

1981

**The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Security Policy, 1945 to
1950 : The Joint Chiefs of Staff's perception of the external threat.**


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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND NATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY, 1945 TO 1950: THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF'S
PERCEPTION OF THE EXTERNAL THREAT

A Thesis Presented

By

MIKAEL SONDERGAARD

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
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Political Science

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
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INTRODUCTION

This thesis deals with the role of the JCS as the principal military advisers of the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government. It concentrates on the JCS's perception of Soviet military and political intentions and capabilities in the postwar era and on the JCS's military proposals regarding the external threat. The purpose of the thesis is to assess the JCS's role substantively rather than to evaluate the relative role of the JCS as an agency amongst other key agencies dealing with foreign policy.

Chapter one provides first a short introduction to the JCS; second, an outline of the role that military men and military considerations have played in the postwar era, emphasizing the views on the JCS, and third, the arguments for choosing this particular focus on the JCS.

Chapters two through four provide a chronological treatment of the JCS' perception of the external threat during the first five years of the postwar era, emphasizing the years 1946, 1948 and 1950. Each chapter starts with a short outline of the conditions and state of the international system and US-USSR relations, in order to provide understanding of the situation the JCS was faced with in the particular year. Each chapter deals with one aspect of the evaluation of the external threat of particular concern to the JCS.

Chapter two deals with the JCS's perception of Soviet intentions in the postwar period. First, there is a discussion of the origins of the cold war and of the military perception; second, an outline of the setting of the year 1946 in terms of conditions of the new international system and the state of US-USSR relations; third, the JCS's perception of Soviet postwar political and military intentions; fourth, evidence provided by the JCS for the changing perception of Soviet threat; and fifth, the perception of the Soviet intentions, in terms of key individuals in the government.

Chapter three deals with the proposals of the JCS in regard to military planning. First, the setting of the year 1948 is described in terms of the conditions of the international system and the still deteriorating relations between the US and the USSR; second, the JCS perception of the external threat is noted in light of the first cold war crises of 1948; third, the JCS planners' preoccupation with measures for a general war as a consequence of Soviet military aggressions is indicated by various warplans; and fourth, below the institutional level, it deals with the impact of individual services and key military figures on warplanning.

Chapter four examines the JCS perception of Soviet capabilities in the year 1950. It examines first the international system and the deteriorating relationship between the superpowers producing the first climax of the cold war in the Korean War; second, the

implications of the Soviet atomic test and the "fall of China" in terms of JCS perception of Soviet intentions and capabilities; third, the revision of the perceptions as a consequence of the invasion of South Korea, and fourth, NSC 68 and the increased militarization of the cold war.

Chapter five provides a short resume of each of the chapters and concludes by investigating the sources of the JCS perception.

C H A P T E R I

STRUCTURE AND VIEWS

The three key actors in defense decision making are the President, the Congress and the military, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, (JCS). Despite being the top military advisers the JCS has enjoyed the least scholarly attention, and the least public attention for that matter too.(1) Moreover, most of the attention the JCS has gotten is from people with some kind of professional military background and affiliation.(2)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In order to understand the JCS perception of the Soviet Union in the immediate postwar period, it is necessary to review briefly the origins, function and present form of the JCS.

The Organizational Development of the JCS. The roots of the present JCS, the Joint Board was established in 1903 following the Spanish-American War, 1898-1900. As it was the case in 1947, the

interservice board was made permanent to fulfill the need of coordination between the armed services in order to carry out their vastly enlarged commitments as a consequence of the wars.(3)

By 1938, the Joint Board had been reduced to a formal medium for passing recommendations to the two Secretaries between whom agreement and cooperation was necessary for coordination of the armed forces, for which purpose the Board had been created.(4) At the time of Pearl Harbor the only joint authority linking the armed services was the President as Commander-in-Chief, step too high for practical purposes which had no supporting staff organization. At the Arcadia Conference, 22 December 1941 to 14 Januar 1942, between the British and the Americans, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, (CCS), was created to coordinate the war effort. According to a paper issued at the Conference on the "Post-Arcadia Collaboration", the CCS was composed of the British Chiefs of Staff and their "United States opposite members".(5) This was the first time the JCS was mentioned.

In February 1942, the JCS was born informally by a Presidential executive order. The JCS was to be composed of the Chief of Staff of the Army, (General George C. Marshall), the Chief of Naval Operations, (Admiral Ernest J. King), and the Chief of the Army Air Force, (General of the Army Henry H. Arnold). As the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Fleet Admiral Leahy soon became de

facto chairman of the Chiefs, being the liaison between the President and the Chiefs and presiding over the JCS meetings. The JCS became the central directorate of American military strategy and operations during the war. See charts one and two of the JCS during the war in the appendix.(6)

In 1947, the National Security Act, (NSA), created the JCS formally. The NSA of 1947 maintained the members of the JCS. The creation of the NSC and the CIA removed some of JCS's functions. The Secretary of Defense as head of the National Military Establishment gave the JCS an additional civilian overhead.(7) Figures one and two of the appendix illustrate the components of the National Military Establishment. Thomas Etzold uses the figures in a short essay on the National Military Establishment. They are one of the best illustrations of the interrelationship of the components of the Military Establishment.(8)

The revision of the 1947 act in 1949, Public Law 216, created a Department of Defense in which the JCS was placed. The de facto chairman became the de jure chairman. The chairman was as before to preside over the JCS meetings, but had no vote. In 1958, the chairman was allowed to vote. See charts three and four in the appendix for the organizational development of the JCS in 1947 and 1949.(9)

Today there are five permanent members; the Commandant of the

Marine Corps became full member in 1978 after having been authorized to vote on matters of direct concern to the Marines since 1952.(10)

The Organization of the JCS, (OJCS) is divided into two parts, the Joint Staff and the JCS staff organization, whose total is about two thousand military and civilian personnel. The Joint Staff is headed by a Director who is appointed by the JCS.(11)

The size of the Joint Staff has also undergone several changes since the 1947 ceiling of 100 officers, proportionally taken from the three services. In 1949 the size was increased to 210 and since 1958 to a ceiling of 400 officers. In practice around 700 officers are today controlled by the JCS, because officers can be assigned to the Organization of the Joint Staff.(12)

The functions of the JCS The discrepancy between the formal and the real function can hardly be any greater than in the case of the JCS. The NSA established the JCS as the "principal military adviser"; in reality the JCS role is by some called ceremonial.

The JCS was assigned the functions of (a)advising, (b)planning and to (c) assisting the President and the Secretary of Defense in their roles as military commanders.

First, the JCS became the principal military advisers to the President, the NSC, the Secretary of Defense and the Congress. The JCS has direct access to all of these. For instance, the JCS, by

tradition, has a prerogative to see the President as a group or individually on a matter of their concern. Furthermore, the Chairman is a permanent member of the NSC and its permanent staff committees.

Second, the JCS was put in charge of military planning. The JCS is supposed to provide strategic and logistic plans and give guidance for the development of the defense budget. Moreover, the JCS must review the plans, programs and the requirements of the separate services.

Third, the JCS was to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in exercising their command responsibilities.(13)

The reality of the JCS role is very different. First, the JCS lawful obligation to provide military advice to the key executive actors is not reciprocated by any obligation of the latter's part to take it. As a matter of fact, the role of the military advisers depends on the individual administration. Each President can choose his own policy in this respect and has done so; the JCS has had to adapt to each President.(14) The President only rarely sees the JCS; in fact its advice is provided via the Secretary of Defense who sees the President frequently, i.e., several times a week.(15) The NSC membership does not guarantee influence. It depends on the President's use of the NSC. For example, Truman did not use the NSC very much to solve any of the first cold war problems and Kennedy

and Johnson neglected the NSC in the making of foreign policy.(16) In fact, according to Korb, the President's relationship to the military advisers is similar to the relationship to his diplomatic advisers in the State Department. He mentions that the relationships to Truman and Eisenhower of Chairmen Bradley and Radford were almost as close as their relationships to the Secretaries of State Acheson and Foster Dulles.(17)

Second, the planning function of the JCS is limited because civilian leaders often consider the JCS plans as unrealistic. The plans are prepared by the Joint Staff, which is built upon a committee structure. Each service has assigned officers to press their views starting at a low level of the organization. Coordination is interpreted by the services as ability to comment as well as to get to answer that all services agree upon. Because of that there is a tendency to agree upon a high common denominator rather than a lower estimate of needed capacities.

Third, the JCS is supposed to help the President and the Secretary of Defense in exercising their command functions. There is some confusion about this point. The Chiefs do not have any forces under their control. The JCS is excluded from the chain of command. There is no legal obligation for the President and the Secretary of Defense to consult or to inform the JCS of decisions on operational matters. However, the Joint Chiefs seem to get involved

when armed conflict occurs, and are usually held responsible for the consequences of operational decisions.(18) The members of the JCS did command operating forces until 1953. Then President Eisenhower announced that the Chiefs were going to devote themselves to planning and advising.(19) Since 1958, when the Service Secretaries were removed from the command, the chain of command for military operations goes from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the four-star or five-star commanders, and from them to the operation units of the armed forces.(20) Contrary to what is commonly believed the JCS is not in the chain of operational command between the Secretary of Defense and the field commanders.(21) The JCS cannot command. The JCS is a staff organization. They can only transmit commands. "The Joint Chiefs cannot command anybody, unless they're lucky enough to have a stenographer."(22)

In short, the JCS organizational history from the Joint Board of 1903 to WW II, and the JCS of 1947 to the present day has followed a common pattern of development in two important respects: (a) its creation was rooted in a need for coordination of the armed forces due to an vastly expansion of American commitments and (b) both the Joint Board and the JCS peacetime role have declined over time.

Since 1953 the JCS is formally the US principal military advisors of the US government. The members of the JCS are not truly Chiefs. The planning becomes unrealistic thanks to the committee

structure of the planning groups within the Staff. The JCS is a staff. The agency does not have any command functions, it seems to get the blame.

The Role of the JCS.

The lack of attention on the JCS does not reflect a consensus about the role that the military men and military considerations were playing in the process of defense decision making, nor is it a sign of common satisfaction with that role.

There are three distinct views on the role of the military in defense policy: (1)the role is too great, (2) the role is appropriate, (3)the role is too little.

The 'Excessive Influential' View. The first view is shared by a group of observers that maintains that military demand and considerations and military men play too great a part in the process of defense decision making. They believe in fact that the U.S. is in danger of 'militarism'. Approaching the subject matter very differently scholars like Harold D. Laswell, C.Wright Mills, Fred Cook, John M Swomley and Julius Duscha belong to this group.(23) Among many others that belong to it, it is worth mentioning Admiral

David Shoup, a former Commandant of the Marine Corps, 1960 to 1963, and a journalist, Tristram Coffin.(24)

The view has furthermore been voiced in public reports like the Hoover Commission and the Rockefeller Committee.(25) It was indicated by a President with high military prestige who in his Farewell Address warned against future dangers of unwarranted influence by a military-industrial complex.(26)

Ten years after President Eisenhower's famous warning against the military-industrial complex, Adam Yarmolinsky, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, concludes a comprehensive study of the social impacts of the military establishment by expressing a view similar to one held by observers in this group.(27)

The 'Appropriately Influential' View. The second view is held by people that think that the military considerations and military men did not exceed the proper role despite the size of the American Post-WW II military complex and the complexity of military policy. Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz are the most prominent scholars sharing this view.(28) To this group belongs furthermore General James Gavin who believes that civilian attitudes and influence prevail as well as the foreign policy expert B.M. Sapin.(29)

The 'Insufficiently Influential' View. A third view was born when Robert McNamara became Secretary of Defense and introduced new working methods within the Department of Defense. This group of observers thinks that the JCS's influence in defense decision making is too little, i.e., that the executive, by bypassing the JCS on too many occasions and sometimes even dictating military planning prevents the JCS from performing properly the role as military advisers.

A few scholars express this view, e.g., John Ries.(30) The group consists mostly of retired military professionals and former defense officials such as former Secretary of the Army, Elvis Stahr, former CNO, 1953 - 1957, Admiral Nathan F. Twining, former Chief of Staff for the Air Force, 1961 - 1965, General Curtis E. LeMay and former CNO, 1961 - 1963, Admiral George W. Anderson.(31) Lieutenant Colonel William A. Hamilton III argues that the civilian leadership during the Kennedy-Johnson era was marked by prejudices regarding the military.(32) Major Lawrence B. Tatum, however, stresses erroneous assumptions held by the military organizations as the cause for the minor role of the JCS in strategy-making.(33) Prominent journalists like Clark R. Mollenhoff, and Hanson Baldwin from the New York Times express this concern.(34) Hanson Baldwin had an experience as a highly placed staff member during the WW II Joint Staff organization.

Recently, this group was joined by some observers expressing similar views regarding the JCS. A senior writer for the Washington Post, George C Wilson, called the JCS a "ceremonial body," a "bothersome board of directors."(35) A former defense official, John Kester, analyzes the role of the JCS. He concludes that the military's role previously had been too little in shaping national security policy.(36)

A Critique of the Literature on the Military Role. A critique of the literature that has been mentioned up to this point is that the understanding of the military role is constrained, because the approach was either too narrowly focused, analyzing a specific case or events of a shorter period of time, or it was too broadly based, analyzing too many phases and actors to rely on enough information on one.(37)

It would be appropriate to add that the question of measurement and specific role of the military had been avoided in the debate, Korb included. The complex composition of the American military advice which crosses the lines of the professional military and the civilian administrators and experts for research institutions and universities makes the avoidance understandable, yet not excusable. What does influence mean? And who is influenced by whom? The overall evaluation of the influence has little meaning.

Furthermore, there is little meaning in comparing the peacetime role with the JCS role during WW II, as Huntington does. It makes very little sense, too, to compare the postwar role with the pre-WW II role, because of the fundamentally different international structure and climate, and the role of the US in international politics.

Moreover, it is only within a normative framework that it is intelligible to deal with a notion of an appropriate role of the military. This assumes that there is some kind of ideal type of role. An examination of many books, reports, and articles on this subject reveals that there is very little agreement as to what this ideal should be apart from the tacit assumption of constitutional norms of civilian supremacy as a given. The only way to understand the criticism that respective authors have on the role of the military is by understanding the tacit normative ideal the authors entertain for the military.(38)

The Thesis.

The substance of American foreign policy after WW II was radically different from that before the war. Having been based largely upon a legalistic and idealistic outlook of the world of

international politics, post-WW II foreign policy became based upon 'realist' premises. A geopolitical, 'realist' outlook which normally is ascribed to military thinking. It could easily have assumed that the military was influential in the transformation.

The difference between thinking of international politics in moralistic terms and the thinking of international relations in pragmatic terms is so radical that it is reasonable to assume that the military that is characterized by the latter type of thinking did have a substantial role.

The assumption is furthermore strengthened by the high public prestige that WW II military heroes enjoyed amongst both the Washington community and the public at large.

The influence is further detected by the fact that since WW II, substantial military forces have been considered necessary for a valid foreign policy. About 10% of the GNP annually has been devoted to military purposes.

The Military Role in American Foreign Policy. It is a matter of evidence that the American military men and military considerations have played an unprecedented part in American foreign policy. It is my thesis, however, that if it makes sense to make a distinction between professional military advisers and civilian advisers, the top military advisers of the JCS have had a largely overrated role in foreign policy after WW II.(39)

On matter of military expertise, the influence amounted to what civilian leaders and institutions would allow. Military considerations have a high position and one prominent American historian today maintains that the American government must work within the framework prescribed by the military.(40)

In foreign policy matters it seems to me that the distinction between civil and military expertise has become blurred. The civilian element has become militarized and the military element has become politicized. Diplomatic specialists have become military generalists, while military experts have become political generalists. It is more reasonable to argue that this blurring is the trend than to argue that the development of the civil-military relationship has been characterized by an increase in influence of formal military institutions and of military professionals.(41)

The JCS perception of the external threat, of the intentions of the major opponents, was largely shared by the top-civilian administrators in terms of values, social causality, etc. While there was agreement that the threat was real and where it came from, there was disagreement about what to do about it. Ironically, in matters of political and military analysis, where the military advice competes with the advice of the diplomatic specialists, the military view tended to prevail, whereas in areas of strategic planning use of force in crisis, weapon procurement, the military specialists' view was not as influential as initially expected.

Domestic Reasons for the Minor Role of the JCS. The domestic components of the complex of reasons for the lack of military influence will be tentatively indicated.

The military specialists do not have the exclusive competence in respect to military matters of the peacetime battlefield. The objective of the military shifted from the effort to win a war, the next war, to the effort win the peace, i.e., maintain peace. The traditional strategy of mobilization changed to a strategy of deterrence.(42)

During WW II, the the Joint Chiefs were the military advisors to the President, - the Commander in Chief, - regarding the strategic direction of the US forces in wartime for which purpose a closed staff system was created. The JCS organization became independent of all but the President. This is crucial; it has been argued convincingly that the JCS role during the war has been somewhat exaggerated, referring to the fact that on several occasions the President's view prevailed when the Chiefs were in disagreement with him in cases such as the desirability of the invasion of Africa, "Operation Torch."(43) There is a difference to the state that Fleet Admiral Leahy perceives when he said in 1945: "The JCS at the present time are under no civilian control whatever"(44) Huntington approvingly uses this quote as evidence for the apogee of the JCS influence.(45)

When time came after the end of the war to integrate the military advice in government, the NSA formalized the status and the functions of the JCS. This political construction did not have the same creativity and constitutional innovation as the T.V.A. system of the 1930's.(46) The committee structure of the JCS organization was not only a system of checks and balances between the military services themselves, but the new National Military Establishment also reinforced a civilian control by placing the JCS within a relationship of immediate subordination to the Secretary of Defense.

A stronger institutional position was further constrained by a long American tradition of anti-militarism, which was rooted in the pre-Revolution experiences with the British occupational forces as well as the experience of many of the 19th century immigrants, many of whom had come here to avoid the long service in the European armies.(47) This traditional attitude is very strong. It explains the apparent contradiction between the public hostility to arms manufacturer of the inter-war years and the strong and still present defense of the 'right' of civilians to bear arms. It makes it easier to understand the paradox between American attitudes towards 'civil' weapons and 'military' weapons.

Furthermore, a stronger institutional position of the military was constrained by the fear of the German General Staff.(48) It is worth mentioning that a common belief at the time was that the

German Military Staff had been a strong factor for the outbreak of WW I prejudiced any counterpart in American government. It was widely believed that Japanese men had caused the Japanese aggressions of the 1930's.(49)

Regarding the JCS perception of the postwar period, the experience of WW II is the most powerful factor determining the perception. The significant impact of WW II experience is found in the believed (a)need for force to pursue foreign policy, (b)danger of appeasement in diplomacy and (c)danger of aggression in world politics.

The Focus of the Thesis.

Any final analysis on the military influence entails an extensive study of the views of other key domestic actors in U.S. foreign policy to satisfy the needs of sufficient material for comparison, but it exceeds the scope of a Master's Thesis. Here focus is on one dimension.

The stereotypes on the role of the military in politics and the lack of studies makes it relevant to focus on the JCS role, not in terms of influence, but in terms of understanding of their perspective. The JCS can boast of coming to a clear attitude about

the Soviet postwar intentions and the role of the US in that respect - earlier than most institutions involved in foreign policy during the formative years of the cold war. It was unnecessary to engage in overt influence. The military's point of view became the prevailing point of view amongst civilians or non-defense officials. And that constituted their influence.

The JCS's perception of the external threat. A more plausible approach to the understanding of the JCS role in the cold war is to link the JCS perceptions of the external threat to JCS proposals of national defense. In other words, we will analyze the JCS reports in terms of their interpretation of Soviet intentions and of Soviet arms and other capabilities - an "explication de texte" - rather than through an objective approach analyzing the JCS role in terms of function of coordinator of forces and vested interests. What did the JCS see? What did the JCS propose? What changes were there in the JCS perception and what were the consequences for the JCS proposals?

Concerning the concept of perception, John Stoessinger suggests the use of four analytical categories: (a) national self-image, which concerns the question of who the national leaders think they are and what role they view their nation should have, (b) perception of intentions which regards the problem of how national leaders view

another nation's intentions toward itself, (c) perception of capabilities and power - a category dealing with military, industrial and human resources in terms of present and future numbers and skills, and (d) perception of the character of the opponent that deals with the view of the nature of the adversary.(50)

For this paper, Stoessinger's categories of intentions and capabilities of the opponent and national self-image constitute a point of departure. They have been used as analytical devices in understanding the JCS's perception of the external threat as manifested in military and diplomatic documents.

The military uses the terms of intentions and capabilities both in a narrow military sense and in a way indicating the broader meaning, which includes diplomatic and other non-military dimensions as well. When the narrow meaning is referred to, it will be specified in this paper.

Notes.

(1) The verb is in the singular. We refer to the JCS as an institution. The JCS advice is a JCS decision which has been approved by the Chiefs. The JCS decisions are indicated in the footnote by JCS and a number.

(2) Lawrence J. Korb, the present Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics is author of the only published book that is entirely about the JCS; Korb, L.J., The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First Twenty-five Years, (Bloomington & London: 1976); it incorporates his Ph.D. dissertation, Korb, L.J., The Role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Defense Budget Process from 1947 to 1967, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, (State University of New York, Albany: 1969), University Microfilms International; (University Microfilms International and the last mentioned institutions in each of the following references provided a copy of the unpublished material for this thesis). In addition there are the following unpublished materials about the JCS: Barber III, H.A., The Joint Chiefs of Staff as an Input-Output Mechanism, unpublished Master's Thesis, (Shippensburg State College: Pennsylvania, 1972), Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania; Benjamin, Roger, W., Military Influence on Foreign Policy Making, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, (Washington University, Saint Louis, Missouri: 1967), University Microfilms International; Harrelson, Joseph, Shelton, Jr., The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Security, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, (The American University, Washington D.C.: 1968) Microfilms International. Teeters, Bernard, G., What Should be Done About the Joint Chiefs of Staff? "An individual study." (Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 1956), the Army Library, the Pentagon; Weeters, Peter, The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: An Evolving Institution, unpublished Master's Thesis, (University of Virginia: 1964), U.S. Army Library, the Pentagon; To the best of my knowledge, Roger Benjamin has had no military affiliation. Bernard Teeters made his "individual study" while he was a colonel of the Army. Lawrence Korb served in the Navy from 1962 to 1966; he served in Vietnam and became lieutenant senior grade. Joseph Harrelson worked four years at the Joint Staff.

(3) The acquired possession of Puerto Rico, Hawaii, Guam and the Philippines expanded American commitments from the Caribbean to the China Seas; the expansion of American commitments after WW II represented a similar change in the function of the military; the

Joint Board was created by a joint order of the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, 17 July 1903, it is also referred to as the Joint Army and Navy Board; Davis, V.E., The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in WW II, The Origins of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, (Washington D.C., Joint Staff: 1972), p 1.

(4) Davis, V.E., op cit, p 27.

(5) Davis, V.E., op cit p 222.

(6) The source of charts one to four, showing the JCS organization during WW II and the first five postwar years is A Concise History of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942 - 1978, Historical Division, Joint Seceretaryiat U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1979.

(7) Sections 201 to 214 of Public Law 253, (NSA), describe the functions of the components of the National Military Establishment.

(8) Etzold, T.H., and Gaddis Lewis J., eds., Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950, (N.Y.: 1978), p 11, p 14.

(9) The appendix does not include charts of the JCS beyond the period of study of the present thesis.

(10) Kester, J.G., "The Future of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, A Better System?" Foreign Polilcy and Defense Review, Vol. 2, No 1, (Washington D.C., American Enterprise Institute; 1980).

(11) Korb, op cit, p 12.

(12) Kester, op cit, p 4.

(13) PL 253, 1947, sec. 211; see also Korb, op cit, pp 11 - 12; for an account of the new role of the military made at the time see Spapin, B.M., and Snyder, R.C., The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy, (Garden City: 1954), pp 1 - 51.

(14) Former chairmen General George S. Brown and General Maxwell D. Taylor in Daly, J.C., et al, The Role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in National Policy, (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978) p 5.

(15) Kester, op cit, p 7.

(16) May, E., "The Development fo Polical-Military Consulation in the United States," Political Science Quarterly, Vol LXX, June 1955, pp 178 - 180; May, E., "The Development of Political-Military Consulation in the United States," in Wildavsky, A. ed., The Presidency, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969).

(17) Korb, L.W., op cit, pp 8-9; The same discrepancy between formal access and real influence is also valid in foreign policy matters. Korb argues that point stressing the difference between JCS formalized channels of access to the key centers of foreign policy formulation and JCS's modest impact in foreign policy; Korb, L.W., "The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Access and Impact in Foreign Policy," Policy Studies Journal, Winter, 1974, pp 170 - 173.

(18) Korb, L. W., op cit, p 11, p 132.

(19) Special Message to the Congress, 30 Apr., 1950, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960) p 234. And A Concise History of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942 - 1978, op cit, p 31.

(20) Kester, op cit, p 5.

(21) Adam Yarmolinsky indicates one such belief: "the line of operational command of forces in the field goes from the President and the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the commanders in chief of the eight commands." Yarmolinsky, A., The Military Establishment: Its Impacts on American Society, (N.Y.: Haper & Row, 1971) p 18.

(22) General Maxwell D. Taylor, in Daly et al., op cit, p 16.

(23) Laswell, H.D., National Security and Individual Freedom, (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1950); Mills, C.W., The Power Elite, (N.Y.: 1956); Cook, F.J., The Warfare State, (N.Y.: Macmillian, 1962); Swomley, J.M., The Military Establishment, (Boston: Beacon, 1964); Duscha, J., Arms, Money and Politics, (N.Y.: Washburn, 1965).

(24) Shoup, D.M., "The New American Militarism," The Atlantic, March 1969, pp 52-56; Coffin, T., The Passion of the Hawks, (Baltimore: Penguin, 1967).

(25) Commission for the Reorganization of the Executive Branch of the Government, The National Security Organization, A Report to the Congress, February 1949, pp 2-3 Report of the Rockefeller

Committee on Department of Defense Defense Organization, Committee Report, SCAS, 83/1, 1953, p 1.

(26) Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61, (Washington D.C.: 1961) p 1038.

(27) Yarmolinsky, A., The Military Establishment: Its Impacts on American Society, (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1971), p 411.

(28) Huntington, S.P., The Soldier and the State, The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, (Cambridge:1957), p 335; and Huntington, S.P., The Common Defense, Strategic Programs in National Politics, (N.Y. & London: 1961), p 114; Janowitz, Morris, The Professional Soldier, (Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press: 1960), p vii.

(29) Gavin James, War and Peace in the Sace Age, (N.Y. Harper & Row: 1958), p 166. Sapin, B.M., The Making of United States Foreign Policy, (N.Y.: 1966) p 164.

(30) John Ries, Management of Defense, (Los Angeles: 1963).

(31) Stahr, E., New York Times, July 8, 1962; Twining, N.F., Neither Liberty nor Safety: A Hard Look at U.S. Military Policy and Strategy, (N.Y.: 1966); Anderson, G., "EX CNO Gives His View on DOD," Navy Times, Sep. 18, 1963, p 10; LeMay, C., America is in Danger, (N.Y.: 1968) p 16-17.

(32) Hamilton III, W.A., "The Decline and Fall of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," Naval War College Review, Vol XXIV, no. 8 April 1972, pp 36 - 58.

(33) Tatum, L.B., "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defense Policy Formulation," Air University Review, July-August 1966.

(34) Mollenhoff, C.R., The Pentagon; Politics, Profits and Plunder, Saturday Evening Post, March 9, 1963.

(35) Wilson, G.C., "The Decline of America's Military Chiefs," Washington Post, June 25, 1978, pp D1 - D2.

(36) Kester, J.G., op cit, p 21.

(37) Korb argues that one part of the literature concentrates on too short a time and another part of the literature concentrates on too many phases of policy. An example of the former is Schilling's

analysis of the making of FY 1950 and an example of the latter is Gabriel Kolko's book, The Roots of American Foreign Policy, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969). A rare exception is Edward Kolodziej's book on the role of the Congress; Kolodziej, E.A., The Uncommon Defense and the Congress, 1945-1963, (Ohio: 1966). Korb, L.B., unpublished dissertation, Albany, 1969, p 8.

(38) This is not to criticize the normative models for being normative. As far as it is possible to separate empirical models from normative standards, the assessment of the role of the military only makes sense to the reader if the author is explicit about his ideal. This is rarely the case in the above literature.

(39) Making a useful distinction between quantitative and institutional terms, Huntington maintains that since 1945 from a high during the war, the role and the political influence of the military professionals have steadily declined. This, says Huntington, is the single most important trend in American civil-military relations in the decades following WW II. The military leaders and institutions were less powerful under Truman than during the war and even less powerful under Eisenhower to reach a low during the Kennedy administration. Huntington, S.P., "Power, Expertise, and the Military Profession," Daedalus, Fall 1963, pp 794-796. Huntington's student, R K Betts later maintained that the role of the JCS was somewhat restored during Nixon; Betts, Richard, K., Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1977) p 6. Lawrence Korb demonstrates that the role of the JCS has increased as the Presidency weakened after the Watergate. President Carter was not able to bypass the JCS as previous presidents did nor fire Chiefs that were unhappy with the policy of the administration. In the post-"Imperial" Presidency, where Congress has an increased role in national security policy, neither the President nor the Congress are content with pro forma JCS endorsements of the administration's policies. Korb, L.W., "The Executive and the Joint Chiefs," Society, Vol 17, no 5, July, August, 1980, pp 56-60. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., coined the term "Imperial Presidency" as the title for a book on the historical expansion of claimed prerogatives since Truman in national security affairs.

(40) Commager, Henry Steele, Seminar on Alex de Tocqueville, Amherst College, Fall, 1980; Commager said that military considerations lay down the premises for American society with specific reference to the period of the Vietnam War.

(41) Some support for this argument is provided by Weigley who

argues that the militarization of the perceptions held by civilian leaders is more important than the military loss of their habit of self-effacement. The military power has become so great and government leaders' awareness of it so acute that the temptation to apply military means as a possibly swift solvent of otherwise intractable problems was constant and sometimes irresistible. "Toughness" had become an index of merit and willingness to employ military force a routine instrument; Weigley, R.F., "Military Strategy and Civilian Leadership," in Knorr, K., ed. Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1976), p 67.

(42) Huntington S.,P., The Common Defense, pp 25 - 29.

(43) Weigley in Knorr, ed., op. cit. pp 66 - 67.

(44) Leahy in US Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Hearing 79th Congress, 1945, 1st Session, p 521.

(45) Huntington, S.P., Soldier and the State, pp 335-336.

(46) The "Tennessee Valley Authority" was the first case of centralization of authority and decentralization of administration.

(47) Sapin, B.M. and Snyder, R.C., The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy, (Garden City:1954), pp 2-4; Sprout, F., "Trends in the Traditional Relations between Military and Civilians," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, V. 92, nr. 4, October 1948.

(48) The traditional argument against the general staff was political, i.e., it threatens civilian control; see, for instance, Taylor in Daly et al. op cit p 38.

(49) One of several explicit references can be found in a House Report in 1947, House Report no. 4214.

(50) Stoessinger, J.G., Nations in Darkness: China Russia and America, Third ed. rev., (N.Y.:1981), p 5, pp 229 - 231. This book is Stoessinger's application of his general theory of international relations based upon the concept of perception. His attempt to make a model "toward a general theory of international relations" is in: Stoessinger, J.G., The Might of Nations, World Politics in our Time, 5th ed., (N.Y.:1975), pp 431 - 446. One textbook in international relations that has been heavily influenced by Stoessinger's subjective-actor oriented concept of perception is Rosen S. and

Jones W., The Logic of International Relations, 1st. ed.,
(Cambridge:1974), pp 1 - 137.

C H A P T E R II

WHO IS THE NEW ENEMY ?

The Cold War and the Military.

Who is the new Enemy? Scholars continue to disagree about the origins of the cold war. Traditionalists - as the official wisdom of the time indicates - are still in no doubt about the course of the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States emerging after WW II. Revisionists blame the US for having caused the cold war or prompted it for reasons of economic gain.

Regarding any conflict there usually are conflicting interpretations. Revisionist interpretations have challenged conventional explanations after each war the US has participated in. This is not an exclusive American phenomenon. What the cold war was and what the reason for it was, seems to depend on the definitions of the cold war as well as the predominant values enthroned by the particular scholar.

Whatever reason and label, the common cause for the Grand Alliance between the Big Three, US, UK and USSR, disappeared during 1945. Tension characterized the relationship between the US and the USSR on the diplomatic level as well as on the military level. On

the diplomatic level the issues of conflict were the future of Poland, the UN, and Germany. On the military level the freeing of prisoners of war, the cooperation in the war effort against Germany, and the occupation of East European countries caused considerable frictions.(1)

Few revisionists have dealt with the role of the defense leadership. When it is dealt with, the influence of the defense leadership is either exaggerated or disparaged.(2)

The military leaders and civilians urged constant vigilance against surprise attack. One historian, Michael Sherry, calls these collective plans and perceptions "the ideology of national preparedness", which, he argues, became an important component of postwar policy and as such encouraged Americans to define the Soviet Union as the nation's next enemy.(3)

Cold war rhetoric contained to a large degree perceptions, images and the traumatic experiences of the 1930's and the 1940's. For an institution such as the military where tradition plays a predominant role, the sense of time and the view of the past becomes important, which is a reason by itself for studying how the historical experience influenced the military's view on postwar world politics. The organizational interests cannot alone provide a full explanation for a given perception at a given time.

The "preparedness ideology" thesis is supported by Daniel

Yergin's hypothesis that the national security is a state of mind - a perception - which was a response to past experience as well as a manifestation of a common understanding of the conditions for general war and practice.(4)

The same scholar argues, in fact, that organizational interests were another source of the military's exaggerated perception of the Soviet intentions and capabilities, i.e., the need of the armed forces to make the American position credible.(5)

Another scholar, a political scientist, R.K. Betts, rejects the claim that bellicose generals - an attitude stereotypically attributed to military men - prompted the cold war by seeking conflicts with the Soviets.(6) His study of cold war crises shows that there is little evidence of consistent differences - in terms of "aggressiveness", i.e., willingness of recommending use of force as a means to resolve a given crisis - in the recommendations of soldiers and statesmen.(7) Against Betts' conclusions three objections can be raised: first, the cold war crises from the Berlin Blockade in 1948 to the Christmas Bombing of Hanoi of 1972 are the evidence for Betts' interpretation;(8) his results may however derive from conditions especially unique for crisis decisions; does the focus of the crises provide enough information to understand the general character of the attitudes? Would such information provide enhanced understanding of these crises? I think so. A second

objection is that defense officials do have a unique institution supporting them, the Pentagon. And third, non-defense officials concerned with foreign policy were conditioned by the cold war to think in perspectives often attributed only to military men.(9)

It would thus be interesting to investigate the military advisers' attitudes and perceptions regarding the external threat to the USA. Do secret and top secret documents of the time reveal any different perception from the already known anxiety? If there is, would it thus be an indication of an attempt to create a public mood in favor of military spending and establishment and maintenance of a large standing army? Another vital aspect of the study is the evidence the military have for aggressive Soviet intentions.

The questions that this study addresses itself to are (a)what did the military advisers, the JCS, believe the Soviets were up to, i.e., what did the JCS expect to happen regarding the Soviet Union, and what did the JCS think the Soviets could do, and (b)what were the reasons for this perception?

Instead of asking whether a bellicose attitude of military men prompted the cold war, we will ask whether the alarmist perception of defense officials regarding Soviet intentions and capabilities prompted the cold war. A first step towards an answer would be to detect whether the alarmist perception differ consistently between defense and non-defense officials.

In sum, this paper will deal with the JCS role in US national policy in terms of the JCS perception of the Soviet intentions and capabilities during the first years of the cold war emphasizing the years 1946, 1948 and 1950. The focus will be on:

(1) what were the JCS perceptions of the Soviet intentions?

(2) what were the JCS perceptions of Soviet military and economic capabilities?

(3) what was the JCS perception of US intentions and capabilities?

(4) which sources for the perception are indicated in the JCS documents and other documents for evidence for (a) historical experience, (b) WW II, (c) organizational interests, the inter-service rivalry (d) role of nuclear weapons and (e) conflict over strategy.

The Setting 1946.

The Postwar International System. At the conclusion of WW II, the USSR and the US emerged in a class by themselves. The postwar international system became characterized by the conflict between these two superpowers in all dimensions of the system.

The Inter-State Relations. WW II brought a radical change in the US foreign and military policy as well as her relationship to the USSR.

In American policy, collective security and preparedness replaced isolation and disarmament as US principles for preventing war. Collaboration with allies during the war developed into participation in the United Nations; Lend-Lease Aid to the Allies developed later into the Marshall Plan and economic aid to friendly and neutral countries.

The relationship to the USSR changed from difficult collaboration to a relationship of confrontation regarding major issues in world politics.

The JCS Perception of Soviet Intentions.

The Early JCS Perception of the External Postwar Threat. The new contours of world politics did not come as a surprise for the American military advisers in the JCS. A JCS report to the State Department in 1944 had forecast the new world conditions. Likewise, forecast was an increasing degree of tensions between the USSR and the US as the common goal for the war-effort became less meaningful.(10)

From early 1945, a series of intelligence reports were made in order to estimate Soviet postwar intentions and capabilities. The JCS was warned about dangers of misperception and miscalculation:

"With the history of foreign s upon the USSR and the legacy of

the Marxian ideology, the Soviet leaders will probably overemphasize any British or American expansionist tendencies and exaggerate the possibility of aggression against the USSR from any quarter"(11)

The reasoning behind the JCS's refusal to approve any of General Deane and Harriman's proposals from the US Embassy in Moscow shows that the JCS took the JIC warning of counterproductive effects seriously.(12)

It is important to note that the JCS seems cautious regarding the perception of the Soviet Union during this first period of the postwar era. Despite a considerable number of intelligence reports there is no JCS decision concerning the postwar threat to the US, before a report was requested.

February 1946. February 1946 is a turning point in the perception of the Soviet intentions amongst American governmental officials. According to Samuel Huntington, the London Conference in the fall of 1945 was a turning point in the relationship between the USSR and the US, because for the first time a stalemated "London Council of Foreign Ministers" adjourned without issuing a protocol.(13) The breakdown of the conference is reflected in the JIC and JSSC reports of the fall of 1945. They are more pessimistic regarding the prospects for diplomatic solutions of the problems by showing a growing dismay over Soviet foreign policy.(14) The JCS asked its planners, JSP, to study areas in which the US could stop an attempted Soviet aggression.(15)

At any rate, only after a series of reports from the strategic and intelligence committees of the JCS organization, the JCS cautiously decided upon an evaluation of the external dangers to peace and to the US, when they were requested to make comments from the military perspective on the State Department paper of December 1945 dealing with the postwar foreign policy of the US.(16)

The JCS word was forwarded to the SWNCC on February 21. The State Department received Kennan's "Long Telegram" the next day, which turned out to become one of the single most influential papers within the government explaining Soviet behavior. Telegram no. 511 from George Frost Kennan, charge d'affaires at the American Embassy in Moscow, contained a 8,000 word long analysis of the sources of Soviet behavior as well as some proposals for US countermeasures. A traditional Russian feeling of insecurity, according to Kennan, determined the Soviet outlook on world affairs. The Marxist ideology provided strong hostility against capitalism. The two sources produced an uncompromising attitude in world affairs and an open-ended need for security. It could be dealt with by a united Western world, which had become morally and economically strong after the US had taken the responsibility. Force was a key element. The Soviets did not understand the logic of reason, but were sensitive to the logic of force.(17)

During the war the JCS was reluctant to spell out its perception

of Soviet postwar intentions. The JCS now perceived the consolidation and the development of Russian power as the greatest danger to the US. It posed an indirect threat, however, because the danger for the US was to become involved in a clash between an expansionist Soviet Union and a still grasping Great Britain.

Concerning the JCS perception of the political role of the US, the JCS did not state that the US should become a mediator between the USSR and Great Britain, as they had done during the war to help minimize the chances for an expected clash. If anything, the US should rather support, through economic means, nations that were endangered by Soviet expansion. Collaboration with the Soviet Union was still perceived as possible, i.e., a tacit indication that the conflicts were not considered as unresolvable. There should, on the other hand, be no compromise of principle regarding further Russian influence in the Europe and the Far East.

Regarding the role of the UN, the JCS did not regard the organization as an effective prevention of war, because of a lack of power and procedure to settle major conflicts. In order to prevent a war, the US should instead have the ability to back its policy with force. The JCS began to think in terms of the lack of preparedness in case of a general war, as well as the credibility of an opposing attitude vis-a-vis an only partly demobilized Soviet Union. Being the strongest military power potentially, the time for

a general mobilization would not be long enough in case of a sudden attack, because the geographical isolation was no longer a factor nor was the Allies' ability to hold potential enemies at bay long enough. In general, the JCS recommended that the American government take a firm and friendly attitude towards the Russians, but emphasizing the firmness.(18)

In short, the JCS overall image of the Soviet Union was mixed. The Soviet Union was an expansionist power, but it was Russian not Soviet communist expansion. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that up to this point the JCS perception on the institutional level did not reveal alarm, but rather concern over the prospects of having to confront the Soviet Union in conflicts ahead. In fact the real concern seems to have been the US's own military capabilities due to the rapid demobilization that was taking place, at a rate that exceeded the military plans made during the war.(19)

The Clifford Report. In July, Clark M. Clifford, Special Counsel to the President, requested JCS recommendations based on Soviet activities that had affected American security.(20) The request came as a convenient opportunity for the JCS to express its concern with which it had watched the growing Soviet expansiveness since the Japanese surrender.(21)

The Clifford report is significant in more than one respect.(22) Although it was never circulated outside the White House, it is the

first government paper which sought a comprehensive policy regarding the Russians. It was edited by Clifford and George Elsey, a White House administrative assistant, who based their paper on reports from several agencies including the Departments of State, War Navy, the JCS, the Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence. Secondly, it contained all the major elements of what later would become the containment policy under the label of the Truman Doctrine. Furthermore, the report revealed a sense of alarm. When the report was handed to the President in the late summer, Truman read the report overnight and first thing the next morning ordered the remaining copies be placed in his safe; leaks would damage efforts to improve the relationship with the Russians, he said according to daughter Margaret.(23)

According to the JCS historians, the final report was basically the JCS report sent to Clifford, which he slightly edited, assisted by Elsey. The report can thus be taken as an accurate reflection of the JCS stand on the issue at the time.

The goal of Soviet foreign policy was now seen as endless expansion, i.e., world domination. War would be inevitable, since the Soviets viewed peaceful coexistence in the long run as impossible. The report says bluntly that the Soviet Union was engaged in aggressive militaristic imperialism, preparing the best possible position for the inevitable conflict. As a matter of fact,

the Soviet Union would use every means short of war to obtain her objectives, i.e., subjugate satellites, control strategic areas, isolate and weaken "capitalist" nations militarily, thwarting every US effort to secure peace settlement, keeping "excessively large" forces in occupied areas - the forces in Eastern Europe deployed offensively against attack on Western Europe or Turkey. According to the report, the Soviet undertook frantic efforts to overcome the US lead in military technology; it was furthermore creating economic dependency in areas under its influence, by demanding exorbitant reparations. On top of all this, the Soviet Union was said to be using religious groups in the Middle East, and the communist party in the US, by encouraging strikes, espionage and violent propaganda attacks.

The Soviet military policy sought to erect a perimeter of client states and trusteeships around themselves. In addition to the military domination east of a "Stettin-Trieste" line, the Soviet Union sought to draw all of Germany and Austria into the sphere of influence, frustrating the formation of any West European bloc. In Greece, Turkey and Iran "friendly" governments should be in place; in the Far East the Soviets would try to neutralize China, Korea and Japan.

The JCS proposed that the US should create strong military forces, because that would be the only sure guarantee for peace. In

fact the US should try to restrain the Soviet influence, and should accord generous economic assistance and political support to all nations not within the Soviet sphere.(24)

The JCS had a dominant role in the drafting of an interdepartmental definition of the containment policy. Compared to the previous JCS perception of Soviet intentions, the JCS had gone from a moderately concerned perception during the war, to a concerned attitude during the first postwar months, to an alarmist perception during the summer of 1946.(25)

The JCS perception seemed to focus on Soviet intentions rather than an estimate of Soviet military and economic capabilities; i.e., the focus on what they feared the Soviets would do rather than what the JCS thought the Soviets could do. An example are the various plans that the JCS estimated would be applied for a possible Soviet invasion of Italy and Spain.

Why did the JCS change its perception from being concerned during the winter of 1945-46 to becoming alarmed by the Soviet foreign policy during the summer of 1946? From perceiving the Soviet Union as a Russian expansionism, the JCS saw now an aggressive Soviet imperialism.(26)(27)

The JCS Comments on Soviet Demands on Turkey. The Soviet demands on Turkey during 1945 and those made in 1946 created a different

response by the JCS, and provide a good case of detecting the difference in reasoning regarding the Soviet motives.

The Soviet Demands on the Dardanelles. For the preparation of the Potsdam Conference, the JCS had been requested to provide military comments on the Soviet demands on the Straits. Two papers were prepared by members of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, (JSSC); Major General Fairchild and Lieutenant General Embick made one and Vice Admiral Willson made the other. The two papers had almost similar conclusions but different premises regarding the appraisal of Soviet motives.

The disapproved majority, Fairchild and Embick, argued that the demands on the Dardanelles should be seen as a continuation of Russian historical aspirations. The motives had thus a moral justification. The Mediterranean was no longer a British lake, said Embick and Fairchild, regarding the effects on the position of Great Britain which had had these ambitions in the past. The two members of the JSSC said moreover that avoidance of a UK-USSR conflict was needed in order to preserve peace. This argument to preserve peace was similar to the one the JCS made in 1944.(28) Finally, the majority paper questioned how the US could oppose the Soviet demands, when US wanted bases in Iceland, in the Pacific and the Azores.(29)

The approved minority opinion, - provided by Vice Admiral

Russell Willson, - argued, in contrast to earlier JCS endeavors for consensus in order to maintain a united war effort, that the US could oppose such demands, because the Soviet Union economic capabilities after the war, the poor state of which made the Soviets need American assistance and support to reestablish the economy. Furthermore, the demands on Turkey, like those on Bear Island and Stitzbergen were demands of a different nature than those previously made, because the Soviet Union could not back up the new ones with force, i.e., they were outside the occupied areas.(30)

It was estimated that the US and Great Britain could oppose successfully Russian effort to seize the areas by force. However, the Russian effort would decline the more distant the demanded area. It was the new nature of the demand as well as the stated Russian interest in preventing a break with the US, because of the need for US capital and other economic support and the declining rate by which the Soviets could back their demand, that formed the premises for the JCS proposal to Truman at Potsdam. The proposal was to defer any final decision or, if that were not feasible, to support demilitarization of the Straits, but to oppose bestowal of base rights upon any foreign power. At the JCS meeting Admiral Leahy reported that the State Department supported the idea that the Straits should become a free waterway. The JCS approved Willson's minority paper and sent it to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.(31)

The Retrocession of Kars and Ardahan. In the spring of 1946, the Soviet Union began making demands on Turkey in addition to those she had made in connection with the Dardanelles. The Soviets asked Turkey to retrocede the Kars - Ardahan region which were two provinces bordering the the Soviet Union. The demand was refused by Turkey and the Soviet Union placed a considerable contingent of troops on the border.(32)

Having been requested to give military comments on the implications of the Soviets demands, the JCS memo to the State Department stated that the demands were a clear manifestation of the Soviet desire to dominate the Middle East and the Eastern Meditaranean.(33)

As for the demands of the bases near the Dardanelles, the Soviet Union had no legitimate need for these bases in either peace or war; in case of war, she could close the Straits without these bases, i.e., the bases would not improve the military position of the Soviet Union. The demands were therefore not based upon a defensive attitude. They indicated an intention to establish exclusive control over the Dardanelles and the Persian Gulf. Accepting these demands would lead to others aimed at the control over the Aegean area; agreement to the Soviet demands in this instance sets the stage and furnishes the basis for further well-timed territorial demands.

According to the JCS, an acceptance of the Soviet demands would lead to consequences which we can categorize as follows: (a) threaten the British Empire as the last bulwark between US and Soviet expansion, (b) undermine nations' confidence in the UN, (c) appeasement in the current view would inevitably lead to war, according to the popular view of the early post WW II era.

"Public opinion against and repugnance to such a policy have led us into two wars in the last thirty years against those who held to the principle of "Might Makes Right."(34)

The Perception of Soviet Intentions by Key Individuals.

Up to this point we have only dealt with the perception of the Soviet intentions after the war, as these were seen through institutional papers, especially the JCS. The JCS consists of the three services, which may have different functions in the war, different experience during the past war and different organizational interests, which may lead them to a different perception of the Soviet threat. According to Jervis it is difficult to separate interests from perception.(35) From the objective perspective, one can ask whether the military with vested interests in peacetime preparedness was detecting Soviet intentions as expansionist earlier than other foreign policy actors.

We will look at the degree of concern with which key officials expressed or are said to have expressed concern about the Soviet postwar intentions and to what degree this concern was expressed. We will examine whether they were alarmed, deeply concerned, moderately concerned, or were indifferent to the Soviet intentions. This study is largely based upon secondary literature.

During the War. During the war, the military lacked a consensus on what threat the Soviet ally posed.(36) Army planners identified no specific enemy in the planning. Unlike the Army Air Force and the Navy, the Army planners thought the U.S. could be attacked from any side. Despite that the Red Army was the most obvious threat to American security interests; army planners did not agree with the distrust of the Russians that shared by the Army Air Force and the Navy.(37)

Among military junior officers, there was also a different perception than the official JCS view. Such concern is reflected in professional military journals in a debate concerning the cause of WW II and the possibilities of avoiding similar mistakes in the postwar era.(38) First lieutenant Riley Sunderland expressed one such view. He makes a correlation between surprise attacks and totalitarian regimes, because of their semimobilization in peacetime.(39)

At the end of the war, there was a considerable diversity in the

views on Soviet intentions amongst key military figures. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal's alarmed view of the Soviet intentions is well known. It is uncertain how far back Forrestal's Russophobia dates.(40) There is no doubt of its early intensity. Forrestal initiated at the end of 1945 a survey to determine whether Stalin had a blueprint for world conquest similar to Hitler's Mein Kampf. After George Kennan's "Long Telegram," Forrestal became an enthusiastic Kennan booster, despite that Kennan stressed that the Soviet Union did not work by a fixed plan. He played a central part in getting an updated version published in Foreign Affairs which became known as the "Mr. X " article in 1947.

Perceiving the Russians at first hand, Forrestal had such allies, who distrusted Soviet behavior, as Ambassador Averell Harriman and head of the Military Mission of the Embassy in Moscow, General John Deane. In Washington, the alarmed view was rare among key officials of the government such as Assentant Secretary of War John McCloy.(41) McCloy's chief, Secretary of War, Henry Stimson was not alarmed but deeply concerned. The alarmist view was expressed by experts in the War Department who argued for "countermeasures in the anticipation of another world war."(42) Also staff in the Department of State voiced a concerned view about Soviet intentions. Secretary of State Stettinius was less concerned than his Russophobe Under Secretary Joseph Grew. But both argued for an unyielding

stand against supposed Soviet expansion in the late spring of 1945.(43)

The firm stand concerning Soviet penetration into Western Europe did not reflect a panic nor a clear idea of Soviet intentions in the top military command. Admiral Leahy and General Arnold showed both a deep concern, whereas Admiral King did not express any stand. This was due to King's sharp distinction between military and political matters. He regarded any views of Soviet postwar plans to belong to political matters. General Marshall's views on Soviet-American relations were less precise than those of his colleagues. Marshall saw little reason to distrust the Russians arguing that the Soviet uncooperative behavior stemmed from a need of maintaining security.(44) General Eisenhower expressed a similar view. But George Patton was deeply alarmed about the prospects of dealing with a "scurvy race" of "Mongoloan Savages" every one of them "an all out son of a bitch, a barbarian and a chronic drunk" who would conspire with the Jews and others to communize Europe and America."(45) However, Patton was amusing rather than persuasive among colleagues. The view expressed by Marshall and Eisenhower prevailed amongst senior officers of the Army.

The perception of Soviet intentions during the war shows two important characteristics,(a)a hardline alarmist view regarding Soviet behavior towards world domination and a softline concerned

view regarding Soviet behavior seen as motivated by national interests; these did not split according to the defense or non-defense affiliation of the officials; and (b) lower-ranking officials in the staff, both in defense and non-defense, seemed more likely to take a hardline view than their chiefs.

After the War. After the war had ended this trend continued. The number of deeply concerned as well as concerned officials grew. As Soviet-American relations were disintegrating, military men viewed events in the fall of 1945 as part of an alarming pattern. Stalinist Russia appeared to more and more military men as an enemy bent on world domination; in the services, this number grew in the Navy and the Army Air Force more than in the Army.

Eisenhower was appointed Army Chief of Staff in November 1945. He maintained his soft outlook. Eisenhower argued in front of the House Military Affairs Committee: "Russia has not the slightest thing to gain by a struggle with the U.S.(46)

Kennan's "Long Telegram" was widely distributed. In addition to James Forrestal's active promotion of the view, it was also promoted by Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Also Secretary of State Byrnes liked it, as did Freeman Matthews, director of the Office of European Affairs. In fact, it expressed what many already believed.(47) But not all liked the Kennan view. General Lucius Clay was in sharp disagreement. Also Clay's adviser in the State

Department, Robert Murphy did not believe in imminent Soviet aggression.(48) Yergin demonstrates however, that Clay's view by late spring of 1946 had become an increasingly lonely view.

Eisenhower continued to be relatively optimistic about Soviet intentions and skeptical about Soviet capabilities to crush US forces in Europe. "I don't believe the Reds want war. What can they gain now by armed conflict? They have gained what they can assimilate. They need a strategic air arm and a Navy," said Eisenhower to Truman during a meeting in the White House in June 1946.(49) This demonstrates again that even when the JCS had approached a deeply concerned outlook by the summer of 1946, the Chief of the Army still continued to be a softliner.

Notes.

(1) As an indication of the growing tensions over time the JCS file, concerning the relationship with USSR, starts dealing with difficulties in cooperation with USSR in the war against Germany. It contains later studies showing estimates of possible Soviet invasion of Spain, Italy and other countries. See CCS USSR 092 (3-27-45)sec. 1 through 67, Modern Military Branch, National Archives, (N.A.), Washington D.C.

(2) Cook, F.J., op.cit., and Kolko, G., The Roots of American Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Power and Purpose, (Boston:1969), Chapter 2.

(3) Sherry, Michael, Preparing for the Next War, American Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941-45, (New Haven and London: 1977).

(4) Yergin, D., Shattered Peace, The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State, (Boston: 1978), pp 196-201.

(5) Yergin, D., loc. cit.

(6) Betts, R.K., Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises, (Cambridge, Mass.: 1977), p 79.

(7) Betts finds that military advisers were usually divided in decisions on whether to commit US armed forces. The military recommendations "echoed" the civilian advice more than they differed. "With the exceptions of the chiefs of naval operations and field commanders, military leaders were less anxious than the majority of involved civilians to initiate United States commitment about as often as they were more aggressive. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) members' views were virtually the same as the dominant civilian attitude more than half the time. The JCS chairman, who is closer to the administration than the service chiefs, had the highest rate of agreement." Betts, R.K., p 4.

(8) Betts considers all cold war decisions in which use of US forces in combat was considered by high-level officials. (secretaries of state and defense; subcabinet personnel such as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs or assistant secretary of state for the Far East; assistant to the President for national security affairs; ambassadors; specific

consulted congressmen) Deployments of forces for symbolic or diplomatic purposes - without intention of committing them to engage in combat - are excluded from the study. The covert use of force in the Bay of Pigs is included, because the foreign policy incident ceased to be covert when the operation began to fail. Betts, p 215, p 234.

(9) Using a terminology from the days of the Vietnam War, Betts' argument is that the military advisers were not more hawkish or dovish on balance than the civilian leaders; additions and alternative views on this issue can be found in: Ikle, F.C., Every War Must End, (N.Y.:1971), Brodie, B., Politics and War, (N.Y.:1973), Gallucci, R., Neither Peace nor Honor, (Baltimore: 1975).

(10) Memo for Info No 121, "Strategy and Policy: Can American and Russia Cooperate?", 22 Aug 1943, CCS 092 USSR (8-22-43) N.A.

(11) JIC 250/1, 31 Jan 1945, Enclosure "D" pp 17-18, ABC 336(1942-48) Russia Sec. 1-A, OPD, Here quoted after Sherry, op.cit., p 165.

(12) The JCS prevented reprisals, such as a cancellation for what was seen as an uncooperative and uncompromising attitude by the Russians during the last months of the war, until the Russians showed a more cooperative attitude; "Arrangements with the Soviets," 7 April 1945, (TS), JCS 1301/2, CCS092 USSR (3-27-45)Sec. 1 and "Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Cancellation of Convoy JW-67 to North Russia," 3 April 1945, (TS), JSC 1301/1, same file.

(13) "The wartime image of postwar great power unity was slowly replaced by a new image of Soviet-American rivalry." Huntington, S.P., The Common Defense, p 34.

(14) JIC 250/5 and JSC 1545, 9 October 1945, CCS 092 (3-27-45)sec. 1.

(15) SM 3779-45 to JSP, 16 October 1945, 092 USSR (3-27-45) sec. 2.

(16) The State Department paper: "Foreign Policy of the United States", extracts are printed in: U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, (FRUS), 1946, Vol I, pp 1134-1136. The paper consisted of two parts. The first of 20 pages was published at the time, whereas the latter part consisted of an American policy regarding relations to individual countries intended

for working purposes; the JCS comments on the State Department's word was also classified as top secret; see FRUS, 1946, Vol I, pp 1139-1140, 1165-1166.

(17) The "Long Telegram" can be found in FRUS, 1946, Vol VI, pp 696 - 709; Etzold, T.H. and Gaddis Lewis J., eds., Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950, (N.Y.: 1978), pp 50- 63; Kennan, G.F., Memoirs: 1925-1950, (Boston:1967), pp 292 - 295; In his memoirs Kennan points out that he had thought of the economic strength of the West rather than the military strength in the telegram. A copy of the Kennan telegram is found in the JCS files. It is an indication that the telegram was circulated outside the State Department to the JCS; CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45)sec. 5; the telegram and the JCS memo are dealt with by the JCS historians as if the JCS memo was a military response to the Kennan telegram; both text and footnote reflect this misunderstanding; Schnabel, James F. The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Security, Vol I, 1945-1947, (Washington D.C.: Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1979) pp 90-92. Another JCS historian, Walter S. Poole, however, stresses the simultaneity of the two papers; Poole, W.S., "From Cooperation to Containment, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Coming of the Cold War," Military Affairs, February 1978, pp 14,16. The JCS memo was explicitly a reponse to the State Department paper and happened to get to the SWNCC one day before Kennan's telegram. Because the State Department soon concurred with the JCS memo regarding the need for strong US military forces, there was no difference to be found on this point between the State Department and the JCS.

(18) FRUS, 1946, Vol I, pp 1165-1166.

(19) An indication that the concern was inward related rather than outward related is manifested by the fact that the JCS decided to stop the series of estimates of the external threats to the US when the advisers thought the important government officials as well as the public had become informed about the sad state of the armed forces; JCS 1545/1 CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45)sec. 5; and Poole, W.S., loc cit.

(20) "Enclosure "B" Memorandum to the President," 27 July 1946, JCS 1696, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45)sec. 9.

(21) Schnabel, James F. Vol I, 1945-1947, p 103.

(22) It is perhaps unfair to call the memo the Clifford report

since Clifford's assistant, George M. Elsey, drafted most of the report; Gaddis, J.L., The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941-1947, (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1972), p 322.

(23) Margaret Truman explains that her father's reaction showed that he had not given up the hope of resolving the conflict despite the facts facing him; see Truman, Margaret, Harry S. Truman, (N.Y.: 1973), pp 347-348.

(24) Schnabel, James F. Vol I, 1945-1947, p 107.

(25) It deserves notice that the final Clifford Report as it appears in the Etzold and Gaddis collection of documents does not mention the Soviet goal to be world domination; see Etzold and Gaddis, eds., pp 64-71.

(26) Walter Poole, the JCS historian, uses the term "imperialism"; I did not find the JCS use that term in the particular document that Poole refers to; Poole, W.S., loc cit; see letter, JCS to Burnes, 13 March 1946, Enclosure "A" to JSC 1641/3, CCS 092 Russia (3-27-45)sec. 5, N.A.

(27) Even though the JCS may not have used the term in the spring there is reason to believe that they used it in the summer, because the term is found in the heavily JCS influenced Clifford Report.

(28) Poole, W.S., p 13.

(29) "State Department Memo Regarding the Montreux Convention," Appendix B to Enclosure "B", JCS 1418/1, CCS092 (7-10-45), N.A.

(30) Bear Island and Spitzbergen are islands in the Arctic Ocean north of Norway. Late in 1944, the Soviets had demanded that the Norwegian government cede Bear Island to the Soviet Union and place Spitsbergen Island under a Russo-Norwegian condominium.

(31) JCS memo to SWNCC, SM 2610, 17 July 1945, FRUS, 1945, Berlin, Vol VII, pp 1420-1422.

(32) FRUS, 1946, Vol VII, pp 799 - 820.

(33) Schnabel, James F. Vol I, 1945-1947, pp 118 - 122; Enclosure A, JCS 1641/3, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45)sec.6.

(34) JCS 1641/3 op cit, p 19.

(35) Jervis, R., Perception and Misperception in International Politics, (Princeton: 19.76) pp 8 - 9

(36) Sherry, p 190.

(37) Herken, ppp 204-205.

(38) Huntington, The Soldier and the State, pp 335,505.

(39) Sunderland, R., "The Soldiers Relation to Foreign Policy," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1943, vol 69, no 9, pp 1170-1175.

(40) Herken, pp 202-203.

(41) Sherry, p.56

(42) Sherry, p 181.

(43) Sherry, p 183.

(44) Sherry, p 184.

(45) Sherry, p 189.

(46) Lyon, P., Eisenhower: Portrait of the Hero, (Boston: Little,Brown, 1974),p 366.

(47) Yergin, pp 170-171.

(48) Yergin, pp 212-213.

(49) Galambos, L., ed., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower : The Chief of Staff, Vol VII, (Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press), p 1106.

C H A P T E R I I I

PLANNING FOR WAR

The Setting 1948.

The International System. By 1948, the trend that emerged from WW II had continued to develop; the leading powers of the former European system were either defeated or economically and militarily devastated. The international system became increasingly characterized by the US and the USSR as the major antagonists, who each engineered a political alignment in the system. This had become clear when the British economic problems surfaced in 1947-48.

The Inter-State Relation. The period 1947-48 saw the final break in the relations between the wartime allies. The political break was manifested by the Truman Doctrine, a political proclamation of containment, and by the Russian refusal to accept the offer of economic assistance from the Marshall Plan in June 1948. In 1948 the coup in Prague and the Berlin Blockade sent shockwaves of war fear throughout the world. Previously undecided nations made up their minds from which super power to seek protection in case of war. A few remained strictly neutral.

The JCS Perception of the External Threat.

The Effects of the 1948 crises. Only one government paper was a clear product of the crisis atmosphere caused by the spring crisis and the fear of war.(1) The NSC 7 was an attempt to raise an argument for the need for an American counteroffensive against communism. The hardline image of Soviet motives continued. The parallel to Hitler's achievements was indicated by the NSC 7's reference to Stalin's policy saying that Stalin had come close to get what Hitler failed to obtain.(2)

The Prague Coup. There is no sign that the Prague Coup caused alarm at the JCS level. Perhaps it was expected that the Soviet Union would try to stabilize her position in Eastern Europe. Several intelligence studies assumed that.(3) Or perhaps the Chiefs were more occupied settling their own disputes over the wartime functions of the three services. Herken makes this point, indicating that the sense of emergency was not perceived as threatening enough for the Chiefs to arrive at a conclusion at Key West later in March.(4)

Apart from a hurried drafting of an extended version of "Grabber", - a Short-Term Emergency Warplan, - surprisingly approved unanimously by the JCS, no direct JCS response was provoked by the

Communist Coup in Prague. The JCS believed that the US was in no imminent danger of war in the spring of 1948.(5)

The Berlin Blockade. The Berlin crisis occasioned by what was seen as Soviet provocations stopping land communication to West Berlin, was, on the other hand, a cause of greater concern for the military leaders. However, in neither case did the JCS revise their perception of Soviet intentions. Repeatedly, the hardline image of the Soviet desire for communist domination of the world by the use of every conceivable means short of general war. Some studies made by the JCS organization show, however, an increased alarm by the still growing tensions, by the less likelihood of diplomatic agreement on any important issue, which, according to the intelligence advisers, made the international situation more combustible than in 1947. The possibility of an outbreak of local wars and of their escalation to general war was enhanced.(6)

The increased concern resulting from these two incidents seems to have been caused by the frustration over the political impasse rather than caused by a change in the image of the Soviet intentions.

This confirms my suspicion that once the perception of Soviet intentions was fixed in the summer of 1946 it remained unchanged; what really concerned the JCS from then on was what they should

propose in their military plans if war should come.(7)

Planning for War, 1948.

Once the hostile and aggressive nature of the Soviet Union had been detected, the military concerned itself with planning for the case of a general war. The plans were thought to be a response to a Soviet provocation, a deliberate but limited provocation from Russia which miscalculated American resolve.

The role of the atomic bomb was most crucial in US strategic planning. The Winning Weapon by the Yale historian Gregg Herken and especially the article on the Hydrogen Bomb decision by David Rosenberg offer valuable insights on this point.(8)

"Grabber" was the 1948 version of the first theoretical plan for war with Russia called "Pincher," drawn up in the summer of 1946. Herken points out that "Grabber" was still a "tentative" plan which reflected the Chiefs' uncertainty of American ability to respond to a war situation.(9)

The war plans "Pincher", "Broiler" and "Grabber" deserve further attention, because the plans illustrate very well the step by step development in the JCS perception of the Russian threat in terms of perception of own capabilities and in terms of perception of Soviet capabilities.

"Pincher". "Pincher" was the first of a series of Joint Basic Outline Plans, (JBOWP), which were drafted beginning the late spring of 1946.(10) "Pincher" anticipated a repeat of WW II. The plan was for a conventional war three years later; it assumed that the American atomic monopoly was not broken.

"Pincher" assumed that Russian capabilities consisted of much larger ground and tactical air force with limited range than the Western Allies. The Russian naval forces were not frightening, but the fleet of submarines was found to be impressive. According to the plans, the war would begin with a Soviet attack on the Western Allies. The Soviet forces could overrun West Europe very quickly. They would destroy allied occupation forces in Germany and seize the Channel coast of France and the Lowlands in order to neutralize Great Britain. Spain would be passed through to get to the Mediterranean. France would be seized. They would take Turkey and the Middle East to gain control of the eastern Mediterranean and of the oil of the Middle East. Yugoslavia would take care of Greece and parts of Italy.

"Pincher" reveals JCS uncertainty about American capabilities, and JCS concern about a large standing Red Army. It furthermore reveals that the JCS had limited knowledge about the stockpile and the rate of peacetime production of the atomic bomb. Bases in Europe were supposed to be established for strategic air offensives

against vital industrial centers and against population centers in the Soviet Union. These air offensive strikes were the only hope for allied victory. There was a list of 20 targets and an indication of which bases the targets could be reached from.(11)

The James Schnabel, a JCS historian, does not mention the drawback regarding these targets. Herken points out that in order to reach these targets the aircraft had to travel a distance that exceeded the capacity of the bombers of the time. Goals set forth by the new plans, "Broiler" and "Grabber," did not change the fact that there was a difference between goal and capacity, i.e., the number of bombers to carry out the planned atomic raids and enough troops to perform evacuation functions.(12)

"Broiler" and "Frolic"/"Grabber". In August 1947 "Pincher" was developed into a Joint War Plan called "Broiler". It was another plan to meet hostilities forced upon the US by Soviet aggression within a frame of three years. As in "Pincher" the allies of the US would be Canada and Great Britain.(13)

"Grabber"'s assumption of the use of atomic bombs is a clear departure from "Pincher", because it indicates an increased confidence in the military advantage of the atomic bomb. Furthermore, political rather than industrial factors had become more important in the selection of the targets, stressing the

psychological effects rather than the devastating effects on Soviet industry.(14)

Finally, "Broiler" assumed the war goals were the defeat of Russia and a liberation of East Europe compelling Soviet withdrawal to 1939 boundaries and a political restructuring of the its Union to ensure Soviet abandonment of its policies of political and military aggression.(15)

In March 1948 the JCS approved an abbreviated version of the plan for future planning.

War Viewed by individuals.

Below the JCS level, the plans and the question of the decisiveness of the atomic bomb were the subject of considerable disagreement. The JCS was not able to take any formal action on "Frolic"/"Grabber".(16)

Admiral Leahy approved "Grabber," but had reservations regarding the use of atomic bombs. He had never been an advocate of the bomb and saw it as a danger for the military ethic, which he supported, of separating civil and military targets.(17)

The Early Admirals' Revolt. The Chief of Naval Operation, (CNO),

Admiral Denfeld argued against an excessive reliance upon an atomic offensive as indicated in "Frolic" and "Broiler". Denfeld was also very concerned about the abandonment of Western Europe to the Soviets without a struggle. The warplan was in conflict with US foreign policy and national objectives, he said. The plan accepted the loss of the Mediterranean leaving the oil of the Middle East inadequately defended.

Was Denfeld's argument against the plan caused by lack of an appropriate naval role rather than concern for the decisiveness of the air offensive? Herken seems to think so: "Unmentioned by Denfeld in his memo, but in fact at the heart of his objection to "Grabber" was its willingness to abandon the Middle East and the Mediterranean, from which the Navy hoped to stage carrier-launched atomic strikes against Russia in wartime".(18) The same author mentions also that Denfeld pointed out two overseen assumptions of the plan: (a)that the President would automatically authorize the use of atomic bombs, and (b)that Russia would fold up after the initial atomic attack.(19)

Therefore, Denfeld's criticism seems to go beyond the concern for the role of the Navy. He stresses that the atomic offensive would have to be carried out at extreme ranges and against heavy opposition. If they turned out to be unsuccessful, the initial loss would be on such a scale that ultimate victory would be extremely

uncertain. The strategy he argued overemphasized Soviet capabilities and underestimated the potential capabilities of the Allies of the US.(20)

The Denfeld criticism thus contained both elements derived from a concern for a future role of the Navy and from concern for the plausibility about the strategy based upon an offensive atomic response as the decisive turning point.

The arguments preceded what was to be called the Admirals' Revolt, which was a week long series of hearings in the House Armed Service Committee in October 1949, following the cancellation of the production of the super-carrier "USS United States." The admirals called the Air Force's reliance on the B-36 bomber a billion dollar blunder.(21)

The reaction to the Navy's arguments from the government and the public was very negative, and Denfeld was fired.(22) There was a disgust with the Navy's arguments seemingly selfish concern in the name of national security. The argument amongst the services over who was going to deliver the atomic bomb to the Russians was so intense that the American government felt it necessary to calm the Russians about the likelihood of any such action.(23) The Russians had had their first atomic test in September 1949 and the debate surfaced in October.

Nevertheless, the core of the debate seems to be the confidence of the decisive effects of offensive bombing.

The Harmon Report. During late 1948, an ad hoc committee headed by a senior Air Force officer, Lieutenant General Hubert Harmon, was analyzing the effects of an atomic offensive through May 1949. It was, according to Rosenberg, one of the major strategic analyses of the early cold war, based on an extensive study of intelligence and interviews with leading experts.(24) Its conclusion was approved unanimously. It contained severe criticism and concern over the atom blitz which was the core in War plan "Grabber".

The Harmon Report argues that strategic air offensives would reduce Soviet industrial capacity by 30 to 40%. Atomic offensives would not bring about capitulation, nor destroy communism or weaken the power of the Soviet leaders. The psychological effects of use of atomic bombs could turn out to be counterproductive. It would furthermore create destructive reactions detrimental to destructive effects which would complicate post-hostilities.(25)

In sum, the Harmon Report emphasized the psychological disadvantages that should be anticipated by any use of atomic bombs against the Soviet Union, and warned that the atomic bomb was not a decisive weapon in a general war against the Soviet Union.

Inter-Service Rivalry. The inter-service rivalry is not an exclusive American phenomenon. Discussion about the functions and the role of the services prevented the US from getting a unified

strategy at this point.(26) Samuel Huntington argues that the interservice rivalry was a child of unification, whereas Stein claims that the rivalry was caused by the fixed ceilings on the total military budget.(27)

The above mentioned dimensions of the conflict were all present at the heated meetings in October about the 1950 budget.(28) The 14.1 billion dollar level or national bankruptcy attitude that the Truman administration used must certainly have increased the pains and the strains within the newly unified military organization.(29)

There is little doubt that the JCS thought the reasons for the lack of comprehensive planning were political. In my mind, however, it is more conceivable that it was a chain of factors that produced the situation; the deadlock was due to a lack of understanding by Truman of the incompatible nature of the alternatives between which decisions were to be made, i.e., small budget vs large conventional forces.

In May 1948 Truman rejected Halfmoon, a JCS approved postwar Joint Emergency War Plan, the keystone of which was the destructive and psychological power of the atomic weapons against Soviet military capability.(30) Instead a plan should be made based on conventional forces alone. Ironically, the decision of rejecting a plan based on the atomic bomb started a process which made final American dependence on an atomic air offensive.(31)

The small budget made it impossible to meet the requirements of a conventional type of force, i.e., the only way the JCS saw an emergency could be met in a war with Russia would be air strikes from Cairo-Suez area or bases in the British Isles. The decisiveness of such a plan was questioned by a competent committee which made a profound study based upon intelligence and other relevant material. The services became dependent upon a weapon upon which they had no real confidence, except perhaps for the Air Force - a confidence that was further moderated by the military's perception of domestic opinion, which they feared would not let the military use the atomic bomb. This public opinion questioned further the bomb's value as a deterrent of war.

Conclusions.

By 1948 the international political system had become more bipolarized. The increased tensions between the superpowers were expressed by the first grave cold war crises - the coup in Prague and the blockade of Berlin - which brought along the first fear of war into the postwar system.

The adversary relationship with the Soviet Union evidently provided a new determinant for the external threat to the US: the US had gotten a powerful enemy in peacetime for the first time.

Once the enemy had been identified, the military advisers suggestions for a proper military posture were more frequently expressed in plans of war: the war planning was intensified and by 1947 it had evolved into three categories: (a) emergency plans for the immediate implementation for the forces at the current time, (b) intermediate plans which were based upon budget and industrial mobilization two years ahead and (c) long-range plans forecasting trends eight to years into the future.

As we saw, the JCS planners expected a repeat of WW II or rather the process of the previous war would take place on the basis of the increased mobility and firepower that had resulted from the technological innovations developed during the war. The atomic bomb was just a bigger bomb and did not impose any need for strategic revisions.

The plans foresaw that the new enemy - very similar to the former enemy in important respects such as incompatible nature of the political regime and its intent and threatening amount of military-industrial resources - would proceed like the former enemy by taking most of Europe and the Middle East. To be sure, the JCS warplans provided for measures to be taken after major parts of Europe and the Middle East had fallen. The decisive turning point would be the air offensive against the Soviet Union's main industrial, political and population centers, as the decisive

element for the defeat of Germany had been according to popular wisdom of the time.

Skepticism regarding the decisive effects of such air offensives which were provided by the major strategic air offensive report after the war is not seen to have been reflected in the internal debates.(32) A change of staff prevented the planners to take the lessons of the report into consideration. The lack of corporate memory is a critique raised against the JCS organization to which staff officers by statute only can be assigned for three years and not reassigned for the next three years.(33)

However, the Harmon Report and the "Early Revolt of the Admirals" show that there was indeed a discussion concerning the plausibility of the atomic air offensive as the decisive turning point in a possible war with the Soviet Union. In fact, the Harmon Report concluded with an explicit warning against the use of atomic bombs during such offensives. Regardless, by 1948 the warplans were based upon a reliance on the atomic bombs.

There is little doubt that the JCS perceived the politically imposed ceiling on the total military budget as the major determinant for their planning. The budgetary ceilings were only one factor in an array of constraining elements such as the inter-service rivalry between the Navy and the Air Force, the discussions over the decisive elements of the envisioned strategies,

the skepticism regarding the atomic bomb, and the conflicting nature of the political demands for economy as well as conventional defense capability. This caused a significant frustration among the JCS planners.

We shall now see how events in June 1950 provided for a new political atmosphere which brought about the means for the realization of the planning ideas.

Notes.

- (1) Herken, op. cit., p 250.
- (2) NSC 7: "The Position of the U.S. with Respect to Soviet-Directed World Communism", March 30, 1948, FRUS, Vol I, Pt. 2, pp 546-550 and Etzold and Gaddis, eds, op cit, pp 164-169
- (3) JIC 250 series CCS 090 USSR (3-27-45), N.A.
- (4) Herken, G., op cit, p 247.
- (5) Herken, G., op cit, p 249.
- (6) "Review of Certain Significant Assumptions, Summaries, and Conclusions, as presented in Joint Intelligence Committee Estimates of the Capabilities of the USSR", JIC 411, 14 Jan 1948, CCS 092 USSR (3-27.-45)sec. 27
- (7) It confirms Roberta Wohstetter's thesis that once a predisposition about an opponent's behavior becomes settled, it is very hard to shake; Wohlstetter, R., "Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight," in Rosi E.J., ed., American Defense and Detente. (N.Y. & Toronto: 1973), p 264.
- (8) Herken, G., op. cit., and Rosenberg, D.A., "American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision," The Journal of American History, May 1980, pp 62 -87.
- (9) Herken, G., op cit, p 219.
- (10) Schnabel, J.F., Vol I, 1945-1947, pp 158-171.
- (11) Schnabel, J.F., Vol I, 1945-1947, loc cit.
- (12) Herken, G., op cit, p 255; Schnabel, J.F., Vol I, 1945-1947, pp 234-237.
- (13) Joint Outline War Plan "Broiler," (TS) 12 Februar 1948, JSPG 496/4, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46)sec. 10.
- (14) Herken, op. cit., p 227- 229

(15) The JCS historian is tacitly excusing these aims referring to the fact that the planners had no authoritative political guidance for "Broiler" or "Grabber,"- a slightly edited version of "Broiler;" Condit, K.W., The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Vol II, 1947-1949, (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, Joint Secretariat U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1976).

(16) Condit, K.W., Vol II, 1947-1949, p 288.

(17) During the war the same argument had made Leahy convince Roosevelt to abandon biological warfar, according to his story; Leahy, W.D., I War There, (N.Y.: Whitteley House, 1950), p 265, pp 439-442.

(18) Herken, op. cit., p 253.

(19) Herken, loc cit.

(20) Condit, K.W., Vol II, 1947-1949, pp 286-287 and JCS 1844/2 (TS), 6 April 1948, CCS USSR (3-2-46)sec. 13.

(21) Hammond's classic treatment basically analyzes the hearings in the House Armed Services Committee and uses the long-term expectations of the services rather than personal disputes as paradigm for the service rivalry, i.e., the Navy had since 1945 seen the Army Air Force as a threat to independence and functional identity; Hammond, P., Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers: Appropriations, Strategy and Politics, in Stein, H., ed., American Civil-Military Decisions, (Tuscaloosa, Alabama, 1963), pp 467 - 556; Rosenberg's treatment and Herken's study are based upon released declassified documents, Herken, op cit, p 306, and Rosenberg, p 78.

(22) Denfeld had supported the Secretary of Defense's policy to save money - the reason for the cancellation. Because of that he lost the confidence of and the ability to control the Navy, and some admirals "rebelled"; Herken, G., cit, pp 546-548; Denfeld was the first Chief to be fired; no Chief has later made a similar mistake, losing confidence of his constituency; Korb, L.J., p 19, p 101.

(23) Acheson reassured the Russians secretly, in case they had become convinced that the US was planning an atomic attack on the Soviet Union; Etzold, in Etzold and Gaddis, eds., op cit, p 21.

(24) Rosenberg, p 72.

(25) "Evaluation of the Effect on Soviet War Effort Resulting from Strategic Air Offensive", May 1949, Etzold and Gaddis, eds., op cit, pp 360 - 364; and JCS 1953/1, CCS 373 (10-23-48)B.P. P.T. no. 1.

(26) According to the Key West agreement, each service had the primary mission of defeating its enemy counterpart, i.e., the Air Force should dominate the sky, and the Navy should dominate the seas and the Army should defeat the ground forces for the enemy. Henry Kissinger says that division of functions was obsolete with modern weapons. Because each service needed a sister-service to accomplish its mission, interservice rivalries were inherent in the definition of the missions. Kissinger, H, A., Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, (N.Y.: 1957), pp 407-408.

(27) Stein, op cit p 563.

(28) Minutes of Meeting, 3,5, October 1948 CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec 1.0 P.T. 1

(29) The classic study of this issue is Schilling, W.R., The Politics of National Defense 1950: in Schilling, Hammond and Snyder, Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets, (N.Y. & London: 1962) pp 1-266; see also Davis, V., The Admirals Lobby, (Chapel Hill: 1967).

(30) The plan had three names: "Halfmoon-Fleetwood-Doublestar," "Brief of Short-Range Emergency War Plan Short Title:" "Doublestar," (TS), 6 May 1948, JCS 1844/4, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46)sec. 13; Rosenberg, op cit, p 68.

(31) Rosenberg, loc cit.

(32) United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Over-all Report, (European War), (Washington D.C.: 1945); United States Strategic Bombing Survey, The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy, (Washington D.C.:1945) and United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Summery Report, (Pacific War), (Washington D.C.: 1946).

(33) Kester, op cit, p 20.

C H A P T E R I V

WHAT CAN THE ENEMY DO?

The Setting 1950.

The International System. International stability seems to have been restored temporarily by the Truman administration's responses to what was seen as Russian provocations in the crises of 1948.

By 1950, the international system was characterized by a military polarization created through formal military peacetime alliances, in addition to the already existing political polarization.

Inter-State Relations. The US-USSR relationship was still growing more antagonistic. Conflicts over issues from the settlement of WW II had not been resolved. The North Korean attempt to resolve the Korean issue through a massive armed invasion of South Korea almost succeeded. The invasion of South Korea was seen by Washington as directed from Moscow. It was the climax of the growing tensions that had characterized the relationship between the two superpowers since 1945.

The JCS Perception of Soviet Capabilities.

Of capabilities and intentions, the two main elements in the perception of the external threat to the US, it seems as if the JCS planners deduce what the Soviet Union will do, from what they can do, i.e., that the planners deduce the intentions from the capabilities. We shall see how.

The Implications of the Soviet Atomic Test. A major change in JCS perception of the Soviet capabilities followed the Soviet atomic test in September 1949. During the remaining part of 1949 and the following year the JCS undertook revisions of the studies of Soviet capabilities based upon a series of estimates. They were preoccupied with what to do.

The explosion of the Russian atomic bomb broke the American atomic monopoly. Longrange war plans like Dropshot, which outlined the scenario for atomic warfare against Russia in 1957, were dropped.(1)

The Joint Emergency War Plan named "Oftackle", which had been approved by the JCS as late as December 1949, noted that the USSR would not have an atomic bomb available in FY 1950.(2) The plan differed from its predecessor, Halfmoon-Fleetwood-Doublestar, by a less exaggerated view of Soviet capabilities and by stressing coordination with the new allies. The importance of the Middle East oil was downgraded.(3)

During this time very little emphasis was placed on Russian intentions; Russia's capabilities were the principal concern. It seemed more frightening what the Russians would do, now that they could do it, i.e., "Pearl Harborize" American defenses. A JCS document argued that:

"As the Soviet stockpile of atomic bombs increases, however, the danger of a paralyzing surprise attack by the Soviets against the United States is also increased, if their capability of delivery has increased proportionately and if the United States defenses remain at about their present strength."(4)

The citation clearly indicates increased concern for capability over intentions. Furthermore, the same document offers evidence for the military reasoning in this respect. "Full reliance," it said, "can never be placed upon military intentions since it is impossible to know the minds of one's opponents and practically impossible to know and weigh accurately the factors from an opposite viewpoint. It is most important," claims the JCS, "that any assessment of the risks inherent in the United States situation of disparity of military forces vis-a-vis the USSR be made with the military capabilities of the USSR in mind rather than Soviet intentions."(5)

As a matter of fact, it was not the event of the explosion as much as the incorrectness of the planners' assumptions regarding Russia and the bomb that stunned the JCS organization.(6) The focus

on Russian capabilities created an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty in which officials failed to reexamine the political and military assumptions. Such a reexamination was sought by Lilienthal and Kennan. But by 1950 Kennan had lost his influence.(7)

In my opinion, the change in the relative weight of focus on the Russian intentions during the first postwar years to the focus of Soviet capabilities at the end of the decade may have been self-defeating, because it precluded any concern for a possible change in Russian diplomacy towards a more cooperative attitude on the major issues of conflict which may have been indicated since the Russian's felt less insecure.

The Invasion of South Korea. The invasion of South Korea was the climax of the growing tensions between the superpowers since the war. Unlike the NSC's initial report, NSC 73, that expected the invasion to be an isolated incident, the JCS expected that it was a part of an all-encompassing Soviet plan. The JCS argued that the NSC 73 underestimated further aggression. JCS believed that a progressive series of piecemeal attacks from the periphery of the USSR should be taken as a warning that the Soviets might wish to initiate a third world war. The JCS stressed the growing Soviet military capabilities and voiced the need to strengthen the power position of the non-communist world. It believed that the US should

abandon a purely defensive policy, and suggested instead a political, economic and psychological offensive. The offensive should take place via the UN. The JCS warned, however, that reliance on the UN as the sole instrumentality for any of the US vital security interests would be unwise.(8)

The "fall of China" and the Soviet bomb had given the conditions for deciding on the H-bomb in January 1950. The NSC 68 papers outlined the goals for American security and prescribed the means especially for the conventional forces. The invasion of South Korea provided a climate for approval of money to do what the military had proposed ever since the early years of the cold war.

The unexpected early bomb for some planners had indicated that the Soviet Union might start a war not out of miscalculation. The JCS seems to have revised its perception on Soviet intentions after June 1950, as we just saw regarding the comments regarding the invasion.

In August 1950 an ad-hoc committee to the Joint Intelligence Committee, (JIC), reveals a rare theoretical sophistication in the forecasting of Soviet moves. In most of the reports studied regarding this subject, the Soviet hostile intentions basically were deduced from the aggressive nature of a totalitarian regime, referring to the Soviet policies and demands against the US desires as evidence that confirmed the perception.

The JIC report states that the Soviets would risk a war despite their belief that the downfall of capitalism is inevitable. The report, in referring to actions and policy statements, argues that the Soviets see an inevitable downfall through the use of force or revolutionary uprising whenever expedient. A major war is the requisite to the establishment of a communist dominated world.

The report continues that there is still extensive support for the idea that the Soviets would attempt to reach their goal of world domination without resorting to armed force. Some believe that Soviet faith in the decay and ultimate collapse of the capitalist world would tend to deter the Soviets from unnecessary use of armed force. On the other hand, the report indicates that Soviet doctrine emphasizes that the politics and war are inseparable in achieving international objectives. The JIC refers to the Stalin dogma that war is simply politics by violence. Korea thus corresponds to Soviet doctrine.(9)

The invasion of South Korea made the JCS revise its view of Soviet intentions; although the JCS perception of Soviet political intentions had become more sophisticated, the JCS view of Soviet political aims remained the same as it had been established during 1946. The JCS perception of Soviet military intentions assumed an increased Soviet aggressiveness. The JCS now questioned the validity of prior assessments of the Soviet threat which rested upon

the assumption that the USSR would not start a war except by miscalculation.

These assumptions had already been incorporated in NSC 68, the first draft of which had been forwarded to Truman in April 1950. A revised version, NSC 68/2, was approved by the President on September 30, when events seemed to have confirmed the paper's validity. The NSC 68 paper became the definitive statement of American national security policy.(10)

Increased Militarization of the Cold War.

The NSC 68 study can be regarded as a culmination of the process of cold war policy formulation which was initiated by Kennan's "Long Telegram" in February 1946. The paper was not drafted in the NSC, but in a special interdepartmental study group of members of the Departments of State and Defense.

As part of the decision to build the super bomb, the hydrogen bomb, Truman requested a review of the cold war policy. Paul M. Nitze, who succeeded Kennan as director of the Policy Planning Staff, (PPS), of the State Department became the chairman of the interdepartmental study group. The NSC 68 can be understood as the

final drafting of the containment policy which initiated by the an interdepartmental effort, the Clifford report, in the late summer of 1946.

The actual drafting of NSC 68 and the weight of the analysis indicated two important differences from the Clifford report in terms of (a) JCS participation and (b) preoccupation with Soviet military capabilities.

JCS and NSC 68. The JCS recommendations of late fall of 1949 and January 1950 carried a lot of weight in Truman's decision to build the h-bomb. The JCS had only a peripheral role in the drafting of NSC 68.(11) The JCS role regarding the NSC 68 was that of approval. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee,(JSSC), represented JCS in the State-Defense collaboration; it did not involve any delegation of JCS authority.(12) Among the JSSC members only Major General Truman H. Landon, USAF, actually attended the sessions of the Study Group that drafted the paper. The JCS had in fact decided against having a JCS representative on the State-Defense study group. The decision was consistent with long-standing JCS policy.(13) The budgetary policy of the Defense Department was challenged by the PPS people. The JSSC men did at first demonstrate views loyal to the current policy, but were not long in coming to agreement with the PPS members of the Study Group. The Study Group's recommendations assumed a sharp increase in defense spending.

The JCS agreed with the JSSC endorsement of the JSC paper and offered to promote the views if necessary. In fact the JCS urged that the entire "Staff Study" be supplied to Truman and not merely the summary report. The JCS advice was followed. Both Secretaries Acheson and Johnson endorsed the plan. Johnson's endorsement came as a surprise considering Johnson's public stand on the economy.(14) Perhaps Johnson's recommendation was based upon the favorable opinions rendered by the JCS, the Service Secretaries and the chairman of the Munition's Board.(15)

Although the JCS had little influence on the drafting of the study, which was dominated by the State Department, the paper only continued on already ongoing trend in the JCS perception of the external threat. The JCS was hardly opposed to the prospects of increase in the military budget.

NSC 68's View of Soviet Military Capabilities. The NSC 68 reflects an analysis that is based predominantly upon Soviet military capabilities. Perception of Soviet intentions derived simply from a perception of Soviet capabilities. The traditional concern of Soviet conventional military strength compared with American weakness was replaced by a new concern for Soviet nuclear capabilities. The study projected that, by 1954, the USSR could produce 200 atomic bombs which would make the USSR able to lay waste

the British Isles, destroy Western European industrial centers and deliver devastating attacks upon the U.S.(16)

Because the Soviets devoted twice as large a proportion of their GNP to military purposes, the USSR was widening the preparedness gap over the Western Powers. Soviet capabilities in the year of 1950 were 175 divisions of which 55 were armored or mechanized, 18,000 - 20,000 aircraft and 250-300 submarines. Soviet block forces could overrun Western Europe, except the Iberian and Scandinavian peninsulas, launch air attacks against the British Isles and launch atomic attacks against selected targets in North America and the United Kingdom.(17)

The USSR was approaching military superiority. If the current trend continued the Western Powers would not be able to oppose effectively Communist military power even in 1960.

Diplomacy was not a likely way to settle the cold war. Of four courses open to the US, the NSC 68 recommended a build up of political, economic and military strength in the free world.(18) This course was recommended over the option of war, which the US was not perceived able of winning quickly, over the option of pre-WW II isolation, which would be a capitulation and would reduce US retaliatory capabilities, and over the option of continuation of the current policies, which would entail a continuing relative decline in US military capabilities.(19)

The Korean War created a climate of national emergency by the end of the year in the climate of which it became politically possible to start the conventional rearmament that was desired by NSC 68. In early July, the JCS had set, optimistically, FY 1952 force objectives to 10 divisions, 218 combatant vessels and 58 wings.(20) The NSC accepted in NSC 68/3 in fact JCS force targets for FY 1954 as force objectives for FY 1952.(21) The administration accepted 18 divisions 397 vessels and 95 wings. Truman approved the plan as NSC 68/4 in December of 1950.(22) It said: "The aggression by the Chinese Communists in North Korea has created a new crisis and a situation of great danger. Our military build-up must be rapid because the period of greatest danger is directly before us. A greatly increased scale and tempo of effort is required to enable us to overcome our present military inadequacy."(23)

Conclusion.

NSC 68's design for conventional rearmament of the US military and the later approval was a major turning point in the history of the cold war policy making. It did not indicate a change of the JCS perception of the Soviet threat. The real change was in the perception of government officials to abandon the belief of

dangerous inflationary increases following increase in military spending. The principal concern now was the change in Soviet military capabilities that had occurred in the fall of 1949 as a consequence of the unexpected early Soviet atomic test. The JCS believed that the danger of war was enhanced, because of the increased military capabilities of the USSR. The North Korean invasion of South Korea was a first proof of the validity of their perception. The Korean War entailed a massive conventional rearmament. The H-bomb decision demonstrated tendency of the traditional warplanning to balance the US weakness in conventional forces with nuclear deterrence.

Notes.

(1) Brown, A.C., ed., Dropshot The United States Plan for War with the Soviet Union in 1957, (N.Y., The Dial Press, 1978)

(2) "Offtackle" was the first postwar plan that took advantage of proceeding from statements of national interests in NSC 20/4. "Note by the Executive Secretary on United States Objectives with regard to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to United States Security," (TS), 23 November 1948, FRUS, 1948, Vol I, Pt. 2, pp 662-669.

(3) "Offtackle" is in Etzold and Gaddis, op cit, pp 324-334.

(4) "Review of Current World Situation and Ability of the Forces Being Maintained to Meet U.S. Commitments," (TS), JCS 1888/2, 13 April 1950, CCS 370 (5-25-48)sec. 2, (N.A.).

(5) JCS 1888/2, p 71, same file.

(6) Herken, op cit, p 305.

(7) Herken, pp 305-310; like Kennan some CIA analysts believed that the possession of nuclear weapons would not cause any dramatic change in Soviet policy and tactics; Herken, p 325.

(8) Poole, W.S., The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Security, Vol IV, 1950-1952, (Washington D.C.: Historical Division Joint Secretariat, 1979), pp 48 - 52.

(9) "An Estimate of the Period in which Hostilities are most likely to commence between the USSR and the Western Powers", Aug 23, 1950, JIC 530/3, (TS), CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45)Sec. 49, RG 218, N.A.

(10) NSC 68 was first published in 1975 in Naval War College Review, XXVII, No 6, May-June 1975, pp 51-108; parts of NSC 68 are in Etzold and Gaddis, eds., pp 385 - 442; the whole report: "A Report to the President Pursuant to the President's Directive of January 31", (TS), 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol I, pp. 235 - 292.

(11) Herken says "The pall left by the Soviet atomic test and the changed perception of the Russian threat made the prospects of

abandoning the "Super" all but unthinkable". Herken, p 319; Rosenberg argues that the JCS played a significant role in the policy-making process. Rosenberg, pp 86 - 87.

(12) For JSSC and PPS locations within the Departments of State and Defense see chats in the appendix.

(13) Paul Hammond says that JSSC prepared the first draft, but the JCS records contain none of the preliminary drafts, according to Poole; Hammond, P.Y., "NSC 68: Prologue to Rearmament", in Schilling, W. R., et al., Strategy Politics and Defense Budgets, pp 296,298 - 318; Poole, W.S., Vol IV, p 8.

(14) Hammond, "NSC 68", p 326.

(15) Poole, W., Vol 4, p 15.

(16) FRUS, 1950, Vol I, pp 250 - 252.

(17) FRUS, 1950, Vol I, p 249.

(18) FRUS, 1950, Vol I, pp 291 - 292.

(19) FRUS, 1950, Vol I, pp 272 - 287.

(20) Poole, W., pp 70 - 73.

(21) NSC 68/3, "Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on United States Objectives and Programs for National Security", 8 December 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol I, pp 425 - 461; and NSC Meeting, December 14 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol I, pp 466 - 467. Security," 8 December 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol I, pp 425 - 461.

(22) NSC 68/4, "Note by the Executive Secretary on United States Objectives and Programs for National Security", 14 December 1950, FRUS, Vol I, 1950, pp 467 - 474.

(23) FRUS, 1950, Vol I, p 469.

C H A P T E R V

CONCLUSION

The International System at Mid-Century. The 1945 American dream was a future world order of cooperation under international law, a world free from spheres of influence and from exclusive alliances, a world order not based on the balance of power but on self determination and democracy regulating from the international organization of all peace-loving nations.

The 1950 reality was radically different on all these points. And so was the American view of the world. Raymond Aron calls the transformation that took place from 1945 to 1947 "the finest hour of American diplomacy." (1) Truman had accepted Stalin's view of international relations. Aron seems to indicate, however, that American diplomacy learned the lesson too well, i.e. the American perception became too schematic. I agree.

JCS Perceptions.

The JCS Perception of Soviet Intentions. In chapter two we saw that within the American government in 1946, the top military advisers, (the JCS), were concerned with the external threat to American

security.

In this paper, I have dealt with the perception of the Soviet Union's intentions and capabilities in the first years of the cold war and the interrelated perception of US capabilities. In the formative years of the cold war, the focus of the JCS seemed to change from a concern of what the Soviet intentions were in 1946 to what American capabilities were. Ironically it seems as if the fears of American weakness, due to the unexpected intensive demobilization or liquidation of American military forces, determined the perception of Soviet intentions as much as the events, if not more.

The military concern over American inability to defend Western Europe has long been known. The present study indicates that the anxiety was an ever present element in the JCS's perception of Soviet intentions and capabilities.

The JCS seems to have become increasingly concerned with Soviet intentions as US demobilization proceeded. The first studies of Soviet postwar intentions and capabilities were initiated for this reason. The JCS feared that the military was not able to resist or defend any Soviet military activity against Western Europe.(2)

The perception of Soviet intentions changed from viewing Soviet policy during the very first months of the postwar era as part of a pattern of defensive Russian expansionism to a view of Soviet policy as part of an aggressive bid for Soviet domination. Although the

evidence given for the Russian motives seem hasty and simplistic - assuming such behavior of a totalitarian regime - there is no evidence in the documents that I have seen that indicates that the JSC purposely developed a threat because they needed one.

Such a thesis has been advanced by several scholars, such as Yergin and Sherry. In order to justify the *raison d'etre* for an extensive peacetime military force, it is claimed that the military needed a threat of considerable magnitude and likelihood to change the traditional American anti-military attitude not to reduce the military back to prewar insignificance and isolation. Sherry demonstrates that key military figures believed that the only thing that could stop the rate of demobilization was a public awareness of the external threat.

Moreover, the fear of a repeat of the WW II experience seems to have been another powerful factor. The Soviet Union was objectively speaking the only power that fitted the expectation of a future enemy; it had all the qualifications of a potential enemy.

Did the JCS alarmist perception prompt the cold war? My answer cannot be conclusive. Most of the top government officials were concerned about the Soviet intentions. The difference is a matter of degree: a) concern, b) very concerned and c) alarmed. It does not break down on institutional affiliation, nor does it break down on defense or non-defense officials consistently. The problem

indicated deserves further study of diaries and other primary material.

The Perception of Soviet Capabilities. In chapter four we saw that from late 1945 the JSC planners assumed that the American military would only be able to defend the Western Hemisphere. The Soviet Union was perceived as capable of taking without much difficulty Turkey, Iran, the Persian Gulf, Manchuria, Korea, North China, in no more than six months. Only Great Britain could be successfully assisted.

American resources for industrial mobilization were greater than any nation of the world. The core of the problem, however, was that there would be no time to mobilize the resources, in case of war. When evaluating Soviet capabilities, the planners frequently stress the central planning and the lack of public opinion as a Soviet asset for rapid mobilization of the economy, which would balance some of the overall weaknesses the Soviet wartime economy would have relative to the American economy.

The Soviet economy was, however still perceived as too weak after the war to support a general war. The JCS did not expect that the Soviets would start a war, except by miscalculation. The JCS was impressed by Soviet military capability, despite the economic weakness. The JCS did not ignore the threat that this military capability posed regardless of Soviet intentions.

Of the Soviet intentions and capabilities, the JCS seems to have emphasized the latter more than the former. We saw that the JCS argued that it is sounder to rely upon what the enemy can do instead of what enemy would do, because you will never know and weight accurately the factors from the opposite view point.

The Perception of American Capabilities. Chapter three revealed that the JCS's proposals were diplomatic as well as military. The JCS was requested to provide military analyses of the alternative outcomes of the various international issues of conflict. The military planning consisted of warplans, which included the tacit assumptions of who the enemy was and what he was up to. The goals of the war plans seem to have followed a development similar to the hardening perception of Soviet intentions. As the early estimate of Soviet intentions caused concern, the later ones caused alarm. The military proposals changed from being a pragmatic, moderate response to become a proposal for absolute defeat of the Soviet regime and liberation of Eastern Europe.

How did the JCS perceive the domestic political conditions? The JCS documents reveal that it was aware of domestic conditions such as a)public pressure for demobilization and a return to a civilian economy, b)the unwillingness to spend money on defense, c)public pressure against the use of the atomic bomb reducing the value of

deterrence that the bomb otherwise would have had. There is no evidence in the documents that the military perceived the domestic front as a bigger threat to national security than the external threat.

The unification of the armed forces by 1947 was only one of many domestic constraints outside the military organization that made any comprehensive strategy possible. The ceiling on the total military budgets of the Truman administration tended to intensify the debate between the services of who should do what. What seems to have been the core of the problem was military skepticism about the plausibility of the atomic air offensive as the decisive turning point in any future plan, as wars were planned at the time. This concern was present together with the disagreement about who should deliver the bomb. These concerns were publicly debated at the time; not known was the secret debate within the military establishment concerning a proper strategy.

The Harmon Report shows the profound nature of the debate. The Report indicated that the planned atomic offensive would not be decisive, but rather counterproductive by increasing the Russian will to resist. It also shows a sophistication in the perception of Soviet Union in making a distinction between the Russian patriotism for the nation and the Russians' attachment to the Soviet regime. It is interesting to note the American Ambassador in Moscow, Walter

B Smith argued before the Harmon Committee that Moscow was a holy city that the US should not bomb. The only hope of success was through the destruction of Central Russia. But he warned that such a war would be a war of annihilation.(3)

Ironically, despite the serious doubts, the JCS maintained the strategy, but was not able to reach a final agreement of the "Grabber" that was based upon the above air offensive, because on lack of economic means for any alternative.

The Russian atomic test and the "fall of China" in 1949 intensified the planning efforts, which resulted in the famous NSC 68. The goals and the JCS's perceptions remained basically the same, although the feeling of emergency was greatly enhanced from time period to time period that we have examined.

The invasion of South Korea was a climax and a turning point. However, the perception of civilian officials concerned with foreign policy changed more than the perception of the military officials.

Sources of JCS Perception.

A Strange Pattern. My findings show that the pattern of JCS's perception and proposals regarding the external threat to the US security follows a strange course. JCS perception of Soviet intentions was determined by its views of US capabilities rather

than an understanding of Soviet behavior and ideology. JCS perception of Soviet capabilities was determined by its views of Soviet political and military intentions rather than intelligence estimates. JCS proposals in terms of military plans were determined by the experience of WW II, service interests and budgetary ceilings rather than the lessons of WW II and new technological development.

Organizational Interests or WW II ? The shift from the subjective actor oriented approach in chapter two to the objective observer oriented approach in chapter three permits us to understand the relative weight of WW II and the vested organizational interests. A clear indication of fear of a repeat of the traumatic experiences of the 1930's and the first half of the 1940's is manifested by the analogies between Hitler and Stalin.

The experience was shared by all government officials and included a certain commonly held belief of social causality, i.e., diplomatic appeasement vis-a-vis an expansionist power would lead to war. Because this belief did not depend upon organizational affiliation, it may explain why the alarmist hardline view of Soviet intentions after the war did not break down consistently along the spectrum of defense - non-defense officials. Organizational interests of the different services indicate the lack of comprehensive planning and disagreement of strategy. The war planning confirms the dictum that generals fight the last wars. But the warplans were also determined by the scarce funds available.

The Role of the JCS.

Even though the JCS may not have been significantly influential in respect to crises decisions, the JCS may have had a significant impact when it comes to formulation of policy. The military heroes of the first JCS of the postwar era carried a lot of weight when they spoke. The influence of the JCS was determined by WW II rather than the new role of the US military.

During the period from 1945 to 1950, the JCS sometimes believed that the Soviets intended to carry out military operations that the JCS thought the Soviets did not have the military capability to do. The inconsistency between JCS' perception of Soviet intentions and capabilities may be explained in terms of vested service interests. It may also be explained in terms belief of what caused the two world wars in the 20th century. The textbook explanation of the cause of WW I is miscalculation and misperception. The textbook explanation of the cause of WW II is one of betrayal and rational piecemeal expansionism for world domination. The JCS believed that the Soviet were pursuing the latter, but at the same time the JCS feared the former.

Notes.

(1) Aron, R., The Imperial Republic, The United States and the World 1945-1973, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1974) p 42.

(2) An indirect support for this argument is that the studies were discontinued when the JCS found that the responsible politicians and the public had become properly informed; they did not believe that the information alone would change the public mood regarding the demobilization; only the threat of a direct attack would.

(3) Minutes 13th Meeting, 16 Februar 1949, Ad - Hoc Committee, CCS 373 (10-23-48)B.P., P.T. No. 2,N.A.

APPENDIX

Figure 1. The National Security Establishment.

Figure 1 shows the agencies of the National Security Establishment created by the National Security Act in 1947.


Source: Etzold, T.H., and Gaddis Lewis, J., eds., Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950, (N.Y.: 1978), p 14.

Figure 2. Organization for National Security, 1947: Representation.

SANAAC: State-Army-Navy-Air Force Cordination Committee.
(Previously SWNCC)


NSRB: National Security Resources Board.

Source, Etzold, T.H., and Gaddis Lewis, J., eds., p 11.



ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY, 1947:

Representation



Note:

The six agencies in the upper tier of the chart were statutory members of the National Security Council. The three agencies in the lower tier participated in the Council's deliberations either informally or at presidential request from the beginning of the system's operations.


Chart 1. The JCS Organization on 1 November 1942.

Source: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, A Concise History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942 - 1978, Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, 1979.

Chart 2. The JCS Organization on 1 April 1945.

Source : Same source as chart 1.

THE JCS ORGANIZATION ON 1 NOVEMBER 1942



THE JCS ORGANIZATION ON 1 APRIL 1945






Chart 3. The JCS Organization on 22 October 1947

Source: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, A Concise History of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942 - 1978, Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, 1979.

Chart 4. The JCS Organization on 23 August 1949

Source: As chart 3.



A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The information for this thesis is provided by official documents of which there are three kinds. The most accessible is the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series published by the State Department. Less accessible is the publication of the JCS's Historical Division on the history of the JCS in National Policy. For the postwar period, only volumes covering the period until 1952 have become declassified so far. These volumes are an historical account for the record. The account made by the JCS historians by means of traditional historical methods, as they put it, have not been formally approved by the JCS and do not necessarily reflect their official point of view. The volumes are thought to have an instructional value for new officers assigned within the JCS organization. Available are the the unclassified editions that were provided after the process of declassification of the original sources. A few pages seem to have been deleted from the original top secret publication. Otherwise, according to the Historical Division, the text of unclassified edition has no addition nor reinterpretation.

The JCS volumes are primarily based on the official documents contained in the master records files of the JCS, where the majority of sources cited in the footnotes have been declassified. This case

file is identified by the prefix, CCS (Combined Chiefs of Staff), and is available in the Modern Military Branch of the National Archives in Washington D.C. It is the least accessible group of documents used here. It has been used to evaluate the two categories of publications mentioned before, and deals in depth with problems.

The case file system originated in 1942 under the Combined Chiefs of Staff; therefore the prefix CCS is attached to each file folder. Each subject matter within broad categories was given a number and put either in the decimal group for the general material or in the geographical part, dealing with regions and countries. Take, for instance, Truman's letter, sent 31 January 1950, to the JCS requesting its proposals concerning a reexamination of US capabilities. It is the first document in the case that contains the JCS material for NSC 68. The label is CCS 381 US (1-31-50). Such a system facilitates later research on a particular subject matter.

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