything." In fact Bradley saw a non-voting chairman as advantageous, since it could mean a greater degree of non-bias if the chairman did

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[262]U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings 1949, 108-125.

did not have to "commit himself by a formal vote."[263]

Specifically, the duties of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff were enumerated as follows:

(1) To serve as the presiding officer of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.

(2) To provide agenda for meetings of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and to assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prose-
cute their business as promptly as practicable.

(3) To inform the Secretary of Defense and, when appro-
priate as determined by the President or Secretary of
Defense, the President, of those issues upon which agree-
ment among the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not been
reached.[264]

Tied in with the creation of the chairmanship was an increase

in the size of the Joint Staff to 210 officers. This would

facilitate the JCS's planning function. The Director of the

Joint Staff continued to be appointed by the Chiefs, though

not by a secret ballot as Forrestal had desired.

The 1949 amendments to the National Security Act laid

the foundation for future DoD centralization that would ulti-

mately culminate in the McNamara Monarchy of the 1960s.

Despite Forrestal's earlier dislike for centralization, he

was instrumental in what he considered "an additional step

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[263]U.S. Congress, House, Hearings, 1949, 2903. During
the hearings General Bradley said "He [the Chairman] should
never have to go back to his service to answer for the things
he did as Chairman.", 2996; Ibid., 2896.

[264]Major Changes, 26.

in the evolutionary process."[265] It was his exposure to the fundamental weaknesses within the defense structure that led him to modify his attitude. In particular, it was the budget process, hampered by inter-service rivalry and the lack of cohesive strategic planning, that made the greatest impact. From Forrestal's perspective, Clifford's pluralistic JCS had failed. He sought a partial solution in the form of an Under Secretary of Defense to help him with the massive amount of work that he was involved in, but it appears that he became increasingly convinced toward the end of his tenure that it was the JCS that needed to be restructured. A chairman with increased power to act as the Secretary's "agent" became Forrestal's panacea. By promoting Bradley to five star rank, the general had the formal rank and prestige to become the "agent" that Forrestal sought. He also attempted, but never succeeded in separating the Chiefs from their services.

Since Forrestal understood the political difficulties in radically restructuring the Joint Chiefs, he opted instead for his "shadow concept" of control. By gaining control over the functions of the JCS, the Secretary would then be in a position to remold the institution. Unfortunately, he was never in a position to put his ideas into effect. Even before

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[265]Memorandum to the Director from C. B. Stauffacher, 6 January 1949, Frederick J. Lawton Papers, box 7, folder "Correspondence, Director Staff," Truman Library.

the amendments to the National Security Act were implemented,

James Forrestal was dead. Exhausted by the very factors

that led him to seek reorganization, he committed suicide in

May 1949.

It remained for Harry S. Truman's successor, Dwight

D. Eisenhower, to complete the reorganization effort that

Forrestal began. Eisenhower's experience as Supreme Allied

Commander in Europe, as well as temporary Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs, left him convinced of the effectiveness of

certain methods of organizational control. In the first

place, he brought with him a strong conviction as to the

necessity for unified command, both in terms of administra-

tive control and staff members attitudes. This belief was

translated into the practical concept of teamwork which for

him was the "essence of all success."[266] Secondly, Eisen-

hower brought from the Army very strong attitudes on proper

organizational and staff procedures. John Donovan, the Eisen-

hower administration's court historian, observed that the

President "imported from the army a form of the staff system,

in which all functions and responsibilities flow in a more or

less fixed order and sequence from the President down."[267]

[266]Stephen E. Ambrose, The Supreme Commander: The War Years of General Dwight D. Eisenhower (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1969), 55.

[267]Robert J. Donovan, Eisenhower: The Inside Story (New York: New York Herald Tribune, Inc., 1956), 69.

The same staff procedures that had worked so well during the war under the supervision of General Walter Bedell Smith, were very much apparent in the person of Governor Sherman Adams, who handled domestic affairs, and Robert Cutler in the National Security Council. Finally, the President arrived at the White House a strong advocate of civilian control of the military, firmly believing that civilians rather than the JCS should control the Department of Defense.[268]

With these general attitudes as a backdrop, Eisenhower developed very specific ideas on how the defense structure should be organized. These ideas were enumerated in two memoranda written in 1948 and 1949; the former was a response to a Hoover Commission inquiry, while the latter was written during his tenure as acting Chairman of the JCS.[269] The major thrust of his recommendations in both memoranda was centralizing decision making power into the hands of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Such authorization would allow the Secretary to deal effectively with inter-service differences and "to render timely and

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[268]Sherman Adams, First Hand Report: The Story of the Eisenhower Administration (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961), 397.

[269]Memorandum for the Military Advisor, 3 September 1948, Eisenhower Papers, 1916-1952 File, box 34, folder "Eberstadt," (Hereafter cited as Memorandum 1948) Eisenhower Library. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 4 February 1949; Eisenhower Papers, 1916-1952 File, box 38, folder "Forrestal(2)," (Hereafter cited as Memorandum 1949) Eisenhower Library.

decisive judgments whenever there is a major difference of opinion among the services and which they themselves cannot solve."[270] This authority would be of particular value in the realm of budgetary matters where the Secretary "may be forced to make specific decisions in numerous cases."[271]

In order to help the Secretary of Defense make these tough decisions, Eisenhower proposed that two new official positions be created; an Under Secretary of Defense and a Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. The former foreshadowed the numerous assistant secretaries that came about as a result of the 1949 legislation and Eisenhower's own Reorganization Plan of 1953. The latter was just another name for the title of Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief that Admiral Leahy wore and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff position that was created in 1949. What was unique about Eisenhower's Military Assistant was the role he recommended for him. The Military Assistant would have only general administrative functions, never be a commander, and would normally retire after this assignment.[272] His primary function was to be a coordinator, who "should have no power of formal decision in his own right."[273] In other words, he would be a

[270]Memorandum, 1949.

[271]Memorandum, 1948.

[272]Memorandum, 1949.

[273]Memorandum, 1948.

chief of staff in the technical military sense. This statement is also very similar in intent to the non-voting provision incorporated into the 1949 and 1953 amendments to the National Security Act. The Chairman-Military Assistant acted essentially as an intermediary between the administration and the Chiefs.

To General Eisenhower, teamwork was essential both in a military staff and in a presidential administration:

> The President should state in unequivocal terms his
> determination to produce teamwork in the Security
> establishment and should seek a virtual pledge from each
> individual...that there will be given to every decision
> of the President and the Secretary of Defense complete
> loyalty and respect, both as to letter and to spirit.
> He should also invite any subordinate who might feel
> himself unable to give such a pledge to ask for another
> assignment.[274]

The role of the Military Assistant was central to the creation of teamwork because it was his job "to make certain that the Joint Chiefs of Staff thoroughly consider every major problem that should properly come to their attention," and "assure that the Joint Chiefs of Staff reach, whenever possible, joint conclusions and recommendations on these problems."[275] The ability of the Military Assistant to assure that the Chiefs reach these "joint conclusions" lies beyond the realm of just coordination and effective administration:

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[274]Memorandum, 1949.

[275]Ibid.

His mere presence on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting
as the trusted assistant of the Secretary of Defense,
should do much to induce, if not compel, the attainment
of unanimous recommendations and conclusions.[276]

This approach was by no means new. Forrestal had sought to

establish the chairmanship with much the same desire for

unanimity in mind. If unanimity could not be reached, then

it was the Military Assistant's job to "present the matter

in all its aspects to the Secretary of Defense asking for a

decision."[277] Unquestionably, the right of access to the

Secretary and their close relationship would have great impact

upon the outcome of the decision.

Along with desiring to centralize the decision making

process, Eisenhower also wanted to take the Chiefs out of the

service's administrative channels and to have them concentrate

upon strategic planning. Their JCS work was to take "pre-

cedence over any personal or individual service matter."[278]

Again, this followed the lead that the Truman administration

had initiated.

It is apparent that during this period, Eisenhower's

thinking was running parallel to that of Secretary Forrestal.

He, like Forrestal, identified increased centralization as

the solution to the problems brought about by the committee

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[276] Ibid.

[277] Memorandum, 1948.

[278] Memorandum, 1949.

nature of the JCS, but the 1949 legislation did not effectively
eradicate these detrimental tendencies and forced Eisenhower
to face the issue of reorganization upon his assumption of
office in 1953.

Even before Eisenhower's inauguration, certain prominent
individuals, identified with the incumbent administration,
suggested fundamental reform within the Department of Defense.
Both Dr. Vannevar Bush, Chief of the Research and Development
Board, and Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett, went on record
advocating a restructured chain of command that reinserted
the civilian service secretaries into a position of prominence,
increased the power of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and transformed the JCS into more of a planning agency.
Both Bush and Lovett found inter-service rivalry and the
Chiefs' service obligations as the primary source of impair-
ment to the JCS' planning mission. Bush, far more radical in
his approach, suggested totally separating the JCS from the
chain of command and creating a new organization to deal with
the command functions. This would allow the Joint Chiefs to
devote full time to planning. Lovett, somewhat more conser-
vative, merely suggested giving increased power to the ser-
vices' vice chiefs of staff and transferring most of the Joint
Staff to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Theoretically,
these changes would result in the Chiefs paying more attention

to planning, while minimizing the services' impact upon decisions.[279]

Upon his inauguration, Eisenhower had to deal quickly with the matter of defense reorganization. Through Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, a special committee, headed by Nelson A. Rockefeller, was appointed to study the Defense Department. This committee, accepting the Lovett-Bush viewpoint, sent forward a series of recommendations that were totally incorporated into the President's Reorganization Plan #6, outlined on 30 April 1953.[280]

The President stated that the first objective of the plan was the "clarification of lines of authority within the Department of Defense so as to strengthen civilian responsibility." Civilian control was the constitutional principle that guided civil-military relations and this meant in organizational terms that:

> We must recognize and respect the clear lines of respo~
> bility and authority which run from the President, thro..
> the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the
> military departments, over the operations of all branches
> of the Department of Defense.

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[279]Major Changes, 28-30.

[280]Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1953, p. 225 ff and U.S. Committee on Department of Defense Organization, Report of the Rockefeller Committee on Department of Defense Organization, 11 April 1953 (printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services, 83d Congress, 1st Session). (Hereafter cited as Rockefeller Report, 1953.)

Establishing the chain of command in the above manner, centralized a great deal of power into the hands of the Secretary of Defense and streamlined the chain of command. Furthermore, it removed the confusion surrounding the relationship between a chief, acting as an executive agent, and his service secretary and the Secretary of Defense. Prior to 1953, a chief of service was named as the executive agent over the unified commands in which his service had a primary interest. It was through the executive agent that communications and decisions were transmitted, thus placing the JCS within the chain of command. In his capacity as executive agent, a service chief did not deal with his service secretary, who felt that his power was being circumvented. After 1953, a military department (i.e., the Department of the Army, Navy, and Air Force) was named the executive agent as opposed to an individual chief.

This restructuring of the chain of command to exclude the JCS was part of the President's desire to "improve our machinery for strategic planning for national defense." Following this approach, the President specifically stated that the Chiefs "are not a command body, but are the principal military advisors to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense." In order to facilitate carrying out this advisory mission, the powers of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs were to be enhanced. Specifically, the

Chairman would be made responsible for managing the work of the Joint Staff and approving the appointment of its members. It was intended that this would free the Chiefs from administrative details and allow them to concentrate on their planning function. Moreover, by giving the Chairman control over the Joint Staff, including the veto power over any appointment, it was hoped that this would ensure the selection of officers who were above service interest[281] and who would be able to concentrate on the "entire effort" of defense planning.[282]

The President's reorganization plan resurfaced the decade-old argument over centralization versus decentralization. Opponents of the bill attacked it for "Prussianizing" the Joint Staff, transforming the Chairman into a single chief of staff, and perverting the original intention of the National Security Act. Proponents defended the bill in terms of efficiency, necessity, and as the only means of eliminating inter-service rivalry.[283] The administration carefully emphasized that the Chairman would not be in a position to dominate the

[281]Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1953, p. 225 ff.

[282]Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change: 1953-1956 (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963), 448.

[283]For a full examination of the fight over centralization vs. decentralization see H. Struve Hensel, "Changes Inside the Pentagon," Harvard Business Review, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Jan-Feb 1954), for a defense of centralization see Eugene S. Duffield "Organizing for Defense," Harvard Business Review, Vol. 31, No. 5 (Sept-Oct 1953) for a defense of decentralization.

JCS. In summary, the advantages the administration saw in the bill were:

"better managerial supervision over the Joint Staff and the relief of the service members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the burden of this managerial function so that they can devote more of their time to the vital and critical responsibilities they have in the fields of service readiness and operations in strategic planning and advice. These advantages will be obtained without the possibility of a situation where a viewpoint could be completely submerged by any action of the Chairman under the duties assigned to him by statute and the additional duty assigned to him in the reorganization plan."[284]

During the next year, the planning mission of the JCS was greatly emphasized by a series of directives and memoranda. The first of these was a Presidential revision of the 1948 Key West Agreement on the functions of the Joint Chiefs. This revision, issued on 1 October 1953, deleted from the Chiefs' functions "the direction of all combat operations," and substituted for it "guidance for the operational control of forces and conduct of combat operations." While the term "guidance" was relatively ambiguous, it clearly was less authoritative than "direction," which implied command. This put into effect the President's view that the Chiefs "are not a command body." The rewording of the functions statement was a step toward achieving the reorganization's objective, namely, to extract the Chiefs from the chain of command. On 26 July 1954,

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[284]Memorandum, 17 June 1953, subject: Purpose and application of Section 1(c) and (d) of Reorganization Plan No. 6, 1953, Bruce Harlow Papers, box 19, folder "Reorganization Plan 36," Eisenhower Library.

Secretary of Defense Wilson issued a directive on "Method
of operation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their relation-
ship with other staff agencies of the Office of the Secretary
of Defense." This directive stated that JCS work was to "take
priority over all other duties," and that the Secretary of
Defense was to be fully informed as to all the deliberations
of the JCS. It further stated that the Chairman was required
to forward to the Secretary of Defense his own "views, advice,
and recommendations," whenever he was in disagreement with
the other Chiefs. Finally, on the 19th of October 1954, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur Radford,
issued a memorandum on "Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization,
its structure and management," which pursuant to the Presi-
dent's intentions, consolidated the Chairman's control over the
Joint Staff.[285]

The result of these various memoranda and directives
was to decrease the Joint Chiefs' command functions while
correspondingly emphasizing their planning mission. These
documents also continued the trend toward centralization with-
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the consolida-
tion of power into the hands of the Chairman. After the July
1954 directive, the relationship between the Chairman and the

[285]U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Secretariat, His-
torical Division, Main Features of the Organizational Develop-
ment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Since 1947, 12 January, 1972,
7-9 (mimeographed).

Secretary of Defense began to resemble the one that Eisenhower
had outlined back in 1949. Despite this increased centra-
lization, the traditional problems of service rivalry and lack
of cohesion in policy formulation continued to be a hindrance.
This point was acknowledged by the President in his January
1958 State of the Union address. After stressing the impor-
tance of strategic planning and the damage that resulted from
inter-service competition, the President indicated that a
reorganization of the defense structure was in the offing.
The direction of this new plan was disclosed when the Presi-
dent said the "end of interservice disputes requires clear
organization and decisive central direction."[286] Increased
centralization was offered up again as the panacea, just as
it had been in 1949 and 1953.

Following the President's State of the Union address,
a special Advisory Committee was set up by Secretary of
Defense Neil McElroy to study Defense Department organiza-
tional problems. For the remainder of January and through
February, the committee met regularly. In their endeavor to
analyze the weaknesses of the defense structure, they were
aided by two recently completed staff studies: the top
secret Gaither Report, produced by the Security Resources
Panel of the Scientific Advisory Committee, and the widely

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[286]Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1958, 2 ff.

disseminated Rockefeller Brothers Report, <u>International</u>
<u>Security: The Military Aspects</u>.[287] What is of particular
interest is the linkage between the authors of these two
staff studies and the membership of the Advisory Committee.
Both William C. Foster, a former Deputy Secretary of Defense,
who co-chaired the Gaither Committee, and Nelson A. Rockefel-
ler, who headed the 1953 reorganization study, were members
of the Advisory Committee.

Of the two studies, it was the Rockefeller Report
that addressed the problems of the Defense Department in
detail. It emphasized the necessity for cohesive national
security policy, and it was extremely critical of the DoD
structure. As in the case of earlier studies, inter-service
rivalry was singled out as the culprit, and increased centrali-
zation was offered as the solution. The Rockefeller Report
recommended making the Chairman the principal military ad-
visor to the Secretary of Defense, an idea that had been
contemplated by Forrestal almost a decade earlier. In regard
to the chain of command, it recommended placing all forces
under a unified or specified command and excluding the ser-
vices from the operational control of those commands. This

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[287]Rockefeller Brothers Fund, <u>International Security:</u>
<u>The Military Aspect</u>. America at Mid-Century Series (New York:
Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1958); Security Resources Panel
of the Advisory Committee, <u>Deterrence & Survival in the</u>
<u>Nuclear Age</u> (The Gaither Report), (Washington: November 7,
1957) published in Morton Halperin, <u>National Security Policy-</u>
<u>Making</u> (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1975).

was a reversal of the 1953 Rockefeller position. With the services eliminated as executive agents, the chain of command would run directly from the President and the Secretary of Defense to the various forces in the field. With operational control in the hands of the civilian secretary, it was logical, as was suggested, to place the Joint Staff directly under the control of the Chairman who in turn would work directly for the Secretary.[288] This would make the Joint Chiefs purely a planning agency along the lines indicated by Dr. Bush and Secretary Lovett in 1952. The Gaither Report, completed in November 1957, proposed very similar conclusions in regard to the chain of command and the services' role as executive agent.[289]

Restructuring the chain of command along these lines became the nucleus of the President's reorganization package presented to Congress in April 1958. Although the Advisory Committee did not publish a formal report, the nature of its advice was a reiteration of the earlier proposals. In a February 27th memorandum to the President, Charles Coolidge, a committee member, wrote:

> The concept of executive agency should be abandoned and unified, etc. commands should be placed directly under

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[288]Rockefeller Brothers Fund, International Security: The Military Aspect, 27-33.

[289]Halperin, National Security Policy-Making, 84-35.

the Secretary of Defense, with the J.C.S. doing the staff work, supported by an integrated operations division of the Joint Staff.[290]

One should not assume that the impetus for the 1958 reorganization was predominately from the outside. On the contrary, the evidence seems to indicate that the President was one of the prime movers in this area. Before a combined Armed Forces Policy Council and Advisory Committee meeting, the President emphatically said, "the use of an executive agency for strategic orders was crazy," and the service secretaries "should not be involved in the preparation of strategic planning." This meeting, occurring on 25 January, a month before the Coolidge memorandum and very close to the onset of the Advisory Committee's work, indicates the ultimate impact of Eisenhower's thinking.[291]

One thing that is striking is the administration's reversal from its 1953 position on the organization of the chain of command. President Eisenhower attempted to explain this change to the Congress by stating that the administration had become aware that the executive agency system was

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[290]Memorandum for the President, 27 February 1958, Rockefeller Records, box 18, folder "136(1)," Eisenhower Library. Coolidge had been special advisor to Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett, thus partially explaining his support for increased centralization.

[291]Memorandum for the Record, 25 January 1958, subject: Meeting on Defense Organization, Rockefeller Records, box 18, folder "136(2)," Eisenhower Library.

"cumbersome and unreliable in peace and not usable in time
of war." He went on to explain that the technological revolu-
tion of the mid-1950s demanded a greater degree of responsive-
ness from the military.[292] This of course meant increased
centralization. A more plausible explanation for this re-
versal may be sought by examining the total package submitted
by the President, and by analyzing the fundamental changes
that were to be brought about within the Joint Chiefs.

If the President's proposal for reorganizing the
chain of command was accepted, then all major organizational
elements of the military would be incorporated under the
banner of either a unified or specified command, and these
would be directly under the command of the Secretary of
Defense. Theoretically this would separate the commanders of
these unified and specified commands from their chief of ser-
vice, thus achieving an integral part of the President's
overall program:

> Because I have often seen the evils of diluted command,
> I emphasize that each unified commander must have un-
> questioned authority over all units in his command....
> I recommend, therefore, the present law, including cer-
> tain restrictions relating to combat functions be so
> amended as to remove any possible obstacles to the full
> unity of our commands and the full command over them by
> unified commanders.[293]

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[292]Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1958, 281.

[293]Ibid., 279-280.

This would finally remove the Chiefs from their command role and make them into a planning agency. With the President echoing the Coolidge memorandum of February 27, he proposed that in the future the Chiefs should "serve as a staff assisting the Secretary of Defense." Obviously, for the Chiefs to accomplish this new and vital mission, the Joint Staff would have to be enlarged and, in words identical to the Coolidge memorandum, an "integrated operations division" would have to be created within the Joint Staff. In order to maximize the effectiveness of this newly integrated staff, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be allowed to assign duties to the Joint Staff and, with the "approval of the Secretary of Defense, to appoint its Director."[294] Moreover, as part of the administration's effort to expand and strengthen the power of the Chairman, the meaningless restriction on his voting within the JCS was to be removed.

The President's program was fully accepted by the Congress. Instrumental in the passage of the bill was the support it received from the members of the JCS. Only the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Randolph Pate, opposed the movement toward centralization. All of the other Chiefs actively supported the bill and reiterated that the role of the JCS had not diminished. Why the Chiefs gave into centralization when they had so vociferously opposed it less

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[294]Ibid., 281-282.

than a decade before is difficult to answer. Undoubtedly, the prestige of President Eisenhower on military matters was important, as well as the fact Eisenhower's Chiefs had been selected with loyalty as a key criterion. Both of these points will be addressed in some detail in later chapters. It is also possible that the Congress began to feel that efficiency in military matters was more important than fear of potential "Prussianization." The national security structure had been in existence for over a decade, so many of the early fears had eroded. Whatever the actual reason, the legislation was the culmination of the centralization process that had started under Forrestal.

Inter-service rivalry and the lack of a cohesively integrated national security policy was the cause of all four major post-war reorganizations. In each case, the solution was further centralization. Theoretically, the 1949 amendments gave the Secretary of Defense sufficient power to deal with the problems that were endemic to his department. This was the opinion of the Chief Counsel of the 1953 Rockefeller Commission:

> Subject to the President and certain express prohibitions ...the power and authority of the Secretary of Defense is complete and supreme. It blankets all agencies and all organizations within the Department of Defense.[295]

Yet in every case, the increased power granted to the Secretary and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs proved to be insufficient

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[295] Rockefeller Report, 1953, Appendix 1.

and merely led to greater centralization in the next reorga-
nization. The reason for this was that the fundamental prob-
lem within the Department of Defense was never addressed. A
canvassing of the recommendations of the special task groups
that analyzed the problem reveals a single common denomina-
tor, the committee nature of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As
far as these studies were concerned, it was the committee
nature that promoted service competition.[296]

As part of his 1958 reforms, the President attempted to
deal with the committee issue, not within the JCS but within
the Joint Staff. Since Eisenhower's failure to address the
committee problem in 1953, the intensification of inter-service
rivalry forced him to reevaluate the situation. If a truly
integrated staff was to be established, as the President pro-
posed in 1958, then the committee system had to be abolished.
This point was made abundantly clear by the President during
the January 25th Advisory Committee meeting when he asked "...
why we should not have the best integrated organization within
the Joint Staff where the best officers would be assigned
rather than a committee system?"[297]

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[296]Ibid., 4-10; Hoover Commission, 66-70; Commission on
Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Five
Staff Papers Prepared for the Task Force on Procurement, (Wash-
ington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), I, A-54; Report
to the President and the Secretary of Defense by the Blue Ribbon
Defense Panel, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1970). Appendix N, Staff Report on Joint Chiefs of Staff
Decisionmaking.

[297]Memorandum for the Record, 25 January 1958, subject:
Meeting on Defense Organization, Rockefeller Records, box 18,
folder "136(2)" Eisenhower Library.

The restructuring of the committees fell within the executive prerogative, thus allowing the administration to implement changes without Congressional concurrence. Under the President's and the Secretary of Defense's direction, the Chairman announced on 27 May 1958 that the committee system would be abolished. In its place, the Joint Staff would be structured along a traditional staff format that was in normal operation in other military staffs. The new organization consisted of six directorates: J-1 Personnel, J-2 Intelligence, J-3 Operations, J-4 Logistics, J-5 Plans and Policy, and J-6 Communications-Electronics. These six directorates, along with the directors of Military Assistance, Advanced Studies, and Joint Programs, made up the newly constituted Joint Staff. One of the primary motivations for changing to this type of organization was that it allowed the Joint Staff to work effectively with the similar staff structures of the unified and specified commands."[298] In conjunction with this reorganization, the Secretary of Defense revised the formal statement of the JCS's functions incorporated in DoD Directive 5100.1. While reiterating some of the traditional functions of the Joint Chiefs, the revision clearly reflected the thrust toward transforming them into a planning agency as opposed

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[298]Major Changes, 42-46. To deal with the new responsibilities of the Joint Staff, it was increased to 400 members in the 1958 legislation.

to a command group. It specifically identified the JCS as the immediate military staff of the Secretary of Defense and as a corporate group, placed them in the operational chain of communication through which the Secretary of Defense issued orders to the unified and specified commands.[299]   It was also hoped, that by giving the Chairman more control over the Joint Staff, the officers selected would be above service interest.

While the President was preparing his reorganization effort, the Chiefs were in the process of examining their own organizational structure and that of the Department of Defense. In December 1957, an Ad Hoc Committee within the JCS was created, under the direction of Major General Earl G. Wheeler, to examine DoD organizations in "order to determine if there are deficiencies" that could be eliminated through reorganization. The report outlined five areas in which it felt there were fundamental problems.

1. Problems and delays within the JCS decision making process and "subsequently above their level."

2. Insufficient coordination between logistics and strategic planning.

3. Complicated channels of authority to commanders in the field.

4. Confusion as to the internal lines of authority within the services, DoD, OSD, and the role of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense.

5. Service budgets were unduly influenced by non-military determinants.

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[299] Ibid., 38.

Among those areas identified by the Wheeler Report, those per-
taining to internal problems within the JCS and the complicated
channels of authority to field commanders were also addressed
by the President. At no time did the Ad Hoc Committee mention
inter-service conflict, nor did it consider the committee nature
of the Joint Staff to be a problem; despite the fact it noted
that the Chiefs tended to reach decisions through compromise
and that there were continual divergencies of opinion within the
JCS. For obvious reasons the Ad Hoc Committee never could
identify the real cause of these problems nor blame the Chiefs
and their structure. Instead, they sought the solution through
procedural means by which the JCS would resolve their diver-
gencies, and they advocated greater involvement by the civilian
decision makers on appropriate issues. In regard to the chain
of command problems, the Wheeler Report suggested either return-
ing to the executive agency structure or giving operational
responsibility directly to the Chiefs. In either case this
was completely contrary to the President's desire. Needless
to say, the President's plan superseded the JCS report, and
it was never acted on.[300]

The Eisenhower administration hoped that the 1958
reforms would eliminate once and for all the problems of

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[300]U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Report by the Ad Hoc
Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Organization of the
Department of Defense. 24 January 1958.

inter-service rivalry and the lack of policy integration.

Unfortunately, as in the case of the three earlier plans,

increased centralization proved to be ineffective. The reason

for this failure, as in all the previous efforts, was that it

never did strike at the fundamental issue, the bureaucratic

nature of the JCS. A 1959 memorandum from the Bureau of the

Budget outlined the continuing nature of this problem:

> The high rank of the officers involved, the importance of
> the issues with which they deal, the aura of mystery which
> surrounds their work, the very title "Joint Chiefs of
> Staff"--all have served to obscure the fact that the JCS
> is a committee. Originally it was an interdepartmental
> committee. Now it is an intra-departmental committee.
> All intra-governmental committees, whether manned by
> civilians or military men, are capable of performing only
> limited functions. Failures have been the inevitable re-
> sult of attempts to assign to committees duties which they
> are organizationally incapable of performing. Past efforts
> to strengthen the JCS have involved the provision of a
> Chairman, later enlargements of his duties and most re-
> cently an expansion of the Joint Staff which serves the
> JCS. All of the changes, however, have left the com-
> mittee character of the JCS essentially intact. It is
> clear that the JCS will remain the main obstacle to sound
> staff organization in the Office of the Secretary of
> Defense until (1) the committee character of the JCS is
> clearly recognized and its duties reduced to those which
> can be performed effectively by a committee and (2) the
> other duties of the JCS are assigned to other OSD staff
> elements.[301]

As the memorandum noted, all the efforts at centralization had

left untouched the basic structure of the JCS. Almost in a

sense of desperation, the memorandum called for the establish-

ment of independent analytic capability in the Office of the

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[301]Memorandum from the Bureau of the Budget, December
1959, Bruce Harlow Papers, box 19, folder, "Reorganization Plan
No. 1," Eisenhower Library.

Secretary of Defense. This had been Secretary Forrestal's original reason for creating the office of the Chairman, but in so doing he had left the JCS structure basically unchanged. Whether Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara read this memorandum is unknown, but the establishment of the Office of Systems Analysis, and the power which he ultimately vested in it achieved the kind of independent analysis that the memorandum called for. In many ways that office fulfilled the role that the Truman and Eisenhower administrations tried to force the Joint Chiefs to take.[302]

For both the Truman and the Eisenhower administrations, the crucial issue regarding political/military planning was the establishment of an organization that could effectively integrate the nation's commitments and capabilities. The Joint Chiefs of Staff was the hinge upon which this policy integration hung. However, in the eyes of both administrations the JCS failed to fulfill their primary mission, the development of usable input into the national security policy making structure. Without this input, policy integration was doomed from the start.

As the civilian leadership assessed the policy making structure in order to determine where the organizational breakdown was occurring, they continually pointed to the JCS as the culprit. It was for this reason that the JCS became the focal

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[302]Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough: Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969 (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1972).

point of the three major reorganizations that occurred after 1947. Within the JCS, the committee structure was identified as the single greatest flaw. The committee nature of the Chiefs appeared to precipitate the inter-service conflicts that destroyed the Chiefs' ability to give unified advice to the political leadership. Without an agreement on the nature and needs of the nation's military capabilities, it was impossible to determine if those capabilities could support the political commitments that were being considered. In practice these differences of opinion stemmed from the twin dilemmas that haunted the Chiefs: their corporate role versus their service role, and their planning function versus their command function. From the very beginning, there was confusion as to which role or function took precedence. General Gruenther assumed, when he was organizing the Joint Staff, that the Chiefs' planning function and hence their corporate role was the most important. But the National Security Act of 1947 left the Chiefs a command function, simply by not identifying that planning had primacy. The result was that the three subsequent reorganizations sought to extract the Chiefs from the chain of command, thereby forcing them into the role of planner.

The heart of all three of these reorganizations was centralizing power into the hands of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Once it had been determined that a pluralistic JCS resulted in dysfunctional competition, the solution appeared to be centralized

management from above. This was the direction that Forrestal marked in his First Report, but the first Secretary of Defense also realized that he needed to have military advice from an expert. It was for this reason that he wanted to establish a powerful Chairman so that he could become his "agent" within the Joint Chiefs. Based upon his experiences as acting Chairman, Eisenhower came to the same conclusion. A strong Chairman, whose rank, prestige, and power was superior to that of the other Chiefs, would be in a position to eliminate interservice conflicts and force the Chiefs to be responsible.

What is apparent is that the Chiefs sought to maintain their command prerogatives in the face of these organizational changes. This goal is still very clear when one examines the Wheeler Report. If the Chiefs lost their command function they would be relegated to what Robert Golembiewski describes as the Neutral and Inferior Instrument (NII) model of a staff.[303] In the NII model the staff is outside the line of command and is primarily a thought and planning structure, as opposed to an organization concerned with execution. In reality it becomes purely an advisory body. From an organizational chart perspective, Eisenhower's 1958 reforms made the JCS a Neutral and Inferior Instrument. The Chiefs were taken

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[303] Robert T. Golembiewski, Organizing Men and Power: Patterns of Behavior and Time-Staff Models, (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co, 1967), 11-14.

out of the chain of command, and the Joint Staff became less a vehicle of the services and more of a planning agency responding to the direction of the Chiefs. The Secretary of Defense became, in effect, the commander of the United States military forces, since he now had the sole ability within the Defense Department to issue direct orders to the unified and specified commands.

While the above analysis did lead to massive organizational changes, the internal problems within the JCS remained untouched. The reason was that there was not one single problem, but two separate problems within the JCS. The first was the one that everyone identified--bureaucratic infighting. Since it was easily identifiable the organizational changes attempted to deal with it. The second problem was alluded to by some of the outside studies, but never formally identified. That problem was the nature of the Chiefs' professional outlook. It caused the Chiefs' "aloofness" when they dealt with other decision making institutions. In order to fully understand the impact of both of these flaws and how they interrelate, we must examine each one in turn, always remembering the organizational structure which supplies the parameters within which they operate.

CHAPTER V

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND THE BUREAUCRACY

A description of organizational changes tells us very little about the actual decision making process. Vince Davis correctly noted that trying to discover how a decision is made by looking at an organizational chart is like trying to determine who will win a ball game by buying a score card.[304] In order to fully appreciate the role of the Joint Chiefs in policy formulation, it is necessary to understand the JCS's own internal decision making system. The product of this system forms the basis of the Joint Chiefs' input into the national policy process. Despite extensive changes within the organization of the JCS, both in terms of size and structure, the staffing procedures of the Joint Chiefs have remained remarkably stable. This personification of bureaucratization has been described by one author as "The Flimsy-Buff-Green-Red Striped Nightmare."[305] These terms refer to

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[304]Vince Davis, "American Military Policy: Decision-making in the Executive Branch," Naval War College Review, Vol. XXII, No. 9 (May, 1970), 7.

[305]Stuart Loory, Defeated: Inside America's Military Machine (New York: Random House, 1973), see chapter 6. The following material on the Joint Chiefs bureaucratic process, unless otherwise specifically identified is taken from Lawrence Tatum, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defense Policy Formulation," in American Defense Policy (2nd edition), ed. by Mark E. Smith and Claude J. Johns (Baltimore: The Johns

the color coded papers which are used at the different stages of the process.

The process itself begins when the JCS is asked to supply input on a subject. The request may be generated either inside the Joint Chiefs or from an agency outside of it. If it is externally generated, then the Director of the Joint Staff will assign a "report for the Joint Chiefs of Staff" to the Joint Staff agency primarily concerned with the problem as well as any other agencies with secondary interest. This "Green Directive" (usually referred to as a "Green Bomb") will identify the problem and the action officer whose function it will be to produce the paper and to shepherd his product through the bureaucratic maze. Secondary agencies concerned with the issue are also requested to assign action officers to help produce the final product.

From the very beginning, the primary action officer is impeded by the short time which is allocated to him to produce his product. Colonel John Harrelson, a former JCS

Hopkins Press, 1968), 377-392. Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense, App. N. Staff Report on Joint Chiefs of Staff Decisionmaking (Washington: G.P.O., 1970). J.S. Harrelson, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Security," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, American University, 1968). The process described here uses the JCS structure as it looked after the 1958 reforms, but the general outline of how the JCS moved its paperwork from the "flimsy" to the "red-striped green" was relatively constant all through the period under investigation.

staffer, noted that "the importance of a paper is measured in inverse order to the amount of time allocated to its preparation."[306] Since the whole bureaucratic process takes on the average two to three weeks to complete, the miltiary strategist is not given sufficient time to produce a quality product.[307]

The first stage of the staffing process is writing the "flimsy".[308] The action officer normally has only forty-eight hours to write it. Its purpose is to serve as a catalyst for further discussion, and may either be a serious piece of work or a straw man designed to draw out the service's positions. Once the first draft of the "flimsy" has been written it is then circulated to the secondary action officers, who represent the services and other interested agencies. These officers normally have only twenty-four hours to respond. Once concurrence is reached the "flimsy turns buff,"[309] which means that it moves up to the next stage of the process.

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[306]Harrelson, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Security," 254.

[307]Tatum, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defense Policy Formulation," 389.

[308]The term "flimsy" comes from the onion skin paper which the first draft is written on.

[309]"Buff" refers to the manila-like legal sized paper that is used.

The "buff" is then circulated among the agencies concerned. If major problems arise that are not editorial in nature, the action officer may call for a planners' meeting in order to hammer out the differences. This meeting is chaired by a Joint Staff planner (flag rank) and is attended by the agency or service planners concerned with the "buff" (usually of COL/CAPT rank). The agency or service positions are circulated in advance on formal memoranda called "purples." Surprise is normally rare, although it may be used if the issue is very important. The selection of specific service planners may also reflect the importance of the issue.

> Some military officers have developed wide-spread reputations in the Pentagon for their skill as negotiators. The assignment of such an officer as a service planner can mean that the service involved has an ax to grind or a "hard" position on the subject at hand.[310]

During the meeting the Joint Staff planner attempts to act as the mediator between the contending agency views. The meeting ends with either concurrence or a continued split in the positions. At this point, the head of the Joint Staff agency concerned may "turn the buff, green."[311] He may forward the "buff" even though there are still differences of opinion over it. This is called a "split green."

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[310]Harrelson, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Security," 249.

[311]The "green" comes from the coarse legal sized green sheets upon which the staffing papers are written, since the paper is legal sized it usually is referred to as a "long green".

The "green" is the next to last stage in the JCS decision making process. If nonconcurrence continues, the non-concurring agency can submit a "purple" outlining its position, which in turn is rebutted by the action officer. This exchange then becomes part of the "green" as long as the nonconcurrence exists. Once the "buff" has turned "green'," it falls under the jurisdiction of the Director of the Joint Staff, who can place it on the Operations Deputies Calendar or the Calendar of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The former organization is made up of the services' Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Operations. If the Operations Deputies fail to reach agreement on the subject, it may be sent back to the planners for further coordination or it may be sent forward to the Chiefs for them to work out some form of agreement. When the paper is finally accepted, a red-stripe is placed at the bottom of the "green," denoting that is has become an official JCS position. It is then sent forward to the Secretary of Defense. A split may also be sent forward with the service "purples" still attached. As ponderous as this system seems, it still handles in excess of a thousand decisions each year. In response to consist-ent criticism that the Chiefs are too burdened to deal with the really important joint issues, alternative methods to the "flimsy, buff" system have been created. Unfortunately, during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, the

majority of the issues were still decided by the Chiefs
themselves.[312]

In this description of the JCS decision making pro-
cess, the requirement to produce consensus at every level
of the process is critical. This requirement has led not
only to the criticism that the system is ponderous, but
that the compromises necessary to produce concurrence
actually dilute the quality of the final product. This pro-
cess of compromise and consensus building reflects what
Roger Hilsman calls the "politics of decision making."[313]
Hilsman maintains that decisions are made by the political
methods of persuasion and bargaining, as contending interest
groups attempt to resolve their conflicts. Thus, the
rational or authoritative model of decision making rarely
exists.

The necessity for operating in this "political" manner
lies in the structure of the American Constitutional system
and in the nature of the bureaucracy. Professor Richard
Neustadt, in his seminal study of the American Presidency,
observed that the Constitution did not create a separation
of powers, but instead "created a government of separated

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[312]See Table 1 for an analysis of the JCS decisions.

[313]Roger Hilsman, The Politics of Policy Making in
Defense and Foreign Affairs (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1971), 14-15.

TABLE 1

JCS DECISION STATISTICS

Year	Total Decisions	Splits (No. %)
1951–52	1628 [1]	5 [2] (.003)
1953–1957	No conclusive data	
1958	887 [3]	13 (1.5)
1959	1038	24 (2.3)
1960	1066	21 (2.0)
1961	1405	15 (1.1)
1962	1458	13 (0.9)
1963	1460	42 (2.9)
1964	1563	47 (1.9)
1965	3017 [4]	40 (1.3)
1966	3281	7 (0.2)
1967	2690	6 (0.2)
1968	2675	6 (0.2)
1969	2339	2 (0.8)

[1] Memorandum for General Bradley, subject: Reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Record Group 218, box 4, folder 020 JCS (16 December 1951) National Archives.

[2] New York Times, 10 January, 1953, p. 4. The Times indicates that during the time frame 1951-52 (the same as covered by the Bradley Memorandum) that the JCS handled 1650 matters, this figure was only 22 off the formal figure given in the memorandum. The Times goes on to state that there were 5 splits during this time. The Bradley Memorandum notes 4, but goes out of its way to state that it is not a complete list. It also notes two "withdrawn splits" which meant that there was Secretarial action taken before the split was sent forward.

[3] Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense, by the Blue Ribbon Panel (Washington, D.C.: July 1970), Appendix N: Staff Report on Joint Chiefs of Staff Decision-Making, 20, compiles all data on JCS decisions since 1958.

[4] In 1965 the JCS instituted a new form of decision making, PM-133. This authorized the CJCS to take actions for the JCS and inform them afterwards on 1) matters in which urgency is crucial; 2) matters in which a JCS policy has already been established; 3) matters in which the CJCS knows the corporate view of the JCS on a similar issue; and 4) matters not important enough to consult the JCS as a corporate body. Under certain circumstances Directors of Divisions in the Joint Staff are allowed to use PM-133. Since its institution, PM-133 has accounted for over 50% of the decision statistics. In 1965 it accounted for 1589 decisions or 52.7%, in 1966-2037 (62.0%), 1967-1620 (60.2%), 1968-1507 (58.5%), and 1969-1280 (54.7%).

institutions sharing power."[314] These separated institutions and their representatives proportionally share power based upon their prestige, expertise, size, and impact on society. This power in turn becomes translated into the ability to influence the outcome of decisions. An institution's primary means of achieving the desired outcome is its ability to persuade and bargain with other institutions. In such a pluralistic environment, "the power to persuade is the power to bargain; status and authority yield bargaining advantages."[315]

The reason an organization bargains is its ideology or prevalent belief which forms the basis for its existence. Some students of bureaucracy have compared organizational ideology to the territorialism of certain species of animals.

> Every large organization is in partial conflict with every other social agent with which it deals...the basic nature of all social struggle is the same - each combatant needs to establish a large enough territory to guarantee his own survival.[316]

This territory becomes defined by the amount of the budget an organization receives or the number of functions that it is given. In the military, these functions become

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[314] Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership (New York: John Wiley, 1960), 34.

[315] Ibid.

[316] Anthony Downs, Inside the Bureaucracy (New York: Little, Brown & Co., 1967), 217-226.

translated into roles and missions, and are inextricably connected to budget allocations. Under these circumstances, an organization will attempt to enhance its essence or mission by any means necessary. The greater the importance of its mission, the greater the influence the organization has, which in turn translates into higher survivability. Any encroachment upon a vital mission is a direct threat to the organization's existence. Conversely, the organization will attempt to incorporate new functions within the boundaries of its mission, thereby increasing its own importance. While all bureaucracies operate in a similar manner, the military has institutionalized its essence in the form of doctrine.[317]

The service action officer is thus instilled with the commitment to protect the organizational essence and attempt through bargaining with his counterparts to achieve the required consensus. These action officers, who are an essential cog in the JCS staffing process, are called the "Indians," because they work for a "Chief." The service "Indians"

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[317]For a further discussion of this point see such works as Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics & Foreign Policy (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974); I.M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organizational Reform (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972); Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1971); and Frank Simonie, "Structure and Policy: The Evolution of the Military Staff," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1975).

are usually bright, young Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels
who, in the words of retired Marine Corps Colonel John
Donovan have,

> ...usually demonstrated their effectiveness as leaders,
> planners and organizational managers. They may also
> have performed heroically in combat, but most of all,
> they must have demonstrated their loyalty as a pro-
> ponent of their own service doctrine and their dedica-
> tion to the defense establishment and its policies.[318]

Devotion to the organizational ideology is repaid with pro-
motions and choice assignments while deviation may well
mean the termination of a career. Thus, the "primary re-
quisite of those engaged in planning at both the service
and joint levels becomes the attainment of a military posi-
tion which does not injure the vital interest of any ser-
vice."[319]

This problem is by no means exclusively restricted to
the service representatives sitting on joint committees; it
deeply affects the structure of the Joint Staff system
itself. In theory the Joint Staff was to consist of officers
detached from their particular service who would develop a
"purple suit" mentality. A "purple suiter" is an individual
who is truly above service interest. The color "purple"
comes from the misconception that combining the colors of

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[318] James Donovan, _Militarism, U.S.A._ (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970), 75-79.

[319] Tatum, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defense
Policy Formulation," 386.

the uniforms of all the services would result in the color

purple. Thus an officer with this type of outlook would not

be committed to any particular service ideology. The problem

between practice and theory was that the officers assigned

to the Joint Staff had to, at some point in the future, re-

turn to their own services. Many times their success or

failure within their own service depends upon the positions

they took while on the Joint Staff. This problem is further

complicated by the fact that all papers produced within the

Joint Staff are passed around at numerous times for service

concurrence. Thus the Joint Staffer has to walk the tight

rope between service advocacy and joint orientation. The

fact that the Joint Staffer's boss will probably be from a

different service exacerbates this problem.[320]

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[320]To what extent the members of the Joint Staff main-
tain a "purple suit" mentality is difficult to document. A
1955 Dartmouth College study on the attitudes of members of
the Joint Intelligence Group and the Joint Logistics Planning
Group reveal that of those interviewed it was almost unani-
mously agreed that an officer who was above service interest
helped the organization fulfill its mission more than an
officer who vigorously supported his service. Despite this,
less than half of the officers interviewed felt that being
above service interest would help them in the next promotion
(slightly less than half believed that being a service advo-
cate would help in the next promotion), and the majority
felt that a superior command performance in their own service
carried more weight before promotion boards than a superior
Joint Staff performance. While inconclusive, it does seem
to support the contention that officers worry how their ser-
vice of origin will perceive their Joint Staff duty and that
service advocacy was somewhat required. Commission on Orga-
nization of the Executive Branch of the Government: Five
Staff Papers Prepared for the Task Force on Procurement,
Volume I, Defense Procurement: The Vital Roles of the

Since the participants in the decision making process
have an obligation to defend their organizational impera-
tives, consensus building breaks down and is replaced by such
artificial methods of achieving unanimity as "paperclipping,"
"waffling," and "logrolling."[321] The pressure for unanimity
is a result of two systemic constraints. The first is the
action officer's short suspense dates. With consensus a
prerequisite at every stage of the staffing process, it
becomes easier to produce artificial unanimity than it is to

National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
(Washington, D.C.: June 1955), A-63. The issue of attempt-
ing to separate the members of the Joint Staff from their
service has been a constant point of analysis in all the DoD
studies conducted since the end of World War II. In an effort
to accomplish this goal Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates
issued a memorandum in 1959 that made joint duty a prerequi-
site for selection to flag rank. Unfortunately, his defini-
tion of "joint" was too broad and the services were allowed
too many exceptions. One recommendation of the 1978 Stead-
man Committee was that the Gates memorandum be enforced and
that the Joint Staff be more effectively isolated from their
services. This would seem to indicate that over thirty years
after the creation of the Joint Staff the problem of service
parochialism still exists. Report to the Secretary of Defense
on the National Military Command Structure (Washington, D.C.:
July 1978), 63-65.

[321]"Waffling" occurs when a paper is written so that
it never actually addresses the important issues and so means
all things to all people. "Paperclipping" is a means of ameli-
orating conflicting demands from different institutions or
organizations. Instead of choosing or prioritizing demands,
all of them are simply combined into a package and sent for-
ward. Thus the different service demands are "paperclipped"
together and sent forward as a "joint" position. "Logrol-
ling" is the time honored political means of achieving one's
objectives and guaranteeing the passage of pet projects. In-
dividuals or organizations promise to support one another's
projects in return for support on their own project.

attempt the less rewarding conversion of attitudes. Such conversions are not only time intensive, which may cause a missed suspense date, but there is little guarantee of success due to the pressure of organizational imperatives and career necessities.

The second systemic constraint lies within the nature of the bureaucracy and the organizational imperatives of the Joint Chiefs. The purpose of a bureaucracy is to produce a unified position or a decision.[322] The failure to do so forces the issue one echelon higher in the structure, bringing into question the rationale for the existence of the lower levels. It is the action officer's mission to produce consensus and relieve his superiors of the ponderous and difficult task of producing consensus at a higher level. The failure to achieve unanimity reflects on the action officer's capabilities and thus affects his career potential. If the issue is vital to the very existence of the service, it will have to be moved to the highest level of the bureaucracy for reconciliation. Even at the level of the Joint Chiefs, the continued existence of a split position is diametrically opposed to the institutional desires of the organization. The military, like any organization, desires to see its advice accepted and its projects supported. Many years ago Max Weber observed that "technical knowledge...of

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[322]Gordon Tullock, The Politics of Bureaucracy (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965), 141.

itself, is sufficient to ensure it [the bureaucratic organi-
zation] a position of extraordinary power."[323]   Obviously,
if the military split on an issue, they fail to take advan-
tage of their technical expertise, and thus lose a substan-
tial amount of their capability to influence decisions.
However, if the Chiefs present a unified front on a position,
they maximize their ability to influence the final action.
During the early 1960s the Chiefs found that if they sent
split decisions to Secretary McNamara they enhanced his abi-
lity to make exactly the decision he wanted to.   In a sense,
the Secretary had divided and conquered the Joint Chiefs,
enhancing even further the civilian domination of military
policy during that time.   By 1965 the Chiefs realized this
and they avoided sending split decisions forward.[324]

What the Chiefs and the Secretary were acknowledging
was the fact that there exists a two-way bargaining relation-
ship between the Joint Chiefs and the administration.   On
the one hand, the administration makes every effort to gain
the Chief's support for the various political or military

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[323]Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Orga-
nizations, trans. A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1947), 379.

[324]Lawrence Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First
Twenty-Five Years, 1947-1972 (Bloomington: Indiana Univer-
sity Press, 1976), 116. See Table 1 for a tabulation of JCS
decisions and splits.

programs that it sends before Congress. The support of

the JCS adds credibility to the proposals by virtue of their

acknowledged "expertise." Conversely, their opposition to

a program that lies within their sphere of "expertise" may

be enough to destroy the proposal.[325] On the other hand,

the Chiefs need the administration's support to attain the

programs they desire to have implemented. As a result,

there occurs a vertical bargaining relationship between the

administration and the Chiefs as corporate groups, while

simultaneously, horizontal bargaining is occurring among the

services.

There is an old Washington adage that says "where you

sit determines where you stand." An essential part of this

bargaining is the role a Chief takes on as a "front man."

A front man is "a leader of a constituency, the sponsor of

a policy, and the principal builder of a consensus for it."[326]

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[325]Examples of such trade-offs have existed all through the history of the Joint Chiefs, unfortunately they are difficult to document. One example which is well known was in regard to the limited test-ban treaty during the Kennedy administration. Certain guarantees were included in order to gain the support of the JCS. See Maxwell Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1972), 282-288. A more contemporary example is the exchange between the JCS and the administration over the Chiefs support of the SALT I agreements. The Navy received a go-ahead on the Trident submarine missile system, and the JCS supported the administration's position on the SALT limitations. John Newhouse, The Cold Down: The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), 246.

[326]Hilsman, The Politics of Policy Making, 35-36.

A Chief's constituency is his own service, and he naturally sponsors its policies and strives to build a consensus among the other Chiefs and the civilian administration for the fulfillment of that policy goal. A front man is more than simply an advocate for a specific policy, he is the focal point of communication between his organization below him and the administration above him. He must represent and defend his organizational imperatives to the administration, while developing support within his own organization for the administration's policies. Most simply stated, a Chief has two constituencies to represent - the President and the civilian administration on one hand, and his service on the other. If he fails to represent either one of these two groups adequately, he will lose its support. Once he has lost the support of either one, he ceases to be capable of fulfilling his role and must be replaced. Let us turn our attention to an example that might help illustrate this point.

The "Revolt of the Admirals" was a unique event in the history of American civil-military relations. Essentially, it was a public proclamation by the naval officer corps that it had lost confidence in the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Louis Denfeld. At this point in our study, we will not concern ourselves with the specific budgetary and strategic aspects of the episode, but only how it reflects the bureaucratic nature of the Joint Chiefs and the roles that various constituencies play in the decision

making process.

The "Revolt" was a product of the unification conflict. The central issue was the relationship of strategic airpower to the future of the Navy. Airpower advocates maintained that a strategic nuclear bomber force was the nation's only reliable deterrent. The Navy countered this by claiming that carrier-based air power still had a role to play in national defense and that technological innovations would allow it to participate as part of the strategic deterrent. The key innovation the Navy counted on was the building of a new generation of flush deck aircraft carriers capable of launching jet nuclear bombers. In a period marked by decreasing defense budgets, each service identified its programs and strategies with the very survival of its organization. In the Navy's case, this perception was especially important. The issue had been temporarily resolved in March 1948 with the signing of the Key West Agreement, which gave the Navy a limited role in strategic bombing.[327] Unfortunately, the agreement did not "solve the impending problem of whether the flush-deck carrier should be built or whether

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[327]The Key West Agreement assigned to the Navy as a collateral function "to be prepared to participate in the overall air effort as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." For a discussion of the developments of the Navy's effort to develop a nuclear capability see Vincent Davis, The Politics of Innovation: Patterns in Navy Cases, Monograph Series in World Affairs, Volume 4, Monograph No. 3, 1966-67 (Denver, University of Denver, 1967), 4-17.

its construction required approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."[328]

By statute, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are an advisory body only, thus making their concurrence or nonconcurrence superfluous. In the real world, theory is often different from practice. Because of the political nature of the decision making process, prestige, expertise, and so on, may become as important as legally sanctioned power. The Chiefs' approval of any program that has the vast strategic and financial consequences of a super-carrier costing approximately one-half billion dollars was a necessity.

At Key West, Secretary Forrestal announced to the Chiefs that he and the President had decided that the carrier should be built. Previously, he had put the Chiefs on notice that if they could not agree on the carrier issue, "I shall have to make my own decision."[329] Apparently that was exactly what the Secretary did. The Chiefs responded "that they would go along with it [the carrier decision] because it was

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[328]Paul Y. Hammond, "Super Carriers and the B-36 Bomber," in American Civil-Military Decisions, ed. by Harold Stein (Montgomery, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1963), 74.

[329]James Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries, ed. by Walter Millis (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), 390.

the President's program."[330] The Chiefs never really dis-

cussed the matter, but merely accepted it. General Hoyt

Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff, later said, "[the

carrier] was not agreed [upon], nor was it discussed..."[331]

After this meeting the Chiefs "positive support" for the

carrier was duly reported to the President.[332]

The carrier issue remained settled for about six

weeks until it became inextricably connected to the 1949

defense budget. Admiral Denfeld claimed, before the House

Appropriations Subcommittee, that the Chiefs had approved

the carrier.[333] Air Force General Carl Spaatz denied this,

forcing the issue to be returned to the JCS for resolution.

By a vote of three to one the carrier was approved for the

second time. Of particular interest to our study is General

Vandenberg's dissent.

General Vandenberg based his dissent on two points.

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[330]U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee No. 4, Heavy Munitions, Hearings on H.R. 6049
to authorize the President, in his discretion, to permit
the stoppage of work on certain combat vessels, 80th Con-
gress, 2nd Session, 1948, 6860. (Hereafter cited as
Hearings H.R. 6049.)

[331]Hammond, "Super Carriers and the B-36 Bomber." 475.

[332]Forrestal, Forrestal Diaries, 393.

[333]U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations,
Hearings on the Navy appropriation bill for 1949, 80th Con-
gress, 2nd Session, 1948, 13.

The first was that the JCS had never had the opportunity to fully evaluate the carrier in terms of its impact on the "over-all military structure," and how it would "carry out joint plans." He then went on to deal with the carrier in relation to the budget problem. He maintained that he could not "at this time approve or disapprove one particular part of the budget of one of the services without the thorough consideration of the programs and budget requirements of all three services." Clearly, Vandenberg was basing his dissent on a technicality and avoiding presenting his own views on the carrier. The reason for his obfuscation is revealed in the conclusion of his statement. "Approval by the Joint Chiefs, as opposed to acceptance of a decision of higher authority, connotes military judgment based on thorough considerations."[334] In Vandenberg's mind, the Chiefs were again merely rubber stamping an administration directive and supporting an administration policy. Ten months later, though, that policy had changed.

In the spring of 1949, budget problems again brought the carrier issue to the forefront. Louis Johnson, the new Secretary of Defense, in an economy move, wanted to reconsider the carrier decision. On the 15th of April 1949, he

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[334]Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 28 May 1948, subject: Construction of the CA Carrier, Leahy Papers, folder, "JCS Outgoing Correspondence, May-June 1948," U. S. Naval Archives, Washington, D.C. (Hereafter referred to as U.S. Naval Archives.)

asked the Chiefs, for the third time, to give their opinion on the carrier. This time the vote was two to one against the carrier, with only Admiral Denfeld dissenting.[335] Reinforced by this negative response, Johnson cancelled the carrier eight days later. Outraged, the Secretary of the Navy, John L. Sullivan, resigned and was replaced by Francis P. Matthews, whom the Navy officer corps believed to be a Johnson man. The cancellation of the carrier was the spark that ignited the "Revolt," but it was not the cause. The real cause was an increasing belief on the part of naval officers that Admiral Denfeld was not properly defending the Navy's interests in the matter. Unfortunately for Denfeld, he became identified with Matthews and became guilty, through association, for the cancellation of the carrier. With the traditional lines of communication apparently eliminated, the officer corps sought alternative expressions for their grievances. The result was an outbreak of bureaucratic warfare and public statements against the Air Force's pet project, the B-36 intercontinental bomber. Admiral Denfeld had lost credibility with the officer corps and had thus lost control of the Navy. Professor Paul Hammond in his major study of the carrier controversy clearly noted this

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[335]Copies of the Chiefs' written responses and positions on the carrier vote are found in the Eisenhower Papers, 1916-1952 File, box 56, folder "Joint Chiefs of Staff," Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. (Hereafter referred to as Eisenhower Library.)

loss of credibility:

> If the professional leader of the Navy, Louis Denfeld, the Chief of Naval Operations since December, 1947, had ever enjoyed the full confidence of the Navy partisans, by September 1949, it had been withdrawn from him. His role as senior member of the Joint Chiefs in the carrier cancellation recommendations, and in the decision not to hold a contest between the B-36 and a Navy fighter, had been misunderstood within the Navy. He had remained silently in office when Sullivan resigned in a blaze of naval glory. And when in the August hearings the Air Force related the times he, as a member of the Joint Chiefs had approved the B-36, the misunderstandings grew.[336]

To this list of incriminations must be added the cuts in the Navy's 1950 budget and Denfeld's own reappointment as Chief of Naval Operations. This last act looked all too much like a reward for services rendered.

Secretary Matthews' reaction to the Navy's media campaign was to order that all statements critical of the administration's policies must stay within the chain of command. In accordance with this directive, Vice Admiral Gerald Bogan, the commanding officer First Task Fleet, sent a letter to Matthews which reflected the disenchantment of the officer corps.

> The morale of the Navy is lower today than at any time since I entered the commissioned ranks in 1916.... In my opinion, this descent, almost to despondency, stems from complete confusion as to the future role of the Navy....

Bogan's letter was an explicit indictment of unification and the National Security Act of 1947. The letter was endorsed

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[336]Hammond, "Super Carrier and the B-36 Bomber," 507.

by the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, Admiral Arthur

Radford, who wrote, "Rightly or wrongly, the majority of the

officers in the Pacific Fleet concur...with the ideas expres-

sed by Admiral Bogan...." It was further endorsed by Admiral

Denfeld himself.[337] The letter became a political bomb when

on 4 October 1949, it was released to the press despite

Matthews' efforts to keep it private.[338] Matthews, realizing

the potential political dangers persuaded Denfeld to state

that his endorsement was a matter of procedure and should not

be construed as approval.[339] By doing so, Denfeld destroyed

what little credibility he had left with the officer corps.

The release of the Bogan letter had exactly the effect

that naval partisans had hoped for; it brought about a full

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[337]See Ibid., 509-511 for a reproduction of Bogan's
letter. Part of Denfeld's endorsement reads as follows:
"I concur in the endorsement of the Chief, Pacific Fleet.
Naval officers have faith in the Navy and a knowledge of the
aggressive role it plays in the defense of the country. They
are convinced that a Navy stripped of its offensive power
means a nation stripped of its offensive power."

[338]G. F. Bogan, Oral History Transcript, Naval Insti-
tute Oral History Program (1970), 122-127. Bogan maintains
that he had nothing to do with the revolt and that his letter
was merely in response to Secretary Matthews' October 1949
invitation to discuss the morale of the officer corps.
Captain John G. Crommlin (USN) one of the leaders of the
Navy's attacks on the B-36 bomber released the letter on his
own. Bogan was later demoted to Rear Admiral and he finally
retired. He blames Admiral Forrest Sherman and Secretary
Matthews for the demise of his career.

[339]New York Times, 5 October 1949. In his public
statement, Admiral Denfeld stated that "such an endorsement
does not mean approval." He went on to say that he was en-
dorsing Admiral Radford's endorsement, and not the content
of the Bogan letter.

scale Congressional inquiry into America's strategic policy.
One by one, the Navy's witnesses marched before the Congressional committee and attacked the Air Forces' programs.
Denfeld was the Navy's last witness and although his statement was moderate in nature, it did corroborate the Navy's position.[340] Instantly Denfeld's credibility with the officer corps was reestablished, but he had lost his value as far as the administration was concerned. A short time later, on October 27th, Denfeld was dismissed and replaced by Admiral Forrest Sherman, an officer who was not identified with the revolt and who was an outspoken advocate of unification.[341]

This particular case study reveals some very interesting aspects about the Chiefs' perceived relationships with each other, their own services, and the administration. There are two sets of issues which must be examined in order to fully analyze the "Revolt of the Admirals." The first of these revolves around the three JCS votes on the carrier and why the various Chiefs voted the way they did. There are several possible explanations as to the Chiefs' voting

[340]U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, The National Defense Program, Unification and Strategy, 81st Congress, 1st Session, 1949. (Hereafter cited as Hearings, Unification and Strategy.)

[341]Sherman had been the Navy's representative during the writing of the National Security Act and had defended that legislation during the hearings.

patterns on the carrier issue. One possible explanation is partisan service politics. By this I mean that the votes reflected service values and bureaucratic interests. To some degree, this was obviously true, but it cannot be used as a total explanation. While this may explain Admirals Denfeld's and Leahy's support for the carrier, it surely does not explain General Vandenberg's concurrence at Key West; nor General Bradley's support for the carrier during the first two votes and then his reversal on the third vote. It is apparent that any analysis of the voting pattern lies beyond the simple solution of partisan service politics.

One possible solution to the question of the Joint Chiefs' voting pattern may be found in the realm of psycho-group dynamics, particularly Irving L. Janis' theory of groupthink. Groupthink occurs when individuals are:

> deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members strive for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action...[Groupthink] refers to a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality, and moral judgment that results from in-group pressure.[342]

The voting pattern of the Joint Chiefs did not reflect the usual form of groupthink, which is a product of group dynamics and peer-group pressures. Instead, it reflected a variation of groupthink, which was the product of a set

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[342]Irving Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, Co., 1972), 9.

of social attitudes inculcated by professionalism and rein-

forced by a rank conscious system. This variation resulted

in the Chiefs subordinating themselves to the real or the

perceived desires of their superiors. Admiral Denfeld

acknowledged that this was the prime motivation at Key West

when he said "that they [the Chiefs] would go along with

it [the carrier] because it was the President's program."[343]

Vandenberg, at the conclusion to his May 1948 dissent,

implied that this was the reason for Bradley's support in

the second vote. Bradley's own explanation for his reversal

in the third vote refers precisely to this type of subordi-

nation.

> This apparent agreement by me at that time [the second
> vote] was based upon my understanding that it had been
> approved by those in authority and I accepted it as a
> fact accomplished. Therefore, I was merely noting, in
> effect, a decision that had already been made by higher
> authority.[344]

Bradley's subordination was so total that he even rejected

the previous two votes as "a formal decision" by the Joint

Chiefs. This despite the fact that the May 1948 memorandum

to Secretary Forrestal specifically stated that the Joint

Chiefs had considered the following question, "Do the Joint

Chiefs of Staff approve the construction of the so-called

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[343] U.S. Congress, House Hearings, H.R. 6049, 6860.

[344] U.S. Congress, House, Hearings, Unification and Strategy, 567.

C. A. carrier?"[345] To this question Leahy, Denfeld and

Bradley "answered in the affirmative." Apparently, Bradley

not only subordinated himself to Forrestal, but did so to

Johnson as well; thus creating the semantical distinction

of "a formal decision." It should be pointed out here that

the type of groupthink exhibited during the carrier votes

was not a totally unique situation. Janis notes that a

similar type of groupthink was demonstrated during the Bay

of Pigs fiasco, and was inextricably connected to America's

Vietnam policy.[346]

In the final analysis the voting pattern on the car-

rier issue reflected a combination of partisan service

politics and a professionalized groupthink. The Key West

vote was a clear example of subordination to administration

policy on the part of all members of the JCS. In General

Bradley's case, this subordination appears to have carried

on into the second vote, in May 1948. On the other hand,

Denfeld and Vandenberg manifested service interest during

the second vote, and most openly, during the crucial third

vote. Denfeld's defense of the carrier was based on its

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[345]Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, 28 May
1948, subject: Construction of the CA Carrier, Leahy Papers,
folder "JCS Outgoing Correspondence, May-June, 1948," U.S.
Naval Archives.

[346]Janis, Groupthink, Chapters 2 and 5.

ability to support the Navy's strategic role as well as its traditional roles of sea control and anti-submarine warfare.[347] Rather expectedly, Vandenberg based his attack upon the carrier's potential military value. He pointed out that the super-carrier was not the optimal system for anti-submarine warfare and its strategic value against a land locked power like Russia was questionable at best:

> The relative military value of the large carrier, when
> compared to other weapons systems procurable with the
> same resources, is of a low order. This carrier is
> designed for bombardment purposes. The resources re-
> quired to make it an operational weapon would produce
> in land-based aviation capabilities considerably greater
> than the capability of the carrier. When it is con-
> sidered that the carrier inherently exposes its bombing
> capability to attack by three entirely separate weapons
> systems--the submarine fleet, the surface fleet, and air
> forces--whereas land-based bombers are exposed to only
> one of these, an even greater disparity between the
> relative worth of these two systems is apparent. The
> carrier not only exposes itself to multiple forms of
> attack, but also exposes to the same dangers its atten-
> dant complex of protective vessels. Even when behind
> this costly protective screen, I believe the carrier is
> today a vulnerable weapon.[348]

A cost effective analysis like this was definitely designed to appeal to Secretary Johnson's cost consciousness.

It is General Bradley's reversal of opinion in the third and final vote that is most illustrative of the

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[347]Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from Admiral Denfeld, 22 April 1949, subject: The USS United States, Eisenhower Papers, 1916-1952 File, box 56, folder, "Joint Chiefs of Staff," Eisenhower Library.

[348]Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from General Vandenberg, 23 April 1949, subject: The CVA-58 Project, Eisenhower Papers, 1916-1952 File, box 56, folder, "Joint Chiefs of Staff," Eisenhower Library.

pressures that are on the Chiefs. It is doubtful that he was manifesting a specific service position in April of 1949. As an institution, the Army was merely a spectator in the debate over strategic delivery systems, since they had none of their own; although it is true that Bradley realized the finite nature of the budget pie and that any increase in expenditures for one service meant a proportional decrease for the other. Also Bradley's own war experience in Europe would have tended to minimize the role of naval airpower. Since Bradley had admitted subordinating his professional opinion on the earlier carrier vote, it may be assumed that Bradley did it again. This would be true providing Bradley actually favored the carrier. It appears though, that Bradley's true opinion tended to support Vandenberg's position. In a 14 September 1948 memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, Bradley assailed a Navy proposal to build three additional super-carriers as part of a mobilization strategy. His rejection of the Navy proposal was based on three points. The first was that the carriers would not be completed in time to have any impact on the war effort. Secondly, he questioned the strategic value of the carriers. He argued that "the Naval threat of the USSR would be diminished or a relatively minor threat at that time:"

> The CVX's [the super-carrier] cannot be justified exclusively on the Navy's primary roles and missions and the assignment of such a large proportion of our industrial effort toward the accomplishment of a collateral mission is not acceptable.

Finally, in place of the airpower supplied by the carrier, General Bradley foresaw the Air Force being fully deployed. It is true that the General did recommend the continuation of the experimental super-carrier itself, but then one must remember that Secretary Forrestal was still in office.[349] Since Bradley had subordinated himself on two earlier votes, there is no reason to believe that he would oppose the carrier at this time. Once Johnson had replaced Forrestal, the pressures for subordination apparently shifted. If we assume that Bradley was not overly infatuated with the carrier originally, then Johnson merely allowed him to voice his own feelings. In his 22 April 1949 memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, in which Bradley outlined his reasons for recommending rejection of the carrier, he repeated much of the same ground covered in his 14 September 1948 memorandum. The super-carrier was simply not cost efficient to accomplish the Navy's primary missions, and the collateral mission of strategic bombardment was covered by the Air Force "which already has adequate means and capabilities

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[349]Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 14 September 1948, subject: Completion of Joint War Plan as basis for Short Range Mobilization Planning, Leahy Papers, folder, "JCS, Outgoing September 48," U.S. Naval Archives.

to perform this function." While Bradley did admit that carrier air power had a role; the land-locked nature of the Soviet Union and its lack of a navy coupled with the limited range of carrier aircraft, minimized that role. In the final analysis, the super-carrier's cost simply outweighed its benefits.[350]

Our analysis of the Chiefs' voting pattern leads us to the second major issue to be discussed, that of the Chiefs' relationship to their services and the administration. As discussed earlier, the Chiefs attempted to play the role of a "front man." The "Revolt" occurred when Denfeld's service constituency, the officer corps, perceived that he was failing to represent them properly to the administration. Under such circumstances they, the officer corps, proceeded to develop alternative means of expressing their grievances. It was not until Denfeld had visibly manifested support for the officer corps that his credibility returned along with his ability to control the officer corps. Unfortunately for Denfeld, the situation had reached a stage where any support for the officer corps was viewed as opposition to the administration and this meant the loss of that vital constituency.

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[350] Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from General Bradley, 22 April 1949, subject: Construction of the Super Carrier U.S.S. United States, Eisenhower Papers, 1916-1952 File, box 56, folder, "Joint Chiefs of Staff," Eisenhower Library.

It is very difficult to determine the exact point Denfeld lost the support of Secretary Matthews. Apparently, the release of the Bogan letter was the beginning of the parting of the ways. On 14 September 1949, Denfeld went to Matthews to thank him for his reappointment to another two year term as Chief of Naval Operations. Matthews was reported to have responded that "there's nothing I have done since I have been Secretary that has given me more pleasure than getting you reappointed."[351] Three weeks later, after the release of the Bogan letter, Matthews told Denfeld that he was sorry that his endorsement had been put on the letter and that this might impair his value as Chief of Naval Operations; but according to Denfeld, Secretary Matthews immediately added, "I've had worse situations than this confront me, but I'm sure if we work together we can overcome this one."[352] Matthews' own comment on the meeting does not include such a conciliatory statement.[353]

The confusion over the exact contents of the meeting may exist because Denfeld felt that he had done nothing to cause the loss of the Secretary's support. It appears though

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[351]Louis Denfeld, "Why I was Fired," Collier's, Vol. 125, No. 11 (18 March 1950), 15.

[352]Ibid; this meeting took place 4 October 1949.

[353]New York Times, 28 October 1949. Matthews released a letter in which he said that he told Denfeld that he feared his usefullness had finished.

that the administration had decided before Denfeld's testi-
mony that his value had ended. According to Admiral Richard
L. Conolly, he was offered the office of Chief of Naval Opera-
tions in return for a pro-administration testimony. Conolly
reported that his pro-Navy stand during the hearings destroyed
his chances for CNO and that Johnson "hit the roof" when he
heard what Conolly had said. The Admiral went on to note
that Johnson supposedly turned to Steve Early, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, and said, "There goes your candidate."[354]
Whether or not the administration had decided to replace Den-
feld before his testimony became unimportant once he had sided
with the rest of the officer corps.[355]

The "Revolt of the Admirals," demonstrates some crucial
aspects about the interaction of the Joint Chiefs with their
two constituencies, their service and the administration. To
be an effective "front man," a chief must somehow balance the
demands of these two groups. Admiral Denfeld found out that

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[354] Richard L. Conolly, Oral History Transcript, Colum-
bia University Oral History Program, (1960), 397.

[355] The day after Denfeld testified before the Congress
he met with Matthews and they discussed why the Admiral had
not cleared the testimony with his service secretary. Den-
feld said that he didn't think it mattered because he had to
do what he thought was right. Admiral Denfeld reported
that "he had been submitting to the pressure to which he had
been subjected as Chief of Naval Operations and a member of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and that he felt that he could not
pursue that course any longer; that he had to speak out in
justice to himself and the position that he was taking."
Memorandum of Record of conversations with Denfeld, 14 Octo-
ber 1949, Presidential Secretary File, box 58, folder, "Cabi-
net-Navy Secretary: Misc.," Truman Library.

the loss of the support of either one reduced, if not elimi-
nated, his ability to perform this function. It was also
rather clear that the administration was the more important
of these two constituencies. Denfeld lost his job only after
he had lost the support of the administration. The Chiefs
as a group acknowledged the supremacy of the administration
by subordinating their professional opinion to the admini-
stration's desires during the three carrier votes. Even
Vandenberg's opposition to the carrier during the second vote
was carefully structured along procedural grounds. By doing
so, he was able to tread the narrow line between the admini-
stration and his service. In this regard Vandenberg was
far luckier than Denfeld. The mere act of the Chiefs sub-
ordinating themselves to the civilian leadership raises
questions about their responsibility to the society. Does
their responsibility lie with their service, which they have
served for thirty or more years; with the administration,
that appointed them; or the society at large, which they
have taken an oath to defend. In Matthews' letter to the
President, asking for the removal of Denfeld, he emphasized
the importance of loyalty as the important link between a
service secretary and a chief:

> A military establishment is not a political democracy.
> Integrity of command is indispensable at all times.
> There can be no twilight zone in the measure of loyalty
> to superiors and respect for authority existing between
> various official ranks. Inability to conform to such

requirements for military stability would disqualify any of us for positions subordinate to the Commander in Chief.[356]

In the final analysis, the Chiefs apparently understood that they must give their loyalty to the administration in order to function in any manner.

The civilian leadership of both administrations were correct in linking the organizational structure of the Joint Chiefs to their dysfunctional bureaucratic behavior. In essence the various reorganizations were designed to achieve two goals, eliminate inter-service conflicts and upgrade the Chief's advisory product. Both of these problems were partially the result of the bureaucratic and political manner in which JCS staff papers were written. Career pressures tended to force action officers to either defend service interests or achieve artificial consensus through such means as paperclipping and waffling. It was through the process of consensus building that the bureaucracy flowed smoothly, and the services tried to avoid open confrontation. Eisenhower was correct in noting that the pre-1958 committee nature of the Joint Staff allowed the services too much influence and that this guaranteed the continuation of dysfunctional bureaucratic behavior within the Staff. What he failed to address in his 1958 reorganization was that at

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[356]New York Times, 28 October 1949.

some point in the future, the Joint Staff action officer still had to return to his service and that this allowed the services to continue to influence decisions.

For the Chiefs themselves, the motivations to defend service interest and achieve artificial consensus are just as strong as they are for the staff officer, but for different reasons. At that point in his career a chief is at the pinnacle of his profession, but being there generates different types of pressures on him. For one thing after spending over thirty years in his service it is only natural that he believes that its mission is essential to the defense of the nation. But simple service loyalty does not completely explain the bureaucratic nature of the Joint Chiefs. The real problem for the Chiefs is that they are caught between their twin constituencies, their services and the administration, as they attempt to negotiate the complex role of being a front man. Denfeld discovered the fate of a chief who loses the support of either group. In this regard the "Revolt of the Admirals" undermines any notion that the military services are a homogenious authoritarian hierarchy. While the Navy's bureaucratic revolution was unique by virtue of its size and impact, it was by no means a unique phenomenon. General Maxwell Taylor had his "Revolt of the Colonels" during the late 1950s, when certain army officers perceived that the prevailing strategic doctrine was going to destroy the

Army.[357]   Although such upheavals are rare, the fear of them

prompts some chiefs to initiate preventive action.   The

selection several years ago of General John Vessey as the

Vice Chief of Staff U.S. Army, has led some insiders to sug-

gest that it was motivated by a desire on the part of new

Chief of Staff nominee, General Edward "Shy" Meyer, to defuse

internal unrest within the service over his selection and the

rejection of Vessey.[358]

In reconsidering the reorganization efforts conducted

during the period of our study, it is apparent that the criti-

cisms levied against the Chiefs were only half right.   Clearly,

there were systemic problems that led to inter-service con-

flict and the dilution of the JCS product, but these two

flaws were caused as much by external bureaucratic factors

as internal ones.   It was true that the Chiefs engaged in ex-

tensive horizontal bargaining in order to protect service

values and achieve the consensus that a bureaucracy demands,

but both presidential administrations either consciously

or unconsciously ignored the vertical relationships and

pressures that helped magnify these flaws.   The Chiefs'

role as a front man necessitated such vertical bargaining,

but it also resulted in tremendous pressures from above,

especially as centralization increased.   Quite openly, both

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[357]Interview with General Maxwell Taylor, January
1975, Washington, D.C.

[358]Interview.

administrations opted for centralization in order to create more consensus, but such consensus would be just as artifical, and thus just as dysfunctional, as the consensus brought about by internal staff pressures. The Chiefs had to defend service interests in order to keep their own bureaucracies in check, and the best means to accomplish this was a unified position that hurt no ones vital interests. Consensus also gave the Chiefs bargaining power vis-a-vis the administration which demanded conformity to its views, and was capable of imposing them through centralized defense management. This combination of pressures put the Chiefs in an untenable position.

One subject that never seemed to be addressed was the nature of the Chiefs' responsibility. Were they responsible to their service, the administration, or the nation. These three were not necessarily synonymous. In order to fully answer that question we must examine it from two perspectives: the administration's perception of what the role of the JCS ought to be, and what the Chiefs thought their own role was. Once we have determined this we will then be in a better position to assess the true role of the Chiefs.

CHAPTER VI

THE CIVILIAN'S PERCEIVED ROLE
OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

One of the most important lessons to be derived from
the "Revolt of the Admirals," was that the Chiefs had to be
concerned with the desires of their civilian superiors.
This is especially important because, by its nature, the role
of an advisor is vague and relatively unstructured. This
allows a great deal of flexibility on the part of both the
Chiefs and the political leadership to determine exactly what
role the Joint Chiefs would fulfill. Because of this flexi-
bility the perceptions of both the civilian leadership and
the Chiefs themselves form the boundaries within which the
Chiefs' ultimate role is decided upon. Thus in order to
fully understand what role the Chiefs have assumed in policy
formulation it must first be determined what role the civilian
leadership allocated to the Chiefs and desired that they
fulfill.

The role that the Truman administration envisioned for the
Joint Chiefs of Staff was by no means clearly determined at
the time of the passage of the 1947 legislation. The adminis-
tration's position, like the legislation itself, evolved as
the human and systemic problems inherent within the structure
surfaced. Secretary Forrestal's reversal on the powers

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of his office reflected such an evolution. Despite this evolutionary process, most of the changes revolved around one basic assumption, that the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were the administration's professional military advisors. As such, the institution of the Joint Chiefs of Staff became the reservoir for the military expertise of the nation. This represented more than a mere statutory function; it represented a philosophical conception of professionalism that ultimately molded the civilian's notion of what role the JCS should play.

This assumption was derived from several possible sources. The first was the President's own lack of military expertise, but that was a traditional handicap for the civilian leadership. The second was the President's own good working relationship with the Joint Chiefs, which resulted from his personal high regard for some of its members. The last, and probably the most important, was the President's philosophical concurrence with the traditional compartmentalization of political and military action. While Truman did have an understanding of the interrelationship between war and peace, it tended to be tied to the traditional ideas of civilian control and the automatonical relationship between the American military and the civilian policy maker. This traditional relationship was reaffirmed when the President stated "the policy of the government determines the

policy of the military. The military is always subordinate
to the government."[359]

On the surface, the President clearly supported tradi-
tional civilian control of the military, but analyzing it
further, we realize that it also reinforced traditional
American military "radical" professionalism. Central to this
professional ethic was the belief that once the policy had
been determined by the civilian leadership, it would be up
to the military experts to achieve the appropriate results.
Conversely, this Uptonian image of professionalism demanded
that the non-professional (the civilian) exit the scene after
the political decision was made, in order to give full reign
to the expert. More than once during the Korean War, Presi-
dent Truman articulated his support for such a functional
division of labor. In the fall of 1950 he stated that "I
am not a desk strategist and don't pretend to be one. I
leave that to the military men."[360] The following year in
responding to a question on the war effort he stated; "that
is a military matter and the President of the United States
has never interfered with military maneuver in the field and
he doesn't expect to interfere in it now."[361] Such an outlook

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[359]Harry S. Truman, Memoirs of Harry S. Truman (New
York: Doubleday & Co., 1956), I, 210.

[360]U.S. President, Public Papers of the Presidents of
the United States (Washington D.C.: Office of the Federal
Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1965), Harry
S. Truman, 1950, 622.

[361]Truman, Public Papers, 1951, 154.

may well explain his tolerance of General MacArthur's transgressions during the early stages of the Korean War.[362]

The division of labor outlined above denotes support for traditional American military professionalism, which was based on the notion of military expertise and the mutually shared assumption, by both civilian and military alike, of the limits of each other's competency. Since fusionism was the antithesis of traditional American political/military bifurcation, the military professional should not and could not be relied upon to incorporate non-military factors into his cognitive processes, just as the civilians were not expected to deal with technical military issues. For the military to do otherwise would undermine civilian control while violating their own professional ethic.

From the very beginning, this approach was understood by the first two Secretaries of Defense, James Forrestal and Louis Johnson, both of whom perceived themselves primarily as administrators, attempting to implement strategic decisions that had already been made in the White House.[363] It may be suggested that the more the civilian leader perceives himself as an administrator, the more he feels comfortable with the

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[362]Truman, _Memoirs_, II, 377-78.

[363]Paul Y. Hammond, _Organizing for Defense: The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century_ (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961), 234.

traditional division of labor due to his own lack of exper-
tise in military matters. While this hypothesis may appear
valid, we will note shortly that President Eisenhower, a
man of tremendous military knowledge, also opted for the
traditional bifurcation of functions. Secretary Forrestal,
unlike his successor, had enough experience to realize that
the only possible way to effectively integrate policy was in
some measure to violate this professional ethic. Unfor-
tunately, he failed totally in his efforts to force the Chiefs
to incorporate economic and political factors.[364] This
effort appears to have been a unilateral attempt on his part
and did not signify any major change in the administration's
attitude. More typical of the administration's true view
was the comment made by former Secretary of the Air Force,
Stewart Symington, who recalled that during the National
Security Council meetings he attended, he never heard "any
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any other military
figure make any voluntary contributions to discussion in the
Council." Mr. Symington went on to say that "they [the mem-
bers of the JCS] were there to answer questions with respect

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[364] See my discussion of the FY 50 budget in chapter
VIII, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Policy Integration.

to matters that had to do primarily with the military."[365]

From Mr. Symington's comments it is apparent that the Truman

administration approached political/military policy making

in a very traditional manner.

Forrestal's successor, Louis Johnson, was far more

of a manager than the first Secretary of Defense, and tended

to support strict constructionalism to a greater degree.

He became so preoccupied with his managerial function that he

ignored substantive issues and considered political/military

coordination outside his purview.[366] As Professor Lawrence

Korb noted, Johnson "saw himself as the President's represen-

tative to the Department of Defense enforcing the administra-

tion's will on an avaricious military."[367] Such a narrow

managerial approach led him to totally compartmentalize the

"political" from the "military" and ultimately led him to

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[365]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,
Hearings on Nomination of Arthur William Radford as Chairman
of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Matthew Bunker Ridgway as Chief of
Staff, Army, Robert Bostwick Carney as Chief of Naval Opera-
tions and Nathan J. Arragut Twining as Chief of Staff, Air
Force, 83d Congress, 1st Session, 1953, 22. (Hereafter
referred to as Hearings, Nominations 1953).

[366]Hammond, Organizing for Defense, 244-47. Walter
Millis with Harry Mansfield and Harold Stein, Arms and the
State: Civil-Military Elements in National Policy (New York:
The Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), 234-6.

[367]Lawrence Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The
First Twenty-Five Years 1947-1972 (Bloomington, Indiana:
Indiana University Press, 1976), 100.

direct that all contact with the State Department should be
carried on exclusively through his office. This acted as a
deterrent to coordination and totally separated the two
departments,[368] forcing the Chiefs to develop their own
assumptions.[369]

On the other hand, the civilians did not really be-
lieve that the Chiefs were capable of incorporating non-
military factors in such a way as to supply the civilians
with usable input. Apparently belying this assumption,
Secretary of State Dean Acheson recalled that during the
Korean War there was a close working relationship between
the JCS, the Department of Defense, and the Department of
State. To support this he pointed out that he and General
Bradley made an agreement to exclude the phrases "from a
military point of view" and from a "political point of view"
from their discussions. He went on to note that each agreed
that they had their own tactical and strategic problems,
but that they "were interconnected, not separate."[370]

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[368] Millis, Arms and the State, 234; also see Dean
Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State
Department (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1969), 373,
for a discussion of how this bifurcation effected the
development of NSC/68.

[369] Hammond, Organizing for Defense, 244-47.

[370] Acheson, Present at the Creation, 441

Superficially, it would appear that Forrestal's goal of
policy integration had been achieved, but on further exami-
nation such a conclusion becomes suspect. Acheson clearly
attributes the good working relationship between the State
Department and the JCS to the presence of George C. Marshall,
the Secretary of Defense. Furthermore, in his memoirs,
Acheson criticized the Joint Chiefs for maintaining its com-
mittee structure and pointed out that because the Chiefs
were "burdened by both staff and command duties," it was
"extremely difficult for civilian officers engaged in foreign
affairs to work with them". He went on to say that:

> All too often it [the JCS] produces for those looking
> for military advice and guidance only oracular utter-
> ances. Since it is a committee and its views are the
> results of votes on formal papers prepared for it, it
> quite literally is like my favorite old lady who could
> not say what she thought until she heard what she said.
> Even on the tentative basis, it is hard for high offi-
> cials to get military advice in our government. When
> he does get it, it is apt to be unresponsive to the
> problems bothering the civilian official.[371]

While it is true that much of the criticism directed at the
JCS was based on its cumbersome organization, and the inser-
tion of a Chairman went a long way toward solving that prob-
lem; Acheson was actually addressing the impediments of

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[371]Ibid., 243 (underline added).

professionalism. Since professional values fostered compart-
mentalization, it is doubtful that the mere elimination of
odious and constrictive terminology would suddenly liberate
the Chiefs and allow them to articulate non-military per-
ceptions.

Such a strict-constructionalist approach actually
enhanced the perception that the Chiefs were experts within
their narrow professional arena. Since they were the Pre-
sident's professional military advisors, he desired to have
free communication with them and sought their honest and
open advice on military matters. This was precisely the
goal that Clifford had in mind when he recommended, in
December 1946, that a pluralistic JCS be created. Similarly,
it was only through open and frank discussion that the
National Security advisory system could work. This did not
mean, however, that the President was willing to abdicate
any of his prerogatives. In his memoirs, Truman recalled
that "I used the council [NSC] only as a place for recommen-
dations to be worked out. The policy has to come down from
the President, as all final decisions have to be made by
him."[372] The President also understood that these recom-
mendations needed to grow out of an unconstrained environ-
ment; thus he absented himself frequently from the NSC's

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[372]Truman, Memoirs, II, 59.

meetings, in order not to prejudice its advice.[373] Such
openness though, demanded some form of institutional linkage
between the President and his advisors, or chaos could
result. Admiral Leahy had performed such a function for
Roosevelt, and Truman continued to use him in the same man-
ner until the Admiral's retirement in 1949. General Eisen-
hower was brought in to temporarily fill the void, but
expediency gave way to institutionalization with the appoint-
ment of General Bradley to the chairmanship in 1949. During
his tenure as Chairman, Bradley scrupulously avoided imposing his
views on the other Chiefs, and attempted to present their
opinions faithfully to the President. During the Korean War,
Bradley attempted, as Leahy had done in the last war, to
act as the bridge between the White House and the JCS. The
General's White House briefings and frequent conversations
with the President "kept the JCS constantly informed of what
was in the mind of the President."[374]

Unfortunately, the same inter-service competition that
led to the institutionalization of the chairmanship, eroded

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[373]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Oper-
ations, Organizing for National Security, Hearings before the
Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, U.S. Senate, 1961,
I, 573 (hereafter referred to as the Jackson Committee). Also
see Richard F. Haynes, The Awesome Power: Harry S. Truman as
Commander in Chief (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1973), 106.

[374]Wilber Hoar, "Truman," The Ultimate Decision: The
President as Commander in Chief; ed. by Ernest May (New York:
George Braziller, 1960), 194.

the administration's confidence in its military experts, and with it the commitment to pluralistic decision making. As the military experts exhibited an increasing amount of service parochialism, the civilian managers became hard pressed to choose between expert testimony. In this regard Admiral Charles D. Griffin, former special assistant to Admiral Radford observed:

> I always felt that the Secretary of Defense always had enough power to do darn near anything he wanted to do. It was a question of not having the knowledge to make a determination between contradictory recommendations that were coming up from the various services.[375]

These differences of opinion increased the administration's difficulty in dealing with congressional opposition to particular segments of the defense program. Dissent within the JCS became even more counter-productive when the experts were needed to rationalize these programs before the Congress. Since the civilian leadership could not receive unified military advice, even on matters that were "purely military in nature," they began to make decisions based on non-military factors, such as the economy. Where dissent did exist a skillful civilian administrator could use it to his advantage, as Secretary Johnson did, when he scrapped the super-carrier United States.

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[375] Charles D. Griffin, Oral History Transcript, U.S. Naval Institute, Oral History Program (1973), 395.

Ultimately, these inter-service conflicts lead the administration to believe that a greater degree of unanimity was required, not just to facilitate internal policy formulation, but also to optimize external policy implementation. Even before the passage of the National Security Act, President Truman began to realize the impact disunity could have and warned the Chiefs:

> ...when the President of the United States, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the Navy, sets out a policy, that policy should be supported by the Army and the War Department and the Navy Department.[376]

Unanimity would relieve the administration of the difficult task of selecting among expert witnesses and would mend the walls against the administration's opponents. Inherent within this solution, though, is a dilemma that the civilian leadership has yet to solve. The imposition of unanimity on the Chiefs destroys open and honest military advice; yet the lack of it destroys unification.

Experience showed the Truman administration that a decision at the executive level did not necessarily end the debate, but at times even exacerbated it, thus making unanimity even more desirable. Slowly and incrementally disunity among the Chiefs became synonymous with opposition to the administration's policy. Initially, the presence of a Chairman and specifically General Bradley's promotion to five star

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[376]Truman, Public Papers, 1946, 194-5.

rank held out the hope that the dilemma could be solved through internal controls. This would result in what President Truman called "Objective Agreements--a true meeting of professional minds."[377] Such internal controls would not mitigate the Chiefs' advisory function, for they would still be free to debate openly and honestly the pressing issues of the day. What was "objective," though, would probably be determined by the administration. By 1949, the administration had come to the conclusion that persuasion was an ineffective means of dealing with the problem, thus the decision to opt for the implementation of Forrestal's "Shadow Concept" of concentrating power via the amendments to the National Security Act.

The civilian leadership made no secret of the fact that it expected the Chiefs to be loyal members of the administration's team, especially in regard to their relations with Congress. Secretary Forrestal informed them that if they could not support the President's program they could resign.[378] Truman himself informed the Chiefs in May of 1948 that he expected them to support his program "in good spirit and without mental reservations." He emphasized that the time

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[377] "Suggested Agenda," Personal Secretary's File, box 91, Daily Sheets, Feb. 1-15, 1949, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri. (Hereafter referred to as Truman Library.)

[378] James Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries, ed. by Walter Millis with the collaboration of E.S. Duffield (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), 545.

for debate ceased once a program became official and that he
expected "every member of the administration to support it
fully, both in public and in private."[379] Despite this
directive, less than a year later, in February 1949, the
President had to remind the JCS that "complete, undivided
loyalty to all such decisions will be demanded at all times
and at all places."[380] The fate of Admiral Denfeld was a
clear example of the requirement for loyalty. In the final
analysis these controls would only be as effective as the men
who would implement them. It was with this in mind that
James Forrestal "liked to insist that he was not as much
interested in the diagram of an organization as he was in
the names in the little boxes."[381]

It was for this reason that the dual problem of lack
of unanimity and public debate on national security issues
became inextricably connected to the JCS appointment process.
While in theory the President as Commander in Chief can
appoint anyone he wishes, reality limits his options. The
Chiefs themselves are chosen from a small pool of available
flag officers. Lawrence Korb notes in his study of the JCS,
the President's "choice is usually limited to a few top men

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[379]Ibid., 437.

[380]"Suggested Agenda " Personal Secretary's File, box 91,
Daily Sheets, Feb. 1-15, 1949, Truman Library.

[381]Richard Betts, Soldiers, Statesman and Cold War
Crises (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press,
1977), 172.

in each branch of the Armed Forces, whose promotion into
this elite is rigidly controlled by the individual ser-
vice."[382] True, the President can reach down into the ranks
of more junior flag rank officers for a Chief, but he will
have to do so over the protests of the service bureaucracy.[383]
Furthermore, the President must remain cognizant of the fact
that the Chief maintains a "front man" relationship between
the administration that appoints him and the service he
represents. Denfeld discovered that the loss of the latter's
support may make it impossible for him to carry on his job.
Reaching too far down into the ranks may well result in such
a degree of animosity being directed against a Chief that
it would be counter-productive to appoint him.[384]

While these factors tend to limit the President's
choice of potential appointees to the Joint Chiefs, his
appointment ability could potentially solve the dual problem
presented above. If the balance between the Chiefs' two

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[382] Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 31.

[383] The promotion of General Harold Johnson and Admiral
Elmo Zumwalt over many senior officers reflected the adminis-
tration's desire to accomplish specific things. MacNamara
wanted an Army Chief of Staff who was attuned to the systems
analysis that he advocated; while Zumwalt was brought in to
deal with many of the social problems that the Navy was con-
fronting. See Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 44, 64.

[384] An example of such a promotion was Major General
Alexander Haig's promotion by President Nixon over 250 other
Generals to Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. It resulted in
a great deal of animosity toward him and those associated
with him.

constituencies was sufficiently disrupted so that the preponderance of loyalty resided toward the administration then unanimity of opinion and loyalty would be achieved. Granted the cost would be the destruction of Clifford's pluralistic JCS, but such pluralism was increasingly perceived as being dysfunctional anyway. At what point the administration realized the advantages of using the selection process to its full advantage is unknown, but an examination of the process may give us some insights.

The membership of the Joint Chiefs during the Truman administration goes through two distinct phases with the "Revolt of the Admirals' acting as a convenient watershed. Up until 1949 the selection tended to conform to Richard Betts' model of a "Routine-Professional" appointment.[385] By this Betts' means that the officer selected was considered to have the highest professional stature within his service, or a least was one of a select group of competitors. Compatibility with the administrations' policies appears to have been of little or no concern, although personality compatibility was still an important criteron. Almost immediately upon the conclusion of the Second World War, Marshall, King, and Arnold retired to be succeeded by the major theater commander from each service, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower,

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[385]Betts, _Cold War Crises_, 53ff.

Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz[386] and General Carl Spaatz.

Each had immense public prestige and was clearly perceived

as the expert in his respective field. With the passage of

the National Security Act in 1947 this group turned over

command to officers who, while well qualified, lacked the

personal prestige of their predecessors. The one exception

to this was Chief of Staff of the Army, General Omar Bradley.

The new Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Louis Denfeld,

had spent the majority of the war in personnel management,

although after the conflict he was posted to the prestigious

billet of Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC), a position

that Admiral Nimitz previously held. The Air Force Chief of

Staff, General Hoyt Vandenberg, had been primarily a tactical

commander during the war (commanding the IX Tactical Air Force)

and afterwards was named the first head of the Central Intel-

ligence Agency. In June of 1947, Vandenberg was named Vice

Chief of Staff and thus began a tradition that the Air Force

maintained for over two decades-appointing a future Chief of

Staff first to the position of Vice Chief. Later, when

Bradley was appointed Chairman, his Vice Chief, General

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[386] E. B. Potter, <u>Nimitz</u> (Annopolis: Naval Institute
Press: 1976), 401. Potter in a footnote discusses Forrestal's
opposition to Nimitz. Forrestal had a difficult time dealing
with the strong willed King and he did not want to continue
the difficulties with a strong willed Nimitz. King forced
his hand and went to the President with the recommendation
that Nimitz succeed him. It is possible that Forrestal wanted
Admiral Marc Mitscher, who supposedly declined the offer of
CNO.

J. Lawton Collins, was named his successor. Collins also had
been a major tactical commander during the war (commanding
the VII Corps in Europe). In each case the Chief designee
had served his apprenticeship and was among the logical
choices for selection.

It is within this framework that the firing of Admiral
Louis Denfeld becomes important. As discussed earlier, the
administration hoped that internal controls and organizational
reform would mitigate the worst aspects of inter-service con-
flict. When Denfeld became too great a political liability
he was removed from office and replaced by Vice Admiral For-
rest Sherman. On the surface, Sherman's appointment seems
to follow Betts' routine professional model. During the war
Sherman had been Nimitz's Chief of Staff and afterwards he
had held important fleet commands. He was universally admired
within the service, specifically recommended by Nimitz, and
despite his apparent junior three star rank was still the 11th
ranking officer in the Navy. But behind Sherman's obvious
military qualifications there were other credentials that
were of equal, if not greater, importance. Admiral Sherman
was acknowledged as a pro-unification officer, who had helped
write the 1947 legislation. He thus was politically attuned
to the desires of the administration. Nimitz acknowledged
this when he recommended Sherman. After narrowing the field
to Sherman and Admiral Richard Connolly, Nimitz told the
President "Sherman is younger and even less involved in

politics."[387] Furthermore, since Sherman was probably the Navy's foremost aviator, his selection would heal some of the wounds caused by the cancellation of the United States. I think it can safely be asserted that these non-professional qualifications guaranteed his appointment over other qualified naval officers such as Admirals Connolly or Blandy.

It would appear that the administration decided to reinforce the notion of loyalty that had been explicitly articulated and implicitly contained within the 1949 amendments to the National Security Act. While Truman had previously appointed officers on a routine professional basis, the appointment of Sherman may easily be interpreted as a step toward the politicization of the Chiefs, or to borrow Betts' label, a "professional-political" appointment. This is not politicization in the most crass terms. Instead it is the selection of an officer based upon professional qualifications, but with an appreciation to the political potential of the individual, especially in regard to the notion of loyalty to the administration's policies.

It was not accidental that upon the death of Admiral Sherman in 1951, his successor was the Commander-in-Chief

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[387]Potter, Nimitz, 448. Sherman originally was against unification and argued, as did Leahy and other Navy officers that unification already existed in the form of the President as Commander-in-Chief. Unfortunately, we cannot document the source of his transformation to a unification advocate. Haynes, Awesome Power, 96.

of the Atlantic, Admiral William Fechteler. To replace the very able Sherman was a difficult task and Truman deferred the choice to his newly appointed Secretary of the Navy Dan A. Kimball, under the assumption that Kimball would have to be able to work with the new CNO. Among the pool of senior admirals only Fechteler had been untainted by the "Revolt." Admiral Arthur Radford, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific, was allegedly Sherman's own choice as his successor, but he took himself out of contention "for the good of the service." Kimball himself recalled that this, among other things, had been crucial in determing his choice of Fechteler.[388] Shortly after Fechteler's nomination he met with the President who emphasized the necessity for the "success of unification of the Armed Forces."[389] Clearly the correct selection of the Chiefs, combined with the 1949 amendments to the National Security Act, would guarantee that success.

The requirement of loyalty to the administration became increasingly important during the last years of the Truman administration and changed the role of the Joint Chiefs substantially. As the Democratic administration was attacked for its foreign policy decisions, it was forced to rely more

[388] K. Jack Bauer, "Dan Able Kimball," in American Secretaries of the Navy, ed. by Bauer, Robert Albion and Pablo Coletta, Draft Copy.

[389] William Fechteler, Oral History Transcript, Columbia University Oral History Program (1962), 65.

and more on the JCS to rationalize and defend its programs.

Bradley, more than any of the other Chiefs, became a stalking

horse for the administration's policies, especially as its

civilian policy makers, such as Acheson, lost all credibility

with the Republicans.[390] The role of the Chairman, because

of his theoretical lack of service affiliation and his close

ties to the administration, seems to have developed a col-

lateral function to support the administration's policies.

Forrestal may have been alluding to this function when he

used the word "agent" to describe the relationship between

the Chairman and the Secretary. Unfortunately, even General

Bradley could only trade on his prestige for a short time.

In the end he also lost credibility. Senator Taft pointed

this out in 1951:

> I have come to the point where I do not accept them [the
> JCS] as experts, particularly when General Bradley makes
> a foreign policy speech. I suggest that the Joint Chiefs
> of Staff are absolutely under the control of the adminis-
> tration.[391]

Under such circumstances it was impossible to keep the illu-

sion of traditional professionalism.

The role the Chiefs were playing in 1953 was a far cry

from the pluralistic model of traditional professionalism

that Truman, Clifford and Forrestal originally envisioned, but

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[390]Samuel Huntington, _Soldier and the State: The
Theory and Politics of Civilian Military Relations_ (New York:
Random House, Vintage Books, 1964), 386.

[391]_New York Times_, 27 April 1951, 4.

pluralism had failed in the face of inter-service conflict and the new demands of the post-war world. The administration's reaction was to opt for more centralization and to demand greater unanimity. This unanimity would result in "objective agreements" to support the administration's policies. The firing of Denfeld, followed by the appointments of Sherman and Fechteler, and the relief of MacArthur, reminded the Chiefs that civilian control of the military was becoming a euphemism for administration control of the military. But the Truman administration had not completely forgotten the ideal of the pluralistic structure. Bradley carefully played the honest broker in his dealings with the other Chiefs. This was undoubtedly the intention of the President, but the administration was caught between the ideal and the realities of the bureaucratic and political world. The changing of the nature of the JCS had begun and would continue into the next administration.

The Eisenhower administration's perception of the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff differed fundamentally from that of its predecessor, primarily due to a differing perception of the Chiefs' advisory function and with it the concept and limitations of what "military expertise" entailed. Since Eisenhower's own military experience and prestige far overshadowed that of his Chiefs, he was in a very real sense his own military expert. As Sherman Adams wrote:

In fact, Eisenhower's personal experience as a professional soldier and as the wartime commander of the greatest expeditionary force that the world has ever seen made him if anything harder to deal with when fear-inspired pressures came from Congress...[392]

With the President as the administration's resident military expert, it was only natural that the Defense Department's civilian leadership tended to be resource managers as opposed to military planners. Eisenhower's first two selections for the office of Secretary of Defense, Charles E. (Engine Charlie) Wilson and Neil McElroy, respectively the presidents of General Motors and Proctor & Gamble, enhanced this perspective. Although neither had any experience in defense decision making, the administration believed that the management skills they possessed were readily transferable. One White House insider was reported to have said, "anyone who can run General Motors can run anything."[393] Wilson himself described his role in that light:

> Actually the current trend in all big enterprises—private business as well as the Department of Defense—is to decentralize actual operations thus leaving top management free to establish and clarify policy and follow up on performance.[394]

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[392]Sherman Adams, First Hand Report: The Story of the Eisenhower Administration (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961), 396.

[393]C.W. Borklund, The Department of Defense (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1968), 137.

[394]Summary of Secretary Wilson's letter of June 17, 1957 regarding the O'Mahoney amendment to the FY 58 appropriations bill. Harlow Papers, box 7, folder "DoD Budget 1958," Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. (Hereafter referred to as Eisenhower Library.)

The fact that the Eisenhower administration did not have to rely on the Joint Chiefs for military expertise also had a profound impact on their role. While Truman had politicized the Chiefs in order to offset criticism of his administration, Eisenhower neither needed nor desired such support. Instead he "desired only their agreement as members of a team."[395] In fact, shortly after Eisenhower assumed office Robert Cutler, the President's advisor on national security affairs, informed the JCS that the President did not like uniformed military officers publicly discussing policy. Cutler quoted the President as saying "I don't like it a damn bit. If it doesn't stop I know what to do about it."[396] Cutler was obviously conveying the President's dislike of Bradley voicing his support for Truman's policy.

The President was committed to the team concept as the backbone of any organization, especially the military, since he felt that unification could never be achieved without it. Eisenhower believed that the Chiefs had to cease being service spokesmen and that they had to rise above service parochialism, but as a former Chief he fully understood the service commitment. In August of 1953 he called for an independent examination of the service roles and missions,

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[395]James A. Donovan, _Militarism, U.S.A._ (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970), 117.

[396]Memorandum of Conversation between General Cutler and General Matthews, 5 February 1953, Record Group 218, box 5, folder "091, China," National Archives, Washington, D.C.

and their relationship to atomic war. Sadly, he lamented,
"such a study cannot be accomplished in a truly objective way
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff because of the understandable
inclination of military men to protect the prerogatives of
their respective services."[397] Eisenhower feared that if the
Chiefs failed to rise above their service interests, the JCS
would become "little more than an agency for eliminating from
proposals and projects unconsequential differences."[398] As
long as the Chiefs continued to represent their services they
could never be molded into the team that the President wanted.
Such a team concept was the nucleus of the staff model that
Eisenhower was familiar with.

The President endeavored to achieve the team concept
through several media. One was to require the Chiefs to
consider non-military factors while developing their advisory
input. This requirement was levied on the Chiefs in a direc-
tive from Secretary Wilson during the summer of 1954. Wilson
called on the Chiefs to "avail themselves of the most com-
petent and considered thinking that can be obtained represent-
ing every pertinent point of view, including military,

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[397]Dwight D. Eisenhower to Carl Heinshaw, Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy, 1 August 1953, Central File,
folder 'OF 108-8(1),' Eisenhower Library.

[398]Final Report to the Secretary of Defense, 8 February
1948, 1916-1952 File, box 38, folder "Forrestal (2)," Eisen-
hower Library.

scientific, industrial and economic."[399] Ostensibly, this
directive seemed to institutionalize the key recommendations
of the 1953 Rockefeller Report, that called for the Chiefs
to draw upon a broader base of knowledge while developing
their war plans; although the Report acknowledged that those
plans should be "based primarily on military factors."[400]
The Wilson Directive seemed to reject traditional military
professionalism and to demand a higher degree of fusion than
previously had been espoused, but it is questionable whether
the President actually wanted such fusion. His own background
seemed to indicate a preference for traditionalism. He
manifested this in his criticism of Bradley's actions and in
his campaign promise to limit the JCS to "purely military
decisions."[401] In a 1958 staff meeting he reaffirmed this
position by stating that "it is necessary [that the JCS sup-
ply] purely military advice and real agreements on the imple-
mentation of strategy, planning and forces."[402]

[399]Quoted in Huntington, The Soldier and the State,
395.

[400]Report of the Rockefeller Committee on Department
of Defense Organization, 11 April 1953 (printed for use of
the Committee on Armed Services, 83rd Congress, 1st Session),
4.

[401]New York Times, 23 April 1953, 16; for a further dis-
cussion of Eisenhower's traditionalism see Chapter VII, The
Joint Chiefs' Own Perceived Role.

[402]Memorandum for Record, Meeting on Defense Organiza-
tion, 25 January 1958, Rockefeller Committee Records, box 18,
folder "136(3)," Eisenhower Library, (Emphasis added).

Given this general outlook by the President, the real
intention of Wilson's directive seems a bit confusing. I
would suggest that it was an effort to get the Chiefs to
leave their service parochialism behind and take a broader
perspective. Admiral Radford's observation, "these damn
so and so's, why can't they look at the broad picture,"
seems to support the contention that the Chiefs were viewed
as being overly narrow in their outlook.[403] Forcing the
Chiefs to take such a broad perspective had inherent advan-
tages. If the Chiefs could be forced to take the same per-
spective as the administration, then it was probable that the
Chiefs would come to the same conclusions as the administra-
tion on strategic and economic matters. If that occurred,
it could also be anticipated that all the Chiefs would sup-
port the "New Look" proposals. This hypothesis seems to be
supported by General Maxwell Taylor's recollection that the
Chiefs were told to consider the views of their superiors
and not submit contentious recommendations.[404] Thus the
directive's issuance shortly after the administration's first
year in office may well have been one effort to achieve
unanimity. This approach only differs in degree from Truman's
demand for unanimity on the part of his Chiefs. Truman
allowed the Chiefs to differ with the administration prior to

[403] Griffin, Oral History, 343.

[404] Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1959), 106.

the final decision. It was only after the decision had been
reached that the administration sought to enforce loyality.
One can argue that the creation of the chairmanship was a
definite move by the Truman administration to require the
Chiefs to consider the views of their civilian superiors prior
to their giving official advice, this had been one of Leahy's
main functions during the war, but that approach was never
institutionalized afterwards in the form of a directive until
the Eisenhower administration.

A second method of guaranteeing that the team concept
permeated the Joint Chiefs was to demand that they submit
unified positions. This was what the President meant when
he said "real agreements on the implementation of strategy,
planning and forces." He specifically forbade the Chiefs
to send split decisions forward,[405] apparently believing that
the elimination of split decisions would also eliminate
inter-service rivalry. Unfortunately, this demand merely
increased the Chiefs' natural inclination to compromise. As
Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations from 1955
to 1961, pointed out, "if you compromise, you compromise to
get something that is not very good."[406] However, the moti-
vation of the President went further than merely the elimi-
nation of service rivalries; it was aimed at the idea of the

[405] Arleigh A. Burke, Oral History Transcript, Colum-
bia University Oral History Project, 53-56.

[406] Ibid.

responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to supply military advice. The President accurately understood that when the Chiefs split on an issue, the decision was thrust up one level higher in the bureaucracy--in this case to the civilian Secretary of Defense. With the experts split, the Secretary can make any decision he wants, and the Chiefs have effectively taken themselves out of the decision making process. Moreover, it is probable that the Secretary will make the decision from a position of relative ignorance, because he has no other "military" experts to advise him. This was the position that Forrestal found himself in prior to 1949. Admiral Burke recalled that the President was afraid that if the Chiefs could not make up their minds "somebody else will make theirs up who doesn't know as much about the military requirements as the Chiefs do."[407]

Responsibility, though, was only part of Eisenhower's rationale for unanimity. Implicitly, the idea of being a member of the team was foremost in the President's mind. Like Truman, the importance of loyalty was also very prevalent, but for different reasons. His military experience left an indelible impression upon him as to the proper mode of decision making and the relationship of the commander to his staff. There is little doubt that the President perceived the Joint Chiefs as his, the Commander-in-Chief's, military

[407]Ibid.

staff. This would explain his expectation of loyalty. This was pointed out by Secretary McElroy when he said, "they [the JCS] should have their opportunity to say to the President what they think...," but once the decision has been made then all discussion must cease.[408] The cessation of discussion did not simply mean compliance through silence, but whole-hearted support for the program. Any form of dissent was not only dysfunctional, but disloyal as well. It followed from this that when there were differences of opinion within the Defense Department team, those differences should remain within the confines of the team and not be publicized. This included the Chiefs' requirement to go before Congressional Committees, which usually resulted in bringing any differences out into the open. This was a phenomenon that Eisenhower characteristically labeled "legalized insubordination." Secretary McElroy expressed the administration's dislike for this form of legislative appeal, when he said, "the right is contrary to the normal relationship between the executive and the legislative branches of the government, it creates a divisive situation not found in any other executive department."[409]

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[408] Neil McElroy, Oral History Transcript, Columbia University Oral History Project, 84-85.

[409] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Department of Defense Reorganization Act, 1958: Hearings on H.R. 12541, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, 1958, 11.

Eisenhower had never liked the existence of this type of appeal arrangement and had noted so in his 1948 memorandum.[410] Later when he became President its continued existence countered his idea of a defense team making policy in unity. In an effort to halt such "insubordination" he ordered that differences within the defense team should not be made public, even to Congress. As he once told Admiral Burke, "once I approve a budget I don't want you people [the Chiefs] going up there [to Congress] and undercutting my budget."[411] He never did understand why the Chiefs could not simply acknowledge support for the President's program without allowing the differences to surface.[412] His dislike for such "legalized insubordination" was such that he even considered legislation that would have negated the Chiefs' requirement to go before Congress.[413]

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[410]Dwight D. Eisenhower to Ferdinand Eberstadt, 20 September 1948, 1916-1952 File, box 34, folder "Eberstadt," Eisenhower Library. Specifically Eisenhower wrote "what is important under this point is the practice of the separate services going individually to Congressional Committees. Until we get firmly established the intent of Congress to act, in matters of basic legislation and the budget, on the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, as opposed to any partisan recommendations of any of the Services, trouble is bound to exist."

[411]Burke, Oral History, 53-56.

[412]Arleigh A. Burke, private interview, Washington, D.C., January 1975.

[413]Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 109.

Another method by which the administration sought to achieve unanimity was through the Joint Chiefs of Staff appointment process. In his 1949 memorandum Eisenhower had recommended to President Truman that he use such a process to facilitate unification:

> While the Law of 1947 was expected to relieve the President of the necessity of giving personal attention to the details of national security problems, yet we are now facing, not a detail of organization, but the problem of energizing the whole system so that it will start to move effectively. In my opinion, this cannot now be done without a certain amount of Presidential intervention, for the reason that inter-service struggles have been carried to the point where only the <u>official who has the appointive and assignment power</u> can sufficiently emphasize his and your determination to secure teamwork.[414]

By the time Eisenhower took office in January 1953, the attacks upon the Joint Chiefs by the Republican leadership had reached such proportions that it was doubtful that the new President could have kept the incumbents in office even if he had wanted to.[415] As luck would have it, three of the four Chiefs, Bradley, Collins, and Vandenberg, were completing their four year term that summer; and the remaining Chief,

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[414]Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 4 February 1949, 1916-1952 File, box 38 folder "Forrestal (2)," Eisenhower Library (referred hereafter as 1949 Memorandum). Eisenhower selected his cabinet in much the same manner, he even did it without senatorial courtesy under the assumption that a staff should be loyal members of his administration, individuals that he could work with, and that he was the only one who should make the final decision; see Adams, <u>First Hand Report</u>, 59.

[415]Aside from the pressure from the Republicans, Secretary designee Wilson also wanted a new team of Chiefs; <u>New York Times</u>, 13 May 1953, 1; <u>Newsweek</u>, 25 May 1953.

Admiral Fechteler, would complete his first two year term during the same time period. Thus the opportunity presented itself to change completely the membership of the JCS.

In selecting the new Chiefs the President appears to have used three criteria. First, the new Chiefs had to have greater global perspective than their predecessors. If nothing else the incumbents were primarily European in orientation; while the Republicans perceived Asia as a focal point for American policy.[416] Secondly, the nominee had to be acceptable to key members of the administration and to the Republican Party leadership. This criterion was based on political reality and the President's notion of the staff model. Finally, the President desired to have loyal Chiefs, who not only had a global perspective, but who would work effectively in the joint arena. His 1949 recommendation that "joint work take precedence over any personal or individual service matter,"[417] encapsulated his ideas on the subject. With these three criteria as a gauge the selection process began.

The four officers whom the President nominated for membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff were Admiral Arthur

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[416] See Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, Ill: The Free Press, 1960), 303 ff, for a discussion of the impact of the geographical mind set of the Chiefs and how this impacted on their approach to war and its interrelationship to politics.

[417] 1949 Memorandum.

Radford as Chairman, and General Matthew Ridgway, General

Nathan Twining, and Admiral Robert Carney as Chief of Staff

of the Army, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and Chief of

Naval Operations, respectively. Each brought with him a

wealth of military experience in different theaters of

operations, and all had commanded one of the unified commands,

which theoretically better prepared them for their joint

duties.[418]

The new Chairman was Admiral Arthur W. Radford, a

central figure in the "Revolt of the Admirals" and the Com-

mander-in-Chief of the Pacific. His previous record of ser-

vice parochialism would appear to have removed him from con-

tention. In fact, while Eisenhower was Chief of Staff, he

had such a dislike for Radford that he told Admiral Nimitz

that if he "brings along that so-and-so Radford" again to a

JCS meeting he, Eisenhower, would refuse to attend.[419] But

the President's personal feelings were mitigated by the fact

that Radford fit all the administration's criteria. His

experience in the Pacific, as well as his strategic outlook,

was totally compatible with the Republican's asian orienta-

tion and the doctrine of massive retaliation. As John Donovan

noted:

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[418] Glenn H. Snyder, "The 'New Look' of 1953," in
Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets, ed. by Warner Schil-
ling, Paul Hammond, and Glenn Snyder (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1962), 412-413.

[419] New York Times, 18 August 1973, 24.

His view was that American military power was overex-
tended, with too many forces committed, notably in Asia,
to positions in which the Communists could pin them
down. Instead of such scattered deployment, Radford
favored concentrating American power in a strategic
reserve in or near North America. Under this arrange-
ment the main reliance for holding the front lines would
rest on the indigenous forces being built up in non-
communist countries, while the mobile power of the United
States remained poised.[420]

Such strategic thinking made Radford completely acceptable

to the Republican leadership, especially Senator Robert Taft

of Ohio,[421] who was becoming very sympathetic to the notion

that air and sea power could replace American ground forces.[422]

Taft even suggested that the new Chiefs be appointed immedi-

ately so that they could begin their reappraisal of American

strategic posture before they officially took over. After

the administration's bitter fight over the confirmation of

Secretary of Labor, the desires of the Ohio Senator were taken

very much into consideration.[423] When the final list of

nominees for the Joint Chiefs was decided upon it was given to

Taft for his approval.[424] In regard to the selection of

[420] Robert J. Donovan, Eisenhower: The Inside Story
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), 18.

[421] New York Times, 25 April 1953, 8.

[422] New York Times, 22 April, 1953, 1.

[423] New York Times, 13 May 1953, 10.

[424] Donovan, Inside Story, 325.

Radford, Taft said " I am glad to have for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a man who has said we are capable of fighting an aggressive war in the Pacific."[425]

While it was undoubtedly the Republican connection that made Radford attractive for the chairmanship, it was Secretary of Defense nominee Wilson who guaranteed his nomination. Eisenhower's commitment to the staff model meant that the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to be totally acceptable to Mr. Wilson, since they were his military advisors as well as the President's.[426] During Eisenhower's pre-inaugural trip to Korea, he and Wilson met with Radford aboard his flagship, the U.S.S. _Helena._[427] Both men were very impressed with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific, and as soon as Admiral Radford had repented for his earlier transgressions against unification the way was paved for his nomination.[428]

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[425] _New York Times_, 15 May 1953, 3.

[426] Dwight D. Eisenhower, _Mandate for Change_ (New York: Doubleday, 1963), 96.

[427] Admiral Fechteler claims that he arranged the _Helena_ meeting and that Eisenhower had not planned to meet Radford. Fechteler, Oral History, 117.

[428] Adams, _First Hand Report_, 403-4. See Wilson's letter to Eisenhower recommending Radford for the Chairman-ship, 12 May 1953, Central File/Official File, box 100, folder "OF 3G-JCS, 5 January-March 1955," Eisenhower Library. Also see _Life_ magazine, 25 May 1953; _Life_ correspondent Richard MacMillan reported that the key point was Radford's presentation during a dinner on Iwo Jima, on the Asian

The rest of Eisenhower's new Chiefs were all equally
acceptable under the various criteria that the administration
established.   All had vast experience as unified commanders-
Ridgway as the United Nations Commander in Korea and then
as Eisenhower's own successor as Supreme Allied Commander
Europe (SACEUR), Twining was Commander-in-Chief, Alaska,
and Carney was Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern
Europe (CINCAFSOUTH).   Carney, in particular, had Eisenhower's
respect, having gone with him to Europe, in 1951, as his
deputy and having been given the Mediterranean command by
Eisenhower shortly before the General retired to run for the
Presidency.   While Carney was CINCAFSOUTH he began to embrace
the strategic ideas that would eventually be the basis for
the New Look.[429]   Until Radford's name was announced as the
new Chairman, Carney was considered the leading candidate.
Eisenhower may well have promised the job to him, only to
find out that Wilson wanted Radford.   Thus the only compen-
sation the President could offer Carney was that of Chief
of Naval Operations.[430]   In due course Carney was nominated

situation.   Secretary Wilson was deeply impressed and Rad-
ford was asked to accompany the group to Korea.   According
to MacMillan, Eisenhower asked his aide, "Is there room on
our airplane for Admiral Radford?"   "No Sir," was the
response.   Eisenhower then said "then see who can be left
behind."

[429] James Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age (New
York: Harper, 1958), 136.

[430] Fechteler, Oral History, 124.

for CNO and the incumbent, Admiral Fechteler, replaced him
in the Mediterranean command.

General Ridgway's selection as Army Chief of Staff
was by no means as clear cut as Carney's selection for Chief
of Naval Operations. Aside from Ridgway, the two other
officers considered to have the best chance to be Collins'
successor were General Mark Clark, the United Nations Com-
mander in Korea, and General Alfred Gruenther, Ridgway's
own Chief of Staff in Europe. Clark's name was also promi-
nently mentioned as a possible Chairman, but his appointment
for any position was opposed by Texas Republicans.[431] Their
opposition to Clark stemmed from the annihilation of the
36th Infantry Division during the crossing of the Rapido
River during the Italian Campaign. The 36th was a Texas
National Guard Division, and the Texans blamed Clark who,
as 5th Army Commander, ordered the attack.[432] Given the
importance of the Texas delegation at the Republican Con-
vention it is not surprising that Clark was passed over.[433]
General Gruenther's non-selection is a far different and
more complicated matter. Undoubtedly, one of the most

[431] New York Times, 10 May 1953, 31.

[432] Martin Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1969), 322-352.

[433] Herbert S. Parmet, Eisenhower and the American Crusades (New York: MacMillian Co., 1972), 83-101.

capable officers in the Army, he had been the first Director of the Joint Staff and had gone with Eisenhower to Europe in 1951 as his Chief of Staff. He continued in that capacity when Ridgway succeeded Eisenhower in 1952. Ridgway's own appointment to SACEUR is clouded by the rumor that the State Department wanted him out of Tokyo while the Japanese Peace Treaty was being negotiated.[434] If that is true, then what does one do with a successful army commander? Gruenther, was unquestionably very qualified to succeed Eisenhower in Europe, but his identification with his former commander resulted in disfavor among Democrats. I would suggest that a temporary solution may have been found with the appointment of Ridgway to SACEUR. Eisenhower still considered Gruenther "the best qualified man in the service of the United States for the post,"[435] and may well have seen the nomination of Ridgway to Chief of Staff as a means of elevating Gruether to the post of the NATO commander, which he did upon Ridgway's return to Washington.

The final member of Eisenhower's new team of Chiefs was Air Force Chief of Staff Nathan S. Twining. His selection appears to be free of the political machinations that proceeded the selections of Carney, Ridgway, and Radford.

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[434] Betts, Cold War Crises, 243, citing C.L. Saltzenberger, A Long Row of Candles (New York: MacMillian, 1969), 748.

[435] Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 449.

Twining had been Air Force Vice Chief of Staff since 1950 and was acting Chief of Staff during the last months of the Truman administration due to Vandenberg's ill health. Despite his presence on the JCS, he seems to have escaped unscathed from the political controversy that surrounded the Joint Chiefs. He was even considered a non-controversial figure within the Air Force and managed to avoid the intra-service conflicts of the period.[436] Despite his low profile, there is little doubt that the Air Force was sympathetic to the new administration's strategic outlook. All of these factors seem to have combined to gain the favor of Secretary Wilson and Air Force Secretary Harold Talbott.[437]

In the final analysis the "new" Chiefs were selected because they fit the administration's criteria of joint experience, global outlook and acceptability. It was only natural that such a wholesale replacement of the Joint Chiefs would raise cries of politicization of the military. Admiral Fechteler later charged that the "Eisenhower administration deliberately injected the Joint Chiefs of Staff into the political arena,"[438] but one must place this action in

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[436]New York Times, 8 May 1953, 1.

[437]New York Times, 29 April 1953, 13. Twining's only possible competitor was General Loris Norstadt who at this time was assigned in Europe where he would eventually succeed Gruenther as the Supreme Allied Commander.

[438]Fechteler, Oral History, 124.

the context of the historical evolution of the JCS as an
institution. President Truman had moved away from routine
professional appointments after 1949 as one component of
his program to create greater unanimity among the Chiefs;
the other component being the 1949 amendments to the National
Security Act. During Eisenhower's tour as acting Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs, he had also emphasized the need for
unanimity, so it was only natural that as President he would
use whatever means were at his disposal to eliminate dys-
functional competition. The President's rejection of split
decisions, the demand that the Chiefs take into account their
superiors' views, and the administration's selection cri-
teria were all part of the President's program to implement
the unanimity that he desired. In 1953, it was merely a
difference in degree, not in intent. In this regard former
Commandant of the Marine Corps, General David Shoup recalled:

> ....both Ike and succeeding Presidents have always felt
> that they wanted to appoint the Chief of service for a
> period of two years. In that way, they would get a
> chance to take a look at them and throw them out on the
> street if they didn't like them and get somebody else
> in their own administration.[439]

During the Eisenhower administration one does not
find examples of the dramatic firing of a Chief as in the
case of Denfeld; instead the President carefully examined
his options before renominating an incumbent. By 1955, two

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[439]General David Shoup, Oral History, Columbia Oral
History Project, 2.

of the "new" Chiefs, Carney and Ridgway, had failed their
first two year loyalty test. Admiral Carney's transgres-
sions were three in number. First, he was not getting along
with the Secretary of the Navy and the Marine Corps Com-
mandant, General Lemuel Shepherd. Second, at times he sided
with General Ridgway in criticizing the New Look. Finally,
the Admiral made some off-the-record remarks about the
likelihood of a Red Chinese invasion of the off-shore islands.
Unfortunately for Carney, those remarks made their way into
the press, causing the administration considerable embarras-
sment.[440] According to former Secretary of Defense Thomas
Gates, Carney was removed because of his problems with
Navy's civilian leadership and the China speech. As Gates
put it, "the question of his loyalty to the administration
was involved."[441]

Ridgway, on the other hand, had a history of opposi-
tion to the administration's programs. In 1958 the President
was reported to have remarked to Representative John McCor-
mick that "I have never been rough with a service Chief of
Staff, with the possible exception of one man whom I told,
when he served out his time, that his usefulness was

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[440] New York Times, 1 June 1955, 16; also see Adams,
First Hand Report, 133 and Eisenhower, Mandate for Change,
478, for a further discussion of Carney's remarks and their
impact.

[441] Thomas Gates, Oral History Transcript, Columbia
University Oral History Project, 24.

over."[442] Since the only two Chiefs the President failed

to renominate were Ridgway and Carney he probably had to

be referring to one of them. Sherman Adams reports that

the conflict between the President and the Army Chief of

Staff "had personal overtones to it." Adams goes on to

recall that "Ridgway had been the President's successor in

the command of NATO forces and Eisenhower's comments about

Ridgway's service in that assignment had been less than

glowing."[443] If that is true, then why did not Eisenhower

simply fire Ridgway, or even Carney, for their obvious dis-

loyal actions? The answer is Presidential style:

> Before I [Sherman Adams] worked for him, I assumed
> Eisenhower would be a hard taskmaster. He did have a
> penchant for orderly thinking and procedures and par-
> ticularly, for careful follow-through on his assignments.
> But he seldom called anybody down when he was displeased
> with his work and I never knew him to punish anybody.
> When General Matthew Ridgway split with him on the ques-
> tion of armed forces manpower levels and when General
> Maxwell Taylor questioned the government's anti-missile
> program, the President was deeply embarrassed but did
> little more than provide for the early retirement of
> these officers.[444]

In order to replace Carney, Ridgway, and all subse-

quent Chiefs, the Eisenhower administration used to varying

degree the same careful methodology that it had used in 1953.

The criteria used in selecting the "new" Chiefs had not only

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[442]Adams, First Hand Report, 421.

[443]Ibid., 399-400.

[444]Ibid., 27. Adams is wrong about Taylor. He re-
tired after a second term as Chief of Staff.

remained valid, but the requirement to have a joint outlook had increased in importance. The one criterion that seems to have diminished in importance, if not completely disappeared, was the requirement to be accepted by the Republican Party leadership. Whether this was the result of the President's increased confidence, the death of Robert Taft, or the decline in the power of Senator Joseph McCarthy is difficult to say, but it did cease to be an important ingredient in the selection process. Replacing it as the most important criterion was being a loyal team player.

Robert Carney's successor as Chief of Naval Operations was the only two star flag officer ever appointed to the Joint Chiefs, Rear Admiral Arleigh A. (31 Knot) Burke. Burke's nickname, acquired during the Second World War, reflected the drive and intensity of this officer. Despite his ability and high standing within the service, his junior rank and earlier involvement in the "Revolt of the Admirals"[445] probably would have excluded him from

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[445]Burke received his nickname while commanding Destroyer Squadron 23, the "Little Beavers," during the Solomons campaign. During one particular action he radioed ahead to some transports to stand aside "I'm coming through at 31 knots." Admiral Halsey then gave him that nickname. During the "Revolt of the Admirals" Captain Burke was a special assistant to Denfeld and head of the Organizational Research and Policy Division, known as OP-23. Its purpose was to prepare the Navy's case for the hearings. As a result of his activities, Burke's name was removed from the promotion list to Rear Admiral, until pressures from House Republicans got it reinstated.

consideration if he had not been supported by the Navy's civilian leadership. [446]

Matthew Ridgway's successor, Maxwell D. Taylor, had a brilliant combat record, was a charter member of the "airborne club," commander of the 101st Airborne Division, and later commander of the 8th Army. Subsequently, he was given command of all United Nations Forces in Korea. Aside from his combat commands, Taylor had been the Superintendent of West Point, the Commandant of Berlin, and the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. Taylor was obviously well qualified for the position of Chief of Staff, but appointments to the JCS had ceased to be of the routine-professional variety since 1949. Despite Eisenhower's efforts to eliminate inter-service fighting through the selection process, it continued to plague his administration. Ridgway had been the key source of disharmony by his attacks upon the administration's New Look proposals.

In essence the administration's New Look posture was based upon a reevaluation of American military capabilities and commitments. This evaluation in turn was based upon certain assumptions as to the nature of the threat. In the first place, the administration believed that the possibility of economic destruction, through overspending, was as

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[446] Thomas Gates, Oral History, 26.

dangerous as the military threat itself. Thus the Republicans sought to balance the budget, which meant that military appropriations had to be cut or at least not substantially increased. Secondly, the administration rejected the hypothesis that there was a year of maximum danger in which the United States must prepare to repel a Russian attack. Instead the President felt that the nation must prepare for a long period of potential danger, and that instead of maximizing expenditures in response to the year of maximum danger, the nation should spread its military expenditures out over the "long haul." Finally, the administration perceived that there were certain lessons to be learned from the Korean War. Most noticeable was that such a war was extremely expensive in terms of money, manpower, and domestic politics. The kind of mid-range war in the third world that Korea represented must be avoided because it drained the nation's military strength and detracted from its primary missions, the defense of the Continental United States and Europe. Instead, indigenous populations would supply the ground combat power for such future wars, while the United States supplied high technology and if necessary nuclear firepower. Technology would be a substitute for manpower both in the third world and in Europe. Under this "bigger-bang for the buck" philosophy the Army found itself at a disadvantage in competing for resources with the Air Force and the Navy. As a result the Army was continually

cut in size during this period, primarily due to fiscal restraints and the lack of a mission.

Whether Ridgway's attacks were motivated by service parochialism or patriotic fear of the weaknesses of the strategy, the results were the same perceived dysfunctional behavior. The President may well have felt that he had made a mistake by selecting Ridgway and he was not going to let it happen again. With this in mind, prior to his nomination, General Taylor was recalled from the Far East for an interview with the President and Secretary Wilson. This process was not unfamiliar to Taylor, who had been interviewed in 1953 prior to his original assignment to command the 8th Army. At that time the discussion was conducted in the shadow of the Truman-MacArthur controversy and had concentrated on Taylor's willingness to carry out his civilian leaders' directives and follow the prevailing defensive strategy. After that experience General Taylor wrote, "having apparently passed the tests in Washington, I departed for the Far East."[447]

The issues were now much broader than whether General Taylor was going to be a loyal theater commander. The selection of the right Chief of Staff was as important to the Army as it was for the administration. The Eisenhower-

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[447] Maxwell Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (New York: Norton & Co., Inc., 1972), 138.

Ridgway conflict had created a deep rift between the Commander-in-Chief and his former service. It would be up to the new Chief of Staff to bridge that gap. Taylor's own recollection of the interview was as follows:

> During the two years as Chief of Staff, General Ridgway had had a very difficult time in the atmosphere of the new administration with its commitment to the strategy of massive retaliation. Although I admired his staunch opposition to this strategic fallacy and doubted that my attitude would be significantly different from his, I had no difficulty with the questions addressed to me by the President and Wilson. Oddly, they were not interested in my views on world strategy, but wished to be assured of my willingness to accept and carry out the orders of my civilian superiors....[448]

The President's lack of interest in General Taylor's strategic views is not all that surprising when one goes into a detailed analysis of the contents of the interview. The memorandum for record written afterwards reveals that the President wanted more than mere assurances that Taylor's Constitutional oath would be kept. First, Taylor was told that he had to "understand and wholeheartedly accept that his primary responsibility related to his joint duties." Second, his strategic views must be "in accord with those of the President." Finally, the President informed him that "loyalty in spirit as well as letter was necessary."[449]

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[448]Ibid., 156.

[449]Douglas Kinnard, _President Eisenhower and Strategy Management: A Study in Defense Politics_ (Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1977), 41-42.

These precepts reflected the President's efforts to institutionalize the ideas he had been advocating since 1948. In his 1949 memorandum to Forrestal, Eisenhower felt that loyalty should be required "both as to letter and to spirit."[450] Admiral Burke recalled a series of meetings with the President, shortly before he assumed the office of Chief of Naval Operations, in which the President emphasized the Chief's joint responsibilities and he told Burke that his primary job as a Chief was not to present the Navy's point of view, but to be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[451]

While loyalty was by no means a new requirement for a Chief, concurrence with the administration's strategic view was. Previously, the Chiefs were required to support the administration's position after it had been decided upon; now that would be obviated by the fact that both the administration and the Chiefs approached strategic problems from a mutually agreed upon perspective. Under these circumstances, it was only natural that Eisenhower was unconcerned about Taylor's strategic views, because he expected them to be the same as his. The unanimity the President sought would finally be achieved, but the penalty would

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[450] 1949 Memorandum.

[451] Burke, Oral History, 20.

be the Chief's objectivity. It was explicit, as Hanson
Baldwin suggested, that the Chiefs maintain the party line
in order to keep their jobs.[452] One is reminded of Admiral
Carney's admonition to General Taylor upon the latter's
assumption of office, "You're one of the good new Chiefs
now but you'll be surprised how soon you become one of the
bad old Chiefs."[453]

Loyalty continued to be a crucial prerequisite for
nomination to the Joint Chiefs all through the Eisenhower
period. When General Taylor retired after two terms in
office his Vice-Chief, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, succeeded
him. Lemnitzer was almost 60 years old at the time of his
appointment and was the oldest man ever to be nominated
for the JCS. A very effective officer who had built a
reputation as a planner, Lemnitzer had held numerous high
level assignments to include the Far East command in the
wake of Ridgway and Taylor. Furthermore, his background
indicated a broad joint outlook. As one Pentagon insider
noted:

> Lemnitzer isn't a yes-man, but you won't see him bucking
> Ike on policy. He will present his requirements effec-
> tively, but he'll accept higher decisions as the final
> word. He's a team worker all the way.[454]

[452] New York Times, 1 June 1955, 16.

[453] Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, 171.

[454] Newsweek, 30 March 1959, 25.

In 1960 when Lemnitzer was promoted to the chairman-
ship, his Vice-Chief, General George Decker was nominated
Chief of Staff of the Army. Decker's whole career appears
to be an anomaly. An ROTC product who fought in the Pacific
during the Second World War, Decker made his fame primarily
as a logistics and fiscal specialist rather than as a troop
commander, although he did have the appropriate troop com-
mands, which included succeeding Lemnitzer in the Far East.
Later when Lemnitzer became Chief, Decker moved to Washing-
ton as Vice-Chief. Decker was a classic case of the com-
petent journeyman officer who methodically punched all the
right tickets and moved up through the hierarchy. He was
not a member of the "airborne club," nor was he a Marshall
protege, an apparent requirement for all the preceding post-
war Chiefs of Staff of the Army. The only other Chief to be
appointed during the remainder of the Eisenhower administra-
tion was Air Force General Thomas White, Chief of Staff of
the Air Force when General Twining became Chairman in 1957.

In the case of both White and Decker the administra-
tion appears to have reverted to something along the line of
a routine-professional appointment. Part of the reason may
lie in the fact that both officers were Vice-Chiefs. This
position allowed the administration the advantage of seeing
them in operation before nominating them.[455] Secondly, there

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[455]General George Decker, Private Interview, Washing-
ton, D.C., January 1975.

appears to have been a lessening of tension between the Army

and the administration during Lemnitzer's tour as Chief.

While the President was obviously very careful in the selec-

tion of Taylor following on the heels of Ridgway, the rela-

tively good experience with Lemnitzer may have paved the way

for Decker. On the other hand, the Air Force, which gained

the most from the New Look posture, was not a problem during

this period, thus making White's promotion even more natural.

While loyalty was important for a member of the Joint

Chiefs, it was absolutely essential for the Chairman. This

perspective was not unique to the Eisenhower presidency.

Bradley showed great loyalty to the Truman administration,

even to the point of risking his own professionalism. Eisen-

hower expected his Chairmen to make sure that the JCS not

only considered the problems that were brought to their

attention, but that he should insure that the Chiefs "reach,

whenever possible, joint conclusions and recommendations."

Furthermore, it would be up to the Chairman to make sure that

the Secretary was provided with sufficient information to

make a decision if the Chiefs split on an issue.[456]

While Admiral Radford personified these expectations,

they generally applied to all the Chairmen after 1949. As

the power of the Chairman increased, it became apparent that

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[456] 1949 Memorandum.

he was the administration's man within the Joint Chiefs.[457] Since the Chairman had no service constituency to worry about, unlike the other members of the JCS, he could play the role of the civilian leadership's front man. During his nomination hearing Admiral Radford pointed out that "...the Chairman, as an individual, is expected to divorce himself completely from any service affiliation. He is supposed to be a member of the defense team under the Secretary of Defense."[458]

The requirement to be above service interest is essential if the Chairman is to represent the administration before the Chiefs. Furthermore, it supported Eisenhower's view of the primacy of the Chiefs' joint orientation. But this requirement brought about some strange transformations as indicated by the following testimony by General Lemnitzer:

> As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff I would have no service affiliation, Senator. I would deal with all the services in exactly the same way and apply my best judgement to the problems as they arise.
>
> As Chief of the Army and throughout my service, I have been an ardent advocate of the role of the Army and the importance of the mission of the Army and naturally I still feel that way today.
>
> But as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I would not

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[457]For a further discussion of this relationship see Peter F. Witteried, "The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: An Evolving Instituion," unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Virginia, 1964.

[458]Hearings Nomination, 1953, 5.

advocate any one service position over any other service position. I would like to make that clear.[459]

General Lemnitzer's testimony reflects the transformation that must occur within an officer when he ceases being a service spokesman and becomes a neutral Chairman. It may be suggested, though, that such a sudden change is only a matter of self-delusion and that it would be impossible for the Chairman to forget the values he had acquired over a whole career. Despite this problem, the Chairman must attempt to maintain at least the facade of neutrality in order to expedite his relations with the other Chiefs.

With loyalty and joint orientation the prime requisites, the President selected his Chairman with the same care that went into the selection of the Chiefs. The chairmanship was first filled by Radford who was followed successively by Twining and then Lemnitzer. The fact the chairmanship rotated among the services was more of an accident than a plan. As the President recalled in his memoirs:

> I had not felt any strong obligation to adhere to any unwritten understanding that the position of Chairman be rotated among the services--Army, Navy, Air--but I felt that such rotation, all other things being equal, was desirable. Happily, I felt that each individual appointed

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[459]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Nomination of General Lyman L. Lemnitzer for Appointment as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General George Henry Decker for Appointment as Chief of Staff, United States Army, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, 1960, p. 12.

during my administrations to the Chairman's position--
Radford, Twining, and Lemnitzer--was the best qualified
men available in any of the services. [460]

What was left unsaid by the President was that all of his

Chairman were loyal team players. Twining was the only one

of the original service Chiefs to be renominated in 1955,

which alone is convincing evidence of his loyalty. The Air

Force was hurt least by the administration's New Look pro-

posals, thus Twining did not have to fight for his service

like Ridgway did. Furthermore, Twining's anti-communist

attitudes paralleled those of Radford. In 1960 when illness

forced him to retire, the President appointed General Lem-

nitzer to succeed him. The same qualifications that made

Lemnitzer a desirable Chief of Staff held him in good stead

for the Chairman's position. He had a relatively tranquil

tour as Army Chief, especially in the wake of Ridgway and

Taylor; and he was a leader in promoting unity within the

JCS. When asked about the differences that existed between

the Chiefs during this time, he remarked that there were no

substantial problems.[461] This is indicative of his emphasis

on the team approach to defense matters.

Another factor that seemed to impact upon the selec-

tion of a Chairman was the correlation of his service to the

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[460]Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 255.

[461]Lyman L. Lemnitzer, private interview, Washington,
D.C., January 1975.

prevailing strategy of the administration. During periods of time when the administration's strategy relied most heavily on nuclear retaliation, the Chairman was either an Air Force or a Navy officer. The reason was that these two services were directly involved in that mission. When the prevailing strategy called for the introduction of ground forces as it did during the period of flexible response, the Chairman was an Army officer. Thus Lemnitzer's selection as Chairman not only indicated his loyalty to Eisenhower's defense team, but the slow movement toward the acceptance of a posture of flexible response. [462]

The selection of the Chairman was important to the administration because of the vast power that resided within that office. Since the position was created in 1949, there had been no substantive increase in the Chairman's power. Even the acquisition of the right to vote was a meaningless gesture, since the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not a democracy, but that right did symbolize the fulfillment of Forrestal's belief that the Chairman should act as the administration's "agent" within the Joint Chiefs or to use Maxwell Taylor's phrase "a sort of party whip." [463]

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[462] See Table 2 for a matrix correlating the appointment of the chairman to the national strategy.

[463] Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, 110.

TABLE 2: CORRELATION OF SELECTION OF CJCS, SERVICE OF ORIGIN AND NATIONAL STRATEGIC POSTURE

Name (Service)	Primary Geographic or Military Concern of the Administration	Administration's Strategic Posture[1]
Bradley (USA)	Europe	F.R.
Radford (USN)	Asia	M.R.
Twining (USAF)	Europe/Nuclear	M.R.
Lemnitzer (USA)	Europe/Third World	toward F.R.[2]
Taylor (USA)	Asia/Third World	F.R.
Wheeler (USA)	Asia	F.R.
Moorer (USN)	Asia/Europe/Strategic Nuclear	F.R.-M.R.[3]
Brown (USAF)	Europe/SALT	M.R.
Jones (USAF)	Europe/SALT	M.R.
Vessey (USA)[4]		

[1] F.R. refers to a flexible response type strategy, while M.R. refers to a massive retaliation type strategy.

[2] During General Lemnitzer's term as Chairman the Eisenhower administration began to move in the direction of flexible response and away from the massive retaliation posture of earlier years. Lemnitzer was also the Chairman during the first two years of the Kennedy administration when flexible response became the prevailing strategy.

[3] The first Nixon administration was marked by a movement away from flexible response and a return to massive retaliation. This was the basis of the so called Nixon Doctrine.

[4] The Reagan Administration does not seem to be marked by a specific geographic concern, but instead a desire to meet Soviet expansionism where ever it presents itself. This includes both the nuclear and conventional arenas.

The source of the Chairman's power is two distinct, but inextricably connected, factors. The first is the fact that, for the most part, Secretaries of Defense have been managers and not military planners. Secretary Wilson, in particular, came into office ignorant of defense matters. Lieutenant General James Gavin reports that one Chief of Staff described him as "the most uninformed man and the most determined to remain so that has ever been Secretary."[464] The second factor is the nature of the bureaucratic system. Since the Chairman is the Secretary's primary advisor on defense matters, the Secretary's inexperience will naturally force him to rely upon the Chairman for advice. This natural tendency is exacerbated by conflicting opinions among the Chiefs. As Admiral Radford noted before Congress:

> I think the responsibility and the authority of the Chairman is greater than appears in law. I have often pointed out to the Chiefs that the more they disagree the more power they hand to the Chairman.[465]

In a case of a split decision, the Chairman is in a position to articulate his views to the Secretary or the President, either personally or through a written memorandum.

[464]Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age, 155.

[465]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Study of Air Power, Hearings before the subcommittee on the Air Force, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, 1956, 1457.

The latter was the style of Admiral Radford.[466] Because the Chairman is the administration's representative to the JCS, his opinion will have far greater impact than that of a single Chief. This phenomenon was observed by Robert Bowie, President Eisenhower's Special Advisor for National Security Affairs:

> ...Admiral Radford...held a very influencial position. In part the differences of opinion among the Chiefs enhanced the influence of the Chairman as spokesman for the military point of view. And since Admiral Radford attended the NSC meetings, this gave him an opportunity really to exercise that role.[467]

Bowie's analysis of Radford's power validates the bureaucratic theory that power increases in proportion to a player's access to the decision maker. Eisenhower understood this clearly in 1949 when he wrote:

> His [the Chairman's] mere presence on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting as the trusted assistant of the Secretary of Defense, should do much to induce, if not compel, the attainment of unanimous recommendations and conclusions.[468]

This is not to say that the Chiefs did not have access to the Secretary of Defense or to the President. On the contrary, the Chiefs apparently had all the access they wanted, though some by virtue of their commitment to vertical loyalty

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[466]Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, 106.

[467]Robert Bowie, Oral History Transcript, Columbia University Oral History Project, 10.

[468]1949 Memorandum.

did not avail themselves of this opportunity as much as others.[469] In the end though, it was the constant and institutionalized contact that gave the Chairman the advantage. Radford, himself, pointed out to the President that because the Chairman sees the President and the Secretary of Defense regularly, he generally has a "closer association with these officials than the other Chiefs."[470]

This combination of factors led the Chairman to become the administration's "party whip." He was in a position not only to attempt to achieve unanimity, but to enforce it, by virtue of his "clout" with the administration. In his book The Uncertain Trumpet, General Taylor described how the Chairman's position prevailed in 18 out of 21 split decisions sent forward to the Secretary of Defense.[471] Clark and Legere, in their study of national security management, suggest that the increasing power of the Chairman was only partially attributable to the desires of the civilian

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[469] During the private interviews both Admiral Burke and General Lemnitzer said they had as much access to the President as they desired. General Decker, while admitting that he had access felt that he should not go directly to the President, especially to fight for an issue that had already been decided upon by the Secretary of Defense.

[470] "Memorandum for the Record," Meetings on Defense Organization, 25 January 1958, Rockefeller Records, box 18, folder "136(3)," Eisenhower Library.

[471] Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, 110.

leadership, but that the Chiefs were also to blame by defer-ring power to the Chairman.[472] The historical evidence seems to indicate that the Chiefs had no real choice in the matter and that the gravitation of power into the hands of the Chair-man was the result of civilian directives and bureaucratic realities. Granted some Chairmen have been more even handed in their use of power than others, but this evaluation appears to depend on whose ox is being gored.[473] We have very little data on whether or not the Chairmen have truly divested themselves of their service affiliation, though Taylor supplies us with some evidence that indicates that the Chairmen tended to support their service of origin.[474] Unfortunately, since Taylor's data only covers the 1955-1959 period more research is needed in order to develop any hypothesis.

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[472]Keith C. Clark and Laurence J. Legere, The President and the Management of National Security: A Report by the Institute of Defense Analysis (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1969), 183-184.

[473]Navy officers familiar with the working of Admiral Radford maintain that he was more than fair and that he was, if anything, tougher on the Navy than on the other services; Burke, interview; Griffin, Oral History. Admiral George Anderson who was Radford's special assistant, feels that Radford was exactly what the Chairman was supposed to be, Anderson, interview. For the opposite view see Gavin, War and Peace, 260-61 or Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, 106-110.

[474]Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, 107.

Ironically, the unanimity the President sought came
about toward the end of his administration through the return
to a more pluralistic JCS. The vehicle for this transfor-
mation was a 29 December 1959 memorandum from Secretary of
Defense Thomas Gates to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This
document, called the Gates-JCS Memorandum announced that the
Secretary of Defense would attend all JCS meetings in which
split issues were being discussed.[475] It rejected the notion
that all differences of opinion within the Joint Chiefs were
necessarily dysfunctional and considered instead that many
of them were "understandable." Unanimity, for the sake of
unanimity was rejected. Gates discovered that attending JCS
meetings was so advantageous that he institutionalized weekly
meetings. He thus was the first Secretary of Defense to
meet with the Joint Chiefs on a regular basis. This resulted
in far less tension between the administration and the Joint
Chiefs, and less dramatic public displays of disunity. Gates
had vast experience in the Department of Defense, at both the
OSD level and within the services. This apparently gave him
confidence that he could make the hard decisions within a
pluralistic environment. As such, he approached the Chiefs,
not as competitors as Wilson had, but more like partners. He
attempted to maintain the image of the honest broker, and he

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[475]J.D. Hittle, The Military Staff: Its History and
Development (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: The Stackpole
Company, 1961), 302.

fully understood the pressures that were playing on the Chiefs:

> I saw to it that everyone, particularly the Chiefs, had
> their innings. They have leadership problems of their
> own. They cannot afford to lose face with their own
> people. It's worth taking the time to listen before you
> do something, even when you know at the onset what you
> are going to do.[476]

In the final analysis the role the Eisenhower administration envisioned for the JCS was surprisingly congruent with the role envisioned by its predecessor. Eisenhower, like Truman before him, sought unanimity among the Chiefs in order to facilitate the decision making process; and like Forrestal, came to look upon the Chairman as a means of expediting this unanimity. The reason for the requirement for unanimity was several fold. First, it was perceived to be the key to eliminating inter-service conflicts. Secondly, because senior civilian defense managers did not have the expertise to choose rationally between alternative advice, it was felt that a consensus JCS position was better than a pluralistic one. Eisenhower, in particular, was aware of the dangers inherent in allowing the non-experts free reign over defense matters. Finally, unanimity was a political asset, especially in the administration's dealings with Congress. Thus in terms of the Chiefs' external input into the policy process, both administrations wanted unified military advice.

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[476] Quoted in Borklund, The Department of Defense, 118.

The notion of unanimity among the Chiefs led directly
to the question of how it would be imposed. After 1948
both Truman and Eisenhower believed that the Chiefs should
be in total concurrence with the administration's position
on defense matters. The only difference was the degree con-
currence would be forced. Since allowing the Chiefs to
generate their own positions had only spawned more divisive-
ness, the easy solution was to make the major decisions at
the top. This guaranteed the integrity of the defense team,
a concept that was prevalent among the civilian leadership
all through the period of our study. By a strange kind of
irresponsible logic it was assumed that the administration's
position on defense matters was the best possible position,
simply because it was not distorted by service parochialism.
The result was the belief, that if the Chiefs could rise
above their service interests, they would see the correctness
of the administration's approach. This was what President
Truman meant when he called for "Objective Agreements--A true
meeting of professional minds" and what President Eisenhower
was attempting to achieve by requiring that the Chiefs incor-
porate "non-military" factors. President Eisenhower's direc-
tive that the Chiefs consider the views of their superiors
encapsulated this notion of democratic centralism that was
accepted by both administrations.

In order to achieve this unanimity of ideas two vehicles were used. The first was the centralization of power into the hands of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman. The latter was the crucial means by which the Chiefs were forced into unanimity. The second vehicle was the selection of the Chiefs themselves. At about the same time that Truman and Eisenhower came to the conclusion that centralization and unanimity were important, the selection of Chiefs changed from the "Routine-Professional" model to the "Professional-Political" model. Aside from this transformation it is difficult to identify any clear cut pattern in the selection process. Truman had the luxury of maintaining the "Routine-Professional" model during most of his administration. The only major exception was the selection of the Chief of Naval Operations, where loyalty to the concept of unification was paramount. Eisenhower seems to have been primarily concerned with selecting Chiefs who were loyal team players. Despite this requirement, Eisenhower never did move in the direction of a purely political appointment. Even Admiral Radford, who was undoubtedly the most political of his Chiefs, was still a very senior four star admiral and held probably the most important field command in the Navy. Furthermore, the President's prior experience with the military staff model led him simply to assume that loyalty would automatically be forthcoming from the members of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff--whom he believed were his staff. The establishment of this commander-staff relationship was the heart of Eisenhower's 1958 reforms.

It was in the external role of the Chiefs that the Republicans differed fundamentally from their Democratic predecessors. While the political realities in Washington had forced Truman to use the Chiefs to rationalize his policies, Eisenhower sought only internal concurrence from the Chiefs. Although his familiarity with the military staff model led him to expect vertical loyalty from his Chiefs which translated into public concurrence with the administration's policies, he did not seek the kind of overt advocacy that Bradley was involved in. To have done so would have been a violation of the military ethic that the President, as a former professional soldier, adhered to.

Ironically, the more the civilian defense managers subordinated the Chiefs to the administration's views the more they destroyed any chance for the professional military to show responsibility. One can appreciate the civilian leadership's perspective on the issue. Their experience had shown that the Chiefs were incapable of fulfilling their advisory role. Instead of unified and usable advice which could guide the civilian leadership, they received split decisions, fostered by service parochialism; diluted, "waffled," and "paperclipped" position papers; and useless

exaggerated demands that were politically or economically impracticable. From the civilian's view point the Chiefs had excluded themselves from the decision making process. This was why Eisenhower so desperately wanted the Chiefs to show unanimity. Unfortunately, in his desire to make the Chiefs a responsible and integral part of the defense team, he was destroying the very independence which was the basis of objective advice. Making the Chiefs into a series of "yes" men removed a vital source of expertise that was an essential part of the policy process.

Part of the problem was an inability on the part of the civilian leadership to understand what the real source of the trouble was. They kept looking for organizational solutions to an organizational problem, when in fact the problem was not completely organizational. A great deal of the trouble lay in the Chiefs own interpretation of what their role was to be and how they should act as professionals. If the organizational structure of the national security policy making system and the nature of the bureaucracy outlined two of the parameters within which the civilian leadership and the Joint Chiefs defined their relationship with each other, the civilian's perceptions of the Chiefs' proper role and the Chiefs' own self-perceptions completed the framework. With this in mind we now turn our attention to the last of these parameters, the Chiefs' self-perception of their role and their view of professionalism.

CHAPTER VII

THE JOINT CHIEFS' OWN PERCEIVED ROLE

In attempting to ascertain the Chiefs' perception of
their role one must first attempt to separate their bureau-
cratic role from their normative ethical values. While such
methodology will help supply empirical data on various per-
ceptual components, such compartmentalization is for heuris-
tic reasons only. In reality a Chief's bureaucratic role and
his ethical norms constantly interact. The former is a
result of his placement within the hierarchical structure,
while the latter is a product of over thirty years of assim-
ilated values. They become inextricably connected through
the Chiefs' perception of themselves as military staff
officers.

In our earlier analysis of defense organizations we
noted the relationship of a Chief's bureaucratic role with
his dual function as the military head of a service and a
member of the corporate body of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
This duality was assessed by most outside analysis as the
primary cause for conflict within the JCS with the separation
of the Chiefs from their services deemed the solution.[477]

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[477]Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch
of the Government, Task Force Report on National Security
Organization (Appendix G) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1949), 66-70; Committee on the Defense
Establishment, A Report to Senator Kennedy, Washington, D.C.,
1960 (Mimeographed), 6; U.S. Committee on Department of Defense

The Chiefs, however, perceive this duality as not only inherent within their role, but functional. The basis for this is their belief that the planning and the operational command functions should be combined in the same person. For the Chiefs, the planning function is a corollary of their corporate role and the command function is a corollary of their service role. As a group, the Chiefs have a great fear of "ivory tower" planning if the plans are developed by nonresponsible staffs, who do not have to be concerned with implementing them. In a secret 1958 Joint Chiefs of Staff self-study conducted under the leadership of Major General Earl Wheeler, the following points were listed as disadvantages to be incurred if the Chiefs were separated from their services:

1. Tends to remove the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from current intimate knowledge of the capabilities of their service.

2. Would make the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsible for planning and execution of joint operations without the concomitant authority and responsibility to budget for and control all the means required.

Organization, Report of the Rockefeller Committee on Department of Defense Organization, 11 April 1953 (printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services, 83d Congress, 1st Session), 4-10; Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Five Staff Papers prepared for the Task Force on Procurement, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), I, The Vital Roles of the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, A-54, A-74; The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel (Fitzhugh Commission). Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), Appendix N, Staff Report on Joint Chiefs of Staff Decisionmaking, 5-11; and Rockefeller Brothers Fund, International Security: The Military Aspects, America at Mid-Century Series, (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1958), 29.

2. Would make the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsible for planning and execution of joint operations without the concomitant authority and responsibility to budget for and control all the means required.

3. Would reduce the responsibility, authority and prerogatives of the Service Chiefs to the functional areas of administration, logistics and training.

Even though the report pointed out that separation would allow the Chiefs to devote full time to their JCS duties and increase their knowledge about the capabilities of other services, the Wheeler Report concluded that "the separation of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from their service affiliations and command responsibilities would be unwise."[478] While the Joint Chiefs of Staff never officially commented on the study, their private views tended to corroborate the Wheeler Report's position. The one exception was General Maxwell Taylor, who advocated separation in his book The Uncertain Trumpet.[479]

A corollary to the unification of planning and command was a tendency on the part of the Chiefs to minimize the actual conflict resulting from these dual roles. Admiral Burke saw them as basically two aspects of the same role:

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[478]Report by the Ad Hoc Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Organization of the Department of Defense, 24 January 1958. (Hereafter referred to as the Wheeler Report).

[479]Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), 165-180.

> How do you handle a wife and yourself, it's no more
> complicated than that. What would he [the Chief]
> represent if he didn't represent his service...the
> ability of a Joint Chief is dependent on his back-
> ground.[480]

General Lemnitzer went even further and rejected the notion

that the two functions were even separable.[481] While most

of the Chiefs admit that the duality exists, they feel that

they have reconciled any conflict to the point that one role

does not impinge on the other. General Ridgway in his Fare-

well Report to the Secretary of Defense expressed the rela-

tionship in symbiotic terms:

> As Chief of Staff, United States Army, it has been my
> duty to seek to maintain the capability of the Army to
> fulfill the Army's assigned commitments. However, both
> as Chief of Staff of the Army and as a member of the
> Joint Chiefs of Staff, it has also been my duty to
> advance the primary interests of United States security
> over and above Service interests.[482]

General George Decker expressed similar views in an inter-

view:

> As service representative...I had the job of trying to
> get my service as much of the resources available in
> the National Defense kitty as I could....As a member of
> the Joint Chiefs of Staff...I had the responsibility
> for the overall military preparedness of the country.[483]

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[480] Interview with Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Washing-
ton, D.C., January 1975.

[481] Interview with General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Washing-
ton, D.C., January 1975.

[482] Matthew B. Ridgway, <u>Soldier, The Memoirs of Matthew B.
Ridgway</u> (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), 131.

[483] Interview with General George H. Decker, Washing-
ton, D.C., January 1975.

Generals Ridgway's and Decker's explanation of responsibility to the nation is similar to our earlier discussion of General Lemnitzer's account of his transformation upon being appointed Chairman of the JCS.

The almost mystical manner in which the Chiefs look upon their command function is more than just the result of their desire to combine authority and responsibility. It is a product of the social values of the military services. Command is considered the ultimate achievement and epitomizes the true soldier. Furthermore, it is a requirement for further promotion. Among the post-World War II Chiefs only Army Chief of Staff, Harold K. Johnson (1964-1968), did not command at the flag rank. Command is considered so important that one Chief even took a demotion from a three star billet to a two star billet in order to command at the appropriate level.[484] Within this atmosphere it is easy to see how a Chief, who is the senior officer in his service and its spokesman, could look upon his role as analogous to that of command. This situation is complicated by the statutory confusion that designated some service Chiefs as commanders.

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[484] In 1958 Admiral George Anderson, Chief of Naval Operations, 1961-63, reverted back to the rank of rear admiral from vice admiral in order to command Carrier Division 6. He needed command at that level in the hierarchy. See Lawrence Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First Twenty-five Years (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), 60-61.

If a Chief has problems identifying his own role,
the officer corps of his service has even greater difficulty
understanding his role. They look toward their Chief as
the defender of their interests and the head of their pro-
fessional organization. He is, in their mind, their com-
mander. Admiral Denfeld's greatest failing was that he
failed as the commander in the eyes of the Navy's officer
corps. The combination of bureaucratic imperatives to re-
present the service and socialized values lead the Chiefs to
act as commanders and defend their prerogatives.

Closely related to the Chiefs' perception that their
dual role is functional is a concomitant diminution of the
dysfunctional nature of inter-service conflict. This is
not to say that the Chiefs consider divergence of opinion to
be a positive good. The Wheeler Report identified it as a
potential area of deficiency.[485] But from the Chiefs' per-
spective such divergence can result in a pluralistic

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[485]Wheeler Report; General Bradley also realized the
potential area involved in split decisions based primarily
on service parochialism. In this regard he had a special
study made "to document cases where individual Chiefs of
Staff took positions which were obviously dictated by pre-
judicial Service views." The study concluded that "There
will continue to be disagreement as long as: (1) There are
separate Services with differing opinions on the philosophy
of war, and; (2) The Chiefs of those Services are charged
collectively with the function of exercising strategic
direction of the Armed Forces." Memorandum for General
Bradley, 16 December 1952, subject: Reorganization of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Record Group 218, box 4, folder "020
JCS". National Archives.

decision making structure. Even the most critical of the former Chiefs, General Taylor, maintained "that while each Chief had unavoidably a 'cast' in favor of his service, it could not be fairly called a 'bias' and that the advantages of that 'cast' outweighed the disadvantages."[486] General Taylor was articulating the belief that each Chief comes into office with specialized service related expertise and that this will naturally lead to differing solutions to problems. The interaction of these differences, however, can ultimately result in the best advice surfacing. Thus each Chief attempts to translate into his own terms Admiral King's adage that what is good for the Navy is good for the United States. Admiral Burke amply described the phenomenon when he said "I was responsible for doing my best with my background for the security of the United States and every Chief knew this...they were chosen because of their knowledge in a certain type of war."[487] This expertise was the basis of Clark Clifford's advocacy of a pluralistic Joint Chiefs of Staff back in 1946. It appears, though, that this faith in such systemic rationalism is in direct proportion to the success that one's service has in achieving its goals. It

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[486]Memorandum to Nelson A. Rockefeller from Charles A. Coolidge, 7 March 1958, Rockefeller Records, box 18, folder "136(1)", Eisenhower Library.

[487]Burke, Interview.

is not accidental that the most vocal critics of the JCS system are former Army generals Ridgway, Taylor and Gavin.

As long as the Chiefs failed to realize that bureaucratic imperatives resulted in inter-service conflict, they never could understand the motivation of the civilian leadership. While both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations perceived dysfunctional behavior, the Chiefs seemed to believe that their actions were not only to be expected but were actually beneficial. Whether or not this was the actual view of the Chiefs or merely a means of rationalizing bureaucratic realities is impossible to determine, but as long as they believed this, the various organizational reforms would have no results. Taking the Chiefs out of the chain-of-command would not change their services nor their own view that they were commanders.

The admonition that differences of opinion were not intrinsically bad did not lead the Chiefs to the conclusion that artificial unanimity was to be avoided. On the contrary, for two good reasons, unanimity was still a goal to be attained. The first was the bureaucratic reality that when the JCS split they effectively lost any control they had over the decision. Not that unanimity means control over a decision--though it is rare for the civilian leadership to completely disregard it--but unanimity does allow the Chiefs a degree of leverage in dealing with the administration.

This harkens back to Admiral Radford's statement that the
more the Chiefs differed, the greater his power as Chairman
became. The same was applicable to the increase in the
administration's power. This led the Chiefs at times to
project the image of unanimity even though there may be
deep seated differences. In 1956 after the so-called "Re-
volt of the Colonels," in which army officers leaked infor-
mation about major disagreements within the JCS, the Chiefs
held a news conference that was designed to dispel any doubt
as to the Chiefs'collegiality. According to one Chief, the
news conference was self-generated, with the sole purpose
of projecting an image of unanimity and destroying the image
of divisiveness that the ' Revolt" created.[488] The second
was that the Chiefs clearly perceived themselves as military
professionals. How these two factors become interconnected
is revealed in the following response by Air Force Chief of
Staff, Thomas D. White, to the charge that split decisions
and inter-service rivalry is dysfunctional.

> Split decisions, though rare, occur whenever a basic
> principle or procedure is involved on which the Chiefs
> are unable to agree. This results in passing upward
> responsibility for decision. On strategic and military
> operations, however, the Service Chiefs are the experts.
> It is therefore a disadvantage for the Chiefs to seek
> others to make decisions on such matters. The advantage
> of a split decision is that a view or a principle is not
> submerged and hidden merely because a numerical majority

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[488] Interview with General Maxwell D. Taylor, Washing-
ton D. C., January 1975.

may oppose it. I feel that numbers do not necessarily make for correct decisions. There can be good results from JCS splits provided higher authority resolves the issue with unequivocal decision....There is always tremendous self-imposed pressure to do the best job possible because agreement among the Chiefs on military matters ought ordinarily to result in the best solution of the problem. Based on past experience, I consider that a compromise solution of a military problem arrived at by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is usually better than a compromise decision made by civilian authority, Moreover, it has been apparent to me that when the Joint Chiefs of Staff forward split views there is a tendency to regard such action as a manifestation of "inter-service rivalry" although such is definitely not the fundamental basis for the action.[489]

The fact that General White described the Joint Chiefs as "experts" is essential in understanding their perception of their role. As professional experts, the Chiefs seek autonomy within their sphere of expertise. Thus the belief that a compromise arrived at by the JCS is better than one arrived at by the civilian leadership. White very clearly denotes the disadvantage of forcing an issue higher in bureaucracy and thus outside the control of the experts. A similar desire is indicated by the following 1953 statement by General Vandenberg, when he asserted "judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the strength of the military forces the country is to maintain must have overriding importance."[490] Likewise, President Eisenhower sought unanimity

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[489]Letter, White to Lyndon B. Johnson, 7 January 1958, Rockefeller Records, box 18, folder "136(3)", Eisenhower Library.

[490]New York Times, 9 June 1953, 10.

among his chiefs because he perceived them as having the
military expertise while the civilian managers did not.[491]
The Chiefs' desire to achieve professional autonomy is also
reflected in the Wheeler Report. As part of the study the
report examined various organizational options for the
Defense Department. One particular option gave the Joint
Chiefs direct operational responsibility of military forces.
The advantage of this option was that it would "raise the
stature" of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and thus impedes un-
desirable civilian encroachment into the field of strictly
military operations.[492] This option was not only the
opposite of the President's 1958 plan, but it reflected the
Chiefs growing concern for their loss of autonomy, in the
face of ever increasing centralization.

White's statement also directs us to another salient
issue within the Chiefs' self-perceptions. As military pro-
fessionals they automatically embraced those traditional
values that required them to limit their view to those
"purely military" aspects of any issue. This demand for
autonomy in military matters was the corollary to this
restrictive caveat. It was not only the Chiefs' rationaliza-
tion to combat the domination of military matters by the

[491] Arleigh A. Burke, Oral History, Transcript, Colum-
bia University Oral History Project, 53-56.

[492] Wheeler Report, (underline added).

civilian managers, but it was also as much a part of their world view as the love of their service.

The American military leader before the Second World War, could and did for the most part, live in a world that bifurcated the political from the military. With the conclusion of the Second World War and the advent of the semi-war, semi-peace environment of the Cold War, that traditional value was strained to the limit. The civilians were the first to break with traditionalism by attempting to institutionalize political/military planning; unfortunately they never could go all the way and opt completely for fusion. Even their half-way efforts, however, put great pressures on the traditional ethics of the Chiefs. Ostensibly, the Chiefs gave the appearance of attempting to surmount the dilemma involved in making their traditional professionalism compatible with the new realities of the Cold War. On the one hand, the national security system forced them to become involved in the budget and foreign policy process, while on the other hand, they had been inculcated over a thirty-year career with a set of professional values that traced its lineage back to Upton. The nature of the dilemma was articulated by General Omar Bradley in an article written for Look magazine in 1952:

> In these next trying years, I predict that as emergencies arise, the military will be called upon for advice and perhaps initially to take charge of problems. I also am sure that as soon as civilian agencies are organized to

take over such civilian problems, the military will gladly withdraw to its purely professional duties.[493]

Such an apologetic position explicitly identified the fact that the boundaries in which a professional officer should operate had been transgressed and that, as good professionals, the Chiefs sought the return to their restricted role.

But what were those "purely professional duties" that General Bradley alluded to? To fit into the traditionalist mold, they should emphasize the automatonical nature of the military profession, the bifurcation of the political from the military point of view, and ultimately maintain that as professionals they should restrict their advice to that which is "purely military" in nature, to the exclusion of other factors. Such an approach would be totally compatible with a narrow perception of civilian control that characterized any appreciation of non-military factors by the professional officer as undermining that American value.

As good traditionalists, they exhibited all of these traits to varying degrees. The notional bifurcation of various power factors, most noticeably the political from the military, is a pillar of traditionalism. Theoretically, such compartmentalization stems from the lack of expertise in these areas. Practically, it will result in misunderstanding, if not outright antagonism, toward the use of those

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[493] Omar N. Bradley, The Collected Writings of General Omar N. Bradley, (Washington, D.C.: 1967), Vol. III, 181.

non-military determinants. General J. Lawton Collins'
sympathy for the problems of General MacArthur and his own
difficulty in identifying the main threads in US policy in
Asia exemplified such compartmentalization.[494] General
Twining's resentment over political restrictions on the use
of airpower in Korea is another.[495] But a bifurcated or com-
partmentalized approach does not always have to lead to con-
flict; it can lead to a simple division of labor along
functional lines based on expertise. Earlier we noted
General Bradley posited such a functional division with his
suggestion that there were "civilian problems" that should
be solved by "civilian agencies." Bradley elaborated on
this approach in an article he wrote in 1950:

> As a soldier, I have no desire to invade the
> field of foreign policy. The conduct of foreign affairs
> is a civilian responsibility. Military policy in our
> democratic America must always remain the servant of
> national aims.[496]

Despite compartmentalization, it is the exclusion of
non-military factors that form the philosophical underpin-
ning of traditionalism. Institutionally, the Chiefs pro-
jected this by placing the restrictive caveat "from the mili-
tary point of view" on almost all their documents; and in-
stitutional philosophy that was reinforced by the personal

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[494] J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969), 248.

[495] Nathan F. Twining, Neither Liberty Nor Safety (New
York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1966), 117.

[496] Bradley, Collected Writings, Vol. III, 40.

perceptions of the Chiefs. In 1953 Bradley reaffirmed the

idea that traditionalism was the only way for a professional

to act:

> Generally...we should confine our part to pointing out
> the military implications and military capabilities...
> Perhaps some people might feel that the Joint Chiefs
> should stand up and resolutely and strongly recommend a
> national policy which we would prefer, but to date, I
> have not yet been convinced that this is the proper role
> for the military leader.[497]

During the Eisenhower administration, the Chiefs continued

to project the perception that this was the proper role.

Admiral Arthur Radford, Eisenhower's first Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs, specifically stated that the Chiefs gave only

military advice.[498] This point was further emphasized by

General Matthew Ridgway in his retirement letter:

> I view the military advisory role of a member of
> the Joint Chiefs of Staff as follows: he should give
> his competent professional advice on the military aspects
> of the problem referred to him, based on his fearless,
> honest, objective estimate of the national interest and
> regardless of administration policy at any particular
> time. He should confine his advice to essentially the
> military aspects.[499]

According to the traditionalist interpretation, the

basis for exclusion lies in the realm of expertise. This was

pointed out very clearly by General Eisenhower in a statement

before Congress in 1947:

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[497] Quoted in Ridgway, Soldier, 330.

[498] U.S. News and World Report, 25 February 1955, 45.

[499] Ridgway, Soldier, 330 (Underline added).

> I appear before you only as a professional soldier, to give you a soldier's advice regarding the national defense. I am not qualified to proceed beyond that field; and I do not intend to do so....[500]

It should be noted that he did not change his views upon entering the White House. Despite the fact that publicly the Chiefs were supposed to incorporate economic factors into their military analysis, the President privately informed them they were to give him "purely military advice."[501]

Ostensibly, it would appear that the Chiefs manifested all the attributes of traditionalism; yet there are certain contradictions that haunt us. While some of the Chiefs appear to manifest a bifurcated approach to policy formulation others fully appreciated the interrelationship of the political and military arenas. Rather incongruently, Admiral Radford said in the same paragraph, that although the JCS gave only advice from the military point of view:

> There is often no clear line of demarcation between foreign and military policy. Instead, there is an overlap. There are military implications in foreign policy and conversely, political implications in military policy.[502]

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[500] Quoted in Ridgway, Soldier, 331.

[501] Memorandum for Record, 25 January 1958, subject: Meeting on Defense Organization, Rockefeller Records, box 18, folder, "136(2)", Eisenhower Library.

[502] U.S. News and World Report, 25 February 1955, 45. Admiral Burke also noted the interaction between military and political factors. See Admiral Burke's opening statement to the Seminar on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Naval Academy, 8 January 1975.

One must question the feasibility of bifurcating political/
military policy when their interrelationship is so well
understood. Bradley's actions as Chairman as well as his
earlier quoted apology attests to this. The complicated
nature of the dilemma is revealed by General Ridgway in his
memoirs.

> If the objective the statesman wishes to achieve
> is a costly one, that is not the soldier's business.
> If it is greater than the political leaders wish to
> support, or think the economy of the country can bear,
> that is not his business. It is the constitutional
> responsibility of the civilian authority to decide these
> questions. If, of course, on first inspection, the cost
> is obviously fantastic, the soldier should make that
> point clear. But within the broad area of reasonable
> appropriations--within the bracket of what a reasonable
> man would say the country could afford--he should scrupu-
> lously eschew any opinion as to whether the cost is
> beyond the reach of the national purse or not. He is
> without competence in that field. If civilian authority
> finds the cost to be greater than the country can bear,
> then either the objectives themselves should be modified
> or the responsibility for the risks involved should be
> forthrightly accepted. Under no circumstances, regard-
> less of pressures from whatever source or motive,
> should the professional military man yield, or compromise
> his judgment for other than convincing military reasons.
> To do otherwise would be to destroy his usefulness.[503]

The nature of the dilemma outlined by General Ridgway
appears to be the incompatibility of a Chief's perceived
normative role with the reality of his job. He decidedly
projected an image of traditionalism which demanded he
restrict his attention to purely military matters and exclude
non-military factors. In reality, though, the "traditionalist"

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[503] Ridgway, _Soldier_, 272.

realized that this was impossible. Whether or not they were projecting this image as a result of a professional ethic or in order to be congruent with the desires of their civilian leadership is impossible to say. Probably it was a combination of both. Undoubtedly, the concept of civilian control played a decisive role. This facet of the professional ethic, was in the words of General Ridgway, "so universally accepted throughout the officer corps that it needed no elaboration;"[504] yet the incorporation of non-military factors seemed somehow to undermine this value system. What is apparent is that the traditionalists were not as pure in their traditionalism as had been supposed. They understood the importance of non-military factors and this led them at least to consider their incorporation. The source of the dilution of their purity has not been explored, but by examining the professional perceptions of General Maxwell D. Taylor we may well find the answer.

Upon assuming the office of Chief of Staff of the Army in 1955, General Taylor perceived his role in very traditional terms. He recalled that he was the product of a socialized professional view that he should restrict his interests to that which was "predominately military" in nature and as such he should "stick to his native" when dealing

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[504]Ibid, 269.

with the civilian leadership. He believed that this was
also the prevalent view of his two immediate predecessors,
Generals Collins and Ridgway. This traditionalist view
eroded, however, as General Taylor became exposed to the
political/military realities of his office. Later when he
came back as Military Advisor to the President it eroded
further. He became an advocate of the view that the profes-
sional officer had to have a broader appreciation of non-
military factors than had previously been proposed. It
should be made clear that this broadening was in addition
to the traditional military expertise, not a replacement
for it. Essential to Taylor's conversion to the "new pro-
fessionalism" lay in his redefinition of the word "military."
While he still believed that his primary mission was to
articulate effectively the military aspects of a particular
problem, the term "military" took on a broader meaning, to
include the economic, social, and political aspects. In his
mind, for the Chiefs to give a "purely military" opinion
on a matter was intellectually dishonest.[505] It may also
be suggested that Taylor's advocacy for the "new profes-
sionalism" had a bureaucratic origin. While Eisenhower
hoped that the Chiefs would come to the same conclusions as
the administration did on economic and political issues if
they examined them from the same perspective; Taylor may

[505] Taylor, Interview.

have seen the incorporation of these non-military factors as a tool to increase his bargaining position <u>vis-a-vis</u> the administration. Furthermore, there was an ironic and possibly unrealized implication in his advocacy for the incorporation of non-military factors. If successful, the military officer would achieve a higher degree of autonomy in the military field than ever before. While previously bifurcation enforced limits on the military professional, the elimination of that bifurcation would also break down those limits. The fusionist officer could claim complete autonomy based on his analysis of all possible factors. Such a breakdown would necessitate a restructuring of the traditional American approach to civilian control of the military, if not completely destroy it.

While we do not have the data base, we can extrapolate from Taylor's experience that a similar evolutionary process may have led other Chiefs to gain an appreciation for the importance of non-military factors and to a varying degree to internalize them. Forsaking the danger of belaboring the point, there appears to be a subtle, but very distinct difference in the minds of former Chiefs between understanding the importance of non-military factors and actually incorporating them into their intellectual process. The former implies a continued version of traditionalism. The

officer somehow manages to keep the military aspect of the issue separate, he understands that non-military factors may affect his plans, and he may even be willing to comment on those non-military factors if pressed on the matter. Unfortunately, the exact nature of this distinction becomes muddied when we attempt to examine it. However, this distinction is evident in the ideas of many former Chiefs as exemplified by General Lemnitzer:

> Their [the Chiefs'] job is to look at it from the military point of view, but recognizing, and not being oblivious of economic, psychological, political, and other aspects, but it's not their primary business to trim their estimates of requirements based upon whether there is going to be this amount of money available...[506]

By gaining an appreciation for the importance of non-military factors and their interrelationship, the professional is better prepared to deal with the inevitable reevaluation of his plans and to integrate them into a policy package by interfacing with non-military agencies. Yet the Chiefs attempted with a high degree of regularity to maintain their traditionalism. In the final analysis how could they claim professional autonomy if they advocated expertise outside their professional sphere? This was one of the main themes of the Wheeler Report, which cited civilian encroachment and the use of non-military determinants as areas of deficiency. Aside from their traditional values, another reason

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[506] Lemnitzer, Interview.

for the Chiefs' continuing grasp of traditionalism was their

own perception of themselves as military staff officers.

For the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the

role of a staff officer was by no means a new experience.

The preponderance of their careers from the rank of Major/

LT. Commander had been in that role, rather than in the more

glamorous role of the commander. During these assignments

they acquired a set of norms as to what a good staff officer

does and does not do, and how he should operate. Staff

officers are functional experts who develop plans, give ad-

vice, and carry out the decisions of the commander. Loyalty

to the commander is implicit within the staff officer's role.

In fact this vertical loyalty is the very foundation upon

which the feudal nature of military society rests. The self-

perception of the Chiefs as staff officers goes back to the

very origin of the organization during the Second World War,

when Admiral Leahy said "we [the JCS] were the staff of the

President of the United States."[507] General Eisenhower

alluded to the same kind of relationship in 1949 when he

referred to his role in the development of the FY 51 budget

as that of "the carpenter and someone else was

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[507]U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government
Operations, Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953 (Department of
Defense: Hearings on H.J. RES. 264, 83d Congress, 1st Ses-
sion, 1953, 211.

the architect."[508] But it is probably General Taylor who
most explicitly explained this aspect of the Chiefs' role
when he noted "as staff officers, we do what we are accus-
tomed to in the military service. We give our best advice
to the commanding general. Then he makes the decision."[509]
For the members of the JCS the commanding general is the
Commander-in-Chief.

What General Taylor left unsaid was that a good staff
officer not only carries out the orders of the commander,
but does so without question. This explains why the Chiefs
tended to support the administration's programs in the public
forum. As General Ridgway said upon the assumption of his
office, "Now loyalty-loyalty is a state or condition like
pregnancy, it either does exist or does not exist." He then
went on to say how that relates to his own staff:

> I shall expect the officers of this staff to present
> their own honest views fearlessly, forthrightly, but
> objectively in light of their own conclusions as to what
> best serves the Army's overall interests. The most dan-
> gerous advisor to have around is the yes-man, and the
> most useless is one who thinks of self instead of service.
> I shall also expect, at all levels, that having once
> expressed his opinions and having heard the decision, the

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[508] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriation,
Hearings, Fiscal 1951, 81st Congress, 1st Session, 1949, 609.

[509] U.S.Congress, Senate, Preparedness Investigating
Subcommittee of the Committee on the Armed Services and the
Committee on Aeronautical and Space Services, Hearings, Mis-
sile and Space Activity, 86th Congress, 1st Session, 1959,
107.

officer's entire support will then be put behind the execution of that decision regardless of what his views had been.[510]

While Ridgway was referring to his own Army staff, the ideal of vertical loyalty can easily be extrapolated and placed within the context of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Ridgway, himself, combined the factors of professionalism and loyalty in his Farewell Report:

> If the military advisor's unrestricted advice is solicited, he should give his considered opinion, for in today's climate national security planning is broad and encompasses many aspects.... However, in my opinion, the military advisor should be neither expected nor required to give public endorsement to military courses of action against which he previously recommended. His responsibility should be solely that of loyal vigorous execution of decisions by proper authority.[511]

It was undoubtedly this notion of loyalty that prompted Truman's Chiefs to come very close to violating their professionalism by defending the administration. It was apparently this concept of loyalty that was so prevalent during the votes on the super-carrier. Furthermore, it is this notion of loyalty that tends to keep the Chiefs from politicizing their differences with the administration and making them public. For some Chiefs even the idea of going to the President to fight a Secretarial decision was considered "kicking over the traces."[512] General Twining

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[510] Ridgway, Soldier, 350-51.

[511] Ibid., 331.

[512] Decker, Interview.

felt that once a decision had been made then discussion of

it had ended, even within the confines of the National

Security Council.[513]   General Decker was exhibiting vertical

loyalty when he said that when the Chiefs go before a Con-

gressional Committee they are not about to volunteer any

information.[514]   As for carrying the fight outside the halls

of the Pentagon, General White's comment before Congress

seems to reflect the norm:

> I think it would be wrong for me to step out of line as
> a member of the team, in defiance you might say of my
> legally constituted superiors and raise an issue....I
> might resign and then carry it to the Congress.[515]

Loyalty precluded an open attack upon the commander

in chief at least while the chief was in uniform. In a

feudal hierarchical system like the military, in which fealty

is all important, the staff officer has two choices,

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[513]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Nomination on Arthur William Radford as Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Matthew Bunker Ridgway as Chief of Staff, Army, Robert Bostwick Carney as Chief of Naval Operations and Nathan J. Arragut Twining as Chief of Staff, Air Force, 83d Congress, 1st Session, 1953, 30.

[514]Decker, Interview. General Taylor indicated that the Chiefs got together after President Eisenhower's heart attack and decided to minimize the number of split decisions they would send forward so as not to task the ailing commander-in-chief; Taylor, Interview.

[515]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Department of Defense Reorganization Act 1958, Hearings on H.R. 12541, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, 1958, 100.

capitulation or resignation. For a chief of staff, transfer is impossible. This explains why Ridgway and Taylor waited until they had retired before they launched their attacks upon the administration. Why did they not use resignation though, as a means of attracting public attention to the issues under debate? When specifically asked this question, General Taylor responded that "a Chief does not resign, he retires."[516] I would suggest that this is not merely a semantical distinction, but reflected a fundamental ethical value which is part of the staff officer's commitment to loyalty. Just as a loyal staff officer should expedite the commander's decisions, so he should refrain from politicizing his differences with the commander until he has gracefully retired. Then, as General White noted he would be free to carry them to the public. This perception is part of what General Taylor called the "ethics of behavior in the military service."[517]

This ethic of military behavior creates a great deal of strain on a Chief, especially if his service has been on the losing side of disagreements with the administration. Since open capitulation would not only result in his service's animosity, but would be a rejection of his professional belief as to what is in the best interest of the

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[516] Taylor, Interview.

[517] Senate, Hearings, Missile and Space Activity, 107.

nation, and since resignation or open opposition is simply
not considered, the Chief is forced to express his disfavor
in such a manner as to prevent an open break with the
administration. General Vandenberg's dissent on the second
super-carrier vote is illustrative of this process. He
could not openly attack the administration's program, yet
he had to defend his service's interests. His use of a pro-
cedural means to reject the carrier accomplished both goals
and appeared to support both of his constituencies. Such
waffling on issues is not unknown among the Chiefs. One of
the best examples occurred in December 1958 during the
development of the Fiscal Year 1960 Defense Budget. The
Chiefs opposed the budget levels that the administration
thought appropriate. Before the National Security Council
only the Chairman, General Twining, endorsed the budget.
Secretary of Defense McElroy continued to press the Chiefs
for a unanimous endorsement. The result was the following
statement:

> The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the FY 1960 pro-
> posed expenditure figure of $40,945,000,000 is adequate
> to provide for the essential programs necessary for the
> defense of the nation for the period under consideration.
> They find no serious gaps in the key elements of the
> budget in its present form, but all have reservations
> with respect to the funding of some segments of their
> respective service programs.[518]

While such waffles allow the Chiefs to display
directly a certain amount of dissatisfaction with an

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[518] Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, 72.

administration policy, they also use indirect means to achieve their goals. One such indirect means is the widely used "leak," either to the press or to the Congress. A so-called leak in 1956 undercut Admiral Radford's efforts to substantially cut American ground forces. When it was published in the New York Times, the West German government reacted quickly to this threat to lower the number of United States forces in Europe and forced the Eisenhower administration to drop the proposal.[519] Congress is a particularly fertile ground for a leak to be planted, and may be inextricably linked to an indirect means of expressing dissatisfaction through Congressional testimony. While it may be true that a Chief will not volunteer information to the Congress, he will happily respond to direct questions that will allow him an opportunity to discuss his dissenting views. It is not difficult to guarantee that the appropriate questions are asked. In most cases a leak is not even needed because the members of the congressional committee know full well the major points of disagreement between the Chiefs and the administration. This was the reason President Eisenhower sought to eliminate the Chiefs' requirement to go before congressional committees. During the debate over the rearmament of Germany, the Chiefs used their testimony to put pressure on the State Department to support their

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[519] Ibid., 72.

pro-rearmanent view.[520]   A third means of expressing dis-

satisfaction is through private pressure groups and former

members of the JCS.   These individuals and groups are in a

position to convey to the public the views of the JCS, with-

out the Chiefs formally announcing their position.   In

either case these indirect means allow the Chiefs to avoid

direct confrontation with the administration.

The idea of staff loyalty also helps explain the

metamorphosis that occurs when an individual is appointed

Chairman.   The role model upon which the chairmanship is

built is that of a chief of staff of any large military

organization.   The chief of staff's primary responsibility

is representing the commander to the various subordinate

staff agencies and coordinating their actions.   In that

position he mitigates conflict between the various agencies.

Only when the issues are irreconcilable does it go to the

commander for him to choose between alternatives.   Normally,

if the staff work has been done effectively, the decision

paper will have only one recommendation on it.   In practice,

the Chairman is the President's chief of staff, which was

Admiral Leahy's formal title; but fear of "Prussianization"

effectively eliminated the possibility of using that title.

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[520]Laurence W. Martin, "The American Decision to
Rearm Germany," in American Civil-Military Decisions, ed.
by Harold Stein (Montgomery, Alabama: University of Alabama
Press, 1963), 621.

The role model of the chief of staff as the commander's representative also explains General Bradley's politicization in support of the Truman administration.

Over the decade and a half that covered the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, the Chiefs exhibited a surprising consistency in the way they perceived their role. This was true both in regards to their bureaucratic position as well as their normative values.

In terms of the bureaucracy, all the Chiefs acknowledged that there were inherent problems and strains placed on them by dual and conflicting functions. While the civilian leadership saw the conflict between the Chiefs' corporate and service roles, and their planning and command functions as a source of dysfunctional behavior, the Chiefs' perceived them as an integral part of their role. The Chiefs rationalized their inextricability based upon the belief that responsibility and authority should go hand in hand.

The source of this rationalization, though, goes deeper than an organizational relationship between responsibility and authority. Part of it stems from the Chiefs own belief that they are both commanders of their services and a staff officer to the commander-in-chief. This is the crucial dichotomy upon which the other conflicts are built. Unfortunately, it was the more superficial dualities, such

as planning versus commanding, that caught the attention of the organizational reformers. In the role of the commander, the service chief is forced to defend his service's interests. Ironically, this leads the Chiefs to accept a certain amount of inter-service conflict as at least theoretically functional. The Chief's staff officer role motivates him to defend the administration's programs. This is, in reality, just another manifestation of the Chiefs' front man role.

Another source of this rationalization comes from the Chiefs' perception of themselves as professionals. For them, the concept of professionalism and its relationship to the client society was similar to that of other professionals. Most of all they perceived themselves as the military experts and, as such, they demanded autonomy within their sphere of expertise. The Wheeler Report's linkage of ending civilian encroachment in "strictly military operations" to regaining the Chiefs operational responsibility is illustrative of the relationship of professionalism to the Chiefs' perceived role. Clearly, the Chiefs were opposed to the process of centralization that had been occurring since 1949. Such centralization made them into automatons and destroyed their cherished command roles, but more importantly the very nature of their professionalism was under attack.

These attitudes, especially the requirement for autonomy in military matters, were the central themes in their traditional world view. Despite the fact they realized the importance of non-military factors, they simply could not let themselves consider them. This retention of traditional compartmentalization of the political from the military was the non-organizational flaw within the Chiefs. This had nothing to do with their place within the formal chain of command. The continuing claim that the JCS product was not as useful to the civilian leadership as it should be, was directly tied to the Chiefs' professionalism. While inter-service competition did result in a diluted product, the inability to consider non-military factors resulted in the production of a potentially useless product. Pragmatism was the means of eliminating this flaw, but both the civilian and the military leadership opposed it. The former, out of a fear for civilian control, and the latter, out of a fear for their professionalism. The Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by virtue of their status as the administration's "agent" appeared to have been less stringent in maintaining a purely "radical" approach, but even then pragmatism was not fully embraced. Merely mouthing foreign policy statements, as Bradley did, did not represent a shift to pragmatism. Instead even he, as well as the other Chairmen, retained his radical philosophy.

In the final analysis the Chiefs were caught between bureaucratic imperatives and ethical norms. Their dual role as commander of a service and staff officer to the President resulted in tremendous tensions. The development of informal means of affecting decisions, while allowing the Chiefs some flexibility, would only achieve marginal or incidental success. In the end they had to deal with their own conscience and their own professional notion of responsibility. Responsibility to the nation was the foundation upon which their professionalism rested. That responsibility became intertwined with the belief that their service was essential to the defense of the nation. By a convoluted logic, what appeared to the civilians to be service parochialism was to the Chiefs the fulfillment of their obligation. Furthermore, that sense of responsibility led them to bifurcate war and politics which had disastrous results on the JCS product. Since the civilians were not getting the product that they felt they needed, they began to make the decisions without the advantage of integrated input that would lead to an integrated policy. The nature of that integrated policy is the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER VIII

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND

POLICY INTEGRATION

Up to this point in our study we have examined the
Chiefs' self-perception of their role and those of their
civilian superiors. We have also seen how the various re-
organization efforts within the Department of Defense receiv-
ed their impetus from the civilian manager's desire to more
effectively integrate political/military policy planning.
But effective integration is more than a mere manifestation
of interface on an organization chart; it is the merging
of the organizational structure and the individual player's
roles. In short, it is as Clausewitz noted "where all the
other threads meet."

Policy integration in its simplest form guarantees
the balancing of the state's capabilities and the state's
commitments, which for our purpose means that the state
has sufficient military power, not only in size, but in
composition, to achieve its political goals. The passage
of the 1947 legislation was predicated upon the desire to
optimize such policy integration and to create an institu-
tional framework to achieve that goal. That framework pre-
supposed a nexus between the nation's foreign policy, the
military planning process, and the development of the defense

budget. Each of these factors in turn become inextricably related stages in the policy integration process. Although the National Security Act never outlined in specific detail how this nexus would be achieved, the formation of the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were requisite elements in a process that would ultimately result in the maintenance of a military establishment that could support the nation's political goals.

From the practical viewpoint, the balance between commitments and capabilities occurs during the budget process, since "planning can be useless and operations impossible if the necessary funds are not authorized and allocated."[521] In the final analysis the budget is a fiscal expression of those forces and plans which are deemed necessary for the security of the nation. The structure of those military forces represents a constraint upon the foreign policy planner that he ignores only at his nation's peril. The defense budget process thus contains all the major elements to be found in the integration of national security policy, and as such may be used as a heuristic tool to examine the process and determine its effectiveness.

Examining the problem of policy integration from a total systems approach, the first step in a hypothetical

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[521]Lawrence Korb, "The Defense Budget Process in the United States, 1953-1970: An Examination and Evaluation," Unpublished paper presented at the American Political Science Association National Conference, 1971, Chicago, IL, 2.

model is the establishment of foreign policy goals, which
will act as a catalyst for the subsequent development of
the military's operations plans and finally the defense
budget. On a superficial level, these three stages--
national policy, military plans, and the defense budget--
appear to flow in a logical sequential pattern, but such
an assumption fails to make the transition from the ideal
model to the real world. Our hypothetical model ignores
the reality of bureaucratic conflict and the necessity for
fiscal feasibility. The defense budget in an unconstrained
ideal environment becomes merely the conversion of military
force postures into monetary amounts. In the real world,
though, defense dollars are in direct competition with other
national priorities, forcing budget considerations to be
addressed at the offset of the policy process. Furthermore,
in order to effectively determine a viable foreign policy
the nation's commitments and capabilities must be assessed.
Likewise, military operations plans are not based solely
on combat effectiveness, but on technical, fiscal, political,
and bureaucratic realities. This model also fails to con-
sider post-executive phases of the budget process, such
as congressional review, that are part of the American
political system, but beyond the purview of this study.

The result is that when our nicely structured hypothe-
tical model is placed in reality, it becomes a complex

process in which the theoretically sequential stages become so inextricably connected that it is difficult to separate one stage from the next. The linear nature of the model is replaced by a cyclical one in which the budgetary process becomes an integral part of the balancing of capabilities and commitments. This, as we noted from our earlier discussion of Clausewitz, requires the fusion of the political and the military aspects of national policy, which presupposes an intellectual fusion on the part of the decision maker, not merely bureaucratic interface. Although such interface is an essential part of the policy making process, it can only help facilitate and not replace fusion. Despite these difficulties, a hypothetical model is heuristically useful in examining the process of policy integration.

With this ideal model in mind we will examine historically how the policy integration process developed during the Truman administration and how the budget process became the means of achieving integration. Particular attention will be given to how the military professionals perceived the process in comparison to their civilian superiors. The traditional difficulty of bifurcating political from military policy is an essential aspect of these perceptual differences, and they clearly surfaced during the first effort at formulating an integrated budget for fiscal year 1950. As such FY 50 is an especially useful vehicle for examining these problems. The lessons learned from FY 50 resulted in massive

structural changes within the NSC and the JCS, as both organizations developed planning systems that more effectively fulfilled their missions and enhanced, at least theoretically, their ability to work with each other. These changes will be traced as the effectiveness of the policy integration process is evaluated during the Eisenhower administration.

Organizationally, it was the movement toward unification that acted as a catalyst for policy integration. The Army based its advocacy for unification on the advantages to be gained through unity of command, which theoretically would maximize the efficient management of resources. Implicit within this argument was the assumption that as war became more complex, the management of resources became more critical and thus needed to be more effectively rationalized. In peacetime, unification would result in a more equitable distribution of resources, as well as greater stability in total allocations. This was the basis of Root's reforms in 1903, which created the General Staff to eliminate the more dysfunctional elements of the bureau system. The correctness of this organizational approach was reinforced by the War Department's reforms in March 1942, that created the Operations Division. After the war, polemical studies like Major General Otto Nelson's <u>National Security and the General Staff</u> seemed to prove the necessity for staff centralization and the "need for an improved General Staff

organization with more effective techniques of control."[522]

One of the central functions of such an improved General

Staff would be to facilitate political/military integration

to include the budget process. Nelson was harkening back

to the increased efficiency of the restructured General

Staff during both world wars and its coordination with the

War Industries Board during World War I and the War Production

Board during World War II.

The history of the unification controversy is essen-

tially a history of conflicting approaches to policy integra-

tion. Whatever difficulties existed between the services,

the civilian leadership definitely wanted legislation that

would bring about policy integration, and do it in such

a manner as to make the Joint Chiefs active participants.

It was with this in mind that the service secretaries be-

moaned, in 1944, the lack of any "established agency of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff primarily charged with developing

for the Joint Chiefs of Staff political, economic and fiscal

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[522] Otto Nelson, National Security and the General
Staff (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1946), 601;
also see Lawrence J. Legere, "Unification of the Armed Forces"
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1950).
Both were dissertations by army officers on leave at Harvard
University, Nelson finished his Ph.D. in 1940.

policy..."[523] The service proposals for unification offered

differing solutions to this problem, but for the most part

those differences flowed along service lines, with the Navy

apparently more cognizant of the nature of policy integra-

tion than the Army. Specifically, the Army's proposals

tended to reflect confidence in a vertical, highly centralized

structure, which exhibited traditional compartmentalization

of civilian from military functions. While this approach

detracted from the total integration effort, it supported

the Army's own perception of its professionalism.

It is the nature of this professionalism that helps

explain the primacy of the Army's position, dominating even

the JCS's own Richardson Plan, written in April 1945.[524]

Ironically, one of the Plan's primary conclusions was that

greater policy integration was needed, especially between

the military services and the State Department. I would

suggest that this particular recommendation was a result

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[523] Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff from
the Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy, undated, subject:
Coordination of Political-Military Problems Between the
Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, William B. Leahy Papers, folder "JCS Misc.
Memos, " U.S. Naval Archives, Washington, D.C.. (Hereafter
referred to as U.S. Naval Archives).

[524] The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Report of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Special Committee for Reorganization of
National Defense (Hereafter referred to as the Richardson
Report), Leahy Papers, box 77, folder "Reorganization of
the National Defense Structure and Comments: October and
November, 1945," U.S. Naval Archives.

of the Chiefs' perception that there was a lack of political
guidance forthcoming from the civilian leadership. Although
the Richardson Report recommended policy integration, it
did not specifically link the commitments generated through
political/military consultation to a force structure upon
which the budget would be based. In a rather convoluted
manner, the Report did point out that the President would
be concerned with budgetary matters and that "the nation
should maintain in time of peace, military forces adequate
to support its foreign policy,"[525] but how that would be
translated into dollars and cents was not very clear. A
partial solution was suggested in the formation of a U.S.
Chiefs of Staff who would advise the President on the overall
budget requirements for each service. This advice would
be transmitted to the President by the Commander of the
Armed Forces, who would double as the Chief of Staff to
the Commander-in-Chief. Concurrently, the request would
also be transmitted by the civilian Secretary of the Armed
Forces, who sat with the Chiefs during their deliberations.
Although, the Secretary sat in with the Chiefs, his primary
function was not as an arbitrator of competing resource
demands, but as a cabinet level advocate for the military
budget.

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[525] Ibid., 21.

The crucial issues of procurement and mobilization planning also were discussed in the Richardson Report. These functions were placed under the purview of a civilian Under Secretary of the Armed Forces, who was to guarantee the compatibility of the Chiefs' military plans to civilian industrial mobilization. Unfortunately, there was built into the system a degree of compartmentalization that mere bureaucratic coordination could not easily rectify. This point was revealed in the observation that the military would be the only agency really concerned with military matters, while the Under Secretary would take care of the civilian or business matters.[526]

On the issue of balancing requirements and resources, the Richardson Report naively stated that this was only a wartime problem. It was presumed that "in peacetime resources will normally be adequate."[527] This statement reflected more than a naive approach to peacetime policy integration, it was based on the assumption that military requirements would drive the budget process. If this was correct, then the Chiefs could safely assume that peacetime resources would be adequate. Furthermore, given the Chiefs' view of professionalism, they probably also assumed that

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[526] Ibid., 23-24. Specifically the Report said "the Under Secretary of his office will initiate action on business matters and that the commander of the Armed Forces on the military matters."

[527] Ibid., 26.

they themselves would establish those requirements and that
they would be based exclusively upon military imperatives.
It seemed logical to the Chiefs, as military experts, to
generate their own budget requests and forward them to the
President, unaltered by either the civilian Under Secretary
or Secretary of the Armed Forces.

This organizational assumption was incorporated into
both the McNarney and the Collins plans. Both of these
Army proposals gave the budgetary responsibility to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, while the civilian secretary acted
merely as a conduit of the budget estimates to the President.
Although, both plans emphasized the elimination of waste
and duplication through unification, neither plan considered
the relationship of political/military planning to the budget
process. In defending the Collins Plan, Secretary of War
Patterson testified that its objective was "to establish
an integrated program of national security," and that this
would best be accomplished by allowing the military experts
to formulate the strategic options upon which this program
would be based.[528] In practice this would mean that the
military experts, the JCS, would formulate the defense budget.
General Collins went even further than Patterson in outlin-
ing the nature of military autonomy in budgetary matters:

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[528]U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs,
Department of Armed Forces, Department of Military Security,
Hearings. 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, 12.

One of the most valuable functions that the United States Chiefs of Staff should perform in time of peace is the development of a balanced military program with which budgetary requirements are thoroughly integrated. After the President has approved the over-all military policy, the budget requirements to implement this policy would be initiated by the three components, the Air, Army and Navy, essentially as at present. These individual requirements would be reviewed and integrated by the United States Chiefs of Staff. Each Chief of Staff of a major component would be expected to present his case to the United States Chiefs of Staff with full freedom and vigor. The U.S. Chiefs would have to weigh any conflicting demands and finally come out with an integrated program of requirements to submit to the President. It is believed that legislation should require that these recommendations be submitted through the Secretary of the Armed Forces, who should be required to transmit them without modification to the President, together with his comments thereon.[529]

Clearly, both the JCS's Richardson Report and the Army's unification plans manifested traditional bifurcation of political and military functions, and used professionalism and expertise as the basis for the military's assertion of autonomy.

The reason for the similarity among the various plans was that their central ideas appear to have had a common source, Brigadier General John McAuley Palmer. Palmer, who was George C. Marshall's mentor, had been intimately involved in planning a War Department reorganization immediately after World War I. Although retired, he was brought back on active duty in November 1941 to help with the nationalization of the National Guard. With the outbreak

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[529]Ibid., 157-8.

of war, he turned his attention to the dual problems of
demobilization and post-war military organization. In 1943,
the Special Planning Division (SPD) was created to coordinate
the planning efforts on both of these issues, and Palmer
was named advisor to its director. The SPD became the focal
point for the Army's reorganization effort and its director,
Major General W.F. Tompkins, was the Army's representative
on the Richardson Committee. Because of Palmer's elder
statesmen status, he was in a position to intellectually
dominate the SPD.[530] The key component of all the plans
so far discussed was the compartmentalization and the iso-
lation of military and civilian functions from one another.
This compartmentalization was an essential part of the orga-
nization plans that Palmer helped write after the First
World War; one of which was for a unified military. In
these plans industrial mobilization and procurement was
under the control of civilian managers, while war plans

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[530] For a detailed study of the role of the SPD see
Michael S. Sherry, Preparing for the Next War: American
Plans for Post War Defense, 1941-1945 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1977); Nelson, National Security and the
Staff, 548-551; Legere, "Unification of the Armed Forces,"
235-240; and "History of the Special Planning Division,"
file No. 2-3.12, Office of the Chief of Military History;
a microfilm copy is held in the U.S. Army Command & General
Staff College Library. As for Palmer's role in the SPD,
Professor I.B. Holly of Duke University, who is preparing
a biography of Palmer, claims that Palmer's ideas "infected"
the young officers around him.

were generated solely by the military staffs. The incorporation of this approach in the National Defense Act of 1920 led to the development of military plans without regard to their industrial feasibility.[531]

Despite organizational shortcomings and structural flaws, the Army's unification plans conformed to that service's traditional sense of professionalism. The effect of this traditionalism is substantiated by an executive branch analysis of the views of such Army unification proponents as Secretary of War Patterson, and Generals Marshall, Collins, Arnold, McNarney, and Eisenhower. Of particular importance was the analysis' evaluation of these individuals' views on two specific points: the military's need for "specific integration with foreign policy" and whether or not "control of [the] budget [should be in the hands of a] civilian secretary." With the noticeable exception of General McNarney, all of those listed were identified as opposing the specific integration of military policy with foreign policy and all, including McNarney, were identified as unanimously opposing a civilian exercising control over the

[531] Marvin A. Kreidberg and Morton A. Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army: 1775-1945. Department of Army Pamphlet No. 20-212 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1955), 692.

military budget. [532]

A further example of the impact of such traditional values is illustrated in a memorandum written by Forrestal to Clark Clifford on 7 September 1946. In this memorandum, Forrestal conveyed his impressions of a dinner meeting with Patterson, Eberstadt, Under Secretary of the Navy John Kenney, and Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, General John Handy. The purpose of the meeting was to reduce the points of service disagreement over unification. In his description of the discussion that ensued, the Secretary of the Navy reported that the Army was "still wedded to the concept that a chart and 'straight-line of command' will solve all problems." This of course ran counter to Forrestal's own belief in a decentralized structure and that an organization was only as good as the men who made it up. However, the Army's fascination in a "straight-line of command" reflected more than an organizational preference; Forrestal realized that it reflected the very nature of Army professionalism:

> The Army's real purpose is to draw a sharp black and white line between civilian and military functions. It is my view, and nobody can shake it, that the operation must be a mixed one; that there is no black and white line because diplomacy and military power are inextricably associated. Both Patterson and Handy took the view that the civilian secretaries should not sit

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[532]Chart entitled "Proposals for Unification Differs in Opinion," undated paper, Samuel Rosenman Papers, box 4, folder "Unification folder #2," Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri. (Hereafter referred to as Truman Library)

with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to which I responded,
"how otherwise can military policy be tied in with
national policy?"

Forrestal went on to write that he had great apprehension
for the unification bill if it followed the "army thinking
on these lines," because such an approach would fail to
achieve the true integration of "the whole complex of our
national, economic, military, and political power."[533]

Secretary Forrestal had hoped that the Eberstadt
Plan would eliminate or at least avoid some of these organi-
zational problems. The National Security Council offered
a means to "ensure that there was a balance between our
foreign commitments and (military) forces."[534] As the
National Security Act began to take form it became more
apparent to the administration that it was the budget process
that guaranteed this balance.[535] However, if integration
was to occur, it required a mitigation of the military's
autonomy in budget matters, and the appointment of a civilian
superior to act as an arbitrator between conflicting

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[533]Memorandum Forrestal to Clifford, 7 September
1946, Clark Clifford Papers, box 16, folder "Unification
Correspondence-General," Truman Library.

[534]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Naval Affairs,
Report to Hon. James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy on
Unification of the War and Navy Departments and Postwar
Organization for the National Security. 79th Congress,
1st Session, 1945. (Hereafter referred to as the Eberstadt
Plan), 55.

[535]National Defense Memorandum for the President,
22 July 1947, subject: S.758 "National Security Act 1947,"

demands for resources.

While there seems to have been a general agreement
that the budget was the crucial aspect of unification, it
was not at all clear how the budget would be developed,
or what role, if any, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would play.
On the surface, it appears that the Navy had a greater under-
standing of policy integration than the Army, but that may be
more attributable to the attitude of James Forrestal than
to the attitude of the Navy's officer corps. We can gain
some insight into the perceptions of Navy professionals by
examining the ideas of Admiral Forrest Sherman, the Navy
officer most closely connected with the writing of the
National Security Act. In January 1947, just prior to the
drafting of the legislation, Sherman sent a memorandum to
his Army counterpart, Lieutenant General Loris Norstad,
expressing his views on how an ideal integrated budget
could be developed:

> (1) Based on a study of the broad factors involved,
> the War Council would determine the national policies
> under which the Armed Forces would expect to function;

Truman Papers, Presidential Secretary File, Subject File,
box 156, folder "Cabinet Defense Secretary", Truman Library.
Clifford noted that the budget issue was one "of the major
purposes of the bill." Earlier President Truman had noted
that unification "will help the budget to a large extent,"
Memo for Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Depart-
ment, 20 April 1946, Truman Papers, Presidential Secretary
File, Subject File, box 145, folder, "Agencies-Military,
Army, Navy Unification," Truman Library.

(2) In light of these policies and their military esti-
mate of the strategic situation, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff would formulate strategic requirements for the
Armed Forces. In the event of disagreement among the
Joint Chiefs of Staff the Secretary of the Armed Forces
would exercise such powers of decision as may be delegated
to him by the President;

(3) The above strategic requirements would then be trans-
lated into terms of men, supplies and money by the three
military departments;

(4) The translated requirements of the military depart-
ments would then be reviewed and integrated by the War
Council under the supervision of the Secretary of the
Armed Forces, who would have powers of decision in the
event of disagreement. The facilities of the budget
officers of the military departments would be utilized
for this if necessary;

(5) The military budgets would then be presented to
the Bureau of the Budget by the Secretary of the Armed
Forces and their details directly to that body by the
Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force;

(6) After action on the integrated military budgets is
taken by the Bureau of the Budget and the President,
their broader aspects would, if necessary, be justified
before the Congress by the Secretary of the Armed
Forces and their details directly by the Secretaries
of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.[536]

Although the power that Sherman was willing to invest

in the civilian Secretary of the Armed Forces was the very

antithesis of the Army's demand for autonomy, one should

not assume that Sherman was being motivated by a totally

different set of professional imperatives than his army

counterparts. A careful examination of the process outlined

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[536] Memorandum for General Norstadt, 27 January 1947,
subject: Formation of Integrated Military Budget, Clifford
Papers, box 17, folder "Unification-Correspondence, Bill
Comments and Recommendations, "Truman Library.

by Sherman, reveals that the Joint Chiefs would take the civilian leadership's guidance and develop the strategic plans that would ultimately be converted into "men, supplies, and money by the three services." Only after these plans had been developed would they be measured against fiscal feasibility.

The model that Sherman apparently used when he developed this budget process was that of the military operations plan. Within the military planning system an organization is first given a mission. The commander will then take that mission and make what is known as the estimate of the situation. This is the thought process by which the commander analyzes his mission, evaluates both enemy and friendly forces, considers alternative courses of action, and finally reaches a decision on how to proceed. Once this decision has been made, an operations plan is drawn up detailing the execution of the mission, which in turn becomes the basis of mission statements directed to subordinate units. Within Sherman's budget process the original mission statement was the political guidance provided to the Joint Chiefs by the civilian leadership. The Chiefs then would proceed to make their estimate of the situation and develop an operations plan.

This approach was structurally identical to the "National War Planning System," the JCS considered in

1942. [537] The first step in that system was the determination by the political leadership of the nation's strategy or concept of war, followed by the military's structuring of a strategy and operations plan to accomplish those goals. Since this type of planning process was universally accepted within the services, it was only natural that senior military leaders would apply it to the problem of policy integration and budget development. The application of this mode of reasoning was seen in a 1949 statement before Congress by General George C. Marshall. He stated that "the estimate of the situation" should determine the formulation of the budget, and that such an estimate should be made once a year "entirely outside of...civilian control." The demand that the generation of the estimate of the situation be exclusively a military function should not be looked upon as an attack upon civilian control, but instead a call for autonomy within a professional sphere of expertise. Obviously, this estimate would be linked to the political mission statement so that the Chiefs would have a framework within which to develop their force lists. While Marshall never did discuss the relationship of that mission statement to the estimate of the situation, the military staff logic

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[537] Vernon Davis, A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II: Organizational Development (Historical Division: Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1972), II, 380.

process presupposes a mission statement from some higher

headquarters or authority. [538]

The methodology incorporated in Sherman's approach

to policy integration was nothing more than a simplified

version of what would later be called program budgeting.

Forrestal was also enamored with this approach and felt

that it ought to be the basis of a "new principle" that would

govern the Military Establishment's budgetary structure. In

his First Report of the Secretary of Defense, Forrestal

outlined a budget system that was very similar to that of

Sherman's:

> The National Security Council will "assess and appraise
> the objectives, commitments and risks of the United
> States in relation to our actual and potential military
> power." The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the basis of
> these evaluations, will maintain long-range strategic
> plans and correlate these with an "annual operating
> plan," indicating such matters as the composition, size,
> organization, and general deployment of the forces,
> the general requirements of the material programs and
> the required levels of operations, training, maintenance,
> construction, and other major programs. Initially
> such plans should be based solely upon military con-
> siderations. [539]

Forrestal's assumption that the operation plans would be

based exclusively on military considerations reveals a

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[538] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Service,
The National Defense Program, Unification and Strategy
Hearings, 81st Congress, 1st Session, 1949, 603-605. (Here-
after referred to as Unification and Strategy Hearings).

[539] National Military Establishment, First Report of
the Secretary of Defense (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1948), 41 (Emphasis Added)

surprising degree of traditionalism on the part of the great

advocate of policy integration. This paradox is explained

when one realizes that Forrestal viewed policy integration

as a continual process that would occur during the develop-

ment of guidance and later during the balancing process.

The Secretary's commitment to military autonomy during the

actual planning phase indicates a faith in the military

and an understanding that the military had unique expertise

in certain areas. The Joint Chiefs had a crucial role in

the development of the budget because they were the only

ones who could make the analysis of military considerations.

As Senator Edward V. Robertson said during the 1947 hearings,

"the Joint Chiefs are the key to the whole thing."[540]

The early drafts of the National Security Act speci-

fically named the Chiefs as advisors "in the integration

of the military budget." Rather inexplicably, this function

was expunged from the final draft.[541] Nevertheless, the

Chiefs remained an integral part of the budget process be-

cause they were the ones that actually prepared the strategic

and logistics plans. Possibly realizing the confusion that

could result from this omission, Forrestal had a budget

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[540] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Armed
Services, National Defense Establishment, Unification of
the Armed Forces, Hearings on S.758, 80th Congress, 1st
Session, 1947, pt. 2, 330. (Hereafter referred to as National
Military Establishment Hearings).

[541] Ibid., 2.

function inserted along with the various other service and
JCS functions enumerated in the Key West Agreement of 1948.
This was the nature of that budget function:

> Prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense, for
> his information and consideration in furnishing guidance
> to the Departments for preparation of their annual
> budgetary estimates and in coordinating these budgets,
> a statement of military requirements which is based
> upon agreed strategic considerations, joint outline
> war plans, and current national security commitments. [542]

Simply assumed by both Forrestal and Sherman was
the existence of coherent policy guidance emanating from
the civilian leadership. This was the crucial step in our
hypothetical model and was the reason the National Security
Council was established. Without such guidance the Joint
Chiefs would have nothing upon which to base their strategic
plans. Unfortunately, the format in which that guidance
would be disseminated was never covered in the National
Security Act. This external communications problem reflected
internal organizational and perceptual problems on the part
of the National Security Council.

Prior to the Korean War, the National Security Council
was viewed as having a narrow advisory role with no opera-
tional or implementation mission. The complex NSC infra-
structure that we now take for granted simply did not exist,

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[542] The text of the Key West agreement is published
in Timothy W. Stanley, American Security and National Defense
(Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1956), 176.

because the Council was not charged with following up on decisions. Only as the demands upon the organization increased during the Korean War did the staff of the National Security Council begin to take form. One consequence of this organizational and functional problem was the lack of systematic and continuous guidance. Another, was that the analyses that were produced tended to be overly narrow in focus, dealing only with a specific issue. It was not until November 1948 that "the first paper of a broad over-all character dealing with the basic national security problems facing the United States," was adopted by the NSC and could be used as guidance for the JCS.[543] That document, NSC 20/4 "U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security," would be the major source of policy guidance until the Korean War.[544] These problems exacerbated the Chiefs' perception that they were forced to work within a policy vacuum and that plans had to be made based upon their own assumptions.

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[543] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Policy Making, Organizing for National Security (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), Vol II, Studies and Background Material, 426. (Hereafter referred to as Jackson Committee).

[544] Memorandum for the National Security Council, 16 November 1948, subject: US Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security, Truman Papers, Presidential Secretary File, Subject File, NSC, box 204, folder "Meeting #27," Truman Library. This folder actually contains an earlier draft NSC 20/3, which with only minor revisions was formally accepted as 20/4.

Was there any validity to the Chiefs' perception? Instead of being produced as a routine matter, NSC papers tended to be reactive documents, promulgated by perceived changes in the political/military environment. Furthermore, there was no JCS representation on the Council's staff during this early period. This situation, according to the National Security Council Organizational History, "made it difficult to anticipate and take into account probable JCS views on a subject under discussion in advance of receipt of their formal written views." [545] Thus the lack of institutional linkages meant a total breakdown in communication. This was exemplified during the Berlin Blockade when the JCS advice was not sought until it was too late for them to have any substantial influence.[546] Part of this problem undoubtedly was the result of the Chiefs not being named the principle military advisors to the NSC, a problem that was alleviated by the 1949 amendment to the National Security Act.

Unfortunately for Secretary Forrestal, his model of policy integration was predicated upon institutional interface that could only occur if there was continual

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[545] Jackson Committee, II, 432.

[546] Kenneth W. Condit, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: Vol II 1947-1949 (Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1978), 154.

bureaucratic linkages. In place of these formal linkages, the Secretary of Defense sought the Chiefs' advice informally based upon their statutory relationship to him. These informal efforts apparently did not remove the belief, on the part of the Chiefs, that there was a policy vacuum in existence. The 1948 Hoover Commission study reaffirmed the Chiefs' fears in this regard when it noted that "the want of firm and clear top level national policy direction on which to base strategic plans leave the Joint Chiefs of Staff to do their planning in something of a vacuum."[547]

This situation presented a real problem for Forrestal since his integration model was built upon the assumption that the military would take the NSC's guidance and convert it into strategic plans. At this stage of the process the military would develop their plans completely unconstrained by resource limitations or other mitigating factors. In other words, the Chiefs would base their plans solely on "military considerations." This was the same approach that Sherman had advocated. After the plans were developed, they would be measured against fiscal feasibility. Only then would changes be made to balance plans against available

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[547] The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government; Task Force on National Security Organization (Appendix G), (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), 37. (Hereafter referred to as the Hoover Commission.)

resources. It was essential though, that the original policy

statement should not be developed exclusive of military

considerations.

As noted earlier, the logic of Forrestal's model

paralleled that of the military's concept of plans being

driven by the mission statement. The problem was that the

mission statement could only be derived from the National

Security Council's guidance, and that agency was remiss

in producing it. Since regularized guidance was not forth-

coming, the Chiefs began to generate their own assumptions

upon which to base their plans. The Hoover Commission,

although appreciating that the Chiefs were working within

a policy vacuum, criticized them for these self-generated

assumptions because they did not always have any correlation

with reality. The Commission's Eberstadt Task Group pointed

out that many of the JCS's strategic plans "are based upon

incomplete and unrealistic assumptions," and that:

> The JCS have not done enough to relate their military
> plans to the national productive capacity in terms of
> manpower, materials, power, transportation, and facili-
> ties. These vital elements of modern strategy appear
> to be too lightly considered in the strategic planning
> of the JCS.[548]

In other words, the Chiefs were not incorporating crucial

non-military factors into their planning process. Naturally,

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[548]Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, 28 January
1949, subject: Comments contained in Detailed Studies of
the Eberstadt Committee, Chapter VI, The Joint Chiefs of
Staff, USACGSC Library C-17073, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.

Eberstadt laid much of the blame upon the lack of guidance

from the NSC, probably because this was an easily identifi-

able cause. What Eberstadt and his task group failed to

understand was that the Chiefs' professionalism was as much

a cause as the organizational problems. Thus Forrestal

was confronted with a total organizational breakdown as

he prepared to implement his "new principle."

There was one preliminary problem that had to be

dealt with before any headway could be achieved in the bud-

get arena. That problem was getting the Chiefs to agree on

the services' various roles and missions. Until this was

accomplished the "deep-seated disagreements," between the

services "made effective planning extremely difficult if

not impossible."[549] The National Security Act of 1947 and

its implementing Executive Order 9877 had merely allocated

to the services missions based on environmental primacy.

Thus the Army was concerned with land operations, the Navy

conducted operations that were at sea, and the Air Force

operated in the air. Such an environmental division did

not address those areas where missions clashed. In particu-

lar the role of the Marine Corps and the Navy's carrier-

based air arm became points of contention. In an effort to

eliminate these and other problem areas Forrestal called

the Chiefs together for a meeting at the Key West Naval Base

in March, 1948. The ensuing memorandum of agreement, called

[549]Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy,
157.

the "Functions Paper," was issued by the President on 21

April 1948 as a replacement for E.O. 9877.[550]

While the "Functions Paper" did eliminate some of

the points of service antagonism, it unfortunately defined

the services' primary and collateral missions only in general

terms, leaving the actual implementation open to interpre-

tation and technological feasibility. Thus while the Navy

was given the collateral mission, "to be prepared to par-

ticipate in the over-all air effort as directed by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff," how this would be accomplished was left

unspecified. During the pre-missile era, the only means

available to the Navy to participate in a nuclear retalia-

tion operation was the carrier-based aircraft; but the Navy

lacked a plane with the requisite range and payload capabi-

lity to deliver the nuclear weapons of the period, as well

as a carrier that was large enough to launch such a plane

if it were developed. The U.S.S. United States was designed

to be such an aircraft carrier, which explains why its can-

cellation caused the "Revolt of the Admirals."[551] Some

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[550]Ibid., 157-183, for a full discussion of the formu-
lation of the Functions Papers.

[551]See my discussion of the 'Revolt' in Chapter V,
also see Paul Y. Hammond, "Super Carriers and the B-36 Bom-
ber," in American Civil-Military Decisions, ed. by Harold
Stein (Montgomery, Alabama: University of Alabama Press,
1963), and Vincent Davis, The Politics of Innovation:
Patterns in Navy Cases, Monograph Series in World Affairs,
Volume 4, Monograph No. 3, 1966-67 (Denver: University
of Denver, 1967).

of the remaining problems were solved at a follow-up confer-
ence held at the United States Naval War College, Newport,
Rhode Island. Still the over-all issue of roles and missions
continued to be one of the major causes for inter-service
rivalry. Despite, his failure to completely solve the roles
and missions issue, Forrestal was correct in believing that
service roles and missions had to be defined before the
budget process could proceed. Only after the services had
determined their relationship with one another could they
begin to translate the political mission statement into
a cohesive and unified military plan. The fact that there
were still unresolved aspects of the issue remaining was
one of the primary reasons that Forrestal's "new principle"
failed.

With the roles and missions issue behind him, For-
restal proceeded to bring the Chiefs into the budget process.
On 30 March 1948, the Secretary of Defense asked the Chiefs
to express themselves on the allocation of a three billion
dollar supplement to the fiscal year 1949 defense budget.
The Chiefs responded with varying force levels and a total
fiscal requirement of over nine billion dollars. The ad-
ministration simply would not accept this three fold increase
and held fast to a ceiling of three billion.[552] This first

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[552] Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National
Policy, 183-205.

effort at implementing the "new principle" not only had

failed, but foreshadowed the problems that would follow.

Within weeks after the administration decided to

hold the line on the FY 49 supplemental budget, planning

began for the FY 50 defense budget. This would be the

first budget that the Chiefs would be involved in from its

inception.[553] Again the administration began with a pre-

conceived budgetary ceiling, this time at 14.4 billion dol-

lars. Although the Chiefs were now part of the budget pro-

cess, they had not yet developed a systematic approach to

formulate their budget advice, this, despite the fact that

they had always claimed that they should be the ones to

develop the actual figures. The result was that the Chiefs

sent forward a compilation of all three services' unilateral

budget estimates, without any integration. This "paperclip-

ped" budget totaled almost 30 billion dollars, a figure

twice the amount the administration was willing to spend.[554]

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[553] For the official JCS analysis of the events sur-
rounding the development of the FY 50 budget see Condit,
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 205-248;
also see Warner R. Schilling, "The Politics of National
Defense: Fiscal 1950," in Warner A. Schilling, Paul Y. Ham-
mond, Glen H. Snyder, Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1962).

[554] Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National
Policy, 219-224. In October 1947 General Gruenther suggested
that the Chiefs develop a strategic plan upon which the
budget would be based. Unfortunately, this effort had not
come to fruition when the Chiefs were asked for their input
into the FY 50 budget.

On June 23 1948, Forrestal reacted to this situation by
asking the Chiefs to set up a special board of senior offi-
cers to help develop the budget. This board of budgetary
advisors, chaired by Air Force General Joseph T. McNarney,[555]
had by August managed to cut the total requirement down
to 23.6 billion dollars, but at that level the services
appeared to be stalemated. From that point until early
October, attempts to break the impasse met with little
success.[556]

Despite these problems, Forrestal was still convinced
that the Chiefs had to take it upon themselves to divide
the monies. On 4 October he verbally informed the Chiefs
that they were to "recommend a subdivision of a 14.4 billion
dollar appropriation for the fiscal year 1950."[557] He fol-
lowed up this verbal guidance with a memorandum to the same
effect two days later.[558] The Chiefs responded on the 7th

[555]James Forrestal, Forrestal Diaries, ed. by Walter
Millis (New York: Viking Press, 1951), 450. The other
members of the board were Major General George J. Richards,
U.S.A., and Vice Admiral Robert B. Carney, U.S.N.

[556]Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National
Policy, 224-225.

[557]Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 6 October
1948, subject: Budget for Fiscal Year 1950, Leahy Papers,
folder, "Budget and Estimates - 1946-1950," U.S. Naval
Archives. For a detailed discussion of the 4 October conver-
sation see Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National
Policy, 231-2.

[558]Forrestal, Diaries, 499.

of October that they "found it impossible to reach an agree-
ment on the recommendation as to the allocation of the funds
to the respective services." The political machinations
surrounding the Chiefs' October 7th response brought into
sharp focus all of the inter-service problems that had haunted
the JCS during the previous months of negotiations. The
split recommendation that was forwarded to the Secretary
of Defense revealed a newly formed alliance between the
Air Force and the Army against the Navy. While the former
two services recommended the division of funds to be along
the following lines: 4.9 billion to the Army, 4.4 to the
Navy, and 5.1 to the Air Force; the Navy recommended figures
of 4.9 billion, 4.9 billion, and 4.6 billion to each service
respectively. Leahy recommended either dividing the 14.4
billion dollars equally among all three services, or simply
taking the .5 billion dollar increase over the FY 49 budget
and dividing that equally among the services.[559]

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[559]Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 7 October
1948, subject Memorandum dated 6 October 1948 from the
Secretary of Defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1949-
1950 Budget, Leahy Papers, folder "JCS outgoing correspond-
ence, October 1948 - January 1949," U.S. Naval Archives.
Enclosed were copies of the individual Chief's recommenda-
tions. Although Leahy went along with Bradley and Vanden-
berg, he also recommended equally dividing up the .5 billion
dollar increase which would mean the Army would get 4.467
billion, the Navy 5.067 billion, and the Air Force 4.867.
Leahy may well have gone along with the Army and the Air
Force in order not to appear to be siding with the Navy.
According to the official JCS history the suggestion to
merely divide up the 14.4 billion dollars equally was made
by Leahy and rejected on 5 October 1948, yet in a working

The differences in the budget figures reflected more than service bureaucratic imperatives; they also reflected fundamental differences over the strategic approach to the next war. All three services agreed that the ceiling resulted in insufficient forces to "meet the D-day demands on the Services in a war with Russia,"[560] and all three services tended to agree that the next war would in its general strategic aspects resemble the Second World War. None of the services seriously thought in terms of defending Western Europe by becoming involved in a land campaign with Russia. The forces available in the West were simply insufficient for this purpose. Instead, those forces that existed would be concentrated on protecting Great Britain and the Mediterranean Littoral. During the early stages of the war the allies would retreat across the Channel to England and across the Mediterranean to North Africa, returning to the continent only after they had sufficiently built up their strength. While the allies and particularly the United States were mobilizing their forces, the enemy would be subjected to

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draft of the 6 October Memorandum, this division is mentioned again and is annotated with the notation "proposed by Navy." This would suggest that it was not totally dropped by the Navy at least as of 6 October. Leahy Papers, folder "Budget and Estimates 1946-1950," U.S. Naval Archives. Also see Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 233-236.

[560]Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 6 October 1948, subject: Budget for Fiscal Year 1950, Leahy Papers, folder "Budget and Estimates - 1946-1950," U.S. Naval Archives.

a devastating air attack consisting of both conventional

and nuclear weapons. How much money each service received

was inextricably connected to its role in the short range

Joint Emergency War Plan "HALF-MOON/FLEETWOOD."[561]

Under "FLEETWOOD" the Navy's two primary missions

were to protect the lines of communication (LOC) between

North America and Great Britain and to maintain access through

the Mediterranean Sea and the Suez Canal, just as the Royal

Navy had done during the Second World War. As part of the

Navy's Mediterranean mission, carrier-based airpower would

attempt to cut the enemy's lines of communication, thus

impeding his advance. Besides these two specific missions,

the Navy retained its collateral mission to support the

Air Force's offensive air operations against the Russian

homeland. According to "FLEETWOOD," "carrier task groups

will supplement and support the air offensive to the extent

practically consistent with their (the Navy's) primary

task."[562] In reality, that task was to protect allied logis-

tics and communications lines and not to be in direct contact

with enemy forces.

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[561] JCS 1844/13, 21 July 1948, File CCS 381-USSR 3/2/46,
National Archives, Washington, D.C. For a discussion of
the evolution of the war plan HALFMOON/FLEETWOOD/DOUBLESTAR,
see Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy,
224-231, 275-301.

[562] JCS 1844/13, 21 July 1948, File CCS 381-USSR-
3/2/46, appendix "A", p. 123, National Archives.

From the Navy's perspective, retaining and accomplishing both its primary and collateral missions under "FLEETWOOD" were not only essential to the defense of the nation, but a matter of bureaucratic survival. The Navy's force levels were predicated upon those missions. If its nuclear retaliation mission was eliminated or its role in the Mediterranean minimized, then its force levels and in particular the number of carrier task groups that were to accomplish those missions would be appropriately lowered. Thus the issues that surrounded the development of the FY 50 budget were the same ones that caused the "Revolt of the Admirals" almost a year later.

Once Forrestal had ordered the Chiefs to produce a 14.4 billion dollar budget, the Chiefs were forced to reconsider their estimate of the situation. The heart of the Army-Air Force alliance was the elimination of the Navy's Mediterranean mission. As part of the 7 October budget debate General Bradley attacked the viability of this aspect of the "FLEETWOOD" plan:

> It is my opinion that to place a fleet in the Mediterranean without taking in ground troops to hold a base, or bases, makes no significant contribution to our initial offensive effort. It is my contention that the idea that Navy Air can stop any ground troop advance is contrary to all previous experiences.
>
> I believe that the Navy should have whatever air force is necessary to carry out its naval mission, but when there is a limited amount of money available, I think we must consider primary missions first. The

Navy concept of a carrier task force in the Mediterranean
by itself is primarily designed to fight an air battle
and stop any Army movement. Both of these functions
have been assigned to the Air Force and the Army.[563]

If the Army-Air Force position was sustained then the United

States would have to rely, at least in the short term, solely

on an atomic air attack based out of Great Britain. Hope-

fully, this would buy enough time for the Army to mobilize

a force capable of invading the continent. The Navy would

be relegated to protecting the lines of communication between

England and North America, the role it had played in the

European Theater of Operations during the Second World War.

Why Bradley sided with the Air Force on this crucial

issue is not difficult to determine. Undoubtedly, his experi-

ence in Europe during the war had something to do with it.

More importantly, it was clear to everyone, that "FLEETWOOD"

could not be conducted within the constraints of the admini-

stration's ceiling. Looking at it realistically, the forces

the Navy needed to operate in the Mediterranean would have

to come at the expense of the Air Force's atomic capability

or the Army's mobilization posture.[564] These same arguments

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[563]Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 7 October
1948, subject: Budget for the Fiscal Year 1950, Army view,
Leahy Papers, folder "JCS Outgoing Correspondence, October
1948-January 1949," U.S. Naval Archives.

[564]This view is substantiated by General Bradley's
comments during the 5 October 1948 meeting of the JCS. "I
think it is up to us to make a recommendation to the Secre-
tary of Defense of the 14.4 [billion dollars] based on what

were advanced by Bradley at other times to explain his anti-
carrier recommendations.[565]

Whatever the reasons behind the service's actions,
the political machinations emanating from the Joint Chiefs
completely exasperated Forrestal. It was during this time
that he became convinced that the Military Establishment
needed to be completely restructured. On October 5th, he
wrote in his diary that he was going to recommend to the
Hoover Commission that the powers of the Secretary of Defense
needed to be strengthened. He also added that he was think-
ing of making General Alfred Gruenther "my principle military
advisor...."[566] His request that the JCS establish the
McNarney Board was just another example of his desire to
find alternative sources of military advice. The fact that
he requested the formation of the McNarney Board as early
as June, reveals that he might have already been having
second thoughts about the effectiveness of the JCS. As
part of his desire to develop alternative sources of advice,
the Secretary wrote Eisenhower on October 8th and asked
him to come to a meeting in which they would "talk fundamen-
tals: policy, budget and our whole military-diplomatic

we consider the relative importance of the three Services
in fighting the war against Russia." Condit, The Joint Chiefs
of Staff and National Policy, 234. Also see Schilling. "The
Politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950," 171.

[565]See my discussion of Bradley's rationale in his vote
against the U.S.S. United States in Chapter V.

[566]Forrestal, Diaries, 497.

positions."[567] This request laid the groundwork for Eisenhower's temporary assignment as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As we noted in Chapter IV., Forrestal's disenchantment with the JCS reached such proportions that he even considered abolishing it.

Aside from looking for alternative sources of military advice, Forrestal also realized that his original approach to the budget process was now bankrupt. Still he was opposed to imposing a division of funds upon the Chiefs because he agreed with their contention that the 14.4 billion dollar ceiling was insufficient. He also disliked having to accept a strategy based exclusively upon a British based Air Force atomic assault. Since it was apparent, though, that the Chiefs had reached a total impasse on the division of the funds, Forrestal realized that he needed a whole new approach. On 5 October 1948, he met with President Truman and outlined his plan to ask the Chiefs to draw up an alternative force structure based upon a figure in the 18.5 billion dollar range. This would allow the administration the opportunity to choose between alternative force postures. [568]

This new approach was revealed to the Chiefs in a memorandum dated 8 October 1948. This same memorandum also

[567] Ibid., 500.

[568] Ibid., 498.

revealed just how far his disenchantment with the Chiefs had gone. The secretary began by outlining the two tasks that he had placed before the Chiefs:

1. State the forces which, in your judgment, should be maintained during the fiscal year 1950.

2. State the forces which, in your judgment, should be maintained during the fiscal year 1950 in light of probable fiscal limitations.

Contained within these two tasks was the essence of the JCS's role under Forrestal's "new principle." The first task called for the development of an unconstrained budget, while the second task outlined the Chiefs' obligation in the balancing of commitments and capabilities. In regard to this latter point Forrestal added that the Chiefs should have supplied an assessment as to the impact the budget ceiling would have on their strategic plans. Such an assessment was necessary in order to make the balancing of capabilities and commitments a rational process. Specifically, the Secretary of Defense pointed out that he was satisfied with the Chiefs' efforts to perform the first task, but that he felt they had failed in their second task:

> The results of your work in carrying out the second phase of your instructions has been inadequate, apparently because there has been a departure from the primary JCS task of developing a statement of lesser force requirements, within fiscal limitations, which would still provide for relative readiness of the forces to be

maintained for the fiscal year 1950. By not pursuing
the primary initial objective in this second stage it
would appear that our efforts have degenerated into
a competition for dollars.

Forrestal went on to inform the Chiefs that they were to

begin work on "force requirements that can be supported

in the general area of 14.4 billion." [569]

It was at this point that Forrestal offered the Chiefs

an opportunity to develop a force posture at a higher funding

level, but he was not going to let them evade their responsi-

bilities. He told the Chiefs that he wanted a "statement

of force requirements on a basis of military necessity."

In essence the Chiefs were still to produce a plan based

on their best analysis of military requirements, but the

plan had to be within the President's ceiling. Even though

alternative force postures could be considered, the Presi-

dent's ceiling was still the goal to be strived for. The

following week he called in the Chiefs to outline the speci-

fics of his new proposal. He started by emphasizing the

importance of the Chiefs' credibility and its relation to

the budget process:

>It is vitally important that the concept of the JCS
>not lose face with the country....I think it is a danger-
>ous thing for the country if it does. You accept, to
>some extent, a confession of inability to get away from

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[569] Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 8 October
1948, no subject, Leahy Papers, folder "Budget and Estimates
1946-1950," U.S. Naval Archives.

service interests and look at the whole business in
the light of what national interest is. That will
be the public interpretation of it.[570]

On the surface, Forrestal was suggesting that the Chiefs

return a budget within the President's ceiling, even if

it meant accepting a "very minimum" atomic air assault force

stationed in Great Britain. Forrestal wanted the Chiefs

to point out the "absurdity" of such a posture, so that

he could argue for raising the ceiling. On a deeper level,

though, Forrestal seemed to be asking the Chiefs to consider

non-military factors, such as the nation's financial sta-

bility, when they prepared their force analysis. By doing

so they would be conducting themselves in a responsible

manner and producing a budget that would be in the national

interest.

On the 3rd of November, the Chiefs met to decide

how to respond to Forrestal. The Secretary had imposed

upon them an 8 November deadline, and warned them that if

they could not divide the funds themselves, he would impose

a division upon them.[571] Since the October 15 meeting in

Forrestal's office, the JCS had been trying to come to some

kind of compromise on the budget issue. They had returned

the budget to the McNarney Board with the twin goals of

producing a budget within the Presidential guidelines and

[570]Forrestal Diaries, 504 ff.

[571]Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National
Policy, 238.

producing an alternative budget as outlined by Forrestal.
In regard to the Board's first goal, no substantial improve-
ment had been made since the 7th of October. According
to the Army's representative, Major General George Richards,
there was "no material change in the views previously held by
[the services]." In an effort seemingly to substantiate
this statement, Richards recommended a budget distribution
that was identical to the Army's position on October 7th.
He freely acknowledged that such a division of funds would
result in an exclusive reliance on a Great Britain or North
African based Air Force atomic assault, and that it would
eliminate the Navy's ability to implement the Mediterranean
portion of "FLEETWOOD." In terms of force structuring,
this lack of a mission could lead to the reduction in the
size of the Navy's carrier task groups.[572] The basic stra-
tegic differences that had inhibited the budget process
from the start were still very much in evidence.

    With the budget assistants still stalemated over
the October figures, the Chiefs themselves moved to formu-
late a compromise position. Sometime between the 3rd

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[572] Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2 Novem-
ber 1948, subject: Force and Fund Allocations under the
14.4 billion Program, Leahy Papers, folder "Budget and
Estimates 1946-1950," U.S. Naval Archives; for General McNar-
ney's view, which was similar to Richards', see Memorandum
for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2 November 1948, subject:
Analyses of Force Requirements for Budget Estimates, Truman
Papers, Presidential Secretary File, General File, box 114,
folder "Bradley," Truman Library.

and the 8th of November, the Chiefs realized that since
they could not come to an agreement on a rational division
of the monies based on an integrated strategy, that the
best alternative was simply to scale down their requests
so that they fell under the ceiling. This kind of simple
quick fix solution was exactly the opposite of what Forrestal
wanted. Warner Schilling, in his study of the development
of the FY 50 budget, points out that neither the Army nor
the Navy were tempted by Forrestal's suggestion to accept
an unbalanced strategy with the hope of increased service
allocations. They did not believe that the Secretary of
Defense could prove the "absurdity" of the 14.4 billion
dollar strategy to the President; but that once the Chiefs
had agreed to the strategy, they would have to live with
it.[573] The Air Force also apparently came to the conclusion
that without the support of the other services, no JCS spon-
sored budget would be accepted at all. It is probable that
the Chiefs realized that if they did not act quickly, they
might be cut out of the budget process altogether, and possi-
bly permanently. On the 8th of November, the Chiefs sent
a memorandum to Forrestal outlining a division of funds
within the ceiling's requirements. The Army would receive
4.8 billion, the Navy 4.6 billion, and the Air Force 5.0

[573] Schilling, "The Politics of National Defense:
Fiscal 1950," 196.

billion. Despite this agreement on the general breakdown
of the monies, the memorandum pointed out that there still
remained a difference of opinion as to the number of air-
craft carriers the Navy needed. The Army recommended six,
the Navy wanted nine, and the Air Force felt that four was
sufficient. Without some kind of agreement on an integrated
strategy the division of FY 50 funds had not really solved
anything, and the Chiefs were no closer to being prepared
to truly participate in the budget process than they were
before.[574]

Shortly afterwards, the Chiefs submitted a 16.9 billion
dollar alternative budget.[575] As they probably expected
the administration kept within its ceiling, thus negating
the value of the alternative budget.

The development of the FY 50 budget reflected most
of the problems that would continue to hamper efforts at
effective policy integration during the remainder of the
period of our study. From the very beginning, the Chiefs

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[574] Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 8 Novem-
ber 1948, subject: Allocation of Funds for 1950 Budget,
Leahy Papers, folder "Budget and Estimates 1946-1950," U.S.
Naval Archives. The fact that this was somewhat of a pyrrhic
victory for Forrestal is indicated in a 9 November letter
to Truman in which he outlined his problems with the Chiefs
and that he wanted Eisenhower's help in the future, Truman
Papers, Presidential Secretary File, General File, box 120,
folder "Forrestal - General," Truman Library.

[575] Letter, Forrestal to Truman, 1 December 1948,
Clifford Papers, box 17, folder, "Unification - Secretary
of Defense," Truman Library.

were working under the twin handicaps of lacking a systematic

means of developing their own unified plans, and working

within a policy vacuum. The political mission statement,

which was the essential first step in Forrestal's "new prin-

ciple," was not forthcoming. Early in the FY 50 process,

Forrestal had asked the National Security Council for guidance

upon which the Joint Chiefs could base their budget assump-

tions:

> I believe that it is imperative that a comprehensive
> statement of national policy be prepared, particularly
> as it relates to Soviet Russia, and that this statement
> specify and evaluate the risks, state our objectives,
> and outline the measures to be followed in achieving
> them....such a statement is needed to guide the National
> Military Establishment in determining the level and
> character of armament which it should seek and, I believe,
> to assist the President in determining the proportion
> of our resources which should be dedicated to military
> purposes. I also believe that it is fundamental to
> decisions concerning the size of, and relative emphasis
> in, our national budget.

While Forrestal's request may be construed as a ploy to

raise the budget ceiling, it also clearly was an effort

to refocus the budget process in the direction that he origi-

nally envisioned it. Although the NSC began to work on

a response, the President informed his Secretary of Defense

that it was his responsibility to "establish a program within

the budget limits which have been allowed," and that the

effort should not wait on the NSC.[576]

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[576]Memorandum for the Executive Secretary National
Security Council, 10 July 1948, subject: Appraisal of the
Degree and Character of Military Preparedness Required

Forrestal's failure to elicit specific guidance from

the NSC forced the Chiefs, as individuals and as a corporate

group, to generate their own assumptions and to determine

certain strategic priorities which were reflected in their

war plans.   Ultimately, however, the Chiefs did have an

opportunity to become involved in the NSC policy integration

process, when they were asked to comment on a draft of NSC

20/3.   On May 25,1948, the JCS were formally asked to develop

a catalog of American commitments "involving the use or

possible use of Armed Forces."   Such a list would be an

integral part in the development of the political mission

statement.   In putting together the catalog, the Chiefs

interpreted the term "commitments" in its broadest context

"to include not only actual assignments of force,...but

also commitments of a less tangible nature, such as those

implicit in pledges, pacts, contingent military actions

and our foreign policies."   The conclusion drawn from this

study was to be expected:

> It is clear from the above summary of commitments and
> their implications and from the attitude and capabilities
> of the USSR, together with the determination of the
> United States to resist communist aggression, an
> over-all commitment which in itself is all-inclusive

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of the World Situation, Truman Papers, Presidential Secretary
File, box 156, folder "Def. Sec. of - Misc folder #1," Truman
Library.   The President's response was a memorandum dated
13 July, 1948, same folder.

and with which the Joint Chiefs of Staff are firmly in agreement, that it is essential to our national security to bring our military strength to a level commensurate with the distinct possibility of global warfare.[577]

The obvious solution to the imbalance between national capabilities and national commitments was to increase the size of the military. Thus the catalog supplied the Chiefs with a perfect weapon with which to attack the budget ceiling. The trouble with this approach, was that the Chiefs waited too long before releasing the document. It was not sent to Forrestal until 2 November 1948, and was referred to in their formal comments on NSC 20/3 two weeks later. Again, the Chiefs pointed out "the dangers inherent in undue disparity between the nation's capabilities and commitments."[578] In effect the Chiefs were charging the civilian leadership to carefully point out exactly what they wanted to accomplish with America's military forces. On the one hand, this would allow the military to shift the blame to the civilians for an inadequate force posture, and reinforce the Chiefs' claim to autonomy in the budget process. On the other hand, if

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[577] Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 2 November 1948, subject: Existing International Commitments Involving the Possible Use of Armed Forces, Leahy Papers, folder "JCS Outgoing Correspondence October 1948-January 1949," U.S. Naval Archives.

[578] Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 15 November 1948, subject: U.S. Objectives with Respect to the U.S.S.R. to counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security, Truman Papers, Presidential Secretary File, Subject File, National Security Council, Box 204, folder, "Meeting #27," Truman Library.

the administration failed to effectively outline their military goals, then the Chiefs would again be in a position to claim autonomy. This was the reverse of what appeared to be the President's approach in which the Chiefs were asked to define what they could accomplish within the budget ceiling.[579] If the Chiefs actually intended to use their catalog and NSC 20/3 as a means of changing the budget ceiling, it failed primarily due to the fact that the document was issued too late in the process to have any effect. By then Forrestal had already issued his ultimatum to the Chiefs and whatever credibility they may have had as a corporate entity had been lost. Had it been available earlier, it might have forced the administration into rethinking the rationale behind the ceiling, or at least would have served as a focus for Forrestal's desire to restructure the budget process in the way he originally envisioned.

A collateral factor that impeded the effective formulation of FY 50 was Forrestal's desire that the Chiefs develop their proposals based solely upon military requirements. This was made very specific in his October 8th memorandum to the Chiefs, in which he outlined his goal of an alternative budget:

> In carrying out this assignment, I do not feel that
> it is necessary for you to consider such matters as

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[579] Condit, <u>The Joint Chiefs of Staff in National Policy</u>, 232.

political complications, possible commitments made in
earlier Congressional testimony, etc. In other words,
I want from you a statement of force requirements on
a basis of military necessity. Other considerations
will, of course, be taken into account in the making
of final decisions, but in the final analysis the respon-
sibility for taking such considerations into account
will be that of the President, assisted to the extent
he deems necessary by the suggestions of his political
advisers.[580]

There is an apparent paradox in the Secretary's desire on

the one hand to have the Chiefs retain their traditionalism,

while on the other hand, understand the budget limitations

and work within them. This paradox is explained when one

recalls Forrestal's original outline of his "new principle."

The Chiefs would take the administration's policy guidance

and convert it into an integrated military plan initially

based "solely on military considerations."[581] Once that

had been accomplished it would then be evaluated against

fiscal and political feasibility. The result would be a

force structure that would achieve the greatest degree of

military security within the limits of those constraints.

As important as it was to have the Chiefs involved in this

stage of the process, it was even more important that they

be involved during the first stage, the formulation of the

political mission statement. If the Chiefs' military advice

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[580]Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 8 October
1948, no subject, Leahy Papers, folder "Budget and Estimates
1946-1950," U.S. Naval Archives.

[581]First Report of the Secretary of Defense, 41.

was effectively integrated into the system during the first
stage, then it made sense to restrict the Chiefs to solely
military considerations at the later stage. The evaluation
of fiscal and political feasibility would be merely a check
stage to guarantee that the JCS's military plans did in
fact support the political goals that were agreed upon earlier
and were within the fiscal limitations also agreed to.

Ultimately, the problem of the stage at which the
Chiefs should be participants was the cause of Forrestal's
efforts being ruined. The first stage of the process, that
of developing an integrated and balanced policy never did
occur. The formulation of NSC 20/3 and the JCS's catalog
of commitments were never directly connected with the budget
process, despite Forrestal's and the Chief's efforts. These
two documents should have been an integral part in determining
the political mission statement. Instead the Chiefs were
brought into the process much later, after the parameters
of that mission statement had been established. Thus the
Chiefs lacked an understanding of the rationale behind the
setting of priorities that led to the ceiling. Without
this understanding, this requirement that they develop their
military plans "based solely on military considerations,"
had a different meaning than Forrestal envisioned. The
Chiefs' analysis of the situation from the military

perspective naturally resulted in a budget in excess of the administration's ceiling. Expecting the Chiefs to somehow remain within their professional limits, yet conscious of the non-military issues, when they had not participated in the decision making process, resulted in a high degree of organizational frustration. The Chiefs believed that they were expected to give their professional imprimatur to a force posture that had been arrived at without any professional input.

The fact that the Chiefs could not "objectively" arrive at the administration's budget ceiling for both the FY 49 supplement and the FY 50 budget pointed out to the administration the dangers of allowing the Chiefs budgetary autonomy. From that time on, during the remainder of the Truman administration and during the Eisenhower administration, the Chiefs would have to endure budget ceilings at the onset of the planning cycle. Professor Lawrence Korb's research into the budget process clearly substantiates the Chiefs' own view that as a result of these ceilings, they had "virtually no impact upon determining the actual size of the military budget."[582] While individual Chiefs such as Ridgway and Taylor voiced their disapproval of this mode

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[582] Lawrence Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First Twenty-Five Years, 1947-1972 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), 128.

of operation, it was the Wheeler Report that captured the

JCS's institutional dissidence on this matter:

> The manner and timing in which the Services' budgets
> are justified, appropriated, and apportioned sometimes
> unduly determine military policy and strategy on the
> basis of peacetime economy and management rather than
> the readiness for war.
>
> Determinations which are essentially military have been
> affected by means of fiscal controls and adjustments
> so that the resulting military funds, as finally appor-
> tioned, are often askew from the military requirements
> upon which the budget was originally predicated.

The end result of the use of these non-military determinants

and the imposition of the budget ceilings was to prevent

"the objective determination of requirements based upon

directed roles, missions and plans followed by a tayloring

to fit a feasible financial plan."[583]

Clearly, the Chiefs appeared to be calling for a

return to Forrestal's original concept of the budget process

which they assumed would allow them a greater degree of

autonomy over matters they considered "essentially military."

But a careful examination of the Wheeler Report's attack

upon imposed budget ceilings reveal fundamental differences

between the Forrestal model of policy integration and the

military's model. Forrestal presupposed the Chief's par-

ticipation during the early stages of the process, when

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[583]U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Report by the Ad
Hoc Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Organization
of the Department of Defense, 24 January 1958 (Hereafter
referred to as the Wheeler Report), 13-14.

political and fiscal guidelines would be established. This

was the basis of his criticism of the Army's "straight-

line of command" and its sharp black and white distinctions

between military and civilian functions.[584] Those guidelines,

which were the result of integrating political and military

policy, would become the mission statement which would drive

the remainder of the process. The military's integration

process as outlined in the Wheeler Report assumes that there

would be no consideration of fiscal feasibility until the

Chiefs' had submitted their requirements statement. The

notion of tayloring the force structure at that point implies

that the Chiefs were not involved at an earlier stage when

fiscal limitations of a non-military variety would naturally

be discussed. They, in essence, were expecting the civilians

to develop political guidance without fiscal considerations,

while they themselves would develop their military require-

ments in a similar vacuum. Ironically, this was precisely

the pattern that was exhibited during FY 50, with the one

exception, that the civilians did consider financial matters

from the start. Under the military's integration process

model, the Chiefs would constantly be producing military

plans that were divorced from reality, as they did in FY 50.

It was this very inability to develop plans that was in

tune with reality that resulted in their exclusion from

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[584] Memorandum Forrestal to Clifford, 7 September
1946, Clifford Papers, box 16, folder "Unification Correspon-
dence - General," Truman Library.

the budget process. The only other option would have been

for the Chiefs to have considered non-military factors when

they developed their force requirements, but this may have

been impossible given their professionalism and the civilian's

fear of subverting civilian control of the military.

The only other time the Chiefs were allowed the oppor-

tunity to redeem themselves occurred a decade later during

the formulation of the Fiscal Year 1959 budget. Again the

Chiefs based their requirements on their professional analy-

sis of the situation, excluded non-military factors, and

produced a budgetary requirement 10 billion dollars in excess

of the administration's desires.[585] Ironically, the Wheeler

Report attacked the FY 59 budget as an example of an imposed

budget ceiling, claiming that it was "contrary to accepted

budgetary practices.[586] Ignoring the fact that budget ceil-

ings had been the norm for a decade, the sequencing of events

actually conformed to the Chiefs' process model, in that

after the Chiefs had developed their requirements, they

were measured against "financial feasibility."

The primary lesson learned from the formulation of

FY 50, and reinforced during the development of FY 59, was

that the Chiefs' desire for budgetary autonomy was incompati-

ble with the civilian leadership's obligation to consider

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[585]Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 106-7.

[586]Wheeler Report, 13.

a broad spectrum of factors influencing national security.
The Chiefs' concept of professionalism demanded autonomy
and any attenuation of their estimates meant an affront
to their professional capability and a violation of tradi-
tionalism. In an effort to get around this traditional
professionalism, the Truman and the Eisenhower administra-
tions reorganized the Department of Defense. It was hoped
that if the Chiefs achieved unanimity, the kinds of dysfunc-
tional inter-service rivalry that took place during the
formulation of the first budget would be eliminated. The
establishment of budgetary ceilings was simply one approach
to dealing with the unrealistic estimates that were being
produced by the JCS. While it is true that "realism" is
relative, in this case the lack of it had the effect of
removing the Joint Chiefs from any meaningful role in the
budgetary process. The fact that the Chiefs, themselves,
were at least partially at fault was never understood by
the military professionals.

While the lessons of FY 50 had a negative effect,
at least in terms of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's future
role in the formulation of the defense budget, they also
had a positive effect on the political and the military
planning systems. After the failure of the budget, the
civilian leadership and the Joint Chiefs apparently agreed
that it was necessary for both the NSC and the JCS to

develop cohesive planning systems within their own structures
and that these newly formed systems would merge their pro-
ducts together to form a unified integrated political/military
plan. This would remove the twin handicaps that had faced
the Chiefs during the formulation of FY 50: the lack of
policy guidance, and the lack of a unified military plan.

In an effort to fill the vacuum in policy direction
a process of codifying national security policy began during
the Korean War and continued on vigorously during the Eisen-
hower administration. This process had two facets. First,
the National Security Council Staff expanded into a more
structured system in order to process guidance. Second,
the NSC formalized and regularized its guidance. This move-
ment culminated, during the Eisenhower administration, in
the publication of an annual document entitled Basic National
Security Policy (BNSP). According to Lawrence Legere, the
BNSP "broadly defined U.S.interests and objectives, analyzed
the major trends in world affairs that might affect them,
and set forth a national strategy for achieving them, cover-
ing political, economic, and military elements thereof."[587]
The BNSP was the result of the President's own inclination
to structure things in a military staff manner. Maxwell

[587]Keith C. Clark and Lawrence J. Legere, editors,
The President and the Management of National Security: A
Report by the Institute for Defense Analysis (New York:
Fredrick A. Praeger, 1969), 218.

Taylor recalled that "it was just like his [Eisenhower's] old staff at SHAEF; all the committees of the NSC were like his general staff divisions."[588] Undoubtedly, Eisenhower looked upon the BNSP as the operations order upon which the JCS would base its planning.

As the National Security Council began to codify its own product and establish communication with other governmental agencies, it was apparent that the JCS would have to do likewise. In 1950, a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was added to the NSC staff, but still the communications problems remained.[589] Until the Joint Chiefs of Staff developed a system that produced a unified military plan it would be almost impossible for them to supply useful advice to the NSC. The lack of such a system had contributed significantly toward the failure of the FY 50 budget. It was with this in mind that the Joint Chiefs of Staff established their "program for planning" in July 1952.

This concept was first outlined by Vice Admiral Arthur Davis, the Director of the Joint Staff, in 1949. Rather

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[588] Maxwell D. Taylor, "Reflections on the American Military Establishment," in Evolution of the American Military Establishment Since World War II, ed. by Paul Schratz (Lexington, Virginia: George C. Marshall Research Foundation, 1978), 9.

[589] Jackson Committee, 432; for a discussion of how the JCS and NSC ultimately developed very effective linkages during the Viet Nam War see William Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979).

inexplicably, although the Korean War had to have had some

impact, the program was not put into effect until almost

three years later. In its final form, the Joint Chiefs

of Staff Memorandum of Policy (MOP) #84 outlined the formu-

lation of three basic policy planning documents, the short

range Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), the mid-

ranged Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP), and the long-

ranged Joint Long Range Strategic Estimate (JLRSE). The

JSCP was the successor to the short range Joint Emergency

War Plans that were the only integrated planning documents

prior to the Korean War. The JSCP dealt with the contemporary

world situation, outlined the services' capabilities and

described how they would react to certain contingencies.

The JLRSE (at times identified as the Joint Long Range Stra-

tegic Study, JLRSS) is a long range study, ten years or

more in advance, which emphasized broad trends rather than

attempting to outline specific operational plans. the JLRSE

was particularly valuable in the area of research and develop-

ment where lead times of a decade or more are normally

required.

While both of these documents are important in the

planning process, it is the JSOP that is the focal point

of the JCS interface with the budget process. According

to the official definition, the Joint Strategic Objectives

Plan is:

> A mid-range objectives plan which translates U.S.
> national objectives and policies from the time frame
> 5-8 years in the future into terms of military objec-
> tives and strategic concepts and defines basic under-
> takings for cold, limited, and general war which may
> be accomplished with the objective force levels.[590]

The JSOP filled the crucial void in the Forrestal/Sherman

approach to the budget process. It was this document that

translated the NSC's political mission statement into a

military force posture. The JSOP was exactly the type of

document that Forrestal wanted the JCS to develop during

the formulation of FY 50, and as such it should be the central

document in the policy integration effort.

The JSOP, however, can only be as good as the guidance

the Joint Chiefs received from the National Security Council.

Despite the Council's vigorous efforts, the Chiefs all through

the Eisenhower administration felt that the NSC's guidance

was still insufficient. This view was reinforced by indepen-

dent analysis such as the Task Force on Procurement of the

Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the

Government which conducted its study in 1955.[591] This con-

tinued criticism of the political guidance is central to

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[590]Dictionary of United States Army Terms, Army Regu-
lation 310-325 (Headquarters, Department of the Army, June
1972), 290.

[591]Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch
of the Government, Five Staff Papers Prepared for the Task
Force on Procurement, Volume I, Defense Procurement: The
Vital Roles of the National Security Council and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (Washington, D.C.: June 1955), A-44.

understanding why the Chiefs continued to believe that the

policy integration process was a failure and that they were

operating in a policy vacuum. Probably, the foremost military

critic of the BNSP was General Maxwell Taylor. General

Taylor described that the BNSP "should be the blueprint

for the security programs of all departments of the govern-

ment and provide the JCS with a firm point of departure

for their strategic planning:"

> Unfortunately, such is not the case. The end product...
> has thus far been a document so broad in nature and
> so general in language as to provide limited guidance
> in practical application. In the course of its develop-
> ment, the sharp issues in national defense which confront
> our leaders have been blurred in conference and in
> negotiation. The final text thus permits many different
> interpretations. The protagonists of Massive Retaliation
> or of Flexible Response, the partisans of the importance
> of air power or of limited war, as well as the defenders
> of other shades of military opinion, we are able to
> find language supporting their divergent points of view.
> The "Basic National Security Policy" document means
> all things to all people and settles nothing.[592]

Since the Chiefs perceived that the BNSP failed to supply

them with appropriate guidance, they, according to Generals

Taylor and Decker, were forced to generate their own assump-

tions upon which they based the JSOP.[593] In a cyclical

kind of scenario, this resulted in the Chiefs supplying

useless advice to the civilians. While the Task Force on

Procurement was criticizing the NSC for its guidance, it

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[592] Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), 82-83.

[593] Interview with Generals Taylor and Decker, January 1975, Washington, D.C.

was also pointing out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had failed to develop a coordinated and integrated war plan and that "efforts to bring non-military advice into the process had been relatively unfruitful."[594]

The fact that the Chiefs had to generate their own assumptions when they wrote their first Joint Emergency War Plans, "BROLIER/FROLIC", in 1946, was explicable;[595] but once the NSC became operational it was dysfunctional. This was partially the cause of the continual disparity between the JCS generated force requirements and the fiscal constraints outlined by the civilian leadership. Granted, the JCS did supply input during the writing of the BNSP, but from the Chiefs perception it was simply "feeding the paper mill over at the NSC."[596] Conversely, one can get a sense of what Eisenhower thought of the JCS input by recalling that in 1958 he not only restructured the Department of Defense, but specifically reorganized the internal staffing structure of the Joint Chiefs.

The failure of the policy integration program that General Taylor noted was reflected in the continual existence of the budget ceilings, which in turn meant that the JSOP

[594] Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Task Force on Procurement, A-44.

[595] Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 276-77.

[596] Interview with General Taylor, January 1975, Washington, D.C.

was not being considered in the generation of a force posture. Forrestal realized that a JSOP type document was essential to the budget process, because it would translate the political mission statement into forces, missions, and dollars; but the budget ceilings superceded the political mission statement and reversed the process by which force levels were determined. This reversal effectively took the Chiefs out of the decision making process, and led General Taylor to write that "nowhere in the machinery of government is there a procedure for checking military capabilities and political commitments.[597]

With the Chiefs' efforts at attaining autonomy in the budget process blocked by the imposition of budget ceilings, they apparently tried the next best thing; to influence the formulation of the political mission statement in such a manner that it would allow for the force levels the Chiefs' sought. This effort met with mixed success in regards to the three major policy statements written during the period, NSC 20/3, NSC 68 (written in 1949-50), and NSC 162/2 (written in 1953). In all three cases the Chiefs attempted to create the image of a disjuncture between the nation's strategic commitments and its military capabilities. This was obviously

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[597] Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, 83. General Taylor tried to get Secretary of State Dulles to meet regularly with the Chiefs. While he did meet with the Secretary informally, there never were established regular meetings. Taylor, interview.

the intention of the Chiefs in their use of the catalog
of commitments to criticize NSC 20/3. While their efforts
failed in 1943, they met with greater success the following
year during the writing of NSC 68. This documents was written
in response to the shocks of the Russian explosion of an
atomic bomb and the fall of China, and was designed to lay
the foundation for future American mobilization. Although
the Chiefs remained conspicuously aloof from the document's
actual development, a representative of the Joint Staff's
Joint Strategic Survey Committee, Major General Truman H.
Landon, was deeply involved in its writing. When the stra-
tegic implications of NSC 68 were translated into dollars
and cents it came surprisingly close to the Chiefs' original
recommendations for FY 50.[598] NSC 68 was never put into
effect because of the advent of the Korean War.

While the Chiefs met with mixed success in their
first two efforts to substantially influence policy, they
were far more successful during the formulation of the NSC 162/2.
Shortly after his election, President Eisenhower called
his new Chiefs together and asked them to examine America's
strategic posture and generate supporting budget estimates.
Their first efforts resulted in estimates that were six
to seven billion dollars in excess of the administration's

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[598]See Paul Y. Hammond "NSC-68: Prologue Rearma-
ment", in Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets.

figures. The Chiefs argued through their spokesman, Admiral Radford, that since the military had not been notified of an official administration position on the use of nuclear weapons, they had to plan for every possible contingency across the whole spectrum of war. According to policy analyst Glenn Snyder, Admiral Radford maintained that if the Chiefs "were told what kind [of war] they were to prepare for, and, in particular, if they were given permission to use nuclear weapons whenever it was technically advantageous to do so, then the costs of defense would be lower."[599] Radford's position that nuclear firepower could substitute for manpower became one of the pillars of the New Look.

These three examples seem to indicate, at least superficially, that the Chiefs were being drawn into the policy process and were capable of influencing the formulation of strategic guidance, but the Chiefs were successful only when their goals were in congruence with the goals of the administration. In 1949 the Truman administration and especially the State Department was very interested in redeveloping the military option. This created the situation for a reevaluation of the whole strategic force structure in NSC 68. In 1953 Radford's arguments for replacing expensive

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[599] Glenn Snyder, "The New Look," in Strategy Politics, and Defense Budgets, 427

manpower with firepower was supported by Secretary of State

John Foster Dulles, who was already committed to the use

of nuclear weapons.[600] When there was a lack of congruence,

as in the case of the development of NSC 20/3, the JCS had

little impact.

The essence of a process to produce an integrated

political/military policy was to achieve a nexus between

the nation's political goals, the military planning process,

and the development of the defense budget. As management

specialist Fredrick Mosher pointed out in his 1954 study

of the defense budget process, "military plans are ineffec-

tive unless they are supported by the budget; and the budgets

are meaningless unless they are based upon sound military

planning, itself built upon approved objectives in foreign

policy."[601] It was in an effort to achieve this nexus that

the rationalism of program budgeting was first introduced.

The problem was that this logical and rational process broke

down with each side blaming the other for the failure to

produce an integrated political/military policy with neither

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[600]In 1952 Dulles published an article in _Life_ Magazine
entitled "A policy of Boldness," in which he advocated a
massive retaliation type strategy. Eisenhower pointed out
to Dulles that such an approach lacked flexibility. Townsend
Hoopes, _The Devil and John Foster Dulles_ (Boston: Little
Brown & Co., 1973), 126-28.

[601]Fredrick Mosher, _Program Budgeting: Theory and
Practice, With Particular Reference to the U.S. Department
of the Army_ (Chicago: Public Administrative Service, 1954),
56.

side fully understanding why the breakdown occurred. The

civilian leadership's experience, first during FY 50 and

later with FY 59, convinced them that the Chiefs could never

be allowed the budget autonomy that they demanded. The

constant interse warfare over weapons systems acquisition

reinforced this assumption.[602] Thus both the Truman and

the Eisenhower administrations established budget ceilings,

which seemed to substantiate the Chief's contention that

the nation's capabilities and commitments were not being

effectively analyzed and balanced. Unfortunately, such

a superficial examination of the breakdown fails to tell

us actually what happened. In order to understand what

did happen we must go through the process and analytically

compare it to our hypothetical model.

First let us examine the nature of the political

mission statement that starts the budget process. The Chiefs

claimed that these statements were ineffectual, forcing them

to operate in a policy vacuum. While such a perception

is quite understandable when there was a lack of institutional

linkage between the JCS and the NSC, the creation of the

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[602]For a discussion of the debates over weapons sys-
tems see Michael Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation:
The Thor-Jupiter Controversy (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1969); Edmund Beard, Developing the ICBM: A Study
in Bureaucratic Politics (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1976); John Medaris, Countdown for Decision (New
York: G. P. Putman's Sons, 1960); James Baar and William
E. Howard, Polaris: The Concept and Creation of a New and
Mighty Weapon (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1960);
Richard Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Nuclear Navy: 1946-
1962(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974).

BNSP should have changed that. One possible explanation

for the continuation of this perception may have been the

Chief's own experience with the military's mission statement.

Within the military logic process, the mission statement

is the essential ingredient, since the commander's "estimate

of the situation" cannot begin without it. Only after he

has received the mission statement is it possible to begin

to look at the enemy situation, the forces available to

him, the terrain, and so forth. The primacy of the mission

statement is clearly noted in the following extract from

the 1940 edition of the United States Army Staff Officer's

Field Manual:

> Every military operation should have a definite aim.
> All missions assigned incident to an operation are con-
> tributory to that end. A commander's mission as conveyed
> in orders or instructions from higher authority should
> require the adoption of a definite course of action [603]
> in meeting the situation which confronts his command.

It is essential that the mission statement define with great

precision the exact objective of the operation. Conversely,

according to one military commentator, "a complex and vaguely

worded objective induces inefficiency and ineffectiveness." [604]

Compared to the specificity of the typical military mission

statement, the NSC's general policy statements epitomized

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[603] War Department, Staff Officer Field Manual: The Staff and Combat Orders (F.M. 101-5) (Washington, D.C.: 1940), 125.

[604] John Beishline, Military Management for National Defense (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950), 48.

vagueness and complexity. This represented a problem when
one realizes that the Chiefs apparently were looking to
the leadership of the Defense Department or to the NSC to
supply them with a military-like mission statement upon
which they could base their planning. In the formulation
of both NSC 20/3 and NSC 162/2 the Chiefs went back to the
administration and asked for greater precision in what was
desired of the military forces. This explains why the Chiefs
opposed the use of ceilings which in effect asked them what
they could accomplish within certain budgetary limitations.
Their opposition to budget ceilings loses credibility, though,
in the face of further examination of the mission statement
model. One of the normal elements of the mission statement
is the allocation of forces to accomplish the mission. If
the commander feels that the forces given to him are insuffi-
cient he can request more, but if that fails he must attempt
to carry out the mission with the forces at his disposal.
The budget ceiling may be viewed as merely the allocation
of forces to the military, and thus fits perfectly within
the mission statement model. Since the Chiefs were opposed
to it, there must have been another reason. Most likely
it was the fact it was developed by non-military professionals
and based upon non-military factors.

It is the use of the military mission statement model
that clarifies the differences between the military's

approach to policy integration from that of Forrestal's.
The military wanted to receive a political mission statement
from the civilians that would be specific enough for the
development of supporting military plans, but not too specific
as to infringe upon their professional prerogative. The
Chiefs would proceed to generate technical military plans
in an economically unconstrained environment with the only
yardstick of effectiveness being the achievement of the
political goals. Most likely, those goals would have to
be framed in geopolitical terms (e.g., the containment of
communism or the defense of Europe) in order to facilitate
their translation into military operations orders. Only
then would they be measured against economic feasibility.
In practice this balancing stage would have no meaningful
affect on the process, since the plans were professionally
developed. If the costs proved unrealistic, then the fault
lay in the original mission statement, which required that
too much be accomplished. It would be the original mission
that would have to be rewritten, either excluding certain
items or becoming more specific (e.g., allowing the use
of nuclear weapons as in the case of NSC 162/2).

Forrestal's approach was fundamentally different,
especially in the first stage. For the first Secretary
of Defense, it was the development of the political mission
statement that was the heart of the policy integration process.

It could not and would not be made exclusively by civilians
without military considerations being included. Thus the
Chiefs had to be involved in writing their own mission order.
Such a process would include consideration of all determi-
nants to include economic and budget factors. Once the
mission statement had been written, the Chiefs would then
apply their expertise and develop a strategic program to
support that mission. The development of this plan would
be unconstrained, except for the constraints that were already
included in the mission statement. Under this approach,
Forrestal was as against the establishment of budget ceilings
without military input, as the Chiefs were, but for obviously
different reasons.

The perceptual difference about the first stage of
the integration process was the tragic flaw that ruined
the best efforts at making the system work. Since the Chiefs
apparently could not work within the framework supplied
by the vague and clearly non-military political mission
statements, they generated their own assumptions upon which
to start the planning process. Naturally, these assumptions
were laced with service perspectives. One example of this
occurred during the writing of NSC 162/2. Radford had built
his argument for the freedom to use nuclear weapons upon
a dysjuncture between commitments and capabilities. This
of course had been the approach taken by the Chiefs in 1948,

but Radford and his supporters defined commitments very
narrowly to mean only agreements in which military force
was actually committed. This would allow for a much smaller
force structure than if the definition would include all
possible commitments as the Chiefs used in their 1948 catalog
and Ridgway argued for in 1953. This broader definition
would allow for a larger force structure, especially for
the Army.[605] It was differences like this that resulted
in paperclipped budgets that far exceeded the civilian's
expectations. Although the Chiefs may have differed on
service matters, they all agreed that the budget should
only consider military expediency. The Chiefs did not con-
sider this to be dysfunctional because this was the way
their professional and organizational ethic was structured.
Autonomy in the budget process meant the exclusion of non-
military considerations.

The Truman and Eisenhower administrations tried to
bridge this gap between the Chief's military requirements
and reality by requiring that the Chiefs take economic factors
into consideration. Forrestal tried this in his 8 October
memorandum, and Wilson tried it wih his 1954 Directive, but
this only created a potentially greater problem and a major
dilemma for the Chiefs. If the military professionals

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[605] Snyder, "The New Look," 427.

began to take into account non-military factors, then the foundation of American civilian-control of the military would be undermined. Only a truely integrated and fusionist approach during the first stage of the process could solve this problem. Fusionism, if understoood correctly by both the civilians and the professional military would not endanger civilian control, and possibly would reinforce it. From the Chiefs' perspective, to submit to the administration's desires and incorporate economic factors not only violated their professionalism, but also made them vulnerable to attack since they lacked the expertise to generate economic assumptions. Furthermore, any conclusion that differed from the administration's would be deemed wrong and further weaken their credibility. Another factor that the Chiefs undoubtedly considered was that the development of alternative force structures would allow the civilians to make crucial military decisions. In the bifurcated world of the military professional, only the expert should be allowed to make those decisions. The Chiefs did not seem to understand that their rejection of fusionism allowed the civilians to exclude them totally from the budget process, leaving the non-military leaders of the administration to make the important military decisions anyway. Given their professional

ethic, it was only natural for the Chiefs to posit these non-experts could never adequately balance the nation's capabilities and commitments. While the placement of blame might be at least partially wrong, the Chiefs were right that policy integration had failed.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

In January 1961, a new Democratic administration came
into office, and like his two predecessors, President Kennedy
understood the necessity of having an effectively managed
defense structure. With this in mind, Kennedy asked former
Secretary of the Air Force, Senator Stuart Symington, to
form a committee to examine restructuring the Department
of Defense. The Symington Committee reported that the re-
organizations of 1949, 1953, and 1958 had not fundamentally
altered the original 1947 structure and that these reorgani-
zations had "failed to bring the organizational structure
of the Department [of Defense] into line with the require-
ments of today's military conditions."[606]

The fundamental structural problem the Committee
pointed out was the confusion that arose from having both
a service and a Department of Defense chain of command.
The solution to this duality was to eliminate the service
secretaries. Their functions would be absorbed by two new
super-directorates that would be formed within the Defense
Department: one for Weapons Systems, and the other for

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[606] Committee on the Defense Establishment, Report to
Senator Kennedy from Committee on the Defense Establishment
(Washington, D.C.: 1960), 3.

Administration. Each would be headed by an Under Secretary
of Defense. This same duality was also pointed out as im-
peding the effectiveness of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
because it forced the Chiefs to assume a "two-hatted charac-
ter" which resulted in inter-service rivalry. The solution
was to eliminate the JCS as it was then configured and to
replace it with a new Military Advisory Council consisting
of senior officers, possibly retired, who would have no
service responsibility. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff would be redesignated the Chairman of the Joint
Staff (which would be expanded in size) and named the
principal military advisor to the President and the Secretary
of Defense. While the chiefs of service would still exist
they would not be a member of the expanded Joint Staff nor
on the Advisory Council, and their precise role was left
rather unclear. In regard to the defense budget, the pro-
fessional military's role was never mentioned, forshadowing
Robert McNamara's total assumption of this responsibility
when he came into office. The logic of this further concen-
tration of power was reaffirmed by Secretary McNamara who
discovered upon assuming office "that the three military
departments had been establishing their requirements inde-
pendently of each other" and that these "so-called require-
ments bore almost no relation to the real world."[607]

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[607]Robert McNamara, The Essence of Security: Reflec-
tions in Office (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 90.

The problems that both the Symington Committee and Secretary McNamara described were by no means new ones. Every staff analysis since Forrestal's <u>First Report of the Secretary of Defense</u> had repeatedly pointed out that the JCS was not effectively coordinating its plans with other agencies and that their plans tended to be divorced from reality. Furthermore, these studies had continually main- tained that there was a relationship between dysfunctional inter-service rivalry and the fact that the Chiefs had to assume both the role of a service commander and a planner within the corporate structure of the JCS. Yet, three re- organizations later, these problems still remained and the panacea of earlier reorganizations, greater centralization into the hands of the civilian defense managers, was again offered as the solution.

The reason for this constant reinvention of the orga- nizational wheel was that the civilian leaders did not under- stand that there were two root causes to these problems and not just one. The first cause, which was more readily identifiable, was organizational and bureaucratic. It was manifested symptomatically by inter-service rivalry and became the primary target for reform. Furthermore, concen- trating on the organizational and bureaucratic causes had the advantage of dealing exclusively with structural matters and avoiding having to address the more complex and

controversial fundamental values and relationships that
existed between the civilian leadership and the military
professional. The second cause, which was less apparent,
but inextricably related to those values and relationships
that were untouched by organizational reform, was the nature
of military professionalism. The civilian defense managers
never did understand that they could not totally solve the
first problem without understanding the second.

It was the issue of inter-service rivalry that captured
the attention of critics of the defense planning system.
Unfortunately, that rivalry was all too easily attributed
to the Chiefs having a "two-hatted" role. Once it became
dogma that there was a cause and effect relationship between
the Chief's placement within the chain of command and inter-
service rivalry, it was axiomatic that the removal of the
former would eliminate the latter. This explains why exclud-
ing the Chiefs from the chain of command became the organiza-
tional panacea for both the Truman and the Eisenhower admini-
strations. But this over-concentration on the chain of
command issue merely obfuscated the fact that it was the
services that were in conflict, not just the Chiefs.

The military services, like any large bureaucratic
organization, had vital interests to protect. Those interests
were generally outlined in the service's roles and missions,
and were more specifically identified in the allocation

of combat missions under the various war plans. Any change
in one of these missions had far-reaching fiscal and organiza-
tional consequences. The protection of these vital interests
led the Chiefs to engage in the same type of bureaucratic
decision making that was occurring all over Washington.
While considered quite acceptable behavior when conducted
by civilian decision makers, it was looked upon as dysfunc-
tional when exhibited by the professional military.

This double standard also ignored the reality that
inter-service rivalry was not just the result of petty
bureaucrats fighting among themselves for a larger slice
of the budget. The Chiefs, as representatives of military
services that had totally different approaches to waging
war, honestly believed that their service was essential
to the nation's defense. Since the military budget was
a reflection of the problems associated with inter-service
rivalry, any objective evaluation of service representation
was impossible. It was forgotten that the Chiefs were
appointed because of their service experience and their
ability to advise based on experience. From the Chief's
perspective, that advisory ability was directly tied to
their command function. One is reminded of Admiral Burke's
statement that "if the Chiefs didn't represent their services
who were they to represent."

Most of the Chiefs saw divergencies of opinion,

resulting from service representation, in a positive light.
The Truman administration, plagued with service conflict,
rejected such pluralism almost from the start. Furthermore,
the civilian leadership did not seem to appreciate the fact
that the Chiefs performed a valuable function while playing
the service "front man" for the administration. They not
only added authoritative support to the administration's
position, they also channeled service discontent. Admiral
Denfeld lost control of his service's officer corps when
it was felt that he could no longer be trusted to defend
the Navy's vital interests. As a result, the officer corps
believed that it had no choice but to seek alternate means
of expression, such as the Congress or the press. Thus
a certain amount of rivalry was necessary, if for nothing
more than constituent consumption.

A related organizational problem was that of the
bureaucratic nature of the Joint Staff. Within the Joint
Staff the problem of service bureaucratic imperatives was
exacerbated by its interconnection with individual career
enhancement. During both the Truman and the Eisenhower
administrations, there were organizational efforts to elevate
the Joint Staff above service interests. The expansion
of the Armed Forces Staff College and the creation of the
National War College was designed to broaden the base of
understanding by America's future military leaders, and

to minimize service parochialism. This latter goal was
the rationale behind Secretary Gates' requirement that all
officers serve a tour at the joint level prior to promotion
to flag rank. President Eisenhower's reorganization of
the Joint Staff in 1958 was also aimed at limiting the ser-
vice's impact on the Joint Staff, by eliminating the committee
system. Unfortunately, none of these efforts had the desired
results.

What the civilian defense managers really wanted
was the independence and analytic skills of a professional
general staff. Such an institution would not only be com-
patible with their management styles, but would also be
theoretically above service interests. Fear of Prussianiza-
tion made such a military general staff anathama to the
civilian leadership, so they proceeded to create a civilian
general staff within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Once the decision had been reached by Forrestal and
Truman to abandon the notion of a pluralistic Joint Chiefs,
because it apparently led to conflict, the basic pattern
for defense reorganization was set. In the place of pluralis-
tic divergency, the Chiefs would be required to supply only
unanimous advice. In order to guarantee this unanimity,
the power of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff was increased, the politicization
of the selection process occurred, and the chain of command

was restructured to make the JCS into more of a planning agency. This latter reform was all important because it directly related to the Chief's advisory function which was the real reason for the creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Forrestal knew he had to have sound military advice on political/military matters. The failure of the Chiefs to agree forced Forrestal to consider disbanding the JCS, just as the Symington Committee recommended, and ultimately to decide upon making the Chairman his "agent" within the institution.

Complicating this problem even further, was the Chiefs' desire not to abdicate their advisory function simply because they could not come to an agreement. Fully understanding the realities of the bureaucracy, they tried to use artificial means to facilitate agreement. This only exasperated the civilian leadership further. In a parodox of logic, the civilian managers thought that unanimity would eliminate all this dysfunctional behavior. What they failed to realize was that while such unanimity did present a solid front to Congress, the more it was forced, the more the Chiefs' advisory function dissipated.

Despite these massive organizational efforts, the reforms failed to address the other fundamental problem, military professionalism, that plagued the Chiefs' effectiveness. Of the three elements of professionalism: corporateness,

responsibility, and expertise; it was the latter one that had the greatest impact. There is little doubt that the Chiefs perceived themselves to be the administration's military experts, a role that the administration normally granted them. Such a perception impacted on the Chiefs' effectiveness in two ways. First, the nature of a profession required that the professional demand autonomy within his area of expertise. Second, the demand for autonomy meant that the expert could not consider factors that were outside his expertise in the development of professional advice. Thus, expertise clearly defined the parameters within which the Chiefs could operate and excluded the incorporation of non-military factors in the process of developing advice for their civilian superiors. The result was the domination of the Huntington/absolutist model. One hundred and fifty years ago Clausewitz suggested that it was absurd to ask that the military professional limit his advice to the military point of view. The advent of nuclear weapons and the cold war have made it all the more absurd. The problem was that pragmatism or fusionism appeared to be incompatible with America's traditional notions of civilian control.

This apparent incompatibility is at the heart of the failure of the policy integration process. The assumption that fusionism was somehow anti-American was taken

for granted by both the civilian leadership and the military

professionals. Furthermore, the parameters determined by

professional expertise were also accepted by all the parties

concerned. Even Forrestal seemed to accept the notion that

the Chiefs were to look at things only from the military

point of view. The difficulties confronting both groups

were more than semantical, they were based on fundamental,

historical, social, and professional beliefs.

Aside from the demand for unanimity and the politici-

zation of the selection process, the ultimate result of

the constant disunity among the Chiefs was to impede, if

not eliminate, their ability to have any meaningful impact

upon such important defense matters as the budget. Without

effective military participation, the administration's

imposed budget ceilings became the main means of molding

defense policy. This is not to say that the amounts allocated

were insufficient, just that the process by which they were

derived was divorced from professional military input. From

the Chief's perspective, this use of non-military determi-

nators failed to analyze and balance capabilities and com-

mitments in a meaningful way, forcing the Chiefs to tailor

their force levels and war plans to fit fiscal criteria,

and increasing their institutional frustration.

While technically the Chief's criticism of the budget

process was correct, it failed to take into consideration

the fact that their own actions had, to a great extent,
led to their exclusion. Instead, the Chiefs blamed the
civilians for the flaws within the NSC structure and vague
policy directives. To be sure, there was substance to their
claims, but a more fundamental cause for the breakdown of
communication was a lack of understanding on the part of
the Chief's civilian superiors about the nature of military
professionalism.

As military professionals the Chiefs sought autonomy
within their sphere of professional competency. Based upon
the concept of expertise they claimed exclusive control
over military matters, and conversely excluded non-military
considerations. This striving for autonomy, as well as
their own career experiences, led the Chiefs to expect that
the budget process would follow the steps of the operations
plan model; a model that both Admiral Sherman and Secretary
Forrestal advanced. Under this model the political leader-
ship would determine the long-range political goals of the
state, while the military determined the most effective
military means of attaining those goals. The major point
of contention occurred when fiscal reality was balanced
against military effectiveness. The creation of ceilings
meant that the administration had determined the level of
the balance prior to the military's involvement.

Another problem that emanated from the military's

professional experience was the relationship of specific mission statements to the operations plan model. Within the military such mission statements were quite specific in order to facilitate planning. Structural flaws and the natural tendency of political statements to be general, led to vague and imprecise directions being given the military. From the Chiefs' point of view, they were operating within a policy vacuum that they were forced to fill themselves. It was only natural that as they generated their own assumptions upon which to base their planning, those assumptions would be based exclusively on military factors. This, of course, led to what the civilians characterized as unrealistic plans and programs. Thus, each side blamed the other for the breakdown in political-military planning.

To achieve real policy integration required a reinterpretation of the liberal definition of civilian control, and the military's perception of the nature of professionalism which relegated the soldier to that of an automaton, and demanded the exclusion of all non-military factors from consideration. Instead the traditional interpretations of both civilian control and military professionalism prevailed, creating an obstacle to policy integration. The more the soldier strove for the type of autonomy in policy formulation that his professionalism demanded,

the more he produced highly professional, but dysfunctional advice. This advice not only excluded many of the non-military factors that the civilian leadership considered important, but it also excluded many factors that were critical to military planning. This undermined the Chiefs' credibility and forced the civilian leadership to seek alternative sources of military advice. The more these alternative sources of advice became dominant, the more the Chiefs became alienated from the policy system, and the more they attacked the system for not considering their professional input.

As each side simply blamed the other, they proceeded to offer new organizational structures that merely papered over the problem. The civilians were afraid to upset the traditional soldier-client relationship that was the basis for the American version of civilian control. The military was equally reluctant to break down the delimitating barriers of traditionalism. The soldier's whole ethical background had instilled in him a reverence for those barriers, and his whole career had prepared him for his place within the staff structure. He would fulfill his role as the Le Grande Brut, and await for the issuance of the political mission statement.

This is not to say that both sides were unaware of the real cause of the policy bifurcation. The professional soldier was fully aware of the political, social, and

economic consequences of his actions, but to articulate

that understanding or project the image that those factors

were taken into consideration might be interpretated as

a challenge to civilian control. Maxwell Taylor's "new

professionalism" came precariously close to such a pronounce-

ment, but even he stayed within the pale. The civilians

also understood the problem or at least diagnosed the symp-

toms. One after another of the independent DoD studies

came up with the same conclusions in regard to the JCS;

but like a doctor who has no theoretical foundation behind

his medical knowledge, they merely treated the symptoms

hoping that it would cure the disease. All of these studies

recommended new organizational panaceas that led to further

centralization, and all called for better coordination between

the national command authority and its military advisors.

Never once did they address the issue of coordination outside

the context of an organizational chart. It was as if they

had never heard of Secretary Forrestal's admonition on the

importance of the men who make up that organizational chart.

Coordination and policy integration was viewed only in

bureaucratic and managerial terms. They never addressed

the necessity for both the civilians and the military to

have mutually shared values, and an appreciation for the

complete spectrum of the military, political, social, and

economic issues at stake.

While the scope of this study ends with the comple-
tion of President Eisenhower's second term, the problems
that have been discussed continued to exist. During the
1970s, two major studies of the Defense Department were
completed and they confirmed the hypothesis that treating
the symptoms would not cure the disease. The first of these
studies was the 1970 Blue Ribbon Defense Panel. While the
Panel's report identified the recurring problems of inter-
service rivalry, the committee nature of the JCS, and the
Chiefs' dual and conflicting role as planner and commander,
this study, unlike its predecessors delved deep enough to
actually find the source of the disease.

> Ideally, the JCS must be fully prepared to provide
> competent professional technical military advice, while
> recognizing and giving full due weight to non-military
> considerations, the political, economic, and social
> realities of national security affairs. They should
> accept the fact that professional military advice must
> be balanced and tempered by higher authority with fuller
> cognizance of those other factors. Nevertheless, the
> prime mission of the JCS, in their view, is to point
> up the hard military risks which may arise from decisions
> weighted more heavily, as will happen, toward non-military
> factors. The JCS, in short, must be ready to make
> clear the national security consequences of alternative
> top-level decisions. Their deep conviction, born of
> their professionalism and their statutory responsibili-
> ties, is that military viewpoints and security risk
> assessments should not become submerged at the point
> of decision by political or economic factors; over-
> weighed, perhaps, but not submerged.[608]

Surprisingly, the Blue Ribbon Panel offered no organizational

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[608]Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, Report to the President
and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense,
Appendix N, Staff Report on Joint Chiefs of Staff Decision
Making (Washington, D.C.: July 1970), 23.

solutions. Instead, it seemed to have faith that the Chiefs were evolving toward the ideal. How this evolution would occur or how it could be facilitated was rather unclear, but the Panel indicated that the "new professionalism" and total policy integration was at hand.

A second major study conducted during the 1970s was the Steadman Report, published in 1978 under the direction of President Carter. Generally speaking, this report showed that the Blue Ribbon Panel's optimistic view was unwarranted. The same problems that had been observed since the passage of the National Security Act remained unchanged, despite thirty years of structural efforts to eliminate them. Although the Blue Ribbon Panel had been unduly optimistic, it at least had identified the narrow military point of view as an obstacle to policy integration. Unfortunately, the Steadman Report, while implicitly substantiating this contention, never followed through with an analysis and offered no solution other than traditional procedural panaceas: changing the make up of the Joint Staff, changing the method by which the JCS produce their paperwork, and creating a separate group of national military advisors composed of former chiefs or CinCs.[609] This is almost identical to the ideas that Forrestal flirted with.

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[609] Report to the Secretary of Defense on the National Military Command Structure (Washington, D.C.: July 1978), 48-65.

After examining the various organizational recommendations, as well as the underlying factors that led to the breakdown in effective policy integration, the obvious question is what is the solution. I find unpersuasive the more radical solutions that would replace the Chiefs with a committee of senior military advisors who would have no command responsibility. While removing the duality that exists within the JCS, I believe the cure can be just as bad as the disease. In the first place, there is no guarantee that senior advisors, whether retired or simply relieved of command responsibility, would be immune from service parochialism. As we noted earlier, inter-service rivalry is at least partially derived from a real commitment to ones service and a belief in the importance of that mode of fighting wars. After nearly forty years in a single service, it is doubtful that such loyalty would be eliminated by virtue of retirement. The real drawback to this suggestion though is the separation of planning from command responsibility. The dangers that can result from irrational ivory tower planning is every bit as dangerous, if not more so, than an over-concentration on purely operational realities. The total elimination of the Chiefs would remove a valuable counter-balance in the planning process. This is not to say that there are not a number of major changes that could be implemented that would increase the Joint

Chiefs effectiveness. Among those possible changes the
following would be my recommendations.

1) Give the Chairman a fifth star and make him the
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief. This would give
him the status and the leverage to more effectively deal
with inter-service rivalry, as well as be in a better posi-
tion to articulate the Chief's views to the civilian leader-
ship. A strong argument can be made for making him a full
member of the NSC or at least its sole military advisor.
Obviously, the selection of the Chairman is important in
order to guarantee that he is above service interests. In
order that he understands the internal workings of the JCS,
he should formerly have been either a Chief, the Director of
the Joint Staff, of the Assistant to the Chairman. Historically,
with the exception of Admiral Radford, all of the Chairman
have had experience somewhere within the JCS. The Chairman
should be looked upon as an objective professional and not
a creature of the administration. If the JCS staffing pro-
cess becomes more responsive to the goals of the administra-
tion and the Chiefs input more usable, then the motivation
behind making the Chairman the administration's "agent"
will have ended. Thus I would oppose having the Chairman's
term expire automatically upon the advent of a new administra-
tion. Such a policy would totally politicize the position

and erode his credibility as a professional advisor.

2) The procedures by which the Joint Staff generates its product need to be totally revamped, eliminating the "flimsy, buff, green, red striped nightmare." The key element that made it such a nightmare was the requirement for service concurrence at every level, which if removed short of the green stage, would minimize the waffled positions that have become the hallmark of the JCS. Obviously, some service input is required at the initial filmsy stage; but between then and the final Joint Staff product, the Joint Staff should work apart from the service staffs. While this will probably result in more split decisions being forwarded, it will be positive in the sense that the issues will be clarified and the opportunity to choose between real alternatives will be at hand. This had been the Truman administration's original intent until inter-service rivalry forced it to replace pluralism with unanimity. This recommendation will only work if the civilian leadership is willing to accept more split decisions and not seek unanimity as a means of escaping their constitutional obligations.

3) With the implementation of the previous recommendation, the role of the Joint Staff will have been enhanced and reliance upon the service staffs minimized; nevertheless, two internal structural changes are needed to increase its effectiveness. First, the Joint Staff needs to develop

its own analytical capabilities, especially in the budget
and costing areas. It was the lack of this capability that
cost the JCS its influence during the McNamara period. Since
the services have developed their own capability, the Chiefs
are forced to rely to a great extent on that self-serving
data.

Secondly, since the JCS plans are criticized for
being divorced from non-military reality, I would suggest
the establishment of a small independent think tank designed
to develop military positions that incorporate non-military
perspectives. Such a think tank would be staffed by bright
young officers selected for their ability to bridge the
gap between the military and the non-military points of
view. Their independence would be guaranteed by making
the assignment permanent, along the lines used by the per-
manent faculty at the military academies. The members of
this think tank would have given up the opportunity for
higher command within their service in exchange for the
opportunity to analyze complex political-military issues
and have an impact on policy formulation. Since, they would
never return to their service of origin, the pressure to
conform to a service viewpoint would be eliminated. They
would, in effect, be a mini-General Staff along the Prussian
model. Two factors would work to mitigate the danger of
ivory tower planning. First, new officers would periodically

be brought in so that the group would not stagnate. Second,

the staff would have no command function. The sole purpose

of the think tank would be to develop alternative analysis

on the issues the Chiefs examine. By having such analysis

the Chiefs might be better able to impact effectively on

policy development.

4) Aside from the major changes within the Joint

Staff outlined above, there are several minor changes that

would enhance the Staff's effectiveness. One would be to

increase the length of time an officer can stay on the staff.

This would increase the institutional memory of the orga-

nization. Second, assign a small number of civilians to

the Joint Staff. While their number should remain small

so as not to become dominant, they would form a permanent

nucleus of the staff and broaden the base of the Joint Staff's

experience. Some of the civilians could be rotated from

other agencies within DoD, State or the CIA, thus increasing

the institutional linkages between those organizations and

the JCS. Such a procedure would go a long way toward eroding

the isolation that the Joint Chiefs have been so correctly

criticized for. It is axiomatic to say that the officers

assigned to the Joint Staff should exhibit a "purple suit

mentality" and that such an approach should be rewarded

in the officers' next assignment. Promotion above the rank

of colonel/captain should be predicated upon assignment

on a joint staff. Such mandatory exposure to the joint arena and the problems related to other services will do much to minimize service parochialism.

5) The Director of the Joint Staff should be given a fourth star and made a full member of the JCS. This would reflect the increased responsibilities of the Joint Staff, and allow him to more effectively argue for the Joint Staff's product, especially since concurrence would not be sought during the product's development. He should also serve as acting chairman if the incumbant is not available. Under the present structure the senior Chief takes over and naturally brings with him his service biases at possibly crucial times. It is essential that the Director be con-sidered an honest broker and that the job not simply be a ticket to be punched for higher command. To preclude the Director protecting his ties to his own service, he should not be considered for the position of a Chief after leaving the Joint Staff. Given his joint experience and the prominence of his former position, the only realistic position that would be available to a former Director would be that of Chairman or a commander in chief of a unified command. His background should emphasize joint planning with at least one prior tour on the Joint Staff and some experience at the unified command level.

6) Consideration should be given to the creation of a joint general staff. Such a staff would consist of a small number of officers, who upon graduation from their service staff colleges and the Armed Forces Staff College would be permanently assigned to the joint general staff. Such officers would make up a substantial portion of the Joint Staff and the joint staffs of the various unified commands. They would have their own promotion system, with the goal being the Director of the Joint Staff. There would be fundamental differences between this organization and the basic Prussian model. First of all, the members of the joint general staff would not all be working for the Director of the Joint Staff. Those that were assigned to unified commands would be working for that commander in chief. The reason for their assignment to the unified commands would not be to guarantee continuity of implementation, but to bring joint staffing expertise. Second, members, of the joint general staff are not expected under any circumstances to command, nor would they be assigned at echelons lower than the unified commands. Finally, the continued existence of the service chiefs and their own staff would act as a check against the joint general staff becoming too dominate and act to counter-balance any ivory tower planning. While this is obviously, the most radical of my recommendations, in the long run it may be the most

necessay.

The above recommendations have totally focused on
the organizational aspect of the problem, despite the fact
that the major thesis of this study is that it is the narrow
perceptual basis of professionalism that led the Chiefs
to exclude non-military factors from their planning process.
The reason is that value transformation does not lend itself
to the same type of itemized recommendations that organiza-
tional changes do. Since this aspect of the problem focuses
on the value system of the officer corps, the only effective
way to deal with it is to change that value system. It
needs to be carefully pointed out that the incorporation
of non-military factors does not destroy the experts know-
ledge. On the contrary, fusionism is simply the use of
differing data to develop the most useful military advice.
The officer must always remember that an overconcentration
on any one factor will be as dysfunctional as the compart-
mentalization that has plagued the national security system
since the end of World War II. To say that fusionistic
balancing would be easy is to totally underestimate the
problem.

Clearly, the attainment of a new value system is
easier said than done. A value system is acquired slowly
over time as a result of role modeling, peer pressure, and
value inculcation. Despite the problems, there are several

ways it can be accomplished. First, the curriculum of the
service schools offers an invaluable tool in fostering prag-
matism.[610] Second, role modeling by senior officers would
have a great effect on junior and middle-grade officers,
especially if they realize the relationship between promo-
tion, and maintaining a joint perspective and incorporating
non-military factors. Finally, the belief on the part of
the civilian leadership that such an approach is in the
national interest is essential to its success. In this
regard Forrestal's plan of asking the Chiefs to develop
an unconstrained and then a constrained budget, can serve
as a model for future administrations. The breakdown in
Forrestal's system occurred when the Chiefs failed to handle
the second assignment.

Mere acceptance of fusionism would have little or
no value if the Chiefs' input was ignored or the institutional
linkages non-existent. The civilian leaders must bring
the Chiefs into the policy process at the earliest possible
stage. The administration must carefully outline its politi-
cal goals so that the Chiefs can generate a strategy and
a force structure to achieve those goals.

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[610] For a discussion of the absolutist position in
the service staff college curriculum see John Binkley and
Donald Vought, "Fort Apache or Executive Suite: The United
States Army Enters the 1980s," Parameters, Journal of the
United States Army War College, 8 (June 1978).

That force structure then must be balanced against fiscal and political realities. As part of this balancing the original assumptions and goals must be reexamined and all alternatives fully and rationally explored. It is at this stage that a pluralistic JCS is essential because it will supply viable alternatives from which the administration can choose. At every stage it must be a joint effort or dysfunctional compartmentalization will occur.

Without such an approach the American government will continue as it has for over thirty-five years, attempting to resolve through structural means a problem that is essentially intellectual and perceptual. True policy integration will never be attained until it is finally agreed that "indeed it is an irrational proceeding to consult professional soldiers on the plan of war that they give a purely military opinion upon what the Cabinet ought to do."

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
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APPENDIX A

APPENDIX A

MEMBERSHIP OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy	20 Jul 42 - 21 Mar 49

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, USA	16 Aug 49 - 14 Aug 53
Admiral Arthur W. Radford, USN	14 Aug 53 - 15 Aug 57
General Nathan F. Twining, USAF	15 Aug 57 - 30 Sep 60
General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA	1 Oct 60 - 30 Sep 62
General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA	1 Oct 62 - 2 Jul 64
General Earle G. Wheeler, USA	3 Jul 64 - 1 Jul 70
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN	1 Jul 70 - 1 Jul 74
General George S. Brown, USAF	1 Jul 74 - 20 Jun 78
General David C. Jones, USAF	20 Jun 78 - 1 Jul 82
General John Vessey, USA	1 Jul 82 -

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

General of the Army George C. Marshall	9 Feb 42* - 18 Nov 45
General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower	19 Nov 45 - 7 Feb 48
General Omar N. Bradley	7 Feb 48 - 15 Aug 49
General J. Lawton Collins	16 Aug 49 - 14 Aug 53

* Date of the first formal JCS meeting

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
(Continued)

General Matthew B. Ridgway	15 Aug 53 - 30 Jun 55
General Maxwell D. Taylor	30 Jun 55 - 30 Jun 59
General Lyman L. Lemnitzer	1 Jul 59 - 30 Sep 60
General George H. Decker	1 Oct 60 - 30 Sep 62
General Earle G. Wheeler	1 Oct 62 - 2 Jul 64
General Harold K. Johnson	3 Jul 64 - 2 Jul 68
General William Westmoreland	3 Jul 68 - 30 Jun 72
General Bruce Palmer, Jr. (Acting)	1 Jul 72 - 15 Oct 72
General Creighton W. Abrams (Died in Office)	16 Oct 72 - 4 Sep 74
General Fredrick Weyand	7 Oct 74 - 30 Sep 76
General Bernard Rogers	1 Oct 76 - 21 Jun 79
General Edward C. Myer	22 Jun 79 - 21 Jun 83
General John A. Wickham	22 Jun 83 -

Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy

Admiral Harold R. Stark	9 Feb 42[*] - 12 Mar 42
Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (also Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet)	9 Feb 42[*] - 15 Dec 45
Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz	15 Dec 45 - 15 Dec 47
Admiral Louis E. Denfeld	15 Dec 47 - 2 Nov 49
Admiral Forrest P. Sherman (Died in Office)	2 Nov 49 - 22 Jul 51
Admiral William M. Fechteler	16 Aug 51 - 16 Aug 53
Admiral Robert B. Carney	16 Aug 53 - 17 Aug 55

* Date of the first formal JCS meeting.

Chief of Naval Operations,
U.S. Navy, Continued

Admiral Arleigh A. Burke	17 Aug 55 – 31 Jul 61
Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr.	1 Aug 61 – 1 Aug 63
Admiral David L. McDonald	1 Aug 63 – 1 Aug 67
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer	1 Aug 67 – 1 Jul 70
Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.	1 Jul 70 – 30 Jun 74
Admiral James L. Holloway, Jr.	1 Jul 74 – 1 Jul 78
Admiral Thomas B. Haywood	1 Jul 78 – 1 Jul 82
Admiral James D. Watkins	1 Jul 82

Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

General of the Army Henry H. Arnold (Commanding General, Army Air Forces)	9 Feb 42[*] – 28 Feb 46
General Carl Spaatz (Commanding General Army Air Forces, until 26 Sep 47)	1 Mar 46 – 30 Apr 48
General Hoyt S. Vandenberg	30 Apr 48 – 30 Jun 53
General Nathan F. Twining	30 Jun 53 – 30 Jun 57
General Thomas D. White	1 Jul 57 – 30 Jun 61
General Curtis E. LeMay	1 Jul 61 – 31 Jan 65
General John P. McConnell	1 Feb 65 – 31 Jul 69
General John D. Ryan	1 Aug 69 – 31 Jul 73
General George S. Brown	1 Aug 73 – 30 Jun 74
General David C. Jones	1 Jul 74 – 20 Jun 78
General Lew Allen	1 Jul 78 – 1 Jul 82
General Charles A. Gabriel	1 Jul 82 –

* Date of the first formal JCS meeting.

Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps

General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr.	28 Jun 52[*]- 31 Dec 55
General Randolph McC. Pate	1 Jan 56 - 31 Dec 59
General David M. Shoup	1 Jan 60 - 31 Dec 63
General Wallace M. Greene, Jr.	1 Jan 64 - 31 Dec 67
General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr.	1 Jan 68 - 31 Dec 71
General Robert E. Cushman, Jr.	1 Jan 72 - 30 Jun 75
General Lewis H. Wilson	1 Jul 75 - 30 Jun 79
General Robert H. Barrow	1 Jul 79 - 30 Jun 83
General Paul X. Kelley	1 Jul 83 -

* Date of statute providing for Marine Corps membership.

APPROVAL SHEET

The dissertation submitted by John Charles Binkley has been
read and approved by the following committee:

   Dr. James L. Penick, Director
   Professor, History, Loyola

   Dr. Robert McCluggage
   Professor, History, Loyola

   Dr. Sam C. Sarkesian
   Professor, Political Science, Loyola

The final copies have been examined by the director of the
dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies
the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated
and that the dissertation is now given final approval by the
Committee with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

_____4/2/85_____   _____
       Date   Director's Signature