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Contracting for Reform: The Challenges of Procuring Security Training and Advisory Services in Fragile Environments

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Panel 15. Advances in Contract Management

Thursday, May 15, 2014	
11:15 a.m. – 12:45 p.m.	**Chair: BG Stephen B. Leisenring,** USA, Deputy Director of Contracting, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ***The Efficacy of the Government's Use of Past Performance Information: An Exploratory Study*** Tim Hawkins, Western Kentucky University ***Contracting for Reform: The Challenges of Procuring Security Training and Advisory Services in Fragile Environments*** Nicholas Armstrong, Syracuse University David Van Slyke, Syracuse University ***Price Analysis on Commercial Items Purchases Within the Department of Defense*** Ralucca Gera, Naval Postgraduate School Janie Maddox, Naval Postgraduate School

Contracting for Reform: The Challenges of Procuring Security Training and Advisory Services in Fragile Environments

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Abstract

Scholarship on private military and security companies largely focuses on their regulation and oversight as security and reconstruction service providers. It gives scant attention, however, to their role as *institutional reformers, advisors, and trainers*. This article presents findings of an in-depth case study on the challenges of procuring advising and training services in Afghanistan. Sixty-seven semi-structured interviews were conducted with elite and mid-level officials embedded within the Afghan defense and interior ministries, national army, and national and local polices forces. We evaluate an existing contracting framework for the purchase and integration of complex products with this data and find that rules, relationship strategies, governance mechanisms, and mutual understanding are critical in security sector reform training and advising contracts. Reliance on the private sector to provide these services will likely remain high, thus, a sharp focus on mutually beneficial outcomes that retain flexibility and accountability is necessary over the long run.

Introduction

Over the last two decades, the international community has invested enormously in reforming defense and internal security institutions in fragile states. Security sector reform (SSR)[1] is now an established security assistance model centered on promoting both effectiveness and democratic governance (e.g., civilian control and accountability) of state security forces (Hänggi, 2009; OECD-DAC, 2007). Yet, these programs have produced mixed outcomes at best despite an extensive commitment of financial and human resources (Brzoska & Law, 2007; Scheye & Peake, 2005; Sedra, 2010). Failures and setbacks have led some scholars to conclude that internationally led SSR—and postwar statebuilding more broadly—are simply overambitious, if not misguided, given the historical record (Andersen, 2011; Egnell & Haldén, 2009; Herbst, 2004). Others argue that mixed results suggest that the international community should renew its commitments but implement SSR more judiciously (Call & Wyeth, 2008; Paris & Sisk, 2009; Scheye, 2010).

A key element of smarter SSR programming involves improving the use and oversight of private military and security companies (PMSCs) as training and mentoring service providers to host national security institutions. The literature on PMSCs focuses almost exclusively on contractor legal status, regulation, and oversight as providers of physical security, logistics, and reconstruction services (Avant, 2005; Chesterman &

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[1] SSR is a multinational policy tool aimed at transforming the security architecture (military, intelligence, and law enforcement services; defense and interior bureaucracies; legislative oversight committees; and special courts) in transitioning and post-conflict countries into more effective, professional, and democratically accountable state institutions. The term "security sector" typically applies to this set of core state actors, but it also can include civil society and non-state armed groups, such as local militia, NGO watchdog groups, and the media. (Hänggi, 2009; OECD-DAC, 2007).

Lehnardt, 2007; de Nevers, 2010; Singer, 2008). It gives limited attention to the use of PMSCs as reformers, trainers, and advisors—agents of the state—who promote the reform and development of foreign military and police institutions in conflict-prone states. To date, research has only explains why military and police training is outsourced (Cusumano, 2010; Martin & Wilson, 2011), highlights calls for stronger government regulation and oversight of human rights and rule of law promotion, and recommends stronger analysis of whether the use of PMSCs as foreign trainers actually saves money (Avant, 2002). Yet, with rare exception (Ebo, 2008; Mancini, 2005), the literature views PMSCs "merely as an object of SSR … as bodies to be regulated" rather than as change agents and technical assistance providers implementing donor states' foreign policy (Cusumano, 2010, p. 4).

In extreme cases such as Afghanistan, the overall scale of reconstruction contracts for security, development, logistics, and engineering support greatly overshadow those for training and mentoring services. This situation has led principal auditors—the Special Investigator for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), U.S. Defense and State Department Inspectors General, U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), and U.S. Congressional Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC)—to prioritize investigations of larger purchases (e.g., construction, weapons sales, and logistics support) over smaller and less easily evaluated purchases involving human-to-human capacity building (CWC, 2011; DoD IG & DoS IG, 2011; GAO, 2012a; SIGAR, 2009). Human capital services are critical, however, to developing technical and administrative capacity and infusing democratic substance into state institutions. To date, few efforts at evaluating the procurement and management of these services have occurred. This paper contributes a deeper understanding of the challenges of achieving goal alignment for complex services in a conflict-prone setting.

Through an in-depth case analysis of training and advising efforts across Afghanistan, this paper presents preliminary findings on perspectives gained from 67 ethnographic interviews with diverse stakeholders involved in Afghan security ministry and security force (ANSF) development. Our findings to date suggest that rules, relationship strategies, governance mechanisms, and mutual understanding are critical to using contracts to purchase complex services for SSR. Consequently, the U.S. government needs a contracting framework that deliberately considers the multifactorial challenges of SSR training and advising in complex environments.

Six sections follow. In the next section, we provide background on SSR and contracting for training and advisory services. Next, we introduce the case study, our methodology, and preliminary findings. We evaluate these initial findings against Brown et al.'s (2010) framework for complex products. We highlight parallels to the need for addressing buyer-seller uncertainty and contract incompleteness. However, the model falls short in suggesting context-specific governance mechanisms that would hold up in a complex contracting scenario like Afghanistan. The conclusion overlays the implications of these findings on the public management and contract governance challenges associated with purchasing complex services, such as ministerial training and advising in conflict-prone environments.

The Complexity of Procuring SSR Training and Advisory Services

Outsourcing SSR training and advising services in fragile states complicates the long-term goal of establishing a functioning and accountable security sector in two ways. First, the scale of SSR activities (OECD-DAC, 2007; UN, 2008) and the demand for human and financial capital for capacity and statebuilding efforts far exceed the capabilities of donor[2] governments' expeditionary capacity—the United States included. Consequently, donors rely on a security network of governmental (civilian and military), non-governmental, and private firms to conduct these missions (Cusumano, 2010, p. 8). This presents additional coordination and oversight challenges. Second, SSR necessitates the host-nation state accept—"locally own" (Donais, 2008)—donor-sponsored reforms and programs. In some cases, contracting out technical assistance may place PMSC personnel in a divided principal scenario (Cusumano, 2010, p. 27). This situation creates a dilemma in which PMSCs work under conditions of conflicting interests while seeking cooperation with host nation actors, or worse, they may withhold information or collude with either the host nation or donor state, or both, to protect their long-term interests (Avant, 2005, p. 125).

These contracting issues are common to internationally led statebuilding. Nevertheless, the nature of training and advising foreign security forces adds complexity to overseas contracting in at least three critical ways.

First, there is a significant supply and demand challenge for qualified trainers and advisors. The demand is most acute during large-scale operation and translates into greater reliance on the private sector and other coalition partners, especially for police training (Perito, 2004). Training and advising foreign security forces requires professionals with a unique combination of traits including extensive technical or subject matter expertise; advanced cultural and language training; and distinct personality attributes associated with the ability to influence and resolve conflicts in austere foreign environments (Bayley and Perito, 2010 pp. 120–124, 149–150; Gerspacher, 2012, p. 2; NTM-A, 2011; Panarelli, 2009, p. 3). These highly specialized and desirable experts are in limited supply and difficult to identify without a robust personal network in the military or law enforcement communities. For example, the most qualified U.S. military individuals for these positions are retired military officers and non-commissioned officers with extensive strategic planning, special operations, or logistics backgrounds. Likewise, top candidates from the law enforcement community typically have experience in federal (e.g., the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Marshals, Drug Enforcement Agency, and the Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program), state, or metropolitan law enforcement (e.g., New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Boston) agencies with specialized investigation, anti-gang, counternarcotic, and counterterrorism subunits.

However, federalism complicates the United States' ability to provide consistent rule of law and police training abroad. The United States lacks a national constabulary force—similar to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, French Gendarmerie, or Italian Carabinieri—with a fixed set of national policing standards. Consequently, the pool of available U.S. police trainers and advisors varies significantly in experience, education, and exposure to different state and local policing traditions and criminal procedures, which may contribute to inconsistencies in expertise and advice.

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[2] We use the term donor state throughout this paper to represent nations providing financial, material, or human resources in support of SSR programs in fragile states.

Second, there is wide variation in staffing needs and requirements for training and advisory positions. There are significant differences in both context (ministerial development vs. basic training vs. embedded operational advising) and functions (defense vs. law enforcement) and in the corresponding advisor skills and expertise required across these different settings. For example, military and police trainers require a specific background and aptitude, are usually based out of a fixed training facility, and typically follow a set program of instruction (POI) with little discretion for deviation. Alternatively, embedded advisor positions, when filled by a civilian contractor, are often filled individually and daily tasks and interactions vary widely depending on the operational context (strategic vs. tactical). This variation is most prevalent at the ministerial level, which demands a careful mix of expert advisors—military officers, defense and law enforcement civil servants, and contract advisors—to develop enterprise-level capabilities[3] (Gerspacher, 2012; NTM-A, 2011; Panarelli, 2009; author interviews, see Appendix A[4]).

Priorities often change in a dynamic environment. Consequently, designing contracts with the flexibility to allow leaders to maintain continuity between advisors and their host nation counterparts—while reallocating available talent to emerging needs—is a significant challenge. Yet designing such contracts demands a degree of task specificity and certainty that seldom exists, and writing rules into formal and complete contracts for contract personnel that possess the right range of skills, capabilities, and experiences is difficult to standardize in a legal document. Professional qualities—such as the appropriate exercise of discretion on sensitive policy issues with senior officials in which trust and cultural sensitivities are required—are difficult to standardize. Over-writing the contract can constrain labor flexibility. Too little specificity with regards to uncontractible qualities risks a failure of common understanding about what personnel attributes are needed.

Third, mission goals—often highly subjective, difficult to evaluate, and sensitive to the existing security and political situation—increase contracting complexity. By extension, goal ambiguity makes it difficult to specify measurable objectives in training and advising services contracts. In fragile states mired in conflict, the need to generate security forces quickly at the expense of quality has significant implications for contract design. Contracts, standards of performance (SOP), and programs of instruction (POIs) are designed for expedience, are focused on basic individual tasks, and are assessed primarily by easily quantifiable input, activity, and output metrics, as opposed to outcome-oriented and quality-based measures. For example, the current police training model in Afghanistan is an eight-week long introductory training course, designed to rapidly develop uniformed police. By comparison, most Western police training programs require a minimum of six months in a classroom setting and another minimum of six months of probationary supervision in the field. Given limitations in a combat zone, including widespread illiteracy among recruits, NATO and U.S. soldiers and civilian contractors are left to evaluate, often in an ad-hoc fashion, what they can, which means graduation and attrition rates, marksmanship scores, and basic tasks such as wearing a uniform correctly and extending common courtesies (author interviews, Appendix A). These metrics say little, however, about larger institutional trends of professional development and whether these efforts are tied to longer term goals of security, stability, and sustainability.

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[3] For example, human resources, logistics, and acquisitions, as well as more specialized policy and functional capabilities, such as strategic planning, intelligence collection, counternarcotics, and internal affairs.

[4] This was also confirmed in several interviews with NATO advisors to the Afghan Ministry of Interior. Note: we granted all interview participants confidentiality for this study due to the sensitive nature of topics discussed. We provide a full listing of participants' rank, position, and related details in Appendix A.

Consequently, contracting for these types of complex services produces highly specialized investments in recruiting, selecting, training, and retaining qualified contract personnel. As Williamson notes (1979, p. 243), the need for specialized types of human capital represents more “idiosyncratic investments.” These investments often demand robust oversight structures to govern the activities of human assets providing complex services in a limited labor market. The contracts governing these types of exchanges are often with monopsonistic buyers. They are also typically incomplete, lacking fully predetermined requirements due to the need for flexibility to address unforeseen contingencies. This incompleteness produces higher transaction costs for the internal provision of the service—the make—of the buyer. Moreover, like any sunk cost, buyers cannot easily recover investments in human assets engaged in a complex service if the relationship with the seller later expires.

Donor governments contract for the building of host nation capacities in a limited pool of advisors and trainers. This limited labor market poses a significant contract design and management challenge because the assets are neither firm specific, easily recovered, nor readily evaluated due to the lack of measurable individual output as it contributes to changes in host-nation outcomes. In part, to be a smart-buyer of services, the government needs to have its own in-house expertise to assess capabilities and performance adequately. Given the types of capacity gaps in the government’s acquisition workforce (DoD and DoS IG, 2011; GAO, 2012b; SIGAR, 2009), the buyers design contracts that measure performance on the input side (i.e., number of personnel trained) and leave sellers accountable for only meeting initial staffing thresholds. As a result, the contracts often lack measurable indicators that hold specific individuals, units, or organizations accountable. Like other complex investments, the human assets of the type described in this paper offer services that are highly asset specific, not easily observed or measured and take place in environments of high uncertainty and low frequency, meaning that buyers and sellers do not necessarily build relationships on trust and reputation (Williamson 1981, p. 561–566).[5] Therefore, within the organizational ecology of providing SSR services in fragile state environments, donor and host nation principals should jointly develop contracted governance structures aligned with mutual goals. However, given the conditions and the uncertainty associated with providing complex services in fragile states, mutual understanding can be difficult to spell out completely, especially while attempting to preserve flexibility and discretion and to minimize the risks associated with lock-in.

Contracting Support to Afghan Security Sector Training and Development

As of April 2012, the United States has appropriated $89.42 billion to Afghanistan’s reconstruction since late 2001 (SIGAR, 2012, p. 4). It holds a dubious record of effectively programming this flood of security assistance. The congressional enactment of the Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC); the establishment of the Special Investigator General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR); and the numerous audits and investigations into fraud, waste, abuse, and contract mismanagement are no surprise, given the massive resource commitment, challenging environment, and myriad actors involved. More concerning, however, is the CWC's finding that between $31 billion and $61 billion of U.S. taxpayer funds were lost to fraud and abuse. Congress's decision to seal hearing records until 2031 is remarkable (Hodge, 2011).

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[5] This is a point we address in our findings as the original contract between DoD and MPRI changed when DynCorp won the contract in 2010, leaving the US government, donor governments, and the Afghan Ministry of Defense to reestablish working relationships with new contractor personnel.

Nearly two-thirds of the total figure spent in Afghanistan (approximately $50.6 billion) has been directed toward the development of the ANSF through the establishment of the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), intended to pay for its training, equipping, operations, and sustainment. In FY2011, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) obligated more than $16 billion in Afghanistan reconstruction funds on contracts ($11 billion through the ASFF) for a diverse range of services, including military base and facility defense; logistical, maintenance, and transportation support; dining facility operations; construction services (roads, schools, and buildings); and training and mentoring Afghan security forces (GAO, 2012b, p. 1). Over the past decade, three firms—DynCorp, International; Military Professional Resources, Inc. (L3/MPRI, now Engility); and Academi (formerly Xe and Blackwater USA)—have been the primary PMSC firms providing training and advising services to the Afghan army, national police forces, and the Afghan Defense and Interior ministries (Figure 1).[6]

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[6] As the timeline in Figure 6 in Appendix C depicts, from 2004 to 2010 DynCorp was the leading provider of police trainers and law enforcement advisors, although Academi provided some specialized support to the Afghan Border Police. Likewise, MPRI was the leading provider of trainers and advisors for the Afghan Army and Ministry of Defense. Following a contested rebidding process in 2010, DynCorp took over as the lead training and advising service provider across the Afghan security forces. Contract oversight responsibility for the Afghan army and police training programs was originally split between the DoD and the US Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), respectively. In 2009, the DoD assumed full control of contract oversight and administration for all training and mentoring services provided to the ANSF, including both the ministries of defense and interior and the Afghan military and police.



Figure 1. **Timeline of Afghan Training and Advising Contracts/Task Orders, 2004–Present**
(http://www.usaspending.gov)

After examining the contracts, we conservatively estimate that the Unites States has spent at least $5 billion since 2004 on the procurement of trainers and advisors to Afghan security forces—just over 5% of the total funds allocated for Afghanistan's reconstruction. Using U.S. government spending records, we constructed a table of these major contracts and task orders, broken down by recipient firms, U.S. government purchasing agencies, Afghan partner institutions, and total obligations (Appendix C, Table 5). FOIA requests were made for each contract and task order.[7]

Five billion dollars is no small figure for such a highly asset-specific investment whose value is difficult to ascertain. Training and advising foreign security forces is a boutique service and often more difficult to measure and evaluate in comparison to the larger and more easily evaluated services for logistics support; engineering and construction projects; and procurement of weapons, equipment, and other material goods.[8]

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[7] DoD (US Army) contracts have been adjudicated and are currently being processed. DoS/INL contracts have been acknowledged, but have been pending adjudication for over six months.

Method

This case study is supported by data collected from an ongoing in-depth examination of how the United States and NATO coalition forces seek to influence the transfer of organizational capacity and professionalism to their Afghan security force counterparts. Data collection occurred between March 2012 and April 2013.

Sampling

Primary data consists of 67 military and civilian elite stakeholders that participated in a confidential semi-structured interview (Creswell, 2009, p. 179).[9] Participants represent a stratified-purposive sample (Teddlie & Yu, 2007, pp. 79–80) of individuals who have served directly in an advisory, training, or partnered capacity with Afghan security forces; who have directly observed NATO-ANSF partnered or partnering activities; or who have been involved in the evaluation or program management of such activities. Exploring their interactions and observations of others' interactions with Afghan security forces during their period, or periods, of service in Afghanistan was critically important.[10] To maximize representativeness, participants were recruited based on four overarching, nested strata: level of analysis; alignment with core Afghan security institutions; type of partnering engagements; and participant attributes (see Figure 2).[11] External observers of NATO partnering efforts and subject matter experts were recruited to enhance validity through triangulation.[12]

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[8] For example, the US Army's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP IV) is a 10-year, $150-billion contract spread across four companies: DynCorp, KBR, Fluor, and SERCO. Contrast that with the US Army's ongoing Afghan training and advising contract with DynCorp worth $232 million over two years and *three orders of magnitude* smaller.

[9] The average length of interviews is 71 minutes. All participants provided written consent to the confidential interview and audio recording following an approved protocol.

[10] Stratified-purposive sampling was necessary due to the multilayered vertical and horizontal alignment of NATO personnel with the Afghan National Security Forces. Random sampling was both impractical and unhelpful due to the time required to build trust and credibility with this population and the research need for candor and contextual richness.

[11] The stratified sample of participants is quite diverse and largely reflects the NATO-ISAF command structure, where the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan focuses on institutional development of the ANSF (i.e., recruiting, training, equipping, and ministerial advising) while the International Joint Command focuses on operations with Afghan army and police units in the field, including providing embedded advisor teams and ground forces to conduct combined operations. It includes individuals who have personally advised Afghan officials, from Afghan ministers and deputy ministers down to the lowest Afghan Army platoon leader or district police chief. Consideration was given to participants' time and location of service in Afghanistan to ensure a primary analytical focus on the period from 2008 to 2013 (e.g., the Afghanistan surge) when NATO's focus on ANSF partnership and development was at its greatest. Notably, several participants served on multiple tours in Afghanistan, with experience dating back to 2003. Participant location also is an important factor, to ensure adequate variation of experiences among tactical level participants.

[12] It is worth noting that five participants are female, despite that fact that the overwhelming majority of Afghan security force advising and partnering activities have been conducted by male combat arms and civilian personnel.


1. Level of Analysis
Strategic
Tactical
2. Afghan Core Security Institutions
Afghan Ministry of Defense
Afghan Ministry of Interior
Afghan National Army
Afghan National Police
Afghan Local Police
3. Type of Partnering Engagement
Ministerial Advising
Embedded Training, Mentoring, and Advising
Partnered Field Operations
4. Participant Attributes
Senior Ministerial Advisors
- Military
- DoD Civilians
- Civilian Contractors
Embedded Trainers, Mentors, Advisors
- Active Duty
- National Guard
- Military Police
- Civilian Contractors
NATO Ground Forces
- Battalion Leaders
- Company Leaders
- U.S. Army Special Forces (ODA)
5. External Observers and Subject Matter Experts
NATO Training Mission-Afg. Staff
Ofc. of the Sec. of Defense-Policy
U.S. Institute of Peace
DynCorp
NATO-ISAF Cdr's COIN Advise & Assist Team
U.S. Army Human Terrain Teams
RAND Corp.
DynCorp

Figure 2. **Stratified Sampling Tree Map**

Data Collection and Analysis

Interviews consisted of a core set of open-ended questions on the participants' background, interactions with ANSF, influencing approaches, and observed changes in ANSF capacity and professionalism (Appendix B). Interviews were interpreted via content analysis (Krippendorf, 2004) though the use of codes that link raw data to broader analytical concepts and theories (Saldaña, 2013, p. 3-5). Coding of the data related to contractor support to ANSF training and development, references to civilian contractor trainer and advisor employment, collaboration, performance, and oversight with coded segments varying from individual sentences to whole paragraph responses (Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2008). Code labels were then organized into a hierarchy of thematic categories for further analysis.

Results and Discussion

The initial coding revealed a range of contract design and oversight issues associated with ministerial advising, tactical training and advising, the contractor's individual characteristics, and his performance. From this we identified three key issues to address in this paper: the selection processes for trainers and advisers; contract design implications of a highly asset specific investment in human intelligence and capability requirements; and labor market issues in terms of availability of contracted personnel to fulfill the operational requirements associated with ministerial advising and training. These issues are not mutually exclusive. There is interdependence among them, especially in how participants articulate them in operational terms.

Trainer–Advisor Selection

Our findings suggest that there is significant need for more effective screening of personnel to serve as ministerial advisors. This need can be quite difficult to fulfill because there is not a “Yellow Pages Test” of personnel in which you can search for those who have the training, socio-cultural-political skills, and defense and security policy backgrounds to enter a fragile state setting and build relationships with host nationals in the highest positions of influence and authority. While on the one hand having institutional policy-making experience in a defense ministry is an important skill set to possess, many of the contractors who are hired are former military officers who reached the rank of lieutenant colonel (O-5) or colonel (O-6) because of their field level tactical experience. In the majority of cases, most of these individuals’ prior military experience was not spent working in a political-bureaucratic environment such as the Pentagon, for example, in a Secretary of Defense or service Secretary’s staff posting, serving in a joint liaison role with other service branches, or interacting with elected or appointed policy makers. A consequential tradeoff follows. Selecting by rank and grade may provide a degree of field-level legitimacy with both uniformed colleagues and host-nation officials with prior military service, and perhaps some degree of subject matter expertise. However, this does not guarantee that these individuals have both the relationship-building skills necessary to develop trust and credibility and begin to influence the thinking and actions of their host-nation counterparts especially on policy and public administration issues.

For PMSC firms responding to request for proposals (RFPs), there is often a standards of performance (SOP) document that outlines key provisions of what contracted personnel are expected to do, but most of these are technical elements associated with development of: protocols, processes, and metrics for collection and reporting of information; training doctrine and plans; and quality assurance mechanisms. Appendix D provides a snapshot of a recent SOP for advisors in the Afghan Ministry of Defense detailing the necessary job requirements for a logistics advisor. These SOPs and their fit with the relative needs of ministerial officials in conflict-prone environments such as Afghanistan are often misaligned because the contracting officials working for the sponsoring donor governments, such as federal civilian acquisition officials in the DoD, lack expertise in the capabilities and requirements necessary to fulfill the mission, goals, and meet the performance targets. On the one hand, it would be easy to demand selection based on quality, but on the other hand, if the contracting award officials have no more information than those who wrote the RFPs and SOPs, then quality becomes an ephemeral and ambiguous criterion. While the case could be made for being more selective of the personnel hired to fill positions, at the end of the day, PMSCs have to meet the performance objectives outlined in the contract. If a contract calls for 85 personnel with certain types of skills, the contractor is going to be held more accountable for whether they hired 85 personnel to fill those positions and less so for whether the personnel were the most qualified, best experienced, or had other relevant skills.

Our interviews reveal a range of outcomes associated on the selection issue, with some asserting that the contracted personnel were qualified and others stating that their work experiences with contractors were less successful. As one interviewee said in a response representative of the majority of our interviews,

> You have some that were very good at working with their Afghan counterparts, guys that would sort of work that soft approach. And then you would have those other guys who would sort of try to force things through. It goes back to selection of who you’re hiring and their experience and how they approach things. This goes to I think a contradiction with the Army because they like to do things quickly. They like to hire en masse. If you want mass, you’re probably going to get a whole lot of folks you don’t really need. (author interview)

It is on this issue of selection, that hiring the right advisers is challenging work. In addition to “expertise,” advisers also have to understand context and socializing an idea and developing the ability to influence policy incrementally, at the margins, and over time in a way that doesn’t threaten their Afghan counterparts. Having a successful tactical reputation at the battalion or brigade level does not mean that person has the ability to train, advise, and teach.

Because the contracts were both to advise and train in the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior, the PMSCs had a range of contract personnel they were responsible for hiring. On the issue of police training, one of our interviewees offered a representative perspective that highlights points above:

> You need a police officer, so you hire one and stick him in the job. Are you going to train him to become a trainer? No! You’re going to stick him in that job. That’s a huge mistake because a police officer knows how to practice policing. They know how to arrest someone, how to investigate, how to patrol, they know the practice of policing in the United States. How do they build someone else’s capacity? Just mentoring and saying to a police officer in Afghanistan “this is how I do things at home,” is useless because they’re not going to do it this way over there. So, there’s a belief in Washington, and in the West in general or the donor community I should say [that when it comes to] providing troops or police officers or any capacity builders that we just grab somebody who has that expertise back at home and then we don’t transform them in to an adviser or mentor. We just stick them in a situation, in a different country, having to do completely different things with no authority, and we hope that they’ll just build the capacity of someone. It’s a huge problem! (author interview)

On the defense side, this situation was best illustrated by an interviewee who offered a representative perspective about a contractor’s past training and experience as a guide for their work as an adviser:

> I was slightly underwhelmed with the performance of several contractors in terms of not only how they were doing the advising mission but also their credentials for doing so. ... We’re talking about building a Ministry of State at the highest levels of a sovereign nation and several of the contractors that I worked with had never ever worked at an institutional level above division. Some had never been above brigade. Several of them have never worked at a headquarters staff, or in the Pentagon, or in any kind of civilian governance institution that they were either principally in charge of or in a very senior assisting role—it just struck me as increasingly odd. Not that some of them weren’t good people, not that that some of them didn’t have great combat records, or military backgrounds, but they simply did not have the depth of experience or perspective to do their jobs at the level of, or [at the] remuneration that we’re paying them. (author interview).

Selecting the right people is an investment in quality and success, but this mindset was absent. The GAO’s mantra is that $1 of audit saves $10 on implementation. One interviewee offered a similar perspective:

> I think if anybody wanted to spend one more dollar adding a little more scrutiny to the preparation of advisors and screening of advisors, I would think that would be worth probably $10 in savings of having the wrong people

> out there—not only the wrong people, but people that create systems and problems that cause more problems in the long run. (author interview)

This call for an investment in preparing individuals to serve as advisors was echoed in quite different ways across the respondents. The issue of differentiating successful advisers from those perceived to be less successful is well illustrated by the following interviewee:

> I actually believe that the key to all good advising is based on three things: relationships, relationships, relationships. Everybody places, in my opinion, far too much reliance on this subject matter expert business. I learned a long time ago that just because you're a subject matter expert or just because you have an eagle [Colonel's rank] on your collar does not make you an expert in everything, and when it comes to building relationships, a lot of people are just not cut out for that. Without the relationship I do not believe you can have the difficult, sometimes even contentious, discussions required to effect real meaningful change. I think one error we make across the board, not just in MoDA [Ministry of Defense Advisors program], is just throwing people into advisory jobs, calling them advisors, and they're in many cases more detrimental than they are effective. So I think there has to be a real hard selection process to pick the right people. In fact, I've told [a General], for example, if he were putting together a team of let's say 10 guys to go to—I'll pick a country—Guatemala, I wouldn't care what the other nine were like, but I would want the team leader to be the Zen master relationship builder because with that you can bring in subject matter experts all day long, but if you don't have the relationship, a subject matter expert is a waste of time. They just come in and talk and the host may be deferential or he may just totally ignore you. (author interview)

This point is contrasted by, although it does not necessarily dispute, the important role that subject matter experts and experience do play for advisors. This "pro/con reflection" on the value of subject matter experts is a recurring narrative illustrated among our respondents, each with his or her version of the story. This example captures the narrative well:

> Just because you wore a badge doesn't mean you could be a good police advisor. I got a guy who's a deputy sheriff in Norman, Oklahoma in a two-car police force. He knew how to give out tickets, he knew how to break up a bar fight, but as far as being a police professional to advise a country on how to set up their police force, no. I mean I had another guy that was a retired inspector—that is a special advisor to the police commissioner of the city of New York, okay? Contractors didn't want to touch him but he was probably the best qualified guy to be an advisor, to be a police advisor. They didn't want to touch him. It scared the daylights out of them. He knew too much. If he knew too much then he's liable to fix it and then we're liable to go home and the gravy train's gone. So he ended up getting frustrated. He ended up going home and going back to work for the Police Commissioner of New York City. (author interview).

A point made in this narrative, is that the New York City inspector made the other contractors nervous because they were afraid that if he fixed the problems, they would be out of jobs. This attitude is illustrative of the interdependent relationship between contract design and selection. We turn next to the difficulty of contract design. Following that discussion, we will look at the labor market issue for a more refined understanding of why advisor selection is so challenging when using PMSCs.

Contract Design Implications

The data suggest a central challenge to contracting for training and advising services is that quality is not given serious consideration and that weakly specified hiring requirements—in terms of personnel experience, skill sets, training, and education—seemed to almost perpetuate the contractor's role in service provision. As one of our respondents put it, if performance were seriously considered and "if people went over there knowing that they had to stay until it was finished, I guarantee you it wouldn't be 10 years" (author interview).

For many of the reasons we cite above, there's a balance, when contracting for training and ministerial advising within the MoI and MoD, between rigidly trying to specify every contingency and leaving the contract incomplete to ensure flexibility and discretion in how a contractor provides services. However, what we found in reviewing the documents and from the interviews is a consistently inconsistent process. Respondents described input- and output-based performance metrics that focused on filling slots and not on getting the right people. On the other hand, military and civilian personnel serving in trainer and advisor roles spoke of contractors with vast institutional knowledge, experience, and capabilities who could serve in additional roles and create value, but who complied with the letter of the law in their contracts and refused to provide information or become involved in certain training activities because that's "not what their contracts incentivized" (author interviews).

One participant expressed frustration with contracted personnel whose duties changed from being trainers to strictly evaluators—"We're only evaluators, not trainers. Our job isn't to train them on these skills, it's to evaluate the training and say whether it's good or not" (author interview). In this interview, what frustrated the respondent was the absence of a team approach to fulfilling the mission goals. This individual noted that the contractors in most cases had more experience, had been on the ground longer, possessed more institutional memory and capacity, but were only going to do what their contract required them to do. There was no goal alignment; just separate rice bowls, a reference to individual parties with their own incentives to maximize the level of resources they could secure. Specifying, requiring, measuring, incentivizing, and penalizing mission performance is difficult to write in a contract. As a result, stories like these are obstacles to success. Contracting for a collaborative team approach to problem solving is actually difficult in ways that Williamson and other contract theorists note (Battigalli & Giovanni, 2002; Hart & Moore, 2008; Williamson, 1996).

This is not a normative case of contractors being effective or not. It is how to align the overlapping goals, actions, and preferences of military, civilian government, and contractor personnel. This was simply missing. To be fair, other respondents, when discussing contractors, noted, "We couldn't live without them. We couldn't do our jobs without them" (author interview).

The role and responsibilities of contractors spanned the continuum of respondent perspectives. Most significantly, this centered on the question of whether contractors were performing inherently governmental roles and responsibilities. Some respondents made clear that "the contractors don't speak for the government" (author interview). Other respondents argued that contractors were more effectively embedded into mid-level institutional relationships with their host nation counterparts and that while ultimate policy decision-making does not take place at that level, implementation most certainly does. While policy-making may ultimately be decided at the top of ministries, proposals, ideas, and their eventual implementation certainly emanated from middle-rank officials who were receiving guidance and feedback from contractors. Lack of recognition in the formal contracts of this effort frustrated numbers of active-duty military and government civilian personnel. In many of the contracts not only were there not individual performance accountability standards and agreements but also there were few, if any, clear mechanisms for rewarding effective personnel and addressing or dismissing ineffective personnel.

Therefore, the contracts and SOPs of trainers and advisers—covering a small yet important role that PMSCs play in rebuilding governance capacity in the Afghan MoD and MoI—were viewed as rigid and incomplete, highly specified on input and output metrics, and divorced from meaningful measurement of outcomes and mission attainment. Respondents were clear that there is insufficient contract management and oversight capacity within the government. Quality is not written into the contracts (author interviews; SOP, Appendix D). This suggests an evaluation and accountability problem and that on-the-ground performance expectations are unrealistic.

On this last point, respondents pointed to DynCorp's work developing a national police force. As we heard repeatedly, context matters. For instance, the starting points are completely different between the U.S. and Afghanistan in terms of defense policy, homeland security, border patrol, and law enforcement. Yet training programs were developed for Afghan personnel who were illiterate, who had no prior law enforcement experience, and who were nevertheless expected to receive a "Basic Eight" week training course and then go out and competently police their communities. Viewed narrowly in terms of the contract, this program is effective and the contractor met his targets. From an implementation and sustainability perspective, this program is neither likely to be operational long-term nor lead to meaningful changes in policing and culture.

Thin Labor Market

When government decides to contract rather than produce or provide a service internally and with its own employees, the fundamental decision is often influenced by the degree of market competition that it can harness and leverage for its own goals, whether that is cost, quality, effectiveness, or simply scale of provision. However, in contracting for ministerial advisors and tactical trainers in Afghanistan, several issues shaped the degree of competition and available supply. As we noted above, advisors and trainers are complex human assets because of the investments that have often been made in their skill sets, experiences, training, and education. Indeed, it is fair to characterize the advisers needed to develop, shape, influence, implement, and evaluate institutional capacity building in the MoD and MoI as specialized investments and not as assets that are commercially available or that fall into the government-furnished categories often associated with other forms of acquisition and procurement. Evident in the timeline we provide above, the PMSC landscape is thin in terms of the number of firms responding to RFPs and competing for contract opportunities.

As the Afghan mission grew, the pool of qualified trainers diminished and, consequently, so did the overall skills of the workforce (author interviews). This diminution of a skilled workforce has several causes.

First, there was a change in the war's strategic focus, and as a consequence of this re-focus, the original mentoring contract held by MPRI was rebid. MPRI had been in Afghanistan working with the MoD and Afghan National Army since April 2005 on training and advising issues, while DynCorp had been working with the Ministry of Interior since 2004 on police training, opium poppy eradication, and building the training and advising capacities of the MoI. The only other PMSC was Academi (formerly Xe and Blackwater), and it was engaged in training and advising the Afghan Border Police. In 2010, MPRI's contracts ended and DynCorp won the competition to provide services not only to MoI but also to the MoD. This contract significantly changed the market of available contract personnel. Moreover, substantial controversy encircled this set of RFPs and awards, including bid protests to the GAO (GAO, 2010). In the end, MPRI largely transitioned out of contracted relationships with the MoD and considerable time was lost, almost two years by most accounts, between the departure of MPRI and its personnel and DynCorp's arrival and standup of its own personnel.

Second, lost during this contract transition period were institutionalized relationships and extensive, often well-qualified, manpower. A number of MPRI personnel were offered an opportunity to apply for positions with DynCorp and did so, but according to the interview respondents—and verified in the secondary contract documentation[13]—the new contract was less financially generous and had more performance targets on the input and output side, with clearer financial penalties for failing to meet the indicators. As a result, respondents universally observed a tradeoff between selection quality and fit relative to scale. For example, a story we heard repeatedly was that one benefit of the contract competition was that poor performers were going to be "sent packing." However, under the new contract, there was a stated need for 2,000 personnel to assume various positions. Near the end of DynCorp's fielding process they only received 1,200 qualified applicants. But with clear performance penalties of $10,000 per day for failing to have 2,000 personnel in place, we were told of a feverish effort to find another 800 people to fill the slots. So, as one respondent noted, "they left under bad terms and now they're bringing them back" (author interview) while another respondent suggested that because the contract was designed wrongly in terms of the SOPs, but included penalties, the contractor was "fielding people that shouldn't be fielded, but they have to or they will be fined so many tens of thousands per day" (author interview).

This challenge was later accommodated slightly in 2012 by force reductions within NATO following the Afghan troop surge, specifically within the NATO Training Mission (NTM-A) command where all ministerial advisors (military, government civilians, and contractors) were assigned. The majority of ministerial advisors were U.S. military officers, typically the rank of colonel. The NTM-A drawdown and reorganization significantly reduced the total number of ministerial advisors, leaving a number of lower ranking individuals and contractors to pick up the remaining slack: "I've never seen so many [Colonels] in my life. But what's happening now with that draw down is they're getting pulled and they're going away and lower ranks are coming in" (author interview). Noted by a range of respondents, many of these very individuals were those with laudable combat records, but "underwhelming" credentials or institutional experience for ministerial advising.

The respondent quotes reflect and the documentation confirms that there was a high degree of contractor personnel within the PMSCs as a result of contracts being rebid; that the quality of the personnel was proportionally less than the demand and what the contract SOPs stated; and that an emphasis on holding the contractor accountable, an important component in any contract, gave way to penalties being applied on the input side of the equation. As a result, the need to fill slots was viewed as more important than selecting quality personnel relative to the performance penalties assigned. It is unclear whether there was any consideration at the time of rebidding and changing the PMSC to the negative externalities and compromises that might result, in terms of institutional knowledge and of established ministerial advising relationships, ground level trust, and legitimacy between donor-funded PMSCs and host-national ministerial officials. Our respondents suggest that this issue was not on the radar of contracting officials, and results, as best these authors can ascertain, appear to confirm this.

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[13] FOIA requests were made for all contracts listed in Appendix C, Table 5. The process of receiving approval for and ultimately receiving the documents has been quite lengthy and the contracts and associated supporting materials have been heavily redacted.

A Clear Need for a SSR Training and Advising Contracting Framework

In general, the need for a contracting framework increases as governments around the world, especially the United States, enter into longer term contractual relationships for the procurement of complex services and products. Such contracts are often expensive, controversial, and viewed as high-risk. Brown et al. (2010) developed such a framework for the procurement of complex products. In this study, we draw upon their framework and apply it to the procurement of advising and training services, a complex service, in Afghanistan. In applying this framework, we evaluate its utility relative to the manner in which SSR services are contracted and the corresponding successes and limitations in a conflict-prone environment.

We also draw upon transaction cost economics to understand complex services that are developed and implemented by human capital assets—themselves often the products of substantial investments in training, education, capabilities, and experiences—in a market that tends to be monopsonistic on the buyer side and is limited on the supply side because of the largely symmetric interdependence between buyers (donor states) and sellers (contractors). While Brown et al. also use a transaction cost approach, their focus is more on a complex product—an integrated system of ships, aviation, information technology, and logistics—as opposed to centering on individuals as complex assets. However, in both the procurement of complex products and services, ensuring goal alignment with a focus on win-win outcomes, accountable performance, and cost effectiveness is critical.

In the case of Afghanistan, what Brown et al. recommend is consistent with what participants perceived as necessary to manage such a complex contracting relationship. Interview and documentation suggest the existing governance structure is insufficient, if not absent. Managing a complex contracting relationship, in other words, requires governing to solve a collective action problem and guiding each side’s incentives away from pursuing their own self-interest at the expense of win-win cooperation. Developing the right governance mechanisms—ones that give rise to coordination and information exchange while promoting flexibility and accountability—are important for creating value in challenging environments that require complex service investments.

Both complex services and products have multiple components integrated into a system that addresses various missions and that frequently consists of highly uncertain design specifications. In this regard, donor states and contractors (buyers and sellers) often have high uncertainty about the service or product, its production costs, quality tradeoffs, and the value of its capabilities. This is consistent with our preliminary findings of ministerial advising and training in Afghanistan. While SOPs exist and contracts over time, from 2003–2013, have been increasingly formalized with clearer metrics of performance, it is also true that there remains high uncertainty about what capabilities are needed, how they are to be used, and what indicators should be incorporated to evaluate performance and hold the respective parties accountable. In the case of Afghanistan, those results are the degree to which (1) the Afghan army, police, and defense and interior ministries are being effectively trained and developed; and (2) the manner in which institutional policy is being crafted and implemented in concert with Afghan counterparts. This high uncertainty leads to two important consequences for contract design and management.

First, contract negotiation requires reducing uncertainty so that the product can be specified at contractible levels. Investments in reducing uncertainty are largely asset specific in that they have negligible value outside the contract, resulting in the classic "hold up" problem (Williamson, 1996). For the buyer, the hold up risk is that once a seller has been selected, no other potential sellers have made the necessary investments, so the advantaged seller may look to change the contract in its favor (David, 1985). Likewise, because the seller has only one buyer for its products, the buyer may also look to change the contract in its favor. These conditions are consistent with the interviews and secondary documentation. There appears to be agreement on several levels that SOPs and performance must be more clearly stated, agreed upon, monitored, measured, and evaluated against expected benchmarks or redressed through joint mediation and arbitration processes. However, the specificity of the SOPs and performance measures should not be confused with the capabilities required to achieve important mission goals.

As we note earlier, the specificity and rigidity of SOPs and position requirements and qualifications increased exponentially over time and because of SIGAR, GAO, and CWC investigations and reports. But, this often took place at the expense of positional fit, quality, and the softer and often more uncontractible elements associated with hiring the right people to advise, mentor, and train. As a result, our interviewees suggested that firms aligned their behavior and actions with the manner in which incentives, performance measures, and sanctions were structured. It is perhaps unsurprising then that contractor firms needed to meet their numbers, get bodies into positions, and consumed themselves less with whether they had the right people and capabilities for achieving mission goals, i.e., having relationship builders in place that could effectively work both horizontally across units and divisions and vertically within respective ministries. It does appear though the parties recognize that each needs the other. What is much less clear, however, is the extent of the integration of PMSCs into the day-to-day work of providing training and advising, side-by-side with military and government civilian personnel. To our knowledge and understanding, there are few, if any, formal statements of governance mechanisms associated with control, authority, delegation of responsibilities and risks, and the evaluation of results in a way that strengthens task and system accountability and transparency within the contracts.

Second, contracts for complex products are necessarily incomplete. Even after buyers and sellers have made asset-specific investments to reduce uncertainty, it is not practical for either party to define fully the complex service or products' qualities in a contract (Tirole, 1999). Doing so would both drive up the writing costs associated with specifying every possible contingency and constrain the discretion and flexibility necessary to adapt and resolve unforeseen issues. Consequently, the incomplete terms of the contract are negotiated later as the product is produced or service is performed and the exchange is executed. As we have already noted, there is the perception that the contracts are rigid on the one hand and ambiguous on the other. The rigidity comes from timelines associated with filling positions, meeting the overall stated number of formal positions to be filled, and having a certain number of personnel who fill technical and advising capability needs. But, as has also been suggested, this rigidity can and does actually undermine cooperation and fails to incentivize joint efforts.

Again, we offer a caveat that we did hear of positive and successful contractor relationships with military, government civilian, and host nation counterparts. Unfortunately, it would appear that while these examples are not rare, more often than not participants reported that relationships do not happen in this way. In part, good outcomes occur because of specific, required skills—the professional maturity and confidence to work alongside host nation counterparts, from senior ministry officials to local unit leader-power brokers, many carrying a host of often unrevealed preferences that may conflict with long-term mission goals, and the savvy to inform, persuade, coordinate, debate, and propose new or alternative solutions to policies, doctrine, processes, and procedures across the Afghan security sector.

The Brown et al., investigation into contracting for complex products devotes little time on complex services, especially those executed by contractors. As a result, while their findings are generalizable to other potential complex products, the authors provide little guidance about how variation in context, institutional policy development, and a country's relative stability and level of economic development might affect the implementation and evaluation of contractors delivering complex services. Our interviews suggest that while firm preference may indicate a desire for lock-in post-2014, individual contractor motivations vary and are not as monolithic as the present literature suggests. In fact, individual motives interact highly, and are more often aligned, with those they are serving than with their employers' motives.

Implications for U.S. Security Assistance Policy and Future Acquisition Research

This article highlights the complexity of procuring security force training and advising services in fragile states. In these settings, donor states face the incredibly difficult task of designing contracts that, on the one hand, are flexible enough to allow for getting the right people in the job—the "Zen, master relationship builders"—and on the other hand, are governed and incentivized in a way that avoids future lock-in.

This case study is relevant given the United States' commitment to assist Afghanistan through 2024 (though tenuous without a signed bilateral security agreement). As long as the United States' partnership with Afghanistan endures, civilian contractors will be required in Afghanistan into the near future. Furthermore, the case illustration of Afghanistan holds more generalizable application to future security assistance environments with a mix of military, government, and civilian contractors providing training and advising services. Broader application is essential given the current U.S. strategic defense guidance proclaiming, "we will seek to be the security partner of choice, pursuing new partnerships with a growing number of nations—including those in Africa and Latin America … [and] we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities" (DoD, 2012, p. 3).

The ephemeral promise of a win-win outcome is the contract ideal. Still, policymakers cannot ignore the high transaction costs and complex principal-agent characteristics associated with overseas contracting. Unlike simple products, the terms of exchange for complex services are likely to be incomplete and to require high discretion and flexibility. However, they should also delimit clear performance standards and accountability measures. Incentivizing contractors to achieve ambiguous goals is problematic, but to say little about expectations in a manner that is measurable risks the inability to monitor contractor performance and preserve accountability. There are, nevertheless, contract design and management tools to get the right people with the right skills in these positions. Varying compensation vehicles, time periods with entry and exit ramps, compete/non-compete clauses, and award fees and penalties are few examples. Most promising, integrated stakeholder governance teams can help with advisor selection challenges and structure expectations and understanding about what goal alignment means under certain conditions. Moreover, they can provide continuous and fully dedicated monitoring, evaluation, and technical assistance in the design and implementation of these contracts.

The focus on SSR contracting and the significance of developing context-specific contract governance mechanisms can serve as a catalyst for new scholarship and policy practice in an evidence-based framework that considers balancing the challenges of contracting for complex products and services with the need for a more integrated social sciences, law, and management approach. These disciplines can illuminate the range of policy environments in which institutions and individuals interact across a host of political, social, cultural, and legal dimensions in fragile governance ecosystems where incentives, rules, cooperation, and understanding shape effective development and implementation of SSR, a critical policy tool of security and economic development.

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Appendix A: Sample Tables and Figures

Table 2. Strategic Level Participants

Table A1. Strategic Level Participants.*

Subject Number (random)	Rank / Grade	Organization	Duty Title(s)	"Advising" Time in Country
Office of Administrative Affairs (National Security Council & OMB) Advisor (1)				
18	Lt. Colonel	U.S. Air Force	Advisor to Deputy Director General, OAA	12 months
Ministry of Defense & Afghan General Staff Advisors (12)				
27	Colonel	U.S. Army, Infantry	Senior Advisor to Afghan Minister of Defense	10 months
14	Colonel	Canadian Army, Infantry	Senior Advisor to Afghan Minister of Defense	24 months
61	GS-15**	Office of the Secretary of Defense	Senior Advisor to Deputy MoD - Strategy and Policy Asst. Chief of Advisors for Afghan Ministry of Defense Development	12 months
57	Contractor	MPRI	Senior Advisor to Deputy MoD - Strategy and Policy	24 months
26	GS-15	Office of the Secretary of Defense	Senior Advisor to Deputy MoD - Aquisitions, Technology & Logistics	24 months
20	GS-14	Office of the Secretary of Defense	Advisor to Deputy MoD - Installation Management	18 months
50	Colonel**	U.S. Army, JAG	Senior Advisor to MoD Legal Advisor Senior Advisor to ANA General Staff - Legal	12 months
25	Colonel	U.S. Army, Infantry	Senior Advisor to Chief of Afghan National Army General Staff	12 months
45	Colonel**	Canadian Army, Infantry	Chief of Advisors, Afghan Ministry of Defense Development Senior Advisor to Chief of Afghan National Army General Staff Senior Advisor to Vice Chief of ANA General Staff	9 months
15	Colonel	U.S. Army, Special Forces	Senior Advisor to ANA General Staff G3 - Chief of Operations	12 months
60	Colonel***	U.S. Air Force	Senior Advisor to Deputy MoD - Strategic Communications Senior Advisor to ANA General Staff G3/5/7	12 months
53	Captain (USN)***	U.S. Navy	Senior Advisor to Deputy MoD - Communications	11 months
Ministry of Interior Advisors (13)				
5	SES**	Office of the Secretary of Defense	Chief of Advisors, Afghan Ministry of Interior Development Advisor to Afghan MoI Chief of Staff	12 months
9	Colonel	U.S. Army, Infantry	Senior Advisor to Deputy MoI - Administration	12 months
64	GS-15	Office of the Secretary of Defense	Senior Advisor to Deputy MoI - Administration	12 months
23	Contractor**	DynCorp	Senior Advisor to Deputy MoI - Administration Senior Advisor to MoI Chief of Staff	48 months
44	Colonel	U.S. Army, Infantry	Senior Advisor to Deputy MoI - Strategy and Policy	12 months
6	Colonel	U.S. Army, Infantry	Senior Advisor to Deputy MoI - Strategy and Policy	12 months
19	GS-15	Office of the Secretary of Defense	Advisor & Director, MoI Development & Transition	12 months
2	Colonel	U.S. Army, Aviation	Senior Advisor to Deputy MoI - Counternarcotics	12 months
28	Colonel	U.S. Army, Aviation	Senior Advisor to Deputy MoI - Counternarcotics	11 months
49	Lt. Colonel	U.S. Army, Aviation	Senior Advisor to MoI Chief of Afghan Local Police	12 months
38	Lt. Commander**	U.S. Navy, JAG	Senior Advisor to Legal Advisor to MoI Senior Advisor to Chief of Legal Affairs, Afghan National Police Senior Advisor to Chief fo Afghan Anti-Crime Police	12 months
60	Colonel***	U.S. Air Force	Senior Advisor to Director, Afghan Public Protection Force Senior Advisor to Director, Afghan Reintegration Program	12 months
53	Captain (USN)***	U.S. Navy	Senior Advisor to Deputy MoI - Communications	11 months
NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan Staff and SMEs (4)				
4	Captain (USN)	U.S. Navy	NTM-A Command Historian	12 months
59	Major	U.S. Army, Armor/FA59-Strategist	Strategic Planner, NTM-A Commander's Initiatives Group	12 months
1	GS-15	Office of the Secretary of Defense	Founding Director, OSD MoDA Program	N/A
24	GS-15	Special IG for Afghanistan Recon. (SIGAR)	Program Evaluation Director	N/A

** Rank ordered by political authoirty or seniority of Afghan counterpart*

*** Dual/triple-hatted advisor assignments or reassigned during tour*

****Advised principals in both MoD and MoI*

Table 3. Tactical Level Participants

Table A2. Tactical Level Participants.

Subject # (Random)	Rank / Civilian Grade	Organization	Duty Title	Intel	Afghan Army		Afghan Police				Primary Location (Province)	Tour Length
				NDS	ANA	A-SOF	ANCOP	AUP	ABP	ALP		
Embedded Trainers, Mentors & Advisors (16)												
51	Colonel	U.S. Army National Guard, Infantry	Embedded Advisor Group Leader - Corps Level		X						Balkh	12 mo.
7	Colonel	U.S. Army, Infantry	Embedded Advisor Group Leader - Brigade Level	X	X			X	X		Herat	> 12 mo.
63	Colonel	U.S. Army National Guard, Infantry	Embedded Advisor Group Leader - Brigade Level		X				X		Kabul	> 12 mo.
56	Major	U.S. Army, Infantry	Embedded Advisor Team Leader - Brigade Level						X		Konar	12 mo.
8	Major	U.S. Army, Infantry	Embedded Advisor Team Member - Brigade Level		X						Paktika	12 mo.
43	Captain	U.S. Army, Engineer	Embedded Advisor Team Leader - Battalion Level		X						Konar	12 mo.
55	Captain	U.S. Army, Infantry	Embedded Advisor Team Leader - Battalion Level						X		Paktika	12 mo.
36	Captain	U.S. Army, Infantry	Embedded Advisor Team Leader - Battalion Level		X						Zabul	12 mo.
11	Colonel	U.S. Army National Guard, Infantry	Commander, Agri-business Development Team		X			X			Nangarhar	9 - 12 mo.
16	Lt. Colonel*	U.S. Army, Military Intelligence	Battalion Commander	X	X				X		Kandahar	12 mo.
41	Lt. Colonel	U.S. Army, Infantry	Battalion Commander; Kabul Military Training Ctr		X			X			Kabul	12 mo.
29	Lt. Colonel*	U.S. Army, Military Police	Battalion Commander				X	X			Kandahar	12 mo.
21	Lt. Colonel*	U.S. Marine Corps, Infantry	Battalion Commander		X			X			Helmand	9 - 12 mo.
39	Lt. Colonel*	U.S. Army, Military Police	Battalion Commander					X			Kandahar	12 mo.
35	Captain	U.S. Army, Infantry	Afghan Uniformed Police Trainer		X		X	X	X		Kabul; Khost	12 mo.
58	Captain*	U.S. Army Reserve, Military Intel.	Advisor to Kabul Military Training Center G1 Advisor to Chief of Intelligence, ANCOP COMISAF CAAT Advisor	X			X				Country-wide	12 mo.
Partnered Operations (General Purpose Forces - 12)												
17	Colonel	German Army, Infantry	Battalion Commander		X		X	X			Kabul	> 12 mo.
16	Lt. Colonel*	U.S. Army, Military Intelligence	Battalion Commander	X	X				X		Kandahar	12 mo.
29	Lt. Colonel*	U.S. Army, Military Police	Battalion Commander				X	X			Kandahar	12 mo.
21	Lt. Colonel*	U.S. Marine Corps, Infantry	Battalion Commander		X			X			Helmand	9 - 12 mo.
39	Lt. Colonel*	U.S. Army, Military Police	Battalion Commander					X			Kandahar	12 mo.
67	Lt. Colonel	U.S. Army, Infantry	Battalion Commander		X		X	X		X	Kandahar	12 mo.
62	Major	U.S. Army, Infantry	Battalion Executive Officer		X			X			Kandahar	12 mo.
34	Major**	U.S. Army, Infantry	Battalion S3; Brigade S3; Division G5		X		X	X		X	Kandahar; Uruzgan; Zabul; Daykundi	>12 mo.
40	Major**	U.S. Army, Infantry	Rifle Company Commander COMISAF CAAT Advisor		X		X	X			Country-wide	>12 mo.
52	Captain	U.S. Army, Infantry	Rifle Company Commander		X		X	X		X	Kandahar	12 mo.
66	Captain	U.S. Army, Infantry	Rifle Company Commander		X			X	X		Paktika	12 mo.
65	Captain	U.S. Army National Guard, Infantry	Rifle Company Commander					X			Badghis	12 mo.
Partnered Operations (Special Operations Forces - 6)												
3	Major	U.S. Army, Special Forces	Company Commander, 13x ODA					X		X	Uruzgan	9 - 12 mo.
32	Captain	U.S. Army, Special Forces	Team Commander, ODA			X					Zabul	> 12 mo.
37	Major	U.S. Army, Special Forces	Team Commander, ODA		X	X					Helmand	> 12 mo.
48	Captain	U.S. Army, Special Forces	Team Commander, ODA							X	Kunar	9 - 12 mo.
12	Captain	U.S. Army, Special Forces	Team Commander, ODA							X	Herat	9 - 12 mo.
47	Sergeant First Class	U.S. Army, Special Forces	Medical Sergeant, ODA			X		X		X	Zabul	> 12 mo.
Third-Party Observers and Subject Matter Experts (9)												
40	Major**	U.S. Army, Infantry	Rifle Company Commander COMISAF CAAT Advisor		X		X	X			Country-wide	> 12 mo.
58	Captain*	U.S. Army Reserve, Military Intel.	Advisor to Chief of Intelligence, ANCOP COMISAF CAAT Advisor	X			X				Country-wide	12 mo.
30	Civilian Contractor	Undisclosed Contracting Firm	COMISAF CAAT Advisor		X					X	Country-wide	6 - 9 mo.
22	Civilian Contractor	U.S. Army Human Terrain System	Human Terrain Team Social Scientist		X		X	X		X	Kandahar	6 - 9 mo.
46	Civilian Contractor	U.S. Army Human Terrain System	Human Terrain Team Social Scientist		X			X			Paktika; Paktiya; Khost	9 - 12 mo.
31	Program Manager	RAND Corporation	Analyst, CJSOTF-A							X	Country-wide	6 - 9 mo.
54	Program Manager	RAND Corporation	Analyst, CJSOTF-A							X	Country-wide	9 - 12 mo.
33	Civilian Contractor	DynCorp	CIVPOL, Program Manger, DynCorp								Country-wide	> 12 mo.
13	Civilian Contractor	DynCorp	VP, Training and Mentoring, DynCorp				X	X	X		Country-wide	N/A

* Individual and/or unit conducted both embedded advising and partnered tactical operations.

** Individual had multiple training or advising deployments



Figure 3. Sample Deployment Coverage Over Time



Figure 4. Strategic Participant Deployment Coverage Over Time



Figure 5. Tactical Participant Deployment Coverage Over Time

Appendix B

Table 4. Semi-Structured Interview Protocol

Table B1. Semi-Structured Interview Protocol

	Advisors / Unit Leaders	Contractors	Third Party Experts
Background Information			
1. When you were deployed (mo/yr)?	X	X	X
2. Describe your job while deployed.	X	X	X
3. How were you selected for this position?	X	X	
NATO-ANSF Interaction Context			
4. Could you please describe your experience with respect to training/advising Afghan security forces?	X	X	X
5. Please describe the violence levels.	X	X	X
Socialization Mechanisms			
6. Please share with me your philosophy on partnering, advising, training. Your unit’s?	X	X	X
7. Could you describe for me an instance in which you felt that your strategies in working with your counterparts were effective? What do you attribute that success to?	X	X	X
8. Could you describe for me an instance in which you felt that your strategies in working with your counterparts were unsuccessful? What do you attribute that lack of success to?	X	X	X
9. Did you ever experience any resistance or undermining behavior? If so, please describe.	X	X	X
10. What motivated your Afghan partner(s)? Did their motivation vary across individuals?	X	X	X
Operational Funding			
11. What discretion did you, or your unit, have to leverage funding (ASFF / CERP / FUOP) or major contracts for your Afghan partners? How did you use it?	X	X	X
Monitoring and Evaluation; Institutional/Policy/Norm Transfer			
12. Were you required to monitor capacity or professional development with your ANSF counterpart(s)? How did you do this? Was this standardized in any way?	X	X	X
13. Did you observe any changes in capacity or professionalism? Please describe.	X	X	X
14. Did you every have discussions of ‘civilian control’, ‘superintendence’, or what it means to be a professional soldier/police officer?	X	X	X
Contractor Support			
15. Did you work at all with private contractor trainers or advisors? If so, please descibe how they were employed. What monitoring/oversight tools did you have at your disposal?	X		X
Private Contractor Trainers / Advisors			
16. Were your duties and responsibilities ever amended? Why? How often?		X	
17. Did you ever deviate from your task order / statement of work / program of instruction in to complete your job? Why? How often? Did you receive any inquiries from your counterparts?		X	
18. Did you ever face any conflicts or dilemmas between your task order / program of instruction and your relationship with your local partner?		X	
Contract Managers			
19. Who did you report to (or supervise)? What was that interaction like?	X		X
20. How much discretion did you have to amend your contractor’s task orders? Was this discretion (or lack thereof) significant toward your mission? What were some of the considerations you would take into account before and after amending task orders?	X		X
Closing			
21. What was your relationship with your counterparts like when you left?	X	X	
22. Do you have one lasting story or memory from your deployment?	X	X	X
23. Is there anything I didn’t ask that you think would be valuable to know?	X	X	X

Appendix C



Figure 6. Training and Advising Contracts as a Proportion of Overall U.S. Reconstruction Spending in Afghanistan

Table 5. Contracts for Afghan Security Force Training and Advising Services (as of May 2013)

Afghan Partner Institutions	Contract / Task Order	Recipient	Purchaser	Performance Period (Date signed / Last payment to recipient)		Subtotal	Total Obligated	Purpose	Corresponding Audit Documents
Ministry of Defense & Afghan National Army	**W91CRB-05-D-0014**	MPRI	DoD	4/20/2005	11/17/2010	$ 456,211,646	**$ 705,420,065**	MoD/ANA Advisors	Nickerson (MPRI) CWC Testimony 12/18/09, 3
	W91CRB-10-C-0030	DynCorp	DoD	2/12/2010	10/31/2013 (Exp.)	$ 249,208,419		MoD/ANA Advisors	DOD DOS IG Joint Audit July 2011, 10; DOD DOS IG ANP Training LL of Contract Transition (August 15, 2011), 10
Ministry of Interior & Afghan National Police	**S-LMAQM-04-C-0033**	DynCorp					**$ 4,098,103,361**		
	(T.O.) S-AQMPD-04-C-1076		DoS/INL	12/7/2004	5/20/2009[1]	$ 294,393,788		Poppy Eradication/Training	DoS IG AUD/IQO-07-48, August 2007
	(T.O.) S-AQMPD-04-F-0282		DoS/INL	6/22/2004	12/18/2005	$ 23,722,151		Police Training - Unspecified	DoS IG AUD/IQO-07-48, August 2007
	(T.O.) S-AQMPD-04-F-0460		DoS/INL	7/12/2004	3/30/2007[2]	$ 59,235,046		Police Training - Unspecified	DoS IG AUD/IQO-07-48, August 2007
	(T.O.) S-AQMPD-05-F-2522		DoS/INL	3/16/2005	3/1/2006	$ 27,025,878		Police Training - Unspecified	DoS IG AUD/IQO-07-48, August 2007
	(T.O.) S-AQMPD-05-F-1473		DoS/INL	12/15/2004	3/7/2006[3]	$ 82,510,133		ANP Training - Training Centers	DoS IG AUD/IQO-07-48, August 2007
	(T.O.) S-AQMPD-05-F-4305		DoS/INL	8/15/2005	12/3/2008[4]	$ 828,247,044		ANP Training	DOD DOS IG Joint Audit July 2011, 10; DOD DOS IG ANP training LL of Contract Transition (August 15, 2011), 9
	(T.O.) S-AQMMA-08-F-5375		DoS/INL	7/30/2008	2/7/2013	$ 672,787,198		MoI/ANP Training & Advising	DOD-DOS IG ANP Compliance with Economy Act (August 25, 2011), 9; DOD DOS IG Joint Audit July 2011, 10, 48; DOD DOS IG ANP training LL of Contract Transition (August 15, 2011), 12
	(T.O.) S-AQMMA-10-F-2708		DoS/INL	9/10/2010	4/18/2011	$ 1,315,134,040		ANP Training	DOD-DOS IG ANP Compliance with Economy Act (August 25, 2011), 9; DOD DOS IG Joint Audit July 2011, 48; DOD DOS IG ANP training LL of Contract Transition (August 15, 2011), 12
	W91CRB-10-C-0100	MPRI	DoD	4/29/2010	6/15/2012[5]	$ 24,551,733		MoI/ANP Training & Advising	DOD DOS IG ANP training LL of Contract Transition (August 15, 2011), 13
	W91CRB-11-C-0053	DynCorp	DoD	12/20/2010	1/14/2013	$ 770,496,350		MoI/ANP Training & Advising	CWC Interim Report 2-24-2011, 28; SIGAR 2011 October, 71; DOD DOS IG ANP training LL of Contract Transition (August 15, 2011), 13
Afghan Border Police	**W9113M-07-D-0005-0017**	Academi (Xe)	DoD	9/29/2008	6/25/2011[6]	$ 225,085,983	**$ 225,085,983**	ABP Training & Advising	DOD DOS IG ANP training LL of Contract Transition (August 15, 2011), 13;
						TOTAL	**$ 5,028,609,409**		

Primary Source: http://www.usaspending.gov

Notes:

*This table present data for private sector human technical/training/advising services alone; not for ANSF facility construction, equipment purchases, or operational funds.

1. On 5/20/09, DynCorp received $4,907,908; on 9/21/12, DynCorp gave back $19,043.
2. On 3/30/07, DynCorp received $11,808,807; on 8/24/12, DynCorp gave back $68,946;
3. On 3/7/06, DynCorp received $4,251,662; on 4/18/07, DynCorp gave back $7,226,938.
4. On 12/3/08, DynCorp received $1,710,403; on 8/15/12, DynCorp gave back $5,874,152.
5. 4/29/10 was the only date money was given to MPRI; on 6/15/12, MPRI gave back $7,689,726.
6. On 6/25/11, Xe received $12,000,000; on 8/22/11 they gave back $11,179,153.

Appendix D: Excerpt From Standards of Performance, DynCorp Contract W91CRB-10-C-0030, Afghan Ministry of Defense Program Support, October 9, 2011



W91CRB-10-C-0030

Afghan Ministry of Defense Program Support (AMoDPS) *October 9, 2011*

4.6.15.15. Conduct fuel site assisted visits to improve accountability dealing with petroleum operations.

4.6.15.16. Provide input, recommendations, and training on monthly fuel orders.

4.6.16. **Logistics Command/FSD Advisor**. (5 positions: 5 SMEs: 201st, 203rd, 205th, 207th & 209th)

4.6.16.1. 215th Corps SME deleted.

4.6.16.2. The contractor shall provide logistics technician support at each Forward Support Depot (FSD) as well as Logistics Command, to conduct logistics systems and processes training to assigned ANA personnel and ensure training is aligned through all levels of the FSD. On-site trainer/technician will work with the NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ4, to develop training plans, hands on actions to train ANA personnel to establish accurate stock record accounts, and proper storage and accountability for all classes of supply, and assess ANA development. The contractor shall:

4.6.16.3. Work with all FSD advisors and NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ4 to develop metrics and assist in the collection and reporting on the operations and efficiencies of FSDs.

4.6.16.4. Work in conjunction with local NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ4 members to ensure assigned ANA Corp's supply needs are met through knowledge of on hand assets and the supply system. This will be accomplished by ensuring that the FSD is adequately addressing the Corp's needs through customer service and issuing operations.

4.6.16.5. Develop ANA training plan based on developmental objectives and inputs from NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ4 and FSD senior advisors. Review annual training plan at least quarterly with NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ4 advisors and provide a copy of the plan to NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ4.

4.6.16.6. Be familiar with, and use of, MoD Decrees, policies, procedures and doctrine to develop and execute training focused on FSD logistics Systems and processes.

4.6.16.7. Quarterly, conduct ANA quality assurance inspections and competency exercises, based on Commands' assessment tools, to evaluate and assess FSD"s attainment of Capability Milestones. Advise and discuss current capabilities and plans to increase ratings with NTM-A/CSTC-A CJ4.

4.6.16.8. Provide active participation in management reviews.

4.6.16.9. Provide CoreIMS EE alignment and training.

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