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WHAT PUBLIC EXPERIENCE MAY BE – ON PUBLICITY, COMMUNICATION AND THE EXPRESSION OF LIVED EXPERIENCES

Samuel MATEUS

Faculty of Arts and Humanities, University of Madeira, 9020-105 Funchal, Portugal
E-mail: samuelmateus@uma.pt

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The idea of public experience is often invoked in different social and academic contexts. However, it seldom deserved a reflection that specifically sought to deepen its meaning from the point of view of social life. In this article we contribute to the understanding of the uniqueness of the public form of experience. We believe that one of the best ways through which we can observe the public experience is by the objectification, performance and dramatization of the culture, i.e., the “expression of lived experiences”. There is, in publicity, the possibility of simultaneous allocation of individual and collective experiences, and it is in this sense that we can see how culture influences the shaping of experience itself. Public experience is characterized by the weaving and intertwining of singular experiences that are pluralized and plural lived experiences that are singularized, in a process where individual and society interpenetrate. The relationship between experience and publicity arises from this symbolic communion contained in the systems of thought and action of societies. The decisive role of the principle of publicity to experience consists, according with the hypothesis we wish to put forward, in making available and communicating the social world of symbolic (cultural) activity. Public experience is, then, envisaged as the experience of a common world where both singular and plural definitions of the individual (taken as society) converge through lived experiences and, particularly, through their expression, which can take different symbolic forms.

Keywords: *Erfahrung, Erlebnis*, experience, expression of lived experiences, principle of publicity, public experience, public sphere, Wilhelm Dilthey.

“Yet all experience is an arch where through/
Gleams that untraveled world whose margin fades/
Forever and forever when I move”.

Alfred, Lord Tennyson, *Ulysses* (2007, first edition in 1842)

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Introduction

What is the relationship between experience and publicity, i.e., how can we gauge public experience? And, furthermore, what is its importance in contemporary societies? Both questions form the interpretive framework of the link between lived experiences and the publicity process. One of the preferred ways to recognize the fluidity of public experience has been through the concept of “lived experience”. As a specialization of the comprehensive concept of experience, this apparent minuteness, which stands out from the experiential continuum, is the support point of the analysis of the publicity process from the point of view of its connection with experience.

As underlined by symbolic interactionism or interpretive anthropology, we have to remove the subjectivist/cognitivist fallacy from such concepts like “mind”, “culture” or “experience”, and identify, in these complex meanings, a renewed, constructed and transformed symbolic system¹. Indeed, taken as a performative and transformational process, experience is something that can be shaped and experimented; the individual’s experience is both an experiment of the self and of the world. If we accept this hypothesis, of an interventional experience, it is not difficult to recognize the need to bring to the discussion the publicity process. It is because experience is an ecosystem consisting of signs and it is because it consists of symbolically mediated interpretations and activities, that experience can be observed from the point of view of publicity.

If the construction of culture, as a symbolic signifier that confers meaning and describes the

world, is a process of public construction of a social reality, then, experience – understood as something that one experiences but also dares to try and take ownership of – is the subject of publicity. Culture is the fabric of meaning through which human beings interpret their experience and guide their actions (Geertz 1973: 145). Culture is a public fact. The blink of an eye does not exist only in the minds of one or two individuals; its intangible meaning exists in social reality. If human activity is seen as symbolic action – whether a painting, a book, a speech or a musical score – we have to consider how it is patterned (Geertz 1973: 10), i.e., how it is publicly performed by the plurality of individuals.

The discourse on publicity is not so interested in describing anger, pride or irony for example but, instead, on what is being socially communicated and declared about these behaviours. To Clifford Geertz, culture is public precisely because it is made up of the circulation of significant symbols (shared and used by all) that impose meaning on experience.

“Undirected by culture patterns-organized systems of significant symbols-man’s behaviour would be virtually ungovernable, a mere chaos of pointless acts and exploding emotions, his experience virtually shapeless. Culture, the accumulated totality of such patterns, is not just an ornament of human existence but-the principal basis of its specificity-an essential condition for it” (Geertz 1973: 46).

Thus, culture is a key element of experience. And for that reason, experience – if culture is to be the public and symbolic construction of the world – is itself a public fact. Without significant symbols, without the effect of publicity and communication, experience would be a sequence of unregulated, random and incoherent sensations and behaviours. Without the role of culture and publicity, culture would be no more than an inconsequential babble. The whole experience is captured through a web of symbols

¹ Notwithstanding the undoubted richness and value of the phenomenological approach to social life, perhaps it is no exaggeration to note that its methodological weakness lies in the defense of subjectivist tendencies that put emphasis on an inner state rather than the type of relationships that the individual, as a social actor, undertakes. Alfred Schütz’s social phenomenology somehow restrains this tendency, although not eliminating it completely (1967).

and meanings that mediate our access to the objectifications and materialities of the social world. But this only occurs under the influence of publicity, through a communication process that ensures the sharing of symbolic activity. This means that not only the effectiveness and meaning of symbolic forms lies in its ability to organize experience, but also that experience depends of the strong presence of publicity as a means of expanding this dynamic and pervasive network of symbols.

These systems of symbolic forms that the word “culture” summarizes constitute our experience of the world. The decisive role of the principle of publicity for the experience is, then, to make accessible, to communicate the social world of symbolic activity. Against essentialism, where the experience would be a finished product, the idea of publicity adduces a dynamic, constructive and experimental argument of the experience. Experience has an essential public nature, insofar it is mediated by culturally modelled systems of linguistic, symbolic and representational forms (cf. Throop 2003: 226). The role of the publicity process is also exponentiated by the undetermined, fluid and disjunctive nature that guides experience. Without conceiving a principle of publicity, it would be more difficult to describe how the unity and structuring of experience evolves, adapts and is modified. Without considering the quality of publicity, it would seem also implausible to separate the two meanings of the experience contained in the German words *Erfahrung* and *Erlebnis*. Indeed, ignoring, in the analysis of social life, a principle like publicity – able to simultaneously sustain the fragmentary and the whole – any serious reference to lived experiences would promptly fall in the dome of solipsism.

In fact, it is because we possess a trans-cultural and millennial concept of “publicity”² that the relationship between the singular and plural definitions of the individual can be obtained,

and any given behaviour (premeditated, intentional or spontaneous) can be communicated to other individuals, and therefore can be adopted in the actions of others, thereby becoming part of the experience. There is, therefore, in publicity the possibility of simultaneous inclusion of individual and collective experience, and it is in this sense that we can see how culture influences the shaping of experience. Social structures of meaning contribute to the shaping of experience precisely because meaning is public. The relationship between experience and publicity arises in this symbolic communion that systems of thought and action of societies contain. Without publicity (and without its communicational aspect, which of course cannot be ignored) experience might not hold its constitutive fluidity and adaptive transience.

The mutuality of experience derives from the inherent relationship between experience, communication and publicity. When I understand my actions and the experience of my actions through my situation in the world, what I understand from my experience and from the experience of others come from a set of typifications and cultural and social structures. Bruce Kapferer calls it “the universalizing character of culture”:

“Any uniqueness that can be in my experience is widespread and lost in a set of constructs, concepts or of crime socially constituted. These stand between me and humans, between the immediacy of my experience and the experience of another person” (Kapferer 1986: 190).

It is precisely in this sense that culture is public and that publicity is a key concept in a reflection about experience. The principle of publicity embodies this universalizing nature of culture, assuming that the experience of a person can reach others and that a singular experience can be pluralized and communicated. The elaborations and symbolic forms which, through the publicity process, operate

² An argument developed in my PhD Thesis (Mateus 2012).

the mediation of the world and, therefore, the formation of experience, are crucial in the intersubjective sharing of experience.

However, what is shared by publicity is not the entirety of the experience in its absolute immediacy³. The commonality of experience triggers the activation of typifications and symbolic forms. Experience becomes public not because it shares the experience itself, but rather the possible interpretations that come with it. In publicity, it is the conceptions and appropriations of the experience that circulate, rather than the singular experience *per se*. The universalizing nature of culture, which allows the mutuality of experience, thus consecrates the public sharing of assumptions that allow the assessment and understanding, collectively, of the experience. The universalization of the particular and the particularization of the universal, present in the principle of publicity are two of the factors that contribute to the public nature of the experience and the possibility of it being subject to intersubjective sharing. One aspect regarding the mutuality of experience that has been analysed in greater detail and which reveals, in a unique way, the centrality of the publicity process is art (Dewey 2012) or the ritual (Turner 1986), precisely because their performances contain this ability to synthesize the individual and the collective.

Dramatization and public experience

It is at the point that we locate the (communicational) role of publicity on the mutuality of experience (*Erfahrung*) that we are faced with its most vital sense: the lived experience (Wilhelm Dilthey's *Erlebnis*). Lived experiences are often made of a dramatization of experience⁴, of per-

formance, of the staging and public encounter between the singular and the plural definition of the individual. It is in the dramatization, for example, of media rites (cf. Couldry 2003), that experience reaches an emotional climax that destroys the symbolic distance that societies sometimes build. There is therefore a dramatic dimension of experience that lived experiences put into practice, and where the intensity of public experience transcends any deferral and allows the communication of intersubjective sharing.

Even in conflict or dissension, public experience is an experience that is staged and aestheticized, an experience that dramatizes the existence. Think of the social figuration: the carnation as a symbol of the peaceful revolution in Portugal, the caricature as figurative representation of social criticism, the song as political resistance⁵. Therefore, public experience, inasmuch as it consists of lived experiences, is an amplified feel where dramatization achieves what rational judgment cannot. Dramatization allows us thus to observe a fundamental aspect of public experience: lived experiences as cultural expressions. Indeed, public experience cannot be confined to a purely hermeneutic, phenomenological or subjectivist understanding. If lived experiences, which characterize the public inhabitation of experience, contemplate this subjective dimension, if experiences belong to an individual who suffers and experiments⁶ life, they are not mere objects of interiority.

³ That would mean to accept the ontology of "experience" parallel to the ontological status of the Essence (cf. the debate around nominalism and existentialism).

⁴ It is not an accident that Dilthey (1945) associated *Erlebnis* to poetry.

⁵ A quick search on the Internet offers us the most varied examples of this figuration which experiences of public experience contain. Social manifestations of 2 March, 2012, in Portugal, illustrate not only the figurative dramatization of existence, but also how publicity fuels the (collective) experience and where the "heroic song" "*Acordai*" (English: *Awake!*) by Fernando Lopes-Graça is wielded and sung like a cry of protest against the economic crisis and the financial intervention of *Troika* (International Monetary Fund, European Union, European Central Bank) in the country.

⁶ This is not to say that the individual experiences life. We want, in contrast, to stress the sense of trial as in the Latin word *experimentum*.

What the dramatization of the experience suggests is the possibility to also consider lived experiences as public expressions that break out in a world of inter-subjective experience mediated by cultural and social forms (cf. Turner 1986). To the extent that culture and meaning are public, dramatization contributes to the social and collective expression of lived experiences. The public experience, made up of these lived experiences, is then characterized by cultural expressions objectified in the materiality, figuration and symbolicity of culture.

A question could be raised: if the public experience (*Erfahrung*) is associated with lived experiences (*Erlebnissen*), is it reasonable to attribute to the lived experience – with experiential and subjective contours – a public, hence, collective dimension? That is, how can we begin to understand that a concept like “lived experience”, so close to subjectivity, can serve as a basis for understanding public experience, a social experience, collective and plural⁷? Is it not the example of an oxymoron, a contradiction in its own terms? For it is precisely because the publicity process operates the transition between the singular and plural definitions of the individual that one can perceive public experience as lived experience. The objectified manifestation of culture, the dramatization and the figuration of experiences, play out the cultural expression of those lived experiences that were initiated in the individual feeling but found a resonance in the society.

In his *Descriptive Psychology and Historical Understanding*, Dilthey was aware of the risks in which the *Erlebnis* could incur if it did not counterbalance the introspective and “interior” dimensions of the lived experience with the social and cultural projections of the experience (see Dilthey 1977). He opposes, then, introspection to “the objectified” projection of the human consciousness (*objectiver Geist Ausdrucken*). To the end product of the mental activity transposed to the world, he calls “objectified

spirit” (*objectiver Geist*) or “cultural expression” (*kultureller Ausdruck*) (Dilthey 1989). The observation of the inner experience is not enough to understand the complexities of the human condition since the psychic life is rarely given in a coherent or total form. Dilthey argues that the examination of the creations or expressions of the human mind are an indirect form to accede to those parts of the psychic life that are not given directly to the introspection (Throop 2002: 9). He is, thus, underlining the importance of the expressions of the *Erlebnis* as way to discern consciousness. Simultaneously, he is extending the approach since the immediate experience, the lived experience (*Erlebnis*) until the culturally mediated experience (*Erfahrung*) (Ermarth 1978: 276–277).

Lived experiences possess a natural tendency to crystallize in expressions that are not identical to the lived experience but that represent it, signified it and figure it. The expression of the lived experience (*Ausdruck Erleben*) is described by Dilthey as a complement of self-experience, since, while this provides the interior experience with an objective reference, the expression of the lived experience is exactly what makes the interior experience a public experience (Throop 2002: 9). Said in another way, the expression of the lived experience is what allows binding the interior psychic structure of a man with the exterior structure of the socio-historical world (Tillman 1976: 124). A pivot between individual and society, between internal and external structures, expression is what allows the possibility of gauging mental and cultural facts. Consequently, Dilthey could formulate the understanding process (*verstehen*) as the principle through which we can reconstruct the crystallized mental life in the most diverse forms of expression of the lived experience:

“Everywhere we see the mixing, in varying degrees, the relationship of personal lived experience with the expression, and the relationship between what happens on the outside

⁷ One possibility is the hermeneutical one (for this approach see Lindseth, Norberg 2004).

and understanding. Because personal lived experience implies a State of mind, but at the same time, [involves] the objectivity of the surrounding world. Understanding and recreating we capture the life of the spirit of others but always through the life of the soul that she infuses” (Dilthey 1945: 141).

The interdependence between lived experience and expression is what truly constitutes the hermeneutic circle. It is from Diltheyan objectivation of the mind that, for example, Victor Turner affirms that the collection of “congregated expressions” of a specific community as objectified mind is nothing other than Diltheyan version of culture (Turner 1982: 14). In fact, he describes this process in a very similar way to that of Dilthey’s:

“the conception of culture that we possess is based on the assumption that we can meet the subjective depths, whether through insight, either via the scrutiny of significant objectivations ‘expressed’ by others. In a complementary manner, the scrutiny of the self can give us clues about the penetration of life objectivations generated from the experience of others” (Turner 1982: 14).

Or, as Geertz writes: “Whatever the sense we make of the inner life of another person, we look for it through his expressions, not through some magical intrusion on his conscience. It’s all a matter of scratching the surface” (Geertz 1986: 373).

Dilthey’s idea of “expression” can help us understand two things more clearly: first, it helps to explain how through symbolic forms can the individual access the private sphere of the subjectivity of others; on the other hand, the concept helps us to describe and understand how lived experiences may form the basis of public experience, and how the individual experience can add to the collective experience.

The expression of lived experiences

The expression of experiences relies in the operative idea of the very notion of culture in that it concerns the transcendence of subjectivity and individual initiative through objectified expressions (performances, figurations, drama, imaginaries, linguistic representations, frames of meaning, ideologies and ideologies, social practices etc.). We observe, therefore, how lived experiences cohabit the symbolic space of expressions, and how the individual and the social merge together.

In an effort of definition, we would say public experience is an experience consisting of lives experiences that are expressed, in an objectified manner, in various forms of symbolic representation. It is a special kind of experience, since it is doubly a lived experience: a lived experience for someone but, simultaneously, lived and experienced by many others. It is in this back-and-forth that the publicity of experience takes place and the public experience is realized in all the objectified expressions that so distinguish it.

Cultural expressions are symbolic materializations that enclose lived experiences. Indeed, lived experiences and expressions seem to be dialectically related: not only we understand others and their expressions based on our lived experience, as these expressions, due to their social and public nature, also structure the experience of people, in the sense that the meta-narratives, rituals, festivals, art and ceremonies help define and illuminate the lived experience (Bruner 1986: 6). Experience is thus culturally invested. The great founding texts (*Oedipus the King*, *Don Quixote*, *Hamlet*) are intense, complex and intricate expressions of life itself, enriching this experience while clarifying it:

“Our knowledge of what is given in the lived experience is amplified through the interpretation of life objectivations, and their interpretations, in turn, are only possible if we dive into

the depths of subjective experience” (Dilthey 1976: 195).

Expressions introduce us in a fundamental distinction between the lived life (reality), the experienced life (lived experience), and life as it is narrated (expressions) (cf. Bruner 1986: 6). Expressions are socially constructed lived experiences, a cultural product subject to the inescapable tension between reality and experience. Therefore, expressions, because they are cultural expressions, are never static or definitive texts; they always involve a procedural activity re-enacted *ad aeternum*. This is proved by the dynamism of the publicity process and the expressions that circulate within it. Experiences have to be expressed and, therefore, every year and every day, new rites have to be performed, new ceremonies have to be publicly acknowledged, new dramas have to be re-presented and reinterpreted within the publicity process.

Social life consists of these symbolic expressions. The importance of publicity (and its communicational nature) lies in the dissemination and generalization imprinted in these expressions, allowing lived experiences to be transformed into experiences (personal or collective):

“The lived experience precipitates towards the expression or communication with the other. We are social beings and we want to share what we learn from our experience. Art depends on this urgency of confession or declamation. The meanings must be told, painted, dance, dramatized, put into circulation. In this case the urgency of the peacock display is indistinguishable from ritual need to communicate” (Turner 1986: 37).

Hence, the major lesson that the notion of “expression” associated with public experience – cultural experience and socially lived – entails is not that experiences are unique and idiosyncratic; it is that, first of all, experience is socially

organized and has a publicity principle that allows it to be shared, owned and re-created over time. From this point of view, public experience is a combination of lived experiences socially and culturally ordered through the expressions and symbolic forms that circulate within in. The expression of lived experiences acts as a kind of yeast added to communication seen as a communal experience:

“The expression transgresses the barriers that separate human beings. Given that art is the most universal language form, given that is woven [...] from common qualities that belong to the public world, she is the most universal and unrestricted form of communication” (Dewey 2012: 440).

It is due to its communicational character that public experience is a shared and commune experience, the expressions of experiences acquiring consistency through the repeated practice of collective organization of experience. The expressions of lived experiences, stemming from communication, have a huge a capacity of putting in relation, of comprehensive conviviality, of social revitalization. Public experience is an experience of collective tuning, it is an experience of amendment of perspectives, of adjustment of attention, and lived experience. Public experience in expressing itself, in communicating, becomes “the” experience.

Given the multiple expressions of experience, *we may characterize public experience as a set of lived experiences that societies articulate as a way of organizing and accomplishing the Experience*. Public experience – made up of successive lived experiences and its expressions – is located on the level of a plurality of individuals. This means that it is a trans-individual phenomenon: it does not correspond to purely individual experiences and neither to completely collectivized ones. It operates at the junction between these two registers of experience, between the subjectivity and objectivity that determines social processes.

The public dimension of experience is volatile. In fact, much like the publicity process, public experience – socially lived experience – exists between the individual and society. However, we use these terms (individual and society) only for the convenience of designating two different regimes of social action. The expressions of lived experiences that constitute the publicity experience indicate precisely, as we pointed out, this alternation between the subjective and objectified subjectivity, between an experience that is lived individually and socially.

William James' theory about the affective experience helps us understand this reasoning that makes the public experience a trans-individual phenomenon. According to the author of the-expression "pure experience", we inhabit a universe of experiences which are not marked by unicity or fixedness but instead, constitute a hybrid and ambiguous universe where the experiences of our emotions are not intuitive contents of interiority. The ambivalence of the affective experience illustrates, as James shows, that subjectivity and objectivity are not issues of experience but of its very classification (James 1905: 282). Experience takes the form of lived experiences or of the publicity dimension, according to the perspective that is imposed on it. James observes:

"it surely can be nothing intrinsic in the individual experience. It is their way of behaving towards each other, their system of relations, their function; and all these things vary with the context in which we find it opportune to consider them" (James 1905: 287).

Just as the line of the horizon moves with the subject who observes, so the experience, as Alfred, Lord Tennyson writes, moves according to what we do with it (Tennyson 2007). Public experience corresponds therefore to a translocation of experience, an association that brings together individualized experiences but which are collectively experienced. This is their

communal and communicational sense: the reverberation of experience through the alveolar spaces between the singular and plural definitions of individual. This point allows clarifying the importance that technological devices of symbolic mediation have in the functioning of the present societies and of public experience. Public experience consists of the lived experiences that become common property, sharable and trivialized⁸. Now, media participate in this mundane communication of experience and sharing of lived experiences (cf. Woodley-Baker 2009). The communication they operate, works as an opportunity, available to each individual, to receive the experience of others. And some of its programming – as in the case of reality TV shows or newscasts – assumes without embarrassment the trend of communicating the experience of otherness, in presenting an experience that lies beyond the immediate experience of the individual. Public experience is reborn here, in the constant widening of the horizons of experience:

"What is accessible only to that individual, what takes place only in the field of his own inner life, must be stated in its relationship to the situation within which it takes place. One individual has one experience and another has another experience, and both are stated in terms of their biographies; but there is in addition that which is common to the experience of all" (Mead 1992: 33).

What belongs to the experience of all is precisely the public experience, is the sentence that seems to follow naturally. Experience, as we hoped to have demonstrated in the argumentation we developed, is purposeful; it is not substantive. Its publicity dimension is therefore located in the interactions that are established between the singular and plural definitions of the individual and the social world.

⁸ In the positive sense of something that subtly spills over and pervades the flow of days.

Conclusions

Experience, as trans-individual phenomenon, is a part of the publicity process which is characterized precisely by the objectification, figuration, representation, dramatization, in short, the expression of lived experience (*Erlebnis*).

By placing publicness of experience on the side of *Erlebnis* we are not precluding it from being associated with the experience in the sense of *Erfhörung*. Public experience is also journey and danger, it is also an event. But it does not end there: it constitutes itself between the singular and plural definition of the individual (society) and it is in that extent that the publicity dimension of experience lends itself to be understood as something lived, felt and concurred.

Public experience is experience (*Erfahrung*) but is simultaneously lived experience (*Erlebnis*), subjectivity that is figured on the materiality or symbolicity of the world and is expressed objectively as a means of being apprehended, interpreted and accommodated by the individual. There is, thus, like a circle that is filled and restarted (from subjectivity to objectivity, then to subjectivity again returning to objectivity, and so on *ad infinitum*). In *The Social Construction of Reality* Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann describe this process divided by the phases of *externalization*, *objectification* and *integration* (Berger, Luckmann 1989). The power of experience – as we know since Aristotle – consists of the productive disposition that gives the individual the possibility to do something (Gregorić, Grgić 2006: 14). Experience allows us to do things. If I have the experience of an articulated table (which I know is made of separate parts united by hinges), I can reduce its volume and make it more plane (the passage from the three-dimensional to the two-dimensional). And by transforming the relation of the object with the world, I have modified my own experience of the table. *The same occurs within public experience: each lived experience added to the publicity process of societies*

is a new opportunity for the transformation of Experience. And each new transformation of Experience is an opportunity for its acting upon the social reality in which we live. Let us take the recent example of the Portuguese song “Grândola, Vila Morena” (English: *Grândola, Village Tanned by the Sun*), where the new lived experience of the song has transformed the experience that the Portuguese had of it. It was that new experience that allowed an action on the world, an interpellation and intervention on Portuguese society. The song as protest against the old regime of Estado Novo (English: *New State*) is now being used by the citizens who reclaim their voice in the democratic system in which they live.

However, this intensification of the experience that comes by its resurgence has a particular impact when associated with publicity: to the extent that it exercises “lived experiences”, the growth trend of the experience entails a very particular sense. The public experience grows horizontally as it challenges the social experience on the same level of generality; that is, lived experiences contribute to a shared collective experience that is added to those that underlie it – *universal integration of the particular*. And, at the same time, public experience grows vertically in the sense that it confers a particular integration of the universal, and where experiences are true cultural expressions or “objectified spirits” (*objectiver Geist*) as Dilthey wrote. We are able to understand the practical and immediate experience, but we are also able, from this vertical growth of experience, to experiment mediated realities, which – in spite of not experiencing them directly – are part of our own experience. As can easily be seen, it is this vertical exponentiation of public experience that is most subject to mediatization. Indeed, media operate not only the symbolic mediation of the world; they also operate, in a particularly idiosyncratic way⁹, the very me-

⁹ The uniqueness of the technological devices of symbolic mediation is confirmed by the number of graduates in communication, which has increased in

diatization of experience. Both of these growths – horizontal and vertical – of the experience occur in public experience because publicity involves the expressions of lived experiences and because publicity, in its communicative role, possesses interpretive schemes common to all. Schütz mentioned the “scheme of our experience” (*Schemata von unserer Erfahrung*) (Schutz 1967: 122) as contexts of meaning. Similarly, public experience seems to be covered by layers of experiential schemes characterized by the mutual conditioning of individuals and by the construction – via communicational phenomena – of complex interactive patterns, capable of delimiting the experience, on the level of the singular definition of individual, much Norbert Elias tells us (1970), and on the level of the plural definition of the individual, which we call society.

To sum up, public experience is, then, the experience of a shared world, where singular and plural definitions of individual converge through lived experiences, and more particularly so through the expression of these lived experiences, which can take on different symbolic forms (figurations, imaginary, representations, rituals, dramatizations). By articulating the particular and the universal, Experience does not remain the same. Once the experiences of one turn into the experiences of many – or as collective experiences are internalized – there is a transfiguration of experience, in which the very nature of the interactions between individuals and between individuals and the world is revolutionized. Social reality encloses a public experience made of externalizations, an experience that is both experiencing and experimentation, and it is this ambivalence that best characterizes the publicity process as a process that encompasses lived experiences and causes their flow.

recent decades. Indeed, the multiplication of research and studies in communication, as well as disciplinary specialization around the “Communication sciences” marks, with particular clarity, the recognition of the importance of addressing the phenomena of mediatization as an object of study.

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KOKIA GALI BŪTI VIEŠOJI PATIRTIS – APIE VIEŠUMĄ, KOMUNIKACIJĄ IR IŠGYVENTŲ PATIRČIŲ IŠRAIŠKĄ

Samuel MATEUS

Viešosios patirties idėja dažnai remiamasi skirtinguose socialiniuose ir akademinuose kontekstuose. Tačiau retai sąmoningai imamas specifiskai pagilinti jos reikšmę iš socialinio gyvenimo perspektyvos. Manome, kad vienas iš geriausių būdų, kuriuo remdamiesi galime nagrinėti viešąją patirtį, yra kultūros objektyvumas, plėtojimas ir inscenavimas, t. y. „išgyventų patirčių reiškinys“. Viešojoje sferoje tai – simultaniškas individualios ir kolektyvinės patirčių skirstymas, ir šia prasme galime suprasti, kokią įtaką kultūra daro pačios patirties formavimuisi. Viešąją patirtį charakterizuoja individo ir visuomenės persiskverbimo procese besiaudžiančios bei besuspinančios individualiai išgyventos ir bendrai perimtos patirtys bei bendrai išgyventos ir individualiai perimtos patirtys. Patirties ir viešumo santykis kyla iš simbolinės bendruomenės, kurią apima minčių sistemos ir visuomenių veiksmi. Remiantis norima iškelti hipotezę, lemiamas viešumo principo vaidmuo patirties atžvilgiu pasireiškia darant prielaimą ir komunikuojamą socialinį pasaulį, kuriame skleidžiasi simbolinė (kultūrinė) veikla. Tokiu atveju viešoji patirtis suprantama kaip bendrai gyvenamo pasaulio patirtis, kuriame tiek individualios, tiek bendramatės individo (suprantamo kaip visuomenė) apibrėžtys suartėja per išgyventas patirtis, o ypač per jų reiškimąsi, įgaunantį skirtingas simbolines formas.

Reikšminiai žodžiai: *Erfahrung, Erlebnis*, patirtis, išgyventų patirčių išraiška, viešumo principas, viešoji patirtis, viešoji sfera, Wilhelmas Dilthey'us.