

1-1-1989

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THE DEPLOYMENT OF EDUCATIONAL INNOVATION  
THROUGH FOREIGN AID:  
AN INQUIRY INTO AMERICA'S DEVELOPMENTAL IDEOLOGY

A Dissertation Presented

by

MICHAEL L. BASILE

Submitted to the Graduate School of the  
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF EDUCATION

February, 1989

School of Education



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
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
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
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School of Education

## DEDICATION

To

L. E. Crouse, Teacher

In your year of retirement, please accept this token from one ever grateful for the spirit of inquiry. While I was the only one who could open my own eyes, you were the first to help me see how closed they were.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Over the years, the members of my committee each contributed to what has evolved into a work outside the mainstream. Horace Reed, by his steadfast supervision, renewed my faith that this was indeed an endeavor of worth. David Kinsey, through his concern for balance, impartiality, and scholarship, tempered my critical urge. Nicholas Xenos, with fruitful suggestion and patience, raised my confidence to deal with unfamiliar theory. I hope that the gaps, excesses, and errors that resulted from my own faults are outweighed by their solid contribution to my personal development.

Resident membership at the Center for International Education for almost a decade has rubbed off only for the good. Dedicated to education through unflinching faith in us who are its students, the Center is owed a great debt from me. There are so many who deserve mention. I will name the one who sits at the center of the Center and embodies the best that it aspires to be, Anna Donovan. Thank you.

Kay Pfeiffer edited the work. I am relieved and grateful that her care and detached perspective exceeded my own.

Most thankful am I to Jan, with whose life mine is ever more bound. Nothing I venture is done without her.



ABSTRACT

THE DEPLOYMENT OF EDUCATIONAL INNOVATION

THROUGH FOREIGN AID:

AN INQUIRY INTO AMERICA'S DEVELOPMENTAL IDEOLOGY

FEBRUARY, 1989

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This study examines the educational policies adopted by the Agency for International Development (AID) over the past three decades. The purpose is to explore the nature of America's developmental ideology embedded in the documented policies by applying a reflective method of critical analysis. The author investigates the hypothesis that the ideological elements of the policies work to narrow the scope with which the Agency is able to approach its educational programming.

The first part of the study is a historical review of the public argumentation used to establish the Agency's approach to development. The public argumentation is found to contain underlying ideological elements that effectively combine rationales for national security with economic development. The arguments set the context in which foreign assistance was initially mounted. The study goes on to explore the more basic underpinnings of development as an

outgrowth of western positivistic thought that evolved into a policy science of development.

The concept of ideology used herein is one based on work conducted by critical theorists in the European tradition of the Frankfurt School and its recent followers. Ideology is looked on as an investigative device which enables the study of how meaning is produced to mobilize concerted policy making. The author develops a framework for the analysis of AID's policies and the identification of their ideological referents within a "social space."

In the second part, a semantic discursive analysis is done on the policies to identify the themes and metaphors contained within them. The metaphors are grouped and analyzed to determine their place among the economic, political, and legitimational forces in which the developmental ideology emerges. AID's educational policy discourses are found to arise dialectically with the effect of concealing their real ideological origins. Their effects are to narrow the diversity with which AID approaches development. The author concludes with evaluative comments about the potentials and limitations of critical analysis for policy research in education.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . .	v
ABSTRACT . . . . .	vi
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . .	xiii
Part 1: THE FUNCTION OF IDEOLOGY IN THE PRODUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE: Towards a Critical Framework . . . . .	1
Chapter	
I. PURPOSE, APPROACH, AND ORGANIZATION OF THE INQUIRY . . . . .	2
The Problem of Two Paths to Social Inquiry . . . . .	2
Purpose of the Study . . . . .	5
Proposing an Alternative Model for Critical Analysis . . . . .	10
Organization of the Study . . . . .	10
II. A REVIEW OF PUBLIC ARGUMENTS FOR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE . . . . .	17
Introduction . . . . .	17
Organization of the Chapter . . . . .	18
Public Argumentation for Foreign Assistance . . . . .	18
The Backdrop of the Cold War . . . . .	21
The Military Component of the Developmental Rationale . . . . .	26
The Economic Component of the Developmental Rationale . . . . .	30
The Political Component of the Developmental Rationale . . . . .	35
The Social Component of the Developmental Rationale . . . . .	41
Summary of the Rational Components of Public Argumentation . . . . .	46
Notes . . . . .	48



III. THE CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY AND THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC ELEMENTS OF DEVELOPMENT THEORY . . .	52
Ideology as an Investigative Concept . . . . .	52
A Personal Note . . . . .	55
Ideology in Western Social Scientific Thought . . .	58
The Historical Origins of Development as a Scientific Concept . . . . .	59
Human Mastery over Nature . . . . .	59
Science and the Regulation of Human Relations . . . . .	61
The Individual and the Concept of Private Property . . . . .	62
The Individual, the State, and the Concept of Authority . . . . .	63
Social Action as a Scientific Enterprise . .	65
Social Referents for the Deployment of Science as Development . . . . .	67
The Social Referents of the Natural Science Model . . . . .	67
Economic Referents for the Deployment of Science as Development . . . . .	71
The Transformation of Society into Questions of Economy . . . . .	72
Adam Smith and the Equation of Self with Social Interest . . . . .	75
Smith's Successors and Exponents: The Split of Economic Science from its Social Referents . . . . .	79
The Modern Interventionists . . . . .	82
The Ideological Referents of Development Science . . . . .	83
IV. THE SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF AMERICA'S DEVELOPMENTAL IDEOLOGY: THE ELEMENTS OF A CRITICAL FRAMEWORK . . . . .	86
Delegitimizing Ideology: The Purge of Social Science . . . . .	87
Uncovering Ideology in Social Policy . . . . .	87

The Historical Backcloth . . . . .	89
Theorizing Ideology: American Sociology Prior to 1960 . . . . .	90
The Impact of the Cold War and the Appropriation of Ideology . . . . .	96
The Critique of Development Science . . . . .	99
Ideology and the Production of Texts . . . . .	101
Marx and the Study of Language . . . . .	101
The Language of America's Developmental Consciousness: The Ideology of Modernity and Economic Expansion . . . . .	104
The Language of Modernity . . . . .	105
The Language of Economic Growth . . . . .	110
The Language of Economic Development . . . . .	114
Ideology and the Science of Development . . . . .	128
Social Action and the Concept of System . . . . .	128
Developmental Systems and State Policy Science . . . . .	134
The Scientization of Development Politics . . . . .	136
The Science of Development: A Critical Stance . . . . .	141
The Social Function of Ideology . . . . .	143
Notes . . . . .	150
V. A FRAMEWORK FOR CRITICAL ANALYSIS . . . . .	156
The Social Space . . . . .	156
The "Interpellation" of Developmental Consciousness . . . . .	161
The Ideology of Economic Functionalization . . . . .	163
The Ideology of Hierarchy . . . . .	166
The Ideology of Scientific Legitimation . . . . .	170
The Constitution of Developmental Consciousness . . . . .	174
Summary of Part 1 . . . . .	180

Notes . . . . .	181
Part 2: THE INSTANTIATION OF IDEOLOGY IN AID'S EDUCATIONAL POLICIES: Its Nature, Social Referents, and Implications . . . . .	183
VI. A DISCURSIVE ANALYSIS OF AID'S EDUCATIONAL POLICIES . . . . .	184
Themes and Metaphors within the Discourse . . . . .	184
Policy as Discourse: The Metaphors Within . . . . .	184
Deconstructing Policy Discourse . . . . .	185
Uncovering Themes and Metaphors . . . . .	187
AID's Statements on Educational Policy . . . . .	191
Sources and Kinds of Material Collected . . . . .	191
Policy Themes and the Metaphors Within . . . . .	192
Round 1: The Key Policy Themes . . . . .	193
Round 2: Deconstructing the Developmental Themes: In Search of the Metaphors Within . . . . .	204
VII. DEVELOPMENTAL METAPHORS AND THE REDUCTION OF DIVERSITY WITHIN THE SOCIAL SPACE . . . . .	236
Round 3: The Ideological Referents for the Metaphorical Components of Educational Policy . . . . .	236
Situating the Metaphors of Economic Growth . . . . .	236
The Functionalist Referents . . . . .	236
The Hierarchical Referents . . . . .	242
State Management of Development Education . . . . .	242
Education and Images of Hierarchy . . . . .	243
Legitimizing the Ideology of Growth . . . . .	247
The Metaphorical Referents for Situating The Poor . . . . .	250
Functionalizing the Economy of Poverty . . . . .	250
Programming Solutions to Poverty: The Hierarchical Referents . . . . .	252
The Project Model of Organization . . . . .	253



Legitimizing Intervention by Reference to to Logical Positivism . . . . .	257
The Ideological Referents for Institutionalizing Innovations . . . . .	261
Functionalizing Economic Knowledge . . . . .	261
The Hierarchical Referents for Innovation . . . . .	264
The Innovational Referents for the Legitimation of Poverty . . . . .	267
Summary of Metaphors and their Epistemological Effect . . . . .	268
VIII. THE DEPLOYMENT OF EDUCATIONAL INNOVATION AND THE APPROPRIATION OF DIVERSITY . . . . .	270
AID's Summary Discourses on the Third World . . . . .	270
Deploying the Discourses and the Appropriation of Diversity . . . . .	272
Developmental Consciousness and Narrowing Economic Choice . . . . .	274
Developmental Consciousness and Marginalizing the Poor . . . . .	277
Developmental Consciousness as Institutional Innovation . . . . .	279
The Developmental Ideology as False Consciousness . . . . .	283
Institutional Implications . . . . .	283
Individual Implications . . . . .	286
Potentials and Limitations of Critical Analysis for Educational Policy . . . . .	289
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .	294

LIST OF FIGURES

	<u>Page</u>
Figure 1: THE FLOW OF THE INQUIRY . . . . .	12
Figure 2: THE SOCIAL SPACE AND THE DETERMINATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS . . . . .	158
Figure 3: THE PRODUCTION OF FUNCTIONALIZED CONSCIOUSNESS . . . . .	165
Figure 4: STRUCTURING THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF ORDER . . .	169
Figure 5: THE LEGITIMATION OF DEVELOPMENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS . . . . .	173
Figure 6: THE SOCIAL SPACE AND THE THINKING SUBJECT . .	179
Figure 7: THE LOGICAL FRAMEWORK . . . . .	258

Part 1

THE FUNCTION OF IDEOLOGY IN THE PRODUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE:

Towards a Critical Framework



CHAPTER I  
PURPOSE, APPROACH, AND ORGANIZATION OF THE INQUIRY

The Problem of Two Paths to Social Inquiry

The spirit of inquiry is propelled by the urge to know the nature of things. We inquire in order to understand our world. We explore as a result of a need to know, and in that exploration we make use of the tools at hand. The need to know is derived from our position in history, while the tools to know are derived from our store of knowledge.

The endeavor to know takes place in time and space, ordered by social convention and cultural artifact. Thus, production of knowledge is foremost a social act. What we know about the world and our relation to it depends on our temporal and spatial location. Moreover, our endeavor to understand and control our interactions with the world is determined by our position and the state of the tools we use. Owing to the situational referents of knowledge, our lot is to live as imperfect beings in an imperfect world.

Problems of inquiry arise whenever our powers of thought outpace our stage of development. We conceive the idea of perfection out of our imperfections. In so doing, we come to exercise the power to think thoughts beyond the range of experience. The abyss between thought and action, between theory and practice propels us to inquire further in the constant endeavor to align ourselves more closely with

our conceptions. The abyss is the source of our advance as well as our misery. We strive to become better, seeking to leap beyond the cage of history, our intermittent successes tempered by propensity to failure, caught forever between the realities of the material world below and the ideals of heaven above.

The power to reason is used to search for and express truth. The lot of humanity is to use this power for social ends. Human struggle throughout history can be seen in the light of competing interpretations of truth, where one version is used to justify the actions of some against the positions of others who hold to a different version. In this struggle, competing sides are pressured to resort to absolute authority to mobilize meaning. Their tendency is to depict truth not as a fallible search for knowledge, but as an authoritative source for the mobilization of action. Reason, when so applied, is directed not purely at the exploration of uncertainty, but at the rationalization of certainty.

Thus, our uniquely human power to reason is subject to the social context in which it is applied. The problem befalls us in the denial of the context and the subsequent recourse to higher authority. The struggle for truth is two-sided, the one recognizing its material roots, the other resorting to absolute authority. The latter seeks constantly to rise above its social origins, the former

seeks to delve into its grounds. The impetus to turn the quest for truth into a scheme to impose knowledge is ever at work, confusing the difference among us all, irrespective of background and education.

The practice of social inquiry is realized then as a dilemma. Reason applied to the study of society is the keystone of deliberate progress. But, if any difference is to be made, reasoned conceptions of progress must render meaning in some social sense. The students of society must exercise the power to mobilize action. Whatever their content, the effect of social conceptions must be to convince enough of us to follow a similar course of action, to develop along a common path. We must be convinced of their truth.

The search for truth is therefore subject to, indeed fueled by, the advancement of social interests. In fact, truth-seeking is an activity imbued with the clash of interests. The dilemma we face is that efforts to find truth are prone to use knowledge to deny their relationships to specific interests, rather than to reveal them. The purpose of knowledge production then becomes the validation of findings in absolute terms, as if the findings were totally free of the circumstances in which they were made. The process of knowledge production tends to deflect attention away from the task of exposing real material interests and relegate it onto the plane of universal proof.

How does this happen in concrete instance? This study is premised on the assumption that the search for and application of knowledge is tied to the advancement of special interests. I accept the validity of this premise fully. My purpose is not to examine its truth or falsity in a philosophical sense. It is rather to see how the premise works in a specific instance and to alert us to its implications. My interest is to explore the questions of why and how we tend to separate knowledge from social interests in order to further them. I take this to be a problem in need of attention because unless we become aware of its origins in the circumstance of history, we are prone to use knowledge more as a weapon in the arsenal of domination than as a tool for social liberation.

Our fate as thinking beings is to produce and use knowledge for good or ill. The obligation we have as researchers and students of society is to appreciate more fully the fact that the knowledge we produce inevitably has social referents.

#### Purpose of the Study

I offer this work in the interests of deliverance from the propensity to apply knowledge without appreciation of its social referents. Insofar as we fail to see the situational roots of knowledge and the interests behind it, we act not out of informed choice, but out of ignorance and

deceit. We serve others unwittingly, and in so doing, we remain subject to the perversion of the very meaning of what we do.

My concern is with education and development. The endeavor to improve education in the Third World is fertile ground on which to examine innovative attempts to spread new knowledge. In the Third World, the clash of approaches to revamp education offers the opportunity to examine how initiatives to modernize educational systems are characterized by starkly conflicting views of political economy. In the effort to promote one's interests over others, competing claims are made to prove the validity of one's knowledge about economy and political organization. The knowledge claims are usually based on assumptions that are held as if universally true, irrespective of variations in culture and history.

My immediate purpose is to examine these claims and the assumptions that underlie them in a specific instance: United States foreign assistance to education in the Third World. U. S. aid is guided by a set of policies that are based in a view of economy and polity that is held to be valid for adoption by other countries. While they claim to accommodate, indeed provide for local variation, I suggest here that the educational policies adopted by the Agency for International Development (AID) are based on knowledge claims whose validity is subject to doubt. The principal



question that guides my inquiry is:

\* Can an alternative way to investigate the validity of the knowledge claims embedded in AID's policy statements be developed? If so, what form does it take, what can it find, and what are its limitations?

The significance of this question is derived from my purpose. I wish to develop a way to resist the propensity to apply knowledge absolutely, without due regard for its social origins and consequences. To this end, I explore the possibility that American development policy is based on knowledge claims that are fallacious. The claims AID makes to revamp and modernize educational systems rely heavily on research procedures conducted in the western tradition of logical positivism. AID's policies in education appear to advance this traditional approach to knowledge formation and application to the exclusion of alternatives. In doing so, the Agency risks furthering obscure, special interests without appreciating their implications for narrowing rather than expanding options for development.

The hypothesis I examine is that AID's educational policies have the social effect of concealing the interests that underlie them. Insofar as the policies conceal such interests, the opportunity to examine, choose, and pursue alternative paths to educational development is diminished. My search is for a way out of the bind in which uncritical adherence to fallacious procedure in social policy keeps us. Unless we develop a way to relate policy to interest more openly, we further - instead of counter - the propensity for

error. We thus remain prone to use educational modernization to diffuse falsity through ideology rather than advance the cause of education as a means to pursue the search for truth in its diverse constructions.

The specific questions I pursue in the study relate to ideology. At the outset, I take ideology to lie at the heart of the problem. Ideology performs a deceptive function in that it enables policy to be produced without explicit reference to the interests it serves. From this perspective, ideology has a dual function. First, ideology provides a means to unify the disparate and conflicting forces of the political economy into rational "wholes." Second, the ideological wholes then operate to produce ostensibly rational discourses on which to base policy. The effects of the discourses are to conceal rather than reveal the ideological interests that underlie them. I suggest that by investigating this dual functional role of ideology a way can be found to counter the propensity for concealing the social interests undergirding policy that at first glance may appear to be neutral, benign, and free of value.

The first set of implementing questions I address therefore has to do with the epistemological foundations of development. What kind of claims has AID been making to pursue the course of development it has taken over the past thirty years? What are the arguments the Agency has used to support such claims? What historical basis in western

social thought can be found to support the knowledge claims embedded in the arguments? The objective of this set of questions is to develop a theoretical framework for the investigation of the function of ideology involved in producing AID's educational policies. .

The second set of questions focuses directly on the policy statements which constitute AID's developmental discourses. What are the policies AID has followed since it assigned explicit priority to education in the early seventies? What major developmental themes can be ascertained in the policies? What metaphorical elements can be extracted from the themes? The objective of this next set of questions is to elucidate the metaphorical sources of knowledge embedded in AID's developmental policies. Once the metaphors are made explicit as such, the door to alternative interpretation may be opened wider.

The third set involves the relationships that I suggest exist between the metaphors found and the ideological wholes in which they were produced. In what ways might the conjunctions of ideology and the specific developmental metaphors conceal interests? What are the implications of continued adherence to present policies? Finally, what is the potential of the frame of analysis I propose in this work for a critical alternative to conventional modes of knowledge production in current use? What are its limitations?

## Proposing an Alternative Model for Critical Analysis


### Organization of the Study

The specific instance of ideology I study here makes use of both deductive and inductive processes of investigation. The overarching concern I have is to avoid the error of replicating the problem I seek to address: the propensity to apply exclusively positivistic methods to the analysis of social problems in the effort to generate new knowledge. In this work, therefore, I apply a critical perspective in the tradition of the Frankfurt School of social analysis. My concern is not to produce new findings as an increment to current lines of conventional social research. Instead, I seek to generate new insight by critical investigation of the fallacies inherent in the current social research used to support educational policy. The mode of critical analysis relies on reflection as the means to investigate the social roots of knowledge claims. My intent is bent on revealing the internal contradictions embedded in the knowledge claims on which AID has based its educational policies.

The study is divided into two parts. Part 1 is concerned with establishing the theoretical potential for the study of ideology in the production of knowledge. This part is directed toward the formation of a critical framework with which to pursue deductively the investigation of the functional role of ideology in the rationalization of

certain economic and political interests. In order to develop this framework, I direct questions to the epistemological origins of the claims AID has made to ground its educational policies. Part 2 applies an inductive method of analysis to "deconstruct" the policy statements made to guide AID's initiatives in education. In the second part, I examine the relations between the metaphorical elements of policy discourses and the ideologies that undergird them. The study concludes with an evaluation of the potentials and limitations of a reflective analytical approach to the investigation of the epistemological foundations of policy formation in education. Figure 1 on page 12 displays the convergence of the inductive/deductive flows of research I use in the effort to expose the nature of the relationship between the clustering of discourses I call "developmental consciousness" and its ideological referents.

Since I start from the position that knowledge is always based in a social referent, my initial focus is on how knowledge is generated in a particular tradition of research, that of positivistic sociology. In Chapter II, I set the historical stage by recollecting the foundations of AID's developmental policies since the late forties. I begin with a review of the arguments put forth in support of foreign assistance as an instrument of development. The review takes the form of reflections on the historical



**THE FLOW OF THE INQUIRY**

**Figure 1**



debate that went into defining AID's foreign assistance programs overall. By examining several samples of the content of that debate, I draw several preliminary conclusions about the limitations of its focus and their effect on the scope with which development was conceived from the start. From that review, I plan to draw a few critical inferences about the shortcomings of those arguments as impediments to clear thinking about possible options for alternative development theories.

Proceeding from these insights, Chapter III examines the theoretical possibility that the production and application of development theory is subject to historical forces that are neither self-evident nor self-explanatory. I develop the concept of ideology both as a focus of attention and as a reflective tool for the investigation. This application of a theory of ideology is directed to the task of reviewing the ways in which knowledge has been produced in the western positivistic tradition. I examine this tradition in accordance with the strands of economic and political thought that have come to be incorporated in development theory. The idea that the theories make certain epistemological assumptions about the nature of the social and natural world is explored. I suggest that the assumptions collectively form an ideology that sets the frame in which development can be defined as a concept.

In Chapter IV my focus is on the means through which a science of development emerged through the separation of ideology from science. This "split" resulted in a narrowed version of ideology and the legitimation of a universally scientific approach to the resolution of development problems. The chapter introduces the concept of language as the central means by which development ideology is legitimated. The concept forms the basis for the critical framework with which I examine those policies later on in Part 2.

This phase of the analysis culminates in Chapter V in a conceptual framework that contains a series of questions whose focus is on the economic, political, and legitimational ideologies that undergird the production of development policy. The framework introduces the analytical concept of the "social space" with which I explore the functional role of ideology in the instance of aid to education. The concept of social space provides a deductive method to study the economic, political, and legitimizing forces that converge to create disparate ideological clusters, the developmentalist version included.

The second direction taken is inductive, where the research methodology of critical reflection is applied in an analytical flow from "earth to heaven." The earth generates the concrete, tangible material in the form of AID's educational policy. Part 2 treats that material with three

discursive operations: thematic, metaphoric, and locational, the latter designed to explore the linkages between the themes and metaphors and their respective ideological positions within the social space.

In Part 2, I begin with what I take to be the central problem - the power of the actual language used to mobilize action to further obscure ideological interests. The purpose of Chapter VI is to examine AID's policy statements with a view to "deconstruct" them. The premise I start with corresponds to the critical theme used throughout the study as a whole. Knowledge is produced to accomplish social ends that are not always self-evident; knowledge is constructed from a certain position. Tools of investigation therefore cannot be neutral. They are created, borrowed, and applied so as to persuade others to follow a certain path, in this case, the developmental path implied by a specific approach to education. With this in mind, I refer to analytical schemes proposed by Foucault and Ricoeur to identify the metaphorical sources of knowledge AID uses to formulate its educational policies. The deconstruction process is directed toward clarification of the knowledge discourses on which the policies are based. My objective here is to extract the knowledge themes and metaphors that lay embedded within the policies.

In Chapter VII, I link the metaphorical themes to their respective ideological positions within the frame of

analysis developed in Chapter V. I see this final operation as a grouping of metaphorical themes within the four major component forces of the social space. At this point I explore what I suspect to be a dialectical relation between the developmental metaphors and their ideological location within the social space. Of particular interest will be the concrete ways by which the discourses on policy act to serve two purposes: To provide a rational basis to govern action on behalf of specific interests while simultaneously concealing them.

I conclude the inquiry in Chapter VIII with an analysis of the implications for continued adherence to such policies without critical reflection on their social effects, devoting particular attention to the possibility that the developmental ideology may act, in fact, to constrict the diversity with which AID can approach assistance to education. Finally, I plan to examine the utility of the proposed approach to the critical analysis of policy production in development education. Ideology, the deconstruction of knowledge discourses, and the dialectical method of examining relations between knowledge and interests are reviewed in order to identify their potentials and limitations as tools for the critique of policy production and application processes in education and knowledge building.

## CHAPTER II

### A REVIEW OF PUBLIC ARGUMENTS FOR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

#### Introduction

The questions of how and why the U. S. Government became involved in the enterprise of development is the subject of this chapter. In the late 1940s, the United States was faced with the choice of returning to isolationist policies of the past or embarking on a new form of global involvement as the most powerful of the industrialized nations to emerge from World War II. The debate turned on the concept of security. Providing assistance to the newly emerging states of Africa, Asia, and Latin America would enhance U. S. security while failure to do so would provide the expansionist tendencies of the socialist states room to spread.

Of interest is the argumentation used to justify national involvement in terms of developmental assistance. This argumentation offers an excellent point of departure to explore the grounds on which a matter of essentially unilateral political interest, that of international security, was transformed into a question of technological progress for the entire nonindustrialized world. In order to begin study of this transformation, this chapter focuses on the discursive arguments put forth by development advocates as a way to examine the rationales on which they

were based. Once identified, the rationales provide a means to trace the epistemological foundations of development thought that undergirds U. S. development policy to this day.

### Organization of the Chapter

This chapter examines the historical context in which foreign assistance has been framed since the demise of the Marshall Plan in the late forties. I look at the public argumentation that has been put forth as a way to raise the security, economic, political, and other social issues that have served as justifications for one kind of foreign assistance or other. My purpose is to trace the evolution of arguments in support of foreign aid in order to identify the major rationales used to support them. Once clearly stated, the rationales will allow me to draw several preliminary inferences about the approach to development taken by the Agency over the span of three decades.

#### Public Argumentation for Foreign Assistance

Referring to the "main tenets" of an "international ideology of development," Francis X. Sutton (1982, pp. 49-57), then deputy vice-president of the Ford Foundation, extracted several ideological themes that were evident in the arguments used to support foreign assistance to



developing countries after the Second World War:

- \* Professed egalitarianism which proclaimed the right of self-determination of all peoples and viewed inequalities between and within nations as problems to be remedied.
- \* Obligation of all nations to strive for material betterment and to observe the rights and freedoms codified in the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights.
- \* With the exception of the Communist Bloc, division of the world into the now developing and the already developed nations, with the latter obligated with concern for the former.
- \* Transformation of national governments of developing nations from "guardians of law and order" into centers to guide the process of "rationally controlled change."
- \* Control over the development process as the rightful governmental prerogative of the developing nations themselves, which would exercise choice over the kinds of external assistance to be introduced.
- \* Appropriate training as the remedy for governmental deficiencies to carry out development programs.
- \* Education as the keystone of development and the universal right of all.
- \* Foreign aid as a neutral technical and economic instrument.
- \* Open international economic system characterized by the free movement of capital and trade.
- \* International political system carried on according to principles of self-determination with the exception of "defection" to the Communist Bloc. (pp. 49-50)

Using Sutton's extrapolation of ideological tenets as a point of departure, I begin with the period when America's attention was initially directed to the emerging problems of developing countries during the Truman Administration.

The effort to forge a consensus around a new direction for foreign assistance was launched as "Point Four" by

President Truman in his Inaugural Address of 1949:

Fourth, we must embark on a bold program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas....

I believe that we should make available to peace loving peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better life. And in cooperation with other nations, we should foster capital investment in areas needing development....

Our aim should be to help the free peoples of the world, through their own efforts, to produce more food, more clothing, more materials for housing, and more mechanical power to lighten their burdens....

Greater production is the key to prosperity and peace. And the key to greater production is a wider and more vigorous application of modern scientific and technical knowledge. (cited in Daniels, 1951, pp. 10-11)

Several of the themes mentioned by Truman were actually incorporated into the "Act for International Development" passed by Congress on June 5, 1950:

Section 402. (a) The peoples of the United States and other nations have a common interest in the freedom and in the economic and social progress of all peoples. Such progress can further the secure growth of democratic ways of life, the expansion of mutually beneficial commerce, the development of international understanding and good will, and the maintenance of world peace.

(b) The efforts of peoples living in economically underdeveloped areas of the world to realize their full capabilities and to develop the resources of the lands in which they live can be furthered through the cooperative endeavor of all nations to exchange technical knowledge and skills and to encourage the flow of investment capital....(From Public Law 535, Chapter 220, Title IV)

Taken together, Truman's public announcement, Sutton's summary of tenets, and the Act for International Development include the basic elements of the publicly argued case for the United States to embark on a new program of foreign

economic assistance to the developing world.

In the following paragraphs, I extract the rationales embedded within the arguments. While overlap is evident, I divide the arguments into their military, economic, political, and social components. The divisions correspond roughly to the historical sequence of arguments put forward following the success of the Marshall Plan in Europe in the late 1940s.

### The Backdrop of the Cold War

The realization that competition for influence among nations could be engaged without direct military conflict is commonly termed the "Cold War." The post-war bipolar conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union was characterized by policies of military deterrence and positioning through the formation of strategic alliances, contending economic approaches to development, political agreements for mutual assistance, and social policies of modernization. The concept of bipolarity depicted a world divided into two major adversaries, the "free world," increasingly dependent on the military largesse of the United States for protection, and the socialist world, whose member states were led by the Soviet Union. The U. S. saw itself in the position of leadership in defending the interests of the free world against the impending spread of both Soviet-inspired and Asian variations of communism,

which were viewed collectively to make up the "Communist Bloc."

The early debate for and against technical assistance took place in this context of bipolarity.<sup>1</sup> Following its decision to reduce the amount of military and economic assistance to Europe in the early 1950s (LRS, 1968, pp. 46-50), the United States increased military assistance to selected nations of Asia, the Near East, and Africa, with a lesser amount going to Latin America (pp. 57-61). The total amount the U. S. expended for exclusively military purposes throughout the developing world until 1958 was less than one third of that spent for other, chiefly economic, purposes, the majority of military and military-related assistance shifting to Southeast Asia over the period (Pentony, 1960, pp. 6-12). While the relative emphasis on and utility of military versus economic assistance dominated the debate during the early years, Kaplan (1967, pp. 282-288) concluded that both sides of the debate exaggerated the difference between the two, inasmuch as the forms in which both military and economic assistance were given resulted in "...add[ing] resources to the recipient society and free[ing] its own tax revenues and foreign exchange for other uses. Both programs may purchase similar and even freely interchangeable goods and services. Either can be used to promote a wide variety of donor or recipient objectives, whether they pertain to national security or to social reform" (pp. 283-284).

The Cold War also set the context in which arguments were made in support of non-military initiatives into the developing nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Economic development provided the means for countering the appeal communist revolutionary philosophy was thought to have to the impoverished, weak, and susceptible peoples of the developing world.

Accordingly, the economic development rationale was put forward as another "peaceful" weapon in the west's arsenal of strategies available for countering the threat of communist expansion. The bipolar view of two armed camps fueled the public debate in the U. S., particularly around the notion of "containment."<sup>2</sup> As a whole, the debate sharpened the American public's concern for communism, not simply as a military, but also an economic and political peril which had the power to spread the tenets of communism to the world's helpless and uninitiated.<sup>3</sup>

One element of the contemporary American national psyche is important to recall here. During the late forties and early fifties, fears of domestic communist infiltration were fueled by several concrete instances. The Hiss trial (Cooke, 1951; Hiss, 1957; Chambers, 1952), McCarthy's charges of subversion against the Voice of America, the State Department, and the Army (Straight, 1954; Rovere, 1959; Shils, 1956), disloyalty accusations against nuclear



physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer (Curtis, 1955), the trial and execution of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg for atomic espionage, and the 1952 vice-presidential election campaign of Richard Nixon, which focused on ridding the Truman Administration of communist conspiratorial influences all contributed to a heightened awareness, indeed a hypersensitivity to the growing communist subversion at the very heart of national government.

On the international front, Soviet military and technological successes at home were paralleled by expansion of communist influence in Asia, most dramatically with the fall of the Kuomintang in China and recognition of insurgency activities in several other countries. Fears that a cherished way of life was threatened from both the outside and the inside by an alien system of belief quite naturally extended into the realm of foreign policy where the threat was most immediately encountered. The idea of an alternative economic approach to life that was actually making headway in the world was most worrisome to an America in the process of increasing its economic ties not only in Europe, but throughout the world of developing nations as well. Milton Friedman (Pentony, Ed., 1960, pp. 105-116) set out the theme of competition between two radically opposed economic systems this way:

What is involved here is no less than another phase of the ideological war in which we are engaged. A central premise of the Communist ideology is that the state must exercise comprehensive control and direction over



the economic activities of its citizens; a central premise of Western liberalism is that free men operating in a free market can promote their own objectives without the necessity for an all-powerful state. (p. 111)<sup>4</sup>

While Friedman's reminder about the essence of liberal democracy may have rung true in an ideological sense, at least to classic economic liberals, tangible efforts to contain communist expansion in Asia and elsewhere emerged in reality as a hodgepodge of tactical and strategic measures which represented a diversity of interests. According to Kaplan (1967, pp. 280-319), early conflicts among administrators and legislators about aid hinged mainly on its form, that is, whether it was to be delivered by way of loans, grants, in-kind deliveries of food or equipment, programs to finance imports or activities, or technical assistance projects. The conflicts tended to detract from achieving security and development objectives on a country-by-country basis according to the conditions actually encountered in the field.

Differing views on how to bring about peace, international stability, and national security often resulted in restrictions on the discretionary authority of aid administrators to develop appropriate responses to local conditions. Stemming as they seemed from conflicting strategies, disparities often prevented the attainment of compromises strong enough to formulate consistent policy. Nonetheless, security needs to implement a consistent

foreign aid policy eventually overrode the objections leveled previously. To this end, a development cum security rationale was advanced with success. The components of that rationale are examined below.

### The Military Component of the Developmental Rationale

Arguments made in the early 1950s in support of linkages between military and economic assistance claimed that such assistance in order of priority would:

- \* Further U. S. security interests by building a strong free world alliance.

- \* Assist in building adequate defenses while preparing basic economies.

- \* Enable the U. S. to provide for its own defense more economically.

- \* Help deter Soviet aggression.

- \* Make the communist alternative less attractive by raising living standards.

- \* Maintain access to raw materials.

- \* Maintain long term strength to resist the Soviet bloc.

- \* Lay the foundation for world prosperity by raising living standards.

- \* Help build the economies and defense establishments of allied nations.

- \* Provide strategic military bases throughout the world.

- \* Help develop a more favorable attitude toward the United States.

- \* Help stimulate more American private interests,

expand exports and markets in developing areas while stimulating employment at home. (Paraphrased from LRS, 1968, pp. 83-84)

One group of proponents took the position that military assistance was needed because overlapping U. S. national security interests and the vulnerability of developing nations required: First, build-up of allied conventional armed forces ready to resist insurgency and aggression; and second, temporary compensation for the disproportionate amount of indigenous capital and other resources the developing nations were obliged to devote to their own defense needs (Pentony, 1960, p. 18). The Military Assistance Program to non-European nations was begun in the early fifties with the avowed purpose to promote internal and external stability and compensate for the lack of regional cooperation among key countries situated on the periphery of the Communist Bloc (LRS, 1968, pp. 57-61).<sup>5</sup> Together, the rationales combined military with economic interests to formulate a security-based development policy.

Justification for military assistance for development was provided by Lucien W. Pye (1963, pp. 49-62). Beginning with the question whether "...military rule can, in fact, establish the necessary basis for the growth of representative institutions" (p. 49), Pye first noted the lack of research into this question on three counts: the western scholar's inattention to "the sociology of armies," the lack of knowledge about the transitional process from

"...a traditional and authoritarian basis to the establishment of democratic institutions..." (p. 50), and the lack of a doctrine to guide U. S. policy in providing assistance for the establishment of such institutions. He raised the administrative institution as a point of focus for targeting assistance, military and otherwise.

Kaplan (1967, pp. 284-286) further identified several forms of military assistance that had economic parallels: operational costs funding, supply, maintenance and repair, construction, and training. The organizational forms by which such administrative functions were argued to correspond with their "purely" economic counterparts could be distinguished in the concern for administrative procedure, bureaucracy, education, and institutional capacity to manage resources efficiently and effectively. In effect, what Pye did was to define the army as a "modern organization," presumably because it was capable of managing resources by carrying out the above functions efficiently. This definition contrasted the army's "rational management model" with the disorder and backwardness supposedly characteristic of "ritualized, tradition-bound" societies (Pye, pp. 52-53). The analytical artifact of asymmetrical definition was employed later by modernization theorists. Modernization rationales were initially based on the logical convention of supplying the definition of modern by counterposing other forms of social organization as "traditional" (e.g., Inkeles and Smith, 1974).<sup>6</sup>

The development potential of military assistance clearly extended beyond the deterrence-oriented thrust of containment policy. The backdrop of the Cold War provided the American public with enough reason to support intervention in the domestic affairs of other nations with a physical presence in the form of military force. However, it could not in and of itself prescribe the forms this presence would actually take. Other rationales had to be devised to guide U. S. involvement in development.

The military rationale in support of economic development can be summarized as a cluster of rationales justifying the expenditure of resources and direct American involvement in the internal affairs of developing nations in the name of security. Such involvement was viewed to be compelled by two essentially external conditions: The spread of communist ideology; and the resultant vulnerability of countries that had not yet developed the means to adequately defend themselves. The cluster of rationales can be stated as:

- \* A cherished way of life was threatened by an alien force of ideas, practices, and arms.
- \* The threat could be contained by organizing sufficient counterforce of ideas, practices, and arms.
- \* The U. S. was obliged to protect itself and other free nations by involving itself in alliances through which it could transfer military and other equipment, transmit knowledge of new practices, and assist in the development of local institutions that would be instrumental to the task of modernization.

The military aspect of development policy was thus supported by the combined rationales for the deterrence of external threat by means of arms and the administrative backing required to deploy them. The cluster as a whole amounted to an operant ideology of protectionistic interventionism (cf., Preston, 1985), where American technological assistance through the military apparatus was argued to be indispensable to the development of the new states whose continued vulnerability to communist exploitation posed a danger to American security. The economic corollary of this view is pursued in the following section where I examine how the Cold War shaped economic development.

#### The Economic Component of the Developmental Rationale

Some proponents of increased foreign economic assistance argued for more direct involvement by the U. S. on a government-to-government basis in order to create or improve the conditions under which economic growth could best take place. Along these lines, Millikan and Rostow (1957) proposed several development policy guidelines: The United States take economic leadership in advancing an assistance program that would make sufficient capital available for "self-sustaining growth"; offer direct assistance in the way of technology, infrastructure, and



institutional development programs; and create a climate for international economic activity which stressed commercial ties among the industrialized nations (p. 55).

While the contemporary American emphasis on vigilance against communist subversion was not the only factor shaping the foreign policy of the period, programmatic arguments in support of foreign economic assistance far from trivialized public attention to the communist problem as an economic challenge. Indeed, in the effort to bolster the force of the economic rationale, proponents of such assistance often cited the economic necessity for combating the spread of communist influence through foreign assistance programs that were responsive to economic needs (Rostow, 1963, pp. 8-18; Chenery, 1962, pp. 32-45). The Rockefeller Report (Daniels, 1951, pp. 77-83) summarized the primacy of the economic rationale that "Peace, free institutions, and human-well being can be assured only within the frame of an expanding world economy" (p. 77). The Gray Report (Daniels, 1951, pp. 72-77) states that ... "the need for economic development in these [underdeveloped] areas [is becoming] daily more pressing, not only for their own welfare, but for the security and the well-being of all the free nations" (pp. 72-73). Others made similar arguments (e.g., Condliffe, 1951, pp.152-156; Russell, 1951, pp. 156-158).

The majority of economic arguments about limiting foreign assistance to the removal of trade barriers alone,

with Milton Friedman's conservative Chicago School leading the list, were cast in the mold of bipolarity with a hostile economic system. On the other hand, the point made by those concerned to do more was that the United States as a responsible leader among free nations was obligated to become involved in efforts to cultivate private enterprise in developing nations as one way to insure the continuation of its own economic ascendancy. Arguments in support of such involvement took different forms. Initially, a series of programmatic strategies were devised as investments to lay an adequate infrastructural base so that economic assistance might be used effectively and wisely without waste. In 1950, the State Department's Special Assistant for Economic Affairs Samuel P. Hayes elaborated on the need to develop sufficient "receptivity" factors among the people:

...Before capital and modern technology can be fully utilized in an underdeveloped area, there is usually a lot of groundwork to be done. The people in that area must be ready to receive technical knowledge and to make efficient use of capital, and the early stages of economic development in many areas must, therefore, be concerned with improvements in basic education, health and sanitation, and food supply. (1951, p. 13)

The "groundwork" was seen to be an infrastructure that was prerequisite to the efficient introduction of technological and capital investments. The groundwork argument was designed to counter charges leveled by conservative legislators and others about "waste" and unnecessary spending down the "rathole" of corrupt governments whose

leaders were prone to take the gifts of American taxpayers and mispend them for their own selfish purposes (e.g., Castle, 1960, pp. 26-31; Braden, 1960, pp. 52-55; Oganessoff, 1960, pp. 130-138). As was the case with any investment, public or private, foreign economic assistance directed toward laying this groundwork was viewed as "risky business" for the single, unprotected corporate investor. The use of public monies was justified on the grounds summarized by Rosenthal that:

...There is ample scope for private investment throughout the world if there is first an impetus to economic development in those areas where so little has been done and where the people have such a low level of existence that their purchasing power is almost nil.

Therefore, the American businessman should welcome the prior and proper use of public funds, to give the underdeveloped areas a start toward improving themselves....(Rosenthal, 1951, p. 135)

Within the economic arguments advanced above on behalf of foreign assistance, several rationales were held in common:

- \* The advance of communism in the underdeveloped world could be countered by American economic leadership exercised through the formation of commercial and governmental ties among independent nations.
- \* The economies of the underdeveloped nations had to be modernized as a condition indispensable to their own and U. S. security against the spread of communism.
- \* If given the choice, people of the underdeveloped world preferred modernization over the traditional way of life. The route to modernization could be expedited through economic collaboration between more and less developed countries.
- \* The exercise of economic choice in a free market economy was conditional to the concept of democratic

freedom. Conversely, restrictions on free markets diminished such freedom.

This ensemble of rationales set the parameters for the specific kinds of economic assistance that could be provided to the developing world in the early 1950s. Collectively, the arguments contained elements of optimism that peace and the democratic way of life could best be secured through the adoption of specific economic policies; faith in the goodness of the modern American version of economic life as appropriate for and desirable by all peoples; and belief in the power of foreign assistance to improve economic conditions for the majority of peoples in the free world. Though not totally consistent, the rationales were combined to form an ideological consensus that proved sufficient in strength for the Truman and Eisenhower administrations to mount what was then an unprecedented economic initiative into the world of uncommitted, newly emerging, and politically independent nations.<sup>7</sup>

In summary, the terms by which U. S. involvement in the economic transformation of developing societies were structured can be distinguished as an ideological cluster of rationales for obligatory American intervention by economic stewardship. The sense of urgency and justification for such intervention was conveyed sufficiently by the context of the Cold War. I will now turn to the political corollary of this cluster.

The Political Component of  
the Developmental Rationale

The world political context within which foreign economic assistance was initiated was also characterized by the emergence of two contending ideological systems which confronted one another in the arena of "peaceful coexistence."<sup>8</sup> The political dimension of the confrontation was summarized as a competition for the allegiance of the peoples of the developing world who were expected to choose sides according to their perception of their national interests. Chester Bowles, Ambassador to India in 1951, stated in the New York Times Magazine:

...Military power is not enough because it deals with only part of the problem...we are also faced with an idea, the idea of world communism; and planes, battleships and tanks have never yet been able to destroy an idea, even a bad idea. The whole history of mankind demonstrated that an idea can be matched in only one way, and that is by a better idea...As we face the threat of world communism we should be thankful that inherent in our American democracy is an idea which potentially is the most powerful in the world...The stakes are no less than the future of the democratic ideal in America and throughout the world. If this ideal is to grow and expand, we must face up honestly to weaknesses in our own democracy. We must offer vigorous assistance to other less fortunate peoples in the development of their economies. We must reject the isolationist concept of military power as an end in itself...If we fail, the ultimate hopes of the free world die with us. In the grim cycle of Professor Toynbee, America will take its place among other once great nations which placed their sole faith in militarism and materialism, and so finally died of moral dry rot. (Bowles, 1951, pp. 38-42)

Bowles' essentially political argument consisted of several rationales. It was framed within the peaceful



struggle between two expansionist ideologies. It was addressed to Americans as part of the effort to garner their support for a political/ideological analog to the exclusive reliance on military power. It called for the spread of democratic forms of government among developing nations. And it drew moral inspiration by invoking the sense of obligation of the most highly developed nation to safeguard political and economic freedom by helping those in need. Besides, more than anything else Bowles' claimed that support for aid could produce tangible security benefits by spreading American democratic ideals while it fostered domestic economic prosperity from growing involvement in foreign economies.

In reality, however, the political history of U. S. foreign assistance throughout the decade of the fifties is rather confusing. A clear sense of purpose and direction is difficult to discern (Pentony, 1960, p. 24). By 1960, it was evident that the political benefits actually derived from the dispensation of aid were very much in doubt. President Kennedy's Message to the Congress of March 22, 1961 (cited in Goldwin, 1962, pp. 1-9) called past concepts "unsatisfactory" and "unsuited" for the sixties. Banfield's review of past doctrines (1962, pp. 10-31) dispelled several of Millikan and Rostow's (1957) premises which guided past aid policies and programs:



\* The doctrine of "indirect influence" whereby aid was expected to change the cultural outlook and institutions of underdeveloped countries was flawed, he said, because the chain of logical assumptions that raising incomes would necessarily change institutions, which would then lead to freedom and democracy, which would then lead to peace, which would result in the enhanced security of the United States, was too precarious and fraught with wishful thinking to produce intended results (pp. 11-18).

\* The doctrine of "direct influence" was based on the direct effects aid was to have on policies set by foreign governments and influenced by public opinion. Such influence was to have been exercised in several ways: (a) as part of a "quid pro quo" bargain between governments; (b) through long term "business friendship" whereby unspecified political benefits would ensue in exchange for economic ones; (c) by "maintaining friendly governments" in power; (d) through the "power of prestige" which would tangibly demonstrate the donor's strength; (e) by establishing a joint climate of "good will" between people; and (f) with the "moral force" that aid would inspire on public opinion in developing nations to reciprocate similarly (pp. 18-21).

\* Altruistic rationales (e.g., Millikan & Rostow, 1957) for aid could not hold water because one culture's definition of "good," namely the recipient's, would necessarily differ from that of another, the donor's;<sup>9</sup> or

because "it is right," in that only individuals acting voluntarily, not government whose nature is coercive, could act morally. Nor could it be argued for the cultural benefit of America, whereby the American professional community's efforts to create a better world would automatically improve the domestic quality of life. Such efforts could logically be countered by groups who would organize themselves to oppose aid (Banfield, 1962, pp. 23-26).

Banfield's refutations notwithstanding, several political doctrines in support of foreign assistance progressed from the contextual concern with developing an arsenal of means to counter the communist appeal (Watnick, 1963, pp. 103-119) toward the deployment of a more comprehensive strategy of modernization. This strategy required "...the development of an ethos and system of values which can compete successfully with the attraction exercised by communism for those sections of the native intelligentsia which have been the source and mainstay of its leadership" (Watnick, 1963, p. 119). The counterappeal was to be directed first toward such targeted elite groups as:

"...the traditional feudal or tribal leaders, the military, the initially small but growing urban commercial and business class, the landowners, and the intelligentsia. As the process [of modernization] takes on momentum and the perception of new alternatives spreads through the society, new groups become important - the peasantry, urban labor, the new student class." (Millikan and Blackmer, 1963, p. 136)

Millikan elsewhere (1962, pp. 90-108) further developed the instrumentalization of aid argument as a multi-purpose component of U. S. foreign policy. This line of reasoning contended that the promotion of American interests in developing nations could be accomplished through a flexible combination of technical assistance programming, the allocation of capital, assistance to land reform, and the international organization of aid. Aid as an instrument of development presupposed the need for the United States to assist directly in the process of reconfiguring internal power relationships in favor of those predisposed to modernization and against those in a traditional form of alignment which were retarding progress. Owing to the competition, according to Millikan, the U. S. had little choice but to involve itself in the process of modernization, as the breakdown of rural society and rapid urbanization were creating potentially "explosive" situations where "...what is required...is a fundamental transformation of social structure, of loyalties and values, of modes of political participation, of opportunities for education, skill acquisition, and challenging employment, and of channels for constructive energies" (p. 99). Of interest is the leadership role he assigned to the central government of the nation involved as coordinator of assistance, allocator of resources, and manager of national development policy, with a primary concern to "override local and parochial interests" (p. 100).

The guiding rationale for the management of the development process through political alliance was based in the concept of "modernity," which Millikan and Blackmer defined as an "ensemble of behaviors that compose the modern style [and is] given its coherence by a frame of mind..." (1963, p. 30). The political significance of the ensemble was that it required a shift in power from rural to urban and from the "tasks and virtues of agricultural life to those of commerce, industry, and modern administration" (p. 30). In effect, the shift meant that aid was to be used to buttress alliances of political economy with selected internally productive elements of a society at the expense of other "traditional" elements. The modernity rationale explicitly called forth its educational corollary where needs for training, skill building, institutional reformulation, and infrastructural development through technical advising gained prominence. Situated in the milieu of the Cold War, the adaptation of aid as an instrument for the reformation of political and economic institutions can be called, the laboratory approach to political stabilization, where the donor introduced diverse approaches to development into the recipient nation in the form of resources and technical advice for the purpose of ushering its advance into a predefined state of "modernity." The introduction of innovations for the purpose of developing institutions that would oversee and manage

development program activities in a range of economic and political areas can be classified as a social project that aimed to restructure local and national institutions. The rationales of that project are examined in the following section.

### The Social Component of the Developmental Rationale

As the sixties progressed, aid programming diversified into several, what I call - social areas, which were adjunct to the economic focus. Technical programs were directed toward improvements in agriculture, health, transportation, electrical power, industrial development, education, and many other areas depending on the needs of the country, U. S. security interests, and unanticipated crises (Nelson, 1968).<sup>10</sup> The overall purpose of the majority of developmental aid was to provide the context for economic growth through the following measures:

- \* Development of technical, professional, entrepreneurial, and managerial skills.
- \* Increased productivity and output in industry and agriculture.
- \* Diversification of crops and industries, to reduce dependence on one or a few mineral or agricultural exports and consequent vulnerability to world market price fluctuations, and to reduce relative reliance on imported goods...
- \* Increased savings and investment, to the point where self-financed investment plus foreign private investment permitted output to grow faster than population.

\* Increased exports, to the point where export earnings plus foreign private investment could finance sufficient imports for both consumption and investment. (Nelson, 1968, p. 14)

The question then became one of what strategies should be adopted to bring about such developments. In reviewing three decades of development programming, Mikesell (1983, p. 21) concluded that past approaches which had emphasized technical assistance but little capital were "...grossly inadequate for realizing the economic goals of the developing countries. What was required were development institutions with both abundant financial resources and technical capacity. Economists formulated capital-oriented growth models to justify large global aid programs, but failed to analyze the basic elements of development strategy and the role of domestic policy in development...." What had been regarded as a matter of general political economy in the decades of the fifties and sixties was seen in the seventies to require more direct attention to domestic institutions which were thought to play a necessary role in the process of attaining a state of self-sustaining economic growth.<sup>11</sup>

By the mid-seventies AID embarked on a new initiative to address itself more directly with the equitable distribution of national developmental resources to the poorest elements of society. Called "New Directions," the policy was based on the philosophy of "growth with equity" advanced by Hollis Chenery and others (1974), whose major



recommendations were for AID to pay more direct programmatic attention to the question of prior neglect of the labor-intensive rural and urban employment seeking sector and the redistribution of development resources necessary to do so (Morss & Morss, 1982, p. 37; Mickelwait, Sweet, and Morss, 1979).<sup>12</sup> The sequel to this strategy was the adoption of the "Basic Needs" approach advocated by Paul Streeten (1981), which recognized the failure of economic growth policies alone to alleviate conditions of poverty and the widening gap between the rural and urban poor and the urban rich.

Morss and Morss (1982, pp. 28-31) distinguished three major strategies of intervention argued to address the problem of economic redistribution: (a) the traditional strategy advocated restraint from interference in the social structure of the recipient nation by working through the local power structure for benefits to "trickle down" to the poor; (b) the incremental strategy argued for cooperative arrangements with institutional elements of the social structure to enable them to redistribute capital assets toward greater participation of the poor; and (c) the revolutionary strategy rejected the utility of any assistance as a stimulus to redistribute in countries whose regimes oppressed the poor. Programmatic initiatives launched by AID in the seventies and eighties have been based on the former two approaches to redistribution under

the general headings of basic needs, employment and income generation, integrated rural development, appropriate technologies, infrastructural and institutional development, and improved agricultural techniques (pp. 32-39).

Activities undertaken within each of the headings show several common rationales:

- \* Development results in large measure from organized efforts, usually called "projects," with outcomes designed to improve the economic welfare of targeted groups.
- \* Beneficial outcomes are predicated on and result in overall improvements in the rate of economic growth.
- \* The recipient state acting through and in the form of its agencies and ministries is expected to play a central role in initiating and sustaining development.
- \* The modification of existing and/or the creation of new organizations to manage the development process is key part of the foreign assistance strategy.

While others may also be evident, the common rationales listed here are acknowledged by their proponents as operationally integral pillars indispensable to AID programming until today. In all, the evolutionary process through which developmental approaches have progressed over the span of the last three decades has a history of growing involvement in the technical internal administration of those key segments of agriculture, health, transportation, infrastructure, and education that have been dedicated to the development phenomenon.

Current thinking on the subject for sub-Saharan Africa (e.g., Morss & Morss, 1986, pp. 88-110) suggests the

following areas of possible programming research for the nineties: population control, shifting the agriculture focus from rural export to self-sufficiency, urban development, institutional development, revising donor attitudes, and increasing policy making capacity in recipient nations. Considering trends to reduce numbers of technical advisers and the reduction of technical assistance overall, new means to generate developmental strategies and approaches need to be devised to take advantage of locally trained professionals and common regional circumstances.

In this line of reasoning, development rationales continue to be modernity inspired and western located. What originated as a Cold War security strategy to stave off the radical propensities of the desperately poor has evolved into an array of technical strategies for engineering institutional development. Development conceived as an end requires social restructuring by a class of specially trained professionals who can be called on to offer discreet inputs within the various institutional systems organized for the task, from agriculture to education. The cluster of arguments on behalf of the social modification process have become increasingly technical. The legitimate grounds for discussion of development have shifted from the political and value centered to the instrumental. The shift is directed to the reordering of society according to technical requirements. I therefore call this cluster of rationales

expertise guided social engineering, where value and politics are subordinated to exclusively technical problems.

### Summary of the Rational Components of Public Argumentation

So far, my focus has remained at the level of public argumentation put forward over the span of three decades of U. S. foreign assistance. I have identified four major ideological dimensions injected into the debate that roughly parallel the historical flow of AID programming implemented during the period:

- \* Protectionistic Interventionism served to justify military assistance in the form of standing personnel, the provision of equipment, and the allocation of internal resources as a developmental concern of national security.
- \* Obligatory Intervention by Economic Stewardship at once provided for a viable economic alternative to communist expansion into the Third World (as the group of "developing nations" came to be called), and for the involvement of U. S. governmental and private institutions in the process of nation-by-nation economic development.
- \* The Laboratory Approach to Political Stabilization sought to direct attention to the political task of revamping national and local institutions in accordance with techniques and methods introduced by the donor to facilitate progression toward a state of "modernity."
- \* Expertise Guided Social Engineering defined development as an end state to be reached through the social restructuring of key institutions according to the technical requirements introduced by western trained experts. The problem of development was posed as a technical matter which could be addressed through mainly technical measures.

In the next two chapters, I set out to devise a

critical framework with which to explore the deeper ideology embedded in this public argumentation. The arguments reviewed up to this point do not adequately explain how such evidently diverse and often contradictory rationales for development have managed to mobilize concerted policy and action in foreign assistance. That exploration will focus on the relationships between positivistic sociology, development science, and ideology.

Notes

1. According to the Library of Congress Reference Service (LRS, 1968) those supporting foreign economic aid subscribed to the view that foreign aid programs constituted:

...a rational attempt to coordinate the resources of all the countries of the free world...in presenting a strong, united front against the forces that would undermine them individually...Those who believe that the free world community must stand united against the common enemy of Communist aggression...also believe that economic foreign aid and military defense are different aspect of the same problem. (LRS, 1968, pp. 97-98)

Those taking positions against foreign economic assistance argued for American military power alone to be deployed in strategic locations throughout the world and supported by a strong economy back home in "Fortress America." A variation of this stance was to support foreign military assistance to friendly governments with economic assistance as a temporary supplement for resources allocated to defense.

2. The doctrine of containment was formulated in the late forties by George F. Kennan (1947), Soviet specialist in the State Department. Writing under the pseudonym "X," Kennan argued that the significance of containment lay in the formal recognition incorporated in the "Truman Doctrine" of the need to both militarily and politically foreclose the spread of communism through a policy of mutual assistance with the other western powers (Blum et al., 1963, pp. 739-743). As a strategy, containment was premised on the belief that opposition through united strength would wear down the Soviet penchant for expansion (Schuman, 1958, pp. 594-599).

3. According to Morgenthau (1960, pp. 79-82), the "policy of prestige" was designed as an adjunct to display U. S. power in Latin America and to preserve the international political status quo by securing the allegiance of the uncommitted nations. As such, foreign aid "...intends to impress the recipient nation with the economic and technological proficiency of the aid's provider" (p. 81), and thereby convince that nation its best interests lay in maintaining a close political relationship. In this view, a policy of increasing such alliances would tend to tip the balance of power in favor of the nation whose assistance was sought most.



4. Friedman's argument here is not so much directed at the communist economic system as it is against the proponents of bilateral assistance undertaken in the name of "free enterprise." Friedman argued that strengthening any government involvement in any one else's economy is a contradiction to the development of free market economies. Foreign assistance in this regard should be limited to the removal of trade barriers and should not engage in technical projects through the sponsorship of government.

5. According to the Mutual Security Act of 1951, the Mutual Security Program was administered by the Mutual Security Agency until the formation of the Foreign Operations Administration in 1953 under the Eisenhower administration (LRS, 1968, pp. 69-70). The issue was administrative - Which department of government was to be responsible for the various aspects of U. S. military and economic aid? By 1955, Eisenhower created the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) and placed it organizationally as a quasi-autonomous unit with its own budgetary and operational authority under the aegis of the State Department. The Agency continued operating under this arrangement until the 1960s. Military assistance was still managed by the Defense Department, with overall coordination responsibility assigned to the Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs. The Technical Cooperation Administration established by Truman in 1950 was merged with the ICA by 1955.

6. The behavioristic implications of modernization theory stem in part from Parson's (1951) analysis of "pattern variables," a classificatory device which distinguished levels of social development between one society and another. Inkeles and Smith (1974) differentiated personal characteristics they associated with "modern" behavior, recommending that inducing changes in "traditional" behavior patterns would lead to modernity.

7. Coffin's (1964) defense of aid, written some ten years later, aimed to revive a "working consensus" to expand and improve aid programs in the face of Congressional criticism about lack of progress. The consensus was to be forged around the following principles:

- \* Aid's increasing importance as an aspect of foreign policy instrumental to the "advancement of freedom in the world."

- \* The need to improve programming quality in light of past experience.

- \* The effort to involve nongovernmental resources.

\* Recognition of the need to institute a "practice of Congressional decision" that would facilitate responsive programming.

\* A set of "realistic expectations about the limitations and potentials of foreign assistance in a complex world." (Coffin, 1964, pp. 267-268)

The effort to achieve a consensus at the time in the early sixties was directed to counteract growing legislative impatience with the lack of concrete successes, particularly in light of the promise of a decade earlier.

8. The term "peaceful coexistence" was emphasized by Premier Nikita Khrushchev from the mid-1950s. Its significance lay in the Soviet endorsement of an alternative arena of competition between socialist and capitalist economic systems. While Khrushchev took appropriate steps to verify the doctrine as a legitimate Soviet strategy derived from Lenin, his efforts to do so were disputed by both western and Soviet scholars as well as the Chinese (Mager & Katel, 1961, pp. 59-75).

9. Banfield's (1962, pp. 10-31) resume of foreign aid doctrines summarily refutes purely humanitarian motivated arguments made in favor of government sponsored foreign assistance on the grounds that "doing good" in American referenced terminology cannot determine what good means in other cultures at their individual moments in history. We thus risk doing more harm than good. Recourse to "good intentions" on our part do little to assuage the furtherance of suffering caused by failure of implementation. Just ask those on the receiving end (pp. 23-24).

Another objection he raised to altruistic inspired aid is primarily Constitutional. The only justification for governments to appropriate the property of some for redistribution to others is for the "common good" of the community over which it rules. By this definition, the U. S. Government is prohibited from acting to assist the citizens of other lands for purely humanitarian reasons (pp. 24-25).

Finally, providing aid because it is morally right to do so is a precept derived either from the will of God or from the imperatives of nature. As such, the moral dictum only applies to individuals acting out of deliberate choice. The nature of government being coercive would preclude taxation of its wealthy members to re-give to the poor on moral grounds alone, as morality remains the exclusive preserve of the individual acting out of personal concern to do good and not out of obedience to the public obligations mandated by rulers.

Countering this critique was the shift in moral emphasis reflected in President Kennedy's appeal for young Americans to volunteer for the Peace Corps (Shriver, 1964; Sullivan, 1964; Textor, 1966). The argument in this case was presented as an opportunity to exercise one's personal obligation to help the less fortunate by applying the skills with which one was endowed by virtue of being reared in a prosperous society. While Peace Corps programming was usually conducted as group initiatives, the core of its appeal was the opportunity provided by an agency of government to take moral action.

10. Primarily administered under the Mutual Security Act of 1954, responsibility for foreign assistance in the form of the Development Loan Fund and the International Cooperation Administration was shifted to the newly formed Agency for International Development (AID) in 1961 (Nelson, 1968, pp. 4-5).

11. Underpinning the developmental ideology of three decades has been the conviction that however the term is defined, development minimally depends on achieving a sufficient rate of economic growth within individual nations. Mathematical models independently derived by Harrod and Domar in the mid-1940s (Todaro, 1977, pp. 52-54) were used to influence investment and other aid policies that required a certain minimal percentage of national income be saved and invested as capital to support the growth of industrial capacity. This model was corroborated by Rostow's (1960) linear stages theory of growth, in which he postulated that all countries must necessarily progress through a series of developmental stages on the way to economic prosperity and modernity. The origins of this thinking are addressed directly in the next chapter.

12. Interestingly, the economic model of greatest programming influence in AID the previous decade was developed by Hollis Chenery and Alan Strout (1966, pp. 679-723), both of whom occupied senior policy positions in the Agency at the time. The model was based on the Rostowian version of self-sustaining growth, a target which required a minimum level of savings, skill capacity, and foreign exchange from exports. AID was argued to have a positive impact on ameliorating the gap existing in any single or combination of areas. Mikesell (1983, p. 7) observed, "The Chenery-Strout model became exceedingly popular and was broadly used as a basis for both the administration of foreign aid programs in individual countries and the estimation of global aid requirements..."

## CHAPTER III

### THE CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY AND THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC ELEMENTS OF DEVELOPMENT THEORY

This chapter focuses on the potential of ideology to guide inquiry into the subject of development. Following a theoretical discussion of ideology and knowledge production, I will review the evolution of ideology as a concept in western social science. The review traces the broad streams of positivist social and economic science that have been incorporated into modern development theory. The chapter concludes with an itemization of factors that have been used to ground a regulatory social science, the developmentalist version included. The aim of the chapter is to explore and bring to the surface the ideological foundations of social science so that a critical frame of reference for investigating ideology in a particular instance can be developed.

#### Ideology as an Investigative Concept

In this study I use the concept of ideology in two ways. First, ideology as it consists of a set of rationales about the true nature of the social world and how it should be ordered; second, ideology as it provides a theoretical means for investigation into the knowledge claims implied by the rationales that are used to order the social world. As



an investigative concept, the theory of ideology provides a means to reflect on the problem of how and why society is ordered the way it is.

For a start, I subscribe to the position taken by John B. Thompson (1984, p. 5) that a theory of ideology should be directed "...towards the study of the complex ways in which meaning is mobilized for the maintenance of relations of domination...." This position sets out the task for my inquiry into ideology in a specific instance. It means that the public argumentation I reviewed in the previous chapter reflects the attempt to further interests through the influence of public policy. Competing rationales were offered to further one view of truth over another. The study of ideology therefore must begin from the premise that rationales contain knowledge claims that are rooted in the clash of interests.

This view contrasts with the position taken initially by Marx where he defined ideology merely as an "imaginary reflection" of more fundamental activities undertaken to sustain productive life (e.g., Marx, 1978 [1846], pp.155-156), with the forms of social relations being determined directly by the nature of production (p. 150). According to Habermas (1971, p. 44), Marx's initial emphasis on the imaginary tended to reduce the role of critical reflection as a forming and moving force of history. Following the lead of Habermas in this respect, Thompson instead refers to

the constitutive power of language to convey meaning in the effort to order social life. In this sense, the use of particular forms of language is immanently practical. Certain expressions, slogans, arguments, and metaphors have the force of formulating and legitimating courses of action taken to maintain or advance the interests of a particular individual or interest group. Material relationships to the mode of production are therefore not so immediately determined as Marx first proposed.

Language then becomes ideological to the extent that it serves to rationalize the pursuit of the self-interests of one race, class, gender, or one social group over another. The intent of some expressions are to distort the real nature of social relations into "figments of truth," namely those governed by laws and facts. Any rationale is ideological to the extent that it masks the oppressive nature of certain social relationships. It does so by resorting to a source of absolute truth, such as positivist science, to justify a particular social formation. The comparative social effects of competing versions of scientific rationality depend on the explicative power that is accorded them. The instance of scientific rationality I investigate in this work owes its explicative power to positivistic versions of social and economic science that gained preeminence in American twentieth century social thought (Held, 1980, pp. 171-174). I claim this version to



be the one that has governed the production of development theories used by AID to rationalize its policies in education.

### A Personal Note

In my view, the business of reflecting on public discourse involves an attempt to "make sense" of the development activity that has been promoted by the United States in the Third World. The task of making sense is neither objective nor passive in the conventional mode of social research. My approach throughout is reflexive and critical, fueled as it were by a personal need to understand more clearly the nature of the work with which I have been engaged for more than twenty years. I subscribe outright to the position held by those who believe that reality is a construction of participants in a field of interaction. I make no claim to be investigating a subject that exists apart from my experience of it. I have a personal interest in resolving the apparent dilemmas and contradictions involved in doing "development work." I say this with the expectation that the project of knowing is one not possible to circumscribe with certainty. The grounds for knowledge are neither concrete nor immutable. I find most objectionable the assumption implicit in many development initiatives that knowledge can be packed and transposed given the right blend of appropriate content and

effective technique. The direction of this inquiry is toward a refutation of the propensity to resort to the certainty of knowledge to back policy.

On the other hand, I am not a relativist in the sense that I believe truth to lie only in the eye of the beholder. Impressions of the social world are formed by those engaged in the act of experiencing it. Following Weick (1979, pp. 164-169; 1977, 271-277), I base my analysis on the position that people "bracket" their own versions of their social setting. In this act, they refer both to their own history and the contingent factors that comprise the immediate situation. As with Popper (1962, p. 73), they "...impose a set of regularities upon the world..." which serve to define the problems with which they deal. My disaffection with past practice is compounded by the conviction that such "bracketing" activity cannot of itself constitute truth. I am left to search, propose, and be refuted socially much as my own search is prompted by the need to refute.

The process of sense making is foremost a pursuit of truth. It is in this respect a social activity, one which uses language and, through exposure to critical scrutiny and refutation, develops. According to Popper (1962, pp. 3-30), the pursuit can vary in form insofar as it is conducted in conformity with "common standards of criticism or rationality." What he suggests:

...is to give up the idea of ultimate sources of knowledge, and admit that all knowledge is human; that

it is mixed with our errors, our prejudices, our dreams, and our hopes; that all we can do is to grope for truth even though it be beyond our reach. We may admit that our groping is often inspired, but we must be on our guard against the belief, however deeply felt, that our inspiration carries any authority, divine or otherwise. If we thus admit that there is no authority beyond the reach of criticism to be found within the whole province of our knowledge, however far it may have permeated into the unknown, then we can retain, without danger, the idea that truth is beyond human authority. And we must retain it. For without this idea there can be no objective standards of inquiry; no criticism of our conjectures; no groping for the unknown; no quest for knowledge. (pp. 29-30)

Following this suggestion, I see this inquiry as an attempt to overcome a fault in the pursuit of U. S. development policy for education. Until very recently, no one has investigated AID's educational policies from an ideological standpoint, that is, with a view to reveal the nature of the ideological positions enmeshed in policy discourse. This approach at the outset follows that taken by Preston (1985, pp. 11-30) in his study of development theory where the notion of "ideology construction" as a method of social theorizing guides his inquiry:

The idea that social theorizing is, in its central and most unequivocal guise, concerned with the construction of ideological schemas whereby action in the world might be ordered and legitimated is readily available within recent discussions of the nature of social theory...(p. 11)

My line of inquiry follows this approach in that it seeks to reveal the nature of the ideological stances that have been packed within a particular brand of development theorizing, that of aid to education.

### Ideology in Western Social Scientific Thought

The analysis of development theorizing published by Preston in 1985 devotes a great deal of attention to the role played by social science in the development process advanced by western nations and thinkers for the Third World. In this he follows the dissent advanced by Giddens (1979) concerning fallacies in the importation of the "received model" of the natural scientific mode of investigation into the social world. The deployment of the orthodox scientific position into the social realm, argues Giddens, is wrong on several counts. Preston's (1985, p. 68) summary refers to errors found by Giddens with respect to the origins of social vis-a-vis natural science and the status of "laws" in the former, the nature of language, the "revelatory" capacity of social science, concepts of "agency and structure," and the "affirmation of the 'received model' (positivistic) of natural science." Preston (pp. 74-89) goes on to fault by example several practices engaged in by theorists advancing specific development approaches, foremost of which is the notion of "modeling" used by orthodox economists. The result of such practice in his estimation is to "sow confusion" by metaphor, confusion emanating from investing authoritative backing to what in reality is an ideological position. The immediate question then arises as to the origins and the effects of the status enjoyed by science in development planning.

The Historical Origins of Development  
as a Scientific Concept

Human Mastery over Nature

The notion that human endeavor is plagued by a dual nature was advanced by Francis Bacon (1939, pp. 5-27) over three hundred fifty years ago. To Bacon, while humans were capable of great understanding and endowed by the Creator with innate powers to sense the world as it truly exists, efforts to understand nature were unfortunately subject to "...the idols, or phantoms, by which the mind is occupied...as...the needs of men are strangely possessed and beset, so that there is no true and even surface left to reflect the genuine rays of things..." (p. 18). In this view, true knowledge of the order and laws of nature could only be derived from what is perceived through the senses. The purpose of knowledge seeking was to convey an accurate, simple, and pure understanding of these laws so that they could be obeyed. The proper conduct of the scientific enterprise then was to exercise controls over the perverse tendencies of the human mind.

According to Held's (1980, pp. 163-164) summary of Horkheimer and Adorno (e.g., 1972), which I paraphrase here, Bacon's assertions about the proper derivation of knowledge were formalized subsequently by social theorists into a positivistic method of investigation that accepted the validity of several assumptions:

\* All research knowledge derives from sensory experience.

\* Meaning is derived from observation.

\* Concepts and generalizations originate in the observation of particular things and events.

\* The sciences represent the pursuit of knowledge through an ideal methodology which applies mathematical formulations derived from the smallest possible number of axioms.

\* The relegation of human value to non-factual, hence non-knowledge status.

The idea that the workings of nature were knowable through science meant they were subject to manipulation, as Bacon concluded that "...those twin objects, human knowledge and human power do really meet in one..." (Bacon, 1939, p. 23). The obligation of scientific endeavor was foremost to observe the natural laws laid down by God. This representation of "man as facilitator" carrying out the will of the Lord presupposed a higher authority guiding the scientific enterprise which was done to further the cause of human mastery over nature. Nature was considered to be real, discoverable, and objectively controllable insofar as laws of observation and experimentation were properly observed. This supposition of the relation of the human being to nature is analogous to the idea of stewardship, which ascribed the right of human dominion over the natural world as a form of custody. Through science, in other words, the world could be transformed for the greater good.



Science and the Regulation  
of Human Relations

While Bacon made frequent reference to the congruity of science (the "new philosophy," in his terminology) with divine purpose, the newly acknowledged power of the human mind to apprehend and transform nature signified a step away from the traditional authority of religion to more secular versions of authority in the regulation of life. Bacon's focus on the relationship between the human and natural worlds led the way for Comte's later focus on the regulation of human relations. If the natural world could be transformed for the better, why not the human? For the "...the fundamental purpose of Comte's philosophy ...was an enlargement of a belief that had always been central in liberal doctrine, the conviction that human relations are amenable to intelligent understanding and control" (Sabine, 1961, p. 717). Comte went so far as to suggest the existence of a "second law" governing social development, a process of evolutionary progression to which all societies could be expected to conform. Combined with the belief in progress, the idea that a "science of society" could play a decisive role in the development of peoples spawned a host of new endeavors in the investigation and regulation of human behavior.

The Individual and the Concept  
of Private Property

The social implications of a "scientifically based" regulation of human relations extended naturally into the economic realm. Locke's (1939, pp. 413-423) treatise on civil government lent force to the principle of the individual's right to the fruits of one's labor as a matter of personal property. The determining factor of ownership was the exercise of personal labor which derived from a combination of acquired ingenuity and individual effort. The result was the private appropriation of the object of labor from the realm of accessibility to the community into the realm of the individual existing apart from community. The transformation of nature by human activity was a right that came to be politicized as individual right.

The basis of Locke's argument in support of individual rights to material property attributed final authority to nature as it was interpreted through science. Locke opened the door to the subsequent merger between private rights to property and the functional rights accorded to those inured with the scientifically based power to organize society. Eventually, the private interests of the individual came to be viewed as separable from those of the community.

The Individual, the State, and  
the Concept of Authority

Mill's later (1939, pp. 1032-1036) call for the state to insure the development of liberal principles through education was argued in the context of the liberalization of society, where the state as an embodiment of democratic principles had the constitutional right to enact and enforce law to safeguard the individual's right to freedom of action. Notwithstanding his strongly argued admonitions against the potential excesses of state power, Mill's principle that the state should be so authorized as to prevent violations of individual liberty nonetheless occasioned various forms of public scrutiny over the potential excesses and deficiencies of private action. Presumably, the state would be expected to play a more intrusive role in those instances "...when society in general is in so backward a state that it could not or would not provide for itself any proper institutions of education unless the government undertook the task..." (p. 1034). Mill left for his followers the task of working out the specific characteristics of what he called "proper institutions." In part, however, he provided the theoretical groundwork for the development of institutional mechanisms to further private interests throughout the body politic as a progressively liberal development. The establishment of such institutional mechanisms were later

determined to be prerequisite to the modernization of society. The state's responsibility was to protect and encourage private initiative to establish such institutions.

The evolution of the concept "private" vis-a-vis "community" can be understood with reference to authority. The question of individual rights and how conflicting interpretations were to be mediated could only be answered by referring to an authoritative source, one that had the power sufficient to resolve conflict. The nineteenth century search for a suitable authority structure in which to invest relative powers for the regulation of social behavior gained impetus from Max Weber. Weber provided a new set of secular ground rules for the legitimation of authority in The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (1947).

According to Weber (pp. 324-341), while the exercise of authority over subordinates in an organizational setting could take various forms, the belief in the "legitimacy" of the authority structure was fundamental. As a practical concept, legitimacy relates to beliefs shared about property. Authority figures and their subordinates ascribe ownership of material goods, capital, and contracts for labor as a legitimate basis on which to arrange work for compensation. The foundational requisites of bureaucratic life, whether public or private, rest on the validity of the claim to obedience implied by the correspondent

administrative structure. Weber proceeded to classify various types of office and function associated with the bureaucratic model, thereby laying the theoretical background for institutional forms in several fields of endeavor throughout the western world. It was Weber who rationalized the individualistic principles identified earlier by Locke and Mill as matters of right into formal principles generic to the operation of modern institutions.

Weber's classification of modern institutions derived its authority from its status as a scientifically based scheme for ordering social progress. In this sense, the scheme served as a rational basis for the diminution of the legitimacy accorded to traditional ranking systems. It thereby both legitimated and unified the authority of a new ranking system, this one characterized by the achievement driven model of technical merit. As a definitive characteristic of "modern" institutional operation, Weber's technical system exercised its social force as a model appropriate for the organization of "developed" societies.

### Social Action as a Scientific Enterprise

In the twentieth century, Parsons had used Weber's scheme in such a way as to combine science with social policy to formulate his version of "systemic functionalism," which served as the point of departure for later modernization theorists. If the form of institutional

rationality was the basis for the scientific organization of society to Weber, the question of social action was the primary focus for Parsons. According to Kinloch (1981, pp. 62-79), Parsons' theory of social action was based in the idea of a system, which consisted of "...an actor, end, situation, and choice of alternate means to an end or normative orientation..." (p. 63). Parsons developed the conception of a systemic basis for the purposeful organization of society. Using empirical science as the rational methodology for social analysis, he laid the foundation for later development specialists of the institutional modernization variety to apply the concept of system across cultures with a view to the manipulation of their operant "pattern variables." The conception of society as a functional system with interacting subsystems that tended toward cohesion became a fundamental tenet of western development planners. Parsons provided the grounds on which later modernization theorists were able to combine notions of the regulation of individual behavior in the wider social setting with the requisites of a capital economy.



Social Referents for the  
Deployment of Science as Development

The progressive application of scientific rationality to the study and regulation of society was forged by way of several assumptions made about knowledge. According to Burrell and Morgan (1979, pp. 1-9), the history of the social sciences is characterized by differing ontological, epistemological, human, and methodological assumptions. The significance of the assumptions is that they determine the nature and scope of questions asked in the conduct of social research. The assumptions suggest a way to trace the social referents for the developmental science that was to come.

The Social Referents of  
the Natural Science Model

Bacon's call for the control of the potentially contaminating effects of the human mind presupposed the existence of a world governed by natural law, to which all God's creation was subject. The process of control evolved as a matter of the observance of orthodox procedure. In their purest form human senses are capable of perceiving the world to the extent such procedure is followed. Accordingly, the role of science was to objectify the relationship between the human being and nature into procedure so that nature could be both "sensed" and made sense of in a manner consistent with its natural maxims, as

if their existence were entirely independent of human influence or interpretation.

As an ontological stance, the severance between nature and human will was based on an assumption that had several social effects:

- \* The elevation of the status of science as the exclusive source and purveyor of absolute truth.
- \* The relegation of other forms of knowledge to the status of myth. (e.g., Horkheimer and Adorno, 1972, p. 11)
- \* The subversion of traditionally local forms of authority by an external source and interpreter of truth.
- \* The advancement of the belief in the potentials and benefits of an empirical social science.

The last effect emerged from the epistemological efforts mounted in the late nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries to place "...the study of human social conduct upon a scientific footing..." (Giddens, 1977, p. 24). Giddens (pp. 25-26) points out that the scientific enterprise previously envisioned by Marx and Comte alike was to develop the linkage between the "predictability" of human conduct through the social sciences and the task of social liberation. The followers of Comte were less interested in the discernment of the contradictions inherent in this approach than were the followers of Marx. As it turns out, Comte's successors came to dominate the field of social policy investigation practiced in the United States and other European countries. The field of international

development since its inception in the nineteen fifties has owed its guiding tenets to this ontological position. The rationales used to undergird development assistance identified in the previous chapter are based in an empirical sociology that takes human behavior to be governable according to natural law. For example, the economic modeling activities that have formed the theoretical basis for AID's development policies are based in the unacknowledged ideological conception that social behavior follows natural laws. Such an assumption takes the idea of "natural" and transforms it into a set of "naturalistic" discourses as a basis for the rationalization of policy.

The postivistic ontology raised certain epistemological questions about the laws that supposedly governed social behavior: What are they? How might they be investigated scientifically?

The critical view of epistemology, on the other hand, raised the kinds of questions that had to do with human agency in the social setting: What role do our conceptions of social law play in the process of organizing social relations? What role do our conceptions of reality themselves play in the constitution of society? Giddens (1977, pp.26-28), following Habermas (1971, pp. 71-81), raised questions about the interconnectedness ("intersubjectivity") of conceptions and the social order. Their questions were based on a rejection of the uncritical

attribution of human behavior to natural law made in the positivist tradition. Giddens argued that people, particularly members of the dominant class, act as agents when they use these conceptions not simply to describe the constitution of society, but actually to formulate various institutions and other social relations in accordance with such conceptions.

The idea of an agency rather than a naturally constituted social order makes alternative paths for the analysis of human behavior possible. To the contrary, conventional positivistic sociology incorporates natural assumptions as the authority to explain and influence the extant social order. The social referents for making such assumptions are supported by the following rationales:

- \* Humanity is placed in a hierarchy above the rest of nature.
- \* An objectively real universe operates in accordance with natural (divine) law.
- \* Insofar as natural law is empirically observed and known, nature exists to be perfected by human effort.
- \* Knowledge should be structured according to the hierarchical order derived from the model of scientific positivism.
- \* The model of research developed to apprehend and transform nature is appropriate for the apprehension and transformation of human society.
- \* The idea of evolutionary progress is distinct from culture and value.
- \* Social improvement according to the tenets of science is a legitimate activity.

The assumptions that underlie positivist sociology have

achieved some of their effects under the ideological rubric of "development," a term which has come to embrace a range of activities and interventions. Sociology has had the function of legitimating this range by providing experts, administrators, methods of research, and political leaders with a common language to manage the process of social change. While positivist sociology has provided a scientific method with which to structure social change, the purpose or end state of such change has been legitimated primarily in economic terms, the subject to which I now turn.

#### Economic Referents for the Deployment of Science as Development

The discourse that characterizes development is distinguished primarily in economic terms, that is to say, in terms that equate human social development with principally economic ends. How traditional conceptions of human productive and reproductive life were transformed into questions of economic development is a matter of historical interest that has a direct bearing on the business of international development today.

The Transformation of Society  
into Questions of Economy

The history of economics, according to Lewis Haney (1949, pp. 8-21), is interwoven with other historical aspects of thought, most fundamental of which are the dichotomous streams between "Idealism and Materialism." The idealist position rests on the principle that human social life can be purposefully shaped by propositions derived from general conceptions of nature. In this view, humanity is depicted as distinct from nature in the sense that the human mind has a quality possessed by no other creature - the ability to conceive ideas not derived from experience. The materialists, on the other hand, tend toward a view that conceptions of the world are induced empirically from the interaction people have with their environment. Idealists tend to refer to abstract principles in their deliberate efforts to influence social policy whilst materialists usually refer to the influence of natural law. The concept of "value," for example, to the idealist is ultimately the result of human attribution while the materialist refers to a law that "objectively dictates" value (Haney, 1949, p. 16). Although economists often mixed various aspects of the opposing streams of thought, the science of economics can trace its origins to the positions taken along each of the streams by the various exponents of economic policy.

Early Hebrew, Greek, Hindu, and eastern philosophers



did not distinguish economic activity as a virtuous endeavor apart from the social milieu or other aspects of an upright life. Aristotle's (1981, pp. 392-393) observations on the subject were commonly shared. "...[I]t is not by means of external goods that men acquire and keep the virtues, but the other way round...for the acquisition of goods external to the soul is due either to the coincidence of events or to fortune, but no man is just or restrained as a result of, or because of, fortune...." Haney (1949, pp. 50-55) noted several common elements that characterized ancient thought, including the subordination of individual material wants to the notion of community and citizenship within the concept of the state, which was often empowered to codify individual behavior to a high degree of detail, particularly in the case of Hindu, Brahman, and Hebrew societies.

Plato (1942: pp. 332-368) may have been the first to deal with the concept of the individual as an entity with interests distinct from the state or community. Throughout the middle ages, however, the concept of individual interest continued to be circumscribed within the protective framework of authority accorded by an overarching establishment of natural law and social institutions, foremost being the church and the state (Haney, 1949, pp. 97-108). It was not until the rise of mercantilism that prior emphasis given to the individual as agent of church and state was inverted, with attention increasingly devoted

to the material needs of humanity as a collection of interests and needs distinct from both church and state. In this view, the status of the church in human affairs gave way to the state as agency to facilitate commercial exchange. Hobbes' (1949, pp. 184-192) description of the state furthered the unification of public with private interest in such a way as to elevate the status of the individual to an unprecedented level:

...for the passions of men are commonly more potent than their reason. From whence it follows that where the public and private interest are most closely united, there is the public most advanced...The riches, power, and honor of a monarch arise only from the riches, strength, and reputation of his subjects...(pp. 185-186).

While the state in Hobbes' view maintained superior position over the individual, the purpose of the nation evolved into the service of the material needs and wants of its citizens who were capable of acting only to enhance their private interests. The mercantilist state was accordingly empowered to raise armies and regulate commerce through a variety of organs whose principal purpose was to protect individual rights to the fruits of commerce and manufacture. The lexicon of economic life was increasingly characterized by the value accorded to the acquisition of goods. As a concept, the independent value that was embodied in goods was determined "extrinsically" by exchange on a competitive market rather than "intrinsically" according to the utility set by individual actors reaching

agreement on price. The notion of cost as an aggregation of labor and other assets expended for production came to play a greater role in the new economic science of supply and demand. And furthermore, the concept of "profit" as favorable balance of trade (surplus) rose in importance to both the nation and the individual with the interests of the two not always compatible.

Where regulation of trade and the accumulation of money as wealth were important to the mercantilist position, the physiocrats emphasized the development of manufacturing industries and agriculture with a view to ending reliance on government as regulator. The social impact of their arguments resulted in the enhancement of individual economic liberties at the expense of state power and the furtherance of such scientifically economic concepts as annual net surplus, capital, taxation, social responsibility expressed as economic concern, and land as income generator through rent (Haney, 1949, pp. 204-205).

#### Adam Smith and the Equation of Self with Social Interest

The question faced by economic and social theorists of the Age of Enlightenment began in the sphere of morality: How to reconcile personal interest with the social good by means of secular authority. Enlightened social thinkers approached the regulation of behavior as a moral problem.

They were concerned to apply the principles of scientific authority to the regulation of society. Smith's comprehensive work, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1937), first appeared in 1776. Its force did not result so much from the introduction of new economic concepts as from its comprehensive scope of previous thought on establishing the most favorable conditions for the expansion of business as a social good. To this end, Smith's main concern was to develop a rational basis to explain, guide, and support the exertion of economic power wrought by industrialization and commercial enterprise as a progressively moral development characteristic of modern civil society. While his interest may still have been the moral principles expressed in his earlier treatise on personal ethics published as The Theory of Moral Sentiments in 1759 (1976), he ultimately succeeded in providing a scientific basis for addressing the problem of personal acquisition of wealth to which later economic policy makers would refer. In Smith's view, morality was defined as a matter of the maximum dispensation of material benefits for all. An individual acted rationally insofar as s/he could be motivated by the "...disposition to admire, and consequently to imitate, the rich and the great..." to whom we accord the power "...to set, or to lead what is called the fashion..." (1976, p. 64).

The Wealth of Nations was an exposition on the naturally operating mechanisms whereby the artificially imposed restraints on trade espoused under the heretofore predominant mercantilist system could be counteracted. The "artiface" of the purposeful direction of the economy for the public good was argued to actually create more harm than good as "...I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good. It is an affectation, indeed, not very common among merchants..." (1937, p. 423), which would play havoc with the self-correcting mechanism effected by the "invisible hand."

Smith's contribution to the science of economics consisted in the development of the laws of the market, which is the self regulating mechanism of a capital economy whereby the self interests of all compete to achieve social harmony (Heilbroner, 1980, pp. 51-57). Among these laws were the division of labor, whereby the natural differences and talents of workers could be so specialized as to effect greater productivity for labor rendered. Since applied labor was the primary factor in determining its cost, an item's value for exchange purposes could be determined objectively by accounting for the labor used to bring it to production. Such one sided determination, however, could not account for its full value, as the item was created for the value it could command as exchange, defined by Smith as the amount of labor it was worth on the market (Haney, 1949, pp. 217-222). The natural drive to accumulate exchange in

excess of cost was defined as the "law of accumulation" (Heilbroner, 1980, pp. 61-63), where such surplus, termed "profit," could be saved and converted to the creation of "capital." Smith's vision for the mechanics of an efficient economy was expressed metaphorically as a grand cycle. Interrelationships of cause and effect between the three factors of production (labor, capital, and land) worked continuously toward harmonic balance according to the mathematical imperatives of their own laws (Adelman, 1961, pp. 25-28).

His recourse to scientific rationales notwithstanding, the moral precepts of Smith's vision remained preeminent. His economics as a system were invariably directed toward the general material betterment of the nation as an agglomeration of consumers acting in pursuit of their own interests. Through growth that resulted from the greater productivity and consumptive power of common people, the social welfare would improve. He distrusted artificial tampering with the workings of the market, not because it would interfere with unbridled power to accumulate wealth, but precisely because it would arbitrarily accord unfair advantage to a class of legislators and bureaucrats who would feign to act in the public interest while in reality act only in their own. The new science of economics, in other words, remained solidly under the moral aegis of humanity in the natural service of itself, only now in



possession of the technology with which to usher in a new age of abundance.

Smith's Successors and Exponents:  
The Split of Economic Science from its Social Referents

Heilbroner (1980, pp. 69-72) pointed out that Smith's grand scheme was developed in an age just preceding the upheavals of the Industrial Revolution. Smith's major assumption was that the natural propensity of society was to be cohesive, that is, the interplay of individual interests would tend toward equilibrium within the context of evolutionary growth. Smith's analysis was conducted in a historical context of economic transition. At the practical level, the assumption provided an ostensibly rational means to achieve economic stability. It gave assurance that there was indeed a right way, a naturally functioning mechanism, which would promote human welfare in due course.

The works of Robert Malthus and David Ricardo lent force to Smith's earlier propositions concerning the natural laws of population and labor. Malthus, however, reversed Smith's optimistic predictions about relatively smooth progress whereby improvements in productivity would automatically counterbalance cyclical rises in population (Haney, 1949, pp. 260-269). In the face of extreme misery and disparities of wealth, Malthus argued that naturally operating economic mechanisms would work best in "checking"

excesses of population which became a key factor of production regulated by the availability of subsistence. He nonetheless believed natural human impulses could be restrained only by individual action, not by government interference.

Ricardo added weight to the doctrine of social and economic "laissez faire" with a view of wages most productively set at the level of subsistence. Such a level would keep demand for food at the lowest level possible while still maintain a labor supply sufficient to permit growth in profits. Since manufacture by its nature had the advantage over agriculture to effect technological improvements in productivity, the greater share of capital from profit would accrue to industry, as "...agricultural production is subject to historically diminishing returns, the larger population [able to] be supported on the same amount of land only at an increasing real cost..." (Adelman, 1961, p. 56).

As a businessman (Heilbroner, 1980, pp. 84-85), Ricardo adopted the pessimistic population projections of Malthus. He carried Smith's mechanics to an extreme level, where there "...is nothing but principle, abstract principle..." in a world not populated by human beings but by "prototypes" who are bound entirely by "laws of behavior" (Heilbroner, 1980, pp. 92-93). In this world, both the capitalist and worker stood to lose as the inevitable result of their

respective dispositions to accumulate and expand wealth and to reproduce themselves in good times, while the landowner stood to gain no matter what the state of the economy.

Ricardo's achievement was to abstract the science of economics from ethics and other branches of social knowledge (Haney, 1949, pp. 307-310). He gave sole recognition to a branch of social analysis that was built entirely on the imperatives of an exclusively economic system: The capitalist would inevitably seek to maximize earnings through improvements in technology, opposition to higher wages, and increases rents, while the worker would inevitably seek to reproduce in numbers to the extent that increases in wages would permit him to feed more mouths. Considering the fact that all human social groupings were deemed to fit into his economic system, such behavioral imperatives were not merely a subordinate part of a larger social scheme posited to simply explain the economic aspects of social relations. Ricardo went so far as to transform the entire realm of human social relations into an internally reciprocal system of economic relations. Neither ethics, religion, kinship, nor other sources of motivation were considered valid to account for the means-ends relationship purported to govern all instances of human behavior.

While Ricardo's endogenously complete system was fabricated on principles governed by natural law, its

infrastructure was pliable. The debate that ensued in the early twentieth century between the interventionists, or planners as they have come to be termed in later development parlance, and the classical and neo-classical schools took place on the cornerstone of natural law as it stood in opposition to human artifice through government. The object of inquiry was nonetheless the same for both camps: What was the most effective means by which a political economy could provide for material wants? Were policies that emphasized the natural course of events more effective than the deliberate management of savings, investment, and exchange rates, for example, by a central authority? All sides accepted an economic calculus on which to structure social behavior.

### The Modern Interventionists

Keynes (1964) placed the economic calculus in the camp of those who advocated the deliberate manipulation of the economy to achieve certain social ends, such as full employment. Seeking a remedy for what conventional economics could not explain as a protracted depression, he argued that the state had a deliberate role to play in offsetting the extreme cycles of a capital economy in that it alone was in a position to promote more consistently full employment. "...I expect to see the State," he said, "which is in a position to calculate the marginal efficiency of

capital-goods on long views and on the basis of general social advantage, taking an ever greater responsibility for directly organizing investment..." (p. 164). His faith in the innate power of capitalism to promote prosperity was not at issue. He offered a theory whereby business and government might cooperate in rectifying the disequilibria that cycled through the economy. In so doing, he laid the theoretical foundation for state management of the development process in the Third World. The premise on which his theory of government intervention rested was that since economic factors were interrelated, the economy could be directed positively through planned measures.

#### The Ideological Referents of Development Science

The elements of social thought I covered above can be combined into an ensemble of rationales that together grounded a science of development:

- \* Economic science was accorded the power to order social policy;
- \* Traditionally diverse systems of social relations were transformed into a single system of economic relations governed by natural law; and,
- \* The state was assigned the role of prime actor in the promotion of economic development.

In the last three decades, this rational ensemble has evolved into a developmental ideology that has served as the basis for the reorganization of Third World societies. Development under this scheme has become an end state in a

system in which social relations are conceptually transformed into a calculus of variables which are to be changed. Adelman's (1961) conclusion in this respect is logical: Given the supposition of underdevelopment as a state in which specific quantitative variables are used descriptively to contrast with a state of (industrialized) development, "...to generate economic development, then, one must impose upon the society shocks that are large enough to alter its behavioral patterns significantly..." (p. 145).

The purposes for rendering such "shocks" are rationalized as economic development. My effort is directed toward the study of how these ostensibly economic ends have been incorporated into policies supported by the following social referents:

\* Regulation of social life by means of new belief systems promoted as matters of scientific fact through:

- The conversion of human effort and talent formerly directed toward community into a merit driven system of individual rights to property;
- The disengagement of the individual from community life through the deployment of external institutions to supplant traditionally reciprocal and local patterns of interaction;
- The disparagement of local knowledge by transposing an alternative, purportedly "superior" system of knowledge production.

\* Ascription of social regulatory authority to scientifically trained specialists through:

- The arrogation of the political function from the realm of local public discourse over questions of value to the realm of public administration;
- The introduction of diverse extensions of the state and private enterprise into the mainstream of community life;
- The reorientation of productive activity from subsistence to specialization for external commerce;



- The assumption of increasing responsibility for social integration of the young by the state.

\* Provision of an instrumental means to rationally plan social change that accounts for cultural difference.

In the next chapter, I examine how these socio-economic rationales have been translated into the basic components of America's developmental ideology.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF AMERICA'S DEVELOPMENTAL IDEOLOGY: THE ELEMENTS OF A CRITICAL FRAMEWORK

In this chapter I cover three avenues of interest. First, I examine the social factors at work in the United States to reduce the concept of ideology to a matter of political doctrine. I investigate how this reduction was due in part to the failure of twentieth century American sociologists to deal adequately with the the proposition that scientific knowledge could be socially produced. I focus on the historical factors that contributed to the "split" of ideology from the field of social science. The first section ends with a look at how sociology has been appropriated into the service of the American state, with consequences for the production and management of development policy.

Second, I investigate the relationships between this enfeebled concept of ideology and the production of development theory. I focus on the language of development as a representation and refinement of what has been called "policy science." And third, I introduce the basic components of a critical framework for the ensuing investigation of the ideology behind state policy in education.

The concern of the chapter as a whole is to explore the epistemological foundations of the scientific backing for the mobilization of U. S. development policy. The rationales for development policy identified in the previous chapter originate in certain knowledge production practices. The socio-historical referents of the economic and political practices are reflected on in critical terms.

Delegitimizing Ideology:  
The Purge of Social Science

Uncovering Ideology in Social Policy

The investigation of ideology is a paradoxical endeavor primarily because the object of study -- ideology -- is contrarily constitutive of the means for studying it. The difficulty involved in analyzing ideology stems from the fact that the means available to undertake such an analysis originate in the self-same ideology. The world within which ideology is produced also produces the methods by which we have come to know the world. Not only is knowledge constructed socially, as Berger and Luckmann (1966) pointed out,<sup>1</sup> ideology circumscribes the space in which knowledge is produced.

This apparent paradox reminds me of an exchange I once saw between a meddlesome tourist and a copra factory worker on an island in the South Pacific. Interrupting her deft maneuvers in extracting the white copra from its inner

shell, the tourist asked the easiest way to open a coconut fresh off the tree. After some hesitation, she replied rather tersely, "From the inside."

Both knowledge and mind are constituted socially. One's personal history is a collective assimilation of modes of thought acquired throughout life in a social setting. The tendency to reimpose these modes of thought to regulate one's reality is a part of one's social inheritance and being (Weick, 1977, pp. 267-300), one's identity in the world. The social effect is to reproduce the world as a reenactment of one's personal history. While Weick's concern was more with the individual processes of organizational reproduction, it nonetheless illustrates in microcosm the social basis on which our concepts about society have been conditioned. My general interest in this section is with ideology as a concept both derived from and constitutive of the composite of social relations within which our world has been made.

The study of ideology is therefore a potentially self-deceptive exercise. Ideology tends to reproduce social relations without exposing them. It is ironically most effective when it is least evident. For precisely this reason, it is necessary to establish a critical vantage point from which to study ideology. Otherwise, the risk would be to reproduce current misunderstanding in new dressing, but without new insight.

Below, I begin with a review of historical factors that have conditioned the insertion of ideology into the means we have developed to understand the social world. Although the stance on which I undertake this review assumes a materialistic basis for social organization, I accept the power of language to influence the social order. Immediate references to the mode of production are highly complex and extremely difficult to draw. For the sake of critical reflection, I start from the point that all our ideas arise from the social conditions in which we live. In this view, mind does not develop in a vacuum. Ideas do not beget ideas in a stream of conscious development divorced from the real conditions of life. The study of history consequently cannot be reduced to a review of particular streams of ideas as if they autonomously gave rise to rather than resulted from the social conditions under which they were produced.

### The Historical Backcloth

The concern I had in the previous chapter was to raise several theoretical issues about the social foundations of knowledge in the positivist tradition. To this end, I touched upon key historical junctures in the development of social science, beginning with Francis Bacon and proceeding summarily through Comte, Mill, Weber, and Parsons. I identified instances in which the production of knowledge was advanced as a result of fundamental assumptions made about the nature of reality, science, human nature, and

society. I also reviewed the historical trend to reduce what had been matters of social relations to empirical rules of economy. In this vein, I traced the main exemplars of political economy in the British tradition, including Smith, Malthus, Ricardo, and finally John Maynard Keynes, who represented various stages in the advancement of the science of economics and its integration into the socio-political sphere of life.

Theorizing Ideology:  
American Sociology Prior to 1960

Ideology as an object of study was almost entirely absent from the American scene in the first third of this century.<sup>2</sup> It was not until Robert Merton (1957, p. 457) addressed critical remarks on Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia (1946) in 1949 that American sociologists directed their attention to the new concept of "the sociology of knowledge." Merton reacted strongly to the "functionalization of knowledge" he saw represented in Mannheim's work. According to Merton, the dilemma inherent in accepting the validity of the concept of a "sociology of knowledge" was that the search for knowledge should be rationally governed by universal grounds for truth and validation. The danger with recognizing knowledge as a socially produced activity undertaken to advance the interests of special groups or classes was that it dispelled



the certainty with which the social world could be known. Truth-seeking should not be a relative enterprise. Truth could be known and explained universally.

Mid-century America needed to rely on the practical, utilitarian approach to understanding social problems advanced by its new breed of pragmatic social scientists. Brains and social planning were viewed to be instrumental to America's recovery from the upheaval wrought by the Great Depression, the Second World War, and the new threat of communist expansion. To America's new breed of applied sociologists, the idea that knowledge could be generated socially was part of a remote, basically European, idealist/materialist debate that arose at the inspiration of Marx to counter the dominance of Hegel's spirit in German social thought. The more immediate needs of a once moribund and a still vulnerable socio-economic system had to be addressed in practical terms.

The frame of socio-economic analysis advanced by Talcott Parsons, for example, provided for "structural functionalist norms" and a "central value system" (Hall, 1978, p. 9) far more suitable for America's immediate needs to build a model society in an age of optimism. Even within the ranks of the American socialist movement, Dittberner (1979, pp. 6-7) noted that the notion of "ideology" was treated with no more than lip-service, the overriding concern instead necessitated by the practical needs for

tangible results in the areas of political organizing and the labor movement.<sup>3</sup>

American sociology responded accordingly. Bierstedt (1981) noted that ten of the key figures (namely, Sumner, Ward, Znaniecki, Ross, MacIver, Cooley, Sorokin, Lundberg, and Merton) instrumental to the development of American twentieth century sociology adopted Spencer's views of society. Spencer had argued that society could be analyzed as a totality of component elements which interacted in accordance with discernible objective laws in an evolutionary scheme (pp. 491-492). It was the business of sociology to develop various means to investigate through cause and effect analysis the functionally interactive elements of American society. The structural-functionalist approach, as it came to be called, was modeled on the same model used to study natural phenomena.

Overall, the main concern of the American community of sociologists was the establishment of a scientific discipline for the analysis of society. While some variation of approach and emphasis was evident, the common aim was to elevate the status of sociology to a level of legitimacy recognized as one among the other sciences. The elevation effort was enhanced by the incorporation of methods, assumptions, and principles generally accepted for use by the natural sciences.<sup>4</sup>

Burrell and Morgan (1979, pp. 42-43) noted a tenet central to the study of society in the structural-functional mode. American sociologists were prone to adopt the biological metaphor wherein society was viewed as a super-organism with its constituent elements tending toward functional cohesion. Having originated with Spencer, the biological metaphor had contributed to Durkheim's concept of the "collective life" (1938, pp. 97-112), whose component elements could be studied under the rules of causation. While Durkheim did not feature prominently per se in the development of American sociology, his basic rules of method laid the foundation for an objective, cause and effect, evolutionary investigative practice that helped distinguish the science of society from the science of the individual, that is, from psychology. He gave precedence to what could be called a "universal flow of social development" outside the realm of human will where conflict was seen as an internal, temporary phenomenon anomalous to the overarching tendency toward social cohesion. This supposition, as much as any other, was appropriated into the mainstream of the pragmatically oriented American sociology which predominates to this day. The subsequent contributions of the American sociologists mentioned above were cast within this cohesive, incremental, conflict-as-pathology mold.

It is small wonder that Mannheim's vision of the social roots of knowledge formation was received with such hostility in the company of American social scientists whose

chief concern was with the establishment of a firm bedding of knowledge production in a potentially tumultuous social climate (Bierstedt, 1981, pp. 11-12). The very idea that the products of disciplined reason could be subjected to the social forces at work in a specific historical epoch was viewed as defiance of the ascendancy and the influence of the new science of society. Dittberner's (1979, pp. 21-40) survey of the reaction among different members of the American scholarly community is notable for the consistency with which Mannheim's notion of attributing class or group interest as instrumental to the knowledge production process was attacked as a relativistic enterprise without scientific basis. Merton's summation is typical:

...[Mannheim's] theory of ideology is primarily concerned with discrediting an adversary, a tout prix, and is but remotely concerned with reaching valid articulated knowledge of the subject matter in hand. It is polemical, aiming to dissipate rival points of view. It is implicitly anti-intellectualistic. It would establish truth by fiat, by sheer political domination if necessary. It seeks assent, irrespective of the grounds for acceptance. It is akin to rhetoric rather than to science...(Merton, 1957, pp. 493-494)

Merton's project, to the contrary, was directed toward the recognition of pluralistic sources and types of knowledge within a universal scheme of proof outside the specific circumstances of history. To this end, he conceived a "scientific ethos" (pp. 552-556) whose purpose was "...the extension of certified knowledge...", a process of investigation guided by four sets of institutional imperatives: "universalism," "communism" (a term referring

to membership in a scientific community to which scholars contributed for the public good), "disinterestedness," and "organized skepticism" (pp. 553-559). Merton's refutation, however, did not so much address the epistemological issues raised by Mannheim as it attempted to further the cause of the American version of sociology. He did so by attacking Mannheim's own attempt to "transcend" (Dittberner, 1979, p. 71) the charge of relativism through a concept Mannheim called "relationism," which was itself an effort to claim validity through testing the researcher's view of the object of study.

This debate was indicative of the importance placed by American scholars on their project to establish a scientific orthodoxy by disengaging the study of society from the realm of political struggle. The lengths to which they went to consign the subject of ideology to a safe, explicable space by opposing it to their science can be seen in "the functionalization of thought" characteristic of the rise of organization<sup>5</sup> and communications theory which, according to Dittberner (pp. 73-74), may have had the effect of "absorbing" concepts like the "sociology of knowledge" into a totality manageable within the confines of the structural-functional paradigm. The overall effect of the absorption was to remove the subject of ideology from the agenda of science.

The problem that emerged, however, was what to do with it. It was not going to fade away. The critical theorists of the relocated Frankfurt School,<sup>6</sup> for instance, as well as other European scholars, had been engaged in the project of redefining the concept of ideology in terms outside the quiet enclave to which it had been pigeonholed by America's sociologists. I do not mean the topic was ignored on the American scene by any means. How ideology instead was relegated to the domain of politics is a subject of great importance to the scientization of early development theory in America.

#### The Impact of the Cold War and the Appropriation of Ideology

Beginning with the decade of the fifties, the study of the role of ideology took place within the parameters of the Cold War. Treatment on the subject by American scholars tended to confine itself to a view where one's "ideology" designated one's political place within the social fabric. The question of how the existence of that place may have derived from a larger socially determined process was for the most part neglected. In the late forties and continuing through the fifties, a series of international conferences were held, which had an overall effect of sharpening the political contrasts between the two ideological systems of totalitarian communism and free world capitalism, particularly as they related to the interests of scholars.<sup>7</sup>



The argument advanced by American sociologists was that the domestic utility of the concept of ideology had dissipated in the modern industrialized state. Ideology's principal role in the future, they argued, should be redirected to the struggle for influence in the developing nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The dissipation thesis featured prominently in the independent declarations of two eminent liberal sociologists of the period, Seymour Martin Lipset (1960) and Daniel Bell (1962). Each concluded that the heretofore "ideological" aspects of the struggle for economic and political influence in the United States and other industrialized democratic nations had, in effect, been "institutionalized" within the legitimate scope of the American social setting. In this setting, contending parties subscribed to a basic consensus on the exercise and disposition of their conflicting interests. The pragmatic orientation of the liberal view was evident in the enlightened self-interest theme they argued should be pursued as a matter of national policy among the developing nations. Lipset saw ideology playing a major role in the struggle to win over hearts and minds:

...Ideology and passion may no longer be necessary to sustain the class struggle within stable and affluent democracies, but they are clearly needed in the international effort to develop free political and economic institutions in the rest of the world...(Lipset, 1960, p. 417)<sup>8</sup>

Bell, on the other hand, confined his view of ideology to narrower terms, particularly with respect to the role

sociology would play in development by providing the means to deal with the question of:

...how, within the framework of freedom, to increase the living standards of the majority of people and at the same time maintain or raise cultural levels...(Bell, 1962, p. 38)

The uplifting process in Bell's way of thinking would be aimed at transforming the total, doctrinaire conception of ideology into the more "parochial" model deployed by "Russia and China" as a domestic call to action toward economic development (p. 403). Such a reorientation of the term would mean dispensing with the "universalistic" aspects of "equality and freedom" promoted on a world scale, as these and other ideological notions were clearly detrimental forces in what he viewed as the very practical struggle to elevate the human race. The problem was historical in the sense that total ideologies of the past tended to simplify, distort, and inflame the passions much as a "secularized religion." The question of development then would involve building democratic institutions for the economic transformation of societies. Such a process would employ a kind of "empirical ladder" by which the target, means, costs, and actors would be specified as sub-elements of a more general systematic approach to the rational planning and orientation of a new society.

The "end of ideology" debate in one sense signified the successful reification of its meaning into the domain of political struggle. Reified as international politics, the

American version of ideology took on a politically neutral shape as a nuts-and-bolts predilection for the pragmatic. So concealed, it was free to be reinsinuated into U. S. policy toward the Third World as an emergent apolitical science of development. The main features of its insinuation can be distinguished in the sixties, a topic I will pursue after completing the task of establishing a vantage point outside the confines of the ideology to American sociology has been subject.

The review of ideology in America I have pursued up to this point was done to distinguish the historical referents involved in splitting the concept of ideology from the practice of sociology. American sociology's exemplars and liberal critics succeeded in appropriating a positivistic version of social science, one that tended to conceal its ideological roots. The problem of critically reflecting on that appropriation process and its implications was left to sociologists of a different orientation. Their work laid the ground for study of how a sanitized rendering of sociology came to be incorporated into development science.

### The Critique of Development Science

Whatever can be said of ideology, its expression is mediated through language. Ideology does not exist apart from language. While particular social systems are characterized by their own social relations, ideology

designates, according to Thompson, "...the complex ways in which meaning is mobilized for the maintenance of relations of domination..." (Thompson, 1984, p. 5). The study of ideology in its concrete manifestations must therefore deal with the question of how language mobilizes meaning so as to sustain or further forms of social domination.

A logical place to begin is with the expressions of the actors involved in making and justifying educational policy. Policy is produced in the effort to put theory into practice. As an agency of the American state, AID enacts policy as a representation of the concrete analyses, conclusions, and prescriptions that result from the deliberations of its policy level staff in reading and responding to the interests of its diverse audiences: administrators and leaders of the Third World, the American Congress and public, professionals in the field, and its own view of its mission. The policy production process is not straightforward. It takes place in a world of competing interests. AID's educational policies are therefore set so as to reflect what appears to be commonly held rationales amongst intersecting forces and events that are neither congruent nor compatible.

## Ideology and the Production of Texts

### Marx and the Study of Language

The path between the concrete expression of actors and the material they have to work with is not linear. Marx saw the problem of the interaction between material history and the expression of idea as one fraught with contradiction:

Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living....(1978 [1852], p. 595)

Marx sought to counteract the heavy spiritual legacy left by Hegel and his critics by reversing the conviction that human affairs were ruled by ideas. He sought to deal with "...real, active men and on the basis of their real life-process...demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life process..." (1978 [1846], p. 154). He went on to emphasize the primacy of the material roots of productive life:

...Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no development; but men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life....(Marx, 1978, [1846] pp. 154-155)

The mere tracing of material roots, however, is a highly complex undertaking, for the power of ideas is felt

throughout society, which is organized to further class interests:

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it...Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch....(Marx, 1978, pp. 172-173 [emphasis in original])

What Marx began to address was the complexity of the interconnections between material reality and its expression in language. It is a project unfinished (Hall, 1978, p. 28), as it were, left for the interpretation of followers in the critical tradition, several of whom were interested to develop an objective means to unravel the knot of reality as a socio-material construction with its correspondent relations of domination. The unresolved problem noted by Hall that haunts the materialist project to this day is the tendency for such objective analytical approaches to "collapse back" unwittingly into some form of structural idealism, leaving the whole field of a materialist theory of ideology itself "under-developed" (p. 28).

Thompson's (1984) interest is to avoid the pitfall of the "idealist collapse" by exploring the means through which



language may itself be materially constitutive of social reality. His sense is that Marx's notion of material activity alone being determinant of ideological constructs was wrong (p. 37). While he rightly attributed the origins of social change to changes in the mode of production of material life, Marx failed to address the fact that the mode is forever mediated through language, which provides the domain within which ideology works. In this line of thinking, language plays a formative role in the production of consciousness. Language does not merely reflect a reality that underlies it - it actually provides the "deep structure" for its creation.

This leaves open the question of how the creative act is conceived possible. Marx's thesis of the dominant ideology being simply the ideology of the ruling class, that is to say, a "...pure reflection of the conditions of life and the world conceptions of that class..." (McDonough, 1978, p. 40), does not so much circumscribe the role of the subject, the utterer, in creating history; it paradoxically necessitates it:

The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism - that of Feurbach included - is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as human sensuous activity, practice, not subjectively...

The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of other circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that it is essential to educate the educator himself....(Marx, 1978 [1845], p. 144 [emphasis in original])

Marx's thesis brings up the crux of the difficulty in analyzing the role of ideology in the formation of the American consciousness. Eyerman (1981) noted that "...in American society... 'false consciousness' seems so widespread that it appears as a normal state of existence. And 'ideology', far from being super-imposed through various types of 'superstructural apparatus', is part and parcel of societal praxis..." (p. 12). Ideology itself serves as a constitutive element that necessitates, in Eyerman's terms, the false cognition that one's ideas of the world can emerge apart from one's experience through "collective human activity" (p. 13). Human beings use language to express their knowledge about the world and in that process they "objectify" their reality. This objectification, when engaged in collectively, forms the basis for social life. Using Thompson's (1984) definition, ideology is then the study of the composite of those relations in which domination of class, sex, and other interests is sustained. The study of ideology must therefore involve how consciousness is produced to obscure real social relations.

The Language of America's Developmental Consciousness:  
The Ideology of Modernity and Economic Expansion

In the first chapter I was concerned to review the public argumentation made in support of foreign assistance. Within the general context of the Cold War, I distilled the

arguments into four ideological subgroups: protectionistic (military) interventionism, obligatory economic interventionism, political stabilization toward modernity, and institutional restructuration through social engineering. In this section I examine how the language of development has been produced with a view to both obscure and realize this ideological ensemble. Three questions guide my inquiry: What is the language of modernity and economic growth consciousness that has been used to guide American international development policy? In what sense do modernity and growth consciousness relate to a developmental ideology? What are the material roots of this ideology?

### The Language of Modernity

The principal rationales of the language of modernity can be distinguished both in the exegeses of its major exponents and in its social referents. Collectively, the rationales compose the ideology out of which the production of developmental texts is made possible.

The notion of modernity made its appearance on the development scene in Lerner's seminal work of 1958, The Passing of Traditional Society. In this work, Lerner introduced the concept of "systemic balance" as an ideal condition toward which all societies evolve, the conditions made up of a constellation of "common compulsions" toward which key members of societies in transition feel the

impulse to move (Lerner, 1958, p. 77). Movement on a societal scale is attributed to a growing transition-minded group of key actors whose collective energy is thought to uplift society out of its traditional orientation and move towards a new, modern outlook. The social is interwoven with the psychological in that the group of "transitionals," by adopting a new set of attitudes and behaviors, "modernizes" the whole society.

Lerner suggested four basic indices of modernity, with descriptive features - by definition - extrapolated from western, primarily American, society as the prototypical model "...that ...reappear in virtually all modernizing societies on all continents of the world, regardless of variations in race, color, creed..." (p. 46):

\* Urbanization is a term characteristic of industrialization where rural populations migrate to the cities for jobs in factories or peripheral activities. This "phase" (p. 61) of the modernization process creates the need for its sequel, literacy.

\* Literacy is designated as a need arising from new concentrations of population who demand more impersonal means of communication for consumption and production purposes. This demand eventuates into "...all sorts of new desires ... and the means of satisfying them" (p. 62).

\* Media Participation denotes the phase of modernization in which participation in all sectors of social life increases - the economic and social included. Participation signifies a general consensus in which the definition of the "Self" changes from a "constrictive" model to an "empathetic" one (p. 72).

\* The notion of "social empathy" is noteworthy because it is central to the developmental scheme. The concept is psycho-social to the extent that it signifies a "readiness" of the general population to adopt the more impersonal features of modern life as normal.

The public broadcast media open a space in which the new individual is able to place herself into the heretofore social-imaginary world of desire, a world not yet experienced, but held enticingly out as attainable given the right combination of social behaviors and attitudes. This juxtapositioning of media with a reorientation of the self is fundamental to the rationalization of development.

Others concerned with adding substance to the reorientation sought to define in more explicit terms just what it was the media, as well as other modern institutions of communication, were supposed to portray. That definition was provided by Inkeles and Smith (1974), who noted twelve "qualities" necessary for modern citizenship, including openness to new experience, readiness for social change, disposition to acquire facts and information, orientation to the future, belief in personal efficacy, use of planning, calculability or trust in institutions, distributive justice, value of technical skill, aspiration for education and work, respect for dignity of others, and understanding of the factory production process (pp. 20-24).

The individual model of modernity is complemented by the institutional, where a dynamic interaction between the two is thought to result in the dissipation of traditionally parochial relations and the growth of new organizations to regulate the transactions of a modern political economy.



What resulted in fact was a huge proliferation of prescriptive research on such topics as institutional development, innovation diffusion (e.g., Rogers, 1971), community development, organization analysis and development, leadership training, technical assistance, development administration, costs and benefits, linkages (e.g., Havelock, 1971), and strategies for change.

An important benchmark in this proliferation of new material was the AID-sponsored digest on institutional development compiled by Melvin Blase in 1973. Blase's work included the most current thinking that defined the scope, substance, and vehicles for the deployment of technical assistance in use up to that day. Works that appeared later in the seventies (e.g., Lindquist, 1978; Hall and Loucks, 1978) focused more specifically on environmental factors that influenced the institutionalization process. One common element in the language of institutionalizing innovations was the recognition that the right experts applying the right methods comprised a positive force for development. Esman's (1972) summary of this perspective illustrates this point best:

The IB [Institution Building] perspective posits purposeful social innovation induced by change-oriented elites who work through formal organizations. Their objective is to build viable and effective organizations which develop support and complementarities in their environment. This support permits the innovations to take root, gain acceptance, become normative and thus institutionalized in society....(p. 21)



His later summary is more to the point: "The IB model is an elitist theory with an explicit social engineering bias. Changes occur from the top down, not from the bottom up..." (p. 26). In this line of thinking, Esman refers to several "theory-related perspectives on social change" (pp. 24-25):

- \* Development is a process that involves the introduction of (technological) innovations in a deliberate manner.

- \* The development process is both initiated and guided by those who see personal and social benefit in planned change.

- \* Inducing innovations requires the creation and/or adaptation of formal organizations which serve to support the institutionalization process.

- \* The end result desired is the inducement of change through networks in the wider environment so that changes will be valued for their own sake (Friedland, 1969, p. 75).

This latter point on the wider society is of course more overtly political, an observation addressed directly by Samuel P. Huntington's (1968) effort to differentiate between the "decaying" effects of rapid modernization and the resultant need to develop the political institutional framework to control sustained economic growth within a stable environment. In this view, economic growth did not so much stabilize as destabilize traditional socio-political systems (pp. 49-53). The problems thought to be caused by the rapid pace of modernization necessitated deliberate political intervention on a society-wide scale (p. 46).

The proliferation of material on development since the 1960s can be traced to several more basic theoretical

premises advanced by the major exponents of "social engineering" ever since Weber concerned himself with the task of bureaucracy and the rationalization of social forms. Beginning with Weber, I extract the most basic rationales for the conflation of social and economic science into the institutionalization model that has been deployed by the United States in the Third World.

### The Language of Economic Growth

The economic rationales for development covered in Chapters I and II gave birth to a host of functionalist approaches to solve the problems of the transition to modernity that are cast within a mold of stabilization. Changing economic factors are viewed to be the underlying cause of the deterioration of traditional institutional forms for maintaining order. The overarching conception is that social change can be accommodated within a new framework of a system of interdependent functions. Weber's contribution to this conception was essentially to classify economic behavior according to a rational scheme whereby human wants were mediated within appropriate institutional forms (Weber, 1947, pp. 158-323). His central concern was to lend the principle of rational discipline to all spheres of collective human endeavor, particularly the economic.

Wilson's (1977) recent study of the American ideology emphasizes the primacy of Weber's search for "calculability

and predictability" as the guiding tenets of life, with capitalism as its chief motivating force and bureaucracy as its ideal form of social organization (p. 146). Weber used sociology as the final ideal point of reference to guide the social enterprise. He raised the rationality of sociology to the level of supreme exemplar to which all forms of human activity were subject. Events outside this calculus were relegated the status of value, that is, to non-fact. The individual as a knowing subject capable of analyzing his position reflectively and taking action outside the sociological frame of reference was left as anomie in an otherwise objectively determined order.

The economic forms were those that, while coeval with capitalism, were independent of it in that they represented the rationalization of the social in its entirety:

Since asceticism undertook to remodel the world and to work out its ideals in the world, material goods have gained an increasing and finally an inexorable power over the lives of men as at no previous period in history. Today the spirit of religious asceticism - whether finally, who knows? - has escaped from the cage. But victorious capitalism, since it rests on mechanical foundations, needs its support no longer....(Weber, 1958, pp. 181-182)

The forms themselves were those generic to the free market economy: from the production and coinage of money, to credit, accounting, profit making, the division of labor, the conduct of commerce, the expropriation of the worker from the means of production, and the numerous other, primarily empirical, observations made by Weber on the

workings of modern industrial capitalism. Throughout his analysis, Weber was concerned to induce the ideal forms for the functioning of relationships within the capitalist mode of production and to hold them up as a compelling spirit of rationality that governed individual behavior. The concrete manifestation of that spirit was bureaucracy, or, in Weber's preferred terminology, the several types of "corporate groups" he identified as the regulatory institutions governing economic intercourse (Weber, 1947, pp. 171-173).

What Weber accomplished was to provide the conceptual scheme whereby the private interests of those holding economic and political power were rationalized. His scheme in effect subordinated the individual subject to the asylum of the irrational, thereby delegitimizing contrary action as anomalistic. Rationalization in reality meant formalization of an authority structure, usually hierarchical in nature, that was accorded legitimacy either by its own members or by the members of a higher authority to command the obedience of its lower status members within the framework of an impersonal, impartial set of rules (pp. 328-341). This system gave rise to a host of related activities: the production of codes of office, descriptions of function and limits of authority, individual rights of appeal, training of staff, technical expertise as career associated with the functions of a specific office, and so forth. Permeating the scheme at the level of society was the system of

interaction between bureaucracy and social class, whereby the former tended to "level" (p. 340) the latter by reducing instances of the historical ascription of privilege.

Weber's sociology served as the ideological antecedent for two subsequent developments. The first derived immediately from the products of his work: The capitalistic forms of organization he classified were later incorporated into a totality to describe and explain social change as a moment within the natural evolution of societies. I proceed to the economic features of that process below. The second is less immediately obvious, but more illustrative of the deception involved in the transposition of the rational mentality that lies at the core of America's developmental ideology: The significance of Weber's contribution is that it provided the imaginary space within which development could be theorized. While I treat that subject in detail in the final section of this chapter, particularly with reference to its major theoretical exponent Talcott Parsons, suffice it to say at this point, that the idea of development presupposes that technical knowledge can be applied to the regulation of human behavior for development. Toward this end, the diversity characteristic of traditional cultural life is exorcised at the cutting edge of science, which turns the individual into an instrumental object in the service of the economy.

The Language of Economic Development

The light in which my analysis of the function of the ideology undergirding development economics was cast by Ronald Meek (1967) when he observed that schools of economic thought arise in response to the real conditions and problems faced in their respective historical periods. The propensity for error increases, he said, to the extent that a particular theory of economics is "extracted" from its own historical circumstances and used to explain or predict events in others (p. 15). This point is central to the analysis of development programming, as this kind of transposition process is the driving force for its economics. Ultimately, the transposition process attempts either to contravene or collapse history. Development theorists are predisposed to insist on the deployment of a preferred version of economic modeling as integral to economic development.

The problem inherent in modeling of any sort is inescapably ideological. The process usually entails a "...curious admixture of syntactical apriorism (elaboration of frameworks) and semantical empiricism (the frameworks grasp the 'real world')..." (Preston, 1985, p. 75). The model that dominated the policy of the sixties was the one that posited, in a neoclassical mold, the causal relationship between capital accumulation, savings, and investment. Known as the Harrod-Domar model of economic



growth,<sup>9</sup> the model was incorporated into the five stages of growth scheme advanced by W. W. Rostow (1964), where the "sweep of modern history" was portrayed as a series of successive developments on the road to the final stage of the society of "mass consumers" (pp. 4-9).<sup>10</sup> It followed logically that at a particular stage of development, certain interventions could be made to accelerate the process toward economic "take-off" and beyond. The problem then became one of applying the correct analytical procedure to determine the extant condition of a particular society's economy, thence to inject the correct "admixture" of ingredients to produce the desired results. The organismic metaphor was preeminent as social and individual development paralleled one another closely.

The organismic metaphor was realized as a compression of economics and sociology into development policy. In fact, it was an ideological construct concealed as science and logic, the conceptual origins of which stemmed directly from Weber. Rostow, referring to his stages of growth theory, simply extended the applicability of Weber's analytical frame as social scientific fact:

These stages are not merely descriptive. They are not merely a way of generalizing certain factual observations about the sequence of development of modern societies. They have an inner logic and continuity. They have an analytic bone-structure, rooted in a dynamic theory of production. (pp. 12-13 [emphasis added])

If is the case, then the stages concept presumes to stand as

truth as we are consciously able to comprehend it. And if it enjoys such standing, then its application is justified prima facie, and those so engaged spread its truth. This is what I mean by recourse to the rationale of the absolute. The authority of science is invoked to support the analysis of development problems.

As an incontrovertible premise of economic development, Rostow's empirical observation is raised to a level of internal logic. It is extracted from the real world of actual social conditions and postulated as deductive truth impelled neither by the momentum of history nor material circumstance, but instead by scientific reason. In this line of thought, the American economic model is not subject to the pecuniary interests of class or individual. It is representative of reason itself, with the order of society being subject to it and not the reverse. The material conditions in which the developmental variations of the model were born have not changed so much as they have been laundered, canonized, legitimated by economic science for transplantation in refined forms as model reconstructions. Research in diffusionist models is thus rendered appropriate for the economic regulation of "backward societies." At the same time, the real material determinants that drive the predominant society and its component interests is conveniently concealed.

In accordance with these determinants, the language of economic science serves a dual function. First, it unifies the related members of the community of development theorists and practitioners into a constituent element of the social totality within which they function.<sup>11</sup> They make their living within the dictates of a technocratic society much as the rest of us. Second, the language serves the ideological purpose of defining the imaginary space in which development theory can be produced. In this sense it provides the rational structure for the mobilization of economic resources and interests to be brought to bear on the Third World. The language of economic development is "mathematized" and as such bears the stamp of universal validity to determine the content and substance of policy initiative (Katouzian, 1980, pp. 166-172).

In addition, several tenets of export capitalism can be traced to "[the] general tendency towards abstraction from the relations between men in production...", which development economist Joseph Schumpeter argued was "scientifically justified" (Meek, 1967, pp. 205-206). Schumpeter's (1954) review of economic analysis echoed Weber's tone of regret for the inevitable mastery of ideas over the conduct of human affairs. I say "regret" because each in his own way yielded reluctantly to the self-generated sway they accorded to the compelling logic of capitalism, whether the logic was to do itself in by the weight of its own "matter of factness," as Schumpeter

concluded (1962, pp. 131-142), or, sadly, to ensnare all individuality into its "iron cage" (Weber, 1957).

Schumpeter's work is of interest because he furthered the advance of development as an economic science which was capable of dealing with technology and the social setting. While he saw the overall goal of economic development as a matter of increasing the rate of production, a concern he shared with other growth theorists, he stressed that technological and social changes were necessary to stimulate an increase in the rate of growth (Adelman, 1961, pp. 94-98). In this calculus, the other factors of production, namely available capital, qualified labor, and exploitable natural resources, were either exogenous or neutral in an equilibrium state economy. Consequently, the inducement of positive economic changes into a socio-cultural setting depended on the introduction of discontinuities, namely innovations, into the current state of technological relations. The process of innovation, however, depended on the one feature of nascent capitalism that appeared to atrophy in highly industrialized societies: entrepreneurship. The pessimistic outlook that dominated Schumpeter's analysis is a direct outgrowth of the inner logic he attributed to the structure of capitalism, which contained an institutional vulnerability traceable to two generic imperatives: The rationalization of the small entrepreneur out of existence (1962, p. 140); and the

subjection of the institutions of "property and free contracting" to the shadow of the enlarging corporate edifice (pp. 141-142). The result was the removal of the vibrant person from the "inner walls of the enterprise," from the "life centering, substantial grip" of tangible property to the remote background of "shareholding" (p. 142), a massive default to the lackluster professional stewardship of corporate management and government bureaucracy.

Schumpeter succeeded in advancing the theory that economic and social development were interrelated by an empirical calculation that was determined by impersonal logic, a logic that removed the notion of class from the calculus of value. In Schumpeter's view, the subordination of class from the central position assigned by Marx was made possible by rejecting the labor theory of value and replacing it with "the marginal utility theory" (Meek, 1967, pp. 207-208).<sup>12</sup> Meek noted the significance of this switch as one that introduced an alternative causation into the calculus of value where the relation between the commodity and its consumer took precedence over the relation between producers represented in the commodity as embodied labor.

The ideological nature of the switch was hidden by its scientific logic, with an overarching effect to remove the economic calculus out of the political realm and, so freed, lay the theoretical foundation for development as a socio-

technical problem to be addressed by the state, not a problem of class originating in the contradictions within the mode of production. The materially based logic of the regime of capital, in Heilbroner's (1985, pp. 53-77) words, was thus obfuscated by its rational logic, the latter having the effect of masking the class dominating imperatives of the former. As the functions of the state in the regime of capital are multivariate and pervasive,<sup>13</sup> I focus below only on those that have a direct bearing on the instrumentality of its role in the extension of American interest in the development of the Third World.

The imperatives of the regime of capital as a whole serve to explain the way society should be constituted in the abstract by the way it is constituted in actuality:

\* First is the fundamental need to amass capital. The drive to accumulate profit was symbolized by Marx (1977 [1867], pp. 198-220 & pp. 247-257) as a continual cycle where commodity is produced and exchanged for money, which is then reconverted into commodity, the surplus value of which in turn is extracted as profit by the owners of capital in an inexorable process of expansion for its own sake as its "...central historical task" (Heilbroner, 1985, p. 77). The whole organization of society then is absorbed into this cycle as facilitator, beneficiary, administrator, insuring its smooth, efficient operation while concealing the relations of domination embedded within it.



\* Second, the immanent drive to accumulate wealth is legitimated as individual right. I touched on this in the second chapter in the exposition of Locke's central thesis on property which has come to be interpreted in modern capitalistic society as individual right to the unlimited ownership of property (Tully, 1980, p. x). Tully's point is that Locke's original meaning was cast in the light of the moral duty to dispose liberally of one's possessions to others (pp. 175-176) and to use such property according to the laws and intentions of God (pp.72-73).<sup>14</sup> According to Locke's axioms, human rights derived from both divine and natural law. They included the right of possession of those goods necessary for survival and enjoyment. His basic conception of the right to property of any kind, however, whether common or individuated (private), was derived neither from natural law nor the convention of political society, but hinged on "...the performance of a social function: to preserve mankind..." (p. 99). It is in this frame of reference that the individual developed personhood, a concept derived from conscious action as an extension of the self into the world. The person therefore owned her actions and, by extension, the fruits of those actions:

...With the transition from man as such to the human agent, the moral analogue of the person and his action is on stage to actualise the natural duties derived from the conceptual model of God and His workmanship. (Tully, p. 110)

Counterposed to Locke's original intention is the metamorphosis of the concept of private property into an ends-motivated force for economic development. As the capitalist mode of production took hold in Britain, the concept was extricated from the context of personal relationship stressed by Locke and inserted into the domain of private acquisition framed in the line of Hobbes and Smith. The idea of property as an extension of human relationships was thus reified into the objects of personal possession where things possessed were accepted as a sign of prudent conduct in one's self-interest before God. Having originated thusly in the Puritan work ethic, the concept of self-interest was later converted into its economic corollary where the successful "man of business" was viewed as upholder of the public welfare, only to be attacked still later as "insatiable exploiter" of labor when the concept of "economic man" gained prominence in the industrial expansion of the nineteenth century (Myers, 1983, pp. 12-27). "Economic man" as the embodiment and executor of self-interest was nonetheless sanctioned as the naturally dictated prerequisite of development.

It is this concept of "economic man" that sits at the heart of development theory exported by the United States today. Its preeminent exemplars base their respective prescriptions for economic development on one fundamental principal: Economic expansion and how best to induce conformity to its needs.<sup>15</sup>

\* Third, the drive to acquire wealth is realized within the dictum of progress. The epitome of this reasoning in the post war era was seen in the work of McClelland and Winter (1969) and the line of behavioral psychologists who hypothesized the relation between national development and its futherance by applying specific, ad hoc educational inputs on a massive scale so as to raise the need to achieve among a critical mass of the people.<sup>16</sup> In this case, the desire to acquire wealth, rather than being a motivator per se, was viewed as one among many possible measures of achievement. The basic idea was that people's needs and behavior can be shaped to effect their own economic development.

This idea of the individual's power to progress also needed its own "guarantor." That guarantor took hold through the metaphysical power ascribed to science. Preston (1985, pp. 124-130) observes that the scientific guarantor gained prominence within the community of eighteenth century "enlighteners,...who took themselves to be the natural governors of society through an equally natural alliance with the rising bourgeoisie..." (p. 128). In the nineteenth century, with the rise of industrialism, the idea of a progressive society became intertwined with that of a liberal (i.e., laissez faire) economy, where the individual is held up as prime mover. The individual in this reasoning is accorded the power to pursue the maximization of his own

utilities. Human desire is depicted as the paramount natural motivator, vouchsafed by the political right of unlimited accumulation (p. 134). The two main guarantors of this right in today's economic development parlance are economic and policy science in alliance with the principal beneficiaries of the extant social order: international investors, multi-national corporations, agencies of the state, and the technical expertise they call on to advance their interests in the Third World. The ideology, then, is very much one that sanctions individual change managed from above while it delegitimizes changes in the relative power relationships determined by class. The ideology of the absolute mastery of positivistic science was most succinctly summed up by McClelland and Winter:

Scientific knowledge is the new God, the new source of man's conviction that he has the competence to act. Yet in another sense, of course, it is a very old God, a conviction that there are certain immutable laws which exist outside of man in the Universe and which, if known and obeyed, give man the power to shape his destiny. (1969, pp. 377-378)

\* Fourth, the development of institutional forms was the concern of several theorists who believed that the right mix of values necessary to effect change depended on a prototypical organizational model. The preeminent exponent of this line of thinking was Gunnar Myrdal. Myrdal sought to counter the "value free" philosophy of the policy scientists of the sixties with an alternative. He promoted the value of "world welfarism" as justification sufficient

to intervene in the effort to reshape old and build new institutions for managing the development process as humanely and equitably as possible. His institution-building approach remains the inspirational centerpiece for social transformation through education that is the focus of this study.

I consider Myrdal critically in spite of the fact that he, along with Dudley Seers, has been noted as one of foreign aid's severest judges (e.g., Seers and Myrdal, 1982; Myrdal, 1973, pp. 126-132). The point of his critique, however, underscores the thrust of his original approach, which involved the transference of a constellation of values through efficient organizational management for development. The cluster of rationales that guided Myrdal's project was stated by Paul Streeten in his introduction to Myrdal's Valuation in Social Theory (1958): How to account for the necessity to exercise value judgment in the implementation of social programs. The necessity to exercise value judgment obligated the social theorist cum practitioner to become critically aware of and to act in accordance with standards of valuation which were to be applied in the social program. The institutional focus was economic in the sense that the "welfare state" was modelled as the composite of means to effect a more just world (Myrdal, 1973, pp. 45-48).



The role of the economist envisioned by Myrdal contrasted with the inflexible macro-growth models that were then, as now, being promoted on a world scale. His models were thought to differ in that they were to be developed in closer conjunction with the realities and "facts" of the local situation (pp. 96-98). National and international economic planning were to be integrated into a centralized approach aimed to reform the domestic socio-economic structure toward more egalitarian ends. Such reforms would include programs to foster national consolidation, redistribution of income, social welfare, industrialization, agricultural productivity, land reform, population controls, education, which included vocational training and literacy, public health, and "social discipline" to counteract corruption (pp. 101-118).

While he emphasized the need for such reforms to be undertaken with local (i.e., national) initiative, Myrdal's call for a developmental ethic could be realized only under the aegis of heavy foreign involvement. Expert advice, training, technical assistance, and resources had to be shared with the proper motives. However much he may have regretted the fact such involvement eventuated as bilateral aid, Myrdal laid the conceptual basis for the "scientization" of value as a transferable prerequisite of development.<sup>17</sup> In this respect, the resemblance of his reforms to orthodox empirical models is indisputable. In by far the largest donor nation, the United States, whose



motives he saw "mixed" at best, rationales for value transfer took form as humanitarian arguments in support of aid and the Peace Corps. The ideological position of "expertise-guided social engineering," to paraphrase Preston (1985), is nevertheless conveyed implicitly within an interventionistic mode. Development is viewed as being either naturally determined, with the expert-as-facilitator, or as one culture's common sense solution to the problems it poses for another.

In sum, the language of development theory and practice has grown exponentially, as refinements in several professional fields continue to provide the basis of research and application. As the proliferation of theories is extensive, the production of development policy can be analyzed as an essential moment in the scientization process. My purpose is to explore how the moment of development science conceals the social referents by which cultural and historical difference is submerged into a predominant economic mainstream. In the next section, I draw several inferences about the development science rationales that have been used to form educational policy and conclude with the rudiments of a framework to examine their ideological referents.

## Ideology and the Science of Development

In the preceding section I dealt with issues of ideology as a social construction and the economic and sociological language of development. In this section, my concern is with how that language is instantiated into the technical science we know as development. The investigative concept I use here is suggested by Brian Fay's investigation of "policy science." The notion of policy science is especially apt for critical reflection on the work of Talcott Parsons in that Parsons' theory of social action provided the theoretical base for the state's role in setting and implementing development policy.

### Social Action and the Concept of System

The history of the development theory that emerged in the sixties and seventies can be cast in the systemic mold originally set out by Talcott Parsons. It was Parsons who provided the theoretical backing by which Weber's earlier work on bureaucratic rationality was given specific social application. Parson's concept of "civil society" was central to the whole theory of social action. Civil society, according to Parsons, was an objective entity that could be analyzed as a "structural-functional system of action." He defined the concept of social structure as:

...a system of patterned expectations of the behavior of individuals who occupy particular statuses in the

social system. Such a system of patterned legitimate expectations is called by sociologists a system of roles. In so far as a cluster of such roles is of strategic significance to the social system, the complex of patterns which define expected behavior in them may be referred to as an institution...Institutional structures in this sense are the fundamental element of the structure of the social system. They constitute relatively stable crystallizations of behavioral forces in such a way that action can be sufficiently regularized so as to be compatible with the functional requirements of a society.

From the psychological point of view, institutionalized roles seem to have two primary functions. The first is the structuring of the reality situation for the action of the individual...Second, they structure the "superego content" for the individual. It is fundamentally the patterns institutionalized in role structure which constitute the moral standards which are introjected in the process of socialization and become an important part of the personality structure of the individual himself...It may be stated as a fundamental theorem of social science that one measure of the integration of a social system is the coincidence of the patterns which are introjected in the average superego of those occupying the relevant social status with the functional needs of the social system which has that particular structure. (Parsons [1951] in Hamilton, Ed., 1985, pp. 126-127 [Emphasis added])

In this passage, Parsons is concerned with two things, the second of which I get to in a few paragraphs. First, the institutional patterns are framed within a larger general theory of four sets of "functional imperatives" deemed necessary for the maintenance or survival of any social system. Of most immediate interest here is the set concerned with the "institutionalization of values" (Parsons and Smelser, 1956, pp. 16-22). The social system as a whole, irrespective of its unique cultural content or history, resides in a situation external to it. The system's sets of functional imperatives interact

reciprocally so as to maintain the institutionalization of the values which define it as one system apart from others. The system seeks to maintain itself by tending toward stability.

The second set of functional imperatives works to relate directly ("interchange") with objects in or facets of the external situation as "goal states" necessary for maintenance of the system as a whole. In the case of complex systems especially, a third, also interactive imperative set, interchanges with the external environment so that its goal states may be attained over the longer term. The fourth set is concerned with maintaining solidarity among the units of the system so as to insure their integrated functioning. The aim of systems analysis, then, is to assess how the whole system is changing and to intervene in the process on the basis of accurate data so as to facilitate improvements in its functioning.

The economy of a system functions in the adaptive dimension as a subsystem concerned with production for the provision of resources to the other subsystems and not simply to the "aggregate of individuals" who compose it (Parsons and Smelser, 1956, p. 22). The economy serves the other functional subsystems, which in turn perform various goal state (political), integrative (organizational), and pattern maintenance (definitional) functions for the system as a whole. A biological metaphor is one in which the

interdependencies are comparable to those in a complex organism where its subsystems, for example, the respiratory, are vitally interconnected with the rest so as to sustain the whole organism. The point is that they exist as instrumentalities to one another. They are not entities whole unto themselves. The parts exist as sub-elements of a greater whole. The individual in this scheme is constituted by the interchanges of the functional subsystems, both serving and being served by them. The grand theory envisages the human being as a functional subsidiary of the social whole.

Parsons granted objective status to the social system as a living entity. The constellation of values that define the system in this sense enjoy a status superior to the subunits within it, individuals included. All exist as interdependent elements of a greater whole. In this way, Parsons succeeded in elevating the status of his sociology to the level of universal arbiter of social change, one that by inference has been deemed appropriate for application across cultures. His analytical frame relegated social content to a space circumscribed within the set of interactive patterns functionally generic to a particular system at a particular stage of development. The patterns themselves are forms derived from the imposition of his sociological scheme of reference, "the grand theory," onto the social setting in question:



The role-partner in a social relationship is a social object. To develop a systematic scheme of points of reference for the analysis of orientations on roles it is then essential first to analyze those basic alternatives of selection which are particularly significant in defining the character of relations to such a good object, and which are constitutive of the character of the relationship pattern itself rather than of its "content" in interest terms, its cultural or motivational aspects in any sense other than as constitutive of relational patterns.... (Parsons [1951] in Hamilton, 1985, p. 133 [Emphasis added])

Parsons proceeded to conceive a theory of social action around the idea of alterable forms which had hitherto been identified by orthodox sociology simply as "empirical regularities" in an equilibrium-seeking social totality. The forms he theorized as deliberately alterable opened the door to the unprecedented proliferation of developmental prescriptions that was to ensue.

Parsons' second concern was with the concept of pattern as an interrelationship between the psychological and socio-structural. The patterned "role expectations" he referred to define the space within which the subject is constituted. Marx's "weight" of the past in Parsons' scheme consisted of the collectivity of social values that were embodied in the relations by which members of a society already live together. Parsons placed the pattern variables he identified on five continua: affectivity vs. affective neutrality, self-orientation vs. collectivity orientation, universalism vs. particularism, achievement vs. ascription, and specificity vs. diffuseness.



Pattern configurations such as these were interpreted by subsequent development theorists to be characteristic of the level of cultural development of whole societies. For example, "...the 'Universalistic Achievement Pattern' was best exemplified by the dominant American ethos. The combination of universalism and achievement-orientation put the primary emphasis on universalistically defined goal-achievement and on the dynamic quality of continuing to achieve particular goals..." (pp. 140-141).

The space circumscribed by the constellation of pattern configurations in a society, however, was not merely a structural matter of concern so much as it restricted the membership of acting subjects in social action programming to those qualified to participate. Wilson's (1977) remarks on the ascribed status of pattern variables underscored the limits of intentful social change inherent in Parsons' theory:

...The infamous pattern variables display not structural alternatives, even within civil society, but "behavioural" possibilities less and less available as real alternatives to people inhabiting a gigantic secondary group. Beyond this, of course, they constitute categories of formally logical possibility within which the functionalist plots empirical probabilities exercising the kind of discipline Durkheim demanded of his sociological army. This is evident in the alternatives alleged to be available in the sociological system - universalism and a performance focus or particularism and ascription....(p. 190)

Parsons failed to see that his version of social action could be so easily reduced to an intrusive, heavy-handed conceptual tool which, as Marx saw, would itself weigh much

as "...tradition...like a nightmare on the brain of the living." In this critical light, Parsons' developmentalist successors could be judged to have turned his dream of rationally managed social change into a nightmare of quick-fix schemes to revamp whole cultures. His grand theory fundamentally lent itself to misapplication of its own momentum. Adriaansens' (1980) otherwise fresh look at Parsons and his critics acknowledged the basic consistency evident throughout all his works, but nevertheless admitted to:

...fundamental ambiguity and lack of precision in The Social System, which translates voluntarism into a double bipolarity, makes the structural-functional theory a hotch-potch from which to pick and choose according to one's book. If only for this reason, the great synthesis, the king-pin of Parsons's convergence theory can be said to have failed in the structural-functional version and a fresh attempt will have to be made. (p. 174)

#### Developmental Systems and State Policy Science

The Parsonian systems approach, in a profusion of sequels and refinements, has been advanced within a frame of policy science advocated on a world scale. Lasswell (1951, pp. 113-116), for instance, observed a global "trend toward scientific and democratic homogeneity." Within the general external trend toward political bipolarity, he noted a corresponding internal trend characterized by: (1) The movement of science and technology toward universality, imposing "uniformities" on world attention and attitudes;

(2) Universal demands to acquire, exercise, and reward "socially useful" skill; (3) Shared control over decision making in skills; (4) A new equilibrium of "collectivizing-individualizing" tendencies with the appearance of homogeneous institutions; (5) Homogeneity of social structure without uniformity of doctrine or single state rule; and (6) The possibility of "unity of moral attitude" which tolerated political and doctrinal difference.

Merton and Lerner (1951, pp. 298-300) used a similar world view to outline two policy "functions" of research in vogue among positivist social scientists at the time - the sensitization of policy makers "to new types of achievable goals" and the means to achieve them. Reciprocally, policy makers themselves were seen to need the assistance of social scientists for the task of public or individual persuasion, the collection of data for decision making, and to delay action by allaying criticism for inaction.

Diesing (1982, pp. 130-132) noted that the Parsonian model was diffused in the works of several "developmental functionalists" (e.g., Apter, 1965). Their approach, as well as source of frustration, was to compress otherwise natural historical development by using a strategy where "...all four functional prerequisites [imperatives] have to be satisfied simultaneously, when almost none of the structures for doing so are yet in place..." (Diesing, 1982, p. 131). In a more critical light, that endeavor resulted

in schemes to control for the unpredictability of the human actor as exerciser of rational choice which had been a core tenet of neoclassical economics.

The effort to shape behavior toward scientifically predictable ends was central to the Keynesian economic and the Parsonian institutional calculus. The advantage to be gained was that all social phenomena, both economic as well as non-economic, could be covered by the systemic blanket and its rational speech (e.g., management information systems, feedback, organizational memory, MBO, etc.) (Diesing, 1982, pp. 149-150). As such, the corporation, the individual, the community, and other social groupings could be studied as collectivities which were accountable in both qualitative and mathematical terms.

### The Scientization of Development Politics

The notion of "mixed economy" pervades developmental politics to this day. The primary vehicle to insure the protection of U. S. public and private investment in the Third World originated in an effort to consolidate domestic state power. The consolidation of state power was realized as an implicit condition for the receipt of American foreign assistance. Notwithstanding the fact this condition contradicted the "free market" Chicago School approach to economic development, the alliance between political liberals of successive Republican and Democratic

administrations and social/developmental advisers and practitioners has dominated state policymaking from Eisenhower up to the present. Also known as the "politics of civility" in the sense advocated by Shils (e.g., 1958 & 1960), the liberal alliance focused on the administration of development in the context of a conflation of old ideological dichotomies into a new coalition based on liberal principles of human tolerance and empiricism. The concept of civility was realized in practice as a mobilization of suitably educated political elites who were to apply sociologically informed plans to institute social reforms under the slogans of democracy cum development.

The American version of global civility was formulated, according to Pakenham (1973, pp. 112-160), under four implicit principles that were characteristic of the liberal optimism of the age: "change and development are easy"; "all good things go together" (America had a history characterized by economic success and prosperity.); "radicalism and revolution are bad;" and "distributing power is better than accumulating power." The historical evidence cited by Pakenham, however, revealed U. S. official toleration of and support for high concentrations of power under authoritarian regimes whenever deterrence to radical movements throughout the world was a factor. Examples of concentrations of state power supported by the United States include the Asian nations of Taiwan, Indonesia, South Korea,



the Philippines, and South Vietnam; and the Latin American nations of Brazil, Chile, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Argentina, Panama, and the Dominican Republic. Packenham's loose classifications of the liberal ideology were not so much concerned with the instantiation of a new theory of development as they were with designating the political parameters of the liberal tradition. His objective was to draw attention to the need for policy reformulation if foreign assistance was to regain its importance as a substantial component of a comprehensive, informed, democratic, and humanitarian foreign policy.

While Packenham identified the implicit principles of liberalism at work, Monsen's (1963) earlier focus was on the need to make the exportable version of the developmental ideology more attractive and explicit, its main strengths stemming from its explicit characteristics of pragmatism, compromise, individualism, pluralism, and democracy (p. 124). The problem was one of better articulation to foreign elites which were responsible for setting development policies. I would argue that such concepts were inherently ambiguous and served to mask what in reality had begun to happen - The ascendant political hegemony of the United States in the Third World was being theorized as a developmental problem. In the decades of the sixties and seventies, The relationship between social science and policy administration, though not wholly free of conflict, grew closer both in theory and practice.



A dramatic early example of official collaboration and the ethical issues it both raised and, more to the point, did not raise, is recounted by Horowitz (1977, pp. 225-257). The attenuation of the hitherto accepted difference between "scientific objectivity" and "social fact" is exemplified by the case of "Project Camelot," a creation of Pentagon research which purported to "...determine the feasibility of developing a general social systems model which would make it possible to predict and influence politically significant aspects of social change in the developing nations of the world..." so as to "relieve" the conditions that gave rise to internal war (p. 226). The good anticipated from the project was encased in political logic. The investigation and reform of traditional societies was justified as a good faith effort by a democratic government with democratic intent.<sup>18</sup> Horowitz's summarization of the operant consent among the project's social scientists highlights the convergence of interests in terms that can be applied to the developmental field as a whole. The source of funding was viewed to be less important than the value of promoting social science as such; the chance to work in a nonacademic setting provided more freedom; the military, too, could be educated; the military was in fact better equipped to promote economic growth; the Pax Americana approach to ending poverty could lessen the need for violence;

participants were confident that the most productive venue for resolving potential ethical conflicts of interest was in the course of practice. Horowitz ends by noting several still unresolved issues of concern involved in the conscription of "orthodox" sociology:<sup>19</sup> The role of the research institute (i.e., the university) as a contractor to produce knowledge; the confusion of the scientific with the social change agent roles; the social application of "objective" research findings across cultures; and the "sanitization" of political into technical speech.

In sum, the scientization of developmental politics evolved from the initial endeavor of American sociologists of the early twentieth century to establish a social scientific orthodoxy which had several basic tenets: objectivity, universality, empirical methodology, and applicability to explain truthfully the events, make-up, and larger social tendencies of contemporary American society. The problematic nature inherent in their approach, however, was not made evident until the 1940s when they were faced with Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia, where the idea that knowledge itself might be subject to the contingencies of its social setting was central. Such a proposition was taken as a threat because its implications went to the heart of the status they had been enjoying as the main exemplars of the social scientific agenda in America. It conjured images of Marx the counter-sociologist and of class, images

that did not fit the regime they had developed for the rational analysis of America's practical needs in an age vulnerable to economic depression at home and totalitarian communist expansion abroad. The direction they set was to establish social science as a neutral font from which to set a rational political agenda. They managed to succeed by the fiat of ending ideology altogether in 1950. They had a more practical job to do. That job entailed helping the cause of democracy throughout the world. What they had to offer were the tools of their science in the service of humanity in need of modernization. The vehicle at their disposal was provided by an alliance of private interest and state power, an alliance that was extended and strengthened throughout the decades of the sixties and seventies.

#### The Science of Development: A Critical Stance

So far, the critical comments I have made in reviewing the positions, assumptions, and rationales of the major exemplars of development science have been offered for clarification. This section sets out to establish a critical vantage point from which to examine the instance of development science as ideology.

Wilson summarizes the central problem of the American ideology in these terms:

The idea that knowledge is inherently neutral, that there is a unitary scientific method, or that science provides the pre-eminent explanatory model

against which the social "sciences" must measure themselves constitutes the epistemic foundation of the American ideology. This ideology is technocratic because it invokes science in order to justify policies aimed at realizing particular objectives. These policies take the form of allegedly neutral techniques whose origins and concerns are distended from the interests they serve....(Wilson, 1977, p. 16)

The practical effects of the ideology he notes are: an anti-reflexive and anti-theoretical bias; a concern for the accumulation of immediately exploitable and applicable knowledge; a "false commitment to 'objectivity'"; "a vision of social and political processes as the product of a 'piecemeal,' trial and error approach" with a concern mainly for legitimacy, reform, and "rules of the game"; and a belief in which the "American-type Western society is exportable," a posture supported by reference to the social sciences and the claimed convergence of world societies according to the Western model (p. 15).

The thrust of Wilson's argument is that the effects of the American ideology coalesce as a constellation of attitudes, actions, and orientations which preclude critical reflection about the realities of social life and their relations to class and other forms of domination. I begin with a look at the material basis that necessitates the function of ideology.

## The Social Function of Ideology

Eyerman's (1981) distinction between consciousness and ideology is an appropriate entry point for the exploration of the role of ideology in development. Distinguishing the function of ideology, he says, implies "...distinguishing between the concepts that an individual uses to understand his/her reality - to situate himself in the world - and those used in scientific reconstructions of that situation..." (p. 203). The latter refers to a process of ideology construction by various "collectivities" in pursuit of their respective interests. In this frame of reference, ideology is produced to advance specific interests by defining what I call "the social space" to their respective, albeit contradictory, advantage. The individualistic ideology of neoclassical economists, for example, adheres to the central premise of their forebears in the sense that they accept Smith's proposition as natural social law: The interests of all are served best only insofar as the members of a political economy act to maximize their individual interests. Science in this reckoning becomes the supreme arbiter of what it determines to be socially natural. This is not to diminish the material interests of those who control the scientific enterprise. It is to point to the ideologization of science as the sole legitimate referee in the ongoing efforts of sectional interests to appropriate social conflict onto the plane of technical problem.

Some of the work of the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School is helpful in drawing inferences about the role of science in ideology construction. The modern practice of social science, according to Horkheimer (1972, pp. 5-6), tends to particularize the social world into elements manipulable according to an idealist frame of reference, thereby failing to acknowledge its own situational genesis. It abstracts itself from its material roots by collapsing the gap between reality and reason, and in so doing, invests itself as the ultimate source of truth. The extant social problems of the real world, in other words, are in need of rational explication - Why the few have so much while the many have so little, an essentially political question, is transformed by social science into a series of technical questions which evade the political valuational problem altogether. What skills are needed to achieve success in a competitive world? This question heads a host of others that confine the working space of social change to an essentially behavioral problem.

First, on the social plane, the relations inherited from the past are accepted as given. The social world is depicted as ordered by an authority structure in a hierarchical mode. In his analysis of family structure, Horkheimer (pp. 101-109) observed that the child learns obedience first. The family structure in its ideal form reflects the authority structure found in society at large,



with its patriarchal system of rank where father's position is not to be challenged. There is a head and there are subordinates. All conventional institutional forms have this pattern in common, whether religious, business, or the state, with its main socializing agency, the school, included. The child's basic consciousness is molded according to the pattern of dominance as an incontrovertible fact of life. The role of science in this instance is to reinforce that pattern. Where such order had hitherto been ascribed to myth, God, divine right, and other forms of spirit, enlightened science introduced a universally standard rationale by which to justify mastery in a new, "once and for all" light (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1972, pp. 11-12). In this view, the unconditional acceptance of authority in some self-evident form permeates all social scientific inquiry. The first question I therefore direct to the analysis of the instantiation of ideology in development education is:

\* What authority structure guides the education for development enterprise? The authority structure determines the personnel qualifications needed, and the relative position of the major and minor parties: agencies of government, donor and receiver constraints, and the roles of advisers, policy makers, and target audiences. I am particularly interested to investigate the way science is used as an overarching metaphor to guide the management of the initiative.

Second, the social world is portrayed as inherently competitive, with persons and institutions pitted against each other in the effort to maximize individual satisfaction

amidst scarce resources. This neoclassical view of "economic man" is of interest because it opens up the problem of will and the role of the subject in an economic order which is taken to be naturally derived. Horkheimer (1972, pp. 77-89) found the need in late capitalism to abstract what he called a mythical version of the human being to coincide with the rationality attributed to the industrialized form of organization common to the factory floor. The problem posed for science was how to account for the emergent contradiction between the neoclassical economic model of rational, free choice and the structural-functional version of the social whole where all are depicted as instrumentally interdependent.

According to Horkheimer and Adorno (1972, pp. 57-62), the contradiction was resolved by contrivance. A new, "rationally cunning" creature was conceived as model to contend with and profit by the conjunction of economic forces that delimit his psycho-social space. This conception, according to Head's (1985) study of French liberalism and its early exemplar Destutt de Tracy, involves a synthesis of "man as embodiment of needs" and society as the metaphorical crucible in which he must strive to meet them, with success determined by the level of achievement the individual is able to manage over the course of a lifetime. This insight reveals the "free" person in modern society in terms of an abstraction, a product of scientific

calculation in which the faculty of reason is circumscribed entirely within a sphere of "getting and spending." The direction of inquiry implied by this conception of "rational man" then concerns the ideological apparatus for remodeling and transmitting the ideal image of homo sapiens as clever entrepreneur amidst social adversity. The guiding question for this aspect of development education is:

\* What image of the educated person underlies the educational process? More specific questions would be directed toward uncovering the economic, political, and cultural factors that are incorporated in this vision of the idealized person. The important focus here is the analysis of factors involved in transmitting ideology into consciousness.

The third focus begins with a question asked by Herbert Marcuse (1964, p. 6): "...how can the people who have been the object of effective and productive domination by themselves create the conditions of freedom?" If the ideology of work in mass industrial society has set the parameters for what is taught and learned in school and specialized training programs, then it has also determined the parameters of skills actually conveyed. These skills preclude critical analysis of the relations between what is taught, how the learning context reproduces the social relations it serves, and reflection on how the consciousness of the subject in modern society is conditioned. Major critics of the reduction of education to exclusively a process of skill transfer include Freire (e.g., 1974, 1973), Carnoy (1974), Apple (1982; 1979), Bourdieu and Passeron

(e.g., 1977), and Ilich (1970). Habermas (1970) speaks of "technocratic consciousness" as:

...the repression of 'ethics' as such as a category of life. The common, positivist way of thinking renders inert the frame of reference of interaction in ordinary language, in which domination and ideology both arise under conditions of distorted communication and can be reflectively detected and broken down. The depolitization of the mass of the population, which is legitimated through technocratic consciousness, is at the same time men's self-objectification in categories equally of both purposive-rational action and adaptive behavior. The reified models of the sciences migrate into the sociocultural life world and gain objective power over the latter's self-understanding. The ideological nucleus of this consciousness is the elimination of the distinction between the practical and the technical. It reflects, but does not objectively account for, the new constellation of a disempowered institutional framework and systems of purposive-rational action that have taken on a life of their own. (pp. 112-113 [Emphasis in original])

The question I would raise has to do with the institutionalization of non- or anti-reflexive bias in development education:

\* In what ways does the message education conveys reflect instrumental consciousness? The related questions to ask would involve the content of educational programs, their objectives, curricula, and methodologies. Another set of questions would turn on the interconnections between content and the institutional needs of the governing economic system. A final concern raised by Habermas and critical theorists in general is with the preclusion of critical reflection. To this end I have developed a set of questions directed toward development education's propensity to eliminate critical analysis from its content.

Finally, I wish to investigate the whole business of development education as an instantiation of policy science on a grand scale. Fay (1975) laid the conceptual groundwork for my interest when he noted "...not merely that the

positivist conception of social science underlies and supports the idea of a policy science...but that it is conceptually connected with it..." (p. 38). I would pursue the investigation further by postulating that the connection is fundamentally material as well, that is to say, the moment of policy science is both conceptual and material. The question I address here is therefore a more comprehensive one:

\* What are the means, methods, and forms by which the model of education for development represented in AID policy reflects the both the material and conceptual interests of the policy science community? One set of follow-up questions is concerned with who the actors are, from theorists to practitioners, and who supports them. The constraints under which they operate comprise another set. And the last concerns various issues arising from the attempt to put theory into practice.

Collectively, the four sets of questions are designed to probe the practice of resorting to absolute authority to support knowledge claims for policy formulation. Since my purpose is to examine the ideological referents of those claims, the method of critical reflection seems most appropriate. In the next chapter, I introduce the concept of "social space" as a way to organize the deductive aspect of the critique. The social space is the framework that situates the functions of ideology as the intermediary site where the conflicting forces of society are unified into rational wholes for the production of policy and the mobilization of action.



Notes

1. Berger and Luckmann (1966, pp. 13-16) exclude from their definition of the sociology of knowledge the epistemological and methodological problems that concerned the originators of the concept, namely Karl Mannheim and Max Scheler. They take a sociological perspective that emphasizes the role of knowledge in society, not the role of ideas per se or the influence of theory on history. In this respect, their focus is not on ideology as I use the term in this work. Their interest is with the process of "reality construction in everyday life," where ideology is but one facet. My focus is rather on the socio-material roots for the construction of theory to guide the practice of education for development. I take this to be an ideological and political activity which uses theoretical knowledge as its legitimating frame of reference.

2. A brief summary of the origins of the term ideology and its relation to western social thought is available in Hall (1977, pp. 9-31). The problem raised is one that has confronted social theorists from the of time Marx, who attempted to account for the problem of an autonomous sphere of ideas and their origins in material life. The concept of ideology in American social thought, according to Dittberner (1979, pp. 1-50), has a much briefer history with the term not appearing in any journal of sociology until 1936.

3. Bierstedt (1981, p. xii) also notes the absence of significant direct attention to the works of Durkheim and Weber in the development of American sociology of the twentieth century. Hall (1977, p. 23), however, notes the appropriation of mainly that part of Durkheim's work which emphasized the rule of norms over individual behavior.

4. This effort can be viewed in the social sense described by Kuhn (1970, pp. 167-168) when referring to a community of scholars who are interested to advance the normative research done within the confines of their accepted paradigm.

5. Hughes (1975) reflects the views of conventional organization theorists by predicating the need for organization development on the increasing pace of environmental change within the larger society and its impact on the operations of organizations. The field of OD, he says (p. 8), focuses on two basic concerns: "...helping organizations become more adept at self-renewal and survival, [and insuring] that the human values of organizational members are furthered..." This focus for



change starts at the level of existing relationships within the functional subunits of a larger social totality. Its interest is less with the social systemic antecedents of conflict than with the effects of the antecedents on the internal operations of discreet subunits. The field is behavior oriented in that it presupposes the possibility of change among individual relations while it takes the overarching system of social relations as a given.

6. For a study of the history of the Frankfurt School, including the problems it faced on relocation to the United States in the mid-1930s, see Martin Jay (1973) and David Held (1980, pp. 36-39).

7. Dittberner (1979, pp. 103-145) reviews a series of international conferences held in the early and mid-1950s out of which the Congress of Cultural Freedom was born. As an anti-communist/anti-totalitarian association of "Free World" scholars, artists, authors, and journalists, the Congress's stated purpose was to counteract the usurpation of artistic and academic freedom into an instrument of state power. Dittberner (p. 10) notes evidence to indicate the financial support of the CIA at least in the formative stages of the association.

The result of the Congress's first meeting in Berlin in 1950 was the issue of a "fourteen point manifesto" in denunciation both of totalitarian communism and neutrality. The "intellectual airlift" to Berlin, as it came to be known in contrast to its immediate military precedent, took place shortly after the Soviet takeover of Czechoslovakia and the outbreak of the Korean War.

8. Lipset's (1960) main concern was to establish empirically the superiority of democracy as the political system best able to satisfy individual wants and needs by offering the best practical means for classes and individuals to resolve their differences. The theoretical premise on which he based his analysis of social relations he put this way:

...it is precisely in those countries where workers have been able to form strong unions and obtain representation in politics that the disintegration effects of political cleavage are least likely to be found...Consensus on the norms of tolerance which a society or organization accepts has often developed only as a result of basic conflict, and requires the continuation of conflict to sustain it...(p. 22)

The degree to which social and political institutions are believed legitimate is indicative of political stability. The sphere in which contending interests are played out is

indicated by the extent of wealth, individualization, urbanization, and education enjoyed by the citizenry (pp. 48-58). This line of reasoning would demonstrate greater political and social cohesion in those societies whose statistical indices along the four dimensions of stable democracy were higher, as this would indicate the effectivity of the basic institutional consensus in the resolution of conflict. Such cohesion would also indicate diminished stridency of ideological conflict.

Bell's (1962) interest, on the other hand, was with expunging ideology from the study of society altogether, as it called forth the unwarranted "aristocratic" critique of mass society advanced by such European scholars as Jose Ortega y Gasset, Karl Mannheim, Hannah Arendt, Emil Lederer, and others. Bell notes:

...The most salient fact about modern life - capitalist and communist - is the ideological commitment to social change. And by change is meant the striving for material, economic betterment, greater opportunity for individuals to exercise their talents, and an appreciation of culture by wider masses of people. Can any society deny these aspirations? (p. 30)

Bell's analysis is based in part on a review of several sociological studies of industrial organization (e.g., the Hawthorne works study, pp. 246-248). He is concerned to establish the plurality of American life, not its massification, by pointing to the proliferation of voluntary organizations, leisure activities, professed anti-conformist attitudes, and the institutionalization of mechanisms to promote change by which the masses are brought into the political, economic, and social picture (pp. 32-38).

9. For a brief, concise explanation of the mathematics involved in the model, see Michael Todaro (1977, pp. 52-54).

10. Rostow's stages of growth theory had an historical antecedent which developed in the tradition of the Scottish School of eighteenth century economic thought (Meek, 1976, pp. 5-36). The thrust of the earlier theory was that "...societies undergo development through successive stages based on different modes of subsistence..." (p. 6 [Emphasis in original]), in this case there being four that were naturally occurring: hunting, pastoral, agricultural, and commercial. Whether Rostow was aware of this theory or not is immaterial to his supposition of a stage theory similar in that it shared the basic idea of natural law and progression toward the mass consumption made possible during the fifth and final stage of industrialization.

11. Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970, pp. 160-173) offers some preliminary thoughts on the nature of "scientific communities" that may have a bearing on the degree of interest manifested by a community of applied social theorists. Their interest would be to define the paradigm within which they work in progressive terms as a field of applied investigation. I would offer the field of development science as a case in point. The theoretical development community would seek to establish itself around a "normal" subject of investigation within a community of scholars with its accepted standards of truth as a discipline distinct both from other disciplines and the social milieu within which it functions. Such a division would signify, according to Kuhn (p. 167), "...the very tenuousness of humanity's hold on the scientific enterprise." I believe that the community of orthodox social scientists as a whole has established a social momentum of its own by the legitimacy accorded to its social function and by the role it has played in the service of particular interests, those of the state included.

A serious impression of a likely parallel development between university research and the interests of private industry is portrayed by John Buescher (1987, pp. 33-47), where the distinctions between objective research and the needs of a budding enterprise become increasingly blurred to the detriment of the former.

12. Marx followed in this respect in a line of economic analysis which placed labor as the central pivot in the valuation of a commodity. He developed the thesis that value represents the composite of relations among its producers and its proper calculation should be so determined (Marx, 1977 [1867], pp. 307-339). The significance of Schumpeter's switch in emphasis from labor to the market mechanism is noted by Meek (1967, p. 208) as a failure on Schumpeter's part to recognize the principle of embodied labor on the one hand and to substitute for it "...the psychological relations between individuals and finished goods..." on the other. Schumpeter thus laid the conceptual foundation whereby the notion of consumer was abstracted from the real relations of membership in a class of producers. In this line of reasoning, a new ideal entity was created whose chief motivation was determined by its relation to the commodity as an object and not to the labor embodied within it.

13. An analysis of the theoretical issues involved in defining the role of the state in capitalist society is found in Jessop (1982).

14. Tully's (1980) study of Locke stresses the Christian concept of "man as the servant of God," His



property, so to speak, whose avocation is to perform His "workmanship" on earth. Locke's meaning of "natural law" is cast within the mold of God's relation to humanity. The relationship is realized as natural (viz., moral) law through the uniquely human power to reason. Locke's definition of property is therefore inclusive of the human faculties to exercise "rights." Reason in this sense is derivative of God's "notions," or the ideas which "stand for" things (i.e., substances) abstracted from the real world of objects or "modes and relations," which constitute understanding of the world.

15. The proliferation of economic growth literature began in the fifties. An indicative classified bibliography can be found in Gran (1983).

16. While McClelland did not hold that the motive to achieve was necessarily tied to the drive to amass wealth per se, he subscribed to the centrality of the entrepreneurial spirit as an indispensable factor in the economic development of socialist as well as capitalist societies. He was not so concerned with the structural implications of particular economic systems as he was with the preparation of those individuals who were motivated to achieve with respect to their peers.

17. Another concerned with issues of ethics in development is Denis Goulet (1977, 1971a & 1971b). His interest is with providing an ethical set of guidelines for policy makers and practitioners operating in the field of development.

18. McCloskey's (1969, pp. 98-124) interest in this vein, incidentally, is in the empirical analysis of differences in opinion expressed between the general American electorate and its active political minority. He concluded that the general voter lacked understanding of democratic ideals embodied in the Constitution and American practice sufficient to inform an ideology clear enough to guide political action and decision. This conclusion was reached despite McCloskey's insistence that the "...American democratic 'ideology' possesses an elaborately defined theory, a body of interrelated assumptions, and a set of ideals that serve as guides for action..." with basic tenets of "...consent, accountability, limited constitutional government, representation, freedom of thought, speech, press, and assembly, equality of opportunity, religious toleration, equality before the law, the rights of juridical defense, and individual self-determination over a broad range of affairs..." (p. 100). Such guides, he noted, had

been codified in law, integrated into education, repeated by presidents, and referred to by all public figures since the founding of the nation.

19. The term "orthodox" is used by Horowitz elsewhere (1977, p. 113) to characterize the increasing role of sociologists to explain (away) the turbulence of the late sixties and early seventies. His tone is critical as he cites instances in which such sociologists were appropriated into a "professional" intelligentsia and made responsible for program innovation on a national scale.

## CHAPTER V

### A FRAMEWORK FOR CRITICAL ANALYSIS

#### The Social Space

The purpose of this chapter is to build a frame of reference for analyzing AID's policies in education. The frame of reference is designed to examine the nature of the developmental ideology embedded within the policies. The frame consists of four propositions that are derived from the four sets of questions developed in the previous chapter. The propositions collectively formulate a critical position from which to investigate the space within which development rationales are produced. The propositions guide this inquiry in the following order:

\* Developmental consciousness is propelled by an ideology of economic functionalization.

\* The organizing principles for developmental consciousness are derived from an ideology of hierarchy.

\* The mechanism for legitimating developmental consciousness is governed by rules derived from an ideology of socio-economic positivism.

\* Developmental consciousness in its specific instances is determined by the convergence of the three ideologies that together constitute the "social space.


The term "social space" is the key concept for my analysis of America's developmental ideology. The concept of social space I use contrasts with the idea of "public sphere" advanced by Habermas in Theory and Practice (1973,



pp. 3-7), and elsewhere (1974). Where Habermas was concerned with the increasing erosion of free debate over matters of general interest that was originally characteristic of eighteenth and early nineteenth century democratic western society (Held, 1980, pp. 260-267), that is, with the decline of the public sphere, I am concerned with the convergence of forces I hold responsible for that decline. This convergence can be depicted as a three-sided interaction of social forces with the combined effect of shaping consciousness, the developmentalist version included, as shown in Figure 2 on page 158.

The base of Figure 2 reflects the economic relations characteristic of a particular mode of production, that of American capitalism being the case in point here. The economic base represents the composite of forces that drives the relations through which the goods and services that sustain the society are produced. I covered the ideological origins of economic functionalism in Chapters III and IV.

The right side of the figure represents the mode of administrative organization by which political relations are ordered. The political axis on the right represents the forms in which decisions are made and carried out, particularly with respect to the administration and distribution of economic resources. I also covered the ideological origins of political administration in Chapters III and IV.



The Economic Base

Figure 2: THE SOCIAL SPACE AND THE DETERMINATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The left side is concerned with representing the methods by which the economic and political relations of the society are rationalized. The function described here is one of legitimation, the purpose of which is to explain in rational terms why society is ordered the way it is. Insofar as development is concerned, the principal means of rationalization is through a combination of economic and social positivism. The concept of development policy science was covered in Chapter IV.

As an embodiment of rationales, consciousness is situated at the center of the figure. The economic, political, and legitimational forces converge to shape diverse forms of consciousness, the developmentalist version being one example.

Different aspects of ideology are placed in the critical interfaces between the economic base and the political and legitimational sides. Ideology is produced there, situated in between the unarticulated ("brute") forces of the social space and the various forms of consciousness that speak for it. While the economic base is viewed in classical Marxian analysis as the ultimate determinant of all social relations, the convergence of the three forces in practice encompasses highly complex, reciprocal, and fundamentally contradictory patterns of interaction in which it is not possible to draw immediate cause-effect relationships. Developmental consciousness

arises from the interaction of this three-pronged convergence of forces that defines the social space. The materialist position I adopt therefore makes allowances for the formative powers of the political and legitimational forces of the social space.

The point I emphasize here is that consciousness is not formed "consciously." Consciousness is formed under the influence of the momentary convergence of its ideological referents, those referents having their origins in the economic, political, and legitimational structure. The function of ideology is to hide its real referents in the social space by producing consciousness in specific moments. In turn, the function of specific moments of consciousness is to mobilize social action by hiding its ideological referents.

The ideological production of consciousness is meant to constrain what Habermas saw as the "public sphere," the site where the conditions for "unencumbered, free debate" were to be realized. The function of the public sphere in his scheme was to sustain the "process core" of democratic government. The concept of social space I use is not equivalent to the public sphere. Rather, it encompasses the public sphere. It contains both the ideologically expressed forces that seek to erode the conditions for democratic dialogue as well as the counter forces at work to nourish it. In theoretical terms, I see the social space as the

site within which the contending forces that seek to mold and liberate consciousness takes place.

My focus is on how the moment developmental consciousness precludes the development of diverse and situationally appropriate forms of the public sphere in the Third World. The concept of the social space enables me to structure a critical investigation of the rational bases for AID's claims to alter local economic, political, and legitimational ideologies and practices by replacing them with the developmentalist.

#### The "Interpellation" of Developmental Consciousness

The concept of a three-sided social space circumscribes the consciousness applied to development. Developmental consciousness and its educational corollaries in this view emerge within a field of forces comparable to what Althusser refers to as a process of "interpellation" (1984, pp. 44-45). When I speak of "developmental consciousness," I mean to concentrate on the aspect of the social space in which consciousness about development is conditioned. The convergence of the three forces, being formative of all aspects of public consciousness, thus creates its own object, in this case the prevalent educational development model.

The thinking subject, as theoretician and practitioner of development, is "called to be" within the social space that has predefined its object, that is, the image of development already embedded in consciousness. The social space provides the framework within which developmental consciousness has emerged. The thinking subject therefore does not create development as a result of a set of autonomous principles and values to be applied to problematic situations. To the contrary, the frame of the social space provides a way to examine how the "thinking" of the theoretician and practitioner about development has been conditioned.

The conditioning of the subject is not a one way process resulting in an objectively determinable creation. To the contrary, the determination of the subject's consciousness through ideological mechanisms also produces its own resistance. The ideologies spawned by the brute social forces exist in dialectical relation to each other. The ideologies emerge as expressions of behavior and attitude in the form of struggles between control and its resistance.

The ideological struggle is thus waged on a three-dimensional front. One flank is engaged with the economic functionalization of consciousness. The second flank involves the hierarchical patterning of institutional consciousness. And the third legitimates the relations of domination through scientific justification. Together,



these ideological proving grounds, as it were, constitute the site at which the struggle between domination and its resistance occurs in specific moments.

### The Ideology of Economic Functionalization

Arising as it does from the base of the social space, the ideology of economic functionalization is concerned most directly with the predominant mode of production as the driving force in determining the nature of the interrelationships among the state and the private entities it serves.<sup>1</sup> The mode of production calls forth certain social relations, those based on class, sex, race and ethnic group being the most immediately obvious. The purpose of ideology is to insure the reproduction<sup>2</sup> of those relations by producing the discursive means for the exercise of control over its object - consciousness. To this end the functionalist economic ideology mediates the relations between the base, the determinative forces it represents, and the individual through the production of consciousness about economic development.

The effect I am concerned with is one whereby functionalized consciousness reproduces extant economic divisions through the mechanism of a multi-tiered system of education. Gramsci's (1971) analysis of this effect is set within the context of a reciprocally acting system of international relations:

...Every relationship of "hegemony" is necessarily an educational relationship and occurs not only within a nation, between the various forces of which the nation is composed, but in the international and world-wide field, between complexes of national and continental civilisations. (p. 350)


According to the first proposition I stated at the beginning of this chapter, the enterprise of educational development is driven by the functional economic imperatives of the relationships among the public and private entities it serves. I intend to focus specifically on the ideological manifestations of that relationship as they are expressed in the language of AID's policies in education by looking at:

\* The relations between the purpose of the educational program and the economic setting. This involves such questions as:

- For what economic purpose are students/participants being prepared?
- What image of developed society is embodied in the educational program?
- What image of the educated subject is embodied by the program?

\* Relations between the forms of knowledge transmitted and their socio-economic functions. This applies the concept of instrumental reasoning developed by Habermas (e.g., 1973, pp. 268-276) and other critical theorists (e.g., Horkheimer and Adorno, 1972, pp. 38-42), whose concern was with the spread of technical rationality with the effect of subverting other forms of knowledge.

Figure 3 on page 165 sets out the economic ideological factors that influence the production of the functionalized part of developmental consciousness. Functionalized consciousness is set at the top of the figure, symbolizing its ultimate dependence on the determinative powers of the relations of production. The overall mode and relations of



**THE PRODUCTION OF FUNCTIONALIZED CONSCIOUSNESS**

**Figure 3**

production at the bottom of the figure generates specific ideologies immediately above. These in turn come to be embodied in certain education for development texts, or policies. The ideologies play a direct role in shaping individual and collective consciousness about all public matters, including the nature of work, human rights, the social order, morality, and the faculties of reason. As texts, these come to play a part in the production of educational policy.

The two-way flow referred to above implies a direct funneling of economic factors through the filtration of ideology, which is distilled finally into consciousness. The individual in turn influences the levels below by giving expression to consciousness. The diagram as a whole, though, tends to underemphasize and oversimplify what Gramsci called the historically formative power of complexes of ideologies which extend well beyond the immediate confines of the conception, "mode of production."

### The Ideology of Hierarchy

I use the term "hierarchy" to stress the conditioned response whereby formal organization has come to be equated with a "top down" administrative structure. The response recollects and realizes the Parsonian modelling of regulated social change where the change process is managed according to some abstracted, universal set of theoretical premises

about human social behavior. I wish to look for concrete evidence that some form of this administrative rationality is implicitly set within the institutional relationships that are patterned into educational policy and program initiatives. This part of the study rests on the proposition that the ideology of hierarchy and authority has been structured into educational policy.

The specific instantiation of authority and hierarchy is necessary to decipher, or "decode," in that the forms it takes are concealed by different kinds of ideological discourse. Broadly, I define the instantiation of authority and hierarchy in educational policy in empirical terms as the attempt to support the assignment of control over the educational process and product to some form of officially sanctioned elite. I focus specifically on the following sub-elements of the ideological patterning of hierarchical and authority consciousness:

\* The locus of control over the allocation of educational program resources. Related questions include who exercises such control, by what office, toward what end, and who benefits.


\* The historical genesis of authority consciousness in the sense developed by Marcuse (1955, pp. 32-36, 205; 1941, pp. 350-360) and Giroux (1983, pp. 33-34). The specific manifestations would be evident in such instances as:

- The management structure of the educational activity.
- The scope of interaction planned between educator and participant.
- The "hidden curriculum" and its role in masking conflict (Apple, 1979, pp. 82-104).

\* Qualifications of staff required to conduct the educational activity and professionalization of students/participants.

My main concern is with how AID's educational policies attempt to put an authoritarian concept of order into practice through institution building. Specifically, I focus on the administrative mechanisms through which educational policy is to be realized. The sub-elements of the cross-cultural transfer of hierarchical patterns of authority are summarized in Figure 4 on page 169. The reciprocal character of the patterns should be stressed. The overarching political framework consists of institutions that are structured according to a hierarchical pattern through which their respective authorities are exercised. Various implicit or explicit hierarchical ideologies are used to undergird the internal organizational patterns of the institutions involved in implementing educational programs. These ideologies are then incorporated into activities at the curriculum and classroom/training level with a resultant effect on the shaping of developmental consciousness. I plan to examine the institutional discourse concerned with organizing educational programming as a way to bring such ideological patterning to light.





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The Political Structure

**STRUCTURING THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF ORDER**

**Figure 4**

## The Ideology of Scientific Legitimation

In order for existing economic and political relations to be maintained, there must be some way to legitimize the social order. If such relations are unequal, particularly when contrasted with western egalitarian values of social justice and economic abundance for all, some form of rational explanation is required. Groups holding power need to rationalize existing circumstances in such a way as to sustain their position over subordinated classes or other groups. Where Christianity once exercised such authority by divine right before the Enlightenment, the Age of Reason ushered in scientific positivism. Here the concern is to investigate how educational policies are legitimated through the mechanism of positivistic economic and social science.

Brian Fay (1975) was interested in the question of the de-politicization of social change through science:

Implicit in this belief that an applied science can perform the tasks now seen as political is the tacit presumption that science provides the paradigm example of proper thinking, and that as long as any human enterprise is not treated in a scientific way it is being treated in an imperfect way. (p. 28)

The effect of such a belief is to remove social valuation from the task of political administration. The question to pursue in examining the legitimation of educational policy is the role played by positivistic science in the policy production process. This is important to understanding the connections I suggest exist between educational policy and

the causational powers attributed to scientific knowledge. According to Fay (1975, pp. 31-44), science is used to establish ranges of predictable social behaviors. Social policy in the form of control is therefore conceptually tied to the notion of prediction and explanation inherent in the positivistic view of science. Being conceptually tied to social engineering, it is merely a logical step to apply objectively rational rules to the resolution of historical problems.

Such intervention also justifies current relations of production because it offers a scientifically rational explanation for them. In reviewing Marcuse's study of rationality and productivity, Habermas (1970, pp. 82-83) noted:

...Domination is rational in that a system can be maintained which can allow itself to make the growth of the forces of production, coupled with scientific and technical progress, the basis of its legitimation although, at the same time, the level of the productive forces constitutes a potential in relation to which "the renunciations and burdens placed on individuals seem more and more unnecessary and irrational."

In the case of educational models applied to the task of economic development, my focus will be on:


- \* In what ways conventional models of educational research are used to further the donor nation's efforts to reproduce its own relations of production through the educational activity? Important to consider are:
- Models of research used in educational programming and their respective sociological theories of personal and institutional behavior (Popkewitz, 1984, pp. 1-44).
  - Relations of domination embedded in theoretical models.

\* What key sociological concepts are used to tie education to socio-economic development?

\* What theoretical connections are assumed or purported to exist between particular developmental strategies and educational activities?

Legitimation through scientific language is an ideological function that enters the social space in all three dimensions. It has economic, political, and other social effects through the power it has to shape consciousness most directly. The language of science has a social impact that extends to all facets of productive and cultural life, serving finally to objectify the world of development and underdevelopment by posing for both all its problems and the universally accepted methods for their resolution. Since scientific language is so thoroughly and pervasively embedded in all social life, it is necessary to focus on AID's educational policy discourses with an eye toward the scientific bases for theorizing.

The focal points for reflecting on legitimation are summarized in Figure 5 on page 173. Scientific legitimation spans all levels of the social space, reflecting the idea that science has been insinuated into all consciousness. Science can be considered to have determinative powers irrespective of its intimate relationship with the mode of production. Its language has been inserted into all development.<sup>3</sup> There, it serves as the ideological mold in which educational programming is cast, thereby legitimating and theoretically underpinning the policies that guide such



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The Legitimational Structure

THE LEGITIMATION OF DEVELOPMENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Figure 5

educational development activities as: The transmission of survival and advancement skills, orientation to authority and hierarchy, and individual and collective moral sense.

### The Constitution of Developmental Consciousness

So far, I have directed my investigation of the concept - social space - to the identification of three dimensions in which ideologies are formulated. The value of this concept is that it serves as a suitable framework for studying the determinative powers of ideology in the production of developmental consciousness. Developmental ideologies in this sense are not merely figments of consciousness. To the contrary, the basis of my investigation is to accept their constitutive powers as a point of departure.<sup>4</sup>

The guiding proposition is that the object, "developmental consciousness," is a composite of the three basic forces that shape the social space. Developmental consciousness is a vehicle that incarnates a particular kind of thinking about development's power over the educational process. The "thinking subject" in this sense is flesh, blood, and brains only to the extent that his or her sense of development is governed by the consciousness which has interpellated him or her within that part of the social space concerned with development. The impact of the three ideological ensembles is thus realized in the set of



developmental discourses produced by the thinking subject acting in conformity with the object that has conditioned it, namely developmental consciousness.

If, therefore, ideology operates in theory in the interval between its material historical referents by conditioning its momentary subject, namely development, how is the subject to be distinguished from its determinants? And further, how is one to distinguish between the individual as dominated (determined) agent created to reproduce relations of domination, that is to say, as object, and the individual as origin that is, Subject of domination?

The dilemma is addressed by Althusser (1984 [1973], pp. 132-139) when he concludes that the "Subject" cannot be understood as human essence at all, because the very idea of an independently thinking subject is an ideological abstraction. The "Subject" can only be understood as process within the stream of historical materialism with an identity that emerges solely in the context of the unfolding of the struggle between classes. The flesh and blood human object embodies consciousness and its varied forms, formulating identity within the context of conflict.

According to this reasoning, the Subject as process is constituted within the social space. This means that the Subject is situated amidst intersecting determinants of economy, politics, and morality, in a state, as it were, of

"objective confusion." By "objective confusion" I mean that the space has no objective order other than that which the intersection of ideologies assigns to it. This is precisely the function of ideology in its generic sense - to provide the sense of order amidst what in objective reality is a confrontation of social forces.

When Althusser refers to the "interpellation" of the subject, he means to set the ideological frame within which the subject is called to be. Society thus anticipates the subject through particular ideological ensembles. These provide the textual matrix, or the social corollary for Lacan's (1977) psychological "Other," in which the consciousness of the Subject is developed.<sup>5</sup>

The consciousness embodied within the individual can and does assume varied forms. The struggle between forms of consciousness, the developmentalist orientation being one cluster, is mediated by the individual. The individual as embodiment of experience complies, adapts, resists, and expresses the struggle in accordance with the the moments of consciousness at work in the particular circumstances of history. The individual may struggle to become conscious of consciousness by accepting, rejecting, or altering rationales in accordance with the search for truth. Choice exists in the context of that struggle.

In searching out the referents of the developmental cluster, I make use of the framework of the social space to

reflect on three elemental relations of domination identified in an unpublished paper by Mustafa Kiziltan (1987) as characteristic of international development assistance in education:


\* Capital - Wage Labor. The ideological forms that realize this relational pattern are expressed in the formation and execution of educational development policy. The purpose of policy is to transmit consciousness of an imaginary subject in marketable terms. Education as transmitter becomes the source of powers to sell or command certain kinds of labor. The converse of this consciousness is that the cultural milieu of the object is viewed as problem-centered, deficient in its current capacity to engage all in the capital - wage labor relation.

\* Expert - Layman. This relation can be made evident at two levels of text: the one requiring qualified candidates to institute the educational program and the other realized as a vision toward which the local participant should aspire. The ideological ensemble in this relation is posited as the new system of rational organizational patterns to be reproduced through institutional reforms. The correspondent subject would then appear as either suitable or unsuitable for participation in this altered institutional framework, depending on the attainment of individual qualifications. Again, the converse of this thinking is the problematized nature of the extant cultural setting.

\* Center - Periphery. The matter that is of concern here relates to Weiler's (1983) observations on the legitimation of scientific knowledge and the correspondent delegitimation of traditional knowledge. The production and spread of knowledge is tied to certain institutional forms introduced by the donor agency. On the social level, certain relations of power are introduced from the center into the host culture through ideological ensembles backed by scientific knowledge. The recipient is then "de-centered," as it were, objectified to be recreated as new subject by virtue of being put into the position of having to pursue correspondent avenues to new knowledge.

The three critical relations function as links between the economic, political, and legitimating ideologies and the re-education of the subject in such areas as the transmission and acquisition of correspondingly marketable life skills, compliance with new authoritative modes of institutional organization, and the subordination of ethics and valuation to scientific rationality.

The Subject and its constitution within the frame of the social space is depicted in Figure 6 on page 179. The Subject constituted within the social space is not a self-contained, symmetrical activity. The constitution of the real subject is dialectical as well as reciprocal. That is to say, the subject does not simply mirror the relations of production, predictably to reinforce and realize them. The subject is not a controllable entity in an objectively scientific sense, as Althusser would have it. While compliance and reciprocity may seem to result from the deterministic standpoint, the will to resist programming is as much an historical fact as the need to benefit from it. The works of such radical educators as Freire, Giroux (1983), Matthews (1980), and others emphasize the need and the possibility of turning the imperative to resist into effective critical action.



The Economic Base

Figure 6: THE SOCIAL SPACE AND THE THINKING SUBJECT

Summary of Part 1

The analytical frame of reference developed here provides a theoretical means for identifying the social referents for the development of particular forms of consciousness. The idea of a social space permits us to examine the functions of ideology in the determination of consciousness. What has been done in Part 1 is the identification of the theoretical constituents of developmental consciousness and their interrelated functions within the social space. The economic, political, and legitimational functions of America's developmental ideology emerge in substance as a set of discourses that guide policy formation in the specific instance of aid to education that is the subject of this inquiry. Part 2 is concerned with the task of applying this frame of analysis to the examination of the relationships between specific policies and their ideological components.



Notes

1. The distinction traditionally drawn between "public" and "private" domains of activity and organization, according to Althusser (1984 [1970], p. 19), is "unimportant," as the ideological function of the institution in question is all that matters. In his analysis of the capitalist state, Jessop (1982, pp. 4-5, 232) remarks that the distinction is difficult to sustain other than in the abstract, when concrete instances of the hegemonic reinforcement and complicity between agencies of the state and their private counterparts is considered.

2. While his focus in a 1977 article is primarily on cultural reproduction, Bourdieu (1977, 487-496) reminds us:

...that the inheritance of cultural wealth which has been accumulated and bequeathed by previous generations only really belongs (although it is theoretically offered to everyone) to those endowed with the means of appropriating it for themselves...(p. 488)

3. Kuhn's (1970) position, to which I have referred in discussion of the social impact of scientific communities, is definitely affirmative in this regard. The whole concept of policy science as a response to social crisis is covered by Diesing (1982, pp. 408-410), where he emphasizes the social genesis of new developments in the social sciences.

4. In an unpublished preliminary paper on education's role in development, Don Adams (1986) reviews the changing conceptions of education according to different theories of development. He classifies the theories by using the paradigmatic scheme proposed by Burrell and Morgan (1979). I find the review very helpful, as it has provided a concise summary of the evolution of major streams of thought that tie education and development.

5. In his 1964 essay (1984, pp. 156-159), Althusser explores the basis on which Freud and Lacan attempted to develop a science of psychoanalysis with its object of study totally distinct from that of philosophy, the physical and social sciences, and the then dominant trend in the practice of "bourgeois" psychology:

One of the "effects" of the humanization of the small biological creature that results from human parturition: there in its place is the object of psycho-analysis, an object which has a simple name: "the unconscious." (p. 157)

I have been using the terms "consciousness" and the "unconscious" without distinguishing between them. I do not mean to elide the difference between the two thereby, as if one conception were identical to the other, but instead I take a position not dissimilar to that argued by Althusser in the same essay (pp. 161-169). The way I interpret his usage of the terms, their difference is less qualitative than quantitative, with the (conscious) discourse of the subject based in the fundamental (unconscious) discourse of its determinative ideological ensembles.

Part 2

THE INSTANTIATION OF IDEOLOGY IN AID'S EDUCATIONAL POLICIES:  
Its Nature, Social Referents, and Implications

## CHAPTER VI

### A DISCURSIVE ANALYSIS OF AID'S EDUCATIONAL POLICIES

#### Themes and Metaphors within the Discourse

The method of discourse analysis is most suitable for an investigation of the instance of ideology. Ideology is cloaked within its own rhetoric. It is therefore neither self-evident nor easily subject to direct scrutiny. It hides itself within the language it produces. For this reason, an analysis of AID's policy statements in education cannot be accomplished in a deductive fashion alone. To have directed the questions developed in the last chapter to the statements as such would have yielded too little. Something else needs to be worked out in the interim with the problem of the ideological basis of the language in which development policy is encased.

#### Policy as Discourse: The Metaphors Within

The interim step involves three operations, the first two of which are undertaken in this chapter, while the third is done in the next:

- \* Uncovering the basic themes found within AID's educational policy discourses;
- \* Extracting and grouping the metaphors embedded within the themes; and,
- \* Locating the metaphors according to their ideological referents within the social space.

In the following paragraphs I spell out the relevant theory on semantic discourse analysis used to deconstruct the policy statements.

### Deconstructing Policy Discourse

In his introductory paper on ideology and development education, Kiziltan (1987) suggested that a connection exists between a theory of ideology and its instantiation in educational policy. He proposed that ideology could be revealed through an analysis of the discourses issued by development theoreticians and practitioners. To this end, he said that "...the study of ideology from a perspective of discourse analysis thematizes the connection between language and ideology, i.e., between word and power, and it locates the ideological within language, be it everyday language or scientific formulations..." (1987, p. 2; emphasis added). This demands a shift of attention away from the thinking subject, as I call him, to the "texts" which authored his thinking and not the other way around. Burton and Carlen's (1979, pp. 32-33) work on deconstructing official government discourse in Britain closely parallels the focus on the view of texts as social constructions. The thinking incarnated as a certain orientation of consciousness within the Subject and the conditions which produced the texts for such thinking then become the object of attention, not the Subject as independent author of the texts.

I choose to emphasize the words "thematize" and "locate" to indicate how I plan to examine AID's discourses. First, I look for the themes that reflect specific instances of how the discourses were formulated. These instances can be classified according to an analytical scheme proposed by Foucault, who focused on discourse for:

...the existence of rules of formation for all its objects (however scattered they may be), for all its operations (which can often neither be superimposed nor linked together in succession), for all its concepts (which may very well be incompatible), for all its theoretical options (which are often mutually exclusive)....(Foucault, 1978, p. 9)

Accordingly, I examine such instances of discourse in AID policy to discover the rules that formed their objects, operations, concepts, and theoretical options.

I begin with the text as a discursive formation with a view to "deconstruct" it by revealing the rules by which it was formed. The themes suggest various metaphors which I will then "locate" according to their respective ideological positions in the social space. This method of analysis is analogous to the historical novelist who freezes a moment much as a photographer would, only then proceeds to trace the individual histories of the moment's components. The individual histories represent the convergence of social forces at work to create the conditions that produced the "frozen" moment. Such a method corresponds with the analytical approach suggested by Coward and Ellis in their



work, Language and Materialism (1977), in which they remark that unity, that is to say, "the text" as (photographic) moment, is only one moment in passing amidst the contradictory flow of history (pp. 88-89).

In the view of Michel Pecheux (1971, pp. 67-69), any discourse can be assumed to be determined by a set of tacit productive conditions which represent the general or interactional context. Pecheux's "tacit" is suggestive of a "cloaked" set of rules that governs the production of AID's policies in education. It remains for the discursive analyst to identify the operative rules by starting with the obvious - with explicit statements of policy the production of which represents a composite of underlying themes and metaphors.

#### Uncovering Themes and Metaphors

Several attempts have been made of late to focus attention on the "unconscious" use of metaphor and other unacknowledged images to guide educational programming generally and development education in particular. Kinsey's pending article in the Comparative Education Review reviews several metaphors in common usage in the field of international education. A metaphor under his definition would be a mode of speech that is developed and applied in one context and subsequently transposed, often unconsciously, onto another, ostensibly because of the

"power" it holds to "...mold our perception, questions, conclusions and prescriptions..." (p. 5). What he finds with respect to content is a predominance of metaphors imported from the world of business, with frequent references to terms like "'broker' of ideas," "input-output," "flow-wastage," "supply-demand," "cost-benefit," "productivity," "accountability," and "efficiency" heading the list.

In addition to the business metaphors, he identifies such other metaphorical ensembles as those suggested by the field of engineering (e.g., those derived from mechanics and construction [Kinsey, p. 7]), which, as with those derived from business, conjure up images of a world of manipulable objects. In a similar vein, the worlds of sports and the military suggest confrontative stances in surmounting competing approaches to life and development, while science offers the biological, geographical, meteorological, and medical (pp. 8-9). Kinsey calls for direct attention to the problem of domination of one class of metaphor over others, the "cool" and hard object manipulative, over the "warm" and soft relationship-oriented metaphors. He suggests that we become conscious of the prevalence of the business/industrial in the field so that the search for alternatives more suitable for education in a developing world can proceed.

The search for the metaphors embedded within development education is rich in promise. Its potential, in my estimation, is that it can play an important role by opening the way for reconstructing perception and stimulating alternative analysis. Developing consciousness of metaphor means that the truth of current perception cannot be taken for granted. Claims of knowledge are not automatically true because they are based on common sense, science, or religious belief. The grounds for knowledge are always open to question, particularly when the development of whole nations is considered. One way to question knowledge is to search for its metaphorical referents in the social space in which they are created and applied.

In The Rule of Metaphor, Paul Ricoeur remarked that "...metaphor accordingly is part not of 'descriptive' but of 'historical' semantics..." (1977, pp. 115-116). The problem with the developmental scientific metaphors, especially those rational models of organization originating in the Parsonian structuralist tradition, is that they are rooted in idealist versions of scientific truth where their semantic meaning is taken to be both inherent and universal. The word in this view is imbued with its own, that is, uniquely correct meaning, irrespective of either its locutionary or historical setting. That being the case, the use of metaphor to explain or influence events can be particularly dangerous in that the metaphor usually goes

unrecognized as such, being taken instead for absolute truth.

The study of ideology in a specific instance can begin with the realization that metaphor has the power to transpose covert meaning from one (historical) setting into another. The position of metaphor floats between ideology and consciousness, emanating from the former to insinuate itself in the latter. An example Ricoeur offers deals with the widespread use of "modelling," which he views as a transpositional process utilizing a "...heuristic instrument that seeks, by means of fiction, to break down an inadequate interpretation and to lay the way for a new, more adequate interpretation..." (1977, p. 240). In this vein,

...the issue is not whether and how the model exists, but what are the rules for interpretation of the theoretical model and, correspondingly, what are its pertinent features. The important point is that the model's only properties are those assigned to it by language convention, beyond any influence of a real construction...Its fruitfulness consists in our knowing how to make use of it; its 'deployability'...is its raison-d'etre...(p. 241)

This line of thought opens the way toward investigating the metaphor as linkage between ideology and policy. The "rules for interpretation" and the "pertinent features" of the model become the object of attention where the interactive role of the rules and features are exposed on the way toward identifying their ideological referents through the path opened by exposure of their metaphors.

## AID's Statements on Educational Policy

Sources and Kinds of Material Collected

The material examined in this study was produced and issued by the Agency for International Development over the past two decades. The material was either issued directly by the Agency itself, or was prepared by the contractors it had officially commissioned. I identified the majority of the data required for the study on visits to the AID Resources Library in Rosslyn, Virginia, and subsequently ordered microfiche copies of what I had selected from AID's document retrieval center in Chevy Chase, Maryland.

AID has typically followed an administrative procedure for the design and implementation of its programs of assistance to education. Briefly, once educational policy is set, projects in technical assistance to education follow a pattern of development and implementation that usually, though not always, begins with a Sector Assessment (SA) made in the individual country, most often by a team composed of experts who are contracted for this purpose. Once the assessment is reviewed by officials of the host government, including the Ministry of Education, and by AID, areas of possible assistance are identified and a series of what are called Project Implementation Documents (PID) and Project Papers (PP) are then developed cooperatively. Following this, individual projects in technical assistance are developed by Agency mission and/or headquarters assigned

personnel, often in the form of Requests for Proposals (RFP), which are forwarded to appropriate institutions for decision about submitting bids in the form of technical proposals. The process is described in a staff training manual published by one of AID's contractors in 1987 (Development Associates, pp. A4-A6).

I focus on the policy statements on education issued by the Agency since 1975. The principal policy sources I have drawn on are titled, "Education and Human Resources" (issued December 12, 1975 and supplemented May 15, 1978), the "Education Sector Strategy" (August, 1983), and the policy paper, "Basic Education and Technical Training," (December, 1982). Significant trends in the educational resource allocation patterns of the Agency were heralded by each of the statements in that they signaled major programmatic initiatives in nonformal education and school related assistance respectively.

#### Policy Themes and the Metaphors Within

In the following paragraphs, I extract what I judge to be the key elements of the four policy sources enumerated above. I say "key" because my focus is on the elements that indicate overarching developmental economic and political assumptions, direction, strategy, and resource allocation. In the first round, the key elements of policy are identified as themes, either by direct quotation or by



paraphrase; while in the second round, the developmental metaphors that are embedded in the themes are examined.

### Round 1: The Key Policy Themes

1975. The following excerpts are taken from the sector policy statement on education issued in transmittal memorandum number 1:2 dated December 12, 1975.

It is AID policy to help LDC's [sic] provide particularly their poor majority with the knowledge, skills, and orientation to enhance the quality of their lives and enable them to participate more fully in, contribute more effectively to, and to receive more benefits from national economic and social growth...(p. 1)

In this statement, phrases are underlined that I judge to be the key elements of policy related to the developmental process, the direction toward which that process is supposed to move, the strategy required to induce such movement, and the allocation of resources needed to mount the strategy. The statement says that development involves giving knowledge, skills, and orientation (I call this ensemble of educational objects "K-S-O" for short.) to a targeted group (class) of poor people who do not currently have the requisite K-S-O. There is a giver and a receiver. There are several references using the word "more," with the implication that once the targeted poor have more they will be able to lead better lives.

The direction of development involves integrating the poor into national economic and social growth. The poor

have either been left out of national growth or by implication retard it by their lack of participation. The movement sought is from a local to a national orientation.

While it says little about how this direction is to be put into effect, the statement implies a strategy of provision or extension of new KSO from a central source to those in outlying areas. It also highlights the central role of government in the extension process with the importance of bilateral assistance a key element.

Further on, the policy statement lists several existing problems and needs:

"...limited resources..." "...more efficient and effective education and human resources system...in support of development..." "...nonformal education alternatives..." "improve, expand, or reorient formal education institutions..." "using education as a means for integrating women and the poor majority into the development process...." (p.1)

The problems and needs identified here are based on the belief that education can and should play a role as an instrument of development. Development is a process that can take place only on the condition that its obstacles are removed, the obstacles in this view being a combination of lack of appropriate material and human resources. The right kind and amount of education is therefore necessary for the human factor to become an instrumental part of, not obstacle to, development.

The direction for education is one of reorientation toward those K-S-O that are development related. This is

borne out by the list of "means and objectives" (pp. 1-2) as the core of AID policy in educational assistance:

\* "Greater relevance to development and the learning needs of the poor majority." Examples offered are expanded programs in nonformal education (NFE), including farmer skill training, health activities, industrial, construction, and crafts OJT. In schools, curricular changes in the direction of nutrition, family planning, and improvements in agricultural practices; in higher education, a "reorientation" of research and teaching towards economic and social development; while a shift in education in general to "existing and expected work opportunities" are all recommended.

\* "Access to learning for higher numbers of people, especially the poor, adult illiterates, and women." Strategies would include the expansion of radio and other mass education techniques, greater use of PVOs, and the use of the formal system for adult education.

\* "Lower unit costs for formal and nonformal education systems," to increase access through "better management and more intensive use of existing systems," including staff and facilities. The objective is to reduce failure, repetition, and drop-out rates as a cost effective measure. One strategy suggested is to increase the involvement of local communities in providing educational programs as a way to increase economies.

\* "Increased attention to improved human resources development strategies," meaning more backing on the part of leadership to: improve local capacity to assess learning needs; use and adapt existing means for learning; set up pilot programs to reach the poor at lower cost; and increase job opportunities and health through other public policies. Such actions would include the "institutionalization" of practices to "utilize resources more effectively," one example being the establishment of "regional and national planning units" to help accomplish the above objectives.

\* Finally, the policies recommended are to be implemented through a process of identification of developmental goals, related needs analysis, assessment of current educational effectiveness, identification of impinging constraints, both political, economic, and cultural, as well as educational. The assessment process culminates in the implementation of suitable formal and nonformal programs. The analytical process "...should be coordinated to the maximum feasible extent with the analysis and planning for other key development sectors, so that it is related to actual and potential work opportunities and needs." Assistance is to be given "...in the light of [a nation's] particular needs, capacity, and commitment to education for development...." (p. 1, emphasis added)

1978. The supplement to this policy statement issued on May 15, 1978 cites several examples of Agency funded

pilot activities using different models for school services, radio mathematics instruction, teacher training, literacy, health, family planning, and nutrition. Higher education assistance for instructional and research improvement for development was also cited as a priority (pp. 27-28).

Of central importance is the adaptation of new technologies for developmental needs through providing technical expertise in the local setting, participant training in the United States, and the strengthening of management capacity to administer development programs locally. The policy here is to introduce modern technology through "...an alliance of the best brains in this country and in the developing countries...to increase their chances to pass the development 'take-off' point...." (AID, 1978, p. 28)

1982. In the eighties, AID reprioritized basic education in the formal system. The Policy Paper, "Basic Education and Technical Training," issued in December, 1982 began this way:

The development of human resources (or "human capital") is vital to the growth of overall productivity and the efficient use of physical capital. While the accumulation of physical capital resources is essential to economic growth, it is the people who shape and energize a nation's development...(AID, 1982, p. 1)

The document goes on to make the following points:

\* Sustained economic and social development requires efforts to increase the numbers and percentages of children to complete "the first levels of schooling"; "...that most

adolescents and adults have skills to participate fully in modernizing institutions and productive activities"; and "...instructional systems which are both effective and cost-efficient." To this end, AID's policy is directed toward programs for "...increasing the efficiency and improving the distribution of basic education and skills training...for primary school age children and functional skills training and vocational education for adolescents and self-employed adults..." (p. 2)

\* Such education and training are to be "...correlated with agricultural productivity, rural and urban development, lower fertility, and increased health and nutritional status..." The private sector needs a work force skilled in these areas in order to grow. (p. 3)

\* The educational problems of the eighties are characterized by: increased lack of educational opportunity for the urban and rural poor, and for females; illiteracy; high drop-out and repetition rates; low quality and lack of resources; inappropriate preparation for employment; high recurrent costs and inefficient use of available resources; persistent cultural, political, and economic obstacles to the education of females; and ineffective administration. (pp. 4-5)

\* The problems are amenable to resolution without a major increase of resources beyond the capacities of the countries involved. The major problems are thought to



result from inefficiencies and ineffectiveness of current systems to utilize available resources and to effect the administrative, curricular, materials, and training improvements necessary to make education more relevant to developmental needs. In short, "...if little learning occurs or if the learning is not effectively related to employment and other desired functions, it is largely irrelevant how many individuals have the opportunity; and if the system is inefficient or ineffective in reaching potential students, it is of little relevance that the curriculum and pedagogy are appropriate"...(pp. 6-7)

\* The policy priorities of the Agency are therefore to focus on:

- The internal efficiency of the system, namely, improving retention, promotion, and other efficiency measures; and programs to improve the home environment;

- The external efficiency of vocational and technical training programs, particularly with respect to the labor market, demographic shifts, and the backgrounds and motivations of students;

- Local initiative and diversification of education and training opportunities, meaning encouraging parental and community involvement in schools, local administration, and the use of community resources. The range of alternative models of administration and financing is wide, and experimentation is encouraged to fit local circumstances. Assistance from the private sector in the form of materials is also encouraged, particularly cooperative programs in vocational training. (pp. 9-16)

\* Assistance should involve the identification of inadequacies, testing of "technical and strategic options for overcoming the inadequacies," and implementing "cost-efficient new programs" (pp. 18-19).

\* The following guidelines will apply for the allocation of AID assistance:

- The focus will be on "...countries which encourage private as well as public schools";
- Program emphasis will be on "...decentralized management, local participation, and diversified sponsorship...";
- In order to increase returns on investment in education, priority will be given to improving the internal efficiencies of existing systems;
- Rather than maintaining inadequate systems, programming will stress improving educational administration, increasing completion rates, access for girls and poor children, and improving technical and material support for local initiatives;
- Support for secondary, higher, and pre-school education will be tied to basic education. (pp. 19-21)

\* Vocational and technical training policy will respond to three general problems: shortages or imbalances of skills with available jobs; needs to supplement deficiencies in pre-service education with training for specific jobs; and needs "...to plan for the future supply of skilled workers, taking changing technologies into account..." This would include "functional skills training" for the self-employed and out-of-school adolescents.

\* Assistance will be directed toward training for: increasing individual productivity; increasing the productivity of enterprises; increasing employment opportunities by diversifying "productive capacity"; improving the "productive performance" of public agencies;

and strengthening "technical and administrative capacities of local development organizations...through training..." Other training will be provided to larger employers to provide training for their own employees, to the pre- and in-service work forces of smaller enterprises, and nonformal programs for organizations acting at the local level. The underlying rule is to gear training as closely as possible to the jobs needed and available. This means encouraging employers to both sponsor and advise on the content of such training to the maximum extent feasible. (pp. 24-28)

\* The basic guidelines for training assistance are to relate training to:

- employment and improving economic productivity;
- specific social or economic objectives for which training needs would be identified by employers and participants;
- skill needs of the participants, including women;
- the vocational and technical needs of community organizations. (p. 29)

\* Strategic assistance will focus on: strengthening capacities to assess, analyze, and research educational needs; improve management at all levels, with a view to local needs and decentralization; and the specific circumstances of individual countries. (pp. 30-34)

The document concludes with references to the "...fuller application of science and technology in development programs; reliance on market mechanisms and the private sector to stimulate economic development;

strengthening of institutions which are key to the development process; and reinforcement of the efforts of local leaders to address their own development problems and to improve the administration and management of local resources" (p. 36). The role of education in development is to counteract people's tendencies "...to rely more on traditional leaders and government officials than on themselves for most important decisions. Neither market mechanisms, nor democratic processes, nor informed personal choice can flourish in such a context" (p. 37).

1983. The final document relating to AID's educational policy of the 1980s is titled, "A.I.D. Education Sector Strategy," issued in August, 1983. While its purpose is not to make policy as such, the paper offers an excellent view of how policy is to be translated into action.

The paper begins with a brief summary of AID experience as lessons learned. These include affirmation of AID's ability to effect reform insofar as efforts to do so are well aimed and sustained over the long term; ways to insure host government cooperation; efforts that use a broad, comprehensive approach; ways to insure a strong institutional base; provision of relevant long and short term training for Ministry and other key personnel; and use of innovational technologies (p. 1).

The strategy in general involves measures to increase efficiency, the "quantitative and qualitative outputs of

educational investments, and effectiveness...in supporting educational and economic development objectives" (p. 2). Nations are targeted according to whether less than two thirds of primary age children complete grade four and there is "...a host country policy commitment to increased internal efficiency..." (p. 3). To those countries that do have a higher primary school age completion rate and a shortage of skilled workers, AID gives priority for technical training and vocational education.

At the country mission level, the recommended procedure to follow is to:

- \* Conduct an education sector survey which would include data to support the selection criteria above, application of the data to local conditions, and a proposal for subsequent educational activity.

- \* Implementation factors to be considered in primary education will be:

- Greater integration of the content (e.g., curriculum reform, teacher training, educational technologies, and NFE) into efforts to reform, increase efficiency, and impact on employment and national development.

- Program areas for efficiency and decentralization of administration and financing will likely include: administration and supervision, management systems, materials development and production, in- and pre-service teacher training, educational technologies for remote areas, research to identify constraints to efficiency, and innovations aimed at "...getting more education for each dollar spent." Some pre-school programs would also be considered. (p. 5-6)

- \* In the area of skills and technical training, programs would include basic skills; NFE service agency

outreach to community organizations; skills training for work through radio and print, extension, and OJT; literacy; and project related training for village level workers in organizing projects, using media, and assessing needs.

The thematic policy review above identifies all the themes evident in the four documentary sources. While other policy statements that have an impact on education were also issued during the period, this material provides an ample quantity of themes to deconstruct for their formative metaphors.

## Round 2: Deconstructing the Developmental Themes - In Search of the Metaphors Within

I use the term "deconstruction" in the sense that AID educational policy represents a discourse on development. The materialist view of discourse begins from the position that the human being in society must be studied as a process of social construction (e.g., Coward & Ellis, 1977, pp. 1-2). In this view all knowledge has social referents. In the postivist tradition, however, the social referents of knowledge are denied. Knowledge instead is expressed in discursive terms which claim their status as truth. An alternative way to begin the study of the validity of such claims is to start from the position of the claims and proceed reflectively.



AID's policy texts have been produced to guide its practice, be reported to the Congress, and to inform the public. In reality, if the texts were momentary constructions, then the direction of inquiry must be toward the social forces of the ideologies that produced them. The route I traverse to expose the ideologies which are implanted in developmental consciousness is backward, in reverse, from text to theme to metaphor to ideology. While the route in this view is not linear by any means, the word "deconstruct" seems apt to describe the process.

According to the theory of ideology I have investigated to this point, the function of ideology is to unify the clash of contradictory forces of the social space by generating the texts to do so. The forces "in contradiction and intersection" in this sense produce the texts which construct the consciousness of the subject, a consciousness that appears rational, whole, and self-justifying.

Developmental consciousness is therefore produced as one moment in dialectical relation to the contradictory forces of the outside world (Coward & Ellis, pp. 8-10). The purpose of this particular construction is to fulfill the main function of ideology, namely to present an evolutionary, complete picture of social relations that are natural and subject only to incremental change, that is to say, to development (p. 27). With this theoretical introduction in mind, the discursive themes that govern AID's educational policies are grouped as follow:

\* Economic Growth. The image of economic growth is prevalent. Growth is portrayed as a social fact of life that will naturally continue. Economic growth is a precondition for social improvement. The latter is causally conditioned by the state of the former. The reforms recommended in education are based on several problems related to economic growth: increasing numbers of school children, more people unemployed, and higher costs. The picture of a healthy society is one in which economic growth outpaces social problems. Such growth is presented as the necessary means to expand services. Economic growth is assumed to be a social good in and of itself, irrespective of specific social purpose.

\* The poor. The "disadvantaged majority" of human beings who survive at the margins of life are called "the poor." They are undereducated, undernourished, underclothed, and inadequately sheltered. They have lacks which prevent them from participating fully in society. They are characterized by low productivity, a deficiency that prevents them from receiving the benefits society could offer. Instead of being active participants in economic and social development, they are (unfortunately) obstacles to it. Many of their beliefs and practices about family structure, leadership and decisionmaking, religion, community relationships, and social purpose are presupposed to be antithetical to development.

\* Education is indispensable to development. Education is the vehicle to bring the necessary knowledge, skills, and orientation (K-S-O) to the poor. The content of education should be determined by the economic developmental needs of society. Educational programming should be directed toward delivering this content to the most needy. Many problems with education today, as well as in the past, result from content which is functionally inappropriate for development.

\* Improving the "quality of life." The theme of improving conditions toward a better life is also evident. The present quality of life is bad because too many people are hungry, out of work, suffer from disease, and live in bad conditions. The right kind and amount of education is believed to enable the people to change these conditions so that they can make improvements in the quality of their lives.

\* Educational resources are in short supply. The lack of adequately and appropriately trained teachers, appropriate educational materials, school facilities and equipment, and competent administration makes schools ineffective in delivering education to the numbers of people, both children and adults, women and girls, who need it.

\* Education management is weak. School and educational administrators are inadequately prepared and trained to provide the support necessary to accommodate their students

and adult clientele. Running large and complex systems from the national level requires skills in managing information and resources, planning, organizing programs, providing support, communication, and making appropriate changes for improvement. This aspect of the administrative problem is viewed to be people-related. In this respect, the right kind of training, often at U.S. institutions, would alleviate the personal deficiencies of management that inhibit education systems from running effectively and efficiently.

\* Education systems are beset with inefficiencies.

These are evident in poor passing, retention, and dropout rates. The problem here is that even those children who can attend school are not provided with the quality of education they need to advance successfully. School resources are not used intensively enough. Costs spread across numbers of students could be reduced with better management.

\* There is a need for innovation. Advances and new practices would help address some of the problems faced by educational leaders. Possible directions include experimentation and introduction of models for decentralization of administration, fostering community and family participation, needs assessment and project development, regional planning, and other cooperative measures to be taken with service delivery agencies outside the education sector. New developments in teaching

methodologies for literacy and numeracy, classroom approaches, and curricular models would increase effectiveness.

\* Institutional development is a necessary means to effect improvements. The introduction of innovations and the improvement of management should be institutionalized. More specifically, the capacity for making improvements should be incorporated into organizations that are responsible for delivering educational services. Institutionalization would involve a dual process of personnel development and the introduction of innovative procedures to strengthen the capacities of educational services in administration, curriculum and materials development and distribution, and, finally, teacher training and support.

\* Modern educational technologies are necessary to increase efficiency and effectiveness. This would include computerization of teacher services, supply distribution, tracking and examination of student performance, and communication among schools and other programs. Advances in radio and television broadcast, print materials, satellite communication, and research methods would help systems reduce costs and reach more people in need. A greater reliance on science and technology is needed to offset traditional patterns so that development can proceed.

\* The final theme I wish to highlight at this stage is one that is evident throughout all the others. The theme underlies AID's efforts to translate its policy goals into action. Its focus is on process, a rational approach to identify problem areas according to educational policy goals, conducting needs analyses, setting resulting objectives, organizing resources and developing suitable plans, dealing with obstacles, taking appropriate actions, and evaluating results. The process is fundamental to decision making about the allocation and delivery of technical resources through projects. It is central to the implementation of the entire program approach to education for development. It sits at the core of the rational planning and implementation methodology employed by the Agency (as well as most western development organizations) to expend its resources. I will pay more direct attention to this general operational model in my summation of AID's developmental ideology in the next chapter.

Up to this point, the themes interwoven in AID's education for development policies have been stated in their own terms. I continue now with the task of deconstruction by first isolating the metaphors embedded within the developmental themes.

The function of metaphor I have shown is to explain or interpret an event or situation such as policy discourse by taking a concept developed in one context and transposing it into another. The insertion of metaphor into policy



discourse is most effective when it disappears by substituting itself as real and sufficient description for and explanation of the conditions that produce policy. Insofar as it is invisible, the metaphor succeeds in its task by insinuating ideology into consciousness. This is why it becomes necessary to deconstruct texts to uncover the metaphors that lie within them.

For this operation I turn to the analytical scheme offered by Foucault which suggests several focal points for the deconstruction of specific instances of discourse. I apply his scheme formulate three combinations of the discursive themes (on growth, the poor, institutionalization, etc.) identified in the previous section as a way to extract the major metaphors hypothesized to lie within them.

1. Growth: The concept of economic growth is fundamental to the entire scheme of development advanced by the Agency. It is the sine qua non of modernization. It makes other advances possible. Without growth, specifically economic growth, there appears to be no possibility of supporting modernization. It fuels the engine of enterprise. It provides government with the resources needed to educate the people, defend the land, and develop the nation. Whether growth is an end or a means to "development" is not clear. In the AID educational policy statements I reviewed, growth appears to be both end and

means. The terms "development" and "growth" are, if not equivalent in usage, inseparable, the latter conditioning the former.

1a. Rules of object formation: In Foucault's analytical scheme, growth imagery can be seen in light of the various "rules" by which it has been formulated. The first is what I would call its "definitive rules of formation," which set growth apart as an object. What is growth that it can be identified in the first place and what are its constituents? Other than to specify its necessity and to make references to "economic and social growth," AID's policy statements in education say little about it directly. The commonly applied set of rules governing the concept, however, are economic in origin. They apply such statistical macro-indicators as GNP, population growth, inflation, life expectancy, GDP, trade balance, external debt, capital flow, development assistance received, income distribution, government revenues and spending, levels of education, skill levels of the labor force, internal and external migration, as well as industrial growth, to name just a few (The World Bank, 1987, pp. 202-267).

The economy assumes life as an entity, an organism, which feeds and is fed. It possesses certain characteristics that define its stage of development, the definition derived from the indicators wherein size, volume, and rates of expansion determine its "health." As object,

the economy then generates its own discourse in the form of measures of growth activity, either in the terms of its absence or regression. To the extent they are taken as a living entity, the growth traits in the form of indicators serve as the foundation of development.

In this way the organismic growth metaphor establishes itself as the realm in which development policy is made possible. It sets the stage on which all development education policies, the "objects" in Foucault's terminology, are produced.

1b. The rules of operation: The indicators of growth are derived from the science of economics which says that economic growth is governable according to a set of "natural laws." The operational rules of the economy in their form as "natural economic laws" set the context in which the Agency's policy discourses have materialized. The discourses define development as problematic according to the universal rules that govern all economies.

In actuality, however, the operant set of rules now thought to apply to the economy was originally developed in the context of natural science. Only as metaphors did they unconsciously make their way into economic science. In turn, the rules purported to govern the process of economic development originated by metaphorical transposition from the universal economic laws which were supposed to govern the process of economic growth. Finally, the rules governing

development are used to define the rules by which educational policy is set. The metaphorical transposition process referred to by Ricoeur is, in this respect, multi-tiered, with the science of economic development deriving its social force from the science of economics, which itself was defined by metaphorical transposition from the natural sciences.

In this vein, AID's policy statements about education's indispensable role in contributing toward "national economic and social growth," "increasing efficiencies in light of decreasing resources," "increasing access," "decreasing unit costs through cost effective measures," and aligning skills with jobs available have borrowed "scientific" backing through a metaphorical transposition process. The transposition, however, goes unrecognized as such. In this sense, the indispensability of growth serves metaphorically as a model for social transition. The inducements to growth are taken as scientifically proven grounds on which to base development policy.

The model of economic science defines the scope within which educational operations can take place. The law of supply and demand, for instance, is cited as governing the kind of training that should be provided for the learning of technical skills. Certain natural laws about human economic behavior and its universality determine the best ways to organize productive activity, with some allowance for

cultural difference thrown in as a factor that needs to be "accounted for." Operations should be set up according to models of innate human tendencies to acquire material goods, since individuals would "naturally" have the highest potential to maximize returns on economic investment. While the list of rules for operationalizing growth goes on, the point is that they find their backing in the discourses on economic science.

1c. Rules governing the formulation of growth concepts:

Conceptual variations on the growth theme are not spelled out in detail in the policy statements made in education. However, there are references made that call such variations to mind. The concept whereby the right skills in the right quantities are infused at the right time conjures up an old metaphor imported from nuclear physics, the "critical mass model." This is generally conceived as a matter of imparting the right blend of K-S-O to needy "pockets" of undereducated poor to counter the scarcity of skilled labor in usually urban industrial centers. Policy references are made to design vocational and technical training on the basis of a tighter "fit" between what is taught and what is needed by firms doing business in the geographic area. The educational endeavor in this conceptual scheme becomes more of a direct function of the labor market, where skilled labor is looked upon as one in a number of possible "missing links" in the economic growth chain. The chain itself is

forged by interlocking links from a variety of theoretical schemes which have their basis in an educational application of "human capital theory," a subject to which I will turn presently. As soon as enough skilled labor is made available, industrial and other productive enterprises will have the "critical mass" needed to spur consumption and savings to increase capital formation.

The discourses on economic growth offer a rational explanation for the current social upheaval wrought by the transition from agrarian to industrialized economies. In this way they provide a rational basis on which to plan development programs. The link-chain model of training, jobs, production, spending, demand, savings, capital formation, expansion, more jobs, and so on is one example of metaphorical modeling to guide development policy. The circularity of an interlocked series of cause and effect linkages represented by the model, however, is not seen as metaphor. It is seen as technology backed by science.

ld. The delimitation of theoretical options:

Education's role in economic development is defined by "human capital theory" (e.g., Becker, 1976, pp.122-130; Schultz, 1963). The theory is based on the proposition that there is an economic value to education that can be determined monetarily by attributing earned income from marketable productive activity in the future to past investment in education. While there is some variation as



to what is to be counted and disregarded, and how one factors in inflation, the idea is that choice making on investment in education, either national (social) or personal, can be facilitated by exclusive reference to the future monetary returns anticipated by the original investment. This referencing process is recommended to be one of the factors thought necessary to inform policy decisions.

For example, in the late seventies and early eighties, AID made a major shift in policy, without a reallocation of resources (Rihani, et al., 1986, Vol III, p. 37), from investment in higher and nonformal education to primary education at least partly on the basis of greater anticipated returns, both social and private, per amount invested (Rihani et al., 1986, Vol. II. pp. 4-5; Psacharopoulos & Woodhall, 1985, pp. 58 & 119). The evidence to support the theory of returns to education from investment in primary education is now widely held to be a valid basis for policy decisions. The measure of potential earning power and its correlation with educational resource input in effect is taken as conditioning the set of theoretical options for investment in education.

Education for development as development is defined by the indicators derived from human capital theory then becomes the equivalent of development. The discourses for theorizing about education are derived logically from human

capital theory. The arena of theorizing is thus circumscribed by the human capital discourses.

The metaphorical image is one of a complex machine that operates through the adjustment of trained expert planners who apply the correct amounts of educational input to the raw material and combine it with other factors to "produce" the ingredients thought essential for economic growth. A kitchen of cooks mixing the stew also comes to mind. The recipe for the stew originates within a particular cultural tradition for a limited number and kind of people. Only now, the cooks have been asked to expand the recipe to feed several households with the same amount of ingredients.

Having covered the metaphors arising from AID's discourses on growth, I continue reviewing the other themes I extracted from AID's policy statements on the poor and the institutionalization of innovations. In so doing, I continue using Foucault's analytical scheme as a guide for reviewing the discourses with a view to uncovering the formative rules embedded in the themes.

2. The Poor: The "Poor" represent the "Other." As the majority of human beings, they are looked on as not yet having the means to participate in the grand process of economic and social growth. They are locked out of the design and implementation of their own development. They suffer the staggering effects of such complex phenomena as population growth, declining agricultural production, urban

poverty, rural stagnation, disease, infant mortality, malnutrition, and lack of education. They are the "victims" where there are no criminals. They are subject to changes over which they have little control and from which they get little benefit. They survive at the margins of society.

2a. The rules for their objectification: As identified in AID policy, they are the "target." AID's development and educational programs are "aimed at" them. Outreach and resources are directed towards them. In this view, they are cited as the object of education for development. They are the ones to be developed. AID's policies are aimed to integrate them into the economic and social mainstream. The question of how they got to be left out, however, is not addressed.

Rules governing the developmental process are thought to be linear. That is to say, development is conceived as progressive, from primitive to more "developed" stages. The predominant image of progress is temporal. The poor are represented as existential objects caught in a present that history is bypassing. They need to "catch-up" with progress. They have to modernize to be saved. While religious overtones are explicitly avoided, the religious metaphor nonetheless strongly parallels the temporal progression toward salvation through the elect route of modernization. Various epistles on modernization are conveyed by "priesthoods" of development workers who

promulgate the rules for salvation in the form of the K-S-O required for success in the modern world. At the center of the portrait on poverty sit the poor as flocks of lost sheep waiting to be guided. While the parallels could be extended, the main point is that the conditions of the poor, their circumstance of life, the relationship patterns that define their sense of kinship and community, are depicted as problematic. They lead lives of low quality. The predominant image that guides interaction with them, the application of educational policy included, is painted in tones of material, intellectual, and spiritual deprivation. Other related aspects of their social lives are defined in quantitatively problematic, not qualitative terms.

2b. Operationalizing development: Rules for implementing development schemes are directed toward variations of targeted populations. The rules are usually defined not in the terms by which the "lumped poor" refer to themselves, but in the terms of those defining the scopes of their respective targets. Examples are derived from project needs statements: out-of-school youth, unemployed urban unskilled workers, primary school dropouts, illiterate farmers, uncertified teachers, undereducated women, and so on. The rule here is that the definition of the problem determines the name of the target. In order for the Agency to show impact, the target has to be defined in specific terms. Policies devised to support programs follow rules

that are object related. Resources are directed at the resolution of the specific problems that are faced by specific people at specific times. The people and the problem become so closely intertwined that distinguishing where the person ends and the problem begins in the project discourses is next to impossible. People are portrayed as problems that need to be solved.

The overarching metaphorical operation is that of "labelling." The poor are subdivided into problem categories so that assistance efforts can be targeted to the right places. The order of the labelling process usually proceeds from priority area to specific problem to target group, with the measurement of project success determined by one particular aspect of the problem alone. One example can be seen in the impact of education on the decline of fertility rates. The problem addressed by the educational input is a high birth rate. Educational inputs are made, outputs are measured, and the outcome (impact) is determined by the extent of decline of the birth rate. If the rate declines as planned, ergo success is achieved.

The formation of operational rules is thus a process of applying "developmental language" in the form of specific problem-related discourses to targeted groups. The groups are "interpellated," to borrow from Althusser, according to the specific instance of developmental discourse to be applied. The function of the discourse is to divide up the

sphere of action into manageable pieces toward which programs can be aimed and impact demonstrated. The implementation of policy is thus made possible through the operation of rational language which provides the means to transpose a host of metaphorical conceptions to isolated problem groups according to the tools available to define and address them.

2c. Rules for conceiving the poor as problem cum opportunity: Applying concepts of development to define the target group according to the problem (or problems) is a process dependent on the state of the art. How the problems of the world's "poor majority" are classified is an outgrowth of the scientific tools at hand to deal with them. When development is considered, the tools are usually derived from concepts about growth and modernization. As I covered growth in the previous section, I focus here on the concepts of modernization embedded in AID's policies for development education.

The duality notion I mentioned briefly in Chapter IV lies at the core of modernization. Duality as a concept is attractive for the ease with which it can be "operationalized" and for the power it has to generate subsequent theory. The concept is, as I noted there, simple to understand. It offers an excellent adjunct to the grand macro-economic scheme of development proposed by Rostow in the early sixties. It is a descriptive process that



involves identifying the principal traits of modernity empirically by extracting them from industrialized society as a model. The profile of modern traits is then ordered according to the specific levels and forms of social organization found in "modern" society, namely individual, institutional, and societal. The second step in the process results from a simple binary operation - The modern profile is contrasted with those found in non-modern societies. To the extent that the traits so profiled are lacking within a specific social profile, by definition, that society is classified as behind, backward, traditional, or any of a number of alternatives to the same effect.

The notion of duality is applied foremost to the poor. It is the conceptual source of the trait-derived lackings found among them. The lackings are then converted into sets of needs that govern the production of educational policies and their curricular offspring. The case of literacy and numeracy are obvious. Others are to be more thoroughly integrated into the underlying economic setting. The K-S-O referred to are derived from those traits that define the knowledge, skills, and orientation thought necessary for individual development. The word "orientation" is emphasized here because it escapes explicit definition in AID's educational policy statements. I surmise that it covers important attitudes and behaviors that are deemed essential for prospering in modern society. These would

include the entrepreneurial approach, rational planning (also a skill), achievement motivation, competitive drive, risk taking, thrift, hard work, and so on. These must be inculcated in the poor ostensibly because they have been deprived of the opportunity to learn them in the context of their own traditional cultures. The image of the path out of poverty is an analog of the well-meaning, scrappy apprentice who, after a suitable period of learning from the master, strikes out on his/her own, takes learning to higher levels, and ends up better off than the old master. In the case of development assistance, however, the image is raised to an international scale where America holds itself forth as the experienced master with Third World nations depicted in the position of apprentice.

2d. Theorizing about the poor: Modernization theory applies two entirely different theories to the development of the poor. The first, alluded to above, posits the vessel of economic growth as the mold in which the poor are cast. The shape of the mold is determined by the constellation of grand schemes which dictate the economic path all societies must traverse in order to progress. The two most notable schemes already covered are Rostow's linear theory of growth stages and the Harrod-Domar model of capital investment as the crucial spur to growth. This constellation of theories and their corollaries provides the frame in which modernization is conceived to be possible.

The second major source of theorizing impetus originates in the concept of modernization itself. The traits list provides a set of objectives for social organization. It visualizes the insides of the outer mold. The ideal individual, institutional forms, and social framework are pictured as complementary, interlocking networks of reciprocal functions and interactions. At the societal level, an expanding industrial economy provides for the material needs of all citizens. At the institutional level, corporations, educational and other governmental services, health facilities, and the customary practices and patterns through which people interact socially and economically are all supposed to function in a mutually compatible arrangement as intermediaries between the economic system and its individual members. At the level of the individual, such institutional formations provide people with the means to relate to each other and to meet their needs. This functionalist perspective is based in the belief that the "natural" tendency of society is toward cohesion. Conflict in the structural functionalist perspective is viewed to be an aberration always reducible to either individual or institutional disfunction. For example, the phenomenon of "underdevelopment" is explained ultimately as a set of temporal deficiencies that beset populations and institutions as a result of internal cultural and geographic influences.

Theorizing about education and its role in development is done within the functionalist paradigm of social change. Imparting the right mix of K-S-O is thought to be possible without overturning the basic unity of the social system because the social system is believed to have an inherent tendency to cohere. Therefore, all theory of education for development is directed toward the incremental improvement of individuals and the institutional frameworks within which they interact. Education is not directed toward collective action which aims to overturn or negate existing institutional relations. "Individuation" is an apt term for describing the function of education in this view. Reform is the discourse that is meant to better institutional forms without eradicating them. Reform theory is to be managed by those in the know, the ones who are properly trained to institute innovations. I will take a closer look at some aspects of institutional reform under the topic of the institutionalization of educational innovation immediately below.

3. Institutionalizing innovations: The context of education for development: In this section I cover several themes related to the educational delivery system: efficiency, administration and management, institution-building, and the process of innovation as technology transfer.

If the context for development is set in the mold of growth and modernization, its strategies for implementation are directed toward problems identified at both the individual, covered in the section above, and the institutional levels. The operational discourses for "institutional development" are found in the Agency's policy statement on institutional development issued in March, 1983. That document stressed the need for "analysis and reform of the policy environment,...consideration and introduction of organizational alternatives,...development of institutional learning capacity,...transfer of knowledge and technology,...analysis and improvement of institutional linkages/coordination,...provision of skills and training,...and capitalizing on local capacities and participation..." (AID, 1983c, pp. 2-6).

3a. The institution and its environment as problem-object: The institution in AID's policy is to be analyzed and treated on two levels - According to the interactions it has with its own external environment; and internally, according to the influences of its environment. The development and implementation of policies for institutional development in this view are conditioned by the prevalent view of economic development and the functional role of education. As an entity the institution, that is, the education system should have the capacity to deliver quality educational services to the right people. The education system plays the intermediate role between the individual

students and the setting within which they are expected to function. To this end, the institution of education is designed to turn raw material into effective producers and consumers.

In this line of thought, the existing institution can be compared with a patient in need of care. The current institution is beset by inner maladies which hinder its abilities to deliver the services intended. In its metaphorical representation as patient, the educational system is seen in need of remedial attention in the form of a series of organizational interventions before it can fulfill its institutional mission. The maladies most frequently cited are: inadequately trained personnel, fiscal management problems, lack of consistent procedures for managing personnel, lack of planning, lack of resources, obstacles to delivering services, unclear objectives, and so on. When institutional development needs are considered, the organizational development approach is high on the list of strategies that can be applied. While AID employs predominantly business-derived metaphors explicitly, comparison to health can be made. The path from economic malnutrition to health is the business of development.

3b. The rules for intervening: The object "institution" provides a locus for the mobilization of resources to carry out the education for development mission. To the extent it experiences difficulties in doing



so, the system as such becomes a focus for the identification of problems. The primary function of the object label, "institution," is to provide a venue for organizing resources, those introduced in the form of external innovations included. The rubric "institution-building" is constructed around the Parsonian "systems" frame of reference. The educational system in this frame is charged with a number of outputs it must make to fulfill its developmental mission. The outputs, as I indicated above, are determined by the requirements of an expanding and transitional economy. Fundamentally, the function of the outputs is to structure the inputs. In order for the system to successfully produce students with the correct mix of K-S-O, namely its outputs, it has to organize the resources to do it.

The educational system in Parson's view is a "subsystem" whose operational deficiencies should be corrected in order to maintain overall balance within the larger social system. The metaphor that guides this approach is the construction of a complex edifice in which component parts must serve each other integrally in order for the subsystem to function well enough to produce the outputs required by its environment. The matching process in a modernizing society becomes increasingly involved and complex. It consequently can be handled only by duly qualified experts who can determine what is needed, know how

to get the right components, and how to trouble shoot problems in the construction process.

As the system has trouble meeting its goals, it needs help. To this end, it calls for the intervention of experts and other resources to identify its deficiencies, make plans to deal with them, and operationalize the assistance. The assistance is aimed to increase the efficiency of the operating system by alleviating its internal problems. In this way, the overarching economic and social system can remain intact while expertise is applied to resolving the problems of its component subsystems. Expert assistance is always given under the condition that radical structural transformation, namely revolution, is not required to address the problems of underdevelopment. While component elements of the system may require periodic adjustment, the system itself is never depicted in a state of severe crisis, at least in the remedial terms described in AID policy and project literature.

3c. Concepts of efficiency and innovation: The idea of efficiency is contained within the idea of system. As an idea it originated in another field entirely, that of engineering, from which it was "borrowed as a metaphor" (Windham, 1988, p. 6). In economic terms, efficiency has to do with "...maximizing the value of all outputs for a given cost of all inputs..." (p. 6). The translation of this metaphorical concept into educational programming is the

subject of Windham's recent study, which was done under the auspices of an AID funded contract. The attempt to "operationalize" the concept is solidly based in systems theory and uses a "production oriented model," or some more complex economic variation, as a way to generate efficiency theory in education. Windham concludes his study by recommending three proposals: (1) Middle and senior level educational administrators be trained in "...decision-making principles and ...efficiency analysis..."; (2) "Establishment and monitoring of effectiveness and efficiency benchmarks within educational institutions and systems; and, (3) Development and maintenance of an educational management system based on the principals [sic] of efficiency analysis" (p. 154). Indicators would be grouped around the systems order of inputs, process, outputs, and outcomes. Examples under the category "inputs" include teacher characteristics, facilities, equipment, materials, and administrative capacity. Under process are found administrative behavior, and teacher and student time allocations. Outputs include attainment, achievement, and equity effects. Outcomes involve indicators of admission to and achievement in further study, employment, earnings, attitudes and behaviors, and externalities (pp. 163-165).

The metaphorical image used to highlight "efficiency" is one reminiscent of Myrdal's professional social engineer who comes in a variety of specializations. The whole idea

of "project" applied by AID is put into practice through the matching of expert advice with the problems it has defined. The financial manager, for example, logically assists in helping to resolve problems with fiscal operations, the curriculum developer, practical skills education specialist, basic education specialist, training manager, nonformal educator, and so on all in their respective areas. This is a case of actual practice. Institutional needs for expertise are centered on the effort to create a rational model of administration, usually hierarchical in form, into which the correct dosages of expertise are applied. The model, echoing Weber, is what is transposed as an ideal method for organizing institutional relationships. Experts by definition are called on to help by introducing what they know, and what they know is based on the models of rational administration in which they have been trained.

The concept of innovation is clearly circumscribed by the concept of institutional development. The latter provides the arena within which the former functions. Because technical educational innovation in many respects exhibits such wide variation, citing specific examples would be superfluous. The circumscription of activity, however, is of interest. Paulston's summation of the arena of innovation, while broadly aimed, raises the question of limits, in that educational innovations amount to "...isolated attempts to change educational practice at the

local level..." while leaving the question of "...who benefits and why..." largely unanswered (1979, pp. 4-5). If Paulston underestimated the scope of educational reform efforts in some countries, his point was aimed in the same direction as mine in that basic institutional relationships within the overall economy are not subject to radical change.

Diffusionist images dominate the modelling for introducing innovations. An idealist structure serves as model toward which the institutional host aspires. Innovations are usually born and developed in external settings for introduction and adaptation in new ones. The inoculation metaphor comes to mind where innovations are injected into the accommodating host, whose potentially negative reaction is controlled by careful attention to the proper catalytic strategies implemented by technical advisers.

3d. The production of theory for institutional innovation: The phrase "local participation" is evident in AID's policy statements. The notion is complemented by references to "decentralization" and "private initiative." The introduction of educational innovation as an outgrowth of modernization shows some theoretical progression from Roger's (1962) seminal work on the diffusion of innovations. In general, innovation theory has developed from the "pre-packaged" formulae of earlier days to increased attention to

the supportive and inhibiting factors found in the local setting. The process of introducing innovations is now viewed to depend on the extent of receptivity and participation of the host. AID's strategic responses to enlist the cooperation and exercise of authority by host officials now includes joint planning, the offer of international training to responsible officials, and increased sharing of decisionmaking at all stages of implementation.

Theory production for introducing innovations is now concerned with schemes for power sharing. Earlier research in organizational development provided AID with the means for analyzing cultural, environmental, and decisionmaking patterns followed by local officials. The research seems to emphasize several analytical, decisionmaking, problem-solving, group dynamics, information systems, and organizational models to promote change in relationship patterns as a way to increase productivity. In all cases, successful application of the models depends on the skills of the technical adviser who looms as the central figure in the modelling process. The adviser-as-linchpin image is apt in the sense that the adviser sits at the key point in a very complex operation. The innovational process is highly dependent on her combination of skills, experience, and other personal attributes in analyzing and responding to local circumstances and personalities. However, state of



the art theory that explores program dependency on the convergence of personality and circumstance so far seems to be in short supply and out of focus.

Up to now, I have highlighted the prominent themes and extracted several metaphors from AID's policy statements on education. In Round 3 in the next chapter, I focus on the "locational" task of relating the metaphors deconstructed from their original discourses to their place in the ideological frame of reference - namely, the social space.

## CHAPTER VII

### DEVELOPMENTAL METAPHORS AND THE REDUCTION OF DIVERSITY WITHIN THE SOCIAL SPACE

#### Round 3: The Ideological Referents for the Metaphorical Components of Educational Policy

This chapter examines the results of the inductive critique of AID's policies done in the last chapter with the purpose of revealing their ideological referents. I apply the deductive questions derived from the concept of the social space to the three metaphorical clusters of economic growth, the poor, and the institutionalization of innovations. The questions are ordered according to their place in the social space: the economic/functionalist, political/hierarchical, and legitimating/scientific.

#### Situating the Metaphors of Economic Growth

##### The Functionalist Referents

Metaphors related to the economic setting dominate AID's policies in education. The purpose of educational assistance is determined by the relationships that can be developed between education and economic growth. Agency policy appears to be based on rationales for productive activity that lead to growth. An examination of the metaphors on which the policy rationales are based assume

the validity of the interrelationships between economic growth and development.

The economic organism metaphor gets its scientific backing from the various growth formulae I have referred to earlier. The rational claim made by the growth formulae derive from the validity of growth measures as an objective application of economic science. The growth formulae depict the ideal developing economy as an aggregate of individuals seeking to maximize their personal returns from productive activities with as little cost as possible. This depiction of human behavior is taken to be universally valid. It means that all rational developmental behavior is reducible to collective compliance with the growth formulae. The metaphorical referents for AID's educational policies reflect the validity of the economic growth imperative as a key to development.

In this view, economic expansion is a process dependent on the aggregation of similar behaviors. The growing economy is a function of people who cumulatively act out of a similar consciousness about their material self interest. The Harrod-Domar and other growth formulae depend on a series of actions to be taken by individuals who are viewed to act rationally only insofar as they act in their economic self interest, that is to say, to the extent that interest is realized by their conformity with the rational behaviors implied by the formulae.

Some variation among them notwithstanding, the growth formulae are derived from a capitalistic model of economic development that ascribes certain human propensities as innate. The ideological function of the formulae is to collapse the cultural gap between existing patterns of socio-economic interaction by diffusing this specific version of developmental consciousness. Human development for everyone then becomes a progressive, evolutionary series of steps along the path between a primitive economy and a mature one.

The bridge to a mature economy has the educational system as a key support. The ideally productive education system turns out students who:

- \* can exercise the requisite basic skill competencies to thrive within a new economic setting;
- \* have reoriented their cultural perspective on their role as citizens in a developing society;
- \* comply with the institutional expectations of a developing capital economy.

While it may appear objective and neutral, considering its apparent function in any social setting, the list of K-S-O in fact transmits the discourses that formulate developmental consciousness. The fundamental purpose of the discourses is to reproduce in students of the Third World the competencies and orientation which drive a capital growth modeled economy. The functional referents of AID's educational policies are based in an ideology that appears to constrict, not expand economic choice. The referents do so by transmitting rationales that:

\* Define the purpose of formal and nonformal education as the chief means for integration into one kind of economy. Education is given the primary function of filtering and classifying according to competencies, training according to this competency-based scheme, and providing the structural model for organizing all state-sponsored educational activities. As a centrally managed institution, the education system is the primary vehicle for the socialization of all youth for participation in the economy.

\* Transpose the overarching image of the economy as an organism on which all are collectively dependent for their livelihood. In this view the economy has the power to reward and punish according to one's behavior. Participation is then defined in terms of the extent of one's integration into the "economy."

\* Infuse a one dimensional definition of educational purpose into all education policy. Education for development means people go to school or to training with the image of a private wealth driven economy implanted firmly in their minds. Jobs mean work for pay. One's labor is to be sold for subsistence, or some marginal allowance above it. The owner of the enterprise for which one works is entitled by right to expropriate the value of the work done over and above the wage for his own private ends. The right to profit off the labor of others is legitimate and natural. All social relations are to be structured around this primary economic relationship. The school and other educational programs exist as feeders into this version of economy.

\* Set the curricular agenda around one predominant image of development. The curriculum in the abstract is depicted as a means to instantiate the human side of "human capital theory" with the correspondent set of K-S-O. The curriculum is transformed into a set of objectives for the inculcation of the K-S-O derived from variations of this theory (Apple, 1979).

The ideological referents for conditioning capital economic growth are designed so as to explain in scientific terminology how to go about the business of transforming societies in the throes of economic and social crisis in an orderly, incremental fashion. The discourses on growth,

therefore, delimit the range of economic possibility to one modeled on orderly progression. To this end, they serve to preempt other, perhaps more disruptive and radical alternatives from the realm of choice by saying, in effect - "Education's role in economic development is to infuse this image of growth in policy makers, planners, administrators, and students. The path to growth along private investment lines is the only way to go." This is the gist of the educational message.

To both current national leaderships and their American counterparts the message is reinforcing. Growth and its developmental corollaries offer the means to manage economic crisis through existing institutional forms, education included. Given the proper assistance, an orderly way out of material deprivation can be found. The ideology, then, is one of possibility within the current order. The formulae for growth in this line of reasoning prove that incremental development is possible. The growth discourses are then juxtaposed against their binary opposites: non-growth, stagnation, violence, and, what is worse, communism.

In order to condition development in the Third World, the mode of capitalist production requires an effective means to offset the social upheaval characteristic of the transition to a capital driven economy. The means at hand is to apply an ideology powerful enough to counteract opposition to and mobilize resources for such development.



For this reason, the ideology of economic functionalism was created dialectically, as antithesis to conceal the real thesis that spawned it: Social relations within western industrial economies were in their historical transitional stage (as they are now) characterized by severe and often violent contradictions. Previously diverse patterns of social relations were uprooted by new and predominantly uniform production patterns of capital-wage labor, expert-layman, and center-periphery (Kiziltan, 1987). The economic functionalist ideologies that made their appearance in the mid-twentieth century under the guise of social engineering schemes were designed to rationalize and legitimate a means to control the basic conflicts they attempted to conceal. The growth ideology on which AID's development policies are based serves much the same purpose.

The central purpose of growth imagery is to provide the context for circumscribing the space within which educational policies can be formed. The private industrial growth model takes its place in the social space as a product of the functionalist ideology whose purpose is to narrow the range of economic options, frame the set of developmental goals, provide appropriate (scientific) methodological procedures, control the means to generate resources, and convey its own reproductive messages through education. The capital growth model thereby expresses itself ideologically as a logical whole. The content of its expressions is the subject of the next section.

## The Hierarchical Referents

In this section I am concerned with two manifestations of education's role in realizing growth ideology: The locus of management control for development education; and education's role in transmitting images of hierarchy.

### State Management of Development Education

The locus of management control for education's role in promoting growth lies clearly with the state. Education for development is a function of the state. All of AID's interventions are managed by policy through bilateral arrangements with the governments of the Third World. The process of managing technical assistance to education is through the vehicle of state administration, American and Third World alike. Fundamental to the transmission of assistance is the governmental structure that sends and receives it.

To the contrary, the basic ideology of growth capital is not one of "growth with control," at least in the sense advocated by Friedman's classical economic "Chicago School" of development. The classical ideology says that controlled economic growth is a contradiction in terms. Yet, AID's policies are filled with references to the importance of

decentralization and local participation. The democratic message of free enterprise seems to square best, at least in a rhetorical sense, only with unleashing the forces of development capital, as if centrally induced development would hinder, not spur the unleashing process. This contradiction is extremely important. The policy discourses on the essentially synergistic nature of free enterprise and development stand in stark contrast to the standard mechanisms for operationalization of the very same policies! Business as usual is wrought with the contradiction between centrally managed development and economic liberalism.

#### Education and Images of Hierarchy.

Images of hierarchy extend directly to the management of education. AID's overriding policy is to integrate education into economic development activities as fully as possible. Educational policy is set with the economic context as primary. The means to achieve integration into the predominant image of capital based economic activity is to reform the institutional delivery system so that it is able to "produce" the outputs that fit into it. Successful graduates are able to market their skills at levels that fit their individual competencies. The integration of education into the growth picture in this view requires a great deal of expert assistance and central coordination, accurate timing, correct focus, competent management, and efficient

application of resources. These are, in fact, the hallmarks of AID's policy I have examined here. Additionally, they are the basic tenets of rational management.

The contradiction emerges in that the primary vehicle for the transmission of such policy is the state, that is to say, by central administration. AID's discourses on decentralization, local participation, the promotion of private enterprise, local initiative, and so on are realized through an ideology of tight central control by a coalition of narrowly qualified, usually foreign, expert advisers and national government policy makers. The metaphorical discourses on localization the Agency produces mask this contradiction. The discourse on decentralization, for example, speaks dialectically to actual policies where the principal means of operationalization is through a hierarchical, centralized delivery system tightly controlled from the top.

Something should be said here about "intentionality." When I use the words "conceal" and "mask," there is an implication of intent. The inference should not be drawn from the notion of intentionality that the Agency is openly cognizant of the contradictions as if it were responsible for their emergence. I see the problem not as one of culpability, but of structure. While speculation can be made about the various levels of awareness and sensitivities of particular staff members, I believe such speculation to

be misplaced. The Agency is an agency that has a mission. Individuals who are responsible for setting policy do so under a set of constraints that determine the conditions and latitude for their substantive policy decisions. My concern is not with the inner space of the policy content itself, but with the forces that circumscribe its production, forces whose social referents are not obvious.

AID's discursive references to "local initiative and participation" are directed to counter the given hierarchical practices inherent in the service delivery model. While the word "outreach" has not been used much lately, the service delivery model is promoted as an innovation to compensate for the deficiencies of the outreach model. In essence the model is a variation on the old extensionist principles of diffusionist theory. Diffusionist theory at its roots is centralistic. There are those who are in the know who use various methods to extend that knowledge to those not in the know. The source of information and initiative is indisputably central.

In this way, the ideology of hierarchy is cloaked under the discursive rhetoric of decentralization and local participation. AID's rhetorical invitations for increased participation not only implicitly accept the validity of current centrally organized service delivery forms, they depend on the rational bureaucratic model to extend and reproduce them in areas hitherto not reached. Outreach

means just that, the extension of organizational forms into marginal areas.

Further, not only is the bureaucratic delivery medium hierarchical, thereby containing the extent of experimentation with or adoption of other forms of social organization, but the educational message conveyed is also circumscribed by the economic path held open.

One prime example of the circumscription effect can be seen in the contradictory policy of integrating women into development. First, women are classified in this discourse as not being in the development picture at all. Their current status, roles, and value to family, community, and productive life is discounted immediately. They are looked upon neither as a possible source of alternative forms of organization, nor for an alternative definition of economic purpose. Instead, women are defined according to the extent of their marginalization. Second, their marginal position is termed an "error," that is, an "oversight" in what is understood to be an otherwise rational system of social and economic organization. The present hierarchical form in which development is supposed to mobilize integration into the economy is to be extended to women, who up to now have been left out. In order to increase the extent of women's formal integration into the economy, AID policy proposes various developmental schemes to bridge the economic gap between the center and the periphery through such mechanisms



as cooperative production, marketing, thrift, and consumer societies. The primary message of the developmental discourse for women is to be more effectively integrated into the prevalent enterprise scheme of the economy, not that they should have the power to change or control it, or establish an alternative space within which to develop a qualitatively different kind of economy, nor should any collective body, no matter what the sex.

Discourses of the managerial variety speak of organization of disparate groups whose common thread is portrayed as being outside the economic and social mainstream. All organizational efforts in this view should be inclusionary. The economic whole as entity should absorb all, irrespective of race, sex, religion, and origin. The discourse in this line of thought could also be extended to alternative beliefs, cultures, historical patterns and traditions, productive practices, and anything else that falls under the rubric of human social diversity. Nothing should stand in the way of economic integration. Indeed, the growth imperative should envelop all within its purview.

#### Legitimizing the Ideology of Growth.

Earlier, I covered the social function legitimation when I referred to the role of science in providing a system of rationality to guide AID's educational policies. The growth metaphors were legitimated by economic science. In

this section I examine the clash between a scientifically grounded policy of growth and the actual social conditions the growth policy is supposed to address.

The growth formula discourses provide a rational basis for making decisions about the direction and allocation of resources to education for development. The metaphorical image of integration frames decisions about the content and levels of education to be made available to specific populations. The various statistical projections on migration, industrial capacity, commercial trade activity, school enrollments, and educational needs of specific groups inform these decisions with specific data. The data are then analyzed and integrated into this vision of development as the basis for formulating policies.

What this whole process is supposed to do is provide an apparently rational framework for organizing and supporting educational activities. To the contrary, the process in reality appropriates political difference. I referred several times immediately above to the importance of the source of educational content and organizational form. The legitimation of economic growth through policy science actually constricts the public sphere of the social space. It removes valuation from the realm of public debate and places it firmly in the hands of qualified experts, who have the legitimate authority to administer the educational process for all. The clash I speak of here is an

ideological one between the exercise of authority over educational content and forms at the local level, and the coalition of advisers and policy makers at the national and international levels. The source of authority is removed from the local level and assigned to the regional and national levels.

AID's discourses referring to increasing community involvement in the running of schools is played against the prior centralization of educational responsibility from family and community to national and international authorities. When AID policy says, "localize," it does so in reference to the prior and continuing administrative absorption by national bureaucracy of the process of knowledge production and dissemination. The effect is to legitimize the importation of economic driven K-S-O models and to delegitimize local knowledge production and use patterns. When it says "foster programs to increase local initiative and independence," AID educational policy does so by introducing the innovative forms for becoming independent. It thereby accomplishes two objectives: The extension of new organizational forms for economic integration to schools and training programs; and the delegitimation and replacement of local practices for socializing and educating children. The ideology is really an ideology of dependency whose discourses are represented as its diametric opposite, that is, as local initiative and power sharing.

The Metaphorical Referents for Situating the Poor  
Functionalizing the Economy of Poverty

The representation of the poor in AID's policy statements is also done from a centralistic position. This fact is very important to uncovering the ideological nature of the discursive references the Agency makes about the poor. The references are made from a position of development looking out at a world of less-than-development. The discourses on targeting resources in this view serve the function of deflecting the focus away from the economic center toward the periphery. The deflection of focus is an ideological maneuver that is disguised by consistent references to the importance of reaching the "poorest of the poor." In reality, the discourses serve the purpose of hiding the operant ideology of control beneath them.

The operant ideology, then, is that which acts to set the parameters within which the discourses are produced. In this instance, the operant ideology that undergirds the poverty discourses is one of control and retention of power over the process of economic and social change. In order to advance the version of capital-driven economic development, maintenance of current forms of international relations is necessary. Development finance and support, technical assistance, and private capital investment require stability

in political relations. Without it, returns on capital investment, as well as lives, are threatened. Economic development and the transition to a capital economy, however, inevitably occur within the framework of tremendous social upheaval. Consequently, mechanisms must be devised for the control of social disruption. The ideology of control says that control can only be exercised in a climate where rational explanations for and alternatives to manage disruption are provided. The deflection of focus onto the poor serves several purposes:

\* The poor become responsible for their poverty. They can do better if they are taught how.

\* The center is absolved of complicity as a possible cause of poverty. The current order of economic relations is thus preserved by rational explanation.

\* The poor-as-target discourse channels energy away from critical analysis of how poverty is conditioned toward opportunities for participation in programs to alleviate poverty by attending to the needs of the victim.

\* The poor are classified, as I showed previously, by the labels generated in the center. The problem definition and resolution process remains solidly under the control of the donor. The donor-as-priest thus defines the sin of poverty and as confessor offers the means for its absolution. The religious metaphor plays itself out not as the ideology of control, which it masks, but as the humanitarian-motivated concerns of the fortunate for the unfortunate. The fortunate as saved are expected to change only insofar as they are able to develop more effective methods for reaching the needy, while the needy are expected to bear the brunt of total change.

In sum, AID's discourses on the poor have the function of providing believable explanations and administrative alternatives for the rational management of poverty, not its

elimination. They are able to do this by virtue of the fact that its solutions to the problems of poverty delimit the range of options for development to incremental measures alone. They do so by cautious avoidance of any attribution to the structural referents of economic, political, and legitimational power.

Programming Solutions to Poverty:  
The Hierarchical Referents

AID's program initiatives are administered centrally, as they must be. This is a structural condition of international relations. The forms of administration employed derive from the cluster of international assistance rationales which provide models and justification for the intervention of one state into the internal affairs of another. Consequently, educational policy making is managed through the discourses of assistance and improvement, not intervention. The discourses on project programming serve the purpose of transforming its interventionist referents into expressions of state sponsored cooperation. The subsequent policies that govern specific project initiatives insure centralized control is maintained from conceptualization through implementation phases.



## The Project Model of Organization

The Agency defines a project as "a combination of human and nonhuman resources organized in a 'temporary' arrangement to achieve a specified purpose..." with development projects defined as "...investments to develop new capabilities in a society to produce additional goods and services. Projects attempt to produce a particular set of outputs to meet identifiable development needs, with specific inputs, within a specified time period..." (Pragma Corporation and Management Systems International, 1985, p. I-17). The Agency uses a series of documents, which I enumerated in the previous chapter, as steps in the project planning, implementation, and evaluation cycle. The cycle enacts the conceptual framework that governs all projects. The cycle in actuality realizes a set of hierarchical discourses in the name of logical planning.

The poor, toward which educational activities are aimed, may be consulted only at project implementation, not at conceptualization phases. The consultation activity usually takes form as a needs assessment. The locus of assessment and decision about project content is ultimately maintained by project planners and policy makers. Decisions about objectives, design, content, resource allocation, and indicators of impact are made at the center by those who are familiar with the requirements and regulations of their respective agencies, that is, AID and the host government.

This procedure is an essential part of the scheme of rational management employed. It is indispensable to the grant process.

The medium of rational planning and its discursive corollaries in the form of project documentation are the rules. The educational message, irrespective of its specific content, is conveyed through the medium of cause and effect planning. The medium is a reproduction of the relations that characterize doing business at the center. I refer not just to the fiscal discourse of accounting for the expenditure of government funds with its accompanying rules, but to the systems discourse of the management of inputs toward outputs, contracting services, monitoring performance, and evaluating achievement.

The project model is indicative of the balance of power realized in the donor-recipient relationship. As such, it embodies an array of complex administrative discourses whose effect is to divest the poor from the process of managing their own development. The discourses are open to them, ironically, only to the extent that their education qualifies them to participate at the level of target.

One example is typical. In order to be qualified to work in an educational development project - let us say - designed to teach teachers how to introduce new methods of literacy into crowded classrooms, the technical adviser hired must have an advanced degree in education. Now this

is an entirely logical result of the credentialing discourse that insures the appropriate provision of expertise. Its correspondent effect, however, is to further the professionalization of the local workforce according to externally introduced models of centralized planning.

Virtually all education for development initiatives supported by the Agency delimit the power that can be exercised to those technically qualified to do it. What is reproduced in the Third World setting are the hierarchical, merit-driven systems of professionalization open only to those with the appropriate educational qualifications. The route to such qualifications is exclusively through the institutions sanctioned by the state, whose organs control the curriculum for such qualification.

The ideology of hierarchy is then masked by the discourses of qualification and professionalization. The Agency in this way conceals its interventionist role under the reformist discourse of educational merit whereby the object status of the poor and the way government deals with them is determined. The intervention does not appear as intervention. The interventionistic ideology is cloaked by developmentalist consciousness of the lump of "unqualified poor" in contradistinction to the avenue newly opened to them - education. In this line of thought, AID comes across as helper, not as intruder. The recipient nation asks for

its help. It consequently offers the tools for social mobility through its educational discourses.

What is not so apparent is that the price for mobility is paid by assimilation of a new mode of hierarchy. Whatever patterns of social interaction characterized traditional life, whether they, too, were hierarchical or not, are to be replaced by a new hierarchy. Only this one does not reveal itself as the necessary political adjunct of the rational management schemes belonging to a capital economy. The ideological discourses of hierarchy speak to their dialectical "Other" as instrument necessary for social advancement. The poor in the sense portrayed as "Other" do not represent diversity. They embody its antithesis, redundant poverty. The discourses thus transform the ideology of hierarchy into a set of tools to climb the ladder of success. Diversity then is reduced to a vertical operation where one can ascend or descend, depending on the competencies and motivation one is able to learn through this kind of education. Lateral diversity, on the other hand, is absorbed by the new economy, where success is to be adjudicated exclusively by the value of one's performance in the marketplace.

Legitimizing Intervention by  
Reference to Logical Positivism

The image of development AID transposes is, as I showed above, non-interventionist. The discourses of non-interventionism the Agency abides by in providing assistance find scientific backing in the force of their own logic. The prime example of the logic of rational planning is seen in the planning device that is used to guide the project development and implementation process. The device is called, "The Logical Framework," or "Logframe" for short (Practical Concepts Incorporated [PCI], undated). I have included a copy as Figure 7 on page 258.

The cause-effect relationship the Agency considers basic to development project planning and implementation that I referred to earlier underlies the project cycle. The relationship is based on multi-tiered set of conditions whose final outcomes are supposed to result in the achievement of some developmental goal. The planning device depends on a simple logical progression stated clearly by PCI, which developed the instrument for AID: "The Logical Framework requires that at each 'level' [i.e., goal, purpose, outputs, inputs] the activities or results planned plus assumptions at that level constitute sufficient conditions to achieve the next higher level" (p. II-10 [emphasis in original]). Assumptions are defined as those conditions beyond the control of project planners and

LOGICAL FRAMEWORK  
FOR  
SUMMARIZING PROJECT DESIGN

EST Project Completion Date \_\_\_\_\_  
Date of this Summary \_\_\_\_\_

Project title: \_\_\_\_\_

NARRATIVE SUMMARY	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS
Program Goal: The broader objective to which this project contributes:	Measures of Goal Achievement:		Concerning long term value of program and project:
Project Purpose:	Conditions that will indicate purpose has been achieved: End of project status		Affecting purpose-to-goal link:
Outputs:	Magnitude of Outputs necessary and sufficient to purpose		Affecting output-to-purpose link:
Inputs: Activities and Types of Resources	Level of Effort/Expenditure for each activity		Affecting Input-to-output link

MANAGEABLE INTEREST  
If Inputs, Then Outputs  
If Outputs, Then Purpose  
If Purpose, Then Goal  
DEVELOPMENT HYPOTHESES

Figure 7: THE LOGICAL FRAMEWORK



practitioners that nonetheless impinge on the success of the project.

The Logframe structures the planning process. Its power derives from its instrumental utility in identifying the controllable and non-controllable factors that are thought to condition successful project implementation. It provides a framework for indicators of attainment at each level of operation, a means for their verification, and the identification of contingent assumptions that must be in place before advancement to the next higher level is possible.

What the Logframe also does is to reduce the complexity of factors involved in carrying out development projects to those that are identified by planners. The option of distinguishing controllable from noncontrollable factors as necessary conditions for success provides the planner with two means of control. One means is derived from the authority over the identification of inputs, outputs, purpose, and the final goal. While AID policy requires that the project be a joint venture with host government officials, the donor in fact controls the major source of inputs in the form of key personnel, material resources, and, more important, the scientific language for development - an isolated set of needs, resultant project objectives, design factors, measurement indicators, and outputs. The project by definition would not happen without the donor,

its agents, and the rational developmental language imported. This is entirely normal procedure in the delivery of foreign assistance.

The other means is intrinsic to the logic of the Logframe itself. The device represents the power of science applied to the resolution of economic and social problems. The belief that rational planning along a systems model is central to the developmental process, indeed conditions it, is what is being reproduced as developmental consciousness. Without it, orderly development is conceived to be impossible. The logic represented by the Logframe is depicted as the logic of development itself. What is reproduced in the Logframe then, and by extension AID's development planning discourses, is the ideological doctrine that the preferred model for human development is a product of this model of rational planning. I quote directly from the PCI document:

...The concepts [contained within the Logframe approach] draw heavily from science, and experience gained from the management of complex space age programs, such as the early satellite launchings and the development of the Polaris submarine. Most importantly, the concepts help one apply basic scientific methods (including hypothesis formulation and testing) to program/project management and are complementary with other management tools. (PCI, p. I-2)

When taken at face value, the brief reference to science is deemed sufficient to guide the project development process. "Science says this is the way it should be done." The science of space engineering is held

out as model for the social engineering of development. The knowledge behind this model is what AID introduces in the form of innovations. The ideology, however, is one by which the production of knowledge is reserved to those deemed legitimately qualified to administer it. Knowledge options for the poor are circumscribed by a superior, heretofore remote system that marginalizes their role in the production of knowledge. The effect of the new knowledge is to limit diversity by relegating alternative knowledge systems to the past as myth, tradition, and backwardness.

The Ideological Referents  
for Institutionalizing Innovations

Functionalizing Economic Knowledge

"Innovation" is the name of the process AID uses to introduce new technologies into the educational systems of the Third World. Once the primary function of education is reduced to that of trainer, feeder, personnel developer, skills builder, and attitude molder within the context of economic development, its curricular offerings fall into place. The school in this view becomes instrumental to the development process. Changes and improvements in the curriculum and its delivery are made within the developmental framework. The process of innovation is directed to strengthening the interconnections between the school, as arm of the educational system, and the economy.

This is, incidentally, not an approach unique to the Third World. It is a continuing matter of serious debate in the United States and other industrialized nations.

The several metaphorical images I traced in the previous chapter on the subject of innovation revolved around the institution as an embodiment of relations in a particular view of the economic and social environment. Visions of the institution as patient, host, edifice, and site for focusing attention were observed. It is that view I wish to focus on here. While the two are interrelated, the environment is seen to be separate from the institution. Both exist, bounded one from the other. Now this is a structuralist view that I argue contains an ideological referent.

As soon as the validity of the split between the institution and its environment is accepted a priori, then the way toward the introduction of their ideal forms and subforms is opened. This Parsonian structuralist view provides the basis on which the economic integration of social forms is made possible. The idea that there is an "ideal" form for anything, be it institution or environment, is full of power. AID's discourses on institutionalization are premised on the belief in the institution as an entity and its reformability according to an idealized set of standards.

AID's policies in education accordingly subscribe to this idealistic view of the institutional development process. The possibility of institutional innovation is then dependent on a certain economic environment. That environment is depicted as being definable in ideal terms. Its constituent elements are likewise identifiable in ideal terms. What AID's policy discourses stressing education's integration into the economy do is to predefine the conditions for development in an idealistic environment. The conditions I examined were derived from the economic standards for "take-off," such as the growth formulae that dictated necessary levels of savings, investment, capital formation, job creation, consumer activity, and so on. These are what I mean by "idealist" standards that are extrapolated empirically from industrial countries and held out as models to be adapted for the Third World.

The idealist version of the developing economy provides the structure for reproducing its institutional forms. The substructure of the educational system is shaped according to the extent to which it can be made to conform with its ideal model. The process of institutional development is then circumscribed as an adaptative series of progressive steps, guided by such questions as: "How ready are they for this? Can they use this at this stage? Can they absorb this amount and kind of help now? If not, how can we get them ready?", and so on. The power of the ideal derives from its ability to mobilize policy around it. The source

of initiative and direction therefore remains solidly within the province of the center-expert system of relations.

AID's institution-building discourses are played against its structural-functionalist ideology.

"Strengthening" and "building" conjure up images of their opposites, weakness and disarray. The binary operation serves to link the ideology with its discourses, the former setting the economic agenda for the latter. Innovation then enters the development scene as the process of diversification, when in reality it delimits the entire milieu of possibility to the adaptation of pre-defined institutional forms.

### The Hierarchical Referents for Innovation

In the last chapter I looked at the discourses of diffusionist theory as the guiding methodology for the introduction of innovations. More recent advances in theories of diffusion call for increased attention to adaptations necessary to be made in the institutional environment of the host so that the innovation can not only be adopted more readily, but also be sustained over the long term. AID's more recent policy statements in education, furthermore, direct attention to the greater returns thought to accrue from investments made "internally," that is, to those countries focusing on encouraging private investment



in education, strengthening basic education, and improving the efficiencies of current systems.

The idea "internal" I examined in the last chapter is explained in terms of an emphasis on existing institutional forms to improve service delivery, management practices, and pass and completion rates. There, I reached the conclusion that the Agency's innovational discourses actually increased local dependency rather than foster self-reliance. The clash between the ideology of hierarchy and the discourse of self-reliance reveals itself in the dilemma faced by policy makers and practitioners around the issue of achieving project results and what is called "sustainability" in the institution.

The Agency on the one hand is bound to measure results through the indicators of development contained in the Logframe. The Agency so binds its contractors to the same results. In turn, the contractors bind their technical specialists to produce the results for which they were contracted. The result-oriented policy framework is worked out in practice at the level of the educational specialist in the field. The specialist, on the other hand, is put into the position of resolving the dilemma between producing results in a timely manner and working out the means to sustain them in the institution. The approaches to accomplish both, however, usually require contradictory strategies.

The dilemma is deeper than the clash of personal approaches implies. The dilemma goes to the heart of the ideology of hierarchy and dependency. AID's policy discourses on the management of innovations and the content expressed within the innovations themselves is often contradictory. I have already investigated the power of the management process in precluding the poor in exercising control over project resources, the pacing of project implementation, the assignment of personnel, and so on earlier in this chapter. For the discourses of participation and decentralization speak to inclusion only by legitimating exclusion.

What I have not covered is the social significance of the dependency production process. The poor are not simply left out of the process of producing and managing innovations. The poor and the varieties of nomenclature applied to them are, in point of social fact, reproduced by the innovative process. This is more than the operation of metaphorical labelling I discussed in the last chapter. The social conditions by which poverty is internationalized are themselves the result of an ideological reproduction of a system of social relations that requires the maintenance of certain levels of impoverishment and dependency for its own growth. AID's discourses on educational technology and the method of their application legitimate that system by precluding the development of options to change it.

The Innovational Referents  
for the Legitimation of Poverty

Recall here that the main function of ideology in theory is to act within the space between the contradictory brute forces of economy and polity and consciousness in order to preserve and expand the system of social relations in current force. The contradictions I refer to involve the crises in which poverty and its manifestations have not been and cannot be resolved by that system of relations. Marx's observation about the necessity for a "reserve army of the poor" is illustrative not of capitalism's inherent limitations so much as it uncovers the intrinsic collision of social forces unleashed when relationships hitherto characterized as social are transformed into relationships increasingly mediated in the marketplace. The ties that previously bound families, clans, and communities are split as they are uprooted by the prevalent need to survive in an increasingly market-driven economy.

The discourses on overpopulation, ignorance, disease, and hunger that AID and other agencies produce and read are to be understood in light of their ideological depiction as anonymous causes of poverty, as "referenceless" phenomena suffered by some in the ineluctable course of human events. In order to explain the continued incidence of poverty, AID produces policy discourses as innovations in education, health, nutrition, and agricultural and industrial

productivity. The innovational discourses are addressed to the mobilization of resources for the symbolic eradication of poverty. Their overarching function is to serve as a buffer to mitigate the crises represented by the growing incidence of world poverty and to mask the ideological referents that condition it. Their effect is to preserve the anonymity of the referents by diverting attention to the problems of the poor as source of their economic station.

The function of the discourses then is to legitimate this state of affairs. The process of institutionalizing innovations must be understood in light of what and whom the discourses speak to: mainly to current leaders of the Third World, to rivals in the socialist, to international educators and practitioners, and, last of all, to the poor themselves.

#### Summary of Metaphors and Their Epistemological Effect

The three metaphorical clusters embedded within AID's educational policy discourses can be summarized as those concerned with economic growth, the reduction of poverty, and institutional reform. The discourses speak to the audiences responsible for the control of resources and the production of policy. The discourses serve the purpose of rationalizing the relations of control through the epistemological claims they make about the nature of the

social development process. Their combined effect is to mobilize the commitment of diverse interests for the extension of American influence.

The next chapter explores the dialectical nature of the relationships between the discourses and their ideological referents in the social space. Its purpose is to further clarify the homogeneous, counter-diverse nature of the American developmental ideology.

CHAPTER VIII  
THE DEPLOYMENT OF EDUCATIONAL INNOVATION AND  
THE APPROPRIATION OF DIVERSITY

In this final chapter I focus on how AID's educational discourses act to constitute the subject of developmental consciousness. I examine the process through which the developmental ideology usurps the meaning of diversity through deployment of its educational policy discourses. The purpose of the chapter is to further clarify the nature of the dialectical relationship between the discourses and the counter diverse intent of their ideological referents.

Finally, I conclude the entire study with a review of the potentials and limitations of the critical method used in this work for the analysis of educational policy.

AID's Summary Discourse on the Third World

Ever since the United States and other western powers turned their attention from the reconstruction of Europe to the development of Africa, Asia, and the Americas nearly four decades ago, the question of how to provide assistance has been a matter of contention. Discussion throughout the period, however, was limited almost entirely to the relative merits and liabilities of various kinds of assistance thought to be of greatest potential effect in the effort to achieve development. While intermittent attempts have been



made to examine the nature of development more directly, research of late continues to be framed in predominantly economic and technical terms. The fundamental assumption made is that the problem of the Third World is by and large an economic problem. That is to say, development involves the implementation of technical strategies for making more goods and services available to more people.

This inquiry began from the point that framing the question of development in strictly economic terms has diverted attention away from how the question itself has been framed toward an amorphous conception labeled loosely as "the plight of the Third World." In this view, we see ourselves as innocent spectators in a panoramic drama of collective misery. While we have done our best to remedy the problem, sent our money and expertise abroad, educated foreign leaders, granted favored treatment, and brought to bear the most advanced technology at our command, success has been sporadic and the problems grow worse.

This work explored the premise that the image we have devised to portray the plight of the Third World has less to do with a realistic picture of development problems there than it does with an obfuscation of our own developmental needs. I suggest herein that the very concept "Third World" is a figment we have devised to suit our own purpose, a purpose that has become obscured even to those of us who would recoil at the thought of somehow being implicated in

that plight. Yet, as a nation we remain convinced that what we witness from the safety of physical and administrative distance could not be of our own making. I believe this view to be wrong. So long as we keep to it, we will continue to suffer the delusion that the measures we take are inherently remedial or beneficial, as if they were by definition of intent fundamentally different from the context in which they are delivered.

In sum, the discourses we have devised to govern our relations with the Third World have enabled us to sustain a vision the epistemic foundations of which are subject to more question than they have received so far. In its most basic sense, this study is offered to further the cause of critical reflection on ourselves and not just on others.

#### Deploying the Discourses and the Appropriation of Diversity

The concept of diversity I have used herein involves the extension of options for development within the social space. The thesis that guided this inquiry suggested the possibility that AID's educational policies and the discursive rationales that support them act to narrow rather than expand development options. They do so by confining the economic and political space within which development options are possible to create. In the review of developmental metaphors that follows, I use this concept of diversity as a point of reference.

If the theoretical function of ideology is to unify disparate and contradictory forces of the social space into rational wholes, it can fulfill its mission only by concealing itself inside the discourses which it creates. Once the ideology is exposed by critical analysis of its discourses, it becomes subject to refutation. Its contradictions are then made vulnerable to reasoned critique. Its power to unify the disparate interests it serves is thus weakened. In the event of total refutation through revolution, new alignments of interests need to be drawn with a new ideology. In the meantime, however, the operant ideology continues to generate modifications in current discourse. In all cases, the discourses still must stand in contradistinction to the ideology in which they were created. Born in ideology, the discourses serve their purpose in dialectical relation to it. Their function is fulfilled only to the extent they are successful in both concealing and realizing the ideology in which they arose.

In this functional definition, ideology is by itself not false consciousness. Ideology rather plays a determinative role in producing false consciousness, AID's developmental discourses included as one instance. The discourses AID sets out under the rubric "development" cannot themselves be the developmental ideology actually put into practice because in their specific discursive instances they arose in dialectical relationship to that ideology.

Developmental Consciousness  
and Narrowing Economic Choice

In the instance of AID's policy discourses on development, what I have been calling "America's developmental ideology," the range of socio-economic relations is narrowed by legitimating one predominant mode of economic organization at the expense of others. In the last chapter, I examined how the discourses are based on the supposition that the "free enterprise" economy is both prerequisite to and co-terminous with development. The policy discourses act to offset the developmental ideology that undergirds them. The discourses do so by circumscribing the functions of education into one of the state's principal mechanisms to achieve fuller economic integration. The central purpose of education is preparation for functioning in a market-driven capital economy. The curriculum is accordingly defined by the knowledge, skills, and orientation (K-S-O) necessary for advancement in this economy. What the policy discourses represent as the essential path to economic development and social change, in actuality reproduces the major relations of capital production: capital/wage-labor, expert-layman, and center-periphery.

The ideological function of the discourses is to portray the developmental path as being paved only within

the economic relations of capital. The economic core of the developmental ideology dictates that previously social relationships are to be increasingly mediated in the marketplace. Productive activity in the developmental ideology is no longer a result of people's social obligations to each other. Increasing production as a goal depends entirely on the motivational power and the incentive of the widespread belief that personal gain can only be made through the mechanism of impersonal exchange transacted in the marketplace. The discourse of economic rationality dictates that the owner of capital maximize the returns received from the market over and above the investments, material and personal, he or she makes. Labor in this exchange is defined not in terms of a social relationship, where one's product is an embodiment of one's self, but in terms of a cost. One's product, labor included, is reduced to commodity. The developmental ideology transmitted by AID's discourses realizes this system of relations and no other.

AID's discursive policy references to diversifying the curriculum are set within the same economic frame. The references to diversification serve the ideology of uniformity in like manner. The term "diversification" distorts the conditioning effects that the market-driven economy has on formulating developmental problems. The

references thereby mask its real ideological referent, namely economic uniformity, by ruling out the diversity needed to develop alternative forms of production and exchange in accordance with the local circumstance of history and culture.

Similarly, the discourses on decentralization and local participation originate dialectically in the hierarchical models used to organize and manage educational innovation projects. The ideology of hierarchy conveyed by the models is that developmental activity can only be initiated from the center. AID's countervailing discourses, however, stress the opposite. They refer to supporting local initiative in the form of encouraging community involvement, local funding, and decentralizing authority for school administration. The legitimate power the state has to manage education is never questioned. Development occurs at its prerogative. The discourses thereby accomplish the purpose of ruling out alternative organizational forms that challenge the economic orthodoxy commissioned by the state. The educational policies promoted by the discourses preclude rational, democratic consideration of organizational alternatives that do not advance the political interests of the state as they are interpreted by the administrators that serve it.

The economic growth formulae were likewise found to serve the purpose of scientific grounding of private



enterprise driven models of economic development. The effect of the growth formula discourses is to delegitimize other economic models from the field of possibility. The scientific discourses thereby narrow economic choice by limiting the range of diversity to the orthodox version of development backed by positivist economic science. The legitimating power of economic positivism brushes aside incipient efforts to focus assistance on the development of alternative forms of economic organization as either vestiges of tradition whose effect is to retard development, or as attempts to institute totalitarian (i.e., socialistic) forms of rule that constrain individual initiative. The discursive formulae achieve the purpose of lending scientific backing to official state policy that seeks to expand the power the state exercises over the process of social change in the name of economic democracy.

#### Developmental Consciousness and Marginalizing the Poor

Likewise, AID's discourses on the poor are based on the view of the poor as the source of the problem. The ideology is one that validates centrally managed economic development approaches at the same time that it admits their severe, but nevertheless "manageable," shortcomings. The idea that programs can be targeted to the poor conveys the impression that poverty is manageable without structural change having

to occur in the center itself. The diversity with which economic problems can be addressed is therefore confined to effectiveness and efficiency strategies where the focus is on the development of better delivery mechanisms to the poor. The only problems with the center as source of developmental initiatives admissible in the discourses are not ones of structure, but of incremental deficiencies that can be alleviated by technical measures alone.

AID's discourses about more effective targeting of assistance to the poor thus achieve the purpose of deflecting and channeling critical attention from the center to outlying areas. The control over economic initiatives the center exercises is consequently maintained by the discourses it creates on programming in education. The educational policy discourses are shaped within an ideological frame of reference whereby central control over development initiatives is maintained by the state and its agencies. The discourses stress managing programs to combat poverty by changing the victim. Educational services are designed to develop K-S-O in the poor as a qualification for participation in a one-dimensional version of productive life. AID's role, as we saw in the institutional cluster of metaphors, is then classified as helper. The bilateral intervention process where the American state is given the legitimate authority to assist in the reorganization of key agencies of the host state is seen as a helping

relationship. The discourses on attainment of competencies and qualifications in actuality, however, eliminate consideration of alternative qualification systems whose end results may be different from integration into a capital economy.

AID's educational discourses also emphasize imparting the new knowledge necessary for survival and prosperity in a modern, expanding economy. The ideology they conceal thereby seeks to replace local and alternative knowledge production processes with a unitary one managed by central authorities. Knowledge production is defined as an outcome of the discourses on rational planning and management that are held out as models on which to base the organization of educational and other social subsystems. The rationality model is legitimated by science, while alternatives are conversely delegitimated. Rational management through policy science is held forth in the discourses as key to diversity where in actuality the possibility for constructing alternatives is reduced.

#### Developmental Consciousness as Institutional Innovation

The innovational process is one moment in the deployment of ideology in the sense that it seeks to instrumentalize education into servant of an idealist vision of the economy. Innovations are directed to improvements in

the delivery of educational services. The innovational discourses are based on rational models for organization which are then adapted to local conditions. The discourses consequently stress the importance of adaptation from a particular idealist referent, usually derived from a hierarchical institutional form. The discourses on the adaptation of innovations are designed to conceal the functionalist ideology whereby education is equated with the inculcation of the K-S-O that lead to economic marketability. Alternative purposes for education are thereby subordinated to the governing ideology whereby education is effective, efficient, and useful only to the extent that it is instrumental to the transmittal of economically rational competencies.

Innovational discourses also emphasize the need to create the institutional climate for self-reliance. What the discourses actually produce is more dependency. Innovations to encourage community involvement in the school, local financing, and decentralized management, for example, aim to facilitate the integration of local communities further into a larger economic system controlled by the state and the national and international interests it represents. As representative of such interests, the state still seeks control. It serves the local community only to the extent that it, the state, furthers the economic needs of the center from which it derives its real power.

The images of education portrayed in the discourse of self-reliance in their specific instances are thus dominated by the purpose of increasing individual and corporate productivity, urban employability, and industrial enterprise. The concrete images of purpose are anti-rural, anti-agrarian, anti-traditional, and anti-local. They present an idealized version of their opposites: urban, industrial, modern, and national and international, to which the poor are expected to aspire. The locus of diversification is therefore shifted from the rural poor to the urban rich. Insofar as the source of ideological authority over education for development is shifted to the center, the power the poor could otherwise develop for alternative forms of education is nullified. The range of choice they can exercise over the kind of ideology they develop to guide their lives is narrowed to what is offered to them by the state. The result is not less dependency, but more.

Finally, the legitimation of new institutional forms through the innovation of old and deficient ones actually preserves the system of social relations in which the maintenance of some level of poverty is necessary. To this end, AID's function is to produce discourses which counter the crises of poverty. The discourses have the effect of appropriating criticism of the economic order. The appropriation function provides positive opportunities for

the potential energies of the concerned and devoted in order for them to work in programs for educating and helping the impoverished. Social criticism is thereby given a legitimate channel for expression. When that channel is circumvented, as in question, protest, confrontation, or resistance, criticism is relegated to the plane of deviation and disorder. As agency, AID provides an institutional mechanism to channel the energies of the concerned to do something about poverty, not just criticize it.

The appropriation of the critical function, however, is more significant a phenomenon than the mere channeling of potentially negative energy in positive directions. The appropriation of social critique by an agency of the state represents the point at which the ideology of positivism becomes practical without our awareness. The state, as servant of anonymous interests, provides the mechanism through which the irrationality of the clash of brute forces in the social space is rationalized as expressions of truth sufficient to unify and govern action. It does this through the power it has to produce the policy discourses that frame specific spheres of collective action, educational development being the concern of this study. To this end, AID's developmental ideology has generated a constellation of discourses that have succeeded in capturing the attention, imagination, and support of those who often hold mutually contradictory views of the world. The discourses



have something in them for liberal and conservative, missionary and pragmatist, militant and pacifist, reformist and radical, foreign and American. The remarkable fact is that such overtly disparate students of social change can be mobilized so effectively to unite themselves to work cooperatively under one agency, regardless of the incompatibilities represented in their respective theories of social change. The power of the developmental ideology to accomplish that feat alone was sufficient reason to prompt this critical inquiry.

### The Developmental Ideology as False Consciousness

#### Institutional Implications

The institution responsible for producing the discourses on development education is the U. S. Agency for International Development. The discourses AID has produced indeed have social referents. They represent an underlying, strategic coalition of interests united by a developmental ideology. The economic, political, and legitimational referents of the developmental ideology are embedded in the policy discourses, oblivious to the uncritical eye. The question of how the knowledge claims that support the policy discourses are validated is epistemological. Are the knowledge claims redeemed by their respective economic, political, and legitimational rationales or not?

The investigation done in this work is not conclusive one way or the other. The most that can be said is that the validity of the economic formulae, the ideal models of institutional organization, and the scientific authority for educational programming as means to rationalize development policy are subject to question. Why? Because several of the claims were found to be mutually contradictory and deceptive. This finding does not falsify the claims definitively, one by one. The finding simply reports that some of the claims may be true, while others must be false. Which are true and which are false is an issue yet to be resolved.

This finding, however, has major implications. The Agency as an institution cannot justifiably remain oblivious to the critical analysis of its own policies as if all were true and consistent in fact. AID is the primary site at which the amorphous, conceptual elements of the developmental ideology are translated into actionable discourses. It thereby produces the texts that serve to unify the adherents of apparently competing belief systems about social development to the extent that the humanitarian and the pragmatist can share a common praxis. If part of the praxis is false, then all of it must be, for in the absence of reasoned critical analysis in which all affected parties participate as equals, who is to judge which is which? The danger is that the policy for the reconstruction of whole societies will be modelled on a flawed base before

rational critique is engaged by the audiences most immediately affected.

The central questions then turn on a political referent. In its role as producer of official development discourse, to what extent is AID bound by the propensity to base policy on conventional approaches to development knowledge? How committed must it be to remaining on its current path of producing discourses that depict the developmental process as simultaneously linear, logical, scientific, propelled by natural law, sequential, technical, apolitical, impartial, and so on? What are the specific referents that obligate the Agency to rationally order what it portrays as an irrational, traditional world by a simplistic act of binary logic - If "a," represented by developmental consciousness, is the source of economic and social diversity, then its opposite, "b," namely underdevelopment, can only be depicted as uniformity and stagnation. What binds the Agency to continue its policy of promoting an ensemble of answers instead of the means to ask and debate questions?

Is it feasible to sensitize the Agency to the policy implications of its ideological referents? In the present American socio-economic structure, what pressure can realistically be brought to bear that would awaken AID as an institution to the implications of spreading false knowledge? Is the institution capable of self-reflection?

Moreover, is any institution capable of reflective action?

The problem with expecting an institution to engage in self-reflection on its own is that it begs the question of its social function and historical situation. The institution is an agency for the deployment of a particular instantiation of ideology. The extent of its volition to mount a project of institutional self-critique, at least one that challenges the very roots of knowledge production that govern its whole enterprise, is limited to the accommodation of disaffected voices from within. A project of that magnitude, for better or worse, is thus left to individual initiative. The individual, in an act of resistance, can abet the cause of institutional freedom with the effort to expose and renounce falsehood by a critical search for truth. The institution, on the other hand, embodies only the consciousness it inherits, nothing more.

### Individual Implications

After more than two decades of work in the development field, I find not more wisdom, but more certainty. The certainty comes in the form of discursive prescriptions intended not for those claimed as beneficiaries of development, the poor. The certainty is rather directed toward those who control funds and governments, those whose concern is with the advantage to be gained from the extension of American expertise and influence in the Third

World. The objective of the epistemology of certainty is to provide believable reassurance for the sustenance and enhancement of one's position doing the business of development.

I come to this conclusion not because I attribute necessarily underhanded motives to anyone involved in the development field. But the rush to epistemic certainty is an individual response to a structural problem, one I think we have lost sight of. The developmental ideology promoted by the United States is first and foremost the business of doing business. While the virtues of the astute business mind are extolled openly as developmental consciousness, the structural requisites of doing development work as a business are not. My motive in undertaking this work, however, is not to impugn business. What I question is the strength of our commitment to see the process of social change as a quest instead of competition among enterprises specializing in development.

Competition may be a way of life hallowed in America, hallowed to the extent that it pervades all our endeavors, business and otherwise. But its permeation of the development field raises social issues that have evaded critical analysis for too long. These issues need to be examined along the lines that follow:

\* To what extent and in what ways do the requirements of conducting development as a competitive enterprise between nations on the one hand and firms within

nations on the other affect the content and structure of development projects?

\* Why and how do firms engaged in development make use of specific kinds of knowledge and discard others to win business?

\* To what extent do the social referents of knowledge choices inhibit or encourage critique of development alternatives?

\* What are the possibilities for incorporating critique of alternative development paths into education for development projects?

While other questions of this nature should be raised, the objective would be to reintroduce direct consideration of the philosophical, political, and social valuational dimensions into development, dimensions either absent, weakly acknowledged, or suppressed altogether in the fervor of activity necessary to gain competitive advantage on the development scene.

The impetus toward critique would otherwise remain latent, buried underneath layers of the technological schemes patented and promoted by the enterprises which have to own and package knowledge before they are able to spread it. It disturbs me that we fail to see we are reproducing the conditions under which knowledge is turned into a commodity before it can be shared.

I am reminded of the pain I felt while living for two years in a village on the Anatolian Plateau. I arrived with what I thought were all the right answers. I was going to develop that village. Instead, I experienced not just the steady erosion of the validity of the answers themselves,



one by one, often under a barrage of well-aimed ridicule, but also the subconscious disdain embedded within me, an inbred arrogance that retarded my own development.

Arrogance brooks neither question nor criticism.

The degree to which our policies on development preclude self-analysis on terms broader than technical merit may be a reflection of our own lack of will to develop ourselves. A friend in Turkey back then helped me take the first step to social awareness when, after working hard for months and months to change recalcitrant attitudes about development, he was stopped by a village elder one day. The old man leaned over on his cane, looked him in the eye and said, "Friend, I've seen you working hard here day in and day out, at great sacrifice to yourself, too. To help us change for the good. Well, if you are to do better in the time you have left with us, you have to understand the meaning of the question I'm going to put to you now...

"Why do you resent me? I've never given you anything."

### Potentials and Limitations of Critical Analysis of Educational Policy

This work employed a two-directional strategy of research. A deductive review of the theory of ideology raised sets of questions about the nature and function of ideology in the production of official policy. This provided a frame of reference for the investigation of

ideology in a specific instance. An inductive analysis of policy texts was then done to surface the metaphorical referents on which the policies were based. The results of each research process were then combined to critically analyze the interrelationships between the metaphorical bases of policy and their ideological referents.

The method used has the advantage of at least recognizing the epistemological bind where ideology tends to reproduce itself through research methodologies that make dubious claims for knowledge. The procedure of deconstruction begins with knowledge in its existential form, where the weight and nature of knowledge is evaluated according to the social context in which it is situated. If, on the other hand, a claim for universally valid knowledge is made, then the supposition that the claim embodies a cluster of interests dispenses with conventional requirements to test the claim only on the basis of procedure that is already suspect. It is logically fallacious to attempt to confirm a universal knowledge claim using procedure identical to the one used to produce the knowledge in the first place. To do so can only lead to the discovery of error in following procedure and its subsequent rectification. It cannot deal with the epistemological implications of flawed procedure itself.

Discourse analysis applied to the study of the meaning and interpretation of the social referents of knowledge

appears to be a tool rich in promise, though seldom used by policy analysts of the western world. The bedrock goal of all policy is the ordering of social relations. The deconstruction of policy texts offers the potential for negating the propensity to mystify the knowledge claims on which it is argued society should be ordered. The process of deconstruction is a way to yield the operations whereby the grounds of knowledge are backed. The objectionable epistemological operations found in this inquiry involve surreptitious metaphorical transposition, universalizing situation-based and -produced knowledge, modelling in one context for deployment into another, legitimation of systems of knowledge production and dissemination controlled by elites, and delegitimation of valuation as a viable knowledge referent for policy making. All operations are ideological to the extent that their material referents are concealed by their discursive products. It is, however, extremely difficult to attribute a specific instance of policy discourse to the advancement of specific interests.

While the procedure of deconstructing texts has the potential to yield the social referents of knowledge, it is limited in its theoretical potential to evaluate the referents comparatively. This work made use of a theory of ideology as the means to study the ways by which meaning is mobilized for the purpose of ordering social relations. The theory of ideology I have used stipulates that unless the

value-bases of whatever standards applied to the ordering process are exposed, reflected on critically, and accepted democratically, then domination in some form must be at work. The study of ideology provides a means of inquiry into the value standards whereby knowledge claims used to order social relations are validated. The potential of the theory of ideology is to offer a means for the exposure and comparison of value standards.

The combination of the two strategies enabled this inquiry to discover the epistemological flaws of policy and their ideological functions. The combination, nonetheless, has important limitations. Foremost is that the attribution of specific interest to specific policy is an extremely complex task, one I discovered to be impossible to undertake given my focus. At this point, I cannot advise whether the combined strategy used here could ever unravel the knot of the complexity of relations involved between material interest as a social referent, the functional role of ideology, and the production of policy in specific instance. All I was able to do was to deal with the interconnections by premising their existence and to reveal the operations which made their concrete instantiation possible.

Another limitation of the strategy is found in the negational source of its power. Its direction is anti-positivist. Its potential offers a way of release from the implicit limits that dominate consciousness. Using it, I

found I could rationally refute the propensity to use knowledge as a way to impose ideology as certified truth. Surely, this must be an essential purpose of the power to emancipate oneself from the ideological constraints on reason. Yet, while refutation through critical reflection should become an institutional as well as personal practice, the structural pressure to formulate concrete, ready-made alternatives in a world that cries out for reassurance is very powerful indeed. Nevertheless, critical reflection allows only for conjecture, not for the redemption of certainty. Used for the good, it is an indispensable guardian of freedom from our tendency to misuse our power to reason.

Some day, we may be able to crack the coconut from the inside after all.

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