

To Rebel or Not to Rebel?  
Explaining Violent and Non-Violent Separatist  
Conflict in Casamance (Senegal) and  
Barotseland (Zambia)

A Comparative Framing Analysis

Dissertation  
zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades  
der Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakultät  
der Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen

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Tübingen

2016

Tag der mündlichen Prüfung:

25.11.2016

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## List of Abbreviations

<b>ANC</b>	African National Congress
<b>AZ</b>	Agenda for Zambia
<b>BASMO</b>	Barotse Anti-Secession Movement
<b>BA64</b>	Barotseland Agreement of 1964
<b>BDS</b>	Senegalese Democratic Bloc (French: <i>Bloc démocratique sénégalais</i> )
<b>BFM</b>	Barotse Freedom Movement
<b>BLA</b>	Barotse Liberation Army
<b>BNC</b>	Barotse National Council
<b>BNFA</b>	Barotse National Freedom Alliance
<b>BNYL</b>	Barotse National Youth League
<b>BPF</b>	Barotse Patriotic Front
<b>BPS</b>	Senegalese Popular Bloc (French: <i>Bloc populaire sénégalais</i> )
<b>BRE</b>	Barotse Royal Establishment
<b>BSAC</b>	British South African Company
<b>CCZ</b>	Council of Churches in Zambia
<b>COW</b>	Correlates of War
<b>CRC</b>	Constitution Review Commission
<b>CSO</b>	Central Statistical Office
<b>CSRP</b>	Civil Society for Poverty Reduction
<b>DRC</b>	Democratic Republic of the Congo
<b>ECZ</b>	Electoral Commission of Zambia
<b>EFZ</b>	Evangelical Fellowship in Zambia
<b>FFP</b>	Fund for Peace
<b>GDP</b>	Gross domestic product
<b>GNI</b>	Gross national income
<b>GRZ</b>	Government of the Republic of Zambia
<b>HDI</b>	Human Development Index
<b>HIV/AIDS</b>	Human immunodeficiency virus/Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
<b>ICG</b>	International Crisis Group
<b>IDP</b>	Internally-displaced person
<b>IHDI</b>	Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index
<b>IR</b>	International Relations
<b>IRIN</b>	Integrated Regional Information Networks
<b>LDC</b>	Least developed countries

<b>LD/MPT</b>	Democratic League/Movement for the Labour Party (French: <i>Ligue démocratique/Mouvement pour le parti du travail</i> )
<b>LTTE</b>	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
<b>MAC</b>	Autonomous Movement of Casamance (French: <i>Mouvement autonome de la Casamance</i> )
<b>MAR</b>	Minorities at Risk
<b>MFDC</b>	Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (French: <i>Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance</i> ) Also: Movement for Constitutional Federalism and Democracy (French: <i>Mouvement pour le fédéralisme et la démocratie constitutionnels</i> )
<b>MMD</b>	Movement for Multi-Party Democracy
<b>MOREBA</b>	Movement for the Restoration of Barotseland (Previously: Movement for the Restoration of the Barotseland Agreement)
<b>MP</b>	Member of parliament
<b>MPLA</b>	People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Portuguese: <i>Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola</i> )
<b>PAIGC</b>	English: African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (Portuguese: <i>Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde</i> )
<b>PCA</b>	Permanent Court of Arbitration
<b>PF</b>	Patriotic Front
<b>PDS</b>	Senegalese Democratic Party (French: <i>Parti démocratique sénégalais</i> )
<b>PS</b>	Socialist Party (French: <i>Parti Socialiste</i> )
<b>PTS</b>	Political Terror Scale
<b>RBG</b>	Royal Barotseland Government
<b>UCDP</b>	Uppsala Conflict Data Programme
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>UNIP</b>	United National Independence Party
<b>UNITA</b>	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Portuguese: <i>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola</i> )
<b>UNPO</b>	Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation
<b>UPND</b>	United Party for National Development
<b>USSR</b>	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
<b>ZEC</b>	Zambia Episcopal Conference
<b>ZNBC</b>	Zambian National Broadcasting Corporation

### 1. Introduction

In December 1982, the Casamance region that constitutes a semi-enclave in the south of Senegal experienced an event that should profoundly mark its future: After frustrations and tensions between the southern region and the political centre in Dakar had been increasing for years, several hundred people took to the streets in Ziguinchor, the regional capital. They protested for the separation of Casamance from Senegal, took down the national flag from the office of the governor, and replaced it by a white one. In the context of the march, leaflets circulated that had been signed by the newly created *Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance*, in short MFDC (English: Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance). Although the march was peaceful, security forces harshly reacted to it and several people were injured. One year later, the movement launched an armed attack against the town which resulted in over 100 casualties. In view of the repressive reaction by the government, the MFDC retreated to the bush where it radicalised and formed an armed wing that engaged in guerrilla warfare against the Senegalese state. The conflict remained latent for several years until it escalated in 1990 and developed into a low-scale armed conflict. Since then, the West African state is the scene of one of the few armed struggles for self-determination on the continent (see 5.1.2.).

Almost 30 years later, the town of Mongu, which is the centre of Zambia's Western Province, experienced similar incidents that constituted the climax of a decades-old conflictual history of the area. The province was originally the core of the Kingdom of Barotseland, an influential traditional realm in pre-colonial Southern Africa. During British colonisation, it constituted a 'protectorate within the protectorate' of Northern Rhodesia.<sup>1</sup> When Zambia obtained independence in 1964, representatives of Barotseland and North-Eastern Rhodesia signed a treaty that guaranteed the special status of the kingdom within the future unified state. However, the central government in Lusaka abrogated this so-called Barotseland Agreement and the autonomy rights and privileges of the area that the paper had stipulated shortly afterwards. Consequently, Barotseland became an ordinary province within Zambia. Since then, activists campaigned with varying intensity for the restoration of the document, and thus greater autonomy of their territory. Subsequent governments suppressed and criminalised the claims and at various instances, relations between the central administration in Lusaka and supporters of the Barotse cause exacerbated. In the 1990s, for instance, several thousand armed men gathered in Limulunga, the winter capital of Barotseland, in order to protect their king from being arrested. Observers described the atmosphere as tense and war-like (Sichone and Simutanyi 1996, 185-190; see 7.1.2.). In January 2011, tensions considerably increased once again and cumulated into violent riots in the provincial capital.

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<sup>1</sup> The Northern Rhodesian protectorate resulted from the amalgamation of North-Eastern and North-Western Rhodesia. The latter largely corresponded to former Barotseland.

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According to official accounts, several people were injured or killed as a result of interventions by the security forces and over 100 individuals got arrested. In view of these events, the situation in Western Province took a remarkable turn. Various social movements continue to demand the restitution of the former kingdom, which is equivalent to separation from their perspective, despite continuing repression by the government. But surprisingly, they largely commit themselves to non-violence and reject the use of force as a possible strategy to achieve their objective although they would have the potential to mobilise for violent rebellion against the Zambian state, as the previous incidents clearly underscored (Sichone and Simutanyi 1996; Zeller 2010b, 301).

The cases of Casamance and Barotseland constitute an interesting constellation when viewed from a theoretical perspective and merit close attention. So far, theories of civil war explained conflict onset by reference to structural factors. They statistically analysed civil wars in order to identify variables that increase the conflict propensity of countries and favour the outbreak of civil war. Among the relevant determinants are various economic, institutional, and identity-related factors. Senegal and Zambia and the respective defecting regions share many of such characteristics, which favour conflict onset. At the national level, numerous variables, namely the economic performance and socio-economic inequalities, the availability of resources, state capacity and fragility, the regime type and the degree of democratisation, and ethnic heterogeneity and distribution are relatively similar across the cases. At the sub-state or regional level, Casamance and Barotseland also exhibit comparable structural characteristics. Both are geographically detached since they are far off and poorly connected to the economic and political centres of the respective countries. Moreover, the areas are economically marginalised as well as underdeveloped and there are perceptions that they are also discriminated against in other societal domains. In addition, the two areas host specific ethnic communities that are distinct from groups in other parts of the countries; they constitute minorities at the national level, but are dominant in their homelands. In view of the striking analogies, one would expect a comparable potential for violence and consequently, a similar outcome – that is, armed conflict – in both cases. Therefore, the completely different courses of the conflicts are puzzling.<sup>2</sup> In addition, it is intriguing that in spite of factors fuelling civil strife and although secessionist struggles are particularly likely to develop into protracted civil wars, the fighting in southern Senegal did not escalate further, but remained at a low level.

The deviant outcomes in the cases of Casamance and Barotseland have important implications for conventional theoretical approaches to armed conflict as they point to an essential deficit in their explanatory potential. Notably, the observations suggest that if similar structural factors can provoke completely different outcomes, they do not automatically lead

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<sup>2</sup> Since there is no organised violence or armed group in Barotseland, the conflict can be classified as non-violent.

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to the escalation of violence and therefore, are insufficient to account for conflict onset. Rather, there must be additional dynamics and mechanisms that translate structures into agency and determine whether a conflict turns violent (or not). So far, prevailing explanations of the emergence of armed conflict ignored such micro-mechanisms which is why they suffer from a considerable blind spot. This is the starting point of this thesis. Since conventional theories fail to elucidate the divergent conflict behaviour in Casamance and Barotseland, the following scientific study will recur to an alternative theoretical approach, namely framing in order to shed light on developments in the two case studies. Framing assesses strategic communication of (non-)violent social movements as well as its effects on the audience and sheds light on sensitisation and mobilisation processes (see below). The approach, which was borrowed from social movement theories, appears suitable to offer new insights regarding micro-mechanisms in the context of conflict onset. Since the theory is applied in a setting where all other independent variables are equal, framing is expected to serve as the key that accounts for the puzzling diverging outcomes. In sum, the inquiry has a twofold objective: First, it will empirically analyse and elucidate variations in conflict dynamics in the two cases by reference to framing. This will provide a detailed picture of how the different conflict behaviours were triggered. Second and more abstractly, by integrating framing into theories of armed conflict, the thesis aims at identifying and understanding micro-mechanisms of conflict escalation and ultimately, refining existing theoretical explanations of armed conflict. In the remainder of the introduction, the underlying reflections of the thesis and its resulting proceeding will be presented in detail.

### **1.1. Theoretical Foundations and Derivation of the Research Questions**

In order to fully apprehend the relevance of the peculiar observations that were made in the cases of Casamance and Barotseland, it is imperative to consider them against the broader theoretical background. Hence, a short overview of civil war studies will be given that also evokes major shortfall which are relevant in the context of the present analysis. On this basis, the research questions that the thesis will concentrate on will be developed. Moreover, the theoretical significance of the analysis as well as contributions to the existing literature on violent conflict will become obvious.

#### *1.1.1. Critical Review of Civil War Studies and Their Deficits*

After the end of the Cold War, new global trends in political violence occurred: The number of intra-state conflicts (i.e. conflicts fought between a government and an armed oppositional group within a national territory) increased and almost entirely replaced conventional warfare

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between countries (Harbom and Wallensteen 2010).<sup>3</sup> These conflicts turned out extremely destructive. They caused high numbers of dead, injured, raped, or displaced people and had negative effects on national economies and infrastructure that continued to strain affected societies and entire sub-regions long after fighting had ended. As a consequence, internal warfare increasingly attracted academic attention and researchers sought to better understand the occurrence of civil strife. With the help of large-N cross-case analyses, they identified underlying structural causes that enhance the likelihood of the escalation of violent conflict. This literature can generally be divided into three major theoretical approaches, namely economic, institutional, and identity-centred perspectives. A first group of scholars studied civil wars from an economic perspective. Academics supporting 'greed'-related theses, explained the outbreak of violence by reference to opportunity structures favouring rebellion as well as profit-seeking and focused on the importance of natural resources for conflict escalation. Likewise, the question whether and how 'grievances', that is, poverty and (horizontal and vertical) socio-economic inequalities cause internal warfare attracted attention. A second school of thought concentrated on the role of institutional factors concerning conflict onset. In this context, a variety of state-related variables, such as the regime type, state capacity, and the impact of repression were analysed. Third, identity-related aspects, such as ethnicity and religion attracted attention. This approach examined the effects of the ethnic composition of societies and settlement patterns. In addition, researchers came up with explanations how identity precisely led to armed conflict, for example, as a result of deliberate instrumentalisation by élites or due to a growing security dilemma between different communities (for detailed overviews of civil war studies, see Bussmann, Hasenclever, and Schneider 2009b; Kalyvas 2007; or 2.).

Overall, the different perspectives contributed to gaining a more thorough and systematic knowledge of root causes of violent conflict and shed light on the conditions under which civil wars occurred. However, they also suffer from various limits regarding their explanatory potential. A major problem of prevailing explanations, which will be at the centre of this thesis, concerns their imprecision with regard to causal mechanisms and their mode of operation. Based on multivariate statistical models, theories of civil wars make probabilistic causal statements and identify structural factors that are correlated with conflict onset. However, even if variables prove statistically significant, many questions about their precise causal relationship with conflict onset remain unanswered. While statistics allow for analysing a large number of cases, they cannot provide an in-depth understanding of events and processes and thus, causal effects. Besides, the quantitative analyses were often connected with unrealistic assumptions that rather obscured than illuminated developments preceding

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<sup>3</sup> Internal conflicts are conventionally categorised according to the number of battle-related deaths they cause. Above 1,000 battle-related deaths per year, they are defined as civil wars. Below this threshold, they constitute low-intensity conflicts (UCDP 2015).

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armed conflict. If authors tried to come up with cause-effect explanations, they were not necessarily empirically well-founded, but often resulted from premature generalisations of anecdotal evidence. In fact, there is no automatism or direct connection that connects structures with agency, but micro-mechanisms, i.e. a sort of connecting links have to intervene and translate factors at the macro-level into collective action. These can be compared to falling dominoes: From the initial impulse (or background conditions), a variety of incidents follow each other until all tokens are knocked over (or conflict erupts). These micro-mechanisms require intense analysis to deepen and refine existing knowledge regarding conflict onset. Yet, conventional large-N studies cannot yield any insights into how precisely specific factors lead to an outcome. They fail to describe what causal mechanisms or additional intervening variables are at play and why violent conflict erupts in a specific region at a given time (see, for example, Desrosiers 2012; 2015; Ross 2006; Sambanis 2004a; Yee 1996).

Another relevant weakness of these theoretical approaches concerns the neglect of low-intensity and non-violent conflicts. Although the number of civil wars multiplied in comparison to the past, the academic field overlooked that they still constitute rare events. In reality, violent conflict does not erupt in many instances despite propitious circumstances. However, the absence of fighting does not imply that there is no conflict or protest activity at all. Conflicts are by definition incompatibilities of interests, objectives, roles and/or opinions between different conflict parties (Krennerich 2002, 250). They do not automatically escalate, but can be waged in a non-violent manner (see, for example, contributions in Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Cunningham 2013; Lawrence and Chenoweth 2010; Sambanis and Zinn 2005; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). Non-violent resistance is “a technique of socio-political action for applying power in a conflict without the use of violence” (Sharp in Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 1). Hence, it does not equal passivity, a low-intensity conflict, or the absence of conflict. Instead, it constitutes a qualitatively different form of conflict and comprises other modes of protest, e.g. demonstrations, marches, strikes, etc. (see Lawrence 2010, 145; Lawrence and Chenoweth 2010, 3-4). Yet, civil war studies do not pay sufficient attention to non-violent instances or low-scale civil strife.<sup>4</sup> This is problematic because conflicts that are waged through peaceful means do not always remain non-violent, but risk transforming into violent struggles of various intensity. Likewise, low-scale conflicts can transform into full-blown civil wars. Consequently, different trajectories of disputes, their connections and the causes leading to different forms of violence and varying magnitude require close consideration, not least since

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<sup>4</sup> The common way of categorising armed conflicts by reference to battle-related deaths per year is often criticised, among others, for being too restrictive and arbitrary as well as neglecting the size of the territory and the concerned population. If a comparatively small area or group is affected, even apparently small numbers of victims can be important in relation to total numbers. For a detailed discussion of this aspect, see 2.1.1.

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their understanding is essential for conflict prevention. In this context, the example of conflicts about self-determination in Sub-Saharan Africa is illustrative. The academic literature frequently highlights that the total of separatist conflicts on the continent is surprisingly small, although there is a variety of structural conditions favouring secessionist aspirations, such as economic inequalities, availability of natural resources, weak and semi-democratic states, ethnic diversity and fragmentation, or arbitrary borders (see Englebert 2009; Englebert and Hummel 2005; Keller 2007). It is true that there are only two states, namely Eritrea and South Sudan that obtained independence in post-colonial Africa, with both countries having previously experienced long internal wars. The Biafrans in south-eastern Nigeria also fought for self-rule, but were unsuccessful. In comparison, in other world regions, such as Europe or Asia, the number of independent states that emerged after the end of World War II as a result of armed struggle was much higher. However, concentrating on high intensity conflicts about self-determination masks that there were and continue to be many smaller movements agitating for an own state in post-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, in Cabinda (Angola), Anjouan (the Comoros), Katanga and South Kasai (Democratic Republic of the Congo), Afar, Ogaden, and Oromia (Ethiopia), Mombasa (Kenya), the Tuaregs (Mali and Niger), Caprivi (Namibia), Biafra and Niger Delta (Nigeria), Casamance (Senegal), Puntland and Somaliland (Somalia), Abyei, Blue Nile, Darfur, and South Kordofan (Sudan), Zanzibar (Tanzania) and Barotseland (Zambia) (Bereketeab 2012; Englebert 2013; Forrest 2004; Hewitt and Cheetham 2000; Ridley 2014; Tull 2011).<sup>5</sup> Some of these groupings used armed force and triggered conflicts of various intensity and duration, while others voiced claims in a non-violent manner. Hence, the list of separatist conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa is much longer and more diversified than often assumed. It is dangerous to exclusively focus on violent instances, since such a restricted perspective risks concealing that there is much more simmering potential for violence on the continent.

### 1.1.2. *Bridging the Gap: Research Questions*

Conventional theories of civil wars are unable to explain the diverging conflict trajectories or elucidate why armed conflicts do not erupt in settings that appear prone to armed struggle due to their exclusive focus on the macro-level. However, there are numerous cases in which there is no civil war, although structural conditions as identified by economic, institutional, and identity-related theories of armed conflict give reason to expect collective violence. Therefore, this thesis seeks to explain the deviating outcomes in the cases of Casamance and Barotseland by predominantly concentrating on the following research question:

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<sup>5</sup> Regions seeking self-determination in North Africa are not included in the list due to the thesis' focus on Sub-Saharan Africa.

## 1. Introduction

*Why did the separatist conflict in Casamance escalate into violent conflict, while it remained non-violent in Barotseland although there are favourable structural conditions in both cases implying a comparable propensity for conflict onset and thus, a similar outcome?*<sup>6</sup>

Furthermore, conflict dynamics were peculiar in Casamance. Despite the initial escalation of violence and phases of intense fighting, the Casamance crisis did not turn into a full-blown civil war, but remained a low-intensity conflict. Hence, the analysis of the Casamançais case will pay special attention to the specific development of events by considering an additional inquiry, namely:

*Why did the armed conflict in Casamance remain so limited in scope after its initial escalation given the presence of structural factors that are usually expected to cause a full-blown civil war?*

These two research questions will serve as a red thread for the empirical investigations whose objective is twofold. Through analysing and comparing dynamics in the two cases, the thesis aims to identify and study the micro-mechanisms of conflict escalation. These 'missing links' will illuminate the puzzling divergence in conflict trajectories in Senegal and Zambia as well as the surprising dynamics in Casamance. Directly related to this, the study seeks to overcome deficits of existing theoretical approaches and refine them in order to improve their explanatory power with regard to the occurrence of armed conflict. Subsequently, it will be discussed how these ambitious targets will be achieved.

### 1.2. Theoretical and Methodological Proceeding

Due to the above-mentioned deficits of structurally orientated theories that are based on quantitative analyses, it is inevitable to adopt a new theoretical and methodological perspective to approach the research questions and elucidate conflict dynamics. Here, framing theory appears a useful tool as it already helped to overcome the overemphasis of structuralist explanations in social movement studies and is perfect to capture connections between different analytical levels. Methodologically, the present thesis will build on so-called micro-approaches to armed conflict and integrate qualitative methods that study a small number of cases in a very detailed way.

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<sup>6</sup> In an article published in 2005, Pierre Englebert compared Casamance and Barotseland and aimed to explain why the first experienced self-determination claims, while the second did not. There are important reasons to re-concentrate on the two cases in a more detailed manner. First, the research question is different, since this analysis focuses on the respective strategies to wage conflict, not the presence or absence of the latter. In this regard, Englebert's work is also outdated, since one can hardly deny calls for self-determination in Zambia's Western Province in recent years. Second, his results are questionable as he mainly explained the variations by reference to regional élites. However, not only did he fail to provide a clear definition of what he understood by 'élite', but his assessment of the role of the élites in the two regions did not correspond to realities (see also Foucher 2002a; 2011; Sichone and Simutanyi 1996).

## 1. Introduction

### 1.2.1. *A Very Short Introduction to Framing...*

The thesis will revert to the framing approach which was borrowed from social movement studies. These and theories of civil war seemingly focus on completely different occurrences of social life and largely existed independent of each other. But at a closer look, armed conflict and non-violent protest rather constitute a continuum than two opposed phenomena and therefore, should be studied in an integrated manner (see above). In addition, there are remarkable parallels in the development of the fields of study. Most importantly, both reached the limits of their explanatory potential at one point since they overemphasised structural determinants. As a reaction, scholars of social movements came up with framing in order to address the deficits. It aimed to overcome existing biases in the analysis through concentrating on the content of strategic communication of collective actors and analysing the influence of the rhetoric on their constituencies. Its main principles can be summarised as follows. Collective action frames (in the following: frames) are “schemata that [simplify] and [condense] the ‘world out there’” (Snow and Benford 1992, 137) and help to structure experience and behaviour. Social movements develop and disseminate collective action frames in strategic interactive communication processes (framing) to “inspire and legitimate [their] activities” (Benford and Snow 2000, 614) and “to [mobilise] potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to [demobilise] antagonists” (Snow and Benford 1988, 198). In order to successfully activate constituencies, frames must draw a coherent and convincing picture of the present challenge that is to be tackled and the way ahead. They also have to correspond to the broader cultural context the movements act in and match experiences and attitudes of the targeted group. As scholars put it, they have to successfully resonate with their constituency, that is, they must be credible and (relatively) salient in the eyes of potential followers and supporters of the movement (see 3.3.2.). Finally, the effectiveness of framing depends on whether and to what extent a movement’s framing is challenged by alternative interpretations or counterframes by competing social actors. If these criteria are fulfilled, framing has an enabling effect as it modifies people’s mind-sets in a way favourable to the activist group and its objectives which is the starting point for (different forms of) collective action.<sup>7</sup> With regard to this thesis, framing appears to be a promising tool for pinpointing and closely analysing micro-mechanisms and thus, examining armed conflicts from an alternative perspective. It serves to analyse in a comparative manner how groupings interpret structural factors in their sensitisation and mobilisation campaigns and translate them into specific group behaviour, i.e. violence or non-violence and whether their efforts succeed.

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<sup>7</sup> Collective action is more than the sum of individual acts. It is purposeful action taken by individuals in their capacity as members or supporters of the movements on the basis of shared beliefs or values (Smelser 1962, 8).

### 1.2.2. ...and How It Will Be Applied

This specific theoretical proceeding also requires adequate methodological choices. Small-N analyses have important strengths. Among others, they take into consideration dynamics and specificities at a sub-state level and focus on characteristics of conflict actors (see 4.1.3.). Consequently, qualitative research provides a more nuanced understanding of armed conflict. It contributes to overcoming the deficits of their quantitative equivalents and helps to explain prevailing puzzles, such as patterns, forms, and intensity of violence (Blatter and Haverland 2012; contributions in Collier and Sambanis 2005a and 2005b; Dixon 2009; Rohlfing 2012; Sambanis 2004a). Concretely, the thesis uses a comparative case study design. Based on relevant quantitative data (for example, statistics and figures referring to socio-economic, institutional, and ethno-religious components) and qualitative-historical records, Casamance (Senegal) and Barotseland (Zambia) were respectively chosen as a case of a violent separatist conflict and a non-violent struggle about self-determination. The case selection corresponds to John Stuart Mill's method of difference (Mill 1843; see also Blatter and Haverland 2012; George and Bennett 2005; Lijphart 1971; Przeworski and Teune 1970; Rohlfing 2009). Thus, both cases exhibit similar independent variables, that is, structural factors favouring conflict onset, but surprisingly vary with regard to the respective dependent variables, namely violent or non-violent collective action. As already underscored, structural conditions obviously cannot account for the divergent outcomes in such a setting, but an additional variable is at the origin of the deviation in results. This provides an ideal setting to apply the framing approach as a connecting piece. It is expected that there will be important differences in collective action frames and their resonance which constitute the key to the puzzle. In short, variances in framing which functions as an intervening variable will elucidate variations in conflict dynamics (Van Evera 1997, 11). At the within-case level, a systematic and theory-guided framing analysis will be carried out. To this end, a two-stage proceeding was developed. In a first step, collective action frames are identified. For this purpose, documents aiming at sensitising and mobilising followers will be examined according to principles of qualitative content analysis and with the help of a computer-assisted qualitative data analysis programme (MAXQDA). In a second step, frame resonance will be assessed and compared on the basis of qualitative and quantitative data collected during intensive field research.

All in all, the outlined theoretical and methodological proceeding will discern deviations in the content of the collective action frames, but also in their resonance. It will shed light on the different effects of framing on conflict dynamic and explain why conflict behaviour varied in the two cases. In concrete terms, it is expected that the analysis will demonstrate that framing had an enabling influence in Casamance and triggered violence in the first place. The limited intensity of the conflict is assumed to result from a loss of appeal and importance

of the movement's rhetoric. By contrast, framing most likely had an appeasing impact in Barotseland and helped to contain the existing potential for violence and avoid the use of force so far.

### **1.3. Beyond the Cases: Contributions to the Literature**

In addition to explaining the dynamics and (non-)escalation of armed conflict in the two selected cases and responding to the research questions formulated above, framing is a useful approach to enrich and refine theories of civil wars in other ways. More precisely, framing allows for identifying micro-mechanisms and establishing an analytical link between structural determinants and agency. In consequence, it explains how variables at the macro-level actually lead to violent conflict on the ground. Furthermore, the theoretical proceeding shifts the focus towards (violent) social movement actors and examines their influence regarding conflict onset. Consequently, armed conflict is not exclusively considered as a result of structural conditions, but is more strongly connected with human agency. Finally, the framing approach captures cultural, ideational, and emotional factors and assesses their relevance for mobilisation. Thus, it takes into consideration components that influence the escalation of violence but had generally been blanked out by quantitative civil war studies. In the following, these contributions will be explained in detail.

Framing introduces a micro-perspective into the analysis of armed conflict that helps to overcome existing shortcomings. As outlined above, the escalation of violence results from micro-mechanisms that link the macro- and the meso-level. Due to their static nature and exclusive focus on the macro-level, conventional civil war studies cannot uncover these connections between different levels of analysis as well as independent and dependent variables. By contrast, the framing approach has the potential to take a closer look at how structural conditions precisely lead to an outcome, namely violent conflict. In this regard, violent collective actors play a key role. They frame their environment and structural factors in a specific manner or even construct them altogether, in order to politicise given structures, legitimise armed struggle, and mobilise followers. By identifying and analysing collective action frames and assessing their resonance, framing is an ideal instrument to disaggregate the seemingly existing automatism between structures and action. Similar to an intervening variable, it yields insights into the persistent 'black box' that exists between background conditions and violent insurgencies on the one hand and non-violent protest on the other. Thus, it allows for an encompassing multi-level approach to the analysis of armed conflict and helps to deepen and refine existing knowledge regarding conflict onset.

Furthermore, framing contributes to shifting the focus of conflict studies in favour of human agency. As a result of the overemphasis of structural factors and underlying econometric

## 1. Introduction

reasoning, conventional theories of armed conflict are largely blind for the role that social movement actors play with regard to conflict onset or discard them as purely profit-oriented rational actors. Yet, the escalation of conflict does not inevitably result from circumstances or cost-benefit calculations, but is the product of deliberate and complex human decisions and agency. Framing focuses on the interactive processes in which collective action frames are created and their effects on the targeted groups. Therefore, the approach allows for closely looking at the (violent) movements, especially the internal structures and functioning of groupings and the impact of leading figures within and outside their ranks. In addition, it studies them in their environment. Thus, it examines interactions between movements and their constituencies and considers relations with organised antagonists, that is, so-called counterframing agents. In sum, the approach allows for an agency-centred analysis and systematically studies various aspects of collective actors and their role in the escalation process. It also takes into account societal dynamics and actor constellations which favour or contain collective violence.

Another asset of framing concerns its potential to concentrate on 'soft' aspects. Conventional theories of armed conflict struggle to capture the impact of ideational, cultural, and emotional determinants as they are difficult to operationalise and quantify. Analysts often treated them as 'window dressing' serving to hide the real interests of armed groups, such as profit-seeking or prematurely dismissed them as irrelevant to explain the outbreak of violence. Lately, civil war studies have begun to experience a 'cultural turn' with scholars increasingly highlighting the importance of diverse aspects such as ideology, symbolic politics, history, emotions, etc. for conflict onset and dynamics of violence (see, for example, Asal et al. 2013; Balcells and Kalyvas 2010; Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood 2014; Kaufman 2001; 2006; 2011; Petersen 2002; Thaler 2012; see also 3.3.1.). Framing, which was introduced into social movement studies due to similar deficits of dominating structural theories, continues this trend and helps to move beyond a purely rational macro-perspective. Through analysing movements' rhetoric and its effects, framing sheds light on the way how cultural and ideational aspects such as meanings, narratives, symbols, myths, collective memory, identities, as well as emotions are instrumentalised and influence the emergence of collective action. Hence, it underscores the significance of 'soft' factors with regard to conflict dynamics, helps to better understand their impact, and integrates its findings into causal explanations.

Overall, integrating framing into civil war research helps to overcome deficits of prevailing structural explanatory approaches and promises to considerably advance the field towards a more thorough understanding of escalation processes. It does so by taking into account relevant influencing determinants and their interactions that had so far been understudied.

### **1.4. Structure of the Dissertation**

To effectively meet its multiple targets, the dissertation will proceed as follows. To begin with, it will lay the theoretical groundwork. For this purpose, existing theoretical literature on civil wars will be reviewed. Notably, structural approaches that explain conflict escalation with regard to economic, institutional, and identity-based factors will be taken into account. Besides, existing micro-approaches will be summarised (2.). Afterwards, framing theory will be introduced. The theoretical chapter aims to integrate framing into civil war studies by revealing similarities and overlaps between the two theoretical approaches. Moreover, it will conceptualise the notions of frame, framing, and frame resonance and critically discuss the explanatory potential of framing. Finally, it will outline the contributions of framing concerning conflict analysis (3.). In the subsequent methodological chapter, the procedure of data collection and analysis will be outlined. In a first section, the methodological process at the cross-case level is at the centre of considerations. The case study method is theoretically reviewed and the precise design and principle of case selection will be outlined. Moreover, the application of a comparative case study with regard to the analysis of armed conflict will be justified. In a second section, the framing analysis that was carried out at the within-case level will be conceptualised. It will be described how frames were identified and how their resonance was assessed. In this context, attention will also be drawn to field research (4.). The subsequent chapters will concentrate on the empirical analysis of the selected cases, namely Casamance and Barotseland. Both cases will be introduced, that is, the history of the respective disputes will be summarised, the principal conflicting parties will be identified, and the conflicts will be analysed with the help of existing theories (5. and 7.). Afterwards, detailed framing analyses will follow, that is, frames and counterframes of relevant actors in both cases will be identified and their effect on the targeted population will be evaluated (6. and 8.). Finally, the findings of the cases will be systematically compared in order to answer the research questions. Empirical and theoretical conclusions will be drawn, with existing challenges also being reflected upon (9.).

## 2. Civil War Studies – Overview and Critical Discussion

After the end of the Cold War, statistics revealed a new, but permanent trend in the worldwide occurrence of conflicts: On the one hand, the number of inter-state wars dropped and reached zero for many years. On the other hand, more and more civil wars erupted. While their total number varied over the years, internal warfare became the prevalent type of violent conflict and largely outnumbered conventional wars between states.<sup>1</sup> Hence, the peace dividend that was expected as a result of the ending of the bipolar world order failed to appear. Scholars reacted to these tendencies by shifting attention to the emerging phenomenon of civil strife and coming up with explanations for their eruption. The present chapter will critically review the existing literature in order to provide an overview of debates and identify shortfalls and gaps of the dominant schools of thought. This helps to locate the present thesis in the academic field and carves out the theoretical void that it aims to fill. For this purpose, the concept of civil wars will be introduced and its relevance will be outlined first (2.1.). Second, different approaches to studying armed conflict will be discussed (2.2.). Third, deficits will be summarised and alternative approaches presented (2.3.).

### 2.1. Definition of Key Concepts and Relevance of Civil War Studies

#### 2.1.1. *Definition of Conflict and Violent Conflict*

Before theories of violent conflict are reviewed, it is necessary to clarify the concept of (armed) conflict. To begin with,

“social conflicts, in the most general sense, can be understood as real or seeming incompatibility of interests, objectives, roles and/or opinions of several conflict parties (individuals, groups, organisations, states, etc.) which are perceived by at least one of the parties in such a way, that it feels impaired regarding the realisation of its interests, objectives, roles and/or opinions” (Krennerich 2002, 250; own translation).<sup>2</sup>

To complete this definition, it is important to pay attention to three aspects that are highlighted in the social science literature more generally. First, conflicts can occur at different levels of society and between various types of (collective) actors, for example, between individuals within families, between state institutions or ethnic communities within a state, or at the systemic level between countries. In the context of this study, intra-state conflicts are of particular relevance and will be discussed in detail below. Second, although the term has a negative connotation in the common sense, a conflict is not necessarily destructive or disordering, but can have progressive or integrative effects. Third, conflicts are not per se linked with violence. The theory distinguishes between latent conflicts, i.e. underlying incompatibilities that are not openly fought over, and manifest ones which are

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<sup>1</sup> See 2.1.2. for detailed figures on the occurrence of civil wars.

<sup>2</sup> For a detailed discussion of definitions of conflict in social sciences, see Imbusch 2010.

apparent as they are openly articulated or waged by the involved conflicting parties. Yet, even a manifest conflict does not automatically turn violent, but can remain non-violent, as in the case of various separatist conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa (Bonacker 2008b, 12-13; Bonacker and Imbusch 2010, 67-71; Imbusch 2010; Schimmelfennig 1995, 27; see 3.1.1.).<sup>3</sup> After this general introduction to the concept of conflict, it is now important to have a closer look at (separatist) armed conflicts, whose analysis is at the core of this thesis. An armed conflict constitutes a particular form of political violence<sup>4</sup> and is defined as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state” (Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP) (2015)). The definition implies that armed conflicts are domestic and fought within an existing sovereign state (Kalyvas 2007, 416-417). Moreover, conflicting parties have to be locally based as well as “politically and militarily [organised]” (Sambanis 2004b, 829). Conflicts can be categorised with regard to their motive or key issue;<sup>5</sup> in relation to the present thesis, especially separatist conflicts are relevant (as opposed to conflicts over access to government). Separatist conflicts (or conflicts about self-determination) are conflicts about a clearly defined territory and population as well as authority over them. Territorial claims embrace a continuum ranging from demands for a greater degree of political or territorial autonomy within existing states on the one hand to full secession or irredentism and thus the modification of state borders on the other (Baker 2001; Forrest 2004, 1, 5; Hewitt and Cheetham 2000, xi; Horowitz 1981, 168-169; Toft and Saideman 2010, 41).<sup>6</sup>

Armed conflicts are classified according to their intensity that is measured by reference to the number of battle-related deaths per year. Minor or low-intensity conflicts result in 25 to 1,000

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<sup>3</sup> In the literature on armed conflict, one often reads about the surprisingly low number of territorial conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa (see, for example, Englebert 2009; Englebert and Hummel 2005; Jackson and Rosberg 1982). These statements overlook that many separatist conflicts on the continent have remained non-violent, e.g. in Zambia (Barotseland), Tanzania (Zanzibar), or Kenya (Mombasa) (see 1.1.1.). Thus, the way of waging disputes about self-determination is puzzling indeed, but not their apparent absence.

<sup>4</sup> Political violence is a specific form of instrumental violence, where force is used to obtain a political objective, e.g. access to power, separation, etc. Other forms of political violence are one-sided violence, riots, or genocide.

<sup>5</sup> Other characteristics are used to distinguish between different types of conflict, such as specific forms of violence (conventional ('old') or irregular ('new') warfare), the involved actors (e.g. international or domestic), or causes (ethnic vs. non-ethnic) (Kalyvas 2007, 426-430). While these differentiations matter for the analysis of the respective conflicts, their detailed discussion would exceed the scope of the chapter. Hence, this literature review will only refer to them if relevant.

<sup>6</sup> Some authors clearly distinguish between separatism consisting of “resistance by a political entity to ‘further incorporation [or] subordination within the larger political authority of which it is already a member’” (Lyon in Wood 1981, 110) and secession “referring to a demand for formal withdrawal from a central political authority by a member unit or units on the basis of a claim to independent sovereign status” (Wood 1981, 110). However, it appears more suitable to understand different claims as a continuum because motives are not necessarily clear and can change over time. Thus, in the present thesis, the terms secessionism, separatism, and self-determination are used interchangeably. All notions are used in a non-pejorative sense.

victims per annum, while full-blown civil wars cause a minimum of 1,000 battle-related deaths per calendar year (UCDP 2015; see also Sambanis 2004b; Sarkees and Schafer 2000). In this respect, a critical regard is imperative. Although it is obvious that some criteria are necessary to allow for systematisation and cross-case comparison, this differentiation is contestable for several reasons (see Bussman, Hasenclever, Schneider 2009b; Kalyvas 2007). First, although the threshold is used by the major datasets (namely, the UCDP and the Correlates of War (COW) project database), it is arbitrarily fixed and excludes cases from analyses despite differences in intensity only being marginal.<sup>7</sup> Interestingly, some protracted and well-known ‘civil wars’ such as in Northern Ireland do not actually qualify as civil wars since they have never reached the threshold. Second, the fixed limit artificially creates categories where there is, in fact, a continuum. Different forms of violence, including less intensive and fierce fighting can alternate which renders definite categorisation meaningless. Since low-intensity conflicts – and even non-violent conflicts – can escalate into full-blown civil wars, they should not be discarded too easily (Johnston 2015; Sambanis 2004b). Third, death tolls are more informative in proportion to the size of the community that the conflict affects than in absolute terms. For instance, territorially confined conflicts might cause a seemingly small number of victims, yet have devastating effects in relation to the equally limited local population. Hence, absolute figures tell little about the actual intensity of the conflict. Fourth, correctly calculating the number of battle-related deaths is a challenge in conflict contexts due to lack of reliable information and data. Moreover, conflicting parties can try to falsify the number of victims and instrumentalise the death toll to their advantage, for example, to discredit their adversary or attract attention from potential allies (Dixon 2009, 729-730; Gates and Strand 2004, 5-7; see also Ball 2005). Because of the difficulties linked with the quantitative definition of civil wars, it appears adequate to adopt a broadened conceptualisation and include low-intensity and non-violent conflicts into the analysis (see also 3.1.1.). This will help to earn a better understanding of dynamics leading towards intra-state wars.

### 2.1.2. *The Relevance of Civil War Studies*

In order to grasp the full extent of the phenomenon of intra-state conflict, it is useful to look at some figures and trends regarding their total number and characteristics, namely regional distribution, intensity, and duration. After the end of the Cold War, there was a remarkable shift in global patterns of conflict. The peace dividend that was hoped for as a result of the decline in bipolarity did not occur, but fighting broke out in many parts of the world, including Europe. After 1989, the overall number of armed conflicts increased until it reached a peak in

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<sup>7</sup> Although still being insufficient, the gradation by the UCDP that distinguishes between low-intensity conflicts and civil wars is better than binary categories only differentiating between the presence and absence of civil wars.

1991/1992 (52 conflicts per annum) and remained at a comparatively high level for several years.<sup>8</sup> In total, while there were 113 armed conflicts between 1946 and 1989 (43 years), 131 conflicts were counted in the following 20 years (1989-2009). Among these, almost a third (47) were of high intensity and classified as civil wars (Bussmann, Hasenclever, and Schneider 2009b, 12; Harbom and Wallensteen 2010, 501-502; Themnér and Wallensteen 2014, 541).<sup>9</sup> The prevalent type of conflict also changed since the fall of the Iron Curtain. Intra-state conflicts had already outnumbered the total count of inter-state conflicts during the Cold War. However, the proportion considerably changed after its end. The number of internal conflicts further increased, while conflicts between states became rare and were even absent in some years suggesting that internal warfare has almost entirely replaced fighting across borders (Eriksson and Wallensteen 2004; Harbom and Wallensteen 2007; 2010; UCDP 2015).<sup>10</sup> Regionally, conflicts have strongly concentrated in Africa and Asia. Since 1989, approximately one third to one half of all conflicts was fought on the African continent which implies that almost half of all African countries suffered from internal fighting. In 2013, three out of seven civil wars were waged in Sub-Saharan Africa, (namely, in Nigeria, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (Themnér and Wallensteen 2014; see also Goldsmith 2001, 128). Statistics also show that intra-state conflicts last longer than inter-state wars; in some cases, for instance former Sudan, fighting has continued for decades (see, for example, Fearon 2004; Jung 2005).

In addition, it is revealing to consider the consequences of armed conflict for concerned societies. The UCDP counted approximately 860,000 battle-related deaths (best estimate) for the period from 1989 to 2013, most of which resulted from internal warfare (Themnér and Wallensteen 2014, 543). According to estimates, two thirds of the direct victims in civil wars are civilians.<sup>11</sup> Yet, it is insufficient to only take into consideration deaths that occurred during the conflict as civil wars adversely affect the concerned population in many other respects: One has to add those that die of indirect effects of conflict, such as diseases resulting from poor hygienic and living conditions or insufficient health care. Inhabitants of conflict zones are injured or disabled as a result of the fighting. Women and to a lesser extent men become victim of various forms of gender-based and sexual violence and have to bear the

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<sup>8</sup> The number of conflicts considerably increased in the early 1990s. It started to drop in 1994, but reached another plateau, before declining again in the early 2000s (Eriksson and Wallensteen 2004; Harbom and Wallensteen 2010). At the time of writing, the total of civil wars is at a relatively low level. The UCDP (2015) counts 33 internal conflicts. Nine of them are internationalised, but none is fought between states (figures for 2013).

<sup>9</sup> The numbers slightly vary according to different sources. However, the proportions are similar.

<sup>10</sup> Tendencies in the development of internationalised armed conflict will not be discussed here.

<sup>11</sup> Occasionally, one reads that up to 90 per cent of the victims in civil wars are civilians. Yet, this figure is too high and the result of misinterpretations of the original source. Likewise, it is broadly claimed that today's conflicts more strongly affect civilians in comparison with conventional inter-state warfare. This does not hold true, either. Statistics apparently showing such a tendency are incomplete or wrongly interpreted (Goldstein 2012; Greenhill 2010). Hence, civil wars do not cause more victims than previous conflicts did. Yet, their negative effects are undisputed.

consequences, such as physical complaints, traumatisation, and stigmatisation. In 2011, the majority of the 10.5 million refugees that existed worldwide had to flee from armed conflict. In addition, the number of internally displaced people (IDPs) that lost their home for the same reason is estimated to amount to 27.5 million (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 2012, 6; see also Doyle and Sambanis 2006, 4; Goldsmith 2001, 128; Münkler 2002). Thus, conflicts cost or adversely affect the lives of millions of civilian victims both during and after fighting. To illustrate the dimensions, examples are revealing: The independence struggle of South Sudan against Khartoum accounted for over two million people killed and additional four million people became internally displaced. Independence of South Sudan only led to new fighting and victims. From 2003 to 2009, the conflict in Darfur caused approximately 450,000 deaths and a total of 2.3 million IDPs and refugees (Maitre 2009, 54). To use a different example, estimations suggest that between 215,000 and 257,000 girls and women might have become victim of sexual violence during the Sierra Leonean civil war (Human Rights Watch 2003, 25-26).

Finally, it is important to consider that neither do the destructive effects of civil wars suddenly stop with the end of the fighting, nor are they territorially confined to war zones. Even after a conflict has ended, humans, and again especially women and children, continue suffering from disabilities and physical or mental illnesses that are connected with conflict and eventually die of them. The risk of falling victim to diseases, such as malaria or tuberculosis increases in the aftermath of conflict (Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 2003). In addition, there are various other negative externalities that often interact and worsen living conditions for decades, such as the destruction of infrastructure (including for instance, poor healthcare, the collapse of the education system, and the destruction of the road system), economic decline, the decay of governance institutions, and the deterioration of social values. These repercussions persist long after the fighting has ended and impair development, well-being, and security in the conflict-ridden countries. Moreover, contiguous countries or entire sub-regions suffer from conflict-related difficulties, such as challenges related to trans-border migration (for example, provision of health care, conflicts about land and resource distribution) or the circulation of small arms and (ex-)combatants, as the examples of the conflict complexes in Central and East Africa exemplify (Bates 2007; Collier 1999; Doyle and Sambanis 2006, 3).

The figures presented here illustrate that major shifts in global conflict patterns have taken place since the end of the Cold War. Not only did the number of conflicts considerably increase, but the types of conflict also changed since internal conflicts largely superseded warfare between sovereign states. These tendencies turned out highly destructive for the local populations and the affected societies. Both the sheer numbers in internal conflicts as

well as their negative repercussions justified and necessitated increasing scholarly attention in order to shed light on civil wars and their eruption.

### 2.2. Review of Macro-Theories on Civil War

The existing literature on civil wars can be generally divided into three major theoretical approaches, namely economic, institutional, and identity-centred explanations that developed out of broader research traditions (see Bussmann, Hasenclever, and Schneider 2009b; Kalyvas 2007).<sup>12</sup> Political violence has for a long time been studied in relation to economic factors, such as poverty and inequality. Scholars of political economy and development economics shifted the focus of the approach by studying the role of profit-making and the relevance of economic opportunity structures regarding the outbreak and duration of armed conflict. In this context, the relevance of natural resources attracted particular attention. A second perspective, which was inspired by comparative politics, concentrated on institutional factors favouring conflict onset, namely the regime type, the quality of state institutions, and state (in)capacity. In addition, the impact of repression on the escalation of conflict was taken into account here. Third and finally, inspired by theories of International Relations (IR), scholars analysed the role of ethnicity with regard to civil war. This school of thought examined the effects of ethnic composition and demographics as well as the role of identities and their instrumentalisation in connection with political violence. The approaches aimed to identify underlying causes, which account for conflict onset and to shed light on the conditions under which civil wars are feasible. Methodologically, the literature on civil wars predominantly consisted of cross-national statistical analyses. As a response to deficits in these (macro-)theories of armed conflict, scholars increasingly came up with micro-theoretical approaches.<sup>13</sup> These analyses turned their attention to aspects that have so far been neglected, such as local influences and specificities of conflict actors. As a result, they helped to provide a more nuanced understanding of the occurrence of armed conflict as well

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<sup>12</sup> While some scholars differentiate between separatist conflicts and conflicts about access to government, others do not. Still others exclusively focus on separatist conflicts. In order to avoid redundancies, the literature review does not consider conflicts about self-determination separately, but will recurrently refer to them in the context of the general discussion of structural causes of conflict onset. This ensures that specificities regarding this type of conflict will be taken into consideration. However, important restrictions will be made. Some authors study separatist conflicts from an International Relations perspective and analyse how international law and norms as well as their implementation impact the emergence (or absence) of self-determination claims and recognition of new entities (see, for example, Coggins 2014; Englebert 2009; 2013; Englebert and Hummel 2005; Jackson and Rosberg 1982). While these works contribute to the general understanding of the phenomenon of separatism, they do not elucidate their escalation and therefore, are not discussed here. Other scholars offered encompassing theoretical explanations of separatist conflicts (see Hechter 1992; Wood 1981). Yet, these lack empirical verification and will not be considered, either.

<sup>13</sup> Conventional theories fail, for example, to explain local patterns in the occurrence, the absence of conflict despite factors enabling it, or variations in the intensity of conflict. These shortfalls will be discussed in detail later in the chapter (see 2.3.2.).

as patterns and intensity of violence. In the following, the major theoretical perspectives on civil war onset will be presented and criticised; in addition, contributions of micro-approaches will be summarised briefly.

### 2.2.1. *Grievances versus Greed: Economic Approaches to Civil Wars*

Economic explanations for civil wars have for a long time been at the centre of academic analysis. They can be divided into grievance-based and greed-related explanations. Scholars of the first school of thought study how various forms of inequality impact civil war onset and also considered the role of socio-political motives, for example, justice-seeking.<sup>14</sup> Supporters of the second one focus on opportunities for civil war, consider profit orientation as a primary reason for conflict, and concentrate on the relevance of resources. Subsequently, the different perspectives and their respective developments will be presented in detail.

#### a) Grievances: Do Injustices Cause Armed Conflict?

The question if and how grievances that result from inequality or unfulfilled expectations lead to violent conflict has preoccupied thinkers for millennia.<sup>15</sup> While the inequality-conflict nexus appears logical in the common sense, it triggered a vast body of literature and considerable debates. Early quantitative analyses found evidence for the relation of frustration or inequality on the one hand and political instability on the other, but also left many questions unanswered, namely with regard to exceptional cases (Feierabend and Feierabend 1966; Russett 1964).<sup>16</sup> Hence, they could not empirically prove and account for what appeared plausible. Ted Gurr provided important socio-psychological insights into the functioning of inequality by introducing the concept of relative deprivation as an explanation for conflict onset. Relative deprivation is defined as

“actors' perceptions of discrepancy between their value expectations (the goods and conditions of the life to which they believe they are justifiably entitled) and their value capabilities (the amounts of those goods and conditions that they think they are able to get and keep)” (Gurr 1968a, 1104; 1968b, 252-253; 1970, 12-13; see also 3.1.2.).

Consequently, individuals perceive a gap between the goods and conditions they consider themselves justifiably entitled to and those goods and conditions that are effectively at their disposal. This gap was assumed to represent a necessary condition for collective violence.

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<sup>14</sup> Per definition, grievances are not exclusively economic, but can include political and social aspects, such as various forms of discrimination, exclusion, and repression. Often, grievances in different dimensions intersect as the example of horizontal inequalities shows.

<sup>15</sup> Davies 1997 presents an overview of reflections by authors ranging from Aristotle, through to Alexis de Tocqueville, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, but also includes more recent contributions, e.g. by Georg Simmel, Ted Gurr, or Mancur Olson.

<sup>16</sup> The studies build on psychological research which came up with – later highly contested – hypotheses that frustration provokes aggressive behaviour (see, for example, Dollard et al. 1997a; 1997b; 1997c).

According to the argumentation, it triggered frustration and aggression which would ultimately lead to collective violence (Gurr 1868a; 1968b; 1970; see also Davies 1962; Eckstein 1980).<sup>17</sup> In sum, Gurr moved beyond prevailing assumptions that frustration per se would lead to violence, but attributed its eruption to a specified psychological process that focused on individual perceptions.<sup>18</sup> While Gurr's argument was theoretically well elaborated and logically convincing, empirical evidence for the proposed causal mechanism was scarce. A major weakness consists in the fact that inequality and frustration are much more prevalent in societies than violent conflict which is why they could not sufficiently elucidate its outbreak (Kalyvas 2007).<sup>19</sup> As a consequence, scholars questioned the relevance of relative deprivation in favour of more structural explanations for internal warfare, for instance, the theory of contentious politics (see 3.1.2.).<sup>20</sup> Nevertheless, studies concerning the impact of inequality on conflict onset remained on the research agenda, but came to different and often contradictory results (see literature review in Bartusevičius 2014, 36). With Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2004) as well as James Fearon and David Laitin (2003), two major studies on civil wars completely rejected the relevance of grievances for the occurrence of violence and supported greed as only valid economic explanation instead (see also Hegre, Gissinger, and Gleditsch 2003).

Despite this categorical dismissal of socio-economic inequality as an explanation for conflict onset, grievance-related research ultimately took root in civil war studies. An important contribution was made by Frances Stewart who highlighted the need to look at group instead of individual inequality, since civil wars are a form of collective violence, and study it in interaction with group identity. Hence, she introduced the concept of horizontal inequalities that are "severe and consistent economic, social, and political differences between culturally defined groups" (Stewart 2008b, 12). According to her, inequalities in the economic, political, and social domain have a particularly strong impact on violence, if they parallel other

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<sup>17</sup> Davies (1962) underscores that revolutions result from a period during which living-conditions improve and hopes and expectations rise that is followed by a backlash reversing this tendency and provoking frustration and ultimately violence (see also Tocqueville 1959 [1856]).

<sup>18</sup> Especially in his early works, Gurr focused strongly on the micro-level. This constitutes an important difference to other conceptualisations of inequality in relation to civil wars, for example, Stewart's horizontal inequalities that are based on a group-based comparison with others within a society (compare Regan and Norton 2005, 320-321). Over time, he increasingly shifted his attention towards structural factors causing deprivation and fuelling the escalation process, as he created a model combining psychological and societal variables (Gurr 1970; 2000; see also Zimmermann 1980).

<sup>19</sup> In addition, seemingly non-aggrieved can also take up arms and rebel as a result of more abstract grievances that are difficult to capture (White 1992). This suggests that both the concept of grievances, its interaction with other variables, as well as its relation to conflict is highly complex.

<sup>20</sup> It is fair to say that Gurr's work should not be considered as wrong. Yet, it was too underdeveloped to account for mobilisation and violent behaviour. Political structures and normative or utilitarian considerations, for instance, only played a marginal role in Gurr's approach, although they interact with perceptions of deprivation and impact collective action (Schock 1996). Recent works demonstrate the value of the concept when it is specified and combined with other social theories (see Dudley and Miller 1998; Pettigrew 2002; and other contributions in Walker and Smith 2002).

prevailing cultural cleavages, such as ethnic, religious, or racial lines.<sup>21</sup> In such a setting, political leaders can easily instrumentalise both identity components as well as socio-economic exploitation of the group in order to mobilise the identity group for political – and potentially violent – protest and overcome collective action problems (Stewart 2002; 2008b; Stewart, Brown, and Cobham 2009). The interaction of these factors can, for example, be observed with regard to the outbreak of the rebellion in northern Ivory Coast in 2002 (Langer 2005). While the concept of horizontal inequalities theoretically clarified the relation between inequality and armed conflict, the findings could initially not be generalised because they were derived from qualitative case-based evidence. Yet, comprehensive quantitative studies verified the interplay of horizontal inequalities (and social inequalities in particular) and identities and successfully substantiated that horizontal inequalities were positively correlated with civil war onset (Besançon 2005; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch, 2011; Østby 2008a; 2008b; 2011; Østby, Nordås, and Rød 2009; Regan and Norton 2005; Sambanis 2004a).<sup>22</sup> Furthermore, Henrikas Bartusevičius (2013; 2014) demonstrated that the relevance of inequality for conflict onset is even bigger than previously assumed, as he proved that vertical inequalities also impact the outbreak of non-ethnic rebellions.<sup>23</sup> His findings suggest that both inequality in income and education at the societal level are positively related with conflict onset and that the distribution of income is more important than the absolute income.

Overall, despite having been identified early as causes for armed conflict, the relevance of grievances for conflict onset was difficult to confirm. Hence, their role remained contested and was even prematurely rejected by some scholars. Recently, both qualitative and quantitative studies adopted a differentiated understanding of the inequality-conflict nexus by disaggregating the independent and dependent variables, analysing different types of inequality (e.g. economic, social, political), reconsidering their measurements, and examining their interaction with other factors, such as ethnic identity. The analyses concluded that grievances increase the risk of armed conflict in effect. These findings were broadened, when the causal impact of vertical inequalities on non-ethnic conflicts was successfully verified which strengthened the relevance of grievance-based explanations in accounting for the occurrence of violence.

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<sup>21</sup> Both objective inequality as well as subjectively perceived inequalities matter.

<sup>22</sup> Interactions of inequality and ethnically distinct groups also exist with regard to separatist conflicts (Sambanis and Milanovic 2011).

<sup>23</sup> In contrast to horizontal inequalities, vertical inequality looks at “the distribution of certain goods in the *total* population” (Bartusevičius 2014, 38; emphasis in the original), that is, inequalities between households or individuals (Stewart, Brown, and Cobham 2009, 3).

### b) Greed: The Role of Profit and Opportunities

During the Cold War, civil wars were largely understood as proxy wars that were externally orchestrated and financed. Since the end of the bipolarity did not lead to an immediate decrease of these conflicts, scholars scrutinised how non-state armed groups could sustain themselves and create income in the absence of foreign support. This led to a second economic explanation that focuses on the role of 'greed', i.e. cost-benefit calculations and profit-making in relation to civil war onset.

Early works identified the importance of economic dimensions, but also stressed their interaction with other factors (Jean and Rufin 1999b). But theoretical explanations increasingly moved towards an exclusively economic interpretation of armed conflict. Georg Elwert introduced the term 'markets of violence' in order to describe conflicts in which the "economic motive of material profit" (Elwert 1997, 88; own translation) dominates over power-related or ideological considerations. According to his theoretical reflections, rational economic behaviour that aims at profiteering is at the origin of markets of violence that become prevalent over time as they supersede conventional forms of income-creation. Their emergence is favoured by the absence of a monopoly of violence and the presence of easily transportable and concealable goods. Ideology, identity, or emotions merely serve to cover the actual objectives of war-making and to stabilise the markets of violence (Elwert 1997; see also Eppler 2002; Jung 2005).

Collier and Hoeffler (1998; 2002; 2004; Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009) advanced the macro-economic interpretation of conflicts further and doubtlessly became both the most prominent and most radical representatives of the greed-thesis as they pointed to the 'resource curse', that is, the negative effect of natural resources.<sup>24</sup> They identified a combination of variables as triggers of fighting and interpreted them by reference to cost-benefit calculations. In their model, primary commodity exports are central as they allow for the financing of fighting and potentially, enrichment. Other important determinants that increase the likelihood of conflict onset are low levels of per capita income which point to low foregone earnings, a low economic growth rate, and poor levels of male secondary enrolment. These factors are considered to reduce the cost of rebellion and participation in it. Their findings had a double effect. First, they provoked a strong focus on the impact of natural resources on the occurrence of violence and thus, pushed to the fore the notion of 'resource wars'. Second, they backed the hypothesis that civil war onset predominantly depends on the opportunity (or feasibility) to rebel. Alternative explanations such as ethnic diversity or grievances turned out to be statistically insignificant and therefore, were discarded as relevant explanations of civil wars, as the following categorical, but illustrative

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<sup>24</sup> The notion of (natural) resources is broad and diverse. While some authors concentrate on specific resources, such as oil, others also include legal and illegal agricultural goods or humanitarian aid (Ross 2003; 2004).

statement shows: “[T]he rising trend of African conflict is not due to deep problems in its social structure, [...] but rather is the contingent effect of economic circumstances” (Collier and Hoeffler 2002, 25). In this context, it is notable that most scholars study the relevance of resources with regard to the choices of oppositional non-state armed groups, but neglect their importance for other stakeholders (Guáqueta 2003; Marut 2010). Yet, resources and their exploitation also financially benefit to paramilitaries or the government. Thus, Robert Bates (2007; 2008) focused on both the state and non-state actors and their interaction by reference to game theory. His findings suggest that a government’s calculation of present and future costs and benefits impacts its decision to protect its citizens and maintain political order or to abandon it, that is, use violence and cause political disorder. This underscores that the state is not merely a victim of attacks, but can also be responsible for the occurrence of violence (see also next paragraph).

Economic factors were also found to have a determining influence on separatist conflicts. Relatively richer regions, whose regional gross domestic product (GDP) is above the national average and that enjoy resource abundance are also more likely to demand greater sovereignty. This can be explained by reference to either their economic capabilities that allow them to provide public and political power within the polity, or the fact that they profit to a lesser extent from the ‘national cake’, i.e. redistribution, and are less interested in maintaining links with the centre (Hale 2000; Horowitz 1981; Ross 2003; Sambanis and Milanovic 2011; Zarkovic Bookman 1992). Yet, cost-benefit calculations are not only central for entities seeking greater autonomy, but also the government’s position. Its reaction depends on the ‘strategic value’ including future costs and values of a separatist territory.<sup>25</sup> The greater the value for the government, the less likely it is to accommodate the demands; in view of the irreconcilable positions, the occurrence of violence is highly probable (Walter 2009).<sup>26</sup>

Finally, the impact of economic factors on civil wars was also taken up in theories of so-called ‘New Wars’, which were discussed both in Anglo-American and German political science. They highlight the commercialisation, privatisation, informalisation, and internationalisation of contemporary warfare. Other than previous wars, these New Wars are fought against the background of disintegrating states which they further undermine. Loose networks of state and non-state actors play a greater role than established institutions, such as state armies. Conventional warfare, i.e. open battles between the involved actors become to a large extent substituted by violence against the civilian population. Criminal activities

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<sup>25</sup> The territorial value does not exclusively depend on resources or economic components. A territory can also have strategic value as it ensures direct access to the coast or is of geo-political importance as it strengthens a government’s position vis-à-vis its neighbouring countries.

<sup>26</sup> Walter (2009) developed an agency-centred model that aims to explain the escalation of separatist conflict by looking at the positions of the conflicting parties. In addition to strategic value, the final strategy of governments also depends on the total number of ethnic groups within the state, the degree of concentration of the ethnic group, and the leader in power.

such as looting, pillaging, illicit trading, etc. maintain the involved actors and turn into an end in itself that replaces ideology or political objectives as causes of conflict. Differences between combatants and civilians, warfare and conventional economic activities, and war and post-war periods become largely blurred (Kaldor 1999; 2005; Münkler 2002).<sup>27</sup> The concept of New Wars does not aim to directly account for the eruption of civil wars. It rather describes and analyses their characteristics and historicises them in a strongly normative manner. Various scholars dispute if contemporary conflicts are really as new as supporters of the theory claim (see, for example, Brzoska 2004; Kalyvas 2001; Melander, Öberg, and Hall 2009; see also Waldmann 1997). Yet, it is imperative to mention the New Wars-approach here as it illustrates to what extent the focus on economic dynamics influences the academic perspective and the way of approaching armed conflicts.

The strong emphasis of economic aspects did not remain unquestioned. In reaction to the findings of Collier and Hoeffler, researchers focused on the impact of natural resources on conflict onset by carrying out additional qualitative or quantitative analyses. These studies suggested that relations between resources and conflict are less obvious and straightforward than suggested by the Collier-Hoeffler model, as Ballentine and Sherman clearly state: “While there is growing agreement *that* economic factors matter to conflict dynamics, there is little consensus as to *how* they matter, *how much* they matter, or *in what ways*” (2003b, 4-5; emphasis added).<sup>28</sup> Various studies try to elucidate these questions. According to Ross (2006), oil and diamonds facilitate rebellion as they favour the emergence of non-state armed groups in regions with abundant resources and due to some form of trade shocks. By contrast, Fearon (2005; Fearon and Laitin 2003) identified a completely different mechanism and argued that oil exportation has repercussions on a country’s state institutions. Due to high revenues from resources, states have little incentive to develop strong administrative structures; thus, state capacity and control remain relatively weaker in comparison to countries that have a similar per capita income, which is not based on oil extraction. This suggests that civil war is not triggered by financial gains for rebel movements, but by institutional weakness which provides opportunities for rebellion (see also 2.2.3.).<sup>29</sup> Humphreys (2005) described six different mechanisms connecting resources with conflict, each with several varieties. The different causal chains are connected to greed, grievances,

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<sup>27</sup> The idea of New Wars bears some resemblances with other theoretical notions, namely the ‘markets of violence’ (Eppler 2002). The role of networks with regard to African politics had also been previously discussed (Bayart 1993).

<sup>28</sup> The Collier-Hoeffler model faces criticism for various reasons. The application of the model to the Senegalese case showed that its assumptions do not correspond to dynamics on the ground (Humphreys and Mohamed 2005). Moreover, there is also methodological criticism of the results as they strongly depend on the design of the model and are difficult to replicate (Fearon 2005). Other reproaches concerned the selection of proxy variables (namely, primary commodity exports), measurement errors, and spuriousness (see Kalyvas 2007, 421)

<sup>29</sup> Yet, Fearon also admits that the state represents an attractive target because of the oil revenues. Hence, he partly accepts the greed argumentation.

and external greed, or focus on the impact of resources on the feasibility of rebellion, state institutions, and networks. Although the article cannot sufficiently test all hypothetical causal mechanisms, it provides evidence for their validity. More importantly, it underscores that much greater differentiation is imperative to understand the effects of resources (see also Koubi et al. 2014). It also proved useful to take a closer look at specific characteristics of resources. Scholars argue that the lootability and obstructability of resources,<sup>30</sup> their location, and concentration have varying effects on different types of armed conflict (e.g. about government or separatist conflicts). Lootable resources are less likely to create grievances among the local population, as people can profit from their exploitation. In the case of conflict, rebel groups can easily benefit from them. In addition, lootable resources, especially drugs and diamonds are particularly likely to lead to non-separatist conflicts and tend to prolong fighting since they create disciplinary problems among the group that is in control of them. The opposite holds true for non-lootable resources. They provoke grievances as exploitation is not beneficial to the region. Even in conflict contexts, governments continue to profit from them due to the challenging extraction. Finally, unlootable resources have a great risk to cause and extend separatist conflicts (Ross 2003). Moreover, the impact of resources depends on whether they are strongly concentrated or dispersed and whether they are located close to a country's centre or in peripheral zones (Le Billon 2001; see also Lujala 2010).<sup>31</sup> In sum, this summary of effects shows that while it is consensus that resources are relevant for the escalation of civil wars and improvements were made in explaining causal relations, the findings regarding their precise mode of action remain inconclusive, underspecified, and often contradictory (Koubi et al. 2014; Ross 2004; 2006). Several papers underscored that it is fruitful to disaggregate the effects of different types of resources; yet, further critical research is still needed to fully understand the 'resource curse'.

While these works demonstrated the need to have a closer look at how natural resources are linked with conflict onset because the assumptions by Collier and Hoeffler were unspecific (if not incorrect), other authors more generally warned of overemphasising the relevance of economic explanations. In their edited volume, Ballentine and Sherman (2003a) compiled qualitative case studies that specifically analysed the role of economic factors regarding conflict onset, duration, and character by reference to civil strife in various regions. The contributions revealed that economic factors were neither the only, nor the most important factors for the eruption of armed conflicts in the given examples, but complex interactions

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<sup>30</sup> Resources are lootable if they "can be easily appropriated and transported by individuals or small groups of unskilled workers" (Ross 2003, 47). This applies, for example, to drugs or gemstones. By contrast, the extraction of non-lootable resources, such as oil, requires considerable technical know-how and investment. Their obstructability depends on whether their transportation can be impeded by rebel groups (Ibid., 54).

<sup>31</sup> It should also be taken into account if and how the impact of resources varies regarding different types of conflict actors.

were at their origin.<sup>32</sup> Even in countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Colombia, where civil wars are broadly qualified as ‘resource wars’, historical, political, institutional, and economic causes interacted (Guáqueta 2003). While this should not lead to the inference that economic factors – whether as incentives or opportunities – are irrelevant, it cautions against drawing premature and erroneous conclusions regarding triggers of violence and highlights the multi-dimensional, evolving, and complex character of conflict dynamics (Ballentine 2003; Ballentine and Nitzschke 2006; Ballentine and Sherman 2003b; Guáqueta 2003; Humphreys and Mohamed 2005).<sup>33</sup>

Economic aspects ranging from looting through resource extraction and narco-trafficking to the instrumentalisation of humanitarian aid influence the eruption of civil wars in various ways that have to be thoroughly understood. Hence, the ‘greed’-theory has its merits: First, it underscores that neither is violence purely emotional, irrational, and contingent nor does it result from clashes of clans or ethnic groups, but it contains instrumentally rational cost-benefit calculations. Second, it argues that conflict does not only depend on motives, but the feasibility of rebellion is an equally important determinant. Third, by disclosing interrelations between war economies and global markets, it highlighted that civil wars are much more internationalised than often assumed (see, for example, Nordstrom 1999). However, these contributions should not overcast the weaknesses of the greed-explanations (see Ballentine 2003; Ballentine and Nitzschke 2006; Ballentine and Sherman 2003b; Bussmann, Hasenclever, and Schneider 2009b; Guáqueta 2003; Humphreys and Mohamed 2005; Jung 2005; Kalyvas 2007). A major problem of greed-related explanations is their exclusive focus on and overemphasis of economic aspects. As a consequence, armed groups are tantamount to *homines oeconomici* whose decision to engage in fighting depends only on cost-benefit and opportunity cost calculations, while other dimensions, such as political motives are neglected or merely considered as covering the actual economic intentions. Ultimately, civil wars become depoliticised and synonymous to organised crime.<sup>34</sup> Moreover, the assumptions of economic reasoning neglect and distort much of the complexity of social reality. Interactions with other variables, such as state structures, identity, etc. are not taken into consideration. Hence, they are not very realistic and conceal more than they explain. Besides, different and competing causal mechanisms can account for the outbreak of violence and it is still more assumed than empirically proven, how resources precisely lead to

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<sup>32</sup> Like the above-mentioned quantitative studies, the case-based analyses also yielded insights into the functioning of economic variables in different phases of conflict. Although the findings cannot be generalised, they enriched knowledge with regard to causal mechanisms connecting independent and dependent variables (Ballentine 2003; Ballentine and Nitzschke 2006; Ballentine and Sherman 2003b; Guáqueta 2003).

<sup>33</sup> Their results remind of earlier works cautioning of the overemphasis of economic explanations (see, for example, contributions in Jean and Rufin 1999a; 1999b; Waldmann 1997).

<sup>34</sup> This does not imply that civil war is more legitimate if it is fought for political reasons, instead of political ones. However, if one wants to solve or prevent armed conflict, it is imperative to consider all dimensions of conflict in an integrated manner.

violence. Finally, there is a problem of endogeneity and spuriousness: The specific economic structures that allegedly cause rebellions can in fact be provoked or enhanced by armed conflicts (Fearon 2005; Guáqueta 2003; Humphreys 2005; Humphreys and Mohamed 2005; Kalyvas 2007).<sup>35</sup>

Studying economic aspects of civil war onset turned out to be important: On the one hand, thanks to continuous efforts to understand the role of inequalities, researchers could ultimately prove that ‘grievances’ effectively mattered. On the other hand, the ‘greed’-explanation drew attention to a previously neglected dimension of civil war that doubtlessly plays an important role in the escalation process: the financing of rebellions and the relevance of opportunities as well as the risk of profit-orientation. The two schools of thought are often presented as theoretically opposed and mutually exclusive of one another, which is partly due to the confrontational academic discourse between their respective supporters. In reality, they are not contradictory, but constitute two sides of the same coin that win or lose importance over the course of the conflict. Various variables that were found to be significant in the Collier-Hoeffler model and apparently prove the importance of greed, such as low school enrolment or low GDP per capita can also be interpreted as indicators of grievances. Moreover, priorities of rebel movements change over time, without entirely replacing each other. This means that economic interest can gain importance, with political motives also remaining key. Hence, it is imperative to take into consideration both the supply and the demand side of armed conflict, i.e. to simultaneously look at reasons for rebellion and opportunities to fight and to focus on varying time horizons of conflict factors, i.e. differentiate between long-term and short-term causes of conflict as well as their modification (Ballentine 2003; Ballentine and Sherman 2003b; Boix 2008; Murshed and Tadjoeeddin 2009; Regan and Norton 2005; Schock 1996). This is an important prerequisite to obtaining a more thorough understanding of violent conflicts and ultimately, resolving them.

### 2.2.2. *On State Weakness, Regimes, and Repression: Institutional Explanations of Civil War Onset*

Since civil wars break out within existing states, it is natural to consider characteristics of the state in order to explain the occurrence of violence. In this context, three dimensions are particularly important; first, the institutional capacity of states, second, the regime type, and third, state behaviour during the escalation process, i.e. repression and its effects on conflict dynamics.

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<sup>35</sup> Methodological deficits of large-N studies will be discussed in depth in 2.3.1.

### a) Institutional Capacity

The relevance of institutional explanations for conflict onset became the focus of attention in the early 2000s. After the terror attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001, both academics and policy-makers became interested in fragile states, their implications for national and international security, and state-building as a remedy (see, for example, Lambach 2015; Schneckener 2007; Spanger 2007). In the following, the influence of state weakness on civil war onset will be discussed more profoundly.<sup>36</sup> According to various definitions, fragile states lack the authority and/or capacity to fulfil state functions, which include among others the provision of security against internal and external threats, political functions (for example, functional state institutions, political participation, and effective governance), and basic services (for example, healthcare and infrastructure).<sup>37</sup> Moreover, fragile statehood often comes along with insufficient checks and balances as well as bad governance which is why the governments of such states lack legitimacy (see, for example, Di John 2008; Ghani and Lockhart 2008; Hobbes 2005; Rotberg 2003b; Schneckener 2011; Stewart and Brown 2009; Stütz 2008). These deficiencies facilitate violence in multiple ways. First, numerous socio-economic and political grievances, and thus reasons for rebellion risk emerging from discrimination and exclusion of groups, unequal distribution of public funds, or poor service delivery. Second, the absence of a state monopoly of violence, limited capacity of the army, and a lack of efficient territorial control especially over peripheral areas favour the emergence of armed movements and thus, both the feasibility of civil war as well as prospects of success (Braithwaite 2010; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Fjelde and de Soysa 2009; Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010; Herbst 2000; Kalyvas 2007; Sobek 2010).<sup>38</sup>

However, the influence of state weakness on the eruption of civil war is less conclusive than often assumed. A first difficulty concerns the operationalisation of institutional capacity (see Hendrix 2010 for a critical discussion of various ways to measure state capacity). While Fearon and Laitin take a state's revenue collection as an indicator, their findings cannot be replicated once state weakness is measured differently (Bussmann 2009). Yet, the phenomenon of state fragility is multidimensional and combines various social, military, economic, and political dynamics. Hence, it is difficult to quantify it and identify the triggers

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<sup>36</sup> Scholars also speak about weak, failing, failed, phantom, quasi, or collapsed states. The definitions slightly vary as they focus on different aspects of state failure or imply various degrees of institutional weakness, but they all refer to a similar phenomenon (see Spanger 2007). Since they are normative and have a negative connotation, Böge et al. (2009) prefer talking about "hybrid political orders".

<sup>37</sup> This understanding of state functions is minimal, but appears adequate since theoretical reflections on the state are largely inspired by western states and are often too demanding for developing countries, where most armed conflicts occur. For more detailed discussions of state functions, see Benz 2008; Ghani and Lockhart 2008; Rüb 2007; Schneckener 2007; Stütz 2008; Weber 2009.

<sup>38</sup> Limited accessibility of areas, for example due to specific geographic features, such as mountains, forests, or proximity to international borders, are assumed to increase the effect. Yet, it is imperative to verify if civil war breaks out in these zones. Moreover, the relation between wooded and mountainous territory on one side and civil war on the other is less clear than often assumed due to poor data (Buhaug and Gates 2002; Kalyvas 2007, 422).

that lead to violence. Second, one notes that especially with regard to Sub-Saharan Africa, the incidence of weak or fragile states is much higher than the occurrence of civil wars. Therefore, weak institutions do not automatically lead to violence. Third, not only is armed conflict a result of state weakness, but civil strife simultaneously undermines institutions. Consequently, it is difficult to clearly differentiate between independent and dependent variables and identify precise causal mechanisms (Bussmann 2009; Kalyvas 2007; Thies 2010).

### b) Regime Type

In addition to state capacity, regime types were analysed in relation to civil war onset. It seems intuitive that democracies are less likely to experience armed conflict in comparison to autocratic regimes. Various mechanisms could explain this tendency. First, strong grievances as a result of socio-economic or political exclusion are less likely to occur in democratic states. Second, opportunity costs for waging wars are expected to be higher. Third, internalised democratic norms as well as non-violent practices of conflict resolution serve to avoid collective violence according to theories of democratic peace. However, empirical data does not back this assumption and analyses showed that the relation between regime type and civil war onset is best described by an inverted U-shaped curve: Democracies and autocracies are equally likely to experience civil wars, while so-called 'anocracies' or semi-democracies, i.e. mixed systems combining democratic and autocratic elements, face a considerably higher risk of internal conflict (Dudley and Miller 1998; Ellingsen 2000; Gleditsch, Hegre, and Strand 2009; Gurr 2000; Hegre et al. 2001). Yet, it would be misleading to deduce from this that autocracies are as peaceful as democracies. Different mechanisms are at play and the nuances of the correlation of regime type and conflict onset require attention. On the one hand, autocratic states do not provide a political arena to voice oppositional claims in a legitimate way. Besides, they are more inclined to use repression to crush emerging rebel movements instead of solving disputes constructively. Due to the diverse effects of repression, this can eventually enhance conflict (see below). Moreover, autocracies are more likely to undergo regime change which is also a factor increasing the likelihood of civil (Gates et al. 2006). On the other hand, democracies allow for social conflict which can be waged non-violently or violently (Ellingsen 2000; Walter 2009).<sup>39</sup> Yet, the positive impact of democracies in avoiding conflict escalation should not be overlooked. Hegre (2003) found that there is an interaction of development and democracy: Median or high levels of development lower conflict propensity in democratic regimes, and vice versa (for similar findings at a sub-regional level, see Raleigh 2007). Thus, democracy

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<sup>39</sup> Interestingly, there is a correlation between the degree of democracy and non-violence: Ethnic groups are more likely to choose non-violent means, the more democratic a country is. However, violence is as likely to occur in democracies as in non-democracies (Walter 2009, 130-131).

has an appeasing effect in connection with other factors. Reynal-Querol (2002; 2005) adopted a different approach that led to comparable findings. Instead of concentrating on the overarching style of government, she examined the role of political systems for the incidence of armed conflict. Her analyses established that the degree of inclusiveness and representation of a system increases or lowers conflict propensity, with a higher level of inclusiveness and representation decreasing the risk of violence. As a consequence, majoritarian and presidential regimes are more likely to experience civil war due to their lower inclusiveness in comparison to consensus-oriented systems with proportional representation. According to the author, opportunity costs for rebellion and penalties aiming to avoid armed conflict vary across the different system types. In addition, one can assume that grievances are less likely to occur and remain less intense in proportional systems because the allocation of political and economic resources is more even and equitable than in exclusive systems. These results contribute to better understand how democratic governance influences conflict onset (see also Carey 2007).<sup>40</sup>

An additional aspect of political regimes that deserves attention especially with regard to separatist conflicts is their territorial organisation, i.e. if they are central or federal states. Decentralisation is sometimes advertised as a means to reduce conflict (Hechter 2000). However, this is only the case if powerful regional parties that could make and organise separatist claims are restricted (Brancati 2006). By contrast, others underscore the escalating effects of federalism as it weakens central institutions and opens the doors to conflict. In this context, it is important to take into consideration that decentralisation has different effects depending on the societal background. If federal entities coincide with ethnic groups or nations in divided societies, decentralisation facilitates mobilisation along group identities and provides separatists with institutions. Yet, even in this case, it can reduce conflict propensity if influential core groups are territorially split up (Bakke and Wibbels 2006; Bunce 1999; Hale 2000; 2004).

### c) Repression

Finally, the role of repression, which is influential as a cause and catalyst of violent conflict, requires attention here. Repression can be defined as

“the actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or [organisation], [...] for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personnel, practices or institutions” (Davenport 2007, 2).

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<sup>40</sup> An increasing number of publications deal with the question under which conditions elections trigger violence (see, for example, Collier and Vicente 2012; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2014; Höglund 2009; Rapoport and Weinberg 2000; Reilly 2002a; 2002b; Snyder 2000). Since the works largely root in post-conflict peacebuilding or democratisation theory and deal with another form of political violence, they will not be reviewed in detail here. Yet, this literature points to another relevant aspect of democracy with regard to the occurrence of violence.

It comprises a great continuum of actions including limitations of freedom of expression and association, intimidation, arrests (with or without trials), disappearances, torture, killings (extra-judicial and en masse), etc. (Davenport and Inman 2012, 619). Repression depends on the regime type with democratic regimes being less likely to recourse to (massive) repression. Some scholars also link it with institutional capacity (Fearon and Laitin 2003). However, this connection lacks empirical basis as there is no systematic analysis of structural conditions leading to repression (Davenport 2007; Davenport and Inman 2012). The question of the influence of repression on mobilisation and radicalisation has been a key issue both for social movement and conflict studies for decades. However, results remained inconclusive for an equally long time and a “punishment puzzle” persisted (Davenport 2007). Consequently, there is evidence for any imaginable relation between state repression and dissident activity, including both an escalating and a deterring effect on rebellion and insurgency or an inverted U-shape. Still other authors did not find any relation at all (see Carey 2006; Davenport 2007; Davenport and Inman 2012; Moore 1998 for overviews of the literature).<sup>41</sup>

As regarding other factors, disaggregating the various dimensions of the independent variable led to a better understanding. Especially the timing and targeting of repressive violence are decisive. If repression is preventive and well-targeted at activists at different levels, it successfully limits contestation, although it does not clear up its underlying causes. Yet, if repression is reactive and indiscriminate, i.e. targeting members of an identity group independent of whether they had participated in protest, it further encourages opposition. The outcome can be explained in several ways. It either results from rational decisions regarding the costs, benefits, and probability of success in the respective situation, or can be linked to the effects that repression has on resource mobilisation at the different stages that opposition movements are in. However, emotional aspects also play a part: Repression can intensify alienation and anger against the state, with violence becoming accepted as a legitimate and necessary means (Hafez 2003; Hafez and Wiktorowicz 2004; Mason and Krane 1989). Although repression does not generally lead to civil war onset, it stirs violence in some contexts and therefore, merits attention in relation to conflict analysis.

At his time, the Prussian General and military theorist Carl von Clausewitz depicted war as a continuation of politics through other means. While this should not justify violence as a method to achieve goals, it highlights that armed conflict does not take place within a vacuum, but has to be studied against the background of the political system and ongoing processes. The institutional approaches to explaining armed conflict attempt to do this and

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<sup>41</sup> Here, the role of repression as independent variable is considered. In fact, repression and conflict interact and violence also impacts state behaviour, with various scholars identifying a spiral of violence (see Carey 2006; Hafez and Wiktorowicz 2004; McCarthy and McPhail 2005; Tilly 2005); yet, examining this aspect of repression is beyond the scope of the thesis.

analyse how state capacity, regime type, and repression affect the likelihood of rebellions. Nevertheless, the overview showed that various interactions remain under-researched.

### 2.2.3. *Identity as a Contested Cause of Armed Conflict*

Especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, conflicts are easily qualified as stemming from identity. Election violence in Kenya in 2007 and 2013, for example, was qualified as “tribal” (*CNN*, 11 September, 2012; *New York Times*, 31 December, 2007). Similarly, recent clashes in the Central African Republic were entitled as “sectarian savagery” (*The Economist*, 15 February, 2014). In fact, the relation between identity and conflict is not as simple as that: While some multi-ethnic societies experience civil wars, others do not. This suggests that identity is not automatically conflictual but only provokes violence under certain conditions. Yet, it is particularly challenging to adequately operationalise identity due to its dynamic and constructed nature which affects the results. Thus, many aspects of the functioning of (ethnic) identity remain disputed. Nevertheless, the present section will offer an overview of different approaches to theoretically integrate identity and especially ethnicity into conflict studies.<sup>42</sup>

#### a) Primordialism

After the end of the Cold War, armed conflicts were (and still often are) prematurely and incorrectly described by reference to ethnic, racial, religious, or tribal affinities and were interpreted from a primordialist perspective. According to primordialists, identity is natural, given, and does not easily change.<sup>43</sup> From this perspective, conflict can be explained in various ways. Some identities are assumed to be more prone to violence than others and therefore, cause armed conflict, for example, if a community’s customs are based on a warrior tradition. Alternatively, violence results from differences between identity groups. They mutually reject – and ultimately exterminate – the ‘other’, since enmities between groups have persisted for centuries and were passed on from generation to generation. ‘Ancient hatred’ becomes an inherent feature of identity. Consequently, conflict is rather “an expression of community” (Barber 1992) than a rationally chosen strategy or a political means that is driven by motives and serves to obtain a goal (Bayar 2009, 1639; Geertz 1999 [1973], 259-260; Huntington 2007 [1996]; Van Evera 2001, 20). Primordialist explanations

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<sup>42</sup> An ethnic group can be defined as “a type of cultural collectivity, one that [emphasises] the role of myths of descent and historical memories, and that is [recognised] by one or more cultural differences like religion, customs, language, or institutions” (Smith 1991, 20; see also Horowitz 1985). There are other types of cultural identities, namely national, religious, or clan identities which can equally be relevant in the context of armed conflict and function differently (see Stewart 2012). Yet, the main focus will be on ethnicity here.

<sup>43</sup> By contrast, constructivist perceive ethnicity as evolving and being constantly (re)constructed in an interactive process combining structure and agency (Nagel 1994, 152; Gurr 2000). For them, violence results from the instrumentalisation of identity.

are problematic for several reasons. First, it must be questioned whether their basic assumption that identity is given and stable is tenable. It is not necessary to look for academic evidence to observe that identities change, for example, as a consequence of migration, or that several identities coexist. Similarly, the natural ‘conflict-proneness’ of certain identity groups has to be questioned.<sup>44</sup> Second, primordialism is more descriptive than analytical. Since violence is a natural consequence of identity, any attempt to explain conflict onset or the interaction of identity with other factors is impeded from the outset. Third, due to their negative world view, primordialists tend to overlook that most of the time, identity groups coexist peacefully and conflict does not manifest; they cannot explain these deviations.<sup>45</sup> After all, primordialism leaves no room for conflict management or prevention, since violence would always re-occur unless an identity group disappeared. As a result of these points of criticism, primordialism became largely rejected at the benefit of more differentiated approaches.

If cultural identity is not per se a trigger of conflict, how does it provoke violence? Numerous quantitative studies entirely rejected the significance of ethnicity for conflict onset since they could not identify a robust significant relation (see, for example, Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003).<sup>46</sup> Only recently, statistical analyses found evidence that identity-related factors can increase the conflict risk and therefore, should be included into analyses (see, for example, Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009; Sambanis 2001; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009).

### b) The ‘Quantification of Identity’: Ethnic Polarisation and Settlement Patterns

Various scholars approach identity by looking at its quantifiable side. They noted that ethnic diversity within a society did not increase conflict risk per se.<sup>47</sup> The highest conflict propensity prevails in societies with considerable minority groups, that is, if there is a form of ethnic polarisation between groups that dispose of the capacity to confront each other (see, for example, Ellingsen 2000; Esteban and Schneider 2008; Horowitz 1985; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005). In addition, settlement patterns, i.e. the geographic distribution and location of identity groups increase the risk of violence. Various studies suggest that the

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<sup>44</sup> Muslims, for example, are often considered to be naturally aggressive. However, in the Rwandan genocide, the Muslim community refrained from committing acts of violence, but protected Tutsis (Doughty and Ntambara 2005). There is also statistical evidence countering the common belief that religion and notably Islam is particularly conflict-prone (Bormann, Cederman, and Vogt 2015).

<sup>45</sup> In some instances, they take this into consideration. Barber (1992), for example, claims that Soviet communism contained violence between antagonist groups in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), which only broke out after the end of the Cold War.

<sup>46</sup> The negative conclusions result from problems to adequately operationalise and measure ethnicity as well as over-aggregation of data. Furthermore, it is imperative to distinguish between ethnic and non-ethnic conflicts in order to assess the role ethnicity plays (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Kalyvas 2007; Laitin 2000; Sambanis 2001).

<sup>47</sup> Nor is ethnic homogeneity a guarantee for the absence of conflict as the example of Somalia shows. Here, almost the entire population is ethnic Somali; however, fighting paralleled clan affiliations.

likelihood of ethnopolitical rebellion is higher if ethnic groups are geographically concentrated (see, for example, Dudley and Miller 1998; Gurr 2000; Hechter 2000; Weidmann 2009). This is especially true for separatist conflicts, since the regional concentration of groups seeking self-rule increases their organisational and mobilising capabilities and enhances the legitimacy of their claim. The number of groups and thus, potential claims-makers within a state also matters in relation to self-determination. If there are other groups that might ask for independence in the future, the government is less likely to accept demands which increases the risk of escalation (Saideman and Ayres 2000; Toft 2003; Walter 2009). Besides, territorial conflicts are more likely if groups are located far away from the political centre and close to international borders (Wucherpfennig et al. 2011; see also Buhaug and Rød 2006). Finally, the presence of related ethnic groups in neighbouring countries increases the likelihood of armed conflict (Cederman, Girardin, and Gleditsch 2009; Melander 2009; Saideman and Ayres 2000). However, other results caution us not to accept these findings as conclusive. Melander (2009) claimed that ethnic groups are more likely to fight in ethnically heterogeneous than homogenous regions and explains his different findings by reference to specific mechanisms, namely dynamics following the security dilemma (see below). This also shows that research still knows little about which constellation is at the origin of conflict. Other scholars highlighted the need to look beyond geographic and demographic characteristics. Hence, they focused on the intersection of identity with other conflict-triggering factors and studied it against the larger societal background. A research team from Zürich and Los Angeles concentrated on Ethnic Power Relations. Their model found that political exclusion and competition paralleling ethnic divisions impacted the risk of violent conflict. Identity groups that do not have access to state power, lost access, or lack representation are more likely to challenge the state through violent means (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Gurr 2000; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009).<sup>48</sup> A comparable line of reasoning provides the basis for theories of horizontal inequalities, according to which identity serves as a catalyst in conflicts about group inequalities (see 2.2.1.).

### c) Triggers of Ethnic Conflict

While polarisation, geographic location, and interactions with socio-economic and political variables constitute conditions under which ethnic conflict is particularly likely to occur, it is also essential to investigate how violence is triggered, i.e. what dynamics and mechanisms lead to its outbreak. One explanation for ethnic violence rests on the security dilemma, which was borrowed from International Relations theory. It stipulates that groups increase their defensive capacities in order to be able to face a potential threat by their antagonists. This is, for example, the case if minority rights appear to be insufficiently guaranteed, if there is no

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<sup>48</sup> Gurr (2000) developed an encompassing analytical framework to examine ethnic conflict.

third party to oversee commitments, or if a group lacks information about the other's intentions. However, since defensive means can equally serve for offensive purposes, the opposition increasingly feels threatened and equally arms itself for protection. Although it was initially not intended, this spiral ultimately culminates in violent conflict (Kaufman 1996a; 1996b; Lake and Rothchild 1996; Melander 2009; Posen 1993; Roe 1999).

According to another school of thought, ethnicity is an important condition for mobilisation. Influential élites can foster the salience of identity, enhance in- and out-group dynamics or antagonisms in relation to other groups, call for support of certain politics, and ultimately incite violence. In short, identity is not per se conflictual, yet it can be as a result of mobilisation. This perspective emphasises the role of leadership in instrumentalising ethnic or religious group affiliation for political purposes (De Juan 2008; De Juan and Hasenclever 2009; 2011; Hasenclever and Rittberger 2000; Kaufman 1996a; Moltmann 2005). In this context, it is important to recognise that ethnicity is linked with ideational, emotional, and symbolic components which can provide a basis for mobilisation and amplify it (Kaufman 2001; 2006; 2011; Petersen 2002). These theoretical approaches also highlight the need to consider subjective components of identity when examining its role for civil wars. However, mobilisation is not always successful. Therefore, it was proposed to use the framing approach to refine the existing knowledge regarding mobilisation in ethnic conflict and account for variations in its success (Desrosiers 2012; 2015; De Juan und Hasenclever 2009; 2015).<sup>49</sup>

It became apparent that identity is neither naturally conflict-prone, as primordialists argue, nor entirely irrelevant for conflict onset as some quantitative analyses concluded. Instead, it became consensus that it has to be analysed against the broader societal background and in combination with dynamics and human agency. Although ethnicity is especially difficult to measure and operationalise, scholars could identify some societal constellations and conditions that promote ethnic conflict and proposed mechanisms that explain why identity causes violence. However, research remains fragmentary and inconclusive in many respects due to insufficient data and measurement problems.

All in all, the precedent overview demonstrated that scholars identified a broad variety of variables that increase the probability of conflict onset. It is useful to divide them into broader categories of factors, such as economic, identity-related, and institutional approaches in order to systematise existing explanations. However, the different perspectives are not mutually exclusive, but it is imperative to combine them in order to obtain an encompassing understanding of civil wars. Moreover, the broad body of literature that strongly grew after the

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<sup>49</sup> While Desrosiers (2012; 2015) theoretically supports the integration of framing into conflict studies, De Juan and Hasenclever (2009) made a first attempt to apply it. Recently, a research project at the University of Tübingen has started to integrate the framing approach into conflict studies in a more systematic manner, with the present thesis being among its results.

turn of the millennium should not be prematurely taken as evidence for better knowledge concerning armed conflict: In many respects, findings are imprecise, incomplete, or contradictory and it is important to recognise that many aspects of civil war onset remain poorly understood.

### **2.3. Bridging the Gap: An Overview of Major Shortfalls of Conventional Theories and Potential Ways out**

The overview of the literature on civil wars demonstrated that considerable progress was made in elucidating under which conditions civil wars are likely to escalate. Yet, despite these contributions, the theoretical approaches also suffer from a variety of important limitations, namely with regard to methodology, causal mechanisms, as well as the absence of human agency in the models. They will be assessed in a systematic manner in the following section.<sup>50</sup>

#### *2.3.1. Critical Discussion of Prevailing Approaches to Studying Civil Wars*

Theories of civil wars are mainly based on cross-national multivariate analyses. This methodological proceeding necessitates a strong simplification of complex social realities which has distortive effects. Consequently, an initial point of criticism concerns state-centrism and the over-aggregation of data. Datasets are generally compiled by reference to information available at the state-level. However, conflicts tend to be regionally concentrated; the Lord Resistance Army, for instance, was predominantly active in northern Uganda or rebellions in the DRC concentrate in the eastern provinces of the country. Consequently, the macro-data does not adequately reflect the situation in specific regions, but provides biased or incorrect information regarding conflict onset. To give an example, the nation-wide GDP per capita tells little about the socio-economic situation in a specific area, since there might be strong inter-regional disparities which remain unaccounted for. Hence, differentiation and disaggregation are necessary in order to move closer to conflict-affected regions and social realities on the ground. This simultaneously underscores that unrealistic and simplified assumptions – national territory is, for instance, considered homogeneous – are at the basis of the studies. A second challenge concerns the operationalisation and measurement of variables since social dynamics cannot easily be quantified. While scholars aim to identify

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<sup>50</sup> Civil war studies also face much broader criticism. A major problem concerns the practical relevance of results. Academic analysis of armed conflict is largely detached from the policy-making community and due to its methodological specificity hardly accessible for practitioners who are not experts in statistical analyses, i.e. the majority. Thus, it is not adequately taken up and translated into policy measures. Yet, scholars make little efforts to present their conclusions in a more understandable way, but appear pre-occupied by academic merits (see, for example, Mack 2002). Given the serious repercussions of civil wars on affected societies, the lack of applicability of civil war studies constitutes an important challenge.

suitable proxies, their choices often remain problematic. This is especially evident in the case of ethnic identity. Various studies concluded that ethnicity did not increase the likelihood of armed conflict. However, this results rather from problems in measuring and operationalising identity than its actual irrelevance. Often, the Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalisation Index is used in order to capture ethnicity.<sup>51</sup> The index measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals speak different mother tongues. Yet, this method of appreciating ethnic affiliation is inadequate. It considers ethnicity at the national level, while regional ethnic distribution is more relevant due to the local concentration of conflict. Moreover, it focuses on ethnic heterogeneity, whereas other patterns, such as polarisation, are neglected, although they are more decisive for conflict onset.<sup>52</sup> Most importantly, (ethnic) identity is constructed, multifaceted, and dynamic. Capturing alterations or subjective and emotional dimensions of identity which are important for conflict dynamics is difficult or even impossible for statistical analyses (Dixon 2009; Gurr 2000; Kalyvas 2007; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005; Sambanis 2004a).<sup>53</sup> This shows that variables do not necessarily depict what they are supposed to which impacts the results.<sup>54</sup>

Other problems concern the explanatory relevance and validity of statistical results.<sup>55</sup> Based on multivariate models, theories of civil wars claim to identify probabilistic causal statements.<sup>56</sup> However, even if variables prove significant, many questions about their causal relationship with conflict onset remain unanswered. Large-N studies cannot yield any insights into how precisely specific factors trigger an outcome, i.e. what causal mechanisms are at play (Desrosiers 2012; 2015; Yee 1996). Despite this drawback, scholars try to develop causal theories. Collier and Hoeffler, for example, came up with an explanation of how resources lead to civil war. In their propositions, they generalised anecdotal evidence from armed conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa and extrapolated them beyond the continent. However,

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<sup>51</sup> Alternative measures that are more appropriate to capture ethnicity have become increasingly used (see, for example, Bormann, Cederman, and Vogt 2015; Ellingsen 2000; Humphreys, Posner, and Weinstein 2002; Posner 2004; Vogt et al. 2015; Wucherpfennig et al. 2011).

<sup>52</sup> Obviously, using the right measurement requires a certain knowledge regarding conflict factors. This raises questions in how far analyses are innovative or rather replicative of previous findings. In other cases, papers seem to mainly aim at backing a specific theoretical school of thought or countering another. In this context, the major reason for using a specific measurement appears to be whether it leads to the intended results.

<sup>53</sup> This also applies to other variables, such as history that have to be taken into consideration since they influence conflict escalation, but cannot easily be operationalised (Humphreys and Mohamed 2005; Kalyvas 2007).

<sup>54</sup> Even if adequate measurement is found, problems of coding remain (Dixon 2009; Humphreys and Mohamed 2005).

<sup>55</sup> Even if a study identifies variables as significant, the problem of spuriousness remains: In many cases, several analyses come to completely different and contradicting results regarding relations between variables. The multitude of diverging datasets, coding, etc. makes it difficult to compare findings and come to a conclusion regarding effects (Kalyvas 2007, 418).

<sup>56</sup> In fact, analyses do a poor job in predicting armed conflicts (Mack 2002).

empirical evidence for the assumed causal relationship was scarce and weak.<sup>57</sup> Additional analyses of the effects of resources on civil strife identify equifinality (see Humphreys 2005; Kalyvas 2007; Ross 2003). This means that there is a multitude of plausible causal mechanisms potentially leading to the same outcome which is not surprising given the complexity of social processes. Yet, quantitative analyses fail to single out which mechanisms fostered violence. Moreover, it is conceivable that factors only indirectly impact escalation processes because they lead to another occurrence that ultimately triggers violence. But the influence of intervening variables is difficult to take into account (Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Ross 2006). Finally, civil war is a rare event and many countries do not experience violent conflict in spite of factors that increase the likelihood of conflict. This shows that the same variables can function dissimilarly in various settings. Therefore, their historicisation and contextualisation are imperative to understanding the way they exactly work and impact the occurrence of violence (Burnell 2005).<sup>58</sup> In this context, it is also noteworthy that the theoretical perspectives are predominantly static and are incapable of explaining why conflict emerged at a specific time. This suggests that they overlook major dynamics – or micro-mechanisms – that precede violence.<sup>59</sup> Another important issue concerns endogeneity. Various factors that are identified as increasing conflict propensity are also influenced in the course of civil strife. As a consequence, it is difficult to distinguish between causes and repercussions of conflict. The example of natural resources is a useful illustration here. Resources are assumed to provoke armed conflict. Yet, civil strife also affects their extraction. While other economic activities, such as services are flexible and can move out of conflict zones or are abandoned, resource deposits are locally fixed and cannot be relocated. Hence, income generation concentrates on the primary sector which increases its importance.<sup>60</sup> Alternatively, group identity can become more salient as a result of inter-group conflict although it did not provoke fighting. These examples highlight that there is a considerable risk of falsely identifying causes of conflict, although these triggers were only enhanced by civil war and grew more important in its course (Guáqueta 2003; Kalyvas 2007, 419; Marut 2010; Ross 2006). The preceding examples illustrate the complexity of causality in the context of civil war onset. In order to thoroughly understand the occurrence of violence it is imperative to understand dynamics, disentangle interactions of variables, and specify

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<sup>57</sup> In the case of Casamance, the Collier-Hoeffler model took into account resources that were not connected with conflict onset (Humphreys and Mohamed 2005). Hence, it identified a casual mechanism although there is none.

<sup>58</sup> One could object that the analyses are not deterministic, but probabilistic.

<sup>59</sup> Here, the example of Casamance is revealing. Although often invoked, territorial isolation cannot account for the fighting as it had not erupted before.

<sup>60</sup> Similarly, rebel groups take over economic activities in their zones of influence to finance themselves. This can be observed in Casamance, where the rebel engaged in cannabis cultivation and trafficking. Although the drug trade existed before the conflict, it was not related with its onset.

mechanisms that forego it. However, knowledge remains scant in this regard (Dixon 2009; Kalyvas 2007; Lawrence and Chenoweth 2010).

Another major shortfall of civil war studies concerns their structural character which implies that they neglect the role of human agency. While actors are occasionally referred to (for example, in the context of greed-related theories as rational cost-benefit seekers or social entrepreneurs with the capacity to stir hatred among ethnic groups in identity-related explanations), they are not systematically included in the analysis. Instead, civil war appears to be the inevitable result of structural variables. However, violence does not automatically result from structural conditions, but the use of force necessitates deliberate choices by individual or collective actors. Their motives are not fixed, but the reasons why groups initiate a rebellion can diverge from the causes that lead them to continue fighting. Therefore, their motivations have to be constantly verified over the course of the conflict. Besides, launching a rebellion requires various efforts to mobilise and organise resources and combatants (Foucher 2002a; see also 3.4.2.). These examples demonstrate that collective actors play a central role in conflict escalation in various regards. Yet, macro-theories of armed conflict do not systematically take into account internal characteristics and specificities of armed groups. The overview of major points of criticism regarding civil war studies underscores that despite progress, the phenomenon of civil war is still insufficiently understood. This does not mean that the existing analyses are incorrect, but rather that their explanatory power reached a limit due to their methodological foundations. Therefore, it is imperative to complement them by applying innovative research designs and integrate qualitative methods that help to counter some of the deficits and focus on so far understudied aspects of violent conflict in order to provide more encompassing and definite results (Dixon 2006; Kalyvas 2007; Sambanis 2004a).

### 2.3.2. *Moving forward: Integrating a Micro-Perspective into the Analysis of Armed Conflict*

As a reaction to the deficiencies of conventional civil war studies and the realisation that they fail to explain many aspects of armed conflict, scholars increasingly adopted alternative methods of analysis, so-called micro-approaches. For one, these approaches focus on aspects that had previously been neglected, such as variations in the intensity of violence, geographical patterns, or the nature of armed movements that participate in armed struggle. For another, they introduced qualitative methods into the quantitatively dominated analysis of intra-state wars. This allows for the examination of civil war from an innovative perspective.

The following section will summarise major micro-approaches and particularly focus on studies dealing with patterns and variations of violence.<sup>61</sup>

As already mentioned, armed conflicts rarely affect the entire territory of a concerned state in a homogeneous manner, but fighting is locally or regionally confined and its geographic extension changes over time. One can also identify variations, for instance, regarding the intensity of fighting or the degree of mobilisation within conflict zones (see, for example, Kalyvas 2006; Wood 2003). In order to take into account spatial variations, specific datasets that depict sub-state variations were introduced (for example, the Armed Conflict Location and Event dataset (ACLED), the Event Data on Conflict and Security (EDACS), or the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (UCDP GED). They include precise information on organised violent events, such as georeferenced location, time, involved actors, numbers of victims, etc. and therefore, provide a disaggregated picture of armed conflicts and allow for analyses at a sub-state level (Chojnacki et al. 2012; Raleigh et al. 2010; Sundberg and Melander 2013). Based on these datasets, various scholars came up with statistical examinations to better understand local and regional conflict dynamics. Buhaug and Lujala (2005) proposed to divide territories into grid cells of the same size in order to be able to capture local variations. Using the example of conflicts about government and territory in Africa, Buhaug and Rød (2006) applied this proceeding. They analysed the impact of factors, which are generally considered to influence the likelihood of civil war within these smaller units of analyses and contributed to refining existing theories.<sup>62</sup> Nevertheless, one should not be over-enthusiastic regarding this quantitatively inspired “micro-theoretic turn” (Cederman and Gleditsch 2009, 489). While it addresses some of the criticism of conventional theories, especially concerning the over-aggregation of data, other difficulties, for example in terms of operationalisation, measurement, or imprecision regarding the exact causal mechanisms leading to the use of force, persist. Yet, further improvements were made by researchers that wandered off the beaten tracks and took a qualitative look at deviations.

Stathis Kalyvas (2003; 2006) underlined that it is imperative to perceive civil war as a multi-level and multi-dimensional phenomenon. According to him, violence does not exclusively follow the ‘master cleavages’ that were at the origin of civil war. Rather, local and individual (or private) conflict lines, identities, and alliances, which had been pre-existing to the conflict and developed further during its course, strongly shape dynamics of violence. Their multiple interactions – cleavages at different levels can parallel or oppose each other and therefore, have re-enforcing or annihilating effects – are at the origin of differences across regions or

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<sup>61</sup> A detailed discussion of micro-approaches to civil wars is beyond the scope of the chapter. Thus, the following section aims to provide an indicative overview of a selection of approaches.

<sup>62</sup> For studies using a similar approach, see Hegre, Østby, and Raleigh 2009; Raleigh and Hegre 2009; or Raleigh and Urdal 2007. Other authors used an alternative proceeding by choosing administrative entities as units of analysis which are geographically and politically more meaningful (Østby, Nordås, and Rød 2009; Rustad et al. 2011).

villages. Moreover, local patterns of violence affect mobilisation and participation in armed groups (Wood 2003). This reasoning can be illustrated with the help of examples. In Ivory Coast, national conflict lines that concerned questions of citizenship and *ivoirité* (English: Ivoirian-ness) paralleled issues of migration and property at the local level (Arnaut 2008). Similarly, local discourses of ownership and belonging shaped patterns of violence in Kenya after the 2007 presidential elections (Jenkins 2015). Hence, “civil wars are not binary conflicts but complex and ambiguous processes that foster an apparently massive, though variable, mix of identities and actions – to such a degree as to be defined by that mix” (Kalyvas 2003, 475). In consequence, it is imperative to disentangle the manifold dynamics and factors existing at different levels of analysis that fuel violence.

In addition, peculiar patterns in the use of force attracted the attention of scholarship. Remarkably, violence against civilians is not universally widespread in all conflicts, but its intensity considerably differs across cases. Jeremy Weinstein (2006) accounted for the variations by reference to characteristics of rebel movements, namely their resource endowment. Access to resources affects the organisational forms of rebel groups. According to the argumentation, resource-rich movements mainly consist of opportunists. They develop discipline problems and engage in high levels of indiscriminate violence against the local population. This ultimately leads to a spiral of violence and defection by the people. On the contrary, poorer groups that do not benefit from natural resources or external support depend on social instead of economic endowments. Their members are more committed which facilitates cooperation and discipline. Hence, these rebel movements maintain better relations with their environment and use force in a selective and targeted manner (see also Weinstein 2005).<sup>63</sup> In addition to its precise findings in explaining differences in the use of force against civilians, an important merit of Weinstein’s book consists in focusing on internal features of non-state armed groups, which had previously been neglected by civil war studies.<sup>64</sup> Furthermore, there are studies regarding variations in specific forms of violence, such as sexual violence. While some conflict zones, such as Bosnia, the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or Rwanda gained notoriety since mass rape was used as a weapon of war, in other cases (for example, Sri Lanka or El Salvador) sexual violence remained very limited. This is surprising as ethnic cleansing, which often provides a background for sexual violence, also occurred in Sri Lanka which suggests that the differences in behaviour do not result from context factors. Elisabeth J. Wood (2009) investigated the exceptional case more profoundly. Her analysis demonstrates that top-down

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<sup>63</sup> For an alternative explanation of violence against civilians, see Wood 2010.

<sup>64</sup> Nevertheless, one has to admit that Weinstein’s theory remains strongly structural since the actors’ behaviour solely depends on resource wealth. In recent years, an increasing body of literature examined various aspects of non-state armed groups, especially aspects of recruitment and mobilisation (see, for example, contributions in Gates 2002; Guichaoua 2012; Henriksen and Vinci 2007; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Kalyvas and Kocher 2007; Vinci 2006; Wood 2003).

implications, i.e. specific leadership strategies and strong hierarchical structures resulting in the capacity to sanction deviant behaviour, explain the absence of sexual violence in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam's (LTTE) repertoire of violence.<sup>65</sup> In addition, anecdotal evidence from El Salvador suggests that societal norms and ideology also help to elucidate why war time rape remained rare (see also Asal et al. 2013; Asal and Rethemeyer 2008; Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood 2014; Thaler 2012).

Additional insights into the functioning of armed groups result from the works by Klaus Schlichte and, once again, Elisabeth Wood. Schlichte (2009) aimed to explain the puzzle of varying trajectories of armed movements. He argues that legitimising and delegitimising effects of the use of force determine the development of an armed group and ultimately, its success because legitimacy is a prerequisite to transform (military) power into (political) rule (see also Veit and Schlichte 2011). His qualitative comparative analysis strongly drew on political sociology and moved away from rationalist thinking. Wood (2003) analysed variations in the mobilisation in the civil war in El Salvador. She proved that while material incentives, namely access to land, mattered to some extent, emotional and moral motives predominantly determined the decision to support the insurgents despite the concomitant high risks to do so. In consequence, she provided important evidence that participation in rebellions cannot be satisfactorily explained by cost-benefit calculations. Instead, non-material factors are crucial.

In sum, micro-approaches deepened and refined the existing knowledge regarding armed conflicts. Not only did they focus on and account for aspects that had so far been neglected (e.g. variations in the occurrence and forms of violence, characteristics of armed movements), but they also integrated qualitative methods which allowed for much more precise descriptions and analyses of dynamics and causal mechanisms. In this respect, it is noteworthy that they do not challenge or counteract previous theoretical approaches, but are complementary because combining different theoretical and methodological approaches is imperative to gaining thorough knowledge of civil war onset.

To sum up, the present chapter provided an overview of the field of conflict studies. First, it introduced the concept of (armed) conflict and discussed the importance of academic analysis concerning it. Second, it reviewed predominant perspectives on civil war, namely economic, institutional, as well as identity-related approaches. Third, major points of criticism with regard to these analyses were summarised. In addition, contributions of the growing field of micro-approaches to civil war studies were presented. In the course of the chapter, it became obvious that none of the existing (micro-)approaches are capable of explaining the puzzle that is at the core of the thesis, namely why conflicts escalate in some cases into

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<sup>65</sup> Wood analyses the absence of rape on behalf of the Tamil rebel group LTTE. Soldiers of the Sri Lankan state army did engage in sexual violence during the conflict.

violence, but do not in others in spite of comparable structural conditions increasing conflict propensity. In order to fill this gap, it is necessary to adopt an alternative analytical tool. The framing theory that is borrowed from social movement studies represents a promising way forward in this regard: It helps to identify micro-mechanisms leading to the eruption of armed conflict and allows for simultaneously studying different levels of analysis and their interdependencies. In addition, by focusing on mobilisation, it yields insights into social interactions and dynamics involving armed movements as well as their constituencies and considers cultural, emotional, and ideational determinants that conventional theories overlooked. Therefore, not only does framing provide a means to answer the research questions, but it can also enrich civil war studies more generally by facing some of the above-mentioned shortfalls. On the following pages, the theoretical proceeding will be outlined in detail.

### **3. Theoretical Framework: Framing as a Tool to Identify Micro-Mechanisms of Conflict Escalation**

The previous literature review provided a synopsis of conventional theories of civil wars. It also discussed the deficits of these quantitative macro-level analyses. Their shortfalls disqualify them from elucidating why separatist claims escalated into armed conflicts in Senegal's Casamance region, while they did not in Barotseland (Zambia), where non-violent protest prevailed although the structural framework was stable in both cases. Neither can they explain the peculiar conflict dynamics in Casamance. Hence, an alternative theoretical perspective is imperative in order to answer the research questions – namely, the concept of frame or framing analysis. The approach developed within the field of social movement studies in the 1980s, when scholars realised that the existing macro-theoretical approaches focusing on opportunity structures and resource mobilisation insufficiently accounted for the complexities related to the emergence of social movements (see, for example, Snow et al. 2014). Against this background, framing should yield new insights by taking into account discursive, cognitive, ideational, and emotional factors. In a nutshell, the idea of framing is the following: Structural conditions do not automatically lead to collective action, but have to be translated into it. Therefore, social movement actors engage in strategic communication – or framing – with the objective to promote a specific understanding of a given problem, the solution they consider adequate, and a way to achieve it. Moreover, they seek to incite potential sympathisers to get involved themselves. In this way, framing agents aim to mobilise potential sympathisers for collective action. If the organisations' interpretations resonate, that is, appear credible and salient in the eyes of the targeted group, they convince followers to participate in joint efforts. Thus, framing serves as a bridge between social structures and collective action and sheds light on the mechanisms translating conditions that exist at the macro-level into mobilisation at the meso-level. Obviously, this reasoning can also be transferred to violent movements.

The present chapter aims to outline in detail why integrating framing into the analysis of civil wars is promising. First, it will identify parallels between social movements and armed conflict as well as the respective theoretical fields (3.1.). Second, the concepts of frames and framing will be defined and delimited from other closely related notions (3.2.). The explanatory power of framing will be at the core of the subsequent third part of the chapter (3.3.). In the fourth and final section, potential contributions of framing to civil war studies will be theorised and discussed (3.4.).

#### 3.1. Theoretical Considerations on the Integration of Framing into Civil War Studies

Social movements and civil wars tend to be considered as two different phenomena and the respective fields of study seem to have little in common. This thesis adopts a different perspective and argues that theories of social movements, namely framing, can make important contributions to better understand armed conflicts. This claim is based on two lines of argumentation. First, it is useful to reconsider definitions as this can help to bridge seemingly existing oppositions in the analysis of the phenomena. Second, both theoretical fields share a comparable trajectory and suffered from similar shortfalls. These observations suggest that it is fruitful to integrate the framing approach into conflict analysis in order to overcome deficits concerning the latter.

##### 3.1.1. *Bridging the Gap: A Definitional Convergence of Social Movements and Armed Conflict*

Studies of civil war and social movements appear to be antithetical as they deal with – seemingly – different phenomena. Yet this image derives from self-understandings of the two fields rather than actual existing discrepancies. In the following, it will be shown that the two areas share important intersections and can be fruitfully combined.

Social movement studies aim to explain under what conditions social movements emerge, how they develop, and finally decline (see, for example, Della Porta and Diani 2006; Tarrow and Tilly 2007). Generally speaking, social movements can be defined as

*“collectivities acting with some degree of [organisation] and continuity outside of institutional or [organisational] channels for the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority, whether it is institutionally or culturally based, in the group, [organisation], society, culture or world order of which they are a part”* (Snow, Soule, and Kriesi 2004, 11; emphasis in the original).

This definition stresses the degree of organisation and continuity, the non-institutional or non-organisational character, as well as the underlying motive as defining elements (see also Turner and Kilian 1987, 223). It does not specify the actual strategy chosen by a social movement. This highlights that social movements are not peaceful by definition. However, social movement studies concentrate predominantly on non-violent protest activity (e.g. environmentalist, peace, or NIMBY initiatives, etc.), while theoretical or empirical research on the use of force in the context of social movements is relatively rare.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> There is some theoretical literature on violence and social movements (see, for example, Della Porta 2002; 2008; Gurr 1993; 2000; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 2006). Moreover, empirical studies deal with violent social movements (see, for example, De Juan and Hasenclever 2009; Della Porta 2002; Karagiannis 2009; Koopmans and Olzak 2004; Rucht 2002; Snow and Byrd 2007; contributions in Wiktorowicz 2004b). Furthermore, researchers focusing on terrorism in various contexts made an important contribution to studying political violence and social movements in a systematic and integrated way (see, among others, Bosi and Della Porta 2012; contributions in Bosi, Demetriou, and Malthaner 2014; Della Porta 1995; 2013; Malthaner 2011; Malthaner and Waldmann 2012; Wiktorowicz 2004a).

### 3. Theoretical Framework: The Framing Approach

At the other extreme, theories of civil wars exclusively look at cases of large-scale armed conflict.<sup>2</sup> Conventionally, if there are more than 1,000 battle-related deaths per calendar year, one speaks of civil wars (Sambanis 2004b; Sarkees and Schafer 2000; UCDP 2015). To study their occurrence, scholars statistically examine relations between conflict triggers and the escalation of violence. They set out from datasets that include conflicts based on the intensity of fighting and the number of conflict-induced victims (e.g. COW, UCDP/PRIO). Conflicts below a certain threshold or instances, in which no violent actions – but potentially other forms of resistance – occur, are not taken into account. They are dismissed as ‘non-events’ or analytically irrelevant vacuum which leads to a loss of information and deficient conclusions.<sup>3</sup> The strict separation of the phenomena in research falsely suggests that there is a dichotomy of violence and conflict on one side and their absence – or the mere existence of social movements – on the other side. Not only is the dualism artificial and simplistic, but it can even be dangerous because non-violent protest potentially escalates into full-blown civil war, as the example of Syria underscores (Johnston 2015).<sup>4</sup>

To understand various conflict trajectories, an intergrated perspective is imperative. In this context, it is useful to recur to the increasing literature on non-violence to bridge the gap between civil wars on the one hand and social movements on the other (see, for example, contributions in Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Cunningham 2013; Lawrence and Chenoweth 2010; Sambanis and Zinn 2005; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). This field of research builds on the shared finding of social sciences that conflicts are not always violent, but involved actors can choose different strategies to wage conflict, namely violent or non-violent tactics (Krennerich 2002; see also 2.1.1.). More precisely, non-violence is defined as “a civilian-based method used to wage conflict through social, psychological, economic, and political means without the threat or use of violence. It includes acts of omission, acts of commission, or a combination of both” (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008, 9). Hence, non-violent conflict does not equal passivity, a conflict of low intensity, or even the absence of conflict. Rather, it constitutes a qualitatively different form of conflict and comprises other modes of protest, e.g. demonstrations, marches, strikes, etc. (see Lawrence 2010, 145; Lawrence and Chenoweth 2010, 3-4). As a consequence, violent

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<sup>2</sup> In the previous chapter, armed conflict was defined as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state” (UCDP 2015).

<sup>3</sup> Recently, this tendency weakened. Various scholars adopted micro approaches and focused on so far neglected aspects of armed conflict such as patterns of violence and their variations (for an overview of these approaches, see 2.3.2).

<sup>4</sup> In this context, it also becomes obvious why the common view on separatist conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa is problematic. While the literature highlights their remarkable scarcity on the continent (see, for example, Englebert 2009; Englebert and Hummel 2005; Keller 2007), it completely neglects that there is a considerable number of low-intensity conflicts about self-determination and additional groups claim secession in a non-violent manner (Bereketeab 2012; Englebert 2013; Forrest 2004; Hewitt and Cheatham 2000; Ridley 2014; Tull 2011; see also 1.1.1.). Hence, the potential for violence related to secessionist claims is considerable, but tends to be overlooked.

### 3. Theoretical Framework: The Framing Approach

and non-violent action – and thus, civil wars and social movements – are not analytically distinct phenomena, but constitute two sides of the same coin.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, they should be better viewed as different ends of a continuum or as strategically chosen alternatives (Cunningham 2013, 291-293, 302; Lawrence and Chenoweth 2010, 3-4). This understanding implicates that civil war studies must change their emphasis to be able to study violent and non-violent protest in an integrated and comparative manner.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, it also means that since the phenomena are related, it is adequate to apply theories of social movements, including framing in the context of armed conflict.

#### 3.1.2. *The Emergence of Framing in Social Movement Studies and Its Potential for Civil War Studies*

In the following section, the genesis of the framing concept will be briefly summarised and parallels to civil war studies will be drawn. This helps to better understand how and why framing can contribute to the analysis of violent conflict.

Social movements and particularly their emergence, dynamics in their development, and tactics have attracted scholarly attention for centuries (see, for example, Tocqueville 1959 [1856]). Major theoretical progress in this field of research occurred during the 20<sup>th</sup> century which finally led to the development of framing. With regard to the theoretical evolution, several phases can be distinguished. In its early stage, social movements were largely regarded as irrational crowds or mobs that were driven by shared emotions and frustration (Goodwin and Jasper 2008, 612; Jasper 2007; Jenkins 1983, 528-529; Smith and Fetner 2007, 29). Theoretical contributions towards a more structured and coherent analysis of social movements were made by scholars like Neil Smelser and Ted Gurr. Smelser (1962) suggested to systematise determinants (such as structural conduciveness or strain, generalised belief, precipitating factors, mobilisation and social control), their changes, and the different outcomes they provoke. Gurr's work had two-fold implications. He moved beyond prevailing assumptions that frustration per se would lead to protest by systematically analysing the impact of psychological and societal factors on the occurrence of violence. His concept of relative deprivation helped to explain collective behaviour and different forms of violence more adequately (Gurr 1968a; 1968b; 1970).<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, Gurr's writing constituted an early approach to the methodic examination of collective violence at the sub-

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<sup>5</sup> The comparison between social movements and armed non-state actors is not appropriate in all cases due to the different characteristics and objectives of the latter. It is especially useful for violent movements that simultaneously fight for social change and have political (and not exclusively economic) objectives, for example, rebel or guerrilla groups (see Schneckener 2006, 25-31).

<sup>6</sup> To some degree, the literature on protest already does so. See, for example, Tarrow 1998; Tarrow and Tilly 2007; Tilly 2006. By bridging the dichotomy, there will be a shift in focus. While the outcome, i.e. armed struggle, was conventionally at the centre of analysis, attention is now turned to collective actors and the type of strategy they adopt. This results in a more agent- and agency-focused approach that can consider aspects of conflict escalation, which have been neglected so far.

<sup>7</sup> For a detailed discussion of Gurr's approach and its limits, see 2.2.1.

### 3. Theoretical Framework: The Framing Approach

state level. Through focusing at 'minorities at risk', he developed a formal model to explain communal mobilisation and political action of identity groups in ethno-political conflict. The approach continues to be a valuable basis for present research since it led to the Minority at Risk Dataset (Gurr 1993; 2000; MAR 2014; see also 2.2.1.). Thus, Gurr's research advanced both the studies of social movements and collective political violence, not least by combining findings from the two areas of study.

In the 1960s, the first important paradigm shift towards structural and rationalist approaches occurred. As a consequence, the focus turned towards political opportunity structures and resource mobilisation of social movements (Jasper 2007). The basic assumption of the political opportunity structures approach is that the emergence and development of social movements depend on their socio-political context and their interactions with it.<sup>8</sup> Hence, it takes into consideration specific social structures and features of the political system as well as modifications in them that enable or constrain social movement activities and thus determine its scope of action (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 2008b, 2-3; Tarrow 1998, 72-73). The concept of political opportunity structures is broad and subsumes a great variety of variables. These range from features such as the degree of centralisation or openness of regimes, to actor-orientated determinants such as elite behaviour, inclination to repression, or quality and stability of alliances, to external influences weakening political systems. Political opportunity structures help to explain the timing, the specific form, and success or failure of social movements and facilitate cross-case comparison (see Gamson and Meyer 2008, 275-277, 281; Kriesi 2004, 69-71; McAdam 2008, 24-31; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 2008b, 3; Tarrow 1998, 77-85; 2008, 43-45, 54-56; Tilly 2006, 186-187; Wiktorowicz 2004c, 20-22). However, political opportunity structures alone are not at the origin of social movements, but the latter have to be effectively organised, if only in a loose manner. Hence, resource mobilisation theory adopted an intermediary perspective inspired by rational choice. It takes into account organisational aspects by focusing on resources that social movements have at their disposal for collective action and the mobilisation of followers. According to the approach, the emergence and success of social movement organisations depend on their capacity to mobilise resources in the initial phase, maintain them throughout their existence, and channel them into concrete activities. Resources can be both (in)formal, (im)material, and internal or external to the movement; they include, for instance, money, networks, media access, financial resources, skills, external support, time, or labour (Gamson 1990; Jenkins 1983; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Lipsky 1968; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 2008b; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Oberschall 1973; Smith and Fetner 2007).

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<sup>8</sup> Political opportunity structures are defined as "consistent – but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national – signals to social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements" (Tarrow 2008, 54).

### 3. Theoretical Framework: The Framing Approach

In the 1980s, social movements underwent a 'cultural turn'.<sup>9</sup> Scholars recognised that in spite of their contributions to better understanding the emergence of social movements, prevailing structural approaches were inadequate to take into account the complexity and multidimensionality of mobilisation processes that they observed in the field (Snow et al. 2014, 23-29; see also, Gamson and Meyer 2008; Noakes and Johnston 2005, 1-2, Snow and Benford 1988; Snow et al. 1986; Tarrow 1998; 2008; Tilly 2006). Thus, there was a need to shift attention towards the connecting pieces that translated structural conditions into collective action and take into consideration various non-material or 'soft' factors, including, among other things, cognition, ideas, meanings, and emotions.<sup>10</sup> Against this backdrop, the sociologist David Snow, together with his collaborators, came up with the framing approach as part of the theoretical re-orientation. By assessing the strategic communication of movements and its effects, framing successfully functioned as a bridge between the structural or macro-level on one side and the group or meso-level on the other. Furthermore, it integrated so far neglected components and dynamics into the analysis. Thus, the innovative approach offered more encompassing, and thus, more realistic explanations of the occurrence of protest movements (see, for example, Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988; 1992; for later works, see, Benford 1997; Benford and Snow 2000; Snow 2004; 2008; Snow et al. 2014; Snow and Byrd 2007; see also Noakes and Johnston 2005, 5; Williams and Kubal 1999, 225-226).<sup>11</sup>

Today, framing constitutes one of the three main dimensions in social movement studies aside from theories focusing on political opportunity structures and resource mobilisation. Over the years, its field of application became increasingly multidisciplinary. Hence, framing is broadly applied in various domains of sociology and political science, for example in political communication analysis (e.g. Chong and Druckman 2007; 2010; 2011), foreign policy analysis (e.g. Dimitrova and Stroembaeck 2005; Loizides 2009; Reese and Lewis 2009), or peace and conflict studies (e.g. Autesserre 2009; 2012; Björnehed 2012; De Juan and Hasenclever 2009; 2015; De Juan and Vüllers 2010; Desrosiers 2012, 2015; Karagiannis 2009; Theobald 2015; Vüllers 2011) as well as other academic disciplines, such

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<sup>9</sup> Other aspects of the cultural turn will not be discussed here. For more information on culture in relation to social movement studies, refer to Jasper 2005; 2007; Snow 2004.

<sup>10</sup> Not only scholars of social movements increasingly focused on the relevance of ideational, cognitive, and emotional factors, but their impact also increasingly attracted attention in other areas of political and social science, for example International Relations or foreign policy analysis. See, for example, Bar-Tal, Halperin, and de Rivera 2007; Goldstein and Keohane 1993b; Laffey and Weldes 1997; Petersen 2002; Rosati 2000; Yee 1996. See also 3.3.1.

<sup>11</sup> Snow was not the only scholar to introduce framing into the field of social movement research, but William Gamson also worked on related questions (see, for example, Gamson 1988; 1992a; 1992b; Gamson and Modigliani 1989). However, Gamson and Snow adopted slightly different perspectives regarding framing. On the one hand, Gamson used framing mainly to examine individual mobilisation. Snow, on the other, focused on the relation between social movements and their constituencies (Noakes and Johnston 2005, 5). Since in the context of this study Snow's understanding is most relevant and adequate, the theoretical chapter will mainly concentrate on his conceptualisation.

as (social) psychology (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman 1981; 1986), or communication and media studies (see, for example, Dahinden 2006; Entman 1993; 2003; 2007; Matthes 2012; Potthoff 2012; Scheufele 1999).<sup>12</sup>

The overview of the history of social movement studies highlights that their development parallels trends in the analysis of civil wars. Both fields proceeded from grievance-based to structural perspectives on the respective phenomena and suffered from comparable shortfalls regarding macro-explanations. While theories of armed conflict continue to be confronted with these challenges, scholars of social movements overcame them by introducing micro-approaches, namely framing, into their analyses. Given these similarities as well as the existing intersections of the phenomena, which were brought out previously, framing represents an interesting alternative approach to theoretically and conceptually advance and refine prevailing theories of civil war. In the following, the concepts of frames and framing will be at the centre of the discussion.

#### **3.2. Clarification of Key Concepts: Frames and Framing**

The notion of frames had existed before it was integrated into social movement studies in the 1980s.<sup>13</sup> Its origin can be traced back to Erving Goffman whose understanding of frames will briefly be summarised in the following.<sup>14</sup> In his book *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience* that was first published in 1974, Goffman describes frames as “‘schemata of interpretation’ that enable individuals ‘to locate, perceive, identify, and label’ occurrences within their life space and the world at large” (Goffman in Snow et al. 1986, 464; Goffman 1986 [1974], 2; see also Benford and Snow 2000, 614; Entman 1993, 53).<sup>15</sup> This is not done in a purely objective or authentic manner, but a frame acts in a transformative way. It “simplifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences and sequences of action” (Snow and Benford 1992, 137; see also Noakes and Johnston 2005, 3). By doing so, frames provide interpretations

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<sup>12</sup> This tripartition is common but misleading. The different perspectives should not be understood as competing. Rather, they are complementary. Framing, for example, allows for studying ideational and discursive elements together with structural factors in order to draw a more encompassing picture of social dynamics (Snow et al. 2014, 31).

<sup>13</sup> In this chapter, the concepts of frames and framing are presented from a predominantly sociological perspective, which is the most relevant in the context of this thesis. Other academic disciplines, in particular media and communication science use them in a different manner (for more information, see Matthes 2012; Potthoff 2012; Scheufele 1999; de Vreese 2005).

<sup>14</sup> Noakes and Johnston trace the origin of the term back to Gregory Bateson who had already used it in 1954 in the context of communicative interaction (2005, 3; see also Oliver and Johnston 2000, 4). Snow himself confirms to have been inspired by Goffman’s ideas (Snow et al. 2014, 27-28).

<sup>15</sup> There are parallels between the psychological concept of schemes and frames as defined by Goffman. A scheme is “an active organisation of past reactions, or of past experiences, which must always be supposed to be operating in any well-adapted organic response” (Bartlett in Brewer and Nakamura 1984, 120-121). Yet, schemes are predominantly individual and personal, while frames contain a collective component.

### 3. Theoretical Framework: The Framing Approach

and help individuals to structure and organise events, experiences, and behaviour (Goffman 1986 [1974], 22-23; see also Benford and Snow 2000, 614; Entman 1993, 52-53; König [no date]; Noakes and Johnston 2005, 3; Snow 2004, 384-385).<sup>16</sup> This is comparable to the function of a focus of a camera: It aims at the central element of a scene and captures it in a picture, while external details are left out. This then leads to a unique photograph, which leaves a specific impression on the spectator. Goffman understands frames as cognitive and predominantly working at an individual level, but they also have a collective dimension since they are shared within a social group and culturally embedded. Hence, they serve as a connecting link. Moreover, frames are constant and do not have to be actively re-negotiated, in Goffman's reading, but can be adjusted, if necessary (Goffman 1986 [1974], ch. 3; see also Jasper 2005, 124; Snow 2004, 385).

#### 3.2.1. *Defining Collective Action Frames and Framing*

Today's framing analysis within social movement studies continues to be inspired by Goffman's ideas, but the concept of frames considerably developed. Instead of being used to process individual experiences, frames, or more precisely, *collective action frames*, the interactive process of their creation and modification – *framing* – and their effects as a result of *frame resonance* became considered key elements of successful mobilisation for collective action.<sup>17</sup> In the following, these different constituent parts will be presented. After this, the framing approach will be delineated from related concepts in order to clarify it further and show its added-value.

##### a) Collective Action Frames

In the context of this thesis, the concept of collective action frames (in the following also simply referred to as frames) is particularly relevant and therefore, requires closer attention.<sup>18</sup> Benford and Snow define collective action frames as “action-orientated sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement [organisation]” (2000, 614). Other than basic frames as understood by Goffman, collective action frames do not merely serve to passively categorise events and experiences at an individual level, but contain an intentional and mobilising component. That means that they provide strategic (and potentially selective or dramatised) interpretations of a situation or a

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<sup>16</sup> As an example, one could imagine the following scene: A red carpet is rolled out in front of a public building with national flags being hoisted. Due to existing frames, it is clear to a spectator that a state visitor is likely to be expected.

<sup>17</sup> Potthoff distinguishes between cognitive and textual frames. Although the distinction is grounded in communication science, it is also useful to differentiate between frames as understood by Goffman that are cognitive and collective action frames, which are explicitly formulated and correspond to textual frames (2012, 35-38, 45-46; see also Scheufele 1999).

<sup>18</sup> In the following, the terms collective action frames and frames are used interchangeably to refer to frames in the understanding of Snow and Benford.

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problem with the purpose to incite people to participate in collective action. More precisely, their aim is to attract attention and sympathy of observers, respectively mobilise or maintain support of potential adherents or already existent constituents, and demobilise opponents (Snow and Benford 1988, 198; see also Benford and Snow 2000, 614-617; Noakes and Johnston 2005, 5-11; Polletta and Ho 2006, 188; Snow 2004, 384-385).

According to Snow and Benford, collective action frames have a specific internal structure in order to serve their purpose, which is successful mobilisation. They consist of three interdependent framing dimensions that fulfil different functions, namely a diagnostic, a prognostic, and a motivational one.<sup>19</sup> These framing dimensions do not exist independently of each other, but they are highly interwoven and must form a coherent whole.<sup>20</sup> The *diagnostic* framing is the first dimension of a frame and the starting point for collective action. It defines the problem of a social situation, i.e. clarifies what the struggle is going to be all about and shows why action is necessary. Hence, it articulates *what went or is wrong and why*. In addition, it identifies the source of the problem. By showing *who or what is responsible*, it determines whom or what collective action will aim at. The second element of a frame is the *prognostic* framing. Here, social movements precisely define what they consider the solution to the previously identified problem. This dimension also contains an action plan on how to achieve the desired alternative state. Thus, this part of framing describes the way forward (*What is the solution? What should we do and how?*). Diagnostic and prognostic framing form a common ground for collective action and are essential prerequisites for the struggle. However, definitional consensus (also referred to as consensus mobilisation) does not automatically lead to collective action (Klandermans 1984; see also Snow and Benford 1988, 199, 202; Walgrave and Manssens 2005, 115). Therefore, action mobilisation is indispensable to provide a final impetus for people to commit themselves to the cause and move “from the balcony to the barricades” (Snow and Byrd 2007, 128). *Motivational framing*, which constitutes the third component of a frame, gives this final impulse for action as it aims to incite (potential) followers or adherents to actively join the movement and participate in collective protest activities.<sup>21</sup> Hence, it provides a ‘call to arms’ by highlighting *why one should participate in action*. This is not an easy task, since there are various reasons for people not to act, even if they sympathise with a movement’s programme. If an activist group

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<sup>19</sup> The following paragraph on frame dimensions is based on Benford and Snow 2000, 615-617; Noakes and Johnston 2005, 5-11; Snow 2004, 384-385; Snow and Benford 1988, 199-202; Snow and Byrd 2007, 123-130. Gamson proposed an alternative conceptualisation of the internal structure of frames. According to him, frames consist of three elements, namely identity, agency, and injustice (Gamson 1992a). In spite of the different wording, the two approaches have great similarities (see Noakes and Johnston 2005, 6).

<sup>20</sup> The quality of frames is among the criteria for frame resonance, which will be discussed in detail in 3.3.2.

<sup>21</sup> This third dimension is a specific characteristic of collective action frames, which distinguishes them from interpretive frames: Not only do they provide interpretation and guidance, but they also aim at inducing action and thus dispose of a mobilising component (Benford and Snow 2000, 616-617; Snow 2004, 384-385).

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fighters for a public (i.e. non-excludable, non-rival) good, all members of society enjoy its achievements, without having to commit themselves to the cause.<sup>22</sup> In other instances, participating in collective action is connected with costs that might even be life-threatening (e.g. in the case of protest against a suppressive regime). Hence, motivational framing is not merely an appeal to act. It proposes a detailed rationale for action and motives.<sup>23</sup> These can be collective or individual benefits or selective incentives of material and non-material kinds, but also moral and solidary stimuli (Benford and Snow 2000, 615-617; Dahinden 2006, 321; Klandermans 1984, 584-586; Polletta and Ho 2006, 190; Snow 2004, 384-385; Snow and Benford 1988, 202). In order to create potent messages and effectively incite (potential) supporters to join collective action, framing agents use various tools. They connect rational and logical arguments with emotional and affective elements. Normative grounds are also invoked.

It is important to note that Snow and Benford's conceptualisation of the internal structure of frames is ideal-typical (see Noakes and Johnston 2005, 12). This has several implications for their identification and analysis. First, it can be difficult or impossible to clearly identify and distinguish between the three dimensions in empirical data material because they overlap. Alternatively, large parts of documents may not perform any of the tasks. Second, movements rarely explicitly phrase the three framing tasks. Motivational framing, for example, often relies on emotions. However, these are only implicitly referred to. Third, in some cases, a framing dimension can be poorly developed or completely absent. If transmitted by media, for example, direct motivational framing is most often missing (see Entman 1993, 52; Noakes and Johnston 2005, 6). With regard to the regional focus of this study, it should also be noted that the framing concept developed in the context of western industrialised societies. This does not exclude its application in other geographic regions. However, one can expect social movements to face slightly different challenges regarding mobilisation in other societal backgrounds. Consequently, framing might also have special features in these settings, which have to be taken into account during the analysis.<sup>24</sup> Despite these challenges, framing is a highly useful tool to analyse the content of social movement

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<sup>22</sup> Social movements often fight for collective goods like peace, democracy, or protection of the environment. Since the access to these cannot be restricted, everyone benefits from improvements. This creates the free rider problem: One also profits from successes, without having participated in collective action which is why one is inclined not to take action, i.e. to free ride (see Olson 1965). In the context of civil wars, the problem of free riding is a different one (see Kalyvas and Kocher 2007).

<sup>23</sup> Economically speaking, motivational framing aims to modify constituents' perceptions of the cost-benefit ratio by presenting costs in a less problematic matter and make benefits appear more important (Walgrave and Manssens 2005).

<sup>24</sup> There might be differences, for example, regarding communication means and channels, the importance of oral communication, or network ties. This does not imply that the use of framing is impossible in non-western societies, but specificities of the context have to be taken into account. For frame analyses in non-western societies, see De Juan and Hasenclever 2009; Karagiannis 2009; Snow and Byrd 2007; Theobald 2015; Wiktorowicz 2004a; Zuo and Benford 1995.

rhetoric. It enables analysts to move beyond merely describing activists' communication and to study it in a precise and flexible way which is a prerequisite to capture its nuances.

#### b) Framing

So far the focus was on frames, their characteristics, and functions. However, collective action frames do not automatically exist and remain stable over time. Rather, social movements actively engage in framing, that is, "signifying work or meaning construction" (Benford and Snow 2000, 614). In the course of constant, strategic, and purposeful *framing processes*, agents (re)interpret, (re)adjust, and (re)connect existing and new frames with the aim to "[define] what is going on in a situation in order to encourage protest" (Noakes and Johnson 2005, 2).<sup>25</sup> Since frames are not exclusively produced by social movement actors and instilled in their audience, their creation is neither one-way nor top-down. But it is best understood as ongoing negotiation between different levels and involved agents. As a result, frames bring together individual and organisational or collective components and serve as a bridge between the social movement and its followers.<sup>26</sup> Thus, framing is a challenging balancing act: Collective action frames have to reflect goals as well as values of social movements on one side. On the other, cognitive, affective, and normative predispositions of their constituents must also be taken into consideration. Finally, framing goes along with contestation, as different and potentially divergent frames confront each other (Benford and Snow 2000, 614, 624-627; Noakes and Johnston 2005, 7-11; Snow 2004, 384; Williams and Kubal 1999, 226). Moreover, framing is not exclusively agent-based although it is often presented in such a manner. Social movements act within and depend on a given structural context that is also familiar to their constituencies. Frames have to be designed in a way as to correspond to this cultural and institutional context.<sup>27</sup> This background encompasses a variety of connected and shared symbols, narratives, and values, but also norms and practices, etc. If framing agents do not adequately contextualise their message to the societal environment, they are unlikely to mobilise followers. The feminist movement in post-communist Czech Republic is illustrative in this regard. Its framing failed, among others,

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<sup>25</sup> There are four techniques of frame alignment that serve to adjust frames and increase their mobilising potency. *Frame bridging* aims to combine two or more different frames in order to create a new, more salient one. *Frame amplification* is used to clarify and revitalise certain elements of a frame, such as specific beliefs and values. If frames are *extended*, their boundaries are enlarged with the aim to include new issues in an existing frame. *Frame transformation* leads to the integration of new topics into a frame (Benford and Snow 2000, 624-625; Noakes and Johnston 2005, 7-9; Snow et al. 1986, 467-476).

<sup>26</sup> Hence, social movements are not "carriers of extant ideas and meanings that grow automatically out of structural arrangements, unanticipated events or existing ideologies" (Benford and Snow 2000, 613). But they represent "signifying agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers" (Ibid., 613; see also Snow and Benford 1988, 213; 1992, 137).

<sup>27</sup> Framing theory highlights that frames have to correspond to the cultural background. However, the institutional background is also relevant here (see Brown 2014).

since the terms and ideas that it used evoked negative memories of the communist rule, i.e. it did not take into consideration the country's history (see Heitlinger 1996). Therefore, framing has to find "the balance between the influence and processes of the active agency of human actors and the structuring power of cultural forms" (Williams and Kubal 1999, 244) in order to best fulfil its purpose (see also Brown 2014; Diani 1996; Koopmans and Olzak 2004; Noakes and Johnston 2005, 7-9). These two perspectives, namely frames as products of social movements on one side or as results of structural constraints on the other, are often presented as contradictory in the literature (Noakes and Johnston 2005, 7; Snow 2004, 393; see also Brown 2014). This dichotomy is simplistic because the relation between structure and agency is a complex one. Actors, including framing agents, necessarily exist within and depend on a given societal environment. They are to some degree – although not completely – restricted by this setting. An agency-centred analysis cannot completely ignore structural influences. Hence, it is more suitable to understand them as complementary dynamics of the framing process that shape its outcome in different ways and to various degrees (see also 3.3.2.).<sup>28</sup>

#### c) Frame Resonance and Framing Effects

Identifying and analysing frames, their different dimensions, and the framing processes leading to their formation is essential for understanding a movement's self-identification, goals, as well as strategies and thereby, its identity. But in order to create an analytical added-value to the study of social movements – and in this case the (non-)eruption of armed conflict – framing analysis has to move beyond merely describing collective action frames. To gain insight into the effects of framing, it is imperative to capture frame resonance, which is a condition for successful mobilisation (see Benford 1997; Polletta and Ho 2006).<sup>29</sup> Frame resonance constitutes the connecting link between frames on one side and collective action on the other. It corresponds to the "appeal and [mobilising] potency" (Snow and Benford 1988, 205), i.e. the effectivity of framing with respect to its target group. Framing effects

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<sup>28</sup> In this context, a final clarifying remark with regard to terminology is necessary. It is important to differentiate between framing in the strict and broad sense. If the term is used in the strict sense, as it is the case in this sub-section, it refers to the constant interactive negotiation process, during which collective action frames are created. In the wider (or methodological sense), framing comprises the entire chain of frame creation and frame resonance (as well as potentially frame readjustment) that is at the core of the analysis. This is illustrated by the fact that one speaks of framing effects or framing analysis; these do not only focus on the creation of frames, but englobe the 'whole'. If the term is used in the strict or broad sense is apparent from the context.

<sup>29</sup> In his *Insider's Critique*, Benford (1997) denounced that framing research remained too often at a purely descriptive and static level. He claimed that a broad variety of frames was identified in countless studies, but their resonance and effects were not systematically assessed. Similarly, there is little work on counterframing effects or additional factors influencing the effectiveness of framing (Polletta and Ho 2006). While the criticism is justified, it is nevertheless important not to underestimate the importance of identifying frames. So far, the framing of armed groups has rarely been subject of frame analysis. Hence, describing these movements' frames is imperative to better understand their mobilisation strategies and constitutes a precondition for any further analysis.

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occur “when (often small) changes in the presentation of an issue or an event produce (sometimes large) changes of opinion” (Chong and Druckman 2007, 104). By putting issues on the agenda, stressing selected aspects, presenting them in a specific manner, and neglecting other dimensions, framing agents aim to change beliefs, attitudes, and feelings among the target group in multiple ways. Framing attracts the attention of constituencies to specific and potentially new or neglected topics and influences underlying deeply-entrenched considerations. Moreover, it modifies how potential followers perceive as well as evaluate topics and produces concernment. These transformations of mind-sets constitute an essential step in people’s decisions to support or join a social movement and are therefore, a necessary prerequisite for action (Ibid., 109-110; Williams and Kubal 1999, 234-236). As a result, effective frame resonance can lead to different forms of active involvement in social movements and (non-)violent protest behaviour.<sup>30</sup> It is important to bear in mind that if social movement activities are likely to provoke government repression or if activism is connected with specific conditions, sympathisers’ actions can vary.<sup>31</sup> Therefore, apart from direct participation in collective action, proponents can openly or secretly support the movement without getting involved (for example, by providing food and shelter to activists), or resist opponents (for example, by boycotting the state).<sup>32</sup>

#### 3.2.2. *Conceptual Clarifications: The Distinction and Added Value of Framing in Relation to Similar Concepts*

In recent years, framing has occasionally been accused of rather resembling a “buzzword” (Matthes 2012, 252) than a clearly defined and applied concept (see also William and Kubal 1999). This is due to the fact that while the framing approach became widely used, it was frequently applied in an imprecise and distorted manner.<sup>33</sup> In addition, there is a variety of competing approaches within political science, sociology, and social psychology that study how discursive and ideational factors, such as ideology, discourses, narratives, symbolic politics, metaphors, or propaganda affect individual or collective decision-making and thus, enable or constrain action and policy-making. Often, differences between these approaches and framing remain blurred. This is why the question arises as to what the uniqueness of framing is in relation to alternative concepts and theories and why it is better suited to

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<sup>30</sup> Frames do not automatically resonate. Conditions for their success will be outlined in 3.3.2.

<sup>31</sup> Besides, active participation in a social movement can be restricted to some parts of society, for example in the case of rebel groups, since especially young and physically fit men or women are suitable for fighting. If supporters do not fulfil necessary conditions due to age or condition, they can still contribute in other ways.

<sup>32</sup> When talking about the consequences of resonance, one has to take into consideration that if frames do not resonate, there is an effect, too. People might be indifferent towards the message of the movement and refrain from any action. It is also possible that they actively delineate themselves from the movement or even actively resist.

<sup>33</sup> It is, for instance, questionable, if Autesserre (2009) refers to frames in the correct sense. In a later article, she prefers the notion of narratives (2012).

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elucidate the emergence of collective action as well as variations in strategy. Hence, framing will be theoretically differentiated from the concepts of discourse, narrative, and ideology.<sup>34</sup> This will further clarify how framing is understood and used in the context of this study and underscore the strengths of the concept in comparison to others.

#### a) Discourse

A basic assumption of discourse analysts is that language influences the way the world and reality is perceived (Diez, Bode, and Fernandes da Costa 2011, 40; Hajer 2008, 212). Hence, it is essential to identify and study discourses. These can be defined as “an ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories, by means of which meaning is assigned to social and physical phenomena and which are produced and reproduced by specific practices” (Hajer 2008, 214; own translation; see also Gamson 1988, 221; Hajer and Laws 2008, 261). There is not a single discourse regarding an issue, but several and potentially opposing ones coexist. In some cases, discourses can be highly dominant which is why they are taken for granted. However, in other instances, they are hardly obvious and have to be carefully identified (Dryzek 2008, 195; Hajer 2008, 214). Discourses prevail on a long-term basis, i.e. before and after issue-specific framing intervenes (Gamson and Modigliani 1989). They are deeply ingrained as well as institutionalised. Thus, although they can change, it is not easy to modify them and they remain relatively stable (Hajer and Laws 2008, 261). Moreover, discourses exist at various levels. One can distinguish between global, cultural or societal, organisational, and individual discourses (Johnston 2002, 68). A variety of signifying agents is involved in their (re-)construction. Discourses within a society, for example, are shaped by specialists, the media, government officials and agencies as well as their allies, lobbyists, and challengers, which include, among others, social movements (Gamson and Modigliani 1989, 3, 7). Furthermore, the ways in which discourses are created are manifold and include written documents, oral statements, but also (institutional) practices (Diez, Bode, and Fernandes da Costa 2011, 39; Hajer 2008, 212; Johnston 2013, 364). With regard to politics, discourses impact, among others, the perception of reality, determine what policy options are conceivable, or shape identities (Hajer and Laws 2008, 261).

This brief overview of characteristics underlines that the notion of discourses is complex and multidimensional, with discourses being a useful analytical tool in various respects. Yet, it is possible to identify conceptual differences with regard to framing: Frames are more selective than discourses for they are issue-specific. They mainly emerge within the context of particular campaigns and, unlike discourses, are articulated by a small number of specific

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<sup>34</sup> There is a multitude of concepts that are similar to or compete with framing. These three were chosen as they occupy prominent places in conflict studies and are frequently used to analyse civil strife. Theoretical approaches of minor importance cannot be taken into account here for reasons of time and space.

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actors. Due to their breadth, discourses also contain more internal tensions and inconsistencies in comparison to frames. Moreover, frames are faster-moving and more flexible than discourses. In addition, they explicitly pursue the goal to mobilise followers which is not the case for discourses. Therefore, the former are more targeted (Dryzek 2008, 195; Polletta and Ho 2006, 191). With regard to social movements, it is important to take into account discourses in order to understand collective action frames because frames exist within a broader discursive field. Discourses function as a background against which framing takes place. So the discursive context has a facilitating or constraining effect on the content of frames, since the latter must align with accepted beliefs, values, or ideas. In other words, discourses enable or curtail the effect of frames.<sup>35</sup> This interactive relationship prompted researchers of social movement studies to concentrate on the implications of discourse with regard to framing effects (Gamson and Modigliani 1989, 35; Johnston 2013, 366; Koopmans and Olzak 2004, 199; McCammon 2013, 371-372; Snow 2004, 402-403; 2008, 7-12; 2013, 367-368). However, framing has a clear analytical advantage over discourses: Due to its precise focus on a movement's communication, changes within it, as well as movement-constituent relations, it can account for the emergence of a social movement and mobilisation at a specific moment. It reveals much more precise information on causal mechanisms in this respect than discourse analysis could provide due to the stable character of discourses.<sup>36</sup>

#### b) Narratives

The analysis of narratives is an important tool in various fields of political science, e.g. in studying public policy or decision-making. A narrative can be understood as a story. In the context of political science, it "refers to the ways in which we construct disparate facts in our own worlds and weave them together cognitively in order to make sense of our reality" (Patterson and Monroe 1998, 315). Like stories in the conventional sense, narratives have a coherent story-line, which is organised around a key topic or problem and comprises various actors, and often contain a normative or moral component. They connect past events to the present environment and potentially prolong the story-line into the future. At the same time, they maintain a link to verifiable events. Although narratives can persist over long periods of time and consequently become apprehended as self-evident or granted, their creation and adaptation requires agency (Autesserre 2012, 206-207; Hajer and Laws 2008, 260; Lejano 2013, 103-104; Patterson and Monroe 1998, 316, 324; Rochefort and Donnelly 2013, 195). Narratives are important for individuals or collectives in order to give meaning to and

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<sup>35</sup> The relationship is reciprocal as framing is part of discourse and influences it.

<sup>36</sup> To be fair, one has to take into consideration that discourse analysis is rooted in another epistemological tradition and does not aim to explain, but is intended to elucidate enabling effects (see Hollis and Smith 1990, ch. 3, 4; Wendt 1998).

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understand social and political realities and are thus part of general knowledge. They deal with topics that are important for the every-day lives of people, but can also make sense of highly abstract ideas, such as identity or nation since they create “shared stories of a culture” (Patterson and Monroe 1998, 321-322). As a result of their ordering function, narratives have an enabling effect. Not only do they shape perceptions and identity, but they also impact decisions and (collective) action, e.g. by influencing how relations develop or which positions and solutions groups favour regarding an issue at stake (Autesserre 2012, 206; Hajer and Laws 2008, 260-261; Lejano 2013, 103; Patterson and Monroe 1998, 316, 318-322; Rochefort and Donnelly 2013, 194-195).

Narratives and frames seem to be similar: Both have a comparable structure, since they refer to specific problems and contain some form of remedy. They are actively created and not historically-grown or given. Furthermore, they aim to ascribe meaning, structure experiences, and lead to specific outcomes. However, there are important differences. Narratives exist at a superior level in relation to frames. If one would depict the two concepts as a pyramid, frames would constitute the tip of the geometric body that is grounded on the foundations, which the narrative constitutes. Besides, a narrative can encompass various frames.<sup>37</sup> It also co-determines what frames are possible in a specific societal environment and how issues are framed (Autesserre 2012, 206; Dryzek 2008, 194-195).<sup>38</sup> Furthermore, framing is more strongly action-orientated than narratives as frames deliberately aim to mobilise people for collective action, while narratives provide the background within which frames function.<sup>39</sup> As a result, one can state that, comparable to discourses, narratives are important to understand why issues are framed in a certain manner and why frames resonate. Thus, they indirectly influence action, but other than framing do not immediately cause it.

#### c) Ideology

Ideology is best understood as

“a more or less systematic set of ideas that includes the identification of a referent group (a class, ethnic, or other social group), an enunciation of the grievances or challenges that the group confronts, the identification of objectives on behalf of that group (political change – or [defence] against its threat), and a (perhaps vaguely defined) program of action” (Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood 2014, 215; see also Beck 2013, 586; Freedman 2004, 6; Snow 2004, 396).

This ‘package’ provides interpretations and motivation for social movements (Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood 2014; Snow 2004, 396). Collective action frames and ideology appear to be almost the same and seem to be used interchangeably in order to describe or analyse a situation, in which movements act according to specific ideas and values (Oliver and

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<sup>37</sup> In addition, other than narratives, frames tend to be more selective.

<sup>38</sup> In this regard, narratives resemble discourses. Yet, the concept of discourse is broader than narratives.

<sup>39</sup> See section 3.3.2. on frame resonance.

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Johnston 2000). In fact, the notions of ideology and frames partly overlap. The latter often include or are inspired by ideological components. Highly conceptualised and developed frames resemble ideology (Gerhards and Rucht 1992, 575; Snow 2004, 401). Nevertheless, they are not identical and it is imperative to differentiate between the phenomena.

Ideologies are generally assumed to be coherent regarding their content and relatively stable over time. They are better developed, but also more static, inflexible, and monolithic in comparison with frames (Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood 2014, 220; Polletta and Ho 2006, 192). This has negative implications for the application of the concept. Details, variances, and dynamics in movements' communication and action are insufficiently taken into account. Hence, analyses on the basis of ideology are often descriptive and undifferentiated. Moreover, an 'ideological lens' suggests uniformity within and between movements of the same ideological colour (Snow 2004, 397-399; Snow and Benford 1992, 135-136; Snow and Byrd 2007). Yet, empirics show that more often than not, there is no coherence in the ideational foundations and strategies of activist groups. Activists can simultaneously refer to an ideology and values that contravene each other. Besides, meaning construction by social movements is not as mono-dimensional and programmatic as the notion of ideology suggests. It is an interactive and flexible process, during which ideas are adjusted depending on the situation (Snow 2004, 397-401). These shortfalls of the concept of ideology became clear in a comparative study of movements, which are generally termed 'Islamist'. It highlighted that there are considerable differences between the motives and behaviour of these groups and warned against considering them as uniform (Snow and Byrd 2007). This underscores that the concept of ideology is incapable of identifying nuances or shifts regarding ideas. Therefore, it has a concealing rather than an elucidating effect. Framing is a more adequate and flexible analytical tool. It avoids categorising social movements and captures subtleties in their communication. Moreover, it takes into consideration dynamics in meaning construction and interactions between framing agents as well as constituents. Finally, it studies the effects of communication in a detailed and impartial way without neglecting the broader ideational and discursive context. In this regard, it also considers – and problematises – ideology.

In sum, there are similarities and overlaps between framing and other competing concepts, such as discourse, narrative, or ideology, which are commonly used in social and political science to study the effect of language and meaning. It is imperative to clearly differentiate between them. Not only does this avoid that framing is used in an overextended and imprecise manner, but it also underscores the analytical advantages of framing in comparison to other concepts.

#### **3.3. Frame Resonance: The Missing Link between Words and Action**

The framing approach is useful for capturing causal mechanisms of various kinds. Depending on the research design and question, it can serve both as independent and dependent variables or, although rarely, both (Snow et al. 2014, 33-35). For the purpose of this study, framing is used as an explaining variable. This means that framing causes a specific outcome. More precisely, it elucidates, why comparable structural factors lead to the eruption of violence in Casamance, but not in Barotseland.<sup>40</sup> Moreover, it is expected to account for conflict dynamics in the first case. The present section will have a closer look at framing-related causal effects as well as the conditions for it. In a first part, findings from various disciplines will be cited which prove the causal impact of 'soft' factors, namely ideas and dismantle scepticism about the explanatory relevance of framing. Yet, frames do not automatically lead to action, but have to resonate with the targeted group (see above). Therefore, conditions for successful frame resonance will be introduced in a second section.

##### *3.3.1. Ideas Matter – Interdisciplinary Insights on the Influence of Ideas on Action*

According to proponents of framing, the strength of the concept lies in its capacity to capture causal mechanisms, in particular regarding the formation of social movements (Benford 1997; Snow et al. 2014). They state that if framing is internally consistent and resonates, it provokes changes in people's mind-sets and ultimately, leads to mobilisation. In other words, ideas matter for collective action. While this seems to be a commonly shared view among framing scholars, it is less so in other disciplines. Especially civil war studies, which are strongly dominated by quantitative analyses refute the impact of ideational determinants on the outbreak of armed conflict or consider them sub-ordinated to structural factors and rational choice.<sup>41</sup> Since this study will apply framing in order to shed light on causal mechanisms leading to armed conflict, it is imperative to have a closer look at its actual explanatory potential in this respect. For this purpose, results from various academic fields will be used that examined the relevance of ideas for action both at an individual and group level. Their insights clearly make a case for the impact of framing on collective action, as the following examples will show.

Important findings regarding the effect of framing were made by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1981; 1986), who examined the influence of framing from a social-psychological perspective. They proved that the way in which a situation was described (or framed) influenced participants' preferences regarding action. As part of a study, test persons were asked what option they would favour regarding a situation, where a deadly disease

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<sup>40</sup> Strictly speaking, framing partly corresponds to an intervening variable (Van Evera 1997, 11).

<sup>41</sup> There are authors that adopted another position and studied the role of ideas for conflict onset. For a detailed review of this literatur, see Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood 2014. See also Thaler 2012.

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threatened to kill 600 people. In an initial survey, Tversky and Kahneman found out that 72 per cent of respondents would go for the option that “200 people will be saved” (1981, 453). Twenty-eight per cent preferred the second option saying: “[T]here is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved” (Ibid., 453). In another round, the measure that would lead to the death of 400 was favoured by 22 per cent of the respondents. Seventy-eight per cent preferred a programme with “1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3 probability that 600 people will die” (Ibid., 453). Basically, in all four cases, an equal amount of patients (200) would be saved. Hence, the different options are identical but were framed differently. As a consequence, preferences shifted from risk aversion that guided choice in the first example, to risk-taking as the preferred strategy in the second one. Similar outcomes were achieved when test persons were confronted with alternatives that could lead to the gain or loss of money.<sup>42</sup> While the study by Tversky and Kahneman concentrated on risk-related questions, their findings are valid beyond this domain, as other research confirmed, for example regarding political communication (see Druckman 2001b, 228-230; 2007, 104). From this, one can conclude that the way in which a given problem is presented plays a significant part for the decision-making process. The formulation determines a person’s preference and consequently, his or her action (see also Björnehed 2012, 18-20). This is even more so, as people are not necessarily aware of alternative ways of framing, which could guide their behaviour (Tversky and Kahneman 1981, 457-458).<sup>43</sup> For the present thesis, these findings are particularly important because they show that differences in framing can explain variances in behaviour.

Ideational elements are not only relevant at the individual level, but research increasingly shows that they also matter at the collective level and with regard to armed groups.<sup>44</sup> Scholars of conflict, political violence, and terrorism increasingly focus on the role that ideology plays concerning the use of force (see, for example, Asal et al. 2013; Asal and Rethemeyer 2008; Balcells and Kalyvas 2010; Desrosiers 2012; 2015; Goodwin 2007; Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood 2014; Juergensmeyer 2000; Thaler 2012; Wood 2009). To illustrate their contribution, selected works will be briefly presented. In line with the present thesis, Marie-Eve Desrosiers (2012; 2015) argues that framing yields a better understanding of mechanisms leading to ethnic conflict. Moreover, it has the potential to tackle persisting puzzles such as why ethnic violence erupts in some settings but not in others. Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín and Elisabeth Wood (2014) assert that ideology has important instrumental and normative functions in mobilisation processes. These theoretical arguments in favour of

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<sup>42</sup> Even when the studies were taken from a purely hypothetical to a more concrete level and respondents could actually receive money, results remained stable.

<sup>43</sup> Interestingly, even if they are aware of alternative frames, they do not necessarily modify their choice (Tversky and Kahneman 1986, S260).

<sup>44</sup> The causal impact of ideas was also subject of reflections in political science more generally. For theoretical considerations with regard to politics and International Relations, see, for example, George 1979 and Yee 1996.

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ideas are buttressed by empirical studies. Multiple works demonstrated that ideology impacts the forms and intensity of violence. Laia Balcells and Stathis Kalyvas found evidence that Marxist ideology is statistically associated with the length and death toll of civil wars. Ideology is thus not merely “window-dressing” (2010, 13). This is in line with Kai Thaler’s (2012) results. He shows that Marxist ideology restrained violence against civilians in the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. However, assaults increased when the ideological foundation of the armed groups faded away. Similarly, Wood concludes that ideology is one of the factors limiting the use of sexual violence by the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador (Wood 2009). Ideology can also influence which forms of violence collective actors may apply (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008) or whether they use violence at all.<sup>45</sup> In a comparative examination of collective actors in the Middle East, Victor Asal et al. (2013) observe that movements that had integrated a gender-inclusive ideology into their programmes were more likely to use non-violent actions in their political struggle than those without feminist references (see also Goodwin 2007).<sup>46</sup>

Overall, the analyses concerning the impact of framing on decision-making as well as the importance of ideology regarding the use of collective violence came to a decisive result: They substantiated that ideational factors – whether these are presented in the form of ideology or framing – influence individual and collective choices. Moreover, studies by conflict and terrorism researchers emphasised that ideas co-determine if armed groups use force as well as what forms and degrees of violence they apply. Thus, they have a bearing on group behaviour and strategy. These findings underscore that frames can function as an explanatory variable provided conditions for frame resonance are met.

#### 3.3.2. *Frame Resonance: Criteria for Successful Mobilisation through Framing*

As previously argued, frame resonance is a prerequisite for collective action. However, frames are not automatically effective, but their resonance depends on a variety of influencing factors. First, the quality of frames, i.e. their structure or *internal consistency* matters. Second, it is decisive to what extent frames correspond to the larger cultural surrounding as well as experiences of the target group, i.e. in how far they are *credible* and *salient*. In this context, the *credibility of frame articulators* is also determining. Third, frame resonance is affected by competing frames or *counterframing*.

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<sup>45</sup> It was argued above that framing and ideology are not synonymous. In this context, parallels can be drawn between the concepts, as considerations regarding ideology underscore that ideas matter for collective action.

<sup>46</sup> In addition, there are analyses concerning relations between ideological aspects and variations in strategy or areas of operation of terrorists; see, for example, Alex 2004; Bloom 2005; Drake 1998; Hegghammer 2013; Moghadam 2009; Pratt 2010; Sánchez-Cuenca and de la Calle 2009.

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#### a) The Internal Consistency of Frames as Prerequisite for Resonance

The first factor that determines if a frame is effective is the quality of its internal structure. It was mentioned above that collective action frames consist of a diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational dimension that build on each other. Each of the dimensions has to fulfil certain criteria in order to have a mobilising effect. The topic must be presented in an easily accessible way. If the problem appears, for instance, too technical or unresolvable, it will not trigger action: In the first case, average citizens would feel incapable of making a change. In the second, action would be considered futile. Furthermore, the content of the framing dimensions also depends on the environment, e.g. political structures, culture, events, and discursive fields, as will be seen later.<sup>47</sup> A frame is most likely to resonate, if it contains all three components. Besides, they have to be logically linked with each other and draw a well-composed and coherent picture in terms of content; for instance, the solution that a collective action frame presents has to be adequate with regard to the initially defined problem. Similarly, motivational framing should not be detached from the diagnostic and prognostic framing regarding an issue, but must be in line with values and beliefs that are formulated in the other dimensions (Gerhards and Rucht 1992, 578-584; Snow and Benford 1988, 201-202). However, the relation between the various framing components is not linear or deterministic and a variety of different options is possible (Brown 2014; Snow and Byrd 2007).<sup>48</sup> In sum, collective action frames need to be logical and consistent in order to effectively lead to mobilisation. The more internally coherent the frames are, the better they resonate and the greater their effect regarding mobilisation – *ceteris paribus*.

#### b) The Salience and Credibility of Frames as Determinants of Frame Resonance

Even well-developed and internally consistent frames do not automatically cause mobilisation, but their effect depends on how well they fit with the cultural background and everyday experiences of the target group. In a nutshell, they have to strike a responsive chord in order to incite people to commit themselves (Snow and Benford 1992, 140).

A key determinant of frame resonance is whether frames match with the audience's cultural and societal background, including, among others, popular values, narratives, shared symbols, myths, underlying discourses, (self-)perceptions, and extant beliefs. The effectivity of frames depends on to what extent they "resonate with people's experiences and their everyday concerns, fit with common understandings of reality, and provide a sense that collective action is likely to have a desired effect" (Marullo, Pagnucco, and Smith 1996, 3-

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<sup>47</sup> For a detailed discussion on limitations regarding the different frame dimensions and their combination, see Snow and Benford 1988.

<sup>48</sup> Yet, the composition is not completely arbitrary because the content of the components and their combination are constrained by the other dimensions. The flexibility is also illustrated by the fact that frames can be developed and adjusted by framing agents, without having to be completely re-created.

4).<sup>49</sup> Snow and Benford introduced the concepts of *(relative) salience* and *credibility* of frames in order to capture the congruence between the rhetoric of social movements and the respective societal context. Together, they determine the degree of resonance. Both can be further divided in order to make them measurable. The salience of frames depends on three factors, namely their *degree of centrality*, *experiential commensurability*, and *narrative fidelity*. The level of credibility of a frame results from its *internal consistency*, *empirical credibility*, and the *credibility of frame articulators* (Benford and Snow 2000, 619-622; see also Noakes and Johnston 2005, 11-16; Polletta and Ho 2006, 190; Snow and Benford 1988, 207-210; Wiktorowicz 2004a, 176; Williams and Kubal 1999, 229). This constitutes a comprehensive tool kit to analyse frame resonance and take into account both cultural and individual dispositions. In the following, the different determinants will be presented in detail. First, frames are (relatively) salient if they are relevant to and linked with present events or topics of debate within a society (compare Cambridge Dictionaries Online 2015). Salience consists of three elements:

1) *Centrality*:

The centrality of frames is given if major ideas, beliefs, and values that a frame contains are important for the target group. The greater the cohesion is between the ideas, beliefs, and values that frames are based on and those that people hold, the higher the level of centrality of a promulgated frame will be (Benford and Snow 2000, 621; Noakes and Johnston 2005, 11; Snow and Benford 1988, 205).

2) *Experiential commensurability*:

Frames are experientially commensurable if the problems that they focus on are effectively part of the everyday life experience of the targeted population. This is important as individuals might well be aware of certain societal ills, but are not inclined to act unless they are directly concerned by them (Snow and Benford 1992, 141). It is also essential that framing proposes ways forward that appear concrete, feasible, and adjusted to the day-to-day life reality in the eyes of potential followers. Highly abstract and theoretical frames risk being too far from actual needs and problems and are consequently ineffective (Benford and Snow 2000, 621; Noakes and Johnston 2005, 11; Snow and Benford 1988, 208; 1992, 141).

3) *Narrative fidelity*:

Frames do not exist in a cultural void. They have to relate to, build on, and correspond to the dominant culture of the constituents in order to be effective. Thus, frame articulators utilise the existing "cultural heritage" (Snow and Benford 1988, 210)

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<sup>49</sup> In the context of frame resonance, it is useful to understand "culture 'as a 'tool kit' of symbols, stories, rituals, and world-views, which people may use in varying configurations to solve different kinds of problems" (Swidler 1986 in Gamson and Modigliani 1989, 10).

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and societal predispositions. These include, among others, stories, myths, underlying discourses, extant beliefs, shared values, (self-)perceptions, expectations, and master frames.<sup>50</sup> Since movements connect them with their argumentation, frames do not appear as something completely new that the targeted persons are not acquainted with and that might even challenge the underlying culture. Rather, if the existing traditional cultural background and societal predispositions are aptly integrated into framing and narrative fidelity is achieved, the potency of the rhetoric is enhanced (Benford and Snow 2000, 622; Gamson 1988, 220-228; Noakes and Johnston 2005, 12; Snow and Benford 1988, 210; 1992, 141). This determinant of frame salience is particularly important in societies, where tradition and culture is greatly valued.

Altogether, the greater the centrality, experiential commensurability, and narrative fidelity are, the higher the level of salience will be that framing achieves. Second, frames have to be conclusive to the audience in order to lead to mobilisation. Hence, their credibility is influential. It can also be subdivided:

1) *Consistency:*

It was mentioned above that frames have to be well-developed in order to resonate. However, consistency goes beyond the quality of frames. It is also imperative that framing corresponds to the principal ideas and values that a movement is associated with. In addition, its rhetoric and action have to be congruent. Real or perceived contradictions between framing, core principles, and activities or inaction of the social movement weaken consistency and coherence between what is said and done (Benford and Snow 2000, 621; Noakes and Johnston 2005, 11, 15; Snow and Benford 1988, 205; Zuo and Benford 1995, 146).

2) *Empirical credibility:*

Empirical credibility is achieved if frames present a comprehensible and plausible interpretation of existing problems and corresponding solutions, i.e. if there is a mutual fit between the framing and the way how potential followers view events. An empirically credible frame does not necessarily have to be factual, true, or objective, but it must be valid in the eyes of the target group. However, highly subjective or exclusive frames can be expected to resonate only with a limited target group and

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<sup>50</sup> Master frames are overarching frames that can be used by different social movements in various contexts and across different population groups in order to achieve mobilisation (Gerhards and Rucht 1992, 575; Snow and Benford 1992, 139). Social movements often relate to previously successful master frames in order to amplify the effectiveness of their message (see Gerhards and Rucht 1992; Noakes and Johnston 2005, 10). For instance, various self-determination movements in Sub-Saharan Africa align themselves with the anti-colonial struggle of the last century.

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thus, have little mobilising potential (Benford and Snow 2000, 620; Noakes and Johnston 2005, 11; Snow and Benford 1988, 208; 1992, 140).

#### 3) *Credibility of frame articulators:*

Not only does frame resonance depend on the content of frames and its fit to the broader cultural background and personal experiences, but it is also determined by who articulates frames. This is why the credibility of frame articulators has to be taken into account. In this regard, factors such as rhetoric skills and persuasiveness, but also knowledge and expertise regarding relevant subjects enhance frame resonance. Moreover, personality or personal qualities, such as character, charisma, or societal positions (for instance, status or traditional legitimacy as well as leadership) can make frame articulators more credible in the eyes of followers and exercise a positive influence on the effectiveness of frames (Benford and Snow 2000, 620-621; Noakes and Johnston 2005, 11-13; Wiktorowicz 2004a).

Overall, the disaggregated presentation of the (relative) salience and the credibility of frames reveals the complexity of frame resonance.<sup>51</sup> In the ideal case, frame articulators manage to take into account a broad variety of variables in order to create successful frames.<sup>52</sup> They have to adjust their rhetoric to deep-rooted cultural elements, such as (group) history, narratives, or symbols, which continue to be significant for communities. In their framing, social movements also have to relate to and instrumentalise or modify these elements for their purpose, without copying them in a shallow way or overstressing their meaning.<sup>53</sup> At the same time, frames have to be congruent with and skilfully use every-day life experiences of frame receivers. In this case, the targeted group believes that it is understood and taken seriously. Thus, it engages in collective action more readily. In addition, frame resonance does not only depend on cognition or logic. The framing agents have to appeal to ideational and normative convictions of their constituency. Besides, emotions impact the success of frames which is why they have to be eased or enhanced depending on whether they have potentially negative or positive effects on sensitisation and mobilisation. However, even if frames achieve salience and credibility, their articulators have not yet overcome all hurdles.

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<sup>51</sup> The division of frame resonance into salience and credibility as well as the six sub-components is criticised. According to sceptics, the different dimensions could not be analytically distinguished, partly overlapped, and were redundant (Noakes and Johnston 2005, 11-16). In contrast to this, the author of this thesis considers the detailed inspection of frame resonance important. Frame resonance is too often neglected or considered as given. To avoid this, it is imperative to analyse resonance in an all-embracing way and capture the various elements that interact in relation to it.

<sup>52</sup> A frame can be potent if the conditions for one or some of the enumerated variables are fulfilled. However, framing effects and the likelihood of successful mobilisation will increase if resonance resides on all six pillars (Snow and Benford 1992, 141).

<sup>53</sup> Remarkably, “[s]trong frames often rest on symbols, endorsements, and links to partisanship and ideology, and may be effective in shaping opinions through heuristics rather than direct information about the substance of a policy” (Chong and Druckman 2007, 111). This underscores the importance of the ideational and figurative components of collective action frames.

Lastly, the resonance of frames depends on whether they are challenged and potentially superseded by alternative interpretations.

#### c) Competing Interpretations as Challenge to Frame Resonance: The Impact of Counterframing and Framing Disputes

Framing does not take place in a vacuum, but there is always a multitude of simultaneous and competing meaning construction processes. Social actors that oppose a movement, for example activist groups with diverging agendas, the government, or the media also try to mobilise followers for their perspectives. For this purpose, they come up with alternative frames, which they disseminate. In short, they engage in *counterframing*. Counterframing is often an asymmetric struggle. It is influenced by factors such as distribution of resources (e.g. money or expertise) and power relations, with the state and media representing strong adversaries to social movements.<sup>54</sup> Finally, a movement can also run into headwind from related movements. Although denouncing the same problem, different groupings can propose different definitions, solutions, or strategies. These inter-movement competitions are referred to as *framing disputes* (Benford 1993; Benford and Snow 2000, 625-626; William and Kubal 1999, 229-230).

Counterframes or framing disputes can challenge and negatively impact the resonance of a movement's framing. To be effective, frames have to prevail over others, i.e. they must provide the most adequate and convincing interpretation of a situation. Yet, if there is strong counterframing, the targeted individuals become familiar with interpretations which they had previously been unaware of. The initial framing becomes vulnerable to criticism. Its content and intended interpretative monopoly is questioned. As a consequence of influential counterframing or frame disputes, a frame's potency diminishes (Gamson 1988, 241). In the worst case, the frame becomes irrelevant. To avoid such a scenario, counterframing and framing disputes can cause a movement to adjust the content and strategy of its framing in relation to other claims-makers and their interpretations. If this is done successfully, the challenged activist group can maintain the previous degree of frame resonance. However, a movement also risks losing credibility as a consequence of inadequate adjustments in its rhetoric and thereby, further alienating its support basis (Marullo, Pagnucco, and Smith 1996, 3; Noakes and Johnston 2005, 17-19; Snow and Benford 1992, 150).

Overall, achieving frame resonance is a difficult challenge. Frames resonate if they appear well substantiated and logical to constituents. Furthermore, social movements have to find the right balance between cultural references and personal experiences of the targeted

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<sup>54</sup> The media is not per se against social movements. In some cases, the media offer important support for social movement organisations and help to spread frames (see Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Walgrave and Manssens 2005). However, governments often have better access to media. In addition, the internal logic of reporting (e.g. the focus of news rather than backgrounds) is also unfavourable to social movements (Gamson 1988, 224-227; Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993).

entities while equally connecting with the mind-sets and emotional state of followers. Neither should framing be too general, as people might not feel concerned, nor remain too specific and only appeal to a limited group. At the same time, activists have to address a highly heterogeneous collective. Depending on the issue at stake, the targeted persons may have diverse historical, cultural, and societal backgrounds. Thus, framing can have divergent effects on them. Furthermore, non-mobilised and mobilised supporters coexist. Hence, new adherents need to be recruited and at the same time, the support of existing activists has to be maintained by strategic framing (compare Marullo, Pagnucco, and Smith 1996). In addition, framing agents must counter competing frames of potentially more influential opponents in order to maintain supremacy. This shows that the potency of frames depends on a variety of both static and flexible factors, which movements have to constantly take into consideration during the framing process. But the efforts to achieve frame resonance pay off because the stronger the resonance is, the more powerful the frame and the greater its mobilising capacity – and thus, its prospect of success with regard to winning hearts and minds and provoking collective action – will be (Benford and Snow 2000, 619-621; Brewer and Gross 2010, 178-179; Marullo, Pagnucco, and Smith 1996, 3-4; Noakes and Johnston 2005, 11, 16; Polletta and Ho 2006, 190; Snow and Benford 1988, 205-210; Williams and Kubal 1999, 229).

#### **3.4. Potential Contributions of Framing to Theories of Violent Conflict**

It was shown above that there are parallels between theories of social movements and civil war studies. They focus on similar phenomena as they both study collective actors and their activities. Besides, their trajectories bear resemblances and they faced comparable difficulties, in particular regarding their strong focus on structural explanations (see 2.2., 2.3.1., and 3.1.2.). Scholars of social movements reacted to these challenges by introducing the framing concept. It helped to include cultural factors that impacted the functioning of movements, study mobilisation processes, and take into consideration how movement agents acted within their given structural environment. Due to the similitudes between the two theoretical fields as well as the contributions of framing to social movement studies, it appears promising to integrate the approach into theories of armed conflict.<sup>55</sup> The remainder of this chapter will discuss how framing can concretely contribute to a better understanding of the occurrence of collective violence. It will also bring up limitations of the approach.

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<sup>55</sup> First steps into that direction have been made. The framing approach became increasingly used by academics to theoretically or empirically deal with various phenomena of armed conflict or violent social movements. For theoretical contributions, see, for example, Desrosiers 2012; 2015; Granzow, Hasenclever, and Sändig 2015; Johnston 2015; Levinger and Lytle 2001. Empirical studies include among others, Autesserre 2009; 2012; Björnehed 2012; Brown 2014; De Juan and Hasenclever 2009; 2015; Jenkins 2015; Karagiannis 2009; Theobald 2015; Wiktorowicz 2004a; 2004c.

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#### 3.4.1. *Framing as a Micro-Approach to Studying the Outbreak of Armed Conflict*

The question why Casamance has experienced civil war, while non-violent protest prevails in Barotseland although structural conditions are stable in both cases is at the centre of this thesis. The constellation represents a puzzle for theories of civil wars. They cannot explain why variations in behaviour occur despite constant structural conditions or why in some instances armed conflict does not erupt despite favourable circumstances. This suggests that macro-theoretical approaches provide an incomplete explanation of civil war onset and fail to capture mechanisms and dynamics that are at play at other levels of analysis, namely the meso-level. The complex connection between structural factors and armed conflict can be illustrated by reference to the example of socio-economic disparities. Although they often play an important role for the outbreak of violent or non-violent conflict, grievances do not automatically lead to protest activities. To cause collective action, it is necessary that injustices are perceived and interpreted in a specific manner. Concerned people have to be aware of (existing or constructed) inequalities and apprehend them as unjust, as for example, in the case of relative deprivation, which is defined as disparity between actual and expected welfare. This gap causes discontentment (see Gurr 1970). It is also essential to discern who or what (for example, actors, policies, or institutions) is responsible for grievances in order to define the target of protest. Furthermore, the situation must appear modifiable since otherwise, collective action would appear useless. However, the source of injustices may not always be obvious or given conditions appear immutable. Consequently, social movement actors must identify or construct them discursively. If these conditions are fulfilled, it is finally necessary that social wrongs are politicised by an agent, for example a social movement organisation or an armed group, to mobilise those affected to engage in (violent) action (Krennerich 2002, 252-253; see also De Juan and Hasenclever 2009; 2011; Hasenclever and Rittberger 2000). The example shows that there is no direct and linear connection between structural conditions and violence, but various different factors interact and numerous conditions have to be fulfilled.<sup>56</sup> Hence, a complex process of micro-mechanisms connects the macro- with the meso-level. It has to operate so that structural variables effectively lead to collective action by groups but does not run automatically. Conventional civil war studies cannot yield respective insights due to their exclusive focus on the macro-level as well as methodological constraints.<sup>57</sup>

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
<sup>56</sup> The picture becomes even more complex if one takes into account that a variety of structural factors are at the origin of violence. Consequently, an even higher number of micro-mechanisms is at play.

<sup>57</sup> Theories of civil wars that are based on statistical analysis can only show that there is a causal relationship between variables and an outcome. However, they cannot trace how a variable (or a specific factor) precisely leads to the use of force. In other words, the micro-mechanisms at play remain hidden.

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In this regard, framing represents a suitable alternative. Social movement actors have to actively intervene at different stages to channel macro-conditions into resistance. Framing agents apprehend and interpret structural factors that are at the origin of the process. They formulate collective action frames and disseminate them to sensitise and mobilise their constituents. Although framing is strategic, frames are not fixed. They can be modified, especially in order to enhance frame resonance. Thus, it is not linear, but there are feedback mechanisms between the targeted and framing agents. Depending on their content and the degree of resonance, frames result in collective action, which is either violent or non-violent. The entire process does not take place in a vacuum, but the larger societal background has to be taken into account. It determines, which frames are possible after all, what options for action are available, and if as well as to what extent frames resonate (see figure 1; see also Brown 2014; Diani 1996).

**Figure 1: The explanatory role of framing**



To sum up, in order to fully understand the eruption of armed conflicts, it is inevitable to study and understand micro-mechanisms of conflict escalation as well as connections between the different levels of analysis. Here, the framing approach can greatly contribute because it has the potential to serve as a connecting piece between the macro- and the meso-dimension. It simultaneously captures the agents' level and takes into consideration cultural and subjective influences without dismissing structural factors. Hence, it is an ideal instrument in order to disaggregate the seemingly existing automatism between structures and action and sheds light into the persistent 'black box' that lies in between background conditions and violent or non-violent collective action.

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#### 3.4.2. *Shifting the Focus: How Framing Contributes to an Agent- and Agency-Centred Analytical Approach*

Framing is relevant to civil war studies beyond its capacity to identify micro-mechanisms and elucidate how structural factors effectively lead to the outbreak of violence. It can help to gain profound understanding regarding framing agents, i.e. violent or non-violent movements. Conventional civil war studies focus on structural conditions that favour the outbreak of armed conflict. Movement activities are perceived to follow the logic of rational choice. Specificities of armed groups, for instance their internal structures or ideological justifications of their struggle, are dismissed as irrelevant concerning conflict onset. In sum, violent actors are marginalised in analyses. However, since the previous section illustrated the key role that collective actors play in escalation processes, it is imperative to closely and systematically examine them (see Foucher 2002a; Krennerich 2002).<sup>58</sup> In this respect, framing analysis can also serve as a remedy as it explicitly focuses on (individual and collective) agents.

Since it allows for in-depth examination of the content of movements' communication, the framing approach is a useful tool to gather information on the ideational foundation of armed movements. Moreover, it focuses on their communication processes and identifies as well as studies frames. Hence, frame analysis provides answers to questions such as how movements precisely formulate their aims, what solution they propose, and how they justify (violent) action. Besides, analysing frames of a specific movement over time yields insights into how movement actors adjust their message to changes in the environment or alternative interpretations, namely counterframing and frame disputes. It can also concentrate on specific topics. Framing elucidates, for example, how armed groups try to create legitimacy through their rhetoric despite having opted for the use of force or sheds light on differences in their legitimising strategies in their home societies and abroad (see Veit and Schlichte 2011). Likewise, it can focus on the manner violent movements react to real or perceived threats, i.e. what type of threat discourse they adopt. In relation to content-specific studies, an important advantage of the framing approach is its flexibility. It does not aim to pinpoint ready-made sets of beliefs and ideas, which might suggest that a movement aligns with a specific ideology. It rather identifies frames by closely examining various forms of material whose aim is to disseminate the movements' message in an inductive manner. As a consequence, framing is well-suited to bring out specificities in movement rhetoric (see 1.2.2.; Snow and Byrd 2007). Furthermore, negotiating frames is a dynamic process that encompasses multiple interactions and contention within groupings as well as between movements and their constituents. By concentrating on them, the framing perspective yields insights into internal structures and functioning of (non-)violent movements as well as their

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<sup>58</sup> Studies on ethnic conflict that analyse the influence of group élites in instrumentalising ethnicity for political purposes underscore the importance of groupings with regard to conflict escalation.

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interactions with the environment. It also studies the role that leaders play with regard to sensitisation and mobilisation.

In sum, framing contributes to a better understanding of various aspects related to activist movements and their impact concerning mobilisation and escalation processes and integrates this knowledge into a refined explanation of conflict onset.

#### 3.4.3. *Making the Invisible Visible: Studying the Impact of 'Soft' Factors Regarding Conflict Onset*

'Soft' aspects, such as ideas, history, culture, emotions, etc. and their consequences only play a marginal role or are neglected altogether in conventional civil wars studies. Yet, various analyses demonstrated that they matter with regard to collective behaviour and (non-)violent conflict (see 2.3.2. and 3.3.1.). Social movement actors refer to 'soft' components in their frames and instrumentalise them for their purpose, for instance, to justify their claims and strategy. Hence, they are part of the mobilising strategy. In addition, the persuasive power of frames depends, among others, on whether frames correspond to the larger cultural background and societal predispositions. Thus, cultural, ideational, or emotional determinants are highly relevant with regard to their mobilising potency. By focusing on collective action frames as well as their resonance, framing captures the manifold ways in which these factors intervene at multiple stages of the mobilisation process and influence conflict dynamics.

In this context, emotions require particular attention. Emotions are psychological states or processes (Keltner, Oatley, and Jenkins 2014). They are not exclusively individual but can equally be collective. These shared emotions intersect with framing and matter for conflict onset. Existing emotional states make specific concerns prevail over others in certain situations and therefore, determine behaviour. Fear, for example, can induce a defensive or aggressive comportment that aims at guaranteeing one's safety or survival (Ibid.; see also Olusanya 2014). Moreover, emotions are modifiable and can change during the framing process. They are inspired by experiences and perceptions of groups, but the emotional atmosphere is also partly constructed by social actors. By generating specific feelings and effective states or reinforcing existing ones, social movements can increase the appeal of their message. This illustrates that frame resonance and resulting activism do not solely depend on rational, logical and well-constructed arguments, but affective and emotive components also play a major – in some circumstances even the bigger – role (Bar-Tal, Halperin, and de Rivera 2007, 442-447, 450; Olusanya 2014; Petersen 2002).

Altogether, framing is a useful tool to analyse cultural, ideational, as well as emotional components and their influence on violent or peaceful collective action. Hence, it helps to elucidate crucial but so far largely neglected dimensions of conflict onset.

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The framing approach is multidimensional. Not only does it examine the content of frames, but it also deals with the process in which these are negotiated and their effects. Interactions between various involved actors within groups as well as between movements and stakeholders within the larger political context are studied. Moreover, relations between the activist groups and the sectors of society that they aim to sensitise and mobilise for their struggle are taken into account. Thus, framing contributes in various ways to conflict studies. It identifies micro-mechanisms causing violent protest or insurgencies. By doing so, it deepens the understanding of conflict onset and helps to complete prevailing structural theories. Furthermore, framing can improve knowledge regarding the functioning of violent movements and their interactions with other actors in the political arena and their constituents. In addition, it focuses on various 'soft' factors and integrates them into causal explanations. Overall, its usage in the context of civil war research promises to considerably advance the field towards a deeper understanding of escalation processes. This is by no means limited to comparative case studies, as in the case of this thesis, that specifically looks at variations in behaviour. But it can equally be used for single case studies. After all, it is important to highlight that framing is not understood as a potential substitute to conventional civil war studies. It does not aim to provide alternative explanations for the escalation of violent conflict. Statistical studies and framing operate at distinct analytical levels and have different methodological proceedings. They both have their respective strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, framing is rather understood as a complementary tool that is combined with other theories with the aim of refining their explanatory power as it provides important information that quantitative methods cannot yield.

#### *3.4.4. Limits of Framing and Frame Resonance: Competing and Alternative Influences*

So far, the chapter focused on the potential of framing to enrich and advance conflict studies. Likewise, reflecting on the limits of the approach is necessary. In this regard, it is imperative to problematise the relationship of framing and other explanatory factors. Mobilisation, as many other social phenomena, is concerned by equifinality, that is, a specific outcome can be caused by different variables whose distinct influences have to be accounted for in the analysis (Mahoney, Kimball, and Koivu 2008, 122; Noakes and Johnston 2005, 16; Opp 2009, 239-240). Concretely, this means that while framing and its resonance are important determinants, collective action can also be influenced or induced by other causes (see figure 1). In the context of this thesis, the role of networks in the sensitisation and mobilisation process and the impact of additional mobilising factors, namely coercion as well as incentives and their interaction with framing require attention.

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By definition, a social network “is a set of socially relevant nodes connected by one or more relations. Nodes, or network members, [...] are most commonly persons or [organisations]” (Marin and Wellman 2011, 11). These connections can facilitate the dissemination of collective action frames. In the empirical chapters, it will be seen that separatist movements in both cases relied on existing networks to spread frames among their respective constituencies. However, social networks are not neutral, but a variety of mechanisms are at play within them. These include, for instance, mutual trust among members, reputation of authorities, shared values, expectations towards allies, or peer pressure. All these aspects impact as well as interact with the mobilising potency of collective action frames. They can reinforce frame resonance but simultaneously risk superimposing effects of framing. This means that people opt to participate in collective action due to their membership in a social web, while the actual content of frames is secondary for their choice (see Passy 2003; Polletta and Ho 2006; Rosefsky Wickham 2004; Singerman 2004).<sup>59</sup> Social networks matter with regard to framing in another way. They do not evenly penetrate societies, but embrace specific segments of society, for example specific ethnic communities or interest groups, while excluding others. This affects the intensity and reach – and thus, the outcome – of sensitisation and mobilisation. If frames are disseminated through networks, groups that do not belong to networks or do not share their communication channels are less exposed to the strategic communication by social movements and ultimately, less likely to adhere to it. This shows that non-adherence to social movements does not always result from a lack of frame resonance, but can also ensue from the exclusion of certain groups from relevant social ties. In addition, it is imperative to closely examine the interaction of framing with other factors instigating participation in collective action. The decision to join an armed or non-armed movement is not mono-causal. The outcome can result from different (im)material factors that vary depending on the type of movement and the social context it acts in and affect people in multiple ways. Backing a non-violent social movement might appear attractive because it is potentially linked with prestige or access to privileges. With regard to armed movements, analyses showed that participating in fighting can represent a source of income, for example, through pay or looting.<sup>60</sup> But it can also be an opportunity for upward mobility as it leads to an increase in one’s social status, provides better access to marriage partners, or offers prospect for future integration into armed forces. Besides, taking revenge for previous suffering inflicted by warring parties or seeking protection from violence are also important motives. In the latter case, people expect that they are better protected from violence by other conflicting parties if they support or join a rebel movement. In these cases, it is

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<sup>59</sup> The impact of framing can also be stronger than the effect of networks (Polletta and Ho 2006, 199).

<sup>60</sup> There is a growing body of literature on mobilisation of armed movements. For more detailed insights, see, for example, Arjona and Kalyvas 2012; Bosi and Della Porta 2012; Chelpi-den Hamer 2012; Dietrich Ortega 2012; Engels 2012; Utas 2003.

### 3. Theoretical Framework: The Framing Approach

ambiguous if and to what degree collective action is voluntary. Finally, participation clearly results from duress in some cases with different actors exercising coercion. On one side, insurgent groups forcibly recruit combatants for their ranks, for example, by abducting them; or, on the other side, local communities can force their members to take up arms.<sup>61</sup>

This brief discussion underscored that there are additional variables that can either favour or obstruct the effectiveness of framing and influence the decision to join and support a social movement. Thus, the ultimate choice does not exclusively depend on successful framing. With regard to the analysis of mobilisation processes, this does not imply that framing and its resonance are irrelevant in determining collective action. Yet, it underscores that it is necessary to study the effects of framing against the respective societal background in order to analytically distinguish between the effect of framing and third variables on the final decision to join or support a social movement. Their impact has to be controlled for and balanced against the one of strategic communication by movements in order to avoid premature and potentially incorrect conclusions regarding causal connections that overrate or ignore framing effects.

The present chapter outlined why framing is a promising approach to address the puzzles that are at the origin of the thesis and to simultaneously refine civil war studies. It introduced the fundamentals of the theory and delimited it from other concepts. Moreover, the causal effect of framing and its conditions, which are crucial for framing analyses, were discussed in detail. Finally, contributions and limitations of the approach were invoked. After the theoretical considerations, it is now imperative to come up with an adequate research design that allows for optimally capturing framing effects.

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<sup>61</sup> Coercion is especially relevant in the context of armed movements and in situations where participation in social movements is linked with high costs. This illustrates that mobilising mechanisms can vary depending on the type of movement and the social context.

#### **4. Methodological Process: Data Collection and Analysis**

The previous theoretical chapter outlined how framing can contribute to a more precise explanation of civil war onset by uncovering micro-mechanisms. It was argued that structural factors do not automatically lead to the outbreak of violence, but have to be articulated and channelled into collective action by framing agents. Therefore, framing functions as an intervening variable, that is, “[a] variable framing intervening phenomenon included in a causal theory’s explanation. Intervening phenomena are caused by the [independent variable] and cause the [dependent variable]” (Van Evera 1997, 11). Framing analyses require in-depth knowledge of social movements, their communication, and the cultural background of the targeted communities. Quantitative methods cannot provide for this, but a qualitative approach is most suitable. Therefore, a comparative case study design was chosen. Two cases of self-determination conflicts, namely in Casamance (Senegal) and Barotseland (Zambia) were selected according to the following criteria: Structural factors at the national and regional level (e.g. political stability, institutional capacity, economic performance, and identity-related variables) are relatively similar in both cases. However, the outcome – that is, the way in which conflict is waged – varies: While armed conflict escalated in Casamance, Barotse activists continue to use non-violent means to claim separation from Lusaka. Since both cases have a comparable propensity for the eruption of civil wars, structural factors cannot account for the variation in behaviour. But different protest strategies are assumed to be induced by framing, i.e. strategic communication by movement entrepreneurs and its effects on constituencies. Thus, the cases will be methodologically examined from a framing perspective.

In the following, the concrete methodological proceeding will be displayed. First, methodological considerations at the cross-case level will be outlined (4.1.). Here, the case study method will be theoretically justified and case selection will be explained. Since qualitative methods are uncommon in the field of conflict research, the merits of such an approach will also be exposed. Second, the procedure at the within-case level will be focused on (4.2.). Here, the different steps of frame analysis, i.e. data collection, data analysis as well as frame identification, and methods of measuring frame resonance, will be summarised. In this context, methodological challenges will also be taken up.

#### 4.1. Methodological Process at the Cross-Case Level: Justifications and Procedure of a Comparative Case Study

##### 4.1.1. *The Case Study Method in Theory*

In social sciences, case study designs sometimes appear to lack systematic methodological proceeding. However, this view ignores that good case studies require careful decisions and their rigorous and consistent implementation. Generally speaking, a case study is defined as an “*empirical analysis of a small sample of bounded phenomena that are instances of a population of similar phenomena*” (Rohlfing 2012, 27; emphasis in the original; see also Blatter and Haverland 2012, 19-20). This definition implies that the scholar exemplarily focuses on a small number of selected cases in order to identify explanations that can be generalised to the larger population of cases. One can distinguish between different types of case studies, namely case-centred or theory-centred analyses (Rohlfing 2012, ch. 3; see also Levy 2008). Case-centred (also referred to as ideographic-inductive; Levy 2008) studies prevail in academic disciplines such as history, ethnology, or area studies. Their objective is to describe a unique event in a very detailed way. However, they are not necessarily inspired by theoretical considerations. This means that neither do case-centred studies apply a theory in order to examine the phenomenon, nor do they aim to contribute to existing theories or generalise their findings beyond the single case.<sup>1</sup> In political science, this type of case study is also occasionally used in order to explore so far unknown events. Yet, the theory-centred case study approach is more prevalent in this discipline and also at the basis of the present thesis. Theory-centred case studies are “explicitly structured by a well-developed conceptual framework that focuses attention on some theoretically specified aspects of reality and neglects others” (Ibid., 4). This means that the entire research process is guided by explicit theoretical considerations and their rigorous implementation. This is important as it helps to identify potential weaknesses and biases in the research process and review the validity of the empirical results (Ibid., 5). The analytical process can be summarised as follows: First, the cases that are to be studied are systematically selected from the universe of potential cases, which is defined by scope conditions. Selection criteria vary depending on the objective of the study (Blatter and Haverland 2012, ch. 2.3.; Rohlfing 2012, ch. 3). Then, the phenomena are analysed from a specific theoretical perspective by using a method (e.g. process tracing, qualitative comparative analysis, etc.) that corresponds to the type of causality and the level of analysis. If several cases are looked at, data collection and analysis must be identical in all cases and subsequently, the outcomes are compared in a structured and focused way. Finally, empirical results are re-connected with theory (George and

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<sup>1</sup> A researcher examining the French revolution without referring to a theory or trying to compare it to other revolutions can be considered to carry out a case-centred analysis (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 42). However, even in these seemingly non-theoretical case studies, theoretical considerations are implicit. Otherwise, a phenomenon could not be identified as exceptional (Rohlfing 2009, 134)

Bennett 2005, 67-69; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 43-46; Levy 2008, 2-5; Rohlfing 2009, 139-140; 2012, 7-9, 66-80, 125-133). Theory-centred case studies can have different purposes. Not only do they provide stringent historicised descriptions and thus, an in-depth understanding of social phenomena. But they are also relevant beyond the unique or few cases studied because they lead to theoretically relevant results that can be generalised to the population of possible cases provided case selection was systematic.<sup>2</sup> The method is useful to study how variables precisely function as well as interact and lead to an outcome. Moreover, it can serve to build, test, or modify hypotheses as well as to probe plausibility and thus contribute to developing and advancing theories (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 68-70; George and Bennett 2005, 110-111, 119-125, 130-131; Rohlfing 2012, 9-12, 40-43, 61-62).<sup>3</sup>

##### 4.1.2. *Criteria for Case Selection*

As previously mentioned, case selection is not random or arbitrary, but has to be systematic and theory-guided according to the purpose of the study in order to provide valid results. Therefore, the procedure of case selection that is applied in this thesis will be outlined and the cases will briefly be introduced hereafter.

The separatist conflicts in Casamance and Barotseland were respectively chosen as cases of violent struggle and non-violent protest from the population (or universe) of existing possible cases. This population included all violent or non-violent self-determination conflicts in post-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>4</sup> The geographic restriction is beneficial since a prerequisite of case studies is that cases are sufficiently similar in order to allow for systematic comparison and avoid distortions. The concentration on a single type of conflict, namely territorial conflicts further enhances the degree of comparability. If cases are too different, it is impossible to clearly identify variables that cause an outcome (Lijphart 1971, 688). Comparative case studies can follow different logics depending on the studied phenomena and the theoretical perspective that is chosen.<sup>5</sup> In the present study, the research question and the theoretical proceeding require a most-similar design that is based on the method of difference exposed by John Stuart Mill who argued:

“If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance save one in common,

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<sup>2</sup> Unlike in natural sciences, generalisation in social science is more limited and contingent (George and Bennett 2005, 131). Nevertheless, one can “draw the most useful kind of theoretical conclusions from case studies, as they build on and go beyond improved historical explanations but present limited risks of extending these conclusions to causally dissimilar cases” (Ibid, 110-111).

<sup>3</sup> For more details on the potential of small-N studies for theory building, see George and Bennett 2005, 119-125; Leuridan and Froeyman 2012; Rueschemeyer 2003.

<sup>4</sup> Due to the specific historical context, self-determination movements in South Africa, which emerged mainly in townships, are not included in the universe.

<sup>5</sup> There are, for example, most-similar and most-different system designs, univariate comparisons, or comparing relationships. For a detailed discussion of other types of comparison, see e.g. Klotz 2009; Przeworski and Teune 1970, ch. 2; Rohlfing 2009, 134-137; 2012, ch. 3, 4.

#### 4. Methodological Process: Data Collection and Analysis

that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or cause, or an necessary part of the cause, of the phenomenon” (1843, 455).

Thus, in this design, all relevant variables are constant except for one. At the same time, the outcome differs. As a consequence, the variation in the outcome of the two cases is explained by the difference in the variable (Bennett 2004, 38-40; Blatter and Haverland 2012, 42-44; George and Bennett 2005, 153-156; Levy 2008, 10; Lijphart 1971, 687-689; Przeworski and Teune 1970, 32-34; Rohlfing 2009, 134; 2012, 115-124; Van Evera 1997, 23, 84-85; see figure 2).

**Figure 2: The logic of the method of difference**

	<b>Variable 1</b>	<b>Variable 2</b>	<b>Variable 3</b>	<b>Outcome</b>
<b>Case 1</b>	p	q	s	<b>Y</b>
<b>Case 2</b>	p	r	s	<b>Z</b>

Source: Own representation based on Blatter and Haverland 2012; Rohlfing 2012

In concrete terms and with regard to the present study, this means that in order to be selected, countries have to share major characteristics, which favour conflict onset according to theories of civil wars and separatist conflict as discussed in chapter 2.2., but differ in the outcome, namely violent conflict or peaceful protest. In such a constellation, the degree of conflict proneness is comparable and the structural variables cannot account for differences in the collective strategies. Instead, distinctions in framing and frame resonance are expected to be at the origin of variations in the behaviour. Various indices, datasets, and statistics were compared in order to identify potential cases. Among the sources were Polity IV (2012), the Political Terror Scale (PTS 2015), the Fragile States Index (FFI 2015), Minorities at Risk data (MAR 2014), the Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger (Hewitt, Wilkenfeld, and Gurr 2008; Hewitt et al. 2012), World Bank figures regarding socio-economic development (World Bank 2014), the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI 2003; 2014),<sup>6</sup> and the index of socio-political instability (Alesina and Perotti 1996). Based on the evaluation of these figures, the self-determination conflict in Casamance, Senegal, was chosen as a case of a violent self-determination movement. The struggle for independence of former Barotseland in Zambia was selected as a case of non-violent protest behaviour.<sup>7</sup> While the data of the two countries is not identical, the indicators' values are situated within a similar range and extreme discrepancies were not detected. However, there are some weaknesses

<sup>6</sup> Until 2013, it was known as Failed States Index.

<sup>7</sup> Other self-determination conflicts (e.g. in Kenya or Tanzania) were also considered, but discarded as differences regarding structural factors were too big. Some cases had to be excluded for practical reasons, such as language barriers or security considerations.

in relation to this proceeding. The indices are mainly based on aggregated national data, with little regional figures being available. Hence, they provide insufficient evidence about regional specificities that affect the likelihood of violence. Moreover, in the case of Casamance, data that precisely measures the state of the country at the time of the beginning of the conflict is scarce, since many statistical measurements were not available at that time. In order to circumvent these deficiencies, secondary sources (e.g. reports and case studies) were also taken into account. This allows for accessing additional information and control for variances of structural variables at the regional and national level with the aim of cross-checking case selection. Altogether, the consulted data highlighted that at the national level, variables that are relevant for the outbreak of armed conflict, such as the economic performance, the availability of lootable resources, state fragility, the degree of democratisation, or ethnic heterogeneity are relatively similar in Senegal and Zambia.<sup>8</sup> At a sub-national level, Casamance and Barotseland also share comparable structural characteristics. Both are far off and poorly connected to the economic and political centres of the respective countries and suffer from economic marginalisation as well as underdevelopment. Moreover, locals feel discriminated against in various societal domains, for example, concerning political representation or cultural recognition. Finally, both regions are mainly inhabited by ethnic communities – the Diola in Casamance and the Lozis in Barotseland – that are different in terms of language, history, culture, etc. from the dominant groups in the countries. While they are in the minority at a national level, they constitute majorities in their homelands. This brief overview demonstrates that the cases are sufficiently similar to be compared without distortions. Moreover, it shows that they correspond to the logic of the method of difference. Structural variables cannot account for the variation in the outcome. Therefore, it is adequate to apply the framing approach to fill the explanatory vacuum and clarify why the self-determination movements chose different strategies. However, before the method of framing analysis will be described, it is necessary to justify the use of a case studies approach with regard to civil war studies.

#### 4.1.3. *Theoretical Justification of a Case Study Design in the Field of Conflict Studies*

There is an increasing number of case studies that deal with various issues related to civil wars as a result of the micro-turn in the analysis of conflict (see, for example, Björnehed 2012; Chelpi-den Hamer 2011; contributions in Collier and Sambanis 2005a and 2005b; Kalyvas 2006; Schlichte 1996; 2009; Weinstein 2006; Wood 2003). Nevertheless, using qualitative small-N analyses is still an unusual method to examine civil war onset (see Dixon

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<sup>8</sup> Since subsequent chapters will closely look at the respective histories and backgrounds of the conflicts (see 5. and 7.), these aspects will not be presented here.

2009, 725). Often, such an approach is considered inadequate in a field that is dominated by statistical studies, with the analyses of Collier and Hoeffler (1998; 2002; 2004) as well as Fearon and Laitin (2003) being among the most prominent examples. Given the continuing pre-dominance of quantitative approaches in civil war studies, it is imperative to justify the methodological choice and describe its added value for the analysis.

Conflict studies are not the first area of social sciences to experience a methodological turn towards qualitative procedures. Methodological developments in International Relations are illustrative here. Like social sciences in general, IR followed the logic of natural science. Hence, scientists intended to identify causal mechanisms and laws in order to explain phenomena in the international field (Hollis and Smith 1990, ch. 3). This positivist understanding impacted on methodology: Research was mainly based on formal models and statistical analyses and there was significant scepticism concerning the use of case studies in IR (see, for example, Goldthorpe 1997; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Lieberson 1991; 1994; Maoz 2002). However, scholars increasingly pointed to the strengths of qualitative research for this field of study. They stressed that if quality criteria were respected, case studies could bear great innovative potential. Notably, they constituted an adequate way to examine complex social phenomena, which were at the centre of International Relations, and contributed to theory development in multiply ways. Among others, they allowed for drawing causal inferences and uncovering complex causal relationships in a small number of cases and therefore, overlapped with large-N analyses. Hence, proponents of case studies argued that instead of considering quantitative and qualitative methods as mutually exclusive, their comparative advantages and synergy effects should be used to advance the field of study (Bennett 2004; Bennett and Elman 2007; Dixon 2006, 726; Skocpol 2003, 414; Tarrow 2010).<sup>9</sup>

Conflict studies can learn from the experiences of International Relations and also benefit from the integration of qualitative approaches. Statistical methods have their merits. They are suitable, for example, to comparatively analyse large numbers of cases, test hypotheses, and identify causal relations between variables. Often, this is of great relevance to get insights into so far understudied issues. With regard to civil wars, quantitative analyses contributed, for instance, to a better understanding of factors increasing the likelihood of civil war onset. However, these approaches also suffer from numerous shortfalls since complex

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<sup>9</sup> Such a reconciliatory stance is also evident in the increasing importance of mixed methods that combine quantitative and qualitative approaches. In opposition to the prevailing 'scientism', adherents of post-structuralist and post-positivist theories, that aimed to understand rather than explain social realities also made use of case studies (Hollis and Smith 1990, ch. 4; Milliken 1999). By introducing alternative methods, such as discourse analysis or ethnographic methods they also contributed to advance the field of IR (see, for example, Hansen 2006; contributions in Klotz and Prakash 2009; Lynch 2014; contributions in Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006). However, due to the epistemological and ontological divergences between the positivist school of thought on the one hand and post-structuralists and post-positivists on the other, these perspectives will not be taken into account here.

social phenomena, including civil wars are not easily quantified and measured. Problems include, among others, selection biases, problems of endogeneity, and omitted variables. Data is often scarce or of poor quality and there are difficulties related to inadequate or incorrect measurement. 'Soft' influencing factors such as ideology or history were too rapidly dismissed or not taken into account at all. Moreover, quantitative analyses tend to focus on the macro-level and fail to consider dynamics and social interactions at the sub-state and local level. Consequently, they draw a picture of civil war that does not correspond to the actual complexity and multi-dimensionality of the phenomenon (Dixon 2009, 721-731; Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood 2014; Humphreys and Mohamed 2005, 266-267; Sambanis 2004a, 261; see also 2.2. and 2.3.). These shortfalls can be avoided or mitigated by the appropriate usage of qualitative case studies, as Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis demonstrated with their edited volumes *Understanding Civil Wars: Evidence and Analysis* (2005a and 2005b; see also Sambanis 2004a). In these, they compiled case studies by various authors that refine assumptions of the Collier-Hoeffler model regarding civil war onset. On the basis of Sambanis (2004a), it will now be outlined in detail in what way case studies can contribute to a more profound understanding of civil wars.

An important advantage of case studies concerns their perspective on variables. Notably, they can specify the way of functioning of variables that had been identified by quantitative studies. While statistical studies bring out causal factors, they cannot explain how these factors effectively lead to the outbreak of violence. Here, case studies help to identify mechanisms and chains of events or variables that – like tipping dominoes in a row – connect the independent variable with the dependent one. Thus, they open the 'black box' of causality and reveal how variables precisely work. Such an in-depth analysis is only possible, if a limited number of cases is studied (Dixon 2009, 721-726; Sambanis 2004a, 259-263, 271; see also Beach and Pedersen 2013; Bennett 2004; 2008, 702-707; Blatter and Haverland 2012; Rohlfing 2012, ch. 6).<sup>10</sup> In addition to explaining causal mechanisms of single variables, case studies can also reveal interactive effects that exist between different variables. Furthermore, the approach helps to identify additional causal variables (e.g. emotions, ideology, coercion, or history) (Dixon 2009, 729-730; Sambanis 2004a, 260, 263).<sup>11</sup> In this regard, Roger Petersen (2002) showed in a case-based analysis how collective emotions, namely fear, hatred, and resentment provoke ethnic violence and developed a causal explanation. His model clearly underscores the need to consider affective dispositions of communities. Yet, quantitative studies cannot capture them since they are difficult to quantify and intervene at the meso-level (see also Bar-Tal, Halperin, and

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<sup>10</sup> A common, yet not the only possible method to determine causal mechanisms is process tracing (see Beach and Pedersen 2013; Blatter and Haverland 2012, ch. 3; Rohlfing 2012).

<sup>11</sup> The present study focuses on the group level and does not take into account the individual level. If adequately designed, case studies can also yield insights into mechanisms at the micro-level.

de Rivera 2007). Furthermore, case studies can help to add a new perspective to the analysis of civil wars since they shift the focus away from a structure- and outcome-centred approach towards agency and process. In the theoretical chapter, it was argued that structural factors do not automatically provoke violent behaviour, as statistical analyses seem to suggest, but have to be politicised and translated into collective action by political actors that sensitise and mobilise the population. For human agency is key for the outbreak of civil wars, it has to be studied accordingly. As a consequence, it is imperative to adopt methods that are able to look at the impact of groups, their strategies and objectives, as well as individual motives in the context of armed conflict (Sambanis 2004a, 259-263, 268, 273). Closely related to agency and similarly important is the process that results in collective violence. Here again, it is useful to refer to the theoretical part of this thesis. It highlighted that civil war studies focus too strongly at the occurrence of large-scale political violence as the outcome, but neglect the actual dynamics that lead towards intra-state warfare or alternative outcomes (e.g. non-violent protest or other types of violence). Small-N studies effectively favour an agency- and process-centred approach to armed conflict. They provide in-depth knowledge of the studied cases as well as the necessary data. This allows for tracing the complex series of events, actions, reactions, and interactions that prompt the outbreak of violent conflict. Moreover, case studies take into consideration group dynamics and relations between violent actors and the population which quantitative analysis overlook (Dixon 2009, 730-731; Sambanis 2004a, 271-273; see also 3.1.1. and Foucher 2002a).

This short compilation of major advantages of qualitative case studies illustrated that concentrating on a small number of selected cases contributes to deepen, refine, and broaden causal explanations of the outbreak of civil war in various respects. By historicising and contextualising causal factors, the method is useful to elucidate how independent variables work and interact and helps to understand under what conditions they trigger violence. It also serves to identify additional variables that had so far been omitted. Furthermore, case studies are useful to take an alternative perspective at the emergence of armed conflict. They allow for looking beyond structural or macro-explanations and including additional levels of analysis, considering cultural aspects, and shifting attention towards agency and process (Sambanis 2004a, 262). In this respect, it is striking that case studies make methodologically similar contributions to the ones that framing made in a theoretical sense. Altogether, neither are qualitative case studies atheoretical and descriptive, nor do they aim to supersede quantitative approaches. But they help to provide more complete, in-depth, and multi-level knowledge regarding factors that influence the outbreak of civil war. Hence, the method appropriately reflects social realities and processes preceding intra-state war and yields additional insights that cannot be obtained by quantitative analyses (Dixon 2006, 726).

### **4.2. Methodological Process at the Within-Case Level: Developing an Integrated Method of Framing Analysis as an Explanatory Approach**

A case study design does not presuppose a specific methodological proceeding at the within-case level (Rohlfing 2012, 27), but the method that is applied has to be chosen in accordance with the specific research objective. The aim of the thesis is to explain variances in collective behaviour of separatist movements by reference to framing. Hence, a qualitative framing analysis is most suitable to this end. Such an approach consists of several interconnected steps. First, it is imperative to identify collective action frames of the movements that are studied. Second, the resonance of frames with the activist groups' constituencies needs to be analysed. This means that the congruence of frames with experiences, attitudes, and beliefs, etc. of the targeted group and the effect of framing on collective behaviour is examined. Third, the findings have to be compared across the cases. The subsequent sections will outline how this is methodologically possible.

#### *4.2.1. Identifying Frames through Qualitative Content Analysis*

Before the methodological procedure to identify collective action frames will be detailed, it is imperative to recapitulate how frames are defined and what their function is. Frames are different from (the presentation of) facts (Dahinden 2006, 308). They select, simplify, and interpret events as well as experiences and structure behaviour. Moreover, frames aim to mobilise (potential) followers to participate in collective action. In order to do so, they contain a diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational dimension (Benford and Snow 2000, 614; Snow and Benford 1988; 1992; Snow et al. 1986; see also 3.2.1.) With regard to methodology, it is imperative to highlight additional characteristics of frames. They have to be clearly discernible within the textual material that they are embedded in and reliably distinguishable from other frames. Moreover, frames are multi-layered as well as hierarchically organised and can contain various sub-frames (Johnston 2002, 64, 73). Framing components and specific semantic or textual characteristics (e.g. (key) words, images, symbols, phrases, quotes, etc.) that appear in written or spoken communication serve as indicators for frames and facilitate their identification (Johnston and Alimi 2013; Vicari 2010; de Vreese 2005, 54). A consistent and comprehensive analytical framework is necessary in order to take into consideration the complexity of frames and capture latent meanings. It also has to remain close to the textual data material in order to avoid distortions. In general, framing analysis can draw on both quantitative and qualitative methodological tools to identify frames (for various methodological procedures of frame identification, see, for example, Dahinden 2006, ch. 9-12; Johnston 2002; Johnston and Alimi 2013; Matthes and Kohring 2008; Potthoff 2012, ch. 8.2; Snow et al. 2014, 31; Vicari 2010). However, quantitative methods, which identify frames by counting frequencies of words or phrases, are too inflexible and easily omit

important details and implicit meaning.<sup>12</sup> Qualitative frame analyses used in sociology or political science are equally unsuitable because they often suffer from a lack of unclear methodology and risk being arbitrary. In order to avoid mere description and imprecision in the analysis of frames, this study uses qualitative content analysis, which allows for systematically studying textual material, as an alternative and combines it with methods that were particularly designed to carry out framing analyses (Chong and Druckman 2011).<sup>13</sup> In the following, the theoretical foundations of the method of qualitative content analysis will be introduced.

In general terms, qualitative content analysis is a procedure to analyse textual matter in a rule- and theory-guided manner. It allows for both interpreting data in a systematic way and looking beyond its manifest content (see Christmann 2011; Hermann 2009; Krippendorff 2013; Kuckartz 2012; Mayring 2000; 2010; Schreier 2012).<sup>14</sup> During the research process, written text is progressively classified in inductively or deductively defined categories. Thus, content analysis is a means to systematically and objectively approach the material as well as its content and to capture inherent meaning and nuances. Moreover, it takes into consideration the context of communication processes (Behnke, Baur, and Behnke 2010, 353-355; Christmann 2011, 275; Hermann 2009, 151-152; Kuckartz 2012, 28, 34-35). Qualitative content analysis allows for exclusively focusing on those aspects of the data that are pertinent in the context of a specific research question. Hence, it reduces and filters material. Although this reductive process leads to a loss of specific information, it helps to reach a higher level of abstraction in the analytical process, which is necessary to draw conclusions from text and contrast findings across cases (Hermann 2009, 151; Schreier 2012, 7-8). Unlike results of free interpretations, inferences made through content analysis are valid and replicable (Krippendorff 2013, 24). Due to these characteristics, qualitative content analysis is an adequate technique to identify and study frames in a systematic way. It permits to focus on frames, while other information is excluded from the analysis. Furthermore, condensing and abstracting material is essential to move beyond superficial description and compare frames between cases.

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<sup>12</sup> For an overview of advantages and shortfalls of qualitative and quantitative methods with regard to frame analysis, see Johnston 2002.

<sup>13</sup> According to Chong and Druckman, frame analysis comprises five steps. First of all, the topic, problem, or issue at stake is to be clearly defined. Second, it is necessary to identify relevant attitudes within society. Third, a coding scheme with preliminary frames has to be developed. Fourth, sources are selected. Five and finally, the data is studied through content analysis (2011, 240-241).

<sup>14</sup> In the following, the term content analysis is used to refer to *qualitative* content analysis unless stated otherwise. Note that there is a difference in the usage of the term qualitative content analysis in the English- and German-speaking academic field. In English, it englobes a variety of different methods, e.g. discourse analysis, rhetorical analysis, conversation analysis, etc. (Johnston 2002, 69-75; Krippendorff 2013, 22-23). In German, qualitative content analysis (also called qualitative text analysis; Kuckartz 2014) refers to a distinct method that was mainly developed by Philipp Mayring (2000; 2010) and Udo Kuckartz (2012). In this thesis, the notion is used to refer to Mayring's and Kuckartz's approach.

#### 4. Methodological Process: Data Collection and Analysis

Subsequently, the precise procedure will be outlined. The analysis of frames diffused by the self-determination movements in Barotseland and Casamance draws on multiple both written and oral primary sources dating from the respective sample periods.<sup>15</sup> In the case of Senegal, this phase ranges from 1980 to 2000;<sup>16</sup> the Zambian case includes the years from 2010 until 2014. Various documents that were published by members of the activist groups or in the name of the movements and disseminated through different channels were analysed. These included, among others, public statements, speeches, websites, newspaper articles in organisation-owned or partisan media, press releases, leaflets, and pamphlets. The documents were published on the movements' websites as well as webpages of supporting bodies, re-printed in secondary sources, and collected during field research. Moreover, oral sources were taken into account, namely interviews with activists or statements that were published in national or international media and on the internet (e.g. Al Jazeera, Muvi TV, and YouTube).<sup>17</sup> Additional information was taken from secondary sources, such as case studies and reports by researchers, NGOs, or think tanks and interviews conducted during field research.<sup>18</sup>

According to theory, frames can be identified in a deductive or inductive manner (see Dahinden 2006, 201, 310-312).<sup>19</sup> Due to the lack of studies on the framing of self-determination movements, it was impossible to deductively derive frames from previous analyses. Instead, frames and sub-frames were inductively identified on the basis of the analysed material. This implies that in order to develop a coding scheme, a basic understanding of the data was imperative. Once the coding scheme was sufficiently adjusted and refined,<sup>20</sup> all data was successively coded, i.e. classed into previously defined categories that represented frames, with the help of the computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software MAXQDA (Kuckartz 2012; Mayring 2000; 2010; Schreier 2012). The sequential coding of the entire body of sources allowed for extracting frames in an intersubjectively intelligible and replicable manner and avoided omitting details. In this context, the question

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<sup>15</sup> Content analysis can be based on sources of various types, for example press articles, speeches, or interviews, as long as they are appropriately edited (Christmann 2011, 278; Hermann 2009, 152).

<sup>16</sup> In Senegal, there was a change of government in 2000 that modified the context factors and the handling of the conflict. Hence, fixing this year as the end of the analysed time period is suitable.

<sup>17</sup> At the time the movements emerged, technological progress greatly varied and the data, which is available for analysis differs. While the internet and new media are useful means to access materials concerning Barotseland, they played a minor role in the case of Casamance. Here, documents had to be accessed through hard copies. Some documents from the MFDC are also available on the internet since they were retrospectively used for propaganda purposes on webpages or weblogs. Visual material, e.g. pictures, was not considered because it did not play a role in any of the cases.

<sup>18</sup> Accordingly, counterframes were identified by reference to oral or written statements (e.g. party programmes, statements, press releases, parliamentary debates, newspaper articles, pastoral letters, etc.) of relevant social actors including the respective incumbent governments, opposition parties, religious actors, or NGOs, etc. as well as interviews with representatives of these agents.

<sup>19</sup> For a discussion of advantages and inconveniences of such a proceeding as well as alternatives, namely a deductive-quantitative and an inductive-quantitative approach, see Dahinden 2006, 311-312.

<sup>20</sup> Neither should frames be defined too broadly, nor too narrowly in order to avoid under- or over-specification and allow for systematising and contrasting frames.

arises when elements of communication effectively constitute a frame. An important criterion for a frame to be considered as such is its representational validity. A frame is representationally valid, if various people other than the researcher are able to identify the same frames and if the frames in question matter for the societies that are concerned (de Vreese 2005, 54; see also Hermann 2009). Two criteria were used to discern frames: First, in order to be considered as such, a frame had to be frequently alluded to in different documents. Issues that were only marginally mentioned did not qualify as frames. Second, interviews were used in order to verify if frames which had been identified through content analysis played a role in the field. They served to rule out erroneously identified frames, refine elements of frames, or uncover additional ones that played an important role in spoken language, but were neglected in written documents (see Johnston 2002, 66-67).

In sum, thanks to qualitative content analysis, the data was condensed and reduced to a limited number of recurrent frames. The proceeding allowed for systematising, typologising, and comparing them (Dahinden 2006, 203). It prevented arbitrariness and increased the validity of the results.

#### 4.2.2. *Framing Analysis II: How to Assess the Impact of Frames*

Identifying frames reveals how movements attempt to present their claims, what remedies they propose, and how they legitimise their strategies in order to acquire and mobilise followers. However, it is imperative to move beyond merely describing frames and assess frame resonance. This elucidates if and to what extent framing has an effect among the targeted population and provokes collective action. The theoretical chapter outlined that the mobilising potency depends on various different frame-immanent and context factors. First, frames must be internally consistent and logical to resonate. Second, organisational, political, historical, and cultural influences determine the (relative) salience and credibility of frames and thus, their effectiveness. Third, framing disputes within movements and counterframing can reduce the influence of frames (see 3.3.2.). This underlines that it is necessary to study framing against the respective societal background in order to be able to assess its impact on the targeted population. However, measuring framing effects is problematic. Methodological approaches are scarce and those existing, such as experiments, input-output-analyses, or surveys (see, for example, Brewer, Graf, and Willnat 2003; Brewer and Gross 2010; Chong and Druckman 2010; Druckman 2001a; Grant and Rudolph 2003; Shah et al. 2010; Tversky and Kahneman 1981; 1986; de Vreese 2010), are not practicable in the present study. Therefore, framing effects will be analysed on the bases of intensive qualitative data, which was collected during field research, and pattern matching as will be detailed hereafter.

##### a) Methods of Data Collection

The analysis of framing effects rests upon intensive fieldwork. Research was conducted on-site in Casamance and Dakar (Senegal) from September to December 2013. A research stay in Western Province alias Barotseland and Lusaka (Zambia) followed in June and July 2014.<sup>21</sup> Semi-structured interviews represented the principal technique of data collection. A semi-structured interview builds on an interview guide that was previously compiled by the researcher and provides a golden thread regarding the content for the verbal exchange. The guide contains a set of topics that are relevant with regard to the research questions and takes into account pertinent theoretical considerations. Each topic is sub-divided into various questions.

In the concrete case of this study, the questionnaire can be divided into several thematic blocks. To start with, the first range of topic addressed the general atmosphere in the respective area affected by the conflict. It aimed to elucidate what grievances and problems existed in these territories, how relations between the separatist regions and the centre were, and how people felt about them. It also contained questions about identity and identification. The core of the interview was dedicated to gaining insights relating to the separatist movements and their sensitisation and mobilisation campaigns. In this context, several questions strived to obtain information about how the groups approached the communities, which communication channels and means they used, and how people learned about the activist movements. This block also aimed to identify, specify, and validate frames. For this purpose, it was investigated what the separatists' principal ideas and aims were and what people heard and memorised regarding their message. In order to clarify specific aspects, questions about the distinct framing dimensions could be included. Concerning prognostic framing, for example, respondents were asked what they knew about the promised independent state or how they imagined it. In addition, frame resonance was evaluated. Here, interviewees should recount how the collective actors' rhetoric was absorbed by communities. Questions should serve to find out what perceptions and opinions prevailed at the group level, but it was also inquired about the interviewee's individual position and why he or she was in favour of the movements and maybe even joined one of them, or not. Furthermore, queries about why the conflicts escalated or remained non-violent from the respondent's point of view and about attitudes towards the use of force were important. In this context, the questioning likewise aimed to uncover the cultural and societal background by bringing up 'soft aspects' (for example, beliefs, attitudes, narratives, values, experiences,

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<sup>21</sup> In Casamance, research was carried out in the Ziguinchor region (Lower Casamance), including all three departments (Ziguinchor, Bignona, and Oussouye). In addition, interviews were conducted in Guinea-Bissau. In Barotseland, research extended to the districts of Mongu, Kaoma, Sesheke, and Senanga. Besides, the city of Livingstone, which is today in Zambia's Southern Province, was included. In both countries, data was also collected in the capital cities Dakar and Lusaka. A total of 165 interviews (75 in Senegal and 90 in Zambia) were recorded.

etc.) as well as modifications in them.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, the credibility of framing agents was assessed through questions focusing on movement leaders. Finally, there were queries concerning counterframing by other actors, for example, if there were any attempts to provide an alternative interpretation of the situation, by whom, and how they were justified. While the broader topics recurred in all interviews, the precise questions were adjusted to the different categories of interviewees (see below). Various groups dispose of different information and insights they can provide and are more or less biased in their responses. To reflect this fact, the questions that were posed during the interview were selected and modified accordingly.

The technique of using semi-structured interviews has various advantages that make it an adequate tool to assess validity and resonance of frames. Unlike narrative interviews, which are strongly influenced by the respondents' preferences, this type of interview allows for focusing on specific issues that are relevant to the researcher and reduces the risk of thematic digression. Nonetheless, it is flexible enough to leave space for the interviewee to give individual insights and perspectives and bring up related issues that matter to her or him. In comparison to surveys based on closed-ended questions, it orients itself more strongly around the respondent's opinion than the researcher's assumptions and is therefore open for unexpected answers. This is especially important concerning topics relating to which little previous research exists or within societal contexts unknown to the researcher. As a result, semi-structured interviews combine structure and freedom and enable broad as well as in-depth data collection (Hopf 2004, 204-206; Merton and Kendall 1946, 541, 545). Not only are interviews important to obtain objective information and knowledge, but they also help to access individual perceptions, impressions, mind-sets, and emotions with regard to events or situations. Thus, they yield insights regarding cognitive and affective processes that other approaches (e.g. standardised surveys) cannot uncover (Björnehed 2012, 69; Richards 1996, 200; Thomson 1998, 584).<sup>23</sup> Moreover, with regard to data analysis, semi-structured interviews allow to compare answers and evaluate them in a systematic manner with the help of thematic categories.

In the literature, various forms of interviews are distinguished depending on the type of respondents with the major ones being elite or expert interviews (see, for example, Gläser and Laudel 2010; Hochschild 2009; Littig 2009; Richards 1996). These archetypical differentiations are problematic. The definitions of the terms 'experts' and 'elite' strongly diverge. Moreover, the terms are ascriptions by the researcher and rather imply specific roles

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<sup>22</sup> These 'soft' aspects and their development are important indicators whether framing resonated or not. First, knowing the cultural and societal background of the target group is important to assess if the content of frames corresponds to it and is credible and salient. Second, changes in these are an indicator that framing was successful.

<sup>23</sup> Information is not necessarily incorrect, because it is subjective. Emotions, thoughts, and perceptions are key in order to understand and reconstruct events.

in the context of the research process than precise positions within society (see Gläser and Laudel 2010, 13; Littig 2009, 117, 119-120). Hence, they tell little about who is actually interviewed.<sup>24</sup> In addition, none of the notions embraces the different kinds of people that were talked to for this study. Therefore, it is preferable to develop alternative categories of respondents for the purpose of this thesis. Interviews were conducted with four types of respondents, namely:

1) *The directly involved:*

This category of interviewees includes activists and members of self-determination movements of various types and status. They can be politically active or participate in fighting as in the case of Casamance. Moreover, both leading figures as well as rank and file members were represented in this category.

2) *The targeted:*

This group embraces bystanders, sympathisers, and potential supporters. While some oppose the movements' ideas, others share their views or have mixed positions, but they are not active members of one of the groups.

3) *The opponents:*

This category of interviewees includes individuals that actively speak out against self-determination movements and their goals. Mainly, these are representatives of different organisations or institutions that engage in counterframing.

4) *The observers:*

This group might be described as experts. It includes people that adopt a mainly observing position and have often traced the conflict over a long period of time and collected a lot of information, e.g. journalists, researchers, members of mediating bodies, or other groups of people that deal with the movements in a professional context. It is important to highlight that interviewees of this category are not always neutral, but can be biased, e.g. due to ethnic or political affiliation.

Through interviewing people of all four categories, it is possible to gather different perspectives on the respective self-determination movements and the conflict, since individuals with various societal backgrounds were approached. In concrete terms, current or past members of different ranks of the movements (including (ex-)combatants of the MFDC) representatives of counter-movements, traditional leaders, researchers, journalists, state

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<sup>24</sup> Richards, for example, defines *élite* as "a group of individuals, who hold, or have held, a privileged position in society and, as such, as far as a political scientist is concerned, are likely to have had more influence on political outcomes than general members of the public" (1996, 199). In another definition, the term is used to refer to "people who are chosen because of who they are or what position they occupy", i.e. "a person who is chosen by name or position for a particular reason, rather than randomly or anonymously" (Hochschild 2009, 124). Similarly divergent definitions exist for the notion of expert (see, among others, Flick 2011, 214-219; Littig 2009, 118-122).

officials, members of local communities, and local as well as international NGO employees were among the respondents. The views are complementary as none of the four groups would be able to provide sufficient information on its own. Interviews with directly involved and targeted, for instance, give insights into perceptions and grievances on the ground. At the same time, observers can provide more reflective and encompassing views on events since they are more distanced or dispose of background information that is often unavailable to others. It is important to highlight that interviews were not limited to the capital cities, for this risks leading to a distortion of or bias in information. Instead, research was predominantly conducted in the regions that are object of self-determination claims and among its residents. In this context, it is imperative to briefly explain how interview partners were concretely selected. In both cases, the research process was supported by local research assistants who helped to identify pertinent respondents according to the requirements of the project.<sup>25</sup> Additional interviewees were found thanks to the snowball effect, i.e. through recommendation of already interviewed individuals. On the one hand, this can be problematic as it might cause a selection bias in favour of specific (sub-)groups. Therefore, active selection was always maintained in order to counter problems regarding sampling and guarantee that people of various societal backgrounds were represented. On the other hand, benefitting from networks and relations between respondents considerably helped to gain access to interlocutors that could not have been met otherwise, for example, due to restrictions by formal protocols, the high standing of a person, or fear in case an individual was prosecuted because of his or her activism.

In spite of all advantages, collecting data through interviews is also problematic. Interviews face criticism for their lack of reliability, inaccuracy, and subjectivity. Flaws result, among others from oblivion, nostalgia, social acceptability, collective memory, or retrospective rationalisation, with these negative effects increasing the greater the time elapse between the interview and relevant events (Diekmann 2009, 446-451; Gläser and Laudel 2010, 147; Littig 2009, 120; Peniston-Bird 2009, 106-107; Richards 1996, 200; Thomson 1998, 584). Retrospectivity is especially a problem regarding the Casamance case. Since the conflict had manifested, more than 30 years have elapsed, during which the Casamançais suffered from the negative repercussions of the armed struggle. Recently, the local population has obtained more information than in the early phases of the conflict thanks to better media coverage and communication technologies as well as a more open political climate. These developments modified perspectives and opinions on the conflict; for instance, popular perception of the separatist group deteriorated over the years and original supporters turned

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<sup>25</sup> At most occasions, local research assistants arranged appointments and were present during the interviews. This enhanced open-mindedness or trust of the respondents. In some cases, people mistrusted the local partners and preferred private conversations.

away from it.<sup>26</sup> There are also problems in relation to present events. Among others, interlocutors lack detailed information regarding developments or their context, are partisan or emotional, or potentially try to instrumentalise the researcher for their political goals through their responses, as it occurred in Western Province (Zambia). These difficulties should neither be ignored, nor overestimated. If carefully examined, even seemingly biased responses provide useful insights. Although being imperfect, human memory proves more persistent than often assumed, as historical research demonstrated (see Peniston-Bird 2009, 108-109). Therefore, interviews still offer valuable insights into past events. Furthermore, it is also informative what is not openly said in interviews. Likewise, emotional and subjective responses are highly important since they are inherent to social phenomena and therefore, must be part of their explanation. Finally, conducting interviews with a great number of individuals with various backgrounds and perspectives and as well as taking into account additional sources help to identify and correct flaws and inconsistencies. Thus, while there are certainly shortfalls regarding the interview methodology, they can be countered if the process of data analysis adequately reacts to them (see Thomson 1998, 585; 4.2.3.).

An additional method of data collection was used in Casamance, where a survey was carried out in carefully selected communities (see figure 3).<sup>27</sup> Both rural and urban areas in different departments in Lower Casamance were chosen on the basis of varying context variables. For instance, several villages that had strongly supported the MFDC were picked out. Often, they also served as areas of retreat for the rebels and/or became affected by the conflict, e.g. through government raids. Moreover, the survey covered quarters of Ziguinchor, where a great number of internally-displaced persons (IDPs) had found a new home. They had frequently been adversely affected by the conflict before having left their regions of origin with either the MFDC or the Senegalese security forces being at the origin of their suffering and expulsion. Since IDPs often came from conflict-affected zones, one can assume that these populations had been in contact with the MFDC and its framing or might even have supported the rebels. Finally, the Kalounayes forest in the north of the Casamance River was included since it remained largely unaffected by the conflict and villages of the area openly resisted the rebel group.

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<sup>26</sup> Some people might also deny their support for the group due to political correctness or fear. Until today, some people do not like to openly speak about the conflict due to past restrictions of the freedom of expression and repression.

<sup>27</sup> N = 313. The survey was carried out in cooperation with the University of Ziguinchor. For a map of Casamance, see 5.

**Figure 3: Overview of the locations selected for the survey**

<b>Location</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Department</b>	<b>Specificities / Reason for selection for the survey</b>
Lyndiane	Quarter of Ziguinchor (city)	Ziguinchor	Strong influx of IDPs
Diabir	Village close to Ziguinchor	Ziguinchor	Location for preparatory meetings for the 1982 march and retreat afterwards
Kolobane	Quarter of Ziguinchor (city)	Ziguinchor	Strong influx of IDPs
Tilène	Quarter of Ziguinchor (city)	Ziguinchor	Native inhabitants strongly affected by land expropriation
Niassia	Village (community of Oussouye)	Ziguinchor	Strong presence of MFDC
Oussouye	Town (west of Ziguinchor)	Oussouye	Place of origin of Father Diamacoune; strong presence of MFDC, increasing resistance against the movement
Effok and Youtou	Villages (west of Ziguinchor)	Oussouye	Strong presence of MFDC
Sindian	Village (north of Bignona)	Bignona	Strong presence of MFDC
Diouloulou and Kafountine	Villages (north-west of Bignona)	Bignona	Strong presence of MFDC
Kalounayes	Forest zone north of the Casamance river	Bignona	Opposition to MFDC by several villages of the Kalounayes zone
Bignona (city)	town	Bignona	Strong support for MFDC

In terms of content, the questionnaire included a block containing general questions regarding the individual's background (for example, age, education, residence during the early phase of the conflict, negative experiences during the crisis, etc.). Similar to the semi-structured interviews, the main body combined both open and closed questions that aimed to obtain factual information about the MFDC, its mobilisation campaign, and activities (for instance, how one had first heard about the MFDC), but also sought to uncover subjective perceptions and opinions of the respective respondent.

The results of the survey are not representative and generalisable, as the sample was not randomised. Nevertheless, the proceeding has major advantages. Due to the survey, it was possible to interrogate more than 300 inhabitants from different segments of society and of all three departments of Lower Casamance. Thus, it allowed for covering a broader territory

and depicting a wider range of opinions and attitudes than face-to-face interviews exclusively conducted by the author could have done. In this context, it was particularly useful that it put a strong emphasis on rural milieus which helped to look beyond the urban centres and countered potential biases in this regard. Moreover, interviewers of local origin guaranteed better access to local communities, since there are no language barriers or lack of trust towards a foreigner.<sup>28</sup> The information gathered through the survey supplemented and completed interview data by additional quantitative evidence. By garnering impressions of popular perceptions and public opinion in a variety of locations, it confirmed tendencies that oral questionings had brought to light. It also drew attention to aspects that interviews had neglected. In sum, the survey was a valuable complement to semi-structured interviews and helped to gain additional insights concerning perceptions and opinions on the ground. Hence, it contributed to improve findings both regarding the sensitisation and mobilisation attempts by the MFDC as well as frame resonance.

As a conclusion of this sub-section, some reflections on the research sites are indispensable because they affect the quality of the collected data. In Casamance, 30 years of low-intensity conflict influenced the landscape of actors in the field as well as the way in which people talk about the crisis. There is a big number of international, national, and local NGOs, which specialise in reconciliation, peace-making and peace-building, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration measures, etc. Most of the civil society organisations that focus on development in the region simultaneously run additional projects related to peace and conflict. Furthermore, there have been several attempts to end the conflict and negotiate peace, in which local actors were involved. Therefore, stakeholders obtained objective knowledge and expertise regarding the conflict and its onset. Besides, researchers of different disciplines studied the events. Their works improved the understanding of the conflict both within the region and at the (inter)national level. Regarding public debate, one observes that while the Senegalese government initially prevented open discourse on the issue, freedom of expression improved. Consequently, people expressed themselves relatively openly in interview situations although fear persists to a certain degree. Finally, one can assume that many people became critical of the original claims of the armed group and war-weary due the persistence of the fighting and its negative consequences on the local population. These dynamics have an impact on the results of research in Casamance. Although the situation is still emotionally loaded, most respondents provided well-informed, reasoned information. Often, this made it difficult to get access to perceptions and feelings that had been prevailing in the early 1980s, when the conflict started, but helped to gain well-founded answers. In comparison, the situation in Barotseland is different. At the time of field research, the Barotseland question was burning. The Mongu riots, which were a traumatising

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<sup>28</sup> Besides, the anonymity reduced distortions through socially desirable responses.

experience for the population in Western Province, only dated back two and a half years. In spring 2014, shortly before research was carried out, an activist group had challenged the government to accept international arbitration. Although the government did not formally react, this act sparked new tensions. Moreover, the state maintained a repressive stance. Pro-Barotse activists continued to be arrested while others awaited trial. Activist groups were denied registration. Many actors were cautious to openly position themselves to avoid negative repercussions. Moreover, the Barotseland question was not publicly discussed. It rarely appeared in national media and if, it was more often than not presented in a biased way. Alternative neutral platforms to talk about the topic did not exist. As a consequence, reliable information was scarce and even locals in Western Province knew little about what was going on. This provided fertile ground for rumours and the situation was very emotional. Hence, the collected data tended to be more passionate and politicised than in Casamance. Finally, little research had previously been carried out with regard to the self-determination conflict in western Zambia which could offer more reflective and distanced insights. In sum, it is imperative – yet challenging – to carefully double-check facts and analyse information. These specificities of the two localities have to be remembered and adequately reacted to throughout the research process.

##### b) Evaluating Data: Assessing Frame Resonance through Interviews

Previously, it was argued that interviews are used as complementary tool to identify and clarify collective action frames. They help to verify if frames that had prior been detected as such through text-based qualitative content analysis, are also apprehended by the local population, i.e. the target group, and can therefore be regarded to be of representational validity. Moreover, they are useful to interpret and understand the meaning of frames. However, the major function of interviews in this research is to assess frame resonance in the studied cases. Applying them for this purpose is suitable for several reasons. First, interviews can serve to study and interpret media effects. More precisely, they are useful to gather specific information regarding such effects and disclose what elements are causally significant and why (see Merton and Kendall 1946). Accordingly, they also contribute to analysing framing effects and resonance. Second, interviews can be utilised to shed light on and reconstruct social situations, events, or processes and contribute to understanding and explaining them (Gläser and Laudel 2010, 13, 37; Richards 1996, 200). Hence, they can trace how framing developed and what reactions it evoked. In this regard, they help to better understand under what conditions frames (or elements of frames) successfully resonate and how they function. Moreover, they specify the impact of framing on the target communities

and identify specific effects of frames.<sup>29</sup> In addition, data from interviews provides evidence on the importance and rating of different frames (Dahinden 2006, 207). Finally, oral recounts allow for comprehending the “tone”, that is, the atmosphere and context of situations which is favourable to capture collective and individual emotions as well as subjective perceptions that parallel framing efforts (Richards 1996, 200).

In this context, it is also necessary to reflect on the potential of interviews, i.e. individual recounts, to yield insights into group dynamics. Although responses represent first and foremost the experience and opinion of the respective respondent, the person is an ‘expert’ for the society he or she lives in and thus capable of providing subjective, but valuable insights regarding pertinent issues and developments concerning the entire group. Moreover, conclusions are not drawn from single statements, but the aggregate of questionings. To exploit the potential of interviews and avoid distortions in their evaluation, they were analysed in a systematic manner. Their content was comparatively examined to filter out recurrent topics and responses that transgress single conversations. Combined with theoretical considerations regarding frame resonance, these overarching patterns or content categories allowed for gathering evidence on the effects of framing. From these, one could progressively deduce general and abstract inferences that led to valid conclusions at the group level. Thus, the careful evaluation of the aggregate of interviews resulted in an “analytical explanation couched in explicit theoretical forms” (George and Bennett 2005, 211). In order to validate the outcomes obtained in such way, they were triangulated with additional data. Triangulation refers to the combination of different data sources, methods, or theoretical perspectives with the aim to cross-check the validity of results and the consistency or argumentation (Checkel 2009, 119; Denzin 1970, 301-313; Flick 2011, 519). Since it considers alternative explanations and assesses their relevance with regard to the outcome, it is also a useful technique to counteract equifinality. In concrete terms, the results of the analysis of interview data were matched with secondary sources about the case studies. In this context, the more distanced and neutral view of observers also turned out useful.<sup>30</sup> Due to their thorough knowledge of the context and their reflective capacity, they could appraise factors influencing frame resonance and changes in attitudes and opinions at the meso-level. Thus, triangulation simultaneously helped to verify and deepen results with regard to frame resonance and prevented incorrect conclusions in this context. Altogether, by respecting the outlined procedure, it was possible to deduce valid conclusions at the group level from the total of interview data.

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<sup>29</sup> With regard to causal effects, specificity is primordial. It is insufficient to now that framing provokes a reaction, but it is necessary to know what frame or elements of a frame cause the reaction under which circumstances (see Merton and Kendall 1946, 541).

<sup>30</sup> In the case of Casamance, the survey also proved useful here.

##### c) Measuring and Comparing Frame Resonance

In order to measure – or ‘quantify’ – frame resonance and compare it across the cases, it is useful to independently assess different aspects. In total, the “appeal and [mobilising] potency” (Snow and Benford 1988, 205) of framing builds on four pillars:

###### 1) *The general degree of frame resonance:*

By assessing the general degree of frame resonance, one discerns to what extent social movements effectively persuade the targeted group of their cause and the necessity to engage in collective action and if their success is durable. In this context, it is important to analytically distinguish between the different functions of collective action frames, namely the diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing dimension in order to gain a differentiated view of the effectiveness of frames. The diagnostic or prognostic functions together create definitional consensus by proposing an interpretation of and a solution to an existing problem. The motivational dimension seeks to achieve action mobilisation by providing a final impetus for people to actively commit themselves to collective action (Klandermans 1984; Snow and Benford 1988; Walgrave and Manssens 2005). Since all components are equally essential for the overall success of frames, the latter are most effective if they are internally consistent and if their different dimensions are well intertwined. If a dimension is underdeveloped or entirely absent, the overall success of framing is weakened.

Furthermore, it is important to take a closer look at factors that facilitate frame resonance. Here, one can differentiate between long-, medium-, and short-term determinants. Long-term factors include, for example, collective memories, shared identities, common myths or symbols, narratives as well as discourses, and values that developed over a long period of time and potentially transcend generations.<sup>31</sup> They are historically grown and deeply entrenched within a society and cannot easily be modified. If framing agents successfully instrumentalise such elements or allude to them in their frames, they provide a particularly thorough and reliable foundation for frame resonance that can hardly be challenged. Medium-term factors favouring frame resonance occur over a certain period that can stretch over several years or decades. Among such determinants are, for example, inter-group relations that result from a specific policy. They are less deeply entrenched than long-term components and remain modifiable, although their alteration takes some time. Consequently, their influence concerning frame resonance is less stable than in the case of long-term components, but still relatively constant. Short-term factors are situational and the least established of the three types of factors which makes them easily malleable.

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<sup>31</sup> Collective memories, discourses, and narratives are part of the cultural background against which collective action frames resonate. For a differentiation between the different concepts and their interactions, see 3.2.2.

Here, collective emotions that are provoked by a single or relatively brief incident serve as an example. They are the most unreliable basis for framing over time since they can quickly change, if there is a modification of the triggering circumstances. This also suggests that opponents can actively engage in suspending such short-term factors. Yet, this does not imply that they are weak with regard to frame resonance, but they can induce strong reactions due to their explosive and impulsive character. The different factors are not mutually exclusive, but can coexist and interact. If frame resonance simultaneously relies on all of them, the movements benefit from their various advantages. In sum, disaggregating the different dimensions of frames and differentiating between various factors favouring their effectiveness provides information on the quality, that is, strengths and weaknesses of frame resonance in general.

2) *The effectiveness of frames referring to the collective strategy:*

Since the question why conflicts remain non-violent or escalate into armed struggle is at the centre of the present thesis, it is particularly important to evaluate the potency of prognostic frames referring to the collective strategy that movements call for. While the content of related frames yields some insights into the possible outcome, it is primordial to separately and closely assess their resonance as it determines whether activists manage to convince their constituency of their preferred strategy.<sup>32</sup> As in the case of frame resonance in general, discerning long-, medium-, and short-term factors promoting the mobilising potency is also helpful here. If an armed movement fails to frame its violent tactic in a way that appeals to its basis, it is unlikely to successfully mobilise (potential) followers for it. One has to remember that it is particularly difficult to convince supporters of the need to take up arms because the costs and thus, the inhibition level related to participation in civil strife are higher in comparison to peaceful collective action. Since rebel movements might use alternative means to overcome collective action problems and win support, namely incentives or coercion, these have to be controlled for. It is also imperative to question where violent or non-violent frames come from and search for their origin, if possible as well as identify components enhancing them. This helps to uncover specific underlying conditions and dynamics that trigger or favour a specific collective strategy (see also 4) in the following).

3) *The credibility of frame articulators:*

The standing of framing agents contributes to reinforcing or weakening the effects of frames independent of their content. This means that weak frames might still have a certain positive effect if a well-reputed framing agent is at their origin. Yet, a leading

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<sup>32</sup> The general degree of frame resonance also affects the effectiveness of strategy-related frames.

figure that does not dispose of credibility from the perspective of the targeted group or loses it can seriously harm the effectiveness of even well-conceived collective action frames.

4) *The impacts of counterframing:*

If other social actors enter the scene, a vivid contest about interpretations can develop between social movements and opposing social forces. The outcome is not fixed a priori. If counterframing remains weak and unconvincing, it does not represent a serious threat but leaves enough room to social movements to maintain a monopoly regarding the interpretation of the situation. Similarly, if framing agents succeed in adjusting their arguments and defending their position with regard to alternative opinions, they can win the rhetorical battle and benefit from counterframing. Yet, this is not given. Counterframes that take up the needs and expectations of the targeted population and correspond to the cultural background can be salient and credible. In this case, they successfully supersede the initial frames of social movements and render them less attractive or even ineffective. Moreover, the constellation of actors matters as it has an escalating or appeasing effect on framing and influences whether a conflict is likely to turn violent or not. More concretely, if a social movement is interested in maintaining constructive relations with a counterframing agent, the group is likely to adopt a moderate position in order to avoid deepening existing trenches. This can be the case if a movement perceives an opponent as a potential ally that might support its demands. Furthermore, open conflicts with important social actors (for example, local élites) can harm the credibility of a movement which is why it refrains from putting them off through unacceptable views. By contrast, framing agents that are in a polarised situation without potential supporters do not face restrictions regarding their position. Consequently, they come up with or maintain more radical frames, namely with respect to the use of armed force.

Altogether, the four dimensions – the general degree of frame resonance, the effectiveness of frames related to strategy, the credibility of frame articulators, and the impact of counterframing – influence the effectiveness of framing by a social movement. They have to be assessed independently and added up to allow for measuring frame resonance and contrasting it with framing effects in other cases. Here, it is important to note that the two research questions necessitate two forms of comparisons. First, the mobilising potency of frames has to be compared across the cases to identify variations. Second, a cross-time analysis is required to analyse differences in frame resonance in Casamance.

##### 4.2.3. *Methodological Challenges to Analysing Framing in Sub-Saharan Africa and Beyond*

Framing allows for obtaining important insights concerning the escalation of violent conflict that other approaches cannot offer. But there are also methodological challenges to identifying collective action frames and assessing their resonance. Social movement studies emerged in the context of western societies and were mainly used to study non-violent social movements. Yet, realities in non-western settings, notably in Sub-Saharan Africa, are different which has to be taken into account when examining framing elsewhere.<sup>33</sup> Likewise, there are specificities connected with mobilisation for armed struggle. Hence, the last section of the chapter will discuss relevant difficulties and potential ways out.

First of all, gathering data that forms the basis for frame identification can be problematic. If a conflict occurred in the past, as in the case of Casamance, finding communication material (i.e. documents or recordings of statements by (violent) social movement actors) can be hard because sources were not systematically archived, be it for a lack of interest or resources or the deliberate political will to destroy them. In (semi-)authoritarian regimes, where the government controls the media sector, newspapers and broadcasts predominantly reflect the official perspective of the state. Hence, they are useful to spot counterframes, but tell little about the positions of movements challenging the government. Such groups cannot use official communication channels, but disseminate their message discretely. These exchanges of ideas are unlikely to be filed and thus, particularly difficult to access for researchers. In more recent conflicts, the internet offers new possibilities to activist groups and constitutes an interesting mine of information. Yet, its influence should be critically reflected upon. Although internet connectivity in Sub-Saharan Africa improved, remote areas are not necessarily well-connected. Furthermore, accessing to the World Wide Web remains expensive compared to local income. In consequence, the net is not broadly and regularly used as a means to communicate and disseminate information. Nevertheless, its relevance should not be underestimated since local communities often come up with creative forms to spread its content offline; for instance, internauts orally distribute information or print and circulate it (Gagliardone and Stremlau 2011, 16-18; see also 8.1.). Yet, this implies that online information does not always reach the population in an immediate and unfiltered way, but is subject of selection and imprecision over the course of the propagation process.<sup>34</sup> In addition, the quality and reliability of online material requires attention. On the internet, publishing in the name of a movement, under a false identity, or anonymously is easy.

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<sup>33</sup> Since both case studies are in Sub-Saharan Africa, the following section will concentrate on this region. While some of the challenges are transferable to other contexts, it cannot be ruled out that there are additional difficulties in other areas of the world.

<sup>34</sup> This is also partly true to for written documents whose content is disseminated orally. One also has to take into account that internet platforms are not exclusively targeted at followers on the ground, but also serve to provide information to external agents, such as the diaspora or international political actors.

Hence, the source of posts can be unclear. Moreover, the internet facilitates the diffusion of incorrect statements. People on the ground are aware of this and might not trust the material whose influence remains limited in consequence. There is also a risk that opinions on the internet are biased since they predominantly reflect the views of a certain segment of society, namely the urban middle-class or even the diaspora who can easily access and use the web. In sum, the internet offers new ways of communication to movements on the ground and additional sources for analysis to the researcher. However, this does not only have positive implications for the research process. Potential distortions regarding the dissemination, sources and quality of online material have to be considered.

After all, the question arises how representative written documents are given the strong oral traditions that often prevail in African societies. Information – whether these are customary knowledge being transmitted from generation to generation or everyday news – are rather passed on verbally than in black and white. There are also manifold obstacles that obstruct the people from accessing printed material and limit its reach. The level of illiteracy considerably varies across different segments of society and remains high in many African countries, including Zambia and Senegal. Depending on the level of education, people do not necessarily master the lingua franca in addition to their local language which is why texts in English or French would be unintelligible to them. Finally, producing and accessing written sources can be expensive for groups and people, respectively; the price of newspapers is, for example, high in comparison with local income. There are additional constraints that are specific to conflict settings. Circulating documents in printing is linked with a certain danger in situations that are characterised by repression and limited freedom of expression. Both in Casamance and Barotseland, individuals were arrested because they possessed so-called ‘seditious materials’. In such contexts, sensitisation and mobilisation campaigns are often informal or clandestine. Overall, due to the limits and risks of written information, spoken communication is often more important on the ground. This constitutes a challenge for framing analysis. Since the access to oral accounts is limited as previously mentioned, written texts might be the only available data source. Yet, the exact content of written communication is likely to deviate from the way movements present their struggle in the localities.<sup>35</sup>

There are also difficulties regarding the assessment and measurement of frame resonance. Since previous reflections on the methodological proceeding already referred to some of them, they will only be compiled briefly. In general, the procedure itself that is used to examine frame resonance can represent a challenge. It was argued above that conventional methods, such as experiments, input-output-analyses, or surveys are not always suitable.

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<sup>35</sup> There is a transcribed translation of a speech that members of the MFDC held in Diola in a Casamançais village. This *Discours de Diatok* illustrates that similar topics come up in oral and written communication, but the presentations and priorities diverged.

Thus, creativity is imperative to come up with adequate alternative tools to gather and analyse data. They have to be rigorously applied to avoid potential flaws. In the context of the present thesis, for example, interviews were conducted for this purpose (see 4.2.2. b)). In addition, analysing frame resonance necessitates in-depth knowledge of the local context in order to prevent incorrect conclusions. To be able to appraise whether and to what degree specific frames resonate (or not) and why, researchers need detailed insights regarding a variety of relevant determinants. These include, among others, historical (for example, the history of the region in pre- and post-colonial times), political (for example, prevalent problems, relations between the centre and the periphery and their development, political attitudes), cultural (for example, regional identities), or affective (for example, sensitivities and collective emotions) aspects in the studied areas. Moreover, gathering information on the (non-)violent movements and their leading figures is essential. Hence, intensive field research in different sites, including the conflict regions is inevitable to obtain the necessary empirical data serving as a basis for framing analysis. This is even more so, if there is few (up-to-date) research on the region and the activist groupings, as for instance in the case of Barotseland, because it is impossible to gain background information through secondary literature. However, fieldwork represents a challenge in itself. Especially in conflict settings that are difficult or dangerous to access, it is linked with non-negligible difficulties and risks or might be impossible. Moreover, performing field research is time-consuming and resource-intensive. Hence, the extensive effort that is linked with it also constitutes an obstacle for the large-scale application of framing. Altogether, the valuable in-depth information that the framing approach offers is simultaneously linked with considerable difficulties and costs that cannot be ignored.

There are also several more specific difficulties that impede getting information on what people think about collective action frames and thus, examining their effectiveness. In this regard, fear can constitute an obstacle. In many cases, social movements that voice controversial demands or apply force face repression by the government. It targets members and sympathisers, but also affects the larger environment of the oppositional groups. In such settings, being associated with a challenging movement becomes risky which is why people avoid talking about it. Likewise, armed groups aim to silence opponents. Hence, informants might be reluctant to position themselves for fear of the negative consequences. This does not only affect ongoing conflicts, where the danger of reprisals is very present. But past experiences of repressive violence have long-term effects which is why people remain careful to speak out. The community that people live in also constitutes a potential threat. To avoid negative reactions on behalf of the group, respondents might be reluctant to disclose their positions, for example, if they oppose views that a majority is in favour of. Finally social desirability has a comparable effect. Interviewees are cautious to express their sympathy for

a movement in an environment that despises it. Thus, they might not uncover their real attitudes to the researcher. Another challenge is retrospectivity. It particularly concerns conflicts that escalated in the past (see 4.2.2.). Recent influences, such as negative experiences resulting from internal warfare or better availability of background information affect the informants' views or memories and thus, their responses. Research demonstrated that oral accounts are relatively reliable and stable which is why they deliver valid results (Peniston-Bird 2009, 108-109). Nevertheless, one must not forget that it can be difficult to precisely assess what people thought and felt in the past and thus uncover the subjective aspect that is relevant for evaluating frame resonance.<sup>36</sup> Furthermore, respondents are unequally subjected to collective action frames because they belong to social networks, which were used to disseminate frames, or joined social movements. In the first case, alternative influences (for example, group pressure) compete with the mobilising potency of frames. These interactive determinants have to be disentangled to correctly assess the effectiveness of strategic communication. In the latter case, interviewees were more strongly exposed to the movements' rhetoric. Thus, they are better informed and more convinced about the content of their message in comparison to outsiders or sceptics. This risks distorting their perceptions of why they initially joined the armed group in the aftermath. Besides, it is difficult to figure out if they got in contact with frames before or after having joined the group.

Overall, it is essential to take into consideration that especially in non-western and violent contexts, applying the framing approach is connected with methodological difficulties. These risk impairing the results of the analysis. Hence, it is necessary to recognise and reflect upon them and conceptualise the entire research process in a way as to counter biases and flaws. To avoid imprecisions regarding frame identification, it is imperative to carefully check the authenticity of sources and estimate their authors' credibility as well as the reach of the material. Likewise, intertextual comparisons and the triangulation of results with other (secondary) sources are useful. Moreover, by attentively planning field research, it is possible to circumvent or attenuate challenges. Interviews help to verify and specify the frames that local people knew about and help to assess their resonance. In this context, carefully designing the questionnaire and strategically sampling respondents are essential means for preventing potential misinterpretations and include various perspectives into the examination. Moreover, the systematic analysis of interviews and the cross-checking of findings with secondary sources also contribute to avoiding distortions.

Up to now, the theoretical and methodological foundations of the thesis were outlined. In an initial chapter, the existing theoretical literature on civil war onset was critically reviewed

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<sup>36</sup> Concretely, one cannot exclude that many people express their frustration about an armed group after years of armed struggle and related suffering although they initially supported it.

which served to discern deficits of the quantitatively orientated approaches and to contextualise this study within the larger academic field (2.). The subsequent theoretical chapter introduced the framing approach and demonstrated why it constitutes a promising means to resolve the puzzles that are at the origin of the thesis and in what ways it can refine and advance theories of armed conflict (3.). The present chapter discussed how to methodologically approach the research questions and apply framing. It proposed a comparative case study design and justified this choice. Moreover, it developed a two-stage proceeding at the within-case level that served to identify collective action frames and measure as well as compare their resonance (4.). The empirical analysis will be at the core of the following chapters. In a first step, the selected cases, namely Casamance and Barotseland will be introduced. Notably, the history of the conflicts will be summarised and their causes will be examined (5. and 7.). In a second step, a detailed framing analysis will be carried out, that is, frames will be identified and assessed with regard to their resonance (6. and 8.). In a final chapter, the results will be drawn together and systematically contrasted in order to finally answer the research questions and evaluate the explanatory potential of framing within conflict studies more generally (9.).

## 5. The Casamance Crisis: A Case of a Violent Separatist Conflict

On the second Christmas Day in 1982, a peaceful march was organised in Casamance, a region in the south of Senegal. A diverse group of people, including men and women of all ages, ethnic groups, and social backgrounds passed through the town of Ziguinchor and marched to the governance. Leaflets signed by the newly created *Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance* (MFDC) circulated and claims for the separation of the region from the Senegalese mainland were raised. The event constituted the public expression of frustrations and mistrust towards the national government that had been growing and cumulating in the region for years. The spectacle took a tragic turn when the protestors lowered the Senegalese flag on the official building and replaced it by a white one. Despite the non-violent character of the protest, security forces reacted with severe repression. As a consequence, several individuals were wounded or arrested. Since then, Casamance has been the scene of one of Sub-Saharan Africa's few violent separatist struggles and West Africa's longest running armed conflict (see Englebert and Hummel 2005). The present chapter will take a closer look at the Casamance crisis.<sup>1</sup> First, its historic background and development will be outlined (5.1.). Second, the major conflicting parties, namely the MFDC and the Senegalese state will be introduced (5.2.). Third, the conflict will be analysed by reference to major theories of armed conflict (5.3.).

### 5.1. The Self-Determination Conflict in Casamance

The Casamance region in the south of Senegal represents a peculiar legacy of colonial times. It constitutes a semi-enclave that stretches along the same-named river and is sandwiched between Guinea-Bissau and the Gambia, with the latter cutting it off almost entirely from the Senegalese mainland (see figure 4). With a surface of roughly 30,000 square kilometres, it makes up one-seventh of the Senegalese territory and is home to slightly over twelve per cent of the Senegalese population which is equivalent to approximately 1.6 million out of a total of 12.9 million people (Evans 2004, 2; Gehrold and Neu 2010, 79; Humphreys and Mohamed 2005, 248; Marut 1992, 208; Ngom, Gaye, and Sarr 2000, 6, 16; République du Sénégal. Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances. Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie 2008, 14; 2014; République du Sénégal. Ministère de l'Économie, des Finances et du Plan. Direction de la Prévision et de la Statistique 1993, 9).<sup>2</sup> In 1984, the region's initial name disappeared from geographic maps

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<sup>1</sup> In Senegal, people most often speak of '*la crise*' – the crisis – when they refer to the Casamance conflict. Thus, the term is also used here.

<sup>2</sup> These figures proportionally correspond to the ones at the beginning of the crisis. In 1976, the population of Lower Casamance (Ziguinchor) represented 5.8 per cent of the Senegalese people (292,000); inhabitants of Upper Casamance (Kolda) made up 8.8 per cent (398,000). Since then, the

## 5. Casamance: History and Background of the Conflict

since it was divided into two smaller administrative units, namely the region of Ziguinchor in the west (former Lower or Basse Casamance) and Kolda in the east (former Upper or Haute Casamance). The government justified the reform by arguments of proximity and governability. However, it is rather an attempt to suppress the major issue of the rebellion by dividing and renaming the region (Dramé 1998, 5-6; LD/MPT 1988, 7; Marut 1997, 2).<sup>3</sup>

**Figure 4: Map of Senegal**



Source: United Nations, Map No. 4174 Rev. 3, January 2004

### 5.1.1. Background Information: The Colonial Past

To get an idea of the societal background, against which the Casamance conflict developed, major features of the regional history will be summarised.<sup>4</sup> Casamance was initially under the influence of the Portuguese who created Ziguinchor as a trading post in 1645. However, the French, who had founded their first settlement in the north in Saint-Louis in 1659, began to expand their control over the entire territory of today's Senegal, including Casamance in the

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population had steadily increased with the ratio having remained stable. In 1988, the total population of Senegal amounted to approximately 6.9 million. The inhabitants of Ziguinchor and Kolda totalled up to 398,000 (5.8 %) and 592,000 (8.6 %), respectively (République du Sénégal. Ministère de l'Économie, des Finances et du Plan. Direction de la Prévision et de la Statistique 1993, 9).

<sup>3</sup> In 2008, the region of Kolda was again divided into Sédhiou (the former Middle or Moyenne Casamance) in the west and Kolda in the east. The MFDC claims an even larger territory by arguing that Casamance includes parts of eastern Senegal, especially Tambacounda and stretches to the river Falémé that marks the border between Senegal and Mali (see, for example, Biagui 1999; Darbon 1985; MFDC 1994; 1995; see also Diedhiou 2010, 254).

<sup>4</sup> An overview of major historical events and dates is provided in the annex (see 11.1.)

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early 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>5</sup> Hence, France extended its influence relatively late towards the south and only gradually subjugated Casamance that consisted of various separate entities with some fiercely resisting foreign rule until it finally controlled – or ‘pacified’ – the region in the 1930s (Marut 2010, 54-57; Perfect and Evans 2010:3; Sy 2007, 163-164). Thus, the foreign political and cultural influence by the colonial power remained weaker in Casamance than in the rest of the Senegalese colony and the two parts had different colonial experiences.<sup>6</sup> In 1960, Senegal obtained independence from France (Hesseling 1985; Lambert 2002, 357; Marut 2010, 56).<sup>7</sup>

As will be seen in the subsequent chapter, the colonial period and its interpretation play a central role in the separatist argumentation of the MFDC. However, it also profoundly influenced social dynamics on the ground. In this regard, the arrival of Catholic missionaries and the introduction of formal education are key elements. While the northern part of Senegal had been thoroughly Islamised, the Muslim faith arrived later in Lower Casamance. It was less deeply entrenched (except among the Manding community) and took longer to successfully gain a foothold in society.<sup>8</sup> This left room of manoeuvre to the Catholic Church that sought to establish its influence in the French colonial territory (Foucher 2003a, 13-16).<sup>9</sup> Yet, Christianisation was not as successful as hoped. Hence, Catholic missionaries ‘Africanised’ the fundamentals of their faith by combining it with selected elements of local traditions and cultures that gained centre stage. The priests particularly sympathised with rural traditions of the ethnic group of the Diola and these represented the major target group of the Catholic Church. Thus, the ‘local’ or ‘Casamançais’ components that the Church used for its purpose were predominantly derived from the Diola cultural repertoire. Through their work, the faith community accustomed a considerable part of the population in the Ziguinchor region with the ‘Casamançais culture’ (or what they had defined as such), raised awareness for their regional cultural particularities, and praised traditions and their importance in times of progressing modernisation. Hereby, the Catholics contributed to the emergence of a

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<sup>5</sup> In the 1830s, the French founded their first settlements in Casamance, namely in Carabane (at the Atlantic Coast) and Sédhiou. Later, they took over Ziguinchor from Portugal. Most sources connect the change in colonial rule to the Franco-Portuguese Treaty of 1886. Others argue that it had already taken place in the 1850s. In the context of this thesis, the effective presence of both colonial powers in Casamance is important as it led to a distinct colonial experience in the region. The precise historic date is of minor relevance.

<sup>6</sup> This was enhanced by the fact that parts of northern Senegal (the so-called *Quatre Communes*, namely Saint-Louis, Dakar, Gorée, and Rufisque) had a specific status within French West Africa due to France’s politics of assimilation. Inhabitants could in principle obtain French citizenship, although this was limited in practice. During a short period from 1848 to 1849 and from 1871, a Senegalese representative was elected to the French parliament and the area disposed of a particular administration in form of the *Conseil général* (see Hesseling 1985, 127-131).

<sup>7</sup> Initially, Senegal became independent as part of the Mali Federation. Yet, the union disintegrated shortly after its creation and Senegal and Mali became independent countries.

<sup>8</sup> The Manding are an ethnic community that mainly settles in the Sédhiou area. For more information on the ethnic composition of Casamance, see 5.3.2.

<sup>9</sup> Approximately one fifth of the half million Senegalese Catholics live in Lower Casamance; yet, Catholics are not in the majority in the area, but approximately three quarters are Muslims (see 5.3.2.).

tradition-based regional identity and became involuntarily a trailblazer for future nationalist and separatist thinkers (Foucher 2002a, 381-383, 402-404; 2002b; 2003a, 22-28; 2005a, 370-380; Marut 2010, 59-62).

The Catholics also established schools in the area and institutionalised modern education. Initially, the local population and Diola in particular rejected instruction as modern intrusion, but increasingly accepted and finally welcomed it as a means of social mobility and opportunity for success. Thus, the Ziguinchor region reached the highest school enrolment figures in the entire country (Foucher 2002a, 377; Juillard 1995, 53; République du Sénégal. Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances. Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie 2008, 82, 85). The widespread schooling should be of double importance for the future rebellion. On the one hand, it enhanced national (or regional) consciousness among the pupils that learned about the characteristics of their region.<sup>10</sup> On the other hand, it was the starting point for inter-regional migration of young literates from Casamance to the northern cities. The population movement simultaneously enhanced interactions with and demarcations from the north and impacted patterns of identification as will be seen further down (Diedhiou 2010, ch. 7; Foucher 2002a, 381-383; 2002b; 2003, 28-29; Manga 2012, 56-64). To sum up, the Catholic Church, although only pursuing its own agenda in Lower Casamance, unconsciously helped to pave the ground for nationalist thinking that should appear decades later.

### 5.1.2. *The History of the Casamance Conflict*

#### a) The Calm before the Storm: Origins of the Casamance Crisis

Even before the Casamance conflict started in 1982, tensions had increased in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Social movements and groups occurred that provided a fertile soil for the MFDC.<sup>11</sup> Three trends, namely conflicts about land ownership and access to resources, migration and economic decline, and nationalist tendencies in the domain of football, were particularly relevant and will be looked at in the following.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Senegal was affected by severe and enduring droughts which provoked the resettlement of populations from the north to the south of the country<sup>12</sup>. Simultaneously, cultivable land in Casamance became scarce as a consequence of

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<sup>10</sup> The catalyst effect of formal education on national consciousness is well-known and can be observed in other cases, such as France (see Barral 1998; Gellner 1989; Hroch 2012; Thiesse 2001).

<sup>11</sup> Relevant individual and collective actors will be introduced in 5.2.

<sup>12</sup> Casamance also suffered from the droughts, but to a lesser extent than other parts of the country (Roquet 2008, 41). There are differences in terms of climate and vegetation between the two semi-arid north and the densely forested sub-tropical south that is marked by the Casamance river and its branches. These features and the resulting consequences (e.g. alleged agricultural potential of Casamance) are often exaggerated and instrumentalised to justify separation.

increasing degradation of the natural environment.<sup>13</sup> Against this background, a land reform, the so-called *Loi sur le domaine national* (English: The National Domain Act) that had been voted in 1964, started to be implemented in Casamance in the late 1970s. The basic idea of the law was that parcels of land, which were neither public property nor registered, could be granted to somebody for effective cultivation (in short, ‘the land belongs to who cultivates it’). This procedure conflicted with realities in Casamance. Due to tradition and labour-intensive agricultural practices, namely rice growing, Casamançais and the Diola in particular were strongly attached to their land.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, rural dwellers were insufficiently informed about the possibility to have land titles registered within a certain delay after the voting of the law. Hence, tensions occurred when the new land law was applied. There are various recounts that lots were attributed to migrants from northern Senegal who often neither knew the communities, nor lived there. They were not necessarily interested in cultivating, but the expropriated land became object of speculation.<sup>15</sup> Several large projects, such as the construction of the luxury Hotel ‘Nema Kador’ in Ziguinchor or the expansion of the Club Med in Cap Skirring, also required the confiscation of property and destruction of fields and existing infrastructure.<sup>16</sup> As a result, many Casamançais lost their land along with their housing and savings, but did not obtain compensation. The implementation of the new land law was perceived to favour Northerners at the detriment of the local population. Natives felt that their customs were neglected and accused the administration, which was largely composed of clerks of northern origin, of favouring migrants due to existing religious networks and ethnic ties between them. In addition to land disputes, access to other resources, such as fish or timber, also provoked tensions between migrant communities – or ‘foreigners’ – from the north and the local population (see, for example, Hesseling 1983, 53-61; 1986; 1991; Humphreys and Mohamed 2005, 269-272; MAR 2003; Marut 2010, 80-87; see also various interviews). In consequence of the discontent about land ownership and

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<sup>13</sup> The city of Ziguinchor faced an enormous population increase in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Between 1973 and 1987, for example, the number of inhabitants in the quarter Kandé more than tripled (Juillard 1995, 41; see also Roquet 2008). Without doubt, this is not exclusively a consequence of interregional migration, but also of intra-regional population movements and high birth rates. However, it illustrates the population pressure that the city was confronted with.

<sup>14</sup> For more information on traditional land ownership, see Hesseling 1983, 6-9; 1994, 244-249.

<sup>15</sup> At the same time, Casamançais who wished to obtain parcels of land in the north saw their request denied. An interviewee expressed his frustration about the land distribution by citing the example of an arriving land-owner from Thiès. When asked about the name of the quarter that his parcel was in, he replied “On a dit Tilène” (English: ‘They told me Tilène’ [name of a quarter of Ziguinchor; the author]) and hereby admitted, that he did not know anything about the area (Interview with a former combatant of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 8 November, 2013). To the respondent, this expressed the ignorance of ‘Northerners’ and the absurdity of the land regime.

<sup>16</sup> In Ziguinchor, 44 families were expropriated at the benefit of the construction of the hotel ‘Nema Kador’. The Club Med in Cap Skirring occupies a large area at the coast. Natural resources that provided livelihoods for the local population became inaccessible, yet new opportunities remained absent. Due to a lack of qualified personnel and unreliable offer in Casamance, the hotel management preferred to hire staff from the north and brought in food from outside the region. Frustrations about such tendencies could escalate: In 1978, in the context of the construction of the club Med, villagers from Cabrousse attacked foreign assets and experienced heavy repression (see Marut 2010, 84-85).

expropriations, social movements formed to voice grievances. Reunions and protest marches were organised. While independence was initially not an issue in their context, the mobilisation provided dynamics that the emerging MFDC could later ride on (Manga 2012, 217-228; Marut 2010, 94).<sup>17</sup>

Increasing recession of the Senegalese economy also affected relations between Casamance and the northern part of the country. Since the 1950s, generations of young Casamançais and more precisely young Diola, migrated to cities in the north, such as Dakar and Saint-Louis in order to complete education and find work, with many becoming civil servants and forming a new educated and professionally successful urban élite that Vincent Foucher labelled the *évolués* (English: the developed or evolved ones) (see, for example, Foucher 2002a; 2002b).<sup>18</sup> Labour migration and the resulting interaction with an 'other' (here: the northern part of Senegal) influenced and enhanced identity construction among Casamançais and regional consciousness became stronger among the *évolués*. They formed cultural associations that originally served as support networks among migrants, but also carried out development projects in their home region and promoted the Diola culture in order to demarcate and protect it from northern influences (Foucher 2002a, 407-417; 2002b, 110-117; 2005b; 2011, 86-87). The associations also contributed to prepare the ground for the MFDC. Relevant topics, namely issues of culture, identity, and regionalism came up in their context. Moreover, they brought together individuals that were perceptible to these themes and at a later stage, to the ideas of the rebel group. Hence, their networks served to disseminate political messages, enhance group solidarity, and mobilise. An illustrative example for a cultural association that became prominent in the context of the conflict was the group *Esukolal* (Diola for homeland). In the early 1980s, it had been formed in Paris around Mamadou 'Nkrumah' Sané, who later became founder and leading figure of the MFDC.<sup>19</sup> 'Nkrumah' Sané also edited the magazine *Kelumak* (Diola for palaver) that aimed to preserve Diola culture and covered a broad array of topics, ranging from the alphabetisation of the Diola language to sports news from the Casamance region. But the *Kelumak* also contained politically sensitive messages. Although it did not agitate for separation, it

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<sup>17</sup> In the late 1970s, Father Diamacoune, at that time a Catholic priest who should later become intellectual head and secretary general of the MFDC, denounced the land policy, but his article *Le 'ras-le-bol' casamançais* remained unpublished by the pro-government newspaper *Le Soleil*. The MFDC newspaper *La voix de la Casamance* reprinted the article in 1994 (MFDC 1994, 7-12).

<sup>18</sup> Under colonial rule, the term *évolués* referred to native inhabitants that Europeanised as a consequence of education and assimilation, for example, by using the colonialists' language and habits. They formed an élite in their respective home countries. In Casamance, the term refers to the educated. Foucher took up the term to describe the aspiring Casamançais élite (Foucher 2002b, 83).

<sup>19</sup> Mamadou 'Nkrumah' Sané was born in the department of Bignona in 1939. He left Casamance in 1964 and resided in Morocco and Mauretania before moving to France, where he continues to live. Already in Casamance, he was politically active, with his commitment having a politico-cultural or nationalist connotation as his opposition to the migration of Diola women and girls illustrates (see footnote 20 in this chapter).

propagated politico-cultural views and took rather radical positions.<sup>20</sup> Articles about the 1980 football final, for instance, were characterised by divisive and aggressive statements. Thus, the *Kelumak* anticipated to some extent the subsequent claims by the MFDC by subtly spreading nationalist messages and preparing the terrain (see *Kelumak* 1981a; 1981b; 1982a; 1982b). While it is difficult to fully appreciate the actual influence of *Kelumak* in Senegal, it did not remain unnoticed. The paper or its content was disseminated through local groups and caused positive resonance among the already mobilised and politically conscious sections of society. Thus, it had some awareness-raising influence after all (Foucher 2002b, 235-238; 2005b; Marut 2010, 97-99; interviews with a former teacher, Ziguinchor, 18 October, 2013; a former NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 5 November, 2013).<sup>21</sup> Meanwhile, 'Nkrumah' Sané increasingly radicalised and finally became the key organiser of the *Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance* and the March in 1982. At present, he is still politically active and claims leadership of the MFDC for himself. His personal trajectory and commitment underscore the relevance of cultural associations for the creation of the MFDC as well as the radicalisation process of those involved.

In the 1970s and 1980s, Senegal fell into an economic crisis that resulted from exogenous factors (e.g. bad weather, droughts, degrading terms of trade, increasing oil prices) and endogenous difficulties (e.g. inadequate financial and structural policies). Real GDP growth slowed down, fell behind population growth rates, and even became negative in some years. The budget deficit and already high external debt increased, while the external balance became negative. Public investment was reduced and the structural adjustment programmes that the government started to adopt in the early 1980s led to downsizing and had negative effects on the Senegalese populations due to increasing unemployment rates and poverty (Claassen and Salin 1991, 118, 122; Cruise O'Brien 1996, 59; Tahari, de Vrijer, and Fouad 1996, 48-51; Weissman 1990, 1628).<sup>22</sup> As a consequence, the public sector that had previously been the main employer of young Casamançais could not absorb the mass of graduates any longer, whose number had shot up because of demographics.<sup>23</sup> This development left many young Casamançais who had previously been among the *évolués*

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<sup>20</sup> The journal also denounced the so-called '*bindanisme*', i.e. the migration of girls and women to Dakar, where they worked as maids. As a consequence, they gained some independence and contributed to the costs of living and education of their (male) relatives at home. However, female migration was not unequivocally appreciated among Diola. Especially conservative and nationalist milieus opposed it and there were initiatives to impede female Diola from leaving or to take them back to their villages. These measures coincided with other activities to exalt Diola culture and limit external influences. For a closer analysis of the relevance of female migration to nationalist thinking, see Foucher 2005b; Lambert 1998 or 6.3.1.

<sup>21</sup> Sané reportedly made contact with Diamacoune and convinced him of becoming the intellectual head and spokesperson of the movement (Marut 2010, 99).

<sup>22</sup> For a detailed overview of Senegal's economic performance from the late 1970s until the early 1990s, see Tahari, de Vrijer, and Fouad 1996, 51.

<sup>23</sup> Figures from the 1980s show that only one twentieth of those reaching working age every year could find employment in the formal sector (Cruise O'Brien 1996, 59).

without future professional prospect and disappointed about their failed national integration. These “lumpen-intellektuelle” (Foucher 2002a, 394) returned to their home region, where – in consequence of their lack of perspective and previous sensitisation through cultural associations – they should form an easily mobilisable basis for the MFDC (Foucher 2002a; 2002b; 2011; Gasser 2000).<sup>24</sup>

The fan clubs of the regional football team Casa Sport, which existed in different cities in Casamance, also functioned as a catalyst for separatist ideas. Sports (namely, football and wrestling) served as a refuge and identity-establishing element for the region. This trend was enhanced in 1980 when the regional football team Casa Sport was disqualified from a decisive football match against the ASC Jeanne d'Arc from Dakar as a consequence of an unfair referee's decision. To some, this appeared to be a direct confrontation between Senegal and Casamance. The unjust outcome simultaneously enhanced communal support for the regional team and resentments against the north. This provided a favourable atmosphere for nationalist rhetoric (see *Kelumak* 1981a; 1981b; 1982b). The early MFDC infiltrated the fan clubs and benefitted from their existing networks to diffuse its message (de Benoist 1991, 27; Foucher 2002a, 412-413; Marut 2010, 92; interviews with a former teacher, Ziguinchor, 18 October, 2013; a former combatant of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 21 October, 2013; a former NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 5 November, 2013).

Finally, several detached incidents reinforced discontent in the region. In 1980, for example, another governor of northern, that is, ‘foreign’ origin was appointed to Ziguinchor which triggered resistance among the local people. In addition, a student was killed by security forces during protests at the *lycée* Djignabo in Ziguinchor which incited protests beyond the school environment. These events, although being unorganised and without an overarching structure, were first symptoms of the growing dissatisfaction in the region and early manifestations of an emerging social movement. None of these trends or episodes instantaneously provoked separatist ideas. Yet, they provided the background, against which such claims should appear and favoured their occurrence in two ways: First, they fuelled anti-northern resentments and strengthened so far latent regionalist feelings in Casamance. Second, they enhanced disaffection and the potential and readiness to voice concerns through collective mobilisation and protest activities in the absence of other ways to articulate them in the political arena. The MFDC took hold on these tendencies. It provided a possibility to speak out and offered a solution – although doubtlessly not the only one – to address the challenges that people faced (see Darbon 1985, 125; Diallo 2009, 23-24; Evans 2004, 3; Fall 2010, 16; Foucher 2002a, 409-413; Gehrold and Neu 2010, 87; Marut 2010, 94).

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<sup>24</sup> This mainly concerns male Casamançais. Girls and young women were less affected by the economic crisis as they were mainly uneducated and worked predominantly in the informal sector.

### b) Towards Violent Conflict

In 1982, the MFDC appeared on stage. On 26 December, it organised a protest march in the regional capital of Ziguinchor. Several hundred people of all ethnic groups and social classes participated, including elderly and mothers with children, and walked to the regional governor's office.<sup>25</sup> The event, sometimes described as carnival- or festival-like (LD/MPT 1988, 16), was generally considered peaceful, with women splashing water from calabashes on the ground, which is a symbol of peace.<sup>26</sup> Nevertheless, it took a provocative turn, when participants replaced the Senegalese flag on the official building by a white one. The central government reacted with severe repression and numerous protestors were injured or arrested (Diatta 2008, 34-36; Evans 2004, 3; Foucher 2002a, 415-417; Geschiere and van der Klei 1988; Marut 2010, 100-101). After a period of relative calm, tensions re-occurred in late 1983. Those, who had been arrested in the context of the first march, namely Father Diamacoune and 'Nkrumah' Sané, were convicted to prison sentences. Besides, three members of the security forces were killed when they tried to dissolve a secret meeting in a sacred forest close to Ziguinchor. On 18 December, 1983, sparsely armed members of the MFDC launched an attack on Ziguinchor under the command of veterans of the French or Senegalese army, among them Sidy Badji.<sup>27</sup> Fighting on the 'red Sunday' continued for hours and officially caused 19 dead and 80 injured, together with many arrests. However, the real number of victims probably amounts to several hundred. In the wake of the clashes and the subsequent repression by the government, the MFDC retreated to the forests. Here, it radicalised and structured its armed wing, the so-called '*Atika*' or '*maquis*' (Evans 2004, 3-4; Humphreys and Mohamed 2005, 247, 251, 290; Marut 2010, 105-106; Schmidt 2011, 115).<sup>28</sup> In 1990, it launched an offensive against the Senegalese army and engaged in guerrilla warfare. The conflict turned into a low-intensity armed conflict (see 5.2.1.). Over the years, periods of intensive violence alternated with calmer phases. Territorially, the conflict remained largely confined to Lower Casamance, yet rebel activity extended to the regions of Sédhiou and Kolda in the mid-1990s.<sup>29</sup> In total, it caused between 3,500 and 5,000 casualties, approximately 750 mine victims suffering from disabilities or injuries, and 73,000 refugees or internally displaced people. Already in 1991, the conflicting parties signed their first ceasefire agreement and several other accords, including a peace deal followed over the years. Yet, none of them provided an effective solution. Hence, the Casamance conflict remains unsettled up to today (Centre National d'Action Antimines au Sénégal 2009, 3;

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<sup>25</sup> The number of a few thousands that one occasionally finds in the literature is too high. For a detailed description of the events by eye witnesses, see Geschiere and Van der Klei 1988.

<sup>26</sup> Some participants had knives or poniards for traditional and symbolic reasons, but not to cause harm (Marut 2010, 100).

<sup>27</sup> Sidy Badji served in the French army and earned combat experience, for example in Indochina and Algeria. He became *Atika*'s fist chief of staff.

<sup>28</sup> *Atika* is Diola for warrior or arrow.

<sup>29</sup> It also affected neighbouring countries and thus, had sub-regional implications

Evans 2004; Gasser 2002, 462; 2005, 460; Humphreys and Mohamed 2005, 248, 290; Marut 2010, 26-27; Sadatchy 2011, 2; Schmidt 2011, 115; UCDP 2015).<sup>30</sup>

### 5.1.3. *Prospect: The Casamance Conflict after 2000*

The events from 2000 until today are not part of the period that is analysed. Nevertheless, recent developments of the Casamance conflict will be briefly summarised in order to provide an overview of the current state of the conflict.

At the beginning of the new millennium, the MFDC was weakened after almost two decades of armed struggle (see 5.2.1.). External allies, especially Libya and Guinea-Bissau had withdrawn their support. The population had also stopped backing the rebellion and longed for peace.<sup>31</sup> Internally, the armed group was divided into various, partly hostile fractions. Father Diamacoune, the charismatic and popular intellectual head of the movement, had increasingly lost influence, but there was no strong leading figure that could represent and reunite the movement. Nonetheless, the asymmetric character of the guerrilla war made a victory on the battlefield difficult despite the state's supremacy. Moreover, a military solution was ruled out as it would have harmed Senegal's image of a democracy (Foucher 2003b; Marut 2010, ch. 10, 11, 14; 2011; Straus 2015, ch. 7). In 2000, Abdoulaye Wade accessed the presidency and put an end to 40 years of socialist rule. Having already been in charge of the conflict as a member of government under his predecessor Abdou Diouf, he promised to resolve the Casamance question within 100 days and confirmed to be willing to negotiate with the rebels under certain conditions.<sup>32</sup> In reality, the government took various steps that moved conflict resolution further away. Among others, Wade fuelled tensions between the different wings of the MFDC, marginalised the moderates (i.e. those he could negotiate with), and discarded internal and external mediators, for example the Gambian government, that had previously facilitated progress in the peace process. While Wade's strategy aimed at weakening the rebel movement and depoliticising the conflict, it did little to settle it. Nevertheless, Father Diamacoune signed a peace accord with the government in 2004. However, the document was rather imposed than negotiated; it largely reflected the state position, but neglected the MFDC's perspective and did not address the underlying causes of the conflict. The accord led to a multiplication of development initiatives in Casamance that brought some relief from hardship, but also failed in many respects, namely with regard to reducing regional isolation. After all, the deal did not bring lasting peace. The majority of the

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<sup>30</sup> Detailed overviews of the conflict are available in Awenengo 2000; Foucher 2002a; Gasser 2000; International Crisis Group (ICG) 2015; MAR 2003; and Marut 2010.

<sup>31</sup> Since the mid-1990s, local peace initiatives multiplied.

<sup>32</sup> The government refused, for example, to negotiate about questions of national unity and territorial integrity which were for parts of the MFDC the only issues they would talk about. Besides, it considered unity of the movement a prerequisite for talks, but simultaneously enhanced and deepened splits within the MFDC.

MFDC – if they knew about the agreement – rejected it and did not consider it binding. Hence, fighting erupted again at various occasions and at different fronts in 2006 and continued in the following years (Evans 2000; Foucher 2003b; ICG 2015; Marut 2010, ch. 11, 13; 2013; Perfect and Evans 2013).

Since the early 2010s – and especially since Macky Sall was elected president in 2012 and repeatedly committed himself to finding a solution to the conflict – there have been some promising moves. Both the government and the MFDC, including hardliners agreed to mediation by the Community of Sant'Egidio. Since then, talks with the Christian lay organisation were organised. Moreover, there is a variety of societal initiatives: Within the MFDC, there are efforts to re-unite the movement in order to be able to negotiate. Robert Sagna, former minister and ex-mayor of Ziguinchor, heads a collective (the so-called *Groupe de réflexion pour la paix en Casamance*; English: Reflection group for peace in Casamance) that mainly consists of so-called *cadres* (see 6.4.1.) and experts of the Casamance crisis and seeks to identify political and institutional solutions to the Casamançais impasse. In addition, various NGOs in Casamance and neighbouring countries as well as traditional organisations work towards lasting peace. What appears promising on the one hand leaves a sour taste on the other: Critics denounce that the commitment for peace partly results from the fact that it is (financially) beneficial for the involved which incites more and more actors to reach out for their share of the cake. With regard to traditional measures, it is criticised that these are inadequate to resolve a political conflict of national scale (Diedhiou 2013; de Jong 2005; Marut 2010, 272-279; Tomàs 2005).<sup>33</sup> Despite occasional incidents (in 2013, for example, several deminers were held hostage by the MFDC for several months), various observers stated that the present circumstances are promising to come to an agreement and some steps forward were made. The Senegalese government, for instance, dropped charges against Salif Sadio; he, in turn, announced a unilateral ceasefire (Sant'Egidio 2014; Seyferth 2014; Toupane 2012; US Department of State. Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations 2014). However, no major advance was made so far and future developments remain unsure.

### 5.2. Conflict Actors

Armed conflicts are defined as confrontations between the government of an existing state and a non-state armed group (UCDP 2015). Hence, the principal conflicting parties in the case of Casamance are the *Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance* on the one hand and the Senegalese state on the other. In the following, the two actors will be briefly presented.

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<sup>33</sup> It is fair to note that the multitude of actors in the peace process as well as the profitable nature of such commitment are not new to the Casamance conflict.

## 5. Casamance: History and Background of the Conflict

### 5.2.1. *The Mouvement de forces démocratiques de la Casamance*

#### a) The Historic and Modern Mouvement de forces démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)

Today's *Mouvement de forces démocratiques de la Casamance* or short, MFDC has a historic precursor. In 1947, intellectuals and politicians from the Casamance region among whom were Emile Badiane, Ibou Diallo, and Édouard Diatta, founded a regionalist political party under the same name in the city of Sédhiou.<sup>34</sup> Although the modern MFDC refers back to this grouping and considers itself in continuity with it, the initial MFDC aimed to represent regional interests within the existing constitutional framework. Thus, it wished to enhance development and recognition for Casamance within a system that largely centred around the *Quatre Communes*, which consisted of the four northern cities Saint-Louis, Dakar, Gorée, and Rufisque, and sought to provide a means for the regional élite to politically participate and access power. Yet, it did not question the integration of Casamance into Senegal. In 1954, the MFDC disappeared from the political arena after future president Léopold Sédar Senghor successfully co-opted and absorbed it in his own party, the *Bloc démocratique sénégalais* (BDS; English: Senegalese Democratic Bloc). Another group, the *Mouvement autonome de la Casamance* (MAC; English: Autonomous Movement of Casamance) was created in 1955. Despite its name, the MAC did not have a separatist agenda, either. It was equally short-lived and merged together with other political groupings in 1956.<sup>35</sup> This illustrates that regionalism and political activism for it have a long tradition in Casamance. However, claims for independence did not exist until the 1980s (Diatta 2008, 120-132; Diedhiou 2010, 265-271; Manga 2012, 69-103; Marut 2010, 69-75; Roche 2001, 117, 164; Seck 2005, 28-41).

The 'modern' MFDC had developed on the basis of different social movements in the region and made its first public appearance in the context of the peaceful march in December 1982.

<sup>36</sup> Unlike its predecessor, the newly created movement adopted an explicitly separatist position and took up arms, although its members see themselves as in continuity with the ancient regionalist party and claim that they resurrected it (African Research Group 1999, 4; Marut 1992, 210; 2010, 69-76).<sup>37</sup> Reportedly, the movement was formed by Mamadou 'Nkrumah' Sané, a Diola from the department of Bignona living in the diaspora, who had

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<sup>34</sup> Based on the work of Séverine Awenengo, Jean-Claude Marut states that the original MFDC was founded in 1949. Yet, the majority of sources and authors, including Mohamed Manga (2012) who provides a detailed account of Casamançais history mention 1947 as year of establishment.

<sup>35</sup> Assane Seck, politician of the MAC, pointed out that the name aimed to demonstrate that it was autonomous from the BDS that had swallowed the MFDC, but did not have territorial aspirations (2005, 29). In 1956, the MAC merged together with other political groupings, among which was the BDS, into the *Bloc populaire sénégalais* (BPS; English: Senegalese Popular Bloc) that later transformed into the *Parti socialiste* (PS; English: Socialist Party).

<sup>36</sup> In the following, the terms MFDC or *Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance* will be used to refer to the movement formed in 1982 if not stated otherwise.

<sup>37</sup> There is no personal continuity between the historic and the modern MFDC. None of the initial founders of the historic MFDC is alive to rectify the misinterpretation.

been politically active before (see 5.1.2. and 6.3.4.). However, Father Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, a Catholic priest, was the movement's actual intellectual mastermind.<sup>38</sup> Even before the creation of the movement, he had not only been known for his profession, but also due to his activist stance and his statements in relation to Casamançais culture and history with nationalist and separatist allusions already shimmering through.<sup>39</sup> Although he had not been involved in the preparation of the march in 1982, he was preventively arrested in its context and subsequently tried for having menaced the safety of the state. After his release, he became secretary general of the *bureau national* of the MFDC in 1991, an office that he held until his death in 2007 (Bassène 2013; Marut 2010; *Sud hebdo*, 15 July, 1988; see also 6.3.4.).

But the MFDC did not only fight with words. In the beginning, its armed branch was poorly organised and equipped – the first attack was reportedly carried out with traditional weapons and rifles – but developed rapidly under the leadership of its co-founder and initial commander Sidy Badji, an experienced army veteran. After the first protest march, the MFDC started sensitisation campaigns in the region. In consequence, individuals or sometimes entire villages decided to support the movement. Moreover, repression by the government inclined people to join. As a result, the number of combatants that mainly comprised former soldiers of the French or Senegalese army, peasants, and young men, rapidly rose to approximately 2,000 to 4,000 men.<sup>40</sup> Furthermore, the fighters' formation improved over the years and the MFDC obtained more sophisticated weapons, for example hunting rifles, AK-47, and grenade launchers which enhanced its capacity. Strategically, the MFDC engaged in guerrilla warfare that targeted the Senegalese army as well as other symbols of the Senegalese state, such as border posts or local governmental institutions. In this respect, the specific natural environment, namely the inaccessibility of the terrain and the proximity of international borders, were beneficial to the *maquisards*. Yet, the regional population was not spared. Over the years, civilians of both Casamançais and northern origin became victims of violence, armed robbery, and land mines by the rebels (Evans 2004; Foucher 2002; Gasser 2002; Gehrold and Neu 2010, 93; Gerdes 2008, 88; Humphreys and Mohamed 2005, 254, 276; Körner 2007, 84-85; MAR 2003; Marut 2010; Sadatchy 2011; UCDP 2015). In this context, it is important to highlight that the MFDC is qualified as a 'poor rebellion'. Unlike many armed groups during the Cold War, it did not benefit of large-scale

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<sup>38</sup> There are no family relations between ex-president Léopold Sédar Senghor and Father Augustin Diamacoune Senghor. For more information on the latter, see 6.3.4.

<sup>39</sup> At a conference held in Dakar in 1980, Father Diamacoune had already made allusions in this regard. See 6.3.4.

<sup>40</sup> It is difficult to provide precise numbers of active fighters since many of them switch between their combatant and civil lives. According to estimations, only one-third of the *maquisards* are permanently mobilised due to financial and logistic restrictions. The remaining engage in economic activities to sustain the movement. The rebels also intermingle with refugees in the neighbouring countries (Evans 2004, 6-7; Fall 2010, 17-19; Florquin and Berman 2005, 360; Gehrold and Neu 2010, 93; Marut 2010, 111, 148-149; Sadatchy 2011, 4).

external backing since it appeared relatively late on the international stage. As a consequence, it depended on support by the local population that contributed financially or in kind. Moreover, the rebels increasingly engaged in illicit economic activities ranging from agricultural production, through to cannabis trafficking as well as cattle raiding, to armed robberies of vehicles or villages (the so-called '*braquages*'). In addition, they benefitted from humanitarian aid that was destined for the refugee population. While the war economy helped to sustain the movement, income generation remained limited in comparison to economic profits of other armed movements on the continent (Evans 2003; Foucher 2007; Marut 2010, 147-157; Sadatchy 2011, 6-7).<sup>41</sup>

### b) One Name, Many Movements: The Internal Structure of the MFDC

From today's point of view, speaking of 'the' MFDC as one movement is misleading. The internal structures of the movement had been weak from the outset. However, it increasingly fractionalised over the course of the conflict and nowadays, comprises a confusing number of splinter groups. Since the internal dynamics are relevant with regard to framing, the development of the movement will be summarised briefly.<sup>42</sup>

While the political leading figures Augustin Diamacoune Senghor and Mamadou 'Nkrumah' Sané spent several years in prison after the first march, the movement lacked proper political leadership. Meanwhile, Sidy Badji developed, structured, and commanded the military wing. In 1991, Sané returned to France where he founded an external branch.<sup>43</sup> Hence, the MFDC simultaneously comprised a political, a military, and an external section that were headed by three distinct persons. The different wings did not have a hierarchical or complementary relationship and lacked centralisation, institutionalisation, as well as co-ordination. They acted independently of each other and even competed. Over time, the rebel group should disintegrate even further. In May 1991, Sidy Badji signed a ceasefire agreement that the MFDC had wrested from the Senegalese state through its offensive. However, parts of the armed movement rejected it. Consequently, it split into the *Front Nord* (English: Northern Front) that remained loyal to Sidy Badji and adhered to the agreement. It stopped fighting, but did not disarm. The group controlled the north-western part of the Bignona department close to the Gambian border with tacit consent of the Senegalese army, where it undertook

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<sup>41</sup> For more information on external support in the Casamance conflict and the MFDC's war economy, see 5.3.3. and 5.3.6.

<sup>42</sup> The precise internal dynamics and cleavages will not be discussed here. For a detailed overview of the fragmentation of the different wings of the *Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance* and the various leaders or leading committees, see Evans 2004, Fall 2010; Foucher 2003b; 2012; Gerdes 2006; Marut 2010, ch. 12, 16.

<sup>43</sup> In connection with the first march in 1982, Augustin Diamacoune Senghor and Mamadou 'Nkrumah' Sané were arrested and stayed in prison until 1987. Diamacoune was rearrested in June 1990 and remained in custody until May 1991. 'Nkrumah' Sané was caught in Guinea-Bissau in 1988. After his extradition to Senegal, he was convicted to ten years in prison in 1990, but was liberated in 1991 and left to France shortly after. He became Deputy-Secretary General and headed the external wing.

illicit economic activities. Furthermore, it engaged in some cooperation with the state in exchange for financial or material support for reintegration and reconstruction projects. Despite its moderate and cooperative position, the *Front Nord* continued to represent a lurking threat and ultimately returned to the battlefield. By contrast, the more radical *Front Sud* (English: Southern Front), initially led by Léopold Sagna, rejected the accords with the Senegalese government. It considered the *Front Nord* as corrupted and re-started fighting in 1992. The fraction retreated to the south of Casamance and benefitted from the porous border with Guinea-Bissau to seek refuge. Later, it branched off again into hardliners led by Salif Sadio and 'hesitants' under the command of Léopold Sagna who was succeeded by César Atoute Badiate.<sup>44</sup> The splits within the *maquis* were reflected in the political and external wing that equally became divided. Father Diamacoune headed the radical political wing and should only later renounce violence which allowed political leaders to re-approach. In the diaspora, Sané adopted militant views, while Jean-Marie François Biagui, a much younger migrant and intellectual who lived in Lyon and wrote several pamphlets for the MFDC, distanced himself from him in favour of moderate perspectives.

The internal fractionalisation had serious consequences for the movement. Often, splinter groups only comprised a small part of the movement, but they all pretended to incarnate the MFDC and acted under its name. However, neither did they have a coherent overarching structure, nor did they share a common position.<sup>45</sup> One wing could negotiate an agreement, but lacked the capacity to enforce the accord on others that rejected it. At various occasions, fighting erupted between different armed factions. Moreover, the *maquis* increasingly emancipated itself from the civilian leadership and acted independently from it. Parts of the combatants considered political means as betrayal to the idea of independence and opposed them which undermined the political component of the movement. The factionalism, changing loyalties, confusion about leadership, and lack of control over combatants harmed the reputation of the movement and weakened the movement in the face of the Senegalese army. Moreover, the internal difficulties impeded and continue to obstruct the peace process. While no faction or individual is legitimate or representative to talk to the state on behalf of the MFDC, it is impossible to re-unite the factions and find a universally accepted spokesperson and common ground for talks.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Since the late 1990s, the radical Southern Front became also active in the department of Bignona.

<sup>45</sup> This became well obvious during field research: A variety of members of the MFDC presented themselves as exclusive spokespersons and representatives of the movement. Interestingly, while the different camps are referred to by names indicating their original position (e.g. the *Front Nord*, *Front Sud* or the Cassolol camp named after the location of its basis), none of them changed names, but all perceive themselves to be the real MFDC. To top it all, Jean-Marie François Biagui, launched a new political party in 2011 – the MFDC or *Mouvement pour le fédéralisme et la démocratie constitutionnels* (English: Movement for Constitutional Federalism and Democracy).

<sup>46</sup> Between 1999 and 2001, meetings were organised in Banjul that aimed to re-unite the movement in view of potential talks with the state. Yet, the process failed and was ended when Abdoulaye Wade

### 5.2.2. *The Senegalese State*

The second conflicting party is the Senegalese state. Senegal is often considered as an exemplary democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa, whose origin goes back to the early and very restricted democratic experiences of the *Quatre Communes* during colonialism (Hartmann 2010; Tine 1997). Compared to other countries in the region that were marred by brutal dictatorships, civil wars, and military coups, the Senegalese political system has been doubtlessly more democratic and functional for a long time. Besides, elections were regularly held as foreseen in the constitution. However, this image should not hide the fact that especially during the rule of the socialist party from 1960 to 2000, the polity suffered from important deficits that could impact the risk of armed conflict.<sup>47</sup> Léopold Sédar Senghor, who became the first president after independence in 1960, successfully concentrated political power in his hands and created a political system with strong authoritarian features. By abolishing the position of the prime minister, he installed a presidential regime – or a presidential dictatorship, as critical observers noted (Hesseling 1985, 223).<sup>48</sup> By restricting or co-opting opposition parties, he gradually neutralised political opponents and created a de facto one-party state by 1966, in which the Socialist Party held a hegemonic position. The regime resorted to intimidation and judicial and violent repression against political critics, for example clandestine opposition parties, students, or unions. In addition, the voting system disproportionately favoured the ruling party and electoral fraud was common. Finally, political patronage and clientelism were used to consolidate political power of the PS. Hence, political authority became strongly personalised and centralised, while the legislative and judiciary remained weak and incapable to effectively control the executive (Cruise O'Brien 1967, 558-562; Diouf 1993, 234-263; Hartmann 2010; Ndiaye 2000; Ottaway 2003; Polity IV 2011; Stetter and Voll 1983; Tine 1997). In the 1970s, the ruling party introduced a controlled liberalisation. Senghor re-established the prime ministerial office. In 1976, a restrained number of political parties whose political ideology was fixed became tolerated.<sup>49</sup> These limitations were abolished in 1981 and Senegal turned (at least, formally) into a multiparty democracy with few remaining restrictions, such as a ban of ethnic and regional groupings. Consequently, the number of political parties rapidly increased. However, they were mainly centred in the capital with little connections to rural areas. Due to its fragmentation into

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became president. Hence the Senegalese government shares responsibility for the stalemate (Evans 2004; Foucher 2003b; Marut 2010; see 5.1.3.).

<sup>47</sup> The democratic performance in Senegal improved in recent years. Both in 2000 and 2012, opposition leaders won the presidential elections with the incumbents respecting the results and ceding power peacefully. At the same time, constitutional reforms, such as the extension of the presidential term from five to seven years were criticised for obstructing the further democratisation of the country. Ottaway (2003) adopts a critical perspective on the apparent democratic turn of the country and argues that while the political élite changed, practices remained largely the same.

<sup>48</sup> The office of the Prime Minister was abolished from 1963 and 1970 and again from 1983 to 1991.

<sup>49</sup> Already in 1974, Abdoulaye Wade's Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS; French: *Parti démocratique sénégalais*) was authorised.

numerous small political parties, the opposition remained weak and did not represent a threat for the *Parti Socialiste* until 2000 (Hartmann 2010; Hesselning 1985).<sup>50</sup> Equally in 1981, Senghor ceded power to his protégé and then incumbent Prime Minister Abdou Diouf, a contested step that was perceived as “constitutional coup d’état” (Ndiaye 2000, 131). Diouf, a technocrat, won the 1983 presidential elections that confirmed him in office and maintained the dominant role of the head of state. This brief overview of Senegal’s post-colonial political history shows that despite its relatively positive trajectory towards democratic overture, the Senegalese polity restricted activities by political opponents and did not refrain from using repression and force.

Accordingly, the position of the Senegalese state towards the Casamançais separatists reflected the way the government had previously dealt with other oppositional forces. It was marked by a combination of rigorousness and intransigence on the one hand and a limited degree of accommodation on the other. At first, the Senegalese reaction to the Casamance crisis was predominantly military. Approximately, 5,000 to 8,000 soldiers were present in Casamance, but additional troops could be drawn together from other regions (Marut 2010, 163-165).<sup>51</sup> Despite its reputation as being democratic and well-trained, the army and other security forces reacted with severe repression and committed serious human rights abuses in the course of the Casamance conflict that often concerned uninvolved civilians (Amnesty International 1998).<sup>52</sup> At the political level, the government initially ignored or downplayed the events in the south of the country. When it could no longer overlook the armed opposition, it attempted to delegitimise it, for example, by presenting the MFDC as an ethnic movement without a broad support basis, and denied the political dimension of the conflict. Although the state appeared willing to talk to the MFDC later, it confirmed throughout the crisis that territorial integrity and national unity were unnegotiable and demonstrated its firm stand by fixing additional conditions for negotiations with the rebels (see 5.1.3. and 6.4.1.).

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<sup>50</sup> In 2000, Diouf did not lose the election as a result of a strengthening of Wade’s PDS, but because Wade successfully created a coalition of several parties.

<sup>51</sup> Some units are not included in these calculations, namely the mobile intervention groups. The figures suggest that the ration of state soldiers and rebels was not overly favourable to security forces. Yet, one has to take into consideration that not all *maquisards* were permanently mobilised. Moreover, parts of the MFDC did not constantly engage in fighting. Thus, the number of combatants that the Senegalese troupes confronted was smaller than their actual total (Marut 2010, 163-165).

<sup>52</sup> The Senegalese army enjoyed the reputation of ‘democratic armed forces’ since it exclusively consisted of volunteers and had never got involved in politics of their country with the exception of the early conflict opposing Mamadou Dia and Léopold Senghor in 1962. Through participating in various UN missions, its level of training and equipment improved (Marut 2010, 168).

### 5.3. Conflict Analysis

While the previous sections outlined the dynamics leading to the eruption of violence in Casamance and presented the major conflicting actors, it did not systematically discuss the underlying causes of the conflict. In the following, major theories of armed conflict will be applied. This allows for focusing on the impact of factors such as geography, culture and identity, socio-economic marginalisation, and political exclusion on conflict onset.<sup>53</sup> Repression, which had a catalysing effect, and external support for the movement will also be taken into consideration. The assessment of these determinants will help to better understand the origin of the civil strife in the region; yet, it will also become clear that the theories suffer from important explanatory shortfalls with regard to the Casamance case.

#### 5.3.1. Geographic Factors

The geographical form and positioning of Casamance is peculiar. The region is almost completely detached from the Senegalese mainland and only connected to it at its eastern end.<sup>54</sup> This has perceptible repercussions on everyday life: In order to reach the northern part and the national capital Dakar which is inevitable in view of the strong economic, political, and administrative centralisation of the country, most people take the overland route through the Gambia.<sup>55</sup> This means that travellers have to cross international borders twice, traverse the river Gambia by ferry (if it is not dysfunctional), and easily spend days on the road, although the distance is only about 500 kilometres (Faye 1994, 67-68).<sup>56</sup> Taking the boat from Ziguinchor to Dakar is another option.<sup>57</sup> But it only leaves several times a week, requires early booking, and is more expensive than travelling by bush taxi. Moreover, while the sea journey is modern and reliable at present, it was frequently interrupted in the past. The Ziguinchor-Dakar route experienced one of the worst maritime accidents after the Second World War, when the then ferry 'Le Joola' capsized as a result of poor maintenance

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<sup>53</sup> For an application of the Collier-Hoeffler model to the Casamance case, see Humphreys and Mohamed 2005.

<sup>54</sup> Strictly speaking, Casamance is not a clearly defined entity. It is not unequivocally prescribed by natural or geographic boundaries. Its territorial limits shifted throughout history. Moreover, it is not internally homogeneous since Upper and Lower Casamance have distinct features, e.g. in terms of climate, vegetation, and population (see Faye 1994, 66-67; Marut 2010, 58-59).

<sup>55</sup> Regional agricultural products, for example, are mainly transformed in the north. Since there are no medical facilities of high standard in Casamance, the treatment of ill people often requires transportation to the north, which is a risky enterprise under such conditions.

<sup>56</sup> In early 2015, the construction of a bridge over the river Gambia began. This is a long-planned project that the government in Banjul had obstructed for strategic reasons. For more information about relations between Senegal and the Gambia and challenges regarding them, see Marut 2010, 130-133; Perfect and Evans 2013.

<sup>57</sup> Since the inauguration of two new boats in early 2015, there are four instead of two weekly departures from Dakar to Ziguinchor and back. Moreover, the ships stop in Carabane which improves access to the western part of the semi-enclave and the price for the cheapest tickets were lowered through state subventions. While these are promising steps, it is too early to evaluate their effects.

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in 2002 causing over 1,800 dead.<sup>58</sup> Safety measures improved, but distrust prevails among parts of the population. Although transportation has developed over the years, difficulties persist. There is continuous criticism that while the government improves infrastructure in the north, its efforts to tackle the enclave-ness of Casamance are insufficient. Given the present frustrations, one can only imagine the difficulties previous generations faced when travelling to Dakar. From a theoretical point of view, peripheral and geographically detachable territories are more likely to experience separatist conflict (see 2.2.). These conditions are fulfilled in the case of Casamance. However, the argumentation does not hold. In fact, the conflict was concentrated in the region of Ziguinchor, but the eastern zones of Casamance remained largely unaffected. Yet, Kolda also suffers from the enclave status. This part of Casamance is even more adversely affected since it is far from the Trans-Gambia Highway and the harbour as well as the airport of Ziguinchor. Since violence only broke out in Lower Casamance, geographic factors are insufficient to explain the rebellion. Besides, they are stable and the enclave-ness of the region had not caused conflict during the first twenty years after independence (Foucher 2011).<sup>59</sup>

It is also important to consider the relevance of geographical conditions with regard to rebel activities and the persistence of the conflict. Due to its long drawn-out and narrow shape, Casamance is surrounded by international borders of considerable length that are never more than 50 kilometres away. This was beneficial to the rebels that could easily seek refuge from army attacks on neighbouring ground, where they intermingled with the local and refugee population.<sup>60</sup> Moreover, they procured supplies (food, arms, or munition) or traded goods in Guinea-Bissau and the Gambia. The natural environment was also propitious for guerrilla warfare. The dense forests provided (effective and mystic) protection and cover since it is difficult to access. Besides, it served as a basis of subsistence and income to the *maquisards*, for instance through wild fruit, vegetables, bush meat, cannabis, or timber.<sup>61</sup> Waterways were similarly useful. They complicate access and orientation to outsiders, while functioning as discrete transport ways to those familiar with the territory (Marut 2010, 107-113). Nevertheless, geographical advantages should not be overestimated, since popular support strongly contributed to the initial boost of the rebellion with many of the sub-regional networks only developing over time (Ibid., 120-130).

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<sup>58</sup> The airplane leaving twice a day from Dakar to Ziguinchor and back is prohibitively expensive for the majority of the population. In principle, it is also possible to circumvent the Gambia by passing east through Tambacounda and remain on Senegalese territory. Yet, people rarely choose this option.

<sup>59</sup> Geography indirectly contributed to conflict onset since it fuelled a feeling of being excluded and belonging to a different identity as will be seen later. Statistical analyses ignore such effects.

<sup>60</sup> Populations in Casamance and the neighbouring countries traditionally maintain close trans-border ties. Various ethnic groups are simultaneously present in the Gambia, Casamance, and Guinea-Bissau.

<sup>61</sup> For more information on the MFDC's war economy, see 5.3.3.

### 5.3.2. *Identity-Related Factors*

A common, but false reading explains the Casamance conflict as stemming from identity-related factors and stresses the alleged cultural and religious 'otherness' of Casamance (see, for example, Darbon 1984; Geschiere and van der Klei 1988). According to this understanding, the traditionalist Christian (or Animist) Diola – an ethnic group considered as being notoriously rebellious – in the south would revolt against the more advanced Muslim and Wolof north. Yet, the cultural dichotomy is exaggerated and the interpretation of the Casamance crisis as an ethnic or religious conflict is incorrect. Senegal is a multi-ethnic state comprising about 20 different ethnic communities. Approximately 44 per cent of the population belong to the biggest identity group, the Wolof, who mainly settle in the northern part of Senegal. The Diola only make up five per cent at the national level. Yet, in Lower Casamance, which is their traditional homeland, 66 per cent of the inhabitants are Diola (Ngom, Gaye Sarr 2000, 6, 16).<sup>62</sup> At first sight, the ethnic distribution and the settlement pattern appear theoretically favourable for conflict onset. However, speaking of 'the Diola' is problematic because they do not constitute a uniform and homogeneous entity, but are divided in four sub-groups with distinctive features. These live in different areas of Lower Casamance and some of them do not mutually understand their dialects which illustrates existing specificities and differences. Hence, claims of a uniform Diola majority have to be treated with care (Marut 2010, 28, 63-64).<sup>63</sup> In terms of religion, Senegal is a predominantly Muslim state with approximately 88 to 94 per cent of the Senegalese population adhering to Sufi Islam. The remainder are Christians (five per cent) or Animists (one to six per cent depending on the figures). Adherents of Christianity and Animist beliefs effectively concentrate in Lower Casamance that alone harbours one fifth of the Senegalese Catholics and thus, a significant community. Yet, one should not overlook that about 60 per cent of the population in the Ziguinchor region (including many Diola) are Muslims. Therefore, neither is Casamance religiously homogeneous, nor does a clear faith-based dualism between Casamance and northern Senegal exist. Moreover, the religious communities coexist peacefully (CIA 2012a; Foucher 2003a, 12, 23; 2005a, 363-364; Gerdes 2006, 86-87; Humphreys and Mohamed 2005, 267-268; Körner 2007, 85-86; Marut 2010, 28, 65; Ngom, Gaye, and Sarr 2000, 15-16; République du Sénégal. Ministère de l'Économie, des Finances et du Plan. Direction de la Prévision et de la Statistique 1993, 24, 27).<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> They do not constitute a majority in the whole of Casamance, but only make up 40 per cent of the population. Middle and Upper Casamance are dominated by the Manding and Peul, respectively. Moreover, there are various smaller communities, for example, the Baïnouk, Mandjack, Mancagne, Balante, etc.

<sup>63</sup> Dispersion is enhanced by the fact that the Diola society is acephalous, i.e. not hierarchically organised and unified through political institutions. Identification took mainly place at the village level.

<sup>64</sup> As an illustration of the good relations, many people invoke the mixed cemeteries in Ziguinchor where Christians and Muslims are buried together – although still in different sections of the graveyard.

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The composition of the MFDC, dynamics in connection with mobilisation, and patterns of violence also yield insights concerning the role of ethnicity and religion in the conflict. Although the rebel movement always highlighted its inter-ethnic and multi-religious composition, it mainly consisted of Diola. Other ethnic groups (e.g. the Peuls) participated, but their numbers remained limited.<sup>65</sup> However, the ethnic concentration increased during the conflict due to two factors. First, the rebel group became increasingly homogeneous in consequence of the coping strategies by the government. By ethnicising the rebel group, that is, presenting it as Diola-based, the administration sought to delegitimise the movement and its claims. Furthermore, repression particularly targeted the Diola. This drove many of the affected into the bush, while other ethnic groups distanced themselves from the MFDC. Second, the sensitisation campaign of the MFDC strongly relied on social structures and networks of the Diola community. Moreover, the framing of the MFDC resonated particularly well with them due to manifold references to Diola culture and the national(ist) consciousness and specific experiences among this community. Thus, to avoid endogenous arguments, the ethnic composition should not be over-interpreted. Moreover, it is not indicative for the objectives of the group. The Casamance conflict is not ethnic in nature, as the government pretended, but political (Foucher 2002a; 2002b; 2005b; 2011; Humphreys and Mohamed 2005, 282; Lambert 1998, 587-589; Marut 2010; see also 5.1.2. and 6.). In terms of religion, the movement was mixed, as it comprised Christians (for example, Father Diamacoune and his brother Bertrand), Muslims (among others, Mamadou 'Nkrumah' Sané, Sidy Badji, or Salif Sadio), and Animists likewise who fought alongside each other for separation.<sup>66</sup> Certainly, there were hostile comments regarding Muslims in some documents by the MFDC. They criticise, for example, the political dimension of Islam, namely the influence of brotherhoods. Moreover, there are numerous venerating references to the local traditional religion. Yet, the mobilising power of religious allusions remained weak in Casamance (Foucher 2005a, 375-376, 381; see also 6.2. and 6.3.).<sup>67</sup> Finally, patterns of violence underline that the conflict was not fuelled by religious or ethnic differences and their instrumentalisation. The MFDC occasionally used force against religious or ethnic targets, as for example, an attack against Muslims praying on a public place in Ziguinchor in 1990 or a massacre of non-Casamançais fishermen illustrate. Yet, there was no purposeful mobilisation or systematic or large-scale violence against members of other faith or ethnic

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<sup>65</sup> The MFDC justifies the predomination of Diola by a founding myth. The other ethnic groups in Casamance allegedly confined the issue to the Diola due to their fortitude which forced the community to the forefront.

<sup>66</sup> Data regarding the ethnic and religious composition of the MFDC is unavailable (Foucher 2005a).

<sup>67</sup> It was argued above that the Catholic Church prepared the ground for the MFDC since modern education and the inculturation of Catholicism promoted the emergence of national consciousness. This does not imply that the conflict was religious (see Foucher 2002b; 2003a; 2005a). In the literature and on the ground, one finds many hints regarding the importance of traditional religion. Yet, its influence is most likely exaggerated. For a detailed and critical discussion on the contribution of Animism, see Foucher 2005a.

communities. Notably, the numerous Diola who continued to live in the north during the conflict did not experience systematic violence (Foucher 2003a; 2005a; see also 6.2.). The seemingly ethnic or religious violent incidences were rather targeted against ‘Northerners’ or representatives of ‘the North’. This suggests that oppositions between ‘Southerners’ and ‘Northerners’ – or natives and migrants – are more relevant identity categories for studying animosities.<sup>68</sup> However, this dualism does not provide an adequate explanation for conflict, either. In Kolda, there were also difficulties related to the influx of settlers and between different groups, but the region did not experience armed conflict (Marut 2010, 81).

Overall, despite some internally unifying and externally demarcating features, there is no unequivocal ethnic and religious dualism that opposes Casamance and northern Senegal. Thus, identity-related explanations of armed conflict cannot account for the outbreak of violence, but risk concealing major causes and dimensions of the conflict.

### 5.3.3. *Socio-Economic Factors*

Disparities in socio-economic development between the southern and the northern part of Senegal are also frequently invoked to explain conflict onset. It is argued that, while the region had great economic potential, for example in terms of agricultural production, fishing, timber, or tourism, it remained marginalised. Existing capacities were insufficiently exploited and infrastructure and public services (for example, medical care, education facilities, or streets, etc.) were poor or absent. Difficulties aggravated as a result of the economic crisis that had affected the country since the 1970s and led to cuts in public expenditure and employment. From 1980s to 1984, the country’s GDP per capita dropped from \$630 to \$430 (GNI Atlas method calculated in current US\$) (World Bank 2015). Since many Casamançais sought employment in the public sector, they were particularly affected by the downsizing in this field. Thus, there were certainly frustrations about the lack of development and the loss of opportunities as well as feelings of marginalisation in comparison to the north (Faye 1994, 66-67; Foucher 2002b; Humphreys and Mohamed 2005, 269-272; Lambert 2002; MAR 2003). This suggests that explanations referring to relative deprivation and grievances have some merit in Casamance. However, some critical remarks are imperative. Conditions for agricultural production and exploitation of natural resources are favourable in Casamance, not least in comparison to the semi-arid northern part of the country. However, the region has never been and could not have become Senegal’s ‘breadbasket’, as sometimes claimed, due to detrimental environmental conditions and cultivation methods.<sup>69</sup> Thus, its capacities and

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<sup>68</sup> Countries such as Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya illustrate that latent conflicts between hosting and migrant populations can escalate into violence (see, for example, Arnaut 2008; Dozon 2000; Dunn 2009; Jenkins 2015).

<sup>69</sup> Natural degradation (for example, salination) and overexploitation negatively affected yields. Local production methods were often traditional and Casamançais lacked entrepreneurial spirit which

the differences between its potential and actual production were exaggerated. Furthermore, economic grievances, poverty, and under-development existed throughout Senegal and concerned all rural areas. Lower Casamance was even relatively well-developed in comparison to other peripheral zones, namely Upper Casamance that was among the poorest and least developed regions of Senegal.<sup>70</sup> Besides, the Ziguinchor region has a particularly high rate of education which should attenuate the conflict risk from a theoretical point of view. This suggests that grievances alone cannot account for the emergence of violence (Humphreys and Mohamed 2005, 269-271; Marut 2010, 28; République du Sénégal. Ministère de l'Économie, des Finances et du Plan. Direction de la Prévision et de la Statistique 1993, 48-50; Schicho 2001, 300; see also 2.).

But is 'greed' a more suitable explanation for the outbreak of armed conflict in Casamance? The list of mineral resources that can be found in Casamance is short. It includes off-shore petrol in the maritime border area between Senegal and Guinea-Bissau and deposits of gold and iron in the Kédougou area in the very south-east of the country. Although the discovery of oil triggered a territorial dispute between Bissau and Dakar, its quantity is limited and cannot be compared with the oil richness of other African countries. Moreover, it remains untapped due to unprofitably high costs. The other mineral resources are not abundant, either, and in fact located in an area outside Casamance that has never been under the MFDC's control (Marut 2010, 23-24, 52). In order to finance its activities, the rebel group exploited agricultural and silvicultural resources (e.g. timber, charcoal, cashew nuts, or cannabis) that it sold in the neighbouring countries, especially the Gambia and to a lesser extent in Guinea-Bissau.<sup>71</sup> However, the war economy – although causing considerable destruction of the natural environment – remained limited. The traffic of cannabis, for example, has never reached the scale narcotics trafficking did in other conflict zones, e.g. in Colombia or Afghanistan. Occasionally, the MFDC even had difficulties to provide its combatants in the bush with necessities, namely food or medication (Evans 2003; Foucher 2007, 180-183; Marut 2010, 150-157). To sum up, 'greed' arguments cannot explain the

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obstructed the efficiency and profitability of agricultural activities (Diatta 1998; Marut 2010, 49-53; interview with a local NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 12 November, 2013).

<sup>70</sup> Some figures from the 1988 census are indicative. While in Ziguinchor region, 5.8 and 6.3 per cent have access to an internal or external water tap, respectively, in Kolda, only 1.5 and 0.8 per cent do so. In Dakar, the figures are at approximately 41 and 50 per cent and thus, above the national average of circa 17 and 27 per cent. This illustrates that while the difference between the capital and Lower Casamance is considerable, the region fares relatively well compared to Upper Casamance and other rural areas (République du Sénégal. Ministère de l'Économie, des Finances et du Plan. Direction de la Prévision et de la Statistique 1993, 48-50).

<sup>71</sup> There were other ways to create supplies and income. In addition to payments or support in kind by the local population, members of the MFDC gathered and hunted what the forests offered (e.g. wild fruit, vegetables, bush meat, fish, etc.) or cultivated land and orchards often after having chased away the initial owners. Some support came from the diaspora or family members of the *maquisards*. Humanitarian aid aimed at refugee communities or even the rebels themselves also helped to sustain them. Finally, pillaging and armed robbery of vehicles or shops also served as source of income (Evans 2003; Foucher 2007; Marut 2010, 148-157).

escalation of armed conflict. Violence occurred at a time when the group did not dispose of any resources as the improvised uprising in 1983 shows. The war economy only developed after 1992, but remained on a low scale and the MFDC did not benefit from profitable resource deposits like other armed movements on the African continent. Certainly, the MFDC would not have been able to sustain itself without the illicit trade and one cannot deny that its members became more interested in economic benefits than separation which obstructs conflict resolution. However, exploitation of resources does not account for the initial outbreak of the fighting.

### 5.3.4. *Institutional Capacity and Degree of Democratisation*

It is difficult to estimate the institutional capacities of Senegal at the beginning of the 1980s since most of the indices measuring state weakness were created much later and do not go back to that period. Yet, combining information from several sources provides evidence to fill the gap. In the earliest statistics available of the Fund for Peace, the West African state's rank is mid-table (rank: 99; total score: 66.1 on a range between 16.8 and 112.3). Prior to that, Senegal did not experience any larger incidents threatening stability (except for the Casamance crisis). Hence, one can extrapolate that while suffering from considerable deficits in international comparison, the state was relatively stable in relation to other African polities. The low GDP per capita and the scores of the Polity IV project that qualifies Senegal as closed anocracy until 2000 support this appraisal (Fund for Peace 2015; Polity IV 2014; World Bank 2015). Additional features, such as effective checks and balances (although the executive clearly dominated the other powers), the smooth transfer of power from Senghor to Diouf, and the effective and well-reputed Senegalese security forces provide further evidence that despite deficiencies, the country disposed of mid-level stability and capacities as well as a certain degree of democratisation.

There are other factors related to the political system that influenced conflict propensity. The political order left little room for political participation and the articulation of alternative political positions outside the PS and its surrounding clientelistic networks. Political parties were forbidden for a long time. After their re-legalisation, they remained weak and detached from rural milieus. As a consequence, large parts of the population, including the Casamançais population lacked adequate representation and did not have access to formal political groupings. Therefore, they were marginalised and left without opportunities to voice their concerns in a constitutional and legitimate manner. A specific feature of the Senegalese polity are Sufi brotherhoods that represent significant informal forces influencing the political process as well as cultural and economic affairs in Senegal.<sup>72</sup> Their spiritual leaders, the

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<sup>72</sup> Senegalese Islam is organised in hierarchical brotherhoods, among which the Quadiriya, Tijaniya, Muridiya, and the Layene are the major ones. They are led by traditional religious leaders (marabouts)

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marabouts, play an important role by obtaining and distributing clientelistic favours and recommending voting decisions. Especially until the early 1990s, there were strong connections between the ruling party and the religious brotherhoods (Beck 2008; Bop 2005; Hartmann 2010; Stetter and Voll 1983; Tine 1997; Villalón 2006). While the brotherhoods are well enrooted in the northern part of the country, their influence in Casamance has remained limited (Beck 2008, 156-159; Boone 2003, 96; Foucher 2003a, 14-15). In addition, Christians and Animists are excluded from these networks. Finally, political marginalisation continued at the regional level. Already under colonial rule, village leaders had often come from the north. After independence, all key posts of local administration were occupied by functionaries of northern descent. At the same time, there was no governor from Casamance in any other Senegalese region (Gehrold and Neu 2010, 85-86).<sup>73</sup> However, the problem was not of merely quantitative nature. Often, the officials from the north did not speak local languages and exhibited a certain superiority complex towards the governed. They did not make efforts to understand the sociology of the region in order to adjust measures and seemed to favour northern migrants at the expense of the local population, as the application of the land reform showed (Mané 2013). In sum, inhabitants of Casamance lacked political representation and opportunities to formally participate in the Senegalese political system, did not have access to informal networks, and were marginalised at various levels.

The review of institutional factors suggests that there was a certain, yet limited opportunity to launch a rebellion due to deficits in state capacity. Furthermore, political exclusion and competition that parallel identity risk triggering armed conflict (see Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). Thus, the systemic context was propitious for conflict. Yet, other regions and communities in Senegal were also and more strongly politically excluded but did not experience violence (Beck 2008). Hence, one has to avoid drawing premature and imprecise conclusions regarding the influence of the quality of political institutions on conflict onset in Senegal.

### 5.3.5. *Repression*

The Senegalese government reacted with merciless repression against the *Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance* and its separatist agenda. The list of human rights violations cited by Amnesty International and other NGOs rather reminds of a Latin American military dictatorship, but does not seem to fit in with Senegal's image of a relatively well-functioning democracy and state of law. Reports included humiliating actions such as torture, sexual abuse, arrests, disappearances, and extra-judicial killings. The security forces

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and constitute clientelistic networks that strongly impact on state politics, economics, and cultural issues (Bop 2005, 1104; Lerch 2001; Thurston 2009, 4; see also Villalón 2006)

<sup>73</sup> Daniel Cabou was the first Casamançais who became governor, but was rejected by the population of Saint-Louis.

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particularly targeted the Diola independent of their actual involvement in or attitude towards the MFDC. Women or elderly were not exempted from harassment (Amnesty International 1998; UCDP 2015). There is no doubt that repression had an effect on dynamics of violence in Casamance. Local communities became caught between two fronts and were simultaneously threatened by the MFDC and state security forces. The brutal treatment on behalf of the Senegalese state successfully discouraged parts of the populace from supporting or joining the rebel group. Yet, many more decided to join the *maquis* as a result of repression that they or members of their family suffered from (Marut 2010, 116-119; interviews with a former combatant of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 5 October, 2013; two MFDC combatants, Bissau, 15 November, 2013; a former commander of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 9 December, 2013). However, it is imperative to take into account the nature and the timing of repression in order to evaluate its impact on the outbreak of the conflict. In this regard, it is remarkable, that at the beginning of the crisis, the government took mainly judicial means to calm the situation. Before and after the first march in 1982, people were arrested. In December of the following year, they were convicted, but received relatively clement sentences given that they were accused of having threatened national security (Marut 2010, 105-106). This underlines that while repression clearly fuelled mobilisation and contributed to the radicalisation of the movement, it cannot explain the initial eruption of violence.

### 5.3.6. *External Support*

It is also important to consider trans-border dynamics and the role that external support played regarding conflict dynamics. Unlike other rebel movements during the Cold War, the MFDC did not receive intensive backing by one of the two blocs as it entered the international stage relatively late. The list of countries that maintained relations with the MFDC contained the usual suspects, such as Iraq and Libya that provided training and weapons, with the latter being smuggled via Mauretania and the Gambia. Yet, their influence and support was less important than often suggested and in the case of Iraq only temporary. Moreover, the *maquis* obtained arms (mainly from USSR/Russia, former Eastern Bloc States, and China) on the sub-regional illicit market that flourished as a consequence of the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia. The most important backing came from the direct but poor bordering states, namely Guinea-Bissau and the Gambia. Already before the conflict, there were close connections between Casamance and its neighbours in the south and north due to transfrontier settlements and migration of ethnic communities as well as shared history, culture, and language. The MFDC profited in various ways from its sub-regional connections. Among others, adjacent territories served as retreat areas for combatants. The presence of refugees in both countries availed the rebel group because its members could disperse themselves among them and benefit from supply destined to the displaced people.

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Besides, Guinea-Bissau was an important supplier of arms and hardware. During the Bissau-Guinean liberation war, the *Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde* (PAIGC; English: African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde) had rear bases in Casamance. Since then, weapons of the PAIGC had remained on Casamançais territory and could be used by the insurgents. Furthermore, members of the Bissau-Guinean army traded material due to their low or overdue payments. State authorities were equally accomplices of the MFDC.<sup>74</sup> The countries were also involved in the Casamançais war economy since looted goods and livestock or illicit silvicultural and agricultural products were marketed on their territories (Dramé 1998, 11; Evans 2003, 9-13; Evans 2004, 8-9; Foucher 2007, 177-180; 2013; Humphreys and Mohamed 2005, 275, 288; Marut 2010, 123-137).<sup>75</sup> External support contributed to sustaining the rebel activities over decades and impacted on conflict dynamics. However, violence in the Casamance erupted at a time, when the movement was self-reliant and not well equipped in terms of weapons. Besides, external support remained of limited extent and often cyclical. Therefore, trans-border networks cannot account for the outbreak of the conflict (Humphreys and Mohamed 2005, 275, 288).

In sum, the chapter provided an overview of the Casamance conflict. It presented the regional historical background, summarised the course of the conflict, and introduced the major conflicting actors. Moreover, the conflict was analysed by reference to major theories of civil war. The different approaches revealed useful because they help to gain insights into underlying issues and difficulties that favoured conflict onset. However, Casamance was not the only region in Senegal to be affected by difficulties in various domains. Hence, they cannot elucidate conflict onset in the area. Moreover, the theories are too static and fail to adequately account for the eruption of violence in the south of Senegal or conflict dynamics, as one could have expected more intensive fighting. Thus, the questions why conflict occurred in the first place, but remained at a relatively low level cannot be satisfactorily accounted for. Against this background, the framing of the MFDC will be analysed in the following in order to offer a more thorough explanation of conflict onset.

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<sup>74</sup> The Gambia was also involved in the arms trade with the *maquis*, but the connections are less clear than in the case of Guinea-Bissau. While the support of the two neighbouring countries was important for the MFDC, it remained limited in absolute terms since both had little capacities to back the rebel group.

<sup>75</sup> Relations between the MFDC and its neighbours were dynamic and changed depending on the respective ruling élites in the capitals and their relations with Dakar. Moreover, neighbouring countries did not only influence conflict dynamics in Casamance, but the conflict also impacted political events in these as the example of the Bissau-Guinean civil war in the late 1990s and the resulting change of government illustrated. For more information on (geo)political dynamics in the sub-region, see Foucher 2013; Marut 2010.

## 6. Rise and Fall of the MFDC: The Casamance Conflict through a Framing Lens<sup>1</sup>

The previous chapter demonstrated that the Casamance region in southern Senegal exhibits geographical, cultural, socio-economic, and political factors that increase the likelihood of a separatist rebellion. However, conflict dynamics are puzzling. On the one hand, the outbreak of armed conflict is not self-evident because in other cases – namely, Barotseland – it did not erupt although there were apparently favourable conditions. On the other hand, despite an initial escalation and periods of intense fighting, the level of violence remained surprisingly low.

In this context it has to be acknowledged that the Casamance conflict has been the subject of a great number of academic analyses. Scholars of various disciplines, among others geography, political science, anthropology, or history studied events from different perspectives, focused on diverse aspects of the crisis, and came up with excellent analyses. Having monitored the conflict for decades, Jean-Claude Marut provided in-depth knowledge of the development of the conflict from its beginning up to today. The role of nationalism and migration were at the centre of writings by Michael Lambert and Vincent Foucher; the latter also yielded important insights into the influence of religion on the conflict. Geneviève Gasser identified motives to join the rebel group. Séverine Awenengo produced a historically founded analysis of narratives. Martin Evans equally analysed historiographies, but also studied the war economy of the MFDC. Jordi Tomàs and Ferdinand de Jong approached the conflict from an anthropological perspective.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, several of the scholars dealt with the rhetoric of the *Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance*. In many respects, this broad body of literature constitutes a useful basis for the subsequent framing analysis. It offers essential information that helps to assess the resonance of the MFDC's message among the local population. However, neither does the present thesis merely replicate previous works, nor does it aim to supersede existing research. Rather, a framing analysis can make important additional contributions to the understanding of the Casamance conflict. While previous studies examined some aspects of the MFDC's propaganda namely the national(ist) discourse with regard to conflict onset, other dimensions of the grouping's rhetoric were neglected. Moreover, effects and failures of its message were not analysed in a disaggregated, encompassing, and theory-guided manner which occasionally led to premature conclusions. By contrast, framing will focus on all content aspects and analyse the interactions and resonance of different frames in an integrated manner. Furthermore, it will provide a more comprehensive perspective on the impact of the MFDC's sensitisation and

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<sup>1</sup> A previous and shorter version of this chapter was published in *Civil Wars* (Theobald 2015). All direct quotes were translated from French to English by the author without additional mention.

<sup>2</sup> The list of authors is not conclusive, but contains the authors whose research is most relevant concerning the thesis.

mobilisation attempts on conflict dynamics and both broaden and refine our understanding of their effects. By doing so, framing helps to better understand both the initial escalation of the conflict and its limited intensity. The latter was largely attributed to structural conditions, such as the low-profit war economy and a lack of external funding. While these played a role regarding the restricted character of the rebellion, the influence of rhetoric and its incapacity to mobilise and overcome deficits was not sufficiently taken into account (Foucher 2007; 2011; Lambert 1998; Marut 2010).

The chapter will proceed as follows. First, the major communication channels that the MFDC used will be presented (6.1.). Then, the different dimensions of the collective action frames will be examined (6.2.), before their resonance will be critically assessed (6.3.). In addition, counterframing of different actors will be considered (6.4.). Finally, preliminary conclusions will be drawn regarding the explanatory importance of framing in Casamance (6.5.).

### **6.1. The Communication Channels of the MFDC**

The *Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance* acted in a specific environment which requires closer attention as it helps to better apprehend the communication processes that were at the origin of the sensitisation and mobilisation campaign by the MFDC.

The MFDC had very limited access to communication channels. Modern communication means (such as (mobile) phones, internet, social networks, etc.) did not exist in Senegal when the movement was born. Other broadly used media in Sub-Saharan Africa, such as newspapers or the radio, were inaccessible because they were controlled by the government.<sup>3</sup> The lack of financial resources further restricted the room of manoeuvre of the armed group with regard to the dissemination of information. Moreover, the government repressed 'subversive' action in Casamance and largely halted any debate on the issue. Finally, illiteracy was widespread which obstructed written communication. Therefore, the MFDC depended on other ways to sensitise or mobilise the population and relied on existing social structures, networks, and communication channels of traditional and modern nature. In the previous chapter, it was mentioned that the rebel movement developed in an atmosphere of growing social unrest and took hold on existing or emerging structures, such as fan clubs of the regional football team Casa Sport, cultural associations, and protest activities against the new land law. These helped to disseminate the movement's message in a discrete but effective way (see Foucher 2002a; Gasser 2000; Mané 2013; Manga 2012; interviews with a former combatant of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 11 October, 2013; a former teacher, Ziguinchor,

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<sup>3</sup> In the Senegalese semi-democracy, freedom of the press and of expression was restricted. The MFDC only gained better access to the media, when private ones gained strength in the late 1980s. They conducted interviews with members of the MFDC or published its press releases (see Gueye 2010; Wittmann 2007; 6.4.1.).

18 October, 2013; a former combatant of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 24 October, 2013b; a journalist, Ziguinchor, 23 October, 2013a; a regional politician, Ziguinchor, 30 October, 2013; a former national and regional politician, Ziguinchor, 1 November 2013; a former NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 5 November, 2013; the director of a local NGO, Sindian, 21 November, 2013; an intellectual, Ziguinchor, 9 December, 2013). The armed group also sent envoys and held meetings in local communities (for example, quarters or villages), which could be disguised as cultural or community events, linked up with established traditional and gerontocratic structures (for example, sacred forests, initiation rites, and fetishes) as well as local opinion leaders, namely elders in the villages who contributed to mobilisation.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, sympathisers or combatants went from door to door in order to spread the word. Audio cassettes helped to diffuse information throughout the region and overcome the lack of radio (Diallo 2013, 56; Gasser 2000; interview with a former teacher, Ziguinchor, 18 October, 2013; interview with a school supervisor, Diouloulou, 29 November, 2013).<sup>5</sup> Through these manifold communication means and channels, the separatists informed the population about their struggle, mobilised support, for example in the form of money ('cotisations'), food, or combatants, and sold membership cards. Yet, these initiatives were not purely informative, but the movement also applied coercive means, as testimonies as well as the *Discours de Diatok*, recording of a meeting, exemplify (Gasser 2000; interviews with a journalist, Ziguinchor, 23 October, 2013a; the director of a local NGO, Sindian, 21 November, 2013; a local politician, Sindian, 22 November, 2013; an intellectual, Ziguinchor, 9 December, 2013).

Collective action frames are mainly identified on the basis of written documents by the MFDC, for example, leaflets or the writings by Father Diamacoune. That is why their relevance for sensitisation has to be discussed here. As in Sub-Saharan Africa and conflict settings in general, the diffusion of written materials was linked with difficulties in Casamance (see 4.2.3). The majority of the population especially in rural areas confirms not to have seen any of these (Theobald 2014). However, observers and members of the MFDC stated that the content of texts was effectively passed on orally and in secret as it had been the case for the cultural magazine *Kelumak* in the early 1980s. Hence, printed material was significant for mobilisation.<sup>6</sup> In this respect, the *Discours de Diatok*, a transcript of speeches by the

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<sup>4</sup> In the context of primordialist explanations of the conflict, the importance of traditional religion for the movement is stressed. This link seems to be overstated. While mystic elements played a role, e.g. in terms of oaths, the movement did not exclusively rely on these elements.

<sup>5</sup> At a later point, the MFDC had the chance to communicate more openly. After the first ceasefire agreement, the Senegalese state allowed the Northern Front to talk reconciliation in their zone of influence and even supported the rebels logistically. On this occasion, representatives of the MFDC diffused separatist ideas and sold membership cards (Interviews with a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 29 October, 2013; a former combatant of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 8 November, 2013; a local politician, Diouloulou, 29 November, 2013).

<sup>6</sup> At various occasions, respondents had textual material of the MFDC with them which illustrates that written communication was not completely unknown.

insurgents (see below), is revealing. It demonstrates that although the focuses and emphasises or written and oral communication slightly differed, the subjects that were evoked were similar. This underscores that written sources corresponded to the insurgents' verbal communication and therefore, yield insights into the collective action frames that were propagated in communities by the MFDC (Interviews with a clergyman, Ziguinchor, 3 October, 2013; a former teacher, Ziguinchor, 18 October, 2013; a former activist of the political wing of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 6 November, 2013; a former combatant of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 8 November, 2013; a local politician, Diouloulou, 29 November, 2013).

Altogether, the overview illustrates that despite numerous challenges and constraints the MFDC reached out to its constituency. Yet, this does not automatically imply that the movement effectively mobilised the local population. In the beginning, the grouping enjoyed popular support. In the 1982 march, men and women of different social background took to the streets. Moreover, the *maquis* quickly grew in term of numbers. However, the backing by the population did not last. It began to fade away in 1992 as a result of increasing violence by the MFDC against the population, economic hardship, and war fatigue (de Jong 1999, 9-10; Foucher 2002a, 418; Marut 2010, ch. 11). Before these dynamics will be studied in detail, it is imperative to identify collective action frames of the *Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance* and analyse their content.

### 6.2. The MFDC's Message: Identification of Collective Action Frames

According to framing theory, collective action frames contain three analytical components, namely diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing. Diagnostic framing provides evidence on what the problem is and its source or the person responsible for it. Prognostic framing suggests options to improve the situation, i.e. it proposes a solution and strategies to get there. The first two dimensions provide a basis for potential collective action, but do not automatically induce it. Concrete protest activities are triggered by motivational framing. It contains 'calls to arms' or rationales, for example, moral or emotional inducements that serve to convince adherents to participate in the movement's efforts (see Dahinden 2006, 321; Polletta and Ho 2006, 190; Snow and Benford 1988, 202).

Before the concrete frames will be outlined, the textual material that provided the basis for the frame analysis will be briefly introduced. The frames of the MFDC were identified by reference to documents that were written by or published in the name of the movement or its main leaders. These include various leaflets that appeared after 1982 and whose author was most likely Father Diamacoune.<sup>7</sup> The priest also wrote the over 140-pages work *Casamance*

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<sup>7</sup> The leaflets were published in secondary sources and will be quoted as such except for the "Proclamation" that was reprinted in the white book by the Senegalese government. The text *La voix de la Casamance* (English: The Voice of Casamance) edited by Dominique Darbon is considered the

– *Pays du refus* (English: Casamance – Country of refusal; 1995) as a response to the testimony given by Jacques Charpy in 1993.<sup>8</sup> This text is not coherent or well-structured, but resembles an arbitrary succession of poorly connected claims and arguments that are often very emotional and bear strong historical references. Moreover, members of the external wing of the MFDC, namely Jean-Marie François Biagui and a collective of authors around Mamadou ‘Nkrumah’ Sané published several pamphlets in the 1990s.<sup>9</sup> Additional documents, such as an issue of the movement’s newspaper *La voix de la Casamance* (English: The Voice of Casamance; 1994), letters by the MFDC to different recipients in Senegal and abroad, speeches by its members, interviews replicated in newspapers, internal documents, and material from websites were also considered.<sup>10</sup> A fundamental complementary source was the ‘Discourse from Diatok’. This French transcript of speeches in Diola, which two members of the MFDC held in the village of Diatok probably sometime between 1984 and 1988 yields important insights into how the movement mobilised followers on the ground and which frames were taken up in this context (Gasser 2000, xlili-liv). Finally, interviews conducted during field research complete the picture of the frames that were disseminated by the MFDC as they help to identify and verify them.

The combination of different materials provides a solid basis for framing analysis if studied in an integrated manner. If frames repeatedly re-occur in different contexts, this is a sign of their importance (see Hermann 2009). One can assume that these frames were also disseminated through other channels, i.e. orally. The triangulation with the ‘Discourse from Diatok’ is especially valuable, as it allows for comparing written and oral communication.

### 6.2.1. Diagnostic Framing

In the diagnostic framing, the MFDC defined the major problems that the region faced and that necessitated collective action. Dominant topics were grievances in various domains but also injustice and colonisation. All difficulties were unanimously blamed on the Senegalese government or ‘the North’.

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manifest of the MFDC (see Darbon 1985, 125; Gasser 2000, 215; de Jong 1995, 141). The origin of the pamphlets published by Joseph Glaise (1990) is not entirely clear.

<sup>8</sup> In 1993, Senegal agreed to consult the French archivist Jacques Charpy on the question whether Casamance had disposed of a specific administrative status under colonial rule, as the MFDC claims. In his report, Charpy refuted this allegation (see Charpy 1993).

<sup>9</sup> Biagui was among the young intellectuals of the MFDC, but later distanced himself from the armed movement.

<sup>10</sup> There were two journals by the MFDC. *La voix de la Casamance*, was edited by ‘Nkrumah’ Sané. Ousmane Tamba, another leading figure who resides in Switzerland, founded *Le Journal du Pays* (English: News from the Homeland), which is today available online. Activists’ websites such as *Le Journal du Pays* or *Essamay’s Blog* occasionally replicated relevant texts and documents from previous decades. Web archives also constituted a useful means to access sources.

### a) Enough is Enough: Multiple Grievances as Root of the Evil

Paramount topics of the diagnostic framing of the movement were *existing grievances* in various societal domains. The MFDC criticised difficulties that Casamance faced and took up the mismatch between the potential and the actual economic performance of the region. The grievance-related frame of the MFDC expressed the “*ras-le-bol casamançais*”<sup>11</sup>, that is, the broadly shared distrust that existed in the region. According to the movement, Casamance was in various respects under-developed and marginalised in comparison to the north, but also lagged behind its actual potential. To illustrate its claims, it cited various examples. Infrastructure, such as streets or health services, was of poor quality or absent. Although Casamance was an important player regarding agricultural production and fishing, all manufacturing industries were outside the region. Hence, the north made profits at the detriment of Casamance with the latter lacking paid employment. Besides, despite the high enrolment rates, educational institutions were insufficient and children had to pursue education in the northern cities or abandon it which amounted to discrimination of Casamançais children. Finally, the documents underscored that none of the promises that the Senegalese state had made with regard to development in Casamance had ever been realised and projects were only implemented elsewhere. In the context of socio-economic frustrations, the MFDC paid particular attention to the destruction of natural resources, especially forests and land expropriation. The movement blamed newcomers from the north for overexploiting natural resources in complicity with the state which led to the degradation of the environment in the south. It outlined that not only did this threaten the ecosystem, but also negatively affected the people’s livelihoods and the cultural heritage due to the importance that the Animist population attributed to holy places (especially, sacred groves) (Darbon 1985; MFDC 1994; 2000). Moreover, it strongly disapproved the unjust and inhuman application of the *Loi sur le domaine national* due to which the long-established inhabitants of Casamance lost their land, property, and basis of living to immigrants that had only recently arrived. Consequently, the people of Casamance became “pursued and chased like undesirable” in their homeland (MFDC 1994, 5). From the MFDC’s point of view, these tendencies were no coincidence but the result of deliberate exploitation, neglect, and sabotage of Casamance by the government. It contented that the Senegalese state took resources and taxes out of Casamance without reinvesting in order to destruct the region’s livelihood, potential, and heritage in all domains (namely, the agricultural, cultural, and intellectual one). Ultimately, this should break resistance in Casamance and destroy the region and the people (Biagui 1994a; 1994b; Darbon 1985; Gasser 2000; MFDC 1991 [1982]; 1994).

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<sup>11</sup> English: weariness, being fed up.

Grievances in other societal domains were also taken up, but were less prominent in comparison to socio-economic frustrations and land as well as resource issues. Notably, the lack of awareness and respect with regard to culture was a recurrent theme in the framing. The MFDC deplored the imperialism or neo-colonialism of the Senegalese who were ignorant of cultural specificities and practices that varied between the northern and the southern parts of the country. As a consequence, policies were not adapted to local realities and caused harm in the region (MFDC 1994; 1995). Likewise, all Casamançais were falsely taken as Diola independent of differences between communities. Moreover, Casamançais and their culture (including animist religious practices) were vilified and belittled by Northerners. The armed group denounced that Northerners considered people from the south as anarchic and backwards, treated them as animals (dogs or hyenas), or imbeciles, and inflicted humiliating treatment on them (Darbon 1985; Diamacoune Senghor 1997; Gasser 2000; Glaise 1990; MFDC 1994; 1995). Finally, the MFDC expressed its discontent about the political exclusion of Casamançais. The movement deplored that high-level political positions were inaccessible to politicians of southern origin. In addition, all important administrative posts in Casamance were occupied by 'Senegalese', i.e. officials from the north. Hence, needs of the local population were not taken into consideration and Casamançais did not feel at home any more (Darbon 1985; MFDC 1991 [1982]; *Sud hebdo*, 15 July, 1988). In sum, the MFDC referred to grievances in various domains that were relevant to different social groups.

### b) Injustice and Colonisation: The Denial of Rights

The MFDC pursued its problem definition at a more abstract level by highlighting manifold injustices that the region suffered from and comparing its situation to colonisation.

The *injustice*-related frame built on the previously discussed naming and shaming of grievances and reinforced their relevance. Yet, it was less factual and more emotional as well as normative compared to the grievance-centred frame. This component of strategic communication underscored that the Casamançais suffered from unfair treatment in all societal domains, which 'the North' inflicted on them, and did not obtain what they were individually and collectively entitled to. These injustices ranged from discrimination in employment to the lack of development and the denial of self-rule to the region. Furthermore, since the beginning of the crisis, the population had fallen victim of indiscriminate repression and humiliation that did not spare the innocent, such as women, children, and elderly.

In line with the deploring of the rampant injustice, the MFDC declared that Casamance had been illegally annexed by Senegal, had lost its liberty, and had become a victim of foreign rule or *neo-colonisation* that was "more perfidious and detrimental than the Franco-Portuguese colonialism" (MFDC 1994, 11; see also Biagui 1994a; Darbon 1985; Glaise

1990; MFDC 1991 [1982]; 1994; 1999; 2000). Hence, the region found itself in an anachronistic and completely unacceptable situation which was comparable to the South-African apartheid regime (Biagui 1994b, 12; Glaise 1990, 89), the genocides in Rwanda and Burundi, or slavery (Diamacoune Senghor 1997; MFDC 1994, 3; MFDC 2011). By framing the underlying difficulties in such a way, the MFDC underscored that the problems that Casamance faced were not just temporary socio-economic ones that could be easily corrected by public policy measures. But it highlighted that they contained a pronounced political and systemic component that a solution necessarily had to tackle. Hence, the diagnostic framing already laid the foundation for the prognostic one.

### c) Attribution of Responsibility

The MFDC did not hesitate to attribute responsibility and define its targets. In line with references to the domination of people of northern origin over Casamançais and alleged colonisation, the grouping generally ascribed responsibility for the problematic situation of Casamance to 'the North' or 'the Northerners' (*les Nordistes*), Senegal, or the Senegalese government.<sup>12</sup> Independent of the concrete label, the MFDC pictured its opponent as unjust, hypocritical, and dishonest because of its past and present attitude regarding Casamance (Biagui 1994a; Glaise 1990; MFDC 1995; 2000).<sup>13</sup> In this context, especially the two presidents, Léopold Sédar Senghor and Abdou Diouf were personally accused of their roles in the conflict. From the MFDC's perspective, Senghor bore a historical responsibility that resulted from his neglect and disregard in terms of economic development and public policies. Furthermore, he had cheated on Casamance, since he had failed to keep his promise that the region should gain independence from Dakar after a fixed time of cohabitation (Gasser 2000; MFDC 1995; *Scoopsdeziguinchor*, 14 January, 2007; *Sud hebdo*, 7 July, 1988).<sup>14</sup> As Senghor's successor and incumbent head of state, Diouf was ascribed a more active part in relation to the Casamance question. The MFDC blamed him for the ongoing poor governance and exploitation in the southern part of the country. Furthermore, it accused him of human rights abuses in the region. From the rebels' perspective, he had provoked the escalation of violence and imposed a war as a result of his overaggressive and arbitrary "gunboat diplomacy". Thus, both statesmen had infringed laws and principles in many ways and inflicted grave injustice on Casamance and its population (MFDC 2000, 2; see also, Biagui 1994b; Darbon 1985; Diamacoune Senghor 1990; Gasser 2000; Glaise

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<sup>12</sup> In the context of the Casamance crisis, the terms *Nordistes* (Northerners) and *Sudistes* (Southerners) are pejorative.

<sup>13</sup> The leaflets published by Glaise (1990) contain open hostilities towards 'Northern' ethnic groups as well as Muslims. In other documents, ethnic and religious accusations are less pronounced.

<sup>14</sup> The MFDC claimed that a document had been signed at independence stipulating that Casamance should become independent after 20 years. For more information on the agreement, see 6.2.3. a) and 6.3.1. d).

1990; MFDC 1994). One also notes that the MFDC described the Senegalese security forces in a pejorative way, for example, as “Forces of Intervention and Repression” that committed violent acts against innocent (Glaise 1990, 88; MFDC 1994; 1995; 1999). Thus, the MFDC defined and constructed a tangible enemy that simultaneously legitimated its political objective and the combat it engaged in.

The MFDC also considered the French government and the international community responsible for the crisis (see Darbon 1985; Diamacoune Senghor 1994; MFDC 1994; 2000). In the past, France had “deliberately violated the status [of the region] as a protectorate” (MFDC 2000, 8) and had failed to attribute to Casamance its rightful independence. Due to its passivity, France and other international actors were perceived to approve war and human rights abuses in the region (Diamacoune Senghor 1990). This frame was mainly directed at the international community and France. Yet, it also served to highlight vis-à-vis the Casamançais population that the Senegalese state acted in continuity with the former colonial power, and thus reinforced the image of ‘the North’ as an illegitimate occupier. Moreover, it demonstrated that the region had to rely on itself.

In sum, the diagnostic framing takes up several recurrent and well-connected issues and clearly attributes responsibility. By doing so, it provides an argumentative basis for separatist claims by the movement.

### 6.2.2. Prognostic Framing

The prognostic framing of the MFDC was less developed and multidimensional than the diagnostic framing but brief and simple. Independence was the only solution to all the problems of the region and the “final objective” (MFDC 1994, 2). In this dimension, the movement also connected the use of force to its ultimate aim.

#### a) “Independence First”: Defining the Objective of the Struggle

In view of the regional problems, which were previously outlined, the MFDC argued that Casamance should better “fly on its own” (*Sud hebdo*, 7 July 1988; see also Sy 2007) and “re-become itself” (Darbon 1985, 137). In other words, *separation and national independence* were the only conceivable options.<sup>15</sup> From the rebels’ perspective, independence implied *liberation* from Senegalese colonisation and exploitation and thus, the end of all its negative consequences. It would bring about better socio-economic development, prosperity, and recognition of the cultural distinctiveness of the region (Biagui 1994a; 1999; MFDC 1991 [1982]; MFDC 1994; 1995; 1999). Aside from this, the MFDC’s maxim can be summarised as

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<sup>15</sup> Regionalisation or autonomy were dismissed as “pacifiers” or “lollipops” (MFDC 1995; *Panafrican News Agency*, 30 October, 2000). They were not an option, but could only be a first and irreversible step towards full independence (Biagui 1994a; 1999; Diamacoune Senghor 1990; MFDC 1999).

“independence first, anything else thereafter” (MFDC 1995, 7; see also Diamacoune Senghor 1998b). The group’s prognostic framing remained vague about the future of Casamance, once separation would be achieved and did not give meaning to the notion of independence, develop a programme, or propose a political or societal vision (Interview with a former teacher, Ziguinchor, 18 October, 2013; interview with a member of the diaspora and NGO activist, Paris, 5 February, 2014).<sup>16</sup>

Interestingly, oral testimonies suggest that populist ideas regarding the socio-economic development of the region circulated. This illustrates that grievances, which were highly relevant for diagnostic frames, were mirrored in the solution that the MFDC proposed. According to the rumours, independence would turn the region into a paradise. Casamance could become prosperous since resources, for example, petrol, which allegedly existed throughout its territory, would be exploited at its benefit. In addition, the region would dispose of a well-developed infrastructure (e.g. an international harbour and airport). In these as well as in the newly created state institutions, everyone would find employment. Existing injustices at the detriment of the local population would be eradicated. There were also references to individual benefits. It is reported that property owned by Northerners – who would leave the region in the wake of independence – was promised to local people (Interviews with a journalist, Ziguinchor, 23 October, 2013a; a journalist, Ziguinchor, 23 October, 2013b; a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 29 October, 2013; a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 8 November, 2013). Here, one observes that prognostic and motivational dimensions intersect as the propositions regarding the prosperous future also provide an incentive for potential followers to participate in collective action.

### b) From Non-Violence to Aggression: The Repertoire of the MFDC

By what means should independence be achieved? Regarding this, the documents by the insurgent group provided some, although not very detailed information and illustrated that its position developed over time. The MFDC pointed out that it did not want to wage a war and put great emphasis on its initially *non-violent intensions*. It repeatedly reasserted its wish to obtain independence through “pacifist, juridical, political, and diplomatic” means (Diamacoune Senghor 1990; MFDC 1991 [1982]). It also stressed that it had acted

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<sup>16</sup> Members of the MFDC explained that the events in the early 1980s took them by surprise and they did not have the time to reflect on the future and develop a project for the society (Interview with a former combatant of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 11 October, 2013; interview with a former activist of the political wing of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 3 December, 2013). Others highlight that they deliberately deferred it to the time, when freedom would be achieved since they understood themselves first and foremost as a liberation movement (Interview with a local NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 12 November, 2013; interview with an activist of the political wing, Paris, 6 February, 2014). In this context, the weakness of the political wing of the MFDC also played a role. Later, some propositions regarding independence were made but did not go beyond mere generalities, namely a timetable for independence and the instauration of self-governing structures (MFDC 1999, 4, 10-11; Sané et al. 1995).

accordingly as the march in 1982 exemplified, which had obviously been a peaceful event (Darbon 1985, 137; Diamacoune Senghor 1990; Gasser 2000, xlix; MFDC 1991 [1982], 34-35; 1994, 2, 11; 1995, 51-52, 109; *Sud hebdo*, 7 July, 1988). But the prognostic framing of the MFDC had to adjust to the escalation of violence which is why the use of force became an issue. In this respect, one can identify two lines of reasoning. On the one hand, violence was presented as a defensive measure given the aggressive stance of the Senegalese government. On the other hand, there were open calls for violence because the end, i.e. independence, justified the means.

In line with the repeated references to its non-violent intentions, the MFDC emphasised that it did not want war. It argued that bloodshed resulted from the way how the Senegalese government under President Abdou Diouf reacted to the demands for independence. Through its “canon dialogue” (Diamacoune Senghor 1997), the state imposed an unjust war on Casamance. The MFDC asserted that in view of this, it was better for the Casamançais to resist and “to die with arms in ones’ hands than succumb to tortures, humiliations, abuses, and vandalism by the Senegalese colonialists” (MFDC 1995). Thus, the rebel group attempted to frame its *violent reaction as defensive, protective, and requisite* in the given situation. It externalised responsibility for the outburst of violence to the Senegalese government, presented itself as the victim, and justified its strategy as involuntary, yet necessary (Biagui 1994a; 1999; Diamacoune Senghor 1997; Gasser 2000; Glaise 1990, 86; MFDC 1994; 1995, 52-53, 81, 109; 2000).

Upon closer examination, the *Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance* did not take an exclusively reactive stance, but one can discern explicitly *aggressive statements* regarding the use of force in the documents published by the MFDC. The rebel group presented military means as an appropriate and inevitable solution if political steps did not bring about any results regarding independence because “national independence cannot be improvised, nor is it given after all: it is seized either politically or militarily” (MFDC 1999, 10; see also Biagui 1994b; 1999; interview with a former combatant of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 8 November, 2013). Although violence was still partly dependent on external factors, such as the government’s intransigence in negotiations, the MFDC adopted a more active and offensive role. It no longer merely reacted to the behaviour of others (or pretended to do so), but it actively decided on its strategy – and thus, the use of force. In addition, the movement stressed its determination. In its rhetoric, it threatened to extend and intensify the struggle and to keep on fighting resolutely and without mercy as long as necessary to obtain its final goal (Biagui 1994a; 1994b; 1999; Gasser 2000; Glaise 1990; MFDC 1995). It is impossible to distinguish whether such propositions were aimed to mobilise the local population or should rather menace the Senegalese government. Independent of the target group, they

underscore that the MFDC did not hesitate to adopt an aggressive stance and openly agitated for violence.

Overall, the prognostic framing of the MFDC was relatively brief and underdeveloped. It introduced independence as the solution to the difficulties defined in the diagnostic framing. Although the movement made some allusions to the prosperity that Casamance would access once separated from Senegal, it remained vague regarding political and economic arrangements in the future state. Moreover, the movement presented violence as a means to achieve its objective and interpreted it either as a defensive reaction to the disproportional behaviour of the Senegalese government or the only conceivable option to progress. Interestingly, there are comparatively few references to the use of force in documents. Yet, this should not be interpreted as a sign of moderation. Rather, this is a result of the document types that were analysed and political correctness, that is, the movement aimed at drawing a positive picture of itself. The allusions to non-violence back this assumption. Despite its deficiencies, the prognostic framing was well-embedded between diagnostic and motivational framing and offered a basis that the latter could build on.

### 6.2.3. *Motivational Framing*

In order to induce collective action, the MFDC invoked issues of history and (national) identity in its motivational framing and also brought up legal arguments. Hence, in many respects, it referred back to topics that were already present in the diagnostic framing and instrumentalised them to convince followers to participate in the struggle.

#### a) With, but Not in Senegal: Historical, Legal, and Nationalist Arguments

The motivational framing was strongly based on a combination of *juridical and historical arguments* (see Evans 2013; Faye 1994; Gasser 2002). In various documents, the MFDC provided a very detailed recount of historic dates and events. It interpreted them in an opinionated way in order to demonstrate that Casamance had been characterised by a specific historical trajectory for centuries (for example, Diamacoune Senghor 1998b; MFDC 1995). According to the MFDC, even before Portuguese colonisation, Casamance had existed as a separate entity that had exhibited unique social and state-like structures (Biagui 1994b; MFDC 1994; 1995). Since it was colonised by Portugal before having been handed over to France, the colonial past of the region also differed from the northern one. Later, Casamance allegedly had a distinct administrative status and constituted an autonomous territory under French protection. Purportedly, it was never fully integrated into Senegal and only “with Senegal, but not in Senegal” (MFDC 1994, 11).<sup>17</sup> Ultimately, the rebel group – and

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<sup>17</sup> This claim is disputed. See footnote 8 in this chapter.

especially Augustin Diamacoune Senghor – argued that President Senghor and Emile Badiane had signed an agreement in 1960 which had stipulated that Casamance would be allowed to secede from Senegal in 20 years in exchange for supporting the independence of Senegal (see 6.3.1.). However, Senegal continued to occupy Casamance despite its resistance and the region had “become a veritable colony” (MFDC 2000, 3; see also Darbon 1985, MFDC 1994; 2000).<sup>18</sup> Thus, Casamance had been denied its “real, absolute, inalienable, non-negotiable, and imprescriptible” (Diamacoune Senghor 1998b, 157) right to self-determination for centuries until today. In sum, the MFDC invented a regional narrative and presented rational – although not necessarily scientifically correct – arguments why separation from Senegal was justified and connected them with juridical vindications.

This juridico-historical framing was closely connected with frames invoking the *Casamançais nation and nationalism*. The MFDC constructed a unitary and homogeneous ‘Casamançais People’ that was said to share a common culture and the above-mentioned history. This ‘*Casamancité*’ (English: Casamance-ness) was largely based on cultural elements, namely symbols, heroes, values, narratives, traditions, etc., of the Diola community and more precisely a section of the Diola concentrating in the so called Kasa, the area around the town of Oussouye in the west of Ziguinchor.<sup>19</sup> Aspects and episodes that did not correspond with the *Casamançais* national project were left aside in the movement’s communication. According to the rebels, the *Casamancité* transcended other identifications, such as ethnicity, religion, or transnational ties and required protection from external influences and modernisation.<sup>20</sup> Moreover, the group made various allusions that there were profound differences between the people of the south and the north. Therefore, *Casamançais* and Senegalese did not belong to the same people, but the *Casamançais* formed a “millennial civilisation” (MFDC 1994) and were morally superior to the Senegalese due to their values. Consequently, *Casamançais* would naturally reject everything that was Senegalese (*Sud hebdo*, 7 July, 1988; see also Biagui 1994a; 1994b; MFDC 1994; 1995).<sup>21</sup>

A specific feature of the *Casamançais* nationalism is the *tradition of rebellion*. The MFDC argued that other than the northern part of Senegal, Casamance had not collaborated with the French administration, but had vehemently resisted it. Even before, the *Casamançais*

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<sup>18</sup> In 1993, a French archivist was called to examine the historical claims by the MFDC. The Charpy-Report concludes that the propositions by the MFDC are historically unfounded which is supported by various scholars. However, the movement continued to use the argument. For a deconstruction of this historical discourse, see, for example, Faye 1994; Marut 2010.

<sup>19</sup> Father Diamacoune was born in Singhalène, a village close to Oussouye. The Diola community consists of several sub-groups with the Diola of the Kasa constituting one of them. There are considerable differences between these sub-groups, for example, they speak different dialects.

<sup>20</sup> The impact of modernisation on Casamance is ambiguous. While the MFDC frames it as a threat to the traditional *Casamançais* identity, modernising tendencies had contributed to the formation of a *Casamançais* national consciousness that the rebels could build on (see Foucher 2002a; 2002b; 2005a; Lambert 2002).

<sup>21</sup> Already in the prognostic framing, Senegal was attached with vices. The negative presentation was taken up and reinforced in the motivational framing.

had been fighting almost uninterruptedly and actively against all kind of foreign occupation since 1645.<sup>22</sup> Thus, the region has remained *invicta felix* (English: undefeated lucky) and should continue to do so (Darbon 1985; Diamacoune Senghor 1990; MFDC 1994; 1995; 1999). The continuous struggle for independence was incarnated by the frequently invoked prophetess Aline Sitoé Diatta who allegedly incited her home community to resist against French colonisation and therefore, was deported to French Sudan (today's Mali) where she died. Hence, Diamacoune presented her as a national hero or the Jeanne d'Arc of Casamance (Darbon 1985; Diamacoune Senghor 1998b; Marut 2010, 360; MFDC 1994; see also *Extrait de la conférence de l'abbé Diamacoune Senghor donnée à Dakar le 23 Août 1980* reprinted in Awenengo 2000).<sup>23</sup> This underscored that the present struggle of the MFDC was not a new one, but represented the logic, legitimate, and desirable prolongation of this centuries-old collective contestation.

The juridico-historical and nationalist references were strongly interwoven and had similar purposes. First, these two components of the motivational framing by the MFDC presented Casamance as a nation with a distinct people that was denied a state although it had existed as an independent entity in the past. Consequently, the region should have the right to independence and statehood as other nation-states (Darbon 1985, 134). By constructing a unitary regional history, the group pretended that there was factual evidence for separatist claims. However, the Casamançais nation suffered from colonisation and risked extinction. Thus, joining the struggle for liberation and independence, which the MFDC engaged in, represented a necessary and legitimate correction of an unjust situation.<sup>24</sup> In this context, juridical references aimed to demonstrate that the struggle was likely to be successful which should facilitate the decision to participate (Biagui 1994a; MFDC 1994; 1995). Moreover, by equating its activities with resistance against external colonisation and interpreting the regional status as continuous violation of individual and collective rights, the movement stirred negative associations and emotions. These were channelled towards 'the North' and in particular, the northern-dominated administration and the "Forces of Intervention and Repression" (Glaise 1990), which were presented as illegitimate and brutal colonisers and thus became a warrantable target of violence. In addition, the MFDC attached normative and moral importance to its action. It frequently underscored that it would finally make truth and justice triumph as well as re-establish the freedom, honour, unity, and dignity of the region

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<sup>22</sup> In 1645, Portugal founded the trading post in Ziguinchor. Hence, the year marks the beginning of foreign occupation of Casamance.

<sup>23</sup> Aline Sitoé Diatta (1920-1944) was a Diola priestess and prophetess from the village of Kabrousse. Reportedly, she incited villages to passively resist to French orders which is why she was deported to Timbuktu and died soon after. Scholars dispute that Aline Sitoé Diatta's commitment was really political and aimed to oppose the colonial administration (see, for example, Tolliver-Diallo 2005). Nevertheless, she is considered a regional heroine. Already before the conflict, Diamacoune praised Aline Sitoé at a famous conference that he organised in Dakar.

<sup>24</sup> This was even more so since the MFDC presented itself as acting in the name of the Casamançais people (MFDC 1994).

(Biagui 1994b; Diamacoune Senghor 1999; MFDC 1994; 1995; 2000). Second, both the historic and the nationalist framing alluded to the apparently existing fundamental differences between Senegal and Casamance and tried to reinforce these perceptions. By doing so, the MFDC aimed to construct an enemy image and increase the readiness to participate in the armed struggle against the 'other', namely the northern coloniser. In addition, the MFDC suggested that specific qualities were inherent to the Casamançais "people of refusal", especially being rebellious, separatist, as well as opposed to everything that was Senegalese (Darbon 1985; MFDC 1994; 1995). Besides, Casamançais were solidary and ready to sacrifice themselves for independence of their country, since a notorious nationalist would be slumbering in every real Casamançais. Thus, joining collective action should appear natural and a historic tradition. The rebels presented collective action as an obligation that resulted from membership in the community and the values associated with it which created a certain group pressure but also reduced individual responsibility of those who joined the fighting with the aim to induce the targeted to support the struggle (Diamacoune Senghor 1999; MFDC 1994; 1995).<sup>25</sup>

### b) Self-Protection and Resistance: Mobilisation for Collective Violence

In addition to offering general arguments to sympathisers why they should join the struggle, the motivational framing also contained elements that specifically aimed at justifying the use of force as an adequate means. The examination of the prognostic dimension showed that the MFDC presented the use of force as initially unintended but mandatory as a result of arbitrary repression by the Senegalese government. This also served to incite followers to join the struggle. All Casamançais – combatants and the population alike – risked falling victim to brutalisation on behalf of the state.<sup>26</sup> Since there was a security vacuum in the region, collective violence constituted a *legitimate and even necessary way to protect and defend* oneself and *take revenge* in an unjust and imposed war. In addition, the rebels portrayed it as the only possible way to liberate Casamance and its people and put an end to colonisation. Hence, the movement underscored that the government was exclusively responsible for the use of force and implicitly confirmed its own innocence. It aptly stirred emotions, especially frustration and anger about the indiscriminate and disproportional abuses, and framed violence in a normative way to convince followers of the need of violence and reduce inhibitions regarding armed combat.

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<sup>25</sup> It was mentioned above that the MFDC's promises regarding the future economic prosperity of the region and its inhabitants are simultaneously parts of its prognostic and motivational framing (see 6.2.2.). Thus, the movement also made very concrete propositions to incite sympathisers to join the struggle.

<sup>26</sup> In the texts, there are various references to the fate of individuals that had become victims of security forces as a consequence of mistakes or arbitrariness of the latter (Biagui 1994a: 24-28; see also Diamacoune Senghor 1997; Glaise 1990). These allusions simultaneously justify violence as a defensive means and discredit the Senegalese state.

Overall, the MFDC aimed to persuade (potential) supporters to take the final step and join its struggle by combining various topics and providing rational, emotional, and normative reasons.

In general, the framing of the *Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance* was internally consistent and logical with the three framing dimensions being sufficiently connected. However, the quality of the different dimensions varied considerably and changed over time. While diagnostic framing was relatively well developed, prognostic framing remained weak which indicates that the MFDC was overtaken by events and did not develop a sound ideological basis for its struggle. Motivational framing was also deficient and rather unidimensional. With regard to content, one observes a shift in topics. Especially in its early days, the movement focused on the numerous difficulties Casamance suffered from, such as land issues, socio-economic under-development, and economic exploitation by the north. Over time, the publications of the movement increasingly turned towards historical and legal arguments. Consequently, there was a certain imbalance in favour of abstract and backward-looking themes, while references to the future were comparatively weak.<sup>27</sup> Furthermore, it became obvious that the movement adopted a double-strategy to simultaneously convince different social groups by combining various lines of argumentation. On the one hand, questions of land rights and resource exploitation were particularly relevant for those affected by negative repercussions of the land law or the degradation of the natural environment. On the other hand, historical and nationalist arguments were targeted at those having previously developed a regional consciousness and interest in cultural topics, for example, as a result of formal instruction or (unsuccessful) migration (see Diedhiou 2010). However, frames do not necessarily have the effect intended by their disseminators, but resonance depends on their interaction with other social dynamics, as the following sections will show.

### **6.3. Assessing Frame Resonance and Framing Effects in Casamance**

The identification of frames by the MFDC yields important insights into how the movement interpreted the regional situation, what solutions it proposed, and how it tried to motivate potential followers to adhere to its aim and strategy. However, it is imperative to move beyond mere description and analyse the effectiveness of the framing by the MFDC on its

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<sup>27</sup> This is partly a reaction to counterframing, namely the publication of the report by Jacques Charpy on the status of Casamance under colonial rule. Historical and juridical arguments, as for example provided in *Casamance – Pays du refus*, should convince sceptics as well as the Senegalese government of the legitimacy of claims. However, the strongly history-centred argumentation provokes a feeling that the MFDC lost relation to reality and the preoccupations of its constituency.

constituency. Hence, frame resonance will be assessed by studying both successful and failed framing attempts. The credibility of frame articulators will be examined separately.<sup>28</sup>

### 6.3.1. A Successful Rebellion? Review of Effective Frame Resonance

The framing of the MFDC referred to various issues that were of great importance to the local population. By building on existing protest movements and aptly instrumentalising networks, the group successfully disseminated its message and circumvented political and social obstacles to framing, such as the limited freedom of expression or high levels of illiteracy. As a result, the insurgent group mobilised supporters and participants in the early phase of the conflict and benefitted from the backing of the local population that supported it financially, through food donations, or protection.<sup>29</sup> In the following, the elements of the MFDC's framing that successfully convinced the local population to support the cause will be systematically assessed.

#### a) Grievances, Frustration, and Feelings of Injustice as Fertile Ground

As outlined in the previous chapter, concrete socio-economic difficulties and perceptions of being discriminated against in various societal domains had already occupied the local population especially in the municipality of Ziguinchor in the 1970s and early 1980s. This manifested itself in the increasing potential for mobilisation and emerging protest initiatives that should later boost the *Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance*.

The list of grievances and injustices in Lower Casamance is long: Due to the implementation of the land law, local people lost their property and basis of existence at the benefit of migrants from the north without obtaining any compensation. Newcomers were also criticised for increasingly (over)exploiting local resources, for example timber or fish (Interviews with a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 29 October, 2013; the president of a local NGO, Ziguinchor, 31 October 2013; a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 8 November, 2013; a former combatant of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 8 November, 2013; a local NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 12 November, 2013).<sup>30</sup> Frequently, the regional administration was criticised in this context. It was dominated by officials of northern origin that knew little about the specific

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<sup>28</sup> Frame resonance is determined by the salience and the credibility of frames. The salience of a frame depends on three factors, namely its centrality, experiential commensurability, and narrative fidelity. The degree of credibility of a frame results from its internal consistency, empirical credibility, and the credibility of frame articulators (Benford and Snow 2000, 619-622; see 3.3.2.).

<sup>29</sup> The MFDC was not uniformly supported throughout Lower Casamance. While some villages collectively backed the movement, others did not. Divergent opinions often divided families.

<sup>30</sup> Migrants of northern origin or foreigners remained a minority in demographic terms, but were economically influential. This is partly due to networks, yet their economic performance was often better and more dynamic. They used more modern techniques, were more strongly implicated in trading, and had a better entrepreneurial spirit in comparison to locals (Interviews with a journalist, Ziguinchor, 23 October, 2013a; a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 29 October, 2013; a local NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 12 November, 2013).

local context. Moreover, they were accused of privileging migrants at the detriment of native inhabitants as a result of clientelistic networks. Hence, Casamançais felt that the administration appeared unwilling to address regional problems. Instead, the governing authorities were characterised by ineffectivity and pretension and seemed to be more interested in their own profit than regional development and the well-being of the population. Thus, it is not surprising that the situation was sometimes compared to colonialism (Juillard 1995, 32-34; interviews with a former teacher, Ziguinchor, 18 October, 2013; a journalist, Ziguinchor, 23 October, 2013a; a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 29 October, 2013; a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 8 November, 2013; a local NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 12 November, 2013; a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 26 November, 2013). There were also allegations that Casamance was disadvantaged in terms of socio-economic development and public investment in comparison to the north.<sup>31</sup> Finally, it appears that Casamançais were discriminated against in recruitment or administrative competitions.<sup>32</sup> Although it is difficult to verify in how far such incidences occurred systematically, the numerous accounts by people who experienced disadvantages because of their origin provide evidence that the problem had a noticeable extent (Interview with a member of civil society, Ziguinchor, 29 October, 2013; interview with the president of a local NGO, Ziguinchor, 31 October, 2013). Altogether, these instances promoted a feeling of being discriminated against and second-class citizens. Especially in the municipality of Ziguinchor, locals considered that they were dominated in all societal domains, disenfranchised, and despised by a 'foreign' – northern – minority that seemingly exploited and disproportionately profited from economic revenues in the south. These perceptions came along with discontent and distrust among the local population vis-à-vis the local administration and the national government but also Northerners more generally.

The MFDC took up and denounced such – real or perceived – social, political, and economic ills that were of fundamental importance to locals in different frames and framing dimensions

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<sup>31</sup> The conflict analysis uncovered that Lower Casamance fared relatively well in terms of infrastructure and development on national average and in comparison to other rural zones throughout the country, which are generally marginalised in the strongly centralised Senegalese polity. Yet, the comparatively more prosperous and privileged urban centres of northern Senegal assumingly constituted the parts of the country that were best known among Casamançais and – incorrectly – equated with 'the North'. Hence, perceptions of marginalisation are not surprising. Moreover, figures on socio-economic development tell little about its relevance for the population. In Casamance, tarred roads served, for example, economic interests, but did not necessarily correspond to local needs (Faye 1994). This suggests that the subjective perception of inequality is more relevant than objective conditions.

<sup>32</sup> There are multiple accounts that Casamançais were discriminated against in competitive examinations or recruitment processes due to their southern origin. For instance, they were refused places at university, jobs, or promotions in spite of their good performance. Instead, 'Northerners' were privileged although their results were worse. Allegedly, entire selection processes had to be cancelled due to such flaws. It is difficult to get information on the extent of the problem. Yet, many interviewees recounted pertinent experiences that they had made or knew about which is why such allegations cannot be discarded (see, for example, interview with a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 29 October, 2013; interview with the president of a local NGO, Ziguinchor, 31 October, 2013).

(see, for example, Darbon 1985; MFDC 1994). These grievance- and injustice-related frames were close to the difficult everyday life experience of the population in Lower Casamance and took up their frustration. Hence, they seemed justified and credible which gave an important boost to the MFDC (Interview with a former national and regional politician, Ziguinchor, 1 November, 2013). Moreover, the movement framed the various socio-economic problems and the political marginalisation in an emotional and normative way. According to the rebel group, Casamance was deprived of justice, honour, and dignity as a result of Senegalese rule. It went even further by equalising the situation of the region with colonisation by Senegal (see, for example, MFDC 1995; 1998). Thus, it invoked painful, but strong memories and enhanced collective emotions, such as frustration, dissatisfaction, and anger. This served to enhance framing effects, justify the group's objective and target of collective action, and ultimately mobilise followers. In addition, the MFDC also canalised grievances into concrete action. It gave a voice to the Casamançais at a moment, where they felt particularly marginalised without having an opportunity to express their frustrations through other channels, since political opposition was restricted and southerners were excluded from decision-making as well as informal political networks influencing politics, namely brotherhoods. Thus, the movement filled a vacuum that was left by the Senegalese institutional and clientelistic structures and appeared an attractive alternative through its participative communication strategy which gave the population the impression of finally being heard and taken seriously.<sup>33</sup> As a consequence, one can presume that the majority of the people participating in the march in 1982 and siding with the MFDC afterwards were eager to express their discontent about socio-economic and political ills since enough was enough and to protest for better consideration for their home region. However, it will be seen further down that this was a fragile and short-lived symbiosis that should later turn against the MFDC because the demonstrators and sympathisers were not necessarily in favour of secession from Senegal (Interviews with a former combatant of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 11 October, 2013; a former teacher, Ziguinchor, 18 October, 2013; a local NGO employee, Cap Skirring, 26 October, 2013; the president of a local NGO, Ziguinchor, 31 October 2013; a local NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 12 November, 2013; with a school supervisor, Diouloulou, 29 November, 2013; an intellectual, Ziguinchor, 9 December, 2013; a member of the diaspora and NGO activist, Paris, 5 February, 2014).<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Respondents stressed the movement's participative communication. Members of the MFDC visited remote villages and communities. They went from door to door to discuss with locals which gave them the feeling of being heard and taken into consideration (Interview with a former activist of the political wing of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 6 November, 2013; interview with a school supervisor, Diouloulou, 29 November, 2013).

<sup>34</sup> While separation from Senegal was explicitly referred to in a leaflet from 1982 (MFDC 1991 [1982]), interviewees occasionally insisted that independence was initially not intended, but was increasingly claimed as a consequence of repression by the government.

The positive framing effect of grievance- and justice-related frames can be demonstrated by reference to a specific social group. For decades, young (mainly Diola) men left the Ziguinchor region in order to pursue education or seek employment in Dakar or other cities of the north and formed a new, economically successful regional élite. Due to the economic crisis, the labour market could no longer absorb the incoming workforce.<sup>35</sup> Consequently, many young Casamançais had to return to their communities without any future professional prospects. Since both education and migration are at the origin of regional consciousness in Casamance, one can assume that their attitudes corresponded at least partly to the MFDC's positions. Besides, they belonged to pertinent networks (e.g. migrant associations) and were therefore easily reachable. Moreover, given their frustration and negative experiences in 'the North', the disillusioned young men were receptive to anti-northern propaganda, which matched their emotional state, and could be mobilised to join the rebels. The *maquis* provided an alternative opportunity for them and increased their prestige compared to inactivity and the image of professional failure that they suffered from (Foucher 2002b; 2005b; Gasser 2000, 250-252; 2002; interview with a former NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 5 November, 2013). In this context, promises regarding the economic development of independent Casamance also proved influential. The MFDC's prognostic framing is far from offering an economic programme for independence. However, the movement drew a picture of future economic well-being and prosperity. It highlighted the alleged resource wealth of Casamance, for example, in terms of oil. Moreover, the MFDC lured potential combatants with the prospect that they would obtain jobs or property after independence (Interview with a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 8 November, 2013).<sup>36</sup>

In sum, the framing regarding grievances of the MFDC stroke a responsive chord and resonated well. Not only did the movement take up issues that were central to the population, but it offered an interpretation that fit the perceptions of the people and were thus experientially commensurable. Furthermore, the framing of the MFDC was in accordance with its action. The emotional and normative presentation of existing difficulties as well as economic promises increased the effect of the grievance-related framing. It took up feelings of frustrations, discontent, and anger among the population and channelled them into concrete activity.

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<sup>35</sup> In the department of Ziguinchor, 75 per cent of the population was less than 30 years old (Juillard 1995, 53) and school enrolment reached almost 100 per cent. These figures give an idea regarding the number of school-leavers. Yet, only a small fraction of those seeking employment could find jobs (Cruise O'Brien 1996, 59; Gasser 2000, 250).

<sup>36</sup> This aspect is less pronounced in written material, but seems strongly present in oral communication. Many people in Casamance recount that they overheard members of the MFDC 'distributing' property among themselves, for example, houses owned by Northerners.

### b) The Temporary Success of Culture-Related Framing

In Casamance, local people often say that they 'go to Senegal' when they travel north to Dakar, as if Casamance and Senegal were effectively two countries. One should not easily take this phrase as an indicator or even a proof of Casamançais separatism. However, it exemplifies that there was a specific regional identity and alludes to a feeling of being different or detached that existed among people (Gasser 2000, 228). Casamance has some culturally distinctive features that distinguish it from the northern part of the country. These and the geographic remoteness of the region are at the origin of a specific regional identity (Interview with a former national and regional politician, Ziguinchor, 1 November, 2013). As previously outlined, the ethnic composition in the northern and southern parts of Senegal deviated. While the Wolof predominated in the north, Lower Casamance is mainly inhabited by (different fractions of) the Diola that constituted a minority at the national level. Moreover, a variety of smaller identity communities live in the region. Thus, there are differences in culture, tradition, and language use. Moreover, many of the ethnic groups present in Casamance have close ties to the neighbouring countries, namely Guinea-Bissau and the Gambia due to trans-border settlement patterns and family ties. Like the northern part of the country, Casamance is mainly Muslim. Yet, the regional population was Islamised later and in a less complete manner which is why there are differences between the Muslim communities, e.g. in terms of organisation in brotherhoods. Moreover, a considerable share of the Senegalese Christians concentrate in Lower Casamance and adherence to traditional religions has remained strong in the area. These variations between the two regions should not be exaggerated or interpreted as being dualistic or even antagonistic and leading naturally to violence (for such a culturalist perspective, see Darbon 1984). On the one hand, both regions are internally heterogeneous which is why it is impossible to identify unambiguous features of 'the North' and 'the South'. On the other hand, there are various cultural interactions and connections between the regions (Faye 1994; Foucher 2002a; 2005a; 2011; Marut 2010).

Although there were no primordialist tensions between communities that account for the conflict, the specific cultural context contributed to frame resonance. Inter-regional relations were strained due to political decisions and societal attitudes. The Senegalese nation-state is predominantly based on elements of Wolof culture and Islam which had repercussions on the everyday life. Wolof developed, for example, into a second lingua franca (apart from French) that increasingly played a central role in the media, administration, and economy.<sup>37</sup> National history was strongly influenced by a Wolof perspective and Casamançais history or local heroes were absent from the national narrative, but also school curricula. Muslim brotherhoods interfered in national politics and impacted economic activities (Cruise

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<sup>37</sup> According to statistics, close to 50 per cent of the Senegalese population speak Wolof as their first and approximately 22 per cent as their second language (Ngom, Gaye, and Sarr 2000, 6).

O'Brien 1998; Gasser 2000; Juillard 1995, 31-35; Marut 1997, 2; interview with a researcher, Gorée, 23 September, 2013; interview with a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 29 October, 2013). This 'Wolofisation', as the domination of the Islamo-Wolof model is referred to, had exclusive effects and fostered perceptions of marginalisation among Casamançais. Ethnic communities in Casamance felt that their specific cultures were not sufficiently respected and taken into account by the national project and feared that their cultural heritage might ultimately be superseded.<sup>38</sup> Additional difficulties stemmed from – apparent or real – hierarchies between communities. In Casamance, people perceived that Northerners despised them as uncivilised and subordinate. This impression cannot be repudiated in view of labels such as “forest people, pagans, palm-wine drinkers (or drunkards) and pork eaters” that Northerners used to describe Southerners (Humphreys and Mohamed 2005, 275). Besides, Casamançais denounced the ignorance and lack of interest in their cultural specificities, since they were all universally considered as Diola independent of their actual ethnic identity. Finally, Wolofisation was not a purely cultural phenomenon, but had economic and political repercussions. Communities could become marginalised and felt excluded from professional activities due to lacking language skills and networks. The influence of brotherhoods constituted a disadvantage for those regions and groups that were not well organised and represented by them. Hence, communities in Casamance felt marginalised within the Senegalese nation-state which culminated into an inferiority complex and an identity crisis.<sup>39</sup> Altogether, a combination of factors, namely geographic distance, existing cultural variations, post-colonial nation-building, and inter-regional relations fostered the emergence of a specific Casamançais identity (Faye 1994, 71; Gasser 2000, 217; Humphreys and Mohamed 2005, 275; interviews with a journalist, Ziguinchor, 23 October, 2013a; a local NGO employee, Cap Skirring, 26 October, 2013; a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 29 October, 2013; a former NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 5 November, 2013; a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 8 November, 2013; a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 26 November, 2013; a former MFDC combatants, Ziguinchor, 3 December, 2013; a former commander of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 9 December, 2013).

Against this backdrop, the MFDC's framing filled a gap from the local population's perspective since cultural topics were central in it. The movement stressed – and often exaggerated – the differences between the south and the north and recognised Casamançais tradition, history, and values. It expressed esteem regarding local culture and its specificities, for example the prophetess Aline Sitoé Diatta, and hailed its superiority in

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<sup>38</sup> Not only the Diola, but also other minority groups such as the Manjack or Mancagne felt that their culture and tradition were not taken into consideration within Senegal.

<sup>39</sup> Socio-economic and political grievances as well as the incidents in the late 1970s and early 1980s increased that perception.

comparison to northern culture.<sup>40</sup> Simultaneously, the group blamed the north of deliberate acculturation that aimed to supersede the cultural heritage of Casamance. Hence, the framing came up with an antithesis to the cultural discourse that dominated in Senegal since such a valorisation of the regional culture was unknown to the population. These propositions attracted attention and met so far unfulfilled expectations of cultural recognition and countered the widespread feeling of exclusion and inferiority. Thus, culture-related frames were welcomed (Lambert 1998, 587-589; interviews with a researcher, Gorée, 23 September, 2013; a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 29 October, 2013; former MFDC combatants, Ziguinchor, 3 December, 2013).

The severe repression by the Senegalese state enhanced the feeling of alienation among Casamançais and thus, increased frame resonance. People had expected the state to react responsibly to the expression of discontent. But the brutality on behalf of the government was understood as continuing non-respect and definite proof that Casamance did not belong to Senegal and that its population was not respected, as a retired MFDC member explained: “[I]f we were really the same [...], having a problem with your brother cannot make your brother take vengeance by committing such acts of violence” (Interview with a former activist of the political wing of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 3 December, 2013; see also interview with a former combatant of the MFDC, Ziguinchor 24 October, 2013b; interview with a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 8 November, 2013). This reflects the feeling that if Senegalese and Casamançais were one and the same, the latter would not have been treated in such a dehumanising manner by their compatriots.

In sum, cultural references were a useful mobilising tool for the MFDC. They were of central importance since many Casamançais shared a feeling of regional belonging and had experienced various forms of discrimination within the Senegalese state and nation. Hence, the MFDC filled a vacuum by venerating regional particularities. Frustration about real or perceived discriminations in other societal domains and alienation resulting from repressive violence further enhanced frame resonance. This shows that collective emotions increased the relevance of cultural framing. However, it will be seen later that cultural references lost their attractiveness. Discrepancies appeared in the positions of the rebel movement and its constituency with regard to the question what should follow from greater appreciation of regional culture and the MFDC failed to adapt its rhetoric to different expectations and constraints (see 6.3.2. b)). Furthermore, the appeal of culture-related frames varied across different ethnic communities as the following section demonstrates that will discuss the role of nationalist propositions. Therefore, culture-related framing is also an illustrative example of how fragile frame resonance can be.

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<sup>40</sup> The MFDC's framing went far beyond highlighting the regional identity. It strongly over-interpreted, exaggerated, or invented alleged regional differences in order to instrumentalise them for its purpose (see, for example, Diatta 2008).

### c) Ethnic Support for Nationalist Framing

The framing by the MFDC went beyond demands of cultural recognition, but contained explicitly nationalist ideas. These had a particularly positive impact among the Diola because the rebels based their national project mainly on elements of Diola culture. Moreover, the nationalist claims coincided with multiple social changes that affected the community and its self-identification. As previously mentioned, the influence of the Catholic Church and modern education provided a foundation for a nationalist feeling among them. Furthermore, decades of labour migration from Lower Casamance to Dakar modified relations between the two parts of the country and promoted cultural awareness, regional identity, and the reversion to tradition. Cultural associations formed among migrants and aimed to preserve and promote Diola culture and demarcate it from northern influence. The interaction of these elements favoured the effectiveness of nationalist frames among the Diola (Diedhiou 2010; Foucher 2002a; 2002b; 2005b; 2011; Lambert 2002; see 5.1.1. and 5.1.2.).

Labour migration also impacted social relations within Diola communities, namely between men and women which promoted nationalist attitudes and thus, resonance of nationalist frames. Both men and women sought employment in northern cities, with female migrants mainly working as maids. Through labour migration, women were able to obtain new opportunities as well as social mobility. With their earning, they financed their endowment and contributed to the family income, including the cost of education of relatives.<sup>41</sup> While their mobility and employment were beneficial to the women as well as the community at large, they were not always well-perceived, but nationalist and traditionalist milieus disapproved and overemphasised the negative aspects that were allegedly linked with female migration.<sup>42</sup> Opponents stressed the poor working conditions of the domestics which were allegedly dishonourable for the entire Diola community. Sometimes, the female migrants were even accused of prostitution (Foucher 2005b, 8; 2011, 92). While migration had initially been temporary, it progressively became permanent because women attempted to marry in the cities in order to quit the rural milieu. Therefore, it became increasingly difficult for men back home to find spouses, according to critics. If women returned to their villages, it was denounced that they had adopted 'foreign' habits and spoke Wolof. In accordance with a broader opposition to the advancing 'Wolofisation', this was perceived to constitute a threat to Diola culture (see Foucher 2002a; 2002b; 2005b; Humphreys and Mohamed 2005; Juillard 1995; Lambert 1999; 2002).<sup>43</sup> While negative views of female migration should not be overemphasised or generalised, they reveal nationalist tendencies that existed among Diola.

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<sup>41</sup> Since education was mainly reserved to the male population, women provided unskilled labour. They were less affected by unemployment as a result of the economic crisis.

<sup>42</sup> The cultural journal *Kelumak* published several articles that virulently criticised the '*bindanisme*' as female migration was referred to (*Kelumak* 1982b). Furthermore, there were – certainly unsuccessful – initiatives to impede girls and women from leaving their communities or bring them back.

<sup>43</sup> In effect, while male *évolués* used French, women tended to speak Wolof (Juillard 1995, 231).

Scholars point out that gender on one side and nation or nationalism on the other side are mutually constitutive. The literature stresses that women do not only play a key role regarding the biological reproduction of national communities, but are also the “carriers of ‘authenticity’” (Jayawardena and de Alwis in Giles and Hyndman 2004b, 10) and thus, responsible for upholding and passing on national tradition and culture.<sup>44</sup> From this theoretical perspective, female labour migration is a both cultural and biological threat to the Diola national community, to which defenders of the nation reacted.<sup>45</sup>

Altogether the conditions were favourable among the Diola with regard to nationalist framing. Cultural consciousness had increased as a reaction to the inculturation of Catholicism and modern education by missionaries which diffused knowledge about national – or rather Diola – specificities. This provided a solid basis for the nationalist framing by the MFDC. Moreover, the Diola community had experienced a variety of modifications that strongly impacted on social realities as well as dynamics and were perceived to threaten the kit of the community. Before the emergence of the MFDC, this had already triggered defensive reactions to preserve Diola culture and fostered the emergence of a culture- and identity-centred and often explicitly nationalist discourse (see *Kelumak* 1981a, 1981b; 1982a; 1982b). Hence, framing proclaiming a Casamançais nationalism perfectly corresponded to existing trends of cultural re-assertion and nationalist ideas as well as common preoccupations and therefore, struck a responsive chord.

### d) The Importance of (Imagined) History in the Framing of the MFDC

References to history are of central importance in the MFDC’s framing as they serve to justify separation and intersect with legal arguments for independence. In order to present a unique and linear regional trajectory that backed its argumentation and objectives, the movement exaggerated, constructed, or (re)interpreted pre- and post-colonial developments in Casamance in many respects. Hence, it created its own narrative that differed from historical realities or distorted them (see Awenengo Dalberto 2010; Evans 2013; Faye 1994; Gasser 2000; de Jong 1994; Marut 1997; 2010, ch. 2). While lack of accuracy can doubtlessly weaken the appeal of frames, their deviation from the truth should not lead to the premature conclusion that they were ineffective. Some elements of the MFDC historical allegations will

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<sup>44</sup> For a detailed theoretical discussion on gender and nationalism, see, for example, Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992; Enloe 1989; contributions in Moghadam 1994; Yuval-Davis 1997. The group of themes is also present in the literature on gendered violence and genocide. Sexual violence against women in the context of armed conflict does not only constitute an attack against an individual, but targets the entire communities that the victims belong to and aims to physically, culturally, and morally destroy them (see Jones 2004; MacKinnon 1994; Russel-Brown 2003; Sharlach 2000).

<sup>45</sup> However, the rejection of female migration should not purely be interpreted from an ideological or theoretical perspective. It also had very mundane causes, namely the emancipation of women at the detriment of men and resulting consequences, for example, the loss of status of the male *évolués*, dependence from (uneducated) women, and access to partners (Foucher 2005b).

be discussed more thoroughly to exemplify that the construction of content is not necessarily an obstacle to convince followers. Today's MFDC presented itself as the reincarnation of the historic eponym that had existed in the 1940s in order to draw on its legitimacy as well as its leaders' reputation. In reality, there were numerous differences, in particular with regard to the goals (regionalism and recognition vs. separatism) and means (constitutional action vs. violence), but these were not necessarily broadly known among the population, as the survey suggests (Theobald 2014).<sup>46</sup> Moreover, the framing invoked a referendum on the future status of Senegal which had been held before independence and in which Casamance supposedly voted against the union with Senegal. This aimed to underscore that there had been early aspirations for separation that justified the continuing struggle. In fact, the vote took place; yet, neither did the MFDC correctly quote the results, nor did it take into account the specific political context of the polls (Marut 2010, 74-75; interview with a former combatant of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 24 October, 2013a). Besides, the Senegalese government was accused of having modified the inscription of a memorial in Ziguinchor to conceal that Casamance had been a separate entity before independence. In reality, the measure rather served to suppress references to the colonial past.<sup>47</sup>

A key element of the MFDC's framing is the alleged existence of a secret treaty between President Senghor and Emile Badiane, a regional politician and co-founder of the historic MFDC. They were said to have signed an accord at Senegal's independence in 1960. The document allegedly stipulated that Casamance should remain within Senegal for a period of 20 years, form its own regional élite, and ultimately gain independence. Yet, Senegal had failed to respect the agreement. The story of the secret treaty played a central role for mobilisation. Due to this accord, which Diamacoune pretended to possess, Casamance had the right to secede according to the MFDC.<sup>48</sup> In this regard, Geneviève Gasser observed that "there is a very strong belief in the existence of this pact and [...] this pact, or the belief in the pact, is doubtlessly at the origin of the current problems of Casamance" (2000, 229). Thus, Diamacoune successfully convinced – or rather, deceived – many followers that the

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<sup>46</sup> For example, less than 34 per cent of the participants in the survey had precise or at least vague knowledge regarding the personality of Emile Badiane (Theobald 2014). Many replies suggest that respondents were not familiar with differences between the historic and the present MFDC.

<sup>47</sup> The memorial in Ziguinchor initially saying 'Casamance to her dead for France' reminded of the Casamançais soldiers that participated in the world wars. The government changed the words into 'Casamance to her dead for the fatherland'. While this modification most likely aimed to suppress traces of foreign occupation, the MFDC interpreted it as an attempt by the government to conceal the difference between northern Senegal and Casamance in retrospect (MFDC 1995, 17, 40, 105, 108, 123; Diatta 2008, 116-117, 206-207; interviews with a journalist, Ziguinchor, 23 October, 2013b; a former combatant of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 24 October, 2013a; a former NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 5 November, 2013; a former combatant of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 8 November, 2013; former MFDC combatants, São Domingos, 17 November, 2013; a former activist of the political wing of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 3 December, 2013). Moreover, statements by national politicians were interpreted in a biased way to demonstrate that they aimed at concealing differences between the two parts of the country (Diatta 2008, 195-209).

<sup>48</sup> The existence of the agreement is disputed and dismissed by most scholars.

document had existed and mobilised supporters on its basis. But why could such a distorted frame resonate in the first place? On closer inspection, a combination of factors enhanced resonance. The story alluded to several historical events or personalities that people remembered or had heard of, without knowing the exact historical relations or being able to verify them. Hence, the MFDC could instrumentalise them according to its needs and connect them with more recent incidences. In addition, a variety of rumours about historical events circulated in Casamance that played in favour of history- and identity-related frames. However, it is difficult to know where they originate from and when they occurred, that is, before or during the conflict in which case they were most likely fuelled by the MFDC.<sup>49</sup> Moreover, Father Diamacoune was broadly recognised as an intellectual who disposed of thorough historical knowledge (see 6.3.4.) which lent further credence to the frames the movement disseminated.<sup>50</sup> Independent of the actual truth of the propositions, this led to an apparently credible storyline in the eyes of many sympathisers that joined the armed struggle on its basis. With regard to the resonance, the low or medium level of education favoured the mobilising potency of history-related frames because it allowed for a certain historical consciousness and partial knowledge serving as fertile soil. Furthermore, familiarity can be more important than objectivity. Hence, people can easily be convinced and potentially, misled if they are confronted with seemingly well-founded arguments from a credible source (see also Awenengo Dalberto 2010, 17).<sup>51</sup>

Overall, in view of the strong presence of allusions to the past – or what the MFDC made out of it – in the movement's framing, it was clearly advantageous that even invented or modified historical aspects could positively impact frame resonance (Interviews with a former combatant of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 24 October, 2013b; a journalist, Ziguinchor, 23 October, 2013a; a journalist, Ziguinchor, 23 October, 2013b; a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 8 November, 2013; an intellectual, Ziguinchor, 9 December, 2013; see also Theobald 2014).

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<sup>49</sup> In Casamance, there were rumours that President Senghor resigned in 1980 because of the agreement. He was allegedly under pressure as a result of separatist claims from Casamance and stepped down to avoid having to keep his promise (Gasser 2000, 220; interview with an assistant of Father Diamacoune, Ziguinchor, 8 December, 2013). These are doubtful (but persistent) allegations in view of Senghor's advanced age (he was born in 1906) and the previous amendment of the constitution that prepared the transfer of power to Abdou Diouf (Diouf 1993; interview with a director of a local NGO, 21 November, 2013; interview with an intellectual, Ziguinchor, 9 December, 2013). Badiane's sudden death is also often connected with the secret pact and at the centre of legends. People also remember that they or their parents were told in different settings, for example at school or in the French army, that Casamance and Senegal were different entities.

<sup>50</sup> Diamacoune developed his arguments in a scientific-like manner by constantly connecting his claims to concrete dates and events and citing persons and documents. Yet, his credibility and persuasive power were not unlimited as will be seen in 6.3.4.

<sup>51</sup> There are also restrictions to the effectiveness of history-related frames. Apparently, references that allude to local or ethnic history were risky since they were better remembered within communities. Hence, re-interpreting and instrumentalising them was difficult and reduced frame resonance in concerned localities or within groups (Toliver-Diallo 2005; Tomàs 2005).

Although it is often argued that the MFDC did not have a coherent ideology and that its rhetoric was largely constructed, it brought up topics that corresponded to long-simmering frustrations and preoccupations in the region.<sup>52</sup> By combining various aspects, it appealed to different target groups. It simultaneously dealt with the problem of underdevelopment and land tenure on one side and aspects of cultural recognition or nationalism that were more relevant for the educated inhabitants on the other (Diedhiou 2010). Moreover, the foregoing discussion of the successful frame resonance of grievance-based, culture-related, and nationalist frames demonstrated why the MFDC's frames attributing responsibility to 'the North', namely the central government including the local administration and recent migrants could succeed. These ascriptions were a cross-cutting theme and mirrored the everyday experience of people on the ground that was marked by – real or perceived – differences between the northern and the southern part of the country and discrimination at the detriment of Casamançais.<sup>53</sup> Thus, the movement succeeded to mobilise (parts of) the population to support or join the group through its strategic communication.

### 6.3.2. *Losing Ground: Deficits in Frame Resonance*

Framing was not generally successful and the separatist movement could not maintain initial framing successes. It increasingly lost credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of its constituency and popular support declined since the mid-1990s. In the following, deficits in frame resonance, which are at the origin of this tendency, will be assessed.

#### a) The Separatist Movement with a Unionist Basis: Rejection of Independence as a Solution

A major challenge to frame resonance concerned the prognostic framing of the MFDC, namely independence as the targeted solution. As mentioned above, many Casamançais doubtlessly agreed with the claims that their region was marginalised and neglected within Senegal in all societal domains. This created support for the MFDC because it attended to and articulated the locals' manifold problems. People were willing to take to the streets to express that they had enough and longed for change as well as express their discontent vis-à-vis Northerners. However, aside from consensually denouncing grievances, there was a

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<sup>52</sup> Observers often highlight that the MFDC did not have a coherent theory or ideology in order to justify its fight and its objective. Although this was true and doubtlessly problematic, as the absence of a vision for independence demonstrates, a more differentiated perspective is necessary. A sound ideological basis is no guarantee for successful mobilisation. Ideologies risk being too inflexible or irrelevant, for example, if they were disconnected from the everyday problems and realities of the population which would impede their mobilising potency.

<sup>53</sup> The framing clearly neglects parts of the problem because it blanks out the local people's responsibility. For example, Casamançais failed or refused to adopt modern agricultural and economic practices which favoured domination by Northerners (Diatta 1998; Labar 2012, 31-34; see also Gasser 2000).

strong mismatch between the MFDC's and the population's respective objectives.<sup>54</sup> The survey proved that close to 80 per cent of the respondents did not endorse total separation.<sup>55</sup> The reasons that the sceptics invoked were manifold: Micro-states were out-dated at times of globalisation and great entities; the MFDC did not have any plans for independence; independence would risk leading to a civil war about leadership and increase economic hardship (Theobald 2014; see also Foucher 2002a, 416; Marut 2010, 114; interview with a former teacher, Ziguinchor, 18 October, 2013; interview with an NGO activist and journalist, Cap Skirring, 26 October, 2013). These arguments reflect that while the status quo was far from satisfying, it had long been accepted as a fact and appeared as the best of the bad solution.<sup>56</sup>

Election results in the Ziguinchor region reflect that there was a critical, yet positive attitude vis-à-vis the Senegalese political system among the regional population (see figure 5). In the presidential elections from 1978 to 2000, the levels of participation in Lower Casamance were similar to the turnout at the national level and only varied slightly. There was no pronounced absenteeism, as in the case of Barotseland, indicating rejection of the political system as such. When contrasted to socialist strongholds, such as the Matam region in the north-east of Senegal, support for the PS, which ruled since independence until 2000, was considerably lower in the Ziguinchor region. Nevertheless, a comparison with national data shows that the PS always remained relatively successful in the south.<sup>57</sup> This is remarkable given the weak party structures and the absence of clientelistic networks in the area. Only the 1983 election results present an exception to the trend. In this year, support for the PS dropped abruptly, while the party even improved its performance at the national level. The outcome is not surprising in view of the preceding events, but also has causes at the national level (Stetter and Voll 1983, 251). In the following years, the voting behaviours in Lower Casamance and the national level re-converged. Finally, one observes that Casamance was one of the major strongholds of the political opposition, although it was unstructured and local.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> The differences in goals became apparent after the first ceasefire: For many local people, it represented a triumph since the government had to take the region seriously. Yet, parts of the MFDC rebuffed the accord, denounced that it did not even refer to independence, and continued fighting (Foucher 2011, 94; Marut 2010, 251-256).

<sup>55</sup> Only approximately twelve per cent believed in it (Theobald 2014).

<sup>56</sup> Although the responses are biased due to the past time, they yield interesting insights.

<sup>57</sup> Certainly, the support for the PS in Lower Casamance was below the national average but the difference was marginal. Furthermore, when disaggregating regional figures, one realises that while the population in Oussouye was particularly hostile to the Socialist Party, it achieved even above-average results in the departments of Ziguinchor and Bignona (especially in 1978 and 1983).

<sup>58</sup> These tendencies are not contradictory. Since the Senegalese opposition has remained weak for a long time, comparatively strong support for political challengers did not exclude a solid basis for the ruling party (Beck 2008, 233-236).

**Figure 5: Comparison of national and regional results of presidential elections, 1978-2000**

	1978	1983	1988	1993	2000	
					1 <sup>st</sup> round	2 <sup>nd</sup> round
<b>National</b>						
Valid Votes	62.5 %	57.9 %	58.6 %	50.9 %	62.0 %	61.5 %
PS	82.3 %	83.6 %	73.2 %	58.4 %	41.3 %	41.2 %
PDS	17.4 %	14.7 %	25.8 %	32.0 %	31.3 %	58.9 %
Others		1.7 %	1.0 %	9.6 %	27.5 %	
<b>Ziguinchor region</b>						
Valid Votes	66.7 %	51.9 %	64.3 %	50.2 %	60.4 %	59.6 %
PS	90.9 %	81.0 %	67.4 %	56.1 %	34.9 %	32.2 %
PDS	9.1 %	17.2 %	31.6 %	28.1 %	37.2 %	67.8 %
Others			1.1 %	15.8 %	27.9 %	
<b>Matam region</b>						
Valid Votes	69.8 %	76.2 %	60.2 %	48.5 %	54.8 %	52.7 %
PS	98.6 %	93.5 %	93.9 %	88.9 %	60.5 %	71.7 %
PDS	1.4 %	2.2 %	5.9 %	4.4 %	8.3 %	28.9 %
Others		4.3 %	0.2 %	6.7 %	31.2 %	

Source: Own representation based on Beck 2008

Taken together, in spite of considerable inter-regional differences, there are no extreme or sudden divergences between Casamançais and national figures. With the brief exception of the 1983 vote, they largely paralleled each other and continued to do so after the Casamance crisis had begun. At large, the results of the elections underscore that the regional population expressed its scepticism vis-à-vis the government, including the ruling class and the influence of northern-dominated networks in politics through the polls. However, the voting behaviour, that is, the turnout and the persistent support for the ruling party also proves that Casamançais did not entirely reject the political regime and question their integration within it (Beck 2008, 154, 233-235; Boone 2003, 83, 115-116, 121; Foucher 2002a, 413; Marut 2010, 332).<sup>59</sup>

To sum up, the visions of the future of the MFDC and its constituency varied. Instead of an own state, most Casamançais rather longed for better consideration of their needs and political as well as economic solutions within the Senegalese state in order to become '*Sénégalais à part entière*' ('full Senegalese citizens') instead of '*Sénégalais entièrement à*

<sup>59</sup> This reminds of the strategy of the historic MFDC. While it was founded to achieve better representation of Casamance within the Senegalese polity and formed an opposition party in this respect, it acted within the constitutional framework.

*part* ('entirely separated Senegalese'). Although having willingly expressed their discontent about prevalent difficulties at the beginning of the crisis, they rejected collective action frames that explicitly or implicitly referred to secession (Foucher 2011; Theobald 2014; interviews with a former teacher, Ziguinchor, 18 October, 2013; an NGO activist and journalist, Cap Skirring, 26 October, 2013; a former national and regional politician, Ziguinchor, 1 November, 2013). Thus, there was no consensus about the objective of the struggle which weakened the appeal of the movement's framing. Subsequently, it will be seen that cultural factors also played in that sense

### b) Unsuccessful Creation of a Casamançais Nationalism

In the previous sub-chapter it was demonstrated that the identity crisis in Casamance favoured cultural framing by the MFDC because it recognised cultural particularities of Casamance that were otherwise neglected in view of the Islamo-Wolof domination of the Senegalese nation-state. Especially Diola adhered to the nationalist framing that was founded on elements of their ethnic culture and that had previously received attention by Catholic missionaries which had increased their salience. Yet, national and nationalist allusions were not unequivocally welcomed. But the local population increasingly opposed these frames since they did not correspond to existing patterns of identity.

In order to better understand the failure of the nationalist frame, it is useful to have a closer look at patterns of identification in the region. Many Casamançais are closely attached to their home region, express pride on it, or share a feeling of regional identity that results, among other things from the geographic location and specific cultural features of the region (Interviews with a journalist, Ziguinchor, 23 October, 2013a; a local NGO employee, Cap Skirring, 26 October, 2013; a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 29 October, 2013; the president of a local NGO, Ziguinchor, 31 October 2013; a local NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 12 November, 2013; a local politician, Sindian, 22 November, 2013; an intellectual, Ziguinchor, 9 December, 2013). But identity processes in Casamance are complex. After decades of interactions between the two parts of the country, which persisted throughout the crisis, many people simultaneously identified themselves with different entities, which can be of sub-regional (e.g. the village or ethnic (sub-)groups) or supra-regional nature (e.g. the nation or border-crossing ethnic ties) with the degree of identification varying between individuals and over time.<sup>60</sup> Hence, they easily perceived themselves as 'Senegalese from Casamance', i.e. neither exclusively Casamançais nor fully Senegalese.

Furthermore, Casamançais regionalism was not automatically linked with nationalism, territorialism, or separatism, but it rather constituted a special form of being Senegalese.

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<sup>60</sup> Fort-five per cent identified the national identity as their major identity, followed by regional identity (27 %) and ethnic identity (23 %). Respondents frequently justified their choice as Casamance was part of Senegal. The reply simultaneously shows that identities intersect (Theobald 2014).

According to many locals, Casamance stood out due to its multicultural character since all ethnic groups from Senegal and different religions peacefully coexisted. Furthermore, Casamançais stressed their attachment to values, such as tolerance, openness, and hospitality. Both features were incarnated by the cemeteries in Ziguinchor where Muslims and Christians are buried together and that Casamançais frequently mention to stress the extraordinary inter-community relations in their region (Foucher 2005a, 381; interview with a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 29 October, 2013).<sup>61</sup> Hence, while they were in favour of better valorisation of their specificities within Senegal, the exclusive nationalist and sectarian rhetoric of the MFDC claiming “the South to the Southerners, the North to Northerners” (Interview with MFDC combatants, São Domingos, 17 November, 2013) and the resulting separation did not correspond to the perception that the majority of the local population had of their region and themselves. Furthermore, it appeared exaggerated and impracticable to people who consequently rejected it (Interview with a former national and regional politician, Ziguinchor, 1 November, 2013).

In addition, although the movement pretended to aspire to civic Casamançais nationalism, the regional identity had a very restricted basis as it was constructed on cultural elements of the Diola culture from the Kasa region. The ‘*Casamancité*’ introduced by the MFDC would be better described as a locally-based form of ‘*Diolaité*’ that the movement unsuccessfully attempted to extend throughout the entire region. It did not appeal to other ethnic communities of Casamance, since they did not share the same cultural heritage, traditions, and practices. Moreover, the MFDC committed the same error as the government to equate being Casamançais with being Diola. A prominent example is the queen and prophetess Aline Sitoé Diatta that the MFDC frequently mentioned in its writings. According to the rebel group, she incarnates the long-lasting resistance of Casamance against occupation and colonisation and constitutes a national hero. However, Aline Sitoé Diatta was not well known outside her home zone and thus, of little importance in other parts of Lower Casamance. Similarly, many ethnic groups do not share the long experience of rebellion against foreign rule, as proclaimed by Diamacoune, but some even cooperated with the colonisers.<sup>62</sup> Even the period of resistance was much shorter than pretended in the MFDC’s documents (Awenengo 2006; de Jong 1999; Marut 2010; Toliver-Diallo 2005).<sup>63</sup> Hence, the rebel group failed to come up with a shared and broadly acceptable foundation for its national(ist)

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<sup>61</sup> This self-image masked existing tensions between different communities in Casamance but also between natives and migrants (Gasser 2000; interview with a journalist, Ziguinchor, 23 October, 2013b).

<sup>62</sup> The Casamance region is not a natural political entity, but a colonial construct. Thus, it does not have a common linear history that is shared by different communities, as the MFDC pretends (Awenengo 2006; de Jong 1994; 1995; Marut 2010).

<sup>63</sup> It is interesting to note that nationalist frames were not necessarily effective on the local level, either. The inhabitants of Oussouye, for example, did not appreciate that their local culture was re-interpreted and instrumentalised by the MFDC. Therefore, they also refuted the frames (Tomàs 2005).

thinking. Furthermore, the nationalist framing threw a shadow on the potential political project after independence. In this regard, the destiny of the non-Diola communities resembled their current situation in the Senegalese nation-state: Due to the discriminating character of the national project that the MFDC propagated, they risked becoming as marginalised in potentially independent Diola-dominated Casamance as they were in Senegal in view of the present Islamo-Wolof domination.

Overall, the nationalist frames that the MFDC constructed to call supporters to arms did not have the intended effect and failed to broadly resonate. Several generations had chosen to migrate north in search for a better life. Although having increased regional consciousness, this had also fostered the cultural and territorial integration of Casamance into Senegal and thus, complex combinations of identification among the regional population that could not easily be reversed. Furthermore, the exclusive conceptualisation of the '*Casamancité*' did not correspond to the existing regional self-image. In addition, it did not take into account the diverse regional population that consisted of various groups with distinct histories and cultures that consequently, did not feel represented. Although the MFDC's cultural framing attracted followers in the short-term, the movement could not provide an answer to the regional identity crisis in the long term and initial sympathy faded away. Therefore, the nationalist frames failed to achieve large-scale mobilisation as well as support and the MFDC even lost backing from other ethnic groups to whom its frames were meaningless. It increasingly turned from a popular, ethnically heterogeneous into an ethnic movement with government repression and ethnicisation of the movement fostering that tendency (Foucher 2011; Gerdes 2006, 88; de Jong 1994, 19; Lambert 1998; interviews with a journalist, Ziguinchor, 23 October, 2013a; a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 26 November, 2013; an intellectual, Ziguinchor, 9 December, 2013; a member of the diaspora and NGO activist, Paris, 5 February, 2014).<sup>64</sup> Ultimately, this did not only lead to passivity and non-participation, but active delimitation occurred. The movement's Diola-based nationalist discourse incited opposition against the MFDC's rhetoric. Civil society groups, such as the *Convention des sociocultures de Casamance* (English: Convention of socio-cultures of Casamance) stressed the internal diversity of the Casamançais society and challenged the Diola-centrism. This further weakened the appeal of the framing (Awenengo 2006; Foucher 2003b).<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> Initially, the MFDC comprised members of other ethnic groups, e.g. Peuls, but turned into a predominantly Diola movement, although it continued to stress its multi-ethnic character. However, this does not imply that all Diola were in favour of the MFDC and separation. The distancing of other groups did not exclusively result from framing, but was also favoured by the government's repression targeting the Diola community and its counterframing (see 6.4.1.).

<sup>65</sup> Since the *Convention des sociocultures* was only created in 2002 and thus, outside the period of analysis, its commitment and rhetoric will not be discussed in detail here.

### c) Deepening Trenches: The Increasing Alienation between the MFDC and Its Support Basis

Armed conflict goes along with particularly high costs for combatants and the supporting population. This represents a challenge for framing agents who constantly have to convince constituents of the relevance and feasibility of their objective as well as the need to use force and overcome collective action problems through motivational framing. In this respect, the Casamançais separatists were unsuccessful in the long run. In its early days, frames strongly built on socio-economic topics, corresponded to grievances that concerned local people and the emotive climate, and suggested a perspective. Thus, it incited sympathisers to commit themselves. Yet, the framing became increasingly irrelevant for the population. For instance, in the text *Casamance – Pays du refus* published in 1995, Diamacoune mainly dealt with the regional history and past injustices (MFDC 1995; see also Diamacoune Senghor 1998b). The document served as a reply to the report by Charpy that rejected the movement's claims about the specific regional status under French rule which explains its historical bias. Nevertheless, it is little surprising that such backward and abstract arguments did not appeal to the civilians who struggled on a daily basis and had diverging priorities.<sup>66</sup> The MFDC's fight rather resembled an end in itself or a question of principle but did not seem to serve the well-being of the people. This illustrates that the rebel group failed to (re-)adjust its framing to the people's needs and could not maintain initial framing successes.

In addition, although the MFDC had pretended that independence was easily and quickly achievable, it did not make any progress herein, but the fighting dragged on (Interview with a local politician, Diouloulou, 29 November, 2013; interview with a former combatant of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 24 October, 2013b). Furthermore, the MFDC's action which contradicted its framing contributed to widen the gap between the movement and the constituency. Unlike other armed groups, the MFDC did not establish parallel state structures or improve infrastructure in the zones it controlled in order to provide a prospect of the future to the population.<sup>67</sup> The PAIGC in neighbouring Guinea-Bissau, for example, established basic local administrative structures already during the liberation war. It tried to foster agricultural production, established schools and health care services, and introduced a people's judicial system in the liberated zones. One can object that it was relatively easy for the liberation movement to achieve progress since the Portuguese had invested little efforts into the development of its colony. However, the initial achievements of the PAIGC were remarkable given the difficult context it acted in (Chabal 2003, ch. 4; da Silva 2010).<sup>68</sup> By contrast, the

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<sup>66</sup> The list of injustices includes abusive acts that communities or individuals suffered from under colonial rule and after independence. Some instances show that Diamacoune was directly concerned or witnessed them. In this context, one has the impression that he partly pursued personal goals.

<sup>67</sup> In fact, the territorial control of the MFDC remained restricted.

<sup>68</sup> Later, the negative consequences, such as poverty and political instability of the Bissau-Guinean civil war rather served as a deterrent example. There are other illustrative cases. Northern Ivory Coast

MFDC had little to offer to the population in the restricted areas it controlled. In many respects, its presence had a negative effect since the local administration left the affected zones and service delivery deteriorated. In the Bignona district, the rebels' war economy caused important destruction of the forests. Circulation in the region became dangerous and restrained due to the risk of falling victim to armed robbery. While scepticism vis-à-vis the MFDC grew, actual improvements in Casamance were achieved by the government or NGOs – and thus indirectly by the state as it sanctioned the organisations' activities – which reduced the credibility and the appeal of the movement in the eyes of the population (Foucher 2009; 2011; Marut 2010, ch. 7, 13; see 6.4.1.).

However, it was not only the MFDC's inaction regarding service delivery or state-like functions that harmed its relationship with its constituency. Initially, the movement had mainly attacked symbols of the state, such as the security forces or police stations. But the rebels increasingly turned against the local people. Violent attacks and anti-personnel mines left many dead or injured. Others fled from the incursions to neighbouring countries or became internally displaced. In order to sustain itself or make profit, the MFDC performed armed raids and took agricultural land from locals who lost their livelihood and revenue. The assaults on the population that the MFDC pretended to represent and protect harmed the movement's credibility and increasingly alienated it from its constituency, as a respondent stressed: "The propositions of the MFDC are not totally credible in view of the way how they proceed by laying hands on the sons of the region" (Respondent No. 22 in Theobald 2014). Ultimately, the alienation resulted in a vicious circle since decreasing support from the population triggered more violence by the movement to compensate the lack of frame resonance and sustain itself which only widened the gap between the MFDC and the local population. Hence, neither independence nor economic progress was achieved, but the conflict exacerbated hardship for the population. In this context, the survey yields interesting insights into popular attitudes. When asked about their lives in the 1970s and 1980s, the majority of the respondents described the years preceding the crisis as relatively unproblematic in comparison to what they went through during the conflict. Doubtlessly, they idealised the situation retrospectively (Theobald 2014). Nevertheless, the statements underscore the suffering that the MFDC brought to the region. While the movement originally appeared as the answer to the challenges in Casamance, it became the cause of the people's problems and even greater frustration and thus, lost support.

Initially, the propositions by the MFDC had touched a raw nerve and appealed to the Casamançais population in view of recent experiences and the escalating situation.

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was controlled for several years by rebel groups that created parallel structures. Somaliland has existed since the early 1990s as a state within a state and is more successful in providing public services than the central government in Mogadishu.

However, collective action frames increasingly lost relevance in the eyes of its followers. Various important components of the frames, namely references to separation and Casamançais nationalism, did not correspond to expectations, self-perceptions, and values of the majority of the Casamançais. Hence, they rejected them as too radical. Not only did the movement fail to adjust its communication, but its own action increasingly contradicted its frames. Since the MFDC failed to overcome the widening gap, it could not maintain the originally positive frame resonance and its potential to mobilise supporters for its separatist struggle declined.

### 6.3.3. *Fighting for One's Rights: On the Emergence and Resonance of Violent Prognostic Framing*

In their prognostic framing, social movements propose a tactic, that is, violent or non-violent action, to achieve a certain objective. This component of prognostic framing requires separate attention for two reasons. First, it is important to examine conditions that trigger specific strategy-related frames in order to better understand the occurrence of armed conflict. Second, their resonance has to be assessed in order to find out whether they appealed to the target group and thus, induced collective activism (or not) and why.<sup>69</sup>

The *Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance* adopted a violent strategy in the wake of the first march. It was rather a precipitate, than a well thought-out move which explains why it was not properly prepared and theorised in advance. In the aftermath of the peaceful protest in 1982, the MFDC was confronted with heavy-handed repression by security forces. Consequently, the movement adopted a reactive violent frame, while continuing to highlight its intrinsic preference for peaceful means. It justified the use of force as externally imposed and unintended but imperative given the circumstances. Thus, it framed violence as a security and self-protective measure against the violent repression by the state which also aimed to conceal its own share regarding the escalation of violence. Later, its rhetoric became more offensive and violence was legitimised as necessary to achieve independence. In this context, one has to take into account that the internal structure of the group favoured violent framing. The MFDC's political branch was weak and lacked recognition by the armed wing. It did not have the capacity to propose and enforce alternative measures to obtain independence. In addition, the movement aimed to culturally embed and legitimise armed struggle by presenting it as an integral element of the Casamançais tradition of resistance due to which the local population had opposed all kinds

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<sup>69</sup> Violent prognostic framing increases the likelihood of armed conflict. However, there is no guarantee that frames propagating a specific strategy lead to the desired outcome. It is conceivable, for example, that non-violent propositions fail if there is a radical societal climate favouring collective violence. Poor resonance of prognostic frames can also result in inactivity.

of foreign occupation since 1645. Thus, it tried to connect violent prognostic frames with its historical and nationalist rhetoric and to provide other than situational justifications for its use. The violent frames resonated partly, but their effectiveness strongly varied over time. In the beginning of the rebellion, the calls for the use of force as self-defence touched a sore spot due to the emotional climate in the region. There had already been tensions between the Casamançais – considering themselves as the perpetual victims of wrongdoings – and the Senegalese – the perpetrators and suppressors – before. When the government reacted with indiscriminate and lasting repression, divisions and alienation appeared even deeper and insurmountable and fuelled aggressiveness. Moreover, the population identified with the defensive dimension since it simultaneously feared to fall victim to the brutal assaults on behalf of the government and grew angry about the unjust and aggressive treatment they witnessed around them. In view of the indiscriminate violence against Diola independent of whether they were members or supporters of the MFDC, taking up arms was often the only means to escape brutalisation or revenge family members which amounted to a sort of retrospective defence. Thus, joining the rebels appeared justified and imperative and many Casamançais would agree with the apt remark of a former member of the MFDC that “it was the state itself that created this rebellion” (Interview with a former combatant of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 24 October, 2013b; see also interviews with a former combatant of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 5 October, 2013; two MFDC combatants, Bissau, 15 November, 2013; a former commander of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 9 December, 2013; see also Gasser 2000).

While violence-related framing found acceptance in the short-term as a result of the emotionally-loaded atmosphere and the heightened tensions at the beginning of the crisis, resonance was not durable and declined in the long-term. Calls for offensive violence were too radical in the eyes of large parts of the local people and counteracted the collective perception of harmonious coexistence and tolerance of different ethnicities and religions that many Casamançais (including the Diola) venerated. Moreover, the evoked history of rebellion was constructed and not unanimously shared throughout Casamance. Thus, for the same reasons that weakened historical and nationalist assertions, violent frames could not maintain their original mobilising potency or gain further ground. Hence, the MFDC's attempts to create a stable foundation for its violent prognostic framing by entrenching it in regional history and culture were unsuccessful. In addition, the enemy image of the Senegalese state crumbled. A considerable portion of Casamançais aspired to better integration into and recognition within Senegal instead of separation. Therefore, when the government took measures to partially address cultural and socio-economic grievances of the region, this contravened the MFDC's framing. While this did not necessarily win over the population, it weakened support for the armed struggle, especially when the MFDC began to justify it as the only option to gain independence. Furthermore, legitimising the fight as a

means to provide security became implausible because the local population itself became victim of the MFDC and was caught between two fronts.<sup>70</sup> Even within the movement, doubts about the utility and legitimacy of armed struggle arose: Since the early 1990s, the movement was divided into a Northern Front having laid down arms and a more radical Southern Front rejecting compromise (see section c) in 5.2.1.). This combination of different factors reduced the resonance of violent framing which appeared inadequate and too radical in the long run to find broad support within the Casamançais society. Besides, the decline of resonance of strategy-related frames coincided with the decreasing appeal of framing more generally. This development helps to explain why violence erupted in the first place but was not sustainable and thus, remained at a comparatively low level.

### 6.3.4. *With and without Diamacoune: Assessing the Credibility of Frame Articulators*

The previous section brought up a multitude of gaps and contradictions in the MFDC's framing. Against this background, it almost appears surprising that the *Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance* managed to successfully mobilise followers at all. Yet, as theorists highlighted, frame resonance is not only a result of the content of collective action frames but is also determined by the credibility of frame articulators. This correlation was beneficial to the rebel movement since Father Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, a Catholic priest of Diola origin, constituted a charismatic and emblematic leader with great power of persuasion and good rhetorical skills.<sup>71</sup>

Born in 1928 in the community of Oussouye (Kasa), Diamacoune was ordained catholic priest in 1956 and held offices in different parts of Upper and Lower Casamance (namely, in Kolda, Oussouye, Ziguinchor, and Kafountine). Over decades, he was preoccupied with political and historical questions and publicly talked about them. He became especially known for animating a popular radio programme for children in the 1970s as 'Papa Koulimpi', during which he also brought up cultural and historical issues and raised awareness for them. In 1980, he held a conference about Aline Sitoé Diatta at the Chamber of Commerce in Dakar (see *Extrait de la conférence de l'abbé Diamacoune Senghor donnée à Dakar le 23 Août 1980* reprinted in Awenengo 2000).<sup>72</sup> In his speech, not only did he praise the prophetic and Casamançais resistance, but he also alluded to independence. In addition,

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<sup>70</sup> Moreover, there is a contradiction between the legally based arguments of the MFDC and its illegal action.

<sup>71</sup> His great personality, character, and charisma were referred to in many interviews, see, for example, interviews with a journalist, Ziguinchor, 23 October, 2013a; a former activist of the political wing of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 6 November, 2013; an intellectual, Ziguinchor, 9 December, 2013.

<sup>72</sup> He also organised conferences in Ziguinchor and included historical references in his teaching. His commitment was beneficial to his later role as a leader of the MFDC, since people already knew him and his earlier allusions (Marut 2010, 360; interview with a researcher, Gorée, 23 September, 2013; interview with a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 29 October, 2013).

he denounced social ills and addressed several letters to the governments of Senegal and France, in which he mentioned the question of separation. Diamacoune's biography suggests that he was victim or witness of injustices at various occasions which inspired his activism.<sup>73</sup> Moreover, his commitment corresponded to the tradition of advocacy of the Catholic Church in Casamance. Reportedly, Diamacoune was not involved in the founding of the MFDC, but Mamadou 'Nkrumah' Sané introduced him to the movement due to the priest's previous initiatives. Moreover, the priest did not participate in organising the first march in December 1982. Nevertheless, he was preventively arrested before the event and convicted for practices in restraint of state security in 1983. Once discharged, he became secretary general of the *bureau national* of the MFDC in 1991 and filled the position until his death in 2007 (Bassène 2013, 202-208; Evans 2000; Foucher 2002a, 415; Marut 2010, 97; *Sud hebdo*, 15 July 1988; interviews with a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 29 October, 2013; a former activist of the political wing of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 3 December, 2013; a member of the diaspora and NGO activist, Paris, 5 February, 2014).

Father Augustin Diamacoune Senghor constituted the intellectual head of the movement and its main theorist who wrote most of the documents published in the name of the MFDC. Due to his manifold activities and posts, he was widely known and esteemed throughout the region, with his reputation and legitimacy feeding on a combination of modern and traditional sources. First, Diamacoune was well-read which made him one of the few intellectuals of the armed group and earned him respect since education is highly valued among Casamançais and Diola in particular. Since he disposed of thorough knowledge regarding regional history, his remarks in that regard were easily accepted. Second, he enjoyed credibility and respect due to his profession and institutional affiliation.<sup>74</sup> A Catholic clergyman could not speak untruthfully or lead people on a wrong way, in the people's view. Third, he passed as a sage due to his age and life experience. Finally, his attachment to regional religious and ethnic traditions – he was profoundly syncretistic, expressed great consideration for traditional values and beliefs, and was even believed to have mystic power – fostered his legitimacy. In consequence, Diamacoune simultaneously appealed to different segments of society and enjoyed credibility and confidence in various social milieus which provided a broad and reliable basis for his leadership (Interviews with a former teacher, Ziguinchor, 18 October, 2013; a former combatant of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 24 October, 2013b; a journalist, Ziguinchor, 23 October, 2013a; a journalist, Ziguinchor, 23 October, 2013b; a former combatant of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 8 November, 2013; regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 26 November, 2013; an assistant of Father Diamacoune, Ziguinchor, 8 December, 2013; an intellectual, Ziguinchor, 9 December, 2013; a member of the diaspora

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<sup>73</sup> Diamacoune experienced the late colonial period. Moreover, he lost property as a result of the new land regime.

<sup>74</sup> For more information on the reputation of the Catholic Church, see Foucher 2003a and 6.4.2.

and NGO activist, Paris, 5 February, 2014). Especially in the beginning of the conflict, Diamacoune's standing was advantageous to the MFDC's framing success. He was very influential within the movement but also within society in Lower Casamance more generally, which helped to mobilise new adherents. One interviewee even argued that the personality of framing agents and Diamacoune in particular had been more important for gaining supporters than the actual content of frames. The example of the agreement between Badiane and Senghor, which was mentioned above, provides an illustrative example of his influence. Without a doubt, Diamacoune's expert status in regional history made his reasoning appear plausible and he could easily convince people of the document and its relevance for self-determination independent of the actual existence of the paper (Interview with a former teacher, Ziguinchor, 18 October, 2013; interview with a journalist, Ziguinchor, 23 October, 2013a).<sup>75</sup>

Diamacoune's initially strong impact with regard to frame resonance becomes more obvious when its development over time is considered and when it is compared to the influence of other leading figures of the MFDC. The analysis of deficits in frame resonance showed that the initial effectiveness of framing declined over the years as a result of the interaction of several factors. Diamacoune could not reverse this tendency, since his own importance both within the armed movement as well as within its constituency decreased. Weakened by his age and placed under house arrest in a building of the Catholic Church, his room for manoeuvre declined. In addition, despite his qualities as an intellectual head of the movement, he had never been a political leader and was incapable to deal with the multiple challenges that resulted from the armed struggle and a disintegrating movement (Marut 2010). The internal power relations of the MFDC exemplify this. The political and military wings of the movement were not well integrated. The civil branch remained relatively weak and lost influence vis-à-vis the *maquis*. Political solutions became increasingly rejected and considered as treason by the combatants (Interview with a former combatant of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 24 October, 2013b). Diamacoune could maintain his function as a secretary general of the movement. However, in the increasingly fragmented rebel group, not all fractions recognised Diamacoune's authority or followed his instructions and his leadership was severely criticised or contested at various occasions.<sup>76</sup> Hence, he clearly lost his influential position within the movement. An early indication hereof is the dissent between

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<sup>75</sup> In the early 1990s, Sidy Badji, head of the armed wing, asked Diamacoune to show him the agreement that allegedly proved that Casamance had the right to independence. When Diamacoune could not provide evidence and admitted that there was no such paper, Badji left the *maquis* because it had constituted the reason for him (and many others) to fight (Interview with a local NGO employee, Cap Skirring, 26 October, 2013).

<sup>76</sup> The fractionalisation of the movement led to a variety of competing positions and personalities within the MFDC. In view of the war economy, personal and economic interests gained importance. Not surprisingly, disputes about power and profit-seeking increasingly superimposed framing and marginalised the role of framing agents.

Sidy Badji, co-founder and first commander of the *maquis*, and the priest as a consequence of the first ceasefire (see 5.2.1.). Moreover, when Diamacoune made efforts to work towards a peaceful solution of the conflict in the 1990s and renounced first to violence and later also to independence, various factions of the MFDC had developed their own dynamics and did not comply with his initiative.<sup>77</sup> Hence, his calls for peace remained unanswered within the movement and violence continued or re-started soon after.<sup>78</sup>

Likewise, his popularity with the Casamançais population declined. Many locals welcomed the ceasefire agreement of 1991 and perceived it as a success because it had wrested recognition from the government. Thus, they had obtained what they had aimed at. Besides, the population suffered from the negative effects of the conflict and the rebels' violence. Hence, they opposed the continuing fighting. War-weariness and frustration about the intransigence and radicalisation of the rebel leaders increasingly replaced the initial popular sympathy for the MFDC and its claims (*Inter Press Service News Agency*, 22 December, 1997). Yet, Diamacoune did not manage to adjust the framing by the rebels to people's expectations and lost ground.<sup>79</sup> He could no longer counter shortfalls in the MFDC's communication through his personality and was incapable of persuading the targeted population of the sense of the struggle as he had successfully done before. From today's perspective, Father Augustin Diamacoune Senghor retrieved his charisma and attractive force after his death. Many Casamançais still (or again) express great fascination and respect for him. However, this glorification that sometimes amounts to the mystification of his person cannot conceal that he had clearly lost his previous standing given the manifold contradictions and the suffering that the separatist conflict had brought about the region.

Yet, none of the other leading figures of the MFDC could follow in Diamacoune's footsteps as the examples of Mamadou 'Nkrumah' Sané and Jean-Marie François Biagui highlight, who were heads of the external political wing. In theory, Mamadou 'Nkrumah' Sané disposes of great legitimacy as a leader. He was among the founders of the movement and remained committed as an activist of the external wing for decades. Having served as deputy secretary general of the movement since 1991, he declared himself secretary general after Diamacoune's death. Jean-Marie François Biagui, considerably younger, only joined the movement in the early 1990s. Being among the movement's theorists, he wrote several

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<sup>77</sup> See, for example, Diamacoune Senghor 1998.

<sup>78</sup> He clearly lacked leadership and control over the movement that increasingly factionalised and despised political action. At several occasions, he criticised himself agreements that had been signed (sometimes with his own contribution) because the content or the conditions of negotiations were unsatisfactory (Bassène 2013, 65-66).

<sup>79</sup> After the ceasefire agreement, the MFDC split into a radical and a moderate section. It is questionable, if framing could have bridged the divide between the militant views and the more conciliatory stance that existed within the movement. Yet, Diamacoune himself, at that time civilian leader of the radical Southern Front, appeared to seek an ideal solution. His intransigence closed 'windows of opportunity' for peace in the region. This increasingly drove a wedge between the movement and the population.

pamphlets and also served as a secretary general for a limited period of time (2001-2005, reappointed in 2006) (Marut 2010, 392-397).<sup>80</sup> It is little surprising that both men were contested within the movement given its internal fractionalisation and the consequential struggles about leadership. However, it is more important to consider their standing within the population of the Ziguinchor region to assess their credibility as frame articulators. In this regard, it is telling that many people of Lower Casamance have never heard of Sané or Biagui or, if they know the names, have little precise information about the two men (Theobald 2014). Those who are better informed often despise them. They criticise, among others, that both had left Casamance a long time ago and remained abroad. Thus, they did not know realities on the ground and the needs of the population, but were considered to theorise 'in vitro' about the future of the region. In addition, there is frustration about their self-interested behaviour, notably the fact that they send Casamançais people's children into war to die for a lost cause, while they and their own families are safely in Europe (Marut 2010, 249; interviews with a former teacher, Ziguinchor, 18 October, 2013; a former combatant of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 24 October, 2013b; a former national and regional politician, Ziguinchor, 1 November, 2013; the head of a local radio station, Sindian, 21 November, 2013). In sum, neither Biagui, nor 'Nkrumah' Sané (nor any other leader) disposed of the same reputation, charisma, and credibility that Father Diamacoune could build on. Hence, the priest left a vacuum after his death in two regards: On the one hand, the MFDC lacked a leader who could stop the disintegration or could even bring the various fractions together. On the other hand, the rebels did not have a personality in their ranks that was capable to effectively link up with the local population, draw on former framing successes, or avoid further alienation of the local constituency.<sup>81</sup>

Father Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, the emblematic intellectual head and leader of the political branch of the MFDC, was a stroke of luck for the group. His prominence, reputation, and charisma gave emphasis to the separatist message and convinced many followers of it. It was particularly beneficial that due to his manifold qualities he appealed to various segments of society. Given the priest's strong influence, his loss of credibility had devastating consequences. His uncompromising position alienated him increasingly from the people that longed for an end of the fighting. Moreover, he was incapable to overcome structural difficulties within the rebel movement, namely the internal splits. Hence, Diamacoune could not hinder the progressing decline of the armed group, but partly contributed to it. Despite the difficulties in his last years, the situation did not improve after his death. Although various individuals, among whom were 'Nkrumah' Sané and Biagui

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<sup>80</sup> Recently, Biagui left the armed movement in order to found a political party, the Movement for federalism and constitutional democracy, which also uses the abbreviation MFDC.

<sup>81</sup> One of the most influential leaders of today's MFDC is Salif Sadio, chief of staff of the radical faction since 1994. He is mainly known due to his radical position and the fear he spread in the region.

competed for leadership, no-one found acceptance within the MFDC and the regional population which further weakened the movement and its framing appeal.

### 6.4. All against One: An Assessment of Counterframing

Neither do social movements dispose of a monopoly regarding framing, nor do their framing attempts take place in a social vacuum. Instead, they compete with so-called counterframing agents, for instance social and state actors, about the interpretation of reality.<sup>82</sup> In the following, the reactions of, first, the Senegalese state and, second, other political and societal actors such as the Catholic Church, oppositional parties, and the *cadres casamançais*<sup>83</sup> (English: Casamançais cadres) will be summarised in an exemplary manner.

#### 6.4.1. Counterframing by the Senegalese Government

The Senegalese state, being one of the conflict parties and the principal target of the *Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance* in terms of armed and verbal attacks, is the most important and influential counterframing agent.<sup>84</sup> While its early counterframing was passive and unintendedly favoured the MFDC, the government developed a more effective strategy over time.

Especially in the early phase of the conflict, the government mainly attempted to play down and trivialise the incidents in Casamance, the MFDC, as well as its demands. Reports regarding the crisis were surprisingly rare. During the first days after the 1982 march, *Le Soleil* published little about the march in Ziguinchor and chose concealing vocabulary (for example, “the events of the Casamance” or “subversive actions”) (*Le Soleil*, 31 December, 1982-2 January, 1983; 19 December, 1983; 11 January, 1984; see also Gueye 2010).

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<sup>82</sup> Opponents of a social movement diffuse counterframes. These contain competing interpretations of the problem and its solution and aim at demobilising potential followers of the social movement on the one hand. On the other hand, they seek to motivate people to support or join alternative action.

<sup>83</sup> In correspondence with most of the literature, the French term will be used in the following.

<sup>84</sup> The analysis of counterframing by the Senegalese state is based on documents that were published on behalf of the government or its members. Moreover, publications on the issue could only be made with the permission of the government. Hence, they also reflected the official position and are taken into account, even if they were not directly issued by the administration. Finally, the national newspaper *Le Soleil* (English: The Sun) yields interesting insights. In the early 1980s, the Senegalese media landscape had not yet been liberalised but was dominated by state media. *Le Soleil* was close to the Senegalese government; it disseminated official statements or press releases and also served as a “propaganda medium for the party in power” (Gueye 2010, 172, 180, 230; see also *ibid.*, 71, 161, 171-172; Wittmann 2007, 238, 241). For almost a decade, the newspaper monopolised reporting on the Casamance conflict and closely reflected the government’s strategy of denying and marginalising the MFDC. Although some independent media existed (e.g., *Sud hebdo* (later *Sud quotidien*), *Le Témoign*, *Wal Fadjri*), tight regimentation restricted their room for manoeuvre and freedom in coverage (Gueye 2010, 68-70; see also Loum 2003; Wittmann 2007, 257-268). They only gained strength and could challenge *Le Soleil* in the 1990s. Then, the private media reported about the Casamance crisis in an often personalised manner, which enhanced the prominence of the movement and its leaders. For a detailed analysis of the reporting on the Casamance crisis by *Le Soleil*, see Gueye 2010.

Sources only mentioned the MFDC in quotation marks or used alternative names. Its goals were – if brought up at all – refuted as unfounded and dangerous or dismissed as pure “propaganda”, “phantasm”, or “separatist madness”. But the actual content of claims was not dealt with (*Le Soleil*, 31 December, 1982-2 January, 1983; 14 December, 1983; République du Sénégal 1991).<sup>85</sup> Overall, early counterframing deliberately aimed to avoid any reflections on the rebellion through banalising or ignoring it altogether, as if the government could pretend that the movement and the crisis were inexistent if it did not refer to them.<sup>86</sup>

When the crisis could no longer be wished away, the government increasingly sought to delegitimise the MFDC, but still avoided dealing with the underlying reasons of the conflict or the rebels’ argumentation. In the white book *Les faits en Casamance: Le droit contre la violence*, the administration praised (in discordance with reality) the democratic and constitutional principles as well as the rule of law, which the Senegalese state was based on, and stressed the existence of national unity and a national sentiment. Against this background, the movement’s strategy and its major objective, i.e. separation, clearly stood out as unnecessary, unlawful, and unconstitutional. In other instances, the combatants were referred to as criminals, bandits, or terrorists which aimed to stress the movement’s inhuman and barbaric character.<sup>87</sup> A specific way of defaming the rebellion was to ethnicise it. The government recurrently presented the MFDC as an ethnically based and exclusively Diola movement. By doing so, it aimed to underscore that it was non-representative with regard to the Casamançais population and lacked a popular basis. Moreover, independence was presented as a purely ethnic purpose threatening the Senegalese nation. Combined with repression, this turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy since members of other ethnic communities distanced themselves from the separatist group (*Le Soleil*, 31 December, 1982-2 January, 1983; 19 December, 1983; 20 December, 1983; 17 July, 1990; 18 July, 1990; 17 September, 1990; 16 October, 1990; 30 November, 1990; République du Sénégal 1991, 18-19, 29; see also Gueye 2010, 180, 235-237).<sup>88</sup>

While the state aimed to demonise, delegitimise, depoliticise, and criminalise the MFDC on the one hand (Gueye 2010, 178, 193, 225, 229-230), it sought to justify its own position and strategy and win the population’s approval for them on the other. For this purpose, the executive power and in particular President Abdou Diouf were presented as strong, decisive

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<sup>85</sup> In the president’s New Year’s Speech, the events were merely mentioned at the margin. After all, the government only recognised in 2004, when the peace accord was signed, that a conflict was fought on Senegalese territory (Marut 2010, 265).

<sup>86</sup> In 1984, the name Casamance disappeared from the maps when the region was divided into Ziguinchor and Kolda. This was also an attempt to make the issue of the conflict disappear by suppressing references to it (Dramé 1998, 5-6; LD/MPT 1988, 7; Marut 1997, 2).

<sup>87</sup> The pejorative and de-humanising rhetoric regarding the *maquisards* – *Le Soleil* mentioned “zones infested by rebels” (5 September, 1997) – served to justify resolute action, such as “cleaning”, “combing”, or “neutralisation” (21 August, 1997; 26 September, 1997).

<sup>88</sup> Occasionally, the MFDC was also presented as being masterminded from abroad and thus, constituting an external threat to the nation-state (Marut 2010, 176).

actors.<sup>89</sup> They rightfully reacted with “rigour, firmness, and determination” (*Le Soleil*, 2 January, 1984) to the violence that the MFDC imposed on the region. Hence, they aimed to protect the national project, i.e. national unity and territorial integrity, to re-establish order, and guarantee security of the population (*Le Soleil*, 5 September, 1997; 13-14 December, 1997). Since the state was allegedly in complete control of the situation, the MFDC’s aspirations were necessarily doomed to fail which was supposed to discourage potential sympathisers (*Le Soleil*, 30 December, 1982; 19 December, 1983; 8 September, 1997). Accusations of excessive violence or human right abuses on behalf of the state were rejected as being “unjust but also unfounded” (République du Sénégal 1991, 24) because such conduct was impossible in a constitutional order. Furthermore, the government presented its action as purely defensive, moderate, and aiming at a peaceful solution (Ibid., *Le Soleil*, 27-28 September, 1997). Altogether, the state sought to display its proceeding as the only possible and rightful option in the given situation and to discard negative images.

In addition, several documents explicitly or implicitly countering the rebels’ claims were published by non-official sources. Since the Casamance question was still a sensitive issue, the government had to permit such publications which suggests that their ideas were conform and beneficial to the official line and contributed to the state’s counterframing.<sup>90</sup> In this context, the *Rapport de Charpy* (1993), which was also re-printed by *Le Soleil* (22 December, 1993) and thus, broadly diffused was especially important. Jacques Charpy, a French archivist, dealt with the historical argumentation of the MFDC and sought to settle the question of the juridical status of Casamance during colonial rule. In this account, Charpy concluded that “Casamance did not exist as an autonomous territory before colonisation [and has] always been administered by the governor of Senegal during French colonialism” (Charpy 1993, 29). This was a clever move to defeat the separatists with their own arguments and strategy since the MFDC’s reasoning was largely based on historical references. The example illustrates that the government engaged at least to some extent with selected elements of the MFDC’s framing, namely demands for separation with the aim to deconstruct it. Other publications backing the position of Dakar in the conflict include, for example, a declaration by the *cadres casamançais* (see 6.3.2.) or pertinent scientific works.<sup>91</sup> Concrete action by the state paralleled its official counterframing. After the first march, the government’s reaction was harsh and heavy-handed. Not only members and sympathisers became victim of severe repression and human rights abuses. But the security forces indiscriminately targeted the Diola which is why many uninvolved civilians suffered from their brutality. This constituted a prolongation of the verbal ethnicisation of the MFDC and should

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<sup>89</sup> One can observe a certain personalisation in the state rhetoric: Abdou Diouf seems to incarnate the government and its actions. This is a consequence of the political system that attributes a central role to the president. Similarly, the MFDC’s framing attributes responsibility to Diouf.

<sup>90</sup> Journalists or authors who did not align with the government were often intimidated or censored.

<sup>91</sup> An example of such a publication is Makhtar Diouf’s *Sénégal: les ethnies et la nation* (1994).

deter potential supporters of the rebellion. Over the years, the government also acknowledged grievances, which were voiced by the MFDC, to some extent and took (partly symbolic) actions to alleviate them. It included, for example, regional politicians in the government to improve the representation and say of the area. The administration also reacted to criticism that the Casamançais history and culture were neglected at the national level and recognised their importance; for instance, the Casamançais prophetess Aline Sitoé Diatta became part of the national narrative and namesake for various public places.<sup>92</sup> Moreover, several matches of the Africa Cup of Nation in 1992 took place in Ziguinchor to underscore the allegiance of the region to Senegal and boost infrastructure. In addition, socio-economic grievances were addressed. The Casamance saw an increase in development initiatives that were mainly shouldered by international donors such as the German Technical Cooperation and USAID or non-governmental organisations (de Benoist 1991; Foucher 2009; 2011; Marut 2010; Toliver-Diallo 2005).<sup>93</sup>

Overall, the effects of the counterframing by the government were as diverse as its strategies and only partly produced the expected results. Indiscriminate repression led to a climate of fear and passivity in Casamance which hampered sensitisation to some extent, because people avoided openly talking about the MFDC. Simultaneously, the government left the public arena to the MFDC since it did not de-construct or disprove frames by the rebel group. Hence, the armed movement, which had not yet lost its appeal, profited from the weak counterframing. Furthermore, while deterring some, repression contributed to the radicalisation of many others. The violent reaction further discredited the government in the eyes of the regional population and drove many sympathisers into active rebellion. Thus, the initial avoidance strategy coupled with repression did not contribute to weaken or eliminate the MFDC, but even favoured it in some respects. Only later, the government opposed the separatists more actively and effectively. The MFDC's reaction to Charpy's report – the publication of a 140-page document listing historic justifications for separation – shows that the movement interpreted the counterframing as a potential threat that required reaction.<sup>94</sup> Moreover, the shift in public policy was important. By addressing existing grievances, the government cut the ground from under the movement's feet as it rendered its claims at least partly obsolete. It offered a better performance in terms of service delivery in comparison

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<sup>92</sup> Among other things, the Ziguinchor stadium, a roundabout in Ziguinchor, a quarter in Dakar, and the ferry that has been connecting Dakar to Ziguinchor since 2008 bear her name.

<sup>93</sup> The peace process in Casamance and related development initiatives became a lucrative business for public and private actors, including the MFDC (Foucher 2009; Marut 2010, 281-287). This tendency intersected with counterframing and fostered its deterring effect.

<sup>94</sup> The MFDC reacted to Charpy's report by publishing *Casamance – Pays du refus*. It also repeatedly highlighted its multi-ethnic and multi-religious character as a response to the ethnicisation by the government.

with the rebels, compensated their inaction, and satisfied expectations on the ground.<sup>95</sup> Besides, it countered the image of 'the North' as the principal source of the problems and matched the expectations of those parts of the population that had supported the MFDC because they wished to be better integrated within the country. Through this, the government might not have immediately won hearts and minds and eradicated all scepticism in Casamance. Nonetheless, it successfully weakened the MFDC.

### 6.4.2. Other Societal and Political Actors

In addition to the government, there were also other socio-political actors that engaged in counterframing, namely the *cadres casamançais*, oppositional parties, and the Catholic Church whose positions will be considered subsequently.<sup>96</sup> As in the case of framing by the MFDC, there is a lack of data that a framing analysis can be based on. Thus, the following presentation is exemplary, but cannot depict all alternative frames in detail.

#### a) The Cadres Casamançais

There were counterframing efforts within Casamance, namely from the so-called *cadres casamançais*. In the past, the *cadres* had migrated from Casamance to the north where they continued to live. They were well-integrated in the northern society, and remained unaffected by the crisis. Hence, they formed a well-educated, economically successful élite that was also present at the political level (Foucher 2002a, 399-400; 2002b, 194-195; 2011, 91-93).<sup>97</sup> The *cadres* rejected the MFDC and its ideas and took the government's side. Simultaneously, they presented themselves as mediators (*Le Soleil*, 24 January, 1991). On the one hand, they highlighted their attachment to their home region and their good connections to different societal groups in order to demonstrate their ability to speak for the Casamançais population. On the other hand, they were well represented in state institutions, with many holding offices or mandates in the government or parliament, respectively. Hence they appeared to be influential advocates of Casamance. The *cadres* acted collectively, for example within the *Collectif des Cadres Casamançais* (English: Collective of the

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<sup>95</sup> The government's action and its effects should not be overestimated. Despite improvements through initiatives of development, people remained critical of it and the deficiencies of such projects. Thus, frustration and scepticism persisted. Incidences, such as the wreck of the 'Joola' in 2002 seriously strained the relationships between the regime and Casamance. In sum, the government rather appeared the better of the worse options in comparison with the MFDC.

<sup>96</sup> In the early years of the conflict, there was a climate of fear that impeded public debate. Civil society and consequently, its counterframing attempts gained strength in 2000 when Wade won presidential elections and ended the socialist hegemony. Today, there is a variety of civil society actors that speak out against separation and the MFDC. Since their emergence is relatively recent, their positions will not be discussed here. For an overview of such opposing voices see Awenengo 2006; Awenengo Dalberto 2010; Foucher 2003b; 2009.

<sup>97</sup> Unlike many young men who failed to gain a foothold in the north due to the difficult economic situation, previous generations of migrants had successfully integrated into the northern society with numerous of them occupying important economic and political positions.

Casamançais cadres) or as a cross-party group of Casamançais parliamentarians. Some are also known for their individual commitment and continue to be involved in the peace process until today.<sup>98</sup>

In 1984, the *Délégation des Cadres casamançais élargie* (English: Extended Delegation of the Casamançais cadres) published a memorandum on the Casamance crisis that yields thorough insights into the *cadres'* position concerning the conflict. In addition, newspaper articles were analysed to specify their stance. In the memorandum, the *cadres* acknowledged that a number of problems negatively affected Casamance, namely concerning the politico-administrative, socio-cultural, and socio-economic domains and had been at the origin of the crisis. They urged the government to tackle them in order to allow for better development and peace in the region (*Délégation des Cadres casamançais élargie* 1984). Yet, the delegation presented the difficulties in a very technocratic and rational manner which is why they appeared easily solvable and neglected political and emotional aspects connected to them. Furthermore, the *cadres* made clear that secession was not the right way to improve the situation and rejected it as being utopian, unacceptable, and contradicting the need of greater continental integration (*Le Soleil*, 30 December, 1982; 18 January, 1984, 21-22 July, 1990; 15 February, 1994). Thus, they explicitly spoke out against the MFDC's major goal and presented their opinion as being supported by the majority of the regional population (*Délégation des Cadres casamançais élargie* 1984, 53; *Le Soleil*, 18 January, 1984; 27 February, 1990). Instead, the *cadres* supported national unity, stressed the fact that Casamance was part of Senegal, and referred to the long tradition of constructive collaborations, interaction, and commonalities between the north and the south to underscore that what united the two parts of the country was by far stronger than existing differences (*Collectif des cadres casamançais* 2005 [2000]; *Délégation des Cadres casamançais élargie* 1984; *Le Soleil*, 10 April, 1991; see also interview with a former national and regional politician, Ziguinchor, 1 November, 2013). They also warmly welcomed the report by Jacques Charpy which they considered as supporting their position and representing a step into the right direction, that is, towards settling the conflict (*Le Soleil*, 22 December, 1993; 30 December, 1993; 15 February, 1994; see also *Collectif des cadres casamançais* 2005 [2000]). The *cadres* also condemned violence and thus the MFDC's means and pointed to the negative effects that armed struggle had for the region. Instead, they called for dialogue in order to find a non-violent solution for the conflict and stressed the importance of peace and democracy as prerequisites for development. Ultimately, the *cadres*

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<sup>98</sup> Among them were Marcel Bassène (PDS, member of parliament (MP), mediator of a ceasefire agreement with the MFDC, and coordinator of the *Commission de gestion de la paix*), or Louis Dacosta (PS, MP, and vice-president of the national assembly; as president of the *Collectif des députés casamançais* he sent missions to Casamance to reduce violence), Pierre Atepa Goudiaby (architect and president of the *Collectif des cadres casamançais* as well as advisor of Abdou Diouf and Abdoulaye Wade) and Robert Sagna (PS, minister under Abdou Diouf, first Diola mayor of Ziguinchor, and leader of the *Groupe de réflexion pour la paix en Casamance*).

expressed their appreciation and support for the steps taken or intended by the Senegalese government (*Le Soleil*, 18 January, 1984; 11 June, 1990; 18 June, 1990, 24 January, 1991; Mané 2013). In addition, they took concrete action to reach out to and get in contact with the local population, community leaders, or the rebels (*Le Soleil*, 30 December, 1982; 11 June, 1990; 19 July, 1990; 21-22 July, 1990). These initiatives served to seek support for their message, sensitise local actors concerning the devastating effects of the fighting, and reduce support for the MFDC. Moreover, they should establish and improve links between Casamance and the state.

In many respects, the counterframing by the *cadres* was close to the position of the Senegalese state that approved their action. Like the government, they tried to delegitimise, de-politicise, and marginalise the MFDC and its framing. Besides, they clearly supported the official strategy (despite some criticism of existing difficulties) and attempted to serve as a connecting link between the regional population and the government. For the MFDC, it was disadvantageous that the regional educated and professionally as well as politically successful élite did not support the movement and the idea of separation since their opposition limited the credibility of the MFDC's framing. Therefore, it is not surprising, that the rebels denounced their activism, called them “*Casamanqués*” (that is, failed Casamançais) as well as “ungrateful chameleons” that had betrayed their home region and the Casamançais nation, or attempted to kill them (Darbon 1985; *Sud hebdo*, 1 February, 1990; 19 December, 1991; interview with a former national and regional politician, Ziguinchor, 1 November, 2013).<sup>99</sup> Nevertheless, the *cadres*' influence was ambiguous. On the one hand, they profited to a certain degree from the fact that they originated from Casamance, were familiar with the region, and represented it in the government. Their high social status lent them credence and reputation. Besides, their positions corresponded at least partly to the view of those who preferred overcoming the regional difficulties through better integration. On the other hand, parts of the population perceived them as being detached from regional realities since they had left the region, remained absent for a long time, and lacked connections to Casamance, especially the rural areas.<sup>100</sup> In this respect, their distanced and rational approach regarding regional problems highlighted that they knew little about the everyday life and grievances in the Ziguinchor region. Furthermore, their commitment was not always positively perceived. Occasionally, one can hear rumours in Casamance that in reality, the *cadres* cooperated with the rebels or personally benefitted from their activism in the peace process. Thus, the *cadres* constituted a certain counterweight vis-à-vis the MFDC and their position illustrated that there was opposition to separation within the region. Yet, their appeals were not automatically favourably perceived

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<sup>99</sup> This is a neologism of “*Casamançais manqués*”.

<sup>100</sup> Leading figures of the MFDC tried hard to present themselves as ‘small’ intellectuals to avoid resembling the *cadres* too closely (Marut 2010, 46).

by the local population. Hence, the influence of their counterframing should not be overemphasised (de Benoist 1991, 32; Foucher 2002a, 420; 2011, 93-94; Geschiere and van der Klei 1988, 217-218; Marut 2010, 45-46).

### b) Opposition Parties

Counterframing by opposition parties was weak. Several factors account for this. First, there was a big number of often small parties that tended to be weak and poorly anchored in rural areas. Second, as mentioned above, members of parliament from Casamance took a common position concerning the conflict independent of their respective political camp and endorsed the official policy.<sup>101</sup> Third, from 1991 to 1993 and 1995 to 1997, President Abdou Diouf governed with a “government of a broader presidential majority” that included politicians from oppositional parties (Diop 2006, 311-312).<sup>102</sup> Hence, the position of the opposition parties coincided with the stance of the government. They spoke out in favour of national unity and territorial integrity, called on the MFDC to contribute its share to settle the conflict, and proposed approaches to resolve it. Yet, some political parties benefitted of the opportunity to criticise the government. They denounced, for example, the socio-economic and political problems of Casamance and condemned the government for its failure to address them as well as its approach to solving the conflict (*Le Soleil*, 30 December, 1982; 24 April, 1991; 23 December, 1993; 30 August, 1997; *Sud hebdo*, 1 February, 1990; 13 July, 1992; 17 September, 1992; *Sud quotidien*, 19 December, 1994).<sup>103</sup> In this regard, the left-wing *Ligue démocratique/Mouvement pour le parti du travail* (LD/MPT; English: Democratic League/Movement for the Labour Party) constitutes an interesting example. It published a 60-sided booklet that dealt with the reasons of the conflict and possible solutions. In the text, the LD/MPT fiercely attacked the government regarding both its long- and short-term policies in Casamance. The party claimed that ill-designed measures had favoured the emergence of the MFDC and condemned the government’s reaction to the crisis as inadequate “to reach the essential objective: national unity and territorial integrity” (LD/MPT 1988, 64). Besides, the text sharply denounced human rights abuses by security forces and compared the state’s behaviour to hypocrisy, dictatorial tendencies, and fascisation (*Fagaru Flash* 1985; LD/MPT 1988). Nonetheless, the party spoke out in favour of national unity and highlighted that reaching it through pacifist means was imperative. Moreover, it came up with propositions to

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<sup>101</sup> The cooperation of members of parliament had symbolic importance because they demonstrated that they were above all Senegalese, while party affiliations and regional identity were secondary.

<sup>102</sup> Moreover, there is a lack of data that obstructs capturing oppositional positions regarding the Casamançais crisis.

<sup>103</sup> Among them were, for example, Abdoulaye Bathily (*Ligue démocratique/Mouvement pour le parti du travail*), Mamadou Dia (*Mouvement pour la démocratie et le socialisme*), or Landing Savané (*And-Jéf/Parti africain pour la démocratie et le socialisme*). Yet, these are small groupings. The LD/MPT, for example, won three mandates in the 1993 parliamentary elections. Its presidential candidate won little more than two per cent of the votes (Tine 1997).

solve the crisis in a cooperative way through a national debate. Doubtlessly, the LD/MPT's counterframing was coloured by party political aspirations and partly aimed to position itself in the political arena as well as delegitimise the government (*Fagaru Flash* 1985; LD/MPT 1988). Nevertheless, it had its merits. It openly brought up the human rights breaches by the government and tried to engage in a constructive manner with the conflict, its causes, and ways out of the crisis. This was a courageous step since critical public debate about the conflict was not well-received and risky.<sup>104</sup>

In sum, the opposition parties largely sided with the government. Some dared to voice deviating opinions and denounced the PS-led administration. Although they could not influence the official line concerning the conflict, they brought in alternative viewpoints that were critical of both conflicting actors and helped to re-politicise and objectify the topic.

### c) The Catholic Church: Words and Deeds

More than one fifth of the half a million Senegalese Catholics live in Lower Casamance (Foucher 2003a, 12). This makes the Catholic Church an influential social actor and counterframing agent. Yet, the Catholic Church did not have an easy position in the Casamance crisis. In principle, it was in a favourable position to intervene. The Catholic Church had acted as an advocate of the local people vis-à-vis the ruling power since colonialism. The protective shield of the institution still allowed the clergy to express critical opinions which constituted an advantage in view of the repressive action by the government that inhibited public debate regarding the crisis. Moreover, the church was well connected to the rural areas and priests enjoyed a good reputation as knowledgeable élite which favoured their access to the population but also politicians and state officials. Yet, Catholic missionaries had contributed to the increase in regional consciousness through their missionary strategy which strongly built on elements of traditional culture. Thus, it had indirectly, yet unintentionally prepared fertile ground for the MFDC.<sup>105</sup> Moreover, the members of the Church simultaneously included the major intellectual head Father Augustin Diamacoune Senghor as well as other sympathisers of the movement on the one hand and ardent opponents of separation (for example, Father Nazaire Diatta) on the other hand. Consequently, it was preoccupied not to create fissures between its own members or alienate its followers, i.e. the Casamançais faithful among whom were also supporters of the

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<sup>104</sup> After having published *Casamance: La Crise*, the LD/MPT faced heavy criticism and was even accused of being associated with the rebels (Interview with a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 29 October, 2013).

<sup>105</sup> While the MFDC had supporters among the Catholic clergy, this shall not suggest that the institution supported the rebel movement or has any connections with it. It is equally incorrect to understand the Casamance conflict as a religious one. First, the rebel movement contained members of all religions. Second, although there were attacks against Muslims, these rather had a regional than a religious connotation, i.e. they were targeted against 'Northerners'. For a detailed discussion of the influence of the Catholic Church on Casamançais nationalism, see Foucher 2002b; 2003a; 2005a.

rebels (Foucher 2003, 19, 34-35; 2005a; 374). Due to these tensions, it was doubtlessly difficult for the Catholic Church to take a stance in the Casamance crisis and articulate it.<sup>106</sup> After the events in the early 1980s, the Catholic Church remained reserved at first. Only after the MFDC had attacked Muslims in 1990, the archbishop of Dakar and the bishop of Ziguinchor condemned the assault which marked the beginning of a more open commitment by the religious community (*Le Soleil*, 1 June, 1990; 18 June, 1990).<sup>107</sup> Soon after, the clergy in Casamance published a statement and expressed a careful and balanced, but clear position (*Le Soleil*, 2 July, 1990). Its principal objective was to dismiss the use of violence by any actor since it counteracted religious principles and to denounce its negative consequences, namely insecurity, threats to regional development, and the loss of lives, for the region as a whole, ethnic and religious communities, and individuals. In this sense, the Church stressed the importance of justice, dialogue, and reconciliation. It repeatedly called for “peaceful solutions for the unity and solidarity of the Senegalese people” (Ibid.) and promised to commit itself in this respect. In the comment, the Church positioned itself against the MFDC’s objective and means on the one hand. On the other, it critically mentioned underlying causes of the crisis and called the Senegalese state to respect human dignity and thus, indirectly referred to its abuses. This shows that the churchmen avoided strong partisanship in contrast to other counterframing agents. Over time, the Church developed an increasingly solid position against separatism and did not get tired to refute violence and to call for dialogue and peace (*Le Soleil*, 4 December, 1992; 30 December, 1993; 9 September, 1997; 6 October, 1997; see also Diatta 1994 [1990]; 1998). The notion of peace had a double-connotation in its counterframing and addressed dangers at different levels of society. First, peace referred to the country as a whole and the inter-regional relations. The Catholics deprecated the use of force, called for a non-violent solution of the conflict, and highlighted that peace was the prerequisite for better development. Furthermore, they spoke out in favour of national unity (*Le Soleil*, 18 June, 1990). Second, peace has a local connotation. In this respect, the Church criticised violence that was targeted against Muslims and invoked the tradition of harmonic coexistence and tolerance between the religious communities in Casamance. Moreover, at various occasions, there were joint initiatives with the Muslim community such as inter-religious marches or prayers for peace (Foucher 2005a, 374-375; *Le Soleil*, 11 June, 1990, 18 April, 1995; 24 November, 1997).

Members of the faith community also individually committed themselves to counter the MFDC’s framing. A notable example is Nazaire Diatta, a Diola priest, anthropologist, and strict adversary of secession, who addressed letters to the Senegalese members of

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<sup>106</sup> The Catholic Church also learnt what price they risked paying. In 1997, a leading Catholic priest and peace activist was killed when his vehicle drove on a mine.

<sup>107</sup> In 1990, the MFDC attacked praying Muslims on a public place in the centre of Ziguinchor with grenades.

parliament and Father Diamacoune (respectively, Diatta 1994 [1990]) and Diatta 1998). In his communication to the representatives, he discussed the origin of the conflict and particularly underlined the problem of the ignorance and non-respect of the Diola culture and religion within Senegal. He pointed out that a major resulting difficulty, which triggered the rebellion, consisted in the lack of recognition of the specificities in all societal domains.<sup>108</sup> Hence, he alluded to mistakes committed by the government and the administration that had contributed to the emergence of the crisis. In his letter to Diamacoune, he denounced the responsibility that the Casamançais themselves and especially the Diola had with regard to underdevelopment and their economic marginalisation in comparison with 'Northerners'. Both letters highlighted that neither was separation the solution nor violence the adequate means to solve the conflict (Diatta 1994 [1990]; 1998).

In addition to words, the Catholic Church also took action. In 1992, it created a clerical committee that engaged in manifold activities to attenuate the negative effects of the conflict and progress towards a solution. Among others, the collective contributed to the signing of ceasefire agreements in 1993 and again in 2001, facilitated local truces, and convinced the MFDC to allow national elections to be held in their zones. It served as a mediator between different factions of the armed group as well as the conflicting parties and negotiated the restitution of looted goods. Moreover, its members and other Catholic actors, such as the Caritas provided humanitarian assistance to the regional population, refugees as well as internally-displaced persons, and *maquisards* to alleviate hardship and, in the case of the latter, to put an end to the pillaging of local communities. Besides, the Church kept a controlling eye on Father Diamacoune and his entourage. Since 1993, the intellectual head of the movement lived in an official building of the Church in the centre of Ziguinchor, where he remained for more than a decade under house arrest. On behalf of the Church, this was a measure to oversee and limit the activities of the popular figure (Foucher 2003a, 35-37).<sup>109</sup>

Altogether, the position of the Catholic Church in the Casamance conflict was not an easy one. However, after an initial period of reluctance, it engaged in counterframing activity. The religious community aptly used its societal status to simultaneously link up with the population, the rebels, as well as the state and made itself heard (Foucher 2003a, 35). An additional strength of the Church was its moderate stance. While it clearly positioned itself against separation as well as violence and called for a peaceful solution, it did not attack the MFDC as radically as other counterframing agents. It criticised, for example, Diamacoune for his political activism and opinion, but simultaneously stressed the need to consider existing

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<sup>108</sup> Diatta had previously published a collection of Diola proverbs. In his letters, he built on them to elaborate his arguments. A deficiency of his approach and reading of the conflict consisted in the overemphasis of cultural or even ethnic factors, since he focuses on the Diola community.

<sup>109</sup> Until today, parts of his estate remains locked up in the so-called *Maison des Œuvres Catholiques* where he lived.

injustices and kept him within their ranks.<sup>110</sup> Moreover, it did not move too close to the state, but also condemned misbehaviour by the government (Diatta 1994 [1990]; *Le Soleil*, 2 July, 1990; *Sud hebdo*, 1 February, 1990). This positioning together with its active involvement earned it credibility in the eyes of different conflicting parties, including followers of the separatist movement, and guaranteed access to them.

In sum, counterframing was under-developed in the early phase of the conflict due to a climate of fear and insecurity within society that hampered position-taking and obstructed open debate. Against this background, the government tried to ignore, talk down, and delegitimise the issue. Yet, the weak counterframing favoured the MFDC since it monopolised the public arena in Casamance and its frames did not meet convincing resistance. Moreover, repression by the state deterred some, but forced many others into the *maquis*. Over time, counterframing gained momentum. Especially the Senegalese government and the Catholic Church became influential. Since the MFDC's rhetoric did not develop much, they could fill a vacuum and propose alternatives. The government partly accommodated claims by the movement and took action to improve the situation in the south. If it could not win back the hearts and minds of the Casamançais population, it nevertheless managed to cut the ground from under the rebels' feet. Other actors, notably the *cadres* and most opposition parties sided with the administration. The clergy also positioned itself against the separatist group. It aptly used its status and reputation to keep up good links with different stakeholders in the conflict. This, together with its humanitarian intervention, earned it a mediating position and allowed it to alleviate hardship in the region.

In addition to analysing the content of counterframes, it is imperative to take into consideration the constellation of actors since it impinges on the content of collective action frames, notably concerning the preferred strategy. In Casamance, all actors condemned the MFDC more or less fiercely and unanimously rejected separation and violence as a means to achieve it. This led to a polarised configuration with the rebel movement being on one side and counterframing agents on the other. Hence, the armed movement did not have an ally that it could expect support from and to whom it sought to maintain a constructive relationship.<sup>111</sup> This configuration favoured the radical stance of the movement and facilitated

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<sup>110</sup> Some sources claim that Diamacoune was ex-communicated. This is incorrect. After his death, he was buried on the cemetery of a seminary in Brin close to Ziguinchor. Maintaining contact with him helped the Church to access to the MFDC, since the movement considered the religious community as favourable to its cause (Foucher 2003a, 35).

<sup>111</sup> It will be seen later that the activists in Barotseland avoided alienating the royal élite. Similar trends cannot be observed in Casamance, but the relations between the MFDC and the regional élite, the *cadres*, were strained. According to the MFDC, they had abandoned and betrayed their home region politically and economically and were only interested in their own benefits. Consequently, the MFDC did not feel bound by the resistance of the *cadres* or the worsening of relations, but pursued its aim independent of their support.

violent framing. In view of the lack of advocates, the armed movement solely depended on its own demonstration of power and force.<sup>112</sup> Hence, it could not depart from its violent framing. This observation shows that even if counterframing agents successfully oppose a violent grouping, they can indirectly back it or contribute to a vicious circle. Hence, it is imperative to take into account the environment of an armed movement to explain its violent struggle, since the use of force does not exclusively come from within but is promoted by external circumstances.

### **6.5. Preliminary Conclusions of the Empirical Analysis of the Casamance Case Study**

The chapter provided an in-depth analysis of the framing by the *Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance* and its effects. To begin with, it gave an overview of how the MFDC sensitised and mobilised followers. It yielded insights into the communication means and channels that the group used in order to reach potential followers and supporters. Furthermore, it examined the different dimensions of the disseminated collective action frames. The analysis of the content showed that the movement's diagnostic framing crystallised around grievances and injustices in various societal fields, with the situation being comparable to colonisation. The armed group clearly ascribed responsibility for the difficulties to 'the North'. In the prognostic framing, the MFDC presented separation – or liberation – of the region from Senegal as a solution to the previously diagnosed problems, yet did not go into detail regarding the future of independent Casamance. It also agitated for and justified violence as a means to achieve self-determination. In its motivational framing, the group invoked historical and nationalist arguments, but also pointed to the defensive character of its fight to incite followers to join the struggle. Although the three framing dimensions were not equally well-developed, with diagnostic framing being more elaborate than the other two components, the framing by the MFDC was relatively consistent and logical. Yet, the movement did not come up with a sound ideological basis for its struggle, since frame development was overtaken by events.

Based on this, the chapter assessed frame resonance. In this respect, it turned out that a complex interaction of concrete and abstract factors impacted the effectiveness of the strategic communication. Especially in its early days, the MFDC successfully touched a raw nerve by taking up grievances that existed in Lower Casamance and interpreting them in a way that matched everyday experiences of the local population. The Casamançais people welcomed references to real or perceived inequalities and frustrations regarding

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<sup>112</sup> This does not mean that the actor constellation triggered violent prognostic frames. These had been adopted at a time when counterframing was still weak or absent. Yet, the polarised situation fuelled them or avoided the modification of the strategy.

underdevelopment, domination by 'foreigners' from the north in the economic, political, and administrative domain, and the non-recognition of regional culture within the Senegalese nation. They had long suffered from an impression of being second-class citizens in the Senegalese state which was enhanced by the violent repression of protest by the state. Furthermore, the framing coincided with a highly emotional atmosphere. Due to the application of the new land tenure regime and several single events, such as the disqualification of the Casa Sport in the football final, the appointment of another governor of northern origin, and the strike at the local *lycée* resulting in the killing of a student by security forces, tensions between the south and the north had further increased in the early 1980s and led to a widespread feeling of *ras-le-bol* or 'enough is enough'. In view of these trends, it was not surprising that frames comparing the present situation with colonialism appealed to local people since such parallels reflected well their experiences and emotional state. Besides, the MFDC represented a long-awaited opportunity to finally voice concerns and seek change that many people gladly seized. Moreover, Casamançais appreciated the attention that was paid to local culture as it fulfilled expectations of cultural recognition and countered the widespread feeling of exclusion and inferiority that they had been confronted with in the Wolof-dominated post-colonial nation-state. The nationalist frames that the MFDC used to justify its claims for national self-determination and to incite potential followers to fight for its cause were particularly influential among the Diola. Within this community, a strong cultural consciousness had emerged over the course of history as a result of various social dynamics and external influences. Furthermore, the rebels' notion of '*Casamancité*' was strongly Diola-centred, i.e. referred predominantly to cultural elements of this ethnic group and was therefore, well received by its members. In this context, an interesting interaction of different factors fuelling frame resonance can be observed with regard to the young (mainly Diola) men who had moved northwards to pursue their education or find paid labour. As a result of the economic recession and downsizing, they increasingly failed to gain a foothold in the cities of northern Senegal and saw their prospects fading away. Simultaneously, their cultural and regional awareness had grown as a result of migration and membership in migrants' networks. Since they were simultaneously attracted by grievance-based as well as cultural framing and had little to lose, they were particularly easy targets for the rhetoric by the armed movement. In addition, historical frames also resonated despite their abstract and constructed character. They were especially relevant to the segments of the population that had some education and were concerned with questions of national and ethnic identity and its recognition. Since historical aspects intersected with nationalist claims, they benefitted from the same societal trends and underlying discourses as nationalist frames. Finally, historical references were successful as they corresponded to rumours or superficial knowledge regarding past events. Hence, they appeared familiar to large parts of the

population who often could not ascertain their correctness. This was an important boost for the movement given the prominent position of historic arguments in the MFDC's framing. In the beginning of the crisis, Father Augustin Diamacoune Senghor, intellectual head and leader of the political wing, constituted a special trump in the hands of the armed group. He was widely known and appreciated throughout Lower Casamance because of his profession and previous activism in the region. His legitimacy as a leading figure resided on both modern and traditional sources which assured his appeal to and credibility among different segments of society. Overall, his reputation and personal qualities decisively enhanced frame resonance. Furthermore, the initially weak counterframing by political and societal actors also favoured the movement. After the march in 1982, the Senegalese government was the dominant counterframing agent, with other social forces such as the *cadres casamançais* and oppositional parties largely aligning to its position. The state mainly trivialised the MFDC without considering or critically dealing with its claims and thus, failed to effectively challenge the rebels' frames. Moreover, Dakar reacted with brutal and indiscriminate repression to the events which the MFDC compared to a declaration of war. As a reaction, the movement presented its recourse to arms as an unintended and predominantly defensive move that had resulted from the situation. Moreover, the experience of violence further alienated the Casamançais and especially the Diola, who were most seriously affected, from 'the North'. This, together with fear or the wish to take revenge, made violence appear as a justified means and drove followers towards the movement and into the *maquis*.

Despite initial successes regarding mobilisation, frame resonance did not last. Over time, divergences between the MFDC and its constituents became increasingly apparent. Although the armed group had its finger on the pulse of the people at first and successfully instrumentalised their grievances and emotions, it did not manage to re-adjust its framing. It failed to react to modifications in the societal context, better accommodate the needs and aspirations of the population, and combine them with its own goals. This led to a spiral of unsuccessful framing attempts and increasing alienation between the rebel group and the people it pretended to represent. Although the inhabitants of Casamance had welcomed demands for greater appreciation and recognition of their cultural specificities, they refuted the exclusive and Diola-centred nationalism since it did not represent their concerns. It failed to widely appeal to them, since various communities did not share the same cultural background. References to elements of Diola traditions or narratives were meaningless outside this group. Furthermore, the multi-layered and dynamic character of patterns of identification negatively impacted frame resonance. Identity can encompass various allegiances whose intensities differ and can change over time. Depending on what identity or what aspect of it is most salient at a given moment, the effectiveness of pertinent frames

varies. Concretely, while there was a feeling of regional identity in Casamance, it was neither territorialist nor separatist. Moreover, it intersected with other both sub- or supra-regional attachments. Considering themselves, for example, as ‘Senegalese from Casamance’ was not contradictory for many Casamançais. Besides, the regional population praised – rightfully or not – the tolerance and multi-cultural character of their home region. The MFDC’s negative nationalist rhetoric could not sustainably entrench itself on this basis. Furthermore, the prognostic framing dimension was problematic in two respects. First, expectations regarding the desired outcome of the struggle fundamentally differed. Although the population welcomed the bottom-up movement denouncing regional problems and the domination of ‘Northerners’, the majority in the Ziguinchor region did not agree with the MFDC’s demands for independence. Instead, they aspired to better political and economic integration and appreciation of their homeland within the Senegalese state, that is, to be full citizens. Second, the prognostic framing referring to collective strategy lost its mobilising force. Justifying violence through self-defence became increasingly incredible because the population became victim to attacks by the MFDC and was thus caught between the two sides. The enemy-image of ‘the North’ also crumbled due to a change in the government’s attitude towards the rebellion (see below). Moreover, offensive calls for violence, which pretended that the use of force was the only possible means, contradicted societal predispositions including, among others, shared values, extant beliefs, (self-) perceptions, expectations, and underlying discourses. While these incongruences could be overcome in the short-term, they proved harmful in the long-term, since the constituency increasingly rejected the MFDC’s propositions as too radical. In addition to mismatches between the framing and popular opinion, there were also growing inconsistencies between the behaviour and the rhetoric of the movement. Neither did the rebels make any progress in achieving their goals, nor were they able to provide a prospect of the future by establishing parallel state structures or improving infrastructure in the zones they controlled. Instead, the armed group increased the difficulties through violence against civilians and its illicit economic activities. It appeared increasingly engulfed by profit-making and internal rivalries between multiple competing factions. Hence, its framing appeared unrealistic and lost relevance as well as credence in the eyes of the majority. In consequence, resonance decreased and support for the armed group faded away. In addition, the movement suffered from a leadership crisis that contributed to reducing the effectiveness of collective action frames. Father Diamacoune had been losing influence and unifying power since the mid-1990s. Although several members of the MFDC in Senegal or the diaspora claimed leadership, they were contested within the movement and unknown or despised by the population for being detached from realities on the ground. Thus, they could not fill the vacuum at the group’s head. Altogether, the failure to maintain mobilisation exemplifies that

the MFDC's framing was top-down and lacked interactivity and dynamism which harmed its appeal. The rebels did not have close connections with their constituency which would have constituted a prerequisite for sustainable positive frame resonance. Against this background, counterframing also began to contribute to weaken the influence of the armed group. Since the early 1990s, the Catholic Church took position in the conflict and developed into an influential actor. The government's counterframing became more elaborated and delegitimised the propositions of the armed movement. Moreover, the administration partly recognised grievances and accommodated them, for instance, by increasing the regional representation in its ranks, improving the infrastructure in the Ziguinchor region, and integrating regional heroes into the national narrative. By doing so, the state cut the ground from under the MFDC's feet and met – unlike the insurgent group – major expectations of the aggrieved Casamançais. Overall, the framing by the MFDC lost its mobilising potency and was unsuccessful in the long run. In this context, one should not overlook the escalating effect that resulted from the actor constellation. Due to the unified opposition of all counterframing actors, the rebels were isolated. Hence, the activist group did not have a reason to adopt a moderate stance to avoid alienating other stakeholders and relied on its own. This fuelled its radical framing regarding collective strategy.

Altogether, framing proved an adequate theoretical approach to elucidate why the Casamance conflict escalated in the first place, but remained at a comparatively low level in spite of structural factors that are usually expected to cause a full-blown civil war. By studying the content of collective action frames, it uncovered how the movement interpreted, contextualised, and politicised the situation and events in order to induce (potential) followers to support its struggle. Framing analysis demonstrated that a complex interaction of various concrete and abstract determinants at different levels impacted frame resonance in Casamance in multiple ways and at different stages of the conflict. Especially in its early days, the MFDC's collective action frames were both (relatively) salient and credible and strongly benefitted from the reputation of Augustin Diamacoune Senghor. Due to the positive frame resonance, the movement successfully sensitised and mobilised supporters and recruits and even incited them to engage in using force. Hence, the approach helped to elucidate how structural factors were successfully translated into collective action through the agency of the movement and explained why violent conflict broke out. However, in many respects frames resonated only partly, not at all, or their effectiveness declined over time because the content of the framing did not correspond to changing needs and expectations of people on the ground or because the activities of the movement increasingly contradicted its framing. In this context, the theory was useful to examine relations between the armed group and the population and uncover weaknesses in the mobilisation process and also considered the impact of the environment the MFDC acted in, that is, the role of

## 6. Casamance: Framing Analysis

counterframing. The deficiencies in frame resonance helped to explain why violence remained of low intensity in the long run.<sup>113</sup> Altogether, framing came up with a solid causal explanation for the conflict dynamics in Casamance. However, in order to provide an encompassing answer to the research questions that are at the core of this thesis, it is imperative to contrast findings from Casamance with results from the second case study, which will be at the centre of the subsequent chapters.

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<sup>113</sup> The MFDC's decline and dynamics of violence were also enhanced by other factors, for example, the comparatively weak war economy and the lack of external support. Yet, while the movement's initially successful framing helped to overcome difficulties and allowed for launching the rebellion, the subsequent non-resonating framing was no longer able to surmount the manifold challenges and uphold mobilisation.

## 7. Historical Background and Analysis of the Barotseland Question

On 14 August, 2013, Afumba Mombotwa, chairman of the separatist movement Linyungandambo and self-appointed Administrator General of the Royal Barotseland Government in Waiting (RBG), declared Barotseland an independent nation:<sup>1</sup> Neither was this proclamation an isolated event, nor did it constitute the first incident of this kind in post-colonial Zambian history, but it was part of the enduring struggle for autonomy or separation of the former kingdom of Barotseland that sections of the Barotse society have been waging for decades.<sup>2</sup>

Already during the struggle for independence from British colonial rule, the Barotse royal élite agitated for self-determination of their realm. Yet, their attempts failed. In 1964, they signed a treaty, the so-called Barotseland Agreement (BA64), with the future government in Lusaka, which stipulated the terms of Barotseland's integration into the nascent state. In consequence, the kingdom became part of the newly independent Republic of Zambia. Yet, the concord was of temporary nature. In 1969, after the Barotseland Agreement had been progressively abrogated, Lozi royalists began to re-demand autonomy from Lusaka. Since then, the question of the status of Barotseland periodically re-occurred on the political agenda – most recently in 2010 and the following years. What is peculiar about the case is that the demands have been – and continue to be – mainly voiced in a non-violent manner, although tensions reached several peaks and the Lozis would have the potential to take up arms against the central government if they wanted to (Zeller 2010b, 301).<sup>3</sup> Yet, according to a leader of the separatist struggle, it is a law matter, not a war matter which implies that strategies to achieve independence have to be chosen accordingly (BNFA 2015). This point of view is even more surprising as several structural factors would favour the use of force. Moreover, the Zambian government has constantly repressed demands which also risks having an escalating effect. In addition, the case of Barotseland bears strong resemblances to Casamance, where a separatist conflict turned into an enduring violent conflict of low intensity. Framing is expected to provide a suitable answer to why the conflict has not degenerated into armed struggle so far and to explain the varying conflict trajectories. Yet, before attention will be focused on framing, the historical and societal background of the Barotseland question will be described in this chapter (7.1.). Moreover, the main conflict actors will be introduced (7.2.) and the conflict will be analysed with respect to theories of violent conflict (7.3.).

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<sup>1</sup> The Administrator General is the head of Barotseland's transitory government, which was created by Linyungandambo. Other self-determination movements criticised its creation.

<sup>2</sup> In the following, the conflict will be referred to as Barotseland question or Barotse question. This terminology is more neutral than expressions such as Barotseland conflict or issue.

<sup>3</sup> In the 1990s, several thousand armed men gathered in Limulunga, the winter capital of Barotseland, in order to protect their king (see 7.1.2.). In 2010 and 2011, protests turned into riots. This suggests that there were violent incidents in the context of the self-determination struggle. However, since there is no organised violence or armed group, the conflict can be classified as non-violent.

### 7.1. Historical Background of the Self-Determination Conflict in Barotseland

Zambia, a landlocked country in southern Central Africa, shares borders with, in a clockwise direction from the north, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Tanzania, Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia, and Angola. Thus, it is encircled by centres of conflict and political violence of different type and intensity. Until their independence in 1980 and 1990, respectively, Zimbabwe and Namibia faced colonisation and apartheid.<sup>4</sup> After liberation, Robert Mugabe's rule became increasingly repressive towards white settlers and opponents of the regime. Furthermore, there were long-lasting civil wars and wars of independence in the Portuguese-speaking neighbouring countries. Katanga, in southern DRC, experienced its first secessionist uprising in 1960. The region is still not pacified and frequently affected by violent conflict as are other parts of the vast country. Moreover, the Namibian Caprivi Strip became the scene of separatist uproar in 1999 (see Burnell 2005, 107-108). In addition, Zambia itself is confronted with internal problems: Its national economy has suffered for a long time from the drop in copper prices, which began in the 1970s, and only recently started to recover from recession. Considerable numbers of refugees from adjacent countries had to be absorbed. Sixty-four per cent of the Zambian population suffer from multidimensional poverty, with additional 17 per cent being threatened by it. Income inequality is high. Approximately 13 per cent of adults are HIV-infected (Brosché and Nilsson 2004, 7; Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSR) 2008; Di John 2010; UNAIDS 2012; UNDP 2013; World Bank 2015). Despite external influences and internal factors conducive to conflict, Zambia appears to be an island of peace and political stability amidst these frequent occurrences of armed conflict in the sub-region (see, for example, Burnell 2005; Di John 2010; Lindemann 2011). However, this image is incomplete. Albeit Zambia's record in terms of political stability is undoubtedly remarkable, it is only one side of the coin. On the other side, the country was also scene of political violence. Independent Zambia experienced riots, episodes of guerrilla warfare, attempted coups d'état, and government repression. For instance, shortly after independence, violent clashes between the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) and security forces on the one hand and the Lumpa Church, a religious movement with a political dimension in the north of Zambia, on the other cost approximately 1,000 people their lives and forced several thousand others into exile into the DR Congo. From 1976 to 1982, the Mushala rebellion destabilised the North-Western Province and terrorised villages (Baylies and Szeftel 1992; Burnell 2005, 108; Hinfelaar 1995; Larmer 2011; Larmer and Macola 2007; PTS 2015; *Zambian Watchdog*, 1 April, 2012; see also contributions in Gewalt, Hinfelaar, and Macola 2008). Within this national context,

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<sup>4</sup> In 1965, Southern Rhodesia (today's Zimbabwe) unilaterally declared independence from Great Britain. The white minority government was confronted with guerrilla warfare to which it responded with violent repression. In 1980, Zimbabwe became an independent state. Namibia had been under South African mandate since 1920 and was a de facto colony until its independence in 1990.

demands for independence of Barotseland were voiced. In the following, the socio-cultural and historical backdrop of the area will be presented.

7.1.1. *The Historical and Societal Background of Barotseland*

Barotseland was one of four kingdoms in pre-colonial Southern Africa, whose origins probably date back to the 17<sup>th</sup> century (Flint 2010, 20-21, Noyoo 2014, 6).<sup>5</sup> Its traditional territory, which covered approximately 207,000 square kilometres, stretched along the floodplains of the upper and middle Zambezi River and also included the nearby higher woodlands.<sup>6</sup> More precisely, it largely corresponded to what is today Zambia's Western Province (see figure 6), but also covered parts of Angola, Namibia (namely the Caprivi Strip), Botswana, and Zimbabwe.<sup>7</sup> Nowadays, approximately 903,000 people or close to seven per cent of Zambia's 13 million inhabitants live in Western Province (Central Statistical Office (CSO) 2012b).

Figure 6: Map of Zambia



Source: United Nations, Map No. 3731 Rev. 4, January 2004

<sup>5</sup> The others were Bechuanaland (today's Botswana), Basutoland (today's Lesotho), and Swaziland. For a detailed account of Barotseland's pre-colonial history, see Bull 2010; Caplan 1970; Flint 2010.

<sup>6</sup> This corresponds to the size of Belarus. In comparison, today's Western Province measures approx. 126,000 square kilometres.

<sup>7</sup> The actual extension of the Barotseland Empire is contested (see Bull 2010, 150-161). In particular, the resource-rich Copperbelt is subject of disputes. In the treaties signed with the British South African Company in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the Copperbelt was considered part of the *litunga's* sphere of influence. Historians like Bull dispute this and argue that the actual expansion of Barotseland was – willingly or not – distorted and exaggerated at the time (Bull 2010, 150-161; see also Caplan 1970, 54; Flint 2003, 394; Sardanis 2003, 109-110, 149).

## 7. Barotseland: History and Background of the Conflict

Barotseland is the traditional homeland of the Lozi community,<sup>8</sup> who represent a 70 per cent majority in Western Province (CSO 2012b, 63, 66).<sup>9</sup> But there are also over 30 other ethnic groups or tribes such as the Nkoyas, Mbundas, Luvale, etc., some of which were subaltern and had to pay tribute to the ruling Lozi in the past (Bull 2010, 55-66, 140-141). The Lozi kingdom had a complex, strongly centralised, and pyramidal government system that displayed features of a constitutional monarchy and effectively controlled its territory.<sup>10</sup> The king, or *litunga*<sup>11</sup> (currently, Lubosi Imwiko II), is the head of state, with the prime minister, or *ngambela*, being “the political, administrative and judicial head” and carrying out the executive functions (*Resolutions of the Barotse National Council*, 2011). In addition, there are various subordinated levels, namely chiefdoms, districts, and villages. Every administrative unit is headed by an executive (e.g. a chief, *induna*, or village headman) who is assisted by an advising council (*kuta*) that fulfils political, administrative, and judicial tasks (see Bull 2010, 48-50; Gluckman 1963; Lewanika 2002, 269-270; *Resolutions of the Barotse National Council*, 2011).<sup>12</sup> Although their influence declined due to British interference and post-colonial policies, traditional governance structures persist in Barotseland – as elsewhere in Zambia. Not only do they carry out governance functions, for example regarding land management or resolution of disputes, but they also continue to be highly respected by many local people (Noyoo 2014).<sup>13</sup>

In pre-colonial times, the Lozi kingdom faced serious, often existential threats from within and outside the territory. Between approximately 1840 and 1864, Barotseland was, for instance, occupied by invaders from the south, the Makololo. In 1884, then ruling *litunga* Lewanika I was overthrown by a rebellion until he regained power in 1885 which is only one example of internal rivalries and succession quarrels in Barotseland. Hence, he signed several treaties, for example the Lochner Concession (1890), with the British South African Company (BSAC) in order to obtain external support and protection in exchange for mineral concessions. Subsequently, Barotseland was placed under indirect rule and became the British protectorate of North-Western Rhodesia. As a result of this, the king’s power was reduced. Nevertheless, the kingdom maintained a considerable degree of autonomy and self-

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<sup>8</sup> Lozi and Barotse refer to the same ethnic group and are used interchangeably here. While the Lozi are among the officially recognised ethnic groups in Zambia, some Lozi argue that they are not an ethnic but a language group and form a nation.

<sup>9</sup> In Western Province, 70 per cent are Lozi speaking, while 50 per cent are ethnic Lozi. On a national level, 6.3 per cent belong to the Barotse language group and 5.7 per cent are ethnic Lozi according to the census (CSO 2012b, ch. 10). The incongruence between the sizes of language group and ethnic group is due to an increasing concentration in the use of specific languages (see Posner 2003).

<sup>10</sup> Gluckman (1963) compared the system to the British bicameral parliamentary system in the Middle Age. This analogy points to the sophisticated nature of the traditional government system.

<sup>11</sup> *Litunga* means earth or owner of the land in Lozi.

<sup>12</sup> An *induna* is a judge and councillor in the Barotse traditional system. The function exists at various levels of the hierarchical system.

<sup>13</sup> This is a simplified description of the Barotse governance system, which is, however, sufficient in this context. The terminology used for the different administrative units varies between publications.

government (Caplan 1968, 343; Lindemann 2011, 1848; Sumbwa 2000, 112; Zeller 2007, 216). In the following years, the region was part of different colonial administrative entities. In 1911, the BSAC merged North-Western Rhodesia and North-Eastern Rhodesia into a single protectorate, Northern Rhodesia (today: Zambia), which was initially under the BSAC's control until it was placed under the administration by the British government in 1924. Between 1953 and 1963, Barotseland was part of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Caplan 1968; 1970).<sup>14</sup> Nevertheless, Barotseland always maintained a special status as a 'protectorate within a protectorate'.

### 7.1.2. *Secessionist Claims in Barotseland*

Claims for self-rule of Western Province date as far back as 1907, when king Lewanika I demanded that his territory should become a direct protectorate, and re-occurred frequently afterwards (Hogan 2014, 910; Mufalo 2011, 2; Simutanyi 2012, 1). During the struggle for independence, these demands intensified. In the late 1950s, calls for self-rule of Barotseland appeared in the context of debates on the intended Federation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia and were fuelled by power struggles between the Lozi royal élite and the nationalist UNIP under Kenneth Kaunda's leadership (Caplan 1968, 346-348; Lindemann 2011, 1848).<sup>15</sup> The aspirant Black nationalist movement in Northern Rhodesia increasingly threatened the position of the Barotse ruling class. This resulted from the fact that, in the nationalists' eyes, traditional leaders had too closely cooperated with the colonial power during indirect rule. Furthermore, they considered traditional governance structures as anachronistic and contrary to Pan-Africanism as well as nationalism and asked for modernisation. Therefore, the Barotse king again called for secession and justified his claims by reference to the distinctive character of Barotseland and its existence as an independent national entity before colonisation (Caplan 1968, 349-351; Zeller 2007, 223).<sup>16</sup> However, these demands remained unsuccessful. As a compromise, the Barotseland Agreement was signed in May 1964 by Kenneth Kaunda, then Prime Minister of Northern Rhodesia, the Barotse King Mwanawina Lewanika III, and a representative of the British government as a

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<sup>14</sup> Nyasaland is nowadays Malawi.

<sup>15</sup> The Lozi royal élite initially opposed the amalgamation of Southern and Northern Rhodesia under settler rule and threatened to demand secession if the British would promote the fusion. However, in exchange for retrieving previously lost powers and privileges, they finally agreed to it at the annoyance of the population. A detailed recount of the Zambian political history cannot be provided here. For more information, see, for example, Caplan 1968; contributions in Gewalt, Hinfelaar, and Macola 2009; Larmer 2011; Mubita and Chisala 2013; or Phiri 2006.

<sup>16</sup> The question of independence of Barotseland was controversial. Different fractions, e.g. Lozi supporters of the UNIP and the urban population settling along the railway, opposed secession (Caplan 1968, 350).

witness. The treaty aimed to clarify “the position of Barotseland as part of the republic of Zambia” (*Barotseland Agreement*, 1964).<sup>17</sup>

Since the agreement and its abrogation by the Zambian post-colonial state continue to be at the core of today’s debate and figure prominently in the activists’ framing, they will be looked at in detail in the following. The BA64 laid down that

“it is the wish of the government of northern Rhodesia and of the Litunga of Barotseland, his council and the chiefs and people of Barotseland that northern Rhodesia should proceed to independence as one country and that all its peoples should be one nation” (*Barotseland Agreement*, 1964).

Within this framework, Barotseland should benefit of a certain degree of autonomy, as the *litunga*, together with his councils would remain “the principal local authority for the government and administration of Barotseland” and would retain law-making competencies regarding specific matters, which were listed in the agreement (among others, local administration and jurisdiction, native treasury, as well as land and natural resource management) (*Barotseland Agreement*, 1964; see also Caplan 1968, 355-356; Zeller 2007, 221; 2012, 30). In addition, the agreement contained a provision that

“[t]he Government of the Republic of Zambia shall have the same general responsibility for providing financial support for the administration and economic development of Barotseland as it has for other parts of the Republic and shall ensure that, in discharge of this responsibility, Barotseland is treated fairly and equitably in relation to other parts of the Republic” (*Barotseland Agreement*, 1964).

However, the Barotseland Agreement did not last. Soon after its signature, tensions between the Zambian central government and the Lozi royal establishment re-emerged and the document was annulled step by step. In 1965, the UNIP government introduced the Local Government Act (No. 69) that abolished the Barotse Government and other traditional governance structures in Barotseland, for instance the Barotse Native Courts and the Barotse Native Treasury as well as privileges of the royal élite. Instead, a local government system as it already existed in other parts of the country was introduced. The assets from the treasury, which allegedly amounted to 78.5 million pounds sterling, were transferred to the Barotse Local Government Fund (*Local Government Act (No. 69)*, 1965; see Mubita and Chisala 2013, ch. 5).<sup>18</sup> In 1969, a nation-wide referendum was organised on the question if future constitutional changes should be voted by the parliament instead of deciding them by referendum. However, from a Lozi perspective the referendum was about the question “whether the Barotseland Agreement should be removed from the constitution or terminated” (*The Post*, 31 January, 2012; see also Constitution Review Commission (CRC) 2005, 510).<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Five months later, in October 1964, the Republic of Zambia became independent.

<sup>18</sup> The amount is not confirmed and object of dispute. According to newspaper reports, there is only evidence of 411,000 pound sterling (*Lusaka Times*, 14 July 2012; see also interview with a former regional politician, Mongu, 11 July, 2014).

<sup>19</sup> The referendum was on the following question: “Do you the support the provisions of the Constitution (Amendment) (No.3) Act of 1969?” (Mubita and Chisala 2013, 113). Since the act foresaw

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At a national level, 85 per cent of the votes cast were in favour of the referendum, but in Barotseland, a majority opposed it (62 %) (*Times of Zambia*, 8 October, 2004).<sup>20</sup> The referendum paved the way for the Constitution (Amendment) (No. 5) Act (1969), which ended Barotseland's existence as an autonomous political entity and fully integrated it into the local government system.<sup>21</sup> Hence, the abrogation of the Barotseland Agreement was completed. In the same year (1969), Barotseland – that had already been relabelled Barotse Province in 1965 – was renamed Western Province and existed henceforth as one province among equals within the Zambian post-colonial state. The Zambian government under Kaunda justified the abrogation of the agreement by the argument that it contradicted the intention to create a unitary nation state and might have provoked demands for comparable privileges by other chiefdoms within the country. In contrast to this, Lozi traditionalists continue to highlight the fact that the accord was unilaterally cancelled without consultation of the other signatory and accuse the government of that time and namely president Kenneth Kaunda of disrespectful behaviour or even treason (see Caplan 1968, 356-358; Englebert 2005, 35; Simutanyi 2012, 2; 7; *Spiegel*, 17 March, 1969; *The Post*, 31 January, 2012; Zeller 2007, 221; 2012, 30).<sup>22</sup>

There were other provisions undermining the status of Barotseland. In 1970, the administration in Lusaka passed the Land and Miscellaneous Provisions Act No. 47 that declared: "All land in the Western Province is hereby vested in the President" (*Land and Miscellaneous Provisions Act No. 47*, 1970). This further reduced autonomy of the province. In the same year, the Chiefs Act was introduced. It permitted the President of Zambia to grant or withdraw recognition from any chief in the country at will in the interest of national unity and order. This led widespread suspicions in Barotseland that the law was targeted at

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to allow future constitutional amendments without referenda, it is referred to as "referendum to end all referenda" (Ndulo 1998, 156; see also CRC 2005, 510; Mbao 2007, 2, 6). Although there is no direct reference to Barotseland in the question, the 2005 Constitution Review Commission admitted that it led to an amendment that "resulted in the abrogation of the Barotseland Agreement without prior consultation with the people of Barotseland through the Litunga and council. The effect of the abrogation meant that all rights, liabilities and obligations accruing under the Barotseland Agreement of 1964 ceased" (CRC 2005, 510).

<sup>20</sup> In addition, abstention was high in Barotseland.

<sup>21</sup> The Act states: The Barotseland Agreement of 1964 "shall, on and after the commencement of the Constitution (Amendment) (No. 5) Act, 1969, cease to have effect, and all rights (whether vested or otherwise), liabilities and obligations thereunder shall thereupon lapse" (*Constitution (Amendment) (No. 5) Act* (1969)).

<sup>22</sup> For the *litunga* and the royal élite, the Barotseland Agreement constituted a means to consolidate and maintain their traditional sphere of influence and prerogative. For Lozi modernists, it provided an opportunity to dismantle the power and privileges of the court and progress towards republicanism (Caplan 1968, 356-357). For the governing in Lusaka, the accord represented "a passport to enable Zambia [to] integrate Barotseland and proceed to Independence [sic!] as one country" (Clement Zaza in Caplan 1968, 356). From their perspective, "the Zambian Government [had] no moral obligation whatsoever to respect or honour the said agreement" (*Ibid.*). This demonstrates that the government in Lusaka had different intentions in comparison to Barotse stakeholders and considered the document less binding. Nevertheless, Caplan's recount suggests that the Barotse élite, whether traditionalist or republican, also had their share in the sudden abrogation of the agreement as they refused to cooperate and did not accept reforms (*Ibid.* 356-358).

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the *litunga*. Even policies that were not explicitly targeted at Western Province risked being perceived as discriminating against Barotseland and further alienated the provincial population from the central administration. When the government abolished the recruitment of Zambian workers for South African mines in 1966, people in Barotseland lost their main opportunity for income creation as the province had constituted an important labour reserve since colonial times. Accordingly, they interpreted the decision as a move against them. In addition, Lozis did not see any improvements in their region despite promises by the central government to bring development. As a result of these manifold incidents, the relationships between the people in Western Province and Lusaka became increasingly strained and marked by distrust. While the UNIP was initially successful in elections in the west, it rapidly lost support to opposition parties such as the Zambian African National Congress (ANC) and the United Party. After the one-party state was introduced, Barotse voters expressed their discontent through absenteeism, resulting in low turnouts (Hogan 2014, 916-918).

Ever since its abrogation, the Barotseland Agreement of 1964 has been an issue of contestation and protest. Since the late 1960s, Lozi traditionalists have been recurrently asking for the restoration of the agreement or full secession, whereupon the Zambian government reacted with arrests (Hogan 2014, 915-918; Simutanyi 2012, 2-4; various interviews). However, Kaunda's 'one-party participatory democracy' left little room for such claims. They re-appeared during the transition process to multi-partism in 1990/1991. During the election campaigns for the first multi-party elections in 1991, Kenneth Kaunda promised to reconsider the question of the Barotseland Agreement, if re-elected. However, Lozis from Western Province as well as the majority of eligible voters throughout the country overwhelmingly voted for Frederick Chiluba of the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD). Moreover, the Barotse Royal Establishment (D) initiated legal procedures concerning the abrogation of the Barotseland Agreement at that time, but withdrew them in order to find an out-of-court settlement. Yet, the change in power did not improve relations between Lusaka and supporters of Barotse separation, but tensions between the two parts of the country re-occurred. At various occasions, activists called for separation, clamoured for the restitution of the Barotse treasury, and denounced underdevelopment and poverty in the region. The MMD government qualified the BA64 as stale; it did not give in to separatist claims and labelled them as treasonous.

A temporary peak in tensions occurred in the mid-1990s (see Englebert 2005, 35; Hogan 2014, 919; MAR 2010; Sichone and Simutanyi 1996, 185-190; Zeller 2010b; 2012, 30).<sup>23</sup> In 1993, approximately 5,000 individuals gathered in Limulunga, the winter capital of Barotseland, to protest for self-determination. In the same year, the MMD was defeated in

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<sup>23</sup> The dates in this paragraph are based on the recounts by Englebert 2005; Hogan 2014; and MAR 2010. In their analysis, Sichone and Simutanyi (1996) give slightly deviant years. However, the events they refer to are the same as those mentioned in the works by the other authors.

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by-elections in Western Province by the pro-autonomy National Party (NP; see below). When President Chiluba toured the province in 1994, the welcoming was unambiguous: Angry inhabitants stoned his motorcade. Furthermore, the royal élite allegedly refused to meet the Zambian head of state and returned like for like, as he had rejected to receive them before. Later that year, there were rumours that the government intended to arrest the *litunga* over claims for separation. In consequence, his subjects took decisive actions and organised a protective army. The tense atmosphere was described as follows

“[t]he Ngongi (traditional war drum) was sounded and up to 2,500 men congregated at the Litunga’s palace, Limulunga, to offer him protection, armed with shotguns, bows and arrows. Those who were there say, it was a state of war” (Sichone and Simutanyi 1996, 190).<sup>24</sup>

These incidents exemplify the increasing difficulties that existed between the province and the centre. In 1995, Zambian security forces confiscated weapons in Western Province, including rocket launchers, land mines, and explosives, which were assumed to originate from the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) (Hogan 2014, 919; MAR 2010). There was another high point due to the rebellion in neighbouring Caprivi Strip in 1999, a rapidly crushed insurrection, whose supporters were mainly Namibian Lozis. In this context, one of the then activist groups, the Barotse Patriotic Front (BPF), was accused of having supported the Caprivi Liberation Army (CLA) and was banned (Kamwanyah 2010; *Panafrican News Agency*, 16 August, 1999; *The Post*, 16 August, 1999).<sup>25</sup>

The Barotseland question was also staged at an institutional level. In 1993, several politicians who had turned their back to the MMD or had been fired created the National Party. Among its leading figures and supporters were prominent Lozis, namely Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika, son of a former *litunga*, his sister Inonge, and Arthur Wina, who advocated for Barotse autonomy. In 1996, Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika formed a new political party, the Agenda of Zambia (AZ), having an explicitly separatist programme. However, these experiences were short-lived and not very successful. While the AZ won two parliamentary seats in 1996, it experienced a complete defeat in 2001.<sup>26</sup> A year later, the party was dissolved and incorporated into the MMD. However, this failure to get a foothold should not exclusively be seen as a result of lacking interest in the topic by the electorate, but the strongly centralised presidential system impeded the emergence of minority parties (Burnell 2001, 249; Erdmann 2007, 15, 25; Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003, 31; Hogan 2014, 919-920; Sichone and Simutanyi 1996, 189-190). Moreover, demands for the restoration of the BA64 were submitted to various constitution review commissions (e.g. in 1991, 1996, and 2005), but have never been taken into account by the respective bodies (Simutanyi 2012, 3; interview with a researcher, Lusaka, 11 June, 2014).

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<sup>24</sup> Some sources speak of an even greater amount of people (Englebert 2005; MAR 2010).

<sup>25</sup> In 1998, the BPF had threatened to use force to obtain Barotseland’s secession (Hogan 2014, 191).

<sup>26</sup> The NP did not compete in the 2001 elections.

In the early 2000s, relations between Mongu and the central government in Lusaka improved due to infrastructure projects favouring socio-economic development in the west (Zeller 2007; 2012). However, after this relatively calm period, the conflict has gained momentum since 2010 and commitment on behalf of the activists increased (Interview with a researcher, Lusaka, 11 June, 2014). The Barotseland question reappeared in the political arena when demands were made – and refuted – to include the Barotseland Agreement of 1964 into the new draft constitution.<sup>27</sup> This provoked violent protest in Western Province in October and December 2010 (Catholic Diocese of Mongu 2011; IRIN 2011; Simutanyi 2012). On 14 January, 2011, a peaceful protest regarding the BA64 that had been organised by different activist groups escalated into violent riots. Security forces of the MMD government under President Rupiah Banda reacted with disproportional force (*The Post*, 31 January, 2012). The Catholic Diocese of Mongu provided a credible analysis of the events: Longstanding anger and frustration existed in the province due to the abrogation of the BA64, the government's refusal to include it into the constitutional draft, underdevelopment, and perceptions that the province had been treated unfairly. Tensions increased when the government repeatedly prohibited meetings by activist movements and mobilised a considerable contingent of heavily armed security forces which inhabitants of the province perceived as provocation. This mixture, together with rumours, e.g. concerning anonymous threats to use violence against 'foreigners' and the alleged resignation of the *litunga*, and inadequate and disproportionate crowd policing against protestors finally led to the escalation of the protests into violence (2011, 7-13). These were the most violent incidents since the mid-1990s. According to official accounts, two people died and several were injured; approximately 120 people were arrested and charged with high treason (IRIN 2011; *Lusaka Times*, 14 January, 2011; Zeller 2012, 31).<sup>28</sup> In the following months, the Barotse question consistently made the news. During his campaign for the presidential elections in September of the same year, Michael Sata, presidential candidate of the Patriotic Front (PF), promised to restore the BA64, but withdrew these propositions after his victory.<sup>29</sup> A commission of inquiry was created by the newly elected government to shed lights on the events that led to the Mongu riots. However, its results were not published.

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<sup>27</sup> As a result of the deliberations of the Mung'omba Constitution Review Commission (2003-2005), president Mwanawasa created a National Constitutional Conference that published its draft constitution in 2010.

<sup>28</sup> These figures are likely to be too low. Activist movements put the number of dead at 19; 14 were wounded and five went missing. Reportedly, almost 200 persons were arrested, some of whom died in detention or afterwards (BFM 2013; see also Mubita and Chisala 2013, ch. 11).

<sup>29</sup> The Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) quotes Sata as follows: "The Barotse Agreement is still a valid agreement. How can you ignore an agreement that was signed, sealed and delivered almost 47 years ago? There is no honest person who can deny the existence and validity of the Barotse Agreement. I am ready to spend two months in Barotseland to help fight for their rights. [...] The PF government will honour the Barotse Agreement without hesitation because we have no problems with it. We see nothing wrong with it" (IRIN 2011).

Since 2012, there has been a change in goals and strategies of the activist movements. Instead of requesting the restoration of the Barotseland Agreement of 1964, they came up with an interesting legal line of argument: They accept the BA64's abrogation, which – for them – paves the way for separation from Zambia (see also Zeller 2012).<sup>30</sup> This reasoning found its expression in the Barotse National Council (BNC), which was convened in Limulunga on 26<sup>th</sup> and 27<sup>th</sup> March, 2012.<sup>31</sup> In its final resolution, the BNC proclaimed that

*“we finally accept the unilateral nullification and the abrogation of the Barotseland Agreement 1964 by the Zambian government, which action has freed Barotseland from being part of Zambia. In line with the Post liminium [sic!] doctrine we can no longer be obliged to [honour] an international Agreement that the other party has nullified and abrogated, which has reverted us to our original status” (Resolutions of the Barotse National Council, 2012; emphasis in the original).*

Thereof, it follows that “[w]e the people of Barotseland declare that Barotseland is now free to pursue its own self-determination and destiny” (Ibid.), which amounts to a unilateral declaration of independence. In order to implement their claim, the activist groups resorted to legal instruments and highlighted their dedication to non-violence. Some months after the BNC, the Barotse National Freedom Alliance (BNFA) addressed a petition to the African Commission of Human and People's Rights in Banjul (the Gambia). In this, it stated that the “rights of the people of Barotseland to self-determination have been violated by Zambia following the unilateral termination of the Barotseland Agreement 1964” (BNFA 2015).<sup>32</sup> In 2013, Barotseland applied for membership in the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO) and was accepted in November (Ibid.). On 30 March, 2014, the same alliance, represented by an independent international arbitration law firm, proposed to the Zambian government to resolve the issue through arbitration by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague.<sup>33</sup> This was delineated as an opportunity to settle the contention according to international law as well as through peaceful means. Furthermore, the movement argued that the lawsuit could deliberate the rightfulness of the government's position regarding the Barotseland Agreement. Yet, a refusal of such a proceeding by the Zambian state would equal a confession that the government was in the wrong and the

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<sup>30</sup> The movement MOREBA, for example, changed its name from Movement for the Restoration of the Barotseland Agreement into Movement for the Restoration of Barotseland.

<sup>31</sup> The BNC is a non-permanent general assembly of all Lozi chiefs on different levels and from all parts of Barotseland and the highest decision-making body in Barotseland. It meets to discuss issues of particular importance and to vote resolutions, which fix the country's major policy lines. Its decisions are binding and will have to be executed by the Barotse Royal Establishment (see *Barotse Post*, 27 September, 2013; Zeller 2012, 31). In 2012, the council was enlarged. In addition to traditional leaders of all districts in Western Province, representatives of the diaspora and additional guests, such as NGO representatives were invited.

<sup>32</sup> Interviews report that petition was accepted as a *prima facie* case (Interview with a leading activist, Mongu, 24 June, 2014).

<sup>33</sup> In their correspondence, the jurists reproduce their clients' position: The Zambian government failed to honour the Barotseland Agreement, which is an international treaty. Since this constitutes a breach of international law, Barotseland has the right to “terminate the treaty once and for all and to determine its own fate” (Kirtley, Sinha, and Dugué 2014a). As a consequence, Barotseland had decided to revert to its original status as an independent nation, as proclaimed by the resolution of the 2012 BNC.

integration of Western Province into Zambia was illegal (Dugué & Kirtley AARPI 2014; see Kirtley, Sinha, and Dugué 2014a; 2014b). The Zambian government failed to respond to the lawyers' request to approve the procedure and sign the arbitration agreement by the fixed deadline of 28 May, 2014. Since the consent of both concerned parties is imperative, the case has so far not proceeded.<sup>34</sup>

Since then, the Barotse question has not considerably evolved. The different movements continue to call for separation with the government ignoring such demands. Occasionally, the issue attracts greater attention, for example, in the context of national elections or lawsuits of Barotse activists. Yet, there have not been any major steps to solve or settle the dispute.

### 7.2. Conflict Actors

The historical overview outlined where the Barotseland question originates from and how it developed over the last decades since independence. In the following section, the main conflict actors will be presented. The Barotseland question mainly concerns the Zambian government (7.2.1.) on the one side and Barotseland on the other. The latter consists of the Barotse Royal Establishment, i.e. the traditional government institutions of the region (7.2.2.) and several activist movements agitating for separation (7.2.3.).

#### 7.2.1. *The Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ)*

In 1964, Zambia obtained independence without violent struggle. Kenneth Kaunda, then leader of the United National Independence Party, became the first president of the unitary state. His rule was ideologically inspired by African Humanism, i.e. a combination of human-centred socialism and nationalism (see Kaunda 1972; Molteno and Tordoff 1974). Although constitutionally being a multi-party democracy, Zambia developed into a de facto one-party state. In 1972, Kaunda effectively introduced one-party rule, which was marked by low to medium levels of repression (PTS 2015). In 1991, the political system was pluralised and multi-party elections were held.<sup>35</sup> These led to a peaceful transfer of power, as Frederick Chiluba of the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy emerged victorious and became president. He was succeeded by Levy Mwanawasa (2002-2008) and Rupiah Banda (2008-2011; both MMD). In 2011, a new party, the Patriotic Front (PF), came to power once more as a result of Michael Sata's victory. Despite differences in their programmes and party

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<sup>34</sup> In June 2015, the lawyers renewed their demand to sign the PCA vis-à-vis President Lungu (Kirtley and Sinha 2015).

<sup>35</sup> Zambia's post-colonial history is divided into three phases that correspond with the regimes in place: During its First Republic (1964-1972), Zambia was a de facto one-party state. In 1972, Kaunda officially introduced one-party rule (Second Republic). The Third Republic began with the transformation of the regime into a pluralist democracy in 1991. For an in-depth analysis of the dynamics of the Zambian political system, see Baylies and Szeftel 1992; Phiri 2006.

affiliations, the subsequent governments took a common position regarding the Barotseland question: They opposed, delegitimised, as well as criminalised the Barotseland Agreement of 1964 and arrested activists.<sup>36</sup>

Since the conflict is ongoing and has been gaining momentum since 2010, it is necessary to have a closer look at the last MMD government as well as the first PF government led by Michael Sata.<sup>37</sup> Sata's predecessor Rupiah Banda (MMD) became very unpopular in Western Province, as he is held responsible for the massive and disproportional repression in the context of the Mongu riots in early 2011 that led to several dead and many more injured and arrested (see, for example, *The Post*, 18 January, 2011; 21 January, 2011; 9 March, 2011). On the contrary, Sata initially took a conciliatory stance. During his election campaign, he expressed sympathy with the separatists and promised – if elected – to implement the agreement within 90 days. Once in office, he instituted the Chongwe Commission of Inquiry with the involvement of the separatist movements in order to shed light on the events leading to the violent clashes in January 2011.<sup>38</sup> The government also released detainees who had been arrested by Banda's administration in connection with these riots. Furthermore, Sata had the Barotseland Agreement published in national newspapers and thus made it publicly available for the first time in Zambian post-colonial history (see, for example, *The Post*, 19 January, 2012). However, the relative openness regarding the Barotseland question did not last. The commission's report, which, among others, allegedly recommended re-instating the Barotseland Agreement, has remained unpublished until now and Sata dismissed its results. He further withdrew his statement regarding the restoration of the BA64, arguing that it would lead to similar claims from other chiefs and thus, to the disintegration of the country (Kelly 2013, 51; *UKZAMBIANS*, 23 February, 2012).<sup>39</sup> In addition, the administration denied registration to activist movements which is why they remained illegal, and did not authorise their rallies or meetings. Barotse activists were arrested, detained, and convicted for their political commitment.<sup>40</sup> In this

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<sup>36</sup> Levy Mwanawasa was an exception. Under his rule, relations were relatively good and he is appreciated due to the development projects he launched (Zeller 2007, 224; see also interview with a former regional politician, Mongu, 11 July, 2014).

<sup>37</sup> Michael Chilufya Sata died on 28 October, 2014 after several months of illness. Former vice-president Guy Scott took over as an interim president. Edgar Lungu (PF) won the presidential by-elections held on 20<sup>th</sup> January, 2015. The thesis focuses on the action and statements by Sata's administration since field research was carried out while he was still in office and the author does not dispose of any first-hand information regarding attitudes of the people in Western Province regarding the newly elected government. The available information suggests that under the new government there is strong continuity regarding the Barotse question.

<sup>38</sup> The Commission was named after the lawyer Rodger Chongwe who presided over it.

<sup>39</sup> 'Honouring the BA64' means different things to different people. A PF functionary highlighted that by honouring the agreement, the party meant to bring development to the province. The successful implementation of projects, e.g. road construction, demonstrated that it stuck to its promise (Interview with a local politician of the ruling party, Mongu, 6 July, 2014). According to another interpretation, honouring the agreement implies maintaining Zambia as a unitary state (Mwewa 2012, 13).

<sup>40</sup> It is fair to acknowledge that the PF government also released activists later. However, this is often done on a *nolle prosequi* basis, which means that the concerned can be re-indicted at any time.

context, one has to note that the restrictive policies of the current government do not only regard Western Province, but the PF generally faces criticism for authoritarian tendencies, namely regarding limitations in freedom of the press and assembly as well as intimidation of the opposition (Dowd 2014; *FAZ*, 26 June, 2012; Herman, Cathal, and McClure 2013; Taal 2014).

### 7.2.2. *The Barotse Royal Establishment*

Barotseland is overseen by the Barotse Royal Establishment (BRE) that includes the central government of the kingdom as well as the councillors at the different governance levels. In spite of colonisation and the superseding of the traditional governance system by the introduction of modern administrative structures, the Barotse monarchy is deeply rooted in the province and remains largely functional.<sup>41</sup>

While the royal élite was initially the major driving force behind calls for self-determination, Barotse “modernising [élites]” took the baton in the struggle in recent years and the court became reserved (Hogan 2014, 922; see also Englebert 2005). Public statements of recent years give some indication on the attitude of the BRE. In 2009, the BNC called on the constitutional commission not to transgress its mandate with regard to the Barotseland Agreement. It asked to integrate the document in the final draft and not to modify the status of Barotseland (*Submission to the Government of the Republic of Zambia by the Barotse National Council on the Matter of the National Constitutional Conference and the Barotseland Agreement 1964*, 2009). In the following year, the National Council rejected the draft constitution since it “[sought] to obliterate Barotseland” (*Submission to the National Constitutional Conference by the Barotse National Council on the Matter of the Draft Constitution 2010 and the Barotseland Agreement 1964*, 2010; see also Mubita and Chisala 2013, 189-203). The BNC that was held after the Mongu riots in January 2011 took a more diplomatic stance. It concluded that “the restoration and implementation of the Barotseland Agreement 1964 shall remain the most urgent matter for discussion with the Government of Zambia” but also stressed that “the Barotse National Council would not support calls for secession [sic!] and believes in Barotseland remaining an indivisible part of the Unitary State of Zambia” (*Resolutions of the Barotse National Council*, 2011; see also *The Post*, 11 February, 2011; *Zambian Watchdog*, 23 October, 2010). Moreover, the final resolution condemned violence and called for dialogue and a peaceful solution (*Resolutions of the Barotse National Council*, 2011). This can be interpreted as an attempt to simultaneously adopt a conciliatory stance vis-à-vis the Zambian central government (and opponents of self-determination among Lozis) and separatist segments of society. As mentioned above, the

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<sup>41</sup> Due to its elitist and exclusive character, the system faces criticism from inside and outside the Lozi community for being undemocratic (Bull 2010; Sichone and Simutanyi 1996; see also 8.3.2.).

BNC came to a different result in 2012.<sup>42</sup> Yet, in how far the king and his councillors support the assembly's conclusions regarding separation is matter of discussion. One does not find direct statements by the *litunga* on the question but contradictory explanations concerning his standpoint coexist.<sup>43</sup> Some respondents took a defensive stance and attributed the monarch's containment to the fact that the king himself has his *kuta* talk: When "he (Litunga) is quiet, it's not that he was siding with anyone" (*The Post*, 2 January, 2012). Instead, he awaits his advisory council to make a decision and has to endorse the results of the Barotse National Council (Ibid.; interview with a researcher and consultant, Lusaka, 9 June, 2014). However, other observers brought forward that the BRE itself was divided on the issue and therefore, reluctant to take a clear stance (Interview with a local NGO employee, Mongu, 4 July, 2014a; interview with a local NGO employee, Mongu, 7 July, 2014). The former *ngambela* Clement Sinyinda, who was a key figure in organising the 2012 National Council and later became chairman of a separatist umbrella movement, resigned from his post invoking tensions between himself and the BRE regarding the BNC resolutions (Hogan 2014, 922; Mubita and Chisala 2013, 357-359).<sup>44</sup> This provides some evidence that the Royal Establishment does not unconditionally support calls for separation – if it does so at all. Overall, in the current struggle, the BRE resembles the "pillion but certainly neither horse nor rider of Lozi secessionism" (Hogan 2014, 922). Rather, traditional authorities are stuck riding the fence. They have to live up to expectations of the local population to sustain their support. Simultaneously, they cooperate with the central government, for example regarding the implementation of projects, and benefit from the status quo – not least in a material way, as they receive salaries from the central government. Consequently, the BRE can be assumed to exercise prudence in taking one side at the detriment of the other (Englebert 2005; Zeller 2007).<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> A critic of the BNC 2012 pointed out that this council deviated in its size and composition from previous ones (Interview with a concerned citizen, Lusaka, 23 July, 2014).

<sup>43</sup> According to the daily newspaper *The Post*, the *litunga* allegedly complained that he was considered to be behind separatists (2 January, 2012). In contrast to this, a press release by the BRE dismissed allegations that he would not support secession or the BNC resolution (BRE 2012). Other sources asserted that he was rather in favour of restoration of the agreement (Kelly 2013, 53).

<sup>44</sup> As any actor involved, the BRE also faces allegations by its critics of having been bribed (*Zambia Reports*, 17 June, 2012).

<sup>45</sup> In his comparative analysis of Casamance and Barotseland, Englebert (2005) underlined the fact that the Barotse élite economically benefitted from the union with Zambia. This observation is correct, however, Englebert's conclusions that this leads to the absence of claims for separation is premature. It is difficult to quantify previous and current demands for independence and they might not be equally supported by all sections of society. However, one cannot deny their existence.

### 7.2.3. *The Activist Movements*

Since independence, various movements and groupings have been formed to campaign for greater autonomy or separation of Barotseland.<sup>46</sup> The Barotse Cultural Association, for example, was apparently one of the first groupings in the Third Republic that was in favour of restoring the Barotseland Agreement and independence. Lozi technocrats created it after the re-introduction of multi-party democracy in 1992. In the late 1990s, the Agenda for Zambia, a political party, spoke up for separation during its brief existence. The Barotse Patriotic Front formed in 1996 even threatened to use violence to achieve independence. In 1999, the movement was banned in the context of the uprising in the Caprivi Strip since it was assumed to have connections with the local Caprivi Liberation Army (Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2011; Englebert 2005, 36; Kamwanyah 2010; MAR 2010).<sup>47</sup> Since these groups ceased to exist, they will not be discussed in detail here. Today, there are four major movements, namely the Movement for the Restoration of Barotseland (MOREBA), the Barotse Freedom Movement (BFM), Linyungandambo, and the umbrella organisation Barotse National Freedom Alliance (BNFA). There is also the Barotse National Youth League (BNYL) that is mentioned occasionally. In addition, rumours circulate online that there is a Barotse Liberation Army (BLA). According to different sources, the group has between 600 and 3,000 members and is determined “to fight back [...] without hesitation” (BLA 2012; *Lusaka Times*, 30 November, 2012; *The Southern Times*, 12 December, 2012; *Zambia Reports*, 13 September, 2012). However, the existence of the BLA is not confirmed (Ndhlovu 2012) and none of the respondents during field research could clarify whether it existed. Hence, this grouping will not be considered in this dissertation, either.<sup>48</sup> Overall, little precise information on these movements is available. Field research could not correct this flaw. Information by members of the movements themselves was clearly biased and has to be handled with care, while independent knowledge was scarce. Furthermore, since the groupings do not have registers of members, it is difficult to estimate the degree of support by the local population (Kelly 2013, 52; interview with activists, Kaoma, 10 July, 2014). To the extent deemed possible given the lack of information, the principal movements will be introduced in the following.

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<sup>46</sup> Political movements and parties that had already advocated a separatist before independence (e.g. the Sicaba Party) will not be taken into account here.

<sup>47</sup> The BPF is still occasionally mentioned in the context of the events in 2010 and 2011. However, observers state that to their knowledge the organisation is not operational any more (Interview with a researcher, Lusaka, 11 June, 2014).

<sup>48</sup> Allegedly, there is another potentially violent group, namely the ‘Barotse Imilemas’. Yet again, little more than the name and some rumours are available.

### a) Barotse Freedom Movement (BFM)

The Barotse Freedom Movement (BFM) was created in June 2009, but only became publicly known when its name was reported in the context of protests regarding the Barotseland Agreement in October 2010 (Kamwanyah 2010; *Zambian Watchdog*, 23 October, 2010). According to newspaper articles, the group was implicated in several protests, which were organised in Western Province. The BFM occasionally published press statements, articles, or open letters. Its centre of activism appears to be the town of Kaoma.

### b) Linyungandambo

Linyungandambo, meaning 'shake your neighbour' in English, was created in 2010 by Afumba Mobotwa, who still serves as chairman (*Barotse Post*, 12 July, 2013; Kelly 2013, 51-52).<sup>49</sup> The manifesto of the movement summarises its objective as follows: "Our mission is complete decolonisation of Barotseland from Zambian colonisation. [...] We are in a determined and irreversible process of restoring our nation to its true identity" (Linyungandambo 2012). The movement apparently adopted a decentralised grass-roots approach to sensitise and mobilise the local population, including inhabitants of rural areas. This strategy seems to be quite successful and Linyungandambo is especially popular among the youths (Kelly 2013, 51-52; interview with a researcher, Lusaka, 11 June, 2014; interview with a youth activist, Senanga, 15 July, 2014).<sup>50</sup> Moreover, the group lobbied the international community about the Barotse question. Over the years, it addressed several letters to international organisations or foreign governments. Written communications were also sent to the Zambian government. Linyungandambo is considered to be the most radical one among the existing groupings. Reportedly, it was implicated in the Mongu riots as well as other protests together with the BFM. Many of the arrested and accused-of-treason activists are believed to be members of it. Moreover, leaflets circulated in the context of the riots that called for violence against non-Lozi people. They were attributed to Linyungandambo. Yet, the group denies being at their origin.<sup>51</sup> In August 2013, Linyungandambo made headlines when it unilaterally proclaimed independence of the Kingdom of Barotseland and established the 'Royal Government in Waiting' with Afumba Mobotwa as its Administrator General.<sup>52</sup> This act did not only provoke the Zambian state, but also the other activist groups.

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<sup>49</sup> Afumba Mobotwa was a former civil servant and previously member of BPF (see 8.3.4.)

<sup>50</sup> Among the different movements, Linyungandambo is considered the most successful in terms of mobilisation although it is difficult to quantify the number of members and supporters (interview with a researcher, Lusaka, 11 June, 2014).

<sup>51</sup> In leaflets quoted in an extract of a parliamentary debate, Linyungandambo allegedly told "Non Lozis [to] pack and go" (National Assembly 2011b). In another pamphlet, the group supposedly stated that Nyanja and Bembas should leave Barotseland for their homelands or risk being "killed like chickens" (Ibid.; see also IRIN 2011). The authenticity of these statements cannot be fully proven.

<sup>52</sup> Mobotwa had already declared himself Administrator General in 2011. The inauguration was held and posted online in August 2013 (Barotseland Free State 2015; Kelly 2013).

### c) Movement for the Restoration of Barotseland (MOREBA)

MOREBA was initially the acronym of the so-called 'Movement for the Restoration of the Barotseland Agreement' that advocated for the respect for the document (*Lusaka Times*, 25 February, 2012). However, as a consequence of the BNC resolution in 2012, it modified its position and began to demand complete separation (*Daily Nation*, 23 October, 2012). This is reflected in its change of names: Nowadays, MOREBA stands for Movement for the Restoration of Barotseland. The group is described as the most intellectual and sober among the groups with its activity concentrating in the Zambian capital. Apparently, it does not manage to mobilise public support (Interview with a researcher, Lusaka, 11 June, 2014; interview with a former politician and a leading activist, Lusaka, 24 July, 2014).

### d) Barotse National Youth League (BNYL)

The Barotse National Youth League probably emerged in 2012 and is a youth organisation. It understands itself "as the brains-trust and power-station of the spirit of Barotseland Nationalism" (BNYL 2012) and is apparently affiliated with Linyungandambo (BNYL 2013; interview with a youth activist, Senanga, 15 July, 2014). The BNYL addressed several letters to President Sata and other high national as well as international politicians, international organisations, such as the UN, or international non-governmental organisations (e.g. Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch) to demand recognition for Barotseland's secession from Zambia. It also favours the creation of a national army to protect the Barotse territory and sovereignty (BNYL 2012b).<sup>53</sup>

### e) Barotse National Freedom Alliance (BNFA)

After the Barotse National Council in 2012, the major activist movements formed the so-called Barotse National Freedom Alliance (BNFA) as an umbrella organisation. According to its website, it comprises Linyungandambo, the Barotse Freedom Movement, the Movement for the Restoration of Barotseland, the Barotse National Youth League, and "others" without precisising the latter (BNFA 2015). But in reality, there seem to be strong tensions between the BNFA and (parts of) Linyungandambo and the two groupings compete for leadership in the independence struggle (see 8.3.4.). The Barotse National Freedom Alliance is chaired by Clement Wainyae Sinyinda, who is the *ex-ngambela* of Barotseland and served as a Member of Parliament and deputy minister in the last MMD government. His prominence is beneficial for the movement. The Alliance's declared aim is to "[coordinate] the implementation of the sovereign resolutions of March 2012 Barotse National Council in a pacific manner" in order to "attain a fully independent and democratic state of Barotseland" and "recognition of their

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<sup>53</sup> In interviews on the ground, few people referred to the BNYL. Yet, it is very active on the internet.

statehood” (BNFA 2015).<sup>54</sup> In this context, leading activists explain that a reason for the creation of the BNFA was the discontent with the lacking commitment of the BRE to execute the BNC resolution (Interview with a leading activist, Mongu, 24 June, 2014). In order to achieve its objective, the BNFA adopts a legalistic argumentation and strategy and constantly stresses that it is interested in finding a peaceful and judicial solution. The movement actively maintains a website where it publishes statements but also background information related to the conflict. It also aims to address the international community and attract attention to the Barotseland question by writing letters to various political actors. Finally, words are accompanied by deeds. Among others, the alliance brought the case to the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights and attempted to initiate arbitration by the PCA.

In sum, all the movements commit themselves to the liberation or separation of Barotseland and aim to sensitise the population in this respect. Yet, it is difficult to identify distinctive programmes or nuances in their ideational foundations as relevant documents that could give indications in this regard are lacking. The groups undertake various concrete activities. Among others, they frequently address letters to the national government and stakeholders of the international community, but also have taken to the streets. In addition, the BNFA resorted to juridical and institutional measures. When asked about the quality of cooperation between the movements, some activists admit that the variety of movements creates confusion. Others stress that it is unproblematic since all groupings fight for the same objective and only use different means and strategies.<sup>55</sup> They further explain that – with the exception of (a faction of) Linyungandambo – the groups manage to collaborate well under the BNFA’s guidance (Interview with a former politician and a leading activist, Lusaka, 24 July, 2014). However, there is a doubt on these allegations. Tensions between the movements occurred in the past and persist. Activists of the other movements, for example, vehemently disapproved Linyungandambo’s solo effort to install a Government of Barotseland (*Zambian Watchdog*, 23 February, 2012). Similarly, supporters of both movements accuse their respective others of being dishonest, avid for power, and having been corrupted by the government (various interviews).

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<sup>54</sup> More precisely, the BNFA describes its objectives as follows: “1. coordinate persons and [organisations] involved in political, legal and other legitimate actions required to peacefully re-instate the status of Barotseland as a self-governing and independent nation; 2. promote a democratic culture in respect of reconstituting and [modernising] the traditional governance structures of Barotseland; 3. promote a worldwide campaign of awareness of the constitutional development of Barotseland during the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods; 4. provide a platform for formulation of policy, constitutional framework and power structures of Barotseland; and 5. fund raise and mobilise resources required for the achievement of these objectives” (BNFA 2015).

<sup>55</sup> One activist further highlighted that their activities were concentrated in different locations with the MOREBA working in Lusaka, the BFM in Kaoma, and Linyungandambo in Mongu (Interview with a former politician and a leading activist, Lusaka, 24 July, 2014).

### 7.3. Conflict Analysis

In analogy to the case of Casamance, the Barotseland question will be analysed by reference to various theoretical approaches to armed conflicts. Geographic, ethnic, socio-economic, and institutional factors of the conflict will be looked at. In addition, repression and external support will be taken into consideration. This will both help to better understand the conflict and uncover parallels between the two cases.<sup>56</sup>

#### 7.3.1. *Geographic Factors*

The territory that Barotseland activists claim corresponds largely with Zambia's Western Province, but also includes areas outside the province that were historically part of Barotseland.<sup>57</sup> Although the remoteness of the area is less obvious than in the case of Casamance, Western Province is far off the economic and political centres of the country, such as Lusaka and the Copperbelt.<sup>58</sup> In addition to geographic marginalisation, accessing the region is difficult due to poor or a lack of infrastructure. This results from the decade-long reluctance of the government to invest in Western Province because of political instability in neighbouring Angola and Namibia and budget constraints due to declining revenues from copper mining, structural adjustment, and kleptocratic governance (Zeller 2007, 211-212). Thus, Barotseland is best described as "a largely disconnected hinterland and the least developed region, socioeconomically, of one of Africa's poorest countries" (Ibid., 210).<sup>59</sup>

In principle, the geographic location of Barotseland would favour civil war onset in various ways. Distance and detachment influence the degree of legitimacy that the state has in the population's eyes as well as its capacity. Both aspects impact the likelihood of conflict onset. Trans-border ties also favour the eruption of violence. Furthermore, separatist groups are more likely to fight in zones far away from the capital that can easily be detached from the remaining territory (see Buhaug and Gates 2002; Buhaug and Rød 2006; Herbst 2000; Wood 1981).

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<sup>56</sup> A brief, but revealing conflict analysis, which partly inspired the following sub-chapters, can be found in Dietrich 2011.

<sup>57</sup> See 7.1.1.

<sup>58</sup> The distance between Mongu, the provincial capital, and Lusaka is approximately 550 kilometres. About 800 kilometres lie between Mongu and Ndola, the capital of the Copperbelt Province where the copper extracting industry concentrates.

<sup>59</sup> When the Trans-Caprivi Highway connecting Lusaka with the sea port of Walvis Bay in Namibia was constructed in 2004, it linked peripheral zones of south-east Barotseland around Sesheke to the centre for the first time. The changes that occurred in this context highlight the degree of marginalisation that the area suffered from and that continue to prevail in other parts of the province. Zeller quotes an inhabitant stating: "Now we are a town. We have electricity, a newspaper every day, a road, shops. We only need cellphone contact here still" (2007, 218; see also Flint 2006, 711).

### 7.3.2. *Identity-Related Factors*

Despite its motto 'One Zambia, one Nation', Zambia is culturally heterogeneous. Officially, there are 73 ethnic communities in the country that can be divided into seven language groups. This means that one language group embraces a multitude of different sub-groups or tribes.<sup>60</sup> Seventeen different ethnicities or tribes, for example, speak Lozi.<sup>61</sup> The four main language clusters are Bemba, which constitutes the largest group with 41.4 per cent, followed by Nyanja (23 %), Tonga (14.5 %), and Lozi (6.3 %).<sup>62</sup> While the Barotse speakers, who are at the origin of the claims for self-determination, represent a minority at the national level, they make up 70 per cent of the population in Western Province (CSO 2012b, 63-66; Erdmann 2007, 12; see also Posner 2003). Thus, they constitute a regionally concentrated group that shares a historically founded identity.<sup>63</sup> This is important as settlement patterns matter in the context of separatist conflicts. In addition, the common identity fosters group cohesion, provides a point of attack for mobilisation and creates legitimacy for the demands (Toft 2003; Wood 1981).<sup>64</sup>

It is important to go beyond ethnic distribution and examine how identity influences access to power. In Zambia, there are no ethnic parties in the strict sense, i.e. parties "that [are] the champion of the particular interests of one ethnic category or set of categories" (Chandra 2011, 155). Nevertheless, political parties are based on provincial strongholds or tend to be associated with certain identity groups.<sup>65</sup> Thus, politicised group identity is an important factor in the political landscape and ethnic or linguistic divisions determine to some extent party formation and voting behaviour (Erdmann 2007; Posner 2003; 2005). Furthermore, Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010) found in their analysis of the interrelationship of ethnic power inequality and armed conflict that access to power as well as its loss affect propensity of violent conflict (see also Walter 2009). This is relevant in the case of the Lozis. During Kaunda's rule, political, military, civil service, and economic positions at different levels were allocated in accordance with 'tribal balancing' in order to prevent potential distributive conflicts and inter-group tensions. Hence, power was equally distributed between different identity groups and the Lozis were adequately represented in various societal domains. Tribal balancing was – although to a weaker extent – maintained in the multi-party

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<sup>60</sup> The term tribe is by no means pejorative here, but is applied "to refer to an ethnic community that is (or was historically [organised] under the authority of a traditional chief" (Posner 2005, 1).

<sup>61</sup> Lozi consider themselves not as a tribe or ethnicity but as an overarching language group or nation that englobes several tribes that live in Western Province (Interview with a researcher and consultant, Lusaka, 9 June, 2014).

<sup>62</sup> In addition, 6.6 per cent speak north-western languages (Lunda and Luvale). Mambwe and Tumbuka are respectively spoken by 3.2 per cent and 3.3 per cent.

<sup>63</sup> This does not imply that the Lozis are a monolithic group and unanimously support secession.

<sup>64</sup> In terms of religion, the country is homogenous since the great majority belongs to different Christian confessions (87-95 %). The remaining are Muslim, Hindu, or adhere to indigenous or other religions (CSO 2012b; US Department of State 2010).

<sup>65</sup> The UNIP, for example, was mainly supported by Bemba, the ANC by Tonga, and the UP by Lozis (Erdmann 2007, 12-13).

democracy (Lindemann 2011, 1849-1856; Mufalo 2011, 5-8). However, it lost importance during Sata's time in office. Lozis consider that governments have become dominated by Bemba-speaking politicians, while Barotse are excluded or only hold minor posts.<sup>66</sup> Hence, the feeling of being politically marginalised increased in Western Province (Africa Research Bulletin 1999, 13641; interview with a local councillor, Malengwa, 7 July, 2014). Furthermore, the population did not benefit from redistribution as a consequence of the equal access to power and resources of its leaders. Rather, the "horizontal equality at the [élite] level" has produced horizontal inequalities at the mass level" (Mufalo 2011, 8), which has led to "unproductive peace" (Lindemann 2011, 1865). As a consequence, there is some potential for inter-group violence.

### 7.3.3. *Socio-Economic Factors*

At first sight, economic figures appear promising. In 2011, the World Bank classified Zambia, having had a gross national income (GNI) per capita of \$1,350 (2012; GNI Atlas method calculated in current US\$) as a lower middle income country (World Bank 2015).<sup>67</sup> Zambia's economy strongly depends on copper extraction. It is, together with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Africa's biggest copper exporter and among the biggest copper extracting countries in the world (U.S. Geological Survey 2014).<sup>68</sup> Making up 90 per cent of its export earnings, the mineral is by far the largest factor of the national economy (Lebas 2011, 147; Zeller 2007, 213). While the country severely suffered from falling commodity prices in the late 1970s, it benefitted from their recovery in recent years and extraction increased. Moreover, the economy remained largely unaffected by the global economic crisis and experienced a positive economic growth rate of greater than or equal to five per cent (International Monetary Fund 2013).

However, Zambia's economic upturn is only part of the story. So other indicators have to be taken into account in order to effectively assess the socio-economic situation on the ground. In 2011, Zambia ranked 164 out of 187 countries in the Human Development Index (HDI) with a total score of 0.430 and is consequently among the least developed countries (LDC) in the world (UNDP 2011a; 2013).<sup>69</sup> Within this group, it was only little above the average score of Sub-Saharan African countries and LDCs and even dropped below the average with the

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<sup>66</sup> In Sata's PF cabinet, only the Ministry of Gender is led by a Lozi minister. In addition, a Lozi politician serves as a Minister of North-Western Province, but is not a member of the cabinet.

<sup>67</sup> According to the World Bank's definition, lower middle income countries have a GNI per capita between \$1,036 and \$4,085 (World Bank Atlas Method).

<sup>68</sup> The Copperbelt, which covers parts of Zambia and the DRC, is the largest copper deposit of the continent.

<sup>69</sup> In 2012, Zambia ranked 163 out of 187 (score 0.448). However, the 2011 data is deliberately used here. On the one hand, the HDI methodology changed from 2011 to 2012. Using the 2011 figures provides for better comparability with previous years. On the other hand, the Barotse question gained momentum in 2011 with the Mongu riots which is why it is adequate to use this year's data.

new HDI methodology (UNDP 2011b, 31; 2013).<sup>70</sup> A closer analysis of human development trends from 1970 until 2005 reveal that Zambia is among the greatest losers in all categories examined and its HDI dropped by almost 41 per cent in the long run.<sup>71</sup> This negative trend is even more remarkable since Zambia did not experience civil war or longer periods of political instability (Gray Molina and Purser 2010, 46; UNDP 2011b, 31-32).<sup>72</sup> Moreover, it is important to note that the society at large did not profit from the increase in the GNI. Zambia's Inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI)<sup>73</sup> of 0.238 proves that the actual development on the ground lags behind the country's potential human development. Sixty-four per cent of the population suffers from multidimensional poverty.<sup>74</sup> An additional 17 per cent are threatened by it (UNDP 2013; see also Southern African Regional Poverty Network 2008).<sup>75</sup> Furthermore, social inequality is considerable. Zambia's GINI-Index of 57.5 is one of the highest in the world and the level of intra-societal inequality is comparable to South Africa (63.1). The poorest fifth of the Zambian society hold an income share of 3.6 per cent, while the highest ten per cent own 47 per cent (Rural Poverty Portal 2014; World Bank 2015). Finally, variations within Zambia regarding socio-economic development have to be taken into account. The Human Development Report of 2011 disaggregated data with regard to different regions (UNDP 2011b). The results show that from 2000 to 2008, Western Province was the least developed region within Zambia. Not only was its overall score of 0.321 (2008) far below the two most-developed regions, namely the Copperbelt (0.480) and Lusaka (0.465), but progress concerning human development is slower than in other regions or the country as a whole.<sup>76</sup> Furthermore, Western Province is the poorest region of the country: Approximately 80 per cent of its rural population live in poverty, with the percentage having

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<sup>70</sup> In 2010, Zambia (0.395) was slightly above the average of LD (0.393) and Sub-Saharan African countries (0.389). However, in 2012, its score of 0.448 fell below the average for both groups of countries (LDC: 0.466; Sub-Saharan African countries: 0.475). Countries with similar HD levels are Angola and Malawi (UNDP 2011a; 2013).

<sup>71</sup> In comparison, the DR Congo's HDI dropped by 32.4 per cent, while Nepal's improvement was the greatest (33.9 %).

<sup>72</sup> This can be explained by three factors, namely inadequate economic policies that led to negative economic growth and structural adjustment programmes; a decrease in life expectancy and GDP per capita as a consequence of HIV/AIDS; and weak governance institutions (UNDP 2011b, 31-32). In recent years, Zambia's performance in terms of human development improved.

<sup>73</sup> The IHDI measures actual human development, while the HDI assesses potential human development (UNDP 2013).

<sup>74</sup> Multi-dimensional poverty does not only consider money-based measures, but integrates multiple deprivations and their intersection (UNDP 2013).

<sup>75</sup> Figures on poverty vary considerably depending on the method of calculation and sources. According to the Rural Poverty Portal, which has links to the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) 59 per cent live in poverty, while rural poverty amounts to almost 77 per cent (2006; Rural Poverty Portal 2014). Independent of the actual value, all sources suggest in unison that the percentage of people living in poverty or extreme poverty is high.

<sup>76</sup> In 2008, the HDI of Western Province progressed by 0.029. The country's average improvement was 0.042. Regarding other indices, Western Province also lags behind the other regions and the Zambian average. Its IHDI value (0.308 in comparison to a national average of 0.389) and Income Index value (0.203 in comparison to a national average of 0.317) are the lowest in the country (UNDP 2011b). In this context, one has to note that rural areas generally lack behind urban centres in Zambia.

remained stably high since 1991 (CSRP 2013; Flint 2006, 711; International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 2003, 2; IRIN 2011; Sichone and Simutanyi 1996, 185).<sup>77</sup> The actual situation on the ground can be further illustrated by some examples: It was already stated above that accessing the region was complicated due to lacking infrastructure. Within the province, travelling is equally difficult due to poor road networks, which are partly impracticable during the wet season. In 2004, the region was Zambia's last province to be connected to a mobile phone network, which, however, covered little more than the regional capital of Mongu. Only 3.5 per cent of families in Western Province have access to electricity, and more than half do not have toilets (Flint 2006, 711-712; IRIN 2011; Mufalo 2011, 4; Smith-Höhn 2009, 31-32; Zeller 2007). In this context, it is important to note that the region disposes of some economic potential: The Zambezi floodplain offers fertile ground and possibilities, such as crop farming, livestock, or fishing. Landscape, cultural heritage, and wildlife make Western Province a possible tourist destination. In addition, mineral deposits (e.g. oil, diamonds as well as other jewellery stones, quartz, etc.) are assumed to be present, yet their actual size is an object of speculation. However, due to a lack of infrastructure, industrial facilities, and investment, economic capacities of Western Province remain unexploited or unprofitable. In the agricultural sector, for instance, poorly organised subsistence farming and fishing prevail (Erdmann 2012, 534; Flint 2006; IRIN 2011; IUCN 2003, 2-3; Sichone and Simutanyi 1996, 185; UNPO 2014; Zeller 2010a, 14, 17). Overall, Western province was – and still is – Zambia's poorest and least-developed region and is socio-economically marginalised in relative and absolute terms. Already during colonial rule, the British considered the region as a "labour reserve and source of tax revenue" (Flint 2006, 705; see also Bull 2010, 190-193), but did not make efforts to sustain the existing economic structures or develop the territory. After independence, nothing changed for the better for the region. Succeeding governments neglected Western Province and failed to adequately invest in infrastructure and public services, thus impeding economic and human development over decades. The socio-economic data underscores that there is strong inequality within Zambia, especially with regard to Western Province. Effective development in the region lacks behind the population's expectations. Thus, grievances and horizontal inequalities that increase the risk of violent conflict are present (Gurr 1970; Stewart 2002; 2008).<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>77</sup> According to other sources, even 84 per cent of the population of Western Province live in poverty, while the national average amounts to 64 per cent (IRIN 2011; Mufalo 2011, 4; Smith-Höhn 2009, 32).

<sup>78</sup> The extraction of resources in other areas of the country does not influence the conflict propensity in Western Province. Hence, greed-arguments are invalidated in this case.

### 7.3.4. *Institutional Capacity and Degree of Democratisation*

As many African polities, Zambia is qualified as a weak state. In the 2014 Fragile States Index, it ranks 49 out of 178 (FFP 2014).<sup>79</sup> According to the State Fragility Index of the Center for Systemic Peace, the country has a score of 18 (Marshall and Cole 2009).<sup>80</sup> This offers a general impression regarding the capacity of the Zambian state in the global context. Having a closer look at the Zambian polity helps to get an even better idea of its stability. Since Zambia's democratisation in 1991, the party in power changed twice as a result of general elections (1991 and 2011). After the presidents Levy Mwanawasa and Michael Sata respectively died in 2008 and 2014, power was transferred to the then vice-presidents (Rupiah Banda in 2008 and Guy Scott in 2011) and by-elections were organised within the constitutionally fixed delay. These events underline that the country disposes of a notable degree of political stability compared to other states in the (sub-)region. Separation of power is constitutionally guaranteed and power structures are "adequately established and differentiated" (BTI 2014, 6) allowing for the exercise of power throughout the territory (Ibid., 7-9).<sup>81</sup> However, the government – and more precisely the president – clearly dominates politics. The capacities of the legislative and judicial branch as well as other institutions to effectively control and provide checks and balances over the executive are limited. Nevertheless, they should not be underestimated. Reports especially highlight the relatively strong independence of the judiciary, although it has not been void of politicisation and interference. Furthermore, the Zambian political system is strongly centralised and decisions are made in Lusaka. This reduces the number of potential opponents for the government, but simultaneously limits opportunities to integrate competing forces into the policy-making process. Besides, political practice is influenced by neopatrimonialist tendencies as well as an authoritarian political culture and leadership style, with political parties being weak. Observers highlighted that authoritative tendencies in Zambia increased during Sata's time in office, and slightly blurred the country's rather successful score regarding democratisation (Ibid., 2-3; Dowd 2014; Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003, 76-79; FAZ, 26 June, 2012).

In sum, there are some limits to state capacity which offers opportunities for violent political opposition. Yet, the hybrid character of the political regime appears to be the greater risk regarding potential conflict onset especially since challenges to democratic governance have recently increased.

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<sup>79</sup> According to the index, Zambia has a total score of 86.2, while the most instable country (South Sudan) reaches 112.9 and the most stable one (Finland) 18.7 (FFP 2014).

<sup>80</sup> A score of zero indicates 'no fragility'; 25 stands for 'extreme fragility' (Marshall and Cole 2009, 31).

<sup>81</sup> Nowadays, governments dispose of a monopoly of violence on the Zambian territory. This was not always the case under Kaunda's rule (BTI 2014, 7-9; FFP 2014).

### 7.3.5. *Repression*

In general, Zambia has had a medium level of repression throughout its post-colonial history. According to the Political Terror Scale, human rights violations such as “extensive political imprisonment”, “[e]xecution or other political murders and brutality”, as well as “[u]nlimited detention, with or without a trial” for political reasons were common (PTS 2015; Wood and Gibney 2010, 373).<sup>82</sup> This also influenced the official reaction towards the question of Barotseland. From the first demands for the restoration of the BA64, successive Zambian governments refuted and criminalised demands for secession throughout post-colonial history and arrested activists. This tendency continued when separatist claims re-appeared in the early 1990s after the pluralisation of the political regime (Simutanyi and Sichone 1996). The current degree of repression in the context of the Barotseland question is difficult to assess as many incidents related to the struggle are covered in a biased manner or remain unreported. Nevertheless, there is clear evidence of repression by the Zambian government vis-à-vis supporters of Barotse independence. In recent years, organisations that campaigned for self-determination of Western Province were denied registration by the administration. Hence, the movements remained illegal and were regularly withheld permission to organise meetings. Their members and supporters of secession were and continue to be arrested and charged with offences such as treason – in theory entailing the death penalty – or conduct likely to cause breach of peace. There were also allegations that the police arrested individuals that did not engage in any activities for separation. Hence, state repression was at least partly arbitrary and disproportionate given the actions of the alleged transgressors (US Department of State. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour 2011). Once in custody, the accused individuals often remain in prison for a long time under dire conditions awaiting their trial. Furthermore, critics denounce that activists were detained far away from their home towns and families, which increased hardship for the concerned. Some individuals died in custody or briefly after having been released (*The Post*, 20 April, 2011; *Zambian Watchdog*, 15 July, 2011). The most intense incident of state violence occurred in the context of the Mongu riots in January 2011. In their course, police forces killed two people and injured several others – among whom were non-involved – when trying to disperse the crowds according to official information. More than 100 people, including a 92-year old former Barotse prime minister, were arrested (see, for example, *The Post*, 19 January, 2011; 27 January, 2011). The actual death toll is likely to be much higher. Alternative sources speak of 19 dead, 14 wounded, and five missing as well as close to 200 arrested (BFM 2013). This highlights that repression is likely to be more severe than official documentation suggests.

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<sup>82</sup> In the PTS (2015), Zambia’s degree of repression since 2000 is mostly at level three, with some brief improvements and setbacks to level two and four, respectively. Its average is at 2.7 between 1976 and 2014.

State repression and human rights breaches on behalf of the Zambian government increased resentment but also fear among the local population. Yet, it has so far not led to violent action by Barotse activists who rather instrumentalise brutalisation by the government in order to justify their cause and delegitimise the Zambian government.

### 7.3.6. *External Support*

Several directly adjacent countries, in particular Angola, Namibia, the DRC, and Zimbabwe, whose borders are relatively close to Barotseland, suffered from or continue to experience long periods of armed conflict and political violence.<sup>83</sup> Links between some of the conflict zones and Barotseland effectively existed. In the mid-1990s, weapons that were most likely of Angolan origin were seized in Western Province. Moreover, there were connections between the Caprivi Liberation Army, which launched a rebellion for the separation of the Caprivi Strip (today's Zambezi Region) from Namibia in 1999, and Lozi separatists on Zambian territory (namely, the BPF).<sup>84</sup> It is noteworthy that the Caprivi Strip was part of the historic kingdom of Barotseland before it was attached to German South-West Africa during the Scramble of Africa and is still populated by Lozi-speaking communities (Flint 2003; Melber 2009).<sup>85</sup> As a result of the geographic location of Western Province as well as existing trans-border connections, opportunities for separatists to obtain weapons from former war zones as well as other forms of practical support (e.g. possibilities to retreat) are likely to be available. Yet, such contacts do not seem to be exploited so far. Moreover, the Barotse separatists enjoy some support from their kinsmen in the diaspora which would facilitate access to resources such as funding or contacts.

Overall, there seems to be some, but little external support for Lozi self-determination so far, which could favour the escalation of violence. However, mobilising and organising backing from the outside would be easily feasible without any doubt.

This chapter provided in-depth information on the Barotseland case by describing the societal background and tracing the origins of the dispute as well as its development from independence until 2014. In addition, the key conflicting parties, namely the government of the Republic of Zambia, the Barotse Royal Establishment, and Lozi self-determination movements were presented. In a final section, different theoretical approaches to armed

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<sup>83</sup> In addition to these countries that share borders with Western Province or are relatively close, contagious effects could also emanate from other conflict-ridden countries in the sub-region, namely Mozambique and South Africa.

<sup>84</sup> For detailed information on and analyses of the events in Caprivi, see e.g. Africa Research Bulletin 1999, 13639-13642; Flint 2003; Massó Guijarro 2013; Melber 2009; Schleicher 1999; 2000.

<sup>85</sup> The primary identification of the Caprivians is contested in the literature. While Melber qualifies them rather as Lozi speakers than Namibians (2009, 475), Flint claims that Namibian national integration was more successful than Zambian nation-building, which made the inhabitants of Caprivi turn towards Windhoek instead of the ancient Lozi royal capitals (2003).

## 7. Barotseland: History and Background of the Conflict

conflict were applied to the Barotseland question and various factors that are theoretically relevant for the outbreak of armed conflict were considered. With regard to the Barotse case study, the conflict analysis highlights that although the conflict has remained non-violent up to now, various variables are present which favour the escalation of conflict. Therefore, neither is the so far non-violent character of the conflict a consequence of structural conditions, nor can future use of force by separatist groups be excluded. Moreover, a comparison with the Casamance case shows that the underlying circumstances of both conflicts are similar. This is another indicator that structural factors alone cannot explain conflict dynamics and whether a struggle turns violent or is waged in a non-violent manner. Thus, the following chapter will study the Barotse question by reference to the framing approach in order to elucidate why the conflicts in Casamance and Barotseland developed differently.

## **8. Barotseland Will Be Free! The Analysis of Collective Action Frames and Their Resonance in the Case of Barotseland**

The previous chapter provided background information regarding Barotseland as well as the principal actors and analysed the conflict. With that said, the following chapter will study the Barotseland question from a framing perspective. First, the communication strategies of the activist movements will be examined (8.1.). Second and third, the groups' collective action frames (8.2.) as well as their resonance (8.3.) will be analysed, respectively. Fourth, the counterframing that the groups face will be assessed (8.4.). Ultimately, the findings will be summarised (8.5.).

### **8.1. The Communication Channels of the Activist Movements**

The various activist movements, namely the Barotse Freedom Movement (BFM), Linyungandambo, the Movement for the Restoration of Barotseland (MOREBA), the Barotse National Youth League (BNYL), and the Barotse National Freedom Alliance (BNFA) are not registered as organisations according to Zambian law and are repeatedly denied the right to hold meetings. Therefore and due to the repression by the government that they face, public activism is difficult. This is further enhanced by the lack of financial assets and infrastructure which obstructs, for instance, large scale dissemination of information through radio broadcasting. These factors impact the access to communicative means, which activist groups can use to sensitise (potential) followers, and impact the effectiveness of mobilisation.

It is reported that the activist groups used different channels of communication to reach the population of Barotseland and educate them about their aims and activities. According to several sources, information regarding the Barotse question was mainly passed on orally. In relation to this, they explained that the movements relied to some extent on traditional governance structures and authorities. As outlined above, the Barotse governance structure has been ramified down to the village level. Thus, local councillors are an effective means to connect separatist organisations and the broader population as they reach people in various locations. Furthermore, knowledge was orally disseminated across different generations. Elders, for example, who still remembered the issue of the Barotseland Agreement from their memory passed on information to younger people (Interview with a local NGO employee and an elderly acquaintance, Kaoma, 10 July, 2014; focus group discussion with youths, Mongu, 12 July, 2014; interview with a community development officer, Senanga, 15 July, 2014).

Activists also make use of the internet and social media in order to spread their message. The Barotse National Freedom Alliance runs a website (2015; [www.bnfa.info](http://www.bnfa.info)) that is regularly updated. Here, the group informs about its activities and uploads, among others

historical and legal documents, communications by member organisations, and news. Supplementary material is available on the “Barotseland official web page” ([www.barotseland.info](http://www.barotseland.info)) that appears to be close to Linyungandambo and its inaugurated Royal Barotseland Government in Waiting (Barotseland Free State 2015).<sup>1</sup> In addition, there is an online newspaper, the ‘Barotse Post’ that publishes information and news on the Barotseland question from a pro-Barotse perspective.<sup>2</sup> Many activists or followers point to these websites when asked how they disseminate information. Finally, some of the movements or the above mentioned media (e.g. the Barotse Post, the BNFA, or Linyungandambo) have a Facebook page or use other social media, such as YouTube. Yet, their degree of activity and the frequency with which they are visited varies and is rather restricted.<sup>3</sup> The reach and impact of information distributed via the internet is difficult to assess. It is a useful instrument to provide information on a relatively large scale within a short time and without too great risk of being caught for both the publisher and the consumer. In relation to this, some respondents confirm that especially young people in urban and peri-urban areas get updates through the net, a trend that is supported by web-enabled mobile phones. They either orally pass the news or print the information and share it with those who lack access to the internet. These accounts seem credible, since similar practices exist elsewhere on the African continent (Interview with a local NGO employee, Mongu, 4 July, 2014a; interview with a local NGO employee, Mongu, 4 July, 2014b; focus group discussion with youths, Mongu, 12 July, 2014; interview with a journalist, Mongu, 13 July, 2014; interview with a local government employee, Sesheke, 16 July, 2014; see also Gagliardone and Stremlau 2011, 16-18).<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, the influence of the web in Zambia’s Western Province should not be overestimated. Due to poor infrastructure, namely lack of access to electricity and absence of mobile networks in many (rural) areas, the internet is not accessible everywhere. Moreover, data bundles are expensive in relation to local income. Besides, some observers highlighted that the anonymity of the World Wide Web also harms its credibility and reliability, since unverified information and rumours can easily be brought

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<sup>1</sup> There is also “the official web portal of the Government of Barotseland” (2013; [www.barotseland.com](http://www.barotseland.com)). However, it provides very little information and does not seem to be updated.

<sup>2</sup> There are also two online radio stations, namely Radio Barotseland and Barotseland Free Radio. However, their activity is very limited and irregular. It appears to consist mainly of music and old contributions that were produced elsewhere and are replayed. Moreover, they are adversely affected by the limited access to the Web. In October 2014, the Barotse Post introduced a category ‘television’, where externally produced reportages and footage in relation to the Barotseland question can be watched. All these are not comparable to conventional radio stations or TV channels in terms of up-to-date information and reach.

<sup>3</sup> The Barotse Post Facebook page displays constant activities. Articles are regularly posted and commented and the site has 5,745 ‘likes’ (8 January, 2016; in comparison to 1,919 likes on 5 August, 2014). In comparison, the BNFA appears to be rather inactive on Facebook. Several profiles invoke connections with Linyungandambo, but have few ‘likes’. All in all, it seems that online discussions mainly take place on websites, such as the Barotse Post, while Facebook is of secondary importance.

<sup>4</sup> During field research, the author frequently obtained online sources (both written and audiovisual material) and occasionally witnessed their informal distribution. This illustrates that these information were known and circulated in Western Province.

into circulation and sources lack trustworthiness (Interview with a local NGO employee, Mongu, 14 July, 2014; interview with a concerned citizen, Sesheke, 18 July, 2014; see also 4.2.3.).<sup>5</sup> In addition, written documents, such as leaflets were reportedly distributed in several instances (Mubita and Chisala 2013). However, their reach also remains unsure. Many respondents stated that they did not collect and read them for fear of being caught and arrested. Others explained that the printed materials were often of poor quality, contained typos, and did not mention the author which harmed their credibility in their eyes (Interview with a civil servant, Mongu, 11 July, 2014; interview with a local NGO employee, Mongu, 14 July, 2014).<sup>6</sup> In sum, as in the case of the *Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance*, the Barotse separatists rely strongly on oral, informal, and discrete channels of communication. Formal means of disseminating information are also used, but it is difficult to fully estimate their effectiveness.

### **8.2. Why Barotseland Shall Be Free: The Framing of the Movements**

In the following, the content of the mobilising rhetoric of the separatist movements will be looked at. Methodologically, the framing analysis of the Barotse separatist movements was carried out on the basis of approximately 80 pieces of written communication of different types that were published between October 2010 and August 2014. They included, for example, newspaper articles or comments, press releases, letters to national and international policymakers, manifestos, leaflets, and speeches by relevant collective actors (BFM, Linyungandambo, MOREBA, BNFA, BNYL, RBG, etc.) or individuals with clear links to the organisations (e.g. chairmen). The documents were retrieved from the internet, print media, and books or were collected during field research. There is a certain selection bias regarding the material. First, available documents were not exclusively targeted at the Barotse population. They often aimed to provide information to external actors and called for their action, as for example, in the case of letters to members of the international community. This is difficult to avoid, since written communication is only available to a limited extent. However, a comparison of documents that were not aimed at mobilising the constituency and those, which clearly served this purpose, showed that the topics were similar. Hence, externally targeted material is still useful to identify collective action frames. Second, some organisations are overrepresented in comparison to others, since they are more active on the internet. This concerns the BNFA, the BNYL, Linyungandambo, and the Barotse government-in-waiting which was initiated by leaders of Linyungandambo. There are

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<sup>5</sup> Rumours are not only a consequence of internet communication, but also result from word-of-mouth communication. Their presence is strong in Western Province and can be attributed to the lack of official information both on behalf of the separatist movements and the government.

<sup>6</sup> There are allegations that the Zambian government distributed leaflets to discredit the groups.

comparatively fewer documents by the MOREBA and the BFM. Third, the analysis principally focuses on written pieces. If available, oral communication was additionally taken into consideration to triangulate the results of the framing analysis.

### 8.2.1. Diagnostic Framing

The diagnostic framing of the self-determination movements outline what the problem is and who is to be blamed for it.

#### a) Legal Argumentation

At the core of the diagnostic framing of the Barotse separatist movements is the *violation of laws frame*. All groups denounce the subsequent governments of Zambia – or Northern Rhodesia, as they call it – in that they failed to respect laws and treaties, in particular the Barotseland Agreement of 1964 and provoked Barotseland’s current difficulties as well as the dispute concerning its status.<sup>7</sup> Accordingly, the frame consists of two sub-frames. The first sub-frame deals with the non-respect and abrogation of the BA64 by the Zambian government, i.e. breaches of law at the national level. In the second one, the groups evoke the infringement of international law through Zambian policies.

The different Barotse self-determination groups denounce in unison the non-respect and gradual, unilateral, and fraudulent *abrogation of the Barotseland Agreement of 1964* by the first Zambian government under Kenneth Kaunda which constitutes the core of the problem. According to the BNFA’s chairman Clement Sinyinda,

“[t]he first generation of Zambian leaders made a mockery of the Agreement and never gave it chance to be operational. Before the ink on the Agreement paper dried up, the Zambian Government went on rampage annihilating, dismantling and shredding the BA ‘64 to pieces thereby violating its principles” (Sinyinda 2014a).

As a result, the agreement and its dispositions ceased to exist. The following comparison that is often made with regard to the agreement shows what this precisely means in the understanding of the separatists. They compare the Barotseland Agreement to a marriage certificate that brings together two equal partners – or in this case, countries, namely Barotseland and Northern Rhodesia – that coexist, but it was not intended to create a new entity. If the conditions laid-out for the marriage are not fulfilled and one companion disregards the terms of the certificate, i.e. the Barotseland Agreement, the matrimony ends and the two individuals return to their previous lives as singles. However, in the present case, the ‘marriage’ did not end with the two spouses going separate ways. They remain tied together, since Zambia took over Barotseland and imposed foreign rule (BFM 2010; BNFA 2014e; Linyungandambo 2012b; see also interview with an academic and activist, Mongu, 3

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<sup>7</sup> In the movements’ rhetoric, the term Northern Rhodesia is often used to refer to present Zambia without Barotseland and to distance oneself from this entity.

July, 2014; interview with two elderly men, Sesheke, 17 July, 2014). While this step proved beneficial to Zambia, it was completely disadvantageous for Barotseland and caused decades of suffering for the country and its people. In a nutshell, the problem to be solved consists in the fact that the Zambian government cancelled the BA64 and, in the view of the activists, has since been depriving Barotseland of its right to self-governance (see, e.g., BNYL 2012b; 2012c; Mombotwa 2013; Mungandi 2014; *Resolutions of the Barotse National Council*, 2012; Royal Barotseland Government in Waiting (RBG) 2014d; Wanga 2014a).<sup>8</sup>

However, the breach of law is not an exclusively internal problem. By nullifying the Barotseland Agreement, the activists argue, the Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) has *violated international law, treaties, and conventions*, such as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Banjul Charter, the Charters of the United Nations (Art. 2) as well as the Organisation of African Unity (Art. III), and the principle of the Postliminium doctrine (see BNFA 2014c; BNYL 2012b; 2014; Mukubesa et al. 2011; Sinyinda 2012b). Since the government did not only violate national laws, but also countermined various key principles of international law, its misconduct is of even greater importance and relevance and must not be ignored. As will be seen in the following, legal arguments pervade all framing dimensions.<sup>9</sup>

### b) Colonisation Frame

A second fundamental element of the Barotseland activists' diagnostic framing, which is closely connected to the previous frame regarding the violation of laws, is the *colonisation frame*. As a consequence of Zambia's non-respect of the Barotseland Agreement and international law more generally, the government unlawfully annexed, occupied, and governed Barotseland, that is, imposed Black colonialism on it. Here again, two major topics can be identified, namely the suppression of Barotseland and the non-respect of human and civic rights in the province.

First, in their *suppression of Barotseland frame*, activists denounce that for decades since independence, the former kingdom has fallen victim of subjugation and suppression – a situation comparable to the Makololo rule (see, for example, Barotse Freedom Movement 2010; BNFA 2013; BNYL 2012b; 2012c; Imenda 2012; Mukubesa et al. 2011; *Resolutions of the Barotse National Council*, 2012).<sup>10</sup> The “relationship of master and servant” had negative implications for Barotseland in many societal domains. In the political realm, the Zambian Government denied Barotseland its right to (democratic) self-governance and obstructed the

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<sup>8</sup> In this context, it is important to highlight that the movements do not base their claims on the content of the agreement but on its abrogation. The dispositions of the BA64 are only occasionally referred to.

<sup>9</sup> This communicative strategy partly targets the international community and tries to attract attention as well as support of external actors. But law-related frames also have internal relevance and aim to persuade constituents within Barotseland.

<sup>10</sup> The Makololo invaded and occupied Barotseland in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. See 7.1.1.

modernisation of local governance institutions (BNFA [no date]; BNYL 2012b; *Resolutions of the Barotse National Council*, 2012). It also stripped the *litunga* of his powers and demoted him to a local chief which amounted to an insult (Simutanyi 2012; interview with a journalist, Mongu, 12 July, 2014). Furthermore, socio-economic development was actively impeded by the central government, as will be shown below (BNFA [no date]; BNYL 2012d). Regarding culture, the framing mentions that Barotseland's history has been systematically ignored in Zambia. Thus, various long-standing grievances and pent up frustrations are brought up in this context. This, together with forced assimilation, is presented as having provoked the decay of the kingdom's morals and values. According to the Barotse activist movements, the Government of Zambia's ultimate intention was to systematically and permanently weaken the Barotse polity and nation in the political, socio-economic, and cultural sphere with the ultimate objective of obstructing its emancipation and impeding it from going its own way, i.e. obtaining self-rule (BNFA [no date]; Linyungandambo 2012a; Mukubesa et al. 2011).

Second, the colonisation of Barotseland by Zambia comes along with serious and constant *breaches of human and civic rights* which are intended to "suppress the truth" (RBG 2014c). Since 1969, Lozis have been deprived of their "freedom of speech, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, right to life, right to fair hearing[,] and right to nationality" (Ibid.).<sup>11</sup> According to the activists, people were "tormented, ridiculed, maimed, arrested without justified cause [...], mercilessly shot dead and murdered in cold blood" (BNYL 2012c), whereas their only offence was speaking up for their country's right to exist as an independent nation (*Barotse Post*, 26 November, 2013; BNFA 2013; BNYL 2012c; Mombotwa 2013; RBG 2014c; Sinyinda 2012b). In this context, the activist groups are eager to provide chronological evidence for their claims. The half-a-century old history of the abrogation and of the subsequent repression of Barotse individuals who were fighting for the restoration of the agreement is recounted in detail. This strategy serves to underline the gravity and duration of the problem and the suffering of the people. It legitimises the fight against the unjust treatment and shows how urgent a final relieving solution is after such a long period of difficulties. From the activists' viewpoint, the situation has further deteriorated in recent years and reached an alarming state. They argued that due to the presence and intervention of Zambian security forces, "Barotseland was under siege and war" (*Barotse Post*, 9 September, 2014).<sup>12</sup> Overall, according to the movements, people in Barotseland have experienced alarming levels of violence, which caused many deaths and imprisonments, and continue to be confronted with the imminent danger of aggression or

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<sup>11</sup> It is often mentioned that the first arrests in the context of the BA64 occurred in 1969.

<sup>12</sup> The presence of Zambian security forces in Western Province intensified after the Mongu riots. This was particularly visible at specific dates, for example, on 28 May, 2014, the ultimatum for the government to agree to arbitration.

even genocide by Zambian security forces (BNFA 2014f; BNYL 2012c; 2014; RBG 2014c; Sinyinda 2014a).

### c) Socio-Economic Neglect

Another diagnostic frame, although weaker than the legal one, concerns socio-economic grievances. The lack of development in Barotseland is at its core. The framing-agents denounce that Barotseland is the least-developed province in Zambia. This is apparent in various fields, namely poor education, health care, and transport networks, as well as the absence of industry, meaningful agricultural investment, and employment opportunities. This results in poverty and overall “dismal living conditions” (*Resolutions of the Barotse National Council*, 2011). The economic and agricultural potential of the province is not exploited and natural resources are used in a non-sustainable and destructive manner (BNYL 2012b; 2012c; Linyungandambo 2012a; *Resolutions of the Barotse National Council*, 2011).

### d) Attribution of Responsibility

To the self-determination movements, it is very clear who is to be blamed for the problematic situation of Barotseland: They explicitly ascribe responsibility for the emergence and escalation of the difficulties of Barotseland to successive Zambian – or Northern Rhodesian – governments and presidents (BNFA 2013; Sinyinda 2012b). As in the case of diagnostic framing by the MFDC in Casamance, responsibility comprises various dimensions and has changed over time.

Activist groups unanimously blame Zambia’s first government and namely its founding President Kenneth Kaunda, who acted in poor faith, for being at the very origin of the Barotseland question. He did not honour, but fraudulently abrogated the Barotseland Agreement shortly after it had been signed (*Barotse Post*, 22 February, 2014; 18 June, 2014; BNFA 2014e; BNYL 2012b; 2012d; Sinyinda 2012b; 2014a; *Zambian Watchdog*, 2 April, 2012).<sup>13</sup> The separatist movements emphasise that Barotseland and North-Eastern Rhodesia only became united as a result of the BA64. Since the Zambian government abolished the document the alliance was founded on, the Zambian administration itself ended the union and therefore, is solely accountable for the separation of Barotseland from Zambia, from the activists’ view. Barotseland became the innocent victim of Lusaka’s politics (*Barotse Post*, 22 February, 2014; BNFA 2014e; BNYL 2012b; Sinyinda 2014a).

Yet, the governments’ responsibility goes beyond the annulment of the Barotseland Agreement, the movements argue. Subsequent Zambian administrations are held responsible for decades of colonisation, during which they robbed the Barotse people of its

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<sup>13</sup> Since the movements argue that Barotseland can revert to its previous status as a consequence of the breach of the BA64, Kaunda is also responsible for the disintegration of Zambia (BNFA 2014e).

nationhood, self-rule, and freedom (BNFA 2013; BNYL 2012b; Mungandi 2014; Shuwanga 2012; *Zambian Watchdog*, 2 April, 2012). Furthermore, the ruling élite ignored all initiatives by activists to make their voices heard – for example, through submissions to constitutional reform commissions – and to amicably resolve the impasse. They even reacted with disproportionate and unjustified violence vis-à-vis committed Lozis. Hence, it is clear for the separatist movements that the development of the Barotseland question and the current tensions were to be blamed on the Zambian government (BNFA 2013; 2014e; Imenda 2014; *Resolutions of the Barotse National Council*, 2012; Sinyinda 2012b; Wanga 2014a). In this context, the ex-presidents Rupiah Banda (MMD, 2008-2011) and Michael Sata (PF, 2011-2014) are targeted personally: Banda is blamed by the activists for the brutal repression of the Mongu riots in 2011, which the BFM refers to as “crimes against humanity” (Shuwanga 2012). His successor Michael Sata not only failed to settle the impasse, although he promised to do so in his election campaign, but also continued to rigorously repress any kind of separatist activism (BNFA 2013; 2014e; Mungandi 2014).

### 8.2.2. Prognostic Framing

The problems that the self-determination movements identify in regard to Barotseland are manifold. Their prognostic framing presents solutions to them and provides a plan of action.

#### a) Returning to Independence

For decades, the Barotse Royal Establishment and supporters of the Barotseland Agreement of 1964 campaigned for the restoration of the document, for example, by demanding that it should be integrated in the national constitution. Yet in recent years, this position has changed and all separatist movements unanimously call for *independence* from Zambia as the only conceivable answer to their region’s challenges. Complete separation would allow Barotseland to govern itself and manage its own affairs according to its needs which would lead to a better situation than the one under Zambian tutelage and colonisation. Regional autonomy is no longer considered a way out. For too long, the Barotse people have been asking for this option in vain which is why they finally discarded it. This position was well expressed by the BNFA:

“Let it be known that as resolved at the BNC convention of March 2012, the people of Barotseland are no longer interested in renegotiating the Barotseland Agreement of 1964. Neither do we want limited regional autonomy. We now demand complete selfgovernment [sic!] and independence” (BNFA 2013).

In the eyes of the activists, independence or self-determination of Barotseland is not equivalent to secession or creating a new state. Barotseland became part of Zambia on the basis of the Barotseland Agreement of 1964. However, the BA64 was not honoured. Consequently, the union with North-Eastern Rhodesia that it had established also ceased to

exist and Barotseland was no longer part of Zambia. Logically, it is impossible to secede from something one does not belong to. Instead, self-rule is equivalent to reverting to the initial state of Barotseland (BNYL 2013; Government in waiting of Barotseland 2012a; Linyungandambo 2012a). This reasoning is also evident in the activists' terminology. Most often, they speak of independence (131 mentions in the analysed documents) and self-determination (25) or self-rule (6). In comparison, the terms secession (18) and separation (8) are less frequently used. Moreover, some actors refuse to be labelled secessionists, as this wording distorts reality in their view (Interviews with a leading activist, Mongu, 24 June, 2014; a local NGO employee, Mongu, 3 July, 2014; two elderly men, Sesheke, 17 July, 2014). In this context, the movements also stressed that they did not actively seek separation, but have finally accepted the Zambian decision to put an end to the document and thus the union it had established (see, for example, BFM 2010; BNFA 2014d).

Furthermore, in accordance with the colonisation frame, which was identified among the key topics of the separatists' diagnostic framing, the groups also point out that self-rule would mean *freedom* and *liberation* from the yoke of Zambian tyranny in all societal domains, namely the political, economic, cultural, and traditional ones (BFM 2010; BNYL 2012a; Linyungandambo 2012a; *Resolutions of the Barotse National Council*, 2012; Wanga 2014b). Thus, the question of independence is a highly emotional issue that extends beyond the question of governance and is connected with a variety of different grievances, as will be seen when frame resonance is discussed (8.).

In some documents, one can find vague reflections on the question of what the political and economic future of an independent Barotseland should be like. The groups outline that the future political system of Barotseland is supposed to be "an independent, secular, constitutional monarchy" (BNFA 2013). It will be based on the British example with the *litunga* remaining ceremonial head of state. Such an approach would allow Barotseland to combine the advantages of its cultural heritage and traditional values, in particular its bottom-up governance system, with modern democratic practices and rights (*Barotseland's Nationalist Guide: Building a Stronger Barotseland*, 2010; BFM 2010; BNFA [no date]; BNYL 2012c; 2013; *Constitution of Barotseland: Barotseland's Emancipation and Restoration Order*, 2012; RBG 2014d; Sinyinda 2012a; *Zambia Reports*, 18 November, 2012; see also various interviews). Supporters of independence also highlight – and often exaggerate – the allegedly enormous economic potential. They enumerate available sources of wealth which the area offers (e.g. water, oil, gas, diamonds, leather, sand, minerals such as diamonds copper, gold, iron, or gemstones, arable land, timber, cashews, tourism, etc.). These resources, together with the fact that economic policies will be decided on in Barotseland itself instead of being imposed by Zambia, will allow for achieving the long-awaited development, prosperity, and welfare for Barotse citizens. In addition, they suggest concrete

economic measures and projects in order to improve the socio-economic situation and quickly alleviate the suffering of the population (*Barotse Post*, 7 September, 2014; Linyungandambo 2012a; Mungandi 2010; RBG 2014d).

### b) Non-Violence, But...

But how is independence or freedom of Barotseland to be achieved? In their motivational framing, the movements commit themselves to an amicable solution and *non-violent action* until they reach their ultimate goal, that is, the liberation of their country and reconfirm their opposition to unlawful acts or armed conflict (BFM 2010; BNYL 2014; Mukubesa et al. 2011). Yet, this affirmation should not falsely be interpreted as stupidity or lack of determination, as various documents stress. They highlight that non-violence as a key principle to obtain independence was even enshrined in the final resolution of the Barotse National Council of 2012, which is the highest decision-making body of the polity and whose decisions are binding. This shows that the idea of peaceful action has particular authority—(BNFA 2014f; Mombotwa 2013; Sinyinda 2014b). Moreover, activists eagerly demonstrate that their commitment to non-violence is not merely lip service, but that they have been sticking to it for the last fifty years and continue to do so as various peaceful steps highlight that were recently taken, namely the petition to the Banjul Commission and the attempt to settle the dispute through the PCA (BNYL 2014; *Press Statement on the Arrests and Prosecution of Eighty-Four People for Advocating for the Resolution of the Conflict [Arising] out of the Abrogation of the Barotseland Agreement 1964 and the Need for Intervention and Resolution of the Same*, 2013; Sinyinda 2012b; 2014a). Finally, the movements indicate that this is not merely the leaders' position, but the Barotse population also favours non-violence, as a signature campaign shows that was reportedly supported by several thousand Barotse citizens (BNYL 2014; see also BNFA 2014d).<sup>14</sup>

The non-violent strategy that the movements commit themselves to is in line with the strong references to legal aspects in the prognostic framing. The separatist groups justify their approach as follows: To them, the Barotseland question is a legal and political matter as it originates from the violation of an agreement. It follows from this that it has to be tackled and solved in a legal and peaceful way. Accordingly, they highlight that “disengaging from Zambia is not a War matter but a Law matter” (BNFA 2014f; BNYL 2014; Sinyinda 2014a). Hence, “calmness, seasoned brains[,] and wisdom” (*Press Statement on the Arrests and Prosecution*, 2013) are needed for its resolution and are regarded as suitable behaviour for statesmen, while flexing muscles is counterproductive (Ibid; see also BNYL 2014;

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<sup>14</sup> When the BNFA demanded the Zambian government to accept arbitration, signatures were collected in order to demonstrate popular backing to this approach. The signed papers are available on the websites of the BNFA and Dugué & Kirtley. According to the law firm, there are 8,000 names, but their authenticity cannot be verified.

Government in waiting of Barotseland 2012b; Sinyinda 2014a). The activists' non-violent discourse also discredits the Zambian government both at the domestic and international level (see Zeller 2012). They criticise the state as using disproportionate violence, a means that is presented as "archaic, barbaric and completely outdated" (Sinyinda 2014b) in a situation where it is neither legitimate nor appropriate. Hence, its action is best characterised as following the principle of "might is right" (Sinyinda 2012a; see also BNFA 2014f; BNYL 2013; Sinyinda 2014a). Implicitly, the Zambian government is regarded as inferior in relation to the Barotse activists and population who not only adopted a more suitable approach, but also stoically endure the suffering inflicted by the suppressive Zambian state.

### c) ... What about Violence?

Do the strong commitment to non-violence by activists and the support for the approach by followers completely exclude the use of violent means in Barotseland? In the documents that were analysed, one finds very few references to the use of force as a potential option. In some rare instances, members of the movements allude to *violence as a last resort*. One of the MOREBA and BNFA leaders, for example, proclaimed that "[t]he best political means is that of litigation, political agitation and diplomacy. If it fails, force is an option in a situation like this because it happens everywhere. It's the natural course of events" (Michael Wanga in *Al Jazeera*, 28 November, 2013). Besides, the groups claim that ongoing provocation of the Barotse people on behalf of the state might lead to a situation where they would not be able to control their followers' frustrations any longer (BNFA 2014d; Sinyinda 2014a). In this case, violence would have to be blamed on the uncompromising behaviour by the Zambian government. Moreover, the activists compare their efforts with the struggle against apartheid by Nelson Mandela and the South African ANC that were pushed into violent uprising against their will by the discriminatory government (BNFA 2014f; BNYL 2014; see also interview with a former national politician, Lusaka, 9 June, 2014). These arguments help them to legitimise possible violence both internally and externally despite their non-violent preferences. Yet, the international community is also held responsible: Activists frequently stress that there is a need for the international community to intervene in the dispute at the current stage and as long as it is still resolvable (RBG 2014b; Sinyinda 2014a; various interviews). This implicitly means that the outbreak of violence, which is regarded as a form of self-help in a hopeless situation, would also have to be blamed on the passivity of international actors.

Referring to violence as *ultima ratio* or externally imposed necessity is a strategic move that helps the activist groups to keep a back door open in various respects. First, the allusions highlight the movements' determination vis-à-vis their constituencies and threaten the opponent. Second, it is a means to simultaneously appeal to different target groups having various preferences regarding the optimal strategy for action. Concretely, the movements

reach out their hands to sections of their constituent society that do not adhere to the principle of non-violence. By doing so, they seek to avoid alienating potentially radical sections that favour violent struggle and losing them to more militant movements. Finally, if the conflict escalated, the framing would still be consistent and the activists could adopt their communication and strategy to the modified context. Hence, the occasional violent framing does not contradict the internal consistency of the framing as well as the congruence between rhetoric and action, but aims to enhance the mobilising potency of the framing.

However, there is an important exception to the relatively modest prognostic framing regarding violence that the movements generally uphold. Before the Mongu riots in January 2011, leaflets that were allegedly published by Linyungandambo circulated in the province. They contained statements that explicitly incited violence against persons and property:

“The hour has come when there will be bloodshed and streams of blood flowing into the plain on this day [14 January, 2011; the author]. The palace shall be on fire if his majesty the king will not allow us to secede on this day. Non Lozis pack and go” (quoted in Mubita and Chisala 2013, 220; capital letters removed by the author).

Another statement reads:

“This serves to warn the following Mbondas [sic!], ma Luvaes and other tribes that they should start preparing to leave Barotseland 14th January, 2011 when we shall secede from Zambia. It has been observed that this period around when we have been fighting for this cause, they have not been supportive and we feel its [sic!] high time they went back to Angola where they came from. Failure to comply will lead to loss of lives” (quoted in Mubita and Chisala 2013, 221; capital letters removed by the author).<sup>15</sup>

Soon after, violence erupted in Mongu which suggests correlation. The authenticity of the leaflets cannot entirely be proven. Linyungandambo refuted being at their origin and occasionally expressed its commitment to non-violence (Government in waiting of Barotseland 2012b; Mombotwa 2013; Mubita and Chisala 2013, 224).<sup>16</sup> Yet, the threats were taken seriously within and outside Zambia.<sup>17</sup> The pamphlets reveal that non-violence is not a compromise among the different groups, but underscore that Linyungandambo might be ready to embark on a radical strategy with violence clearly being an option. This impression was also voiced in interviews by various observers of the current situation in Western Province that appraised Linyungandambo as being more radical than the other collective actors (various interviews).

While the problem definition and the targeted solution are largely the same across different groups, there are variations regarding the means – non-violence or violence – that should be

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<sup>15</sup> In documents signed by the BLA, the tone is even more aggressive and there are open threats to use force. However, it is unclear if this group really exists. Hence, its rhetoric is not taken into account.

<sup>16</sup> This must be interpreted as a strategic move. Furthermore, in comparison with statements by other individual or collective actors, documents by Linyungandambo contain very few references to non-violent struggle.

<sup>17</sup> The pamphlets were object of a parliamentary debate in the aftermath of the riots and are quoted at various occasions (IRIN 2011; Kelly 2013; Mubita and Chisala 2013; National Assembly 2011b).

applied. This implies that there is a framing dispute with regard to the optimal strategy to achieve self-rule between different activist movements.

### 8.2.3. Motivational Framing

The motivational framing by the separatist movements' activists is weaker and more implicit than the other dimensions. Nevertheless, it is possible to distinguish topics that aim at giving Barotse people an incentive to join and support the struggle.

#### a) Legal Motives to Join the Struggle

In correspondence with the two other framing dimensions, law and justice are invoked to mobilise sympathisers. Judicial arguments serve to highlight that fighting for independence is a just cause on the one hand, and to underline that the Zambian state is wrong on the other hand.

Here again, the nullification of the Barotseland Agreement of 1964, which already played a prominent role in the prognostic and diagnostic framing, is key. Barotseland and Northern Rhodesia were merged together on the basis of this document. Since it was abrogated, there is no legally binding connection between the two countries. As a consequence, Barotseland is free to revert to its initial status. To strengthen this reasoning, the movements repeatedly stress that this proceeding corresponds to the Postliminium doctrine.<sup>18</sup> Irrespective of the BA64, Barotseland has the *right to self-determination* as inscribed in international law (e.g. the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights), since it has been an independent nation for centuries. Hence, the struggle is just and legitimate and so is participation in it (BNFA 2013; 2014e; [no date]; BNYL 2012b; 2012c; Mungandi 2014; RBG 2014b; *Resolutions of the Barotse National Council*, 2012; Sinyinda 2012b; *The Freedom Credo*, 2012).

To further reinforce their position, supporters of separation highlight that the government does not have any grounds to base its position and action on. They argue that Zambia has been illegally occupying Barotseland for decades. It breached a variety of international legal documents ranging from the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (see, for example, BNFA 2013; BNYL 2012b; 2012c; RBG 2014a; Sinyinda 2012b; *Zambian Watchdog*, 2 April, 2012). According to the movements, the

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<sup>18</sup> The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law explains the notion of postliminium as follows: The postliminium principle derives from Roman law and regulated the status of individuals or property after termination of foreign occupation and the return to initial authority. According to postliminium, Roman citizens that lived in territories that were invaded by foreign powers automatically regained their previous status, once the area was re-conquered by Rome. Similar rules could apply to property. Later, international law extended the principle to peoples to make them "recover their liberty in case the power of their allies delivers them from the rule of the enemy" (Grotius in Woltag 2009), which means that they reverted to their pre-occupation status. Nowadays, postliminium is a historical legal concept that refers to the "consequences to legal acts of a belligerent after the termination of a belligerent occupation in the former occupied territories" (Woltag 2009).

administration's unlawful position becomes apparent, since it refused arbitration. The activists argue that if the government had any legal basis for its territorial claims, it could easily accept this means to settle the dispute, since it would prove that the GRZ is in its right. However, the rejection proves that the government in Lusaka fears losing the case. Similarly, the framing-agents highlight that so far, supporters of separation were arrested and accused for treason, but have never been convicted. This is presented as evidence that the Zambian judiciary cannot charge them, since they did not commit any crime (see *Barotse Post*, 23 April, 2013; 26 November, 2013; BNFA 2014b; 2014e; BNYL 2012b; 2012c; 2012e; 2014; Government in waiting of Barotseland 2012a; *Press Statement on the Arrests and Prosecution*, 2013; Sinyinda 2012b).<sup>19</sup>

All these arguments serve the purpose of mobilising followers by convincing them that all their activities are morally and legally right. In that respect, Sinyinda clearly stated that “[i]t is not treason to seek Freedom. It is our Birth right [sic!]” (2014b; see also *Barotse Post*, 23 April, 2013; *Press Statement on the Arrests and Prosecution*, 2013). Besides, such comments also aim to reduce the costs of participation, for instance, regarding convictions that could impede followers from committing themselves.

### b) The Duty of Nation

Beyond legal rationales, *Barotse nationalism and patriotism* are invoked to emotionally motivate people to act. Belonging to the Barotse nation necessitates commitment to it (*duty of nation-frame*). The movements claim that people have to stand together to preserve their unique cultural heritage and continue what their forefathers had been fighting and dying for throughout centuries, i.e. their country and nation, while non-participation is treason and betrayal (*Barotse Post*, 23 April, 2013; Barotseland National Youth and Sport Council 2014; BNFA 2014b; Imenda 2012; Linyungandambo 2012a; Mungandi 2010; Sinyinda 2012a).<sup>20</sup> Furthermore, the activist groups frame their fight as struggle for independence from foreign occupation. They stress that Barotseland is denied the sovereign nation-state, which it should be entitled to, and Lozis cannot live their culture freely. These injustices require correction. Although there is a tendency in Barotseland to idealise British rule (see Flint 2003, 413, 426-427; 2010, 153-158; interview with a former national politician, Lusaka, 9 June 2014), one can assume that comparing the issue to colonisation stirs strong feelings in Barotseland, as it does throughout the African continent, and creates support (Muyunda

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<sup>19</sup> The number of sentences is much lower than the number of people that were arrested in the context of the Barotseland question. Yet, Barotse activists were effectively convicted. In August 2014, for example, the Kaoma magistrate court convicted three men to three years in prison each for “publication of false news with intent to cause fear or alarm to the public contrary to the laws of Zambia” (*Zambia Reports*, 2 August, 2014).

<sup>20</sup> In this context, a Lozi politician who served in government under Kaunda at the time when the BA64 was abrogated is accused of having betrayed his home country and is depicted as “detractor” and “black horse” (Imenda 2012).

2014). To sum up, the movements aptly instrumentalise the idea of the Barotse nation and collective as well as individual emotions tied to it. In addition, they create social pressure that results from group identity in order to induce people to participate.

### c) Timing

Another reason to join action is *time*: The movements aim to mobilise supporters through an *enough is enough-frame* that emphasises the need to act (Sinyinda 2012a; see also Mombotwa 2013). In many documents and interviews, activists stressed that the hopelessness and suffering of Barotseland had been prevailing for almost five decades, a period much too long, as the subsequent quote exemplifies:

“We have been insulted enough, ridiculed enough, teased enough, mocked enough, cheated enough, dribbled enough, used enough, hurt enough, misunderstood enough, [marginalised] enough, sidelined enough, [victimised] enough, neglected enough, tossed back and forth enough, subjugated enough, segregated enough, mistreated enough, and we must put an end to it” (Sinyinda 2012a).

Since no alleviation is coming from outside, Barotseland relies on itself to obtain change which makes participation in the struggle imperative.

Moreover, the current situation is presented as a historic moment or window of opportunity that has to be utilised before it disappears and makes all current and previous efforts lost. Thus, *time is ripe* for action. This was well expressed by the then *ngambela* and future chairman of the BNFA during the Barotse National Council in 2012:

“We can no longer wait for other people or another time. To every generation is given a cause to either fulfil or betray. To our generation is given the awesome responsibility to resolve the Barotseland crisis, a consequence of an impasse and a resultant failure from the non implementation [sic!] and unilateral abrogation of the Barotseland Agreement 1964. It is entirely up to us to either fulfil or betray this cause” (Ibid.).

By borrowing the French poet Victor Hugo’s citation that “[t]here is nothing more powerful than an idea whose time has come” (BNFA 2014f; emphasis removed; see also BNYL 2014), the activists made clear that there was a unique opportunity to act. This means for supporters that their commitment is needed right now or risks being too late.

The motivational dimension is comparatively weak in the Barotse activists’ framing, which can be explained as follows. The relative lack of motivating and mobilising statements is partly due to the types of data that were available for analysis and the audience they addressed. Many of the documents aimed to provide information (e.g. articles, letters). The audience were not only citizens of Barotseland, i.e. potential followers, but also national and international political actors. Thus, it is not surprising that calls for action are rare. However, one observes that motivational framing is much more prominent and explicit in material that was directly addressed at constituents, such as speeches. Another reason for weak

## 8. Barotseland: Framing Analysis

motivational framing is that in the eyes of the activist movements, gaining followers' support does not constitute a priority at the current stage of the struggle. From their perspective, the population *is* already sufficiently sensitised. At the Barotse National Council in 2012, the people deliberated at the hands of their envoys on their future and decided to declare independence. This means that mobilisation for self-determination and even separation itself have already been achieved. In consequence, the fight entered a new phase. Hence, it is more important to obtain international recognition and support which would pressure the Zambian government to accept Barotseland's decision (*Barotse Post*, 21 June, 2014; Imenda 2014; *Zambian Watchdog*, 2 April, 2012; group interview with members of an activist group, Livingstone, 21 July, 2014). Thus, the movements tend to target international actors in order to seek their backing, as the great number of letters and statements to various political actors illustrates.

In terms of content, the framing of the Barotse movements for self-determination is strongly based on legal arguments. Moreover, Barotse history and identity are invoked in order to achieve consensus mobilisation and incite sympathisers to engage in collective action. In concrete terms, the framing is organised around the issue of the Barotseland Agreement of 1964 and its abrogation, which is central to all three framing dimensions (diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational). As a result, Barotseland is under foreign occupation and repressed by Zambia. In addition, the socio-economic marginalisation of the province is denounced. Subsequent Zambian governments are blamed for these ills. As a solution, the separatist movements call for complete separation of Barotse territories from Zambia and present vague propositions regarding the country's political and economic future. While there is consensus between different activist groups regarding the problem definition and the solution, they dispute the adequate strategy to achieve independence. On the one hand, the alliance led by the Barotse National Freedom Alliance prefers non-violent action, while Linyungandambo adopted a more militant approach and even openly called for violence in leaflets on the other hand. In the motivational framing, the groups bring up legal arguments, invoke the Barotse nation and responsibilities that result from belonging to it, and stress the need to act as soon as possible. Overall, the framing is internally consistent and logical, although motivational framing is only weakly developed. In addition, the movements' rhetoric integrates both rational and emotional elements in order to appeal to different sections of society.

### 8.3. Assessing Frame Resonance and Framing Effects in Barotseland

When talking to people in Western Province about the current situation and the future of their region, emotions are strong. Many of the people interviewed expressed frustration and anger about the socio-economic conditions and the incumbent PF government as well as previous administrations. In line with that, a considerable number of interviewees approved the idea of Barotseland becoming an independent country. This can be taken as indicator that there is support for self-determination. But it is difficult to objectively assess how many Barotse within and outside Western Province are in fact in favour of independence of Barotseland. Some figures help to get a clearer picture: In 2001, a survey revealed that “58 [per cent] of Lozi respondents in Barotseland and Lusaka said that they would not support an independence struggle” (Flint 2010, 151). This result is problematic for two reasons: First, it was carried out 14 years ago. However, one can assume that developments of the last few years strongly impacted on public opinion. Second, one cannot deduce from the formulation whether respondents oppose independence or whether their negative reply refers to the means to get there, i.e. the potentially violent struggle.<sup>21</sup> A more recent poll published by the Afrobarometer survey in 2013 came to different results. It found that in Western Province, 61 per cent of the population agree or strongly agree that the Barotseland Agreement should be honoured, while only 36 per cent (strongly) disagree (Afrobarometer 2013, 18; see also Simutanyi 2012, 12-13).<sup>22</sup> These statistics also have their downside, since honouring the Barotseland Agreement is not synonymous with separation and independence, but can also amount to other solutions, for example de-centralisation. In addition, the position of Lozis outside Western Province cannot be derived from the figures because only aggregated data is available that does not distinguish between ethnicities at a national level. Despite these challenges, the numbers show that a considerable part of the population of Western Province backs the idea of autonomy or even separation.<sup>23</sup> This is also supported by anecdotal evidence from the province which reveals that there is scepticism among the population regarding their belonging to Zambia. A report by the Catholic Diocese of Mongu drew attention to the fact that families or entire villages refused to be counted in the 2010 national census and individuals did not wish to be registered as voters in the 2011 elections since they did not feel as being part of Zambia. On several occasions, independence celebrations were boycotted (Catholic Diocese of Mongu 2011, 18-19). The exact degree of support cannot be conclusively quantified. Hence, there are reasons to believe that a considerable

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<sup>21</sup> The exact question is not provided in the publication.

<sup>22</sup> Results strongly varied across the country. At the national level, 71 per cent of all Zambians think that the government should not honour the Barotseland Agreement of 1964, while only 19 per cent agree. In Southern Province, which partly belonged to the kingdom of Barotseland, 40 per cent of respondents were in favour of honouring the agreement (Afrobarometer 2013).

<sup>23</sup> In various interviews, respondents stressed that the report of the Chongwe commission of inquiry also concluded that there was support for autonomy in the region (see, for example, interview with a researcher and consultant, Lusaka, 9 June, 2014; interview with a local councillor, 18 July, 2014).

part of the population in Western Province and to some extent beyond is concerned about the status of the province within Zambia and its relations with Lusaka and that the voices calling for self-determination are not marginal ones, as opponents of separation try to suggest.<sup>24</sup>

### 8.3.1. *The Hope for a Better Future: Why Framing Resonated*

As outlined in the theoretical chapter, framing has to effectively resonate with the target group in order to mobilise followers for action.<sup>25</sup> Subsequently, factors that explain why the framing of Barotse activist was successful in this regard will be studied.

#### a) “Now, We Are the Poorest of the Poor!” Poverty and Underdevelopment as Fertile Ground for Separatist Framing

Already decades ago, Barotseland was compared to a living museum that exhibited the life style of a bygone era (Caplan 1970, ch. 6). Until today, the level of socio-economic development has remained low. The *Living Conditions Monitoring Survey* revealed that Western Province displayed the highest poverty level and the greatest poverty gap nationwide (CSO 2012a, 184, 198; see also 7.3.3.).<sup>26</sup> This result was presumably not surprising to the majority of inhabitants of the province given their daily struggle. Nevertheless, having the fact in black and white was a formative experience: Many respondents highlighted that they were ‘the poorest of the poor’ (various interviews; see also Flint 2003, 708, 711).<sup>27</sup> Such statements and the statistical evidence explicitly expressed what had been an underlying feeling of neglect so far (Interview with a local NGO employee, Mongu, 4 July, 2014b; interview with a local NGO employee, Mongu, 5 July, 2014).

Whether real or perceived, the problematic socio-economic situation provides fertile ground for separatist framing. There is a general feeling that Western Province is poorly endowed

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<sup>24</sup> It is difficult to say, if the majority of the population in Western Province favours independence. Various interviewees expressed doubts that if a referendum was held, separation from Zambia would be endorsed. However, it is necessary to recognise that the status of the province and potential secession is a topic of concern for a considerable part of society and not only for a negligible minority.

<sup>25</sup> Resonance is achieved if constituents adopt a positive attitude towards and identify with movements and their claims after having been exposed to framing. As a result, they are inclined to engage in collective action. Prerequisites of resonance are the salience and credibility of frames. The higher the degree of salience and credibility is, the more effective the frame will be. To that end, collective action frames need to successfully tie-in with the existing cultural background of the targeted communities. Framing must, for example, build on existing discourses or narratives in order to be convincing.

<sup>26</sup> Some scholars contest that the province is economically marginalised and highlight the general rural-urban divide in Zambia (see, for example, Mufalo 2011; interview with a local NGO employee, Sesheke, 17 July, 2014). It is true that all provinces with the exceptions of Lusaka and the Copperbelt, which are the economic centres of the country, have comparable poverty levels. However, more important than the factual discrimination is the people’s feeling of being marginalised in terms of socio-economic development, which should not be ignored. This feeling was enhanced by the census.

<sup>27</sup> In a more recent report, Luapula province was the poorest province with Western Province finishing second-last. Yet, the change in figures is marginal and not reflected in improvements on the ground.

with infrastructure, such as roads, healthcare facilities, schools, and institutions for higher education, etc. Chagrin is particularly great with regard to the absence of industries in Western Province. Not only did subsequent governments fail to bring any investment into the region, but the few existing factories, e.g. in cashew nut processing, stopped functioning after having been privatised. As a consequence, there are no job opportunities for local people and especially the youth lack prospects.<sup>28</sup> Relative grievances, that is, perceived differences in what the province actually disposes of and should or could dispose of, are even more revelatory than absolute ones. In Western province, the feeling of deprivation contains three dimensions in people's views: First, Western Province has not made any progress since independence, but its situation has even deteriorated; second, the socio-economic state of the province contravenes its actual potential; third, the region is marginalised in comparison to other Zambian provinces. These perceptions will now be considered in detail.

First, there is a common belief that Barotseland was an economically vibrant realm and still prospered, when it became independent from Britain as a part of Zambia. As a result of the kingdom's economic activities and wealth, the Barotse treasury was well-filled. This image is idealised and does not fully correspond to reality (see Flint 2010, 155-157); yet, it represents a stark contrast to the present situation where economic activity is missing in the province.<sup>29</sup> Due to this disparity, many informants expressed frustration that during the past fifty years since independence, the province did not make any progress in socio-economic terms. In their view, it did not benefit from its union with Zambia, but rather suffered from it and is presently even worse off than during colonisation (various interviews; see also Zeller 2010a, 16; Erdmann 2012, 534). Second, the poor economic performance does not only contradict previous achievements, but it does not match the province's actual potential, either. In many Lozis' perception, the province used to dispose of agricultural and mineral resources (e.g. timber, mangoes, cashews, oil, diamonds, etc.) that are still available. These could be exploited and processed within the province which would allow for creating jobs and revenues. However, they had either been used in an exploitative and destructive manner by non-natives as in the case of fish and timber, or have remained unused altogether, like mineral resources. In consequence, Barotseland did not benefit from its potential and had its wealth destroyed.<sup>30</sup> Third, the opinion that Western Province is discriminated against by the

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<sup>28</sup> This is aggravated by the fact that the few jobs that exist, for example, in the public service are attributed to Zambians from other provinces. Many people in Western Province contended, for example, that when the government recruited for the security forces, they brought applicants from other areas to Western Province and hired them instead of natives from the province (Interviews with a local consultant, Mongu, 23 June, 2014; a leading activist, Mongu, 24 June, 2014; a local NGO employee, Mongu, 4 July, 2014b; a journalist, Mongu, 13 July, 2014).

<sup>29</sup> This is an illusion or extenuation. Various scholars reported that the British saw Barotseland mainly as a labour reservoir and did not invest in the protectorate. Furthermore, Barotseland's once vibrant agriculture had started to decline before independence (Flint 2010; Gertzel 1984; van Horn 1977).

<sup>30</sup> It is difficult to estimate the region's economic potential. Activist groups tend to exaggerate resources (e.g. oil, diamonds) and simplify the way how they could be used. In reality, there is little

central government in comparison to other areas of the country is widespread. According to the Barotseland Agreement, the Zambian government had “the same general responsibility for providing financial support for the administration and economic development of Barotseland as it has for other parts of the Republic of Zambia” and should “ensure that Barotseland is treated fairly and equitably” (*Barotseland Agreement*, 1964). However, this was allegedly not respected. Many people in Western Province concur that the region did not receive its ‘fair share of the national cake’ in terms of public investment, but was cheated. Moreover, it continues to be neglected compared to other provinces, where industrial or developmental projects are realised. Some individuals adopted an even more radical position. According to them, governments deliberately discriminated against Western Province in order to destroy the economic potential of the former kingdom and keep the population poor and uneducated.<sup>31</sup> This should avoid their emancipation and prevent them from demanding separation from the rest of Zambia. This extreme view is doubtlessly not shared throughout society. However, even more moderate segments feel alienated by the failure of the post-colonial state to address needs and improve living conditions in Western Province. As a result of poor governance, whether it was intended or not, they feel as second-class citizens. It also provoked scepticism towards the political ruling class in Lusaka (Interviews with a local consultant, Mongu, 23 June, 2014; with a local NGO employee, Mongu, 5 July, 2014; a regional NGO employee, Mongu, 14 July, 2014). In a nutshell, the population of Western Province experience economic hardship at a daily basis. There is a feeling of being discriminated against in various respects. Moreover, an idealised image of Barotseland’s economically successful past prevails in collective memory and coincides with a common belief that Barotseland could do better on its own. All in all, it did not benefit, but only suffered from the union with Zambia (various interviews).

The problem of education in Western Province is a good example to illustrate the grievances. Initially, formal education in Zambia started in Barotseland since missionaries founded their first schools on its territory. When Zambia obtained independence, the level of education was

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evidence of mineral wealth in Western Province and the profitability of their extraction, but they are assumed to be of limited importance (Interview with a former regional politician, Mongu, 11 July, 2014). Similarly, there is some agricultural potential, yet its lucrateness is also difficult to foresee. Overall, it seems realistic to argue that the province could do better if available resources were used and processed in the region which would create paid employment. However, the image of Barotseland becoming a flourishing region appears rather unrealistic.

<sup>31</sup> Occasionally, such perceptions amount to conspiracy theories. There are, for instance, allegations that the Zambian government deliberately decimated livestock in the area by infecting it with diseases. In this regard, a neutral observer ascertained that government policies probably neglected Western Province, but did not do so deliberately. The respondent claimed that the area received its fair share. However, the government did not take into account specific local constraints, such as the sandy soil that increased costs for construction and transportation (see footnote 34 in this chapter). As a result, the same amount of money achieved less in Western Province in comparison to other areas. Hence, the distribution was probably fair, but not equitable. In addition, national planning was not necessarily responsive which also harmed its effectiveness (Interview with a regional NGO employee, Mongu, 6 July, 2014; see also interview with a local NGO employee, Mongu, 4 July, 2014a; interview with a regional NGO employee, Sesheke, 17 July, 2014).

high in the kingdom and Lozis made up the majority among graduates. Moreover, the royal government founded the Barotse National School, which was the first public school in the country that was not run by missionaries. Nowadays, Western Province stopped being a forerunner in terms of education. Educational facilities in Western Province are insufficient, in particular regarding tertiary education. In the entire province, there has been and there is no state university up to now. Professional training institutions are similarly scarce and partly private.<sup>32</sup> Simultaneously, many families are incapable of providing for transportation to and accommodation in other parts of Zambia. Hence, young people from the region have difficulties in accessing higher education and cannot compete with students from other areas. Therefore, from the sympathisers' perspective, the deterioration of the situation compared to the past is obvious. Moreover, the PF government promised to build a university in Mongu in 2011. At the time of writing, the project remains pending. Yet two universities in Munchiga province that had been proposed at the same time and whose construction had recently started are almost completed. In Western Province, this is interpreted as another proof of the continuing discrimination of the region and triggers incomprehension among locals. People feel that they are once again placated with empty promises, as so many times before (see Gertzel 1984; interview with a chief's wife, Mongu, 11 July, 2014; focus group discussion with youths, Mongu, 12 July, 2014).

Given the manifold (real or perceived) multi-dimensional disparities and the feeling of neglect that arises from them, several frames resonate well. Diagnostic frames taking up socio-economic issues appear both credible and salient. Together with the sharp condemnation of the Zambian government, they nourish radical opinions regarding the origin of underdevelopment and aggravate alienation from the government. Socio-economic grievances also strengthen legal frames that denounce the non-respect of the Barotseland Agreement by the post-colonial state. Most importantly, thoughts and emotions related to the lack of development provide a substantial basis for the idea of separation. The absence of progress and its interpretation lend credence to claims that it does not make sense to maintain connections with Zambia. Breaking up the union and taking matters into ones' own hands appears an option, not least since Barotseland allegedly did well in the past. Overall, the socio-economic state in Western Province and continuous frustrations related to it make calls for separation seem credible to large parts of the population that long for a better future (see, for example, interview with a regional NGO employee, Mongu, 4 July, 2014b).

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<sup>32</sup> The recently created University of Barotseland is a private university. Several provinces face the same difficulties as Western Province and do not host state universities. It seems that inhabitants of Western Province feel particularly aggrieved about this fact, since the region used to be a pioneer regarding education. In addition, there are educational institutions that could have been transformed into universities, in their view. All these factors would have made Barotseland an attractive place for higher education facilities.

There is no doubt that socio-economic grievances constitute an important base for demands for self-rule. However, does this mean that improvements concerning living-conditions would calm the situation as, for example, in Casamance? Some observers express this view. The PF administration highlights that its way of honouring the agreement is to make Western Province progress. It attempts to address grievances and counter separatist claims by promising and implementing development projects in the region. These include, for example, announcements to construct a stadium and a university in the provincial capital. One of the most visible on-going projects is road-making.<sup>33</sup> Thanks to the expansion of the road network in rural zones as well as in the town of Mongu, locations which were so far only accessible over sandy tracks during the dry season and by boat during the several months-long rainy season, will be connected to tarmac.<sup>34</sup> Furthermore, existing roads are being remade. It is necessary to examine how the population think of current development projects that the government launched in Western Province. Interestingly, people do not automatically perceive them positively in the sense that a national government is finally making efforts to better integrate and develop the region. Instead, many interviewees express strong resentments against the construction works. They are rejected, for example, for being externally imposed on locals who lack ownership and might have divergent priorities. Others denounce that the government merely pretended to pay attention to the region. In their view, the current efforts were trickery that served to buy the support of citizens of Western Province in order to make them renounce calls for separation. Still, others consider them as a gift that Barotseland should happily accept before seceding. These critical opinions are not representative of the entire population. Nevertheless, the arguments mentioned provide insights into existing mind-sets in Western Province. They demonstrate that it is unclear if these measures will have the attenuating effect that the administration desired and that the current efforts might come too late to settle the matter of self-determination (BNYL 2012e; Kelly 2013, 51; interviews with a local NGO employee, Mongu, 4 July, 2014a; a journalist, Mongu, 13 July, 2014; a head of an education institution, Mongu, 14 July, 2014). Moreover, they underscore that separatist demands cannot be exclusively reduced to socio-economic factors and thus, are unlikely to be eradicated by public investment. But there are other dimensions, namely identity and political components that interact and contribute to these claims. A similar conclusion was drawn by a Lozi interviewee who insisted that it was better

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<sup>33</sup> Some of the road projects were already launched under the MMD government and are now implemented by the PF that benefits from them. The construction of the stadium and the university has not started at the time of writing.

<sup>34</sup> Western Province faces difficult geographic and climate conditions. The soil consists mainly of Kalahari sands. During the wet season, vast areas of the Zambezi flood plain are completely flooded for months. This represents a challenge for road construction. For instance, in order to connect Mongu to the town of Kalabo, which is 34 kilometres far, 25 bridges are necessary. An initial attempt to build this road has failed.

to be poor and free than rich and enslaved (Interview with an opposition politician, Lusaka, 25 July, 2014).

b) (Perceived) Political and Cultural Marginalisation and Resulting Fears

The lack of socio-economic development in Western Province and the feeling of neglect and unjust treatment that comes along with it are particularly pronounced. However, other grievances also exist in the region. Various people in Western Province criticised that Lozis were inadequately represented in the national government. In this context, they stressed that Zambia has never had a president of Lozi origin. While this is true, the same can be said for many Zambian tribes. It is noteworthy that during Kaunda's time and practice of tribal balancing, Lozis were rather over- than underrepresented in key positions in the government, administration, and army, etc. (Lindemann 2011; Mufalo 2011; interview with a researcher and consultant, Lusaka, 9 June, 2014; interview with a former national and regional politician, Mongu, 5 July, 2014; see 7.3.2.). By contrast, in the first PF government ruling from 2011 until 2015, there has been only one Lozi minister, who is considered to hold a minor office (the Ministry of Gender), and a Lozi Provincial Minister, who is not represented in the cabinet.<sup>35</sup> Thus, representation declined in comparison to the past which follows from the fact that tribal balancing lost importance after Kaunda had been voted out of office. This suggests that there is some truth to the perception that Lozis are (more) marginalised (than in the past). Moreover, ethnic and tribal identities, while not being completely new, became more manifest during Sata's presidency and inter-group tensions increased at the detriment of the national identity in comparison to past presidencies. It is a logical consequence of this tendency that politics are more strongly interpreted through an identity perspective and potential or real imbalances in representation appear more salient. In Western Province, the weak representation of Lozis is seen as a result of strategic discrimination by the ruling and can lead to ethnic animosities that especially target the Bemba who, according to some informants, dominate the Zambian state, favour their tribe as well as their homeland regarding redistributive politics, and simultaneously enhance the neglect of Western Province (Interview with a local councillor, Malengwa, 7 July, 2014; interview with a head of an education institution, Mongu, 14 July, 2014; group interview with members of an activist group, Livingstone, 21 July, 2014).

Moreover, critical voices in Barotseland allege that Lozis became increasingly marginalised within their homeland, i.e. Western Province, and that their culture was diluted. This was

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<sup>35</sup> This changed after the presidential by-elections in January 2015. Three out of 21 cabinet members are from Western Province, namely the Vice-President, the Minister of Agriculture and Livestock, and the Minister of Education. Moreover, there is a Lozi Provincial Minister. All provinces are rather equally represented in the new government with the exception of Southern Province (*Zambia Reports*, 23 March, 2015).

mainly attributed to the presence of refugees from Angola in the area. They are accused of becoming more and more dominant, but failing to adapt to practices and traditions of the local population. Yet, culture and traditions are of great importance for Lozi self-identification, as will be seen below. This implies that Lozi perceive their identity to be threatened by migrant populations. Refugees are also supposedly better looked after than the local population which fuels resentments. Furthermore, there are claims that those naturalised would vote for the government and weaken the political position of the native Lozi population (Interview with a local NGO employee and an elderly acquaintance, Kaoma, 10 July, 2014; focus group discussion with youths, Mongu, 12 July, 2014; interview with a journalist, Mongu, 13 July, 2014).<sup>36</sup>

It is not the task of this thesis to ascertain, whether the (occasionally strongly xenophobic) claims regarding domination by the Bemba or refugees have foundation or are supported by a majority in the province. Regardless of their accuracy, statements made in this respect yield insights into the emotional state of some sections of the Lozi society. Apparently, there are people in Western Province that fear to be ousted or surpassed by members of other groups. Consequently, they adopt a defensive position. This is further indicative of underlying feelings of being inferior and treated unfairly. For some people, concrete experiences, e.g. discrimination in recruitment, add to these views.<sup>37</sup> Many of the existing or perceived discriminations against Barotse people are not taken up in the movements' framing. However, those who share negative attitudes regarding other communities easily make the link between their opinion and the separatists' rhetoric. Since there is a fit between the feeling or the experience of being discriminated against and injustice-related framing, the latter appears attractive to them and is likely to resonate.

### c) National Identity and History: The Soil That Makes Separatist Framing Blossom

The Barotse are very aware of traditions and their national consciousness and history play an important role for self-identification. They also impact frame resonance in three ways. First, Lozi tradition, institutions, and identity represent a strong integrating force that is at the origin of a distinct identity and continues to defy the younger Zambian national identity.

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<sup>36</sup> It is difficult to estimate the exact number of Angolan refugees and their descendants in Western Province, since there are no provincial statistics available. In addition, those who have stayed in Zambia for a long time might not appear in official statistics any more. Given geographic proximity and cultural ties, one can assume that the majority of refugees from Angola settled in Western Province, where one of Zambia's two major refugee settlements is located (see also UNHCR 2001). Therefore, national statistics yield some insights regarding numbers. Nationwide, there were 22,788 Angolan that were of concern to the UNHCR in August 2014. This number is relatively low compared to the peak year 2001, when 218,154 Angolan refugees were counted in Zambia (UNHCR 2007; 2014). The Zambian state both tries to repatriate or locally integrate refugees (UNHCR 2013, 3-5). In an article published in 2000, integration of refugees in Zambia was described as rather successful (Bakewell 2000). However, the UNHCR noted that tensions occurred between local and refugee populations in the sub-region due to scarcity of resources (2013, 2-3).

<sup>37</sup> See footnote 28 in this chapter.

Second, Lozis feel frustrated about the lack of attention paid to their history within Zambia. This hampers identification with the post-colonial state. Third, legal arguments appear easily comprehensible and credible against the historical background of Barotseland.

While the Republic of Zambia classes Lozis or Barotse among the officially recognised ethnic or language groups, Lozis themselves highlight that they rather form a distinctive nation. They highlight that Barotseland had existed as an autonomous, sovereign entity that was comparable to a nation-state long before Northern Rhodesia or Zambia was created (Interview with a local NGO employee and an elderly acquaintance, Kaoma, 10 July, 2014; interview with a youth activist, Senanga, 15 July, 2014; see also Flint 2003; 2010; Ranger 1968).<sup>38</sup> From their perspective, the Lozi nation embraces over 30 tribes and is held together by various components. People in Barotseland are loyal to their *litunga* and identify with the monarchy. Hence, the kingship, together with traditional institutions, had a strong integrating force and provided for the unity of the numerous tribes. The shared homeland (*Bulozi*) and a common – though contested – history also held them together. In addition, the Barotse nation disposed of a lingua franca (Lozi or *Silozi*) as well as shared practices and customs. Finally, a long tradition of intermarriages diluted differences between the sub-groups in favour of the common identity (see Flint 2003; 2006; 2010, 9-10, ch. 7; Gluckman 1959, 19-21).<sup>39</sup> Over the course of history, the specific Lozi identity grew stronger. In pre-colonial times, Barotseland's hegemonic status within the sub-region impacted the self-perception of the kingdom and its inhabitants. Later, the special relations with the British colonisers and the considerable degree of autonomy that the protectorate could preserve under foreign rule were influential in this regard. Until today, a historically-grown specific identity prevails and continues to be influential despite decades of identity politics during Kenneth Kaunda's presidency. Throughout his rule, a major political objective was nation-building. Kaunda aimed to create a common Zambian identity and foster national unity, while simultaneously overcoming the potentially destabilising forces of tribal or ethnic cleavages in the country. This is reflected in the national slogan 'One Zambia, One Nation' that is also inscribed on the Zambian coat of arms. Concrete measures were taken to implement it. English was prioritised as national language over native languages. Kaunda encouraged intermarriages between spouses originating from various tribes to overcome differences and foster unity. Furthermore, children were sent to school in other regions than their home areas to promote intermixing of different identity groups. At a political level, he avoided domination by one tribe

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<sup>38</sup> Today's Lozis' ancestors probably migrated from present-day DR Congo to the Zambezi floodplains in the 17<sup>th</sup> century. In the early days, they lived in groups and had decentralised governing structures. When the British arrived in Barotseland at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, they discovered a well-established, functional governing system that was organised around the *litunga*-ship, but also included other institutions (see, for example, Bull 2010; Flint 2010; Gluckman 1963).

<sup>39</sup> Lozi is a Sesotho language that was brought to Barotseland by the Makololos. It replaced the Luyana or Luyi language that had previously been spoken in the kingdom. Hence, the lingua franca is not the language of the tribe that the royal family stems from, but was externally brought.

and created multi-tribal cabinets by means of tribal balancing. The introduction of the one party state and the abrogation of the Barotseland Agreement were also presented as a means to attack tribalism. Strong tendencies towards urbanisation were favourable to these measures since it intensified cohabitation and interaction of various communities (Larmer 2009, 124; Posner 2003; 2005, ch. 3; see also interview with a former civil servant, Mongu 12 July, 2014).

In comparison to the century-old Barotse identity, the Zambian nation-building remained relatively weak and unsustainable in the eyes of many Lozis.<sup>40</sup> Although the national narrative seemingly overlapped and silenced alternative patterns of identification to a certain extent, it could not replace them. Being a Zambian national remained irrelevant and meaningless to many people in Western Province, but they continue to identify themselves first and foremost as Lozis (see Flint 2003; interview with a former national politician, Lusaka, 9 June, 2014). This is not a purely internal process, but manifests itself in everyday life. Individuals, for example, prefer to talk about Barotseland instead of Western Province. They deny their Zambian identity and emphasise being Barotse nationals. Especially in recent years, Barotse people have preferred to sing their anthem instead of the Zambian one during public ceremonies (Catholic Diocese of Mongu 2011, 18-19; Center for Policy Dialogue and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2012; interview with a former diplomat, Mongu, 24 June, 2014).

In addition, many Lozis express frustration about the way Zambian history is told as a result of identity politics. It appears obvious that Kaunda's nation-building aimed at bringing together and uniting all ethnic and tribal groups that coexist on Zambian territory. However, a different interpretation dominates in Western Province: According to many Barotse, the motto and the constant highlighting of Zambia being a unitary state should suggest that Zambia is a culturally, territorially, and administratively monolithic entity. This should especially conceal or deny the fact that the post-colonial state was created by unifying two entities, with one of them being Barotseland.<sup>41</sup> Moreover, Barotseland should be assimilated by stripping it from its history and covering all differences. This had the overall aim to avoid calls for independence by Barotseland. People in Western Province often complain that historiography started with the appearance of Kenneth Kaunda and presented an account of 'his' Zambia; whatever had existed before or outside his sphere of influence was neglected. Consequently, history was told in a simplified and partial manner. Some individuals even go as far as calling it falsification of history.<sup>42</sup> Various indicators are cited as evidence for this

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<sup>40</sup> Yet, it did not remain without any impact as will be seen later.

<sup>41</sup> Many Lozis insist that Zambia results from two entities, namely Barotseland and Northern Rhodesia. This interpretation of history is not fully correct. Barotseland had existed as kingdom before the British arrived and had coexisted with North-Eastern Rhodesia at the beginning of colonial rule. However, North-Western and North-Eastern Rhodesia were already merged into Northern Rhodesia in 1911, with Barotseland maintaining a specific status. Thus, the two entities had close ties well before 1964.

<sup>42</sup> There is some truth in this claim. The Zambian post-colonial history remained unidimensional and linear under the aegis of the UNIP government. There was no space for dissent in this national history.

impression. The Barotseland Agreement was not taught in schools and until 2012, copies of the documents were not available. As a consequence, many people in other areas were not aware of the BA64 or knew only little about it. Even young people in Barotseland had scarce or no information concerning the document until recently (Interview with a youth leader, Mongu, 3 July, 2014; focus group discussion with youths, Mongu, 12 July, 2014; interview with two elderly men, Sesheke, 17 July, 2014). Proper names became victim of 'Zambianisation' or 'Bembaisation', that is, they were modified, if they contained any reference to Barotseland (Lewanika 2011, 5).<sup>43</sup> Barotseland itself suffered this fate: Not only was it reduced to a province despite its existence as a separate country, but Barotse Province was later re-named Western Province. Hence, it was belittled and lost all references to its past and origin.

Closely related to this, there is a feeling among Barotse people that contributions by the former kingdom to the post-colonial state are neglected. From a Lozi perspective, important impulses for the benefit of the entire country came from them or originated in their area. Formal education, for instance, started in Barotseland, where missionaries founded the first schools. From there, it was brought to the eastern parts of present Zambia. Hence, the cradle of Zambian education was in Western Province. Besides, Lozis engaged in the nationalist struggle. Among others, the first president of the Northern Rhodesian ANC, Godwin Mbikusita-Lewanika, came from Barotseland. His name is rarely mentioned, but accounts on the struggle for independence concentrate on Kaunda and his allies (Interview with a former national politician, Lusaka, 9 June, 2014; interview with a local government employee, Sesheke, 17 July 2014; *Zambian Watchdog*, 24 October, 2014; see also Ranger 1968). Lastly, Barotse consider to have influenced the country's cultural heritage. Important geographic names, for example, are of Lozi origin. The traditional name *Mosi-oa-Tunya* (English: the smoke that thunders) for the Victoria Falls is Lozi and still used today. From a Lozi perspective, the multiple accomplishments and contributions that Barotseland made in various domains are not sufficiently honoured, but often completely ignored or repudiated.<sup>44</sup> This creates incomprehension and frustration, as the former Catholic bishop of Mongu once aptly underlined: "Our people in Western Province seek recognition for what they are and for what they have contributed to the making up of this country" (Duffy 2010).

According to Lozis, Barotseland coexisted with Zambia as one of two equal partners, whose rights and distinctiveness the Barotseland Agreement stipulated. Thus, the document

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Historiography only recently began to focus on the diversity that existed (see, for example, Gewalt, Hinfelaar, and Macola 2008; Larmer 2011). However, this neglect does not only concern the Barotse, but affects various social groups whose story is not told. Moreover, the interpretation that this was deliberately aimed to suppress Barotse history is questionable.

<sup>43</sup> The Barotse National School, for example, was renamed Kanyonyo Primary School.

<sup>44</sup> The *Musisi* is an example of a contribution, which is somewhat honoured. Originally being a traditional dress of Lozi women, it developed into a national costume and is today worn by first ladies at official receptions (Focus group discussion with indunas, Malengwa, 4 July, 2014).

provided a framework that would have allowed combining Lozi and Zambian identity, that is, adhering to the larger nation while maintaining and recognising local particularities. Yet, Barotseland lost its autonomy due to the abrogation of the agreement. In addition, the post-colonial state did not recognise its history before independence as well as within the post-colonial state. As a consequence, the common basis of the two partners was destroyed. It is difficult for Barotse people to identify themselves with the national whole which they are so obviously not part of and in which they cannot be anything but guests. Moreover, given the importance of history for Lozis, the neglect of their past is tantamount to denying their identity and kingdom. This is seen as leading to the acculturation of present and future generations (Duffy 2010; interview with a former national politician, Lusaka, 9 June, 2014).

The previous existence of Barotseland as an independent entity and its history within Zambia as well as simmering frustrations about the decade-long neglect of everything that is Barotse provide an emotional and identity-related base for collective action frames. Moreover, they serve as a foundation for legal framing and the feasibility of separation. Since all framing dimensions contain law-related frames, their resonance is an important engine for the groups' mobilising force. Given the pre-colonial past of Western Province that locals are very well aware of, it is easy to convince them that Lozis should enjoy the international right of self-determination as a people. Independence constituted a birth-right of the Barotse and would reconstitute what had been taken away from them, as two sympathising respondents proclaimed (Interview with a local NGO employee and an elderly acquaintance, Kaoma, 10 July, 2014). The nullification of the Barotseland Agreement that remains present in people's minds also provides stark evidence and further justifies the claims.<sup>45</sup> Being an independent nation does not only appear legal due to Barotse history, but also practicable as a result of it. The monarchy functioned in the past and institutions and structures prevail. Barotseland resembles a polity within a larger polity and therefore could operate independently again. It also possesses all necessary attributes of statehood such as a flag, a coat of arms, and an anthem. Only international recognition seems lacking for Barotseland to be an autonomous state again (Interview with a former diplomat, Mongu, 24 June, 2014; interview with a youth activist, Senanga, 15 July, 2014).<sup>46</sup> While history renders legal framing credible, its effectiveness is enhanced by concrete measures that the movements implement and their results, such as the successful application to the UNPO. They demonstrate the consistency of the activists framing and concrete activities. The lines of argumentation that connect history with present legally-grounded claims are defective and distorted in many ways.

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<sup>45</sup> Thanks to the comparison of the agreement with a marriage certificate, equivocal as it is, its relevance is evident to people without any knowledge of legal principles.

<sup>46</sup> Obviously, this argumentation has little to do with international law regarding the recognition of states. Attributes of statehood serve to strengthen statehood, but are by no means prerequisites of it. Yet, in Western Province, the existing symbols are evoked to highlight that Barotseland is ready to be independent (various interviews).

Nevertheless, they have a certain convincing potency since two factors combine: The biased or simplified framing by movements coincides with incomplete knowledge or misconception of Zambian history among the population. For instance, Barotseland's existence as a British protectorate is emphasised, while its relationship with North-Eastern Rhodesia is neglected. Moreover, interpretations of the Barotseland Agreement or Kaunda's nation-building policy are not always precise, and biased in favour of a Barotse perspective. This results in resonance of the historically and legally grounded arguments of the legitimacy of separation. It also shows that the emotional weight of history is more important than facts.

After having described the persisting importance of the Barotse identity and frustrations about the attitude towards Barotse identity and history in Zambia, it is obvious that quests for independence are not exclusively a result of economic suffering. But there is a strong identity-related and hence, emotional side to it that makes the separatists' framing resonate. First, the widely shared feeling of belonging to a community is important, since the Barotse nation is evoked in all dimensions of framing and represents a key element of the mobilising argumentation. In addition, people see their concerns reflected, although not all of the disappointment that exists among people regarding national identity and history is explicitly taken up in the framing. Moreover, activists provide a way forward to alleviate the grievances: Independence would put an end to non-recognition and superimposition of Lozi identity and history and lend Barotseland the status that it merits. Thus, collective action frames that refer to issues regarding nationality and identity are highly salient and credible against the experiences that Barotse had and the way these are memorised and perceived. In addition, national identity and the previous existence as an independent state help to make legal framing, which is relatively abstract and detached from everyday reality, accessible and credible to the target group. This is an important achievement since legal references play a dominant role in all components of framing; that is why their successful resonance is an important boost for collective action.

### 8.3.2. *Prevailing Scepticism: Reasons for Unsuccessful Framing*

Although there is sympathy for the question of Barotseland, scepticism regarding the future and potential self-determination of the region exists. However, people that do not favour separation or are unsure if it would bring the expected improvements often do not dare to speak out publicly and thereby take a conformed position. Since they are part of the (tribal or national) community and identify themselves with it, they feel group pressure. Hence, critics fear being considered as 'bad' Lozis or traitors, if they openly demonstrate that they do not support independence (Interview with a regional NGO employee, Mongu, 14 July, 2014). This renders identifying critical voices more difficult. Nevertheless, various reservations

against the separation of Barotseland that negatively impact resonance of various frames can be identified.

### a) Doubtful Prospects: Political and Economic Challenges to Independent Barotseland

Important doubts exist regarding the viability and prospects of potentially independent Barotseland. They include mainly political and economic concerns. Undeniably, there is still support for the Lozi monarchy, which is memorised in glorious terms, and traditionalist attitudes persist in Barotse society. However, this does not mean that identification with the Zambian national project and democratic attitudes are completely absent among the population. Instead, opponents of separation refer to past and present experiences regarding Barotseland or kingship more generally, in order to voice scepticism about returning to monarchy and to refute calls for independence. They point to the discrimination that existed between members and non-members of the royal family. The aristocracy enjoyed privileges that commoners could not access, with the latter being obliged to pay tribute or provide forced labour. Critical respondents fear that, as before, the Barotse monarchy would be feudal, one-sided, and only beneficial to the royalty. Hence, they stress their preference for democratic governance (Interviews with a former NGO employee, Mongu 4 July, 2014; a former teacher, Mongu, 6 July, 2014; a former regional politician, Mongu, 11 July, 2014; a regional NGO employee, Mongu, 14 July, 2014; a concerned citizen, Sesheke, 18 July, 2014; a businessman, Sesheke, 18 July, 2014; see also Bull 2010; Sichone and Simutanyi 1996). In the past, this experience had already driven the Barotse towards republicanism: Many Zambian nationalists who originated from Barotseland and joined Kenneth Kaunda's independence struggle came from the newly emerging Lozi intelligentsia. As they realised that the traditional system remained dominated by the traditional aristocracy and that there were no opportunities for them in Barotseland, they committed themselves to (future) Zambia which was synonymous to opposing the traditional Barotse system (Mulford 1967, 219; Ranger 1968, 239-243; see also Caplan 1970, 158-159, 179-180).

In addition, interviewees expressed doubts regarding the capacities of the Barotse Royal Establishment to govern an independent country. They worried that the BRE did not function correctly as it used to do.<sup>47</sup> They also recounted that it currently does not always fulfil its duties as expected, for example regarding the implementation of development projects, and even instrumentalised its influence for its own private benefits, while the population lived in

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<sup>47</sup> People cite various examples of the BRE's disturbed functionality: After Sinyinda's resignation, the post of the *ngambela* has remained vacant. Furthermore, traditions were abandoned. The *litunga*, for example, does not return to the actual capital Lealui, but permanently resides in Limulunga.

dire poverty.<sup>48</sup> Finally, examples of kingdoms in the sub-region, namely Swaziland or Lesotho, clearly showed the disadvantageous and anachronistic character of monarchical government systems in these days (Interviews with a former national and regional politician, Mongu, 5 July, 2014; a regional NGO employee, Mongu, 6 July, 2014; a former regional politician, Mongu, 11 July, 2014; a former civil servant, Mongu, 12 July, 2014; a concerned citizen, Sesheke, 18 July, 2014). Overall, the negative memories of the feudalistic Barotse past live on regardless of whether people had actually experienced these accounts or only heard about them.

Furthermore, despite pronounced discontent regarding underdevelopment of Western Province, sceptics voice their concerns about the economic potential of Barotseland and thus, about its prospects regarding economic development and viability. The movements stress the existence of abundant resources on the territory and often highlight that it was an advantage that Zambia had always refused to invest in Western Province, since the existing wealth remained untouched and was now fully available to the Barotse nation. However, there is disbelief among many of the people who were interviewed regarding the economic potential of Barotseland. They emphasise that the promised richness is largely based on speculations. Barotseland is presumed to be resource-rich due to its geographic location (e.g. the immediate neighbouring countries dispose of commodities) or geologic characteristics (e.g. the sandy soil is seen as a sign for oil reserves). While there are most likely some mineral deposits in the area, they are probably much more localised and limited as the movements' propaganda suggests (Interview with a former regional politician, Mongu, 11 July, 2014). In addition, individuals are aware that promises by the movements regarding future development are unrealistic and that it will take time to compensate decades of marginalisation. Moreover, they question if the movements and their leader are capable and willing to realise their propositions regarding development (see 8.4.4.). Overall, separation is not the key to development in many people's view, since problems would remain or emerge anew (Interview with a former teacher, Mongu, 6 July, 2014; interview with a businessman, Sesheke, 18 July, 2014). In this context, observers occasionally stress that mainly poor people favoured separation. Since they lacked instruction, particularly suffered from underdeveloped, and had little to lose, they were especially receptive to populist arguments. By contrast, those who owned businesses or property and better understood economic correlations were reportedly more sceptical about it as well as related promises (Interview with a former regional politician, Mongu, 11 July, 2014; see also Englebert 2005). This allegation appears logical and there is most likely some truth to it. Yet, it should not be concluded that the Barotse élite unanimously reject the idea of self-determination. Moreover,

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<sup>48</sup> For example, people have to pay if they wish to see chiefs or the king which can be considered a modern form of tribute.

the claim seems to suggest that separatist calls are less legitimate because they are predominantly backed by the poor.<sup>49</sup>

However, opposing separation does not equate to favouring the status quo. Various individuals see a chance for the movements to bring about positive change with regard to politics and economics. Especially among intellectuals, the opinion is common that it is imperative to see the question of Barotseland in a less ideological way and to consider it from a democratic perspective. This would create space for discussion, since it is easier to talk about devolution of power than independence of Barotseland. Moreover, decentralisation would allow for effectively sharing power and involve the province in decisions regarding issues of development. Hence, it is considered a suitable solution that could accommodate the positions of both conflicting parties and be advantageous for the entire Zambian state (Chitala 2012a; 2012b; Mubita and Chisala 2013; interviews with a researcher and consultant, Lusaka, 9 June, 2014; a researcher, Lusaka, 11 June, 2014; a local consultant, Mongu, 23 June, 2014; a former national and regional politician, Mongu, 5 July, 2014). Hence, concerning the problem of underdevelopment, opponents of separation still appreciate the Barotseland Agreement and its current prominence because they consider it as a useful tool that can help to get the difficult situation of Western Province on the political agenda and ultimately, induce the government to bring improvements to the area (Interview with a local NGO employee, Mongu, 3 July, 2014; interview with a former national and regional politician, Mongu, 5 July, 2014).

Independence is by no means a unanimously accepted compromise, but people voice concerns about negative political and economic side effects that could occur in case of separation. This shows that prognostic frames have only limited success, if people are aware of the precise content of these frames at all.<sup>50</sup> Furthermore, the variety of counter-arguments underscores that there are differences within the provincial population regarding the question of how to tackle the manifold difficulties that Western Province suffers from. Independence does not constitute the only option, but there are credible alternatives to alleviate both political and socio-economic difficulties, namely decentralisation and more effective development policies. Besides, one can clearly identify appreciation of the idea to remain within Zambia, which is – despite all its flaws – metonymic with democratic governance. As a

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<sup>49</sup> Positions of ‘the people’ and ‘the élite’ are not as unequivocal as sometimes suggested. There is no data to quantify the opinions of various social groups. However, separatist calls have always had support from parts of the (both royal and common) élite and continue to do so (Hogan 2014; Sichone and Simutanyi 1996, 191-194); but it is equally correct that other segments of the intelligentsia preferred national integration (Caplan 1970; Mulford 1967; Ranger 1968). Promises of a better future after separation might be illusionary. Yet, ignoring the opinion of an entire social group – whether it is the one of the poor or the élite – is undemocratic and risks concealing issues of conflict as well as creating new ones.

<sup>50</sup> Activists emphasised in interviews their wish to install a constitutional monarchy with a democratically elected head of government. Yet, this objective does not seem to be well-known since most interviewees outside the immediate networks of the groups were not familiar with such plans.

result of these factors, the credibility and salience of calls for separation and thus, their mobilising potency are confronted with limitations, and scepticism remains.

### b) Non-Resonance as a Result of Tribal Identification

Not only was there discrimination between members and non-members of the royal family, but inequality also existed between different tribes. As aforementioned, the Lozis do not consider themselves as a tribe but as an overarching language group or nation. They highlight that the communities that are included are very similar and grew even closer together through intermarriages and by exchanging cultural practices.<sup>51</sup> This perspective contains some truth. According to the national census, only 50 per cent of the population of Western Province are ethnic Lozis, while 70 per cent speak Lozi (CSO 2012b, ch. 10). It follows from this that the Lozi language group embraces other (non-Lozi) tribes (see Posner 2003; 2005). Nevertheless, this reading is not shared by all tribes. There are identity groups in Barotseland that refute being subsumed under the Lozis. From these groups' perspective, the Lozis are only one group among others but not overarching. These communities stress their specificity and differences in relation to the Barotse, for example regarding their culture, language, and governance structures, which they wish to preserve. Their experiences under the Barotse kingdom were often negative. In order to sustain their costly reign, Barotse kings subjugated peripheral tribes and forced them to pay tribute or provide slaves (see, for example, Flint 2003; Zeller 2012). As a consequence, members of concerned tribes do not wish to return to the feudalistic past, but instead highlight the gains and freedoms the Zambian democracy provided for them (Interviews with a former NGO employee, Mongu, 4 July, 2014; a former teacher, Mongu, 6 July, 2014; a former regional politician, Mongu, 11 July, 2014; a concerned citizen, Sesheke, 18 July, 2014; a concerned citizen, Lusaka, 23 July, 2014). The deviations in self- and external perception as well as different perspectives on the past impact the relations between the identity groups and have negative effects regarding frame resonance. The positions of the Nkoyas and the Mbundas will serve as an example.<sup>52</sup> The two groups migrated centuries ago to the territory of Barotseland. They respectively comprise 4.7 per cent and 14.7 per cent of the population of Western Province and therefore, form minority groups (CSO 2012b, 68).<sup>53</sup> Both reject separation and wish to remain within Zambia.

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<sup>51</sup> The *litunga's* royal drums, for example, originate from the Nkoyas, and the Mbundas initially constructed his barge for the Kuomboka ceremony.

<sup>52</sup> It is probable that other tribes in Western Province are also opposed to separation, but attract less public attention. The Nkoyas and Mbundas are widely known for their critical stance and since their cases are well documented, they were chosen as examples here (see also 8.4.2.).

<sup>53</sup> The Nkoyas consider themselves as a larger sub-group including others, for example, the Ilas and Kaondes (Mubita and Chisala 2013, 154). If one includes these tribes, they make up 5.3 per cent of the population in Western Province (CSO 2012b, 68). Yet, van Binsbergen draws attention to the fact

Tensions between the Lozis and the Nkoyas have historical roots and are as old as their cohabitation. While both groups have their own governance system, the Lozi monarchy gradually introduced parallel ruling structures and established its influence over Nkoya territory. This led to the humiliation and degradation of Nkoya chiefs. Until today, they are subordinated to the Lozi *indunas* which caused – still enduring – discontent among the Nkoyas (Interviews with a former teacher, Mongu, 6 July, 2014; local councillors, Kaoma, 9 July, 2014; a local chief, Kaoma, 9 July, 2014). Furthermore, the Nkoyas' cultural distinctiveness was, from their view, not sufficiently recognised. For example, Lozi was taught at school instead of their native language which led to poor results in the education of Nkoya kids, and the Nkoya language was hardly ever used on the radio (van Binsbergen 1985, 206; Mubita and Chisala 2013, 162, 166).<sup>54</sup> Other negative experiences under Lozi rule include the pillaging of Nkoya villages by the Lozi kingdom and loss of land in favour of Lozis and other tribes that migrated to their area. According to van Binsbergen, a partial interpretation of history developed among the Nkoyas. Hence, the Lozis are perceived to be the root of all evil, while other actors or structural factors that caused the difficulties they faced, namely capitalism or colonialism were neglected. Simultaneously, positive developments, which the Nkoyas owe to the Lozis, were ignored (1985, 220-222). Already under colonial rule, this provoked occasional protest against the Lozis. Consequently, it is little surprising that at independence, the Nkoyas turned away from the detested and discriminating Barotse surroundings and appreciated the post-colonial state that offered new opportunities to them. From their perspective, the remains of Lozi domination that persisted after independence finally disappeared due to the abrogation of the Barotseland Agreement (van Binsbergen 1985, 209-210, 217).

The case of the Mbundas reveals similarities. The group migrated from today's Angola to Barotseland in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century. Since the Mbundas supported the Lozis' ancestors in various battles, friendship grew between the two tribes and a contract was signed between them that inscribed rights and privileges for the Mbundas. Yet, the Mbundas had a range of discriminatory experiences. Despite their history, they complain of being treated like refugees that are only temporarily tolerated and of facing hostilities. The accord was not respected and Mbunda chiefs did not get the recognition they should have. Moreover, the community denounces cultural discrimination as their language was not taught in school. After

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that the Ila, Kaonde, and others are not as close to the Nkoyas as one might think: For instance, these tribes do not speak Nkoya and do not necessarily identify as such (2003, 202, 206).

<sup>54</sup> On a national level, only 0.5 per cent are Nkoyas. Thus, the non-recognition of the Nkoya language, which Nkoyas perceived as an assault against their culture, was a pragmatic decision (see van Binsbergen 1993, 23). Until today, cultural aspects remain contested. Some Nkoyas, for example, refuse to speak Lozi (Interview with a regional NGO employee, Mongu, 6 July, 2014). In 1988, the Nkoyas revived their traditional harvest feast, the Kazanga. This is partly a move to distance themselves from the famous Lozi Kuomboka ceremony (van Binsbergen 1993, 27). For a more detailed discussion of the emergence of the Nkoya culture and identity, see van Binsbergen 1985.

Linyungandambo called for the eviction of several tribes, among whom were the Mbundas, the community feared violent incursions. In January 2011, a shop owned by a Mbunda was in fact damaged (Mubita and Chisala 2013, 346, 349).

The two cases illustrate that tribal identity and the resulting position within the society of Western Province, i.e. whether individuals or groups consider themselves as being part of 'the Lozis' or not, determine framing effects. Hence, frame resonance varies across different social groups.<sup>55</sup> As will be outlined later, representatives of both tribes openly oppose calls for separation and highlight their willingness to remain within Zambia (see 8.4.2.). Due to their respective historical background and the common reading of it, neither history-related nor nationalist frames resonate with Nkoyas and Mbundas. In both examples, the opposition to the separation of Barotseland from Zambia is characterised by past experiences of tribute paying, oppression, and humiliation as well as continuing quarrels about leadership, freedom, and recognition of chiefs, which are well ingrained in collective and individual memory (Mubita and Chisala 2013, 163). Moreover, their non-identification as Lozis and the importance of their tribal identity renders nationalist frames ineffective. These factors do not only impede separatist frames, but also make counterframes appear more convincing in the eyes of these tribes' members. Recent assaults that the Mbundas experienced enhanced their doubts about their future in Barotseland (Interviews with a former teacher, Mongu, 6 July, 2014; local councillors, Kaoma, 9 July, 2014; a local chief, Kaoma, 9 July, 2014; see also Mubita and Chisala 2013, ch. 7, 10, 13).

Supporters of separation are aware that internal fragmentation and the ensuing impairment of frame resonance are disadvantageous to them. They react by delegitimising opponents. The Nkoyas, for example, are often considered as having been bribed by the government as a result of its divide and rule tactics. Hence, their opposition is presented as stemming from corruption. Remarkably few Lozi interviewees admitted that the historical background and inter-tribal relations were at the origin of the Nkoya opposition. Besides, other tribes are depicted as having a detrimental attitude towards the province which serves as a justification to neglect their concerns (Focus group discussion with youths, Mongu, 12 July, 2014).

### c) Nationalism versus Tribalism: Ideational and Practical Implications of the Motto 'One Zambia, One Nation'

The question as to what extent Kaunda's nation-building was successful and helped to replace ethnic and tribal identification by a feeling of national belonging is still subject of debate. While the degree might be contested, one cannot deny that it had some impact on the Zambian society. At a societal and political level, "*overt* ethnic politicking [remained]

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<sup>55</sup> There are also internal differences within groups. The Nkoyas, for example, do not favour the status quo in unison. Some reportedly preferred independence while others even call for the creation of a Nkoya province within Zambia in case of secession of Barotseland (see 8.4.2.).

largely illegitimate” as a result of the unifying policies (Larmer 2009, 124; emphasis in the original). This contributed to maintaining peaceful cohabitation between the numerous communities. Although Kaunda’s person and his rule are controversial in Zambia, the political stability he established tends to be appreciated. At an individual level, many Zambians grew up with measures of nation-building and effectively internalised the idea of national unity (Interview with a researcher and consultant, Lusaka, 9 June, 2014; interview with a former civil servant, Mongu, 12 July, 2014). This also impacts frame resonance. The motto of ‘One Zambia, One Nation’ is opposed to the activists’ framing and is often evoked in order to discard requests for the restoration of the BA64 or independence. Moreover, separatist ideas are termed anti-national and tribalist. In this context, one can observe that the motto’s meaning has apparently shifted. While it was created to end tribal differences, it is now interpreted as a safeguarding appeal to protect the Zambian unitary state against (territorial) disintegration in conjunction with the Barotse question.<sup>56</sup> Yet, national unity is not merely an ideational topic, but there are very concrete concerns. What would happen, for instance, to inter-tribal marriages or those people from Western Province living in other parts of Zambia? How would property of ‘Northern Rhodesians’ in Barotseland or of Barotse in ‘Northern Rhodesia’ be dealt with? Various inter-linkages exist between former North-Western and North-Eastern Rhodesia and the country appears practicably inseparable. As a result, social groups that would be particularly affected by the redrawing of borders, for example, people from Western Province that live in other parts of Zambia but own property in the West, oppose separation. Besides, negative consequences of secession, such as inter-group violence are feared (Flint 2003, 425; interviews with a local NGO employee, Mongu, 4 July, 2014b; a former regional politician, Mongu, 11 July, 2014; a regional NGO employee, Mongu, 14 July, 2014).

In sum, separatist framing does not achieve salience or credibility in the eyes of the people if national identification and acceptance of the Zambian national project is strong. Not only does it contradict an ideational component that strongly influenced Zambians throughout Kaunda’s 27 years in government, which constitutes a legacy that is not easily washed away. But it is also difficult or even impossible to reconcile the idea of cutting Barotseland off given the numerous connections and the degree of integration between Barotseland and the rest of Zambia which clearly challenges the feasibility of respective propositions.

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<sup>56</sup> Interestingly, there are people in Western Province who claim that the slogan ‘One Zambia, One Nation’ only aimed to bring Barotseland and Northern Rhodesia together. According to them, pretending that the slogan should unite Zambia’s 73 tribes only served to conceal that the country was made up of two parts (*Barotse Post*, 3 October, 2013).

### 8.3.3. *To Rebel or to March for Freedom? Assessing the Resonance of Non-Violent and Violent Prognostic Framing*

Since the question why the dispute about self-determination in Barotseland remained non-violent is at the core of the thesis, it is imperative to have a closer look at the resonance of prognostic framing. As demonstrated in section 8.2.2., the movements predominantly call for non-violent action and consider violence as *ultima ratio* at the very most. Yet, Linyungandambo advocated for violent means to achieve independence and is also estimated to be the most radical by observers. Hence, there is a framing dispute, although it is waged in a discrete manner, between the activist groups regarding the most adequate strategy. In the following, it will be demonstrated why the non-violent prognostic framing successfully resonated with the population and which factors contributed to the failure of calls for militant solutions.

#### a) Non-Violence as Preferred Choice

In their framing, the different separatist groups put a strong emphasis on their determination to obtain self-governance in a peaceful manner, although they would have the potential to rebel against the central government if they wanted to (Zeller 2010b, 301). The commitment to non-violence as preferred strategy could be interpreted as being mainly used to attract external attention and gain legitimacy at the international level. One cannot exclude that such strategic considerations partly fuel the non-violent prognostic framing of the Barotse separatist movements. Nevertheless, calls for peaceful action also appeal to the local population and thus, are more than externally targeted propaganda, falsely claiming to be peaceful.

The non-violent framing blends in well with the diagnostic framing of the movements. It corresponds to and is a logical consequence of the recurrent legal argumentation concerning the abrogation of the Barotseland Agreement. Since the Agreement was concluded with a signature, it is only logical to dissolve it in the same way, i.e. end a juridical problem via juridical means (various interviews). Hence, the framing by the separatists is internally consistent. Moreover, non-violence as a preferred option conforms to the self-image that separatist groups create and must be seen as a strategic choice. They present themselves as being in the right both with respect to national and international legal principles. This stance necessitates action that is legally acceptable. Violence would harm their image and credibility both within and outside Barotseland. Furthermore, prognostic framing and concrete action by movements match with each other. The self-determination movements undertook various steps that should bring the region closer to independence, such as joining the UNPO and attempting to launch arbitration proceedings. These measures do not only highlight that the activists are determined to obtain their goal through peaceful means, but also illustrate to

followers that such efforts are promising, since they help to advance the cause. In sum, this shows why the majority opted for peaceful means in their struggle and framed their strategy accordingly.

While the choice of non-violent prognostic framing was thought through well, it also proved effective. The non-violent framing is congruent with the pre-existing self-understanding and collective memory of Lozis of being a historically peaceful nation. They narrate that Barotseland has always avoided violence if possible. For example, the realm had never experienced military rule, but was governed by a civil leader throughout its history. Besides, the king did not impose his rule, but monarchy was a choice of the people and his power was restricted through checks and balances. Moreover, colonisation is not depicted as a violent experience, but tends to be interpreted in an almost naïve manner as amicable relationships with the British who did not conquer their territory, but were invited as protectors and signed treaties with the *litunga* at eye level. Thus, it rather resembled friendship instead of foreign rule (Flint 2010, 153-154; interview with a former national politician, Lusaka, 9 June, 2014; interview with a local councillor, Sesheke, 18 July, 2014). This image is doubtlessly biased and neglects or belittles incidents of physical or structural violence in Barotse history, such as violent quarrels regarding the throne, the overthrow of the Makololo invasion, oppression and exploitation of tribes, or drawbacks of colonisation.<sup>57</sup> Closely related to this is the self-conception that Lozis have of themselves as a highly developed and cultivated society. They contend that they had obtained achievements, such as a functioning political system or formal education earlier than other parts of Zambian society and long before Zambia itself came into being as a country. Moreover, the use of force had been abolished by Christian missionaries already centuries ago. In consequence, violence is considered to contravene their level of civilisation. Lozis somehow regard themselves as being 'British' which is synonymous to being cultivated and superior – in particular with regard to 'Zambians' who are seen as more backward and whose violent reaction is despicable (Interviews with a former national politician, Lusaka, 9 June, 2014; a local NGO employee, Mongu, 4 July, 2014b; a local NGO employee, Mongu, 7 July, 2014; two elderly men, Sesheke, 17 July, 2014). The movements aptly adapt their framing to the non-violent discourse and collective memory, which prevail in Barotse society.<sup>58</sup> Therefore, the content of prognostic frames corresponds to the cultural background which favours its salience and credibility. Furthermore, respect and democratic principles, namely debate and consensus-making are considered core elements of traditional governance structures in Barotseland. Therefore, non-violent mechanisms to settle disputes are institutionalised and have a tempering impact

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<sup>57</sup> The Makololo invaded Barotseland in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and ruled the kingdom for over two decades until they were defeated. See 7.1.1.

<sup>58</sup> As outlined in the theoretical chapter, framing takes place against the larger background of discourses which have a facilitating or constraining effect on its content. However, framing is less static than discourses and better suited to provide information on causal mechanisms.

(Zeller 2010b, 301; focus group discussion with indunas, Malengwa, 4 July, 2014; interviews with a local NGO employee, Mongu, 7 July, 2014; a former civil servant, Mongu, 12 July, 2014; a clergyman, Sesheke, 17 July, 2014; a local councillor, Sesheke, 18 July, 2014). In this context, it is important to note that traditional institutions are still valued. According to a survey, a total of 79.3 per cent of respondents believed very strongly or strongly in traditional authorities and issues (Sumbwa 2000, 11). Against this backdrop, non-violent framing easily achieves salience and is accepted as principal strategy. Moreover, adopting peaceful means is almost obligatory for the movements since they present themselves as being in continuity with the BRE which earns them credibility and respect. Therefore, they need to act in a way and according to values that people associate with the monarchy (i.e. non-violence). Deviating from them would reduce their trustworthiness and thus, the effectiveness of frames.<sup>59</sup>

In addition, calls for non-violent action also appeal to followers due to relatively recent negative experiences of armed conflict and fear thereof. Zambia enjoys the image of having been a peaceful island in a troublesome (sub-)region. However, this representation tells only part of the story. Under Kaunda, Zambia became a major frontline state that actively supported decolonisation and fought against white minority rule on the African continent in its neighbouring countries as well as South Africa. Various liberation movements had support bases on Zambian territory. Barotseland was particularly affected by the liberation struggles in Namibia and Angola as well as the civil war in the latter. It temporarily served as an important retreat area for the South-West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) that intermingled with the local population. During the war of independence and the civil war in Angola, the Portuguese army and later the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA; English: People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola) respectively hunted suspected insurgents in Western Province. The Caprivi rebellion, a brief yet formative secessionist conflict, erupted in the immediate vicinity. Furthermore, Western Province accommodated a considerable number of refugees from the Angolan civil war. Hence, despite the relatively peaceful trajectory of Zambia, Barotse people came into close contact with violent conflicts, which spilled over from neighbouring territories, and also suffered from their socio-economic and psychological repercussions (Flint 2003, 424-425; 2010, 171-172, 189-195; Marten and Kula 2008, 305; interview with a university professor, Lusaka, 18 June, 2014).<sup>60</sup> Furthermore, respondents frequently cite examples of ongoing African conflicts, such as the ones in South Sudan, DR Congo, or northern Nigeria as deterrent examples and highlight that they do not want Barotseland and its citizens to experience similar things. Not

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<sup>59</sup> Here, one has to note that perceptions and reality contradict each other. While the democratic and peaceful self-image is incorrect, the consensus and debate about it are important regarding frame resonance.

<sup>60</sup> In addition, the Zambian political history is not as peaceful as it often seems (see 7.1.).

least the deadly repression of the riots in 2011 gave a sample of what the province might face if it opted for violence (Sinyinda 2014a; interview with a local NGO employee, Mongu, 4 July, 2014a; interview with a local NGO employee and an elderly acquaintance, Kaoma, 10 July, 2014). Due to previous negative experiences and awareness regarding the risks of armed conflict, there is a certain aversion to the use of force within the Barotse society. Against this backdrop, violent framing is unlikely to be successful, but calls for peaceful action correspond better to people's needs and emotional state. As a consequence, non-violent framing strikes a responsive chord.

### b) Inter-Generational Differences: Fertile Soil and Counterweight for Violent Prognostic Framing

Violence effectively broke out in relation to the Barotseland question in several instances. At first sight, this is little surprising. Linyungandambo, which is an exception to the predominantly conciliatory framing agents, is known for its militancy and occasionally instigated violence. Moreover, observers stress that there is propensity for violence in Western Province. They express fears that the conflict could turn violent in the future as a result of unaddressed grievances, the lack of open dialogue as well as legitimate opportunities to voice concerns, and the absence of progress regarding the Barotse question – in short, as a consequence of the emotional pot boiling over (Kelly 2013; interview with a researcher and consultant, Lusaka, 9 June, 2014; interview with a local consultant, Mongu, 23 June, 2014). Yet, given the coincidence of violent framing on the one hand and apparent readiness to use force on the other hand, it is surprising that the conflict is still waged in a peaceful manner and can be classified as non-violent. From this, one can deduce that there are factors that impede the resonance of calls for violence and help to contain their mobilising power. Thus, components favouring and impeding violent prognostic framing will be looked at in detail in order to elucidate the absence of armed struggle in Barotseland.

During discussions, interviewees frequently highlighted that in the past, mainly the elder generation had traditionalist tendencies and were concerned with Barotseland and the abrogation of the agreement. Meanwhile, the younger generation became increasingly interested in it and started to take the baton (Interview with a researcher and consultant, Lusaka, 9 June, 2014; interview with a local consultant, Mongu, 23 June, 2014; see also Hogan 2014, 923).<sup>61</sup> Nevertheless, there are important discrepancies between the age groups concerning the method of approaching the issue and the preferred strategies, which are relevant regarding frame resonance and potentially, future conflict dynamics. The youth

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<sup>61</sup> The notions of youth and young people as social categories are understood in a large sense, as it is common in African studies. The terms comprise individuals that are not children any more but still not yet socially independent since they cannot create their own household. Often, they could not complete education and struggle to find employment. Moreover, they tend to be marginalised from both traditional and modern power structures (see Abbink 2005; Cruise O'Brien 1996).

are less patient to see an outcome of the struggle and more radical regarding the means that are to be applied to obtain separation at the detriment of negotiation and consensus-making.<sup>62</sup> Besides, they are much more emotional about the issue compared to elder respondents; in interviews, for example, anger and frustration of the young people interrogated were often palpable. Not surprisingly, Linyungandambo is the movement that appealed most to young people (Interviews with a researcher, Lusaka, 11 June, 2014; a head of an education institution, Mongu, 14 July, 2014; a youth activist, Senanga, 15 July, 2014).<sup>63</sup> Several factors account for the radical tendencies. First, young people are particularly affected by the socio-economic underdevelopment, in particular the lack of prospects in terms of education and employment which leaves them with no opportunities and little to lose. An employee of a regional NGO concisely described their situation and generational differences:

“[T]hey [the young] are the ones who feel the pinch now. They are the ones who have dreams of what they want to do. The other guys only have memories of how it used to be. So they might as well say ‘Ok, maybe this is our life. We enjoyed our days...’ But for the youths they look to up north and the only big thing they see is limitation” (Interview with a regional NGO employee, Mongu, 14 July, 2014).

Simultaneously, promises about the economic potential that could be realised if the province became independent seem to provide a better alternative to the current dead-end (Kelly 2013; interview with a local NGO employee, Mongu, 4 July 2014b). Second, since they have better access to the internet and other media, the youth are more aware of disparities regarding development between different regions within Zambia but also between Zambia and other countries. They are also more exposed to online information regarding the Barotseland question that is often partial, but do not necessarily dispose of in-depth background knowledge themselves, which makes them easily convincible (Focus group discussion with youths, Mongu, 12 July, 2014; interview with a regional NGO employee, Mongu, 14 July, 2014).<sup>64</sup> Likewise, there is no opportunity to voice their grievances, since the government turns a blind eye to demands regarding the topic of Barotseland and represses open dialogue. This risks creating an emotionally-loaded atmosphere, in which the aggrieved understand violence as their only remaining option to be heard and achieve progress (Kelly 2013; see also interview with a regional NGO employee, Mongu, 14 July, 2014). Finally, young people were not or at least to a lesser extent exposed to Kaunda’s state-building policies. In comparison with previous generations who had first-hand experiences regarding

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<sup>62</sup> Intergenerational differences in conflict settings are not unique to Barotseland. Young people are often found to be more radicalised in comparison to older generations (e.g. in Côte d’Ivoire) (see contributions in Abbink and van Kessel 2005). This highlights once again that one cannot exclude a similar development as in other countries, were young men and women engaged in violence.

<sup>63</sup> This does not mean that the entire generation of young Barotse people is radicalised and ready to use violence. Yet, the degree of radicalisation is higher than among other social groups.

<sup>64</sup> In a group discussion, the young participants confirmed that they had relatively recently and often by accident heard about the BA64 (Focus group discussion with youths, Mongu, 12 July, 2014).

## 8. Barotseland: Framing Analysis

the national project, national identification and cohesion lost relevance to them and rank behind regional identity. As a result, the upcoming generation has recently begun to claim being Barotse instead of Zambian, even though they were born after independence and did not experience the change in nationality as elders did (Interview with a researcher and consultant, Lusaka, 9 June, 2014; interview with a regional NGO employee, Mongu, 6 July, 2014). If it was hoped that the Barotseland question would die out over time, this is not the case. Instead, new energy is starting to fuel the clamour because the young generation has become interested in it. The youth are more responsive to violent frames and willing to resort to force than elder people. This increases the likelihood of an escalation of the conflict.

Yet, it is imperative to consider the overall effect of violent prognostic frames in society and variations between groups in order to understand which collective strategy prevails. In this regard, one discerns that the above mentioned factors, which make the peaceful framing resonate, still outweigh the effect of radical rhetoric. In this regard, the following quote provides an insightful appraisal:

“I don't think people are ready yet to commit themselves for it [armed struggle]. Especially as the leadership has not yet changed. The leadership is still the elderly group who are more conservative, look at dialogue as a way of resolving the issue. It is not yet the young ones. I think if the young ones get more and more organised, then it will be a different story” (Interview with a researcher and consultant, Lusaka, 9 June, 2014).

This statement suggests that although the number of young people is constantly increasing as a consequence of demographic tendencies, the older generation still dominates the social order. Since they are strongly shaped by the non-violent self-image and collective memory of the Barotse, their societal influence controls violent tendencies (see also interview with a head of an education institution, Mongu, 14 July, 2014; interview with two elderly men, Sesheke, 17 July, 2014). In addition, traditional values and practices such as debating, explaining, and consensus-making, which are institutionalised within traditional government structures, also have a calming effect on the situation.

In sum, peaceful collective action frames held the upper hand in relation to aggressive rhetoric so far. Although resorting to violence is an attractive option to the youth, the strong non-violent tradition that lives on in Barotse society and that is incorporated in traditional governing institutions constituted a sound foundation for non-violent framing. The distribution of social power also had a mitigating effect, since the older generation that is more inclined towards peaceful means continues to occupy the main societal positions. Overall, these factors reduced the effectiveness of radical summons. Nevertheless, it is impossible to entirely exclude that violence might erupt in Barotseland in the long-run if the balance between different social groups changes at the benefit of the youth and thus, violent framing.

### 8.3.4. *Who is Who? The Credibility of Leadership and Movement Structures*

After having studied the content of framing by Barotseland activists, the source and degree of credibility of their leadership will be assessed in the following. The separatist movements in Barotseland do not have a strong, charismatic head like Father Augustin Diamacoune Senghor in the early years of the MFDC in Casamance. Nevertheless, there are several leaders whose names are well-known and who are closely associated with the struggle. The two principal personalities are Clement Wainyae Sinyinda (BNFA) and Afumba Mombotwa (Linyungandambo), whose respective personal backgrounds will briefly be summarised before their credibility from the population's perspective will be critically assessed.

Clement Sinyinda was a member of parliament for the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy in Senanga district until 2011 and Deputy Minister of education. After having ended his political career at the national level, he served as *ngambela* of Barotseland and played a key role in the orchestration of the Barotse National Council in 2012. Later that year, he resigned – reportedly due to tensions with the BRE – and became chairperson of the newly created Barotse National Freedom Alliance (Mubita and Chisala 2013, 357-358). As a consequence of his political activism for independent Barotseland, Clement Sinyinda was arrested by security forces in October 2012 and remained in prison for several months before he was released. He continues to live with his family in Mongu. Another prominent, yet less visible personality of the separation struggle is Afumba Mombotwa, chairman of Linyungandambo. Until 1999, he had been working as a civil servant for the Zambian Ministries of Agriculture and Foreign Affairs for almost two decades. After his exit, he was a member of the Barotse Patriotic Front from 1999 to 2002 and is therefore a veteran of the Barotse independence struggle. In 2010, he founded a new organisation, Linyungandambo, which he still leads. In 2013, he unilaterally declared Barotseland independent and named himself Administrator General (a position corresponding to the one of Prime Minister) of the disputed interim government that was introduced by Linyungandambo. Afumba Mombotwa acted discretely. His whereabouts after the swearing-in ceremony were unknown, but he regularly held speeches or made press statements that circulated on the internet. In early December 2014, he was arrested by Zambian security forces and is still in prison at the time of writing (*Barotse Post*, 12 July, 2013; Kelly 2013, 51-52).<sup>65</sup>

When asked about the reputation of leaders, respondents often highlighted that they were relatively well-known given the fact that they could not openly campaign or take political action for the cause they committed themselves to, which obstructed their visibility. Moreover, they were regarded as politically experienced because they previously held public offices or worked as civil servants for the Zambian state. In addition, Clement Sinyinda

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<sup>65</sup> In mid-August 2015, the trial of Mombotwa and three other arrested Barotse activists began in Kitwe and is still ongoing at the time of writing.

gained reputation and prominence because he served as *ngambela* in the Barotse traditional government. The position of the prime minister is connected with high publicity and popularity. Furthermore, the office allowed him to openly speak out for independence and take meaningful action. So he enhanced his profile as a supporter of independence. He also benefitted from the respect and credibility that the BRE as an institution enjoys within the Lozi society. Mombotwa, in contrast, looks back at a long history of separatist activism. This makes his present participation credible. In addition, Linyungandambo is reported to have engaged in a successful strategy of grass-roots mobilisation which increased his fame in the province (Kelly 2013, 51; interviews with a local NGO employee, Mongu, 4 July, 2014a; a local government employee, Sesheke, 16 July, 2014; two elderly men, Sesheke, 17 July, 2014; see 7.2.3.).

However, the leaders' credibility is also limited by various factors. Their political past is not only advantageous, but can also be considered a weakness regarding credibility, since previous and present loyalties are contradictory. People perceive a discrepancy between their former political and administrative careers in the Zambian state and government, which had criminalised and suppressed the Barotse question, and their current engagement for separation of Western Province. Interviewees frequently pointed out that during their time in office or public service, today's activists kept silent on Barotseland's legal status. Furthermore, they had failed to bring progress to their home region while they held responsible positions, but nowadays criticise the current lack of development in Western Province and inaction of the present and past administrations. This raises questions about their sincerity. Some interviewees even went as far as to accuse them of hypocrisy (Interview with a former national and regional politician, Mongu, 5 July, 2014; interview with a regional NGO employee, Mongu, 14 July, 2014).<sup>66</sup> Rivalries between the self-determination movements and the suspicion that the leaders are more interested in their own private benefits than the common good further discredit them. People in Western Province are aware that several movements supporting the same goal coexist, but fail to unite and even fight each other. Although member organisations of the Barotse National Freedom Alliance seem to cooperate relatively well, they continue to persist as independent movements. In addition, parts of Linyungandambo and the BNFA strongly oppose each other, among others regarding their respective strategies for independence. The Alliance, for example, disagreed with Linyungandambo's move to create a transitional government. The two organisations are far from being discrete with regard to their divergences, but publicly attack each other and

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<sup>66</sup> Multiple alliances and changing loyalties are common for Barotse politicians in the Zambian polity. Some prominent politicians changed party affiliation several times. Moreover, people in Western Province do not hold politicians from their area accountable for inactivity, but consider them as victims (Interview with a regional NGO employee, Mongu, 14 July, 2014). Hence, previous membership in or loyalty to the central government can but does not necessarily harm the credibility of individuals voicing out for separation.

disseminate rumours that the opponent would collaborate with the government and sabotage efforts for Barotseland's independence (see, for example, BNFA 2014a; Shuwanga 2012; Wanga 2014c). The multitude of groups is not always negatively perceived, but the movements are sometimes seen as predecessors of future political parties in Barotseland that have different local strongholds and target groups (Group interview with members of an activist group, Livingstone, 21 July, 2014).<sup>67</sup> Moreover, it is unclear in how far the population in the province catches the full extent of rhetorical exchanges of blows between different groups on the internet. Yet, the internal fragmentation undeniably leads to confusion and resentments among the people. Observers voiced the impression that the movements and their leaders mainly aspire to supremacy and power as well as positions and personal gains.<sup>68</sup> Independence for the Lozi nation, which is the main goal they pretend to fight for, and the well-being of the population appear to be secondary and a means to their ends (Flint 2003, 428; interview with a local NGO employee, Mongu, 14 July, 2014; interview with a concerned citizen, Sesheke, 18 July, 2014). Thus, the inter-group antagonism weakens the impact of the self-determination movement as a whole. But they also negatively affect the appeal of the different groups and their leaders as well as framing efforts. Furthermore, people occasionally complain that those in leading positions are safely hidden, while followers on the ground actively engage in protest for independence and get arrested or killed for their actions. In this respect, Sinyinda's time in prison seems to have earned him respect and gave him a martyr-like image.<sup>69</sup>

A factor that indirectly influences the credibility of separatist leaders is the lack of confidence in other authorities. Election results of the Second and Third Republic show that turnout in Western Province was always below the national average (African Elections Database 2011; Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) 2011; 2015; Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa 2015; see figure 7). Since there was no option to vote for opposition during Kaunda's one-party rule, abstention from voting was the only possibility to express discontent. After a period of relatively broader participation in elections in the early and mid-2000s, when close to 70 per cent of the electorate in the west casted their votes, the turnout

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<sup>67</sup> Some activists explained that the different movements were complementary, since they act in different parts of Barotseland and have diverging target groups. The BFM, for example, is centred in Kaoma. The MOREBA is active in Lusaka and mainly finds support among Lozi intellectuals. Linyungandambo is prominent among the youth. Nevertheless, strong divisions between the BNFA and parts of Linyungandambo cannot be denied (Group interview with members of an activist group, Livingstone, 21 July, 2014).

<sup>68</sup> Note that such gains could also result from co-optation by the Zambian government.

<sup>69</sup> The fact of having been arrested or not is at the origin of rumours. In conversations, sympathisers of Linyungandambo claimed that Sinyinda collaborated with the GRZ as his time in prison demonstrated. Simultaneously, hearsays circulated that Linyungandambo was a counter-insurgent movement and sided with Lusaka, as until Mombotwa's capture in late 2014, leaders of all movements were arrested except for the Linyungandambo heads (Interview with a researcher and consultant, Lusaka, 9 June, 2014). Since the author stayed in Zambia before Mombotwa's capture, it cannot be assessed if and to what extent his fate modified opinions.

dropped again in the 2008 and 2011 elections. Overall, this is an indicator that legitimacy of the Zambian government system has always been low in the province and declined again in recent years (interview with a regional NGO employee, Mongu, 14 July, 2014).

**Figure 7: Comparison of voter turnout in Western Province and at the national level in selected presidential elections**

	National average	Western Province	Difference
<b>1973</b>	39.44 %	22.03 %	17.41 %
<b>1991</b>	45.27 %	40.98 %	4.29 %
<b>2001</b>	67.81 %	62.63 %	5.18 %
<b>2006</b>	70.77 %	67.53 %	3.24 %
<b>2008</b>	45.43 %	38.44 %	6.99 %
<b>2011</b>	53.65 %	47.77 %	5.88 %
<b>2015<sup>70</sup></b>	32.36 %	29.84 %	2.52 %

Furthermore, election results considerably varied between the province and the national level (see figure 8). This is particularly striking in the case of the 2011 presidential elections. While Michael Sata won the polls with 42.24 per cent of the casted votes (corresponding to 22.66 % of all registered voters), he only obtained 23.12 per cent of the casted votes (11.04 % of registered voters) in Western Province, and finished third behind Rupiah Banda (MMD; 33.20 %) and Hakainde Hichilema (UPND; 28.21 %).<sup>71</sup> Only in two of the 17 constituencies of the province, Michael Sata came first (namely, in Mongu Central and Nalolo). In various districts, he received less than 20 per cent, in one even less than ten per cent of the casted votes (ECZ 2011). This is an indicator that from the onset of his term in office, the population of Western Province did not broadly back Sata.<sup>72</sup>

<sup>70</sup> Although events outside the period of analysis are not systematically examined, the results of the presidential by-elections in 2015 yield interesting insights into tendencies regarding the relations between voters and politicians. While the difference between participation at the national and provincial level is marginal, preferences are obvious: Hakainde Hichilema (UPND) won in all electoral constituents in Western Province and obtained almost 80 per cent of the votes. Edgar Lungu (PF) obtained less than 16 per cent. At the national level, Lungu (48.33 %) narrowly defeated Hichilema (46.67 %) (ECZ 2015).

<sup>71</sup> Election results slightly diverge as different sources use different methods of calculation. However, the variations are marginal. The Zambian president is elected by relative majority vote which allows him or her to succeed, even if he or she obtains far less than half of the votes.

<sup>72</sup> Figures of previous elections show that support for Sata increased in other parts of Zambia over the years. A similar trend could not be observed in Western Province.

**Figure 8: Results of the presidential elections in 2011 at the national and provincial level**

Candidates	National average		Western Province	
	Casted votes	Registered voters	Casted votes	Registered voters
<b>Michael Sata (PF)</b>	42.24 %	22.66 %	23.12 %	11.04 %
<b>Rupiah Banda (MMD)</b>	35.63 %	19.12 %	33.20 %	15.86 %
<b>Hakaide Hichilema (UPND)</b>	18.28 %	9.81 %	28.21 %	13.47 %

Moreover, his already weak support basis in the province was shattered. Trust declined because the government failed to deliver on its promises and took unpopular decisions, as a short overview of the PF government's first years from a Barotse perspective will show. During his campaign, Michael Sata expressed solidarity with the activist movements and promised that he would restore the Barotseland Agreement of 1964 within 90 days, if he was elected. Especially in Mongu, many people voted for him after these propositions and the experiences of the Mongu riots. After his election, he implemented reconciliatory means in the first place. Many of those who had been jailed during the violent incidents were released. The government created a commission of inquiry that examined the causes of the bloody events in January 2011. Sata also had the BA64 published in national newspapers. Thus, for the first time in Zambian history, the text was publicly available.<sup>73</sup> Finally, development projects were announced, e.g. the construction of a university and a stadium in Mongu. Nevertheless, the 'wind of change' did not last. Sata repudiated the results of the commission of inquiry, allegedly without having read them, and did not take further action on the Barotseland Agreement. The commission's report remains unpublished up to the time of writing. This caused strong discontent among people in Western Province and strained relations between Western Province and the government (Interviews with a local consultant, Mongu, 23 June, 2014; a clergyman, Limulunga, 26 June, 2014; a local NGO employee and an elderly acquaintance, Kaoma, 10 July, 2014; see also 7.2.1.). In addition, arrests soon resumed. At various instances, activists were only released on a *nolle-prosequi*-basis instead of being discharged which means that they could be re-charged at any time.<sup>74</sup> The construction of neither the university nor the stadium has begun. Especially the latter is a particularly contested project in the province because it does not meet local needs.

<sup>73</sup> Some individuals in Western Province claim that the text was falsified and critical passages were not published (Interview with a teacher, Mongu, 8 July, 2014). The allegations are wrong, but exemplify the degree of suspicion that exists in Western Province vis-à-vis the government.

<sup>74</sup> In case of *nolle prosequi* (Latin for 'will no longer prosecute'), prosecution drops charges against a defendant. Unlike in the case of acquittal, future proceedings, i.e. re-indictment and a new process are not excluded (Nolo Legal Encyclopedia 2014; West's Encyclopedia of American Law 2008).

Altogether, while government and politicians frequently suffered from a lack of legitimacy and support in Western Province, relations further deteriorated as a consequence of the handling of the Barotseland question since 2010. Hence, there is a lot of mistrust among Barotse regarding the central administration in Lusaka and the Patriotic Front in particular.<sup>75</sup> The leadership vacuum makes the frames that criticise the government and propose a better future after independence appear promising. In addition, it helps separatist movements and their leaders to take hold in society, since they represent an alternative. Thus, the weak performance by the central government and its heavy hand increased the local leaders' credibility. However, gaining ground on other actors' failure is risky for the groups. So far, the movements made promises, namely regarding economic development, and raised high expectations, which will be difficult – if not impossible – to fulfil. Moreover, unlike an actual government, the activist groups do not have the resources to implement them. Therefore, they are in a weak position: If they fail to satisfy hopes, the separatists will lose support as other political actors did before. At the same time, it is relatively easier for the government to realise developmental projects, whose success would again impact on power relations between the various political actors.<sup>76</sup>

In this context, the influence of the Barotse monarchy also deserves attention. Traditional authorities are incapable of providing guidance and cannot fill the gap resulting from the lack of national leadership. The failure by the BRE to clearly position itself regarding separation caused confusion and disappointment among Barotse. Furthermore, there are allegations that the BRE does not take any steps to implement the BNC resolutions, since it benefits from the status quo (8.3.2 a); see also Englebert 2005; Zeller 2010b). Some people even claim that its members were bribed. Yet, these tendencies have a more ambiguous effect on the credibility of frame articulators than poor governance at the centre. Although there is frustration concerning the position and performance of the Royal Establishment, it is still an important authority in Barotse society and its voice weighs much. Observers pointed out that demands for separation could be much stronger if the BRE stood united behind them. Yet, it rather adopted a form of passive counterframing which impedes the movements' influence in the province to a certain extent.

Overall, the credibility and prominence of both Clement Sinyinda (BNFA) and Afumba Mombotwa (Linyungandambo) is influenced by a number of factors. Their positive appeal is mainly based on their past professional experiences in the Zambian government and administration. In addition, Sinyinda profited from serving the Barotse traditional institutions, while Mombotwa is a veteran in the Barotse struggle for independence who has been an activist for almost two decades. Moreover, the framing agents momentarily benefit from the

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<sup>75</sup> In addition to frustrations regarding the province, there is also discontent regarding national issues, e.g. the constant failure of subsequent governments to agree to a new constitution.

<sup>76</sup> Such a scenario was observed in Casamance.

political disillusionment among parts of the Barotse people who are disappointed about subsequent governments' inaction and bad governance. Consequently, the separatists represent a better alternative. There are also negative influences, such as allegations of dishonesty, self-interestedness, or rivalries between the movements which reduce the leaders' integrity and reliability. Furthermore, the activist groups lack support from the traditional authorities. In spite of these deficits, they compile a considerable degree of popularity and reputation that lend credence to their framing in the eyes of constituents and thus, favour frame resonance.

### **8.4. Opposing Voices: An Assessment of Counterframing and Its Success**

The idea of separation of Western Province is challenged both within Barotseland itself and Zambia as a whole. The demands are, among others, dismissed as anachronistic and unrealistic in times of globalisation. Separation is depicted as undemocratic, tribalist, and contradictory to the idea of the unitary state as well as the nation's motto 'One Zambia, One Nation' that is perceived to have shaped the lived reality, for example, in form of intermarriages and mobility. Besides, relenting to the supporters of self-determination would amount to a Pandora's Box as it risks leading to similar claims by other groups and thus, the country's disintegration. Often, oppositional opinions or statements are highly emotional and not necessarily well-informed of events on the ground or positions of the activists. In fact, a real public debate about the Barotse question is absent due to several factors. Notably, there is no political space for open discussion and the topic is generally avoided. Many people and organisations do not engage in debates regarding the issue in fear of government reprisals. At various occasions, media houses and journalists have been faced with repressive acts for reporting on the Barotseland question. Nevertheless, some actors at the provincial and national level seek to engage in counterframing. The positions of the main political and civil society actors will be summarised in the following.

#### *8.4.1. Political Actors*

The Government of the Republic of Zambia is the main target of claims for separation by activists and the major stakeholder in the dispute. Consequently, it is also the principal counterframing agent that will be studied first. Other political actors, such as opposition parties and the BRE also speak out on the issue and their positions will be taken into account afterwards.

### a) The Government of Zambia

The counterframing by the Zambian central government is weak since it makes few public statements concerning the question of the Barotseland Agreement. Nevertheless, three strategies to oppose activism for self-rule can be discerned. First, the government aims to delegitimise claims for separation. It considers the BA64 problematic since it is rooted in colonial policies. Moreover, demands for self-determination are categorised as irresponsible, unacceptable, and treasonous, since they allegedly threatened the integrity of the Zambian territory and state. In line with this, the claims-makers were criticised as unrepresentative and illegal. Simultaneously, the government justified its own position against criticism by highlighting that its objective was to protect lives and property and act in the interest of the entire Zambian people (*Lusaka Times*, 25 February, 2012; *Times of Zambia*, 29 March, 2012; *Zambian National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC)*, 19 August, 2013; *Zambian Watchdog*, 28 March, 2012; interview with a politician of the ruling party, Lusaka, 17 June, 2014; interview with a civil servant, Senanga, 15 July, 2014). Second, the government stresses that, from its point of view, the BA64 concerned development and de-centralisation, but did not represent a basis for secessionist claims. Since the GRZ undertook various efforts to improve socio-economic conditions in Western Province, as it eagerly highlighted, its policies were perfectly compatible with the document. This also implies, in the government's view, that it effectively kept its campaign promise to honour the agreement (National Assembly 2012; 2013; interview with a politician of the ruling party, Lusaka, 17 June, 2014; interview with a local politician of the ruling party, Mongu, 6 July, 2014). Third and last, the government attempts to attribute as little importance as possible to the Barotse question in order to deny, silence, or downplay it altogether. Members of the government often evade critical questions in parliamentary debates. They do not answer at all, provide elusive replies, or state that decisions would be made at a later point (*The Post*, 24 July, 2014; National Assembly 2011a; 2013; 2014; interview with a researcher, Lusaka, 11 June, 2014). Moreover, events in relation to Barotse question are not necessarily taken up by public or pro-government media and detailed (or critical) reporting is rare.

### b) Opposition Parties

Opposition parties also pay attention to the topic. They frequently raise points of order in the parliament, ask critical questions, and attack the government's position and coping strategy. Furthermore, the question of the status of Barotseland is a recurring issue in election campaigns. Leading personalities of the two major opposition parties Movement for Multi-Party Democracy and United Party for National Development (UPND) issued statements, in which they promised an alternative, more open approach towards the theme and potential

changes.<sup>77</sup> Yet, the parties rather seem to use the Barotse question for their own benefits, that is, to criticise the PF government and position themselves in the political arena in order to gain votes, but do not constructively engage with the problem and a potential solution.<sup>78</sup>

### c) The Irresolute Position of the Barotse Royal Establishment

The Barotse Royal Establishment is another concerned political actor. For decades, the BRE had been supporting calls for the restoration of the Barotseland Agreement. However, in recent years, it has become reserved. It stressed the importance of paying attention to the question of the Barotse status, especially during the constitution making process, but also highlighted that secession was not an option. Moreover, it called for dialogue and a peaceful solution (*Resolutions of the Barotse National Council*, 2011; *Submission to the Government of the Republic of Zambia by the Barotse National Council on the Matter of the National Constitutional Conference and the Barotseland Agreement 1964*, 2009; see also Mubita and Chisala 2013; *The Post*, 11 February, 2011; *Zambian Watchdog*, 23 October, 2010; Zeller 2010b, 312). It is unclear, in how far the *litunga* and his councillors support the resolutions of the BNC in 2012, which deliberated separation. But there is evidence that the BRE does not unconditionally support calls for separation and is at best divided regarding the question. Various observers highlighted that separatist movements would gain considerable strength if they were backed by the BRE. Hence, its reluctance can be interpreted as at least passive opposition to independence, if not explicit hostility (see Zeller 2010b).

### 8.4.2. Critical Voices from Civil Society Actors

It would be an exaggeration to talk of counterframing by the civil society at large. Most organisations do not engage in the question out of fear and speak out only indirectly, for example, by bringing up development issues in Western Province. The loudest and most coherent voice regarding the Barotseland question belongs to the Roman Catholic Church. Moreover, associations representing the Nkoyas and Mbundas, two tribes in Western Province, speak up against separation. Finally, the positions of the Barotse Anti-Secession Movement (BASMO) will be presented here that, although being marginal if not unknown, exemplifies that there are attempts to develop an alternative discourse and uncovers the difficulties related to this effort.

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<sup>77</sup> In June 2014, Hakainde Hichilema of the UPND argued that he would honour the Barotseland Agreement if he would be elected at the end of the term. Nevers Mumba (MMD) declared in December of the same year that he would hold a referendum on the question (*ZNBC*, 31 December, 2014).

<sup>78</sup> This observation also includes the Patriotic Front: As the other parties, it aims to gain an advantage from the Barotse question in terms of political profiling and votes.

### a) The Catholic Church: A Critic of Both Sides

The Catholic Church has a decade-old and strong tradition of political commitment in Zambia: In numerous pastoral letters and other types of individual or collective statements, it fulfilled its responsibility to educate citizens about their rights and duties, denounce problems related to governance, and to serve as “voice of the voiceless” (Komakoma 2003b, 3-9). It is important to understand the stance of the Catholic Church regarding the Barotseland question against this history of political activism.<sup>79</sup>

The Catholic Church has been concerned with the Barotseland question over several years and notably, before tensions increased in this context. As early as 2010, late Paul Duffy, former Bishop of Mongu Diocese, publicly denounced poverty and underdevelopment in Western Province (e.g. *The Post*, 13 January, 2010; 18 January, 2010; 19 January, 2010; 20 January, 2010). In December of the same year, he addressed a letter to the Zambian president as a consequence of violent protests in several towns in Western Province. After the Mongu riots in January of the following year, the Zambia Episcopal Conference (ZEC) took the issue up in a pastoral Solidarity Statement dedicated to the situation in Western Province as well as in two of their regularly Pastoral Statements. Moreover, the Diocese of Mongu provided detailed and critical input to the Chongwe Commission of inquiry. Additional statements, some of which were supported by other religious actors, followed over the years. Finally, comments by members or bodies of the Catholic Church or other denominations in Zambia can also be found in newspaper reports. Based on these sources, counterframing was identified.

In various documents, the Catholic Church refers to the problems that it considers to be at the origin of the Barotseland question: Among these are the failure to include the BA64 into the constitutional draft, the underdevelopment and discrimination of the province, as well as the frustrations resulting from this (Catholic Diocese of Mongu 2011; Council of Churches in Zambia (CCZ), Evangelical Fellowship in Zambia (EFZ), and Zambia Episcopal Conference (ZEC) 2014; ZEC 2013). Regarding this, it expresses solidarity for the activists. Yet, statements such as “we believe that the Barotseland Agreement of 1964 is not synonymous with secession from Zambia” (Catholic Diocese of Mongu 2011, 6) and “we believe that the intentions of our founding fathers and mothers in negotiating and signing this agreement were to foster unity among all people of Zambia and to create the unitary state of Zambia” (ZEC 2011; see also *Lusaka Times*, 27 November, 2010; *Times of Zambia*, 31 March, 2012) underscore that territorial segregation is not the solution, in the eyes of the Church. Its main concern is the way the issue is handled and how a settlement is going to be achieved. In this

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<sup>79</sup> Other denominations and church bodies also occasionally speak up regarding the events in Western Province and supported the Catholics’ activism, for example through joint statements. However, the Catholic Church is most active both in terms of statements and action. Therefore, this analysis is predominantly based on its positions with other confessions’ stances serving as additional material.

respect, the Church highlights that the issue of the Barotseland Agreement is real. It cannot be wished away and will not resolve itself (*Times of Zambia*, 31 March, 2012). Hence, the various actors speaking on behalf of the Church do not become tired of calling for reconciliation and dialogue in order to find a peaceful way forward and avoid further alienation as well as potential escalation. They highlight that all stakeholders, i.e. the government, opposition parties, the BRE, activist groups, and the aggrieved Barotse population, have to contribute to a constructive atmosphere in order to find an amicable solution for the impasse and avoid violence. Dialogue is the only way forward. In this context, religious leaders criticise the central government, particularly the Banda and Sata administrations, regarding its handling of the issue and denounce human rights violations and provocative action by the state. Simultaneously, it implores activist groups to avoid violence (Catholic Diocese of Mongu 2011, 7-13; CCZ, EFZ, and ZEC 2014; Chinyemba 2012; *Lusaka Times*, 7 February, 2011; *Times of Zambia*, 31 March, 2012; ZEC 2011; 2012; 2013).<sup>80</sup>

Overall, the Catholic Church is often mentioned as the only civil society actor that openly speaks out on the question of Barotseland and exercises some influence in the debate. It is interesting how its commitment is perceived. Although it discards separation and equally criticises all conflict parties, it is often considered as siding with self-determination movements and activists feel reassured by its interventions. This can be attributed to the fact that it lends an open ear to the groups' claims and esteems them as partly justified (e.g. criticism regarding socio-economic marginalisation) and that its activities go beyond verbal statements. At several occasions, church leaders met with the activist groups which can be interpreted as a sort of recognition.

### b) Ethnic Opposition from the Nkoyas and the Mbundas

Aside from the Church, some groups representing the interests of special tribes in Western Province disseminate counterframes. Especially the Kazanga Cultural Organisation and the Cheke Cha Mbunda Cultural and Writers Association, cultural organisations that respectively represent the Nkoya and Mbunda tribes, as well as traditional authorities of both communities make themselves heard. Both groups oppose calls for separation and voice their concerns in this regard.

The Nkoyas had already voiced their dissent, when the Barotseland Agreement reappeared in the political arena in the 1990s. According to them, the BA64 is illegitimate in itself since

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<sup>80</sup> Banda's MMD government is blamed for several factors that led to increasing tensions as well as violence in 2010 and 2011. The Church particularly denounces provocative action and human rights violations, before, during, and after the Mongu riots. Michael Sata faces criticism for not having kept his electoral promises, not publishing the report of the Chongwe Commission of Inquiry, as well as continuous human rights breaches and inaction (Catholic Diocese of Mongu 2011, 7-13; ZEC 2013).

preliminary negotiations did not include all stakeholders, i.e. groups in the region. Calls for self-determination are considered “divisive” and “selfish” requests of a “disgruntled and power-hungry” minority. They refute separation as it would lead to the subjugation of other tribes and would risk causing anarchy in the province. They highlighted that they did not wish to return under Lozi domination, but preferred remaining within the Republic of Zambia if necessary by cutting areas that are predominantly inhabited by Nkoyas from Western Province and annexing them as a new province to Zambia (*Lusaka Times*, 28 October, 2011; 29 March, 2012; *UKZAMBIANS*, 29 December, 2011; 27 February, 2012; 7 April, 2012; see also Mubita and Chisala 2013, 154-167, 308, 328).<sup>81</sup>

The Mbundas support the agreement, but point out that it would not provide for secession, but guaranteed the union of Barotseland with Zambia. They highlight that they do not wish to separate from Zambia and express fears that they would become victims of slavery and discrimination in independent Barotseland due to current experiences: “Mbundas strongly feel they have no future in a [sic!] secession, when they are suppressed now” (Cheke Cha Mbunda Cultural and Writers Association 2012). The Zambian Republic is perceived as protecting them from Lozi misrule. Moreover, they highlight that it is necessary to include all concerned parties in decisions regarding Western Province. Hereby, they stress that they do not feel represented by ‘the Lozis’ or the Barotse National Council, which allegedly brought together all communities from Barotseland (Cheke Cha Mbunda Cultural and Writers Association 2011; 2012; 2015; Mubita and Chisala 2013, 310-327, 344-353). Unlike the Nkoyas, who did not participate in the Barotse National Council in 2012, the Mbundas were present and made a statement. This demonstrates that while both communities oppose independence, the Nkoyas also express their refusal through their behaviour. In contrast, the Mbundas use communication platforms such as the BNC to make their voice heard.

### c) The Barotse Anti-Secession Movement: A Grass-Roots Initiative Caught between the Fronts

During field research, an interesting discovery was made: Active citizens of Barotse origin attempted to launch the Barotse Anti-Secession Movement (BASMO), an organisation that should inform and sensitise people, especially regarding history and the Barotseland Agreement, with the aim to provide arguments against secession of Western Province from Zambia.<sup>82</sup> The BASMO reacts to the separatist framing by adopting a strongly legally- and

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<sup>81</sup> At the same time, Nkoya respondents highlighted that they wished to peacefully coexist with their Lozi neighbours which, according to them, was most of the time unproblematic.

<sup>82</sup> BASMO has a historic precursor: In 1960, in the context of the quarrels on Barotseland’s future that preceded independence, an organisation sharing the same name and acronym was created and propagated a nationalist agenda (*Barotse Anti-Secession Movement "BASMO"* [no date]; Caplan 1970, 194-195). The analysis is based on unpublished documents that a leading activist left to the author and remain in her possession.

historically inspired reasoning. The Barotseland Agreement is central for its position. The group hints at flaws in the understanding of the BA64 and demands that the document should be properly interpreted. Moreover, it calls to resolve the dispute through dialogue and peaceful means and avoid war. In this regard, it stresses that in the text itself, it is inscribed that the Zambian High Court should settle disagreements concerning the document. The movement also provides evidence why uniting with Zambia was and remains necessary and beneficial to Barotseland. Furthermore, the documents prepared in the group's name reflect its interpretation of the Zambian-Barotse history before and after 1964 and list failures on behalf of Barotseland regarding the agreement (*Barotse Anti-Secession Movement "BASMO"* [no date]; *Synopsis or Summaries over Barotseland Agreement 1964* [no date]; interview with a concerned citizen, Lusaka, 23 July, 2014). In this context, the counterframing movement also urges to “[a]void calls for secession for it is curse or an Affront to the doctrine of Unity [sic!] being legacy of our distinguished father King Lubosi Lewanika” (*Synopsis or Summaries over Barotseland Agreement 1964* [no date]; emphasis in the original).<sup>83</sup> By doing so, it highlights that separatist demands contradict the former *litunga*'s will and invoke emotions connected with the idea of Barotse national identity and history. Finally, the BASMO criticises the convocation, composition, and proceeding of the Barotse National Council of 2012 as unorderedly and non-transparent. It refutes the final resolution as undemocratic, “stage managed and never emanated from the majority in the villages” (*Barotse Anti-Secession Movement "BASMO"* [no date], 5). In sum, the BASMO's rhetoric mirrors the separatists framing in many respects, but comes to diametrically opposed conclusions.

The BASMO is in a very early stage of creation – one could almost say that it is little more than an idea that is unlikely to develop further. It is realistic to assume that it is unknown outside the organising circle and its message does not have any influence on public discourse in Zambia. Nevertheless, it is taken into consideration here as an example that there are pockets of people in the province that try to bring up their concerns about separatist demands. In addition, it illustrates the difficulties that such an initiative faces. For example, official registration and a certain degree of structural organisation are prerequisites for sensitisation, with both necessitating funds. Furthermore, opponents of separation risk being accused of betrayal and faced with hostility in Barotseland, but they are also likely to become victim of repression by the state that seeks to suppress public debate on the issue. Hence, obstacles for grass-roots initiatives to engage in counterframing are high, if not even prohibitive (Interview with a concerned citizen, Sesheke, 18 July, 2014; interview with a concerned citizen, Lusaka, 23 July, 2014).

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<sup>83</sup> Lubosi Lewanika or Lewanika I, whose name means ‘unifier’ was *litunga* from 1878 to 1916 (with an interruption from 1884 to 1885).

Overall, counterframing remains weak and under-developed in Zambia since there is little space for open discussion on the issue. Yet, the separatists' framing is occasionally challenged in the political arena and by civil society actors. The government mainly circumvents or delegitimises the topic, but also stresses that its policies correspond to the BA64. Contributions by the opposition are politicised and driven by the prospect of future elections, but they do not constructively and rationally engage with the arguments of separatists. Among civil society actors, the Catholic Church is most influential. It recognises some of the grievances voiced in the separatists' framing. Yet, it does not favour separation and calls for dialogue between all stakeholders to achieve a peaceful solution. Moreover, various tribes, namely the Nkoyas and the Mbundas, actively stand up against self-determination. Their position is based on historical experiences and can be assumed to be successful among members of the respective communities. Finally, the BASMO is an interesting example of how counterframing that originates within Lozi society could effectively look like. However, it has not been successfully organised. Thus, it is illustrative for the challenges that opponents of separation have in order to make themselves heard.

As in the case of Casamance, it is useful to take into consideration the relations between the self-determination movements and counterframing agents and the impact of the configuration on collective action frames. In Barotseland, the constellation of actors was different, notably with regard to the Barotse Royal Establishment and the Catholic Church. For the Barotse activists, constructive terms with the provincial élite are important. The *litunga* and his entourage were major symbols of legitimacy and continuity for politics in Barotseland. The self-determination movements strongly based their demands and thus, their framing on the former monarchy and claimed to aim at re-installing it. However, the BRE who should eventually lead the newly independent Barotseland did not support their activism. It remained silent in this respect or uttered criticism. The opposition from the royal court constituted a challenge for the activists, since it risked threatening the credibility of the entire movement and its objectives. Unlike in Casamance, where the MFDC did not show any interest in cooperating with the regional élite, i.e. the *cadres*, the separatist movements in Barotseland had to avoid increasing disagreements. Thus, it refrained from disseminating too radical frames that would contradict the king's opinion and impair connections. Furthermore, there is some evidence that the activist groups' relations with the Catholic Church also had a mitigating effect on framing. The religious representatives clearly called for non-violence, warned of the risks of violence, and expressed their support for national unity. But the Bishop of Mongu had already denounced existing difficulties in Western Province before tensions increased in consequence of the Mongu riots. After the escalation, spokespeople of Christian communities continued to underscore that some of the criticisms by the activist movements were justified, namely with regard to socio-economic hardship in the area and condemned

the government's approach to the issue. Hence, although basically opposing the self-determination movements, the Church appears as an ally to the groups. This reacts upon framing. The Barotse activists would risk losing support from the Church and thus the backing of a potentially useful proponent if they adopted a more radical stance and agitated, for example, for violent means.<sup>84</sup> From this observation, one can deduce that if movements perceive to have an influential ally that apparently supports their framing to some degree, they are more inclined to adopt positions that are acceptable to the seeming intercessor and avoid putting it off.<sup>85</sup> As a consequence, the examples of the Barotse Royal Establishment and the Church illustrated that the constellation of actors had an appeasing effect on framing in Barotseland independent of the concrete content and the virtue of counterframing.

### **8.5. Preliminary Conclusions of the Empirical Analysis of the Barotseland Case Study**

In order to elucidate why the self-determination conflict in Barotseland remained non-violent, the framing approach was applied. At first, the content of the collective action frames that the separatist movements disseminated was examined. The diagnostic framing by the self-determination movements outlined the core of the persisting problem. It emphasised the legal dimension of the issue that resulted from the unilateral abrogation of the Barotseland Agreement of 1964 by the first post-colonial government and refusals of subsequent administrations to reinstate the document. As a consequence, Barotseland lost its autonomy and has been suffering from colonisation and psychological, physical, and cultural repression as well as human rights violations. Socio-economic underdevelopment of the territory which derived from systematic and deliberate neglect by the government in Lusaka is also part of the problem. All these difficulties are in unison blamed on post-colonial Zambian governments. The solution is straightforward. In their prognostic framing, all activist groups speak out for independence as the only way forward. Yet, the strategies to implement this goal vary and there is a framing dispute. While the majority of the movements argue for political and legal – that is, non-violent – measures, Linyungandambo accepted a more militant position and reportedly called for violence in leaflets. In their motivational framing, the movements use various strategies to incite the targeted population to participate in collective action. Once again, they invoke legal arguments in order to convince followers of the rightful character of the struggle. In addition, activists stress that national identity and patriotism

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<sup>84</sup> One can infer that in case of tensions between the Church and the activist movements, the latter would not only lose support of the clergy, but might equally risk deterring believers. This calculus might also influence the movements' modest position. Yet, empirical data is insufficient to conclusively prove this assumption.

<sup>85</sup> The example of the Catholic Church suggests that even partial or perceived support by a counterframing agent can affect the collective action frames of a movement.

necessitate commitment in favour of Barotseland. Finally, time is pressing because the country has suffered for too long and there currently is a window of opportunity that makes efforts promising. Altogether, the framing of the movements is relatively coherent. Various topics recur in all framing dimensions. This is particularly obvious in the case of legal arguments. Moreover, they strongly refer to the distinct Barotse history and identity. These do not only provide rational arguments for separation, but also stir emotions, which are important to convince followers of the importance of the cause and to mobilise for action.

Afterwards, frame resonance was assessed. In general, collective action frames resonated well. Doubtlessly, some segments of society reject separation. Nevertheless, statistics revealed that over 60 per cent of the inhabitants of Western Province are in favour of honouring the Barotseland Agreement (Afrobarometer 2013, 18; Simutanyi 2012). The figures highlight that a substantial proportion of the provincial population has a positive attitude regarding the movements' ideas which is a prerequisite for action. The strong and wide-spread perception that Western Province is socio-economically marginalised and the very real difficulties that people in the area suffer from in their everyday lives provide fertile ground for framing. This does not only regard frames that explicitly refer to underdevelopment. The lack of progress fostered a feeling of not being entirely integrated into the Zambian state and being second-class citizens. Besides, there are allegations that former Barotseland was deliberately neglected. Hence, the impression that Barotseland did not at all benefit from its union with Zambia, but is nowadays even worse off and lags behind its potential became prevalent. In view of these intersecting emotions and grievances, independence represents a plausible and promising alternative to the status quo. However, quests for self-rule do not exclusively result from economic problems. Strong identity-related grievances can also be detected. These derive from the simultaneous lack of identification with the Zambian nation, which remained weak in comparison to the historically grown and deeply entrenched Barotse identity, and a feeling of being culturally marginalised within the post-colonial state. People stress, among others, that their history and contributions to the emergence of the country are not recognised in national historiography which alienates them from Zambia. Besides, parts of the population feel that Lozis became increasingly superseded by immigrants, whom they accepted in their homeland but who now fail to adapt. In addition, legal arguments are easily comprehensible and convincing, since they harmonise well with the prevailing distinct identity and historical consciousness. References to the Barotse nation, history, or identity can be found in all three framing dimensions. Given the emotional and ideational significance of these topics in society, respective frames effectively mobilise. Finally, socio-economic and identity-related factors that enhance frame resonance should not be understood as being detached, but they overlap and reinforce each other. Socio-economic grievances became, for example, interpreted through an ethno-political lens.

This rendered identity even more salient and increased the feeling of being discriminated against in all societal domains among Lozis. Due to these intersections, objective problems are increasingly emotionalised which creates new points of vantage for framing.

Furthermore, the standing of frame articulators also influences the mobilising potency of framing. Concerning this, activist movements work in a difficult environment in Barotseland. Since independence is a taboo topic and they are not officially registered, the groups cannot sensitise openly, but do so clandestinely. This reduces their visibility. Nevertheless, the key framing agents, namely the leaders of the BNFA and Linyungandambo, are well-reputed within the population due to their previous professional activities as a politician or a civil servant in the Zambian government and the Barotse traditional governance system. This helps them to transmit their message in a credible manner. Yet, it is important to take into consideration that some factors, for example, the internal fragmentation of the movement and rivalries between the groups, clearly reduce their integrity. Moreover, leading figures face allegations of being more concerned with personal gains and positions than the political agenda. Despite these points of criticism, the framing agents' credibility still enhances the effectiveness of their promulgated collective action frames.

Not all frames resonate evenly across the targeted population. Different social groups support separatist movements and their ideas to various degrees, with some opposing them completely. Adherence to framing depends on identification as well as (to some extent) social position. The movements' rhetoric does not persuade members of tribes that do not want to be subsumed under the Lozi nationality, namely the Nkoyas and Mbundas. Due to these communities' lack of affinity to the Barotse culture and kingdom, which results from their negative experiences under Lozi rule and their memory of this era, collective action frames do not resonate with them, but they rather support counterframes. There are other group affiliations that also impact frame effectiveness and account for variations in resonance within the Lozi group. Despite the persistence of a Barotse identity, the post-colonial state influenced identification. Those who feel part of the Zambian nation rather than an ethnic or tribal group remain unconvinced by calls for separation and refute them. Moreover, there is awareness that in practice, secession cannot easily be accomplished due to close relations between Western Province and the rest of Zambia. It also matters if people understand themselves as republican and in opposition to traditionalist and royalist thinking or if they fear for being discriminated against in the monarchy since they are not part of the royal family. In sum, prevalence of specific group identities (e.g. tribal, ethnic, or national) as well as ideational and emotional factors that are connected to respective affiliations, such as attitudes, values, cultural heritage, history, as well as collective memory influence how

frames are apprehended and whether they appear credible and salient.<sup>86</sup> As a result, the mobilising potency of the rhetoric varies between different groups and it is imperative to study framing and its resonance from various (groups') perspectives.

Counterframing is another factor that decreases the effectiveness of framing. In the case of Barotseland, few actors engage in constructive counterframing attempts and there is no public debate on the question of separation. The government, which is the key opponent of self-determination, has not yet developed a firm position. It evades the subject, denies the legitimacy of the claims, and justifies its own politics as being in line with the substance of the Barotseland Agreement. Moreover, all political parties politicise the Barotse question. Verbal controversies on the matter rather serve political profiling, but do not aim to critically engage with the issue itself in order to find a solution. The Catholic Church is the most committed opposing agent. The institution simultaneously criticises social ills in Western Province as well as the intransigent position of the government and calls for dialogue. Although it refutes separation, it is often perceived as siding with the self-determination movements which is why they do not consider it as a threat. The counterframing by the Nkoyas and Mbundas represents probably the biggest challenge to Barotse separatists and there are indications that activists are aware of the risk that their rhetoric might pose to them. They deny the existence of an alternative message disseminated by representatives of these tribes or delegitimise them by claiming that they had been bribed by the government. Nevertheless, the framing of separatist groups is not seriously challenged by counterframing at the current stage. Beyond content, the relations between different stakeholders matter. Here, one observes that the self-determination groups are interested in maintaining constructive relationships with the Barotse Royal Establishment and the Catholic Church. Therefore, the activists were more inclined to adopt positions that were acceptable to these and avoided putting them off through too radical framing. This suggests that the configuration of actors had an appeasing effect on framing in Barotseland.

Finally, the framing analysis shed light on the question of why the dispute about independence has remained non-violent, although structural conditions favour the escalation of armed conflict in Zambia. In order to explain this surprising development, it is imperative to particularly focus on prognostic framing, which determines the strategy that is used to achieve the defined aim. There is a framing dispute between groups that organise around the BNFA and that commit themselves to political legal action and (a radical fraction of) Linyungandambo that is ready to apply force. Both the non-violent and the violent frames resonate to some extent. On one side, calls for non-violence are successful, since they are congruent to the legal arguments present in all framing dimensions. In addition, they appeal

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<sup>86</sup> These groups are not stable and clearly delineated, but can change since different identities, for example, ethnic/tribal, political, and social identities overlap to various degrees. Depending on the degree of salience of the different determinants, frame resonance varies.

to Lozi people who imagine themselves as a cultivated and peaceful nation that has renounced using violence a long time ago. Moreover, non-violent action is rooted in traditional institutions of Barotseland that venerate dialogue, negotiation, and compromise. People in Barotseland still largely support their native governance system and therefore, back non-violent principles. Finally, violence is not an option since people had first-hand experiences with armed conflict in the sub-region. They wish to avoid renewed distress and therefore, are not willing to engage in fighting. On the other side, violent framing is especially popular among the young generation. This is due to the fact that the youth are especially affected by socio-economic marginalisation and without prospects as a result of it. This makes them more impatient to quickly achieve an outcome. Furthermore, they are highly aware of existing disparities and exposed to online information, including (radical) framing on the Barotse question that is disseminated through the web. In view of the combination of factors, violence is the most adequate and promising strategy from their perspective. Since there is support for both violence and non-violence, the overall outcome, i.e. what frame and thus, what form of collective action becomes dominant, depends on the intensity of resonance of the different prognostic frames and on the balance of power in society. In Western Province, authority is exercised by segments of society that oppose armed conflict, mainly the elder generation. Moreover, traditional institutions, which still enjoy support by the young generation, also calm the situation. These determinants help to contain propensity for violence. Taken as a whole, non-violent frames resonate better and have more weight in comparison to calls for armed force in the current societal setting. As a result, non-violent means constitute the dominant method of waging the conflict, whereas mobilisation for violence was less successful on a large scale. However, the use of force cannot be completely ruled out as the occasional occurrences of bloodshed show. Moreover, changes in the relations of social forces might lead to a change in resonance which could develop into stronger violent tendencies in the future.

## **9. To Rebel or Not to Rebel? Systematic Comparison of the Case Studies**

Both Senegal and Zambia are confronted with separatist movements within their respective territories. But there is a remarkable difference between the two cases. On the one hand, secessionist claims in Casamance developed into an armed conflict; on the other hand, activist groups in Barotseland fight for self-determination through non-violent means. This variation is all the more astonishing since the two countries exhibit considerable structural similarities (see 5. and 7.). So why did the conflicts evolve as they did? Likewise, it is surprising that the Casamance crisis did not escalate further despite conditions favouring intra-state warfare.<sup>1</sup> Conventional theories of civil wars cannot provide explanations because they overemphasise causal factors at the macro-level. Micro-approaches offer qualitative and more dynamic insights into violent conflicts and therefore, appear better suited. Yet, none of the existing theories is able to account for the variation in collective strategy. Hence, an alternative theoretical perspective is necessary. In this regard, framing appears a useful tool as it helped to overcome comparable difficulties in social movement studies. The present chapter will compile the results of the framing analyses in the two cases (see 6. and 8.). It will compare the effects of framing on conflict behaviour in Casamance and Barotseland in order to answer the research questions as well as demonstrate the explanatory relevance of framing (9.1.). It will also review contributions of the framing approach concerning conflict studies more generally (9.2.).

### **9.1. A Comparison of the Effects of Framing Regarding Conflict Behaviour in Casamance and Barotseland**

The foregoing chapters provided an in-depth analysis of the effects that framing by separatist movements had in Casamance and Barotseland. Based on comprehensive data gathered during field research in both locations, they analysed the content of collective action frames and their resonance, focused on the credibility of frame articulators, and examined the role of counterframing. In the present chapter, the findings of the two cases will be systematically compared. This is expected to give an answer to the research questions and thus, to shed light on the varying outcomes in the two cases as well as conflict dynamics in Casamance. In order to gauge and contrast frame resonance, the criteria for measurement that had previously been developed will be applied (see 4.2.2.). These comprise the general degree

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<sup>1</sup> As outlined in the introduction, two research questions are at the basis of this thesis. First, why did the conflict in Casamance escalate into violent conflict, while events in Barotseland remained non-violent although there are favourable structural conditions in both cases implying a comparable propensity for conflict onset and thus, a similar outcome? Second, why did the armed conflict in Casamance remain so limited in scope after its initial escalation given the presence of factors that are usually expected to cause a full-blown civil war?

of frame resonance, the effectiveness and origin of frames referring to the collective strategy, the credibility of frame articulators, and the impact of counterframing.

### 9.1.1. *Winning Hearts and Minds? A Comparison of the General Degree of Frame Resonance and Its Implications*

The antecedent qualitative content analysis showed that the frames that activist movements in Casamance and Barotseland disseminated to sensitise and mobilise their followers bear some resemblances since they refer to similar topics. Not only does separation constitute the final solution, but groupings equally conjure socio-economic, political, and cultural grievances. These are said to culminate into manifold injustices that the breakaway regions and their inhabitants suffered from. In addition, the groups do not shy back from comparing their particular situations to colonisation. They attribute responsibility for past mistakes and present problems to the governments in Dakar and Lusaka, respectively. Moreover, they bring up cultural, historical, and legal arguments – whether these are true or invented – and allude to the existence of a specific (Casamançais or Barotse) nation in their argumentation. The movements embellished these overarching subjects differently and used them in a variety of ways within their strategic communication. Nonetheless, these recurrences and parallels are useful to generally contrast the effectiveness of the framing across the cases.

In Casamance, the *Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance* initially registered positive frame resonance. Major topics of the movement, such as grievances and existing injustices in various societal domains fell on fertile soil because the regional population faced manifold difficulties due to underdevelopment. This included poor infrastructure and public services as well as a lack of industry in the region. Moreover, locals deplored their insufficient representation and participation in the administrative and political domain. Social dynamics during the 1970s and early 1980s that increased challenges for the Casamançais people and heightened frustrations as well as tensions between the local population and ‘the North’ played in favour of the group’s rhetoric. Notably, the Casamançais suffered from the repercussions of the Senegalese economic crisis. Unlike in the past, young men, who migrated from the southern part of the country to the north to pursue their education or find paid labour, struggled. As a result of downsizing and structural adjustment measures, the educational and economic system could no longer absorb the influx of aspiring young people which ultimately left them without any prospects. Furthermore, a new land law was implemented in the Ziguinchor region that turned out disadvantageous for the native population. As a consequence, many Casamançais lost their property to migrants from the north. Single events, such as the defeat of the Casa Sport in the national football final and the killing of a student during a strike at the *lycée Djignabo* in Ziguinchor, increased resentments. This accumulation of factors led to a feeling among the regional population that

their homeland was increasingly and unfairly exploited by 'foreigners' at their detriment. Thus, comparing the situation with colonialism did not appear far-fetched. Many communities also felt like second-class citizens in the cultural domain. They denounced the ignorance, disdain, and non-recognition of the distinctiveness of southern cultures within the Islamo-Wolof-dominated Senegalese nation-state. Hence, they appreciated culture-related frames of the MFDC since these finally granted them respect. Moreover, the movement attempted to invoke a Casamançais national identity to justify its claims for secession and mobilise followers to actively commit themselves to the cause. Although this frame failed to broadly resonate across the region, it gained support among the ethnic group of the Diola since the rebel group borrowed many elements from their culture to base its national project on. Besides, questions of identity and national belonging were particularly prevalent among the Diola since the Catholic Church had previously fuelled awareness in this regard through its missionary activities and education. Later, cultural and national consciousness continued to flourish in migrant milieus as a result of interactions with 'the North' as well as alienation from it. Interestingly, references to history and the juridical arguments related to them also had some success in Lower Casamance, although these were rather abstract and largely invented. The low or medium level of education allowed for a certain historical consciousness and partial knowledge. Furthermore, many rumours about the past circulated in Casamance. Against this background, juridico-historical frames appeared trustworthy since they connected to events or personalities that people had heard of without knowing the exact historical relations or being able to verify them. Ultimately, the MFDC's head Father Diamacoune was broadly recognised as an intellectual with good historical knowledge which made him a reliable source and enhanced the mobilising potency of history-related frames (see 9.1.3.).

However, the movement could not maintain initial framing successes, but increasingly lost credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of its constituency in the 1990s. An important setback consisted in the lack of consensus regarding the actual objective of the fighting. Many Casamançais were ready to support the MFDC since it allowed them to express their discontent about societal illnesses vis-à-vis 'the Northerners'. Nevertheless, they preferred better economic and political integration into the Senegalese state as a means to alleviate their difficulties. Thus, they rejected the MFDC's principal objective, namely independence. Moreover, the nationalist framing turned out problematic. Although there was a specific regional identity, it contravened the nationalist thinking by the MFDC. It was not discriminating, territorialist, or even separatist. Instead, many Casamançais thought of themselves as 'special Senegalese' and stressed the regional tradition of diversity, tolerance, and hospitality. Hence, the nationalist and sectarian ideas did not correspond to the self-image of a large number of people who regarded the frame as too radical. In addition, due to

its Diola-centrism, the MFDC's national rhetoric remained irrelevant for other communities that did not share the same cultural heritage. Furthermore, the Casamançais national project was as restrictive and exclusive as the present Senegalese nation-state in their eyes. Hence, the nationalist frame did not achieve broad resonance across the Casamançais society beyond the Diola. This constituted an important setback for the motivational framing of the armed group. Moreover, alienation between the MFDC and its constituency increased. The movement did not provide a prospect for the future to people in the region. Nor did it establish parallel state structures or improve infrastructure in the zones it controlled. Instead, civilians fell victim to acts of violence by the armed group and suffered from negative repercussions of its war economy which enhanced hardship and war-fatigue. Besides, ideational goals lost importance in view of vested interests of movement leaders, namely power or economic profit. Thus, there were considerable inconsistencies between the group's framing and action which harmed its credibility. Taken together, frame resonance was generally positive in the beginning but declined in the long run.

As in Casamance, socio-economic grievances were recurrent in the collective action frames of Barotse activists. The inhabitants of Western Province experienced socio-economic hardship, underdevelopment, and poverty on a daily basis and perceived themselves as being deliberately neglected by the central government. Hence, frames denouncing related issues were both credible and salient in their eyes and thus, successfully resonated. Moreover, many individuals shared the view that being part of Zambia had not been beneficial to Barotseland, which they remembered as the wealthy and powerful kingdom it had once been. This illustrates that the past of the realm (or what was handed down about it) still strongly impacts the present. The historic influence can be very concrete, as the still functioning traditional institutions show, or is more abstract since, for example, collective identity and memories or history-related discourses as well as narratives promote framing effects.<sup>2</sup> In sum, history provided an important boost for frame resonance and activists knew how to exploit it for their purpose. In addition, legalistic frames that were used to justify independence but also to mobilise supporters resonated due to the memories or the numerous narratives of the abrogation of the Barotseland Agreement of 1964. Besides, claims for separation or the reversion to a better past appeared feasible in view of the previous existence of a Barotse state and the persistence of the traditional governance

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<sup>2</sup> There are important conceptual differences between narratives and discourses on one side and framing on the other side. Frames are more selective and targeted as well as are more flexible and faster-moving. In addition, framing is explicitly action-orientated and aims to mobilise people for collective actions. Yet, taking into account narratives and discourses is important when analysing framing since they influence the content of frames and are part of the larger cultural background, against which collective action frames resonate. Depending on their congruence with framing, narratives and discourses have a facilitating or constraining effect (Hajer and Laws 2008, 260-261; Patterson and Monroe 1998, 316-322; Rochefort and Donnelly 2013, 194-195; for a detailed discussion of conceptual distinctions, see 3.2.2.).

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system. Finally, nationalist frames benefitted from the fact that they could build on the historically-grown Lozi national identity that still has a certain integrating force, although it is not as encompassing as the separatist groups pretended. In sum, a broad variety of often deeply-entrenched components provided a solid basis for collective action frames with all three framing dimensions profiting from them. This favoured the general degree of frame resonance and represented an important advantage to the Barotse separatist groups over the MFDC.

Doubtlessly, the activists also struggled with societal headwinds and frames did not resonate unequivocally. Modernists voiced scepticism that Barotseland would be viable after independence. They stressed the insufficient functionality of the traditional institutions and their discriminatory as well as undemocratic character. They also questioned the regional economic capacities and potential for development. From their point of view, the difficulties of the province, which they partly recognised, would be better addressed through decentralisation and more efficient development measures. This shows that they did not oppose the framing as a whole but parts of it, namely the proposed solution. There was also opposition related to identity. On the one hand, tribal identification limited frame resonance which demonstrates that the success of framing varies across different social groups. Some communities, especially the Nkoyas and the Mbundas refuted to be part of the Lozi nation due to their own particularities. They had also suffered from discrimination in the former kingdom which is why they did not wish to return to feudalism. On the other hand, some parts of the provincial population rejected separation for being tantamount to 'tribalism' given the Zambian national project and its merits, namely political stability and republicanism. In this context, the feasibility of separation was also questioned due to the manifold interlinkages between Western Province and the rest of Zambia. Despite these challenges from different sides, collective action frames of Barotse separatist groups effectively resonated.

In order to systematically measure and compare the general degree of frame resonance in Casamance and Barotseland, it is useful to differentiate between the framing dimensions and to categorise factors that favour frame resonance with regard to their time range and deep-rootedness (see 4.2.2.). In Casamance, the frames that referred to socio-economic, cultural, and political grievances as well as the feeling of injustice related to them were particularly strong and successful among the population. This illustrates that the diagnostic framing dimension resonated comparatively well. Yet, the different topics evoked in this context were not all accepted to the same extent. By contrast, the MFDC's prognostic framing, that is, its proposed way out, failed to broadly appeal since there was no unanimity among the MFDC and its constituency about what the solution should be. Hence, the armed group did not attain consensus mobilisation which is an important prerequisite for activating followers to commit themselves to a cause. Moreover, motivational framing was only partly and

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temporarily successful which limited the appeal of the rebels' calls to arms (see also 9.1.2.). While historic elements had some influence, the nationalist references did not have a mobilising impact outside the Diola community. The justifying argument that the use of force would serve as self-protection against foreign repression also lost its persuasiveness over time. Overall, the resonance of the different framing dimensions greatly varied and was especially deficient with regard to the prognostic and motivational components. This considerably weakened the MFDC's potential to effectively and sustainably mobilise followers. Furthermore, frame resonance in Casamance mainly relied on short- and medium-term factors. These doubtlessly have essential advantages and can provide a strong impetus and an important basis for frame resonance. Especially emotions, which belong to the short-term determinants, can amplify the success of a frame because their intensity and affective character constitute an explosive mixture. Their impact became apparent during the emotionally tense atmosphere, which prevailed in the region after the first marches and in consequence of repression by the government and served as fertile ground for the MFDC. Yet, such factors are contingent, unsustainable, and relatively easy to modify. The government managed, for instance, to decrease frustrations which are among the medium-term determinants of frame resonance through accommodating policies. Hence, it cut the ground from under the MFDC's feet. Overall, the Casamançais rebels failed to draw upon long-term or underlying factors. Its attempts to mobilise by means of a (constructed) national identity were not crowned with success outside the Diola community. Hence, frame resonance lacked a stable and deep-rooted basis.<sup>3</sup> Compared to Casamance, the content of framing in Barotseland and its different dimensions were overall well-developed and internally consistent which favoured frame resonance. It contained several thematic areas that appealed to the local population. While the diagnostic framing was especially influential, there were also deficits as previously mentioned. These particularly concerned the prognostic dimension, since some parts of the Barotse society opposed independence. Nevertheless, a modification in the status of Barotseland received large support and was more broadly accepted than the idea of separation in Casamance. Motivational framing was also compelling despite some weaknesses.<sup>4</sup> Altogether, those elements of collective action frames that were successful outweighed existing shortfalls. As a result, the groups effectively attained both consensus and action mobilisation which gave them an important advantage in comparison to the MFDC. With regard to the content of frames, real or perceived inequalities and (the feeling of) neglect also played an important role in the west of Zambia. However,

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<sup>3</sup> Instead, underlying attitudes, which could have served as a long-term basis enhancing frame resonance, contravened the movement's framing and weakened its appeal.

<sup>4</sup> Armed conflict goes along with particularly high costs for combatants and the supporting population. This represents a challenge for framing agents who have to convince constituents of the relevance and feasibility of their objective as well as the need to use force and overcome collective action problems. Hence, mobilising for non-violent action is easier than inciting followers to take up arms.

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there were additional relevant thematic areas, notably the common identity as well as cultural, historical, and political components that intersected, mutually reinforced each other, and contributed to positive frame resonance. Consequently, the activist groups simultaneously benefitted from short-, medium-, and long-term factors that favoured frame resonance and could build on a both more diverse and more thorough foundation than the Casamançais rebels. In this respect, it is noteworthy that determinants with various time frames were not mutually exclusive, but interacted. Frames referring to the past, for instance, simultaneously profited from deeply enrooted and situational components because allusions to former times also involved strong emotions. These included, for example, pride connected with identity or anger about the non-respect of the Barotseland Agreement of 1964. Therefore, frame resonance resulted from a combination of dynamics and components of different time frames and could benefit of the advantages of all of them. In this context, long-term components, including the cultural background and societal predispositions are especially important. They form a reliable and stable base to draw upon since they do not easily alter and are hard to be challenged by counterframing and accommodating actions. But the explosive impact of emotions also played in favour of the Barotse groupings. Overall, frame resonance in Barotseland was not exclusively dependent on situational dynamics and components but was also founded on deep-rooted elements of local culture. Finally, the frames that successfully resonated in Barotseland contained a larger array of interdependent topics, whereas the appeal of the MFDC mainly depended on grievance-related frames. This constituted an important advantage for the Lozi activists, since diverse themes potentially appeal to different societal groups and thus, to a greater amount of people. Besides, opponent actors had to react to manifold issues and demands at once which made counterframing more complicated.

Overall, collective action frames resonated to a greater degree in Barotseland than in Casamance. The MFDC's mobilising potency was reduced since the group failed to achieve consensus mobilisation. Moreover, its motivational framing, that is, its 'call to arms' was weak. Although their rhetoric was also challenged, Barotse activists were successful in attaining resonance with regard to all framing dimensions. Thus, they were able to both convince their followers of their cause and offered rationales as to why they should join collective action. Moreover, the mobilising potency of framing in Barotseland resulted from short-, medium-, and long-term determinants which formed both a strong and diverse foundation. By contrast, the MFDC failed to invoke deep-rooted components and depended on short- and medium-term factors which made its rhetoric vulnerable.

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### 9.1.2. *Prognostic Framing and Its Resonance as Determinants of Violent or Non-Violent Action*

Prognostic frames referring to the preferred collective strategy of a movement play a major role in determining whether a conflict escalates or remains non-violent. Therefore, they will be assessed and compared separately. The activist groups in the two regions adopted fundamentally different positions in this regard. On the one side, the *Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance* (more or less openly) agitated for armed struggle. On the other side, the Barotse activist groups mainly opted for peaceful means with the exception of Linyungandambo. Yet, the content of prognostic frames is insufficient to explain the deviation in collective strategy. It is also imperative to consider what favoured the emergence of these frames, how they blended into framing more broadly, and whether and to what extent they effectively resonated.

The strategy-related frames of the MFDC were dynamic. In consequence of the government repression after the first march, the movement opted for a reactive violent frame. It presented the use of force as a means of self-defence that was unintended but inevitable in view of the circumstances. Later, it called more actively and offensively for armed struggle and legitimised violence as a necessity to achieve independence. It is important to note that the movement's radical position was to some extent influenced by the relations between different stakeholders that led to the MFDC's isolation (see 9.1.4.). The violent frames partly resonated, but their effectiveness varied over time. In the beginning of the crisis, the calls for the use of force as a protective measure touched a sore spot. Frustrations about real or perceived socio-economic, cultural, and political discrimination of the region had intensified and accumulated in the years preceding the first protest march. The grievances intersected with resentments towards 'the Northerners'. Divisions and alienation between the two parts of the country appeared insurmountable. Furthermore, the situation was emotionally charged as a result of the indiscriminate violent proceeding of security forces, which often affected innocent bystanders, and the failure of the government to engage in dialogue. Individual experiences, for example anger about the brutalisation of family members or the fear to fall victim to repression, interacted with and reinforced collective emotions. In view of this mixture of factors, taking up arms seemingly presented an opportunity to protect the community as well as oneself and to take revenge for past sufferings. Thus, it appeared justified and imperative. Yet, while the combination proved very effective for a restricted period of time, short- and medium-term factors favouring frame resonance are modifiable and constitute an unstable foundation in the long run. This was disadvantageous for the armed group and its prognostic framing. Calls for violence lost their appeal, when the wave of emotions abated and grievances as well as the enemy image of the Senegalese state crumbled as a result of accommodating policies of the government. Since the rebel movement itself increasingly became a threat to the local population, justifying violence as a protective means became

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implausible. As in the case of framing more generally, the MFDC failed to provide a durable basis for its strategy-related prognostic frames which could have helped to maintain support for them. It tried to culturally embed such frames by connecting them with historical and nationalist arguments, namely the idea of Casamance as a traditionally rebellious region that had been engaging in a struggle for liberation for centuries. However, this attempt failed since the movement's conceptualisations of a Casamançais nation and common history were not broadly embraced. Instead, many Casamançais praised (whether rightfully or not) the tolerant and multi-ethnic tradition of their home region which implies that long-term determinants contradicted the use of force. Therefore, the armed group could not convince its constituency of its violent strategy. Especially calls to offensively use force were considered too radical by the majority of the Casamançais and thus, did not resonate. In sum, the MFDC's violent framing was a precipitate rather than a thoroughly thought through decision. This explains that it was not properly prepared and theorised in advance. Frames calling for violent collective action experienced a brief and intensive boost in view of a short-lived combination of propitious factors, but their resonance was unsustainable given the lack of a long-term basis and declined. This helps to explain why violence erupted in the first place, but was not sustainable and thus, dropped to a comparatively low level.

In Barotseland, the majority of the activist movements called for non-violence to achieve independence. Solely Linyungandambo adopted a more radical stance that included violent means. The non-violent framing corresponds well to and results from the strong emphasis of juridical arguments that relate to the BA64 and pervade all framing dimensions. It is also in line with the activists' way of proceeding (for example, joining the UNPO or trying to initiate arbitration) that illustrates their determination to stick to peaceful means. Hence, the self-determination groups exhibited a remarkable coherence concerning different framing dimensions as well as their framing and action. This earned them credibility and constituted a non-negligible advantage over the MFDC that enmeshed itself in contradictions. Furthermore, the Barotse activists benefitted from long-term factors favouring their strategy-related framing. These constituted another plus compared to the Casamançais rebels. Calls for non-violence corresponded to the pre-existing self-understanding and collective memory of Lozis. They perceived themselves as a highly developed and cultivated society that was historically peaceful and avoided violence whenever possible. They also venerated democratic principles and considered debate, dialogue, and consensus-making as core institutions of traditional governance structures in Barotseland.<sup>5</sup> Due to their close fit with societal predispositions, such as collective memory, practices, and tradition, the non-violent prognostic frames benefitted from a strong and durable basis. Moreover, the older generation that upheld conservative views and was more inclined towards peaceful means held the

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<sup>5</sup> Myth and reality overlap. Consensus and debate are important in Barotseland, yet the democratic and peaceful self-image is exaggerated.

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main societal positions. This also helped to keep the situation calm. In addition, people in Western Province had suffered from armed conflicts in neighbouring countries whose negative socio-economic and psychological repercussions remained unforgotten. Besides, the potential risks connected with violence were especially present in the area in view of the Mongu riots in 2011. The prevailing fear and aversion to the use of force within the Barotse society enhanced the resonance of the non-violent rhetoric.<sup>6</sup> Finally, the emergence and retention of non-violent frames was also determined by the movements' relations with other relevant actors. The groups presented themselves as being in continuity with the Barotse traditional élite in order to increase their trustworthiness and in consequence, the effectiveness of frames. Besides, the Catholic Church was perceived as a potential ally as it criticised social ills in the province. Thus, the activists were interested in maintaining constructive relations with both stakeholders and refrained from adopting extreme positions, namely agitating for violence that could alienate them. As a result, the constellation of framing and counterframing agents had an attenuating effect in the case of Barotseland (for a detailed discussion, see 9.1.4.). Altogether, opting for non-violence was a thoughtful decision in Barotseland and contributed to the overall coherence and resonance of the activist groups' frames. The proposed strategy was both relatively salient and credible in the eyes of the majority of followers due to their experiences, underlying attitudes, and values. It was particularly advantageous for the movements that they could rely on favourable factors with various time frames, including determinants of a long-, medium-, and short-term range that interacted and provided a solid and permanent founding for the prognostic frames regarding strategy. Simultaneously, non-violent framing corresponded to people's present needs and emotional state which is why they identified with it.

However, calls for non-violence were challenged by Linyungandambo that vindicated a more radical point of view and occasionally instigated violence. Therefore, there was a framing dispute between different activist movements with regard to the most adequate collective strategy. Its repercussions on the effectiveness of prognostic frames and resulting collective action have to be taken into account. It is not surprising that violence broke out in relation to the Barotseland question at several instances because militant frames were temporarily successful. They had some appeal in view of the current situation. The combination of unaddressed grievances in various societal domains, frustrations about the deadlock of the Barotse question, and repression by the government favoured the resonance of calls for violence. This reminds of Casamance where the emotional pot also boiled over and culminated in armed conflict. Furthermore, Linyungandambo was particularly successful among the young generation due to multiple propitious factors. The youth were susceptible

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<sup>6</sup> Activist movements in Casamance and Barotseland reacted differently to repression. While the MFDC used it to justify violence, most movements in Barotseland instrumentalised repressive action to delegitimise the government and legitimise their own – non-violent – way of proceeding.

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to the movement's radical propositions since they were especially affected by the underdevelopment of the province, notably the lack of opportunities regarding education and employment. Likewise, as a result of better media access, they were well aware of regional disparities in terms of socio-economic development. Moreover, young people were interested in the regional past but had often only partial historical knowledge. Furthermore, they adhered to a weaker extent to the traditional institutions and values of non-violence and dialogue having an appeasing effect as previously described. In addition, they were less exposed to influences that could make them receptive to counterframes, especially Kaunda's rhetoric and practices regarding national identification and unity which is why they lost relevance to them. Finally, young people had little to lose and separation appeared an attractive way out of the present dead-end. In consequence, they were more emotional about the issue, less patient to see an outcome of the struggle, and more radical regarding the means than elder proponents of separation. From their point of view, the use of force was preferable to negotiation and consensus-making as peaceful means had failed to achieve progress. Altogether, this illustrates that there were short- and medium-term determinants that favoured the acceptance of violence to some extent. Furthermore, long-term factors having an attenuating effect were weaker among the youth in comparison to other segments of the Barotse society. Nevertheless, violent instances remained rare so far. This is due to the fact that non-violent frames continue resonating more effectively compared to violent ones in the aggregate and therefore, outweigh the influence of radical rhetoric. But the increasing popularity of militant positions among young people should be interpreted as a warning that violent frames might gain momentum if priorities in the society shift and the older generation that still occupies leading positions loses influence at the benefit of the young one. Therefore, violent escalation cannot entirely be ruled out in Barotseland.

Overall, the comparative perspective on strategy-related frames in Casamance and Barotseland yields important insights with regard to the different outcomes of the two conflicts and helps to account for conflict dynamics in the former case. Comparable to a flood wave, the MFDC's calls for reactive violence reached great but brief popularity that rested upon situational and emotional factors. This enabled the escalation of the violent conflict. However, the strategy-related prognostic frames suffered from similar deficits as collective action frames as a whole. Support abated as quickly as it had increased because the majority of Casamançais did not accept the use of force due to their underlying points of view and value judgements. Hence, the framing lacked a stable basis and the rebel group could not maintain its initially successful mobilisation. The alienation between the armed group and its constituency widened further as the MFDC adopted a more offensive strategy. As a consequence, the initial level of violence was unsustainable and dropped which resulted in a low-intensity conflict. In Barotseland, framing also influenced conflict dynamics. The

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occasional riots illustrate that there is potential for violence in the province. Linyungandambo tried to stir up followers and was partly successful. Violent frames corresponded to experiences of marginalisation and neglect, frustration, and radical attitudes that were particularly prevalent among the younger generation. Yet, the majority of the activist movements had adopted moderate positions and stuck to non-violent means. This choice increased the overall internal coherence of the content of their frames as well as the match of their framing and action. Moreover, non-violent frames fit with the cultural background and societal predispositions in Barotseland. Therefore, they resonated better and more durably than violent calls and outweighed these so far. In sum, one can clearly observe that framing countered violent tendencies and impeded the escalation of the conflict; hence, it had an attenuating effect.

### 9.1.3. *Personality Matters: The Credibility of Frame Articulators*

The separatist movements in Casamance and Barotseland could both rely on well-reputed and credible leading figures that positively influenced frame resonance. Yet, there are differences across time and cases.

Father Augustin Diamacoune Senghor represented a godsend for the *Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance* whose intellectual and political head he was. He was broadly known since he held positions in different locations of the region and undertook various other public activities, namely animating a radio show and organising conferences. Moreover, he could build on different forms of legitimacy (including among others, authority resulting from being a Catholic priest and an intellectual with thorough historical knowledge, his strong charisma combined with the power to convince, and proven knowledge and respect for local traditions) which guaranteed him the recognition of various societal groups. His standing clearly favoured frame resonance, with some followers being apparently more strongly attracted by his person than the actual content of the framing. Thus, his commitment had a boosting effect for the MFDC regarding mobilisation. It became especially obvious to what degree Diamacoune's personality had determined the success of framing, when he lost his authority within both the armed movement and the population in the mid-1990s and finally deceased. The rebels did not dispose of another strong and authentic leading figure to replace him. Hence, there was a vacuum at the top of the insurgent group that represented an unsurmountable drawback for it. This was especially problematic because the movement would have needed an influential frame articulator to counterbalance the increasing alienation of the MFDC from its constituency and internal divisions. Thus, the coincidence of detrimental factors accelerated further its loss of support.

In Barotseland, the major organisations, namely the Barotse National Freedom Alliance and Linyungandambo also disposed of prominent leading figures. Clement Wainyae Sinyinda

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(BNFA) had previously been a politician of the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy and had also occupied the position of the *ngambela* in the Barotse traditional system. Afumba Mombotwa (Linyungandambo) had worked as a civil servant in Lusaka and was an activist of the first hour. Consequently, they were well-known in the province and considered as credible and experienced with regard to political issues. However, their reputation was also contested. Critical voices denounced that the present leaders of the independence struggle had failed to commit themselves to bring development to Western Province let alone separation while working for the government. Hence, their present dedication appeared hypocritical. Related to this and in view of the fractionalisation of the movement, it is not surprising that there were allegations that they would be more interested in personal gains and positions than the well-being of the province and its people. Such claims cast doubts on the leaders' intentions and harmed their image to a certain extent. However, they did not fully destroy it. Therefore, the Barotse framing agents' credibility still enhanced the effectiveness of their promulgated collective action frames.

From a comparative perspective, Father Diamacoune's trustworthiness was high at first and exceeded the standing of the movement leaders in Barotseland, which only reached a medium level given the multiple points of criticism that they faced. Thus, the credibility of frame articulators positively impacted the appeal that framing had on the respective constituencies in both cases with the effect being stronger in Casamance. Yet, Diamacoune's reputation decreased and the rebel group did not dispose of another powerful leading figure to replace him. The loss of a convincing head constituted a major setback for the MFDC and negatively affected frame resonance. Hence, this aspect also contributes to accounting for the deviant conflict behaviour and dynamics of violence over time. Moreover, the example of Casamance exemplifies the important role that movement leaders play regarding the effectiveness of frames.

### 9.1.4. *Alternative Views: The Relevance of Counterframing and Constellations of Actors on Protest Strategy*

Depending on its argumentative strength, the counterframing by concerned political and social actors can reduce the mobilising potency of the strategic communication of social movements. Moreover, the constellation of actors impinges the emergence and development of frames concerning the preferred strategy. Consequently, it co-determines whether movements use violent or non-violent frames.

#### a) Deconstructing Separatism: The Argumentative Relevance of Counterframing

In both cases, different political and civil society actors engaged in counterframing with varying degrees of success as the following comparison will illustrate.

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The Senegalese government, the main counterframing agent in the early phase of the crisis, mainly reacted to the events by playing down, marginalising, and criminalising the MFDC. The state highlighted the value of national unity and territorial integrity, but did little to dispute the content of the framing or deal with the underlying reasons of the conflict. Therefore, its early counterframing was ineffective and unintendedly favoured the MFDC that monopolised the rhetorical arena and did not meet convincing resistance. The weak counterframing was accompanied by vigorous and indiscriminate repression having contradictory implications. On the one hand, the brutality had a deterring effect because it obstructed public debate and sensitisation. On the other hand, it drove many supporters towards the MFDC, discredited the government, and enhanced the alienation of Casamançais from the central administration. Hence, it played into the hands of the MFDC. Other political and societal actors, namely the *cadres casamançais* and opposition parties also spoke out. However, they disposed of limited influence within the region and largely aligned with the official viewpoint of the government.<sup>7</sup> Their counterframing neither strengthened nor diversified the opposition to the MFDC and thus, did not effectively challenge it. Gradually, the government came up with a more proactive and sophisticated position to deconstruct the rebels' demands. It also acknowledged grievances voiced by the MFDC and adopted policies in various fields to alleviate them. By proposing alternative arguments and partly accommodating claims by the rebels, the Senegalese government increasingly managed to counter medium- and short-term factors that had favoured the MFDC's rhetoric. It also invalidated its own negative image as the principal source of the problems and matched the expectations of those who wished to be better integrated and recognised within the country. Although this might not have prompted Casamançais to endorse the regime, it cut the ground from under the movement's feet and reduced support for the movement. After initial hesitation, the Catholic Church also turned into an influential counterframing agent. The faith community disapproved separation and violence, stressed the importance of justice, dialogue, as well as reconciliation, and called for peace at the national and regional level. It openly denounced the underlying causes of the crisis as well as human rights abuses and criticised both conflicting parties. The Church also took humanitarian action to reduce the suffering in the region and worked towards a solution of the conflict, for example, by mediating. Its important societal position and status, the moderate attitude, and its active involvement earned the religious community credibility in the eyes of different stakeholders and helped the institution to make itself heard (Foucher 2003a, 35-36). Altogether, the

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<sup>7</sup> Oppositional parties were weak due to the hegemony by the *Parti Socialiste*, the fractionalised party scene, and their feeble connections with rural areas. The *cadres'* standing was more favourable. Their descent and social rank lent them some credibility and helped to limit the cogency of the MFDC's framing to a certain degree. Yet, their influence should not be overestimated. They were criticised for being too detached from regional realities or even faced allegations of personally benefitting from their activism in the crisis. Thus, there was considerable reservation towards them among the locals.

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counterframing agents came up with more adequate strategies over the course of the conflict, but also benefitted from a window of opportunity. Since the MFDC's rhetoric did not evolve much, they could fill a vacuum and propose alternatives. The increasing war-weariness and disappointment about the MFDC that grew among the regional population also favoured counterframing.

Various actors also tried to challenge the idea of separation in Barotseland. The government in Lusaka adopted an evasive strategy in order to deny, silence, or downplay the Barotse question altogether. If avoiding the topic was impossible, it aimed to delegitimise claims for independence and the movements by treating them, among others, as unrepresentative, illegal, as well as tribalist and presenting them as a threat to the founding principle as well as the future of the Zambian state. Furthermore, the administration stressed that by promoting development, it actually honoured the Barotseland Agreement as promised. The official counterframing did not argumentatively challenge the rhetoric of the separatist movements. Admittedly, since collective action frames were deeply entrenched in the societal and cultural background of the target group in Barotseland, they were more difficult to challenge than in Casamance. Moreover, development initiatives by the state did not win over hearts and minds by reducing grievances and feelings of alienation in Western Province. Rather, mistrust towards Lusaka prevailed among many people in Barotseland and harmed the influence of the central administration. Taken together, the government's counterframing apparently appealed to sceptics of separation. Yet, it was incapable to convince those appreciating the idea of an independent Barotse state. Therefore, it consolidated the status quo but did not change majorities. Other actors also interfered. The Barotse Royal Establishment had supported calls for the restoration of the BA64 in the past. Yet, it took a rather reserved position. Although the traditional leadership occasionally stressed the importance of re-considering the status of Barotseland, it discarded secession and called for dialogue and peace. The unclear and cautious stance of the *litunga* and his councillors must be interpreted as a form of counterframing that has twofold and contradictory implications. On the one side, due to the high standing of the traditional élite in society, their passivity weakened the separatist movements. On the other side, the lack of support for the activists and consequently the seeming indifference regarding the concerns of the province triggered incomprehension for the BRE among locals. This was beneficial to the activist groups. The Catholic Church in Zambia, which had already denounced socio-economic difficulties in Western Province before political tensions regarding Barotseland increased, highlighted that the current problem originated in the failure to include the BA64 into the constitutional draft, the underdevelopment and discrimination of the province, as well as the resulting frustrations. Simultaneously, it stressed that secession was not a solution and called for reconciliation and dialogue in order to settle the matter peacefully and in a cooperative

manner. In this context, the clergy condemned the use of force by all concerned actors. In spite of its critical attitude towards both conflicting parties, the Church was often considered biased in favour of the self-determination movements both by the activists themselves and the government. There was also ethnic-based resistance, notably from the Nkoya and Mbunda communities. Their counterframing intersected with the official rhetoric of the state. Both groups feared that separation would lead to their subjugation under Lozi domination, which they had suffered from in the past. Therefore, both groups preferred remaining within the Zambian state of law. The counterframing corresponded to the experiences and (self-)perceptions of the two communities, but did not resonate beyond them. Hence, the reach of the ethnic-based counterframing was limited since both tribes represented minorities in the province.<sup>8</sup> Nevertheless, their opposition challenged the activists' framing because it countered their assertion to act on behalf of the entire province. Besides, the commitment by the Mbundas and the Nkoyas was of symbolic importance because they dared to actively stand up against self-determination.<sup>9</sup> By and large, the other counterframing agents challenged the activist movements' appeal to some degree, but did not constitute a strong counterweight.<sup>10</sup>

Although separatist movements in both cases initially benefitted from the ineffective counterframing, the overall impact varied. In Casamance, the counterframing strategy of critics of separation evolved. Over time, they successfully opposed the MFDC and weakened its appeal in spite of initial difficulties. In Barotseland, both the state and non-state actors have not yet managed to come up with strong arguments that could sustainably weaken separatist movements and their deeply enrooted framing. Hence, the activists' rhetoric is only challenged to a limited degree.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> The Mbundas and the Nkoyas together make up less than 20 per cent of the provincial population (CSO 2012b, 68) and presumably did not unanimously support the status quo.

<sup>9</sup> There were other counterframing agents of marginal influence. Opposition parties mainly used the issue of Barotseland to criticise the government and position themselves in the political arena, but did not constructively engage with the topic. The BASMO, a grass-roots initiative from Western Province, aimed to rectify information concerning the Barotseland question and provide arguments against secession. However, the group has remained embryonic due to practical constraints and the limited freedom of expression. It did not have any influence on public debate in Zambia. Yet, it exemplifies the difficulties that are connected with counterframing regarding the Barotse question.

<sup>10</sup> In this regard, there are resemblances between the present situation in Barotseland and the beginning of the crisis in Casamance. The poor counterframing results, among others, from the government's attempts to inhibit public debate about the issue of Barotseland by limiting freedom of speech and assembly. However, such restrictions do not automatically weaken social movements but often favour them since they continue to disseminate their frames, while counterframing agents, such as the BASMO, are deterred from propagating their positions. As a consequence, framing agents can dominate public space without facing opposition. Weak counterframing is also determined by other factors, such as opportunism in an unsure situation where one does not want to clearly take sides.

<sup>11</sup> The time that has elapsed since the beginning of the conflict in Barotseland is shorter than in the case of Casamance. Hence, agents had less time to react to the framing and to come up with an effective strategy. At the current stage, it is impossible to predict how counterframing will develop in the future and if it might become more successful, as in the southern region of Senegal.

### b) The Impact of the Constellation of Actors

Not only the content of counterframing and the influence of opposing actors are relevant. The relation between social movements and counterframing agents also has to be taken into account to elucidate the deviant outcomes in conflict behaviour in Casamance and Barotseland. There are instructive differences concerning the constellation of actors between the two cases.

In Casamance, the counterframing agents fiercely opposed the rebels' objective and notably denounced the use of force as a means to achieve it. Hence, the MFDC did not have an ally that it could expect support from. Nor did it seek to maintain good terms with stakeholders in the region (for example, the local élite). Consequently, the polarisation between the rebel movement on one side and the counterframing actors on the other was pronounced. The isolation of the MFDC favoured the radical stance of the movement and facilitated violent framing. Furthermore, given the lack of advocates, the armed movement solely depended on its own demonstration of power and force. Hence, neither could it depart from its violent framing, nor did it have an incentive to do so.

By contrast, the Barotse activist movements were interested in not putting off and alienating specific counterframing agents, namely the Barotse Royal Establishment and the Catholic Church. The BRE did not support separation, but was an important stakeholder because it simultaneously incarnated the glorious past of the former kingdom and served as traditional leaders that could influence the population. The self-determination movements strongly organised their framing around the monarchy whose interests they pretended to represent and that should continue to rule after independence. Due to the key role that the aristocracy played in the activists' demands, its opposition threatened the credibility of the framing by the separatist groups. In order to avoid increasing and open disagreements with the court, the movements refrained from disseminating too radical frames that would contradict the *litunga's* opinion. Contacts with the Catholic Church were also important. Although the faith community denounced separation, it supported some aspects of the groups' frames, namely claims concerning socio-economic difficulties of Western Province, and aimed to mediate between the conflicting parties. Thus, it appeared as an ally to the movements. This constituted another incentive for them to avoid extreme views, especially with regard to their collective strategy, as these risked endangering the (actual or imagined) backing by the Church. Hence, separatist movements were interested in maintaining positive relations with relevant stakeholders. This had a mitigating effect on the content of frames and helps to explain why most groups avoided calls for violence so far.

To sum up, the actor constellation between framing and counterframing agents influences the content of collective action frames. If there is a marked polarisation between different actors and if social movements do not need to cooperate with their detractors, as it was the

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case in Casamance, they do not face limitations concerning framing and can adopt or stick to radical positions, including violence as a collective strategy. Yet, if activist groups depend on counterframing agents, have to prevent open confrontation, or even find (partial) support from them, like separatists in Barotseland did, their rhetoric is restricted by the dual obligation to attract followers on the one hand and maintain constructive relations with their opponents on the other hand. Thus, they avoid extreme opinions and frame their claims in a way that appears acceptable to their counterparts. This demonstrates that independent of the content of counterframing, relations between the different actors can have an escalating or appeasing effect on framing. Thus, it influences whether a conflict is likely to turn violent or not. As a consequence, it is imperative to take into account the interactions of (armed) movements with other relevant actors to explain the outbreak of armed conflict, since violence does not exclusively come from within but is partly promoted by external circumstances.

### 9.1.5. Comparative Wrap-Up

Altogether, framing – more precisely, divergences in the content of collective action frames and their resonance – proved useful to account for conflict trends and notably, variations in the dependent variable in the two cases (see figure 9). It helped to provide important insights into dynamics, processes, and interactions that determined the respective ways conflict was waged. In Casamance, the framing by the MFDC was deficient in many respects. The different dimensions of the collective action frames were poorly developed and insufficiently connected. Thus they could not draw a coherent and convincing picture of the MFDC's ideas and aims. In spite of this inconvenience, the movement initially succeeded in mobilising followers since its propositions effectively resonated in view of the frustrations and tensions that had increased in the region in the foregoing years, the local population's everyday hardship, as well as feelings of being discriminated against. Moreover, its propositions particularly appealed to the Diola, since the rhetoric corresponded to specific experiences and the cultural as well as national consciousness of the ethnic group. Outside this community, framing was less effective. This illustrates that the insurgent group benefitted to a large extent from situational factors regarding general frame resonance, while long-term factors played a smaller role and were restricted to a specific sub-group of society. A significant trump in the hands of the MFDC was its leader Father Diamacoune who had a very good standing in the Ziguinchor region and disposed of great persuasive powers. His charismatic personality enhanced the mobilising potency of framing and inclined many followers to support the insurgents or join the *maquis*. As a result of government repression, the MFDC opted for a defensive violent frame, which was poorly theorised. Later, it adopted a more offensive stance and actively agitated for the use of force. Its radical position was

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favoured by its distance and isolation from other stakeholders. The emotionally charged atmosphere that developed after the first march and the experience of brutal repression fuelled the mobilising potency of violent prognostic frames and contributed to overcoming collective action problems. This combination of factors led to the initial escalation of the Casamance conflict since supporters could be temporarily convinced to engage in and support violent collective action. However, in the long run, the manifold inconsistencies that existed with regard to the MFDC's framing increasingly weakened its appeal among the target group. The collective action frames were not well enrooted and lacked broad support within the Casamançais society which harmed their resonance. Notably, the idea of separation and the use of force as a strategy to achieve it were too radical in the eyes of considerable parts of the regional populace and contradicted their self-perceptions and values. Moreover, the movement began to turn against the civilian population and inflicted suffering on the people it pretended to represent. This incompatibility between the MFDC's framing and action counteracted frame resonance. Hence, the gap between the armed group and its support basis widened. The loss of its influential head and the resulting leadership vacuum further impaired the mobilising potency of the movement. Finally, counterframing agents, who only had a marginal impact at the beginning of the crisis and thus, had left the rhetorical arena to the separatists, developed a more efficient position which helped to cut the ground from under the rebels' feet. Altogether, the MFDC's framing experienced an intensive, but short-lived boost – figuratively, the kettle boiled over – that was followed by a decline in the effectiveness of framing. The movement failed to maintain its original success as well as the high level of mobilisation and increasingly lost support from the population of the Ziguinchor region. Dynamics of violence followed this trend: After the escalation and periods of intense fighting, the crisis turned into a low-intensity armed conflict. This clearly proves the explanatory potential of the framing approach concerning the evolution of the Casamançais conflict.

Although being different in many respects, observations in Barotseland were equally revealing. Unlike in Casamance, collective action frames by the Barotse activist movements were relatively more consistent despite some weaknesses. The framing resonated due to a combination of short-, medium-, and long-term factors that intersected and mutually reinforced each other. This provided a solid and lasting basis for the movements that simultaneously benefitted from the favourable influence of emotions. Although the credibility of frame articulators was less pronounced than in Casamance, the movement leaders' standing within the Barotse society still had a positive effect on mobilisation. In addition, the groups experienced little headwind since counterframing was underdeveloped and could not challenge them at a large scale. As a result of the interaction of these factors, the groups' propositions appealed to a considerable part of the provincial population. This constituted an

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important foundation for collective action and an advantage in comparison to the MFDC. With regard to the protest strategy, there was a framing dispute. Its result was instructive with respect to the development of the conflict. On the one hand, the majority of the groupings opted for non-violent means; this was a conscious move that followed from the strong emphasis of legal references in all frame dimensions and found its reflection in their concrete actions. Moreover, the actor constellation – activists wished to maintain good terms with counterframing agents – favoured their moderate position. On the other hand, Linyungandambo took a more radical stance and agitated for applying force. The occasional riots related to the Barotse question demonstrated that there was potential for violence in the province. Especially the young generation favoured the militant views by Linyungandambo. They corresponded to experiences of marginalisation and neglect that the youth had been confronted with as well as the frustration and extreme attitudes that resulted from these. But peaceful frames represented a powerful counterbalance. They conformed well to non-violent preferences and traditions, which were deeply entrenched in the cultural and societal context of Barotseland. Hence, they found great acceptance among the local people. Moreover, peaceful means were venerated by traditional social forces that still have strong influence in the Lozi society. On the whole, the resonance of non-violent prognostic framing was more thorough and durable than the appeal of violent propositions and has largely outweighed the impact of calls to arms up to now. In conclusion, the framing by the Barotse self-determination movements – and their non-violent rhetoric in particular – relied on a strong and durable basis and was highly effective. Yet, its influence was completely different in comparison to the communication by the MFDC. In fact, framing had a mitigating effect in Barotseland and played a crucial role in impeding the escalation of the conflict so far. In this context, it is important to stress that while the decrease in the intensity of violence in Casamance resulted from weak frame resonance, the non-violent action in Barotseland was a consequence of the strong mobilising potency of frames.

Figure 9: Comparison of frame resonance and effects in Casamance and Barotseland

	<b>Casamance (CA)</b>	<b>Barotseland (BL)</b>	<b>Comparative results</b>
<b>General degree of frame resonance (all frame dimensions)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Strong resonance of diagnostic framing</li> <li>▪ Prognostic framing problematic: Absence of definitional consensus between MFDC and its constituency regarding the aim of the struggle</li> <li>▪ Motivational framing partly successful</li> <li>➔ Incomplete consensus and action mobilisation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ All framing dimensions effective despite existing weaknesses and opposition</li> <li>▪ Both consensus and action mobilisation at least partly achieved</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Different framing dimensions of Barotse activists appeal to a greater extent to constituency than in CA</li> <li>▪ Successful consensus and action mobilisation constituting a prerequisite for collective action only achieved in BL</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Frame resonance mainly based on short- and medium-term components</li> <li>➔ Weak basis for mobilisation, lack of sustainability of resonance</li> <li>➔ Decline in framing resonance over time</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Short-, medium-, and long-term components promoting frame resonance</li> <li>➔ Stable and thorough basis for mobilisation</li> <li>➔ Diversity of topics appeal to various societal groups</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ More stable and diverse foundation for frame resonance in BL thanks to long-term determinants</li> <li>▪ Greater general degree of frame resonance in BL in comparison to CA</li> </ul>
<b>Origin of violent / non-violent collective action frames</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Defensive violent frame as a reaction to repression; later, also more offensive calls for violence</li> <li>▪ Violence poorly theorised</li> <li>▪ Polarisation and isolation of the MFDC favour radical position</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Non-violent prognostic framing as logical consequence of strong legalistic framing</li> <li>▪ Interest in cooperation and maintaining constructive relations with opponents have attenuating effect on position</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Collective strategy in BL derives from deliberate decision, coherence with other framing dimensions</li> <li>▪ More precipitate and insufficiently theorised in CA</li> <li>▪ Actor constellation favours radical frames in CA, but has a mitigating effect in BL</li> </ul>
<b>Resonance of prognostic frames concerning</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Combination of short- and medium-term factors leads to an intensive but short boost for violent frames</li> <li>➔ Lack of sustainability and foothold</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Coherence of framing and action of movements</li> <li>▪ Long-term factors foster non-violent frames</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ More stable and durable basis for strategy-related frames in BL vs. situation-related acceptance of violent frames in CA</li> </ul>

<b>collective strategy</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Loss of plausibility of violent frames in view of the people's suffering caused by the MFDC</li> <li>▪ Rejection of offensive violent frames as too radical (unfavourable long-term factors)</li> <li>▪ Decline in resonance of violent frames paralleling the decrease of general frame resonance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➔ Nonviolent prognostic framing conforms to cultural and societal context</li> <li>▪ Framing dispute about collective strategy challenges non-violent frames: Violent frames resonate especially among the youth and are favoured by the present situation (favourable short- and medium-term factors)</li> <li>➔ Resonance of non-violent frames still outweighs calls for violence</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Violent framing in CA gradually loses acceptance, while non-violent frames in BL remain influential enough to calm violent tendencies</li> </ul>
<b>Credibility of frame articulators</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Outstanding level of credibility of Father Diamaoune Senghor</li> <li>▪ Decrease in Diamaoune's credibility and reputation in mid-1990s</li> <li>▪ Leadership vacuum and disputes after his death</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Credibility and prominence as a result of previous activities as politician or civil servant</li> <li>▪ Leading figures confronted with accusations of hypocrisy and self-interest</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Initially high credibility of Father Diamaoune favouring frame resonance; but considerable loss of persuasiveness in the long-term</li> <li>▪ Medium credibility of framing agents in BL still has positive impact, although weaker than in CA</li> </ul>
<b>Impact of counterframing</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Initially weak counterframing left political arena to MFDC and favoured escalation of violence</li> <li>▪ More effective counterframing together with targeted policies weakened frame resonance</li> <li>➔ Challenge to short- and medium-term determinants favouring frame resonance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Generally weak counterframing does not represent a counterweight to separatist rhetoric</li> <li>▪ Strong cultural embeddedness of frames hampers counterframing</li> <li>▪ So far, failure to develop a strategy effectively countering the separatists' framing</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Initially, ineffective counterframing in both cases</li> <li>➔ Rhetorical arena left to the separatist groups in their favour</li> <li>▪ Counterframing agents successfully challenged the MFDC; in BL, counterframing still weak</li> </ul>
<b>Outcome: Conflict behaviour</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Initial <b>escalation of violence</b></li> <li>▪ Decline of mobilising potency of framing: loss of support, <b>low-intensity armed conflict</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>Non-violent conflict</b> (occasional non-organised violent clashes)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Framing explains difference in collective behaviour and conflict dynamics in the CA case</li> </ul>

## 9.2. Theoretical Contributions of Framing to Civil War Studies

### 9.2.1. *Conclusive Abstractions on the Theoretical Relevance of Framing*

A comparative overview of geographic, socio-economic, institutional, and identity-related factors as well as repression and external support in Casamance and Barotseland demonstrated that the cases exhibited comparable structural conditions (see 5.3 and 7.3.). Since these macro-determinants prompt that both regions have a similar conflict propensity, they are insufficient to explain the deviation in collective strategy. Nor can they account for the peculiar dynamics of violence in the case of Casamance. Rather, there are additional variables and interactions at play. These have to be taken into account because they decisively shape the outcome, that is, whether violence erupts or protest remains non-violent. In order to answer the two research questions of this thesis and move beyond the overemphasis of structural conditions with regard to conflict onset, the framing approach was used since it helps to identify micro-mechanisms triggering the escalation of violence. In the preceding sections, the results of the framing analyses in the two cases were systematically contrasted with regard to the general degree of frame resonance, the role of prognostic framing for violent or non-violent collective action, the credibility of frame articulators, and the relevance of counterframing as well as constellations of actors. The comparison underscored that framing intervenes at multiple stages and can either favour or obstruct the eruption of armed conflict. Therefore, it plays a key role in explaining the deviant conflict behaviours and conflict dynamics. In the following, the major theoretical findings concerning the influence of framing will be summarised and abstracted.

First of all, the general degree of frame resonance is a decisive determinant. It focuses on the internal quality of collective action frames and examines their resonance in a disaggregated manner. It is imperative to identify and analyse frames and the different dimensions (namely the diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational one) that they are composed of. This helps to gain important insights regarding what topics activist groups bring up and whether they are well-connected and integrated into an altogether consistent argumentation. The mobilising potency of the different frame dimensions also requires attention. Their effectiveness and interplay impact if consensus and action mobilisation are achieved, which are essential prerequisites for joint action. Furthermore, prognostic frames are particularly relevant because movements and their leaders use them to propose a solution and most importantly, a suitable strategy to achieve it. The form of protest they advocate for – and thus, their willingness to use force or not – is a first and important indicator whether a conflict is either waged violently or in a peaceful manner. The likelihood of violence increases if social movement actors adopt violent prognostic frames. Yet, frames are not always effective; they do not automatically lead to collective action and thus, armed conflict. It is pivotal if and how strongly they resonate with the target group. In order to do so,

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collective action frames have to present an interpretation of the situation and propose a solution to the identified problems that persuade the concerned group. Moreover, they have to convince sympathisers of the necessity to participate in the struggle. In sum, frames have to be (relatively) salient and credible in the eyes of (potential) followers. In this respect, the general degree of frame resonance pictures to what extent frames successfully reach the audience. It indicates if an activist group manages to gain acceptance by the local population that consequently supports it or joins its ranks. Both a high level of mobilising potency and positive relations between the movement and its target group constitute important requirements for collective action. It is useful to differentiate between various factors influencing frame resonance with regard to their time frame and deep rootedness. The durability and intensity of the effectiveness of frames vary in dependence with short-, medium-, and long-term factors that are more or less thoroughly entrenched in the respective societal and cultural context. In this regard, the comparison illustrated that long-term components provide a particularly strong and permanent basis for frame resonance that is difficult to challenge. Yet, situational components should not be prematurely dismissed. Especially the emotional appeal of frames is significant because it can help to overcome deficits in frame resonance that result, for example, from poor argumentation. Furthermore, emotions function like a catalyst; they considerably amplify frames and provide an important boost for social movements. This can lead to mobilisation and participation in collective action that would not have been possible otherwise. Thus, although such short-term factors are modifiable and less stable, they play a decisive role regarding the effectiveness of frames.<sup>1</sup> In this context, it is equally important to take into account that determinants favouring frame resonance are not evenly distributed within a society. Communities have, for instance, various cultural and historical backgrounds, which influence collective identification. As a consequence, frames have diverging effects on different groups. They successfully reach some segments of society and incite them to support or join the movement, as in the case of nationalist framing effectively appealing to the Diola, while other societal groups cannot be mobilised but react with non-participation or resistance. The resonance of prognostic frames is especially telling regarding conflict dynamics. Supporters have to be convinced that the proposed strategy of a movement is adequate in order to become active. In this respect, it is also useful to differentiate between different components that favour strategy-related propositions to understand their effectiveness. Overall, the risk of escalation is highest if frame resonance is strong in general and violent prognostic frames successfully appeal to the target group. The non-acceptance of a movement's strategy can have a

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<sup>1</sup> Regarding stability and strength, medium-term factors lie between short- and long-term ones. Their precise characteristics depend on for how long they have existed, for example, for several years or even decades, which brings them closer to long-term determinants. If they only subsisted for a short period of time, they resemble short-term components.

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remarkable impact on the manner in which conflict is waged, since followers that do not agree with the means of a group do not act accordingly. Here, both Casamance and Barotseland provide evidence of the consequences of such a constellation. In Casamance, violent prognostic frames were initially approved given the situation. As a result, violent struggle escalated, but abated when the propositions lost their persuasiveness. In Barotseland, there was a framing dispute regarding the optimal strategy. While most activist movements propagated non-violence, Linyungandambo took an aggressive stance. Calls for peaceful means resonated more successfully in the societal setting. However, especially among the young people the idea of applying force enjoyed popularity and there were occasional riots in Western Province. Hence, the equilibrium is fragile and might ultimately turn into full-blown violence. Overall, both examples exemplify that the resonance of prognostic frames related to strategy is essential to elucidate conflict dynamics. Movement leaders also play an influential role with regard to mobilisation. Their readiness to resort to violence is a first step in the direction of armed struggle. Moreover, the credibility of frame articulators, which is composed of different elements such as their status, knowledge, legitimacy, etc., positively or negatively affects frame resonance and ultimately, influences the outcome. Finally, framing rarely remains unchallenged by opponents, but counterframing agents propose alternative arguments to weaken and delegitimise social movements and demobilise their followers. Their commitment affects collective behaviour in two ways. First, convincing counterframes can constitute an important counterweight to activist movements and weakens their appeal among their supporters. This is even more so if reputable actors are the origin of the challenging rhetoric and if it is complemented by well-targeted political actions that aim to tackle the problems that are at the origin of the conflict. A lack of counterframing initiatives is favourable to social movements since they do not face effective headwind and can potentially monopolise the political arena. Second, the constellation of actors impacts preferences of framing agents. Collective actors that are isolated as a result of a polarised setting are more inclined to adopt radical views and strategies. By contrast, if movements hope to win allies or wish to maintain constructive links with opponents, they rather propagate peaceful means. In this case, the relations between different stakeholders have a mitigating effect on the position that activist groups take.<sup>2</sup>

The framing approach was used as an intervening variable in order to account for the deviant conflict trends in Casamance and Barotseland. The analysis of the two selected cases and the subsequent comparison of the results highlighted that the link between framing and collective conflict behaviour is not a simple one. The interplay of different aspects determines the outcome, that is, whether a conflict is waged violently or non-violently. In this respect, the pivotal factors that require attention are the general degree of frame resonance, which

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<sup>2</sup> This shows that the decision to opt for violent prognostic framing is not intrinsic to the movements but also externally influenced.

comprises the content and quality of collective action frames as a whole as well as their general resonance; the appeal of strategy-related prognostic frames; the influence of major leading figures on the mobilising potency of frames; and the impact of counterframing and of interactions of opponents with framing agents concerning the content and effectiveness of frames. Taken in isolation, each of these determinants affects the way how conflict is waged and can have an escalating or mitigating effect. If their respective mechanisms and impacts are separately examined, added up, and balanced against each other, they provide a detailed picture of why conflict escalates or non-violent resistance occurs.

### 9.2.2. *The Added Value of Framing: Integrating Micro-Mechanisms, Agency, and 'Soft' Factors into the Analysis of Armed Conflicts*

Conventional civil war studies only provide an incomplete explanation of conflict onset because they suffer from various shortfalls due to their quantitative methodological proceeding (see 2.3.1.). Regarding this thesis, they entirely fail to account for deviations in protest behaviour in Casamance and Barotseland. In this respect, the previous comparative section proved that framing was a valuable alternative to elucidate conflict dynamics in the two selected cases and to successfully respond to the initially formulated research questions. But framing is a theoretically relevant approach beyond the specific puzzle analysed here. It can serve to overcome existing analytical deficits of prevailing explanatory approaches to civil wars and improve them. This section will reflect on the theoretical contributions of framing to the analysis of violent conflict more generally. It will particularly discuss its potential to work out micro-mechanisms, shed light on agency, and pay attention to the relevance of ideational, emotional, as well as cultural factors in relation to conflict escalation. Prevalent theories of armed conflict exclusively concentrate on structural factors at the macro-level in order to account for the escalation of civil war, but fail to capture causal mechanisms and dynamics that intervene at other levels of analysis. Therefore, they are unidimensional and static and can only offer partial explanations of internal warfare.<sup>3</sup> The present case study design, in which different protest behaviours occurred despite comparable background conditions, illustrated that structural factors do not automatically lead to violence and therefore, are insufficient to solely explain conflict onset. Rather, structures have to be translated into specific collective action. In consequence, there are additional dynamics or micro-mechanisms that connect the macro- with the meso-level and have to operate so that structural variables effectively lead to collective action by groups. This process comprises numerous stages ranging from the interpretation and politicisation of

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<sup>3</sup> Theories of civil wars that are based on statistical analysis can only show that there is a causal relationship between variables and an outcome. However, they cannot trace how a variable (or a specific factor) precisely leads to the use of force. In other words, the micro-mechanisms at play remain hidden. For a detailed discussion of weaknesses of prevalent theories of civil war, see 2.3.1.

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background conditions, to propositions of improvements as well as measures to achieve them, and mobilising attempts aiming to induce different forms of action or non-action. It is inevitable to study and understand these 'chain links' in order to fully apprehend the eruption of armed conflicts. In this respect, framing serves as the missing 'piece of the jigsaw' that helps to improve and complete our knowledge about the escalation of violence. By analysing the strategic communication of social movement actors and its resonance among the target group, the framing approach simultaneously captures dynamics and determinants at the structural and agents' levels and the interconnections of the different analytical levels. Hence, framing is an ideal instrument to disaggregate the seemingly existing automatism between structures and collective action. It allows for a process-orientated, multi-level analysis and uncovers micro-mechanisms that trigger armed conflict or alternative forms of protest.

Second and immediately related to this, framing introduces an agent-centred perspective that helps to focus more closely on the impact of armed groups on the escalation of violence. In conventional theories of civil wars, collective actors only play a secondary role. At best, insurgent groups are considered as profit-oriented *homines oeconomici* that apply force out of rational and cost-benefit calculations but are denied ideological or political objectives. Economic considerations and opportunity structures certainly play a role and should not be neglected. Yet, the escalation of conflict is the product of complex and deliberate human decisions and agency. Social movement actors have to actively intervene to channel macro-conditions into various forms of resistance. The analysis of framing allows for adequately studying the role of collective and individual framing agents concerning the eruption and development of violent conflict. Notably, social movements participate in frame construction and strongly influence the content of collective action frames with the aim to legitimise their struggle and means and to mobilise followers to join in. They provide, for example, a specific interpretation of context conditions to convince supporters of the propitious character of a situation. By doing so, they translate structural factors into collective (violent or non-violent) action and thus, determine conflict strategies. Moreover, the approach can capture specificities of movements, for example, their structures and functioning. Notably, it studies the influence of leading figures within and outside activist groups with regard to the effectiveness of frames. The importance of such aspects became clear in the Casamançais case. Both the role of Father Diamacoune and the internal fragmentation of the movement are decisive in relation to mobilisation as well as the escalation and the development of the conflict. Furthermore, armed movements do not operate in a vacuum but interact with other collective actors. This also has an impact on collective strategies and conflict trends. Hence, the framing approach examines activist groups in their environment. It thoroughly studies interactions between social movements and their constituencies and considers the

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constellation of framing and counterframing agents. The quality of their relationships influences the preferences of a movement regarding strategy as well as the mobilising potency of the activists' rhetoric. In sum, the framing approach allows for an agency-centred analysis and systematically examines various aspects related with (violent) collective actors that are relevant regarding the escalation of conflict, yet have tended to be overlooked by structural theories so far.

Third, conventional theories of armed conflict dismiss the relevance of so-called 'soft' factors with regard to conflict onset. These comprise cultural, ideational, and emotional aspects, which are difficult to quantify and operationalise. Yet, recent analyses showed that such components influence conflict dynamics and therefore, require close attention (see 2.3.2., 3.3.1., and 3.4.3.). Social movement studies experienced similar difficulties but successfully overcame them. During the 'cultural turn', scholars came up with framing to counter the overemphasis of structural and objective factors in explaining the emergence of social movements. In consequence, the approach constitutes an adequate means to equally capture the relevance of culture, ideas, and emotions with regard to mobilisation for and the escalation of violence, as will be seen in the following. In this context, the influence of identity and emotions will receive particular attention.

In general, 'soft' components including narratives, collective memories, (interpretations of) history, symbols, myths, and emotions, etc. play an important role at various stages of the framing process. To begin with, social movement actors integrate cultural aspects – or their sometimes highly peculiar interpretation – into framing and instrumentalise them for their purpose, for instance, to justify their claims and strategy.<sup>4</sup> The MFDC, for example, came up with its own version of regional history to legitimise separation and mobilise for participation in its struggle. In Barotseland, activists successfully rooted their calls for non-violence in the former kingdom's culture and history. The degree of frame resonance depends, among others, on whether and to what extent collective action frames comply with the cultural knowledge and background of the target group. If social movements aptly take up relevant components, the effectiveness of framing increases. In this instance, frames allude to elements that are familiar and important to the constituency and touch a raw nerve. If this is not the case, the mobilising potency of collective action frames remains weak. This shows that cultural aspects can decisively influence the intensity of framing effects.

In this context, the importance of identity for frame resonance became obvious. Cultural aspects are often connected with a specific group identity, which in turn influences frame resonance. The case studies showed that certain frames successfully reached some segments of society, as in the case of nationalist frames effectively mobilising Diola, and incited them to support or join the movement. Other societal groups were only reached to a

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<sup>4</sup> Since cultural elements are not fixed, framing agents can re-construct or modify their meaning. Therefore, their interpretation can diverge from the original one.

lesser extent or not at all, as the example of the Nkoyas in Barotseland shows, and reacted with non-participation or resistance. This suggests that collective action frames have diverging effects among different parts of society since the degree of credibility and salience varies across groups according to their specificities and background. However, one has to take into account that identity is multi-layered and dynamic. It is not exclusive, but can encompass various allegiances whose intensities differ and can change over time. The Casamançais, for instance, occasionally refer to themselves as 'Senegalese from Casamance'. Depending on what identity or what component of it is most salient at a given moment, the impact of frames varies. Hence, taking into account identity-related aspects helps to better understand dynamics that favour or constrain organised collective violence. Furthermore, (collective) emotions and frame resonance mutually re-enforce each other through positive feedback effects. Emotions can either be related to collective action frames or exist independent of them. In the first case, framing agents purposefully create or stir (pre-existing) emotions through framing and instrumentalise them to mobilise followers. If they succeed in provoking or reinforcing such emotions, these are related to frames. In both case studies, the respective movements alluded, for instance, to colonisation, which is linked with painful memories, in order to justify demands for independence and tried to use the emotional loading of the comparison for their end. If movements successfully trigger emotions or link up with existing ones and intensify them, frame resonance increases. In the second case, the emotional climate is detached from the content of frames. In Casamance, government policies provoked frustration and anger among the population even before the MFDC emerged. If such independent emotions parallel frames, they constitute a fruitful ground for them and reinforce their resonance. Here, the mobilising potency of frames results from their fit with the broader emotive atmosphere. The impact of affective components on frame resonance highlights that frames do not need to be factual or objective. In an emotionally charged setting, subjective and distorted frames can be very powerful if they correspond to it. Yet, resonance that is based on emotive elements is not necessarily sustainable and modifications of the emotional climate influence the effectiveness of frames. If emotions develop, the mobilising potency of frames that relied upon them will decline or entirely disappear.<sup>5</sup> In sum, framing cannot be analysed through a purely objective lens. It is imperative to take into consideration emotions as well as their development and effects as

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<sup>5</sup> Trends in the resonance of violent frames by the MFDC are illustrative here. In the beginning, its calls for violence fell on fertile soil because repression by the government had provoked an emotionally charged situation in the region and the use of force was presented as a means of self-protection. Independent of this emotive climate, the militant prognostic framing became rejected by the population who considered it too radical and contradictory to societal predispositions, for instance, popular values and (self-)perceptions. In the short term, prevailing fear, frustration, and anger helped to successfully overcome this mismatch. This underscores that the decision to recur to force was not purely rational, but emotions played a considerable role. When the emotional climate changed, the rebel movement could no longer maintain frame resonance.

they impact frame resonance and thus, dynamics of violence. Altogether, cultural, ideational, and emotional components play an important role regarding mobilisation – and the potential escalation of violence – in conflict settings. Framing is a useful means to include such subjective aspects and study their impact on the outbreak of armed conflict. Consequently, the approach helps to elucidate a crucial, but so far largely neglected dimension of conflict onset.

Overall, prevalent theories of civil wars suffer from various shortfalls and only provide imprecise and incomplete explanations for the escalation of violent conflict. Concerning this, the framing approach turned out a promising tool to overcome deficits and contribute to conflict studies in multiple ways. The approach analyses strategic communication by armed movements and its effects regarding mobilisation for protest behaviour and conflict onset in a theory-guided and encompassing manner against the respective societal background. Framing also focuses on different analytical levels and adopts an integrated perspective on their interactions. By doing so, it uncovers micro-mechanisms that connect the macro- and meso-level and translate structural factors into violent protest behaviour. Identifying and understanding these triggers is pivotal for an in-depth comprehension of the occurrence of violent conflict. The framing approach also allows for an actor- and agency-centred perspective. Not only does it concentrate on social movements and examine their internal structures and the role of leading figures, but it also takes into account their relations and interactions with other relevant stakeholders, namely the targeted constituency and counterframing agents. Moreover, it studies so-called 'soft', that is, cultural, ideational, and emotional determinants. The analyses highlighted that they are of fundamental importance for conflict onset as they influence framing processes in multiple ways. Framing theory systematically examines and integrates them into a causal explanation of armed conflict. Overall, through incorporating a variety of (understudied) factors, their dynamics, and interdependences, framing provides an encompassing and multi-faceted explanation of civil war onset. Thus, it contributes to completing and refining existing knowledge regarding the origin of intra-state warfare.

### *9.2.3. A Review of Methodological and Theoretical Challenges to the Framing Approach*

Despite the above-mentioned advantages, framing is not unproblematic. The thesis discussed both theoretical and methodological challenges of the approach in previous chapters (see 3.4.4. and 4.2.3.). In a final section, it is now important to critically reflect if and to what extent these biases influence the empirical results of the analysis.

Theoretical difficulties concern the impact of additional causal influences on mobilisation, such as social networks, coercion, or incentives, and their interaction with framing. In both

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case studies, traditional and modern networks served as a link between different relevant social actors. In Barotseland, the traditional governance institutions provided a communication system that helped to spread the separatist movements' message. In Casamance, the MFDC relied on various customary and modern channels, namely the fan clubs around the Casa Sport, cultural associations, but also traditional and gerontocratic structures. Hence, social networks favoured the dissemination of frames and positively influenced their resonance in both regions. However, in none of the two cases, the role of networks was so strong as to outweigh the effect of framing. In Casamance, social ties also had a partly exclusive impact. Since they were mainly Diola-centred, other communities were less exposed to the insurgents' rhetoric. Yet, the non-resonance of frames cannot be solely attributed to the non-belonging to networks. The framing analysis highlighted that the content of the frames clearly played a role in this regard. In sum, the influence of networks paralleled effects of framing, i.e. they promoted positively resonating frames or further reduced the effectiveness of already weak frames. Thus, interactions between networks and strategic communication do not distort the explanatory power of framing. Similarly, one observes that considerations such as future benefits, revenge, or coercion affected the decision to support or join the separatist groups. In both regions, there were convictions that the future independent states would be better developed and prosperous. In Casamance, there were also promises that participants in the rebellion would personally benefit from their commitment, for instance, through employment or property. However, the influence of incentives on mobilisation should not be overestimated. The groups integrated such future benefits in their collective action frames. As a consequence, what appealed to people was rather the idea of or the hope for potential benefits, but actual material or immaterial benefits failed to materialise and cannot explain participation in collective action. Likewise, the Casamançais war economy did not trigger the initial support for the movement. The illicit activities only started after the escalation of violence and the rents that were produced by harvesting and selling natural resources, such as cannabis, timber, or cashew nuts, were relatively limited in comparison to the profits that insurgent groups in other parts of the continent obtained. In addition, the *maquisards'* life in the bush was characterised by deprivation which signifies that the group had little to offer to its members. This underscores that economic profit was hardly an incentive to join the MFDC.<sup>6</sup> Likewise, coercion and revenge were important mobilising motives especially in Casamance. Many (ex-)combatants confirm that they decided to join the *maquis* because they had suffered from ill-treatment by security forces or had witnessed how such actions were inflicted on loved ones (see 6.3.1 and 6.3.2.). There are also reports that villages sent fighters into the bush. Here again, such motives did not exist independent of framing. The armed group frequently referred to

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<sup>6</sup> However, the war economy contributed to prolonging the conflict. Hence, profit-making influenced the decision to continue fighting. Yet, there were also other motives, including political ones.

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repressive acts by the state and resulting injustice in different framing dimensions. Hence, the movement actively channelled occurring emotions into action. Such frames particularly appealed to sympathisers having made negative experiences related to repression. In addition, it is important to note that, unlike other rebel groups, the MFDC refrained from systematically using force to recruit fighters. Overall, it is imperative to consider additional determinants, such as incentives, coercion or revenge and compare their impact with the one of framing because the decision to support or join (non-)armed groups can result from manifold causes and their interaction. In both cases, alternative triggers were present, but their influence remained restricted and intersected with framing. Hence, such third variables do not challenge or superimpose the relevance of framing as the major explanatory factor.

In addition, the specific methodological difficulties that are linked with identifying collective action frames and measuring their resonance in conflict contexts and non-western societies were considered. Throughout the research process, data of various types and origins was compared and results were triangulated with additional (secondary) sources. This aimed to avoid imprecise or incorrect conclusions. Intensive research stays in both countries, including the regions seeking independence was also very valuable. The total of 165 interviews (75 in Senegal and 90 in Zambia) was used to verify and specify collective action frames. Moreover, the data offered broad and in-depth information that served as a basis for examining the mobilising potency of frames. It helped to gain the necessary knowledge concerning the cultural and societal background which is imperative to realistically assess frame resonance. This was particularly useful in the Barotse case, since little secondary sources are available on Lozi separatism. Thanks to the carefully conceptualised research design, well-considered method-related choices, and the strong data material, methodological difficulties were successfully attenuated or countered which guaranteed valid and representative results.

Theoretical and methodological difficulties concerning the integration of framing into conflict studies cannot be ignored and were also present in this study. However, the foregoing discussion demonstrated that their impact was limited and did not question the results of the framing analysis. Not only does this underscore the relevance and strength of the empirical findings, but it also highlights that framing is an adequate tool to examine the occurrence of armed conflict.

The conclusive chapter brought together the findings of this thesis with regard to the specific research questions and the understanding of conflict onset more generally. Notably, it systematically compared the results of the framing analyses in Casamance and Barotseland. In this respect, it paid particular attention to the general degree of frame resonance, the mobilising potency of prognostic frames related to collective strategy, the credibility of frame articulators, and the impact of counterframing in order to measure and contrast the influence

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of framing on conflict behaviour in the two cases. The framing approach proved a useful instrument to analyse and illuminate the puzzling observations that were at the origin of this study. Variations in the movements' framing and in its resonance provided reliable explanations for the different outcomes, that is, violent and non-violent conflict in Casamance and Barotseland, respectively. Groups in Barotseland benefitted from positive resonance of both their framing in general and their non-violent prognostic frames. The credence of their leaders and the weak counterframing activities also played in that sense. Conditions were less favourable in Casamance. The MFDC, headed by Father Diamacoune, successfully united followers and convinced them of the need to take up arms in the beginning which led to the escalation of the conflict. However, its propositions in general and the violent prognostic framing in particular soon lost their appeal. The mobilising effect of the MFDC's rhetoric became too deficient and weak to overcome the various challenges, including increasingly influential counterframing. As a result, the group could not reverse the growing reservation among the population and failed to sustain the initially high level of mobilisation. Hence, the framing perspective allowed for reviewing the surprising dynamics of violence in the Casamance case from an alternative perspective and delivered interesting results. Moreover, the chapter stressed that in addition to answering the research questions, framing can make important contributions to conflict studies at large by summarising its major advantages. Notably, the approach sheds light on micro-mechanisms of conflict escalation. By doing so, it helps to understand how variables precisely lead to a specific outcome. Furthermore, it studies characteristics of (non-)violent groups and focuses on their relations with their constituencies and other relevant stakeholders. This allows for a movement- and agency-centred perspective that realistically appraises the role of collective actors with regard to the emergence of civil wars. Finally, framing integrates 'soft' factors, for example, culture, ideas, and emotions into the analysis due to its specific methodological proceeding. Although influencing the escalation of violent conflict, these were often dismissed by conventional theories as they are difficult to grasp in a quantitative manner. Overall, framing has the potential to focus on various understudied but relevant aspects impacting conflict onset as well as dynamics of violence. It integrated them into an encompassing theoretical analysis which ultimately, leads to a more thorough understanding of the occurrence of armed conflict.

## 10. Concluding Remarks

The thesis started from a peculiar observation. Both in Casamance and Barotseland, there were activist groups seeking independence from the respective countries they belonged to. Surprisingly, the conflict trajectories varied completely. In Casamance, a region in the south of Senegal, claims for secession emerged in the early 1980s. The situation quickly escalated into a protracted low-intensity armed conflict. The course of events was different in Barotseland, a former kingdom and protectorate that became Zambia's Western Province. Separatist tendencies had simmered since independence in 1964 and gained momentum after 2010. Previous mobilisations in the mid-1990s and the outbreak of riots in 2011 clearly illustrate that there is potential for violence in the province. Nevertheless, the majority of the activist movements continue to agitate non-violently for self-determination and organised collective violence did not break out. The fundamental deviation in the conflict behaviour is all the more surprising since both cases exhibit comparable structural features at the national and sub-national level that influence their conflict propensity, according to theories of civil wars. These include geographic, socio-economic, institutional, and identity-related factors as well as repression by the state and external support. As a consequence, one would expect a comparable likelihood of violent conflict and a similar outcome in both cases. The present thesis intensively dealt with the peculiar divergence. It focused on the question why the Casamançais conflict turned violent, while the one in Barotseland remained non-violent despite structural conditions favouring conflict onset in both cases. Moreover, conflict dynamics in Casamance were remarkable for another reason. In view of the presence of macro-factors that are usually expected to cause a full-blown civil war, the occurrence of violence seems unsurprising. Yet, in spite of phases of intense fighting, the conflict remained of low intensity. Hence, the study equally investigated why this armed conflict was so limited in scope after its initial escalation.

The observations that were made regarding events in Casamance and Barotseland and the consequential research questions have major theoretical implications. To fully grasp their relevance, it is imperative to view them against the larger theoretical background of civil war studies. Due to the increasing number of intra-state wars after the end of the Cold War and their devastating effects, scholars dealt with the underlying reasons of internal warfare. By carrying out large-N cross-national studies, they identified structural factors that increase the probability of the occurrence of armed conflict, namely economic, institutional, and identity-related determinants. Although civil war studies provided for a better general understanding of the occurrence of civil strife, none of the existing theories can account for the deviant outcomes in the two cases that occurred despite similar context conditions. From this, it follows that causal variables at the macro-level are insufficient to elucidate the eruption of civil wars. Rather, there are important additional variables, so-called micro-mechanisms that

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intervene. They translate structural factors into different forms of collective action and decisively influence the way a conflict is waged, that is, violently or non-violently. Hence, it is necessary to take them into consideration and study their functioning. However, conventional ways of analysing civil wars are incapable of 'looking under the surface' and capturing these missing links because they exclusively focus on context conditions. In consequence, the thesis pointed to a larger deficit of these theories and simultaneously sought to offer a way forward by proposing an alternative scientific approach. In recent years, a new theoretical trend, so-called micro-perspectives, emerged as a response to deficits in quantitative theories of civil wars. They opened up the field of studies by including alternative theoretical and methodological proceedings. Notably, they applied qualitative methods to analyse a variety of aspects related to violent conflict, that is, they focused on a small number of cases that they examined in a very detailed manner. As a result, they successfully contributed to elucidating remaining puzzles, for example, concerning forms or dynamics of violence. The present thesis is part of this rising micro-turn. It suggested making use of the framing approach since none of the existing micro-theories is able to shed light on the questions formulated above. Scholars of social movement studies introduced framing into their academic field at a time, when it faced challenges that are comparable to the ones that theories of civil wars are confronted with. In particular, framing served to counter the overemphasis of structural determinants. It turned attention to variables at other analytical levels as well as 'soft' aspects, that is, cultural, emotional, and ideational factors that had so far been neglected in explanations of the emergence of social movements. Therefore, and in view of other parallels between the respective phenomena, framing constituted a promising remedy to analyse conflict onset and dynamics from an alternative perspective.

Concretely, to find answers to the research questions, a comparative case study was carried out. The cases were selected according to the principles of John Stuart Mill's method of difference which provided an ideal setting to apply framing. Since all other explaining variables were stable across the cases, differences in collective action frames and their resonance were expected to account for the diverging outcomes. In order to be able to assess and compare the influence of framing, a complex two-stage proceeding was developed that took into account all relevant components. First, collective action frames were studied and in particular, recurrent topics as well as the different framing dimensions were pinpointed. Among others, this revealed whether movements called for violent or non-violent action and provided information on the consistency of frames. Second, it was assessed if and to what extent frame resonance could be achieved. Here, it was useful to differentiate between short-, medium-, and long-term factors favouring or obstructing the effectiveness of frames in different ways. Moreover, the impact of the framing articulators' credibility was considered as it influences the mobilising potency of strategic communication. Finally,

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counterframing was examined as it potentially challenges and deconstructs frames. Moreover, the relationship between social movements and opponents influences the position of activists, that is, whether they adopt a radical or moderate stance. Since all these constituent parts of framing either favour or impede the outbreak of armed conflict, they had to be studied in a disaggregated manner. Eventually, their respective effects were summed up in order to apprehend how framing contributed to the escalation of violence, its intensity, or alternative protest forms and compare the effects across the cases.

The major empirical findings of the thesis can be summarised as follows. The collective action frames by the MFDC certainly provided a generally logical interpretation of the situation, they also suffered from deficits. Hence, the quality of the different framing dimensions varied with the diagnostic framing being more elaborated than the prognostic and motivational ones. Thus, it suffered from a lack of consensus and action mobilisation. The content of strategy-related prognostic frames requires particular attention. As a consequence of the severe repression by the state after the first march, the MFDC called for the use of force as a defensive measure that was unintended, but necessary in the present situation. Later, it adopted a more offensive position and presented violence as the only means to obtain separation. The polarised actor constellation, that is, the lack of relations between the insurgent group and counterframing agents, also fuelled violent frames. In view of the specific situational and emotional conditions in Casamance in the early 1980s, the MFDC's propositions matched the everyday life realities and corresponded to real or perceived grievances of the local population and especially, those of the Diola. Hence, they effectively resonated. Notably, violent prognostic frames appeared acceptable to the constituency because of the recent experiences that the local population had made and emotive climate. Moreover, the insurgent movement profited from the credence and reputation of its main leader Father Augustin Diamacoune, who successfully attracted followers. The absence of effective counterframing was propitious since effective rhetorical opposition was lacking. This combination of factors favoured the mobilising potency of frames and prepared attitudes for the armed struggle. As a consequence, a considerable number of men could be convinced to join the *maquis* and many Casamançais supported the movement in other ways. Ultimately, violent conflict broke out. However, the conditions became increasingly disadvantageous for the MFDC. Its propositions – including demands for secession – lost relevance in the eyes of the population that refuted them as too radical and contradicting their interests, self-perception, and values. In addition, the gap between the grouping and its constituency widened since the local people suffered from the negative repercussions of the conflict which rendered the movement's frames implausible. In this context, one can observe that the MFDC mainly relied on short- and medium-term factors favouring resonance which changed over time or were thwarted by more efficient counterframing and accompanying political

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action. Yet, the framing lacked solid and deep-rooted foundations. Moreover, Diamacoune had lost his persuasiveness without being succeeded by another charismatic personality. Thus, the group did not dispose of a credible leader to overcome deficits in the content of its framing and save the MFDC's appeal. Simultaneously, counterframing gained strength and was accompanied with targeted political measures to alleviate grievances. This weakened the group's standing further. As a result of this modified constellation of determinants, the framing success of the armed group declined and the movement lost support. It was incapable of overcoming the manifold challenges and could no longer effectively convince its constituency to engage in the struggle. To sum up, the originally positive frame resonance prepared the ground for the escalation of violence in Casamance in the first place. However, it was short-lived and the mobilising potency of framing abated later without entirely dying out. As a result, the initial level of mobilisation could not be upheld which is why the armed conflict levelled off at low intensity.

In the Barotse case, framing was equally effective and illuminating, yet functioned differently. The collective action frames of the self-determination groups were internally consistent and achieved both consensus and action mobilisation. The decision to revert to non-violent means resulted from the strong emphasis of legal aspects in the framing which necessitated adequate action. However, the relations between the activist movements and relevant stakeholders also had a mitigating influence because the majority of the groups sought to maintain cooperative terms with some of their opponents whom the groups perceived as possible allies. Thus, they avoided adopting too radical positions that risked deteriorating relations. With regard to frame resonance, the movements benefitted from a combination of factors of different time-frames favouring the mobilising potency of their strategic communication. They simultaneously relied on a stable and deeply-entrenched foundation and profited from propitious situational determinants. The popularity of the major leaders of the separatists also played in that sense and the activists faced comparatively weak headwind through counterframing. Hence, the high general degree of frame resonance provided for a stable basis for the movements' activism. Moreover, their non-violent prognostic framing corresponded well to the societal and cultural background and found great acceptance among the local population. Yet, there was no consensus about the adequate strategy to achieve independence. One of the movements, Linyungandambo, disseminated violent propositions that especially the younger generation welcomed. However, due to their strong appeal, peaceful prognostic frames dominated over these calls to use force. Thus, in spite of the framing dispute and the existing readiness to use force among certain social groups, non-violent collective action prevailed. This illustrates that framing had an appeasing influence on the situation and helped to avoid organised violence. Altogether, the comparative analysis underscored that the framing approach entirely lived up

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to its promises. With regard to the case studies, it clearly demonstrated that framing – more precisely, differences in the content of collective action frames and their resonance – effectively played a key role in explaining the deviant conflict behaviours and conflict dynamics. It has either an escalating or mitigating effect – as in Casamance or Barotseland, respectively – depending on the effects of different components and their interplay.

Although the analysis concentrated on Casamance and Barotseland and traced the precise functioning and effects of framing in the two specific cases, the findings have farther-reaching implications. The thesis constitutes an initial strong proof that the framing approach is able to offer pertinent explanations of escalation processes and can also be applied to other instances in order to better understand the occurrence of violence or its absence. Its use is not limited to comparative case studies but can equally be revealing with regard to single cases. Furthermore, based on the findings, it is possible to draw some first general conclusions as to under which circumstances framing leads to the escalation of violence. To sum up, armed conflict is particularly likely to occur if social movements come up with internally consistent collective action frames and propagate calls for violent action. While illustrating the leaders' readiness to use radical means, militant propositions are not a sufficient condition for escalation because they do not automatically trigger action, but the resonance of frames is also influential. Here, not only the general degree of frame resonance is essential, but calls for violence also have to successfully appeal to the targeted group. Thus, the risk of escalation is highest, if frames resonate both in general and concerning violent prognostic frames in particular. With regard to different factors promoting resonance, both short- and long-term determinants matter due to their respective specific modes of functioning. On the one hand, long-term factors provide a particularly stable and enduring basis for frame resonance that is difficult to challenge. On the other hand, situational determinants, especially emotions can serve as a strong impetus to frame resonance and help to overcome difficulties in this regard, such as poor argumentation. Influential leading figures that speak out in favour of violent struggle also contribute to enhancing framing effects. With regard to counterframing, weak opposition, which does not threaten frames, and a polarised actor constellation, which fuels the radicalisation of movements, favour the use of armed force. This correlation demonstrates that framing analysis clearly adds to a refined and systematised understanding of the occurrence of violent conflict.<sup>1</sup>

In sum, framing provided a well-founded explanation to the research questions and offered very concrete empirical findings. In addition to this, the broader theoretical contributions of the approach require attention. Overall, the framing perspective proved useful to advance and ameliorate conflict studies by yielding insights into conflict dynamics that other theories cannot offer. First of all, unlike conventional theories of civil wars, the framing approach looks

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<sup>1</sup> Assumingly, there are other factor constellations that are propitious to conflict onset which is why further research is necessary (see below).

## 10. Concluding Remarks

beyond structural factors. It takes into account dynamics at different levels of analysis (namely, the macro- and the meso-level) and their interactions. Hence, it disaggregates the seemingly existing automatism between structures and action and establishes a bridge between them. By doing so, framing opens the 'black box' of conflict escalation, identifies micro-mechanisms triggering conflict onset, and elucidates how background conditions precisely lead to violent (or non-violent) collective action. Altogether, it completes and refines existing knowledge regarding the causal relations between structural factors and the occurrence of violence. Second, framing acknowledges the active role that (non-)armed movements and their leaders play concerning the way conflicts are waged by underscoring that collective and individual actors actively intervene at different stages to channel macro-conditions into various forms of resistance. By studying their rhetoric, decisions and the content of mobilisation campaigns of collective actors can be closely analysed. Framing also takes into account internal structures and specificities of groups which helps to gain an encompassing understanding of their implications. Besides, it examines collective actors within their larger social context. In this regard, the approach sheds light on interactions between the movements and their respective constituencies. Notably, it considers their relations with counterframing agents as the constellation of stakeholders impacts the movements' choices regarding the preferred strategy as well as the mobilising potency of activists' communication. In sum, the framing approach allows for an agency-centred analysis and systematically examines various aspects related with (violent) collective actors that are relevant regarding the escalation of violence, yet have largely been understudied. Third, the framing approach shifts attention to so-called 'soft' factors, that is, cultural, ideational, and emotional determinants that civil war studies left aside so far. It constitutes an adequate instrument to capture subjective components, for example narratives, collective memories, (interpretations of) history, symbols, myths, or emotions, and studies their role with regard to mobilisation and potentially, the escalation of violent conflict. It demonstrates that social movements aptly weave them into their rhetoric to culturally embed and justify their claims and strategy. Moreover, such factors influence the resonance of collective action frames because these have to correspond at least partly to the cultural context in order to be effective. Thus, the approach helps to elucidate a crucial, but so far largely neglected dimension of conflict onset and captures it in a theory-guided manner.

Despite these considerable contributions, the explanatory potential of the framing approach with regard to the analysis of armed conflict is far from being exhausted and further research remains obligatory. While the dissertation demonstrated that framing is a useful tool to identify and analyse micro-mechanisms of conflict escalation, it only did so in two cases that are both located in the same region, namely Sub-Saharan Africa. It is important to be cautious about generalising findings to other cases and geographic zones. The manner of

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functioning of framing is highly specific and dependent on the context. This suggests that while one can conclude from the present study *that* framing matters, it is difficult to describe *how* it influences dynamics in other settings. It is also important to note that the analysis only brought up some of the possible causal mechanisms related to framing. Notably, it demonstrated that depending on the content of prognostic framing, strong frame resonance led to either violent or non-violent action. Besides, weak resonance provoked low-intensity violence in Casamance. However, there are other conceivable effects of framing depending on various determinants, such as the precise content of prognostic framing and the intensity of frame resonance, and their interplay. Insufficient resonance can, for instance, trigger non-action or – if non-violent frames are unconvincing in a radicalised surrounding – result in violent behaviour. Yet, these constellations remained unexplored by this thesis. In consequence, further research is as necessary as promising. Most importantly, the framing theory should be more broadly applied to investigate violent conflict in order to better apprehend the functioning of framing in the escalation process and allow for comparing results across cases. First, carrying out framing analyses in a greater number of cases would help to identify collective action frames that armed movement frequently use to justify and mobilise for their struggle. This could serve to discern patterns in their communication strategies, such as recurrent topics and overarching master frames that are similar in various settings. Thus, it would enhance our comparative understanding of legitimising strategies of insurgent groups. It should also be analysed which conditions particularly favour the occurrence of radical frames as well as their resonance. Moreover, it would be possible to compare the effects of similar frames in different settings (and vice-versa). Overall, the use of framing in numerous cases would lead to a more encompassing and systematic understanding of the precise effects of framing and its specificities in violent contexts and non-western settings. Second, it is imperative to systematically compare which combination of components results in a specific outcome. As a consequence, it appears useful to contrast numerous cases that exhibit different characteristics (for example, different degrees of frame resonance, variations in the content of frames as a whole and regarding the prognostic dimension in particular, counterframing of various intensity, etc.). In the ideal case, such a comparison could lead to systematised theoretical knowledge of the effects of different components of framing and potentially weigh their influence on the ultimate collective strategy. In conclusion, the thesis clearly represented a first successful step towards the integration of framing theory into conflict analysis. Although the potential of the approach has not yet been entirely exploited and further research remains indispensable to entirely apprehend its explanatory relevance, there are good chances that framing is effectively going to be among the “next big things” of conflict research (Goodin 2009, 24).

## 11. Chronicles of the Conflicts in Casamance and Barotseland

### 11.1. The Casamance Conflict: List of Relevant Events<sup>1</sup>

17 <sup>th</sup> – 19 <sup>th</sup> century	France, Portugal, and England compete for power in West Africa's coastal area.
1645	The Portuguese create a first trading post in Ziguinchor.
1659	The French found their first settlement in Saint-Louis in the north of today's Senegal. During the late 19 <sup>th</sup> century, they extend their influence over the entire territory of the country.
1886	France takes possession of Ziguinchor as a consequence of the French-Portuguese treaty fixing the borders. However, French control and influence over Casamance remain more restricted in comparison to the northern part of the colony, namely the <i>Quatre Communes</i> .
1943	The prophetess and local hero Aline Sitoé Diatta from Cabrousse in Lower Casamance is sent into exile to today's Mali due to her alleged resistance to the French colonisers. She dies in exile soon after.
1947	The historic <i>Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance</i> (MFDC) is created as a regionalist party. In 1954, the party merges with Senghor's party BPS.
20 August, 1960	Senegal obtains independence. Leopold Sédar Senghor becomes the country's first president.
1963 – 1974	The African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) engages in a guerrilla war against the Portuguese army to obtain independence of Guinea-Bissau.
10 September, 1974	Guinea-Bissau becomes independent.
Late 1970s	In Casamance, social tensions increase about resource allocation as a result of the economic crisis and the application of a new land law ( <i>Loi sur le domaine national</i> , 1964). At several instances, protests take place and sometimes turn violent.
January 1980	During manifestations at the <i>lycée Djignabo</i> in Ziguinchor, a student is killed by security forces.
August 1980	The Casamançais football team Casa Sport loses the Senegal FA Cup against the team ASC Jeanne d'Arc from Dakar due to an incorrect referee's decision, which supporters of the football team from Ziguinchor perceive as discrimination. Father Diamacoune animates a conference at the Chamber of Commerce in Dakar, during which he honours Aline Sitoé Diatta and the Casamançais resistance against colonisation. For the first time, independence is publicly brought up (23 August).
1 January, 1981	Abdou Diouf, prime minister since 1970, succeeds Senghor as head of state.
26 December, 1982	In Ziguinchor, several hundred protestors march to the governance of Ziguinchor. At the end, the Senegalese flag is replaced by a white one. Leaflets signed by the MFDC circulate. Despite the non-violent character of the protest, security forces react with severe repression.

<sup>1</sup> More detailed overviews of the Casamance conflict are available in Awenengo 2000; Foucher 2002a; Gasser 2000; ICG 2015; MAR 2003; Marut 2010.

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	Several individuals are wounded or arrested. Father Augustin Diamacoune Senghor and Mamadou 'Nkrumah' Sané had been arrested preventively.
6 December, 1983	Three gendarmes are killed when trying to dissolve a meeting in the sacred forest at Diabir close to Ziguinchor.
13 December, 1983	Those arrested in relation to the first march are convicted to prison sentences.
18 December, 1983	The MFDC launches a violent attack on Ziguinchor. Several hundred are killed. Afterwards, the government arrests numerous people in various communities in Lower Casamance. The attackers retreat into the bush and organise to form an armed movement (referred to as <i>Atika</i> or <i>maquis</i> ).
1983 – 1988	Calm returns to the region. The MFDC sensitises and mobilises the local population to participate in the struggle.
January 1984	Casamance is divided into the administrative units of Ziguinchor and Kolda. The label Casamance disappears from maps.
April 1990	The MFDC launches an offensive against the Senegalese state which marks the escalation of the conflict. In the following months, violence by the rebel group against the military, security forces, and state agents or representatives intensifies. The government reacts with repression both in Casamance and Dakar.
31 May, 1991	The MFDC, the Senegalese government, and the Bissau-Guinean government sign a ceasefire agreement in Bissau (Guinea-Bissau). Parts of the movement, including Father Augustin Diamacoune Senghor reject the agreement. Consequently, the MFDC is divided into the moderate <i>Front Nord</i> under Sidy Badji's command, which lays down arms, and the radical <i>Front Sud</i> that continues fighting despite the accord.
1992	In July, violent clashes between the MFDC and security forces resume. The conflict increasingly spreads to neighbouring countries, especially Guinea-Bissau. These host refugees but also experience fighting within their territories and support the rebel group, for example through arms trade.
8 July, 1993	After a call for peace by Diamacoune in April, a new ceasefire is signed between the priest and the Senegalese government with Guinea-Bissau acting as guarantor, but does not last. Among other things, the ceasefire stipulated French arbitration regarding the historic status of Casamance during French rule.
December 1993	The French historian Jacques Charpy hands in his report confirming that Casamance has always been governed as a part of Senegal under French rule.
22 July, 1994	Yaya Jammeh undertakes a successful coup d'état and becomes president of the Gambia.
1995	The Senegalese army launches a military offensive against the armed wing of the MFDC in cooperation with Guinea-Bissau as well as the Gambia and with French support.
April 1995	Father Diamacoune is put under house arrest by the Senegalese government.
December 1995	Diamacoune calls for peace. Negotiations with the government begin,

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	but do not lead an agreement. Nevertheless, the following year is relatively calm.
Since 1995	Violent attacks by the MFDC take place in the regions of Sédhiou and Kolda that had previously been unaffected by the conflict. The army takes vigorous action against the MFDC.
18 January, 1998	For a third time, Diamacoune calls for peace and condemns violence.
1998	The Senegalese state intervenes in Guinea-Bissau on behalf of Nino Vieira, after it has discovered that elements of the military trade arms to Casamance. Parts of the MFDC support the junta led by Ansoumane Mané.
1999	Members of different wings of the MFDC meet several times in Banjul (the Gambia) with the objective to discuss about options for peace and re-unification of the movement to allow for negotiations with the government.
2000	Abdoulaye Wade (PDS) is elected president and promises to resolve the Casamance crisis within 100 days.
26 September, 2002	The ferry 'Le Joola' linking Ziguinchor with Dakar capsizes. The maritime accident causes almost 1,900 victims according to official numbers.
30 December, 2004	Diamacoune signs a peace accord with the Senegalese state. While the agreement allows for the multiplication of development initiatives, it does not lead to peace since various fractions of the rebel movement reject it.
2006	Despite the peace accord, parts of the MFDC resume violent attacks against the Senegalese army. At several occasions, there is in-fighting between different fractions.
13 January, 2007	Father Diamacoune deceases in Paris. Mamadou 'Nkrumah' Sané proclaims himself Secretary General of the MFDC.
2007	Abdoulaye Wade is re-elected president.
2012	Macky Sall wins presidential elections and commits himself to settle the Casamance crisis.
Since 2012	New attempts are made to initiate negotiations between the conflicting parties, among other things the lay community Sant'Egidio intervenes as mediator. While some improvements were made, the outcome of the current process remains unsure.

**11.2. The Barotse Question: List of Relevant Events<sup>2</sup>**

17 <sup>th</sup> century	The group of the Luyi (or Luyana), the ancestors of the Lozis, migrate to the Zambezi floodplains. The traditional governance system gradually develops.
approx. 1840 – 1864	The Makololo invade and rule Barotseland for several decades until they are finally overthrown.
1870s/1880s	Christian missionaries arrive in Barotseland and found mission stations.
1890	The <i>litunga</i> of Barotseland and the British South African Company (BSAC) sign the Lochner concession; Barotseland becomes a British protectorate. Further treaties follow.
1911	North-Western Rhodesia (Barotseland) and North-Eastern Rhodesia are amalgamated into Northern Rhodesia. The protectorate is governed by the BSAC.
1924	The British government overtakes the administration of Northern Rhodesia from the BSAC and establishes indirect rule.
1949	Zambia's first party, the Northern Rhodesian ANC, is founded.
1953	The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (also referred to as Central African Federation) is created. It comprises Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Nyasaland (Malawi), and Northern Rhodesia (Zambia).
1958	The United National Independence Party (UNIP) is created.
1961 – 1974	Angola fights for independence from Portugal.
18 May, 1964	King Mwanawina Lewanika ( <i>litunga</i> of Barotseland) and Kenneth D. Kaunda (Prime Minister of Northern Rhodesia) sign the Barotseland Agreement; Duncan Sandys (Principal Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and for the Colonies) signs as a witness.
24 October, 1964	Zambia obtains independence (beginning of the First Republic). Kenneth Kaunda (UNIP) becomes the country's first president.
1965	The Local Government Act abolishes traditional government institutions. Barotseland is integrated into the uniform local government system.
1966 – 1990	Namibia fights for independence from South Africa.
1969	Following a referendum, the Zambian parliament votes the Constitutional Amendment Act that annuls the Barotseland Agreement of 1964. In the same year, Barotseland is renamed Western Province.
1972	Zambia becomes a one-party state (beginning of the Second Republic).
November 1975	Angola becomes independent after 13 years of fighting against Portugal.
1975 – 2002	The MPLA and the UNITA confront each other in the Angolan Civil War.

<sup>2</sup> More detailed overviews of the Barotseland question are available in Bull 2010; Flint 2010; Hogan 2014; Larmer 2011; MAR 2010; Mubita and Chisala 2013; Phiri 2006; Sichone and Simutanyi 1996.

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1990	Namibia becomes independent.
1991	As a result of protests, president Kaunda agrees to organise multiparty elections (beginning of the Third Republic). Frederick Chiluba (MMD) wins the first multi-party elections; power is transferred peacefully (2 November).
Early 1990s	The democratic opening leads to new demands from Barotseland to restore the Agreement, which Chiluba declares stale.
1994	During a visit to Western Province, inhabitants stone President Chiluba's vehicle. Later this year, several thousand Lozis take up arms to protect the <i>litunga</i> due to allegations that the king was supposed to be arrested.
August 1999	In the Caprivi Strip (Namibia), which was historically part of the Barotse Empire, the Caprivi Liberation Army launches an armed uprising to demand secession. The rebellion is quickly repressed by Namibian security forces. Reportedly, there were connections between the separatists in Caprivi and Barotseland, namely the Barotse Patriotic Front.
2 January, 2002	Levy Mwanawasa (MMD) is elected president.
2002	The Angolan civil war ends.
29 June, 2008	Rupiah Banda (MMD) takes over presidential responsibilities after Mwanawasa's disease and death.
October 2010	The Constitutional Commission removes the Barotseland Agreement from the new draft constitution. Violent protests follow in Mongu.
December 2010	Riots break out in Limulunga and Mongu.
14 January, 2011	The suppression of a meeting by the police escalates into the so-called 'Mongu riots'. According to official numbers, two people are killed, twelve hospitalised, and over a hundred arrested. According to activists, the respective figures are much higher. The Chongwe Commission tours the province and collects statements to shed light on the violent events in January. Its final report has never been published.
23 September, 2011	Michael Sata (PF) is elected president.
26 – 27 March, 2012	The Barotse National Council gathers in Limulunga. By accepting the annulment of the Barotseland agreement, its final resolution stipulates separation.
6 September, 2012	Barotse activists tear apart copies of the draft constitution.
November 2012	Activists invoke the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights in Banjul, the Gambia. They claim that their right for self-determination is not respected. The Commission accepted the claim, but has not yet made a decision.
14 August, 2013	The Barotse Government in Waiting chaired by Administrator General Afumba Mombotwa (Linyungandambo) is officially sworn in and unilaterally declares Barotseland independent. Other Barotse activist groups distance themselves from this move.
Spring 2014	An international law firm asks the Zambian government on behalf of the Barotse National Freedom Alliance (BNFA) to agree to arbitration by the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The deadline (28 May)

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	elapses without a reaction on the part of the government.
August 2014	Three Barotse activists are convicted to three years imprisonment with hard labour.
28 October, 2014	Michael Sata dies.
8 December, 2014	Linyungandambo leader Afumba Mombotwa is arrested together with other activists. Their trial begins in August 2015.
20 January, 2015	Edgar Lungu (PF) wins the presidential by-elections.

### 11.3. Glossary of Common Names and Foreign Language Terms

#### Casamance

Atika	Armed wing of the MFDC (see also 'maquis') (English: arrow, warrior)
Badiane, Émile (1915 – 1972)	Co-founder of the historic MFDC and regional politician
Badji, Sidy (1926 – 2003)	Veteran of the French army; co-founder and first commander of the <i>maquis</i>
Biagui, Jean-Marie François (*1961)	Exiled in France during the conflict; leading figure and intellectual of the external wing; served as Secretary General; abandoned the armed struggle and created a political party called Movement for Constitutional Federalism and Democracy (MFDC)
Bindanisme	Term referring to domestic labour of Diola women in the north
Cadres casamançais	Regional élite that successfully migrated to the northern part of Senegal; many of them obtained influential positions in politics or the economy (English: Casamançais cadres)
Casamance – Pays du refus	Pamphlet by the MFDC published as a response to Charpy's Report (1995); written by Augustin Diamacoune Senghor (English: Casamance – Country of refusal)
Casamancité	Quality of being Casamançais, having typically Casamançais features (English: Casamance-ness)
Casa Sport	Regional football club from Casamance
Diamacoune Senghor, Augustin (1928 – 2007)	Catholic priest; intellectual head and political leader of the MFDC
Diouf, Abdou (*1935)	Second President of the Republic of Senegal (1981–2000; Socialist Party – PS)
Discours de Diatok	French transcript of speeches in Diola held by two members of the MFDC in the village of Diatok between 1984 and 1988 (English: Discourse from Diatok)
Esukolal	Diola cultural association founded by Mamadou 'Nkrumah' Sané in Paris at the beginning of the 1980s (English: homeland)
Front Nord	Moderate armed wing of the MFDC; accepted the 1991 ceasefire agreement; loyal to Sidy Badji (English: Northern Front)
Front Sud	Radical armed wing of the MFDC; refused the 1991 ceasefire agreement and continued fighting (English: Southern Front)
Kasa	Area around the town of Oussouye (south of the Casamance River and west of the city of Ziguinchor); also depicts one of the Diola sub-groups
Kelumak	Diola cultural magazine edited by Mamadou 'Nkrumah' Sané at the beginning of the 1980s (English: palaver)

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La voix de la Casamance	Newspaper of the MFDC (English: The Voice of Casamance)
Les faits en Casamance: Le droit contre la violence	White book by the Senegalese government published in 1991 (English: The Facts in Casamance: Law versus Violence)
Le Journal du Pays	Newspaper of the MFDC (English: News from the Homeland)
Le Soleil	Senegalese pro-government newspaper (English: The Sun)
Loi sur le domaine national	Reform of land tenure that led to many expropriations in Casamance (English: The National Domain Act)
Maquis	Armed wing of the MFDC (see also 'atika')
Maquisards	Combatants of the MFDC
'Nkrumah' Sané, Mamadou (*1939)	Exiled in France; founder of the MFDC, leader of its external wing, and Deputy Secretary General; auto-proclaimed himself Secretary General after Diamacoune's death
Rapport de Charpy	Report prepared by the French historian Jacques Charpy in 1993; confirmed that Casamance had always been governed as a part of Senegal under French rule (English: Charpy's Report)
Quatre Communes	Oldest colonial towns in the north of Senegal (Saint-Louis, Dakar, Gorée, and Rufisque); their inhabitants benefitted of a particular status and privileges (English: Four Communes)
Sadio, Salif (*1971)	One of the current military leaders of the MFDC; known for his radical stance
Sall, Macky (*1961)	Incumbent (fourth) President of the Republic of Senegal (since 2012; Alliance for the Republic – APR)
Senghor, Léopold Sédar (1906 – 2001)	First President of the Republic of Senegal (1960–1980; Socialist Party – PS)
Sitoé Diatta, Aline (1920 – 1944)	Priestess and prophetess from the village of Cabrousse; allegedly stirred resistance against the French who deported her to exile, where she died; venerated as a regional heroine
Wade, Abdoulaye (*1926)	Opposition politician during socialist rule; third President of the Republic of Senegal (2000–2012; Senegalese Democratic Party – PDS)

## Barotseland

Banda, Rupiah (*1937)	Fourth President of the Republic of Zambia (2008–2011; Movement for Multiparty – MMD)
Barotseland Agreement	Document signed in May 1964 by the then <i>litunga</i> of Barotseland and Kenneth Kaunda (then Prime Minister of Northern Rhodesia) and witnessed by a representative of the British government; stipulated the status of Barotseland within independent Zambia and inscribed rights and duties of both signatory parties
Barotse National Council (BNC)	Non-permanent general assembly of all Lozi chiefs; highest decision-making body in the Barotse traditional governance system
Barotse Royal Establishment (BRE)	Traditional government of Barotseland headed by the <i>litunga</i> ; also includes the <i>ngambela</i> and the councillors at the different levels
Chiluba, Frederick (1943 – 2011)	Second President of the Republic of Zambia (1991–2002; Movement for Multiparty Democracy – MMD)
Chongwe Commission (of Inquiry)	Commission of inquiry headed by the lawyer Robert Chongwe; investigated the events leading to the Mongu Riots in 2011; its report was withheld by the PF government
Copperbelt	The continent's largest copper deposit covering parts of Zambia and the DRC; also province in the north of Zambia
Induna	Judge and councillor in the Barotse traditional system; function existing at various levels of the hierarchical system
Kaunda, Kenneth D. (*1924)	Leading figure of the struggle for independence; first President of the Republic of Zambia (1964–1991; United National Independence Party – UNIP)
Kuomboka ceremony	Famous ceremony during which the <i>litunga</i> moves from his summer capital Lealui to his winter capital Limulunga (English: 'to get out of the water')
Kuta	Advising council or court in the Barotse traditional governance system; fulfils political, administrative, and judicial tasks
Lewanika	Name of several <i>litungas</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Lewanika I (also known as Lubosi Lewanika; ruled from 1878 to 1916 with an interruption from 1884 to 1885): signed agreements with the BSAC that transformed Barotseland into a British protectorate;</li> <li>- Mwanawina Lewanika (also known as Mwanawina III; ruled from 1948 to 1968): signed the Barotseland Agreement in 1964;</li> </ul> also used as royal family name
Limulunga	Winter capital of Barotseland; approximately 15 km from Mongu (see also 'Kuomboka')
Litunga	King of Barotseland (English: the earth)
Lubosi Imwiko II	Current <i>litunga</i> (since 2000)
Lungu, Edgar (*1956)	Incumbent (sixth) President of the Republic of Zambia (since 2015; Patriotic Front – PF)
Makololo	People in Southern Africa; invaded and occupied Barotseland in the 19 <sup>th</sup> century

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Mbundas	Tribe in Western Province; originally from Angola
Mombotwa, Afumba (*1955)	Founder and leader of Linyungandambo; proclaimed himself Administrator General of the Barotse Government in Waiting
Mwanawasa, Levy (1948 – 2008)	Third President of the Republic of Zambia (2002–2008; Movement for Multiparty Democracy – MMD)
Ngambela	Prime Minister of Barotseland
Nkoyas	Tribe in Western Province settling mainly in the upper woodlands
Sata, Michael (1937 – 2014)	Fifth President of the Republic of Zambia (2011–2015; Patriotic Front – PF)
Sinyinda, Clement Wainyae (*1952)	Former <i>ngambela</i> of Barotseland; chairman of the Barotse National Freedom Alliance (BNFA)

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**Interviews conducted in Senegal (sorted by date)**

- Interview with a researcher, Gorée, 23 September, 2013.
- Interview with a clergyman, Ziguinchor, 3 October, 2013.
- Interview with a teacher, Ziguinchor, 5 October, 2013.
- Interview with a former combatant of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 5 October, 2013.
- Interview with a former combatant of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 11 October, 2013.
- Interview with a former teacher, Ziguinchor, 18 October, 2013.
- Interview with a journalist, Ziguinchor, 23 October, 2013a.
- Interview with a journalist, Ziguinchor, 23 October, 2013b.
- Interview with a former combatant of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 24 October, 2013a.
- Interview with a former combatant of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 24 October, 2013b.
- Interview with a local NGO employee, Cap Skirring, 26 October, 2013.
- Interview with an NGO activist and journalist, Cap Skirring, 26 October, 2013.
- Interview with a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 29 October, 2013.
- Interview with a regional politician, Ziguinchor, 30 October, 2013.
- Interview with the president of a local NGO, Ziguinchor, 31 October, 2013.
- Interview with a former national and regional politician, Ziguinchor, 1 November, 2013.
- Interview with a former NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 5 November, 2013.
- Interview with a former activist of the political wing of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 6 November, 2013.
- Interview with a former combatant of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 8 November, 2013.
- Interview with a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 8 November, 2013.
- Interview with a local NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 12 November, 2013.
- Interview with two MFDC combatants, Bissau, 15 November, 2013.
- Interview with former MFDC combatants, São Domingos, 17 November, 2013.
- Interview with the director of a local NGO, Sindian, 21 November, 2013.
- Interview with the head of a local radio station, Sindian, 21 November, 2013.
- Interview with a local politician, Sindian, 22 November, 2013.
- Interview with a regional NGO employee, Ziguinchor, 26 November, 2013.
- Interview with a local politician, Diouloulou, 29 November, 2013.
- Interview with a school supervisor, Diouloulou, 29 November, 2013.
- Interview with former MFDC combatants, Ziguinchor, 3 December, 2013.
- Interview with a former activist of the political wing of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 3 December, 2013.
- Interview with an assistant of Father Diamacoune, Ziguinchor, 8 December, 2013.
- Interview with an intellectual. Ziguinchor, 9 December, 2013.
- Interview with a former commander of the MFDC, Ziguinchor, 9 December, 2013.
- Interview with a member of the diaspora and NGO activist, Paris, 5 February, 2014.
- Interview with an activist of the political wing, Paris, 6 February, 2014.

**Interviews conducted in Zambia (sorted by date)**

- Interview with a former national politician, Lusaka, 9 June, 2014.
- Interview with a researcher and consultant, Lusaka, 9 June, 2014.
- Interview with a researcher, Lusaka, 11 June, 2014.
- Interview with a politician of the ruling party, Lusaka, 17 June, 2014.
- Interview with a university professor, Lusaka, 18 June, 2014.
- Interview with a local consultant, Mongu, 23 June, 2014.
- Interview with a former diplomat, Mongu, 24 June, 2014.
- Interview with a leading activist, Mongu, 24 June, 2014.
- Interview with a clergyman, Limulunga, 26 June, 2014.
- Interview with a local NGO employee, Mongu, 3 July, 2014.
- Interview with a youth leader, Mongu, 3 July, 2014.
- Interview with an academic and activist, Mongu, 3 July, 2014.
- Focus group discussion with indunas, Malengwa, 4 July, 2014.
- Interview with a former NGO employee, 4 July, 2014.
- Interview with a local NGO employee, Mongu, 4 July, 2014a.
- Interview with a local NGO employee, Mongu, 4 July, 2014b.
- Interview with a former national and regional politician, Mongu, 5 July, 2014.
- Interview with a local NGO employee, Mongu, 5 July, 2014.
- Interview with a former teacher, Mongu, 6 July, 2014.
- Interview with a local politician of the ruling party, Mongu, 6 July, 2014.
- Interview with a regional NGO employee, Mongu, 6 July, 2014.
- Interview with a local councillor, Malengwa, 7 July, 2014.
- Interview with a local NGO employee, Mongu, 7 July, 2014.
- Interview with a teacher, Mongu, 8 July, 2014
- Interview with a local chief, Kaoma, 9 July, 2014.
- Interview with local councillors, Kaoma, 9 July, 2014.
- Interview with activists, Kaoma, 10 July, 2014.
- interview with a local NGO employee and an elderly acquaintance, Kaoma, 10 July, 2014.
- Interview with a chief's wife, Mongu, 11 July, 2014.
- Interview with a civil servant, Mongu, 11 July, 2014.
- Interview with a former regional politician, Mongu, 11 July, 2014.
- Focus group discussion with youths, Mongu, 12 July, 2014.
- Interview with a journalist, Mongu, 12 July, 2014.
- Interview with a former civil servant, Mongu, 12 July, 2014.
- Interview with a journalist, Mongu, 13 July, 2014.
- Interview with a local NGO employee, Mongu, 14 July, 2014.
- Interview with a head of an education institution, Mongu, 14 July, 2014.

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- Interview with a regional NGO employee, Mongu, 14 July, 2014.
- Interview with a youth activist, Senanga, 15 July, 2014.
- Interview with a community development officer, Senanga, 15 July, 2014.
- Interview with a civil servant, Senanga, 15 July, 2014.
- Interview with a local government employee, Sesheke, 16 July, 2014.
- Interview with two elderly men, Sesheke, 17 July, 2014.
- Interview with a regional NGO employee, Sesheke, 17 July, 2014.
- Interview with a local government employee, Sesheke, 17 July 2014.
- Interview with a clergyman, Sesheke, 17 July, 2014.
- Interview with a concerned citizen, Sesheke, 18 July, 2014.
- Interview with a businessman, Sesheke, 18 July, 2014.
- Interview with a local councillor, Sesheke, 18 July, 2014.
- Group interview with members of an activist group, Livingstone, 21 July, 2014.
- Interview with a concerned citizen, Lusaka, 23 July, 2014.
- Interview with a human rights activist, Lusaka, 23 July, 2014.
- Interview with a former politician and a leading activist, Lusaka, 24 July, 2014.
- Interview with an opposition politician, Lusaka, 25 July, 2014.

**Consulted newspapers and journalistic platforms**

Barotse Post.

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Daily Nation.

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ).

Inter Press Service News Agency.

Le Soleil.

Lusaka Times.

New York Times.

Panafrican News Agency.

Scoopsdeziguinchor.

Spiegel.

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The Economist.

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Times of Zambia.

UKZAMBIANS.

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Zambian National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC).

Zambian Watchdog.

Zambia Reports.