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Some views on our knowledge of substance.

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SOME VIEWS ON OUR
KNOWLEDGE OF
SUBSTANCE

A Thesis Presented

By

Robert J. Boyle, Jr.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The present thesis is an outgrowth of my senior honors thesis which I wrote as an undergraduate at the University of Massachusetts back in 1983. Both papers deal with the same subject, but there are a great many differences between them. My senior honors thesis focused almost exclusively on the views of David Hume. Some comparisons to the views of Rene Descartes were made. In the present essay, equal attention will be paid to the views of four of the greatest western philosophers: Rene Descartes, David Hume, John Locke and Immanuel Kant.

My experience has been that whenever any of the great philosophers are studied in isolation one becomes very susceptible to their views, since they argue so well. When I first read David Hume's Treatise on Human Nature, I was wholly convinced that we cannot be certain that our minds are anything more than collections of perceptions. It is only after one has acquired a knowledge of the works of a few philosophers that one can begin to see some of the faults in the reasonings of these great thinkers.

This paper represents my own attempt to gain a larger perspective on a philosophical problem that had intrigued me since I first read Descartes' Meditations. The problem is to determine what sort of knowledge we have of ourselves as thinking beings. Descartes was certain that he existed as a

thinking being, and what is more, he thought he could be certain that, as a thinking being, he was an immaterial spirit wedded to a corporeal substance, his body.

John Locke rejected Descartes' conclusion that a person can know himself to be an immaterial spirit. Locke thought that we experience our own thinking, and so, we cannot doubt that we think. But, he said, as far as we know, it may be possible that the substance that thinks in us is replaced at every moment by a new substance, but that our consciousness remains unaffected since these substances can transfer the same consciousness from one to another.

According to David Hume, we cannot even know that there is an active mind that thinks within us. He thought that all we can know of the mind is that it is a collection of perceptions. Faulty reasoning led Hume to this conclusion. In my section on Hume I attempt to show exactly what the faults in his reasoning are.

Immanuel Kant also thought that Hume's conclusion concerning our knowledge of our minds was wrong. According to Kant, we can know there to be something within us that thinks. Unlike Locke, however, Kant did not think that we know that this thinking thing resides in us by experience. Kant thought that we learn of the existence of the thinking mind within us by drawing inferences from experience. By considering what experience would be by itself, apart from the activities of the thinking mind, and by considering how

much we actually know about our experience, we can determine how much our understanding contributes to our experience. Once we have determined that the understanding must make a contribution to our knowledge of our experience in order that we can know as much about that experience as we do, we must naturally conclude that, of course, this understanding, or thinking part of the mind, must really exist.

In sum, then, we can be certain that we think, but we cannot be certain as to what sort of thing it is that thinks in each of us. The question remains open whether it is some immaterial spirit, or if it is just a corporeal substance, our brains. If we suppose it is an immaterial spirit, we cannot be certain that it is always the same spirit that thinks within us, for, as far as we know, immaterial spirits may be capable of transferring consciousnesses from one to another. If, on the other hand, we suppose that it is a brain that thinks within us, then we can be relatively certain that it is always the same brain that thinks within us, barring, of course, the possibility of some science-fiction-like experiment in which the same consciousness can be transferred by radio waves, from one brain to another.

Insofar as I succeed in putting the views of the four philosophers mentioned above on the problem of what sort of knowledge we have of ourselves as thinking beings, in perspective, this paper will be helpful to beginning

students interested in studying the works of these men. It will help them to see some of the faults in the reasonings of these great thinkers. It will also help them to form the basis of an opinion of their own on this problem.

CHAPTER II

RENE DESCARTES

Rene Descartes had been dissatisfied with the philosophy of his time ever since he was a young man. He said that despite the fact that it had "been cultivated for many centuries by the best minds that had ever lived... no single thing is to be found in it which is not subject of dispute".¹ He noted that, in philosophy, learned men will apply all of their skill and ingenuity to make the views they support seem probable. The fact that a view seems probable, then, may be no more a sign of its truth than of the skill employed in presenting it. For such reasons, Descartes said that he "esteemed as well-nigh false all that only went as far as being probable".²

He was greatly impressed with mathematics "because of the certainty of its demonstrations and the evidence of its reasoning".³ In geometry, for example, one begins with five axioms, such as that any two points determine a line, and deduce theorems in accordance with some rule of inference. Descartes hoped to be able to apply a similar brand of reasoning to philosophy.

The axioms of geometry, Descartes thought, are self-evident. They do not require proof.⁴ One could say that they are self-evident because no one can doubt that they are true. To apply geometrical reasoning to philosophy, Descartes would first have to discover some

self-evident principles to serve as his axioms. All the rest of his principles he would derive from these first principles. His complaint against philosophies of previous generations was that nothing of any certainty could be found in them. Any principle in which he could not be completely certain could not serve as an axiom for Descartes. For him, to be an axiom meant to be indubitable. Descartes wanted his first principles of philosophy to have the same epistemological status as the axioms of geometry. He wanted them to be beyond doubt.

Descartes searched for his first principles by testing each of his beliefs to see whether any of them could not be doubted. In the Meditations he finds that he may even doubt that he has a body. "I shall suppose", he said,

not that God who is supremely good and the fountain of truth, but some evil genius not less powerful than deceitful has employed his whole energies in deceiving me. I shall consider that the heavens, the earth, colours, figures, sound, and all other external things are nought but the illusions and dreams of which this genius has availed himself in order to lay traps for my credulity; I shall consider myself as having no hands, no eyes, no flesh, no blood, nor any senses, yet falsely believing myself to possess all these things.⁵

Even under this assumption, however, he could not doubt his own existence. Even if "there is some deceiver or other", he said, "I exist also if he deceives me".⁶ Having found that he could not doubt that he exists, Descartes decided that the proposition, "I am", would serve as a type of axiom

for his philosophical system.

Axioms serve as premises in the derivation of further theorems. Given that he exists, the first thing that Descartes was concerned to show was what he must be. In the end, he concluded that he could only be a thinking substance. He had a variety of things to say as to what a substance is. At one place he distinguished between a substance and a created substance. The only substance, God, is, he said, "a thing which so exists that it needs no other thing in order to exist".⁷ Created substances, on the other hand, "need only the concurrence of God in order to exist".⁸ A complete substance is, he said, "merely a substance endowed with these forms or attributes which suffice to let me recognize that it is a substance".⁹ Incomplete substances, he said, "have no lack of completeness", and are only incomplete, "insofar as they are referred to some other substance, in unison with which they form a single self-subsistent thing".¹⁰ A hand, for example, may be considered an incomplete substance since it is a substance in itself, and also contributes, along with other parts, to the composition of the body of a person.

Descartes also distinguished between corporeal and spiritual substances. Substances are of either sort depending upon what sort of principal attribute they have. It is "a common notion", said Descartes, "that nothing is possessed of no attributes, properties, or qualities".¹¹ It

follows that if one observes an attribute, there must be something to which the attribute belongs. Descartes went on to say that "although any one attribute is sufficient to give us a knowledge of substance, there is always one principal property of substance which constitutes its nature and essence, and on which all the others depend".¹² From the observation of any one of its attributes, then, we can know a thing to exist; but only by discovering the thing's principal attribute can we come to know what it is.

The essence, or nature, of any substance depends upon its principal attribute. A substance cannot be of a particular nature if it does not have the attribute that is unique to substances of that nature. A substance cannot remain the same sort of thing if its principal attribute is taken away. All of its other attributes may be changed without changing the nature of the substance. To discover what a substance is essentially, then, one would need to consider what attributes of the thing could not be changed without changing what the thing itself is.

In the Meditations, Descartes considered what the essence of a piece of wax might be.¹³ He began by noting that the piece of wax that he had in his hand had a color, a smell, and emitted a sound when struck. When he moved the wax near a flame, none of these attributes remained. "Let us attentively consider this, and", he said, "abstracting from all that does not belong to the wax, let us see what

remains".¹⁴ He concluded that only the attributes of being extended, flexible, and movable remained. These attributes, he thought, are merely modifications of the attribute of extension. The principal attribute of the wax, according to Descartes, is extension.

The difference between corporeal and spiritual substances is that they have different principal attributes. Descartes said that "extension in length, breadth, and depth, constitutes the nature of corporeal substance; and thought constitutes the nature of thinking substance".¹⁵ As he goes on to say, "we cannot conceive figure but as an extended thing; so imagination, feeling, and will, only exist in a thinking thing".¹⁶

Because Descartes thought that there are two different kinds of substances, the corporeal and the spiritual, he was a dualist. "Two substances are said to be really distinct", said Descartes, "when each of them can exist apart from the other".¹⁷ He thought that corporeal and spiritual substances could subsist independently of one another, and that is why he thought they were distinct.

Descartes thought that the mind is more easily known than the body. He could doubt that the external world exists, but he could not doubt his own existence. As he said,

if I persuade myself that there is an earth
because I touch or see it, by that very same fact,
and yet by a stronger reason, I should be per-

suaded that my thought exists; because it may be that I think I touch the earth even though there is possibly no earth existing at all, but it is not possible that I who form this judgment and my mind which judges thus, should be non-existent.¹⁸

One might think that Descartes is an idealist since he believes it is possible that the external world does not exist. But he thought that, as a matter of fact, there are two types of substances. He believed that these two types existed independently of one another. One type of substance could exist even if the other did not. There could be a world with no spirits, or there could be a community of spirits with no physical world for them to inhabit.

Because he believed that "nothing belongs to my essence (i.e., to the essence of the mind alone) beyond the fact that I am a thinking being",¹⁹ he concluded that the mind and body are completely independent of one another. He denied that the fact that the mind is an incomplete substance, insofar as it is only a part of the essence of man, implies that the mind must be dependent upon the body. "For in my opinion", he said,

nothing without which a thing can still exist is comprised in its essence, and although mind belongs to the essence of man, to be united to a human body is in the proper sense no part of the essence of mind.²⁰

According to Descartes, the way in which we know the objects of sense is proof of the existence of the mind. As he said, "all the reasons which contribute to the knowledge of wax, or any other body whatever, are yet better proofs of

the nature of the mind!".²¹ As we noted, he found that he could doubt the existence of the external world. He could not doubt that he had sensations, but he could doubt that external objects were the cause of his sensations.

Descartes considered three possible causes of his sensations. He said,

although the ideas which I receive by the senses do not depend on my will, I did not think that one should for that reason conclude that they proceeded from things different from myself, since possibly some faculty might be discovered in me--^{21a}though hitherto unknown to me--which produced them.

One possible cause of his sensations, then, would be his own self.

Descartes ruled out this possibility.²² He supposed that God could create whatever he, Descartes, could clearly and distinctly conceive, exactly as he conceived it. Proof that two things could exist separately, he thought, was the fact that he could clearly and distinctly conceive one without the other. This led Descartes to the conclusion that he was only a thinking thing which, as such, could exist separately from his body. As a thinking thing he had certain faculties. His faculty of imagination, he thought, could not be conceived as being distinct from a thinking thing. The images he imagined would not exist if there were not something doing the imagining. Likewise, the faculty by which we observe objects changing position or shape would be useless unless there were some objects going through change.

Hence, it cannot be, according to Descartes, that a person can be the cause of his own sensations.

This argument begs the question. Why is it that the objects that appear to be going through change cannot be supplied by some unknown faculty of the mind? Descartes said that this cannot be so because the active faculty that does supply the objects of sense "does not presuppose thought".²³ What causes objects to be present to our passive faculty of perception is something that would exist even if thinking things did not exist, according to Descartes. But this is exactly what needs to be shown.

Descartes also argues that the fact that "ideas are often produced in me without my contributing in any way to the same, and often against my will", shows that these ideas cannot be produced solely by his own faculties.²⁴ But if we can suppose there to be some unknown faculty of his that causes his sensations we can also suppose that he has no control over this faculty. Descartes' arguments against this first explanation of how his sensations are caused are ineffective. But he goes on to consider what must be the cause of his sensations if the cause is not, as he supposes, one of his own faculties.

According to Descartes, there are only two more possible explanations. Either his sensations were caused by God, and there really is no external world, or else they were caused by external objects. He ruled out the former

possibility when he said, "since God is no deceiver, it is very manifest that He does not communicate to me these ideas immediately".²⁵ External objects, then, must be the causes of sensations.

What the cause of our sensations may be is, however, unimportant as far as any proof of the existence of a thinking thing is concerned. Whatever the cause of the sensations, it is enough to show that the mind contributes something to our knowledge of them in order to show that the mind exists as an active, thinking thing. Whatever their cause, the existence of sensations is a matter of fact. One need only consider what sensations are by themselves, to determine what contribution the mind makes to our knowledge of them. From the fact that we can know more about what we perceive than we could ever receive from our unthinking senses, we can infer that there must be a thinking mind.

Descartes makes similar observations while discussing the piece of wax in the Meditations. As we noted before, Descartes' wax had a certain color, smell, and made a certain sound when struck.²⁶ Also, as we noted, Descartes concluded that only extension belongs to the wax essentially. All other aspects of the wax may be changed. Suppose the attributes are changed, as by the heat from Descartes' fire. How does one know that what results is still a piece of wax? Not by the senses, for every sensation of the wax is different from before. An act of

judgment is required. One must know what sort of changes wax is capable of, and be able to recognize when any such changes take place. The senses merely convey information. They cannot make judgments.

Consider the attributes that persist through change. Extension, and its modes, flexibility and movability, are not attributes of the wax that are apprehended through the senses. A sensation is something that occurs instantaneously, and is replaced just as quickly by a new sensation. Through sensation we become acquainted with a particular quality of the wax, at a particular time and place. But by saying that the wax is flexible we make a judgment as to how its appearance may change in the future.

Descartes believed that we have a conception of what wax is. We cannot imagine all the possible combinations of size, shape, and position that one piece of wax is capable of assuming, yet we know that these combinations are possible. Our conception of wax is what enables us to comprehend all these possibilities. Descartes did not explain what this concept is, but we may suppose that it is a set of principles that describe what conditions will cause what changes in wax. Part of our conception of wax, then, would be our knowledge that heat causes it to expand.

When a change in the wax occurs we judge that it is the same wax by referring to our conception of wax. If it were not for our ability to judge, and our ability to form

concepts, we could be unable to perceive that objects persist through change. From the fact that we do perceive persistence through change we can infer that we can judge from concepts.

But, more than this, from the fact that we perceive persistence through change, we can infer that there is an active, judging mind that does the perceiving. To deny this conclusion one must hold that a knowledge of attributes such as flexibility--attributes that entail that the object in question does persist through time--can be given through sensation.

As we mentioned before,²⁷ Descartes thought that he knew his mind and body to be completely separate and independent things just from the fact that he could conceive of each without the other. The reason he could conceive each separately was that each has a different principal attribute from the other. The principal attribute of the mind is thinking, while the principal attribute of the body is extension. As we also mentioned,²⁸ Descartes thought that from the observation of a single attribute one can rightly infer the existence of a substance to which that attribute belongs. Just as from the observation of a colored figure one can infer the presence of a physical object, such as a piece of wax, so from an awareness that there is thinking going on, one can infer that there is a spiritual substance doing the thinking. As Descartes said,

it is certain that no thought can exist apart from a thing that thinks; no activity, no accident can be without a substance in which to exist.²⁹

CHAPTER III

JOHN LOCKE

John Locke asked us to suppose the mind to originally be like a blank sheet of paper, or like an empty cabinet.³⁰ He thought that the mind comes to be full of ideas only through experience. Sensation and reflection are the only sources of our ideas, according to him. Ideas are derived through sensation by the interaction of our senses with external objects. Locke said that reflection is similar to sensation, and may be called "internal sense".³¹ Ideas derived through reflection have to do with the operations and activities of the mind itself.

Locke said that an idea is "whatsoever is the Object of the Understanding when a man thinks".³² Our first ideas are sensations.³³ They awaken the mind and cause it to begin to think. The first idea we derive from reflection is that of perception.³⁴ Locke mentioned the fact that people often do not hear what is going on around them, not because they are deaf, but only because they are too busy thinking about other matters.³⁵ He said that "whatever impressions are made on the outward parts, if they are not taken notice of within, there is no Perception".³⁶ One must pay attention to one's sensations in order to perceive, and by realizing that perceiving depends upon paying attention one can recognize oneself as being a perceiving thing--one can recognize that one has some control over what one perceives.

Ideas are the raw material of thought. Thinking, to Locke, is just a series of mental operations. He thought that a man's repertoire of such operations is limited. As he said,

Man's Power and its way of Operation...[are] much-what the same in the Material and Intellectual World. For the Materials in both being such as he has no power over, either to make or destroy, all that Man can do is either to unite them together, or to set them by one another, or wholly separate them.³⁷

By uniting ideas, complex ideas are formed. When ideas are set by one another, they can be compared, and through comparison, relations between ideas can be discovered. General ideas are formed by wholly separating, or abstracting, one or more ideas from a complex idea of a particular object. According to Locke, all of our ideas are either simple ideas, or else they are either complex, abstract, or expressive of relations.

Locke said that "We know by Experience, that we sometimes think".³⁸ That we know we are thinking is, according to him, as apparent to us as that the sun is shining. Both are matters of experience. It is no harder to understand how an idea of an operation of the mind is derived through reflection, than to understand how the idea of light is derived through sensation. As Locke said,

The Mind receiving the Ideas... from without, when it turns its view upon itself, and observes its own Actions about those Ideas it has, takes from

thence other Ideas, which are as capable to be the objects of its contemplation,³⁹ as any of those it received from foreign things.

We use words, thought Locke, in order to express to others the ideas in our own minds. As he said, "Words in their primary Signification, stand for nothing, but the Ideas in the Mind of him that uses them".⁴⁰ He thought that the truth of any proposition consists in the agreement of the ideas signified by the terms in the proposition.⁴¹ For example, the statement, "This white swan is black", is false because the idea of a white swan does not agree with the idea of a black swan. The agreement of ideas, which is the basis of Locke's account of truth and falsity, is something that a person determines for himself just by comparing the ideas in his head.

Locke said that, "he that hath not determined the Ideas to the Words he uses, cannot make Propositions of them, of whose Truth he can be certain".⁴² It follows that if we want to be certain of the truth of our propositions we must first determine what ideas correspond to the words we use.

Locke said that "The far greatest part of Words, that make all Languages, are general Terms".⁴³ General terms are the outward signs of general ideas. Locke said that

Ideas become general, by separating from them the circumstances of Time, and Place, and any other Ideas, that may determine them to this or that particular Existence.⁴⁴

and he gives an example of how this is done. An infant in a nursery may notice that his nurse and his mother have similar shapes, and have other qualities in common; and by abstracting the ideas of these shared qualities, he forms a general idea, of which he has not yet a name, but which we know to be the idea of a human being.⁴⁵ Afterwards, he will classify beings as human according to whether or not they conform to the abstract idea of a human being that he has formed.

Locke said that "every distinct abstract idea, is a distinct Essence".⁴⁶ He distinguished between real and nominal essence. The real essence of things is "the real internal, but in Substances, unknown Constitution of things, whereon their discoverable Qualities depend".⁴⁷ The nominal essence of a thing, on the other hand, is some of its discoverable qualities, which may agree with some abstract idea that we have, and so allow us to give the thing a name. Descartes thought that objects have principal attributes which make them instances of their kind.⁴⁸ These attributes, he thought, are essential to the objects. Descartes thought the real essences of things can be known. Locke said,

Let any one examine his own Thoughts, and he will find, that as soon as he supposes or speaks of Essential, the consideration of some Species. or the complex Idea, signified by some general name, comes into his Mind: And 'tis in reference to that, that this or that Quality is said to be essential.

We do not distinguish substances into species, said Locke, according to their real essences. he thought that things must have internal constitutions which are responsible for the production of the various properties we observe in the objects. But this constitution is unknown to us. If we see two objects with similar properties, we infer that their constitutions must be similar. Once we have classified objects into species according to their observable qualities, we can suppose there to be some similarity in their internal constitutions, and this is as close as we can come to acknowledge of the real essence of a species. It is only by the nominal essence of things that we can distinguish them into species. It is only after-the-fact that we suppose the members of a species to share a common, real essence.

Locke said that words stand for ideas only. His claim that we distinguish substances into species by reference to their nominal essence is compatible with this view. The nominal essence of anything is just an abstract idea with a name annexed to it. Abstract ideas are ideas of types of things, but we also have ideas of particular things. Locke thought that our ideas of particular things are just collections of simple ideas, along with a vague notion of something to which those simple ideas belong, or in which they inhere. Whereas our ideas of types of things are

abstract ideas, our ideas of particular things are complex ideas. Whereas our ideas of types of things are independent of time and place, "and any other Ideas, that may determine them to this or that particular Existence",⁵⁰ our ideas of particular things contain exactly those ideas which determine them to a particular existence, such as the ideas of time and place.

Our complex ideas of particular things are prior to our abstract ideas of types of things. As we noted,⁵¹ Locke thought that the mind can either unite, relate, or separate its ideas. The ideas that make up our complex idea of some particular thing must first be united before an idea of what sort of thing it is can be abstracted. Locke said,

that our complex Ideas of Substances, besides all these simple Ideas they are made up of, have always the confused Idea of something to⁵² which they belong, and in which they subsist.

This is because "we imagine", said Locke, that simple ideas, "cannot subsist, sine re substante, without something to support them".⁵³ Our idea of substance in general, said Locke, is of that which produces and supports simple ideas.

According to Locke, we form "an obscure and relative" idea of substance in general before we form our ideas of the different types of substances.⁵⁴ He said that even though we categorize an object into a species according to its nominal essence, we often suppose that each object, once

categorized into a particular species, shares a common, unknown constitution with the other members of that species.

Descartes thought there to be two different substances out of which particular existences are formed: the corporeal and the spiritual.⁵⁵ He thought that the two kinds of substances existed independently of one another, so that spiritual substances are immaterial. Locke said that it is impossible

for us, by the contemplation of our own Ideas, without revelation, to discover, whether Omnipotency has not given to some Systems of Matter fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to Matter ⁵⁶ disposed, a thinking immaterial substance,

or, as he said elsewhere, "it is no harder to conceive how Thinking should exist without Matter, than how Matter should think".⁵⁷ The only difference that Locke saw between corporeal and spiritual substance is that the simple ideas that make up our complex idea of a spiritual substance are derived from reflection. The ideas of corporeal substances are composed of such simple ideas as extension, solidity, and of such not-so-simple ideas as the idea we may have of an object that it has the power to fly or to swim. Our ideas of spiritual substances, on the other hand, are made up exclusively of ideas of the operations of the mind.

Locke thought that our "obscure and relative" idea of substance in general is the same whether we are considering corporeal or spiritual substances. He used the phrase

"particular sorts of substances" to refer to different sorts of objects, such as foxes, apples, or minds. Descartes' claim that there are two sorts of substances may give rise to some confusion when discussing Locke's view of spiritual substance. For Locke, spirits, or minds, are just another of the many sorts of substances. The same 'obscure and relative' idea of substance in general underlies our ideas of spiritual and corporeal substances. For Descartes, substance in general was of two kinds, spiritual and corporeal. Locke said that

Whatever... be the secret and abstract Nature of Substance in general, all the Ideas we have of particular distinct sorts of Substances, are nothing but several Combinations of simple Ideas, coexisting in such, though unknown, Cause of ⁵⁸their Union, as makes the whole subsist of itself.

What Locke said here applies equally to spiritual as well as corporeal substances. Descartes thought that the mind was more easily known than the body.⁵⁹ Locke thought that the real essence of objects of either sort are equally unknown.

The abstract idea we form of spirit is what gives us the opinion that spiritual substances are independent of matter, according to Locke. He said that

the Mind getting, only by reflecting on its own Operations, those simple Ideas which it attributes to Spirits, it hath, or can have no other Notion of Spirit but by attributing all those Operations, it finds in itself, to a sort of Being, without Consideration of Matter.⁶⁰

The fact that our abstract idea of spirit contains no ideas that are also to be found in any of our ideas of the

different sorts of corporeal substances, does not prove to Locke that spiritual and corporeal substances are made up of fundamentally different stuff. He thought that it is only according to the nominal essence of things that we distinguish them into species; and a nominal essence, he thought, is just an abstract idea with a name. For all we know, the real essence of spirit, its internal and unknown constitution, may be formed out of the exact same stuff as are the real essences of various material things. Locke said that,

We know certainly by Experience, that we sometimes think, and thence draw this infallible Consequence, That there is something in us, that has a Power to think.⁶¹

Descartes thought that we can know the thing that has a power to think to be an immaterial substance. We can know it to be a substance, he thought, because thinking is an attribute, and no attributes can exist without a substance in which to inhere.⁶² We can know it to be immaterial, he thought, because only thinking belongs to it essentially.⁶³

Locke thought that "thinking is the Action, and not the Essence of the soul",⁶⁴ because the soul does not always think, as when it is asleep. He said that

the Operations of Agents will easily admit of intention and remission; but the Essences of things, are not conceived capable of any such variation.⁶⁵

If thinking were the essence of the mind, and the mind were to fall asleep, and stop thinking, then it would stop being

a mind.

Locke thought that even though we are justified in supposing that there is something within us that has a power to think, we do not know the secret nature, or real essence of this thing. Hence, we do not know that it is an immaterial substance, any more than we know that it is a material one. How little we know about the thinking substance itself is shown, by Locke, when he comes to discuss personal identity.

According to Locke, a man's personal identity is determined by his consciousness. He said that "without consciousness, there is no Person".⁶⁶ A person's consciousness need not be continuous. Indeed, it is not, since he must sleep. Any two ideas that belong to the same consciousness, belong to the same person. We may suppose that, for ideas to belong to the same consciousness, they need not be present to that consciousness at the same time, but only that they must both be capable of being recalled at will.

Locke considered the question,

whether if the same Substance, which thinks, be changed, it can be the same Person, or remaining the same, it can be different Persons.⁶⁷

He noted that the first part of this question is of interest only to those who suppose the substance that thinks to be immaterial. Those who think that what thinks in us is some material object, such as the brain, would naturally say that

the same person remains through a change of substance, since they would acknowledge that the body constantly replaces the substance out of which it is made. Likewise, the second part of the question concerns only those who take the substance that thinks to be immaterial, since those who consider it to be a material substance that thinks within us believe that this substance does not remain the same.

Locke answered affirmatively to both parts of the question. As to the first part, he said,

if the same consciousness... can be transferr'd from one thinking substance to another, it will be possible, that two thinking Substances may make but one Person. For the same consciousness being preserv'd, whether in the same or different Substances, the personal identity is preserv'd.⁶⁸

According to Locke, we do not know that the same consciousness ever is transferred between thinking substances; but we do not know that such transference cannot be made either. For all we know, the substance that thinks in us may be constantly replaced by a new substance each minute, and yet our consciousness remains unaffected.

Locke's view that personal identity consists in sameness, or continuity of consciousness supports his claim that we cannot know the thing that thinks within us to be an immaterial substance. He said that "We can have Knowledge no farther than we have Ideas".⁶⁹ We know there to be some active faculty within us that performs the mental operations that we perceive, but we have only a relative idea of the

substance to which that faculty belongs. If, as Locke said, it is possible that the substance that thinks within us can be changed without any change in our consciousness, then, for all we know, the thing that thinks within us may be different at any given moment.

CHAPTER IV

DAVID HUME

David Hume considered experience to be our only source of knowledge, as did Locke. He thought that experience is made up of perceptions. As he said, "no beings are ever present to the mind but perceptions".⁷⁰ He felt that all our perceptions could be classified as either impressions or ideas. All of our simple ideas, said Hume, are derived from, and exactly represent, some impression.⁷¹ Because this is so, it is impossible for us to have an idea of something of which we have not first had the impression.⁷² Because our experience consists of nothing but perceptions, Hume said that "'tis impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically different from ideas and impressions".⁷³ After we have had a certain impression, and derived a simple idea from it, our imagination can take that idea and connect it to any of our other ideas, and form whatever sort of combinations it wishes.⁷⁴ But, said Hume,

Let us chace our imagination to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the universe; we never really advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can conceive any kind of existence, but those perceptions, which have appear'd in that narrow compass. This is the universe of the imagination, nor have we any idea but what is there produc'd.⁷⁵

Also, following Locke, Hume held that all our impressions derive from either sensation or reflection. Stated in Hume's terms, we have two sorts of impressions,

and they are our only sources of ideas. The impressions of sensation "are such as without any antecedent perception arise in the soul".⁷⁶ The impressions of reflection, on the other hand, arise either immediately after an impression of sensation, or after some idea. Said Hume,

Of the first kind are all the impressions of the senses, and all bodily pains and pleasures: Of the second are all the passions and other emotions resembling them.⁷⁷

Hume's theory of knowledge is similar to one that Plato discussed in the Theaetetus. Hume held that whatever knowledge we have is based upon experience. Perceptions are, so to speak, the basic units of experience. Hume said that "The only existences, of which we are certain, are perceptions".⁷⁸ One can imagine Hume saying, as Theaetetus is portrayed as having said that

It seems to me that one who knows something is perceiving the thing he knows, and, so far as I can see at present, knowledge is nothing but perception.⁷⁹

The view that knowing is the same as perceiving leads naturally to a conclusion that was very important to Hume. If to know is to perceive, then not to perceive is not to know. If we do not have a perception of a thing, then we do not have knowledge of it either. To know that a thing exists is to have some knowledge of it. Hence, we cannot know that there are things that we do not perceive, if to know is to perceive. We can determine the scope and limits of our knowledge, then, just by determining what perceptions

we have.

Locke considered words to be the outward signs of the ideas in a person's mind.⁸⁰ Hume's view is similar, as he considered the meaning of any term to be the idea or ideas that it conveys, or brings to mind. Locke thought that if we are not clear as to what ideas our terms signify we will have no way of knowing whether the statements we use those terms in are true or false.⁸¹ Similarly, Hume thought that if we use a term to which there is no corresponding idea, then because we do not know the thing the term refers to, that sort of term is meaningless to us. As Hume said,

When we entertain... any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea... we need but enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived? And if it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion.⁸²

Analyzing terms by searching out the perceptions that correspond to them is fundamental to Hume's philosophy, and he performs this sort of analysis often. Of special interest to us is his analysis of our idea of mind. The mind was considered, by people like Descartes, to be a spiritual substance. We will begin by looking at Hume's analysis of substance in general.

After having argued that our idea of substance is not derived from the impressions of sensation or reflection, Hume concluded that,

We have... no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor

have we any other meaning when we either talk or reason concerning it.⁸³

Locke thought that our ideas of particular substances are made up, not just of simple ideas of the qualities of objects, but they also contain an idea of something to which they belong, or in which they inhere.⁸⁴ Hume acknowledged the fact that the particular qualities, which form a substance, "are commonly refer'd to an unknown something, in which they are supposed to inhere",⁸⁵ but he considered this something to be a fiction. The something in which we suppose that perceived qualities inhere is entirely different from any of our perceptions. Hume said that

We have no perfect idea of any thing but of a perception. A substance is entirely different from a perception. We have, therefore, no idea of a substance.⁸⁶

To this it should be added that, we have no idea of a substance as something that is different from perceptions. Our only ideas of substances are, as Hume said, just collections of perceptions.

The above conclusion applies equally to spiritual and corporeal substances. As we noted, Hume held that the "only existences of which we are certain, are perceptions", but he thought that the constancy and coherence of some of our perceptions enables us to suppose that there are existences independent of us, which are distinct from our momentary and interrupted perceptions.⁸⁷ Despite the fact that we are naturally led to believe in external objects, Hume thought

that we cannot know that they exist. As far as we know, what we take to be physical objects are really only collections of perceptions, and the perceptions are all in our minds.

Hume also thought that so-called spiritual substances, or minds, are nothing but collections of perceptions. We should note that he took the terms "self" and "mind" to be equivalent. He said that "The idea of ourselves is always intimately present to us".⁸⁸ According to his view of the meaning of terms, this idea that we have of ourselves is the meaning of the term "self" (or "mind"). Hume performed his analysis of this term by seeking out the impressions from which our idea of ourselves is derived. He said that

when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other... I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception.⁸⁹

Because he could not find anything in his idea of himself except particular perceptions, Hume concluded that his self is nothing but a collection of perceptions, and his idea of his self is nothing but an idea of one particular collection. He generalized his findings, and said

I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement.⁹⁰

According to Hume, we have no idea of "the thing that thinks" ("res cogitans" in Descartes' terms) within us. To

him, the mind, although it may really be "a thinking thing", is only known by us to be a collection of perceptions. He said that,

The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance... The Comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the place, where these scenes are represented...⁹¹

Hume's analysis of "mind" seems inconsistent at first. If the mind is, as Hume claims, just a bundle of perceptions, what is the "I" that enters into the self, and stumbles over the various perceptions? Hume's way of speaking suggests that there is something that looks around at all the perceptions, and concludes that the mind is just a collection of them. If there is something that enters into the self, and reviews the self's various perceptions, then, of course, it would be a mistake for that thing to conclude that the mind is just a bundle of perceptions.

Suppose that Hume is right, that the mind is just a collection of perceptions, and that minds have absolutely no idea of anything within them that has a power to think. The question is, how could a collection of perceptions, by itself, have an awareness that it is just a collection of perceptions?⁹²

Nelson Pike gave an answer to this question. After noting that only thinking things can be aware of anything, Pike said that "A series of conscious states cannot be aware

of itself as a series",⁹³ and the reason is because it is not a thinking thing. He went on to say,

a series of conscious states might contain an awareness which is of itself represented as a series. Analogy: A collection of pictures cannot paint a picture which is of itself pictured as a collection. But a collection of pictures might contain a picture which is of itself pictured as a collection.⁹⁴

Pike's suggestion resolves the apparent inconsistency in Hume's analysis of "mind". Hume's view that the mind is just a bundle of perceptions is consistent at least, but is it correct? If Hume is right, then we have no knowledge of the existence of something within us that thinks.

Pike notes another apparent inconsistency in Hume's manner of speaking. Pike said,

When we turn to Hume texts, we often find him saying that the mind perceives, believes, remembers, etc., things... [But] for Hume, the mind does not do anything--it includes things. Statements containing mental verbs... are used by Hume as conveniences--manners of speech... [By Humean analysis] statements mentioning the activities of mind... [can be] replaced by statements affirming only the presence of certain mental substances (perceptions) within a certain collection.⁹⁵

For example, the statement, "I see a table", can be analyzed into the statement, "The visual perception of a table is occurring within a certain collection of perceptions."⁹⁶

Hume said that,

All kinds of reasoning consist in nothing but a comparison, and a discovery of those relations, either constant or inconstant, which two or more objects bear to each other.⁹⁷

Comparing is an activity. If Pike is right about Hume, then any statements mentioning the occurrence of comparisons ought to be reducible to statements affirming the presence of certain perceptions within a particular bundle of perceptions.

How are we to reduce the statement, "I have compared these objects", to a statement about perceptions? Unlike our previous example of the statement, "I see a table", this new statement is not so easily reducible because, although we know that visual perceptions correspond to the activity of seeing, we do not know what sort of perceptions correspond to the activity of comparing.

Through comparison we discover how objects are similar and how they are different. Perhaps we can reduce the statement, "I have compared these objects" only by means of a statement about what we have discovered by comparing, such as "I have found them to be different". Using Pike's analogy, we can say that we have pictures of these objects hanging in our galleries, and "finding objects to be different" only means that there is another picture in the gallery that is a picture of the first two pictures, and underneath this third picture there is a caption that reads, "These objects are different". I can think of no other way in which the information derived from comparing can be portrayed in terms of conscious states, or in terms of pictures in a gallery.

In order for any collection of perceptions to contain an awareness of differences among objects, then, there must be something within the mind that can read the captions. This can only be a thinking mind. The statement, "I have found these objects to be different", is not reducible to talk about perceptions; and so, neither is the activity of comparing. Comparing entails the presence of a thinking thing. It is impossible to represent the information derived through comparison in terms of sensory information, which is all that any perception, no matter how complex, can contain.

Hume cannot consistently hold that the mind is just a collection of perceptions, and that the mind can compare. One or the other of these views must go. To say that the mind does not compare leads to absurdity. Hume, himself, said

that time cannot make its appearance to the mind, either alone, or attended with a steady unchangeable object, but is always discover'd by some perceivable succession of changeable objects.⁹⁸

We discover time, then, by noticing differences in objects from one moment to the next. But we can only notice differences by comparing. If we did not compare, we would not notice differences, and so, we would have no awareness of time. The fact that we are aware of time, then, shows that we are capable of comparing.

Since we certainly do know that we compare, the only

alternative is to admit that the mind is not just a collection of perceptions. There is something within us that can compare and think. This is the only sensible conclusion.

Some people think that Hume reached this conclusion on his own. R. P. Wolff said that

Hume began the Treatise with the assumption that empirical knowledge could be explained by reference to the contents of the mind alone, and then made the profound discovery that it was the activity of the mind, rather than the nature of its contents, which accounts for⁹⁹ all the puzzling features of empirical knowledge.

There are reasons for saying that this view of Hume is not entirely accurate. The view that the mind is something that can be active is contradictory to Hume's view, stated in the Treatise, that the mind is just a collection of perceptions. It seems unlikely that Hume would have made the profound discovery that the mind is more than just a collection of perceptions, and not have bothered to rewrite his first philosophical work before it was published.

He did, in fact, rewrite the Treatise some years later. The result of this rewrite was the Enquiries. In the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding he omitted his analysis of "mind", not because he thought the analysis was wrong, but only because he wanted his new works to receive a better reception than had the Treatise. In the Enquiries he continues to hold the same view as to how to analyze terms.¹⁰⁰ If he had elected to analyze the term "mind" in

the Enquiries it is beyond doubt that he would have reached the same conclusions he had in the Treatise. His method of analysis had not changed from one book to the next.

CHAPTER V

IMMANUEL KANT

As we noted, John Locke and David Hume distinguished between ideas derived from sensation and ideas derived from reflection. Immanuel Kant made a similar distinction. He said that the mind has two faculties, sensibility and the understanding. Knowledge, Kant held, arises only from the interaction of these two parts of the mind.¹⁰¹

According to Kant, our sensibility requires of the objects of experience that they be spatiotemporally continuous. He believed that our perception of space and time arises out of us a priori, and is not derived from experience. If the external objects that exist independently of us were not spatiotemporally continuous, then because we only perceive objects as being in space and time, we would not be able to represent these objects to ourselves, and so, we would not know them. The objects that do appear to us through our senses appear to be in space in time. Hence, we can conclude that the objects themselves are spatiotemporally continuous.

The above argument is similar to the following. A piece of hot wax is of such a nature that only hard objects will make an impression upon it. If one sees the impression of a seal upon some wax one can infer that the seal itself is hard even without seeing it. The hardness of the seal in this argument is analogous to the spatiotemporal continuity

of objects in the other argument. Just as there would be no impression on the wax if the seal were not hard, so there could be no image of an object in the mind unless that object were actually spatiotemporally continuous. For Kant, the mind is of such a nature that only spatiotemporally continuous objects can make an impression upon it.

Kant said that "appearances can certainly be given in intuition independently of functions of the understanding".¹⁰² We can perceive things without thinking about them. Locke also took note of this point. He observed that a person who has no defect in hearing might not hear what is going on around him if he is too busy thinking about other matters.¹⁰³ I may have a succession of perceptions, but if I do not attend to them, and investigate them in order to discover their contents I do not learn anything from any of them. Each single perception that I have appears and disappears. If I did not investigate any of them, I can have no memory of them after they are gone. As Kant said,

If each representation were completely foreign to every other, standing apart in isolation, no such thing as knowledge would ever arise. For knowledge is [essentially] a whole in which representations stand compared and connected.¹⁰⁴

It is the role of the understanding to compare and connect our experiences. The understanding, Kant held, has certain concepts which enable it to engage in rule-directed activities.¹⁰⁵ The concepts provide rules which the understanding must follow. As Kant said, "a concept is

always, as regards its form, something universal which serves as a rule".¹⁰⁶ Since it is the understanding that connects up and organizes our experience, this organization must be done according to rules.

Kant wanted to show that without the concepts of the understanding it would be impossible for us to know that we have any experience whatsoever. If we were presented with different perceptions, and our minds did not apply their concepts to the perceptions, then

These perceptions would not then belong to any experience, consequently would then be without an object, merely a blind play of representations, less even than a dream.¹⁰⁷

Suppose I have a succession of perceptions. If so, then at any given moment I have before me only one perception. That perception may contain a variety of things. If I am in a greenhouse during the spring then each of my perceptions will contain many different patches of vivid color. In order for me to learn anything from, or to get anything out of, any one of my perceptions I must be able to display each of the various contents of that perception before my mind's eye. I must be able to say of my perception, "There is a yellow patch, and a blue one, several red ones, etc.". If I were not able to do this, then no one of my perceptions would have any meaning to me at all.

If, as I was displaying the contents of one of my

perceptions before my mind, I forgot what the previous content was as soon as I moved on to consider another content, then the whole business of displaying those contents would be of no use to me. I must be able to remember what I find to be in my perceptions. If I could not, then it would be just as if I never examined them in the first place. The fact that I do know the contents of my perceptions tells me that I must have run through them, and that I must have remembered what I found to be their contents.

Kant makes the following point,

If we were not conscious that what we think is the same as what we thought a moment before, all reproduction in the series of representations would be useless.¹⁰⁸

To see this, suppose I have a succession of perceptions, and that at one point I reproduce in my imagination one of the perceptions that has just gone by. If I were not aware that what I have reproduced is the same as what has gone before, then it would seem to me that what has been reproduced is really only a part of my present perception. I could not know it to have any relation to something that existed in the past. It would not appear to me to be a reproduction, or a memory. As I would not be aware that it is a memory, I would not be aware of what it was remembered for. This being so, I could not think to use that memory, and so I would not use it. I would be unable to compare the present

to the past. I would be unaware of time.

I may be remembering some perception for the purpose of displaying the contents of that perception before my mind. But if I forget why I remembered that perception the image will mean nothing to me. But if I know why I remembered the perception and display its contents before my mind, and then forget what these contents are (forget which perception they belong to, or simply forget that they belong to some perception--forget, that is, that what they are are contents of a perception), then as these contents are displayed before my mind, they will mean nothing to me.

If we could not know that we have certain mental images just because we are remembering the contents of some past perception, then we could never come to know what the contents of any past perception were. And since we can only display the contents of a perception to ourselves only after the perception has occurred, it follows that we could never learn the contents of any perception.

The fact is, however, that I am able to remember things, and to know with certainty that what I have presently remembered refers to something that actually occurred to me in the past.

Because I can remember, my experience is more than just a succession of disconnected perceptions. I can remember an entire series of perceptions. I can remember them in the exact order in which they occurred, or I can switch the

order around. The order in which I remember my perceptions depends upon the purpose I have in remembering them. If I want to know how I got to a certain place I may remember my perceptions in a regressive order so that I can retrace my footsteps.¹⁰⁹ Also, I can be aware of the contents of each of my perceptions. All of this would be impossible if the mind could only perceive, and not analyze its perceptions.

David Hume did not think that perceptions have to be analyzed before their contents can be known. He spoke often about perceptions of tables, trees, billiard balls, and other common objects. He did not think about all the knowledge, stored away in a person's mind, that must come into play before that person can say of some visual image, "That is the image of a table". Hume thought that the sole activity of the mind is to associate ideas. Still, he did not think that we could know for certain that there is a mind that associates ideas. He thought that from the fact that our ideas appear to be associated, we infer that there must be some mind that associates them. As he said,

the actions of the mind are... the same with those of matter. We perceive only their constant conjunction; nor can we ever reason beyond it.¹¹⁰

A major psychological principle of Hume's was that similar ideas come to be associated by the mind, so that the occurrence of one occasions the occurrence of the other. This sort of association presupposes that the mind can compare ideas and find them to be similar. Comparing,

investigating, and, in general, discovering what the contents of our perceptions are involves more than barely perceiving. We know that the mind does more than just perceive from the fact that we know more about our perceptions than we could if all we did was perceive. If we know the mind associates ideas, we know that the mind does more than just perceive, and associate what it perceives, since in order to associate ideas the mind must be able to perform such operations as comparisons.

Kant distinguished between empirical apperception, or inner sense, and transcendental apperception.¹¹¹ Empirical apperception gives us a view of the contents of our minds. When Hume entered most intimately into what he called his self, and stumbled over his various perceptions, he was engaged in empirical apperception. Locke said that we could use the term "internal sense" to describe the notice that the mind takes of its own operations.¹¹² Through empirical apperception, or inner sense, we come to know the empirical self. As Kant said, inner sense "represents to consciousness even our own selves only as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in ourselves".^{112a} Hume's phrase, "a bundle of perceptions", can be used accurately to describe the empirical self.

"Apperception" can mean "self-consciousness", but it can also mean, "understanding experiences in terms of past experience". It is the understanding that makes

apperception of this second sort possible. The understanding requires of all our perceptions that they fit into one organized, unitary experience. This is required a priori. Kant said

I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge insofar as, this mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori.¹¹³

Hence, transcendental apperception, or the a priori requirement of an organized experience, is the ground, or condition of the possibility of, empirical apperception.

The understanding goes about organizing its experiences in accordance with certain categories, or concepts, that it has. Proof that the understanding operates in this way is that empirical apperception, or our experience taken as a whole is organized upon certain principles.

That there is a part of the mind called the understanding is obvious from the mere fact that we are aware of our experiences at all. As Kant noted, without this part of the mind, experience would be, "merely a blind play of representations, less even than a dream".¹¹⁴ It is the understanding that investigates our perceptions so that their contents can become known to us. It is the understanding to which belong the faculties of memory and imagination. In answer to Hume, how do we know that the mind is not just a collection of perceptions? Because without an active thinking part of the mind to understand

our perceptions experience, or bare consciousness, would be impossible.

Kant's philosophy reaffirms that we can be certain that there is a thinking aspect of the mind. Kant made Hume's analysis of mind obsolete. Descartes thought we can be certain that we exist as things that think, but he also thought that we could know the thing that thinks within us to be an immaterial spirit. John Locke thought that we could know ourselves to be thinking things, but that we can not know ourselves to be substances of any sort. Kant agreed with Locke on this point.

I have already discussed Kant's point that experience would be impossible without a thinking mind to interpret our perceptions. Now, I would like to discuss his point that self-knowledge would be impossible if the self did not have any experiences. Kant said that "'I think'... is an empirical proposition... [that] cannot take place without inner sense".¹¹⁵ According to Kant, Descartes' belief that we can know ourselves to be immaterial spirits rests on faulty reasoning. Kant said that

I think myself on behalf of a possible experience, at the same time abstracting from all actual experience; and I conclude therefrom that I can be conscious of my existence even apart from experience and its empirical conditions. In so doing I am confusing the possible abstraction from my empirically determined existence with the supposed consciousness of a possible separate existence of my thinking self, and I thus come to believe that I have knowledge that what is sub-
stantial in me is the transcendental subject.¹¹⁶

In fact, the transcendental subject, or the understanding considered by itself apart from any possible experience, would be unconscious of everything, including itself.

Kant's insight into this matter is shown when we consider that even those who believe the self to be an immaterial spirit, and who believe in an after-life in which the self is separated from this physical world, still can only imagine that after-life in terms of a possible experience.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

I hope that this survey of the views of these four philosophers on the same philosophical problem puts such a perspective on this problem that renders it more understandable. Before I end this paper I would like to discuss Locke's view that we cannot be certain that it is always the same substance that thinks within us.

As far as Locke was concerned, continuity of consciousness was the sole criterion of personal identity. He considered whether the same person could remain even if the substance that thinks inside him were replaced. This reduces to the question, can the same consciousness be transferred from one thinking substance to another? Locke considered this question within the context of taking the substance that thinks to be immaterial. In this context, the question is unanswerable since we do not know anything about the nature of immaterial spirits. But the same problem can be raised even if we suppose that it is some material thing, such as a brain, that thinks within us. If it is possible to transfer the same consciousness from one brain to another, then, according to Locke, the same person remains after the transfer as before.

Suppose a mad scientist devised a machine that could transfer consciousness from one brain to another. If everyone knew about this machine, they would know that it is

possible that it will not always be the same substance that thinks within them, and so they will not count sameness of substance as the criterion of personal identity.

A person whose consciousness was transferred to another brain by this machine would know that his consciousness has been transferred since he would find himself inhabiting another body. This fact distinguishes the case of transfer of consciousness between brains from transfer of consciousness between spirits. For, as Locke pointed out, if it is a spirit that thinks within each of us, then these spirits could transfer consciousness from one to the other without our even knowing it, since they could also transfer from body to body.

Suppose that the consciousness-transfer exists, and that the mad scientist transfers consciousness from one brain to another, but that he also sedates his victims and performs a brain transfer on them. When the unsuspecting victims awaken, they will find themselves within the same bodies, and with the same consciousness as they had before intact, but the substance that thinks within them will have been changed. And they will not even know it. This case is identical to the transfer of consciousness between spirits that Locke considered.

If, on the other hand, a brain transfer were performed without a consciousness transfer also taking place, the victims would know that something fishy had happened to

them, but, furthermore, it would still be the same brain that had the same consciousness within each of them.

If a person knew that consciousness transfers and brain transfers were both possible, and he woke up in somebody else's body, he could not be certain whether he had undergone a brain transfer or a consciousness transfer, and so, he could not be certain whether it was still the same substance that thinks within him.

We do not know that brain transfers and consciousness transfers are impossible. We do know, however, that no one has yet devised a way to perform either feat. Hence, those of us who believe that it is a brain that thinks within each of us can be satisfied that it is always the same substance that thinks within each of us. Since our brains are part of our bodies there is no need for us to refrain from taking sameness of body to be a criterion of personal identity. Of course, we cannot be absolutely certain that it is always the same substance that thinks in us, since it is possible that what thinks in us is an immaterial spirit. We must be satisfied in being practically certain that it is always the same substance that thinks within us.

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- ⁵Ibid., p. 148.
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- ¹⁴Ibid., p. 154.
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- ¹⁹Descartes, Vol. II, p. 96.
- ²⁰Ibid., p. 97.
- ²¹Descartes, Vol. I, p. 157.
- ^{21a}Ibid., p. 189.

²²Descartes, Vol. I, p. 190-191.

²³Ibid., p. 191. To say that something does not presuppose thought is to say that it does not depend upon thought.

²⁴Ibid., p. 190.

²⁵Ibid., p. 191.

²⁶See above, p. 7.

²⁷See above, p. 9.

²⁸See above, p. 6.

²⁹Ibid., Vol II, p. 144.

³⁰John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P.H. Nidditch (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975), see pp. 104 and 55.

³¹Ibid., p. 104.4.

³²Ibid., p. 47.

³³Ibid., see p. 117.23.

³⁴Ibid., see p. 143.1.

³⁵Ibid., see p. 144.4.

³⁶Ibid., p. 143.

³⁷Ibid., p. 163.

³⁸Ibid., pp. 108-109.

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⁴⁰Ibid., p. 405.2.

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⁴²Ibid., p. 538.

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- ⁵⁹See above, p. 8.
- ⁶⁰Ibid., p. 445.11.
- ⁶¹Ibid., pp. 108-109.
- ⁶²See above, pp. 6 and 13.
- ⁶³See above, pp. 8 and 13.
- ⁶⁴Ibid., p. 228.
- ⁶⁵Ibid., p. 229.
- ⁶⁶Ibid., p. 344.
- ⁶⁷Ibid., p. 337.
- ⁶⁸Ibid., p. 338.13.
- ⁶⁹Ibid., p. 538.1.

⁷⁰David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. P.H. Nidditch, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 212.

⁷¹Ibid., see p. 4.

⁷²Ibid., see pp. 5-6.

⁷³Ibid., p. 67.

⁷⁴Ibid., see pp. 8-10.

⁷⁵Ibid., pp. 67-68.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 276.

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 275.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 212.

⁷⁹Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, eds., The Collected Dialogues of Plato (New York: Bollingen Foundation, 1963), p. 856.

⁸⁰See above, p. 15.

⁸¹See above, p. 16.

⁸²David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals (reprinted from the 1777 edition by L.A. Selbe-Bigge; 3rd ed. by P.H. Nidditch; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), p. 22.

⁸³Hume, Treatise, p. 16.

⁸⁴See above, p. 19.

⁸⁵Hume, Treatise, p. 16.

⁸⁶Ibid., p. 234.

⁸⁷Ibid., see p. 195.

⁸⁸Ibid., p. 354.

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 252.

⁹⁰Ibid., p. 252.

⁹¹Ibid., p. 253.

- ⁹²Nelson Pike, "Hume's Bundle Theory of the Self: A Limited Defense:", American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. IV, No. 2, April, 1967, see p. 163.
- ⁹³Ibid., p. 163.
- ⁹⁴Ibid., p. 163.
- ⁹⁵Ibid, p. 165.
- ⁹⁶Ibid, p. 164.
- ⁹⁷Hume, Treatise, p. 73.
- ⁹⁸Ibid., p. 35.
- ⁹⁹Robert Paul Wolff, "Hume's Theory of Mental Activity", The Philosophical Review, Vol LXIX, 1960, (Reprinted in Hume; ed. V. C. Chappell; London: MacMillan, 1968), pp. 99-100.
- ¹⁰⁰Hume, Enquiries, p. 22.
- ¹⁰¹Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press; 1965), A 51.
- ¹⁰²Ibid., A90.
- ¹⁰³See above, p. 14.
- ¹⁰⁴Kant, A97.
- ¹⁰⁵Robert Paul Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1973), p. 178.
- ¹⁰⁶Kant, A106.
- ¹⁰⁷Ibid., A112.
- ¹⁰⁸Ibid., A103.
- ¹⁰⁹Ibid., see A121.
- ¹¹⁰Hume Treatise, p. 633.
- ¹¹¹Kant, see A107.
- ¹¹²Locke, see p. 105.4.
- ^{112a}Kant, B152-153.

¹¹³Ibid., B25.

¹¹⁴See above, p. 37.

¹¹⁵Ibid., B429.

¹¹⁶Ibid., B426-427.

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