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# Constitution of Cyprus and the Cyprus conflict : a historical analysis of dependency

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THE CONSTITUTION OF CYPRUS AND THE  
CYPRUS CONFLICT : A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS  
OF DEPENDENCY

Ioanna Papayannis ©

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate  
Studies in partial fulfillment of the degree of

Master of Arts

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## CONTENTS

	Page
<b>INTRODUCTION</b>	4
<b>CHAPTER ONE</b>	
<b>HISTORICAL BACKGROUND</b>	14
I. Ottoman Rule	14
II. Divide and Rule: The Process of Ethnic Differentiation	17
III. British Interests in the Eastern Mediterranean	23
IV. The Anti-Colonial Struggle	27
V. The New Constitution	34
VI. U.S. Interests in Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean	36
VII. Constitutional Crises and Ethnic Conflict	41
VIII. The Increase of External Involvements and the 1974 Crisis	46
IX. The Consequences of Partition	55
<b>CHAPTER TWO</b>	
<b>INTERNAL FORCES AND THE CYPRUS CONFLICT</b>	58
I: Everyday Relations of the Cypriots	58
II. Relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in their Political, Social and Economic Systems	63
<b>CHAPTER THREE</b>	
<b>FOREIGN INTERVENTION AND ETHNIC CONFLICT</b>	71
I. The Rise of Nationalism under British Colonial Rule	73

	Page
II. Relations between Greece and Turkey with regards to their respective ethnic communities	81
III. Relations between the United States, Greece and Turkey over Cyprus	87
 <b>CONCLUSIONS</b>	 96
 <b>REFERENCES</b>	 109

## INTRODUCTION

The Cyprus Conflict, as it is known to world politics, has attracted the attention of scholars concerned with the question of the survival and role of small states and nations in the Mediterranean. The events in Cyprus can be summed up in one phrase : ethnic conflict in a small Mediterranean country with a legacy of colonial rule. The two ethnic communities of Cyprus, Greek and Turkish, have been involved in an ongoing conflict which, after a chain of dramatic events, which will be retold in this thesis, became the unresolved "Cyprus Question".

It seems that after the final confrontation of 1974, it has been impossible to reconcile the differences of the two Cypriot peoples. In July of the same year, the Greek military junta interfered in the affairs of Cyprus by staging a coup d'état against the island's legal government. This was followed by a Turkish invasion and occupation of 40% of its soil, thus imposing a "solution" on the Cyprus Question. The costs in human terms have been enormous, since thousands of lives were lost, 1,700 people are still missing and are almost certainly dead, and 200,000 Greek Cypriots and 9,000 Turkish Cypriots were driven from their homes to become refugees.

Apart from these tragic circumstances, the repercussions of the actions that took place in 1974 were numerous and were felt at all levels of international politics. Apart from the tragic loss of human life, the destruction of Cyprus as an independent, sovereign and unified state, was the most serious

loss of all. The Cyprus Conflict brought two NATO members, Greece and Turkey, to the brink of war, has aggravated their existing differences over the potentially much more serious question of territorial rights in the Aegean, and has directly resulted in serious problems between Washington, Ankara and Athens over U.S. military bases in both countries. The stability of the Mediterranean has been hurt once more. The Eastern Mediterranean, with the on-going Lebanese civil-war, the whole Middle-Eastern Question and the added Cyprus Conflict stands like a time-bomb to international peace. This explosive situation was exacerbated in 1987, with the tension that was created in diplomatic relations between the two neighbouring countries -Greece and Turkey- over oil rights in the Aegean. War, however, was averted.

The original independence settlement of 1960, which resulted in the planning of the Constitution of the new State of Cyprus, was an affair determined in great measure by Great Britain, Greece and Turkey, without much reference to the people of Cyprus as such, or to their community leaders. Concrete historical facts have led researchers to conclude that there was never real independence in Cyprus. The effect that the original constitutional settlement had on the Cypriot people perpetuating a community divided between 80% Greeks and 18% Turks (with 2% Maronites and Armenians making up a total population of 650,000), was in essence no different from the effect that the partition had on the island : total separation of the two peoples thus became forcibly permanent.

Lack of serious analysis of the topic has produced



misconceptions and over-simplified "versions" of the Cyprus problem, so that the whole conflict is made out to be an irreconcilable quarrel between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, which erupted into open violence in the last thirty years or so. It will be argued in this thesis, however, that the distortion of ethnic relations between the two ethnic communities, which resulted in total separation, was not a product of the historical progression of hatred that the two ethnic groups developed for one another within Cyprus.

It is the purpose of this thesis to show that foreign strategic interests dictated by power politics in the Middle East, have been the most decisive factors in the development of ethnic conflict between the Greek and the Turkish communities of the island. A few necessary steps have to be taken in order to indicate the process of total separation that the two ethnic groups experienced. It will be necessary to show how internal realities and domestic processes, like nationalist aspirations of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the island, were manipulated by international power politics, and directed from outside by those great powers.

This thesis argues firstly, that Great Britain as the former colonial power, followed a divide-and-rule policy, through its administrative practices and turned always-existing apolitical religious differences between Muslims and Eastern Orthodox Christian Cypriots into antagonistic nationalisms, initiating and thus consolidating ethnic differentiations. Once Great Britain evaluated the strategic importance of Cyprus, for its military operations in the rest of its Empire, and for

those of the new-born Western Alliance, Britain then played one ethnic group off against the other, in order to weaken Greek majority demands for self-determination.

With the break-up of the British colonial system, and with changing realities in international power politics, Great Britain agreed to allow independence of the island on the condition that its military bases were maintained on Cyprus and so preserve its rights as an interested party through binding treaties. Additionally, nationalist influences from Greece and Turkey were introduced in order to interfere with domestic social and political processes in the island. Reciprocally, the emotional attachments of each ethnic community to its motherland were manipulated, rendering the developments in Cyprus, so that it was easily dominated from outside.

In 1960, Britain designed a Constitution that institutionalized foreign intervention in the political affairs of Cyprus, and favoured the Turkish minority -as a protégée of Turkey, the most important Western ally at the time- against the "rebellious" Greek majority. This deeply disturbed the two communities, thus distorting ethnic relations.

Secondly it will be shown that the crises of 1963 and 1968 were a result of the deficiencies of the British imposed 1960 Constitution, its unworkable provisions, and the unequal balance of power divided between the two communities. Institutionalized intervention resulted in conflict between them and between their respective mother countries. American involvement

in Cypriot politics, directly or covertly asserted through successive Greek and Turkish governments, provided the completion of a closely woven linkage which further promoted separation.

Lastly, this thesis will link the partition of the island to the external interests and interventions involved prior to the implementation of the 1960 Constitution of Cyprus and then secured in that Constitution, and persisting after independence, to show that partition was not simply the outcome of armed conflict between two alienated and frustrated ethnic communities. It was a directed plan, as well as a desired result firstly on the part of U.S. diplomacy, Great Britain (particularly throughout the mid-fifties and lasting well into the early seventies), and lastly the NATO powers to incorporate Cyprus into the Western sphere of influence, and to please Turkey, one of its most important Western allies in the Mediterranean (a relationship which has lasted for over thirty years).

Sociologically, the Cyprus conflict may be well viewed as a majority/minority issue, where race, language and religion have been the dividing factors ever since the two ethnic groups of Cyprus have come into contact with one another. However, our purpose is to show that a historical perpetuation of these differences based along these lines was never true for Cyprus, and that its two communities have lived peacefully side-by-side, in the past.

This thesis does not underestimate the internal dynamics

of ethnic differences per se, such as social and cultural changes and the development of nationalism, as factors giving rise to ethnic consciousness and conflict. However, it does maintain that ethnic conflict was exacerbated by external encouragement of extremism by both sides, and that, in short, external involvements have been most decisive in explaining the constraints that were created and the unwillingness of the two communities to live and function side-by-side. Therefore, this perspective suggests that the inter-communal conflict in Cyprus cannot be viewed solely within the borders of the Republic, as the two major ethnic groups of the island had little, or, no control over their own destiny.

In theoretical Sociology the area of dependency constitutes a wide topic of research, and has presented several contemporary models dealing with this issue, which are directly applicable to Cyprus.

Harry Magdoff, in his works Age of Imperialism (1966) and From the Colonial Age to the Present (1978), analyses the features of modern Imperialism, stressing that dependency can take many forms -economic, political or military- in our post-colonial era. He makes a distinction between Colonial Imperialism and Imperialism without colonies. In the former, he stresses that the dominant power had in the past disrupted the traditional ruling groups of the colonies and destroyed their political power. The dissolution of the colonies was carried out in such a way as to preserve for the mother country as many of its advantages as possible. The "core" had created and

sponsored élites which were psychologically and economically dependent on foreign rulers (Magdoff, 1978, p.140,143).

Also, Magdoff analyses historically the new realities that were shaped after the Russian Revolution and the Second World War, and shows how "reconquering lost territories", becomes an essential feature of the market economy to counteract the expansion of the socialist world. (Magdoff, 1966, p.40).

Central to his thesis of "Imperialism Without Colonies" is the new role of the United States, which becomes the leader and organizer of the world system, interfering in the politics and class-conflicts of ex-colonies. The United States aims at becoming the main provider of military assistance, or the dominant partner of an alliance, and economic aid, strengthening those sections of the ruling class which are sympathetic and reliable, and constructing a global network of military bases and staging areas (Magdoff, 1978, p.110, 144). Thus, a country can be officially, politically independent, but, in fact enmeshed in diplomatic dependence on the United States.

Jawaharlal Nehru, in Glimpses of World History (1949) draws some parallels between direct (colonial) Imperialism and indirect Imperialism, "without colonies". He names them respectively "visible" and "invisible" Imperialism, and explains how formerly dependent ex-colonies can be equally dominated by this new invisible Imperialism (Nehru, 1949, p.g. 478,479). Whereas Britain controlled India and other parts of the world, by governing the population directly, and responsibly, the U.S. gains economic, political and military control without

shouldering any responsibility for governing the country, by exercising indirect domination, that is by supporting and maintaining dictaroships by choice (Nehru, 1949, p.570).

Finally, the theoretical political geographer Yves Lacoste, concentrates on a special category of dependent countries, which owe that dependency to their key geo-political and strategic position. As with Magdoff, Lacoste's paradigm applies to Cyprus as well (Lacoste, 1985).

The theoretical frameworks of the aforementioned writers provide a basis and a point of departure for this thesis' discussion of the ethnic conflict in Cyprus by tracing its historical development at the domestic as well as at the international power politics level.

I will establish in this thesis, that Cyprus falls into the category of the new-geopolitically dependent colony. As a former colony, its internal realities were exploited by the British colonial rulers, and ethnic separation had been promoted, in order to advance British, and the American colonial interests. With the break up of the British Imperialist system, covert Imperialism was exercised by United States diplomacy, NATO and their clients at the time of independence. Constant interference in the domestic politics of Cyprus, thus, provided the ground for the ethnic divisiveness and escalation of the conflict, that reached its peak with the 1974 partition of the island.

A number of scholars have discussed the international

linkages entwined in the Cyprus Question and have treated it as a power-politics issue. However, although it has been suggested before that foreign involvements have contributed to ethnic conflict in Cyprus, the kind of dependency has been inappropriately emphasized, as this thesis sets out to demonstrate.

Parallel to that, the notion that the geo-political position of a country can play a critical role in the course of history, especially in the Mediterranean, gains new importance. It adds a new dimension to the area of dependency and ethnic relations and so opens up a new area of research worthy of scholarly attention.

This thesis suggests that the "Cyprus Question", although it appears to be a complex and unique issue, might prove useful as a future field for scholarly endeavour, especially of geo-political dependency. It would be interesting to examine for example multi-cultural societies and the potential of this particular dependency as a decisive factor for distorting ethnic relations.

Naturally enough, this thesis employs the analysis of documents, mainly secondary sources, as well as some primary sources, for unfortunately a lot of primary sources are still kept confidential in the government files of Greece, Turkey, Britain and the U.S. as well as in the files of the government of Cyprus. However, adequate primary sources were available to me through the appropriate archives of the Greek Government and the Government of Cyprus.

Government Publications, and the international press, have been used to provide additional information, as well as scholarly monographs and books. This type of material has provided the basis on which new insights and arguments on the topic have been developed.



## CHAPTER ONE

### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A brief historical account of Cyprus is necessary in order to explain the factors which led to the island's unresolved conflict, and the context in which ancient differences -sometimes rivalries- have been exploited for modern politico-economic interests. The geo-political importance of Cyprus throughout history is also emphasized. In addition, this chapter intends to stress the long tradition of co-existence and the point where ethnic differentiation began, late in this century.

#### I. Ottoman Rule

The island of Cyprus has been Greek from the Bronze Age. During the second millenium before Christ, the island was settled by Achean Greeks. The records of antiquity confirm the Hellenic character of the island. The Cypriot mythology is indissoluble from the Greek. Its tempting and vulnerable position, saw Cyprus become part of Assyria, Persia, the Empire of Alexander the Great, the Roman Empire, and finally, a province of the Byzantine Empire. Later, it fell under the hegemony of Richard the Lionheart; was handed over to the Franks, until it was occupied by the Turkish Ottoman Empire, which ruled it for 300 years. The character of the island remained unmistakably Greek, until the British took over in 1878, as Ronald Storrs, an early Governor of the island, testifies (Storrs, 1945).

The Christian population of Cyprus, which had been oppressed under Frankish rule, was rather relieved once the Turks became

the new rulers, the ancient dignity and the privileges of the Orthodox Church, were restored (Hill, 1952).

The administrative system of the new order became corrupt, however. Initially though, the intentions of the Turkish Government, with respect to the treatment of the island were praiseworthy since the Turkish Government declared that the Greeks would be treated with justice and moderation (Hill, 1952).

Traditional co-existence and shared social and cultural identity characterized the period of Ottoman rule in Cyprus. In accordance with the Islamic conception of the Ottoman Empire Christians were to be protected, although they were not to enjoy the privileges accorded to the true believers. There were a large number of conversions to Islam during those years prompted by an act of economic necessity to avoid the capitation tax, which fell heavily on the shoulders of the Christian Greeks. This explains the fact that Greek and Turkish settlements were interspersed all over the island, and that there were no separate ethnic communities.

Testimony of shared culture is the form of religious syncretism, recorded in the past. The Cryptochristians of Cyprus -used to be called "Linobambakoi"- practiced the rites of Islam publicly, and Christianity secretly. Each person used to have a Christian, as well as a Moslem name (Dawkins, 1933). Such phenomena persisted until our time, well after the development of Greek and Turkish nationalism on the island in the form of agricultural co-operation and social intercourse and seen most prominently, in the context of the integrated village unit of

rural Cyprus (Kitromilides, 1977) (Attalides, 1977).

In Cypriot agrarian society, Greek and Turkish peasants were under two systems of social control, or, two "Millets". In each Millet, control lay in the hands of the pasha and the aghas, and the Orthodox hierarchy respectively (Hill, 1952). Conflicts during the Ottoman period in Cyprus did exist, but seemed to have been along class lines. The social structure was such that all classes were composed of both Muslims and Christians. In fact, due to the increasing corruption and increasing exploitation of the peasantry, peasant revolts erupted against the oppression from above, in which Turks, as well as Greeks, took part (Alastos, 1955) (Hill, 1952). In addition, power struggles within the local Turkish power structure, or between the powerful groups heading the two "Millets", have been recorded (Kitromilides, 1977). Furthermore, common action at the grassroot level stimulated a number of actions as strategies for survival.

On one occasion, due to the rebellion of the mainland Greeks against Ottoman rule, the Governor of Cyprus convinced the Sultan to execute the most wealthy and influential among the Greeks of Cyprus, because of fears over a possible uprising on the island. Despite the fact that a large-scale massacre took place, we have recorded attempts of Turks, to rescue their Greek fellow-countrymen (Hill, 1952).

Until the end of the 19th century, European travellers and observers had never commented on cultural distinctions or differences of "national character" between Muslims and Chri-

stians in Cyprus (Alastos, 1955). In fact, the concept of nationality was meaningless to the Cypriot during the period of Ottoman rule. Even in the 20th century when the Orthodox Christians increasingly began to view themselves as Greeks, the Muslims continued to view themselves as a religious, not as a national group. Furthermore, it is important to stress that before 1955 there was no history of inter-communal conflict in Cyprus. The island had been described as an "ethnographical fruit-cake" in which the Greek and Turkish currants were mixed up in every town and village and almost in every street (Hitchens, 1984). Although political clashes over the future of Cyprus had actually been taking place, the Cypriots never experienced the religious and national struggle of Crete and other Greek islands occupied by the Turkish Imperial armies. Even during the First World War with Britain and Greece on one side, and Turkey on the other, there was no hostility between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots. It was only when the Turks put on British uniforms to oppose a popular movement that they were shot at by the Greeks of Cyprus.

When the Ottoman rule ended in 1878, the Turkish presence in the island formed 18% of the population. At the same time, the Greek presence, stretching back for over 3,000 years, formed 80% of the population.

## II. Divide and Rule : The Process of Ethnic Differentiation

In 1878 the island was ceded to Great Britain as a security for helping the Turks maintain and defend Turkish domination

in Asia against Russia. However, the primary object of Britain taking Cyprus, was its strategic importance (Hill 1952). Great Britain took over Cyprus agreeing that she would hand the island back to Turkey as soon as the Russian threat had abated. From 1878 until 1914, Great Britain ruled on trust for Turkey, but when in 1914 Turkey joined forces with the Central Powers, Cyprus was annexed outright by the British Empire.

Cyprus was held as a colony not so much for its own sake, but so as to guarantee other British colonial dispensations in Egypt, Palestine and India. It was, however, governed as a true Crown colony.

The British rulers enforced a policy of indirect rule. The adoption of policies designed to further the interests of the colonial power inevitably had an impact on the existing social system. Implementing such policies assumed an understanding of the social realities on the island. The gradual transformation of the social system during the early years of British rule presented a series of changes which redefined minor existing differences between the two ethnic groups. During this process, shared culture and values were ignored.

It is important at this point to mention a series of changes that were brought about by the British. The freedoms that were granted to the individual, as well as the promotion of European Culture, and the existence of a British community, strongly influenced the two ethnic groups of Cyprus.

The cities became clean and "tidy", with beautiful government houses and schools, as well as private residences.

Electricity was installed throughout the cities, and roads were constructed. The peasants were educated in ways that promoted cultivation and forestry. Cattle-raising was also promoted. (Zannetos, 1930).

Among the most notable changes was the promotion of commerce. A new middle class of professionals and merchant traders was formed and became a powerful economic element in the country. There was a surplus of scientists (Ibid, 1930).

The Church also showed significant progress. The higher clerics were University graduates, with the opportunity of undertaking post graduate studies in Europe.

In the meantime, the rise of Greek nationalism started to be felt in the island early in the 19th century, with Cyprus' response to the Greek War of Independence. The first formal expression of the desire for Union, "enosis" with Greece, occurred. However, for many years it did not disturb the traditional co-existence between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots. By contrast, there were no signs of the development of a Turkish nationalism in Cyprus.

Economic change and social mobilization during the first decades of British rule, were the preconditions for the intensification of nationalist demands. The penetration of nationalism from the cities to the rural areas through the channels of school, church, political and economic patronage, provided the mass basis for the development of the "enosis" movement, into a powerful political force in Cyprus (Attalides, 1976). When the rural communities were effectively socialized

by Greek nationalism it was a turning point for a mass movement to be created. In addition, new social groups were drawn into politics, and identified with Greek nationalism.

During the period of Ottoman rule, there was no administrative separation of Greek Cypriot from the Turkish Cypriot schools. From the first years of British rule, though a formal educational system was established, but it was divided rather than unified. Two Boards of Education were created, one Greek, the other Ottoman, and control was vested in Athens and Constantinople respectively.

The curricula used from 1878, until 1933, in both the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot schools had not kept pace with developments in the mother countries of the two ethnic communities. This was especially so in the Greek schools, since the Archbishop continued to head the Greek Board of Education. The schools were considered nurseries of the national ideals, and the aims of the Greek state (Spyridakis, 1959) (Anastassiades, 1979). This dual secular school system ensured the development of the political cultures.

This segregation was further reinforced by the political institutions which the British established. In 1882, the British colonial administration established a Legislative Council, where members of the two communities participated. The British administration, in fact, depended on the vote of the Turkish minority to offset the elected votes of the Greek Cypriots. In time, these actions led to the promotion of separate antagonistic nationalities, the Greek and the Turkish.

Since, the British perceived two ethnic groups in the Cyprus, the Legislative Council was similarly constituted with British members being the "balancers" between the presumed antagonistic ethnic representatives.

As the educational values and curricula of the mainlands were transplanted to Cyprus, the two ethnic communities were faced with the historical confrontation of the two nations, that fought their wars of independence against one another (Kitromilides, 1977). In time, the Cypriots came to view themselves just as the British did, separate antagonistic nationalities, Greek and Turk fighting for political power and control over the same territory.

Thus, the British took apolitical religious differences in Cyprus between Muslims and Eastern Orthodox Christians, and through indirect rule politicized them and transformed them into nationalist groups. Thus, the development of a unitary Cypriot nationality was hindered (Pollis, 1979).

Once separate nationalities were formed, and each ethnic group -through British policies- was made to identify with its respective mother country, two reciprocal things happened. Firstly, Greece as a country whose method of nation-building had been a long process of "union" of some of its former territories, asked the British that Cyprus be united with her. This was refused by the British. In turn, the Greek Cypriot community which had suffered from unjust economic measures imposed on it, demanded "enosis" with mother Greece. These demands were strongly rejected and boycotted by the British



rulers (Stephens, 1966), (Kyriakides, 1968), (Pollis, 1979).

In 1931, the Greek Cypriots protested against an imposed tax increase. The economic crisis was in fact part of the economic depression which dominated all Europe in the 1920's. An uprising took place and the Legislative Council was abolished. The Greek community suffered severe educational restrictions, the British aiming at the elimination of the "Greekness", which was cultivated in the Greek schools, a system which the British themselves had created. The teaching of history and geography was forbidden, and the flying of the Greek flag was prohibited, up until World War I (Kyriakides, 1968).

Shortly after World War I, and in order to counteract the majority's demands for Union with Greece, the British continued to side with the loyal Turkish minority, thus forming a permanent opposition to the Greek Cypriots.

The use of a minority population in the proping up of colonial rule was not a rare phenomenon. The immediate benefits of this policy of playing one group off against another was to keep ultimate control for oneself, and it was a classic technique of colonial administrations. In the long run, once each ethnic community would be conscious of ethnic differentiation, independence would trigger contests over prospective spoils (Attalides, 1977), (Kitromilides, 1977).

The culmination of the process of ethnic differentiation in the consolidation of structurally and culturally distinct, and often antagonistic communities, deeply conscious of their

attachments, sets the preconditions for ethnic conflict. Ethnic violence is probable once suspicion and antagonism have been created.

As for the Turkish Cypriots, although their leaders had opposed Greek "enosis", their main demand was the continuation of British rule. These protests were often phrased in religious rather than national terms.

### III. British Interests in the Eastern Mediterranean

In the first decade of the 20th century, Cyprus had attracted some slight British attention as a possible strategic post on a projected overland route to the Persian Gulf and India, via the Euphrates Valley. In fact, for Prime Ministers from Disraeli to Harold Wilson, Britain's policy in Cyprus has been a reflection of her general policy in the Near and Middle East and of the role of Turkey in the area (Stephens, 1966). After World War II, British interest in Cyprus became of great importance because of the British withdrawal from Palestine in 1948 and following the disastrous intervention in Egypt over the Suez Canal in 1954. Cyprus became the new British Middle East Headquarters.

At the U.N. Assembly in 1954, Cyprus raised the issue of the form that self-determination would take. This marked the beginning of the internationalization of the Cyprus problem. In these debates, it was revealed that the problem of Cyprus was closely interwoven with the interests of Britain, which were to fulfil her treaty obligations to the Arab states, NATO, Greece, Turkey and the U.N. (General Assembly, 9th Session,

First Committee, 750th Meeting, 1954).

To the British, sovereignty over Cyprus was not only necessary but paramount. Any discussion concerning Cyprus would have to be considered within the broader context of Eastern Mediterranean politics especially within British-Greek-Turkish relations.

Turkey too, was becoming of increasing importance in British as well as American plans for the Middle East. The U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles wanted an American-backed alliance between Turkey, Iran and Pakistan to close the gap, in the ring of containment around Russia. Apart from preventing Russian penetration, Turkey was also helping preserve British oil interests in the Middle East.

Anthony Eden seized the opportunity to combine the American and the British concepts by encouraging the creation of the Baghdad Pact, signed in 1955. Turkey played a leading role in this Pact. Turkey assumed a tremendous political and military significance in the eyes of the British government. The British policy began to show signs of going back to the original idea which had inspired the Cyprus Convention, protection of, and support for, Turkey as the shield for British interests in the Middle East, that is, in the Persian Gulf. Eden was to write later in respect of Cyprus "I regarded our Alliance with Turkey as the first consideration in our policy in that part of the world" (Eden, 1960, p.414). Elsewhere of Cyprus : "First came the strategic value of the island. Our military advisers regarded it as an essential staging post for

the maintenance of our position in the Middle East, including the Persian Gulf" (Parliamentary Debates-Commons, 1955-1956, VOL.550, p.403-419).

As Stephens notes "Yet if imperialism consists of one people's ruling against the latter's will for the sake of the former's strategic or economic interests, then there never was a more clear cut case of it than Cyprus (Stephens, 1966, p.139). Anthony Eden had announced in the House of Commons : "...Our duty if called on... is to safeguard the strategic needs of our country and of our ally (Turkey). Neither the NATO obligations...nor the Baghdad Pact, nor any agreement in the Middle Eastern area of the Persian Gulf, or anything else, none of these can be speedily and effectively carried out today unless we have the assured and unfettered use of bases and the use of facilities in Cyprus". (Parliamentary Debates-Commons, 1955-1956, VOL.550, p.403-419).

The Anglo-Turkish partnership that had been formed, encouraged and welcomed Turkish involvement in the Cyprus dispute. Turkey's interest in Cyprus had not been expressed yet, since Britain maintained power over the island. In 1951 the Turkish Foreign Minister had observed that if there was to be a change in the status of Cyprus, Turkey should participate in order to safeguard its interests (World Opinion on Cyprus, 1958). (Attalides, 1979). These interests were expressed in the 1954 U.N.debate where opposition to the self-determination of Cyprus was declared on the grounds that the status of Cyprus was important for the defence of Southern Turkey and of the

Northern Mediterranean in general (General Assembly, op.cit. 1954). Thus Britain stimulated Turkish involvement, in order to counteract the majority's demands for self-determination by suggesting that Turkey had some grounds for claiming that Cyprus should return to her. At a London conference in 1955, Britain invited Turkey to attend as the third interested party in the dispute. Turkish newspaper AUDINLIK, testifies to the fact that with the formation of the Anglo-Turkish partnership the British aimed at inciting trouble between the Greeks and the Turks, in order to justify their position on the island (AUDINLIK, 28-30/3/79).

In the late 1950's, British setbacks in the Middle East, namely the Suez expedition, the Lebanese Civil War and the weakening of the Baghdad Pact, increased Britain's dependence on Turkey and increased Cyprus' importance as an advance British base in the Mediterranean. Moreover, the membership of Great Britain, Greece and Turkey in NATO made the Cyprus dispute more complex. It brought other NATO allies into the dispute and eventually it became a Cold War issue. The British Government indicated that the Cyprus dispute not merely reflected the rival claims of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, but it essentially reflected the national interests of Greece and Turkey and the strategic interests of Britain and NATO as well (Parliamentary Debates-Commons 1955-1956).

There is substantial evidence to suggest that the increasing importance of Turkey as a strategic factor to the United States and Great Britain, resulted in the corresponding weakening of Greece's position within the NATO Alliance. As

Kuniholm stresses, "...if one had to rank the strategic importance of Turkey and Greece, geography and sheer numbers would give Turkey priority. This was true in the early 50's and it is even more true today" (Kuniholm, Orbis, '83).

#### IV. The Anti-Colonial Struggle

In 1954, the British Minister of State for the Colonies, Hopkinson, announced in the House of Commons with respect to Cyprus : "There are certain territories in the Commonwealth which, owing to their particular circumstances, can never expect to be fully independent" (Parliamentary Debates-Commons 1955-1956).

This statement triggered opposition by the Greek Cypriot side. Once the British divide-and-rule policy provided the basis for the development of dual nationalisms and once their divisive policies and the cultivation of ethnic differentiation had succeeded in creating revalry between the two ethnic groups of Cyprus, the Cypriots became fertile ground for Greek and Turkish propaganda. By 1955, the rise of EOKA, a terrorist organization which attacked the British for the purpose of achieving union with Greece, further polarized the two communities. The movement as such did not antagonize the Turkish Cypriots. However, the British began to employ Turkish Cypriots in the island's police and auxiliary forces, thus making them a target for terrorists, and dependent on the British for protection. The British, trained an exclusively Turkish mobile reserve to combat EOKA. It was at that time

that the Turkish Cypriot community acquired a Turkish identity, coupled by the fact that during the same period Britain brought Turkey into the negotiations for the independence of Cyprus as an interested party. The first true inter-ethnic conflict between the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus took place in 1957, when Volkan, a Turkish terrorist group was organized to combat EOKA. It is noteworthy that in 1955, Dr. Kuchuk was allowed to organize, with the declared help of a Turkish national, a political party with the name "Cyprus is Turkish Party". This was at a time when all Greek political parties were banned, and Britain claimed exclusive sovereignty over the island (Pollis, 1979), (Hitchens, 1984).

With British encouragement and systematic direction from mainland Turkey throughout the period, Volkan managed to bring the entire Turkish Cypriot community into its grip. This triumph of extremist policy by the Turkish Cypriots, failed to be achieved by the extremist elements of EOKA, the Greek Cypriot fighters. Moreover, though the Turkish Cypriot terrorist group Volkan was founded in 1955 and carried out many lethal attacks on civilians very few members of it were ever tried, or punished by the British Crown. In contrast, numerous supporters of the Greek Cypriot EOKA were hanged, and hundreds more imprisoned.

Ethnic antagonism was strengthened further by the support of Greece and Turkey for their ethnic communities in Cyprus. (Daily Herald : 11-7-1958), (Tribune 13-6-1958), (The Observer, 13-7-1958).

The pro-Turkish British policy gave birth to a series of constitutional proposals that favoured the Turkish minority of Cyprus, thus weakening the position of the Greek Cypriot majority. The Turkish newspaper Audinlik confirms this fact, in an article published on 31-3-79.

In 1956, Lord Radcliffe presented a constitution for limited self-government, which he had drawn up. These proposals favoured the Greek majority, giving them the representation in government that was in accordance with their numerical superiority in the total population. At that time, Archbishop Makarios, leader of the Greek Cypriot political groups, was exiled by the British to the Seychelles, because of the earlier break-up of the negotiations, between the rulers and the Greek Cypriots. Mr. Lennox-Boyd, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, revealed the proposals to Parliament, adding the assurance that if they were adopted and worked well over a period of years, the Government would then consider self-determination. To this he added that, if the Greek Cypriot demands for self-determination continued to be identified with union with Greece, the Turks of Cyprus would also have the right of union with Turkey (Parliamentary Debates-Commons-1956). Thus, the idea of partition, which was to become the official Turkish policy and has remained unchanged until now, was officially born and offered to the Turks as an alternative solution which would satisfy their demands. There is some evidence that the public floating of the partition idea was the result of a policy agreed between the British and Turkish governments at a meeting in Ankara (Foley, 1964). A few months later, it was put forward



in the House of Commons.

Naturally, the Greek Cypriots turned down the plan, over fears of partition, and a great opportunity was lost for the Greek Cypriots, which in time might have solved the Cyprus Question to their advantage. In such an environment of distrust and suspicion, however, and with the Greek Cypriot leader Makarios in exile the responsibility of the failure fell heavy on the shoulders of the British Government.

Throughout the following year, until the beginning of the Greco-Turkish talks at the end of 1958, which led to the Zurich and London agreements, it was Turkey who dictated the course of diplomacy over Cyprus, while the British and the Greek Cypriots were fighting each other on the island. The intention of the Turks was to block any deal between Britain and the Greek Cypriots, which would open the door to self-determination (Tribune, 16-9-1955), (The Manchester Guardian, 23-11-1955), (The Spectator, 13-7-1956).

In 1957, the new Governor of Cyprus, Sir Hugh Foot, arrived in Cyprus and began to prepare the ground for new negotiations. The violence between the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots and the British rulers was at its peak. Foot proposed that Cyprus had the right to be given an opportunity for self-determination. If the majority wanted union with Greece, Turkey had to agree to it. However, this was rejected by the British Cabinet. They cautioned that Turkey was a cardinal factor in the defence of the West, and if Turkey was offended, it could lapse into neutrality (Foley, 1962).

The last constitutional proposal was the MacMillan Plan of 1957. This plan provided for a limited self-government. The country would be run by a council headed by a British Governor with representatives from Greece, Turkey and Cypriots of both communities. Defence, internal security and foreign affairs would be run by the British. In each town, there would be separate municipalities for Greek and Turkish residents.

The Greek government together with Greek Cypriot leaders rejected the plan. They cautioned that the MacMillan Plan was imposing a triple condominium and it was aiming at partition. With regards to the plan, Harold MacMillan himself, wrote : "Could the solution devised by Solomon in a similar predicament now be proposed as an acceptable escape of our difficulties? Or could its threat perhaps bring the contenders to a sense of reality? If partition became a practical answer, we need only be concerned about the future of the military base and installations, so necessary both for the protection of our interests in the Middle East and for the support of the right flank of NATO". And elsewhere : "Although for my part, I disliked the idea of dividing so small an area into two separate nations with the usual frontier troubles and with the obvious economic disadvantages, I began however, reluctantly, to feel in my own mind that perhaps partition will be the only way out" (Mac Millan, 1971, my emphasis).

This new plan provided for the delineation of British military enclaves where full British sovereignty would be retained, while the rest of the island would be ruled by a condominium of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey with

sovereignty held in partnership (Mac Millan, 1971).

In the British parliament, the plan was strongly criticized by the Labour Party. Some excerpts from the debates in the House of Commons reveal the Labour Party's opposition to the MacMillan Plan : "What does that imply about the constitution? It is that it achieves the object of holding the two communities so much apart that they will require the British to keep law and order on the island. Therefore, the Tories who say that they have diagnosed correctly what the ultimate effect of the constitution will be and they are supporting the constitution, not because they want to see a settlement, but because it holds the two communities apart and that will be an excuse for us to stay on the island" : Mr. R.H.S. Crossman (World Opinion on Cyprus, 1958, p.81).

And, "...It envisages a total separation of responsibilities for administration and government in the two communities. In my view, this plan was correctly described by The Times as a form of non-territorial partition in itself. I should say that it makes self-determination virtually impossible and partition of the island, almost inevitable" : Mr. Kenneth Robinson (World Opinion on Cyprus, 1958, p.81-82).

And again, "The danger of the plan -and I am sure that the Colonial Secretary must have seen this in preparing it- is that it will encourage both communities in the island to look almost exclusively to the representatives from Ankara and Athens. There is no unity that way" : Mr. James Callaghan (World Opinion on Cyprus, 1958, p.85).

Finally, "I hope that the ultimate idea is unity and not partition. But we have seen elsewhere how very difficult it is to achieve integration after a long period of segregation; and you are proposing to enforce this segregation after centuries of peaceful integration" : Lord Winster (World Opinion on Cyprus, 1958, p.87).

These views proved to be of great importance in the later political history of Cyprus, for, as will be indicated in the following pages, they became self-fulfilling prophecies.

In sum, it was felt by the British opposition, that the MacMillan Plan aimed at perpetuating British rule by deepening the gap between the Greek and the Turkish Community. In Cyprus, the reaction was an increase in violence.

In the same year, MacMillan revised his plan and announced it to the interested parties. The modifications were minor. The representatives from Greece and Turkey would now sit in the Governor's council with the Cypriots, but they would be there to advise them. The revised plan was still unacceptable to the Greek Cypriot leader Archbishop Makarios, and to Greece : A few months later, the Turkish government announced it would co-operate with the British in implementing the plan, which was reconciliable with partition (Foley, 1964). Lord Radcliffe, strongly opposing this decision declared that a division of Cyprus would have been impossible since there was no physical division between the two communities, which were scattered indistinguishably over the island. There was no room to manoeuvre in Cyprus such as there had been in India and Ireland.

(Journal of the Royal Empire Society-Jan.-Feb., 1958).

#### V. The New Constitution

In 1958, the British military had decided that it didn't need all of Cyprus as a base but simply bases in Cyprus. Once it was announced that the MacMillan Plan was to be enforced with Turkish co-operation alone, it was agreed that the Turkish Representative would arrive on October 1, 1958.

The MacMillan Plan had several attractions for the Turkish Cypriots and for Turkey. It provided no central legislature which could be controlled by a Greek majority. On the contrary, its provision of separate communal assemblies and the later addition of separate municipalities provided useful stepping-stones to partition, should it need to be pursued in the future. (Stephens, 1966) (Hitchens, 1984).

At the end of the same year, the fear over the possibility that the British would withdraw to their bases, and let Turkey invade and allow de facto partition of Cyprus, had a strong impact on the Greek government and the Greek Cypriot leader, Makarios. Additional pressures by the United States for a solution in order to avoid weakening the south-eastern flank of the NATO Alliance, made the Greek Government agree to negotiate over Cyprus with Turkey. The Greek Foreign Minister agreed with his Turkish opposite to a solution based on the future independence of Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot leaders were

obliged to make the necessary concessions and retreat from their position of non-acceptance of the revised MacMillan proposals, in view of the approaching danger of Turkish partition demands.

The five interested parties, that is, Greece, Turkey, Great Britain, the Greek Cypriot leader, Makarios, and, the Turkish Cypriot leaders, at two conferences in London and Zurich, signed an agreement for a new constitution for Cyprus, based on the revised MacMillan Plan.

In the 1960 Constitutional agreements of London and Zurich, disproportionate guarantees were given in favour of the Turkish minority, which comprised 18% of the total population, against the Greek-speaking majority of Cyprus. Furthermore, the constitution itself contained the seed of partition within it. It continued the British colonial practice of creating separate categories of citizenship -now designated as Greek and Turkish instead of the traditional "Muslim" and "non-Muslim".

Some of the significant constitutional provisions were :

1. Separate municipalities were provided for at a ratio of 60% Greek representation to a 40% Turkish representation. Greeks and Turks were to have separate local elections.

2. Civil Service and Police posts were to be shared at a ratio of 70% Greek representation and 30% Turkish.

3. The Army ratio was fixed at a 60%-40%.

4. A 70%-30% ratio was to obtain in the House of Representatives and the Cabinet. The Turkish Vice President of the Republic carried with him the right of veto. A "separate

majority" provision on matters concerning tax and the electoral law gave the Turkish Cypriot minority an additional right of veto in the House of Representatives. There, separate majorities of Greek and Turkish members were required to modify fiscal, electoral, or municipal laws. This meant that a bill supported by thirty five Greek and seven Turkish members could be defeated by eight Turkish votes. Little wonder that this constitutional disequilibrium had negative effects on Cyprus. (Stephens, 1966), (Kyriakides, 1968), (Kuniholm, Orbis, 1983).

#### VI. U.S. Interests in Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean

In the years 1945-1959, a parallel can be drawn between American interests in Cyprus and American interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.

The internationalization of the Cyprus problem, hurt American interests in a number of ways :

- 1) It threatened the cohesion of the new-born Western Alliance, only two years after the entry of Greece and Turkey into it.
- 2) It threatened to dissolve the Balkan Pact, an alliance signed in 1954 between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia, against the Soviet Balkan countries. The support that Yugoslavia was giving to the Greek demands automatically excluded Turkey from the alliance.
- 3) It hindered Greek political and military co-operation with the United States.
- 4) It threatened to lead Greece and Turkey into an open military

confrontation. Such a Turkish-Greek confrontation would break the NATO defense system on its southern flank, and would invite Soviet involvement in the area.

5) The Cyprus Question had a serious impact, and threatened to alter the internal political situation of Greece, which had been carefully constructed in accordance with the Truman Doctrine by the Americans after the Civil War.

6) The dispute created problems in the United Nations and provided ground for Soviet propaganda.

7) There was AKEL, the Communist Party of Cyprus, which was well organized and supported by a wide section of the population.

(Coufoudakis, 1977), (Attalides, 1979).

The broader U.S. interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East were the following. From 1945, the major goal for the Americans was to prevent Soviet expansion in the Southern Balkans and the Northern Middle East. Until 1954, the U.S. had successfully defended their interests in these regions. In view of new situations, that is British withdrawal from the region, the continuing Arab-Israeli dispute, the Soviet penetration of Egypt and the Eastern Mediterranean, the threat of neutrality and the rise of nationalism among the Arab states, as well as the need to secure the routes and resources of Middle Eastern Oil, the Cyprus dispute was seen as hurting this balance of power. The dispute was preventing the U.S. and Great Britain from using Cyprus as a base for joint action in the area. Furthermore, it undermined the idea of containment against the Soviet Union (Coufoudakis, 1977), (Attalides, 1979).



As Harry Magdoff maintains, after the Second World War, the expansion of the socialist world intensifies the urgency to save as much as possible of the declining imperialist network. The post-Second World War era marks the new role of the United States as leader of the World System and main provider of aid and military assistance (Magdoff, 1966, 1978).

In 1953, the U.S. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, presented his idea of forming an organization as an anti-communist barrier of Muslim nations that extended between the Soviet Union and the Middle East. This agreement was signed in 1955, and named the "Baghdad Pact". The Americans called the tune of the Baghdad Pact, in which they were members only in name. With the signing of the Pact the importance of Turkey became paramount for the national security of the U.S. Thus, the dilemma that the Cyprus Question was presenting for the U.S. was to solve the problem in such a way as to keep its two NATO allies -Greece and Turkey- satisfied, and within the sphere of NATO (Stephens, 1966) (Coufoudakis, 1977).

As early as 1953, U.S. diplomacy started taking an active role in the Cyprus problem, thus stepping into Britain's shoes. The line of divergence between the British and the United States policy was becoming clear. Britain was mainly interested in the Middle East's oil resources, and was devoting her whole attention to Turkey as an ally and opposing Greek claims on Cyprus, while the Americans were interested in the unity between its allies, and with providing mutual defense arrangements between Greece and Turkey (Stephens, 1966). However, since Turkey became the only country in the Eastern Mediterranean

capable of substantial resistance to the Soviets, and the most significant in defending the Middle East and the Persian Gulf against Soviet attacks, Greece was the country where all the pressures were concentrated, in order to speed up the resolution of the dispute (Kuniholm, Orbis, 1983).

United States interests to make Cyprus available to NATO were known as early as 1957, when Dulles presented his plan for Cyprus at a NATO conference. Cyprus would become part of NATO and would be ruled by three commissioners. Internally, it would have some degree of self-government.

Even before independence, Archbishop, later President Makarios had declared his intentions to seek support for the struggle of independence, "from East and West". After independence, Makarios' scope for non-alignment became greater. He was determined to move his country away from an alliance where Turkey carried such weight.

Following independence Cypriot foreign policy was seen by the U.S. as hurting its interests in a number of ways :

- 1) Instead of forming an anti-communist barrier with Greece and Turkey, Cyprus gave the local communists a respectable political role, including seats in the House of Representatives.
- 2) The Cyprus Government had also signed a series of Treaties with the Soviet Union.
- 3) Furthermore, Makarios attended a series of conferences of the non-aligned nations, and developed close relations with socialist , as well as, Arab leaders, like Tito of Yugoslavia and

Nasser of Egypt.

In 1963, at an Afro-Asian conference held in Nikosia, Makarios reaffirmed his intention to reject all military alliances. Even at the times of crises, like the 1963 conflict a little later he appealed for assistance to Greece, the Soviet Union, Egypt, and the United Nations, thus rejecting any NATO mediation (Attalides, 1979).

John Foster Dulles shared, along with his British colleagues, the contention that Turkey had interests equal to Greece's in the future of the island and that a solution was to be found through Greco-Turkish talks, but limited within the scope of the Western Alliance. The Greek Government, in perfect loyalty with the aspirations of the Greek Cypriots, wanted to seek a solution through the United Nations. This was consistently, covertly, boycotted by the U.S. diplomacy, in a number of ways. Some examples are :

- 1) Blocking the General Assembly's agenda.
- 2) Supporting neutral and negative resolutions
- 3) Supporting resolutions that were openly opposed to Greece (Coufoudakis, 1977), (Xydis, 1967).

The Zurich and London agreements that became the basis for the Constitution of Cyprus, were approved and guided in their design by U.S. diplomacy.

## VII. Constitutional Crises and Ethnic Conflict

According to the Zurich agreement which was part of the constitutional settlement, the Turkish Cypriots, who were earlier an insignificant political quantity, had suddenly acquired an altogether disproportionate importance. When the British left Cyprus, the proportion of Turkish Cypriots in the various grades of the Civil Service starting with the most senior grade, were : 26%, 19%, 20%, 18%, 17%, 25%. The proportion of Turkish Cypriots in the population was 18.5%, according to the census of 1960. According to the constitutional settlement, the proportion at all levels had to be raised to 30% within five months of independence.

The unworkability of the constitution and the disequilibrium of the unequal constitutional guarantees allotted to each community invited friction between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots. Furthermore, it undermined Greco-Turkish relations.

Immediately after Independence fights broke out over the constitutional issue. The 70/30 ratio of representation in the Public Service, the separate municipalities and the division of the army into social units were the major constitutional areas of tension that led to the conflict between the two ethnic groups (Foley, 1964), (Kyriakides, 1968), (Attalides, 1979).

The simplest conflicts had to do with the allocation of jobs and economic resources. The Civil Service was already well staffed by tenured people. Two thousand Civil Service appointments were appealed against in the Supreme Court between 1960

and 1963. The Greek Cypriots looked upon this provision of the constitution as causing the Greek Cypriot community a "loss of jobs" and furthermore, causing hardship to the Greek public servants in a discriminatory way. They complained as well that there were not enough qualified Turks to fill the posts. This problem as it developed, reminded each young civil servant that he and his community were in competition with the other community for these appointments. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots looked upon the implementation of this provision as essential to secure for the Turkish community adequate representation in all spheres of government activity (Kyriakides, 1968) (Attalides, 1979). The case went to the Supreme Court. Neither the Court nor the Public Service Commission was able to find a solution which would satisfy both sides.

The separate Majority Vote created a new crisis in the area of Income Tax Law and contributed to the Constitutional breakdown. The inability to agree on the tax legislation left the Government without legal authorization to collect taxes. Both communities reverted to their Communal Chambers in order to pass separate Income Tax laws. This action dramatized the importance of the Communal Chambers and placed the two communities further apart from each other.

One of the most bitter battles, however, proved to be the Army deadlock. This was due to the veto granted to the President and Vice President, according to Article 50 of the Constitution. The provisions for the establishment of the Army were not clear

to the two communities. The issue was, whether the Army would be formed on a separate or a mixed basis. The Council of Ministers on the one hand, decided to form the Army on a mixed basis at a 60%/40% ratio of representation according to the Article 129 of the Constitution. The Vice President however, insisted on separation in accordance with the very same article. The Army deadlock was never solved, since the decisions were continually vetoed, alternatively by the President and the Turkish Vice President.

The separate Municipalities provision was probably the greatest source of trouble in the 1960 Constitution. Under British rule there existed in Cyprus unified Municipalities. In 1958, during the anti-colonial struggle, however, the Turkish Cypriots established separate municipalities. In 1959, the British Colonial Administration gave "de jure" recognition to the Turkish Cypriot municipalities. The 1960 Constitution (Article 188), provided for the President and the Vice President to come to a compromise solution with regards to the municipalities. The proposals that the Greek side drafted on the issue provided for unified municipalities, over fears of geographical partition. Naturally, they were rejected by the Turkish Vice President. The case went to the Supreme Court which had no power to solve the issue.

The two ethnic groups of Cyprus formed themselves into two opposing groups with fixed positions toward the 1960 Constitution, were unable to function within this constitutional

framework.

The Greek Cypriots felt that they had set aside their aspiration of "enosis", only to gain less than proportional representation while contributing more heavily to the country's economy. The Turkish Cypriots, arguing that implementing the provisions of the 1960 Constitution was the only way to cope with the majority, remained extremely suspicious of any suggestions to change the constitutional status quo. For the Greek Cypriots, this uncompromising attitude to implement all the separatist provisions of the Constitution, was felt to be motivated by a desire to promote partition.

Additionally, different Cold War alignments by the leaders of the two communities deepened the gap and increased the conflict. The Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee meant that four sovereign states were now involved in the island. However, the President of Cyprus Makarios, was opposed to any NATO intervention or mediation efforts in the affairs of Cyprus, contrary to the Turkish side which was accusing the President of allowing Communist infiltration in Cyprus, because of his policy of non-alignment (Kyriakides, 1968), (Attalides, 1979).

As a way out of the deadlocks of the Constitution, the Greek Cypriots began to talk of "removing the negative elements" from the Constitution. In December 1963, Makarios informed the British, Greek and Turkish governments that he intended to amend the Constitution. He proposed a 13 point amendment which provided for unified town councils, a unified army, and, the abolition of the 70/30 ratio of representation in the Public Service.

These were rejected by the Turkish Government. Makarios in turn, rejected the Turkish rejection.

The tension that the Constitution had created and the deep frustration and separation that had estranged and made the two communities hostile to one another, led to a violent conflict between them, and Greece and Turkey came to the brink of war over Cyprus.

In the middle of all these difficulties, the extremist groups were able to begin action. "Secret armies" had been organized by the extremists on both sides. The Turkish Cypriots were determined to prevent any Greek Cypriot attempts to bring about extra-constitutional solutions to the deadlocks. The Greek Cypriots were preparing to stop the partitioning of the island and eventual intervention by Turkey.

Once confrontation began during this crisis, the Turkish forces, both local and non-Cypriot, attempted to establish permanent positions. These strongholds were mainly positions which commanded crucial roads or communications and were not within areas where Turkish civilians lived. A Turkish enclave was established on the northern coast, a fact that deeply alarmed the Greek Cypriots who feared the idea of opening a salient within easy reach of mainland Turkey (Hitchens, 1984).

The "Green Line" separated the Greek from the Turkish sectors of Nicosia. All Turkish Cypriot civil servants remained in the Turkish sector and neither the President, nor the Ministers and House Members participated in the government. Physical



separation of the two communities in a mixed society was now becoming a reality. The outlines of true geographical partition were slowly making their appearance, as well.

Meanwhile, in 1964, Turkey threatened to intervene militarily in Cyprus. U.S. President Johnson, concerned about the effects of a crisis on the southern flank of NATO, prevented the operation after a strong letter to Inonu, the Prime Minister of Turkey, informing him that the U.S. would not assist Turkey in the event of crisis with the Soviet bloc (Kuniholm, Orbis, 1983). Instead, Turkish jets flew low over Cyprus and bombarded several villages.

#### VIII. The Increase of External Involvement and the 1974 Crisis

The increase of external involvement in the affairs of Cyprus during the 1963-1964 crisis revealed the importance of Cyprus in the international power politics scene. Cyprus had become the centre of attention for NATO and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was at one time supporting Cyprus against NATO intervention. For the West, naturally the major issue was the cohesion of the NATO alliance. Cyprus thus, as a non-aligned country became the centre of contradictory policies on the part of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. On some occasions the U.S. strengthened the independence of Cyprus if this was necessary to prevent a Greek-Turkish conflict. On some occasions the Soviet Union overlooked threats to the independence and non-alignment of Cyprus if there was a possibility of detaching one of the allies from the alliance (Attalides, 1979),

(Kuniholm, Orbis, Sum. 1983).

Initially Great Britain as a Guarantor Power, took the part of playing the role of the peace-keeper and was encouraged and supported in this role by the U.S. The Anglo-American efforts toward a political solution to the problem were centred upon providing a plan which would bring Cyprus under NATO control. In 1964, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs Duncan Sandys proposed giving NATO countries a greater role in peace-keeping operations in Cyprus. President Makarios rejected the plan insisting that the 10.000 peace-keeping force in question, be selected by the U.N. Security Council.

The failure of the British plan persuaded the U.S. to take a more active role in the problem of safeguarding U.S. interests within NATO. Under-Secretary of State George Ball, flew to London in order to assist in formulating a plan for Cyprus. Ball revived the original British plan to include European troops (as peace-keeping forces), from countries outside NATO. But again, the peace-keeping force would not be controlled in essence by the U.N. and Makarios rejected it. The Soviet Union gave full support to Makarios' decision. The Greek Government of George Papandreou had accepted the plan, under heavy pressures from U.S. President Johnson, who warned Greece that the U.S. would not get involved in the event of a new Greco-Turkish confrontation over Cyprus, in which Greece was bound to be the loser. (Cyprus, Public Information Office, Cyprus...: The Problem in Perspective, Nicosia, 1969).

The problem for the U.S. was as follows. On the one hand, with a fully independent Cyprus the strategic interests of NATO

were in danger. On the other hand, if either Greece or Turkey intervened militarily, NATO cohesion would be threatened. The first problem could be solved by ending the independence of Cyprus and the second, by making the form of the termination the subject of agreement and territorial adjustment between Greece and Turkey. Since Greece had the upper hand because of her troops, Greece had to be convinced to accept partition under the guise of "union with Greece" (Attalides, 1979), (Kuniholm, Orbis, 1983).

The new U.S. plan designed for the future of Cyprus was presented by Dean Acheson. The basic idea was to declare union with Greece while ceding to Turkey :

- 1) a large base in the Northern Karpasia area,
- 2) three cantons with some form of local autonomy
- 3) the Greek Aegean island of Kastellorizon.

Both Greece and the Greek Cypriots rejected the plan as unacceptable, indicating that this was another form of "double Enosis" or partition. For the U.S., the Acheson solution meant :

- 1) Giving both NATO allies a slice of Cyprus which would end the quarrel and terminate the threat of the cohesion of NATO,
- 2) Makarios, the radical supporter of non-alignment would be neutralized,
- 3) the Republic would fall within the circle of NATO as a strategic base in the Eastern Mediterranean (Foley, 1964), (Kyriakides, 1968), (Attalides, 1979), (Hitchens, 1983).

Although the plan was rejected, the political consequences of the Acheson proposal were enormous. On the one hand, the events in Cyprus created great tension between the relations of

the Cypriot government and the Greek government. This led to the weakening of the last parliamentary democracy in Greece. Finally, this created tension between Makarios of Cyprus and General Grivas of Greece (Coufoudakis, 1977).

An event connected with the Acheson Plan was that while Acheson was trying to gain approval of his plan from the Greek Government, George Ball was trying to manipulate the conflict between Makarios and General Grivas (Weintal and Bartlett, 1967). General Grivas, a fanatical anti-communist ex-EOKA fighter, was to return in Cyprus with the encouragement of "western diplomatic circles", to command Greek troops and to help check pro-communist feeling in Cyprus. He was backed by U.S. Intelligence. In his secret meeting with Grivas, Ball gained the General's approval for a plan that provided for "Enosis" of Cyprus with Greece, and at the same time the ceding of bases to Turkey and to NATO. In this way, the major obstacle to these, Makarios, would be removed (Weintal and Bartlett, 1967).

Makarios protested against the involvement of Grivas and the stationing of Greek troops in Cyprus (The Economist, July 4, 1964). Two years later, Grivas was accused of having launched attacks on Turkish villages.

In 1964, Makarios negotiated an agreement with the Soviet Union for anti-aircraft weapons to strengthen Cyprus' defences against future Turkish air-attacks (The Economist, August 22, 1964). At the same time the Soviet Union began to use the Cyprus dispute to lure Turkey away from NATO. Turkey, which was offended, due to Johnsons's intervention to prevent an

invasion of Cyprus, was eventually able to get Soviet support for an "independent and federated Cyprus" (Kyriakides, 1968).

One thing was certain at this point, that the attempts to enforce and preserve peace through NATO mediations, had failed. Since there were no other alternative solutions to the problem, the U.S. and Britain finally accepted the idea of assistance from the U.N. The Security Council resolution provided for both the placing of a U.N. peace-keeping force in Cyprus, and of a mediator, in order to reconcile the two sides and find, through bilateral talks, the basis which would replace the 1959 constitutional agreements.

The U.N. mediation efforts toward a political solution of the problem met with little success. Despite this fact, U.N. mediation continued to be effective for a period of 10 years. The mediator, Galo Plaza, undertook a comprehensive study of the situation in Cyprus. He commented that all solutions that the U.S. had pursued in the previous years were not applicable to the Cypriot reality. He rejected any idea of partition or federation for obvious political, economic and social reasons. He indicated the urgency for Cyprus to become a demilitarized zone, a "fully independent" state, under the rule of the majority, thus rejecting the constitutional agreements.

Naturally, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots rejected Plaza's Report (U.N. Security Council, S/6253, 26-3-65). As a result Galo Plaza resigned as U.N. mediator. Any other efforts of mediation undertaken by Representatives of the Secretary-General, were undermined by parallel mediation efforts of American and

NATO representatives. This period of U.N. mediation was anything but "harmful" to U.S. interests in Cyprus. In fact, U.S. policy was relaxed, assured by the fact that the possibility of a direct Greco-Turkish conflict was weakening.

At a local level, however, the tension in Cyprus heightened, thus strengthening the possibility of a direct confrontation between Greece and Turkey. Armed irregulars from both Cypriot communities, plus infiltration of military personnel from Greece and Turkey constantly increased the threat of violence.

In 1967 new battles took place, after Grivas the right-wing extremist launched attacks on Turkish villages. Turkey, issued an ultimatum to Greece and mobilized for an invasion of the island. The United States, with Cyrus Vance as a mediator, once again prevented the war, which would have probably involved the Soviet Union. Since Greece was this time responsible for the Cypriot troubles, she made all the major concessions. Grivas, as well as the Greek troops were withdrawn, thus weakening Cyprus' defensive capabilities.

The continued stalemate on Cyprus, in conjunction with the Soviet-Turkish rapprochement and the inability of the U.N. to solve the problem, led to increasing Turkish pressures for bilateral talks with Greece. The prospects of a dialogue took a new turn for the worse after the April 1967 military coup in Athens. The most serious change was the permanent clash between the Cypriot Government and the Government in Athens. The military junta was ideologically in complete opposition to Makarios' liberal, non-aligned policy. The new military regime,

isolated both at home and abroad wanted desperately, for reasons of prestige to resolve the Cyprus Problem, a problem that for years had haunted both Greek and international politics. At a secret meeting at Evros, Greece offered Turkey -without the consent of the Cypriots- a large military base on Cyprus, in return for union of the island with Greece. Turkey, wanting more concessions on the part of the Greeks, rejected the plan (Kyriakides, 1968).

In such an environment of mistrust as this, the psychological repercussions in each community were enormous. The Turkish Cypriots felt they could not live with the Greeks, unless they were physically separated. The Greek Cypriots believed the Turks were purposely trying to promote partition, through physical separation of the two communities.

The worsening of the relations between Athens and Nicosia continued after the 1967 Greco-Turkish confrontation over Cyprus. In 1968, there was an attempted assassination of the Greek dictator Papadopoulos, in which two leading Cypriots had been implicated by Athens (Coufoudakis, 1977).

After the 1967 confrontation, the general policy emphasis of the U.S. State Department shifted to supporting Cypriot independence, through the process of inter-communal negotiations. Makarios, however, remained for the U.S. a disturbing factor to the solution of the Cyprus dispute.

Beginning in 1970, the Greek Colonels began a sustained campaign against Makarios which failed, following the trial and heavy convictions which fell on the shoulders of the Greek

officers sent over to Cyprus by the Greek junta. These officers were secretly training, arming and forming a terrorist organization to overthrow Makarios (Hitchens, 1984). "Der Spiegel" in the Spring of 1970, revealed a secret plan designed by Greek officers to firstly, overthrow Makarios with the assistance of the Cypriot National Guard and then to partition Cyprus with Turkey. The notorious Colonel Ioannides, was the author of this plan.

The involvement of the United States and the CIA in the Greek military coup in Athens and the period of subversion and terror (1970-74) in Cyprus, is beyond the scope of this study. It is sufficient to mention though that a major task of U.S. foreign policy was its determination to solve the Cyprus problem, in a way consistent with perceived American interests. An independent non-aligned Cyprus was viewed by the U.S. as a potential threat to U.S. interests, and Makarios had been labelled by the U.S. as the "Castro of the Mediterranean". In fact, the urgency of incorporating Cyprus into NATO became more immediate after the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, and the continuing Middle East crisis (Couloumbis and Hicks, 1975), (Stern, 1977).

Between 1972-1974, EOKA B, a terrorist organization formed to overthrow Makarios and divide the island with Turkey, was causing the greatest trouble to the Cypriot Government. Moreover, this trouble was made worse by the fact that the Cypriot National Guard had been infiltrated by EOKA-B members.

The second military coup in Athens, in 1973, led to a



suspension of the secret Greco-Turkish talks on Cyprus. Colonel Ioannides became the most influential man in the last Greek junta.

In 1974, EOKA-B was declared an illegal organization. Makarios sent a letter to President-General Gyzikis of Greece, accusing Athens of complicity both in the activities of EOKA-B, and in efforts to assassinate him, the Archbishop. The letter also contained an ultimatum requesting Greece to remove the 1,000 officers from the Cypriot National Guard (Ethnikos Kyrix, July 11-12, 1974).

As early as June 27, both the U.S. Ambassador Henry Tasca and the CIA Station Chief, had reported to Washington that a coup d'état in Nicosia was a real possibility (Bell, Orbis, 1974). However, although the ex-dictator Papadopoulos had similar designs to move against Makarios, these plans were to be implemented along with Turkey. Colonel Ioannides, counting on the United States diplomacy to prevent a possible Turkish invasion, instigated a coup d'état against Makarios. Makarios and his legal Government were replaced with Greek officers known for their dedication in the "enosis" cause. As shown earlier, the Nixon Administration which was well informed about the course of events, however, chose not to stop them (Stern, 1977), (Hitchens, 1984).

This provided the opportunity for Turkey to land troops on Cyprus, thus interpreting rather "broadly" the Treaty of Guarantee. This Turkish response : a large-scale invasion of the island -under the name of a "peace-keeping operation"-

led to Turkish occupation of 40% of the island's soil, forcibly exchanging its population, and thus creating territorial separation between the two communities. In 1983, nine years after the invasion, the Turkish authorities declared the occupied area an independent Turkish state, thus formalizing the 1974 partition (U.N. Yearbook, 1983).

#### IX. The Consequences of Partition

Since 1974, the Turkish military occupation has been the dominant fact of Cyprus. From East to West the island is divided as sharply as Berlin, with 39% of the territory, about 20% of the population and 65% of the productive economy in Turkish hands. About 30,000 Turkish soldiers remain on Cypriot soil, and 25,000 Turkish settlers from the mainland have been brought to fill the posts that the Greek Cypriots left behind when they fled from Turkish occupied Cyprus.

All Greek-speaking Cypriots were expelled from the North while the Turkish Cypriots of the South have been transferred to the North to create the grounds for territorial partition. The demographic structure of the island has been totally altered. Unlike any other situation of divided states, the border of Cyprus may not be crossed for any reason whatsoever by a Cypriot citizen.

Gradually the South of Cyprus, overcrowded by Greek-speaking refugees, started building an economy. The economy has been booming and the South has almost become the prime financial

and business centre for the whole of the Middle East. Most of the tourist trade until 1974 was in the two areas of the North, Famagusta and Kyrenia, now occupied by Turkish troops and part of the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus". Tourist centres have been built in the South which has become a new area of attraction for European and Middle Eastern travellers.

On the other side, the Turkish Cypriot administration is fighting a losing battle to keep the economy afloat. Whole cultivated areas that have fallen into Turkish hands remain abandoned and tourist resorts are like ghost towns. The economy of Northern Cyprus is heavily dependent on Turkey. The Turkish Cypriot authoritarian leadership is blaming this economic defeat on the "economic blockade" imposed by the Greek Cypriot government. Indeed, occupied parts of Cyprus have been declared closed to navigation by the officially recognized Cypriot Government. Ships that visit northern parts are blacklisted and their master is liable for prosecution if his ship calls later at a government controlled port.

The inter-communal talks that have been initiated between the two Cypriot sectors, under the auspices of the United Nations, have stalled on several major points. The Turkish Cypriot President of the Federated State promotes the notion of a "confederation". This consists of a nation with two quasi-independent states with two economic policies, two foreign policies and, internal boundaries which citizens may not cross without internal passports. He is prepared to reduce the Turkish held territory. However, the stumbling block to agreement

remains the Turkish insistence on equal status for the two communities, with equal rights to mineral resources, air space and freedom to enter close relations with the respective mother countries.

The Greek Cypriots are willing to make some major concessions, without however abandoning their demand for immediate removal of foreign armies from Cypriot soil. Additionally, they push for the possibility of allowing 12,000-30,000 Greek Cypriots to return to the northern town of Varosha, reoccupy their homes and operate their hotels and businesses.

What the sources cited in this chapter reveal is that ethnic differentiation between the two ethnic communities of Cyprus began at the point where British administrative practices combined with nationalist influences from Greece and Turkey. An additional system of external links provided the basis from which power politics in the area can be easily felt in Cyprus.

## CHAPTER TWO

### INTERNAL FORCES AND THE CYPRUS CONFLICT

The previous chapter presented an historical overview of the Cyprus problem.

It is the task of Chapter 2 to examine domestic developments in order to appreciate fully the effects and real "gravity" of the external influences and interventions in the island's affairs. The indigenous forces to be discussed constitute the basis on which the external forces will be analysed in the following chapters. In order to examine the issue of internal ethnic relations between the two communities of Cyprus, two levels of historical developments will be discussed :

1. Relations of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots, in their everyday life. It is necessary to begin at the point where conflict was absent in the relations of the two communities.
2. Relations between Turkish and Greek Cypriots and their political and social systems with reference to the economic, cultural, religious and military realities, on the island.

It is important to establish whether the relations of the two ethnic communities, with their errors and weaknesses alone, were sufficient to create separation and lead to the present and continuing crisis on Cyprus.

#### I. Everyday Relations of the Cypriots

The overwhelming tenor of the literature of social

scientists, journalists, and political figures who became involved with the Cyprus dispute, or who conducted studies on the spot, leads to the astonishing conclusion that in the everyday social relations of the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus rivalry and distrust were, and are, until recently surprisingly weak. In fact, these very same relations could not have constituted the basis for divisive solutions to the Cyprus problem.

Evidence of peaceful co-existence of the two groups can be traced back to the Ottoman period. During Ottoman rule there took place a substantial number of conversions from Christianity to Islam. As described earlier in this thesis, this explains similarities in patterns of life, other than the religious life of the two ethnic groups.

Until very recently there existed whole villages of Greek-speaking Muslims. Also, various phenomena of dual religious allegiance and religious syncretism had been recorded, on the part of Muslims, and these only disappeared with the development of nationalism.

Perhaps the strongest elements in the traditional co-existence are interdependent patterns of economic and ritual relations. A characteristic of Cypriot society was the "merchant intermediary", through whom the merchandise of the peasant producer was marketed and credit was provided by him to the peasant. This system survived until 1974. Until, then, Greek Cypriot intermediaries were buying goods from Turkish Cypriot peasants (Attalides, 1979).

Another traditional element was share-cropping. By this process, the surplus land of one family was combined with the surplus labour of another family. Share-cropping arrangements between Greek and Turkish Cypriots went on until 1974.

In the area of ritual relations, weddings and coffee-shops were the socializing occasions and places, respectively, that determined the degree of belonging to a given social reality. The importance of the coffee-shop can be demonstrated by the fact that coffee-shop owners with political allegiances with the left or right, have separate coffee-shops in Cyprus, which only people of their own political ideology frequent. Until 1974, Greeks and Turks in Cyprus sat together in the same coffee-shops.

At weddings, the Greek Cypriot family would place a large candle in the Mosque of the Turkish village, which meant an open invitation to all their Turkish neighbours (Attalides, 1979).

It has been recorded that even when the Greek and the Turkish sectors of Cyprus had turned into battle-fields and its inhabitants had to undergo repeated exchanges of population, in mixed villages, Turkish and Greek Cypriots could still be seen living peacefully together.

In a survey carried out by Stanley Kyriakides, immediately after the 1964 crisis, it was shown that inter-communal relations were significantly better in the rural areas than in the towns, where only 10% of Greek Cypriots blamed the Turkish

Cypriots for the troubles. In both communities the majority was well aware of the common interests of the "ordinary people" and did not blame their Orthodox or Muslim neighbours for the inter-communal trouble (Kyriakides, 1968).

Brigadier Harbottle for example, describes how in the middle of the 1967 fighting in mixed villages, members of both ethnic communities were seen co-operating and helping one another to get to safety. In the Paphos district, Greek and Turkish Cypriot villagers were witnessed helping each other to escape along the country roads, with the assistance of the UNFICYP personnel. Elsewhere, at the height of the 1967 conflict, members of the two communities were sitting together in the same coffee-houses exchanging Christmas gifts (Harbottle, 1970).

These are also accounts of assistance by Turkish to Greek Cypriots, and vice versa during events of the 1974. Again Brigadier Harbottle, in an article he wrote later in 1974, testifies to this fact. There, he claims ... "one could imagine that such relations would have been severely or badly mauled as a result of recent events, but no, the co-operation and co-existence remains as firm as before. Many are the examples during the fighting, where human relations and standards of civilized behaviour requiring a degree of courage of the persons involved, have triumphed over ethnic differences". (Harbottle, The Times, 17-10-74).

These instances of human relations reveal that the rela-



tions of the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus at an everyday level, could not have constituted the basis for separatism let alone for partition of the island. On the contrary, the evidence shows that the Greeks and the Turks of Cyprus wanted in nearly every instance to get relationships back to normal, and to live peacefully with their neighbours. The evidence also reveals that the story of animosity between the Greeks and the Turks of Cyprus is a myth and has been promoted for purposes foreign to the Cypriot ethnic communities.

In fact, as mentioned earlier, one can trace back problems of inter-communal relations to foreign intervention from colonial imperialist powers, Britain and the U.S., or from Turkey and Greece.

In the 50's the British, by recruiting Turkish Cypriots to the Auxiliary Police Force, disturbed the balance of peaceful co-existence and managed to turn the two communities against one another. When a Pan-Cypriot trade union organization -organized by the Cypriot Communist party AKEL- was formed, aiming at uniting Turkish and Greek Cypriots along common class lines, the British discouraged the promotion of such cooperation. Furthermore, when some trade unionists were murdered, and their clubs burnt down, the British did not prosecute the instigations of these arsons. After independence, it was the Turkish and the Greek Governments that put mainland and local extremists into commanding positions in Cyprus, by giving them money and weapons. And when President Makarios started acting like a Cypriot, the Greek junta decided to remove him. Above all,

where the British had made an opportunistic use of the so-called Greek-Turkish Cypriot rivalry and distrust, the U.S. made an instrument of it.

This thesis, however, would be incomplete if it failed to examine the political, economic and social systems of the Greek and the Turkish communities, and account for their mistakes and missed opportunities in their recent history.

Curiously enough, it had become obvious to the Cypriots around 1967, that "enosis" or "taksim" would have meant a definite economic loss for both communities, and a transformation of Cyprus into a remote province of either Greece or Turkey or both. However, if economic and social interests had been left undisturbed to determine the attitudes and behaviour of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots at the level of everyday life, a common Cypriot interest could have evolved in the long run.

## II. Relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in their political, social and economic systems

Economically, the Turkish minority, despite its privileged status, were in essence an underprivileged group. It appeared in the Independence period that there was a "stinginess" on the part of the central government, in allocating economic aid, or in the sharing of the resources for education and housing. In a way, the Turkish minority felt like "second-class citizens", compared to the Greek majority. This, in social terms, was a problem. Greek trade unionists made efforts

to enlist Turkish Cypriots as fellow workers. The absence of a specific development program for the Turkish community, made the gap between the two communities, even wider.

The matter is not as simple as this, however. Additional literature on this issue explains the reasons why the Turkish Cypriot economy was inferior to its Greek counter-part.

In 1963, production was, in most sectors, in Greek hands. This did not make the Turkish Cypriots inferior, it simply meant that there was a higher incidence of businessmen and professionals among the Greek Cypriots. This was because the bourgeoisie in Cyprus was mainly Greek Cypriot. A brief look at the economic relations of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots before and during British rule explains this peculiarity.

Going back to the internal social evolution of the Ottoman Empire, the Greeks along with other Christian nationalities, started on the road of economic modernization, earlier than the Turks. The traditional ruling-class position of the Turks as administrators and landowners, did not encourage economic enterprise, which was left in the hands of the Greeks (Jeness, 1962). Thus, the Cypriot bourgeoisie, the entrepreneurial class especially, was Greek rather than Turkish. This situation did not change in the period of British rule. During that period, the Turks showed an inadequate participation in the more modernized sectors of the economy, a problem originating in their historically conditioned delay in economic modernization (Kitromilides, 1977). Thus, such economic inequalities that continued operating in the British colonial period, and later,

in the post-independence period, were due to historical and cultural factors, not political ones.

The changes that took place during the period of British rule were bound to affect the Greek Cypriots more than the Turkish Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots, had a business oriented tradition which helped them to develop a middle class with a high incidence of businessmen and professionals, whereas the Turkish Cypriots, the overwhelming majority at least, remained small farmers. This largely explains the differences between the standards of living of the two ethnic groups until 1960. Later, as will be suggested, this business oriented tradition, explains the prosperity achieved by the Greek Cypriots in the South of Cyprus, after the 1974 war and partition, despite the devastation it experienced from the war, and the burden of the number of refugees there. This economic differentiation between the two communities became intensified in the post-independence period.

Returning to the issue of Turkish inferiority in the post-independence period, if members of both communities had participated in the same trade unions, then reduction of the Turkish population to a position of inferiority would have been prevented.

One of the reasons which explains the inferiority of the Turkish Cypriot economy after 1963, is the "Buy Turkish Campaign". This policy, among a population of 100,000, was bound to lead to a lower standard of living. Furthermore, the Turkish leadership's attempts to set up separate Turkish Cypriot

industries and facilities, produced the same result, a lower standard of living for Turkish Cypriots.

Other important factors that reinforced the economic isolation of the Turkish Cypriots and fostered their inferior status were the following :

1) Status insurance payments to Turkish Cypriots were hindered. According to research conducted by an American political scientist, this happened because the Turkish Cypriots had been unwilling to admit the government's legitimacy by allowing government insurance officers and welfare workers to carry out the requested inspections and verifications, even under UNFICYP auspices (Stegenga, 1968).

In other cases the problem was the claim of exclusive control of people and areas, by the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

2) Until 1969, the Turkish Cypriots received almost no benefit from aid to Cyprus, from the UND development program. The evidence shows that this happened because the Turkish leadership insisted on receiving aid from the United Nations directly, a demand which the U.N. turned down. Of course, individuals could apply to the Cyprus Government for participation in UNDP financed projects. The Turkish leadership, however, exerted pressures and discouraged such actions by its community (Attalides, 1979).

3) It was reported from UNFICYP and the U.N. Security Council, that in 1964, the Turkish leadership was prohibiting members of its community to : a) enter the Greek sector without a permit, b) and to trade with the Greek Cypriots. A fine, or imprisonment

was the penalty if these two were infringed. c) Associating with Greek Cypriots in any way, and visiting their hospitals was also subject to heavy fines (Report by the U.N. Secretary General, Nikosia, 1974).

What is noteworthy is the fact that the Turkish community of Cyprus developed a left-wing political movement. This movement was a step forward towards reintegration. Its ideology was to stress social rights for workers of both communities, and consequently de-emphasized the ethnic strains that nationalism had created.

A series of positive changes could have been obtained at a political, social and economic level. In time, economic inequalities could have been controlled, or even minimized, and co-existence would have been nurtured. However, since the Turkish Community was economically, heavily dependent on Turkey, this movement was eliminated by nationalist organizations, organized in Turkey itself. (Attalides, 1977, 1979), (Kitromilides, 1977).

In addition, the contradictions involved in the neglect of Turkish Cypriot interests by the Greek Cypriot leadership, are twofold. If there had been a real effort to develop special economic development programs, this would have been opposed by the Greek Cypriot entrepreneurs, whose interest was in cheap Turkish labour. By the same token, the Turkish Cypriot leadership would have turned down such a scheme, in order to keep its community isolated and maintain their monopoly of exploiting Turks only by Turks.

Culturally and religiously, as mentioned earlier, there were certain similarities between the two communities. Several Christian and Muslim rites had been adopted by the ethnic groups centuries before and there was a sense of a shared common culture. However, Turkish culture was different from the Greek, a fact which the Greek Cypriot Government had failed to understand. Consequently, it had not set up any institutions specifically designed to meet Turkish cultural and religious needs.

Educationally, there was no effort to emphasize a specifically Cypriot history, through school history and literature curricula, and given the pervasiveness of both dominant mainland ideologies, another opportunity to raise a common political consciousness was missed.

At the political level, another dimension of the problem was the place the Greek Orthodox Church occupied in Greek Cypriot life. It was considered to be the guardian of national feeling and consciousness which had generated the "enosis cause". The contradictory position of Archbishop Makarios as head of State, representing both ethnic communities of Cyprus, and also as head of the majority's religious community, meant he was representing only one of the two communities, and so made it very difficult for the Turkish Cypriots to identify with the new order, during and after independence. However, a valid argument would very well be that the Archbishop was the only person capable of following a policy of independence, leading his people away from the "enosis cause", with its right-wing orientation, and with no opposition from the Church. For all we know, the Church would have not allowed any other

politician to let the "enosis cause" weaken. This accomodation of course, created problems that were reflected in culture and education. It also made the Turkish Cypriots sceptical, that the Government of Cyprus was not totally legitimate in their eyes (Kadritzke & Wagner, 1979).

These problems, however, could be very well understood if one thinks that the Church could not be the vanguard of explicit ideological re-orientation. Makarios was walking on thin ice trying to create a fine balance out of all these seeming contradictions and potential conflicts.

A different aspect of the complex Cypriot crisis that contributed to the destruction of the Cypriot State, was the presence of foreign military forces on Cypriot soil. Under the Treaty of Guarantee, it was legal to allow mainland Greek and Turkish armies to settle permanently on the island, a fact which was thoroughly exploited by the two mother countries of the Cypriots. President Makarios later admitted to such mistakes. In a self-criticism, shortly after the military coup against him, and the Turkish invasion, he regretted how losely the Treaty of Guarantee had been interpreted, and he confessed his inability to resist foreign military infiltration in Cyprus.

However, as mentioned earlier, when he attempted to dissociate his Government from that of both Greece and Turkey, he was met with opposition from both countries. A few days before his legal Government was overthrown, Makarios wrote a letter to Greece's military leader, President Gizikis, accusing the Greek army officers of subversion and demanding that they



be removed from Cyprus. A few days later, he accused the Greek dictatorship of directing and financing EOKA-B, which was aiming at the dissolution of independence of the Cypriot State. The response was his removal as head of state, and the eventual partition of Cyprus.

It is evident then that even the most serious mistakes of the Cypriot ethnic communities, in their social and political relations, could only be described as imposed mistakes. Although ethnic inequalities did exist, they were a product of cultural factors, inherited from the Ottoman period of rule. During British rule ethnic inequalities were overtly exploited through British administrative practices. In the post-independence period elimination of these inequalities would have meant following different policies and transforming the face of Cypriot society altogether. There were major obstacles to this :

Firstly, it would necessitate attempting to attract the mass of Turkish Cypriots into fuller integration with the Cypriot economy.

Secondly, it would have meant confronting the Turkish leadership, which was disrupting Turkish Cypriot links with the Cyprus trade union movement. The Turkish leadership was acting so as to discourage the Turkish Cypriots, arguing the need for unity against the majority.

Any feeling, attempt, or desire for the natural rules of social and ideological development to take its course, were faced with constant outside mainland intervention. Thus, the task of minimizing, and even eliminating these two major obstacles proved to be an insurmountable task for the Makarios government.

### CHAPTER THREE

#### FOREIGN INTERVENTION AND ETHNIC CONFLICT

In Chapter 3 the complex issue of involvement and intervention of external forces in Cyprus will be discussed. These external developments will be examined and related to the domestic processes and actions analysed in the previous chapter, in order to reveal the basic structures of inter-dependence between these levels of development. The purpose of this Chapter will be to demonstrate that :

1) The use of pressures by external forces has been crucial for the separation of, and the political disintegration in Cyprus, but also that 2) internal realities themselves -institutional structures, the rise of nationalism, behaviour, and so on- were to a large extent the consequences of external factors.

In addition, it will be shown that the Cypriot communities' attachments to their mother-countries provided the means through which domestic processes in Cyprus could be influenced and directed from outside.

The Cyprus problem, the way it has unfolded, involved questions of nationality, of inter-communal relations, of strategy and of geo-politics.

Recorded Cypriot history is principally that of the exploitation of the island as a staging post to somewhere else by the dominant power of the time. This, in time was replaced by its exploitation by a number of powers instead of one : Greece, Turkey, the U.S. and Britain.

Intervention by imperialist powers in the Cyprus problem has always been caused by military-strategic interests rather than economic interests. Cyprus' geographical position places it at the crossroads of Europe, Asia and Africa, situated as it is only 40 miles from Turkey, just over 100 miles from Syria and Lebanon, and 180 miles from Israel.

Just as Cyprus' geographically strategic position led to the internal conflict on the island from the post-Ottoman period until now the material cited in this thesis reveals that ethnicity and religion in themselves were not sufficient to bring about this internal conflict, given the existence of states in which cultural diversity persists within the framework of a common nationality. Viewed from a historical perspective, there was no necessity or inevitability leading to ethnic differentiation. To understand the historical developments that brought ethnic conflict, one must view them in terms of the processes of change. In many states, the ethnic religious or tribal conflict seems to be the outcome of colonial policies in the state's early years and, of the continued domination by foreign powers in the internal affairs of newly created sovereign states.

In order to analyse the external forces of intervention involved in the Cyprus conflict, one has to examine historical developments at 3 levels :

1. The Rise of Nationalism under British Colonial Rule.
2. Relations between Greece and the Greek Cypriots and similarly,

Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, in order to reconstruct the rising level of foreign power intervention.

3. Relations between the United States, Greece and Turkey, with reference to the Cypriots, in order to determine the level of political and military alliances between the three countries.

If one has studied Cyprus under the Ottoman rule, one cannot fail to overlook the fact that a traditional society such as Cyprus, which shared a common culture, where existing differences were not of political significance, did not succeed in forming a politically cohesive state, but became increasingly differentiated. There are numerous examples of groups within states that form different religious, cultural and ethnic entities. These differences, it needs to be stressed, may or may not be divisive nor may they lead to inter-group conflict. The process of transformation of Cypriot society began with British colonial rule.

#### I. The Rise of Nationalism under British Colonial Rule

The religious but apolitical differences between Muslims and Eastern Orthodox Christians were perceived by the British in nationalist terms. Through colonial rule they politicized these differences and transformed the two ethnic communities into competing political and nationalist groups. This was in sharp contrast with the "Millet" system of Control by the Ottoman Empire, where groups were defined along religious and

class lines, with class frequently cutting across religious barriers, while political authority was legitimately in the hands of the Sultan of Turkey.

Among observable changes that the British introduced into Cyprus were, the training of an indigenous civil service, the introduction of a new legal system and a program of literacy. The new educational system especially led to the creation of two discrete political cultures whereby the Muslim and Orthodox Christians learned different languages, histories and ideologies. Young Cypriots went to study at the universities in Greece and Turkey, and attachment to their respective motherlands was thus intensified. Greek nationalism grew from mainland teachers sent to Cypriot schools and was spread to Cyprus, thus providing a basis for a nationalist belief system (Kitromilides, 1977).

The addition of political functions by the British to the "Millets" further divided the two communities, and fostered the development of two parallel social systems.

Following a policy of indirect rule, the British relied on local power structures in managing domestic affairs, and, as a rule, discouraged ethnic integration. Thus, by preserving and then politicizing traditional power structures, such as the Orthodox Church and its civil functions, they provided its leadership with the potential impetus for ethnic conflict (Kitromilides, 1977).

As mentioned earlier in this thesis, the British introduced a series of economic and social changes which affected

the Greek Cypriots more than the Turkish Cypriots. This peculiarity was the product of cultural factors. The Greeks, a business oriented ethnic group formed a bourgeoisie which was trained according to the British tradition and became a powerful economic factor, a process in which the Turkish Cypriots were left behind. This economic change and social mobilization were the preconditions for the intensification of nationalist demands. The consequence was that the system of horizontal interethnic bonds forged in a traditional society were gradually undermined and eventually broken for good. If social and cultural change provided the internal dynamic of ethnic differentiation, British colonial policy marked the beginning of this process.

So, from the first years of British colonial rule, that is the first decades of the 20th century, Cyprus became increasingly polarized between Greeks and Turks and this resulted in nearly complete segregation of the two communities and the gradual formation of two nations. In time, and in this way, separate antagonistic nationalities were promoted, which were fighting for political power, and for control over the same territory, while the development of a single cultural identity was hindered.

It has been underlined and established earlier that Cyprus was, to the British from the very beginning, a key base to Western Asia and a launching pad for intervention in the Middle East; it was also governed as a Crown colony. The significance of this in strategic and geo-political terms becomes paramount if one considers that Cyprus remained, until

1959, the only country in Europe to be part of a modern European Empire. This, however, became even more important in international politics, specifically at the First United Nations debate where the self-determination of Cyprus was opposed on the grounds that the continuation of the colonial status of the island was important for the defence of Southern Turkey and the Mediterranean in general. Thus, we have an early picture of Cyprus, where already international pressures by Western powers overruled its Cypriot aspirations for independence. It became a necessity to the West that Cyprus remain under the Western sphere of protection and domination.

Once the British had reconstructed Cypriot realities and dual nationalities had developed, the rise of nationalism in the island can be observed. The Greek Cypriot majority is the first to demonstrate its opposition to colonial rule, the Turkish minority always being a few steps behind in this development. Greece's long process of nation-building through union of its ancient territories with the mainland, had left Cyprus out in the cold, because of international opposition. Consequently, Greece welcomed Greek Cypriot actions with open arms. To combat such a majority, the British invented and introduced a third party into the dispute, mainland Turkey. This deliberate action marked the first confrontation between two communities that had for centuries lived peacefully side-by-side. Stirring up the Turks to become an interested party was a necessity to the British since Cyprus was becoming indispensable for its strategic position in the South-Eastern Mediterranean, especially after Britain's setbacks in Palestine and Suez. Cyprus

became a staging-post for operations in the Middle East. The British united with the minority of Cyprus to outnumber the island's majority and justify their presence there. Moreover, Turkey was emerging as a precious western ally, protecting British oil interests in the Persian Gulf and preventing Russian penetration into the area. This latter factor was to be adopted by NATO and to become the official policy of the Alliance with regards to Turkey.

This manufactured triangular situation created bitter hatred among the Greek Cypriot majority. It made them feel like a powerless minority, whereas the real minority -the Turkish Cypriot- was dominant. It also reflects the classic technique of successive British governments : to play one group off against the other and become a sort of a "mediator" to reconcile the differences between the two ethnic communities which, they themselves, had created! This then justified their continual presence on the island. (Kitromilides, 1977).

British discrimination against Greek nationalism strengthened Turkish nationalism on the island. Britain went so far as to ban activities of the Greek extremist group EOKA, but to allow activities of its Turkish equivalent the extremist group Volkan, whose appearance has already been mentioned in Chapter One. Furthermore, employing Turkish Cypriots in the police force to combat the majority meant that in a country where martial law was in effect, its restrictions and prohibitions were in essence directed against one and only one target, the Greek majority, while the Turkish minority was enjoying the privileges and had all the advantages. These actions were



divisive, inviting ethnic conflict, long before independence in 1960.

The idea of the partition of Cyprus was another consequence of British colonial policy, to strengthen Turkish nationalism. Thus, the approach of independence would trigger contests over prospective spoils. It was a guarantee to a continuous conflict between the two ethnic communities, and an attempt to lure Turkey to assume a leading role within NATO. Naturally, partition, or "Taksim", became an aspect of Turkish policy for Cyprus. It was to counteract Greek aspirations for "enosis". This also reveals that Greece was in an inferior position in NATO, vis-à-vis Turkey. Greece had to compromise with a "double enosis" solution, which meant maintaining authority of a part of Cypriot territory, instead of over none at all.

The partition idea revived old Turkish claims that Cyprus was a Turkish possession. This is partly why it was adopted by mainland Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, as official policy. Given the geographical setting of the Eastern Mediterranean, it became clear to the Greek Cypriot majority that they remained a tiny majority, when compared to their Turkish neighbour which was only forty miles away across the sea. The Turkish Cypriots appeared as a geographically separated section of a majority group. The inability of Greece to gain such status for herself vis-à-vis Turkey and for her majority, started the antagonism between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus. The appearance of Greece and Turkey in the arena was a development which was beyond the power of the Cypriots to control. In fact, the Cypriots who were earlier living in harmony with

each other, now found themselves fighting each other. They were caught between three foreign powers which claimed interests on their soil.

In a sense, the British had cultivated, through divisive policies, the attachments the Cypriots felt to have with their respective mother-countries. The British, profiting from this "psychological" dependency, managed to bring the two foreign countries into the dispute. These countries were British allies and both members of NATO.

In a constitutional agreement which was reached after having exerted all sorts of pressures on Greece and Turkey, segregation between the two ethnic communities of Cyprus was institutionalized. The Constitution was designed in such a way as to accomodate and permit ethnic conflict, instead of resolving it. It stressed ethnic dualism, instead of meeting the practical needs of the entire population. This agreement was favourable to the minority and thus revealed the importance of Turkey within the Western Alliance, in contrast to that of Greece's unimportance. Furthermore, the Constitution reflected the power configuration of Greece and Turkey within NATO.

Despite the fact that the minority gained a small victory by getting favourable conditions, the constitutional agreement would in the long run, act against the interests of the Cypriot people who were deprived of any power to have a say in their own independence. They were blinded by externally imposed nationalism and had to accept an alliance in which external forces were uppermost. In this alliance decision-making was impossible.

The Constitution was a compromise solution between partition and "enosis", policies that the two mother countries of Cyprus had dictated to their protégés, under the pressure of British colonial diplomacy. In it there were two levels of formal political intervention :

- 1) The Veto-power of the Turkish Cypriot leadership and
- 2) The Treaty of Guarantee which gave Great Britain, Turkey and Greece, a formal right of intervention.

There was no substantial say for the two Cypriot sides who had to accept it or face the danger of partition. The seeds of partition were institutionalized in the Constitution and at all levels of government, since it was purely bi-communal, aiming at separation and inviting foreign intervention, by NATO especially.

From the beginning the Cyprus problem was caught in a vicious circle. The Cypriots needed a single political identity in order to fight for real independence. However, since there was no real independence, they were hindered in developing a specific identity they could identify with, which would draw them closer together rather than closer to their respective mother countries.

The Cypriot Constitution was designed in such a way as to "protect" the minority from the majority, as if the two were hostile to one another. The government, however, in order to function needed the two to be in permanent peaceful agreement.

There was no power-sharing because there was no power to share. Not able to change their own Constitution made each side

feel helpless, frustrated and outnumbered in the face of the other. This "double-minority" situation made segregation deeper and wider, along psychological, social, political and economic lines. Even at the hour of independence, the Cypriots were treated as objects, rather than subjects in their own country as things to be deliberated over, rather than as people to be negotiated with.

Additionally, a legacy of inter-communal tension and distrust had been created by outside powers and then built into an imposed Constitution. As a consequence of this, the public life of Cyprus was alienated by the very spirit of its Constitution and always in the direction of ethnic antagonism.

As Harry Magdoff points out, in many colonies, the dominant power has disrupted the traditional ruling groups and destroyed their political power. The dissolution of colonies was carried out in such a way as to preserve, for the colonial power, as many of its advantages as possible. Therefore, the power structure of former colonies is unstable. Such was the case in Cyprus (Magdoff, 1966, 1978).

## II. Relations between Greece and Turkey with regards to their respective ethnic communities

As long as economic, cultural, political or military dependencies do not deprive a society of the ability to determine its own course of social development, it is reasonable to define it as independent in a political sense. This, was not true for

Cyprus, however. The post-1960 period of the Cyprus problem is characterized by foreign interests -which, contrary to the authentic interest and self-determination of a small country, are not only permanently profiting from internal tensions, but also reproducing them in order to keep doors open for direct or indirect foreign intervention.

Non-alignment as an orientation of the Republic in its international relations made Cyprus a target for foreign intervention and destabilization soon after its independence. The deficiencies of the Constitution, that is, the disproportional importance given to the minority, the eternal unchangeability of its basic provisions and the interventionist claims based on its Treaties, was bound to create conflicts among the two communities. Therefore, it makes a poor argument to attribute the conflicts that took place in the first seven years of Cyprus's independence and which contributed a great deal to an easy pretext for NATO intervention, to the Cypriots themselves. Although the NATO plan of 1964 which lead to partition or double "enosis" did not succeed, it however, promoted political control of the Cypriot communities by Athens and Ankara, which meant, in essence, control by the heads of NATO in Washington, given that Greece and Turkey were dependent on NATO.

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Analysing the role of Greece and Turkey as intervening foreign powers is a complex issue, but it can be safely asserted that the dependency each Cypriot community had from its mother-country was a serious obstacle to inter-Cypriot mutual understanding.

Firstly, there was in effect the political and military elites of NATO countries influencing Greek and Turkish policy on Cyprus, in the name of the common fear of certain social forces, endangering the capitalist economies in their respective countries. These pressures were exerted through governmental, military and secret service channels. They were especially true with the Cypriot non-alignment policy and contacts with the socialist and Arab World and, were the point of divergence between the Cypriot government and the Greek military government.

Furthermore, nostalgic national feelings of the two neighbour-countries towards the two ethnic communities of Cyprus created attachments between these communities with their mother countries, instead of between them. These national, social and emotional attachments furnished the most effective channels through which domestic social and political processes in Cyprus could be influenced and directed from outside.

The institutionalized interference resulted in friction, preventing the Cypriots from developing their own political consciousness.

The intervention of Turkey in the affairs of Cyprus has a long tradition, as mentioned earlier in this thesis. It contributed a great deal to tensions between the two communities when it sided with the British and was offered the use of the threat of partition to control the Greek Cypriot struggle.

Similarly the presence of the Greek army in Cyprus acting on orders from Greek governments attempted several times to

overthrow President Makarios and his legal government. However, although the Turkish Cypriot community was totally suppressed by a dictatorial rule over its community with tight control from Ankara, this was not true for the Greek Cypriots. Athens faced strong resistance and a policy of independence from the Greek Cypriot community. EOKA B, with whose help Makarios was overthrown in 1974, was not supported by the Greek Cypriot masses. On the contrary, the equivalent Turkish TMT group was more successful and dictatorial in its treatment of its people, murdering its own nationals when they argued for co-operation with the Greek side (AUDINLIK, 28-30/3/79), (Hitchens, 1984).

The evidence cited in this thesis reveals that the 1964-1967, as well as the criminal acts during the invasion of 1974, on both sides, were mainly instigated by non-Cypriot elements or, Cypriots obeying foreign orders. As mentioned earlier, extremist elements on both sides further destroyed the pre-existing peaceful Greco-Turkish Cypriot co-existence. Greek officers from the mainland were very active in the 1964-1967 crises, launching attacks against Turkish mainland soldiers, as well as Turkish Cypriot guerrillas, and Turkish Cypriot civilians. The same people had turned against Greek democrats and leftists who were regarded as traitors to the "union cause".

Similarly, the fanatical Turkish TMT, directed by Ankara was slowly partitioning the North of Cyprus by establishing Turkish enclaves, and preparing for a final confrontation with the Greek Cypriots. At the same time TMT was assassinating Turkish-Cypriot democrats who favoured Greco-Turkish co-operation and who publicly voiced their opposition to TMT and its

seperatist plans (Hitchens, 1984).

The Turkish government was pursuing a policy of suspicion by transmitting its ideology and propaganda to the Turkish Cypriot community. The same was not true, however, for President Makarios and the Greek Cypriot side, which was not a puppet of the Greek government.

The only really serious crisis (mainly caused by inner Cypriot tension between 1963-1964) ended in partial separation but did not irreparably disturb the island's inter-communal relations.

One could say that the Turkish Cypriot side was totally dominated by Ankara while the Greek Cypriot side was under permanent intervention from Athens.

It has been argued that between 1967-1974 the inter-communal talks were heading in a direction, where, had it not been for external interventions by external powers, a viable Cypriot national framework might have emerged. A civilised Cypriot nationalism would have been created. However, subversive action by Greece and Turkey, by army officers, was taking place on Cypriot soil. This was in complete accord with U.S. plans for Cyprus, especially after the clash between Athens and Nikosia. The Greek junta, which was increasingly identifying itself with U.S. interests and its communist fears over Cyprus, assumed a greater role in these covert and overt operations.

An analysis limited to the relationship of Greece and Turkey to their respective Cypriot communities, definitely



indicates that the two foreign powers with traditionally conflicting interests, attempted to expand their hegemony over their communities in Cyprus. However, there is a contradiction in this relationship. Although at times Greek and Turkish national interests have been, and still are in conflict mostly over the question of oil rights in the Aegean, both are members of NATO and both have been client states of the U.S. The traditional foreign policy objective of both Greece and Turkey had been to strengthen their own security, in the light of the threat posed by a non-aligned Cyprus with a strong communist party, by incorporating Cyprus within the Western military Alliance. A large proportion of Cyprus controlled by Greece would have worked wonders for the junta's prestige, as any proportion would have suited Turkey's strategic need to control access to its southern parts.

The U.S. would have bases in Cyprus for use in its Middle East strategy. The strategy of the Greek junta was to use the slogan "enosis" to weaken and, if necessary, overthrow Makarios.

Time after time, Greece and Turkey had agreed on a "solution" to the Cyprus' conflict only to find its implementation stopped by Makarios. It was Greece and Turkey who agreed on the constitution of 1960 and on the Acheson partition plan in 1964. It was Greece and Turkey who insisted, in 1971, on a Greek and Turkish government representative participating in the inter-communal talks between the two Cypriot communities, as constitutional experts. And it was in 1971, that Greece and Turkey apparently made a secret agreement at a NATO meeting, to end the independence of Cyprus and partition the island, without

the consent of the Cypriots.

The U.S. has used Greece and Turkey during the past decades as vehicles for implementing its objectives consistently and totally ignoring the aspirations of the Cypriots themselves. It could be said that the Cypriots, suppressed by a dominant ideology imposed by military ruling classes (Greek-Turkish-NATO) under the rubric of "Enosis/Taksim", were forced to fight each other instead of uniting to overthrow the external forces that were only pursuing their own strategic and military interests.

### III. Relations between the United States, Greece and Turkey, over Cyprus

There are world powers that seek to dominate weaker states to varying degrees and they do so in order to satisfy what are defined by the imperial powers' leaders as the interests of their own citizens (Attalides, 1979). These powers were Britain and later the United States, who exercised their influence in the course of pursuing their global interests. Those strategic interests and their conflicting aims intersected at various times with indigenous political processes and, the political processes in Greece and Turkey.

Another important point is reached here : Since Greece and Turkey have been involved in NATO, the Cyprus issue has become a Cold War issue. The United States assumed the new role of leader and organizer of a world system, replacing Britain, unofficially before Cypriot independence, through the formation

of NATO. They supported every British action, including the separatist constitutional agreements.

In the colonial period the United States was concerned with the defense of the South-Eastern Mediterranean against a "communist threat" and, with keeping its two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey in a peaceful state, for the cohesion of the south flank of NATO. The Cyprus conflict was making this harmony impossible. On the one hand, Makarios' policy of non-alignment, his contacts with the socialist and Arab world and his refusal to incorporate Cyprus into NATO, was justified what United States policy perceived as a "communist threat". On the same grounds, a Greco-Turkish confrontation over Cyprus was always a possibility, thus, threatening the Alliance.

Makarios's policy was a small-state policy which meant that in order to survive, it had to place itself between the two great power blocs and play off East and West in order to get a better bargain, politically and economically.

The 1963-1964 conflict was seen by the United States as an opportunity to establish the internal balance of forces in Cyprus, in favour of greater Western orientation, and to forestall the Cyprus governments appeal to Moscow for military aid against the possibility of an invasion by Turkey. Thus there was the Johnson mediation to avoid a Greco-Turkish invasion.

In order to solve these "problems" and keep the two NATO allies satisfied, what was needed was the elimination of the independence of the small state, in such a way as to keep both

Greece and Turkey, satisfied.

The political pressure has more often than not fallen on Greece which was a smaller and a weaker state and, an inferior NATO ally in relation to Turkey (Kuniholm, Orbis, Summer 1983) (Gruen, Orbis, Summer 1980). U.S. diplomacy, being well informed of the wishes and fears of the Greek governments exploited political situations and manipulated Greece, in order to achieve its goals. Thus, they maintained that :

- a) In case of war with Turkey, Greece would be the loser because of its smaller army and its inferior military equipment.
- b) The United States claimed they could not always be expected to prevent Turkish invasions.
- c) Removing Makarios was in the best interests of Athens, Washington and NATO
- d) With an Acheson type solution, the nationalistic dreams of Greece could be made possible (Attalides, 1979), (Coufoudakis, 1977).

To understand the Greek junta's policy in Cyprus between 1971-1974, it has to be understood that its relationship with its allies was primarily with the United States and Turkey. The junta's "Turkish policy" was formulated in Athens, with the sole aim of falling in line with American efforts to "tidy up" the whole Eastern Mediterranean sector in view of the Soviet threat and the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Turkish policy aiming at the partition of Cyprus had found a supporter in the Nixon Administration. Turkey had been one of the strongest anti-communist countries on the periphery

of the Soviet Union and, its military forces were second only in number to those of the United States among NATO forces. However, after Turkey had been humiliated by President Johnson's intervening and preventing the 1964 invasion, she pursued a more independent policy and made close contacts with the Soviets. This alarmed a U.S. administration that feared the possibility of a neutral Turkey. The strategic importance of Turkey was much greater compared to that of Greece's. This legacy is true even today (Kuniholm, Orbis, Summer 1983), (Coufoudakis, 1981).

The military coup organized and believed to be carried out by Greek officers, in order to overthrow Makarios, was known to the Nixon Administration long before it actually took place. The United States government was silently letting history take its course and was ignoring Intelligence Reports that pointed to a major crisis which would involve overthrowing the Makarios regime as well as provoking a Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The Nixon Administration with Henry Kissinger as its Secretary of State did not take any action to prevent the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey. This indicates the replacement of democracy by a mini-junta on the island were known, predicted and carefully ignored by the United States and executed by Greece, a NATO member and a U.S. ally. Its outcome was probably a desired one by the U.S.

However, Makarios survived and escaped and the Turkish invasion, claimed as a "peace-operation" followed five days later as planned and was carried out in two stages. The U.S. administration was careful not to condemn the coup when it took place. It also did not stop the Turkish invasion, contrary to

the overwhelming amount of evidence by official reports and reports of the European Press, between the date of the coup and that of the invasion. When it happened it simply pleaded ignorance on the matter (Stern, 1977), (Hitchens, 1984). This reveals how the partition of Cyprus was falling in line with United States interests and was in accord with the original Acheson partition plan of 1964, the long standing official U.S. policy on the Cyprus issue. It was simply executed by another NATO ally, Turkey.

A series of actions of the U.S. administration that followed after the 1974 invasion, point to the same conclusion.

Dr. Kissinger promoted a cease-fire agreement on 22nd of June by promising Turkey that Glafkos Clerides, a right-wing Cypriot leader, would become the President of Cyprus pending new elections. The fact that Cyprus already had a constitutionally elected President, was ignored.

At a Press Conference that was held over the Cyprus crisis, Dr. Kissinger revealed that the U.S. did not, during the first and second stage of the Turkish invasion, freeze military aid to Turkey and so condemn the Turkish aggression of Cyprus. This action was opposed to U.S. legislation. The importance of this economic, and military aid represented the United States and Turkey's mutual interest in the defense of the Eastern Mediterranean (Coufoudakis, 1975).

Finally, once partition was successfully carried out, an arms embargo was imposed on Turkey by the U.S. administration, after numerous debates in Congress. This was finally and

completely lifted by the Carter administration in 1978, once Ankara suspended all U.S. operations and closed down military installations in Turkey (Coufoudakis, 1975). Turkey was too precious to be lost to the non-aligned world or to the Eastern bloc. These facts demonstrate that the U.S. administration gave a "carte-blanche" to Turkish policy over the Cyprus issue. Furthermore, it gave the Turks priority on the issue.

After the fall of the Greek junta, the new Greek government resorted to diplomatic methods to seek a solution to the crisis. Greece did not really get any "piece of the action" from the conflict, and was humiliated abroad, whereas Turkey, through its aggressive policy, gained a great deal. After 10 years of occupation, its 30,000 troops still dominate the partitioned north. The temporary sanctions that Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots received, were only a "front" imposed so as not to offend the international laws of human rights. The necessary steps to create long-range conditions for national survival could only be undertaken without presenting a vital danger to the very existence of the permanent interventionist forces. Even the most serious mistakes, were not rooted in the free will and decisions of the Cypriot people. A legacy of "enosis" and "taksim" separatism was institutionalized in the Constitution and imposed by the will of external powers. The essence of this tragedy and how strong this legacy of intervention hindering the development of a common Cypriot identity was, is shown when the Cypriot government attempted to act as an independent government and was then overwhelmed by a military coup and foreign invasion.

And yet, there were attempts by the two communities of Cyprus to solve their problems. The bi-communal talks which lasted six years, raised some hopes for the future of Cyprus. This, however, was boycotted, as well, by outside forces. The agreement to initiate bi-communal talks was followed the day after by an attack from Greek extremists.

In spite of fears, problems and constant interventions, there were improvements in the talks. There were concessions by the Turkish side on veto power and reinforced representation; and by the Greek side, increasing the components and mechanisms for Turkish Cypriot autonomy. The two communities had appeared to have reached an agreement in 1973. This was not favourably viewed by the western powers. It seems that international interests did not view the inter-communal talks as a means for a solution for the ethnic conflict between Cypriots. They favoured a solution which would come from an agreement between Greece and Turkey. The United States wanted a rapid conclusion of the talks and, as mentioned earlier, had warned it would not interfere in case of a Greco-Turkish war. This was in line with its policy towards the Greek junta and towards Turkey and the U.S. strategic and geo-political posture vis à vis the Eastern Mediterranean.

The two ethnic communities of Cyprus did not have a chance to develop a clear understanding of their political situation and find an adequate ideological expression for their common national interests. On the contrary, a legacy of separatism institutionalized in the Constitution, haunted its communities until the time it became a reality.



Thus, an analysis of the external involvements in the Cyprus conflict indicated that ethnic conflict was exacerbated by external encouragement of extremism. The external linkages of Cypriot domestic policies were used effectively for this purpose. Therefore :

- 1) The use of external forces has been the crucial factor for the segregation and political disintegration of Cypriot society.
- 2) Internal realities have been exploited by external forces, and so are to a large extent the consequence of external factors. The dependent foreign relations of the two mother-countries provided a system of linkage through which international power politics in the Mediterranean could directly influence domestic affairs in Cyprus.

Therefore, the history of Cyprus makes it evident that the principal determining factors for ethnic conflict have not been cultural or religious differences, between its two dominant ethnic communities, but the policies pursued by interested powers, external to Cyprus. The obstacles to the political integration of Cyprus have been largely a consequence of the functioning of factors outside the boundaries of the state of Cyprus.

Some arguments that Magdoff develops on the "decline of Colonialism", will serve as a conclusion to this chapter. Magdoff maintains that the decline of colonialism has brought problems for the imperialist centres : 1) For the previous owners of colonies (i.e. Britain), how to maintain their privileged position, saving as much of the colonial system as

possible 2) For the U.S., how to extend its influence and control over the privileged preserves of the former colonial powers (Magdoff, 1978, p.141). These currents characterize perfectly historical developments in Cyprus, involving the two aforementioned powers.

## CONCLUSIONS

It has been argued at the beginning of this study that over the last decades, the two ethnic communities of Cyprus, which had previously lived peacefully side-by-side, became increasingly segregated.

It has been shown that this division began not in the long period of Ottoman rule, but during British Colonial rule. During this transformation period, the colonial ruler shaped realities on the island along the lines of two differentiated nationalities, the Greek and the Turkish. It, thus, set the stage for the rise of nationalism and for future ethnic rivalry, by favouring one ethnic community over another, for the purpose of maintaining its imperialist status in Cyprus and in the Mediterranean region.

Social and cultural change, and the whole process of modernization, intensified ethnic separation. Along with the development of nationalism, these became the factors that contributed to the rising of ethnic consciousness and conflict. Thus, they constituted the internal dynamics of ethnic conflict.

The process of division of the two communities strengthened when Britain allowed Greece and Turkey to gain control over Cypriot politics, and the United States to exercise pressures there.

The Constitutional agreements that were reached simply institutionalized sectarian differences and legitimized foreign involvement in Cypriot affairs. Furthermore, they contained the seeds of partition which, of British policies of a

"solution" to the Cyprus "question", was the most desirable for Britain.

The crises that the constitutional compromises provoked, proved that the Government of Cyprus was, from the beginning, powerless to determine its own future. The limitations of the Constitution, which amounts to limitations on its independence, and in turn the absence of the absolute balance of power between the two communities, imposed structural barriers to the evolution of commonalities and did not inspire confidence in the legitimacy of the political regime.

Constant external interference from the United States, Greece and Turkey after independence, dismissed all hopes for achieving full independence and eventually power sharing. These countries, manipulated all the potential factors in their relations with the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots, and so invited tension. These external involvements have been decisive in the distortion of the ethnic relations in Cyprus, and in the escalation of conflict, to outright confrontation.

The United States, as the leader of the Western World System, having replaced Britain as the imperial power, along with the interested parties were aiming at blocking independence, creating ethnic separation, partition of the island and so make it subservient to Western interests in the region. This had a double function at the time :

- 1) To terminate the independence of a small non-aligned state with a provokative foreign policy, and turn it as before into a base for military operations in the region.

2) To give Turkey the lion's share since its geo-political position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the Middle East, made and still makes it, an anti-communist barrier, and so its demands were and are to be taken seriously.

By the 1970's the island's population was segregated, although not totally, along psychological, social, economic, and political lines.

The events of 1974, the military coup against the Cypriot Government, and the Turkish invasion, led to territorial partition, a scheme desirable to all interested parties, except the Cypriots themselves.

The prospects are that the two communities will remain physically separated, as citizens of a bi-zonal federation, rationalized as an inevitable and just consequence of the existence of two conflicting ethnic groups.

What developments we would have in Cyprus, without British colonial policies, without Greek and Turkish governments' nationalist actions, which further polarized the two communities, and, without United States efforts to divide the island, it is difficult to say. However, it is certain that religious and ethnic differences have not been the determining factors of ethnic conflict, between the two ethnic communities of Cyprus.

It can be argued that without external interventions, internal involvements would have been different, once the determinants would no longer have been foreign powers. The structuring of the Cypriot reality would not have been contingent on

Britain, Greece, Turkey and the United States.

Thus, this perspective challenges the arguments that ethnicity produces conflict leading to division.

The inter-communal conflict in Cyprus cannot be viewed alone as a minority/majority issue, but its determinants may be found outside the borders of the Republic. International factors are the crucial variables accounting for internal developments, including ethnic conflict.

Theoretically, the above analysis suggests that ethnic conflict was a result of a "new", geo-political dependency, and possesses nearly all the features of Magdoff's "new Imperialism". Cyprus, an island with a geo-political and strategic position of enormous significance in international world politics, in the South-Eastern Mediterranean, in near proximity to Middle East and Turkey, was colonized by the British, in the last part of the 19th century. During the period of Colonial Imperialism, the dominant power disrupts the traditional co-existence of ethnic groups in order to advance its colonial interests. It thus exploits internal realities and promotes ethnic separation, and carries out the process of de-colonization in such a way, as to preserve as many of the advantages possible, for future use, and to prevent social revolutions directed towards real independence.

After independence, Cyprus enters the period of "Imperialism without colonies". With the break-up of the Imperialist system, the United States assumes the role of leader and organizer

of the world system, and exercises covert domination, interfering in the politics of Cyprus, offering a military alliance -which is refused- in order to block Cyprus from stepping into the socialist camp.

In a world of competing imperial powers, ancient differences are exploited for modern purposes. The internal dynamics of conflict are cultivated to prevent real independence in Cyprus, and eventually to turn the island into a military staging area. The United States associates with reliable governments and establishes ties with the Greek military junta, in order to achieve its goal. Although Cyprus appears to be an officially independent country, it is actually dominated by this covert Imperialism and its linkages, that is Greece and Turkey, through their membership in NATO. Ethnic conflict, thus, instigated and promoted from the outside, becomes an inevitability. The outcome is a partitioned Cyprus.

As Nehru observed, in overt or, "visible Imperialism", the rulers govern directly, and with responsibility to the population, in order to maintain good relations in the future. Similarly in Cyprus, the British introduced a number of measures that contributed to the progress of the country, and the well being of its population. In contrast, covert Imperialism or "invisible Imperialism" can largely dominate and control, without shouldering any of its responsibility to the population. This is easily exercised by supporting military governments by choice. In Cyprus, United States diplomacy dominated the political affairs of the country, through its clients Greece and Turkey. Close relations between the United States Government

and the Greek military junta, as well as the covert support it offered the mini-junta that seized power in Cyprus, 1974, have been discussed earlier in this thesis.

Caught up in international manoeuvres during the Cold War, Cyprus acquires a position of dependency, as a result of military and strategic priorities. Thus, the strategically decisive location of the island, enforces the continued production of the mono-cultural product.: military facilities for foreign powers.

Regionally and in the "geography of political tendencies", there are territorial similarities between Cyprus and other Middle East countries. As with the Lebanese and the Arab-Israeli experiences, the events that took place are symbols of international politics, great power interests and the legacy of Western colonialism in the Near East. In a general sense Cyprus shares with the Lebanon and the Palestine conflict a few common elements. They all involved ethnic conflict, great power interests, territorial invasions and United States involvement in the region for NATO operations. However, the particular circumstances of the Cypriot experience, and its particular form of dependency makes it unique among dependent states in general, and dependent states of the Middle East, in particular.

There is a contradiction which has to be pointed out here : Cyprus is a European and not a Middle Eastern state, with special arrangements with the European Economic Community. As a European non-aligned country, it has shared the properties



of the Mediterranean non-alignment movement. This movement promotes the strengthening of the security and peaceful cooperation in the region, particularly with respect to the elimination of crisis, pressure, outside interference and, neo-colonialist activities. Also, it concerns itself with the reduction of tension and armed forces in the region.

As a former colony however, which was the only European country to be part of a modern empire until as late as 1960, it presents itself as a covertly dependent country, in which, internal realities were shaped along the lines of external interests and resulted in ethnic conflict, and where multi-complex NATO intervention has never ceased. In this conflict-ing double-identity Cyprus may be in a category of its own, vis-à-vis the new dependency.

Further research of politico-economic dependency with relation to multi-ethnic societies might add new theoretical dimensions to the field of Political Sociology. An interesting topic might be to explore the probability of dependency as the decisive factor for the distortion of ethnic relations at a multi-cultural society.

The critical role played by Geo-politics, as in the course of history especially of Mediterranean history, has gained new importance in Sociology. The Mediterranean might prove fertile ground for comparative studies of ethnic conflict and its link to geo-politics. Similarly future research could offer some useful insights to the complex Cyprus issue. Perhaps new researchers of the field will be able to determine whether the

Cyprus case stands in a category of its own in Political Sociology, or could it actually serve as a model of the geopolitical dependency being the decisive factor that produces inter-ethnic conflict in a society, when the particular domestic realities of the small country are effectively exploited.

In view of this, it can be seen that there are several principal dimensions to the unresolved Cyprus crisis.

As much as in the past as in the present the geo-political and strategic position of Cyprus has been important in South Eastern Mediterranean politics, and several factors are progressively making this importance diminish.

In the future it is not going to be to the benefit of any party involved in the dispute to have an unresolved crisis in the Mediterranean. Concerning this, the following needs to be stressed.

1) The advanced technology of our era has progressed to such a degree as to make the use of satellites possible, substituting thus in the future military facilities and military bases in key positions around the globe. In this age of nuclear and computerized warfare, conventional strategy and even geopolitics are obsolete, while the constant of geography itself can no longer be the strategic factor that it was. In the event of a Middle Eastern settlement, Cyprus would automatically lose the importance it has always had for the West as a base for attack, and for the East, as a line of defence (Coufoudakis, Orbis, Fall 1981).

2) The failure of the United States Intelligence and diplomacy throughout Cyprus' short period of independence in particular during the latest phase of the crisis, has created problems in relations between the United States and Greece. The experience of the United States' policy, backing and supporting military rule in Greece, and its subversive activities in Cyprus, has created a Greek majority that wishes nothing less than the withdrawal of all American forces from Greece.

The circumstances that took place before and after the Turkish invasion, concerning United States policy, has caused bitterness and a sense of inferiority on the part of Greece vis-à-vis Turkey.

The problem of a divided Cyprus is the major issue in Greece's negotiation about its future role in NATO, and its relations with Washington and the European Community.

Similarly, the same circumstances leading to partition, and United States policy over the issue, have created deep problems in Turco-American relations. It has been the cause of alienation on the part of Turkey, ever since the U.S. embargo on transfers of military equipment to Turkey had been imposed. This has marked a precedent for Turkish policy to suspend U.S. operations and close-down military installations whenever Turkey wishes to counteract U.S. actions. It often makes it explicit to the United States government that access to facilities is directly related to decisions on military assistance.

3) The Cyprus crisis has become a stumbling block for Turkey, for several reasons :

a) The permanent stationing of 30,000 men in the North of Cyprus and the total support of the new Turkish federated state has drained mainland Turkey's economy. Haunted by a series of major problems and in face of the economic, political and constitutional collapse, the government of Turkey was overthrown and replaced by General Evren's military dictatorship.

b) The Cyprus crisis has been blocking Turkish participation in the European Economic Community. The European Convention of Human Rights has condemned Turkish actions as violating the human rights of the Cypriot people. It has also protested against territorial occupation over a large part of Cypriot soil, and against the maintainance of Turkish troops in the North. European criticism caused the Turks to withdraw from the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly in 1982. Full membership for Turkey in the E.E.C., a desired goal, is mainly hindered by the Cyprus question.

c) It has led Turkey to strategic isolation. Greece's return to NATO's southern military wing has contributed to a diminishing of the importance of Turkey to the West. This importance can only be assessed together with Greece's.

Similarly the Cyprus conflict has become a stumbling block for Greece.

a) Greece's foreign policy is pledged to include a "solution to the Cyprus problem" as its major task.

b) The Cyprus conflict has generated a dispute between Greece

and Turkey over territorial rights in the Aegean. Greece's sea and air space have been violated frequently by Turkey, which often resorts to a show of strength.

c) Greece has attained a position of inferiority vis-à-vis Turkey in NATO. The Greek Government has publicly claimed since 1981 that it regards Turkey as its rival neighbour, with the biggest NATO army in Europe, and not the Soviet Union as a threat to the country's security. Consequently, Greece uses the urgency of a solution to the Cyprus crisis as a defensive weapon, for a better bargain vis-à-vis Turkey.

Greco-Turkish relations have been badly harmed and two NATO allies which are supposed to have mutual defense arrangements are in a constant state of the threat of war, and the threat of the dissolution of NATO.

4) The Cyprus crisis has created most damage to the Cypriots themselves.

The Turkish Cypriot leadership, despite the fact that it was left with all the advantages, was not successful in keeping the economy of the occupied North going, and the Turkish Federated State cannot exist on its own. It is suffering from high inflation and an economic blockade imposed by the official Cypriot government and the international community. Furthermore, the new Turkish state has been recognized only by two conservative Moslem states : Turkey and Bangladesh. Third World countries especially supported U.N. resolutions that are in favour of a unified and independent Cyprus.

Comparing Turkish Cyprus' economically underdeveloped situation with the rising prosperity of the Greek South, makes its problem seem even larger.

In comparison, the Greek Cypriots having suffered the losses brought about by a foreign invasion and division of their country into two, have recovered from an economic disaster, and claim to have learned from the mistakes of the past.

The basis of co-operation has always existed in Cyprus and the two ethnic communities, if left alone, could reach some degree of trust and a political consciousness of their distinct national identity.

If the two communities of Cyprus are able in the future to keep out of foreign domination and reach a settlement there is hope for the future. Characteristic, is the continuous involvement of the mother-countries in the negotiations for a settlement, contained in a statement that the ex-Turkish Foreign Secretary Gunes made to James Gallagher at a Geneva Conference in 1974 : "It is not the Cypriots who decide the fate of Cyprus, it's the Turks and the Greeks and all the rest is blah-blah" (Irish Times, 3-4-1976).

The government of Cyprus has the task to promote the initiative to improve and spread a new consciousness.

In the area of education the common political consciousness has to be raised. Here the situation does not seem to bright for it seems that since 1974 very few changes have taken place,

in terms of the dogmas and the ideology prevailing in each sector of the divided state. Kadritzke and Wagner mention an astonishing incident that reveals the attachments that still exist between each community with its mother-country. The Greek Cypriots in the Olympic Games at Montreal were part of the Greek team, under a Greek flag, instead of having formed together a team, representing the Republic of Cyprus (Kadritzke & Wagner, 1979).

For an oppressed people, its ability to determine its future, is also dependent on the ability to reanalyse its own history frankly, and learn from its mistakes.

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