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Approaching *Logos* among Reason, Rationality and Reasonableness

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Abstract: *Logos* has been the fundamental of human behavior. However, it often appears as diverse expressions such as reason, rationality or reasonableness at different times. It seems obvious that each of them has its own limitation relative to *logos* itself. Therefore, it has still been a problematic issue how to approach *logos*. For this reason, we will try to approach *logos* on the basis of the relationship among and between the three expressions.

Keywords: *logos*, rationality, reason, reasonableness

1. Introduction

There always seems to be *logos* everywhere. It cannot be seen or touched, but exactly the real influencing factor that making things happen. From each decision made unconsciously tens of thousands of times every day to the evolutionary history of human, everything seems to be regulated implicitly by *logos*. Of course, when we talk about the ancient Greek term *logos*, considering all diverse forms of human life world, including different regions divided by geography feature, different social communities ruled by various culture or religion faith, even disparate lifestyles depending on occupations or social status in the same society, different forms of *logos* should be taken into account, which represent different aspects of principle, steer the routes of everything, and jointly construct the whole of image of an operating world.

It is true that there exists established law of period potentially in human history. In the meanwhile, this mysterious law implies the secret of *logos*, which foreshadows the development of human and draws the background color of human fate. That is to say, *logos* is closely tied up with development of human being. Thus, without an authentic and true understanding of *logos*, it would be nothing but a means, an instrument of self-destruction. And such a destructive, chaotic world is surely anti-humanity.

In the next section, based on the significance and inevitability of the topic, we will at first outline the origin of *logos* and its development by appealing to ancient philosophers and their foresighted theoretical achievements. We tentatively classify them into three dimensions: reason, rationality, and reasonableness. Through overall and deep documents consulting, we primarily introduce the intricate history of *logos* family, including dictatorship of reason in earlier stage and crisis of rationality in afterward stage, as well as its evolutionary form which is reasonableness.

Faced with this complicated world, if we want to draw up the dividing line between theory and practice, philosophy and science, lives and life, the first step is to find the clear demarcation among and between reason, rationality, and reasonableness. And this is also the topic we will discuss in the third section. Over the past few decades, the notions of reason, rationality, and reasonableness have been mentioned in academic researches worked by not only logicians but also scholars from interdisciplinary fields, such as psychologists, economists, jurists, politicians, among others. However, there are plenty of circumstances in disorder. For instance, the mis-transformation of reason to rationality is common for a long period. The universal reason and instrumental rationality cannot make up certain deficiencies which reveal necessity of the concept of reasonableness. Among these conflicts, we attempt to figure out what happens when reason, rationality, and reasonableness are regarded as *logos* respectively, and what defects they have. This is closely related to the principles which embrace different aspects of life, including our ultimate concern towards ontological dimension, instrumental theories in natural science and human affairs in practical life.

In the fourth section, we will return to "*logos*", including not only redressing the misunderstandings mentioned above, but a systematic cognition toward guiding human survival, production and living using reason, rationality, and reasonableness. It is required to track back to *logos* in a more comprehensive perspective, and this may be just principle, on which all of criterion to judge whether reasonable or not are based, that we're looking for adapted by the current age.

The last part is intended to be the conclusion of this paper. After all these arguments, we hope that readers will be convinced sincerely that if reason is the principle of our ultimate concern and if rationality is the instrumental, purposeful principle in natural science, then reasonableness can serve to be the principle of human practical life which embraces morality, laws, arts etc. Furthermore, another significant thesis elucidated in this paper is that any attempt to break them apart or any ambition of being relied on only one form of *logos* family to build a world alone may cause the crisis of mankind. In this way, this paper aims to track bake to *logos* in comprehensive perspective, which comes from the three expressions of *logos* family integrally.

2. *Logos* and its evolution

In order to figure out where *logos* family come from, we are willing to start with some splendid research achievements introduced by intellectual predecessors who have already carried on the discussions about *logos*, and look back on how these sages have witnessed the evolutionary development and inter-dimensional transformation of *logos* step by step.

2.1. The origin of *logos*

The ancient Greek term *logos,* the original root of the modern English word "reason", is generally regarded as the basic principle of everything in the universe. The writing of Heraclitusis is the first place where the word *logos* appears in ancient Greek philosophy (Peters, 1967, pp. 28-35). For Heraclitus, *logos* is mainly used to indicate the regularity of birth and death. Heraclitus considers that fire is the origin of the whole of the world, which is burning in a certain scale and under the will of *logos* (Guthrie, 1967, p. 45). His starting point is that the order of the universe is regulated neither by god nor by people, but by its own

logos. Heraclitus believes that each coin has its two sides, and interdependence and mutual struggle between opposite sides are exactly the cause of evolution and progress, which is called *logos*. He also thinks that the competition between contrary sides gives birth to a balance or a harmonious order. Behind everything there is a fundamental principle, a central word, a dominant force or a potential god. *Logos*, which represents all forms of ultimate, genuineness, and primacy, commands all people and objects prostrating themselves in worship and following the operation law of *logos*. *Logos* is eternal, similar to "the law of god," and it is a fallacy to deviate from it. This term, *logos*, often signifies that the ultimate truth, or identifies with the God. (Peters, 1967, pp. 28-35)

Logos is seen as a natural law, the original substance and motivation for mastering and ruling all things. *Logos*, in other words, as a kind of omnipotent power throughout the universe according to requirements of rational principles ruled by natural law, is the basis of law and justice, the root of good and evil. Besides, *logos* is often considered as a part of the soul, including the purpose of the universe and human life, with a value and a sense of direction. Furthermore, *logos* distinguishes humans from the other species, at the same time, reflects the limitation of people in the face of the God, universe and fate.

The connotation of *logos* is not set in stone. Literally speaking, *logos* is a word which could mean for example "speech" or "explanation" or an "account" (Audi, 1999, p. 346). However, the earliest major philosophers to publish in English, such as Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke, also routinely wrote in Latin and French, and compared their expressions to Greek, treating the words *logos*, ratio and reason as inter-changeable. The meaning of the word "reason" in senses such as "human reason" also overlaps to a large extent with "rationality", and the adjective of "reason" in philosophical contexts is normally "rational", rather than "reasoned" or "reasonable". Some philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, for example, also used the word ratiocination as a synonym for "reasoning" (Hobbes, 1666, p. 289). Yet an independent existence of universal *logos* was clearly suggested by Heraclitus. As the natural law guiding the operation of everything, *logos* developed into three different dimensional variants, namely reason, rationality, and reasonableness, accompanied by the process of the development of human history. That is to say, the evolution of *logos* seems to be corresponding to the development of human society. There is an intrinsic relationship under the evolution of three variants of *logos*. In different historical periods, each variant of *logos* has its own glory days respectively. In the rest of this section, we will introduce how three different expressions of *logos* occupy the dominant position respectively in different times. And this also provides us with reason and basis theories that help us reflect on the expression and position of *logos* after all of these disputes.

2.2. The domination of reason and rationality

From the age of Aristotle, the speculative pursuit of knowledge has played a central role in human culture. This can be called the glory age of "reason". At that time, "philosophy" refers to the whole range of systematic and methodical treatment of any inquiries, embracing all kinds of subjects from geometry and astronomy at one pole, to aesthetics and historical narrative at the other, regardless of whether the twentieth century would classify them as Science and Technology or not. In all these studies, "reason" plays a core part. And for more than two thousand years, all such studies are equally considered (Toulmin, 2001, p. 15). No field of investigation or speculation is dismissed as intrinsically un-philosophical. Human adaptability

and mathematical rigor are regarded equally as twin aspects of the human reason (Toulmin, 2001, p. 14).

However, from the mid-seventeenth century on, an imbalance begins to develop. The switch from philosophical egalitarianism to scientific hierarchy at the beginning does not entirely exclude those essayists who set out to illuminate key features of our lives rather than trying to prove theoretical truths, and who invite us to share reflections rather than checking deductions. This change takes place gradually over three or four centuries (Toulmin, 2001, p. 22) But in the twentieth century, notably in the USA, academic philosophy becomes a narrowly technical subject concerned with abstract theories, and the concrete concerns of autobiographical authors like Montaigne are generally ignored as being intrinsically un-philosophical (Toulmin, 2001, p. 23).

In the twentieth century, scholars in the universities of Europe, North America, and their zone of influence have been preoccupied with the concept of rationality (Toulmin, 2001, p. 1). There is a widespread tendency to insist on the superiority of theoretical abstraction and logical deduction, at the expense of directly human modes of analysis. Along with this rivalry, there emerges the contrast between "Two Cultures" of the Natural Sciences and the Humanities. (Snow, p. 2) It is true in the whole spectrum of academic fields, from the physical sciences at one pole to the humanities at the other (Toulmin, 2001, p.1). Certain methods of inquiry and subjects are seen as philosophically serious or "rational" in a way that others are not. As a result, a competition for attention comes out across all realms of inquiry. Subjects like comparative literature, linguistics, and aesthetics have refocused on methodological questions about the legitimacy of ideas and ways of thought whose validity they has previously taken for granted. Eventually, there is a hierarchy of prestige so that investigations and activities are ordered with an eye to certain intellectual demands.

In 1920s to 1930s, scholars and critics, as much as natural scientists, share a common confidence in their established procedures (Toulmin, 2001, p. 1). The term "scientific method" embraces, for them, all the methods of observation, deduction, generalization, and the rest that have been found appropriate for the problems and issues preoccupying those subjects. Focusing on rationality, academic writers have neglected to analyze the complementary concept of reasonableness. Yet as we find in all our present inquiries, the bureaucratization of learning has created as many problems as it solves.

2.3. Revival of reasonableness

Since the 1960s, the years have seen a revived interest in questions about practical values in medical ethics, ecology, and other practical fields. This turning of the tide points to a future in which the rational demands of scientific technique will be balanced by attention to the demand of the human situations in which intellectual or practical skills can reasonably be put to use. (Toulmin, 2001, p. 2)

For now, however, the spotlight remains on the intellectual validity of rationality itself: the human values of reasonableness are expected to justify themselves in the court of rationality. The answers of questions have not yet been generally accepted in the world academy—whether the twin concepts of "rationality" and "reasonableness" are interdependent ideas or not? How do these two concepts differ from, and relate to, each other? And how do we reach a point at which they came to be at cross-purposes with each other? On its face, this is a historical problem, to be answered in historical terms.

Thus, we need to restore the original meaning of *logos*, not in order to put it again in the museum, or on the altar, but to fully understand its evolutionary process.

3. Logos as reason, rationality, or reasonableness

Reason, rationality, and reasonableness can be translated identically into "*lǐ xìng,* 理性" in Chinese. Similarly, these three words have been used as "*logos*" in the English-speaking world in certain ages. In this part, we will discuss what happens when reason, rationality, and reasonableness are regarded as *logos*, respectively, and what defects they have.

3.1. Reason as logos

3.1.1. The universal reason as objectivism

Reason, as the alternative form of *logos*, is dispersed with Galileo's victory which consolidated the reign of a unique reason, a fully objective reason. Similar to the Galilean process, the Cartesian project of objectifying the subject pushes the separation of *res cogitans* and *res extensa*. He regards *res cogitans* as a fully independent object, attributed by an autonomous thinking quality, and wants to demonstrate its mathematical objectivity, same as the *res extensa*. As such, Descartes opens the gate to the domination of objectivism whose name is universal reason (van Doan, 2001, p. 21). For him, all sciences are ultimately one science which is understood as universal. Unlike Aristotle who happens to believe that the different subject matters of different sciences demand different methods, Descartes argues that differences between the sciences are only a result of our cognitive activity, similar to the way the distinctions between the arts depend on the exercise and disposition of body. That is to say, the limitation of cognitive abilities brings about the sharply divided disciplines. Like Galileo, Descartes is convinced of the idea of one universal science and of one universal method (van Doan, 2001, p. 21). His success in showing that geometrical propositions can be proved by arithmetical mean pleads against Aristotle, who asserts that geometry, and arithmetic, constitutes distinct sciences, and who has denied that geometrical propositions can be proved arithmetically, proceeds to declare that there is only one universal science, and universal method in like manner (Descartes, 2008, p. 149).

However, Descartes is inclined toward natural science as the model of research, and as the unified science, revealing his ambition to construct the unique science with a mathematical method. To look for the foundation upon which one can build any scientific knowledge, he turns to the Archimedean point, which indicates the basis of knowledge definitely being indubitable, which means *self-evident* (Descartes, 2008, p. 144). In the first place, Descartes needs to find this absolutely universal and objective thing. To Descartes' point of view, *res cotigans* is a substance which is as much independently self-subsistent as an external thing, *res extensa*. As he notes, thinking substance is a complete thing no less than that which is extended. And the corporeal substance of *res cotigans* is occasional. Descartes wants to establish the objective criteria which are taken for granted in mathematics. These criteria are of qualitative and quantitative measure (Descartes, 1967, p. 411). Although, it is not difficult to find that, in his later research, Descartes is confused in separating *res cogitans*, from the arithmetical perspective, from *res extensa*, which is also in the arithmetical conception from his belief. Since our purpose here is to show that

Descartes' separation of *res cogitans* from *res extensa* is the source of modern dualism, we will not delve deeper in his difficulty.

Nonetheless, having defended the autonomous status of *res cogitans*and its mathematical objectivity, Descartes cannot say *res cogitans*is exactly the foundation of science, because he needs to prove that *res cogitans*is constructed on the indubitable foundation which is called *Ego cogito* (Descartes, 1908, p. 10). He argues that the indubitability of the *cogito* is irrefutable because the *cogito* is neither a question of logical nor analytical inference. It is evident because we intuit it. In this way, the *Ego* is no longer a subjective individual, but the most objective, or the most universal and necessary *Ego* which serves as the transcendental condition of science. And according to the Cartesian process of transformation of the *cogito* to the principle or axiom, Descartes tacitly takes *cogito* as reason itself (Descartes, 2001, p. 4).

More specifically, Descartes seems to put it this way: only the thinking subject is the real and objective ground which can warrant truth, and as such, can lay foundation to science. But the thinking subject is primarily a thing, a fully objectified thing. As such, though Descartes still keeps the term subject, it is evident that the real subjective subject has gone for the sake of objectivity (van Doan, 2001 p. 30). In short, what Descartes contributes to modern science is his intention to get rid of subjectivity. And considering his great efforts directed toward subject-object dualism, and his insistence on understanding objectivity in the sense of an arithmetical axiom, he can be considered as the father of "universal reason", a kind of *logos* which is constructed on arithmetical calculus and which serves as the best instrument to knowledge. In this way, *logos* also loses its original meaning.

3.1.2. The misunderstanding of universal reason

In the previous part, we briefly described the objectification of the thinking subject by tackling Descartes' fatal division of *res cogitans* and *res extensa.* In this part, we wish to point out: it is a critical error to misjudge the ontological aspect of reason, which is the main cause of the de-transformation of reason into rationality. We will follow Heidegger's critique of rationalistic reason and his effort to reconstruct reason in its ontological dimension.

According to Heidegger, our misunderstanding of reason primarily brings about our misunderstanding of both science and technology. Since Galileo and, after him, the British empiricists, the positivists hold the view that natural science is the sovereign domain of truth. Unaware of the limitation of scientific thinking, and the capricious nature of technology, we hence tend to identify reason with rationality, technology with machine technology. Heidegger (1980) holds the view that the reason of such a misunderstanding of technology lies deeply in the process of artificial transformation of reason into rationality. It forcefully transforms science into a kind of know-how, and reason into a kind of manual instructions (Heidegger, 1980, p. 28). In another words, technology is stripped of its ontological character and becomes a mere instrument, a so-called instrumental reason.

Considering the reconstruction of reason, as far as Heidegger is concerned, rationality can be possible if it is born in and lives in reason, because rationality is only the appearance of reason, or the reincarnated reason in time and space. For Heidegger, both rationality and reason belong to Being, though they are different fundamentally and on performance. Rationality is determined by the temporal and spatial characteristics of Being while reason itself belongs to the essential realm of Being (Held, p.164). On one hand, in Heidegger's opinion, the history of Reason is identical with that of Being. In other words, Reason can be fully understood only if it

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is born in Being, and comes from Being itself (Heidegger, 2002a, pp. 36-38). On the other hand, Heidegger has seen the inseparability between *Logos* and Being (Heidegger, 2002b, p. 36). It seems to him that *Logos* bears the same character of as Being. (Heidegger, 1975, p. 60). To sum up, Reason, *Logos* and Being share the common root which has characteristics of transcendence and self-manifestation. However, in the eyes of rationalists, Being is no more than the *res extensa*, the external subjected to the *res cogitans*. Thus, it assumes that Being can be precisely calculated. In short, Being is just an instrument like any other tool. In contrast to such an understanding of Being, Heidegger seeks to restore the authentic nature of Being. Being is a dynamic, living reality which cannot be limited by time or space. It transcends all limits which restrict it. In a word, it is itself a transcendent act. In terms of Heidegger, transcendence is described as below:

> Transcendence is firstly the relationship between being and Being starting from the former and going toward the latter. Transcendence is, however, at the same time the relationship leading from the changeable being to a *being in respose*. Transcendence, finally, corresponding to the use of the title "Excellency", is that *highest being itself* which can then also be called "Being" from which results a strange mixture with the first mentioned meaning. (Heidegger, 2002a, p. 57)

Therefore, transcendence determines or reveals the authenticity of Being. That means, transcendence is the Reason which reveals Being. In this way, Heidegger points out the defective consequences of the over-admiration of the objectivism of universal reason and relying on universal reason alone to guide science and technology, that is, the misjudging of reason with rationality (van Doan, 2001, p. 145). In the meanwhile, according to the establishment of the common root among Reason, *Logos* and Being, Heidegger finishes the work of reconstruction of reason, reversing the tendency of neglecting the original meaning of *logos* since Cartesian times.

3.2. Rationality as logos

3.2.1. The crisis of rationality

The crisis of rationality stems from the ambition of the rationalists and empiricists to build a social world solely on rationality (von Doan, 2001, pp. 3-4). It is related to the crisis of science, and admitted by scientists themselves such as Oppenheimer, Weizsacker and many scientifically-minded persons such as Husserl, Horkheimer, etc. (van Doan, 2001, p. 16). We are warned about the current human sciences, however successful their achievement was in the past, and however notable their contribution to the collection of precise data and the codification might be, standing in danger of losing life-meaning.

Beside what has been mentioned above, the scientific method which used to be the correct mean of knowledge is either ridiculed or put in doubt (van Doan, 2001, p. 17). For those who laugh at the scientific method, reason seems to head mistakenly toward tragic self-destruction. Many anti-positivists claim the breakdown of science and describe such a disaster as the loss of life-meaningfulness. Like Heidegger, they state the similar idea that the development of the process of dehumanization in the form of contemporary positivism leads to a virtual breakdown (van Doan, 2001, p. 18) In addition, Husserl traces the cause of such a disaster back to the mathematization of nature in Galileo's science and in Kant's proclamation of the end of

traditional metaphysics (van Doan, 2001, p. 19) Likewise, Horkheimer (1947), who sees the death-symptom of rationality visible in the claim of all modern ideologies, and in the "arrogance" of science based on "technical knowledge", denounces that it is "rationality" itself that is the cause of human insanity (p. 33).

3.2.2. Husserl's reaction to rationality

The mistake that taking the model of mathematics for the universal model put forward by Descartes is denounced by Husserl with his striking analysis of the process of mathematization since Galileo. We will present a brief sketch of his main propositions and figure out how he connects the crisis of science with the deformation of rationality. And Husserl's criticism provides a reason for our reflection on the necessity of returning to the original reasonableness.

According to Husserl (1992), Galileo's mathematization of nature particularly leads to the crisis of science, which consists of three steps: to take pure geometry as the most universal spatial model; to consider nature as mathematical in physics; to calculate senses (Husserl, pp. 20-92). Although the process of mathematization, considered by Husserl, is not accidental, (van Doan, 2001, p. 33), the tendency of universalization and necessity implicit in science is pushed far beyond its limits. There is nothing wrong with a demand for clarity or certainty, but one should reflect on its degree once they are applied to human world. Winch (1958) suggests that science should know its own limit by minding its own business and philosophy should do the same thing (p.8). More explicitly, the difference between scientists' and philosophers' aims might be expressed as follows: the scientist investigates the nature, causes and effects of particular real things and processes, whereas the philosopher is concerned with the nature of reality as such and in general. Therefore, there must be a distinction between multi-dimensional forms of *logos*, depending on which kind of relation, and on which subject it deals with. That means, rationality, if it is isolated or separated from the life-world, will be a mere tool, and deprived of any meaning of life.

Looking back to the tendency of mathematization of nature and of human life-world, it is pushed much farther after Descartes. As followers of Descartes and advocates of empiricism, Locke and Hume maintain the view that what counts as science must be of exact, clear and evident in nature (Husserl, 1992, p. 3). In this regard, the most satisfiable thing is the "fact" itself. In Husserl's (1992) own expression, the "mere-fact sciences" transform men into "fact-men" (p. 4). That is to say, man is not much different from any outside factor whose function is merely mechanical. Needless to say, man is stripped of his subjectivity, and consequently the meaning of his existence. But such a universal science is unacceptable, because the life-world is not an accumulation of experiences or facts, but a living world. It is a life lived by human beings, not a concept or a dead thing. The past idea that a science, fully separate and independent, could be the foundation of human life, or in our context, could serve to be the reason of human life is no longer tenable. In Husserl's (1992) view, to restore the role of science, to reconstruct the function of rationality, one should recognize the importance of life-world, and accept the fact that science is in fact nothing but a distillation from the life-world (p. 12). Thus, the principle of life must be found in human-life, which is exactly reasonableness.

3.3. Reasonableness as logos

3.3.1. Reasonableness as human nature

In this part, we will proceed to discuss reasonableness and its common root of *logos*. The main source is Tao, a traditional theory in ancient China, which came up with their own expression, focusing mainly on human nature and conflicts of human interests, to which reasonableness seems to be the only solution.

The literature of Chinese philosophy is fully stuffed with all sorts of discussions centered around human nature. What is human nature? We will venture a step further to first understand what constitutes human nature. In the meantime, it means there are some characteristics which help us to understand human nature. These special characteristics can be human acts, language, creative activity, artistic life, etc. Then we proceed to ask why these things are much different from those of animals. The answer would be because our acts are always oriented toward a goal which in turn satisfies our needs, desires, and interests and that our acts are not random in the sense that they are well designed and executed to attain the desired goal. We will know that, through these special things which make man different from animals, man is rational. And all of these things which constitute human nature as rational are guided by interests which are manifested in the diverse pattern of human life. But there is another troublesome phenomenon concealed behind the identification above: What predetermines good or bad comes not from a priori innate idea of evil or goodness which is implanted in the human brain from birth, but from whether or not some acts, or some results conform or satisfy our basic human interests. The same act occurs in different cultures, countries, races or even parties, which may use diverse evaluation criterion. For instance, telling the truth may be good for one and bad for another; a custom may be regarded as sacred in one country while evil in another. There are numerous examples showing that human nature is not so much determined as it is historically and socially constructed, but known by virtue of human activities of solving problems, of enjoying, of hoping, and of contracting nature, other fellows, and himself, etc. In the meanwhile, any human activity conducted as special things distinguished from animals always presupposes a certain relationship with (1) oneself, (2) others, and (3) nature. From an internal act toward himself, man demands a self-consciousness, a desire of self-being. From an inter-subjective act, man strives for harmony, peace, and happiness. From an external act toward nature, man always looks for something which can satisfy his knowledge, needs and curiosity, etc. (van Doan, p. 197) In a word, human nature can at best be seen from what constitutes it, and this what is none other than human interests which are visible in human activities and relationships.

3.3.2. Reasonableness as human interests

Ancient Chinese philosophers never refuse to talk about the question, "What is man?". However, the point they follow in grasping this question is not an analysis of the meaning of human beings, but a phenomenological description of how man is becoming man (van Doan, 2001, p. 197). That is to say, man is not a priori determined but developing. To be in the world means that man has to learn to deal with others, or more precisely, with others' interests. In this context, the way of regulating, distributing interests, and solving the problems of interests-conflict is called reasonableness in the case of Confucius. To prove that reasonableness has much to do with interests, we need to make a qualification concerning our explanation of the nature of interests.

According to Maslow's hierarchy of human needs, human needs could be divided into five hierarchical categories, namely physiological, safety, love, esteem, and self-actualization (Maslow, 1943, pp. 370–396). Compared with Maslow's theory, we need to turn to the Confucian way of classifying human interests mentioned in works as follows: (1) physiological interests (2) knowledge interests, (3) esteem interests, and (4) self-actualization interest.

The first kind of human interests which is regarded by Confucius as humanly most natural is physiological interest. By physiological interests, he means interests in wealth and daily needs, such as food, clothes, horse, carriage, money and so on, which can be considered the fundamental interest of the physical body and not the spirit. As Confucius (1998) said:

Wealth and rank are what every man desires. (p. 41)

The second kind of human interests, on which Confucius puts much more emphasis compared with physiological interest, is the interests in learning, or interests in knowledge. Why should we learn, and what can we learn? As Confucius (1998) believes, we learn not only for the sake of learning, but also for an accumulation of knowledge which can (1) solve human problems:

Just as the hundred apprentices must live in workshops to perfect themselves in their craft, so the gentleman studies, that he may improve himself in the Way. (p. 253)

(2) transform a man into a better one：

Highest are those who are born wise. Next are those who become wise by learning. After then come those who have toil painfully in order to acquire learning. Finally, to the lowest class of the common people belong those who toil painfully without ever managing to learn. (Confucius, 1998, p. 221)

And (3) point out the right way:

A gentleman who is wide versed in letters and at the same time knows how to submit his learning to the restraints of ritual is not likely, I think, to go far wrong. (Confucius, 1998, p. 75)

In the third place, we will proceed to refer briefly to human interests in ethical problems, including moral laws, which is the quintessence of Confucian thought. As a matter of fact, all thought of Confucius is based on so-called esteem interests and the Confucian reasonableness is mainly constructed on these esteem interests. According to an article called *Balanced Enquires: Criticisms on Confucius* concerning about humanity and written by Wang Chong (1907, ch. xxxiii), a follower of Confucius, he who can practice five things wherever he may be is a man of humanity, those are earnestness (rén, 仁), generosity (yì, 义), liberality (lǐ, 礼), intelligence (zhì, 智) and truth-fullness (xìn, 信). And these can be gained through the human act of mutual recognition, social engagement, and cultural and historical life.

The last type of human interests is about how human beings conform to this world. For Confucius, we are living in a harmonious world and should not disturb a natural course relative to history, as Zeng Tsu (2011) said:

> What *The Great Learning* teaches, is—to illustrate illustrations virtue; to renovate the people; and to rest in the highest excellence. (p. 3)

The alienation of the world would not come about until humans tend to build an abnormal relation to it. Evidently, the whole of humanity share the common wish and desire within the fourth kind of interest. However, not all of the interests would provide every human with a common desire, hope for a better life and ultimate concerns. There are always conflicts born from interests. Sometimes, they come from the purpose of interests or the methods of reaching interests; sometimes they come from the unequal distribution of interests. What's more, conflicts may spring from the different value and meaning of interests.

By describing reasonableness as the different principles which help us to cope with external events, to conform or to adjust ourselves to the environment and society, to develop ourselves into a much more ideal stage, to self-correct when needed, to enjoy aesthetically our lives, we wish to say, that reasonableness can serve to mediate human relationships and interests among individuals, or between man and himself. It is also clear that rationality differs from reasonableness, and Confucius has understood reason only in terms of reasonableness, which is to commit the naive mistake of reductionism. Since the thesis is not about what would be going on if Confucius had used rationality in dealing with external nature, but that reasonableness concerns itself mainly with the human life-world and its Weltanschauung, it cannot be excluded from other forms in the *logos* family, i.e., rationality and reason as *logos*.

4. Return to *Logos*

At the beginning, we put forward three research objectives, namely 1) figuring out multi-dimensional forms of *logos*, namely reason, rationality, and reasonableness respectively, and how these three variants evolve from *logos* step by step; 2) what defects there are when reason, rationality, and reasonableness are regarded as *logos* alone; 3) how to approach a more authentic *logos* in a comprehensive perspective based on predecessor's experience and lessons. The first two problems have been solved above. The last one will be discussed emphatically in this section. In order to sketch out a version of comprehensive *logos*, we will discuss the following three aspects: 1) what does *logos* consist of?; 2) what does the internal relationship look like among elements of *logos*?; 3) what benefits will it bring when we return to an authentic *logos*?

The self-manifestation of *logos* in its manifold forms such as reason, rationality, and reasonableness is the main content of *logos*, which can be understood in terms of the human relationship with nature (rationality), with others (reasonableness), and with the inner world (reason). In other words, reason expresses the ontological and metaphysical (theological) dimension of man; rationality, taken to be the most effective instrument in dealing with technological knowledge and advance, reflects the human technical interest of dominating nature and of deciding human fate; reasonableness is constructed on human tentative solution of conflicts, on human relationship, and understanding which happen in daily life.

After understanding the content of the new *logos* divided into three dimensions and their differences, the second step is to sort out the internal relationship among dimensions of new

logos. Answering the question of the metaphysical dimension on the guidance of reason tends to take humans for a community, for the sake of world peace, social harmony and cultural integration; to answer the question of the dimension of natural science under the guidance of instrumental rationality, human being are seen as a part of nature; to answer the problem of human social life in the sense of reasonableness, it is inclined to solve the problem of practical conflicts created by human as individuals. That is to say, the dimensional relationships among three kinds of elements of the new *logos* are both cross and parallel. On one hand, regardless of which dimensional perspective, human goals are regarded as the ultimate interests from beginning to end. On the other hand, when human survival, production and living problems are handled with different rational principles, properties of the human and the role it plays in history are distinct in accordance with different perspectives.

The third step needs to be divided into two directions: one to focus on objectives of each dimensional term of *logos* concerns, the other to discuss the significance of approaching *logos*. Summarized from previous theories which have been described, as a matter of fact, the objects about which three manifolds of expressions are the same, yet because of the differences of dimensions discussed, we are led to distinct theoretical results. When talking about god guided by ultimate reason, freedom and equality does not need to rely on a particularly specific case in life. God is abstract, representational and windy; but in the discussion of god in terms of reasonableness, god is no longer abstract. Because people need a savior or leader to guide them out of poverty and wars, a monarch comes into being under the guidance of reasonableness, playing *logos*' role in real life. Similarly, dealing with natural science, people can treat rationality as the behavior criterion, interpreting the world into strings of formula and theorem, and all of the feelings of love are physiological needs; and when people use reasonableness as the principle, one is more willing to regard individual interests as the ultimate value, and take individual desires for the code of conduct. Once one's desire is fulfilled, he wins what he wants. In other words, reason, rationality, and reasonableness are three layers wrapping around the life-world. The content of these tiers are the same, yet just at different levels. If we say that reason cares more about the pure, logical, idealized aspect, then rationality tends to concentrate on the theoretical instrumental purposed aspect, while reasonableness focuses on practical workings in accordance with daily and ordinary life. Thus, we conclude that reason only cares about the ultimate concern, which raises everything to the metaphysical dimension, and only discusses the existence of the ultimate propositions, such as freedom and equality. Rationality only cares about science and theoretical tools. In the eyes of rationality advocators it seems that everything follows operating rules precisely and tens of thousands of phenomena require quantitative measurement. When people take reasonableness as a principle, they are concerned about goals, interests, tangible and practical action, as well as morality, which looks noble while actually serving the community in order to maximize profit.

The latter direction that needed to be answered is how it makes sense to find out about the new *logos*. In fact, there are four main points:

1) This is a question of values. Based on the different perspectives of value, man can gain different answers in the same issues.
2) It helps us to choose and switch neatly between different types of *logos* expressions, making us live better in this changing world.
3) We need to repeat once more our main thesis that any attempt to separate the entirety of reason, rationality, and reasonableness and any effort to use only one

principle, be it reason, or rationality, or reasonableness would cause a crisis of knowledge and of human life, as well as of science; in addition, a stagnation, or backwardness in terms of the process of human civilization.

4) *Logos* is no longer just the origin of reason, no longer just the ancient Greek root. In this modern world, it should play a new role, corresponding to the diversity of human activities and the multitudinous social production way of life. Therefore, the restoration of *logos* involves a full range of guiding significance.

5. Conclusion

Until now, in order to unravel the relationships between reason, rationality, and reasonableness, we have described a brief evolutionary history of *logos*, discussed the origin of reason, outlined the mis-transformation of reason into rationality, analyzed the crisis of rationality as well as hinted that reasonableness may be a form of reason which deals with social conflicts. Besides, accompanied by the transmutation of historical background, the law of *logos* evolution seems to depend on the law of the development of human civilization. In this context, readers will be convinced sincerely that if reason is the principle of our ultimate concern, and if rationality is the instrumental, purposeful principle in natural science, then reasonableness can serve to be the principle of human practical life which embraces morality, laws, arts etc. Furthermore, the other significant thesis elucidated in this paper is that any attempt to break them apart, or any ambition of relying on only one form of reason to build a world alone, may cause the crisis of mankind. In the fourth section, after looking back on the whole of evolutionary history, it seems that *logos* could be further pictured comprehensively from three aspects: the content, internal relationship, and benefits of *logos*, which is adapted by wisdom and draws lessons from predecessors, guiding people how to make decisions in the process of social life, and getting rid of chaos in human living.

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