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Perceptions of Equality and National Identity amongst Young British South Asian Muslims in Bradford, England

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Recommended Citation

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Young British South Asian Muslims in Bradford, England

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts in Geography

by

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University of Arkansas
Bachelor of Arts in International Relations and Middle East Studies, 2008

December 2013
University of Arkansas

This thesis is approved for recommendation to the Graduate Council.

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Abstract

In the wake of urban riots and terror attacks in the United Kingdom, British public debate and policy have focused on the nation's immigrant communities. These debates have commonly called into question whether immigrant communities in Britain are sufficiently integrated into "mainstream" society and included in the nation. These questions have been particularly focused on the country's immigrant Muslim communities because they have, over the years, been accused of segregating themselves from, and within, British society. This study explored the local and national identities of young British South Asian Muslims in Bradford, which is one of the largest Muslim communities in Britain. National identity is commonly thought to be predicated upon equality, but there is limited empirical data to support the theory. Through survey-based research, this study adds a layer of data to support the theory as it found young British South Asian Muslims were more likely to identify with the nation if they felt as if they were equal members of society, thought they had equal access to education, or thought British South Asians had equal access to education. This study also explored the educational priorities of the Muslim community because it has struggled to attain a high rate of educational qualifications. This study found the educational goals of British South Asian Muslims differed from those of the White British population. These differing priorities may further explain the communities' educational qualifications gap. As such, this study offers valuable insight for policy makers and educators as they consider consumer demands while allocating scarce resources in the city's education sector.

Keywords: Islam, Bradford, UK, Muslim identity, British identity, Education

Acknowledgements

There are not many things in life that are done alone, and the production of a thesis is no different. I have many people to thank for their help and support over the years. Chief among them are my parents, wife, and children. I give sincere thanks daily for your love and support. My extended family has also been tremendous help. I thank my in-laws for their support, as well as Christine, Andrew and her family for putting me up while I conducted my research in Bradford. Thank-you.

I have also been fortunate enough to have had great mentors and professors associated with both the King Fahd Center for Middle East Studies and the Department of Geosciences at the University of Arkansas. I have thoroughly enjoyed my time in both programs and am grateful for the lessons I have learned, both in and outside of the classroom.

Lastly, a special thanks to my committee: Drs. Paradise, Davidson, and Gordon. Thank-you for your time, guidance, and friendship over the years.

Dedication

Dedicated to Katherine, Miryam, Ruthie, Elam, and Maia; you guys are my motivation. Thank-you for your patience, love, and understanding as evenings and weekends were consumed with thesis writing. Hopefully the word 'thesis' will become less of a hiss and byword in the home as you guys approach university yourselves. Remember to apply yourselves in whatever you pursue and strive to do your best as you represent your family, faith, and self.

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Chapter 1 Introduction

In the wake of the 2001 urban riots in northern England, as well as the July 7, 2005 terror attack in London, British public debate and policy have often focused on the nation's immigrant communities (Peach 2006; Phillips 2006; Githens-Mazer 2008; Shaw 2002; Thomas and Sanderson 2011). These debates have commonly called into question whether immigrant communities in Britain are sufficiently integrated into "mainstream" society and included in the nation - simply put, are they "British"? These questions have been particularly pointed at Muslim immigrants because they have, over the years, been accused of segregating themselves from British society (Shaw 2002; Phillips 2006).

One of the Muslim communities frequently accused of segregating itself is the South Asian Muslim community in Bradford, West Yorkshire. With a quarter of the Metropolitan District being Muslim, Bradford has one of Britain's largest Muslim communities, and was the scene of some of the worst urban riots in 2001. In July 2001, two days of rioting there injured 326 police officers and 14 members of the public. The riots involved as many as 500 individuals and caused up to £10 million of property damage (Hussain and Bagguley 2005). Government inquiries into the cause of the riots, which also occurred in nearby Burnley and Oldham, concluded racial segregation had been a contributing factor. The Home Office's report on the riots, for example, concluded, "many [of these] communities operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives. These lives often do not seem to touch at any point, let alone overlap and promote any meaningful interchanges"(Home Office 2001).

This conclusion was echoed ten years later by Prime Minister David Cameron who argued state multiculturalism had created a society that "encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and the mainstream" (New Statesman 2011). In a February 2011 speech at the Munich Security Conference, Cameron claimed multiculturalism in Britain

had failed because it allowed a segment of the British Muslim community to segregate itself from "mainstream" society. He argued the breakdown of a common sense of British national identity had also contributed to Islamist extremism and "home grown" terror. To counter extremism, Cameron argued stronger British and local identities were needed to promote "true cohesion" in society.

Driven by these public concerns for the integration and national identity of British Muslims, this study sought to determine whether they identified with the nation. As alluded to by Cameron, a shared national identity is thought to promote social solidarity and cohesion (Jelen 2011). According to social theorists like Deutsch (1964), national identity is fostered by equality; however, immigrants, including those in Bradford, are commonly disadvantaged members of society. For example, 60% of Pakistani and Bangladeshi households in the UK live in poverty, compared to 20% of White British households (Modood 2006). In Bradford, the Muslim community is particularly disadvantaged in the areas of education and employment. According to the 2001 Census, more than half (50.7%) of all Muslim adults in Bradford had no educational or vocational qualifications, and nearly a third (30.3%) of all Muslim adults had never worked or were long-term unemployed (Office for National Statistics 2001c). The 2001 Home Office inquiry into the urban rioting also highlighted the Muslims' low level of qualifications and concluded educational opportunities in Bradford had been far from equal. Peach (2006) has argued some British Muslims feel excluded from society because of their poor socioeconomic conditions. This study sought to determine whether the community's very identification with the nation has also been affected by how they perceive this inequality.

Given the Muslims' low level of qualifications, this study also sought to explore their educational priorities and whether they felt like they were able to achieve them. At the national

level, Modood (2006) has demonstrated ethnic minorities, including Pakistanis, are more likely than white students to enter into higher education. In 2001, the likelihood of a white student entering into higher education was 38%, while the likelihood for a Pakistani student was 49%. However, Modood found ethnic Pakistani students were less likely to enter prestigious universities and less likely to get high grade degrees. Modood also found Pakistani students, most of whom are Muslim, were the most likely to leave school without qualifications (Modood 2006).

While this has been demonstrated at the national level, this study sought to determine whether Muslim students in Bradford felt like they had equal access to education, and whether they were able to achieve the educational goals that were most important to them. The inability of British Muslims in Bradford to meet some of their demands in the education sector has, in the past, led to feelings of injustice and rejection. This study sought to determine whether education is an area of public life where the city's Muslim community continues to feel it is being discriminated against.

Lastly, this study explored the acculturation strategies of young British South Asian Muslims. According to Berry (1997), immigrants can adopt one of four acculturation strategies when interacting with others in their host society. Depending upon how immigrants value interaction with the new society and the maintenance of their own cultural identities, they can choose one of the following strategies: integration, assimilation, segregation, or marginalization. For example, Robinson's (2009) study of adolescents in Birmingham and Leicester found young Pakistani Muslims most commonly pursued segregation. While this is in keeping with the charge that British Muslims segregate themselves from society, Phillips (2006) claims British Muslims in Bradford are eager to better integrate into British society. To test Phillips' claim, this

study explored the local, regional, and national identities of young Muslims in Bradford to determine whether they were more likely to show signs of segregation or integration.

Academically, this study adds to the growing literature on immigration, acculturation, and national identity. It also adds empirical data to the theory that equality promotes national identity, which is important because Shulman (2003) has argued there is little data to support the commonly accepted theory. The findings of this study suggest the majority of young British South Asian Muslims in Bradford have successfully integrated into British society as they readily identify with the nation. Nevertheless, a sizable minority has not; and based upon the community's educational priorities identified in this study, Muslims in Bradford may integrate less in the future.

Chapter 2 Previous Research

To establish the academic foundation for this study, this chapter briefly highlights the following topics: the 'nation' and national identity; national identity and international migration; and lastly, acculturation. This chapter also provides some historical background on immigration to Britain and the establishment of the South Asian community in Britain. Finally, this chapter explores the socioeconomic conditions of the South Asian community in Bradford, with a particular focus on the Pakistani Muslim population.

2.1 The Nation and National Identity

The 'Nation'

In its simplest form, a nation is a political community attached to a geographically bound territory. The attachment to the land can be either physical or emotional. Theorists, however, have struggled to more objectively define the nation. Hugh Seton-Watson, a leading scholar of nationalism, concluded after a lifetime of study that a purely scientific definition could not be produced (Anderson 2006). Although scholars have struggled to objectively define the nation, Hutchinson and Smith (1994) claim the descriptions of it put forward by Renan, Stalin, and Weber represent the broad views held within the discipline.

Ernest Renan and the Nation: "An Everyday Plebiscite"

The nation, argued Renan in a Parisian lecture hall in 1882, is "a soul, a spiritual principle" (Hutchinson and Smith 1994). In his lecture, *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?*, Renan claimed the nation can be unified by a common language and shared interests. He also noted the historic role played by a common ethnicity or religion in unifying tribes or small political bodies like the Greek city-states. However, he argued these traits alone do not define the modern nation. Renan claimed the modern nation is, above all else, a product of common history and the shared desire of a people to form a collective; as he argued:

> A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Only two things, actually, constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. One is in the past, the other is in the present. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of remembrances; the other is the actual consent, the desire to live together, the will to continue to value the heritage which all hold in common... To have common glories in the past, a common will in the present; to have accomplished great things together, to wish to do so again, that is the essential condition for being a nation. (Hutchinson and Smith 1994)

United by a common heritage, even an imagined history, the key to the nation, according to Renan, is the willingness of a people to participate in it. Renan claimed, "[The nation] supposes a past, it renews itself especially in the present by a tangible deed: the approval, the desire, clearly expressed, to continue the communal life. The existence of a nation (pardon this metaphor!) is an everyday plebiscite" (Hutchinson and Smith 1994). Renan's views are akin to the right of self-determination that carried significant weight during the early 20th century, particularly in the creation of new nation-states following World War I.

Joseph Stalin and the Nation: A Community of People with a Common Language, Territory, and Economy

Stalin defined the nation as an "historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture" (Hutchinson and Smith 1994). To constitute a nation, Stalin argued, each of these traits had to be present. To illustrate this requirement, he pointed to the British and Americans. Despite sharing a common language, heritage, and, for a time, national identity, the two ultimately became independent nations because they did not share a common territory. Stalin argued the nation requires the extended cohabitation of a people on the land, as he claimed, "a nation is formed only as a result of lengthy and systematic intercourse, as a result of people living together generation after generation" (Hutchinson and Smith 1994). Stalin's prerequisite for sustained cohabitation has implications for international migrants because it implies the first immigrant generations are not part of the nation.

Max Weber and the Nation: A Community of Sentiment

According to Weber, the nation cannot be defined in empirical terms because nations are ultimately tied to prestige, cultural values, and communal solidarity. Although he asserts a common anthropological type can be relevant to nationality, Weber argues nations are not necessarily based upon a common race, ethnicity, or religion - though these elements can unify the community. Weber identified the nation as a "community of sentiment" linked to a legend of a "providential mission" or destiny, and distinguished from others by its unique cultural values. He writes, "The significance of the 'nation' is usually anchored in the superiority, or at least the irreplaceability, of the culture values that are to be preserved and developed only through the cultivation of the peculiarity of the group"(Hutchinson and Smith 1994). According to Weber, it is the responsibility of the nation's members, particularly the intellectuals, to preserve and cultivate the cultural values which distinguish the nation from others.

National Identity

National identity is one's moral and emotional identification with the nation, and has been described as the "social glue" that binds the nation together (Mortimer and Fine 1999; Tilley and Heath 2007; Jelen 2011). Parekh writes, "National identity is about whether we identify with a community, see it as ours, are attached to it and feel bonded to our fellow members in a way in which we are not bonded to outsiders" (Mortimer and Fine 1999). According to Parekh, national identity creates the sense of belonging and social solidarity that unifies members of the nation and allows them to see past their differences. Likewise, Loden (2008) claims shared national identity promotes cohesion by reducing in-group bias amongst the nation's subgroups. As this is the case, national identity is more than a mere passive identification with the nation, national identity actively sustains it.

National Identity Promoted by Symbolism, Economic Advantage, and Equality

Because shared national identity fosters social harmony, the nation's powerbrokers commonly strive to promote it amongst the population. In the view of Renan, it is the role of the intellectuals to promote national identity. However, these efforts can also be the function of the state, and are commonly undertaken in cooperation with social institutions, including national educational systems (Marginson 2002; Hobsbawm 1992). In 2010, for example, the French government mandated that a copy of the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen*, a symbol of French national identity, be placed in every French classroom. The government's intent was to promote French national identity in response to the country's growing immigrant population (Willsher 2010).

As attempted in France, states and national powerbrokers often appeal to symbolism to foster national identity. Symbols have long been used as "devices" to promote or reify national identity, and can include anthems, flags, currency, architecture, documents, flora, and fauna (Jelen 2011). In addition to a copy of the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen*, the 2010 French mandate required every classroom display a French flag. This is an example of what Billig (1995) termed "banal nationalism", or the everyday evocation of nationalism through the use of symbols like flags. For example, the Stars and Stripes is an omnipresent unifying symbol of American national identity, as Samuel P. Huntington writes:

> Since the Civil War, Americans have been a flag-oriented people. The Stars and Stripes has the status of a religious icon and is a more central symbol of national identity for Americans than their flags are for peoples of other nations. Probably never in the past, however, was the flag as omnipresent as it was after September 11. It was everywhere: homes, businesses, automobiles, clothes, furniture, windows, storefronts, lampposts, telephone poles. In early October, 80 percent of Americans said they were displaying the flag, 63 percent at home, 29 percent on clothes, 28 percent on cars. Wal-Mart reportedly sold 116,000 flags on September 11 and 250,000 the next day, compared with 6,400 and 10,000 on the same days a year earlier.... The flags were physical evidence of the sudden and dramatic rise in the salience of national identity for Americans compared to their

other identities. (Huntington 2004)

Observing the role symbolism plays in fostering national identity, Parekh writes, "Symbols play an important part in nurturing and vivifying national identity. They are symbols of our community, and not any other, and give it an unmistakable and tangible presence. They integrate us into the life of our community and link us to its past and future" (Mortimer and Fine 1999).

In addition to symbolism, national identity can also be fostered by appeals to material benefit. Karl Deutsch, for example, argued "images of the community" are formed when social interactions, which he termed as transactions, lead to rewards; as he writes:

> If these [social] transactions were rewarded, the image of a community may be strongly positive. Liking this kind of community, people may say: We belong together. In their favorable reaction to the community, they might then also say, I can see myself as a member of this community; I will call it "we" if I speak of a group. I will call it "home" if I speak of a territory. I will express and experience love of country (patriotism) or love of a group of people (nationalism), but in any case I identify with this symbol or this group. What is done to this country or to this group or to its symbol, such as the flag, is done to me. I feel diminished or enlarged, depending on the diminution or enlargement of this country or this group. (Jacob, Toscano, and University of Pennsylvania 1964)

According to Deutsch, national identity is promoted when individuals think their membership in the nation yields economic advantage. An example of this was the adoption of a common British identity following the creation of Great Britain in 1707. Despite the longstanding animosity and distrust between the English, Welsh, and Scottish, the three nations ultimately adopted a common British identity because access to the British Empire gave them economic advantage (Colley 2009).

Not only does the nation need to offer its members economic advantage to foster national identity, but, according to Deutsch, it needs to do so equitably. Deutsch argues the uneven distribution of benefits diminishes political integration and national identity, as he writes, "Where wealth distributions are so skewed that only a small percentage of the population

receives a large percentage of the nation's wealth, social conflict and disintegrative tendencies also usually exist" (Jacob, Toscano, and University of Pennsylvania 1964). In Deutsch's opinion, it is the responsibility of the state to ensure the equal distribution of benefits – be they economic, educational, social, or cultural.

According to Shulman (2003), scholars commonly accept Deutsch's dual arguments that economic advantage and equality foster national identity. However, Shulman argues there is little empirical evidence to support these theories. In his own study, Shulman concluded the economic strength of a nation, or equality within it, do not necessarily translate to a stronger national identity. One of the primary hypothesizes Shulman tested was the claim that wealthier members of the nation would have a stronger attachment to it because the nation had "served them better economically"(Shulman 2003). His study concluded, however, that poorer members of the nation were slightly more likely than wealthier members to identity with the nation. Although wealth was a poor indicator of national attachment, his study concluded factors like ethnicity, education, and age each had greater influence upon one's attachment to the nation (Shulman 2003). As such, he noted the need for scholars to further investigate the links between ethnicity, economic inequality, and national identity.

2.2 National Identity and International Migration

The 20th and 21st centuries have been marked by high rates of international migration. As of 2010, approximately 3.1% of the world's population were considered international migrants, defined as those living outside the country of their birth (United Nations Population Division 2013). However, the world's international migrant population is not evenly distributed, and is concentrated in the more developed nations. According to the United Nations Population Division, 60% of the world's international migrant population lives in Europe, North America,

Australia, New Zealand, and Japan (United Nations Population Division 2013).

In response to the high level of international migration, scholars have begun to examine its impact on national identity. Some, like Wright (2011), have questioned whether the high level of international migration threatens the social harmony that is derived from a common sense of national identity. Others, like Jelen (2011), have argued national identity itself is threatened by the increasing number of people who consider themselves "stateless", including refugees, international students, travelers, and laborers who frequently cross national boundaries. Likewise, Weaver (1993) has expressed the concern that the high level of international migration threatens "societal security", or the "ability of a society to persist in its essential character" (Huntington 2004). Echoing Weaver's concerns, Huntington (2004) argues international migration is the greatest threat to "societal security" as he claims it was responsible for the erosion of American national identity before 9/11. Huntington argues American national identity had given way to other identities that had become more salient at the end of the 20th century, as he writes:

> Among some educated and elite Americans, national identity seemed at times to have faded from sight. Globalization, multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism, immigration, subnationalism, and anti-nationalism had battered American consciousnesses. Ethnic, racial, and gender identities came to the fore. In contrast to their predecessors, many immigrants were ampersands, maintaining dual loyalties and dual citizenships. A massive Hispanic influx raised questions concerning America's linguistic and cultural unity... The national unity and sense of national identity created by work and war in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and consolidated in the world wars of the twentieth century seemed to be eroding. By 2000, America was, in many respects, less a nation than it had been for a century. The Stars and Stripes were at half-mast and other flags flew higher on the flagpole of American identities. (Huntington 2004)

Huntington was concerned that American national identity and its cultural underpinnings were being challenged by the increasing member of immigrants from Latin America and Asia who, in his assessment, favored separation over assimilation.

Immigrants as a "Threat"

In 1806, Napoleon's government submitted a series of twelve questions to the Assembly

of Jewish Notables that had been convened by the government. Among the questions posed to

the body were the following: 1. "In the eyes of Jews, are Frenchmen considered as their

brethren? Or are they considered as strangers?" and 2. "Do Jews born in France, and treated by

the laws as French citizens, consider France their country? Are they bound to defend

it?"(Bloomberg 2004). In response to the first set of questions, the Assembly affirmed the

national identity of French Jews, as it attested:

> In the eyes of Jews, Frenchmen are their brethren, and are not strangers... How could they
> consider them otherwise when they inhabit the same land, when they are ruled and
> protected by the same government, and by the same laws? When they enjoy the same
> rights, and have the same duties to fulfill? There exists, even between the Jew and
> Christian, a tie which abundantly compensates for religion - it is the tie of gratitude. This
> sentiment was at first excited in us by the mere grant of toleration. It has been increased,
> these eighteen years, by new favors from government, to such a degree of energy, that
> now our fate is irrevocably linked the common fate of all Frenchmen. (Bloomberg 2004)

To the second set of questions, the Jewish body acknowledged the community had, for a time,

enjoyed fewer rights under French law, but they maintained their love for the nation regardless;

as the Assembly responded:

> The love of the country is in the heart of Jews a sentiment so natural, so powerful, and so
> consonant to their religious opinions, that a French Jew considers himself in England, as
> among strangers, although he may be among Jews; and the case is the same with English
> Jews in France. (Bloomberg 2004)

Pleased with these responses, Napoleon continued his policies of extending equal rights under

the law to Jews in the French Empire.

As in Napoleonic France, immigrants today are commonly viewed as a threat, and

sometimes, as in the case of Jews in France, as a potential fifth column. Writing of the often

hostile relationship between the host nation and immigrants, Triandafyllidou claims, "There is

virtually no record of an immigrant population that is perceived by the host nation as an inspiring Significant Other. The negative and threatening representation of the immigrant seems to be an intrinsic feature of the host-immigrant relationship"(Delanty and Kumar 2006). While it may be an "intrinsic feature" of the relationship, the threatening representation of the immigrant is amplified following outbreaks of public disorder and violence involving immigrant communities. This occurred in Britain, for example, after the urban riots in 2001. It has also occurred after terrorist attacks and high profile anti-government demonstrations involving British Muslims. For example, the far-right British Nationalist Party (BNP) vilified the Muslim community as a fifth column following a provocative 2010 Remembrance Day protest in London. During the day's customary moment of silence, a small group of young British Muslims burned poppies - the symbol of Remembrance Day - while chanting "British Troops burn in hell!" Responding to the protest, the BNP posted on its website under the heading *Islamic Fifth Column in Britain*, "The justifiable outrage over the incident, which was clearly designed to insult all British people honouring the dead in all wars, has hidden a host of other incidents which clearly show that anti-British sentiment runs very high across the entire Islamic community in Britain" (British Nationalist Party 2011). The protest also drew the criticism of the mainstream media. The *Daily Mail* reported, "Three miles across London from the Armistice Day ceremony at the Cenotaph, another face of Britain was on display. It was contorted with hatred, poisoned by politics, and fuelled by flames from a giant, burning poppy. These were the Muslim extremists who brought shame to the memory of the dead" (Harris 2010). Like other mainstream outlets, the *Daily Mail* distinguished the actions of the minority as extremists, but the demonstration still cast a shadow over the wider Muslim community in Britain.

Although immigrants are commonly seen as a threat, the British Muslim community has

faced additional scrutiny because of the security threat posed by a minority. In 2011, British

intelligence officials estimated there were at least 200 British Muslims actively planning suicide

operations in the United Kingdom (Rayment 2011). Moreover, since 2001, British Muslim

immigrants have conducted five notable terror attacks in the UK, and have been implicated in at

least ten major plots or attempted attacks (see Appendix A). According to Thomas and

Sanderson (2011), the number of terror attacks and plots demonstrate the nation faces a real

threat from "home grown" Islamist terrorists.

      Because of the security threat posed by British Islamist extremists, the national identity of

all British Muslims is ever present in the national headlines and as a topic of political debate

(Thomas and Sanderson 2011). This is partly due to the fact that some of the British Muslims

who have been involved in "home grown" terrorism have demonstrated a weak identification

with the nation, instead identifying with the *'umma*, or global Muslim community. For example,

the ringleader of the July 7, 2005 attack in London seemed to identify more strongly with

Muslims outside Britain than with other Britons. With a thick Yorkshire accent, the second-

generation immigrant Mohammad Sidique Khan claimed in his "martyr's" video:

> *Your democratically elected governments* continuously perpetuate atrocities against *my people all over the world*. And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging *my Muslim brothers and sisters*. Until *we* feel security, *you* will be *our* targets. And until *you* stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of *my people* we will not stop this fight. We are at war and I am a soldier. (Italics added for emphasis) (BBC News 2005)

One of the attackers in the May 2013 murder of British soldier Drummer Lee Rigby made a

similar statement in the immediate aftermath of his attack. Michael Adebolajo, a British-born

Muslim convert of Nigerian descent, told onlookers, "*We* will never stop fighting you. The only

reasons we have done this is because Muslims are dying every day. This British soldier is an eye

for an eye, a tooth for tooth. We apologize that women had to see this today but *in our lands our*

women have to see the same. *You people* will never be safe" (italics added for emphasis) (Hjelmgaard and Stranglin 2013).

National Identities of Immigrants

Contemporary studies and social commentary on national identity and immigration are focused around the intertwined questions: 1. Do immigrants identify with their host nation? and 2. What factors promote their ability to integrate into society? These questions are more than academic. For one, immigrants who integrate into society have higher self-esteem, are more competent in their work performance, and achieve higher academic standards (Phinney et al. 2001). Phinney (2001) also argues the immigrants' attachment to the nation promotes social cohesion, which is what the Conservative Government in the UK hopes to achieve through better integrating the nation's Muslim immigrant communities.

According to Berry (1997), immigrants arrive in a new country with differing views on the value of retaining their own cultural identities and adopting those of the host nation. Based upon how these different values intersect, Berry argues immigrants adopt one of four acculturation strategies: integration, assimilation, segregation, or marginalization. These differing strategies are represented in Figure 2-1. If an immigrant considers it of value to maintain relations with the host society, and the host nation is receptive to immigrants and is open to cultural diversity, the immigrant will likely integrate or assimilate. Alternatively, immigrants who do not value relations with the host society will either pursue a strategy of separation or marginalization depending on how they value the maintenance of their own cultural identities. Phinney et al. (2001) argue integration is the best strategy for the immigrant's well-being, while marginalization is the worst strategy. For example, immigrant adolescents who integrate or adopt a "bicultural orientation" perform better in schools than those immigrants who

adopt other acculturation strategies.

Although it is thought integration is the best acculturation strategy for immigrants, fusing multiple identities is not easy. For example, Indian-American author, Jhumpa Lahiri described the difficulties she faced trying to balance multiple, and at times competing, identities; as she writes:

> When I was growing up in Rhode Island in the 1970s I felt neither Indian nor American. Like many immigrant offspring I felt intense pressure to be two things, loyal to the old world and fluent in the new, approved of on either side of the hyphen...my perception as a young girl was that I fell short at both ends, shuttling between two dimensions that had nothing to do with one another. (Facing History and Ourselves Foundation 2008)

While it can be difficult for immigrants to reconcile multiple identities, studies suggest multiple factors that increase the likelihood an immigrant will successfully integrate into society. These factors include a common language and the absence of discrimination (Robinson 2009; Phinney et al. 2001; Loden 2008).

A common language is generally seen as a fundamental building block of the nation (Smith 1991; Hutchinson and Smith 1994). Despite Huntington's (2004) concern that immigrants increasingly maintain their own language instead of learning the language of their host nation, studies suggest immigrants continue to see learning the host language as an important entryway to full participation with the nation. For example, the 1994 General Social Survey in the United States found more than 85% of Hispanics in the national survey saw speaking English as being "very" or "fairly important" in making someone a "true American" (Citrin et al. 2007). The 2002 Pew National Hispanic Survey also found Hispanics overwhelmingly believed learning English was essential to succeeding in America (Citrin et al. 2007). Loden's (2008) study of national identity amongst secondary school students in Sweden concluded Swedes and immigrants alike agreed the ability to speak Swedish was an important

	Is it considered to be of value to maintain one's identity and culture?	
	Yes	**No**
Yes	Integration	Assimilation
No	Separation/ Segregation	Marginalization

Is it considered to be of value to maintain relations with the larger society? (for the left-side rows Yes/No)

(Berry 1997)

Figure 2-1: Immigrant Acculturation Strategies According to Berry

step in becoming a "real Swede".

Equality, or at least the absence of overt discrimination, has also been identified as a determining factor in the success of an immigrant's acculturation. Loden (2008), for example, concluded in his study that "fair chances to establish oneself as a full member of society" was essential to the immigrants' subsequent identification with the nation. Robinson's (2009) study of Hindu and Muslim students in Britain likewise found perceptions of discrimination affected the immigrants' acculturation strategy. Robinson concluded discrimination was reported less frequently from those adolescents who pursued integration than from those who adopted separation as an acculturation strategy.

2.3 Britain: A Legacy of Migration

Responding to the xenophobic criticisms of King William III, Daniel Defoe wrote in 1701:

> The Romans first with Julius Cæsar came,
> Including all the nations of that name,
> Gauls, Greek, and Lombards; and, by computation,
> Auxiliaries or slaves of ev'ry nation.
> With Hengist, Saxons; Danes with Sweno came,
> In search of plunder, not in search of fame.
> Scots, Picts, and Irish from th' Hibernian shore;
> And conq'ring William brought the Normans o'er.
> All these their barb'rous offspring left behind,

The dregs of armies, they of all mankind;
Blended with Britons, who before were here,
Of whom the Welch ha' blest the character.
From this amphibious, ill-born mob began,
That vain ill-natured thing, an Englishman.
(Defoe 1870)

As encapsulated by Defoe in his satirical poem, *The True-Born Englishman*, England - and by extension Britain - is a nation of migrants. Some of the earliest immigrants arrived in the form of invading armies, introducing the likes of the Angles, Saxons, Danes, and Normans to Britain (Layton-Henry 1992). Others immigrated to Britain as refugees, escaping either religious or political persecution. These settlers included French Protestants in the 17th century and Eastern European Jews in the 19th and 20th centuries. Some of the more recent immigrants moved to Britain for economic reasons. For example, immigrants from the West Indies and South Asia migrated in response to Britain's labor shortages in the middle of the twentieth century. Their immigration was also a legacy of Britain's colonial history.

In addition to a long history of immigration, Britain has been a considerable source of emigration over the centuries. The British emigrated for many of the same reasons that immigrants settled in Britain, including economic gain, refuge from religious or political persecution, and Britain's colonial policies. Pushing aside initial concerns that Europeans who settled in foreign lands would lose their civility, the British became the leading colonizers of North America, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa (Earle 1992; Erickson 1989).

Although the recent levels of immigration to Britain have drawn significant public attention, historically, the level of British emigration outpaced the volume of immigration. Figure 2-2 depicts the net migration to Britain between 1871 and 1940, while Figure 2-3 represents net migration between 1951 and 1988. As seen in these figures, annual emigration has exceeded immigration for most of the last 140 years. Even in the 1930s when immigration

briefly surpassed the rate of emigration, many of the immigrants were in fact British citizens

returning to Britain after having failed to establish themselves abroad (Layton-Henry 1992).

Only in the last three decades has the annual rate of immigration consistently surpassed

the level of emigration. Figure 2-4 represents net migration to Britain between 1964 and 2011.

Between 1964 and 1987, net migration totaled -842,000 and the annual number of immigrants

exceeded the number of emigrants only six times. In contrast, net migration between 1988 and

2011 equaled 2.3 million and the annual number of immigrants outnumbered emigrants 21 times

(Hawkins 2013). The increased level of immigration to Britain in recent decades is consistent

with trends observed elsewhere in Western Europe as countries that once sent migrants out into

the world have since become "immigrant receiving societies" (Massey et al. 1993).

Notwithstanding the historical presence of minorities in Britain and the continued

presence of a large ethnic majority, recent immigration has reshaped the country's human

landscape. In 1991, the white population represented 94.1% of the total population in England

and Wales. Ten years later, the white population represented 91.3% of the population, and in

2011, it represented 86% of the population (National Statistics 2006; Office for National

Statistics 2013d). The decreasing proportion of whites in England and Wales is due in part to

weak natural population growth. Between 1991 and 2011, the white population grew by just one

percent (Office for National Statistics 2013d; National Statistics 2006).

By contrast, the non-white population in England and Wales, particularly the South Asian

population, has grown rapidly in recent decades because of immigration and natural population

growth. In 1991, South Asians represented 2.9% of the overall population of England and

Wales; in 2011, they represented 5.3% (National Statistics 2006; Office for National Statistics

2013d). Between 1991 and 2011, the ethnic Indian population grew by 65%, the Pakistani

**Net Migration to Britain
1871-1940**

(Layton-Henry 1992)
Figure 2-2: Net Migration to Britain, 1871-1940

**Net Migration to Britain
1951-1988**

(Layton-Henry 1992)
Figure 2-3: Net Migration to Britain, 1951-1988

(Hawkins 2013)
Figure 2-4: Net Migration to Britain, 1964-2011

population by 140%, and the Bangladeshi population by 168% (National Statistics 2006; Office

for National Statistics 2013d).

The transformation of Britain from an emigrant sending nation to an "immigrant

receiving society" has produced a strong public reaction. A poll conducted in June 2013 by

Ipsos-MORI highlighted the widespread public concern with recent levels of immigration. The

annual survey found that after the economy, the second most important issue facing Britons was

race relations/immigration. While 50% of respondents said the economy was the most important

issue facing Britain, 35% claimed the most important issue was race relations/immigration

(Economist 2013b). It has been claimed that the public's concern over recent immigration is

sharpened by the fact that many of the immigrants in the 20th century were former colonial

subjects (Ali, Kalra, and Sayyid 2008). However, the concern is also tied to economic

considerations. An Ipsos-MORI survey in April 2013 found 55% of British respondents thought

the level of immigration had to be solved to end the country's economic crisis (Economist

2013b).

The public's concern with immigration is also reflected in government policy. Immigration control, for example, has been a cornerstone of the Conservative Government's agenda. In addition to pledging to reduce annual net migration to the tens of thousands, the government has made the integration of immigrant communities a priority. In an April 2011 speech to the Conservative Party, Cameron argued new immigration controls were necessary to better integrate new immigrants into British society and to relieve the pressure that recent immigrants had placed on society. In his address to the Conservative Party, Cameron argued:

> Between 1997 and 2009, 2.2 million more people came to live in this country than left to go and live abroad. That is the largest influx of people Britain as ever had and it has placed real pressure on communities up and down our country. Not just pressure on schools, housing and healthcare - though those have been serious - but social pressures too. Because real communities aren't just collections of public service users living in the same space. Real communities are bound by common experiences, forged by friendship and by conversation; knitted together by all the rituals of the neighbourhood, from the school run to the chat down the pub. And these bonds take time. And so real integration takes time too. That's why, when there have been significant numbers of new people arriving in neighbourhoods, perhaps not able to speak the same language as those living there, on occasions not really wanting or even willing to integrate, that has created a kind of discomfort and a disjointedness in some neighborhoods. (The Guardian 2011)

To reduce net migration and promote the integration of new immigrants, the Conservative-led coalition government has since introduced policies which limit non-EU immigration, tighten controls on student visa programs, and place greater emphasis on the need for immigrants to speak English.

Government Efforts to Restrict Immigration to Britain

The Conservative Government's initiatives are the latest in a series of government efforts to restrict immigration since the turn of the 20th century. A timeline of key events and efforts to restrict immigration is found in Table 2-1. The timeline highlights the repeated concern for the ability of immigrants to integrate or assimilate into British society, as well as the continued concerns with non-European immigration.

Each of the events in Table 2-1 were important in the development of immigration controls in Britain. However, the intent here is to highlight the efforts to limit immigration at the turn of the 20th century because of the parallels with Muslim immigrants today. Some of the most visible migrants at the turn of the century were Jewish refugees who, like the Muslims today, were distinctly different from the white majority because of their religious and cultural markers. The panic over anarchist-linked migrants at the turn of the century also resembles the contemporary fear of Islamist-linked immigrants. Indeed, government debates in the 1890s over the right to deport anarchists bears striking semblance to the government efforts in the 21st century to deport immigrants like Abu Qatada who are suspected of links to international terrorism.

Jewish Immigrants at the Turn of the 20th Century

At the turn of the 20th century, persecution and pogroms in Eastern Europe and Russia pushed a large number of Jewish migrants to the west. Although most of these settled in the United States, many of them transited Britain. According to an account of the day, Britain was a natural transit point for the Jewish refugees because of its geographic location and its dominance of the world's sea trade (Anonymous1897). While most Jewish migrants travelled onto the United States, some settled in Britain. Between 1875 and 1914, an estimated 120,000 Jewish refugees chose to settle in Britain (Layton-Henry 1992).

While the Jewish community in Britain was relatively small, it did not go unnoticed because successive waves of immigrants settled in relatively few places. Most immigrants were attracted to London, in particular to East London. In 1901, the East London Borough of Stepney was home to 40% of London's immigrant population (The National Archives n.d.). The spatial concentration of immigrants spurred political movements opposed to their presence. For

example, the Conservative Member of Parliament for Stepney, Sir William Evans-Gordon, helped to form the anti-immigrant British Brothers' League. Established in 1901 as an anti-immigrant movement, it soon became associated with anti-Semitism. The movement's political power was demonstrated the following year when the government responded to its pressure by forming the Royal Commission on Alien Immigration, with Evans-Gordon as a member of the body. The Commission's recommendations led to the *1905 Aliens Act* that gave the government the power to refuse entry to destitute immigrants. However, the act also established the right of asylum to those, like the Jewish immigrants, who could prove they were fleeing persecution.

The Anarchist Debates

Politicians like Evans-Gordon were opposed to immigration on the grounds that immigrants posed a threat to the British working class. However, the House of Commons' Committee on Emigration and Immigration (Foreigners) in 1889 had concluded the rate of immigration was not sufficient enough to warrant legislation. Nevertheless, a crisis on the continent in 1894 led Parliament to reexamine the issue. In June 1894, French President Marie Carnot was assassinated by the Italian anarchist Santo Caserio. It was claimed in the press that the assassin's plot had been planned in England.

It was not the first time that England had been charged as being a safe haven for anarchists. In February of 1894, a terror attack in Paris carried out by anarchist Émile Henry was also reported to have been planned in England. After the attack, *The Times* reported parts of London had become rife with Continental anarchists and their supporters. The *Times* also claimed the material support for the attack had been provided in London, as it reported:

> The district of Tottenham Court Road has long been notorious as the favourite domicile of the most advanced section of the Socialist party and of the Anarchists, English and foreign. In a street off this main thoroughfare is a club, known to the police for years past as the resort of political desperadoes of all nationalities, wherein anarchy and the 'Social

Table 2-1

Timeline of Key Events and Efforts to Regulate Immigration to Britain

1889
A Select Committee of the House of Commons concluded newly established immigrant communities led to localized overcrowding in major cities; however, the number of immigrants was not large enough to warrant legislation.

1894
Political campaigns respond to Jewish immigration that had created large immigrant settlements in East London. Prime Minister Lord Salisbury introduced a Bill to restrict immigration.

1898
Lord Hardwicke's bill, which was similar to Lord Salisbury's Bill of 1894, failed to pass Parliament.

1901
Conservative Member of Parliament (MP) Evans-Gordon formed the British Brothers' League, an anti-Jewish movement that campaigned against immigration.

1902
The government responds to pressure from the British Brothers' League by establishing the Royal Commission on Alien Immigration, with Evans-Gordon a member. The Commission concluded the immigrant population was not numerically significant and was as "healthy and clean" as the British population. The Commission also concluded immigrant children were able to adapt well in English schools after any deficiencies in language were overcome. Nevertheless, the Commission recommended the government have the power to refuse entry to 'undesirable' aliens.

1905
The Royal Commission's recommendations led to the *1905 Aliens Act*. The Act granted the government the power to refuse entry to immigrants who could not financially support themselves. The Act also firmly established the policy of asylum to those who could prove they were fleeing religious or political persecution.

1914
The onset of WWI led the Liberal Government to pass the *Aliens Restriction Act of 1914*. The Act gave the Home Secretary complete control over immigration and foreign residents inside the country.

1919
The *Aliens Restrictions (Amendment) Act of 1919* replaced the *1905 Aliens Act* and extended the 1914 Act by a year.

1920
The *Aliens Order* is passed giving the Home Secretary the authority to deport any immigrant whose presence in Britain was not considered 'conducive to the public good'. The law was

renewed annually until the *Immigration Act of 1971.*

1947
After WWII, the government took pro-immigration initiatives to settle 120,000 Poles who had served under British command during the war. The *Polish Resettlement Act* was passed to assist Polish service members and their families to establish citizenship and permanent residence in the Commonwealth.

1948
The *Nationality Act of 1948* conferred British citizenship to all those who then lived within the Empire and Commonwealth, giving them full access to live and work in Britain without a visa.

The *Empire Windrush*, the first Caribbean migrant ship arrived in Britain. The *Windrush* brought West Indian migrants on its return trip from delivering British emigrants to Australia.

1949
The Royal Commission on Population, first established in 1944, reports the declining fertility rate in Britain would lead to an economic downturn and decreased emigration. It was feared these would reduce British influence in the world. However, the Commission concluded large-scale immigration was impractical due to concerns over training and housing immigrants. The Commission was also concerned with the immigrants' ability to assimilate.

1952
Between 1952-1957, Conservative MP Cyril Osborne carried out an anti-immigration campaign in the House of Commons. Although he was not successful, his views on restricting "colored immigration" were shared by many, including members of the cabinet. However, it was not politically viable to restrict Commonwealth immigration because the government was, at the time, actively promoting the image of a multiracial Commonwealth.

1958
Anti-minority riots in Nottingham and Notting Hill force the issue of immigration to the fore. After the riots, the *Daily Express* published the results of a public opinion poll claiming 79.1% of national respondents favored controls of "colored immigration". Conservative MP Martin Lindsey claimed, "We all know perfectly well that the core of the problem is coloured migration. We must ask ourselves to what extent we want Great Britain to become a multi-racial community … a question which affects the future of our own race and breed is not one we should merely leave to chance" (Layton-Henry 1992).

1960
In an attempt to indirectly restrict immigration, the government tried to persuade colonial and Commonwealth governments to unilaterally limit the issuance of passports to their citizens. As an example of the pushback, the Indian Supreme Court ruled it was

unconstitutional for the Indian government to refuse passports to its citizens.

1961
At the Conservative party's annual conference, 39 resolutions demanding immigration controls were submitted for discussion. In October, the Queen announced the *Commonwealth Immigrants Bill*.

1962
The *Commonwealth Immigrants Bill* became law on 1 July. The law enacted immigration controls for all holders of Commonwealth passports, except those born in the UK or those holding British passports. Holders of Commonwealth passports wishing to migrate to Britain had to receive a work voucher through the Ministry of Labour. The voucher system gave priority to those with either a job offer or those with high demand skills. According to Layton-Henry, the Bill signaled a "decisive change in

British government policy and the break with the long tradition of treating all Commonwealth and colonial people as British subjects with equal rights of citizenship, including access to the UK as native Britons" (Layton-Henry 1992).

1964
In the wake of the *Commonwealth Immigrants Bill*, race and immigration were key issues in the General Elections. In election speeches in Bradford and Birmingham, Conservative Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home boasted nearly a million would-be immigrants had been excluded as a result of the *Commonwealth Immigrants Bill*. Harold Wilson, who became Prime Minister in the election, accused the Conservatives of using immigration as an excuse for their failures to address housing and education.

In Birmingham, Conservative Peter Griffiths pulled off a shock victory over Patrick Gordon Walker who was expected to become Harold Wilson's foreign secretary. Griffith's campaign benefited from an anti-immigrant campaign poster bearing the racially charged and offensive slogan, "If you want a nigger for a neighbour, Vote Labour".

1965
As the number of minority immigrant students increased in the 1950s and 1960s, white parents sought to limit their enrollment. In response to pressure, local authorities placed quotas on the number of minority students allowed to enroll in a given school. In 1965, the Department of Education and Science instituted a policy of busing minority immigrants from the inner cities.

1968
Responding to the immigration of South Asians from East Africa, the Labour government, under pressure from the Conservatives, issued the *1968 Immigration Act*. The Act required new immigrants to have sufficiently close connections to Britain, such as a parent or grandparent born in Britain.

(BBC News 2010; Brown 2001; Brah 2008; House of Lords and House of Commons Join
2009; Peach 2006; Layton-Henry 1992)

Table 2-1: Timeline of Key Events and Efforts to Regulate Immigration to Britain

> Revolution' are preached. Some time ago the frequency of the visits paid by some of the
> leading frequenters of the club to a house in another street leading off Tottenham Court
> Road, and the fact that a number of French and Spanish Anarchists had taken up their
> residence in the same building, led to a special and very careful watch being kept on the
> place. It was speedily discovered that the suspected men were in frequent
> communications with the leading Continental Anarchists, and, as a matter of fact, as it is
> now known, the latest bomb-thrower, Emile Henry, was in the house only a few weeks
> ago. There is also reason to believe that he obtained from fellow-conspirators in this
> house the ingredients and material with which to manufacture the infernal machine which
> he threw with such terrible effect in the Café Terminus in Paris. (Great Britain Parliament
> 1892)

Lord Salisbury used this report to justify the introduction of his *Aliens Bill* before the House of

Lords in July of 1894.

Lord Salisbury's legislation sought in part to grant the government the power to expel

known anarchists from the country; however, the bill also sought government powers to restrict

the entry of destitute immigrants. Lord Salisbury argued the bill was necessary to safeguard

28

Britain's working class population, as he claimed destitute immigrants had increased the burden

on the tax payer through increased poor rates (Steele 2001). He also appealed to the principles of

supply and demand in the labor force, arguing the increased presence of migrants made it more

difficult for working class British citizens to find work. During the second reading of the bill,

Lord Salisbury argued:

> [The immigrants] diminish the chances of earning a livelihood which your own
> population feels so much. Their difficulty of finding employment is increasing more and
> more, the number of those who are seeking public relief gets greater and greater, and
> there is a very general belief among working men, and I think that belief is founded upon
> facts, that the introduction of these aliens, who are content with the very lowest
> conditions of existence, has a tendency to drive our own population out of employment
> and to increase the hardness of that battle which they have to fight in finding the means
> of living. (Great Britain Parliament 1892)

According to Salisbury, it was incumbent upon the government to restrict immigration to limit

the competition faced by British workers in the labor market.

In the final decades of the 19th century, other countries had enacted restrictions similar to

those proposed by Lord Salisbury. For example, the United States had passed the *Immigration*

Act of 1891 which gave the government the authority to exclude "all idiots, insane persons,

paupers or persons likely to become a public charge, persons suffering from a loathsome or a

dangerous contagious disease, persons who have been convicted of a felony or other infamous

crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude"(Anonymous1891). Because of this, and

similar legislation elsewhere, Lord Salisbury claimed Britain would become the only country

open to receive the world's destitute if Parliament did not act. He argued the failure to act would

permanently disadvantage the country's working class.

Despite these arguments, Lord Salisbury's bill was not carried further than a second

reading. The bill was attacked by its opponents as a case of the "anti-alien party" capitalizing

upon a crisis in Europe to force anti-immigrant measures (The Speaker 1894). Opponents of the

bill did not want to reverse Britain's traditional openness to immigrants. They also feared the

bill's passage would be a tacit admission that Britain had indeed been a "hot bed of conspiracy

against other countries"(The Speaker 1894). Those opposed to the bill were also unsatisfied with

the legislation's provision to expel those deemed as anarchists, fearing it would lead to

government overreach. They feared the Home Office would be inundated with requests to

extradite foreign dissenters who could be falsely labeled as anarchists. To illustrate this concern,

they argued the legislation would have led to the expulsion of the Italian nationalists who had

found refuge in Britain decades earlier, including Giuseppe Mazzini. The Earl of Cowper, who

opposed the bill, argued it would have forced the Home Secretary to consider foreign requests to

extradite Mazzini because he had been an advocate of political assassinations.

In Lord Salisbury's counter-argument, he claimed the Mazinni example was not

applicable. Lord Salisbury argued the anarchists posed a problem not previously faced in

history. Using an argument that could be mistaken for a present-day appeal to removing

international terrorist safe havens, Lord Salisbury argued:

> My whole case is that everything has changed since the days of Kossuth, Mazzini, and
> Garibaldi. It is no longer a case of liberty against despotism. It is no longer a question of
> giving a harbor of safety to those who, in the vicissitudes of politics, have failed to carry
> their own ideals into effect. You are now dealing with men for whom any such excuse is
> impossible, and would be almost disgraceful. You are dealing with men who commit
> crimes, which it is difficult to exceed by reference to any which history has recorded, and
> which it would be difficult to exceed in any imagination that the power of poets or
> romancers could portray. If you remain the only State from which they cannot be turned
> out, by a mathematical law they must all come here. (Great Britain Parliament 1892)

Salisbury's argument did not convince his peers, who ultimately thought the anarchist threat and

level of immigration were insufficient to warrant rushed legislation. Those who held this view

were bolstered by the release of a report by the Board of Trade, which was published as the

Aliens Bill was before Parliament. The purpose of the *Alien Bill* was to curb the tide of destitute

immigrants, but the report concluded immigration to Britain constituted more of a trickle. The

report concluded: 1. the number of immigrants had been exaggerated and paled in comparison to

both the number of emigrants and the total population; 2. there were relatively few destitute

immigrants who would be considered paupers; 3. contrary to the public opinion, the majority of

the immigrants were law-abiding, industrious people; and lastly, most immigrants quickly

assimilated into English society (Anonymous1897). The timing and conclusions of the report led

many Parliamentarians to dismiss out of hand the need to enact any controls on immigration.

2.4 South Asians in Britain

South Asian Immigration before World War II

There has been a South Asian presence in Britain since the 1600s, but settled

communities did not appear until the 19th century (Ali, Kalra, and Sayyid 2008; Peach 2006).

The earliest to settle were lascars, Asian sailors who, in 1924, constituted 17% of the British

merchant fleet (Ali, Kalra, and Sayyid 2008). Working conditions at sea were difficult, and the

first Asian settlers were lascars who abandoned their ships while docked in Britain. As a result,

the first South Asian immigrant communities in Britain were located in the port cities of Cardiff,

Liverpool, and East London (Ali, Kalra, and Sayyid 2008). Although early lascar settlers often

faced discrimination, they also found support from charities and missionary societies like the

Strangers' Home for Asiatics in London that provided them with food and lodging as they

settled.

British labor shortages during World War I encouraged further South Asian immigration.

Despite government warnings against the hiring of lascars who abandoned their ships, companies

like Lever Brothers and John Walker and Tate heavily recruited them during the war (Ali, Kalra,

and Sayyid 2008). During the war, lascars continued to settle in industrial port cities, but South

Asians also began to settle further inland as they found work in Britain's wartime munitions factories (Ali, Kalra, and Sayyid 2008). As a result, Asian settlements appeared in Sheffield and Glasgow.

A depressed economy during the interwar years decreased the overall demand for labor and discouraged further immigration. Moreover, to protect British workers, employers and the British government introduced policies that excluded immigrants from whole segments of the job market (Ali, Kalra, and Sayyid 2008). However, not all industries were equally impacted by the downturned economy. Emerging industries, including car and appliance manufacturing, established new factories in the country's interior. The establishment of these new industries encouraged the relocation of South Asians from the docks to Britain's interior, including the Midlands.

Despite the reduced demand for labor, South Asians continued to settle in Britain during the interwar period. High unemployment in India, as well as a downturn in Punjabi agriculture encouraged South Asian emigration (Ali, Kalra, and Sayyid 2008). Changes in the shipping industry also further encouraged lascar settlement. As ships switched from coal to oil-fired power, the demand for South Asian workers in the labor-intensive boiler rooms decreased, leading lascars to seek out new work on land (Spencer 1997). South Asian students also continued to immigrate to Britain. On the subcontinent, a British education was viewed as an invaluable opportunity for upward mobility, and in 1927, there were approximately 1,700 Indian students in Oxford, Cambridge, Manchester, Liverpool, Sheffield, Leeds, and Bristol. Many of these students settled in Britain after completing their degrees (Ali, Kalra, and Sayyid 2008).

South Asian Immigration after World War II

The outbreak of World War II restored the demand for immigrant labor as many of the factories established during the interwar years were retooled for the manufacture of munitions

and war materiel. The demand for Asian lascars also rebounded as British mariners were called to serve in the Royal Navy. As a result, the number of lascars nearly doubled during World War II (Spencer 1997). However, as the lascars' ships were either given over to the war effort or destroyed at sea, many of the lascars again found themselves out of work. Asian immigrants during the war, including unemployed lascars, were directed by British authorities to seek work at wartime factories in Bradford, Leeds, Birmingham, and Coventry (Ali, Kalra, and Sayyid 2008).

Wartime labor demands encouraged immigration, but the mass migration and settlement of South Asians in Britain did not occur until after World War II. Britain's growing economy after the war required additional labor. At the same time, Britain's former colonies did not have the means to make their labor forces fully productive. The result was migration from the peripheries of the former Empire to Britain as its former colonies, particularly the New Commonwealth, became a source of inexpensive labor (Ali, Kalra, and Sayyid 2008).

As seen in Figure 2-5, New Commonwealth immigration to Britain after the war was initially dominated by Caribbean immigration. By the 1960s, however, the number of South Asian immigrants to Britain dramatically increased. In contrast to Caribbean immigration, which had been relatively gender-neutral, South Asian migration was, at first, largely undertaken by males (Peach 2006). Attracted to Britain by higher wages, South Asian males immigrated to Britain to support their families who often remained in India, Pakistan, or Bangladesh.

Initially, the workers did not see themselves as settlers, and their remittances were used to build up estates, homes, and businesses in South Asia. The laborers' intent to not settle was evidenced by their frugal living conditions in Britain, as most lived in domiciles shared by multiple migrant workers (Cohen 1974). Most South Asian migrant laborers fully anticipated

they would return to South Asia after the season of their labor in Britain was complete. Changes to British immigration laws in the 1960s and 1970s, however, altered South Asian immigration trends. As British subjects, prior to the introduction of the *Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962*, South Asians were free to enter and leave Britain without restriction. However, the new law, which was enacted in the summer of 1962, required holders of Commonwealth passports to obtain vouchers from the Ministry of Labour before they could enter the UK. The new law, which was unabashedly intended to reduce "coloured immigration", had the unintended consequence of leading to a sharp increase in South Asian immigration. Migrant male laborers who had initially planned to return to Asia, instead summoned their families to join them before the law was enacted. In the 18 months prior to the enacting of the law, approximately 50,000 Pakistanis entered Britain, compared to the 17,000 who had entered between 1955 and 1960 (Shaw 1988).

New Commonwealth-born Population of Britain 1989-91
by Year of Entry ('000)

(Ali, Kalra, and Sayyid 2008)
Figure 2-5: New Commonwealth-born Population of Britain, 1989-91

"Push" Factors Contributed to South Asian Migration

British demand for labor after World War II was not the only factor that contributed to South Asian immigration, as "push" factors in South Asia also contributed. For example, the construction of the Mangla Dam in northern Pakistan during the 1960s led to a mass emigration from Mirpur District. The Dam and Mangla Reservoir, which were created under the Indus Water Treaty signed between India and Pakistan in 1960, immersed approximately 200 villages and towns, including the district center. Over 65,000 acres of land were submersed, and up to 100,000 people were displaced as a result of the project, which was completed in 1967 (Kalra 2000). While some of those displaced relocated to the immediate surrounding area, others were given land in the Punjab as compensation. A number of others, however, emigrated to Britain with the money they received as compensation.

In the 1960s and 1970s, South Asians in East Africa were also compelled to emigrate, and due to colonial ties, many migrated to Britain. In the late 19th century, Britain had recruited Asian laborers as indentured servants to build the railroads in East Africa. When the East African nations of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika gained their independence in the 1960s, the nations' South Asian populations, which were never fully incorporated into East African society, were granted British citizenship and allowed to emigrate to Britain. In 1972, Idi Amin, then President of Uganda, stripped the Asians of their Ugandan citizenship and expelled them from the country; many of these also settled in Britain.

Patterns of South Asian Settlement in Britain

The initial South Asian settlements in Britain reflected the community's lascar heritage as the earliest communities were located in port cities like Cardiff, Liverpool, and London. These first communities were small. In the first half of the 20th century, Cardiff was the largest center

of Asian, African, and West Indian settlement, but there were fewer than 2,500 of these minorities living there in 1930- and most of them were Arabs and Somalis (Spencer 1997). By the middle of the 20th century, South Asian communities had expanded into Britain's interior as industries and wartime factories required their labor. By the end of World War II, South Asian communities were also located in Sheffield, Glasgow, Oxford, Cambridge, Manchester, Bradford, Leeds, and Bristol.

At the beginning of the 21st century, Britain's South Asian communities are still primarily concentrated in these same industrial cities (Peach 2006). A quarter of Britain's Bangladeshi population lives in only one London district, in the Borough of Tower Hamlets. Similarly, British Sikhs are largely concentrated in London, Birmingham, and Wolverhampton, while Hindus are centered in London and Leicester. British Pakistanis, who are predominately Muslim, are centered in London, Birmingham, Manchester, Bradford, Leeds, and Luton (Peach 2006).

South Asian communities are found in relatively few British cities, but they originated from even fewer places. According to Peach (2006), 80% of the British Pakistani population originated from either Mirpur District in Azad Kashmir or from the nearby Chhachh area in Attock District (formerly known as Campbellpur District) in Punjab Province. Similarly, over 80% of the British Bangladeshi population emigrated from Sylhet District in Bangladesh, and 80% of British Sikhs came from Jullundur District in the Indian Punjab. Lastly, 70% of Indian Hindus and Muslims came from the Indian state of Gujurat (Peach 2006).

The large number of immigrants from relatively few places is a factor of colonial ties, physical geography, and chain migration. Figure 2-6 depicts the British Pakistanis' places of origin. As noted above, over 80% of the British Pakistani community emigrated from Mirpur

and Attock districts. The others came from Peshawar in Khyber Paktunkhwa Province and from villages in the Punjabi districts of Rawalpindi, Jhelum, Gujurat, and Faisalabad (Shaw 1988).

Mirpur and Attock districts had been a source of lascar laborers for Britain's merchant fleet in the 19th and early 20th century. For example, laborers from the Chhach area in Attock District commonly found employment in Bombay as stokers in the fleet's boiler rooms, as a 1907 edition of the Punjab District Gazetteer attested, "From the northeast corner of the Chhachh very large numbers of men go out as stokers on the P. & O. and British India boats and come back shattered in health, but full of money" (Cohen 1974). In the 19th century, Mirpur and Attock were also primary sources of recruitment for the British Indian Army and Navy (Kalra 2000; Shaw 1988).

In addition to these colonial ties, the physical terrain of northern Pakistan contributed to the migration of Mirpuri and Chhachi males to Britain. In contrast to the center of Pakistan's Punjab Province, which is arid but irrigated, the land in the north is rough, hilly, generally underdeveloped, and dependent upon rainfall for agriculture. As a result, much of the land is not cultivatable. According to Shaw (1988), these factors naturally predisposed males in northern Pakistan to seek work outside of their home districts. Moreover, because primogeniture was not practiced in Pakistan, the scarce land available for agriculture was divided into smaller plots with each successive generation (Shaw 1988). This contributed to underemployment in the region and applied pressure to the area's male population to find work elsewhere.

The geography of northern Pakistan predisposed the region's male population to migrate, but the process of chain migration accounted for the relocation of near entire villages from northern Pakistan to Britain. Mirpuri and Punjabi communities place particular emphasis upon clan loyalty and the male networks of the extended family, or *biradari* (*brotherhood*) (Shackle

2010). These networks played a key role in determining the patterns of immigration and settlement in Britain. Once established with a job and housing, the first migrant workers assisted others within their *biradaris* to immigrate, often helping them find initial work and housing. As a result, Pakistani immigrant settlements in Britain tended to closely mirror their communities in South Asia. For example, a study of the Pakistani community in Oxford discovered the majority of its 2,000 members could be traced back to two immigrant chains, one of which began with a single individual who immigrated to Glasgow during World War II (Spencer 1997). Chain migration explains how British Pakistanis from Mirpur, Attock and Peshawar are centered in Bradford, while British Pakistanis from Jhelum and Faisalabad are predominately found in Oxford (Shaw 1988).

2.5 The South Asian Community in Bradford

There is not one South Asian community in Bradford; instead, there are multiple South Asian communities divided by ethnicity, religion, and places of origin. According to the 2011 Census of England and Wales, there were 130,032 South Asians of Pakistani, Indian, or Bangladeshi descent living in the City of Bradford Metropolitan District (see Table 2-2). [1] In 2011, the number of South Asians in Bradford equaled 24.9% of the district's overall population, representing a significant growth since 2001(Office for National Statistics 2013d). In 2001, there were 85,409 South Asians in Bradford, or 18.3% of the district's population at the time (Office for National Statistics 2001a). This represented a 52.2% growth in ten years. By contrast, the district's White British population decreased .9% during the same time (Office for National Statistics 2001a; Office for National Statistics 2013d). The district's South Asian

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[1] The Metropolitan District includes Bradford and surrounding towns, including: Keighley Shipley, Bingley, Ilkley, Haworth, Silsden, and Denholme.

Figure 2-6: British Pakistanis' Places of Origin (Map)

population is centered in Bradford, where they constitute nearly four-tenths (39.7%) of the city's

population.[2] Keighley is the district's other center of South Asian settlement, as seen in Figure 2-

7. In 2011, South Asians represented 52.1% of the census ward Keighley Central (9,512 South

Asians/18,255 total residents) (Office for National Statistics 2013b).

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[2] Bradford includes the following census wards: Bolton and Undercliffe, City, Great Horton, Little Horton, Clayton and Fairweather Green, Queensbury, Wibsey, Royds, Bowling and Barkerend, Bradford Moor, Thornton and Allerton, Toller, Heaton, Manningham, and Tong.

2011 Census Ward	All Usual	Pakistani		Bangladeshi		Indian	
		#	%	#	%	#	%
Baildon	15,360	81	0.5%	2	0.0%	121	0.8
Bingley	18,294	126	0.7%	17	0.1%	90	0.5
Bingley Rural	17,895	324	1.8%	25	0.1%	133	0.7
Bolton and Undercliffe*	16,365	2,237	13.7%	617	3.8%	850	5.2
Bowling and Barkerend*	20,618	6,785	32.9%	1,669	8.1%	858	4.2
Bradford Moor*	21,210	13,553	63.9%	1,127	5.3%	954	4.5
City*	23,485	10,037	42.7%	553	2.4%	1,632	6.9
Clayton and Fairweather	16,982	2,789	16.4%	267	1.6%	1,201	7.1
Craven	16,373	70	0.4%	6	0.0%	112	0.7
Eccleshill	17,945	959	5.3%	122	0.7%	151	0.8
Great Horton*	17,683	6,429	36.4%	78	0.4%	1,517	8.6
Heaton*	17,121	8,516	49.7%	398	2.3%	545	3.2
Idle and Thackley	16,135	113	0.7%	3	0.0%	255	1.6
Ilkley	14,809	27	0.2%	4	0.0%	56	0.4
Keighley Central	18,255	7,909	43.3%	1,467	8.0%	136	0.7
Keighley East	16,775	1,877	11.2%	344	2.1%	83	0.5
Keighley West	16,551	459	2.8%	197	1.2%	74	0.4
Little Horton*	21,547	10,447	48.5%	497	2.3%	602	2.8
Manningham*	19,983	12,058	60.3%	1,806	9.0%	894	4.5
Queensbury*	16,273	439	2.7%	1	0.0%	408	2.5
Royds*	17,360	571	3.3%	42	0.2%	272	1.6
Shipley	15,483	1,153	7.4%	140	0.9%	275	1.8
Thornton and Allerton*	17,276	1,859	10.8%	67	0.4%	309	1.8
Toller*	19,914	14,397	72.3%	154	0.8%	750	3.8
Tong*	20,608	657	3.2%	90	0.4%	416	2.0
Wharfedale	11,836	25	0.2%	1	0.0%	25	0.2
Wibsey*	14,671	1,815	12.4%	92	0.6%	293	2.0
Windhill and Wrose	16,308	460	2.8%	63	0.4%	307	1.9
Worth Valley	14,387	68	0.5%	7	0.0%	45	0.3
Wyke	14,950	374	2.5%	7	0.0%	191	1.3
BRADFORD (CITY)	281,096	92,589	32.94	7,458	2.65%	11,50	4.0
DISTRICT TOTAL	522,452	106,61	20.41	9,863	1.89%	13,55	2.5

*Ward is part of Bradford (city)

Table 2-2: Bradford District's South Asian Population, 2011 (Office for National Statistics 2013)

The majority of South Asians in the district are of Pakistani origin, and are concentrated

in the Bradford city center. In 2011, Pakistanis represented 20.4% of the district, and constituted

the majority population in the Toller, Manningham, and Bradford Moor areas of Bradford (see

Figure 2-8). In Toller, Pakistanis represented 72.3% of the census ward (14,397 Pakistanis/ 19,914 total residents). Telling of the Pakistani presence in the city, a Pakistani Consulate is located in downtown Bradford (53.796934°, -1.756171°). As seen in Figure 2.9, the district's Indian community is centered in western Bradford. The largest concentration of Indians is in Great Horton, where they represented 8.6% of the census ward (1,517 Indians/17,683 total residents). Lastly, the Bangladeshi population is the smallest of the South Asian communities, representing 7.6% of the district's South Asian population. As seen in Figure 2-10, the Bangladeshi population is centered in downtown Keighley and in southeast Bradford. The largest concentration of Bangladeshis is in Manningham, where they constituted 9% of the census ward in 2011 (1,806 Bangladeshis/19,983 total residents) (Office for National Statistics 2013b).

By religion, Bradford's Indian population is the most diverse of the South Asian communities. In 2011, 32.2% of Bradford's ethnic Indian population identified themselves as Hindu, 30.6% as Muslim, and 25.3% as Sikh. The district's Pakistani and Bangladeshi populations, on the other hand, are predominately Muslim. According to the 2011 Census, 94.3% of the ethnic Pakistanis identified themselves as Muslim, as did 93.8% of the district's Bangladeshi population (Office for National Statistics 2013b). In all, 87.6% of the South Asians in Bradford District are Muslim.

Diversity within the Bradford's South Asian religious communities generally corresponds to the immigrants' places of origin. For example, Bradford's Hindu population is divided into two distinct groups, the Gujuratis and Punjabis. More than half of the Gujuratis, who outnumber the Punjabis, immigrated to Bradford from East Africa. The two groups are distinctly different, and have developed their own social and cultural societies, as well as established their own

Figure 2-7: 2011 Census, South Asian Population in Bradford (Map)

Figure 2-8: 2011 Census, Ethnic Pakistani Population in Bradford (Map)

Figure 2-9: 2011 Census, Ethnic Indian Population in Bradford (Map)

Figure 2-10: 2011 Census, Ethnic Bangladeshi Population in Bradford (Map)

Hindu temples in Bradford (Halstead 1988). The Muslim community reflects similar diversity. The Pashtuns from the area of Peshawar and Punjabis from Attock District are commonly associated with the Islamic revivalist Deobandi and Tablighi Jamaat movements. However, the majority of Bradford's Muslim community is from Mirpur and practice the Sufi-oriented Barelevi form of Islam (McLoughlin 1998).

The Establishment of South Asian Communities in Bradford

The establishment of the South Asian communities in Bradford has been traced to World War II. According to Dahya (1974), the first South Asians to settle in Bradford were unemployed lascars who, in 1941, were directed by British authorities to find work in wartime munitions factories in Leeds and Bradford. The community was small during the war. In 1945, there were approximately 30 former lascars in Bradford, living in the vicinity of the University of Bradford in homes owned by Polish immigrants (Cohen 1974).

After the war, labor demands in the city's woolen mills encouraged further South Asian immigration. Bradford's wool industry, which was the city's most important industry, had attracted migrant labor since the 19th century. For example, German and Irish immigrants settled in Bradford in the 19th and early 20th century, and Eastern Europeans began arriving during the middle of the 20th century. By the 1950s, however, the Eastern Europeans began to leave the mills for higher paying jobs in other sectors. Initially, females filled the vacancies in the mills, but they were excluded by law from working the overnight shifts that were introduced in the 1950s. These restrictions introduced the demand for a new source of inexpensive labor to work the overnight shifts that were introduced when the mills installed new machinery and converted to 24-hour operations to compete with growing international competition.

To meet the new labor demand, Bradford's mills turned to South Asian laborers who, on

average, earned less than British workers. In 1961, the average weekly wage for manual labor

was £15, but the average Asian in Britain earned £8.25. By 1971, the average wage had risen to

£36.25, while the average Asian still only earned £16.10 (Halstead 1988). Because South Asian

labor was relatively inexpensive, Bradford's woolen mills actively recruited in South Asia by

placing advertisements for labor in Pakistani newspapers. Although an Asian laborer in the

1960s and 1970s earned roughly half the wage of his or her British counterpart, the wages still

attracted South Asian laborers because the average weekly wage in Mirpur at the time was 37

pence (Shaw 1988).

Bradford's South Asian population, particularly the Pakistani community, has continued

to grow rapidly since the 1960s. In 1964, there were an estimated 12,000 Pakistanis and

Bangladeshis in Bradford; in 2011, there were 116,477- representing an 871% population growth

in under 50 years (Cohen 1974; Office for National Statistics 2013d). Figure 2-11 depicts the

growth of Bradford's New Commonwealth population between 1961 and 2011. Immigrants from

the West Indies and Africa are included in this graph, but their immigration has not been as

numerically significant as that of the South Asians. In 2011, there were only 8,574 West Indians

and Africans in Bradford (Office for National Statistics 2013d). As such, the chart primarily

**Bradford's New Commonwealth Population
1961-2011**

■New Commonwealth Population

(Office for National Statistics 2013d; Halstead 1988; Office for National Statistics 2013a; Office
for National Statistics 2001a)
Figure 2-11: Bradford's New Commonwealth Population 1961-2001

represents the growth of Bradford's South Asian community. The significant population growth

after 1961 is due in large part to the permanent settlement of South Asian laborers and their

families in Bradford because of the aforementioned *Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962*.

Socio-Economic Conditions of Bradford's South Asian Communities

According to most socio-economic indicators, Bradford's Sikh and Hindu communities

fare better than the city's Muslim population. According to Halstead (1988), members of the

Sikh community were among the first South Asians to leave the woolen mills when jobs in better

paying sectors were still available. Their wives also commonly work, and the community has

little objection to coeducation or western clothing; some are even willing to abandon their

turbans and beards to more easily find work (Halstead 1988).

As a result, home ownership in the Sikh community is high. According to the 2001

Census (the most recent census data for home ownership by religion), 86% of Sikh households in

Bradford owned their own homes, 35% of whom owned their homes outright. The rate of home

ownership among the Hindu community was even higher. In 2001, 88% of Hindu households

owned their own homes. By comparison, 74% of Muslim households owned their own homes,

27% of whom owned their homes outright. In terms of home ownership, Bradford's South Asian

communities each fared better than White British households. As of 2001, 72% of White British

households in Bradford owned their own homes (Office for National Statistics 2001b).

Compared to White British households, a lower percentage of Muslims were living in

council homes in 2001. While 12% of White British households lived in rented council homes in

2001, only 4% of Muslim households lived in council housing (Office for National Statistics

2001b). Although this could be interpreted to suggest the Muslims are doing better

economically, the lower proportion of Muslims in council estates is due in part to discriminatory

housing practices and the Muslims' hesitance to move into council estates associated with crime and racism. According to Kundnani (2001), only 2% of Bradford's council housing was allocated to Asians. As a result, the Muslim community was compelled to stay in the inner city where housing prices were kept low by white flight from Bradford's working class neighborhoods (Kundnani 2001). Phillips (2006) points out young British Muslims in Bradford also try to avoid council estates because of the crime, drugs, and gangs associated with them. Some of the large estates are also associated with racism, as participants in Phillips' study identified some estates in Bradford are "not for Asians" (Phillips 2006).

Although there is near-parity between the White British and South Asian Muslim populations in terms of home ownership, there is wide disparity between them in terms of education and employment rates. By religion, Muslim adults have the lowest level of educational qualifications in Bradford, as represented in Figure 2-12. In 2001, more than half (50.7%) of all Muslim adults in Bradford between 16 and 74 years old had no educational or vocational qualifications (Office for National Statistics 2001d). Younger Muslims have more educational qualifications than older Muslims in Bradford, but Muslims still had the fewest educational qualifications in every age group, as depicted in Figure 2-13. Even though Muslims constituted only 14.2% of Bradford's adult population in 2001, one in five Bradfordians (20.5%) without qualifications was from the Muslim community (Office for National Statistics 2001d).

The Muslims' low level of educational qualifications most likely contributes to their high rate of unemployment. In 2001, 7.7% of Bradford's population was characterized as either long-term unemployed or as never having worked. The unemployment rates of the Hindus and Sikhs were slightly better, at 5.8% and 6.2% respectively. However, nearly a third (30.3%) of all Muslim adults were characterized as either long-term unemployed or as never having

worked (Office for National Statistics 2001c). Muslims represented 56% of all the Bradfordians who had never worked or were long-termed unemployed in 2001.

As a result of the recession, overall unemployment rates in Bradford have increased since 2001. According to the 2011 Census, 11.1% of Bradford's population was characterized as either long-term unemployed or as never having worked. The unemployment rates of the Hindus and Sikhs in Bradford both increased, to 8.5% and 9.4% respectively. Although the Muslim rate of unemployment decreased slightly to 29.2%, they still represented 54.1% of all Bradfordians who had never worked or were long-termed unemployed in 2011 (Office for National Statistics 2013c). Figure 2-14 compares the unemployment rates in 2001 and 2011.

(Office for National Statistics 2001c)

Figure 2-12: Percentage of Bradford's Population without Educational, Vocational Qualifications

The high rate of unemployment in the Muslim community is partly attributable to the cultural tendency of Muslim women to remain in the home to care for the family. According to the 2011 Census, 45.7% of Muslim females in Bradford had never worked in the formal economy (Office for National Statistics 2013c). Nevertheless, Muslim males still had the highest rate of unemployment by religious affiliation. In 2011, 6.9% of all males in Bradford District were long-termed unemployed or had never worked, compared to 11.6% of Muslim males.

While Muslims represented 21.3% of the male population in Bradford District, 35.7% of the males in Bradford who were either long-term unemployed or had never worked were Muslim (Office for National Statistics 2013c).

(Office for National Statistics 2001c)
Figure 2-13: Percentage of Bradford's Population without Educational Qualifications, by Age

(Office for National Statistics 2001c; Office for National Statistics 2013c)
Figure 2-14: Percentage of Bradfordians who have Never Worked or were Long-term Unemployed, by Religion (2001 and 2011)

2.6 Education and Bradford's Muslim Community

Factors Contributing to the Muslim Community's Low Level of Educational and Vocational Qualifications

In 2002, Katz interviewed 300 Bradfordian youth, a majority of whom were South Asian Muslims. Katz found only 11% of those she interviewed in Bradford demonstrated a high level of the "life skills" necessary to transition from adolescence to adulthood, including the ability to handle money, eat well, and apply for work. By contrast, 34% of the national sample possessed a high level of these skills (Katz 2002). Her study also highlighted a number of the obstacles which the city's South Asian Muslim students face when it comes to realizing their educational aspirations, including the lack of positive role models, poor communication skills and limited proficiency in English.

In addition to Katz's findings, other factors thought to contribute to the Muslim community's low level of educational and vocational qualifications include the socioeconomic status of the earliest Muslim immigrants to Bradford, the reluctance of some immigrant parents to allow their children to pursue higher education, and the extended absences of South Asian Muslim children from school. The Muslims' perception that British schools threaten their cultural and religious identities likely also contributes to the community's qualification gap because it contributes to the reluctance of some Muslim parents to send their children to British schools. The reported sense of alienation some Muslim youth feel in British schools may also contribute to their lack of qualifications as anecdotal evidence suggests it reduces their attentiveness at school.

Generally speaking, the first Muslim immigrants to Bradford were uneducated, rural laborers. As a result, the earliest Muslim immigrants placed greater emphasis upon work over education to make a living (Shackle 2010). The first immigrants' own lack of education, as well

as their emphasis on work over education, likely contributed to the limited educational qualifications of the second and third generation immigrants.

Studies and historical examples have also shown the reluctance of immigrant parents in Bradford to allow their children, particularly their daughters, to pursue an education. Their reluctance has likely also contributed to the Muslim community's low level of qualifications. For example, in the 1970s, Muslim parents Abdullah Patal and Riaz Shahid famously removed their daughters from school because they did not want them attending mixed-sex secondary schools in Bradford. Katz's (2002) study found Muslim immigrant parents continued to resist allowing their daughters to pursue an education, even after they turned 18 years old. Moreover, 38% of the youth she interviewed in Bradford stated the need of their families for them to stay in the home influenced their decision to either drop out of school or study close to home (Katz 2002).

Another known factor to contribute to the Muslims' education gap is their limited proficiency in English, even among second and third generation immigrants. Even though many of the South Asian Muslim youth interviewed in Katz's study were born in England, their limited English skills were noted in the study results. Katz pointed to the limited interaction between South Asian Muslim children and non-Muslims, inferred to be native-English speakers, as contributing to the Muslims' limited proficiency. Noting the same, Lewis (2007) attributes the limited interaction between Muslim and non-Muslim youth to the time Muslim children spend after school in the city's *madrassas*. According to Lewis, Muslim boys and young men are often required by their families to attend the *madrasa* for several hours each day after school to attain an Islamic education. This schedule allows little time for Muslim youth to socialize with each other, let alone with non-Muslims (Lewis 2007).

To further explain the young Muslims' limited English skills, Lewis (2007) also points to

the Muslim community's continued preference for arranged, transcontinental marriages. Through these marriages, British Pakistani families arrange spouses from Pakistan for their British-born sons and daughters. As a result, many South Asian Muslim children in Bradford continue to be born to families where at least one parent is a new immigrant, and who themselves often have limited English skills. In support of his claim, Lewis highlights a study of British Pakistani pupils and their fathers. Of the 23 households in the study in northern England, all but one had at least one parent who was a new immigrant. More than half of the fathers in the study could not fluently communicate in English, and two-thirds of the mothers could not read or write English (Lewis 2007).

The 2011 Census revealed the number of households in Bradford where English was the main language of the children but was not spoken by adults in the household. According to the census, 2,943 (1.5%) households in Bradford had this language barrier in 2011. Although the census did not identify the religious or ethnic backgrounds of these households, as seen in Figure 2-15, these households were concentrated in South Asian neighborhoods. For example, in Toller, where Pakistanis represent 72.3% of the population, 5.3% of the households there had children whose main language was English, but whose parents did not speak it (Office for National Statistics 2013e).

Because of the limited English skills of immigrant parents, many South Asian Muslim children in Bradford get their most exposure to English at school. However, the immigrant children's exposure to English can be interrupted by truancy and extended absences from school, factors which are known to also contribute to the Muslim community's low level of qualifications. In particular, education authorities in Bradford have noted how school term visits to the subcontinent are especially disruptive to the children's education. In the early 1980s,

Figure 2-15: 2011 Census: Language Barriers at Home, Bradford District (Map)

controversial head teacher Ray Honeyford estimated the education of a third of the pupils at

Bradford's Drummond Middle School was interrupted by extended school-term visits to the

subcontinent (Halstead 1988). Similar numbers were reported more recently at Victoria Primary

School in Keighley, where approximately 98% of the school's students are South Asian. As of

2001, 44% of the students in the Bradford area school had a prolonged absence of at least four

weeks, though the average extended absence from school was over ten weeks, according to

Headmaster Kay Lindley (Crace 2004). The students' extended absences disrupt both their

mastery of English and education. Explaining the impact of these absences, the school's assistant

head teacher claimed:

> Almost all our children don't speak English at home, and many speak little, if at all, when
> they first arrive here. As a result, their learning can be fragile and needs constant
> reinforcement. When they go away for a long time they stop speaking English and forget
> much of what they've learnt. This is critical for a curriculum delivered in English. (Crace
> 2004)

According to the staff, even the school's best students struggled to make-up the material missed during their extended school term visits to the subcontinent.

The impact of these trips to the subcontinent has also been explored in qualitative studies. For example, a participant in M.Y. Alam's (2006) study of Pakistani Muslim males in Bradford attributed his limited education to an extended visit to Pakistan, as he explained:

> I went to Pakistan in nineteen ninety-five. My father went over to build himself a house. The general idea was to go back and live back home. I'd just started my 'A' levels and my father asked me to come over in the summer holidays - 'Cove over, we haven't seen you for such a long time.'

> I left and I spent sixteen months there; didn't complete my first year. My education, I couldn't really get into it when I came back, plus most of my friends were already at university. I did 'A' levels at Bradford College and within two or three months I left. I'd have loved to have gone to university and got a degree in something but that's not how things worked out. (Alam 2006)

The participant's account of struggling to make-up missed coursework is in line with studies that indicate students who miss significant periods of school commonly struggle to complete their education or achieve high qualifications. According to a British government study, only 35% of students who miss between 10% and 20% of their schooling achieve the five A* to C GCSEs necessary to continue on in higher education (Barnett 2011).

Experiences of the Muslim Community in Bradford-Area Schools

Public education is commonly seen as a tool in nation building (Marginson 2002; Meyer 1977). This is especially true of those who ascribe to the modernist interpretation of the nation, or the view that the nation is a relatively new phenomenon constructed by the modern state. Hobsbawm, a leading proponent of this view, argues public education was one of the most important tools available to the state in creating the nation. In addition to standardizing the nation's language, public schools instilled the "image and heritage of the nation" in the student (Hobsbawm 1992). Public education plays a similar role in the acculturation of immigrants. In

the 1960s and 1970s, for example, local authorities hoped Bradford's public schools would help

to integrate minority immigrant students into "mainstream" British society (Halstead 1988).

Despite the authorities' intent for schools to help integrate the immigrants, experiences in

Bradford-area schools have had the opposite effect for some within the Muslim community who

felt marginalized by their encounters with prejudice and cultural misunderstandings at school.

For example, another Pakistani male in Alam's (2006) study attributed his sense of exclusion

from British society to his experiences at school, as he explained:

> *I'm an outsider, we're outsiders. I don't want to say we're left out or no one likes us or*
> *anything like that but we're like aliens from another planet. Some people treat us or see*
> *us that way and we might as well be. At school there were some teachers who said it, in*
> *a sly, clever way about us being not the same. Still now it happens, this.* Even the ones
> who were okay used to sort of assume it because they were trying to be nice and help out.
> Some of them, they're genuinely nice but even them, they can't help it. Any time
> anything happened, and they were like, 'Is it 'cos you got cultural problems?' 'Don't your
> parents understand you?' Yeah we understand. It's your culture, isn't it? It's hard being
> in two cultures, innit?' that kind of stuff. *Everything about us was about us as pakis, not*
> *normal people because we weren't normal people, weren't the same people. Most of them*
> *didn't bother me and I didn't bother them. I don't know if they were racist but they just*
> *cruised through - they didn't give a damn so we didn't either. I left school with hardly*
> *nowt worth writing home about. My own fault. Hold my hands up, but a better school*
> *would have made a difference.*(italics added for emphasis) (Alam 2006)

The participant's account demonstrates how the sense of exclusion at school can contribute to the

students' reduced attentiveness and interest at school, both of which likely led to the participant's

own lack of qualifications.

The participant's account of exclusion and prejudice in Bradford-area schools is not

thought to be atypical. Katz's (2002) study found students in Bradford were twice as likely as

other participants in the nation to claim they had experienced racism at school. One of the

participants in Katz's study claimed, "If I did things again, I would change the teachers, I would

try my best to get away from racist people, especially the teachers that I thought frankly were

racist. I really hate them, I really do. They are so unfair and have no understanding about our

lives" (BBC News 2002).

Like the participant in Katz's study, British Muslims have argued state schools fail to fully understand or accommodate their cultural and religious identities. The former director of the Association of Muslim Schools, Idreas Mears, has argued the schools' failure to understand their Muslim students contributes to the students' sense of alienation, as he argues:

> State schools do not handle the meaning of Muslim identity well for the children. In actual fact, the way that general society looks at Muslims is as an immigrant minority-ethnic-racial-group and how young people are made to look at themselves through the teaching in state schools tells them 'you are this marginal group/minority group and have therefore got to integrate with the mainstream'. So there's a process of marginalization and that often leads to resentment. (Meer 2009)

In response, Muslims in Britain have worked to inject their own values into state schools. When this has failed, they have worked to open independent Muslim schools. These efforts were undertaken in part to preserve the Muslims' unique cultural identities; however, they were also driven by the Muslim community's aspirations to more fully establish Islam in Britain.

Injecting Muslim Values into Bradford Schools and the Opening of Independent Muslim Schools

The perceived failure of Bradford-area schools to accommodate Muslim values has, over the years, frustrated the city's Muslim community. The city's Muslims have also expressed frustration when they thought schools in Bradford threatened their cultural identities. For example, Riaz Shahid, a parent who, in the 1970s, sent his daughter to Pakistan rather than have her attend a mixed-sex school in Bradford, complained, "[In British schools,] Muslim children are being systematically transformed and indoctrinated into a British way of life, and are losing their identity" (McLoughlin 1998). Shahid's concerns were not necessarily unwarranted since local authorities at the time favored a policy of integration over multiculturalism. These frustrations spurred the efforts of Muslim parents and associations in Bradford to inject their

cultural values and preferences into state schools. In time, they also lead to the community's efforts to establish independent and state-funded Muslim schools in Bradford.

Since the 1960s, Muslim immigrants have worked to implement changes in Bradford-area schools. In the 1970s, Muslim parents and organizations successfully introduced the teaching of Islam in area schools, and in the 1980s, the community successfully lobbied the local government to serve *halal* food in those schools attended by Muslims. These efforts were in response to local demands, but they also represented the recognition of the wider British Muslim community that it needed to implement changes within state schools to transmit their religious heritage onto their children (Meer 2009).

According to Halstead (1998), it was traditionally the responsibility of the mothers and mosques in Bradford to transmit religious education onto their children. In the 1960s, however, Muslims in Bradford became aware of the state's responsibility under the *1944 Education Act* to provide denominational education in state schools. The Act allowed parents to remove their children from school at the beginning or end of each school day for off-site religious education. The act also made provisions for an outside instructor to give religious instruction in the school.

In the 1960s, Muslim associations, including the Muslim Association of Bradford and the Muslim Education Trust, lobbied local authorities to allow instructors of Islam to teach in Bradford's secondary schools. Although their demand was guaranteed under the *1944 Education Act*, local authorities were hesitant to accommodate the community's request for Islam to be taught in state schools. Bradford's Director of Education, F.J. Adams, worried the introduction of Islamic religious education would be divisive and counter the city's policy of promoting integration- a policy founded on the belief that minority immigrants should adopt the culture of the majority (Halstead 1988). Despite his objections, the Council approved the Muslim

community's request, though only in part. Initially, the Council restricted the state-funded instruction of Islam to Bradford's immigrant education centers. In 1972, however, local authorities more fully consented to the community's demands and permitted Islam to be taught in any secondary school in Bradford.

Having secured the introduction of Islamic religious education in state schools, Bradford's Muslim community began a campaign against the serving of non-*halal* food in those schools attended by Muslims. They secured this concession in 1983, but not without opposition. Animal rights activists were particularly opposed because of the method of animal slaughter mandated under Islamic law. In the face of this opposition, the Bradford Council of Mosques mobilized the community. According to Halstaed (1998), an estimated 3,000 Muslims joined a pro-*hahal* demonstration in Bradford, and 7,000 people signed a petition supporting the provision. The mayor of Bradford was part of the opposition, but the Bradford Council ultimately voted in favor of the Muslim community.

Through such political pressure, the Muslim community has been able to inject some of its values into existing Bradford schools. However, the community's other goals, including its demand for single-sex education, were only achieved through the opening of Muslim faith-based schools. Efforts to open a Muslim school in Bradford were initiated in the 1970s, but they did not successfully establish one until the following decade.

According to Halstead (1998), one of the Muslim community's most sustained demands in Bradford has been its demand for single-sex education. Many in the conservative community oppose co-education, particularly after primary school, because it violates their religious and cultural standards that outside of the family the sexes should be separated at puberty. Halstead argues the Muslims' demand for single-sex education only intensified as Bradford Council

moved away from it in the 1970s. For their part, local authorities favored co-education, arguing it promoted greater gender equality, and by 1974, Bradford Council only operated one girls' school, the Belle Vue Girls' School (Halstead 1988).

The Muslim community's demands for single-sex education came to the fore in 1973. In May of that year, a local parent, Abdullah Patel, publically objected to the placement of his daughter at Hanson Upper School, a co-educational secondary school in Bradford. After his appeals to the Department of Education and Prime Minister were dismissed, Patel removed his daughter from school. Despite threats of legal action against him, he kept his daughter at home until 1975, when she turned sixteen and could legally leave school. In December of 1973, Riaz Shahid, an immigration consultant, left the UK after a residence of 15 years so his 13-year-old daughter did not have to attend a co-educational school (Halstead 1988). Also in 1973, the Muslim Association of Bradford, a Deobandi-orientated organization, proposed changes to the law that would have allowed girls to legally leave school at the age of twelve.

The Muslim Association of Bradford's proposal had little chance of adoption, but Muslim associations continued working towards opening a Muslim girls' school. In 1974, Patel helped found the Muslim Parents' Association (MPA) that worked to coordinate Muslim demands for concessions at Bradford's existing schools and to open new Muslim ones. In the 1980s, Shahid, who had since returned to Bradford, also became involved with the MPA and unsuccessfully worked to secure state funding for five Muslim schools, including a girls' school (Halstead 1988).

According to McLoughlin (1998), the MPA ultimately failed to secure government funding because the Bradford Council of Mosques (BCM), a local government funded organization established in 1981, did not endorse the MPA-backed plans. Although the BCM

agreed with the objectives of the plan, the organization did not support the plan because it did not view the MPA as a legitimate representation of Bradford's Muslim community (McLoughlin 1998). For its part, the BCM was involved in advocating the integration of Muslim values into local schools, securing the aforementioned serving of *halal* food in Bradford schools, for example.

Although the MPA failed to establish a state-funded Muslim girls' school, the Muslim Association of Bradford successfully opened an independent girls' school in 1984. Initially named Bradford Muslim Girls' Community School, the school opened with 26 students enrolled, and largely served the Deobandi Pashtun community who would have sent their daughters to Pakistan rather than have them attend a non-Muslim school (Lewis 2002). Despite initial setbacks, including insufficient funding, inadequate facilities, unqualified teachers, and poor government reviews, in time, the school made significant strides in improving its reputation. In 1989, the school hired qualified teachers for the first time, and in 1990, it became registered with the Department of Education. In 1993, with 178 pupils enrolled, the school's students achieved GCSE results that were on par with other inner-city Bradford schools (McLoughlin 1998).

By 1994, these improvements allowed the school, renamed as Feversham College, to submit a competitive application to receive state funding as a Voluntary-Aided (VA) school. As a VA school, the government would pay, at the time, the school's running costs and 85% of its capital costs. According to McLaughlin (1998), the school hoped earning VA status would ease its abovementioned financial and staffing problems. The school's application had the support of both the local community and local government, but the Secretary of State for Education ultimately rejected the application. While recognizing the community's demand for single-sex education, the Secretary of Education Gillian Shephard rejected the application on the grounds of

safety and over concerns for its curriculum. The school lacked a viable means of escape from

the second floor in case of a fire, and the government was unsatisfied with the school's plans to

implement technology education as required by the National Curriculum (McLoughlin 1998).

Although the school's application was rejected on the grounds of safety and its

curriculum, the Muslim community assumed the government's rejection had greater meaning.

According to McLaughlin (1998), the Muslim community saw the school's application as "a

symbolic test of Muslims' equal participation and inclusion in the British nation", and the

government's rejection of the application was seen as a rejection of the Muslim community.

Demonstrating the sense of rejection felt by Bradford's Muslim population, McLaughlin points to

the following reactions in the national press:

> The Government has missed an opportunity to show the Muslim community that it values
> what they are doing for their daughters ... Their decision not to is a violation of the
> Muslim community's human rights [*The Independent*, 17 February 1995).

> It is unfortunate that the UK remains out of step with Europe ... [The] Republic of
> Ireland, Denmark and the Netherlands already have state-funded Muslim schools. We
> look forward to the day when we as British Muslims can also claim to have equitable
> treatment from our government [*Q-News*, 24 February 1995). (McLoughlin 1998)

The rejection was also felt by some of the students at Feversham College. In letters to the

Muslim News, one student wrote, "I feel rejected, upset and unequal", and another wrote, "They

wouldn't give it to us because we are Muslims, and they wouldn't like to see the Muslims getting

the best education" (McLoughlin 1998). The school's failure to receive state funding in 1994

clearly left some Muslims in Bradford feeling rejected and wondering if they were an equal part

of the nation.

Despite the rejection, Feversham College reapplied for government funding, and in 2001,

was awarded state funding. According to the school's website, the achievement was a "landmark

in the college's journey"(Feversham College 2013). It was also representative of the journey

taken by the British Muslim community to open and fund Muslim schools in Britain. According to Meer (2009), the state's funding of Muslim schools in Britain was made possible with the election of New Labour in 1998. Meer observes the Conservative government had been "hostile to the idea of state-funded Muslim schools", but New Labour had promised in its election manifesto to support Muslim schools (Meer 2009). Blair's New Labour Government delivered on its promise in its first year in government as two Muslim schools, the Islamia School in London and Al-Furqan School in Birmingham became the first Muslim schools to be awarded VA status.

Since 1998, there has been a significant growth in the number of Muslim faith-based schools in England, including independent and state-funded schools. Not including *madrassas*, in 2012, there were 142 Muslim schools in England, including 12 that were state funded (Department of Education 2013). As seen in Figure 2-16, the growth in Muslim schools in England has occurred over a relatively short period. One of the first Muslim schools in England was the aforesaid Islamia School in London, which opened in 1983 with the financial support of Yusuf Islam (the musician formerly known as Cat Stevens). By 1989, there were 15 Muslim schools, and six years later, there were 25 in operation (Parker-Jenkins 2002; McLoughlin 1998). In 2003, there were 53 Muslim schools, and by 2005, there were nearly 100 independent Muslim schools in England (Garner 2005; BBC News 2007).

The rapid growth in Muslim schools represents a significant investment by the Muslim community, and speaks to the community's intent to more fully establish both itself and a unique Muslim identity in Britain. Explaining the role Muslim schools play in more fully establishing the Muslim community, Mears, the former director of the Association of Muslim Schools, has stated:

I think we're at a very interesting stage. The metaphor I use is that the first Muslims that came here were like the farmer standing on the ground; they were standing on it but didn't have roots in it. But their seed has been scattered with some falling on good ground, others falling on stony ground and yet some being blown away in the wind. *In some ways, we're only now at the beginning of establishing a genuine Muslim presence in Britain, and Muslim schools are the key to that presence* (italics added for emphasis). (Meer 2009)

While Mears argues Muslim schools are critical to the establishment of the Muslim presence in Britain, the head teacher at the Islamia School in London, Abdullah Trevathan, argues Muslim schools are also crucial in the creation of a unique British Muslim identity, as he explained:

If anything - [the Islamia] school is about creating a British-Muslim culture, instead of, as I've often said in the press, conserving or saving a particular culture, say from the subcontinent or from Egypt or from Morocco or from wherever it may be. Obviously those cultures may feed into this British-Muslim cultural identity, but we're not in the business of preserving... it's just not feasible and it's not sensible... it's dead; I mean I'm not saying *those* cultures are dead but it's a dead duck in the water as far as being here [in Britain] is concerned. (Meer 2009)

The Muslim community in Britain is not monolithic, but is diverse in terms of its ethnicity, race, places of origin, and culture. However, Muslim schools in Britain are seen by some as the key to unifying the nation's Muslim population under the umbrella of a new and distinct "British Muslim" identity.

Number of Muslim Schools in England
(Not Including *Madrassas*)

Figure 2-16: Number of Muslim Schools in England

Chapter 3 Methodology

3.1 Research Questions

It is commonly held that the nation is predicated upon the ideal that its members enjoy full equality in civil, legal, and political rights (Smith 1991; Gellner 1997). It is also argued that a strong national identity, which is the "social glue" that binds the community together, is promoted by economic advantage (Jacob, Toscano, and University of Pennsylvania 1964; Jelen 2011). However, according to most socio-economic indicators, immigrants are often disadvantaged members of society. For example, 60% of Pakistani and Bangladeshi households in the UK live in poverty, compared to 20% of White British households (Modood 2006).

Peach (2006) has argued the Muslim community's poor socioeconomic conditions contribute to their sense of exclusion from British society. This study sought to determine whether perceptions of inequality have also affected the South Asian Muslims' very identification with the nation. In so doing, this study sought to add empirical evidence to the theoretical link between equality and national identity, evidence which is lacking according to Shulman (2003). The education sector is one of the areas of public life where South Asian Muslims have, in the past, expressed feelings of discrimination and inequality. It is also an area where they have struggled to achieve the same level of qualifications as others in Britain. In 2001, more than half (50.7%) of all Muslim adults in Bradford had no educational or vocational qualifications (Office for National Statistics 2001d). The Home Office's inquiry into the 2001 Bradford riots also concluded educational opportunities were far from equal in the city (Home Office 2001). Because of these conditions, this study used access to education as a key measure of equality to test for an association between it and national identity. In addition to determining whether Muslims in Bradford felt like they had equal access to an education, this study also sought to explore their educational goals and the level of emphasis they place upon an education.

These inquiries were intended to find other factors that may contribute to the Muslim community's low level of qualifications.

In addition to exploring perceptions of equality and national identity, this study sought to determine which acculturation strategies were being employed by young British Muslims. According to Berry (1997), immigrants can pursue one of four acculturation strategies depending on how they value the retention of their own cultural identities and their interactions with the host society; these four strategies are: integration, assimilation, separation, or marginalization. Despite the body of studies exploring these strategies elsewhere, Robinson (2009) claims Berry's theory of acculturation has been understudied in Britain. As such, this study adds to the limited body of studies exploring Berry's acculturation strategies in the country.

While Berry's theory of acculturation has been understudied in Britain, British Muslims have commonly been accused of segregating themselves from society (Shaw 2002; Peach 2006). For example, the government's inquiry into the 2001 Bradford riots also concluded that the Muslim and White British communities were living "parallel lives" (Home Office 2001). Concern for the Muslims' separation from British society has again come to the fore since 2011 as the Conservative Government has called for policies to better integrate them into society to combat "home grown" extremism. Despite accusations that Muslims in Britain have pursued segregation, Phillips (2006) argues British Muslims in Bradford are in fact eager to more fully integrate into British society. Given conflicting reports, this study sought to determine whether young British Muslims in Bradford more commonly exhibited indicators of integration or segregation.

Primary Research Questions

To address these issues, this study sought to answer the following core questions:

1. Do British South Asian Muslims in Bradford identify with the nation? Do they identify as being English or British? What are their dominant, or most important, identities?

2. Do British South Asian Muslims in Bradford see themselves as equal members of society?

3. Is there an association between perceptions of equality and national identity?

4. Is education important to young British South Asian Muslims in Bradford, and what are their educational goals? Have they been able to achieve the type of education that is most important to them? Do they think they have equal access to educational opportunities?

5. What acculturation strategies have been adopted by young British South Asian Muslims? Have they integrated into British society?

3.2 Assumptions and Hypotheses

Based upon a review of the available literature, this study worked under the following assumptions and hypotheses:

Assumptions

1. Most British South Asian Muslims under 30 years old in Bradford are second or third generation immigrants

2. British South Asian Muslims at the University of Bradford were from Bradford or the immediate surrounding area

3. Respondents who identified with the nation would describe themselves as British or English on the survey

Hypotheses

1. Most young British South Asian Muslims would identify with the nation, but they would be less likely than White British respondents to identify with the nation

2. Most young British South Asian Muslims would identify with the nation, but their identity as Muslim would be the more dominant identity

3. Young British South Asian Muslims would be less likely than White British respondents to see themselves as equal members of society

4. Young British South Asian Muslims who saw themselves as equal members of society would be more likely to identify with the nation than those Muslims who did not see themselves as equal members of society

5. Education would be important to most young British South Asian Muslims, but their educational goals would differ from those of young White British respondents

3.3 Study Design

Procedures

To answer the research questions, data was collected through administering a structured questionnaire in Bradford, England in late December 2009 and early January 2010. Using non-probable sampling, the questionnaire was completed by respondents at multiple locations in Bradford, including Bradford City Center, Lister Park, Bradford College, the University of Bradford, and multiple Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh places of worship (see Figure 3-1). To minimize sampling and selection bias, static control points were established at the various survey sites. For example, at the University of Bradford Library, the survey was administered at the main entrance. This allowed the researcher to invite each library patron to participate in the study. No incentives were offered to the participants, who were told the questionnaire was part of an academic study exploring perceptions of education and national identity. The respondents

completed the questionnaires themselves unless they asked the researcher to record their

answers.

Figure 3-1: Survey Sites in Bradford, West Yorkshire

Instrument

To gather data, a one-page, two-sided questionnaire was designed for the study. The

survey questions were designed to elicit the respondents' local and national identities,

educational goals, and perceptions regarding their access to education, as well as the access of

those of their religious and ethnic backgrounds. The questionnaire also sought to determine

whether the respondents saw themselves as equal members of society. The questionnaire, seen

in Figures 3-2 and 3-3, primarily utilized closed-ended questions which gave the respondents a

series of forced-choice alternatives, Likert rating scales, and checklists. Some of the questions

also allowed respondents to provide comments or additional responses not included in the survey

UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS
PERCEPTIONS OF EDUCATION AND NATIONHOOD
Residents of Bradford

SEX: ❏ Male ❏ Female   **AGE years:** ❏ 16-19 ❏ 20-29 ❏ 30-39 ❏ 40-49 ❏ 50-59 ❏ 60-69 ❏ 70 or over

CITIZENSHIP: ❏ UK ❏ Other(s)_____

EDUCATION COMPLETED (highest level): ❏ Primary School   ❏ Secondary School ❏ College ❏ Higher Education
           ❏ Postgraduate   ❏ Apprenticeship or Professional Training
           ❏ No Formal Education or Professional Training

ETHNICITY: *White:* ❏ British   ❏ Irish   ❏ Other_____
           Asian: ❏ Indian   ❏ Pakistani   ❏ Bangladeshi   ❏ Other_____
           Black: ❏ British   ❏ Caribbean   ❏ African   ❏ Other_____
           Mixed: ❏ White and Black Caribbean ❏ White and Black African ❏ White and Asian ❏ Other_____
           Other: ❏ Other_____

RELIGION: ❏ Buddhist ❏ Christian ❏ Hindu ❏ Jewish ❏ Muslim ❏ Sikh ❏ No Religion ❏ Other_____

EARNINGS/Year: ❏ Less than £6,000 ❏ £6,001-£9,000 ❏ £9,001-£15,000 ❏ £15,001-£21,000
           ❏ £21,001-£27,000 ❏ £27,001-£33,000 ❏ £33,001-£40,000 ❏ £40,001-£50,000
           ❏ More than £50,001

Growing up, how much was education stressed in your family?
    ❏ Not at all   ❏ Very little ❏ A fair amount ❏ A lot

If you have children, how much do/did you stress education to them?
    ❏ Not at all   ❏ Very little ❏ A fair amount ❏ A lot ❏ I don't have children

If you do not have children yet, how much do you plan to stress education to them?
    ❏ Not at all   ❏ Very little ❏ A fair amount ❏ A lot ❏ I don't plan to have children ❏ I have children

The chart below describes 5 different educational goals (Nelson, 2006)	
Basic Education:	One that provides students with basic reading skills and basic math skills
Religious Education:	One that provides students with strong values and strong religious beliefs
Liberal Education:	One that teaches students how to solve problems and think for themselves
Vocational Education:	One that prepares students to find a good job
Civic Education:	One that makes sure every student becomes a good citizen and shows respect for the laws of his/her country

Which educational goal listed above is the most important to you? (*Choose only 1*)
    ❏ Basic education ❏ Religious education ❏ Liberal education
      ❏ Vocational education ❏ Civic education

Do you feel as if you are/were able to achieve the type of education that is most important to you? ❏ YES ❏ NO

Do you feel as if you have/had as much access to education as anybody else in the country? ❏ YES ❏ NO

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ARKANSAS

Please Turn Over ➜

Figure 3-2: Study Questionnaire (Page 1)

How much access to education do most people of your ethnic background have?
- ❑ They have the **same access** to education as others in the country
- ❑ They have **less access** to education than others in the country
- ❑ They have **more access** to education than others in the country

How much access to education do most people of your religious affiliation have?
- ❑ They have the **same access** to education as others in the country
- ❑ They have **less access** to education than others in the country
- ❑ They have **more access** to education than others in the country

How would you describe yourself? (*Choose all that apply*)

❑ Asian	❑ Atheist	❑ Bangladeshi	❑ Bradfordian	❑ British	❑ Buddhist	❑ Christian
❑ English	❑ European	❑ Hindu	❑ Indian	❑ Jewish	❑ Jullunduri	❑ Mirpuri
❑ Muslim	❑ Pakistani	❑ Sikh	❑ South Asian	❑ Sylheti	❑ Yorkshire(wo)man	
❑ Other_____						

How would you describe yourself? (*Now choose only 1*)

❑ Asian	❑ Atheist	❑ Bangladeshi	❑ Bradfordian	❑ British	❑ Buddhist	❑ Christian
❑ English	❑ European	❑ Hindu	❑ Indian	❑ Jewish	❑ Jullunduri	❑ Mirpuri
❑ Muslim	❑ Pakistani	❑ Sikh	❑ South Asian	❑ Sylheti	❑ Yorkshire(wo)man	
❑ Other_____						

Do you personally feel that you are a part of British society?   ❑ YES ❑ NO

Comments?_____

Do you personally feel that you are an equal member of British society?   ❑ YES ❑ NO

Comments?_____

Thank-you.

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Simon J Reid
Department of Geosciences
113 Ozark Hall, Fayetteville AR 72701-1201

Nelson, M. J. 2006. Muslims, markets, and the meaning of a "good" education in Pakistan. *Asian Survey* 46, (5) (09 01): 699-720.

Figure 3-3: Study Questionnaire (Page 2)

design. The questionnaire recorded the respondent's gender, age, citizenship, highest level of

education completed, ethnicity, religion, and earnings. To ensure the respondent's identity

would remain anonymous, the survey did not record a name, address, or other personal details.

3.4 Study Site: Bradford, West Yorkshire, England (53° 47' 33'' N, 1° 45' 11'' W)

Physical Context

The study was conducted in Bradford, West Yorkshire, England. Bradford is located

approximately 47 kilometers (30 miles) northeast of Manchester, 14 kilometers (9 miles) west of

Leeds, and 278 kilometers (172 miles) north of London (see Figure 3-4). Bradford is the

administrative center of the City of Bradford, a metropolitan district that includes Bradford and

the surrounding towns (see Figure 3-5). Bradford is located in the eastern region of the South

Pennines, a low mountain range running north-south that separates the North West from North

East of England. As seen in Figure 3-6, Bradford is not located on a major river, but is situated

between two river valleys, the Aire Valley to the north and the Calder Valley to the south. Of

the two valleys, Bradford is closer to the Aire Valley. The city is situated at the bottom of a wide

valley which opens up to the west, where Bradford Beck (Stream) and its tributaries flow from

the Pennine Hills. The beck, which is now mostly beneath the city's foundations, flows east

towards the City Center, where beneath Bradford Cathedral it turns north to meet the Aire River.

The Bradford Beck was one of several streams that converged in Bradford, whose earlier

crossing points, or fords, likely gave the city its name - from the Old English Brád (Broad) Ford.

Although Bradford is not located along a major river, Bradford's geologic record

indicates the area once consisted of swamps, estuaries and coastal deltas. The ancient vegetation

created the local deposits of coal which have been extracted in Bradford since the 1600s. In

addition to a rich supply of coal, the bedrock from the Period also contains the ironstones,

Picture 3-1: Surveys were conducted at the Abu Bakr Mosque on Steadman Terrace Road (Reid, 2010)

Picture 3-2: Inside the Shree Lakshmi Narayan Hindu Temple on Leeds Road, where surveys were completed (Reid, 2010)

Picture 3-3: Surveys were conducted outside the Guru Gobind Singh Sikh Hudwara on Leeds Road (Reid, 2010)

Picture 3-4: Most surveys were completed at the University of Bradford library, but some were completed at the Atrium above (Reid, 2010)

Picture 3-5: Cartwright Hall, Lister Park. Surveys were completed in the park, which was donated to the city by Samuel Lister (Reid, 2010)

Picture 3-6: Bradford City Hall in Centenary Square where surveys were conducted (Reid, 2010)

Bradford, West Yorkshire, United Kingdom
53° 47' 33" N, 1° 45' 11" W

Figure 3-4: Bradford, West Yorkshire, United Kingdom (Map)

Figure 3-5: Bradford District (Map)

Figure 3-6: Terrain and Geography of Bradford (Map)

sandstones and other sedimentary rocks that fueled Bradford's industrial economy. For example, the ironstones were used to extract the iron used in the ironworks that were established in Low Moor south of Bradford. According to Haworth (2006), the cannons fired at the Battle of Trafalgar came from Low Moor, as did the plates used in the construction of the Sydney Harbor Bridge. The area's sandstones, particularly the flagstones, were quarried and used as a prized building stone throughout England, as Haworth claims, "London was said to be paved with 'gold' because of the colour of the flagstones produced in Bradford" (Howarth, Smith, and Bradford Heritage Recording Unit 2006). Each of these resources were themselves significant, but their co-location, coupled with the city's access to canals, gave Bradford the economic advantage that allowed it to become the "worsted capital" of the world in the 19th century (Howarth, Smith, and Bradford Heritage Recording Unit 2006).

Social Context: Bradford's Industry and Immigration

Historically, Bradford's most important industry was the wool industry. The city's wool trade was responsible for transforming Bradford from a market town to the industrial hub of a global market in the 19th century. Although Bradford's woolen trade waned in the 20th century, the industry created the cultural and ethnic diversity for which the city is known today. For several centuries, Bradford's woolen industry attracted migrants to the city, including South Asians in the second-half of the 20th century.

Bradford has been a site of woolen production since at least the 14th century. The presence of a fulling mill in Bradford was first recorded in 1311 (Keighley 2007). However, woolen production remained a cottage industry until the introduction of the steam engine in the late 18th century. The introduction of the steam engine allowed woolen and worsted production to move into the heart of the city, which allowed the mills to become large commercial

endeavors.

When the first steam powered mill in Bradford opened in 1798, East Anglia was the center of English worsted wool production (worsted yarn derives its name from the Norfolk village of Worstead in East Anglia). By 1850, however, most of the country's worsted yarn and cloth production had transferred to Yorkshire. In 1850, 88% of England's 850,000 spindles and 89% of the country's 326,000 power looms were in Yorkshire (Clapham 1910). The county remained the center of woolen production into the 20th century. In 1904, 90% of the country's 2,823 combing machines were in West Riding, which corresponds to present-day West Yorkshire, South Yorkshire and North Yorkshire (Weld 1912).

When the country's woolen production shifted to Yorkshire at the start of the 19th century, Halifax and Leeds were the centers of woolen manufacturing in the region. By the middle of the 19th century, however, Bradford overtook its regional competitors (Smith n.d.). Bradford's rise was aided by the aforementioned presence of local coal, engine manufacturing, and metal works at Low Moor. Technological innovations in Bradford also gave the city its competitive edge. For example, Samuel Lister's Comb (see Picture 3-9), which was patented in 1849, was one of several inventions in Bradford that mechanized the combing process, the last and most difficult process of wool production to be mechanized (Weld 1912). The combination of natural resources, innovation and entrepreneurship allowed Bradford historian John James to write in 1841, "[Bradford] has risen to the capital of the worsted trade; and assumed an importance which, when contrasted with its condition a few short years ago, astonishes" (Webb 1976).

Bradford remained the world's preeminent wool manufacturer at the turn of the 20th century. In 1907, Sir John Clapham wrote, "Bradford is the chief seat of wool-dealing, yarn-

Picture 3-7:Victorian-era woolen mills still dot Bradford's cityscape. Drummonds Mill in the foreground, Lister Mill in the background (Reid 2010)

dealing, and of all things commercial. Its supremacy is unquestionable. Bradford is actually by far the greatest wool-working city in the Riding or, for that matter, in the world " (Clapham 1907). The growth in Bradford's textiles industry was accompanied by growth in its related industries. Warehouses, dyeworks, printing presses, commercial services, and metal works all thrived in Bradford during the 19th and early 20th centuries.

The rapid growth of Bradford's industrial base led to significant population growth in the city during the 19th century. Attributing the population growth to the mechanization of the worsted wool industry, Mortimore (1969) claims Bradford's population grew more rapidly than many other northern industrial towns. In 1801, there were 29,733 inhabitants in Bradford and the surrounding towns; by 1911, the population had grown to 293,321, representing an 885% population growth (Mortimore 1969; Richardson 1968). The rapid population growth in the19th century was reflected in Bradford's urban expansion, which is depicted in Mortimore's map (see Figure 3-7). Mortimore depicts the urban extent of Bradford in 1950 compared to the outline of Bradford in 1800.

(Mortimore 1969)

Figure 3-7: Mortimore's Map of Bradford's Urban Expansion, 1800-1850

Bradford's population growth in the 19th century was primarily due to immigration. The

earliest immigrants to Bradford came from the surrounding towns, boroughs and counties. By

1851, 21.7% of Bradford's population was born outside of Yorkshire (Richardson 1968). During

the first half of the 19th century, international migrants also began arriving. In 1834, a minister

at the Horton Lane Congregational Chapel in Bradford wrote of the city's changing human landscape, "The natives of Scotland are here, the natives of Ireland are here, from the pleasant vales of Devonshire men and women have come: from the banks of the Rhine and the Elbe they are coming" (Bradford Heritage Recording Unit and Bradford Libraries and Information Service 1987). A century later, J.B. Priestley, the English novelist born in Bradford, echoed the minister's description of Bradford's cosmopolitanism, as he wrote, "Bradford was determinedly Yorkshire and provincial, yet some of its suburbs reached as far as Frankfurt or Leipzig" (Bradford Heritage Recording Unit and Bradford Libraries and Information Service 1987).

A combination of "push" and "pull" factors brought the international migrants to Bradford. For example, food shortages and landlessness in Ireland "pushed" Irish immigrants to the city in the 19th century. Most immigrants to Bradford, however, were attracted by the economic opportunities in the city. For example, German merchants settled in Bradford in the second half of the 19th century to establish woolen export warehouses at the heart of the woolen industry. The German influence on architecture and culture in Bradford is still observable in a section of the city known as Little Germany.

Immigration to Bradford slowed as the textiles industry struggled at the turn of the 20th century. International competition, changing fashion, and a depressed world economy contracted Bradford's export market, and profits slumped. In 1920, the export of woolen and worsted goods totaled 139.5 million pounds; the following year, it equaled only 62 million pounds (Smith n.d.). The decreased demand for textiles in the 1920s and 1930s led to high unemployment and the closure of many of the city's textile mills. Between 1928 and 1932, 400 textile mills in Bradford closed (Smith n.d.).

Despite the economic downturn in the 1920s and 1930s, immigration to Bradford

Picture 3-8: The 64-Spindle Cap Spinner, c. 1828. During spinning, the roving is drawn out and the fibers are twisted together to create thread (Reid, 2010)

Picture 3-9: The Lister Comb patented in 1849 by Samuel C. Lister of Manningham was one of several local inventions that gave Bradford an edge in woolen manufacturing. Combing straightens the wool fibers, separating the short wool from the long wool (Reid, 2010)

continued, though at a reduced rate. During the interwar years, Jewish immigrants came from Southern and Eastern Europe, including Italy, Russia, Germany, and Poland. The Jewish immigrants were not motivated by economic considerations like most of the earlier migrants to Bradford. Like the Irish before them, Jewish immigrants were motivated by "push" factors at home. In the case of the Jewish immigrants, they were fleeing anti-Semitism and persecution on the Continent.

The Second World War spurred immigration again as the war created additional demand for labor in the textile mills and wartime factories. South Asian immigrants first came to Bradford at this time, finding work in the city's munitions factories. The demand for labor continued after the war, leading the government to introduce schemes to entice workers to Britain. For example, Ukrainians from the 14th Waffen SS 'Galicia' Division who were captured by the British during the war were allowed to settle in Britain to protect them from retributions in Stalinist Ukraine. Some of these settled in Bradford under the newly established European Volunteer Workers scheme, as did a number a Polish servicemen who had served Britain during the war.

Many of these immigrants initially found work in the city's woolen mills; however, by the 1950s, the Eastern European immigrants began leaving the textile mills for better paying jobs in other sectors. Initially, females replaced the lost labor, but they were excluded by law from working the overnight shifts that were introduced in the 1950s. South Asian males, who had begun immigrating to the city during the war, fulfilled the new requirement for overnight laborers as Bradford's mills began to actively recruit in South Asia. By 1964, there were 12,000 Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in Bradford, most of whom were working in the mills (Cohen 1974).

By the 1960s, Bradford's woolen industry was in decline. Competition from overseas increased as wool producing countries like Australia and South Africa, which had previously supplied wool to Bradford, began to process it themselves. Clothing fashions also changed as synthetic fibers replaced wool. Due to these changes, the number of Bradfordians employed in the woolen industry declined sharply in the 1960s and 1970s. Between 1961 and 1978, the number of workers employed in Bradford's textile mills dropped from 73,000 to 28,000 (Wainwright 2003). In 2002, there were fewer than 1,000 people still working in the city's textiles industry (Howarth, Smith, and Bradford Heritage Recording Unit 2006). The few textiles companies in Bradford today specialize in high quality fabrics.

As the textiles industry declined, its associated industries either left Bradford or adapted to new markets. For example, firms in Keighley that had once made looms and spinning frames now make lifts and escalators, while plants in Low Moor that once made dyestuffs have since become chemical plants (Wainwright 2003). Printing companies are also still found in Bradford. For example, the UK headquarters of Hallmark Cards is located in the city.

As South Asians were predominately employed in the mills, the decline in the city's woolen industry had a disproportionate impact on the Muslim immigrant community. On one hand, the closure of the mills led to the opening of small Asian businesses, mostly in the service industry, as Asian families pooled their resources to open shops, restaurants and takeaways (Kundnani 2001). However, the closure of the mills primarily led to the community's ongoing high unemployment. It also reduced the interaction between the South Asian and White British communities. According to Kundnani, the textile industry had been "the common thread binding the white and Asian working class into a single fabric" (Kundnani 2001). As the mills closed, however, the interaction between the two communities unraveled. The separation of the two

communities was reinforced by the subsequent white flight from Bradford's working class neighborhoods.

3.5 Selection of Bradford as the Study Site

Several factor contributed to the selection of Bradford as the study site, including its social history and current demographics. As a center of recent immigration, Bradford is well suited for studies related to the construction of national identity. Because of the immigrants' poor economic standing and known disparities in educational opportunities, the city is also well suited for this study's look at the hypothesized association between equality and national identity.

Within Bradford, the University of Bradford was selected as the primary study site. The institution dates to 1832, when it opened as the Mechanics Institute. In 1882, it changed its name to Bradford Technical College, and in 1957, the Bradford Institute of Technology was established to offer higher education. In 1966, the Institute became the University of Bradford, receiving a Royal Charter to become Britain's 40th University.

As depicted in Figure 3-8, the university's student body reflects the diversity of Bradford's human terrain. According to information provided by the University Registrar's Office at the time of the study, there were 12,314 students enrolled at the University of Bradford, including 2,691 post-graduate students. Of the students domiciled in the UK, 4126 (44%) were white, while 2912 (31%) were ethnic Pakistanis. Indicative of the university's outreach to the city's Pakistani community, the university's chancellor since 2005 is Imran Khan, the former cricketer and chairman of Pakistan's Tehreek-e-Insaf political party.

Conducting the surveys at the university was intended to gain greater access to the study's target population, namely young British South Asian Muslims. As a male researcher, access to the female South Asian Muslim population would have been otherwise limited. Attempts to gain

access to female respondents were initially made through contacting male powerbrokers in some of the city's mosques. These attempts, however, were ultimately unsuccessful because mosques in Bradford remain a male-dominated domain. Conducting the study at the university, therefore, allowed females to be included in the study. As an outsider, the university setting also facilitated a more natural access to the city's young male Muslim population. Because the Muslim community in Bradford is regularly scrutinized by outsiders, likely to include by security services, the university setting facilitated access to Muslim males who might otherwise have been suspicious of an outside researcher, particularly an American researcher inquiring about their national identity and sense of belonging in British society.

**Ethnic Breakdown of University of Bradford
Students Domiciled in the UK**

Figure 3-8: Ethnic Breakdown of University of Bradford Students

Picture 3-10: Atrium and Richmond Building, University of Bradford (Reid, 2010)

3.6 Study Limitations

Conducting the study at the university granted access to a large number of young British South Asian Muslims, but using the university students as the sample population also introduced limitations and potential biases in the study. For example, it reduced the likelihood the entire sample would be from Bradford. At the time of the study, only 30% of the students enrolled at the university were from Bradford according to the Registrar's Office. Nevertheless, the percentage of British Pakistani students from Bradford was higher. At the time of the study, 56% of the British Pakistani students enrolled at the university were from Bradford. With moderate to high confidence, the study worked under the assumption that British South Asian Muslim respondents surveyed at the university were likely from Bradford or the immediate surrounding area.

While the South Asian Muslim respondents at the University of Bradford offer valuable insights into the city's Muslim community, this subset may not fully represent the wider Muslim community. Because over half of the Muslim adults in Bradford have no educational or vocational qualifications, those at the university are more privileged than many of their peers.

They have had opportunities unknown to most in the city's Muslim community, and, as a result, they may have been more predisposed to identify with the nation than other Muslims in the city. While this may be the case, because most respondents at the university indicated they too had experienced or witnessed inequality in British society, the sample population still serves as a suitable sample to test for associations between perceptions of equality and national identity.

By relying on the sample from the University of Bradford, survey questions related to educational priorities or goals may also have been biased. As students at a university that focuses on science, technology, liberal arts, and life sciences, it could be expected that most students surveyed would favor a liberal education, regardless of the respondent's ethnic or religious backgrounds. As such, the survey results may have misrepresented the educational priorities of the wider, more conservative Muslim community.

Lastly, based upon the history of the Muslim immigrant community, the study worked under the assumption that British South Asian Muslims under 30 years old were most likely second or third generation immigrants. However, the survey did not ask respondents to indicate how long they or their families had been in Britain. This limited the analysis and conclusions that could have been derived by further exploring the differences between immigrant generations.

Chapter 4 Results and Analysis

Between late December 2009 and mid-January 2010, the questionnaire was administered to 576 participants in Bradford. The majority of participants were UK citizens, but the survey was also completed by citizens from at least 50 other countries and territories (see Appendix B). Only those surveys completed by UK citizens were included in the study. Of the 359 questionnaires completed by UK citizens, 305 surveys were answered in full. The other 54 surveys were partially completed, however, individual responses were included where possible.

4.1 Demographics

Gender: The survey was completed by 154 (42.9%) females and 205 (57.1%) males.

Age: As depicted in Figure 4-1, the study was completed by 262 (73%) participants under 30 years old, the study's target age group. The survey was also completed by 97 (27%) participants over the age of 29.

Ethnicity: As depicted in Figure 4-2, most participants were Asian. The study was completed by 199 (55.4%) British Asians, including 194 (54%) British South Asians, the study's target population. The survey was also completed by 127 (35.4%) White British participants, and 33 (9.2%) participants who described themselves as Arab/Middle Eastern, Black, Mixed, or Other. Of the 194 South Asians in the study, 148 (41.2%) were of Pakistani origin. Figure 4-3 depicts the ethnic breakdown of the British South Asians in the study.

Religion: Figure 4-4 depicts the breakdown of respondents by religion. Most of the study's participants identified themselves as Muslim. The survey was completed by 193 (53.8%) Muslims, 71 (19.8 %) Christians, and 62 (17.3%) people who claimed they had no religious affiliation. The study was also completed by 21(5.8%) Hindus, 3 (.8%) Sikhs, and 1 (.3%) Buddhist.

Education: Figure 4-5 depicts the level of education completed by the British participants. The

questionnaire asked respondents to identify the highest level of education they had completed, but the graph most likely represents the level of education the respondents had completed or were pursuing at the time of the study. The survey was completed by 264 (73.5%) people who claimed they had completed either college or a higher education.

Number of UK Participants by Age

Age	Number
16-19 Years Old	83
20-29 Years Old	179
30-39 Years Old	39
40-49 Years Old	35
50-59 Years Old	18
Over 60 Years Old	5

Figure 4-1: Number of UK Participants, by Age

Number of UK Participants by Ethnicity

Ethnicity	Number
Asian	199
White	127
Other	3
Mixed	11
Black	11
Arab/Middle Eastern	8

Figure 4-2: Number of UK Participants, by Ethnicity

Ethnic Breakdown of British
South Asian Respondents

Pakistani, 148

Indian, 41

Bangladeshi, 5

Figure 4-3: Ethnic Breakdown of British South Asian Respondents

Number of UK Respondents
by Religion

Religion	Number
Buddhist	1
Christian	71
Hindu	21
Muslim	193
Sikh	3
No Religion	62
Other	8

Figure 4-4: Number of UK Respondents, by Religion

Highest Level of Education Completed by UK Participants

Figure 4-5: Highest Level of Education Completed by Study Participants

4.2 Survey Results at University of Bradford (White British and British South Asian Muslims under 30 Years Old)

The survey results of all British respondents are found in Appendix C. However, only those questionnaires completed by White British and British South Asian Muslim respondents under 30 years old at the University of Bradford are included in the results below. This is intended to reduce the influence of compounding variables, such as age and immigrant generation, in the analysis. By looking only at this subset, the study had 188 surveys to use in the analysis below, including the responses of 48 White British respondents and 140 British South Asian Muslims.

The questionnaire included nine independent questions, which are found in Table 4-1. The responses to each survey question are presented individually below, allowing for those surveys with some incomplete responses to be included where possible. A snapshot of the results is found in Table 4-2.

Q1) Growing up, how much was education stressed in your family?

Q2) How much do you stress education to your children, or if you don't have children yet, how much do you plan to stress education to them?

Q3) The chart below describes 5 different educational goals, which educational goal is the most important to you?

Basic Education: One that provides students with basic reading skills and basic math skills
Religious Education: One that provides students with strong values and strong religious beliefs
Liberal Education: One that teaches students how to solve problems and think for themselves
Vocational Education: One that prepares students to find a good job
Civic Education: One that makes sure every student becomes a good citizen and show respect for the laws of his/her country

Q4) Do you feel as if you are/were able to achieve the type of education that is most important to you?

Q5) Do you feel as if you have/had as much access to education as anybody else in the country?

Q6) How much access to education do most people of your ethnic background have?

Q7) How much access to education do most people of your religious affiliation have?

Q8) Do you personally feel that you are a part of British society?

Q9) Do you personally feel that you are an equal member of British society?

Table 4-1: Survey Questions

Survey Question	Responses Statistically Different?	Key Finding (s)
Q1: Growing Up, Level of Emphasis Placed upon Education	YES	88.65% of respondents had education stressed "a fair amount" or "a lot"; however, British South Asian Muslims were more likely than white respondents to have had education stressed "a lot"
Q2: Level of Emphasis Placed upon Education for their Children	NO	96.69% of respondents stress education "a fair amount" or a "lot" to their children, or plan to when they have children
Q3: Educational Goals	YES	Educational goals were dependent upon population; a religious education was the most important goal of British South Asian Muslims and a liberal education was the most important goal of White British respondents
Q4: Achieve Educational Goal?	NO	90.43% of all respondents claimed they were able to achieve their desired type of education; for Muslim respondents, achieving one's goal was dependent upon the goal
Q5: Equal Access to Education?	NO	89.58% of all respondents thought they had equal access to education
Q6: Ethnic Group has Equal Access to Education?	YES	British South Asian Muslims were less likely to think members of their ethnic background had equal access to education (34.29% thought South Asians had less access)
Q7: Religious Group has Equal Access to Education?	YES	British South Asian Muslims were less likely to think members of their religious background had equal access to education (28.78% thought Muslims had less access)
Q8: Part of British Society?	NO	94.68% of respondents thought they were part of British society
Q9: Equal Member of Society?	YES	British South Asian Muslims were less likely to think they were equal members of British society (19.42% thought they were not equal members of society)

Table 4-2: Comparison of Responses: White British and British South Asian Muslims under 30 Years Old, University of Bradford

4.2.1 Q1: Growing Up, How Much was Education Stressed in Your Family?

Because the earliest South Asian immigrants to Bradford placed more emphasis on work than education, the first survey question was designed to test claims that the immigrant community has since placed greater emphasis upon education as a means of social mobility (Shackle 2010). The question utilized a Likert rating scale, allowing respondents to choose one of the following closed-ended responses: "not at all", "very little", "a fair amount", or "a lot". The question was answered by 137 British South Asian Muslims and 48 White British respondents.

As seen in Table 4-3, most participants (88.65%) claimed education was stressed, or emphasized, "a fair amount" or a "lot" in their youth. A statistical test for the difference between the two population proportions indicates British South Asian Muslims were just as likely as White British respondents to have had education stressed "a fair amount" or "a lot" by their families ($z = .292$, $p = .7707$). However, British South Asian Muslim respondents were more likely than White British respondents to have had education stressed "a lot" while growing up ($z = 2.39$, $p = .0084$) (See Table 4-4).

Growing Up, How Much was Education Stressed in Your Family?					
Count **Row %**	Not At All	Very Little	A Fair Amount	A Lot	Total
South Asian **Muslims, <30**	6 4.38%	9 6.57%	46 33.58%	76 55.47%	137
White **British, <30**	1 2.08%	5 10.42%	25 52.08%	17 35.42%	48
Total:	7 3.78%	14 7.57%	71 38.38%	93 50.27%	185

Table 4-3: Responses to Question 1

British South Asian Muslims More Likely than White Respondents to Have Had Education Stressed "a Lot" While Growing Up

Goal: Test to see whether British South Asian Muslims were more likely than White British respondents to have had education stressed "a lot" while growing up

$\mathbf{H_O}$: $p_1 \leq p_2$

$\mathbf{H_1}$: $p_1 > p_2$

Test Statistic: $z = \dfrac{\hat{p}_1 - \hat{p}_2}{\sqrt{\hat{p}(1-\hat{p})(\frac{1}{n_1}+\frac{1}{n_2})}}$

$n_1 = (sample\ size, South\ Asian\ Muslims) = 137$

$n_2 = (sample\ size, White\ British) = 48$

$\hat{p}_1 = (proportion\ of\ South\ Asian\ Muslims\ who\ identified$ "a lot")= 76/137

$\hat{p}_2 = (proportion\ of\ White\ British\ who\ identified$ "a lot")= 17/48

$z = 2.39;\ p\text{-}value = .0084$

Decision Rule: one-tail test (right), for a significance level (α) of .05, reject the null hypothesis if
$z > 1.645$

Conclusion: Since 2.39 > 1.645, we reject the null hypothesis. At the 5% level of significance, we conclude British South Asian Muslims were more likely than White British respondents to have had education stressed "a lot" while growing up. Since the p-value is between .001 and .01, there is strong evidence against the null hypothesis. Demonstrating the significance of the test, the test statistic (z) is also large enough to reject the null hypothesis with a significance level of .01 (2.326).

Table 4-4: British South Asian Muslims More Likely to Have Had Education Stressed "A Lot"

4.2.2 Q2: How Much Do You Stress Education to Your Children, Or If You Do Not Have Children Yet, How Much Do You Plan to Stress Education to Them?

The survey also sought to determine how much stress, or emphasis, the respondents planned to place upon their children's education, or already did if they had children at the time of the study. The question was intended to gauge how much the respondents value an education. The question utilized the same Likert rating scale as the previous question: "not at all", "very

little", "a fair amount", and "a lot". Respondents could also indicate they did not plan to have children. The question was answered by 134 British South Asian Muslims and 47 White British respondents. The vast majority (96.69%) of the respondents planned to emphasize education "a fair amount" or "a lot" to their children (see Table 4-5). Although a greater proportion of British South Asian Muslims emphasized, or planned to emphasize, education "a lot" to their children, the difference in proportions was not statistically significant ($z = 1.05$, $p = .1469$)

How Much Do You Stress Education to Your Children, Or If You Do Not Have Children Yet, How Much Do You Plan to Stress Education to Them?						
Count Row %	Not At All	Very Little	A Fair Amount	A Lot	I Don't Plan to Have Children	Total
South Asian Muslims, <30	2 1.49%	3 2.24%	46 34.33%	83 61.94%	0 0.00%	134
White British, <30	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	21 44.68%	25 53.19%	1 2.13%	47
Total:	2 1.10%	3 1.66%	67 37.02%	108 59.67%	1 0.55%	181

Table 4-5: Responses To Question 2

4.2.3 Q3: Which Educational Goal is the Most Important to You?

This question was based on Nelson's (2003) study of educational priorities in Rawalpindi, Pakistan. Using the definitions in Table 4-6, Nelson asked Pakistani parents to prioritize their educational goals for their children. Borrowing from Nelson, this study asked respondents to identify their educational goals based upon the definitions in Table 4-7. The question was answered by 140 British South Asian Muslims and 48 White British respondents. According to a chi-square test of independence, the respondents' educational goals were dependent upon ethnic group ($x^2 = 22.891$, $p = .0001$) (see Table 4-9). For example, British South Asian Muslims were

more likely than white respondents to identify a religious education as the most important goal of an education ($z = 3.576$, $p = .0002$). By contrast, White British respondents were more likely than British South Asian Muslims to identify a liberal education as the most important educational goal ($z = 3.47$, $p = .0003$) (see Tables 4-10 and 4-11).

Nelson's (2006) Definitions of a "Good" Education

Basic Education:	"Some people say that a good school teaches students how to read and write. In other words, good schools provide students with basic reading skills and basic math skills."
Religious Education:	"Some people say that a good school is a school that creates good Muslims. In other words, good schools provide students with strong values and strong religious beliefs."
Liberal Education:	"Some people say that good schools teach students how to solve problems and think for themselves."
Vocational Education:	"Some people say that good schools prepare students to find good jobs."
Civic Education:	"Some people say that good schools make sure that every student becomes a good citizen, showing respect for the laws of their country."

Table 4-6: Nelson's Definitions of a "Good" Education

Educational Goals Included on Study Questionnaire

Basic Education:	One that provides students with basic reading skills and basic math skills
Religious Education:	One that provides students with strong values and strong religious beliefs
Liberal Education:	One that teaches students how to solve problems and think for themselves
Vocational Education:	One that prepares students to find a good job
Civic Education:	One that makes sure every student becomes a good citizen and shows respect for the laws of his/her country

Table 4-7: Educational Goals Used on This Survey

4.2.4 Q4: Do You Feel As If You Are/Were Able to Achieve the Type of Education that is Most Important to You?

Based upon the Muslim community's struggles to meet some of its demands in the education sector, the survey asked respondents whether they were able to achieve the type of

Which Educational Goal is the Most Important to You?						
Count Row %	Basic Education	Religious Education	Liberal Education	Vocational Education	Civic Education	Total
South Asian Muslims, <30	14	41	35	28	22	140
	10.00%	29.29%	25.00%	20.00%	15.71%	
White British, <30	2	2	25	15	4	48
	4.17%	4.17%	52.09%	31.25%	8.33%	
Total:	16	43	60	43	26	188
	8.51%	22.87%	31.91%	22.87%	13.83%	

Table 4-8: Responses to Question 3

education that was most important to them. The question was answered by 140 South Asian Muslims and 48 White British respondents. As seen in Table 4-12, the vast majority (90.43%) of respondents felt as if they were able to achieve the type of education that was most important to them. A statistical test for the difference between the two population proportions indicates British South Asian Muslims were just as likely as White British respondents to have felt like they were able to achieve the type of education that was important to them ($z = .23$, $p = .82$).

However, within the Muslim sample, the achievement of one's educational goal was dependent upon the respondent's goal ($p = .006$, see Table 4-14). Of the 49 British South Asian Muslims who claimed a liberal or basic education was the most important goal of an education, all claimed they were able to achieve it. By contrast, 32 of the 41 (78%) Muslims who stated a religious education was their educational priority were able to achieve it. Of the 91 Muslims who favored a religious, vocational, or civic education, 78 (85.7%) claimed they had achieved the type of education they valued most.

4.2.5 Q5: Do You Feel as If You Have/Had as Much Access to Education as Anybody Else in the Country?

This was the first of the survey's four questions intended to gauge the respondents' perceptions of equality in British society. The question was answered by 140 British South

<h2 style="text-align:center">Educational Goals Dependent Upon Ethnic Group</h2>

Goal: Test to see whether educational goals were dependent upon ethnicity (British South Asian Muslim and White British)

H$_O$: Educational goals are independent of ethnicity

H$_1$: Education goals are dependent upon ethnicity

Test Statistic: $x^2 = \sum \frac{(observed-expected)^2}{expected} = 22.891$; *p-value*= .0001

Decision Rule: For a significance level of .05, reject the null hypothesis if $x^2 > x^2{}_{0.05,4}$ or 9.488

Conclusion: Since 22.891 > 9.488, we reject the null hypothesis. There is enough evidence to claim education goals are dependent upon ethnicity. Since the p-value is less than .001, there is very strong evidence against the null hypothesis. Demonstrating the significance of the test, the test statistic (z) is also large enough to reject the null hypothesis with a significance level of .005 (14.860).

Which educational goal is the most important to you? (Observed)						
Count Row %	Basic Education	Religious Education	Liberal Education	Vocational Education	Civic Education	Total
South Asian Muslims, <30	14 10.00%	41 29.29%	35 25.00%	28 20.00%	22 15.71%	140
White British, <30	2 4.17%	2 4.17%	25 52.09%	15 31.25%	4 8.33%	48
Total:	16 8.51%	43 22.87%	60 31.91%	43 22.87%	26 13.83%	188

Which educational goal is the most important to you? (Expected)					
Expected	Basic Education	Religious Education	Liberal Education	Vocational Education	Civic Education
South Asian Muslims, <30	11.91	32.02	44.68	32.02	19.36
White British, <30	4.09	10.09	15.32	10.98	6.64

Table 4-9: Educational Goals Dependent upon Ethnic Group

British South Asian Muslims More Likely than White British Respondents to Favor a Religious Education

Goal: Test to see whether British South Asian Muslims were more likely than White British respondents to identify a religious education as the most important goal of an education

$\mathbf{H_O}$: $p_1 \leq p_2$

$\mathbf{H_1}$: $p_1 > p_2$

Test Statistic: $z = \dfrac{\hat{p}_1 - \hat{p}_2}{\sqrt{\hat{p}(1-\hat{p})(\frac{1}{n_1}+\frac{1}{n_2})}}$

$n_1 = (sample\ size, South\ Asian\ Muslims) = 140$

$n_2 = (sample\ size, White\ British) = 48$

$\hat{p}_1$
$= (proportion\ of\ South\ Asian\ Muslims\ who\ identified\ a\ religious\ education)= 41/140$

$\hat{p}_2 = (proportion\ of\ White\ British\ who\ identified\ a\ religious\ education)= 2/48$

$z = 3.576;\ p\text{-value}= .0002$

Decision Rule: One-tailed (right-tailed), for a significance level (α) of .05, reject the null hypothesis if $z > 1.645$

Conclusion: Since 3.576 > 1.645, we reject the null hypothesis. At the 5% level of significance, we conclude British South Asian Muslim respondents were more likely than White British respondents to identify a religious education as their most important educational goal. Since the p-value < .001, there is very strong evidence against the null hypothesis. Demonstrating the significance of the test, the test statistic (*z*) is also large enough to reject the null hypothesis with a significance level of .005 (2.576).

Note: For the proportion of White British respondents who identified religious education as their most important educational goal, n*p is less than 5, but n*(1-p) is greater than 5.

Table 4-10: British South Asian Muslims More Likely than White British to Favor a Religious Education

Asian Muslims and 48 White British respondents. 163 (86.7%) of the respondents felt as if they

had as much access to education as anyone else in the country. While 10.42% of the White

British respondents felt like they had less access to education, 14.29% of the British South Asian

Muslim respondents felt like they had less access. Although a higher proportion of British South Asian Muslims felt as if they had less access to education, the difference in proportions was not statistically significant ($z = .681$, $p = .25$).

White British Respondents More Likely than British South Asian Muslims to Favor a Liberal Education

Goal: Test to see whether White British respondents were more likely than British South Asian Muslims to identify a liberal education as the most important goal of an education

H$_O$: $p_1 \leq p_2$

H$_1$: $p_1 > p_2$

Test Statistic: $z = \dfrac{\hat{p}_1 - \hat{p}_2}{\sqrt{\hat{p}(1-\hat{p})(\frac{1}{n_1} + \frac{1}{n_2})}}$

$n_1 = (sample\ size, White\ British) = 48$

$n_2 = (sample\ size, South\ Asian\ Muslims) = 140$

$\hat{p}_1 = (proportion\ of\ White\ British\ who\ identified\ a\ liberal\ education)= 25/48$

$\hat{p}_2 = (proportion\ of South\ Asian\ Muslims\ who\ identified\ a\ liberal\ education)= 35/140$

$z = 3.47;\ p\text{-}value= .0003$

Decision Rule: One-tailed (right-tailed), for a significance level (α) of .05, reject the null hypothesis is >1.645

Conclusion: Since 3.47 > 1.640, we reject the null hypothesis. At the 5% level of significance, we conclude White British respondents were more likely than British South Asian Muslim respondents to identify a liberal education as their most important educational goal. Since the p-value is less than .001, there is very strong evidence against the null hypothesis. Demonstrating the significance of the test, the test statistic (z) is also large enough to reject the null hypothesis with a significance level of .005 (2.576).

Table 4-11: White British Respondents More Likely than South Asian Muslims to Favor a Liberal Education

Do you feel as if you are/were able to achieve the type of education that is most important to you?			
Count **Row %**	Yes	No	Total
South Asian Muslims, <30	127 90.71%	13 9.29%	140
White British, <30	43 89.58%	5 10.42%	48
Total:	170 90.43%	18 9.57%	188

Table 4-12: Responses to Question 4

Do you feel as if you have/had as much access to education as anybody else in the country?			
Count **Row %**	Yes	No	Total
South Asian Muslims, <30	120 85.71%	20 14.29%	140
White British, <30	43 89.58%	5 10.42%	48
Total:	163 86.70%	25 13.30%	188

Table 4-13: Responses to Question 5

4.2.6 Q6: How Much Access to Education Do Most People of Your Ethnic Background Have?

In addition to a question about the respondents' own access to education, the questionnaire asked respondents if they thought members of their ethnic background had equal access to education. The question was answered by 140 British South Asian Muslims and 48 White British respondents. While 3 (6.25%) of the White British respondents thought White Britons had less access than others to education, 48 (34.29%) of the British South Asian Muslims thought South Asians had less access. A test for the difference in proportions indicates British South Asian Muslims were less likely than white respondents to think members of their ethnic background had equal access to education ($z = -2.67$, $p = .0038$) (see Table 4-19).

For British South Asian Muslims, Achieving Educational Goals Dependent Upon Goal

Goal: Test to see whether achieving one's educational goal was dependent upon the respondent's goal

H_O: Educational goals are independent of population

H_1: Education goals are dependent upon population

Test Statistic: $x^2 = \sum \frac{(observed-expected)^2}{expected} = 7.408$ (Yates); *p-value*= .006

Decision Rule: For a significance level of .05, reject the null hypothesis if $x^2 > x^2{}_{0.05,1}$ or 3.841

Conclusion: Since 7.408 > 3.841, we reject the null hypothesis. There is enough evidence to claim achieving one's educational goal was dependent upon the South Asian Muslim respondent's educational goal. Since the p-value is between .001 and .01, there is strong evidence against the null hypothesis. Demonstrating the significance of the test, the test statistic (*z*) is also large enough to reject the null hypothesis with a significance level of .01 (6.635).

Do you feel as if you were able to achieve the type of education that is most important to you? (Observed)			
Count Row %	Yes	No	Total
Basic/Liberal/Vocational Education	75 97.4%	2 2.6%	77 55.00%
Religious/Civic Education	52 82.54%	11 17.46%	63 45.00%
Total:	127 90.71%	13 9.29%	140

Do you feel as if you were able to achieve the type of education that is most important to you? (Expected)		
Expected	Yes	No
Basic/Liberal/Vocational Education	69.85	7.15
Religious/Civic Education	57.15	5.85

Table 4-14: For Muslims, Achieving Educational Goals Dependent upon Their Goals

4.2.7 Q7: How Much Access to Education Do Most People of Your Religious Affiliation Have?

The third survey question related to equality in British society asked respondents whether

they thought their coreligionists had equal access to education. This question was answered by

104

139 British South Asian Muslims and 48 White British respondents. More than a quarter

(40/139, 28.8%) of the British South Asian Muslim respondents thought Muslims had less access

to education, while only one (2%) White British respondent, who described himself as a

Christian, thought his coreligionists had less access to education. A test for the difference in

proportions indicates British South Asian Muslims were less likely than White British

respondents to think their coreligionists had equal access to education ($z = -3.20$, $p = .0007$) (see

Table 4-20).

How much access to education do most people of your ethnic background have?				
Count **Row %**	Less Access	More Access	Same Access	Total
South Asian Muslims, <30	48 34.29%	8 5.71%	84 60.00%	140
White British, <30	3 6.25%	6 12.50%	39 81.25%	48
Total:	51 27.13%	14 7.45%	123 65.43%	188

Table 4-15: Responses to Question 6

How much access to education do most people of your religious affiliation have?					
Count **Row %**	Less Access	More Access	Same Access	N/A	Total
South Asian Muslims, <30	40 28.78%	8 5.76%	91 65.47%	0 0.00%	139
White British, <30	1 2.08%	1 2.08%	43 89.58%	3 6.25%	48
Total:	41 21.93%	9 4.81%	134 71.66%	3 1.60%	187

Table 4-16: Responses to Question 7

4.2.8 Q8: Do You Personally Feel That You Are a Part of British Society?

Since 2001, Bradford's Muslim community has commonly been accused of segregating

itself from "mainstream" British society (Shaw 2002; Phillips 2006). Peach (2006) has also

claimed the poor socioeconomic conditions of the British Muslim community isolate them from society. As such, the survey asked respondents whether they felt as if they were part of British society. The question was answered by 140 British South Asian Muslims and 48 White British respondents. The overwhelming majority of respondents (178/188, 94.68%) felt like they were part of British society. Although a smaller proportion of Muslim respondents felt as if they were part of society, a test for the difference between the two population proportions indicates British South Asian Muslim respondents were just as likely as White British respondents to feel like they were part of British society ($z = 1.16$, $p = .123$).

Do you personally feel that you are a part of British society?			
Count **Row %**	Yes	No	Total
South Asian Muslims, <30	131 93.57%	9 6.43%	140
White British, <30	47 97.92%	1 2.08%	48
Total:	178 94.68%	10 5.32%	188

Table 4-17: Responses to Question 8

4.2.9 Q9: Do You Personally Feel That You Are an Equal Member of British Society?

In addition to asking respondents to identify whether they felt like part of society, the survey asked respondents if they felt as if they were equal members of society. The question was answered by 139 British South Asian Muslims and 48 White British respondents. While 131 (93.57%) of the British South Asian Muslim respondents felt like they were part of society, only 112 (80.58%) thought they were equal members of society. By contrast 45 (93.75%) of the 48 White British respondents thought they were equal members of society. As seen in Table 4-21, British South Asian Muslims were less likely than White British respondents to feel like equal members of society ($z = -2.144$ $p = .016$.).

Do you personally feel that you are an equal member of British society?			
Count Row %	Yes	No	Total
South Asian Muslims, <30	112 80.58%	27 19.42%	139
White British, <30	45 93.75%	3 6.25%	48
Total:	157 83.96%	30 16.04%	187

Table 4-18: Responses to Question 9

British South Asian Muslims Less Likely than White Respondents to Think Members of their Ethnic Background Had Equal Access to Education

Goal: Test to see whether British South Asian Muslims were less likely than White British respondents to think that members of their ethnic background had equal access to education

H_O: $p_1 \geq p_2$

H_1: $p_1 < p_2$

Test Statistic: $z = \dfrac{\hat{p}_1 - \hat{p}_2}{\sqrt{\hat{p}(1-\hat{p})(\frac{1}{n_1}+\frac{1}{n_2})}}$

$n_1 = (sample\ size, South\ Asian\ Muslims) = 140$

$n_2 = (sample\ size, White\ British) = 48$

$\hat{p}_1 = (proportion\ of\ S.\ Asian\ Muslims\ who\ thought\ ethnicity\ had\ equal\ access\ to\ education) = 84/140$

$\hat{p}_2 = (proportion\ of\ White\ British\ who\ thought\ ethnicity\ had\ equal\ access\ to\ education) = 39/48$

$z = -2.67;\ p\text{-}value = .0038$

Decision Rule: One-tailed (left-tailed), for a significance level (α) of .05, reject the null hypothesis if $z < -1.645$

Conclusion: Since -2.76 < - 1.645, we reject the null hypothesis. At the 5% level of significance, we conclude British South Asian Muslims were less likely than White British respondents to think members of their ethnic background had equal access to education. Since the p-value is between .001 and .01, there is strong evidence against the null hypothesis.

Table 4-19: British South Asian Muslims Less Likely than White British to Think Members of their Ethnicity Had Equal Access to Education

Table 4-20: British South Asian Muslims Less Likely than White British Respondents to Think Their Coreligionists Had Equal Access to Education

4.3 Analysis and Discussion

4.3.1 The Local, Religious, and National Identities of Bradford's Immigrant Muslim Community

In addition to the nine survey questions, the questionnaire asked respondents to describe themselves. As seen in Table 4-22, the survey included a checklist with local, regional, and

British South Asian Muslims Less Likely than White Respondents to Feel Like Equal Members of Society

Goal: Test to see whether British South Asian Muslims were less likely than White British respondents to see themselves as equal members of British society

H_O: $p_1 \geq p_2$

H_1: $p_1 < p_2$

Test Statistic: $z = \dfrac{\hat{p}_1 - \hat{p}_2}{\sqrt{\hat{p}(1-\hat{p})(\frac{1}{n_1}+\frac{1}{n_2})}}$

$n_1 = (sample\ size, South\ Asian\ Muslims) = 139$

$n_2 = (sample\ size, White\ British) = 48$

$\hat{p}_1 = (proportion\ of\ British\ South\ Asian\ Muslims\ who\ felt\ like\ equal\ members\ of\ British\ Society\,) = 112/139$

$\hat{p}_2 = (proportion\ of\ White\ British\ respondents\ who\ felt\ like\ equal\ members\ of\ British\ Society\,) = 45/48$

$z = -2.144;\ p\text{-}value = .016$

Decision Rule: One-tailed (left-tailed), for a significance level (α) of .05, reject the null hypothesis if
$z < -1.645$

Conclusion: Since -2.144 < -1.645, we reject the null hypothesis. At the 5% level of significance, we conclude British South Asian Muslims were less likely than White British respondents to feel like equal members of society. Since the p-value is between .01 and .05, there is moderate evidence against the null hypothesis. Demonstrating the significance of the test, the test statistic (z) is also significant enough to reject the null hypothesis with a significance level of .025 (-1.960).

Note: For the proportion of White British respondents who perceived they were equal members of British society, n*p is greater than 5, but n*(1-p) is less than 5.

Table 4-21: British South Asian Muslims Less Likely to Feel Like Equal Members of Society

national identities which the respondents could choose. It also included regional and national

identities common to Bradford's immigrant communities. In addition to the close-ended

responses on the checklist, respondents had the option to write in other identities not listed on the

questionnaire.

Respondents were asked to describe themselves twice. The first time, respondents were directed to select as many identities as applied. The second time, respondents were instructed to select only one response. The pairing of questions was designed to gain insight into the respondents' nested, or hyphenated, identities. Forcing them to subsequently select only one identity was intended to determine the respondents' primary, or dominant, identities.

How you describe yourself? (Choose all that apply)
❑ Asian   ❑ Atheist   ❑ Bangladeshi   ❑ Bradfordian   ❑ British
❑ Buddhist ❑ Christian   ❑ English   ❑ European   ❑ Hindu
❑ Indian   ❑ Jewish   ❑ Jullunduri   ❑ Mirpuri   ❑ Muslim
❑ Pakistani ❑ Sikh   ❑ South Asian   ❑ Sylheti
❑Yorkshire(wo)man   ❑ Other_____

Table 4-22: Identities Included on the Survey

The National Identity of British South Asian Muslims

One of this study's primary objectives was to determine whether young British South Asian Muslims identified with the nation. Figure 4-6 depicts the number of respondents who selected each identity on the checklist, and demonstrates the gambit of identities found amongst Bradford's South Asian Muslim community. As hypothesized, most young British South Asian Muslim respondents identified with the nation. When multiple identities were allowed, 105 of the 140 (75%) British South Asian Muslim respondents identified themselves as British or English.

A smaller sample collected elsewhere in Bradford also demonstrated the propensity for young British South Asian Muslims to identify with the nation; however, they were less likely than the respondents at the university to identify with the nation ($z = -1.926$, $p = .0271$). Of 17 British South Asian Muslims under 30 years old who completed the survey elsewhere in

Bradford, only 9 (52.94%) described themselves as British or English. It is thought the British

South Asian Muslims at the university were more likely to identify with the nation because, as

university students, they had probably enjoyed more opportunities than most other young

Muslims in Bradford.

How Do British South Asian Muslim Respondents Describe
Themselves? (When Multiple Responses Allowed)
n=140

Figure 4-6: Local, National, and Religious Identities (Multiple Responses Allowed)

While this study hypothesized most young British South Asian Muslims would identify

with the nation, it was thought they would be less likely than white respondents to describe

themselves as British or English. Whereas 105 (75%) of 140 British South Asian Muslims at the

university identified with the nation, 43 (93.75%) of 45 White British respondents described

themselves as British or English. As hypothesized, a test for the difference between the two

population proportions demonstrates British South Asian Muslims were less likely than White

British respondents to identify with the nation ($z = -2.730$, $p = .0032$) (see Table 4-23).

As seen in Figure 4-6, this study also found British South Asian Muslims more

commonly described themselves as British rather than English. While 93 (66.4%) of the British

South Asian Muslim respondents described themselves as British, only 31 (22.1%) described themselves as English. By contrast, the study found White British respondents more commonly described themselves as English. Of the 48 White British respondents at the university, 38 (79.2%) described themselves as English, while 33 (68.8%) described themselves as British. A test for the statistical difference between the two population proportions demonstrates White British respondents were more likely than British South Asian Muslims to describe themselves as English ($z = 7.073$, $p < .0001$).

This finding was subsequently corroborated by the 2011 Census of England and Wales that asked respondents about their national identity. Geospatial analysis of the census shows White British Bradfordians identified more strongly with being English than British. Conversely, Pakistani Bradfordians identified more strongly with being British. The bivariate maps in Figures 4-7 and 4-8 plot the White British population and where English and British identities were strongest in Bradford District. In the census output areas with large white populations, English identity was the strongest while British identity was low. In contrast, the bivariate maps in Figures 4-9 and 4-10 plot the Pakistani population and where English and British identities were the strongest. In census output areas with high Pakistani populations, British identity was the strongest while English identity was low. Linear regression confirms these relationships, as seen in Figures 4-11 and 4-12.

The propensity for British South Asian Muslims to more readily describe themselves as British suggests "British" is a more inclusive identity than "English", which likely has more ethnic and ancestral overtones. As Colley (2009) has demonstrated how the British identity was able to subsume the English, Welsh, and Scottish under one national identity in the 18th century, so too has it been able to incorporate diverse immigrants in the 20th and 21st centuries. Because

British South Asian Muslims Less Likely than White British Respondents to Identify with the Nation

Goal: Test to see whether British South Asian Muslims were less likely than White British respondents to describe themselves as British or English

H_O: $p_1 \geq p_2$

H_1: $p_1 < p_2$

Test Statistic: $z = \dfrac{\hat{p}_1 - \hat{p}_2}{\sqrt{\hat{p}(1-\hat{p})(\frac{1}{n_1} + \frac{1}{n_2})}}$

$n_1 = (sample\ size, South\ Asian\ Muslims) = 140$

$n_2 = (sample\ size, White\ British) = 48$

$\hat{p}_1 = (proportion\ of\ British\ South\ Asian\ Muslims\ who\ identified\ with\ the\ nation)$
$= 105/140$

$\hat{p}_2 = (proportion\ of\ White\ British\ respondents\ who\ identified\ with\ the\ nation)$
$= 45/48$

$z = $ *-2.730 p-value= .0032*

Decision Rule: One-tailed (left-tailed), for a significance level (α) of .05, reject the null hypothesis if
$z < -1.645$

Conclusion: Since -2.730 < -1.645, we reject the null hypothesis. At the 5% level of significance, we conclude British South Asian Muslims were less likely than White British respondents to describe themselves as British or English. Since the p-value is between .001 and .01, there is strong evidence against the null hypothesis. Demonstrating the significance of the test, the test statistic (z) is also small enough to reject the null hypothesis with a significance level of .005 (-2.576).

Note: For the proportion of White British respondents who identified with the nation, n*p is greater than 5, but n*(1-p) is less than 5.

Table 4-23: British South Asian Muslims Less Likely than White British Respondents to Identify with the Nation

a common national identity is thought to reduce both in-group bias and social tension, the British

identity shared by both the South Asian and white communities will encourage those who seek to

better integrate immigrant communities into British society. However, the ongoing process of

Figure 4-7: White British Population and English Identity (Bivariate Map)

Figure 4-8: White British Population and British Identity (Bivariate Map)

Figure 4-9: Pakistani Population and English Identity (Bivariate Map)

Figure 4-10: Pakistani Population and British Identity (Bivariate Map)

English Identity Dependent Upon Percent of White British Population in Output Area
2011 Census

$y = 0.6807x + 0.1891$

⋅ % of Output Area who Identified as English

White British Population as % of Output Area (Wh BR P.)

SUMMARY OUTPUT

Regression Statistics	
Multiple R	0.975683647
R Square	0.951958578
Adjusted R Square	0.951927097
Standard Error	0.048721087
Observations	1528

ANOVA

	df	SS	MS	F	Significance F
Regression	1	71.77789	71.77789	30238.25577	0
Residual	1526	3.622334	0.002374		
Total	1527	75.40022			

	Coeffic-ients	Standard Error	t Stat	P-value	Lower 95%	Upper 95%	Lower 95.0%	Upper 95.0%
Intercept	0.18912	0.00296	63.841	0	0.1833	0.1949	0.1833	0.194
Wh_BR_P.	0.68072	0.00391	173.89	0	0.6730	0.6884	0.6730	0.688

Figure 4-11: English Identity Depends Upon Presence of White British Population

British Identity Dependent Upon Percent of Pakistani Population in Output Area
2011 Census

$y = 0.5619x + 0.2549$

% of Output Area who Identified as British

British Identity (% of Output Area)

Pakistani Population as % of Output Area (Pak_Per)

SUMMARY OUTPUT

Regression Statistics	
Multiple R	0.898829014
R Square	0.807893597
Adjusted R Square	0.807767708
Standard Error	0.066315257
Observations	1528

ANOVA

	df	SS	MS	F	Significance F
Regression	1	28.22238	28.22238	6417.51451	0
Residual	1526	6.710910	0.004397		
Total	1527	34.93329			

	Coeffic-ients	Standard Error	t Stat	P-value	Lower 95%	Upper 95%	Lower 95.0%	Upper 95.0%
Intercept	0.2549	0.002054	124.108	0	0.250907	0.2589	0.2509	0.258
Pak_Per	0.5618	0.007014	80.1093	0	0.548094	0.5756	0.5480	0.575

Figure 4-12: British Identity Depends Upon Presence of Pakistani Population

devolution in the UK threatens this shared national identity as English, Scottish, and Welsh national identities become more salient amongst the white population.

The British-Muslim Hyphenated Identity

Some within the Muslim community have claimed that Islam and British culture are incompatible. Likewise, some have concluded that British and Muslim identities are irreconcilable. For example, the Islamist organization Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT), which has a presence at the University of Bradford[3], has claimed on its recruitment videos:

> Muslims in this country need to answer some very serious questions. Where does their allegiance lie?... I think Muslims in this country need to take a long, hard look at themselves and decide what is their identity. Are they British or are they Muslim? I am Muslim. Where I live is irrelevant. (BBC News 2003)

While some, like the HT, claim Muslim and British identities are mutually exclusive, this study found most Muslims at the university have reconciled these identities, laying claim to both. Of the 124 British South Asian Muslims who described themselves as Muslim, 96 (77.4%) of them also described themselves as British or English.

Muslim as the Dominant Identity

Allowing respondents to choose multiple identities revealed their nested, or hyphenated, identities. To determine the respondents' dominant, or most important, identities, the survey forced respondents to select one identity. Figure 4-13 depicts the number of British South Asian Muslim respondents who identified with each identity when they were forced to choose only one. As hypothesized, the British South Asian Muslims' most important identity was their Muslim identity. When forced to choose one identity, 78 (56.1%) of 139 British South Asian Muslims described themselves as Muslim. Moreover, of the 96 British South Asian Muslims

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[3] According to Rashad Ali, a former HT member who sat on its national leadership committee, the HT ran the University of Bradford's Islamic Society, a student organization that promotes Islam on campus and aims to act as the voice of Muslim student at the university(Ali 2008).

who described themselves as Muslim and either British or English, 58 (60.4%) subsequently

described themselves as Muslim, while 25 (26%) described themselves as British or English. Of

note, one of the respondents refused to choose between the two identities, instead writing in

"British-Muslim". This probably indicates the presence of the unique hybrid identity that some

Muslims, including Trevathan (2009), hope to create in Britain.

How Do British South Asian Muslim Respondents Describes Themselves? (When One Response Allowed)
n=139

Figure 4-13: Local, National, and Religious Identities (One Response Allowed)

Continued Identification with South Asia

The study found young British South Asian Muslims continue to strongly identify with

South Asia. When multiple identities were allowed, this study found 124 (88.5%) of the 140

British South Asian Muslims described themselves using at least one "Asian" identity (meaning

they described themselves as Pakistani, Mirpuri, Sylheti, South Asian, Asian, Bangladeshi,

Indian, or Jullunduri). Of the 140 British South Asian Muslims in the study, 90 (64.3%)

described themselves as Pakistani, while 77 (55%) described themselves as Asian. This study

also found local Pakistani identities remain important to the community, as 24 (17.1%)

respondents described themselves as Mirpuri. Although accounts of young British South Asian

Muslims suggest their ties with South Asia are not as strong as those of their parents, family ties

and visits to the subcontinent likely explain in part their continued identification with South Asia.

Although this study demonstrated young British South Asian Muslims still strongly identify with Asia, only 3 (2.1%) of the 140 British South Asian respondents described themselves as South Asian. This is in keeping with Dash's (2008) study of South Asian regionalism that found the South Asian regional identity was still underdeveloped. Dash found Pakistanis were the least likely of the five South Asian nationalities he studied (Bangladeshi, Indian, Nepali, Pakistani and Sri Lankan) to think of themselves as citizens of South Asia. In his study, only 12% of Pakistanis saw themselves as "South Asian" (Dash 2008).

4.3.2 Association between Equality and National Identity

It is commonly thought that the nation is predicated upon the ideal that its members enjoy equality in legal, civic, and political affairs (Smith 1991). However, Shulman (2003) argues there is little empirical evidence to support the theory that equality promotes national identity. In his own study, Shulman found poorer members of society were slightly more likely than wealthier members to identify with the nation.

Given Shulman's claim, this study sought to test for an association between perceptions of equality and national identity. To do this, the questionnaire utilized four measures of equality. In addition to directly asking respondents whether they saw themselves as equal members of society, the survey asked them about their educational access, as well as the access of those within their ethnic and religious backgrounds. Access to education was used as a key barometer of equality because of the known disparity in educational qualifications and opportunities in Bradford.

This study found perceptions of inequality and discrimination were high amongst the British South Asian Muslim population. Nearly 1 in 5 (19.4%) young British South Asian

Muslim respondents saw themselves as unequal members of society, compared to just 3(6.3%) of the 48 White British respondents. This study also found more than half (79/140, 56.4%) of the British South Asian Muslim respondents felt like they or members of their ethnic or religious backgrounds were discriminated against.[4] By contrast, 10 (20.8%) of 48 White British respondents felt like they or members of their ethnic or religious backgrounds had been discriminated against.

Even though British South Asian Muslims were less likely than White British respondents to identify with the nation, this study found an association between perceptions of inequality, or discrimination, and national identity. It found those Muslims who saw themselves as equal members of society, or had not experienced discrimination, were more likely to identify with the nation. British South Asian Muslims were more likely to identify with the nation if they felt like they were equal members of society ($z = 2.192$, $p = .0142$), thought they had equal access to education ($z = 1.673$, $p = .0472$), or thought South Asians had equal access to education ($z = 2.507$, $p = .0061$). Collectively, those who had not experienced or witnessed discrimination were also more likely to identify with the nation, as seen in Table 4-24. This finding is in line with other studies, including studies by Loden (2008) and Robinson (2009) that found the absence of discrimination was key in determining whether immigrants identified with the nation. The key findings from the four tests for association are discussed below, but also summarized in Table 4-25.

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[4] This represents respondents who felt they were unequal members of society, had less access to education, thought members of their ethnic background had less access to education or thought members of their religious background had less access to education

Goal: Test to see whether young British South Asian Muslims who had not experienced or witnessed discrimination were more likely to identify with the nation

H_O: $p_1 \leq p_2$

H_1: $p_1 > p_2$

Test Statistic: $z = \dfrac{\hat{p}_1 - \hat{p}_2}{\sqrt{\hat{p}(1-\hat{p})(\frac{1}{n_1}+\frac{1}{n_2})}}$

$n_1 = \begin{pmatrix} sample\ size, South\ Asian\ Muslims\ who\ had\ not\ experienced\ or \\ witnessed\ discrimination \end{pmatrix} = 61$

$n_2 = \begin{pmatrix} sample\ size, South\ Asian\ Muslims\ who\ had\ experienced\ or \\ witnessed\ discrimination \end{pmatrix} = 79$

$\hat{p}_1 = (proportion\ of\ British\ South\ Asian\ Muslims\ who\ had\ not\ experienced\ or$ $witnessed\ discrimination\ and\ ID'd\ as\ British\ or\ English) = 51/61$

$\hat{p}_2 = (proportion\ of\ British\ South\ Asian\ Muslims\ who\ had\ experienced\ or$ $witnessed\ discrimination\ and\ ID'd\ as\ British\ or\ English) = 54/79$

$z = 2.0677;\ p\text{-}value = .0194$

Decision Rule: One-tailed (right-tailed), for a significance level (α) of .05, reject the null hypothesis if $z > 1.645$

Conclusion: Since 2.067> 1.645, we reject the null hypothesis. At the 5% level of significance, we conclude British South Asian Muslims who had not experienced or witnessed discrimination against members of their ethnic or religious backgrounds were more likely to identify with the nation than those who experienced or witnessed discrimination. Demonstrating the significance of the test, the test statistic (z) is also large enough to reject the null hypothesis with a significance level of .025 (1.960). As the p value is between .01 and .05, there is moderate evidence against the null hypothesis.

Table 4-24: Absence of Discrimination Promoted National Identity

Equal Members of British Society and National Identity

As hypothesized, this study found British South Asian Muslims were generally less likely than White British respondents to identify with the nation ($z = -2.730$, $p = .0032$). However, this study also found that British South Asian Muslims who saw themselves as equal members of

Summary of Associations: Measures of Equality and National Identity (British South Asian Muslims Under 30 Years Old, University of Bradford)		
Measure of Equality	**Association Between Measure of Equality and National Identity?** (significance level of α = .05)	**Key Finding (s)**
Perceived Equal Access to Education	YES	Of those who thought they had equal access to an education, 78% identified with the nation; 60% of those who thought they had unequal access identified with the nation
Perceived Ethnicity Had Same Access to Education	YES	Of those who thought South Asians had equal access to an education, 82% identified with the nation; 63% of those who thought South Asians had less access identified with the nation
Perceived Coreligionists Had Same Access to Education	NO	Of those who thought Muslims had equal access to an education, 75% identified with the nation; 75% of those who thought Muslims had less access identified with the nation
Perceived Self as Equal Member of British Society	YES	Of those who thought they were equal members of society, 79% identified with the nation; 59% of those who thought they were unequal identified with the nation

Table 4-25: Summary of Associations between Measures of Equality and National Identity

society more readily identified with the nation than those who thought they were unequal. The

study found 89 of the 112 (79.46%) British South Asian Muslim respondents who saw

themselves as equal members of society identified with the nation. By contrast, 16 of the 27

(59.26%) British South Asian Muslims who felt like they were unequal members of society

described themselves as British or English (see Figure 4-14). As seen in Table 4-26, the

difference in proportions is statistically significant, demonstrating those who see themselves as

equal members of society are more likely to identify with the nation ($z = 2.192$, $p = .0142$).

Equal Member of Society and National Identity
British South Asian Muslims < 30 Years Old

■ Identified as British/English
□ Did Not Identify as British/English

Perceived Self as Equal Member Of British Society

21%
79%

Did Not Perceive Self as Equal Member of British Society

41%
59%

Figure 4-14: Equal Member of Society and National Identity

Equal Access to Education and National Identity

As seen in Table 4-27, this study found British South Asian Muslim respondents who thought they had equal access to education were more likely to identify with the nation than those who thought they had unequal access ($z = 1.673$, $p = .0472$). The study found 93 of the 120 (77.50%) British South Asian Muslims who felt as if they had equal access to education identified with the nation. By contrast, 12 of the 20 (60%) British South Asian Muslim respondents who thought they had unequal access described themselves as British or English (see Figure 4-15).

Ethnic Group's Access to Education and National Identity

As seen in Table 4-28, this study found British South Asian Muslims who thought South Asians had equal access to education were more likely to identify with the nation ($z = 2.507$, $p = .0061$). The study found 69 of the 84 (82.14%) British South Asian Muslim respondents who thought South Asians had equal access to education identified with the nation. By contrast, 30 of the 48 (62.5%) British South Asian Muslims who thought South Asians had less access to education identified themselves as British or English (see Figure 4-16).

British South Asian Muslims who Thought They Were Equal Members of Society were More Likely to Identify with the Nation

Goal: Test to see whether British South Asian Muslims who thought they were equal members of society were more likely to describe themselves as British or English than those who thought they were unequal

H$_O$: $p_1 \lessgtr p_2$

H$_1$: $p_1 > p_2$

Test Statistic: $z = \dfrac{\hat{p}_1 - \hat{p}_2}{\sqrt{\hat{p}(1-\hat{p})(\frac{1}{n_1} + \frac{1}{n_2})}}$

$n_1 = (sample\ size, South\ Asian\ Muslims\ who\ Felt\ as\ Equal\ Members\ of\ Society)$
$\quad\quad = 112$

$n_2 = (sample\ size, South\ Asian\ Muslims\ who\ Felt\ as\ Unequal\ Members\ of\ Society)$
$\quad\quad = 27$

$\hat{p}_1 = (proportion\ of\ British\ South\ Asian\ Muslims\ who\ Felt\ \ Equal\ \ and\ ID'd\ as$
$British\ or\ English) = 89/112$

$\hat{p}_2 = (proportion\ of\ British\ South\ Asian\ Muslims\ who\ Felt\ Unequal\ and\ ID'd\ as$
$British\ or\ English) = 16/27$

$z = 2.192;\ p\text{-}value = .0142$

Decision Rule: One-tailed (right-tailed), for a significance level (α) of .05, reject the null hypothesis if $z > 1.645$

Conclusion: Since 2.192> 1.645, we reject the null hypothesis. At the 5% level of significance, we conclude British South Asian Muslims who thought they were equal members of society were more likely to identify with the nation than those who did not feel like equal members of society. Since the p-value is between .01 and .05, there is moderate evidence against the null hypothesis. The test statistic (*z*) is also large enough to reject the null hypothesis with a significance level of .025 (1.960).

Table 4-26: British South Asian Muslims who Thought they were Equal Members of Society were More Likely to Identify with the Nation

Religious Group's Access to Education and National Identity

   Although 40 (29%) of 139 British South Asian Muslim respondents thought Muslims had

less access to an education, it had no bearing on their identification with the nation. The study

British South Asian Muslims who Thought They Had Equal Access to Education were More Likely to Identify with the Nation

Goal: Test to see whether British South Asian Muslims who thought they had equal access to an education were more likely to describe themselves as British or English than those who thought they had less access

$\mathbf{H_O}$: $p_1 \leq p_2$

$\mathbf{H_1}$: $p_1 > p_2$

Test Statistic: $z = \dfrac{\hat{p}_1 - \hat{p}_2}{\sqrt{\hat{p}(1-\hat{p})(\frac{1}{n_1} + \frac{1}{n_2})}}$

$n_1 = \begin{pmatrix} Sample\ Size, British\ South\ Asian\ Muslims\ who\ \ Perceived \\ Equal\ Access\ to\ Education \end{pmatrix} = 120$

$n_2 = \begin{pmatrix} Sample\ Size, British\ South\ Asian\ Muslims\ who\ Did\ Not\ Perceive\ Equal \\ Access\ to\ Education \end{pmatrix} = 20$

$\hat{p}_1 = $ *Proportion of British Asian Muslims who Thought they had Equal Access and ID'd as British or English*) = 93/120

$\hat{p}_2 = $ (*Proportion of British South Asian Muslims who Thought they had Unequal Access and ID'd as British or English*) = 12/20

z = 1.673; p-value= .0472

Decision Rule: One-tailed (right-tailed), for a significance level (α) of .05, reject the null hypothesis if $z > 1.645$

Conclusion: Since 1.673 is > 1.645, we reject the null hypothesis. At the 5% level of significance, we conclude British South Asian Muslims who thought they had equal access to education were more likely to identify with the nation than those who thought they had less access to education. Since the p-value is between .01 and .05, there is moderate evidence against the null hypothesis.

Table 4-27: British South Asian Muslims who Thought they had Equal Access to Education More Likely to Identify with the Nation

found 68 (74.73%) of the 91 British South Asian Muslim respondents who thought Muslims had equal access to education identified with the nation. By contrast, 30 (75%) of the 40 British South Asian Muslims who thought Muslims had less access to education described themselves as British or English (see Figure 4-17). As seen in Table 4-29, the difference between the

British South Asian Muslims who Thought South Asians Had Equal Access to Education were More Likely to Identify with the Nation

Goal: Test to see whether British South Asian Muslims who thought South Asians had the same access to education were more likely to identify with the nation than those who thought South Asians had less access

H$_O$: $p_1 = p_2$

H$_1$: $p_1 \neq p_2$

Test Statistic: $z = \dfrac{\hat{p}_1 - \hat{p}_2}{\sqrt{\hat{p}(1-\hat{p})(\frac{1}{n_1} + \frac{1}{n_2})}}$

$n_1 = (Sample\ Size,\ British\ South\ Asian\ Muslims\ who\ Felt\ Like\ Ethnic\ Group\ Had\ Same\ Access)\ = 84$

$n_2 = (Sample\ Size, British\ South\ Asian\ Muslims\ who\ Felt\ Like\ Ethnic\ Group\ Had\ Less\ Access) = 48$

$\hat{p}_1 = (Proportion\ of\ British\ South\ Asian\ Muslims\ who\ Felt\ Like\ Ethnicity\ had\ Equal\ Access\ to\ Education\ and\ ID'd\ as\ British\ or\ English) = 69/84$

$\hat{p}_2 = (Proportion\ of\ British\ South\ Asian\ Muslims\ who\ Felt\ Like\ Ethnicity\ had\ Less\ Access\ to\ Education\ and\ ID'd\ as\ British\ or\ English) = 30/48$

$z = 2.507;\ p\text{-}value = .0061$

Decision Rule: One-tailed (right-tailed), for a significance level (α) of .05, reject the null hypothesis if $z > 1.645$

Conclusion: Since 2.507 > 1.645, we reject the null hypothesis. At the 5% level of significance, we conclude British South Asian Muslims who thought South Asians had equal access to education were more likely to identify with the nation than those who thought South Asians had less access to education. Since the p-value is between .001 and .01, there is strong evidence against the null hypothesis. Demonstrating the significance of the test, the test statistic (z) is large enough to also reject the null hypothesis with a significance level of .001 (2.326).

Table 4-28: British South Asian Muslims who Thought South Asians had Equal Access to Education were More Likely to Identify with the Nation

population proportions was not statistically significant ($z = -.033$, $p = .9737$). As a result, this study concluded British South Asian Muslims who thought Muslims had less access to education were just as likely to identify with the nation as those who thought Muslims had equal access.

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National Identity Not Dependent Upon Perceiving Coreligionists Had Equal Access to Education

Goal: Test to see whether British South Asian Muslims who thought Muslims had less access to education were just as likely to identify with the nation as those who thought Muslims had less access

$\mathbf{H_O}$: $p_1 = p_2$

$\mathbf{H_1}$: $p_1 \neq p_2$

Test Statistic: $z = \dfrac{\hat{p}_1 - \hat{p}_2}{\sqrt{\hat{p}(1-\hat{p})(\frac{1}{n_1}+\frac{1}{n_2})}}$

$n_1 = (Sample\ Size,\ British\ South\ Asian\ Muslims\ who\ Thought\ Most\ Muslims\ Had\ Equal\ Access) = 91$

$n_2 = (Sample\ Size, British\ South\ Asian\ Muslims\ who\ Thought\ Most\ Muslims\ Had\ Less\ Access) = 40$

$\hat{p}_1 = (Proportion\ of\ British\ South\ Asian\ Muslims\ who\ Thought\ Muslims\ Had\ Equal\ Access\ and\ ID'd\ as\ British\ or\ English) = 68/91$

$\hat{p}_2 = (Proportion\ of\ British\ South\ Asian\ Muslims\ who\ Thought\ Muslims\ Had\ Less\ Access\ and\ ID'd\ as\ British\ or\ English) = 30/40$

$z = -.033;\ p\text{-}value = .9737$

Decision Rule: Two-tail test, for a significance level (α) of .05, reject the null hypothesis if z < - 1.960 or > 1.960

Conclusion: Since -.033 is not less than -1.960, we do not reject the null hypothesis. At the 5% level of significance, we conclude British South Asian Muslims who thought Muslims had equal access to education were just as likely to identify with the nation as those who thought Muslims had less access. Since the p-value is greater than .1, there is little evidence against the null hypothesis.

Table 4-29: National Identity Not Dependent Upon Perceiving Coreligionists Had Equal Access to Education

4.3.3 Acculturation: Integration, Assimilation, Separation and Marginalization

Berry (1997) claims immigrants can adopt one of four acculturation strategies when interacting with others in their host society. Depending on how immigrants value both maintaining their own cultural identities and having relations with members of the host society,

Equal Access to Education and National Identity
British South Asian Muslims < 30 Years Old

Identified as British/English
Did Not Identify as British/English

Thought They Had Equal Access to Education

22%
78%

Thought They Had Unequal Access to Education

40%
60%

Figure 4-15: Equal Access to Education and National Identity

Educational Access of Ethnicity and National Identity
British South Asian Muslims < 30 Years Old

Identified as British/English
Did Not Identify as British/English

Thought South Asians Had Equal Access to Education

18%
82%

Thought South Asians Had Unequal Access to Education

37%
63%

Figure 4-16: Ethnic Group's Access to Education and National Identity

Educational Access of Co-Religionists and National Identity
British South Asian Muslims < 30 Years Old

Identified as British/English
Did Not Identify as British/English

Thought Muslims Had Equal Access to Education

18%
82%

Thought Muslims Had Unequal Access to Education

37%
63%

Figure 4-17: Religious Group's Access to Education and National Identity

immigrants can choose one of four strategies: integration, assimilation, segregation, or

marginalization (Berry 1997). A matrix depicting how these values and strategies intersect is

seen in Figure 4-18. Immigrants who want to maintain their own cultural identities as well as

interact with the host society tend to integrate, while those who only value relations with the

larger society tend to assimilate. Conversely, those who emphasize the maintenance of their own

cultural identities without desiring to interact with the host society tend to seek segregation.

Those immigrants who neither seek to maintain their own cultural identities nor adopt those of

the host society pursue marginalization.

		Is it considered to be of value to maintain one's identity and culture?	
		Yes	No
Is it considered to be of value to maintain relations with the larger society?	Yes	Integration	Assimilation
	No	Separation/ Segregation	Marginalization

(Berry 1997)
Figure 4-18: Immigrant Acculturation Strategies According to Berry

Over the years, Muslims in Bradford have been accused of segregating themselves from

"mainstream" British society. Indeed, the building up and clustering of Asian businesses, shops,

restaurants, schools, places of worship, and funeral homes allows the city's South Asian

communities, if they so choose, to go from cradle to grave without the need to meaningfully

interact with the majority white population. Despite ethnic clustering in Bradford, Phillips

(2006) argues the city's Muslim community wants to be better integrated into British society.

She, like Kundnani (2001), argues the city's ethnic clustering is due to institutional

discrimination in the housing market as well as the Muslims' desire for the support and

protection associated with living near other South Asians.

To determine whether the Muslim community in Bradford more commonly demonstrates indicators of integration or segregation, this study adapted Berry's matrix to see which acculturation strategies were being employed by young Muslims in the city. In this analysis, respondents were assessed to have pursued integration if they described themselves using identities associated with both the immigrant community and British society. Those respondents who described themselves using only "local" identities were assessed to have pursued assimilation, while respondents who identified themselves using only identities common to the immigrant community were assessed to have adopted a strategy of segregation. Lastly, those respondents who did not use identities common to either British society or the immigrant community were assessed to have pursued marginalization. Table 4-30 depicts how the acculturation strategy of each respondent was inferred based upon their descriptions of themselves.

Picture 4-1: Example of the businesses serving the Muslim community in Bradford, Muslim Funeral Service on Darfield Street (Reid, 2010)

Picture 4-2: Jamiyat Tabligh-ul-Islam Central Mosque, built in 1995. The mosque sits off Lumb Lane, opposite the Muslim Funeral Service pictured above and less than 500m from the Pakistani Consulate (Reid, 2010)

Picture 4-3: Another example of the businesses serving the Muslim community, Raja's Pizza serves samposas and the "Tastiest Halal Pizza Ever" (Reid, 2010)

Picture 4-4: South Asian females walking down terraced street in Manningham where Muslims constitute the majority. Muslims claim they continue to live in Muslim enclaves because of the mutual support it provides (Reid, 2010)

Analysis of the survey data reveals most British South Asian Muslims at the university have integrated into British society. Of the 140 British South Asian Muslim respondents, 114 (81.4%) described themselves using identities associated with both the immigrant community and British society. Separation, or segregation, was the second most common strategy observed, and was seen in 22 (15.7%) of the British South Asian Muslim respondents. Assimilation, or the adoption of only British identities, was identified in only 4 (2.9%) of the respondents. None of the respondents exhibited traits of marginalization.

A smaller sample of surveys collected elsewhere in Bradford revealed similar proportions amongst young British South Asian Muslims in the city. Of 17 young British South Asian Muslims surveyed elsewhere in Bradford, 11 (64.7%) showed signs of integration, while 5 (29.4%) demonstrated signs of segregation. Using a significance level of $\alpha = .05$, a chi-square

test for independence confirmed that the acculturation strategies were not statistically different ($x^2 = 1.314$ with Yates correction, $p = .2516$). This suggests the acculturation strategies seen at the university are probably representative of those in the city's wider South Asian Muslim community.

These study results differed from those in Robinson's (2009) study of Pakistani Muslim and Indian Hindu adolescents in Birmingham and Leicester. While Robinson found Indian adolescents favored integration, she found separation was the most common acculturation strategy amongst Pakistani adolescents. The differing results may be due to differences in the study populations. Robinson conducted her study amongst secondary school students, while this study focused on university students and other university-aged respondents.

4.3.4 Education and the British South Asian Muslim Community in Bradford

Bradford's Muslim population has achieved a disproportionately low level of educational qualifications. In 2001, more than half (50.7%) of all Muslim adults in Bradford had none (Office for National Statistics 2001c). Factors known to contribute to the Muslim community's lack of qualifications include their extended absences from school and limited proficiency in English (Lewis 2007). The socio-economic conditions of the earliest Muslim immigrants has also been cited as a contributing factor, as has the first immigrants' emphasis on work over education as a means of social mobility (Shackle 2010).

Because education was not emphasized at first by the earliest South Asian Muslim immigrants to Bradford, this study sought to test claims that education has since become more valued as a means of social mobility (Shackle 2010). If a continued undervaluation of education was found, it would help to further explain the community's education gap. However, this study found the vast majority of British South Asian Muslim respondents valued education. Of 137 British South Asian Muslim respondents, 122 (89%) claimed education was emphasized "a fair

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Integration		Assimilation
Identities Commonly Associated with Immigrant Community	***Identities Commonly Associated with British Society***	***Identities Commonly Associated with British Society***
Asian	British	British
Bangladeshi	Bradfordian	Bradfordian
Indian	English	English
Jullunduri **&**	European	European
Mirpuri	Yorkshireman	Yorkshireman
Muslim		
Pakistani		
South Asian		
Sylheti		
Count (Percentage) **114/140 (81.4%)**		**Count (Percentage)** **4/140 (2.9%)**
Separation/Segregation		**Marginalization**
Identities Commonly Associated with Immigrant Community		***Identities Not Commonly Associated with Immigrant Community or British Society***
Asian		
Bangladeshi		
Indian		
Jullunduri		
Mirpuri		Other
Muslim		
Pakistani		
South Asian		
Sylheti		
Count (Percentage) **22/140 (15.7%)**		**Count (Percentage)** **0/140 (0.00%)**

Table 4-30: Identities Used to Infer Acculturation Strategies

amount" or "a lot" in their families. Moreover, 129 (96.3%) of 134 British South Asian Muslim respondents intended to emphasize education "a fair amount" or "a lot" to their children.

One might expect most university students to have had education emphasized to them, regardless of their ethnic or religious background. However, this study found British South Asian Muslims were more likely than White British respondents to have had education stressed "a lot" to them by their families ($z = 2.39$, $p = .0084$). Demonstrating the value of an education

to the Muslim community, more than 55% of the British South Asian Muslim respondents at the university had education emphasized "a lot" to them, while only 35% of the White British respondents at the university had education stressed "a lot" to them in their youth.

Because most Muslims in Bradford have no educational qualifications, the sample at the university may not have represented the wider Muslim community's views on education. However, the surveys conducted elsewhere in Bradford suggest education is probably valued by most Muslim families in the city. Of 24 surveys completed by British South Asian Muslims elsewhere in Bradford, 21 (87.5%) indicated education was stressed to them "a fair amount" or "a lot" while growing up. Using a significance level of $\alpha = .05$, a two-tailed statistical test for the difference in population proportions indicates British South Asian Muslims elsewhere in Bradford were just as likely as those at the university to have had education stressed "a fair amount" or "a lot" in their youth ($z = .222$, $p = .824$). This suggests the level of emphasis placed upon an education by the families of university students likely mirrors the emphasis that the wider Muslim community places upon an education.

This study also explored the educational demands, or preferred goals, of Bradford's Muslim community. Based upon Nelson's (2003) study in Rawalpindi that demonstrated Pakistani families favored civic and religious educations, this study hypothesized that the educational goals of Bradford's Muslim community would differ from those of the White British majority. It was thought the British South Asian Muslims' goals would reflect the findings in Nelson's study.

As in Nelson's study in Pakistan, the most common educational goal identified by British South Asian Muslims in Bradford was a religious education, defined as an education that provides students with strong values and strong religious beliefs. In this study, 41 (29.29%) of

the 140 British South Asian Muslim respondents identified a religious education as being the most important goal of an education. A liberal education, defined in this study as an education that teaches students how to solve problems and think for themselves, was the second most common response, and was identified as a priority by 35 (25%) of the British South Asian Muslim respondents.

By contrast, a liberal education was the priority for the majority of White British respondents. This study found more than half (25/48, 52.09%) of the White British respondents identified a liberal education as the most important goal of an education. Furthermore, only 2 (4.17%) of the white respondents claimed a religious education was their educational priority.

The white respondents' preference for a liberal education corresponds with the stated aims of the National Curriculum. While the National Curriculum is designed to reflect and incorporate Britain's minority populations, including allowance for their religious education, the Curriculum is ultimately designed to pass on the knowledge and values of society as influenced primarily by the majority population. In this case, the basis of the National Curriculum is a liberal education as championed by the Victorian school inspector and literary Matthew Arnold (1822-1888), who was the first to propose a national curriculum in England (Conway 2010). It was Arnold's belief that a liberal education was the most important goal of an education, superseding religious, civic and vocational aims, as he argued:

> The aim and office of instruction, say many people, is to make a man a good citizen, or a good Christian or a gentleman; or it is to fit him to get on in the world, or it is to enable him to do his duty in the state of life to which he is called. *It is none of these*, and the modern spirit more and more discerns it to be none of these. These are at best secondary and indirect aims of instruction; *its prime direct aim is to enable a man to know himself and the world… To know himself, a man must know the capabilities and performances of the human spirit; and the value of the humanities… is that it affords for this purpose an unsurpassed source of light and stimulus…* But it is also a vital and formative knowledge to know the world, the laws which govern nature, and man as a part of nature. (Italics

added for emphasis)(Conway 2010)

Despite the inclusion of religious and civic education in the current curriculum, a liberal education still forms the basis of the National Curriculum today.

Based upon the findings in this study, it is suggested that the differing educational goals of the white and immigrant Muslim communities may contribute to the latter's limited educational qualifications. The National Curriculum, with a liberal education as its foundation, may not appeal to those with differing educational goals, particularly if they feel like they are unable to achieve them in state schools. All 49 of the British South Asian Muslim respondents who claimed a liberal or basic education was their most important educational goal said they were able to achieve the type of education that was most important to them. By contrast, 32 (78%) of the 41 Muslim respondents who stated a religious education was their top educational priority claimed they were able to achieve their goal. Of the 91 Muslims who favored a religious, vocational, or civic education, 78 (85.7%) claimed they had achieved the type of education they valued most.

While the National Curriculum includes some provision for religious education, if the Muslim students' demands for it are not being met in state schools, they have other options, including seeking out a religious education in one of Bradford's increasing number of *madrassas* and independent Muslim schools. As of 2013, an estimated 9,000 children in Bradford attended a *madrasa* at least one hour several days a week, while Lewis (2007) claims they commonly spend several hours each school day in a *madrasa*. In 2013, roughly 1,000 children also attended an independent Muslim school in Bradford (Economist 2013a).

The pursuit of studies at the *madrassas*, though highly desired by Muslim families, may actually contribute to the community's low level of educational qualifications. Lewis (2007) has argued the time that Bradford's Muslim youth spend in the city's *madrassas* disrupts their

mastery of English, which, in turn, has been observed to contribute to the Muslim community's underachievement at school (Crace 2004; Katz 2002). The very time being spent in the *madrassas* may also affect the students' performance at school if it subtracts from the time they have available to do their other schoolwork. While this may be the case, further research is required to determine if there is a relationship between time spent at the *madrasa* and the students' performance at school.

Although this study found 9 (22%) of the 41 British South Asian Muslim respondents who favored a religious education felt like they were unable to achieve it, the survey did not include follow-up questions to determine why their educational goals were not being met. Despite the provision of some religious education in state schools, it is possible their goals were not realized because of the National Curriculum's primary focus on a liberal education. Alternatively, it is just as likely their goals went unfulfilled because of the identified shortcomings in the education provided by Bradford's *madrassas*.

The quality of education provided in Bradford's *madrassas* is said to be improving; nevertheless, many of them reportedly offer their students only a very basic knowledge of Islam. A 2013 study by Bradford's Council of Mosques concluded many of the city's *madrassas* have only a "very narrow understanding of faith education," and are largely limited to assisting their students to identify and read Qur'anic text, memorize the five pillars of Islam, and pray (Council for Mosques 2013). The Council's study also highlighted the language barrier that is commonly found in the city's *madrassas*. Although English is the primary language of many of the city's youth, the teachers at the *madrassas* are commonly brought in from Pakistan and frequently have little or no command of the language. The linguistic and cultural barriers between teacher and student most likely limits the students' ability to learn and fully place into context the material

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being taught. The poor learning environment reported in many of the city's *madrassas* may

explain why some of the participants who favored a religious education also claimed they were

unable to attain it.

Chapter 5 Conclusions, Implications, and Recommendations for Further Study

5.1 Key Findings and Implications

Key Findings

      This study's primary objectives were to determine whether British South Asian Muslims in Bradford identified with the nation and felt like they were equal members of British society. In so doing, this study sought to test for an association between perceptions of equality and national identity. Although the association between the two is commonly accepted in theory, Shulman (2003) has argued there is little empirical data to support the theoretical link between them. Table 5-1 provides a summary of the study's findings, while Table 5-2 summarizes how the study's hypotheses were borne out by the study results.

      As hypothesized, this study found most young British South Asian Muslims identified with the nation. Of the 140 British South Asian Muslims under 30 years old who participated in the study at the University of Bradford, 105 (75%) described themselves as British or English. Importantly, this study also found an association between perceptions of equality and national identity. The British South Asian Muslims who participated in this study were more likely to identify with the nation if they felt like they were equal members of society ($z = 2.192$, $p = .0142$), thought they had equal access to education ($z = 1.673$, $p = .0472$), or thought South Asians had equal access to education ($z = 2.507$, $p = .0061$).

Implications

      Finding an association between equality and national identity adds a layer of empirical data to the literature to support Deutsch's theory (1964) that equality promotes national identity. More importantly, it has implications for policymakers, stakeholders, and community powerbrokers who have worked to promote social cohesion in Bradford following outbreaks of ethnic tension and violence in the city. Because a shared national identity is thought to reduce

in-group bias and promote social cohesion, promoting equality and highlighting, or publicizing, the British Muslims' identification with the nation may help to reduce social tension in the city.

Because the Conservative government has also linked "home grown" extremism to a lack of the immigrants' integration at the local and national level, publicizing the Muslim community's attachment to the nation as identified in this study may also help to refute the commonly held misconception that the British Muslim community does not identify with the nation. Disputing these misperceptions is important because participants in the study identified negative representations of the Muslim community in the media as having contributed to their sense of exclusion from British society.

By 2020, it is projected that 50% of Bradford's population will be under 25 years old (University of Bradford 2013). The quickly changing demographics in Bradford will have major implications for policymakers, not in the least in the education sector. With emerging choices in the city's education market as a result of the opening of independent Muslim schools, policymakers will need to consider the educational preferences and demands of the community when allocating scarce resources. This study provides invaluable insight into the educational priorities of the city's Muslim community. While a liberal education, which is the cornerstone of the existing National Curriculum, is important to the Muslim community, so too are religious and vocational educations. Educators and policymakers will need to find innovative ways to incorporate these demands into the education that is offered in Bradford-area schools. Better addressing and incorporating the community's demands in the education sector would probably encourage further community involvement and buy-in, which may increase qualification attainment rates as a result. Conversely, failure to consider the community's educational priorities could work at cross-purposes with government efforts to integrate the community by

giving them the impression they are being excluded from the education sector as has happened in

the past. It might also lead to higher enrollment in the city's Muslim schools, which could

disrupt government efforts to better integrate the Muslim community if British South Asian

Muslim and White British children have even less interaction as a result.

5.2 Suggestions for Further Study

- This study concluded a religious education was a priority for Muslims in Bradford. The time Muslim youth spend in the city's *madrassas* may contribute to the community's qualification gap if it detracts from their course work. However, further studies are necessary to determine if there is a relationship between the time being spent in the *madrasa* and the Muslim community's performance at school.

- This study found Muslim respondents who favored a basic or liberal education were able to achieve their educational demands. However, those who favored a religious education were less likely to feel as if they had been able to achieve the type of education they valued most. Further research is required to determine why they are not achieving their educational goal. Possibilities include the National Curriculum's focus on a liberal education and the identified shortcomings in the city's *madrassas.*

Research Question	Findings amongst British South Asian Muslims under 30 Years Old at the University of Bradford
Do British South Asian Muslims in Bradford identify with the nation? Do they identify themselves as English or British?	105 (75%) of 140 British South Asian Muslims identified with the nation, describing themselves as British or English; 93(66%) described themselves as British and 31(22%) described themselves as English
What are the British South Asian Muslims dominant, or most important, identities?	When forced to select only one identity, the three most common identities were: Muslim (78, 56%), British (26, 19%), and Pakistani (13, 9%). Of 96 respondents who described themselves as Muslim and identified with the nation, 58 (60%) subsequently described themselves as Muslim, and 25 (26%) as British or English
Is there an association between perceptions of equality and national identity?	Using a significance level of $\alpha = .05$, those who thought they were equal members of society were more likely to identify with the nation ($p = .0142$). Those who thought they had equal access to education were also more likely to identify with the nation ($p = .0472$), as were those who thought South Asians had equal access to an education ($p = .0061$)
Is education important to young British South Asian Muslims, and what are their educational goals? Have they been able to achieve the type of education that is most important to them?	Nearly 9 in 10 British South Asian Muslim respondents claimed education was stressed to them a "fair amount" or a "lot" while growing up. The British South Asian Muslims' educational goals differed from those of the White British respondents. The most common goal identified by British South Asian Muslim respondents was a religious education (41, 29%), followed by liberal (35, 25%), vocational (28, 20%), civic (22, 16%), and basic (14, 10%) educations. All of those who identified a liberal or basic education claimed they were able to achieve it; 32 (78%) of 41 respondents who favored a religious education felt like they were unable to achieve their educational goal
What acculturation strategies have been adopted by young British South Asian Muslims in Bradford? Have they integrated into British society?	114 (81%) British South Asian Muslims demonstrated indicators of integration, having described themselves with identities common to both the immigrant community and British society. Separation, or segregation, was identified in 22 (15.7%) respondents, while 4 (2.9%) of the respondents demonstrated signs of assimilation.

Table 5-1: Research Questions (Conclusions)

Hypothesis	Findings amongst British South Asian Muslims under 30 Years Old at the University of Bradford
Most young British South Asian Muslims would identify with the nation, but they would be less likely than white respondents to identify with the nation	105 (75%) of 140 British South Asian Muslims identified with the nation; however, 45 (94%) of 48 white British respondents identified with the nation. Using a significance level of $\alpha = .05$, a test for the difference in the population proportions indicates British South Asian Muslims were less likely than white respondents to identify with the nation ($p = .0026$)
Most young British South Asian Muslims would identify with the nation, but their identity as Muslim would be the more dominant identity	105 (75%) of 140 British South Asian Muslims identified with the nation. Of 96 respondents who described themselves as Muslim and identified with the nation, 58 (60%) subsequently described themselves as Muslim, and 25 (26%) as British or English
Young British South Asian Muslims would be less likely than non-Muslims to see themselves as equal members of society	112 (81%) of 139 British South Asian Muslims claimed they thought of themselves as equal members of society, compared to 45 (93.75%) of 48 White British respondents. Using a significance level of $\alpha = .05$, a test for the difference in the population proportions indicates British South Asian Muslims were less likely than white respondents to feel like equal members of British society ($p = .016$). British South Asian Muslims were also more likely than white respondents to feel as if they or those of their ethnic or religious background were discriminated against ($p < .0001$)
Young British South Asian Muslims who saw themselves as equal members of society would be more likely to identify with the nation than those Muslims who saw themselves as unequal members of society	89 (79%) of 112 British South Asian Muslims who thought of themselves as equal members of society identified with the nation. By contrast, 16 (59%) of 27 British South Asian Muslims who did not feel like equal members of society identified with the nation. Using a significance level of $\alpha = .05$, those who thought they were equal members of society were more likely to identify with the nation ($p = .0142$)
The educational goals of young British South Asian Muslims would differ from those of the young white respondents	While the most common educational goal of British South Asian Muslim respondents was a religious education (41/140, 29%), 25 (52%) of 48 White British respondents favored a liberal education. A chi-square test for independence demonstrates educational goals are dependent upon ethnic group ($p = .0001$)

Table 5-2: Study's Hypotheses (Conclusions)

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Appendices

Appendix A. Major Attacks, Attempted Attacks, and Terror Plots in the UK Involving British Muslim Immigrants since 2001

Date of Attack	Target	Type of Attack	Casualties
7/7/2005	Public Transportation in London	4 x PBIEDs	56 Killed, including 4 Bombers ~700 Injured
7/21/2005	Public Transportation in London	5 x PBIEDs	1 Injured
6/30/2007	Glasgow International Airport	1 x VBIED	1 Killed (Bomber) 5 Injured
5/10/2010	MP Stephen Timms	Attempted Assassination	1 Injured (MP Timms)
5/22/2013	British Soldier	Murder	1 Killed (Drummer Lee Rigby)

Date of Attempted Attack	Target	Type of Attack
12/22/2001	Transatlantic Flight	PBIED
6/29/2007	Night Clubs in London	2 x VBIEDs

Date Plot Disrupted	Intended Target	Type of Attack
09/03/2004	Sites in the UK and US, including NYSE, IMF, World Bank	VBIEDs (Limousines), "Dirty Bomb"
8/9/2006	10 x Transatlantic Flights	PBIEDs, "Liquid Bombs"
01/31/2007	British Muslim Soldier	Abduction, Murder
12/20/2010	US Embassy in London, London Stock Exchange, and Home of London Mayor; Mumbai style attack on Parliament	IEDs
11/2011	Civilians in supermarkets and town centers	11 x PBIEDs
4/23/2012	Luton Territorial Army Base	VBIED
7/3/2012	English Defense League rally on 30 June 2012 in Dewsbury	IEDs
7/5/2012	Royal Wooten Bassett, British Security Services	IEDs, Assassinations

IED: Improvised Explosive Device; PBIED: Person-borne IED; VBIED: Vehicle-borne IED

Appendix B. Count of Respondents by Country of Citizenship

Country/Territory	# of Respondents	Country/Territory	# of Respondents
United Kingdom	359	Bangladesh	1
Other/Not Identified	23	Belgium	1
India	18	Brazil	1
Nigeria	17	Denmark	1
Pakistan	17	Egypt	1
China	10	France	1
Malaysia	10	Gambia	1
Lithuania	7	Hong Kong	1
Latvia	5	Iran	1
Libya	5	Italy	1
Ireland	3	Jordan	1
United States	3	Kuwait	1
Vietnam	3	Malawi	1
Botswana	2	Mexico	1
Eritrea	2	Poland	1
Germany	2	Portugal	1
Ghana	2	Refugee	1
Greece	2	Romania	1
Iraq	2	Russia	1
Kenya	2	South Africa	1
Norway	2	St. Lucia	1
Oman	2	Tanzania	1
Saudi Arabia	2	The Netherlands	1
Zimbabwe	2	Uganda	1
Australia	1	Zambia	1
Austria	1	**Total**	**529**

Appendix C. Responses of All UK Citizens

Q1. Growing up, how much was education stressed in your family?

The question was answered by 355 of the 359 respondents.

Q1: Growing Up, How Much Was Education Stressed in Your Family?

A Fair Amount, 134

Very Little, 41

A Lot, 167, 47%

Not at All, 13

a. Q1: By Gender

Growing Up, How Much Was Education Stressed in Your Family?					
Count Row %	Not At All	Very Little	A Fair Amount	A Lot	Total
Male	5	24	78	95	202
	2.48%	11.88%	38.61%	47.03%	
Female	8	17	56	72	153
	5.23%	11.11%	36.60%	47.06%	
Total:	13	41	134	167	355
	3.66%	11.55%	37.75%	47.04%	

b. Q1: By Age

Count Row %	Not At All	Very Little	A Fair Amount	A Lot	Total
Growing Up, How Much Was Education Stressed in Your Family?					
16-19 Years Old	1 1.22%	6 7.32%	32 39.02%	43 52.44%	82
20-29 Years Old	7 3.95%	17 9.60	66 37.29%	87 49.15%	177
30-39 Years Old	3 7.69%	5 12.82%	17 43.59%	14 35.90%	39
40-49 Years Old	2 5.71%	7 20.00%	13 37.14%	13 37.14	35
50-59 Years Old	0 0.00%	6 35.29%	4 25.53%	7 41.18%	17
Over 60 Years Old	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	2 40.00%	3 60%	5
Total:	13 3.66%	41 11.55%	134 37.75%	167 47.04%	355

c. Q1: By Ethnicity

Count Row %	Not At All	Very Little	A Fair Amount	A Lot	Total
Growing Up, How Much Was Education Stressed in Your Family?					
Arab/Middle Eastern	0 0.00%	4 50.00%	0 0.00%	4 50.00%	8
Asian	8 4.08%	17 8.67%	64 32.65%	107 54.59	196
Black	0 0.00%	1 9.09%	3 27.27%	7 63.64%	11
Mixed	0 0.00%	1 9.09%	4 36.36%	6 54.55%	11
Other	1 33.33%	0 0.00%	1 33.33%	1 33.33%	3
White	4 3.17%	18 14.29%	62 49.21%	42 33.33%	126
Total:	13 3.66%	41 11.55%	134 37.75%	167 47.04%	355

d. Q1: By Religion

Count Row %	Growing Up, How Much Was Education Stressed in Your Family?				
	Not At All	Very Little	A Fair Amount	A Lot	Total
Buddhist	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	1 100%	1
Christian	2 2.82%	13 18.31%	30 42.25%	26 36.62%	71
Hindu	1 4.76%	3 14.29%	5 23.81%	12 57.14%	21
Muslim	6 3.16%	18 9.47%	63 33.16%	103 54.21%	190
Sikh	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	1 33.33%	2 66.67%	3
Other	2 25.00%	1 12.50%	3 37.50%	2 25.00%	8
No Religion	2 3.28%	6 9.84%	32 52.46%	21 34.43%	61
Total:	13 3.66%	41 11.55%	134 37.75%	167 47.04%	355

Q2. How much do you stress education to your children, or if you don't have children yet, plan to stress education to them?

The question was answered by 348 of the 359 respondents.

Q2: How much do you stress education to your children?

I Don't Plan to Have Children, 18 — Not at All, 6 — Very Little, 7

A Lot, 215

A Fair Amount, 102

a. Q2: By Gender

How much do you stress education to your children, or if you don't have children yet, plan to stress education to them?						
Count Row %	Not At All	Very Little	A Fair Amount	A Lot	I Don't Plan to Have Children	Total
Male	0 0.00%	2 1.02%	59 29.95%	129 65.48%	7 3.55%	197
Female	6 3.97%	5 3.31%	43 28.48%	86 56.95%	11 7.28%	151
Total:	6 1.72%	7 2.01%	102 29.31%	215 61.78%	18 5.17%	348

b. Q2: By Age

How much do you stress education to your children, or if you don't have children yet, plan to stress education to them?						
Count Row %	Not At All	Very Little	A Fair Amount	A Lot	I Don't Plan to Have Children	Total
16-19 Years Old	1 1.23%	1 1.23%	26 32.10%	50 61.73%	3 3.70%	81
20-29 Years Old	3 1.75%	3 1.75%	56 32.75%	107 62.57%	2 1.17%	171
30-39 Years Old	0 0.00	1 2.56%	9 23.08%	24 61.54%	5 12.82%	39
40-49 Years Old	1 2.94%	2 5.88%	6 17.65%	19 55.88%	6 17.65%	34
50-59 Years Old	1 5.56%	0 0.00	4 22.22%	11 61.11%	2 11.11%	17
Over 60 Years Old	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	1 20.00%	4 80.00%	0 0.00	5
Total:	6 1.72%	7 2.01%	102 29.31%	215 61.78%	18 5.17%	348

c. Q2: By Ethnicity

Count Row %	How much do you stress education to your children, or if you don't have children yet, plan to stress education to them?					
	Not At All	Very Little	A Fair Amount	A Lot	I Don't Plan to Have Children	Total
Arab/Middle Eastern	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	2 28.57%	4 57.14%	1 14.29%	7
Asian	5 2.59%	6 3.11%	56 29.02%	124 64.25%	2 1.04%	193
Black	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	2 20.00%	8 80.00%	0 0.00%	10
Mixed	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	2 20.00%	7 70.00%	1 10.00%	10
Other	0 0.00%	1 33.33%	0 0.00%	1 33.33%	1 33.33%	3
White	1 .80%	0 0.00%	40 32.00%	71 56.80%	13 10.40%	125
Total:	6 1.72%	7 2.01%	102 29.31%	215 61.78%	18 5.17%	348

d. Q2: By Religion

Count Row %	How much do you stress education to your children, or if you don't have children yet, plan to stress education to them?					
	Not At All	Very Little	A Fair Amount	A Lot	I Don't Plan to Have Children	Total
Buddhist	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	1 100.00%	0 0.00%	1
Christian	1 1.43%	0 0.00%	17 24.29%	48 68.57%	4 5.71%	70
Hindu	1 4.76%	3 14.29%	6 28.57%	11 52.38%	0 0.00%	21
Muslim	4 2.17%	3 1.63%	54 29.35%	120 65.22%	3 1.63%	184
Sikh	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	1 33.33%	2 66.67%	0 0.00%	3
Other	0 0.00%	1 12.50%	3 37.50%	2 25.00%	2 25.00%	8
No Religion	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	21 34.43%	31 50.82%	9 14.75%	61
Total:	6 1.72%	7 2.01%	102 29.31%	215 61.78%	18 5.17%	348

Q3. The chart below describes 5 different educational goals, which educational goal is the most important to you?

Basic Education:	One that provides students with basic reading skills and basic math skills
Religious Education:	One that provides students with strong values and strong religious beliefs
Liberal Education:	One that teaches students how to solve problems and think for themselves
Vocational Education:	One that prepares students to find a good job
Civic Education:	One that makes sure every student becomes a good citizen and shows respect for the laws of his/her country

The question was answered by 356 of the 359 respondents.

Q3: Which Educational Goal is the Most Important to You?

a. Q3: By Gender

Which educational goal is the most important to you?						
Count Row %	Basic Education	Religious Education	Liberal Education	Vocational Education	Civic Education	Total
Male	29 14.29%	38 18.72%	68 33.50%	37 18.23%	31 15.27%	203
Female	15 9.80%	22 14.38%	52 33.99%	36 23.53%	28 18.30%	153
Total:	44 12.36%	60 16.85%	120 33.71%	73 20.51%	59 16.57%	356

b. Q3: By Age

Which educational goal is the most important to you?						
Count Row %	Basic Education	Religious Education	Liberal Education	Vocational Education	Civic Education	Total
16-19 Years Old	12 14.81%	13 16.05%	24 29.63%	19 23.46%	13 16.05%	81
20-29 Years Old	16 8.94%	40 22.35%	54 30.17%	38 21.23%	31 17.32%	179
30-39 Years Old	7 17.95%	3 7.69%	14 35.90%	6 15.38%	9 23.08%	39
40-49 Years Old	3 8.57%	1 2.86%	24 68.57%	5 14.29%	2 5.71%	35
50-59 Years Old	5 27.78%	3 16.67%	4 22.22%	3 16.67%	3 16.67%	18
Over 60 Years Old	1 25.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	2 50.00%	1 25.00%	4
Total:	44 12.36%	60 16.85%	120 33.71%	73 20.51%	59 16.57%	356

c. Q3: By Ethnicity

Which educational goal is the most important to you?						
Count Row %	Basic Education	Religious Education	Liberal Education	Vocational Education	Civic Education	Total
Arab/Middle Eastern	2 28.57%	0 0.00%	1 14.29%	1 14.29%	3 42.86%	7
Asian	22 11.17%	51 25.89%	47 23.86%	38 19.29%	39 19.80%	197
Black	1 9.09%	2 18.18%	4 36.36%	2 18.18%	2 18.18%	11
Mixed	1 9.09%	0 0.00%	8 72.73%	1 9.09%	1 9.09%	11
Other	1 33.33%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	2 66.67%	3
White	17 13.39%	7 5.51%	60 47.24%	31 24.41%	12 9.45%	127
Total:	44 12.36%	60 16.85%	120 33.71%	73 20.51%	59 16.57%	356

d. Q3: By Religion

Count Row %	Basic Education	Religious Education	Liberal Education	Vocational Education	Civic Education	Total
Which educational goal is the most important to you?						
Buddhist	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	1 100.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	1
Christian	10 14.08%	7 9.86%	21 29.58%	23 32.39%	10 14.08%	71
Hindu	4 20.00%	2 10.00%	6 30.00%	3 15.00%	5 25.00%	20
Muslim	23 12.04%	51 26.70%	45 23.56%	34 17.80%	38 19.90%	191
Sikh	1 33.33%	0 0.00%	1 33.33%	1 33.33%	0 0.00%	3
Other	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	4 50.00%	3 37.50%	1 12.50%	8
No Religion	6 9.68%	0 0.00%	42 67.74%	9 14.52%	5 8.06%	62
Total:	44 12.36%	60 16.85%	120 33.71%	73 20.51%	59 16.57%	356

Q4. Do you feel as if you are/were able to achieve the type of education that is most important to you?

The question was answered by 355 of 359 respondents.

**Q4: Do you feel as if you are/were able to achieve the type
of education that is most important to you?**

a. Q4: By Gender

Do you feel as if you are/were able to achieve the type of education that is most important to you?			
Count Row %	Yes	No	Total
Male	177 87.62%	25 12.38%	202
Female	141 92.16%	12 7.84%	153
Total:	318 89.58%	37 10.42%	355

b. Q4: By Age

Do you feel as if you are/were able to achieve the type of education that is most important to you?			
Count Row %	Yes	No	Total
16-19 Years Old	73 90.12%	8 9.88%	81
20-29 Years Old	163 91.06%	16 8.94%	179
30-39 Years Old	30 78.95%	8 21.05%	38
40-49 Years Old	32 94.12%	2 5.88%	34
50-59 Years Old	16 88.89%	2 11.11%	18
Over 60 Years Old	4 80.00%	1 20.00%	5
Total:	318 89.58%	37 10.42%	355

Q4: By Ethnicity

Count Row %	Do you feel as if you are/were able to achieve the type of education that is most important to you?		
	Yes	No	Total
Arab/Middle Eastern	8 100.00%	0 0.00%	8
Asian	177 90.77%	18 9.23%	195
Black	11 100.00%	0 0.00%	11
Mixed	10 90.91%	1 9.09%	11
Other	2 66.67%	1 33.33%	3
White	110 86.61%	17 13.39%	127
Total:	318 89.58%	37 10.42%	355

d.Q4: By Religion

Count Row %	Do you feel as if you are/were able to achieve the type of education that is most important to you?		
	Yes	No	Total
Buddhist	1 100.00%	0 0.00%	1
Christian	62 87.32%	9 12.68%	71
Hindu	20 100.00%	0 0.00%	20
Muslim	171 90.00%	19 10.00%	190
Sikh	3 100.00%	0 0.00%	3
Other	4 50.00%	4 50.00%	8
No Religion	57 91.94%	5 8.06%	62
Total:	318 89.58%	37 10.42%	355

Q5. **Do you feel as if you have/had as much access to education as anybody else in the country?**

The question was answered by 355 of 359 respondents.

Q5: Do you feel as if you have/had as much access to education as anybody else in the country?

a. **Q5: By Gender**

Do you feel as if you have/had as much access to education as anybody else in the country?			
Count Row %	Yes	No	Total
Male	162 80.20%	40 19.80	202
Female	134 87.58%	19 12.42%	153
Total:	296 83.39%	59 16.62%	355

b. Q5: By Age

Do you feel as if you have/had as much access to education as anybody else in the country?			
Count Row %	Yes	No	Total
16-19 Years Old	67 82.72%	14 17.28%	81
20-29 Years Old	153 85.47%	26 14.53%	179
30-39 Years Old	32 84.21%	6 15.79%	38
40-49 Years Old	26 76.47%	8 25.53%	34
50-59 Years Old	14 77.78%	4 22.22%	18
Over 60 Years Old	4 80.00%	1 20.00%	5
Total:	296 83.38%	59 16.62%	355

c. Q5: By Ethnicity

Do you feel as if you have/had as much access to education as anybody else in the country?			
Count Row %	Yes	No	Total
Arab/Middle Eastern	4 50.00%	4 50.00%	8
Asian	168 86.15%	27 13.85%	195
Black	8 72.73%	3 27.27%	11
Mixed	10 90.91%	1 9.09%	11
Other	1 33.33%	2 66.67%	3
White	105 82.68%	22 17.32%	127
Total:	296 83.38%	59 16.62%	355

d. Q5: By Religion

Do you feel as if you have/had as much access to education as anybody else in the country?			
Count Row %	Yes	No	Total
Buddhist	1 100.00%	0 0.00%	1
Christian	56 78.87%	15 21.13%	71
Hindu	18 90.00%	2 10.00%	20
Muslim	158 83.16%	32 16.84%	190
Sikh	3 100.00%	0 0.00%	3
Other	6 75.00%	2 25.00%	8
No Religion	54 87.10%	8 12.90%	62
Total:	296 83.38%	59 16.62%	355

Q6. How much access to education do most people of your ethnic background have?

The question was answered by 358 of 359 respondents.

Q6: How much access to education do most people of your ethnic background have?

Same Access, 238

Less Access, 79

More Access, 41

a. Q6: By Gender

Count Row %	Less Access	More Access	Same Access	Total
How much access to education do most people of your ethnic background have?				
Male	45 22.06%	28 13.73%	131 64.22%	204
Female	34 22.08%	13 8.44%	107 69.48%	154
Total:	79 22.07%	41 11.45%	238 66.48%	358

b. Q6: By Age

Count Row %	Less Access	More Access	Same Access	Total
How much access to education do most people of your ethnic background have?				
16-19 Years Old	24 28.92%	7 8.43%	52 62.65%	83
20-29 Years Old	44 22.58%	18 10.06%	117 65.36%	179
30-39 Years Old	6 15.38%	6 15.38%	27 69.23%	39
40-49 Years Old	4 11.76%	7 20.59%	23 67.65%	34
50-59 Years Old	1 5.56%	3 16.67%	14 77.78%	18
Over 60 Years Old	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	5 100.00%	5
Total:	79 22.07%	41 11.45%	238 66.48%	358

c. Q6: By Ethnicity

How much access to education do most people of your ethnic background have?			
Count Row %	Less Access	More Access	Same Access	Total
Arab/Middle Eastern	3 37.50%	0 0.00%	5 62.50%	8
Asian	61 30.81%	16 8.08%	121 61.11%	198
Black	6 54.55%	0 0.00	5 45.45%	11
Mixed	4 36.36%	1 9.09%	6 54.55%	11
Other	1 33.33%	2 66.67%	0 0.00%	3
White	4 3.15%	22 17.32%	101 79.53%	127
Total:	79 22.07%	41 11.45%	238 66.48%	358

d. Q6: By Religion

How much access to education do most people of your ethnic background have?			
Count Row %	Less Access	More Access	Same Access	Total
Buddhist	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	1 100.00%	1
Christian	5 7.04%	8 11.27%	58 81.69%	71
Hindu	3 14.29%	4 19.05%	14 66.67%	21
Muslim	63 32.81%	13 6.77%	116 60.42%	192
Sikh	1 33.33%	2 66.67%	0 0.00%	3
Other	1 12.50%	2 25.00%	5 62.50%	8
No Religion	6 9.68%	12 19.35%	44 70.97%	62
Total:	79 22.07%	41 11.45%	238 66.48%	358

Q7. How much access to education do most people of your religious affiliation have?

The question was answered by 357 of 359 respondents.

Q7: How much access to education do most people of your religious affiliation have?

a. Q7: By Gender

How much access to education do most people of your religious affiliation have?					
Count Row %	Less Access	More Access	Same Access	N/A	Total
Male	39 19.21%	13 6.40%	145 71.43%	6 2.96%	203
Female	19 12.34%	11 7.14%	114 74.03%	10 6.49%	154
Total:	58 16.25%	24 6.72%	259 72.55%	16 4.48%	357

b. Q7: By Age

Count Row %	How much access to education do most people of your religious affiliation have?				
	Less Access	More Access	Same Access	N/A	Total
16-19 Years Old	17 20.48%	7 8.43%	56 67.47%	3 3.61%	83
20-29 Years Old	33 18.54%	13 7.30%	130 73.03%	2 1.12%	178
30-39 Years Old	4 10.26%	1 2.56%	29 74.36%	5 12.82%	39
40-49 Years Old	2 5.88%	2 5.88%	25 73.53%	5 14.71%	34
50-59 Years Old	1 5.56%	1 5.56%	15 83.33%	1 5.56%	18
Over 60 Years Old	1 20.00%	0 0.00%	4 80.00%	0 0.00%	5
Total:	58 16.25%	24 6.72%	259 72.55%	16 4.48%	357

c. Q7: By Ethnicity

Count Row %	How much access to education do most people of your religious affiliation have?				
	Less Access	More Access	Same Access	N/A	Total
Arab/Middle Eastern	2 25.00%	0 0.00%	6 75.00%	0 0.00%	8
Asian	51 25.89%	14 7.11%	132 67.01%	0 0.00%	197
Black	1 9.09%	1 9.09%	9 81.82%	0 0.00%	11
Mixed	1 9.09%	2 18.18%	7 63.64%	1 9.09%	11
Other	1 33.33%	1 33.33%	1 33.33%	0 0.00%	3
White	2 1.57%	6 4.72%	104 81.89%	15 11.81%	127
Total:	58 16.25%	24 6.72%	259 75.55%	16 4.48%	357

d. Q7: By Religion

How much access to education do most people of your religious affiliation have?					
Count Row %	Less Access	More Access	Same Access	N/A	Total
Buddhist	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	1 100.00%	0 0.00%	1
Christian	2 2.82%	4 5.63%	65 91.55%	0 0.00%	71
Hindu	4 19.05%	2 9.52%	15 71.43%	0 0.00%	21
Muslim	50 26.18%	12 6.28%	129 67.54%	0 0.00%	191
Sikh	1 33.33%	1 33.33%	1 33.33%	0 0.00%	3
Other	0 0.00%	1 12.50%	6 75.00%	1 12.50%	8
No Religion	1 1.61%	4 6.45%	42 67.74%	15 24.19%	62
Total:	58 16.25%	24 6.72%	259 72.55%	16 4.48%	357

Q8. Do you personally feel that you are a part of British society?

The question was answered by 355 of 359 respondents.

Q8: Do you personally feel that you are a part of British society?

a. Q8: By Gender

Do you personally feel that you are a part of British society?			
Count Row %	Yes	No	Total
Male	192 94.58%	11 5.42%	203
Female	144 94.74%	8 5.26%	152
Total:	336 94.65%	19 5.35%	355

b. Q8: By Age

Do you personally feel that you are a part of British society?			
Count Row %	Yes	No	Total
16-19 Years Old	75 91.46%	7 8.54%	82
20-29 Years Old	170 94.97%	9 5.03%	179
30-39 Years Old	36 94.74%	2 5.26%	38
40-49 Years Old	32 96.97%	1 3.03%	33
50-59 Years Old	18 100.00%	0 0.00%	18
Over 60 Years Old	5 100.00%	0 0.00%	5
Total:	336 94.65%	19 5.35%	355

c. Q8: By Ethnicity

Do you personally feel that you are a part of British society?			
Count Row %	Yes	No	Total
Arab/Middle Eastern	6 75.00%	2 25.00%	8
Asian	188 94.95%	10 5.05%	198
Black	8 88.89%	1 11.11%	9
Mixed	9 81.82%	2 18.18%	11
Other	3 100.00%	0 0.00%	3
White	122 96.83%	4 3.17%	126
Total:	336 94.65%	19 5.35%	355

d. Q8: By Religion

Do you personally feel that you are a part of British society?			
Count Row %	Yes	No	Total
Buddhist	1 100.00%	0 0.00%	1
Christian	67 95.71%	3 4.29%	70
Hindu	18 94.74%	1 5.26%	19
Muslim	180 93.26%	13 6.74%	193
Sikh	3 100.00%	0 0.00%	3
Other	7 100.00%	0 0.00%	7
No Religion	60 96.77%	2 3.23%	62
Total:	336 94.65%	19 5.35%	355

Q9. **Do you personally feel that you are an equal member of British society?**

The question was answered by 353 of 359 respondents.

Q9: Do you personally feel that you are an equal member of British society?

a. Q9: By Gender

Do you personally feel that you are an equal member of British society?			
Count Row %	Yes	No	Total
Male	165 81.68%	37 18.32%	202
Female	127 84.11%	24 15.89%	151
Total:	292 82.72%	61 17.28%	353

b. Q9: By Age

Count Row %	Yes	No	Total
Do you personally feel that you are an equal member of British society?			
16-19 Years Old	68 82.93%	14 17.07%	82
20-29 Years Old	154 86.52%	24 13.48%	178
30-39 Years Old	31 81.58%	7 18.42%	38
40-49 Years Old	22 66.67%	11 33.33%	33
50-59 Years Old	14 82.35%	3 17.65%	17
Over 60 Years Old	3 60.00%	2 40.00%	5
Total:	292 82.72%	61 17.28%	353

c. Q9: By Ethnicity

Count Row %	Yes	No	Total
Do you personally feel that you are an equal member of British society?			
Arab/Middle Eastern	5 62.50%	3 37.50%	8
Asian	164 82.83%	34 17.17%	198
Black	6 66.67%	3 33.33%	9
Mixed	9 81.82%	2 18.18%	11
Other	0 0.00%	3 100.00%	3
White	108 87.10%	16 12.90%	124
Total:	292 87.72%	61 17.28%	353

d. Q9: By Religion

Do you personally feel that you are an equal member of British society?			
Count Row %	Yes	No	Total
Buddhist	1 100.00%	0 0.00%	1
Christian	59 85.51%	10 14.49%	69
Hindu	17 85.00%	3 15.00%	20
Muslim	156 81.25%	36 18.75%	192
Sikh	3 100.00%	0 0.00%	3
Other	5 71.43%	2 28.57%	7
No Religion	51 83.61%	10 16.39%	61
Total:	292 87.72%	61 17.28%	353

Appendix D: Institutional Review Board Approval Letters

UNIVERSITY of ARKANSAS
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120 Ozark Hall • Fayetteville, Arkansas 72701 • (479) 575-2208 • (479) 575-3846 (FAX)
Email: irb@uark.edu

Research Support and Sponsored Programs
Institutional Review Board

December 4, 2009

MEMORANDUM

TO: Simon Reid
Tom Paradise

FROM: Ro Windwalker
IRB Coordinator

RE: New Protocol Approval

IRB Protocol #: 09-12-307

Protocol Title: *Perception of Educational Access and Nationhood: South Asian Muslims in Bradford, England*

Review Type: ☒ EXEMPT ☐ EXPEDITED ☐ FULL IRB

Approved Project Period: Start Date: 12/03/2009 Expiration Date: 12/02/2010

Your protocol has been approved by the IRB. Protocols are approved for a maximum period of one year. If you wish to continue the project past the approved project period (see above), you must submit a request, using the form *Continuing Review for IRB Approved Projects*, prior to the expiration date. This form is available from the IRB Coordinator or on the Compliance website (http://www.uark.edu/admin/rsspinfo/compliance/index.html). As a courtesy, you will be sent a reminder two months in advance of that date. However, failure to receive a reminder does not negate your obligation to make the request in sufficient time for review and approval. Federal regulations prohibit retroactive approval of continuation. Failure to receive approval to continue the project prior to the expiration date will result in Termination of the protocol approval. The IRB Coordinator can give you guidance on submission times.

If you wish to make *any* modifications in the approved protocol, you must seek approval *prior to* implementing those changes. All modifications should be requested in writing (email is acceptable) and must provide sufficient detail to assess the impact of the change.

If you have questions or need any assistance from the IRB, please contact me at 120 Ozark Hall, 5-2208, or irb@uark.edu.

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Email: irb@uark.edu

Research Support and Sponsored Programs
Institutional Review Board

December 22, 2009

MEMORANDUM

TO: Simon Reid
                             Tom Paradise

FROM: Ro Windwalker
                             IRB Coordinator

RE: PROJECT MODIFICATION

IRB Protocol #:   09-12-307

Protocol Title: *Perception of Educational Access and Nationhood: South Asian
                             Muslims in Bradford, England*

Review Type: ☒ EXEMPT   ☐ EXPEDITED   ☐ FULL IRB

Approved Project Period: Start Date: 12/21/2009 Expiration Date: 12/02/2010

Your request to modify the referenced protocol has been approved by the IRB. Please note that this approval does not extend the Approved Project Period. Should you wish to extend your project beyond the current expiration date, you must submit a request for continuation using the UAF IRB form "Request for Continuation." The request should be sent to the IRB Coordinator, 120 Ozark Hall.

For protocols requiring FULL IRB review, please submit your request at least one month prior to the current expiration date. (High-risk protocols may require even more time for approval.) For protocols requiring an EXPEDITED or EXEMPT review, submit your request at least two weeks prior to the current expiration date. Failure to obtain approval for a continuation *on or prior to* the currently approved expiration date will result in termination of the protocol and you will be required to submit a new protocol to the IRB before continuing the project. Data collected past the protocol expiration date may need to be eliminated from the dataset should you wish to publish. Only data collected under a currently approved protocol can be certified by the IRB for any purpose.

If you have questions or need any assistance from the IRB, please contact me at 120 Ozark Hall, 5-2208, or irb@uark.edu.

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