



Langer, A. I. and Sagarzazu, I. (2018) Bring back the party: personalization, the media and coalition politics. *West European Politics*, 41(2), pp. 472-495. (doi:[10.1080/01402382.2017.1354528](https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2017.1354528))

This is the author's final accepted version.

There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are advised to consult the publisher's version if you wish to cite from it.

<http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/143441/>

Deposited on: 05 July 2017

Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow  
<http://eprints.gla.ac.uk>

# **Bring back the party: Personalization, media and coalition politics**

**Ana Ines Langer**  
**University of Glasgow**

**Iñaki Sagarzazu**  
**Texas Tech University**

What effect, if any, does a change in type of government have on the degree of media personalization? We argue that, the different incentives that single and multi-party governments provide to individual politicians and parties affect the level of media personalization. Where the parties are more involved (i.e. multi-party coalitions) there will be less media personalization. In contrast, where a single individual can command the party, there will be more media personalization. We test these assumptions with a novel dataset created from over one million newspaper articles covering a continuous 24-year period in the UK. We find that the switch to a coalition government in 2010 indeed changed the dynamics of media personalization. These findings not only provide key insights into the phenomenon of personalization but also enable us to better understand some of the potential consequences of changes in government types for power dynamics and democratic accountability.

Key words: Personalization, UK, coalition, media, parties

What effect, if any, does a switch between single and multi-party governments have on the degree of personalization? In the last few decades personalization has often been described as a key characteristic of contemporary politics and political communication (McAllister 1996; Mughan 2000; Poguntke and Webb 2005b; van Aelst, Sheafer and Stanyer 2012). Broadly defined, the process of personalization is understood as an increase over time in the centrality and autonomy of individual politicians at the expense of collective institutions (parties, cabinets and parliaments). Personalization can affect the role of individuals in government, in voting behavior, in campaign communication, and in media coverage, with each of these dimensions potentially reinforcing one another. It is then not surprising that the phenomenon raises strong normative concerns, especially in parliamentary democracies; it does so regarding its potential impact on the balance of power within the executive and between the executive and the legislature, on the role of political parties, on the rationality of electoral behavior, and on the quality of media coverage and therefore on citizens' ability to keep their representatives accountable (see Adams and Maier 2010; Langer 2011 for overviews).

This paper focuses specifically on media personalization. Although media and political personalization are distinct phenomena, they are also interdependent and thus the media dimension of personalization matters well beyond itself (Poguntke and Webb 2005a). In fact, research has demonstrated that although changes in the political dimensions often come first, the degree of media personalization in turn can affect the political behavior, standing, and legitimacy of different political actors (Rahat and Sheafer 2007, 70). For instance, a higher degree of media personalization can enhance the power resources of the prime minister vis-à-vis the cabinet and Parliament as well as affording her more autonomy from the party (Bennister and Heffernan 2012, 786). Similarly, a higher degree of personalization encourages voting behavior based more strongly on individual, rather than (merely), on a partisan basis because 'personalized media coverage primes personalized voting behavior' (Takens et al. 2015, 249).

Personalization research, especially on its media dimensions, has focused mostly on exploring longitudinal trends, with mixed results. While some have found positive (non-linear) trends (Dalton, McAllister and Wattenberg 2000; Karvonen 2010; Krauss and Nyblade 2005; McAllister 2007; Rahat and Sheafer 2007), others report scarcely any

evidence of increase over time (e.g. Kriesi 2012; Vliegenthart, Boomgaarden and Boumans 2011). In relation specifically to the UK, research has provided fairly clear, albeit not unanimous, support for a rise on media personalization, especially for the presidentialization thesis (Boumans, Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2013; Langer 2011; Mughan 2000; but see Kriesi 2012).

In contrast to the growing longitudinal literature, research about the impact of the characteristics of the political system (and especially regime type and electoral and party variables) on the degree of media personalization is rare, especially studies providing actual comparative data (Boumans, Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2013; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000; Holtz-Bacha, Langer and Merkle 2014; Kriesi 2012; Van Aelst et al. 2016). There is nonetheless consensus that institutions are key for explaining variations in the degree of personalization (Dalton, McAllister and Wattenberg 2000; Karvonen 2010; Kriesi 2012; Mughan 2000; Poguntke and Webb 2005b; Van Aelst et al. 2016). Yet, the impact of coalition government dynamics has been generally overlooked, and in fact most often not mentioned at all. Moreover, little to no attention has been paid to how changes in the political setting affects the degree of media personalization. Specifically, to the best of our knowledge, there are no studies focusing on what happens when the type of government changes.

The lack of attention to the impact of coalitions in the degree of media personalization, and especially a switch between systems, is rather puzzling given the significant effect that single vs. multi party governments have on individuals and party dynamics. Research on political institutions has demonstrated how different types of government—and hence changes from one to the other—affect the role of different actors, especially the relationships between individual politicians and collective institutions (Colomer 2002; Laver and Shepsle 1990; Lijphart 2012; Rose 1991). This literature, however, has generally ignored the role of the media. As a result, despite the strong empirical links between the degree of media personalization and the characteristics of political institutions, how changes in the latter affect the former has rarely been analyzed (Rahat and Sheaffer 2007 the most outstanding exception).

Thus, our research question asks: what effect, if any, does a switch between single and multi-party governments have on the degree of media personalization? Although type of government is key, it cannot be assumed that the differences will automatically transfer

across systems. The impact of the change in type of government is mediated by institutional variables and norms; for instance, those of a majoritarian democracy in the UK. As such, the overall characteristics of the system are not transformed overnight, but there are important adjustments. In this regard, as will be discussed below, much of the coalition politics literature points out multi-party governments survive through complex arrangements that enable parties to cooperate rather than to fight. This cooperation typically expands the role of parties and diffuses power across a number of cabinet offices (reducing those of top officials such as the Prime Minister, or Minister of Finance). In other words, the presence of coalition governments tends to diminish the degree of political personalization.

In light of these findings we ask whether the same process applies to media personalization. Although the media in some ways mirrors the developments taking place in the political system, the characteristics of the coverage are strongly shaped by a number of other factors that have to do with news values, journalistic routines and norms, and market conditions (O'Neill and Harcup 2009; Shoemaker and Reese 2013). Hence, a change in the degree of media personalization due to the presence of a coalition can be expected but not assumed, and thus needs to be empirically tested.

The scarcity of data in this regard is in contrast to the empirical reality. While there are a significant number of countries that have either just coalitions or single party governments, there are also many that change between arrangements. As Figure 1 shows, for instance, about half of OECD countries have switched between single party and multi-party coalition governments quite regularly in the last 40 years.

#### **FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE**

Research on media personalization has for the most part focused on those countries that are stable in terms of type of government, especially Germany, the Netherlands and the UK (e.g. Boumans, Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2013; Mughan 2000; Wilke and Reinemann 2001). Moreover, the former two are also highly similar in terms of a number of coalition-specific features and institutional rules (Martin and Vanberg 2008, 506). For the UK case, which had a coalition government from 2010 to 2015, there have not been studies analyzing the impact of this change on media personalization, or personalization more generally (bar Bennister and Heffernan 2015)

We test our theoretical expectations in the UK using a novel longitudinal dataset that spans a period of over 24 years. The UK is especially suited for our aims firstly because of its long history of single party governments and secondly because of the positive trends found in the degree of media personalization over time (Boumans, Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2013; Langer 2007, 2011; Mughan 2000). Furthermore, the existence of a coalition government from 2010 to 2015 allows us to test our hypotheses in a least-likely scenario. That is, if we are able to find differences in the level of media personalization in single party vs. coalition governments in this highly personalized case with strong norms of single-party government, then it could be expected that similar changes take in place in other settings.

This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we discuss the concept of media personalization followed by how political institutions are expected to shape it, in particular coalition politics. After we present our hypotheses, we proceed to describe the research design and to present our data and analysis. We conclude with a discussion of our findings and its implications for understanding personalization of politics, types of governments, and the interaction between the two.

### **The Personalization of politics and its media dimensions**

As discussed above, the central tenet of the personalization of politics literature is that there has been an increase over time in the centrality and autonomy of individual politicians at the expense of collective institutions (parties, cabinets and parliaments) which is manifested in, and in turn is reinforced by, personalized media coverage. Related to this concept, the somewhat contentious presidentialization of politics thesis states there has been a shift in power resources and accountability within parties and governments, comprised of more leader-centred electoral processes, greater accumulation of leaders' power resources within the executive and growing mutual autonomy between leaders and their parliamentary supporters' (Webb and Poguntke 2013, 653).

Media personalization is also best understood as a multi-dimensional concept. Most of the recent literature (e.g. Adam and Maier 2010; Karvonen 2010; Langer 2011; van Aelst, Sheafer and Stanyer 2012) agrees that it is necessary to distinguish between at least two dimensions: firstly, a change in the overall visibility of different actors, specifically from collective institutions to individuals; and secondly, a shift in the focus of that attention, with

a greater emphasis on the personalities of politicians and especially their personal—rather than strictly political—dimensions. van Aelst, Sheafer and Stanyer (2012) label these two categories of media personalization as individualization and privatization. We focus in this paper on the former.

Within individualization it is necessary to distinguish two sub-dimensions based on the two collective actors that are said to lose prominence as a result of personalization: political parties and cabinets. The first dimension is fairly straightforward: personalization implies more attention to individual politicians relative to the party they represent. Within this, *general* (van Aelst, Sheafer and Stanyer 2012) or *decentralized* (Balmas et al. 2014) *personalization* refers to an increase in relative attention towards all individual politicians, whereas *centralized* or *concentrated personalization* is specifically in relation to individuals at the top. The second dimension is closely associated with the concept of the ‘presidentialization of politics’ (Foley 2000, Mughan 2000, Poguntke and Webb 2005), which in relation to the media is expected to lead to a *‘leadership stretch’*: coverage that is even more leader/prime minister-centered (they have always been the focal point of coverage) and that might have ‘the effect of displacing cabinet ministers into relative obscurity and of marginalizing other political institutions to the periphery of public attention’ (Foley 2004, 293). It also makes sense to incorporate in our conceptualization, as some others have done (Boumans, Boomgaarden and Vliegthart 2013; McAllister 2011; van Aelst, Sheafer and Stanyer 2012), an in-between approach, where not only the leader but a small elite of *heavy weight* party/government individuals increasingly dominate the coverage. Within government, this elite is generally defined as ministers occupying one of the Great Offices of State, i.e. Finance, Foreign Affairs, and Home Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister, where present.

The different dimensions of media personalization, and specifically individualization, are summarized in Table 1.

**Table 1: Dimensions of media personalization (individualization)**

<b>Dimension/definition</b>	<b>Increased attention to</b>	<b>Relative to</b>
<b>Decentralized (or general) personalization</b>	All individual cabinet members	Party; cabinet
<b>Centralized personalization (Presidentialization and leadership stretch)</b>	Head of government	Party; all other cabinet members; ministers at top departments or 'great offices'
<b>Centralized personalization (Heavy weights)</b>	Ministers at top departments or 'great offices'	Party; lower ranked ministers

**Coalition governments: a challenge to the personalization of politics?**

How do we expect the switch to a coalition government to affect the personalization of politics? Although as shown in the previous section research about personalization—and especially that focusing on the media—has generally overlooked the impact of the distinctive dynamics of multi-party governments, the literature about coalitions, both in general as well as some work focusing specifically on the UK during 2010-2015 (Atkins 2015; Bennister and Heffernan 2012, 2015), does enable us to draw some hypotheses. It is worth highlighting again that the characteristics of the coverage tend to reflect changes in the institutional realm but are also strongly shaped by a number of other factors which have to do with news values, journalistic routines and norms, and market conditions. Hence change in the degree of media personalization due to the presence of a coalition cannot be assumed. First, we discuss what we know about the impact of coalitions on the role of political parties, followed by their effect on the role of the prime minister and the rest of the cabinet.

During coalition governments, there are several reasons to expect parties—defined both as an institutionalized collective actor and a group of individuals acting more or less coordinately under the same 'label' (Vercesi 2016)—to play a greater role than in single-party governments. For starters, there are more parties in government and hence more



relevant party-related activity. But it is not just about numbers. Gay, Schleiter and Belu (2015) summarize well the challenges that coalitions bring for parties:

‘In single-party governments party cohesion is equal to government cohesion. As a result, government cohesion is high on average, which limits the need for negotiation and compromise and the frequency of open disagreements in the day-to-day management of government. This benefits the day-to-day management of government priorities by the executive. In contrast, coalitions require parties with different policy aims, divergent electoral priorities, competing desires to control ministerial portfolios and different intrinsic group identities to work together’ (Gay, Schleiter and Belu 2015, 119).

As a result of these dynamics, coalitions necessitate policy and communication coordination as well as bargaining and oversight mechanisms across the different members of government and their legislative parties (Martin 2004; Sagarzazu and Klüver 2017; Zubek and Klüver 2015). This makes the party as collective actor more prominent, as well as expanding the number and roles of party actors involved in government-related activities. In addition, when two (or more) parties govern together, there is more potential for conflict. Given that conflict is one of most influential news values (O’Neill and Harcup 2009; Semetko and Valkenburg 2000), this dynamic is particularly likely to generate an increase in news coverage of the party, and hence lower media personalization. Conflict emerges not only because of disagreements across parties but also because of the likely presence of greater intra-party discontent, which is a typical coalitional problem (Vercesi 2016). This is particularly likely to be the case in countries like the UK where single-party governments are the norm because in addition to policy compromises, which to an extent characterize any coalition, intra-party discontent is also likely to arise from the reduced number of ministerial portfolios available for the party and the perceived failure of the leader to win the election outright. For example, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government in the UK endured unprecedented levels of intra-party dissent, including backbench rebellions (Atkins 2015; Heppell 2014). Drawing on the above, we can formulate the first of our hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1:

*During the coalition government there will be decreases in both centralized and decentralized media personalization vis-à-vis the party.*

Secondly, as a consequence of the way politics plays out in coalitions, the head of government can be expected to lose some of their pre-eminence vis-à-vis cabinet ministers. Generally speaking, the levels of the Prime Minister's power are understood to be greatly influenced by his/her freedom to hire and fire cabinet ministers; the degree of autonomy to set the government's and parliament's agenda; and the ability to get his/her preferred policies accepted and enacted in Parliament (O'Malley 2007). In these regards, the UK prime minister's power has been consistently regarded to be at the stronger end of the continuum (King 1994; Lijphart 2012; O'Malley 2007; Rose 1991), with the process of presidentialization arguably stretching it—at times at least—further (Poguntke and Webb 2005a).

But, regardless of the starting point, how much heads of government can make use of these power resources will be strongly affected by the composition of the government. In this regard, as Andeweg (2000) highlights, the literature quite unanimously concludes that heads of single-party majority governments are in a much better position to make use of whatever formal powers are available to them than heads of coalition governments. In fact, each of the dimensions above are likely to be negatively affected by the existence of a coalition government both because of the presence of the junior partner(s) and the weakened power resources of the prime minister vis-à-vis the party. As a result, in opposition to the presidentialization thesis, where power within the executive increasingly concentrates in the Prime Minister, research has shown that coalitions disperse power across the cabinet as a result of the weakened ability of the premier to command the cabinet and party (Bennister and Heffernan 2012, 2015) as well as because of the mechanisms in place to keep control of the coalition pact (Carroll and Cox 2012). These studies have not addressed, however, the role of the media. Nonetheless, given the relationship between the two we can draw the following hypothesis

*Hypothesis 2A:*

*During the coalition government there will be decreases in media 'presidentialization' (i.e. relative visibility of the prime minister vis-à-vis ministers, both of the Great Offices and the rest of the cabinet);*

The fact that the head of government is expected to be weaker 'does not imply that coalition governments are models of ministerial equality' (Andeweg 2000, 383). The functional equivalent of a powerful prime minister is very often present in the form of a

collective coalition leadership (Andeweg 2000). For instance this was the case in the UK Conservative-Liberal Democratic coalition with the so-called 'Quad' composed by both party leaders, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and his second-in-command from the Lib-Dems (Hayton 2014). Moreover, because of the power-sharing arrangements of the coalition, it is usually the case that the party leaders of the other member(s) of the coalition take some of the most important offices (Andeweg 2000). This has been the case for example in the German coalition tradition, where the junior partner gets the Vice-chancellorship and the Foreign Affairs Ministry. In addition, ministers of the junior party, regardless of the size of their departments, tend to have more prominence than that normally associated with their portfolio because of their role in overseeing the senior party (Carroll and Cox 2012). Furthermore, and more specifically regarding media coverage, these ministers are likely to get more attention than their post generally attracts because of their potential newsworthiness as voices of intra-coalition conflict and dissent.

As such, while we hypothesized that the prime minister will lose visibility vis-à-vis the Great Offices and the rest of the cabinet (2a above), there are countervailing forces regarding the prominence of the Great Office vs. other ministers. Thus our final hypothesis states that:

#### *Hypothesis 2B*

*During the coalition government the other dimension of centralized personalization, 'heavy weights' (i.e. ministers in Great Offices vs the rest of the cabinet) will not show significant change.*

### **Research Design**

Having defined the hypotheses, we now proceed to test these theoretical expectations. To do so we will first define our case of study. This will be followed by a description of the dataset we collated and how we created our independent and dependent variables.

#### **Case: UK**

The UK presents a unique opportunity for testing our hypotheses. During our time frame the UK had three single party governments under both the Labour and Conservative parties followed by a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government, in place from

April 2010 to May 2015, which was replaced by a single party Conservative government. Moreover, in the UK, as discussed above, most previous studies have found a high degree of media personalization as well as a positive trend over time, hence making it an ideal case for exploring whether the change in government type disrupts structural trends (Boumans, Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2013; Langer 2007, 2011; Mughan 2000). Furthermore, as the UK has had a long history of single party governments it could be expected that politics as usual would prevail. These characteristics make this case a natural experiment of sorts, one which allows us to test how media personalization is affected by the change in government type in a least-likely scenario. As such, if our least-likely case shows evidence of a diminishing level of media personalization during the coalition government then similar changes are also likely to apply in other settings, effectively highlighting the significance of the interrelationship between institutions—and their changes— and norms both in relation to government and media.

## **Data**

In order to analyze how media personalization is affected by the presence of a coalition government we proceeded to collect newspaper articles from the seven UK newspapers with widest circulation, including both broadsheets (*The Guardian*, *The Daily Telegraph*, *The Times* and the *Financial Times*) and tabloids (the *Daily Mail*, the *Daily Mirror* and the *Sun*). The time frame under study is 10<sup>th</sup> of April 1992 (after the re-election of the Conservative government led by John Major) to 13<sup>th</sup> of July 2016 (last day of David Cameron's as Prime Minister), hence continuously covering day-to-day coverage for over 24 years<sup>1</sup>. This time frame allows us to cover four different Prime Ministers (including those often regarded as epitomes of collegial and 'presidentialized' leaders), a change of Prime Minister midway between elections, four general elections and, crucially for our aims, a coalition government, and a subsequent majority government. These settings provide a unique opportunity to evaluate the effect that a change in the type of government has on the degree of media personalization.

The newspaper articles in our dataset were collected from searches on the LexisNexis database. The search strategy followed the operationalizations of the concepts

---

<sup>1</sup> Due to Lexis-Nexis availability, for three of the newspapers we have only partial data: The Mirror starts in 29<sup>th</sup> May 1995 and The Sun and the Daily Telegraph from 1<sup>st</sup> January 2000.

explained above. We first collected the names of every individual who sat in cabinet during the period under study, finding a total of 147 ministers. We then use this list to search in Lexis Nexis. First, we searched all articles that mentioned each of these individuals plus the Prime Minister by full name during the period(s) they were in post<sup>2</sup>. We used both first and last name<sup>3</sup> to minimize the number of false positives<sup>4</sup>. Secondly, we searched for articles mentioning the party/parties in government using the name of the party and its variations<sup>5</sup>. In order to systematically exclude false positives, we only downloaded articles that mentioned the party name with a capital letter at least once.<sup>6</sup>

In total, we found over 1.9 million newspaper articles in our 24-year period for members of the cabinet and governing parties. However, as each article is counted only once in the process of building our dataset, regardless of how many of the actors it mentions, this leaves a total of 1.1 million unique newspaper articles. The numbers varied across newspaper titles. In line with the size and style of each outlet, the three tabloids plus the Financial Times have a lower average than broadsheets: around 7,000 and 10,000 newspaper articles per year respectively.

Once all articles were downloaded, we carried out systematic manual checks to deal with any errors on the processes of downloading and archiving. Then we proceeded to aggregate the articles based on our operationalization of media personalization (Table 1). We grouped cabinet posts into: (1) the Prime Minister; (2) Top ministers which include the

---

<sup>2</sup> For ministers from the House of Lords we had a threefold search strategy. We first searched for the combination of titles (e.g. Lady/Baroness or Lord/Baron) and last name. Then we included the title, one or several of the forenames and last names, before we added, in a last step, all combinations of the first and last names without the title.

<sup>3</sup> We also included the short version of the first names into the search string, when this is how the minister was generally known, e.g. Ed Miliband as well as Edward Miliband.

<sup>4</sup> In order to check the robustness of this search strategy, for a sample of ten ministers we also searched by last name only: in 89.7 percent of the articles the full name was used at least once. Moreover, there were no noteworthy differences between the two samples.

<sup>5</sup> The variations included Conservative, Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats and Lib Dems, and for the Conservative party also Tory and Tories.

<sup>6</sup> By including only those articles which also featured capitalized 'Labour' or 'Conservative', we were able to systematically exclude articles not referring to the political parties such as mentions to 'labour market' or 'conservative estimates'.

three 'Great Offices of State': the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Home Secretary, and the Foreign Secretary plus the Deputy Prime-Minister (whenever the post was in use); and (3) Ministers: the rest of the cabinet.<sup>7</sup>

### **Dependent Variables**

Once the dataset was cleaned of duplicates, we proceeded to aggregate all this information to a count of all newspaper articles for each month for the four groups of offices described above. In total our dataset covers over 24 years (1992-2016). However, for one of those years (1992), it covers only nine months as the timeframe starts after the April general election of 1992, and for 2016 it covers only six months as we ended collection with David's Cameron resignation as PM. We divided the sample by newspaper type because of the differences that previous research has found (Kriesi 2012; Vliegthart, Boomgaarden and Boumans 2011). This makes a total of 294 monthly observations for each of tabloids and broadsheets.

Using this monthly data we proceeded to create our eight dependent variables (see figure 2), which cover the different dimensions of media personalization discussed in Table 1. Because absolute figures are affected by the growth over time in newspaper pagination (Langer 2007) as well as the fact that some sources are not available for the full period, we measure personalization based on ratios. Ratios, which represent relative visibility (i.e. one actor vis-à-vis another) and control for these variations as well as any potential issues with archiving by Lexis-Nexis, are the best basis to test our hypotheses. It is also how typically it has been done in the literature (Dalton, McAllister and Wattenberg 2000; Langer 2011; Mughan 2000; Wattenberg 1991). As such our dependent variables are references of individuals or sets of individuals vs. parties (figure 2.A) and references between different individuals or sets of individuals (i.e. one actor or set of actors relative to others) as depicted in figure 2.B.<sup>8</sup>

### **FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE**

---

<sup>7</sup> Table 1 in the online appendix lists all the cabinet offices included in our study.

<sup>8</sup> Because of the skewed distribution of the ratios we proceed to log-normalize our dependent variable.

Figure 2 suggests the presence of some interesting trends, but what is most striking is that there are considerable variations throughout. Figure 2A for instance shows that in almost all cases the visibility of the parties increase during elections. Also, the Prime Minister sees an increase in reporting since 1997, in line with the upward trends found in some of the literature; this trend however changes circa 2010 with the coalition government. The relative visibility of the Great Offices has also shown growth but there is also a clear drop in the late 2000's, probably as a result of Gordon Brown—an exceptionally powerful minister—moving from Finance to the premiership in 2007. The patterns in Figure 2B (top offices vs. other offices) are also varied but overall suggest the presence of centralized personalization, with a 'Brown effect' again present in most figures; the relative visibility of the PM however drops with the arrival of the coalition government and raises again after 2015.

### **Independent Variables**

To test our theoretical expectation that the change to a coalition government will be associated with a lower degree of personalization, we included a dummy variable with a value of one (1) if the government is a *coalition* and a zero (0) otherwise.

The most important—albeit not uncontested—finding of the literature on media personalization so far, especially for the UK, has been the existence of a *time trend* (see above). Since, as discussed below, the inclusion of a trend variable does not bias the estimates of our coefficients (Box-Steffensmeier Janet M. and Smith 1996) we decided to include it for theoretical reasons. As such, similar to Boumans, Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart (2013), our first control variable is a (linear) count for every month in our dataset.

We furthermore control for a number of variables that are known to affect the degree of personalization and/or the characteristics of coverage more generally. This includes first seasonal variations due to the *summer recess* (specifically August), because media coverage has quite distinctive characteristics during what is known as the 'silly season' (Franklin 2005); secondly, *campaign* periods, specifically the months affected by the dissolution of parliament: thirdly the months where there were changes of cabinet personnel either due to cabinet *reshuffles* or more broadly *change of government*, and a

dummy variable to account for the months since the *EU referendum* was announced until it was held (May-July 2016). In addition, we controlled for months where there were *major international summits* (i.e. meetings of the European Commission, G8 or G20) as it is the kind of event that has been hypothesized to increase presidentialization (Poguntke and Webb 2005a) and a previous study has shown that some of these have indeed affected the relative media visibility of different actors (Boumans, Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2013). We also control for newspaper type (i.e. broadsheets and tabloids) as previous studies on personalization (Kriesi 2012; Vliegenthart, Boomgaarden and Boumans 2011) as well as political coverage more generally have found significant differences between the two (Franklin 2005) with the latter associated with more simplified and personalized narratives (Boumans, Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2013). Due to the unique situation that existed after Tony Blair's re-election in 2005, where there was great party pressure to push Blair out and promote Gordon Brown as the new Labour leader and Prime Minister (Quinn 2011), we have included a dummy to account for the possibility that the PM-in-waiting factor altered reporting on the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Finally, due to the irregular presence of the Deputy Prime Minister position, we have included a dummy variable to account for those periods with this additional Great Office (Kirkup and Thornton 2015). These last two variables will only be used in the models including the Great offices (and hence the Chancellor and DPM respectively).

## **Analysis**

Once the dataset was created we proceeded to analyze the extent to which a switch to a coalition government affects the degree of media personalization. Since we have a dataset constructed over time our first task is to check the time series properties of our dependent variables, specifically in order to remove time-dependent noise. To do this we carried out three steps. First, we checked for the presence of a Unit Root (using the Dickey Fuller and KPSS tests) and made sure our dependent variables were stationary.<sup>9</sup> The tests for the presence of a unit root concluded that our series were stationary, and trend

---

<sup>9</sup> Due to the panel structure of our dataset, where we have an observation per newspaper type per month, we performed the Dickey Fuller and KPSS tests first for the broadsheet sample and second for the tabloid sample. Results can be provided upon request.



stationary, and as such did not need to be trend corrected (Box-Steffensmeier Janet M. and Smith 1996). Second, we used the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions to identify the lag structure of our dependent variables. Based on this analysis we determined that our four series with Party as the denominator have a three-month lag structure (Table 3), while our politicians time series have a five-month lag structure (Table 4). Given these lag structures we have included in each of the models the appropriate number of time lags (as recommended by Box and Jenkins (1970)), this means for instance that where the lag structure is a three-month lag (an AR(3) model) we include  $Y_{t-1}$ ,  $Y_{t-2}$ , and  $Y_{t-3}$ . Finally, after running each regression we performed the Portmanteau (Q) test to identify the presence of white noise in our residuals, of which there was none.<sup>10</sup>

After doing all the necessary time series tests we proceeded to test our hypotheses. We did this by running two sets of linear regressions. The first set included the variables where we test the first hypothesis, i.e. that there is a decrease in media personalization in the parties dimension because of the coalition government (see Table 2). The second set tests hypothesis 2A and 2B, which refer to personalization of different groups of ministers vis-à-vis each other and the Prime Minister (see Table 3).

#### **TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE**

Table 2 shows the results for the four regressions where we compare politicians and parties. The first column compares only the Prime Minister, the second compares only the Great Offices (Prime Minister excluded), the third all other ministers, and the last column compares the full Cabinet to the party/parties in government. The results for the most part confirm hypothesis 1 in both the centralized and decentralized dimensions: there is a significant decrease in three of the four ratios during the coalition government, most especially for the Prime Minister. The third model, other ministers vs party, has a non-significant coefficient for coalition. We argue that this is the case because—as hypothesis 2 suggests based in the literature (see above)—in coalition governments lower ranked Ministers have a greater, and potentially more conflictive and hence newsworthy, role as

---

<sup>10</sup> Due to the panel structure of our dataset, where we have an observation per newspaper type per month, we performed the Q test first for the broadsheet sample and second for the tabloid sample. We report both scores.

representatives of the junior party (or parties). This increased attention to other ministers is also consistent with the findings of our second hypothesis discussed below.

Figure 3 shows the change in the average number of monthly articles mentioning the government parties based on the margins obtained by changing the coalition variable while holding all other variables constant. For the PM model, there is an average increase per month of about 140 extra articles mentioning the government parties during coalition times versus single party governments. Given that in our sample the monthly average of articles referring to the government party/ies is roughly 900, this is about a 14% increase in the attention that the party receives as a consequence of the switch to a coalition government. For the other three models the effect is smaller, 7%, 3%, and 5% increase party vs. Great Offices, other Cabinet Ministers, and all Cabinet respectively. The control variables in the models behave mostly as it would be expected from previous findings in the literature.

**FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE**

Table 3 tests the expectations from our second hypothesis. The first three columns show that during the coalition government there is a decrease in media 'presidentialization' or 'leadership stretch' (i.e. relative visibility of the Prime Minister vis-à-vis cabinet members, both 'heavy weights' and others). The data confirms hypothesis 2a: the change to a coalition government reduces the centrality of the Prime Minister relative to the cabinet.. On average there are 150, 113 and 110 fewer articles per month for the Prime minister compared to the entire cabinet, to just the Great Offices, or just to the cabinet without the Great Offices respectively (see Figure 4); this is roughly a 18%, 14% and 13% decrease during the coalition. Also, contrary to hypothesis 2.b but consistent with the findings in hypothesis 1, the relative visibility of the occupants of the Great Offices vs. the rest of the cabinet ministers also sees a statistically significant decrease from being in a coalition versus a single-party government of about 7%. The control variables mostly behave in the way that would be expected.

**TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE**

**FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE**

## **Conclusion**

So far the bulk of systematic research carried out on personalization of politics has focused on finding, or disproving, the existence of an upward time trend. These studies, while providing significant insight into these dynamics, have for the most part shied away from understanding how changes in institutional settings might affect this phenomenon. In this paper we make a first attempt at understanding how a change in type of government, between a single party and a multi-party coalition, affects the degree of the personalization of politics, specifically in its media dimension.

We find that the change to a coalition government is associated with a lower level of media personalization especially media ‘presidentialization’ as the Prime Minister loses prominence in the coverage in relation to both the party and other cabinet ministers. These findings are reinforced by the fact that our dataset includes also the first majority government after the coalition period where, to a large extent, there was a reversal to pre-coalition media personalization patterns. This demonstrates firstly that the presence of a coalition government altered the dynamics, hence reinforcing the importance of paying attention to changes in type of government and more broadly to institutional variables when analyzing personalization. Secondly, it shows that although the degree of media personalization—at least in the UK—has increased over time and according to our data continues to do so, for the most part; these trends are clearly neither smooth nor irreversible. In fact, fluctuations very much characterize the phenomenon, and hence it is essential for further research to try to uncover the factors that explain them. Thirdly, our analysis reveals that different dimensions of personalization were affected by the change of government to varying degrees, reinforcing the importance of distinguishing them conceptually and empirically. Finally, the analysis confirms that, despite mediatization (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999; Strömbäck 2008) and hence the increasing influence of the media logic over politics, changes in the political realm continue to strongly shape the characteristics of media coverage.

In this regard, although our analysis does not identify causal relationships, it is rather evident that the institutional change, and hence the political dimensions, came first. At the same time, it is likely that the changes in the degree of media personalization in turn shaped the behavior of politicians, hence closing the feedback loop on the Politics-Media-Politics model that has been found in the past for personalization (Rahat and Sheaffer 2007) and more generally for the media-politics relationship (Wolfsfeld 2011). There is need for

further studies however that enable us to better understand how political personalization affects the media dimension and vice versa.

In relation to the literature on coalitions, our analysis confirms several of its findings from a perspective of media coverage of the coalitions and its actors. First, in terms of power dynamics it confirms the extent to which parties are crucial for the day-to-day of multi-party governments; and the weakening of the power resources of the prime minister vis-à-vis other members of the cabinet, as seen through media visibility. This finding is important because it shows that media reporting seems to adapt to the particular dynamics that exist in coalition governments: as power is diffused between different cabinet members and coalition parties so is media reporting. In other words, the political dynamics found in the literature on coalition politics (Bennister and Heffernan 2015; Carroll and Cox 2012; Martin 2004; Sagarzazu and Klüver 2015; Zubek and Klüver 2015) seem to be reflected in, and most importantly strengthened by, media reporting.

Second, as argued by Müller and Meyer (Müller and Meyer 2010a; Müller and Meyer 2010b) coalition parties can, and indeed do, use sources external to the coalition for patrolling and exerting control over other actors in the coalition. In this regard, our analysis of the changes in the coverage of coalition ministers and parties suggests that in multi-party governments the media can help coalition parties by providing an external source of ministerial behavior reporting, hence lessening the problem of imperfect information (Lupia and McCubbins 1998).

Our findings also pose interesting questions about the normative implications of personalization, both in general and specifically in the presence of coalitions. On the one hand, the changes we found can be regarded as a positive development as both parties and cabinets play a key role in democratic politics—especially in parliamentary democracies—which is precisely one of the key reasons why the phenomenon of personalization triggers alarm bells. On the other hand, the fact that coalition governments change the dynamics of media reporting of the cabinet and the parties poses interesting questions regarding clarity of responsibility. It has been long argued (e.g. Powell and Whitten (1993)) that it is easier for citizens to hold elected officials accountable in single-party governments because there are clearer lines of responsibilities. This is in contrast to coalition governments which, it is argued, make it more difficult for voters to reward/punish good/bad performance. In this regard, personalization can play a crucial role because: ‘focusing attention on the prime

minister as the individual who is accountable for the government's collective performance, [makes] it easier [for the public] to deliver reward or punishment, particularly when compared to an abstract collective' (McAllister 2011, 64). If, as found here, media reporting of coalitions places less emphasis on the prime minister, and more coverage on the rest of the cabinet as well as the government parties, voters could arguably have a harder time assessing government performance. Obviously our findings cannot tell us which of these two interpretations of democratic accountability are more appropriate. But they do highlight the theoretical and normative relevance of investigating media personalization.

Our analysis is particularly timely because, while the UK coalition government might have been an exception to the rule of single-party governments, it is not an isolated case. In the UK itself, the 2017 snap election failed to return a majority government. Moreover, for instance Spain, another country with stable single-party governments backed by a strong mostly two-party system, has seen, since the return to democracy, the emergence of new competitive parties and the real possibility of a multi-party government. In the opposite direction Denmark, after a history of coalition governments since 1982, elected in 2015 a single-party minority government. Furthermore, there are—as shown in figure 1—a significant number of OECD democracies that constantly switch between single and multi-party governments. These trends make it highly relevant to extend the study of personalization of politics to include changes in types of government. More broadly, it calls for studies of the effects of changes in types of governments to pay greater attention to the role of media coverage.

### **Acknowledgements**

We would like to thank Johannes Gruber for the invaluable assistance with data collection, and Orian Brook, Heike Klüver, the journal's anonymous reviewers and the participants at the Comparative Politics Research Cluster at the University of Glasgow and at the annual conference of the International Journal Press/Politics for their helpful comments.

### **ORCID**

Ana Ines Langer: 0000-0002-5331-544X

Iñaki Sagarzazu: 0000-0001-8350-0454

### **Disclosure statement**

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

### **Notes on contributors**

**Ana Ines Langer** is a senior lecturer at the School of Social and Political Science at the University of Glasgow. Her research interests focus on political communication and its impact on the democratic process. She has published extensively about the process of personalization of politics. [ana.langer@glasgow.ac.uk]

**Iñaki Sagarzazu** is Assistant Professor in Political Science at Texas Tech University. His research interests are at the intersection of political institutions and communications. His research has been published in journals such as the American Journal of Political Science, the British Journal of Political Science, Political Behavior, Electoral Studies and West European Politics among other journals. [Inaki.sagarzazu@ttu.edu]

## References

- Adam, Silke, and Michaela Maier. (2010). 'Personalization of Politics. A Critical Review and Agenda for Research.' *Annals of the International Communication Association*, 34 (1), 213-57.
- Andeweg, Rudy B. (2000). 'Ministers as Double Agents? The Delegation Process between Cabinet and Ministers.' *European Journal of Political Research*, 37 (3), 377-95.
- Atkins, Judi. (2015). 'Introduction: Conflict, Cooperation and the Cameron–Clegg Government.' *The Political Quarterly*, 86 (1), 81-84.
- Balmas, Meital, Gideon Rahat, Tamir Sheafer, and Shaul R Shenhav. (2014). 'Two Routes to Personalized Politics: Centralized and Decentralized Personalization.' *Party Politics*, 20 (1), 37-51.
- Bennister, Mark, and Richard Heffernan. (2012). 'Cameron as Prime Minister: The Intra-Executive Politics of Britain's Coalition Government.' *Parliamentary Affairs*, 65 (4), 778-801.
- . (2015). 'The Limits to Prime Ministerial Autonomy: Cameron and the Constraints of Coalition.' *Parliamentary Affairs*, 68 (1), 25-41.
- Boumans, Jelle W, Hajo G Boomgaarden, and Rens Vliegthart. (2013). 'Media Personalisation in Context: A Cross-National Comparison between the UK and the Netherlands, 1992–2007.' *Political Studies*, 61 (S1), 198-216.
- Box-Steffensmeier Janet M., and Renee M. Smith. (1996). 'The Dynamics of Aggregate Partisanship.' *American Political Science Review*, 90 (3), 567-80.
- Box, George E.P., and Gwilym Jenkins. (1970). *Time Series Analysis: Forecasting and Control*. San Francisco: Holden-Day.
- Carroll, Royce, and Gary W Cox. (2012). 'Shadowing Ministers Monitoring Partners in Coalition Governments.' *Comparative Political Studies*, 45 (2), 220-36.
- Colomer, Joseph M. , ed. (2002). *Political Institutions in Europe*. 2nd editon. London and New York: Routledge.
- Dalton, Russell , Ian McAllister, and Martin Wattenberg. (2000). 'Consequences of Partisan Dealignment.' in Russell Dalton and Martin Wattenberg (eds.), *Parties without Partisans. Political Change in Advanced Industrialised Democracies*. New York: Oxford University Press, 37-63.
- Dalton, Russell, and Martin Wattenberg (eds.) (2000). *Parties without Partisans. Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Foley, Michael. (2004). 'Presidential Attribution as an Agency of Prime Ministerial Critique in a Parliamentary Democracy: The Case of Tony Blair.' *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 6, 292-311.
- Franklin, Bob. (2005). *Key Concepts in Journalism Studies*. London: Sage.
- Gay, Oonagh, Petra Schleiter, and Valerie Belu. (2015). 'The Coalition and the Decline of Majoritarianism in the UK.' *The Political Quarterly*, 86 (1), 118-24.
- Hayton, Richard. (2014). 'Conservative Party Statecraft and the Politics of Coalition.' *Parliamentary Affairs*, 67 (1), 6-24.
- Heppell, Timothy. (2014). 'Ministerial Selection and Portfolio Allocation in the Cameron Government.' *Parliamentary Affairs*, 67 (1), 64-79.
- Holtz-Bacha, Christina, Ana Ines Langer, and Susanne Merkle. (2014). 'The Personalisation of Politics in Comparative Perspective: Campaign Coverage in Germany and the United Kingdom.' *European Journal of Communication*, 29 (2), 153-70.
- Karvonen, Lauri. (2010). *The Personalisation of Politics: A Study of Parliamentary Democracies*. Colchester: ECPR Press.
- King, Anthony. (1994). 'Chief Executives in Western Europe.' in I. Budge and D. McKay (eds.), *Developing Democracy*,. London: Sage.
- Kirkup, Jonathan, and Stephen Thornton. (2015). "Everyone Needs a Willie': The Elusive Position of Deputy to the British Prime Minister.' *British Politics*, doi:10.1057/bp.2015.42.
- Krauss, Ellis S., and Benjamin Nyblade. (2005). "'Presidentialization' in Japan? The Prime Minister, Media and Elections in Japan.' *British Journal of Political Science*, 35 (2), 357-68.
- Kriesi, Hanspeter. (2012). 'Personalization of National Election Campaigns.' *Party Politics*, 18 (6), 825-44.
- Langer, Ana Inés. (2007). 'A Historical Exploration of the Personalisation of Politics in the Print Media: The British Prime Ministers 1945-1999.' *Parliamentary Affairs*, 60 (3), 371-87.
- . (2011). *The Personalisation of Politics in the UK: Mediated Leadership from Attlee to Cameron*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Laver, Michael, and Kenneth A. Shepsle. (1990). 'Coalitions and Cabinet Government.' *The American Political Science Review*, 84 (3), 873-90.
- Lijphart, Arend. (2012). *Patterns of Democracy*. New Heaven: Yale University Press.




- Lupia, Arthur, and Mathew D. McCubbins. (1998). *The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know?* New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Martin, Lanny W. (2004). 'The Government Agenda in Parliamentary Democracies.' *American Journal of Political Science*, 48 (3), 445-61.
- Mazzoleni, Gianpietro, and Winfried Schulz. (1999). "'Mediatization" of Politics: A Challenge for Democracy?', *Political Communication*, 16(3), 247-61.
- McAllister, Ian. (1996). 'Leaders.' in Lawrence LeDuc, Richard Noemi and Pipa Norris (eds.), *Comparing Democracies. Elections and Voting in Global Perspective*. London: Sage.
- . (2007). 'The Personalization of Politics.' in Russell J. Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (eds.), *The Handbook of Political Behavior*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 571-88.
- . (2011). 'Political Leaders in Westminster Systems.' in Kees Aarts, Andre Blais and Hermann Schmitt (eds.), *Political Leaders and Democratic Elections*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Mughan, Anthony. (2000). *Media and the Presidentialization of Parliamentary Elections*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Müller, Wolfgang C., and Thomas M. Meyer. (2010a). 'Meeting the Challenges of Representation and Accountability in Multi-Party Governments.' *West European Politics*, 33 (5), 1065-92
- Müller, Wolfgang C., and Thomas M. Meyer. (2010b). 'Mutual Veto? How Coalitions Work.' in Reform Processes and Policy Change: Veto Players and Decision-Making in Thomas König, George Tsebelis and Marc Debus *Modern Democracies* (eds.). New York: Springer.
- O'Malley, Eoin. (2007). 'The Power of Prime Ministers: Results of an Expert Survey.' *International Political Science Review*, 28 (1), 7-27.
- O'Neill, Deirdre, and Tony Harcup. (2009a). 'News Values and Selectivity.' in Karin Wahl-Jorgensen and Thomas Hanitzsch (eds.) *The Handbook of Journalism Studies*, International Communication Association Handbook Series. New York: Routledge, 161-74.
- Poguntke, Thomas, and Paul Webb. (2005a). 'The Presidentialization of Politics in Democratic Societies: A Framework for Analysis.' in Thomas Poguntke and Paul

- Webb (eds.), *The Presidentialization of Politics. A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-25.
- , eds. (2005b). *The Presidentialization of Politics. A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Powell, G. Bingham, and Guy D. Whitten. (1993). 'A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context.' *American Journal of Political Science*, 37 (2), 391-414.
- Quinn, Thomas. (2011). 'From New Labour to New Politics: The British General Election of 2010.' *West European Politics*, 34 (2), 403-11.
- Rahat, Gideon, and Tamir Sheafer. (2007). 'The Personalization(S) of Politics: Israel 1949-2003.' *Political Communication*, 24 (1), 65-80.
- Rose, Richard. (1991). 'Prime Ministers in Parliamentary Democracies.' *West European Politics*, 14 (2), 9-24.
- Sagarzazu, Iñaki, and Heike Klüver. (2017). 'Coalition Governments and Party Competition: Political Communication Strategies of Coalition Parties.' *Political Science Research and Methods*, 5(2), 333-349.
- Semetko, Holli, and P Valkenburg. (2000). 'Framing European Politics: A Content Analysis of Press and Television News.', *Journal of Communication*, 50 (2), 93-109.
- Shoemaker, Pamela J., and Stephen D. Reese. (2013). *Mediating the Message in the 21st Century*. New York: Routledge.
- Strömbäck, Jesper. (2008). 'Four Phases of Mediatization: An Analysis of the Mediatization of Politics.' *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 13 (3), 228-46.
- Takens, Janet, Jan Kleinnijenhuis, Anita van Hoof, and Wouter van Atteveld. (2015). 'Party Leaders in the Media and Voting Behavior: Priming Rather Than Learning or Projection, Political Communication.' *Political Communication*, Online first.
- Van Aelst, Peter, Tamir Shaefer, Nicolas Hube, and Stylianos Papathanassopoulos (2016). 'Personalization.' in Claes de Vreese, Frank Esser and David Nicolas Hopmann (eds.) *Comparing Political Journalism*.
- van Aelst, Peter, Tamir Sheafer, and James Stanyer. (2012). 'The Personalization of Mediated Political Communication: A Review of Concepts, Operationalizations and Key Findings.' *Journalism*, 13 (2), 203-20.
- Vercesi, Michelangelo. (2016). 'Coalition Politics and Inter-Party Conflict Management: A Theoretical Framework.' *Politics & Policy*, 44 (2), 168-219.


- Vliegenthart, R., H. G. Boomgaarden, and J. W. Boumans. (2011). 'Changes in Political News Coverage: Personalization, Conflict and Negativity in British and Dutch Newspapers.' in Kees Brant and Katrin Voltmer (eds), *Political Communication in Postmodern Democracy*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 92-110.
- Wattenberg, Martin P. (1991). *The Rise of Candidate-Centered Politics: Presidential Elections of the 1980s*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Webb, Paul, and Thomas Poguntke. (2013). 'The Presidentialisation of Politics Thesis Defended.' *Parliamentary Affairs*, 66 (3), 646-54.
- Wilke, Jurgen, and Carsten Reinemann. (2001). 'Do the Candidates Matter? Long Term Trends of Campaign Coverage - a Study of the German Press since 1949.' *European Journal of Communication*, 16 (3), 291-314.
- Wolfsfeld, Gadi. (2011). *Making Sense of Media and Politics: Five Principles in Political Communication*: Taylor & Francis.
- Zubek, Radoslaw, and Heike Klüver. (2015). 'Legislative Pledges and Coalition Government.' *Party Politics*, 21 (4), 603-14.

**Figure 1. Number of changes from single party to coalition governments (OECD 1980-2015)**




Source: ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 2016)

**Figure 2.A Rations of personalization – Offices versus government party/parties**



**Figure 2.B Rations of Personalization – Top offices versus lower offices**




**Table 2. Regression coefficients for personalization vis-à-vis governing party/parties**

	<b>PM v Party</b>	<b>Great Offices v Party</b>	<b>Other Ministers v Party</b>	<b>All ministers v Party</b>
Time trend	0.001***	0.0001	-0.001***	0.0001
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Coalition	-0.135***	-0.069**	-0.026	-0.082***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Parliament Dissolved	-0.197***	-0.208***	-0.455***	-0.257***
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)
August Recess	-0.074***	-0.080**	-0.122***	-0.081***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Change of PM/government	0.249***	0.415***	0.727***	0.442***
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.05)
Major international summits	0.121***	0.068**	0.072***	0.085***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Cabinet reshuffles	-0.017	0.050*	0.081***	0.038**
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
PM-in-waiting	-	0.096***	-	0.034
		(0.03)		(0.02)
DPM	-	0.107***	-	0.029**
		(0.03)		(0.14)
Brexit	-0.158*	0.087	-0.043	-0.052
	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.07)
Broadsheet	0.001	0.031*	0.039**	0.017
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Y <sub>t-1</sub>	0.608***	0.648***	0.575***	0.693***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Y <sub>t-2</sub>	0.055	0.032	0.042	-0.031
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Y <sub>t-3</sub>	0.163***	0.091**	0.061	0.131***

	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	-0.271***	-0.158*	0.170***	0.109**
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.05)
N	576.000	576.000	576.000	576.000
F	174	112	94	121
R-sqr	0.788	0.737	0.667	0.750
Q stat (p of $\chi^2$ )				
<i>Broadsheet</i>	51.54 (0.10)	41.62 (0.40)	32.85 (0.78)	53.87 (0.07)
<i>Tabloids</i>	42.75 (0.35)	33.61 (0.75)	23.45 (0.98)	36.59 (0.62)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Confidence levels: \*p < 0.1, \*\*p < 0.05, \*\*\*p < 0.01.

Figure 3. Predicted number of party/parties articles by month





**Table 3: Regression coefficients for personalization of Prime Minister v others**

	<b>PM v Cabinet (Great Offices + Other Ministers)</b>	<b>PM v Great Offices</b>	<b>PM v Other Ministers (Great Offices excluded)</b>	<b>Great Offices v Other ministers</b>
Time trend	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.000***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Coalition	-0.196***	-0.135***	-0.147***	-0.076**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Parliament Dissolved	0.110**	0.011	0.227***	0.198***
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
August Recess	-0.004	-0.003	0.017	0.012
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Change of PM/government	-0.310***	-0.172**	-0.450***	-0.311***
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Major international summits	0.045**	0.050*	0.040	-0.001
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Cabinet reshuffles	-0.071***	-0.058*	-0.089***	-0.039
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
PM-in-waiting	-0.142***	-0.156***		0.045
	(0.03)	(0.04)		(0.04)
DPM	0.011	-0.081***		0.166***
	(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.03)
Brexit	-0.213**	-0.273**	-0.137	0.158
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.12)
Broadsheet	-0.039***	-0.039**	-0.027	0.005
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Y <sub>t-1</sub>	0.541***	0.611***	0.444***	0.447***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Y <sub>t-2</sub>	0.067	0.013	0.151***	0.095**

	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Y <sub>t-3</sub>	0.049	0.067	0.045	0.073
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Y <sub>t-4</sub>	0.041	0.025	0.066	0.048
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Y <sub>t-5</sub>	-0.006	-0.001	0.068*	0.090**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	-0.748***	-0.263***	-0.466***	-0.354***
	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.10)
N	572.000	572.000	572.000	572.000
F	94	76	120	90
R-sqr	0.730	0.687	0.752	0.722
Q stat (p of $\chi^2$ )				
<i>Broadsheet</i>	53.52 (0.07)	35.42 (0.67)	50.28 (0.12)	35.14 (0.68)
<i>Tabloids</i>	45.43 (0.25)	35.05 (0.69)	46.40 (0.22)	32.49 (0.79)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Confidence levels: \*p < 0.1, \*\*p < 0.05, \*\*\*p < 0.01.

Figure 4. Predicted number of articles by month for PM / Great offices

