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The Limits of the Case Study: Exemplarity and the Reception of Classical Literature

Simon Goldhill

It still strikes me myself as strange that the case histories I write should read like short stories and that, as one might say, they lack the serious stamp of science

—Sigmund Freud

IT IS HARD TO IMAGINE an academic field in the humanities that does not place the case study at its heart. Philosophy loves its conundrums, literary criticism its texts, history its particular stories. Even linguistics depends on case studies of, for example, the starred sentences when Jane and John fall in love but fail in grammatical nicety. Indeed—and here the self-reflexivity already inherent in my opening becomes almost too pushy—the relationship between generality and example is fundamental and integral to any serious academic pursuit. Even the singularity has become fascinating to theorists of existential risk because of its exemplary and generalizable qualities. It is possible to question, but not to dethrone, the test case, the example, the particulars, through which a generalization is explored. Indeed, a generalization untested through examples, or, even more pertinently, unapplied to examples, is of little if any value. In no area is this nexus of issues more insistent than in the burgeoning field of classical reception studies, that is, an arena where contemporary scholars consider how exemplary writers or artists of the past express themselves through their engagement with the exemplary cultural artifices from ancient Greece and Rome, which are themselves integrally informed by the rhetorical structures of mythological exempla. Classicism is, after all, the exemplar of exemplification. But this immediate, layered complexity of the classical example in modernity only makes it more compelling to start the process of questioning how such exemplification functions.

For it is far from clear that classics or any other branch of literary study has in any adequate way theorized the nature of the exemplarity

integral to its practice.¹ Back in 1992, I wrote an essay called “The Failure of Exemplarity,” a piece that attempted to demonstrate not just how tricky the apparently transparent process of exemplification is, but also how the gap between an example and the generality it aimed to prove, was both constitutive and damaging to the process it . . . exemplified.² It was an article originally written for a lecture series set up in Cambridge in response to the brouhaha over whether Jacques Derrida should be awarded an honorary degree (a highly politicized case of making an example of someone), a series that was in itself a very strident, nationally publicized and well-attended political event. Heady days. It seemed to me then, and it seems to me now, that despite the injunction of the discipline of rhetoric to consider precisely how to make an example, and despite the practice of classical scholarship, which has so often depended on its *exempla* and *paradeigmata*, classicists in particular have not yet taken up the challenge of conceptualizing this foundational aspect of their work.

At the heart of the problem lies a slide in the language of exemplarity that is all too often obscured and obscuring. The term “example” can be used to indicate no more than a particular instance of a general category (and therefore of little theoretical interest or political purchase). So we say that “and” is an example of a conjunction. “An example of the category of tool is a hammer.” No more, no less. “Paradigm” has a similar function in the field of grammar: “I walk, you walk, he walks” (etc.) is the paradigm of the present indicative active verb in English. The notion of paradigm also allows for irregularity within an ordered system (“I am, you are, he is” [etc.] is an exemplary paradigm of an irregular present indicative active verb).³ But the notion of the example, not least when it becomes discursive, also slides into the explicitly normative: “Roger Federer is an exemplary tennis player, [because . . .].” The sense of regularity and irregularity of the paradigm can become a fully moralized or politicized evaluative process. “The paradigm of political evil is Donald Trump . . .” But the exemplar—the case, the case *study*, case *history*—is a narrativized instance that, by virtue of its individuality, is always in a relation of excess or lack to its *comparandum* or generality. So when Heracles is held up as an example for a person to follow, it is only through the negotiation of a play of difference and similarity that the hero functions as a model. This is so even in the minimal circumstances of a single word example: “Like Heracles, Roger Federer . . .” or “The example of Heracles shows that . . .” “What would Jesus do?” has to remain a question because no subject who can ask the question can reasonably answer it outside the optative mood, a potential answer. The example of Jesus may be good to think with, but it cannot function

in the same way as “a hammer is an example of a tool.” Much normative discourse—with profound consequences—strives to turn a case into an instance, as if the excess and lack could be repressed, as if “What would Heracles do?” could have a certain, clear answer. In this article, my concern will be with such narrativized examples, under the rubric of the case study.

The theory of the case study has been explored since 1992 in fascinating ways, especially in the history and philosophy of science, with a set of arguments that classicists and other literary scholars can both learn from and also contribute to significantly (as Geoffrey Lloyd in particular has already undertaken and as, from a different angle, has Brooke Holmes).⁴ I am less interested in the empirical and triumphalist accounts of case study methodology provided largely in the social sciences.⁵ Rather, it seems to me that the relation between narrative, ideology, and the form of the case study is much more pertinent for reception study.⁶ One question that might be debated is the degree to which forms of production determine forms of thinking: while the turn to a German-inspired institutionalization of the PhD in American and England has been well studied, the consequences for the ordering of knowledge arising from such professionalization has been less deeply investigated.⁷ The politics of form has become a major issue in literary criticism,⁸ and the form of scholarly discourse itself has become a recognized issue, for classicists in particular, through discussion of the commentary, the encyclopedia, and technical writing.⁹ Yet the form of the scholarly article (such as this), with its word limit and conspectus of prior opinions, or the monograph, based so often on the requirements of a PhD, have been less debated. There is at least a *prima facie* argument to be made that one especially familiar current template of discussion in reception studies, where a single author’s response to antiquity or a single text’s engagement with the Greek or Roman past is analyzed, goes hand in hand with the institutional structures of publishing and promotion, and that therefore here too the intellectual lineaments of the debate are being significantly informed by the mode of production. The case study and the article may well be genetically linked.

More pressing, however, at this point in the development of classical reception studies is the drive to reconceptualize the object of classical knowledge from what can profitably be termed postclassicism.¹⁰ Classicism, the ideological relation that fundamentally determined how antiquity has been understood in the post-Renaissance West, depends on two key relations to the past of antiquity. First, classicism *idealizes* antiquity. Classicism is founded on the assumption that certain examples of the literature of the past are paradigmatic examples of a genre that

define its essence and nature. The definition of the “first class” is laid down by the *classics*. This is extended from art to the social conditions in which the art was made, though how these ancient social conditions are understood may vary radically in modern reconstructions. Even—especially—countercultural movements found their drive in an idealized past: for the men who desired men, ancient Greece, with its expressive erotics, was a place to dream of; for the radical or revolutionary, Greece was a site of desperately longed-for liberty. Even when the demerits of, say, slavery, or, from another perspective, democracy, were recognized within a localized argument, it was only as a foil to the prevalent idealization of the past.

Second, the past of classical antiquity is linked to the present in a *genealogical* descent. For post-Enlightenment Germans most insistently, intent on the *Sonderweg*, the special, destined journey of the German people, a *fons et origo* in ancient Greece was not just a gesture of cultural affiliation but also—with more horrific consequences—an assertion of racial privilege. The discovery—or invention—of Indo-European provided a link between India, Greece, and Germany through the blood of the Aryans; the Greek language was determined to have a particular and telling relationship with the German language; German values—with the full nationalist sense that Johann Gottfried Herder gave to the idea of *das Volk*—embodied the ancient principles of Greece to the extent that Germans could be styled the “new Dorians.”¹¹ Such national genealogies find parallels across Europe, as people strive to make themselves paradigms of inheritance.¹²

This combination of idealism and genealogy, required by classicism, constructs a specific object of knowledge and a specific style of knowing. Its archetypal science is philology, which is either linguistic—the model for other forms of philology—or based on archaeological method and material culture, so-called *Sachphilologie*, “Thing- or Object-Philology.” This could be taken to embrace all cultural forms to allow “a complete understanding of the Greeks”¹³—a principle whose prime theorist is August Boeckh.¹⁴ This scientific method found its roots in eighteenth-century heroes such as Friedrich August Wolf.¹⁵ It lauded the repression of personal engagement or an individual’s emotional response in the name of empiricism and objectivity. It organized knowledge in disciplinary and regulated forms, buttressed by authorized, professional status. It demanded that the object of knowledge be a word (treated by *Wortphilologie*) or a thing (treated by *Sachphilologie*), where neither the nature of a word nor the nature of a thing is contested as a potentially objective, contained, recognizable, and describable entity. Objectivity made the object of knowledge; the object of knowledge reciprocally established

the subject who knows, the scientist.¹⁶ Classicism in this objective way constructs its examples to be exemplary. It puts them on a pedestal; it utilizes these examples in service of its idealizations and the politics that instantiate such idealizations.

We have never yet been modern, as Bruno Latour constantly reminds us, but the post-Second World War decades have witnessed a significant shift away from such a social and epistemological positioning of the subject, despite the increasing dominance of science as the model of knowledge.¹⁷ It can no longer be taken for granted that classical antiquity will be regarded as an ideal, or even as a special case for the history of the West. It can no longer be asserted that modernity's relation to the past is one of genealogical affiliation. Where it once seemed inevitable, natural, and true that modern Christianity was directly linked to its origins in the earliest Christianity of the Roman Empire, now models of rupture, change, and difference seem required; where it once seemed evident that narrating stories of the Roman empire meant narrating stories of our ancestors and paternal models, now it is as common to assert the radical otherness of the past. It is not self-evident *why* Judith Butler needs *Antigone* to pronounce on gender relations. In short, how we make the past exemplary has become a different and highly problematized question.

Such generalizations would need a great deal of nuance and exploration and investigation of evident counterexamples to make them wholly convincing as explanations of the condition of modernity. Nonetheless they are adequate for what seems to me to be a crucial grounding for our discussion here: namely, that the move away from classicism's imperatives toward idealization and genealogical affiliation *change the object of knowledge* in classical scholarship. Antiquity has remained integral to the contemporary intellectual imaginary.¹⁸ Yet the challenge to the dominance of philology as the privileged science of *Altertumswissenschaft*; the challenge mounted by literary theory's questioning of the canon, the status of the text, and the status of literary knowledge and its inherited values; the challenge mounted by rhetoric's question to history, and postprocessual theory to archaeology; in short, the challenge by modernity to classicism, in questioning both the idealization and the genealogy of classicism, sets out to undermine both the evident object of knowledge and the established subject who knows. Consequently, the constantly repeated questions of modernity to the classical tradition have become: If this is an example, what is it an example of? If this is a paradigm, how does it establish a politics and an epistemology? How am *I* to be part of your machinery of exemplification?

Reception theory is a key battleground in this seismic shift, because reception theory is inevitably focused on how the past is made exemplary. Again, a confessedly oversimplified model of this developing intellectual arena will have some heuristic purchase on understanding at least the direction of travel. Great men played a very large role in the early, heroic days of *Rezeptionsgeschichte*. Pioneers allowed themselves a chapter on the *Nachleben* of a great work (at the end of a book usually), which showed how other great men had responded to the text of the great man. This might take the form of so-and-so's translation of a foundational text of Western culture, or a new literary version of such an icon. So, to take a single example that I have explored at length elsewhere, Richard Strauss's opera *Elektra* takes as its libretto a version of Hugo von Hofmannsthal's play *Elektra*, which is a version of Sophocles' play *Electra*.¹⁹ As a classicist and editor of Sophocles, then, Hugh Lloyd-Jones (and, following him, Malcolm Davies) compared the text of von Hofmannsthal with the text of Sophocles, literary text to literary text, to see how the modern text adapted the ancient.²⁰ They considered no intermediaries, except for Goethe (another great man), barely any cultural context for either text, and no audience or performance contexts. The model here is most closely aligned with the most traditional form of the history of classical scholarship, a genre where great scholars commune with each other across the centuries and across geographical or intellectual contexts in the pure pursuit of answers to shared questions.²¹ Many other versions of such a limited and unnuanced construction of an intellectual tradition could be given and continue to be written. At one level, such a naive position allows classicists to look at, say, translations of ancient masterpieces and do no more than evaluate them as if they were student compositions, awarding marks for accuracy or, in a telling phrase, for "capturing the original." At another level, this sort of criticism relies on and promotes simplified comprehensions of "the case study," where the "original text" and its "reception" are treated as bounded objects of knowledge. It takes for granted the exemplary status of the canon of classical texts. It gives you exemplary great men responding to the exempla of antiquity. This, if you will, is reception as practiced within the ideological and epistemological framework of classicism.

Reception theory has constructed four particularly incisive critiques of this traditional model of classical reception, each of which relates to the central question of how the object of knowledge and the position of the subject who knows is articulated—and thus each opens a new perspective on how we recognize or construct examples. First, the recognition of a multiplicity of intermediaries between past and present has diffused the direct and unilinear genealogy of source text and response. So, a

translation such as von Hofmannsthal's is written not just in response to a source text but also to other translations, both contemporary and within a tradition of translations; to models of understanding the past; to contemporary politics, including the politics of language; and to other translations of other classical works. When Robert Fagles, for example, begins his celebrated translation of the *Iliad* with the single word "Rage," it would be trivial in the extreme merely to consider it as a more or less accurate rendition of the Greek word *mênin*.²² It also is set against versions that begin "Sing, Muse . . ."; against the biblical associations of the silenced and familiar translation "Wrath"; against other first-word crises of translation or composition, from "Arma . . ." to "Of Man's first . . ." to "riverrun, past Eve and Adam's . . ."; against modern notions and traditions of reflecting on extreme anger; against the professional critical discussion of how to translate the first word of the *Iliad* and its role in understanding the epic; against a long discussion of the degree to which English syntax can be distorted to capture the word order of Greek; and against knowing that everyone is waiting to see what the first word of this new translation of the *Iliad* will be—and revelling in a monosyllabic, ungrammatical shock. This diffusion of the process of reception pushes hard against the limits of the case study by revealing the work of *limitation* involved in forming an example as a bounded object of study. To make Fagles's "Rage" no more than an example of a modern English translation of an ancient Greek word, good or bad, requires ignoring how it is also a case study of zones of encounter between present and past, an intricately enfolded narrative of critical engagements. To imagine Fagles (or any translator) face to face with the *Iliad* without the swirling interference of innumerable intermediaries looks hopelessly blinkered. How diffuse or how restricted—how *limited*—any exemplary case is taken to be, then, will depend on a set of critical commitments, which can be more or less misrecognized, disavowed, and/or made explicit.

Second—and this follows from the first point—reception theory has begun to focus on the temporality of the exemplar. At one level, scholars have insisted on the present of any interaction with the past, even and especially when taking an example from the past. So, as Charles Martindale has been particularly influential in asserting, if "meaning is realised at the point of reception," meaning is not integral to or inherent in a text of antiquity; and, what is more, later traditions create the meaning of texts of antiquity, as the filters of the tradition of reading produce the understanding of a community.²³ Thus, with a willful reversal of the ineluctable directionality of time, it makes sense to talk of Hegel's influence on Sophocles. A recognition of the constitutive role of the history of reading in the construction of the object of knowledge

will inevitably change its status as a paradigm and thus its role in any case study. At what point, then, it may be asked, does classical reception become no more than a cultural history of a modern era? At what point is an example only of and for the present?

Yet (post)classicism insists on a gap between the here and now of modernity and the past of antiquity, a gap constitutive of critical self-consciousness, based on an awareness of how the present is different from the past. The exemplar plays a key role in this process of seeing oneself otherwise. The exemplar is, for sure, a mode of encounter with antiquity, a mode of knowing and of organizing knowledge of the past. It is also a persuasive term designed to construct a particular and particularized form of attentiveness: it is activated as a normative template for a present moment. But the exemplar, rhetorically the figure of a past historical character, event, or locus, emphatically *interrupts* context. An exemplar is not invoked as a representative cross-section of a historical point in time and space: it is a singular case designed to illuminate a single case. The exemplar insists that the past is necessary to explain and frame and comprehend the present. Whatever its claim on a specific historicity—and an exemplar so often speaks of a lost time with a hankering for an idealized past—the exemplar speaks *across time*. The exemplar, then, is first of all a persuasive genealogy that asserts the past as a model, that interrupts the context of the present with the claim of an elsewhere and other time, that reads selectively, normatively, hopefully. Making an exemplar for the here and now is also a way of going beyond the here and now, of seeing oneself from elsewhere.²⁴

Yet—and this is the third challenge, which follows on from the second—cultural history is a necessary if vexed element in this recognition of historicized reading. That is, while a history of reading is evidently constitutive of any form of the history of classical scholarship or the history of classical tradition, the impact of cultural history is more problematic. It is more problematic because it exposes the “con” in context. It is easy enough to assert the foundational historicist claim that things—texts, people—are of their time, and need to be understood as products of and in time. The difficulty comes when we try to articulate the dynamics between the contrasting and competing claims that there is value in understanding antiquity and its texts as another, passed and particular era; that meaning is realized in the process (as I would prefer to say) of reception; and that not only are we as scholars the products of a historical moment, but also that both we and others are capable of being ahead of our time, out of date, behind the times, self-consciously conservative, willfully radical, and so forth. It is far from clear under such circumstances what “putting in context” will require, even when

it remains an apparent imperative. In short, how *situated* should an example be? The example interrupts context, but what context does it itself require? How are the multiplying contingencies of the particular to be framed? If appealing to Heracles as an example for today disrupts the present with a claim to and from the past, how is the potentially ever-expanding figuration of the hero to be negotiated? To situate an example thus as an object of knowledge allows it to be known but also makes such knowledge more contingent, unstable, and in need of engaged negotiation.

The fourth challenge follows inexorably. The subject who knows—the critic—is also framed by the contingencies of her situatedness. So, to what degree is a historical self-consciousness of the positionality of the critic debilitating? The more that the contingency of the object of knowledge, and contingency of the subject who knows, is allowed, the more unstable the process of knowing may seem. Is it inevitable that the necessary move beyond traditional classicism will leave us floundering? Will Lucian's parody of the skeptic—so radically unsure of everything that he cannot walk—find embodiment in the post-whatever critic, so anxious about assertion or value judgment or bias or authority that finally only a shrug of silence will do; or, worse and more likely, a constant reiteration of hopeless but, no doubt, excessively articulate anxiety . . . ?

In the second part of this article, I will attempt to provide some answers to these questions of what is at stake in taking an example. What I hope to have demonstrated so far, however, is this. Classicism, as an ideological and epistemological relation to Greco-Roman antiquity, constructs an object of knowledge through idealization and genealogical affiliation. Integral to classicism, thus, is a logic of exemplification: it finds in the classical past the exemplars and paradigms for today. The practice of the case study within classicism takes shape within such a framework of knowing. The challenges to classicism mounted in recent decades, which can be termed postclassicism—and enforced, one should add, in case it is not self-evident, by globalization, changing patterns of education, developing forms of media, resistance to imperialism, the thinking of feminism, and so forth—change the nature of the object of classical knowledge and thus the process of making a case study, using an example. The exemplarity of Greece and Rome has become less and less self-evident, the pedestals more shaky. The need to rethink the case study and its role in classical scholarship has never been more insistent and compelling. What a classical example is *of* and *for* has never seemed less stable, in fields outside classics, for sure, but especially and with especial force within classics, the subject based on its own exemplarity.

II

To explore the process of exemplification, I set out from an aspect of temporality raised in the first part of this paper. Now, from one perspective all literature—all art—is an exercise in reception, if reception is understood merely as a constructed engagement with a past, or as written in and as a tradition, or as an adaptation of other stories (or art forms). All stories are written through other stories and have a constructed literary past, as it were, written into them. What is distinctive about “classical reception,” however, within the mode of both classicism and postclassicism, is a self-conscious, constructed relation to antiquity. This is not just that classical reception is about how literature and other forms of art take as a subject the past of Greek and Roman antiquity (and I would add Hebrew and Egyptian, etc.). Rather, this very engagement with antiquity as a classical model—hence (post)classicism—requires a particular dynamics of untimeliness. It requires an explicit hypostasization—which need not be positive—of a particular past; it requires a sense that the present is disrupted from that past, while it is also genealogically linked to it, and that the present needs this ancient past to find itself; it needs its sense of untimeliness to find self-expression. Classicism must know it is not classical, that it is out of time with the models it is adopting and adapting; it must know its own untimeliness. Untimeliness, in this sense, marks the self-consciousness—in political, aesthetic, psychological, cultural terms—of one’s self in construction as a historical subject.

Richard Wagner will serve as a most brief, if culturally influential, example of these dynamics of untimeliness. “I felt myself more truly at home in ancient Athens,” he wrote, “than in any condition which the modern world has to offer.”²⁵ Because the modern world is so alienating, he longs for another place that is a true home—and, like Nietzsche, Hegel, Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl and others, finds it in an idealized Hellenic antiquity. This philhellenic idealism is predicated on the insufficiency of the present in aesthetic, psychological, and political terms. Yet although all roads lead across the rainbow bridges of exile toward the homeland of Greece (as Nietzsche put it), it requires a revolutionary modernism to reach that idealized state.²⁶ *Zukunftskunst*, “the art of the future,” is the corollary of a longing for the past, by projecting the idealism of the past into an idealism of the future. At one level, that is, the present’s untimeliness is pulled into existence by two vectors of desire—a longing for the lost past and a dreaming for a hoped-for future. If we turn away from Wagner’s prose alone, however, and start to build an audience response into the event of Wagner’s music theater, it is precisely the modernity of Wagner, his resolute and iconic contemporaneity, that proves

most thrilling and most alienating to his listeners. That is, the evaluation of Wagner's music is contested precisely in terms of its *timeliness*: it is of the moment—and thus either excitingly up to date and in tune with its own modern era, or frighteningly challenging and discordant. The music is felt by its audiences to sound out the precipice of Time.

It is hard to live long with one's own untimeliness, especially if untimeliness is recognized as a sign of the times. But I think that if reception—or (post)classicism—is to have a strong sense as a description of a style of cultural production, untimeliness may be a necessary dynamic of its working. What this means for our interest in the limits of the case study is twofold. First, it allows us to see one way in which the case studies of classical reception are articulated in and against the general literary or artistic culture in which they are produced—not just by virtue of the artwork's integral connection with a particular historical past of antiquity, Greek or Roman, say, but also by virtue of a specific engagement with a temporality that speaks to the self-conscious construction of the self as a historical subject. Second—and this is the photographic negative of the first—it should encourage us to focus, at least for strategic political purposes, on eras, and examples, *cases* where this construction of the historical subject through antiquity is prevalent, privileged, and of broad significance. I at least find it easier to see the pressing insistence of the need for classical reception studies when—as in the Renaissance, as in Victorian Britain—the image or influence of classical antiquity was something worth fighting over, killing each other for, screaming at each other about—because of what it says about the historical self-understanding of modernity.

Thus—and this forms the first conclusion of this paper—in discussing the construction of the case study, we need to be acutely aware of the *politics* of the case study. At one level this should mean articulating why certain case studies are chosen. Is it because of *their* intense, influential, and evident engagement with the history and politics of the day, which may, as with Wagner, be integrally linked to an aesthetic argument? Or is it because of another narrative—a literary case, say, that attempts to eschew contemporary politics, such as Pope's use of rhyming couplets to translate Homer; or an argument about form, that explores the use, say, of classical bodies in stained glass windows? Our choice of case studies, that is, of how case studies come to seem to be relevant, will always depend on a narrative about the relation between classics as a study and the society in which it takes place, and on an account of the politics of such engagement. This is to take a stance as a scholar, too, about which version of classics is to be privileged, what the history of classics is to be (as I did when I just suggested that the moments when

classics is thought worth screaming about were for me the most interesting junctures in the discipline's history). That is, the case study raises a question of *responsibility* as much as *response*—a translation of the ethical exemplarity embodied in the classical tradition into a contemporary sense of ethical and political engagement.

To decide that the history of classical scholarship is best expressed as a conversation over time by great men about shared questions of textual criticism may seem naive, but it cannot be thought innocent. To see the study of classics, alternatively, through the history of educational reform is a different set of blinkers that both reveals and obscures the lineaments of the field. To see it through religion would be a further determining narrative. And so on. In each case, the narrative of classical learning that justifies the selection of a case study is a critical decision about what matters in classics, about what impacts are most relevant, and about what understandings are most important.²⁷ So too, then, the articulation of the case study *as a case* will be formulated in relation to such politicized choices. So, if we put together both the ability of classics to become a privileged terrain for the expression of how and why the past matters for the present, and the necessary implication of the scholar in drawing up such narratives of the place of classical study in society, it becomes clear that the politics of reception—at all levels—sets at stake the self-understanding of the subject within history.

To approach the second conclusion of this article, I want to turn to the question of technology and genre, again with specific regard to the limits of the case study, and to begin by considering photography, which has repeatedly been discussed specifically with regard to the impact of mechanical innovation and new forms of representational politics. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, as photography became one of the most widely circulated forms of representation, photography of classical antiquity has been a particularly charged area. The first areas especially to use photography include mugshots for police control of miscreants, visiting cards—and images of sites of biblical and classical antiquity.²⁸ Such images of the archaeological past began as ways of asserting the reality of the world to which the photographs spoke—the truth of scripture, the actuality of Livy—that had been severely challenged in their authority by critical history and the other sciences of objective knowledge. Many photographs were hand-produced, costly, privileged art objects—and took full part in the aggressive conflicts over cultural representation in the nineteenth century.²⁹ But by the end of the century, however, photography had become so cheap and so prevalent that history had undergone the postcard effect. The postcard “becomes the poor man's phantasm: for a few pennies, display racks full of dreams,” writes Malek Alloula with

passion. “The postcard is everywhere, covering all the colonial space, immediately available to the tourist, the soldier, the colonist. It is at once their poetry and their glory captured for the ages; it is also their pseudoknowledge of the colony. It produces stereotypes in the manner of great seabirds producing guano. It is the fertilizer of the colonial vision.”³⁰ We might add that images of classical desire—Wilhelm von Gloeden’s naked boys from Sicily, say—also moved from the art world of the elite magazine into the exchange and mart of smutty sexuality.

The sheer number of images of the Coliseum or the Parthenon—those clichés of the visual imaginary, for Freud, as for any tourist—poses a question to the process of exemplification integral to the case study. What are photographs of the grandeur that was Rome or the glory of Greece case studies or examples of? Mementos or souvenirs, in the model of Susan Stewart’s lovely study?³¹ Are they, as Alloula suggests, signs of cultural colonialism? Are they failures of the aura or originality, as all reproduced images in the age of mechanical production seem to Walter Benjamin?³² Are they how classics enters the imagination or how classics clashes with the imagination? Can any single image of a postcard become a “case study,” or is it only as a collective that they signify? On the one hand, recent work on the novel by Franco Moretti, constructed by digital techniques and insistent on itself as the opposite of close reading, demands that we should think of cultural products on a large scale; we should take huge data sets as our subject of study in order to understand their real cultural purchase.³³ What would happen to the case study in classical reception if we followed this vector and resisted the drive toward close reading in the name of circulation, dissemination, prevalence? On the other hand, classicists have hugely enjoyed looking at the uptake of antiquity in popular culture—the reach of *Ben-Hur* into the advertising realm of flour, cars, soap, hair-oil has been a particular favorite—but there has been next to no extended theoretical exploration that explains or explores such a phenomenon.³⁴ If the postcard circulates pseudo-knowledge and fertilizes the stereotypes of colonialism, how does *Ben-Hur* flour enter the epistemology of culture?

The genres of production made possible by the technology of photography and other forms of mass production raise two questions, then, for the epistemology of classical reception and its examples. On the one hand, it is often assumed, I think, in reception studies that the author, the audience, and the critics are all “subjects who know,” and are all trained in classical knowledge. The author works with an allusive style, based on a reading of classical texts; the audience and critics (as a super-audience, the arbiters and makers of taste), share such a reading and enjoy the playfulness of the author’s engagement, a playfulness

that may be searingly serious and painful, of course. We all share the classical tradition. At a more sophisticated level, the insecurities, failures of knowing, and politics of collusion in reading such allusiveness have become recognized.³⁵ Yet while a film like *O Brother, Where Art Thou?* announces it is based on Homer in the first shot, the film's writers claim never to have read the *Odyssey* except in a cartoon version, and its huge audience cannot be expected to have read it either, and cannot be expected to enjoy the philological joke of its hero singing a song entitled "I Am a Man of Constant Sorrow," clearly a translation of *Odyssey* book 19, l.117. What happens to forms of "reception" when the sending and receiving of the classical tradition is so playfully disregarded—is asserted and flouted in the same moment? It is imperative for analyzing works of modern culture in particular (though not solely modern work, for sure) that the dynamics of ignorance and abandonment becomes part of the epistemology of reception theory. The limits of the case study in reception theory are to be formulated through the practices of ignorance as much as classical knowing, through abandonment and flouting as much as affiliation. Since the classical tradition has become so fragmented and cracked and unshared, the status of the example become more fragile, more open to the interference, noise, and disregard of the subjects who do not know.

On the other hand, the profusion of reproduced objects is all around us. I am myself unexercised by the semantics of *Ben-Hur* flour, where it is difficult to progress beyond the recognition that the branders of the flour wish to utilize the popularity of the book *Ben-Hur* to increase the popularity of the flour (though no doubt a card-carrying Baudrillardian would have a good go at a journey into the semantics and economics of the popularity of popular culture). Rather, I am more taken by the way in which the logic of ignorance and fragmentation I have just discussed becomes fully a part of a modernist poetics of reproduction. The genius of Andy Warhol is paradigmatic here in the most insightful way. He may be most famous for multiple images of objects whose status is dependent upon the repetition of their image, whether it is the large-scale economics of the selling of huge numbers of soup cans, or the cultural celebrity of Marilyn Monroe's endlessly reproduced image, shot by shot. Repetition is the form and subject of his art. But for me some of the most intellectually gripping pictures he made were his late stitched photographs of nude hustlers. So, he stitched together four identical images of a naked man, hired on the street and posed as the Barberini Faun.³⁶ The repetition of the image moves the piece away from a witty joke on an old image, and starts to ask questions about repetition and desire. How many Barberini Fauns make up the erotic imagination? What role is

there for repetition in the imagery of desire? How different is one hustler (body, fantasy) from another? How many times do you need to look at the sexualized body? Is your eroticism no more than the repetition of past images? Can you desire without cliché? Or repetition? Or, as we might say, without entering the classical tradition . . .? Those old Greek bodies keep getting repeated in our visual repertoire of desire. In this modern world, the singularity of the example is constantly threatened by the mechanics and erotics of repetition. Here we go again. . . . An exemplar, by definition, is repeatable—but what does the structure of repetition do to the logic of the exemplar?

So my second conclusion is this. To construct a case study is to commit to a model of (social) epistemology—for classical reception studies about where and what classical knowing is, and the place of ignorance and silence in the work of constructing a classical tradition; and about the place of repetition in such a work of constructing the self in and against such a tradition. The exemplar becomes fragile, thus, because of the fragmentation and diffusion of the tradition in which it participates; the dynamics of unsharing are also crucial and integral to the dynamics of cultural collusion. The case study of classical reception always has the ability to collapse into a case of another infection altogether.

For my third conclusion, I turn toward a recent book on classical reception that introduces a subject that had previously slipped under the radar, namely, Gideon Nisbet's study of the reception of Greek epigrams in the nineteenth century.³⁷ In the last decades of the nineteenth century and the first years of the twentieth, it became a fashion for the gentlemen of the Empire, at home and especially abroad, to make translations of the epigrams of the *Greek Anthology*, especially those poems connected with love, and to circulate them especially in small, privately printed editions, or in small runs from standard houses. Nisbett has collected many of these volumes and explored how they acted as signs and symptoms of a culture of desiring, particularly in the often-repressed world of male desire for other males—though the phenomenon was also a broader sign of cultural belonging among elite men. It seems to me that this phenomenon provides a fascinating set of questions for the case study in reception theory, which picks up a great deal of what I have been discussing and will add a third conclusion to my argument.

Each of these little poems is designed to be a jewel and to be appreciated for its jewel-like clarity and wit, no doubt. But how many need to be read to make a case study? Let us take as our example the wonderful and much celebrated translation of a Callimachus epigram by William Johnson Cory, that begins, "They told me, Heraclitus, they told me you were dead." Can we just read Cory's Heraclitus poem, as a translation,

as it were? Surely it needs to be seen, as it was published, in a carefully selected series that make up a book of poems. It was, however, also designed to stand within a series of such books, circulated amongst consenting adults. How many such books make up the study of the genre, the necessary frame of any individual example? The epigram, that is, is the perfect place to explore the logic of scale inherent in the problem of exemplification and literature: from a small individual poem to a widely circulated genre. How a case study is constructed will depend on a critical decision about such dynamics of scale.

Each poem, as a translation of a known poem, and often with a line of Greek added to the title or as an epigraph to the poem, also requires a form of double reading. These translations are for people who do and will read Greek and will hear the Greek through the English. So we and they know that Callimachus wrote “ἔϊπε τις Ἡράκλειτε τέον μόνον,” which we might translate with lumpy literalness, “Someone told me, Heraclitus, your fate . . .” Cory’s brilliant rendition, “They told me, Heraclitus, they told me you were dead,” is made so powerfully moving by the repetition of “they told me,” and becomes particularly effective and affecting against the single and simple *eipe tis*, “someone told.” The echoing “they told me, they told me,” however, also recalls how many times this poem has been translated and reversioned. There is a self-reflexivity of literary reproduction in the repetition of “they told me,” an echo of the tradition of echoes that is the classical tradition. So a double reading is required, hearing in the English a reworking of the Greek, a cultural difference of expressivity between the two languages, a recognition of syntactic difference and the search to transcend it, a form of attention trained through years of schooling in verse composition as the translation of English into Latin and Greek. “They told me” is also the sign of received tradition (a mark of *fama*, as Philip Hardie would have it).³⁸ The epitaph for Heraclitus is itself a poem about the survival of poems against the dust of human life. The translation thus becomes a way of engaging with and commenting on the classical tradition it is participating in. It also echoes against other translations of this very well-known poem: that is how its brilliance is calibrated as a translation. Cory’s poem is a case study in how examples become increasingly diffuse as multiple audiences, reading strategies, and a self-consciousness about tradition are built into our model of comprehension.

Now Cory was a schoolmaster at Eton who was forced to leave the school because of a scandal to do with his rather too public, flamboyant, and sentimental attachment to his pupils. His memoirs were published by subscription, and the list of twenty-three subscribers included a circle of Etonians, many of whom had known him, and all of whom admired

him. He was a figure of the imagination for a widening group of men in the English literary scene who were as much attracted to his persona as to his poems. The title *Ionica* to the insiders screamed its lyric roots in Greek desire. Cory himself retired to Hampstead, where he surprised everyone, including himself, by marrying and finishing his days teaching girls Greek. But his charisma and charm meant that he left behind him something of a cult of romantic friendship among the boys, which both engaged and exercised the schoolmasters, and made *Ionica* an icon in the increasingly anxious world of British eroticized homosociality.³⁹ The Heraclitus poem is also about men sitting and drinking and hanging out together through the night and, in terms to strike a particular chord with Victorian schoolmasters, about how you might not hear about a former favorite for some time until his death in the far-flung reaches of the Empire was reported. The poem and its translation also make up a case study in the cultural role of poetry in homosocial desire and its expression—both as a translation and as a text for circulation. The cultural history that determines the reception of this poem is an integral part of its functioning as a work of “classical reception.” The more intimately this cultural history is explored, the less easy it is to integrate such close reading into the analysis of the genre of translations of epigrams as a wide-scale phenomenon within the even wider culture of translations.

Cory was a highly self-conscious writer, and his readers were equally self-conscious, especially about the reticent expression of desire. Greek was a necessary alibi. As innumerable historians of sexuality have emphasized, the term “homosexuality” has a short history. The pathologizing of sexuality begins in the last years of the nineteenth century and only becomes a culturally recognizable norm after the First World War, when the effects of first the Oscar Wilde trial and then the trial of Radclyffe Hall established a pathologized model of transgressive homosexuality in public discourse.⁴⁰ Cory and his pals lived through this transitional period (and many were actively involved with the work of Havelock Ellis and others that was so instrumental in such pathologization).⁴¹ Reading these self-conscious expressions of a reticent and concealed desire also becomes, then, a self-implicating gesture for the reader. How much desire you hear, and what sort of desire, will be self-exposing, as you reinvent the history of homosexuality again. It is simply not possible to maintain an objective, externalized critical position in evaluating the reception of such verse. There is for us, as for Cory and his early readers, a dynamic of knowingness that always implicates and undermines the subject who presumes to know. What a critic makes Cory a case study of, and how, will always be telling. My third conclusion, then, is that the reader’s desire is a constitutive but disruptive factor in the construction of the case study.

We cannot do without the case study or the example, but unless we engage with more methodological sophistication in the politics, epistemology, and role of desire in the processes of exemplification (my three conclusions), we will not be able to appreciate adequately the complexity of the case study as a form in classical reception, or of the example in literary studies more generally. In supplementing the opening argument about the failure of exemplarity through a turn to the historicism of reception study, we have repeatedly rediscovered how the process of articulating a test case is enfolded back into a set of further questions about politics, epistemology, and desire, and how, thus, the idea of tradition itself cannot repress the slippage and intellectual violence involved in its strategies of exemplification. In short, tradition is a constructed, fragmented, challenging concept at the heart of contemporary discussion of classics in and as history—and central to the construction of literary and cultural tradition is the problematic necessity of the example.

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NOTES

This article could not have been written without Miriam Leonard, Brooke Holmes, and Constanze Guthenke, as well as the other members of the postclassisms collective.

1 This despite some excellent detailed studies. See Rebecca Langlands, “Roman *Exempla* and Situation Ethics: Valerius Maximus and Cicero de Officiis,” *Journal of Roman Studies* 101 (2011): 100–122 and John Henderson, “Down the Pan: Historical Exemplarity in the *Panegyricus*,” in *Pliny’s Praise: The Panegyricus in the Roman World*, ed. Paul Roche (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2011).

2 Published in Irene J. F. de Jong and J.P. Sullivan, eds., *Modern Critical Theory and Classical Literature* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994).

3 This is not to deny the coercive force of grammar and accent teaching: see, for example, Lynda Mugglestone, “*Talking Proper*”: *The Rise of Accent as Social System* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1997); or in antiquity, Maud W. Gleason, *Making Men: Sophists and Self-Presentation in Ancient Rome* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1995).

4 See, for example, G. E. R. Lloyd, *Ancient Worlds, Modern Reflections, Philosophical Perspectives on Greek and Chinese Science and Culture* (Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press, 2004); Brooke Holmes, *The Symptom and the Subject: The Emergence of the Physical Body in Ancient Greece* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2010).

5 For examples from a huge bibliography, see Yves-Chantal Gagnon, *The Case Study as Research Method: A Practical Handbook* (Quebec: Presses de l’Université de Québec, 2010); Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Univ. Press, 2005); Peter G. Swanborn, *Case Study Research: What, Why How?* (London: Sage, 2010); and the brief and useful Bent Flyvbjerg, “Five Misunderstandings about Case-Study Research,” *Qualitative Inquiry* 12, no. 2 (2006): 219–45—all with further bibliography.

6 Seminal here is John Forrester’s work; see, for example, “If *P*, Then What? Thinking in Cases,” *History of the Human Sciences* 9, no. 3 (1996): 1–25—which has led most recently to Joy Damousi, Birgit Lang, and Katie Sutton eds., *Case Studies and the Dissemination of*

Knowledge (New York: Routledge, 2015). There are also some important and reflective articles (cited separately below) in *On the Case*, ed. Lauren Berlant, special issues of *Critical Inquiry* 33, no. 4 (2007) and 34, no. 1 (2007), and an important discussion of narrative in social science in Andrew Abbott, *Time Matters: On Theory and Method* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2001), 123–60. The case study in medicine too has become an important site of contention (especially, most recently, with regard to big data): see Volker Hess, “Observatio und Casus: Status und Funktion der medizinischen Fallgeschichte,” in *Fall—Fallgeschichte—Fallstudie. Theorie und Geschichte einer Wissensform*, ed. Susanne Düwell and Nicolas Pethes (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2014), 34–59 (with plenty of further bibliography); Kathryn Hunter, *Doctors’ Stories: The Narrative Structure of Medical Knowledge* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1991), especially 69–122. The approach of Hurst Kächele, Joseph Schachter, and Helmut Thöma, *From Psychoanalytic Narrative to Empirical Single Case Research: Implications in Psychoanalytic Practice* (New York: Routledge, 2014) has been contentious. Freud famously commented, “It still strikes me myself as strange that the case histories I write should read like short stories and that, as one might say, they lack the serious stamp of science” (*Studies in Hysteria* [1895], in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, trans. and ed. James Strachey et al. [London: Vintage, 2001], 2:160), though it would take a good deal to unpack the significance of that remark for Freud’s own work.

7 In England, see Christopher Stray, *Classics Transformed: Schools, Universities, and Society in England, 1830–1960* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1998); and in general now James Turner, *Philology: the Forgotten Origins of the Modern Humanities* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2014); with the case studies of Ward W. Briggs and Herbert W. Benario, eds., *Basil Lanneau Gildersleeve: An American Classicist* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1986); Briggs, *Soldier and Scholar: Bail Lanneau Gildersleeve and the Civil War* (Charlottesville: Univ. of Virginia Press, 1998).

8 See, for example, in classics Simon Goldhill, *Sophocles and the Language of Tragedy* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2012) and Victoria Wohl, *Euripides and the Politics of Form* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2015); and in general the introductory but instructive Marjorie Levinson, “What Is New Formalism?” *PMLA* 122, no. 2 (2007): 558–69.

9 See Goldhill, “Wipe Your Glosses,” in *Commentaries-Kommentare*, ed. Glenn W. Most (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1999); Tim Whitmarsh and Jason König, eds., *Ordering Knowledge in the Roman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007), to be read alongside Richard R. Yeo, *Encyclopaedic Visions: Scientific Dictionaries and Enlightenment Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2001); Aude Doody, *Pliny’s Encyclopedia: the Reception of the Natural History* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010); Doody, Sabine Föllinger, and Liba Taub, eds., “Structures and Strategies in Ancient Greek and Roman Technical Writing,” *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* 43, no. 2 (2012)—alongside, for example, Jim Endersby, *Imperial Nature: Joseph Hooker and the Practices of Victorian Science* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2008).

10 The following paragraphs are indebted to collaborative work undertaken with the postclassicism network: <http://www.postclassicism.org>.

11 See Bruce Lincoln, *Theorizing Myth: Narrative, Ideology, and Scholarship* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1999); Sonia Sikka, *Herder on Humanity and Cultural Difference: Enlightened Relativism* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2011); Jonathan M. Hall, *Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997); and the seminal E. M. Butler, *The Tyranny of Greece over Germany: A Study of the Influence Exercised by Greek Art and Poetry over the Great German Writers of the Eighteenth, Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1935).

12 See Joep Leerssen, *National Thought in Europe: a Cultural History* (Amsterdam, Amsterdam Univ. Press, 2006).

- 13 Suzanne L. Marchand, *Down from Olympus: Archaeology and Philhellenism in Germany, 1750–1970* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1996), 43. See also Philippa Levine, *The Amateur and the Professional: Antiquarians, Historians, and Archaeologists in Victorian England, 1838–86* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1986); Cathy Gere, *Knossos and the Prophets of Modernism* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2009).
- 14 See Axel Horstmann, *Antike Theorie und moderne Wissenschaft: Augustus Boeckhs Konzeption der Philologie* (Frankfurt: Lang, 1992).
- 15 See Anthony Grafton, Most, and James E. G. Zetzel, *Prolegomena to Homer, 1795, F.A. Wolf* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1985).
- 16 See Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, *Objectivity* (New York: Zone Books, 2007); Mary Poovey, *A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and Society* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1998).
- 17 Bruno Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern*, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1993).
- 18 See, for example, Goldhill, “On Knowingness,” *Critical Inquiry* 32, no. 4 (2006): 708–23; Miriam Leonard, *Athens in Paris: Ancient Greece and the Political in Post-War Paris* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2005); Wolfgang Detel, *Macht, Moral, Wissen: Foucault und die klassische Antike* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1998); Leonard, ed., *Derrida and Antiquity* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2010).
- 19 Goldhill, *Who Needs Greek? Contests in the Cultural History of Hellenism* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002), 108–77.
- 20 Hugh Lloyd-Jones, “The Two Electras: Hofmannsthal’s *Elektra* as a Goethean Drama,” in *Greek in a Cold Climate* (London: Duckworth, 1991); Malcolm Davies, “The Three Electras: Strauss, Hofmannsthal, Sophocles, and the Tragic Vision,” *Antike und Abendland* 45 (1999): 36–65.
- 21 Lloyd-Jones translated Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf’s *History of Classical Scholarship* (London: Duckworth, 1982); see also C. O. Brink, *English Classical Scholarship: Historical Reflections on Bentley, Porson, and Housman* (Cambridge: James Clarke, 1986); Rudolph Pfeiffer, *History of Classical Scholarship from the Beginnings to the End of the Hellenistic Age* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1968) and *History of Classical Scholarship from 1300–1850* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976).
- 22 Homer, *The Iliad*, trans. Robert Fagles (New York: Penguin, 1990), 77.
- 23 See Charles Martindale and Richard F. Thomas, *Classics and the Uses of Reception* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006); Martindale, *Redeeming the Text: Latin Poetry and the Hermeneutics of Reception* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992), with Goldhill, “Cultural History and Aesthetics: Why Kant is No Place to Start Reception Studies,” in *Theorising Performance: Greek Drama, Cultural History and Critical Practice*, ed. Edith Hall and Stephe Harrop (London: Duckworth, 2010), a polemical and not wholly reflective piece. Seminal for “interpretative communities” remains Stanley Fish, *Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretative Communities* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1980).
- 24 This paragraph in particular is cowritten with Constanze Gutheke.
- 25 Richard Wagner, *Opera and Drama*, trans. Edwin Evans (London: William Reeves, 1913), 412; see Goldhill, *Victorian Culture and Classical Antiquity: Art, Opera, Fiction, and the Proclamation of Modernity* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2011), 125–52.
- 26 Friedrich Nietzsche, *Werke*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1967), 7:3, 7:412–13, discussed in Goldhill, *Who Needs Greek?* 294–99.
- 27 Carolyn Steedman, “A Boiling Copper and Some Arsenic: Servants, Childcare, and Class Consciousness in Late Eighteenth-Century England,” *Critical Inquiry* 34, no. 1 (2007): 36–77, as an exploration of the role of “the case” in scholarship, argues appositely that E. P. Thompson’s choice to work on male, industrial figures of the working class rather than female domestic labor determined a generation’s view of what counts in such history.

- 28 For mugshots, see John Tagg, *The Burden of Representation. Essays on Photographies and Histories* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1988); on visiting cards, Elizabeth McCauley, *A. E. E. Disdéri and the Carte de Visite Portrait Photograph* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1985) with the more sophisticated Steve Edwards, *The Making of English Photography: Allegories* (University Park: Pennsylvania Univ. Press, 2006); on Holy Land photography, see Goldhill, *The Buried Life of Things: How Objects Made History in Nineteenth-Century Britain* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2014), 64–108, with bibliography.
- 29 See Jonathan Crary, *Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Univ. Press, 1990); Daston and Galison, *Objectivity*; and Chris Otter, *The Victorian Eye: a Political History of Light and Vision, 1800–1900* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2000).
- 30 Malek Alloula, *The Colonial Harem*, trans. Myrna Godzich and Wlad Godzich (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1986), 4.
- 31 Susan Stewart, *On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the Collection* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984).
- 32 Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” in *Illuminations*, trans. Harry Zohn, ed. Hannah Arendt (1935; New York: Schocken, 1968).
- 33 Franco Moretti, *Graphs, Maps, Trees: Abstract Models for a Literary History* (London: Verso, 2005), is an introduction to his lab’s work.
- 34 See Pantelis Michelakis and Maria Wyke, eds., *The Ancient World in Silent Cinema* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013); Barbara Ryan and Milette Shamir, *Bigger than Ben-Hur: The Book, Its Adaptations and Their Audiences* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse Univ. Press, 2016).
- 35 Stephen Hinds, *Allusion and Intertext: Dynamics of Appropriation in Roman Poetry* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998).
- 36 See Goldhill, *Victorian Culture*, 265–72.
- 37 Gideon Nisbet, *Greek Epigram in Reception: J. A. Symonds, Oscar Wilde, and the Invention of Desire, 1805–1929* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2013).
- 38 Philip Hardie, *Rumour and Renown: Representations of Fama in Western Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2014).
- 39 On William Cory, see Francis Warre Cornish, ed., *Extracts from the Letters and Journals of William Cory* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1897); Faith Compton Mackenzie, *William Cory: A Biography* (London: Constable, 1950); Reginald, Viscount Esher, *Ionicus* (London: John Murray, 1923).
- 40 See, for example, David M. Halperin, *One Hundred Years of Homosexuality: and Other Essays on Greek Love* (New York: Routledge, 1990); Matt Cook, *London and the Culture of Homosexuality, 1885–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003); Jonathan Katz, *Love Stories: Sex Between Men Before Homosexuality* (Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 2001); Laura L. Doan, *Fashioning Sapphism: The Origins of a Modern English Lesbian Culture* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2001); Doan, *Disturbing Practices: History, Sexuality, and Women’s Experience of Modern War* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2013); Jodie Medd, *Lesbian Scandal and the Culture of Modernism* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2012).
- 41 Harry Oosterhuis, *Stepchildren of Nature: Krafft-Ebbing, Psychiatry, and the Making of Sexual Identity* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2000).