



Resilience of Networked Infrastructure with Evolving Component Conditions: Pavement Network Application

Levenberg, Eyal; Miller-Hooks, Elise; Asadabadi, Ali; Faturechi, Reza

Published in:
Journal of Computing in Civil Engineering

Link to article, DOI:
[10.1061/\(ASCE\)CP.1943-5487.0000629](https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)CP.1943-5487.0000629)

Publication date:
2017

Document Version
Peer reviewed version

[Link back to DTU Orbit](#)

Citation (APA):
Levenberg, E., Miller-Hooks, E., Asadabadi, A., & Faturechi, R. (2017). Resilience of Networked Infrastructure with Evolving Component Conditions: Pavement Network Application. *Journal of Computing in Civil Engineering*, 31(3), [4016060]. DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)CP.1943-5487.0000629

DTU Library

Technical Information Center of Denmark

General rights

Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

- Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
- You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
- You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

Resilience of Networked Infrastructure with Evolving Component Conditions: A Pavement Network Application

Eyal Levenberg¹, Elise Miller-Hooks², Ali Asadabadi³, and Reza Faturechi⁴

Abstract: This paper deals with quantifying the resilience of a network of pavements. Calculations were carried out by modeling network performance under a set of possible damage-meteorological scenarios with known probability of occurrence. Resilience evaluation was performed a priori while accounting for optimal preparedness decisions and additional response actions that can be taken under each of the scenarios. Unlike the common assumption that the pre-event condition of all system components is uniform, fixed, and pristine, component condition evolution was incorporated herein. For this purpose, the health of the individual system components immediately prior to hazard event impact, under all considered scenarios, was associated with a serviceability rating. This rating was projected to reflect both natural deterioration and any intermittent improvements due to maintenance. The scheme was demonstrated for a hypothetical case study involving Lagan Airport. Results show that resilience can be impacted by the condition of the infrastructure elements, their natural deterioration processes, and prevailing maintenance plans. The findings imply that, in general, upper bound values are reported in ordinary resilience work, and that including evolving component conditions is of value.

Author keywords: Resilience; Pavement; Infrastructure; Serviceability; Aging, Maintenance.

¹ Corresponding author, Technical University of Denmark, E-mail: eylev@byg.dtu.dk

² University of Maryland, E-mail: elisemh@umd.edu

³ University of Maryland, E-mail: ali.asadabadi@gmail.com

⁴ JetBlue, E-mail: reza.faturechi@gmail.com

25 **Introduction and Motivation**

26 Networked civil infrastructures, such as transportation, water, and energy systems, are essential to the
27 functioning of any modern society, and therefore must be resilient. Numerous works have focused on
28 the development and quantification of resilience metrics, and some have proposed normative models for
29 such systems. Common to their definitions is a concept of system-level coping capacity under multi-
30 component damage due to, for example: extreme meteorological conditions, geological hazards, and
31 human-made events of an accidental or intentional nature. Damage to the system may also originate
32 from less extraordinary events. In this context, resilience is generally conceived in terms of the system's
33 ability to absorb damage thus continuing to serve the intended purpose, and recover within an acceptable
34 time and cost (e.g., Holling 1973; Haines 2009; The White House 2015; National Infrastructure
35 Advisory Council 2015).

36 An underlying and typically unstated assumption in treating resilience is that the pre-event
37 condition of all system components is uniform, fixed, known, and pristine. This means that resilience
38 evaluations are, in effect, specific to the pre-event condition assumed at the moment of analysis as if the
39 damage events were imminent. In reality, at a given point in time, the level of 'health' across components
40 is uneven, with some offering a reduced inherent ability to endure damage. That is, infrastructure
41 component integrity evolves over time. Two main governing and competing factors determine
42 infrastructure integrity: (i) Progressive condition deterioration under usual service as a result of the
43 combined effects of physical and environmental loading (i.e. "wear-and-tear" and aging), and (ii)
44 Maintenance activities that aim for partial or complete condition renewal, or merely for slowing the
45 natural deterioration rate (i.e., preventative). Based on a thorough review of the literature (Faturechi and
46 Miller-Hooks 2015) which scanned over 200 articles, it appears that other than two works by Dehghani
47 et al. (2013, 2014), no prior work on resilience or related performance measure computation has
48 explicitly accounted for non-pristine integrity, timewise evolution, and subsequent unevenness in system
49 component conditions. Dehghani et al. (2014) assessed expected network performance in terms of
50 vehicle miles traveled and other devised vulnerability metrics over multiple randomly generated generic
51 disruption scenarios involving link failures. Both papers discuss the need for condition-based
52 vulnerability assessment as advocated herein, or more specifically, the need to incorporate each
53 element's condition in replicating link failure probabilities. Their application in (Dehghani et al., 2014)

54 on a hypothetical example demonstrates that a range over network performance results from assuming
55 different link probability failure distributions (i.e. all link failures are either uniform, beta or normal).
56 Herein, this general idea of a need for condition-based assessment is furthered.

57 This work proposes and demonstrates a condition-based resilience quantification methodology
58 that incorporates component-condition evolution in a systems-based analysis. Resilience calculations,
59 which may include resilience enhancing preparedness and response actions, are carried out under a set
60 of possible damage-meteorological scenarios with known probability of occurrence. Each scenario
61 consists of hazard type identification, meteorological state, number of affected segments (damage
62 extent), and damage severity in terms of required repair duration and resources. The evaluation is
63 performed *a priori* while accounting for optimal response actions that can be taken under each of the
64 scenarios; preparedness actions that improve resilience are also optimized. To account for condition
65 evolution, the health or integrity level of the individual system components immediately prior to hazard
66 event impact (under all considered scenarios) is associated with a serviceability rating. This rating is
67 projected to reflect both usual deterioration and policy-guided improvements due to maintenance.
68 Impacts from generated damage-meteorological events are made to depend on the pre-impact
69 serviceability ratings, exemplifying the added vulnerability of deteriorated components. The
70 quantification scheme also captures the increased damage extent, extra repair costs, and longer repair
71 times due to pre-event non-pristine conditions.

72 Hereafter, pavement condition and its expression through serviceability is first described. Then,
73 an existing concept of resilience is restated and subsequently expanded to incorporate component
74 serviceability rating. The formulation is applied next to an airport case study to demonstrate the value
75 and effect of including natural deterioration and maintenance policies in resilience quantification.
76 Lastly, gained insights and main conclusions of the study are listed and discussed. It is important to note
77 that the applicability of the concepts and general methodology presented herein transcend this
78 pavements application, generally applying to a system of components whose conditions differ,
79 deteriorate over time and are influenced by maintenance and/or replacement actions. Specific models of
80 deterioration/serviceability, maintenance or renewal planning, or system resilience as throughput or

81 other will differ based on the use, but the framework is designed to be generally applicable. Moreover,
82 it accounts for the system impacts of multiple link-based maintenance and resilience enhancements.

83

84 **Pavement Condition Evolution**

85 *The Serviceability Concept*

86 Without repair actions, pavements progressively deteriorate with time. The decline is directly associated
87 with structural or physical damage involving distress modes, such as: rutting, cracking, longitudinal
88 roughness, and raveling. It therefore represents a timewise diminishment in coping capacity against
89 damage events of operational (e.g., overloading), natural (e.g. flooding), or other causes. The
90 degradation pattern is case-specific as it depends upon the pavement design, as-built mechanical
91 properties of the different layers, traffic intensity, and prevailing climatic conditions.

92 The concept of serviceability is often employed in the pavement arena for quantifying
93 infrastructure condition. The idea was introduced and developed during the 1960's in conjunction with
94 the AASHO road experiment (Carey and Irick 1960). In this experiment, different full-scale road
95 sections were intensively trafficked for a period of two years by trucks of known weight, axle
96 configurations, and travel speed. At the same time, the evolution of surface distress was closely
97 monitored and recorded. A serviceability rating in the range of 5 (=pristine) to 0 (=worst possible), was
98 adopted to quantify the condition of each road section from a user and structural perspective. Initially,
99 the rating was based upon a subjective visual score given by a group of experts examining the ride
100 surface (Present Serviceability Rating, PSR); it was later correlated with objectively measurable damage
101 such as density of cracked or patched zones, longitudinal roughness, etc (Present Serviceability Index,
102 PSI). In the AASHO road test, a power-law expression was found adequate for all pavement types to
103 describe the evolution of serviceability as a function of traffic loadings:

$$104 \quad S = S_i - (S_i - S_f) \left(\frac{W}{\rho} \right)^\beta, \quad (1)$$

105 where S denotes the current serviceability rating, S_i is the initial serviceability rating prevailing
106 immediately after construction, S_f is the final or unacceptable serviceability rating, and W is the

107 cumulative number of equivalent vehicle passes applied to the section up to point for which S is
 108 calculated. In effect, if the traffic intensity is timewise uniform, W may be seen as equivalent to age.
 109 The parameters ρ and β are regression constants that embody the experimental setup, such as
 110 pavement layering arrangement and mechanical properties, prevailing environmental conditions, and
 111 loading characteristics of passing vehicles. By substituting $S = S_f$ it may be noticed that ρ equals the
 112 value of W at failure. Graphically, the deterioration pattern (i.e., the shape of S vs. W curve) depends
 113 upon the value of β ; for $\beta=1$ the curve is an oblique line, for $\beta>1$ the curve is concave, while for
 114 $\beta<1$ it is convex.

115 The AASHTO deterioration function is well recognized and still widely utilized in engineering
 116 practice. At the same time it is deemed restrictive, incapable of correctly matching observed long-term
 117 pavement behavior, mainly because its curvature never reverses as needed (Fwa 1990). This
 118 shortcoming was later rectified by considering a slightly different equation capable of producing an S-
 119 shaped curve (Garcia-Diaz and Riggins 1984):

$$120 \quad S = S_i - \frac{S_i - S_f}{\exp((\tau/t)^n)}, \quad (2)$$

121 wherein t is the time since construction or time elapsed since most recent repair (i.e. when serviceability
 122 is S_i), τ and n are parameters controlling the deterioration pattern, analogous to ρ and β in Equation
 123 1. Note that $S = S_f$ is approached only at infinite time. By setting $S_i = 100\%$ (i.e., pristine) and $S_f = 0$
 124 (i.e., worst possible) the resulting serviceability curve can be viewed as a so-called survivor curve
 125 (Lytton 1987; Stampley et al. 1995).

126 Plots of Equation 2 over a 25 year period are included in Fig. 1. Three different n values (0.5,
 127 1.0, and 2.0) are considered in Fig. 1(a) for $\tau = 7$ years. Three different τ values (5, 7 and 9 years)
 128 are considered in Fig. 1(b) for $n = 1$. As can be seen, Equation 2 is able to describe a pavement that
 129 progressively deteriorates - while switching between three different degradation rates. Initially, for a
 130 certain time interval, the degradation rate is very small - allowing the pavement to practically remain in
 131 pristine conditions. Next, the deterioration rate increases, causing a relatively quick drop in
 132 serviceability. Finally, the deterioration rate is arrested, slowing the drop in serviceability. In both charts
 133 the solid line indicates an assumed benchmark case, associated with $n=1$ and $\tau=7$ years. This

134 benchmark case depicts a realistic situation for a pavement with an initial serviceability rating of 100%
135 that deteriorates to 50% serviceability after 10 years and to a rating of about 25% after 25 years. Two
136 pavement damage pictures are superposed over the charts, each associated with a different serviceability
137 level. The association is approximate, merely provided to exemplify the physical meaning of the curves.
138 The purpose here is to intuitively reinforce the link between lower serviceability and infrastructure
139 vulnerability to a hazard event.

140 Also included in Fig. 1 are qualitative ratings of infrastructure condition, ranging from “Good”
141 to “Failed”. The descriptive scale is identical to that employed in the Pavement Condition Index (PCI)
142 method (ASTM D6433 or ASTM D5340), a scheme often used by pavement managers (Shahin 2005).
143 For the purpose of the current work a PCI index may be used in place of a serviceability rating, i.e., they
144 are interchangeable.

145 *Maintenance*

146 The curves in Fig. 1 essentially represent pavement condition under a no-maintenance situation. When
147 maintenance is applied at some point in time, it changes the shape of the deterioration curve. First,
148 rehabilitation activities appear as a sudden jump in the curve, i.e., an abrupt increase due to improved
149 serviceability. Further, maintenance work alters the subsequent shape of the deterioration curve.
150 Realistically, pavements cannot be preserved at their original as-built serviceability levels throughout
151 the life of the system. Hence, some decline in performance is allowed in the different network
152 components before taking repair actions. Policies for maintaining deteriorating systems have been
153 studied extensively (not necessarily for the pavement discipline), with numerous proposed model types
154 (Wang 2002), e.g., age-based, periodic/sequential, failure/performance/condition-based, cost limited,
155 repair-duration limited, opportunistic, etc.

156 In practice, pavement repair actions are scheduled according to a condition-based policy (Hajek
157 et al. 2011; Air Force Civil Engineer Center 2014). Typically, a set of intervention rules is pre-stated,
158 triggering a specific maintenance effort on the basis of the component condition level. An intervention
159 rule associated with a high serviceability rating usually requires more frequent repairs but involves only
160 preventive or minor rehabilitation. Triggering intervention at low serviceability levels typically implies
161 that major and costly rehabilitation efforts are necessary. Research on this connection, e.g. Camahan et

162 al. (1987), Madanat and Ben-Akiva (1994), has generally focused on maximizing cost effectiveness by
163 optimizing decisions, such as: (i) how frequently maintenance should be applied; (ii) to what condition
164 a pavement should be allowed to deteriorate before action is taken; and (iii) what best maintenance
165 alternative to take for a given situation. Contributions in this field have also attempted to integrate
166 condition forecasting into the optimization.

167 Fig. 2 depicts condition evolution for a pavement under a simplistic threshold-based
168 maintenance policy. The abscissa represents time and the ordinate represents serviceability rating.
169 Starting from an arbitrary “current” rating, the condition is seen to degrade with elapsed time until a
170 predefined threshold level is reached ($S = 60\%$ in the case shown). This threshold designates a
171 minimal acceptable serviceability rating for the infrastructure being considered. Repair intervention is
172 therefore triggered, raising the rating to $S = 100\%$. Then after, the pavement condition continues its
173 decline, triggering a new repair intervention once the threshold is encountered again. This situation is
174 repetitive/cyclic. The depiction in Fig. 2 is deemed simplistic, because it presumes that the deterioration
175 curve has identical shape before and after repair, and because the pavement receives treatment at the
176 exact designated timing - assuming all necessary resources are available for the repair. Without loss of
177 generality, these simplifications are adopted for the current work.

178

179 **Resilience Definition**

180 The literature is replete with qualitative discussions and quantitative methods for measuring system
181 resilience, as well as other related system performance metrics, including: risk, vulnerability, reliability,
182 robustness, flexibility, survivability, etc. See Faturechi and Miller-Hooks (2015) for a synthesis of
183 articles proposing such measures in the context of transportation systems alone. The concept of
184 resilience as adopted and computed herein considers two main features: (i) the system’s innate ability,
185 based on the physical properties and topology/connectivity of its components, to cope with a disruption
186 event that causes physical damage and (ii) the system’s ability to adapt through quick, cost-effective
187 actions that can preserve or restore post-event performance/functionality. Both features are depicted in
188 Fig. 3, which schematically illustrates system performance vs. time before and after a disruption event;
189 notice the time axis changes scale between pre- and post-event, from months (pre-disruption) to hours

190 (upon disruption). As can be seen, the system's post-event performance level after a time period with
191 length T^{\max} is composed of two parts: (i) coping capacity - defined as performance level prevailing
192 immediately after disruption; and (ii) adaptive capacity - defined as the improvement in performance
193 level restored during T^{\max} for a given set of repair resources. Ultimately, resilience is defined with
194 respect to a baseline. It is taken as the ratio of post-response system performance level at event time t
195 to pre-event system performance level for link serviceability levels at base time zero.

196 Fig. 3(a) illustrates the commonplace assumption of a system that is initially (and at all times)
197 in pristine condition (e.g., Bruneau et al. 2003). On the other hand, Fig. 3(b) depicts a system with
198 fluctuating performance. This latter case is the non-traditional viewpoint offered herein; it originates
199 from evolving component conditions and varying component age. As can be seen, pre-event
200 performance level for the system is imperfect, leading to poorer coping and adaptive capacities than
201 seen in Fig. 3(a).

202 A mathematical modeling approach proposed in Miller-Hooks et al. (2012) is used in this paper,
203 wherein resilience is quantified through solution of a nonlinear, two-stage, stochastic program. The
204 stochastic program seeks to maximize the expectation of an indicator representing the resilience of the
205 network (throughput in this case) over possible disruption scenarios. That is, resilience actions are
206 incorporated in the resilience computation, thus accounting for not only the innate coping capacity of
207 the system, but also post-event adaptability in the disruption event's immediate aftermath. Optimal
208 mitigation and preparedness actions are determined in the first-stage prior to event realization, and
209 scenario-dependent, optimal, remedial actions are chosen in the second-stage in the form of recourse.
210 Recourse decisions are taken with full knowledge of how the event is realized. Availability, cost and
211 implementation time of recourse options may also depend on the choice of preparedness actions. An
212 integer L-shaped decomposition method is applied to provide exact solution for the problem. This
213 method decouples first- and second-stage decisions, eliminating bilinear terms that are the root of the
214 nonlinearity.

215 As a means of introducing evolving component conditions into the resilience model, failure
216 probabilities are associated with serviceability, the latter being governed by: age, normal deterioration
217 curves, and maintenance policies. Specifically, the probability an adverse event will lead to component

218 failure depends on the component's serviceability level at the event time, and the ability of the system
219 to provide services depends on its functioning components. Moreover, the cost and time for
220 implementing repair or other restorative options post-event are also functions of pre-event serviceability
221 rating. If a component is deteriorated, the effort required to return it to pristine condition will be greater
222 than if that component were not deteriorated. This is in part because the effectiveness of the restorative
223 options will be diminished once the component has deteriorated to certain levels. This integration of
224 component condition in resilience computation is described and demonstrated through a case study
225 given next.

226

227 **Demonstration on Case Study**

228 *Introduction and Design*

229 A specific case study is employed hereafter to demonstrate and assess the effects and value of
230 incorporating evolving component conditions in resilience quantification. Use is made of a pavement
231 system representing Laguardia Airport's (LGA's) taxiway and runway network. This choice builds on
232 previous work (Faturechi et al. 2014), which was motivated by the fact that air transportation is one of
233 fastest growing transportation modes worldwide. It is also driven by the particular sensitivity of airport
234 operations to pavement condition. LGA contains two intersecting runways and supporting taxiways - as
235 depicted in Fig. 4. These components and their interconnectivity are represented by a 68-node, 104-link
236 network.

237 Resilience of the LGA pavement network was computed in Faturechi et al. (2014) with an
238 implicit assumption of pristine component condition (pre-event). Fig. 5 synthesizes the employed
239 modeling approach, and the reader is encouraged to consult Faturechi et al. (2014) for full details. In
240 general terms, the model involves identification of a set of potential directed paths through the airport
241 network for maneuvers between the gates and takeoffs or landings. Despite that each runway can be
242 used in two directions, within a given period of time, runway operations are unidirectional for safety
243 reasons. Thus, the model forces a choice of direction, a so-called runway configuration, within a given
244 time period. If an arc is damaged, its capacity to support the movement of an aircraft is zero; hence, only
245 paths whose constituent arcs are undamaged or repaired can support flow.

246 Consequently, for a given budget B and response duration T^{\max} (see Fig. 3(a)), resilience is
 247 computed as the ratio $\alpha_{B,T^{\max}}$ of the expected number of landings and takeoffs to a comparable pre-
 248 disruption flow rate given by demand $D^{w,s}$ for each maneuver w and aircraft type s , over all disaster
 249 scenarios ξ . As defined in Figure 5, $f_p^{g,w,s}(\xi)$ is the flow rate of maneuver w for aircraft type s
 250 in path p under runway configuration g and scenario ξ .

$$251 \quad \alpha_{B,T^{\max}} = \frac{E_{\xi} \left[\sum_{w,g,s} \sum_{p \in P^{g,w,s}} f_p^{g,w,s}(\xi) \right]}{\sum_{w,s} D^{w,s}}, \quad (3)$$

252 The expectation is taken over a set of predicted disaster-meteorological event scenarios that may arise
 253 due to any one of a number of hazard event types, whether natural, accidental or malicious, with
 254 anticipated occurrence probabilities. First-stage decisions mitigate disaster impact and can support post-
 255 event repair opportunities (e.g. availability of materials, repair equipment, trained crews, and contracts
 256 with external resources). These decisions are taken *a priori* with the knowledge that second-stage
 257 recourse (repair) decisions will be taken optimally *a posteriori* given the available resources, and
 258 knowledge of how the disaster-meteorological event unfolds.

259 An overview of the computational framework, specified for the case study, is given in Fig. 6.
 260 Similar to Faturechi et al. (2014), the scheme consists of three main modules: (i) scenario generation,
 261 (ii) mathematical modeling; and (iii) model solution. As part of the scenario generation, runway and
 262 taxiway link failure probabilities were made functions of serviceability as described in Equation 2. To
 263 capture serviceability levels as a function of component's age and maintenance plan, serviceability
 264 ratings $S^a(t)$ were explicitly defined as a function of time t for each runway or taxiway link a :

$$265 \quad S^a(t) = S_i^a - \frac{S_i^a - S_f^a}{\exp\left(\left(\frac{\tau}{t - t_m^a}\right)^n\right)}, \quad (4)$$

266 where t_m^a is the time of last maintenance before time t which has brought the serviceability of link a
 267 back to S_i^a at that time ($t > t_m^a$ at all times). S_i^a is the initial serviceability condition typically taken as
 268 pristine, and S_f^a is the final (worst possible or ultimate) serviceability rating approached if no repair is
 269 applied typically taken as zero.

270 Each scenario is defined in terms of damage severity and type (climate/geological, operational,
 271 natural deterioration, and terrorism), along with current meteorological conditions in terms of
 272 temperature, precipitation and visibility conditions. Meteorological conditions are described in terms of
 273 temperature, visibility, wind velocity and precipitation, which might affect potential damage causes and
 274 types. The causes also affect damage location and distribution of damage in multiple locations over the
 275 pavement network. The likelihood of an event falling within any of these causal categories depends on
 276 the geographical characteristics of the airport. A host of damage-weather scenarios are possible. To
 277 capture correlations between damage characteristics and meteorological conditions, conditional
 278 probabilities are employed in generating scenarios. The probability of each scenario is assumed to be
 279 known *a priori*. Specifically, let $p_a(\xi_0)$, $p(\xi_0 | d)$, $p(d | m)$ and $p(m)$, be the probability of
 280 scenario ξ_0 , probability of scenario given disruption type d , probability of disaster type given
 281 meteorological condition m , and probability of meteorological condition m for the given geographical
 282 location, respectively. Then,

$$283 \quad p_a(\xi_0) = p(s | d) \cdot p(d | m) \cdot p(m), \quad (5)$$

284 The failure probability $p_a(\xi_t)$ of link a , given disruption-meteorological event ξ_t arising at
 285 time t , is related to $S^a(t)$ as follows:

$$286 \quad p_a(\xi_t) = \min \left\{ 1, \left(1 + c(1 - S^a(t)) \right) p_a(\xi_0) \right\}, \quad (6)$$

287 where $p_a(\xi_0)$ is the failure probability of link a at 100% serviceability (i.e. under pristine conditions)
 288 for given event type. As can be seen, the sought failure probability is governed by a positive
 289 proportionality constant c . This is a newly introduced parameter that links serviceability ratings to the
 290 formulation. Higher values of c infer greater influence of component condition on failure probabilities.
 291 Note that if c is set large enough, it is possible that a probability greater than one would be generated;
 292 a ceiling of probability-one is therefore assumed. If $S^a(t) = 100\%$ at all times, then the influence of
 293 c is annulled, yielding the familiar assumption in the resilience literature: $p_a(\xi_t) = p_a(\xi_0)$. Similarly,
 294 the damage severity of link a is captured through repair action implementation cost and time, which
 295 are also formulated as a function of the link's serviceability level:

$$296 \quad b_a(\xi_t) = \left(1 + c(1 - S^a(t)) \right) b_a(\xi_0), \quad (7a)$$

$$297 \quad q_a(\xi_t) = \left(1 + c(1 - S^a(t))\right) q_a(\xi_0), \quad (7b)$$

298 in which $b_a(\xi_0)$ and $q_a(\xi_0)$ are implementation cost and time of repair actions in link a with a
 299 serviceability rating of 100%. Their values depend on the event type. While the c parameter was taken
 300 as identical across Equations 6 and 7, in a more general formulation this presumption may be relaxed.

301 Given possible weather conditions and probability of their occurrences specific to LGA,
 302 disruption-meteorological events, resulting damage types (e.g. cracking, disintegration, distortion, loss
 303 of skid resistance), potential damage extent in terms of maximum number of affected segments, and
 304 repair actions required in each case were generated. Each disruption meteorological event gives a set of
 305 link failure probabilities which are used to randomly generate operational (one) or failed (zero) link
 306 states to create each disruption-meteorological scenario. An overview of the scenario generation process
 307 is given in Fig. 6. Conditional probabilities capture correlations between damage characteristics and
 308 meteorological conditions. Thus, the result of scenario generation is the set of disruption-meteorological
 309 events with one/zero values for link functionality and characteristics associated to that disruption event
 310 such as the required repairs, available repairs, etc. Ultimately, resilience was assessed at 6-month
 311 intervals over a 15-year time horizon during which network component conditions continually evolved.

312 *Case Study Specifics*

313 Presented in what follows are modeling details involved in resilience quantification of the LGA case
 314 study. First, a budget B for emergency preparedness and response of \$25,000 was assumed. Also,
 315 T^{\max} was set to 8 hours, and c in Equations 6 and 7 was taken to equal 1.5 (in lieu of relevant
 316 information from other sources this choice was based on preliminary run results). Resilience is measure
 317 of a system's innate coping capacity and ability to adapt when confronted with a challenge. Thus,
 318 resilience is conceptualized here to include adaptive actions that can be taken quickly and relatively
 319 cheaply. Higher monetary and time budgets can be used; however, a system that would require
 320 significant resources for continued operations might not be considered resilient. Benchmark
 321 deterioration curve parameter set was assumed to hold for both taxiways and runways; with reference
 322 to Equation 4 these are $n = 1$ and $\tau = 7$ years. Two separate threshold-based maintenance plans (MPs)
 323 were considered. In MP1 rehabilitation actions are taken whenever runway serviceability reaches 80%
 324 and taxiway serviceability reaches 60%. This is consistent with a repair interval of about 4.0 and 7.5

325 years, respectively. In MP2 the rehabilitation thresholds were 60% for runways and 40% for taxiways.
326 Respectively, these imply repair intervals of about 7.5 and 13.5 years.

327 With both MPs, runways are maintained at higher average levels than are taxiways. MP1
328 imposes more stringent rehabilitation demands as compared to MP2, and represents an airport pavement
329 network that is, on average, in better condition. Moreover, the age of each runway at the beginning of
330 the resilience analysis period was randomly set given $\sim U[0,4.0]$ and $\sim U[0,7.5]$ years for MP1 and MP2,
331 respectively. Similarly, the starting age of the taxiways was randomly set given $\sim U[0,7.5]$ and
332 $\sim U[0,13.5]$ years for MP1 and MP2, respectively. This procedure generated a realistic situation where
333 the serviceability across the network is non-uniform.

334 MP1 and MP2 parameters are summarized in Table 1 which lists the initial ages of the different
335 network components, as well as their associated serviceability rating and maintenance threshold. As
336 may be seen, taxiways were grouped based on their orientation relative to the runways: parallel and
337 perpendicular. Such distinction has some operational implication that is captured (internally) by the
338 model. Condition evolution of taxiways and runways according to MP1 is plotted in Fig. 7(a). Similar
339 information for MP2 is included in Fig. 7(c). Each chart includes four lines, representing changes in
340 infrastructure serviceability over a 15 year period. Starting levels are dissimilar per Table 1 values. As
341 can be seen, full rehabilitation to pristine conditions is presumed after a threshold is encountered,
342 generating a repetitive pattern. Because starting serviceability levels are different, and because the
343 rehabilitation threshold for taxiways and runways are different, the condition of the system at any point
344 in time is spatially nonuniform.

345 ***Results and Analysis***

346 The resilience indicators for the case study, calculated through Equation 3, are presented in Fig. 7. Charts
347 7(b) and 7(d) display resilience calculation outcomes associated with MP1 (Fig. 7(a)) and MP2 (Fig.
348 7(c)), respectively. Each chart contains 31 values covering an analysis period of 15 years at 6-month
349 intervals. The resilience values fluctuate due to differences in component conditions between the
350 different evaluation times, and also because of the statistical nature of generating scenarios. Specifically,
351 each point in the figure is computed from an average performance value over 360 randomly generated
352 disruption-meteorological scenarios. Model runs might be repeated over additional sets of randomly

353 generated scenarios to produce a range of resilience estimates or a single expectation over a larger set
354 of possibilities.

355 Two horizontal lines are superposed on each resilience chart, forming bands that encapsulate all
356 run results. These lines represent a single upper bound (UB) evaluation and a single lower bound (LB)
357 evaluation of the system resilience plus (or minus) two standard deviations that were calculated based
358 on the spread in each case. The UB case denotes system resilience level with all components in pristine
359 condition (pre-event). It is therefore unaffected by MP specifics. The LB case denotes a system
360 resilience level with all components at their worst allowable condition simultaneously - according to the
361 governing MP threshold. This LB value will differ between MPs and in the case shown is slightly higher
362 for the more stringent MP1. Note that while pristine conditions are presumed in the computation of the
363 resilience upper bound, and worst acceptable serviceability for the lower bound, the resilience bound
364 values are computed over 360 randomly generated disruption-meteorological scenarios. Thus, they may
365 vary as a function of the scenario generation output. The difference between UB and LB is about 17%
366 for MP1 and about 20% for MP2. This difference directly depends on the value chosen for c in
367 Equations 6 and 7 and the set of generated scenarios.

368 Overall, Fig. 7 reveals that the network resilience changes over time between the upper and
369 lower bounds with values that depend, among other factors, on link conditions, link natural deterioration
370 pattern, and prevailing MPs.

371

372 **Conclusions and Future Work**

373 This paper is concerned with quantifying the resilience of an airport pavement network while allowing
374 for evolving component conditions. Application to a case study demonstrated that resilience is impacted
375 by the initial condition of the infrastructure links, by their natural deterioration trends, and by prevailing
376 maintenance policies and actions. The impact found was not negligible, indicating the need and value
377 for such an approach. The method employed is flexible and can be further refined or compounded by,
378 for example: (i) assigning different maintenance thresholds to different components or incorporating
379 other repair policies; (ii) optimizing maintenance actions rather than assuming a given schedule or

380 protocol; or (iii) using any one of a number of serviceability models, including stochastic methods for
381 predicting future condition.

382 Note that for other pavement networks, such as a roadway network, the adopted resilience metric
383 would be modified. In the case of the roadway network, a measure based on vehicular throughput or
384 travel time/delay could be employed. In the latter case, a bi-level programming formulation might be
385 adopted where the lower level would provide link travel time estimates given post-event roadway
386 conditions and chosen resilience actions. Refer to Faturechi and Miller-Hooks (2015) for roadway
387 resilience estimation in which pristine conditions are implicitly assumed; such estimates account for
388 user response to system changes.

389 Even though a specific case and type of application were considered, the findings here are of
390 general nature; they imply that earlier resilience works report UB values (refer to Fig. 7). In other words,
391 best-case resilience estimates are typically provided. For the current formulation this is equivalent to
392 annulling c in Equations 6 and 7. Moreover, in light of evolving component conditions, the definition
393 of resilience may also require reexamination. Resilience is typically quantified relative to a pre-event
394 baseline signifying pristine system performance. Because component conditions are allowed to evolve,
395 pristine performance is not realistically achievable, while at the same time pre-event performance
396 fluctuates (see Fig. 3).

397 Commonly, optimization of MPs is based on life cycle cost analyses. A continuation of this
398 work may include MPs that are associated with resilience quantification, i.e., investigating MPs in terms
399 of effects on resilience. One option in this connection is making the MP a decision variable, with its
400 own budget, and integrating in the decision process for preparedness (current model did not include
401 maintenance cost and resources). Timing and location of repair decisions was not considered in the
402 employed MP, but the approach here allows testing such strategies (e.g., Medury and Madanat 2013).
403 So doing can lead to new implications for maintenance budget allocation/prioritization. Also of interest
404 is performing an in-depth parametric/sensitivity analysis of each resilience calculation. This means
405 investigating the solution details for resilience by event categories, differences in division of budget
406 between preparedness and response, or any other changes in decision variables. These aspects will serve
407 as topics for future work.

408 **Acknowledgements**

409 This work was funded by the National Science Foundation. This support is gratefully acknowledged,
410 but implies no endorsement of the findings.

411

412 **References**

- 413 Air Force Civil Engineer Center. (2014). "Engineering Technical Letter (ETL) 14-3: Preventive
414 Maintenance Plan (PMP) for Airfield Pavements." Department of the Air Force, Tyndall Air Force Base,
415 Florida.
- 416 Bruneau, M., Chang, S. E., Eguchi, R. T., Lee, G. C., O'Rourke, T. D., Reinhorn, A. M., Shinozuka, M.,
417 Tierney, K., Wallace, W. A., and von Winterfeldt, D. (2003). "A framework to quantitatively assess and
418 enhance the seismic resilience of communities." *Earthquake Spectra*, 19(4), 733-752.
- 419 Camahan, J., Davis, W., Shahin, M., Keane, P., and Wu, M. (1987). "Optimal maintenance decisions for
420 pavement management." *Journal of Transportation Engineering*, 113(5), 554-572.
- 421 Carey, W. N., Jr., and Irick, P. E. (1960). "The pavement serviceability-performance concept." *Highway
422 Research Board Bulletin*, 250, 40-58.
- 423 Dehghani, M. S., Flintsch, G. W., and McNeil, S. (2013). "Roadway network as a degrading system:
424 vulnerability and system level performance." *Transportation Letters*, 5(3), 105-114.
- 425 Dehghani, M. S., Flintsch, G. W., and McNeil, S. (2014). "Impact of road conditions and disruption
426 uncertainties on network vulnerability." *Journal of Infrastructure Systems*, 20(3), 04014015.
- 427 Faturechi, R., Levenberg, E., and Miller-Hooks, E. (2014). "Evaluating and optimizing resilience of airport
428 pavement networks." *Journal of Computers and Operations Research*, 43, 335-348.
- 429 Faturechi, R., and Miller-Hooks, E. (2015). "Measuring the performance of transportation infrastructure
430 systems in disasters: a comprehensive review." *Journal of Infrastructure Systems*, 21(1), 1-15.
- 431 Federal Highway Administration Pavement Distress Identification Definition Manual,
432 wistrans.org/mrutc/files/Distress-ID-Manual.pdf (accessed on June 17, 2015).
- 433 Fwa, T. F. (1990). "Shape characteristics of pavement performance curves." *Journal of Transportation
434 Engineering*, 116(5), 692-697.
- 435 Garcia-Diaz, A., and Riggins, M. (1984). "Serviceability and distress methodology for predicting
436 pavement performance." *Transportation Research Record*, 997, 56-61.
- 437 Haimés, Y. Y. (2009). "On the definition of resilience in systems." *Risk Analysis*. 29(4), 498-501.
- 438 Hajek, J., Hall, J. W., and Hein, D. K. (2011). "Common airport pavement maintenance practices." *A
439 Synthesis of Airport Practice, ACRP SYNTHESIS 22*, Federal Aviation Administration, Transportation
440 Research Board, Washington, D.C.
- 441 Holling, C. S. (1973). "Resilience and stability of ecological systems." *Annual Review of Ecology and
442 Systematics*, 4, 1-23.
- 443 Lytton, R. L. (1987). "Concepts of pavement performance prediction and modeling." *Proceedings of the
444 2nd North American Conference on Managing Pavements*, Ontario, Ministry of Transportation and U.S.
445 Federal Highway Administration, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, 2.3-2.20.
- 446 Madanat, S., and Ben-Akiva, M. (1994). "Optimal inspection and repair policies for infrastructure
447 facilities." *Journal of Transportation science*, 28(1), 55-62.
- 448 Medury, A., and Madanat, S. (2013). "Incorporating network considerations into pavement management
449 systems: a case for approximate dynamic programming." *Transportation Research Part C*, 33, 134-150.

- 450 Miller-Hooks, E., Zhang, X., and Faturechi, R. (2012). "Measuring and maximizing resilience of freight
451 transportation networks." *Computers and Operations Research*, 39(7), 1633-1643.
- 452 National Infrastructure Advisory Council, *Critical Infrastructure Resilience Final Report and*
453 *Recommendations*. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/niac/niac_critical_infrastructure_resilience.pdf
454 (accessed July 27, 2015).
- 455 Shahin, M. Y. (2005). "Pavement management for airports, roads, and parking lots." Springer, 572 p.
- 456 Stampely, B., Miller, B., Smith, R., and Scullion, T. (1995). "Pavement management information system
457 concepts, equations and analysis models." Texas Transportation Institute, Research Report TX 96/1989-
458 1.
- 459 The White House, Office of the Secretary, Presidential Policy Directive -- Critical Infrastructure Security
460 and Resilience, Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21, 2013. [https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-](https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil)
461 [office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil](https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil) (accessed
462 July 27, 2015)
- 463 Wang, H. (2002). "A survey of maintenance policies of deteriorating systems." *European Journal of*
464 *Operational Research*, 139(3), 469-489.
- 465

466 **Tables**

467

468

469 **Table 1.** Details of Maintenance Plans

Infrastructure Component	Maintenance Plan 1 (MP1)			Maintenance Plan 2 (MP2)		
	Starting age (years)	Starting Serviceability rating $S_a(0)$	Predefined Repair Threshold	Starting age (years)	Starting Serviceability rating $S_a(0)$	Predefined Repair Threshold
Runway 1	3.1	90%	80%	3.8	84%	60%
Runway 2	1.7	98%		1.1	100%	
Taxiway-perpendicular	4.5	79%	60%	10.5	49%	40%
Taxiway-parallel	6.2	68%		3.2	89%	

470

471

472 **List of Figure Captions**

473

474

475 **Fig. 1.** Serviceability curves (Eq. (2)) showing the influence of: (a) n parameter, and (b) τ parameter.

476 Superposed damage pictures illustrate the physical meaning of condition rating; image source:

477 Federal Highway Administration Pavement Distress Identification Definition Manual (2015)

478 **Fig. 2.** Illustration of a threshold-based maintenance policy

479 **Fig. 3.** Approaches to infrastructure resilience: (a) pre-event system performance is timewise constant

480 with all components in pristine condition; and (b) pre-event system performance fluctuates due

481 to non-uniform component conditions

482 **Fig. 4.** LGA runway and taxiway network layout

483 **Fig. 5.** Overview of stochastic program for airport pavement network resilience computation employed

484 in Faturechi et al. (2014)


485 **Fig. 6.** Diagram of case study resilience quantification

486 **Fig. 7.** Case study results: (a) evolution of serviceability according to MP1, (b) consequent system

487 resilience under MP1, (c) evolution of serviceability according to MP2, and (d) consequent system


488 resilience under MP2

489 **Figures**
 490
 491



492 **Fig. 1.** Serviceability curves (Eq. (2)) showing the influence of: (a) n parameter, and (b) τ parameter.
 493 Superposed damage pictures illustrate the physical meaning of condition rating; image source:
 494 Federal Highway Administration Pavement Distress Identification Definition Manual (2015)
 495


496



497

498 **Fig. 2.** Illustration of a threshold-based maintenance policy


499



500

501 **Fig. 3.** Approaches to infrastructure resilience: (a) pre-event system performance is timewise constant
 502 with all components in pristine condition; and (b) pre-event system performance fluctuates due
 503 to non-uniform component conditions

504



505
506
507

Fig. 4. LGA runway and taxiway network layout


508

Objective	$\max E_{\xi}[Z(\xi)],$ where $Z(\xi) = \max \sum_{w,g,s} \sum_{p \in P^{g,w,s}} f_p^{g,w,s}(\xi)$	Maximize expected number of takeoffs and landings of small and large aircraft types, i.e. flows, f , through the system over all disruption scenarios ξ , g runway configurations, w -maneuvers, s -aircraft types and P -active paths (constant denominator in Eq. 3 included for resilience computation)
subject to		
<i>First stage constraints</i>		
Pre-event decision variables:		
τ_m = binary variable indicating that m repair crews are employed to support internal repair capabilities (= 1 if exactly m are employed and = 0 otherwise)		
$\gamma_{e,n}$ = binary variable indicating if n units of additional equipment of type e (e.g. rollers, pavers, cutters) are purchased (= 1 if provided and = 0 otherwise)		
Resource limitations		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of trained repair crews • Number and type of equipment to keep on site 		
<i>Second stage constraints (given meteorological-disruption event realizations, ξ)</i>		
Post-event decision variables:		
$\pi^g(\xi)$ = binary variable indicating whether or not runway configuration g is selected under scenario ξ (= 1 if selected, and = 0 otherwise)		
$\lambda_{a,r}^{ex}(\xi), \lambda_{a,r}^{in}(\xi)$ = binary variable indicating whether or not repair action r is taken by external and internal (airport repair team and equipment) resources, respectively, on taxiway $a \in A_1$ under scenario ξ (= 1 if taken and = 0 otherwise), respectively		
$\lambda_{a_i,r}^{ex}(\xi), \lambda_{a_i,r}^{in}(\xi)$ = binary variable indicating whether or not repair action r is taken by external (outsourcing) and internal resources, respectively, on segment i of runway $a \in A_2$ under scenario ξ (= 1 if taken and = 0 otherwise), respectively		
$f_p^{g,w,s}(\xi)$ = post-repair flow rate along path p for runway configuration g , maneuver type w and aircraft type s under scenario ξ		
Link capacity constraints		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • taxiway capacity estimates as a function of directional capacity envelopes • runway capacity estimates under visibility conditions 		
Operational constraints		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • minimum operating strip lengths by aircraft type and maneuver • runway configuration selection 		
Damage impact and options		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • capture effects of disruption event • repair decisions – use of internal versus external resources • post-event, post-repair link performance 		
Repair period limit		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • only takeoffs and landing occurring before T^{\max} counted in resilience • repair time limitations 		
Equipment use restrictions		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • use of single equipment piece limited to one location at any point in time • multiple pieces of equipment can be used at multiple damage sites simultaneously • outsourcing permitted at a cost 		
Post-repair flow restrictions		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • arriving and departing flow rates limited to original demand 		
Budget limitations		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • portion of fixed budget allocated to preparedness (first-stage) decisions • portion of budget saved for post-disruption event (second-stage) repair actions • post-event repair actions can be taken internally if resources put in place pre-event 		

509
510
511
512

Fig. 5. Overview of stochastic program for airport pavement network resilience computation employed in Faturechi et al. (2014)


513



514

515 **Fig. 6.** Diagram of case study resilience quantification

516



517
518
519
520

Fig. 7. Case study results: (a) evolution of serviceability according to MP1, (b) consequent system resilience under MP1, (c) evolution of serviceability according to MP2, and (d) consequent system resilience under MP2

521
522