

NEW TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN PROVINCIAL
NEWSPAPERS: COMPUTERISATION AND BARGAINING POWER OF
JOURNALISTS

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ABSTRACT

The thesis examines whether the introduction of computerised editorial systems (direct input) in provincial newspapers has altered the bargaining power of journalists. It analyses whether power has been transferred from the printers to the editorial workers, and has shifted the frontier of control between the workforce and managers in the journalists' favour.

Drawing on evidence from documentation, observation, face-to-face structured and unstructured interviews and a questionnaire survey, the thesis concludes that the control relationships in provincial newspapers have undergone important changes as result of new technology.

In the short term, control appeared to transfer to editorial workers because the National Union of Journalists (NUJ) chapels enjoyed considerable success in the negotiation of direct input at local level. The NUJ was very successful in securing detailed New Technology Agreements that included substantial pay increases for journalists.

The increased control stemmed largely from the enhanced influence over strategic contingencies in the production process: the greater immediacy and pervasiveness of the journalists in general, and the sub-editors in particular. However, although this 'latent power' has been transferred from the printers, in the longer term journalists have not developed overall workplace control. This is a result of the inability of journalists to influence the labour market, the absence of a uniform collective workgroup consciousness, weak trade union discipline and an inappropriate organisational structure. The development of workplace control has also been inhibited by the positive attitudes of the journalists to the technological change, particularly in terms of greater job satisfaction and increased skill levels, which have outweighed the negative effects such as health and safety problems. Moreover, new technology seems to have widened differences and divisions between editorial workers, and this has reduced further their ability to act collectively to exert workplace control.

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GENERAL ABBREVIATIONS

ABC	Audit Bureau of Circulations
ACAS	Advisory, Arbitration and Conciliation Service
ADM	Annual Delegate Meeting
AFN	Association of Free Newspapers
CPU	Central Processing Unit
DI	Direct Input
F/MoC	Father/Mother of the Chapel
IoJ	Institute of Journalists
NCTJ	National Council for the Training of Journalists
NEC	National Executive Council
NGA	National Graphical Association '82
NS	Newspaper Society
NTA	New Technology Agreement
NUJ	National Union of Journalists
PC	Personal Computer
PNIC	Provincial Newspapers Industrial Council
RSI	Repetitive Strain Injury
SOGAT	Society of Graphical and Allied Trades '82
TUC	Trades Union Congress
UKPG	United Kingdom Press Gazette
VDT	Video Display Terminal
VDU	Video Display Unit

COMPANY ABBREVIATIONS

AP	Argus Press
BHNG	Bucks. and Herts. Newspaper Group
BN	Bailey Newspapers
BNL	Becketts Newspapers Ltd.
BPM	Birmingham Post and Mail
BUP	Bristol United Publishing
CN	Capital Newspapers
CNG	Cumbrian Newspaper Group
ECN	Eastern Counties Newspapers
EMAP	East Midland Allied Press
HDN	Huddersfield District Newspapers
ING	Ingersoll Publishing
JN	Johnston Newspapers
KMG	Kent Messenger Group
MEN	Manchester Evening News
NN	Northcliffe Newspapers
NP	Northern Press
NWWN	North Wales Weekly Newspapers
PSN	Portsmouth and Sunderland Newspapers
REED	Reed Regional Publishing
SAN	Stephen Austin Newspapers
SHN	Sharman Newspapers
SN	Southern Newspapers
TI	Trinity International
TRN	Thomson Regional Newspapers
UN	United Newspapers
WP	Westminster Press
YA	Yellow Advertiser
YIT	Yattendon Investment Trust

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction - Workplace Control

The recession, the introduction of new technology and the UK political environment create opportunities for employers to adjust their managerial practices in an attempt to exert greater control in the workplace. This has been characterised variously as an employers' offensive (Hyman & Elger, 1981), a reclamation of managerial prerogatives through 'macho management' (Mackay, 1986), 'new realism' (Bassett, 1986), flexibility and pragmatism (Atkinson, 1984; Purcell, 1987) or 'very little change' (MacInnes, 1987; Marginson et al, 1988; Martin, 1987). The underlying question is, are managers attempting to push back the frontier of control?

The thesis proposes to address this question and examine the movement of the frontier and the way the workforce can hold it back. It takes the argument further by examining whether in certain circumstances the frontier is being redrawn rather than pushed back, with control being transferred not to managers, but from one group of workers to another. The analysis takes the provincial newspaper industry as a case study, within which the relevant issues of workplace control can be examined. The reasons why this industry is appropriate for analysing the shifts in workplace control are outlined later in this chapter, but first it is important to consider the frontier of control and the methods available to employers to push it in their favour.

The frontier of control has been defined by Storey as

'the structure of managerial control and managerial rights versus the challenge from organised labour and workers' rights' (1981; pl25). The picture is of a border of workplace control, ever shifting through the interaction and confrontation of workers and managers. The precise components of the frontier will be made apparent in the next chapter where a model of workplace control is developed. For now, the general definition will suffice in order to isolate the areas upon which management might focus to push the frontier in their favour.

The various surveys and research reveal two broad areas of control push: new technology and collective bargaining. These areas are interwoven and in practice are unlikely to be seen as discrete categories either by management or unions, as shall become apparent throughout the thesis, however to outline the general trends, they are examined separately below.

New Technology

The introduction of new technology has generally been welcomed by workers (Daniel, 1987) in spite of the possibility of it being used by management to exert greater control over the work process. The control issues it raises concern deskilling, work intensification and flexibility.

The seminal work by Braverman (1974) produced a vigorous debate over whether deskilling and the degradation of jobs was a prime objective of management in introducing new technology. In the light of empirical surveys, his theory was modified (for example, Edwards, 1979; Thompson, 1983) and criticised (for example, Wood, 1982; Knights,

Willmott & Collinson, 1985; Francis, 1986) and has given rise to the widely accepted notion that managers tend to make political and strategic choices when introducing new technology (for example, Wilkinson, 1983; Buchanan & Boddy, 1983; Child, 1985). New technology might therefore be used to deskill and degrade work, for example, by removing the discretion of operators over the task and transferring the control to supervisors and managers (a much cited example is Noble, 1979). Alternatively, the new technology could be used to reskill and upgrade workers, by increasing their discretion over the tasks and enriching jobs, and thereby gaining commitment to managerial goals - described by Friedman (1977) as 'responsible autonomy'. The decision on how to apply the new technology might therefore reflect the political choices of the management, the location of job control issues on their agenda of technological objectives, the 'biases' of the new technology built in by the suppliers, and the influences of the existing technology and production arrangements (McLoughlin & Clark, 1988). This 'strategic choice' perspective is adopted by this thesis.

Work intensification has been associated with changes in technology (Edwards, 1985) because it can more easily be adopted in the guise of efficiency. The technology allows managers greater opportunity to intensify production in three main ways: first, they might use new technology to increase the capital intensity of the production process by replacing staff with machines, but without reducing the overall level of output. Thus, whilst the technology may take over much of the work, the expected output of the

remaining workers (who cannot be replaced by technology) might increase. Secondly, new technology might transform the work process so that different tasks are being performed, which workers are unable to compare with previous tasks, and so are more likely to accept different productivity levels - especially if the setting of productivity levels and other job control issues are presented by management as needing 'technological expertise'. Thirdly, the new technology may have the potential to speed up the process, or introduce machine-paced production processes rather than leaving the pacing of work to the discretion of individual workers or work teams.

Linked to the issue of work intensity is the notion of flexibility. Daniel (1987; p172-178) found extensive use of flexibility associated with new technology because it can be used to break down demarcation and increase the flexibility of tasks - thereby allowing 'economies of scope'. In terms of workplace control, this may mean that workers can be trained to become multi-skilled (Cross, 1985). The particular value to management is two fold: first it allows workers to be moved from task to task in line with fluctuations in demand; and second, it breaks down traditional group loyalties since workers might therefore no longer identify themselves with a specific workgroup. Consequently, it has the potential to reduce collectivism, and weaken trade union organisation.

Flexible firm theorists (Atkinson, 1984; Atkinson & Meager, 1986) argue that managements are splitting the workers into three components - core workers, peripheral

workers and external workers - and that this trend stems directly from increased unemployment, and less labour intensive work processes brought about by technological change. Core workers are offered a degree of employment security through reskilling and upskilling, with enterprise specific training courses, whilst peripheral workers are subject to the fluctuating labour market and are employed at times of high productivity demand. In this way the core workers are buttressed from the ebb and flow of the labour market by the peripheral workers. The external workers are the least secure, being employed on freelance contracts, working outside the workplace and meeting their own overheads.

Consequently, flexibility has different applications for core and peripheral workers. The core workers are subject to 'functional flexibility' - the multi-skilling noted above. Clearly this can increase the substitutability of workers by allowing greater flexibility within the workplace, and has implications for nurturing an enterprise-orientated attitude. First it is likely to be associated with enterprise-specific training to match any new technology and so ties the workers more closely to the enterprise; second, multi-task workers are able to perform a greater variety of jobs which might lower boredom and increase commitment yet still ensure that the tedious and unrewarding tasks get done.

Atkinson and Meager did not however notice any significant increase in the extent of vertical flexibility within manufacturing. They argue that this is largely because of union demarcation, training problems and

occasionally health and safety considerations. Such an observation is important when considering the frontier of control since it implies that union resistance might play a key role in the reduction of flexibility - thus the trend might be for skilled organised workers performing core functions to acquire new skills (whether enterprise-specific or not) yet maintain or enhance their employment patterns and labour market position.

Worker influence over functional flexibility (or resistance to flexibility) does not however necessarily enhance the workgroup's control, since management may adopt 'numerical flexibility', a phrase used by Atkinson and Meager to characterise temporary work, part-time work, overtime and flexible working hours.

They argue that peripheral workers witnessed the most numerical flexibility from their study. Temporary workers tended to be unskilled and semi-skilled, usually with skills not specific to the company and fewer employment rights, whilst part-timers were employed to match demand fluctuations throughout the day, which reduced overheads but ensured high levels of productivity. The trend in overtime was to reduce it or place it under more managerial supervision. Flexible working time was found to be rare, and when it did occur was restricted to part-time workers.

There is conflicting evidence over the extent of this numerical flexibility. Millward and Stevens (1986) argue that there is a small but significant increase in the use of part-timers, a decline in homeworking and outworking, and a significant decline in the use of freelance work. However, Hakim (1987) suggests that analysis of the

Department of Employment's 'Labour Force Survey' 1981-85 shows a rise of part-time workers from 4.184 million in spring 1981 to 4.475 million in spring 1985 (from 19.7% to 21.7% of all people in employment); and also shows a dramatic increase in temporary work from 621,000 in 1981 to 1,314,000 in 1985 - and especially large increases in men doing temporary work. This is paralleled by a steady decline in the permanent (core) workforce: from 70% of all employment in 1981 to 66% in 1985. Hakim concludes that the importance of the flexible sector has "clearly been underestimated; it is hardly a narrow and insignificant fringe on the edges of the labour market" (1987; p93).

In general the control implications are that peripheral workers not only face less employment security through high rates of unemployment, but are less likely to be able to control the times and nature of that employment. In short, management enhance their control by gaining compliance over the working contract to meet the specific needs of the enterprise (with respect to demand and productivity).

In practice it may be more difficult to define core and peripheral workers than first appears. There may for example be an element of core workers who can be subjected to numerical flexibility, whilst many of the peripheral workers might be functionally flexible enough to perform core tasks - indeed both these possibilities seem extremely likely if management seriously seeks to reduce overheads and enhance control. And recently the whole flexible firm thesis has come under a swinging - and convincing - attack (Pollert, 1987; MacInnes, 1988) because 'it is inaccurate empirically, it suffers at a methodological and conceptual

level, and it is highly contestable at a policy level' (Pollert, 1987; p27).

Generally, it can be concluded that flexibility tends to reduce a workgroup's influence over specific aspects of the work process. The most effective method of the workgroup retaining influence might be strong unionisation, thereby minimising functional flexibility or ensuring checks and guarantees to preserve demarcation. However, management may seek to combat this with an increase in numerical flexibility, which not only provides greater productivity at peak times, but reduces the extent of workgroup collective identity and unionisation by using a more transient workforce with fewer employment rights. Where specific skills are needed, and specific training has to be given, numerical flexibility will be less easy to implement and core workers may be in a stronger position of influence.

Collective Bargaining

New technology also creates new bargaining issues for trade unions. Should technology be the subject of bargaining? At what level should bargaining be conducted? Who should be involved? What issues should be covered? The TUC advocates the adoption of new technology agreements (TUC, 1979) but surveys show that managers have been more likely to adopt methods of informal consultation rather than full negotiations (Daniel, 1987). Moreover, unions have often been ill-prepared and ill-equipped to deal with the bargaining issues associated with new technology (Williams & Steward, 1985; Dodgson & Martin, 1987).

Concurrent with the new bargaining issues created by new technology, there appear to have been changes in the general approach to bargaining. Brown (1986) has argued that there has been a trend towards decentralisation of management resulting in collective bargaining becoming more concentrated in the work place with the effect of focussing the workers' attentions on the enterprise and not the industry as a whole or other workers in similar jobs. This enterprise orientated bargaining is beneficial to managers, claims Brown, since it allows them to conduct bargaining within a framework set by the local labour and product market, and reduces the extent of bargaining over comparability.

A further distinction is made by Kinnie (1985) who suggests from his research in four firms that there has been a strategy to decentralise operational decision-making whilst retaining strategic decision-making at corporate level. This therefore not only allows adaptability to the local market, but also removes the trade union negotiators from contact with the strategic decision-makers in the industry. Kinnie argues that this is a calculated managerial response to the changing economic environment which has reduced demand, changed the nature of demand and increased product market competitiveness.

The findings of both Brown and Kinnie are supported by a more recent and rigorous survey conducted by Marginson et al (1988). Interestingly they make the point that enterprise structure, product and relationship to the company as a whole are the key variables in determining the extent of decentralisation, whereas factors of size and

overseas ownership - thought by some studies to be important - have very little influence.

Decentralisation is in effect both an economic and political strategy. Economic because it allows local management to tighten its use of labour and match bargaining to changes in local circumstances, thereby maintaining profitability; and political because it isolates workers from other enterprises and associates their interests with the success of the firm - the most overt expression of this being profit-linked pay schemes.

The economic performance of the firm in the product market and the value of the worker in the local labour market are the key variables; both have important control implications. In the first instance, product competition concerns both price and quality, and so not only depends on low labour costs and high productivity, but also worker performance (motivation), investment in up-to-date equipment, quality control, maturity of the product, marketing and feedback systems. These quality aspects are almost entirely the domain of the management and so failure to be competitive may have as much to do with inept or inappropriate management as it does with staffing levels and labour costs. Clearly if workers are tied more closely to the economic performance of the enterprise they are implicitly tied more closely to the quality, experience and farsightedness of local management, and more vulnerable to its failure than when bargaining and decision-making were more centralised and conducted on an industry-wide (or company-wide) basis.

Secondly, with regard to the labour market, the extent

to which workers will lose control depends on two factors: first, their level of substitutability, either because their work is unskilled or because there is a surplus of skilled workers; and second the extent of unionisation and its influence over entry into the labour market through, for example, training or a closed shop. Thus unorganised, unskilled workers (for example shop workers) would be more vulnerable to local labour market fluctuation as a result of decentralisation than skilled unionised workers.

Although there is strong evidence of decentralisation (Kinnie, 1985; Marginson et al, 1988) it should not be considered a blanket rule. Indeed senior managers may exercise discretion and retain central control of collective bargaining where either a workforce is skilled and highly unionised, or where particular local labour market circumstances offer the workers a strong local bargaining position. It might also be appropriate when the enterprise has a strong product market since profit linked pay schemes would increase overheads in proportion to profits and thus diminish profit margin increases. In other words it would be in the interests of management to encourage comparability in such circumstances, since compared with their colleagues at enterprises in depressed areas with local level bargaining, the workers in the favourable local market conditions would seem relatively well paid.

The decision not to decentralise is therefore also a strategy of control. If the above hypothesis is correct then managements would be seeking to push back the influence of the workers through wage and work comparisons

which under other circumstances they would consider erroneous. Whilst unionised workers themselves would find that bargaining bore no relation to the productivity and profit levels of their particular workplaces.

The change in the nature of collective bargaining not only concerns the level at which it is conducted, but also its content. Daniel and Millward (1982) and Chadwick (1983) claim that there is an increased use of consultative committees rather than negotiation, whilst the increase in single union deals with a no-strike clause suggests that some organised workers are willing to give up the ultimate sanction - the withdrawal of one's labour - that often forces an employer to negotiate rather than consult. Terry (1983) and Brown (1986) argue that the collective bargaining structures, specifically the shop stewards' organisations, have been accepted by management as being useful and appropriate, but that the scope of bargaining and power of the stewards has decreased.

There has also been a marked decline in union membership (Millward & Stevens, 1986) brought about by the contraction of many strongly unionised manufacturing industries, the development of the service sector and the emergence of new management techniques, particularly Japanese management, employer-selected single-union no-strike deals ('sweetheart deals' and 'beauty contests'), and US style human resource management (outlined respectively by, for example, Bassett, 1986; IRJ Special issue Vol.19 No.1; Guest, 1987). However, trade unions have weathered the recession fairly well (Kelly, 1987; Legge, 1988) and employers have not adopted strategies of 'unqualified anti-unionism' (Hyman, 1987) or

sought to derecognise the unions (Batstone, 1984; Millward & Stevens, 1986; Marginson et al; 1988), although recent surveys suggest that derecognition might be an underlying trend (Labour Research April 1988; Towers, 1988; Claydon, 1989) and non-unionism may be on the increase (Bassett, 1988).

Generally, the recession and successive pieces of government legislation intended to limit the influence of the trade unions, have created an environment in which the unions are on the defensive (Sherman, 1986) and employers are encouraged to re-assert control in the workplace, exemplified in the public and private sectors by the attitudes of Edwardes at British Leyland (Edwardes, 1983), McGregor at the Coal Board during the 1984-85 miners' strike, and Murdoch at the News International plant at Wapping in 1986.

There are clearly a number of strategy options available for employers to use in order to push back the frontier of control. They rely on reducing labour intensity of production but maintaining productivity through increased intensification of work - and perhaps deskilling and degrading certain workers, whilst upskilling and increasing the flexibility of others. There is also the potential to increase the enterprise-orientation of the workers and break down comparability within a particular industry as well as between industrial sectors. In addition the increased isolation of workers at enterprise level through the introduction of new technology, decentralisation, and numerical flexibility may reduce the collective consciousness and organisational ability of the

workforce, whilst increasing their substitutability. Finally, changes in collective bargaining might be introduced with new technology and the concomitant changes in working practices, especially in a political and economic environment that discourages trade unionism, and seeks to minimise the role of collectively organised workers.

A shrewd employer might use a package of strategies tailored to his or her particular company. The frontier of control will move, so it is important to examine the extent to which it moves, the way it moves, and the ability and willingness of the workgroup to hold it back. To do this the provincial newspaper industry was selected as an industrial sector in which to locate the analysis, and a model of workplace control was devised to provide a framework for analysing the issues. The provincial newspaper sector is described below, and the model and methodology are outlined in chapter two.

THE PROVINCIAL NEWSPAPER INDUSTRY

The provincial newspaper industry was selected as an appropriate sector for examining the frontier of control because of a number of features. First, the industry had been experiencing economic uncertainty, and the recession accentuated the need to cut costs and develop new production techniques. Second, the industry has been undergoing technological change since the 1960s and had reached a crucial stage in its development: direct input technology. Third, the industry was characterised by strong

craft unionism and restrictive practices.

These three factors interlinked to produce an industry that was the antithesis of Thatcherite industrial policy. The frontier of control had been pushed back by the printworkers, thus by the 1980s, the provincial newspaper industry was ripe for management control-push and the redrawing of the frontier.

To clarify this position before launching into an analysis of the frontier of control, there is summary of the industrial background, concentrating on the three key elements: economic environment, labour organisation and new technology.

Economic Environment


Daily and weekly paid-for provincial newspapers have been faced with growing competition for advertisers and consumers from free newspapers, magazines, radio, and television. Table 1.1 and figure 1.1 show the shifting patterns of revenue during the 1980s. The total growth is almost 22%, but this does not indicate the rising operating costs, and the loss of potential advertising revenue to the free sector. Overall, profit levels are not being maintained by the paid-for sector. The recession forced advertisers to re-examine their budgets and attempt to target their potential customers, or go for cheap saturation methods. Adverts were placed in the provincial press far more selectively, and alternative methods such as leafletting became popular.

Table 1.1: Regional newspapers' revenue (£m)

	1982	1983	1984	1985	% Change 1982-85
Total revenue	941.4	1015.2	1083.9	1144.6	+21.8
Weekly	296.3	326.6	356.3	374.6	+26.4
copy sales	46.8	49.2	47.8	48.6	+ 3.8
advertising	249.5	277.4	308.5	326.0	+30.6
Morning, Evening and Sunday	645.1	688.4	727.5	769.9	+19.3
copy sales	252.7	269.5	279.7	299.7	+18.5
advertising	392.4	418.9	447.8	470.2	+19.8

Source: Keynote Business Information - Newspapers (1986)

Figure 1.1: UK newspaper & periodical industry sales and advertising revenue 1987



In spite of a more discriminating approach by advertisers, the provincial press continued to outperform its other main rivals, with the exception of television (see table 1.2), however, this disguises two important trends, first, that the percentage share of advertising revenue attracted by the provincial press is in decline; and secondly that of this share, the free sector is getting an increasingly large slice. Director of the Newspaper Society, Dugal

Nisbet-Smith, quoted the following figures:

[In 1986] the regional press carried £1.1 billion of advertising, 21.5% of the nation's advertising expenditure. Of this, frees carried £314 million, or 28.5% of the regional total. In 1970, frees carried only 1.4% of the regional share.

UK Press Gazette, July 27 1987.

Table 1.2: Advertising share (%) of media 1980-1987

	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>
Television	27.1	28.7	29.7	31.0	30.8	31.0	32.7	32.4
Regional press	25.0	24.3	23.6	22.8	22.7	22.6	21.5	22.1
National press	16.7	16.6	16.5	16.3	16.7	16.8	16.5	16.6
Consumer magazines	7.5	7.1	6.7	6.3	6.2	5.7	5.4	5.2
Directories	3.2	3.4	4.0	4.3	4.5	4.7	5.2	5.4
Other	20.5	19.9	19.5	19.3	19.1	19.2	18.7	18.3

Source: Advertising Association

Copy sales similarly suffered because consumers were offered a greater variety of sources of news and information. National and regional reporting is extensively covered by radio and television, whilst the free newspapers began to increase their local news coverage, which posed a particular threat to the paid-for sector. Thus the Director of the Newspaper Society, Dugal Nisbet-Smith, commented in 1986:

To be absolutely frank, in an ideal world, most traditional publishers would rather the free industry had not grown to the extent it has... [It has] promoted a much more vigorous industry - price conscious and efficient.

Times May 5 1986.

Free newspapers were able to enter the market as a result of easier access to the advertising market through running at lower operating costs. Smaller staffing levels, lower wages (with fewer unions), contract printing and higher productivity using new technology allowed the frees to undercut the weeklies. The reason they could do so is that

whereas a daily newspaper receives 50% of its revenue from the cover price, a weekly newspaper's cover price amounts to just 10% of its revenue. Therefore, the loss of 10% revenue by producing the newspaper free of charge could be recouped through lower operating costs.

Table 1.3 shows the change in percentage share of advertising revenue of the provincial press. It illustrates that the free newspaper sector has been increasing steadily its advertising revenue at the expense of the paid-for sector.

Table 1.3: Provincial newspapers' advertising share 1980s

	Column Percentages					
	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	
1986						
Paid-for dailies	57	55	53	51	50	49
Paid-for weeklies	27	26	25	24	23	22
Free weeklies	15	18	22	24	26	29

Source: Advertising Association


The increase in the free newspaper sector and the decline of the weeklies and bi-weeklies can be assessed by comparing the number of titles registered in Benn's Press Directory (published annually) for the period 1980-1989 (see table 1.4). It demonstrates the marked decline of the weekly paid-for sector, with the number of free titles exceeding the paid-for titles by 1987. This decline and the steep rise of free newspapers is further illustrated in figure 1.2 which shows the changing circulation trends of the UK press.

Table 1.4: Number of weekly newspapers during 1980s

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
Paid-for weekly	1016	1015	987	975	957	907	867	803	784	795
Free newspapers	281	354	436	529	581	732	843	885	931	1013

Source: Benn's Press Directory 1980-89

Figure 1.2: UK press by circulation 1937-1987



However, circulation alone is an imperfect measure, not least because it distorts the importance of the free newspapers. Circulation shows the number of newspapers distributed, and whereas one could argue that a newspaper will only be bought if the purchaser intends to read it (and so reflects readership) a free newspaper is not bought and no such relationship between circulation and readership can be supposed. In addition, circulation figures hide the

fact that a single copy may be read by more than one person, and they do not indicate the average time a person spends reading the newspaper.

A survey conducted by Marplan in 1985 showed that the number of people who consult free newspapers is the same as the number who look at national dailies: three out of four people. However they found that almost four out of four people consult a provincial paid-for newspaper available in their area. Marplan found that time spent reading a free newspaper was significantly less than time spent with a paid-for weekly. The Association of Free Newspapers claim that the average time spent reading a free newspaper is 25 minutes, compared with 35 minutes for a paid-for weekly (source: New Society 13/2/1987).

The general trend of a decreasing number of provincial titles and a fall in circulation of the provincial paid-for sector does indicate that readership is falling. It does not necessarily mean that fewer people want to read paid-for newspapers, but suggests that it may be getting increasingly difficult to secure advertising and profitability in the paid-for sector (especially weeklies). In areas where paid-for weeklies have disappeared they have usually been replaced with one or more free newspapers, and indeed some publishers have converted their weekly paid-for titles into free newspapers. A large number of paid-for publishers have entered the free newspaper market, and recently many of the independent free titles have been bought up by the groups. Thomson Regional Newspapers is particularly notable in its acquisition policy, with three large free weekly groups being bought since May 1988.

Figure 1.3: UK regional press - ownership by circulation (Jan 1988)




Table 1.5: Principle provincial newspaper publishers by circulation (000) and number of titles (1988)

Publisher	Daily		Weekly		Free		Aggregate annual circ. (000000)	Total titles
	Circ.	Titles	Circ.	Titles	Circ.	Titles		
Thomson Regional Nprs	1066	11	214	29	2065	39	451	79
Northcliffe Nprs (Assoc.Nprs)	884	14	321	22	1339	22	362	58
United Newspapers	596	8	367	47	1938	36	306	91
Reed Publishing	110	4	325	29	4077	87	263	120
Westminster Press (Pearson)	484	10	298	25	1659	37	253	72
East Midland Allied Press	116	3	618	45	2389	61	193	109
Guardian & Manchester E.News	291	1	242	30	1222	23	167	54
Ingersoll Publications	352	3	10	3	526	10	138	16
Midland News Association	336	2	54	7	546	14	136	23
Lonhro	311	2	293	15	332	6	130	23
Eastern Counties Nprs.	228	4	107	10	925	12	125	26
Southern Newspapers	165	3	139	10	1015	23	111	36
Portsmouth & Sunderland Nprs	188	3	101	10	754	10	103	23

Sources: Press Council Annual Report; Benns Press Directory; Audit Bureau of Circulations

Figure 1.3 illustrates the ownership of the provincial press in 1987, and table 1.5 gives a breakdown of the principle publishers, circulation figures and the number of titles produced. Ownership of a cross section of newspapers in a particular location - a daily paid-for, a weekly paid-for and a free weekly - increasingly has become a means of securing advertising revenue - thus the recession and increased competition forced companies to diversify into free publications. In addition, companies were also forced to look at ways of reducing costs whilst investing for the future. This meant re-examining the labour structure and considering new technology.

Labour Structure and New Technology

The provincial newspaper labour structure is organised into four broad sectors: origination workers (skilled) in editorial jobs writing, designing, planning and managing the newspaper; production workers (skilled/craft) - composing, typesetting, operating photocomposition equipment, copy-taking and inputting - artists, and production work overseers and managerial staff; clerical workers involved with advertising, telesales, administration, circulation and promotional work; and production workers (manual) involved with printing and distribution.

Origination staff are covered by two unions, the National Union of Journalists (NUJ) and the Institute of Journalists (IoJ). Mobility is high, and most provincial newspapers have a fast labour turnover in the editorial area. Production workers (craft) are organised by the

National Graphical Association (NGA) on a closed shop basis. The craft based apprenticeships system meant relatively low labour mobility. Clerical and manual production workers are recruited by SOGAT. Traditionally its strength lies in the press room and distribution work; clerical staff membership is low, although telesales is the largest recruitment area and female membership is higher than in the other unions.

The dominant workgroup has traditionally been the NGA printers. The strong union organisation meant that all typesetting material or original artwork was handled by NGA workers only if it carried an NGA origination mark - other work was 'blackened' - thus a self-regulating work process developed. In addition, the apprenticeship system controlled entry to the labour market, whilst the Father of the Chapel (FoC) often took responsibility for organising overtime, holidays and so forth. The printworkers were regularly cited by trade union critics as an example of the worst excesses of restrictive practices.

As the market tightened and competition for advertising increased, profits were squeezed and provincial newspaper managers argued that the printers were over-pricing their labour and were clinging onto inappropriate, outdated practices, such as guaranteed overtime. They sought to reduce labour costs by stripping down the workforce, and to regain some of the managerial control. New technology - web-offset and photocomposition - provided an opportunity to reduce the labour intensity of the work process, but changes had to be negotiated with the NGA who maintained their production dominance.

By the early 1980s the UK provincial newspaper industry was in a state of technological infancy. Publishers of newspapers in the United States, Australia and Europe were adopting the computerised production techniques, but only one UK newspaper - the Nottingham Evening Post - had adopted the latest technology, and that had brought about serious conflict both between management and the unions, and between different workers at the newspaper. The NGA were resisting the introduction of the computerised systems - Direct Input (DI) - because it would mean the demise of their jobs. This is because DI transfers a large part of the production process that was traditionally performed by NGA printers into the editorial and advertising departments.

The crucial issue was the control of the 'second keystroke'. Traditionally, all copy, whether originated internally or from outside sources, was rekeyed into the system by NGA members. The DI system meant that rekeying was no longer necessary, and many of the associated production tasks would become redundant. The elimination of the second keystroke effectively destroyed the influence of the NGA over production and wiped out its power base by dramatically reducing the number of printers necessary to produce a newspaper, and limiting their ability to halt or disrupt the production process. For the managers, direct input was therefore attractive for two reasons: not only did it reduce labour costs, but also eliminated the restrictive practices of the NGA. For journalists, the introduction of editorial direct input did not pose any particular threat to jobs, but did raise questions about

how the system would be used, who would benefit and what effect it would have on working practices. More specifically, it had the potential to bring the NUJ into conflict with the NGA, as had happened at the Nottingham Evening Post, because the journalists would in effect be taking over the production tasks that were formerly the work of the NGA printers.

A detailed account of how the NGA reluctantly came to accept DI is beyond this thesis (see Gennard & Dunn, 1983; Gennard, 1987), however two important developments must be noted. First, the Stockport Messenger dispute in 1983 signalled to the NGA that its continued presence in provincial newspapers was no longer guaranteed (well documented by Dickinson, 1984; Goodhart & Wintour, 1986). Second, the attempts by two newspaper groups - the Wolverhampton Express and Star, and Portsmouth and Sunderland Newspapers - illustrated to the NUJ and the NGA that unless they allied with each other over the introduction of DI, one union would be played off against the other by management, and in the long term this would be detrimental to both of them. Consequently, they decided to work together and forget the differences (and traditional animosity) that had characterised their past. At head office level they signed a Joint Initiative in October 1985 (see appendix A) in order to pave the way for inter-union cooperation at local level. It was the breakthrough the NUJ required, and really signalled the start of the editorial direct input introduction process; it is therefore the starting point of this thesis.

Journalists and the Frontier of Control

The focus of the study is therefore the effect that the introduction of direct input editorial systems will have on the workplace control of the journalists. Specifically the question being examined is: has the transfer of the production tasks from the printers to the journalists also resulted in the transfer of control? In introducing direct input, managers may have caused a shift in the frontier of control which, although to the detriment of the printers, has been to the benefit of the journalists. If this is so, how have the journalists responded to their enhanced control, and how can they hold back the realigned frontier?

To address these issues a model of workplace control has been constructed as a framework for analysis and is outlined in chapter two, with an explanation of the methodology used. Chapter three examines the objectives and strategies of management in introducing direct input, elaborating upon many of the issues raised above. Chapter four looks at the process of bargaining associated with the introduction of the new technology and assesses the influence of the NUJ at the pre-operational stages; it reveals the initial changes in workplace control.

The next three chapters closely analyse the post-introduction effects of DI on the workplace control of the journalists. They each concentrate on one dimension of the model: production control, examining the journalists' influence over strategic contingencies in the workplace; workgroup consciousness, examining the extent of collectivism and individualism expressed through attitudes to the production process and workgroup organisation; and

control actualisation, analysing the ability and willingness of the journalists to take action to achieve their control potential. Each of the chapters test the theory of enhanced control against evidence from empirical research.

Throughout the chapters there are summaries of the main propositions, and at the end, general conclusions about the main issues raised. Finally, chapter eight brings together the central themes, draws conclusions about the changes in workplace control, and offers speculation as to future control developments.

CHAPTER TWO

The Model and the Methodology

In assessing the movement of the frontier of control we are attempting to analyse the power relationships that characterise industrial relations. To do so we can construct a framework that allows us to examine the various elements that constitute workplace control, and to use this to measure the changing nature of control in the provincial newspaper industry. A model of workplace control has been developed and is outlined below, followed by a description of the methodology adopted. First, however, it is important to identify the main assumptions and definitions adopted in the thesis.

Three assumptions have been made about the environment within which the framework is constructed. First, a pluralist approach has been adopted, assuming conflict to be a natural consequence of a workplace comprising groups and individuals with differing interests. Second, the workgroup is the focus of analysis, and is characterised as a respondent body, as opposed to an initiative taking body. Thus we assume that managerial prerogative to introduce technological change is not challenged, but that the workgroup can and will respond to the initiative and challenge the nature and form of the technological change. A third assumption is that new technology is not a pre-determined entity, but that its use stems from political choices made by owners and managers, and the influence of the workgroup in bargaining over its introduction.

The analysis therefore must begin with an examination of the process of technological change since this reveals the different interests of management and workgroups associated with new technology, and the differing extents to which both sides can influence the outcome of the change process. These aspects are the foci of chapters three and four: the former outlining why and how management initiated change, and the latter examining the bargaining processes and the short-term results of technological change. These chapters are to some extent scene setting, yet reveal the initial movements of the frontier of control which are later placed in the context of medium to long term developments. The chapters analyse different types of data, and the issues raised and conclusions drawn form important reference points for the subsequent chapters.

The definitions needing explanation largely concern the concept of 'power'. Martin (1977) rejects the Weberian analysis of power - the probability of being able to carry out one's own will - since it overlooks power relationships which may be mutually convenient, and it reveals power only in action (1977; p37). He argues that a more adequate theory of power is that adopted by Buckley (1967) which focuses on non-self-regarding action: that since an individual or group will seek to maximise their own benefits, we should concentrate on the occasions they fail to do so. In other words, if A acts in a non-self-regarding manner it is due to the existence of B's power over A, forcing compliance with B's wishes. Martin argues that the strength of the analysis lies in three areas: firstly, it "shows that power is the property of a relationship, not of

the individuals in that relationship" (1977; p39); secondly, that the frame of reference of the actors is vital to understanding power relationships; and thirdly, that analysis of power must take place from the frame of reference of the subordinate.

In accepting this, we are suggesting that the workgroup focus (the journalists) is appropriate, and that power is the extent to which the workgroup complies with the wishes of management and acts in a non-self-regarding manner. Compliance, however, can take a number of forms: **coercion** - the ability to obtain compliance by threatening to withdraw the means to sustain life; **authority** - compliance through legitimacy, by the granting of consent; and **influence** - compliance other than through coercion or authority. Martin (1977) argues that the first of these, coercion, is largely inapplicable due to worker mobility, social welfare and legal and political rights of workers, although he suggests that in recession, high rates of unemployment, threats of closure and the reduction of wages might be interpreted as a type of coercion. However, the concepts of authority and influence will be the most useful in examining workplace control.

In general we can define control as some measure of the "balance of power between the two sides" (Smith, 1979) but since power can take a number of forms, a model of control must allow us to identify the nature of power relationships in differing workplaces. Poole (1976) identified three aspects of power: latent power; values, beliefs and perspectives; and the exercise of power. Marchington (1979) outlined four 'phases' of power - power capacity, power

realisation, power testing and power outcome - whilst more recently, Kirkbride and Durcan (1987) have suggested widening the power analysis to include the processes by which power resources are translated into outcomes through rhetoric, behaviour and action. Elements of all these theories are combined to develop a model of workplace control for the study of provincial newspapers.

Model of Workplace Control

The model identifies three control areas where power relationships are important - structure, consciousness and action - and presents them as interdependent, so overall control must be viewed in terms of the power **within** each dimension and the feedback and interaction **between** each dimension. This avoids the notion of time or stage progression implicit in a linear model. The three dimensions are examined under the headings, **production control, workgroup consciousness and control actualisation**. They are outlined below as theoretical concepts, and are applied to the data in chapters five, six and seven, where the methods of measurement and hypotheses associated with the dimensions will become apparent.

Production Control can be defined as the power of the workgroup over strategic contingencies in the workplace. This follows the work of Hickson et al (1971) and Marchington (1979) who concentrated attention on key elements within the workplace through which the workgroup might gain influence. The greater the workgroup's influence over these strategic contingencies then the lower the

chance of their compliance with non-self-regarding actions. Strategic contingencies are therefore routes through which influence may be exerted: factors essential to the work process which the management and workforce may seek to control.

Two contingencies can be identified as having a strategic role in the workplace: the production process and the labour market. The first of these, the **production process**, concerns the influence of the workgroup over the 'tasks' involved in production, and the influence over the production 'work-flow'. This depends on the pervasiveness of the workgroup - the degree to which the workgroup connects with other workers in the production process; and the immediacy of the work - the speed with which the rest of the workplace would be affected by action or disruption by the workgroup. Clearly, control over the 'tasks' will have implications for control over the 'workflow', although there might be occasions where the 'tasks' are defined by management, or the technology itself, but where 'workflow' still remains an area of potential control - or vice versa.

The second strategic contingency is the **labour market**. This concerns the extent to which the workgroup is substitutable. A workgroup might seek to regulate itself through a number of methods such as strict demarcation of tasks, non-flexibility, restriction of entry to the job, training or professional qualifications. In contrast a management is likely to want to increase flexibility of staff, encourage internal sideways mobility, and eliminate demarcation and restrictive practices.

Thus, production control is the extent to which the

workgroup can influence strategic contingencies in the workplace to resist complying with the wishes of management and thereby resist acting in a non-self-regarding manner.

Workgroup Consciousness is the second dimension of the model and can be defined as the ability of workers to recognise their collective control potential and develop group identity. In this sense it is associated with the values and beliefs of the subordinate group, and the shaping of those values by the work environment, working practices and other actors. We can therefore break workgroup consciousness into two components: workgroup organisation and workgroup attitudes.

Control over **workgroup organisation** stems from the nature of work tasks and the autonomy of the workgroup. If tasks are integrated and the shop floor workers are self-organising, then it is likely they will share a common interest, the expression of which is likely to be a strong union organisation - the ultimate being a pre-entry closed shop. Alternatively, the common identity may take the form of some other collective organisation, such as a 'professional' body. In this way group organisation also depends upon the workers' disposition to the job. Where a workgroup feels no collective identity, shopfloor organisation is likely to be minimal and this aspect of control consciousness under-developed, thus individualism dominates.

The second aspect, **workgroup attitudes** concerns orientations of the members of the workgroup to the work process. In particular this concerns the changes caused by

the introduction of new technology, and the realignment of attitudes. For example, new technology may lead to changes in attitude if it affects skill level, self-discretion at work, work pacing, monitoring, and overall job satisfaction. The consequent positive and negative attitudes of the workgroup may affect their overall disposition to work and their collective role in the production process - the expression of which might be changes in militancy and collective organisation.

Workgroup consciousness can therefore be characterised as a workgroup's recognition of the appropriateness of collective organisation, and its members' attitudes to work and collectivism derived from the changes in their relationships to production caused by new technology.

Control Actualisation is the third dimension of the model and concerns the process by which the workgroup can achieve its control potential. A detailed analysis of the process is undertaken in chapter seven, but the components can be identified here as: recognition of a need to act, willingness to act, consideration of action, selection of action, and implementation.

This dimension attempts to encapsulate workgroup perceptions of the need and legitimacy for action, or threat of action, and the ability of the workgroup to make decisions that lead to effective outcomes. The processes of appraisal, deliberation of options, selection, reappraisal and implementation are therefore dependent on structural factors, such as union organisation and resources; historical factors, such as recent disputes and attempts to

operationalise power; exogenous influences; and workgroup confidence, based on individual and collective assessments of the likelihood of success in the particular circumstances.

Control actualisation is therefore the process of realising full control potential as a workgroup by action (or inaction) that secures a desired outcome.

The model is designed to measure the control exercised by the subordinate workgroup by taking into account a variety of power relationships within the workplace defined by structural factors, values and beliefs, and processes. A three dimensional model has been adopted to emphasise the interdependence of all these factors and point to the complexity of their interconnection. The component parts of the dimensions suggest that different workplaces will experience varying degrees of control. We might therefore analyse control as lying somewhere between these two extremes: on the one hand there is the workgroup with strong control enjoying a high level of structural influence over the production process and labour market, having a strong collective identity and awareness of their importance to production, and expressing a willingness to implement its control potential; on the other hand there is the workgroup with weak control, having influence over only minor areas of production, being part of a non-regulated labour market, having no workgroup identity due to fragmentation, resulting in an inability to act collectively.

Having outlined the model to be used to analyse the data concerning workplace control, the rest of this chapter will address the methodology employed to collect the data.

Methodology

When I began the research, there were 80 newspaper companies that had introduced direct input technology. It was impossible to survey all of these because of the detailed analysis required by the model, so a sample of 20 daily provincial publications was selected. In selecting the sample, four factors were taken into account in order to ensure that it was representative: the ownership of the newspaper, the size of the newspaper (measured by circulation), the publishing location and the density of NUJ membership. For practical reasons (mainly financial) some newspapers had to be eliminated, consequently the sample was largely self-selecting. The sample is described by table 2.1. Throughout the subsequent chapters, the term 'sample' refers to these 20 newspapers, unless otherwise stated.

As outlined earlier in the chapter, the journalist workgroup is the focus of the study. Within this workgroup the NUJ union members were targetted for study for two reasons: first, because in all cases they were the collective majority (the alternative organisation, the Institute of Journalists has a very low membership), and in most cases the NUJ constituted over 50% of the workforce - sometimes nearly 100% as shall be examined in later chapters. The second reason was that the most unionate members of the workforce are likely to act as the vanguard

group in terms of achieving favourable new technology agreements (explored in chapter four), recognising their control potential (chapter five), collectively organising (chapter six) and taking action (chapter seven).

Table 2.1: Newspaper sample

	% NUJ Density	Group	Circulation (1987)
Basildon Evg. Echo	57	WP	61,086
Bath Evg. Chron.	56	WP	26,554
Blackpool Gazette	86	UN	52,336
Bradford Tlg. & Argus	87	WP	80,531
Brighton Evg. Argus	72	WP	94,832
Bristol Evg. Post	97	BUP	108,589
Burton Mail	64	YIT	22,068
Cambridge Evg. News	88	YIT	46,025
Colchester Evg. Gazette	39	REED	30,796
Huddersfield D'ly Exam.	100	HN	42,970
Leeds - Yorkshire Post	62	UN	91,939
Liverpool Post	86	TI	70,534
Middlesbrough Gazette	96	TRN	81,535
Newcastle Journal	96	TRN	60,426
Peterborough Evg. Tlg.	91	EMAP	32,962
Sheffield Star	87	UN	142,604
Southern Evg. Echo	69	SN	84,912
Swindon Evg. Advertiser	66	WP	36,758
Worcester Evg. News	69	REED	28,445
Yorkshire Evg. Press (York)	42	WP	53,805

The data was collected through observation, documentation, interviews and questionnaires. The fieldwork considerations of each method are outlined below.

Observation

Prior to undertaking this research I was employed as a journalist and consequently was able to bring participant-observer experiences to the analysis. This was particularly useful in examining and comparing the changes to the production process and the role of the journalist.

Documentation

There was a wealth of documentation made available to me through the NUJ. Particularly useful were copies of the New Technology Agreements signed by various chapels - an analysis of which forms the basis of chapter four. Various internal documents, surveys, and chapel circulars provided useful background information.

Structured Interviews

The focus of the study is the workgroup, thus interviews were undertaken with the elected NUJ chapel officers at the 20 establishments. This often meant interviewing existing and former chapel officers, and in several cases entailed interviews with journalists who were no longer employed by the company concerned. In addition to local level NUJ representatives, regional and national officers were interviewed, including representatives from the Provincial Newspapers Industrial Council (PNIC). This was designed to give an industry overview and examine possible trends perceived by the NUJ.

In addition, interviews were carried out with a sub-sample of managers from four companies. Key managers were interviewed about technological change at local level and throughout the group, and much of this material is used in chapter three.

All the interviews were taped, and consequently all the quotes in the text are verbatim apart from the occasional deleted expletive. The average length of time interviewing an NUJ representative was over two hours, whilst for managers it was half this amount. The former group, perhaps

not surprisingly, were far more willing to volunteer information although all the interviewees were extremely cooperative. None of the questions were left unanswered.

Unstructured Interviews

Where possible I obtained a wider impression of the editorial workforce by talking to other journalists. The interviews were unstructured and informal, although where possible I took notes. This ranged from a five minute chat to an hour's group discussion after work with the sub-editors at one newspaper.

Attitude Survey

As has been outlined above, the model demands an assessment of the attitudes of journalists to their work, collective organisation and the new technology, so a pilot study was carried out at one establishment to find the best method of data collection. Half the editorial workforce were interviewed whilst the rest were given questionnaires covering the same issues to complete and return. This was done with the full cooperation of the management.

Although the face-to-face interview method of data collection was preferable, it posed a number of problems. First, it was very time consuming; second, it meant all the interviews had to be arranged beforehand with management, and consequently it was seen as a managerial project; third, I was told who I could interview by management, thus sampling techniques could not be used; and fourth, it was difficult to arrange interviews with reporters who spent a large amount of time out of the office.

The questionnaire survey was therefore seen as an appropriate method in the light of the pilot study, not least because it would depend less on access being granted by management. The questionnaire itself was an abbreviated form of the pilot questionnaire, which had not produced any anomalous responses. A copy of the questionnaire is included in appendix B.

Questionnaire

The questionnaire was distributed via the F/MoCs. They were asked to give a copy to each of the NUJ members who used the direct input system. Inevitably some of the chapel members did not receive questionnaires because they were on leave, or worked in district offices, although the F/MoC were asked to try to ensure that all relevant NUJ members received a copy.

Retrieval was again through the F/MoCs, and this was intended to improve the response rate: members were perhaps more likely to fill in a questionnaire for someone they knew rather than an outsider. In practice there is little evidence to suggest that using the F/MoCs as postmen/women improved the response rate. Indeed it may have introduced a further administrative layer, although it was far less costly - an important consideration that had to be borne in mind. Using the F/MoC also had the advantage of providing a focal point - someone to 'chase up' - for retrieving the questionnaires. The disadvantages tended to rest with the problem of motivation: all the F/MoCs were happy to agree to distribute the questionnaire, but many were less enthusiastic about collecting them in. Consequently, even

the most motivated F/MoC had to be reminded and cajoled a number of times. After a steward had received the ninth telephone reminder, I decided to treat the chapel members as non-respondents, and so they were eliminated from the questionnaire survey. Overall, four chapels were eliminated in this manner, whilst a further three were removed for other reasons: the FoC was on extended leave; the FoC left and the questionnaires were lost; and a pathetically low response rate at one chapel.

The overall response rate was about 30%. This was calculated as follows: the number of NUJ members in each chapel was obtained from the NUJ head office; non-users of DI, such as photographers, were eliminated; and then a 10% contingency figure was subtracted to allow for people on holiday, maternity leave, sick leave and so forth. This provided the number of potential receivers. The returned questionnaires from each chapel were calculated as a percentage of the corresponding 'potential receivers' figure. In practice the percentages are, if anything, underestimated since it is doubtful whether all the stewards were diligent in ensuring all 'potential receivers' actually got their questionnaires. A breakdown of the response rates is given in table 2.2.

The 30% return rate is low and somewhat disappointing when one considers that journalists are highly literate white-collar workers. However, in mitigation, we can forward two important points: first, journalists are swamped with pieces of paper on a daily basis - the questionnaire is just something else to read and has no novelty value. Secondly, journalists work to deadlines and

have to prioritise their work stringently - the questionnaire would be at the bottom of the list.

Table 2.2: Questionnaire response rate

Establishment	No. of NUJ DI users who received questionnaires	No. of completed questionnaires	response rate
1	30	6	30%
2	25	18	72%
3	48	13	29%
4	49	14	29%
5	40	9	22%
6	60	15	25%
7	15	6	40%
8	51	12	24%
9	FoC not motivated		
10	36	20	55%
11	FoC not motivated		
12	45	10	22%
13	FoC on extended leave		
14	55	13	24%
15	30	11	37%
16	FoC not motivated		
17	FoC left - completed questionnaires lost		
18	Eliminated (only 1 questionnaire returned)		
19	22	6	27%
20	FoC not motivated		
Totals	507	153	c30%

The return rate is, in fact, consistent with recent surveys conducted by the NUJ itself. Although they have an administrative and secretarial staff at their disposal the NUJ full time officers generally expect only a five to 10% response rate to postal surveys. Even the NUJ's most important annual survey - the pay survey of all 245 provincial newspaper chapels conducted to assist chapels with local level bargaining - this year elicited only a 37% response rate, including responses obtained over the telephone.

How representative is the sample of respondents?

A hazard of using the F/MoCs is that they may be more inclined to distribute and retrieve the questionnaires on a partial basis - they may send back a sample of the work colleagues with whom they are most friendly, rather than a sample of the chapel as a whole. This however can be tested by examining the sample to see if it is representative of the target population, thus in talking with the F/MoCs I obtained a breakdown of each chapel with regard to sex and job description.

Of the 153 respondents, 115 (75%) were men and 38 (25%) were women. This compares favourably with the data collected from the stewards which suggested that the average percentage of women NUJ journalists is 22%. This figure is distorted by the complete absence of women from the photography departments, and since the latter were not included in the survey (because they do not use DI) we would expect the percentage of women respondents to be greater than 22%. The percentage of women is less than the NUJ national figures which record a 32% female membership (NUJ, April 1989) although this may be accounted for by higher percentages of women journalists in certain sectors, for example, Press and Public Relations, magazines and books.

The job distribution of the respondents is illustrated in table 2.3. The respondents were given a number of categories to tick and the responses were then recoded. Sports staff were redistributed into the reporter or sub categories whilst features staff were treated as a separate category since they use the DI system for writing and

subbing their own material. Editorial managers were distinguished as those people who took supervisory responsibilities on a daily basis, above chief reporter and chief sub - identified by the responses to question 34. They were treated as a separate category since their supervisory role was considered likely to affect their views.

Table 2.3: Job categories of respondents

Reporter	83	54%
Sub editor	47	31%
Features	15	10%
Editorial manager	8	5%

	N=153	

The distributions are representative when the elimination of the photographers is taken into account. The most important categories for the purpose of analysis are the subs and reporters. At each of the newspapers, up to one third of the editorial workforce were subs; the figures varied according to the size of the publication, and the number of editions, but a 31% figure indicates that the respondents were not disproportionately subs, as one might expect since they spend all their working day in the office and would be the easiest group from whom questionnaires could be collected by the F/MoCs.

Further details which help to describe the sample cannot be checked against existing information, thus when we look at factors such as age, we can simply check the distribution to see whether it shows anomalies, and whether these are likely to result from bad sampling techniques. Further distributions to help describe the sample are

therefore listed below.

Table 2.4: Age of respondents

<u>Years</u>		
18-25	25	16%
26-35	70	46%
36-45	33	22%
46-55	17	11%
over 55	8	5%

	N=153	

Table 2.5: Years in journalism

<u>Years</u>		
under 2	8	5%
2 - 5	26	17%
5 - 10	36	24%
10 - 15	26	17%
15 - 20	16	10%
20 - 25	14	9%
25 - 30	10	7%
over 30	17	11%

	N=153	

It might be argued that the respondents will fall into two categories: first, those who are fed up and dissatisfied at work and fill in the questionnaire because it is a distraction, or welcome relief; and second, those who are most union-orientated since the questionnaire was distributed via NUJ channels. The former group might therefore possess negative attitudes and these could distort the overall responses. This point will be borne in mind when analysing the results in chapter six. The latter group is very much the target group for the attitude survey because it will consist of the most unionate members of the workforce, as has been outlined above. The orientation to unionism displayed by the sample is discussed in detail in chapter six.

The method of collecting the data for the sample is

presented in table 2.6. The relationship of the methodology to the model is illustrated by tables 2.7 to 2.9 and serves as a summary of the general issues which will be analysed in detail in chapters five, six and seven. However, the analysis begins by assessing the managerial objectives and strategies in introducing new technology.

Table 2.6: Data collection methods

<u>Method</u>	<u>Respondents</u>	<u>No. of Companies</u>	<u>Level of analysis</u>	<u>Dates</u>
Questionnaires	153 (31%)	13	Establishment	Feb'88 - Feb'89
Structured Interviews (taped)				
NUJ (local)	33	20	Establishment	} Feb'88 - Sept'88*
NUJ (regional)	3	-	Industry	
NUJ (national)	2	-	Industry	
Managers (sub-sample)	19	4	Establishment	July'87, Feb'88 Oct'88, Feb'89
Unstructured Interviews ** (not taped)	50+	20	Establishment	Sept'87 - May'89
New Technology Agreements	-	76	Establishment	Oct'85 - Jan'88

* plus three interviews in July 1987.

** informal conversations during visits and telephone conversations where notes were taken.

Table 2.7: Model of workplace control - Dimension 1: Production Control

<u>DIMENSION</u>	<u>POTENTIAL MANAGERIAL STRATEGY</u>	<u>MEASUREMENT</u>	<u>METHOD</u>
PRODUCTION CONTROL			
Production process			
Tasks - conditions & working practices	Enterprise-specific technology	Comparison of model NTA with actual NTA	Documentation
Workflow	Functional flexibility	Ambit considerations Extent of integration of tasks (pervasiveness) Deadlines & shelf-life of product (immediacy)	Interview - union Workgroup survey Observation Interview - managers
Labour market			
Substitutability	Numerical flexibility	Comparison of model NTA with actual NTA	Documentation
Demarcation	Multi-skill training	Union membership (completeness)	Branch records
Training		Training programme Transfer policy	NTA & interviews
Recruitment		Use of freelance/outwork Use of part-timers Contingency cover for industrial action	Interviews
		Recruitment policy Internal career structure	NTA, workgroup survey & interviews

Table 2.8: Model of workplace control - Dimension 2: Workgroup Consciousness

<u>DIMENSION</u>	<u>POTENTIAL MANAGERIAL STRATEGY</u>	<u>MEASUREMENT</u>	<u>METHOD</u>
WORKGROUP CONSCIOUSNESS			
Workgroup organisation			
Tasks: integration & similarity	Functional flexibility No demarcation	Extent of demarcation	NTA, interviews
Recognition of need for collective organisation	Individual employment contracts No strike agreements Encourage professional associations	Extent of unionateness Extent of professionalism & individualism	{ Union numbers Workgroup survey Workgroup survey
Ability to organise	Non-union policy Short term employment Use of YTS workers	Management/union agreement	NTA, interviews
Isolation	Homeworking/outworking	Type of technology Physical location of worker Amount of freelance work	Observation Workgroup survey Interviews
Workgroup attitudes			
Technology	Functional flexibility	Number of workers affected Closer ties to production process through * regulations: health and safety : ergonomics * productivity measures * working practice changes	Documentation NTA Interview - union
Work tasks	Non-comparability with other workers Reduced threat of being made redundant	Skill levels, awareness and satisfaction Training & skills/mobility	Workgroup survey

Table 2.9: Model of workplace control - Dimension 3: Control Actualisation

<u>DIMENSION</u>	<u>POTENTIAL MANAGERIAL STRATEGY</u>	<u>MEASUREMENT</u>	<u>METHOD</u>
CONTROL ACTUALISATION			
Need & Willingness to act			
Mismatch between worker perceptions of legit. authority and managerial practice	Replace negotiation with consultation	Introduction of new tech. compare NUJ recommendation over negotiations (type, stage, range) with management practice	Interviews
		Changes in work practices subsequent to technology	NTA & interviews
		1988 pay bargaining	Interviews
Selection of action			
Legitimacy of action	More individualism	Attitudes to professionalism	Workgroup survey
Past experience & 'folklore'		Recent disputes	{ Documentation Interviews
Exogenous factors	Threat of closure or redundancy	Dependents, age, commitments to region, career damage, employment security	Workgroup survey
Selection of action			
Availability		Types of action	Observation
Appropriateness	Threat of law	How/why decided upon	Interviews
		Effectiveness: compare goals and outcome	Documentation
Implementation			
Solidarity	Substitute workers	Density of union	Documentation
	Offer incentives to break ranks	Change in union membership	Interviews
	Identification of worker interest with firm's profitability	Compare goals and outcome	
Clarity of goals		Defining of goals	Interviews with negotiators
	Injunction and sequestration	Changes in goals	Revision of policy
Resources		Union structure & organisation	Documentation Interview - union

CHAPTER THREE

Managerial Objectives and Strategies

This chapter examines the objectives and strategies of provincial newspaper managers in introducing direct input. Specifically, it addresses two questions: what are the reasons for introducing direct input? What strategies were adopted in introducing change?

The first section analyses whether the objectives in introducing direct input stemmed from a desire by management to push back the frontier of control, or whether the change process was led by other factors. The second section examines the strategies used by managers at local level to introduce change, and the extent to which these can be seen as an attempt to assert managerial control over the editorial workers. The themes developed here are pursued in greater detail in the subsequent chapters, with reference to specific newspapers and the impact upon the various dimensions of workplace control.

MANAGERIAL OBJECTIVES

Research suggests that motives behind technological change stem from either market objectives, control objectives or a mixture of both. For example, Buchanan and Boddy (1983) define three sorts of objectives that management pursue in introducing new technology. First, 'strategic objectives' in response to the changing market; second, 'operating objectives' to improve quality and reduce costs; and third, 'control objectives' to exert greater influence over the production process and reduce worker intervention. This

third category has subsequently been subdivided by McLoughlin and Clark (1988) into: 'labour control objectives' aimed at improving human performance and productivity, and 'operational control objectives' aimed at improving the performance of the production process. This qualification is needed, argues McLoughlin, to account for objectives which seek to improve control over production by extending skills and tasks, or reorganising workers, rather than reducing human intervention.

Similarly, Child (1985) has outlined four managerial objectives associated with the introduction of new technology: first, to reduce operating costs and improve efficiency by a reduction in labour, reallocation of labour, a reduction in waste, and better utilisation of capital equipment; second, to increase flexibility of the product and the staff, especially through reducing demarcation; third to raise the quality and consistency of production through the greater accuracy, fast information processing and feedback systems of new technology; and finally, to increase managerial control over operations by the quicker handling of data across large distances, and the elimination of personnel to interpret or transmit control data.

Willman (1986b) suggests that a firm's objectives in innovating are associated with the product market and the competitive environment: maximising the performance, maximising the sales, and minimising production costs. Firms operating in a young product market will seek to improve existing products and services, and develop new ones. In a maturing product market, firms will emphasise

production efficiency and reliability, and so managers might seek greater control over production, whilst organisations in a mature product market will be looking to minimise production costs, particularly by reducing the need for labour, or by improving its efficiency.

Having outlined these market and control objectives at a general level, we can now consider them in relation to direct input in provincial newspapers.

Market Objectives

Provincial newspapers are operating in a matured product market. In terms of the product life cycle, the 'cash cow' evening newspaper in its existing form may soon become a 'dog' unless its life can be extended. The introduction of colour, the move to tabloid, extensive editorialising, zoning and changes in format and content of the newspaper are just some of the methods being adopted by the companies in order to combat this. However, the introduction of direct input will have the most marked effect on improving profitability because it will reduce labour costs, increase labour flexibility, and free production time. Provincial newspaper managers therefore seem to be accepting Buchanan & Boddy's 'strategic objectives' to preserve their market position, adopting the 'operating objectives' to reduce production costs, whilst exerting McLoughlin's 'labour control objectives' to utilise labour better.

Chapter one outlined the economic difficulties experienced by the paid-for sector during the 1980s. In particular it pointed to the loss of advertising and sales revenue because of the expansion of alternative media and

the free newspapers. The decline in circulation of the paid-for titles signalled a change in consumption patterns and this fed back into advertising because most advertisers make choices based on a cost per thousand (cpt) value: the cost per column centimetre of reaching a thousand readers. Clearly a decline in circulation would increase the cpt value and make the newspaper less attractive to potential advertisers. Faced with this descending spiral of loss of circulation and advertising revenue, managers must choose from a number of marketing strategy alternatives.

First, to maintain the cpt value the managers can lower the advertising rates every time circulation drops. However, this erodes profits even further, because the decreased revenue from copy sales is paralleled with a decrease in advertising revenue. A second strategy is to raise the cover price of the newspaper in order to offset some of the lost revenue, however this is likely to reduce circulation even further, and once again feeds through into advertising. Thirdly, a strategy favoured by most managers is a promotion drive to attract more readers. Three examples from the sample illustrate the way newspapers attempt to revamp their image: the Bradford Telegraph & Argus changed from a broadsheet to a tabloid; the Southern Evening Echo changed its page design, layout and masthead; the Newcastle Chronicle and Journal introduced colour. The problem with making such changes, is that the newspaper may attract new readers but may lose some of its existing readers in the process. So to reduce the risks, most of the changes are preceded by market research - which is itself costly and time consuming.

A fourth strategy is to increase the amount of advertising space by reducing the editorial content. In this case overheads would stay the same - or decrease slightly - whilst there would be greater potential for advertising. This is the method adopted by most free newspaper managers who match available advertising revenue to production costs, and use editorial to 'fill the gaps'. The problem for paid for newspapers, is that although this method is used to a small extent, there is less flexibility because a dramatic drop in editorial content is likely to affect sales and reduce circulation. For free newspapers, the circulation is of course not based on sales, but on copies delivered.

A fifth possible strategy is again to increase the amount of advertising space, but by increasing the pagination. The disadvantage is that this raises marginal costs - newsprint, overtime, wastage, press time, and so forth. Increasing pagination therefore only helps to sustain profitability when marginal costs equal marginal revenue. Logically newspapers ought to move down the cost curve to this point even if it means turning down some advertisers or cutting circulation - in fact they rarely do either.

The sixth alternative is to lower the cost curve. Greater efficiency in usage of capital and labour, less wastage, higher productivity, and a less labour intensive production process, are all associated with lowering the cost curve. It is this strategy that newspaper managers have been adopting since the introduction of photocomposition. The objectives in introducing new

technology have therefore been in line with profit maximising by cost reduction. Most of the managers interviewed described this as 'efficiency', and the particular type of efficiency upon which they focused seemed largely to be dependent upon their function in the company. To cite a few examples of their replies when asked why new technology was introduced:

It was a developmental opportunity to gain time in editorial [either to] get the newspaper out onto the streets earlier... so you have a greater selling opportunity... [or to] incorporate much later news into the paper.

Editor

It enabled us to eliminate the double keying, makes production more efficient, allows us greater flexibility than before and enhances the product.

Senior manager (production)

To reduce costs. We have gone from tremendous manning levels. In getting to that stage our unit costs have dropped dramatically - our break-even point has dropped dramatically.

Senior manager (finance)

It allowed control of the copy to be put into the hands of the people who originate the copy - or more precisely into the hands of the heads of department in editorial. This makes the editorial process more efficient in theory.

Head of Department (editorial)

To make huge reductions in costs because taken as a whole, new technology will totally eradicate printers from provincial newspapers in five years time.

Supervisory manager (production)

The opportunity to do things we have never been able to do before. For example, we have just installed our first direct link to an advertiser who can plug straight into the system. This is invaluable for motor dealers, or estate agents because it means they can change copy much nearer to deadline.

Senior manager (commercial)

Two reasons: a) benefit to the paper - the quality of the paper and the quality of the day to day running, and b) obviously cost, and therefore profit.

Editor

The quotes also highlight the 'quality improving' aspect of

the introduction. There are two ways of viewing this. Cynically, one could argue that 'improving quality' is a more publicly acceptable reason than 'cutting costs' especially when the latter is associated with job losses. Alternatively, it could be suggested that product quality is very much a genuine concern for the market reasons stated above: increasing circulation and advertising. Greater design flexibility, a better service to advertisers, more editions, colour advert facilities, and so forth, are clearly potential methods of extending the product life cycle. In this sense the market objectives may be based on both cost cutting and product development.

The most illustrative example of this last point was at the newspaper where the money saved from cost cutting had been re-invested in a state-of-the-art colour press. The potential is enormous because the press allows back-to-back high quality colour printing on newsprint. It also reduces print-run waste to a minimum and has a computerised centrally controlled feedback system to check ink-weights and monitor tones, with the option of automatic adjustment - and it needs just one or two operators. It is the first of its kind in the UK and as yet the company are just experimenting with it, however one of the senior managers commented that because of the flexibility of the production system and colour quality of the product it is likely that the company will be able to compete both in the magazine and newspaper market on the same technology. In short they may be in the process of developing a new product - something between a newspaper and a magazine - which may turn out to be their star product of the future. So to

reiterate, the objectives in introducing new technology for this company seem to have stemmed from a desire to cut costs and to develop the product.

A further way in which the technology will assist in product development is through the enormous information processing potential. One company have been compiling a household database through integrating the information collected in editorial and advertising. The significance of such an information resource was explained by the Business Development Manager:

[Using the database] We can easily target in on groups. We are already talking to advertisers about what their target markets are, so we could link it to them not only through advert space, but also leaflet distribution. We have discussed the idea of setting up a sort of intelligence unit to handle databases and adapt them to applications in the real world. We would need a commercial systems man who is directly responsible for interfacing technology with the day to day running of the business.

This particular manager's vision of the future was atypical, but nevertheless realistic. And his company had made considerable steps towards integrating the advertiser into the system by offering a direct input facility to estate agents and car dealers at their own establishments via a VDT - copy being input by an employee of the advertising company, not the newspaper.

Summary

Provincial newspapers have been operating in an increasingly competitive market due largely to the rise of free newspapers, and recession causing advertisers to re-examine their budgets. The consequence in the late seventies and early eighties has been a steady decline in

circulation and advertising revenue. To remain competitive managers have sought to introduce new technology to lower unit costs. Direct input is the latest development allowing a reduction in the labour intensity of the production process, increased efficiency and greater flexibility. It also provides the opportunity to develop the product both for the reader, for example through new design, colour and later news, and for the advertiser by opening up opportunities for targeting potential consumers.

Control Objectives

In addition to the market objectives the managers may also have had control objectives in introducing the new technology. We can identify four categories: deskilling, workforce flexibility, de-unionisation, and production control.

Deskilling

The question arises as to whether direct input technology can be used to deskill the editorial workers, and if this was a considered objective of management in introducing the new technology. Micro-electronic technology has been equated with the deskilling of clerical work by fragmentation, simplification and standardisation (Crompton & Reid, 1982); or at least it gives managers a 'choice' about whether to deskill the workforce or not (Storey, 1986). For journalists there is less possibility of being deskilled because, if anything, direct input enhances their job content. It can do this in two ways: first, because the transfer to work on a VDU demands the acquisition of new

skills - journalists must become 'computerate'. Second, the technology does not demean the creative processes involved in journalistic work: the writing of stories, devising headlines, page design, and so forth. Indeed there is strong evidence to suggest that the skill issue associated with direct input is 'upskilling' rather than 'deskilling' - an issue that will be explored in chapter six.

The counter argument to this, expressed by some journalists, is that the job has become deskilled because the journalists are being 'reskilled' rather than 'upskilled'. They argue that the new 'skills' are 'production tasks' which do not enhance the qualitative aspects of the work for the sub-editors. Furthermore, they suggest that for reporters the emphasis has shifted away from quality of work to quantity of work. Subscribers to this view concede that deskilling the journalists was unlikely to have been a central objective of management, but suggest that it should not be ignored as a contributing factor.

All of the managers interviewed were asked about the effect new technology had made on the skills of journalists - and all replied that, with the exception of the photographers, the editorial workers had acquired new skills. They tended to stress the upskilling of the sub-editors and the reskilling of the reporters. This is perhaps unsurprising given that managers are hardly likely to announce publicly that jobs have been deskilled. It also conforms with the findings of Daniel (1987; p161) who noted that 55% of managers considered that the introduction of new technology in the office had made the jobs of the

workers more skilled, compared to 39% who reported no change and just 2% who said the jobs were less skilled.

The question of choosing whether to deskill the journalists is not applicable, largely because managers had already 'chosen' to deskill the printers by transferring production tasks to the editorial floor and making their jobs redundant. The deskilling debate must be set in this context, and really centres around whether journalists have been reskilled or upskilled. Therefore, we can reject the argument that deskilling of editorial workers was a control objective of managers.

Workforce Flexibility

A second possible control objective of management is to increase the flexibility of the workforce. Numerical flexibility occurs when managers divide their workforce into peripheral and core workers. The former will tend to be unskilled and semi-skilled and will be employed on short-term or part-time contracts to match fluctuating demand. The core workers will enjoy far more employment security but will become increasingly flexible in the type and range of tasks they perform - thus they will experience functional flexibility. Overall, flexibility will allow managers to make more efficient use of their workforce and match labour costs more closely to demand.

For newspaper managers, the prospect of numerical flexibility was clearly less important than overall staff reductions. Direct input has reduced the need for print workers irrespective of demand. The process is less labour intensive but no more numerically flexible, although the

future potential for homeworking and freelance work by journalists is discussed in chapter five. As far as functional flexibility is concerned, there is little doubt that it was a prime objective of managers. The advantage of direct input is that it eliminates the double-keystroke (as outlined in chapter one) and breaks down the demarcation of tasks between printers and journalists. The journalists, in using the new technology are more functionally flexible - again the question of whether this flexibility can be further extended is examined in chapter five.

Deunionisation

The breakdown of demarcation had the effect of weakening the influence over production of the craft unions. The value for management was two-fold: not only were labour costs reduced, but also the restrictive practices of the NGA would be abolished. Managers who were interviewed did not disguise the fact that this was a clear objective. Their attitude is summed up by the Assistant Managing Director who commented:

[Direct input] has allowed us to be released from the late seventies in terms of managing.

The question of whether the employers were also concerned with the objective of deunionising the journalists is far more difficult to assess. The NUJ Provincial Newspaper Organiser argues that companies have the objective of deunionising the editorial floor, evident in the shift in employment policies away from collectivism towards individualism. But even if this is the case, it need not

necessarily have been identified by management as an objective in introducing new technology. As one Editor expressed it:

It is true to say that the agreement we have with the NUJ has radically altered - it has been simplified. That is the new realism that has come in with new technology - not because of it, but with it.

Smith (1988) has argued that the decreasing advertising market and the consequent commercial vulnerability of newspapers has forced managers into accommodating rather than confronting the unions, despite the need to reduce costs. If this is the case, then an anti-union approach is likely to be associated with economic recovery and the increasing profitability of newspapers.

Production Control

Associated with the reduction in labour intensity is the notion of increased production control. The removal of restrictive practices theoretically returns all aspects of production control to management and clearly this was a consideration; all the managers interviewed described the 'freeing' of production from the dominance of the printers. The question of whether in practice this production control has been transferred to the board room or the editorial floor is rigorously analysed in chapter five.

Commentators have claimed that production control objectives are mainly associated with raising the quality and consistency of the product (for example, Child, 1985). The reason for this would be to maximise the sales in a maturing product market (Willman, 1986b) and this, as the previous section discussed, was a market objective for

managers. The managers interviewed felt that the value of new technology was that it made feasible in cost and production terms the inclusion of later news, colour, more editions and so forth. By implication, they were arguing that product quality would improve because **they** were making the right decisions and choices about the way they could use new technology. Several quotes illustrate this:

I don't think the readers have noticed the change - if they have it's subconscious. I don't think they put it down to new technology and I wouldn't want them to; in some ways its none of their business. The important thing is satisfying their needs, and we do that, not the technology.

Editor

The public will notice changes only if we deliberately instigate them, such as the layout. We have always had a high quality of reporting and technology does not affect it.

Editor

The product has not been changed by the technology. I think the writing is tighter and the ability to make quick and late changes improves the quality, but it is doubtful whether the readers have noticed.

Senior manager

The impression gained was that production control was an important objective for these enterprise level managers because it enhanced their ability to make choices about the product. This occurred first because direct input removes the influence of the NGA over the organisation and distribution of work, by lowering the labour intensity of the process, and secondly because there is greater production flexibility by using direct input, in terms of pushing back the deadlines to insert later news or, perhaps more importantly, later advertisements, and also in terms of making more changes to pages to enable the production of more editions. Even so, managers were reluctant to say that the quality had been improved - perhaps because it implied that the quality was sub-standard before new technology.

Symbolic Objectives

Although it is difficult to establish the role of symbolism in setting managerial objectives, there is some evidence to suggest it played a role for newspaper managers. The interviews revealed an interesting consideration: the public image of the firm.

The editors were reluctant to suggest that the public discerned any change in the product as a result of the introduction of new technology as can be seen from the quotes cited above, however, many of the managers felt that the overall image of the firm was enhanced by the introduction of new technology. Consequently, when the direct input system went live, the newspapers turned the event into a feature article - or in one case a pull-out supplement. The articles were similar in tone: they equated the new technology with advancement of the firm - a modern firm image.

Perhaps significantly - although it is impossible to be certain without a wide survey of provincial newspaper managers - it was the managers at the small independent newspaper who were most avid about the importance of company image and being seen to be a modern firm, amongst the technology leaders. A senior manager summed up the general view:

We are a progressive firm. We saw how the technology had worked in the USA and knew it was the way to move into the nineties.

The arguments for symbolic objectives are of course far less convincing than market and control objectives. They may be nothing more than a post-introduction justification, but they should not be totally ignored since the image of

the firm to the local community is likely to play an important role in the support the community has for the newspaper.

Summary

Direct input has the potential either to upskill or reskill the journalists, and there appears to have been no opportunity or intention by managers to attempt to deskill journalists. Equally, the journalists are no more numerically flexible and there is little evidence to suggest this was an objective. Deskillling and employment flexibility were clear management objectives aimed at the print workers through reduction of printing staff. However, in eliminating printers it was the objective of the managers to increase the functional flexibility of journalists by transferring production tasks to the editorial floor.

Deunionisation was a clear managerial objective with regard to the printers since managers wished to abolish the restrictive practices of the NGA closed shop. As yet it is unclear whether deunionisation will also extend to the editorial floor. In eliminating the printers from the production process the managers sought to regain control over production and enhance their opportunity to make choices about the development of the product. This necessarily involves transferring skills to other areas, notably the editorial floor and thus it may be that in attempting to meet their production control objectives the managers have merely transferred influence over production from the printers to the journalists.

MANAGERIAL IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES

This section examines the strategies that managers have chosen to adopt in introducing direct input. The next four chapters all discuss strategy issues in the context of the model, so this initial analysis of strategy covers the pre-introduction issues. It addresses two issues that managers have to evaluate when planning technological change: where should decisions be made and who should participate? Francis (1986) identifies four approaches: centralised participative, centralised non-participative, decentralised participative, and decentralised non-participative. He outlines a number of advantages and disadvantages for each (1986; p.195) and suggests that they will be appropriate in different circumstances, rejecting the notion that there is a single 'best way' of implementing change.

Following this approach, we can address two questions: what evidence is there of decentralisation? How much participation of end users took place?

Decentralisation and Centralisation

Daniel (1987; p87) found that the decision to introduce advanced technical change in the private service sector was more likely to be taken at the higher management level (76%) rather than the establishment level (22%). Equally, the decision about how to introduce the change tended to occur at the higher management level (46%) rather than at establishment level (41%) although the difference is only 5%. In focusing on the introduction of word processors and

computers in the private service sector, Daniel found that decisions to innovate and decisions about how to innovate, took place most often at the establishment level: 48% and 57% respectively, compared with 38% and 29% for higher level management (1987; p95).

Martin (1988) found that managers tended to stress the involvement of their own level when asked about decisions over new technology. However, he argues that the general trend in the service sector is for corporate level to decide upon change, but to leave decisions over how to change to establishment managers.

These conclusions conform with the logical assumptions that whilst decisions over investment in technology, product or service and overall staffing levels are likely to be made at head office, the decisions over how to operate the technology, where to rationalise the workforce and how to change working conditions and practices are more easily and effectively decided at establishment level. In effect, the evidence from the surveys reinforces the findings of Kinnie (1985), that strategic decisions (investment, staffing, productivity) are made at corporate level whilst operational decisions (rationalisation, technology type, working practices) are made at establishment level - thus there is both centralisation and decentralisation occurring at the same time.

Initiating Change

It would seem probable that in provincial newspapers the initiative to introduce direct input technology came from higher level management. To establish this a wide survey of

the different levels of management would have to be undertaken and that is outside the scope of this particular study. However, a number of broad preliminary observations can be made. First, there seemed to be no obvious pattern to the way newspapers within the groups adopted technology. For example, if all the weekly titles of a group had introduced direct input, followed by the dailies, or if there was a regional pattern it might point to a centrally co-ordinated introduction plan. It is more probable that the group management indicated to the establishments that it was permissible to investigate new technology, but left it up to the individual establishments to devise a timetable.

A second observation suggesting establishment autonomy concerns the research of the systems. At each of the 20 newspapers, the research was led by establishment managers who made visits to newspapers that were using direct input - some of the first innovators thus made visits to the United States and Europe. Local managers say they were left to decide how to go about their research into direct input and arrange visits to see systems running, and contact suppliers.

A third indicator of autonomy is the diversity of direct input systems being used within groups. This suggests that there was no centralised buying policy and that establishment managers were left to decide the system most suitable for their enterprise. This point was made by one of the newspaper editors:

There are various systems in other places across the group. It seems logical that a group ought to have some sort of policy on what to buy because obviously you have a bit more clout with the supplier, and you can exchange equipment and

copy with others in the group if necessary. However, the paper has a tremendous amount of autonomy.

It is extremely unlikely that the final selection of the system was left to the establishment managers. The large capital investment would almost certainly have to be approved by group corporate management, and indeed this is substantiated by the managers interviewed. One particular poignant effect such 'approval' could have is illustrated by the manager who explained:

We put in a request for a particular system and we were told that we could have half that amount. That is what this system cost. I think this system has turned out doing seven tenths of what the other system would have done, so cost effective wise, it has done very well. We originally did two or three shortlists, based on costs, functions, et cetera. Initially this system was bottom of the list - we had crossed it off.

In this example, the group approval process forced establishment managers to reappraise their research, and choose a direct input system they originally considered unsuitable. This demonstrates the control that higher level managers retain through budgetary plans and targets. As Purcell recently observed, "co-ordination and control comes through the budgetary control mechanism" (1989; p.55), or as a senior manager said:

The areas we come up against are cost. That's where we hit the group's influence or suggestion - or demand!

If higher management increasingly are decentralising establishments into profit centres or cost centres, adopting flexible management to meet new market conditions as the surveys seem to show (Legge, 1988), then autonomy really means greater managerial accountability. A senior manager commented:

[Head Office] are saying to us: 'the more decisions you can

make on your own within the money framework, the better - we want to have less influence over the day to day workings of operations; we will come and see you occasionally, and obviously we will look at your incoming figures, and if there are ups and downs we will want to know why, but beyond that, in general trading terms, what you do is up to you.

A senior manager from another group said:

There has been a crucial change in the corporate philosophy. Day to day the operation is solely us - we do not conform to a group way of running things. We used to have a system where all the publishing centres were virtually branch offices of the divisional level. It [divisional control] was very strong day-to-day wise - the reporting was very strong. In the last two or three years, the middle section [divisional management] has been taken out. We do not suffer from corporate constraint any more.

Method of Change

The surveys by Daniel (1987) and Marginson et al (1988) were in agreement in identifying the establishment as the most important decision-making unit with regard to the operational aspects of change in the service sector. Clearly such establishment autonomy would allow managers to exercise discretion over the use of technology and changes in working practices and conditions in line with the particular local labour market and product market competition. Therefore we could examine the extent of decentralisation by assessing the autonomy of establishment managers in bargaining over new technology.

From accounts by the union representatives, none of the negotiations in the 20 newspapers directly involved managers above establishment level. However, many of the F/MoCs felt that the managers were being told what to do by group managers. The managers interviewed denied this was the case, although some were less emphatic than others. For example, one of the Editors argued that he was completely autonomous in conducting the negotiations over new

technology as long as decisions made locally would not have repercussions group wide. He said:

We referred to London on specific points where we felt there might be ramifications throughout the group over concessions, or over a particularly hard line taken on one issue. There was a broad discussion with London, but surprisingly, certainly to me, we were left to get on with it and get the best deal we could.

This contrasts with the FoC's impression of the same negotiations:

Really we were negotiating with the group MD in London. Phone calls [between managers] were going back and forth. When it was suggested to the company MD that he was not empowered to make decisions without getting the group approval he refuted it strongly. Interestingly he did come back to us at one stage after considering an aspect of the agreement saying that London would not accept it.

At another of the case studies, the senior negotiator (the Editor) was directly over-ruled by divisional management after starting negotiations at the unions' request on a joint-union basis. He argues that he had originally been persuaded by the unions against his 'better judgement' and decided such meetings would be fruitless. The FoC possesses an open letter the Editor sent to union members following the joint meeting which states that the meeting was constructive. He suggests that it is more than coincidence that between sending the letter and changing his mind over the joint-meetings, the Editor attended a board meeting with divisional directors.

Full time officials from the NUJ argue that there were discernable group strategies that became apparent to them as they moved around the country to participate in the different negotiations. Many of these 'group strategies' are discussed in the next chapter with reference to the new technology agreements. Managers denied there was a group

strategy, and indeed one senior manager felt there was insufficient support from group level:

The group seem to have a much more relaxed attitude to the corporate aspect on industrial relations. I don't really get any guidance in terms of i.r. All negotiations tend to be done locally without any real advice - or support almost. On new technology the group did not arm us with other agreements that had been achieved around the group - people from the NUJ and NGA would come in armed with agreements from other papers in the group, but we did not even have that knowledge.

Summary

Recent surveys of technological change suggest that a tendency for strategic decision-making to be centralised and operational decision-making to be decentralised to establishment level managers. In newspapers there seems to have been local autonomy in deciding when to move to direct input and how to research the potential systems, but central decision-making over the final selection through central control of the capital expenditure budget.

Local managers argued that they were totally autonomous when bargaining over the changes with the workforce, although union representatives and fulltime NUJ officers claimed that there was evidence of centralised control.

Employee Participation

In introducing change, managers must address the questions of who should be involved, at what stage, and how. Subsequent chapters deal with the issues of involvement of the journalists, and their influence over the research, selection and design of the process, however, some preliminary comments are made here in relation to managerial strategy options.

Managers are faced with three broad choices of

strategy: unilateral imposition, consultation or negotiation. In deciding on the appropriate method, managers are likely to be influenced by existing bargaining arrangements. Willman (1986) has pointed out that this will affect directly the unions' influence because decentralised bargaining is likely to give unions influence over the implementation of change, whilst centralised bargaining will give them more influence over the strategy for change. Alternatively, managers may chose to adopt totally different bargaining procedures to introduce new technology, which may mean refusing to bargaining and imposing the change unilaterally, arguing that it is part of the managerial prerogative to do so. Davies (1986), for example, found three distinct unilateral strategies in her study of the brewing industry, first was the threat of closure or dismissal unless the workforce complied with the changes. Second was the attitude that managers 'knew best'; they portrayed themselves as the experts, giving the impression that input via the trade union would be unproductive. Third, was the adoption of a step-by-step approach to change, leaving the most controversial changes until last - introduction by stealth.

A further example of unilateral imposition occurred at the News International printing plant at Wapping. The print unions were not needed to operate the new equipment, so after initial attempts to bargain failed, the management adopted a unilateral imposition approach and brought in an alternative workforce (a full account can be found in Melvern, 1986). Thus, there is likely to be less union involvement where managers believe that existing workers or

prospective operators have nothing constructive to offer in the implementation process.

Decisions about who to involve might also be prejudiced by managers' attitudes to the occupational group being affected. Daniel (1987) found that managers introducing change were more likely to involve office workers than manual workers, although this tended to be through informal consultation. He argues, "There would appear to be no reason why a semi-skilled worker in an office should have any more to contribute to discussions about proposed changes or should have any more right to have a voice in such discussions than a semi-skilled manual worker. But it appears that the British class problem persists and British managers still have difficulty in communicating with British manual workers" (p.288). However, Daniel might be over-interpreting the situation, since it may be that it is easier and more convenient for a manager to interrupt work in the quiet office environment in order to have an 'informal chat' about new technology than to stop the production line, shout above the machines, or find off-site manual workers.

Daniel found that negotiation was the least likely form of employee involvement, and that generally levels of consultation and negotiation were very low. He found that in offices where unions were recognised, negotiation occurred in only 10%, whilst consultation with union officers occurred in 54%, and in 34% there were no discussions at all (1987; p142). When unions were not recognised, the incidence of negotiation and consultation dropped even lower.

Given that journalists have a formal union structure with a collective bargaining tradition, will be expected to use the new technology, are white-collar workers, and are reasonably articulate, it is perhaps not surprising that newspaper managers have generally accepted that negotiation is the appropriate means of involving journalists in the implementation of direct input. Moreover, they have been willing to accept the NUJ proposal that bargaining takes place under a New Technology Agreement (NTA). The bargaining process and the role of the NTA is discussed in the next chapter, however a minority of companies have adopted alternative bargaining strategies which are discussed here.

Four additional strategies can be identified: first, negotiation with journalists over technology pay for using the direct input system, but not over a NTA; second, negotiation of a NTA but not including technology pay. These 'restricted negotiation' strategies tend to have been adopted by weekly newspapers. Third, is the strategy of no negotiation - unilateral imposition. Again this tends to be at weekly newspapers, in particular the free weeklies which often have either very few journalists, or a low density of NUJ members. Fourth, and most recent, the Northcliffe Newspapers group has been offering technology pay tied to personal pay increases. It has been the last of the major groups to adopt direct input, and in a number of newspapers the journalists are receiving technology pay although as yet are not using the new equipment. The group is telling the journalists that by accepting the pay increases they are agreeing to operate new technology when it arrives, and

so the individual companies will not be entering into negotiations over its use - in short, they are suggesting this constitutes a personal agreement, freely entered into, which obliges journalists to operate direct input when it arrives. Six companies in the Northcliffe group have introduced direct input, and the managers have consulted journalists as individuals, but not union representatives.

A summary of these differing strategies is presented in table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Company strategies for DI introduction

	No. of Companies	No. under different ownership	Company's main publication	
			<u>Daily</u>	<u>Weekly</u>
Full negotiation				
NTA & tech pay	105	42	49	56
Restricted negs.				
NTA only	2	2	0	2
Tech. pay only	11	8	2	9
No negotiation	16	13	3	13
Personal pay increases	15	1	11	4

Compiled from NUJ (March 1989)

Summary

Managers have been willing to negotiate with journalists over direct input rather than imposing the changes unilaterally, or offering limited participation through a consultative process. This is likely to be because managers need the full cooperation of journalists in the implementation process. The type of negotiation varies, although a new technology agreement including technology pay is the most common bargaining method.

Conclusions

The main managerial objective in adopting direct input seems to be the lowering of production costs. However, there is a contradiction in that reduction of operating costs involves an increase in the capital intensity of the process through a large investment in new technology. The cost savings are therefore offset in the short term by the often massive investment in equipment - one of the companies spent £20m. In addition, wage increases for people who must retrain on the equipment, and the potential need for additional staff in non-print areas, would also reduce the savings achieved by destaffing in the production area. Therefore labour cost saving had a high capital investment price, and most of the companies are facing a long payback period. This may mean them seeking to reduce costs further subsequent to the introduction of new technology; this is explored in the next chapter.

Given the need for higher investment, why did managers bother to adopt new technology? The reasons fall into two categories: survival and control. Provincial newspaper managers in the UK have been slow to adopt new technology; the United States, Australia and Western Europe are in a far more advanced state of technological change. The reasons for the slow adoption of new technology in this country can be attributed to the strength of the print unions, the conservatism of newspaper managers (see for example, Storey, 1978), the lack of government financial assistance and encouragement, and the prohibitive costs of the technology. Consequently, investment in new technology - particularly editorial direct input - has largely been

viewed as rife with uncertainty. By the early 1980s however, with systems operating in other countries for managers to assess, a change in the industrial relations climate within the UK, and intensified market pressures caused by the recession, new technology became a more attractive proposition. Importantly, the industry in general considered it necessary for the survival of the provincial press - exemplified by the launch of 'Project Breakthrough' by the Newspaper Society in 1983: a campaign that urged the provincial press to adopt direct input as the first step in a survival plan based on the investment in new technology.

New technology for survival was therefore a defensive innovation. This is further illustrated by the reluctance of some companies to adopt direct input even after the system had been tried and tested at other newspapers. Northcliffe newspapers for example, has trailed behind not only the other major groups, but also some of the independently owned newspapers; it was in March 1985 that the diffusion of editorial direct input began with the system at the Wolverhampton Express and Star, but it was almost four years later before the first Northcliffe title introduced direct input. Whereas the Northcliffe group may have thought the market advantage of being early innovators would be offset by the disadvantage of being first along the technological learning curve, Thomson Regional Newspapers took the opposite view. They wanted not only to be part of the vanguard, but to be seen to be part of it. Therefore, although newspaper managers generally have considered editorial direct input a defensive innovation,

some managers have been more defensive than others.

The second reason for investing in new technology was to re-establish control over the production process. The elimination of the printers and the potential for increased flexibility of journalists theoretically freed management from many of the constraints of the past. The technology therefore allows greater control over the development of the product, and the utilisation of labour and equipment for maximum efficiency and profitability. In practice the control objectives may not be realised if the journalists are able to exercise increased influence over the production process and enhance their bargaining power. This is the focus of the thesis and the issues will be explored in detail in the next four chapters. For now, we can put forward the proposition that the managers were not oblivious to the possibility that the technology would transfer power from one workgroup to another, and consequently their strategies in implementing new technology would seek to minimise the possibility of transfer. Typical examples of this would be the limiting of bargaining over new technology, the marginalisation of the NUJ, the adoption of increasingly individualist rather than collectivist employment policies, and the isolation of key editorial workers. These strategies and others will all be examined in the subsequent chapters.

Having considered the managerial objectives and made some preliminary comments about the strategies involved in introducing change, it is now possible to undertake a more detailed analysis of the implementation and operation of the new technology. The focus is the journalist workgroup;

starting with their influence in the collective bargaining process as new technology is introduced. In assessing this, we can consider a much wider sample of newspapers where direct input has been introduced by examining the new technology agreements that formed the basis of the negotiation process. The next chapter makes a quantitative and qualitative assessment of these agreements, whilst subsequent chapters examine the post-introduction control implications by applying the information gathered from the 20-newspaper sample to the model of workplace control developed in the previous chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

New Technology Agreements and Bargaining Power

In 1979 the TUC recommended the New Technology Agreement (NTA) as the appropriate method of negotiating the introduction of technological change into industry. The objective was 'to exert trade union influence as fully as possible over this whole process [of technical change] - from the decision to invest to the operation of equipment - so that questions such as hours of work, manning levels, working conditions, even the design of equipment itself, are matters for negotiation' (TUC, 1979; p64). This chapter therefore examines the extent to which the NUJ has matched these objectives in the negotiation of NTAs at provincial newspapers, and analyses the implications for local level bargaining power. These issues are addressed through first a brief discussion of the NUJ's model agreement, secondly a statistical analysis of 76 NTAs, thirdly an assessment of the negotiators' achievements with comparisons from other research, and fourthly a detailed quantitative and qualitative study of the distribution of benefits following the introduction of technology and the 1988 pay round.

The NUJ Model Agreement

The NUJ made its first tentative steps to introducing a technology policy in the 1970s, as provincial newspaper managements began developing Optical Character Recognition systems and photocomposition. Direct input was being used in Australia and the United States, thus the inevitability of its arrival in the UK provincial press prompted the NUJ

to devise its first model agreement in 1978. Subsequent revisions and additions, relying on experiences from other countries, and other industries in the UK led to a detailed and wide ranging model agreement for provincial newspaper chapels by October 1985. It was also a joint agreement made with the NGA following the signing of a national accord which committed both unions to negotiate technology together. Since that date only minor changes have been made to the model, and it has remained not only a statement of policy, but the negotiating document for most newspaper chapels.

The model is divided into eleven sections that cover all the TUC's guidelines, as well as introducing clauses dealing specifically with NUJ/NGA involvement over elements of job design, transfer and recruitment. The full text of the model agreement is contained in appendix C, but the subject areas are: the scope (whom it affects including non-union staff), employment opportunities, training and recruitment, job security, health and safety, the working environment, terms and conditions for i) transferees ii) NGA members iii) NUJ members, monitoring and duration of the agreement, and disputes and differences.

The model agreement contains clauses that are inapplicable in some circumstances, however the basic principles remain the same and thereby make it flexible enough to be a realistic working document for all types of provincial UK newspapers. So given this strong policy statement, the model will be used as a litmus test of the achievements of negotiators at local level. It was important to devise an analytical tool that could provide a

means of comparing the locally negotiated NTAs with the ideal (the model) and with each other.

Analysis of the New Technology Agreements

New Technology Agreements covering the period from November 1985 to January 1988 were examined - a total of 76 agreements, representing all but one of the total number signed during this period. Three NTAs were signed before November 1985 but they were negotiated retrospectively, after the technology had been introduced, so are eliminated from the analysis. The agreements from November 1985 were negotiated prior to the introduction of direct input and in line with the NUJ/NGA joint accord. These agreements covered different types of newspapers, in locations of varying prosperity across Great Britain and under a range of ownership.

The score system developed is designed to assess the achievement rates of newspaper chapels in negotiating the technology at their place of work. The system takes the model NTA recommended by the NUJ as being the achievement objective, and therefore measures each of the agreements against this ideal. The underlying assumption is that the model is in itself an attainable objective and not just a policy statement to form the basis of an 'ambit' claim. The merits or otherwise of this assumption will be discussed below.


The clauses of each agreement were measured individually against the model clause, with scores allocated only if the wording, or the meaning, of the NTA was the same as the model. Where the clause was ambiguous,

the objective was deemed not to have been achieved and no score was allocated. The clauses were grouped into related sections (see appendix D) and each section was then awarded an achievement percentage. These percentages for each section were aggregated to give an overall achievement percentage for the NTA, thus the success rate of the chapel is recorded on a scale of one to 100.

Obviously in some cases certain clauses were inapplicable and were not negotiable, thus these were eliminated from the particular sections, allowing all the aggregate scores to be comparable. Also eliminated were clauses that specifically concerned the NGA (when the NTAs were negotiated jointly) since these are not NUJ objectives although they form part of the model agreement. However the 'joint negotiating' clause was included into the scoring - except where a company contracts out its typesetting and printing, and thus employs no NGA members.

A full list of the scores is included in appendix E, showing a range from 98.4 at the Eastbourne Gazette and Herald, to 37.5 at the Yorkshire Evening Press (York), with a mean score of 72.5 and a standard deviation of 13.29. The distribution of scores is described by figure 4.1. This raises the question of how we can account for the differences between the scores: what variables are likely to influence the score achieved by the NUJ chapel? Four notable differences between the newspapers are the frequency of publication, the NUJ editorial density, the ownership and the date of the agreement. Each of these will be examined in turn to assess whether they have any separate impact on the achievement score.

Figure 4.1: Distribution of NTA scores



Frequency of publication might influence the negotiations because the composition of the editorial workforce will be different. The size of weekly editorial workforces are smaller than daily newspapers, and weeklies are career stepping-stones for many journalists, thus they often have a large proportion of young transient journalists, with no dependents and perhaps a more militant attitude. Daily newspapers are likely to have a wider distribution of ages, internal career paths and consequently more restraints on militancy. If these generalisations hold true for the sample, we might expect differences between the scores of weeklies and dailies - the former securing better NTAs.

To test this, the sample was divided into weekly and daily newspapers, and the mean and standard deviation was calculated for each (see table 4.1) which revealed that the mean score for weekly newspapers chapels was higher than for daily newspapers, as predicted. However, a difference of means test showed there to be no significant difference, and so we cannot assume that the frequency of publication alone played an important role in the negotiation of NTAs.

In short, a weekly newspaper chapel is no more likely to have secured a high scoring NTA than a daily newspaper chapel.

Table 4.1: Comparison of weekly and daily NTA scores

Weeklies	Dailies
N = 40	N = 36
X = 74.7	X = 69.9
s = 12.3	s = 14.1

t = 1.57

Decision: $p=0.05$ Accept H_0 - Sig. Dif. not proven.

The second potential influence was the density of NUJ membership. It might be assumed that a high density of NUJ members amongst the editorial workers would lead to a greater level of success in negotiating the NTA since there would be greater solidarity. We might expect to see a positive correlation between the score achieved and the NUJ density. To test this, frequency of publication was controlled by just examining the daily newspaper sample, and a correlation analysis was calculated for the scores and NUJ density. The results show an extremely slight positive correlation which has no significance ($r=0.0069$ $N=32$ $F_{1,30} = 0.0014$).

This finding of no correlation is surprising, however it should be borne in mind that at all but one of the newspapers in the daily sample, the density was above 50% of the editorial workforce. Notably, at the newspaper where the density was below 50%, the score achieved (37.5) was considerably lower than the mean score (69.9). It may be that having once achieved over 50% density, the significance of density for bargaining is reduced. Alternatively the overall density of the editorial

workforce may be less important than high levels of density in key areas of editorial production. This issue will be considered later in this chapter and in more detail in other chapters.

The third factor affecting the scores might be ownership. The assumption is that newspapers belonging to groups may be subject to additional group pressures which influence the bargaining process. For example, there might be a centralised industrial relations policy which constrains local level managers. Chapter three suggested that local managers considered themselves to be autonomous during new technology negotiations, although the NUJ officers were sceptical as to the extent of autonomy, especially over the financial aspects of the agreements. To examine this factor, we can isolate the four major groups - Thomson Regional Newspapers (TRN), Reed Publishing (REED), United Newspapers (UN) and Westminster Press (WP) - and draw comparisons between them and with the rest of the sample.

In looking at the raw data in appendix E, there seems to be a high incidence of low scores amongst the group owned newspapers. To test the significance of this, an analysis of variance was calculated to compare the four group samples with the non-group sample. The result suggested that the assumption of no significant difference between the groups is false ($F_{4,71} = 15.6$ reject H_0 at $p=0.05$) consequently a series of t-tests were performed to compare each of the group samples with each other and with the non-group sample. The results and decisions are presented in table 4.2 - the left-hand side of the lower

table shows the decisions whether at P=5% to accept or reject the null hypothesis, and the right-hand side shows the corresponding t-values.

Table 4.2 Comparison of group and non-group samples

Sample	size	mean	std.dev
UN	12	60.5	8.7
TRN	8	59.5	4.0
WP	9	64.0	16.4
REED	5	72.2	7.6
Non-group	42	80.2	9.5

H_0 : No significant difference between each pair of samples

t-value and decision table

	UN	TRN	WP	REED	Non-Group
UN	*	0.280	0.589	2.447	6.309
TRN	A	*	0.696	3.583	5.910
WP	A	A	*	0.979	3.915
REED	R	R	A	*	1.773
Non-G	R	R	R	A	*

P=0.05 A=accept R=reject

The tests reveal that the non-group sample differs statistically from the UN, TRN and WP samples, but not the REED sample. Similarly the REED sample differs from the UN and TRN samples. From this we can conclude that group ownership was an important factor in bargaining where newspapers were owned by TRN, UN or WP, and this led to their achievement scores being significantly lower than other newspapers.

The analysis can be taken a stage further by examining the standard deviations of the three groups (see table 4.2). The TRN sample has the lowest standard deviation; the UN standard deviation is twice as large, whilst the WP sample is four times as large. This relationship suggests that if group factors were important, they seem to have been most

effective at TRN and least effective at WP. Possible reasons for these group influences will be considered later in the chapter.

The fourth factor that may have influenced the NTA bargaining and so account for the difference in scores is the date when the NTAs were negotiated. The NUJ Technology Organiser has claimed that the NTAs have become gradually worse over time, and that the best agreements from the NUJ's position, were the earlier ones. To substantiate this statement we can therefore hypothesise that there is an inverse correlation between the score values for bargaining achievement and time. We can test this by computing a correlation analysis for score against month of signing. In fact this shows only a very slight negative correlation, which is not statistically significant ($r=-0.075$ $F_{1,74}=0.422$ Accept H_0 at $p=0.05$).

The calculations do not confirm the theory that the NTAs are getting worse. There is no evidence to suggest any significant correlation between the achievement (score value) of the NUJ negotiators and the date when the agreements were signed. The implications of this are important since if, as the Technology Organiser stated, the NUJ Head Office believes there to be a worsening of agreements, then it may in practice be lowering its negotiating targets in line with this declining expectation. Thus, the head office's false assumptions about the bargaining power over the agreements may in the future be **responsible for** worse technology agreements when in fact the potential for negotiation has remained unchanged. In short, the statistics show no reason why the

NUJ should adopt a 'worsening agreement' attitude and lower their expectations, and they do not account for the range of achievement in bargaining new technology.

Summary

The NTAs can be examined by comparing each signed agreement, clause by clause, with the model agreement and calculating an 'achievement score'. The scores reveal a large variation in achievement which may be a consequence of four main factors influencing the bargaining of the chapel: the frequency of publication, the NUJ density, the ownership of the title, and the date of negotiating the agreement. Statistical tests on the data suggest that ownership is the only one of these factors to have impacted upon the achievement scores to any notable extent. Chapels negotiating NTAs at Thomson Regional Newspapers, United Newspapers and Westminster Press have been generally less successful in achieving NTAs which match the model agreement than chapels at newspapers not owned by these groups.

NTAs, Ambit Claims and Bargaining

Recent commentators suggest that generally unions have had only minimal success in either securing meaningful NTAs or negotiating the introduction of technology. Williams and Moseley (1982) conducted a survey of 100 NTAs and found that many were vague and somewhat meaningless with often only limited provision for union involvement. Achievements were largely over the more easily quantifiable aspects of technology, such as health and safety issues where union

negotiators could back up their arguments with research data. And in respect of sharing the benefits of technological change, only 13 agreements contained commitments to shorter working weeks and higher pay.

Dodgson and Martin (1986) argue that technology policy can largely be characterised as a series of 'ambit' claims representing 'what would be desirable in the best of all possible worlds, rather than a set of realisable objectives, or even a list of priorities' (1986; p15), whilst Williams and Steward (1985) argue that 'both the adoption and content of technology agreements have been limited compared to original TUC objectives'.

The analysis of the NUJ technology agreements however suggests that provincial newspapers do not conform with the pattern of 'failure' apparently witnessed in other industries. This is evident for three reasons. First, during the period November 1985 to January 1988, only 12 direct input systems were introduced at newspapers where there is an NUJ chapel, without a NTA. Most of these were weekly newspapers (many low staffed free newspapers) and only two were daily publications.

Secondly, the negotiating document - the 'model agreement' - was proposed by the NUJ as a realistic objective and was not forwarded as a statement of what might be achieved in an ideal world. This is confirmed by the fact that in many instances, the clauses of the NTAs are verbatim transcripts of the model agreement. In addition, such high score values achieved by some newspaper chapels would not have been possible if the model agreement was anything other than a realistic set of objectives.

Thus, the model agreement and the NUJ's technology policy cannot be considered an ambit claim.

Thirdly, the content of the model agreement, and many of the final documents signed, cover a substantial part of the TUC guidelines, specifically over the limitation of the negative effects - working practices, ergonomics, job losses, and transfer - and the sharing of financial benefits through a technology payment (discussed extensively in the next section).

The success rate achieved by the NUJ was undoubtedly enhanced by the coordinating role of the NUJ head office across the industry. In particular they ensured that a national or regional officer was present at all of the negotiations. Although the extent of involvement of the full time officer varied from chapel to chapel, his or her presence provided a vital communication link with head office at every stage. This contrasts with evidence found by the Trade Union Research Unit (1981) that often information about new technology was not transferred between head office, union representatives and members, largely through ineffective communication links. In addition, TURU found that the exchange of information between unions was almost non-existent. This was not the case in provincial newspapers because the joint accord between the NUJ and NGA guaranteed cooperation at head office level, whilst the model agreement advocated joint negotiations with management, or where this failed the presence of an observer. At some newspapers the members voted to form a joint or federated chapel to enhance communication and force management to negotiate jointly

with both unions.

This aspect of multi-union negotiation was an important TUC guideline which Williams and Moseley found to have been disregarded in 75% of the agreements they studied. In a more recent survey, Williams and Steward (1985) found that 89% of the 240 agreements they sampled covered only one union although other unions would be affected by the change process. The union was not successful in its attempts to insist that all negotiations were undertaken jointly with the NGA, however the single signatory figure is low compared with the surveys cited above: 35%. It would have been even lower if joint negotiations had not been blocked by some managements.

United Newspapers and Thomson Regional Newspapers were very reluctant to allow joint negotiations. At the three United Newspapers titles covered in the 20 newspaper sample the managements agreed to allow observers into the meetings whilst keeping the negotiations separate - a compromise formula. There were however some joint talks on issues of common interest, for example the transfer of printers to the editorial floor. At the two TRN titles joint negotiations were also blocked by management, although one of them adopted a somewhat time consuming system of holding joint discussions prior to each set of individual negotiations - all three parties revealing their negotiating position before splitting into parallel bargaining sessions. This proved to be problematic according to the NUJ FoC:

What happened was that although we reached agreement during the discussions, the negotiations which followed were always long and drawn out because management would try to insert new proposals - because they were speaking to just one union.

This led to continual cries of, "They've moved the goal posts again!"

The resistance to joint negotiation seems to be founded upon a desire by management to keep the unions separate so as to reduce their collective bargaining power, and prevent supportive action being taken in the event of a dispute. Clearly if separate technology agreements were signed management would have grounds for claiming that any supportive action taken by either union would be unlawful, whereas in the case of a joint agreement, a dispute with one union would be more likely to put management also in dispute with the other union. Thus at a number of newspapers separate NTAs are signed by the two unions, yet both documents have in part, or in total, identical clauses.

The NUJ appears to have enjoyed a good degree of bargaining success and influence over technology. Although there was a great deal of emphasis on ergonomics (much of which is discussed in later chapters), the NUJ also sought to extend bargaining to areas that were traditionally the sole prerogative of management. Three areas stand out in particular: control over the labour supply, pacing and monitoring of the workflow, and right of self-transfer.

The NUJ wanted to influence the labour supply in a number of ways. First, it advocated that there should be no new inputting of copy by journalists and that all direct inputting should be performed either by staff journalists or NGA members depending on the origin of the copy. This meant that all freelance material would have to be re-keyed into the system by NGA members. For most of the managements

this proved unacceptable, thus most of the agreements contain compromise clauses whereby direct inputting is extended to freelance journalists but with limitations over the numbers who are allowed the direct input facility. In some cases managements agreed to discuss the selection of these freelancers (although custom and practice was the most frequent selection method) whilst in about 20% of the cases, the selection of freelancers, and consequently the control of the labour supply, remained in the hands of management and was not open to bargaining. Conversely, in three cases the chapel succeeded in restricting all freelance direct inputting to NUJ members only.

The second aspect concerned with labour supply was the selection and training of transferees. In virtually all newspapers the appointment of staff is the prerogative of the editor. Usually this would involve consultation with relevant departmental heads (who may belong to the NUJ) but the union would not be involved officially. The NUJ/NGA technology policy however was to seek involvement over the selection of transferees to the editorial floor and to participate in the development of a training programme - the latter aspect being largely an issue of job design. For the majority of newspapers, this objective of being involved with selection was achieved, but 17 companies specifically reserved the Editor's right to select transferees, whilst 12 newspapers abandoned the clause altogether.

The NUJ had even more varied success over the pacing and monitoring of the workflow. The issue of screen breaks proved to be a problematic clause. The model agreement

advocated a break of 10 minutes after every 75 minutes of continuous on-screen work, and 25 chapels achieved this. The rest of the chapels negotiated breaks at various intervals between 75 minutes and three hours, with at worst, no specific right to come off-screen, but an acknowledgement that 'natural breaks' occur in the work. In virtually all the cases the screen breaks were conditional on not disrupting the office deadlines. It appears that management were reluctant to pass a contractual right to come off screen to the journalists, thereby giving them increased discernment over the pacing of work. This is particularly relevant for sub-editors since the technology has increased their pervasiveness and immediacy in the production process (discussed in chapter five), thus management sought to restrict the subs' self-pacing potential and the consequent disruption of the workflow if they took screen breaks at regular intervals. Perhaps the yielding of management in some cases arose either as a result of a strong chapel, or through the increasing amount of scientific data associating eyesight problems and muscular strain with long periods of VDU work.

The monitoring clause - the facility to measure keystrokes - proved to be less of a problem for most chapels, but 40 of the NTAs contain no reference to the clause, suggesting either that it was impossible to reach agreement or that neither side thought it important. Whatever the reason, in such cases the negotiators have failed to exert influence over an issue that has the potential to become an important productivity measure (although it is doubtful if keystroke measurement alone

would be used to assess a journalist's performance). Of the 36 NTAs where keystroke is mentioned, eight have clauses which specifically allow management to use the facility.

The third area over which there was a large amount of management resistance concerned the right of self-transfer. This included people with a permanent health condition preventing them from using the VDUs, pregnant women or anyone who after training could not achieve the required level of competence on the new equipment. The model agreement argues for a right of transfer without loss of status and pay or damage to career prospects. In short it was advocating that the redesign of the job (use of direct input) should only be permissible if it was compatible with the physical and intellectual abilities of the individual journalist. There was however a strong amount of management resistance; some refusing to include the clause, others rewording it to guarantee the continued employment of the journalists concerned, but not their status or pay. Significantly, the strongest opposition was directed at the pregnancy clause. The model clause argues for the right of transfer not only for women who are pregnant, but for any woman who believes herself to be pregnant; this was unacceptable for 22 newspaper managements who gave the right of transfer only to women who have been medically tested for pregnancy. Three further NTAs omit the clause completely. Six of the NTAs include a preamble to the clause suggesting that there is no medical evidence to substantiate any fears of harm to unborn children, the tone of which suggests that any women requesting transfer is somewhat irrational. But in any case the pregnancy clause

even as framed in the model does raise important issues of privacy and civil liberties, not least that the introduction of new technology means that one of the first people to know that a woman is pregnant will be her employer - and of course if she does transfer, the rest of the office will know. The decision to inform people, will be out of her control because of new technology.

Obviously there are local variations in many of the other clauses, but the three areas highlighted represent the most consistent differences from the model. These common difference are not apparent when examining the score values since they indicate the extent of success and failure, but not the specific areas. All these issues are examined in close detail in the subsequent chapters, concentrating on the 20 newspaper sample.

Generally management has accepted the NUJ's involvement and right to bargain over the introduction of new technology. This contrasts sharply with the findings of Daniel (1987) which suggest the most common form of involvement over change for white collar workers was by informal consultation, and that where union negotiation took place it was largely amongst manual workers with strong trade union traditions and where a multi-level collective bargaining framework exists (1987; p113-150).

The NUJ has accepted the managerial prerogative to introduce change, and the technology policy carries only an 'ambit' provision for union involvement at the design and selection stage - although implicitly many of the clauses necessitate involvement at a pre-implementation stage, or the potential for the technology to be flexible and

adaptable. However the bargaining was not just restricted to limiting the negative aspects of change. The most notable achievement for the NUJ has been its success in securing new technology payments.

Summary

Unlike many unions surveyed, the NUJ has been successful in adopting new technology agreements as a bargaining tool. Its success stems from adopting a realistic model NTA that could be easily adapted to meet local level requirements, signing a joint accord with the NGA, and developing a well co-ordinated, centrally administered negotiation strategy.

The NTAs not only cover the limiting of the negative effects of technology, but follow the TUC guidelines in seeking to extend bargaining to control issues - particularly labour supply and transfer - although its success in these areas has been varied.

New Technology Payments

The NUJ were successful in negotiating technology payments in all but one newspaper. Their policy was that payments should be negotiated at local level, and that there should be equal payments to include not only those journalists who would use the technology (reporters and subs) but also those who would be expected to cooperate with its introduction, notably photographers. In some cases the photographers do use the system, for example, to write captions, or where the diary is kept on screen.

Tables 4.3 and 4.4 give a full break down of the technology payments negotiated. Table 4.3 shows an

Table 4.3: New technology payments - even

	<u>Co.</u>	<u>Seniors</u>	<u>Juniors</u> <u>pro-rata</u>
WEEKLY PUBLICATIONS			
Andover	SN	£20.00	no
Armagh	IND	£ 8.50	no
Aylesbury	BHNG	£10.50	no
Basingstoke	SN	£15.00	no
Burnley	UN	£10.00	no
Chester	TRN	£14.00	yes
Chesterfield	JN	£18.00	no
Down	IND	£ 8.00	no
Dursley	BN	£12.00	no
Harrogate	UN	£10.00	no
Hertford	SAN	£15.00	no
High Wycombe	WP	£18.00	no
Leeds	UN	£10.00	no
Llandudno	NWWN	£17.00	yes
London	YA	£10.00	no
London (Kilburn)	CN	£10.00	no
London (Hackney)	CN	£10.00	no
London SE	WP	£15.00	no
Mansfield	IND	£20.00	no
Merthyr Tydfil	TRN	£12.00	no
Mexborough	REED	£15.00	no
Milton Keynes	IND	£15.00	no
Sidcup	IND	£ 7.60	no
Sittingbourne	IND	£15.00	yes
South Shields	NP	£15.00	no
Stafford	IND	£20.00	yes
Taunton	REED	£16.00	no
Watford	WP	£20.00	yes
Wells	IND	£15.00	no
DAILY PUBLICATIONS			
Belfast	IND	£17.00	no
Belfast	TRN	£17.00	no
Blackburn	TRN	£14.00	no
Bolton	REED	£15.00	no
Bradford	WP	£25.00	yes
Brighton	WP	£30.00	no
Burton	YIT	£25.00	no
Cambridge	YIT	£30.00	no
Cardiff	TRN	£17.00	no
Carlisle	CNG	£14.80	yes
Coventry	ING	£30.00	no
Darlington	WP	£28.00	no
Hartlepool	PSN	£11.50	no
Leeds	UN	£25.00	no
London	TRN	£23.00	no
Middlesbrough	TRN	£17.00	no
Newcastle	TRN	£17.00	no
Newport	UN	£17.00	yes
Norwich	ECN	£25.00	no
Peterborough	EMAP	£17.50	no
Poole	SN	£20.00	no
Southampton	SN	£25.00	no
Sunderland	PSN	£14.00	no
Swindon	WP	£20.00	no
Worcester	REED	£20.00	no
York	WP	£15.00	no

Table 4.4: New technology payments - uneven

<u>Place of publication</u>	<u>Co.</u>	<u>Seniors</u>	<u>2-years</u>	<u>5-years</u>	<u>Subs extra</u>	<u>Photogs.</u>	<u>Juniors Pro-rata</u>
WEEKLY PUBLICATIONS							
Ashton u Lyne	UN	£ 7.50	£ 7.75	£ 8.00	£1.50	0	yes
Bedford	IND	£12.50	£12.50	£12.50	£5.00	£12.50	no
Chorley	UN	£ 8.25	£ 8.25	£ 8.25	£2.00	0	yes
Eastborne	BNL	£18.00	£18.00	£18.00	£2.00	£15.00	yes
London	AP	£10.00	£10.00	£10.00	£2.50	£10.00	yes
Lurgan	IND	£13.25	£15.00	£18.00	0	£13.25	yes
Newark	IND	£14.00	£14.00	£14.00	£2.00	£10.00	yes
Peterborough	SHN	£ 1.40	£ 1.40	£ 1.40	40p	£ 1.40	yes
Slough	IND	£17.50	£17.50	£17.50	£7.50	£10.50	no
Southport	TI	£ 8.50	£ 8.50	£ 8.50	£3.00	£ 8.50	no
Wigan	UN	£ 8.25	£ 8.25	£ 8.25	£2.00	0	yes
Yeovil	BUP	£ 5.29	£ 5.29	£ 5.29	£7.13	£ 5.29	yes
DAILY PUBLICATIONS							
Basildon	WP	£18.00	£18.00	£18.00	£5.00	£18.00	no
Blackpool	UN	£15.00	£15.00	£15.00	£2.00	£15.00	no
Bristol	BUP	£31.08	£31.08	£31.08	£5.94	£31.08	yes
Colchester	REED	£14.00	£14.00	£14.00	£6.00	£14.00	yes
Huddersfield	HDN	£19.00	£21.00	£23.00	0	£19.00	yes
Northampton	UN	£16.30	£16.30	£16.30	£1.70	£16.30	no
Preston	UN	£25.00	£25.00	£25.00	£3.00	£25.00	no
Sheffield	UN	£22.00	£22.00	£22.00	0	£14.00	no

alphabetical listing by location, and by frequency of publication, of payment made on an across-the-board basis. In such cases the only discrimination between journalists was whether they had completed their indenture period and training since in some cases this would mean a pro-rata technology payment. In the majority of cases, however, juniors received the same technology payment as seniors.

Table 4.4 lists those newspapers where technology payments were made unevenly. In cases such as Huddersfield, this meant that technology pay was distributed pro-rata in line with the existing banded wage system based on seniority, and thus the technology payment maintained already existing differentials. At the majority of newspapers listed in this table, the discrimination was over the job, with payments being made on an incremental scale according to whether the journalist was a photographer, a reporter or a sub-editor.

In order to compare the technology payments made to subs, reporters and photographers in weekly and daily papers, the mean values for the respective groups were calculated, and the results are presented in table 4.5. In general, journalists working in companies where the principal publication was a daily newspaper, received higher payments across all job categories. This mirrors the fact that salary levels are higher for daily newspaper journalists than weekly journalists. This differential is accepted across the industry and reflects not only the higher turnover and profitability of daily titles, but also the greater intensity of daily newspaper work. The NUJ policy was to accept this two-tier pay structure in

bargaining over technology pay.

Table 4.5: Comparison of even and uneven technology payments by job and frequency of publication.

	<u>Sub</u> £	<u>Sen.Rep.</u> £	<u>Photog.</u> £
Weekly			
Even	13.94	13.94	13.94
Uneven	13.29	10.37	7.20
difference (even-uneven)	0.65	3.57	6.74
Daily			
Even	19.83	19.83	19.83
Uneven	23.00	20.05	19.05
difference (even-uneven)	-3.17	-0.22	0.78

However, aside from the differences in the size of average payments made to weekly and daily journalists, there appears to be two contrasting trends. In weeklies, journalists received higher payments if they were awarded 'even' technology pay - particularly the photographers - but in dailies, the opposite was true for subs and reporters: they were worse off if they had received even payments - especially the subs. If such results were used to inform future journalists about the most advantageous technology pay system, then the advice might be: all photographers and weekly reporters should seek an even payment system; daily subs should aim for an uneven system; whilst weekly subs and daily reporters might be marginally better off by advocating an even and uneven system respectively.

Managements may have been making strategic choices in the distribution of payment across the workgroup. Offers of

stratified pay in daily newspapers could be used strategically to encourage acceptance by winning over the key production journalists (the subs) through the elevation - financially and symbolically - of their importance within the workgroup. In weeklies, there are fewer deadlines, so the subs are not such a key workgroup.

The fact that the journalists received technology payments does not necessarily demonstrate an increase in the bargaining power of the journalists. It might be argued that management acknowledged that an up-grading of pay was an appropriate reward for the extra skills the journalists would be obliged to learn. In this case, the issue is magnitude of the technology payment, rather whether or not payment was made. Taking the 20 newspaper sample we can see how the original offer by management and the original claim by the chapel compares with the final settlement at each newspaper (see table 4.6).

At each newspaper the management made an offer of technology pay, although in the case of Basildon they claimed that the £8 already paid to journalists for working on portable Tandy laptop computers also covered the move to full direct input. Also, at five newspapers management claimed that the photographers were ineligible for technology pay since they would not be using the system. At each of the 20 newspapers the chapels did however manage to secure some payment for photographers in line with NUJ policy.

So as before, this raises the question of how the differences in the magnitude of payment can be explained. High payments might be expected in prosperous areas of the

Table 4.6: Technology Pay - Offers, Claims and Settlements.

Newspaper	NTA Date	MANAGEMENTS 1st offer			NUJ CHAPELS response			Final settlement			Pre-NTA existing Tech.pay	Diff.offer/claim (av.across jobs)	
		Rep	Sub	Pht	Rep	Sub	Pht	Rep	Sub	Pht		Man.	Journ.
		£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	
Basildon	Sept 87	0	0	0	20	20	20	7	15	7	8	9.70	10.30
Bath	Feb 88	14	14	0	30	30	30	22	22	22		12.70	8
Blackpool	May 87	7	9	5	--25-30--			15	17	15		8.70	11.80
Bradford	Apr 87	25	25	0	25	25	25	25	25	25		8.30	0
Brighton	Nov 86	8	8	0	35	35	35	25	25	25	5	19.70	10
Bristol	Sept 86	--15-20--			--30-40--			--26.50-32.50--			4.50	11	6.50
Burton	Feb 87	5	5	5	64	64	64	25	25	25		20	39
Cambridge	May 86	5	5	5	not specified			30	30	30		25	n/a
Colchester	May 87	5	5	0	30	30	30	14	20	14		12.70	14
Huddersfield	Feb 86	--10-20--			30	30	30	----19-25----				7	8
Leeds	Feb 87	20	20	20	30	30	30	25	25	25		5	5
Liverpool	Nov 85	10	12	10	35	40	35	20	23	20	5	10.40	16.50
Middlesbrough	Dec 86	8	8	8	not specified			17	17	17		9	n/a
Newcastle	Oct 86	10	10	10	40	40	40	17.50	17.50	17.50		7.50	22.50
Peterborough	June 86	8	10	8	30	30	30	17.50	17.50	17.50		8.90	12.50
Sheffield	Mar 87	19	19	13	30	30	30	22	22	13		2	11
Southampton	Aug 87	10	10	10	40	40	40	25	25	25		15	15
Swindon	Sept 87	15	15	15	35	35	35	20	20	20		5	15
Worcester	Mar 87	12	15	0	25	25	25	20	20	20		11	5
York	Mar 87	20.50 to all			accepted			20.50	20.50	20.50		0	0

Note: Huddersfield and Bristol negotiated stratified payments in line with their existing wage grading structure.

country - especially where property prices are high - since the real value of the technology pay would be lower. In fact, whilst Bristol, Brighton, Cambridge and Southampton did receive high technology payments, so did Leeds and Bradford. Furthermore, it was not just the newspapers with large circulations, high staffing levels and a large financial turnover that received high technology pay; journalists at the Burton Daily Mail - the country's smallest provincial daily newspaper in all three respects - received the joint third highest payment.

The date of negotiating the agreement might affect the technology pay. There could be two trends: either technology pay decreasing as bargaining settles to a market level, or payment increasing as chapels become more confident. But neither trend can be perceived from table 4.6. If we use data from the full sample and compute the correlation between the date of the agreement and the amount of technology pay for seniors, we find that for the daily newspapers, there is a very small inverse correlation ($r=-0.0167$). For the weekly sample this inverse correlation is slightly larger, but is still not statistically significant ($r=-0.2982$). The figures reveal that there may be a tendency for technology pay to be decreasing over time, and furthermore, the magnitude of this inverse correlation might increase if inflation is taken into account. To test this, the technology pay made to weekly senior reporters was discounted at a rate of 4% per annum (approximating inflation during the period) and the correlation was recalculated. This time the inverse correlation was significant ($r=-0.3547$ $F_{1,40} = 5.7599$

Reject H_0 at $p=0.05$). This suggests that technology payments are decreasing in real value over time, and so may account for the differences observed. This result is not entirely unexpected because as the non-technology using journalists become the minority rather than the majority, their bargaining power across the industry will decrease. They will be less able to bargain for extra money for a skill that is increasingly becoming a necessity for journalistic work.

The differences might also be affected by density of NUJ membership at the newspapers. Theoretically a high NUJ density would enhance the bargaining power and lead to high technology payments.

Table 4.7: NUJ density and new technology payments

<u>Chapel</u>	<u>NUJ Density</u>	<u>New Tech Payment</u>
Basildon Evg. Echo	57%	£11.00*
Bath Evg. Chron.	56%	£22.00
Blackpool Gazette	86%	£16.00*
Bradford Tlg. & Argus	87%	£25.00
Brighton Evg. Argus	72%	£25.00
Bristol Evg. Post	97%	£31.00*
Burton Mail	64%	£25.00
Cambridge Evg. News	88%	£30.00
Colchester Evg. Gazette	39%	£17.00*
Huddersfield D'ly Exam.	100%	£23.00*
Liverpool Post & Echo	86%	£21.50*
Middlesbrough Gazette	96%	£17.00
Newcastle Chronicle & Journal	96%	£17.50
Peterborough Evg. Tlg.	91%	£17.50
Sheffield Star	87%	£22.00
Southern Evg. Echo	69%	£25.00
Wiltshire Nprs. (Swindon)	66%	£20.00
Worcester Evg. News	69%	£20.00
Yorkshire Post (am)	62%	£25.00
Yorkshire Evg. Press	42%	£20.50

* denotes adjusted average

Table 4.7 compares the density in the sample with the technology pay, but as with the NTA scores, a correlation

analysis suggests that the assumption of density affecting bargaining is false, since there is only a small positive correlation, which is not statistically significant ($r=0.226$ $F_{1,18} = 0.967$ Accept H_0 at $p=0.05$).

A further consideration is the extent to which the technology payments have been made in line with existing differentials across the industry. How do the wage levels of journalists before and after technology compare? Table 4.8 is a league of the average reporter's wage for the sample - showing payment excluding and including technology pay.

Table 4.8 League tables of weekly wages (reporter average)

<u>Excluding Tech.Pay</u>		<u>Including Tech.Pay</u>		<u>Change of position</u>
	£		£	
Newcastle	222.50	Newcastle	240.00	same
Blackpool	215.00	Leeds	235.00	+1
Leeds	210.00	Blackpool	230.00	-1
Liverpool	210.00	Liverpool	230.00	same
Middlesbrough	201.50	Cambridge	221.00	+1
Cambridge	191.00	Middlesbrough	218.50	-1
Southampton	190.00	Southampton	215.00	same
Bath	190.00	Bath	212.00	same
Bradford	185.00	Bradford	210.00	same
Brighton	185.00	Brighton	210.00	same
Bristol	183.50	Bristol	210.00	same
Huddersfield	183.00	Huddersfield	204.00	same
Peterborough	175.00	Peterborough	192.00	same
Worcester	170.00	Worcester	190.00	same
Sheffield	168.00	Sheffield	190.00	same
York	166.50	York	187.00	same
Basildon	164.00	Swindon	177.00	+2
Burton	160.00	Burton	175.00	same
Swindon	157.00	Basildon	171.00	-2
Colchester	146.00	Colchester	160.00	same

Data based on figures from NUJ earnings survey (Nov. 1987).

The columns are remarkably similar suggesting that the negotiated technology payments were a reflexion of both management and the NUJ's desire to maintain existing differentials between newspapers, and their relative success in doing so. It seems that the size of the

technology payments was very much dominated by the market value of journalistic labour, based on existing wage levels.

Neither management nor the NUJ can claim the greater victory, which suggests that the balance of bargaining power between management and the NUJ did not change. This can be explored further by returning to the final two columns in table 4.6. They show the extent to which the settlement differed from management's first offer and the chapel's first response. Taking the mean average across all 20 newspapers, management paid out £10.43 more than their original offer, whilst the chapels accepted £11.67 less than their original claim. The difference between these two sums is small and suggests that bargaining for technology pay, taken across the whole sample, represented an even achievement for both sides. So, management and the NUJ could both claim victory in terms of meeting their financial objectives. It confirms that the bargaining power, measured in terms of influence over technology pay, remained unchanged.

Summary

The NUJ succeeded in negotiating technology pay: the majority of payments were made on an across-the-board basis whilst the rest discriminated between journalists according to their job and seniority. The technology pay reflected the difference between the salaries of weekly and daily journalists, since weekly technology payments were, on average, lower than daily payments. The magnitude of payment also differed amongst the weekly titles and amongst

daily titles, and these cannot be accounted for by regional differences or by the NUJ density at the newspapers. However, there is a general trend for the real value of technology payments to be decreasing over time which may account for some of the differences. Furthermore, the payments seem to have been made in line with existing differentials between newspapers, which suggests that the balance of bargaining power between management and the NUJ has not changed.

Ownership Influences in Technology Pay Bargaining

The evidence so far suggests that managements were willing to pay, but clearly wished to keep payments to a minimum. This raises two questions: what methods could managements employ to reduce the overall new technology payment made to their editorial workers, and what affect would group ownership have on influencing technology payments? To address these issues we can return to the data from the full NTA survey in tables 4.3 and 4.4.

In examining the newspapers where uneven-payments were made (table 4.4), they seem to be fairly representative of the sample in terms of region, and level of technology pay (they include high technology payers like Bristol and Preston, and those at the lower end of the scale, such as Peterborough and Ashton under Lyne) but not in terms of ownership. Two anomalies exist: first, United Newspapers are clearly over represented, and secondly, Thomson Regional Newspapers do not feature in the list.

United Newspapers titles constitute 33% of the newspapers in the table (58% of all United's technology

using newspapers). By comparison, only one Westminster Press agreement (Basildon) and one Reed Publishing agreement (Colchester) has uneven payments, with the subs receiving more money than reporters and photographers. All the Thomson agreements have across-the-board technology payments. It is however misleading to suggest that such stratified payments were imposed against the chapel's wishes. In the cases of Basildon and Colchester the chapels voted to accept the principle that subs should be paid more money because technology would be more disruptive to their working practices - a resolution which was out of line with NUJ policy. Conversely, at Newcastle (TRN) the chapel opposed the company's attempts to introduce stratified payments and succeeded in getting across-the-board payments.

These two opposite NUJ strategies were justified by the FoCs as follows:

The chapel felt there would come a time when, because of the nature of the subs' jobs and extra skills and training needed, that the market rate for the job would have to go up to attract people, whereas for reporters and photographers this would not occur. It was vital for us to get the best deal for them as this would be the only real opportunity.

[FoC Newcastle]

Management wanted some sort of differentiation and we realised that it would not be such a bad thing for subs to get more money because they would be most involved with the change. In hindsight we should have held out and pushed for more money for subs. At the time we did not realise what they would be thrown into.

[FoC Colchester]

At each of the United Newspapers publishing centres, the original offer, although not all the final agreements, always involved some form of stratification; this suggests that a group strategy was being adopted. From the tables it is impossible to say whether this was an attempt to bargain

down the overall payments, or if it reflected a desire to distribute the rewards for cooperation with technology on a usage basis: those who use the technology the most (the subs) should get the most money. Alternatively the 'payment according to job' system might have been a recognition by management of the production significance of the journalistic tasks: the subs, whose cooperation is most important to the production process under new technology receiving the highest rewards, and the photographers, because of their higher substitutability, getting the least money.

To assess whether ownership has had a similar impact on bargaining over technology payments as it appeared to have on the overall NTA we can try to ascertain the extent to which the groups differ in their technology payments. Table 4.9 compares the payments made to daily newspaper senior reporters. Similar results were obtained by comparing technology payments made to subs and to photographers, thus the calculations are not included.

Table 4.9: Comparison of technology payments made to daily newspaper senior reporters

Sample	size	mean	std.dev
UN	6	£20.05	4.51
TRN	6	£17.50	2.95
WP	6	£22.67	5.92
OTHERS	16	£20.24	6.50

[Note: REED daily sample was too small to be included: N=3]

Statistically there is no significant difference between the samples, however two features of table 4.9 suggest that group factors were operating. First, as with the NTA scores, TRN chapels were the least successful, and the

standard deviation from the mean is once again very small. This supports the earlier suggestion that TRN had an influential group strategy. The second feature is the success of the WP chapels in securing the highest average payments, particularly since they had not been any more successful than chapels at other groups in securing high scoring NTAs.

If this analysis of payment is combined with the conclusions from the earlier section concerning the effectiveness of the negotiators over the range of NTA clauses, a picture of the importance of group factors begins to emerge. The Reed group has been the least successful in negotiating the range of technology clauses (the average NUJ negotiation score is higher), but in terms of payment has maintained consistency with the other groups. The Westminster Press group has succeeded in negotiating down the NTAs as a whole, but the price they have paid seems to be the awarding of a higher than average technology money. The Thomson group seems to have concentrated on negotiating down the technology agreements, whilst maintaining technology payments which give a group average consistent with other newspapers: parity amongst the group. United Newspapers' strategy appears to have been an attempt to negotiate down the NTA clauses (resembling TRN and WP) and to offer stratified payments, with a view to minimising the overall total technology payment. Whilst this has been to the advantage of the subs, and to a lesser extent the reporters, it has been to the detriment of the photographers, as table 4.10 clearly shows.

Table 4.10: Technology payments made by United Newspapers
Mean Average Technology Payments

	UNITED NPRS.		NON-UNITED NPRS.	
	even	uneven	even	uneven
Sub	£14.4	£16.36	£17.18	£17.89
Rep	£14.4	£14.61	£17.18	£13.66
Photog	£14.4	£10.04	£17.18	£12.39
	-----	-----	-----	-----
Total	£43.2	£41.01	£51.54	£43.94

Essentially the statistics have demonstrated that differences in technology pay may be a result of ownership influences. The payment analysis has revealed consistencies within and between the groups that suggest the significance of group membership when examining union bargaining power. The importance of this is that the negotiating process at newspapers belonging to one of the major groups may therefore have been subject to corporate constraints which may have influenced the bargaining and the eventual settlement.

The overall significance of the new technology pay bargaining for the NUJ is not so much the technology payments themselves as the magnitude and distribution of technology pay. Thus, the final section of this chapter examines whether technology pay advantages have been preserved or eroded by annual wage negotiations.

Claw-back and the 1987/88 Pay Round

By examining the bargaining following the introduction of direct input, we can attempt to answer a question central to the analysis of the NUJ's bargaining power: have the managements sought to claw back some of the technology pay through awarding lower annual pay awards or have the NUJ

capitalised on a stronger bargaining position and pushed for higher awards?

Although all managements seemed to accept the principle of payment for new technology, there was less consensus about the relationship of the technology pay to the basic pay. Four systems emerged. First, in the majority of cases, the technology pay was included into the basic wage levels, representing a step increase in pay, with bargaining to continue as normal. Clearly this was favoured by the NUJ as it represented an up-grading of the value of the job, rather than a separate skill award, and simplified bargaining.

The second method adopted was to consolidate the technology pay and the basic pay, as above, but to set a fixed percentage increase for the next one or two bargaining rounds. This reduced uncertainty about pay for the journalists, although confined them to the agreed increase whilst providing management with a fixed labour-cost budget, thereby enabling more accurate short to medium term financial planning. The chapels that accepted this system are not so convinced of its value in hindsight. The MoC at Cambridge expressed clear regrets:

It was a mistake to forgo two annual local pay rounds. The management gave us between £4.50 and £5 at each. This meant that some of the technology pay was absorbed back. We lost about £5 a year so the real value of the technology pay was not £30 but £20.

A third system adopted was to keep the basic pay and the technology pay separate, but for both to be negotiable in the future. Clearly this works the same as the first system, although it means two sets of negotiations have to take place. It was this method the Leeds chapel thought

they had agreed to, but when it came to the next round of bargaining they were told by management that technology pay was fixed. The FoC acknowledges this was an oversight in the negotiations, and one that could prove to be costly.

Leeds, as with other newspapers, therefore operate the fourth type of system whereby technology pay is kept separate from other pay and is frozen. In effect, after a number of years it will have become devalued, so chapels are faced with the task of securing higher increases on their basic rate to compensate for the devaluing of the technology pay.

Table 4.11 shows the different systems operated in the 20 newspaper sample.

Table 4.11: System of technology payment

Increase basic	Increase basic forgo bargaining	Separate both negotiable	Separate not negotiable
Bath	Cambridge	Blackpool	Leeds
Basildon	Huddersfield		Middlesbrough
Bradford			Newcastle
Brighton			Peterborough
Bristol			York
Burton			
Colchester			
Liverpool			
Sheffield			
Southampton			
Swindon			
Worcester			

The 1987/88 pay round was set against a radically altered bargaining back-drop. Not only was technology pay to be accounted for, but also bargaining was to be conducted entirely at local level. Traditionally the NUJ head office and the Newspaper Society had negotiated a national increase for all the provincial newspapers. In theory each chapel could improve on this by negotiating at local level,

getting a house increase on top of the national increase. Generally this worked to the advantage of the larger provincial newspapers, especially where the NUJ chapel was strong, or militant. However this system was abandoned in 1986/87 when the national negotiations broke down, leaving all bargaining to individual chapels.

The 1987/88 pay round has been surveyed by the NUJ head office (March 1988) revealing that settlements were generally above the Newspaper Society's recommended increase of £5.25 to £5.75 (3.5% to 3.9%) for weeklies and £5.75 to £6.25 (2.8% to 3.1%) for dailies. Managements have been willing to pay above the NS recommendations, although they were not all willing to negotiate. The exception to this has been Thomson Regional Newspapers who have, across eight of their titles, tied pay increases to the signing of individual contracts. This seems to be a policy of encouraging individualism - an issue which is discussed in later chapters, and specifically in the conclusion (chapter eight).

Table 4.12 shows how the 20 newspaper sample compares with the average increases. If managements were attempting to claw back technology pay, the pay round increases would most likely be low. There is evidence of this at the TRN titles (Newcastle and Middlesbrough), but this is due to the individual contract policy. Cambridge also shows a poor annual increase but this is because their technology deal of £30 was dependent on foregoing two years of house negotiations.

Table 4.12: 1987/88 pay round increase (sen. rep's average)

Newspaper	Group	Pay Increase		Above or below NS recommended
		£	%	
Basildon	WP	12.00	7.0	above
Bath	WP	10.50	5.0	above
Blackpool	UN	8.00	3.5	above
Bradford	WP	10.00	4.8	above
Brighton	WP	10.50	5.0	above
Bristol	BUP	12.00	5.7	above
Burton	YIT	8.00	4.6	above
Cambridge	YIT	5.00	2.6	below
Colchester	REED	12.50	8.0	above
Huddersfield	HDN	13.00	5.3	above
Leeds	UN	9.50	4.5	above
Liverpool	TI	13.00	5.7	above
Middlesbrough	TRN	0.00	0.0	below
Newcastle	TRN	5.00	2.2	below
Peterborough	EMAP	7.50	3.7	above
Sheffield	UN	12.50	6.6	above
Southampton	SN	10.50	4.9	above
Swindon	WP	15.00	8.5	above
Worcester	REED	9.50	5.0	above
York	WP	8.50	5.0	above

Table 4.13: 1987/88 pay round averages (senior reporter)

	Pay rise	Weekly wage	Percentage
Mean	£ 9.625	£203.13	4.7 %
Median	£ 10.25	£210.00	4.9 %

The average pay increase across the 20 newspapers is illustrated in table 4.13. Comparing this with a survey by the Industrial Relations Report and Review (September 20, 1988) reveals that the journalists' awards were below the national average. The IRRR study shows that between October 1987 and March 1988 median pay increases, based on settlements across a range of industries, lay between 5.5% and 5.6%, whereas the 20 newspaper sample is less than 5%. So although the NUJ chapels have succeeded in negotiating pay deals higher than the NS recommendations, the settlements are on average below national pay settlements.

Although there seems to have been no concerted attempt

by management to claw back technology pay, the absence of national level bargaining may account for the relatively low performance. It will take several more years of local bargaining before any analysis can be undertaken as to whether management strategy has been to suppress journalists' wages thereby eroding the advances made through technology payments.

Conclusions

McLoughlin & Clark (1988) argue that the surveys of NTAs suggest that 'by the mid 1980s the new technology agreement initiative had lost its impetus, at both a national policy level and in the negotiating practice of individual unions' (1988; p83). Whilst this may be true as a general case, it is not accurate when examining the NUJ. This chapter has shown that the union has readily accepted the NTA as an appropriate way of securing involvement in technological change, and at the time of writing, NTAs are still being signed. Moreover, whilst other unions have had limited success with NTAs, the NUJ seems able to boast considerable benefits.

The NUJ has achieved an admirable record of success in negotiating the introduction of direct input. They have met the TUC's objectives of securing new technology agreements that cover not only minimisation and control of the negative aspects of technology, but also the sharing in the benefits brought by new production methods. The most obvious example of gains made being the technology payments which in general have raised the journalists' basic wages. So why have the NUJ have been so successful?

The success can be attributed to two factors: the type of technological change, and the coordinating role of the NUJ head office. In the provincial newspaper industry, the direct input system was introduced to reduce operating costs and for greater flexibility, with the greatest cost saving being in the production department, as chapter three has outlined. In adopting direct input managers were required to elicit the support of the journalists since they would be the operators of the new equipment. It would have been difficult to implement the change without the co-operation of a significant number of journalists, especially since there was the permanent possibility of conflict with the printers. The signing of the joint accord between the NUJ and NGA forced management to reconsider the strategy for introduction since the two unions could not be played off against each other as they had been at newspapers such as the Wolverhampton Express and Star, and the Portsmouth News. The joint accord may in practice have failed to produce joint negotiations and joint agreements across the whole industry, but undoubtedly it worked in the NUJ's favour by preventing inter-union conflict.

In addition, the need for journalists not only to operate the new equipment, but to train to use it, provided the NUJ with a powerful bargaining position: until serious negotiations have taken place and an NTA has been signed, the NUJ would instruct chapel members not to train. The blanket policy was for NUJ members not to touch any new technology unless the chapel had a signed agreement with management.

The second factor which accounts for the NUJ's success

is the important coordinating role of head office. They employed a full time New Technology Officer and developed a new technology policy by drawing on the experiences of journalists in other countries where direct input had been introduced - thus, in this particular case, it was an advantage for the editorial workers that the industry was not a technology leader. Having developed a policy, and settled the differences with the NGA by signing the Joint Accord, a model NTA was formulated which could be handed down to chapels at local level for them to adapt to their particular circumstances. However, as the analysis has shown the model NTA was applicable to a large number of newspapers, and was a realistic bargaining document, rather than representing an initial bargaining position from which the chapels would be expected to move considerably. Yet, in spite of the clarity and simplicity of the model NTA, head office also arranged special conferences and training sessions for chapel officers, and ensured that a fulltime NUJ officer spoke to chapel members before negotiations and led, or attended, the negotiations with local management.

This high profile adopted by head office is examined further in chapter seven; it undoubtedly provided the chapels with a clear focus for coordinating their approach to negotiations. The potential for taking this leading role was almost certainly helped by the fact that direct input technology, although supplied by different manufacturers, has basically the same impact on the restructuring of work on the editorial floor - an issue closely examined in the next chapter.

Managements can also claim success over the change

process since they have introduced a less labour intensive, more flexible production process with the cooperation of their workforces, even though hard bargaining took place at many of the centres. Savings on costs in the short and medium term are likely to compensate for the extra money awarded in technology pay, although investment in alterations in the working environment may have been excluded from the original budget, and in some cases managements may choose not to comply with these extra costly changes - a theme pursued in later chapters.

The level of technology pay allows both the NUJ and management to claim success. It is unlikely that managements thought they could introduce direct input without payment of some sort to journalists, so their objective seems to have been to keep payment to a minimum. Equally the NUJ can hardly claim that any payment, no matter how meagre, is a success because their real objectives were to secure high payments for all their members, including photographers. It might also be argued that even without the NUJ new technology payments would have been awarded. Daniel (1987) found that 'trade union representation did little to increase the chances that office workers had of increasing their earnings as a result of technological change' (1987; p250) whilst the above analysis of NUJ density showed it to have had no impact on the achievement of NTAs or the magnitude of the technology pay. However, the difference between the technology pay first offered by management and the settlements finally achieved through bargaining suggest that without the NUJ, technology payments would have been considerably lower.

The NUJ can be proud of its achievement in securing NTAs, but the analysis revealed considerable differences in the content of the NTAs, evident from the differing scores they were awarded when measured against the model agreement. Some of these differences were undoubtedly due to group influences, and the chapter revealed that group membership seems to have played a part in the attitude to joint negotiations, the range of issues negotiated in the NTAs, and the distribution of technology pay across the journalistic tasks. However, the NTAs and the technology payments do not seem to have been affected by strength of chapel membership, by frequency of publication (weekly or daily) or the date of negotiating the new technology.

Overall, the NUJ has enjoyed an increased role in bargaining and has met virtually all its objectives. In this sense its bargaining power seems to have been enhanced. However, this finding is not particularly surprising because the introduction of direct input involved a realignment of working practices, changes in the working environment and the learning of new skills. In short, if the NUJ had not been able to exert influence over this change in which its members are key actors, and whose cooperation was vital to management, then the NUJ could have been dismissed as an industrially impotent organisation. Thus, we need to look at the journalists' ability to retain their enhanced bargaining position and hold back the potentially encroaching frontier of control. To do so we turn to the three dimensions of the model developed for the analysis of workplace control: production control, workgroup consciousness and control actualisation.

CHAPTER FIVE

Production Control

This chapter deals with the first of the three dimensions that constitute the framework for analysis of workplace control: production control. It seeks to examine the extent to which technology has altered the journalists' influence over contingencies in the workplace, identified in the model as being of strategic significance for a workgroup in its influence over management planning and decision making.

The analysis is divided into two broad sections: the first deals with production issues and the second with the labour market. Within each section a number of hypotheses will be examined as indicators of the movement of the 'strategic' elements in the frontier of control. The analysis will assess the extent to which the journalists have greater potential influence over these strategic contingencies and whether the technology has been the sole contributing factor.

THE PRODUCTION PROCESS

Selection of New Technology

Selection of technology is traditionally the prerogative of management, thus an examination of the involvement of journalists in the process of selecting the direct input systems may indicate whether they have enhanced their influence over production capital. Two fundamental questions must be addressed: first, is 'selection' a control issue in the newspaper industry, and second, to

what extent did journalists seek involvement in the selection process?

Commentators such as Noble (1979), Wilkinson (1983), and Child (1985) have argued that in selecting technology, managers make 'political' decisions, and that the potential of new technology 'to increase managerial control' may be an important factor in the selection of a particular system. Thus, considerations of cost, efficiency and 'state of the art' technology are coupled with the extent to which the technology can be used to enhance managerial power. Labour process theorists following the Bravermanian line would go on to suggest that this manifests itself in the form of deskilling.

In the newspaper industry there is no evidence that control issues played a part in the selection stage. The 20-newspaper sample reveals a wide variety of direct input systems being used, see table 5.1, but masks the similarity of the systems: they all render the same type of jobs obsolete; they all intensify journalistic work in the same way; and they each require similar reskilling and upskilling. In short, the use of the system at each newspaper is substantively the same. However, the systems differ in cost, customisation potential, upgrading potential, speed, size, user friendliness and so forth, and these factors provided the basis for selection. Where enhanced control was a managerial consideration, it was debated at an earlier stage when the company was deciding whether or not to innovate, as has been discussed in previous chapters. The specific nature of direct input offers no real opportunity for managerial control to be

enhanced further at the selection stage by a 'strategic choice' of system. Given this situation, some managements did allow journalistic input into the selection process (discussed below) but of the newspapers surveyed, the final selection was solely a management decision.

Table 5.1: Direct input systems of the sample newspapers

Newspaper	System
Colchester	Norsk Data
Newcastle	Norsk Data
Peterborough	Norsk Data
Swindon	Norsk Data
Blackpool	Atex
Sheffield	Atex
Southampton	Atex
Bath	Hastec
Huddersfield	Hastec
Liverpool	Hastec
Bristol	Press Computer System
Cambridge	Press Computer System
Middlesbrough	Press Computer System
Bradford	GB Techniques - Mentor
Worcester	GB Techniques - Mentor
Brighton	Systems Integated International
Burton	Systems Integated International
York	Compiagraphic
Leeds	Composition Systems Incorporated
Basildon	GMR

Coupled to this is the second question of whether the journalists sought involvement in the selection process. The TUC advocated 'full trade union involvement from the earliest stage, in the process of adapting to new technology' (TUC, 1979). The NUJ, the first union to employ a full-time Technology Officer, produced booklets on technology for its membership, devised negotiating courses and guidelines for shop stewards, and established a detailed policy on how chapels should negotiate. But missing from the policy was a commitment for inclusion at the selection stage. The focus of the NUJ was on the introduction and implementation stages, and although this

has not been without its benefits (as chapter four has illustrated) the question of why involvement at the selection stage was not pursued needs to be considered. Commentators have suggested that a union's concentration on implementation of technology reflects its lack of confidence and experience in non-traditional negotiating areas - a result of the 'anti-intellectualism' of unions (Hull, 1978) or conversely, the 'anti-unionism' of the expert (Tipton, 1982).

The NUJ Technology Officer described the particular dilemma the Union faced:

The difficulty for the union is that it is not traditional to be involved in management functions such as choice and selection. It is hard for management to accept and also puts us in a difficult position because on the one hand we are saying to our members 'don't have anything to do with technology until you get a house agreement' and on the other hand we are saying 'get in and be part of the planning process'.

This uncertainty over the legitimacy of Union involvement is reflected at the steward level. A third of the F/MoCs interviewed considered 'selection' to be a management task, but all thought that there should have been some opportunity for journalist involvement in the assessment of direct input systems.

Exclusion from the final selection, however, did not preclude the chapels from involvement in research about the various systems available. The sample shows a varied picture of journalistic input ranging from non-involvement and non-interest to full-involvement (table 5.2).

Table 5.2: Journalist involvement in system research

<u>INVOLVEMENT</u>		
Research unit involving NUJ	Research unit with journalists	Consultation Committee
Bradford Huddersfield Colchester	Peterborough Sheffield	Bath Cambridge
<u>NON-INVOLVEMENT</u>		
NUJ chapel parallel research	NUJ chapel interested individual	NUJ chapel non-interest
Blackpool Bristol Leeds Newcastle Southampton	Basildon Liverpool Middlesbrough	Brighton Burton Swindon Worcester York

Most of the companies were unwilling to involve the NUJ. To have done so would have meant an extension of bargaining to capital investment - traditionally the prerogative of management - and would have given the Union greater access to company information such as accounts, financial plans, investment schemes, pay-back levels and profit margins.

An attempt to quantify the merits of the systems of involvement or non-involvement must be treated with caution, however it is possible to offer a comparative analysis using the score system developed in chapter four since this covered all clauses of the NTAs. Table 5.3 shows the mean achievement score for each of the six 'involvement' systems, and reveals that the type of involvement had very little impact on the overall NTA. This is to be expected since the NUJ head office took a key role in informing the F/MoCs about the technology and had a fulltime officer present during negotiations. Even when the

chapel were uninterested in the research stage, it was not detrimental to their NTA success.

Table 5.3: Type of involvement in system research

Type of 'involvement'	Score (%)
Consultation committee	77.5
Research unit with journalists'	74.5
NUJ Chapel parallel research	73.5
NUJ Chapel non-interest	71.6
Research unit involving NUJ	66.4
NUJ Chapel interested individual	59.9

The seeming lack of importance in involvement over research can largely be explained by the homogeneous usage of direct input technology: it has the same effect on production, irrespective of the system chosen, as outlined above. Research involvement was therefore less important for journalists than for workers in other industries, especially since most of the preliminary research had already been done by the NUJ head office. In short, being involved in research was not particularly educative for the chapel officers, and did not improve their bargaining position. In fact, it may have had the opposite effect: management may have been able to avoid bargaining over certain implementation issues **because** the chapel were involved in the research and were party to the selection. This may explain why table 5.3 suggests there was no advantage, in terms of the NTA, for research units with chapel representation.

The diversity of approach from company to company may have arisen from two sets of uncertainty: the uncertainty of individual chapels as to an appropriate role given the 'dilemma' of the NUJ policy, and the uncertainty of

managements whether or not to involve the journalists, and how to involve them. Thus, the managerial stance of unilateral selection of technology may have been influenced in some cases by journalistic input into the research. Equally, the educative process of involvement in research (either formally, or through parallel research) may have assisted the chapel in its later negotiations. So whilst selection remained in the hands of management, the process of selection encouraged the chapels into previously uncharted territory: assessment and appraisal of capital investment. This is particularly important when, as argued above, the nature of direct input technology renders the 'selection decision' of less control significance than in other industries.

Summary

The direct input systems, although diverse in their cost, customisation, and size, all change the newspaper editorial process in the same way, therefore the particular type of system selected offers managers no extra control advantages. Any such advantages are achieved at the earlier stage of deciding whether or not to introduce technology - a stage from which the NUJ were totally excluded. Management could therefore take a flexible approach to involving the NUJ in selection, and this is reflected in the varying degrees of involvement in the sample. Generally the NUJ was less concerned with selection than with implementation and there seemed to be no particular advantage in the chapel being involved at the selection stage. When an NUJ Chapel was involved, it participated in

the research of the system; the final decision was left entirely to management.

Working Environment and Working Practices

Technology in the office inevitably means a transformation of the working environment and associated changes in working practices, so the ability of a workgroup to exert influence over these factors would give some indication as to the power relationship between managers (change initiators) and workers (change respondents). For journalists, direct input provided an opportunity to influence the design of the office and workstations; to improve health and safety provision; and to limit the negative or unknown effects of the changes in working practices associated with the operation of the direct input system. If journalists have achieved these potential objectives then it is possible to conclude that as a workgroup they have enhanced, or at least maintained, their control position as respondents.

Control of the working environment was approached by the NUJ through the development of ergonomic clauses in the NTA. The Union had at their disposal survey material from research in the United States, Australia and Europe, where direct input systems had been in operation for some time. They also had a qualified ergonomist working full-time for the Union, so perhaps not surprisingly they felt confident about bargaining over these issues. From the data collected in the 76-newspaper analysis, 70 NTAs had virtually full provision as specified by the NUJ, with the remaining six newspapers incorporating a consultation clause establishing

a working group to devise the ergonomic guidelines. There is however a gulf between what has been agreed to and what is practised. All of the chapel officers interviewed in the 20-newspaper sample expressed dissatisfaction over at least one aspect of the ergonomic provision; seven chapels had presented formal complaints to management, two had brought in the union ergonomist and submitted a report to management, and one chapel was on the verge of a dispute.

Although ergonomic provision has generally been accepted by management, enforcement depends on union pressure at chapel level. The problem is typified by this comment from a chapel technology officer:

We don't have much power over these sorts of issues because there is difficulty convincing a chapel that ergonomics are worth fighting for.

The NUJ has therefore achieved the procedures for control of the working environment (the negotiated NTA) but not, in many cases, the practice. This argument will occur repeatedly in the subsequent analysis, and its root causes will be examined when looking at the internal organisation and discipline of the NUJ in chapter seven.

An alternative explanation is that managements did not anticipate the level of technology pay they would be obliged to pay out, and that in order to stay within budget limits, they diverted some of the money originally allocated to the working environment into the technology pay. This, however, has to remain pure speculation since only individual managements can confirm this and are unlikely to do so because it would demonstrate that the unions out-bargained them.

Linked directly to ergonomics are the health and safety

objectives, sought by the NUJ in order to exert some control over the changes in working practices. The Union argued that even if the ergonomic clauses were complied with, there were three further potential problem areas for journalists: visual adaptation, job security, and stress and ill-health.

Eye sight problems are thought to be caused by a VDU operator working at different focal lengths under changing light conditions. The NUJ wanted the newspaper companies to pay for eye-tests and, if needed, either the NHS cost of a pair of glasses, or the cost of a change of prescription. They were arguing that journalists should not be out of pocket as a result of the changing working practices, and should not be tempted to 'manage as before' rather than paying for eye-tests and spectacles. All 76 of the NTAs surveyed contain clauses conforming with the NUJ's wishes, and at all 20 newspapers several journalists have either had their spectacle prescriptions changed, or have had to start wearing glasses for VDU work. The VDU might not be the cause of eyesight problems - it may merely have highlighted to journalists an already existing eye problem - but even so, it does not detract from the fact that the NUJ has achieved the limitation of one set of 'negative effects' of direct input.

The job security issues concerned the right not to work on screen, but to perform a comparable task of equal status and responsibility, with the same pay, if journalists found themselves unable to use the technology for health reasons - for example, epilepsy or migraine. In addition to people with this 'permanent' health condition, the NUJ wanted

similar rights for women who believed themselves to be pregnant and were worried about the non-ionising radiation affecting the foetus. The objections raised by management have been examined in chapter four and show that in general, management felt that 'who does what, and where' is not a decision over which the Union should have influence. Their resistance undoubtedly was intensified by experiences with the closed shop NGA in the 70s when the steward would organise the overtime, time-off, sick leave and in many cases recruitment of replacements. Allowing the NUJ to claim right of transfer for individuals was of course far removed from the influence once exerted by the NGA, but did represent the same principle: that control over the placement of staff and the design of the job was a legitimate part of union activity. This was a principle the managements wanted to abandon.

The strong managerial opposition to these issues is evident from the sample interviews: there were more objections and hard bargaining over this 'control principle' clause than over any of the ergonomic health and safety clauses. The latter were concerned with influencing control over the working environment whereas the former sought to influence control over production - far more important for union power. This theme can be seen repeated with reference to the 'screen-breaks' clause, detailed below.

In looking at the third area of potential problems, ill-health and stress, the NUJ were concerned with preventative measures. They wanted provision in the agreement to limit the possible 'unquantifiable' danger to

the individual that changing working practices could bring about. Relying on scientific and survey data, they highlighted five potential hazards: eye-strain and visual fatigue; repetitive strain injury (RSI) - a generic term for a variety of industrial injuries affecting the tendons and muscles of the wrist and arms; back-ache; headaches; and stress. The Union argued that even in an ideal working environment all these hazards could occur if journalists were obliged to work on-screen for long periods. The subs were considered to be particularly vulnerable because direct input meant they would spend virtually the whole of their working day staring into the VDU. The solution, advocated by the Union, was a statutory break from screen of ten minutes after every 75 minutes of continuous screen work.

The screen-break principle was one that most managements disagreed with. Their objections lay not with the health and safety argument, but with the potential disruption to the production flow that such breaks might cause. They claimed that 'natural breaks' occur in journalistic work, and that statutory breaks were unnecessary. The NUJ, on the other hand, suggested that 'natural breaks' were less likely to occur under direct input since more functions could be performed at the desk, physical movements at the workstation were more restricted, and journalists would be far more isolated and less able to take breaks to chat to colleagues. The screen break issue involved hard bargaining at virtually all the newspapers, perhaps because statutory breaks were reminiscent of the tools-down tea-break of the NGA workers; a disruption to

production that management were keen to watch disappear with the demise of the printworkers. Consequently, the various NTAs have a wide range of screen-break clauses - from the full ten minutes after 75 minutes of continuous work, to ten minutes after three hours work. In some cases no statutory breaks are established; in other cases the clauses insist that breaks do not occur at deadline time, which, for multi-edition newspapers, renders the screen-break provision virtually ineffective.

A further problem, and for the NUJ a much deeper one, is that even where there is provision for screen-breaks, journalists are not exercising their right to take them. It poses two threats to the Union: first, managements may claim, on a custom and practice argument, that the breaks are unnecessary since they are not taken, and second, journalists may be held responsible for causing their own health problems by not observing the breaks. In the 20-newspaper sample, all the F/MoCs said that breaks were not observed. A selection of comments illustrates this:

Early on we did get all the news subs to take breaks at the same time in the morning and all go down to the canteen, but this dwindled, and now one person goes down, buys all the coffees and brings them back.

Most people just ignore screen breaks - especially the subs because it is unrealistic for them to work an hour and break for ten minutes when approaching deadlines.

There is no pressure from management for us not to take screen breaks - if they are not taken it is because journalists forget, or don't bother and the chapel officers don't remind them.

The problem is implementing screen breaks. People won't take them, which is crazy because if we don't take what we can get from the agreement, management aren't going to keep to it either.

People don't take screen breaks because working practices are dictated by the culture of the office, not the NTA.

Some people actually boast about how long they've spent on screen. You can keep telling them but they take no notice, and then they'll moan about aches and pains.

Not taking screen breaks stems from a professional attitude. You realise as a sub that there are times that taking a break would delay the newspaper, so you keep going. The problem is really understaffing.

This last comment highlights an issue relevant to a number of newspapers in the sample: that screen breaks are ineffective for subs because of a staff shortage in the subbing area. If chapels pushed for increases in the number of subs because of direct input, the necessity to stay on screen might disappear. In fact some chapels have fought for, and some managements have accepted, an expansion of the subbing departments - usually one or two extra subs. This suggests that the subbing department is increasing its importance in the production process; an issue that will be examined below.

There also seems to be a disagreement over the practical purpose of screen breaks. Some stewards argued that screen breaks could be used as a new form of industrial action:

Subs tend to take their screen breaks fairly religiously, principally because they have a number of grievances with the company, and taking breaks is a means of drawing their protest to the company's attention.

The issue of screen breaks came up during the pay negotiations. Some people suggested that they could be used as a form of disruptive action - a work to rule.

Other stewards vehemently disagreed:

It's wrong to pretend that screen breaks could be a sanction. Those who claim that are just making excuses for not taking breaks. You should be taking them, and you should be seen to be taking them.

Subs are not taking screen breaks. Some of them saw breaks as an industrial sanction, but I have argued that screen breaks are not a sanction but a right.

The Union's policy is that screen breaks should never be used as an industrial sanction because to do so would deny the legitimacy of the breaks as part of the normal working arrangements. The Union must therefore ensure that screen breaks are taken regularly, but this involves policing members to get their compliance. The dilemma is illustrated by the Chair of the NUJ Technology Committee.

We are publishing posters and stickers reminding people about the importance of screen breaks. If people just won't take breaks, I don't know what you can do.

Summary

The NUJ were more successful in influencing the working environment than in influencing the new working practices. This seems likely to stem from the higher value that managements put on control over working practices, since these represent control over the production process. The willingness of managements to yield over the environmental clauses may have been a bargaining tactic allowing them to take a harder line on the working practice issues, or to speed up the negotiations. Whether or not managements had any real intention of conforming with the working environment clauses they agreed to, is less important to the NUJ than the control implications. The Union has succeeded in establishing the principle of influence over the working environment, but has had less success in operationalising it. The NUJ has forced managements to accept the Union's environmental arrangements in contractual form, but has had only limited success in ensuring that managements comply with such arrangements.

Pervasiveness and Immediacy

Crucial to an analysis of a workgroup's influence over production are the issues of pervasiveness and immediacy: the extent of influence over the production process, the ability to halt or disrupt production, and the speed with which disruption occurs. Theoretically, a highly pervasive workgroup, with rapid immediacy potential, has greater influence than a segmented, compartmentalised workgroup, time-isolated from the production workflow. For the analysis of journalists, the question is whether direct input has brought about changes in the functional relationship of editorial workers to the production process: how has editorial production changed, and to what extent are journalists more or less able to influence the production workflow?

The central change brought about by direct input is polyvalence, or 'functional flexibility' as the flexible firm theorists prefer to call it. Work previously performed by printers is now done by journalists in the editorial room. However, the term 'polyvalent journalist' would be a misnomer because what has occurred is the acquisition of extra tasks (and skills) by journalists depending on their function in the editorial process. The least polyvalent are the photographers for whom the technology has meant, at most, writing captions on screen and accessing an on-screen diary. In the overwhelming majority of newspapers in the sample, photographers do not even touch the system, although they may be affected by changes in working practices associated with direct input. The potential exists for flexible photographers, and two newspaper

managements in the sample had made tentative suggestions to the NUJ chapel about the possibility of reporters carrying automatic cameras for simple head-and-shoulder type shots, but were sharply rebuffed. More recently, a new daily provincial newspaper in Chester introduced photo-journalists, although it has since retreated from the idea, acknowledging that different skills and different temperaments are required for the two tasks (UKPG May 8 1989).

One NUJ chapel's NTA obliges photographers to test and assess new photographic techniques and equipment, and this may be significant for the future as electronic filmless cameras are used increasingly. An editor from one of the sample newspapers envisaged a new type of photographer in the near future:

[Filmless cameras will mean] some of the art of photography will be transferred to the picture editor who will freeze frame, crop, highlight and whatever, on screen. The photographer will be simply pointing the camera...so we may expect the photographer to have other skills. It may be that photographic trainees would be encouraged to take on other skills.

This is significant since the company in question, like the Chester example above, both belong to groups that have opted out of the industry-wide training scheme which does not provide for a cross-over of photographic and writing skills.

Second on the ascending scale of 'flexibility' are the reporters. They use word processors instead of typewriters and are expected to proof read and correct their own material, thus 'clean copy' is sent via the system to the newsdesk. The extent to which this can be described as 'flexible working' is questionable. The reporters have been

flexible in the change to new work forms, and the new working practices associated with them, but on a day-to-day basis the majority of their work - news gathering - has not changed. The same is true of specialist reporters, for example municipal correspondents, and court reporters.

Sport and feature writers, the third group of editorial workers, spend a greater proportion of their time in the office, working on the screen, and in many instances do their own subbing. In most newspapers they form separate, small, self-sufficient departments and therefore are likely to contain people with a greater variety of editorial skills. This has been the traditional way of working and is unaffected by technology except that the multi-skills are now technology orientated.

The news desk is the fourth distinct editorial work area. It is here that copy-tasting, task allocation and news coordination takes place. The monitoring of incoming copy from reporters, PA, correspondents, freelancers, press officers, publicity departments and other sources means that a mixture of on-screen and hard copy material has to be handled. Flexibility has meant adapting to the new editorial process whilst retaining many of the traditional practices for handling non in-house originated copy.

Finally, the sub editors can be characterised as the most polyvalent of all journalists. They have had to adapt to subbing on screen, and incorporate tasks that were previously performed by printers. So, instead of reading hard copy and adding layout instructions for compositors to set, subs have to input coding instructions into the stories on screen. They write headlines and cross-heads on

screen, adding typeface, size and setting, and may do multi-legging, boxes, ruled edges and so forth which were formerly the tasks of NGA compositors. Subbing has intensified because there are more tasks for the sub to perform in completing a page; subs are in effect also working as pseudo-compositors.

The discrimination between different groups of editorial workers is important in addressing the question of pervasiveness. The subs undoubtedly have more influence since they have greater control over a larger amount of the pre-paste-up process. Before direct input was introduced, the time from hard copy leaving the subbing room to it reaching the photocomposing machine was out of the subs' hands since it depended on the second keying of the copy, the addition of typesetting instructions, the first printout, reading, correction and the re-inputting of corrected copy. Under direct input, the copy arrives at the photocomposition machine the moment the sub downloads it from his or her terminal.

Interestingly, technology seems also to have increased the subs' pervasiveness **within the editorial process**. This has occurred in two ways. First, many newspapers have shifted the reporters' deadline - not by pushing it backwards, but by bringing it forwards. The F/MoCs argue that this demonstrates that the subbing process has been greatly extended, and more time is required to handle the copy. They argue that earlier deadlines may reduce the quality and thoroughness of the news that makes the first edition. Management argue that under any system there has to be a balance struck between the 'quality' of early news

and the printing of the newspaper, thus one Editor said:

We can use the technology to bring the newspaper out an hour earlier. An evening newspaper has a shelf-life of about two and a half hours, so if you can extend that, you have a greater selling opportunity. We could absorb that hour by incorporating later news - but we have to strike a compromise. If readers would wait until 9 o'clock at night I could produce a far better newspaper. We have an edition system, so we are getting later news into the paper throughout the day, and are more able to change pages at short notice. Our direct input gives greater flexibility and puts greater control over input into the hands of editorial people.

The issue of editioning is the second way subs have increased their pervasiveness. An edition 'to get the newspaper on the streets earlier' is largely, as one steward put it, "a way of getting the lunchtime house hunters to buy two copies of the paper". It also increases 'small ad' space and situations vacant - two valuable sources of income for a newspaper. An earlier edition means earlier deadlines, again led by the time required for the extended subbing process. Likewise, regional editioning (as opposed to time editions) means newsdesk may have to re-prioritise its copy schedule according to the subs' requirements.

The increased importance of the subbing processes in the production of the newspaper was cited by all the stewards interviewed - irrespective of their own role in the editorial room. They all envisaged a further expansion of this in the near future as page make-up on screen replaces paste-up.

Further editioning might also intensify the work of the reporters and photographers. An expansion of the number of pages to fill will necessitate the writing of more copy, whilst the extension of the geographical area of coverage

might mean some reporters have to transfer to district offices, or increase their 'patch'. For example, at one newspaper in the sample, two new district offices were opened and three reporters were transferred from the city centre head office. Of these three journalists one was a volunteer, another was obliged to transfer as part of his training, and the third was told that his job had moved, so he would have to follow it, or leave the company.

Immediacy, the second control issue, has always been an important contingency in newspaper production. One newspaper manager explained:

Time is our most valuable commodity. A lost half hour upsets the whole production process and has the potential to stop us getting the paper out on time.

In fact he was justifying why it would be impossible for me to interview all of the subs, however it does illustrate an acknowledgement that a 'tools down' by subs has the potential to create a severe problem. This is particularly important since a newspaper is a highly perishable product. Industrial action of the NGA has traditionally halted production, whereas action by the NUJ has rarely had the same effect, but under direct input this might change. The crucial timing of the subbing process, coupled with the new task-specific skills of the subs, has increased their immediacy, and by implication, their disruptive potential.

Summary

It is possible to argue that, in theory, subs have become the crucial workgroup. They have acquired skills to perform more tasks, the subbing process has been extended and has a greater influence over the post-subbing and pre-subbing

stages of production, and the relationship of the subbing department to the final product has become time-critical. If pervasiveness and immediacy are vital contingencies in the control of the production process, logically, under direct input, subs are the workgroup potentially most able to influence production, and more able to do so than under the traditional production process.

This, coupled with the other production issues, raises a multitude of questions about the changing role of subs which will be addressed in the conclusion of this chapter. It is important first of all to examine the second aspect of strategic control: the labour market.

LABOUR MARKET

Entry to the Workgroup

A key contingency over which the workgroup can seek to gain influence is access to work. Traditionally strong unions have sought control of the internal and external labour market through the pre-entry closed shop, apprenticeship, overtime arranged by the shop steward and clear disciplinary and dismissal procedures; nowhere more prevalent than in the Fleet Street NGA chapels (Martin, 1981). The introduction of direct input technology during the 1980s has transferred skills, made certain tasks redundant and reduced the workforce, obligating the NGA to retreat from its position of union 'completeness' (Gennard & Dunn, 1983). Coupled to this the confrontations at the Stockport Messenger and News International at Wapping have demoralised NGA members and the union has accepted that its

future presence in provincial newspapers will be minimal, if not non-existent. This raises the question of whether the NUJ chapels can take over from the NGA in exerting influence over the labour market, given the greater dependency on the journalists brought about by the new technology.

The NUJ has a policy of seeking a post-entry closed shop. The policy handbook states:

Our ultimate goal is for all working journalists to be members of the NUJ. All chapels are, therefore, encouraged to operate a post-entry closed shop.

In the light of the 1988 Employment Act, this policy is somewhat redundant since the union would be unable to take any action to force employers to comply with the policy (Mackie, 1988). Only one newspaper in the sample had, in the FoC's words, "an unofficial closed shop" with the management informing new employees that the NUJ was the appropriate union to join. This was confirmed by management:

We do not interfere with union organisation - it is up to the journalists. Obviously when new employees arrive they will be influenced by journalists. As yet we have not had an employee who has expressed a wish not to join the NUJ, so the 'unofficial closed shop' has developed through custom and practice.

The other chapels had varying degrees of membership, from 42% at worst to 97% at best. Mean average membership for the sample was 75.5% of journalistic staff, compared with the national average for provincial dailies of 74.4% (NUJ, Nov.1987).

None of the F/MoCs interviewed considered the chapel to have any influence over the company's recruitment of journalists, although some suggested that where heads of

department are involved in selection, if they are NUJ members, the union has 'informal' influence. Some stewards suggested that the most important factor was personal influence, and that 'suggestions', with regard to poaching journalists, was the appropriate way for F/MoCs to influence recruitment of new employees. Given this 'informal' structure, the extent of NUJ influence depends on the unionateness of the chapel concerned, and contrasts sharply with the NGA's once tight control over entry to the workplace.

The NUJ has never been able to exert as much influence as the NGA over the training of new entrants to the newspaper. The craft apprentice structure of the NGA, is echoed by the indenture structure of the NUJ, but this has largely developed as a pay and conditions agreement with the employers. Training is not organised by the NUJ, nor is it uniform across the industry. At best it will constitute a full-time block release course at a training college approved by the National Council for the Training of Journalists (NCTJ), examinations, on-the-job instruction with senior journalists, and a proficiency test after two years. At worst it will be non-existent. Some companies run their own training courses, with their own examinations, allowing the NUJ no input; other companies take on people who have completed a pre-entry journalism course, thereby avoiding paying for training. The only real consistency throughout the industry is the acceptance of the Proficiency Test as a professional journalism qualification - but it is not like a union card in a closed shop; you do not need the proficiency certificate to get a job in

journalism.

This loose training structure suggests that the NUJ chapels have little influence over maintaining the consistency of work standards. The NGA, proud of their roots in the labour aristocracy, maintained their craft standards and the control of labour flow, through the self-regulating apprenticeship system, but the 'professional standards' of journalism are controlled by the employers through their training provision and recruitment policy.

The demise of the printers has led to the breakdown of their control over entry. One FoC explained:

Many compositors took the redundancy on offer, and the company has replaced them with school leavers in the interim before going over to page make-up on screen in a couple of years. They [the school leavers] don't know what they're doing. They are doing the jobs of people who went through long apprenticeships to get the skills. Paste-up is becoming a joke - it's deskilled and deunionised.

It is difficult to foresee the development of an NUJ controlled entry and training structure, since in some newspapers NUJ members already work alongside unsupervised, unqualified juniors who are performing the same jobs as fully trained senior journalists, but for 60% of the basic pay.

The generally weak influence over the internal labour market is further reflected in staffing levels. A constant complaint from the F/MoCs was that the newspapers were understaffed, and that managements had not been diligent in replacing people as they left. However, direct input had created greater pressure in the subbing area, and most of the newspapers took on one or two extra subs as a result of direct input. The F/MoCs claimed that these extra subs

should not be seen as staff increases, but were, in most cases bringing the subbing department up to its previous staffing levels. A further effect in several newspapers, subsequent to the expansion of editions, has been an increased number of reporters - associated with the opening, or re-opening of a district office. Again the stewards argue that these increases are a re-establishment of former staffing levels rather than an overall increase.

Chapels have been unsuccessful in bargaining for staff increases, although the technology has put pressure on managements to re-establish former staffing levels. This suggests that direct input technology has important implications for the editorial labour market. It has the potential to increase the demand for labour in two ways: first by intensifying the subbing process meaning more subs are needed to produce the same number of pages; and second through the potential expansion from editorialising, creating a need for more copy to be generated by reporters. These editorial staff 'gains' however can be more than offset by the printing staff losses, and at each of the sample companies, there has been a net loss of labour, meaning the production process is far more capital intensive under direct input.

The Chair of the NUJ technology committee argues that the industry is seeing the beginning of a labour supply shortage in the subbing area, which is likely to push subbing wages upwards, and will enhance any NUJ chapel's bargaining position where technology has been introduced:

I am convinced that we have a subbing skill shortage in provincial newspapers. Firstly because you need more subs to produce the paper, secondly because there are fewer subs available for management to draw from than before, unless

they train them, and thirdly because the job is more difficult and tedious, so fewer people are interested in subbing. I am convinced we have something like a 10-20% shortage nationally - you only have to look at the number of subbing jobs being advertised.

This skills shortage has also been noted by managers, for example the Editor of the Northern Echo, Alan Prosser, recently wrote:

The consequences of the shrinking labour market are interesting, to say the least, for provincial newspapers. That stream of bright-eyed and bushy-tailed young people endlessly passing through is no longer guaranteed. Newspapers will have to compete for human resources on a scale hitherto unimagined... The best journalists... will be more discerning about the companies they work for. They will expect, and be able to demand, more for their skills, and for the results they achieve. (UKPG Dec. 1988.)

Whilst the imminent skills shortage appears to be an area of agreement between the NUJ and managers, the two groups differ considerably in their solutions to the problem. The NUJ sees it as an opportunity to bargain for higher basic pay, whilst managers such as Prosser, suggest individual pay bargaining and merit payments made according to expertise is the way forward. Some companies are already taking the unprecedented move of training raw recruits on company-specific courses, as opposed to upskilling reporters (UKPG May 15 1989).

The possibility of a skills shortage raises important issues in assessing the NUJ chapels' bargaining power. Highly skilled workgroups, such as subs, might recognise their strong collective bargaining power and negotiate within the NUJ structure. The bargaining power of the chapels would therefore be enhanced. Alternatively, journalists with skills that are in demand might pull away from collective bargaining in favour of individual pay

increases being offered by management. This could eliminate chapel bargaining altogether, by seriously undermining one of the central functions of the NUJ, and weakening its strength in terms of editorial density, and membership in key production areas.

It would seem that an increasing differential between pay levels of subs and those of other journalists is almost inevitable. This command of higher wages could transform the subs into an élite within the editorial process, especially when linked to their greater control over the production process - an issue that will be further explored in later chapters.

Summary

The NUJ has influenced, but has not controlled, entry to the labour market. Its lack of a closed shop, and a diverse and loose training structure means entry to journalism is dominated by the employers. Staffing levels have been depleted, but changes in technology are highlighting the greater demand for editorial labour, especially in the subbing area. The impending skills shortage might enhance the bargaining position for the NUJ in general, and the sub-editors in particular, or might encourage individual pay bargaining.

Substitutability and Training

The issue of substitutability is a crucial factor in examining the labour market influence of a workgroup because it indicates the level of dependency that an industry has on a particular workforce. The less

substitutable the workforce, the more dependent the industry is upon them, and the greater their potential influence, especially if alternative employment is available. This section will examine substitutability with reference to enterprise specific skill training, whilst the next section will analyse it in the light of the flexibility debate.

Substitution depends on two factors - the availability of labour, and the training requirement. In an economic environment of high unemployment, labour availability is no problem - especially if recruitment is not subject to restrictions from the existing workforce. Training, however presents more of a problem, and it is acknowledged by employers that journalism requires competence necessitating a level of education that precludes a percentage of available labour. This is reflected in the fact that journalism has always been able to attract graduates.

Given this training restriction, substitution depends upon the availability of ready-trained labour. This raises two questions: are there more unemployed trained journalists because of technology? Does direct input make journalists any more or less substitutable?

There is no evidence to suggest that direct input has decreased the number of journalists employed - in fact, evidence from the sample seems to suggest that it has provided more journalistic jobs. The previous section argued that instead of employers reducing the editorial staff through non-replacement, they have replenished the numbers through greater demand due to the new production process and the labour savings in the printing departments.

However, it is possible to argue that the early stages of new technology (web-offset and photocomposition) were responsible for editorial job losses since the lower barriers to entry into newspaper production opened up the market to free newspapers with tiny editorial staffs, and that they forced the closure or stripping down of paid-for newspapers (see chapter one).

Direct input is likely to restore the balance in favour of paid-for newspapers because of the huge labour savings in production costs. For free newspapers, which are substantially less dependent on editorial, the introduction of direct input editorial may not be cost effective, thus paid-for newspaper groups may buy up or buy out free newspapers in increasing numbers as they will be able to take advantage of their existing direct input system. Another development may be the increasing use of desktop publishing by free newspapers. If any of these scenarios develop there is nothing to suggest a substantial decrease in the employment opportunities for journalists as a result of direct input.

In addressing the question of whether direct input makes journalists more or less substitutable, it is necessary to look at the specific training needed to operate the technology. Earlier in this chapter an editorial upskilling scale was suggested. It was constructed, in ascending order as follows: photographers, reporters, sport and features, newsdesk, and sub-editors. It was argued that upskilling was directly linked to flexibility because each new skill involved taking over an aspect of production work previously performed by print

workers. This scale may also be viewed as one of increasing complexity of work, which is inversely proportional to substitutability. The employers are therefore least able to substitute the subs and most able to substitute the photographers. However, the fundamental question is, has this substitutable potential been affected by the introduction of direct input?

If complexity has increased, then one might answer in the affirmative, but this is dependent upon the extent to which a sub-editor can be substituted either from the internal workforce (especially from reporters) or from the external workforce (for example, another newspaper). Transferring a reporter, would mean training him or her not only to perform a very different type of job - subbing uses considerably different skills to reporting - but would also involve extensive technology training. In the sample, training for subbing ranged from an afternoon to a week, and all of the F/MoCs expressed concern that not enough training was given to subs. Reporters, on the other hand were given on average two hours, and in contrast the F/MoCs considered this to be sufficient. So the subs are not easily substitutable from the internal workforce.

Substitution from the external workforce poses similar problems. The least problematic group would be trained subs (either unemployed or from other newspapers) who are familiar with on-screen subbing. The question then becomes, to what extent is direct input technology enterprise-specific? At the beginning of the chapter it was argued that the systems perform largely the same functions, and transform the production process in similar ways.

However, the operation of individual terminals can differ considerably, depending on the manufacturer, therefore a sub familiarising himself or herself with a new system, may take as long to adapt as a sub using direct input for the first time. And the adaptation time itself will be, very much an unknown quantity contingent on uncontrollable variables such as the individual's attitude, learning capabilities, and technological orientation, coupled with the training provision provided by the company, which judging by the sample evidence, management seem to under-provide.

At the present, substitution in subs seems to necessitate greater training provision than under the old editorial system. This may be the result of an adjustment period, and might change when direct input is in operation at all provincial newspapers - although the restriction on easy substitution may repeat itself when newspapers transfer to page make-up at different speeds, and as seem likely, to differing extents. Therefore, the enterprise-specific training of new technology limits further an employer's ability to substitute a sub, and increases the enterprise's dependency on the existing subs. The other side of this argument, however, is that low substitutability associated with enterprise specific technology training also ties the sub to the enterprise, making it less easy for him or her to get a job elsewhere. Whereas, in the case of other editorial workers, their lower enterprise specific training requirement, in terms of technology, allows them greater mobility.

Low substitutability associated with enterprise

specific training creates a mutual dependence between employer and employee that, paradoxically, both enhances and restricts the influence of either side, thus solidifying **existing** power relationships. However, Marxist critics might argue that since capital is always more mobile than labour, increased interdependence reduces the power of the workforce in general. Whichever interpretation is favoured, evidence from chapter four suggests that the NUJ secured notable gains for its members in the bargaining over the introduction of technology, and so in the short term at least, it can be suggested that the subs' influence is petrifying, rather than crumbling.

Summary

Journalists enjoy low substitutability due to the nature of the job and the training requirement. New technology is likely to lower substitutability further by upskilling jobs and creating more job opportunities. Upskilling will differ according to the journalistic task, and subs are likely to become the least easily substituted under direct input. However, enterprise specific technology and training will have the effect of reducing a worker's mobility in the labour market - the employer and employee will become tied together more closely.

Flexible Workers

As has been highlighted in chapter one, the flexible firm model (Atkinson & Meager, 1986; Atkinson & Gregory, 1986) is as inappropriate for newspapers as it is for other industries (Pollert, 1987; MacInnes, 1988) but flexibility

does merit discussion. Two questions must be addressed: what forms of flexibility are possible in the provincial newspaper industry? How might flexibility affect control issues, particularly the substitutability of journalists?

The flexible firm theorists suggest two types of flexibility - functional and numerical. These definitions are also used by ACAS (1987). For the purpose of this analysis, these functional and numerical definitions will be used, and some consideration will be given to the distancing of workers.

Functional Flexibility

Functional flexibility - the development of multi-skilled workers capable of performing a variety of production tasks - is applicable to journalists in the sense that tasks formerly performed by printers are now being done by journalists, in the editorial room. But flexibility has largely been one-sided because the 'opportunity' of acquiring new skills was offered to journalists, was not extended to printers. Functional flexibility, in the sense of multi-skilling, has not taken the same form as, for example, the flexibility of the once highly demarcated craftworkers in the oil industry (Cross, 1985; Young, 1986). Printers largely have been excluded from 'flexibility' because there have been only modest transfer opportunities. Table 5.4 gives a breakdown of the extent of transfer; the newspapers are numbered to preserve the anonymity of the F/MoCs.

Multi-skilling has broken down demarcation, by upskilling journalists and making printers redundant.

Table 5.4: Transfer of NGA printers to editorial

Newspaper	Potential Transferees	Actual Transferees	Method of Selection	F/MoCs comments (paraphrased)
1	3	0	Negotiated	No one applied
2	unspecified	1	Eds.decision	Chapel didn't consider it important, NUJ head office was annoyed with Chapel.
3	2	2	Eds.decision	Transferees have not been given the agreed proper training.
4	unspecified	0	Eds.decision	No one allowed to transfer.
5	6	0	Eds.decision	No one has applied.
6	unspecified	1	Eds.decision	NGA people preferred to take redundancy.
7	4	1	Test set by training centre	Only one person passed the test.
8	unspecified	2	Eds.decision	Several others transferred but gave up.
9	4	1	Aptitude test set by Editor	Only one person passed - the Ed. originally only wanted one transferee.
10	0	0	---	Management would not negotiate this.
11	unspecified	2	Eds.decision	Both are now non-trade unionists.
12	unspecified	0	Eds.decision	NGA people are considered for vacancies but are competing with trained journalists.
13	unspecified	2	Eds.decision	Both had to wait 12 months before a decision on their transfer was made.
14	8	4	Agreed procedure	Management have asked for more applicants.
15	unspecified	2	Eds.decision	Chapel is worried about inadequate training
16	0	0	---	Not an issue.
17	unspecified	1	Eds.decision	Others have been turned down despite the editorial room being understaffed.
18	6	4	Eds.decision	Poor quality applicants, but management originally only wanted 4 transferees.
19	unspecified	0	Eds.decision	Ed. said applicants were not up to standard
20	unspecified	4	Eds.decision	No complaints. NCTJ full training. Others are currently being considered.

However, employers have made very little attempt to break down the compartmentalisation of tasks within the editorial room. It would, for example, be impossible to suggest that direct input has led to the 'flexible journalist', the way Cross (1985) describes the flexible craftworker. A flexible journalist would be a person who could be moved around the office according to demand, thus his or her week might be spent reporting, working on newsdesk, down-table subbing, feature writing, and so forth. This would necessitate two developments - multi-skill training and comprehensive technology training, and an acceptance of the flexibility principle by the journalists.

From the sample, two newspaper managements tried to introduce an element of editorial flexibility. The first suggested that there should be reporter-subs who would transfer to the subbing table at the behest of the editor, with a minimum of 24 hours notice. The management tied this to the 1988 pay round, arguing that any pay increase was dependent on the acceptance of this flexibility principle. The chapel argued that the need for flexibility really reflected a shortage of people in the subbing department, and after considerable negotiation, the management not only dropped the flexibility issue but also agreed to employ two more full-time subs.

At the second newspaper, the management were far more successful, and the weak minority NUJ raised no formal objections. The FoC explained:

We have one journalist who is called over from the newsdesk to the subbing desk at the request of the Chief Sub. She stays on the same pay as she would get in the newsroom, yet is seconded to do a higher paid job. She is a union member but the chapel is weak and apathetic.

The stewards in the sample were not opposed to the principle of editorial flexibility, and argued that it already existed in the features department and sports - where reporting, subbing and layout were not always demarcated tasks. They objected to flexibility being a way of getting 'cheap sub-editors'. One FoC commented:

We don't want a situation where a reporter has been transferred to work in the subbing area, but is not getting a sub's level of pay [the very situation at the above newspaper, of which he was unaware]. If we have reporter-subs, then we must negotiate a new minimum rate of pay appropriate for a journalist with those skills.

This lack of internal flexibility therefore minimises substitutability from within the existing workforce, whilst, as the previous section has shown, the technology training limits substitution from the external labour market, depending on the particular job of the editorial worker. So functional flexibility has not increased the substitutability of the journalists. They remain core workers and are perhaps more compartmentalised by the technology - they are certainly no less compartmentalised by direct input.

Numerical Flexibility

Numerical flexibility constitutes an attempt by the employer to adjust the size of the workforce to match the changing pattern of demand. This can be achieved either through the use of part-time and temporary employment contracts, or by replacing the employment contract with a commercial contract. This numerical flexibility can therefore be used irrespective of the substitutability of the worker, and could be adopted for core workers

(especially in the absence of functional flexibility) because it reflects changes in demand for the labour, not the quality or type of labour itself. Workers with low substitutability are however able to command a higher fee for their part-time or sub-contracted labour than highly substitutable workers. Thus, for example, an eye-surgeon working part-time, and a freelance management consultant brought in by Company X, are, in the numerically flexible sense, no different from the part-time hospital cleaner, or Company X's weekly window cleaner, although the former will command higher payment because they are in a smaller, more specialised labour supply market.

In newspapers the numerically flexible editorial workers are part-time journalists, and freelancers. The discussion above argued that journalists enjoy low substitutability - increasingly so with direct input technology - so it seems likely that newspaper managers would adopt this numerical flexibility as the most appropriate method, if they were concerned with increasing flexibility at work. The sample data, however, suggests that numerical flexibility has not increased in the editorial department.

Only one of the F/MoCs said that there had been an increase in part-timers following the introduction of new technology, whilst three of the F/MoCs remarked that there had been changes but these were due to requests from women to move to part-time work during pregnancy. Two of the newspapers employed no part-time journalists at all, and one newspaper introduced a job-share scheme at the request of the chapel.

In terms of freelance work, five F/MoCs said that more freelancers were being used following the introduction of direct input. This seems to have taken two forms: freelance sub-editors and freelance contributions. At three of the newspapers freelance subs were employed to cope with the increased demand in the subbing department. They were used particularly to cover for permanent subs who were on holiday or sick leave - but such cover, according to the F/MoCs, did not occur under the old editorial system, which further suggests the increased importance of subs. At the two other newspapers, the F/MoCs argued that the amount of contributed copy had increased. In one case the relatively weak chapel has made no approach to management in spite of freelance contributions coming from non-NUJ people. The FoC at the second newspaper is considering what action to take:

We have a lot of contributors to the paper who write sport and specialist columns, and during the technology talks we agreed on a fixed list of people who would be allowed to write copy on Tandy portables. In practice this has been horrendously abused. All sorts of people are being given these remote terminals - even school children contributing to a feature we have called Schools' Corner! We [the chapel] are deciding what to do about this.

To arrive at the conclusion that there has been no notable increase in part-time workers and freelancers is somewhat tenuous since the sample only covers 20 newspapers. A much larger survey may reveal a different trend, but is beyond the scope of this thesis. It is possible to suggest, given the representative nature of the sample, that if numerical flexibility really is a significant trend, there would have been more evidence of it in the 20 newspapers.

It is not surprising that numerical flexibility has not been adopted by newspapers because this type of flexibility

may be associated with employer uncertainty over the cost-effectiveness of part-time and freelance labour. This can be illustrated by examining the work groups most likely to be numerically flexible. They fall into two categories: highly specialised, with low substitutability; and low skilled, with high substitutability. For the former group, employers can more easily see it as cost-inefficient to employ, for example, a full-time management consultant rather than hiring one as a freelance trouble-shooter. The highly specialised group benefits from low competitiveness in a small labour market and commands high wages. The second group of workers, at the other end of the scale, are forced into a competitive labour market by employers because of the low skill levels and high substitutability of their work. The large labour market competition, especially during recession, forces labour costs down and so employers are more likely to view it as cost-effective to maintain this numerical flexibility.

The two ends of the scale represent over-pricing and under-pricing of labour, however, inbetween is a vast range, and cost-effective decision-making in employing labour must become far more blurred the closer one moves to the mid-range. This may be particularly true when, as in the case of journalism, demand fluctuates on a daily basis, and rapid response is necessary. In short, numerical flexibility might not be seen as having any cost saving advantages for workers with mid-range skill levels in an unpredictable, highly perishable product market.

A further issue connected with numerical flexibility is 'removed' workers: employees on permanent employment

contracts but not based at the workplace. The advantage for employers is that they do not incur the overheads of an office or workshop, yet retain the same value of labour from the employee. There have always been 'removed' workers - for example, commercial travellers - but it is important to make the distinction between people on permanent contracts, and those on piecework pay, for example, homeworking in electronic assembly, or clothing manufacture. The 'removed' worker is more associated with white collar work, and more likely to be connected with jobs involving self-motivation. Prime examples of this are the Rank Xerox networking system, the home-based contract programming service of ICL, and the fieldworkers of Texaco, UK (Bailyn, 1988). Reporters are prime candidates for 'removal', but this will depend on the technological practicality, and the social implications.

Journalists are already using portable data transmission units to send copy via the telephone, and many district offices transmit all their copy to the central computer in this manner, on a daily (often hourly) basis. It is possible for reporters to work entirely from home, and indeed this issue brought the NUJ chapel at one newspaper into direct conflict with management. The former FoC explained:

A reporter in one of our district offices was offered an extra £5 to work from home. There might be an argument to say that in some very small places there is no need for a district office, but we [the Chapel] felt that in this case there was a need for an office to identify the paper to the community. We then learned that management wanted to close other district offices because of the technology. We started negotiations with the management and eventually had a walkout with 90% support. This had great effect because we planned it for 3pm on budget day. The district office has stayed open.

Reducing costs may be feasible because of the technology, as in this example above, however other pressures may lead to the technology being used in a radically different manner. At another newspaper, for example, the management wanted to increase the community's awareness of the newspaper, in the hope of increasing sales, and so they opened up two new district offices and produced an extra edition of the newspaper. They argued that the technology brought this about because of the quick transmission of copy, and the greater opportunity to editorialise.

There seems to be nothing technologically determined about 'removal' of workers as these two examples demonstrate. Location of journalists is most likely to reflect managerial strategies to make the newspaper more competitive. Furthermore, managers may be deterred from removing workers if they feel it would reduce supervision and control, or might deprive journalists of social contact at work and lead to demotivation and poor quality work.

Summary

Functional flexibility in the editorial room has meant that journalists now do many jobs previously performed by printers. There has not been the development of the 'flexible journalist' who can perform a variety of tasks within the editorial area. Journalists are therefore not easily substitutable from internal labour market. Numerical flexibility, associated with an increase in part-time and freelance work has not increased in the newspapers studied. This might be because of uncertainty as to the cost-effectiveness of non-permanent employees in the

production of a highly perishable product with no work stockpile potential. New technology makes it easier to 'remove' workers from the office, and this has occurred, but such developments seem to be led by considerations other than the technological ability to do so. There is nothing to suggest that future journalists will all work from home, although there may be an increasing number of satellite offices.

Conclusions

This chapter has examined the changing influence of the journalists over various strategic contingencies in the production process. It has attempted to isolate the factors that stem directly from the introduction of direct input editorial systems by analysing the relationship of the editorial workers to the production process and the labour market. From the analysis, two central themes have emerged.

The first theme is that the role of the sub-editor seems to be going through a transformation in a number of ways. The sub has a far more central role in the production process under direct input. Not only have skills been transferred from the printworkers to the subs, to a much greater extent than to any other editorial worker, but also this transfer has integrated the sub-editors further into the production process. They are experiencing increased pervasiveness through an extension of control over many of the traditional post-subbing tasks, whilst simultaneously enjoying pre-subbing increased influence because a greater number of editorial workers are orientated around the changing subbing process, in particular new deadlines. In

addition, the immediacy of the sub-editor has increased, not because the perishability of the product has altered, but because technology has extended the subbing department's influence over production - in short, it has brought subs closer to the press room by transferring print skills to the editorial floor.

Increased influence over production is also coupled with upskilling, an intensification of work and the need for more training. This may have the effect of increasing the employer's dependency on the sub-editor and may create a skill shortage. In such circumstances a sub is likely to be able to command higher wages; the previous chapter has already demonstrated that new technology has brought about an increase in journalistic wages. Therefore, the trend might be towards lower substitutability for journalists in general and subs in particular. The analysis suggests that the potential use of flexibility to increase substitutability has not occurred; employers are not using technology to upskill printers, develop the 'flexible journalist', or peripheralise the journalists through part-time or freelance work.

The sub is therefore solidifying his or her position as a key employee. The other journalists are, theoretically, in a weaker position, since new technology has not provided them with the same production control as subs. In practice the fortunes of both groups are likely to be intermingled unless the new technological production experiences of the subs cause them to reappraise their value to production, and their relationship to editorial colleagues. In short, it is possible to speculate that the change in control over

strategic workplace contingencies experienced by subs might turn them into a professional élite, or a militant core, or both. This will be explored further in the next chapter.

The second theme is the ability of journalists using new technology to exert influence over the production contingencies and labour market in principle, but not in practice. Thus, they were able, through the NUJ, to establish New Technology Agreements with clauses and procedures for control of the working environment and operation of technology, yet have had less success in achieving managerial compliance. The NUJ seems unable even to convince its own members of the value of many of clauses such as screen breaks.

This is also true of entry to the labour market. The NUJ is keen to support the professional training scheme yet is unable to ensure its uniform adoption in provincial newspapers, thus the professional journalistic qualification cannot be used as a labour market control, unlike other 'professions'. New technology might exacerbate the situation further because more enterprise specific training seems likely as employers attempt to match journalists to their own company's technology. This pull to the enterprise might lead to further in-house journalistic training and diversification, rather than standardisation.

In theory, production control has moved largely in the journalists' direction. They have a greater influence over the production process; they are less substitutable, have been upskilled and are more solidly core workers. Journalists have the potential ability - the latent power - to control strategic contingencies, yet in practice lack, do

not exercise this control. To understand why this should be so, it is important to examine the workgroup consciousness of the journalists - the second control dimension.

CHAPTER SIX

Workgroup Consciousness

This chapter aims to explain workgroup consciousness. As described in chapter two, we cannot assess the impact of new technology on bargaining power without examining the attitudes of the workgroup and their consciousness of a changed role or position within the production process. Thus the fundamental question is, how has new technology affected the journalists' collective consciousness and propensity to adopt a trade union workgroup bargaining posture?

The chapter begins with an examination of the attitudes of the journalists to the existing workgroup organisation, by analysing the extent and nature of collective consciousness. It then assesses whether the adoption and implementation of direct input technology encourages either collectivism or individualism. This is done by first assessing the operational impact of new technology, and then examining post-introduction attitudes of journalists to the use of the direct input system and to the changes in the work process. Will the experience of using new technology support or undermine the development of a collective consciousness? How might this occur, and what current evidence of such a development can be found from the newspapers studied? The analysis draws on data from the F/MoC interviews and the questionnaire survey, focusing on two areas: new working conditions and practices, and job quality.

The conclusion, in assessing the overall impact of new

technology on workgroup consciousness, examines internal conflicts that might arise between the disposition of journalists towards their work and to workgroup solidarity, and assesses the future role of trade union collectivism amongst journalists.

Workgroup Organisation

Journalists are represented by two organisations: the National Union of Journalists and the much smaller Institute of Journalists. Historically both organisations share the same roots, but they split early in the 20th century over how they should represent journalists. The NUJ advocated the adoption of trade union strategies including the use of industrial action when deemed appropriate. The IoJ rejected the legitimacy of industrial action and adopted a principle of collective persuasion without relying on the ultimate sanction of a withdrawal of labour, thus, like the NUJ, the IoJ has established an institutional framework at national and local level for bargaining over wages and conditions.

The difference between the two organisations arises from a disagreement not over the **need** for collective representation, but over the **type** of collectivism. Journalists who reject collectivism and prefer an individualistic approach are those who are neither members of the NUJ nor the IoJ. Even they fall into two categories: those for whom non-membership is a positive choice, and those who are non-members by default (usually apathy). In daily provincial newspapers, the incidence of individualism is very low; in the sample, less than 5% of the journalists

were non-NUJ and non-IoJ. Moreover, the NUJ has a dominant presence across the paid-for sector of provincial newspapers. A survey by the NUJ (1987, Nov.) revealed that in daily provincial titles with a circulation between 30,000 and 150,000 average NUJ density was over 80%, whilst dailies with a circulation of less than 30,000 averaged 69% NUJ membership. Weekly newspapers - including some free newspaper groups - averaged 65% NUJ membership, although a thorough survey including all free titles is likely to reveal a lower figure.

The willingness of journalists to organise collectively is a dominant feature of the provincial newspaper industry, but how can we characterise this collectivism? Is it professional orientated or trade union orientated? To answer this we can examine collectivism with reference to the responses to the questionnaire.

Professional Collectivism

Professionalism is a notoriously difficult concept to analyse, not least, as Legge (1978; p75) points out, because of the confused use of the term 'professional': "is the term meant to indicate that an **occupation** possesses certain characteristics or that the **individuals** employed perform their jobs in a certain manner?... on the one hand, we talk of the 'medical profession', yet equally talk of a 'professional' entertainer or footballer." The question of whether journalism can be characterised as a 'profession' is an interesting issue - Tunstall (1971) for example, suggests that journalism is, like teaching, a semi-profession - and perhaps it merits a thesis of its

own, but it is beyond the scope of this research. However, the aspects of professionalism concerned with self-management by the workgroup can be analysed in the journalistic context as an indicator of collectivism. These professional-collectivist attitudes are primarily concerned with the autonomy of the journalists over their workgroup organisation: their ability to control the training, conduct and discipline of journalists, through which the workgroup will influence entry to and exit from the employment market. In short, the elements of professionalism which, in the context of a craft organisation would constitute a closed shop.

Respondents in the questionnaire survey were asked to identify their job as either a trade, craft, or profession, or to indicate their own description. This was to discover the proportion of NUJ journalists who considered themselves to belong to a profession in spite of their membership of a trade union; an organisation more usually associated with a 'trade' or 'craft'. The results are listed in table 6.1.

Table 6.1: Respondents' classification of 'journalism'

Craft	9.21%
Trade	10.53%
Profession	71.71%
Just a job	3.29%
Art form	0.66%
Don't know	4.61%

(N = 152)

The overwhelming majority opted for the 'profession' category. The respondents were also invited to explain their chosen categorisation; 65% of the 'profession'

respondents answered the question. The explanations fell into three broad categories: those who stressed specialist training and the career structure; those who stated that the job was vocational; and those who emphasised the responsibility and integrity of the task.

Amongst the more esoteric responses were those who classed journalism as a profession by default - for example, 'all writers are academics, and all academics are professionals', or 'it is on a par with other professions' or 'we do not make things so it is not a craft, and we do not buy or sell so it is not a trade'. Others associated professionalism with white-collar work, for example, 'an office based job can't be described as a craft or trade'. The variety of responses, and often the uncertainty of the wording used by the respondents suggests that there is no consensus amongst journalists as to why journalism should be labelled a 'profession' - moreover it reflected the ambiguity of the term.

Further questions (numbers 8, 11 & 12) attempted to assess attitudes to the 'self-regulation' of the 'profession': training, a code of conduct, and a disciplinary body for misconduct. The assumption being made is that if journalists advocate self-management through exerting sole influence over these aspects, they can be said to demonstrate professional-collectivism. Table 6.2 gives a full breakdown of the responses to each of these questions by the journalists who identified their job as a 'profession'.

Table 6.2: Attitudes of respondents who identified their job as a 'profession'.

Training courses should be run by:

Independent body (advised by journalists & employers)	55%
Organisation run totally by journalists	34%
Newspaper where the trainee is employed	8%
Either independent body or the trainee's newspaper	3%

[N = 108]

A code of ethical conduct should be devised by:

Newspaper owners & managers	1%
The government	2%
The public	2%
Journalists	43%
Body of all the above groups	49%
Journalists & owners/managers	2%
Journalists & the public	1%
No need for a code of conduct	1%

[N = 109]

A disciplinary organisation should consist of:

Only journalists	34%
Public appointed reps.	8%
Journalists & public reps.	15%
Journalists & lawyers	4%
Journs.,lawyers & public reps.	5%
Journs.,owners/managers & public	4%
Journs.,owners/managers & lawyers	5%
All groups (ie. journs.,public reps, owners/managers & lawyers)	13%
No need for disciplinary body	13%

[N = 109]

The table reveals that at least one third of the respondents in each case advocated self-management as defined above, however a majority of respondents felt that employers ought also to be involved in the training of journalists, and almost half the respondents believed that a code of conduct should be devised not only by journalists but also by newspaper owners, managers, the government and the public. This multi-interest involvement (especially public involvement) is also reflected in the 'best

composition of the disciplinary organisation': 54% stating that non-journalist interest groups should have representation on a disciplinary body, compared with 34% who believe that journalists should be the sole representatives.

From the table it is impossible to assess the overall orientation of the journalists, however we can develop a 'professional-collectivism index' from the responses to the three questions, and use it to compare the replies of the respondents who described their job as a profession with those who considered journalism not to be a profession. The index is formulated by examining the replies of each respondent across the three questions, and allocating values as follows:

	<u>Response</u>	<u>Value</u>
Training	- journalists only	= 1
	- independent body	= 0.5
	- rest	= 0
Code	- journalists only	= 1
	- journs. & public	= 0.5
	- rest	= 0
Discipline	- journalists only	= 1
	- journs & public	= 0.5
	- journs & lawyers	= 0.5
	- journs/pub/law.	= 0.5
	- rest	= 0

Thus, an index rating of three would demonstrate a strong orientation to professional-collectivism, whilst a rating of zero would show the respondent to have no inclination towards these aspects of professionalism. The results are presented in Table 6.3.

Table 6.3: Orientations to professionalism

Prof. index	<u>Respondents who described journalism as:</u>		
	'Profession'	'Non-Profession'	'Don't know'
3	8	1	0
2.5	18	3	0
2	20	1	0
1.5	15	6	1
1	20	6	1
0.5	24	14	3
0	4	5	2
	N=109	N=36	N=7

The table shows that for each category the majority of respondents display a low orientation to professionalism over these three questions. Whilst this is to be expected for the 'non-profession' sample, it is a surprising result for the 'profession' sample. In this latter group only 8 respondents (7% of the sample) display a full professional-collectivist attitude, but on the other hand, only 4 respondents achieved a zero rating. Taking the value of 1.5 as the halfway mark, 42% of the 'profession' group fell above and 44% fell below this value, compared with 14% above and 69% below for the 'non-profession' group. The mean values are 1.3 (sd=0.88) for the 'profession' group and 0.96 (sd=0.78) for the 'non-profession' group, which are not significantly different ($p>1\%$). Overall the tendency is to be semi-professional in attitude. This conforms with the evidence from the written responses to job classification, outlined above, which suggested that there was uncertainty as to why journalism should be described as a profession.

In short, the journalists in the sample are diverse in their attitudes. Consensus is not reflected in the three

central elements of professional self-management. The journalists may agree that they are part of a profession, and may choose to label their job as such, but they are in disarray over what constitutes a profession and over what elements they should seek self-management. The sample offers no evidence to suggest that unity arises, or might arise, through collective professional identity.

Trade Union Collectivism

A second form of collectivism is associated with the trade union orientation of workers. In the context of non-manual work, analysis has largely concerned the question of whether white collar workers join unions for different reasons than blue collar employees: do they express the same type of collectivism? Blackburn (1967) suggests that measures of unionateness can be used to understand the character of trade unionism - later refined to enterprise unionateness and society unionateness, which has an ideological element (Blackburn et al, 1974). Although these measures of unionateness have been criticised, it has been largely over claims that unionateness also demonstrates the degree of class consciousness possessed by the workgroup (especially Bain et al, 1973), so for the purposes of this research, the measures will be used solely to analyse the trade union collectivism of journalists. In addition, the analysis will draw on some of the methodology adopted by Mercer and Weir (1972) in their study of white-collar attitudes to trade unionism.

Blackburn's seven measures of unionateness are:

- 1/ Declaration as a trade union.
- 2/ Registration as a trade union.

- 3/ Affiliation to the TUC.
- 4/ Affiliated to the Labour Party.
- 5/ Independence of employers for purposes of negotiation (ie. not a single company union).
- 6/ Acceptance of collective bargaining and protection of members' interests as the major function.
- 7/ Willingness to take industrial action.

With the exception of number four, the NUJ meets all of these criteria, however this shows us nothing about the collectivism of the membership - the unionateness may stem from historical tradition and not reflect the current membership. To examine unionate attitudes amongst journalists in the sample, respondents were asked questions about the workgroup organisation (numbers 27 to 32) which correspond to the measures of unionateness.

To establish the attitude to collective bargaining, respondents were asked to indicate which of the following statements they most agreed with:

- 1/ Journalists should have an organisation through which they bargain with management over pay, conditions, technology, etc.
- 2/ Journalists should have an organisation to represent them for individual grievances, but decision-making over pay, conditions, technology, etc. should be left to management.
- 3/ There is no need for any such organisation for journalists.

Perhaps not surprisingly, nobody agreed with statement three, however a massive 97% ticked the first statement. This suggests that the respondents have a collectivist attitude in their perceptions of a need for an organisation to bargain with management. Of course this organisation need not necessarily be the NUJ - an IoJ sample of respondents might have answered similarly - but by implication we can assume that the respondents, as members of the NUJ, see it as an appropriate organisation in this respect.

There were two questions concerning affiliation to the TUC, and the responses are shown in table 6.4

Table 6.4: Attitudes to TUC affiliation

		Is the NUJ affiliated to the TUC?			
		Yes	No	Don't know	Totals
Should it be affiliated?	Yes	63.3%	1.3%	5.3%	69.9%
	No	7.3%	6.0%	2.7%	16.0%
	Don't know	10.0%	1.3%	2.7%	14.0%
Totals		80.6%	8.6%	10.7%	99.9%

Over 80% of the respondents were aware that the NUJ was already affiliated to the TUC, and the majority of these (63% of the total) felt that it ought to be a TUC member. Furthermore, 70% of the total advocated membership of the TUC irrespective of whether they knew if the NUJ was a current member. In contrast, 16% of the respondents thought that the NUJ should not be affiliated, and only 7% were aware of the union's existing membership and thought it should leave. Of the 8.6% who were wrong about the affiliation about two thirds (6% of the total) are likely to want the union to pull out, and the rest will either be pleasantly surprised or indifferent. Taken overall the results suggest that the respondents are fairly well informed about the TUC affiliation and display a unionate attitude.

The issue of the legitimacy of industrial action was addressed by asking respondents whether they thought journalists are ever justified in striking, working to rule, undertaking go slows, and so forth (question 30).

Again there is a uniformity, with 97.4% of the respondents agreeing with the legitimacy of strike action, 1.3% disagreeing, and 1.3% who did not know. It might be argued that this is not surprising because a journalist who disagrees with industrial action is more likely to be in the IoJ or not part of any collective body. However, a person may join a union for numerous reasons, not least for the benefits of collective negotiation, especially in the absence of an alternative representative body, and consequently may compromise his or her view about industrial activity. Furthermore, by being in the NUJ, journalists can use their influence and votes to **avert** industrial action with the same vigour as those who seek to **promote** industrial action.

Two questions were asked about policies the NUJ should pursue: the first (number 31) - inspired by Mercer & Weir's study (1972) - invited respondents to rank a series of seven policies in order of importance; the second (number 32) asked them to state why they were a member of the NUJ. From these questions it was hoped that an impression could be gained about the journalists' attitudes to the role of the union, bearing in mind that unionateness is likely to be reflected in the advocacy of 'collective bargaining' and 'protection of interests' as the two major functions of the NUJ.

Each of the seven policies in question 31 was given a score of six to zero according to the rank ordering of the respondent (first place received six points, second place five, and so on). The scores for the whole sample were then added to give an overall policy league - table 6.5.

Table 6.5: Attitudes to NUJ policy

<u>Rank</u> <u>score</u>	<u>As % of</u> <u>maximum</u>	<u>Policy objective</u>
867	94%	Negotiate for better wages and conditions
743	81%	Protection against redundancy or dismissal
520	57%	Problems of individual members
394	43%	Forum for debate of journalistic matters
372	41%	Achieve professional recognition
206	22%	Achieve 100% membership
108	12%	Organise social events

[N=153. Max. possible score = 918. Min. = 0]

The table reveals that the bargaining and protection roles of the NUJ are considered to be very important policies by the respondents, and indicates unionate attitudes. The union's role as an advocate for the individual is considerably lower than the first two policies, whilst the policies more associated with 'professional' issues lie fourth and fifth, although these score higher than the closed shop policy. The responses reveal a unionate attitude over the policy role of the NUJ, particularly since the bargaining and job protection policies scored considerably higher than the others; most respondents ranked them first or second, the difference probably reflecting the journalist's personal priorities with respect to the protectional or promotional role of the NUJ.

To support this question, respondents were asked why they were members of the NUJ. This open question brought about a fair degree of consistency in the responses, thus it was possible to define the response categories as listed in table 6.6.

Table 6.6: Reasons for NUJ membership

PROTECTION	24	}	31	22.6%
- of job	4			
- of conditions	3			
TO IMPROVE - pay & conditions	5	}	8	5.8%
- conditions	3			
TO PROTECT & IMPROVE CONDITIONS			11	8.0%
FOR BARGAINING	9	}	19	13.9%
FOR INFLUENCE/REPRESENTATION	10			
WORKPLACE SOLIDARITY/STRENGTH	18	}	20	14.6%
INDUSTRIAL SOLIDARITY	2			
POLITICAL BELIEFS			16	11.7%
PEER PRESSURE			13	9.5%
NO ALTERNATIVE ORGANISATION	5	}	8	5.8%
BETTER THAN THE IOJ	3			
HABIT			7	5.1%
OTHER REASONS			4	2.9%
			[N=137]	[100%]

The most common reason for membership was protection against the erosion of working conditions or job loss. The responses did not give the impression that the NUJ could achieve improvements - there was a distinct feeling of the defensiveness. For example, of the 20 respondents who said they joined for reasons of solidarity, the majority felt that collective strength was the means by which journalists could hold back managerial excesses rather than push for improvements. Almost 14% of the respondents said they joined because of the NUJ's bargaining role, most suggesting that membership was the only way of securing some form of representation at work. About 12% of the respondents were in the NUJ because of their political beliefs, whilst 6% had joined because there was no alternative effective organisation, and 9.5% were members

as a result of pressure from their work colleagues.

The impression given is that most respondents joined the NUJ because it offered 'insurance' whilst allowing the possibility of improvements. The wider ideological commitment to trade unionism was expressed by 12%, but the rest were union members for pragmatic reasons, largely based on self-interest - and in this sense they might be said to be displaying individualism. This very much reflects the findings of Mercer & Weir (1972) who suggest that white collar workers have a tendency to display 'a "conditional assent" not to the values necessarily, but to the possible efficacy of trade unions in obtaining tangible benefits for their members' (1972; p57).

In examining the responses across all the questions, there is considerable evidence that the respondents display enterprise unionateness: they have opted into membership, support affiliation to the TUC, emphasise the protection and bargaining role of the NUJ, and are willing to take industrial action. To this extent, the respondents are trade union orientated in their collectivism.

Summary and some preliminary conclusions

Overall there appears to be strong evidence of collectivism amongst the respondents. A large proportion of the journalists in provincial newspapers are members of the NUJ - particularly in the daily paid-for sector. There is little evidence of professional-collectivism because although the respondents characterised their job as a profession there was low professional orientation over self-management of the 'profession'. On the other hand, the

respondents displayed a high degree of unionateness and seemed therefore more favourably disposed to trade union collectivism.

This trade union collectivism, however, might be seen by individual journalists as the best way of enhancing their own interests - collectivism may be the means to an end, rather than a political end in itself. This point has been made by Roberts et al (1977) who argue that white and blue collar workers are equally 'willing to support either individualistic or collective action, or a combination of both, depending on the strategy that best fits their situations' (quoted in Hyman & Price, 1983; p172). The orientation towards trade union collectivism may be a result of the changing work environment of provincial newspapers. Simpson (1981) has argued that the commercialisation of the provincial press in the 1960s and 1970s has had the effect of extracting greater levels of productivity from journalists and 'routinising' the work, thereby creating an upsurge in the trade union orientation of journalists. He argues that they sought protection through the NUJ and identified it as the most appropriate promotional body. The sample evidence supports this view and raises the wider issue of whether current developments in technology will have an impact on this trade union collectivist orientation. In what ways might direct input encourage greater collectivism or individualism amongst journalists?

New Technology, Collectivism and Individualism

To identify the effect that direct input has on workgroup

organisation we can put forward two alternative hypotheses: technology brings increased shared work experiences through closer integration of journalistic work, or technology segments tasks and isolates journalists in the editorial process. The former suggests increased collectivism, the latter increased individualism. But is there any evidence from the case studies to support either of these hypotheses?

Increased collectivism might arise in two forms in relation to new technology. First, more journalists may see the need to combine collectively prior to the introduction of technology, in order to ensure they are covered by the bargaining process. If this were so then it might be possible to measure the move to collectivism by examining union density before and after technology; an increase might suggest a move to collectivism. Such an analysis is methodologically impossible not only because of the inaccurate records of individual chapel membership, but more importantly because any changes are meaningless without full details of demographic changes in the composition of the editorial workforce. However, an impression of chapel interest or apathy was gained from stewards at each of the case studies by asking them whether they had noticed if any new members had expressed concern over technology. Two stewards said that the chapel had increased membership because of technology, but in both cases the new members were in fact lapsed NUJ members.

The second way in which new technology might increase collectivism is by integrating journalists more closely in the office. This can take a number of forms. Social

integration might be enhanced since a larger part of the production process is now completed on the editorial floor. This, as has been suggested in chapter five, has broken down traditional demarcation although it has not led to the fully flexible journalist. Consequently, more social interaction in terms of 'production relationships' takes place on the office floor because there are fewer people, and there is less departmental segmentation. In most newspapers the new technology has led to the refurbishment of the office with nearly all newspapers now adopting an open plan layout instead of separate rooms for subs, sport, features and so forth, thereby increasing physical integration.

Communication may also become easier because of the reduced noise level as the clatter of typewriters is replaced by the gentle tapping of the computer keys. At one newspaper there was a move by management to increase verbal communication amongst journalists, and the computer manager removed the 'internal mail' facility from the computer system so that memoranda could not be passed via the screen. Conversely, another company erected dividing screens after the open plan office was deemed to be too 'vocal'. Conversation previously drowned by noisy typewriters became audible and 'distracting' - not least because rival publications (although owned by the same company) shared the same office and accusations of stealing and 'spoiling' stories arose.

The extent to which closer integration will encourage collectivism largely depends on whether journalists perceive a commonality in their work. This may be filtered

through their specific relationships to the production process or through their shared experiences (positive or negative) in their use of new technology. Both these issues will be explored in detail later in this chapter.

The alternative hypothesis that new technology will isolate journalists and reduce their propensity to identify collective interests can be examined by assessing their attitudes to direct input and the individual control implications of the direct input system.

Chapter five concluded that there had been no significant increase in either home-working or freelance contributions as a result of new technology, and therefore the isolation experienced by 'distanced' workers is not relevant for journalists. To assess feelings of isolation the focus of attention must be the editorial room - in particular the physical workstation and the working practices of the journalist. The most recent NUJ booklet on new technology (NUJ, March 1987) argues that working on VDUs creates a sense of isolation which leads to increased stress. It states that this is particularly prevalent amongst subs who spend all day on screen work. Drawing evidence from surveys in the United States and Japan, the NUJ report concludes:

Journalists who spend long periods of their working day in front of a screen will experience social isolation - become 'hermits', as an American copy-editor once put it. [NUJ, March 1987. pl0]

This counters the argument stated above that lower noise and open plan offices will encourage verbal communication. The F/MoCs who were interviewed adopted the increased isolation argument on the basis that the VDUs obscure more

of a journalist's field of vision when sitting at the desk, and require a greater degree of concentration. They agreed that noise levels were reduced, but argued that this has an inhibiting effect because 'chat' is more easily heard, especially by superiors who share the same office. They said that verbal communication is consequently reduced because the tendency is to restrict it to work matters as opposed to social matters. A number of the stewards also felt that the environment had become more 'clinical' which again had the effect of reducing social discussions.

This view was not restricted to the F/MoCs who, arguably, may have been taking a 'union line' on the issue. An editor of one of the large newspapers commented:

Somehow there doesn't seem as much fun around the subs desk. There doesn't seem time for jokes or chatter, because you are very conscious of the screen. I know myself that if someone starts fooling around it takes your mind off what's going on on the screen and you can miss a few mistakes. I think socially the office is not quite as much fun.

The isolation may be part of a learning curve; as journalists become more familiar and comfortable with the equipment, the office 'atmosphere' may become more relaxed. Evidence of this is provided by one of the newspapers where direct input has been operational since early 1986 - a sub commented:

When the VDUs were first introduced they were treated like precious objects. Slowly people got used to them - stickers and cartoons started to appear on them, just like the old typewriters. People started to customise them - but they're still monstrosities!

If the feeling of isolation is associated with time spent on screen and increased concentration, then subs are likely to experience greater feelings of isolation than reporters. We can test this by examining the questionnaire data to see

if there is any discernible difference between subs and reporters who answered the question of whether they felt new technology made them more or less isolated from their colleagues (question 23). The results are presented in table 6.7.

Table 6.7: Attitude to isolation

The VDU makes me feel...	Column percentages	
	<u>Reps</u>	<u>Subs</u>
much less isolated	0	4
slightly isolated	2	4
same as before	50	22
slightly more isolated	31	31
much more isolated	17 } 48	39 } 70
	100	100
	[N=82]	[N=46]

The table shows a tendency to feel more isolated because of the VDU, with the intensity of isolation greater amongst the subs. It might be argued that those people most likely to respond will be the journalists with the most negative attitudes to technology, or those who are most likely to adopt the NUJ standpoint. Nevertheless, there is a difference in feelings of isolation between reporters and subs so even if the sample is composed entirely of negatively-orientated respondents, the argument that isolation is associated with time on screen and intensity of work is substantiated.

The respondents were also invited to state **why** they felt more or less isolated. There was no discernible difference in the reasons given by the subs and by the reporters. They nearly all fell into two broad categories - those who claimed that the screens blocked their field of vision, and those who felt that isolation resulted from the

greater concentration necessary to operate the new technology. Typical examples of responses of people in the first category were, 'machines block the view', 'people are obliterated by the screen', 'screens form a barrier', 'you can't look over the top of the screen like you could with a typewriter', 'we no longer laugh and talk because the VDUs are in the way'. The second category included comments like, 'the extra concentration means you are absorbed into your own little world and become oblivious of others', 'the screens capture everyone in an hypnotic gaze', 'the subbing stage is more important so more concentration is necessary', 'its complicated and time consuming, so there is no chat'. Several of the subs indicated that intensification of work had created feelings of isolation: 'it is harder work so there is less socialising in the office', 'greater intensity of work so less time to talk or take breaks', 'I now serve the VDU!', 'less time to chat'.

Two further noteworthy points arose from the examination of the written responses. First, the subs who felt **less isolated** stated that this was because of a feeling of unity in adversity - or as one respondent wrote, 'we now all work as a team to try and understand the damn things'. Familiarisation may reverse this and lead to feelings of increased isolation. The second point is that a number of reporters stated that they felt more isolated because they worked in district offices and that the technology had reduced their verbal contact with head office. Whereas before direct input they would talk to newsdesk over the telephone, they now tend to rely more upon electronic communication. In this sense they may be

experiencing the type of isolation associated with 'distanced' workers.

Isolation may therefore have reduced the collective identity of the journalists by compartmentalising them, reducing their shared experiences and minimising their social-verbal exchanges. Conversely it might create a collective identity - the feeling of all being in the 'same boat' and not liking it. A further issue is undoubtedly the type of isolation experienced - for instance, are the negative feelings of the sub and the district reporter arising from the same type of isolation? Clearly we should be cautious in viewing isolation as an homogeneous entity, not least because the type of isolation may be more related to the management strategy and choices in introducing and implementing the technology than to the direct input system (or the VDU) itself, as has been argued by commentators such as Wilkinson (1983) or Buchanan (1986).

Although isolation may be associated with negative feelings - at least amongst the sample group - this may be counteracted by greater individual control over the work process. Direct input has been shown to increase the tasks of journalists by breaking down demarcation and transferring skills from printworkers to the office floor. Although the previous chapter argued that this led to an intensification of work, it did not contain a discussion of the attitudes of the journalists. There is substantial evidence to suggest that journalists see themselves as upskilled and have upvalued their work; this will be discussed in some detail later in this chapter. Before proceeding to this it is important to discuss the

relationship between work intensification, multi-skilling and individualism.

A journalist who has more tasks to perform has in theory more individual control over his or her section of the production process. A sub who complained to me about now having to do the work of three people qualified it by adding: "But at least there is no one further down the line to cock it up - if you make a mistake, it appears in the paper and the only person you have to blame is yourself." He did not like having to do work formerly done by printers, but was happy with the notion of his increased control over the appearance of the finished product. In short, like all the journalists interviewed, he was happy with the greater individual control in spite of reservations about the system itself.

Journalists are traditionally autonomous, self-motivated workers and have always experienced some degree of isolation. This is further encouraged by the competitive work environment; not only do they attempt to beat other newspapers to the story, but also compete within the same office, particularly if they are seeking promotion or merit money. Their collectivism seems to be associated with the need for the individuals to bring their skills together at some point in the newspaper production process - although some journalists avoid this altogether: freelancers. In this sense journalists have per se individualistic attitudes to work and workgroup organisation by the nature of their training, but experience collectivism through their relationship to production in a classical Marxian sense. Direct input

appears to be breaking down collective production relationships not by segmenting work in a Fordist or Taylorist manner, but by vertical reskilling. Individual journalists have more control over a larger part of the production process and this may lead to the development of individualism. Conversely if journalists impose their existing NUJ-collectivist rationale onto the new work structures then journalistic collectivism might become a more powerful industrial influence than ever before. To pre-empt this, newspaper managers are likely to be considering how they can limit collectivism, and might seek to adopt employment policies, such as those outlined in chapter three, with the intention of developing individual work relationships and marginalising the role of the NUJ.

Summary

Direct input technology seems to have embodied within it the potential to encourage either greater collectivism or greater individualism. In the case of the former, journalists may become more aware of their collective identity through the increased social and physical integration of the editorial workers, and particularly as a result of production tasks being transferred to the editorial floor. On the other hand individualism may arise through the increased isolation of journalists at their workstations caused by the intensification of work and restricted eye and verbal contact. Sample evidence suggested isolation was associated with intensity of work, the subs being the group most likely to experience isolation.

Direct input may also be associated with greater individual control which, coupled with isolation, may result in individualism. Conversely individual control might be coupled with existing collectivist attitudes and lead to a recognition by journalists of the potential industrial control attainable through collective workgroup organisation.

Post-introduction attitudes

So far the analysis has examined the relationship between journalists in terms of their orientations to collectivism, and the operational aspects of the new technology that might enhance or break down collectivism. In addition to this it is vital to assess the attitudes of the journalists towards the new technology, because positive and negative feelings arising through the use of direct input will affect expectations and satisfaction at work, which in turn will feed through into the workgroup consciousness. Negative experiences and dissatisfaction with the working conditions and practices might highlight to journalists the need for a strong collective workgroup organisation to campaign for change and bargain with management. Conversely, positive experiences of direct input, especially feelings of being upskilled, might lead journalists to up-value the status of their work and pull away from trade unionism as an appropriate bargaining structure. The rest of the chapter examines these broad hypotheses by examining first the attitudes of the questionnaire respondents to the new working conditions and practices introduced with direct input, and second, the

attitudes to job quality.

Attitudes to New Working Conditions & Practices

The discussion of NTAs in chapter four outlined the NUJ's attempt to limit the negative effects of direct input. Their policies were based on the TUC's recommendations (TUC, 1979), research in other industries where office technology has been introduced, and in other countries where direct input editorial systems are in operation (in particular the United States and Australia). To clarify the possible 'negative' effects of direct input, table 6.8 outlines the issues.

During the interviews, the F/MoCs were asked to assess the journalists' general attitudes to the operation of the technology. They were prompted about each of the hazard areas listed in the table. The responses were mixed but the majority of stewards felt that ergonomic issues and eye problems were of the most concern to their members. All the stewards said that they had been approached over 'minor ailments' such as sore eyes and various aches and pains, but most felt that there was very little tangible evidence with which to confront management; and moreover, many were reluctant to approach management since they felt that in some instances the journalists themselves were largely to blame because they were not taking screen breaks. The general feeling is summed up by the FOC who commented:

I've had loads of people telling me about various aches and pains. Some people have shown me rashes, or told me they have tired eyes. There are certainly loads of minor ailments, but nothing you can pinpoint to the new technology with any certainty. You need to take facts to management, or they won't accept your argument.

Table 6.8: Direct input technology - potential hazards and preventative methods

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Potential hazard</u>	<u>Possible method of avoidance</u>
Working Environment	Screen glare Stuffy, hot atmosphere Uncomfortable workstation	Diffusers/ window blinds Air conditioning system Ergonomically designed furniture
Health & safety	Eye problems/strain Headaches Repetitive Strain Injury Non-ionising radiation	Eye tests/ screen breaks Screen breaks/ alternative work Screen breaks Right of transfer off screen (especially pregnant women)
Stress	Isolation Intensification of work	Screen breaks/ communal rest areas Adequate staffing levels
Work monitoring	Keystroke measurement	Guarantees of it not being used as a performance/productivity measure
Training	Inadequate/ piecemeal Poor instructors	Written training procedure Qualified instructors/experts
Transfer	Loss of jobs for journalists who cannot adapt to VDU	Right of transfer to alternative work

The F/MoCs were much more confident when approached by members suffering from symptoms of Repetitive Strain Injury (RSI) - not least because they could get an independent opinion. There were eight certified cases of RSI amongst the sample at the time of the interviews, and more recently the newspaper industry has seen an increase in the incidence of RSI (UKPG, Feb.27 1989) with clusters in certain companies, for example, 20 to 30 cases at the Evening Standard, and 60 cases at the Financial Times (UKPG, Feb.13 1989).

The questionnaire responses confirm the stewards' claims that journalists are concerned about the working environment. Over three quarters of the respondents felt that they were working in a less healthy and less safe environment as a result of direct input.

	Percentages				
	much less	slightly less	same	slightly more	much more
Has technology made your working environment more or less healthy and safe?	34.9	42.8	14.5	4.6	3.3

[N = 152]

If broken down into job categories the strength of feeling about the adverse working environment is more evident amongst the subs and feature staff who spend the longest time in the office, but for each job category, less than 10% of the respondents felt that new technology had improved health and safety.

Column percentages

The working environment...	Reps	Subs	Features
much less healthy & safe	33.7	43.5	26.7
slightly less healthy & safe	41.0	43.5	40.0
same	15.7	6.5	26.7
slightly more healthy & safe	7.2	2.2	0
much more healthy & safe	2.5	4.4	6.7
	100	100	100
	[N=83]	[N=46]	[N=15]

Nearly all the stewards reported that journalists were dissatisfied with the direct input system itself, complaining that it was not user friendly, ran too slow at peak production times, crashed too often, or lost copy. Over half of the stewards felt that many of the negative attitudes to the systems resulted from poor or inadequate training. They argued that some managements had minimised training, or undertaken their own training without recruiting qualified instructors, the result being that journalists were not using the system properly or realising its full potential.

Again the questionnaire data seems to confirm the comments of the stewards. Many respondents indicated that they would have liked more training on the new equipment - 45% wanted slightly more training and 21% wanted much more training. Notably, only one respondent felt that too much training had been given, with only a third of the respondents satisfied with training. This suggests that generally newspaper managements underestimated the amount of training required.

	Percentages				
	much less	slightly less	same	slightly more	much more
Would you have liked more or less training on how to use the new equipment?	0.7	0	32.7	45.1	21.6
					[N = 153]

We can suggest that the dissatisfaction relates to the extent of usage of the system, and hypothesise that subs are likely to have been least satisfied with training, and therefore account for the majority of negative responses. Although this seems to be substantiated by the percentages if the table above is broken down into job category, a chi-squared test of the frequencies shows no significant association. Further tests revealed that the dissatisfaction with training seems to be associated with age: the older journalists are more likely to have wanted more training. This is in fact consistent with the apparent association between job and training dissatisfaction since older journalists are more likely to be feature writers or subs. Managers may therefore have set training time to a minimum requirement, rather than adapting it to the needs of each individual journalist. However, the people most dissatisfied with training need not necessarily be those using the system badly - it may be that the older journalists would have liked more training because they can see more easily the full journalistic potential of the system - thus management may be under-using their skills.

Obviously any new technology system will need debugging, but the stewards claimed that although many of the initial problems had disappeared over time, there were residual problems inherent in the systems themselves,

largely because of their design. One FoC commented:

Direct input systems are generally developed without involvement from the journalistic side at the design stage. When newspapers have been consulted by software programmers, they usually contact the production department. Journalists have not been able to influence the software when the system is on the drawing board, so there is a big gap between the system and the user.

The technology officer at another chapel commented:

We are now using a typesetting system, but unlike printers we are not familiar with typesetting, so the system is not geared up to the needs of journalists. As a result we are operating a system that doesn't seem to be user-friendly, and most reporters are using it like they would a word processor. In fact it is not a very good word processor - it is too slow, has no dictionary - so that may be where some of the complaints about the system stem from.

The lack of journalistic involvement at the design stage may therefore account for some of the negative attitudes to the technology reported by the stewards, thus when one sub commented to me, "I enjoy using computers and have my own PC, but I hate subbing on computer because it's boring, hard work, and tiring", he may have been expressing a view common to a number of journalists.

The point that technology can be pre-determined prior to its introduction has recently been made by McLoughlin and Clark (1988) who suggest that 'in many cases of process innovation, the technology is designed and manufactured by other firms... management in the adopting organisation may have little scope to influence directly the basic design features of the technology, although they may be able to set specifications or select from alternative types of equipment or system' (1988, p.101). This seems to be the case for provincial newspapers since systems on offer were largely developed from those operating in other countries, which may have deterred customisation; managers preferring

to buy the tried and tested technology rather than choosing to experiment. Consequently, some managers may have viewed the technology as pre-determined, and in so doing conferred on the technology a determinant role. By way of contrast, in one of the case studies a computer expert was employed as a full-time computer manager with a staff of three people. As a result the system has been radically customised and the computer manager claims to have relied largely on direct feedback from the journalists. The FoC said that there are no complaints about the system itself and if any problem arises it is dealt with very quickly.

The final issue concerning changes to working practice is the issue of monitoring of productivity through keystroke measurement. Chapter four suggested that it was largely a non-issue, excluded from many of the new technology agreements. The F/MoCs interviewed considered 'keystroke' as an inappropriate measure of productivity for journalism; they acknowledged that it may be used by management but felt confident that it would never be used as the sole productivity measure. Moreover, they argued that line managers were fully aware of productivity levels of journalists without recourse to keystroke measurement. The questionnaire data revealed that 38% of respondents felt it was less difficult for managers to measure their productivity, compared with 20% who felt it was more difficult, whilst 42% felt it made no difference. These responses were distributed across the job categories, suggesting measurement of productivity was not associated with role in production. However, the fact that 38% of the respondents indicated that it was easier for managers to

measure their productivity perhaps shows that for many individuals it is not such a non-issue as the F/MoCs have suggested.

Summary

Health and safety issues were perceived by the F/MoCs to be the most important negative effect of new technology with many journalists reporting ailments. This concern was reflected in the survey which showed that fears about a worsening work environment were associated with the extent to which a journalist used the technology. Further worries were expressed over the inadequacy of training; older journalists tending to want much more training on the equipment. These problems with the usage of the system may stem from the non-involvement of journalists at the design stage. The technology tended to be determined by the supplier and embodied a production orientation, thus many journalists find it user-unfriendly.

Attitudes to Job Quality

The second set of attitudes assessed are concerned with the impact of new technology on job quality. From the interviews with the F/MoCs, the impression gained was that although journalists were unhappy with specific aspects of direct input technology, in general they were pleased with its overall effect on their jobs. At every newspaper visited I was continually told by journalists, "We wouldn't want to go back to the old system." The statement was, however, usually a preamble to a complaint about some

drawback of the system. The questionnaire addressed a number of job quality issues in an attempt to assess general attitudes, and in particular to identify whether there were differences between the reporters and the subs who were affected by the new technology to differing extents. A summary of the responses is presented in table 6.9 and will be referred to throughout this section of the analysis.

Table 6.9: Questionnaire responses - Technology

	Percentages				
	much less	slightly less	same	slightly more	much more
Has technology made your job more or less satisfying?	9.9	7.2	38.2	34.2	10.5
					[N = 152]
Would you describe your job as more or less skilled since the introduction of new technology?	0	4.9	19.0	54.3	22.2
					[N = 153]
Do you think new technology makes journalists more or less likely to produce better quality work?	3.3	9.9	35.1	39.1	12.6
					[N = 151]
Do you think technology has made you more or less productive each week?	0.7	7.9	39.9	36.0	15.7
					[N = 153]
Are you more or less able to control the pace at which you work?	8.7	15.2	48.3	21.9	6.0
					[N = 151]
Does new technology make it easier for journalists to move to another newspaper?	2.0	8.8	36.5	41.9	10.8
					[N = 148]
Does the new technology make your job more or less difficult?	10.5	34.0	26.8	20.3	8.5
					[N = 153]

Which one of the following statements do you most agree with?

Technology has made my job less monotonous	17.8
Technology has made my job more monotonous	12.5
Technology has not affected the monotony of the job	23.7
Technology has replaced old monotonous aspects with new ones	34.9
There are no monotonous aspects to my job	11.2
	[N = 152]

Job Satisfaction

The questionnaire asked respondents to indicate whether new technology made their job more or less satisfying. The overall tendency was for journalists to feel more satisfied rather than less satisfied, however, when broken into job categories a difference does emerge.

	Column percentages		
	Reps	Subs	Features
much less satisfaction	6.1	14.9	13.3
slightly less satisfaction	3.7	17.0	0
same	50.0	17.0	33.3
slightly more satisfaction	35.4	31.9	46.7
much more satisfaction	4.9	19.2	6.7
	100	100	100
	[N=82]	[N=47]	[N=15]

As the table illustrates, reporters were least likely to consider that direct input had affected their job satisfaction, but when it did affect satisfaction, it was in a positive rather than negative manner. The subs were more likely to indicate that direct input had affected job satisfaction, and there was less agreement over whether it had increased job satisfaction (51%) or decreased satisfaction (32%).

Respondents were asked to explain why they felt more or less satisfied, and the answers reveal a clear difference in attitude between and within the job categories. Reporters who felt greater job satisfaction tended to stress the 'quality' aspects of the work - cleaner copy, easier to correct and revise, a polished, neater product. This satisfaction seems therefore to stem from aesthetic improvements in the task of writing; instead of numerous

small scruffy sheets of paper, the reporters send neat, justified blocks of screen text through to subs. Other reporters stressed 'job content' factors, deriving greater satisfaction from 'learning a new skill', 'being faced with a new challenge', and so forth. Similarly a few respondents identified the acquisition of new skills as leading to better job opportunities, and hence were more satisfied. In such instances they were indicating that satisfaction had arisen largely from a feeling of greater job security, or improved career opportunities. Finally, some reporters expressed far more practical reasons for feeling greater satisfaction, notably the ease with which direct input allowed stories to be transmitted to the office from outside locations or district offices; instead of reading the story over the telephone to a copytaker, it can be transmitted using a modem.

The overwhelming majority of subs who felt more job satisfaction stressed the 'greater control' they had over the final product. Others stressed the greater accuracy arising from their enhanced control over the production tasks. Similar to the reporters who felt greater job satisfaction, some subs stressed the extra skills and the new challenge that direct input posed.

The less satisfied reporters expressed worries about the health problems created by the VDUs and the intensification/productionisation of work. There was also a feeling of 'a loss of the newspaper atmosphere' expressed by a few respondents. All the subs who felt less job satisfaction alluded to production-line work with phrases like, 'tied to the machine', 'like a conveyor belt',

'mechanical tasks', 'routine', 'its a word sausage-machine', and so forth. Thus, whilst the extra control aspects of the technology gave some subs increased job satisfaction, they had an opposite effect on other subs.

Overall, there seems to be consensus amongst the journalists who felt less job satisfaction, irrespective of their job category. The journalists who felt more satisfied attributed it to a variety of reasons, but the subs seemed to stress the extra control over the work process. These responses to job satisfaction are illustrated in the chart below, and many of the themes are taken up in specific detail by other survey questions, outlined below.

	<u>Job Satisfaction</u>	
	more	less
Reporters	aesthetic practical/ease skill job security/ opportunity	health production line atmosphere
Sub-editors	control skill	production line atmosphere

Skill

The responses to the question of whether journalists feel themselves to have been upskilled by direct input backs up the impression acquired through interviews with the F/MoCs. Only 5% of the respondents felt less skilled by the technology, whilst 76% considered themselves to be more skilled. It could be suggested that this feeling of being upskilled is related to the extent of usage of the system.

Percentages calculated for each job category are displayed in the table below. It shows that a greater proportion of the subs than of the reporters felt themselves to be more skilled, and that subs tended to consider themselves 'much more' skilled whereas reporters largely considered themselves to be 'slightly more' skilled. Notably, features staff were similar to subs in their overall upskilling assessment, yet were in line with reporters in considering themselves to be 'slightly more' rather than 'much more' skilled. This conforms with the suggestion that attitudes to upskilling are related to the extent of usage of the system.

	Column percentages		
	Reps	Subs	Features
much less skilled	0	0	0
slightly less skilled	3.6	8.5	0
same	24.1	8.5	20.0
slightly more skilled	63.9	36.2	60.0
much more skilled	8.4	46.8	20.0
	100	100	100
	[N=83]	[N=47]	[N=15]

Respondents were invited to comment why they felt that new technology had altered their skills. The overwhelming majority of the upskilled reporters stated that in learning to use the terminal they had acquired a new skill; some claimed it was a grounding in computing, whilst others chose to label it far less grandly as a familiarity with word processing. A few respondents stressed the greater responsibility for copy as a result of the removal of the second keystroke, and two identified this as taking over a greater part of the production process.

The upskilled subs all fell into two categories with their explanations: those who stressed the technical expertise needed to operate the equipment, and those who stated that they now do tasks previously performed by printers and have had to acquire their production skills. The implications of all these upskilling explanations will be discussed later in this chapter, but for now we can generalise by saying that whilst there is agreement amongst journalists that they have been upskilled, the intensity of extra skill and reasons why they consider themselves upskilled is dependent on the job category.

Quality of Work

A connection between the quality of the product, perceived by the worker, and the feeling of being upskilled or deskilled has been suggested by Cockburn (1983). She argued, for example, that a compositor working on a tabloid newspaper may be inclined to feel deskilled by photocomposition techniques if the new technology was perceived by the compositor to have made no improvement to the product quality. She is therefore suggesting that, in considering skill issues, the outcome of the work process as perceived by the subject group is as important as the tasks themselves. If we apply her argument to journalists then an indication of upskilling could be the attitudes to the quality of journalistic work. The questionnaire addressed this by asking whether new technology makes journalists more or less likely to produce better quality work. The respondents generally considered technology to have the effect of improving the quality of journalistic

work (52% - better quality, 13% poorer quality).

When the data is broken down into job categories, it reveals that each group tended to suggest an overall improvement of quality, but a notably smaller percentage of reporters than subs or features staff considered the changes to have had a worsening effect on quality (see the table below). This may be a result of the aesthetic pleasure that many of the reporters seem to get from using the technology - in particular the 'clean copy'. It would need far more detailed research to identify the effect of direct input on journalistic standards, style, technique and so forth, and clearly that is outside the scope of this particular study. However, the majority of respondents felt that the quality of journalistic work increases with new technology - and thus by implication, there must be greater potential for improved product quality, especially as journalists have more influence over a larger part of the production process. But any quality perceptions must be treated very cautiously, not least since they are likely to change over time - particularly as the technology learning curve flattens out.

Column percentages

Better quality work...	Reps	Subs	Features
much less likely	1.2	4.4	6.7
slightly less likely	2.4	24.4	13.3
same	38.6	31.1	20.0
slightly more likely	43.4	28.9	53.3
much more likely	14.5	11.1	6.7
	100	100	100
	[N=83]	[N=45]	[N=15]

Productivity, Pace and Monotony

The 'production line' aspects of direct input systems were examined by asking questions about attitudes to productivity, pace and monotony of work. At its simplest level, journalists who felt as though they had been turned into production line workers would be likely to indicate that productivity had increased, that they had less control over pace of work, and that the task had become more monotonous. The F/MoCs suggested that this production-line attitude would be most evident in the subbing department, so the questionnaire analysis focuses on differences between reporters and subs-editors.

The responses, as displayed in table 6.9 give the impression that technology has increased productivity, has had little effect on control over the pace of work, and has substituted old monotonous tasks for new monotonies. However, when broken down into job categories a different impression is gained.

	Column percentages		
	Reps	Subs	Features
much less productive	0	2.1	0
slightly less productive	2.4	12.8	20.0
same	44.6	29.8	40.0
slightly more productive	45.8	29.8	13.3
much more productive	7.2	25.5	26.7
	100	100	100
	[N=83]	[N=47]	[N=15]

In terms of productivity, 53% of reporters and 55% of subs consider themselves to be more productive, but whereas only 7% of reporters consider themselves to be **much more** productive, the comparable figure for the subs is 26%. Furthermore, whereas 15% of subs consider themselves less

productive, only 2% of reporters think likewise.

The perceptions of productivity are likely to be associated not with wordcounts, or stories subbed, but with the extra tasks that are now performed by journalists. The figures are consistent with this, since the subs, who use the new technology the most and have taken over the most production tasks, constitute the workgroup that has indicated the greatest perceptions of increased productivity. The F/MoCs have suggested that this is also connected with the slower subbing process. They argue that subbing takes longer on screen not just because it is a new process to learn, but also because there are more tasks to do. As a consequence the intensification of work, necessary to meet the deadlines, has created an increase in productivity, without speeding up the overall news process. Logically, therefore, subs may perceive a productivity decrease because they are getting through less stories or pages, whilst in practice they are increasing productivity because they are having to perform more operations on each story and each page. Thus metaphorically, it is not so much a case of speeding up the machine as reducing its number of operators.

Indeed there is little evidence from the questionnaires that journalists generally feel less in control over the pace at which they work. Of the reporters, 62% indicated there was no change, and 25% felt in greater control over the pace of work. On the other hand, although 30% of the subs indicated no change and 30% felt in greater control, the remaining 40% thought there had been a reduction in their control over the work pace. This suggests an

underlying tendency for subs to feel that new technology has infringed upon their self-pacing, and so there is a possibility of them interpreting this as a production-line technique.

Column percentages

Control over pace of work	Reps	Subs	Features
much less	1.2	19.6	13.3
slightly less	11.0	19.6	13.3
same	62.2	30.4	40.0
slightly more	18.3	28.3	20.0
much more	7.3	2.2	13.3
	100 [N=82]	100 [N=46]	100 [N=15]

Respondents showed differences according to their job categories with respect to the question on monotony. A greater proportion of subs than reporters felt that technology had made their jobs more monotonous; reporters were more inclined to feel that the monotony had not been affected by new technology. Almost half the subs compared with under a third of the reporters felt that old monotonous tasks had been replaced by new monotonous tasks. In addition, a larger proportion of reporters than subs considered there to be no monotonous aspects to their job. The responses indicating increased monotony are more evident amongst the subs than the reporters.

Column percentages

	Reps	Subs	Features
less monotonous	19.3	13.0	20.0
more monotonous	6.0	23.9	13.3
same	28.9	13.0	40.0
old monotony for new monotony	30.1	47.8	20.0
no monotony in the job	15.7	2.2	6.7
	100 [N=83]	100 [N=46]	100 [N=15]

Overall the responses for productivity, pace and monotony suggest that negative attitudes are associated with the type of usage of the system. The F/MoCs claimed that, amongst the journalists, it is the subs who are least content with new technology because they are exposed to production line techniques. Whilst this is substantiated by some of the responses, there is general diversity amongst the subs. In fact, if we examine all the respondents, only four people indicated that new technology had increased productivity, reduced their control over the pace of work and increased monotony - our original indicator of a 'production worker' attitude. Of these respondents, three were subs and one was a chief sub. Twenty respondents fell into two of the three production work attitude categories, of which 12 were subs, six were reporters and two were feature writers. So although this substantiates the F/MoCs' view that a production line attitude would be most evident amongst subs, it suggests that the attitude itself is a minority one, rather than one shared by the majority of new technology users.

Job Opportunity

Some of the satisfaction amongst the reporters resulted from a feeling that direct input had enhanced their job opportunities (noted above). This stemmed from a feeling of greater job security and/or a feeling of greater mobility in the labour market. This latter aspect was addressed by a separate question, with 53% of the respondents indicating that new technology made it easier for journalists to move to another newspaper, and only 11% believing it made such

mobility more difficult.

There was little difference between subs and reporters on this issue. Most notable was the tendency for a greater proportion of subs than of reporters to feel less mobile as a result of new technology. But for each category, over 50% felt that new technology had enhanced mobility.

Column percentages					
Opportunity to move...	Reps	Subs	Features		
much less	1.3	4.4	0		
slightly less	6.3	13.0	6.7	7.6	17.4
same	41.8	28.3	33.3		
slightly more	39.2	39.1	60.0	50.6	54.3
much more	11.4	15.2	0		
	100	100	100		
	[N=79]	[N=46]	[N=15]		

Job Difficulty

The final 'quality of work' question is job difficulty. Obviously greater 'job difficulty' does not necessarily mean less satisfaction: some journalists might welcome a difficult challenge and so 'less difficulty' might lead to boredom. Conversely, other journalists might be pleased if new technology makes their jobs easier to do. However, it all depends on how 'difficulty' is interpreted, thus respondents were invited to indicate **whether** new technology had made their job more or less difficult, and **how** it had done so. In fact, out of all the technology questions, this 'job difficulty' one obtained the best response, with the written section elicited 142 responses out of a potential 153.

As above, we can examine whether the impression given by the F/MoCs is substantiated by the questionnaire data: that a sub is more inclined to find the job difficult

because of the extra tasks and skills to be learned, whilst a reporter will find it easier because it is more efficient to write stories and make corrections on a VDU than on a typewriter. The percentages revealed by the table below seem to back up the F/MoCs. A much greater proportion of subs consider their jobs to be more difficult: 51% compared with 11% for reporters. Conversely, a greater percentage of the reporters than of the subs indicate less job difficulty: 54% compared with 28% for subs. This is further substantiated by the feature writers who fall evenly into both categories (47% each) since they are the group experiencing both the ease of word processing and the difficulty of on-screen subbing.

Column percentages

	Reps	Subs	Features
much less difficult	12.1	6.4	20.0
slightly less difficult	42.2	21.3	26.7
same	34.9	21.3	6.7
slightly more difficult	9.7	31.9	40.0
much more difficult	1.2	19.2	6.7
	100	100	100
	[N=83]	[N=47]	[N=15]

Nearly all the reporters who claimed that new technology had made their job easier gave a word-processing reason, for example, 'easier to move copy around', 'quicker to amend copy', 'less hassle than typewriters', 'can correct and restyle stories better', and so on. The other respondents were district reporters and stated that it was easier to send copy using a modem rather than reading it over the telephone. Similarly, the feature writers also cited word-processing reasons for new technology making the job less difficult. The subs who felt it reduced job

difficulty fell into two groups. The first group cited technical reasons, for example, 'more accurate word-counts', 'better headline fits', 'better planning estimates'. The second group cited control issues: 'less need to involve printers', 'corrections can be made instantly without involving printers', 'it takes it out of the control of the malignant and stupid (the printers)', 'more control over the final product'.

Turning to the respondents who considered the job to have been made more difficult, the reporters cite specific problems they have encountered, for example, 'I can't take work home', 'it is more difficult to phone in stories', 'I have to hump a bloody laptop portable around with me', 'there are not enough screens in the office', 'the advantages are outweighed by having to spend too much time at the desk'. The subs, on the other hand, virtually all stressed the same reasons: there is more to learn, and more tasks to do. Some, in addition, stated that there was a greater need for accuracy, for example, 'there's more to do yet less room for mistakes', 'there is no safety net for misprints - the readers have gone'. The feature writer respondents stated similar reasons: that the job was now more complex because of the technical learning required. But perhaps the most interesting comment came from a News Editor who wrote, 'I spend most of the day getting the reporters to devote their time and energies to journalism rather than technology.'

Summary

Generally the journalists in the survey see the new

technology as an improvement of job quality. Although there is a general increase in job satisfaction, reporters tended to stress improvements in the practical aspects of work - especially ease of writing - the subs were more mixed in their responses. Some stressed feelings of greater control over production, whilst others expressed concern about the production line aspects of the new process - for example, intensification of work. Overall, there is a feeling of being upskilled, but clear differences between the job categories as to the intensity of upskilling and reasons for feeling upskilled - reporters feeling slightly more skilled because they were computerate, and the subs feeling much more skilled because they had taken over the tasks of printers. Journalists in the survey tended to agree that they were more productive, produce better quality work and are more mobile in the labour market. Reporters considered the job to be less difficult because new technology improves their ability to amend and revise stories, whilst subs thought it was more difficult because of the extra learning required.

Conclusions

This chapter has analysed workgroup consciousness by examining collectivism, individualism, and attitudes to the use of the direct input editorial system. This concluding section therefore uses the preceding evidence to assess the central question with which the chapter began: how has new technology affected the journalist workgroup's collective consciousness and propensity to adopt a trade union workgroup bargaining posture?

Negative experiences of new technology might highlight for journalists the need for a strong collective organisation to bargain and campaign on their behalf. From the attitude survey and the F/MoC interviews, the impression gained was that changes in the working environment associated with new technology had led to the strongest negative experiences. This seemed to be associated with how much a journalist used the system, thus the workgroup most likely to have shared negative experiences were the subs. Collective consciousness is therefore logically most likely to develop in the subbing department.

Such a development of collectivism might further be enhanced by the nature of the subbing function: it is performed in the office with a large degree of contact between the subs, therefore encouraging the exchange of information and the development of group identity. However, the attitude survey found evidence of increased isolation of journalists, especially in the subbing area. There seemed to be less contact and less communication, thus hindering the development of collectivism during working hours.

Health and safety issues arising through the operation of direct input might encourage collectivism by subjecting journalists to concerns about the work environment and working practices previously associated with blue collar work. For example, screen breaks, regular eye checks, and ergonomics are new types of work regulation aimed at protecting the journalist against new dangers: industrial illnesses like RSI. Collectivism could be seen by

journalists as a means of influencing these health and safety measures, and ensuring that the employer complies with the best practice throughout the newspaper industry. However, the culture of journalism might intervene to halt the development of industrial regulation. This culture is concerned largely with meeting the deadline; an unprofessional job is not necessarily one that is done badly, but one that failed to appear in the newspaper - these two issues not being mutually exclusive of course. A feature writer explained it as follows:

The industry has a culture which encourages getting the story, and getting it into print whatever. This means we are constantly cutting corners and will work with the tools and conditions we have. Other jobs, especially other professions, are not like this; people will refuse to carry on rather than turn in shoddy work.

This emphasis was expressed by all the journalists interviewed, and is stated as one of the prime objectives of the NCTJ Proficiency Test: '[to examine the ability] to work to a deadline and to a stipulated length without sacrificing accuracy and vital content' (from an NCTJ Proficiency Test document sent to all candidates on registering for the examination). The culture implies that a journalist who does not meet the deadline is either incompetent or demotivated, and therefore encourages a 'grin and bear it' approach. Evidence from the sample suggested that screen breaks are not being taken because it would disrupt the deadlines and infringe upon the profession culture of the industry, thus whilst chapels have argued strongly for ergonomic provision, there has been little collective action to enforce an employer's compliance (this is examined further in the next chapter).

Finally, collectivism may be associated with a workgroup's awareness of a loss of control over the work process. If direct input had lowered journalists' discretion at work, they might identify the need for collectivism either to seek to regain process control, or to halt further infringements. In fact the attitude survey showed that rather than a loss of control, there was generally increased satisfaction amongst the editorial workers, largely from feelings of being upskilled and having greater influence over the production process. Journalists were also more confident about the value of their labour in the market place; an impression which has been reinforced by the new technology payments made to journalists: new technology users can extract a higher price for their labour than non-users.

If these positive feelings of being upskilled and having greater control over production are as extensive as the survey data suggests, and outweigh the negative effects, then logically we could forward the following hypothesis: journalists, like the craft printers before them, will turn to trade union collectivism as a means of protecting and preserving their new skill 'territory', and of asserting their new production control. However, such a hypothesis is false because it ignores four crucial elements in the development of workgroup consciousness. First, it fails to recognise the heterogeneity of journalism. The survey revealed that the reporters and sub editors have different experiences of new technology, and that in some instances these manifested themselves in divergent attitudes according to job category. New

technology may therefore be splitting collective consciousness, rather than unifying it. It is possible to envisage the subs identifying themselves as an élite within the production process because it is they who have acquired the majority of new technology skills - they have been upskilled whereas reporters have been reskilled - and it is the subs who have taken over the largest share of the production functions previously performed by printers. In this sense they have enhanced their role as core workers, and as such may share less identity with the more peripheral reporters. Therefore, if trade union collectivism grows, its strength will lie in the subbing room.

The second factor is that the hypothesis overlooks the potential development of professional-collectivism amongst journalists. Their attitude to trade union collectivism may be pragmatic rather than ideological, and so, having achieved a more central role in the production process, they may up-value the status of their work and reappraise their bargaining organisation. They are more skilled, more specialised, and provide a 'vital' public service; these are preconditions not only for traditional craft trade unionism, but also for professionalism.

Thirdly, journalists are faced with increasing pressure from provincial newspaper managers who are introducing individualist employment policies. Individual contracts, merit pay and derecognition are the main examples and are being pursued at local level to varying extents (outlined in chapter three). If this constitutes an offensive against collectivism, then strong trade unionism may act as a

rallying call, but evidence so far suggests that it cannot halt such policies. Professionalism might become a sort of 'collectivist compromise', offering the employer a single body with which to consult, whilst guaranteeing non-disruption through no-strike deals, and enterprise commitment through personal pay contracts. The employers' policies cannot be ignored when considering the development of collective consciousness.

Finally, the hypothesis overlooks the nature of the NUJ itself. The suggestion that collective consciousness will develop into trade unionism depends upon the existing trade union structure. The NGA was renowned for its trade union discipline, and its strength lay not only in its ability to halt production, but also in the guarantee of 100% support for all its actions. Collective consciousness is therefore intertwined with solidarity and willingness to act, so we need to examine the impact new technology has made on these two factors. That is the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Control Actualisation

This chapter examines control actualisation: the process by which latent power is transformed into control. It addresses two central questions: what has been the impact of new technology on the industrial activity of journalists? Has new technology assisted or hindered journalists in the implementation and effectiveness of action?

The control actualisation process is represented in diagrammatical form in figure 7.1, and briefly outlined. The various stages are then examined in detail throughout the chapter, with reference to the negotiations in introducing new technology (examined in chapter four) and various examples of industrial action from the 20 newspaper sample. The impact of direct input is examined at each stage, with an overall assessment made in the conclusion.


Throughout the text the word 'action' is used to denote any activity which seeks to influence managerial decision-making. Thus, action need not necessarily imply disruptive activity.

Control Actualisation Process

The process is illustrated in figure 7.1 and is largely self-explanatory. The first stage is the recognition of a need to act which may arise for either defensive or promotional reasons, or both. This causes the workgroup and its individual members to consider whether they are prepared to act: the willingness to act. This willingness

Figure 7.1

CONTROL ACTUALISATION PROCESS



is continually re-examined throughout the later stages. If at the initial stage there is no willingness then the workgroup or individual will reappraise the need to act, however if there is an initial willingness, the workgroup will go on to consider the types of action at its disposal, and then select the appropriate action. A reappraisal of willingness to act occurs in the light of the selection made, from which the workgroup or individual might reconsider the action or reappraise the need for action. Assuming that there is still willingness to act, the workgroup will implement the action and then assess the outcome. If the action is thought to be ineffective, there might be a review of the action beginning with the willingness to act, alternatively the action may be abandoned, with the actualisation process concluding unsatisfactorily for the workgroup: the issues creating the need to act will not have been settled in the way they wanted. If the action is effective, then the process is successful for the workgroup, action will be abandoned, the need to act will have been settled, and there will most likely be a morale boost amongst the workgroup with regard to their industrial influence.

This brief sketch of the process provides a summary, but the rest of the chapter will examine control actualisation in detail, stage by stage.

Recognition of a Need to Act

This recognition is derived for defensive or promotional reasons by members of the workgroup. These two categories are defined and examined separately, but in practice there

may be an overlap between them, confusion about them, and fluctuations between the defensive and promotional 'need to act' as the control actualisation process progresses.

Promotional Need to Act

The promotional 'need to act' arises from union policy. It is distinguished from defensive action by its objectives: securing an improvement for the workgroup to enhance their position, conditions, pay and so forth, in the workplace. For example, action to secure a week's extra holiday is 'promotional' whereas annual pay round collective bargaining is generally 'defensive' in that it seeks to preserve the financial status of the workgroup. Clearly there will be an overlap between the categories, and indeed some members of the workgroup might identify a defensive need whilst others see a promotional need over the same issue.

In the context of technological change in provincial newspapers, the NUJ developed a promotional policy. It arose from a recognition across the industry that direct input was inevitable - newspapers would have to adopt new technology to maintain profitability - and a recognition amongst journalists that without their full cooperation, direct input could not be introduced successfully. This provided a strong bargaining position: it gave the NUJ an opportunity to attempt to improve the salaries of journalists through new technology payments, and to secure new technology agreements that would formalise the introduction and operation of the technology - an assessment of the agreements and the NUJ's success was made

in chapter four.

The strength of the policy rests on two factors. First, the leading and coordinating role of the NUJ head office. The NUJ head office drew on the experience gained in other countries, where direct input had been introduced, to formulate a new technology policy, and from this developed a model new technology agreement. This agreement - nicknamed 'negotiate by numbers' - provided a simple to follow recipe-type bargaining policy to be negotiated at local level. The chapels were therefore starting from the same bargaining position across the industry and consequently could evaluate and learn from the experiences of others. This was coordinated through head office, and a national full-time officer attended all the local negotiations.

The second factor was the simplicity of action. The NUJ advocated no training without an agreement, so that the direct input editorial system could not become operational until a NTA had been signed. It was relatively easy to ensure that NUJ journalists did not train on the equipment, and so the action - or more precisely 'inaction' - was not controversial and not detrimental to the individual.

The NTAs were therefore enabling agreements which helped journalists to structure the negotiations with a particular emphasis on the promotional objectives. At local level there was freedom for the chapels to settle deals within this broad framework, and pursue particular clauses and issues according to their own preferences. Across the sample the new technology pay was identified as the most important issue according to the F/MoCs interviewed, and in

this sense the negotiations were promotional, although arguably many of the clauses were defensive in that they sought to limit the potential negative effects of direct input.

The success of the negotiations, especially with regard to the technology pay, has been emphasised in chapter four. However, a notable exception is the case of one of the sample newspapers where new technology negotiations led to a bitter dispute between the NUJ and management. It is outlined here as an example of unsuccessful control actualisation, in respect of the 'promotional' aspects of new technology bargaining.

NEW TECHNOLOGY DISPUTE. The management were prepared to negotiate the introduction of direct input with the unions involved, but were not prepared to negotiate jointly with the NUJ and NGA, as the joint accord between the unions required. At local level the two unions decided to follow the national guidelines and refused to engage in any negotiations over direct input unless they involved both unions. The intransigence of both sides blocked all negotiations for about six months. The Editor had set a deadline for the date he wanted the system to go live, and when this was just four weeks away he decided to write to all the chapel members at their home addresses, telling them that they would be expected to use the equipment whether or not the NUJ had negotiated an agreement for them. This, coupled to the fact that three IoJ members had already trained on the new equipment, urged the chapel to reconsider the negotiating arrangements, and thus a week

before the deadline a compromise was reached whereby the two unions would negotiate separately, but concurrently, with an observer at each other's negotiations.

The NUJ negotiations proceeded rapidly over the first few days, but by the fourth day deadlock was reached over screen breaks and technology pay. The Deputy General Secretary was brought into the negotiations, the screen break issue was settled, but there was no advance over the issue of technology pay. The problem was that the photographers were being offered less money than the reporters and subs, and the overall payments were less than the technology pay increases that had been awarded by comparable newspaper managers - especially those in the same ownership group. A chapel meeting was called where the officers were to recommend rejection of the final offer, however, minutes before the meeting was to start, the Editor gave the FoC a revised offer which awarded reporters and subs £2 a week on top of the technology pay. The officers interpreted this as undermining their authority: the Editor was attempting to deal directly with the chapel rather than through the negotiating procedure. The offer was rejected after a three hour meeting with heated debate.

The new technology deadline arrived and five people were selected for training - they were the most senior members of the editorial staff in the NUJ. The chapel officers argued these people were selected since they were likely to be the least resistant; they had the most to lose in personal career terms. The Editor said he selected them because he was pursuing a top downwards training programme. Two of the five people resigned from the NUJ and began

training, the other three refused to train and were suspended by the Editor. The chapel held a mandatory disruptive meeting in support, and were ordered out of the building by the Editor. The next day as each NUJ member arrived for work, he or she was asked by the Editor if they were prepared to train on the new equipment, and each replied they would not do so without a new technology agreement. All 100 chapel members were therefore not working - the NUJ officers claimed it was a lockout, and the Editor claimed it was a strike.

The dispute lasted for four weeks. No NUJ members returned to work, but the newspaper continued to be produced, not least because all other unions in the building continued to work. After four weeks, with no sign of movement from management, the NUJ head office advised the chapel to return to work, accepting the Editor's final new technology offer, and so the dispute ended. There was a great deal of hostility and resentment over the subsequent months, the chapel passed a motion of no confidence in the Editor, large numbers of the editorial staff left, and there was bitterness towards the two former NUJ members, the IoJ members, and the other unions.

The expectations of the chapel over how much new technology pay they would receive were high. They wanted parity with other journalists working in more prosperous areas of the country. But even if they were over-ambitious and over-confident, the situation was aggravated by the very short negotiation period, and much of the debate and consideration of action was rushed. Whilst this undoubtedly helped to ensure solidarity and prevented drifting of

opinion, it may have inhibited the selection of appropriate action, and did not produced the desired outcome for the journalists. These issues concerning the actualisation process are addressed later in the chapter, with reference to this and other disputes.

Defensive Need to Act

Defensive action is primarily concerned with preserving the status quo. It is largely the reaction of the workgroup to managerial initiatives, and consequently involves the workgroup making an assessment of the legitimate authority of management. When a mismatch occurs between the workgroup's perceptions of managerial authority and managerial practice, the need to act is most likely recognised. Thus, for example, if newspaper managers changed the bargaining process to consultation rather than negotiation, journalists might recognise a need to act to defend their negotiating rights, unless they considered the new system to be more appropriate, or considered the unilateral change to the bargaining process to be within the legitimate authority of management.

The attitudes of journalists to managerial authority over decision making were assessed by the questionnaire. For seven aspects of employment, respondents were asked to indicate whether they thought the NUJ chapel should be involved in decision making. An index of involvement was calculated for each of these by attributing values of two, one or zero for each response, according to whether the respondent felt the chapel should be involved in decision making over the particular issue **always**, **sometimes**, or

never. Thus, each respondent could register a value between zero and 14, where 14 represents chapel involvement over all seven issues, and zero represents no chapel involvement at all. Using this index, table 7.1 shows the frequency of the responses. The respondents registered a high level of desired involvement, which is to be expected if the sample consists of the most unionate journalists.

The question is broken into its component parts in table 7.2. This reveals general consensus that the chapel should **always** be involved in changes to working conditions and practices, holidays and time off, changes in technology and dismissal of staff. The respondents were generally less convinced that the chapel should always be involved in investment in new projects, with 40% advocating involvement only sometimes. Likewise, changes in the content and style of the newspaper were perceived as being areas over which the management had more unilateral control, whilst the appointment of journalistic staff, was seen as the area where management prerogative was the most legitimate, although even in this case only 25% of the respondents felt that the chapel ought never to be involved.

In general, respondents had a traditional trade union orientation to decision-making, advocating involvement where changes directly affected journalists. However, as might be expected from the most unionate journalists, there was a notable proportion (16%) who advocated full involvement over all the issues, and the index mean was relatively high: 11.4. From these results we might predict that journalists are most likely to be willing to act if management infringe upon the traditional areas of

Table 7.1: Index of attitudes to involvement

<u>Index of Involvement</u>	<u>Number of Respondents</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
14	24	15.7
13	19	12.4
12	32	20.9
11	33	21.6
10	20	13.1
9	17	11.1
8	4	2.6
7	3	2.0
<7	1	0.7
$[\bar{X} = 11.4]$ [s = 1.825]	[N = 153]	[100%]

Table 7.2: Involvement of the NUJ chapel in decision making

	The NUJ chapel should be involved		
	always	sometimes	never
Changes in working conditions and practices	98%	3%	0%
			[N = 153]
No. of holidays, days in lieu, etc.	91%	9%	0%
			[N = 153]
Changes in technology	92%	7%	1%
			[N = 153]
Changes in the content or the style of the newspaper	34%	56%	10%
			[N = 152]
Investment in new projects, eg. launch of a new title	54%	40%	6%
			[N = 152]
Appointment of journalistic staff	26%	49%	25%
			[N = 151]
Dismissal of journalistic staff, eg. redundancy	89%	9%	3%
			[N = 153]

collective bargaining - conditions, holidays, etc.- rather than the traditional areas of management prerogative - content and style of the newspaper, or investment.

An example of action arising through the workforce perceiving management to have overstepped their authority is the 'bugging dispute' which occurred prior to the introduction of editorial direct input at one of the newspapers in the sample. This particular dispute caused a great deal of controversy at the company. It arose when the NUJ discovered that the room in which all union meetings were held had been electronically bugged. According to the FoC, the chapel officers first became suspicious when managers began to repeat verbatim what had been said at the chapel meetings. This was compounded when a chapel member who was passing the door of one of the managers' offices, heard the proceedings of a chapel meeting seemingly coming from a radio or tape recorder. This was reported to the FoC, the room was searched and an electronic bug, disguised as an electrical plug, was found. The other unions were contacted since they also held their meetings in the room, and for two days virtually the whole workforce was on strike, halting the production of the newspaper. The management denied all knowledge of the bug, and according to the FoC, claimed it had been planted by a left wing activist. After two days, the management agreed to have an independent inquiry into the matter, and the union members agreed to return to work with no loss of pay.

Although it was never proven that management were responsible for planting the bug, the suspicion was enough to convince all the unions that action was appropriate. The

FoC claims that even far from militant NUJ members were outraged and demanded strike action. The fact that people were prepared to believe the claims about managers planting the bug perhaps indicates that employees already distrusted management. And if the management really did plant the bug, it shows that they were contemptuous of the existing negotiating procedures.

Shortly afterwards, still feeling confident about their negotiating position, the chapel took a half day strike over management's refusal to pay journalists extra money for working on bank holidays. The management capitulated, incorporating it into the terms and conditions of work. This was seen by the chapel as a victory, and thus when it came to starting the new technology negotiations, the chapel were fairly confident, and the management were reluctant to provoke further confrontation. In this way, the defensive action had a spillover effect on 'promotional' action.

The question of whether the introduction of technology affects the recognition of the need to act is not easy to answer. The journalists have been brought into closer contact with the production process, and are subject to new working patterns and arrangements, which may create discontent and conflict, but this might lead to greater toleration of problems. Management, for example, might identify the post-introduction period as 'bedding in', 'debugging', or 'productionisation' (Wilkinson, 1983) and foster an atmosphere of toleration, encouraging the workforce to put up with temporary inconvenience. This process might restructure attitudes not only to working

conditions and practices, but also to managerial authority. Conversely, as Wilkinson (1983) found, 'productionisation' enhanced the influence and discretion of some workers which led to greater problems when managers subsequently attempted to reassert their authority and make further changes.

The focus for many of the journalists following the introduction of new technology has been the need to 'defend' the health and safety aspects of their work. Direct input introduced a recognised industrial illness into the editorial room - RSI - and numerous minor ailments. This has caused concern amongst a large number of chapel members, many of whom have identified a need to act. Three examples stand out from the sample. In the first case, the journalists were dissatisfied with the working environment because management had failed to comply with the provisions laid down in the new technology agreement. When this was pointed out, the editor claimed that there were not enough funds available but that changes would be made. After several months of inaction by management, the chapel called in the NUJ ergonomist after members began to complain about aches and pains. A report was produced which was presented to management; they refused accept the findings because the ergonomist was not 'independent'. The chapel then brought in a local authority inspector to check the office - a further report was produced recommending changes. By this time one journalist was on permanent sick leave with RSI and several others had medically diagnosed symptoms. However, as yet, management have still taken no action.

The second case again concerns a failure by management to comply with the NTA. The chapel complained that because the office had no air-conditioning, windows had to be opened on hot days, which caused the blinds to flap in the wind, the consequence was that shafts of light caused reflections across the VDU screens and led to eyestrain and headaches. The Editorial Director responded by talking individually to journalists about the problem, and 'solved' the reflection problem by suggesting that journalists weigh down the bottom of the blinds with coats and jumpers.

Similarly, reflections from the windows caused problems at the third case. The management had not provided blinds in spite of several requests by the chapel. Journalists therefore taped newspaper pages to the windows to diffuse the direct sunlight, however on seeing this, the Managing Director said it gave a bad impression of the office and the makeshift blinds had to be removed.

In each of these cases, the need to act stemmed from practical necessity. They are illustrative of the problems that new technology can create, but more importantly, demonstrate the problems faced by a workgroup in identifying the need to act: deciding on the appropriate form of action. This is discussed in detail later in the chapter, but it is worth noting here that for the three cases above the chapel's action has not been effective, and thus similar action may be perceived by them as inappropriate in the future.

Although health and safety issues illustrate the direct effect new technology can have, defensive action is more likely to depend on new strategies used by management

either in introducing new technology or in the process of bargaining and decision making once direct input has been introduced.

Chapter three suggested that, in adopting direct input, managers are pursuing objectives of reducing costs and increasing work flexibility, so may seek to reduce the collectivism of the workforce. From the sample there are four examples of where post-introduction managerial policy has led to defensive action by journalists. These concern maternity leave, homeworking, individual contracts, and merit pay.

MATERNITY BENEFIT. The management at one company attempted to tie the 1987/88 pay increase to changes in maternity benefit. The proposal was to reduce maternity leave to the statutory minimum, although the NUJ nationally had negotiated an extra six weeks maternity leave for any woman who returned to work after her child was born. The pay increase fell within the bargain procedure, but the maternity leave issue was not negotiable as far as the management were concerned.

A chapel meeting was held to discuss the issue, and although the pay offer was accepted by the members, the chapel felt that the management did not have the right to withdraw unilaterally from the nationally negotiated maternity provision. The members voted overwhelmingly in favour of taking strike action unless the maternity proposal was withdrawn. This was communicated to management and the issue was dropped.

The threat of action in this case stemmed from the

chapel perceiving management to have overstepped their authority at local level by attempting to ignore a nationally negotiated employment policy. The strength of feeling must have been high since issues such as maternity leave are not generally recognised as mobilising issues.

The acting MoC commented:

The only people more shocked than management about the chapel members' decision, were the chapel officers! There were some strong arguments put, and I don't think it solely concerned the maternity leave issue. Many members saw it as the thin end of the wedge - they would start with maternity leave and then go onto other terms of employment.

HOMEWORKING. The management at one company decided to close down one of its district offices. It was not seen by management as part of the negotiating function of the NUJ, and thus the reporter who worked from the office was offered an extra £5 per week to work from home. This arrangement had already been operating in two other district offices, and so management could claim that the precedent had been accepted by the NUJ chapel. However, the former FoC claims that the closure of the two offices were accepted with reservations, and that the new proposed closure was more important since it would affect the image of the newspaper in that area. There was a further worry that homeworking would then become the norm in all the districts.

After a series of negotiations with management, the chapel decided to stage a walk out. It was planned for 3pm on budget day, for maximum effect. The paper was still produced, but the coverage was less extensive. The district office has remained open, and as yet no other journalists at the newspaper work from home.

The FoC claims that the opening or closure of a district office is not perceived by the journalists as purely a management decision because it always involves staffing levels. Moreover, the chapel argued that closure of the district office would reduce the public profile of the newspaper in the district - which suggests that the management decision also infringed upon professional attitudes to the job, and as such was not just a management issue.

INDIVIDUAL CONTRACTS. The move by some companies to introduce individual contracts to replace house agreements (examined in chapter three) brought one newspaper chapel in the sample into direct conflict with management. After seeing the proposed new contracts, the chapel decided that members should not sign them, and should withdraw all goodwill. The chapel also voted by 51 to 13 in favour of taking strike action if necessary. The Editor wrote to all chapel members warning that he would sack anyone who refused to work normally, and he refused to negotiate with the NUJ or allow NUJ officials into the building.

The chapel were objecting not only to the withdrawal of NUJ bargaining rights, but also the extension of working hours for no extra pay. The new contracts contained the following wording:

Although your normal hours will be 75 per fortnight, these hours will be worked in such a way as to ensure the proper and efficient publication of the company's products. On occasions you may be called upon to work hours in excess of 75 in any fortnight. You may, in the case of an emergency, be called out to assist with company matters.

The Journalist November 1988 p.3

The NUJ newspaper The Journalist arranged for photographs

to be taken of two senior members of the editorial staff (non-NUJ) leaving an alleged 'strike-breaking training centre' where the management were supposedly training non-journalists to use new technology, so that in the event of a dispute the newspaper would continue to be produced. The Editor accused the FoC, Deputy MoC and the Chapel Clerk of absenting themselves from work and they were immediately suspended. The FoC and the Clerk were subsequently sacked. The chapel wrote a letter to the company's chief executive which called for the reinstatement of the FoC and the Clerk, and outlined the low morale of the journalists due to the management's actions (UKPG Nov.14 1988 p.23). The two chapel officers were not reinstated, they decided to take their case to an industrial tribunal and agreed to an out of court settlement (UKPG May 1 1989 p.14).

In spite of the initial show of strength and the ballot in favour of strike action, the chapel did not stop work. They went no further than a withdrawal of goodwill, although this may be because the management pre-empted any action by suspending the chapel officials.

MERIT PAY. The move towards the introduction of merit pay instead of collective pay bargaining resulted in a strike at one of the newspapers in the sample. In a secret ballot, 80% of the chapel voted to strike in an attempt to reinstate the NUJ's right to negotiate pay increases on their behalf. They objected to the proposed pay increases, which ranged between 4.5% and 10%. The Editor wrote to five striking junior reporters, informing them that they were in

breach of their indentures, and the Managing Director sent letters to the 30 striking NUJ members threatening dismissal.

After five weeks, both sides agreed to ACAS being brought in, a settlement was reached, which included a new banding pay structure, a commitment to negotiate future across-the-board increases, NUJ consultation in the company's performance-related pay awards, and pay deal lasting nine-months instead of 12 months. Both sides claimed it a victory.

These examples are cases where the need to take action has been clearly identified although cannot be attributed directly to new technology. Similar issues may have arisen before direct input was introduced, which, as with promotional action, raises the question of whether, after recognising the 'need', journalists are prepared to take action: does new technology make journalists more or less willing to act?

Willingness to Act

Willingness to act is a crucial stage in the control actualisation process. It is the point where latent power begins to be considered as a coercive force by the workgroup, and throughout the subsequent stages, willingness is continually reappraised. Figure 7.1 therefore over-simplifies the issue by implying that once a workgroup is willing to act, the process will go ahead. There is no inevitability as developments in considering action, selecting action and then implementing action may

reduce or enhance willingness. Moreover, assumptions about what is going to happen, held by the individual or expressed by the group, will have a crucial impact upon the initial willingness to act.

Bearing in mind these qualifications, we can characterise the initial willingness to act as being dependent on the level of confidence of the workgroup. This takes two forms: confidence that the correct decision will be made by the group about the form of the action, and confidence that given the correct decision is made, the action will produce an outcome that conforms with their intended goals - put simply, confidence in the ability to win. Dissonance in confidence will dissuade an individual from being willing to act, whilst dissidence amongst the workgroup over willingness to act might undermine their confidence about being successful.

An important / of this study is whether there are specific features of direct input technology that will encourage or discourage willingness to act. Journalists may be more willing to take action if they have experienced recent success in negotiating the new technology agreements. The successful conclusion of agreements across the industry had a considerable spillover effect in terms of workgroup confidence. After each NTA was signed and technology payment agreed, the NUJ Head Office published the details and distributed them to chapels, as well as arranging for pre-technology chapel briefings, and the presence of national officers during local negotiations with managers. The consequence was that most chapel members were very well informed about the implications of new

technology - moreover their expectations were raised by the early successes of the NUJ once the differences with the NGA had been sorted out and the Joint Accord had been signed in October 1985.

In addition to the considerable confidence building practices of the NUJ, willingness to act was also affected by the large amount of personal networking that occurs amongst journalists. The high mobility of journalists for career purposes means that the grapevine is wide reaching and very efficient - especially since it is composed of people whose job it is to process information quickly. The gains to be made and the lessons to be learned from new technology were therefore passed along at a personal level, as well as through the institutional framework of the NUJ. Thus, virtually every non-official NUJ member spoken to during the fieldwork visits referred to colleagues on other newspapers who had either better or worse experiences of new technology.

The experience of success over the NTAs, coupled with the impression of becoming more important to the production process, as much of the evidence in chapter six seems to suggest, may prompt journalists to feel more confident about their ability to influence the managerial decision making process. In this respect, new technology has brought about an increased production consciousness that might encourage journalists to act in order to enhance their working conditions, practices and rewards. We might therefore expect to see an increase in the promotional action of the chapels.

Alternatively, journalists may be less willing to act

because of their success in negotiating new technology. If they perceive an improvement in their work roles and are happy with the new skills and processes that direct input involves, as chapter six suggests, then the increased satisfaction may lower the willingness to act - by reducing the recognised need for action - or may at least lead to greater complacency. New technology will therefore not have spurred journalists into action, even though individual journalists may feel more confident about their influence over the production process, because it reduces the need to act.

A third possible scenario is that new technology will bring with it new forms of working arrangements that change the issues over which journalists consider taking action. For example, if RSI becomes a serious health and safety issue then willingness to act will be reappraised by journalists in the light of this - traditionally journalists have never had to worry about health and safety issues at work. In short, it may be too soon to judge the full impact of direct input on willingness to act since journalists themselves are still learning about the advantages and disadvantages of the new technology. Direct input could conceivably shift the terms of reference: journalists may in the future have to consider action over different types of issues which will cause them to reappraise their willingness to act.

If the initial willingness to act is expressed by the workgroup - although continually subject to revision, as was stated at the beginning of the section - then we need to examine the next stages in the actualisation process and

the effect new technology has had upon them.

Summary

Willingness to act is continually revised throughout the actualisation process, and is based on the level of confidence possessed by the workgroup as a whole, and by individual journalists. The confidence concerns their ability to take appropriate action and to succeed in achieving their goals.

New technology may have enhanced the confidence of journalists through the successful negotiation of new technology agreements, and the subsequent use of the system enhancing their feelings of centrality to the production process. Conversely it might reduce their willingness to act by lowering the need for action, especially if new technology has increased job satisfaction. Direct input may, however, give rise to new issues, such as health and safety, which might cause journalists to reappraise the need to act and their willingness to act.

Consideration of Action

Action, as was stated at the beginning of the chapter, covers a wide range - from sending a letter of complaint to management, to an all out strike. Action incorporates the normal collective bargaining procedures, and so when a workgroup considers action it need not necessarily be thinking about industrial disruption. The process is most likely to be cumulative: persuasion being replaced by coercion through disruption until a result is achieved which satisfies, pacifies or dissuades the workgroup.

However, the threat of action is likely to be very persuasive if it will cause disruption and if managers are convinced that it will be carried out. So what forms of industrial disruption are available for journalists, and how, if at all, has direct input technology affected these?

Traditional forms of industrial action ranging from a strike to a work to rule are all applicable to journalism, with the notable exception of an overtime ban. This has never been an available form of action simply because journalists do not work overtime - or more precisely, their overtime is considered to be part of the contract of employment, and is recognised as 'unsocial hours' for which they receive time off in lieu - always at the discretion of the head of department, and usually to be taken at slack productivity periods in the working week. This flexible hour arrangement has further implications for potential forms of action. For example, whilst the NGA has always been able to use a mandatory chapel meeting as a disruptive industrial sanction, the NUJ's attempts are less effective because the work is not paced, and 'productivity losses' can be made up without overtime payments. Journalists are subject to certain inbuilt restrictions on industrial action by the very nature and organisation of the job, nevertheless they still have access to a range of industrial sanctions and in the past they have used them with varying degrees of success.

The second part of the question - the impact of new technology - is far more difficult to assess. Chapter five concluded that journalists had achieved greater pervasiveness and immediacy in the production process which

would suggest that the potential for effective action is greater in terms of halting or disrupting production. Subs in particular were identified as having a core role and low substitutability, so a disruptive meeting in the subs room might be as powerful a sanction as once was the mandatory NGA chapel meeting in the press room, or the composing room. On the other hand, electronic data transfer could allow managers to reduce the effectiveness of action by using syndicated copy, or importing data and subbed copy from other publishing centres.

New forms of industrial action are clearly now available to the journalists. Sabotage of the equipment through 'incompetence' was identified by one FoC as being a possible way of coercing management into giving more training. Overloading the system, with press association copy for example, was cited by a news sub as a potential means of slowing down the system and creating disruption without breaching any contract of employment or invoking the disputes procedure. Dumping copy to the wrong electronic location caused havoc at one newspaper without it being apparent who was to blame. These particular forms of electronic sabotage are largely the subs' potential 'weapons', and are likely to become more sophisticated over time as subs become familiar with the system.

Far more controversial for the NUJ has been the issue of using the screen break as a sanction (outlined in chapter five). To reiterate, the official NUJ line is that screen breaks should be part of the conditions of employment and must be taken on a daily basis, but the practice of most journalists is to ignore screen breaks and

to consider taking them, or threatening to take them, only when the chapel wants to register dissatisfaction with the management. Again it is the subs who would wield the greatest influence by using the screen breaks as a form of industrial action.

New technology seems to have expanded the potential for industrial action by the subs rather than by the journalists in general. This is consistent with the conclusions that it is the subbing departments that have taken over the key areas of production control from the printers. The NUJ's influence over the subs is therefore crucial to its control of industrial action, likewise the ability of management to satisfy the subs may become a key strategy in preventing effective industrial action. This ties in with the suggestion in chapter three that individual contracts and merit payments might be used by some newspaper managers as a means of reducing collectivism amongst journalists.

Although action by the subs to halt production may be undermined because the new technology allows managers easier access to alternative copy, the NUJ are less dependent on the support of other unions. Before direct input, the effectiveness of action depended upon the co-operation of the NGA, whereas with direct input, a chapel taking action has only to secure the support of other journalists - although this is likely to be a mammoth task in itself as the 'implementation' discussion illustrates below. Moreover, successful action under direct input is likely to depend on unity in the key editorial production area - the subbing department - and clearly this

will have implications for academic investigations into trade union influence. For example, would the overall density of NUJ membership continue to be a relevant indicator if the union strength lay in its ability to organise in the subbing area? This issue is well illustrated by the comment of one FoC:

We were highly successful in negotiating our technology agreement because we had 100% membership in subs. Management were aware of this and tried desperately to pick off the subs - most blatantly they offered them more money and early training. Once the NTA was signed we realised that the future strength of the chapel would depend on a sort of closed shop in subs, so when a new sub was recruited soon afterwards, he was put under a lot of moral pressure until he joined.

Even with full union membership in the subbing room it is doubtful whether new technology can provide the chapel with the means to stop a newspaper from being printed. An editor at one newspaper said that he had a contingency plan that would allow the newspaper to be produced even if every trade unionist in the building was on strike. This is accepted by the NUJ, and the Chair of the New Technology Committee commented:

We will not get to the position of being able to stop too many papers, but new technology gives us more power to disrupt them, and that's enough for our purposes.

Summary

New technology has widened the scope of potential industrial action and has brought journalists into closer contact with the production process. The subs, as the key production workers, are likely to have the greatest access to industrial sanctions. Disruption of production by journalists is more likely, although the ability to stop the publication of a newspaper is unaffected, especially as managers may have easier access to alternative copy through

methods of electronic data transfer.

Selection of Action

The next stage in the actualisation process is the selection of action by the workgroup. The decision will be based on four key factors: the legitimacy of the action, the likely effectiveness of the action, the personal loss and gain, and past experiences.

Legitimacy of the Action

One of the conclusions drawn in chapter six was that the 'professional' culture of journalism was 'meeting the deadline' at whatever cost. This may discourage journalists from taking action by nurturing a 'grin and bear it' attitude and associating this with a 'professional' approach. This was evident, for example, from the screen break issue when sub-editors in particular were complaining of aches and pains, yet refusing to take their agreed screen breaks because by so doing they would miss deadlines, the newspaper would be late, and their competence might be questioned.

Action is therefore more likely to be selected if it does not infringe the 'professional' culture of the journalists. Thus, the new forms of disruptive action outlined in the previous section might become increasingly attractive to journalists since they are less likely to cause a conflict between the desire to act and the wish to preserve professional integrity.

An additional constraint on selection is the consideration of the legitimacy of the action in the

particular circumstance. Individual NUJ members will have different ideas about the applicability of action depending upon their assessments of the problem in question and their political orientations. Thus they may argue that strike action, for example, is a legitimate industrial sanction yet be unwilling to apply it to particular situations at their own workplace. Journalists may however begin to reappraise these aspects of legitimacy because direct input gives rise to new issues concerning working conditions and practices. The legitimacy of action may therefore be related to the attitudes to new technology, and the positive and negative experiences from using the equipment, as discussed in chapter six.

Considerations of Effective Action

In deciding whether or not to take action, the chapel as a whole, and journalists individually, will assess the likely outcome of the action. They will make both collective and personal judgements on the extent to which action will be effective in the given circumstances, based upon its immediate impact, the likely support of others, and the appropriateness in the particular industrial setting.

The impact of the action is most likely to be measured by the disruptive effect it has on the production of the newspaper. As argued in the previous section, journalists are aware that even a full withdrawal of their labour will not prevent the publication of the newspaper, however the F/MoCs interviewed all felt that if NUJ members stopped work the newspaper would suffer a substantial reduction in quality. This was certainly true in the case of the new

technology dispute cited above where the newspaper was published throughout the four weeks of industrial action, yet had noticeably less local news. The former FoC claims that he received information that the newspaper was also losing circulation, which, by the third week, was feeding through to advertising.

Support from other workers in the company is theoretically an important factor in encouraging a workgroup to take action. Not only does it prevent a particular group from feeling isolated, but also magnifies the impact of the action. In the case of the bugging dispute - outlined above - the FoC claims that the action only lasted two days because the total stoppage by all trade unionists brought the company to a halt. In contrast, the new technology dispute led to strike action by the journalists only - all the other trade unionists worked normally. However, this did not dissuade the NUJ chapel from taking action, largely for two reasons. First, the other trade unionists were not in direct dispute with the employer and so the FoC felt that the employment legislation prevented other unions from taking supportive action, and in any case would be used as an excuse by other unionists who did not want to offer support - particularly NGA members. Secondly, the NUJ had a historical record of always standing alone in disputes - they rarely had the backing of other unions, and consequently had no expectations about getting support in this instance; they were consequently not disappointed when their picket lines were crossed.

Substitution of workers also plays an important role.

Journalists generally feel confident about their value to an employer, not necessarily through their journalistic skills, but through their local knowledge and contacts. Whilst it may be possible to replace a whole editorial workforce in a few days, it would be virtually impossible to replace their collective knowledge of the local community. However, this might also act as a dissuading factor: journalists whose bargaining strength lies in the amount of local contacts they have are in a weaker bargaining position with an employer outside the locality, and so consequently may be discouraged from taking action as it may undermine their present position. This links into the discussion below on consideration of career damage.

This issue of substitution may have played an important role in the case of the individual contract dispute since in this particular case about 30% of the workforce were non-NUJ and the management had developed a contingency plan to train non-journalists. Strike action by the chapel would undoubtedly have brought this plan into operation, and thus the chapel may have felt disinclined to strike knowing that there was a readily available source of alternative labour.

Appropriateness of action is a key factor since a chapel member is unlikely to be willing to act when he or she considers the proposed action inapplicable to the situation. In itself, appropriateness is difficult to assess, not least because it will depend upon a large number of variables: chapel strength, industrial setting, personal attitudes, and so forth. In practice, appropriate action may be a compromise between alternatives, and its effectiveness is therefore likely to be constrained by this

(discussed below). In the case of the homeworking dispute, the chapel considered a number of alternatives, from taking screen breaks to a day's strike. The opportunity of minimising loss to the individual members and maximising the cost to the company arose largely through chance: budget day was approaching. The decision to stage a walkout at 3pm was relatively easy for most NUJ members to agree to, and more importantly, it was easy to organise.

Personal Loss and Gain

The decision to act will inevitably involve weighing up the pros and cons. On a personal level this is likely to be centred around likely career damage and the effect on dependents.

Career damage may occur in two forms. First, journalists may be worried about being overlooked when it comes to promotion, or second, they may be worried that management will try to get rid of them at the first opportunity.

Fears of financial loss, are also important. A middle-aged journalist is less likely to get another job and consequently may be less militant. But, as mentioned above, long serving journalists will be more valuable to the newspaper because of their greater local knowledge and their experience, so may have greater security. Inevitably each journalist will make a personal assessment of the extent of damage that taking action could have on his or her future with the company.

Considerations of the effect of action on dependents is likely to play one of the most important roles.

Journalists, like all workers will assess the consequences of action on their families, usually by measuring the short term financial loss against the possible long term gain. The tendency will be for militancy to be more prevalent amongst younger journalists with no dependents. In the case of the new technology dispute, the young trainee journalists were keen to stay on strike, not least because, according to the former FoC, their strike pay exceeded their normal weekly wage. Conversely, in the case of the merit pay dispute, the trainees returned to work because they were threatened with dismissal.

Past Experiences

Finally, journalists are likely to consider their experiences of past action. Amongst the older journalists there is a great deal of 'folklore' surrounding the national pay disputes of 1977/78. Their picket lines were crossed by other trade unionists and that has resulted in a great deal of bitterness. Action therefore has been coloured by memories of this dispute of the late 70s - largely seen as a failure, in spite of the fact that many chapels received some of their highest pay increases for many years. Younger journalists, although accepting much of the folklore, do not have the same personal memories.

Summary

Selection of action will be affected by four factors. First, the legitimacy of taking action may be undermined by the 'professional' culture of meeting the deadline at whatever cost, and personal considerations of the

legitimacy of particular action in a journalist's own workplace. New technology may cause a reappraisal of this legitimacy, especially if new forms of industrial disruption are available.

Secondly, journalists may be discouraged from taking action after considering the likely effects of their action. They will assess their ability to disrupt production, the likely support of other workers, and the appropriateness of action for their particular industrial setting.

Thirdly, journalists will make some assessment of personal loss and gain, particularly with regard to career damage and the effect on dependents. And fourthly, they will be influenced by past action and experiences.

Implementation

In implementing the action, the workgroup will rely on three major factors in helping to produce a successful outcome: trade union organisation, discipline and resources; the strength and resolve of the workgroup; and the appropriateness of the action.

Trade Union Organisation, Discipline and Resources

The effectiveness of the action will depend upon the extent of trade union discipline within the NUJ, and particularly within the chapels. A well organised union with the ability to monitor and orchestrate its members is more likely to be able to achieve solidarity. It will be able to exert pressure on unsupportive or apathetic members through the union structure, and will have the backing of the union

organisational machinery, its officials and its resources throughout the action.

Organisationally, the NUJ has never been strong - particularly if compared with the NGA. In spite of advocating a post-entry closed shop the union has rarely achieved it outside of Fleet Street, and as a consequence there has always been a residual group of non-union journalists who remain outside the NUJ influence. In addition, it has had to contend with the IoJ journalists who exert little influence across the industry in general, but have played an important role in certain provincial newspapers. Thus, for example, in one of the case study newspapers, the IoJ were strong enough to form a 'chapter' (the IoJ equivalent of a chapel) consisting of 20 journalists. When the discussions over new technology were opened by management, the IoJ and the NUJ were invited to participate in a working party, but since the NUJ policy is not to bargain collectively, or to recognise the IoJ, the chapel felt that this would be against their interests. Management refused to have two working parties set up and so the NUJ chapel was effectively excluded from participation in the design stage of the system by the presence of the IoJ - or more precisely, by the NUJ's policy towards the IoJ.


In addition to the absence of a closed shop, the NUJ is faced with diversity within the industry - and within its own membership. 'Journalist' is a generic term which covers not only newspaper reporters, sub-editors and photographers, but also radio and TV editorial staff; public relations officers; press officers; magazine staff;

editorial staff in book publishing; freelancers; press agency staff; creative artists; and teletext and viewdata staff. In accommodating this heterogeneous group of workers, the NUJ recognises that there are often direct conflicts of interest that have made supportive action in the past difficult to organise, not least for freelancers who, by following union instructions not to supply copy to a company in dispute, may seriously damage their own business.

This lack of influence by the NUJ over outside copy is well illustrated by the new technology dispute. The 100 NUJ editorial workers stayed on strike for four weeks but the Editor continued to produce a newspaper - although of much lower quality. He did this by using three IoJ members, two non-unionists, freelancers and substantial amounts of press agency copy. He also had the full co-operation of other unions in the building.

Structurally, the NUJ also lacks the ability to exert discipline and control over individual chapels. Figure 7.2 shows the relationship between the various bodies within the union. The Annual Delegate Meeting (ADM) is the policy making body and members gain access through the branch structure. However, the branches have no industrial role and are rarely involved directly in disputes, whilst the Area Councils, which act as types of Branch Committees, often have no members elected to them either through apathy or a lack of faith in their organisational role. Action is therefore coordinated through full time regional officers and members of the appropriate Industrial Councils. Consequently, although there is close direct contact

Figure 7.2: Structure of the National Union of Journalists



Source: NUJ Policy Kit, 1984.

between a chapel and head office, there is very little contact between chapels, or with the wider membership, other than through head office circulars. This rather anomalous position of the branches has become an issue regularly brought up at the ADM, and a working party has been set up to investigate the restructuring issue and to report back to the 1990 ADM.

The structure also acts to raise the importance of chapel officers. The F/MoC becomes a key figure in organising action and ensuring solidarity within the chapel. He or she liaises directly with head office and has little or no contact with counterparts in other chapels. The main point of contact is the branch meeting which is often poorly attended, not least because of its low industrial significance.

Furthermore, the F/MoC becomes central to the NUJ's ability to exert influence over working practices. Thus, for example, the screen break issue highlighted in earlier chapters was supposed to be self-policing and coordinated through the F/MoC but, in practice, many of the F/MoCs were themselves not taking screen breaks. This illustrates a particular problem the NUJ faces: motivation of the chapel officers. Clearly some F/MoCs will be motivated for political or professional reasons, but their roles may conflict with their own career paths. For example, at one of the case study newspapers where the new technology negotiations had resulted in a very favourable agreement for NUJ members, the FoC felt he had been victimised by management. He said he had been turned down for promotion three times, and most recently has received sideways

'promotion' against his wishes. At the same newspaper, the new chapel officers were recently dismissed for their involvement in a dispute over individual contracts and no other chapel member is prepared to take on the role of a chapel officer.

Overall, the NUJ lacks the structure and organisation to exert the kind of discipline needed to influence willingness to take action. This does not mean that particular chapels at particular times cannot demonstrate solidarity and militancy, especially if the other factors identified below come into play. In comparison with a highly organised and disciplined union - like the NGA once was in provincial newspapers - the NUJ is in the second division. Or as one former FoC, with a large amount of union experience, expressed it:

The NUJ will never be as well disciplined as the NGA. It has a different attitude and there is not the same collective strength. You have too many people of different minds, and there is a great deal of apathy. We need to start building at chapel level - membership, discipline, commitment and awareness - but we don't have the resources or the people with commitment to do this at local level.

Any workgroup taking action will inevitably need to draw on resources provided by the union. This may be administrative assistance, advice, help with co-ordination, financial support, legal backing and so forth. For example, during the new technology dispute, the chapel brought in national and regional officers, issued circulars and information through the administrative and secretarial staff at head office, took advice from union solicitors, set up a strike fund and distributed strike pay, and publicised the dispute through the union newspaper. Access to these resources were crucial in keeping the dispute going for four weeks, in

spite of its unsuccessful outcome. But has new technology affected these resources?

There is no evidence that direct input has had any impact upon the NUJ's resources, not least because there has been no significant increase or decrease in membership. There is, however, concern at head office that the role of the union might be diminishing as a result of management policies associated with new technology. The introduction of individual contracts and merit pay, as outlined in chapter three, might be reducing the collective bargaining role of the NUJ, and consequently its relevance to journalists. Some NUJ officers see this as a result of new technology because direct input allows management to marginalise the unions through eliminating the craft workers, and to adopt individual employment policies to buy off the journalists. Alternatively, other NUJ officers see new technology as an opportunity for the union to expand its membership by including new types of workers or possibly merging with other unions. Both these cases are speculation and can only be assessed over time, however, at present, new technology has had no impact on resources available to journalists taking action.

Workgroup Solidarity and Strength

A high union density is theoretically an advantage to a workgroup taking action since there will be greater solidarity, however, the analysis in chapter four suggested that density was not an important factor in securing favourable new technology agreements and high technology payments. The actualisation process need not necessarily be

constrained by the extent of NUJ membership amongst the editorial workers because a high level of workgroup density may be less important than a high density in certain areas - for example, amongst subs. Furthermore, examining density as a factor in the successful achievement of goals may be misleading because, for example, whilst high union density might help secure high wage increases, so might low union density. The latter may be true because in order to keep union membership low, managements have to negate the need for a union by adopting employment policies such as no-redundancy and high wages - IBM being a classic example - consequently a low density of union membership may also be associated with favourable workgroup gains. From a worker's point of view, there is no point being in a union if there are no advantages to be gained, just as there is little point staying out of a union if it represents the best opportunity of securing improvements at work.

Turning to the question of the impact of new technology on NUJ density, there was no evidence to suggest that more journalists joined or left the union as a result of direct input (chapter five). If density changes it is likely to be as a result of new management employment policies such as those outlined in chapter three, rather than because of new technology.

Low substitutability is an important factor in workgroup strength, yet new technology has had a mixed effect upon this. Reporters are more easily substituted, not least by freelance writers, but subs are less substitutable. New technology may therefore have increased the strength of subs, and so the effectiveness of action

might depend upon the support of the subs: the union density of subs, rather than that of the whole workgroup.

In addition, solidarity may be undermined by the impact of new technology upon job segmentation. There are greater differences between subs and reporters in their forms of work (chapter five) and their attitudes (chapter six) consequently there could be a divergence of interests within the workgroup that undermines solidarity.

One clear effect of the new technology with respect to solidarity has been the increased production role of journalists. The gradual disappearance of non-journalistic staff who have influence over the production process will mean that journalists are less dependent upon the support of other unions. In the past, successful action has largely depended upon solidarity amongst unions, but in the future the NUJ will not have to seek the support of the print unions because the latter will have no significant presence in provincial newspapers.

Selection of Appropriate Action

The success of the NUJ in the introduction of new technology was undoubtedly a result of the selection of appropriate action at head office level. The development of a new technology policy and the production of a model agreement gave F/MoCs clear objectives and guidelines. Within this broad policy, the chapels were left to set their own targets and to select action applicable to their own industrial setting. The new technology dispute is an example of failure - perhaps miscalculation. However, although the journalists lost the dispute, they did not

lose the deal over new technology: the NTA they signed was more favourable than six others in the sample.

As was outlined above, new technology gives journalists access to a greater variety of action, so the effectiveness of action may increasingly depend upon the selection of action appropriate to the local environment: management industrial relations strategy, chapel density, strength in subs, production times and deadlines, key publications, and so forth. Some NUJ officers already identify 'sophistication' of action as a way of increasing the effectiveness of action. The view is summed up by a NUJ provincial organiser:

New technology can mean new forms of action - chapels can stay at work but jointly decide to take action which will slow down the whole process. The action is still done collectively, but has to be more carefully monitored to make sure everyone is pulling their weight. We must encourage chapels to think in a more sophisticated way about how and when to take action.

Summary

The influence of the NUJ is impeded by the absence of closed shop and the diversity of its members, who often have conflicting interests. This is compounded by a weak organisational structure that gives no significant industrial role to branches and area councils, isolates chapels by providing little opportunity for inter-chapel contact other than through head office, and over-emphasises the role of the F/MoC.

The strength of the workforce, measured by trade union density, has not been altered by new technology. The subs might be in a more favourable position since they are less substitutable, and consequently a high density of union membership in the subbing area might increase the

effectiveness of workgroup action. Solidarity amongst journalists may have decreased because direct input segments tasks, but solidarity between journalists and other newspaper employees is less essential because journalists have more direct influence over the production process.

An effective outcome may depend upon journalists making increasingly sophisticated choices about the type of action for the particular circumstance and industrial setting. Access to resources for support and backing during industrial action have not been affected by new technology. Resources may be threatened if there is a drop in membership as employers attempt to marginalise the union. On the other hand, new interpretations of 'journalistic work' and new forms of work - both brought about by technological change - might give the NUJ the opportunity to recruit new members, or to merge with other unions.

Conclusions

New technology appears to have had an impact on industrial action in both a direct and indirect manner. The obvious direct effect is that new technology obliges a chapel to seek negotiation over the introduction process. For most of the newspapers in the sample, and from the wider survey discussed in chapter four, it was the hardest period of bargaining since the national pay disputes of the late seventies. Chapels were having to consider how to get management to bargain over the new technology and over what issues. The lead role of the NUJ head office facilitated this, but the journalists' strength lay with the necessity

for their cooperation in the introduction: they would be the people using the new equipment.

The discussion of technological change, the setting up of joint NUJ-NGA meetings, the hard bargaining, and in some cases the mandatory meetings, withdrawal of goodwill, walkouts and so forth, were all a direct result of new technology. It shifted the industrial setting and forced journalists to re-examine the issue of industrial action, even if no action was taken.

After the new technology has been introduced the focus of the workgroup shifts to the consequences of change. Thus, problems created by the new system - health and safety, screen breaks, lost copy, failure to meet deadlines, feelings of isolation, and so forth - are new areas of potential conflict. These issues have forced journalists to consider the need to act, but there is little evidence that chapels have been willing to take disruptive action over these technology-related issues, not least because, as chapter six illustrated, the journalists' discontent with certain aspects of the new technology is outweighed by their satisfaction with the advantages of the new system. However, at newspapers where particular problems are continually being ignored by management, chapels are beginning to consider more disruptive action.

The new technology has also had an indirect effect upon action by transforming the production process and radically altering the working relationships. Chapter six discussed how this fed through into attitudes, whilst this chapter has considered the role new technology has played in the willingness to act. Overall, this indirect effect upon

action has been to urge journalists to reassess their role in production and their potential to halt or disrupt the production process. The view long held by journalists, that they can never take effective unilateral action because of the strength and pervasiveness of printers, is no longer applicable. New technology therefore forces journalists to reappraise their traditional beliefs about the relevance and effectiveness of industrial action. Of course many journalists may still reject industrial action, especially if the legitimacy of action conflicts with their values, but nevertheless, the new working arrangements created by new technology has obliged journalists to re-evaluate their relationship to production.

It cannot be assumed, however, that all editorial workers will make the same evaluations of their new work roles, especially if they differ in their experiences of using new technology. It might transpire that new divisions occur within the editorial room over the need to act, and the apparent split in work tasks and attitudes between subs and reporters may shift priorities, with promotional or defensive action by one group being unacceptable or perceived as unnecessary by the other. Thus, new divisions between the journalists, created by direct input, may inhibit the actualisation process.

New technology has prompted journalists - particularly NUJ officers - to re-examine the types of action that can be undertaken. The evidence from the sample suggested that at chapel level the journalists were aware that a close relationship to production allowed for a greater variety of disruptive action - most importantly, action that could not

be traced to an individual. At national officer level this was recognised as more 'sophisticated' action, and has been accepted as a potential tool of coercion. However, much of the action could be taken individually as opposed to collectively. Not only might new technology have created greater potential for types of disruption, but it might also have reduced the number of people necessary for disruptive activity. So even if there is a greater division between the editorial workers over the need for action and the willingness to act, then the disruptive potential of the minority, as opposed to the majority, may mean that the actualisation process can be implemented by fewer workers than prior to direct input - for example, a few disgruntled subs may be able to cause as much disruption as the traditional NGA mandatory chapel meeting.

Overall, two contradictory themes emerge when assessing control actualisation. First, there seems to be greater potential industrial activity, due to the increased pervasiveness and immediacy of the journalists, the low substitutability of subs, the variety of forms of industrial disruption and the increased industrial awareness of the journalists. On the other hand there are counter forces that may be dampening the development of collective industrial action of the editorial workforce: the weak organisation and trade union discipline of the NUJ, the 'professional' culture of journalism, managerial employment policies that encourage individualism, and a division within the editorial room between the subs and reporters in terms of their work tasks, values and attitudes. The development of effective control

actualisation would be a product of the convergence of these themes, however, evidence from the sample suggests that the trend seems to be towards divergence.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Conclusions

The Frontier of Control

The frontier of control is a useful metaphor for the power relationships that exist between managers and employees. It creates the impression of a boundary defining control over work practices and processes, with opposing groups on each side, continually exerting pressure either to move it in their favour and enhance their control, or to hold back frontier and prevent encroachment into their control terrain. As this thesis illustrates, the metaphor can facilitate an understanding of control, but it cannot fully explain the subtle control relationships that exist within the workplace, for two main reasons.

First, the frontier of control only represents one type of power relationship: the superordinate-subordinate relationship (or higher to lower). In studying the movement of the frontier we are therefore largely focussing on the changes in the control influences of managers and workers - and implicitly the suggestion is that the loss of control by one group will be the gain of the other. The frontier cannot explain mutually beneficial changes in power, nor can it conceive of a shrinking or expansion of areas of control for both 'sides'.

Second, the frontier does not explain the power relationships within the interest groups. The tendency is to identify all the members of a particular interest group as sharing the same goals and control objectives, and to assume that these are in conflict only with other interest

groups. In practice, power relationships are likely to be far more complex. For example, one of the most important changes in control that this thesis illustrates is the shift of the power relationships not just **between** different groups of workers (printers and journalists) but **within workgroups** (for example, reporters and subs). The frontier of control has not simply been pushed forward or backwards between workers or managers, but has undergone a far more complex transformation that the topological metaphor cannot fully encompass.

To help analyse the subtleties of the changes in workplace control, a model was devised that broke down the concept of control into its component parts. This helped to provide a picture of control not as a boundary between two sides, but as a complex network of power relationships, contingent on influence over working practices, procedures, processes, and attitudes. Therefore this final chapter brings together the general themes that have emerged and assesses the overall changes in workplace control experienced by journalists in provincial newspapers.

Direct Input and the Transfer of Power

The latent power of journalists has been enhanced due to the change in their relationship to the production process. Editorial influence has increased because many of the traditional print tasks are now performed by journalists working in the editorial area, whilst other tasks have been made redundant by the direct input system. For the reporters this has largely meant learning word-processing skills, and writing and correcting copy directly onto the

screen. For the sub-editors, direct input has meant that the traditional tasks of checking copy content and style, headline writing, and page design have been transferred to the screen, but in addition, type and layout instructions now have to be input directly, and since there are no readers, subs must also proof read far more diligently; a mistake by a sub is now more likely to appear in the final product because there are fewer post-subbing stages and checks. The complete design process - creativity and production - is more heavily dependent on the subbing department than before direct input.

Each 'story' now spends a larger part of its pre-press life in the editorial department so the process is more dependent on the skills of editorial workers from the origination of material to paste-up. Journalists are consequently far more pervasive than prior to direct input but this is not uniform across the editorial department. Photographers have experienced no direct change in their work although they may be expected to meet new deadlines and conform with other effects of direct input. Reporters have changed working practices and have learned new skills but the bulk of the work - getting the stories - has not been affected. In-office editorial workers have experienced a far more dramatic restructuring. Newsdesk staff now mainly perform copy-tasting on screen, and features writers use direct input for writing and subbing copy, however the greatest increase in pervasiveness has been experienced by the sub-editors because the subbing process has extended in two directions. It has extended forward into the traditional production process, and backwards

towards the origination of the material. The evidence from chapter five suggested that subbing deadlines had to be realigned to account for the extended time copy spent in subs, and the increasing time-critical nature of subbing deadlines. Other deadlines, particularly those for reporters, were altered to accommodate the extended subbing process, thus at several newspapers the direct input system had been extolled for its potential to put back deadlines, yet in practice had brought many of the pre-subbing deadlines forward.

Overall, the editorial process seems to be orientated to subs much more than it was prior to direct input; and there is no evidence to suggest this is a temporary change due to a learning process. Indeed, most journalists and editors acknowledged that the subbing process had been intensified by direct input and some of the sample newspapers had confirmed this by permanently increasing the number of sub-editors.

The expansion of the subbing process and the elimination of many post subbing stages has meant that the sub-editors have far greater immediacy than before direct input. Immediacy is a particularly important strategic contingency in newspapers because of the perishability of the product. The shelf-life of a daily provincial newspaper is about two hours, consequently many companies have several time editions and zoned editions. Direct input has increased the potential for editorialising, and managers have generally been eager to take advantage of this since it increases advertising space and copy sales. As a result deadlines have become even more critical and immediacy is

an even more powerful control contingency. For example, missing the subbing deadline for the first edition of a newspaper has a knock on effect for all subsequent deadlines throughout the day, and whilst the traditional process allowed contingency time at the various post-subbing stages, direct input limits this by focussing production in the subbing department. This illustrates an irony of direct input: in allowing for more editions, later stories and page changes closer to production deadlines, it diminishes the safety net of contingency time should an unforeseen problem cause delays in the subbing area.

The implication of the increased immediacy of subs is that they theoretically now have as much power as for example, the NGA compositors. If the NGA held a mandatory meeting, their immediacy could have severe repercussions for production - so, a mandatory NGA meeting became an effective industrial sanction. Likewise, if the all the subs took the regular screen breaks allowed in many of the NTAs at the same time, the disruption to production would be severe. They have a comparable industrial sanction - arguably a more powerful one - although, as yet, screen breaks have not been used for disruptive purposes.

A further effect of direct input has been the impact upon the substitutability of journalists, however, as with immediacy, the editorial workers have not been affected in the same way. Reporters are no less substitutable because the word processing skills they use on direct input systems can be learned in a day, and are easily transferable between newspapers. Conversely, subbing skills require greater training and more detailed knowledge of the

particular direct input system. Although all direct input systems perform virtually the same tasks, there is a large number of suppliers and great variety in the hardware and software. Generally the basic principles of usage are the same, but the detailed learning and fairly lengthy accustomisation period reduces the substitutability of the sub-editors.

The overall effect might be a reduction in mobility and a greater mutual dependence between the sub and the employer. A sub seems likely to be less willing to leave a newspaper having once become familiar with the system, and the managers may be more inclined to attempt to retain their trained subs. This situation seems to be exacerbated by a decline in the number of journalists who want to train to be sub-editors. Both managers and journalists in the provincial newspaper industry have already acknowledged a skills shortage in subs. The NUJ attributes it to the greater intensity of work and extra stress caused by direct input, whilst managers stress demographic changes.

The lower substitutability of subs and the increased immediacy of the subbing department, coupled to the skills shortage, has theoretically increased the bargaining power of the subs, however as yet this has not materialised into either a claim for higher subs wages or a concerted effort by NUJ chapels to increase staffing levels in the subs department. The promotional need to act - more pay for subs - was cited by a number of the chapels in the sample, and has been recognised by some managers; this was reflected in the higher technology payments made to the subs at some newspapers. Chapels have not acted to secure higher

increases for subs during the post-direct input pay round bargaining, but instead seem to be relying on increasing the subs' pay with the next stage of new technology: on-screen page make-up.

The defensive need to act (increasing the number of subs) has been identified by the NUJ, and most chapels have requested that management increase staffing levels in subbing departments. Managers are reluctant to increase the overall number of subs, but are prepared to keep staffing level constant. However, some newspapers, particularly in the south, are finding it difficult to retain subs, and replace them when they leave largely because, journalists claim, the salaries do not compensate for the intensity and responsibility of the work. Increasingly, subs are moving to other forms of journalism - particularly PR - whilst journalists wishing to become subs are attracted to areas of the country with a lower cost of living - especially where house prices are lower.

Control over the strategic contingencies of production seems to have been transferred from the printworkers to the editorial floor, although it is concentrated in the sub-editing department. Much of the latent power possessed by the NGA has been transferred with the production tasks. However this raises the question of whether the journalists will use latent power to push back the frontier of control between themselves and managers. There was a period during the introduction stage of direct input when journalists operationalised power; the development of control amongst journalists may have seemed a very real prospect to those within the industry and observers.

Chapter four demonstrated that the NUJ had achieved considerable success in coercing management to negotiate the introduction of direct input using New Technology Agreements. Not only did these agreements cover the limiting of the negative aspects of new technology, but also provided for new technology payments, and sought influence over aspects which previously had been seen as the sole prerogative of managers: job design issues and labour transfer.

At this stage, it appeared that the journalists, through the NUJ, had taken over the bargaining power of the NGA and were exercising increased control. They were setting the agenda for bargaining, and securing their declared objectives in the negotiation process. However, the particular circumstances of the introduction process should be borne in mind since these point to the likelihood of the control transfer being temporary rather than permanent. Three features stand out.

First, management were dependent upon the full cooperation of the journalists and could not afford to alienate them at such a critical juncture. The NTAs were useful enabling agreements, and subsequently some clauses have not been implemented in full by management - particularly since there was little fear of militant action being taken over issues such as ergonomics. Moreover, the NTAs provided managers with a route to a more important immediate target: the dismantling of traditional print tasks without confrontation. The granting of favourable NTAs for the NUJ was undoubtedly the price management were prepared to pay for removing control from the NGA.

The second feature of the negotiations was the leading role taken by the NUJ head office. The weakness of the branch structure forced head office to deal directly with chapels in coordinating the negotiations at local level. They wrote and collected a large amount of reference material with which to prepare potential chapel negotiators, arranged conferences and workshops for the F/MoCs, and where possible, ensured that a full-time officer was participating in the negotiations at local level. Most of the success can be attributed to the farsightedness of the NUJ officers in developing a technology policy that was based on the practical experiences of journalists in other countries; was easy for journalists with no knowledge of direct input to comprehend; could be easily adapted to varying local circumstances; and could provide a structured, stage by stage, negotiating procedure. The model agreement is either a masterpiece of policy drafting, or a wonderful example of serendipity.

The third feature that accounts for the strength of the journalists during the introduction negotiations is the solidarity they displayed. Direct input was very much an unknown quantity, and consequently, although journalists undoubtedly had preconceptions about its likely effect, they had no first hand experience. Since they were unaware of the differing effects it was likely to have upon the various editorial workers, they were drawn closer together as a workgroup because of the uncertainty of the change process. Direct input provided a single focus that has ceased to exist after the introduction of new technology

because of the differing experiences of the editorial departments. Some of these varying effects were accounted for in the detail of the NTAs, although the NUJ deliberately minimised the potential workgroup rifts; the most obvious example being the advocacy of across-the-board technology pay, even though it was evident that some editorial workers would be required to make larger adjustments in their working practices and undertake more training than others.

Direct input provided the chapels with a purpose for collective action, a willingness to act, and a set of clear objectives. It focused the collective interest of the editorial workers and perhaps over-stated the commonality of goals, but nevertheless achieved solidarity within each chapel which led to successful bargaining irrespective of the density of the NUJ membership, the type of newspaper, the publishing location or the date when the negotiations took place. This seems even more remarkable considering that all negotiations occurred at local level. In fact local level bargaining appears to have helped achieve better results, since where newspapers belonged to groups, and were subjected to corporate influences, the overall NTAs were not as favourable to journalists, and technology pay increases were often not as large.

Given these particular mitigating factors, the post-introduction continuation of control should not be seen as inevitable. In fact, embedded in the new technology itself, the journalistic work process, and the values and culture of the industry and the journalists, there are other factors that seriously inhibit the maintenance of

control.

Journalists and Workplace Control

The first of the factors that has prevented an overall shift of control in the journalists' favour concerns control over production. Although power seems to have been transferred through a change in the influence of journalists over the strategic contingencies of production, control is restricted to the operational aspects of the new technology, and does not apply to control over the labour market. The NGA's closed shop ensured that the union monitored and regulated entry to the labour market and influenced the distribution of tasks within the workplace. The appointment of staff and the allocation of work is not regulated by the NUJ. It has achieved neither a closed shop nor professional self-regulation.

In the case of the closed shop, its post-entry policy has been hampered by the existence of an alternative 'union' - the Institute of Journalists - which offers a less unionate form of collectivism. NUJ membership fluctuates with the turnover of staff, although the Union is successful in retaining a residual membership of over 50% at nearly all daily newspapers and at the majority of weekly paid-for publications. But even where there is a high NUJ density, chapels have no influence over the labour market.

An additional problem is the presence of an external labour market - freelance journalists - who limit NUJ control. Although many are members of the Union, there can be a conflict of interests between the fulltime staff and

freelance journalists - effectiveness of industrial action is invariably undermined by the existence of this alternative external workforce. In theory, new technology allows management to make more use of freelance journalists, since there is easier transmission of copy and pictures, but in practice, provincial newspapers have not increased the amount of freelance material, although the option to do so, especially during industrial action, is a contingency that would allow continued production of the newspaper.

It might be argued that the failure to achieve a union closed shop amongst white-collar, middle class workers is not surprising, however, the NUJ has had no success in controlling the labour supply through professional self-management of training, ethics and discipline. Many companies fail to comply with the training provisions laid down by the National Council for the Training of Journalists, others run their own training schemes, and there are many working journalists without any professional qualifications. The press card, supplied by the NUJ - unlike, for example, the Equity card - is not an employment requirement and carries with it no special privileges - it is nothing more than an identity card. The NUJ does have a code of ethical conduct and a disciplinary procedure, but non-NUJ journalists do not have to comply with the code, whilst many NUJ members frequently infringe it without suffering any repercussions. The disciplinary procedure is somewhat ineffective since the ultimate sanction of withdrawing a journalist's union membership is of little significance when such membership is not a prerequisite for

practising journalism; it is not like being debarred, defrocked or struck off.

The production control of the NGA rested on two pillars of power: operational dominance over production and control of the labour supply. The operational aspects of production control have been transferred and consequently the journalists do possess a great deal of latent power, however this is diluted by the failure to control - or even influence - the labour supply. However, this second aspect could not really be expected to transfer; it was not a direct consequence of the NGA's relationship to production tasks, but developed from its historical craft roots.

The development of control is further inhibited by the increasing divisions within the editorial department - especially between the reporters and the sub-editors - not only in terms of the tasks they perform, as cited above, but also in their attitudes. The discussion of production control revealed that the power has largely been transferred to the subbing department since it has extended its influence over the production process. The subs have therefore become the key workers in the production process and have enhanced their core role because it is they who have the greatest strategic contingency control over production. This is associated with the extra skills that subs have had to learn. Although reporters have been reskilled by the computerisation of the editorial process, the subs have been upskilled: they have taken on extra skills rather than just adapting their existing skills.

The fact that reporters and subs use the technology in totally different ways is reflected in the diversity of

their attitudes towards the system. Amongst the editorial workers, the subs have the greatest negative orientation to the new technology because they use it for longer periods, and perceive it to have intensified their work. In particular they experience greater isolation at work which may reduce their collective consciousness towards each other, as well as towards the wider editorial workforce who share different concerns about the new technology. Again this demonstrates a paradox of direct input. It has increased the pervasiveness of the subbing department and has integrated the editorial tasks more closely, yet the consequence has not been to bring journalists closer together. In fact, it has brought to light the increasing diversity of editorial tasks and has limited the contact of the in-office workers by intensifying the work of the subs, and erecting a physical barrier between them: the VDUs. For reporters based at the main office, increased isolation does not seem to have occurred, but for those working in district offices, there seems to be less verbal and physical contact with the main office and the subbing department, because copy is transmitted via modems, and this might become a source of discontent.

These differing experiences and attitudes are also evident in the positive feelings towards new technology. Generally journalists derive greater work satisfaction following the introduction of direct input, although this arises for different reasons. The reporters tend to stress the computer skills and the 'clean copy' they can now produce - in fact this is largely an aesthetic improvement, although some reporters claim that by allowing them greater

manipulation of text, direct input gives them the opportunity to create better copy. This may of course be a bargaining ploy, and managers generally reject the notion that new technology can improve the quality of the writing.

The subs cite the main reason for greater satisfaction as being their increased control over the production process, and they seem prepared to offset the negative effects, such as work intensification, against this. Generally the negative attitudes to the technology appear to be associated with poor ergonomics leading to aches and pains, and an unpleasant working environment. Theoretically these aspects may have provided a rallying call, bringing the journalists together, but in fact there is virtually no evidence of this, perhaps because the journalists are inclined to see these negative effects as less important when set against their positive feelings towards job satisfaction. In addition, the intensity of negative feelings will depend upon the extent and type of usage of the system, and so will vary across the editorial departments. Journalists will have different opinions as to what constitutes the most important negative effect, and consequently will have different sets of priorities in dealing with the issues.

Furthermore, the overall 'will to act' in a collective manner over the negative aspects of direct input is undoubtedly held back by the journalistic culture. There is an emphasis on meeting the deadlines, with the failure to do so displaying incompetence or a lack of 'professionalism'. This culture has probably been nurtured by managers and owners, since missing a deadline costs

money, but it is embodied within the NCTJ training objectives and is extolled as a virtue by the journalists themselves. Even if it was originally the imposition of a type of industrial production discipline by management, it has now become embedded in journalistic culture and remains unchanged by new technology, despite the extra pressures that direct input puts on the subs in meeting the deadlines.

This dominant culture therefore negates the advantages that the subs may have acquired through their increased immediacy in production. They may be able to halt or disrupt production far more easily as a result of new technology, but their will to do so has not altered. This is well illustrated by the screen break issue: subs at many of the newspapers have the right to take screen breaks, yet they refuse to do so because of the effects upon production. Even where the ergonomics are very poor and journalists have incurred aches and pains as a result of the new technology, screen breaks are not taken. The subs complain loudly, yet are not prepared to take their allowed regular breaks, let alone consider collective action.

For other editorial workers, the regular break issue is less important since there are natural breaks in the work. As a consequence they do not recognise a need to act, although they may acknowledge the need amongst subs. The cultural factors and the differences between the subs and other editorial workers limit the development of a will to take action. This may reflect the inexperience of journalists in having to face health and safety problems. Such problems are more usually associated with blue collar

work, thus direct input may have brought with it a new set of working environment issues that journalists may be reluctant to confront with industrial action. Particularly notable is the emergence of recognised industrial injuries, such as tenosynovitis, which may coerce journalists into action since such injuries do not merely cause discomfort: they prevent a journalist from continuing in his or her job.

Direct input has changed the agenda of issues over which the need to act may arise, and in addition it has affected control actualisation in two further ways. First, it has increased the options over the type of industrial action by making disruptive activity easier through the changed pervasiveness and immediacy of the journalists, however differences between the editorial workers, in terms of their identification of a need to act and their willingness to act, might give rise to different perceptions of the appropriateness of action.

Secondly, the collectivism of action may be less of a requirement than prior to direct input. In elevating the production role of the subs, the technology allows collective action within this area to have a much greater impact, thus general collective action across the whole of the editorial workforce may no longer be necessary. Although, as outlined above, there are reasons for supposing subs' militancy will not occur, the possibility remains, especially where there is a high density of NUJ membership in the subbing department.

In addition to enhancing the effectiveness of partially collective activity, direct input also allows greater scope

for individual action. Journalists can now engage in industrial sabotage through technological disruption, or could cause problems through purposeful bad practice - these techniques are being discovered by journalists, especially as they become more familiar with the systems. Knowing a system's vulnerability and how to slow it down may become an effective industrial sanction. The particular problem for management is that this sort of action does not necessarily have to be coordinated by the NUJ - an individual journalist with a grievance could take action. Perhaps a comparable example is a dissatisfied computer programmer who puts a bug in the system before resigning or after being sacked. Journalists would not be able to change the software, but could cause severe disruption. In a more anecdotal vein, the point is well illustrated by one of the case study newspapers that lost all overnight copy because a cleaner inadvertently bumped into one of the CPUs with a vacuum cleaner.

General collectivism amongst the editorial workforce does not seem to have been enhanced by direct input. The solidarity amongst the journalists that occurred during the introduction process has, since then, only manifested itself at a few newspapers. This tends to have been for defensive rather than promotional reasons. The more general picture is that instead of building on their collective strength, chapels have relapsed into inactivity. Instead of the gains made by the introduction negotiations giving them confidence, it has led to apathy. On the other hand, there has not been the backlash against collectivism that some NUJ officials prophesied: that once direct input was

operational, the advantages of being in the NUJ would diminish. In fact provincial newspaper journalists can be characterised largely as having a collectivist orientation. This is evident not only from the high membership of the NUJ, and the unionate attitudes displayed, but also by the presence of the IoJ. Unlike many comparable white collar workers, journalists not only have a union, but also have an alternative collective organisation. This is all the more surprising since individualism is a characteristic of journalistic work, so collectivism is not encouraged by the working environment or working practices, yet journalists do perceive benefits in combining collectively for bargaining purposes.

The implications for individualism and collectivism of direct input are obvious from the above discussion. The advantages of collective organisation may diminish if the various editorial workgroups are subject to differing experiences and develop different priorities and interests that lead bargaining objectives to become more diverse. Direct input may have diversified editorial work tasks and production relationships to such an extent that the shared interests and collective advantages are realigned to match the sub-groups on the editorial floor, rather than the whole editorial workforce. This may be comparable with the NGA whose chapels were organised by task - with, for example, chapels of composers being far more powerful than chapels of readers.

Finally, perhaps one of the most important factors in the inability of the journalists to build upon the gains made during the introduction process and exert the same

control as the print workers, has been the NUJ internal structure. The lack of a strong branch organisation helped to secure successful NTAs by forcing head office to coordinate the negotiations, but ironically, post-introduction, its absence has allowed chapels to slip back into apathy. Again this contrasts with the NGA whose branch structure had an important industrial role in coordinating activity within and between chapels. The somewhat anomalous position of the NUJ branches has been a long running point of contention within the NUJ and a committee has been set up to review its role in the union structure, although if restructuring goes ahead it will be too late to build on the control gains made through the NTA bargaining. In short, the NUJ structure is inappropriate for a workforce in ascendancy. There is an overall lack of internal discipline and coordination - the two aspects that made the union very successful in achieving notable gains during the process of introducing technological change.

A New Management Offensive?

Workplace control temporarily shifted in the favour of journalists whilst new technology was being introduced. Since then, there are still clear areas of latent power, which constitute production control, that remain in the hands of the journalists - particularly the sub-editors. This raises the question of whether there has been an attempt by managers to regain those control aspects that direct input has transferred to the journalists from the printers.

The re-establishment of managerial control might be

sought through increasing workforce flexibility. By establishing a flexible, multi-skilled core workforce, and a numerically flexible peripheral workforce, managers could more easily match employment to production, breakdown internal demarcation, and increase worker substitutability. In the context of newspapers this would mean the use of more freelance journalists, increasing numbers of outworking staff reporters, and the introduction of reporter-subs, and photo-journalists, or the development of multi-skilled journalists. In fact the data collected showed no significant move to this flexible firm scenario. Furthermore, evidence suggests that there seems to be increasing demarcation of task between the journalists, and attempts by a few newspapers to get reporters to carry cameras for head-and-shoulder shots have been rebuffed strongly by journalists.

An alternative policy for re-establishing control might be to reduce collectivism amongst the workforce. To do this individualistic employment policies would have to be adopted in order to isolate journalists and reduce their awareness of a common interest or the need for collective organisation for protective and promotional reasons. This strategy has already been adopted by a number of provincial newspaper managers.

Personal pay contracts are being introduced at some newspapers to replace the house agreements and new technology agreements. This move seems to have been led by Thomson Regional Newspapers who insisted that all pay increases in the 1987/88 pay round were conditional on signing personal pay contracts. Interpretation of this at

local level varied considerably, and so whilst some journalists received no pay increase because of a refusal to sign the new contracts, others were given a pay increase without signing. The NUJ policy was that none of these contracts should be signed, and consequently those journalists who did sign were obliged to leave the union. At the TRN title in Reading this has meant that there is no longer an NUJ chapel.

Recently other newspaper managers have adopted the 'individual contract' policy: Southern Evening News (Southern Newspapers Ltd), Kent Messenger Group, Wiltshire Newspapers (Westminster Press group), Aldershot News series (Guardian and Manchester Evening News Ltd.), Essex Chronicle series (Northcliffe Newspapers), and Plymouth's Western Morning News & Evening Herald (Northcliffe Newspapers). The managers at the Brighton Evening Argus (Westminster Press group) have terminated the House Agreement and New Technology Agreement and have made individual pay rises, but the NUJ chapel expects to be offered a new agreement combining aspects of the house agreement and the NTA.

At the Newcastle Chronicle & Journal (TRN) the House Agreement has been replaced with a simplified document restricting the range of issues recognised for collective bargaining. At the Yorkshire Evening Press (Westminster Press), where the chapel has always been weak (density of 40% - October 1985) management have recently introduced individual contracts that put bargaining on an individual basis and amended the grievance procedures by replacing the right to have a union official as a representative, with

the right to have a 'work colleague' present.

These examples give rise to the question of whether managers have the intention of marginalising the NUJ, with the ultimate purpose of derecognition. Although surveys such as those of Millward and Stevens (1986) and Marginson et al (1988) found no significant move to derecognition, a trend of derecognition across a range of industries was identified by a Labour Research survey. It identified 23 attempts to derecognise an established trade union or trade unions between January 1987 and January 1988, of which only three were unsuccessful. Of these 20 derecognitions, four were NUJ book publishing chapels (Labour Research, 1988 April). Further survey evidence is examined by Towers (1988) who concludes, 'Whilst it is clear that there is currently no major movement towards derecognition by British employers, what was once extremely rare is now becoming more commonplace and, in some sectors, derecognition initiatives seem to be becoming almost fashionable' (1988, p.184). In a footnote he cites publishing as a prominent 'fashionable' sector.

Whilst there does seem to be a trend towards marginalisation of the NUJ, it is misleading to argue that it has been consistent, or constitutes derecognition. At TRN, according to NUJ national officers, the Edinburgh publishing centre has not been affected; Belfast, Newcastle and Aberdeen have reduced house agreements but retain collective pay bargaining; Blackburn, Cardiff, Chester, Merthyr Tydfil and Middlesbrough have had their house agreements abandoned with personal pay contracts offered to senior editorial staff, but with NUJ grievance

representation intact; and Reading has extensive personal pay contracts, no NUJ chapel and management positively discouraging NUJ membership.

Some NUJ officials and members argue that the ultimate managerial goal is to deunionise the newspaper industry. The first step was the removal of the NGA through the introduction of direct input, and the next stage is derecognition of the NUJ. In short they are suggesting that managers are on the offensive. They cite TRN as the prime example of a 'union busting' company, and argue that its strategy emanates from the International Thomson Organisation Ltd (ITOL) head office in New York. This is in part supported by figures which show that TRN titles have traditionally been amongst the newspapers with the highest NUJ density. A far more satisfactory explanation relates to the increased competition and changing product market with the arrival of new technology. The Thomson organisation has been restructured over the last three years, the titles within the group now have a different relationship with ITOL Head Office, and the middle tier (the TRN divisional management) has fewer functions. There is greater local level managerial accountability because each publishing centre has become an autonomous profit centre. This allows managers to pursue the industrial relations policy they deem to be most appropriate in order to secure their individual financial targets that have been set by head office. Consequently, it is hardly surprising that the diversity of TRN titles in terms of circulation, publishing location, turnover, staffing levels and profitability should be reflected in a diversity of industrial relations

strategy. Elsewhere I have argued that there has been a move within ITOL to a human resource management centred strategy at corporate level and that this has caused local managers to reappraise their functions and the nature of industrial relations (see Personnel Review 1989 Vol.18 No.4).

The problem with the derecognition thesis is that it treats as homogeneous what may be a diverse and complex set of industrial relations strategies, as the Thomson titles illustrate. Furthermore, it elevates these 'strategies' of labour control to prime importance. Whilst there are managers who undoubtedly have learned lessons from their experiences with the NGA over labour control, it is somewhat tenuous to claim that managers fear the takeover of control by journalists. The preceding chapters have shown that whilst latent power has been transferred, control has not. The lack of transferred control is not related to the strength of management in negotiations, or post introduction policies, but is due to inhibiting factors inherent in journalistic work, workplace organisation, attitudes, and workgroup orientations.

The move towards policies that encourage individualism rather than collectivism might be a recognition by managers of the control potential of the workgroup, and therefore an attempt to halt its development at an early stage. On the other hand it may represent an increased managerial confidence due to the elimination of the NGA, and a requirement both to develop the product in order to remain competitive, and to contain costs in the light of the large capital investment in new technology (or imminent capital

investment). Attempting to marginalise the NUJ may therefore be a means of controlling one area of uncertainty in financial planning; it might thus be a welcomed by-product rather than an end in itself.

Overall, managers are attempting to prevent the expansion of control by journalists, rather than embarking on an employers offensive. However, particular newspapers may have managers who see opportunities for control push, and increasingly the type of workplace control may differ from newspaper to newspaper. Therefore, new technology seems to have transformed workplace control, although it cannot dictate the extent or nature of this transformation in the long term. Given that the present situation is perhaps a honeymoon period for the journalists and the NUJ, the thesis concludes with speculations about the future.

New Technology and Control: Future Developments

The most significant developments are likely to occur amongst the sub-editors, not only because of their increased importance to production through direct input, but also because the introduction of on-screen page make-up is likely to enhance their centrality further. Their distinct attitudes, new skills and new experiences of work might consequently lead to the sub-editors identifying themselves as an élite workgroup. Increasingly, they might isolate themselves from other journalists and seek higher wages and better conditions by using their latent power of immediacy as a bargaining tool. However, this would depend upon the development of a strong workgroup consciousness and the adoption of a much more militant attitude, no

evidence of which can be found in the research. It may require the NUJ to focus its attention on achieving 100 per cent density in the subbing departments, as opposed to across the workforce in general.

Alternatively, managers might acknowledge the special role of the subs and could attempt to reduce the development of a strong workgroup consciousness through the use of employment policies directed to the individual as opposed to the workgroup. This may in fact be costly, with subs enjoying high salaries and improved conditions of work - especially if demographic changes exacerbate the skills shortage that already exists. But such costly policies may be the price managers have to pay - and are willing to pay - in order to prevent the emergence of a collective workgroup consciousness and the development of control amongst the subs.

Further changes in technology might also provide managers with choices which will affect the development of control. On-screen page make-up raises questions of work allocation. Does one upskill subs, or should new editorial workers be introduced, such as on-screen graphic artists? How should worktasks be split, and how would such groups interact with each other? Some managers are fearful that it would lead to the rebirth of craft unionism and so are advocating flexibility amongst the subs. But such wide multi-skilling may pose problems over quality and speed of production.

Some newspaper managers have strong reservations about the supposed advantages of on-screen page make-up and are looking into alternative systems, especially page-planning

systems, such as the one used by The Independent. Technological developments might therefore lead to greater diversity in production techniques from newspaper to newspaper, and differences in the levels of control exerted by key workers.

Furthermore, there may be greater diversity in the organisation of news gathering. Reporters can be more easily distributed around a region either in district offices or working from home. This seems increasingly likely for the future, since much of the pre-subbing stages are individualistic. An increased number of small district offices seems most feasible since this not only 'flies the flag' for the company but provides an easily accessible way to place adverts, and enhances local coverage, so consequently may improve sales. It also maintains management's daily control and contact more effectively than homeworking - or telecommuting - whilst inhibiting the development of a strong workgroup consciousness amongst journalists.

Speculation aside, the transfer of production tasks to the editorial department, has increased the latent power of journalists, and in the short term, enhanced their control. Consequently, the 'frontier of control' is at present in a state of flux, but in the long term it will be redrawn along very different lines because technology increases the diversity between journalists at different newspapers, and between editorial workgroups within newspapers. As technological change continues, managers are likely to develop control push to enhance their managerial flexibility at local level, so for the journalists to hold

back the frontier - let alone push it in their favour - they must convince management that they can exert workplace control and are prepared to do so. Evidence from this research suggests that they are seriously inhibited in both respects.

APPENDIX A

NUJ-NGA Joint Initiative on Direct Input

NUJ/NGA AGREEMENT: DIRECT INPUT IN
PROVINCIAL NEWSPAPERS.

The National Union of Journalists and the National Graphical Association (1982) have concluded the terms of the following agreement to provide for the introduction of Direct Input into provincial newspaper offices. Both unions agree that Direct Input will only be introduced on the basis of prior joint union agreement with the employer. This agreement sets out the terms to be included in such agreements.

All negotiations with employers for the introduction of new technology as outlined in this agreement will only be undertaken jointly by both unions at national officer level with branch and chapel involvement.

1. General Principles

- A. There will be a NUJ/NGA linking arrangement in any office where Direct Input new technology is introduced and where NGA members transfer.
- B. The unions commit themselves to maintain and increase trade union membership on the introduction of Direct Input new technology.
- C. The unions commit themselves to reach an agreed training programme for those NGA members moving into editorial work.
- D. The introduction of new technology shall not result in any compulsory redundancy.
- E. The unions commit themselves to support a policy whereby only trade union members are allowed access to the Direct Input new technology.
- F. There should be no diminution of wages and conditions for Journalists or NGA members. The principle to be followed should be that of "levelling-up" of wages/ conditions wherever this is possible with the introduction of new technology.

2. Distribution of Work

- A. Staff journalists will have the facility to directly input copy they originate without the need for re-keying by compositor members of the NGA.
- B. Page planning, page lay-out or dummyping will continue to be undertaken by journalists in the traditional manner by marking up page lay-outs on paper. VDTs will not be used by journalists for this purpose or to make-up and assemble pages.

- C. The retention of the following work is the exclusive province of the NGA and its members, including retention of exclusive bargaining rights by the NGA:
- i) The input of contributed copy in whatever form - and in whichever area it's undertaken - eg. letters, correspondence copy, agency material, sporting fixtures, results, etc.
 - ii) All separate reading and correcting functions.
 - iii) The make-up and assembly of pages, any parts or sections of pages, or any material inside a page, will continue to be undertaken solely by members of the NGA, in whatever form by hot metal, paste-up and/or the operation of VDTs.
- D. The principles in paragraphs B and C (iii) above will be observed for a period of not less than 5 years by both unions.
- E. The NGA will continue to represent and negotiate conditions for its members involved in origination work (Inputting, Reading, Correcting, Make-up, Assembly, Photo-typesetting, Computer operating etc) irrespective of the department where those members are situated and are performing those operations, excluding those referred to in clause 3B below.

3. Re-deployed Members into the Editorial Area

- A. In deciding the numbers to be transferred - which shall be additional staff - the NUJ and NGA shall take account of the following considerations:
- i) there will be no compulsory redundancy of members of either union
 - ii) the number of NGA members affected by the diminution of work in the composing area
 - iii) the introduction of direct entry technology into the editorial area
 - iv) the slower process of sub-editing on screen
 - v) maintaining a journalistic career structure without acting to the detriment of the overriding principles of this agreement.
- B. The NGA accepts that NGA members who transfer into the editorial area on editorial functions (reporting and sub-editing) will be represented by the NUJ for collective and individual bargaining purposes.

- C. NGA members who transfer into the editorial area on editorial functions (reporting and sub-editing) will remain in membership of the NGA and continue to pay their subscriptions directly to the NGA.
- D. NGA members who transfer to the editorial area on editorial functions (reporting and sub-editing) will also become full members of the NUJ, they will not be required to pay subscriptions to the NUJ, but would be subject to NUJ industrial control from National, branch and chapel level.
- E. The subscription arrangements set out in this agreement will be observed for a period of not less than 5 years.

4. Joint Chapel Arrangements

- A. It is envisaged that there will be two chapels in the origination area of all newspapers - an editorial chapel and a production chapel.
- B. The editorial chapel will include all journalists and NUJ/NGA members employed on sub-editing or reporting who have been transferred from the production chapel to editorial area.
- C. The production chapel will include all NGA members who are involved in the inputting of contributed copy, reading and correcting functions, page make-up, operating photo-typesetters, computers and any other ancillary processes etc.
- D. The editorial chapel has sole authority to negotiate on any issues which affect the editorial area, but will not enter into industrial disputes of any kind without prior reference and agreement with the production chapel, and both unions as set out below.
- E. The production chapel will operate under exactly the same terms of reference as the editorial chapel and will not enter into industrial disputes without prior reference and agreement to the editorial chapel, and both unions, as set out below.
- F. FoC/MoCs of both unions will be entitled to attend all committee and chapel meetings of both unions.
- G. Additionally, a joint NUJ/NGA chapel will be established in each new technology house which will operate on the basis of joint meetings of all NUJ and NGA members to elect joint chapel officers.
- H. A joint NUJ/NGA chapel committee consisting of equal numbers of NGA and NUJ representatives will be established at each house where new technology is introduced.

- I. Any industrial problems that cannot be resolved by discussions between the chapels and the company will be referred to the Joint Chapel Committee (or if necessary the full joint chapel) who will involve full-time officials from both unions.
- J. At any subsequent meetings with the company, full-time officials of both unions will be present at negotiations with a view to satisfactorily resolving the matter.
- K. If the matter remains unresolved, and it is not possible for the two chapels to arrive at a common recommendation on how to pursue the problem, the chapels, the full-time officials and representatives of each union's Executive will meet to try to arrive at a common position on the issue.
- L. If a common position is agreed, the matter will then be pursued by both unions jointly in negotiations with the company. If no satisfactory resolution is obtained through negotiations, both unions may jointly pursue official industrial action and picket lines will be respected.
- M. Should it not be possible for the two unions to arrive at a common agreement, each individual union will reserve the right to pursue the matter unilaterally.
- N. There will be a Joint Standing Committee which will consist of the NUJ/NGA representatives who negotiated this agreement, who will supervise its implementation.

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APPENDIX B

Questionnaire for the Workgroup Survey

JOURNALISTS AND NEW TECHNOLOGY

This questionnaire is part of an independent research project concerning journalistic work and new technology in provincial newspapers. Although it has been distributed via the NUJ, all the responses will be kept in the strictest confidence. To ensure this anonymity, the NUJ (and yourselves) will have access to the results of the survey, but not to the individual questionnaires.

I hope you can spare the time to complete the questionnaire - it'll take about 15 minutes. Please return it to your FOC/MOC.

Thank you.

Mike Noon

Researcher, Imperial College of Science and Technology, London.

1/ Please tick your job category.

Reporter Sub editor Features Sport Other

2/ How long have you been working for this newspaper?

3/ How many years in total have you been a journalist?

4/ Please list any full-time jobs other than journalism that you have done for more than two years.

.....

5/ Have you ever attended a journalist training course?

NCTJ Post-entry

In-house training scheme at this paper

In-house training scheme at another paper

Pre-entry journalist course

No opportunity to attend course

Other (please specify).....

6/ How long did you attend for?

7/ Do you think all juniors nowadays should be obliged to attend a training course? Yes No

8/ Who do you think is best suited to run training courses?

An independent body advised by journalists and employers

The newspaper where the trainee is employed

An organisation run totally by journalists

Other body, eg. education authority.....

Journalistic Work

9/ Would you say your job was a:

Craft Trade Profession Other (specify)

Why?

10/ Below is a list of qualities that a senior journalist might possess. Please number them in order of importance. If you want to add any extra qualities, please do so.

ability to absorb information

ability to write quickly and concisely

competent office skills (typing, shorthand)

outgoing personality

good analytical powers

good knowledge of grammar

sense of news value

.....

.....

11/ Who should devise a code of ethical conduct for journalists?

newspaper owners and managers

the government

the public

journalists themselves

an independent body representing all groups

other body (please specify).....

there is no need for a code of ethical conduct

12/ If there was an organisation to discipline journalists for misconduct, who should be represented on such a body?

journalists

owners and managers

lawyers (eg. solicitors, magistrates)

public appointed representatives

others? (please specify).....

there is no need for a disciplinary body

Technology	much less	slightly less	same	slightly more	much more
13/ Would you have liked more or less training on how to use the new equipment?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
14/ Has the introduction of new technology made meeting the news deadline more or less difficult?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15/ Are you more or less able to control the pace at which you work?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
16/ Does technology make it more or less difficult for your superiors to measure the amount of work you produce?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
17/ Does the new technology mean you spend more or less time at your desk?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
18/ Do you think technology has made you more or less productive each week?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
19/ Do you think new technology makes journalists more or less likely to produce better quality work?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
20/ Does new technology make it easier for journalists to move to another newspaper?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
21/ Has technology made your working environment more or less healthy and safe?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
22/ Does the new technology make your job more or less difficult?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

How?.....

23/ Does the VDU make you feel more or less isolated from other journalists?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
--	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------

Why?.....

24/ Has technology made your job more or less satisfying?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
---	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------

In what way?.....

- | | | | | | | |
|-----|---|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 25/ | Would you describe your job as more or less skilled since the introduction of new technology? | much
less | slightly
less | same | slightly
more | much
more |
| | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

In what way?.....

- 26/ Which **one** of the following statements do you most agree with?

Technology has made my job less monotonous

Technology has made my job more monotonous

Technology has not affected the monotony of the job

Technology has replaced old monotonous aspects with new ones

There are no monotonous aspects to my job

Workgroup organisation

- 27/ Which **ONE** of the following statements do you most agree with.

1. Journalists should have an organisation through which they bargain with management over pay, conditions, technology, etc.

2. Journalists should have an organisation to represent them for individual grievances, but decision-making over pay, conditions, technology, etc. should be left to management.

3. There is no need for any such organisation for journalists.

- | | Yes | No | Don't know |
|--|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 28/ Is the NUJ affiliated to the TUC? | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 29/ Should it be affiliated? | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 30/ Do you think journalists are ever justified in taking industrial action? (eg. strike, work to rule, go slow, etc.) | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

- 31/ The following is a list of aims which the NUJ could pursue. Please number them in order of importance.

To protect journalists against redundancy or dismissal

To negotiate with management for better wages & conditions

To try and achieve professional recognition for journalists

To provide a forum for serious debate of journalists matters

To organise social events for journalists

To deal with the problems of individual members

To achieve 100% membership

Some other aim (specify).....

- 32/ Please state why you are a member of the NUJ ?

.....

APPENDIX C

NUJ Model New Technology Agreement

AGREEMENT BETWEEN

and

The National Union of Journalists

and

The National Graphical Association (1982)

I N D E X

INTRODUCTION 1

SCOPE OF THE AGREEMENT 1

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES 2

TRAINING AND RECRUITMENT 2

JOB SECURITY 3

HEALTH AND SAFETY 4

WORKING ENVIRONMENT 4

TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR TRANSFEREES 5

TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR NGA MEMBERS 6

TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR NUJ MEMBERS 6

MONITORING AND DURATION OF THE AGREEMENT 6

DISPUTES AND DIFFERENCES 7

THE AGREEMENT 7

1. Introduction

1.1

1.2 The agreement provides for the introduction and operation of a computer controlled editorial direct input system and is in addition to existing agreements between the Company and the NUJ and the Company and the NGA.

1.3 No union member will be made redundant as a consequence of the operation of this agreement.

2. Scope of the Agreement

2.1 The Company agrees that staff journalists will input their own copy into the system via VDUs or portable transmission units. They will not be required to perform inputting functions which they have not done before.

2.2 Telephone copy originated by staff journalists and all editorially acceptable contributed copy received on paper or over the telephone from freelance journalists, contributors or correspondents, will be input into the system by NGA members.

2.3 The Company and the Unions recognise that some contributed copy will need substantial rewriting by staff journalists. When rewritten, such copy will be input into the system by the staff journalist concerned. Where contributed manuscript copy is of poor quality in terms of its legibility, but is editorially acceptable, then it will be input into the system by NGA members.

2.4 Press Association wire service material will be directly received into the system and be subject to the terms of the agreement between the Newspaper Society and the NGA, which limits the use of P.A. to 14,000 words a day or 84,000 words a week.

2.5 In accordance with the provisions of clauses 2.1 to 2.4 copy can be called to screen by sub-editors, subbed, headlined, given typographical

instructions, read and corrected, and then directly output to the phototypesetter(s).

- 2.6 The methods of page make-up will remain unchanged by this agreement and will continue to be undertaken only by NGA members. Page planning, page layout and page dummied operations will continue to be undertaken by staff journalists in the traditional manner by marking up page layouts on paper. Any proposed changes to methods of make-up in the future will be progressed through negotiations and the full adherence to the disputes and differences procedure(s) between the Company and the Unions.
- 2.7 An authorised staff journalist will initial every page in its final form prior to it being passed to the repro and plate-making departments.

3. Employment Opportunities

- 3.1 The Company and the Unions accept that the system will eliminate the work previously undertaken by NGA members and agree that editorial employment opportunities will be made available and offered to suitable NGA members who want to transfer into the editorial department to retrain as journalists.
- 3.2 NGA members who transfer into the editorial department will join the NUJ and remain in membership of the NGA. The NUJ will collectively bargain for them and individually represent them.
- 3.3 The NGA will continue to collectively bargain for and individually represent its members, excluding the NGA member(s) referred to in Clause 3.2.

4. Training and Recruitment

- 4.1 A jointly agreed training programme will aim to ensure that sufficient training is given to each journalist so that he/she is proficient in the use of the new equipment. Training will be given by suitably trained staff and/or the suppliers.

- 4.2 All training will be carried out during normal working hours. The training will be organised to ensure that the journalists' normal work load can be completed during normal working hours. Training will cover the health and safety aspects of using VDUs.
- 4.3 No journalist or prospective trainee will be refused employment because of their previous inexperience with VDUs. The Company will train all new journalists in accordance with clauses 4.1 and 4.2 of the agreement.
- 4.4 The Company will supply each journalist with a comprehensive users manual to the system and its equipment.
- 4.5 NGA members who apply to transfer to the editorial department under Clause 3 of the agreement will be subject to a jointly agreed selection procedure which conforms to the provincial newspaper industry's standards
- 4.6 Successful applicants will undergo a minimum of one year's re-training in line with the National Council for the Training of Journalists' recommendations for adult entrants into journalism.

5. Job Security

- 5.1 The Company guarantees that no journalist will have to leave his/her employment, lose status, position or pay, as a result of the introduction and operation of the agreement.
- 5.2 The Company undertakes not to use any electronic facility for measuring keystrokes to assess a journalist's work performance.
- 5.3 The security of each journalist's private electronic desk or basket will be respected by the Company. Relevant senior editorial staff will only enter the desk with the prior permission of the individual concerned or in exceptional circumstances, with the agreement of an NUJ chapel officer.
- 5.4 The Company agrees that editorial standards should not suffer as a consequence of the introduction and operation of the agreement. To ensure that adequate records are kept, published stories and raw copy will be held for six months either on paper or electronically.

- 5.5 The Company undertakes to ensure that there are sufficient visual display/portable transmission units for all journalists who are required to use them. Visual display units will be used in the Company's offices while portable transmission units may be used by reporters on an assignment.
- 5.6 The Company will inform all journalists of the provisions and implications of the Data Protection Act.

6. Health and Safety

- 6.1 The Company and the Unions agree that short breaks from screen operation will be taken frequently to avoid eye-strain and fatigue. In no case will an employee be required to work continuously on screen for more than _____ without it being followed by a break away from screen work.

- 6.2 An employee who has a permanent health condition precluding him/her from using a VDU, or who believes she may be, or is, pregnant will have the right to transfer from screen work without loss of salary, status or damage to career prospects.

- 6.3 All employees will have an eye-test prior to using visual display/portable transmission units and at least annually thereafter. The results will remain confidential unless the employee wants to use them as evidence under Clause 6.4. The Company agrees that eye-tests can be taken during working hours at a mutually agreed time. The Company will reimburse employees who have an eye-test more frequently than once a year.

- 6.4 If an employee requires spectacles or a change of prescription to use a visual display/portable transmission unit then the Company will reimburse the reasonable cost of such lenses or spectacles. The Company will also pay for contact lenses or plastic lenses where the employee prefers these.

7. Working Environment

- 7.1 The Company and the Unions agree that the following clauses are to avoid unnecessary strain to employees. These clauses will be implemented

prior to the operation of this agreement.

- 7.2 The VDU screen will be able to be tilted and swivelled, detached from the keyboard and have forward and backward mobility. Document holders will be provided if they are required.
- 7.3 Sufficient space will be provided beyond a VDU so that it is possible to look past the screen to momentarily relax the eyes. VDUs will be arranged so that neither the individual nor the screen is facing a window.
- 7.4 Desks will be compatible with VDU use and will have sufficient service area to allow forward and backward mobility of the screen and keyboard. The chair will be adjustable for height and backrest position, be of robust construction and have five feet with attached castors.
- 7.5 All windows will be fitted with adequate adjustable coverings to control natural light and artificial light fittings will have suitable diffusers fitted. The working environment will be organised to avoid bright colours so that glare will be minimised.
- 7.6 The Company will ensure that the temperature and humidity of the workplace is properly regulated and that noise from printers and other equipment is controlled by the fitting of acoustic hoods, etc.
- 7.7 The VDUs will be regularly maintained by qualified personnel to manufacturers' specifications and their reports will be made available on request to representatives of the Joint Chapel.

8. Terms and Conditions for Transferees

- 8.1 It is agreed that the following arrangements will apply to NGA members who transfer to the editorial department under the provisions of Clause 3.1 and 3.2 of this agreement.
- 8.2 For a period of one year (the) transferee(s) will continue to be paid (his/her) their existing basic gross earnings plus average bonus and average overtime of _____ per week.
- 8.3 On the successful completion of one year's training (the) transferee(s) will receive a salary of _____ per week.

8.4 The difference between 8.2 and 8.3 will be multiplied by _____ years and paid as a lump sum to the transferee.

9. Terms and Conditions for NGA Members

9.1 The Company guarantees that there will be no reduction in NGA members' earnings as a consequence of this agreement. It is anticipated that the Company will be able to maintain the work load at a level that will achieve this objective. Should this not be the case then the Company and the NGA chapel will agree measures to achieve maintenance of earnings at the previous normal level.

9.2 NGA members will be entitled to 5 weeks holiday a year.

9.3 Other changes to be negotiated.

10. Terms and Conditions for NUJ Members

10.1 Journalists will receive a new technology payment of _____ a week from the implementation and operation of this agreement.

10.2 Journalists will be entitled to 5 weeks holiday a year.

10.3 Other changes to be negotiated.

11. Monitoring and Duration of the Agreement

11.1 The proposed and actual purchase of the system will be subject to consultation between the Company and the Joint NUJ/NGA Chapel.

11.2 The Company representatives of the Joint Chapel will meet regularly to monitor the operation of the agreement.

11.3 The Agreement will operate for one year and thereafter until such time as either party gives 3 months' notice in writing of the termination of the Agreement.

11.4 The Agreement can be revised by mutual agreement at any time.

12. Disputes and Differences

12.1 In the event of a dispute or difference arising out of the implementation or operation of this agreement then both the Company and the Unions will follow the agreed disputes and differences procedure(s).

12.2 The Company and the Unions may, by mutual agreement only, seek the assistance of an expert on VDUs to resolve a dispute or difference.

13. The Agreement

13.1 The Agreement requires the signature of the Company and the Unions at national and chapel level.

13.2 SIGNED on behalf of:

APPENDIX D

The New Technology Agreement Score System (Methodology)

The model NTA contained 51 separate clauses. For the purposes of the score system, each clause was categorised under one of 10 general headings. The headings were developed from the model agreement and as a result of interviews with NUJ full-time officers. Each of these headings represents a new technology objective of the NUJ, thus each issue (clause) is a component of the objective. The headings were not weighted in importance because NUJ policy was that all the issues were important and had to be covered during negotiations - hence their inclusion in the model agreement. Each clause therefore carries a percentage value associated with its heading classification, however to avoid the over-representation of certain clauses, some were grouped together, and a few were eliminated. Also eliminated were clauses that applied solely to the NGA, and the NGA-associated clauses if a company contracts out its typesetting and printing and consequently has no NGA employees. The resultant objectives and clauses against which the NTAs were measured are listed overleaf. The percentage achievement for each objective was calculated by examining each agreement to see whether the clause was present and had the same meaning as the model. The ten 'objective scores' were then aggregated for each agreement to give a total achievement score.

- 1/ **Joint agreement with the NGA**
- 2/ **Scope**
 - a) No new inputting by NUJ
 - b) Contributed copy - NGA input
 - c) No freelance direct input
 - d) Subbing on screen
 - e) Page make-up unchanged
- 3/ **Employment opportunities**
 - a) Potential for NGA transferees to editorial
 - b) NUJ representation for NGA transferees
- 4/ **Training provision**
 - a) Direct input: joint NUJ-Management agreement
 - b) NGA transferees:
 - i/ selection (joint union-management agreement)
 - ii/ NCTJ or one year minimum training
- 5/ **Security**
 - a) No redundancy of NUJ members
 - b) No NUJ member's loss of status
 - c) No keystroke measurement
 - d) Private 'electronic desk'
 - e) Sufficient terminals in office/use
- 6/ **Health & safety**
 - a) Screen breaks (10 mins per 75 mins continuous work)
 - b) Right of self-transfer for pregnant women
 - c) Right of self-transfer for people with a permanent health condition
 - d) Eye-tests at company expense
 - e) New/changed prescription re-imburement
- 7/ **Ergonomics**
 - a) Appropriate screen type
 - b) Positioning of screen & keyboard
 - c) Furniture
 - d) Lighting
 - e) Humidity/temperature/noise
 - f) Clause guaranteeing consultation over ergonomics
- 8/ **Earnings**
 - a) New technology payments for NUJ members
 - b) Five-weeks' holiday for all NUJ members (including trainees)
- 9/ **Regular review meetings**
- 10/ **Technology disputes procedure**

APPENDIX E

New Technology Agreement Scores

Place of Publ.	Group	Score	Dev.	Sq.Dev.
15 Eastbourne	BNL	98.44	25.99	675.480
6 Norwich	ECN	97.50	25.05	627.503
63 Southampton	SN	95.00	22.55	508.503
41 Burton	BPM	95.00	22.55	508.503
18 Poole	SN	90.94	18.49	341.880
61 London	CN	90.00	17.55	308.003
43 Belfast	IND	90.00	17.55	308.003
67 Dursley	BN	89.38	16.93	286.625
62 Milton Keynes	IND	88.75	16.30	265.690
42 Andover	SN	87.50	15.05	226.503
44 South Shields	NP	86.25	13.80	190.440
26 Coventry	BPM	86.25	13.80	190.440
19 Bristol	BUP	86.25	13.80	190.440
16 Aylesbury	BHNG	86.25	13.80	190.440
14 Mansfield	IND	85.94	13.49	181.980
30 Chesterfield	JN	85.94	13.49	181.980
12 Peterborough	EMAP	85.00	12.55	157.503
23 Brighton	WP	85.00	12.55	157.503
52 Sidcup	IND	83.75	11.30	127.690
73 Mexborough	REED	83.75	11.30	127.690
25 Llandudno	NWWN	83.75	11.30	127.690
65 High Wycombe	WP	82.19	9.74	94.868
68 Wells	IND	80.00	7.55	57.003
49 Down N.I.	IND	78.44	5.99	35.880
66 Darlington	WP	78.44	5.99	35.880
53 Armagh N.I.	IND	78.44	5.99	35.880
78 London	AP	78.33	5.88	34.574
75 London	YA	77.50	5.05	25.503
74 Hertford	SAN	77.50	5.05	25.503
9 Cambridge	BPM	77.50	5.05	25.503
70 Bedford	IND	77.50	5.05	25.503
47 Worcester	REED	76.25	3.80	14.440
11 Lurgan N.I.	IND	76.25	3.80	14.440
36 Slough	IND	73.75	1.30	1.690
33 London	CN	73.75	1.30	1.690
31 Hinckley	IND	73.75	1.30	1.690
60 Chorley	UN	73.33	0.88	0.774
4 Basingstoke	SN	72.81	0.36	0.130
46 Carlisle	CNG	72.19	-0.26	0.068
8 Hartlepool	PSN	71.88	-0.57	0.325
27 Peterborough	SHN	71.25	-1.20	1.440
7 Huddersfield	HDN	70.94	-1.51	2.280
77 Newark	IND	69.06	-3.39	11.492
64 Northampton	UN	68.75	-3.70	13.690
40 Ashton u Lyne	UN	68.33	-4.12	16.974
48 Taunton	REED	67.19	-5.26	27.668
13 Stafford	IND	67.19	-5.26	27.668
5 Sittingbourne	IND	67.19	-5.26	27.668

continued...

Place of Publ.	Group	Score	Dev.	Sq.Dev.
55 Colchester	REED	67.14	-5.31	28.196
17 Sunderland	PSN	66.88	-5.57	31.025
22 Bolton	REED	66.56	-5.89	34.692
28 Merthyr Tydfil	TRN	66.25	-6.20	38.440
54 Blackpool	UN	65.63	-6.82	46.512
29 Cardiff	TRN	64.69	-7.76	60.218
71 Swindon	WP	64.38	-8.07	65.125
45 Sheffield	UN	64.06	-8.39	70.392
57 Southport	TI	63.44	-9.01	81.180
38 Leeds	UN	63.13	-9.32	86.862
37 Newport	UN	62.81	-9.64	92.930
69 Basildon	WP	62.50	-9.95	99.002
10 London	WP	61.88	-10.57	111.725
58 Wigan	UN	61.43	-11.02	121.440
51 Bradford	WP	61.25	-11.20	125.440
59 Yeovil	BUP	60.00	-12.45	155.002
76 Chester	TRN	60.00	-12.45	155.002
20 Blackburn	TRN	59.38	-13.07	170.825
21 Newcastle	TRN	57.81	-14.64	214.330
24 Middlesbrough	TRN	57.50	-14.95	223.502
35 London	TRN	55.71	-16.74	280.228
39 Belfast	TRN	55.00	-17.45	304.503
56 Harrogate	UN	51.43	-21.02	441.840
79 Burnley	UN	51.25	-21.20	449.440
32 Preston	UN	50.31	-22.14	490.180
72 Leeds	UN	45.71	-26.74	715.028
34 London	WP	42.50	-29.95	897.003
50 York	WP	37.50	-34.95	1221.503

Total Scores = 5506.46
 Sample Size = 76
 Mean Score = 72.45
 Sum of Squares = 13252.27
 Variance = 176.70
 Standard Deviation = 13.29

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