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Appropriate (or be appropriated by) academic discourse: There is a text in this class

James Ray Drake

APPROPRIATE (OR BE APPROPRIATED BY) ACADEMIC DISCOURSE: THERE IS A TEXT IN THIS CLASS

A Thesis

Presented to the

Faculty of

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In Partial Fulfillment

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in

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by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis raises the question: How does academic discourse (re-)produce itself? This question points to interdisciplinary studies on human information processing. The thesis attempts to translate inductive and deductive procedures for information processing into a system for processing academic discourse.

I will argue that the natural-acquisition of academic discourse between a student as passive-recipient and a teacher as discourse authorizer, whose methods of response are passive-aggressive, distances the two parties. I will further argue that this distancing works against a collaborative movement that brings the reader's comprehension process together with the writer's production process. Having shown that these factors adversely affect the acquisition of academic discourse, I will propose an alternative to the natural-acquisition of academic discourse. Specifically, I will advocate a new model for teaching and learning. This new model re-forms the student's consciousness of form-content relationship from unawareness in natural-acquisition to an awareness for these relationships in academic discourse. The re-forming of consciousness will be discussed in chapter two and the re-forming of the relationship between form and context for academic discourse will be discussed in chapter three. In

chapter four, I provide some scaffolding for a proposed metacognitive pedagogy.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

As this thesis nears completion, I realize the need to acknowledge the historical "discursive formations" from which it has emerged (Foucault The Archaeology of Knowledge). I was an undergraduate from 1966 to 1969. I want a reader to be aware of this so I can acknowledge myself as a product of "open-enrollment." With the help of composition teachers like Mina Shaughnessy, students like me survived that undergraduate experience. To say I am a product of open enrollment who survived is to acknowledge historical-political influences on discourse.

In the context of historical-political influences, I suggest (in my thesis) that a "natural process" mode for writing instruction worked prior to open-enrollment because students arrived at college with writing already part of their genetic makeup. But post- open-enrollment students needed "real" instruction in writing. Teachers like Shaughnessy tried (hard) to provide it. I think these early composition "specialists" must have taught against stifling political pressure from their teaching colleagues.

My point is this: Having "survived" the undergraduate experience, I moved on to graduate school. Within that context, thesis writing is required. Accordingly, historical influences have emerged as a thesis on the conscious appropriation of academic discourse. This thesis

could and would only be written by such a product of open-enrollment as myself.

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PROLOGUE: WHAT WRITERS KNOW

A Commonplace Scenario

Here is a scenario familiar to students and teachers alike: Stunned at having received a "C-" on a paper, a student approaches the teacher, asking: "I don't understand what you want; could you just tell me what you want?" The teacher traditionally offers some version of the following: "What I think doesn't matter. I want to know what you have to say about the subject." The teacher may not realize it, but I contend that such a response is disingenuous. It begs the question of authority.

The teacher's response implies that the student has the authority to choose content. But the fact is that the student cannot say whatever she or he wants. The student's content must meet the teacher's expectations by presenting certain kinds of knowledge in certain ways. For the content to be considered appropriate, it must fall within the subject matter of the discipline. Moreover, it is usually not enough to include the subject; students are also expected to present this content in certain forms accepted in a discipline--such as the experimental lab report in Biological sciences, the "empirical study report" format "which emerged in the Natural sciences" (Kirscht et al), and analysis of literary text in English. In this thesis, I'll be using the term discourse to refer to this integration of

contextual content and form. The scenario demonstrates that it is the teacher speaking for the discipline, not the student, who authorizes the discourse.

Consequently, students who are told to say what they have to say may err if they do not learn what constitutes appropriate discourse in that particular course or discipline. With one hand, the teacher's response gives a student authority. But with the other hand, it prevents the student from learning to write using the procedures of the discipline, which emerge as forms for writing. In effect, the response prevents students from achieving real authority and blocks the learning required for entry into the academic community.

One way to represent this kind of teacher-student interaction is with a game metaphor. Students become desperate game players as they try to guess what university professors want. As David Bartholomae explains in his ground-breaking essay on how academic discourse is learned: "The student has to appropriate (or be appropriated by) a specialized discourse" (135). Notice that Bartholomae makes a distinction between the two ways students can learn academic discourse: either "to appropriate" or to "be appropriated by" discourse. "To appropriate" implies that the student is consciously drawing in a discourse. While to "be appropriated by" a discourse suggests a student is being unconsciously drawn into a discourse. My purpose in this

thesis is to make a case for the first, conscious kind of learning. But before making that case, we need to understand why teachers typically maintain the unconscious learning process, acted out as a guessing game.

The primary reason teachers don't answer the student question directly is that they don't know the answer or they don't know that they know. For many professors, this knowledge is not available because as student-writers, they were not conscious themselves of learning the discourse of their field. Most professors were "appropriated by" their discipline and learned academic discourse through the process of being unconsciously drawn into it. This traditional way of learning is through the unconscious processing of trial and error. Traditional discourse acquisition is thus a conditioned-response.

It is not surprising that few professors are aware of their own learning process. Berkenkotter and Huckin name this traditional way of learning "cognitive apprenticeship":

> The enculturation into the practices of disciplinary communities is "picked up" in the local milieu of the culture rather than being explicitly taught. (485-6)

This leads us to another reason for why the student's question is not answered: most teachers themselves do not understand how discourse is appropriated through the dual processes of reading and writing (Flower "Studying Cognition

in Context" 13). Later in the thesis, I will explain this lack of understanding in terms of schema as patterns for situation and frames as patterns for text.

If teachers had been aware of their own learning process, then they could answer the student question directly. Their own awareness of what they know would provide the discourse knowledge necessary in order to tell students what is appropriate. But the answer based on awareness requires a special language. Awareness language--discourse about discourse--is one way of saying that for teachers to tell students what is appropriate requires metacognition. As Flower defines it in "Taking Thought: The Role of Conscious Processing in the Making of Meaning," metacognition is "the thinker's own level of active awareness" (191); "it is a mode of thought or level of awareness at which information can be considered, worked over, altered, and/or applied to the task at hand" (188).

Without metacognition, teachers are unable to explain to students what they want either in terms of content or form. Thus, professors are unable to describe what is appropriate discourse even though they may be able to recognize it when they see it. Moreover, without metacognition, students as they write are unaware of teacher expectations. Acquisition for students remains implicit and thus subconscious. And so there is a gap between the student's intentions and the teacher's expectations.

In such a guessing game, students can neither recognize or reliably reproduce appropriate discourse. For students, relying on this game is risky and time-consuming. So they ask the question in order to get the answer more quickly and surely. Then students want affirmation that the discourse has in fact been "surely" appropriated. This need for affirmation causes them to return to the teacher with the same question. Since they have not learned what is appropriate, students must ask the same question in order to determine if the "gap" has been closed. This re-questioning continues through each and every writing task until a writer has been "appropriated by" a discourse. But then, the questioning only stops because students receive the implicit affirmation of a grade. It has not stopped because students have explicit awareness of their own discourse knowledge.

Now that we have some understanding of why students ask the question and why most teachers can't answer, I would like to lay out the case I intend to make in this thesis.

I will argue that the natural-acquisition of academic discourse between a student as passive-recipient and a teacher as discourse authorizer, whose methods of response are passive-aggressive, distances the two parties. I will further argue that this distancing works against a collaborative movement that brings the reader's comprehension process together with the writer's production process. Having shown that these factors adversely affect

the acquisition of academic discourse, I will propose an alternative to the natural-acquisition of academic discourse. Specifically, I will advocate a new model for teaching and learning. This new model re-forms the student's consciousness for patterns of (interior) cognitive activity and materializes those patterns into (exterior) patterns for structure in writing. The re-forming of consciousness will be discussed in chapter two and the re-forming of structure in chapter three. In chapter four, I will provide some scaffolding for a proposed metacognitive pedagogy.

CHAPTER ONE: [A] COURSE IN NATURAL ACQUISITION

In the prologue, I used the metaphor of the guessing game to represent the way students and teachers negotiate writing assignments. Now I want to begin describing this guessing game by sketching the unconscious experience upon which it is based. My sketch, which draws on my own acquisition experience, on a text analysis of CSUSB M.A. in Composition thesis proposals, on my observations as a "participant-observer" graduate-student committee member, and on composition research, helps to both explain and analyze acquisition experience.

Problem Analysis

One reason students have difficulty acquiring the academic discourse their professors expect is that their professors approach writing instruction implicitly. Most of them base their approaches on their own experiences of negotiating writing assignments, experiences that foreground the guessing game metaphor. Drawing from surveys of composition research, George Hillocks uses natural process and Arthur Applebee uses write-react to explain this guessing game tradition.

Hillocks believes most professors acquired their own academic discourse through natural process. In his review of research on composition, he reports that those who advocate a natural process mode of instruction

> see teaching as primarily reactive. Treatments in

> this mode provide a low level of structure and are nondirectional about the qualities of good writing. This position suggests that the skills of good writers are part of every [person's] genetic makeup. According to this view, the teacher's role is to respond with hints and questions that help [students] learn ways of dealing with writing of a particular kind. [Students] develop standards for themselves. [A teacher] posits no influences that might have caused the development of these standards. (119)

I contend that professors use this natural process mode of instruction because they consciously or unconsciously assume that "good writing" is "part of every person's genetic makeup." They believe that acquisition occurs naturally, so, quite "naturally," they expect students to "develop standards for themselves," standards that (they believe) will, of course, square with the conventions of academic discourse.

The assumption that acquiring academic discourse occurs naturally is played out in what Applebee calls the write-react instructional pattern. As he catalogues "the types of knowledge that ordinarily become relevant in a school writing situation" (365), Applebee explains and indicts this write-react tradition:

> There is even less attention to strategies that

> help a student while actually writing. The typical instructional pattern is one of the most part students are simply confronted with the fact that something is wrong, or does not make sense. This is a very negative instructional approach, one that tells the student that the process has gone wrong without providing strategies to avoid similar problems in the future. (373)

This natural process mode and its write-react practice form the basis for what I am calling the guessing game of acquiring academic discourse. Both describe the absence of metacognition and posit that students, at least worthy ones, arrive already equipped with academic discourse.

I contend that this isn't so--that acquisition isn't natural. The assumption of natural occurrence could be a carry over from pre-"open-enrollment" days (Shaughnessy 1-6), a time when more students did arrive at college with "good writing" already part of their genetic makeup. I suspect that even before open enrollment many students engaged in the guessing game, though somewhat more successfully. But, as Shaughnessy suggests, open-enrollment has exposed the huge gaps between the players in the acquisition metaphor of the game.

I suggest that acquiring academic discourse through a natural process results from privileging the reception as

opposed to the production of texts. Such a privileging of reception over production reflects composition studies' "paradigm shift" from a research focus on text to a research focus on the reader. Giles Gunn confirms that "interdisciplinary studies in recent years has been selectively focused." According to his review, "interdisciplinary work has placed less emphasis on the [writer] and the world, than on the reader and the [text]" (246). And so I contend privileging the reader adversely affects learning and disables the writer.

The result seems to be a strange segregation of reading from writing. That is, privileging the role of teacher/ reader distances the reading process from the writing process, disallowing what could be a collaborative meaning-making process. This lack of collaboration occurs when professors infer that acquiring academic discourse is natural. Such an assumption seems to be perpetuated by the transfer of contextual behaviors from the student position to the teacher position: Students, in task representing, develop standards for themselves, and then professors react passively/aggressively to their writing. This approach to instruction perpetuates these behaviors in task representation--students who have received passive/ aggressive reactions to their writing become teachers who passively/aggressively react to student writing.

Teachers who want to preserve their insider position of

reader generally do so by not acknowledging standards. They keep "secret," perhaps even from themselves, their knowledge of what constitutes good discourse. In fact, instructional approaches such as natural process and write-react require teachers to keep that "secret." This requirement helps us understand why teachers downplay and withhold knowledge, which in effect maintains the guessing game (Foucault The Discourse on Language 225-6). More to the point, it helps us understand how passive/aggressive teaching downplays, withholds, and excludes the component of metacognition.

It makes "sense" that teachers prefer a natural process model of reading and grading because that is how their own experience as students has taught them to understand acquisition. They do not have the metacognitive knowledge that would enable them to teach more "explicitly" (Williams and Colomb). However, when students can't ask questions about discourse and when teachers can't answer even if students do ask questions, the reading process is distanced from the writing process. I will show how this distancing works against the collaborative movement that can bring the reader's comprehension process together with the writer's production process.

Situating the Analysis in Context

To illustrate my critique of the natural-acquisition process of teaching, I use Applebee's "write-react" model to analyze the experience of ten students in a particular

discourse community: graduate students writing thesis proposals for CSUSB's English Department Graduate Committee during the academic year 1990-91. My illustration draws on a text analysis of these ten students' thesis proposals as well as the students' descriptions of their proposal writing process and their interactions with the Graduate committee. Three of ten proposals were approved on their initial presenting. The seven that were rejected "pending revision" provided two sets of data for analysis: first, they provided the initial thesis proposals that were rejected, and second, they provided the revised thesis proposals that were ultimately approved. Consequently, I looked at three initially-approved proposals, seven initially-rejected proposals, and seven revised and approved proposals; i.e. seventeen pieces of data from ten individual writers.

As Applebee puts it, the student is engaged in a "pattern of write-react, the first phase involving only the student and the second involving only the [faculty]" (373). During that academic year, students wrote their thesis proposals through the natural-acquisition process. That is, for the initial "write" phase, students received very little guidance. At that time, the policies and procedures of the graduate committee "allowed" students to "develop standards for themselves." Although the students were enrolled in a thesis planning class, the instructional mode was "write-react" with the other graduate students who were not

yet socialized into the discourse of the discipline as the thesis readers. The instructor facilitated the writer-reader roles rather than represented the judgement of the discipline or the graduate committee. Moreover, in the writing phase, any participation of the thesis committee was left to the initiative of the student and to the willingness of the (overburdened) committee members.

The graduate committee communicated with the students (what Applebee calls the "react phase") by letter. Graduate students who had received these letters indicated that they were, in Applebee's terms, "more of a reaction than a response." Specifically, the letters were reactive in that the most common "metadiscourse" (Williams) related comment was that the thesis proposal was not "clear." Then the letters moved to a content review that pointed to places where clarity was particularly problematic. But, as Richard Lanham has observed, "clarity" is a "premise" that is "false" (Style: An Anti-Textbook 11). A reading that uses the term "clarity" to critique is based on a false premise. That is, because it used the negative and ambiguous term "clarity," the committee's reaction did not define what students should do to achieve clarity nor did it encourage students to produce the expected discourse.

Significantly, in my text analysis of ten thesis proposals, only three writers were able to infer the expected discourse conventions and have their proposals

accepted on the first submission. Each of these three reported that they had operated through natural-acquisition; in short, one might say that these three writers were just lucky. However, the situation is more complex. Faculty members' talk as they reviewed thesis proposals revealed their tacit assumption that students had learned to write discourse-correct proposals in the thesis-planning class. But in that class, students sketched the parameters of "correctness" more generously than did committee members because of the "write-react" class pedagogy. Furthermore, while committee members expected that most proposals would need to come to the committee at least twice, students were engaged in an informal competition for first-round approvals.

Thus, I agree with Applebee when he says that write-react "is a very negative instructional approach, one that tells the student that the process has gone wrong without providing strategies to avoid similar problems in the future" (373). Three out of ten or thirty percent is a "F" on any grade scale. This constitutes a failure in the process of meaning-making because the reader (graduate committee), rather than acting in collaboration with the writer, is keeping discourse knowledge a secret. An unfortunate outcome with several proposals was that they never reached the committee's standards but finally were approved when the committee members reasoned, "this is as

good as it's going to get."

Comprehending the Concept of Acquisition

The above discussion shows that under a system of natural-acquisition, the meaning-making distance between student and teacher is increased, thus limiting the possibility for the meaning-making itself. In what follows, I sketch the process of natural-acquisition in order to problematize it, which will provide a basis for an underlying framework for an awareness of academic discourse.

I draw on the discipline of cognitive studies to present a perspective of human information processing (Beaugrande 229-34). In an interdisciplinary studies essay, Giles Gunn delineates a third coordinate: "the world to which a text refers." I integrate this coordinate into my analysis of acquisition in order to explain the distancing factor. To paraphrase Gunn, any explanation for the distancing of faculty from students must include not only an exploration of social processes and cognitive activities but also an exploration of "the spaces between" social processes and cognitive activities (246).

To explain academic discourse acquisition in terms of social processes and cognitive activities, the first aspect of acquisition can be seen as the social process of a form-content exchange that flows from a group to an individual. Martin Nystrand elaborates on this exchange:

> The speech community acts on the individual who, as a learner, becomes a fluent native speaker through a process of socialization, that is, by becoming a member of the 'tribe'. By interacting first with his [sic] meaning group. . .the individual comes to know tacitly the significant differences and regularities that make up his [sic] spoken and written language. ("Rhetoric's" 2)

Nystrand foregrounds the tacitness in this process. But I will emphasize metaknowledge in the same process in order to present an underlying framework necessary for an awareness of academic discourse. Such an underlying framework could provide a bridge from the tacit process to a metacognitive one.

From Nystrand's meta-account, we understand that an uninformed listener/comprehender experiences, receives, and, accordingly, acquires the "significant differences and regularities" of a general structure as a gross whole. For example, in learning a native language, the general structure of an idiom speech-form, like a convention or text feature for academic discourse, is acquired as a gross whole. In terms of the "gestalt" phenomenon, a student receives a situational pattern with the meaning convention in a configuration so unified as a whole that its gross structure (cannot be or) has not been derived from its

particular parts. This is analogous to seeing the forest, but only having a vague sense of particular trees. Such a socialization process occurs from a group to an individual.

In this light, acquiring academic discourse becomes a sociological and deductive phenomenon. Nystrand holds that this socio-deductive exchange provides "the resources of language for discourse" ("Rhetoric's" 1-2).

Layers of group influence naturally complicate the acquisition process of academic discourse. Discourse communities, as layers of group influence, complicate acquisition with layers of conventional semiotic structures. These unified structures, however, are not formed in a student's mind as a result of induction. In other words, students have not derived these structures from the particulars that constitute them. This is illustrated by graduate students' experience in writing thesis proposals to prove they have mastered academic discourse in their discipline. In this case, graduate students' learning process is complicated by the different discourse communities to which members of the graduate committee belong. Committee members represent three sub-disciplines of English--literary studies, linguistics, and composition studies--and they bring their own expectations of what academic discourse should be like. If the student is not aware that she is writing against competing community conventions, then she will not have the awareness of the

complication produced by such competing conventions. This isolates the writing process (hence the writer) from the reading process (hence the reader). Consequently, content and form are isolated from context. So the proposal procedure contributes to a complexity that distances faculty (and their expectations) from students (and their intentions) in what should be a collaborative process of comprehensible meaning-making between writer and reader.

This situation, writing thesis proposals for the graduate committee, occurs in a very local community--a department on a university campus. Since what happens in such local communities can be so complicated, one can imagine the complication and confusion in a global community: The graduate students have read the published texts in their global community required for classes. This exponentially increases the layers of influence on general structures and deducible conventions of academic writing. Thus the conventions can not be consciously discerned by the student in the process of natural-acquisition.

From our perspective of exploring the spaces between social processes and cognitive activities, the second aspect of acquisition is the psychological process of a form-content exchange that flows from an individual to a group. This exchange occurs in the mind of a writer as an internal dialogue from self to its textual world. The dialogue constitutes a monologic conversation in which a

writer, perhaps unconsciously, relates to audience through an abstract(ed) textual world. In other words, when a writer writes or creates a particular text, she considers specific conventions appropriate for her audience in her discipline. Martin Nystrand has elaborated on this exchange thus: "This collectivity exists like an institution 'outside the individual' and 'only by virtue of a sort of contract signed by the members" ("Rhetoric's" 1-2; see also Saussure "The Object of Study" 14).

This aspect of acquisition is subsequent to the socio-deductive aspect discussed previously. It engages a student-writer in the inductive process of adding together particulars in order to structure the gross pattern from the gestalt experience that has been deductively arrived at from the group/community. In terms of gestalt phenomenon, the student must turn around and re-form a set of particulars that will match the general, semiotic structure that she has deduced from the gestalt experience. So this side of acquisition is analogous to the proverbial, seeing the particular tree(s) in order to have a sense of the forest.

Graduate students writing a thesis proposal, who are uninformed about the text conventions for their community, draw on the structural resources that they have unconsciously and "naturally" acquired from reading the published texts in their global community as well as texts in the local community composed by professors. When we

consider the activities leading to discourse re-forming and the form-content exchange from the individual to the group, acquisition of academic discourse becomes a psychological and inductive phenomenon. Martin Nystrand views this psycho-inductive aspect as

> the rhetorical study of audience defined as the investigation of writers' plans and goals, taking into account the ways in which writers locate all available means for achieving particular effects on readers, plus causal relations between effective texts and such effects. ("Rhetoric's" 2)

Students attempting to negotiate academic discourse are engaged in the inductive process of adding together particulars to form text conventions. At the level of local discourse, the psycho-inductive procedure such as this one is almost a manageable task. For the students are not too much removed from their audience--they can knock at the door of committee members--and some of the conventions are made explicit. But at the level of published texts in the global discourse community, this task is much less manageable. There are several reasons. First, there are too many layers of text conventions to discover and distinguish without help. Second, unraveling and adding together particulars into text conventions has been relegated to a subconscious procedure of trial and error. In a procedure of trial and

error, acquisition of academic discourse becomes a process of stimulus-response, if it happens at all.

Conclusion

I have argued that the natural-acquisition of academic discourse between a student as passive-recipient and a teacher as discourse authorizer (whose methods of response are passive-aggressive) distances the two parties and limits the possibility of meaning-making. Such a distancing works against a collaborative movement that brings the reader's comprehension process together with the writer's production process. These factors adversely affect acquisition of academic discourse. Therefore, I will propose an alternative to the natural acquisition of academic discourse. Specifically, I will advocate a re-forming of consciousness leading to a re-forming of structure that makes up academic discourse. The re-forming of consciousness will be discussed in chapter two and the re-forming of structure in chapter three. In chapter four, I will provide some scaffolding for a proposed metacognitive pedagogy.

CHAPTER TWO: THE ACT OF READING [. . .TO WRITE]

In order to move beyond acquisition as an unconscious response to a stimulus, we must replace the game model with a new model of teaching and provide a scaffolding for learning that will more effectively answer the question: What do university professors want? The new teaching model requires awareness on the part of the teacher and the educational scaffolding requires awareness on the part of the student. The teaching model I propose re-forms first the student writer's consciousness for cognitive patterning. Then it re-forms the student's academic discourse by recalling those cognitive patterns and reproducing them into conventionalized discourse structures.

Having personally acquired academic discourse through a game-based model, I respond to the question from an acquisition experience in which I played two roles concurrently: the student of composition and the teacher of composition. From the perspective of a student, I was aware that I was obliged to consciously think about how I was to read and respond to the class as text. In other words, I was attempting to understand the professor's intention and interpret her meaning as composer of the writing class. Such a transformation is called knowledge. "Knowledge" marks a question answered, a difficulty disposed of, a confusion cleared up, an inconsistency reduced to coherence, a perplexity mastered. But the problem was the professor

didn't give any indication of what constituted knowledge. From the perspective of a teacher, I am aware that I am obliged to participate in the conscious act of (meaningfully) constructing the situation of a class. I am obliged to merge my own transformation of obscurity to clarity in order to construct the class in a way that would enable the student to master perplexity, cohere inconsistency, clear up confusion, and dispose difficulty.

These dual perspectives bring the act of responding to the situation together with the act of constructing a meaning for that situation. While the student responds to this situation by asking questions designed to identify salient facts and add them together to interpret the situation, the teacher constructs a meaningful answer to the student's asked or anticipated questions by taking apart knowledge to compose the situation so that obscurity turns into clarity. I suggest that my experience is not unusual and that many university professors have at different times participated in conversations, where they both asked the question (what does the professor want?) in their role as student and attempted to answer it in their role as teacher.

On the surface it might seem that the scenario illustration, which contextualizes an undergraduate experience of acquiring academic discourse, is mismatched with the thesis proposal illustration, which contextualizes a graduate experience of acquiring academic discourse. But

the two illustrated experiences are not mismatched because these two perspectives can be applied to our question-answer dilemma. This application provides the teaching model that bridges the student's question to the teacher's answer by matching teacher expectation with student intention.

Such an implicature between intention and expectation becomes a teaching model that will turn obscurity into clarity by bridging the teacher's composing act together with the student's interpreting act. Whether they realize it or not, teachers have, through dual experiences, made the turn from obscurity to clarity. Teachers have had a student experience in which they responded to the class situation of acquiring academic discourse and interpreted that situation in order to reduce obscurity. And they have, as well, their teacher experience in which they construct a meaning for the class situation of acquiring academic discourse and compose that situation in order to produce clarity. In my view, this means that one half of the question-answer situation is shared by both teacher and student. This shared commonplace experience bridges the gap between the student's role as questioner and the teacher's role as answerer.

So I ask myself (a student asks the teacher) "What do we as teachers want?" I am proposing that the teacher's awareness reversal from obscurity to clarity (i.e. from interpreting to composing) can be used as a teaching model for the same obscurity to clarity reversal in a student.

And being aware of both roles, I can envision a new metaphor on which to base an alternative model of teaching, a metaphor in which composition becomes a sign for itself. The class signifies a text that professors write and simultaneously a text that students read. I will show how in the metaphor of class-as-text, the teacher's dual experiences serve as a teaching model that will provide awareness by reversing a spontaneous and inductive pattern of thought into a metacognitive form of deduction. By "metacognitive form of deduction," I mean a pattern of thought that recalls a conventionalized discourse structure and reproduces it for a new situation. Such a teaching model provides the student with awareness and thus draws together teacher expectations with student intentions. It does not distance or isolate the critical coordinates of composition: the writer, the reader, the text, and the world to which the text refers (Gunn 246; Abrams 6).

Re-forming an Awareness of the Class-as-Text

In order to understand how the new teaching model works, we need to understand why discourse awareness must be facilitated to emerge from a "natural" process of language acquisition. Language acquisition theory helps explain how and why discourse awareness emerges from natural acquisition. This understanding will supply the particular practices for the new teaching model, which will transform student consciousness from unawareness to awareness.

Because students (by and large) have not been obliged to participate in the conscious act of responding to their own patterns of thought, they come into a class with expectations defined by the traditional teaching approach; they expect a game to be played. Students enter the class to determine how the teacher will play the game. They are anxious and even hoping that they will learn something. The instruction mode we've called natural-acquisition process disappoints students and its lack of comprehensibility reduces them to frustrated game players as they try to guess what professors want.

Since the educational principle of readiness dictates that teaching begin at the point where the student is when she arrives in a class, the new teaching model must reverse obscurity into clarity, as a result clarity will emerge from obscurity. That is, we need to understand why discourse awareness must be facilitated to emerge from a "natural" process of language acquisition. One significant reason is that when the student arrives in a class, her cognitive pattern is primarily spontaneous and inductive thought. In order for teaching to begin at the point where the student is when she arrives in a class, I use language acquisition theory to explain this awareness reversal in which the acquisition of academic discourse emerges from a process of natural language acquisition.

A game metaphor suggests tactical concepts that play

out in strategies for offense and defense. On the offense side are the commonplace practices of potential for scoring, and on the defense side are the commonplace practices of opposition to scoring in the game of unconscious acquisition. Language acquisition theory explains how these commonplace practices in natural-acquisition reduces acquiring discourse to a game.

In the game metaphor, students experience what has been defined by language acquisition theorist Stephen Krashen as language "submersion" with little or no comprehension (101). This process of language submersion begins, and is taught quite "naturally," at a high level of generality. The commonplace practice of language submersion is seen at such high levels of generality as when a teacher speaks about content appropriate to her discipline but speaks without acknowledging its appropriateness. This lack of acknowledgement is natural and understandable because the conventionality of appropriate content is implicit. When language submersion happens at high levels of generality, any knowledge of the integration of form and content becomes unconscious. The problem is that this submersion practice makes comprehension unlikely at lower levels of generality where the meanings implied are not so self-evident.

To illustrate, I use a game analogy with its strategies for offense and defense. In the game, a teacher uses the defensive strategy when, in speaking about appropriate

content, she lowers the level of generality and uses the vocabulary appropriate to her discipline but submerges that vocabulary by not acknowledging it. This lack of acknowledgment is important because students do not comprehend the vocabulary as a sign (or text feature) for that discipline. The teacher who uses specialized vocabulary is just like a native English speaker using the speech form of an idiom in a conversation with an ESL speaker. The class does not comprehend the specialized vocabulary just like the ESL speaker does not comprehend the idiom because the speech form of the idiom and the specialized vocabulary cannot be understood from the individual meanings of its elements. In both situations, meaning-making intention is distanced from meaning-making expectation. Students listen and add together particulars in their spontaneous process but they do not arrive at the meaning the speaker intends. So they affirmingly nod their heads but with no comprehension of the speaker's intended meaning. In other words, in order for the students to comprehend the specialized vocabulary (as a lower level of generality), the higher level of generality (of content appropriate to a discipline) must be acknowledged.

Conversely, using the new metaphor of class-as-text, we can see that students experience what Krashen defines as language "immersion" with comprehensible input (101). This process of language immersion does not spontaneously begin

but must be explicitly taught and this teaching must begin at high levels of generality. The commonplace practice of language immersion is seen at such high levels of generality as when a teacher speaks about content appropriate to her discipline and acknowledges its appropriateness. This acknowledgement reverses implicit conventionality into explicit conventionality at the high generality level of appropriate content. When language immersion happens at high levels of generality, knowledge of the integration of form and content becomes conscious. The potential would be for this immersion practice to make comprehension more likely at lower levels of generality where the meanings implied are not so self-evident.

To illustrate, I return to the game analogy with its strategies for offense and defense. Students experience comprehensible input in the class-as-text because when the teacher speaks, she speaks, not in the defensive mode of opposition but speaks in the offensive mode of potential as a member on the same team. The teacher speaks using discourse about discourse--awareness language--or language that acknowledges the integration of content and form. The teacher must, as a commonplace practice, use this language in order to reverse obscurity into clarity (i.e. interpreting into composing). This language must be used as a contextual behavior in the new teaching model because it facilitates the emergence of discourse awareness from a

"natural" process of language acquisition. Such language facilitates this awareness emergence by reversing a spontaneous and inductive pattern of thought into a metacognitive form of deduction (i.e. a pattern of thought that recalls a conventionalized discourse structure and reproduces it for a new situation). And so the teacher must use this language to reverse a process of language submersion into a process of language immersion.

The key difference between the game and the class-as-text, as a model for teaching academic discourse, is this metacognitive language. Contextual behaviors (in a class situation) understood as either framed by the game experience of language submersion, which has no comprehensible input (in the form of discourse about discourse), or framed by the class-as-text experience of language immersion, which has comprehensible input (in the form of discourse about discourse), helps us appreciate that "a language should be viewed as a system" of "signs" (Beaugrande and Dressler 31; Tobin xii; Saussure "The Object of Study" 15). What this means is that the key aspect of comprehensible input (in the form of "discourse about discourse") is actually making students aware of the levels of generality in a language system. In the case of academic discourse, comprehensible input (in the form of discourse about discourse) is making students aware of the levels of generality for the system of signs that constitute an

integration of content and form in the language of academic discourse. So learning a language, especially the language of academic discourse, is a matter of internalizing that sign system. Students need to be "immersed" in the appropriate discourse for the class or the discipline in order to learn to comprehend it.

But the question is how best to internalize it. What does it mean to transform a student with little or no comprehension into a writer of appropriate academic discourse? In other words, how would internalization happen within the proposed class-as-text framework? More specifically, how would a student be transformed from a reader of the class-as-text into a writer of appropriate discourse? To answer these questions we have to distinguish between a teaching model that re-forms consciousness and an educational scaffolding that re-forms discourse into conventionalized structures. Using the metaphor of class-as-text, this chapter will show how the proposed teaching model, with its commonplace practice of language immersion, would re-form the student writer's consciousness from unawareness to awareness. Students learn to identify salient facts and add them together to comprehend what they are being taught in class. Understanding how the student writer's consciousness is transformed supplies half the answer to the questions about internalization. Chapter three will provide the other half. It shows how an

educational scaffolding re-forms the student's academic discourse by enabling her to recall the cognitive patterns she has been made aware of and to reproduce them as conventionalized discourse structures.

In this chapter, language acquisition theory helps define the commonplace practices of language immersion for our teaching model. These practices will help student writers re-form unawareness into awareness of form-content relationship in cognitive patterning. This teaching model with its consciousness transformation represents how obscurity reverses into clarity. It facilitates the emergence of discourse awareness from a "natural" process of language acquisition. Awareness emerges when a spontaneous and inductive pattern of thought reverses into a metacognitive form of deduction (i.e. a pattern of thought that recalls a conventionalized discourse structure and reproduces it for a new situation). Through this transformation, the act of reading as responding (i.e. interpreting) reverses into the act of writing as constructing (i.e. composing). And so, through this transformation, readers become writers.

Underlying Theory for an Alternative Model

As a teacher, I have taught English both as Second Language (ESL) and as "Freshman Composition." The longer these two situations overlapped, the more I saw them as the same. To teach academic discourse is not only like teaching

a language: It is teaching a language. Since teaching academic discourse is teaching a language, then Krashen's language acquisition theory can help in achieving the goal for "Freshman Composition" classes of students learning the specialized discourse appropriate in the academic community. Specifically, this research can help us understand the theory underlying the new teaching model as well as help us understand its commonplace practice of language immersion. On the theory side, this will involve the research helping us to understand how discourse awareness emerges from a "natural" process of language acquisition as well as help us understand why the commonplace practice of language immersion facilitates reversing a spontaneous and inductive pattern of thought into a metacognitive form of deduction.

Stephen Krashen establishes a premise fundamental to a model for teaching academic discourse: "Humans acquire language in only one way--by understanding messages, or by receiving 'comprehensible input'" (2). He explains:

> The idea that we acquire in only one way may not be fashionable in this age of individual variation. There is, after all, very good evidence that people differ in many ways, and these variations affect the acquisition of knowledge in general (e.g. the field dependence--field independence distinction, left and right cerebral hemisphere preference, differences in

> cognitive style). Yet there are some things we all do the same, and some functions we acquire in the same way. The visual system, for example, is structured similarly and develops similarly in everyone. Chomsky suggests that there is similar uniformity in the language faculty, and that the language acquisition device operates in fundamentally the same way in everyone. . . .The extensive evidence for the Input Hypothesis supports Chomsky's position, and extends it to second language acquisition. We may see individual variation 'on the surface'--different sources of comprehensible input, different strategies for obtaining input, different messages, and of course different languages. But deep down, the 'mental organ' for language produces one basic product, a human language, in one fundamental way. (3)

What Krashen is saying here, based on Chomsky's suggestion, is that "the language faculty," which "operates" "in fundamentally the same way in everyone," "extends" to "second language acquisition." I apply Chomsky's theory and further extend it to the "different language" of academic discourse acquisition. In my application, I use Lev Vygotsky's research to extend the "input hypothesis." The purpose for this extension is to begin to define what it

means to transform a student with little or no comprehension into a writer of appropriate academic discourse. And in defining this transformation, I will explain why discourse awareness must be facilitated to emerge from a "natural" process of language acquisition. This explanation will lower the level of generality for our new teaching model and thus will particularizes how that teaching model works. Vygotsky's view that language acquisition happens as two concept forming processes supports Krashen's idea that we internalize language through comprehensible input.

Vygotsky's theory of concept forming can be used to particularize and refine Stephen Krashen's "theory of second language acquisition." According to Krashen, there are "two different ways that second language competence is developed" (Jones 97; Krashen 1). Krashen calls the first way "acquisition," equivalent to Vygotsky's process of spontaneous concept forming. This first way of developing competence and its equivalent in Vygotsky both involve the spontaneous, inductive process of adding together particulars in order to comprehend meaning. So this way of developing competence involves "knowing language" but without awareness of that knowledge (Krashen 1). Earlier, we saw that many teachers depend on a "natural-acquisition" process for learning academic discourse. We can see now that this process is founded on a theory of language acquisition that only recognizes spontaneous concept

forming. Natural-acquisition is a psycho-inductive process that never consciously organizes into a system.

Krashen calls the second way of developing competence "learning," equivalent to Vygotsky's process of scientific concept forming. Krashen's own conclusion needs to be refined; he concludes that it serves a limited "monitoring" function as a sort of "mental editor" (102). My understanding moves beyond his conclusion in that I equate "learning" as the second way of developing competence with Vygotsky's process of scientific concept forming. In my view, this second way of developing competence requires that learners not only know language but also "know about language." This means that a language learner must not only be able to move from the particular to the general but she must also be able to consciously apply conventionalized discourse structures in order to produce meaning in a new situation (i.e. move from general to particular). Enabling a language learner to make this move (of consciously applying conventionalized discourse structures) will extend our definition for what it means to transform a student into a writer of appropriate academic discourse.

In Thought and Language, Lev Vygotsky theorizes a "zone of proximal development" (xxxv, lvi, 142-43, 159-61, 187, 189, 192-96, and 270). This zone is where a process of spontaneous concept forming draws together with a process of scientific concept forming. He explains this convergence of

processes as an "alternating" "movement of thought":

> when the process of concept forming is seen in all its complexity, it appears as a movement of thought within the pyramid of concepts, constantly alternating between two directions; from the particular to the general, and from the general to the particular. (author emphasis 142-3)

Vygotsky goes on to define this alternating thought motion in the process of concept forming as a reverse direction move. He states "that from the very beginning scientific and spontaneous concepts develop in reverse directions: Starting far apart, they move to meet each other" (author emphasis 192): His statement, which uses the descriptive language of "develop in reverse directions," defines the reversed awareness relationship between form and content within each type of concept forming: In spontaneous concept forming, with its "direction" of thought "from particular to general," the relationship between form and content is unconscious. While in scientific concept forming, with its "direction" of thought "from general to particular," the relationship between form and content is conscious. According to Vygotsky, a person

> becomes conscious of his [sic] spontaneous concepts relatively late; the ability to define them in words, to operate with them at will, appears long after he [sic] has acquired the

> concepts. He [sic] has the concept but is not conscious of his [sic] own act of thought. The development of a scientific concept, on the other hand, usually begins with its verbal definition and its use in nonspontaneous operations--with working on the concept itself. It starts its life in the [person's] mind at the level that his [sic] spontaneous concepts reach only later. (author emphasis 192)

Vygotsky thus foregrounds how the relationship between form and content reverses from an unawareness of form-content relationship within spontaneous concepts into an awareness of form-content relationship within scientific concepts.

Most university students come into a class with the spontaneous, inductive pattern of thought. And so they are only able to (consciously) see particulars but are not aware of the generalities that those particulars constitute. By analogy, with this pattern of cognitive activity, they are deep in a forest and so close to particular trees that they are unconscious of the forest itself. In contrast, university professors come into their class with the deductive pattern of thought. This thought pattern can be destructive or constructive depending on whether it is conscious or not. If it is unconscious, then the professor is able to consciously see only generalities and so the professor is not conscious of the particulars that

constitute those generalities. Whereas if the deductive pattern of thought is conscious, then the professor is able to consciously see both her generalities as well as the particulars that lead to those generalities. The professor who is unconscious of her pattern of thought has a deductive world view that is at best unhelpful and perhaps even adversarial to the inductive world view of the student. But the professor who is conscious of her deductive pattern of thought can draw on both world views and help students to reverse their unawareness of the relationship between form and content into an awareness of that form-content relationship. To pick up the analogy, the professor who has the conscious, deductive pattern of thought is able to draw on her memory of comprehending the forest from a different perspective. And with this different perspective, she can take students from their vantage point of unconscious, inductive thought to the vantage point of conscious, deductive thought. Students who are so close to particular trees that they are unable to comprehend the forest, can be provided with the different vantage point of conscious, deductive thought, which would enable them to comprehend it. That is, students would be able to reverse their unawareness of the relationship between form and content within spontaneous concepts and thus would be able to comprehend the levels of generality in the relationship between form and content for the language of academic discourse.

Vygotsky concludes with the means for facilitating such a reversal. He concludes and contributes to our model for teaching academic discourse by providing the means for organizing spontaneous concepts into a system: "The formal discipline of scientific concepts gradually transforms the structure of spontaneous concepts and helps organize them into a system" (206). He previously emphasized that "the absence of a system is the psychological difference distinguishing spontaneous from scientific concepts" (author emphasis 205). This is significant because Vygotsky has provided the means for reversing discourse obscurity into clarity by explaining how consciousness is transformed from unawareness to awareness. Such a reversal, which transforms consciousness, happens, according to Vygotsky, through a metacognitive form of deduction that emerges clarity (i.e. discourse awareness) from an (obscure) spontaneous and inductive pattern of thought. In my view, this elaboration by Vygotsky defines not only what it means to transform a student with little or no comprehension into a writer of appropriate academic discourse, but also explains why awareness must be facilitated to emerge from a natural process of language acquisition. And the means for emerging clarity (more appropriately "discourse awareness") from obscurity (more appropriately "a spontaneous and inductive pattern of thought") would be a system.

This way of applying the language acquisition theory of

Krashen and extending the "input hypothesis" with Vygotsky's research has contributed to our model for teaching academic discourse. The teaching model I have proposed merges social and cognitive processes. Of Vygotsky's two processes discussed above, one is sociological and deductive. The "Scientific" process is sociological in that the exchange of a pattern for contextual content is from the group to the individual. It is deductive in that an agent of the group applies an awareness procedure to take apart conventionalized discourse structures for text in order to construct meaning. The second process is cognitive and inductive. The "Spontaneous" process is cognitive in that the exchange of a pattern for contextual content is from the individual to the group. And it is inductive in that an uninformed (and thus unaware) individual, seeking entrance into the group, spontaneously adds together particulars in order to comprehend meaning.

In another work, Vygotsky explains how the social and cognitive processes merge when scientific concept forming gradually transforms the structure of spontaneous concepts and helps organize them into a system. In other words, he explains how cognitive gestalt experiences (i.e. acts of memory) emerge from social processes in a way that transforms the structure of concepts within a spontaneous, inductive process and helps organize its particulars into a system. This brings a cognitive process together with a

social process. According to Vygotsky, this reversal of one process into another constitutes the discourse transforming process of internalization. He states that "internalization consists of a series of transformations:"

> (a) An operation that initially represents an external activity is reconstructed and begins to occur internally. . .
>
> (b) An interpersonal process is transformed into an intrapersonal one. . .
>
> (c) The transformation of an interpersonal process into an intrapersonal one is the result of a long series of developmental events.
>
> (author emphasis Mind in Society 56-7)

Together these social and cognitive processes provide a systematic way of acquiring language. The implication for learning academic discourse is clear: Metacognition is needed if "learning" is to take place. Rather than neglect either of these processes like natural-acquisition, which only recognizes spontaneous concept forming, I have proposed a model for teaching academic discourse that obliges one process to merge into another. It is not enough to depend on natural-acquisition teaching and to leave learning to chance. To assure learning, the circle must be complete: The learner must become aware of what she is learning. The teacher on the other hand, must not only be aware of her own

student experience, but must draw on that experience and transform the what of learning (i.e. contextual content) into an awareness for how she is teaching (i.e. procedural knowledge).

Alternative Teaching Model

We have, in the teacher's experience of dual perspectives, a model that reverses consciousness from unawareness to awareness by reversing inductive, spontaneous comprehension into the metacognitive awareness of acquisition. This metacognitive form of deduction is what enables a teacher to draw on her student perspective and to take apart conventionalized discourse structures for the new situation of teaching a class. The two situations (of student perspective and teacher perspective) reverse on each other and the former determines meaning for the latter. Inductive comprehension reverses from unawareness into awareness through a metacognitive form of deduction. That is, the inductive process of adding together particulars to comprehend meaning from the student situation reverses on itself through an act of memory (as a metacognitive form of deduction) and this reversal creates an awareness of the system that has reproduced itself.

To illustrate how a student would be transformed from reader of the class-as-text into a writer of appropriate discourse, I draw on my experience of studying literary theory as a graduate student. In my cognitive process of

inductively reading the semiotic class-as-text, I recognized and comprehended systematicity as levels of generality from particular to general. That is, through reading actual texts required for the class and through reading the semiotic text of the class itself, I inductively added together the particulars into conventionalized discourse structures that defined such literary-critical approaches as Reader-Response and Deconstruction. Then through a reversal of processes, I used my awareness of the induced conventionalized structures in the social process of taking apart those conventionalized structures in order to construct meaning and deductively write. So I used the induced conventionalized structures of Deconstruction to deductively write Deconstructively. And I used the induced conventionalized structures for Reader-Response to deductively write Reader-Response. And so, in writing tasks for the class, I reversed the levels of generality from my inductive reading and deductively back-formed the levels of generality for discourse production as levels from general to particular.

In this illustration, the scaffolding for the transformation of spontaneous concepts into a system by the process of scientific concept forming is the systematicity of literary-critical approaches. The next chapter will explain the place of an educational scaffolding in our model for teaching academic discourse. The purpose for a

scaffolding is to provide a systematicity, like the system of literary-critical approaches from the illustration, that can be applied to academic discourse. This provision of a system will enable students to recall and reproduce it for the situation of an academic writing task.

Now, I want to suggest the answer to the question, "how would internalization happen in the proposed class-as-text teaching model?" as well as the more specific question, "how would a student be transformed from a reader of the class-as-text into a writer of appropriate discourse?" We have, in the teacher's experience, a model that reverses consciousness from unawareness to awareness by reversing inductive, spontaneous comprehension into the metacognitive awareness of acquisition. This metacognitive form of deduction is what enables a student to draw on their memory and to take apart conventionalized discourse structures for the new situation of a writing task. The two situations (of being made discourse aware and of a required writing task) reverse on each other and the former determines meaning for the latter. Consciousness reverses from unawareness of inductive comprehension into awareness for a metacognitive form of deduction.

To elaborate in more concrete terms, students are engaged in a cognitive process of inductively reading the semiotic class-as-text in which they come to comprehend systematicity as levels of generality from particular to

general. That is, they read the semiotic text of the class itself and inductively add together particulars into conventionalized discourse structure that define the course or discipline. Then through a reversal of processes, students use their awareness of the induced conventionalized structures in the social process of taking apart conventionalized structures in order to construct meaning and deductively write. And so, in writing tasks for a class, students reverse the levels of generality from their inductive reading and deductively back-form the levels of generality for discourse production as levels from general to particular.

Up to this point, I have not claimed anything surprising to students of academic discourse. My contribution, which is not generally accepted, is that internalization happens in the zone of proximal development. This zone of proximal development provides for the cognitive "textual space" where awareness re-forms conventionalized discourse structures and reproduces them in new situations (Nystrand "The Structure of Textual Space" 75-86). Therefore, in the cognitive "textual space" of the zone of proximal development, the act of reading as interpreting reverses into the act of writing as composing. A name for this series of transformations leading to discourse internalization could be discourse back-forming. I propose that the practice of back-forming contributes to a model for

teaching academic discourse in that it obliges the awareness of systematicity within appropriate discourse. That's what I mean when I say the zone of proximal development provides the cognitive textual space where awareness re-forms conventionalized discourse structures and reproduces them for new situations.

Re-formed Contextual Behaviors in the Class-as-Text

As expressed at the end of chapter one, the problematic contextual behaviors of student as passive recipient and teacher as discourse authorizer need to be changed. Natural-acquisition works against the collaborative movement that brings the reader's comprehension process together with the writer's production process. From the teaching model I have proposed based on the metaphor of class as text, these contextual behaviors are re-formed and redefined. The role of student is understood as a reader of the semiotic class-as-text; in this role a reader is engaged in comprehension and is interpreted as initially operating in the process of spontaneous concept forming. This new understanding manifests itself as a reader engaged in the process of spontaneous concept forming that in time reverses consciousness from unawareness to awareness in order to make a gross motion toward a common center with production. And the role of professor is understood as a writer of the semiotic class-as-text; in this role a writer is engaged in production and is interpreted as initially operating in the

process of scientific concept forming. This new understanding manifests itself as a writer engaged in the process of scientific concept forming that in time transforms spontaneous concepts and helps organize them into a system.

In order to appropriate academic discourse, teaching must implement an educational scaffolding. A scaffolding constitutes the system that spontaneous concepts are organized into. This implementation allows a professor, semiotic-writer, engaged in the scientific process to facilitate a discourse transformation for a student, semiotic-reader, engaged in the spontaneous process.

In the next chapter, such a prerequisite educational scaffolding is proposed. This educational scaffolding is drawn from reading research and theory and the concept of genre knowledge from composition studies. That is, regarding the questions raised earlier about how internalization would happen in the framework of class as text, chapter three supplies the second half of the answer. It shows how an educational scaffolding re-forms the student's academic discourse by enabling her to recall the cognitive patterns she has been made aware of and to reproduce them as conventionalized discourse structures.

CHAPTER THREE: A TEACHER'S INTRODUCTION TO [SEMIOTICS]

To assure learning, the circle of teaching and learning must be complete. The learner must become aware of what she is learning. For the circle of teaching and learning to be complete, however, the teacher must not only be aware of her own student experience for the what of learning, but also must draw on that experience and transform it into an awareness for the what and how of teaching.

Applying the what of learning (i.e. contextual content) to the how and what of teaching (i.e. procedures to content) involves, as I explained in chapter two, a consciousness transformation from unawareness of form-content relationship within spontaneous concepts into an awareness for form-content relationship within scientific concepts. This awareness transformation constitutes what I have defined as a metacognitive form of deduction in which a learned pattern of thought recalls a conventionalized discourse structure and reproduces it for a new situation.

In order for professors to understand this emergence of discourse awareness and to apply the what of learning to the what and how of teaching, they need to understand the place of an educational scaffolding in our model for teaching academic discourse. To emerge awareness from unawareness, an educational scaffolding would function to organize spontaneous concepts into a system for the language of academic discourse. Therefore, in order for professors to

understand how an educational scaffolding helps them draw on the what of learning and apply their knowledge from that experience to the what and how of teaching, they need to be introduced to semiotics.

Semiotics, or semiology, is generally understood as the study of the system of signs. Within this study, a "sign," as commonly defined, is an arbitrary mark or sound that has become imbued with meaning by virtue of its membership in a system of conventionality. The systematicity of signs could be more precisely understood as layers of form-content relationship, which constitute conceptual levels of generality, imbued with meaning by virtue of their membership in a conventionalized system. Language has been considered the most obvious case of such a system of signs, but behaviors and non-written systems of conventionality have been studied semiologically as well. Much has been made in recent years, for example, of the use people make of body language as signs,- crossing of the arms equivalent to a sign for a person's resistance.

"In the broadest sense, any meaningful sign configuration is a text, and must possess textuality" (Beaugrande and Dressler 218). I (lower the level of generality for our educational scaffolding and) particularize this general view of semiotics as sign configurations that possess textuality, in order to deal with the "sign configuration" of two types of texts. In

other words, I have lowered the level of generality, which extends the general view of semiotics, for the purpose of helping us become aware of the sign system transaction between an academic situation and an academic text.

In chapter two, I showed how the actions of students and teachers constitute commonplace behaviors in a situational context that produce the sign system for a semiotic class text. If the process of learning academic discourse happens as the situational sign system for a semiotic class-as-text reverses through metacognition into a sign system for the conventionalized structures of academic discourse, then we need to understand just how the sign system from a situation is (re-)formed into the sign system for a text. In other words, how does the learner in reading the class-as-text acquire the discourse of that particular course or academic discipline?

To transform implicit conventionality into explicit conventionality, I extend semiotics in order to explain how the sign configuration of one type of text is transformed into another. That is, semiotics helps explain how a reader as interpreter is transformed into a writer as composer when the sign system of a situation-as-text (with "text" features constituted by commonplace behaviors in a situational pattern) is transformed into a sign system for an academic text (with "text" features constituted by conventionalized patterns appropriate to "the world" of that discipline).

I have also suggested (in chapter two) that "comprehensible input" in the form of discourse about discourse is actually making students conscious of the relationship between content and form. And so in my view, comprehensible input provides the form-content common center for an inductive process to reverse and reproduce a deductive process. I illustrated this reversal of one process into another with the experience of teachers who had dual perspectives and consequent awareness. That illustration elaborated one perspective as the reading of the semiotic class-as-text and the other perspective as the writing of the semiotic class-as-text.

To transform the perspective of reader (of the semiotic class-as-text) into the perspective of writer (of a writing task), an educational scaffolding is necessary in order for spontaneous concepts to be organized by scientific concept forming. The purpose for this chapter is to provide an educational scaffolding that will reverse the situational sign system for a semiotic class-as-text and recontextualize it into a sign system for the conventionalized structures of academic discourse. This will supply the structural side and thus complete the answer to the questions about how internalization would happen within the proposed class-as-text teaching model.

Reading research and theory and the concept of genre knowledge from composition studies helps elaborate (in terms

of a semiotic sign system) how acquisition awareness reverses into the awareness of conventionalized discourse structures and thus helps explain how those conventionalized structures for academic discourse are internalized and re-produced. This chapter will analyze H. P. Grice's "theory of implicatures" in order to represent how situational meaning makers (i.e. hearer/comprehenders and speaker/ producers) must have commonplace behaviors and represent as well how textual meaning makers (i.e. reader/comprehenders and writer/producers) must have conventionalized discourse structures. The analysis will conclude that commonplace behaviors for situations as well as conventionalized structures for texts are necessary for a discourse community to preserve and reproduce a system for meaning (i.e. knowledge). Then, the chapter will show how schema and frame theory supply a vocabulary for the awareness language of discourse about discourse. The analysis will conclude that such a vocabulary enables us to describe layers of form-content relationship, which constitute conceptual levels of generality for a language system, and that such a vocabulary provides teachers with a means for describing situational patterns, textual patterns, as well as patterns for knowledge that arise in semiotic sign systems. Finally, we will see how an interactive theory of reading along with the concept of genre knowledge explains a phenomenological event that transacts inductive

processing from reading into deductive processing for writing. That is, we will see how the reader's act of inductively interpreting a sign system from a situation (i.e. a class-as-text) is transformed into the writer's act of deductively composing a sign system for an academic text.

Argument from "Situated Cognition"

Before I begin however, "I" need to raise a situation that provides "you," the reader, with an opportunity to bridge interior consciousness with exterior textuality and thus supply your own content for the text "you" are reading. My purpose is to facilitate the metacognitive awareness of your discourse, or in words borrowed from James Moffett, to facilitate an "I-you" "transactional" meaning (Teaching the Universe of Discourse 11-3).

"I" ask "you" to recall your own experience of acquiring academic discourse. The reason behind this request is that within natural-acquisition and its write-react teaching approach, internalization is an unconscious process--or a process that has become controlled by the subconscious mind. Asking you to recall your acquisition experience is not a casual but an important appeal. The remembering is important because it raises your consciousness of the form-content relationship and will enable you to see in your own experience the commonplace pattern for the situational text of internalizing academic

discourse. This is an exercise comparable with calling to consciousness the keyboard sign-system that has become unconscious as you type.

Recalling the memory is also important because it is a strategy for arguing my case. As text linguists Beaugrande and Dressler suggest, "text receivers are readily persuaded by content they must supply on their own: It is as if they were making the assertion themselves" (8; see also 154, 160, 176, and 206 note #4).

The argument goes like this: If a reader recalls her acquisition experience and it matches the pattern of the writer's experience, then the meaning implicature is achieved between writer intentionality and reader expectancy. In effect, if the request to recall your own acquisition experience is successful, then you, the reader, will be aware that I, the writer, am consciously appropriating "scientific concept forming" in the process of taking apart internalized conventions for text production. And thus the reader will become conscious of processing the writer's discourse and aware of the text's intent to organize those spontaneous concepts into the writer's meaning system. This is an act of memory, which is deductively composed by a writer and inductively comprehended by a reader. And my request for the reader to recall your own acquisition is an attempt to facilitate this act of memory.

In recalling acquisition experience, an issue related to sequencing needs to be raised. In order for you to relive the acquisition experience, you must begin at your present condition of awareness and move backwards. You can't go all the way back to the beginning because at that point you were unaware of discourse beyond the content level. And so, you must move backwards or deductively through this sequence and reverse the order from how it actually occurred.

I have defined such a need to back into awareness, in chapter two, as the reversal of consciousness from unawareness of the form-content relationship into awareness of the form-content relationship. Back-forming is what allows the process of acquisition to reverse and transform consciousness and consequently allows the composing process to reproduce a conventionalized discourse structure for a new situation. I believe this happened in your acquisition experience, and it is what I would expect you to remember.

Reading research and theory elaborates (in semiotic terms) how an educational scaffolding helps (re-)form the student's academic discourse by enabling her to recall the cognitive patterns she has been made aware of and to reproduce them as conventionalized discourse structures. Grice's "theory of implicatures" helps us see how situational meaning makers (i.e. hearer/comprehenders and speaker/producers) must have commonplace behaviors and the

theory helps us see as well how textual meaning makers (i.e. reader/comprehenders and writer/producers) must have conventionalized discourse structures.

H. P. Grice's Implicatures Theory

The idea of implicatures is abstracted from speech-act theory by Martin Steinmann. He defines for discourse analysis a producer-comprehender communication as a "cooperative venture." This cooperative venture defines a meaning exchange in which a producer "performs" "speech acts" with "communicative presumptions." And these communicative presumptions constitute "mutual contextual beliefs" that "result" in a comprehender "recognizing" the "intended" meaning for a speech act (298). Implicatures, then, are cases in which producers draw on and exploit mutual knowledge of beliefs and conventions in order to communicate meanings (Cooper 119).

Implicatures theory provides the foundation for a meaning making system. It provides an understanding for how situational meaning makers must have commonplace behaviors as well as an understanding for how textual meaning makers must have conventionalized discourse structures. And so, meaning makers either read actual texts or experience situational texts and in so doing they are spontaneously processing commonplace implicatures (i.e. add together in order to interpret implicatures). Then they either write actual texts or enact situational texts and in so doing they

(re)produce the commonplace implicature (i.e. take apart in order to compose implicatures). I conclude that both commonplace behaviors (as lower levels of generality for layers of form-content relationship in situations) and conventionalized discourse structures (as lower levels of generality for layers of form-content relationship in texts) are equally necessary for a discourse community to preserve and reproduce a system for meaning (i.e. knowledge).

Schema Theory: Schema as Patterns from Situations

We can extend Grice's theory of implicatures (as a high level of generality) and begin to construct our educational scaffolding by using schema and frame theory (as a lower level of generality) to supply a vocabulary for the awareness language of discourse about discourse. This vocabulary will provide us with the means to describe layers of form-content relationship, which constitute conceptual levels of generality for a language system.

Schema theory is important for a metacognitive process of discourse appropriation in that it enables teachers to describe situational patterns, textual patterns, as well as patterns for knowledge in situational and textual discourse systems. Students, thus become aware of purposeful form-content relationships in the conventionalized language system for academic discourse. That is, schema theory provides the means by which a reader of the semiotic class-as-text is able to inductively add together

particulars in order to interpret and comprehend levels of generality as layers of form-content relationship for the commonplace situation of the semiotic class-as-text. Later, I will elaborate how schema theory provides, from the opposite perspective, the means by which a writer is able to deductively take apart a representation for an assigned writing task in order to compose levels of generality as layers of form-content relationship for the conventionalized structures of academic discourse.

I will now explain two reciprocal sides of schema theory that help us describe how the acquisition process (of adding together particulars in order to interpret meaning) is transformed into the composing process (of taking apart particulars in order to construct meaning).

Schema theory, according to Rumelhart, explains "how knowledge is represented and how that representation facilitates the use of the knowledge in particular ways" ("Schemata: The Building Blocks of Cognition" 34). Within schema theory, the first reciprocal side to be elaborated is the understanding of a schema. A schema is

> a data structure for representing the generic concepts stored in memory. There are schemata representing our knowledge about all concepts: those underlying objects, situations, events, sequences of events, actions and sequences of actions. (34)

A common example is the restaurant experience as a sequence of four physical situations: entering, ordering, eating, and exiting (Schank and Abelson 42-4; Brown and Yule 245; Nystrand "The Structure of Textual Space" 79). So a schema represents a behavioral pattern associated with a commonplace situation that is stored in memory.

An example of a situational schema related to academic discourse would be the commonplace situation and procedural activities of academic research. Since the pattern for induction, by definition, observes particulars and then induces generalization(s), so induction's commonplace situational schema for research could be described as a sign system for observation that sequences itself from particular to general. That is, what has come to be commonly understood as (the semiotic sign system of) the "experimental method" with its (disingenuous) "inferential" behaviors and procedural activities (North 147): formulation of hypotheses or questions, data collection, data analysis, and conclusions (Lauer and Asher 20). Conversely, since the pattern for deduction, by definition, begins with its generalization(s) and then observes, so deduction's commonplace situational schema for research could be described as a sign system for observation that sequences itself from general to particular. That is, what can be broadly defined as (the semiotic sign system of) "dialectic" with its (straightforward) behaviors and procedural

activities: the seeking of knowledge via the deliberate confrontation of opposing points of view (North 60).

So inductive and deductive procedures for observation could be understood as behaviors and procedural activities that constitute situational schemas for research. Reading theory has named the inductive pattern for observation a "bottom-up" approach to reading comprehension, which processes information from particular to general. And the deductive pattern for observation has been named, by reading theory, a "top-down" approach to reading comprehension, which processes information from general to particular (McCormick "An Introduction to Theories of Reading" 1-10). Based on a synthesis of reading and schema theory, inductive observation is a "bottom-up" situational schema for research and deductive observation is a "top-down" situational schema for research. I contend that these observation patterns become "naturally" transformed into patterns for reading comprehension by members of a discourse community and that these observation/reading patterns are (re-)formed into the texts of that community. The significance of this is in the fact that in order to transform the reader of the semiotic class-as-text into the writer of appropriate academic discourse, the spontaneous "bottom-up" approach to reading must be merged into a conscious "top-down" approach to writing. This occurrence of observation/reading patterns from research transforming into textual patterns for

academic discourse implies that one must first have procedural knowledge of research schema in order to compose discourse appropriate for one's academic discipline.

Frame Theory: Frames as Patterns for Text

Whereas schemas represent situational sign systems stored in memory, knowledge frames are more abstract. They represent conventionalized discourse patterns stored in memory. Teun van Dijk, a text linguist, defines frames:

> Discourse processing at various levels depends on our conventional knowledge of the world, as it is represented in structures called frames. . . . Frames are knowledge representations about the 'world' which enable us to perform such basic cognitive acts as perception and language comprehension. . . .Frames may be thought of as conceptual networks that contain embedded pointers to other frames. . . .Frames are not merely chunks of knowledge, but units of conventional knowledge according to which mutual expectations and interactions are organized. (18-21)

A frame structure could be as simple as a contextualizing question that structurally layers form-content relationship and points to an answer. For example, the student question, "I don't understand what you want; could you just tell me what you want?" points to and creates the expectation for an answer to come. Another

frame structure would be a simple contextualizing effect that structurally layers form-content relationship and points to a cause for a problem. As an example, the foregrounded problematic effect of academic discourse not being learned points to the cause for the problem as natural-acquisition and thereby creates the expectation for an alternative teaching model that would resolve the problem.

Frames work in another (more abstract) way as "conceptual networks that contain embedded pointers to other frames." In my view, this means that frames work as similar but different structures in a text according to which the meaning interactions between the reader and the text are organized by expectations created through structures early in a text. For example, two similar but different scenes in a narrative exploit intra-textual knowledge according to which the interaction between reader and text determines meaning for a new situation. So an early scene organizes an expectation, and a later scene has its meaning determined through intra-textual knowledge that exploits the organized expectation.

Such an embedded frame is illustrated in scenes from Steinbeck's Of Mice and Men. Early on, the narrative contextualizes a meaning in a scene where an old dog is "put out of his misery," shot and killed (48-50, 52-4, 67). The contextualized meaning (as an embedded pointer) is that the

old dog should have been killed by "a caring-responsible party," rather than being shot and killed, as it was, by an antagonistic third person. Later in the story, this embedded frame is recalled by a comparable situation in which George, "a caring-responsible party," puts Lennie out of his misery (113-7). Shoot and kill associated with antagonistic action is an organized expectation of the earlier meaning; that is, George has assumed his proper responsibility (unlike the owner of the old dog) and has not allowed Lennie to be shot (like the old dog was) by an antagonistic and uncaring third person. Literary critics would call this narrative technique "forewhadowing." For discourse theorists, frame theory explains how Steinbeck exploited intra-textual knowledge from the earlier scene that he intentionally gave the reader in order to determine the meaning for a new situation later in the text.

Frame structures are not to be understood as merely two structures having a textual effect on each other, like two independent scenes in a story, but understood, as stated previously, to constitute structural "networks." To illustrate how frame structures work as networks, I present the stair-step network for meaning interactions between reader and text that accumulatively organizes expectations for the frame system from Of Mice and Men. In the novel's frame system, readers experience a stair-step (re-)forming of structure. This stair-step (re-)forming of structure

occurs through a series of scenes:

> Scene network for organizing major expectation: scene where an old dog is shot and killed as a structural act having a structural effect on the scene where George shoots and kills Lennie.
> Scenes network for organized expectation through the organized stair-stepping of memory:
> (1) initial scene in which Lennie is hiding a dead mouse from George because he petted it too hard and unintentionally killed it, which becomes the basis for an associable memory; (2) scene where George warns Lennie about being careful with a puppy and reminding him about not petting it too hard and hurting it, which is the associable memory organized by the initial scene because it reminds the reader about the dead mouse; (3) scene where George reminds Lennie about the "girl in Weed" and the "trouble" because he scared her when he just wanted to touch her dress, which is an associable memory organized by the previous scene in that it again reminds the reader about Lennie's inclination to touch and unintentionally hurt; (4) scene where George warns Lennie about staying away from Curley's wife in order to avoid trouble, which is an associable memory organized by the previous scene in that it reminds the reader about

the "girl in Weed" and that "trouble"; (5) the scene where Lennie wants to touch the hair of Curley's wife and unintentionally kills her, which is an associable memory organized by the previous scenes; it also serves as a transition to the final scene that culminates the organized major expectation where George shoots and kills Lennie.

Grice's theory of implicatures supplies (the high level of generality to) a theoretical underpinning for our pedagogy. Schema and frame theory work (as lower levels of generality) within the broader domain of implicatures theory; this theoretical system or network provides a vocabulary by which we can identify and name what we see happening in texts.

For our educational scaffolding, frames constitute (embedded and conventionalized) implicatures that are recognized by members of an academic discourse community. Therefore, we can say that frames constitute an embedded implicature that a writer (from a particular discourse community) establishes for a reader (from the same discourse community) as a structure early in a text by means of which the reader comprehends meaning by expectations created through those early structures. An example of a frame (as an embedded and conventionalized) implicature, appropriate to a particular discourse community, would be Stephen North's use of his design for "practice-as-inquiry" in the

book, The Making of Knowledge in Composition.

North's book with its "making knowledge" content has an epistemological concern; that is, the book is about inquiry methods for an academic community. He is promoting practice as inquiry for the purpose of establishing the composition instructor as a legitimate, and appropriate, teacher-researcher. North has written his book in an order that facilitates a meaning discovery (i.e. implicature) by a composition student-turned-instructor reader. He has written using this structure to be comprehended by a reader experienced in and knowledgeable of that community.

As the book is ordered, the reader reads the "Practitioner" chapter with its design for practice as inquiry. Then in the book's subsequent sections, a reader reads the exposition of Historical (66-90), Hermeneutical (116-32), and Philosophical (91-115) inquiry modes, which North names as a group, "the Scholars" (59-65). The frame of practice-as-inquiry (as an embedded and conventionalized implicature appropriate to a particular discourse community) is recognized by a reader when the interactions between the reader and text are organized by an expectation created through that early structure of practice-as-inquiry. The reader becomes aware and comprehends that practice-as-inquiry is a (re-)organizing of the three "scholar" inquiry modes. That is, the frame of practice-as-inquiry is comprehended when text structures

back-form on each other through the process of the reader remembering a previous commonplace pattern. Through this act of memory, the reader becomes aware that practice-as-inquiry contextualized meaning interactions between reader and text at the beginning in order to organize expectations in a way that determines meaning for a new situation later in the text. The determined meaning (i.e. organized expectation) is that practice-as-inquiry is defined by the community commonplace behaviors of the "scholar" inquiry modes.

In my view, this constitutes an example of a frame (as an embedded and conventionalized) implicature appropriate to a particular academic discourse community. And so we could describe what North has done structurally in his book as turning a situational pattern into a textual pattern. That is, the writer has brought an inductive "bottom-up" commonplace situational schema for research together with a deductive "top-down" conventionalized frame for discourse structure.

Since North's book demonstrates that the pattern from a situation can, indeed, be turned into the pattern for a text, the question becomes, how did that transformation from situation to text happen? More precisely, how does interpreting a situation merge into composing a text? I contend that the answer lies in the "situated cognition" question that "I," the writer, directed to "you," the

reader, earlier in this chapter.

As the next section demonstrates, the commonplace pattern for the situational text of internalizing academic discourse has been reproduced and framed in the language appropriate to a specific discipline, by the experience of "situated cognition" as a defining principle of genre knowledge within composition studies.

Genre Knowledge

Carol Berkenkotter and Thomas Huckin in "Rethinking Genre From a Sociocognitive Perspective" explain: "Our knowledge of genres is derived from and embedded in our participation in the communicative activities of daily and professional life. As such, genre knowledge is a form of 'situated cognition'" (482). They further elaborate: "Genre knowledge of academic discourse entails an understanding of both oral and written forms of appropriate communicative behaviors."

Berkenkotter and Huckin use the concept "situated cognition" (as a high level of generality) to elaborate (as a lower level of generality) a "duality of discourse" principle. This principle explains, according to Berkenkotter and Huckin, how in our use of "disciplinary genres, we <u>constitute</u> social structures and simultaneously <u>reproduce</u> these structures" (author emphasis 492).

What these writers define as "constitute(d) social structures," I call schemas or patterns for situations, and

what they define as "simultaneously reproduce(d) structures," I call frames or patterns for texts. In their words, constituted social structures are simultaneously reproduced, and in my words, schema from situations become frames for texts. So social process merges with cognitive process.

I borrow an illustration to show how patterns from situations merge into patterns for texts. Kirscht, Levine, and Reiff, in their article "WAC and the Rhetoric of Inquiry," use the "empirical study report" as a form to demonstrate how cognitive activity equates into structures appropriate for a specific discipline. The empirical report is framed structurally as "Introduction, Methods, Results, and Discussion." They define this "format [to have] emerged in the natural sciences and [to] now [be] used with variations in many fields" (375). Cognitive activities for the structural frame of the empirical report are schematized (i.e. pattern from situation) as an underlying inquiry (i.e. cognitive) process. In short, these writers confirm that research schemas as patterns for situations transform into structural frames as patterns for academic discourse.

In another genre knowledge article, Amy J. Devitt contributes to our understanding of this process whereby the genres of academic discourse are constituted and reproduced:

> Genre and situation are so linked as to be inseparable, but it is genre that determines situation as well as situation that determines genre. If genre not only responds to but also constructs recurring situation, then genre must be a dynamic rather than static concept. Genres construct and respond to situation; they are actions" (author emphasis 578).

What we begin to see here is that the cognitive activities involved in (re-)forming consciousness (from unawareness into an awareness of form-content relationship), do not "separate," as Devitt implies, from the cognitive activities involved in (re-)forming structure for discourse.

The implication is that an instructional focus on procedural knowledge would facilitate the transformation of not only consciousness but also structure. From the context of composition studies, George Hillocks defines a mode of instruction that elaborates a context for transforming situation into text. Hillocks proposes an "environmental" mode of instruction in which the focus is on the facilitation of (situated) procedural knowledge. Environmental instruction is primarily interactive problem-solving. I propose that (in the sense of an environmental mode of instruction) an interactive theory of reading along with the concept of genre knowledge can be used to bring "bottom-up" situational patterns together with

"top-down" textual patterns. That is, we understand how the reader's act of inductively interpreting a sign system from a situation (i.e. a class-as-text) is brought together with the writer's act of deductively composing a sign system for an academic text.

I contend that, for our teaching model based on the metaphor of class as text (with an educational scaffolding), phenomenological theories of reading account for, and thus allow for, a Vygotskian transaction between spontaneous induction and scientific (metacognitive) deduction. That is, these phenomenological theories explain how top-down theories of reading interact with bottom-up theories of reading. So in our teaching model, we understand that bottom-up theories of reading (in the cognitive process of spontaneous concept forming with its pattern of thought from particular to general) transact with top-down theories of reading (in the social process of scientific concept forming with its pattern of thought from general to particular). And we understand, as well, how top-down thinking (i.e. the social process of scientific concept forming) operates to organize the structure of spontaneous concepts (i.e. the cognitive process of bottom-up thinking) into a system.

The question becomes what constitutes an academic frame. The answer for that question brings together metacognition with the reader's answer to the situated cognition question. The reader's own sign system for her

discipline's academic discourse constitutes the answer. I suspect that such a textual frame merges situational patterns from research (i.e. schema) into textual patterns for academic discourse. I contend that procedural knowledge facilitates such a transformation. In this way, early situations organized an expectation, and later situations had their meaning determined through intra-situational knowledge (more appropriately "procedural knowledge") that exploited the organized expectation.

Conclusion

When student-readers don't experience the gestalt of structure re-forming through the memory of a commonplace, then it is not likely that they will re-form consciousness. Students need to have the re-forming of structure pointed out so that consciousness might have the opportunity to re-form. It is an exercise comparable to this writer asking the reader to recall acquisition experience and thus point to commonplace structures that constitute the integration of content and form in the reader's academic discipline.

In the next chapter, I propose a metacognitive pedagogy and offer some educational scaffolding.

CHAPTER FOUR: A RHETORIC FOR. . .TEACHERS [WHO WRITE]

I have shown how a reader's comprehension process moves (phenomenologically) to meet a writer's production process. To facilitate this motion of thought in the "zone of proximal development" and bring a reader's spontaneous induction from the interpreting process together with a writer's metacognitive form of deduction for the composing process, I offer some educational scaffolding for a proposed metacognitive pedagogy.

The scaffolding quite naturally borrows from my own academic discourse community at CSUSB and its membership. From composition specialist Rise Axelrod, I borrow and propose a system of textual frames; for a "freshman composition" course, I would teach the one provided in The St. Martin's Guide to Writing (Axelrod and Cooper 3rd ed). And from linguist Sunny Hyon, I borrow and propose the use of (language immersion) teaching practices, which she based on English for Social Purposes (Hammond et al).

A Generative System of Academic Frames

Axelrod and Cooper provide a system of frames for discourse that can be applied at the undergraduate level. In "Part One" of their "brief contents," these frames are listed under the heading of "writing activities."

Remembering Events	Taking a Position
Remembering People	Proposing Solutions
Writing Profiles	Making Evaluations
Explaining Concepts	Speculating about Causes

For Axelrod and Cooper, "writing activities" constitute the macro-textual frame or genre, and "writing strategies" constitute the micro-structures that make up stair-step networks within a genre or macro-textual frame. These writers supply the generative process as well as the strategies necessary for constructing an intra-textual stair-step network, or intra-textual frame system, of embedded pointers. In "Part Two" of "brief contents," the generative process is provided (under the heading of "invention and inquiry") and the means for intra-textual networks are provided under the headings of "cueing the reader" and "writing strategies."

Invention and Inquiry	Defining
Cueing the Reader	Classifying
Narrating	Comparing and Contrasting
Describing	Arguing

Again, for Axelrod and Cooper, "writing activities" constitute the macro-textual frame or genre, and "writing strategies" constitute the micro-structures that make up stair-step networks within a genre or macro-textual frame.

From an expanded "contents," these writers provide the details for a particular type of textual frame, or the

details for a particular academic genre that is appropriate at the undergraduate level. Axelrod and Cooper supply readings for a textual frame, which are an essential part of this teaching-learning model and which have application in my next section on metacognitive teaching practices.

For my purposes, I will present one such textual frame; i.e. undergraduate academic genre (emphasis added):

5 Explaining Concepts

For Group Inquiry

PURPOSE AND AUDIENCE

BASIC FEATURES OF EXPLANATORY ESSAYS
A Well-focused Subject / A Main Point or Thesis / An Appeal to Reader's Interests / A Logical Plan / Clear Definitions / Appropriate Writing Strategies / Careful Use of Sources

GUIDE TO WRITING

THE WRITING ASSIGNMENT

INVENTION AND RESEARCH
Finding a Concept / Exploring the Concept / Focusing on One Aspect of the Concept / Researching Your Subject / Testing Your Choice / For Group Inquiry / Establishing a Main Point/ Considering Explanatory Strategies

PLANNING AND DRAFTING

GETTING CRITICAL COMMENTS

REVISING AND EDITING

LEARNING FROM YOUR OWN WRITING PROCESS

A WRITER AT WORK: USING SOURCES

Of significance are the "invention and research" step "considering explanatory strategies" and the section "basic features of explanatory writing." "Considering explanatory

strategies" under "invention" is significant because it guides the writer to generate their intra-textual network of strategies appropriate to explanatory writing. And "basic features of explanatory writing" is significant because it guides the writer by providing the global "family resemblance" characteristics for that genre of writing, which the writer is attempting to (re-)produce.

Some Metacognitive Teaching Practices for Language Immersion

Sunny Hyon has formalized some teaching practices that serve to facilitate matacognitive awareness and thus guide student writers to (re-)produce a textual frame or genre. She describes "the teaching learning cycle" as having four stages of activity. Under each of the "stages," I present some samples of language (immersion) teaching practices.

Stage One Building the Context for a Text Frame

introduce learners to a broad range of written texts that apply the text frame in a real context (The St. Martin's Guide uses several "scenarios," which begin the "writing activity" chapters, to serve this purpose of situating a frame.)

Stage Two Modeling a Text Frame

1. the teacher reading model text frame(s) to students, 2. shared reading of text frame(s) between students, 3. discussion of who writes a certain text frame, why, and where they are likely to be found, 4. analysis, based on examples of the frame structure

for a text and the function of each feature within the frame structure for a text, and 5. practice in distinguishing and labelling features within the frame structure for a text.

(The St. Martin's Guide supplies the resources for such teaching-learning practices with several models of a text frame in the "writing activity" chapters).

Stage Three Joint Construction of a Text Frame

1 (a) negotiation between teacher and students or

1 (b) negotiation between students regarding appropriate features for a text frame and/or appropriate intra-textual network of strategies, and 2. shared re-drafting, drawing on shared knowledge about a text frame.

Stage Four Independent Construction of a Text Frame

1. building and developing knowledge of the text frame through activities such as reading, information gathering, and note-taking, 2. writing own text, approximating appropriate features for the text frame, 3. consulting with other students or with the teacher regarding the appropriateness of the text frame, 4. re-drafting where necessary, and 5. class discussion of any difficulties experienced by learners in writing their text.

This systematicity of textual frames and the transformation to discourse awareness form the basis for

what I am calling a metacognitive pedagogy for acquiring academic discourse. The (language immersion) teaching practices provide students with metacognitive awareness for a text frame, which they will need to (re-)produce for writing tasks in the university.

EPILOGUE: REDRAWING THE BOUNDARIES

As many readers familiar with poststructuralist literary theory will recognize, the subtitle to this thesis, "There Is A Text In This Class," alludes to a well-known work by Stanley Fish, Is There A Text In This Class? In my title, I was attempting to create for the reader that textual situation, which we commonly know as allusion," in order that a reader would come to understand later in the text, a meaning determined by that earlier structure. The determined meaning was that in order for academic discourse to be consciously learned, the awareness problem must be resolved. The interdisciplinary nature of composition studies presents this problem for those who would appropriate its discourse and become composition specialists. The would-be composition specialist must be a metacognitive thinker or the student's question, "What do university professor's want?" will go unanswered. If we have a class-text, then we should be metacognitively aware of that class-text and acknowledge it to students rather than keeping it a secret. When teachers do not acknowledge their class-text, this practice maintains the status quo of unconscious discourse or discourse under the control of the subconscious mind.

My text ends with a poem I used to begin the very first paper I wrote for our graduate program. It was a paper about the identity crisis of composition practitioners. Now

at the end of the program, I interpret that crisis to be one consequence of the fact that what happens in most composition classes has very little, if anything, to do with the metacognitive process of appropriating academic discourse. I began the paper with a recontextualizing of Theodore Roethke's "Dolor" that I retitled, "Dolor Recast"; so with apologies to the poet Theodore Roethke for the poem revision and to Professor E.M. White for the pre-literate academic discourse, I close with that poem.

I have known the inexorable sadness of discourse restricted,
Neat in their boxes, dolor
of description, narration, exposition, and argumentation,
All the misery of composed product
emphasis over composing process,
Desolation in the strong concern for usage,
Lonely syntax, spelling, punctuation,
The unalterable pathos of text analysis
Ritual into words, sentences, and paragraphs,
Endless duplication of lives and objects.
And I have seen dust from the walls of institutions,
Finer than flour, alive, more dangerous than silica,
Sift, almost invisible, through long afternoons of tedium,
Dropping a fine film on nails and delicate eyebrows,
Glazing the pale hair, the duplicate gray standard faces.

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